

TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARISON OF AL-QAEDA
AND HAMAS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY
SEVİNÇ EBRU TEMEL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE PROGRAM OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

MAY 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer Akder
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts.

Dr. Richard Dietrich
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur (METU, HIST) _____

Dr. Richard Dietrich (METU, HIST) _____

Prof. Dr. Hayriye Erbaş (Ankara Uni., SOS) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name : Sevinç Ebru Temel

Signature :

ABSTRACT

TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARISON OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS

TEMEL, Sevinç Ebru

M.S., Graduate Program of Middle East Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Richard Dietrich

May 2019, 149 pages

The aim of this thesis is to analyze al-Qaeda and Hamas, which are two of the organizations that come to mind when it comes to terrorist activities in Middle East, compare them under headings including their ideologies, goals, spheres of influence, their position in the international arena, and, finally, introduce a new and realistic approach to the perception of terrorism in the Middle East by revealing the mistaken belief and ideas about Hamas. It is seen that there has appeared a tendency of using terrorism side by side with Islam especially due to the bloody terrorist acts of al-Qaeda and that Hamas has been affected with this perception. There are still arguments claiming that Hamas should be included in the list of terrorist organizations, although the perception of it in world public opinion has begun to change after it joined the parliament following its becoming a political party after 2006, and as a result of election victory. Therefore, in this study, it has been attempted to reveal the differences between Hamas, and al-Qaeda, whose terrorist character is so obvious, and which identifies itself with Islam, by comparing the two, and "what Hamas is" and "what it is not" are both examined. This study has revealed

that uniform evaluations made on Hamas with a reductionist approach cannot present an objective analysis, and thus there emerged a need to conduct realistic academic studies which focus on the essence of Hamas that is missing in the literature and is not affected by personal feelings.

Keywords: Terrorism, Hamas, al-Qaeda, Palestinian Issue, Resistance Movement

ÖZ

ORTADOĞU'DA TERÖR: AL-QAEDA VE HAMAS MUKAYESESİ

Temel, Sevinç Ebru

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Programı

Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Richard Dietrich

Mayıs 2019, 149 sayfa

Bu tezin amacı, Ortadoğu'da terör denildiğinde akla gelen yapılardan ikisi olan El-Kaide ve Hamas'ı analiz etmek, ideolojileri, amaçları, etki alanları, uluslararası arenadaki konumları ve güncel durumları başlıkları altında karşılaştırmak ve nihai olarak Hamas hakkında yanlış bilinen nitelikleri ortaya koyarak Ortadoğu'da terör algısına yeni ve gerçekçi bir yaklaşım getirmektir. Özellikle El-Kaidenin kanlı terör eylemleri neticesinde günümüzde İslam ile terörü yan yana hatta iç içe kullanmak gibi bir eğilim geliştiği ve bu algıdan bir direniş hareketi olan hamasın da nasibini aldığı görülmektedir. Her ne kadar 2006 sonrası partileşmesi ve seçim zaferi neticesinde parlamentoda yerini almasının ardından Hamas hakkında dünya kamuoyundaki algı nispeten farklılaşmaya başlamış olsa da hamasın terör örgütü listelerinde yer alması gerektiğini savunan görüşler halen mevcuttur. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada Hamas'ı el kaide gibi terörist niteliği tartışma götürmeyen, kendini İslam'la bir tanımlayan bir örgütle kıyaslamaya tabi tutarak farklılıkları göz önüne serilmeye çalışılmış, hamasın aslında "ne olduğu" ile beraber "ne olmadığı" da incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ile Hamas'a dair şimdiye kadar indirgemeci bir yaklaşımla yapılmış tekdüze değerlendirmelerin makul, gerçekçi ve objektif bir analiz ortaya

koyamayacağı ve bu doğrultuda özellikle Hamas'a dair literatürde eksik kalan öze dönük, hissiyattan uzak gerçekçi akademik çalışmaların gerekliliği de ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Hamas, El-Kaide, Filistin Meselesi, Direniş Hareketi

To My Beloved Family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Richard Dietrich for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragement and insight throughout the research.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents, Ayşe Temel, Hüseyin Vehbi Temel, Serdar Temel for their special encouragement and support for every phase of my educational life. Without them I could not finish this thesis.

I would also like to thank to my friend, Ceylan Ergenoğlu for her support and hospitality throughout my master education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION ABOUT TERRORISM.....	6
3. TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE CONTEXT OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS	13
3.1. What is Al-Qaeda?.....	13
3.1.1. Historical Background of Al-Qaeda	13
3.1.2. Foundation/Founding Fathers	16
3.1.3. Ideology	21
3.1.4. Main Targets and Strategy	27
3.1.5. Organizational Structure	31
3.2. What is Hamas?	40
3.2.1. Historical Background of Hamas.....	40
3.2.2. Foundation / Founding Fathers	41
3.2.3. Ideology	45
3.2.4. Main Targets and Strategy	48
3.2.5. Organizational Structure	51
4. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST	57
4.1. Geographical / Sphere of Influence	57
4.2. Ideological	61
4.3. Based on Targets.....	66

4.4. International Responses	71
4.5. Current Positions	80
5. CONCLUSION	86
REFERENCES	93
APPENDICES	
APPENDIX A: HAMAS CHARTER	101
APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	138
APPENDIX C: TEZ İZİN FORMU/THESIS PERMISSION FORM.....	149

LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure 1.</i> View of al-Qaeda processes which highlight the core functional areas for organizational activity	34
<i>Figure 2.</i> Organizational structure and hierarchy of al-Qaeda.....	35
<i>Figure 3.</i> Hamas's internal structure	56

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UN	United Nations
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The fear of terror, which has been in the forefront throughout the world especially since the 1900s, continues to remain on the agenda with an increasing effect in the 21st century. The notion of terror, which has a long history, has transformed into practices having many different qualities throughout history. It is seen that the terrorist activities, which arose as part of riots against the rulers and the ruling class in the Middle Ages, began to increase as of the 16th and the 17th centuries on the basis of the ideology of nationalism, underwent transformation in the 20th and 21st centuries, and began to be performed on religious grounds. In this process, although there have been Christian-based terrorist organizations such as the Army of God, Nagaland Rebels, Phineas Priesthood ... etc, Jewish-based terrorist organizations such as Gush Emunim Underground, Jewish Defence League, Kach, Kahane Chai, and Sikh terrorist organizations such as Babbar Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force of Khalistan, Khalistan Liberation Front, Islamic terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Islamic Fatah, Hizbut Tahrir have come to the forefront and religious terrorism has been identified with Islamic terrorism.

Even though each of the above-mentioned organizations and the Islamic organizations have differences in terms of their organizational structures, they are all generally put in the same equation, and social movements and/or organizations such as Hamas, which are controversial whether or not they have a terrorist character, are also included in this single classification. For this reason, in this thesis, two organizations, al-Qaeda and Hamas, which differ in terms of their structures and activities, are addressed, and these organizations are analyzed separately while their differences are revealed by means of a comparative method.

This study is important to show that some resistance movements are organizations like Hamas, which can be used to overthrow the identification of Islam with Islamic terrorism. Hamas and al-Qaeda are considered to be on the same category, and their differences are ignored, by almost all the lists of terrorist organizations. There are many studies on the unique organizational structure and activities of Hamas in the literature; however, most of the studies conducted in the academic field generally consider Hamas in the same category with the other terrorist organizations. This thesis also attempts to remedy the lack of studies in this field. This thesis is also important in terms of being a study which has not been conducted in the literature before. In the literature, there are many studies that points out such aspects of Hamas from other organizations, emphasize its aspect of being a social resistance movement, and especially its positioning quite differently from other organizations as a result of the transformation following its election victory in 2006. Some of these studies are the book *Hamas as Social Movement* by Glenn Robinson, the article “Hamas: Past and Present” by John Voll and Amjad Atallah, the book *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence* by Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, the book *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* by Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, and the book *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid* by Roane Carey. Besides, there are also the studies advocating the opinion that Hamas has no peculiarity differentiating it from other organizations and that it should also be considered as a terrorist organization just like the others. The book *What went wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* by Bernard Lewis, the article “Islamikaze and their significance” by Raphael Israeli, the article “Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide Bomber” by John Rosenberger, the book *The Tragedy of the Middle East* by Barry Rubin, and the article “The Psychological Make-up of a Suicide Bomber” by John Lachkar can exemplify the studies in this direction.¹ While there are studies conducted on both Hamas and al-Qaeda and the middle east, this is the first study purporting that Hamas is situated differently, by comparing Hamas and al-Qaeda on the basis of different motives. In this study, we have specially selected al-Qaeda to read the differentiating aspects of Hamas, because we are of the opinion that

¹ Ersin Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, 2008, Ankara, p.12 (footnote).

comparing Hamas with al-Qaeda that is considered as a terrorist organization by the entire international public opinion, with a few exceptional opinions, and that is indicated as one of the reasons why Islam and terrorism are identified will be more effective in revealing what Hamas “is not”.

The main purpose of this thesis is to elucidate what can be considered as terrorism and what is not by presenting different definitions of the concept of terror that have not been clarified so far, and to distinguish Hamas from al-Qaeda whose character as a terrorist organization is recognized by many different communities, by comparing them under the terms "those that are terrorist organizations" and "those that are dissimilar to them".

The methodological framework of the thesis is based on historical analysis, comparative method and content/discourse analysis. Firstly, the different definitions of terrorism will be discussed based on the historical processes, persons, and events relating to terror and terrorism concepts. In addition to the current perception and interpretation ways of terrorism, we will try to understand if these definitions are appropriate for the ideology, targets, and current situations of al-Qaeda and Hamas. The discourse analyses, which are among the most important factors of this study, will not only be presented with the subjective comments of the founders and members of the two organizations that are addressed, but also with the discourses of the third persons/countries/groups that are directly and/or indirectly parties to the issue. By means of the comparative method that is the basic structure of this dissertation, al-Qaeda and Hamas will be comparatively assessed under 5 titles and efforts will be made to reveal their differences. The selection of “geographical sphere of influence”, “ideological stance”, “main objectives”, “international responses”, and “current positions” as the comparison titles is not based on the fact that there is no criterion that reveals the differences of the two organizations, but based on the fact they can give clearer answers to the research question that this study tries to answer; namely, how Hamas differentiates from a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda. The preliminary preparation of the comparative analysis will be the chapter where the two organizations are separately studied and where the two organizations’

foundation, ideologies, objectives, and organizational structures will be dealt with and analyses will then be made for their different aspects.

This study mainly consists of 5 main sections including an introduction and conclusion sections at the end of the study. In the second part of the thesis, different definitions in the literature related to the concept of terror and their interpretation and forms of application in different historical periods are discussed. It is necessary to examine the historical roots of the concept to comprehend what terrorism today corresponds to. For this reason, its emergence in its history of approximately 2000 years, how it was systematized during French Revolution's Reign of Terror, how the understanding of terrorism, which is identified with Islam especially in the Middle East consisting mostly of Muslim societies, is compatible with al-Qaeda but incompatible with Hamas, are going to be analyzed in this section.

In Section 3 of the thesis, a basic framework for Hamas and al-Qaeda is presented. First, the intellectual and conjunctural grounds affecting the emergence of al-Qaeda have been examined, and it has been attempted to analyze how the organization, in a manner identical to Islam, has consolidated itself and created a huge network across the world. This analysis is organized under 4 subheadings. First, the founders of the ideological sub-structure that prepared the foundation of the al-Qaeda is examined, and how such thinkers as Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna affected the ideological framework of al-Qaeda, in the light of such concepts as radical Islam, jihadism, tawhid, takfir and religious principles. Secondly, the ideology which is the main motivation of the existence and the activities of the al-Qaeda is examined, where anti-Zionism, anti-Westernism and anti-Semitic notions and discourses are emphasized. It is also examined how the ideology of the al-Qaeda is identified with Islam and/or is chosen as the point of reference for the movement. In the next subheading, the main objectives and strategies of the terrorist acts of al-Qaeda are discussed; and how they legitimize slaughtering anyone (except for themselves) whom they considered to be an infidel, including Muslims, Christians, Jews and others who have different beliefs and faiths, and how they misinterpret and misuse Islamic texts and the Quran are analyzed. In the next subheading, we examine how the organization of al-Qaeda

operates over a vast geographical region such as the Middle East, the Pacific, East-West-North Africa and South Asia, the groups it is affiliated with, and how its inner structure functions.

In the Section 3 of the thesis, Hamas is also examined based on the same sub-headings under which al-Qaeda was analyzed; the sources of inspiration, the ideas and masterminds that served the existence of Hamas, the ideology pointing to the existence of movement, and the main goals and what kind of strategy it pursues in reaching these goals are analyzed, respectively. At the end of this section, the organizational structure of the organization since its foundation is examined with an emphasis on the aspect of the "social resistance" of the movement.

To provide the main objective of the thesis in comparison/contrast, which is the fourth main section of the thesis, al-Qaeda and Hamas are compared under 5 main headings including geographical qualities/spheres of influence (global/regional), ideological basis (Islamic/national), goals, how they are perceived in world public opinion, and their current positions.

Section five, which is the final part, ends with the conclusions of the thesis. In the conclusion, both the main ideas of the thesis are emphasized and it is concluded that the fact that Hamas has become a political party and has a resistance spirit, operating in the political arena greatly distinguishes it from other organizations, that it is not reasonable to call Hamas a terrorist organization considering a number of qualities it has, as opposed to the general understanding of world public opinion, and that it would be more appropriate to call it a social resistance movement.

CHAPTER 2

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION ABOUT TERRORISM

Although the meaning and definition of terrorism have been studied for centuries, it is still one of the most controversial and complex concepts in social sciences to define, and yet there is no single and universal definition. The well-known term “terrorism”, which is frequently used in daily life, has been studied by many scholars in order to suggest explanations. The main reason for the differences in definitions of terrorism results from the fact that it can change depending on an individual/group or an individual/group that is identified as “terrorists” can be called “freedom fighters” by another individual/group. Therefore, a common definition of terrorism is still not available. Although there are more than 200,000 definitions worldwide, the definition suggested by Albert J. Jongman and Alex P. Schmid is perhaps the most compatible and comprehensive one in practice: “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and the main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audiences), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.”²

² Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988), p. 28.

In order to understand what terrorism is, firstly the origin and evolution (etymology) of the word should be looked up. Linguistically, terrorism is derived from “terror” which means “fear, disturbance, panic and anxiety” in Latin. The word “terror” has 2000-year history and was initially used and heard during the French Revolution. The word terrorism, in and of itself, was coined during the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror (1793-1794). In the reign of terror (Le Gouvernement de la Terreur), a group rebels, the Jacobins, used the term when self-reflexively portraying their own actions in, and explanations of the French Revolution.³ State terror in France, which turned into major violent acts, caused the deaths of, 16,000 to 40,000 people. In addition to state terror utilized by the French government at the end of 1700s, modern-day terrorism began to be used in reference to the killing of people by non-state actors with various motives. This was mainly due to the fact that in the 1800s when the concept of the nation-state began to develop, any kind of counter value, person and movement that the state considered as threats against its national values, independence and integrity was identified as “terrorist” or “terrorism”. For instance, pacific Tibetan Buddhists for the Chinese were called “vicious terrorists”; in Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe described the democratic opposition wing in the country as terrorists. In other words, the exact meaning of political enemy/opposition in that time was terrorist. In fact, terrorism’s being a tool and a technique is the most common aspect of this concept. Contrary to popular belief, this technique/method did not appear in be disseminated via the nationalist movements in the 19th century, it is well-rooted as a concept of “war” in history.

The emergence of the notion of terrorism and its historical use reveal that the emergence of terrorism as a reflection of political violence, though not in the sense of its present use, was with the Jewish partisan group the Sicarii, who rebelled against Roman administration in AD 66-73. Throughout the Middle Ages, suicidal attacks and bloody struggle of the Ismaili and the Naziri religious sects against the Empire of Saladin, and small terrorist groups that resisted the Ottoman army in Albania in the 16th century are among the very first examples.

³ Jonathan Matusitz, *Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction*, (SAGE Publications, 2013).

It is impossible to define terrorism without referring to the conditions, history and cultural context of each period when it is defined. Although terrorist movements have been mainly linked to Marxist ideology in the last 30-40 years, today it is clear that the situation is different in most cases. Marxist terrorist organizations which were dominant worldwide in the last quarter of 1900s are currently the minority, replaced by different terrorist organizations with various motives. This shows that political context and cultural structure are the primary factors shaping the emergence, development and sustainability of the organizations in the field.

Today we see that cultural and religious factors are much more effective in the existence of terrorist organizations than strict political and national motives. Yet this does not mean that modern-day terrorist organizations are not triggered by political national motivations. However, we are witnessing that terrorist organizations, motivated by the former factors in the past, currently consider and use these factors as complementary and component parts. At this point, the transformation of Hamas and al-Qaeda serves as a testimony for this statement and will be elaborated in the following sections.

Essentially, “terrorist organizations (structures)” are conceptually defined as the opposition to state and state apparatuses. An opposition stance and antagonism are in the nature of terrorist organizations. While the state apparatuses are as rational as possible, terrorist groups prefer to use emotional means. This is when International Relations Theories help to analyze the situation. As the realist paradigm suggests, while states often pursue a balance of power based policy, terrorist organizations prefer to reflect their policies and legitimacy of their actions through a moral/spiritual tone –which is often ideological-.⁴

Another factor which has appeared in the historical course of the concept of terrorism is the source of terror in terms of the perpetrator. The concept of terror which used to be state-violence was initially identified as top-down terror, yet today it is defined as bottom-up terror depending on the current strategic principles and

⁴ Edited by Gerard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin, *“The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda”*, University of California Press, London, 2007, p. 6.

perpetrators. The top-down definition of terrorism, which can also be defined as state-terrorism, means that either terrorist activities are conducted by a state itself, or the persons committing terrorist activities are backed by a state. The top-down terror approach, which is used in reference to totalitarian regimes such as Syria, Libya and Iran, is well reflected in the military strategies of this type of state and government. For instance, the military concept of “strategic bombing” is intentionally designed as a completely systematic means of mass destruction against the state. One of the most striking examples of this is undoubtedly the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks.

Many academicians, politicians and analysts emphasize that, especially from mid-1900s, the meaning of terrorism has dramatically changed and developed a new identity. This up-to-date concept which is called “New Terrorism”, consists of different objectives, tactics and activities with different motivations and actors.⁵ An interesting approach to the problem of defining terrorism was taken by two Dutch researchers from the university of Leiden, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. They collected 109 academic and official definitions of terrorism and analyzed them in search for their main components. They found that the element of violence was included in 83.5 percent of the definitions and political goals in 65 percent, while 51 percent emphasized the element of inflicting fear and terror. Only 21 percent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting, and only 17.5 percent included the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals or outsiders.⁶

In many societies, terrorism is considered as a fundamental threat to peace, stability and even daily life. However, many activities that directly threaten social life are not clearly defined as terrorism by everyone. In this respect, the very first step to understand terrorism is to clearly identify what extremism is. Extremism basically can be defined as “radical”, “extreme level” and “ultra” in terms of mentality and

⁵ Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’” , *Peace Conflict & Development*, Vol. 8, (January 2006), p. 2.

⁶ Edited by Gerard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin, “The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda”, University of California Press, London, 2007, p.14.

political issues. In this sense, terrorism has usually been considered as the embodied form of actions of extremism as the terrorists go into actions of violence against different religions, nations, interests or groups by legitimizing extremist thoughts and opinions. It is possible to call extremism a “precursor for terrorism”. Briefly, extremism is an overarching belief system terrorists use to justify their violent behavior.⁷ Although extremism, itself as a bridge for terrorism, leads to different actions, its common characteristics can be listed under 4 titles:

1. Intolerance
2. Moral absolutes
3. Broad conclusions
4. New language and
5. Conspiratorial belief

Without doubt, intolerance is one of the most distinguishing features of the extremist system of thought and behavior due to the fact that pro-extremist individuals or groups believe that anyone or anything embracing a pattern of thought or behavior other than what they believe should not be given any space to live. Moreover, they legitimize themselves and their thoughts by underlining the mistakes/wrongness of the opposite party. For instance; during the Cold War, the American President was referred to, by the pro-US camp, as “the leader of the free World” and by Latin American Marxists as the embodiment of “Yankee imperialism”.⁸

Moral absolutes, as the second main characteristic, refers to the fact that according to extremists, the distinction between good-bad, beautiful-ugly, right-wrong is crystal clear and not negotiable. Their priority is to make what they believe “good”, “right”, “beautiful” and superior, and force others to embrace it. Regardless of the type of terrorist organization/extremist group acting in line with either religious, social, cultural or psychological motives, the main triggering factor is that they

⁷ Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, (California, 2014), p. 3.

⁸ Ibid, p. 4.

unconditionally act in accordance with what they believe and mobilize the masses in this way.

Another distinctive characteristic is that they completely categorize the people or the things they are against as the “enemy” and reject any kind of objective data or change that might create a difference in what they believe.

Finally, to demonize “the other” through the language and discourse they created and to emphasize the legitimacy of any means of massacre, conspiracy, attack is yet another characteristic of extremism.

According to İhsan Bal who analyses terror and terrorism as products of the modern age, terrorism can be interpreted in three waves. While the ones who deviated towards the direction of terrorism among the 19th century workers’ movement and anarchists form the first wave, the ones who used terror as a tool in their struggle for independence during 20th century and terrorist actions and strategies during the Cold War period constitute the second wave. The third wave of terrorism is the current form of global terrorism which is still being utilized.⁹

One of the most critical points to understand the effects, outputs and most importantly the existence/nature of terrorist actions is to accurately address the targets and objectives of terrorism. According to Gus Martin, terrorism has 4 typical objectives. The first one is “changing existing order”. Regardless of the fact whether it is either nationalism, religion or internationally-motivated terrorist action, this objective is mainly fixed. As the main motivation leading the persons or groups engaged with terrorist actions to show a tendency in this way is that they could not find any response to their demands in the existing order, so they would replace it with such a new order that it created a living space for their demands and ideals. For instance; for a terrorist organization acting on ethnic grounds, they often request independent status or legal claim. On the other hand, for a religion-oriented terrorist

⁹ İhsan Bal, *Terörizm: Terör, Terörizm ve Küresel Terörle Mücadelede Ulusal ve Belgesel Deneyimler*, 2006, Ankara, p.7.

organization, they mainly request to make their holy/sacred values the engine of their new order they establish from the ground up.

The second typical objective is directly related to a terrorism objective which is to create psychological destruction by means of extreme violence rather than creating a concrete effect. This often paves the way for the values that terrorists or terrorist organizations are trying to impose on the society to be also adopted in the state of chaos by leading the people to think about and become confused between the concepts of strong and weak, guilty and innocent.

The third objective is an extension of the second objective. The main motive in the terrorist acts, especially against the state or the government, is to reveal the weakness and inabilities of the states/governments thanks to their actions and consequently to trigger movements against the existing social order. So, it would not be wrong to also identify the third objective as “social disruption”. In this context, metro attacks, shopping center bombing, attack at the airport due to security gaps are the main examples. The final objective is all inclusive and can be referred as “creating a revolutionary environment”. The persons or groups conducting terrorist actions for this purpose will eventually start to embrace a revolutionary spirit towards the deaths and the deteriorated order thanks to the propaganda they formed; which will make it easier to overthrow the existing order by the support of public/individuals. Especially in Turkey, it is observed that PKK, both in its mountain and city structures, prioritize this objective and frequently refer to it in their revolution propaganda.

Within the scope of this study, I will try to reveal that considering the history of terror definitions, al-Qaeda can be identified in the light of these definitions, yet Hamas is quite far away from this stance.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE CONTEXT OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS

3.1. What is Al-Qaeda?

3.1.1. Historical Background of Al-Qaeda

Compared to other Islamic- based terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda acts as a threat not only against the West and the Jews, but also against Muslims who keep out of the mainstream Islamist structure. In what way al-Qaeda interprets and misuses Islam to legitimize its actions should be analyzed in detail.

Islam, in the eyes of al-Qaeda, is a structure more than a religion. In as much as, according to the ideology of al-Qaeda, Islam is beyond a body of eternal rules, it is the strict and mandatory body of rules which dominates all social and political concepts in daily life. In this sense, characterizing al-Qaeda as a “political Islamist” organization seems to be logical. The main problem in classifying such terrorist organizations is to get an answer to this knotty question: “How do you interpret Islamism?”. There is a widely-accepted perception that the concept of Islamism is interpreted and used in an anti-Western and anti-modern sense. According to this point of view, a group of minority communities identifying themselves with Islam allows and supports the use of all forms of terrorist activities and violence against the West in order to achieve their goals. Sometimes Islamism is also used as Islamic Fundamentalism as it also refers to extremism in this respect. The main notions

emphasized in such a use are the “radical” and “militant” aspect of Islam¹⁰. In contrast with this understanding, Islam is the “religion” and “state (dawla)” according to certain scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi who served to form the idea of Islamism and Muslims in many parts of the world following them. There is no distinction between religion and politics/state and Islam is a complete comprehensive way of life.¹¹ In other words, Islamists admit that this movement that they have been following does not accept Islam solely as a religion. They also consider Islam, far away from extremism and militancy, as a part of all societal dynamics and especially politics. This is precisely the point where Islamists are contrasted with the Western modernism and its perception of politics.

Even though the Western countries reject Islamism on account to the fact that Islam and Islamism cannot get on well with their own ideology and modern democratic principles, many references exist indicating that Islamism may square with democracy and not to have an aggressive/offensive image. However, if Islamism enables the one and /or the party to take ultimate authority over by a democratic election to impose its own rules/order and to block calling elections again, then it turns into a remarkable threat. But if an Islamist ruling party is conscious that it owes to its success to the public support and sustains the current position and political system by elections, Islamism ceases to be a threat. That is to say, the main problem here is how to define Islamism which mostly used in pejorative meaning. Undoubtedly, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are the primary example of an extreme and unfavorable instance.¹²

According to common interpretations in the literature, al-Qaeda is not made up of an entire/monolithic organization but an ideology or idea-based community composed of weak networks. If not so, by the end of the Soviet invasion of

¹⁰ Peter R. Demant, *Islam Vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World*, (London, 2006), p. 89, 90.

¹¹ John O. Voll, “Political Islam and the State”, *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*. Ed. by John L. Esposito, Emad El-din Shahin, (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 61-62.

¹² Richard Whelan, *El-Kaidecilik: İslam'a Tehdit, Dünya'ya Tehdit*, Ankara, 2006, p. 19.

Afghanistan al-Qaeda would have been eliminated. As a matter of fact, with the death of Usama bin Laden and arrest/exile/killing of militants from the core structure of the organization, al-Qaeda should have broken up. The whole story indicates that it is more than an ordinary terrorist organization. Al-Qaeda conducts its actions as an upper structure providing finance, network, military needs, equipment, education and technology. It does not have any headquarters, or a leader to carry out its activities single-handedly. Indeed, al-Zawahiri is nothing but a symbolic figure. However existing terrorist organizations largely differ in such features.

Based on the definition of terror and terrorism, many distinct comments on the essence of al-Qaeda have been expressed. For instance, Hoffman stated that,

Al-Qaeda is an ideology more than an army; a transnational movement and umbrella-like organization, not a monolithic entity. It uses professional terrorists, closely linked to the al-Qaeda command-and-control nucleus, for spectacular, highly lucrative strikes such as 9/11, the 1998 embassy bombings etc.¹³

Rosenau stated that,

Al-Qaeda is a worldview, not an organization. Like the anti-globalization movement, al-Qaeda is made up of a politically, nationally and ethnically diverse group of militants who do not agree on everything but subscribe in general terms to an ideology.¹⁴

As stated above, the common emphasis is on the idea that al-Qaeda, rather than a monolithic organism, is a way of thinking/perception and ideology. By both the definition of terrorism I principally refer to in the first part and the interpretations on the structure of al-Qaeda mentioned so far, this study also defend the similar explanations. In my opinion, al-Qaeda, without doubt, is a logically-organized terrorist structure and involved in various bloody terrorist activities throughout the world. However, it differs from either other Islamic-based terror groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or non-Islamic terror groups in Europe and the world over as well. In this sense, comprehending its ideology and outlook has much importance. Thus, in the following part of this study, the foundation/founding

¹³ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 15, 16.

fathers, ideology, main targets, tactics and finance of al-Qaeda will be analyzed deeply.

3.1.2. Foundation/Founding Fathers

Although the center/core ideology of Al-Qaeda was not shaped by a single theologian, thinker or ideologist, those who served in the formation of Al-Qaeda were influenced by the ideas of many Islamic scholars and thinkers and they reflected those ideas on the future of the movement. Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb and Hasan El- Banna were some of them. Although, it is difficult to say that all claims of these ideologists were accepted by al-Qaedaists, their arguments were mostly the milestone to form the ideological framework of the al-Qaeda.

Ibn Taymiyya has been adopted by modern-day radicals. At the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, his political statements and Islamic views affected the following Islamist thinkers and some Islamic terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya was seen by many as the founder of revolutionary Sunni Islam. Because of being a strict conservative and having Sunni character, his point of views grew out of oppositional pivot which included both non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims. His fundamental argument was the impossibility of separating society, state and religion (Islam). This shows that secularism in existing meaning was not possible for him.¹⁵ Moreover, he advocated the purification of Islam and restoration of the Islam's glory as in the time of Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs. Also, the distinction between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb was also declared by him and to actualize this opinion, he considered it possible to use 'fetwas' against unbelievers. Being a follower of Hanbali Fiqh and shaping the radical Islamic thinking with his fatwas, Ibn Taymiyyah differs from other Muslim

¹⁵ Richard Whelan, *Al-Qaedaism / The Threat to Islam, The Treat to the World*, (Irelans, Ashfield Press, 2005), p. 44, 45.

scholars to a great extent in his different opinions about the khawarij¹⁶. Claiming that he takes as reference what the Prophet Muhammad said on this matter during his period, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that Muslims may not opt to worship, read the Quran, perform salah, and fast together with a khawarij. As a matter of fact, although the khawarij declare themselves Muslims, this is not a sincere declaration in the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Quran does not speak to their hearts; thus, whoever fights against and kills them will be in glory in the hereafter.¹⁷ By virtue of this opinion, Ibn Taymiyyah would, later on, be considered by some people as the spiritual leader of modern Islamic terrorism. Ibn Taymiyyah focused his radical fatwa regarding kharijite especially on the Mongols. Upon the invasion of Syria by the Mongols several times, he even strived to make believe and convince his real Muslim followers that the Mongols were more diabolic and serious targets than the khawarij; that they must absolutely fight against them, and that this is the duty of every real Muslim. Hence, he said during his conversation with the Mongolian King Ghazan “You have your cadis, imams, and sheikhs and you claim to be Muslims, but you make war on Muslims.” He actually meant that “you are not real Muslims, Islam does not reflect on your spirit, mind, and practices; therefore, you cannot be regarded as Muslims and you are the inevitable targets of jihad.” Although the Mongolian King Ghazan became a Muslim in 1295 and encouraged his people, he, as you can see, was not a real Muslim in the sight of Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah even used this against the Mongols to try to declare them heretic in the eyes of

¹⁶ The school of Khawarij (Havaric) appeared once the appointment of the caliph was left to the judge after the Battle of Siffin between Prophet Ali and Muawiye (Hijra 37/Gregorian 657). In this case, a group of people started to struggle against him acclaiming that those who had committed a sin by rebelling against Prophet Ali would be abandoned from the religion and the state leaders who had committed sin would not be obeyed, and martyred him. Those ideas of Khawarij, which may be perceived as preserving religious provisions in the first plan but open to subjective evaluations, constitutes the first seeds of anarchy in Islamic society. The school of Khawarij initially appeared as a movement that was supported and obeyed by illiterate and ignorant public and the bedouins who were unable to adopt to the disciplined city life, and there were less or more follower in each period and the Ibaziyye branch of this sect has arrived till our days. Nowadays, Ibazis are mainly living in Northern Africa, Madagascar, Zanzibar and Umman Sultanate. As it only depends on the evidence of Quran, according to followers of Sunnah there are certain different fiqh thoughts as well. (Retrieved from <http://www.islamveihsan.com/haricilik-nedir-hariciler-kimdir.html>) (For further information see “İslam İlmihali 1, TDV Yayınları, 2002”).

¹⁷ Johannes J.G. Jansen, “Ibn Taymiyyah and the Thirteenth Century: A Formative Period of Modern Muslim Radicalism”, *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, Vol. 5/6, Gli Arabi nella Storia: Tanti Popoli una Sola Civiltà (1987-1988), p.392.

Muslims based on the allegation that Mongols were not implementing the Sharia Law, but were maintaining their own traditional rules and provisions.¹⁸ Such that, the penalty of a “renegade” or a “hypocrite” must be much severer than that of a non-Muslim according to Ibn Taymiyyah.¹⁹ These fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah greatly shaped radical Islamic thinking; however, it predominantly had an impact on Al-Qaeda ideology. It is observed that Al-Qaeda ideology was put into practice under the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and we know that he declared “outsiders”, “other Muslims”, and “non-true believers” as heretics and portrayed as targets. By inspiring from Ibn Taymiyya’s claims, al-Qaedaists has considered the fetwas to ask for jihad against everything opposed to Islam and Islamic rule.

The other prominent Islamist figure whose opinions influenced the birth of al-Qaedaism was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He was the founder of Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. During the 18th century, Wahhabi movement as a Sunni attempt for revival of Islam affected the Middle Eastern countries and other Islamic areas all around the world. Major claims of Wahhabism are the same with Ibn Taymiyya and it could be summarized with one concept: “the purification of Islam”. Wahhabism led by Muhammad ibn Abd Al- Wahhab merged its power with the political wing, Muhammad Al-Suud in 1774. Since that time, Wahhabism has been regarded as a radical Islamist political organization rather than a religious movement.²⁰ Wahhabism is still the formal state ideology and religious root of Saudi Arabia. In terms of al-Qaeda, the understanding of ‘tawhid’ (oneness of God) and ‘jihad’ were inspired by al-Qaeda. Both Taliban and al-Qaeda fulfill their goals in accordance with the doctrines of Wahhabism. As an interesting postscript, it should be kept in mind that the Saudi Arabia is one of the only three nations which maintained diplomatic relations with Taliban. Besides, Saudi Arabia’s support to al-

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 394.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 395.

²⁰ Roger Hardy, “Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and The War on Terror” in *Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers*, ed. By Madawi Al-Rasheed, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 106.

Qaeda is the other controversial topic.²¹ Except for the al-Qaeda and Taliban, Wahhabism, due to its radical Islamist Sunni character, form the mental background of any Islamic oppositional movements in different regions, countries such as central Asia, Russia and the Caucasus.

Another significant figure was Mawlana Mawdudi. He was an Islamist thinker and political activist as well. He established the Jamaat-Islami in Pakistan in 1940s to eliminate state and social crisis in those years, because he believed that the only way to struggle against daily problems was the revival of Islam and living in accordance with Islamic rule, since the law and order of Allah are for all humanity as a rescuer. As some scholars argue, Mawlana Mawdudi formed the modern style Islamist political theory and pioneered for following thinkers, activists. His ideology was more than a religious attempt, because he claimed that the “Theo-democracy” was an alternative and the best system in administration. To al-Qaeda, Mawdudi’s Jamaat-i Islami movement was a reference to accuse western countries and their imperial desires of declining the Muslim Power. As it has been already mentioned above, this argument of Jamaat-i Islami’s became the main allegation of al-Qaeda.²² Mawdudi argues that the state and governmental order that the modern world called “Jahiliyya” must be abolished, and that the only way to do this is to insist on “Sharia”. He also asserts that the modern world ideologies such as secularism, liberal democracy, socialism and fascism prioritize the supremacy of certain ideas and persons instead of the messages and doctrines of Allah and the Prophet; which deteriorates the values of Muslim world.²³ According to Mawdudi, it is one of the main objectives of the West to govern the countries where the Muslims intensively populated in accordance with those ideologies. Therefore, it is inevitable that any

²¹ James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*, (New York, Facts on File Inc, 2004), p. 276, 277.

²² Faisal Devji, *The Terrorist in Search of Humanity*, (London, Hurts Publisher, 2008), p. 133,134.

²³ “Abul Ala Maududi” , [www. Counterextremism.com/extremists/abul-ala-maududi](http://www.Counterextremism.com/extremists/abul-ala-maududi) accessed on 22.03.2017.

state, ideology or system become the target unless they are not far away from Sharia, Allah's commands and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) the influential Egyptian ideologue of Islamism, was also known as the founding father of the militant jihad. Due to its aforesaid feature, Al-Qaeda, as inspired by him, has conducted its jihadist actions. From 1930s to 1960s, Qutb wrote many books and in these books he pointed out the importance of Islamic jihad, its contents and its role in the world. Furthermore, he applied the term 'Islamic Jihad' as not a defensive action or movement but a defensive war. This explanation indicates the degree of radical attitude of Sayyid Qutb.²⁴ Sayyid Qutb has been particularly concerned about the role of Islam in the state and society. He essentially followed the ideologies of certain preceding Islamists such as Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) and yet he put the emphasis on a different aspect. He not only drew the attention, as his predecessors, to Western hegemony in Muslim geography, European imperialism, Zionism and Western cultural invasion but he also emphasized that by way of returning to self and self-criticism, Muslims confronted the corrupted politics as well as cultural structures and ideas in their own countries and abolished them. He firmly criticized the secularism in his featured books "In the Shade of Qur'an (Fi Zilal al-Qur'an)", "Milestones (Ma'alim Fi al-Tariq)" and "This Religion of Islam" and argued that secularism should be replaced by Sharia that represents the justice and administration system of Allah and emphasized the idea of "the sovereignty of God over the earth".²⁵

The last but not the least important Islamic figure was Hasan al-Banna (1906-49). Even he was educated in accordance with Sunni religious discipline, he substantially acquired western knowledge. He founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 and tried to cope with Egyptian problems by gathering society around this organization. For him, the main problem of his time was the westernization and the ruling elites' western oriented point of views. That's why Muslim Brotherhood

²⁴ Dale C. Eikmeier, "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism" *Parameters*, (Spring 2007), p.85-98.

²⁵ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam*, (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1,2.

implemented more democratic movement by being part of democratic arenas at the first half of the 20th century.²⁶ But even though having democratic features, The Muslim Brotherhood also acted as a “training ground” for radicals.

3.1.3. Ideology

It is essential to initially analyze the mentality, beliefs and ideology of Al-Qaeda militants to better understand the nature of their terrorist actions.

Al-Qaeda typically grounds its ideology with anti-Zionist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic discourses. In addition, many Islamic wings have their share from al-Qaeda’s hatred activities as well. According to this ideology that calls all sects and practices except those of Sunni Islam “deviant”, the slaying of an US citizen or a Shia is equally obligatory to a certain extent. Following this fact, it is possible to state that the milestones of al-Qaeda ideology mainly found its roots in Islam and Islamism, yet it differs significantly from the usual meaning of these concepts.

The first step to take in understanding the al-Qaeda ideology is to understand Islam and Islamism. Considering which concepts they prefer to identify with Islam and Islamism, it is apparent that the concept of “Jihad” is in the first rank. As it is not possible to make a single definition for Jihad and Islamism, the most important point is to explain when and in what meanings we need to refer to those concepts and “how it is misinterpreted”. For al-Qaeda militants, Jihad has only one meaning which the Holy War. However, many Islamic scholars emphasize that Jihad has two intertwined meanings: the struggle against the self and the struggle in the name of Allah. In fact in Quran, Jihad is also explained by referring to many different meanings which are recognizing and loving the Creator; resisting the pressure of parents, peers and society; staying on the straight path steadfastly; striving for religious deeds; having the courage and steadfastness to convey the message of Islam; defending Islam and the community; helping friends who may not be Muslim; removing treacherous rulers from power; defending all of the above through

²⁶ Uri M.Kupferschmidt, “Reformist and Militant Islam in Urban and Rural Egypt”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, (1987), p. 414, 415, 416, 417, 418

preemptive strikes; winning the freedom to inform, educate and convey the message of Islam in an open and free environment; and thus freeing people from tyranny.²⁷ The al-Qaeda mentality only refers to “the struggle in the name of Allah” part of Jihad movement and distort the real meaning to legitimize its actions. It is crystal clear that al-Qaeda militants do not refer to many of the above-mentioned meanings of Jihad which is originally and deeply analyzed in Quran. On the contrary to the Islamic motto “There is no compulsion in religion”, the militants of this organization consider that there is no harm in proselytizing and protecting the Islamic religion by force of arms.

If we better understand the six main principles of Jihad (inferred by the Holy Book Quran) listed below which are stated in Rohan Gunaratna’s book titled “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror” we may clearly see that how far away al-Qaeda militants from the true Jihad.

1. Jihad is for the sake of Allah, not for the sake of wealth, goods, fame, glory or power;
2. Obedience to the imam;
3. Avoid misappropriating booty;
4. Respect pledges of protection;
5. Manifest endurance under attack;
6. Avoid corruption ²⁸

As it is understood from the principles, Jihad practice in Islam has quite clear borders which are absent in al-Qaeda actions. For instance, most of the victims of al-Qaeda terrorist actions are the unarmed innocents including the women, children, elderly and the disabled who have no power to resist despite the common Islamic belief that the children, elderly, women and the disabled shall not be killed even during the Jihad. In this sense, it could be interpreted as the high cadres in al-Qaeda

²⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York, 2003), p. 112, 113.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 113.

structure misinterpret and mispresent the message/the word of God for their own political interests.

The concept of Jihad, which can generally be expressed as "fighting for the sake of God," has been at the center of every radical Islamist ideology. The reason why it is of such crucial importance is not only because jihad is a justifiable war against non-Muslim people, groups, nations, or states, but also because it is considered permissible against the groups within Islam itself.

Although the notion of Jihad has made impact in the world public than in the past with Medieval Crusades in the historical process, the roots of Jihad practices date back to the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca. The community that was formed and obeyed to the Prophet Muhammad in the middle of the seventh century after Muhammad's hegira from Mecca to Medina in 622 were the architects of the first activities for the spreading of Islam.²⁹ Although there are differences between today's understanding of Jihad and theirs in practice, the efforts of this community have been the beginning of Islamic jihad with the aim of spreading the commands of Allah and the teachings of the prophets and establishing a world order in the light of these teachings and commands. Even though there had been attempts for the preservation and spreading of Islam in the period from the time of Muhammad until the establishment of the modern nation-state order after the Westphalia Agreement in 1648, the perception of "enemy" and the perception of struggle for the sake of Jihad of the Islamic ideology began to take form with Medieval Crusades.

Although, the roots of Jihad practices date back to the Medieval Crusades, it is known that Abd el-Kader declared Jihad in 1832 against the French colonial powers occupying Algeria. However, the main characteristic of Jihad practice of that time was that it has a very "defensive" nature and cannot be declared without a serious threat or intervention against Islam and Muslims. The possible question is that while the current and historical understanding of Jihad is similar to what is written in Quran as explained above, how do al-Qaeda militants have different practices and whom and what do they refer to? Here comes the stage Abdul Ala Maududi, one of

²⁹ Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices*, (Princeton, 2006), p. 15.

the founding fathers of al-Qaeda. Indian-born Pakistani ideologue, Abdul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) is the first person who conceptualized and explained the Jihad in a political context which is quite different than the explanation in Quran and by the predecessors. According to Maududi's perception of Jihad, this concept has more than a "defensive" characteristics. Jihad is a way to provide freedom of religion (also for non-Muslims) and establish fair governance and religious government. In this sense, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1956) who were impressed by Maududi's readings and shaped the worlds/intellects of the founders of the al-Qaeda organization served for the Jihad movement by shifting the political context of the Jihad and putting it into practice. 30

Although al-Qaeda made quite a name for Usama bin Laden, the establishment and conceptualization of al-Qaeda on an intellectual basis was thanks to Abdullah Azzam. Abdullah Azzam is known as one of the ideologists who used and interpreted the global Jihad in today's context. He embraced the idea of calling for Jihad all around the world and fighting for it all the way.³¹ He particularly emphasized the importance of spreading the Jihad on a global scale via the newsletters, information notes, tapes, videos by making the use of technology. This is precisely the point that forms the intellectual basis of this expansive network to be established by al-Qaeda in the future and opens the door into new methods carrying the teachings of Jihad one step forward. Usama bin Laden and his advisors, al-Zawahiri and al-Turabi improved the al-Qaeda ideology which was initially developed by Usama bin Laden and took it a step further to establish a world-wide terrorist network. Although initially there were different opinions among the manager and advisor cadres of the organization, in the final analysis there was a common basis for its ideology. Unlike the terrorist struggles and actions against the non-Muslim population or governments, the al-Qaeda ideology is not in favor of regional, small scale resistance or actions. Bin Laden aimed at having the support of the large-scale political radical Muslims through his anti-Western and anti-Israeli discourse and successfully reached his objective. Additionally, starting from the

³⁰ Ibid, p. 114.

³¹ Jarnet M. Brachman, "*Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*", (New York, 2009), p. 112.

second half of 20th century, many different nationalities were present among the al-Qaeda militants while other groups such as Hezbollah only consisted of Lebanese communities, and Islamic Jihad only consisted of Egyptians. This was mainly due to Bin Laden's desire to establish a widespread terror network. 32

It is obvious that the concept of Jihad is the key and the corner stone for al-Qaeda ideology. However, how Islam is referred to and interpreted on the route to Jihad should be taken into consideration. According to Bin Laden, Islam was not a tool but rather a goal to reach the political targets. Contrary to popular belief, the main objective was to achieve the true Islam and its common practices by pushing the political targets to forefront. In this context, the main message of Bin Laden frequently conveyed to the Muslims all around the world was that all "Muslims are wrong and sinful until the Western powers, especially the US, completely withdraw from the territories where the Muslim society exists. It is the first duty of all Muslims to struggle against this situation to free from this sin". This discourse was used during various occupation periods including Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan³³.

In the Al-Qaeda ideology, it is necessary to join the Jihad movement against the non-Muslims as a requirement of the Islam religion and being Muslim. For joining the Jihad movement, there are eight reasons to join Jihad which are listed below:

1. So that nonbelievers do not dominate
2. Because of the scarcity of manpower
3. Because of the fear of hellfire
4. To fulfill the duty of Jihad and responding to all the calls of Allah
5. To follow the footsteps of pious predecessors
6. To establish a solid foundation as a base for Islam
7. To protect those who are oppressed in the land

³² Ibid, p. 116.

³³ Rohan Guaratna's interview with an Al Qaeda member, November 2011. For further information see: Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York, 2003).

8. To seek martyrdom.³⁴

The implementation of the Al-Qaeda ideology and the world-wide support for Al-Qaeda were mainly initiated by 3 fatwas declared by Usama bin Laden in August 1996, February 1997 and February 1998. During the conference held in August 1996, he obviously revealed the situation by stating as follows:

It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustices imposed upon them by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators to the extent that the Muslims' blood has become the cheapest in the eyes of the "world", and their wealth has become as loot, in the hands of their enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qian, Lebanon, are still fresh in our memories. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, Ogden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken place, massacres that sent shivers through the body, and shake the conscience. All this – and the world watched and heard, and not only did they not respond to the atrocities, but also, under a clear conspiracy – between the USA and its allies, under the cover of the iniquitous "United Nations" – the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. The people of Islam awakened, and realized that they were the main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance. And all the false claims and propaganda about "human rights" were hammered down and exposed for what they were, by the massacres that had taken place against the Muslims in every part of the world.³⁵

The final objective of the Jihad movement would be the foundation of an Islamic State and an Islamic Universal Order in the light of the Quran and Prophet's messages.

The concept of "martyrdom" is one of the complementary parts of al-Qaeda mentality. Every person who is deemed worthy of this position and fights for this ultimate cause is a true Muslim and believer, and Allah would reward them. This is the key notion of al-Qaeda ideology and reaching the level of "martyr" is the highest position to achieve.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Pierre Tristam, "Bin Laden's Declaration of War on the United States, 1996", <https://www.thoughtco.com/bin-laden-declare-war-on-us-2353589> accessed on 18.09.2017.

It is obvious that they pursued a Machievallist policy to eliminate any obstacle on the route to the true Islam as any action for the organization's principles is legitimate regardless of its being moral or non-moral action. There is no limit for the scale of violence and there is also no power to push a limit. Therefore, they are not open for any kind of dialogue, peace talks and negotiations. Sitting around the same table with the group that they define as "the others" is interpreted as being one of "them", being infidel and opposing to Allah's orders.³⁶

3.1.4. Main Targets and Strategy

Undoubtedly, it is necessary for al-Qaeda, as well as other terrorist organizations, to have an enemy to justify their own existence. In this manner, al-Qaeda proves its identity as "the true believer" by referring to the existence of "the infidels". The aforementioned reference practice results in a wave of hatred that is often worrying and surprising for the West. Bernard Lewis, generalizing all Muslims on this issue, states that the minority called "fundamentalists" often bears extreme hostility towards certain interests, movements, policies and even countries and completely rejects Western civilization.³⁷

Bernard Lewis' generalizing claim that all the Muslims target the west and the western civilization on the basis of the al-Qaeda does not seem to be fully comprehensive. The distinction between al-Qaeda's "true believers" and "infidels" shows that the goals of the organization are shaped by this distinction, and not only the western, but also other non-Muslims, and even Muslims who have not been considered one of them have also been affected by the activities of the terrorist organization.

Al Qaeda's goals, which target people, groups or states from different geographical regions of the world with different motives, can be classified in two groups. Al-

³⁶ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York, 2003), p. 98, 99.

³⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), p.24, 25.

Qaeda's objectives can be divided into two (2) groups as of the short-term and the long-term objectives. One of the long-term objectives was to re-establish the Sunni Caliphate that was abolished by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 20th century in Turkey and to designate Usame bin Laden to serve as the Caliph. According to this mentality, the Islamic Caliphate to be restored would cover not only the Ottoman-legacy territories but also the Gulf and the Middle East region (including the Shia countries) as well as Spain, France, Italy, Sicily, Hungary, the Balkan States, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Crimea, the majority of Anatolia and Asia and the Northern Africa.³⁸ It would not be wrong to underline that this is the most important long-term objective that has determined all the road maps of al-Qaeda since the idea of restoring the Caliphate on such a vast geography requires a total change, genocide and mass movement. In this context, any inhumane means of destruction leading to absolute victory could be acceptable and practical for the al-Qaeda ideologists and militants. The new order to be established by restoring the Caliphate would be a kind of world referring to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions in the 7th century, which would make it "the ideal".³⁹ It was planned that firstly, any kind of union such as the UN, NATO, EU that was established by or through the West would be abolished and secondly, all Muslim movements and regimes would also be demolished so that there would be no power left to impede the Islamic Caliphate. Moreover, the secular Muslims who are not considered as the real Muslims but the "sinful" Muslims must be killed. Therefore, the killing of these people for the sake of the Islamic Caliphate would not be a kind of ferocious act but, instead, considered as the jihad for the sake of "the true Islam".

Besides the desire for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate at the top, another long-term objective of the al-Qaeda is to demolish democracy which is considered as a threat to Islam, remove all the freedoms of women who are subordinate both in the presence of Allah and in society, abolish the secularism and replace it with the Sharia Law, to destroy the State of Israel in particular, and the Jews in general, and US citizens in particular and the Christians in general, and to abolish the secular

³⁸ Richard Whelan, *El-Kaidecilik: İslam'a Tehdit, Dünya'ya Tehdit*, (Ankara, 2006), p. 109.

³⁹ Daniel Pipes, "Militant Islam Reaches America", W. W. Norton & Company.

Republic of Turkey that is an outcome of the republican modernization initiated by Atatürk in Turkey after 1923.

The typical characteristic of the above-mentioned objectives is that any kind of phenomenon belonging to the West and related with Western values in general is strictly rejected and all of them are considered as “anti-Islamic” phenomenon.

Considering that objectives and activities are two ends of the same plane, the declaration of the Jihad to fight against all the values that are accepted as threats against Islam and the assumption that the tendency to acts of violence is the only language the West understands are the inevitable conclusions.⁴⁰ As it is considered as a threat to Islam, none of the above-mentioned items identified as a target reflect a compromise culture and seem to be of a character that can be resolved by dialogue. Therefore, violence and fundamentalism are the most effective means of breaking down the order and creating an atmosphere of fear for al-Qaeda, which sets targets for those issues which the partners would never compromise.

After understanding the extremely clear objectives of an ambiguous structure like al-Qaeda, it is necessary to analyze the strategies to reach these objectives. I already emphasize that the Jihad is the primary strategy; in fact, it is not only the strategy but also the ideology. However, how they assign a meaning and serve the Jihad to the public is a key point to analyze.

Although a distinction is made between greater and lesser Jihad, according to several ideologists who have interpretations on the notion of Jihad and the ones in Quran, there is no such distinction when the practice of the ideology of al-Qaeda is considered. It is seen that the lesser Jihad, which includes the struggle against imperialism, infidels, Zionism, comes to the forefront, while the greater Jihad, which is the struggle against the nafs⁴¹, has not been stressed in the activities declared by

⁴⁰ Jason Burke; “Think Again: Al-Qaeda”, *Foreign Policy*, (Mayıs/Haziran 2004), retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/think-again-al-qaeda-4/> accessed on 06.02.2018.

⁴¹ “The word Nafs in the Qur’an, when referring to the human being, has been used in basically two different but closely related meanings. One simply means ‘a person’ and with a stretch of definition

al-Qaeda to be conducted for the purpose of Jihad. As it is not possible to encounter any indication of the struggle against personal desires in any activity of the al-Qaeda groups, yet it is highly likely that every act of terror reflects the belief that the Islam obliges all Muslims to proselyte Islam by using the sword, blood, war and tyranny. As long as al-Qaeda continues to proselyte Islam by using the sword, it is geographically supported by the close and long-distance communities. The goal of the al-Qaeda mentality –rather than murder, injury, threat and fear- is to declare to the world that it is able. Indeed, the main objective of 9/11 attacks was –instead of killing 2,996 people- to declare to the rest of the world that “al-Qaeda, which is underestimated as a small-scale terrorist organization, is able to organize historically bloody and large-scale acts of terror even in the US which is a well-known super power with the most secure intelligence, so beware of our power.”⁴² The mentality of al-Qaeda never openly depicts this strategy that it desires to engrave on the peoples’ minds with the characteristics of attack, intervention and aggressiveness. According to this mentality, the al-Qaeda militants unconditionally defend Islam, the world and the Ummah against the West, and especially the US, that is the architect of the Crusaders’ project with a history of more than 1000 years. Consequently, the terrorist acts forming the practical part of their strategy are also “defensive”. Emphasizing that all “true Muslims” in particular are exploited by the Western and Crusader mentality, they keep the “victimization” part of the cake for themselves and legitimize any kind of anti-Western, anti-American and anti-semitic propaganda. The atrocities carried out during the 2003 invasion of Iraq in the name of military operations and the unlawful treatment of those who were suspected to be somehow linked to al-Qaeda in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo prisons as a response to al-Qaeda’s actions are motivated by Islamophobia facilitate al-Qaeda’s strategy of defense and paves the way for further bloody terror operations.

in the same category of meaning has also been used for associated meanings like “life of a person”. The second meaning can be translated as the inner self (often also translated as soul). Nafs in the meaning of Soul or Inner Self in the Qur’an refers to that entity inside us that is continuously interacting with our mind and can easily affect us (as a person) in a positive or negative way.” (Retrieved from <http://www.exploring-islam.com/what-is-nafs.html> accessed on 15.11.2018).

⁴² “9/11 Death Statistics”, Retrieved from <http://www.statisticbrain.com/911-death-statistics/> accessed on 25.10.2016.

The reason why al-Qaeda puts the US on the top of the list is that any victory over the US would bring along the decline of the EU and the West altogether because the US is the first domino. Moreover, al-Qaeda believes it can find more active allies all over the world thanks to its hostility specifically against the US rather than the West. Instead of targeting the EU that has not been able to completely unite yet, the US is a perfect propaganda tool for the al-Qaeda militants thanks to its relatively better consolidated and dominant position. There is neither a definitive state or nation nor a clearly bordered organization on the opposite side of the fight against the US in particular and the West in general. As Osama bin Laden often emphasized, “we” are the 1.5 billion Muslim population and Islamic Ummah, namely all Muslims. Yet it is not explicable for an al-Qaeda like organization, which does not regard any sectarian believers as “the true believers” other than the Sunni, to have such a large-scale goal and talk pedantically. However, al-Qaeda, ironically, is far from this discourse, often emphasizes sectarianism in Islam, and does not consider anyone who is not Sunni as a "true believer".

Although we face an organization with extraordinary objectives and discourse, there are still certain limits that the al-Qaeda leaders are aware of. One of the restrictions is that al-Qaeda has neither the manpower nor the equipment to directly fight against the US. Therefore, their fight primarily aims, instead of directly fighting against the US or the West, to accelerate the collapse of the state by disturbing and terrorizing the state officials by means of targeting the public, to make the United States appear helpless in the eyes of public which is the main point, and loosening the ties between the state and its citizens.

3.1.5. Organizational Structure

It has become an object of curiosity what type of an organisational structure, human resources and material al-Qaeda uses to manage its activities that are in operation in a vast geography from Middle East to South Asia and from Pacific to East, West and North Africa. The main characteristic of al-Qaeda that distinguishes it from other terrorist organisations is certainly the huge network that it established and the correspondingly the complex structure including other terrorist organisations that

are active in various countries. In order to analyze the organisational structure of al-Qaeda, it is firstly necessary to understand the inner structure of the organisation and then to factor in the existence of various terrorist organisations in different regions of the world that are acting either as a branch of al-Qaeda or serving for the same purpose with a common ideological interest yet without any direct connection to al-Qaeda.

The inner structure of al-Qaeda has undergone a serious transformation and to reach its present state. The process that initiated with the idea of supporting the Afghan resistance during the Soviet invasion by Usame bin Laden, who was the young and wealthy son of a Saudi family, paved the way for the establishment of the Afghan Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidamat) under the spiritual leadership of Abdullah Azzam, a former leader of Muslim Brotherhood. This offered an opportunity to establish a center where mujahids, who got and/or desired to get into action in many different parts of the world with a jihad motto, could receive a guerilla training and their social, economic, technical and martial needs were satisfied. After that point, the idea of al-Qaeda, which consisted of a small group of people or structure supporting the Afghan resistance and training guerillas, was transformed into a transnational terrorist network and an ideological movement that would “inspire” tens of thousands of people living on Muslim geography⁴³.

Meanwhile, Bin Laden’s path crossed with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Taliban group that was composed of mujahids made use of the fall of the Soviet-backed Afghan Democratic Republic in 1992 and took over the government between 1996-2001 under the Taliban Afghanistan which became a safe heaven for al-Qaeda as its institutionalisation process continued under the guidance of Usama and Zawahiri. As a result of these circumstances, all the groups supported and provided with service by al-Qaeda were united under an umbrella organisation called “The world islamic front for the struggle against the

⁴³ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, (New York 2004). P. 24, 25, 26.

Jews and Crusaders” which was founded in early 1998 by Usama bin Laden so that the jihadist groups had a new structure to take better-organized actions.⁴⁴

As the local structure of al-Qaeda transformed into a global jihadist movement in a short time, it has never been evaluated in the same category as the other terrorist groups or organisations. Due to the influence of many non-Arabic members of the movement, it aimed at becoming a Pan-Islamic movement including 1.3 billion muslim population rather than being a Pan-Arabic movement.⁴⁵

It would not be easy to reach the target of operating on such a vast geography having a huge population. However, its being different from other classical, regional and local terrorist organisations and having a decentralized structure allowed it to be more agile and simplified its work. Established around a central ideology, the organisation wanted to unite all Muslims to act against non-Muslims. The fact that this ideological principle was firmly acknowledged and embraced by the connected networks diminished the importance of the centralized organizational structure. Therefore, the skeleton-crew organisational structure was not much more than a spiritual leadership.

Although there is a common belief that Osama bin Laden was the leader of al-Qaeda in the early days when the first seeds of the organisation were planted, the organisation was in fact under the responsibility of neither Bin Laden nor any other personality. Bin Laden was the person who set out the ideology as well as the objectives for the organisation; in other words, he was an operational actor. There were many other key leaders in this network apart from Bin Laden. The majority of those leaders have either been imprisoned or killed in the mean time, however the organisational structure remained the same. This situation was due to the decentralized structure of the organisation.

⁴⁴ Randy Borum, Michael Gelles. “Al Qaeda’s Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational Perspectives.” *Mental Health Law&Policy Faculty Publications*, (2005), p. 470.

⁴⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. (New York, 2003), p.128, 129.




Figure 1. View of al-Qaeda processes which highlight the core functional areas for organizational activity⁴⁶

The above-mentioned table summarizes the organisational targets and functions of al-Qaeda even though its limitations and role distribution are not precise.

Nicole Hutchinson and Art Pyster define al-Qaeda in their article “Al-Qaeda: Study of Decentralized Organization” as “self-organizing system of systems; components within the system enable appropriate configuration and reorganization in response to environmental stimuli”⁴⁷. In the light of this explanation, it can be stated that al-Qaeda has a flexible and decentralized structure which is not shaped by any external factor and is self-adapting, and have leaders who are active at local levels and where sometimes their duties and responsibilities overlap.

⁴⁶ Nicole Hutchison and Art Pyster, al-Qaeda: Study of Decentralized Organization, (January 2010), Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265027902/download> accessed on 15.03.2016.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Given the dynamics of the al-Qaeda organisation in general, it can be said that the distribution of work and responsibilities are not precise and well-identified in the inner structure of the organisation; which is presented in detail in the below-mentioned chart.




Figure 2. Organizational structure and hierarchy of al-Qaeda⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (December 2010), p. 1055.

The “*Amir*” position at the top of the chart refers to the person who is directly responsible for the activities carried out by al-Qaeda. This position, referring to the person who is the leader of the movement, is especially responsible for the strategic planning of operations as well as internal affairs, annual budget and action plans. Bin Laden served in this position until his death. However, it has been seen that Zawahiri obtained the authorization for certain activities as if he was the *Amir*.

The Deputy can be considered as the proxy to the Amir and he is obliged to fulfill the important duties assigned by the Amir. Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who was the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, held this position until Bin Laden was killed. It is also known that the Deputy position was key for many activities and had direct contact with cell leaders.

The Secretary is the person who is assigned by the Amir and fulfills the responsibilities of organisational works (mainly external affairs, appointments, etc.).⁴⁹

The Command Council (Majlis Al Shura) is the highest decision-making unit in the organisational structure. The members, who compose the thematic sub-units of the Council, are responsible for planning, implementing and inspecting the related activities. They are personally appointed by the Amir. Only the senior members of the organisation can be a member in the Council.⁵⁰ The Command Council consists of six sub-committees in total; namely political, religious, military, administrative and financial, security and media committees. Every sub-committee has its own designated roles and responsibilities. As is seen in the above-mentioned chart, it is the Military Unit which makes the organisation most visible in public. This unit is mainly responsible for the planning and implementation of world-wide terror attacks as well as providing guerilla training and preparing technical equipment. Another highlighted committee, beyond any doubt, is the Media Committee. One of the

⁴⁹ “Harmony Papers Data Base.” Available at <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-00080-Trans.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (December 2010), p. 1056.

priority goals of the Committee is to spread worry and fear among the public by publicizing the news about the attacks organized in different places, times, and scales by a gigantic network like al-Qaeda.

The inner structure of al-Qaeda can be described briefly in this way, however the actual organisational structure is based on the relations between the core staff and the other world-wide groups that they are in connection with. Considering the regional distribution, it is known that Afghanistan, India and Pakistan in South Asia; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapur from the Pacific Region; Iran, Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen from Middle East; Algeria, Egypt and Morocco from Northern Africa; Ethiopia and Somali from Eastern Africa; Mali and Nigeria from Western Africa joined the al-Qaeda network. Some of these countries established an organic bond with the organisation while some others only pursued an ideological and target-oriented partnership.

There are 7 different types of relations between al-Qaeda and the groups which are active in the above-mentioned countries:

1. Al-Qaeda Central / Core
2. Al-Qaeda Directed Branch/ Territorial Extension
3. Autonomous Affiliate
4. Independent Cell (inspired by AQ)
5. Anti- AQI (though occasional ally)
6. Many veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War
7. No affiliation⁵¹

According to a study, it is stated that there are 56 group/organisations from various geographies that are either a member of al-Qaeda network or having close relations:

⁵¹ Victoria Barber, "The Evolution of Al Qaeda's Global Network and Al Qaeda Core's Position Within it: A Network Analysis". (2015) Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/469/html> accessed on 15.05.2016.

- 313 Brigade
- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
- Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
- Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia)
- Ahrar al-Sham
- Al Jama'a Al-Islamiya
- Al Qaeda Core (AQ)
- Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
- Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY)
- Al Shabab
- Al Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood)
- Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions
- Al Tawhid Islamic Front (TIF)
- Ansar al-Islam (AI)
- Asif Raza Commandos
- Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)
- Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)
- Black Banner Brigade
- Boko Haram
- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
- Free Syrian Army
- Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
- Haqqani Network
- Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI)
- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
- Hizb-I-Islami
- Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)
- Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
- Indian Mujahideen
- Islamic Army in Iraq
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

- Islamic State (IS)
- Jabhat al-Nusra
- Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
- Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)
- Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)
- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
- Jundallah
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
- Lashkar-e-Zil
- Liwa al-Islam
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
- Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
- Mujahideen Army (MA)
- Mutassim Bellah Brigade
- Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
- Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement
- Second Soran Unit (SSU)
- Sipah-I-Mohammed
- Taliban
- Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)⁵²

The ideological basis and the objectives are the features in common for the above-mentioned 56 organizations. From the ideological point of view, all of them can be considered as Anti-Shia, Anti-Western, Wahhabi and Nationalist; and their common objective is to overthrow the governments where they are active and to establish an Islamic country in its place.

⁵² Victoria Barber, "The Evolution of Al Qaeda's Global Network and Al Qaeda Core's Position Within it: A Network Analysis". (2015) Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/469/html> accessed on 15.05.2016.

3.2. What is Hamas?

3.2.1. Historical Background of Hamas

Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, is generally described in existing literature either as a marginal organization and passed over, or as a terrorist organization. However, when Hamas is analyzed within the context of its historical background and social roots, it can be clearly seen that this resistance movement differs from other terrorist or marginal organizations on several counts.⁵³

Hamas emerged with the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987 against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the vision of Hamas includes the militancy towards Israel, it identifies itself as a complete social movement. At the top of its agenda are liberating the 1967 boundaries of Palestinian territories through a holy war against Israel, establishing an Islamic state in these territories, and reforming society with the directions of Islam.⁵⁴ Obviously, Hamas has both national claims actualized by militancy, and religious targets specific to Islam. Indeed, the former become the current issue of Hamas's policy, not the latter. In other words, the idea of "reforming Muslim society in accordance with true Islam" is not the main motivation of Hamas but the key tool to legitimize its actions. In any case, if it is asserted that the Islam and Islamic objective have dominated its policies, then we reach an impasse in understanding the support of Palestinian Christians for Hamas. Thus, having said that, Hamas is deeply rooted in Palestinian society regardless of religion, nationality, color, sex and so forth. In addition to this, Hamas has been able to transcend social fragmentation and class divisions to ensure its presence in all walks of life: among university graduates and the uneducated, farmers, blue and white-collar workers, lawyers, engineers, doctors,

⁵³ Ersin Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, 2008, Ankara, p. 8.

⁵⁴ Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, (New York, 2000), Preface.

young and old, women and men.⁵⁵ The aforementioned spectrum can be assumed as one indication of Hamas's large-scale support and success among Palestinians. The success of Hamas lies in combining national freedom aspirations with religious doctrines and daily concerns. Even though some argue that Hamas's main commitment and target is to reform Muslim society in accordance with true Islam, Hamas determines a road map primarily on liberating Palestinian society and promoting Palestinian citizens' interests by both pursuing militancy towards Israel and providing social welfare, education and health services for them.⁵⁶ To understand Hamas, its roots and establishment better, the social dynamics, historical and political background of Palestine and the actors who emerged in this territory over time should be analyzed in detail. Otherwise, regardless of its internal variables, the Palestinian conflict tends to be regarded just as an international issue and Hamas just as a terrorist organization.

3.2.2. Foundation / Founding Fathers

Even Hamas comes into prominence after the Israeli occupation of Palestine, its emergence and consolidation dates back to very early times. The Islamic Resistance Movement not only keeps the heritage of previous organizations and represents their continuance, but also, unlike the others, it manifests a movement that hosts the sociological basis of Palestine society as a whole. In other words, it differs from other resistance movements in terms of social impact and support.

Since it follows the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) intellectual basis, The Muslim Brotherhood has a place in the establishment of Hamas. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna. At the beginning, its scope and the sphere of influence was relatively limited. However, in due course, it grew rapidly. The founder of MB, Hasan al-Banna, pointed out that the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was to revitalize the Islamic soul and put the emphasis on three

⁵⁵ Ibid, Preface.

⁵⁶ Ibid, Introduction.

key elements: 1) revival 2) organization 3) upbringing.⁵⁷ These elements are crucial to turning a society into an ideal one as closely as possible to that instituted by the Prophet Muhammad. In an advanced stage, the “ideal order” enables the establishment of an Islamic state and society governed by Islamic rule.

Although the main objective of the Muslim Brotherhood is to maintain Islamic revivalism, it was observed that the movement could not be indifferent to various incidences happening in the nearby regions towards the end of 1930s. For instance, the special effort for doing something for the sake of Palestinian lands which were under British mandate in 1930s cannot be explained through its Islamic tendency. Yet there is another fact that not only the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim societies such as Christians and Jews were living on the Palestinian territory which was initially under the British mandate and later Israeli occupation, which partially reveals the impact of Arabic nationalism. Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement started to be considered as an active player during the Arab-Israel Wars that broke out following the establishment of Israel State on the Palestinian territory. As a result of the partition of the Palestinian territory into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with bold lines, the area of the MB activities was affected and this situation laid the foundation of the future Hamas organization. The afore-mentioned territorial partition also resulted in the fact that the Gaza Strip and West Bank came under the domination of Egypt and Jordan, respectively. As Jordan, dominating the West Bank in 1954, prohibited the MB's activities in the region, this led the MB movement to stand by with folded arms in the Gaza Strip where it had the highest support. However, it was relatively easier for the movement to sustain its activities in West Bank that was under the domination of Jordan.

Following the establishment of the Islamic Union (al-Mucemma) in 1973 in Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood caught a great opportunity to become an organizational structure. Later, the main founding body of Hamas, including Sheikh Ahmad Yasin,

⁵⁷ Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.22, No.4 (Summer 1993), p. 6.

Dr. Abdulaziz Rantisi and Mahmud Zehar actively took part in the union. In other words, al-Mucemma would underpin the Hamas structure in future.⁵⁸

Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the factors that determined the reactions of 1967 Arabs has differed from time to time. From the establishment of the Israeli state until the Six Day War, the most powerful motivation for all the Arabs was Pan-Arabism (Arab nationalism). However, as a result of the Six Day War and 1973 War, the Arab States' dramatic defeats vis-à-vis Israel proved the failure of this idea and it weakened. Such an ideological gap would be filled with another one and this was 'radicalism'. From 1970s and onwards, radicalism on a global scale and the emergence of Islamic movements have appeared as alternatives to Arab nationalism. The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution provided a model to such radical attempts. With the establishment of the Islamic Union in 1973, the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer an organization only trying to establish religious influence, it also initiated social services for citizens without exception. Having said that, Palestinians realized that the MB sincerely cared for them and their problems. The sympathy of Palestinians for the Muslim Brotherhood started to sharply increase and opened the communication channels between the organization and the Palestinians. Another factor affecting the Palestinians' tendency was the idea that the reason for the Israelis' success was their reliance on religion. It was asserted that, due to this reason, extreme right and religious political parties in Israel such as Likud and Shas were on the rise, however Arabs in general and Palestinians privately were distanced from these ideas. Thus, the point of view regarding the main reason of failure was being distant from Islam and resistance dramatically strengthened among Palestinians.⁵⁹

The Muslim Brotherhood was not in active resistance, showed only limited passive resistance and did not join the armed struggle against Israeli occupation until 1987. During the Intifada years, the cadres in the MB fell into disagreement about

⁵⁸ Ebu Amr, *Batu Şeria ve Gazze'de İslami Direniş: Hamas ve İslami Cihad*, (İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 1998), p. 39, 40.

⁵⁹ Ali Öner, *Dünden Bugüne Filistin*, (Ekin Yayınları, 2006), p. 161.

resistance. While one group in the Muslim Brotherhood was composed of young, well-educated people who mostly grew up in refugee camps, the other was mostly old, pro-status quo and the representatives of traditional leadership. This duality that had emerged in the MB since the 1980s would identify the route map being followed and lay the foundations of Hamas. The former group supported the MB's active resistance and armed struggle in the occupied territories, and in the end this group would substitute the MB branch with Hamas. The transformation from Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas brought up two fundamental questions: "Do we first create a pure Muslim society and then resist the occupation, or do we first resist and overcome the Israeli occupation and then create a Muslim society?". The cadres mentioned above, composed mostly of young people, preferred the second choice and this preference determined the future of Hamas. Even though the priority is on the resistance, the MB branch which formed Hamas in the occupied Palestine territories never neglected Islamic characteristics in Hamas' philosophy.⁶⁰

According to the Hamas Charter declared on 18 August 1988, which describes its philosophy and ideology, Hamas identified itself as the branch of the Palestine MB and by this, it indicated its political program as well. The most remarkable point in this declaration was the emphasis on both the national characteristic of the Hamas movement and its Islamic character along with Palestinian identity. In other words, Hamas would represent the synthesis of the Palestinian national movement and political Islam.⁶¹ Furthermore, in the Hamas Charter it was claimed that the Palestine issue had three dimensions: 1) Islamic Dimension 2) Arab Dimension 3) Palestinian Dimension. Hamas located itself at the center of these 3 dimensions.⁶²

⁶⁰ Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement", *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* ed. By Wictorowicz, Quintan, (Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Pres, 2004), p. 118, 119.

⁶¹ Musa K. Budeiri, "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements in Palestinian Politics", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No.3, (Spring 1995), p. 95.

⁶² Hamas Charter, Article 7-Article 9. For further information see: Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, (Washington DC, 2000), Appendix.

The consolidation of Hamas was also related to the evaluation and the role of the PLO regarding the Palestinian issue and its relationship with Hamas. While Hamas leaders and cadres resided in occupied Palestine territories during the first Intifada, the PLO administration was in Tunisia. Under these circumstances, this began motivating the Palestinians to take the side of Hamas and against the PLO.

There was a great dichotomy between Hamas and the “Unified National Command of the Intifada” which was founded by the PLO to coordinate the Intifada. While the PLO and Unified National Command of the Intifada attached importance to negotiations rather than the resistance, Hamas always put the emphasis on resistance. Thus, Hamas rejected uniting with the Unified National Command of the Intifada. The PLO mostly organized the round-table meetings according to the negotiation conditions determined by the US and Israel. Hamas warned all sides of the danger of such an attitude. The peace plan declared by the PLO as of 1988 caused the final break between Hamas and the PLO. The afore-mentioned peace plan included a two-state solution offered in accordance with United Nations Resolutions and Decisions. However, Hamas’ key provision in negotiations called for ending Israeli occupation rather than a two state solution.⁶³ Due to being fed up with the futile policies conducted by the PLO over the years, Palestinians began to sympathize Hamas’s determination to resist.

Nevertheless, if it is formed by fair elections and organizations are represented proportionately, Hamas stated its willingness to be a part of Palestinian National Council, stating that the reverse case would be dangerous.

3.2.3. Ideology

The main motivation of Hamas’ resistance and the struggle against Zionist colonialism in Palestinian territory is undoubtedly the Zionist attacks against the Muslims in Palestine. Some argue that this is a battle between religions, namely

⁶³ Ebu Amr, *Batı Şeria ve Gazze’de İslami Direniş: Hamas ve İslami Cihad*, (İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 1998), p. 115, 116, 117.

Islam and Judaism; however, the stance and perspective of Hamas indicate that it is not a religiously-oriented war but rather a multi-directional and multipartite puzzle.

It would be wrong to say that the ideology of Hamas does not refer to Islam, yet it is considered not as an objective but as a tool. Thus, as stated in Hamas' Charter, religious discourse is used to motivate and mobilize the masses and to criticize Palestinian authorities and all other Arab unions and organizations that could not make any progress in the case of Palestine. Religious discourse is the heart of Hamas' ideology, however here is a point that needs special attention: The heart of Hamas' ideology is not religion itself, but rather the discourse. It is also inevitable for an organization reflecting its ideology through Islamic discourse not to emphasize Jihad. However, Jihad is only applicable in cases where infidels try to occupy Islamic lands and take over the administration. In other words, unlike other Islam-based organizations, having an infidel subject is not enough itself to declare the Jihad.⁶⁴ Most of the Islamic statements that survived until the midst of 1990s have started to fade and be replaced by the national discourses speaking about how to end the occupation of Palestine and to find multilateral solutions to the illegal settlement problem. The fact that the side they struggle against is Jewish is not considered a main concept; instead the struggle has very clear lines in terms of a pro-occupation mindset, colonialism and Zionism.

In general, the struggle against the Zionist occupation was triggered by the fact that Israeli forces bombed the sacred prayer halls of the Palestinian Muslims and tried to interrupt their prayers. For instance, following a massacre by an ultra-right wing Zionist group in Al-Aqsa Mosque that killed twenty Palestinians in October 1990, Hamas declared that the current situation was a war between Islam and Judaism.⁶⁵ However, this statement reflected the mentality of Israel, not the Hamas ideology. Even the early Zionist movement was based on history more than religion, after the

⁶⁴ Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, (Washington DC, 2000), p.276 (Hamas Charter- Article 15).

⁶⁵ "Hamas and Kin: The Terrorists". Retrieved from https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/9780817947729_77.pdf accessed on 02.06.2017.

establishment of Israeli State in 1948, the movement was transformed into a religion based one. What is emphasized by this notice is that the main sources behind the Israeli occupation is religion although Hamas is not motivated by the differences in terms of religious ideology, but rather by the aggressive attitudes of Israel. According to Hamas, no one will confront an aggressive attitude because of their ideology or belief unless their ideology and belief result in actions to attack and destroy the Palestinians.

Another example confirming the fact that Hamas ideology is not entirely religious is the official statements of Hamas declaring that the struggle will continue until the Zionist forces have completely withdrawn from the Palestinian territory. If this had been a struggle against Judaism and Zionism, Hamas would have stated that this struggle would continue until there was not a single Zionist left in the world.

Another important characteristic of Hamas' ideology is that it does not and/or cannot anticipate a holistic resistance as there is neither an Arab union that is able to unite against the occupation of Palestine nor an Arab country decisively participating in the resistance. It can also be argued that many Arab countries that could not tolerate the pressure have withdrawn from the struggle in practice following the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt. As a result, that their former allies have abandoned the battle field, Palestine and Hamas were left alone in their struggle against Israel with only very limited regional or global support.

Hamas, acting on the assumption that Israel is a part of Zionist-American alliance in Palestinian territory, expresses its strategy against the architects of the occupying Zionist project and the West that is considered a collaborator as:

1. The Palestinian people are the direct target of the Zionist settler occupation. Therefore, they must bear the main burden of resisting the unjust occupation. For this reason, Hamas seeks to mobilize the full potential of the Palestinian people and channel it into steadfast resistance against the usurper.
2. Palestine is the terrain for confrontation with the enemy. The Arab and Islamic countries are the regions from which our Palestinian people can draw support, particularly political, informational, and financial support; but the bloody confrontation with our Zionist enemy must take place on the sacred soil of Palestine...

3. There must be incessant resistance to and confrontation with the enemy in Palestine until we achieve victory and liberation. Jihad for the cause of God is our objective in that confrontation. The best method of resistance is to do battle with the soldiers of the enemy and destroy their armor.
4. It is our view that political action is one of the means for pursuing Jihad against the Zionist enemy. Its objective should be to strengthen the endurance of our people in their Jihad against the occupation; to mobilize the forces of our people and our ummah in defense of our cause; to defend the rights of our people; and to present their just cause to the international community.⁶⁶

3.2.4. Main Targets and Strategy

British colonial strategy, the Zionist movement and the establishment of the Israeli State paved the way for Palestinian Nationalism.⁶⁷ All these developments are not only the reason why Hamas was established but also identified the target list to fight against them. Hamas, who has been making itself known as one of the key elements of the Israel-Palestine conflict, underlined Hamas's most important goals in the definition of the organization in Hamas Charter. The fact that the organization defines itself as a national independence movement reveals the organization's main objective is to recognize and protect the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, to save the occupied territories and to fight for this purpose.

Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founding leader of Hamas, likewise expressed the spirit and objectives of the organization as follows:

“The movement struggles against Israel because it is the aggressing, usurping and oppressing state that day and night hoists the rifle in the face of our sons and daughters.”⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Hamas, “Introductory Memorandum” For further information see: Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, (Washington DC, 2000), Appendix.

⁶⁷ Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, (New York, 2000), p. 13.

⁶⁸ Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 2nd edition, (Pluto Press, 2010), p.16.

In this expression of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the goal of fighting against Israel does not in fact refer to opposition to any people, religion or ethnicity. What is highlighted here is the opposition to state policy, namely Zionism, which deprives the Palestinians of their fundamental rights by illegitimately occupying Palestinian territory. In other words, the main objective here is to fight against Zionism.

Apart from the nationalism-induced objectives of Hamas, there is also a religious/Islamic dimension. However, this is not whatsoever linked to certain fundamentalist objectives of other Islamic organizations such as the elimination of non-Muslims all around the world and the establishment of Islamic States. As Hamas is acknowledged as an Islamic movement with an anti-Zionist target, it is obvious that there is no need to emphasize the religious aspects of the movement. Otherwise Hamas would have also target the Christians living on the occupied Palestinian territory. However, it was observed that Muslim Palestinians and Christian Palestinians joined their forces in many cases, which is far from being anti-Christian. The scope of religion as a Hamas goal is clearly identified in Hamas Charter as below:

...The non-Zionist Jew is one who belongs to the Jewish faith, whether as a believer or due to accident of birth, but does not relate to the above ideas and takes no part in aggressive actions against our land and our *umma*. The Zionist, on the other hand, is one who embraces the aggressive Jewish ideology and becomes an instrument for the realization of those ideas on our land and against our *umma*. On this basis, Hamas will not adopt a hostile position in practice against anyone because of his idea or his creed but will adopt such a position if those ideas and creed are translated into hostile or damaging actions against our *umma* and our nation.⁶⁹

In brief, being a Jew is a condition yet being a Zionist is a choice; which is a frequent Jewish example from Israel. The Jewish academician/writer Miko Peled, who is the son of a general in the Israel military forces, mentions on all occasions that he is strictly against the Zionist occupation policy of Israel (for detailed information, please refer to the book titled “The General’s Son: Journey of an Israeli in Palestine”). Would Peled, who emphasizes the rightfulness of the Palestinians and

⁶⁹ Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), p. 51. (For further information see: Hamas leadership interview, *Filastin al-Muslima*, April 1990).

Hamas-specific resistance on every occasion, would do the same if this was an anti-Semitic movement?

It is possible to expand the content and size of the liberation-based and anti-Zionist target of Hamas with many more examples from inner structure. Yet it is necessary to mention the services provided to the Palestinians by Hamas as a social movement apart from the Hamas objective to liberate the Palestinians and their territory. These are not only the *raison d'être* for Hamas but also one of the targets. It is the knowledge that the Palestinians, who are forced to live as “neighbors” with the illegal Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territory, are exposed to both physiological and psychological violence. The illegal Israeli settlers, each of whom has the right to bear arms, not only pose a threat to the freedom and independence of the Palestinians, but also are in attempts to prevent them from enjoying their public and social rights. This is undoubtedly a natural consequence of the government-supported discrimination and occupation policy imposed by the Israeli government. Under these circumstances, the social service characteristics of Hamas appears once again as the main target and *raison d'être* of Hamas. During the First Palestinian Intifada period between 1987-93, when Hamas ascended as an alternative to the PLO, and the Oslo period between 1993-2000, Hamas offered many services to the public that the Palestinian government could not offer due to legal barriers. Although the idea of liberalization was the main objective, it also aimed to minimize the unjust treatment and deprivation of the Palestinians in daily life. In this regard, they constructed not only the mosques which are the main mobilization place for the Palestinians fighting against the occupation, as well as other problems such as poverty and unemployment, but also hospitals, schools, soup kitchens, cultural centers, charity associations, Islamic social complexes, sports-art clubs, professional development schools, training centers, etc.⁷⁰ It is also known that Hamas provided financial aid to those who are in need. All these activities in the field of social services indicate that Hamas, carrying out a struggle for the sake of independence, also tries to make the Palestinians feel like they are not alone and

⁷⁰ Mete Çubukçu, *Bizim Filistin*, Metis Yayınları 2002, p. 131.

aims at satisfying their daily needs.⁷¹ Hamas, acting like a non-governmental organization in this respect⁷², also serves to defend the rights of the Palestinians in the political arena after the 2006 elections, to respond to their legitimate demands, and to offer political representation both in local and international platforms.

3.2.5. Organizational Structure

Although Hamas and other well-known terrorist organizations are put in the same equation, Hamas' being regional and differently organized distinguishes it.

Most of the literature investigating Hamas' organization mainly emphasizes the aspects of conflict, security and strategy, and misses one important feature. That is, Hamas' structure and organization cannot be explained solely by the concepts of conflict, security and military power; which makes it quite different. The main starting point to comprehend the organizational structure of Hamas is the social dynamics and the mobilization/interaction that has been behind Hamas since its establishment, rise and transition to a political platform. In summary, it would not be enough to only study suicide attacks, kidnappings or bombings to understand the internal structure of Hamas.

The classification by Mishal in terms of the internal structure and formal organization of Hamas seems to be extremely significant. This classification reflects not only the division of labor but also the extent of Hamas' actions. According to the above-mentioned classification, Hamas' organization has four (4) pillars:

1. Social activities
2. Political activities
3. Internal security

⁷¹ Johanna McGeary, Jamil Hamad, Aharon Klein, Matt Rees, "Inside Hamas", *Time Canada*, Vol. 163, (May 2004) p. 14.

⁷² Mark LeVine, "Chaos, Globalization and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3, (Summer 2006), p. 475, 476.

4. Military activities⁷³

The most prominent feature of these four pillars is that there is no strict hierarchy among them, each can make their own decisions on a local basis in most of the cases, and all are officially affiliated with the political wing in terms of general/comprehensive decisions. This means that although all the pillars support each other, contrary to what is commonly believed, their activities are independent from the military pillar.⁷⁴ Due to the absence of a strict hierarchy between the pillars, information is produced not only by an expert or leader, but also by the members working in different departments and positions and their interaction/negotiation with each other. In this sense, it is impossible to see a culture of unconditional submissiveness to the leader in Hamas as we observe in other organizations. The Hamas structure prioritizes the sense of mission and responsibilities, instead of submissiveness to a leader. Social dynamics and demands are freely represented in Hamas due to the flexible boundaries of relations and the horizontal rather than vertical structure, thus developing their policies and strengthening the legitimacy of the organization.

In the organization, there is no unconditional submissiveness to the leader and no mobilization around only one leader. Instead, the organization has a representative leadership which consists of the Political Bureau and Advisory Board. The members of the Political Bureau and Advisory Board consist of those who have devoted themselves to the struggle and were banished and/or were imprisoned for many years.⁷⁵ Sheikh Ahmet Yasin was the top leader in Hamas until he was killed by Israeli forces in 2004. However, Sheikh Yasin, as a respectable personality, principally served as an advisor, rather than making military decisions. Sheikh Yasin had been banished from his homeland due to Israeli suppression for many years, was

⁷³ Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, p. 100.

⁷⁴ Shaul Mishal, "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 581, 582.

⁷⁵ Khaled Hroub, "Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 33, No.4, (Summer 2004), p. 32.

sentenced to prison many times due to his opposition to Israel and especially for being the co-founder of the “Islamic Union” that was established by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip in 1973. The years under cruelty and suppression bestowed him with more sympathy before the Palestinian public. Sheikh Yasin, who was released after 1985, played a charismatic leader role in outreaching to the masses thanks to his respectable personality and passed the legacy of the organizational culture on to the next generations thanks to the exchange of his experiences. After Sheikh Yasin was assassinated, Dr. Abdulaziz Rantisi took over the position. However, he was immediately targeted and assassinated by Israel due to his pro-intifada and armed-resistance discourse and actions. In this process, the organization continued its activities without disruption. As I have already mentioned, the flexible relation network within the organization prevents the internal dynamic being weakened because of the frequent position changes. Hamas, following the decision to prove itself in the political arena after 2005, started to mention different leaders, namely Khaled Meshal and Ismail Haniye. Khaled Meshal, who was known as the Chief of Political Bureau of the organization, served as a kind of diplomatic agent and was responsible for controlling the regional and the global networks. On the other hand, Ismail Haniye was one of the leaders who had served the organization since the very beginning and especially became known after his term as the Prime Minister of Palestine in the Hamas Government following the 2006 elections. Like the other senior level Hamas officials, Haniye was also well-educated and devoted himself to the Palestinian issue for the sake of which he served time in prison for many years as his share of Israeli persecution. The most distinctive characteristic of Ismail Haniye was that he was in favor of a truce, especially after the War in 1967, and the moderate struggle, and supported the idea that instead of ignoring the existence of Israel, Hamas would end the resistance and never violently respond on the condition that Israel stopped persecuting the Palestinians. Although the majority of the radical wing in Hamas rejected his ideas, he was still symbolically a prominent leader as he improved the respectability of the organization in the political arena and managed to ease reaction thanks to his moderate image.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Khaled Amayreh, “Profile: Ismail Haniya”, (February 22, 2006), Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/20084916260799585.html> accessed on 18.10.2016.

I have already mentioned that the most comprehensive part in the Hamas organization is the social activities that are extremely diverse. However, it would not be wrong to say that the mosques, in terms of location and the ones who provide mobilization in those places, form the most significant share of the social activities. The mosques are not only a place to worship, but also a functional location for social, cultural and even political activities. As a matter of fact, it would be unexpected for a resistance organization like Hamas, always having close relations with the society, to conduct negotiated activities. It is a golden opportunity for Hamas to advise and lecture the community gathered in those places at prayer times. Thanks to the social service-based activities, Hamas strengthens communication with its grassroots and, on the other hand, the Palestinians start to consider themselves important, as an indispensable part of this struggle.⁷⁷ The most surprising point is that the non-Muslims and the secularists living in Palestine are accustomed to being used for this purpose and do not feel strange. The mind-building initiated at mosques continues with the help of “Zakat Committees”. It is known that Hamas, unlike other organizations, receives no financial aid from the international arena. Therefore, Hamas pursues a strategy to satisfy the need –yet in a small scale- from within the organization. The donations that are officially collected by the Zakat Committees, in addition to the fees paid by Hamas members, form the main source of the services provided by Hamas to the Palestinians. In other words, the voluntary donations of the public are used for the sake of the public; which clearly shows that Hamas is a social movement with the characteristics of a non-governmental organization.

In addition to the social activities and mobilization provided at mosques, the social service networks also contribute to the Hamas organization as Hamas inherited a critical religious, social and charity network from the Muslim Brotherhood in those lands. As the foundation of the social service networks was laid depending on many charities established by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, Hamas also kept this heritage alive, especially during the First Intifada between 1987-1993 and Oslo Accords between 1993-2000.⁷⁸ Taking this opportunity, Hamas managed to furnish

⁷⁷ Ebu Amr, *Batı Şeria ve Gazze’de İslami Direniş: Hamas ve İslami Cihad*, (İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 1998), p. 43, 44, 45.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 45.

the Palestinians with many services that the Palestine Government could not provide and was increasingly supported. Neither the UN and other international organizations avoided delivering help to the Palestinians via Hamas; which contributed the reliability of Hamas.

It is not only the small-scale social services networks that are referred to as the backbone of Hamas, but also primarily mosques and schools, clinics, hospitals, public soup-kitchens, sports clubs were opened to provide social services to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation.⁷⁹ Besides the newly established institutions and infrastructure services, the Palestinians who had to carry on under the occupation were also provided with psychological services. The people in need were inspired, through therapy and conversation, that they were not alone, so that the psychological damage of the occupation is minimized. In this sense, it is clear that Hamas is not an ordinary organization as no ordinary organization cares about the mental state of their members or society in general. There is only one single explanation to all negative situations: Because they sacrifice themselves for their nation and land and all is fair after this point.

Hamas not only provides services to the Palestinians in the occupied lands, but also tries to outreach to Palestinian refugees living abroad. For instance, Hamas delivers food, education, and health services to almost half a million refugees living in Lebanon which hosts a large number of the Palestinian refugees.⁸⁰

Finally, the reaction of the non-Muslim population -one of the most important aspects of the Hamas organization- should be taken into consideration. There is a Christian population living in Palestine together with the Muslims. However, Hamas provides equal services to the Christians and the Muslims without making any discrimination in terms of ideology or religion considering that not only the Muslim but also the Christian Palestinians suffer from the Israeli occupation. Thanks to this

⁷⁹ Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas: Social Movement", *Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach*, Indiana University Press, 2004) p. 126, 127.

⁸⁰ Are Knudsen, "Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005, p. 226, 227.

CHAPTER 4

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

4.1. Geographical / Sphere of Influence (Global / Regional)

Over the course of 1990s, al-Qaeda had relations with many Jihadist groups that acted on the basis of nationalist motives. The key common point was their anti-US strategic objectives. Once they established the required network, they declared the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders through which many different groups including the Egyptians, Pakistanis, Afghanis and Bangladeshis were united under one umbrella. The al-Qaeda organization was one of the leading groups for the Front, having the mission to organize and coordinate the other groups in the network. In time, al-Qaeda played a part in the global representation of these groups and became the architect of large-scale attacks creating regional impact.⁸²

The al-Qaeda networks, immediately crossing beyond Afghanistan's borders after their foundation, gained the cadres and members to spread its influence even throughout Egypt and Northern Africa once it was united with Egyptian Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. This means that al-Qaeda was no longer a national organization as in 1988, but rather transformed into a regional one which paved the way for its global objectives. Following the establishment of close relations with strict Jihadist groups based on their anti-US approach, al-Qaeda both acquired the motives and established the technical infrastructure required for the 9/11 attacks.⁸³

⁸² Barak Mendelsohn, Al Qaeda's Franchising Strategy, *Survival*, Vol. 53, (June-July 2011), p. 32.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 32.

Comparing al-Qaeda with many other fundamentalist groups, -with the Palestinian resistance movement as the easiest movement for comparison- the mission of al-Qaeda is first of all transnational, not limited to any specific nation-state context and not driven by the needs and aspirations of a specific people.⁸⁴ Al-Qaeda's transboundary character in terms of both ideology and activities, was described by Oliver Roy "the adherents of al-Qaeda are indifferent to their own nationalities. They all define themselves as Muslim internationalists and link their militancy to no particular national cause."⁸⁵

In reference to the morphology of al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism it has been said that "the ideological edifice of Islamist globalism rests on the populist evocation of an exceptional crisis".⁸⁶ The ummah experiences an incomparable wave of attacks on its territories, values and economic resources. Although Bin Laden blames the global "Judeo-Crusader alliance", he considers that its assault on Islam is the expression of an evil much larger than that represented by certain nation-states or imperialist alliances.⁸⁷

According to Manfred B. Steger, Bin Laden tries to legitimize the hateful activities of al-Qaeda by putting forward certain scenes as evidence including the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula, American operations against Muslim fighters in Somalia, the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims during the Yugoslavian civil war between 1991-1995, and the occupation of Iraq.⁸⁸ Al-Qaeda uses all these above-mentioned incidents and

⁸⁴ Christina Hellmich, "Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, 2008, p. 113.

⁸⁵ G. W. Bush, 'State of the Union Address', 29 January 2002, Transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov.

⁸⁶ Manfred B. Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism", *New Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2009.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 534.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 535.

conflicts as a trump card to carry out various terrorist activities against the countries who are on the al-Qaeda list, the Western Powers or the Great Powers. Considering the fact that the location of the incidents and actions used as a trump card against these countries are unrelated and distant from each other, it is possible to suggest that al-Qaeda considers itself as the global advocate of the Ummah/Islam and Islamic rules. Moreover, the cadres of the organization allege that the organization is independent of time, place and persons and carries out all its activities accordingly.

While the US-led coalition placed its troops in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Georgia to fight against the multinational, global al-Qaeda structure, al-Qaeda's reaction to this was to establish a multinational alliance with various terrorist groups all around the world. This shows that al-Qaeda and related groups decided to change the territorial status of the struggle initiated in Afghanistan into a global-scale organization.⁸⁹ The fact that Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, united his forces with Usama bin Laden in October, 2001 strengthened the al-Qaeda forces, expanded the impact area and increased the risk and danger. Although the US has deployed its troops to Yemen, the Pankishi Valley in Georgia and Mindanao in the Philippines, even now it is not as strong as in the early 2000s, al-Qaeda still maintains its existence in Somalia, Indonesia, Chechenia and Kashmir. Al-Qaeda puts forward that the main objective of outreaching to these places is to “transform the associate groups ideologically and operationally from a territorial Jihad approach to a universal Jihad mind-set”.⁹⁰

It would be sufficient to read the following statement that was introduced by Hamas to understand whether Hamas functions on a regional or local basis, or on a transboundary, global geography: “The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the recognition of the legitimate rights of

⁸⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New York, 2003, p. 297.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 313.

Palestinians”⁹¹. This definition emphasizes the fact that the main objective of the movement is to free occupied Palestinian territory and the struggle only prevails over the Palestinian territories which are under occupation. Hamas only fights against the Israeli state occupying the Palestinian territories, which is quite contrary to al-Qaeda’s targeting even the most remote geographies or nations because of religious differences. There is no evidence proving that the Hamas organization, with the sole objective of Palestinian freedom, aims at founding an Islamic State on Palestinian land or at any other place under any circumstances. Similarly, the geographic strategy of Hamas also has a very precise framework not only for armed resistance action but also social movement activities.

Hamas sets the border of its activities in line with the statement of “the field of engagement with the enemy is Palestine” and Khaled Hroub states that “Hamas reiterates this conviction on its strategy to assure the outside World that attacking any Westerner even Israeli targets outside Palestine is not on the agenda of the movement.”⁹² In this context, it is not possible to find any armed attack, bomb attack or suicide bombing by Hamas outside the occupied Palestinian territory. The main reason for the armed struggle on Palestinian territory is that the parties of struggle including Hamas do not have equal power and forces and self-defense is compulsory. Hamas can be considered as a nation engaged in a national struggle in a bordered territory and supporting this resistance movement while al-Qaeda is a bloody and cruel terrorist organization that killed almost 4500 people between 1992-2008 all around the world from New York to Tanzania, Iraq to Indonesia, London to Saudi Arabia.⁹³

⁹¹ Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, p. 15.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 21.

⁹³ “Death toll of Al Qaeda attacks: more than 4,400 lives”, (May 6, 2011) Retrieved from <http://npsglobal.org/eng/news/29-non-state-actors/1034-al-qaeda-attackss-death-toll-more-than-4400-lives.html> accessed on 05.05.2016.

4.2. Ideological (Islamic / National)

It is not irrelevant for Hamas to adopt national motives in terms of the Palestinian issue. One side of the struggle is a colonial state and on the other side there is a nation whose rights were usurped and that was attempted to be colonized and assimilated without any identity and national values. This explains the reasons why Hamas was established with an emphasis on the national resistance and actions. Considering the stance of al-Qaeda, it is observed that they act purely in line with a religious Jihad policy and pursue the strategy of “attack/destroy/annihilate” towards the whole world that they have declared to be “the infidels” regardless of nationality, and their defense of rights instead of displaying a nationalist resistance. The resistance of Hamas against the Israeli occupation is often identified as terrorist activity without questioning the cause-effect relation and the context, and is put in the same category with the bloody massacre policy of an organization like al-Qaeda that has no reasonable justification in its context.

On one hand, there is a nation and its struggle against the fact that it became a minority in its own homeland, especially after the war in 1967, and has been left stateless as a result of illegal settlements since its establishment; on the other hand, there is an organization that always violates the fundamental right to live in the name of Allah and against the people who were created by Allah without any reasonable justification for their actions.

As is known, the Palestinian territory was opened to British colonialism by a mandate government decision enacted by the League of Nations in 1920. As the UK first paved the way for the establishment of the State of Israel and then withdrew from the territory, it accelerated Zionist colonialism. Zionist settlement had begun under the Ottomans, but increased under the British Mandate. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the struggle of the Palestinians, particularly Hamas, is a kind of national resistance and awakening directly against the Zionist movement.

It is easy to understand the spirit of nationalism even if you isolate Hamas from this picture and only consider the internal reaction from within the society. Imagine that

you are not recognized as the citizens of your homeland, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank and all entrance and exit is under the control of Israel. This starts the fire of the national resistance in the very heart of the Palestinians. Moreover, living behind the wall of shame, 8m in height and 1000 km long crossing the West Bank keeps the spirit of resistance quite alive.⁹⁴

What else lies in the background of this national struggle? Statistical data also verify how the Palestinians are trapped on a small piece of land. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Israel has occupied almost 78% of the Palestinian territory and in the course of time, completed the consolidation through the illegal settlement policy. Israel has always kept an eye on the remaining 22% and colonized all the territory by also occupying the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. This endless process of the illegal settlement was crowned by inhuman activities such as surrounding the territory with barbed wire, constructing roads only open for Jews and the establishment of check points. Additionally, both the Palestinians living in Israel and in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip realized that they are recognized only as second-class citizens. The Palestinians as second-class citizens are deemed unsuitable for military service and hence excluded from the basic social services. It is also forbidden for the Palestinians living in Israel to own any property or land. Since they are second-class citizens, basic services such as electricity and water are not provided in the regions densely populated by the Palestinians. Moreover, they are not allowed to stand on their own feet by Israel's pursuing a policy of terrorization hoping that they will abandon their lands if possible. For instance, the illegal settlers in East Jerusalem (equal to almost 10% of the total Jewish population in Israel) are highly dangerous as they are armed and even backed by the State. The State of Israel, organizing the armed actions not with its own hand, but through Israeli citizens, tried to create an image that the armed policy against the Palestinians is actually not a policy of the State.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Ran HaCohen, "The Apartheid Wall", (May 21, 2003), Retrieved from <http://www.antiwar.com/hacohen/h052103.html> accessed on 01.06.2016.

⁹⁵ Marwan Bishara, *Filistin / İsrail: Barış veya İrkçılık*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003), p. 112.

When all the above-mentioned conditions are put together like the pieces of a puzzle, it can be interpreted that the Palestinians living in the open-air prison will continue to resist against these inhuman practices and policies in any possible way and the resistance will be increasingly violent depending on the level of violence of the struggle, unless the policy of colonialization and the related acts of exile are stopped. Therefore, the resistance of the Palestinians is a protest movement directly against the policy of colonialization imposed by Israel and “the justified answer” of the Palestinians to Israel.

Certainly, neither Hamas’ rules and regulations, nor the members are devoid of the Islamist qualities. However, the point which ideologically differentiates Hamas and al-Qaeda is that al-Qaeda considers Islam as both a target and a tool, while Hamas only occasionally refers to Islam. In this respect, it would not be correct to identify the Hamas movement with an emphasis and target on Islamism apart from its national approach. For instance; while the Islamist terrorist organizations acting on religious ideologies like al-Qaeda do not recognize the right to live for those who have different interpretation of Islam other than their own understanding and declare them “the perverted”, Usame Hamdan who was the former Hamas representative in Beirut defines this approach as “an intriguer practice” and strongly opposes it.⁹⁶ The moderate approach adopted by Hamas has a reflection on the positive attitudes of the Christian Palestinians living in the occupied territories towards Hamas. In short, in the Hamas movement, the religion of Islam is often used as a divine power to unite and motivate people, instead of as an exclusivist or goal-oriented tool, which is quite different from al-Qaeda practices. Therefore, Hamas should be considered as a national liberation movement which is free of Islamist emphasis.

Of course, it would not be sufficient to explain Hamas through only a single ideological criterion as Hamas not only maintains the religious legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also reflects a different characteristic through its “national” spirit in the Palestinian struggle against colonialism. Considering the times when Hamas

⁹⁶ Anders Strindberg and Mats Warn, “Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, The Palestinian Rejectionists and Al-Qa’ida Compared”, *Journal of Paşestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Spring 2005), p. 26.

was established and developed, it can be seen that Hamas cannot be completely free from the religious qualities. The heavy defeat of the Arab States in the 1967 war proved the failure of Arab nationalism and Palestine but the 1973 War, which began well for both Egypt and Syria, probably finished the process. From this date on, suffered from increasingly violent attacks due to the lack of support from the Arab States. Consequently, the Palestinians realized that the path to victory was not through Arab nationalism, but strong local Palestinian nationalism. All Islamic movements in the Middle East gained momentum as global phenomenon in 1970s-80s, and especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. At the end of 1980s Hamas' reinterpretation of the concept of "nationalism", which was made impractical by Al Fatah is the cornerstone of the Hamas consolidation. Once the Ikhwan Movement established al-Mujamma' al-Islami (the Islamic Union) in 1973, the cooperation between its members and the Palestinians under occupation became closer and the basic needs of the Palestinians were provided thanks to charitable organizations. By taking this opportunity, the sympathy of the Palestinians towards the movement increased and the organization, which would continue its activities under the umbrella of Hamas in the upcoming years, began to appear in society at that time. Similarly, Hamas has an approach based on nationalism-oriented services without Islamic/religious emphasis.

Considering the informal structure of Hamas, mosques and masjids in particular play a significant role in daily life and the contacts established in such environments provide Hamas with great grassroots support. As Mishal states "Hamas, as a local movement, underlines communication and friendly interactions instead of a strict religious hierarchical structure, which is the key role in the establishment of the organizational power of Hamas."⁹⁷ The Ikhwan leaders, who served in the region even before the appearance of Hamas in the social and political life of Palestine, supported all groups –regardless of whether they were Islam-oriented or not–struggling against the occupation and the Zionist threat, and gave the message that they were truly open to any kind of cooperation unless they bear strong hostility towards or performed any act of hatred against Islam; which shows that neither the

⁹⁷ Shaul Mishal, "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Summer 2003), p. 581.

Ikhwan Movement as the predecessor of Hamas, nor Hamas itself ever acted solely for Islamic reasons and set the national liberation as the ultimate goal. The critical point here is not to completely ignore the Islamic attribute of Hamas when emphasizing its national aspect. As a matter of fact,⁹⁸ making such a comment will be inappropriate despite the existence of the word Islam even in the movement's name. The Islamic identity of the movement's members and the Muslim supporters thereof by majority underpin this argument. However, what makes Hamas different from al-Qaeda at this point is the fact that Hamas movement does not use Islam for the target as it is the case with al-Qaeda and that no struggle is made in the name of Islam in the last instance.

The main reason why al-Qaeda is interpreted through Islamism is that al-Qaeda bases itself on the Quran. However, this reference often uses the texts of Quran to legitimize acts of terror which are not even remotely related to Islam. Likewise, Rohan Gunaratna states that "Aiming to galvanize the spirit of its supporters, al-Qaeda corrupts, misrepresents and misinterprets the Quranic text".⁹⁹ Accordingly, the militants of al-Qaeda, notably bin Laden and his followers, provided support by intentionally exploiting Islam and used it as a tool to reach to their political goals. From this point of view, it should be emphasized that while considering al-Qaeda as an Islamist organization, Islam/religion is often used as a means far from its true and original meaning. Although Islam and Islamism appear as the main objectives in the al-Qaeda discourse, in practice, they are only used as an exploited tool.

According to Abdullah Azzam, the mastermind of al-Qaeda, "Coming to the defense of a Muslim country against invasion by non-Muslim forces was a clear case of personal obligation (fard'ayn): It was every Muslim's duty to join the Jihad."¹⁰⁰ As understood from this perspective, the al-Qaeda struggle targets non-Muslims and

⁹⁸ (Hareket-ül Mukavemet-ül İslamiyye / Islamic Resistance Movement).

⁹⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. (New York, 2003), p. 14.

¹⁰⁰ Christina Hellmich, *Al-Qaeda: From Global Network to Local Franchise*, (New York, 2011), p. 23.

declares that Jihad is the duty of all the “true believers” regardless of whether or not they have been attacked. In this sense, the struggle initiated in Afghanistan in 1979 may be the model for Jihad against non-Muslims in many parts of the world as the al-Qaeda leaders, members and supporters firmly believe that everything happens according to God’s will.¹⁰¹ Therefore, all the attacks they carried out all around the world were just because they were what Allah ordered or wanted. From a similar perspective, “the Jihad is the foreign policy of Islamic states”.¹⁰² These statements legitimize the attitude that every Muslim and Muslim country/government must compulsorily adopt this mentality and specifically target regimes that do not obey this doctrine.

4.3. Based on Targets

It is clear that Hamas and al-Qaeda have significant differences in terms of their founding objectives, targets and strategies. Hamas is a kind of struggle/resistance reflecting the demands of the territory-oriented community (Palestinians) from a specific occupying enemy (Israel).¹⁰³ On the other hand, the struggle of al-Qaeda is neither responsible to any group nor serves the goals of its members or depends on a piece of territory.

Robert Pape, in his book *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, argues that Hamas’ actions have the characteristics of a response of weaker actors against foreign occupation. Therefore, he suggests that Hamas’ actions, as well as other similar actions, are beyond being irrational but rather they are well-organized,

¹⁰¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 305.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 313.

¹⁰³ Anders Strindberg and Mats Warn, “Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, The Palestinian Rejectionists and Al-Qa’ida Compared”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Spring 2005), p. 26.

political and secular. In this context, he underlines that Hamas' actions can only be explained not by religion, but by the objective to end Israeli occupation.¹⁰⁴

Considering Hamas' objectives from the inside, Dr. Abdulaziz Rantisi, one of the former leaders killed by Israel, says:

The fundamental strategy of Hamas is to fight against the occupying forces in Palestine. So far, we have not attacked anyone but only the occupants. Therefore, it is impossible for us to attack either Americans or the other countries primarily targeted by other terrorist organizations. Let me clearly say that regardless of the circumstances, our armed struggle will never move beyond the Palestinian territories.

At this point, one may wonder how to explain certain violent acts where Hamas is involved in or where the persons claiming the attacks allege their affiliation with Hamas and; thus, where the responsibility is attributed to Hamas. Mehola Junction Bombing that killed 2 people and injured 10 people on the 16th of April, 1993, Dizengoff Street Bus Bombing that killed 25 people on the 19th of October 1994, Kfar Darom Bombing that killed 7 people and injured 52 people in 1995, Erez Crossing Bombing on the 7th of October 2001, and also the attacks at checkpoints in Haifa, Jerusalem, Netanya, Azzoun, Hadera, Tulkarem, and various places may exemplify these attacks.¹⁰⁵ In this paper, we are trying to draw attention to the fact that the attacks differentiate from Al-Qaeda attacks in terms of their goals and contents, without legitimizing the abovementioned attacks. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to highlight that in spite of the fact that the target of arsons and bombings of buses, streets, and checkpoints had been the Israeli soldiers and there had been occasional civilian casualties, the Israeli soldiers and police officers were actually targeted as the enforcers of occupation and the oppressive regime. Beyond doubt, the 9/11 attacks are, besides many other attacks, the most striking ones that indicate the extent of difference of attacks organized by al-Qaeda from the violent acts of Hamas and that help to understand their targets and scales. It is known that one of

¹⁰⁴ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 45.

¹⁰⁵ Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993), <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx> accessed on 10.04.2019.

the bloodiest attacks of the history was made by crashing two hijacked aircrafts on the World Trade Center in the US and another aircraft on Pentagon on the 11th of September 2001. As a result of this attack, nearly 3 thousand people died, while more than 3 thousand get injured.¹⁰⁶ The analysis of the target group indicates that they were civilians by majority and they acted with the motive of homicide without any discrimination. Further, the following examples can also be referred to as the much-ballyhooed attacks of al-Qaeda globally:

1. Only in 1998, 224 people died and more than 5000 civilians get injured following the attacks at the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.¹⁰⁷
2. Following the Al-Qaeda's bomb attacks in London on the 7th of July 2005, 50 people died and more than 700 get injured.¹⁰⁸
3. At the suicide attack in an open-air marketplace in Baghdad on the 3rd of February, 2007, more than 140 people died, while nearly 150 got injured.¹⁰⁹

The main objective of the al-Qaeda movement is to “keep alive the Jihadist spirit among Muslims in general” during and after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which means that the crisis environment created by the regional liberation struggle was forced to serve the global expansion of Jihadist ideology. They supported the idea that the defeat of the Soviet Union in the region would lead to the defeat of another super power, namely the US, and this could only be possible through Jihadist activities. Once the Afghan-Soviet War ended, Osama bin Laden primarily aimed to establish an international army and gather all the war-torn Islamist

¹⁰⁶ “September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts.” (04.09.2018) <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html> accessed on 10.04.2019.

¹⁰⁷ Lough, Richard (August 19, 2008). "Pursuing al-Qaeda in Horn of Africa". Al Jazeera English. accessed on 10.04.2019.

¹⁰⁸ “London bombings of 2005.” <https://www.britannica.com/event/London-bombings-of-2005> accessed on 10.04.2019.

¹⁰⁹ “Bombings Kill at least 171 Iraqis in Baghdad.” (18.04.2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18cnd-baghdad.html> accessed on 10.04.2019.

extremist groups under its umbrella so as to continue defend the rights of all oppressed Muslims.¹¹⁰

Ayman Zawahiri, with a radical Islamist mentality, played a significant role in defining al-Qaeda targets. Zawahiri thought that Bin Laden must consider terrorist tactics/terrorist actions to achieve their desired goals. By blending Jihadist ideology with terrorist tactics, the goal was to govern Muslim countries in accordance with Shariah law. It was planned that through the expansion of Shariah governance over Middle-Eastern countries, US influence on these countries would be weakened and so, the Muslim regimes that were US allies were expected to adopt Shariah governance. The most prominent development expected was that the establishment of World Islamist Front for Jihad and its fight against the US would simultaneously lead to the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.¹¹¹ It is clearly seen that their main objective is not even remotely close to any nationalist motive or fight for independence. Yet al-Qaeda has no Palestine-like nation/community for the sake of whom they fight for independence. Although it has been clearly observed who was portrayed as a target by al-Qaeda since the very first day of its foundation and actions, the scope already enlarged and the list grew longer in the course of time. Zawahiri makes a categorization and mentions about six (6) tools which form the content of the target list and used by the West against the Islam.

1. United Nations
2. Muslim regimes that work with the West
3. Multinational corporations
4. International communications and data exchange system

¹¹⁰ Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi & Shadid Ali Khattak, "Operation Geronimo: Assassination of Osama Bin Ladin and its implications on the US-Pakistan relations, War on Terror, Pakistan and Al-Qaeda", *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (July-December 2011), p. 350.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 351.

5. International news agencies and satellite media channels
6. International relief agencies.¹¹²

Considering Hamas in the light of the above-mentioned categorical targets, it is observed that Hamas doesn't exhibit an aggressive attitude towards these six (6) targets. It is particularly notable that Hamas has not taken a stance against the UN and member states in order to achieve a solution to Palestinian issue through their decisions and on the contrary, Hamas gives a green light to the international rights-based approach. What is important here is to what extent the UN and UN resolutions are fair and not under Israeli pressure. No Muslim country is targeted just because they make an alliance with the West and have close relations, yet Muslim regimes are expected to become a party to the Palestinian issue and give support by taking initiatives. Similarly, the presence of international relief agencies is positively welcomed by Hamas as they provide services – although very limited- to the Palestinians living in an open-air prison under siege.

The struggle carried out by al-Qaeda is not only a war strategy, but it also diversifies its methods in line with globalization. The most striking methods, especially those conducted outside of Afghanistan, are information infrastructure attack, financial fraud, economic warfare, psychological operations, and mass casualty terrorism actions.¹¹³ The diversification of methods shows that the targets and scale also vary. For instance, previously an American citizen felt under threat because of bomb attack, but nowadays s/he feels even more insecure while making a personal transaction on the internet. It is clearly understood that on one hand, there is a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda that enlarges the boundaries of its targets and scale to reach out every day and on the other hand, there is Hamas -the main subject of comparison in this study- which never aims to target any country or society outside the borders of Palestine. is not related to other type of attacks but only resistance-based actions. If it was possible to lump Hamas and al-Qaeda together, Hamas would be expected to have the same diversity of the above-mentioned targets

¹¹² Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 300.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 312.

and methodology. Besides that fact that the military wing of Hamas does not aim at any other country, nation, or religious group than the occupied Palestinian territories, the individuals that “are apart from them”, and are from other nations or religions are not targeted in the Palestinian territories. This claim is underpinned in practice with the statements made by the Christian Palestinians that were interviewed in Jerusalem and West Bank within the scope of this dissertation. During my interviews, the Christian Palestinians expressed that they, as non-Muslims, had not been threatened by Hamas, had not been under any attack, and there had not been any conflict and; on the contrary, they had also been benefiting from the social opportunities offered by Hamas just as the other Muslim Palestinians in the Palestinian territories.¹¹⁴

It is clearly seen that Hamas and al-Qaeda are the poles apart in terms of targets, yet these two structures are introduced as if they were on the same boat due to a general habit of putting every Islamic organization into the same pot and stigmatizing them all as “terrorist organization”.

4.4. International Responses

The “War on Terror” Coalition, established by the US leadership after the September 11 attacks, aimed to organize large-scale attacks as a reaction against all kinds of terror threats – especially al-Qaeda-, conduct studies to prevent their attacks and eradicate every single cell of the terrorist groups. Since 2001, although the bombings and destruction-oriented actions against al-Qaeda and Taliban have destroyed their physical infrastructure in Afghanistan, the top leaders were not immediately killed but their activities were disrupted. Muslim communities worldwide still provide financial and human support to al-Qaeda to keep the organization alive, protect its global network and continue to expand its ideology.

¹¹⁴ We scanned the literature for the attitudes of Christians living in the occupied Palestinian territories towards Hamas and their interrelations, but have failed to find any study in this context. The comment given here is solely based on interviews made with a few Christian Palestinians.

The declaration of “state of alert” in the US and Europe to fight against al-Qaeda does not create a detrimental impact on al-Qaeda. Any means of traditional action such as capture, arrest, trial, imprisonment, humiliation and injury conducted to protect the West from the acts of terrorism just whipped al-Qaeda, contrary to what is expected, and resulted in more intensive violence.¹¹⁵ So, what is the scale of loss and damage? In the first six months of the struggle against al-Qaeda and Taliban, 16 out of 25 key leaders of al-Qaeda were killed. These include the leaders from various geographies namely, Bin Laden’s brother-in-law and the military commander of al-Qaeda Muhamad Atef, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Party of Turkestan Juma Namangani and Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad, Abu Salah al-Yemeni, Abu Jafar al-Jaziri, Abu Hafs and Muhammad Omar Abdel Rahman.¹¹⁶

Besides the military intervention orchestrated against the al-Qaeda staff following September 11 attacks, a series of economic intervention was also conducted. It was planned that in the short-term period, stopping the staff transfer from Pakistan to al-Qaeda would leave al-Qaeda in a difficult situation. Therefore, trade sanctions imposed by the US on Pakistan due to nuclear trials in Islamabad were abolished in 1998 and the US allowed the Pakistani import and export activities to reach 426 million dollars.¹¹⁷ It was assumed that the economic prosperity and comfort in the country would prevent or at least minimize the mujahids’ claims by means of terror.

Considering the stance of international public against Hamas, it seems impossible to interpret the situation from a single perspective. It depends on not only time and conditions but also the bilateral relations of the leaders. The only thing that does not change is the different attitude towards Hamas than al-Qaeda. It was observed that while al-Qaeda was placed on the top of terror lists and any means of fight against

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 300.

¹¹⁶ Debriefing of a senior Al Qaeda member, undisclosed location, 2002.

¹¹⁷ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 312.

al-Qaeda was considered legitimate; assault, one-to-one attack or complete destruction were not the pursued goals in terms of Hamas and even after 2006, following the establishment of the party system, the perception of Hamas has dramatically changed. Hamas has been discredited from since the very first day of its establishment due to its origins and relations with Muslim Brotherhood. Until the middle of 2000s, the international public and Israel were of the same mind declaring Hamas as a terrorist organization and rejecting any negotiations. Likewise, the policy pursued after Hamas' victory in 2006 also aimed to marginalize Hamas and strengthen the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Mahmud Abbas.¹¹⁸ However, the post-2006 evolved differently. Israel declared that they would have never negotiate with Hamas unless the international community declared a truce and officially recognized Israel and the Israel-Hamas agreements signed so far. However, the international perception, on the contrary, decided that it was not an effective way of solving the problem to leave Hamas out of the box and isolate it. The gradual dissolution of the diplomatic boycott enabled Hamas to manoeuvre.

Hamas, originally ignoring the importance of the diplomatic network and international relations, started to feel the absence of the network and good relations following the establishment of the party system and initiated bilateral relations, particularly with Asian and European countries. The close relations that Hamas first established with Switzerland were considered as the door to the West. This close network, which was officially declared in 2014, continued with official or private meetings of Hamas officials and Swiss diplomats in and out of the Gaza Strip.¹¹⁹ Political relations began with Switzerland, and continued with the support of Sweden. Many non-European countries from various geographies similarly started to consider Hamas as a legitimate actor. For instance; on 8 February 2014 at the Munich Security Conference, Qatar's Foreign Minister Khaled al- Attiyah's defense

¹¹⁸ Jerrol Kessel and Pierre Klochendler, "Hamas gaining international legitimacy", (May 2, 2009). Retrieved from <https://electronicintifada.net/content/hamas-gaining-international-legitimacy/8211> accessed on 17.08.2017.

¹¹⁹ Adnan Abu Amer, "Hamas expands international outreach", (March 12, 2015). Retrieved from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/hamas-foreign-relations-jihadism-eu.html> accessed on 22.11.2017.

of the Hamas movement before many European ministers against the Israeli Minister Yuval Steinitz who accused Hamas of being a terrorist organization heavily resonated among the public. Similar approaches can be observed from Latin American side. On February 12, a diplomatic delegation from Brazil visited the members of the Legislative Assembly of Hamas in Ramallah. They conducted bilateral meetings with Hamas politicians, namely Ahmad Atwan, Mohammad Tawtah and Ayman Daraghme. The relations with Asian part has also been well moderated. In this respect, a member of Hamas Political Bureau Muhammed Nasser paid an official visit to Indonesia and Malaysia to discuss the possibility of an official cooperation.¹²⁰

It appears that the bilateral relations with the Turkish side are even closer thanks to deep-rooted ties. In fact, Turkey was the first Muslim country to officially recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Israel after its foundation in 1948. Although Turkey didn't take a stand on the Israel-Palestine issue until the end of 1990s, the religion-based Welfare Party/the Government of Mr. Erbakan began to take a clear stance on the Palestinian side in 1996. The pro-Palestine policy pursued by the AKP Government, which came to power after 2002, positively deepened the Hamas-Turkey relations, especially following the establishment of the party system in Palestine in 2006. Turkey, officially recognizing the results of the 2006 elections, got in contact with Hamas. The Hamas delegation, including the Chief of the Political Bureau Khaled Meshaal, visited Ankara in March, 2006 and made a call for Turkey to give the Hamas Government the opportunity to prove itself in the eyes of Turkish foreign relations and the international relations and adopt a positive attitude towards Hamas.¹²¹ On 31 May 2010, the death of 6 Turkish civilians during the Israeli attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla which departed from Turkey to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip and deliver aid and support resulted in the freezing of Turkish-Israeli relations and deeply improved Turkey-Hamas relations.

It was the European Court's decision in December 2014 that increased the scope of Hamas' actions in terms of transnational relations. According to the decision, Hamas

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Muhsin Salih, "Türkiye'nin Hamas politikasının belirleyici unsurları", (April 23, 2014). Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiyenin-hamas-politikasinin-belirleyici-unsurlari>.

was removed from the terrorist blacklist. Such a decision provided a significant opportunity for Hamas to prove itself and improve the international relations.¹²²

While Hamas took steps to develop political relations and be officially recognized; Israel, on the other hand, continued a series of counter lobbying activities to convince the international community not to recognize the new Palestinian Government with Hamas. As justification, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that “If the international community recognizes and develops relations with Hamas, it would not strengthen peace but terror as Hamas is a terrorist organization with a primary objective to eradicate Israel”.¹²³

The United States of America, without doubt, plays the most determinant role in terms of the Israel-Palestine issue. It is observed that US policies are mainly in favor of Israel as the US considers Israel as its agent in the Middle East. Hamas, on the other hand, does not perceive the US as an absolute opponent party, and thinks that the US might play a key role in ending the Israeli occupation and removing the pressure on the Palestinians. Hamas also announced that if the US did not take a stance to end the occupation and could not influence Israel in this respect, this situation would contradict the values of justice, human dignity and democracy that the US unconditionally defends.¹²⁴ The US policy towards the Palestinians is to support the President of the State of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas who backs Fatah’s

¹²² Peter Beaumont, “Hamas taken off EU terror blacklist”, (December 17, 2014). Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/hamas-taken-off-eu-terror-blacklist> accessed on 02.08.2016.

¹²³ “Israeli PM Netanyahu urges international community not to recognize new Palestinian government with Hamas”, (June 2, 2014). Retrieved from <http://eipa.eu.com/2014/06/israels-netanyahu-urges-international-community-not-to-recognize-new-palestinian-government-with-hamas/>.

¹²⁴ “Ask Hamas”, Retrieved from <http://hamas.ps/en/page/13/FAQ> accessed on 11.05.2017.

staff and to break the resistance by weakening Hamas that openly struggles against Israel.¹²⁵

Obama mentioned in a statement about the issue that “I have said from the beginning that no country would tolerate rockets being launched into their cities. Consequently, I have consistently supported Israel’s right to defend itself, and that includes doing what it needs to do to prevent rockets from landing on population centers and, more recently, as we learned, preventing tunnels from being dug under their territory that can be used to launch terrorist attacks. I also think it is important to remember that Hamas acts extraordinarily irresponsibly when it is deliberately siting rocket launchers in population centers, putting populations at risk because of that particular military strategy.”¹²⁶ The point that Obama missed, or deliberately ignored, is that he considers Israel as vulnerable against the Hamas attacks and emphasizes that these attacks are unacceptable. Yet he never mentions the fact that it was Israel who first ignited the wick and considers Hamas as the center for pure military warfare strategies and prefers not to mention the social background, the transition to the party system and social services of Hamas. Even if Obama’s criticism may be partly seen accurate, this does not change the reality of his subjective approach.

Considering the tendencies in the Arab and Islamic World in general, it seems that there is a moderate attitude towards the Hamas movement by many Arab countries that are not proactive towards the Palestinians. As a matter of fact, the Hamas government, considering the regional dynamics and the common grounds in terms of religion and culture, paid an official visit after the Palestinian Parliamentary Elections in 2006 to many Middle-Eastern, Northern African and Gulf countries

¹²⁵ Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Lifts Embargo To Help Abbas”. (June 19, 2007). Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/18/AR2007061800123.html> accessed on 11.05.2017.

¹²⁶ “Remarks by the President at Press Conference After U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit”, (August 6, 2014). Retrieved from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/remarks-president-press-conference-after-us-africa-leaders-summit> accessed on 11.05.2017.

including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Libya, Sudan, Bahrein, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen and Iran. This shows that Hamas attaches great importance to the Arab World for the Palestinian issue.¹²⁷

Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections was a complete surprise for the US as Hamas, a US State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, managed to win 74 parliamentary seats out of 312 seats in the Palestinians Legislative Council. Following the elections, the US, Russia, the EU and the UN declared that their support for the Palestinian Authority could be sustained on the condition that Hamas would stop violence, recognize Israel and the Israel-Palestine agreements previously signed, which were rejected by Hamas.¹²⁸ As Fatah declined to join the Hamas-led coalition following the elections, the US and the EU declared that they would stop supporting the Hamas-formed Government and would provide aid to the country only through international and non-governmental organizations. The main aim of this attitude was to isolate and force Hamas to form a coalition with Fatah and agree to the conditions.¹²⁹ As a result, Hamas could no longer afford to pay salaries due to the financial difficulties, and poverty in the Palestinian territory increasingly gained momentum. This dramatically increased the tension in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to serious conflicts between Hamas and Fatah's security forces. The Mecca Accord was signed between the PA President, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal on February 8, 2007 to end the conflicts and establish a "National Unity Government". The structure of the newly established government included Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas wing as the President, and Hamas was awarded with 9 ministries, while Fatah received 6 ministries and the rest would be distributed between the small parties and the independent members. The independent members included Finance Minister Salam Fayyad –who was a world-

¹²⁷ "Filistin Sorunu ve Hamas'ın bölgesel ilişkileri", (December 21, 2007). Retrieved from http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD4211_filistin-sorunu-ve-hamasin-bolgesel-iliskileri.html accessed on 12.05.2017.

¹²⁸ Paul Morro, "International Reaction to the Palestinian Unity Government" Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22659.pdf> accessed on 03.06.2017.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

famous economist- and Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr who was a supporter of Mahmoud Abbas. The US attitude towards the reactions addressing the Unity Government did not differ much. The Bush administration declared that the Unity Government was a total disappointment and the US government would be open to dialogue only with the non-Hamas members. The US continued to support PA President Mr. Abbas. The only common ground within the scope of the stance of the US for Hamas during both Bush and Obama periods and also current period of the President Trump is to address the Palestinian National Authority and especially Mahmoud Abbas and to weaken, isolate, and marginalize Hamas by supporting the efforts made by Abbas to aggrandize and bring Al Fatah to the fore. This implies that Hamas is not regarded and/or addressed as a political player by the US despite of gaining ground in the political area following its election victory in 2006.

The approach of the EU was quite similar to that of the US. EU officials met the non-Hamas members following the establishment of the Unity Government. The reason behind this attitude was that the settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue was believed to be the key role to reshape the Middle East. Despite the negative attitude of the EU, 10 members of the European Parliament paid an official visit to Hamas President Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip on May 1, 2007; which was followed by an announcement of the EU spokesman underlining that such negotiations should not be perceived as any change in the EU policy.¹³⁰

It is observed that the UN approach towards Hamas – slightly supportive of the opposition- was not clear enough. Neither the UN Security Council nor the UN General Assembly has made any decisions or made amendments against the Unity government. However, Ban Ki-Moon's rejection of meeting Hamas officials and only meeting with PA President Abbas during his Palestine visit in 2007 and his

¹³⁰ Jamie Smyth, "MEPs Ignore EU Policy of Boycotting Hamas Officials", *Irish Times*, May 2, 2007.

statement underlining that the political atmosphere was still not clear enough after the new government, was an explicit indication of the UN's hesitant approach.¹³¹

The reaction of the Arab states was that they must play a role in the Israel-Palestine issue. Accordingly, the Arab League appointed Jordan and Egypt for the peace talks during which there was no negative or positive attitude adopted towards either Hamas or Israel and the only priority for the sake of the region was to solve the problem regardless of the parties included. It was also observed that the approach of Saudi Arabia and Iran differed slightly. Saudi King Abdullah made a call to end the international boycott against the Palestinian National Authority in light of the Unity Government established between Fatah and Hamas, and stated that the problem would only be solved if Israel withdrew from the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 and an independent Palestinian state was established with Jerusalem as the capital. In the light of the fact that these requests are also on the bargaining agenda of Hamas, it can be interpreted that Saudi Arabia supports Hamas and its requests.

Iran's reaction should separately be interpreted as Iran has provided arms, financial aid and military training since Hamas' establishment. Although the Shiite-Sunni tension peaked in the 2000s, Iran has never stopped supporting Hamas, and Hamas officials never neglect to visit Tahrān. The close stance of Iran towards Hamas is the result of Iran's clear opposition to Israel. According to IMF data, a large part of the \$ 70 million in cash that entered the Palestinian territory in 2006 came from Iran.¹³²

Considering the reaction of Russia, which is the second super power after the US, they have had a very lively dialogue with Hamas officials since the very beginning. Russia holds a mediatory position in the Arab-Israel struggle by leaving the dialogue channels open for both parties as Russia believes that it is wrong to leave Hamas out of the picture.

¹³¹ "Secretary General's Joint Press Conference with President Mahmoud Abbas," (Ramallah, March 25, 2007), Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printoffthecuff.asp?nid=998> accessed on 04.06.2017.

¹³² IMF, "West Bank and Gaza: Fiscal Performance in 2006," (March 2007). Retrieved from <https://www.imf.org/~media/external/np/wbg/2007/eng/032607fp.ashx> accessed on 15.06.2017.

4.5. Current Positions

After 9/11, the coalition powers within the Global War on terrorism carried out activities to expel al-Qaeda from their Taliban-controlled Afghani base. Having this purpose in mind, they destroyed training system in the bases, almost two third of the organization members were either killed or neutralized alive.¹³³ Yet it is still unclear point that to what extent al-Qaeda were taken out of the game. The organization proceeds on its way stronger than even before as regional cleanup is not sufficient to inactivate the organization. As I already described al-Qaeda in the beginning of this study, I underlined that al-Qaeda is not a central organization but rather a network of an ideology, a world perspective. The main reason behind is the unique structure of the organization.

Hamas, having been transforming dramatically since its foundation, experienced the most efficient transformation in the eyes of global public due to the 2006 elections of the Palestine Legislative Assembly, without question. Hamas, which was not approved by many even before it became a party, when it was only a social service network and resistance movement, started to draw even more reaction following its victory in 2006. Hamas thought that the assembly order and elections conditions were not fair and therefore boycotted the 1996 elections, which facilitated the work of al-Fatah and paved the way for the single party regime of al-Fatah until 2006. Yet the general elections in 2006 created concerns among many who were closely and/or remotely involved in the Palestinian problem. According to the election results, Hamas managed to win 72 seats out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Assembly, leaving al-Fatah only with 45 MP.¹³⁴

The motives behind the astonishing success of Hamas are actually not surprising. The result was inevitable due to the policies followed by Hamas itself and the fact that other actors and developments unwittingly served for the rise of Hamas. The

¹³³ Randy Borum & Michael Gelles, "Al-Qaeda's Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational Perspectives", *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, Vol. 23, 2005, p. 472.

¹³⁴ Jamil Hilal, "Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls: 1994-2005", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No.3, (Spring 2006), p. 16.

conditions of that time revealed that the Oslo Peace Talks, far from contributing to the peace process, made the process even more complicated. Under these circumstances, Hamas not only made itself apparent in helping the Palestinians through its social services network but also continued the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.¹³⁵ The main reason leaving for al-Fatah to lose its credibility with the Palestinians was that al-Fatah avoided the armed struggle and served certain activities legitimizing the Israeli occupation and intensifying the violence. Due to this reason, al-Fatah already lost its social legitimacy to a great extent in advance of the elections in 2006. In addition, the corruption and fraud cases involving the al-Fatah members also paved the way for Hamas' success.

Although Hamas never gave up the armed struggle, they preferred using a language that is civil, speaking to the heart of society and responding to the daily problems of the Palestinians, rather than using the language of the military and the armed struggle, a fact which led Hamas to gain sympathy with the Palestinian public.¹³⁶

In the new era, Hamas appears as a new actor going beyond being a resistance movement or a social service network, successfully combining the resistance with democratic elections. The method adopted, although insufficient to completely eliminate criticism, is a good method to understand the role of Hamas in terms of the Palestinian problem and its solution. Meliha Altunışık also states that peace without Hamas is not possible; in other words, it is not possible to build peace without including Hamas in one way or another regardless of the fact that Hamas is the ruling party or represented in a sufficient or insufficient way in the parliament.

¹³⁵ Graham Usher, 'Hamas Risen', Middle East Report 238, (Spring 2006), Retrieved from <https://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/hamas-risen> accessed on 10.08.2017.

¹³⁶ Mahjoob Zweiri, "The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2006), p. 676, 678.

Although Hamas' participation to the system brings along certain challenges, it is still promising for the peace talks.¹³⁷

The adventure that Hamas –as the elected ruling party- has been experiencing since 2006 when it came to power bears no resemblance to the well-known adventures of democracy. Let us assume that a party having the majority in parliament does not have the power required for governance and it is somehow isolated from the decision-making missions. Many parties including the US and EU who did not recognize Hamas and put embargo were not pleased with Hamas victory aimed at driving Hamas into a corner through the policies they implemented. Thus, Hamas was in fact under an economic blockade and its revenues for the payment of services and labor were cut because of the embargo led by the US, EU member states and many other countries.¹³⁸ The prior objective of this international embargo was to make Hamas officially recognize Israel. However, they never spoke of concessions by Israel. Beyond any doubt, Gaza Strip paid the price for all those occupations and air strikes. Hamas was unable to provide the Gaza Strip with fundamental needs such as food and water, medication, etc. because of the embargo. Consequently, hunger and health problems prevailing in the region increased the mortality of the Palestinians.

Hamas has also suffered from the lack of an objective mastermind in the political arena since the day it came to power. As Mahmud Abbas, the President of Palestine, had close relations with al-Fatah, he used his power and position to render Hamas helpless by assigning al-Fatah members to the positions in the bureaucracy, aid and security. An obvious example is that the selection of the members of Constitutional Court was completely given to Abbas. In this case, the senior authority tries to execute what the President wants and veto what the President does not approve of

¹³⁷ Meliha Altunışık, Speech at Palestine Conference after Elections, Ankara, SETA Foundation. Retrieved from www.setav.org.

¹³⁸ Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, p. 121.

instead of reviewing the legality of the laws enacted by parliament and solving the possible problems between parliament and the President.¹³⁹

Hamas, although most of its MPs were arrested, has been struggling with the MPs on duty under quite challenging situations. In fact, the divided lands of Palestine widely impact political will. The members of Hamas who were elected as MPs in the Gaza Strip could not enter into the West Bank in consequence of Hamas' isolation policy implemented in the Hamas-occupied territories. By reason of this disconnection, the assemblies were convened separately in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the difficulty in political communication naturally has an impact on governance.¹⁴⁰

The fact that Abbas tried to support al-Fatah and passivate Hamas increased the trouble in Palestine. In fact, many people began to mention that this situation may turn into a civil war. Since 2006, the idea of establishing a National Unity between al-Fatah and Hamas was inconclusive.¹⁴¹

Mahmud Abbas was opposed to the idea of National Unity which was proposed for Hamas and al-Fatah. Al-Fatah also abstained and put forward certain conditions that Hamas could not accept. Hamas, on the other hand, implied on occasion that it is ready for cooperation and joint struggle with al-Fatah to free Palestine from Zionism and the occupation. Moreover, Hamas made concessions to many conditions and mentioned that Abbas might continue negotiations with Israel if he desires, the Palestinian militia could unite under the Palestinian Army to be established under the Palestine government and Hamas could be flexible in complying with the current agreements between Israel and the PLO unless "Fundamental National Palestine

¹³⁹ Charmaine Seitz, "Fatah Ventures into Uncharted Territory", Middle East Report Online, April 19, 2006, Retrieved from <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041906> accessed on 20.06.2017.

¹⁴⁰ Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, p. 122.

¹⁴¹ Nigel Parry, "Palestine on the Brink of Civil War?", The Electronic Intifada, (December 15, 2006), Retrieved from <https://electronicintifada.net/> accessed on 15.06.2017.

Principles” were removed or violated.¹⁴² In other words, the al-Fatah and Abbas wing never leaned towards any kind of unity/negotiations while Hamas adopted a positive attitude towards correctly based political agreements/negotiations.

Al-Qaeda was committed to continue all its increasingly violent actions in despite of all losses for its fight against “War on Terror” coalition led by USA. Indeed, Al-Zawahiri legitimizes the tactics and terrorist actions of al-Qaeda in his book “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner- Meditations on the Jihadist Movement” as mentioned below:

1. The need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.
2. The need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties.
3. The targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an impact on the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop its brutality, arrogance and disregard for all taboos and customs. It must restore the struggle to its real size.
4. To reemphasize what we have already explained, we reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.¹⁴³

The fact that Hamas had its own share of the persecution restored Hamas to play the leading role in the national-based Palestinian resistance led by Hamas. The occupying Israeli forces plotted many assassinations through targeted attacks. The attacks, previously targeting the leaders and members of al-Fatah, have been channeled towards Hamas since 2000s upon the fact that Hamas gained strengths and supported by the Palestinian public. This new trend resulted in killing of more than 300 Hamas leaders and members. The objective was to break the resistance and clear off the political leaders who dominated the organization.

In the aftermath of Usama bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda had to change its ideological direction in terms of terrorism. Although ISIL came into prominence and al-Qaeda was overshadowed, al-Qaeda maintains its existence and bloody terrorist actions.

¹⁴² Graham Usher, “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah and the Palestinian Elections”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Spring 2006), (20-36), p. 34.

¹⁴³ Ayman al- Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner- Meditations on the Jihadist Movement*, (London, December 2, 2001), p. 66.

The American intervention in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks forced bin Laden to withdraw. Bin Laden fairly lost its former power although he somehow maintained his network with the other groups he previously interacted with. Particularly following the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, Iraqi al-Qaeda pursued different policies than the central organization and attacked the Shi'ites instead of fighting against the US in particular and the West in general, which paved the way for the ultimate break. The ISIL terrorist organization, which had broken its connection with al-Qaeda and started to be increasingly active, took over control in the region after the leader of Iraqi al-Qaeda, Zarqawi was killed by the US in 2006. It was considered that al-Qaeda lost its coordinated power once Usama bin Laden was killed by the US in 2011. It was also alleged that Zawahiri, the successor of bin Laden, did not establish a mutual relation with the related Jihadist groups. The rise of ISIL completely damaged al-Qaeda's credit. The leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the Caliphate in 2014 and the majority of the Jihadist groups left al-Qaeda and started to join ISIL forces¹⁴⁴.

Both the civil war in Syria and domestic instability in Iraq in the last 3-4 years helped ISIL to expand its influence area. In Dabiq, the journal of ISIL which is published in English, al-Qaeda was defined as an already expired organization, and ISIL mentioned that they would never let any other organization, especially al-Qaeda, dominate over ISIL-dominated territories.¹⁴⁵ It is unknown whether al-Qaeda can come to prominence again after the rise of ISIL, however it is obvious that al-Qaeda did not dissolve, and is still, and will continue to be, a bloody terrorist organization although it was confronted and forced to struggle against rivals.

¹⁴⁴ 'El Kaide'nin ikinci nefesi', Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/tr/el-kaidenin-ikinci-nefesi/a-19229605> accessed on 25.06.2017.

¹⁴⁵ "El Kaide'den tarihi itiraf: DAEŞ bizi parçaladı." (June 12, 2015). Retrieved from <http://www.ahaber.com.tr/dunya/2015/06/12/el-kaideden-tarhi-itiraf-daes-bizi-parcaladi> accessed on 25.06.2017.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As long as al-Qaeda and its associate groups can appeal to Muslims worldwide to share its ideals, aims and objectives, its support and operational cells will regenerate and multiply.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the responsibility of international arena and all counter terrorism groups is to prevent people's tendency to join underground organizations by meeting the needs of the people who are supported by these organizations. At this point, any person, organization or state offering any kind of infrastructure or sponsorship for the organizations should be dissuaded through sanctions either political or commercial. However, only imposing sanctions would not be enough for many cases. Under these circumstances, all the Western world -especially the US- should highlight any kind of economic, political and diplomatic means of counter terrorism actions. Working in cooperation with the Muslim countries that are the backbone of pro-Islamic organizations such as al-Qaeda in terms of human capital, their governments and citizens and positioning them in the heart of the struggle must be the prioritized objective. In order to completely eliminate the problem, the true source of the problem must be targeted.

Before proceeding to the counterterrorism diplomacy stage, eliminating the active armed groups with military methods can also be implemented as a method. As mentioned by David Galula in his book "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice", the guerilla forces must be eliminated to prevent the unification of rebels and their growth with resurgence in the regions/conflict zones to be determined with priority. This, of course, will not bring the terrorist activities to a complete halt, but initially transforming them into small and ineffective groups and limiting their

¹⁴⁶ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 309.

means of mobility could be the short-term target.¹⁴⁷ Thereafter, propaganda activities will be initiated to announce to both the general public and also to the own groups of guerilla forces that the latter suffered serious casualties and were weakened step by step so as to disrupt the legitimacy and future of the terrorist movement; thus, the movement will be simmered. During the subsequent process, efforts will be made to initiate a dialogue process with the guerilla as far as possible and the moderate rebels will be offered to remain neutral until the peace is made completely or they will be warned that the military operations would continue at full steam.¹⁴⁸ According to David Galula, military operations will still continue at the second stage; but, the operations will be at a much smaller scale. Rather than the small-scale fight against rebels, the community will be prioritized at this stage and the security of civilians and other persons in charge during the struggle will be generally ensured by deploying static units. The counterinsurgent forces that are called as static units and remain in a communication network will be assuming a strategic duty in the military intervention.¹⁴⁹ Although the abovementioned stage categorization of David Galula has some further stages, only these two stages seem practicable for al-Qaeda; however, the elimination of the military wing or the prevention of attacks in the first place is not in question when it comes to Hamas. Because, it is envisaged regarding the question of Palestine that the military wing of Hamas will automatically be abolished and the counterattacks will discontinue where a solution process involving dialogue with Hamas and where the Israeli attacks, to which Hamas reacts with a defense strategy, end.

In addition, to eliminate al-Qaeda's attractiveness and support in Muslim eyes around the world, its ideology must be discredited.¹⁵⁰ Although it is not possible to completely achieve this by making strong propaganda supporting that this is not true Islam and its requirements, and making reasonable recommendations, still the effects can be mitigated. Unfortunately, it is observed that all the parties united

¹⁴⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, London, 2006, p. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 76, 77.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 77, 78.

¹⁵⁰ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 315.

against the common threat of terrorism cannot reach a consensus and paved the way for islamophobia by adding fuel to the current situation. Guaratna, making a detailed analysis of al-Qaeda's future and lifespan, states:

Every terrorist group has a life span. Al-Qaeda's life span will be determined by the ability and the willingness of the anti-terrorist coalition to destroy its leadership, counter its ideology, marginalize its support and disrupt its recruitment. Unlike most terrorist groups of the twentieth century, Al-Qaeda is multidimensional. In the lexicon of modern international terrorism, a multidimensional group challenges the enemy on the military, political and socio-economic fronts. Therefore, the key to overcoming Al-Qaeda is to interlock and engage with it on all its critical fronts. Although the West can help Muslim rulers and regimes to fight Al-Qaeda on the military plane, there is little it can do to politically isolate it and win over its support base. As Al-Qaeda poses a durable long-term threat to Muslims worldwide, it is the Muslim elite who must stand up and fight the threat it represents. The West can help, but it is a battle that can best be fought and won by Muslims against Muslims.¹⁵¹

It is obvious that Hamas has dramatically changed since the day it was founded and differentiated itself from many other organizations which are classified as terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Nowadays, Hamas functions as an officially-elected political party. The fact that Hamas still has the characteristics of a resistance movement and consequently continues the armed struggle is directly associated with the fact that Israel is constantly increasing the dimension of occupation and its cruel actions.

In the environment where Hamas has developed the number of illegal Israeli settlements to legitimize the Israeli occupation on Palestinian territory, constructed wall of shame to isolate the Palestinians from the rest of the world and even from each other and discriminated against the Palestinians by ignoring all fundamental human rights and freedoms since 1948, Hamas gives the green light to conduct negotiations and solve the problem in democratic terms as long as its red lines are respected, while Israel never mentions sitting around the same table, and its missile strikes against civilians indicate that Israel will not give up the armed struggle. 'These are the most evident attacks of the Israeli regime against the Palestinians in 2016: 27.335 Zionist settlements were constructed, 6970 Palestinians were arrested

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 318.

in the West Bank, 1240 children and 151 women were arrested in Jerusalem and Gaza Strip, 1023 households and various institutions were set on fire in the West Bank and Jerusalem'.¹⁵²

The staff who initially worked for the Muslim Brotherhood before the 1980s and later functioned for Hamas not only maintained their initial Islamic identity from the past, but also struggled for the freedom of the Palestinians and the occupied Palestinian territory and will continue to do so. Therefore, it is vital to emphasize the national aspect of the movement, which is the main difference between the other main subject of this study, namely al-Qaeda and Hamas. In this comparison, the national struggle of Hamas for the liberation of Palestine stands completely opposite to the alleged struggle of al-Qaeda for Islam and Ummah.

As a result of the comparison between Hamas and al-Qaeda in terms of their geographical action arena, their objectives, their perceptions by the international arena and the reactions towards them, and their current situations, I am convinced that their structures are completely dissimilar to each other. It is clearly shown that it is not reasonable to identify two completely opposite structures –one is an organization and the other one is a resistance movement- as Islamic terrorist organizations just because the geographies where they emerged and their ideologies have the Islamic characteristics. The common conclusion of hundreds of books and articles on al-Qaeda is the fact that this organization –without any doubt- is a terrorist organization. Both the definitions of terror in the literature so far, and all types of actions mentioned and prohibited in the Quran describe al-Qaeda. The various definitions of terror in an academic context are stated in the first part. In the academic context, terror can be defined as the systematic violent acts against laws and legislations to terrorize and discourage.¹⁵³ However, the statements in Quran and Islam are quite ground breaking and interesting. Contrary to the common belief,

¹⁵² “2016 Yılında Filistin”, (January 01, 2017). Retrieved from <https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2017/01/01/1284349/2016-yılında-filistin> accessed on 02.07.2017.

¹⁵³ Prof.Dr. Remzi Kaya, “Kuran Ayetleri Işığında Terör ve Çözüm Önerileri”, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt 17, Sayı 2, 2008, p. 10, 11, 12.

this concept which is frequently used by different organizations including al-Qaeda to legitimize their activities is prohibited in Quran and Islamic culture regardless of who is the object of actions and strictly opposes to defeatism and violence. Yet, Quran describes the act of killing and shedding blood as a murder against all the humanity. In the Ma'idah section, 32nd verse of the Quran, it is stated that

Because of that ... whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption (done) in the land, it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one, it is as if he had saved mankind entirely...¹⁵⁴.

It is also stated in a hadith that “No doubt, your blood, goods, honors, bodies are wrong as the holy day in the holy month in the holy city, they have impunity... after me, do not be (like) the infidels beheading (killing) each other.”¹⁵⁵ It is obvious that al-Qaeda “abuses Islam for the sake of Islam” for its own interest although there are many verses and hadiths as explained above. On the other hand, Hamas never makes such a reference. The victory of Hamas in 2006 elections was taken as an excuse by US, Israel, EU and certain Arab regimes including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia to impose embargo and suppression instead of strengthening the democracy in Palestine, the public was punished just because they elected Hamas.¹⁵⁶ It is still clear that Hamas' interest is not personal but rather national considering the fact that Hamas emphasizes the importance of acting in line with democracy under these circumstances and gave the green light to establishing a coalition government with al-Fatah although they have different views. Maybe the main question - “Today it is Hamas but which organization will be next?”- resulted from the concerns of those who do not accept Hamas as an officially and legally elected political party and still identify it as a terrorist organization in 2017. It must be clearly pointed out that just because a terrorist organization expresses itself by integrating into the political system after a certain point does not attribute “innocence” to that organization. Let

¹⁵⁴ *MÂÏDE Suresi 32. Ayet-i Kerime Tefsiri. For further infomation see: <http://www.kurantefsiri.com/kuran/maide-suresi-ayet-32-kuran-tefsiri.aspx>.*

¹⁵⁵ Prof.Dr. Remzi Kaya, “Kuran Ayetleri Işığında Terör ve Çözüm Önerileri”, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt 17, Sayı 2, 2008, p. 11.

¹⁵⁶ Doyran, *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*, p. 133.

us assume that –however unlikely- an organization like al-Qaeda enters political life and becomes an elected party in a country. This does not change the fact that it is still a terrorist organization that conducted terrorist actions once upon a time. In other words, the politicization process is not a tool used to acquire innocence and/or legitimacy. Because if one group’s main objective and tool is “terror”, then transforming into a political party or any other version cannot make it innocent and legitimize in the eyes of people. In this context, there must be a different approach adopted for Hamas. Speaking of Hamas, we mainly refer to a resistance organization without having terrorist sakes, is a legitimate national resistance movement and represents the Palestinians on the political level by having gradually adapted itself to the current conjuncture and serving its nation through social services networks. In this study, we are trying to reveal the fact if Hamas is of a terrorist organization nature through a comparison with al-Qaeda, an indisputable terrorist organization. However, everyone can ask the question in the last instance that “So, what about the military/armed wing of Hamas and their attacks, how we are supposed to consider them?” Hamas’s tactics of using suicide bombers against Israeli soldiers and -in some cases- Israeli civilians is justified due to the inequality of the two sides’ military strength and rightness of their cause. What we must take note of at this point is that in what areas, for what reason, and against what Hamas exerts and/or is supposed to exert its armed forces? Had Hamas been a movement that had the purpose of killing, setting on fire, destroying, and terrorizing and that aims at civilians, it could have done these in the West Bank and Jerusalem too with the help of its members; however, it did and is not acting in this manner. The fact that the armed struggle against Israel by the Qassam Brigades occurs only in Gaza indicates that this is maybe a resistance and response by the Palestinian against Israeli attacks on Gaza to protect Gaza, as the only place they could dominate, and personally themselves. When we think about the bombing attacks, missile strikes, firing on Gaza by Israel, it is extremely natural for Hamas to organize a military/armed wing to try to protect the Palestinian people by means of a near-equal military force in direct proportion to the impossibility and irrationality of the reaction of the Palestinian to these attacks with stones and fists. Would Hamas still have organized an armed wing to counterattack and target the Israeli had Israel not organized armed attacks on Gaza? So far, we never had the opportunity to test this yet Israeli attacks

continued without ceasing. Had this been the case, we then could have put forward that the aim of Hamas was not organized to resist or to protect the Palestinian people, but to target the Israeli and to kill and terrorize them. However, it is not possible to make such a remark under current conditions. For this reason, it will not be wrong to allege that an aspect of the future of the Palestinian, who have no other chance to protect their right to live in Gaza, is protected by means of the military/armed resistance of Hamas and to legitimate the status in this case. Even considering the matter from the standpoint of “right to live”, as the most basic human right, will be sufficient for such a conclusion.

Besides, -in global context-, Hamas should also not be analyzed in the same context with Irish Republican Army (IRA). Since IRA’s separatist independence sake and the way of action are totally different from Hamas. While IRA uses terror to bring independence for Northern Ireland from Great Britain, Hamas tries to keep Palestine territory and the rights of Palestinians in the case of Israeli attacks and the violation of rights.

Up to this point that we recently arrived, we have been facing the problem of terrorism which is a reality of our times. There is still a question mark about when this will end or how many lives have to be lost to pay the price. Only when the states/governments that are the victims and respondents of this situation make an objective assessment by avoiding the stereotypes and non-ethical interests about terrorism and the affiliated organizations, it is possible to understand who is what and maybe in time more sound steps can be taken to achieve a true solution.

REFERENCES

- Abu Amer, Adnan. " Hamas expands international outreach". (March 12, 2015). <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/hamas-foreign-relations-jihadism-eu.html> (22.11.2017).
- Abu-Amr, Ziad. " Hamas: A Historical and Political Background". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.22, No.4, Summer 1993.
- Abu-Amr, Ziad. *Batı Şeria ve Gazze'de İslami Direniş: Hamas ve İslami Cihad*. İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 1998.
- Abul Ala Maududi , [www. Counterextremism.com/extremists/abul-ala-maududi](http://www.Counterextremism.com/extremists/abul-ala-maududi) (22.03.2017).
- Al- Zawahiri, Ayman. "Knights Under The Prophet's Banner- Meditations On The Jihadist Movement". London, December 2, 2001.
- Altunışık, Meliha. Speech at Palestine Conference after Elections. Ankara, SETA Foundation. www.setav.org (15.04.2017).
- Amayreh, Khaled. "Profile: Ismail Haniya". (February 22, 2006). <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/20084916260799585.html> (18.10.2016).
- Ask Hamas, <http://hamas.ps/en/page/13/FAQ> (11.05.2017).
- Bal, İhsan. *Terörizm: Terör, Terörizm ve Küresel Terörle Mücadelede Ulusal ve Belgesel Deneyimler*. 2006, Ankara.
- Barber, Victoria. "The Evolution of Al Qaeda's Global Network and Al Qaeda Core's Position Within it: A Network Analysis". (2015) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/469/html> (15.05.2016).

- Beaumont, Peter. " Hamas taken off EU terror blacklist". (December 17, 2014).
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/hamas-taken-off-eu-terror-blacklist> (02.08.2016).
- Bishara, Marwan, *Filistin / İsrail: Barış veya Irkçılık*. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003.
- Bombings Kill at least 171 Iraqis in Baghdad. (18.04.2007)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18cnd-baghdad.html>
(10.04.2019).
- Bonner, Michael. *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices*. Princeton, 2006.
- Borum, Randy & Gelles, Michael. "Al Qaeda's Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational Perspectives." *Mental Health Law&Policy Faculty Publications*, 2005.
- Brachman, Jarnet M. "*Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*". New York, 2009.
- Budeiri, Musa K. "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements in Palestinian Politics". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No.3, Spring 1995.
- Burke, Jason. "Think Again: Al-Qaeda", *Foreign Policy*, (June 2004),
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/think-again-al-qaeda-4/> (06.02.2018).
- Burke, Jason. *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*. New York, 2004.
- Bush, G. W. 'State Of The Union Address', 29 January 2002, Transcript Available
At www.whitehouse.gov. (11.01.2019).
- Calvert, John. *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam*. Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Çubukçu, Mete, *Bizim Filistin*, Metis Yayınları 2002.
- Death toll of Al Qaeda attacks: more than 4,400 lives. (May 6, 2011)
<http://npsglobal.org/eng/news/29-non-state-actors/1034-al-qaeda-attacks-death-toll-more-than-4400-lives.html> (05.05.2016).

Debriefing of a senior Al Qaeda member, undisclosed location, 2002.

Demant, Peter R. *Islam Vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World*. London, 2006.

Devji, Faisal. *The Terrorist in Search of Humanity*. London, Hurts Publisher, 2008.

Doyran, Ersin. *Bir Direniş Hareketi Olarak: Hamas*. 2008, Ankara.

Ed. by Chaliand, Gerard & Blin, Arnaud. *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda*. University of California Press, London, 2007.

Eikmeier, Dale C. "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism". *Parameters*, Spring 2007.

El Kaide'den Tarihi İtiraf: DAES Bizi Parçaladı. (June 12, 2015).
<http://www.ahaber.com.tr/dunya/2015/06/12/el-kaideden-tarhi-itiraf-daes-bizi-parcaladi> (25.06.2017).

El Kaide'nin İkinci Nefesi. <http://www.dw.com/tr/el-kaidenin-ikinci-nefesi/a-19229605> (25.06.2017).

Filistin Sorunu ve Hamas'ın Bölgesel İlişkileri. (December 21, 2007).
http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD4211_filistin-sorunu-ve-hamasin-bolgesel-iliskileri.html (12.05.2017).

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory And Practice*, 2006, London.

Gunaratna, Rohan. "Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure And Its Evolution".
Studies In Conflict And Terrorism. December 2010.

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York, 2003.

HaCohen, Ran. "The Apartheid Wall". (May 21, 2003).
<http://www.antiwar.com/hacohen/h052103.html> (01.06.2016).

Hamas and Kin: The Terrorists.
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/9780817947729_77.pdf (02.06.2017).

Hamas Charter, Article 7-Article 9. For further information see: Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, Washington DC, 2000, Appendix.

Hamas. "Introductory Memorandum". For further information see: Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*, Washington DC, 2000, Appendix.

Hardy, Roger. "Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and The War on Terror" in *Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers*, ed. By Madawi Al-Rasheed. New York, Columbia University Press, 2008.

Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-00080-Trans.pdf>.

Hellmich, Christina. "Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, 2008.

Hilal, Jamil. "Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls: 1994-2005". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No.3, Spring 2006.

Hroub, Khaled. "Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 33, No.4, Summer 2004.

Hroub, Khaled. *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 2nd Edition. Pluto Press, 2010.

Hroub, Khaled. *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington DC, 2000. Hamas Charter- Article 15.

Hutchison, Nicole & Pyster, Art. "al-qaeda: Study of Decentralized Organization". January 2010, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265027902/download> (15.03.2016).

IMF. "West Bank and Gaza: Fiscal Performance in 2006". (March 2007). <https://www.imf.org/~media/external/np/wbg/2007/eng/032607fp.ashx> (15.06.2017).

Israeli PM Netanyahu urges international community not to recognize new Palestinian government with Hamas, (June 2, 2014). <http://eipa.eu.com/2014/06/israels-netanyahu-urges-international-community-not-to-recognize-new-palestinian-government-with-hamas/> (03.08.2016).

İslam İlmihali 1, TDV Yayınları, 2002.

Jansen, Johannes J.G., "İbn Taymiyyah and the Thirteenth Century: A Formative Period of Modern Muslim Radicalism", *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, Vol. 5/6, Gli Arabi nella Storia: Tanti Popoli una Sola Civiltà (1987-1988), pp. 391-396.

Kaya, Remzi. "Kuran Ayetleri Işığında Terör ve Çözüm Önerileri". *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt 17, Sayı 2, 2008.

Kessel, Jerrol & Klochendler, Pierre. " Hamas gaining international legitimacy". (May 2, 2009). <https://electronicintifada.net/content/hamas-gaining-international-legitimacy/8211> (17.08.2017).

Kessler, Glenn. "U.S. Lifts Embargo To Help Abbas". (June 19, 2007). <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/18/AR2007061800123.html> (11.05.2017).

Knudsen, Are. "Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon". *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005.

Kupferschmidt, Uri M. "Reformist and Militant Islam in Urban and Rural Egypt", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1987.

LeVine, Mark. "Chaos, Globalization and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine". *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3, Summer 2006.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003.

London bombings of 2005. <https://www.britannica.com/event/London-bombings-of-2005>. (10.04.2019).

Lough, Richard (August 19, 2008). "Pursuing al-Qaeda in Horn of Africa". Al Jazeera English. (10.04.2019).

Mâide Suresi 32. Ayet-i Kerime Tefsiri. For Further Infomation See: <http://www.kurantefsiri.com/kuran/maide-suresi-ayet-32-kuran-tefsiri.aspx> (12.08.2017).

- Manfred B. Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism", *New Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2009, p. 534.
- Martin, Gus. *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*. California, 2014.
- Matusitz, Jonathan. *Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction*. SAGE Publications, 2013.
- McGeary, Johanna & Hamad, Jamil & Klein, Aharon & Rees, Matt, "Inside Hamas". *Time Canada*, Vol. 163, May 2004.
- Mendelsohn, Barak. "Al Qaeda's Franchising Strategy", *Survival*, Vol. 53, June-July 2011.
- Mishal, Shaul & Sela, Avraham. *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, New York, 2000.
- Mishal, Shaul. "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective". *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4.
- Morro, Paul. "International Reaction to the Palestinian Unity Government". <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22659.pdf> (03.06.2017).
- Öner, Ali. *Dünden Bugüne Filistin*. Ekin Yayınları, 2006.
- Pape, Robert. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005.
- Parry, Nigel. "Palestine on the Brink of Civil War?", *The Electronic Intifada*, (December 15, 2006), <https://electronicintifada.net/> (15.06.2017).
- Pipes, Daniel. "Militant Islam Reaches America". W. W. Norton & Company.
- Remarks by the President at Press Conference After U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. (August 6, 2014). <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/remarks-president-press-conference-after-us-africa-leaders-summit> (11.05.2017).

Robinson, Glenn E. " Hamas as Social Movement", *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. ed. By Wictorowicz, Quintan. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Pres, 2004.

Salih, Muhsin. "Türkiye'nin Hamas politikasının belirleyici unsurları". (April 23, 2014). <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiyenin-hamas-politikasinin-belirleyici-unsurlari> (10.08.2016).

Schmid Alex P. & Jongman Albert J. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988.

Secretary General's Joint Press Conference with President Mahmoud Abbas. (Ramallah, March 25, 2007). <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printoffthecuff.asp?nid=998> (04.06.2017).

Seitz, Charmaine, "Fatah Ventures into Uncharted Territory", *Middle East Report Online*, (April 19, 2006). <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041906> (20.06.2017).

September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts. (04.09.2018) <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html> (10.04.2019).

Smyth, Jamie. "MEPs Ignore EU Policy of Boycotting Hamas Officials". *Irish Times*, May 2, 2007.

Soherwordi, Syed Hussain Shaheed & Khattak, Shadid Ali. "Operation Geronimo: Assassination of Osama Bin Ladin and its implications on the US-Pakistan relations, War on Terror, Pakistan and Al-Qaeda". *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, July-December 2011.

Spencer, Alexander. "Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism'". *Peace Conflict & Development*, Vol. 8, January 2006.

Strindberg, Anders & Warn, Mats. "Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, The Palestinian Rejectionists and Al-Qa'ida Compared". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Spring 2005.

Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993), <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx> (10.04.2019).

Tristram, Pierre. "Bin Laden's Declaration of War on the United States,1996". <https://www.thoughtco.com/bin-laden-declare-war-on-us-2353589> (18.09.2017).

Usher, Graham. " Hamas Risen". Middle East Report 238, (Spring 2006). <https://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/hamas-risen> (10.08.2017).

Usher, Graham. "The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah and the Palestinian Elections". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3. Spring 2006.

Voll, John O. "Political Islam and the State", *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*. Ed. by John L. Esposito, Emad El-din Shahin, Oxford University Press, 2013.

Whelan, Richard. *Al-Qaedaism / The Threat to Islam, The Treat to the World*. Irelans, Ashfield Press, 2005.

Whelan, Richard. *El-Kaidecilik: İslam'a Tehdit, Dünya'ya Tehdit*. Ankara, 2006.

Wynbrandt, James. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York, Facts on File Inc, 2004.

Zweiri, Mahjoob. "The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake?". *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2006.

2016 Yılında Filistin, (January 01, 2017). <https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2017/01/01/1284349/2016-yılında-filistin> (02.02.2017).

9/11 Death Statistics. <http://www.statisticbrain.com/911-death-statistics/> (25.10.2016).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: HAMAS CHARTER

Document No:1

The Hamas Charter¹⁵⁷

THE CHARTER OF ALLAH: THE PLATFORM OF THE ISLAMIC
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS)

In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate:

You are the best community that has been raised up for mankind, enjoining right conduct and forbidding what is bad, and believing in God. If the People of the Book had believed, it would be better for them; some among them have faith, but most of them are sinners. They will not harm you, except for trifling annoyances; if they fight you, they will turn their backs, and no help shall they get.

Shame is pitched over them wheresoever they are found, except when under a covenant from God and from the people. They have incurred the wrath of God and pitched over them is destitution. This is because they rejected the signs of God and

¹⁵⁷ Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, (New York, 2000), Appendix.

slew the Prophets in defiance of right. This is because they rebelled and transgressed beyond all bounds.

Quran, Surah 3 (*al- 'Imran*), v. 109-111

Israel will rise and will remain firm until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated what was before.

The Martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna (may God have mercy on his soul)

The Islamic World is burning. Therefore, it is incumbent on everyone to put a little of it out so that he can extinguish what he is able to do without waiting for anyone else.

Sheikh Amjad al-Zahawee (may God have mercy on his soul)

Introduction

Praise be to God, whose help we seek, whose forgiveness we beseech, whose guidance we implore, and on whom we rely. We give peace and blessings upon the Messenger of God, his family, his companions, his followers, and those who spread his message and followed his tradition. May they endure as long as heaven and earth and eternally ever after.

O, people, from the center of events, from the depth of suffering; from the hearts of believers, immaculate arms; upon realizing the duty, responding to the call of God, we meet and join together with discipline based on the path of God. The will was firm to offer its role in life to overcome all difficulties and to surmount all obstacles in the path. Our preparation was continuous, and we are ready to sacrifice

body and soul for the sake of God. Thus it was that the seed was formed and began to chart its path in the tempestuous sea of hopes and dreams, dangers and difficulties, and pains and challenges from within and without.

When the idea matured, the seed grew, and the plant took root in reality detached from the temporary emotional outburst and unwelcome haste, the Islamic Resistance Movement came forth to perform its role of *mujahidah* (struggle) for the sake of its Lord. The Movement placed its hands with the hands of all *mujahidin* (strugglers) who strive to free Palestine. The souls of its *mujahidin* gather with the souls of all the *mujahidin* who stove with their souls on the land of Palestine for all time since it was conquered by the companions of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him), until this very day.

This is the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Al-Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas)], showing its form, revealing its identity, stating its position, clarifying its expectations, discussing its hopes, and calling for aid, support, and a joining of its ranks, because our struggle with the Jews is long and dangerous, requiring all dedicated efforts. It is a phase that must be followed by succeeding phases, a battalion that must be supported by battalion after battalion of the vast Arab and Islamic world until the enemy is defeated and the victory of God prevails.

This is how we perceive them approaching over the horizon.

And you shall certainly know the truth of it after a while.

Surah 38 (*Sad*), v. 88.

God has decreed: It is I and my messengers who must prevail, for God is one full of strength and able to enforce His will.

Surah 58 (*al- Mujadilah*), v. 21.

Chapter One: Introduction to the Movement

Ideological Origin

ARTICLE 1:

The Islamic Resistance Movement: Islam is its system. From Islam, it reaches for its ideology, fundamental percepts, and view of life, the world, and humanity. It judges all its actions according to Islam, and it is inspired by Islam to correct its errors.

The Link between the Islamic Resistance Movement and the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood

ARTICLE 2:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is an international organization. It is one of today's largest Islamic movements. It has a comprehensive understanding and precise conceptualization of the Islamic percepts in all domains of life: concept and belief, politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and training, communications and the arts, the hidden and the evident, and the rest of life.

Structure and Essence

ARTICLE 3:

The structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement is comprised of Muslims who are devoted to God and worship Him verily.

I have created humans and spirits so that they may worship Me.

Surah 51 (*al-Dhariyat*), v. 56.

They knew their obligation toward themselves, their families, and their country. They reached awareness and fear of God. They raised the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to free the country and the people from the [oppressors'] desecration, impurity, and evil.

Nay, We hurl truth against falsehood, and it destroys it, and behold, falsehood does perish!

Surah 21 (*al-Anbiya'*), v. 18.

ARTICLE 4:

The Islamic Resistance Movement welcomes all Muslims who share its beliefs and ideology, enact its program, keep its secrets, and desire to join its ranks to carry out the duty and receive their reward from God.

The Historical and Geographical Dimensions of the Islamic Resistance Movement

ARTICLE 5:

The historical dimension of the Islamic Resistance Movement originates in its adoption of Islam as a way of life. It reaches back to the birth of the Islamic Message and to the Righteous Predecessors. Therefore, God is its goal, the Prophet its leader, and the Quran its constitution.

Its geographical dimension extends to wherever Muslims are found, to those who adopt Islam as a way of life in any region on earth. Thus, it establishes a firm foundation in the depths of the earth and reaches to the highest heavens.

See thou not how God sets forth a parable? A goodly word is like a goodly tree, whose root is firmly fixed and whose branches reach to the heavens. It brings forth its fruit at all times, by the love of its Lord. So God sets forth parables for the people in order that they may receive admonition.

Surah 14 (*Ibrahim*), v. 24-25

Differentiation and Independence

ARTICLE 6:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian movement. It gives its loyalty to God, it adopts Islam as a way of life, and it strives to raise the banner of God over every inch of Palestine. Therefore, in the shade of Islam it is possible for all followers of different religions to live in peace and security in their

person, property, and rights. In the absence of Islam, conflict arises, oppression and destruction are rampant, and wars and battles prevail. The Muslim poet, Muhammad Iqbal, eloquently states:

When faith is lost, there is neither security nor life for those who do not receive religion. And whoever is satisfied with life without religion, then he has allowed annihilation to be his partner.

The Universality of the Islamic Resistance Movement

ARTICLE 7:

By virtue of the distribution of Muslims, who adopt the system of the Islamic Resistance Movement all over the globe, they work toward aiding it, accepting its positions and strengthening its Jihad. Therefore, it is a universal movement, and it is prepared for this because of the clarity of its ideology, lofty goal, and the holiness of its objectives. Upon this basis it should be considered, given a fair evaluation, and acceptance of its role. Whoever cheats it of its right, avoids supporting it, or is so blind as to ignore its role, then that is a person who argues with fate. And whoever closes his eyes to reality, intentionally, one day will wake up to find himself left behind and worn down by efforts to justify his position. *Reward is for those who are early.*

The oppression of close relatives is more painful for the soul than the blow of a sharp sword.

And unto thee We revealed the scripture in truth, confirming the scripture that came before it, and guarding it in safety: So judge between them by what God

has revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the truth that has come to thee. To each among you We have prescribed a law and an open way. If God had so willed, He would have made you one people, but He tests you in what He has given you. So strive as if in a race in all virtues. The goal of all of you is to God. It is He who will show you the truth of matters wherein you differ.

Surah 5 (*al-Ma'idah*), v.48

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a link in the chain of Jihad against the Zionist occupation. It is tied to the initiation of the Jihad by the Martyr 'Izzidin al-Qassam and his Mujahid brothers in 1936. And it is connected to other episodes in the Jihad of the Palestinian people, the Jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1948 War and the jihad operations of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1968 and thereafter. This is so even though the episodes were few and far between and the Jihad was intermittent due to the obstacles placed in the way of the *mujahidin* by those in the Zionists' orbit. The Islamic Resistance Movement looks forward to implementing God's promise no matter how long it takes because the Prophet of God (may peace be upon his soul), said:

The final Hour will not come until Muslims fight against the Jews and the Muslims kill them, and until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, and a stone or tree would say: O Muslim, servant of God, there is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him! But the tree of Gharqad would not say it, for it is the tree of the Jews (cited by Bukhari and Muslim).

The Motto of the Islamic Resistance Movement

ARTICLE 8:

God is its goal;

The messenger is its Leader.

The Quran is its Constitution.

Jihad is its methodology and

Death for the sake of God is its most coveted desire.

Chapter Two: Objectives

Goals:

ARTICLE: 9

The Islamic Resistance Movement has developed at a time when the absence of the spirit of Islam has brought about distorted judgement and absurd understandings. Values have lost meaning, a plague of evil doers, oppression, and darkness has become rampant, and cowards have become ferocious. Nations have been occupied, their people expelled and fallen down. The state of truth has disappeared and the state of evil has been established; as long as Islam does not take its rightful place in the world arena, everything will continue to change for the worse. The goal of the Islamic Resistance Movement, therefore, is to conquer evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, so that the country may return to its rightful place, and so that the call may be heard from the minarets pro-claiming the Islamic state. And aid is sought form God.

And if God had not checked one set of people by means of another, the earth indeed would be full of mischief. But God is full of bounty to all worlds.

Surah 2 (*al-Baqarah*), v. 251

ARTICLE 10:

Meanwhile, the Islamic Resistance Movement, as it is making its own path, will support the weak, defend the oppressed, and, with all its might, will use its energy to realize the truth and defeat falsehood in speech and in action, here and everywhere it can reach out and effect change.

Chapter Three: Strategies and Methods

The Strategy of the Islamic Resistance Movement: Palestine is an Islamic Trust

ARTICLE 11:

The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic land entrusted to the Muslim generations until Judgement Day. No one may renounce all or even part of it. No Arab state nor all Arab states combined, no king or president nor all kings and presidents, and no organization nor all organizations, Palestinian or Arab, have the right to dispose of it or relinquish or cede any part of it, because Palestine is Islamic land that has been entrusted to generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgement. Who, after all, has the right to act on behalf of Muslim generations until the Day of Judgement?

This is its status in Islamic law, and it is similar to all land that were conquered by Muslims, where Muslims made the conquered lands a trust for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgement

And it was so when the commanders of the Islamic army, after they conquered Iraq and Syria, sent to the Muslim's Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khatab, a question concerning the conquered lands: Shall they divide up the land among the army or leave the land to the original owners? And after discussion and consultation between the Caliph of the Muslims, Umar ibn al-Khatab, and the companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), they decided that the land should remain in the hands of its owners to benefit from it and its wealth; but the control of the land and the land itself ought to be endowed as a Waqf [in perpetuity] for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. The right of its owners is of the benefits only, and this trust is permanent as long as the heavens and earth last; and any action taken in contradiction of Islamic law with respect to Palestine is unacceptable action to be rescinded by its claimants.

Verily, this is the very truth and certainty. So, celebrate with praises the name of the Lord, the Supreme.

Surah 56 (*al-Waqi'ah*), v. 95-96

Nation and Nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance

Movement

ARTICLE 12:

Nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part and parcel of religious ideology. Nothing is loftier in nationalism or deeper in devotion than this: If any enemy invades Muslim territories, than Jihad and fighting the enemy becomes an individual duty on every Muslim. *A woman may go fight without her husband's permission and a slave without his master's permission.*

The likes of this do not exist in any other system, and this is a truth about which there is no doubt. If other nationalisms have materialistic, nationalism has all of that and in addition, which is more important, divine reasons providing it with spirit and life, where it is connected to the originator of the spirit and life, raising in the heavens the divine banner to connect the earth with the heavens with a strong bond.

When Moses comes and throws his cane, sorcery and sorcerers indeed became invalid.

Truth stands out clear from error: Whoever rejects evil and believes in God has grasped the trustworthiest Handhold that never breaks. And God hears and knows all things.

Surah 2 (*al-Baqarah*), v. 256

Initiatives, Peace Solutions, and International Conferences

ARTICLE 13:

The initiatives, what is called a “peaceful solution” and “international conferences” to resolve the Palestinian problem, are contrary to the ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement, because giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of religion. The nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion; it educates its members on this, and they perform Jihad to raise the banner of God over their nation.

And God has all power and control over His affairs, but most men know it not.

Surah 12 (*Yusef*), v. 21

From time to time an invitation for an international conference is made to search for a solution to the problem. Some accept and others decline for one reason or another, demanding some condition or conditions be fulfilled before agreeing to attend and participate in the conference. Because of the Islamic Resistance Movement’s awareness of the parties participating in the conference, especially their past and present opinions and positions on Muslim interests, it does not believe that conferences are capable of meeting demands, restoring rights, or giving justice to the oppressed. Those conferences are no more than a means of forcing the rule of unbelievers in the land of Muslims. When did the unbelievers justly treat the believers?

Never will the Jews or the Christians be pleased with thee unless you follow their religion. Say: "The guidance of God is the only guidance." Were you to follow their desires after the knowledge that has reached you, then you would find neither Protector nor Helper in God.

Surah 2 (*al-Baqarah*), v. 120

There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through struggle [jihad]. As for international initiatives and conferences, they are a waste of time, a kind of child's play. The Palestinian people are too noble to be fiddling with their future, rights and destiny. As it says in the honorable tradition:

The people of Syria are God's whip on His earth. He takes revenge on whom He pleases of His servants. It is forbidden for the hypocrites to rule over the believers, and they will die in worry and darkness.

(Ahmad and Tabari)

The Three Circles

ARTICLE 14:

The problem of the liberation of Palestine relates to three spheres: the Palestinian circle; the Arab circle; and the Islamic circle. Each of these circles has a role to play in the struggle against Zionism, and each one has its own responsibilities. It would be an unmitigated error and sheer ignorance to neglect a single one of these circles, because Palestine is an Islamic land accommodating the first *qibla* [direction to face during prayer] and the third holiest sanctuary, from whence the ascent of the Prophet (may peace be upon him) took place.

Glory to God who did take His servant for a journey by night from the sacred place to the farthest place, whose precincts We did bless in order that We might show him some of Our signs: for He is the One who hears and sees all.

Surah 17 (al-Isra'), v. 1

Because of such, its [Palestine's] liberation is obligatory on every Muslim no matter where he lives, and the problem should be looked at on this basis. Every Muslim must know this.

When the problem begins to be resolved on this basis, where all the resources of the three spheres are utilized, then the current situation will change and the day of liberation will be near.

Of a truth you are stronger because there is terror in their hearts from God. This is because they are a people devoid of understanding.

Surah 59 (al-Hashr), v.13

Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine is Obligatory

ARTICLE 15:

When an enemy usurps a Muslim land, then Jihad is an individual religious duty on every Muslim; and in confronting the unlawful seizure of Palestine by the Jews, it is necessary to raise the banner of Jihad. That requires that Islamic education be given to the masses locally and in the Arab and Islamic spheres. The spirit of Jihad, fighting, and joining the ranks must be broadcast to the *umma* [Muslim community]. The education process must involve scholars, teachers, educators,

communicators, journalists, and the educated, especially the youth of the Islamic movement and its scholars. Fundamental changes must be made in the educational system to liberate it from the effects of the ideological invasion that was brought by the Orientalists and missionaries. Their attack suddenly descended on the area after Saladin al-Ayyubi defeated the Crusaders. Then the Crusaders knew that it was impossible to defeat the Muslims except by preparing the ground with an ideological attack to confuse their thoughts, stain their heritage, and defame their history; after this a military attack could occur. That paved the way for the imperialist attack in which [General Edmund] Allenby claimed when he entered Jerusalem: “Now the Crusaders are over;” and General Gouraud stood by the tomb of Saladin and said: “We have returned, O Saladin.” Imperialism helped the ideological invasion establish its roots firmly and it still does. And all that was preparation for the loss of Palestine.

We must instill in the minds of Muslim generations that the Palestinian cause is a religious cause. It must be solved on this basis because Palestine contains the Islamic holy sanctuaries of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram Mosque, which are inexorably linked, as long as the heavens and earth exist, to the night journey (*isra*) of the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him), who ascended to the heavens (*miraj*) from there.

To guard Muslims from infidels for one day in God’s cause is better than the world and all that exists on its surface. A place in paradise as small as that occupied by the whip of one among you is better than the world and all that exists on its surface. And a morning or evening journey with the worshipper in God’s cause is better than the world and all that exists on its surface.

(Imam al-Bukhari)

By him in whose Hand is Muhammad's life, I love to be killed in the path of God, then to be revived to life again, then to be killed and then to be revived to life and then to be killed.

(Agreed upon *hadith*)

Training the Muslim Generation

ARTICLE 16:

We must train the Muslim generation in our area, an Islamic training based on performing religious duties, studying God's book very well, and studying Prophetic tradition (*Sunnah*), Islamic history and heritage from its authenticated sources with the guidance of experts and scholars, and using a curriculum that will provide the Muslim with the correct world view in ideology and thought. In addition, it is necessary to study carefully the enemy's material and human potential, to know his weaknesses and strengths, and to know the powers that support him and stand by his side. Along with necessity of knowing current events and new trends, we must study the analyses and commentaries on them. It is important to plan for the present and the future and to study every trend, so that the fighting Muslim (*mujahid*) can live in his time with the full knowledge of his destiny, purpose, path, and the events surrounding him.

O my son, if there be but the weight of a mustard seed, and it were in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, God will bring it forth. For God understands the finer mysteries, is well acquainted with them. O my son, establish regular prayer,

enjoin what is good, forbid what is evil, and bear patiently whatever may befall thee. This is firmness in all matters. Swell not thy cheek at men or walk insolently through the earth, for God does not love any arrogant boaster.

Surah 31 (*Luqman*), v. 16-18

The Role of Muslim Women

ARTICLE 17:

Muslim women have a role in the liberation struggle that is no less important than the role of men; women is the maker of men, and her role in guiding and educating the generations is a major role. The enemies have understood her role; they think that if they can direct her and raise her the way they want, far from Islam, then they have won the battle. You will find that they support their efforts with continuous spending through the mass media and cinema industry, and also through the education system by way of their teachers who are part of Zionist organizations that assume different names and forms, such as the Masons and Rotary Clubs, and intelligence networks and other organizations. These are all centers of destruction and saboteurs. Those Zionist organizations have great material resources that enable them to play a significant role in society to realize their Zionist goals and enforce the understanding that serves the enemy. While these organizations play their role, Islam is absent from the arena and alienated from its people. The Islamists should play their role in confronting the schemes of those saboteurs. When the day comes that Islam has its way in directing life, it shall eliminate those organizations that are opposed to humanity and Islam.

ARTICLE 18:

The woman in the house of the *Mujahid* and the striving family, be she a mother or sister, has the most important role in caring for the home and raising the children with the ethical character and understanding that comes from Islam, as well as training her children to perform their religious obligations and preparing them for their contribution to the Jihad that awaits them. From this perspective, it is necessary to take care that the schools and curricula educate the Muslim girl in order to become a righteous mother aware of her role in the battle of liberation. She must have the necessary awareness and attentiveness in running a home. Being economical and avoiding carefree spending of the family's income are required to continue the struggle in the overwhelmingly arduous situation. She must always keep in mind that money is blood that must flow only in the veins to sustain the life of children and parents equally.

For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who have humility, for men and women who give the charity, for men and women who fast, for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage in God's praise – for them has God prepared forgiveness and great reward.

Surah 3 (*al-Ahzab*), v. 35

The Role of Islamic Art in the Battle for Liberation

ARTICLE 19:

Art has rules and standards by which one can determine whether it is Islamic or ignorant. The Islamic liberation is in need of Islamic art that lift the spirit and does not stress one aspect of humanity over the others but raises all aspects equally and in harmony. Man is a miraculous being, made out of a handful of clay and a breathed spirit. Islamic art communicates to man on this basis. Ignorant art communicates to the body and emphasizes the element of clay.

Books, articles, newsletters, sermons, pamphlets, poetry, plays, etc., if the characteristics of Islamic art are included in them, are necessary for ideological education and provide invigorating nourishment to continue the struggle and relax the soul, because the struggle is long and the work hard. The souls will become bored but Islamic art revives the vigor, imparts excitement, and invokes in the soul high spirits and correct deliberation.

Nothing corrects the soul if it is deliberating than a change from state to state.

All this is serious with no mirth included because a nation in Jihad does not know merriment.

Social Solidarity

ARTICLE 20:

The Muslim society is a cooperative society. As the Prophet (may peace be upon him) said: *“The best of people are the Asharites. If a difficult situation befell them, at home or during travels, they would gather what they had and divide it up equally among themselves.”* This is the Islamic spirit that ought to prevail in every Muslim society. The society that confronts a vicious enemy, like a Nazi in its behavior of not differentiating between men and women or elders and youth, must be first in adorning this Islamic spirit. Our enemy relies on collective punishment, stealing people’s homeland and possessions, and pursuing them in the lands of exile, and the places where they gather. Our enemy has adopted the practice of breaking our bones and shooting women, children, and old men – with or without reason – and creating concentration camps to place thousands in inhuman conditions, not to mention the demolition of homes, orphaning of children, and the issuing of tyrannical laws against thousands of young people so that they spend their best years in the obscurity of prisons.

The Nazism of the Jews has included women and children. Terror is for everyone. They frighten people in their livelihood, confiscate their wealth, and threaten their honor. Their treatment of and terrible behavior toward people is more violent than would be that of war criminals. Deportation from one’s homeland is a form of murder

To cope with this behavior, people need social solidarity. We must confront the enemy as one body; if one member suffers, the rest must be vigilant and come to his defense.

ARTICLE 21:

Part of social welfare consists of helping all who are in need of material, spiritual, or collective cooperation to complete various projects. It is incumbent upon the members of the Islamic Resistance Movement to look after the needs of the people as they would their own needs; and it is incumbent upon them to spare no effort in realizing this and protecting them. They must avoid, without resorting to foul play, whatever might harm future generations or cause damage to their society because they come from the masses; their power and their future is [the movement's] power and future. It is a duty of all members of the Islamic Resistance Movement to share the people's happiness and grief, and they must consider it their duty to meet the demands of the people and do what benefits them. When this spirit becomes dominant, love will be deepened, cooperation and compassion will prevail, and the ranks will be strengthened in the confrontation with the enemies.

Forces Abetting the Enemy

ARTICLE 22:

The enemies have planned well to get where they are, taking into account the effective measures in current affairs. Thus, they have amassed huge fortunes that gave them influence that they have devoted to the realization of their goals. Through money they gained control over the world media, such as news services,

newspapers, printing presses, broadcast stations, and the like. With money they financed revolutions throughout the world in pursuit of their objectives. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, and most of the revolutions here and there that we heard about and are hearing of. With wealth they established clandestine organizations all over the world, such as the Free Masons, the Rotary and Lions clubs, etc., to destroy societies and promote the interests of Zionism. These are all destructive intelligence gathering organizations. With wealth they controlled imperialist nations and pushed them to occupy many nations to exploit their resources and spread mischief in them.

Concerning the local and international wars, let us speak without hesitation. They were behind the First World War in which they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate, picked the material profit, monopolized the raw wealth, and got the Balfour Declaration. They created the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind the Second World War, in which they grew fabulously wealthy through the arms trade. They prepared for the establishment of their state; they ordered that the United Nations be formed, along with the Security Council, in place of the League of Nations, so that they could rule the world through them.

There was no war that broke out anywhere without their hands behind it.

Every time they light the fire of war, God extinguishes it. But they strive to do mischief on earth, but God loveth not those who do mischief.

Surah 5 (*al-Maidah*), v. 64

So the imperialist powers in the Capitalist West and the Communist East support the enemy with all their might, with material and human aid, and they change roles. When Islam appears, the powers of the unbelievers unite against it because the community of unbelievers is one.

Oh you who believe! Take not into your confidence those outside your ranks: they will not fail to corrupt you. They desire only your ruin. Base hatred already has appeared from their mouths; what their hearts conceal is far worse. We have made the signs plain for you, if you have wisdom.

Surah 3 (*al-Imran*), v. 118

It is not by chance that the verse ends with “if you have wisdom.”

Chapter Four: Our Position

Other Islamic Movements

ARTICLE 23:

The Islamic Resistance Movement regards the other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation. Even if differences arise in one perspective or viewpoint, there is agreement between them on several other perspectives and viewpoints. If their intentions are pure, and they are true to God, the Islamic Resistance Movement regards these movements as an exercise of independent judgement in theological matters [*ijtihad*], provided that their conduct remains within the confines of Islam. Each person who uses independent judgement shall have his share of truth.

The Islamic Resistance Movement considers these movements as a reserve fund on which it can draw. It asks God to give His guidance to everyone and Hamas shall miss no opportunity to call on others to rally to the banner of unity, which it shall seek to forge on the basis of the Quran and the Tradition [*sunnah*]

And hold fast all together to God's rope, and do not be divided among yourselves.

Surah 3 (al-Imran), v. 103

ARTICLE 24:

The Islamic Resistance Movement does not allow slander or condemnation of individuals or movements because the believer is not a slanderer or curser. Despite the need to differentiate between this and that position and the actions of individuals or groups, whenever there is a mistake in a position or action, the Islamic Resistance Movement has the right to point out the mistake, warn against it, and to clarify the truth. It adopts this in current circumstances with impartiality. Wisdom is the object of the believer's persevering quest, and he takes it wherever he finds it.

God loves not that evil should be broadcast about in public speech, except where injustice has been done. For God is He who hears and knows all things. Whether you publish a good deed or conceal it, or cover evil with pardon, verily God does blot them out and has power.

Surah 4 (*an-Nisa'*), v. 148-49

Patriotic Movements in the Palestinian Arena

ARTICLE 25:

[The Islamic Resistance Movement] gives them due respect, appreciates their circumstances and [the influences in] their environment, and will lend its support to them as long as they do not give loyalty either to the Communist East or the Crusading West. The Islamic Resistance Movement assures their members and heroes that it is a moral and struggling movement, ethical and attentive in its view of life and its cooperation with others. It abhors opportunism and only wishes well to individual people and groups. It does not aspire for material gain or personal fame, or reward for people. It uses its own resources and what is available to it.

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power.

Surah 8 (*Anfal*), v. 60

It [Hamas] has no other ambition than to perform its duty and win God's favor.

All the nationalist groups operating in the arena for the sake of liberating Palestine should be assured that it [Hamas] is a helper and supporter, and never will be anything else. By word and action, past and present, it unites rather than divides, repairs rather than destroys, values good advice, pure efforts, and powerful actions, closes the door to petty disputes, and does not heed rumors and defamation as it realizes the right of self-defense. Anything that contradicts these guidelines is fabricated by the enemy or by those who tread in his footsteps in order to create chaos, divide ranks, and distract us with side issues.

O you who believe! If a wicked person brings you any news, verify it, lest you harm people unwittingly, and afterward repent of what you did.

Surah 49 (*al-Hujurat*), v. 6

ARTICLE 26:

Although the Islamic Resistance Movement has a positive view toward the Palestinian Nationalist Movements that do not owe their loyalty to the East or West, that does not prevent it from discussing the options in the local or international arenas with respect to the Palestinian problem. This is an objective discussions, from an Islamic perspective, clarifying the extent to which they [the options] serve the national interest.

Palestine Liberation Organization

ARTICLE 27:

The Palestine Liberation Organization is closer than any other group to the Islamic Resistance Movement; it includes the fathers, brothers, relatives and friends [of our members]. How can a good Muslim turn a cold shoulder to his father, his brother, his relative, or his friend? We have but one homeland, one affliction, one shared destiny, and one shared enemy. Being affected by the situation that surrounded the formation of the organization and that overwhelms the Arab world with chaotic ideologies due to the ideological invasion which has swept the Arab world since the defeat of the Crusades and the ongoing consolidation of Orientalism, missionary work, and imperialism, the organization adopted the idea of a secular state and as such we considered it.

Secular ideology is diametrically opposed to religious thought. It is on ideology that positions, actions and decisions are made. Therefore, despite our respect for the Palestine Liberation Organization and what it might become, and not reducing its role in the Arab-Israeli struggle, we cannot exchange the Islamic nature of Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our religion, and whosoever neglects part of his religion is surely lost.

And who forsakes the religion of Abraham but such as debase their souls with folly?

Surah 2 (*al-Baqarah*), v. 130

The day that the Palestine Liberation Organization embraces Islam as a way of life, we shall be its soldiers; we shall be the fuel for its fire, which consumes the enemies. Until that happens – and we pray to God that it will happen soon – the position of the Islamic Resistance Movement toward the Palestine Liberation Organization is the position of a son toward his father, a brother towards his brother, and a relative toward his relatives. He will suffer if a thorn pricks him, support him in confronting the enemy, and wishes guidance for him.

Your brother, your brother! He who has no brother is like a fighter going to battle without weapons.

And know that your cousin is like your wings. And does the falcon fly without wings?

The Arab Countries and Islamic Governments

ARTICLE 28:

The Zionist invasion is a vicious attack that does not have pity and uses all low and despicable methods to fulfill its desires. It relies to a great extent for its meddling and spying activities on the secret organizations that are its off-shots, such as the Masons, Rotary and Lions clubs, and other such networks of spies. All these secret or public organizations work for the benefit and with the guidance of the Zionists. They are behind the drug and alcohol trade with its wide variety to facilitate the ease of its control and expansion. The Arab states surrounding Israel are requested to open their borders to ease the movement of *mujahidin* to and from it, and that is the least they could do. We should not lose this opportunity to remind every Muslim that when the Jews occupied immaculate Jerusalem in 1967, they stood on the stairs of the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and loudly chanted: “Muhammad has died and left girls behind.”

So Israel with its Jewishness and its Jewish population challenges Islam and Muslims. *So the eyes of the cowards do not sleep.*

National and Religious Groups, Institutions, Intellectuals, and the Arab-Islamic World

ARTICLE 29:

The Islamic Resistance Movement would like for each and every organization to stand by its side on all levels, supporting it, adopting its positions, promoting its activities and movements, and working to gain support for the Islamic Resistance Movement so the Islamic people can be its backers and victors. A

strategic dimension is needed on all levels: human, material, media, historical, and geographical. The public is kept aware of the Palestinian situation and what is facing it and being plotted against it through the holding of supportive conferences and the production of clarifying statements, supportive articles, and purposeful pamphlets, which educate the Islamic people ideologically, morally, and culturally in order to fulfill its role in the battle for liberation. This is the role it played in defeating the Crusaders and pushing back the Tartars and saving human civilization. And that is easy for God.

God has decreed: "It is I and my messengers who must prevail." For God is strong, able to enforce His will.

Surah 58 (*al-Mujadilah*), v. 21

ARTICLE 30:

Authors and scholars, media people, preachers, teachers and educators, and people in the rest of the different fields in the Arab and Islamic world: All of you are called upon to adopt a role and carry out your duty, due to the ferocity of the Zionist invasion, its penetration into most countries, and its materialistic and media control and what has been built on that in most countries of the world.

Jihad means not only carrying arms and confronting the enemy. The positive word, excellent article, beneficial book, aid, and support- if intentions are pure so that the banner of God is held high- also constitute Jihad for the sake of God. *"He who provided equipment to a fighter who fought for the cause of God and he who*

stayed behind to look after the family of the fighter in the cause of God in fact fought for the cause of God.” (Narrated by Abu Dawud and Tirmidhi)

The People of Other Faiths

ARTICLE 31:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a humanistic movement that cares for human rights and observes the magnanimity of Islam toward the followers of other religions. It never attacks any of them, except those who show hostility toward it or stand in its way in order to stop the movement or frustrate its efforts.

In the shade of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three religions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, to live in peace and harmony. This peace and harmony only is possible under Islam, and the history of the past and present is the best written witness of that.

Followers of other religions should stop fighting Islam over ruling this area, because when they rule there only is murder, punishment, and banishment. They make life hard for their own people, not to mention the followers of other religions. The past and present are full of examples to prove this.

They will not fight you together, except in fortified towns or from behind walls. Their determination is strong among themselves. You would think they were united, but their hearts are divided. That is because they are a people devoid of wisdom.

Surah 59 (*al-Hashr*), v. 14

Islam gives everyone his rights and forbids enmity over the rights of others, but the Nazi Zionist efforts will not last as long as their battles. *The state of oppression is an hour, but the state of truth lasts until the coming of the hour.*

With regard to those who do not fight you for faith or to drive you out of your home, God does not forbid you from dealing kindly and justly with them; for God loves those who are just.

Surah 60 (*al-Mumtahinah*), v. 8

The Effort to Isolate the Palestinian People

ARTICLE 32:

World Zionism and the forces of imperialism are following a clever plan to cause one Arab country after the other to drop out of the battle with Zionism so that in the end the Palestinian people will be isolated from their allies. Egypt, to a very large extent, dropped out of the struggle when it concluded the treasonous Camp David agreements. Now they are trying to entice other countries to conclude similar agreements and drop out as well. The Islamic Resistance Movement calls on the Arab and Islamic people to work seriously and constructively in order not to allow that dreadful scheme to be carried out and to educate the masses about the dangers of withdrawal from the struggle with Zionism. Today it is Palestine and tomorrow it may be another country and then other countries, because the Zionist scheme has no bounds; after Palestine they want to expand from the Nile River to the Euphrates. When they have occupied the area completely, they look toward another, as such is

their plan in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The present is the best proof of what is said.

Withdrawal from the circle of struggle is high treason and a curse on those who do it.

If anyone turns his back on such a day, except as a strategy of war or to retreat to regroup, he brings onto himself the wrath of God and his abode is hell, an evil refuge indeed.

Surah 8 (*al-Anfal*), v. 16

It is necessary to gather together all forces and abilities to confront the Tartaric-Nazi invasion; the alternative is loss of homeland, exiling of the population, the promotion of evil on earth, and the destruction of all religious values. Every person should know that he will be held accountable before God.

Then anyone who has done even a speck of good shall see it, and anyone who has done even a speck of evil shall see it.

Surah 99 (*az-Zalzalah*), v. 7-8

The Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself the spearhead or a step on the path in the circle of struggle with world Zionism. It adds its efforts to efforts of the workers in the Palestinian arena. What is left is that this should be followed by more steps and measures by the Arab and Islamic people and by Muslim organizations in the Arab and Islamic regions because they are the people who are prepared for the forthcoming role in the battle with the Jews, the merchants of war.

Among them We have cast enmity and hatred till the Day of Judgement, and every time they light the fire of war, God extinguishes it; for they strive to do mischief on earth, but God does not love those who do mischief.

Surah 5 (*al-Ma'idah*), v. 64

ARTICLE 33:

The Islamic Resistance Movement sets out with these general concepts, which are equal and in harmony with the patterns of the universe and are being poured into the river of destiny to confront the enemy. Its struggle is to defend Muslims, Islamic civilization, religious sanctuaries, of which al-Aqsa Mosque is foremost, and to inspire the Arab and Islamic people, their governments, and their nationalistic and official organizations to fear God as they consider the Islamic Resistance Movement and ways to deal with it. It should be, as God has wished, a supporter and helper, spreading out its hand to assist and provide support until God's decision is manifested. The masses join ranks and fighters join *mujahids* and other groups, which sally forth from everywhere in the Muslim world, answering the call of duty and repeating "come to Jihad," a call bursting forth into the highest heavens and reverberating until liberation is complete, the invaders are pushed back, and God's victory prevails.

Verily God will help those who aid Him, for verily God is strong, exalted in might.

Surah 22 (*al-Hajj*), v. 40

Chapter Five: Historical Proof

Facing the Enemy throughout History

ARTICLE 34:

Palestine is the heart of earth, the meeting of the continents, the object of greed for the avaricious since the dawn of history. The Prophet (may peace be upon him) pointed to that in his noble narration to Ma'ath ibn Jabal:

O Ma'ath, God is going to open Syria for you after I'm gone. From Al-Arish to the Euphrates, its men, women, and children will be steadfast until the day of resurrection. Whosoever of you chooses a coastal site of Syria or Jerusalem, then he is in constant Jihad till the day of resurrection.

People have coveted Palestine more than once, and they drowned it with armies to fulfill their covetousness. The hoards of Crusaders, waving their faith and waving their crucifixes, were able to defeat the Muslims for a specific period of time. The Muslims did not get it back until they united together under their religious banner, glorified their Lord, and fought as *mujahids* under the leadership of Salahdin al-Ayyubi for nearly two decades. Then there was a clear victory, the Crusaders were defeated, and Palestine was liberated.

Say to those who reject religion: Soon you shall be vanquished and gathered together in hell, an evil bed, indeed, to lie on.

Surah 3 (*al-Imran*), v. 12

This is the only way to liberation. There is no doubt in the truth of the historical evidence. It is a pattern in the universe and a law of nature that only metal breaks metal; nothing defeats their corrupt belief except the true belief in Islam because belief only can be vanquished by belief. In the end, victory goes to truth; truth is victorious.

Already our word has been passed before to Our servants, sent that they certainly would be assisted and that Our forces surely must conquer.

Surah 37 (*as-Saffat*), v. 171-3

ARTICLE 35:

The Islamic Resistance Movement considers the lesson and wisdom to be learned from the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salahdin al-Ayyubi, the liberation of Palestine, the defeat of the Tartars at the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut, the defeat of their forces by Qatuz and Al-Dhahir Baibars, and the world’s rescue from the destructive onslaught of the Tartars, who were destroying all traces of human civilization. The current Zionist invasion had been preceded by the many invasions of the crusading West and others, such as the Tartars from the east. The Muslims confronted those invasions, prepared for fighting, and defeated them. They should be able to confront and defeat the Zionist invasion. This is not difficult for God if our intentions are pure, our efforts are truthful, Muslims have benefited from past experiences and been freed from the vestiges of the ideological invasion, and they follow the way of their predecessors.

Postscript

The Islamic Resistance Movement are Soldiers

ARTICLE 36:

The Islamic Resistance Movement, as it is making its way, emphasizes repeatedly to all our people, the Arab and Muslim people, that it does not want fame for itself nor material gains or social status. It is not directed against any of our people in order to rival or replace them; there is nothing of that at all. It never will be against any Muslims or the peacefulness of non-Muslims in this place or anywhere else. It only shall help associations and organizations that work against the Zionist enemy and those who are in its orbit. The Islamic Resistance Movement depends on Islam as a way of life, its faith, and religion and supports whoever adopts Islam as a way of life, no matter where he is or whether it is an organization, committee, or group. The Islamic Resistance Movement is only its soldiers, nothing else.

We beseech God to guide us and others through us, and to decide the truth between our people and us.

Our Lord! Decide Thou between us and our people in truth, for Thou art the best to decide.

Surah 7 (*al-Araf*), v. 89

And our last prayer is: "All praise is due to God, the Lord of the Universe."

Palestine: 1 Muharram 1409 A.H.

18 August 1988 A.D.

APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Tarihin pek çok döneminde ses getiren ve gündemi meşgul eden terör olgusu özellikle 1900'lerde dikkatleri iyiden iyiye çekmeye başlamış, 21.yy'da ise dünya gündemini en çok meşgul eden güvenlik meselesi haline gelmiştir. Konjonktüre bağlı olarak saikleri, hedefleri, çeşitleri, yöntemleri değişen terör olgusunun 21.yy'da "küresel terör" niteliğine büründüğü görülmektedir. Küresel terörizme dair uluslararası kamuoyunda, terörü İslam'la ve özellikle Ortadoğu coğrafyasıyla özdeş gören algı sebebiyle İslam'ın terörle (olası) ilişkisi, İslami terör örgütlerinin bu algıya hizmet edip etmediklerinin incelenmesi bir gereklilik olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Sözü edilen gerekliliğe bağlı olarak bu çalışmada, Ortadoğu'da adı terörle yan yana geçen El Kaide ve Hamas'ı mukayeseli olarak ele almak, faaliyet alanları, ideolojileri, hedefleri, uluslararası kamuoyunda algılanış biçimleri ve mevcut durumlarına bağlı olarak iki örgütün birbirinden nasıl farklılaştığını gözler önüne sermek suretiyle Ortadoğu'da terör algısına yeni bir boyut kazandırmak hedeflenmektedir.

Bu tez çalışması 5 bölüme ayrılmıştır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümü, tezin amaçlarının, cevap aradığı sorunların, ihtiva ettiği bölümlerin kısaca tanıtıldığı giriş bölümüdür. Aynı zamanda bu bölümde bu tezin literatüre ve sonraki çalışmalara nasıl bir katkı sunacağı da belirtilmektedir. Giriş bölümünde çalışmanın metodolojik niteliği de açıklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, tarihsel analiz, söylem analizi ve karşılaştırmalı metot olmak üzere üç temel araştırma yöntemine yer verilmiştir. Tarihsel analiz hem terör kavramının süreç içerisinde kullanımına yönelik değişimi gözler önüne sermek hem de çalışmaya konu iki örgütü geçmişten günümüze ele almak için kullanılmaktadır. Çalışmanın bir diğer metodolojik unsuru olan söylem analizi ise sadece El Kaide ve Hamas'ın kurucu ve/veya üyelerinin sübjektif yorumlarını içermemekte, aynı zamanda konuya doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak taraf olan üçüncü kişilerin, ülkelerin, grupların söylemlerini de içerir biçimde sunulmaktadır. Bu tezin

yapıtasını oluşturan karşılaştırmalı analiz metodu ile El Kaide ve Hamas, belirlenen beş alt başlıkta mukayeseli olarak değerlendirilmekte ve farklılıkları ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Karşılaştırma başlıkları olarak, “coğrafi etki alanı”, “ideoloji”, “temel hedefler”, “uluslararası kamuoyunda algılanış biçimi” ve “mevcut pozisyon” seçilmiş olması, iki örgütün farklılıklarını ortaya koyabilecek başka herhangi bir kıstas olmamasından değil, bu çalışmanın cevap aradığı yani Hamas’ın El Kaide gibi bir terör örgütünden hangi açılardan farklılaştığı sorunsalına seçilen kriterlerin diğer kriterlerden daha net cevap verebileceğinin düşünülmesindedir.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, terör kavramının farklı tarihsel dönemlerde ele alınış biçimlerini incelemektedir. Terörizm, anlam ve tanım düzeyinde yüzyıllardır üzerinde düşünülmüş ama yine de tek, evrensel olarak geçerli bir açıklamaya varılamamış, sosyal bilimlerin tanımlanması en çetrefilli ve ihtilafli kavramlarından biridir. Genel geçer bir terörizm tanımının halen mevcut olamamasının sebebi, kişi ya da gruplara göre tanımlamanın değişmesi, terörist olarak adlandırılan bir kişi ya da örgütün diğer bir grup insana göre özgürlük savaşçısı olarak adlandırılabilmesidir. En temel şekliyle sistematik ve bilinçli şekilde korku salmak, tedirgin etmek, panik ve endişeye sebep olmak, zarar vermek şeklinde izah edilebilecek olan bu kavram 2000 yıllık bir geçmişe sahip olsa da büyük ölçüde Fransız İhtilali ile adından söz ettirmeye başlamıştır. Fransa’da 1793-1794 yılları arasında büyük çaplı şiddet olayları haline dönüşen devlet terörü 40 bine yakın insanın ölümüne sebep olmuştur. 1900lü yılların son çeyreğinde ise dünya çapında Marksist terör örgütleri dominant hale gelmiştir. Günümüzde terörün ve terörist hareketlerin oluşumunda kültürel ve dini öğelerin, katı siyasi ve milliyetçi saiklerden çok daha etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Aslında tüm zamanlarda karşımıza çıkan terör kavramsallaştırmalarının ortak yönü, terörün farklı hedeflere ulaşmada bir teknik/araç olarak kullanılmış ve kullanılıyor olmasıdır. Küresel terör olarak adlandırılan günümüz terör anlayışına kapsam ve etki bağlamında El Kaide’yi oturtmak son derece kolayken, Hamas’a dair oluşabilecek muhtemel farklılıklar bu çalışmaya temel oluşturmaktadır.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü, El Kaide ve Hamas ile ilgili temel bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. El Kaide’nin ortaya çıkışını etkileyen tarihsel ve düşünsel zemin

incelenmekte, örgütün kendisini İslam ile özdeş biçimde nasıl konsolide ettiği, dünya çapında nasıl devasa bir network kurduğu, neleri amaçladığı analiz edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Kendisini İslami olarak tanımlayan diğer terör örgütlerinden farklı olarak El Kaide sadece Batı'ya, gayrimüslimlere tehdit olmakla kalmamakta, aynı zamanda Müslümanlara da tehdit oluşturmaktadır. El Kaide için İslam dinden fazlasıdır. El Kaide ideolojisine göre İslam, uhrevi kurallar bütünü olmasının yanı sıra aynı zamanda sosyal ve siyasal hayatı yönetmeye muktedir kurallar bütünüdür. Bu noktadan hareketle El Kaide ideolojisinde İslam çoğu zaman yanlış yorumlanmak ve kötüye kullanılmak suretiyle terörist eylemlerin motivasyonu haline getirilmektedir. Günümüz algısıyla Radikal/Militan İslam şeklinde adlandırılabilen bu eğilimin kökeninde Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab, Seyyid Kutub, Hasan el-Benna gibi İslami mütefekkirler/bilim insanları yer almaktadır. “Müslüman ülkesi” ile “küfür ülkesi/savaş ülkesi” şeklindeki ayırım, sekülerizmin ve diğer tüm –izm’lerin Allah’a ve O’nun kurallarına şirk olduğu iddiası, Teo-demokrasi, devrimci İslam, cihat, Şeriatın üstünlüğü ve son kertede İslamcılık teori ve pratiği gibi pek çok ideal ve uygulama yukarıda zikredilen isimlerden etkilenilerek benimsenmiştir. İdeolojisini anti-Siyonizm, anti-Batı, anti-emperyalizm, anti-semitik söylem ve faaliyetler üzerine oturtan El Kaide, cihat yöntemiyle Siyonizm’e, emperyalizme, Batı’ya yönelik terör eylemlerinde bulunmakta, yanı sıra Sünni İslam’ın dışındaki diğer İslam mezheplerine mensup Müslümanları da hedef almaktadır. Tüm bu faaliyetlerle ulaşılmak istenen asıl nokta ise Allah’ın emirleri ve Hz. Muhammed’in öğretileri ışığında bir İslam Devleti kurmak ve halifeliği yeniden canlandırmaktır. El Kaide tarafından yapılan “gerçek mümin” ve “kafir” ayırımıyla doğru orantılı şekilde gerçek müminler dışında kalan tüm dinlerin, mezheplerin ve ideolojilerin taraftarlarının katli meşru görülmekte, bu meşruiyet de cihat ve şehitlik kavramıyla açıklanmaktadır.

Sovyetlerin 1979 ‘da Afganistan’ı işgali sebebiyle Afgan savaşçılara destek olmak amacıyla dünyanın dört bir tarafından toplanan “mücahitler” Usame Bin Ladin’in oluşturduğu çatı yapıyla bir araya gelmiş, Sovyet işgalinin bitmesinden sonra bu çatı yapının sınırları Afganistan dışına taşmış, önce bölgesel daha sonra küresel bir terör ağına dönüşmüştür. Bu nedenle El Kaide’yi yekpare bir örgütten ziyade Ortadoğu’dan Güney Asya’ya, Pasifikten Doğu, Batı ve Kuzey Afrika’ya kadar

devasa bir coğrafyada faaliyet gösteren bir ağ yapılanması olarak adlandırmak daha doğrudur. Yapılanmanın hiyerarşik bir lider kadrosunun olmadığı kabul edilmekle beraber, ölümüne kadar Bin Ladin örgüt lideri olarak dünya çapında tanınmıştır. “Emir” olarak adlandırılan bu pozisyonun yanı sıra bir “Emir Yardımcısı/Vekili” pozisyonu bulunmakta, ayrıca siyasi, dini, askeri, güvenlik, yönetim ve finans komitesi şeklinde alt bölümlere ayrılan “Komuta Konseyleri” yer almaktadır.

Tezin aynı bölümünde Hamas da El Kaide gibi ayrıca ele alınmakta, hareketin tarihsel arka planı, kuruluşu, kurucu babaları, ideolojisi, temel hedefleri ve organizasyonel yapısı açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. İsrail-Filistin Sorununun günümüzdeki temel aktörlerinden biri olan Hamas hareketinin fikri kökeni eskiye dayanmakla beraber asıl kuruluşu 1987 yılında başlayan Filistin İntifadası ile 1948 yılında Filistin topraklarında İsrail adında bir devletin kurulması, 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşı (Altı Gün Savaşları) ve 1973 Savaşı ile İsrail işgalinin kalıcı ve sistematik hale getirilmesine tepki olarak işgal atındaki Gazze ve Batı Şeria topraklarının özgürleştirilmesini hedefleyen direniş, Hamas ile beraber farklı bir zemine oturmuştur. Mısır’da kurulan Müslüman Kardeşler ‘in fikri altyapısına sahip olmakla beraber Hamas, işgal altındaki Filistin topraklarında hem bir askeri direniş hareketi hem de sosyal hizmet ağı olarak faaliyet göstermeye başlamıştır. Müslüman Kardeşler ideolojisinden farklı olarak Hamas İslami diriliş/uyanış öncelememiş; İslam’ı Filistin’in özgürleşmesi yolunda halkı bir arada tutup motive eden bir unsur olarak ele almıştır. Müslüman Kardeşler ‘in 1973’te Gazze’de İslami Birlik’i kurmasıyla beraber ileride Hamas’ın yönetici kadrolarını oluşturacak Şeyh Ahmed Yasin, Dr. Abdülaziz Rantisi ve Mahmud Zehar gibi isimler bir araya getirilmiştir. O dönemde Filistin Meselesinin önemli unsurlarından biri olan Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü’nün gerek askeri gerekse diplomasi alanında İsrail karşısında başarısızlıkla sonuçlanan birtakım girişimleri nedeniyle Hamas’ın Filistin toplumu nezdinde kredisi artmış ve FKÖ’ye alternatif olarak yükselişe geçmiştir. Hamas’ın temel motivasyonu Siyonist işgale karşı direniş yürütmektir. İşgal altındaki Filistin topraklarının özgürleştirilmesi, Filistinlilere yönelik yapılan hak ihlallerinin önüne geçilmesi ve Filistin halkına sunulan hizmetlerin artırılması hedefleri arasında yer almaktadır. Hamas’ın katı hiyerarşik bir yapılanması olmamakla beraber temsili niteliği olan, saygı duyulan bir “lider” kadrosu bulunmakta, ayrıca sosyal, siyasal, iç güvenlik ve askeri aktiviteleri yöneten, birbiriyle yatay ilişki içerisinde bulunan alt birimlerin bütünü şeklinde faaliyet göstermektedir. Hamas’ın ön plana çıkan asıl

niteliği, direniş hareketi yönüyle beraber işgal altındaki Filistin topraklarında sosyal hizmet ağı olarak hareket etmesi ve 2006 seçimleri sonrası kendisine siyasi arenada da yer bulmuş olmasıdır. Burada Hamas'ın, bünyesinde faaliyet gösteren Zekât Komiteleri vasıtasıyla toplanan paraları ihtiyaç sahibi Filistinlilere nakdi ve aynı yardım olarak dağıtan, okul, cami, hastane, gençlik merkezi, aşevi, spor merkezi inşa eden bir yönü olduğuna dikkat çekilmektedir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde El Kaide ve Hamas beş alt başlık etrafında mukayese edilerek farklılıkları ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. İlk olarak iki örgütün coğrafi etki alanları incelenmekte ve El Kaide küresel ölçekli bir örgütken, Hamas'ın bölgesel hatta sadece işgal altındaki Filistin topraklarıyla sınırlı bir alanda faaliyet gösterdiğinin altı çizilmektedir. El Kaide'nin İslam adına yürüttüğünü iddia ettiği küresel cihat politikasının doğrudan sonucu olarak dünyanın pek çok farklı ülkesinde kanlı terör eylemlerine imza attığına şahit olunmaktadır. El Kaide tarafından organize edilen saldırıların hedef ve ölçeğini anlamada ve bunların Hamas'ın şiddet eylemlerinden ne ölçüde farklılaştığını görmede ise diğer pek çok saldırısının yanı sıra en çarpıcı olanı şüphesiz 11 Eylül Saldırıları'dır. 11 Eylül 2001'de kaçırılan iki jet uçağının ABD'de Dünya Ticaret Merkezine, diğer bir jet uçağın ise Pentagon'a çarptırılması ile tarihin en kanlı saldırılarından birine imza attığı malumdur. Bu saldırı neticesinde 3 bine yakın kişi hayatını kaybetmiş, 6 binin üzerinde kişi yaralanmıştır.¹⁵⁸ Hedef alınan gruba bakıldığında ise büyük ölçüde sivillerin olduğu, hiçbir ayırım gözetmeksizin öldürme güdüsüyle hareket edildiği görülmektedir. Yanı sıra, El Kaide'nin dünya çapında ses getiren saldırılarına aşağıdaki birkaç örnek de eklenebilir:

- Sadece 1998 yılında Nairobi, Kenya, Dar es Salaam, Tanzanya'daki ABD elçiliklerine düzenlenen saldırılarda 224 kişi ölmüş, 5000'den fazla sivil yaralanmıştır.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ "September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts." (04.09.2018) <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html> accessed on 10.04.2019.

¹⁵⁹ Lough, Richard (August 19, 2008). "Pursuing al-Qaeda in Horn of Africa". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved January 20, 2019.

- 7 Temmuz 2005 yılında Londra’da gerçekleşen El Kaide bombalı saldırısında 52 kişi ölmüş, 700’den fazla kişi yaralanmıştır.¹⁶⁰
- 3 Şubat 2007’de Irak Bağdat’ta bir pazar yerinde gerçekleştirilen intihar saldırısında 140’tan fazla kişi ölmüş, 150’ye yakın kişi yaralanmıştır.¹⁶¹

Hamas’ta ise El Kaide’de olduğu gibi sırf dini ya da mezhepsel farklılıklardan dolayı herhangi bir ülke ya da millet hedef alınmamakta, yalnızca Filistin işgalinin sorumlusu İsrail’e karşı mücadele yürütülmektedir. Öncelikli hedefi işgal altındaki Filistin topraklarının özgürleştirilmesi olan Hamas’ın, ne açık ne üstü örtülü şekilde, Filistin topraklarında ya da dışında bir İslam Devleti kurma niyeti olduğunu gösterir ibare yoktur. Hamas’ın tüzüğünde de hem coğrafi strateji ve direniş hem de hizmet faaliyetleri bağlamında sınırlar net biçimde ifade edilmektedir.

İkinci mukayese başlığı olan ideoloji kısmında El Kaide’nin İslami niteliği vurgulanırken, Hamas’ın “milli” niteliğinin altı çizilmektedir. El Kaide, iddia ettiği üzere İslam’ı yaymak, “kafir”leri ve onların inançlarını yok etmek, İslam Devleti kurmak gibi motivasyonlarla hareket ederken, Hamas’ın söylem ve eylemlerinde böylesi örneklerle rastlanmamakta, söylem ve aktivitelerinde direniş teması ön plana çıkmaktadır. Burada kritik nokta, Hamas’ın “milli” yönüne vurgu yaparken İslami niteliğini de yok saymamaktır. Zira hareketin adında (Hareket-ül Mukavemet-ül İslamiyye / İslami Direniş Hareketi) bile İslam ibaresi yer almaktadır. Hamas üyelerinin İslami kimliği, hareketin destekçilerinin büyük çoğunluğunun Müslüman oluşu da bu yargıyı desteklemektedir. Ancak Hamas’ı bu noktada El Kaide’den ayıran, Hamas’ta İslam’ın El Kaide’de olduğu gibi hedefe dönük kullanılmıyor ve yine en nihayetinde İslamiyet adına bir mücadele yürütülmüyor olmasıdır.

İki örgütün hedeflerinin karşılaştırıldığı diğer başlıkta, Hamas’ın Filistin’de İsrail işgaline karşı silahlı mücadele yürütmeyi ve işgali sonlandırmayı hedeflemesinin

¹⁶⁰ “London bombings of 2005.” <https://www.britannica.com/event/London-bombings-of-2005> accessed on 10.04.2019.

¹⁶¹ “Bombings Kill at least 171 Iraqis in Baghdad.” (18.04.2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18cnd-baghdad.html> accessed on 10.04.2019.

yan sıra Filistin halkının siyasal temsilini sađlayan bir siyasal parti, sosyal hizmetler sunan bir sivil toplum örgütü olarak faaliyet gösteriyor oluşu vurgulanmaktadır. Şeyh Ahmed Yasin'in de İsrail'e karşı yürütölen mücadelenin aslında bir halka, dine ya da etnisiteye karşıtlık durumunu ifade etmediđini, Filistin topraklarını gayrimeşru yollarla işgal etmek suretiyle Filistin halkını baskı altında tutup haklarından mahrum eden devlet politikasına yani siyonizme karşıtlık olduğunu her fırsatta vurguladıđı bilinmektedir.

Cihatçı ideolojisini terörist taktiklerle harmanlayarak Müslüman devletler tesis edip, onların Şeriata uygun biçimde yönetilmelerini sađlamaya çalışan El Kaide'nin ise koyduđu hedeflerin herhangi bir bađımsızlık mücadelesiyle ilgisi bulunmamaktadır. Hedefinde tüm Batı ve gayrimüslimler, hatta El Kaide çizgisinde olmayan tüm Müslümanlar yer almaktadır. Detaya inildiđinde ise uluslararası örgütler, yardım kuruluşları, çok uluslu şirketler, uluslararası haber ajansları ve diđer medya kuruluşları da El Kaide için ortadan kaldırılması gereken Batı ürünü "şeytani" yapılarıdır.

El Kaide ve Hamas'ın uluslararası kamuoyunda algılanış biçimlerine bakıldıđında, Hamas'a yönelik algının aktörlere ve dönemlere bađlı olarak deđişme gösterdiđi ancak El Kaide'ye yönelik algının görece tek çizgide devam ettiđi söylenebilir. 2001 yılında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde gerçekleşen ve El Kaide tarafından üstlenilen 11 Eylül Saldırıları neticesinde ABD önderliğinde oluşturulan Terörle Küresel Mücadele Koalisyonu vasıtasıyla özellikle El Kaide ve Taliban'a yönelik gerçekleştirilen imha çalışmaları ile bu örgütlerin fiziksel altyapılarında ciddi kayıplar verdirilmiştir. Keza Kuzey Amerika ve Avrupa'da da El Kaide ile mücadele için alarma geçilmiştir. Uluslararası kamuoyunda birkaç münferit destek dışında resmi düzeyde El Kaide'ye meşruiyet atfeden ya da destek veren açıklama bulunmamaktadır. El Kaide, geçerliliđi pek çok kesim tarafından kabul edilen terör örgütü listelerinin neredeyse tümünde yer almaktadır. Uluslararası kamuoyunun Hamas'a yönelik tutumunu ise tek biçimde ele almak mümkün gözükmemektedir. Hamas'a yönelik algı, koşullara, ülkeler ve liderler arası ilişkilere bađlı olarak şekillenmektedir. El Kaide'ye kıyasla Hamas'a daha ılımlı tavır takınıldıđı ve özellikle 2006 seçim zaferi sonrası Hamas'a yönelik algıda ciddi deđişimler

yaşandığı gözlenmektedir. 2006 seçimleri sonrası Hamas özellikle Asya ve Avrupa ülkeleriyle iletişime geçmeye başlamıştır. İsviçre'yle yapılan karşılıklı ziyaretleri, İsveç'le yapılan görüşmeler takip etmiştir. 8 Şubat 2014'te gerçekleştirilen Münih Güvenlik Konferansı'nda Katar Dışişleri Bakanı Halid Elatiyyah, İsraili ve Avrupalı pek çok Bakanın önünde Hamas'a desteğini ifade etmiştir. Aynı dönemde Latin Amerika ve Asya ülkelerinin birkaçı da benzer girişimlerde bulunmuş; Brezilya'dan diplomatik bir heyet Ramallah'ta Hamas'ın Yasama Meclisi üyelerine bir ziyaret gerçekleştirmiş, Hamas Siyasi Büro üyelerinden bir grup Kasım 2014'te resmi düzeyde işbirliği imkânlarını görüşmek üzere Endonezya ve Malezya'ya ziyaretler düzenlemiştir. 1948'de kuruluşunu takiben İsrail Devletini resmi olarak tanıyıp diplomatik ilişkiler kuran ilk ülkelerden biri olan Türkiye, 1990lı yılların sonuna kadar İsrail-Filistin Meselesinde herhangi bir tavır takınmamış, 1996 yılından itibaren Erbakan Hükümeti / Refah Partisi ile Filistin tarafında duruş sergilemeye başlamıştır. Türkiye'de 2002 sonrası iktidara gelen AK Parti Hükümeti'nin de Filistin ve Hamas'ın yanında durduğu ve özellikle Hamas'ın 2006 seçim zaferi sonrası ilişkilerin olumlu manada derinleşmeye başladığı görülmüştür. Hamas'ın eski Siyasi Büro Şefi Halid Meşal'in sık sık gerçekleştirdiği Türkiye ziyaretleri, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın pek çok platformda dile getirdiği Hamas'a ve Filistin Meselesine yönelik destek söylemleri bu yakın ilişkinin göstergeleridir.

Hamas'a uluslararası kamuoyunda manevra kabiliyeti sağlayan gelişmelerden belki de en önemlisi Aralık 2014'te Avrupa Mahkemesi'nin yayınladığı karar olmuştur. Hamas'ın Batı nezdinde kendini ispatlaması ve ilgili ülkelerle ilişkilerini geliştirebilmesi adına dönüm noktası olan bu karara göre Hamas, Avrupa'nın terör örgütü listesinden çıkarılmıştır.

İsrail'in Hamas'a yönelik tutumuna bakıldığında herhangi bir dalgalanma yaşanmadığı görülmektedir. ABD politikasıyla paralel olarak İsrail, Filistin Otoritesini ve Mahmud Abbas'ı muhatap almakta, El-Fetih'in ön saflarda olmasına ses çıkarmamakta ve Hamas'ı bu vesileyle marjinalleştirip güçsüzleştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bush, Obama ve Trump Hükümetlerinin ortak noktası Filistin Sorununda aynı çizgide politika izlemeleridir.

Arap ve İslam dünyasında Filistin Meselesine yönelik proaktif tavır sergilemeyen pek çok ülkenin dahi Hamas'a dair ılımlı tavır takındıkları gözlenmektedir. Nitekim 2006 Filistin Parlamento Seçimleri sonrası Suudi Arabistan, Mısır, Suriye, Katar, Libya, Sudan, Bahreyn, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Kuveyt, Umman, Yemen, İran gibi pek çok Ortadoğu, Kuzey Afrika ve Körfez ülkesiyle karşılıklı ziyaretler gerçekleştirilmiştir. İran, diplomatik temasların yanı sıra Hamas'a kuruluşundan itibaren silah, finansman ve askeri eğitim desteği sunmaktadır.

Bu tezin mukayese bölümünün son kısmında El Kaide ve Hamas'ın mevcut durumları incelenmektedir. 11 Eylül'den bu yana Terörle Küresel Mücadele Koalisyonu bünyesinde yer alan koalisyon güçleri Afganistan üssünden El Kaide'yi püskürtmeye yönelik faaliyetlerine devam etmektedir. Örgütün lider kadrosu ve üyelerinin üçte ikisine yakınının öldürüldüğü veya sağ olarak ele geçirildiği iddia edilmektedir. Ancak bu durumun El Kaide'yi etkisiz hale getirip getiremediği halen soru işaretidir. Zira merkezî ve yekpare olmayan El Kaide gibi bir ağ yapılanmasının sadece bu tarz kayıplarla güçsüzleşmesi ya da kendini lağvetmesi çok mümkün görünmemektedir. Usame Bin Ladin'in ölümünün ardından El Kaide ideolojik yönünü kısmen değiştirmek durumunda kalmış, bu ortamda IŞİD ön plana çıkmış ve El Kaide bir nebze de olsa IŞİD'in gölgesinde kalmıştır. ABD'nin 2003 yılında Irak'a müdahalesi sonrası Irak El Kaidesi merkezden farklı politikalar izlemeye, genelde Batı özelde ABD ile savaşmak yerine Şii'lere yönelik saldırılar düzenlemeye başlamış, bu durum da merkezden kopuşu tetiklemiştir. O yıllarda IŞİD'in yükselişe geçmesi ve IŞİD lideri Ebu Bekir el-Bağdadi'nin 2014 yılında halifeliğini ilan etmesi ile cihatçı grupların çoğunun El Kaide'den koparak IŞİD saflarına kaymaya başladığı iddia edilmiştir. Ancak tüm bu koşullar altında El Kaide'nin kanlı terör eylemlerine devam ettiği gözlenmektedir.

Hamas en büyük dönüşümü geçirdiği 2006 Filistin Parlamento Seçimleri sonrası yeni dönemde sadece bir silahlı direniş hareketi ya da sosyal hizmet ağı olmaktan öte, siyasi arenada da söz hakkı kazanan bir aktör olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Hali hazırda pek Çok Hamas milletvekili İsrail makamlarınca tutuklu bulunuyor, karar misyonlarını diledikleri gibi işletemiyor olsalar da Hamas'ın da sistem içerisinde bir aktör olduğunun göstergesi olarak siyasi mevcudiyetleri önemli bulunmaktadır. İç

siyasetteki ikilikle doğru orantılı olarak Filistin Devlet Başkanı Mahmud Abbas'ın Hamas'ı baskı altına almak, devletin bürokrasi, yargı, güvenlik kadrolarına El-Fetih üyelerini getirmek suretiyle Hamas'ın elini kolunu bağladığı iddia edilmektedir. Yaşanan hizipleşmenin etkileri, 2016 yılından bu yana El-Fetih ve Hamas arasında Ulusal Birlik kurulmasına yönelik atılan adımların sonuçsuz kalmasında da hissedilmektedir. Mahmud Abbas, kurulması teklif edilen Ulusal Birlik Hükümeti fikrini reddetmektedir. Benzer şekilde El-Fetih de bu fikre çekinceli yaklaşmakta, Hamas'ın kabul edemeyeceği şartlar öne sürmektedir. Hamas Filistin'i Siyonist işgalden kurtarabilmek adına El-Fetih'le işbirliğine ve birlikte mücadeleye açık olduğunu ifade etmektedir.

Sonuç olarak herhangi bir terör örgütünün kendisini siyasal sisteme entegre etmeyi başarması ona başlı başına "masumiyet" kazandırmaz. Yani siyasallaşma süreci, terör örgütlerine masumiyet ve /veya meşruiyet kazandıran bir araç değildir. Bu kapsamda Hamas farklı olarak ele alınmalıdır. Zira Hamas denildiğinde, silahlı direniş bünyesinde doğrudan hedef alınmamasına rağmen çatışmaların dolaylı olarak hedefi olup hayatını kaybeden sivillerin varlığını yok saymamak suretiyle, geçmişi de bir terör örgütü olmayan, bir ulusal direniş hareketi yürüten, aynı zamanda sosyal hizmet ağları vasıtasıyla halka hizmetlerde bulunan, konjonktüre bağlı olarak evrilip kendisini siyasal düzlemde Filistin halkını temsil eden bir siyasi parti olarak konumlandırılan bir yapıdan bahsedilmektedir.

Gelinen son noktada tüm dünya yadsınamaz bir gerçeklik olan terör sorunu ile karşı karşıyadır. Bu sürecin nihayete erip ermeyeceği ya da daha ne kadar canla bedel ödeneceği soru işareti olarak zihinlerimizde durmaktadır. Kendine İslamla meşruiyet kazandırdığını düşünen ve dünya genelinde İslamofobik algıya hizmet eden El Kaide gibi örgütlerin destekçileri nezdinde kredisinin azaltılmasının tek yolu da yine İslam'ı ve onun emirlerini doğru okumak ve anlatmaktan geçmektedir. Zira Maide Suresi 32.ayette, "Kim ki bir cana karşılık veya yeryüzünde bozgunculuk çıkarmaya karşılık (ceza) olmaksızın (haksız yere) bir cana kıyarsa bütün insanlığı öldürmüş gibi olur. Her kim de bir hayatı kurtarırsa bütün insanlığı

kurtarmış gibi olur.”¹⁶² buyrulmaktadır. Hal böyleyken özü ya da ortaya çıktığı coğrafya itibariyle İslami niteliği olan ancak El Kaide ve benzer örgütlerin İslam algısı ve bu uğurdaki hedefleriyle uzaktan yakından alakası olmayan diğer yapıların aynı kefedede değerlendirilmemesi önemlidir.

Bu çalışma terörü İslamla ve coğrafi olarak Ortadoğu ile özdeş gören yaklaşımdan farklı olarak, El Kaide ve Hamas gibi iki farklı yapıyı mukayeseli olarak ele almak suretiyle farklı bir yaklaşımın mümkün olduğunu görme fırsatı vermiştir. El Kaide ve Hamas’a dair literatürde münferit pek çok çalışma olmasına karşın bu iki örgütün farklılaştıkları yönlerin altını çizen çalışma eksikliğini gidererek literatüre katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu tez Ortadoğu’nun başat meselelerinden biri olan terörizme dair örgütler bazında eleştirel ve mukayeseli çalışmalar, direniş hareketi ve terör örgütü ayırımını netleştirecek örnek analizler yapılması gerekliliğini de göstermiştir.

¹⁶² MÂİDE Suresi 32. Ayet-i Kerime Tefsiri. For further information see: <http://www.kurantefsiri.com/kuran/maide-suresi-ayet-32-kuran-tefsiri.aspx>.

APPENDIX C: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Social Sciences
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
- Enformatik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Informatics
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : TEMEL
Adı / Name : Sevinç Ebru
Bölümü / Department : Ortadoğu Araştırmaları

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARISON OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

** Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.
A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date