

THE ISLAMIC STATE'S IDEOLOGY:
CONSTITUTION OF DOCTRINE AND TERRITORIALITY
THROUGH THE DISCOURSES IN DABIQ AND RUMIYAH

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the constitution of the Islamic State's (IS's) ideology and territoriality, using Critical Constructivism as its theoretical and methodological reference. Towards this, the discourses of the IS, especially those in the Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines, were analysed using Roxanne Lynn Doty's "Discursive Practices Approach" together with its categorising mechanisms of "presupposition", "predication" and "subject positioning." The discourse analyses show that the overall IS Ideology is bifurcated into doctrinal and territorial matters. In constructing its doctrine, the IS adopts and in some cases extends notions as understood by Wahhabism, Qutbism and the

Sahwah Scholarship. In Wahhabism, notions regarding *Tauhid/shirk*, *bid'a*, *al-wala' wal bara'* and *budud* play vital role in this respect. The notions of *Jahiliyyah*, *hakimiyyah*, *shari'a* and offensive Jihad, as utilised by the IS, have strong links with Qutbsm. The Sahwah scholarship anti-shiism, together with Hakimiyyah, Shari'a and offensive Jihad served as an inspiration for the IS's ideological construct, as well. The thesis argues that the IS's doctrine could rightly be described as 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.' It further argues that the group's doctrine serves as the basis for its 'ultra-exclusionary territoriality.' The exclusionary nature of its territoriality lies in its extreme (re) interpretations and utilisation of the notions of *Dar-al Islam* and *Dar-al kufr* as its basis. Through its roadmap to the caliphate, territorial consolidation and administration, aspects of its 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology' could still be discerned.

Keywords: ideology, territoriality, ultra-exclusionary, hybrid, Islamic State

ÖZ

İSLAM DEVLETİNİN İDEOLOJİSİ: DABIQ VE RUMIYAH'DAKİ SÖYLEMLERİ AÇISINDAN DOKTRİN VE TERİTORYALİTENİN OLUŞTURULMASI

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Bu tezde teorik ve metodolojik referans olarak Eleştirel konstrüktivizm kullanımlarıyla İslam Devletinin (IŞİD) ideolojisi ve teritoryalitenin bileşimi araştırılmaktadır. Bu düşünceyle, özellikle Dabiq ve Rumiyah dergilerindeki IŞİD söylemleri Roxanne Doty'nin "Tutarsız Uygulamalar Yaklaşımı" yazısıyla birlikte "ön koşul", "yükleme" ve "özne konumlandırma" sınıflandırma mekanizmalarıyla birlikte analiz edilmiştir. Söylem analizleri genelde IŞİD ideolojisinin doktrinel ve teritoryal konular şeklinde çatallandığını göstermektedir. IŞİD doktrinini yapılandırırken nosyonları Vahabilik,

Kutubçuluk ve Sahwa Alimleri tarafından anlaşıldığı şekliyle benimsemekte ve bazı durumlarda da bunları genişletmektedir. Vahabilikte Tevhid/şirk, bid'a, al wala wal bara' ve hudud kavramları bu açıdan hayatı roller oynarlar. IŞİD tarafından kullanılan cahiliye, hakimiyet, şeriat ve saldırgan cihatçılık kavramları Kutubçuluğa kuvvetle bağlıdır. Sahwah Alimliğinin Şiizm karşıtlığı, hakimiyet, şeriat ve saldırgan cihatçılıkla birlikte IŞİD'in ideolojik yapısı için de ilham kaynağı olarak hizmet etmiştir. Bu tezde IŞİD doktrininin “ultra dışlayıcı hibrid ideoloji” olarak doğru bir şekilde tanımlanabileceği savunulmaktadır. Grubun ideolojisinin “dışlayıcı teritoryalitecilik” temeli olarak hizmet ettiği de tartışılmaktadır. Grubun teritoryalitesinin dışlayıcı niteliği Dar’ül İslam ve Dar’ül Küffar nosyonlarının kendi temeli olarak aşırıcı yorumunda ve kullanımında yatar. Bu üç ideoloji “Halifeliğe giden yol haritası”, teritoryal konsolidasyon ve idaresinde de fark edilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İdeoloji, Teritoryalite, Ultra Dışlayıcı, Hibrid, İslam Devleti

To My Mom, Wife and Kids

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My journey to get this piece of work done has not been smooth sailing. I had to change my supervisor (and thesis committee) and rewrite my entire thesis, at a moment I thought I had finished. I concurrently had to face freezing of my scholarship due to the delays caused by these setbacks. Nonetheless, I managed to sail through successfully. This could not have been possible without the timely intervention of my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür. Despite her tight schedule as Head of Department then, with a number of students under her supervision, and family she accepted to supervise my work. Thank you abundantly, for everything Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür. I really appreciate your commitment to see me thorough this lonely journey successfully. I would like to also thank Assoc. Prof. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç and Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömür Atmaca. They both were members of my Thesis Progress Committee. I thank you for your invaluable feedbacks and unflinching support, despite your respective tight schedules with work and family. To Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalçinkaya and Assoc. Prof. Zana Çitak, I thank you both for agreeing to be part of my Jury and for the insightful and invaluable feedback that has changed the outlook of the entire thesis for the better.

I would like to thank institutions, journalists and or researchers who have made access to some key documents on IS and its discourses (sometimes

translated from Arabic to English) easily accessible online. The thesis does not reflect the views of these individuals or institutions. They include the Brookings Institute, The Washington Institute, and the Clarion Project (where I accessed all the issues of both Dabiq and Rumiyyah Magazines of the IS). Individuals include key researcher on the IS, Ayman Jawad Tamimi and Journalist Rukmini Callimachi.

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ABBREVIATIONS

IS	The Islamic State
ISIS	The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
IS-K	The Islamic State in Khorasan
AQI	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
WB	al Wala' wal Bara'
MENA	Middle East North Africa
CSC	Critical Social Constructivism
CC	Critical Constructivism
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
USA	United States of America
UK	United Kingdom
JCPA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
IR	International Relations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN	United Nation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

That the MENA (Middle East North Africa) region has been grappling with longstanding militant armed groups and militancy cannot be overemphasised. However, the Islamic State's (IS's) proclamation of its self-styled caliphate on the 29th of June 2014, followed by the constant display of its brutal ideology to bring horror to the doorsteps of both its far and near enemies have attracted renewed interest in this field.¹ In particular, IS's 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology' coupled with its 'ultra-exclusionary territoriality' has fascinated many due to its ruthlessness and exceptionality. This is largely because, while previous and much older militant organizations like Al-Qaeda (both central and subsidiaries)² are regarded as ideologically ferocious, the IS's brutality overshadows that of Al-Qaeda to such an extent that Al-Qaeda considers IS extreme. In terms of territoriality, other militant groups in the global jihadists' movement mostly support the idea of the establishment of an

¹Islamic State's Dabiq Issue 1, "Khilafah Declared," *Al Hayat Media Centre*, June 2014, 6.

²Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Islamic State but have not succeeded in doing so. Osama Bin Laden, for instance, has frequently made references to the need to restore the caliphate.³ Indeed, Al-Qaeda affiliates in Mali and Yemen attempted, unsuccessfully, to respectively hold on to a territory for their ultimate Islamic State vision.⁴

There have been several studies on militant groups and militancy in the region and on the IS in particular, as would be shown under the review of the literature section. However, existing works in search of the roots of the regional militancy appear to have categorised the origins into endogenous factors, exogenous elements and in some rare cases, a complex admixture of both. While these categorisations are informative with regards to the general outlook and understanding of militancy and militant groups in the region, they are inadequate in aiding our in-depth knowledge of the ideological configuration of armed groups in the area. Besides, works on the IS either oversimplify the ideological constitution of the group, and its territoriality, or pay less attention to it. Indeed, the ideological leaning of the IS does not lend itself to easy categorisation as would be demonstrated later. This study, situating itself within the broader regional militancy studies, uses a Critical Social Constructivist approach to explore IS's 'ultra-exclusionary ideology' alongside its idea of an ultra-exclusionary territorial 'Islamic state' as a representation of one of its ultimate visions (if not *the* vision).

³Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State," 2014, 9.

⁴Rukmini Callimachi, "Al Qaida's Papers" (The Associated Press, December 2013), https://www.kellyaward.com/wp-content/uploads/2003/11/Rukmini_stories.pdf.

This study mainly aims to answer the following question: How is the Islamic State's ideology constituted? This research question stems from the realisation that not much research has paid attention to the constitution of the IS's ideology in a focused way. In answering this question utilising Critical Social Constructivism (CSC) as its framework, I aim to delineate a way of analysing and understanding the IS that give an in-depth attention to the constitution of its 'ultra-exclusionary ideology' and how that supports its 'ultra-exclusionary territoriality.' In doing so, I hope to develop a comprehensive analytical tool based on which the complex ideological construct of the group coupled with its territoriality could be explained intelligibly and or understood. As such, by answering the question, the study would significantly augment the literature on IS specifically with respect to its ideology and territoriality. Ultimately, the study hopes to contribute to the extensive research on the radical ideologies of militant groups or militancy in the MENA region.

The focused nature of the research question has made the scope of this research modest. It seeks to explore IS's ideological roots, its composition and how that fuels its territorial quest through the lenses of Critical Constructivism as it is reflected in its two important journals, Dabiq and Rumiyah. The thesis is an attempt to appreciate, especially, how an in-depth understanding of the IS's ideology could help in understanding the group, its militancy and perhaps other militant groups (militancy) in the MENA region. In a nutshell, this thesis is an introductory or foundational work that attempts to examine how

understanding the ideological construct of the group can help explain it and its militancy. Several countries will be engaged with as and when necessary. However, the primary countries of focus are Syria, Iraq and to some extent Libya. Some crucial terminologies central to the research are worth elucidating upon. These are ‘Wahhabism’, ‘Qutbism’, ‘Sahwah scholarship.’

Wahhabism is a contested terminology. That is because the scholar whose name is associated with it never referred to his works as Wahhabism nor his followers referring to themselves as Wahhabis or their Islam Wahhabi Islam.⁵ However, it is used in academic discourses to refer to the teachings, preaching, writings and interpretations of some essential Islamic concepts according to the Suadi Arabian Scholar Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-92).⁶ It is also, at present, used to refer to the version of Islam practiced in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That is because of the famous pact between Ibn Suad, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Ibn Wahhab to support each other.⁷ The tag Wahhabism emanated from his surname Wahhab. It is therefore inaccurate to declare Ibn Wahhab as the founder of Wahhabism or to refer to Wahhabism as a sect, as others like

⁵Natana DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁶Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab, *Kitab At-Tawhid* (Independently published, 2019), ii.

⁷DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 60.

Ramtanu Maitra contends.⁸ Instead, it is appropriate that he is regarded as the inspiration behind such ideology through his works, writing and preaching. Aspects of Wahhabism's interpretations of some key concepts of Islam like Tawhid, Shirk, and WB among others would be explored towards examining how those have been adopted, extended or modified by the IS through its discourses in constructing its ultra-exclusionary doctrine.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) was one of the leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt and for some time its chief ideologue. Sayyid Qutb authored several books promoting his ideas and that of the organisation. He authored various works like *This Religion* (*Hadha Din*, 1962),⁹ The characteristics and components of Islamic concept (*Khasai's al-Tasawwur alislami wa muqanwimatuhu*, 1962),¹⁰ The future belongs to this religion (*al mustaqbal li Hadha al-Din* 1965)¹¹, *al-Islam wal mushkilat al hadara*(Islam and the problem of civilisation, 1962) and the 'Milestones' or 'Signposts On The Road' (*Ma'alim fee al-Tariq* 1964).¹² The most influential of his works is the

⁸Ramtanu Maitra, "What Is Wahhabism?," *Executive Intelligence Review* 39, no. 38 (September 28, 2012): 40–40.

⁹Sayyid Qutb, *This Religion of Islam* (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1994).

¹⁰Sayyid Qutb, *The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics* (Indianapolis IN, USA: American Trust Publications, 1992).

¹¹Sayyid Qutb, *Islam, the Religion of the Future* =: (I.I.F.S.O, 1971).

¹²John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (London : Hurst & Co., 2010), 206.

‘Milestones’ or ‘Signposts On The Road’ (*Ma’alim fee al-Tariq*).¹³ His ideas put together especially in ‘the milestone’ is referred to as *Qutbism*.¹⁴ Aspects of Qutbism such as Jahiliyyah, Hakimiyyah, Shari’a and offensive will be explored as well so as to investigate how IS adopt, extend or modify these notions through their discourses towards constituting their doctrine.

The *al-sahwa al-islamiyyah* (Islamic awakening) movement is interestingly a blend of mainly Saudi and Egyptian clerics, which started in the 1950s and 1960s in Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ The movement started when members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) sought shelter in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia after being persecuted by the then Gamal Nasser’s regime.¹⁶ The main motivation for its formation was as a result of the MB not in favour of the Wahhabi brand of Islam practised in the kingdom.¹⁷ The unpredictability of the sahwa was a result of its ability to combine active Salafism with the Muslim Brotherhood’s

¹³Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (India : Angel Book House FZE, 1989).

¹⁴Dale C. Eikmeier, “Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism,” *Parameters: U.S. Army War College* 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 85–97.

¹⁵“Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” Washington Post, accessed December 9, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/saudi-arabias-muslim-brotherhood-predicament/>.

¹⁶“Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament.”

¹⁷The GroundTruth Project, Saudi Islamists consider democracy, confront royal dogma, *Global Post* (n.d.). Accessed on July 20, 2016 from <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/saudi-arabia/110901/saudi's-nascent-democratic-movement-confronts->

political activism.¹⁸ Their extreme ideology especially, *Takfiri*, started to manifest in the 1990s when they accused Saudi Arabia of apostasy for hosting and helping western troops to fight Saddam's Iraq. That together with other shadowy activities the kingdom deemed detrimental to its survival led to the deportation of most of the MB members back to Egypt and repressing the movement. It has since been in a hiatus until the Arab uprising in 2011 presented an opportunity for the resurgence of the sahwa voice especially as many referred to it as 'the Arab awakening.' That shook the Saudi Kingdom and was made worse by the relative successes of the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia by way of transitioning them to democracies. It was not surprising then that the Saudis supported the coup in Egypt that ousted Morsi just after a year in office. The original sahwa scholarship (sahwi ulama') ideologically managed to blend Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies (both Qutbist camp and the Bannaist camp).¹⁹ An essential ideological stand of theirs that is conspicuous in IS's discourses is their extreme views on the shias, which IS has adopted, modified and extended.

Since the declaration of the Caliphate by the IS, in the summer of 2014, there have been numerous write-ups and researches trying to understand or explain the group in diverse ways. Different works have focused on

¹⁸Hassan Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746>.

¹⁹Stéphane Lacroix and George Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), 51.

diversed aspects of the group like its ideology, terrrtoriality, and its history or genealogy. Interestingly, less attention is given to the constitution of the group's ideology. Where ideology is treated, it is either in a very generic sense or linked to other aspects of the orgainsation inspired by such an ideological leaning.

Most of the accessible books on IS indicates that the IS is an extreme Sunni terrorist organization. They further sub-classify the group as Wahhabi or Salafi Jihadi group. They sometimes emphasise on the group's belief in escathological events and how they literally interprate those. Others align the organisation to Sayyid Qutb's ideas especially those in the 'Milestones.' The regional sectarianism, the sahra scholarship ideas and activism is also regarded as an inspiration for the IS especially its anti-shiism. However, how the specific aspects of these ideologies help in constituting the Islamic states ideologies especially through their original discourses is not visible.²⁰

The group's obsession and sophisticated utilisation of the Internet did not go unnoticed. Some research contrasts the IS with Al-Qaeda on how the former is able to utilise the Internet effectively to moblise following and

²⁰See William Faizi McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse : The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York : St. Martin's Press., 2015); Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State"; Patrick Cockburn, *The Rise of Islamic State : ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*. (London ;NewYork :Verso.,2015),<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=i&p&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1996501&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>; Robert Manne, *The Mind of the Islamic State: ISIS and the Ideology of the Caliphate* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2017); Graeme Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, First Edition edition (New York: Random House, 2016); Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State."

spread its mischievous propaganda.²¹ Other research on the group focused on the origin and the historical evolution of the group. Some of the works focus on the personalities of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi. Some also emphasise on how the IS is a continuation of al-Qaeda rather than a completely new militant group.²²

The boundless territorial ambition of the Islamic state is at the centre of some works. Andrew Hosken highlighted how conquering the entire world feature prominently on the agenda of the IS.²³ The Raqqah diaries on the other hand highlighted the brutality and the barbarity taking place in the IS's controlled areas with reference to Raqqah.²⁴ Guitsizzi's work focused on the IS-K (The Islamic State in Khorasan), highlighting the extension of territorial presence of the group in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian regions.²⁵

Indeed some of these works have acknowledged the works and actions

²¹See Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, First Edition (New York, N.Y: Ecco, 2015); Abdel Bari Atwan, *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*, First edition (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015).

²²See Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, First Edition edition (New York, NY: Regan Arts., 2015); Fawaz A. Gerges, *ISIS: A History* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2017); Lawrence Wright, *The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State* (London: Knopf, 2016); Anthony Tucker-Jones, *Daesh: Islamic State's Holy War* (Pen and Sword Military, 2018).

²³Andrew Hosken, *Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State* (Place of publication not identified: Oneworld Publications, 2015).

²⁴Samer, *The Raqqa Diaries: Escape from Islamic State*, ed. Mike Thomson (Interlink Pub Group, 2017).

²⁵Antonio Giustozzi, *The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad* (London: Hurst, 2018).

of some earlier scholars to form the basis of IS's ideology, especially 'The Milestone', 'Introduction to the jurisprudence of Jihad' and 'Essentials for making ready (for Jihad).' Although these works have been acknowledged to form the basis of IS's ideology, however, in the end a very simple categorisation or ideological leaning is assigned to the IS. It also does not give an apparent trajectory as to how the IS put together the fragments of the various aspects of these write-ups in constructing their ideology. Or perhaps demonstrate how these works reflect in the IS's discourses and practices. This is where my research comes in. This research would trace the constitution of the IS's ideology utilising the group's discourses without losing sight of the historical underpinnings of the ideology.

In an attempt to discern, grasp and categorise ISIS's ideology most of the text on the group as shown above, implicitly or explicitly, link it exclusively to the Sunni sect, ideologically (Wahhabism-Salafism or Jihadi-Salafism). Ostensibly, this is due to IS's being historically rooted in AQI which conspicuously describe itself as Sunni and the IS considering itself as a continuation of AQI's struggles.²⁶ Interestingly, Renowned Scholars like Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel are sharply divided on this issue especially within the context of the IS. Roy, in 'Jihad and Death' argues (in a rebuttal to Kepel) that Salafism is not responsible for Jihadism and seeking death. He strongly

²⁶They also proclaim to be part of Ahlu sunnah wal jama'a see Islamic State's Dabiq Issue 2, "The Flood:It's Either with the Islamic State or the Flood," *A/Hayat Media Centre*, June 2014, 23.

rejected Kepel's emphasis on the role of Islam and Salafist ideology in promoting Jihadism. Roy ultimately argues, “jihadi terrorism is not the consequence of the radicalization of Islam (through Salafism), but rather of the Islamization of radicalism.”²⁷ Roy’s argument is consistent with his previous works especially when situated within the context of his debates with Gilles Kepel.²⁸ For Gilles Kepel, Islam and Islamism’s role in the rise of Jihadism in France and wider Europe cannot be ignored. This is so, especially, when examined within the context of the series of terror attacks France suffered and the ideological inspiration behind those.²⁹ Even though both are well known rivals for their divergent position regarding the agency of Islam or salafism when it comes to violent Jihadism, they appear to be singing the same song with different voices. For Roy, radicals and Jihadis in France and wider west should be seen as primarily as rebellious youth who have chosen Jihadism as a mode of revolt. Kepel on his part asserts that “in groups destabilized by the experience of colonialism and migration, by job insecurity and poverty, by being made to feel inferior culturally and symbolically, the imposition on oneself and one’s community of a set of rigorous religious norms can be seen

²⁷Olivier Roy, *Jihad and Death : The Global Appeal of Islamic State*, 2017, 6,
<http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/45864>.

²⁸See Olivier Roy, *Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways*, First Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam : The Search for a New Ummah*, The CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies (New York : Columbia University Press, c2004., 2004).

²⁹Gilles Kepel and Antoine Jardin, *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West* (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017).

as a way of restoring social stability and control”³⁰

The works examined above are insightful in trying to understand various aspect of the IS. However, with respect to ideology and territoriality whilst most work acknowledge that both needs to be better understood it appears cursory attention has been given to these aspects of the group by way of over generalisation or oversimplification. I would examine the constitution of the group’s ideology through its *Dabiq* and *Rumiyyah* magazine discourses and how that resonates with its territoriality.

It is interesting to observe how some analysts situate the IS as an extension of the usual sectarianism bedevilling the region. Improper understanding of the fundamental dichotomy between the two main sectarian strands in Islam would lead to such derisory categorization of IS’s ideology as extreme Sunni sectarianism or *khawarij* (*Kharrijites*).³¹ As rudimentary as it may seem, according to a survey by the New York Times reporter Jeff Stein, some senior security officers and legislators in Washington did not know the fundamental difference between *Shia* and *Sunni* actors at the peak of the Iraqi invasion in 2006.³² IS’s ideology is far more complicated than such unsophisticated categorization under just ‘sectarianism as the usual label’. This

³⁰Kepel and Jardin, 138.

³¹See H.m. Sanjeev Kumar, “ISIS and the Sectarian Political Ontology: Radical Islam, Violent Jihadism and the Claims for Revival of the Caliphate,” *India Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (01 2018): 119–37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928418766683>.

³²Jeff Stein, “Opinion | Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiïte?,” *The New York Times*, October 17, 2006, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html>.

is not to debunk the fact that IS's ideological constitution has conspicuous 'anti Shiism' component as would be shown in the 'ideology chapter,' but the group is not exclusively sectarian group joining in to participate in the customary sectarian fissure in the region.

This research is a qualitative study that purposefully explores the constitution of the IS's ideology. Toward achieving such an end, the study primarily delves into historiographical accounts of the IS, as well the discourses of the IS. The research relied on primary (Dabiq and Rumiyyah discourses) as well as secondary interviews, research, and data from some researchers and journalists who were lucky to have gained the trust of relevant respondents were adopted. Some of the research notes of think tanks that have managed to sponsor their researchers to these areas like the Brookings Institute, The Washington Institute, and the Clarion Project (where I accessed all the issues of both Dabiq and Rumiyyah Magazines of the IS) were utilised. Content analyses of IS's Dabiq and Rumiyyah Magazines were conducted. Also, relevant translated documents from key researchers on the IS like Ayman Jawad Tamimi³³ were greatly consulted. Brave Journalists like Rukmini Callimachi who focus on reporting on IS (Syria and Iraq) were keenly followed on social media.³⁴ Lastly, relevant books; Journal articles, newspapers,

³³"Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed March 16, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/>.

³⁴Rukmini Callimachi, "1. Hello Everyone, I Wanted to Share What I Learned from the More than 15,000 Pages of ISIS Documents That My Team and I Unearthed over Five Different Trips to Iraq. We Recovered the Records in 11 Different Cities and Towns. First up, How We Found

magazine, conference papers, working papers, theses, and relevant websites on the subject matter were consulted as well.³⁵ In analysing the data obtained from these sources, the study used Critical Social Constructivist (CSC) analytical tools. Of utmost importance has been Roxanne Doty's *Discursive Practices Approach*. In particular, her three textual analysis mechanisms: "presupposition," "predication" and "subject positioning."³⁶ This will be highlighted on in the next chapter on Critical Constructivism.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces the study in terms of the problem statement, research question, significance of the study, review of the most relevant literature, and methodology. The second chapter explores the theoretical approach or framework adopted. It explores the evolution of social constructivism as a social theory of International Relations (IR), its fundamental tenets, variations within the constructivists' scholarship as demonstrated in the works of some key scholars, critiques of constructivism and the utility of CSC in understanding the construction of ideas (ideologies) by non-state transnational militant groups like the Islamic State. Of utmost importance is the utility of

³⁵ Them. [Https://Www.Nytimes.Com/Interactive/2018/04/04/World/Middleeast/Isis-Documents-Mosul-Iraq.Html ...](https://Www.Nytimes.Com/Interactive/2018/04/04/World/Middleeast/Isis-Documents-Mosul-Iraq.Html ...),” Tweet, [@rallimachi](#) (blog), April 5, 2018, <https://twitter.com/rallimachi/status/981965068505141248>.

³⁵ There is not enough space to state these important works here, but their citations would be seen in the ensuing chapters.

³⁶ Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 3 (1993): 297, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600810>.

Critical Constructivism in understanding the IS and the constitution of its ideology as well as its augmenting territorial ideology. The third chapter examines IS's ideology, its roots and constitution. It argues that contrary to the tendency to align IS with a single ideology; the IS is espousing 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology' by combining concepts from Wahhabism, Qutbism, and the 'Sahwa Scholarship.' The fourth chapter delves into the territoriality of the IS. It discusses its territorial roadmap, its methodology and governance and how that resonates with its hybrid ideology. The conclusion section summarizes and analyses the main findings of the research. It also makes some recommendation for future research.

CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the evolution of social constructivism (generally called constructivism) as a social theory of International Relations (IR), its fundamental tenets, variations within the constructivists' scholarship as demonstrated in the works of some leading scholars, critiques of constructivism and the utility of CSC in understanding the ideological constitution of non-state transnational militant groups like the Islamic State (IS).

Constructivism was first introduced to the field of International Relations by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in his famous work of 1989, “World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations.”³⁷ A fundamental proposition, in this work, is the assertion that humans are social beings engaged in social relationships. These social relations *make or construct us* humans into who we are. By extension, through the same

³⁷Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, S.C: Univ of South Carolina Pr, 1989).

social relationships (especially interacting with each other) we make the world into what it is. That is, social ties affect the world and the world; in turn, affects our social relationships. From this, we deduce social constructivism's contention that the world is socially constructed. An essential part of this social interaction is the role played by rules (not just legal) to guide the conduct of humans. In developing regulations to govern our social relationship, we develop interests and identities to make and remake our social world.³⁸

Social constructivism was initially received with skepticism especially in North America where neorealism and neoliberalism were dominating discourses. However, following the significant changes in the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s (especially the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the bipolarity), coupled with the failure of the dominant rationalist or materialist theories (neorealism and neoliberalism) to offer meaningful explanations to these changes, constructivism was sought after due to its emphasis on the social construction of our world and of international relations. More importantly, it gives room for the possibility of change and its explanation. In the section that follows the chapter highlights some of the distinguishing features of social constructivism that made it appealing.

³⁸Onuf.

2.2 Key Tenets of Constructivism

One of the main features of constructivism that distinguishes it from other major theoretical approaches like neorealism and neoliberalism is its emphasis on ideational variables as a supplement to materialist variables.³⁹ Constructivism emphasizes, ontologically and epistemologically, on the social construction of ideas and the meaning given to objects and practices in international relations. Contrary to the popular mistaken notion that constructivism downplays the significance of material resources, constructivism recognizes the importance of material resources (military, strategic and economics resources) but argues that they should be understood through the ideas, and the perception that give the meaning they have for human endeavor. For instance, why is a state with outstanding military and economic capabilities respected globally? It is precisely because of the inter-subjective meaning and understanding that such a state could defend not just itself when the need be and take care of its financial needs, but it is also capable of assisting others materially. That is, the meaning given to such material capabilities is as significant as the resource itself.

The idea of ‘sovereignty’ is another example. States regard each other as sovereigns due to an existing inter-subjective understanding to that effect. That is, a sovereign state exercises autonomy over a defined territory and population without interference from an outside entity or another state. That

³⁹Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 163.

is due to the inter-subjective meaning and understanding that are given to the notion of ‘sovereignty’. The idea is worthless without the inter-subjective meaning assigned to it.

Interestingly, because the idea is socially constructed (which makes it hardly constant) it can therefore be shaped and reshaped through social interaction. There was the promulgation of an idea known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P),⁴⁰ which is reshaping the earlier understanding of sovereignty. The idea of R2P gave prominence to the need to protect the rights of citizens abused within other states regarded as ‘despotic.’ Most of the ‘civilized’ nation-states around the world agree with this through inter-subjectivity and norm acceptance. When critically analyzed, R2P increases the ability of a state to extend its power beyond its borders while shrinking that of others within their own border. Meaning that through social interaction, not only do states accept the notion of sovereignty but could be shaped and reshaped by states through interaction and norm acceptance.⁴¹ That emphasizes how ideas are constructed and shaped by human endeavor or states’ interactions.

As a result of the recognition and emphasizing on the importance of these non-material factors or ideational variables by constructivists, it has been internalised even by some scholars within the discipline of International Relations, who do not entirely agree with constructivism. For instance, John

⁴⁰“United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” accessed April 22, 2019, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>.

⁴¹Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298–316.

Mearsheimer, who is a staunch neorealist recognises what he calls non-material factors. By non-material factors, he refers to “strategy, intelligence, and resolve” which are influenced, socially.⁴² Besides, Stephen Walt (another key realist) has hinted in an article in Foreign Policy that constructivism could be a third “pillar” of the Scholarship on International Relation due to its unwavering commitment to addressing the problem of normativity.⁴³

The social aspects of interest and identity formation are very central to constructivists. For Constructivists, states’ interests and identities are socially constructed and have the possibility to change over time. For instance, Constructivists would argue that the hostile relationship between North Korea and the United States of America has more to do with the social relational issue rather than the military hardware itself. That is, it has to do with whether America regards a particular state as an ‘enemy’ or a ‘friend.’ Thus American leaders perceive an unfriendly relationship with North Korea and therefore see the need to contain it. On the other hand, they perceive the United Kingdom (UK) as a great ally, and therefore there is no need for containment. The constructivists understanding of interest and identity gives room for the possibilities to have changes in interest and identities depending on the situation a state finds itself. That is, the interest and identity of a nation could be different at different times depending on the circumstances the said state

⁴²John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York : Norton& company., 2001), 58.

⁴³Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (1998): 29–32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275>.

finds itself. For example, contrary to the supposedly timeless neorealist logic, not all countries have survival as their primary interest. For smaller states within a disputed region sandwiched by mega-states like Bhutan (located between China and India), for sure its top priority is survival. For more prominent countries, like the USA, rather than survival, it may want to play a much more significant role in shaping global affairs. Therefore, contrary to the timeless logic of neorealism where identities and interest could be unalterable, constructivism acknowledges the reality of the possibility for a change.

Another example is regarding the relationship between the US and Iran under the Obama administration and the same relationship under Trump. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) came to fruition under the Obama administration due to the perception of Iran by that administration leading to the joint agreement in 2015. However, under Trump, that same agreement has been overturned not based on concrete evidence of violating the deal but on the perception that Iran is cheating. The vital role perception plays in shaping a country's identity, and interest cannot be overemphasized.

Anarchy is central to understanding international relations. It refers to a concept in International Relations where, arguably, there is the absence of hierarchy in the global structure or system of states. That is the absence of supra-national authority above nation-states. To have a comprehensive understanding of the concept of anarchy, one needs to understand the agent-structure issue and how different theoretical approaches conceptualizes it.

Agents refer to active participants in the international system whether nation-states or non-states actors. The structure on the hand refers to the broader environment within which agents participate.⁴⁴

Scholars like Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, and Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie, and Peter Katzenstein, contributed to shaping constructivism into a ‘social theory of international politics.’⁴⁵ The most famous of these scholars is Alexander Wendt with his numerous works on social Constructivism, the pioneering and the most popular of which is “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”⁴⁶ A key and well-known argument posited by Wendt in this piece is to depart with the traditional rationalists (or materialists) approaches like neorealism and neoliberalism regarding anarchy. For the neorealist anarchy would eventually lead to self-help or war and conflict. The neoliberals, on the other hand, see it to be a permissive force for cooperation. Constructivism

⁴⁴Alexander E Wendt, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory* (Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği İktisadi İşletmesi, 2009).

⁴⁵Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, no. 2 (1992): 391; Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security*, no. 1 (1995): 71, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217>; John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity : Essays on International Institutionalization*, The New International Relations (London ; New York : Routledge, 1998., 1998), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1114410&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security : Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2018); Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations* (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : SAGE Publications, 2005., 2002); See Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions : On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 2 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1989., 1989).

⁴⁶Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

(especially *Wendtian* variant) differed from both to argue that ‘anarchy is what states make of it.’ That is it could lead to peace and cooperation or conflict depending on the interpretation or meaning given to the social interaction taking place in an anarchic environment.

Interestingly, the divergent views regarding anarchy by constructivists and the rationalists (neorealists and neoliberals) bring to the fore the general agent-structure problem in IR. For the neo-realists, the anarchical structure is deterministically conflictual leading to their assertion that the behavior of states is influenced by the anarchical architecture of the international system. That is, countries try to maximize security to ensure their continued survival as a result of the arrangement of the global system. Or going by the neoliberals’ logic, states cooperate because that is good for the betterment of all in an anarchic structure. Therefore, for neoliberals and neorealist, the structure influences the agency and not the vice versa. However, for constructivists, agency and structure are mutually constitutive. That is agents influence structure and the structure influences agents. Due to the interaction between the agency and the structure, there could be changes in the social structure or arrangement in the international system. For example, through social interaction among agents in the global structure cold war ceased to exist bringing about new outcomes altering the structure and making it not bipolar anymore.

2.3 Variations within Constructivism

Despite constructivists sharing and agreeing on the basic premises of constructivism, they are not as monolithic as one might think. They have internal differences regarding unit of analysis (whether to focus on states' internal dynamics or structural dynamics or even nonstate actors) and or methodological differences regarding how to analyze such dynamics or answer a related question. Concerning the unit of analysis, some scholars prefer to prioritize how the international system or structure influences state identity, interest or priorities while others focus on domestic dynamics and how that shape states values in the international arena. Some even prefer to focus on how international society (intergovernmental or multinational organizations) shapes states identities, and interests. Methodologically, some constructivists support and utilise positivists' methods while others favor post-positivism. These differences led to what Ted Hoft popularly referred to as the critical and conventional variants of constructivism.⁴⁷ Going by Ted's categorization, the following sampled work of constructivists highlights some of this unity in diversity of the constructivists' scholarship.

First of all, I would like to start with the *Wendtian* constructivism. That is because the combination of Alexender Wendt's contributions to the constructivists approach through several articles and later a book, represent systemic, structural, North American or conventional variant of

⁴⁷Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, no. 1 (1998): 171, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>.

constructivism.⁴⁸ Wendt focused on refuting the neorealist, and the neoliberals claim that the international system or structure is predetermined. Besides, although both rationalists allude to this, they reached interestingly distinctive conclusions on what such predetermined anarchic structure could lead to as indicated earlier. Wendt agrees with the rationalists that the structure is anarchic but disagreed with both rationalists approaches by arguing that anarchy need not to strictly lead to self-help or cooperation but ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.⁴⁹ That is for the neorealist and the neoliberals; states have pre-given identities and interest before interacting with other nations. But for Wendt, states gain, make and remake their identities and interests through social interaction.

Wendt demonstrated these through the outcome of the ideal type of anarchic structure for intelligibility. These are Hobbesian anarchy, Lockean anarchy, and Kantian.⁵⁰ Under the Hobbesian ideal type anarchy driven by the original philosophy of Thomas Hobbes ‘war of all against all’, states view each other as staunch enemies, and only the fittest survive. Life is more likely to be solitary and brutish and more prone to violent conflict. Historically, Wendt suggested that most of the world history (perhaps western history) supported

⁴⁸Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

⁴⁹Wendt.

⁵⁰Wendt, 259.

this trend until the 17th century.⁵¹ Under the Lockean culture of anarchy, however, there is a restrained rivalry in the sense that despite enmity, states do not see the need to eliminate each other but to coexist strategically. He again, historically, characterized this with the aftermath of the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Lastly, the Kantian ideal type anarchy is characterized by Wendt to be the end of the Second World War. In this type of anarchy, states see each other as friends, resolve to live peacefully and support each other in times of need.⁵²

There are two significant deficiencies noted with the Wendtian approach. First, Wendt argues for a socially constructed world yet alludes to the predetermined anarchic nature of the international system. That is, he disagrees with neorealism and neoliberalism about what the outcome of anarchy might be but agrees in principle with them that the global structure is anarchic, but the outcome depends on ‘what states make of it.’ Besides, closely related to this is focusing so much on the systemic structure to the neglect of the internal dynamics of a state.⁵³ This focus opens the door for Wendt to be categorised by some scholars as ‘realist constructivist’ concerning his focus on

⁵¹Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

⁵²Wendt.

⁵³Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009., 2009), 211.

the international structure.⁵⁴ Far from being realist, Wendt's focus on structure is as a result of his concentration on responding or challenging neorealism, which focuses more on analysing the international structure.

Another conventional constructivist, Martha Finnemore, posited an alternative systemic approach in her book "National Interest in International Society."⁵⁵ Unlike Wendt, Finnimore's main point was not about responding to the anarchy debate but how states interest and identities are defined and shaped by the international society norms. In particular, she analysed how international societies shape states identities and interests. She suggested that the norms of international societies are transmitted to states through international organizations. These international organizations socialise states by teaching them these norms. She demonstrated this through three case studies.

In the first case study she argued, using United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), that international organizations are very successful in propagating ideas that help states to be more 'civil'. She indicated that bureaucracy for science policies did not exist in most countries in the 1950s. However, as a result of UNESCO's efforts in introducing countries to the idea that to be a modern and civilized nation-state having scientific bureaucracy is key, and many countries now do have such

⁵⁴Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, *Constructivism and International Relations : Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, The New International Relations (London ; New York : Routledge, 2006., 2006).

⁵⁵M. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Cornell University Press, 2017).

policies. Finnemore's second case study centered on how the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) succeeded in pushing and promulgating 'appropriate behavior' for civilized states involved in a war. The third case study centered on how the World Bank through the strong leadership of Robert McNamara managed to get third world countries to make poverty alleviation as part of economic policy norm. Wendt and Finnemore respectively focused on how the international structure and international societies shape the values and identities of states through different approaches.

Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink in their 1998 article developed the life cycle of the norm model.⁵⁶ An essential contribution of this work is to highlight how norms evolve to the point of their cascade and internalisation. They argued that norms have a life cycle and demonstrated that through three stages. The first stage is what they refer to as "norm emergence." By norm emergence, they refer to the point where a norm is introduced by a 'norm entrepreneur' who could be a state or not and for whatever motive. An important issue regarding norm emergence is the usage of persuasion by the norm entrepreneurs to get their message across and accepted. The next stage is 'norm cascade' or general acceptance where critical mass accepts the new norm. The final stage is the internalisation stage.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.

⁵⁷Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

Other constructivists like Peter Katzenstein focuses on how internal dynamics especially culture, norms, and identity shape the behavior of state in the international system concerning security. The book he edited “The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics” demonstrates this.⁵⁸ In his “*Alternative Perspectives on National Security*,” chapter he argued that national security issues had transcended the general materialist assertion as posited by realism. He argued that conventional theories like realism and liberalism do not well explain issues such as economic stability, migration, ethnic conflicts and technology. Katzenstein’s chapter together with other contributing chapters from like-minded scholars offered a sociological perspective to the issue of National Security in “The Culture of National Security.” Not debunking the claims of mainstream theories like realism and liberalism, the approach analyses the significant role(s) played by cultural influences in the shaping of identity and interests. That is Katzenstein argues that influences in national security matters is not confined to material power but includes the concepts of norms, culture, and identity. That is in sharp contrast to the realist and liberal approaches because his sociological approach seeks “broader definitions of national security — such as economic competitiveness, human rights, or human welfare.”⁵⁹

⁵⁸Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New Directions in World Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, c1996., 1996).

⁵⁹Katzenstein, 1–26.

Another chapter worth noting in “The Culture Of National Security” is Michael N. Barnett’s, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East.”⁶⁰ A fundamental proposition in this work that puts it at odds with other conventional theoretical approaches and to situate it within the constructivist realm is the argument that identity politics explains most alliances and relationships in the Middle East rather than military hardware. That is in response to Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory,⁶¹ which according to Barnett fails to explain how a state’s intent is determined and in doing so, what exactly constitutes a threat to another state.⁶² He used identity politics to explain Israel-US relationship, the formation of allies in the Arab States, interstate interactions and alliance formation, the vital link between identity and the construction of a threat. Empirically, Barnett cites the Baghdad Pact, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the U.S.-Israeli alliance to support his argument that a state’s identity is indeed relevant in alliance formation.⁶³ Ted Hopf is another constructivist analysing the construction of national identities and how they shape states behavior, especially in foreign policy formulation. In his book, “Social Construction of Foreign Policy: Identities and Foreign

⁶⁰Katzenstein, 400–432.

⁶¹Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1990., 1990).

⁶²Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New Directions in World Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, c1996., 1996), 400–432.

⁶³Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 1996, 400–432.

Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999.”⁶⁴ He analysed Soviet and Russian foreign policies and how the ideas of the personalities behind the scene shape them. That is because state identity is mostly expressed through central decision-makers. Two case studies were undertaken, on Moscow of 1955 and Moscow of 1999 because these were turning points in the history of modern Russia. Through intertextual sources, including archives, journals, newspapers, memoirs, writers, and textbooks he concluded that the reconstructed domestic identities go along way in explaining Soviet/Russian foreign policy in 1955 and 1999.

The fundamental proposition of social constructivism that world politics is socially constructed leads to methodological (ontological and epistemological) differences regarding positivism and post-positivism. Can the socially constructed world be studied using scientific methods or not? Which is the best way to make a knowledge claim of our world? Is there a world out there apart from human interaction? Some constructivists are in favor of positivism.⁶⁵ That is to import pure scientific methods in trying to understand our social world. They argue that the international system as a social construct contains some pattern for generalizations and testing hypotheses. They know

⁶⁴Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics : Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2002., 2002).

⁶⁵Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 67 (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999., 1999), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1326287&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; See for example Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 98 (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005., 2005).

this require carefully implemented methods to be unearthed but maintained it is possible. The works of Wendt, Finnemore, Adler, Hopf, and Ruggie indicated above among others demonstrate this. These constructivists believe in cause and effect; dependent and independent variable since their analyses are more interested in the objectivity of the conclusions they arrive at and in objective truth.

Besides, among the positivist camp, there are differences in opinion regarding anarchy and authority (or anarchy and post-anarchy) in the international system. On one hand, there are the ‘conventional constructivists’ like Wendt, Finnemore, Adler, Hopf and Ruggie who agree with neorealist and neoliberals that the current international system functions under condition of anarchy (though their conclusion as to what such anarchic situation might lead to is very different as indicated above) and therefore take anarchy as a critical element in their analysis of the international system.

However, as a result of the ‘structuration’ proposition by constructivists, constructivism opens a possibility for those who believe in ‘post-anarchy’ international system where the key organizing principle might not necessarily be anarchy but authority. Authority as in ‘legitimated power.’⁶⁶ Structuration is a concept that was expounded initially by Anthony Giddens as

⁶⁶Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy : Legitimacy and Power at the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2007., 2007),
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1280334&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

a way of examining the link between structures and actors.⁶⁷ For Giddens, structures (referring to rules and conditions guiding social interaction within an environment) are not deterministic of what actors do, unlike how the neorealist would want us to view the anarchic structure. Structures and actors (i.e., agents) engage in a relationship that entails inter-subjectivity for understanding and meaning. That leads to structure not only influencing the actions of the actors but also the actors influencing the structure through their action. That is what Giddens referred to as ‘structuration.’ This group of constructivists has found empirical evidence that suggests that there exist international authority institutions in different forms in both public and private spheres. Public types might include the UN Secretary-General,⁶⁸The UN Security Council,⁶⁹The discourses of international law⁷⁰, and norms on

⁶⁷Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] : Polity Press, 1984., 1984).

⁶⁸Micheal Barnett, “Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory,” in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa : Global-Local Networks of Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47–68, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=nlebk&AN=529376&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

⁶⁹Hurd, *After Anarchy*.

⁷⁰Iain Johnstone, “The Power of Interpretive Communities,” in *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 98 (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005., 2005), 185–204.

legitimate intervention.⁷¹ Private forms include the legitimated power of firms and institutions in international markets.⁷²

However, the other side of the argument represented by the post-positivist see these assertions as problematic. They argue that no matter how ‘scientific’ a method might be, data on social life cannot be completely objective. Researchers or observers cannot detach themselves from the objects they study. The social world cannot be studied by ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ methods or dependent and independent variables dichotomy. Instead as stated by David Campbell, social inquiry:

...has to be concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality, and the historicity of knowledge. That reaffirms the indispensability of interpretation, and suggests that all knowledge involves a relationship with power in its mapping of the world.⁷³

That is the aim of theoretical approach in this regard is not to be fixated on testing hypotheses or identifying regular patterns in a socially constructed international system. Instead, an objective of a theory like constructivism should be the interpretation of the meaning and its relations to

⁷¹Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention : Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2003., 2003).

⁷²Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 85 (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, c2002,2007.), accessed January 6, 2019,
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1270930&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

⁷³David Campbell, “Poststructuralism,” in *International Relations Theories : Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford : Oxford University Press., 2007), 203–28.

power toward producing the stability being witnessed in the social world.⁷⁴

Scholars sharing this view are labeled as ‘critical constructivist,’ and they include David Campbell, Jim George, James Der Derian, R. B. J. Walker, Andrew Linklater, and Ann Tickner and Roxanne Doty.⁷⁵

In this respect, the works of these critical constructivists would serve as an inspiration for this study. In particular, Roxanne Doty’s work would serve as a key inspiration for this study.⁷⁶ The chapter would demonstrate how this work would be of practical aid to this study later in the ensuing passages. In the article entitled “Foreign Policy as a Social Construction: a Post Positivists Approach to US Counter-Insurgency Policy in the Philippines,”⁷⁷ Doty analysed foreign policy as a social construction using the post-positivist approach. This study is particularly interested in the kind of questions Doty asks and her Discursive Practices Approach. Doty used ‘how possible’ strategy to explore identity and interest formation in foreign policymaking. Even

⁷⁴Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in *Theories of International Relations* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan., 2009), 161–87.

⁷⁵See David Campbell, *National Deconstruction : Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis, Minn : University of Minnesota Press, c1998., 1998); James Der Derian, *Critical Practices in International Theory : Selected Essays* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2009., 2009); R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside : International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 24 (Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1993., 1993); Andrew Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics : Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity* (New York, NY : Routledge, 2007., 2007); See J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations : Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New Directions in World Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, c1992., 1992).

⁷⁶Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”

⁷⁷Roxanne Lynn Doty.

though this study is not situated squarely within the foreign policy studies, it has nonetheless adopted, extended, modified and utilized her approach.

On structuring of questions, Doty insists on the ‘how possible questioning approach’ rather than the why questions. She maintains, “What is explained is not *why* a particular outcome is obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practice was made possible.”⁷⁸ That is for Doty, why question takes for granted certain practices and meanings as given. But the ‘how’ question is deeply interested in how those practices and meanings were socially constructed, and how they came to be accepted as the justification for answering the why question. For instance, on the subject of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, there could be several reasons that could be given in this regard. One popular answer is that Iraq is amassing weapons of mass destruction and since Iraq is a rogue state, which implies that, it is a wild place to maintain those stockpiles. And since Saddam Hussein had refused to destroy those weapons, Iraq had to be invaded. The problem with such an answer is that the question takes for granted many unanswered questions because it is just interested in getting a reason for the outcome. It accepts that Iraq is a rogue state without asking *how* come Iraq is regarded as a rogue state. How is the idea of a rogue state constructed? Using this approach Doty asks two questions that are central to her study: “how were particular subjects and mode of subjectivity constituted to make United States interventionist policy

⁷⁸Roxanne Lynn Doty.

in the Philippines circa 1950?” and “how did the practices involved in this specific instance of policy-making further the construction and hierarchical positioning of subjects thus locating some “sovereign” equals as the rightful interpreters and judges of others?”

2.4 Critiques of constructivism

Constructivism, like any other IR theory, has its fair share of criticisms mainly from neorealism. One of such criticisms directed to constructivism by neorealism is that constructivism overemphasises on norms and how it is socially constructed among states. The problem neorealist, like Mearsheimer, has with this is that such emphasis makes it seem as if it is possible to instill states with a ‘communitarian’ norms.⁷⁹ He contends that anarchy; unequal material capabilities and uncertain intention put together gives states little choice but to compete with each other aggressively.⁸⁰ But what neorealists are not ready to accept is that states do easily become friends through social interaction.

Another criticism directed to constructivism by realists is that constructivism does not adequately analyse the problem of uncertainties and deception. Uncertainty is about the hidden intentions of states regarding the present and the future from the public domain. For the neorealist, the anarchic nature of the international system always directs states to look for

⁷⁹John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” *International Security*, no. 1 (1995): 257, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539218>.

⁸⁰John J. Mearsheimer, 257.

ways and means to be more secure. This ‘noble’ intention could be misread leading to the security dilemma. Concerning deceptions, neorealists argue that constructivists are mistaken to assume that states would always engage in a sincere and open social interaction. However, realists contend that states could easily pretend to be peace lovers for their selfish gains. Constructivist would respond to this criticism by emphasising that the nature of anarchy is hugely intricate which is why the neorealist argument that it deterministically must lead to self-help is problematic. Wendt demonstrated this complexity with his three ideal model anarchy and the level of internalisation in each. The Hobbesian and the Lockean anarchy are very close to the neorealist conception indicating the fact at least the Wendtian constructivism recognises these dynamics. However, what the realists reject to accept is the Kantian model, which is also a possibility.

Neorealist also questions constructivists view on change. In particular, they question constructivism for not accounting for the rise and fall in discourses. Mearsheimer contends that constructivists fail to account for why neorealism has been a dominant discourse.⁸¹ That the only change they talk about is the changes in the international system and how variation in the material world drives change in discourses.⁸² Besides, Robert Jervis argues that constructivists fail to account for ‘how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined. It does tell us something about the

⁸¹John J. Mearsheimer, 369.

processes at work in political life; it does not tell us anything about the expected content of foreign policies or international relations.⁸³ Constructivist would respond to that by emphasising that they do study change through the analysis of social interaction. Constructivists emphasize on ‘collective learning, cognitive evolution, epistemic change and the “life cycles of norms,” all of which involve the institutionalisation of people’s knowledge, practices, and discourses.⁸⁴ It is instead the neorealist, who do not recognize change and insist that the world operates with constant timeless logic of anarchy.⁸⁵ Despite neorealism being the leading contender of constructivism, it seems not to have a compelling critique of constructivism. That is because constructivists appear to share some vital common grounds with neorealists even though the outcome or method of analysis could differ. For instance, anarchy is an essential concept for both neorealists and some constructivists. However, they differ concerning the implication or the outcome such anarchy could lead. Another issue is concerning rationalism or materialism dichotomy vis-a-vis constructivism. Both rationalists and constructivist recognised the importance of material capabilities. However, they conceptualize it in different ways. Neorealists emphasised on the material capability to be a dictate of the anarchic structure while constructivists contend that the meaning material

⁸³Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 976.

⁸⁴Emmanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations”, in *Handbook of International Relations* (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : SAGE Publications., 2002), 102.

⁸⁵Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 17.

capability has stemmed from inter-subjective understanding states give to it through social interaction.

The last area is concerning strategic interests. There is a common mistake regarding neorealists not concerned with norms. And constructivists not so much concern about states interests. However, constructivists just like neorealists recognise the importance of strategic investments. But what distinguishes the two approaches concerning interest is the fact that neorealists see states to pursue the permanent interest of consistent increasing security to ensure survival whereas constructivist are interested in how that interest came to be and the possibility of that interest changing according to the priorities of a state and its interaction with others.

2.5 Conclusion: Critical Constructivism For Understanding IS

Constructivism in general (conventional and critical variants), unlike the well known theoretical approaches to understanding international relations like neorealism and neoliberalism, gives much attention to how ideas (ideologies), identities, meanings, interests are socially constructed and how those, in turn affect the actions and inaction of state and non-state actors. They both try to demonstrate how practices and identities are the products of human agency. Both believe in the inter-subjectivity and the meaning given to social practices, the mutual constitution of actor and structure; and the link between power and knowledge. These are valuable tools in trying to understand militant groups like the Islamic State (IS). But unfortunately, it

appears constructivism's contribution to explaining terrorism or militant terror networks has not been visible. This study hopes to contribute to filling such a theoretical gap.

As can be seen from the sampled works of key constructivists above like Wendt, Finnemore, Hopf, and Katzenstein, their focus has been on states and the international system (or international society) and to a lesser extent on how domestic affairs shape the behavior of a state in the international arena. Besides, as shown in the previous chapter, the literature reviewed on militancy and those on IS are hardly theoretically conceptualised. Even though best suited for the study of non-state actors especially transnational militant organizations, there appear to be a paucity of works in this regard. Constructivism could be of great utility in understanding non-state actors, especially armed militant groups and how their identities, aspirations, interests are shaped by cultural, domestic, religious, historical underpinnings as well as a regional and international system.

Conceptualisation of identity by critical constructivism is more profound than that of conventional constructivism. Conventional constructivists treat identity as an explanatory variable of some social practices especially security phenomena. However, critical constructivism tries to understand the very composition of identities to make sense of some social patterns, especially insecurities. That is, instead of associating identities to particular behavioral patterns, they are more curious with how people come to

identify with a specific identity and the narratives associated with such. Rather than accepting identities as ‘given’ and using them to explain particular behavioral patterns as in what conventional constructivism does, critical constructivism wants to explore and understand the very origin and composition of these identities. Seeking a deeper understanding of the IS’s ideological composition through such a perspective would be of great utility for this study.

Regarding IS’s ideology, conventional constructivism would accept the fact it is a construct but would not be much interested in its composition but instead just take it as ‘a given’ and try to examine its effect. For example, conventional constructivist would describe IS’s ideology as a ‘radical interpretation’ of Islamic practices and would base on that to explain the group’s action but would not be interested in the very composition of the ideology. This approach can be seen in most of the literature reviewed. They take IS’s ideology as ‘a given’ and try to explain how their actions and inactions are dictated by that. The efficacy of critical constructivism for this study lies in its interest in the very composition of an ideological construct. Therefore, the critical constructivist’s approach would help the study to unearth how the IS comes to believe in that single truth it is ready to defend by hook or crook. Analysing the means through which such identity is expressed would be pivotal to this study. Therefore, language or discourses are essential in this regard. For the purposes of this research discourse analyses of

the official mouthpiece of the IS is utilised as indicated in the methodological overview.

Besides, in some regard, conventional constructivists see identity to have starting and end points, but for critical constructivist identity formation is an on-going process. This understanding of an identity formation being an on-going process is of great utility when it comes to an understanding of a militant group's identity or ideology like the IS. There is an ongoing 'structuration' of a sort where the IS affects the international structure while the international structure, in turn, affects it. For instance, when the IS declared the caliphate back in the summer of 2014, the international community responded by forming a global coalition against IS — an action followed by a reaction. When the bombardment of IS started, it used that to sell, shape and reshape its identity by appealing to its sympathisers that it's being pounced by its enemies. Likewise, when there is an attack by IS or any terrorist organisation other than IS, the international media seem to be waiting to impose it on IS before it officially claims responsibility, forcefully. What this does or did was to help shape IS a global terror network of some depth and resources capable of striking where it pleases at will. IS then tries to project itself by, sometimes, ambiguously claiming responsibility some acts terror it did not commit.

Methodologically, critical constructivism is best suited for the study being undertaken. Despite sharing some basic premises, concepts and views

with other strands of constructivism (primarily conventional constructivism), critical constructivism stands out for the type of methodology it adheres to and the questions it asks. Methodologically, it is pluralistic to allow some post-positivistic methods like discourse analysis which is very important to this study. In contrast, conventional constructivism still operates with the positivist framework as it attempts to formulate general patterns and laws as can be observed in the works of conventional constructivists discussed above. It asks the ‘what and the ‘how’ kind of questions like how do actors come to believe in what they do in terms of their identities, ideas, and norms. A critical constructivist wants to find out the component of such identities, ideas and norms and how they are created through written or spoken communication among peoples. Unlike the structural or conventional constructivists, who focus more on state actors (although recognising the importance of non-state actors), critical constructivism emphasises more or pays more attention to non-state actors. In this regard they draw from post-modernism and their textual analytical methods.

For this study, such methodological concerns fit perfectly with the kind of inquiries this study seeks to undertake. How does the IS come to believe in its ultra exclusionary ideology? How are the compositions of its ideology constituted? In an attempt to find answers to questions like these, textual analysis of IS’s written and spoken communication (both its English

Magazines and some translated Arabic documents) via its media outlets would be indispensable.

In an attempt to answer such questions insight would be drawn from Doty's methodological approach. Methodologically, she adopted a textual analysis approach she refers to as *Discursive Practices Approach*.⁸⁶ With this approach, Doty emphasizes on the "linguistic construction of reality."⁸⁷ It must be stated that the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Shapiro, Campbell Ashley, and Walker inspired Doty toward adopting this methodology as she pointed out herself.⁸⁸ Of Particular importance is her usage of some concepts to provide analytic categories. These concepts are "predication" "presupposition", and "subject positioning."⁸⁹ These textual analysis mechanisms developed by Doty would be adopted and utilized in an attempt to answer the questions regarding the Islamic State. This will be used in analyzing the group's discourses via their media outlets like their online publications, magazine, translated documents, videos, and others.

By 'presupposition' she refers to how language always contains presupposed meaning and not even the straightest forward of expression is an exception to this. Going by the example, she gave, if someone asks another

⁸⁶Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction."

⁸⁷Roxanne Lynn Doty, 302.

⁸⁸Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction."

⁸⁹Roxanne Lynn Doty, 306.

person: “Have you stopped beating your dog?” from this simple question emerge many presuppositions. The question presupposes that the questioner has presumptive right to interrogate. Besides, the question itself presupposes the existence of something called a dog, and the person questioned has engaged in the habit of habitual beating the dog he or she has. The importance of this presupposition as a textual analysis mechanism is that it gives some background knowledge through which a particular world is constructed where certain things are accepted as truth and not others.⁹⁰

“Predication” as a text analysis mechanism helps in constructing a world by way of labeling. It involves emphasizing on the quality of subjects through the use of predicates like adjective and adverbs to modify them. An example she gives is that if one states that ‘the US is a land of fair play, liberty, and freedom’. It predicates that the United State is a subject with these qualities. Such attributes tell us the identity of subjects what they capable of doing.⁹¹

The last but not the least textual mechanism is “subject positioning.” As a build up on to the two tools above, subjection position allows for analyzing the relationships among subjects made possible by ‘presupposition’ and ‘predication.’ Some important relational categorization may involve ‘supporter’ ‘opposition’ ‘friend’, ‘enemy’ ‘we’ ‘them’. In this categorization,

⁹⁰Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”

⁹¹Roxanne Lynn Doty.

there is this apparent or latent ‘othering’ in a relationship where one is ‘superior’ and the other ‘inferior’, ‘civilized state’ ‘rogue state’ and so on.

All in all, the chapter traced the development of social constructivism as a social theory of international relations. Because constructivists are not uniform with respect to their unit of analysis and methodology, key variations among constructivists scholarship have been demonstrated via their respective works. The main critique of constructivism comes from neorealist. However, it appears both approaches agree on some key concept but analyse them differently. Of utmost importance is the usefulness of critical constructivism in understanding non-state transnational militant groups like the Islamic State (IS). In this respect, the applicability of the critical constructivist’s methodology like Doty’s Discursive Practices Approach and the ‘how possible’ questioning has been invaluable in understanding the Islamic State’s ideology and territoriality.

CHAPTER 3

THE ISLAMIC STATE'S ULTRA-EXCLUSIONARY HYBRID IDEOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter disinters the complex constitution of the IS's ideology through, though not exclusively, the discourses in its two most popular English Language propaganda magazines, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.⁹² Towards this end, Doty's “*Discursive Practices Approach*,” a critical constructivist discourse analysis methodology, would be instrumental. In particular her categorisation mechanisms namely “presupposition,” “predication” and “subject positioning” would be adopted in the discourse analyses, especially the quotations from the Dabiq and the Rumiyah magazines.⁹³ Dabiq is the name of a city near northern Syria where an apocalyptic encounter is set to occur between the Crusader army and the Muslim army as part of the eschatological events leading to the Day of Judgement, according to a *hadeeth* the IS usually

⁹²The Dabiq and the Rumiyah are published in different languages, but I used the English version. Other equally essential materials like its propaganda videos and online publications have also been utilised, including Arabic translated documents.

⁹³Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”

refers to.⁹⁴ Concerning the *hadeeth*, the issues of the magazine quoted Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi saying in one of his sermons that “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.”⁹⁵ *Rumiyah* is the successor to the Dabiq magazine and slightly shorter in content. Its title refers to Rome. In all the *Rumiyah* issues, the successor to Al Zarqawi is quoted saying “O muwahhidin, rejoice for by Allah we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome)”-Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.⁹⁶ He was referring to how the IS intends not to relent in their violent Jihad until they symbolically defeat Rome just like the ancient Rome was conquered by Muslims before.⁹⁷

The titles of both magazines and the related quotations above indicate that the IS has an unwavering ‘presupposed’ knowledge and belief in these eschatological prophecies and their role in those. The title of the magazine *Dabiq* is adopted, not only because of the ‘presupposed’ strong belief in an apocalyptic encounter between the Muslim army and the crusader army in Dabiq but also the IS is supposedly the chosen army to lead such an encounter. Likewise, behind the name *Rumiyah* lies the firm belief that Rome

⁹⁴Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” 4–5 here they quoted the hadeeth in this respect.

⁹⁵Dabiq Issue 1, 4–5 this quotation can be found in almost all the Issues of the Dabiq magazines.

⁹⁶Islamic State’s Rumiyah Issue 1, “RUMIYAH,” *A/Hayat Media Centre*, 2016, front page.

⁹⁷Peter Sarris, *Empires of Faith : The Fall of Rome to the Rise of Islam, 500-700*, Oxford History of Medieval Europe (Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011).

will once again be conquered by Muslims as done centuries before, with the IS in a presumptive lead. The IS believed in these prophecies and their interpretations of it so much so that they repeat them in all the issues of the respective magazines. Assuming that these are authentic prophetic sayings. Did it specifically mention that IS is to be the army in charge? Is that encounter to happen in this era or it had already happened? Could the hadith have deeper meaning rather than the IS's literal reading of it? A building block has been set by human agency in constructing a reality (using discourse) based on a presupposed knowledge that is hardly comprehensive.

The translated version of the original hadith on the apocalyptic encounter is as follows:

Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-A'maq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract them). When they arrange themselves in ranks, the Romans would say: Do not stand between us and those (Muslims) who took prisoners from amongst us. Let us fight with them; and the Muslims would say: Nay, by Allah, we would never get aside from you and our brethren that you may fight them. They will then fight, and a third (part) of the army would run away, whom Allah will never forgive. A third (part of the army), which would be constituted of excellent martyrs in Allah's eye, would be killed and the third who would never be put to trial would win, and they would be conquerors of Constantinople. And as they would be busy in distributing the spoils of war (amongst themselves) after hanging their swords by the olive trees, the Satan would cry: The Dajjal has taken your place among your family. They would then come out, but it would be of no avail. And when they would come to Syria, he would come out while they would be still preparing themselves for battle drawing up the ranks. Indeed, the time of prayer shall come and then Jesus (peace be upon him) the son of Mary would descend and would lead them in prayer. When the enemy of Allah would see him, it would (disappear) just as the salt dissolves itself in water and if he (Jesus) were not to confront them at all, even then it would dissolve completely, but Allah would kill them by his

hand, and he would show them their blood on his lance (the lance of Jesus Christ).⁹⁸

Lucidly, the IS has tweaked the hadeeth to project itself as the army being referred to by the hadeeth. However, the hadeeth mentioned that the military would be coming from Madina of the modern day Saudi Arabia. The IS is not coming from there. The hadeeth also indicates that the last third of the army would conquer Constantinople. Historically, Fatih Sultan Mehmet who was also a Muslim conquered Constantinople centuries ago.⁹⁹ Could the prophecy they are relying on have come to pass? There are more to the hadeeth than the surface and literal reading by the IS. What is at work here is ‘presupposed’ knowledge of both Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir which has been accepted by the IS and its sympathisers.

Far from the ‘presupposed’ belief in the assurances of the *hadeeth*, the IS is conspicuously overwhelmed, militarily.¹⁰⁰ However, it is inconceivable that its multifarious and malicious ideology ebbs with its military trounce. The international coalition appears to be drowned in celebrating such military

⁹⁸“Sahih Muslim Book 041, Hadith Number 6924,” Hadith Collection, accessed December 26, 2018, <http://hadithcollection.com/sahihmuslim/169-Sahih%20Muslim%20Book%2041.%20Turmoil%20And%20Portents%20Of%20The%20Last%20Hour/15505-sahih-muslim-book-041-hadith-number-6924.html>; Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” 4.

⁹⁹Ahmet Gündüz, *The Conquest of Istanbul by Ottomans, Its Importance for Turkish-Islamic World and Europe* (Karadeniz Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2014).

¹⁰⁰“Donald Trump Pulls US Troops out of Syria,” accessed January 6, 2019, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/12/19/syria-troop-withdrawal/2361385002/>; “Iraq’s Prime Minister Declares Victory over ISIS,” Washington Post, accessed January 6, 2019, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2017/live-updates/battle-for-mosul/inside-the-battle-for-mosul/iraqs-prime-minister-declares-victory-over-isis/>.

defeat as the ideology lingers. Ideologies mostly outlive their initiators. Besides, terrorist networks like the IS, tend to use their frailest episode to strategise and metamorphose into much stronger organisations rather than fade. Seeking an in-depth understanding of the oeuvre of IS's ideology in some details is imperative. Based on the detailed analyses of the discourses in the *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines conducted, in addition to other resources on IS, the IS ideology could be rightly described to be bifurcated into doctrinal and Territorial ideological concerns. Both complement each other in an intricate fusion. This chapter would concern itself with the doctrinal issues and argues that juxtaposing IS's ideology to Wahhabism, Qutbism and the *Sabwi* scholarship; the IS's ideology espouses a complex blend of these ideologies, the aggregate of which transmutes into what could be rightly considered as an 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.' The next chapter would focus on the constitution of the organisation's Territoriality inspired by its 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.'

3.2 The roots of IS's Ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology

There is the strong tendency to trace and link the Islamic State to one ideological rhizome, like '*salafism*', '*salafi-Wahhabism*' or '*takfirism*' or generalize it as 'radical Sunni terrorist group' as indicated earlier in the literature review section in the introductory chapter, but blanketing the IS's ideological roots to a single source (or generalizing it) is misleading. The IS does not lend itself to a simple categorisation. Instead, the group combines a hybrid of ideologies so

far as that would help support its actions, convince its supporters and prospective recruits. It would cite whatever ideology, whichever scholar, Islamic historical antecedent that would help justify its course as seen in the discourses of their magazines.¹⁰¹ While this might appear as ‘everything goes,’ careful analysis of the group’s discourses indicates a mixture of Wahhabism, Qutbism and Sahwa scholarship at work. The following is an ideological exploration regarding IS links to these diverse but interconnected ideologies towards constructing what could be regarded as ‘ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.’

The ‘ultra-exclusionary’ aspect of IS ideology is demonstrated through the discourses in its propaganda magazines. The front page of the second issue of the Dabiq was boldly entitled “The flood: either with the Islamic State or the flood.”¹⁰² This title was clarified as metaphorically referring to the theological (both Qur’anic and Biblical) history of the flood during the period of Prophet Noah (Nuh) when he invited his people to God for almost a thousand years, but only a few responded as a result he prayed and God punished them with an extensive flood.¹⁰³ The title was elaborated on by a detailed article where IS classified itself as the eradicator of the ideology of

¹⁰¹See Dabiq and Rumiyyah issues.

¹⁰²Dabiq Issue 2, “The Flood:It’s Either with the Islamic State or the Flood,” front page.

¹⁰³“Surah Hud [11:15-25],” Surah Hud [11:25-49], accessed January 6, 2019, <https://quran.com>; *Genesis 7, New King James Version (NKJV) | The Bible App*, accessed January 6, 2019, <https://www.bible.com/bible/114/GEN.7.NKJV>.

“free choice” and the provider of an alternative which the ultimate truth. Anyone who stands on its way is a clear enemy. That is, either with us or against us. The article states:

So until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it's upon us all to work together to eradicate the principle of “**free choice**,” and not to deceive the people in an attempt to seek their pleasure, neither by calling to “free choice” directly, nor by alluding to it indirectly. Rather, we must confront them with the fact that they've turned away from the religion, while we hold onto it, grasping its purity, its clarity, its comprehensiveness, without any blemishes due to shirk, misguidance or heresy, and that we're completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all other religions, and that we will continue to fight the people of deviation and misguidance until we die trying to make the religion triumphant.¹⁰⁴

In this excerpt, it is clear that the IS presupposes itself not just as an eradicator of the ‘the principle of free choice’ but a provider of an alternative that is the ultimate truth. It also presumes itself to be the group to ‘make the religion of Allah triumphant over all else.’ By the principle of free choice, it is referring to giving people the options to choose between Islam and other religion. The ultra- exclusionary nature of this lies in the IS not recognising other religions and people’s right to choose what they want to believe. That is if one’s choice is not IS’s version of Islam then you are with the ‘flood.’ IS presupposes its version of Islam to be the ultimate truth. It also highlights the fact that anyone who attempts standing on its way could be killed regardless of whether the person is a Muslim or not. The latter part of the quotation

¹⁰⁴Dabiq Issue 2, “The Flood:It’s Either with the Islamic State or the Flood,” 11 My emphasis.

indicates how IS is determined to succeed in this course or die trying in the worst case. In terms of predication, it labels itself as the ‘eradicator of the principle of free choice’ and labels others as ‘people of deviation and misguidance’. That sets the stage for ‘subject positioning’ where the IS is in relations with others sees itself as righteous, and all others are on a wrong path to God. The danger and the ultra-exclusionary nature of the IS ideology are that as soon as it labels a person or a group as the ‘other’, such an individual or group becomes prey for execution or subject for an attack. That is using presupposition, predication and subject positioning IS has constructed idea regarding who is with it and who is against its course in the discourse above.

A second article in the same issue entitled “the floods of Mubahallah” extremely raises its reader’s inquisitiveness. That is because the concept of *mubahallah* is to invoke God’s imprecation on a deviating or lying party during accusation and counter-accusations as a means of arbitration in extremely exceptional situations, in Islam.¹⁰⁵ Why would IS seek *mubahallah* and against whom? The article was based on a sermon delivered by the erstwhile official spokesperson of the IS, Shaykh Abū Muhammad al-’Adnānī entitled “La’natullāhi ‘Alal Kādhibīn” (May the Curse of Allah Be Upon the Liars).¹⁰⁶ He was referring to the “Jawlānī Front” popularly known as Al-Nusrah front. That was after the Nusra front leadership officially declared the IS as an

¹⁰⁵“Mubahala.Pdf,” accessed January 6, 2019, <http://www.en.islamic-sources.com/download/E-Books/Intellectual/Mubahala.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 13, “The Raafidah:From Ibn Saba’ to Dajjal,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, January 2016; Rumiyah Issue 1, “RUMIYAH,” 37.

extreme in practice even more than the *kharārij*. That provoked the IS leadership leading to such a sermon. Al-adnani states in invoking the curse “O Allah, whoever conspires against jihād and the mujāhidīn, then make his plot backfire, reveal his secrets, expose his intentions, and make an example out of him for those who heed. O Allah, subject them to the authority of diseases and disasters.”¹⁰⁷

The quotation from this second article extends the ‘ultra-exclusionary nature of the IS’s Ideology in the sense that it is not targeting ordinary Muslims or non-Muslims but another group that also believes in and practices militant Jihad. However, because the IS ‘presupposes’ its form and interpretation of Jihad to be the ultimate truth anyone who disagrees with its approach and the general interpretations of key aspects of Islam deserves to be cursed. The IS presupposes itself to be a group engaged in ‘legitimate Jihad’ and its members too ‘Mujahidin’. That is, it strongly believes in its version of Jihad and that its followers the Mujahidin have a special place with God. Its ultra-exclusionary nature lies in the fact that Al Adnani uses predication ‘whoever’ in invoking the curse to indicate that anyone who disagrees with the IS is among the cursed party. IS is exclusionary in its ideology as it does not only tag others as *kuffar* (or apostates) but also ready to shower curses unto whoever opposes its ideology (Sunni, Sufi or Shiīte). The tone is set for the ultra-exclusionary journey in terms of constructing its ideology through similar discourses.

¹⁰⁷Dabiq Issue 13, “The Raafidah:From Ibn Saba’ to Dajjal,” 20.

The following section would explore the composition of the complex hybrid aspects of its ideology (doctrines) to bolster its ultra-exclusionary ideology through notions of Islam as understood by Wahhabism, Sahwa scholarship and Qutbism.

3.3 Wahhabism and Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab in Brief

Before examining the nexus between the IS and Wahhabism the chapter would give a brief biography of the scholar whose name is associated with the movement, and how it came to be associated with an ideology now known as ‘wahhabism’. That would help give some insights into what informed his preaching, teaching and writings.

According to a brief biography in the translated version of one of his most influential book *Kitab at tauhid* (the book of Islamic monotheism),¹⁰⁸ Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab was born in Uyainah in the province of Najd, northwest of Riyadh the capital city of modern-day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He came from an ancestry of profound scholarship and righteousness. His grandfather, Sulayman ibn Ali ibn Musharraf was a judge (*qadi*) and his uncle Ibrahim ibn Sulayman was a *mufti*(a judge and an issuer of Islamic legal opinions) while his father Abdul Wahhab ibn Suleyman was a *qadi* as well. As such he received his primary education from his father.¹⁰⁹ He memorised the Qur'an at a very tender age and by maturity had read the books

¹⁰⁸See also DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 17–40.

¹⁰⁹DeLong-Bas, 19.

of preceding scholars like Sheikhul Islam Ibn Taiymiyah and one of ibn Taymiyyah's students *Allamah* Ibn Qayyim. He is most influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah. He also studied under Sheikh Abdullah bin Ibrahim bin Sa'id Najdi and Sheikh Muhammad Hayat Sindhi for some time in Madina. He travelled to Iraq and Basra in search of knowledge as well. As a result, he became well versed in *Tafseer*, *Hadeeth* and *Fiqh*.

During his time, there were so many practices contrary to the Islamic monotheistic teachings and so much moral decadence in and around Najd. The Commoners were engaging in idolatrous acts like worshipping trees, stones, calling on people they thought to be saints from their graves and so on. Even though there were some scholars, they seemed less motivated to admonish against such practices. Sheikh ibn Wahhab set out to preach and to call people to order. He *puritanically* called people to Islamic monotheism based on a stringent interpretation and adherence to the Qur'an and ahadeeth. He also warned strictly against bid'ah (innovation). Most people answered his call, and as a result, he gained following. He and his followers were referred to as Muwahiddun (adherents to monotheism) due to their emphasis on the Islamic monotheism and would later develop into a movement now known as Wahhabism.¹¹⁰ To be sure, the sheikh and those who ascribe to his teachings neither recognise nor accept the Wahhabi or Wahhabism tag.

¹¹⁰Robert G. Rabil, "Why America Needs to Beware of Saudi Wahhabism," Text, The National Interest, May 18, 2015, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-needs-beware-saudi-wahhabism-12906>.

The sheikh was expelled from the city of Uyainah as a result of the rulers' and some of the commoners' inability to stand his puritanical Islamic teachings. He moved to the city of Dar'yah, a very prominent city with lots of Arabia's notables. Here he was highly welcomed, and a stage was set for a pact between Sheikh Ibn Wahhab and the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Ibn Saud. The two agreed to support each other in a complementary way. Ibn Saud pledge to support the Sheikh's da'wah (calling people to teachings of Islam) while in reciprocation sheikh supports ibn Saud politically.¹¹¹ Dar'iyah became a centre of da'wah with the support of Ibn Saud. With this alliance, the foundation was set for a kind of 'wahhab/ibn Saud front' to play a vital role in the build-up to the formation of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the current marriage between the centre of power and the religious establishment. It is this marriage between the two that led to the rise of the tag Wahhabism or Wahhabi Islam about the version of Islam practised in Saudi Arabia.

3.4 Wahhabism's Nexus to IS Ideology

Wahhabism (*Wahabi Salafism*)¹¹² is an ideology that most scholars associate the IS.¹¹³ Paramount among them is William McCant. There are

¹¹¹Rabil.

¹¹²See Mohamed Bin Ali, "The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism," 2012, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edsble&AN=edsble.579894&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

many reasons McCant makes references to in support of his assertion, but he mainly argues that the literature the IS uses to educate and indoctrinate its members and followers at large is mostly in sync with the literature used in the Saudi religious education establishment.¹¹⁴ Wahhabism is used to describe the brand of *Salafism* practised predominantly in Saudi-Arabia. That is because most aspects of Islam practised in the Kingdom resonate with the teaching of Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab. The tag came to prominence after the Saudi royal establishment decided to adopt that brand of Islam as a state religion because of the pact between the scholar and the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Ibn Saud in establishing the current Saudi State as indicated above.¹¹⁵ The IS extensively quotes the sheikh in its propaganda materials and uses several Wahhabi pieces of literature indicating its subscription to several Wahhabi ideologies, but to blanket the group as solely Wahhabi (or *Wahhabi Salafi*) is misleading.

The link between the IS and Wahhabism lies in IS's adoption, utilisation and some cases extension of Wahhabism's understanding and application of some Islamic principles and practices. The Concept of *Tawhid* (the oneness of God or absolute Islamic monotheism) and *shirk* (violation of

¹¹³Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State”; J.R. Macris, “Investigating the Ties between Muhammed Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, Early Wahhabism, and ISIS,” *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7, no. 3 (02 2016): 239–55, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2016.1227929>; McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*.

¹¹⁴McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*.

¹¹⁵Rabil, “Why America Needs to Beware of Saudi Wahhabism.”

absolute monotheism), *bid'a* (innovation), the concept of *al wala wal bara* (*henceforth, WB*) (drawing near to what is pleasing to Allah and His Messenger and, on the other hand, withdrawing from what is displeasing to Allah and His Messenger¹¹⁶or simply loyalty and disavowal)¹¹⁷; and the penal (*hudud*) aspects of the *Sharia* (Islamic law).

The major preoccupation of Sheikh Abdul Wahhab was *Tawhid* (Islamic monotheism or oneness of God) as a result of the practices of the commoners during his lifetime. Which is why one of his most influential books, arguably, is ‘al Kitab al-Tawhid’ (The book of Islamic Monotheism). The first chapter of the book entitled “at-Tawhid” (Islamic Monotheism) started off with quotations of some Qur’anic verses and ahadeeth to explain what Tawhid is:

And I (Allah) created not the Jinns and men except they should worship Me (Alone).¹¹⁸
And verily, We have sent among every Ummah (community, nation) a Messenger (Proclaiming): Worship Allah (Alone), and avoid (or keep away from) Taghut (all false deities etc. i.e. do not worship Taghut besides Allah).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶Mohammed Bin Saeed Al-Qahtani, “Al-Wala Wal-Bara - English - Mohammed Bin Saeed Al-Qahtani,” IslamHouse.com, accessed December 9, 2018, <https://islamhouse.com/en/books/386693/>.

¹¹⁷See Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism.”

¹¹⁸“Al-Qur'an Al-Kareem,” Al-Qur'an al-Kareem, accessed March 24, 2019, <https://quran.com/51/56>.

¹¹⁹“Al-Qur'an Al-Kareem”16:36.

Worship Allah and join none with Him in worship.¹²⁰

He cited the following ahadeeth:

Ibn Mas'ud (May Allah be pleased with him) said:
Whoever wishes to ascertain the very will of Prophet Muhammad (May the peace and blessing of Allah be upon him) on which the Prophet has put his seal, let him read the Statement of Allah: "Say (O Muhammad (May the peace and blessing of Allah be upon him): Come, I will recite what your Lord has prohibited you from: Join not anything in worship with Him... (up to) ...And verily, this is My Straight Path.¹²¹

It is narrated that Mu'adh bin Jabal (May Allah be pleased with him) said: I was riding behind the Prophet (May the peace and blessing of Allah be upon him) on a donkey, and he said to me "O Mu'adh, do you know what is the right of Allah on his slaves and what is the right of the slaves upon Allah?" I responded: "Allah and His Messenger know best.

He continued,

The Right of Allah upon His slaves is to worship Him Alone and never to associate anything with him. The right of slaves upon Him is not to punish any person who does not associate anything with Him." I said: "O Allah's Messenger, may I not give the glad tidings to the people?" He replied: "No. Do not inform them lest they rely on (this promise and lapse in their service to Him).¹²²

What is clear from these quotations above is that there is an uncompromising and a steadfast resolve to worship, serve and obey Allah alone to attain true Tawhid in accordance to the teachings of Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Because Tawhid is a very complex and broad

¹²⁰"Al-Qur'an Al-Kareem"4:36.

¹²¹Abdul-Wahhab, *Kitab At-Tauhid*, 13.

¹²²Abdul-Wahhab, 13.

concept Sheikh Abdul Wahhab categorized tawhid into three: The tawhid of lordship, tawhid of divinity and tawhid of unique characteristics. Tawhid of lordship refers to Allah's (God's) possession of complete dominion over heavens and earth and the giver and taker of life).¹²³ The tawhid of divinity constitutes servitude and worship to God alone by all his creation. That is anyone who worships any other creature has deviated from the right path.¹²⁴ The last category concerns God's characteristics and attributes by His Lordship (first type) and Divinity.¹²⁵ He heavily based on the Qur'an and the ahadeeth to shape these categorizations. Tawhid, therefore, became the hallmark of his teaching, preaching and the Wahhabi movement that was inspired by his teachings.

Closely linked to the concept of Tawhid is the notion of shirk (violations of absolute monotheism or polytheism). *Mushrik* (sin.) or *mushrikun* (pl.) are those who remain Muslims but inconsistent in their monotheism. Being *mushrik* leads to a grave consequence as stated by the sheikh:

And unless these *mushrikun* witness that God is the sole creator, they do not believe in Him, and they will not be blessed by him, and they will not live or die except through him, and a leader cannot lead except by him and that all that is exalted from among these and their associates and the seven heavens

¹²³DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 57.

¹²⁴DeLong-Bas, 57.

¹²⁵DeLong-Bas, 57.

and among them and their associates, all of these are servants to Him under his charge and power.¹²⁶

Shirk is very close to unbelief and denial of God, his divinity and attributes. Referring to the Prophet, the sheikh indicated that the mushrikun could be fought (*qital*) not a declaration of Jihad on them (IS's extension). Indeed ibn Abdul Wahhab engaged in chopping down a supposedly sacred tree, destruction of the tomb of Zayd Ibn Khattab to demonstrate his firm adherence to Tawhid.¹²⁷ In context, this was done as a result of the fact that people then were visiting this shrine as an intermediary in worship. He categorized shirk into greater shirk and lesser shirk. Greater shirk refers to calling on any other being apart from God alone for whatever altruistic purposes.¹²⁸ Lesser shirk constitutes 'any action that is intended to worship God but has a hidden intention of calling attention to oneself.'¹²⁹

While Muslims predominantly see polytheism (*shirk*) as an anathema to their faith, and Tawhid as fundamental to the Islamic faith, IS extends it by

¹²⁶Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab, "Kashf Ash-Shubuhaat (Removal Of The Doubts) - Muhammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhab," 158, accessed January 6, 2019, <https://www.hasbunallah.com.au/kashf-ush-shubahat/>.

¹²⁷"Unwan Al-Majd Fi Tarikh Najd. by Bin Bishr, Uthman Bin Abdallah.: Publications of King Abdul Aziz Public Library, Riyadh Hardcover, First Edition - Kutub Ltd.," 39, accessed January 6, 2019, <https://www.abebooks.com/first-edition/Unwan-Al-Majd-Fi-Tarikh-Najd-Bishr/22445197755/bd>.

¹²⁸DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 67.

¹²⁹Abdul-Wahhab, *Kitab At-Tauhid*, 98.

physically fighting anyone who is a polytheist and any objects they deem polytheistic even if such are statues that are serving archaeological purposes at present. That is for Ibn Wahhab divinity was attributed to the tomb or tree he chopped as indicated by the actions of the commoners in his time. The IS adopting this ‘presupposed’ itself as the purifier of the people and its governed areas from ‘shirk’. That is regardless of the time and context those engaged in shirk, and their objects of shirk should be physically fought and be destroyed. Indeed the IS has been involved in the targeted attacks on Sufi and Shias together with their shrines. The extension of this by the IS is in the fact that they smash centuries-old statues found in their captured territories which are currently serving archaeological and historical purposes but not as deities or objects of worship.¹³⁰ They justify the smashing of statues through predication and subject positioning. They historically predicate and equate those who engage in idolatry to the idolaters of Mecca who were fought and conquered and their idols smashed. They cite the prophet’s smashing of the three hundred and sixty idols found in the holy Ka’aba during the conquest of Makkah and the smashing of Idols by Abraham before him.¹³¹ The IS misses out on context. Those idols were the god’s of the Meccans, but these ancient

¹³⁰The most noteworthy of the statue squashing was witnessed when they captured Palmyra. See Kareem Shaheen, “Isis Destroys Tetrapylon Monument in Palmyra,” *The Guardian*, January 20, 2017, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/20/isis-destroys-tetrapylon-monument-palmyra-syria>.

¹³¹Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, March 2015, 28.

statues are used for historical and archaeological purposes, not objects of worship, at least at present. Besides, if their presence in principle were against Islam, they would have been squashed when Islam ruled most of those lands in which they are found under the *Rashidun*, and other Islamic empires like the Umayyad, the Abbasids and much later the Ottomans.¹³² That is through presupposed knowledge and understanding that polytheist and objects of polytheism must be fought and destroyed, the IS has constructed predication of *Mushrikun* akin to those in the time of prophet Abraham and later during the era of Prophet Mohammed justifying their ‘subject positioning’ of ‘others’ who could justifiably be fought and destroyed.

A sophisticated adoption and extension of the concept *Tawhid* and *Shirk* could be seen in an article entitled “conspiracy theory shirk.”¹³³ In this article, the IS debunked the conspiracy theories alluding to the fact that terrorist attacks are the work of non-believers to undermine Muslim and Islam. Besides, accepting such theories on the part of Muslim undermine Jihad and *shahada* (martyrdom). They cited many cherry-picked verses to point out the fact that it is Allah who is the Lord of all and possess the power over all things. The fault line of conspiracy theory is that it attributes such lordship powers to the non-believers when it claims that through conspiring they could

¹³²Dabiq Issue 8, 22–24.

¹³³Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 9, “They Plot and Allah Plots,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, May 2015, 14.

plan and execute at will and point fingers at Muslims as those responsible. The article states:

Sadly, this shirkī attitude (both minor and major) entered the hearts and minds of many supposedly “Islamic” leaders, scholars, and callers – in imitation of the Arab nationalists before them – as they began to describe the enemies of Islam with attributes bordering rubūbiyyah (Allah’s lordship). To them, the kuffār had the near absolute knowledge, power, and ownership to plot and executed any grand conspiracy of their desire. It is almost as if they attribute to them the ability to create with the word “be”! Their evil became most apparent in issues related to jihād. If one desired to perform jihād, these leaders would warn that jihad now was a conspiracy to kill off the sincere Muslim youth and thereby leave the Muslims’ lands to the secularists. If one wanted to join a jihād jamā’ah, they would warn that it was the creation of the kuffār to aid in achieving kāfir interests. If jihād operations – like those of September 11th – were carried out against the kuffār, they would claim these operations were conspiracies by the kuffār to justify their aggression against Muslims. If a mujāhid leader achieved shahādah, they would say that the kuffār used him up and needed to dispose of him just in case he decided to come out and expose the “conspiracy” of which he was supposedly a part. If the mujāhidīn liberated territory occupied by the kuffār, they would say that the kuffār allowed them to do so because kāfir interests necessitated a prolonged war. If the mujahidin announced an Islamic state, they would say that the kuffār facilitated such to justify their continued interference in Muslim affairs. And so, according to these theorists, almost all the events of the world were somehow linked back to the kuffār, their intelligence agencies, research, technology, and coconspirators!¹³⁴ Conspiracy theories have thereby become an excuse to abandon jihad, to have great awe for the kuffar, to forsake the Obligation of bay’ah, and to pursue the Dunya, all in the name of political “awareness.”¹³⁵ The extreme belief in conspiracy theories varies between minor and major shirk depending on the degree of power, knowledge, and ownership attributed by its believer to the kuffar.¹³⁶ If one were to reinterpret the history of the Muslims by the conspiracy theories of these theorists, he would come out with grave deviance.¹³⁷

¹³⁴Dabiq Issue 9, 15.

¹³⁵Dabiq Issue 9, 15.

¹³⁶Dabiq Issue 9, 15.

¹³⁷Dabiq Issue 9, 15.

In light of this, one should realize the difference between the various rival parties of the kuffār forming real alliances – like the Crusader-Safawī-Nusayrī coalition – to wage war against the Islamic State and thereby achieve their mutual kāfir interests, and between believing that the Christians, Rāfidah, Jews, and apostates are all covert members of the same secret society, underground political party, or grandiose conspiracy theory, all of them adoring each other and faking their hostilities. May Allah expose the real conspiracies of the kuffār and erase the shirkī conspiracy theories from the hearts.¹³⁸

The above quotations indicate how in the ‘presupposed’ knowledge of the IS, conspiracy theory is extrapolated to mean assigning Allah’s attribute of lordship to humans especially non-believers as capable of planning and executing at will. That is the *Tawhid* and *shirk* categorisations of Ibn Abdul Wahhab has been used and extended in understanding and practice toward constructing a specific ideological leaning towards ‘conspiracy theory.’ While in the original teaching of Ibn Wahhab such attribute to other beings could be regarded as shirk but to extend and link it to a conspiracy theory is a bridge too far. In terms of complicated, the last quotation above predicated those against IS and its version of jihad to include opposing parties including Christians, Rafidah Jews and apostates so as to engage in ‘subject positioning’ toward making them a target of exclusion. Evidently, with this article and the discourses it carries, the IS has been able to adapt and extend the Islamic notions of tawhid and shirk as understood by Ibn Wahhab towards constructing an aspect of their exclusionary ideology.

¹³⁸Dabiq Issue 9, 17.

Bid'a is an Arabic term that is loosely translated as an innovation or an invention.¹³⁹ It is used in the Islamic theological sense to refer to an act of worship or deed that is not supported by the Islamic literature (notably the Qur'an) and the action or inactions and commendations of the prophet and his companions (the Sunnah). The sticky part regarding Wahhabism's preoccupations with bid'a is that it regards many practices as bid'a to the extent that it creates dicey scenario that easily leads to declaring coreligionists polytheists or apostates for actions that might not be regarded as bid'a by other mainstream scholars thereby creating tension even among Sunni Muslims. For instance, as indicated in the short biography of Sheikh Wahhab, he strongly preached against embracing saints and or their graves as shrines for *wasila* (intermediaries) to worship God as this is considered an act that automatically leads a person out of the fold of Islam. Likewise, circumambulating graves, slaughtering animals in the name of a saint, or believing in the divine authority of imams are also deemed polytheistic acts. While mainstream Muslims agree that such innovations in religion are forbidden, as they are akin to *shirk*, most Wahhabi scholars take a leap further, to label as many practices as bid'a but which other Muslims consider acceptable. Most Wahhabi scholars do not only condemn Sufi and Shia beliefs that most of their practices cannot be regarded as acts of worship but based

¹³⁹IDP Research Division, *Bid'ah (Innovation in Islam)* (Islamic Digital Publishing, 2018), 1.

on that to declare them infidels.¹⁴⁰ Drawing on this the IS declares anyone who engages in bid'a as an infidel (*takfirism*) contrary to the mainstream Islamic scholarship who would in the extreme sense classify such as a sinful act but not necessary rendering one an infidel. This view, in essence, gives the IS license to spill the blood of coreligionists who differ with them in opinion regarding what is an innovation or not.

An example of extending the concept of *Bid'ah* to serve its capricious course, is demonstrated in the IS published article in the eighth issue of the Dabiq entitled “Irja’ the most dangerous form of Bid’ah (and its effects on the Jihad in Sham)”¹⁴¹, a long and carefully researched article, at least compared to the other pieces in the magazine. Irja’ is referring to a sect in Islamic history that sought to counter the *khawarij* or *Kharrijites* for their strict interpretation of Islam and most of its practices. They became known as the *murji'a* sect. In doing so, they also went to the extreme by neglecting primary duties and notions of the Islamic faith most Muslim scholars agree to be an essential part of the faith. For example, they do not see faith to be statements and practice but rather just statements. That is using the limb to worship is not an obligation for them.¹⁴² They do not believe that faith (*imaan*) increases and decreases but rather faith is constant. They do not believe in the concept of

¹⁴⁰Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State,” i.

¹⁴¹Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” 39–56.

¹⁴²Dabiq Issue 8, 43.

hypocrisy. The *murj'a* notions of these concepts would be at odds with most orthodox or mainstream Islamic scholars and teachings hence the *murj'i'a* is regarded as a deviant sect by many.

However, the IS used its presupposed understanding of the concept of *bid'a* toward the end of the article to categorise the Muslims who oppose its ideology as belonging to the *Murji'a* deviant sect and that they could be killed. The section entitled “the *irja'* of jihad claimants” used ‘predication’ to categorised (in reference to the war in Syria and the attempt to defeat the Islamic state) the Muslim parties in support of IS’s defeat into four: “Islamic factions with an international agenda”, “Islamic” factions with a nationalist agenda”, “Nationalist factions with an “Islamic” agenda”, “Secularist factions with a democratic agenda”¹⁴³ They lamped these groups and declared them *murtaddin* (apostates). This label allows for ‘subject positioning’ in terms of their relationship with the IS. For the IS the punishment for apostasy is death contrary to views of other scholars and some Qur’anic verses. It has therefore through this propaganda article constructed a worldview of its own that licenses it to kill based on a tweaked interpretation and extension of the concept of *Bid'ah*. IS has adopted the Wahhabi hard-line stance on *bid'ah* and extended it to categorise its enemy as engaged in the worse form of *bid'ah* of *Irja'* hence they can be targeted and killed by the IS.

¹⁴³Dabiq Issue 8, 52.

Another concept adopted and extended by the IS towards constructing its ultra-exclusionary ideology is the *Wahhabi* concept of *al-wala' wal-barā'* (WB). There are numerous scholarly works on this concept, especially in relation to modern salafism and wahhabism.¹⁴⁴ There are therefore numerous and elaborated definitions.¹⁴⁵ However, basically According to Muhammad al-Qahtani (a staunch Wahhabi scholar), *al-wala'* *wal-barā'*, has two major prerequisites of true faith: *al-wala'* which is a manifestation of sincere love for Allah, His prophets and the believers; *al-barā'*, on the other hand, is an expression of enmity and hatred towards falsehood and its adherents. Both are evidence of *iman* (faith) he contends.¹⁴⁶ This definition can be seen within the context of faith being the matter of the heart. That is a matter of creed. However, other scholars like Wagemakers call for cautiousness in defining the concept since ‘al wal wal barā’ in Wahhabi discourse is disputed and the happenings in the Arabian Peninsula in the nineteenth century, especially the

¹⁴⁴Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the ‘Threat to Islam’: Al-Wala’ Wa Al-Bara’ in Salafi Discourse,” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 4 (2008): 1; Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism”; Joas Wagemakers, *The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ Wa-l-Bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi* (Oxford University Press, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0004>; Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy Of The Second Saudi State: Quietist And Radical Wahhabi Contestations Of Al-Walā’ Wal - Barā’,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 1 (2012): 93, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743811001267>.

¹⁴⁵Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism,” 66.

¹⁴⁶Al-Qahtani, “Al-Wala Wal-Bara - English - Mohammed Bin Saeed Al-Qahtani.”

Saudi civil war have influenced the meaning and practice of the concept.¹⁴⁷

Indeed, most Wahhabi scholars have extended the concept beyond the issue of faith to include hatred and enmity of anyone who is not Muslim but not unjustly fighting and killing them.

That is evidenced in a fatwah of a famous scholar of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz, which was also cited by Ali Ibn Mohammed in his thesis. Ibn Baz states:

Al-Wala' wal Bara' means to love the believers and be loyal to them and to hate the disbelievers and to have enmity to them, i.e. to be free from them and their religion (*wa al-barā'a minhum wa min dinibim*). That is *al-Wala' wal Bara'*. But to hate and declare enmity to them does not imply that you could fight them unless they initiate the fight first. It means that you should hate them and show your enmity in your hearts. They should not be your friends, but you must not hurt and do injustice to them. If they accept the peace (salam), then reply the salam to them. Advise them and show them the path of goodness.¹⁴⁸

Another like-minded Wahhabi scholar, Dr Abdullah Al-Farsi also clarifies the issue regarding WB:

...when we say hate, we do not mean that this hate involves killing people unjustly or doing harm to people unjustly. You hate them, and you love guidance for them. You hate them and be just to them. You hate them and be gentle and good with them. Just like Allah says in the Quran which means (You will not find a group of people who have faith in Allah and the Day of Judgement and at the same time have a love for those who oppose Allah and

¹⁴⁷Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy Of The Second Saudi State: Quietist And Radical Wahhabi Contestations Of Al-Walā' Wal -Barā’,” 104.

¹⁴⁸Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism,” 164–65.

the Messenger). Then Allah says after that Allah by telling you that you should not love them is not forbidding you from being just to them...¹⁴⁹ If one analysis the quotations regarding the clarification by Wahhabi scholars on the subject matter of WB, the understanding is that the hate component is supposed to be a matter of heart and non-confrontational. Besides, although not explicit another connotation is that the hate is directed towards the actions of disbelief and not the person engaged in the act. That is to hate the disbelief, not the disbeliever. Consequently, the concept has evolved to extend from doctrinal dimensions to social, political and Jihadi connotations as rightly observed by Bin Ali.¹⁵⁰ The doctrinal dimension as seen in the definition above is the most crucial as most mainstream Muslim scholars (including Wahhabis) see it as a way of preservation of one's faith. The social relational aspect of it is to confine it to the relationship between Muslims and non-muslims to be hostile since they do not ascribe to the Islamic faith. Politically, political Salafist interpreted it to mean befriending or dealing with Muslim dominated countries or 'Islamic countries' while hating non-Muslim countries. In a connected vein, it is interpreted to mean befriending those who support sharia and hating those who hate its implementation. The final dimension is the Jihadi connotation of the concept of al wara' wal bara'. That is a combination of the social and political dimension of it. This because in addition to strained social and political

¹⁴⁹Bin Ali, 165–66.

¹⁵⁰Bin Ali, 77–80.

relations with ‘others’ as a result of WB, the jihadi dimension justifies violence and terror against ‘the hated other’.¹⁵¹

The IS link to this principle lies in their adoption of it and extending its dimensions to encapsulate political, social and jihadi connotation to justify not only their staunch hate for non-believers and believers who (according to their version of Islam) are deemed enemies of Allah due to differences in beliefs, including both Sunnis (Sufis) and Shias but fighting and killing them as well.

In the tenth issue of Dabiq in a short article entitled “WALA’ AND BARA’”,¹⁵² the IS elaborated on its presupposed understanding of the doctrine through its usual cherry picking of *ahadeeth* and verses of the Qur'an. In reference to Jews and Christians, the article states “Hudhayfah said, “One should be wary of becoming a Jew or Christian without him realizing it.” He then recited, {And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of them} [Al-Mā'idah: 51] [Reported by 'Abd Ibn Humayd and al-Khallāl in “As-Sunnah”].”¹⁵³ The IS understanding is that if one befriends a Christian or Jew, he automatically becomes one of them. Therefore, the best is to hate them both. Regarding hatred toward fellow Muslims, they usually refer to the hadeeth that states among other things that “...The **strongest bond** of

¹⁵¹Bin Ali, 77–80.

¹⁵²Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 10, “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, June 2015, 38–39.

¹⁵³Dabiq Issue 10, 38.

faith is the love for Allah's sake and the hatred for Allah's sake.”¹⁵⁴ The IS wittingly use this concept of *wala wal bara'* to justify hatred towards reputable coreligionists. The IS prefers to extend and emphasise on the social relational and jihadi aspect of WB rather than doctrinal.

Concerning the Jihadi extensions of the WB doctrine, the IS takes a step further by not just hating their coreligionist whom they regard as enemies of Allah but called for the ‘killing the Imams of kufr in the west’ after accusing them of apostasy.¹⁵⁵ They were referring to some scholars/Imams in the US, Australia and Europe like Hamza Yusuf, Yasir Qadhi, Hisham Kabbani, Bilal Philips among others who the IS believes are residing in the west comfortably without engaging in any Jihad. Their crime is that:

They are found spouting Sūfī and “Salafī” slogans, calling to their madhāhib and “ulamā,” yet reinterpreting anything the scholars that even they recognise said about the concepts of *tawhīd*, *jihād*, ***walā'***, and ***barā'*** to make them compatible with Western ideology. Though their kufr was apparent to those who recognised it years ago, they became even more ardent and blatant defenders of the Crusaders after the Khilāfah was reestablished, uniting with their cross-bearing allies in the global war against the Islamic State, the only true bastion of Sharī'ah rule on earth.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴Dabiq Issue 10, 39.

¹⁵⁵Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 14, “The Murtadd Brotherhood,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, April 2016, 8–14.

¹⁵⁶Dabiq Issue 14, 13.

Indeed, in the ninth edition of the Rumiyah ‘the cross bearing’, ie Christians and Jews were targeted as worthy of being targeted and killed. The main article of the issue which was also the front page title was captioned “The Ruling on the Belligerent Christians.”¹⁵⁷ The article celebrated attacks on Christians and Jews especially the attacks in Egypt. Through ‘presupposition’, ‘predication’ and ‘subject positioning’ the IS constructed its ideological ruling regarding the Christians and Jews and the bottom line is “The default with regards to the blood of mushrikin is that it is permissible to shed....”¹⁵⁸

The Christians of Misr possess weapons in preparation to fight the Muslims. Rather, they are engaged in fighting the Muslims through their continuous transgressions against any Christian who embraces Islam, kidnapping them, killing them, and putting them through trial and tribulation to make them return to shirk. And likewise through their membership in the taghut’s army, security and intelligence agencies, and police force, which wage war against the Muslims and guard the shari’ah of the taghut, and they are among the most sincere supporters of the taghut Sisi in Misr, and among his closest allies and most loyal partners in his war against Islam and the Muslims. Furthermore, they, their priests, and their monks are among the people most active in defaming the religion of Islam, the Noble Quran, and the Messenger. As such, they are from the leaders of kufr whom Allah has commanded us to fight.¹⁵⁹

Juxtaposing the quotations of the Wahhabi scholars above with those of the IS in its magazine regarding WB, clearly presupposition, predication and subject positioning is at work. The IS has adopted and extended the meaning

¹⁵⁷Islamic State’s Rumiyah Issue 9, “RUMIYAH,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, 2017, 4–11.

¹⁵⁸Rumiyah Issue 9, 5.

¹⁵⁹Rumiyah Issue 9, 7.

based on its presupposed belief that WB is not just hating with your heart or hating the act of unbelief a person is engaged or perhaps the person himself or herself but attacking, fighting and killing the ‘other’ based on the doctrine of WB. In terms of predication, it has succeeded in labeling the coreligionists who are well versed in the religion better than most of their leaders as ‘imams of kufr’ ‘wicked imaam’ ‘imams of kufr in the west’ and the west or Christians as ‘their cross-bearing allies’. Both have been positioned relationally in subject positioning to deserve to be killed. The doctrine of WB has been extended to include not only hatred towards the west and its ideologies like democracy, capitalism but also to violently attack, fight and kill, including Muslims who are on the same side with the IS.

Regarding the implementation of the penal codes (*hudud*) in the territories it governs, the IS has taken cue from the penal components of the shari’ah and to some extent from countries which are not fully Islamic yet practices these punitive aspects of the Islamic law like the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is regarded as largely practising Wahhabi Islam. Another link to Wahhabism lies in the fact that Ibn Abdul Wahhab had applied some of these penal codes in his lifetime. For instance, he sanctioned the stoning of a woman who had come to him proclaiming she had committed fornication (*zina*).¹⁶⁰ Regarding the penal code on fornication (Zina) implemented to the

¹⁶⁰Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam : From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2004., 2004), 27,
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b1235566&sit=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

woman in question it was not a mere exercise. It must be noted that the woman in question came willingly. He had to ask for the cross-examination of her mental state. After which she was given three opportunities to repent. Despite that ibn, Abdul Wahhab was reluctant until the ulema pushed him to implement the penal code.¹⁶¹ Besides, Saudi Arabia (which predominantly practices Wahhabi Islam) implements these more than any other country. In the second issue of the Dabiq, the IS featured news for *hudud* being carried on some eight people, and a woman was being stoned for adultery. Interestingly, it just shows the photo of heading with no details given.¹⁶² Again in another instance, the magazine shows two men who were accused of being high way armed robbers being executed.¹⁶³ There are other gory accounts of the implementation of the penal codes of the shari'a like the accounts of Samer in the literature reviewed.¹⁶⁴

The IS have taken inspiration mostly from this, unfortunately out of context. Besides, according to Hassan Hassan, the IS supports its brutal display beheadings and other forms of capital punishment by citing some stories in Islamic history be they authentic or not and contemporary scholars

¹⁶¹DeLong-Bas, 27.

¹⁶²Dabiq Issue 2, “The Flood:It’s Either with the Islamic State or the Flood,” 32 and 36.

¹⁶³Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” 45.

¹⁶⁴Samer, *The Raqqa Diaries*.

who support such.¹⁶⁵ Hassan cited an Islamic state cleric Abu Asaad al-Samaan who cited an early Islamic story to justify beheading even though the story is disputed. Hassan states:

According to al-Samaan, Muslim women were separated from the men in the city of Medina during the Battle of the Ditch and put in a secured place. But a man, identified in the story as Jewish, managed to climb to the secured place and approached the women. Safiyya asked an old man to kill the intruder, but the old man responded that he was incapable of fighting. Safiyya, who had fought in a previous battle, killed the approaching man, beheaded him, and threw his severed head onto enemy fighters to terrorise them¹⁶⁶

That they also cite one of the most notable Islamic commanders in the history of Islam, Khalid Ibn Walid and how he fights and smack the enemies. The IS took pride in publishing execution of people who lived in its controlled territory for apostasy and also stoning for adultery among others?¹⁶⁷

They combine these stories with citation of contemporary Islamic scholars to justify their ‘savagery’. There are several scholars they cite some of whom might not even necessarily support the IS’s course, but their teaching or preaching appear, inadvertently, appealing to the IS. Some of the scholars who appear to stand out of the lot are Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, Sayyid imam al-sharif and Abu Bakr Naji. These scholars are authors of books the founding

¹⁶⁵Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State.”

¹⁶⁶Hassan, 17.

¹⁶⁷Dabiq Issue 2, “The Flood:It’s Either with the Islamic State or the Flood,” 33–34 and 38.

father of the IS, al-Zarqawi found appealing. He studied them and circulated them in his training camps and now IS is also taking inspiration from these books. Al-Muhajir authored ‘Questions about the Jurisprudence Of Jihad’ while Naji authored the ‘Management of Savagery.’¹⁶⁸ “Essentials for making ready (for Jihad)” was authored by Sayyid imam al-sharif. Naji in the Management of savagery stated:

Those who have practised jihad know that it is nothing but brutality, callousness, terrorism, deterrence and infliction. I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam, so do not confuse the two. Fighting cannot continue and transition from one phase to another unless the first phase includes infliction and deterrence of the enemy.¹⁶⁹

These scholars justify beheading and spilling of the blood of non-believers. Therefore, when it comes to *hudud*, the IS presupposes sharia to be mainly the penal code. It demonstrates this by showcasing it in its magazines, and propaganda videos usually carry with its gory photos of executions of these criminal codes. The next chapter would also highlight more on the implementation of the *hudud* in its captured territories.

3.5 The *sahwa* Scholarship’s nexus to IS’s Ideology

The nexus between the *sahwa*, (ant-Shiism, especially) and the IS ideology is the fact that most scholars who support and justify anti-shii

¹⁶⁸Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *Isis : Inside the Army of Terror*. (New York : Regan Arts., 2016), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b2017178&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

¹⁶⁹Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State,” 17.

ideology are from the Saudi-Egypt Sahwa generation or somehow have links with the sahwa generation. They include scholars like Ibrahim al-Fares, Muhsin al-Awaji, Mohammed al- Barrak, Hamoud al-Omari, Mohammed al-Nojaimi, Saad al-Durihim, among others.¹⁷⁰ The IS cite these scholars to justify their sectarian hatred. For instance, according to Stephane Lacroix, the Islamic State made a list of 196 written, video, and audio items as a recommendation to be distributed to recruits and members. Interestingly, most of these were the works of the sahwa scholars mentioned above. In particular, new members are strongly encouraged to watch sermons by clerics or scholars associated with the Sahwa on the topics relating to *al wala' wal bara'* doctrine.¹⁷¹

Among such Scholars, of utmost importance to the Islamic State is Turki Al-Binali who is believed to be second in command in terms of influence after the deposed Al Anbari.¹⁷² He focuses on two primary themes which are of utmost importance to the Islamic State's ideology both of which have a link to tawhid (Islamic monotheism) as mentioned above: the nullifiers of Islam and Tawhid itself. He has delivered lectures and wrote a textbook on Tawhid to be used by the Islamic State, in its territories especially in Libya.

¹⁷⁰Hassan, 15.

¹⁷¹See Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*.

¹⁷²Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Islamic State Training Camp Textbook: Course in Fiqh [Islamic Jurisprudence]," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed January 7, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/07/islamic-state-training-camp-textbook-course-in>.

¹⁷³He is said to have been a disciple of Salman al Awda, a key figure in the Saudi sahwa. Al-binali is particularly useful to the IS in terms of Shia hatred due to his extreme views on shias. As a result of his extreme sectarian and takfiri views he was, in 2007, expelled from his studies in Dubai, and banned from Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar including his own country, Bahrain.¹⁷⁴ He, in mid-2015, in the wake of Islamic State suicide bombings of Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait threatened similar attacks against some Shia mosques in Bahrain.¹⁷⁵ Although there are some moderate ‘sahwi’ scholars, the IS align itself with the extreme views of the sahwis on the question of Shiism. In the 1990s some of the sahwi’s called for the banning of Shia Islam in the kingdom and that they should be prohibited from holding administrative power in the country.¹⁷⁶

In demonstrating seriousness regarding anti-Shiite ideology, the IS’s thirteenth issue of the Dabiq was titled “The Rafidah: from Ibn Saba’ to Dajjal”.¹⁷⁷ In this issue, there were two main articles targeted at justifying hating and killing of the Shiites. The first article is entitled "know your enemy:

¹⁷³Al-Tamimi.

¹⁷⁴Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State.”

¹⁷⁵Hassan.

¹⁷⁶Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, 183.

¹⁷⁷Dabiq Issue 13, “The Raafidah:From Ibn Saba’ to Dajjal.”

who were the Safawiyyah".¹⁷⁸ They were referring to the Persian Empire up until modern Iran discrediting it as an enemy of the Muslims especially the Sunnis. The second article, which is longer and well documented entitled the same as the front page "The Rafidah: from Ibn Saba' to Dajjal."¹⁷⁹ The ultimate aim of this article was summarised under the subsection 'The Ruling upon the Rafidah' which started with quoting Abubakar al Baghdadi "The Rafidah are a party of shirk and apostasy."¹⁸⁰ They cited numerous scholars to support and justify why the shia's are not Muslims to support their stance. Some of the quotations are as follows:

Al-Awzā'ī (died 157AH) said, "Whoever curses Abū Bakras-Siddīq has apostatised" [Al-Ibānah as-Sughrā – Ibn Battah]. Al-Firyābī (died 212AH) was asked about one who curses Abū Bakr. He replied, "He is a kāfir" [As-Sunnah-al-Khallāl].¹⁸¹

The Rāfidah make takfīr of the majority of the Sahābah, hate them, and curse them. Muhammad Ibn 'Abdil-Wahhāb said, "The verses of the Qur'ān about the virtues of the Sahābah are numerous, and the ahādīth on this are altogether mutawātir explicitly stating their righteousness. Thus whoever believes that the Sahābah or majority of them became fāsiqīn or murtaddīn or believes in the right or legality of cursing them has thereby disbelieved in Allah and His Messenger, denying the virtues of the Sahābah that Allah and His Messenger related" [Ar-Radd 'Alar-Rāfidah].¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸Dabiq Issue 13, 10–12.

¹⁷⁹Dabiq Issue 13, 32–45.

¹⁸⁰Dabiq Issue 13, 35.

¹⁸¹Dabiq Issue 13, 37.

¹⁸²Dabiq Issue 13, 36.

Shaykh Az-Zarqāwī also said, “The imāms of the Salaf pronounced takfīr upon the Rāfidah and exposed their reality... Imām Mālik (□ .a.) said, ‘He who curses the Sahābah of Rasūlullāh(s.a.w.) has no share of Islam’ [As-Sunnah – Al- Khallāl]. Mālik also commented on the following verse: {And the description of them [the Sahābah] in the Injīl is as a plant which produces its offshoots and strengthens them so they grow firm and stand upon their stalks, delighting the sowers – so that Allah may enrage by them the kuffār} [Al-Fath: 29] by saying, “Thus whoever is enraged by the Sahābah is a kāfir.” Imām ash-Shāfi‘ī followed him in this deduction” [Ilā Ummatī al-Ghāliyah]

What is evidenced in the above quotations is that most scholars base on certain actions of the Shia to regard them as not believers. That is the declaration of these scholars quoted above is targeted towards some of the actions of the Shia, not their person. Besides, they did not indicate that they should be fought and killed. Fighting and target killing of the Shia would be an extension by the IS. Al-Qaeda has a different view regarding the targeting and killing of the Shias. This view could be decoded from Al Zawahiri's view on the shias. His views are regarded as ‘extreme’ by the IS. The magazine quoted al Zawahiri:

Adh-Dhawāhirī said, “We consider the Twelver Shī‘ah one of the mubtadi’ sects that innovated bid’ah in creed that reached the point of cursing Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, the Mothers of the Believers, and the majority of the Sahābah and Tābi‘īn. They consider them to be kuffār, they openly curse them, and they believe the Qur’ān to have been distorted... and they have other innovated beliefs such as claiming the infallibility of the twelve imāms and that these imams reached a level that neither a prophet nor angel has reached ... As for those who are ignorant and believe in these false tenets due to ahādīth they thought to be authentic while the truth had not reached them or due to them being ignorant laymen, then they are excused due to ignorance”[MawqifunāMin Irān].¹⁸³

¹⁸³Dabiq Issue 13, 39.

He also said in his infamous letter censuring Shaykh az-Zarqāwī , “If attacking some of the heads of the Shī'ah is necessary [as you claim], then why do you attack the laymen of the Shī'ah? Doesn't this lead to their false beliefs taking root deeper in their hearts, whereas the obligation upon us is to speak to them with da'wah and clarify and convey the truth to them so that they might be guided to it? Will the mujāhidīn ever be able to kill all the Shī'ah of Iraq? Did any Islamic state in history ever try to do so? Why are the laymen of the Shī'ah killed despite them being excused due to their ignorance? And what would we have supposedly lost if we had not targeted the Shī'ah? ... And do our brothers forget that both we and Iran need each other not harming one another during this era in which the Americans target us both?” He said in another letter censuring the targeting of Rāfidī temples, markets, and neighbourhoods that he believes “these deeds spill inviolable blood, as the blood of the women, children, and commoners of the Shī'ah – except their fighters – is inviolable because they are excused due to ignorance.” He then goes on to say mockingly, “Do you want to kill all the Shī'ah of Iraq? Then follow them up by killing all the Shī'ah of the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula? Then the Shī'ah of Iran, Shām, and the rest of the world?!” He also said, “[The mujāhidīn] must not fight the deviant sects such as the Rāfidah, the Ismā'īliyyah, the Qādiyāniyyah, and the deviant Sufis, as long as these sects do not fight Ahlus-Sunnah. If they fight Ahlus-Sunnah, then the response should be limited to the fighters of these sects, while at the same time we must clarify that we are only defending ourselves. We must avoid striking their non-fighters, their families, their homes, their places of worship, their celebrations, and their religious gatherings ... As for the areas that fall under the control and authority of the mujāhidīn, then these sects should be treated with wisdom after da'wah, promoting awareness, exposing shubuhāt, and commanding the good and forbidding the evil in a manner that does not lead to a greater harm, such as the mujāhidīn being cast out of those regions or the masses revolting against them or a fitnah being instigated that the enemies of the mujahidin will exploit to occupy these regions” [General Guidelines for Jihādī Activism].¹⁸⁴

Based on the above statement by al Zawahiri, indicating a very different view of the Shia elsewhere the article continued:

Adh-Dhawāhirī's policies towards the Rāfidah are based upon his deviant belief that they are “Muslims.” As for his claim that no Islamic state throughout history ever attempted to kill off the Rāfidah, then that is due to

¹⁸⁴Dabiq Issue 13, 39.

his ignorance. The Twelver Rāfidah had not existed during the eras of the Rāshidī, Umawī, and ‘Abbāsī khulafā’ as they exist today, for the sect had been a minority practising taqiyyah, never having the political power nor the military might manifest and propagate their blatant kufr and shirk, a condition changed by the advent of the Safawī state four hundred years ago.¹⁸⁵

The Taliban’s views are also unsurprisingly closer to the views of the Alzawahiri and Al-Qaeda. “As for the nationalist Taliban, then they are similar to Dhawāhirī’s Qā’idah, considering the Rāfidah to be their brothers and publically denouncing those who target the Rāfidah.”¹⁸⁶

An important question would be where from the idea regarding not only declaring the shias Kuffar but targeting their lives, properties and shrines. It is constructed through presupposition, predication and subject positioning. The IS presupposes (by Al-Zarqawi, especially) that since most of the scholars they cited declared the shias as kuffars or disbelievers or apostates them presumably, they could be targeted and killed. This presupposition was made possible by the extreme Shia-Sunni tension in Iraq especially during the peak of AQI insurgency under Al-Zarqawi. Unfortunately, that has trickled down to the period of IS. Regarding predication by way of labelling is apparent in al Baghadi's statement that ‘The Rafidah are a party of shirk and apostasy’. The stage is set to position them so that they could be targeted and killed. This was made possible by the sahra scholarship who sanction the targeting and killing

¹⁸⁵Dabiq Issue 13, 39–40.

¹⁸⁶Dabiq Issue 13, 39–40.

of Shias. That is why in the magazine of the IS true to their words and believe the attacks and execution of the Shiites is celebrated. An attack on Shiites in Afghanistan was celebrated by the IS. When the Taliban denounced such attacks, the IS tagged them as Nationalists.¹⁸⁷ That same magazine showed a photo of Shia temple blown by the ‘mujahidin’.¹⁸⁸

When one analysis IS's actions and practices concerning the above concept and their Wahhabi connotations, one would be tempted to conclude that IS's ideology is Wahhabi in nature. While they ascribe to Wahhabi ideas as explored above, they by all means possible leap further. That makes it complicated to classify them squarely Wahhabi. Besides, the faction of the sahra scholarship that sanctions the targeting, killing and destroying the shias property the anti Shiism emanating from this is clear. However, this does not paint the larger picture as IS takes inspirations from other sources too, especially ‘Qutbism.’ The next section would explore Qutbism's connection to IS's ideology.

3.6 Qutbism Nexus to IS's Ideology

The fundamental idea promoted in this work is that when Muslims were supposedly adhering to the fundamental principles of Islam especially strictly adhering to Tawhid and placing sovereignty in its proper place, Allah

¹⁸⁷Dabiq Issue 13, 41.

¹⁸⁸Dabiq Issue 13, 41.

exalted them by rewarding them with the caliphate. However, when the Muslims abandoned the fundamental Islamic principles of Islam, Allah humiliated them by stripping them off the caliphate. To restore such lost glory, Muslims have to go back to the fundamental teaching of Islam not in terms of reversing back time but using the fundamentals to respond to contemporary challenges. He conceptualises this through an extensive elaboration of critical issues including *jahiliyyah*, *hakimiya* (and *sharia*) and *jihad*.¹⁸⁹ The link between IS and Qutbism could be traced along the lines of his understanding and extension of the meaning of these concepts namely *jahiliyyah*, *hakimiya*, (and *sharia*) and *jihad* and the IS's adoption (and in some cases further extending the concept both in theory and practice) of such.

With regard to *Jahiliyyah* in the 'Milestones' or 'Signposts On The Road,' Sayyid Qutb reinterpreted and extended the concept of *Jahiliyah* (the pre-Islamic condition of ignorance of the guidance of God) to mean that the Muslim world or the Arab leaders akin to the original *jahiliyyah* period are going back to the days of ignorance by abandoning Islamic teachings in favour of atheistic philosophies and ideologies that place men as the master of other men. Sayyid Qutb states:

If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in *Jahiliyyah*, and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This *Jahiliyyah* is based on rebellion against Allah's sovereignty on

¹⁸⁹Qutb, *Milestones*.

earth. It transfers to a man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what Allah Almighty has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of Allah is the oppression of His creatures. Thus the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against Allah's authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by Allah Almighty.¹⁹⁰

To solve the Jahili problem, Qutb proposed a solution:

We must return to the pure source from which those people (the earlier followers of the prophet Mohammed) derived guidance ---the source of which is free from any mixing or pollution.”¹⁹¹ He again states “from (Islam) we must derive our concept of life, our principles of government, politics, economics and all aspects of life.”¹⁹² From this also emerges an important slogan of the Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) which is “Islam is the solution.”¹⁹³ He continues: “In order to bring this about, we need to initiate the movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country. Only such a revivalist movement will eventually attain to the status of world leadership, whether the distance is near or far.”¹⁹⁴ “How is it possible to start the task of reviving Islam?”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁰Qutb, 38.

¹⁹¹R. Scott Appleby, “History in the Fundamentalist Imagination,” *The Journal of American History*, no. 2 (2002): 498, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3092170>; Phillip Margulies, *The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, Turning Points* (San Diego : Thomson/Gale, 2006., 2006), 29.

¹⁹²Qutb, *Milestones*, 32–33.

¹⁹³Qutb, 32–33.

¹⁹⁴Qutb, 32–33.

¹⁹⁵Qutb, 32–33.

Qutb asks the reader rhetorically. He continues:

“It is necessary that there should be a vanguard which sets out with this determination and then keeps walking on the path, marching through the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world. During its course, it should keep itself somewhat aloof from this all-encompassing Jahiliyyah and should also keep some ties with it.”

First, the method of this religion is very practical. This movement treats people as they are and uses resources which are in accordance with practical conditions. Since this movement comes into conflict with the Jahiliyyah which prevails over ideas and beliefs, and which has a practical system of life and a political and material authority behind it, the Islamic movement had to produce parallel resources to confront this Jahiliyyah. This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs, and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili system which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs, but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords instead of the Almighty Lord. This movement does not confine itself to mere preaching to confront physical power, as it also does not use compulsion for changing the ideas of people. These two principles are equally important in the method of this religion. Its purpose is to free those people who wish to be freed from enslavement to men so that they may serve Allah Almighty alone.¹⁹⁶

From the quotations above on Jahiliyah by Sayyid Qutb we could draw a ‘presupposition’ of the meaning of Jahiliyyah not be confined to the original ignorance of God in the Arabian-peninsula but to include communism, capitalism and all human-made systems that fail to bow to the dictates of almighty. This presupposition is precipitated by the happenings of the period in the Egyptian context where the leaders were taking solace in following in the footsteps of some of the countries practising these systems. The link between Qutb and the IS in this respect is the fact that it adopted the

¹⁹⁶Qutb, 27–28.

‘presupposed’ extension of the concept and used it a novel way. In an article entitled “from the pages of history: flags of Jahiliyyah”¹⁹⁷ the IS lambasted the infamous Sykes-Picot and referred to the designated flags of these demarcated lands as ‘banners of jahili origins’.¹⁹⁸ It proceeded to engage in ‘predications’ when it stated: “These *jāhilī* flags essentially represent the crusaders, their apostate agents, Arab nationalism, and the puppet *tawāghīt* loyal to the crusaders.”¹⁹⁹ That leads to the constructing of the other through ‘subject positioning’. Indeed the article concluded stating:

After this brief history, every Muslim should reject any group raising these *jāhilī* banners and every party cooperating with those who raise them against the Islamic State. The treachery deepens as the *Sahwah* seeks cover from the air forces of Qatar and *al Salūl* against the Islamic State. May Allah resurrect them within the ranks of their forefathers – al-Husayn Ibn ‘Alī and ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Sa’ūd – on Judgment Day.²⁰⁰

Another link between IS and Qutbism is the latter’s suggestion that hating foreign or Jahili ideologies are not enough but standing up to it and seeking to replace it relentlessly with that which is the perfect way of life. The IS ‘presupposes’ this to suggest fighting Jahili (ignorance) ideologies by any

¹⁹⁷Dabiq Issue 9, “They Plot and Allah Plots,” 20.

¹⁹⁸Dabiq Issue 9, 19.

¹⁹⁹Dabiq Issue 9, 19.

²⁰⁰Dabiq Issue 9, 23.

means necessary in societies to get rid of them to be an obligation upon Muslims. To the IS this serves as a green light to display brutality to anything or anyone who engages in Jahiliyyah accordingly to their interpretation of Islam. In their magazines (both Dabiq and Rumiyah issues) the IS is clearly against the West and all that it stands for including very good Muslims residing in the west but in IS's understanding since they are comfortably residing in the western countries they are a party to promoting 'western ideologies' like 'free choice', democracy and so on. "An individual is not saved from the filth and impurity of shirk and its people as long as he does not disbelieve in the tawaghit of his era, their shirk, and those who commit shirk, such as the apostate partisans of democracy, nationalism, and manmade laws."²⁰¹ They also target those who are not in western countries but try to implement western ideologies home. They referred to the former president Morsi and the MB as apostates for participating in democratic processes in Egypt.

"Murtadd Brotherhood" group and its parties, factions, and sister organisations, which have denied tawhid, the Shari'ah, wala and bara, and jihad, and have resisted adhering to these tenets, mocked them, waged war against them, and supported the Crusaders and the tawaghit in waging war against them. Rather, it is obligatory on the Muslim to manifest his disbelief in all of these apostates as much as he is able to, with his pen and tongue, and his sword and spear, thereby following the two khalils of Allah (Muhammad and Ibrahim), may the best of blessings and peace be upon them both, and it is Allah's help that is sought, reliance is upon Him, and there is no power or might except by Allah.²⁰²

²⁰¹Rumiyah Issue 1, "RUMIYAH," 6.

²⁰²Rumiyah Issue 1, 6.

Clearly, in these quotes, we can see the labelling by way of predication paving the way for subject position towards constructing their 'enemies' as the other worthy of targeting and killing.

Besides, this call to move away from 'neo-jahilliya' and fight it is closely linked to strictly abiding by the *sharia*. Interestingly, for a group like the IS, sharia application means a display of its penal codes. When in fact, the penal laws constitute a tiny fraction of the sharia and some of which could only be applied after fulfilling very near-impossible conditions.²⁰³ The IS undermines the current world order as it is regarded as human-made and falls within the confines of *Jahili* ideologies. They, therefore, seek to establish the 'law of Allah'.²⁰⁴ Sayyid Qutb in the milestone spent some time, energy and space elaborating on Shariah. He states:

No doubt the Shari'ah is the best since it comes from Allah Almighty; the laws of His creatures can hardly be compared to the laws given by the Creator. But this point is not the basis of the Islamic call. The basis of the message is that one should accept the Shari'ah without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. That is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam. One who is attracted to this basic Islam has already resolved this problem; he will not require any persuasion through showing its

²⁰³For instance, the situation for stoning and flogging after committing an act of fornication or adultery requires four people to have witnessed the culprits engaged in the act at the same time. Seeing them just lying on the bed but not involved in the act is rejected as evidence to execute this penal code.

²⁰⁴Dabiq Issue 10, "The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men"; Dabiq Issue 8, "Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa."

beauty and superiority. That is one of the realities of the faith.²⁰⁵

In Qutb's thought, we could see a presupposition that the Shari'a is entirely divine, which is somewhat misleading. That is because the basic framework of the shari'ah is divine (Qur'an and authentic Sunnah), but the content of the shari'ah is filled by man through *Ijma'* or *Ijtihad*. These are two Islamic legal terminologies that allow for the opinion of competent scholars applying some Islamic principles. These principles are used when the Qur'an or the Sunnah is not very clear on some issues especially in contemporary times. Some issues like organ donation or transplant, space explorations are issues that are not directly addressed in the Qur'an and would require a competent scholar to put some bit and pieces together through *qiyas* to arrive at an opinion. The slippery slope regarding this is that the ruling arrived at might not be applied universally. But in Qutb's presupposition, the shar'a is a direct law from God applicable universally.

Clearly, in Qutb's thought, the world needs shar'ah to progress, as opposed to man-made rules. Therefore to achieve such he proposes "...the bringing about of the enforcement of the Divine Law (Shari'ah) and the abolition of human-made laws cannot be achieved only through preaching. Those who have usurped the authority of Allah Almighty and are oppressing Allah's creatures are not going to give up their power merely through

²⁰⁵Qutb, *Milestones*, 50.

preaching; if it had been so, the task of establishing Allah's religion in the world would have been very easy for the Prophets of Allah. That is contrary to the evidence from the history of the Prophets and the story of the struggle of the true religion, spread over generations"²⁰⁶That brings us back the vanguard or Islamic movement whose task it would be to see to the eradication of human-made laws and establishments of shar'ah globally.

Taking a cue from these ideas regarding the shar'ah the IS entitled its eighth and tenth issues of the *dabiq* "sharia alone will rule Africa" and "The law of Allah or the laws of men."²⁰⁷ The previous title was in reference to the pledge of allegiance coming from Boko Haram of Nigeria and the acceptance after that by the Islamic state. "The Islamic State's spokesman, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani (hafidhahullah), said, "And we bring you the good news today of the Khilafah's expansion to West Africa, for the Khalifah (hafidhahullah), has accepted the pledge of allegiance made by our brothers in Jama'at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wal-Jihad. We congratulate the Muslims and our mujahid brothers in West Africa on their pledge of allegiance, and we congratulate them on joining the caravan of the Khilafah. So rejoice, O Muslims, for this is a new door that Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, has

²⁰⁶Qutb, 68.

²⁰⁷Dabiq Issue 10, "The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men"; Dabiq Issue 8, "Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa."

opened so that you may migrate to the land of Islam...”²⁰⁸ The article praised them for implementing sharia'h and prayed that they are able to sustain that. “Despite crusader hostility, however, the mujahidin carried the banner of tawhīd, calling to the truth, clashing with the people of falsehood, and exacting revenge on the crusaders and apostates, until Allah's decree came, and the mujāhidīn were granted authority in the land. They implemented His Sharī'ah, established the prayer, commanded the good, and forbade the evil.”²⁰⁹ “We ask Allah to keep their feet firm against those seeking to uproot His Sharī'ah.”²¹⁰ The latter article is targeted at factional militant groups who are willing to fight against the Islamic state alongside the coalition. It also sought to address whether fighting the Islamic state is apostasy or not? “We likewise renew our call to the soldiers of the factions in Shām and Libya. We call on them to think long before embarking to fight the Islamic State, which rules by that which Allah revealed. Remember, O you afflicted by fitnah, before embarking to fight the Islamic State, that there is no place on the face of the Earth where the Sharī'ah of Allah is implemented, and the rule is entirely for Allah except for the lands of the Islamic State. Remember that if you were able to capture one hand span, one village, or one city from it, the

²⁰⁸Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” 15.

²⁰⁹Dabiq Issue 8, 16.

²¹⁰Dabiq Issue 8, 16.

law of Allah in that area would be replaced with the laws of men. Then ask yourself, ‘What is the ruling on someone who replaces or is a cause for the replacement of the law of Allah with the law of man?’ Yes, you become a kāfir because of that. So beware, for by fighting the Islamic State you fall into kufr whether you realise it or not”²¹¹

Clearly, in the above quotations IS presupposed itself, as implementing sharia'a and abiding by it and all those supporting the coalition and fighting along their ranks are apostates. While Qutbism advocates for shari'a, the extension of the notion of implementing the sharia's will be the brutality, the IS takes pleasure in displaying and praising Boko Haram for killing non-combatant civilians, kidnapping girls, forcing them into marriages and impregnating some of them. On its side too, the IS does a lot of this that mainstream scholars would regard as outside the scope of shariah. It, therefore, labels those fighting against it as apostates to justify their targeting. The IS have captured, tortured and raped Yazidi women. Some of them were taken as slaves by the IS all in the whimsical presupposition that they are implementing shari'a.

Furthermore, Qutbism's vital link to IS has is Qutb's view on *Jihad* and its connection to the *fighting Jabiliyyah or Jabili ideologies*.²¹² The above concepts

²¹¹Dabiq Issue 8, 16.

²¹²Generally refers to spiritual struggle against oneself or unbelievers in some extreme cases after specified conditions are met and declaration to that effect made by a kind of ‘universalistic Islamic leader.’

sighted require the Muslim youth to wage jihad, as suggested by Qutb. That it would need a jihad to fight ‘neo-jahiliyah’, practice *sharia* and *hakimiyah*. The IS’s conceptualisation and practice of Jihad are very close if not similar to that of Sayyid Qutb. *Jihad* is a word that is mostly misunderstood or abused. Jihad means struggles or fighting.²¹³ The controversy arises when we ask struggle against what or fight against whom or what? This leads to the types of jihad or forms of Jihad in Islam. While most scholars are of the view that there is the Jihad against the self and the Jihad that involves physical fighting between Muslims and non-Muslims, others narrowly view and emphasise on Jihad as physical fighting. According to mainstream scholars, the most severe form of Jihad or the jihad that needs to be highlighted on more is the struggle against oneself to be righteous. For these groups of scholars, they recognise arm or militant Jihad but conclude that such a Jihad involves the fulfilment of nearly impossible Islamic requirement today to be declared. Even with that, they believe in a defensive form of Jihad that is fighting to protect oneself, society or country from attack. These include scholars like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Mohammad ‘Abduh(1849-1905).²¹⁴Even Ibn Wahhab usually goes by the contextualised and limited

²¹³Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism,” 16.

²¹⁴Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, 222.

nature of armed Jihad.²¹⁵ For others, they have a very radical view of Jihad. They emphasise on armed Jihad and dismiss the idea of defensive Jihad in favour of offensive Jihad.

Qutb falls in this second category. He dismisses defensive Jihad. He uses his *ijtihad* to declare fighting Jahiliyyah and Jahili ideologies as a legitimate form of armed Jihad. He states 'Jihad is not restricted to the defence of the homeland. Rather, it is a command to extend the borders of Islam to the ends of the earth, which belongs to Allah.'²¹⁶ He argues "Those who say that Islamic Jihad was merely for the defence of the 'homeland of Islam' diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less important than their 'homeland'."²¹⁷ This is interesting especially concerning the IS's motive of continually expanding its territories. Besides, their boundless conception of territoriality (as discussed in details in the territoriality chapter) seems to be directly his idea.

Subsequently, for the IS Jihad is about fighting and bloodshed and that is the essence of Islam. An endorsement of offensive Jihad occupies a special place in their propaganda. In its magazine an article entitled "Islam is the

²¹⁵ DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, 259.

²¹⁶ Qutb, *Milestones*, 93.

²¹⁷ Qutb, 93.

religion of the sword, not pacifism" attest to this ideological leaning²¹⁸ The articles stated as the title suggests "There is a slogan repeated continuously by apologetic "duāt" when flirting with the West and that is their statement: "Islam is the religion of peace," and they mean pacifism by the word peace. They have repeated this slogan so much to the extent that some of them alleged that Islam calls to permanent peace with kufr and the kāfirīn. How far is their claim from the truth, for Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword, and the evidence for this is so profuse that only a zindīq (heretic) would argue otherwise."²¹⁹ After their usual cherry picking of the so-called sword verses from the Qur'an, some hadeeth and references to some scholars, they debunked the notion that the root meaning of Islam is 'peace'. "It is clear then that salām (peace) is not the basis of the word Islam, although it shares the same consonant root (s-l-m) and is one of the outcomes of the religion's sword, as the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, and swung until 'Isā (Jesus – 'alayhis-salām) kills the Dajjāl (the Antichrist) and abolishes the jizyah. After that, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth."²²⁰

The IS presupposes Islam to be armed Jihad and nothing less, as can be

²¹⁸Islamic State's Dabiq Issue 7, "From Hypocrisy to Apostasy," *Al Hayat Media Centre*, January 2015, 20.

²¹⁹Dabiq Issue 7, 20.

²²⁰Dabiq Issue 7, 24.

detected from their discourses. That is in their understanding of Islam, any Muslim who does not believe in armed Jihad is not a proper Muslim. Despite numerous verses in the Qur'an countering this understanding. They further call on Muslims who are living in non-muslim countries to attack ordinary citizens.“Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr must be reminded that the blood of the disbelievers is halal, and killing them is a form of worship to Allah, the Lord, King, and God of humankind. This includes the businessman riding to work in a taxicab; the young adults (post-pubescent “children”) engaged in sports activities in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a sandwich. Indeed, even the blood of the kafir street vendor selling flowers to those passing by is halal to shed – and striking terror into the hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty. There is no shar’i requirement to target soldiers and policemen nor judges and politicians, but all kuffar who are not under the covenant of dhimmah are fair game. How can the disbelievers ever dream of safety and security while Muslims suffer anywhere in the world and while the rule of Allah is mockingly replaced by humanmade monstrosities of democracy?”²²¹ They regard these attacks as ‘just terror.’²²²

That is while for Qutb offensive Islam is part of the Islamic faith the IS extends to mean the very essence of Islam. Besides, while Qutb, despite his

²²¹Rumiyah Issue 1, “RUMIYAH,” 36 See also Rumiyah Issues 1 and 5; Dabiq Issues 7,8,9,10 and 12.

²²²Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 12, “Just Terror,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, November 2015; Islamic State’s Rumiyah Issue 3, “RUMIYAH,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, 2017, 10.

favouring of offensive Jihad would most certainly not encourage the targeting of ordinary citizens, this brutal extension is made possible by the 'IS's sheikhs of Jihad.' The like of Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, Sayyid Imam al-sharif and Abu Bakr Naji who justify savagery in their sermons and their writings.²²³

Hakimiyyah is another Qutbist concept adopted by the IS.²²⁴ Hakimiyyah is an Arabic term that originates from the root letters *h.k.m.* From this base word, we get other words that relate to hakimiyyah like *hukm* (rule) singular, *ahkam* (rules) plural, *Hakim* (ruler).²²⁵ According to Wright, the word *ahkam* expresses the intent of the forcefulness of the term *hukm* to mean that the sovereignty of Allah surpasses the sovereignty of others. This supports the view that infinitive of the root word *h.k.m.* means 'governorship, rule, command authority and dominion'²²⁶. According to Wehr, 'hakimiyyah means domination, dominion, rule, sovereignty, judgeship, judicature, jurisdiction'²²⁷. Linguistically, the term *hakimiyyah* have both legal and political connotations. Qur'anic verses regarding the term *hukm* have various

²²³Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State," 12–14.

²²⁴This concept was originally al Maududi's concept which was borrowed and polished by Qutb. See Muqtedar Khan, "Sovereignty in Modernity and Islam," accessed January 7, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/20619475/Sovereignty_in_Modernity_and_Islam.

²²⁵Sayed Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty : The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb* (New York, NY : Routledge, 2006., 2006), 16.

²²⁶Khatab, 16.

²²⁷Khatab, 17.

connotations but have in the end the same legal and political undertones as well. With this background, Qutb developed his thoughts on hakimmiyyah.

Hakimmiyya according to Mukhtadar Khan is a derivative of the Arabic word ‘govern,’ which was used by al Maududi and later adopted by Islamic political thinkers as ‘sovereignty.’²²⁸ According to Qutb based on his understanding and the extension of the meaning of hakimiyyah, sovereignty belongs to only Allah, and any ideology that places sovereignty in anything other than Allah should be fought. For Qutb, an integral part of Tauhid is the belief that God is the sovereign in everything. While most mainstream scholars would agree with Qutb on this, it would be a matter of dispute if God requires us to mandatory and forcefully establish an Islamic state that ensures hakimiyah. Qutb's thought means the rejection of the status quo in term of democracy and capitalism, especially. While most mainstream Islamic scholars would agree with him on his understanding of sovereignty belonging to only Allah; they would disagree with him regarding fighting the status quo, especially when such a status quo allow Muslims practice their religion, freely.

Adopting such an understanding from Qutb, the IS rejects the current international system as it does not correctly place sovereignty at its rightful place, they claim.²²⁹ It seeks to establish a caliphate in which it could practice

²²⁸Khan, “Sovereignty in Modernity and Islam.”

²²⁹This view has a strong implication on their notion territoriality as shown in the chapter on Territoriality.

its ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology. The ultimate goal in Qutb's discourses is the establishment of an Islamic state, which would counter Jahili ideologies and its societal arrangements. This is in sync with what ISIS stands for. This notion would be elaborated in some details in the next chapter, on territoriality.

The interpretations of these concepts in Qutbist views are believed to have appealed to fundamentalist jihadist and have increasingly contributed to militancy in the region and beyond. Most importantly, these militant organisations call for the return to the *khilafa*, or the caliphate is believed to have inspired groups like the IS.²³⁰ While the IS ideological worldview has links with Wahhabism, Qutbism and the sahra generation scholarship, it appears that Iraq invasion and the Arab spring with their respective consequences have helped entrenched the ultra-exclusionary ideology of the IS. The next section of the chapter explores these.

3.7 The Iraq invasion, the Arab uprising and IS's ideology nexus

Most of the members, followers and sympathisers of IS in Iraq, Syria, Libya and other related countries elsewhere are teenagers or in their youth. They have seen their countries put to ruins by western powers (especially Iraq and later Libya) and their allies in the region. When they weigh IS's narrative regarding how 'the enemy' really hates their progress and the realities on the ground, it seems to make sense to them. In as much as western ideologies are,

²³⁰R. Scott Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination."

arguably, considered not to have direct radicalization effects on these youth, the witnessing of the outcome of enforcing or applying such ideologies (democracy, good governance, human right and so on) through invasion or deposing their leaders with its catastrophic outcome makes them hate the invading powers. This creates a fertile ground for the IS to spread its ideology. Such an observation of the reality on the ground entrenches the concept of *al bara*(hatred of Allah's enemies), which is a crucial component of WB discussed above used to justify intense hatred towards the enemy and in this regard towards the invading powers and their alien ideologies, precisely as preached by the IS.

In Iraq, the 2003 invasion did not only create an unattended power vacuum and shattered the country into pieces but had a lot of sectarian ramifications as well.²³¹ Iraq under the Saddam reign has incubated a sectarian Pandora box in waiting, only to be widely unleashed by the invasion and its aftermath. The invasion was ill conceived by the Bush administration as a step, which would automatically transition Iraq to smooth democracy without considering the complex nature of Iraq's social fabric. Ostensibly, the invasion plunged the country into chaos rather than stabilising it. These notwithstanding, the invasion link to sectarianism mainly lies in the Obama administration's strong support for a divisive and sectarian Maliki government

²³¹Ali Khedery, "Iraq in Pieces," *Foreign Affairs*, September 22, 2015,
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-09-22/iraq-pieces>.

which was supposed to fill a power vacuum that was dominated by Sunnis. The filling of the void with predominantly Shia elements and the attendant sectarian biased policies of the sectarian former PM Nuri al Maliki was used as an opportunity by the then AQI to intensify its enmity claim towards the Sunnis by the Shias thereby attacking Shia civilians and their shrines. In retaliation, the ever-growing Shia militias with the backing of both Iraq's government and Iran also started committing atrocities against the Sunnis.

These retaliatory attacks would serve as an enticement for the IS regarding its attacks of other sects especially the Shias. AQI and later the IS gained acceptance among the Sunnis precisely because they had lost hope in the central government of Iraq to protect them against the Shia militia attacks and to attend to their needs.²³² Both AQI and later IS as militant organisations who regard themselves as Sunnis appear to listen to them (the locals in the Sunni areas) further polarising the Iraqi social fabric. They also used biased sectarian policies to serve as an avenue to recruit Sunni youth who see an enemy within and without. To the IS, combating the near enemy is of prime importance before dealing with the distant enemy.²³³ An enemy within in this regard is the Shia dominated government (primarily al Maliki's) who do not serve the interest of the Sunnis and the invading forces who have torn their country apart. The IS used this fissure to especially garnering support in Sunni

²³²Khedery.

²³³Gerges, *ISIS*.

dominated areas before and after the declaration of the so-called ‘caliphate.’ What the invasion and its aftermath did was to entrench the above discussed IS’s ideological views and to help AQI and later IS recruit based on what was happening on the ground. These sectarian attacks have extended beyond the borders of Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan as recent conspicuous sectarian attacks in both countries have shown.²³⁴ That is the Iraqi invasion helped IS put into practice, justifiably, its *sabwa* scholarship anti-Shia ideological component.

The Arab spring with its attendant protests across the region was not free from sectarian ideological readings and IS’s ideological exploitation. In particular, that of Syria was directly read in sectarian terms since the majority of the participants, and indeed a chunk of the Syrian populations are Sunnis. It is believed to have created an opportunity for the Sunnis to oppose the Alawite regime publicly. As discussed earlier this led to a regional sectarian spill over where Hezbollah (a Lebanon based Shia organisation) weighed and supported Assad with some of its militias. Besides, Iran and Russia also show support to the Assad regime. Turkey whose aim in the Syrian conflict, until the recent ambiguity, has been the toppling of the Assad regime, showed massive support to the opposition to the Syrian government. The IS again used its sectarian rhetoric to win over the hearts and minds of some of the Sunni

²³⁴“Isis Is Now Waging a Sectarian War in Afghanistan – and Even the Taliban Opposes It | The Independent,” accessed January 7, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/isis-in-afghanistan-sectarian-war-taliban-opposes-it-middle-east-islamic-state-islamism-a7158146.html>.

militia thereby securing some swaths of land in Syria.²³⁵ In its propaganda magazines, especially the Dabiq, the IS makes a lot of references to the Syrian conflict, competing militant groups and highlighting the fact that the IS is the valid claimant of the Jihad in 'Sham' as it prefers to refer to Syria.

As evidenced above the Iraq invasion, the Arab Spring (especially the Syrian conflict) can well be put into perspective when one assesses it using critical constructivist lenses. The IS presupposes itself as the liberator of the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria and for that matter the unifier of a region that has been separated by the 'false banners of Jahiliyyah'. Anyone who stands on its way or does not support it is labelled using predication which allows for subject positioning between the IS (the Liberator) and the others (enemies). Justification is then made to find a reason to target and kill the enemy.

²³⁵"The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects," accessed January 7, 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-shiite-jihad-in-syria-and-its-regional-effects>.

3.8 Conclusion




Figure 3.1 The IS's ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.

Tracing the roots and the constitution of IS's ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology is a complicated task. It does not lend itself to oversimplification and homogeneous categorisation. It has traces of different ideologies put together. Paramount among these is the utilisations of the theological interpretations, adoption and extension of some concepts in Wahhabism, Qutbism and the Sahwa scholarship as a guide. As can be seen from figure 3.1, the ultra-exclusionary ideology of the IS takes inspiration from Wahhabism, Qutbism and the sahra ulama.' From Wahhabism, it mainly adopts and sometimes modifies and extends the notion of Tawhid/Shirk, WB, Bid'a and the hudud

(penal) aspects of shari‘a. The notions of Jahiliyah, Hakimmiyyah and offensive Jihad could be linked to Qutbsm. The main inspiration from the Sahwi ulama’ is anti-Shiism and offensive Jihad but to a lesser extent Tawhid al-hakimiyyah and shari‘a as well. These notions from the three ideologies, contribute in different proportion as shown by the arrows pointing to the middle towards constructing ‘the ultra-exclusionary ideology.’ Besides, the miscalculation following the September 11 attacks’ invasions of Iraq, (and to some extent Afghanistan) did more to entrench the IS’s ideological configuration rather than break it, as they use the invasion and its consequences as their references for justifying their hatred towards the invading powers and all those who support them. The Arab spring and the subsequent developments regarding ‘sectarianising’ the conflict, especially in Syria, greatly helped the IS to spread and entrench its ideology, especially WB, ‘takfirism’ and ‘anti-Shiism’.

The implications of such an ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology cannot be overemphasised. It leads to what Hassan Hassan rightly regarded as ‘*takfirism within takfirism*’.²³⁶ Takfirism ordinarily is the excommunication of a fellow Muslim based on differences in interpretation of a religious creed, doctrine or practice (mostly using the notion of Bid'a and WB). That is labelling fellow Muslims, both Sunnis (Sufis) and Shias, as infidels as mentioned earlier. In the context of the IS, its takfirism is so extreme that it is

²³⁶Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State.”

described as takfirism within takfirism to show how deeper it runs. This means a license to kill fellow Sunnis (even militant jihadists) in as far as they disagree with the IS's views. By extension this translates into extreme hate and maltreatment of other minorities like the Yazidis, Christians and others as the new normal. Even though the IS has been defeated militarily and territorially, such a complex and sophisticated ideology would not just disappear. However, it appears, unlike the military tactics applied in crushing IS militarily, there are no concrete tactics concerning how to counter its ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.

CHAPTER 4

IS'S ULTRA-EXCLUSIONARY TERRITORIALITY

4.1 Introduction

Despite losing the swath of land under its control, one of the fascinating aspects of the IS remains its capturing of territories and attempting to govern. The IS demonstrated its seriousness regarding holding on to its boundaries, administering, and even expanding as much as it could for almost five years. Both the declaration of the Caliphate and its intent to continually expand its territory were prominently captured in its discourses. The first issue of the *Dabiq* was titled “The return of the Khilafah”²³⁷ while the fifth issue was labelled “Remaining and expanding by Allah’s will.”²³⁸ One of its famous slogans is *baqiya wa tatamaddad* (lasting and expanding).²³⁹ This assertion is deeply rooted in its ‘ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology.’ It is the ideology of the IS that serves as the foundation for its territoriality. The doctrine the IS

²³⁷Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” front page.

²³⁸Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 5, “Remaining and Expanding,” October 2014, front page By Allah’s will is written in Arabic.

²³⁹See Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq”; Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS as Revolutionary State,” November 17, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-revolutionary-state>.

believes, and practices are so brutal that it dictates creating its own territorial space to practice such. Hence, at its peak, it engaged in de-territorialising parts of Iraq and Syria to make way for its self-proclaimed caliphate. What are the foundations of a territoriality that is exclusively (supposedly) Islamic? How is different or similar to the conventional territoriality?

Utilising the '*Discursive Practices Approach*' alongside its categorising mechanisms of 'presupposition,' 'predication', and 'subject positioning' the chapter explores the territoriality of the IS as an integral part of its 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology' discussed in the previous chapter. Despite its sophisticated nature, the ideological roots of IS's exclusionary territoriality could be best understood when situated within the context of its 'ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology'. That is, its territoriality draws from the Islamic concepts explored in the previous chapter as understood and explains by its hybrid exclusionary ideological roots (i.e. Qutbism and Wahhabism, the *sahwah al-Islamiyah* scholarship). This chapter would, first of all, explore and juxtapose conventional territoriality with the foundations of the ultra-exclusionary nature of the group's territoriality through the concepts *Dar-al-Islam* and the *Dar-al-Jahiliyah* before proceeding to explore the territorial road map to the *Khilafah* of the IS, its territorial methodology and administrative organisation. While exploring these, aspects of the exclusionary hybrid ideology that have been adopted as a base but in some cases modified or extended in a bid to realise its territoriality would be highlighted. Most of the concepts used to constitute IS's

exclusionary ideology in the previous chapter are visible in harnessing the territorial notion of the group as well, highlighting their complementing nature.

4.2 Dar-al Islam and the Dar-al Jahiliyah (or Dar-al Kufr) Dichotomy

Etymologically, territoriality is rooted from a Latin noun *terra* (in reference to land or earth) and its verb form *terrere* (meaning to ward-off or frighten off).²⁴⁰ It has been given diverse but interrelated definitions. For instance, John R. Gold defines territoriality as “the processes and mechanisms by which people establish, maintain and defend territories.”²⁴¹ Another definition given by Robert D.Sack is “the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area.”²⁴² Even though the definition may seem different but the underlying issue they both agree on is the attempt to exert control over a territory by a group of people.

In the context of International Relations, the major theoretical frameworks (neo-realism and neo-liberalism especially) are regarded as ‘state-centric’ in their analyses by virtue of the fact that they give primacy to nation-

²⁴⁰Ahu Şenses, “Nationalism and Territoriality: The Conception of Homeland in the Communities of Turkish Origin in Bulgaria and the Netherlands. [Electronic Resource]” (METU, 2014), 22, (METU Theses JV6091 .S593 2014).

²⁴¹J.R. Gold, “Territoriality and Human Spatial Behaviour,” *Progress in Human Geography* 6, no. 1 (01 1982): 44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030913258200600102>.

²⁴²Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality : Its Theory and History*, Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography: 7 (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 55.

state to be the centre of their analysis.²⁴³ States or nation-states within the context of these theoretical frameworks cannot be regarded as conventional ‘nation-states’ without specific territory over which they exert their sovereignty. Territoriality has therefore been very crucial in the formation of the modern nation-state since Westphalia.²⁴⁴

An important component of a modern nation-state is the occupants or the content of the territory or the membership to the territory through ‘nationalism’ and citizenship. Whilst these ideas may be regarded as exclusinory in the sense that one has to be a member of a particular nation or a citizen to be regarded as member of a particular territory. Whilst this is true, there is this tacit understanding of the possibility of other nations living side by side other nations. For example the German nation with their territory, living along side, the Turkish nation, English nation and so on. To a greater extent, this is the conventional territoriality, as we know it. While this may seem to be in close semblance with that of the IS, I argue that, that of the IS is ‘ultra-exclusionary’ in the sense that it is not seeking to create a territory to live along side other nations and their territories but to destroy and conquer the status quo by dividing the world into two abodes namely Dar-al Kufr and Dar-

²⁴³John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics. [Electronic Resource] : Re-Visioning World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Routledge), 54–55, accessed August 8, 2019,
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat06966a&AN=metu.b2546425&site=eds-live&authtype=ip,uid>.

²⁴⁴Derek Croxton and Anuschka Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia : A Historical Dictionary* (Greenwood Press, 2002).

al Islam.

The notion of dividing the world into two camps has symbolised IS's territoriality as 'ultra-exclusionary' analogous to its augmenting ultra-exclusionary ideology. The exclusionary nature of this lies in the group ascribing to the idea that the world needs to be divided into *Dar-al Kufr* or *Dar-al Jahiliyah* (abode of disbelief or ignorance) and *Dar-al Islam* (abode of faith or Islam). In the first edition of the Dabiq, a short, colourful article titled "the world has divided into two"²⁴⁵ stated, referring to al-Baghdadi, that:

Amirul-Mu'minin said: "O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews."²⁴⁶ It continued, "Amirul-Mu'minin said: "O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah's grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership."²⁴⁷

That was in al-Baghdadi's khutbah (sermon) at the Annuri mosque after the declaration of the Khilafah. From the discourse above, "presumption," "predication" and "subject positioning" pointing to the exclusionary nature of the IS could be deduced. The IS 'presupposes' that the

²⁴⁵Dabiq Issue 1, "Dabiq," 9.

²⁴⁶Dabiq Issue 1, 10.

²⁴⁷Dabiq Issue 1, 10.

world must be divided into two camps, due to the ‘neo-Jahiliyyah’ that has engulfed the entire world, for the ‘Muslim Ummah’ to be able to practice the Islamic faith without any dilution. It presumes that there is the need for territorial space to be known as the ‘*Dar-al -Islam*’ or the *Khilafah* that would automatically return the Muslim ummah their ‘dignity’ ‘might’ ‘rights’ and ‘leadership’ as opposed to the abode of kufr and Jahiliyyah. These ‘presuppositions’ have been used to construct a reality through discourse. The discourse also engaged in ‘predication’ and labelling by positioning itself as the vanguard of the Muslim *ummah* who has returned the ‘khilafah’ which represent the camp of Islam and faith whilst the camp of disbelief is represented by the ‘jews’, ‘crusaders’ and ‘all religion of kufr’ with United States and Russia in the lead. Through its staunch belief in the clear demarcation of the world into two camps, the IS has constructed reality through discourse and presupposition based on which the world must be divided into two camps. That is in turn used as a reason upon which attacking and killing anyone on the ‘camp of disbelief’ could be justified. Some important unanswered questions that arise from this worldview are: Do Muslims require an ‘Islamic State’ or *Dar-al -Islam* to be able to practice their faith properly? How do we classify those Western Countries (non- Muslim countries) that allow freedom of religious practices regardless of one’s belief? Where did the dignity, rights, might and leadership of the Muslim ummah go? Who took them and how would a declaration of the *khilafah* return all these?

IS's notions of dichotomisation of the world into two camps have roots in its ultra-exclusionary ideological roots. It explicitly has links with Qutbsm but implicitly linked to Wahhabism and the *Sahwīs* as well. The notions could be linked to Qutbsm, not only because of their usage of the notion of Jahiliyah as the basis for such partitioning but also Sayyid Qutb's articulation of a similar notion and the exclusionary nature of such a discourse and vision. In the *Milestones*, he states:

There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-al -Islam), and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari'ah is the authority and Allah's limits are observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-al -Harb).²⁴⁸

It continued:

a Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the Shari'ah of Allah is established, and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with Allah Almighty; a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar-al - Islam; a Muslim has no relatives except those who share the belief in Allah, and thus a bond is established between him and other Believers through their relationship with Allah Almighty.²⁴⁹

The similarity between what Qutb conceptualised as the abode of Islam (Dar-al -Islam) and the abode of war (Dar-al -Harb)²⁵⁰ and that of the IS is lucid in these excerpts. Sayyid Qutb envisions the establishment of an Islamic

²⁴⁸Qutb, *Milestones*, 131.

²⁴⁹Qutb, 32–33.

²⁵⁰Qutb used Dar-al Harb here to signify that any abode of disbelief or ignorance is a target of attack or war.

State as the ultimate goal where the only recognised law is the shari'ah as a way to get rid of Jahili systems.²⁵¹ He also emphasised the fact that what makes a person qualified as a member of such abode is his or her belief in Allah and that such people have no ties with anyone except through their shared belief or faith. The IS is re-echoing the same idea only with an eye on the contemporary happenings. He also engaged in similar presuppositions, predication and subject positioning just like those of the IS indicated above. Therefore, the idea regarding dividing the world into Dar-al -Harb and Dar-al -Islam in Sayyid Qutb's political and ideological thought lays a foundation for a conceptualisation of territoriality that is supposedly Islamic and extraordinarily 'exclusionary'. To articulate this conception, he relied on several interconnected notions towards achieving such an end. The foundational notions include Tawhid, Jahiliyyah, Hakimiyyah and Shari'ah as discussed in the previous chapter.

Unlike Qutb, it must be stated that Ibn Abdul Wahhab has no clear or direct conceptualisation of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-kufr in his original works. However, his link to the concept is in the fact that most of his works and actions allude to the need for the demarcation of the world into two camps or at least the creation of an Islamic state where the divine laws of Allah would be observed. That is Ibn Wahhab envisage an Islamic state which would be led by a pious and God-fearing leader who would act in the name of the religion

²⁵¹Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty*, 1.

of Allah through the interpretation of the texts by the ulema (Islamic scholars). Wahhabism's link to the idea of the division of the world into two camps could be traced in Ibn Taymiyyah's works. Ibn Abdul Wahhab had studied most of the works of Ibn Taymiyyah as part of his training. That is usually conflated with a blind following of Ibn Taymiyyah. Studying the works of Ibn Taymiyyah by the ibn Abdul Wahhab is understandable given the fact that he (Ibn Taymiyyah) was the leading authority in the Hanbali school of thought.²⁵² Therefore, he studied ibn Taymiyyah's works but rarely refers to ibn Taymiyyah in his works. Even though they share convergent view but they also have their differences especially on the topic of jihad and politics. Interestingly, because Sheikh Wahhab has not been very articulate on political issues, most Wahhabis refer to ibn Taymiyyah for guidance.

A case in point is his notion of the division of the world into *dar- al-kufr* and *dar-al-Islam*. Some of these lacking in the writings of ibn Wahhab led to the fusion of the ideas of ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyyah by most Wahhabis. A key and instrumental work of reference by Wahhabis is the '*Majmū‘ fatāwā shaykh al-islām Ahmad ibn Taymiyya*', twenty-volume compendium of Fataawa on a potpourri of issues.²⁵³ An essential volume in context is volume eighteenth which concentrates on issues relating to Jihad

²⁵²DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 108.

²⁵³Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū‘ fatāwā shaykh al-islām Ahmad ibn Taymiyya*, 37 vols, ed. by ‘Abd Al-RahMān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim Al-Najdi _Al-HAnbali_[Rabat, 1981], vol. 18, 244-284

and Hijra.²⁵⁴ Augmenting *sheikh ul* Islam's classical work in terms of territoriality was the 1744 pact between ibn Saud and ibn Wahhab, which was very instrumental in realising this vision and the founding of the first Saudi State.²⁵⁵ The pact made sure that Mohammed ibn Sa'ud wields legitimate power while the sheikh has the freedom and power to preach and teach Islam. That is in addition to using his works like "Kitab al-tawhid" and *kashf shubabat* to fight Jahiliyah; the sheikh envisions the opportunity to implement shari'a in the kingdom making it an abode of Islam. Following his cue prominent Saudi clerics like the late Sheikh ibn Baz, sheikh Uthaymeen and sheikh Munajid are a vital proponent of this notion as can be seen in their fatwas urging Muslims to flee the abode of kuffar to the abode of Islam, referring to Saudi Arabia.²⁵⁶ These fataawa from Saudi clerics supporting the notion of 'islamic state' no matter how different such a vision might be from that of the IS serves as an impetus for the extremist group. It also entrenches the notion as an originally Wahhabi idea, not a borrowed one.

The sahwah connection to this dichotomy is the sahwi scholarship's political activism and the fact that they envisaged, as a mixture of Qutbsm and Wahhabism, the establishment of a separate state for Muslims that is governed

²⁵⁴Michot Yahya, *Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule. Ibn Taymiyya* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 2007); DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 256.

²⁵⁵Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, 17.

²⁵⁶Sarah Albrecht, *Dar Al-Islam Revisited: Territoriality in Contemporary Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslims in the West*, Muslim Minorities, V. 29 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2018), 126–29.

by the shari'a. That is not surprising since the instrumental figure in developing the sahwah scholarship's hybrid ideology is the brother of Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Qutb who is known as 'the sheikh of the Sahwa'.²⁵⁷ A professor of Shari'a himself, Mohammed Qutb tried to draw a parallel between his brother's Jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah dichotomy to Ibn Wahhab's jahiliyyah and Twahid.²⁵⁸ His views, which in large part represent the Sahwa view on the need for dar-al-Islam, is summarized by one of his assertions in 'the Jahiliyyah of the twentieth century':

There is no difference between the question of creed and the question of shari'a: either there is a government according to God's revelation (*al hukm be ma anzala Allah*) or *Jahiliyya* and shirk (the association of God with other entities) for the knowledge of the truth of God and just believe in him imply granting sovereignty (uluhyya) only to him as they imply directing adoration(ubudiyah) only to him....aqeda(creed) and shari'a are the two sides of a single question. They emanate from a single source and lead a single end. This source and this end our belief in God and submission (Islam) to him.²⁵⁹

He went on to propose a fourth pillar to the Wahhabism's three categorisations of tawhid termed 'tawhid al hakimiyyah'²⁶⁰ reflecting the unflinching resolve to ensure that hakimiyyah and sharia's is implemented to the fullest. If there is the need for these two notions to be observed to the

²⁵⁷Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, 52.

²⁵⁸Lacroix and Holoch, 54.

²⁵⁹Lacroix and Holoch, 53.

²⁶⁰Lacroix and Holoch, 53.

fullest, that can only be done within the confines of the Islamic state. That isn't surprising because the 'sahwis' have been trying to create a hybrid of Qutbism and Wahhabism. Historically too, the sahwi scholarship rose against the Saudi royal family for not being pious and religious enough pushing for the need for change. These led to protests and countered protest until the banner of the sahwi scholarship inspired Bin Laden to also rise against the royal establishment and their western allies especially America.²⁶¹

Interestingly, the dichotomisation concepts as they stand (dar-al -harb and Dar-al -Islam) have no direct origins from the Qur'an or the Sunnah, but rather scholars of Islamic jurisprudence deduced them through *ijtihad*.²⁶² Ijtihad is a concept that Ibn Wahhab strongly advocated for as opposed to *taqlid*.²⁶³ The original rationale behind the theoretical division of the world idea is entirely misunderstood by radical scholars and militant terrorist organisations like the IS. The legal dichotomisation of Dar-al -Harb (kufr) and Dar-al -Islam has been transformed into a revolutionary Islamic territorialization concept. The categorisation emanated from the usage of early Muslims Jurists to refer to Madina in the context of Hijra(migration to Madina) as Dar-al -Islam because it had opened its arms to receive Muslims

²⁶¹Iacroix and Holoch, 151–200.

²⁶²Giovanna Calasso and Giuliano Lancioni, *Dar Al-Islam / Dar Al-Harb: Territories, People, Identities*, Bilingual edition (Leiden ; Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2017), 384.

²⁶³DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 106.

and their religious practice and Mecca where Muslims were persecuted as the Dar-al -Harb.²⁶⁴ The word *Dar* is used in the Qur'an in two senses, eschatological and physical space senses as observed by Lodhi.²⁶⁵ In the eschatological senses, there are references like *Dar al akhira*(the last or final abode) *dar-al salaam*(abode of peace) *Dar- al bawar*(abode of perdition) while for the physical sense there are references to Madina.²⁶⁶ It was in the second half of the eighth century that the Darul-Islam/Dar-al -Harb dichotomisation became developed and widely used by Muslim as a legal concept to help in a ruling regarding Muslims' international relations and to issue some verdicts about Muslim lands.²⁶⁷ The developments in context (and the current adaptation and usage) by militant organizations are not for the original intent of dividing the world into two camps by any means possible.²⁶⁸ The content and criteria of what camp can be regarded as dar-al Islam or not are as straightforward. Going by the original intent of the demarcation where the early Muslim referred to Madina as Darul Islam due to it's welcoming and

²⁶⁴Calasso and Lancioni, *Dar Al-Islam / Dar Al-?*

²⁶⁵Anees Lodhi, "Giovanna Calasso and Giuliano Lancioni (Eds): Dār Al-Islām / Dār Al-Harb: Territories, People, Identities. (Studies in Islamic Law and Society.) x, 450 Pp. Leiden: Brill, 2017. £126. ISBN 978 9 004 33103 7.," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 81, no. 2 (June 2018): 355–56, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X18000708>.

²⁶⁶Lodhi.

²⁶⁷Calasso and Lancioni, *Dar Al-Islam / Dar Al-?*, 384.

²⁶⁸M. Badar and M. Nagata, "Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World: A Critique from an Islamic Perspective," *Arab Law Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (01 2017): 305–35, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15730255-12314024>.

accepting the Muslims who migrated, we may refer to most western countries as ‘modern Madina’ in the sense of allowing freedom of worship for Muslims. Besides, only Muslims did not inhabit Madina.

4.3 The IS’s Road Map to Khilafah (caliphate)

The road map to the *Khilafah* was conspicuously captured in IS’s discourses. In the first issue of its *Dabiq* magazine, an article entitled “from Hijra to Khilafah”²⁶⁹ laid down the ‘roadmap towards the Khilafah for the mujahidin’. This road map and its content is an extension or modification of the idea of Khilafah or the Dar-al-Islam. That is because the three ideological roots discussed in the previous chapter agree and support the establishment of an Islamic state (or abode of Islam) but have no detailed and ferocious blueprint regarding how to achieve that, but the IS constructed one using these ideologies as foundation.

There are five steps enumerated by the article, namely “Hijra, Jama’ah, Destabilize Taghut, Tamkin and Khilafah.”²⁷⁰ The article relied heavily on the experiences of Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and his methodology to develop these steps. The steps and the ideas are not very far from those of the infamous book, ‘The management of Savagery’ whose author goes by the pseudonym Abubakar Naji. However, according to Hassan Hassan, Naji’s real name is Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim who was a member of the Egyptian

²⁶⁹Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” 34.

²⁷⁰Dabiq Issue 1, 38.

jihadist Islamic Group.²⁷¹ Indeed upon reading Naji's book, Al Zarqawi was reported to have remarked, "It is as if the author knows what I'm planning."²⁷²Indeed the 'management of the savagery is rightly regarded as the manual of al Zarqawi because of his love for the ideas.²⁷³ However, before one concludes that the IS is on the same sheet as Naji, the discourse in the Dabiq was quick to distance itself from agreeing with Naji one hundred per cent. It states "Note: Although Nājī's book describes the overall strategy of the mujāhidīn very precisely, Nājī fell into some errors in his discussions on issues related to the takfir of parties who forcefully resist the Sharī'ah and its laws.²⁷⁴ That shows that the IS does not agree with Naji in terms of creed but agrees with him on his 'management of savagery' for territoriality. That is very classic of IS picking any ideologies, modifying them and utilising them to construct their version of it. That accentuates the source of the hybridity of their ideology.

Naji's central argument in 'the management of savagery' is that consistent use of violent insurgency and attacks in a target state would eventually weaken the ability of the said state to enforce law and order. When

²⁷¹Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State," 17.

²⁷²Dabiq Issue 12, "Just Terror," 40.

²⁷³Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS*, 43.

²⁷⁴"Islamic-State-Isis-Isil-Dabiq-Magazine-Issue-12-Just-Terror.Pdf," 40, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-isis-isil-dabiq-magazine-issue-12-just-terror.pdf> footnote 2.

tawwahush (chaos or savagery) ensues, the jihadist will step in to restore order from the disorder they have caused. In doing so, they would construct an Islamic state.²⁷⁵ Naji' idea here is very close to Qutbsm than any ideology especially if one considers the Qutb's notion of 'offensive jihad.' The IS used these ideas as a model both in Iraq, Syria and later Libya as would be shown under the third phase of the roadmap.

The Hijrah, which is the first phase of the road map, is strongly linked to the second stage of Jama'ah. "In short, these phases consist of immigrating to land with a weak central authority to use as a base where a Jama'ah can form, recruit members, and train them."²⁷⁶ That is, it is a stage where the mujahidin are encouraged to flee the abode of kufr or Jahiliyyah to the abode of Islam. The hijra is supposed to be embarked on to a land where the mujahidin would be free to practice their Jihad. Such a place is supposed to be a haven for operation. It cited how Abu Mus'ab chose Afghanistan and later Kurdistan as a base for his original organisation "Jama'atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad."²⁷⁷ However, now such safe havens are numerous like Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Sinai Peninsula, Waziristan, Libya, Chechnya, and Nigeria, as well as parts of Tunis, Algeria, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the discourse

²⁷⁵Ahmed S. Hashim, "From Al-Qaida Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis)" (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), December 2014).

²⁷⁶Dabiq Issue 1, "Dabiq," 38.

²⁷⁷Dabiq Issue 1, 38.

contends.²⁷⁸ The discourse was quick to give an alternative in case there is not such a place, or in case Hijrah is not possible. “If such a land does not exist or Hijrah is not possible, the place can be formed through long campaigns of *nikayah* attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells.”²⁷⁹ Nikayah attacks are attacks that focus on causing the enemy injury, damage or death.²⁸⁰

Responding to the call to Hijra, many youngsters left their home countries like the United States, United Kingdom, among others for Iraq and Syria. At the peak of the caliphate in 2014-2015, there were reports of lots of Muslims youngsters who, believing their western host countries were abodes of kufr, responded desperately to the call of the Islamic state.²⁸¹ By presupposing that the world must be divided into two camps and that the Islamic state must be established by all means possible as a result of the jahiliyyah that has engulfed the world, the IS has constructed a worldview that makes ‘territorial Hijra’ an obligation in modern times. True believers must embark upon Hijra. While this would make their view similar to that of Qutb, ibn Wahhab, and the *sahwīs* making it an obligation and a first step on the road map to the Islamic state would be an extension. Indeed the IS devoted an

²⁷⁸Dabiq Issue 1, 36.

²⁷⁹Dabiq Issue 1, 38.

²⁸⁰Dabiq Issue 1, 19.

²⁸¹“Foreign Fighters In Iraq And Syria -- Where Do They Come From?,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html>.

entire magazine discussing the trying to convince its sympathisers to join its cause and to physically migrate to the Islamic state and help finalise its edification.²⁸² The pagans of Mecca forced the prophet to embark on a physical Hijra due to the persecution of the early followers of Islam. Besides, Madina was not exclusionary because there existed non-muslims and were considered in the ‘covenant of Madina’.

The meaning and application of hijra have evolved over Islamic history. Hijra could be regarded as migrating from persecution due to the proclamation of the Islamic faith to a haven where one could practice his or her faith in a secure environment. That was historically witnessed in the first Muslim hijra to Abyssinian, modern-day Ethiopia.²⁸³ The second form of hijra was the migration from Mecca to median also from persecution but to establish an Islamic community.²⁸⁴ Scholars are divided regarding the permissibility of hijra in our contemporary era. When critically examined in both instances persecution is a constant. Why would IS opt for an interpretation of hijra that has territorial implication without being persecuted? It is precisely because the IS has the vision to establish the Islamic state by hook or crook, that is why it is too fixated on that. Sayyid Qutb’s conception

²⁸²Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 3, “A Call to Hijra,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, July 2014.

²⁸³Badar and Nagata, “Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World,” 9.

²⁸⁴Badar and Nagata, 9.

of Hijra is territorially adopted with modifications. In terms of predication or labelling, the very idea of Hijra in its territorial connotations brings to mind the place one is trying to leave for the other. One is leaving an abode of Jahiliyah for the ‘abode of Islam’. With this labelling come subject positioning where anyone who supports such an idea is regarded as an ally, and anyone who does not help is seen as an enemy. A reality has been constructed based on which beguiled youngsters would embark on hijra to the IS-held territory firmly believing, mistakenly, that they are following in the footstep of the prophet. That affects the way allies and enemies are viewed and treated.

With a firm belief in the ‘territorial hijra’ and massive response to the calls to embark on Hijra comes the formation of Jama’ah where like-minded mujahidin are supposed to come together, recruit others and train. The idea of Jam ‘ah here is akin to the notion of an ‘ummah’ albeit in a nucleus sense which is expected to grow into a fully-fledged ummah. In the sense of three ideological roots they see the ummah not as specific movement, group or community but the totality of Muslims regardless of race, nationality, and language but united by the ‘islamic creed’. That is the Ummah refers to the camp that observes the limits set by Allah and they recognise and place the sovereignty of Allah in its rightful place. The extension by the IS here is, the group presupposes itself to be the legitimate nucleolus representation of the Muslim ummah whom other collectivities of the ummah must join in its bid to establish and maintain its self-proclaimed caliphate. In posturing this way, it

has to embark on labelling other Jamaat or groups and individuals that it considers illegitimate to represent the collectivity of the Muslim ummah. That is evidenced in the discourse:

Sadly, they are now opposed by the present leadership of famous jihad groups who have become frozen in the phase of nikayah attacks, almost considering the attainment of power to be taboo or destructive. And rather than entrusting the affairs of the Ummah to the pious mujahidin, the present heads of these groups insist upon leaving the matter out for grabs so that any munafiq can stretch out his arm and reach for the leadership of the Ummah only to destroy it... wallahul-musta'an.²⁸⁵

The discourse continued:

What makes matters worse is that the new leadership of these groups took advantage of the old leadership's shahadah to start propagating a hitherto suppressed deviant methodology, one that ultimately considered the tawaghit – like Morsi and Haniyeh – to be a new hope for the Ummah.²⁸⁶

The third stage is the 'Destabilize Taghut' phase involved causing as much mayhem as possible to the extent of chaos. The idea is "With chaos, he intended to prevent any taghut regime from ever achieving a degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands ruled for decades by tawaghit"²⁸⁷ And among the strategies encouraged for this stage by Abu Mus‘ab are Car bombs, Improvised Explosive Device

²⁸⁵Dabiq Issue 1, "Dabiq," 20.

²⁸⁶Dabiq Issue 1, 20.

²⁸⁷Dabiq Issue 1, 36.

(IEDs) and suicide bombings.²⁸⁸ Indeed Iraq before the caliphate declaration witness unthinkable insurgency especially under Zarqawi's AQI. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the power vacuum that came with it played in favour of the then AQI's plan. They used that opportunity to intensify their insurgency. At the peak of the AQI insurgency, Iraq witnessed lots of suicide bombings and attacks almost daily. Later when the vacuum was filled by predominantly *Shia* elements as the principal ruling elites, AQI used that to influence the Sunni elements in the rural areas that have been neglected by the Shia government. They used that to show their human face and to show that they are there for the Sunni. They were able to win their hearts and minds. The same opportunity presented itself through the Syrian civil war, and all that they had to do was to intensify weakening the Bashar regime to establish an Islamic state when he falls. In the same vein, the Libyan civil war that started in 2011 also provided the IS with a fertile ground to accelerate chaos and mayhem to restore that with an Islamic state or wilayaat. They partially succeeded, but it backed fired. Besides, attacks on the *Shia* minority soared. The Syrian war also provided the opportunity for the IS to practice the destabilising the regime step where they utilised an already precarious situation for their sinister end. After so much havoc and mayhem has been caused through this stage, the stage is set for the next step, which would be the stage of Tamkin.

Tamkin (consolidation) stage is the stage where an order is worked out

²⁸⁸Dabiq Issue 1, 37.

of the chaos caused.

These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially withdraw from the rural territory and regroup in major urban regions. The Jama'ah would then take advantage of the situation by increasing the chaos to a point leading to the complete collapse of the taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer to as “tawahhush” (“mayhem”). The next step would be to fill the vacuum by managing the state of affairs to the point of developing into a full-fledged state, and continuing expansion into territory still under control of the taghut.”²⁸⁹

After consolidating territories through Tamkin, the conditions are set for the Khilafah to be formed and announced.

Such were the five stages of the road map of the IS towards the Khilafah as highlighted by its discourses. The elaboration on the last two phases, ‘tamkin phase’ and the ‘khilafah’, would be discussed in details respectively. Both would highlight the territorial consolidation methods and the territorial organisation, administration or governance of the institutions under the caliphate and how they were intended to function to keep the caliphate ‘remaining and expanding’.

4.4 Islamic State’s Territorial Consolidation (*Tamkin*)

The IS’s territorial methodology in terms of attempting to consolidate those territories that need to be salvaged from the mayhem and chaos it had

²⁸⁹Dabiq Issue 1, 37.

caused could be broadly divided into pre-territorial and post territorial phases.²⁹⁰ In both phases, the following five methodological elements and sub-phases could be observed in relative strengths depending on whether they are being utilised in pre-territorial or the post territorial phase or both.

The first and foremost is the intelligence element or phase.²⁹¹ In this phase the IS utilises its usual autonomous sleeper cells to infiltrate other organisation to gather intelligence. They sometimes used local individuals who have secretly pledged allegiance to them. Indeed IS is widely known for its effective utilisation of sleeper cells.²⁹² They usually seek to garner information regarding the essential local players through which they could be best informed of their future enemies and friends. The interesting thing is that not much is known about how they go about their work. That is not surprising since the head of the unit was a former *mukhabarat* officer of Saddam's regime, Abu Ali al-Anbari. In term of structure, the *Amniyat* (security units) are vital parts of the IS's intelligence structure.²⁹³ The gathered intelligence helps them to target susceptible local tribe leaders especially in the Sunni enclave of Iraq to co-opt them or entice them to pay allegiance together with their tribesmen.

²⁹⁰Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Research Notes*, no. 29/30 (January 2016): 1.

²⁹¹Zelin, 1.

²⁹²Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS*, 210.

²⁹³Weiss and Hassan, 211.

That would enable them to have entry to a particular village to make way for the territorial control of the place.

They sometimes involve in creating or putting forth a front group that has pledged allegiance to it to do the footwork for it. A case in point is the utilisation of the Liwa Shuhad al Yarmouk (The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade).²⁹⁴ Another case exemplifying the intelligence phase is the case of wilayat Tarabulus (the Tarabulus Province) in Libya.²⁹⁵ Through intelligence, the IS was able to identify and garner the support of vital players in the city of Sirte. In a critical gain, it had defectors from the Sirte branch of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya's (ASL).²⁹⁶ That enabled it further to reach out to Gadhafi's former elements for allegiance. With both the ASL and Ghadafi's old elements, it enabled IS to have vital information for recruits and to ground their foot in that territory. Besides most of these elements pay repentance fee which serves as a source of income for the IS.²⁹⁷ Sirte was significant to the IS as it was regarded as the birthplace of Ghadafi and very crucial in its attempt to gain

²⁹⁴"Liwa Shuhada' Al-Yarmouk: History and Analysis," *Syria Comment* (blog), September 18, 2015, <https://www.joshualandis.com/blog/liwa-shuhada-al-yarmouk-history-and-analysis/>.

²⁹⁵Zelin, "The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology."

²⁹⁶"The Islamic State's Burgeoning Capital in Sirte, Libya," accessed February 2, 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-burgeoning-capital-in-sirte-libya>.

²⁹⁷Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Repentance: Financial Income for the Islamic State," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed February 2, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/09/repentance-financial-income-for-the-islamic-state>.

control of Libyan territories. Many references were made to the Sirte incidences and advancements in its magazines.²⁹⁸

The pre-territorial intelligence is entirely a construct, and an extension of the IS fuelled by the general yearn for Dar al Islam and the need to strategise towards achieving such. One of the internal strategies perhaps is using the ‘tawahush’ and ‘nikayah’ as an offensive Jihad strategy. It also utilises the notion of the ‘ummah’ to ally with necessary parties towards gathering the needed intelligence and achieving what needed to achieve in an area of interest. That is using the notion of offensive Jihad and the ummah by the IS has succeeded in constructing an intelligence phase’ as a first step towards the consolidation of the territories it targets to control. That is presupposing that the gathering of information is vital to its success and believing that offensive Jihad and alliances through the notion of Ummah or jama’ah could be utilised for that end the IS constructed a phase to suit its needs. One of the aims of such a unit was to garner information that would enable it to engage in labeling or predication. That is with the intelligence gathered the IS could know its future allies or enemies to enable it to tag such an individual or group as a partner or enemy. With such labelling, the stage is set for subject positioning where such individuals or groups will be positioned as ‘the illegitimate’ or ‘impious other’ who could be executed.

²⁹⁸Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” 61; D.G. Kibble, “Dabiq, the Islamic State’s Magazine: A Critical Analysis,” *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 3 (01 2016): 18; Kibble, 62.

In the post-territorial phase, the intelligence unit continues, and its work extends to include gathering intelligence in the areas along and across the borders of the controlled territories of the IS.²⁹⁹ Within the IS-controlled territory, the intelligence unit is engaged in seeking out enemies and defectors from within. Because the IS had lots of defections from other militant groups it kept a very close eye on the issue of defection. In wilayat Idlib for instance, in the post complete territorial phase, the IS sought out its enemies and defectors and started executing them.³⁰⁰ Even though this backlashed leading to IS to be forced out of Idlib, but it shows the extension of the intelligence role after a complete control. The intelligence unit becomes an integral part of the post territorial security apparatus known as the hisbah (moral police). The purpose of the hisbah and its link to the notion of shari'ah and its enforcement would be elaborated on in the ensuing passages later.

Based on the intelligence gathered they could start missionary work (da'awa) to show the human face of IS to the locals. They hold preaching forums where the preachers of the IS get to put across their interpretation of Islam. They also try to convince locals about the need for armed jihad. They show their propaganda videos. They also pass out booklet and pamphlets on the streets. In some interesting cases, they deliberately do activities that would attract the youth. They organise Qur'anic competition, 'Tag of war' and other

²⁹⁹Weiss and Hassan, *Isis : Inside the Army of Terror*, 210.

³⁰⁰Zelin, "The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology," 12.

'fun' events to get the attention of the youth. In the post territorial phase, this continues as Friday sermons and preaching by IS preachers and Imams who have passed an examination organised for imams and preachers by the IS.³⁰¹

The next phase after garnering some support from the locals would be the military phase. Sometimes depending on the terrain and the locals involved, they do run the intelligence phase and the military phase hand in hand. Those were in rare situations where they could afford to skip the da'wah phase as a result of being received with open arms by the locals. The military step entails the establishment of militant training camps for attacks. Militants are taught how to hit and run, drive-by shooting, IEDs, car bombings, suicide bombing and so on. Most of the activities of the military phased are best demonstrated by one of its propaganda videos.³⁰² The military phase continues even after the pre-territorial step to the post territorial phase as attacks continue on both 'the near and distant enemy'.

Moral Policing (Hisbah) is one of the visible phases of IS's territorial control. Strategically, they start the hisbah activity during a partial territorial control or in a post-territorial control. It uses the moral police and their services to ensure that people abide by the shari'a as understood and implemented by the IS in its controlled territories. Their activities include

³⁰¹"Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed March 16, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/>.

³⁰²"ISIS Jihadists Put out Hollywood-Style Propaganda Film," The France 24 Observers, accessed February 2, 2019, <https://observers.france24.com/en/20140613-hollywood-film-jihadist-propaganda-isis>.

identifying and bringing to book fornicators, drunkard, thieves, dealers in contrabands like cigarettes. They also oversee the implantation of the hudud aspects of the shari'a including stoning and flogging. They also sometimes engage in the distribution of medicine and also checking the expiry dates of food items. IS's extension concerning the Hisba's role as policing abiding by the shar'ah is that while their ideological roots would favour a comprehensive implementation of the shari'ah, the IS presupposes the display of the penal codes of the sharia'h to be its focus. That can be seen in its brutal display of graphic images of executions, stoning, flogging among others. It engages in labelling as well when it captures traitors in its camp.³⁰³

The final phase is governance both in its pre-territorial form and post-territorial form. Pre-Territorial governance is fundamental and gets more sophisticated after complete territorialisation. In the pre-territorial governance what is most visible is taxation, reconciliation and arbitration among disputing parties. That is important because in the rural areas of Iraq and Syria there are numerous tribes and usually there are unsettled disputes. The regime's arbitration of these disputes are generally very slow and time-consuming, and some disputes remain unresolved for a very long time. Prioritising and fast-tracking arbitration and dispute resolution provides a faster alternative for

³⁰³Dabiq Issue 1, "Dabiq," 41; Dabiq Issue 2, "The Flood:It's Either with the Islamic State or the Flood," 13; Dabiq Issue 3, "A Call to Hijra," 17; Dabiq Issue 5, "Remaining and Expanding."

those who are in desperate need of it.³⁰⁴ However, after territorialisation, the governance transcends these basics. It tries to make visible its presence and authority by rebranding the city or territory into its image. It erects its signature black flag and paints it on walls around the city. It also establishes the diwanat (departments or ministries) in charge of different functions. It also formalises its pre-territorial arbitration role by setting the shari'ah courts. The hisbah becomes well institutionalised. The office of the khalif becomes the highest of all hierarchically. Interestingly, the intelligence wing also becomes part of the Aminiyat (security services) but mostly operates independently of the other security apparatuses perhaps because of the secretive nature of their work. These post territorial governance would be discussed in details under the organisational structure of the Caliphate.

4.5 The Territorial Organization (Administration and Governance Structure) of the Caliphate

An integral part of IS's territoriality both in partial territorial stage and especially so after complete territoriality is the utilisation the *diwan*(sin.)*diwanat*(pl.) (institutions, offices, department or ministries). According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the term has evolved and metamorphosed in the course of Islamic history. It was first used under the

³⁰⁴Rukmini Callimachi, "The ISIS Files: When Terrorists Run City Hall," *The New York Times*, April 4, 2018, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html>, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html>.

Caliph Umar (634–644), to refer to pension list or warriors who are entitled to spoils of war.³⁰⁵ The Abbasids, the sessanians and later the ottomans adopted it to refer to various governance institutions. Following historical cue, the IS names its institutions diwanat and use these institutions to stamp its authority and or to extend it territoriality by providing the needed service through these institutions. There are different diwanat, as expected, intended for the delivery of several functions within its controlled territory. The topmost of all that symbolises the caliphate is the Diwan al-Khilafa (office of the caliph), and the Majlis al-Shura(advisory council),³⁰⁶ These are followed by others like the Diwan-al zakah(Zakah Ministry),³⁰⁷ Dīwān Bayt al-Māl(ministry of finance),³⁰⁸ Diwan siha or Health Dīwān (Health department),³⁰⁹ Diwan al-Dawah wal-Masajid wal-Awqaf (Administration of *Dawa* Activity, Mosques, and Religious Endowments),³¹⁰ Diwan al Hisbah(moral police department).³¹¹ Diwan of

³⁰⁵“Divan | Islamic Government Unit,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 12, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/divan-Islamic-government-unit>.

³⁰⁶Guardian Staff, “The Isis Papers: A Masterplan for Consolidating Power,” *The Guardian*, December 7, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamic-state-document-masterplan-for-power>.

³⁰⁷Dabiq Issue 2, “The Flood: It’s Either with the Islamic State or the Flood,” 36.

³⁰⁸Dabiq Issue 5, “Remaining and Expanding,” 18.

³⁰⁹Dabiq Issue 9, “They Plot and Allah Plots,” 25.

³¹⁰Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology,” 8.

Judgment and Grievances,³¹²Diwan al-Ta'aleem (department of education).³¹³

There are many ways the IS uses these institution to show that it is in charge of a particular territory. The most visible way is the issue of notices to regulate diverse social, economic and religious lives in the areas under their control. For example, in the wilayat al their in the Deir Zor province upon gaining control of the territory the IS through the ‘diwan al Siha’ announced in an attempt to regulate provision for medical services relating to childbirth and the service charges for such. It fixed the prices for normal birth and caesarean section and 12 hours stay in the hospital. It indicated toward the end of the circular that failure to abide by the regulation would attract attendant consequences.³¹⁴ Again in the field of education through the Diwan Ta'aleem (education ministry) it issued notices to the Mosul university closing some department and pronouncing some subjects as incompatible with the shari'ah and demanding that professors follow some strict regulations. The College of human rights, political sciences and fine arts, archaeology, physical education, and philosophy department, and the Department of management of tourism

³¹¹Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Aspects of Islamic State (IS) Administration in Ninawa Province: Part III,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed February 7, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/15961/aspects-of-islamic-state-is-administration-in>.

³¹²Rumiyah Issue 1, “RUMIYAH,” 11.

³¹³Staff, “The Isis Papers.”

³¹⁴Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed February 4, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>.

and hotel institutions were all closed down. Subjects like Democracy, culture, freedoms, rights, Fiction and theatre in the English and French language and translation departments were all banned.³¹⁵The Diwan al Hisbah in *wilayat Ninawa* (Mosul Centre) issues a notice regarding the shutting down of shops on Friday for Friday prayers and opening them twenty minutes after prayers. The Hisba goes round shutting shops and enforcing compliance.³¹⁶In another instance, the Diwan al awqaf wal masajid (department for mosques and endowment) also issue notices forbidding marriages outside of the shari'a courts and also opening of sharia'ah institutes for men and women respectively.³¹⁷

While all the diwanat are essential in term of IS's territorial administration and in attempting to express IS's authorities in its controlled territories, four institutions (or concepts) stand out of the lots in terms of holding the IS's territorial conception together. Aspects of the exclusionary ideology are conspicuously discernible through these institutions or notions. These are the office of the Caliph, the Hisbah, the Shari'ah court and the notion of wilayat (provinces). These institutions are making the piecing of the caliphate possible as shown in chart 4.1. As shown in the chart, the caliphate is

³¹⁵Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Aspects of Islamic State (IS) Administration in Ninawa Province: Part I," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, accessed February 7, 2019, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/15946/aspects-of-islamic-state-is-administration-in>.

³¹⁶Al-Tamimi, "Aspects of Islamic State (IS) Administration in Ninawa Province."

³¹⁷Al-Tamimi.

at the very centre of these four diwanat with each supporting it. The office of the caliph has an extraordinary relationship with the notion of wilayaat and the wilayaat themselves in that these are the reason for being for the caliphate. It is the allegiance paid by the residence (or in some cases leaders) of various provinces to the IS that makes it territoriality possible. Besides, Wilaya also makes the boundless territoriality notion of the IS's territoriality feasible, since a Wilaya could be as far as possible from the epicentre of the caliphate. Likewise, the Hisba also has a reciprocal relationship with the shari'a court as that is their institution of reference for their job and for the penalties that result from violating any shar' ruling. The hisba, on the other hand, supervises and makes sure that the shari'a regulations are observed. It is the hisba that is in charge of executing the penal aspect of the IS's brutality. It is therefore not surprising that it is the most feared institution in the caliphate. They both support each other while at the same time supporting the ultimate goal, the caliphate. The inspiration for all these and the happenings within the caliphate is supported by the three ideological roots of the IS's creed, Wahhabism, Qutbsm and the sahwī ulema. The following section would discuss the office of the caliph, the wilayat, the hisbah and the shari'a courts in some details.




Figure 4.1: The caliph, the shari'ah courts, the hisbah and the wilayat

4.6 The institution of the *Khalifah* or Caliph³¹⁸

The office of the caliph is one of the critical institutions holding the very idea of the caliphate or the Islamic state. In the wake of the IS phenomenon, an important and legitimate question would be: since when did the ‘Islamic State’ become part of the Muslim discourse?³¹⁹ This is relevant because in the Islamic literature and in fact in practice, the conception of ‘a

³¹⁸This section’s historiography is based on the notes taking by the author from Al Jazeera, “The Caliph,” accessed January 6, 2019, <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/the-caliph-islamic-history/index.html>; see also Mona Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History* (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 5–6.

³¹⁹Mohammed Ayoob, “The Myth of the Islamic State,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 3, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-03/myth-islamic-state>.

territorial state in an Islamic sense' and as espoused by many militants or Islamists today has not been clear or at least been dormant until the nineteenth century when there was the need to respond to colonial rule in Muslim dominated countries. Interestingly though, the concepts or the institution of the *Khalifa* and the practice of *shari'ah* (in one form or the other) has always been part of political discourse and practice of Muslim societies' but not 'territorial state.'³²⁰ Territoriality was practised concerning the ability to acquire, through conquest (or allegiances with surrendering tribes or communities) and defending such territories as witnessed in various Islamic campaigns and expansions especially so in the aftermath of the Prophet's demise.

The Arabic word *Khalifa* is approximately translated to mean successor, a deputy or vicegerent. In the context of Islam, it is used to imply, the successor, deputy or vicegerent of God and his prophet on earth. The office or the Institution of the Caliph (*Khalifa*) started after the demise of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD and the contestation that followed regarding who succeeds him.³²¹ There were two main camps. Those who favoured succession by blood relations to the prophet and those who believed it should be based on consultation and mutual consent among the companions (*sahaba*) of the prophet. The first group favoured Ali as the cousin and son in law of

³²⁰Ayoob.

³²¹Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 5.

the prophet because of his marriage to Fatima, the daughter of the prophet. The latter (known today as the *Sunnis*) favoured Abubakar as the first male to accept Islam and that the prophet made him led prayer ones. At the end of the struggle, Abubakar became the first Caliph. After him Umar ascended, followed by Uthman and then, finally, Ali, after 20 years.³²² That did not go down well with the *al'ladhīna yushāyi'ūna* Ali (the faction or supporters of Ali) known today as the *Shias*.

Muawiya, who was the then governor of Damascus and a cousin of the assassinated Caliph Uthman did not pay allegiance to Ali contesting his leadership. They met at the battle of *siffin*³²³, which ended indecisively and both agreed to negotiate. Some factions in the camp of Ali were against the negotiation with Muawiya and defected. They saw him be weak and impious, contrary to what they had earlier believed. This group of defectors would later be known as the *kawarij* or *Kharjites* (the defectors). After the demise of Ali, Muawiya proclaimed himself the automatic successor and then founded the Umayyad dynasty. The Umayyad dynasty also had its contestations and challenges, but most importantly, Muawiya named his son, Yazid, as his

³²² These four would be known as the *Khulafa al-Rashidun* (the rightly guided Caliphs).

³²³ Siffin is the name of the place the Battle took place. According to the Global Britannica, it's currently along the Iraqi-Syrian borders see retrieved July 18, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Siffin>.

successor.³²⁴ After the demise of Muawiya and the eventual ascension to the throne of Yazid; Hussayn (the son of Ali) refused to pay allegiance to him. That led to a bloody battle between the factions of Yazid and Hussayn in the city of Karbala of modern day Iraq. The camp of Yazid assassinated Hussayn. This incidence became a symbol for reference by the *Shias* that indeed the succession by blood has been vindicated since a successor as a caliph by blood has been assassinated. After that incident, it was as if the fissure between the *Sunnis* and *Shias* would never see closure. Karbala has since become a holy city for the *Shias*, and there is annual symbolic ritual commemorating and mourning the demise of Hussayn.³²⁵ The ascension and diverse claims to the throne of the caliph continued through the Abbasids Empire down to the Ottoman Empire that ended in 1924 with the declaration of modern Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey).³²⁶

Regarding the Territorial state in Muslim discourses, some discourses tend to classify the prophet's leadership in the city of Madinah as the first ideal 'Islamic State.' But this conception is largely western influenced and is mostly

³²⁴In fact under Muawiya (and the Ummayad) in general, the office of the Caliph took a very imperial shape devoid of its staunchly religious flavour during the *Rashidun*. Therefore, it is not surprising, as an emperor would have done, he appointed Yazid, his son as his successor.

³²⁵See Yasmin Kaye, Ashura 2015: What is the Shia festival in Karbala and why do worshippers flagellate themselves, *International Business Times*, (Friday, October 23, 2015) retrieved July 24, 2016, from <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ashura-2015-what-shia-festival-karbala-why-do-worshippers-flagellate-themselves-1525268>

³²⁶Nick Danforth, The Myth of the Caliphate: The Political History of an Idea, *Foreign Affairs* (Wednesday, November 19, 2014) retrieved July 10, 2016, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate>

deduced using western concepts of the social contract and the constitution.³²⁷

Madina was called *Yathrib* before the migration of the prophet Mohammed to the city. It acquired several names as Muslims settled in and thrived under the leadership of the prophet. It was referred to as *al-Madinah* (the city), *al-Madinah al-Munawwarah*, (the radiant city) and sometimes *al-Madinah an-Nabawi* (the city of the prophet). Madina in traditional Islamic literature has never been referred to as ‘a state’ but ‘a city.’ For a time, it could be regarded as the capital city of the Muslim *ummah* (the collectivity of Muslims) due to conquests and expansions under the leadership of the prophet and later, *khulafa al Rashidun*³²⁸ (the four rightly guided caliphs) who mostly ruled from Madinah and much later from Kufa, starting under the Caliph Ali.

Madinah under the prophet functioned as an exemplary Muslim dominated community but to refer to it, as ‘an ideal Islamic state’ is problematic both in terms of fixed territorial and institutional conceptions of the modern state system. It is problematic in terms of fixed territory because there was consistent hope for other surrounding communities or tribes accepting Islam and becoming part of the Islamic larger Islamic community. Most importantly, there existed consistent hope and yearning for a return to Mecca for its ‘re-conquest’ and ‘Islamization.’ Institutionally, there is little evidence to suggest

³²⁷See Muqtedar M. A. Khan, The Compact of Medina: A Constitutional Theory of The Islamic State, *IJTIHAD*(Wednesday, May 30, 2001) retrieved on May 20, 2016, from <http://www.ijithad.org/compact.htm>

³²⁸Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate*, 5.

there existed robust state institutions for governance, standing army and police, tax administration,³²⁹ judiciary and institution for policy implementation during this early Islamic period in Madinah. However, there exist some documentary evidence regarding these institutions during the Umayyad and the Abbasid reigns respectively regarding the existence of these institutions in one form or another.³³⁰ Interestingly, those institutions could hardly be characterised as wholly 'Islamic' because they already existed and these Islamic empires built upon them after Islam extended into those empires, especially the Byzantine and the Sassanian empires.³³¹ It is therefore misleading, to assume a replicable model Islamic State existed in the case of Madinah. It was nonetheless an exemplary Muslim community. Clearly what held the conception of the caliphate historically and symbolically was the office of the caliph.

The IS has made their caliph's office the highest in its organisational structure because of the presupposition that it's legitimately bringing back the Khilafah, and its leader is the legitimate khalifah. Sympathisers and followers of the IS have likewise presupposed IS to be the legitimate caliphate and hence

³²⁹Tax should not be mistakenly confused with Zakat, which is one of the pillars of Islam.

³³⁰For more on this see: Fred M. Donner, The Formation of the Islamic State, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1986), pp.283-296.

³³¹Nazih N. Ayubi, Hashimi Nader, and Qureshi Emran, "Islamic State - Oxford Islamic Studies Online," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*, accessed April 6, 2019, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0394>.

the need to pay allegiance to the caliph. The office of the caliph, therefore, becomes a critical pillar and symbol of the self-proclaimed caliphate. At the peak of the IS's self-styled caliphate, the Kaliph in the person of 'Amīrul-Mu'minīn Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Awwād al-Qurashī' ³³² (popularly known as, al-Baghdadi) was concurrently a political and religious leader and a binder of the IS's Territorial conception in their self proclaimed caliphate. The first and the last part of his name are crucial. 'Amīrul-Mu'minīn (the commander of the faithful) and Qurashī (surname indicating that one is from the Quraishi family, the family of the prophet). That is carefully constructed to legitimise the caliph and the caliphate. The title of the commander of the faithful was the title that the first caliph was addressed with to signify the highest level of his faithfulness and loyalty. That is an important requirement for a legitimate khalif (Sunni theology) or the Imam (Shiite theology). The second is that the Khalifa must have blood lineage with the prophet. These two important requirements have been carefully crafted to presuppose the exceeding piety of the khalipha and his lineage with the prophet. That is the office of the caliph is the reason for the Islamic state. The Islamic state fails to be an Islamic state without the caliph. The Caliph is the commander in chief and the 'political imam' concurrently. Any decision he makes in so far as it tallies with the IS's interpretation of Islam is unquestioned and therefore hold full power. In terms of territoriality, the office of the caliph becomes the visible symbol of the

³³²Dabiq Issue 5, "Remaining and Expanding," 18.

presence of the ‘islamic state’. Besides, groups and individual needed to pledge allegiance to the caliph to be regarded as parties to the Caliphate. That will be elaborated on under the wilayat.

Upon the declaration of the caliphate, the first call of al-Baghdadi was targeted towards professionals:

Amirul-Mu'minin said: We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha' (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specialisations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their emigration, is wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the dire need of the Muslims for them. People are ignorant of their religion, and they thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it. So fear Allah, O slaves of Allah.³³³

In this discourse, al Baghdadi was referred to as the commander of the faithful, presupposing that he is the leader of the entire Muslim ummah. Besides, he was not only calling on Muslim professionals and experts but passing a legal judgement at the same time by presupposing that their migration to the ‘islamic state’ is an obligation. There are contestations regarding the permissibility and legality of the concept of Hijra itself.³³⁴ It also engaged in predication or labelling others as ignorant of their religion and asking those who could help to fear Allah. Meaning that if one does not respond to the call, you do not fear Allah and not exactly a party to the Islamic state. That positions all those who do not respond to the request to be

³³³Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” 6.

³³⁴Badar and Nagata, “Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World.”

regarded as the ‘enemy other’ who can be targeted and killed.

In one of the discourses of the Dabiq, in an article entitled “Advice to the soldiers of the Islamic state” by the erstwhile Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. He strongly advised the mujahidin to listen and obey the khalifah al Baghdadi.

“Likewise, know that we do not allow any soldier to make pacts or grant security. That is only to be done by Amīrul-Mu’mīnīn and his deputies, for he is typically more aware of, and better capable of determining the interests of the State.”³³⁵ “It is obligatory to obey those of his orders that don’t entail sinfulness, regardless of whether he is otherwise just or oppressive. Beware of slandering him without right, for to do so may be a major sin that destroys the slave. And from the advice of Aktham Ibn Sayfī is his statement, “Don’t dispute excessively concerning your leaders... for there is no jamā’ah for the one whom the people differ over.”³³⁶

It continues:

“Concede to your leader’s decision, and accept his opinion and direction so that there is no disunity or division, as long as it’s an opinion or an issue of ijtihād or it has a basis in the Sharī’ah and doesn’t entail any sinfulness. As long as you seek Allah’s reward, then know that the reward lies in listening to and obeying your leaders, on condition doing so doesn’t involve opposing the Sharī’ah.”³³⁷ “Be patient with your leader even if he has wronged you, for this is a religious obligation. Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) said, “Whoever sees from his leader something he dislikes, then let him be patient with him.” “Make lots of du’ā’ for Amīrul-Mu’mīnīn in his absence, and also for your poor brother...”³³⁸

The above discourses helped in constructing legitimacy for the caliph

³³⁵“Dabiq6.Pdf,” 6, accessed December 6, 2018, <http://www.ieproject.org/projects/dabiq6.pdf>.

³³⁶Islamic State’s Dabiq Issue 6, “Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan – a Testimony From Within,” *A/Hayat Media Centre*, December 2014, 9–10.

³³⁷Dabiq Issue 6, 10.

³³⁸ Dabiq Issue 6, 10.

and how his orders should be followed without questions based on the ‘presupposition’ that he is the right Caliph and the caliphate itself is legitimate. Based on this full power constructed through discourse, and the recognition that all who have paid allegiance to him would follow him, the caliph issued several binding decrees and orders, presumably based on shari‘a. The following are but just a few of his orders, initiatives or decrees ranging from mild to brutal. In one of such issues, he tasked the finance ministry to study an issue and put together a comprehensive proposal. "The initiative was called for by Amīrul-Mu’mīnīn, Khalīfah Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Awwād al-Qurashī, who tasked Dīwān Bayt al-Māl with studying the issue and submitting a comprehensive proposal for its implementation, which was subsequently approved by the Shūrā Council."³³⁹ This is a mild and non-aggressive order. However, in other instances the order or declarations assumes life-threatening tone "It should then be no surprise that Amīrul-Mu’mīnīn Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī (hafidhahullāh) declared that any of the apostates from the sahwāt or otherwise who repent to Allah and surrender themselves to the Islamic State would be guaranteed amnesty, even if they had killed a million mujāhidīn. But those who are caught before they repent, then there is no amnesty for them, and theirs shall be a painful – and fatal – punishment."³⁴⁰ Again a discourse

³³⁹Dabiq Issue 5, “Remaining and Expanding,” 18.

³⁴⁰“Dabiq-Issue-14.Pdf,” 9, accessed December 7, 2018, <http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Dabiq-Issue-14.pdf>.

called on Muslims to wage jihad behind the enemy lines, wherever they find themselves, “This was reiterated as a direct order from Amirul-Muminin, who said, "O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing Hijrah to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory" (A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah). But if you are unable to do so, then know that you have been blessed with the opportunity to serve a much greater purpose than dwelling among Muslims and waging jihad on the outer edges of the land of Islam. Indeed, you are behind enemy lines, able to strike them where it hurts them most.”³⁴¹ That is based on the ‘presupposition’ that wherever one lives if not within the territorial control of the IS is living in a land of Kufr and must strike and kill innocent souls. That is regardless of whether such a state grants Muslims freedom of worship and practice of their faith.

In a lengthy declaration, he attacked nationalism and factionalism:

Amīrul-Mu'minīn Abū 'Umar al-Baghdādī (rahimahullāh) said, “The idea of nationalism and patriotism contradicts the religion in a number of its fundamentals. First, preferring people to others is by their piety, not their blood. Allah (ta'ālā) said, {O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you} [Al-Hujurāt: 13]. Second, it contradicts the creed of walā' and barā' – a great fundamental of the religion – and uproots it. The Arab Iraqi Christian is their brother who has all rights whereas the Indian or Turkish Muslim has no rights. The Sharī'ah of these people necessitates preferring 'Uqbah Ibn Abī Mu'ayt and Abū Jahl to Bilāl the Ethiopian and Salmān the Persian. Third, it opposes the bond

³⁴¹Islamic State's Dabiq Issue 15, “Break the Cross,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, July 2016, 27–28.

between the believers. Rasūlullāh (sallallāhu ‘alahyi wa sallam) said, ‘The believer to the believer is like a building, each part holding up the other’ [Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the authority of Abū Mūsā al-Ash’arī]. He (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) also said, ‘The example of the believers with regards to their love, mercy, and sympathy is like that of a single body, if a limb feels pain, the rest of the body responds to it with sleeplessness and fever’ [Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the authority of an-Nu’mān Ibn Bashīr]. ...Fourth, it is based upon the da’wah to jāhiliyyah and partisanship. Allah (ta’ālā) said, {Whenthose who disbelieved had put into their hearts hāmiyyah – the hākimiyah of Jāhiliyyah} [Al-Fath:26]. Rasūlullāh (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) said, ‘Whoever calls to ‘asabiyah (factionalism) is not one of us’ [Reported by Abū Dāwūd on the authority of Jubayr Ibn Mut’im]” [Adhillah ‘Alal- Mu’minīn A’izzah ‘Alal-Kāfirīn].”³⁴²

4.7 The Hisbah

Another essential institution or notion that is helping keep the caliphate in shape is the notion of hisbah and its institutionalisation. Hisbah is mostly translated to mean ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’³⁴³ by the IS. That, in context, is consistent with Qur'an chapter 3 verses 104 “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be successful.” It is also consistent with the hadith that commands Muslims to the best of their ability in commanding good and forbidding evil. That based on Qur'an and the Sunnah Muslims have been commanded without a shred of doubt to command that which is good and forbid evil. However, the bone of

³⁴²Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” 8.

³⁴³Dabiq Issue 8, 30; Dabiq Issue 10, “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” 51; Dabiq Issue 12, “Just Terror,” 16.

contention is that what is right and wrong according to the IS is not consistent with mainstream Islam. Classical Islamic scholars and jurists consider the institution of hisbah as an integral part of implementing the Islamic law (shari'a). Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Juwaini opined that hisba, as in enjoining good and forbidding evil is the very heart of the overall aim of the shari'a. This highlights the fact that the overarching objective of the sharia is not to kill whoever does not agree with it but to educate and to seek the betterment of the society rather than destroy it.

In most Muslim dominated countries and regions, the hisbah (or the moral police, as it is popularly referred to) serves as a powerful institution that ensures that the populace abides by the moral standard set by these countries. Prominent among these countries is Saudi Arabia. Taking a cue from this, the IS established the hisba in its controlled areas to uphold the shari'ah to shape and maintain the Islamic identity of the caliphate. It is also engaged in different kinds of activities to ensure that the controlled areas of the IS abide by the sharia'ah according to the group's interpretation of the Islamic law. As indicated above the hisbah is a very prominent institution in both pre-territoriality and after complete territoriality. In the initial stages of its post-territorial phase, it issues many notices on different subjects and issues warning regarding the consequences regarding not abiding by such notices. The notifications are mostly based on the 'presupposition' of making sure that the residents of the Islamic state abide by the shari'a to the fullest and also to

preserve the strict Islamic character of the Caliphate. It tries to control different aspects of the life of residents. Some of the content of the notices that show the hisbah's role and significance in the post territorial phase are as follows. One of its earlier notices was "On Movement of Women and the Garages: Raqqā Province" aimed to regulate the movement and travelling of women within the Islamic state and across its provinces. It sets out the condition under which a woman could travel. Those above the age of 50 have no obligation to travel with their husbands or close relations. However, those who are below the age of 50 must fulfil certain conditions before they can travel.³⁴⁴

Another notice by the Diwan al-Hisbah of wilayat al Barqa in (Derna: Cyrenaica Province, Libya) was on women's clothing. It was a warning on how serious an offence it is for a woman not to dress according to their strict interpretation of the Shari'a. In the Ninawa province, a notice also targeting women was on selling prohibited garments in the region, making it illegal to sell any apparel or clothing that is not shar'ah compliant. It states among other things "It is forbidden to sell and display garments violating the law, like tight garments, transparent ones [i.e. ones showing the body underneath them], and ornamented ones."³⁴⁵ For men, a directive was issued on "Prohibition on shaving beards." It stated among other things "thus, whoever from the men

³⁴⁴Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents."

³⁴⁵Al-Tamimi.

violates this in having shaved his beard after the date of the issuing of this statement must be arrested, for he will expose himself to an inquiry. And God is the guarantor of success."³⁴⁶ Another glossy pamphlet circulated in the Islamic state by the hisba, entitled "The Sanctity of Men's Garments" was found in 2017 and directed men regarding how they should wear their garb especially in terms of length. "What Muslims are plagued with nowadays is that men wear their clothes long and women wear their clothes short!" the pamphlet chides.³⁴⁷

Another notice is on the "Obligation of Fasting in Ramadan: Raqqa Province (Indirect testimony: June 2014)" "The statement also asked whoever cannot fast in this month for legitimate reason according to Shari'a to inform the Diwan al-Hisbah and prove it before the people, and whoever does not fulfill the conditions is to face the punishments of the law on the subject of lack of fasting during this month"

In wilayat al Baraka in Hasaka province, the Hisba issued a "Warning against certain customs on Eid al-Adha". The listed some practices that it deemed unacceptable Islamically. It stated among other things that the visitation of tombs on the day of Eid is forbidden, sacrificing an animal on behalf of a dead person, celebrating the eve of the eid and many more. In another noticed issued in the wilayat Fallujah entitled "Prayer of the

³⁴⁶Al-Tamimi.

³⁴⁷Callimachi, "The ISIS Files."

Congregation: Fallujah Province" emphasised the grave consequences that await those who do not pray in congregation and are caught transacting business or any other act.

In a very interesting twist a notice issued in the wilayat al furat entitled "Prohibition on pigeon keeping above the roofs of houses" stated among other things that All those who keep pigeons above the roofs of their houses must stop doing this entirely within a week of the date of the issuing of this statement and whosoever violates it will be subject to consequences of reprimand including a financial fine, imprisonment and flogging. Other notices were titled "Reiteration on Ban on Importing Iranian Food and Medical Goods, Ramadan 1436 AH," "Notification on banning operation of medical aid organisations in Raqqa province [May 2015]", "Notification on ID cards etc. in Hisbah Offices, Deir az-Zor Province" "Prohibition on music, song and displaying photos on shops."³⁴⁸

The IS followed the notices with action as can be discerned from the discourses of its magazines. In one of the discussions of its magazine, an article entitles 'dawa and hisbah in the Islamic state' summarises the work of the hisba and gave an example of what they have done.

As such, the Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic obligations, judge their disputes, implement the shar'ī hudūd, eradicate

³⁴⁸Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents."

all traces of shirk and heresy, incite the people to jihād and call them to unite behind the Khalīfah, Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Awwād Al-Husaynī Al-Qurashī. These pictures are a window into the various hisbah (commanding the good and forbidding the evil) and da’wah related events and activities taking place within the Islamic State.”³⁴⁹

The pictures they were referring to showed the destruction of the tomb of Yahya Abul Qasim, Qur'an school in session at Manbij, Group repentance in al-khayr, da'wa kiosk distributing leaflets, and destruction of a stockpile of tobacco.³⁵⁰ That is a milder version of the hisbah's work. In some cases they engage in levelling of erect graves, executing the penal aspects of the shari'a like chopping off the hand, head of suspects.

Analysing the hisbah its notices and actions are all based on the ‘presupposition’ that the IS's version of Islam in terms of right and evil is the ultimate truth hence all those under its controlled forcefully abide by these rules and regulation. Besides, the hisbah ‘presuppose’ itself to be a vanguard of the shari'ah. As a supposed law and order enforcement institution the hisbah becomes a very crucial pillar holding the caliphate.

4.8 The Sharia Courts

Key institutions that serve as the reference point and backbone of the hisbah are the sharia'ah courts. Besides, the very idea of the establishment of

³⁴⁹Dabiq Issue 3, “A Call to Hijra,” 17.

³⁵⁰Dabiq Issue 3, 16–17.

the Islamic state or the caliphate is the presupposition that its establishment would ensure the maximum and unflinching application of extreme shari'ah injunctions by the IS. One of IS's primary goal in its post territorial administrative organisation is to establish the shari'ah court to serve as a recourse to the litigation whenever necessary. The establishment of the shari'a courts is based on the presupposition that whoever allows the conventional court to arbiter in his or her affairs has abandoned the fundamental of the religion and has allowed the law of men to regulate his or her affairs. That is, establishing the sharia' court and allowing it to mediate in all affairs are a fundamental part of the faith according to the IS. A demonstration of the shari'a court's line of duties and responsibilities is demonstrated by the IS's official archives and the discourses in the magazine.

One of the notices official announcement of the caliphate was entitled "Establishment of the Islamic Court, Deir az-Zor City, October 2013" referring to the Caliphates' establishment of the shari'ah court in Wilayat Deir az-Zor. The notice states "Opening of the Islamic Court for Deir az-Zor city as a step to establish the law of God- Almighty and Exalted is He- for examining societal and Shari'a cases and problems."³⁵¹ Its intention was captured by its discourses too: "Shari'ah courts are established in every city and are judging by the laws of Islam"³⁵² Notices such as this are used by the

³⁵¹Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents."

³⁵²Dabiq Issue 12, "Just Terror," 48.

IS to notify the populace under its controlled territory about the existence of a sharia court. It also contains a warning about whoever decides to undermine the authority of the court.

After the court, notices regarding penal coded and other regulatory aspects of sharia are circulated. For instance, a “Statement on punishment for theft, Deir az-Zor Province Islamic State Wilayat al-Kheir”³⁵³ was circulated. The notice cherry-picked some hadith and Qur'anic verses to justify the penal code to meted out. The verdict was “Therefore the one called ‘Ibrahim Akla al-Khalf al-Satam’ who stole from a safe and the type of thing stolen has been worth its nisab [NB: value liable to zakat tax], the Islamic court has decided upon him that his right hand should be cut off from the wrist joint and it should hang on his neck for three days and should accompany him in the province's prison and in its markets as recompense for what he has committed, a deterrent from God, and God is mighty and wise. And that should be a deterrent for him and others besides him, cleansing his sin. And perhaps God will forgive him.”³⁵⁴

Such notifications were all over. Notification from Shari'a Court, Tel Manis (Idlib Province), September 2013 Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham Wilayat Idlib Shari'a Court in Tel Manis. Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim The

³⁵³Al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents.”

³⁵⁴Al-Tamimi.

Shari'a Court in Wilayat Tarabulus: city of Sirte “Every Muslim inside the abode of Islam (city of Sirte and what is affiliated with it) must ratify contracts of all his transactions (selling, purchase, leasing, trust, consolidation of debts, mortgage...) in the Katib al-'Adl office in the Shari'a court.”

All these actions are based on the ‘presupposition’ that:

As for he who submits to the rule and legislation of the taghut, as is the case with those who vote in the democratic elections and referendums and those who seek justice from courts judging by manmade laws, then such people believe in and worship taghut and have left the basis of Islam – the testimony that there is no god but Allah, that there is none deserving worship or obedience except for Allah – as well as its reality – Salamah (sincerity) and istislam (submission) to Allah – and whoever considers them to be Muslims, muwahhidin, abandoners of taghut, and disbelievers in it should review the religion of Islam before he is laid down in his grave.³⁵⁵

This is an article entitled “Allah is the judge, the rule is His” While ordinary Muslims would not dispute that Allah is indeed the ultimate judge and ruler, they would be at odds with the idea that adjudicating based using conventional law or participating in an elections renders undermines Allah’s sovereignty and makes a Muslim non muslim. That is in this discourse the IS regards anyone who votes, adjudicate using conventional laws to have abandoned the very fundamentals of Islam.

The eighth issue of the dabiq was entitled “shari'a alone will rule Africa”³⁵⁶ while the tenth issue of the Dabiq was front-paged: “the law of

³⁵⁵Islamic State's Rumiyyah Issue 3, “RUMIYAH,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, 2016, 18.

³⁵⁶Dabiq Issue 8, “Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa,” front page.

Allah or the law of men: is waging war against the Islamic state apostasy?”³⁵⁷ The first article referred to the pledging of allegiance to the IS by Boko Haram and the acceptance of the allegiance by the Khalifa because of Boko Haram's relentless efforts in aiding by an implementing the shar'ah. However, the northern Nigerian case of implementing the shari'a is a curious case because such implementation is backed and supported by the central government. The only thing Boko Haram knows how to implement well is killing innocent civilians and snatching young girls from the schools. The second article tries to legitimise the IS as the sole entity implementing the shari'ah properly. It is, therefore, an act of apostasy to fight an implementor of Allah's shari'ah according the IS.

4.9 The *Wilayat* (Provinces)³⁵⁸

The Arabic word *Wilayah* is rooted in the Arabic letters ‘*w-l-y*’ which means ‘to govern’. The concept is adopted by the IS as an institutional administrative methodology to refer to the areas under its control both afar, near and sometimes non-existing. In western contexts, it would be akin to the concept of provinces or governorate. The *wilayah* is an integral part of IS's territorial methodology.³⁵⁹ It took inspiration from the territoriality practised

³⁵⁷Dabiq Issue 10, “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” front page.

³⁵⁸Farhan Zahid, “The Islamic State in Pakistan: Growing the Network,” accessed April 14, 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-state-in-pakistan-growing-the-network>.

³⁵⁹Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology.”

by earlier empires like the Roman and Sassanian but most importantly, the early Islamic empires of Abbasids and later the Ottomans.³⁶⁰

That emphasises how IS would like to relive the past centuries in a modern era. The *wilayah* in terms of notion and practice is hugely instrumental in IS's territoriality. It demonstrates in practical terms how IS is trying to create a borderless world because some of its *wilayah* is far from the areas it directly controls. Besides, it shows how IS is shrewd in utilising notions for its propaganda. At the peak of the caliphate (in July 2016), IS has a total of 35 confirmed *wilayat* of which 19 were inside Iraq and Syria and the remaining, outside.³⁶¹ What this shows in terms of understanding IS's territoriality is that the group adopted the early Islamic empires system of *wilayah* as a model. It also indicates its ambition for ever-expanding territories as its slogan state, *tatamaddad* (ever expanding). That is creating a borderless world contrary to the current system. Another point regarding the *wilayat* is the fact that it could help the IS resurface should it even lose its entire territory. Indeed, there is documented evidence suggesting this happening in parts of Afghanistan or Pakistan in case the Iraq–Syria enterprise fails.³⁶² A case in point is The

³⁶⁰William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, a member of the Perseus Books Group, 2013), 1–37.

³⁶¹Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Observations on the new Islamic State video ‘Structure of the Caliphate, *Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s Blog*(Wednesday, July 6, 2016) retrieved July 7,2016 from <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/07/observations-on-the-new-islamic-state-videoCaliphate>. According to Al-Tamimi there are speculations that IS is trying to avoid pronouncing its entire *wilayat* as a strategy.

³⁶²See Farhan Zahid, The Islamic State in Pakistan: Growing the Network , *Fikra*

Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) which operates in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan on behalf of the IS main.³⁶³The Khorasan case as indicated was taught to be a rumour. But indicate Bokoharam and the Marawi of the Philippine. The notion of the wilaya knows no bound as far as fealty to the IS is declared by a group regardless of the location, if the IS accepts that region or the group, it becomes part of the IS. Interestingly, the IS realising the robust nature of the notion of the wilyat started using abstract versions of it. In Saudi Arabia, it declared some wilayat abstractly just for staging attacks like the case of Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.³⁶⁴

4.10 Conclusion

The Islamic state has utilised its radical interpretation of the territorial notion of *dar-al kufr* and *dar-al Islam* dichotomy as a base for its exclusionary territoriality. Based on its “presupposed” belief that the world must be physically demarcated into two camps, it developed a road map toward actualising an establishment of the caliphate and organisational strategies detectable through its discourses. Ideologically, its inspiration stems from the

Forum(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy April 2017), retrieved April 7, 2017 from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-islamic-state-in-pakistan-growing-the-network>

³⁶³Milo Comerford, “Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, 2 Years On,” The Diplomat, accessed April 14, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/islamic-states-khorasan-province-2-years-on/>.

³⁶⁴Cole Bunzel, “The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states-pub-62810>.

notions discussed in the previous chapter for its territoriality, highlighting how the group's doctrine and territoriality complement each other. The doctrine needs its own space to be put into practice while the territoriality needs the doctrine to justify its reason for being. In terms of "predication," the IS positions itself not only on the camp of Islam but as the true representation of Islam and Muslims while those on the camp of kufr or Jahiliyyah are to face perdition. It then becomes easy to engage in 'subject positioning', where its abode of Islam or caliphate is considered as a place where every 'true' Muslim must be or help in extending its borders as far as possible while all other places on earth and all those occupying deserve destruction. After constructing the foundation, it relied on aspects of notions as understood by its ultra-exclusionary ideology to pursue its 'road map to the caliphate', pre-territorial and post-territorial consolidation and administration. Extreme interpretation of aspects of offensive Jihad, Shari'a (and hudud), hakimiyyah, Jahiliyyah have aided the group in this respect.

In terms of administration of the territory, despite a number of the *divananaat* that the IS utilises, it is clear that the four shown in figure 4.1 above hold the caliphate in one piece. The office of the Caliph serves as the symbol of the caliphate, issues binding decrees and accepts allegiances from tribes and groups. It has special relationship with the Provinces (wilayaat) as that ensures that the caliphate extends in terms of territory under its control. On the other hand the Shari'a courts and the Hisbah have special complimentary

relationship. The Shari‘a courts arbiter among residents of the caliphate in matters of dispute and matters deemed unislamic according to the IS.

It also serves as a reference point by the Hisbah in ensuring that people abide by the Shari‘a. The hisbah acts on the instructions of the Shari‘a courts in terms of what is lawful or not. It (the hisbah) also refers offenders to the courts in order that the appropriate punishment will be meted out to offenders. In fact, the Hisbah carries out the capital punishment instructed by the courts.

All in all, the IS has succeeded in utilising and extending the theoretical notion of dar-al Islam and dar-kufr to mean physical territory. In doing so, they relied on the idea from Wahhabism, Qutbism and Sahwah scholarship, which constitute its ultra-exclusionary ideology. Even though these ideologies have no blueprint regarding how to capture, consolidate and administer an Islamic state or a caliphate, the IS has shown the way, albeit despicable one due to its barbarity. The IS territoriality has been physically defeated, but the ideological struggle is far from over.

CONCLUSION

The inquiry started with the question: how is the Islamic State's ideology constituted? The question led to the exploration of the IS's discourses through its Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines. These discourses were analysed using critical constructivist 'Discursive Practices Approach' with its categorization mechanisms of 'presuppositions', 'predication' and 'subject positioning.' It was found that the ideological constitution of the IS is intricate and does not lend itself to easy perspicuity. Despite this, it is interesting that a plethora of works oversimplify IS ideology by connecting it to a single or generic ideological root. This research departs with such conclusions by digging deeper into the very constitution of the group's complicated ideology through its discourses.

Unlike most research on IS focusing on different aspects of the group, especially its historical evolution and its barbaric acts of terror, this research focused on the very formation of IS's ideology that defines the group and its actions. As demonstrated in chapters three and four, the IS's ideology is bifurcated into doctrinal and territorial concerns. Both fragments make a complex whole. However, treating them separately, yet recognizing their wholeness, allows for a deeper understanding of the two aspects of the group's ideology. The IS's ideology could be linked and situated within the

confines of three ideologies — Qutbsm, Wahhabism and the sahwi ulema (sahwa scholarship). The IS adopted some notions as understood by these ideologies towards constructing their ruthless Ideology, which could be rightly regarded as ‘ultra-exclusionary hybrid ideology’. Interestingly, the ideology serves as a base for its exclusionary territoriality.

The overall findings of the study are represented in figure 5.1 below. As shown in figure 5.1, both IS doctrine and territoriality join together to support the generally visible ideology of the IS, hence forming the joint building blocks supporting the general IS ideology. The doctrine and the territoriality are in turn supported by the three ideologies of Wahhabism, Qutbism and the Sahwah scholarship.

Wahhabism (in its various versions like Salafi-jihadism, or takfirism), is the ideology the IS is mostly associated with. However, it has been found that the group adopts, in addition to notions from Wahhabism, some notions that could be linked to Qutbsm and the Sahwa scholarship to extend and construct its ideology. Notions in Wahhabism that the IS draws from are Tawhid, Bid'a, WB, and the penal aspects of the shari'a (hudud), as can be seen in figure 5.1 below. For instance, regarding the notion of WB, the mainstream Wahhabi teaching as demonstrated in chapter three is to regard it as a matter of the heart and to hate the actions of the disbeliever, not the disbeliever himself or herself. But, IS extended it to include physically attacking, killing or beheading of anyone who is deemed an enemy as a result of the person's actions or

inactions. They even extend it to attack not just ordinary Muslims but scholars and fellow militant jihadists who do not ascribe to their ferocious interpretations and practice of the Islamic faith. This is constructed through their discourses by ‘presupposing’ that WB means physically attacking anyone deemed enemy of Allah and believers by the group. They also engage in predication by labelling others as ‘imams of kufr’ ‘wicked imam’ apostates and so on. It then positions itself in terms of ‘Subject positioning’ to those it labels as its enemies for that reason it is justified for their blood to be shed.

Likewise, regarding the penal code, it took the pressure from the ulema of his time for Sheikh Ibn Wahhab to approve of the stoning of a woman who voluntarily came to him for stoning to be carried out on her as result of committing *Zina* (fornication). The IS, through its Hisba, carry some of these penal codes without any meticulous procedure followed for verification. They stalk people; accuse them of committing Zina and a penal code is meted. The most visible aspects of the shari‘a when it comes to the IS is the penal aspects, when in fact that constitute just a tiny fraction of the entire set of the Shari‘a and in most cases require nearly impossible conditions to be satisfied before implementation.

Another supporting pillar to the duet (IS’s ideology and territoriality) is Qutbism. As shown in figure 5.1, the key notions adopted by the IS that could be linked to Qutbism are Jahiliyah, Hakimiyyah, offensive Jihad and the Shari‘a. In Qutb’s thought, Jahiliyah is the reason for hakimiyyah, shari‘a, and

offensive Jihad. That is, it is because the world has been engulfed in ‘neo-Jahiliyyah’ that the Ummah needs an Islamic State or the caliphate to practice their faith. That is, Jahiliyyah is anything that does not use Islam as its basis and hence needs to be forcefully fought and be replaced by that which is Islamic. Precisely, what the IS is espousing. Notions in Qutbsm for the IS is a two-edged sword in that it supplies its ideology and territoriality. In terms of ideology, Jahiliyyah, as understood in Qutbsm, has a strong link to Tawhid and Territoriality concurrently. That is, if Tawhid is the recognition and affirmation of Islamic monotheism, an idea that is Jahili is ‘anti-Tawhid’ or *Shirk*. Any idea or system categorized as *Jahilli* is so because it automatically does not recognize this aspect of the Islamic creed. Territorially, the concept is useful in the sense that in the IS’s thought, conventional ‘nation-states’ are illegitimate because they neither recognize the laws of Allah (the Shari‘a) nor govern by it. In fact, as shown through their discourses they regard any Muslim who accepts adjudication through conventional laws as apostates. To resolve this matter, they needed to carve out a territory where the laws of Allah would be fully implemented, according their understanding of the Islamic faith.

Territoriality is central to the IS’s discourses and ideology, yet not much research could be found giving in-depth attention to this aspect of the group’s ideology. This is because it is generally regarded as part of the overall IS ideology and therefore treated with other ideological aspects of the group.

Despite the contentious nature of the very foundation of the IS's territoriality, it has managed to constitute and practiced it. It is controversial because it was not originally meant to be a physical separate territory for just Muslims. The notions of Dar-al Islam and the Dar-Kufr form the foundation of IS's exclusionary territoriality. Through the articulations of Qutbsm, it has come to be understood and adopted by the IS and other militant organizations as referring to physical territory. Interestingly, despite Wahhabism and the sahra support for the idea, they do not have a very direct and clear articulation of it. However, Qutbsm's articulation of it is very lucid as indicated in the fourth chapter. As an extension of the notion, the IS developed a road map towards the realization of the Khilapha and the consolidation strategies both in the pre-territorial phase and the post-territorial phase. The most interesting observation is in the post-territorial consolidation strategy, in terms of formation of the *diwanaat*. Whilst all the dewanaat served an equally important purpose for the IS, in terms of territoriality however, four key diwanaat are discerned to be holding the territoriality notion of the IS and its *Khilafah* together. These are the office of the Khalifa, the wilayat, the hisbah, and the shari'a courts as shown in the offshoot of the Territoriality in figure 5.1. The details could be seen in chart 4.1. in chapter four.

Beside their territorial importance, the four (khalifah, Hisbah, Diwanaat, and wilayat) have been also observed to have a strong root and inspiration from elements of the ultra-exclusionary ideology, especially

Jahiliyyah, Shari‘a, and hakimiyyah. The office of the Khalifah is based on the ‘presupposition’ that the Khalifah is not only regarded as a descendant of the prophet and his successor but also as a representative of the entire Muslim Ummah who would oversee the implementation of Allah’s shari‘a and hakimiyyah. The Hisbah is entirely based on the supposition that the caliphate is implementing the authentic Shari‘a and therefore people must abandon all acts of Jahiliyyah and conform to the shari‘a, especially in the controlled territory of the IS. Failure to comply invokes the wrath of the Hisba, which mostly oversees and implements the penal aspects of the Shari‘a in the caliphate. Augmenting the Hisbah as an institution of reference, are the sharia courts which adjudicate on different matters and issue diverse verdicts. The foundation of the Shari‘a is based on the presupposition that anyone who practices and adjudicates with conventional law or courts has committed an act of shirk which a denunciation or violation of Tawhid. The Khalifah, the hisbah and the Shari‘a court working hand in hand would ensure that Hakimiyyah prevails in the controlled territories of the IS. Supporting and helping in expanding IS’s territoriality is the notion and the practice of Wilayah. The Wilayah ensures the effective running of not only the provinces under the IS but also the realization of their boundless territorial notion. A Wilaya could be real or imaginary and could be as far from the epicenter of the IS as possible. This is made possible by the notion and the practice of the Wilaya.

Most studies on the IS are not well situated, theoretically and

methodologically. This study situates itself within the confines of Critical Constructivism whilst methodologically adopting aspects of Roxanne Doty's Discursive Practices Approach (a discourse analysis methodological approach) with its corresponding categorizing analytic tools of 'presupposition' 'predication' and 'subject positioning'. The effectiveness of Critical Constructivism in understanding the constitution of ideas and ideologies cannot be overemphasized. In particular, the plurality of methodologies in term of ascribing to post-positivist approaches made it possible to analyse the discourses of the IS thoroughly. The analytic tools of 'presupposition', 'predication' and 'subject positioning' is extremely invaluable in understanding the construction of IS's ideology. The group uses a lot of presupposition, predication and subject positioning in constructing its ideology. For instance, a key 'presupposition' that has been observed is the unflinching believe that it has a major role to play in the eschatological events heralding the Day of Judgment. It also presupposes that most of the *abadeeth* referring to a group that would fight and capture a particular territory is actually referring to the IS. It 'predicates' itself to be a genuine caliphate and a vanguard of the entire Muslim ummah. This sets the stage for 'positioning' itself as representing the ultimate truth whilst anyone who is against it, is an enemy and deserved to be fought.

All in all, the research has contributed a fresh perspective regarding the ideological constitution of the IS. With the utilization of Critical Social

Constructivism as its framework, together with the Discursive Practices Approach, the study has presented an approach for understanding the IS that focuses thoroughly on the constitution of its ‘ultra exclusionary ideology’ and how that supports its exclusionary territoriality. Hence, the study has developed an analytical tool based on which the group’s complex ideological construct coupled with its territoriality could be explained and or understood intelligibly. The study has contributed to the narrow field of IS and the wider militancy (or radical ideologies) studies in the Middle East in two major ways. First, it has helped in filling a gap on the IS as research that thoroughly focused on the constitution of IS ideology and territoriality without presuming it as ‘a given.’ It has also situated the study of the IS within the critical constructivists’ theoretical framework. Therefore, it has significantly supplemented the literature on IS, specifically with respect to the doctrine as well as its territoriality and to the general literature on militant groups or militancy in the MENA region.

However, the modest and the focused nature of the research have impacted on its reach. It has focused on the IS’s ideological roots, its composition and how that fuels its territorial quest through the lenses of Critical Constructivism, to the neglect of the other aspects of the organization. While this undoubtedly contributes to the studies on IS, other aspects of the organization remain relevant. For instance, the comparative study of the ideological constitution of the IS vis-à-vis other militant organization like al-

Qaeda would be invaluable. This would be interesting because it will bring to bear those aspects of IS's ideology that make other militant organizations like the al-Qaeda or the Nusra front to regard it as an extreme group. An in-depth understanding of the Islamic legal validity of some of the notions that the IS is adopting to construct its ideology would be remarkable. This is because; most of these notions are contentious in our contemporary times, but IS treats them as eternal in terms of space and time. For instance, when can an armed Jihad be legitimate in our contemporary times? Who authorizes that? On what basis and in what context is Hijra still permissible today? Is there a possibility of a conscious interdisciplinary collaboration between the field of Islamic Studies and International Relations in understanding radical ideologies and militant groups? Nonetheless, the work can be regarded as robust foundational work based on which significant exploration could be undertaken towards understanding the IS and other militant groups and radical ideologies in the region.




Figure 5.1 IS Ideology: Ultra-exclusionary Doctrine and Territorialit

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
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APPENDICES

A: FRONT PAGES OF DABIQ MAGAZINE ISSUES



DABIQ

1435

RAMADAN

2 ISSUE

THE
FLOOD




IT'S EITHER THE
ISLAMIC STATE
OR THE FLOOD

FEATURE:
THE FLOOD OF THE
MUBĀHALAH

DABIQ

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SHAWWAL

3 ISSUE



A CALL TO **HIJRAH**

FEATURE:
HURAH FROM
**HYPOCRISY
TO SINCERITY**

SPECIAL:
FOLEY'S
BLOOD IS ON
OBAMA'S HANDS

DABIQ

1435
DHUL-HIJJAH

4 ISSUE




THE FAILED CRUSADE

FEATURE:
REFLECTIONS ON
THE FINAL CRUSADE

ARTICLE:
THE REVIVAL OF SLAVERY
BEFORE THE HOUR

DABIQ

1436
MUHARRAM
ISSUE 5




DABIQ

6 ISSUE

1436 RABI' AL-AWWAL

AL-QAIDAH OF WAZIRISTAN

A TESTIMONY FROM WITHIN



DABIQ

8 ISSUE

1436 JUMADA AL-AKHIRAH



SHARI'AH ALONE
WILL RULE AFRICA



DABIQ

10 ISSUE

1436 RAMADAN


THE LAW OF ALLAH OR THE LAWS OF MEN



DABIQ

11 ISSUE

1436 DHUL-QADAH



FROM THE BATTLE OF
AL-AHZĀB
TO THE WAR OF COALITIONS

DABIQ

12 ISSUE


1437 SAFAR



DABIQ

13 ISSUE

1437 RABI' AL-AKHIR



THE RĀFIDAH
FROM IBN SABA' TO THE DAJJĀL

DABIQ

14 ISSUE

1437 RAJAB




The Murtadd
Brotherhood

DABIQ


15 ISSUE

1437 SHAWWAL



BREAK THE CROSS

B: FRONT PAGES OF RUMIYAH MAGAZINE ISSUES



AL HAYAT
MEDIA CENTER

RUMIYAH

EN

Muharram 1438

ISSUE 2

O mawlidin, repizi, firby Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome). — Abu Hamzah al-Mahajir ﷺ

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ALHAJAH
MEDIA CENTRE

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ISSUE 3

Safar 1438

O mawlidin, sejatu, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome). – Abu Hamaid al-Mujahid ﷺ

Foreword

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Paths to Victory – Part 2 P-20

Towards the Major Malhamah of Dabiq P-24

The Obligation of Exposing Wicked Scholars P-28

Jihad through Du'a P-32

Sultan Mahmud al-Ghaznawi P-36

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ALTAQAF MEDIA CENTER

RUMIYAH

EN

Rabi' al-Awwal 1438

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O mawla! We beseech You; for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome). – Abu Haneefah al-Makki رض

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Hijrah Does Not Cease as Long as the Kuffar Are Fought

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You Will Remember What I Have Told You

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Interview with the Wall of Tarabulus

P-10

Whoever Takes His Book as His Teacher Will Be More Correct than Mistaken, If...

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A Treatise on Hypocrisy and the Hypocrites

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Indeed Allah Has Blessed Me

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The Pledge to Fight to the Death

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Marrying Widows Is an Established Sunnah

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ALFAQI
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RUMIYAH ISSUE 5 | 2013

ISSUE 3 If you're looking for big ideas, we will surprise you with our third major theme: the three laws of business finance—the Pyramid of Wealth.



RUMIYAH

Jumada al-Ula 1436 ISSUE 6 O mawabbatin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome). – Abu Hanifah al-Muhajir ﷺ

■ Foreword
They Say, "We Fear That a Calamity May Strike Us"

■ Articles
And Do Not Weaken in Pursuing the Enemy

Shedding Light on the Blessed Operation in Istanbul

The Safe Zone

Paths to Victory: Part 4

Examples of the Sahabah's Eagerness to Attain Shahadah

■ Interview
With the Military Amir of His Wilayah

■ Sisters
Wala and Bara, O Women

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ALHAYAT MEDIA CENTER

RUMIYAH

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ESTABLISHING THE ISLAMIC STATE

BETWEEN THE PROPHETIC METHODOLOGY
AND THE PATHS OF THE DEVIANTS

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ


اللَّهُ
رَسُولُ
مُحَمَّدٌ

RUMIYAH

EN

Rajab 1433


ISSUE 8



AMONG THE BELIEVERS ARE MEN


SHAYKH ABU SULAYMAN ASH-SHAM





ISSUE 10 · RAMADAN 1438 · EN

RUMIYAH



**THE JIHAD
IN EAST ASIA**

C: CURRICULUM VITAE

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Middle East Technical University (METU)

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Master of Social Science in Political Science by research (November, 2010)

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RESEARCH INTEREST

Islam in Global Affairs, Constitution of Radical ideologies, militancy (militant Islamic groups), and religion, geopolitics and socio-economic issues affecting the MENA region.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant for International Security (PS3240), semester II, 2010
National University of Singapore; Faculty instructor; Prof.Dr. Lee Lai To

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LANGUAGES:

English (official language), Arabic (upper-intermediate), Turkish (intermediate), French (basic) German (basic), Hausa (proficient), Malay, and Mandarin (conversational).

PUBLICATIONS

Ph.D. dissertation: The Islamic State's Ideology: Constitution of Doctrine and Territoriality Through the Discourses in Dabiq and Rumiyah.

Book: The China Factor in Ghana's Textile and Construction Industries, 2010.
<https://www.amazon.com/FACTOR-GHANAS-TEXTILE-CONSTRUCTION-INDUSTRIES/dp/3844397256>

Book Chapter (forthcoming): Empowering and Arming Africa's "Ungoverned" Spaces: Historical and Contemporary Role of Global Actors in Tar, UA, and Onwurah, CP (Eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflict in Africa London: Palgrave Macmillan

CONFERENCE PAPERS

"The Islamic State's Territoriality and Violence"

"The War on Terror and the Making of the Vicious Cycle of Global Insecurity"

"The Impact of the Islamic State's Territoriality on the Notion of Borders in the 'New Middle East'"

"The Ummah between Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufr: introspection on the radicalisation of concepts"

"Islamization of Knowledge and the Challenge of Defining 'the Secular Knowledge' within the Context of the Maqasid"

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Playing football, table tennis, travelling, meeting people, and learning new languages

D: TURKISH SUMMARY

BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM

İlk bölüm başlıca çalışmaya problem tanımı, araştırma soruları, çalışmanın önemi, ilgili literatür taraması ve metodoloji ile başlamaktadır.

MENA (Ortadoğu Kuzey Afrika) bölgesi, uzun süredir devam eden militan silahlı gruplarla boğuşmaktadır ve saldırganlığın üzerinde çok durulamamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti'nin (IŞİD) 29 Haziran 2014'te kendi halifeliğini ilan etmesi ardından hem uzak hem de yakın düşmanlarının kapılarına korku vermek için acımasız ideolojisini sürekli olarak göstermesi, bu bölgeye olan ilgiyi yeniden üzerine çekmiştir.¹ Özellikle, IŞİD'in 'dişlayıcı bölgeciliği' ile birlikte 'aşırı dışlayıcı karma ideolojisi', acımasızlığı ve aykırılığı nedeniyle pek çok kişiyi büyülemiştir. Bu büyük ölçüdedir çünkü El Kaide (hem merkez hem de yan kuruluşlar)² gibi daha önceki ve daha eski militan örgütler ideolojik olarak acımasız sayılırken, İslam Devleti'nin vahşiliği El Kaide'nin vahşetini öyle bir geçmiştir ki; El Kaide, IŞİD'i aşırı olarak görmektedir. Teritoryalite bakımından, küresel cihatçıların hareketindeki diğer militan gruplar çoğunlukla İslam Devleti kurulması fikrini desteklemektedirler, ancak bunu başaramamışlardır. Örneğin Usame Bin Ladin sık sık halifeliği geri getirme

¹Islamic State's Dabiq Dergisi 1, "Khilafah Declared," *Al Hayat Media Centre*, Haziran 2014, 6.

²Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda [El Kaide'nin Yükselişi ve Düştüğü]*, 1 basım (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

İhtiyacına atıfta bulunmuştur.³ Nitekim El-Kaide'ye bağlı Mali ve Yemen'deki militant gruplar, başarısız bir şekilde, nihai İslami devlet vizyonu için bir bölgeye tutunmaya çalışmıştır.⁴

Bölgelerde militan gruplar, militanlık ve özellikle IŞİD konusunda birçok çalışma yapılmıştır. Ancak, teritoryal militanlığın köklerini araştıran mevcut çalışmalar kökenlerin, iç kökenli etkenler, dış kökenli unsurlar ve bazı nadir durumlarda ikisinin karmaşı olarak sınıflandığını göstermektedir. Bu sınıflandırılmalar bölgelerdeki militanlık ve militan grupların genel görünümü ve anlayışı hakkında bilgilendirici olmakla birlikte, bölgelerdeki silahlı grupların ideolojik yapılanması hakkında derin bilgi sahibi olmamıza yardımcı olma konusunda yetersiz kalmaktadır. Ayrıca, IŞİD üzerinde yapılan çalışmalar ya grubun ideolojik yapısını ve sınırlarını aşırı basitleştirmekte ya da çok az dikkat etmektedir. Gerçekten de, IŞİD'in ideolojik eğilimi, kolay sınıflandırılmaya elverişli değildir. Kendisini daha geniş teritoryal militanlık çalışmalarına konumlandıran bu çalışma, nihai vizyonlarından birinin (nihai vizyon değilse) temsili olarak dışlayıcı bir bölge olan “İslam devleti” fikrinin yanı sıra, İslam Devletinin “dışlayıcı bir ideolojisini” araştırmak için Eleştirel Toplumsal inşacılık yaklaşımını kullanmaktadır.

³Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,[Kağıt Devletten Halifeliğe: İslam Devleti'nin İdeolojisi]” 2014, 9.

⁴“Rukmini_stories.Pdf,” sitesinden erişildi Şubat 11, 2019, https://www.kellyaward.com/wp-content/uploads/2003/11/Rukmini_stories.pdf.

MENA bölgesi, tartışmasız, bugün dünyanın en uzun süren şiddetli çatışmalarının ve militanlığının merkez üssüdür.⁵ Bu durumun böyle olmasının sebebi çarpıcıdır. Bazı cevaplar arayışında olan yazar, Ephraim Karsh'ın “Ortadoğu’yu Yeniden Düşünmek” isimli kitabının ilk bölümünü (Orta Doğu Neden Bu Kadar istikrarsız?) çok düşündürücü bulmuştur.⁶ Karsh, teritoryal şiddet ve militanlığın büyük ölçüde içsel teritoryal faktörlerden kaynaklandığını ve çağdaş devlet sistemini baltalamayı amaçlayan bu faktörlerin başının “panarapçılık (kavmicilik)”, “en büyük Suriye (Suriye el-Kubra)” ve “tek bir Müslüman topluluğun İslamcı fikirleri” ya da ‘ümmet’ gibi ideolojileri olduğunu öne sürmektedir.⁷ Ephraim Karsh'ın bu ideolojilere özellikle ‘ümmet’e odaklanması ve bu ideolojilerin özellikle Ortadoğu'daki çağdaş ulus-devletleri baltalamaya çalıştığı konusundaki ısrarı ilgi çekmektedir. Bu iddia, IŞİD'in iddiasını haklı çıkarmış gibi görünen halifeliğinin ilanı ile birleştiğinde, bu konudaki diğer bilimsel çalışmaların incelenmesine neden olmuş ve nihayetinde bu konuda başlıca araştırma yapılmasına ilgi doğmuştur.

Karsh'ın çalışmasının yanı sıra, birçok bilimsel çalışma Orta Doğu bölgesindeki sürekli şiddetin veya militanlığın temel nedenlerini teritoryal dinamik-

⁵Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East [Orta Doğu'nun Uluslararası Politikası]*, 2 basım (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015), 1

⁶Efraim Karsh, *Rethinking the Middle East [Orta Doğu'yu Yeniden Düşünmek]*, 1 basım (London ; Portland, OR: Routledge, 2003).

⁷Karsh, 1.

lere ehemmiyet vererek açıklamaya çalışmıştır.⁸ Bu iddiaların tam aksine; Edward Said ve Roger Owen gibi bilginler, bölgedeki gidişatın, dış güçlerin dış müdahalelerine, yani; Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İngiltere, Fransa ve Rusya bağlamışlardır.⁹ Başka bilginler teritoryal militanlığın nedenini, birbiriyle ilişkili konuların karmaşık bir sentezini kullanarak analiz etmişlerdir.¹⁰

Bu geniş araştırmalar teritoryal militanlığı (ve veya militan grupları) açıklamaya çalışırken, daha önce var olan araştırmaların aktivizmini ve ideolojisini açıklayamadığı, uç bir değer (IŞİD) ortaya çıkmaktadır. IŞİD'in kendisi, zaten, teritoryal militanlığın ürünüdür ancak dış müdahale ve yerel dinamiklerle mümkün kılınmıştır. Takipçiler açısından, birçok yabancı uyruklu kişi etkilenmiş olup halifeliğin zirvesinde binlerce insan onların kapısına atılmıştır. Bölge ve ötesinden, örgütel ve bireysel bağlılıklarını elde etmeyi başarmıştır. Aynı şekilde, bölge içinde ve ötesinde mağdur ettiği insanları sarsmış ve dehşete düşmüştür. IŞİD ile ilgili bu çalışma bağlamında, kendi halifeliğinin ilanı, acı-

⁸Richards Alan, "Socioeconomic Roots of Middle East Radicalism [Orta Doğu Radikallığının Sosyoekonomik Kökleri]," *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 4 (2002): 22; R. Scott Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination [Aşırı Tutucuların Hayalinde Tarih]," *The Journal of American History*, no. 2 (2002): 498, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3092170>.

⁹Edward W. Said, *Orientalism [Oryantasyon]*, 1. basım (London: Pantheon Books, 1978); Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East [Modern Orta Doğu'nun Kurulmasında Devlet, Güç ve Politika]*, 3. basım (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004); Deepak Tripathi and Johan Galtung, *Imperial Designs: War, Humiliation & the Making of History [İmparatorluk Tasarımları: Savaş, Aşağılama & Tarih Yazmak]* (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2013); Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*.

¹⁰Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology [Uluslararası İlişkilerde Orta Doğu: Güç Politika ve İdeoloji]* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter Hinchcliffe and Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945 [1945'ten beri Orta Doğu'daki Çatışmalar]*, 3. basım(London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).

masız militanlık ve bunların hepsinin bölgedeki şiddet ve aktivizmi nasıl beslendigine dair birçok açıklama yapılmıştır. Bazı uzmanlar, IŞİD'in ortaya çıkışının temel kökenlerinin ve onun acımasız ideolojisinin, 2003 Irak işgali ve bunun müteakiben de-baasifikasyonunun (Baasçılığının bitirilmesi) sağladığı verimli zeminlerin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia etmektedirler; Suriye iç savaşı tarafından daha da şiddetlendirilmiştir.¹¹ Dahilin, eski Başbakan Maliki'nin Sünnileri dışlayan ve Şii'lere güç veren mezhep politikalarına atıfta bulunması, mevcut bekleyen çatlamayı genişleterek daha fazla yayılmasını sağlamıştır.¹² Ayrıca bazıları; grubun kökeninin, İslam'ı fetih ve halifelik dini olarak radikal veya aşırılıkçı yorumlamalarından kaynaklandığını değerlendirmektedirler.¹³

Bu çalışmalar ve diğer ilgili çalışmalar, bölgedeki gidişat (çatışma, militanlık ve militan gruplar hakkında) ve özellikle de IŞİD hakkındaki konularla ilgili mevcut bilgilere katkıda bulunmuştur. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışmalar, grubun ideolojisinin ve onun bölgeciliğin oluşumuna verilen dikkatin daha az olduğunu ve atışmanın aynı zamanda cazibesini ve militanlığını nasıl körüklediğini ilginç bir şekilde ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Grubun ideolojik yapısını, bunun militanlığını ve bölgeciliğini nasıl beslediğini inceleyen az sayıda araştırma ca-

¹¹Ali Khedery, "Iraq in Pieces," *Foreign Affairs [Dış İşleri]*, Eylül 22, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-09-22/iraq-pieces>.

¹²Khedery ve diğerleri, literatür taramasında da görülebileceği gibi bu mezhep önyargularına ulaşmıştır.

¹³William Faizi McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse : The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State [IŞİD'in Kıyameti: Tarih, Strateji ve İslam Devleti'nin Kıyamet Tasavvuru]* (New York : St. Martin's Press., 2015).

lışması var gibi görülmektedir. Bu nedenle, Eleştirel Yapılandırmacılık kullanarak yapılan bu çalışma, grubun bölgeciliğin yanında ideolojik oluşumunu ve bunun, grubun daha iyi anlaşılmasında nasıl yardımcı olabileceğini araştırmaktadır. Özellikle araştırma, “aşırı dışlayıcı ideoloji” nin oluşumunu ve bunun “dışlayıcı bölgeciliği” için bir temel teşkil ettiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Araştırma Sorusu: İslam Devleti'nin ideolojisi nasıl oluşturulmuştur?

Çalışmanın amacı

Çalışma, Eleştirel Sosyal Yapılandırmacılık (CSC) çerçevesinde, “ultra dışlayıcı ideolojisi”nin oluşumuna derinlemesine önem veren IŞİD’i, onun militanlığını ve “dışlayıcı” kavramını nasıl desteklediğini analiz etmenin ve anlaşmanın bir yolunu açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle çalışma, grubun kendi topraklarıyla birleştirdiği karmaşık ideolojik yapının anlaşılır ve açık bir şekilde açıklanılmasına dayanan kapsamlı bir analitik araç geliştirmeyi ümit etmektedir. Bu nedenle, çalışma İDlarındaki literatürü, özellikle ideolojisi ve territoryallığı açısından önemli ölçüde artırmayı umuyor. Bunu yaparken, çalışma MENA bölgesindeki militan gruplar veya militanlıklar üzerindeki kapsamlı araştırmalara katkıda bulunacaktır.

Sınırlandırma

Bu araştırmanın kapsamı mütevazidir. İslam Devleti'nin ideolojik kökenlerini, kompozisyonunu ve onun toprak arayışını, Eleştirel Yapılandırmacılık mercekleri aracılığıyla nasıl teşvik ettiğini araştırmayı hedefliyor. Bu, İD hakkındaki anlayışımızı arttırmaya kesinlikle yardımcı olsa da, hiçbir şekilde kapsamlı değildir. Kuruluşun konu ile ilgili diğer yönleri eksik kalmaktadır. Geniş kapsamlı araştırma, sınırlarının ötesinde aşırı genelleştirilmemelidir. Özellikle, İD'in ideolojisine dair derinlemesine bir anlayışın, MENA bölgesindeki grubu, militanlığını ve belki de diğer militan grupları (militanlığı) anlamada nasıl yardımcı olabileceğini anlama çabasıdır. Özette, çalışma, grubun ideolojik yapısının ne anlama geldiğini ve bunun militanlığını açıklamaya nasıl yardımcı olabileceğini incelemeye çalışan giriş veya temel bir çalışmadır. Gerektiğinde birkaç ülke ile ilgilenecek, ancak odaklanılan başlıca ülkeler Suriye, Irak ve bir dereceye kadar Libya.

İKİNCİ BÖLÜM

İkinci bölüm, sosyal Yapılandırmacılık 'nin (genellikle Yapılandırmacılık olarak adlandırılır), Uluslararası İlişkiler (IR), temel kurallarının, yapılandırmacıların burs içerisindeki varyasyonları ve eserlerinin gösterildiği gibi sosyal teorisi olarak gelişimlerini araştırp, bazı onde gelen akademisyenler, yapılandırmacılık

eleştirileri ve İslam Devleti (İD) gibi devlet dışı militan grupların ideolojik anayasasını anlamakta eleştirel sosyal Yapılandırmacılık yarar.

Genel olarak yapılandırmacılık (konvansiyonel ve kritik varyantlar), neorealizm ve neoliberalizm gibi uluslararası ilişkileri anlama konusundaki iyi bilinen teorik yaklaşımın aksine, fikirlerin (ideolojiler), kimliklerin, anlamaların, çıkarların sosyal olarak nasıl ortaya çıkarıldığına ve bunların nasıl gerçekleştiğine çok dikkat eder. Devlet ve devlet dışı aktörlerin eylemlerini ve eylemsizliğini etkileyebilir. Her ikisi de uygulamaların ve kimliklerin insan ajansının ürünleri nasıl olduğunu göstermeye çalışıyor. Hem öznellik, hem de sosyal uygulamalara verilen anlam, aktör ve yapının ortak yapısı ve iktidar ile bilgi arasındaki bağlantıya inanırlar. Bunlar, İslam Devleti (İD) gibi militan grupları anlamaya çalışırken değerli araçlardır. Fakat ne yazık ki, yapılandırmacılığın terörizmi ve militan terör ağlarını açıklamaya katkısı görünmüyor gibi görünüyor. Bu çalışma böyle bir teorik boşluğu doldurmaya katkıda bulunmayı umuyor.

Wendt, Finnemore, Hopf, Katzenstein ve diğerleri gibi anahtar yapılandırmacıların örneklenmiş eserleri, odaklarının devletler ve uluslararası sistem (ya da uluslararası toplum) ve iç meselelerin bir devletin uluslararası arenada davranışını nasıl şekillendirdiği konusunda daha az olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, militanlıkla ilgili genel literatür ve IŞİD'e odaklananlar teorik olarak neredeyse kavramsallaştırılmaktadır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin özellikle de uluslararası

rası militan örgütlerinin çalışması için en uygun olmasına rağmen, bu konuda çalışmaların bir yönü var gibi görünmektedir.

Yapilandırmacılık; devlet dışı aktörlerin, özellikle de silahlı militan grupların ve onların kimlikleri, istekleri, ilgilerinin; kültürel, yerel, dini, tarihi desteklerin yanı sıra teritoryal ve uluslararası bir sistem tarafından nasıl şekillendirildiğini anlamada çok faydalı olabilir.

Kimliğin eleştirel yapıllandırmacılık ile kavramsallaştırılması, geleneksel yapıllandırmacılıktan daha derindir. Geleneksel yapıllandırmacılar kimliği bazı sosyal uygulamaların, özellikle de güvenlik olaylarının açıklayıcı bir değişkeni olarak görürler.

Bununla birlikte, eleştirel yapıllandırmacılık, bazı sosyal kalıpları, özellikle güvensizlikleri anlamlandırmak için kimliklerin bileşimini anlamaya çalışır. Yani, kimlikleri belirli davranış kalıplarıyla ilişkilendirmek yerine, insanların belirli bir kimliğe ve bununla ilişkili anlatılanları nasıl tanımladıklarını merak ediyorlar. Eleştirel yapıllandırmacılık; kimlikleri, geleneksel yapıllandırmacıların belirli davranışsal desenleri açıklamak için vermesi ve kullanması gibi kabul etmek yerine; bu kimliklerin kökenlerini keşfetmek ve anlamak istemektedir. Böyle bir perspektif ile İslam Devleti'nin ideolojik kompozisyonunu daha derin bir bakış açısıyla daha iyi anlamaya çalışmak bu çalışma için çok faydalı olacaktır.

ID'in ideolojisini "bir verilen" olarak kabul ediyorlar ve eylemlerinin ve eylemsizliklerinin bunun tarafından nasıl dikte edildiğini açıklamaya çalışırlar. Bu çalışmada Eleştirel Yapıllandırmacılık'ın etkinliği, ideolojik bir yapının bile-

şimi temeline dayanıyor. Bu nedenle, eleştirel yapılandırmacı yaklaşım, İD'in ne olursa olsun savunmaya hazır olduğu bu tek gerçeğe nasıl inandığını ortaya çıkarmak konusunda çalışmaya yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu kimliğin ifade edildiği araçların analizi, bu çalışma için çok önemlidir. Bu nedenle, dil veya söylemler bu konuda esastır. Bu araştırmmanın amaçları doğrultusunda, ID 'in resmi sözcüğünün söylem analizleri kullanılmaktadır.

Ayrıca, bazı açılardan, geleneksel yapılandırmacılar kimliğin başlangıç ve bitiş noktalarına sahip olduğunu görürler, ancak eleştirel yapılandırmacı kimlik formasyonu devam eden bir süreçtir. Devam eden bir süreç olan bir kimlik oluşumuna dair bu anlayış, militan bir grubun kimliği veya İD gibi bir ideolojinin anlaşılması söz konusu olduğunda büyük yarar sağlar. Sırayla, uluslararası yapı kendisini etkilerken bir yandan da İD'nin etkilediği uluslararası yapı ile aynı türden, sürekli devam eden bir 'yapı' vardır. Örneğin, İslam Devleti 2014 yazında halifeliği tekrar ilan ettiğinde, uluslararası topluluk, İslam Devleti'ne karşı küresel bir koalisyon kurarak tepki verdi. İD'in bombardımanı başladığında İD, sempatizanlarına düşmanları tarafından saldırıyla uğrayacağını söyleyerek kimliğini; satmak, biçimlendirmek ve yeniden şekillendirmek için kullandı. Aynı şekilde, İD'in ya da İD dışındaki herhangi bir terör örgütünün saldırısı olduğunda, uluslararası medya resmi olarak sorumluluk üstlenmeden önce, saldırıyı İD'ye yüklemeyi bekliyor gibi görünüyor. Bunun şimdî ve daha öncesinde yaptığı şey, İD'nin istediği yere saldırabilme kapasitesine sahip kaynak ve derinlikliği olan küresel bir terör ağı oluşturmaya yardımcı olmaktadır. ID,

yapmadığı bazı terör eylemlerinin sorumluluğunu belirsizce üstlenerek kendisini yansıtmaya çalışmaktadır.

Metodolojik olarak, eleştirel yapılandırmacılık, yapılan çalışma için en uygun gibi görünmektedir. Bazı temel öncüller, kavramları ve görüşleri diğer yapılandırmacı gruplarla (öncelikle konvansiyonel yapılandırmacılık) paylaşmasına rağmen, eleştirel yapılandırmacılık, uyguladığı metodoloji ve sorduğu sorular ile öne çıkmaktadır. Metodolojik olarak, bu çalışma için çok önemli olan söylem analizi gibi post-pozitivistik yöntemlere izin vermek çoğulcudur. Buna karşılık, konvansiyonel yapılandırmacılık, yukarıda tartışılan konvansiyonel yapılandırmacıların çalışmalarında gözlemlenebilecek genel kalıpları ve yasaları formule etmeye çalıştığından, pozitivist çerçeveyeyle çalışmaktadır. Eleştirel Yapılandırmacılık, ‘aktörler; kimlikleri, fikirleri ve kuralları açısından yaptıkları şeye nasıl inanırlar?’ gibi soru çeşitlerinden ‘nasıl’ı sorar. Eleştirel bir yapılandırmacı, bu tür kimliklerin, fikirlerin ve normların bileşenini ve halklar arasında yazılı veya sözlü iletişim yoluyla nasıl yaratıldıkları bulmak ister. Devlet aktörlerine daha fazla odaklanan (devlet dışı aktörlerin önemini kabul etmesine ve bu çalışma için hala çok faydalı olmasına rağmen) yapısal veya konvansiyonel yapılandırmacıların aksine, eleştirel yapılandırmacılık, devlet dışı aktörlere daha fazla önem veriyor veya daha çok vurgulamaktadır. Bu bağlamda post modernizmden ve metinsel analistik yöntemlerinden yararlanırlar.

Bu çalışma için, Eleştirel Yapılandırmacılığın metodolojik kaygıları, bu çalışmanın üstlenmeye çalıştığı sorulara mükemmel bir şekilde uyuyor. ID,

“ultra dışlayıcı hibrit ideolojisine” nasıl inanıyor? ”Bu ideolojinin kompozisyonları nasıl oluşuyor? Bunun gibi sorulara cevap bulmak için, IS’nin yazılı ve sözlü iletişiminin (hem İngilizce Dergilerinde hem de çevrilmiş bazı Arapça belgelerde) medya üzerinden yayınlanması vazgeçilmezdir.

Bu tür soruları yanıtlama girişiminde, Doty’nin metodolojik yaklaşımından içgörü alınacaktır. Metodolojik olarak, ‘*Söylenmel Uygulamalar Yaklaşımı*’ olarak adlandırdığı bir metinsel analiz yaklaşımı benimsemiştir.¹⁴ Doty, bu yaklaşımla “gerçekliğin dilsel inşasını” vurgulamaktadır.¹⁵ Michel Foucault, Jacques Derida, Shapiro, Campbell Ashley ve Walker’ın çalışmalarının, kendisinin de belirttiği gibi bu metodolojiyi benimseme konusunda kendisine ilham verdieneni belirtmek gereklidir.¹⁶ Özellikle önemli olan, analitik kategorileri sağlamak için bazı kavramları kullanmasıdır. Bu kavamlar “öngörme”, “ön varsayıım” ve “özne konumlandırma”dır.¹⁷ Doty tarafından geliştirilen bu metinsel analiz mekanizmaları, İslam Devleti ile ilgili soruları cevaplamak amacıyla benimsenip kullanılacaktır. Bu, grubun söylemlerini çevirmiçi yayınları, dergileri, çevrilmiş

¹⁴Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction [Sosyal Yapılandırmacılık olarak Dış Politika].”

¹⁵Roxanne Lynn Doty, 302.

¹⁶Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction [Sosyal Yapılandırmacılık olarak Dış Politika].”

¹⁷Roxanne Lynn Doty, 306.

belgeleri, videoları ve diğerleri gibi medya kuruluşları aracılığıyla analiz etmede kullanılacaktır.

'Önceden varsayımlı' ile dilin her zaman önceden belirlenmiş bir anlamı içerdigini ve en açık ifadenin bile bunun istisnası olmadığını ifade eder. Örneğe bakıldığından, bir kişi başka birisine "Köpeğiniz dövmeyi bırakınız mı?" diye sorsa, bu basit sorudan birçok ön varsayımlı ortaya çıkıyor. Soruyu sorgulayıcının sorgulama hakkı olduğunu düşündürmektedir. Ayrıca, sorunun kendisi, köpek denilen bir şeyin varlığını ve sorgulanan kişinin, sahip olduğu köpeği dövme alışkanlığına sahip olduğunu kabul etmektedir.. Bu varsayımlının metinsel bir analiz mekanizması olarak önemi, belirli şeylerin başkalarının değil gerçek olarak kabul edildiği yerlerde, belirli bir dünyanın nasıl kurgulandığı hakkında temel bilgi vermesidir.¹⁸

Metin analizi mekanizması olarak "öngörme", etiketleme yoluyla bir dünya inşa edilmesine yardımcı olur. Bunları değiştirmek için sıfat ve zarflar gibi yüklemeler kullanımı yoluyla konuların kalitesini vurgulayarak içerir. Onun verdiği bir örnek ise, 'ABD'nin adil oyun, özgürlük ve bağımsızlık diyarı' olduğunu belirtir. Bu cümle, Birleşik Devletler'in bu niteliklere sahip bir konu olduğunu tahmin ediyor. Bu nitelikler, öznelerin kimliğini yapabileceklerini söyler.¹⁹

Sonuncusu ama en önemlisi olarak metinsel mekanizma "konu konumlandırma" dır. Yukarıdaki iki araç için bir yapı olarak, itaat pozisyonu, 'önvarsası-

¹⁸Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction."

¹⁹Roxanne Lynn Doty.

yım' ve 'tahmin' tarafından mümkün hale getirilen konular arasındaki ilişkileri analiz etmek için izin verir.

Bazı önemli ilişkisel sınıflandırmalar, "destekçi", "muhalif", "arkadaş", "düşman", "biz" kavramlarını içerebilir. Bu kategorizasyonda, biri "üstün", diğerinin "aşağı", "medeni devlet", "haydut devlet" gibi bir ilişkide belirgin veya gizli bir "ötekileştirme" vardır.

Sonuçta bölüm, sosyal yapılandırmacılığın sosyal bir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi olarak gelişimini izlemiştir. Yapılandırmacılar, analiz ve metodoloji birimleri bakımından tekdüze olmadıklarından, yapılandırmacıların bilimleri arasındaki kilit farklılıklar kendi çalışmaları ile gösterilmiştir. Yapılandırmacılığın ana eleştirisini neorealistten gelmektedir. Bununla birlikte, her iki yaklaşımın da bazı temel kavamlar üzerinde hemfikir olduğu, ancak farklı analiz ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. İslam Devleti (İD) gibi devlet dışı ulusötesi militan gruplarını anlamada eleştirel yapılandırmacılığın faydası son derece önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, eleştirel yapılandırmacıların Doty'in Söytemsel Uygulama Yaklaşımı ve "mükün olup olmadığını" sorgulaması gibi metodolojisinin uygulanabilirliği, İslam Devleti'nin ideolojisini ve teritoryallığını anlamada paha biçilmezdi.

ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM

Üçüncü bölümde İslam Devleti'nin karmaşık ideolojik yapısı daha çok kendisinin en popüler iki propaganda dergisi olan *Dabiq* ve *Rumiyah*'taki söyleyişlerini inceleyeceğiz.

lemleri üzerinden irdelenenecektir.²⁰ Bu doğrultuda bir yapısalçı eleştirel söylem analizi yöntemi olan, Doty'nin “Söylemsel Pratikler Yaklaşımı”nı benimsemek faydalı olacaktır. Özellikle kendisinin “varsayma”, “sifatlandırma” ve “özne konumlandırma” olarak adlandırdığı kategorileri, ilgili söylem analizlerinde, bilhassa Dabiq ve Rumiyah dergilerinden yapılan alıntıların incelenmesinde kullanılacaktır.²¹

Dabiq kuzey Suriye yakınlarında ve ID'nin sıklıkla atıfta bulunduğu bir *badise* göre Kıyamet Günü'ne evrilecek olan eskatolojik olayların bir parçası addedilen Haçlı ordusuyla İslam ordusu arasındaki apokaliptik çarşışmanın gerçekleşeceği varsayılan şehrin adı.²² Bu hadise istinaden derginin çeşitli sayılarında Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi'nin vaazlarından birinde dile getirdiği “Kıvılcım Irak'ta parladı ve alevi şiddetlenmeye devam edecek -ta ki Dabiq'teki Haçlı ordularını yakana kadar” sözlerine atıfta bulunuluyor.²³ Rumiyah, Dabiq dergisinin halefi ve içeriği biraz daha kısa. Başlığı Roma anlamına geliyor. Rumiyah'ın bütün sayılarında, Al Zarqawi'nin halefinin “Ey Muvahhidler, Allah'a sevinin ki cihadımızdan ancak Rumiyah'ın (Roma) zeytin ağaçlarının altında

²⁰Dabiq ve Rumiyah dergileri farklı dillerde yayınlanıyor ancak ben İngilizce nüshaları kullandım. Arapça'dan çeviri belgeler de dahil olmak üzere propaganda videoları ve çevrimiçi yayınlar gibi diğer eşit derecede önemli materyallerden de yararlanılmıştır.

²¹Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”

²²Dabiq Sayı 1, “Dabiq,” 4–5 burada söz konusu hadis alıntılmış.

²³Dabiq Sayı 1, 4–5 bu alıntıya Dabiq'in hemen her sayısında rastlamak mümkün.

dileneceğiz” sözlerine yer veriliyor- Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.²⁴ Bu sözler Roma'yı daha önce Müslümanların fethettikleri gibi sembolik olarak yenmeden, ID'nin şiddet dolu cihatlarından vazgeçmeyeceğini ifade ediyor.²⁵

Hem dergilerin isimleri hem de yukarıda yer verilen alıntılar ID'nin bu eskatolojik kehanetler ve kendilerinin bu kehanetlerdeki rolü hakkında sarsılmaz bir “varsayımsal” bilgi ve inanca sahip olduğunu gösteriyor. Dabiq isminin seçilmesi yalnızca İslam ordusu ve Haçlı ordusu arasındaki apokaliptik çarışmanın burada gerçekleşeceğine olan güçlü inanca değil, ID'nin de bu çarışmaya önderlik edecek seçilmiş ordu olduğu iddiasına dayanıyor. Aynı şekilde Rumiyah isminin seçilmesi de Roma'nın yüzyıllar önce olduğu gibi, bu kez ID'nin önderliğinde Müslümanlar tarafından fethedileceğine olan kesin inancın bir tezahürü. ID'nin bu kehanetlere ve yorumlarına beslediği inanç öyle güçlü ki, söz konusu kehanet ve yorumlara bahsi geçen tüm dergilerde tekrar tekrar yer veriliyor. Ve bunların Peygamber'in gerçek sözleri olduğu varsayılıyor. Peki bu hadis ID'nin çarpmayı yürütecek ordu olduğundan bahsediyor mu? Çarışma gelecekte gerçekleşecek bir çarışma mı yoksa zaten gerçekleşti mi? ID'nin sözcüklerini gerçek anlamlarıyla alarak okuduğu bu hadisin daha derin başka bir anlamı olabilir mi? Böylece insan edimiyle belli bir gerçekliğin inşası-

²⁴ID'nin Rumiyah Dergisi Sayı 1, “RUMIYAH,” *Al Hayat Media Centre*, 2016, kapak sayfası.

²⁵Peter Sarris, *Empires of Faith : The Fall of Rome to the Rise of Islam, 500-700*, Oxford History of Medieval Europe (Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011).

na yarayan (söylem vasıtasyyla) bir yapıtaşrı oluşturulmuş oluyor ki bu edim kap-sayıcı olmaktan uzak bir varsayımsal bilgiye dayanıyor.

ID'nin ultra-ayrımçı melez ideolojisinin köken ve yapısının izini sürdürmek oldukça karmaşık bir iş. Basitleştirmek ve homojen kategorilere ayırmak mümkün değil. Bir araya getirilmiş farklı ideolojilerden izler taşıyor. Bunların içinde öne çıkan Vahhabi, Kutub ve Sahwa yazınındaki bazı kavramların teolojik yorumlanması, benimsenmesi yahut genişletilmesi şeklindeki kullanım. ID'nin ultra-ayrımçı ideolojisi Vahhabilik, Kutubculuk ve Sahwa ulemasından ilham alıyor. Temelde Vahhabilikten, bazen değişikler bazen genişletmeler yaparak Tevhit, WB, Bid'a kavramlarını alıyor ve şeriatın hihad (cezai) kısmını benimsiyor. Cahiliye, Hâkimiyet ve saldırgan cihat kavramları ise Kutubculukla bağlantılıdır. Sahwa ulemasından gelen temel kavramlar öncelikle Şii karşıtlığı ve saldırgan cihat ve daha az ölçüde de Hâkimiyet Tevhidi ve şeriat. Bu üç ideolojiden gelen bu kavramlar, orta yolda buluşan oklar gibi ID'nin ultra-ayrımçı ideolojisine işaret ediyor ve farklı oranlarda katkılarıyla onu inşa ediyorlar. Ayrıca 11 Eylül saldırılarını takip eden ve yanlış hesaplarla gerçekleştirilen Irak (ve bir dereceye kadar Afganistan) işgalleri ID'nin ideolojisini sarsmaktan çok pekiştirmiş, çünkü ID bu işgal ve sonuçlarını işgal kuvvetlerine ve destekçilerine olan nefretlerini meşrulaştırmak için bir dayanak olarak kullanmıştır. Arap Baharı ve akabinde gerçekleşen gelişmelerle çatışmaların özellikle Suriye'de "mezhep merkezli" hale gelmesi; ID'nin özellikle WB, "tekfircilik" ve "Şii karşıtlığı" doğrultusunda kendi ideolojisini yaymasına ve pekiştirmesine

oldukça yardımcı olmuştur.

Bu ultra/ayrımçı melez ideolojinin olası sonuçlarını gereğinden fazla vurgulamak neredeyse imkânsız. Yolun sonu Hassan Hassan'ın haklı gerekçelerle “tekfircilik içinde tekfircilik” olarak adlandırdığı duruma çıkıyor.²⁶ Tekfircilik temel olarak bir Müslümanın dini bir inanç, doktrin veya uygulamadaki yorum farklılıklarını nedeniyle (özellikle de Bid'a ve WB kavramları kullanılarak) dinden aforoz edilmesidir. Bu da kendisi gibi Müslüman olan birini Sünni (Sufiler) ya da Şii olsun daha önce belirtildiği gibi kafir ilan etmek anlamına gelir. İD bağlamında, tekfircilik o kadar aşırıdır ki, ne kadar kemikleştigiini anlatmak için tekfircilik içinde tekfircilik olarak betimlenmektedir. Bu da ID'nin görüşlerine karşı çıktııkları takdirde, örgüt üyelerinin kendi gibi Sünnileri (cihatçı militanlar olsalar bile) öldürmeye yetkilerinin olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu da Yezidiler, Hristiyanlar ve diğer azınlıklara yönelik aşırı nefret ve kötü muameleyi normal kılıyor. İD askeri ve teritoryal olarak mağlup edilmiş olsa bile, böyle karmaşık ve sofistike bir ideoloji kolayca ortadan kalkmayacaktır. Fakat öyle görünüyor ki, ID'yi askeri olarak ezmek için uygulanan askeri taktiklerin aksine, ultra/ayrımçı melez ideolojisine nasıl karşı konulacağına dair somut bir taktik bulunmamaktadır.

DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜMÜ

Kontrolü altındaki geniş toprakları kaybetmiş olmasına karşın IŞİD'in

²⁶Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State.”

en etkileyici yönlerinden biri hâlâ bölgeleri almaya devam etmesi ve yönetmeye çalışması olmaya devam etmektedir. IŞİD neredeyse beş yıldır sınırlarını koruma, idare etme ve hatta bu sınırları mümkün olduğu kadar genişletme konularında ciddi olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Hem Halifeliğin hem de topraklarını sürekli olarak genişletme niyetinin ilanı beyanlarında belirgin bir şekilde sezilmektedir. *Dabiq*'in ilk sayısının başlığı “Halifenin dönüşü”²⁷ iken beşinci sayısının başlığı “*Allah’ın izniyle* kalıcı olmak ve genişlemek” idi²⁸. En ünlü sloganlarından biri *baqiya wa tamaddad* (kalıcı ve genişleyici)²⁹ şeklindedir. Bu iddia köklerini gayet güçlü bir şekilde ‘ultra dışlayıcı hibrid ideolojisinden’ almaktadır. Bu, IŞİD'in bölgeciliğinin temeli olarak hizmet eden ideolojidir. IŞİD'in inandığı doktrin ve pratikler o kadar acımasızdır ki bunların uygulanması için kendi bögesine ihtiyacı vardır. Zirve döneminde kendi iddiası olan halifeliğe yer açmak için Irak ve Suriye'nin parçalar koparmakla uğraşması bu yüzdedir. Dışlayıcı (varsayılan) bir tarzda İslami olan bölgeciliğin temelleri nedir?

Bu bölümde ‘önkoşul’, ‘yüklemleme’ ve ‘özne konumlandırma’ kategorizasyon mekanizmalarının yanında “Tutarsız Uygulamalar Yaklaşımı” kullanılarak bir önceki bölümde tartışılan “ultra dışlayıcı hibrid ideolojisinin” ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak IŞİD'in bölgeciliği tartışılmaktadır. IŞİD'in dışlayıcı bölgecili-

²⁷Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq,” front page.

²⁸Islamic State's Dabiq Issue 5, “Remaining and Expanding,” October 2014, front page by Allah's will is written in Arabic.

²⁹See Dabiq Issue 1, “Dabiq”; Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS as Revolutionary State,” November “17, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-revolutionary-state>.

ğinin ideolojik kökleri karmaşık niteliğine karşın en iyi şekilde ‘ultra dışlayıcı hibrid ideoloji’ bağlamına oturtularak anlaşılabilir. Yani teritoryalite önceki bölümde hibrid dışlayıcı kökleriyle anlaşıldığı ve açıklandığı şekilde İslami Kavramlardan da köken alır (örneğin Kutbism ve Vahabilik, *sahwah al-Islamiyah* ilmi). Bu bölümde IŞİD’in teritoryal halifeliğe giden yol haritasının, teritoryal yöntemleri ve idari örgütünün araştırmasından önce grubun bölgeciliğinin ultra dışlayıcı niteliğinin temelleri Dar-ül İslam ve Dar-ül Cahiliye kavramları üzerinden araştırılmaktadır. Bunlar araştırılırken taban olarak benimsenmiş olan ama bazı durumlarda teritoryalciliğin gerçekleştirilmesi isteğiyle değiştirilen veya genişletilen dışlayıcı hibrid ideoloji vurgulanmıştır. Önceki bölümde IŞİD’in dışlayıcı ideolojisinin oluşturulması için kullanılan bu Kavramların çoğu grubun bölgeci kavranışının kullanılışında da görünür durumdadır ve bunların tamamlayıcı nitelğini vurgulamaktadır.

İslam Devleti teritoryal Dar-ül Kufr ve Dar-ül İslam dikotomisinin radical yorumunu kendi dışlayıcı bölgeciliğinin temeli olarak kullanmıştır. Dünyanın fiziksel olarak iki kampa ayrılması gerektiği “varsayılan” inancına dayanarak, halifeliğin kurulması ve söylemlerinde görülebilen örgütsel stratejilerinin oluşturulması yolunda bir yol harası geliştirmiştir. İdeolojik olarak, aldığı ilham önceki bölümde bölgeciliği açısından tartışılan kavramlardan gelmekte ve grubun doktrinin ve bölgeciliğinin birbirini tamamladığını vurgulamaktadır. Doktrinin uygulamaya konmak için kendi alanına ihtiyaç duymakta, teritoryalite ise varlık nedeninin haklı gösterilmesi için doktrine ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

IŞİD ‘yüklemleme’ açısından kendini yalnızca İslam kampına koymamakta, aynı zamanda kendini İslam’ın ve Müslümanların gerçek temsilcisi konumuna koymakta, Kufr veya Cahiliye kampındakilerin ise cehennem azabıyla karşı karşıya gelmeleri gerekmektedir. Bu durumda İslam veya halifeliğin bulunduğu yer her ‘gerçek’ Müslümanın sınırları mümkün olduğu kadar genişletmesi veya buna yardım etmesi gereken bir yer olduğu ve dünya üzerindeki diğer her yerin ve buralarda yaşayanların mahvolmayı hak ettikleri bir yer olduğu ‘özne konumlandırma’ işine girişilmesi kolaylaştırılmaktadır. Temeli inşa ettikten sonra ‘halifeliğe giden yol haritasının’, teritorialite öncesi ve sonrası pekiştirmesi ve idaresinin peşinde koşulması için kavramların ultra dışlayıcı ideolojiye göre anlaşılan hususlarına dayanmıştır. Saldırgan Cihat, Şeriat (ve hudut), hâkimiyet ve cahiliye kavramlarının aşırı yorumları da gruba bu açıdan katkıda bulunmuştur.

Bölgelinin idaresi açısından, IŞİD’in çok sayıda *diwananat* kullanmasına karşın bunlardan dördünün halifeliği tek parça halinde tuttuğu açıklıktır. Halife halifeliğin sembolü olarak hizmet eder ve kabilelerin ve grupların bağlılıklarını kabul eder. Vilayetlerle ilişki özel bir ilişkilidir ve halifeliğin kontrolü altındaki bölgeler açısından genişlemesini sağlar. Diğer taraftan şeriat mahkemeleri ve hisbe arasında da özel bir ilişki vardır. Şeriat mahkemeleri halifelikte yaşayanlar arasındaki anlaşmazlıklarda ve IŞİD’e göre İslami olmayan anlaşmazlık konularında yargı görevini yerine getirir. Aynı zamanda Hisbe insanların şeriat kurallarına uymalarını sağlarken onun için bir referans noktası sağlar. Hisbe neyin yasal olduğu, neyin olmadığı açısından şeriat mahkemelerinin talimatları üzeri-

ne hareket eder. Ayrıca faillere uygun cezaların verilmesi için bunları mahkemelere sevk eder. Aslında Hisbe mahkemelerin talimat verdiği cezaları infaz eder.

IŞİD sonučta ortalama fiziksel bölge içinde Dar-ül İslam ve Dar-ül Küfür teorik kavramlarının kullanılması ve genişletilmesinde başarılı olmuştur. Bunu yaparken dışlayıcı ideolojiyi oluşturan Wahabizm, Kutbism ve Sahwah ilimlerine dayanmışlardır. Bu ideolojiler bir İslami devletin veya halifeliğin fethi, pekiştirilmiş edilmesi ve idaresiyle ilgili herhangi bir tasarıya sahip olmasalar da IŞİD barbarlığı nedeniyle degersiz de olsa bunun için bir yol göstermiştir. IŞİD bölgeciliği fiziksel olarak yenilmiştir, ama mücadele bitmiş olmaktan çok uzaktır.

SONUÇ

Soruşturma şu soru ile başladı: İslam Devleti (İD)'nin ideolojisi nasıl kurulmuştur? Bu soru, İslam Devleti'nin söylemlerini Dabiq ve Rumiyah dergileri aracılığıyla keşfetmeye yol açtı. Bu söylemler, eleştirel yapılandırmacıının "Söylenmesel Uygulama Yaklaşımı"nı kullanarak "ön varsayımlar", "tahmin" ve "konu konumlandırma" kategorileriyle analiz edilmiştir. İslam Devleti'nin ideolojik yapısının karmaşık olduğu ve kendisini kolay bir anlayışa kavuşturmadığı bulunmuştur. Buna rağmen, bir çok sayıda eserin, bu IS ideolojisini tek veya genel bir ideolojik kökene bağlayarak aşırı basitleştirmesi ilginçtir. Bu araştırma, gru-

bun karmaşık ideolojisinin oluşumlarına söylemleri aracılığıyla daha derine inerек bu sonuçlara varmıştır.

İD konusundaki farklı yönlerine odaklanan araştırmaların aksine, özellikle grubun tarihsel gelişimi ve barbarca terör eylemleri, bu araştırma, İD'nin grubu ve eylemlerini tanımlayan ideolojisinin oluşumuna odaklanmıştır. Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerde gösterildiği gibi, İslam Devletinin ideolojisi doktriner ve territorial kaygılarla bölünmüş durumdadır. Her iki fragman da karmaşık bir bütündür. Ancak, onlara ayrı ayrı davranmak, ancak bütünlüklerini tanımak, grubun ideolojisinin iki yönünün daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlar. IS'in ideolojisi üç ideolojinin sınırları içinde birleştirilebilir ve yerleştirilebilir - Kutbizm, Vahabizm ve sahwi ulama' (Sahwa Bilimi). İslam Devleti, bu üç ideolojinin insafsız ideolojilerinin inşasına yönelik olarak anladığı bazı kavramları benimsemiştir, ve haklı olarak 'ultra dışlayıcı hibrit ideolojisi' olarak kabul edilebilir. İlginç bir şekilde, bu ideoloji dışlayıcı bölge için temel oluşturur.

Çalışmanın genel bulguları Şekil 5.1'de gösterilmektedir. Şekil 5.1'de gösterildiği gibi, İD doktrini ve bölge, grubun genel olarak tanımlanabilir ideolojisini desteklemek için bir araya gelir, dolayısıyla, genel ideolojilerini destekleyen ortak yapıtaşlarını oluşturur. Grubun doktrini ve bölgeciliği sırasıyla Wahhabism, Qutbism ve Sahwah biliminin üç ideolojisi tarafından desteklenmektedir.

Vahabizm (Selefi-cihatizm veya takfirizm gibi çeşitli versiyonlarında), İD'in en çok ilişkili olduğu ideolojidir. Bununla birlikte, grubun, Vahabizm kavramlarına ek olarak, ideolojisini genişletmek ve inşa etmek için Kutbizm ve Sahwa bili-

miyle bağlantılı olabilecek bazı kavramları benimsediği bulunmuştur. Vahabizm'de İslam Devletinin çıkardığı düşünceler Tevhid, Bid'a, WB ve seriatın cezai yönleridir (hudud), Şekil 5.1'de görüldüğü gibi. Örneğin, WB nosyonuyla ilgili olarak, üçüncü bölümde gösterildiği gibi ana akım Wahhabi öğretisi, onu bir kalp meselesi olarak kabul etmek ve inkar eden kişinin kendisinden değil, kâfirlerin davranışlarından nefret etmektir. Ancak İslam Devleti, kişinin eylemleri ya da eylemsizlikleri sonucu düşman olarak görülen birisine fiziksel olarak saldırmayı, öldürmeyi ve baştan çıkarmayı kapsayacak şekilde genişletti. Bunu, yalnızca sıradan Müslümanlara değil, İslami inanç hakkındaki insafsız yorumlarına ve uygulamalarına atıfta bulunmayan bilgin ve diğer militan cihatçılara saldırmak için genişletmedirler. Bu, İslam Devleti'nin söylemleri ile "WB" nin, Allah düşmanı olan herkese ve Allah inananlarına grup tarafından fiziksel olarak saldırmak anlamına geldiğini varsaymakla bilinmektedir. Ayrıca, başkalarını 'kufr imamları', 'kötü imamlar', mürtedler vb. olarak etiketleyerek de tahminde bulunurlar. Daha sonra, öznelerini düşman olarak etiketlediği kişilere konumlandırma açısından yerleştirir ve bu nedenle kanlarının akmasını meşrulaştırır.

Aynı şekilde, ceza kanunu ile ilgili olarak, Şeyh İbn Wahhab'ın Zina'yı (feragatname) taahhüdü üzerine taşlama yapmak için gönüllü olarak kendisine gelen bir kadının taşlanması onaylaması zamanının Ulamasından baskı almıştır. İslam Devleti, Hisba'sı aracılığıyla, bu ceza kanunlarından bazlarını, doğrulama için izlenen titiz bir prosedür olmaksızın uygulamaktadır. İnsanları takip etmekte, Zina'yı işlemekle suçlamaktadırlar ve bir ceza kanunu çıkarılmaktadır.

Şeriat'ın İslam Devleti'ne geldiğinde en göze çarpan yönleri, aslında Şeriat'ın bütün kümesinin sadece küçük bir kısmını oluşturduğu ve çoğu durumda tatlmin edilmesi gereken neredeyse imkansız koşulların gerekli olduğu ceza yönleridir.

Düete bir diğer destek direğî (IS'in ideolojisi ve teritoryallığı) Kutubizmdir. Şekil 5.1'de görüldüğü gibi, İslam Devletinin Kutbîzm ile bağlantılı olabilecek ana kavramları Jahiliyah, Hakimiyyah, saldırgan Cihad ve Şeriat'tır. Cahiliyah, Kutb'un düşüncesine göre, hakimiyet, şeriat ve taarruz Cihadının nedenidir. Yani, dünya 'neo-Jahiliyyah'a sarıldı çünkü Müslüman Ümmetin inancını uygulamak için bir İslam Devletine veya halifeliğe ihtiyacı var. Yani Cahiliyah, İslam'ı temel olarak kullanmayan bir şeydir ve bu nedenle zorla mücadele edilmeli ve bunun yerine İslami olan bir şeyle değiştirilmelidir. Kesin olarak, IS'nin desteklediği şey budur. İslam Devleti'nin Kutbîzm'deki düşünceleri, ideolojisini ve teritoryallığını sağlayan iki ucu keskin bir kılıçtır. İdeoloji açısından, Cahiliyah, kutbîzmden anlaşıldığı gibi, aynı anda Tawhid ve teritoryallik ile güçlü bir bağa sahiptir. Dolayısıyla, eğer Tevhid, İslami tek tanrılığın tanınması ve onaylanması ise, Cahiliye olan bir fikir "Tevhit karşımı" ya da Şirkir. Cahiliye olarak sınıflandırılan herhangi bir fikir veya sistem, İslami inancının bu yönünü otomatik olarak tanımadığı için böyledir. Teritoryal olarak, bu kavram, İslam Devleti'nin düşüncesine göre, geleneksel "ulus-devletlerin" gayrı meşru olduğu anlamında kullanışlıdır, çünkü Allah'ın kanunlarını (şeriat) tanımadalar veya bununla yönetmezler. Aslında, İD'nin söylemleri ile gösterildiği gibi, geleneksel

yasalarla karar vermeyi kabul eden Müslümanları mürtedler olarak görürler. Bu sorunu çözebilmek için, İslam Devleti, İslam inancını anlamalarına göre, Allah'ın yasalarının tam olarak uygulanacağı bir bölgeyi oymak gerektiğini düşünmüştür.

Teritoryallik, İD'lerin söylemleri ve ideolojisinde merkezi bir öneme sahiptir, ancak grubun ideolojisinin bu yönüne derinlemesine dikkat eden çok fazla araştırma bulunmamaktadır. Bunun nedeni genel olarak genel İD ideolojisinin bir parçası olarak görülmesi ve bu nedenle grubun diğer ideolojik yönleriyle ele alınmasıdır. İslam Devletinin teritoryal ideolojisinin temelinin tartışmalı mahiyetine rağmen, onu oluşturmayı ve uygulamayı başardı. Bu bölge tartışmalı çunkü aslında sadece Müslümanlar için fiziksel olarak ayrı bir bölge değildi. Dar-al Islam ve Dar-Kufr kavramları, İslam Devletinin dışlayıcı bölgelerinin temelini oluşturuyor. Kutbism'in eklemleri sayesinde, İD ve diğer militan örgütler tarafından fiziksel bölgeye atıfta bulunulduğu anlaşıldı ve kabul edildi. İlginçtir ki, Vahabizm ve sahra fikri desteklese de, bunun doğrudan ve net bir ifadesi yoktur. Bununla birlikte, Kutbism'in eklenmesi, dördüncü bölümde belirtildiği gibi çok açıktır. Bu fikrin bir uzantısı olarak, İD, Hilafat'ın hayatı geçirilmesi için bir yol haritası ve hem bölge öncesi hem de bölge sonrası dönemde konsolidasyon stratejileri geliştirmiştir. En ilginç gözlem, diwanaatin oluşumu açısından, bölge sonrası konsolidasyon stratejisindedir. Tüm diwanaat işverenleri için eşit derecede önemli bir amaca hizmet etse de, teritoryallik açısından, dört temel diwanaat işçinin ve hilafetinin teritoryallığı nosyonunu bir

arada tutmaktadır. Bunlar, Figür 5.1'de Teritoryallığın dışa vurumunda gösterildiği gibi, Khalifa'nın ofisi, Vilayet, hisbah ve şeriat mahkemeleridir. Detaylar, bölüm 4'teki grafik 4.1'de görülebilir. Teritoryal öneminin yanı sıra dördün (halifah, Hisbah, Diwanaat ve Vilayet), ultra dışlayıcı ideolojinin unsurlarından, özellikle Jahiliyah, şeriat ve hakimiyya'dan güçlü bir kök ve ilham aldıkları görülmüştür. Halife ofisi, Halife'nin yalnızca peygamberin ve halefinin soyundan değil, aynı zamanda Allah'ın şeriat ve hakimiyetinin uygulanmasını denetleyen tüm Müslüman Ümmet'in bir temsilcisi olarak görüldüğü varsayıımıma dayanmaktadır. Hisbah, tamamen halifeliğin, otantik şeriatları uyguladığına ve bu nedenle insanların tüm Cahiliye eylemlerini terk etmeleri ve özellikle İslam Devleti'nin kontrolündeki topraklarında şeriatlara uyması gereği varsayıımıma dayanmaktadır. Buna uymamak, halifelikte Şeriat'ın ceza yönlerini çoğunlukla denetleyen ve uygulayan Hisba'nın gazabını çağırır. Hisbah'in referans kurum olarak güçlendirilmesi, farklı konularda kararlar alan ve çeşitli kararlar alan Şeriat mahkemeleridir. Şeriat'ın temeli, konvansiyonel yasa veya mahkemelerle pratik yapan ve bunlara başvuran herkesin Tevhid'in ihbar veya ihlali olan bir şüphe eylemi gerçekleştirdiği varsayıımıma dayanmaktadır. El ele çalışan halifah, hisbah ve şeriat mahkemesi, Hakimiyyah'ın İD'nin kontrol edilen bölgelerinde hükm sürmesini sağlayacaktır.

İslam Devletinin topraklarının genişletilmesine destek olmak ve yardım etmek, Vilayet kavramı ve pratiğidir. Vilayet, yalnızca İslam Devleti altındaki illerin değil, aynı zamanda sınırsız teritoryal görüşlerinin gerçekleşmesinin de

etkili bir şekilde yürütülmesini sağlıyor. Bir Vilayet gerçek veya hayali olabilir ve IS'nin merkez üssünden olabildiğince uzak olabilir. Bu, Vilayet kavramı ve pratiği ile mümkün olmaktadır.

IS üzerinde yapılan çoğu çalışma teorik ve metodolojik olarak iyi bir konumda değildir. Bu çalışma, kendisini eleştirel Yapılandırmacılık sınırları içinde konumlandırırken, Roxanne Doty'nin Söylemsel Uygulama Yaklaşımı (bir söylem analizi metodolojik yaklaşımı) 'varsayımlını önleme' ve 'özne konumlandırma'nın' analitik araçlarını kategorize ederek yönlerini metodolojik olarak benimsemiştir. Eleştirel Yapılandırmacılığın fikirlerin ve ideolojilerin oluşumunu anlamadaki etkinliği vurgulanamaz. Özellikle, post-pozitivist yaklaşılara atıfta bulunma anlamındaki birçok metodoloji, İD söylemlerini iyice analiz etmeyi mümkün kılmıştır. "Ön varsayımlar", "tahmin" ve "konu konumlandırma"nın analitik araçları, IS'nin ideolojisinin yapısını anlamada son derece paha biçilmezdir. Grup, ideolojisini inşa etmek için pek çok önyargı, tahmin ve özne konumlandırma kullanır. Örneğin, gözlemlenen kilit bir "ön varsayımlar", yargı gününü müjdeleyen eskatolojik olaylarda oynayabileceği önemli bir rol oynadığına inanmaktadır. Ayrıca, belirli bir bölgeyle savaşacak ve onları ele geçirecek bir gruba atıfta bulunan ahadeitlerin çoğunun aslında İD'e atıfta bulunduğu varsaymaktadır. Gerçek bir halifelik ve tüm Müslüman ümmetin öncüsü olduğunu "öngörüyor". Bu, 'konumlandırma' aşamasını, kendisine karşı olan, düşman olduğu ve savaşılmayı hak eden bir kişi iken, nihai gerçeği temsil eden bir ortam oluşturur.

Sonuç olarak, araştırma İD'in ideolojik yapısına ilişkin olarak yeni bir bakış açısı sağlamıştır. Eleştirel Uygulamalar Yaklaşımı ile birlikte eleştirel Sosyal Yapılandırmacılığın çerçevesi olarak kullanılmasıyla birlikte, çalışma, İD'lerin "ultra dışlayıcı ideolojisi" nin oluşumuna ve dışlayıcı bögelerinin nasıl desteklendiğine odaklanan bir yaklaşımın anlaşılmasına yönelik bir yaklaşım sunmuştur. Bu nedenle, çalışma, grubun kendi ülkesiyle birleştiği karmaşık ideolojik yapının anlaşılır biçimde açıklanabileceği ve anlaşılabileceği bir analitik araç geliştirmiştir. Çalışma, Orta Doğu'daki İD'in dar alanına ve daha geniş militanlık (veya radikal ideolojileri) çalışmalarına iki ana yoldan katkıda bulunmuştur. Birincisi, İD ile ilgili bir boşluğu doldurma konusunda, İD'in ideolojisi ve bölge oluşumu üzerine 'verilen' bir varsayım olarak kabul etmeden iyice odaklanan bir araştırma olduğunu doldurdu. . Bu nedenle, özellikle doktrinin yanı sıra toprakları ve MENA bölgesindeki militan gruplar veya militanlıklar hakkındaki genel literatür ile ilgili olarak İD hakkındaki literatürü önemli ölçüde desteklemiştir. Bununla birlikte, araştırmanın mütevazı ve odaklanmış doğası, erişimini etkilemiştir. İslam Devleti'nin ideolojik kökenlerine, kompozisyonuna ve territorial arayışını, örgütün diğer yönlerini ihmal etmek üzere, eleştirel Yapılandırmacılık mercekleri aracılığıyla nasıl teşvik ettiğini ele aldı. Bu şüphesiz İD'in çalışmalarına katkıda bulunmasına rağmen, organizasyonun diğer yönleri ilgili kalıyor. Örneğin, İslam Devleti'nin El-Kaide gibi diğer militan örgütlerle karşı ideolojik yapısının karşılaştırmalı çalışması paha biçilmez olacaktır. Bu ilginç olurdu, çünkü El-Kaide ya da Nusra cephesi gibi diğer militan örgütleri aşırı bir

grup olarak görmesini sağlayan, İslam Devleti'nin ideolojisinin bu yönlerini taşıyacak. İslam Devleti'nin ideolojisini inşa etmek için benimsediği bazı fikirlerin İslami yasal geçerliliği hakkında derinlemesine bir anlayış dikkat çekici olmaktadır.

Bunun nedeni ise; Bu nosyonların çoğu çağdaş zamanlarımızda çekişmelidir, ancak İD onlara zaman ve mekân açısından ebedi davranıştır. Mesela, silahlı bir Cihad ne zaman meşru olabilir? Bunu kim yetkilendiriyor? Hangi temelde ve hangi bağlamda Hicret bugün hala izin veriliyor? İslami Çalışmalar ve Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında radikal ideolojileri ve militan grupları anlamada bilinçli bir disiplinlerarası işbirliği olasılığı var mı?

Bununla birlikte, bu çalışma, İD'yi ve bölgedeki diğer militan grupları ve radical ideolojileri anlamak için önemli keşiflerin yapılabileceği temel sağlam bir çalışma olarak görülebilir.

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