

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF GRICEAN REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS
OF
MEANING

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ŞULE NUR DİNÇER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SEPTEMBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sadettin Kirazcı
Director (Acting)

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. David Grünberg
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan (Ankara Uni., FEL) _____

Prof. Dr. David Grünberg (METU, PHIL) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aziz F. Zambak (METU, PHIL) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : ŞULE NUR DİNÇER

Signature :

ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF GRICEAN REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF MEANING

Dinçer, Şule Nur
M. A., Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

September 2019, 64 pages

The aim of this thesis is to examine Paul Grice's reductive analysis of the concept of non-natural meaning (meaning_{NN} for short). The two stages of Grice's reductive analysis will be outlined. The utterer's meaning in the first stage and utterance-type meaning in the latter will be explained. The thesis will state the important objections and amendments in chronological order made by the selected philosopher, as well as – if available – Grice's own response to the criticisms. We shall critically evaluate the objections raised and argue that circularity in Grice's 1957 analysis is evident. Finally, we conclude that Grice's Programme can be stated as flawed due to a failure to account for circularity.

Keywords: Meaning, Intention, Utterer's Meaning, Convention, Circularity

ÖZ

GRICE'İN İNDİRGEMECİ ANLAM ANALİZİNİN KRİTİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

Dinçer, Şule Nur
Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

Eylül 2019, 64 sayfa

Bu tezin amacı Paul Grice'in doğal olmayan anlam (meaning_{NN}) kavramının indirgemeci analizini incelemektir. Grice'in indirgemeci analizinin iki aşaması sunulmaktadır. İlk aşamada konuşmacı anlamı ve ikinci aşamada cümle anlamı açıklanmaktadır. Tezde, seçilen filozofların Grice'in indirgemeci analizine yaptığı önemli itiraz ve değişiklikler kronolojik sıra ile, ayrıca – eğer varsa – Grice'in eleştirilere verdiği cevaplar belirtilmektedir. Edilen itirazlar eleştirel olarak değerlendirilmekte ve Grice'in 1957 analizinde döngüsellik bariz olduğunu savunulmaktadır. Son olarak, Grice'in Programının döngüsellik açıklanamadığı için hatalı olarak ifade edilebileceği sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Anlam, Niyet, Konuşmacı Anlamı, Uzlaşım, Döngüsellik

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. David Grünberg for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Teo Grünberg for his crucial contributions to the thesis and valuable discussions on the content.

I thank my friend Tolgahan Toy and Assoc. Prof. Anna Bergqvist for discussing my initial ideas, for reading my work and giving subtle feedback.

I thank my parents for their endless support and encouragement. Without their substantial support this thesis could not have been completed. I thank my sister Müge Uğuz, for being my lifelong friend.

I also thank Erdem Dincer, for his emotional support, for always being there for me, and for simply being an amazing person.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. GRICE'S TWO-STAGE ACCOUNT OF NON-NATURAL MEANING.....	3
2.1 First Stage: Utterer's Meaning.....	3
2.2 Second Stage: Utterance-Type Meaning.....	13
3. SURVEY OF DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING GRICE'S PROGRAMME.....	16
3.1 Counterexamples Directed Against Sufficiency.....	18
3.1.1 Strawson.....	18
3.1.2 Searle.....	21
3.2 Counterexamples Directed Against Necessity.....	29
3.2.1 Platts.....	30
4. ON CHARGE OF CIRCULARITY.....	34
4.1 Causal Account.....	34
4.2 Possible Charge of Circularity.....	36
4.2.1 Strawson and Searle.....	36
4.2.2 Platts and Blackburn.....	42
5. CONCLUSION.....	44
REFERENCES.....	46
APPENDICES	
A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY.....	48

B. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM.....64

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to define the meaning of language, most scholars have traditionally been inclined to outline their questions concerning the concept in two forms: questions about the meanings of particular linguistic expressions (words, phrases, and sentences), and questions about the nature of linguistic meaning itself. This document is strongly focused on the former, seeing the latter of secondary relevance when contrasted with the potential learnings to be achieved when examining the nature of meaning within the domain of semantics.

A critical figure of note in this field is Herbert Paul Grice, a British philosopher of language. One of his contemporaries, Peter Frederick Strawson, set forth several questions regarding meaning in his Inaugural Lecture, "Meaning and Truth":

What is it for anything to have a meaning at all, in the way, or in the sense, in which words or sentences or signals have meaning? What is it for a particular sentence to have the meaning or meanings it does have?¹

Grice's work proposes answers for these questions via a semantical theory based on the communicative intentions of the utterers. According to his theory, the meaning of an utterance is defined in terms of non-semantic concepts, i.e. belief and intention to produce in an audience.

¹ Strawson, 1971, p. 171.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Grice's reductive analysis of the concept of non-natural meaning ($\text{meaning}_{\text{NN}}$, for short) and attempt to show that the Gricean Programme he proposed is, in fact, circular.

In Chapter 2, we will outline the two stages of Grice's reductive analysis of the concept of non-natural meaning. We will explain the utterer's meaning in the first stage and utterance-type meaning in the latter.

In Chapter 3, we shall give a survey of discussions that are related to Grice's Programme, stating the important objections and amendments in chronological order by beginning with Peter Frederick Strawson and finishing with Mark Platts. The structure in each subsection will be (i) the criticisms of Grice's account made by the selected philosopher, (ii) the philosopher's amendments to the theory, and – if available – (iii) Grice's own response to the criticisms.

In Chapter 4, we will make a critical evaluation of the objections raised first against the sufficiency, and second against the necessity of Grice's definition. We will claim that even though Grice's proposed analysis seemed to be successful at the beginning, circularity is evident.

Finally, in Chapter 5, we will conclude that a detailed examination of Grice's account of $\text{meaning}_{\text{NN}}$ reveals Grice's 1957 analysis as flawed due to a failure to account for circularity.

CHAPTER 2

GRICE'S TWO-STAGE ACCOUNT OF NON-NATURAL MEANING

Grice makes a distinction between the meaning of utterances (especially utterances of sentence-types of a natural language) and the meaning of utterance-types. In the first stage, Grice aims to define the meaning of utterances in terms of non-semantic concepts, viz. in terms of propositional attitudes. In the second stage, he defines the meaning of utterance-types in terms of conventional regularity of utterer's meaning. The non-circular definition of utterer's meaning in the first stage and that of utterance-type in the second stage constitute Grice's project of a reductive analysis of the concept of non-natural meaning.

We shall restrict our attention to utterances of a "descriptive or informative kind"² such as utterances of sentences in the indicative mood.

2.1. First Stage: Utterer's Meaning

Grice's account of meaning in the first stage is given in his essays "Meaning" and "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions"³. But we shall

² Grice, 1989, p. 215.

³ These two papers are reprinted in *Studies in the Way of Words*. And all our quotations will refer to the latter.

consider in this chapter only the former essay leaving the discussion of the latter to Chapter 3 below.

Distinction Between Natural Meaning and Non-Natural Meaning

In his paper "Meaning" Grice's starting point is to make a distinction between two sorts of meaning, respectively natural and non-natural meaning (the latter abbreviated as meaning_{NN}). This distinction is primarily based on an analysis of the ways in which the word 'mean' is employed in ordinary contexts.

Natural meaning is the kind of meaning that something has when it is a natural and a reliable sign, or symptom, or evidence of something. Natural meaning rests on a law-like relationship in the world. Natural meaning can be exemplified by the following sentence:

"Those spots mean (meant) measles."⁴

In order for the word 'mean' to be properly used in the sentence above, it has to be the case that a person couldn't have those particular spots on the skin without having measles. So, the idea is that the spots must be characteristic; in fact, they have to be unique for measles. That is to say a person couldn't have those spots unless he has measles. Then, it is correct to say those spots mean measles. There is a natural relation between those spots and having measles, and that's why it is called natural meaning.

Non-natural meaning (meaning_{NN}), on the other hand, is the kind

⁴ Grice, 1989, p.213.

of meaning distinctive of linguistic expressions and communication. An illustration of non-natural meaning is as follows:

“Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full.”⁵

In the example, three rings mean the bus is full. Indeed, we could instead have four rings to mean that “the bus is full”. It is not a natural meaning, but rather a non-natural one in the sense that some people have decided that those three rings mean whatever they mean. So, this is a non-natural meaning.

Let’s examine closely already mentioned two statements in which the word ‘mean’ is used to attribute to something, respectively natural and non-natural meaning:

- (1) “Those spots mean that he has measles.”
- (2) “Three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full.”

So, what is the distinction between the two? At a glance, it seems that there is no difference at least in their forms; both of them are starting with a reference to objects, followed by a ‘mean that’-phrase and so on. But, according to Grice, the two actually have a certain dissimilarity. As I have mentioned, the first use of ‘mean’ – the meaning of spots – in (1) is natural, while the second use of ‘mean’ – the meaning of rings – in (2) is non-natural.

⁵ Ibid., p. 214.

In addition to making the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, Grice also gives two tests that we can apply in case we are unsure whether a given case is an instance of natural or of non-natural meaning:

- (i) First test: *Entailment*. In cases of natural meaning, 'x means that p' entails p. So, if x naturally means that p, then it follows that p must be the case. However, in cases of non-natural meaning, there is no such entailment.

I cannot say, "Those spots meant measles, but he hadn't got measles"... That is to say, in cases like this, *x means that p* entails *p*.⁶

I can use [2] and go on to say, "But it isn't in fact full – the conductor has made a mistake"... That is to say, here *x means that p* does not entail *p*.⁷

Returning to the measles example. It would be incoherent to say, "those spots meant measles, but he hadn't got measles". Statement (1) merely states a fact of nature given such-and-such facts. The spots are reliable sign of the illness that they are assigned for. Therefore, in the case of natural meaning error is improbable. Yet, that's not the case for non-natural meaning. We can go on and say, "Those three rings mean that the bus is full, but it is not full –the conductor has made a mistake". The three rings have an established meaning that the bus is full, but the three rings can mean what they mean and we can still have the thing that they are assigned for not be the case: that is the bus may not be full after all.

⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

⁷ Ibid., p. 214.

The second use of 'mean' seems a matter of convention, namely, some people have decided that those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full. If it is a matter of convention, then for the people who are using those conventions may fail to follow those conventions in an adequate way. So, the bus driver, or the conductor, may be mistaken about whether the bus is full or not. Hence, whereas natural meaning is a reliable, non-natural meaning need not be reliable. However, Grice refuses to express the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning in terms of the concept of convention. Grice remarks that a reason for his refusal is that "some things which can mean_{NN} something are not signs (e.g., words are not), and some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g., certain gestures)"⁸. It follows that the concept of convention is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a non-natural meaning.

(ii) Second test: *Quotation*. In cases of natural meaning the verb 'to mean' cannot be followed by a quotation, ("a phrase in inverted commas"); in cases of non-natural meaning, it can.

It is not possible to write, "Those spots mean 'he has measles'" as a result of what the spots mean is not the phrase 'he has measles'; it is rather that the person has measles. Compare that with "Those three rings on the bell mean 'the bus is full'". That is absolutely correct as what the three rings on the bell mean is that the same factor as if the conductor turned around and shout it out 'the bus is full'. That is, the three rings mean the same thing

⁸ Ibid., p .215.

as the sentence 'the bus is full' while the spots do not mean 'he has measles'. This is yet another way to separate two kinds of meaning.

Although Grice starts out by drawing the distinction at the beginning of his article, he is only interested in non-natural meaning. Non-natural meaning has two forms: *utterer's meaning* which is the non-natural meaning of utterances in particular instances, and *utterance-type meaning* which is the non-natural meaning of types of such utterances. Only the former will be dealt with in this section, and the latter will be dealt with in the next section.

Concepts Used in Grice's Account

In the case of meaning_{NN}, at least six concepts are in play: a human agent (A) (a human agent is called the utterer); an audience (a second person); an utterance (x) (an action performed by the agent, not necessarily a verbal one); an *effect* in the audience which is produced by utterance x; an *intention* of the agent A (which is directed at the audience); and *recognition* by the audience of agent A's intention. It will be helpful to present these concepts as a list for the sake of perspicuity. The list of concepts that Grice uses is:

- (1) (A) Agent
- (2) Audience
- (3) (x) Utterance
- (4) *Effect* in the audience
- (5) *Intention* of agent A

(6) *Recognition* by the audience of agent A's intention

Grice's Definition of Utterer's Meaning

Grice uses as definiendum in his definition of utterer's meaning the following sentence:

$A \text{ meant}_{\text{NN}} \text{ that } p \text{ by } x \text{ (on a particular occasion)}^9$

where A is a human agent called *utterer*, x is an *utterance* consisting in an action of, or a token produced by A , and p is a proposition.

Grice's basic assumption is that cases in which something meant_{NN} something involve intentions. For this reason, the aim of this subsection is to show the emphasis that Grice puts on the notion of *intention*.

His account consists of the following three clauses:

First Proposal

$A \text{ means}_{\text{NN}} \text{ by } x \text{ that } p \text{ if and only if } A \text{ utters } x \text{ intending that an audience believes that } p.$

⁹ This is a formalization of Grice's following sentence: "A meant_{NN} by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)", 1989, p. 217.

However, this initial proposal is too simple. Grice gives an example, which shows that this simplistic account is not sufficient:

I might leave *B*'s handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that *B* was the murderer; but we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meant_{NN} anything or that I had meant_{NN} by leaving it that *B* was the murderer.¹⁰

It is not enough that the utterer intends the audience, in this case the detective, to form a certain belief but for non-natural meaning it is also important that the utterer intend the audience to recognize utterer's intention. The detective finding the handkerchief at the murder scene may not pick up the intention of the utterer because the detective may think that it was an accident that the handkerchief was left at the scene. That is why Grice thinks leaving the handkerchief at the crime scene does not have non-natural meaning. Thus, it is needed to add something more to this simplistic account to give it meaning_{NN}.

Second Proposal

Given that first clause is not sufficient, Grice makes the following proposal:

Clearly we must at least add that, for *x* to have meant_{NN} anything, not merely must it have been "uttered" with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an "audience" to recognize the intention behind the utterance.¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 217.

¹¹ Ibid.

We see thus that “the utterer *A* must also intend that the audience recognizes his first intention”. Hence, the second proposal can be formulated as follows:

A means_{NN} by *x* that *p* if and only if *A* utters *x* intending that (i) the audience believes that *p*; and (ii) that the audience recognizes *A*’s intention (i).

Even if this account deals with the murderer example, Grice claims that it is still not sufficient and he gives a counterexample to the second proposal:

Herod intended to make Salome believe that St. John the Baptist was dead and no doubt also intended Salome to recognize that he intended her to believe that St. John the Baptist was dead...Yet I certainly do not think that we should want to say that we have here cases of meaning_{NN}.¹²

So, why is the Salome example a counter-example to the proposed definition of meaning_{NN}? Well, it is a counter-example because there is a significant difference between “*presenting* someone (Salome) with evidence that *p*” (death of John the Baptist), and “*telling* someone (Salome) that *p*”. Only telling carries non-natural meaning, presenting evidence does not. Since telling requires the audience to recognize the utterer’s intention and presenting evidence does not require the audience to pick up on the utterer’s intention. If you are presented with the head of someone on a platter, you know that this person is dead quite irrespective of what you think the utterer’s intentions are. Hence, you don’t have to actually recognize the utterer’s

¹² Ibid., p. 218.

intention in order to form the belief that John the Baptist is dead; therefore, presenting a head on a platter is natural meaning for that person to be dead, it does not mean it non-naturally.

Third Proposal

In order to cope with the Salome example, Grice adds a third clause to his account:

A means_{NN} by *x* that *p* if and only if *A* utters *x* intending that: (i) the audience believes that *p*; and (ii) the audience recognizes *A*'s intention (i); and (iii) the audience believes that *p* on the basis of his/her recognition of *A*'s intention (i).

Thus, we see that there is a connection between the utterer's intention to induce a belief in the audience and the utterer's intention that the audience recognizes the first intention. In other words, the audience is intended to have the belief by means of, or as a consequence of his/her recognition of the utterer's intention. In order to illustrate this, Grice gives yet another example involving two scenes:

- (1) *A* shows *B* a photograph of *B*'s wife's kissing another man.
- (2) *A* draws a picture of the same scene and shows it to *B*.

If a person *A* shows another person *B* "a photograph of *B*'s wife's kissing another man" is contrasted with a case in which *A* draws a picture of the same scene and shows that drawing to *B*, it

illustrates a case of meaning_{NN}. Even though *A*'s intention is the same in both cases, i.e. to make *B* aware of the fact that his wife's having an affair, only the second case is an example of non-natural meaning. But why does only the showing of the drawing have non-natural meaning whereas the showing of the photograph does not? Well, the reason is that the photograph would have had the effect on *B*, namely, would produce in *B* the belief that his wife's having an affair regardless of *B*'s recognition of *A*'s intention.

In contrast, the drawing has non-natural meaning because for *B* to recognize *A*'s intention is a necessary condition of the occurrence of the intended effect on *B*. That is, without recognizing what *A* wants *B* to believe, *B* may misinterpret the drawing. For instance, *B* may take the drawing to be simply a display of *A*'s drawing skills. In fact, *B* may not understand what it is supposed to mean_{NN}, which stands for *B*'s wife has an affair, unless *B* recognizes *A*'s intention in showing the drawing. Thereby, the drawing is only interpreted correctly when the audience picks up on the utterer's intention that the utterer has to the belief that the audience is supposed to form.

2.2. Second Stage: Utterance-Type Meaning

In his essay "Meaning" Grice makes the following remark concerning the relationship between "utterer's meaning" and "utterance-type meaning", the latter qualified as *timeless*:

If we can elucidate the meaning of

"A meant_{NN} by *x* that so-and-so (on a particular occasion),"

this might reasonably be expected to help us with

" x means_{NN} (timeless) something (that so-and-so)"¹³

But he does not explain this relationship. On the other hand, in his essay "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", Grice introduces the notion of conventional meaning of an utterance-type that is expressed as follows:

(1) X means ' p '

where " X " stands for an utterance-type (of a descriptive or informative kind). Grice calls sentences of the form (1) "statements of *timeless meaning*".¹⁴

Grice considers the case in which utterance-type X is "current for some group G ; that is to say, to utter X in such-and-such circumstances is part of the practice of many members of G ".¹⁵ In that case, following Davies (1996) (1) can be reformulated as (2):

(2) Sentence-type X means that p in the language of group G ¹⁶

¹³ Ibid., p. 217.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁶ Davies, 1996, p. 23.

(2) is analyzed in terms of utterer's meaning by the following sentence:

(3) By convention, members of G use utterances of sentence-type X to mean_{NN} that p

We see that sentence (3) is the analysans corresponding to the analysandum (2). This fact is the reason for qualifying utterance-type meaning as *conventional*. The analysans (3) is further analyzed in terms of the non-semantic concepts of intention and belief in virtue of the account of utterer's meaning given the previous section 1. It follows that the analysandum (2) is itself analyzed in terms of the same concepts. In this way, the concept of conventional utterance-type meaning is ultimately reduced to the non-semantic concepts of intention and belief. The first stage of this reduction consists in the analysis of (3), and the second stage in the analysis of (2) in terms of (3).

In his essay "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning" Grice formulates the ultimately reduced form of the definition of utterance-type meaning as follows (we restrict the definition to the case of utterance-types of descriptive or informative kind):

For group G , utterance-type X means p if and only if at least some (many) members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some audience A , they want A to believe that p , the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other) members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires.¹⁷

¹⁷ Adapted from Grice, 1989, p. 127, D3.

CHAPTER 3

SURVEY OF DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING GRICE'S PROGRAMME

The so-called Gricean Programme concerns the reductive analysis of the concept of conventional utterance-type meaning. The two stages of this reductive analysis are outlined in Chapter 2 above. So far Grice's proposed analysis seems to account for the non-circular definition of utterance meaning and that of utterance-type. The definition of utterance-type meaning in stage two appeals to the utterer's meaning, which itself is ultimately based on the utterer's intentions. Unsurprisingly, there have been many criticisms of this account.

This chapter covers the most famous objections and amendments articulated by Strawson, Searle, and Platts. Strawson (1964) pointed to a difficulty with Grice's analysis which arises in the case in which Grice's three clauses are fulfilled, but the utterer intends the audience to *believe* they are not. Searle (1965) highlighted a failure to deal with the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects, and that Grice failed to account for the extent to which meaning is a matter of rules or conventions. Finally, the concerns from Platts (1979) regarded the circularity of compositional meaning.

In his essay "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions", Grice reformulates his definition of utterer's meaning as follows:

"*U* meant something by uttering *x*" is true iff, for some audience *A*, *U* uttered *x* intending:

- (1) *A* to produce a particular response *r*
- (2) *A* to think (recognize) that *U* intends (1)
- (3) *A* to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2).¹⁸

where *U* is the utterer (speaker), *A* is the audience and *x* is the utterance produced by *U*.

Grice makes two explanatory remarks that may be useful here: first, he uses the terms "uttering" and "utterance" in an artificially extended way to apply to any act or performance that can be a candidate for meaning_{NN}. Second, he clarifies what is meant by the third clause of the definiens:

And to suppose *A* to produce *r* "on the basis" of his thinking that *U* intends him to produce *r* is to suppose that his thinking that *U* intends him to produce *r* is at least part of his reason for producing *r*, and not merely the *cause* of his producing *r*.¹⁹

We see in the above definition that what the utterer *U* means by uttering *x* on a particular occasion is closely related to the response *r* that the utterer intends to produce in the audience *A*, and what the utterance *x* means is based on what the utterer meant by uttering it. In other words, to specify what *U* meant is to specify the nature of the intended response, and where *x* is an indicative utterance, the response is *A*'s believing something in accordance with conditions (2) and (3).

We shall state below counterexamples directed first against the sufficiency, and second against the necessity of Grice's definition.

¹⁸ Grice, 1989, p. 92.

¹⁹ Ibid.

3.1. Counterexamples Directed Against Sufficiency

Taking into consideration a remark of J. O. Urmson, Grice reformulates the above definition in the following amended form:

- "*U* meant something by uttering *x*" is true iff:
- (1) *U* intended, by uttering *x*, to induce a certain response in *A*
 - (2) *U* intended *A* to recognize, *at least in part from the utterance of x*, that *U* intended to produce that response
 - (3) *U* intended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part *A*'s reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (1).²⁰

However, this amended form faces with counterexamples in which the utterer *U* fulfills the above three clauses, but does not mean_{NN} something by uttering *U*. To deal with them, Grice at several stages, offers redefinitions of the notion of utterer's meaning, and each of them is regarded as being replaced by its successor.

3.1.1. Strawson

In his essay "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", Strawson argues that Grice's analysis of the concept of utterer's meaning is not sufficient as follows:

Grice's analysis of his concept is fairly complex. But I think a little reflection shows that it is not quite complex enough for his purpose. Grice's analysis is undoubtedly offered as an analysis of a situation in which one person is trying, in a sense of the word 'communicate' fundamental to any theory of meaning, to communicate with another. But it is possible to imagine a situation in which Grice's three conditions would be satisfied by a person *S* and yet, ..., it would not be the case

²⁰ Ibid., p. 94.

that *S* could be said to be trying to communicate by means of his production of *x* with the person *A* in whom he was trying to produce the response *r*.²¹

where *S* is the utterer (speaker), *A* is the audience and *x* is the utterance produced by *S*. He proceeds to present counterexample that satisfies three clauses (on the original analysis), but where *S* does not intend that clause (2) should be recognized:

S intends by a certain action to induce in *A* the belief that *p*; so he satisfies condition (1). He arranges convincing-looking "evidence" that *p*, in a place where *A* is bound to see it. He does this, knowing that *A* is watching him at work, but *knowing also that A does not know that S knows that A is watching him at work*. He realizes that *A* will not take the arranged "evidence" as genuine or natural evidence that *p*, but realizes, and indeed intends, that *A* will take his arranging of it as grounds for thinking that he, *S*, intends to induce in *A* the belief that *p*.²²

However, as Strawson and Grice agree, "in such a case one would not say here that the utterer had *meant* anything at all."²³ At this point, to deal with the case Strawson suggests adding a minimum further clause, namely:

[The utterer *S*] should not only intend *A* to recognize his intention to get *A* to think that *p*, but that [*S*] should also *intend A to recognize his intention* to get *A* to recognize his intention to get *A* to think that *p*.²⁴

This would generate a fourth clause in the analysis:

²¹ Strawson, 1964, p. 446.

²² Ibid.

²³ Grice, 1989, p. 95.

²⁴ Strawson, 1964, p. 447.

(4) that *A* should recognize his intention (2).²⁵

Nevertheless, Strawson points out that this seems like the start of an infinite regress in the sense that we may now need an additional clause according to which (5) *A* should recognize (4).

In order to cope with Strawson's counterexample, Grice formulates the second redefinition in two versions:

The second redefinition, version A:

"*U* meant something by uttering *x*" is true iff *U* uttered *x* intending thereby:

- (1) that *A* should produce response *r*
- (2) that *A* should, at least partly on the basis of *x*, think that *U* intended (1)
- (3) that *A* should think that *U* intended (2)
- (4) that *A*'s production of *r* should be based (at least in part) on *A*'s thought that *U* intended that (1) (that is, on *A*'s fulfillment of [2])
- (5) that *A* should think that *U* intended (4).²⁶

According to Grice, the analysis at several points exhibits a feature such that *U*'s *n*th "sub-intention" is specified as an intention that *A* should think that *U* has his *n*-*I*th "sub-intention". This has led to the suggestion that the analysis of meaning is infinitely regressive.²⁷

As Neale (1992) argues that "the same sort of counterexample can still be generated", Grice proposes to introduce a clause in

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Grice, 1989, p. 96-7.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 97.

order to block the regress with the addition of a second part to the entire analysis.²⁸

The second redefinition, version B:

"*U* meant something by uttering *x*" is true iff (for some *A* and for some *r*):

- (a) *U* uttered *x* intending
- (1) *A* to produce *r*
- (2) *A* to think *U* to intend (1)
- (3) *A*'s fulfillment of (1) to be based on *A*'s fulfillment of (2)
- (b) there is no inference-element *E* such that *U* uttered *x* intending both (1') that *A*'s determination of *r* should rely on *E* and (2') that *A* should think *U* to intend that (1') be false.²⁹

3.1.2. Searle

In his book *Speech Acts*, Searle (1969) starts his criticism with the following questions: "what is it for one to mean something by what one says, and what is it for something to have a meaning?"³⁰. After considering Grice's analysis of meaning, although he finds Grice's analysis valuable he argues that it is "defective in at least two crucial respects"³¹:

First, it fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of rules or conventions. This account of meaning does not show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says, and what that which one says actually means in the language. Secondly, by defining meaning in terms of intended effects it confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts.³²

²⁸ Neale, 1992, p. 36-7.

²⁹ Grice, 1989, p. 99-100.

³⁰ Searle, 1969, p. 43.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., pp. 43-4.

We hence see that Searle first objection to Grice's analysis of meaning does not explain the role of linguistic conventions. Second, Searle claims that while on Grice's account, communicative intentions are perlocutionary intentions, they are in fact illocutionary intentions.

To illustrate his first objection, Searle then presents a counterexample to Grice's analysis of meaning, which is about an American soldier pretending to be German by uttering a line from a German poem that he remembers from high school:

Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and that I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to believe that I am a German soldier in order to get them to release me. What I would like to do is to tell them in German or Italian that I am a German soldier. But let us suppose I don't know enough German or Italian to do that. So I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I am a German soldier by reciting those few bits of German I know, trusting that they don't know enough German to see through my plan. Let us suppose I know only one line of German, which I remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German course. Therefore I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the following sentence: *Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?*³³

As we can see, this part of Searle's criticism basically concerns the role of conventions. And the point of this counterexample is to illustrate the connection between what a speaker means and what the words he utters mean.

In this example, Searle raises the issue that someone may utter a sentence in another language, which is not a meaningless sentence, and use it in a sense different from its actual meaning. The point is that with regard to Grice's account, a sentence about

³³ Ibid., p. 44.

flowers in German uttered by an American soldier could mean "I am a German Officer". Searle claims that this situation would fit all the required intentions; consequently, the three clauses of Grice's account are satisfied:

I intent to produce a certain effect in them, namely, the effect of (1) believing that I am a German soldier, and I intend to produce this effect (3) by means of their (2) recognition of my intention.³⁴

Nevertheless, the words have no correlation with the actual meaning. Does uttering the German sentence "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?" mean that he is a German officer? For Searle, it seems that the answer is "no":³⁵

[No] ... because what the words mean and what I remember that they mean is, "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?" ... Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of *convention*.³⁶

This case shows that the first stage of Grice's analysis cannot be formulated independently of the second stage. In addition, Grice's analysis fails to account for the role of linguistic conventions in utterance-type meaning.

Based on the example, Searle proposes an additional stage which adds that the utterer intends to respect the linguistic conventions for the use of the sentence he utters:

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ This point is derived from Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 510.

³⁶ Searle, 1969, p. 45.

In the performance of an illocutionary act in the literal utterance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect; and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect.³⁷

This additional clause introduces utterance-type meaning in the analysis of utterer's meaning.

Before examining Searle's second objection, it is worth explaining the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects for the sake of clarity of what Searle claims. The distinction was first made by J. L. Austin in his book *How to do Things with Words*. In Austin's terminology, an illocutionary act is basically what we do *in* saying something. In detail, it is an act that can be classified not only by its content, but also its *force* (stating, warning, promising, naming, advising etc.). For instance, if I warn you that a dog is approaching and state that a dog is approaching, the acts that I perform are instances of different illocutionary acts: the former has the force of warning but the latter has the force of stating.

A perlocutionary act, on the other hand, is basically what we do *by* saying something. Particularly, it is an act that can be classified by its "consequential effects upon feelings, thought, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of the persons".³⁸ For example, if I state that a dog is approaching, and so perform

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Austin, 1962, p. 101.

one illocutionary act, I may thereby perform (intentionally or not) a variety of perlocutionary acts: I may convince you that I believe that a dog is approaching, or may inform you that a dog is approaching, or make you uncomfortable.

Perlocutionary acts presuppose illocutionary ones. And whatever effects the illocutionary acts have are called perlocutionary acts. Unlike illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts are not entirely conventional. That is, the act performed is not determined just by circumstances, utterer, and the words uttered. Besides, perlocutionary acts cannot generally be made explicit in the way that illocutionary acts can, since they are not conventional in the way that illocutionary acts are. For instance, I cannot perform the perlocutionary act of saying something that makes someone feel better by saying "I hereby make you feel better by saying that...".

Searle claims in his second objection that in Grice's analysis "saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform a perlocutionary act"³⁹:

Grice in effect defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a perlocutionary act, but saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary, not necessarily a perlocutionary, act.⁴⁰

In contrast, Searle argues that saying something and meaning it is not a matter of intending to perform a perlocutionary act, but

³⁹ Searle, 1969, p. 44.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

an illocutionary act.⁴¹ Searle objects that intended effects of meant utterances could not be perlocutionary, and he says the reason is "because many kinds of sentences used to perform illocutionary acts have no perlocutionary effect associated with their meaning."⁴² Then he gives the following example:

For example, there is no associated perlocutionary effect of greeting. When I say "Hello" and mean it, I do not necessarily intend to produce or elicit any state or action in my hearer other than the knowledge that he is being greeted. But that knowledge is simply his *understanding* what I say, it is not an additional response or effect.⁴³

On this analysis, utterer's intention is an intention to be understood. However, it is neither a perlocutionary effect, nor an intention to induce any result over and above its being understood. Rather, it is an illocutionary intention:

In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consists simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this effect that I have been calling the illocutionary effect.⁴⁴

John Perry also agrees with Searle's claim by stating the following:

It seems that the only *new* mental state needed is the audience's recognition of the speaker's communicative

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 46.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 47.

intention; his understanding of the speaker's utterance. This is what has been called 'illocutionary uptake'.⁴⁵

Grice himself responds to Searle's objections in his essay "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions", and we shall now present below the analysis of his response to these objections.

Firstly, he does not accept Searle's revision concerning conventions, saying that:

I would like, if I can, to treat meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a special case of meaning something by an utterance.⁴⁶

Secondly, Grice thinks that Searle's example is not a genuine counterexample. He thinks, on one elaboration of the case, that the soldier's intention is not to get the Italians to believe he has said he is a German officer, but merely to get them to believe he has been speaking German in the hope they will reach the conclusion that he is a German officer: "...we don't know any German, and we have no idea what he has been trying to tell us, but if he speaks German, then the most likely possibility is that he is a German officer?"⁴⁷. Though he intends them to believe that he is a German officer, he does not intend that they should come to believe this on the basis of their recognition of his intention. Rather, he intends that the Italians should believe on the basis of their reasoning as above.

⁴⁵ Perry, 2006, p. 18.

⁴⁶ Grice, 1989, p. 101.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Another elaboration illustrating Grice's objection to Searle's example is in which a shopkeeper invites his British visitor into his shop: "in dulcet tones and with an alluring smile [the shopkeeper] says to [the visitor] the Arabic for 'You pig of an Englishman'."⁴⁸ While his words are meant as an insult, his true intent was for the visitor to enter the shop. Now suppose that the soldier's intention is to get the Italians to believe he has just said that he is a German officer. In attempting to do so, he utters a German sentence for which the conventional meaning in German is "I am a German officer". But if so, for Grice, the American does not mean that he is a German officer. In any case, he does not intend for the Italians to take his words literally as he knows they have no understanding of the words' true meaning. Therefore, what he meant in the circumstances is not the same as what his words literally meant.

However, Grice proposes the following revised analysis of utterer's meaning:

I would like to suggest a revised set of conditions for "U meant something by x,"...:

Ranges of variables: A: audiences
 f: features of utterance
 r: responses
 c: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional)

$(\exists A) (\exists f) (\exists r) (\exists c):$

U uttered x intending: (1) A to think x possesses f
 (2) A to think u intends (1)
 (3) A to think of f as correlated in way c with the type of which r belongs

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

- (4) A to think U intends (3)
- (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A to produce r
- (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r
- (7) A to think U intends (6).⁴⁹

Grice does not think that Searle's objection causes his analysis any significant problems concerning his analysis and, *prima facie*, refuses Searle's amendments by requiring that the audience intends to believe there to be "modes of correlation" between features of the utterance and the intended belief.

Nonetheless, in the revised analysis, as we have already seen in the passage quoted above, Grice includes in the "modes of correlation"⁵⁰ a *conventional* one between the speech act and intended belief. Given that in case of natural languages the mode of correlation is typically conventional, Grice's revised analysis seems to endorse the revision proposed by Searle.

3.2. Counterexamples Directed Against Necessity

As we have seen in Section 3.1., there are a number of counterexamples that argue against sufficiency of Grice's argument. Now, counterexamples directed against necessity claiming that satisfying Grice's three clauses for a case of utterer's meaning are not necessary for an utterance being a case of utterer's meaning shall be presented.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 103.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

As we have stated in the previous chapter, the concept of conventional utterance-type meaning is ultimately reduced to the non-semantic concepts of intention and belief. Recall how Grice formulates the ultimately reduced form of the definition of utterance-type meaning:

For group G , utterance-type X means p if and only if at least some (many) members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some audience A , they want A to believe that p , the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other) members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires.⁵¹

Mark Platts raises two objections against the necessity of this definition, which are presented below.

3.2.1. Platts

In his book *Ways of Meaning*, Platts starts his objection by claiming that “intentions to produce certain effects” in the audience are not necessary as follows:

First, it is unclear that the utterances of any given sentence will standardly be accompanied by any one set of intentions on the parts of speakers. Reflection upon the diversity of circumstances of utterance including the diversity of speakers' beliefs, speakers' beliefs about the audiences' beliefs, and speakers' desires suggest the unlikelihood of speakers uttering that sentence standardly intending to induce the appropriate belief in the audience or even to induce the belief in the audience that the speaker has the appropriate belief. About the only plausible candidate for the intention regularly accompanying the utterance of sentence p is that of saying that p ; but importation of this notion of *saying* at this

⁵¹ Adapted from Grice, 1989, p. 127, D3.

point would again render the Gricean programme circular.⁵²

Besides, Perry mentions that propositional attitudes, i.e. belief and intention, are not necessary:

But even this rather modest subgoal may be too much too require for the success of the communicative action *qua* communicative action. Suppose I say that it is raining, and you hear me and understand the meanings of my words. But you don't think I am being sincere; you don't believe that I believe what I said. But still, I have said it. My overall plan to help insure that you don't get wet and catch cold may fail, but I do seem to have succeeded in saying what I set out to say. It seems that the only *new* mental state needed is the audience's recognition of the speaker's communicative intention; his understanding of the speaker's utterance.⁵³

Afterwards, Platts argues that Grice cannot provide a non-circular account as follows:

Utterer's intentions are not recognised by unfailing intuition, nor do Acts of God figure large. It is perhaps possible that very simple intentions be detected quasi-behaviouristically; but for intentions of any fair degree of complexity, this is simply implausible, the behavioural guide being too *inexact*. Any explanation of how such intentions are recognised will inevitably rely upon the audience's recognition of the literal meaning of the sentence; that meaning is the route to the speaker's intentions, the reverse journey usually being impossible.⁵⁴

Grice defines the meaning of utterance-type in terms of utterer's meaning, which is itself clarified in terms of utterer's intentions to produce beliefs in audiences. According to this objection, recognizing utterer's intentions involves knowing what their utterances mean in the language. Thus, utterer's meaning cannot

⁵² Platts, 1979, p. 90.

⁵³ Perry, 2006, p. 17.

⁵⁴ Platts, 1979, p. 91.

be formulated in terms of utterer's intentions, simply because knowledge of utterer's intentions presupposes knowledge of utterer's meaning.

Here is his other objection that concerns the meanings of (the infinitely-many) unuttered sentences:

On Grice's theory, sentence-meaning is defined in terms of the intentions with which the sentence is uttered, along, perhaps, with the response standardly secured in an audience by that utterance. Now, as an account of the meanings of sentences in natural languages this will not do for a simple reason: the majority of such sentences, natural languages containing a denumerable infinity of sentences, will never be uttered. They will therefore not be uttered with any intentions, nor will their utterance induce any response in an audience. What, then, can Grice say about these unuttered sentences?⁵⁵

It is possible to produce infinite number of utterances in languages, and as Platts points out, most of them will not be uttered with any intentions. Therefore, they will not induce any response in the audience, and there will be no convention to mean anything by them. Then the question is: what accounts for the meaning of such utterances?

One possible answer that seems open to Grice is to appeal to hypothetical intentions, i.e. what an utterer would have intended by producing such an utterance. But Grice's recourse to hypothetical intentions gives rise to a dilemma. Either these hypothetical intentions are unconstrained in case of which "the meanings of unuttered sentences *could* mean anything, so they

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

do mean nothing"⁵⁶; or otherwise these intentions are constrained and the only admissible constraints consist in the conventional meaning of the unuttered sentences.⁵⁷

As Platt states the second horn of the dilemma would make Grice's account circular:

Generally, the constraint upon the hypothetical intentions with which a sentence can be uttered, and upon the audience's responses to such an utterance, is precisely the meaning of the sentence...If this is correct, the attempt to define the meanings of unuttered sentences in terms of hypothetical intentions and responses is hopeless: for it presupposes a prior notion of sentence-meaning.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 89-90.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

CHAPTER 4

ON CHARGE OF CIRCULARITY

In the previous chapter, the counterexamples directed against the sufficiency and necessity of Grice's definition are left hanging in midair. In this final chapter, we shall evaluate these objections, and attempt to show that Grice's revised analysis of meaning turns out to be circular, which eventually will justify Platt's claim we have quoted at the end of the previous chapter.

In the first sub-section, we shall state one alternative account that Grice himself considers, namely, a casual account of non-natural meaning.

4.1. Causal Account

Grice himself consider and rejects a causal account of meaning_{NN} that C. L. Stevenson suggests. In the causal analysis of meaning_{NN}, for *x* (an utterance) to mean something, (i) *x* must have (roughly) a tendency to cause in an audience a cognitive attitude, and (ii) *x* must have a tendency to *be* caused in the speaker *by* the same kind of attitude. After examining the analysis, Grice gives two counter-examples to this account in order to set out an obvious problem with this proposal. As Grice states:

It is no doubt the case that many people have a tendency to put on a tail coat when they think they are about to go to a dance, and it is no doubt also the case that many people, on seeing someone put on a tail coat, would conclude that the person in question was about to go to a dance. Does this satisfy us that putting on a tail coat means_{NN} that one is about to go to a dance (or indeed means_{NN} anything at all)? Obviously not.⁵⁹

This example satisfies Stevenson's causal conditions by making an audience think that one is about to go to a dance, and by being produced by an attitude in the person that he was about to go to a dance; however, Grice's point is that putting on a tail coat does not mean_{NN} that the person is about to go to a dance. In the second example, on this account, to say "Jones is an athlete" tends to make an audience believe that "Jones is tall". But we do not want to count being tall as part of being an athlete. We may want to allow that there are nontall athletes. Therefore, going against the account being discussed, we do want to say that being tall is not part of the meaning of being an athlete. The account, as it stands, does not allow us to introduce this rule. Such a rule would presuppose that "athlete", for instance, has a meaning but that seems mistaken.

What Grice finds wrong with the causal account can be summarized: firstly, it omits the notion of intention, which has a great importance for his own account. What needs to be specified here is not the *effect* that tends to be produced, but rather the effect that the speaker *intends* to produce in an audience. Secondly, it focuses on the idea of a standard meaning of an utterance, and ignores what a particular speaker may mean on a particular occasion.

⁵⁹ Grice, 1989, p. 216.

In addition, Grice mentions another deficiency concerning the causal theory that it only analyzes “standard meaning” without considering the fundamental notion that is “what a speaker means” on a particular occasion. In addition, he adds, more controversially, that, “the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions”.⁶⁰

4.2. Possible Charge of Circularity

4.2.1. Strawson and Searle

We have seen that in Chapter 3, Searle offered an account of meaning in terms of intentionality to avoid the counterexamples while preserving the self-referentiality of intentions.⁶¹ Hence, Searle added the following clauses to Grice’s three conditions:

- (i) the utterer intends to respect the linguistic conventions for the use of the sentence uttered
- (ii) the utterer’s intentions are illocutionary

Searle’s counterexample about the American soldier trying to convince his Italian captors that he’s actually a German soldier was examined. Searle asks: what does determine the meaning of an utterance? We have seen that he argues that what a

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 217.

⁶¹ Searle, 2007, p. 9.

speaker means cannot be determined independently of the meaning of the sentence uttered.

Note that Grice's main aim is to give a non-circular definition of utterance meaning and that of utterance-type. Searle's revision introduces utterance-type meaning in the analysis of utterer's meaning. In such cases, "what we can mean is at least sometimes a function of what we are saying".⁶² Thus, Searle's amendment presupposing utterance-type meaning renders Grice's reductive analysis circular. In other words, Searle's modification reverses Grice's theory to the effect that utterance-type meaning must be analyzed in terms of utterer's meaning.

Grice's refusal of Searle's revision has a great importance for his analysis because, if he accepts it, his account becomes circular. Can Grice avoid this charge of circularity? It does not seem possible.

Grice himself is fully aware of the charge of circularity and in his essays, he makes further remarks on these objections:

"Some have worried about circularity problems that might arise in an attempt to define timeless meaning ("mean_t") in terms of occasion meaning (here referred to as "mean_s").

(a) There is certainly no definitional circle. I have at least hinted at the possibility of defining "mean_t" in terms of "mean_s," but I have never regarded "mean_s" as potentially definable in terms of "mean_t"; indeed, in nonconventional communications, utterers mean, without any dependence on the meaning of their utterances (which usually have no meaning).

(b) There is a possibility of "epistemic regress" (or circle). Suppose C to be a conventional ad hoc device (which will

⁶² Searle, 1969, p. 45.

mean_t something). Then the identification of what U means_s by uttering C will require the identification of what C means_t. But if "C means_t 'p'" = "people normally mean_s by C that p," then to discover what C means_t requires discovery of what individual utterers mean_s on this or that occasion. But this in turn presupposes a knowledge of what C means_t. And so on."⁶³

Here, Grice claims that if there is a circularity, this would be only an epistemic regress. In regard to the epistemic aspect of Searle's objection, his criticism is correct. As Grice acknowledges:

Of course I would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence), the speaker's intentions are to be recognized in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence[.]⁶⁴

Searle argues and Grice acknowledges in the quoted passage above that in most of the cases an audience understands what has been said by an utterer by means of understanding the meanings of the words and sentences that were uttered. However, unlike Grice, Searle emphasizes the importance of sharing mutual knowledge of linguistic conventions that Grice's analysis surely fails to mention.

Grice redefines the notion of the intended effect several times to deal with the objections raised by Strawson and Searle, and then subsequently weakens his reductive analysis:

I shall for the moment assume that the demand that I face is for a form of *reductive* analysis which is less grievously flawed than the one which I in fact offered; and I shall reserve until

⁶³ Grice, 1989, p.138.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 100-101.

later consideration of the idea that what is needed is *not* any kind of reductive analysis but rather some mode of explication of the concept of meaning.⁶⁵

Recall Grice's revised analysis of utterer's meaning also includes in the "modes of correlation" a *conventional* one, where he indeed endorses Searle's revision.

We argue that Searle's claim about the role of linguistic conventions should be conceded. However, it is uncontroversial that this is only possible for the occasions of linguistic conventions are shared by both audiences and speakers. Searle does not mention the cases in which the audiences and speakers do not share knowledge of conventions of a language and yet the communication is possible. Searle's first contribution is of great importance to Grice's analysis and it is correct only when both parties share the linguistic convention.

We have stated Strawson's argument against the sufficiency of Grice's analysis of utterer's meaning in the previous chapter. Strawson suggested a fourth clause in the analysis. Although the fourth clause generated in the analysis tackles Strawson's counterexample, Strawson worries (2004, p.121), and Shiffer confirms (1972, p. 18ff), that it has led to an infinite regress in which further counterexamples can be generated by introducing more clauses in analyzing the meaning. Grice's redefinition for blocking the regress was also presented. It has been shown that Grice's initial analysis is not sufficient. Regardless of the success of Grice's revised analysis in coping with the counterexamples

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 351.

and block the infinite regress that Neale has argued, we will show below that Strawson's claim about understanding is more challenging to Grice's analysis.

Both Strawson and Searle make similar claims about understanding, i.e. what Austin calls "uptake". Strawson suggests that Grice's account should explain: "what it is for *A* to *understand* something by an utterance *x*, an account complementary to the account of what it is for *S* to *mean* something by an utterance *x*."⁶⁶ Thus, he suggests the following:

I suggest, then, that for *A* (in the appropriate sense of "understand") to understand something by utterance *x*, it is necessary (and perhaps sufficient) that there should be some complex intention of the (*i*₂) form, described above, which *A* takes *S* to have, and that for *A* to understand the utterance correctly, it is necessary that *A* should take *S* to have the complex intention of the (*i*₂) form which *S* does have. In other words, if *A* is to understand the utterance correctly, *S*'s (*i*₄) intention and hence his (*i*₂) must be fulfilled.⁶⁷

It is obvious that Strawson's claim about understanding is more damaging to the analysis. Here, Strawson and Searle share similar concerns with regard to understanding. Grice mentions this again in his own writings:

The most general complaint, which comes from Strawson, Searle and Mrs. Jack, seems to be that I have, wholly or partially, misidentified the intended (or M-intended) effect in communication; according to me it is some form of acceptance (for example, belief or desire), whereas it should

⁶⁶ Strawson, 1964, p. 448.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

be held to be understanding, comprehension, or (to use an Austinian designation) "uptake."⁶⁸

Grice acknowledges that this criticism causes even more trouble for his analysis:

First, it might be suggested that there is a certain arbitrariness in my taking relativized meaning as tantamount to a speaker's meaning something *by* an utterance; there are other notions which might compete for this spot in particular the notion of something's meaning something *to* a hearer. Why should the claims of "meaning *to*," that is of passive or recipient's meaning, be inferior to those of "meaning *by*" (that is, of acting or agent's meaning)? Indeed a thought along these lines might lie behind the advocacy of "uptake" as being sometimes or even always the target of semantic intention.⁶⁹

When considering Grice's use of "meaning *to*" and "meaning *by*", the following formulation would follow:

Utterance *x* means that *p* to audience *A*
Utterance *x* means that *p* by utterer *U*

Thus, the circularity seems to be inevitable in the analysis once again.

We suggest Searle's second clause should also be conceded. He argues that saying something and meaning it is an illocutionary act. He explains this by giving the example of a greeting when saying "Hello". However, he does not explain the connection between the linguistic conventions and the performance of an illocutionary act. He never mentions that an utterer speaks with

⁶⁸ Grice, 1989, p. 351.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 352.

illocutionary intentions thanks to linguistic conventions whereas Austin claims that illocutionary acts are necessarily conventional: "We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention."⁷⁰

4.2.2. Platts and Blackburn

Simon Blackburn claims that a possible response to Platts's dilemma concerning hypothetical intentions which we outlined in the previous chapter would be as follows:

It is certainly true that although a speaker will at any time only have understood a certain set of sentences which he has been exposed to, he is equipped to go on and understand new ones, and will standardly do so in just the way other speakers would as well. That is fortunate. But it is not some mysterious thing, the meaning of the new sentence which "constrains" the speakers and explains this identity in psychology...nothing constrains a group...except their training and the way they find it natural to take that training.⁷¹

Arguably, Blackburn thinks that Grice can avoid Platts's dilemma by taking hypothetical intentions as being constrained by training.

However, if utterer's training for certain sentences are unconstrained, then again "the meanings of those sentences *could* mean anything, so they *do* mean nothing". Otherwise, the trainings are constrained in their literal meanings, which seems

⁷⁰ Austin, 1962, p.105.

⁷¹ Blackburn, 1984, p. 128.

to be the only available solution. Thus, Blackburn's response fails as the circularity is again in question.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, a review of Grice's reductive analysis of the concept of meaning_{NN} was presented. His Gricean Programme consists of a reductive analysis of the concept of conventional utterance-type meaning. The utterer's meaning in the first stage and utterance-type meaning in the latter was outlined. Then, a survey of discussions concerning Grice's programme and of related debates with respect to this document's frame was made, following the chronological order in which objections and amendments arose.

The first set of objections discussed was directed against the sufficiency of Grice's definition in which the utterer *U* fulfills the initial three clauses, but does not mean_{NN} something by uttering *U*. These objections were raised by Strawson and Searle. The second set of objections seemed to show that Grice's three conditions are not necessary for an utterance being a case of utterer's meaning. A critical evaluation of the aforementioned objections was made, and Grice's own responses were presented, when available. Presented counterexamples revealed that Grice's three conditions were neither sufficient nor necessary.

It was shown that, as Grice's Programme is an analytical one, the requirement of non-circularity became the burden of his analysis. It was additionally shown that Grice added more and more

clauses in each revised versions of his analysis and the details of the analysis became unimportant. We did not aim to defend Grice's proposal, instead arguing that the result of these objections primarily threatens the non-circularity of his reductive analysis.

Finally, we concluded that, regardless of the possibility that Grice's revisions hindered the objections, the clear outcome of this thesis is that the circularity in his analysis is evident. As a result, Grice's Programme can be stated as flawed.

REFERENCES

- Austin, J. L., 1962, *How to Do Things with Words*. OUP: Oxford.
- Blackburn, S., 1984, *Spreading the Word*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davies, M., 1996, "Philosophy of Language". In Bunnin, N. & Tsui-James, E.P. (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Grice, P., 1957, "Meaning," in Grice (1989), 213–223.
- Grice, P., 1968, 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word-Meaning', *Foundations of Language*, 4: 225-42.
- Grice, P., 1969, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," in Grice (1989), 86–116.
- Grice, P., 1982, 'Meaning Revisited', in *Mutual Knowledge*. N.V. Smith (ed.), New York: Academic Press, 223–43.
- Grice, P., 1989, *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Neale, S., 1992, "Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language", *Linguistics & Philosophy*, 15: 509-559.
- Perry, J., 2006, "Pragmatics",
<https://plstp.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics/>
- Platts, M., 1979, *Ways of Meaning*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Schiffer, S., 1972, *Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Searle, J., 1969, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J., 2007, "Grice on Meaning: 50 Years Later", *Teorema*, 26: 9-18.

Strawson, P., 1964, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", *The Philosophical Review*, 73(4), 439-460. Reprinted in Strawson 1971, pp. 149-69.

Strawson, P., 1971, "Meaning and Truth", in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*. London: Methuen.

APPENDICES

A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

GRICE'IN İNDİRGEMECİ ANLAM ANALİZİNİN KRİTİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

Dil felsefesinin en temel kavramlarından biri de anlam kavramıdır. Dilin anlamını tanımlamaya çalışırken, birçok bilim insanı geleneksel olarak anlam kavramıyla ilgili sorularını iki şekilde tasvir etme eğilimindedir: belirli dilsel ifadelerin anlamları hakkında sorular (kelimeler, ifadeler ve cümleler) ve dilsel anlamın kendi doğası hakkında sorular. Bu tezde, belirli dilsel ifadelerin anlamları hakkındaki sorular ele alınmaktadır.

Dil felsefesi alanında önemli bir isim İngiliz filozof Herbert Paul Grice'tır. Grice anlam kavramıyla ilgili sorulara, konuşmacıların iletişimsel *niyetlerine* dayanan semantik bir teori ile bazı cevaplar önermektedir. Grice'a göre konuşmacıların niyetleri (*intention*) vardır ve bu niyetler doğrultusunda düşüncelerimizi şekillendiririz. Bu yüzden Grice'ın amacı niyet temelli bir semantik kurmaktır. Grice'ın teorisine göre, bir ifadenin anlamı semantik olmayan kavramlarla, yani dinleyicide oluşturulan inanç (*belief*) ve niyet (*intention*) ile tanımlanmaktadır.

Bu tezin amacı Paul Grice'ın doğal olmayan anlam (*meaning_{NN}*) kavramının indirgemeci analizini incelemektir ve önerdiği Gricean Programın aslında döngüsel (*circular*) olduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktır.

İkinci bölümde Grice'in indirgemeci (*reductive*) analizinin iki aşaması sunulmaktadır. İlk aşamada konuşmacı anlamı (*utterer's meaning*) ve ikinci aşamada cümle anlamı (*utterance-type meaning*) açıklanmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölümde Peter Frederick Strawson ile başlanıp Mark Platts ile bitirilerek, önemli itirazlar ve değişiklikler kronolojik sıra ile belirtilmekte ve Grice'in Programına ilişkin tartışmalar incelenmektedir. Her alt bölümde (i) seçilen filozof tarafından Grice'in indirgemeci analizine yaptığı önemli itirazlar, (ii) filozofun Grice'in teorisinde yaptığı değişiklikler ve – eğer varsa – (iii) Grice'in eleştirilere verdiği cevaplar belirtilmektedir.

Dördüncü bölümde edilen itirazlar eleştirel olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Grice'in indirgemeci analizi başlangıçta başarılı görünmesine rağmen döngüsellik bariz olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Son olarak, Grice'in 1957 analizinin döngüsellikini açıklayamadığı için hatalı olarak ifade edilebileceği sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Grice, ifadelerin anlamı (özellikle de doğal bir dilin cümle türlerinin ifadeleri) ile ifade türlerinin anlamı arasında bir ayrım yapmaktadır. İlk aşamada, Grice konuşmacı anlamını semantik olmayan kavramlar açısından tanımlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İkinci aşamada ise cümle anlamını, konuşmacı anlamındaki uzlaşım sal düzenlilik açısından tanımlamaktadır. Grice'in indirgemeci analizi, ilk aşamada konuşmacı anlamını, ikinci aşamada cümle anlamını döngüsel olmayacak şekilde tanımlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Grice "Meaning" ("Anlam") adlı makalesinde iki tür anlam, sırasıyla doğal anlam (*natural meaning*) ve doğal olmayan anlam (*non-natural meaning*), arasında bir ayırım yapmaktadır. Grice'in ayırımı "anlam" kelimesinin sıradan bağlamlarda kullanılma biçimlerinin bir analizine dayanmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle Bu ayırımın arkasında, onun 'mean' (anlatmaya çalışmak) fiilinin İngilizce'deki kullanımlarından yola çıkarak anlatma edimi konusunda yaptığı ayırım ve bu ayırımlar arasındaki kurduğu ilişki yatmaktadır.

Doğal anlam, bir şeyin doğal ve güvenilir bir işaret, semptom veya bir şeyin kanıtı olması durumunda sahip olduğu anlamdır. Doğal anlam aşağıdaki cümle ile örneklendirebilir:

"Bu lekeler kızamık anlamına gelmektedir."

"Anlam" kelimesinin yukarıdaki cümlede doğru bir şekilde kullanılması için, bir kişinin cildinde kızamık olmadan o lekelerle sahip olamaması gerekir. Dolayısıyla buradaki ana fikir lekelerin kızamığa özgü olmaları gerektiğidir. Yani bir kişi kızamık olmadığı takdirde o noktalarla sahip olamaz. O halde bu lekelerin kızamık anlamına geldiğini söylemek doğrudur. Bu noktalar ile kızamık arasında doğal bir ilişki vardır ve bu yüzden doğal anlam denir.

Doğal olmayan anlam ise dilsel ifadeler ve iletişimi farklı kılan anlam türüdür. Doğal olmayan anlamın bir örneği şu şekildedir:

"(Otobüsün) çalan üç zili 'otobüsün dolu olduğu' anlamına gelmektedir."

Örnekte üç zil, otobüsün dolu olduğunu anlamına gelmektedir. Halbuki otobüsün dolu olduğunu belirtmek için zili üç kere çalmak yerine dört kere de çalabilirdik. Bu, doğal bir anlam değildir. Tam tersine bazı kişiler bu üç zilin ne anlama geldiğine karar verdiği için doğal olmayan anlamdır.

Grice doğal ve doğal olmayan anlam arasındaki farkı uzlaşım kavramı açısından açıklamayı reddetmektedir. Uzlaşım kavramının doğal olmayan anlamı oluşturması açısından ne yeterli ne de gerekli olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Grice, makalesine bu ayrımı yaparak başlasa da aslında sadece doğal olmayan anlamla ilgilenmektedir. Grice'in doğal olmayan anlam tanımında niyet kavramı çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. Grice Programında, doğal olmayan anlam kavramı üç madde ile açıklanmıştır. Bu analiz analitik olarak sunulmuştur. Grice birine bir şey anlatmaya çalışmanın, daha doğrusu "doğal olmayan yoldan bir şey anlatmanın", her şeyden önce zincirleme bir yönelim/niyet işi olduğuna dikkat çekmektedir. Grice'a göre bir iletişim ortamında anlatıcının (iletide bulunmaya çalışanın, konuşmacının) S cümlesiyle bir şey anlatmaya çalışması demek, anlatıcının şu niyetler içinde olması demektir: (i) S cümlesinin dinleyicide (iletinin alıcısında) e etkisine yol açması yönelimi, (ii) dinleyicinin, anlatıcının bu (i) niyette olduğunu kavraması/anlaması yönelimi, (iii) dinleyen kişide kendini göstermesini istediği e etkisinin, bu kavramanın bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkması yönelimi. Tek bir cümleyle anlatmak gerekirse, anlatıcının söyleminin dinleyicide e etkisini göstermesi niyetinde olması gerekir. Grice, ayrıca, konuşan kişinin anlatmaya çalıştığı şeyin ne olduğunu sormanın, dinleyicide kendini göstermesi

istenen e etkisinin ne olduğunu sormaktan başka bir şey olmadığını ifade eder.

Grice'a göre, zincirleme bu üç niyetin üçünün birden gerçekleşmesi durumunda ancak "bir şey anlatmaya çalışmaktan" söz edilebilir. Sözgelisi mendilini cinayetin işlendiği yere bırakarak cinayeti araştıran dedektifin, cinayeti işleyenin mendilin sahibi *B* olduğuna inanmasını sağlayabilirim. Ancak böyle bir durumda benim mendili oraya bırakarak *B*'nin katil olduğunu anlatmaya çalıştığım söylenemez. Çünkü anlatıcının, söylemini dinleyen kişide (dedektifte) e etkisini (katilin mendilin sahibi *B* olduğu inancını) doğurması yöneliminde olması yeterli değildir; ayrıca dinleyen kişinin bu söylemin arkasındaki yönelimi (söylemin dinleyende e etkisini doğurması yönelimini) kavraması yöneliminde de olması gerekir. Ne var ki, bu iki yönelimin ikisinin birden olduğu durumlarda da konuşan kişinin bir şey anlatmaya çalıştığı söylenemez. Katilin o olduğunu inanılmasını sağlamak amacıyla birinin mendilini cinayet yerine bıraktığımda bir şey anlatmış sayılamam. Herodes Vaftizci Yahya'nın başını tepsi içinde sunduğunda Herodes'e bir şey anlatmaya çalışmış olmuyor.

Sözgelisi Bay *A*'da eşi Bayan *A*'nın Bay *B* ile aşk yaşadığı yollu bir inanç oluşturma yönelimiyle, bu Bay *A*'ya, eşiyle Bay *B*'nin olmayacak ölçüde samimi bir manzara sergiledikleri bir fotoğraf gösterdiğimde bir şey anlatmaya çalıştığım söylenemez. Çünkü Bay *A*'da eşi ile Bay *B* arasında aşk ilişkisi olduğu yönündeki inancın, benim onda böyle bir inanç oluşturma yöneliminde olduğumu kavramasının sonucunda oluşması yöneliminde olduğum söylenemez: Söz konusu fotoğrafı kazara odasında

düşürdüğümde de onsa böyle bir inanç oluşabilir. Yaptıklarımın bu kişilerde kendini göstermesini istediğim etkilerinin, bu etkileri görmek amacıyla yaptıklarımın arkasındaki yönelimlerin söz konusu kişiler tarafından kavranmalarının sonucunda ortaya çıktıklarını söylemek öyle kolay olmayacaktır. Peki hangi koşullarda bu kişilerin bir şey anlatmaya çalıştıkları söylenebilir? Grice'a göre Bayan A ile Bay B'yi samimi bir biçimde gösteren bir resim çizip Bay A'ya gösterdiğimde ancak bir şey anlatmaya çalıştığımın söz edilebilir. Bu son örneklerde, karşımdaki kişiler yaptıklarımın arkasındaki yönelimleri kavramadıkça, onlardan beklediklerim ortaya çıkmayacaktır. Söz konusu resmi yaparken benim, sözgelisi bir sanat yapıtı ortaya koymaya çalıştığımı düşünecek olursa Bay A'da beklediğim inanç oluşmayacaktır.

Grice açık açık dile getirmese de onun, bizim dildışı anlatımlarla dildışı iletilerde bulunmaya çalışıldığını söyleyebileceğimiz bu anlatma örneklerini anlatma kavramının dışında tutmaya çalışmasının arkasında, başta Grice'ın ortaya koymuş olduğu üç koşulu düşünecek olursak, şöyle bir akıl yürütmenin bulunduğu söylemek yanlış olmaz: Anlatmak, yalnızca bir yönelim zincirinin olması değil, bunun yanı sıra bu yönelimlerin kavranmasını sağlayıp karşıdaki kişide bir etki meydana getirme edimiye, bu yönelimlerin kavranmasını sağlayıp beklenen etkiyi meydana getirecek araçlar olan anlatımların, söz konusu yönelimleri tartışmasız bir biçimde taşıyacak anlatımlar olması gerekir. Dildışı anlatımlar söz konusu yönelimlerin dışavurulması açısından güvenilir araçlar olmadığı için, böyle anlatımlar aracılığı ile iletide bulunmaya çalışanların bir şey anlatmaya çalıştığını söylemek yanlış olur.

Bu açıklamalar doğrultusunda Grice'ın örneklerine baktığımızda, kimilerinde gerçekten kişilerin anlatmayı anlatma yapan yönelimlerden bazılarını taşımadıkları açıktır. Örneğin, *B*'nin mendilini cinayet yerine bırakarak dedektifte katilin *B* olduğu inancını oluşturmak isteyen kişi, mendili cinayet yerine bırakmasının dedektifte katilin *B* olduğu inancına yol açması yönelimindedir. Ancak onun, bu yöneliminin dedektif tarafından kavranması yöneliminde olduğu söylenemeyeceği gibi dedektifte oluşmasını istediği inancın mendili cinayet yerine bırakmasının bir sonucu olarak dedektifte oluşması yöneliminde olduğu da söylenemez. Dolayısıyla bu kişinin yaptığı, bir şey anlatmaya çalışmak olarak değil, en iyimser yorumla, yanlış bir izlenim yaratmaya çalışmak olarak nitelendirilebilir. Fakat, Grice'ın, söz konusu yönelimler eksik olduğu gerekçesiyle bir şey anlatılmaya çalışılmadığını belirttiği örneklerin büyük bir bölümünde, kişilerin söz konusu yönelimleri taşımadıklarını, dolayısıyla da bir şey anlatmaya çalışmadıklarını söylemek pek olanaklı görünmüyor. Herodes ve resim gösterme örneklerinde durum bu şekildedir. Grice'a göre, Herodes'in, Salome'yi Vaftizci Yahya'nın öldüğüne inandırma yönelimi ve Salome'nin onun bu yönelimini kavraması yönelimiyle Vaftizci Yahya'nın başını tepsi içinde Salome'ye sunarken bir şey anlatmaya çalıştığını söyleyemeyiz. Adam da eşinin *B* ile aşk yaşadığına inandırma yönelimiyle ve adamın onun bu yönelimini kavraması yönelimiyle eşi ile *B*'yi samimi bir biçimde gösteren bir fotoğrafı gösteren kişinin durumu da böyledir. Çünkü bu kişilerde oluşturulmaya çalışılan inançlar, başka şeyler yapıldığında da karşıdaki kişide ortaya çıkabilecek inançlardır. Mesela, kişi söz konusu fotoğrafı kazara adamın odasında düşürdüğünde de aynı inanca yol açabilir. Grice'ın iç içe geçmiş üç yöneliminden ilk ikisi olduğu halde üçüncüsü olmayan,

bu sebeple de bir şey anlatılmaya çalışıldığı söylenemeyecek bu örneklere getirdiği açıklama bu şekildedir.

Bu örneklerin oluşturduğu sonuçlardan yola çıkarak Grice, niyet/yönelim kavramını temel alarak üç koşuldan oluşan analizini ortaya koymaktadır. Grice'ın kendi terminolojisiyle, (i) anlatımlarımın karşımdaki kişide e etkisi oluşturması yöneliminde, (ii) karşımdaki kişinin bu (i) yöneliminde olduğumu kavraması yöneliminde, (iii) anlatımımın karşımdaki kişide ortaya çıkarmasını istediğim e etkisinin, (i) yönelimimi kavramasının sonucu olarak onda kendini göstermesi yöneliminde olurum.

Tahmin edilebileceği gibi Grice'ın analizi oldukça fazla sayıda eleştiriye maruz kalmıştır. Grice eleştirilerle başa çıkabilmek için orijinal analizini pek çok kere gözden geçirerek revize etmiştir.

Strawson "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" adlı makalesinde, Grice'ın konuşmacı anlamı kavramının analizinin yeterli olmadığını savunmaktadır ve analize dördüncü bir madde eklemektedir: (iv) dinleyicinin konuşmacının niyetini (ii) fark etmesi gerekir. Buna rağmen Strawson, bunun sonsuz bir gerilemeye (*infinite regress*) neden olabileceğine dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü bu koşullara dinleyicinin konuşmacının (ivi) niyetini fark etmesini gerektirecek beşinci bir koşul eklenebilir. Neale da buna benzer endişelerini dile getirmektedir. Bu eklemenin üzerine Grice belirlemiş olduğu üç koşula eklemeler yapmak durumunda kalır.

Searle *Speech Acts* adlı kitabında Grice'ın anlam kavramı analizini çok değerli bulmasına rağmen "en az iki önemli açıdan kusurlu"

olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Searle, ilk eleştirisinde Grice'ın anlam analizinde dilsel uzlaşımın rolünü açıklamadığını söylemektedir. Bu itirazını bir Amerikan askeri ile ilgili bir örnekle açıklamaktadır. Örnekte İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında bir Amerikan askeri İtalyan birlikleri tarafından kaçırılmaktadır. Amerikan askeri bu birliklerin onu serbest bırakmaları için Alman askeri olduğuna inanmalarını istemektedir. Askerin yapmak istediği şey İtalyan birliklerine Almanca ya da İtalyanca olarak Alman askeri olduğunu söylemek. Fakat bunu yapacak kadar Almanca veya İtalyanca bilgisine sahip değildir. Bu yüzden lise yıllarından Almanca bir şiirden hatırladığı bir satırı okuyarak Alman askeri olduğunu söylemek ister. Bunu yaparken İtalyan birliklerinin Almanca bilmediklerine güvenerek onlara bir Alman askeri olduğunu söylemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu sayede serbest bırakılmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Örnekte görüldüğü gibi, Searle'ün eleştirisinin bu kısmı temel olarak uzlaşımın dildeki rolü ile ilgilidir. Bu örneğin amacı konuşmacının ne anlatmak istediği ve kullandığı kelimelerin ne anlama geldiği arasındaki bağlantıyı göstermektir. Searle burada Almancada anlamlı bir cümlenin gerçek anlamı dışında kullanıldığına vurgu yapmaktadır. Burada belirtilmek istenen şey Grice'ın teorisine göre Almancada çiçeklerle ilgili bir cümle "Ben bir Alman askeriyim" anlamına gelebilmektedir. Searle'e göre bu durum Grice'ın üç maddesindeki bütün gereklilikleri karşılamaktadır. Ancak kullanılan kelimelerin gerçek anlamla bir bağlantısı yoktur. Almanca adına bildiği tek cümle olan ve "Limon ağaçlarının çiçek açtığı o ülkeyi biliyor musun?" anlamına gelen cümleyi "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?" söylerken bir Alman askeriyim mi demek istiyoruz? Searle bunun böyle olmadığını savunmaktadır. Örnek, Searle'ün Grice'ın iletişim

sırasında konuşan kişinin anlatmak istediği ile bu amaçla ürettiği cümlelerin ait olduğu dilde taşıdığı anlam arasında kurduğu ilişkiye karşı çıkarken verdiği bir örnektir.

Bu örnek, Grice'ın analizinin ilk aşamasının ikinci aşamadan bağımsız olarak formüle edilemeyeceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca Searle'e göre, Grice'ın analizi cümle anlamında dilsel uzlaşımın rolünü açıklayamamaktadır.

Bu örnekten yola çıkarak Searle Grice'ın analizine bir madde daha eklemektedir. Bu ilave madde, konuşmacı anlamının analizinde cümle anlamını içermektedir.

Searle'ün ikinci itirazını incelemeyi önce edimsöz edimi (*illocutionary act*) ve etkisöz edimi (*perlocutionary act*) arasındaki ayrımı açıklamak gerekmektedir. Bu ayrım ilk olarak John L. Austin tarafından *How to do Things with Words* kitabında yapılmıştır. Söz edimleri kuramı (*Speech Acts Theory*), Austin'in ortaya attığı ve onun öğrencisi olan Searle tarafından geliştirilmiş bir dil felsefesi kuramıdır. Austin bir şey söylemek, bir şey yapmaktır görüşünden yola çıkar. Örneğin birisine, "Merhaba!" dediğinde "selam verme" edimi gerçekleşir. Buradaki temel iddia, bir dili konuşmanın bir dizi kurala dayalı eylemde bulunmak olduğu yönündedir. Austin bir şey yapıp söylerken yapıp-ettiğimiz işlere "edimsöz edimi" ya da kısaca "edimsöz" der.

Söz edimleri kuramında dilin işlevleri terimiyle bireylerin dille ne yaptıkları açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Her cümle için sözle yerine getirilen bir eylem olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Bir başka ifadeyle tüm ifadelerin sahip oldukları anlamdan başka, belli güçlerle belli

işler yaptıkları söylenebilir. Şimdi Austin'in sınıflamasına değinelim. Edimsöz edimi, bir cümleyi söyleyerek onunla çağrıştırılan uzlaşımsal güçle bağıntılı düz ifadede bulunma, ikram etme, söz verme vs.; yani, gelenekselleşmiş iletişim gücü olan ifadelerdir. Bu nokta, söz edimin işlevini göstermektedir. Dil yoluyla kişilere bir iş yaptırılırken ortaya çıkan edimsöz güçleridir (*illocutionary force*). Örneğin; bildirimde bulunma, soru sorma, bilgi verme, emretme, rica etme, randevu alma edimsözleri gerçekleşmektedir. Etkisöz edimi ise, bir cümleyi söyleyerek dinleyici üstünde ifadenin şartlarına özel etkilere yol açma; yani, sözün yarattığı etki, söz edimin sonucunu ya da etkisini gösteren bölüm olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Bir söz edimi gerçekleştirmekle, dünyadaki bir şeye etkide bulunulur. Demek ki Austin'in açıklamış olduğu bu iki edim, bir şeyler söylemiş olmakla edimde bulunmak ve bir şey söylemiş olmakla edimde bulunmak yoluyla bir şeye etki etmek olarak karakterize edilebilir. Austin'e göre edimsöz edimi bir şey yapmakken, etkisöz edimi için şöyle bir tanımlama yapar. Bir şey söylemek çoğu zaman, konuşan kişinin, dinleyici ya da başka kişilerin duyguları, düşüncüleri ya da edimleri üzerinde dolaylı etkiler yaratacaktır. Bu tür bir edimde bulunmaya, bir etkisöz ediminde bulunmak, yerine getirilen edime de, uygun olduğu yerlerde, etkisöz der. Austin'e göre bu edim, bir şey söylerken bir şey yapma edimi olarak tanımladığı edimsöz ediminden farklı olarak, bir şey söyleyerek bir şey yapma edimidir.

Etkisöz edimi kavramı, edimsöz edimi kavramıyla bağlantılı, edimsöz edimlerinin dinleyen kişilerin edimleri, düşünceleri, inançları vb. üzerindeki sonuçlarını ya da etkilerini gösteren bir

kavramdır. Örneğin, düşüncelerimizi gerekçelendirerek karşımızdaki kişiyi kandırmaya ya da ikna etmeye, birini uyararak onu korkutmaya ya da telaşlandırmaya; birinden bir ricada bulunarak, kişiye bir şey yaptırmaya, bilgilendirerek, kişiyi ikna etmeye çalışabiliriz. Bütün bu anlatımlar etkisöz edimlerini gösterir. Belirtmek gerekir ki, işin içinde olan araçlar uzlaşımsal olmadıkça, ortada bir edimsöz edimi olamaz; dolayısıyla onu gerçekleştirmek için başvuru olan sözel olmayan araçlar da uzlaşımsal olmalıdır. Edimsöz edimleri uzlaşımsal edimlerdir. Etkisöz edimleri ise uzlaşımsal olmazlar. Her iki tür edim sözel olmayan bir biçimde yerine getirilebilir; fakat böyle olduğunda bile bir edimin edimsöz adını hak edebilmesi için, o edimin uzlaşımsal nitelikte söz-dışı bir edim olması gerekir. Ama edimsöz edimini gerçekleştirmek için uzlaşımsal edimlerden yararlanılmasına rağmen etkisöz edimleri uzlaşımsal değildir. Etkisöz edimi, ya bir etkisöz hedefinin gerçekleşmesi, ya da edim sözün devamı olan bir etkisöz edimin yaratılması olabilir. Bir edimsözün etkisöz hedefi, bir başkası için devamındaki etkisöz olabilir.

Searle ikinci itirazında, Grice'in görüşünden farklı olarak, bir şey söylemenin ve anlamına gelmenin etkisöz edimi olmadığını; aksine bunun bir edimsöz edimi olduğunu savunmaktadır. Konuşmacının niyeti anlaşılması gereken bir niyettir. Searle'e göre, bu bir etkisöz edimi değil, bir edimsöz edimidir. Böylece Searle Grice'in doğal olmayan anlam için belirlemiş olduğu üç koşula şu koşulları eklemiştir: (iv) konuşmacının niyetlerinin edimsöz edimi olduğu, (v) konuşmacının ilgili cümleyi söylerken dilsel uzlaşımı dikkate aldığı.

Grice, Searle'ün dilsel uzlaşım ile ilgili olan itirazının kendi analizine ilişkin herhangi önemli bir soruna yol açtığını düşünmemektedir. Grice'ın itirazına göre, Amerikan askeri İtalyan askerlerine anlatmaya çalıştığı şeyi "Kennst du das Land, who die Zitronen blühen?" cümlesiyle değil de Almanca konuşması aracılığı ile anlatmaya çalışmaktadır. Ellerine düşmüş olduğu İtalyan askerlerinden beklediği "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?" cümlesini dikkate almaları değil, Almanca konuşmasını dikkate almalarıdır. Grice'ın bu itirazı oldukça fazla önem taşımaktadır çünkü eğer Grice bu itirazı kabul ederse, analizi döngüsel olmaktadır ve bu da Gricean Program açısından büyük bir sorun teşkil etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Grice'ın revize edilmiş analizinde "uzlaşımşal" (*conventional*) modunu dahil etmektedir. Grice'ın revize edilmiş analizi Searle tarafından önerilen revizyonu onaylıyor gibi görünmektedir.

Platts'ın itirazında ise konuşmacıların niyetlerini fark etmek onların kullandığı ifadelerin dilde ne anlama geldiğini bilmekle yakından ilgilidir. Bu nedenle konuşmacı anlamı konuşmacıların niyetleri açısından formüle edilemez. Çünkü konuşmacıların niyetlerinin bilgisi cümle anlamını öngörür. Bu nedenle Platts'a Grice'ın döngüsel olmayan bir teori sunamayacağını iddia eder. Cümlelerin aslında hiçbir niyetle daha önce söylenmemiş olduğu göz önüne alındığında, Grice'ın tek seçeneğinin, cümlelerin anlamlarını, söylenecek niyetleri ve oluşturacakları etki açısından açıklamaya çalışmak olduğu görülmektedir. Yani, Grice daha önce söylenmemiş cümlelerin anlamlarını varsayımsal niyetlerle (*hypothetical intentions*) açıklamaya çalışabilir. Ancak tüm varsayımsal niyetler anlamla ilgili olamaz. Platts, belirli bir cümlenin anlamını oluşturan varsayımsal niyetler üzerinde ne gibi

kısıtlamalar olduğunu sormaktadır. Eğer böyle bir kısıtlama yoksa daha önce hiç söylenmemiş cümlelerin anlamları tamamen belirsiz kalacaktır: cümleler herhangi bir anlama gelebilirler, bu yüzden de hiçbir şey ifade etmezler. Diğer yandan, kısıtlamalar varsa, bunlar nelerdir? Platts, bu noktada Grice'ın verebileceği tek bir cevabın varsayımsal niyetlerin cümlenin anlamı ile sınırlandırıldığını, dolayısıyla da analizin döngüsel olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Searle'ün eleştirisi önemli bir noktaya değinmektedir. Grice'ın anlam analizi cümle anlamını semantik olmayan kavramlara indirgemekte başarısız olmaktadır. Geçekten de analizde konuşmacı anlamı cümle anlamını içermektedir ve analiz döngüsel bir biçim almaktadır. Daha sonraları Grice, bir dinleyicinin söylenen kelimelerin ve cümlelerin anlamlarını kavrayarak bir konuşmacı tarafından söyleneni anladığını kabul eder.

Searle'ün dilsel uzlaşım konusundaki eleştirisi de doğrudur. Fakat bu eleştirinin yalnızca dilsel uzlaşımın konuşmacılar ve dinleyiciler tarafından paylaşıldığı durumlarda geçerli olduğu savunulmuştur.

Searle'ün ikinci eleştirisi de kabul edilmelidir (bir şey söylemek ve anlamına gelmek etkisöz edimi değil, edimsöz edimidir). Ancak Searle dilsel uzlaşım ve edimsöz edimi arasındaki bağlantıyı açıklamamaktadır. Austin edimsöz edimlerinin uzlaşımsal olduğunu söyler fakat Searle bu konuda açık bir şey belirtmemektedir.

Strawson'un anlama (*understanding*) konusundaki iddiası ise Grice'in analizi açısından daha büyük bir sorun teşkil etmektedir. Grice da bu eleştirinin kendi analizi açısından büyük bir sorun yarattığını kabul etmekte ve bunu daha sonraki çalışmalarında dile getirmektedir.

Simon Blackburn, Platts'ın eleştirilerine cevap vermektedir. Blackburn bu yanıtında Grice'in, Platts'ın ikileminden söz konusu varsayımsal niyetleri eğitimin (*training*) belirlediğini savunmakta ve konuşmacıların bu eğitime gösterdiği doğal tepkiyle açıklamaktadır. Fakat bu cevap önceki meseleyi yeniden gündeme getirmektedir. Eğitim elbette konuşmacıların sözlü davranışlarını belirler. Bu eğitim ancak cümle anlamını kavramakla ilgili bir eğitimse Platts'ın söz ettiği ikilemden kurtulmak mümkün olabilir. Platts'ın varsayımsal niyetleri neyin belirlediğini sorduğu gibi, aynı şekilde konuşmacıların eğitimini de neyin belirlediğini sorabiliriz. Daha önce olduğu gibi, mevcut tek cevap, cümlenin anlamı gibi görünmektedir. Blackburn'ün yanıtı, döngüsellik yeniden gündeme gelmesi nedeniyle başarısız olmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada Grice'in doğal olmayan anlam kavramına getirilen itirazlar detaylıca incelenerek sunulmaktadır. Tezde, Grice'in Programının analitik bir program olması nedeniyle döngüsel olmama şartının analizi açısından bir gereklilik olduğu, Grice'in analizinin revize edilmiş versiyonlarının her birine daha fazla madde eklediği ve analizin ayrıntılarının önemsiz hale geldiği gösterilmektedir. Edilen itirazların Grice'in indirgemeci analizinin döngüsel olmayışını tehdit ettiği öne sürülmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Grice'in analizinin revize edilmiş halinin itirazları engelleme potansiyeline bakılmaksızın, analizde döngüsellik çok açık olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

B. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Social Sciences
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
- Enformatik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Informatics
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Dincer
Adı / Name : Şule Nur
Bölümü / Department : Felsefe Bölümü

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : A Critical Evaluation of Gricean Reductive Analysis of Meaning

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master **Doktora** / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.
A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature **Tarih** / Date