

TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY: FROM PACIFISM  
TO PROACTIVE POLICIES BETWEEN 1976- 2018

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VUSLAT NUR ŞAHİN

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sadettin Kirazcı  
Director (Acting)

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

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Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat  
Tanrısever  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

**Examining Committee Members**

Assist. Prof. Dr. Şerif Onur Bahçecik (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

Assist. Prof. Dr. Hatice Çelik (Kırıkkale Uni., Uİ) \_\_\_\_\_



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Name, Last name : Vuslat Nur Şahin

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY: FROM PACIFISM TO PROACTIVE POLICIES BETWEEN 1976- 2018**

Şahin, Vuslat Nur

MSc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

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This thesis examines Japan's security policy, with particular focus on relations with East Asian countries and the US, especially consider the policy changes in security from pacifism to proactive. More specifically, it presents an overview of the transformation of Japan's security policy in response to the change in the security environment in East Asia, particularly North Korea's military development and the rise in China's power and the role of Unites States in the region. For this purpose, the thesis pays particular attention to change in the content of its basic policy document, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), compiled in 1976 and subsequently revised five times, in 1995, 2004, 2010, 2013 and 2018

**Keywords:** Japan, Security, National Defense Program Guideline (NDGP), Self Defense Forces (SDF), Proactive

## ÖZ

### 1976- 2018 ARASINDA JAPONYA GÜVENLİK POLİTİKALARININ DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: PASİFİZMDEN PROAKTİFLİĞE

Vuslat Nur Şahin

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

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Bu tez Japonya'nın Kuzey Doğu Asya ülkeleri ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne karşı belirlediği güvenlik politikalarını incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken özellikle Japon güvenlik algısının pasifizmden proaktif politikalara dönüşmesi göz önünde bulundurulmuştur. Özel olarak bu dönüşüm durumunun Japonya'nın çevresindeki gelişmelere bağlı olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu değişimler arasında Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer silah çalışmaları, Çin'in yükselen gücü ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin bölgedeki rolü başlıcadır. Bu amaçla bu tez daha çok Japonya'nın Ulusal Güvenlik Program Rehberleri'ni temel alarak bu dönüşümü anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu rehberler 1976, 1995, 2004, 2010, 2013 ve 2018 olmak üzere beş kere yayımlanmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Japonya, Güvenlik, Öz Savunma Gücü, Ulusal Güvenlik Program Rehberleri, Proaktif

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPG	National Defense Program Guideline
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRC	People Republic of China
SDF	Self Defence Force
U.S	United States
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Japan is one of the most controversial countries when the national security is in the screen. It should be highlighted that Japanese culture is rooted by samurai tradition. The last traditional Japanese government was Tokugawa or Edo period governed Japan nearly in 250 years with peace and prosperity, in addition to that Tokugawa Ieyasu's dynasty of shoguns defended Japan against Western influences especially Christianity, after the mid of 19<sup>th</sup> century Tokugawa shogunate drastically became weak and as a result of this, 'imperial restoration'<sup>1</sup> was started. The first step of Meiji restoration was finishing the feudal system in Japan, it caused to modern Japan in terms of culture, politics, society, economy, technology, and law. Although Japan started to modernisation process after the Meiji Restoration in 1868; the modernisation was developing so quickly and resulted Japanese superiority in Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and Russian-Japanese War in 1904-1905. These superiorities were met by international area with shock because just in 1853, American Perry Expedition colonialized Japanese Empire.

This increasing power of Japan encouraged Japan to participate the First World War; and the Second World War. The Second World War was a cornerstone experience for Japan. Japanese passion about being a world power especially rooted from Japanese necessity to natural resources. The first step is Japanese invasion of China in 1937, this was followed by Japanese participation to Axis Alliance with signing to Tripartite Pact in 1940. Japan pursued war for her favour until Japanese attack to Pearl Harbour in 1941, the result of this act was United

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<sup>1</sup> It was also named as Meiji restoration because it was occurred in the period of Emperor Meiji

States participation of the Second World War in order to be against to Japan. Although Japan occupied much of the Southeast Asia, the participation of the United States changed this situation against to the Japan with the help of the United States' triumph of Battle of Midway in 1942. Although Japanese army push back to the Japan, United States did not satisfy and the United States President Harry S. Truman, and his government decided to use atomic bombs at the first time in Japan. United States used mortal atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 15, 1945 Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced that Japan would surrender. Later on September 2, 1945 the Japanese signed a surrender treaty with US General Douglas MacArthur aboard the battleship USS Missouri.

As a result of the Second World War, Japan directed to 1946 constitution which is known as "Peace Constitution" because predicted to disarmament of Japan.

Article 9 of Constitution is that:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.<sup>2</sup>

It could be interpreted that Japan drastic change rooted from the loss of the Second World War, but United States diplomatic success in this point is to create an ally from an enemy; one of the Cold War alliances of United States is Japan. The first step of this alliances is the Korean War in 1952; some of the improvement occurred about Japan security forces' feature in this time, even Japan was under the United States occupation. Japan Defence Agency was formed according to the accomplishment of the target of defending Japan from external conflicts. However, some of the scholars argued that it is not enough to create a general trust for Japan

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<sup>2</sup> "The Constitution Of Japan", *Japan.Kantei.Go.Jp*, 1947, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution\\_and\\_government\\_of\\_japan/constitution\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html).

especially by the neighbours of Japan in which had terrible memories from the Second World War.<sup>3</sup>

For demonstration and understanding Japan's adaptation in the international system, it should get to the bottom of and, and should define what sort of adaptation has Japan at the beginning. As it was mentioned before Japan renounces her military activities with her constitution. On the other hand, in the same year with the establishment of the SDF, Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau, indicate to Japan's constitution and openly declare that the SDF's only existence reason is self-defence and the SDF has never equipped with modern warfare equipment. The reason for the Cabinet Legislation Bureau declaration is put a strict limitation in front of SDF to prevent SDF's transformation to other countries armies. As Richard J. Samuels also mentioned the SDF's 'war potential' rooted from be 'definable only in relation to other states' capabilities and international conditions'.<sup>4</sup>

It could be said that Japan designed her security policy as defining her military capabilities by comparing with other states and as a result of this situation Japan created her relative pacifism when the comparison is thought<sup>5</sup>. Actually the Cabinet Legislation Bureau main intention is prevent the SDF's possible activities in the abroad, and draw them legal framework according to the constitution. Cabinet Legislation Bureau highlighted that SDF's only assigned position is self defence<sup>6</sup>. Thanks to the UN Charter Article 51, countries have the right of

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<sup>3</sup> Leif-Eric Easley, "How Proactive? How Pacifist? Charting Japan's Evolving Defence Posture", *Australian Journal Of International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (2016): 69, doi:10.1080/10357718.2016.1181148.

<sup>4</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Politics, Security Policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?" JPRI, March 2004, , accessed July 22, 2019, <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, "Japan's Pacifism Is Dead", *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 142, doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1542803.

<sup>6</sup> "II. Basis Of Defense Policy | Japan Ministry Of Defense", *Mod.Go.Jp*, 1957, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/dp02.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html).

collective self-defence. Japan also benefits from this fundamental right, for that reason Japan's bureaucrats tried to be more delimiting than other countries. This regulatory mind set has specific name in Japan which is *senshu bōei* and which means 'exclusively defensive defence'

Japan restrictions which target security policies, was not limited in the 1950s. New restrictions occurred in the period of 1960s and 1970s. Some of the examples make this clear. For instance, Eisaku Sato who was the prime minister, declared sets of principles about the policies for nuclear weapons and other arms exports in 1967. Sato was so determined about kept away nuclear weapons from Japan neither production nor introducing them the Japanese land. In addition to that Sato also determined about limiting arm export. He stated that Japan will be strict about arm export, some of the countries were in the blacklist and Japan is not going to export them arms; those states are 'communist states', 'states under UN arms-exports sanctions', or 'those involved or likely to become involved in armed conflict'.<sup>7</sup> This arm export limitation in 1967 influence successor governor, like Takeo Miki who stated that 'Japan, as a peaceful country, is to avoid promoting international conflicts by exporting arms' in 1976.<sup>8</sup> Miki's anti-militarist activities were not limited with the export issue; he also regulated defence spending and narrows that 1% of GDP with the cabinet decision.

United States adopted Nixon Doctrine in 1969, when United States experienced hardship in the Vietnam. Although this doctrine has different points, one of them is more important than others because it is directly influencing Japan. According to the doctrine United States declared that even the alliances of United States in East Asia should undertake and share more security burden. However, when Sato openly explained that security of Japan regionally depends in opposition to the

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<sup>7</sup> Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, "Japan's Pacifism Is Dead", *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 142, doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1542803.

<sup>8</sup> Hideaki Kaneda et al., *Japan's Missile Defense Diplomatic And Security Policies In A Changing Strategic Environment*, ebook (The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2007), [http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/policy\\_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf](http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/policy_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf).

instability on Korea and Taiwan in Washington, Nixon was convinced about come back Okinawa for Japanese security.

Japan suddenly find her in a position to change her defence strategy; either because of the push of the United States or Nixon Shocks<sup>9</sup>. Those situations bring Japan to the point of re-thinking her defence position. Whole these developments encourage Japanese public opinion and state-level thinking to stronger defence mechanism. Because United States established more warm relations with the Soviet Bloc and this means Japan had to protect her own border from USSR or PRC. It is the first time public discussions in Japan legitimize Japan's own security procurement. The legitimization is justifying as economic interests' correlations with national security.

It could be said that 1976 restrictions are highest point of the quasi pacifism, because at the last time Japanese government and cabinet put restriction according to their own demand.

Basic Policy on National Defence in 1957 is significant document because this is a single document which was explained Japanese strategy up to 2013 National Security Strategy.<sup>10</sup> In the Basic Policy declares that Japan establishes her self-defence bear in the mind of her national condition and international situations.<sup>11</sup> It could be said that Japan defence capability has two main dynamics which are the economy and public opinion.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> floating the dollar and opening relations with mainland China

<sup>10</sup> Kei Wakaizumi, "Consensus In Japan", *Foreign Policy*, no. 27 (1977): 158, doi:10.2307/1148017.

<sup>11</sup> "I. Constitution And The Basis Of Defense Policy | Japan Ministry Of Defense", *Mod.Go.Jp*, accessed 22 April 2019, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/dp01.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html).

<sup>12</sup> Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska, *Security, Strategy And Military Change In The 21St Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015).

As it could be seen Japan improve her image according to either ‘peaceful cultural norm’ or ‘antimilitarist culture’.<sup>13</sup>

Even in the 1970s, Japan contrary to ordinary declared that Japan is not going to transform her economic power to military power, as usual, rather Japanese politicians stated that even if Japan becomes an important power in the economy, Japan will never try to transfer her power in the military. This type of rhetoric find place in the official papers such as Diplomatic Bluebooks or official speech in the prime minister level. One of the example is Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda’s speech in 1977,

What I really see as important is the question of peace. We are taking a unique stance in the world. If we had wanted to, we could have had powerful weaponry. But although we have that potential, we do not pursue it. Are we perhaps not the first country in world history to take such an approach? If one looks at history, economic great powers have almost unfailingly become military great powers. Japan does not choose that road.<sup>14</sup>

To sum up, it could be seen that Japan had improved her quasi pacifism until 1976. In other words, Japan intentionally put her in a weak position in terms of military potential.

The main target of this research is understanding Japanese security perception transformation from pacifism to proactive between 1976-2018. For understanding pacifism and proactive security constructivism and realism were chosen as for drawing theoretical line. Those years are chosen according to the publishing National Defence Programme Guideline which is published by Ministry of Defence for specified the defence politics of the Japan. National Defence Programme Guideline published in 1976 (1977 Fiscal Year), 1995 (1996 Fiscal Year), 2004 (2005 Fiscal Year), 2010 (2011 Fiscal Year), 2013 (2014 Fiscal Year) and 2018 (2019 Fiscal Year). The main primary resource of these theses is National Defence Programme Guideline and the developments between two of the guidelines.

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<sup>13</sup> Peter J Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms And National Security* (Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>14</sup> Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, "Japan's Pacifism Is Dead", *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 142, doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1542803

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM QUASI PACIFISM TO PROACTIVE SECURITY UNDERSTANDING

Terms generally means different things in East and West culture. Before the discussion about pacifism, what does pacifism mean in the Japan is crucial. Pacifism in the Western culture means complete denial of force. On the other hand if the term Heiwashugi translates, this means ‘peace-ism’<sup>15</sup>.

At the first place, it is necessary to explain that why the term of “quasi-pacifism” is used rather than pacifism. As it was mentioned in the introduction part, Japan constitution’s 9th article is the base of Japanese National Security understanding, and it was discussed very detailed in introduction part too; to sum up Japanese constitution put limitations about offense and defence; it is very clear about not being offensive, but it gives right to self-defence. For that reason, “quasi-pacifism” is chosen because a constant pacifist position rejects a right to self-defence whether in personal conflicts, domestic public affairs or international relations; the Japanese constitution applies pacifism only to international relations, and law allows self-defence.<sup>16</sup>

The concept of pacifism is quite contrary to ordinary, especially in the eyes of main theories of International Relations. As it is known, the main International Relations theories explain lots of things with the help of security which is being

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<sup>15</sup> Mari Yamamoto, *Grassroots Pacifism In Post-War Japan*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2004).

<sup>16</sup> Yasuo Hasebe, "The End Of Constitutional Pacifism?", *Washington International Law Journal*26 (2017).

stronger in the military sense. Japan is stepping out of line, although she is one of the leading economic powers in the world; there is not such an example like Japan in the literature. For that reason, some of the theorists are interested in this issue. This thesis examines two of the theories. The first one is “Constructivist Theory” and “Realist Theory” in the International Relations.

But at the first place, it is important to understand researcher limited some of their discourse with just only having an army, can a strong army be only one condition to meet the standards? Or there are another scale factors? It could be seen that most of the analyses in the literature is underestimate the military power of the Japan. Most of the analyses of Japanese security policy greatly underestimate Japanese military power. For example, in 1993 Thomas Berger wrote, “*In the short to medium term it is unlikely that Japan will seek to become a major military power.*”<sup>17</sup> Peter Katzenstein noted that Japan is a leader in defence spending, but concluded that Japanese defence expenditure did not make it “*a world class military power,*” and that “*by conventional measures of military strength Japan ranks far behind its major industrial competitors.*”<sup>18</sup> Paul Midford claimed that Japan has been “*underproviding for its security*” and “*incurring significant risks as a consequence.*”<sup>19</sup> Yoshihide Soeya wrote, “*No responsible decision maker in post-war Japan has ever attempted to convert accumulated economic wealth into military might.*”<sup>20</sup>

When the reason of this delusion is thought, the primary reason can be misleading statistic: defence spending as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP). The World Bank data is based on this miscalculation. However, when the total amount

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<sup>17</sup> Thomas U Berger, *Cultures Of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> Peter J Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms And National Security* (Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>19</sup> Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion And Security*, n.d.

<sup>20</sup> Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A Welch, *Japan As A 'Normal Country'?*(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

of expenditures was thought Japan is the 9th in the world after than Germany. When it was thought that, Japan has not got big army or any kind of traditional army this amount is really huge which only 0.9 per cent of Japanese GDP is.




Figure 2.1. Military Expenditures by Country (in US\$ billions) 2018

Before the theoretical discussion, some of the information about Japanese technical military power and her position in the world is helpful to understanding why Japan has an importance for world security even her questionable security position.

Starting from the late 1970s, a buck-passing strategy would necessitate Japan to rise its input to the alliance. As the Soviet naval threat raised and the United States failed to repair the regional balance of power, Japan should have enlarged both its military power and participation. In the post-Cold War world, conventional threats to Japan have declined, which recommends that Japan should reduce its military efforts. Simultaneously, a significant threat—the risk of attack by small numbers of ballistic missiles perhaps armed with weapons of mass destruction—has worsened. Unless Washington appears organized to solve this problem for Japan,

Tokyo should build up its capabilities to counter this threat itself. All in all, throughout the post–Cold War period, Japan should be dropping its conventional military power and military roles and focusing more on the ballistic missile threat.

After World War II, Japan expended far less on defence than did other wealthy states. By the 1990s, but, Japanese defence spending had exceeded that of the European great powers. By way of Japanese spending enlarged, so did Japanese military capabilities. In 1945 the once-powerful Japanese military was broken down. Any military equipment that had lasted the war was devastated by the Americans or removed to U.S. allies. In the early 1950s, Japan began to take initial steps toward rearmament, obtaining U.S. hand-me-downs and other less modern systems.

Japan’s security role after the Second World War is really limited and Japan acted so carefully as a part of alliance with the United States, the only big exception was acquiring one guided missile destroyer and Korean War–vintage aircraft in the late 1970.




Figure 2.2. Comparative Defense Spending Over Time Among Spending Leaders, Excluding the United States and the Soviet Union, 1965-2000 (U.S.\$ Billion, constant)

Because this scope of pacifism was such a narrow line, opposition groups from Japan claimed that SDF's overseas activities was illegal according to the 1954 SDF law, even the United States asked Japan to cooperate in the Korea and Vietnam; the Diet refused it. According to the Diet (Japanese Parliament), any type of these joint military exercises were against the constitution.

## 2.1. Pacifist Security Theories

### 2.1.1. Constructivist Theory

The first theory about explained "passive" culture in the Japan is constructivist theory. According to the constructivist theorists; states regulate their own security policies mostly according to the societal norms and identities. Because of this explanation, culture of antimilitarism can be rooted from international and/or domestic political reasons. The hospitality to militarization reflected as taking a dislike to military forces, and this situation can lead a country to take decisions in the institutions and laws. The public opinion and opposition groups resistance about developing military power can challenge the authority who want to develop military power and capability.

Some of the scholars claim that Second World War created the belief of anti-militarisation is the Japan's national mindset, this mindset caused to Japanese security policy in the post war era. For example, Gleen Hook mentioned '*...persistent strength of anti-militaristic attitudes in Japan create persistent strength of anti-militaristic attitudes.*'<sup>21</sup> Another important Japan expert Katzenstein stated that "*there exists no observable relation between Japan's relative position and its security policy, ... Japan's security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power*".<sup>22</sup> The

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<sup>21</sup> "Overview And Fundamental Concepts Of National Defense | Japan Ministry Of Defense", *Mod.Go.Jp*, accessed 29 July 2019, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/overview.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/overview.html).

<sup>22</sup> Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska, *Security, Strategy And Military Change In The 21St Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015).

third expert opinion is from Sun-Ki Chai, “*The incompleteness of systemic explanations suggest that domestic factors are essential to explaining the anomalous nature of Japanese defence policy.*”<sup>23</sup>

To sum up, according to the constructivist Japan security policy depends on Japanese norm of antimilitarism which inherited from the Second World War. Katzenstein argues “*strong reactions to anything that smacks of Japanese militarism act as a social restraint on national security policy, ... a series of taboos curtail the growth of the military.*”<sup>24</sup> Berger claims, “*in each instance efforts to significantly expand . . . Japanese defence establishments and international roles foundered on the shoals of domestic opposition.*” due to Japanese antimilitarism.<sup>25</sup> Hook states that “*mass attitudes have been of crucial significance in constraining the normalization of the military as a legitimate instrument of state power.*”<sup>26</sup> Chai mentioned Japanese constitution article 9<sup>27</sup> as an example of the norms influence to the law and institution.<sup>28</sup> To sum up, according to the constructivist scholars, Japanese domestic norms determined Japanese military scope and limitation from the Second World War.

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<sup>23</sup> Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, "Japan's Pacifism Is Dead", *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 142, doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1542803.

<sup>24</sup> Peter J Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms And National Security* (Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>25</sup> Thomas U Berger, *Cultures Of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan from owning military forces or using them in the conduct of foreign policy

<sup>28</sup> Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, "War Is Peace: The Rearticulation Of 'Peace' In Japan'S China Discourse", *Review Of International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2015): 266-286, doi:10.1017/s0260210515000157.

### 2.1.2. Realist Theory

The second theory which explains Japanese pacifism is Realism. To short, Realist scholars explain international area with an anarchy environment. According to realists there are two main aggressive policies. These are conquest<sup>29</sup> and bandwagoning<sup>30</sup>.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, there are two defensive policies. One is balancing<sup>32</sup> and other is buck-passing. The buck-passing is evaluated in the scope of this thesis. According to the Buck-passers, admitting the balance for eliminating threat. On the other hand, they do as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others.<sup>33</sup>

According to the realists there are some reason needed for chosen buck-passing as a strategy. For instance, countries in which experience risky situations because of their own geographic conditions or military technology make them defenceless, another example is countries in which have strong alliance for procuring security for these countries too<sup>34</sup>.

After the definitions of both theories, it could be claimed that discussing this situation in the case of Japan was a great opportunity. The fundamental question is that, whether Japan decides her security policy as a result of Second World War

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<sup>29</sup> military expansion to gain regional hegemony

<sup>30</sup> aligning with a strong, aggressive state to gain some of its spoils

<sup>31</sup> Thomas U Berger, *Cultures Of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

<sup>32</sup> building military power, finding allies, and confronting aggressive states/ 37

<sup>33</sup> Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan's Military Gets New Rules Of Engagement", *The Diplomat*, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-military-gets-new-rules-of-engagement/>.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas S. Wilkins, "Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Foreign And Security Policy Under The 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism Or New Dead End?", *Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (2016): 134-135, doi:10.1080/10371397.2016.1172949.

such a strategy, or the pacifism is a result of Japanese public opinion strong opposition of militarism because of the Second World War.<sup>35</sup>

For example; Japan should try to find opportunity and increase her own military existence when her prior security alliance United States experiences power loss or fail.

## 2.2. Proactive Security Theories

The post war Japan's one of the drastic changes in the security policy occurred in the Shinzo Abe government. The term proactive pacifism<sup>36</sup> emerged in that era.

### 2.2.1. Continuity

There are two main discussions found place in the literature during the Abe government. The first one is 'continuity'. This means, the change in security policy is accumulative, foreseeable and mostly forced by pacifist, or anti-militarist, sentiments. Michael J. Green argued that '*Abe's national security agenda is not, in fact, a departure from the general trajectory established by his predecessors in the post-Cold War era. It represents far more continuity than change.*'<sup>37</sup> In the same line, Jeffrey W. Hornung and Mike M. Mochizuki, even the recognizing that Japan's new security policies will transform to Japan more proactive in terms of security, at the end of the day Japan's pacifist limitations stay mostly unbroken, as a consequence Japan continues be 'exceptional' United States alliance.<sup>38</sup> Adam P.

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<sup>35</sup> "Japan Looks To Space Technology To Defend Itself From North Korea", *Forbes.Com*, 2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/saadiampekkannen/2017/01/28/japan-looks-to-space-technology-to-defend-itself-from-north-korea/>.

<sup>36</sup> Named as "sekkyokuteki heiwashugi" in Japanese

<sup>37</sup> Micheal J. Green, "Japan Is Back: Unbundling Abe'S Grand Strategy", *Lowyinstitute.Org*, 2013, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/japan-back-unbundling-abe-s-grand-strategy>.

<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey W. Hornung and Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan: Still An Exceptional U.S. Ally", *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2016): 95-116, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2016.1170483.

Liff explains Abe's security position with the words 'evolutionary' and 'incremental', and rejects that they constitute '*an abrupt transformation of Japan's defense policy*'.<sup>39</sup> Leif-Eric Easley states that '*Tokyo ... is not aggressively remilitarizing*';<sup>40</sup> as well as Andrew L. Oros writes that '*the effect of the post war antimilitarist legacy remains strong even in contemporary Japan under Prime Minister Abe and even in the midst of a security renaissance*'.<sup>41</sup>

### 2.2.2. Incrementalists

The second one is 'incrementalist'. According to this view Abe administration's new policies about security is revolutionary when compared with the previous practices. According to Christopher W. Hughes who criticises that academic circles obsessed 'consensus' about Japan's security policy transformation when defining this as a 'statis' or 'immobilism'. In addition to that he claims that '*mounting signs of Japanese remilitarization*'.<sup>42</sup> In the eyes of Hughes, the choice about confirm collective self-defence should be seen as '*a watershed moment in Japan's development of a radical security trajectory*'.<sup>43</sup> Huges is not the only one. Bryce Wakefield and Craig Martin do agree with Huges. They mention that Abe '*profound systemic ramifications*' and can cause to Japan's participation in wars

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<sup>39</sup> Adam P. Liff, "Japan's Defense Policy: Abe The Evolutionary", *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (2015): 79-99, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.1064711.

<sup>40</sup> Leif-Eric Easley, "How Proactive? How Pacifist? Charting Japan'S Evolving Defence Posture", *Australian Journal Of International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (2016): 69, doi:10.1080/10357718.2016.1181148.

<sup>41</sup> Andrew Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, n.d.

<sup>42</sup> Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan'S 'Resentful Realism' And Balancing China'S Rise", *The Chinese Journal Of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (2016): 109-150, doi:10.1093/cjip/pow004.

<sup>43</sup> Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan'S Strategic Trajectory And Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity Or Radical Shift?", *The Journal Of Japanese Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 93-126, doi:10.1353/jjs.2017.0005.

'sooner than Abe's defenders claim'.<sup>44</sup> Michael Auslin defines Abe's security policies like '*Japan's new realism*' and pointed that Abe has 'distanced his country from its post war pacifism'.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> 10 Yeong-Don Loh, "The Right Of Collective Self-Defense And Japan'S Reinterpretation Of Its Constitution", *HUFS Law Review* 42, no. 4 (2018): 203-234, doi:10.17257/hufslr.2018.42.4.203.

<sup>45</sup> Michael Auslin, "Japan's New Realism", *Foreign Affairs*, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/japans-new-realism>.

## CHAPTER 3

### JAPAN NATIONAL DEFENCE PROGRAM GUIDELINES AND DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN GUIDELINES

#### 3.1. Japan 1976 National Defence Program Guideline (1977 Fiscal Year)

The first National Defence Program Outline was published in the years after fiscal 1977. This year is important because it was the time of détente period which of the easing of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union from 1967 to 1979. The era was a time of increased trade and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>46</sup> Relations cooled again with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan<sup>47</sup>. As it was mentioned before Japan security strategy depends on United States security benefits in the world. In the cold war conditions, the United States defined Japan as one of the most strategic partner in the region. Because of the Japan's geostrategic position, Japan is the neighbour both of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and the People Republic of China (PRC). Those two communist obscures were seen as the rival enemies by USA. Japan felt secure in this insecure environment until the détente, if the cold war finished, who would give security support to Japan. In addition to that Japan has not got any type of good image among the regions' countries, as a result of her acts in the Second World War which was mentioned in the previous parts.

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<sup>46</sup> For example: signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks

<sup>47</sup> Heather Campbell, "Détente | United States-Soviet History", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed 11 January 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/detente>.

Formulated against the backdrop of the détente of the 1970s, the 1976 Guidelines were based on awareness that:

- (1) ‘in general, a full-scale military clash between East and West would be unlikely to occur’
- (2) ‘in the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security alliance would continue to play a substantial role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan’<sup>48</sup>

On the other hand the first objective of the outline highlights the “constitution”. It could be understood that whether USA take her security support from Japan, Japan had not got any plan about establishing her own military power. Although she had crucial economic power in this time, she would like to continue her pacifist policies in the militaristic issues.<sup>49</sup> In the first paragraph of the objectives part, she openly describe that the limits of the security and defence depends on the constitution, and define the scope of the guidelines according to this. As it could mentioned before another significant point in the part of the objectives is that close ties which was between Japan and the USA, a natural reason of this was security arrangement between those countries had special place in this chapter.

Japan describes her domestic conditions as “fundamentally stable”, and she did not estimate any drastic changes. As a result of this she describes her fundamental defence goal as continue to her surveillance position in the peacetime and have a counter power against any kind of small scale aggression even in this point Japan NDPG highlighted the her defence force’s limited capacity. But it seems that she did not expect any large scale aggression in the region.

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<sup>48</sup> "National Defense Program Outline 1977 Fiscal Year", *Worldjpn.Grips.Ac.Jp*, 1976, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

The second part of the guideline is “international situation”. Even in the second part of seventies Japan was a carefully following international relations and aware that world politics start to experience more diversified international relations<sup>50</sup>.

In this part Japan also defines her own détente understanding and in a few words she said that USSR and the United States have a dialogue which basically aimed avoiding nuclear war and establishing mutual relations. Another interesting point is that an emphasis of regions: “in many individual regions as well, various efforts are being made to avoid conflict and stabilize international relations”<sup>51</sup>. This is important because in 1977 Japan declared “Fukuda Doctrine” which is based on a speech by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. In 1977, while on a tour of the ASEAN member states, the prime minister made a speech in Manila in which he articulated Japan's foreign policy that later became known as the Fukuda Doctrine<sup>52</sup>. ASEAN was born on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1967, with the signature of five foreign ministers; those countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The ASEAN Declaration was signed in Bangkok.<sup>53</sup>

Prime Minister Fukuda promised that:

Japan which is a country committed to peace, would never become a military power and that Japan would establish a relationship of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries in wide-ranging fields’. In addition to that, ‘Japan would collaborate undoubtedly with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts, as an equal partner.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Sueo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions In Japanese Foreign Policy", *Asian Survey* 28, no. 5 (1988): 509-525, doi:10.1525/as.1988.28.5.01p0162r.

<sup>53</sup> "ASEAN Member States - ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY", *ASEAN | One Vision One Identity One Community*, 2019, <https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/>.

Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999 in ASEAN.

<sup>54</sup> "Promotion Of Relations With Other Countries", *Mofa.Go.Jp*, accessed 28 July 2019, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1977/1977-3-1.htm>.

The Fukuda Doctrine was presented as the base of Japan's current and future diplomacy toward the rest of Asia. The fundamental elements of the doctrines are 'First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power'<sup>55</sup> Fukuda declared that nevertheless Japan had the capacity to rearm and/or to produce nuclear weapons, it steered clear of recover its military past. Fukuda used article 9 of the 1946 constitution to acknowledge Japan's pacifist stance post-war.<sup>56</sup> For the ASEAN nations and Southeast Asia altogether, this explanation served like psychological reassurance to the memories of Japanese aggression in the Second World War. "Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding with these countries"<sup>57</sup> The Prime Minister involved mutual assurance and confidence between Japan and ASEAN by highlighted the words "heart to heart" in his interpretation to have stronger relations among Japan and ASEAN<sup>58</sup>.

Japan also saw herself as a part of equilibrium in this Northeast Asia and Asia Pacific. The other parts of this equilibrium are China, USSR and United States. Was Japan over estimate her position? Because she had not got any military power but she established a balance and replace military power with economic power. In addition to that Korean peninsula was still seen as a high tension area by the Japan. According to the Japanese viewpoint large scale military conflict between two parties in the bipolar worlds is not possible in the coming future. But Japan openly made public that if ever any kind of the large scale military conflict occurred

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<sup>55</sup> "National Defense Program Outline 1977 Fiscal Year"

<sup>56</sup>Wolf Mendl, *The Cold War Era 1947-1989 And Issues At The End Of The Twentieth Century*(London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2001).

<sup>57</sup> "National Defense Program Outline 1977 Fiscal Year"

<sup>58</sup> Chiara Chiaponi, "Japan And The Asia-Pacific In The 1970S: From An Economic To A 'Heart-To-Heart' Relationship", *Modern Asian Studies* 50, no. 5 (2016): 1679-1704, doi:10.1017/s0026749x15000372.

between parties and Japan was in fix in the conflict, USA must provide a security zone for Japan because of the USA- Japan Security Arrangement.

The third title of the guidelines is “Basic Defence Concept”. Japan was always highlights her defence position and also she had not got any offence aim in both the region and international area. But cold war time’s biggest threat was nuclear war and Japan experienced nuclear weapons destructive effect in the Second World War. She defined her position in this nuclear struggle as relying on the nuclear deterrent capability of the USA<sup>59</sup>.

Fourth part of the guideline is “posture of national defence”. This part consists of some setups. Those are warning and surveillance, countering direct military aggression, command communication, transportation and rear support service, education and training personnel, disaster relief operations, and posture of the ground. One of the critical issue in those part is located the part of setup for countering direct military aggression. In this part of the chapter the issue of external assistance is clarifies by saying to capability was limited with the “in principle without external assistance<sup>60</sup>”

The fifth part is posture of the ground, maritime and air self-defence forces. The subtitles are ground self-defence force, maritime self-defence force, and air self-defence force. This chapter mostly consists of technical details<sup>61</sup>.

The sixth part is important and put forward the main policies. The basic goal in improving Japan's defence capability must be the maintenance of the postures outlined in Sections IV and V, with due consideration to qualitative improvements aimed at parity with the technical standards of other nations. In addition to carefully adapting to changing economic and fiscal conditions in harmony with government policies in other fields, the points below should be borne in mind

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<sup>59</sup> "National Defense Program Outline 1977 Fiscal Year"

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

when defence improvements are actually implemented. Decisions on major projections in fiscal yearly defence improvement programs will be submitted to the National Defence Council for consultation. The actual scope of such major projections will be decided by the Cabinet, after consultation with the National defence Council.

(1) Establishment of reasonable standards for personnel recruitment and consideration of measures aimed at securing quality personnel and enhancing morale. (2) Effective maintenance and improvement of defence facilities and attempts to harmonize such facilities with the surrounding communities through consideration of environmental protection, such as anti-noise measures. (3) Effective implementation of equipment acquisition programs, with overall consideration of such factors as swift emergency resupply, acceptable education and training ease and cost efficiency. Attention should also be given to the possibility for adequate domestic production of the equipment in question. (4) Improvement of the technical research and development system for the maintenance and improvement of qualitative levels of defence capability.

In addition, with regard to Japan's defence capability, the Guidelines stipulated that it should (1) be furnished with the various functions required for defence and (2) be in a balanced posture in organization and deployment, including logistic support, (3) take adequate surveillance posture in peacetime, (4) effectively cope with limited and small-scale aggression, and (5) be capable of shifting smoothly to a new setup when an important change occurs in the situation. The concept of Basic Defence Capability introduced by the 1976 Guidelines attached importance to deterrence, emphasizing measures to prevent an invasion of Japan.

### **3.2. Developments Between 1979 and 1995**

United States-Soviet relations visibly got better with the mid of the 1980s. On the other hand, Eastern Block experienced a signal of disintegration at the end of 1980s. As a result of this situation, one of the most well-known symbols of the

Cold War, the Berlin Wall came down on 9 November 1989. Additionally, many Soviet Republics gained their own independence after the 1991. The Soviet Union declared to conclude to exist on 8 December 1991. Boris Yeltsin who is the first president of the Russian Republic, designed the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). As a result of this development, the Cold War which took forty-five years was over. The developments were not limited with the West, in spite of the Tiananmen Square protests which took place in Beijing in 1989, after Mao Zedong, who was the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1935 until his death, 1976; Deng Xiaoping was a reformer especially about liberalization. For that reason China became closer to the West and the cooperation between them is surprisingly dramatically increased in the early 1990s.<sup>62</sup>

End of the Cold War did not mean end of the international conflict. The Gulf War started as a result of Iraqi invasion to Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Actually this situation created a Japanese “shock” or “trauma” for some of the Japan experts, because Japan came to face to face with the post-Cold-War harsh condition in the first time.

Gulf War was an important point to United Nation (UN). United Nation Security Council (UNSC) experienced a torn between superpowers during the Cold War. Gulf War seemed like a chance for the United Nations to play a leadership role in the solution of the Gulf Crises in the international area. This development was crucial for Japan for one reason; the United States expected more from Japan in terms of collaboration to the peace activity of United States; it could be thought that this situation is against Japanese constitution article 9; however, Japan depended not only on her security policy to the United Nations but also on an unquestionable security partnership with the United States.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Samuel S. Kim, "China's Path To Great Power Status In The Globalization Era", *Asian Perspective* 27, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>63</sup> Beata Bochorodycz, "Policy Entrepreneurs And Policy Proposals: The Gulf War Experience And Foreign Policy Change In Japan After The Cold War", *Silva Iaponicarum*, no. 52535455 (2018), doi:10.14746/sijp.2018.52/53/54/55.2.

As it was mentioned before, the expectations about Japan were more military contribution after end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Japan had not got any experiences about sending military troops outside the country beyond that, Japanese public opinion still harshly disagreed with this type of action and also legally it was not possible. Japan felt an obligation about contribution anymore; this let Japan to find an alternative way in this framework. This alternative way is financial and material aid. However, this kind of an aid was strongly criticized by United States as a part of the war for their physical power. This situation led Japan to shoulder more financial burden of the war. One of the examples is Michael Armacost, the US ambassador to Japan at the time, got the nickname “Misutā Gaiatsu” (Mr. External Pressure)<sup>64</sup>. The important point is that Japan did not shape her Middle East Policy according to the United States’ policies in the region. Even Japan continued her relations with Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Japanese public opinion also started to see Iraq as an alone state in the war condition and could not understand United States moral reason for the existence in the Middle East and this situation caused a rise in the voice of Japanese public opinion against Japan support to the United States in the Gulf War.

These developments caused a reflection to Japan- United States relations. United States President Bush asked more Japanese support in terms of logistics and transportation, but the problem is about Japanese Self Defense Force was not capable of that because of the Japanese Constitution. As a result of this, Japan government asked this type of support to the Japanese Private Firms. As it could be predicted that, Japanese firms did not lean towards this request because the action area is a war zone. Senior Japanese diplomat Tanba Minoru must explain to the United States about Japan could not do anything about such kind of support to them. United States’ answer to that issue was very strong and strict, threatened Japan for economic losses in the Gulf Region, these prompt to Japanese private firms to take risk and be part of the logistics and transportation activities in the Gulf

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<sup>64</sup> Nakanishi Hiroshi, "The Gulf War And Japanese Diplomacy", *Nippon.Com*, 2011, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/the-gulf-war-and-japanese-diplomacy.html>.

Region. It is important to see that one of the major issues for Japan is economic benefit; it could be before that National Security in some cases.

During these developments, the Kaifu government proposed “United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill” on October 1990 to the Diet for providing a legal foundation to Japanese contribution to the United Nation activities in the level of personnel. These propose was not welcomed by the opposition groups. Although the Diet had a continuation to pass that type of proposal, Japanese public opinion really disagreed about these type of participation; one of the public surveys showed that just the twenty percent willing to this improvement. As a result of this situation, the Diet put these proposals aside.<sup>65</sup>

The Government’s another fail was insufficient actions about Japanese citizens’ security in the war zone. For example, Japanese citizens were taken hostage in Iraq, and although the Japanese diplomacy showed full effort after this point<sup>66</sup>, Japanese hostage and Western hostage took their freedom at the same time. This situation shows that Japan was not seen different than Western Countries in the Middle East even with her diplomatic effort.

When the international coalition attack to Iraq in 17 January 1991 started, Japanese watched the war like the whole world live in the CNN, this seemed United States tour de force in the eyes of Japan. However, this type of thoughts did not challenge Japan’s contribution to the war, Japan made material contribution. Civilians and diplomats continued their activities in Iraq even in the hard war condition. This type of action won general approval. For example, Coalition commander General Norman Schwarzkopf expressed his deep gratitude to Japan<sup>67</sup>. On the other hand,

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<sup>65</sup> "Reinhard Drifte: Japan's Quest For A Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter Of Pride Or Justice?", *Max Planck Yearbook Of United Nations Law Online* 4, no. 1 (2000): 583-587, doi:10.1163/187574100x00179.

<sup>66</sup> For example Japan’s Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited Iraq for negotiation about hostage issue

<sup>67</sup> Nakanishi Hiroshi, "The Gulf War And Japanese Diplomacy", *Nippon.Com*, 2011, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/the-gulf-war-and-japanese-diplomacy.html>.

even the zealous effort of Japan both in the field and in the economy, the final was total failure for Japanese Diplomat and SDF. Because intentionally or unintentionally, Japan's name of Japan's name from Kuwait's official expression of thanks was deliberate or accidental is not known.<sup>68</sup>

It could be said that the major threat for Japan was not the Iraq; it was the increasing nuclear developments of North Korea. North Korea started to acquire missile programme with the adoption of United Soviet Socialist Republic's missile which was named as SCUD-B, launch pad from Egypt between 1976 and 1981. As a result, North Korea made the first test fires of her missile in 1984; this circumstances collect international reaction, especially Japanese reaction and resulted to North Korea signed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985. Japanese persistence about concrete step was resulted in 1994, North Korea and United States signed a deal about taking apart old nuclear reactors in return for two new ones which is established by international help and this situation annoyed Japan.<sup>69</sup>

Japan also pushed the constitutional limits, as it was mentioned before, Japan declares that using her defense for either self-defense or peace in international area. And it is visible that Japan gives importance to United Nation for providing and maintaining the peace. For that reason, Japan procured secondary support such as providing personal and material support to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which was a major UN peacekeeping operation supported by the UN member states' contribution. One of the points in there is UNTAC asked help from Japan, and Japan responded it in 1992-1993<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>68</sup> Youssef Times, "AFTER THE WAR; Quick Kuwaiti Recovery Is Seen, With The Cost Less Than Thought", *Nytimes.Com*, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/18/world/after-the-war-quick-kuwaiti-recovery-is-seen-with-the-cost-less-than-thought.html>.

<sup>69</sup> "Timeline: North Korea's Nuclear History | Financial Times", *Ft.Com*, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/17d64600-74c8-11e2-b323-00144feabdc0>.

<sup>70</sup> Yasuhiro Takeda, "Japan's Role In The Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, And Finance", *Asian Survey* 38, no. 6 (1998): 553-568, doi:10.1525/as.1998.38.6.01p03633.

Another historical moment is, the 50th anniversary ceremony of Pearl Harbor in December 1991, gave a chance to think about the ways of after war Japan-U.S. relations and to provide an opportunity for the future cooperation. President George Bush, in his statement at the Arizona Memorial, focused on the significance of Japan-U.S. cooperation for the future, and the importance of outplacng antagonism which take place in the Second World War.

Another remarkable point about Japan United States bilateral relations was the President George Bush's visit to Tokyo in 1992 with his wife. In that visit, possible future cooperation areas were discussed and Unites States- Japan cooperation was highlighted. This was not just in the speeches also 'Tokyo Declaration on the Japan- U.S. Global Partnership and its Action Plan' entered into force with which United States predicted more burden sharing in security –peace and prosperity- with Japan and Japan confirmed this.

Unfortunately, the hopes turned to disappointments because United States public opinion started to define Japan as a threat because of the increasing Japanese economic power. For example, some of the Americans started to boycott Japanese products and promote American products with the campaign of "Buy American". The reaction against Japan was not limited with economy, some of the Americans assault Japanese nationals or Japanese origin Americans in America as a target of hate crime. United States officials used the 20th anniversary ceremony of the reversion of Okinawa as a reminder of historical friendship between United States and Japan.<sup>71</sup>

The 20th anniversary ceremony of the reversion of Okinawa in May 1992, with invited former U.S. Government officials concerned, served as a good opportunity to remind the Japanese people of the importance of these verifiably uncommon efforts of returning to the peaceful administrative jurisdiction.

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<sup>71</sup> Dana Frank, "Our History Shows There'S A Dark Side To 'Buy American'", *The Washington Post*, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/30/theres-a-dark-side-to-buy-american/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.3d88d613ef78](https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/30/theres-a-dark-side-to-buy-american/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3d88d613ef78).

### 3.3. Japan 1995 National Defence Program Guideline (1996 Fiscal Year)

In the 1995 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), the purpose is specified in two main points. The first point is that Japan's Constitutions. This security limitations which root from constitution are already mentioned. It is so visible that Japan did not change her point of view even the end of the cold war. Although it was mentioned in the previous chapter, after cold war era the definition, scope and the tools of the war was changed. In this framework Japan clearly defined her position with in favor of pacifism. In addition to that Japan easily adopt new security tools, and start to tool "soft power" tools. In 1995 NDPO this situation find a place like that: "...Japan, under its Constitution, has been making efforts to secure stability in the international community through diplomatic activities....."<sup>72</sup>

The second important point is that Japan- United States (U.S) security arrangements. Because Japan feel U.S security support would continue despite the fact that cold war is over. This shows two main consequences. The first one is U.S's interest about Asia Pacific will continue, and U.S still see Japan as a main partner in the region. This consequences directly cause mutual interdependency between two countries. U.S needed Japan because she has important role in the region at first and secondly she started to develop remarkable relations with the region especially ASEAN countries which have more lebensraum after the end of the cold war. On the other hand, Japan needs U.S because she experienced that security still a concern in international arena and Japan geostrategic location will be cause some future conflicts and clash of interests.

Although Japan is aware that importance of security and U.S support, at the first time she decided that having self-defence force (SDF) in this environment is really important. Because if U.S interest in the Asia- Pacific may change or she may finds new partners instead of Japan the situation will turn the work unfavourable

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<sup>72</sup> "MOFA: National Defense Program Outline In And After FY 1996", *Mofa.Go.Jp*, 1995, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/>.

for Japan. As a result of this possibilities, 1995 NDPO's "purpose" part have a phase about this:

.... Brought on by the end of cold war, and that expectations for the role of the Self Defense Forces have been increased in such function as providing aid in cases of large scale disasters and contributing to build a more stable security environment through participation in international peace cooperation activities, in addition to their principal mission of defending Japan.<sup>73</sup>

The second part of NDPO is "international situation". Obviously the fact of end of the cold war is dominant in this part. Japan did not expect any kind of global armed conflict in the new framework on the other hand Japan was conscious on unresolved territorial issues which remained from the cold war. The visible result of those unresolved territorial issues is absolutely regional conflicts because of ethnic and religious differences. This concerns are not unique of the Japan, also the European Economic Community in this time share the same concerns with Japan. The crucial issue is that Soviet Union has nuclear power and now there is no Soviet Union and also some small states occurred in addition to that those states experienced some conflict inside the countries (for example Chechenia conflict in Russian Federation). Those interstate conflict and after that radical movements are risky especially for the possibility of the using mass destruction weapons including nuclear arms.

Japan saw possible solution as arms control and disarmament. This could be provided with the help of the multilateral agreements between U.S, Russia and the Europe. In addition to that Japan may be one of the earliest countries which have awareness about regional dynamics. In this solution 1995 NDPO mentioned that security efforts should be thought with the regional security frameworks, it should be broaden via multilateral and bilateral dialogues and Japan also highlights the importance and position of the United Nation about establishing peace. Japan gives importance to the United Nation because a country likes Japan want powerful international and intergovernmental organizations for feeling more secure and being part of more controlled international arena. Japan saw United Nation as a new balancing power in the new world order.

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid

Although Japan's concerns were mentioned before this chapter, the most crucial concern is uncertainty of Korea for Japan. This uncertainty causes unpredictability and the problem which is separated Korea is not solved with the end of the cold war. This situation would turn a potential threat in the eyes of Japan. When the developments in this issue on though it could be seen that Japan foresight is true about that. Again when the possible problems were mentioned Japan always made references to Japan- U.S security arrangements.

The third part of 1995 NDPO is that "security of the Japan and roles of defence capabilities". When the basic defence policy of Japan defined, it puts some characteristics forward. The first one is that soft power tools which were defined detailed in this part, and second one is defence oriented policy of Japan and the third one partnership with the U.S. It could be said this part show parallelism with the 1976 NDPO. As it mentioned before Yoshido Doctrines influences continue even today. One of the proofs of the Yoshido Doctrines influences is seen in the after cold war Japan- U.S security arrangements.

When Japan's foreign policy evaluated, it can be seen that Japan foreign policy tried to more independent after the cold war era, this period is really small period. In this time Japan started to join peacekeeping operations, had more close relations with China, tried to find her own foreign policy identity. However this experience's lifetime was very short. 1995 NDPO also has some clues of this experience. Japan's positions in the international society defined as important and "*.....government's active efforts to establish a more stable security environment.*"<sup>74</sup> This mean Japan accredits herself as an international peace builder role in the new framework.

Japan- U.S security arrangements take a specific place in the 1995 NDPO. Japan defines this partnership as a primary necessity of establishing stability in the region, and also sees U.S existence as a balance factor when the issue is power and security. And it gives four main titles about arrangements:

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid

- 1) to promote exchange of information and policy consultation
- 2) to establish an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas including joint studies, exercises and training, as well as enhancement of mutual support in those areas
- 3) to enhance broad mutual exchange in the areas of equipment and technology
- 4) to implement various measures to facilitate smooth and effective stationing of U.S forces in Japan<sup>75</sup>

Japan located her position as being active member of the United Nations and stabilizer in the geography in which Japan has already be in part of it, and finding new roles in the world. For example Japan highlights the importance of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is obligation in the eyes of the Japan, despite the significant partner of Japan also has the nuclear weapons, Japan does not give up her ideas and position in this issue. Because Japan's one of the neighbor is Russia but another and more important neighbor when the issue is nuclearisation is North Korea. Although North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands that auditor was given access to two nuclear waste storage sites. As a result of this, North Korea threatens to quit the NPT but ultimately opts to continue to be part in the treaty in 1993. North Korea and the United States signed an agreement. North Korea accepted to freeze and eventually demolished its old, graphite-moderated nuclear reactors for exchange of international aid to build two new light-water nuclear reactors in 1994.<sup>76</sup>

It could be said that Japan tries to open new window in the issue of more active foreign policy as it is mentioned before. For that reason she sustained the importance of international peace cooperation activities.

The fourth part of 1995 NDPO is "Contents of Japan's Defence Capability", and mostly mentioned ground, maritime and air self-defence force structures. In this

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> CNN Library, "North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts", *CNN*, 2013, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html>.

part, the answer of the direct aggression is specified. It is said that Japan response comes immediately considering the bilateral and multilateral agreements, international law, constitutions and Japan- U.S security arrangements.<sup>77</sup> Disaster relief operation also has separate part.

### **3.4. Developments Between 1995 and 2004**

Although Taiwan Strait is a controversial area and has its' own problematic dynamics, it could be said that 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was different than others. It has been the most controversial event in the strait since 1958 Kimmen Crisis. China deployed some 150,000 troops in Fujian Province bordering the strait, and conducted three consecutive military exercises in areas near Taiwan<sup>78</sup>. Some of the scholars define 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as a turning point of the post-Cold War era<sup>79</sup>. Because United States of America came up against China. The last conflict between U.S and China occurred in 1950. This is important because this issue shaped Asia Pacific security concerns and countries attitude. After this crisis was occurred, U.S increased her military existence in Asia especially with the help of partnership with Japan. In addition to that U.S also experienced to possibility of using hard power tools against China could not bring absolute solution in place of this U.S decided to use diplomatic manoeuvres when the issue is China relations. Taiwan Crisis in 1996 not only had political results but also had economic results. It is clear that 1996 crisis specified bilateral relations in the region, for example Chinese – American, Japanese- Chinese and Japanese- American.

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<sup>77</sup>"MOFA: National Defense Program Outline In And After FY 1996",

<sup>78</sup> Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 11 (1996): 1055, doi:10.1525/as.1996.36.11.01p01792.

<sup>79</sup> Robert S. Ross, "The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis", *Security Dialogue* 27, no. 4 (1996): 463, doi:10.1177/0967010696027004010.

When the historical background of the trilateral relations (Japan- Taiwan- China) thought it could be seen that, at first Taiwan belongs to Japan (in 1895)<sup>80</sup>. Although some of the Taiwanese people fight against those 50 years Japan ascendancy, Japan applied very good planned assimilation policy toward Taiwan. For that reason some of the well-educated old generation businessmen or politicians still have some pro Japan feelings<sup>81</sup>.

Although it could be said that there is a clash of the interest in the Taiwan Strait none of the side of the interest groups want any kind of hot war in this area. Because there are no winners in this kind of fight in the Strait.

Another important point about post-cold war security in the Asia Pacific is that 1997 US- Japan Defence Guidelines. The security partnership between Japan and US repeat one more time in 1997. The security ties became stronger even if the cold war is over. In addition to that it could be said that US still continues her interests in Northeast Asia Pacific region and gives priority to the region especially the dialogue with Japan.

It could be said that Japan- US relations' priority is in economic means especially after the cold war<sup>82</sup>. On the 1997 US- Japan Defence Guidelines, US role of taking a security burden would change. Japan turned more burden sharing role in the security issues and take more responsibility when the issue is Japan's security. However, those developments are not obstacle against US- Japan security partnership in the region. The natural question at that point is that why the Japan and US need a new guideline. As it could be remembered that 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis mentioned before, the result of the crisis was security instability in the region. Moreover, Korean Peninsula had also risky dynamics (the details about

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<sup>80</sup> Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux And Solutions", *Asian Survey* 36, no. 11 (1996): 1059, doi:10.1525/as.1996.36.11.01p01792.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1060

<sup>82</sup> Chris Ajemian, *The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under The Japanese Constitution And Their Implications For U.S. Foreign Policy*, ebook, 1998, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/858/7PacRimLPolyJ323.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

Korean Peninsula will be mentioned in ahead). This means the guideline had strategic purpose<sup>83</sup>.

Although Japan has worldwide economic power at that time, she is not equal with US because of her constitution and U.S helps in military terms. After the 1997 Guidelines' new responsibilities Japan took a step to be more equal and sovereign power in the world. Because Japan proved that she saw U.S as an immediate partner in the region<sup>84</sup>. In the Cold War Era Japan was taking an advantage of passive military policy. Because U.S takes the security burden of Japan, Japan became economic superpower at the end of the cold war. Japan was directly making her investment in developing high tech instead of military technology. Japan did participate neither Korean nor Vietnam War. Those wars caused not only economic deficit for participant countries and but also lost of human resources. According to those events it can be said that at the beginning point pacifism is not a choice for Japan. This is directly pushed by USA such a punishment for the Second World War, and then Japan reflects passivism as a result of moral concerns, however it can be said that this was directly result of the realist thinking<sup>85</sup>. In addition to that Japan had to develop her soft power tools even in the cold war era. After the cold war, security understanding was also changing and soft power gained more importance than hard power. U.S' interest in this framework is contribution the downfall of USSR and delay of the Chinese expansion<sup>86</sup>. As it was mentioned before, Japan has more elbow room with the 1997 Guidelines. On the other hand, Japan tries to create her own security environment before this guideline. From the end of the Second World War until

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<sup>83</sup> "U.S., Japan Deepen Defense Ties--And China Gets Nervous", *Los Angeles Times*, 1997, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-sep-28-op-37058-story.html>.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Mike Mochizuki, *Toward A True Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

<sup>86</sup> Seizaburo Sato and Yuji Suzuki, *A New Stage Of The United States-Japan Alliance* ([S.l.]: [s.n.], n.d.).

after the Persian Gulf War, Japan did not participate in any U.N operation. Japan participated Gulf War in 1990- 1991. Japan was also participate UN Peacekeeping force in 1992 as a non-combatant country. This is the first time Japan joined UN Peacekeeping force. Persian Gulf War was an important turning point for Japan because it is absolute turning point for Japanese passivism.

When the Japanese- American relations thought, American economic support of Japanese security is always highlighted. On the other hand, Gulf War is one of the exceptions. Because at that time Japan was supporting U.S military forces economically too<sup>87</sup>.

Aiming to meet both needs, the stated purpose of the 1997 Guidelines is to "provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies."<sup>88</sup> The most crucial point about the guidelines was it has proven that bilateral security and political relations still existed and would be maintained.

Another important issue is that U.S somehow declared Japan as a leader of Asia, not only politically or economically but also in terms of security. Suddenly, Japan found herself as a sharing part of Japan's security spending. Moreover, Japan was also declared as a rival partner of U.S in the Asia. This maneuverer causes long rung results for US foreign policy because U.S cannot shape her Asia policy without Japan<sup>89</sup>. But it could be said that U.S tries to make Japan as a leader in the cold war era. However, the leadership is just limited in the economical means, because Japan left lots of bad memories to Asia in the Second World War as an

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<sup>87</sup> Akiho Shibata, "Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation And Recent Developments In U.N. Operations", *Yale Journal Of International Law* 19, no. 2 (1994): 316, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsr edir=1&article=1648&context=yjil>.

<sup>88</sup> "THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION (September 23, 1997) | Japan Ministry Of Defense", *Mod.Go.Jp*, 1997, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/anpo/19970923.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19970923.html).

<sup>89</sup> 6.2/20

aggressor. Japan tries to establish new bridges and ties with the Asia especially with the help of Yoshida Doctrine. On the other hand, Japan was not in the apologize psychology, but saw herself as a victim because of nuclear attacks to Hiroshima and Nagasaki<sup>90</sup>. The region was not need only an economic leader because the real world policy's one of the most important issues is security even the end of cold war. China started to fulfil this gap in the region.

In addition to China, Korean Peninsula has its own dynamics. North Korea's nuclear activities were not seen as athreat by not only South Korea but also Japan, too. Although in those years Japan undertake more role for stability, her alliances understanding is questionable, because Japan was not send aid troop to neither Gulf War nor Taiwan Strait Crisis even her economic power (the years which mentioned, Japan was the second largest economy in the world). Those entire crises caused instability but Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 caused more instability in the region<sup>91</sup>. At the same time US also started to examine the relationship with Japan. As one scholar notes: 'If, as some Japanese critics have charged, this is not really an alliance at all but rather a patron-client relationship, then it is a peculiar relationships, one in which the patron commits to the defence of the client and the client commits to little in return.'<sup>92</sup>.

The fundamental question will be what the reason behind Taiwan Strait Crisis was after China got more open and visible Taiwan question was at China's agenda. Taiwan turned her policy about reunify with China in 1996, and started to re questioned about being part of the China or not. China perceived this situation in a very negative way because this event occurred just one year before of Taiwan election. China decided to give a response about this event and made military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Those missile tests also caused fear for Japan

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<sup>90</sup> Kenneth B Pyle, *The Japanese Question* (Washington, DC: AEI Press published for the American Enterprise Institute, 1996).

<sup>91</sup> James Shinn, "Testing The United States-Japan Security Alliance", *CURRENT HIST.-ASIA*, 1997, 425.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

because Japan is a neighbour of Taiwan and her political position is so obvious because of her alliances. It is somehow a new situation for Japan. Japan only experienced Russian threat in the Cold War era, China was as a minor security issue for Japan unlike the post-cold war era.

The 1997 Defence Guideline between US and Japan created a strong and developable framework about Japan's new defence system but it did not include any kind of structure<sup>93</sup>. One of the question will be why Japan and U.S need to continue their security relations even the end of the cold war. The fundamental reason is that U.S face to face with new threats like Japan after the cold war. Those security challenges are increasing of China and nuclear power of North Korea. This security alliances help for establish more stability for both of the countries in terms of security<sup>94</sup>. As it was mentioned before U.S tries to make Japan as a regional leader and convert her economic power to politics and tries to feel more relax about the region, because Japan seems like an equal to U.S in terms of international leadership. Even some American realist scholars started to see Japan as a treat against U.S and define Japan's economic power was challenge for U.S hegemony<sup>95</sup>. It could be said that U.S was not the only country saw Japan as an international power. The interesting point is that Japan does not place herself as a global leader in the world. Although the international pressure to Japan, Japan saw herself as a self-sufficient country especially in the public opinion level<sup>96</sup>. The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines represent a minor escalation in Japan's military role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a minor legal enhancement to the Security Treaty, and a major symbolic move to Japan's electorate and neighboring Asian countries. Japan's likely determination is that constitutional Guidelines will

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<sup>93</sup> Chris Ajemian, *The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under The Japanese Constitution And Their Implications For U.S. Foreign Policy*

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Koji Taira, "Japan, An Imminent Hegemon?", *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science* 513, no. 1 (1991): 151-163, doi:10.1177/0002716291513001013.

<sup>96</sup> Chris Ajemian, *The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under The Japanese Constitution And Their Implications For U.S. Foreign Policy*

help Japan in order to place one foot in front of the other on the slow path to self-sufficiency and stability in Northeast Asia<sup>97</sup>. Japan caused to bad memories to the other countries and she did not properly apologize to the countries in which experienced Japan occupation between 1930s and 1950s. Japan started to change her attitude especially after the Cold War. It could be explained by the international push<sup>98</sup>.

Another crucial point for Japan is nuclear activities of North Korea, in which signed an IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement on 9 April 1992<sup>99</sup>. According to the agreement, North Korea gives promise about access to IAEA inspectors. The access includes authenticate North Korea's nuclear facilities' and materials' fullness and rightness<sup>100</sup>.

The good starting about North Korea did not continue in the same line. In 1993, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made a speech and claimed that they could not access to suspected waste sites. According to this development IAEA demanded authorize special ad hoc investigation to the United Nations Security Council. After that, North Korea declared that she was withdrawing from NPT on 12 March 1993<sup>101</sup>. The conflict smoothed over via the Jimmy Carter's travel to the Pyongyang who is the U.S. President at that time and he met with Kim Il Sung. Carter made a public speech about Kim Il Sung accepted that the outline of the deal which is finally completed in October 1994 as Agreed Framework<sup>102</sup>. In the

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> "IAEA And DPRK: Chronology Of Key Events | IAEA", *Iaea.Org*, 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/chronology-of-key-events>.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

light of the framework, North Korea accepted that hold up her gas graphite moderated reactors and facilities which were related to the reactors<sup>103</sup>. Although Agreed Framework was suspended North Korea's plutonium program nearly a decade at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, party was not satisfied implementation of the framework, and the result of the agreement between the parties<sup>104</sup>. It could be said that intensive bilateral talks between U.S. and North Korea finalized on October 2002, this was occurring when the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang. North Korea secretly continued her production of nuclear facilities and they acknowledge this in Kelly's visiting. However, after a while North Korea claimed that producing nuclear weapon is a part of the self-defense right. Those speeches caused to be rough state to North Korea. IAEA inspectors' make a negative statement about North Korea. The result of these undesirable developments was the withdrawal of North Korea from NTP on January 2003<sup>105</sup>, after that North Korea declared that she just uses nuclear energy for electricity, and she had no intention about producing nuclear weapon.

Japan first deployed its military overseas for support of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>106</sup>. Some scholars claim that Japanese foreign policy is driven by the domestic policies and public opinion is skeptic about military force of the Japan, and this being militarily activeness issue is still as a conflict in the Japan domestic politics and that reflects to her international policies too. Even the negative aspects of Japan public opinion about active military power, Koizumi organized overseas

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<sup>102</sup> "IAEA And North Korea: The Verificaton Challenge | IAEA", *Iaea.Org*, accessed 29 July 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/iaea-and-north-korea-the-verificaton-challenge>.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> "Fact Sheet On DPRK Nuclear Safeguards | IAEA", *Iaea.Org*, 2002, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisories/fact-sheet-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.

<sup>106</sup> Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Christopher K. Lamont and Philip Streich, *The Limits Of Japanese Militarism: The 2003 Iraq War And The War On The Islamic State*, ebook, 2017.

military operation in Iraq in 2003. The result of the operation was a dramatic loss of 2009 election for Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP)<sup>107</sup>. In that point it is important to understand why Japan public opinion support pacifism. Actually, there is no support for absolute pacifism. Their main point is that Japan's defense power should focus on just defending the Japan. The probable military power of the Japan is not a part of international politics<sup>108</sup> or tool of foreign policy. Japan's public opinion another discomfort about Japan's participation in Iraq intervention is that Japan public opinion did not see any threat from the Middle East<sup>109</sup>.

Richard Samuels is prominent in the discussion of hedging in Japanese foreign policy. In a 2002 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (and a 2003 postscript), Samuels and Heginbotham described Japan's "dual hedge:" the twin crises of North Korea and participation in the yet-to-start Iraq War that were then pulling Japanese foreign policy in separate directions. According to the authors:

In both cases, Tokyo's priority is to avoid any action that might lead to a break with Washington without putting it conspicuously out of line with other states with which Japan would like to do business. To avoid abandonment, the Japanese government is convinced it must show some support for the U.S. position on Iraq.<sup>110</sup>

One of Japan's public opinion was satisfied Japan's attitude about 9/11 at the beginning. But this satisfaction did not continue in a long period. Japan layman did not want to support Koizumi's policies about Iraq War, as a result of this situation Koizumi's policies dramatically declined. Whole those situations caused deviation of Japan military policies<sup>111</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion And Security*, n.d.

<sup>110</sup> Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2002): 110, doi:10.2307/20033272.

<sup>111</sup> Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion And Security*, n.d.

Japan was very willing and brave about participating Iraq War in 2003. This situation had more than one reason. The first reason is that Japan wanted to support her dearie and unique security partner. The second reason is Japan wondered to see her own military capacity in real war. As it was mentioned earlier, Japan came face to face with real security threat after the cold war. She experienced sudden development of China and Chinese some aggressive attitude in the region, and also North Korea was a very risky about Japan when the nuclear capability was thought. In addition to that world was changing after the cold war. U.S gave more space to Japan for providing her own security. In the different circumstances, the Japanese public opinion is surprised about this new bold Japan and made her anxious. The Japanese public opinion was not the only one, also U.S' other security partners are also apprehensive about situation. As it could be remembered some of the Western alliances of U.S rejected to being a part of U.S invasion in Iraq. Some of the members are Germany, France and Canada.

The argument of Koizumi about to participating the U.S led coalition is important. Koizumi had two main arguments. One was that U.S complimentary to Japan's security in decades. The other one is that overcome the shame of Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" at the first Gulf War.

U.S asked for a more active role to Japan after the cold war, this was mentioned before. Sometimes this expectation of U.S causes the crisis between Japan and U.S. One of the most significant examples is the First Gulf War<sup>112</sup>. Japan just supported U.S as an economic term during the Gulf War. This policy of Japan defines as "checkbook diplomacy" because the support and was only limited with financial support there was not any kind of military support of U.S forces. This policy of Japan was highly criticized<sup>113</sup>. This was a shock for Japan and Japan lost her reputation and the alliances' position with U.S was examined by the U.S (both in public opinion and by policy makers). As a result of this situation Japan enacted

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<sup>112</sup> Peng Er Lam, "Japan's Human Security Role In Southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal Of International And Strategic Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2006): 141-159, doi:10.1353/csa.2006.0002.

<sup>113</sup> Kazuhiko Tōgō, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

International Peace Cooperation Law, with which the Japan's Self Defense forces about contributing to United Nation Peacekeeping Operation in 1992. Japan exercised her first transboundary military operation as a result of this permission in September 1992 in Namibia.<sup>114</sup>

The bilateral relations was very close as a result of Japan's contribution to the Iraq war. There was a summit between parties at May 2003. Koizumi assured Bush that "Japan wished to make a contribution [to the reconstruction of Iraq] commensurate with its national power and standing<sup>115</sup>. One other important characteristic of Japan's troop in Iraq War was that the first time Japan sent the transboundary troops without any kind of United Nation mandate<sup>116</sup>.

The participation of Japan was legitimized via "Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law". This law was passed without reinforcement of the opposition group in the Diet<sup>117</sup>. Authorized groups tried to gain support of Japan's public opinion with the help of cartoon like logo about the war. The logo highlighted peaceful security power of Japan and US- Japan alliances.

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<sup>114</sup> "MOFA: Japan's Contribution To UN Peacekeeping Operations", *Mofa.Go.Jp*, accessed 15 August 2019, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005.html>.

<sup>115</sup> Gerald L Curtis, *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War*, n.d.

<sup>116</sup> "MOFA: Overview Of Japan-US Summit Meeting", *Mofa.Go.Jp*, 2003, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv0305/overview.html>.

<sup>117</sup> Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Christopher K. Lamont and Philip Streich, *The Limits Of Japanese Militarism: The 2003 Iraq War And The War On The Islamic State*, ebook, 2017.



Figure 3.1.<sup>118</sup>

However Japan started to take her position in Middle East because Japanese became a target in Iraq. Two Japanese diplomats were shot and killed in Iraq on 29 November 2003. This situation was continuing in April 2004. Some Japanese Journalists and aid workers were kidnapped. After those people was released, kidnappers made a speech and said that they would burn Japanese troops if Japanese troops continue their activities in Iraq. Among other things, the leader of Al Qaeda Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi threatened Japan, Poland and Bulgaria about pull back their military forces from Iraq, otherwise Al Qaeda would continue its attacks to Japanese Citizens<sup>119</sup>.

After the pullback of Japanese forces from Iraq, the contradictive decision of Koizumi which is participating the war is an agenda topic not only for the public opinion but also Japanese judicial system. In April 2008, the Nagoya High Court declared that the Air Self- Defense Forces (ASDF) airlifting of coalition troops (which Japanese forces engaged in beyond their reconstruction role in Samawah) was unconstitutional, violating both Article 9 and the hastily written law that

<sup>118</sup> Japanese Defense Ministry campaign to garner public support for the Iraq mission. Source: *Japan Times*.

<sup>119</sup> United Refugees, "Refworld | A Face And A Name: Civilian Victims Of Insurgent Groups In Iraq", *Refworld*, 2005, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45d093fe2.html>.

provided justification for the SDF dispatch on condition that Japanese forces would operate only in "noncombat" areas. "In modern warfare, the transport of personnel and supplies constitutes a key part of combat," concluded Judge Aoyama Kunio. "The airlift of multinational forces to Baghdad . . . plays a part in the use of force by other countries." The ruling LDP rejected this ruling, continuing to insist that Baghdad was not actually a combat zone.<sup>120</sup> It could be said that Koizumi made misestimate about showing Japanese alliances to U.S with the help of supporting U.S forces in Iraq. Japanese citizens were died in there, also Japanese legal system decided that this participation was not legal. To sum up, Japanese participation to Iraq war with U.S only caused to more determinant Japanese public opinion about pacifism<sup>121</sup>.

### **3.5. Japan 2004 National Defence Program Guideline (2005 Fiscal Year)**

Although 2004 Guideline is not the first guideline after the Cold War, the post-Cold War anxiety of Japan is more visible in this guideline. It could be said that 2004 Guideline has two main goals about security. The first one is that "preventing direct threats from reaching Japan"<sup>122</sup> and the second one is "improving international security environment", so as to decrease the possibility of threat against Japan. Japan defines her source for achieving the goal as Japan's own effort, Japan's cooperation with the U.S, less but not least strong cooperation with Japan's alliances and international community<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> David McNeill, "Secrets And Lies: Ampo, Japan's Role In The Iraq War And The Constitution", *Japan Focus*, 2010.

<sup>121</sup> Nakanishi Hiroshi, "The Gulf War And Japanese Diplomacy", *Nippon.Com*, 2011, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/the-gulf-war-and-japanese-diplomacy.html>.

<sup>122</sup> *The National Defense Program Guidelines And The Build-Up Of Defense Capability*, ebook, accessed 29 July 2019, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/pdf/2013/25\\_Part2\\_Chapter2\\_Sec1.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/25_Part2_Chapter2_Sec1.pdf).

<sup>123</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-*, ebook, 2004.

Japan defined threats in international area against her in 2004 guideline at the first place. According to Japan interstate military confrontations and international terrorist organizations are the core threats for international security environment at that time. It could be said that, Japan influenced 9/11 Attack like many countries. This guideline highlights the interdependence and increasing globalisation causes new, crucial and immediate security problems for the countries. Some of the problems are mass destruction weapons, ballistic missiles and international terrorist activities<sup>124</sup>.

On the other hand, everything are not dark and pessimistic. On the other hand, Guideline mentioned closer relations and mutual relations between Russian Federation and U.S., Japan sees this situation as an opportunity for her because her this bilateral relations help to more structural fight against security threat<sup>125</sup>. According to Japan, UN is one of the roof institutions after the Cold War and U.S. is the sole superpower<sup>126</sup>.

To that point Guideline seems so similar with other guidelines. However, “... *the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community..*”<sup>127</sup> inscription is rather different than others. It is the first time, Japan promoted such a kind of military activity, when the development in Iraq War was thought it could be evaluated as a clue of developments<sup>128</sup>. On the other hand, 2004 Guidelines still refer to the constitution about military pacifism and mention that Japan will be

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p.1

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p.2

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> For more detailed information please see the 8th part of the thesis

important actor about international disarmament<sup>129</sup>, and she also emphasizes her consistency about non nuclear principles.

The only cooperation is not the cooperation between US and Russia, Japan also spotlight the cooperation in the region of Asia-Pacific. After the Cold War many Asia Pacific countries were lacking in dewatering their own countries. As a result of this situation there was a power gap after the Cold War, and this situation caused more unpredictability in the region. Cross Taiwan Strait relations and developments in Korean Peninsula are examples in the 2004 Guidelines<sup>130</sup>. The guideline is openly declaring North Korea as a “major destabilizing factor” for the security of the region. In addition to that China is defined as “has major impact on regional security”. When China is mentioning, China’s activities in sea, nuclear facilities and modernized army is referred by the Guideline. After that Japan- U.S Security arrangement defines as one of the leading factor in the region security<sup>131</sup>.

One of the important part of 2004 Guidelines is Japan’s security considerations. Those are,

- Limited strategic depth
- Long coast lines
- Numerous small islands
- A high population density
- Concentration of population
- Industry in urban areas
- A large number of important facilities in coastal areas
- Frequently natural disasters
- Security of the sea lines of communication<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-*,

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3

Another important point mentioned in there is discussions about Japan's membership to the UN Security Council. Japan defines this mechanism as a life buoy, as it is mentioned before Japan really believing to International organizations prevent conflicts. She thought that if she becomes a part of the security council she can easily prevent any kind of conflict even she take action against offensive operation in the world especially in the Asia Pacific region. This demand of Japan<sup>133</sup> was highly protested by the China<sup>134</sup>.

The third part of the guideline is about Japan's defence forces. In that point again Guideline emphasize that Japan is a sovereign country, and should realize minimum necessities about her security. The new thing is new types of threats and the question is how Japan can give sufficient answer against those threats. But there is no answer to this crucial question<sup>135</sup>. Another threat which is defined by the guideline is low birth rate. This could have financial results<sup>136</sup>.

Japan- U.S. Security Arrangements still has an important place in the guidelines. Even the Cold War is ended and U.S has different security concerns in the Middle East, it is understood that the context and implementation of the arrangements still continue. Japan defines the reason of why U.S still penetrating powers in Asia Pacific for security concerns and unpredictable countries in the region. Japan saw U.S as a balancing and protecting power in the region<sup>137</sup>. In addition to that Guideline also indicated that Japan should decrease the excessive burden to U.S in terms of security, but this does not mean cooperation will be end<sup>138</sup>. The

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>133</sup> Even it could not be as a demand when it is a discussion topic at that time

<sup>134</sup> For more detailed information please look at part of 3.4 of the thesis

<sup>135</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-*,

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p.5

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p.6

arrangements between two countries are not just limited with the U.S military support to Japan especially in financial terms. The arrangements also includes “intelligence exchange”, “operational cooperation”, “cooperation on ballistic missile defence” and “equipment and technology exchange”<sup>139</sup>. It could be understood that Japan tries to transfer the security relations with U.S to the new spheres, and establish new kind of cooperation areas.

Japan also mentioned one of the important soft power tools in the Guideline which is “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). The Official Development Assistance (Seifukaihatsuenjo) is an arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan). The goal of the office is to help developing nations with supplies, civil engineering and other assistance. The ODA was started in 1954 after Japan signed the Colombo Plan, which pledges to provide aid to nations who need it. As of 2003, the ODA has provided over \$221 billion USD to 185 nations and regions<sup>140</sup>.

One of the important milestone of Japan Security history is Japan’s Self Defence Force participation to the Iraq war allied with the U.S<sup>141</sup>, the justification of being part of the Iraq War also mentioned in 2004 Guideline. At the beginning there is more general acknowledge and language is used: “... *would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts*”<sup>142</sup>. After this phase the Guideline clarify the Japanese interest towards to Middle East; for the Guideline Japan has strong economic ties with the region

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid

<sup>139</sup> Ibid

<sup>140</sup> "Official Development Assistance – Definition And Coverage - OECD", *Oecd.Org*, accessed 29 July 2019, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>.

<sup>141</sup> For more information please look at part 8

<sup>142</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-*,

historically. But one of the reason is more important than history or economic ties, which is energy necessity. Japan absorbed her energy necessity from the Middle East, either gas or oil.

Another point which takes place in the Guideline is Japan's active role emphasis in the Asia-Pacific region's multilateral organisations. According to the Guideline, Japan has common security agenda with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For the Japan side, Japan continues her support for stabilization of the region in terms of security with the cooperation with the U.S<sup>143</sup>.

The next part of the Guideline is "Role of Defence Force"<sup>144</sup>. In that point Japan clearly focused on hot topics of that times about security. One is that, invasion of Offshore Islands. Even there is no given name about the topic, it is clear that Japan aware about dangerous in Kuril Islands. Another one is that Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace, as it could mentioned with more details, this rhetoric remind the 2005 East China Sea drilling activities<sup>145</sup>. The next title is "preparations to deal with full scale invasion"<sup>146</sup>; the crucial point in this part is Guideline message is although original role of defence force activity sphere and manoeuvre capacity is limited, if the original role is changed the results could be different- because technic capacity is more than original work existingly.

The next one is "proactive efforts to improve the international security environment"<sup>147</sup>. The role of the UN still underlined, as well as Japan also put her own suggestions in this part and briefly mentioned she promote efforts about establishing international peace and security via security dialogue, defence

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p.7

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p.8

<sup>145</sup> For more information please look at part 8

<sup>146</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-*,

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p.9

exchange, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts<sup>148</sup>.

The next part is “critical elements of our defence capabilities”. This part consists of four main titles. The first one is “enhancing joint operation capabilities”, shortly in there the main focus is based on training, education, intelligence and communications. The second one is “strengthening intelligence capabilities”, briefly the main concern about it, early timing, collecting, properly analysing, and sharing. The third one is “incorporating the progress in science and technology into defence forces”, and the last one is “utilizing human resources more efficiently”.

There is an important phase placed at the end of the 2004 Guideline, in there it is mentioned that this guideline is express Japan’s security vision for a decade, on the other hand if there is significant change in international area, the guideline will be revised in a first five year. It can be interpreted as whether Japan officials were planning to re-establish their security agenda in those five years.

### **3.6. Developments Between 2004 and 2011**

North Korean nuclear activities did not stop, as a matter of fact this was continuing in drastically increasing way in the millennium. The issue was get on top of Japan, there are some international speculations started after the North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 October 2006. Those speculations were about the possibility of nuclear weapons arsenal development by Japan<sup>149</sup>. As geographical neighborhood of two countries was thought it could be understood. Japanese citizens felt “concerned” after this 2006 nuclear test. For proving this, some public surveys were made by

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> "Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response To North Korea’s Nuclear Test | Arms Control Association", *Armscontrol.Org*, accessed 29 July 2019,

Asahi Shimbun. The sixty two percent of the respondents used the word of “concerned”<sup>150</sup>.

The nuclear activities of the North Korea turned a matter of life and death for Japanese people. Furthermore they felt alone because international public opinion, United Nations or other anti-nuclear favor governments and non-governmental organizations efforts were useless. North Korea did whatever she wanted in the South Asia, and threatened her neighbors with the help of nuclear weapons. Everybody knows that this kind of drills and experiments were made just for commination. Japan needs necessity of self-defense against the nuclear program of North Korea. This time Japan public opinion also supports this kind of action.

Although they are totally disagree about Iraq War, now the security threat is very close to them it is their own problem in their own geography. As a result of that, Japanese people give support to action as a response<sup>151</sup>.

Together with, Japan had more factors beyond the North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Japan needed the new kind of defense strategy as a result of changing security environment both in the region and in the world. Other factors which shaped Japan security strategies were drastic increasing influencing area, power and capability of China’s People’s Liberation Army. This capacity is not limited with human power but also they have ballistic missiles capabilities which easily target to Japan<sup>152</sup>, PLA Navy (PLAN)’s maneuver’s sometimes incompatible with the Law of Sea treaty and even sometimes disobey the treaty.

Russia opened to her a new way and it is unpredictable that how she acts in the Asia Pacific region. Also Russia and Japan have territorial disputes which named as Kuril Island. However, it is not unique to Russian Japan relations. In addition to that Japan has sea border problem with China. Japan formally claimed The

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p.2

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p.2

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 1895 and a series of Japanese citizens have been privately owned for most of the past 120 years. Apart from a brief period after World War II when the United States controlled the territory, Japan had persuasive control over the islands since 1895.

China started to advocate its claims about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the 1970s by mentioning historic rights over the area. Tensions increased again in September 2012 when Japan buys three of the disputed islands from the private owner. There are many economic importance of islands, that are located in the northeast of Taiwan, which have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near outstanding shipping routes, and are ringed by rich fishing areas<sup>153</sup>.

Dokdo Island includes a group of disputed islets in the East Sea which is also known as the Sea of Japan. South Korea presently controls the islands where they are recognized as Dokdo, which means Solitary islands; on the other hand Japan also claims the islets and call them Takeshima, which means Bamboo islands.

South Korea claims that territory belong to them, she shows evidence that date back to the sixth century in the period of the Unified Shilla and in the 1900 Korean Empire rule officially incorporating three islands into modern Ulleung County. Japanese claims depend from seventeenth century records apart from "terra nullius" incorporation in 1905.

Contemporary, South Korea classifies the islets as a part of Ulleung County, North Gyeongsang Province, while Japan classifies them as part of Okinoshima, in Oki District, Shimane Prefecture.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> "Global Conflict Tracker L Council On Foreign Relations", *Global Conflict Tracker*, accessed 29 July 2019, [https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?goal=0\\_aa18ea5b4e-ff3d9e77cf-#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea](https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?goal=0_aa18ea5b4e-ff3d9e77cf-#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea).

<sup>154</sup> "Liancourt Rocks - History Of Far East", *History Of Far East*, accessed 29 July 2019, <http://andong.over-blog.com/article-179429.html>.

On the other hand Japan's security problems are not limited with threats from other countries or territorial disputes with other parties. Japan also has risky location because of the natural disasters. Earthquakes and tsunamis create huge economic and social losses for Japan. Because Japan is a high tech country, these kind of natural disasters sometimes cause to more accidents. For example, as a consequences of a large scale earthquake, a tsunami infirm the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors, lead to a nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. All three cores broadly blended in the first three days. Official 'cold shutdown condition' was announced in mid-December.<sup>155</sup>

Besides cooling, the fundamental ongoing task was to avoid release of radioactive materials, especially in contaminated water exposure from the three units. This issue became newsworthy in August 2013.

There have been no deaths or cases of radiation sickness from the nuclear accident, but over 100,000 people were displaced from their homes to protection from this. Government sensivity postpone the return of many of them.

Authoritative figures illustrate that there have been well over 1000 deaths from continuity of the expulsion, in contrast to little risk from radiation even early return had been allowed<sup>156</sup>.

It is obvious that Japan takes risk when she used nuclear energy. The basic reason of this is Japan needs huge amount of energy and she has not got any kind of natural sources. She also experienced a lack of energy supply because of political turmoil in Middle East. Actually she has to continue her nuclear energy activities<sup>157</sup>.

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<sup>155</sup> "Fukushima Daiichi Accident", *World Nuclear*, 2018, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx>.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

Japan has lots of security concerns as those were mentioned before. For that reason, some of the scholars argue that Japan tries to get permanent membership in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), for protecting herself from any kind of threat. It was also mentioned that Japan trust UN about establishing a security balance<sup>158</sup>. Although Japan has an image about peaceful resolution of problems some of the questions about Japan's nuclear capability is raised. Some of the circles ask that whether Japan capable to produce her own nuclear weapon or not. Indeed, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso said last fall that "*Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons.*" But he added, "*We are not saying we have plans to possess nuclear weapons.*"<sup>159</sup>

It could be said that Japan and U.S strengthened their ties whenever Korean peninsula experienced a crisis because of the North Korea's nuclear activities. After the North Korean crisis in 1993-1994, Japan determined to reconsider its roles and missions within the alliance, declared a Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, and created the new Japanese-U.S. defense guidelines in 1998.<sup>160</sup>

It is obvious that Japan drastically increased her defense capacity with the help of 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines. This guideline is different than others, because all of the others were mostly focusing on Japan's homeland security. At the first time after the Second World War Japan introduces to the international security with the help of this guideline. This guideline suggests three views to achieve Japan's national security: Japan's own defense efforts, Japan's cooperation with the United States, and Japan's cooperation with the international community.

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<sup>157</sup> "Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response To North Korea's Nuclear Test | Arms Control Association", *Armscontrol.Org*, accessed 29 July 2019,

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> "Japan Can Hold Nuclear Arms For Self-Defense: Govt", *U.S.*, 2007, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-idUST4792620061114>.

<sup>160</sup> "Top US Nuclear Negotiator Stops In Japan On Way To North Korea", *Physics Today*, 2007, doi:10.1063/pt.5.021709.

The Japanese-U.S. alliance has aimed attention to essentially on bilateral cooperation at a strategic level as a rule, that is, Japan's dependence on the U.S. nuclear shade, without any clear cut definition of the two militaries' roles and missions and without any material joint military planning<sup>161</sup>. The bolstered Japanese-U.S. alliance, augmented by multilateral security dialogues, is forecasted to empower a necessary base for constructing this solid alliance network in the Asia-Pacific region. Even, Japanese government officials suggest the U.S- Japan Nuclear Planning Group. This group is seen as an umbrella which is protecting Japan from any type of nuclear aggression of North Korea.

On the other hand, some of the experts claim that Japan's security understanding transformed from pacifism to the realism. The reason behind this is that, unsecure environment of the Japan. Still, Japanese leaders could neither suspect the protection capability of U.S nor Japan's own capacity about having nuclear defense facilities<sup>162</sup>.

Japan's possible membership of UN Security Council is membership is mentioned in 2004 Guideline<sup>163</sup>. When the issue is discussed, some protests started in China against Japan in the first half of the April 2005. At the beginning those protests started against the Japanese school history books. According to the Chinese protestors, Japan underestimated their own vital and brutal activities against China in 1937-1938. Moreover, they never mentioned the word "occupation" which they were responsible in Second World War, but they evaluated their activities in the Second World War as against Western Colonialism. In addition to that, this book did not give a place comfort women issue and give just a small place to Nanjing Massacre, which is a bloody event for Chinese history. The Japanese stores were attacked by buckers during the protests<sup>164</sup>. Some argues that the book was written

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<sup>161</sup> Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, "A New Military Strategy For Japan.

<sup>162</sup> Michael Auslin, "Japan's New Realism", *Foreign Affairs*, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/japans-new-realism>.

<sup>163</sup> For more detailed information please look at part 3.5

by a nationalist and Japan's current policy is promoting nationalism for having strongest position among Asian countries<sup>165</sup>.

Some of the experts comment about this protests and claim that this protests have two reasons behind that. The first one is that, Chinese government just tries to live down domestic politics of China at that time. The second and more important reason for the study is, China tries to evoke the international public opinion about Japanese acts before and during in the Second World War, and tries to establish an opponent view about Japan membership to UNSC.<sup>166</sup> Another dynamic against Japan could be the Japanese contribution to the Iraq War. As it could be remembered in 2004 Guideline, Japan has more open ideas about giving up military pacifism. As it could be predicted, China will feel unsecure with the neighbor like Japan as a militarily active and technologically capable<sup>167</sup>. One another development in this time is clash between China and Japan about drilling oil and gas in East China Sea. In 2005 Koizumi administration gave permission to the Japanese firms for that<sup>168</sup>. As a result of Japan's this act, China protests Japan and threaten to Japan about taking action against her.

It could be said that this event is the second biggest street protest in China against a country. The first one is against U.S for the bombing Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999<sup>169</sup>. Some of the research is made among the protesters and

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<sup>164</sup> Yue-him Tam, "Who Engineered The Anti-Japanese Protests In 2005?", *Macalester International* 18 (2007).

<sup>165</sup> "Japonya Protestoları Yayılıyor", *Bbc.Co.Uk*, 2005, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2005/04/050411\\_china\\_japan\\_protests.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2005/04/050411_china_japan_protests.shtml).

<sup>166</sup> Wieland Wagner, "Atavistic Abe: Japan's PM Courts Old Dangers - SPIEGEL ONLINE - International", *SPIEGEL ONLINE*, 2012, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-nationalist-government-of-japan-stokes-tensions-with-china-a-877691.html>.

<sup>167</sup> Yue-him Tam, "Who Engineered The Anti-Japanese Protests In 2005?".

<sup>168</sup> James Manicom, "The Sino-Japanese Energy Dispute In The East China Sea: Strategic Policy, Economic Opportunities, And Cooperation", *The Economics Of Peace And Security Journal* 4, no. 2 (2009), doi:10.15355/epsj.4.2.38.

according to the resulted just a small number of the participants clearly understood the reason of the protests and had conscious about historical truth. Most of them were used such a diplomatic or politic tools of the Chinese government. According to the field researcher the protesters were unorganized.<sup>170</sup> But he also claims that those unorganized group is supported by the government.<sup>171</sup>

As a result of those protests, On June 30, 2005, on behalf of the sponsoring organizations, the GA submitted to U.N. Secretary- General Kofi Annan a petition with 42 million signatures collected in 41 countries. They contest that Japan was denied a permanent seat on the U.N. At the first place, Japan should accept her crimes in the Second World War, should make an apology, and gives indemnity to the victims. They also expected that Japan would not misrepresent the historic truth in Japanese textbooks.<sup>172</sup>

It is important to keep in mind that this time also important in terms of China and Japan bilateral relations. It is the first time that China' economic cooperation with U.S showed better performance than Japan's.

### **3.7. The National Defense Guideline (2011 FY)**

Like others, 2011 NDPG mentioned “preventing direct threat”, “eliminating external threat” and “securing peace and security of Japan”<sup>173</sup>. In addition to that this guideline mainly has three main objectives. The first one is that, “*to prevent*

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<sup>169</sup> Joseph Kahn, "In Rare Legal Protest, Chinese Seek Boycott Of Japan Goods", *Nytimes.Com*, accessed 29 July 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/world/asia/in-rare-legal-protest-chinese-seek-boycott-of-japan-goods.html>.

<sup>170</sup> Yue-him Tam, "Who Engineered The Anti-Japanese Protests In 2005?".

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> "What Japanese History Lessons Leave Out", *BBC News*, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21226068>.

<sup>173</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines For FY 2011 And Beyond*, ebook, 2010, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf).

*any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate external threats that have reached it so as to minimize the ensuing damage, and thereby secure the peace and security of Japan and its people*<sup>174</sup>. The second one is that *“to prevent threats from security environment in the Asia- Pacific region and by improving the global security environment, so as to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order and ensure Japan’s security and prosperity”*<sup>175</sup>. This objective is important because some of the scholars and politicians blame Japan because by arguing Japan compressed between her own interests toward Asia- Pacific region and USA’s interests towards the region. The principle can evaluate as an answer of those types of criticisms. Another criticism about Japan is that, Japan is becoming more isolating country because of her alliances with USA; this situation causes more lonesome Japan not only in Asia Pacific but also in the international area. This principle also answers this criticism too. The third one is that *“to contribute creating global peace and stability and securing human security”*<sup>176</sup>. This principle could be evaluated as a follow up of Japan’s more active position in the UN and Japan’s possible intention about having permanent seat at the UNSC. After explanation of the principle, it could be said that Japan may want to have more alternatives in terms of security after 2008 Economic Crisis in the USA. Economic crises mean USA would spend less money for security of Japan which is not priority of USA. This is both opportunity and a challenge for Japan. It could be seen as an opportunity because Japan found chance to be open especially in the security field, it was a window of opportunity to establish new cooperation. As a proof of this situation Japan openly expresses that, she will strengthen the cooperation with South Korea and Australia<sup>177</sup>, and also she is aware that global shift in the balance of power from U.S, although she is still an important player, to

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p.1

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., pp.1-2

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., p.2

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., p.8

rising powers such as India, China, and Russia<sup>178</sup>. In addition to that Japan argue that global shift in terms of balance of power is apparent in the region of Asia-Pacific. One of the remarkable point about that is, Japan defined ASEAN as a “traditional partner”<sup>179</sup>. On the other hand it is a challenge because Japan has to be more proactive even the public opinion was not support this kind of changes after the Iraq War experiences. Another proof about proactivity is this sentence: “*Japan’s defense force is the ultimate guarantee of its national security*”<sup>180</sup>.

After that, guideline gives answer to question of how can Japan realize these principles? Japan addressed to her ally and cooperation with Asia- Pacific countries. In there also could be seen that Japan gave importance to new cooperation with international communities especially in the field of security. In addition to that Japan also addressed UN; highlighted supporting UN’s activities about peace and stability in all around the world<sup>181</sup>. For Japan, the mass destruction weapons, ballistic missiles, international terrorism and piracy are the main problems of international communities<sup>182</sup>. UN is not the only tool which Japan can be part of international community, other tools are ODA, her diplomatic efforts and her cooperation with international organizations like NATO<sup>183</sup>. Although Japan trust UN, she argues that UN should be reformed for effectiveness.

Like other guideline, the emphasis of the constitution also exists, and also Japan looks decisive about her basic defence policy. The basic defence policy includes

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p.8

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p.6

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p.8

securing civilian control, continuing non-nuclear principles, building a modest defence force etc.<sup>184</sup>. On the other hand, the guideline also has proactive security understanding of Japan because it has a part which mentions being more active in the international security environment; for example, UN peacekeeping activities, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief<sup>185</sup>. In addition to that Japan openly declares that she does not continue “Basic Defence Force Concept”<sup>186</sup>. Japan openly declared her new “Dynamic Defence Force” understanding which is the most important part of the guideline. Japan defends her new position with difficult security environment, and declares to build appropriate size defence force with her own resources and structural reforms in order to produce more outcome with limited resources<sup>187</sup>.

The third part of the guideline is security environment surrounding Japan. At first, Japan believes complex interdependency between neighbour countries in the region. The guideline mentioned that this type of interdependence is decreasing the possibility of war in the region. It could be said that China has capitalist economy in the international level and especially after 2000s, Chinese economy was getting bigger and unpredictable. Although Chinese participation of common economic system is a good thing, China also increased her security spending; Japan watched this type of development carefully<sup>188</sup>. In addition to that South Korean economy became more structured and stable, also Russian economy repaired itself after the 1997 ruble crises. On the other hand, Russia also started to robust her military existence again in the Far East after the end of the Cold War<sup>189</sup>. Whole of the

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p.2

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p.7

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p.4

neighbours of Japan which were possible risks to Japan, became part of the same economic system, and this situation is beclouding the possibility of war. In addition to that Japan remarked the regional conflicts which are rooted from ethnicity or religion<sup>190</sup>, also pointed up uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait. Plus, Japan was openly blaming North Korea to destabilizing to the region.

The fourth part of the guideline is “basic policies to ensure Japan’s security”. It is similar with prior guidelines. The theme is basic defence policies which is fulfilled with the help of alliances and partners. Among other things, the new guideline also meets the necessities of the new world, special importance to the information security<sup>191</sup>. The guideline is also emphasising the cooperation inside the government. The proactive new security feature is introduced in this part also. But new “Dynamic Defence Force” is not against to alliance with US. Japan still declare that she is adhere to the Japan- US Security Arrangement, and Japan still see this arrangement as a guarantee of security. However, this does not mean that Japan underestimated the Okinawa issue. Japan smoothly acknowledges that Japan implemented some measures to watch the USA’s security forces positions and acts toward to the local community. Also this part draws general framework about important countries in the region.

The fifth part of the guideline is “future defence forces”. SDF’s role is specified according to the possible security threat to the Japan. Security of the sea, responding to attacks on the offshore islands, cyber-attacks, ballistic missile attacks, nuclear disasters are the main concerns of SDF.

After that, the guideline focuses on SDF’s force posture and organization equipment and force disposition. GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF’s role and position specified in the guideline within a technical way.

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p.8

The sixth part of the guideline is “basic foundations to maximize defence capability”. At the place, the guideline mentions effective utilization of the human resources. One of the interesting points in this part is that declining birth rate is defined as a risk and the suggestion for this problem is that increasing ratio of people who gets higher education. In addition to that, Japan gave importance to the research and education inside the military. Equipment is also another important part of the maximizing defence capability. It should be efficient, and correspond to the changes in international environment.

### **3.8. The Development Between 2010 and 2013**

In 2010 the Battle of Okinawa turned to the bilateral problem between Japan and U.S. that times Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pledged to close Battle of Okinawa in his election campaign. The Okinawa people were so disturbed because of the American soldiers in the region<sup>192</sup>. Some of the experts evaluated this situation as a natural reaction against “client state” relations after two decades passed from the Cold War<sup>193</sup>. In that analogy Japan is described as a “client state”<sup>194</sup>. But before that, Okinawa’s position should be explained. Although Okinawa is a part of pre-modern and modern Japanese state, after the Second World War, Okinawa has been under the USA’s military rule until 1972<sup>195</sup>, even after Japanese took back again Okinawa from United States; Okinawa’s position is used by U.S for war making. Some examples of U.S used for the position of Okinawa are Korean War (1950- 1953), Vietnam (1961-1975), Gulf (1990),

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<sup>192</sup> "Amerikan Üssü Okinawa‘Da Kalacak", *Amerika'nin Sesi / Voice Of America - Turkish*, 2010, <https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/amerikan-ussu-okinawada-kalacak-95110414/884347.html>.

<sup>193</sup> Rupert Cox, "The Sound Of Freedom: US Military Aircraft Noise In Okinawa, Japan", *Anthropology News* 51, no. 9 (2010): 13-14, doi:10.1111/j.1556-3502.2010.51913.x.

<sup>194</sup> Gavan McCormack, "The Travails Of A Client State: An Okinawan Angle On The 50Th Anniversary Of The US-Japan Security Treaty - FPIF", *Foreign Policy In Focus*, 2010, [https://fpif.org/the\\_travails\\_of\\_a\\_client\\_state/](https://fpif.org/the_travails_of_a_client_state/).

<sup>195</sup> The island was ruled by USA, but the local people had Japanese citizenship

Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq (2003)<sup>196</sup>. It could be said that the island still has special importance for USA, because it is so close to China and Taiwan.

Okinawa island is nearly %6 of total acreage of Japan, and closely %75 of the U.S soldiers who are responsible for protection of Japan also located in this island. After the 1990s, the local community was complainant about the military base of U.S. They generally troubled about U.S's soldiers, and acts of violence which rooted from USA soldiers in the island<sup>197</sup>. Actually the clash between local community and U.S's soldiers increased after 1995, and this was a hot debate. It reached the hottest position in 2010, 90.000 Okinawan protested USA's military existence in the island. It could be said that U.S do not evaluate Okinawa issue as a primary problem among the U.S and Japan<sup>198</sup>. Actually, Tokyo did not think same with the Okinawan. Tokyo saw U.S forces in Okinawa can help Japan to protect herself from the Chinese and even further North Korean threat, this issue caused tension in one time between 2009 and 2010, after the Japanese government relayed. Even after 2006 referendum some predicted certain changes; still there is no step until today<sup>199</sup>.

Cold relations between North Korea and Japan continued for the first two years after Kim Jong Un ruling power. Tokyo condemned North Korea because of the April 2012 satellite launch when is timed to celebrate the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung. Approximately at the same time, in August 2012, the Japanese and DPRK Red Cross Societies met in China for discussing the repatriation of the body of

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<sup>196</sup> Gavan McCormack, "The Travails Of A Client State: An Okinawan Angle On The 50Th Anniversary Of The US-Japan Security Treaty - FPIF"

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, "The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia", Center for Strategic and International Studies, (August 2012):14.

<sup>199</sup> <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/116/-abd-japonya-ittifakinin-yumusak-karni--okinawa-adasi/#.XNkdJFWLTIU>

Japanese soldiers and personnel who died in Korea during World War II<sup>200</sup>. On the other hand, Japan delayed intended follow-up to these negotiations after the second North Korean satellite launch in December 2012. Japan expanded further its unilateral sanctions regime, after the North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013<sup>201</sup>. Japan co-sponsored with the EU for a UN Human Rights Council resolution which established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate North Korean human rights abuses, including a provision requiring the Commission to look into North Korea's abductions of foreign nationals in to the following month<sup>202</sup>.

Nuclear facilities and threat from North Korea is not the only issue between Japan and North Korea, another issue is abduction. Japan also wanted to solve abduction issue in these talks. However, North Korea had some preconditions about apologizing and paying reparations for Japan's colonial movements before negotiations can go one step further<sup>203</sup>.

North Korea's these type of actions affected not only Japan but also other countries in the region. As a result of this situation China called emergency meetings.<sup>204</sup> China is one of the main trade partners of North Korea. This bilateral relations are not limited with trade but those two countries also have important ally relations too. International community expected China to preclude the crises which

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<sup>200</sup> "Japan Mission Leaves For Talks With N. Korea", *Arab News*, 2014, <http://www.arabnews.com/news/533851>.

<sup>201</sup> "Measures Taken By Japan Against North Korea (Announcement By The Chief Cabinet Secretary) (Cabinet Decisions And Other Announcements) | Prime Minister Of Japan And His Cabinet", *Japan.Kantei.Go.Jp*, 2013, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/decisions/2013/0405tyoukanhappyou\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2013/0405tyoukanhappyou_e.html).

<sup>202</sup> David Hawk et al., "A United Nations Commission Of Inquiry For North Korea", *38 North*, 2013, <https://www.38north.org/2013/04/dhawk040113/>.

<sup>203</sup> "An Overview Of North Korea-Japan Relations", *NCNK*, 2015, <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/overview-north-korea-japan-relations>.

<sup>204</sup> "U.S., Japan, South Korea To Meet Soon Over Crisis", *Edition.Cnn.Com*, 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/30/koreas.crisis/index.html>.

rooted from North Korea's irresponsible action about nuclear armament. As a result of this, China collected an emergency meeting with six important actors for the region which are China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the U.S.<sup>205</sup> Even the two sides sit on the table together, one part is China, Russia and North Korea and the second part is South Korea, Japan and the U.S.

### **3.9. The 2013 National Defence Programme Guideline (2014 FY)**

The guideline clearly mentioned why Japan needs a new guideline. The answer is that the new guideline is based on "Defense Capability Build-up in Fiscal Year 2013".<sup>206</sup>

The second part of the guideline is "security environment surrounding Japan". Like the previous guideline, NDPG 2013 also defined China and India as newly emerging power centres because of new world's power balance shifts. It does not mean that Japan sees China and India as an alternative of the U.S, even she still defined U.S is the largest national power. Japan expected that U.S would continue her balancing role and peace keeper in international community<sup>207</sup>.

Japan defined three main other international concerns. The first one is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The second one is piracy acts, and the third one is the use of outer space and cyberspace<sup>208</sup>.

After those international concerns, Japan focused on the developments in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the Guideline, countries are strengthening their cooperation in the region. This cooperation involves not only traditional security

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines For FY 2014 And Beyond*, ebook, 2013, [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217\\_e2.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf).

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p.1

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p.2

challenges but also non-traditional security challenges<sup>209</sup>. However, North Korea increases tension in the region with her armed force and military power and especially with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. North Korea does not threaten just South Korea, but also Japan, and supposedly North Korea threatens the international community too<sup>210</sup>. North Korea's more aggressive attitude mentioned in the previous part which is focused on the events between 2010 and 2013.

Although North Korea is the main threat to Japan, it is not the only one. China also improves her military skills and armaments. According to Japan, China is not transparent about her intentions about her military existence in the region. Although China claims that she has no intention about deployment, Japan's concerns are focused on the East China Sea and South China Sea issues. Japan's claims are that China has intruded into Japanese territorial water.<sup>211</sup> In addition to that, Chinese vessels and aircraft enter the Pacific Ocean, and China is expanding her operations even to the area which is north of Japan. The guideline argues that Japan should follow Chinese military developments not just for the sake of Japan but also for the international community.

Other concerning power in the region is Russia according to Japan because Russia reformed her military power. According to the guideline, the U.S. puts greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>212</sup> Japan still gives special importance to being an ally with the USA as it could be seen in the guideline and still sees it as a balancing and protecting power for the region. Another concern for Japan is that securing maritime and air traffic, especially securing Exclusive Economic Zones.

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., pp.2-3

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p.4

Japan sees herself in a position where experience more severe security condition than 2010 NDGP, even the possibility of war is weak in the post-cold war era. According to the guideline, a country cannot overcome this entire problem. For that reason Japan should establish more cooperation between military and non-military sector, and cooperation between countries which have same interests and concerns about security environment.

The third part of the guideline is “Japan’s Basic Defense Policy”. Japan defined her basic defence policy as a “proactive contribution to peace”. This contribution involves both Japan’s her own security and the security of Asia- Pacific region. In addition to that the guideline defines the USA and Japan alliances as a keystone of security, and expresses that Japan should strengthen her cooperation with the USA. Another point is that about constitution. According to the guideline, Japan should develop her defence power according to the military and three non-nuclear principles.

In accordance to the guideline, Japan should organize a comprehensive defense which is mainly flexible for joint operations, capability to protect Japanese nationals from foreign countries, and response posture to disaster. But, the main point is Japanese new “Dynamic Joint Defence Forces”. According to the guideline, Japan should adopt her SDF according to the new international security environment, which is even includes “gray zones”.<sup>213</sup> Another main point is “Proactive Contribution to Peace” which is based on international cooperation. According to this understanding, Japan should be part of international peace activity. It can be possible with the top-end bilateral and multilateral cooperation with especially to International Organisation. Although Japan gives importance to international security and peace, her main concern is Asia- Pacific. The guideline also expresses that defense forces had special position in this Guideline because of

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid., p.7

the surrounding security environment, and new defence understanding is “*both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity...*”<sup>214</sup>.

As it is mentioned before this new defence understanding does not mean that Japan is giving up her cooperation with the U.S. Unlike, the guideline mentioned stronger alliance because U.S should protect her interests in the region and Japan experiences severe security issues in the region<sup>215</sup>. The important issue is that Japan defines U.S as a “cornerstone” of her national security<sup>216</sup>. In addition to that parallel with Japanese effort about stabilizing Asia- Pacific, Japan sees bilateral relations with USA also help to realize this target of Japan. Japan still draws U.S to highlighted the importance of her position in the Asia Pacific.

On the other hand, security cooperation is not limited with the USA, cooperation in the Asia- Pacific region with ASEAN is important especially in terms of non-traditional security fields. Japan and North Korea have an agreement on security information protection. Another country which Japan would like to establish stronger security ties is the Australia. According to the 2013 NDPG, Japan shares security interests with Australia<sup>217</sup>. As it was mentioned before in the previous parts, Japan seeks new opportunities about establishing new partnership in the Asia Pacific region, Australia is a good one in this framework. In addition to that, Japan also sees Australia’s position as a good partner in the international peacekeeping activities, because Australia also has not so active or offensive security perception. In this framework, Japan suggests trilateral agreements such as USA, Japan, ROK or USA, Japan, Australia. It is also a proof that Japan want to be an active player both in the Northeast Asia, and the Asia- Pacific region. But

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<sup>214</sup> Ibid., p.8

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., p.10

Japan openly reveals that USA and Australia will proactively contribute building cooperative relations in the region<sup>218</sup>.

After Asia- Pacific, this guideline mentioned the core security actors in the Northeast Asia. Japan is doubtful about China's activities in the region especially on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan<sup>219</sup>. Another crucial security actor especially in the Northeast Asia is Russia. Japan mentioned security dialogue between those countries<sup>220</sup>. The main target of this cooperation is promoting regional security with the help of bilateral training and exercises.

Another part of the relations with the international security community is Japan-Southeast Countries relations. The main theme of this cooperation is disaster management, maritime security and international peacekeeping activities. For Japan, the major power is India in terms of security cooperation<sup>221</sup>.

On the other hand, cooperation with the countries is not the only method for Japan to stabilizing security environment. Other tools are; bilateral defence cooperation, diplomatic policy initiatives, joint training in the military.

Japan clearly defines her position about cooperation with countries and international organisations as ASEAN, NATO, and the EU. The main issues about cooperation are arms control disarmament, non-proliferation, international terrorism, failed states, weapons of mass destruction<sup>222</sup>. For overcoming those

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid., p.12

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p.11

<sup>220</sup> Including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (2+2)

<sup>221</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines For FY 2014 And Beyond*

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p.12

problems, NDPG suggested utilizing the SDF's capabilities and increasing the number of SDF's personnel<sup>223</sup> (both in local and in the UN).

The next part is the "future defense forces". At the beginning the role of the defense force is defined.

The first one is that "effective deterrence of and response to various situations". This includes some elements that are protecting lives and properties, intelligence superiority. Japan openly express that she cannot tolerate changes which come with using force. Ensuring security of sea and airspace surrounding Japan, Japan specified the response areas: attacking on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace, and major disasters.

The second one is that "stabilization of Asia- Pacific and improvement of global security environments". It could be said that after the Japanese participation to the Iraq War, she took some lessons, and Japanese security concern directly shift from global to regional. This means security of Asia- Pacific become one of the main concern for Japan. For achieving this stabilization mission Japan specified some initiatives those are, holding training and exercises, promoting defense cooperation and exchange, promoting capacity building assistance, ensuring maritime security, implementing international peace cooperation activities, cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

The next part is that "priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defence Forces". At the beginning basic approach and capacity of SDF is defined. It could be seen that Japan takes measures against three main security concerns, one is remote Island, the other one is maritime security, ballistic missile attacks. One is the main problem of Japan- Russia relations, the other one is the main problem of Japan- China relations, and the third one is the main security concern between Japan- North Korea relations. After 2011 Tohoku Earthquake responses to major

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p.13

disasters became the important security concern<sup>224</sup>. It was important in that point because, Japan wants to be active in the international peacekeeping activities with her SDF force.

The next part defines architecture of each service of SDF force. This part is mostly a technic part. The components of the SDF are Ground SDF, Maritime SDF, and Air SDF. Basic foundations for SDF are same with the previous one. The only new part is “medical”. In this point a National Defense Medical College Hospital mentioned<sup>225</sup>. Another important subtitle is promoting reform of the ministry of defense; this reform basically target more functional defense forces with the unification of military and civilian elements.

In the last part is the additional points like others, these guideline planned for one decade long<sup>226</sup>. But it is visible that Japan planned more active defense force in the future, “.. *Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability...*”<sup>227</sup>.

### **3.10. Developments between 2013 and 2019**

December 2012 election was a victory for LDP which gained majority of the votes. Shinzo Abe come back to the leadership with some intention about powerful international position and defence role for Japan. In his speech in 2013, he mentioned:

Japan must remain a leading promoter of rules...for trade, investment, intellectual properties, labor, [and the] environment...Japan must continue to be a guardian of

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p.20

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p.30

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

global commons...Japan must stay strong, strong first in economy, and strong also in its national defence .<sup>228</sup>

As it could be predicted that, new and more security oriented policies are not limited by Abe's speech. 2013's National Security Strategy also clearly mentioned 'proactive contributions to peace'. This included establishing National Security Council, and protecting state secrets<sup>229</sup>. This improvement is not limited by Abe's personality or political line. In addition to that, China was becoming a security concern against Japan especially for maritime activities of China and Chinese military modernisation<sup>230</sup>. In January 2013, a Chinese warship locked weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese helicopter and naval destroyer. China declared an Air Defence Identification Zone, including areas of the East China Sea which is declared as a part of Japan by Japan in November 2013. In addition, China gradually challenged Japan's powerful authority beyond the Senkaku Islands with the help of activating additional planes and ships to guard what Chinese named as the Diaoyu Islands. As a return, Japan increased her air force activities in the relevant places. Japanese Air Force activities increased and closely arrived an average of 1.5 daily in 2013-2014—a substantial escalation from the years previous to 2010.<sup>231</sup> Chinese fighter jets blocked Japanese investigation planes; as a result of this situation the risk of conflict increased.

The cornerstone about Japanese public consideration to the security policy of Japan was Cabinet decision in 2014 of July. With that decision, the scope of the article 9 is increased to the exercising collective self-defence.<sup>232</sup> The changes come

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<sup>228</sup> Shinzo Abe, "Statement By Prime Minister Shinzo Abe", *Asia-Pacific Review* 22, no. 2 (2015): 102-105, doi:10.1080/13439006.2015.1123132.

<sup>229</sup> Leif-Eric Easley, "Korean Courage To Deal With Japan", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 36, no. 1 (2014): 25-33, doi:10.1080/10803920.2014.879516.

<sup>230</sup> "DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014 | Japan Ministry Of Defense", *Mod.Go.Jp*, 2014, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2014.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html).

<sup>231</sup> Tetsuo Kotani, *Crisis Management In The East China Sea*, ebook (SIPRI, 2015), <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2015/sipri-fact-sheets/crisis-management-east-china-sea>.

hand in hand with the political reforms and this situation caused some considerations. First consideration is 'grey-zone situations' such as military groups in the offshore islands. The main threat at this point is China. Japanese policy makers estimate that China gradually increase her territorial claims with starting to civilian rooted provocation.

The second consideration is when the limitations over the SDF were thought, the Japanese Cabinet is wondering more active position and role in the UN Peacekeeping operations. The earliest examination at this point is Japanese contribution to the UN in South Sudan since 2012; not only on the personnel level but also supply level with the help of the Japanese base. But the new and changing policy is that; in the scenarios of attack to Japanese citizens; Japan's SDF can both conducting a non-combatant withdrawal, and civilian and military SDF forces equally share the SDF operations control<sup>233</sup>.

In addition to that the most controversial scenarios are about limitation of exercising, the right of self-defence in the new framework. For example, what will be the limitation of Japanese assistance to the United States in the any kind of hardship in international water as an alliance?

It should be remembered that the drastic changes inside the security policy of Japan is not only because of the dynamics inside the Japan; but also United States experienced one more time to similar situation in Nixon Doctrine period like economic concerns, budgetary issues, public opinion's negative viewpoint and scepticism after Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of these developments, United States expected that her alliances should shoulder security burden one more time. In this time the security burden is not limited with the economy, United States

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<sup>232</sup> "Cabinet Decision On Development Of Seamless Security Legislation To Ensure Japan's Survival And Protect Its People", *Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Japan*, 2014, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e\\_000273.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html).

<sup>233</sup> No Author, "Japanese Defense Ministry Mulls Further Steps Against Power Harassment As SDF Recruiters Struggle | The Japan Times", *The Japan Times*, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/03/national/japanese-defense-ministry-mulls-steps-power-harassment-sdf-recruiters-struggle/>.

expected more active security position from Japan.<sup>234</sup> Subsequently, bilateral defence guidelines between United States and Japan fulfil this expectation as a predict cooperation in the fields of space and cyber missions, progressive contribution about transport capabilities etc.<sup>235</sup> The main question mark about those developments in the security is where should be new self-defence understanding find a place when the constitution of Japan, especially article 9 is thought.

As it could be predicted, the new security policies' direct influence was on the defence budget. The Cabinet approved a defence budget of 4.98 trillion yen in January 2015 which reached a high record in the Japanese history.<sup>236</sup> However, this historical increase is not seen as a drastic one when it is compared with the China in which the defence spending percentage reached double, because of that reason Japanese spending is not seen as offensive but it was rather defensive.

It could be said that 2013 NDPG is applied in terms of securitisation of the offshore island; the point in there is 'sufficient amphibious operations capability [to secure remote islands] without delay in the case of an invasion'.<sup>237</sup> After the 2014's May; SDF exercised its defence positions in the islands with the different opportunities.

More active role in the defence and more defence spending also reverberate to the military technology; Japan introduce Izumo Helicopter destroyer in 2013. Although it is designed for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, some doubts increased like Izumo will be used as a traditional military tools by

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<sup>234</sup> Glenn D. Hook and Key-Young Son, "Transposition In Japanese State Identities: Overseas Troop Dispatches And The Emergence Of A Humanitarian Power?", *Australian Journal Of International Affairs* 67, no. 1 (2013): 35-54, doi:10.1080/10357718.2013.748274.

<sup>235</sup> *The Guidelines For Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation April 27, 2015*, ebook, 2015, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>.

<sup>236</sup> *Defense Programs And Budget Of Japan Overview Of FY2015 Budget*, ebook, 2015, [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_budget/pdf/270414.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/270414.pdf).

<sup>237</sup> *National Defense Program Guidelines For FY 2014 And Beyond*.

neighbours. On the contrary, Japan continued to improvement of military technology besides the criticisms, Japan produce the second upgraded version Izumo which is Kaga in 2015 on August.

While Japan is becoming more active in the defence industry, she is more opinionated in international area too, because Japan is being a part of international defence cooperation. As it mentioned before Japan is more active, some examples are helpful for analysing the situation. For example Japan puts her security position about South China Sea at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and Syria and Ukraine at the Group of Seven (G7) summit.<sup>238</sup> Another crucial change at this point is that Japan in the first time affords weapons for supporting another country which is South Sudan with the UN Mission in December 2013. It was a signal of changing on arms export ban which mentioned in the previous parts. In 2014's April, arms export ban involved just for the countries in which committed in conflict or experienced sanctions from UN or any international agreement.<sup>239</sup>

As it was always mentioning in the NDPGs before, Japan tries to establish new security alliances. For example, In July 2014, Japan and Australia signed an agreement allowing the consideration of joint production of submarines.<sup>240</sup> Australia is not the only security partner of Japan, in addition to Australia, France, Israel, Britain, Germany, Canada and NATO are also security partner of Japan in different levels. On the other hand, for the protection from piracy acts, Japan developed a close cooperation with ASEAN countries.

Other important issue which Japan gives higher importance is disaster relief cooperation. In the first time MSDF officer commanded the disaster relief portion

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<sup>238</sup> *Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit 7-8 June 2015*, ebook, 2016, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000084020.pdf>.

<sup>239</sup> "MOFA: Japan's Policies On The Control Of Arms Exports", *Mofa.Go.Jp*, accessed 29 July 2019, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html>.

<sup>240</sup> M. Erika Pollmann and Alan Tidwell, "Australia'S Submarine Technology Cooperation With Japan As Burden-Sharing With The USA In The Asia-Pacific", *Australian Journal Of International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (2015): 394-413, doi:10.1080/10357718.2015.1034088.

of the exercise in 2014; when the Philippines experienced typhoon. In this operation, the largest placement outside Japan occurred from the time when the SDF's founding with the more than thousand troops. Japan shows same performance also in the Nepal in 2015 earthquake in terms of search and rescue and medical relief.

Even these type of developments Japanese public opinion and policy makers still far away the idea of fight against international threats like Islamic States with the traditional military and security tools. It could be said that Japan's main concern is more regional than international in terms of security exceptionally active participation in UN. Some of the experts claim that Japan can act quickly in the any type of emergency situation without delay, and this can help establishing strong security networks inside Asia. This type of baby steps can create a chance to establishing defence network, Asian states participates military training, exercises, intelligence-sharing etc., in the long run more cooperation means less conflict in the region.<sup>241</sup>

### **3.11. 2019 National Defence Programme Guideline**

The last NDPG was published in 2019 Fiscal year, December 2018. The first sentences of the guideline is that *'Japan since the end of World War II has consistently treaded the path of a peace loving nation.'*<sup>242</sup> It could be said that Japan tries to continue her peaceful image even in the line of productivity. For proving this situation Japan even uses such an assertive word 'forerunner'. On the other hand, in the second paragraph guideline highlights the sovereignty of Japan, and Japan's state level effort about procuring national security in different levels. Giving importance to peace does not mean that renounce security. For that reason, Japan defined her defence capability to guarantee for having security. Why does

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<sup>241</sup> Bhubhindar Singh, *Security Identity, Policymaking Regime And Japanese Security Policy Development* (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013).

<sup>242</sup> *National Defense Program Guideline For FY 2019 And Beyond*, ebook, 2018, [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218\\_e.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf).

Japan need defence? According to the guideline, the reason is drastically changing the security environment which surrounded Japan, and guideline also based its defence argument to that point. In addition to that, there are some risks exist against realizing Japan's more strength defence force according to the guideline those are: an aging population and severe fiscal capability.<sup>243</sup>

2019 Guideline also highlights the partnership between United States like others in the first pages. On the one hand they are brighten the alliance relations but on the other hand the guideline openly against the traditional 'client- patron' relations and draw role of Japan as a sovereign nation. The alliance's first aim still provides the security in the region but the name of the region is changed in this time. The term of Asia Pacific used in the previous guideline but in this time Indo Pacific was used. After that introduction, the next title is 'Security Environment Surrounding Japan'. According to the Guideline, two points are important in characteristic of security environment. First one is that complex interdependence among countries and the second one is shifting balance of powers in the new world. This new shift rooted from Chinese growth for the guideline.

The war is not only traditional war anymore for the big countries; it was replaced by hybrid war according to the guideline. It mentioned that even some big countries use social media for manipulation.<sup>244</sup> Obscurely, China and Russia was implied when the events were thought. On the other hand, military technology becomes more advanced and this means states should develop their own military technology. This military technology is not limited with the territorial military activities but in addition to that, space and cyber securities find their places in the new world. Also maritime security technologies gain more importance especially for countries like Japan. After the general framework of security is drawn, situations by country and the region are mentioned. The guideline defines United States as the 'world's largest comprehensive national power'; it is also aware that China and Russia is challenged United States' super power in the new framework.

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid., p.2

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p.3

Why does the guideline define the United States as a major power is because it sees the United States as the most advanced one in the military technology? The guideline also take attention to that United States should be more active in the Indo Pacific for her own interest, and remunerate her power and stabilizer role in the world.<sup>245</sup> The alternative and challenger of United States is China, even the successful growth rate of China is not transparent about her growth and it is a risk for not only in the region but also in the world. China experienced border conflict with the region's countries in the both East China Sea and South China Sea, and after the growth of China increased her military existence in both of the regions.<sup>246</sup> Another regional and international threat is North Korea for Japan. Although lots of attempted for limiting or efface North Korea's nuclear activities; there are not any kind of development occurred about North Korea's offensive nuclear activities.<sup>247</sup> Another interesting point is that the guideline mentioned Russia's nuclear activities, it could be interpreted as trial for collecting attention from United States for taking a more active security role in the region. The next title is 'Characteristics of Japan'. The main security concern which comes from Japan's geographical position is numerous islands because of long coastline. The second security concern is natural disasters and the third one is the ,aging population and low birth rate. To sum up, Japan sees that although hot conflict between big countries is lower, the regional threat for Japan is still uncertain.

The third title is 'Japan's Basic Defence Policy'. It is important that "Proactive Contribution to Peace" is used. Still there are emphases on soft power tools like diplomacy. The two main points are not change in the 2019 NDPG, the first one is the importance of United States and Japan security alliance positions. The second one is constitution, however this time constitutional interpretation of self-defence changed. On the one hand, guideline clearly stated exclusively defence oriented policy and on the other hand not being military threat for other countries. The

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<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p.4

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p.5

<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p.6

exclusively defence means protecting peace and civilian and observed nuclear activities of the other countries.<sup>248</sup>

After that point guideline put National Defence Objectives. Those are

- 1) to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation's disposal
- 2) to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential
- 3) should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.<sup>249</sup>

SDF's active role defined in an attack situation like this responding the attack and protecting civilians and crucial facilities such as nuclear facilities. In addition to that, new world threat is different than old one; this means guideline gives message about readiness to cyber, space and electromagnetic threats. Other main responsibility is the protection in the condition of the large scale disaster.

Another head title is "Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance". The classic point in there is giving role to United States for establishing and maintaining peace in the region. On the other hand, Japan declares that United States and Japan share common interests –even the Trump administration comes to power-. Yet another point is that, Guideline clearly stated that Japan buys military equipment from United States<sup>250</sup> in these proactive policy changes, and Japan is not a competitor in that sense.

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p.7

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p.8

<sup>250</sup> *In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment.*

As it was mentioned before Okinawa issue is controversial for Japanese public opinion, the new guideline eases the United States with this statements: '*Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS)*'<sup>251</sup>.

After that, the guideline declared alliances other than the United States. This section is so detailed about drawing framework on those security alliances with Australia, India, ASEAN Countries, United Kingdom, France, Canada, New Zealand. Japan sees the Republic of Korea and the United States as a guarantee for the region. China is an important figure for the region, especially if China volunteer about developing security cooperation with trust, it is nearly same for Russia too. Japan tries to create new cooperations in Central Asia, Middle East and Africa, specifically countries in which Japan is a part of United Nations peacekeeping or peace building activities.

One of the most important points in the guideline, Japan will keenly encourage international peace cooperation activities, though giving comprehensive concerns about some of the factors which purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country, In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security<sup>252</sup>. This type of rationalisation is necessity for justifying acts like in Republic of Djibouti. In 2009, in response to piracy off the coast of Somalia members of the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other countries including Japan, China, Australia, and many others deployed personnel, air and naval resources as part of global anti-piracy measures. In 2009 Japan's National Diet passed the "Anti-piracy measures law". Three Lockheed C-130H Hercules aircraft of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force's 401st Tactical Airlift Squadron were sent to the base in July 2016 to evacuate

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<sup>251</sup> *National Defense Program Guideline For FY 2019 And Beyond*,

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18

Japanese citizens from Juba in South Sudan after fighting broke out there.<sup>253</sup> They were expected to pick up around 70 Japanese citizens.

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<sup>253</sup> Reiji Yoshida, "SDF Is Ordered To Evacuate Japanese Nationals From South Sudan | The Japan Times", *The Japan Times*, 2016, [https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/11/national/mobilization-of-sdf-eyed-for-south-sudan-to-protect-japanese-nationals-amid-fighting/#.XVVlj\\_IzbIU](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/11/national/mobilization-of-sdf-eyed-for-south-sudan-to-protect-japanese-nationals-amid-fighting/#.XVVlj_IzbIU).

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

Before the discussion about theories testing transformation Japanese security policies from pacifism to proactive policies, it is important to explained commonalities and differences between NDPGs. It can help the evaluation of the transformation in the security understanding through the time. As it was mentioned before some of the scholars directly connect proactive policies to Abe's political views. This comparison helps to understanding when the pacifism was replaced by proactive policies, this transformation is immediate or slowly.

Commonalities between the NDPGs could be categorised in three titles. The first one is the emphasis of the loyalty to the article 9<sup>th</sup> of the Japanese constitution. Even the concentration of article 9<sup>th</sup> show differences among guideline to guideline, this is the first similarities between them. This situation can be interpreted as whatever take place in the domestic or international politics neither Japanese Public opinion nor Japanese governors are not ready to demonstrate full challenge against to the constitution, even its means being a 'normal' state.

The second commonality is stationary security alliance between United States and Japan in the guidelines. Even if the governments' change, political views change or international system change, Japan and Unites States see each other as organic partners. Actually this cooperation caused not always acquisition but sometimes also mean losing for the sides of alliance. For example; although one of the reason of reaching Japanese economic power is United States shouldered the military burden of Japan, this could be counted as an absolute win; on the other hand Japan

sometimes is ignored in the region because Japan seen just a tool of United States for using maximize her interests, this caused to giant loses for Japan.

The third one is Japanese firm belief to United Nations. Japan always believed in UN to fulfil its mission, and protecting and securing power of United Nations. Japan attribute establishing peace with the help of the UN, because of that reason Japan always support UN either financially or physically. The Japanese belief of UN also always takes part of every NDGPs. It is still a question mark whether Japan sees UN to drive her influence and/or to see her power and military limitation or not.

When the differences among the NDGPs discussed, also those consisted of three main continents. The first one is the threats. For example, in 1976, nuclear threat was the main security threat. In 1995, border uncertainty which has caused by over of the Cold War. In 2004, international terrorism defined as a threat which is caused by the fear of 9/11. In 2010, Nuclear activities of North Korea was threat, and it is continuing in 2018 too. It could be said that Japan defines threat as a realist perspective.

The second difference is scope and amount of allies of Japan. Like threats alliance also defined with realist viewpoint. In 1976 and 1995 the only alliance was United States. ASEAN was declared alliance in 2005. In 2010, scope becomes larger with the South Korea, Australia, EU, India, China and Russia. In 2013 OSCE, Great Britain and France also added in the list. Lastly, in 2018, Canada and New Zealand became part of the alliance. It is important to see that when the Japan feels weakness or apathy in the region, she just added new partners and alliances in her list.

The third point is changing means of SDF's. In 1976, the scope of SDF was minimum basic defence, basic defence mechanism for a sovereign country in 1995, being part of international peacekeeping in 2004, being ready for different scenarios in 2010, giving respond to necessities in 2013, and lastly proactive contribution to the international peace in 2018.

After that analysis when the theories are thought, it could be said that although Japanese public opinion is more pacifist and help to maintaining pacifism in a line and this situation remembered constructivism, Japanese statesmen –not only Shinzo Abe- prepare Japan to more proactive security policies during the time as it could be seen with NDGS. In addition to that, Japan tries to open it new alternatives and solutions besides the absolute partnership of United States. It is still questionable whether Japan from today is a normal state or not. Japan changes her mechanism and policies immediately according to world's necessities and reforms about security depend on current development in international area.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Japonya, Meiji döneminden önce dışa kapalılık politikasını benimsemiştir, 1850'lerden itibaren Japonya Batı baskısıyla dışa açılmaya zorlanmıştır bu durum 1854 yılında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile imzalanan Kanagawa anlaşmasıyla zirveye ulaşmıştır. Bu anlaşma Japonya Dostluk ve Ticaret anlaşması olarak da bilinmektedir. 1868 Meiji Restorasyonu birçok akademisyen tarafından Japon siyasi tarihinde modern bir başlangıç noktası olarak tanımlanmaktadır<sup>254</sup>, bu atılımla beraber iç politikada yaşanan devinimlerin dışında uluslararası anlamda da hızlı bir entegrasyon ve sanayi hamlesini görülmektedir. Japonya 1894-1895'de Sino-Japon savaşını kazandı. 1904-1905'te ise Rus-Japon savaşının galibi oldu. Bu anlamda artan cesaret ve güçleri onları Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na katılmış olsalar da daha pasif bir rol üstlenmeye teşvik etmekle beraber Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonucu ve savaş sonrası gelişmeler Japonya'yı İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda özellikle kendi bölgesinde oldukça saldırgan bir ülke olmaya yönlendirdi. Savaş sonrası ağır kayıplar veren ve militarizm anlamında kendi tarihi içinde bir devrim yaşayan Japonya, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Yoshida Doktrini'ni kabul ederek bambaşka bir güvenlik anlayışının parçası oldu. Bu doktrin esasen dış politikada ABD'nin güvenlik ve uluslararası politika konularındaki duruşunu benimserken özellikle güvenlikle ilgili harcamaların külfetini ABD'nin sorumluluğuna vermeyi, buradan doğacak tasarruflarla Japonya'nın iyi eğitilmiş kalifiye nüfusunun da desteklediği ekonomik üretim konusundaki kaynaklarına odaklanmasından

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<sup>254</sup> Herschell Webb, *An Introduction to Japan*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 18-22

oluşuyordu<sup>255</sup>. Politika, zaman içinde olağanüstü ekonomik büyümeye yol açtı ve on yıllar boyunca Japonya'nın ekonomisine ve dış politikasına yön vermeye devam etti. Bugün bile Japon dış politikası Yoshida Doktrinin izlerini taşımaktadır. Kısaca Meiji döneminin ardından, savaş sonrası içinde bulunduğu durumun etkisiyle Japonya, dış politika konularını göz ardı etti, ekonomik kalkınma, ekonomik büyümeye ve teknolojik devinimlere önem verdi. Günün sonunda, Japonya soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde yeni bir karakter ve güç kazandı.

1947'de Japonya "Barış Anayasası" olarak adlandırılan bir savaş sonrası anayasası benimsemiştir. Söz konusu anayasanın 9.maddesi bu çalışmanın konusu açısından özel önem arz etmektedir.

Madde9- Nizam ve adalete müstenit milletlerarası bir sulhu gönülden dileyen Japon milleti, halkın hükümrancılık hakkı olarak harpten ve milletlerarası anlaşmazlıkları hal içinde tehdit ve kuvvet kullanmaktan daimi şekilde feragat ederler<sup>256</sup>.

Tüm bu zaman zarfında Japonya daima Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni müttefiki olarak görmeye devam etti. Bu sıkıca bağlı ikili ilişkiler Amerika nezdinde de oldukça önemliydi. Japonya dönemin kapalı coğrafyasında Amerika'nın bölgeye açılan kapısı olmuştu. Japonya özellikle komşuları ve soğuk savaş koşulları düşünüldüğünde jeopolitik konumu itibariyle Amerika için oldukça önemliydi. Bu durum iki ülkenin tesis ettiği müttefiklik ilişkisini de yeri dolduramaz kılıyordu. Bu durum Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin, 1970'lerde Japonya'yı rakip olarak görmesi sebebiyle değişmeye başladı, çünkü Japonya her geçen gün artan ekonomik gücü ve teknolojik kapasitesi açısından tahmin edilemez bir yükseliş tecrübe etmekteydi. Dünya'nın güvenlik kaygıları ve güvenlik araçları da artık yavaş yavaş değişmeye başlıyordu. Silahlanma bu denklemde artık tek güvenlik sağlayıcı olmaktan çıkmış ekonomi de artık bir güvenlik aktörü olacağının sinyallerini yine 1970lerde vermeye başlamıştı, 1980'li yılların sonuna gelindiğinde Japonya'nın ekonomik gelişmesi o denli göz kamaştırıcı hale

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<sup>255</sup> "Yoshida Doctrine." Taketori Monogatari | Japan Module, son güncelleme 13 Ekim 2013 <http://www.japanpitt.pitt.edu/glossary/yoshida-doctrine>.

<sup>256</sup> Akif Erinay, "Yeni Japon Anayasası (1)." *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, C 7 (1950): 1-2.

gelmiştir ki, "Japan As Number One" sloganı altında, Japonya'nın dünyanın en büyük ekonomik gücü olması planları yapılmaya başlanmıştır<sup>257</sup>. Ancak, 1990'lerin başında Doğu Asya'da yaşanan gelişmeler Japonya için durumu değiştirdi özellikle ekonomik anlamda durgunluk ve ardından gelen kriz sonrası ABD Japonya'nın rekabet gücü hakkındaki görüşlerini değiştirdi. Japonya artık ABD için eskisi kadar ciddi bir tehdit unsuru olmaktan çıkmıştı. Buna ek olarak, Japonya değişen küresel dengeler içinde yeni bir yola doğru ilerliyordu. Çünkü yeni küresel politika da kendine yeni bir rol bulacağına benziyordu. Japonya sadece soğuk savaş sonrası değil barış anayasasından sonra da anti militarist politikalarına rağmen onu kayda değer bir aktör haline getirecek başka araçların arayışındaydı, dönemin konjonktürü Japonya'ya o aradığı fırsatı sağlayacak dinamiklere sahipti. Japonya'nın bu yeni yolundaki aracı, diğer ülkelerle ikili ve çok taraflı ilişkiler kurmaya başlamaktı çünkü Japonya soğuk savaş koşullarına rağmen askeri pasifizm konusundaki ideolojisini sürdürüyor ve dış politikaya nazaran ekonomiye öncelik veriyordu. Japon liderler, Çin'in artan etkisinin, Doğu Asya'nın küresel ilişkilerinde giderek artan öneminin ve ABD'nin görece etkisinin yavaş ama etkili bir şekilde azalmasını, Japonya'nın bölgeye yaklaşımını yeniden gözden geçirmesinin zamanı geldiğini düşünüyorlardı. İleriye dönük olarak, Japonya, belirli konuları ele alma yetkisi olan çok taraflı iletişim ağını ve ilişkilerini gözden geçirmeliydi. Ayrıca, aynı zamanda Japonya, kendi kurumlarının süreç içinde uluslararası sistem normlarının mevcut ilkeleriyle uyumlu bir şekilde evrimleşmesini sağlamalıydı.

Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından Japonya, Doğu Asya'da finansal krizler, nükleer silahların yayılması, insan hakları ihlalleri, terörizm, ekolojik tehditler ve enerji güvenliğine karşı tehlikeler ile mücadeleye yardımcı olmak için önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.

Japonya'nın komşularıyla ilişkilerinde dönüm noktası niteliğinde bir değişimi yaşadığı söylenebilir. Eski Japon başbakanı Takeo Fukuda, 1977'deki değişimi

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<sup>257</sup> Murat Yavuz Ateş "Mucizeden Duraklamaya Japon Ekonomisi: Sonuçlar, Sebepler." Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. erişim 20 Eylül 2018. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mucizeden-duraklamaya-japon-ekonomisi\\_-sonuclar\\_-sebepler.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mucizeden-duraklamaya-japon-ekonomisi_-sonuclar_-sebepler.tr.mfa).

daha sonra “Fukuda Doktrini” olarak bilinen bir konuşma yaptığında başlatmış oldu. Konuşma, başbakanın Güneydoğu Asya Uluslar Birliği (ASEAN) turu sırasında gerçekleşti ve bu geziden sonra Japonya Doğu Asya politikasının çekirdeğini oluşturan üç temel ilkeye sahip oldu. (1) Japonya asla bir askeri güç olmayacak ve Güneydoğu Asya’da barışı ve refahı teşvik etmek için çalışacaktır; (2) Japonya, karşılıklı güvene dayalı olarak bölgedeki hükümetlerle ilişkiler kuracaktır; ve (3) Japonya, bölgesel dayanışmayı güçlendirmek için eşit ortaklık yoluyla ASEAN ile işbirliği içinde çalışacaktır. Bu tarihi konuşma, Japonya’nın Doğu Asya’ya yönelik pro-aktif ve düşük anahtar yaklaşımının (*low key approach*) ilk açık ifadesiydi<sup>258</sup>.

Japonya coğrafi olarak Doğu Asya bölgesinde Çin, Tayvan, Kuzey Kore, Güney Kore ve Rusya’nın belli bir parçasıyla beraber yer almaktadır ve bu bölgeyle arasındaki bağlar sadece coğrafi bir yakınlıkla özdeşleştirilemez. Japonya bölgede bulunan diğer ülkelerin de tarihi ve kültürel mirasının çoğunu paylaşmaktadır<sup>259</sup>. Fakat bu ortak payda özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın saldırgan Japonya’sından miras kalan kötü imajından mütevellit bölgeyle olan ilişkilerini ve aidiyetini ciddi biçimde zedelemiştir<sup>260</sup>. Bu durumun ardından ülke bölgede yeni ve barışçıl bir imaj inşa etmek adına özellikle Doğu Asya’da bazı yumuşak güç araçlarını kullanmaya çalışmaktadır<sup>261</sup>. Japonya’nın bu çabası kimilerince geç kalınmış bir çaba olmakla beraber özellikle soğuk savaşın ardından görülebilir düzeyde olmuştur<sup>262</sup>.

Bunun yanı sıra kendine has iç dinamikleri ve tarihinden gelen çok paydalı yapısı ile Doğu Asya’daki bölgesel hareketler de hem akademik hem politika uygulayıcı

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<sup>258</sup> Ali Ercan Su “Eleştirel Teori Çerçevesinde Hegemonya ve Alt- Hegemonya: Almanya ve Japonya Örneği” (Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2006), 280

<sup>259</sup> John H Miller, *Modern East Asia an Introductory History*. (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), xxi-xxiv

<sup>260</sup> David Leheny, "A narrow place to cross swords: Soft power and the politics of Japanese popular culture in East Asia." *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism* (2006): 211-233

<sup>261</sup> Joseph S. Nye, "Soft power." *Foreign policy* 80 (1990): 153-171.

<sup>262</sup> Sueo Sudo. *Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Relations*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 26

çevrelerde ayrı bir öneme sahiptir. Kendisinin bir parçası olduğu Doğu Asya'daki bölgeselleşme ve bölgesel ekonomik işbirliği gelişmeleri Japonya'nın son dönem dış politikasının en önemli unsurlarından birini teşkil etmektedir

Her ne kadar Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile geliştirdiği ilişkiler ve bu ilişkilerin sonucunda ki dış politika manevraları sebebiyle Japonya birçokları tarafından "Asya'da bir Batılı" olarak tanımlansa da, Japonya gerek jeopolitik konumu gereği gerek bölgeyle arasındaki organik bağları hasebiyle Doğu Asya bölgesinden çok uzak kalması ya da bölgeye karşı kayıtsız kalması mümkün olan bir aktör değildir.

Bu çalışmada öncelikle Japon güvenlik eğilimleri ve anlayışları hakkında giriş bilgilerinden, ikinci olarak Japonya'nın askeri arka planından, üçüncü olarak çalışmanın ana teorileri olan pasifizm ve pro-aktif politikalar tartışılacaktır. Öncelikle Japonya'da pasifizm tam olarak Batı'da ki anlamına karşılık gelmemektedir daha ziyade barışçılığın temsil etmektedir. Ayrıca Japonya'yı tam olarak pasifist bir devlet olarak tanımlamak doğru değildir çünkü kendi öz savunma gücünü muhafaza etmektedir. Bu çerçevede pasifist güvenlik teorileri yapısalcılık ve realist teori üzerinden tanımlanır ve tartışılırken; pro-aktif güvenlik teorileri süreklilik ve çoğalanlık çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. Japon güvenlik algısının değişimini algılayabilmek için birincil kaynak olarak Japon Ulusal Güvenlik Program Rehberleri seçilmiştir. Bu rehberler Japonya Savunma Bakanlığı tarafından belli yıllarda Japonya'nın güvenlik sorun ve önceliklerini belirlemek üzere yayımlanmıştır. Ulusal Güvenlik Program Rehberleri 1976 (1977 Mali Yılı), 1995 (1996 Mali Yılı), 2004 (2005 Mali Yılı), 2010 (2011 Mali Yılı), 2013 (2014 Mali Yılı) ve 2018 (2019 Mali Yılı)'nda olmak üzere beş kere yayınlanmışlardır.

Yapısalcı teoriye göre ülkeler güvenlik gibi önemli dış politikalarını belirleme konusunda dahil kamuoyundan ve toplumsal norm ve kimliklerden etkilenmektedir. Japonya İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası yaşadığı travmanın ardından askerileşmeden oldukça uzak yeni bir güvenlik algısı inşa etmiştir. Fakat realist teoristler Japonya'nın yeni güvenlik yaklaşımının ardında aslında bir güç dengesi görmektedirler. Onlara göre şayet bir ülke kendi güvenliğini tek başına sağlamakta

zorlanıyorsa bölgedeki güç çatışmasını kendi faydasına kullanarak güçlü bir müttefik bularak daha pasif bir rol oynayabilir. Bu açıklama ilerleyen satırlarda tanımlanacak Yoshido Doktrinini de örnek olarak görmüştür.

Bu araştırmanın ana hedefi, Japonya'nın Asya Pasifik bölgesindeki güvenlik rolünün değişimini anlamaktır. Bu araştırmanın temel sorusunun yanı sıra bir takım alt soruları da bulunmaktadır bunların en temel ve belirleyici olanları "Japonya'nın güvenlik algısı yıllar içinde mi dönüşüme uğramıştır yoksa bu Başbakan Şinzo Abe'yle birlikte başlayan bir dönüşüm müdür?" Bu sorunun da literatürde iki farklı cevabı vardır. "Süreklilik" şeklinde ifade edilen kavrama göre Japonya uzun yıllardır bu pro-aktif dönüşüme hazırlanmaktaydı. Güncel gelişmeler ışığında kendi faydasına olabilecek adımları atmaya soğuk savaşın ertesinde başlamıştı. "Çoğalanlık" kavramına göreyse bu dönüşüm Şinzo Abe'nin kişiliği ve politik duruşuyla doğrudan ilgilidir. Bu teorileri daha iyi anlamak için başta kısaca değilinen Japonya'nın askeri planını bilmek oldukça önemlidir.

Bugün, Doğu Asya ülkelerinin geçmişin gölgesinden sıyrılıp kendi bireysel karakterlerini geliştirdikleri iddia edilebilir. Buna ek olarak, bölgede üç büyük güç merkezi bulunmaktadır. Bu merkezler Japonya, Çin ve Güney Kore'dir<sup>263</sup>. Günümüzde Çin, özellikle sosyal bilimciler ve politikacılar için ciddi bir cazibe ve merak merkezi konumunda bulunmaktadır. Çin'in atacağı her adım ilişkilerini inşa etme ve sürdürme şekli dünya kamuoyu tarafından dikkatle takip edilmektedir. Çin'in Japonya'ya göre en önemli artısının nüfusu olduğu gerçeği herkesin aklına ilk gelen olmakla beraber, Çin özellikle ekonomik ve teknolojik güç açısından Japonya ile aynı çizgiye bugün bile ulaşmamaktadır. Japonya 2018 Eylül'üne kadar Çin'e hala resmi olarak yardım veren bir ülke pozisyonunda bulunmaktaydı<sup>264</sup>. Güney Kore, dünyadaki imajı hakkında daha iyi bir konuma sahiptir ve aynı zamanda ekonomik bir güce sahip olduğu da aşikardır, ancak güvenlik konusunda ise onun öncelikli ve en temel sorunu Kuzey Kore'dir, tam da

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<sup>263</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the US-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia." *International Security* 23.4 (1999): 49-80.

<sup>264</sup> Ebuchi, Tomohiro, and Tsukasa Hadano. "Japan to End China Aid, and Proposes Joint Assistance for Others." *Nikkei Asian Review*. October 23, 2018, erişim 31, 2018. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Japan-to-end-China-aid-and-proposes-joint-assistance-for-others>.

bu güvenlik endişesi sebebiyle Güney Kore sahip olduğu tüm araçlara rağmen tam olarak bölgeye odaklanmamaktadır.

Buna ilave olarak, bahsedilen bölge olan Doğu Asya dünyada en hızlı büyüyen bölgelerden biri konumundadır. Doğu Asya'nın hızla dünyadaki güç eksenlerinden birine dönüştüğünü iddia etmek yanlış olmayacaktır. Öncelikle Japonya'nın neden bölgede önemli bir güç merkezi olduğunu anlamak gerekmektedir. Japonya'nın bölgedeki etkisi ekonomik konumu, pazar hâkimiyeti, teknolojik altyapısı, yerleşmiş siyasal kültürü, homojen nüfus yapısı (bölgedeki diğer ülkelerle kıyaslandığında) ve uluslararası imajından kaynaklanmaktadır. Ordusu olmayan, askerleşmeyi anayasası nezdinde yasaklamış bir ülkede güçten nasıl söz edilir sorusunu soracak olursak kabul etmeliyiz ki soğuk savaştan sonra diğer bir çok konsept gibi güç konseptinin de anlamı ve kapsamı değişmiştir. Bahsettiğimiz güç kavramı olduğunda, dünyadaki yumuşak gücü uygulama konusundaki en başarılı örneklerden birinin Japonya olduğu aşikardır<sup>265</sup>. Özellikle bölgede ya da Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) gibi bölgesel ya da uluslararası örgütler vasıtasıyla, Japonya uluslararası yardımları ve yabancı yatırımları kullanmaktadır; Buna ek olarak Japon kültürünü de yumuşak bir güç aracı olarak kullanmakta ve genellikle uluslararası alanda teknolojisi, kültürü, insan hakları politikaları ve yardımları aracılığıyla adından sık sık başarıyla söz ettirmektedir<sup>266</sup>.

Tezin içerisinde her bir Ulusal Güvenlik Program Rehberi özel olarak ele alınmış ve bu rehberlerin arasında gerçekleşen ve Japonya'nın ulusal güvenlik politikalarını etkileyen her bir gelişme tek tek ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda 1976-1995 arasında gerçekleşen Soğuk Savaşın bitişi, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer faaliyetleri, Körfez Savaşı (1990-1991), Japonya'nın Kamboçya'da Birleşmiş Milletler barışı koruma operasyonlarına katılması (1992) ve Amerika'yla Japonya arasında 1992 yılında imzalanan Tokyo Deklarasyonu ele alınmıştır. 1995- 2004 yılları arasında Japon güvenlik algısını belirleyen olaylar: Tayvan Boğaz Krizi ve Çin'in yükselişi, 1978 yılında imzalanan Japonya Amerika Savunma İşbirliği

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<sup>265</sup> Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, "Contesting soft power: Japanese popular culture in East and Southeast Asia." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8.1 (2008): 73-101.

<sup>266</sup> Shafiqul Islam. "Yen for development: Japanese foreign aid and the politics of burden-sharing." (1991).

Rehber'inin 1997 yılındaki revizesi ve bunun sonucunda daha yakın Japon-Amerikan ilişkileri, Kuzey Kore'nin Japonya için gittikçe daha çok tehdit haline gelmesi, Irak Savaşı ve Japonya'nın Irak savaşında Amerika'yı asiste etmesi, Çin-Rusya ilişkilerinin güçlenmesi ve Çin- Japonya ilişkilerinde gerileme ele alınmıştır. 2004 rehberinin detaylı tahlilinin ardından 2004-2010 yılları arasındaki temel gelişmeler; Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer anlamda engellenemez çalışmaları, Çin'de Japonya'da okutulan tarih kitaplarından birinde İkinci Dünya Savaşı hakkında yazılanlar nedeniyle başlayan sokak protestoları ve Japonya'nın yeni düzende kendine Amerika dışında Hindistan veya Avustralya gibi yeni partnerler bulmasıdır. 2010 rehberinin ardından 2013 yılına kadarsa Japon kamuoyunun Japonya'da görev yapan Amerikan askerleriyle yaşanan ihtilafı durum, Japonya'nın Güney Kore'yle ilişkilerini güçlendirmesi ve Kuzey Kore tehdidi devam etmektedir. 2013-2018 yılları arasındaysa; Şinzo Abe'nin sağlamlaşan liderlik pozisyonu ve bunun sonucu olarak 2013'te tanıtılan yeni Milli Güvenlik Stratejileri en önemli başlıktır. Bu durum öz güvenlik güçlerine atfedilen rolün artmasıyla devam etmiştir. 2015'te Japonya savaş sonrası tarihinin en yüksek savunma bütçesini ayırmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra Japonya uluslararası platformlarda da uluslararası güvenlik meseleleri hakkında düşüncelerini daha yüksek sesle dile getirmeye başlamıştır. 2011'de meydana gelen Fukushima Daiichi nükleer santral kazasının ardından Japonya afet yardımları konusunda uluslararası anlamda daha aktif rol üstlenme misyonu da edinmiştir.

Ulusal Güvenlik Rehberleri arasında bazı benzerlik ve farklılıklar olduğu söylenebilir. Bu benzerlik ve farklılıklar Japonya'nın güvenlik politikasının proaktif politikalara evrilmesinin süreç içerisinde yavaş yavaş gerçekleştiğini, Şinzo Abe'nin yönetimine mahsus olmadığını göstermesi bakımından oldukça önemlidir.

Benzerlikleri üç başlıkta incelemek mümkündür. Birincisi tüm rehberlerde Japon anayasasının 9. maddesine atıf yapılmaktadır. 9.maddenin anlamı süreç içinde değişmiş olsa da bu maddeye verilen önem ve bağlılıkla ilgili söylemler süreç içerisinde korunmuştur. Bu durum uluslararası arenada ne olursa olsun Japonya'nın yöneticilerinin de Japon kamuoyunun da henüz 9.maddeden

vazgeçmek gibi keskin bir adım atmaya yani klasik tanımıyla ‘normal’ bir devlet olmaya hazır olmadığının göstergesi olarak yorumlanabilir.

İkinci benzerlik ise Amerika ve Japonya arasındaki güvenlik işbirliği ve müttefiklik durumuna verilen önemin değişmemesidir. Her iki ülkede de hükümetler değişse de Japonya adeta Amerika Birleşik Devletlerini organik bir müttefik olarak görmekten hiç vazgeçmemiştir. Zaman zaman bu müttefiklik ilişkisi her iki ülkeye zarar vermiş olsa da ülkeler bu ilişkiyi sürdürmeye bugünde devam etmektedirler.

Rehberler arasındaki üçüncü ve son ortak noktaysa Japonya’nın Birleşmiş Milletlere olan inancının her seferinde vurgulanmasıdır. Japonya konumu gereği Birleşmiş Milletleri her daim uluslararası barışın garantörü olarak görmektedir. Bu sebepten ötürü Birleşmiş Milletlere başta maddi olmak üzere destek vermekten hiçbir şartta çekinmemiştir. Bu vesileyle Japonya’nın kendi yumuşak gücünü ve barışçıl imajını da ihraç ettiği düşünülebilir.

Farklılıklara sıra geldiğinde ise onları da üç temel başlık altında toplamak mümkündür. Bu başlıklardan ilki “tehditler”dir. Örneğin, 1976’da nükleer tehdit en önemli tehditken, 1995 yılında Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasının ardından meydana gelen sınır belirsizleri tehdit haline gelmiştir. 2004 yılında 11 Eylül saldırılarının etkisiyle uluslararası terörizm tehdit unsuru olarak tanınmış, 2013’te doğal felaketlerinde tehdit olabileceğine yer verilmiş 2018’de ise uzun yıllar boyunca süregelen Kuzey Kore’nin nükleer çalışmaları tehdit olarak nitelenmiştir.

İkinci temel farklılık yıllar içerisinde inşa edilen ittifak ilişkileridir. 1976 ve 1995 yıllarındaki rehberlerde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tek müttefik olarak tanımlanırken 2005’te ASEAN, 2010’da Güney Kore, Avustralya, Avrupa Birliği, Hindistan, Çin ve Rusya listeye girmiştir. 2013 yılında AGİT, Büyük Britanya ve Fransa, 2018 yılında ise Kanada ve Yeni Zelanda yeni müttefikler olmuşlardır.

Üçüncü farklılık ise Öz Savunma Gücü’nün değişen rolüdür. 1976’da temel minimum savunma anlayışı 1995’te egemen bir ülkede temel savunma

mekanizmasının sağlanması olarak değişmiştir. Bu durum 2004 yılında uluslararası barışın sağlanmasına katkı, 2010 yılında farklı senaryolara hazır olmak, 2013 yılında ihtiyaçlara karşılık verebilmek ve son olarak 2018 yılında uluslararası barışın sağlanmasına pro-aktif katkı anlayışına dönüşmüştür.

Japonya'nın bölgedeki ülkelerle sağlam bağlara dayanan ve gerçekçi ilişkiler kurmak için elindeki tüm aygıtlarla çabaladığı söylenebilir.

Dış politikada çok katmanlı bir yaklaşımın benimsenmeye başlanması, Japonya'nın dış politika seçeneklerini de genişletmesine yardımcı olurken, diğer yandan farklı çevrelerden gelen seçenekler, ülkenin dış politika yapısını hem olumlu hem de olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir. Artılardan biri, Japon dış politika yapıcılarının, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Asya'daki diğer ülkelere (Çin ve Güney Kore'de de dahil olmak üzere) yönelik dış politika ve güvenlik politikalarında manevra yapmak için daha fazla alan sunuyor olmasıdır. Bu anlamda, Japonya'nın ekonomik dış politikasıyla ilgili olarak Ellis Krauss'un tabirinde önerdiği gibi, Japonya'nın "normalleşmesine" yardımcı olabilir. Aynı şekilde, büyüyen seçenekler, Japonya'nın dış politika davranışında aktif liderlik rollerini oynaması için daha fazla fırsat ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bir diğer tarafta ise, Japonya'nın da içinde yer aldığı dış politika çevreleri ne kadar çeşitli olursa, Japonya'nın müzakere ve diplomatik manevra becerilerini geliştirme zorunluluğu doğmaktadır. Çok taraflı ortamlarda diplomatik pazarlık, kontrol edilmesi daha zor hale gelme eğilimindedir ve üye devletlerin farklı bileşimleri, bu tür pazarlık becerilerinin ayarlanması gereken farklı ortam ve koşullara sahiptir. Yani iyi ilişkilere sahip katmanlara mensup ülkeler arasında yaşanacak bir çıkar çatışması Japonya'ya taraf seçme zorunluluğu doğurabilir ya da sahip olduğu katmanlardan birinden atılmasıyla sonuçlanabilir. Tabii bu kötü bir senaryodur ama bu tarz katmanlı ilişkilere sahip ülkelerin aldığı temel risklerden biridir.

Japonya elindeki aygıtlar göz önüne alındığında diğer ülkelerden başka bir pozisyonda yer almaktadır. Elindeki ordu dışı aygıtlarla ve bölge ülkeleriyle bölgeye has dinamikler çerçevesinde güvenlik ilişkileri kurmaya çabalamaktadır. Yıllardır güvenlikle ilgili kararları ABD'ye bıraktığı düşünülse de aslında ordu dışı

aygıtlarla kendini her duruma karşı güvenlikle ilgili en kötü senaryoda uluslararası kamuoyu oluşturma gücüyle korumaktadır. Bu kapsamda Japonya'nın bölgesinde bir güvenlik aktörü olduğu, güvenlik sorunlarında Batı'nın dikkatini çekebildiği ve dünyanın en önemli ekonomik güçlerinden biri olmasıyla da bu durumu desteklediği düşünülebilir.

Tüm bu analizlerin ardından Japon kamuoyunun bugünde pasifist çizgide olduğu söylenebilir. Bu durum yapısalcı teoriyi destekler niteliktedir. Fakat bu durum Japonya'yı yeni alternatifler aramaktan alı koymamaktadır. Bunun en somut örneği geliştirdiği yeni güvenlik ittifaklarıdır. Bugün hala Japonya'nın önümüzdeki süreçte 'normal' bir devlete dönüşüp dönüşmeyeceği belirsizliğini korumaktadır. Fakat şu aşıkardır ki Japonya dönüşen Dünya'nın gerekliliklerine göre mekanizmalar üretmekte ve politikalar belirlemektedir.

## APPENDIX B: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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### YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ŞAHİN  
Adı / Name : Vuslat Nur  
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler

**TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English):** JAPAN SECURITY POLICY TRANSFORMATION: FROM PACIFISM TO PROACTIVE POLICIES BETWEEN 1976- 2018

**TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE:** Yüksek Lisans / Master  Doktora / PhD

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. \*
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