

CIRCILING MINERVA: QUEST FOR NATION

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
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ABSTRACT

CIRCILING MINEVRA: QUEST FOR NATION

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This thesis tries to answer the question of how and why the concept of nation has become so powerful in politics and everyday life. The theoretical and conceptual problematization conducted to this end focuses on two important strands in the literature on nation and nationalism: Durkheimian ethno-symbolism and Weberian historical sociology. For, they are these two theoretical strands that help define two main arguably constitutive aspects of the concept of nation, namely culture and state respectively. Concluding that these two perspectives fail to give persuasive accounts of “nation” by naturalizing it as well as exaggerating its power, the thesis will argue that these theories’ common attempt to find an anchor for nation to explain its power fails. Yet the thesis also proposes that lack of an anchor is what makes the concept of nation powerful. Hence, nation can reconstruct itself as an empty signifier to be persistently redefined within changing historical conditions and through different ideologies, including nationalism.

Keywords: Nation, Nationalism, Culture, State, Capitalism

ÖZ

HARELENEN MINEVRA: MİLLET DAİR BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Can, Sedat

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tezin temel amacı millet kavramının günlük hayatı ve siyasette neden ve nasıl bu kadar güçlü bir kavram olduğu sorusuna cevap bulmaktır. Bu maksatla yürütülen teorik ve kavramsal sorunlaşturma, millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründe iki önemli akım olan Durkheimci etno-sembolizm ve Weberci tarihsel sosyolojiye odaklanır. Çünkü bu iki teorik akım millet kavramını tanımlamak için yaygın olarak kullanılan kültüre ve devlete odaklanan yaklaşımlardır. Bu iki yaklaşımın millet olgusunu doğallaştırarak ve gücünü abartarak yetersiz bir millet tanımı sunduğunu öneren tez, milleti tanımlamak için sundukları sabitelerin ise geçersiz olduğunu savunur. Ancak, tez bir sabitenin olmayışının aslında millet kavramını güçlü kılan şey olduğunu önerir. Böylece millet mefhumu kendini boş bir gösteren olarak değişen tarihsel koşullara göre yeniden tanımlanabilmekte, milliyetçiliğinde dâhil olduğu ideolojilerle göre yeniden kurgulayarak genel-geçer bir kavram olarak kendini var etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Millet, Milliyetçilik, Kültür, Devlet, Kapitalizim

To the METU forest which, like me, lost
many brothers and friends to early death

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The story of the Tower of Babel depicts a conflict between God and people. People who speak the same language build a tower to challenge the power of God, but God punishes them for their arrogance and pride. He confounds their language so that they cannot understand each other and scatters them all over the world. People are now unable to communicate with each other. They begin to fight and can no longer work in unity. The Tower of Babel takes its name from this event, with “babel” meaning confusion, particularly the confusion of people who emphasize their dissimilarities despite a wide range of similarities.

This archaic story is also the story of modern human beings. People are caged into different nations, and act and think in accordance with these artificial borders. “Nation”, whether as a noun or an adjective, pervades our daily vocabulary. From holidays and cuisine to clothing, everything is fetishized with national stereotypes. Dying, killing, or sacrificing one’s life, even one’s children, is done for national salvation, with personal identification being used for collective mobilization for the sake of the nation. War and conflict are the inevitable outcome of this political discourse. But why is this the case? Why and how did the concept of the nation become so powerful that it penetrates every aspect of modern life? In other words, why and how did humanity begin to perceive itself as divided into separate nations and/or to regard each other as members of other nations?

This thesis will problematize the dominant approaches to nation and nationalism to find an answer to these questions, or more properly to understand how and why the

concept of nation has become so powerful in politics and in our daily life. To this end, it will revisit the basic arguments of two significant perspectives that take the question of nation seriously, namely ethno-symbolism and historical sociology, to highlight why the concept itself is highly ambiguous and elastic, and its power can only be made sense within the context of its persistent reproduction through various political projects and practices, including the nationalist ones. The lack of a defining anchor helps the conception of nation to function as empty signifier for imagination, enabling its persistent reconstruction in different historical contexts again and again. This argument is indeed not original as it has been the main point of those critical perspectives that underline why nation cannot be problematized by itself without nationalism. Still, an updated critical evaluation of ethno-symbolism and historical sociology on nation regarded important for manifesting the emptiness of a phenomenon does not eliminate its power. Nation is still practiced as a reality by the nationalists as well as the masses, and its power as such needs to be rethought in search for alternative strategies to combat it.

One way to problematize the power of nation would be to clarify the historical spread of the concept of nation in our vocabulary. In this regard, Liah Greenfeld's book, *Five Roads to Modernity* provides a detailed analysis of the semiotic and lexical changes in the historical development of the concept. This book also proves that the concept of nation entered into political discourse very recently while its deployment has been rather gradual. In England, it becomes a significant component of political life starting from the 17th century.¹ In France, the political discourse starts to become nationalized from the 18th century onwards departing from the English path and followed by Russia and Germany.²

Indeed, the historical development of the “power” of the nation has been already identified in the current modernist literature that underlines the constitutive role of nation in the making of the modern world. Benedict Anderson's monumental work

¹ Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: First Harvard University Press, 1992), 31 -87.

² Greenfield, *Nationalism*, 160-165.

starts with the question of why nation has become so central even among Marxist movements.³ Sinisa Maleševic proposes that the idea of nation is the most operative ideology of modernity.⁴ Andreas Zimmer tries to understand why nationalism as a legitimizing political movement has started to proliferate across the world.⁵ Therefore, it is right to ask why the concept of nation is so powerful, or why scholars think it is so.

In the Bible, the obsession with nation was the result of God's will, but for a scientific explanation, we need to search for a more elaborate answer. Anyone who has a more or less scholarly interest in the issue of nation and nationalism is faced with the division between primordialism and modernism. On the one hand, it is claimed that nations and nationalisms are natural phenomena with quasi-unchangeable aspects that could be traced in the flow of history. On the other hand, they are viewed as totally modern phenomena that can not be reduced to a fixed element. This distinction has another dimension; the primordialist approach is divided into two as perennialism, which prioritizes nations having had long histories dating back to ancient times, and primordialism, which again emphasizes "the passion and self-sacrifice characteristic of nations and nationalism by deriving them from 'primordial' attributes of basic social and cultural phenomena like language, religion, territory, and especially kinship", as Smith claims.⁶ In this division, while perennialism proposes that the nation has a long past, whether continuous or recurrent, primordialism perceives the

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 2.

⁴ Sinisa Maleševic, *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 89-108.

⁵ Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War Nationalism: State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.

⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 223, 224.

nation as a stable entity with respect to objective characteristics attaching the individual to the nation.⁷

Having said this, it is almost impossible to find any scholar to be categorized as a primordialist or perennialist simply, as Coakley says.⁸ For example, it is argued that Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz are on the side of primordialism in regarding national attachments as given or a priori, and primordial sentiment as ineffable. This claim is shown to be false on the grounds that Geertz and Shils actually define attachment not as given or ineffable bonds, but as being perceived by members as stable and fixed.⁹ Furthermore, Pierre L. van den Berghe, another scholar often described as a primordialist, rejects the distinction between primordialists and subjectivists, saying that this is a crude categorization.¹⁰ A similar argument could be promoted for the so-called perennialists such as John Armstrong, Donald Horowitz, and Walker Connor. Although they advocate some pre-modern elements in the formation of nation, they do not perceive nation as a trans-historical category or date it back to ancient times.¹¹ Thus, it is appropriate to say that primordialism or perennialism is “a long-dead horse that writers on ethnicity and nationalism continue to flog”, as Brubaker suggests.¹² Most scholars actually agree on the historicity of nation and nationalism and deny taking national attachment as a natural or a given. Therefore, it should be said that the theoretical debate on the duality of modernism and primordialism/perennialism is a fruitless and unnecessary academic enterprise. According to Coakley, this “duality of the objective modernity of nations to the

⁷ John Coakley, “Primordialism” in nationalism studies: theory or ideology?,” *Nations and Nationalism* 24, no. 2 (2018): 334, 335.

⁸ Coakley, “Primordialism,” 335.

⁹ Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 2010, 56, 57.

¹⁰ Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective,”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978): 401.

¹¹ Coakley, “Primordialism,” 335.

¹² Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1996), 15 n. 4.

historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists" could be easily overcome by the analysis of primordialism as a component of nationalist discourse rather than a theory attempting to explain nation and nationalism.

However, despite the academic poverty of perennialism and primordialism, the myth of the eternal and natural nation is widely consumed and produced in everyday life, as mentioned above. Two general references that are highly deployed to explain the eternal and natural character of nation in the minds of nationalist agitators have been the state and culture. It is argued that the modern state enhances and empowers the nation and makes nationalist feeling alive. For cultural understanding, cultural constructions such as ethnic ties, linguistic stereo types or other social elements make national feeling prevalent and persistent in modern life. The thesis' focus on Durkheimian ethno-symbolism and Weberian historical sociology will enable a thorough problematization of these two references as the former explains nation in relation to culture and the latter to state.

As the thesis will maintain, the rise of the modern state has been integral to the development of nations and nationalism for historical sociology while for ethno-symbolism, ethnic bonds cause national feeling to be alive and powerful throughout history. Additionally, while the ethno-symbolist account regards the nation as a continuation of *ethnie*, hence the formation of nation as cultural revival, according to historical sociology it is the state that provides the social space for national political demands. It is however also true that ethno-symbolism cannot explain nations without an ethnic core, such as the American nation, while the Weberian historical sociology cannot answer why some national movements mobilize against the state or why they have no desire to create their own state. The thesis will hence ultimately argue that both accounts fail to understand these as they neglect the power of nation. It will be underlined that these accounts do not give a persuasive explanation as they problematically regard nations as given and fixed entities, an assumption which causes the reification of existing populations of states as nations, as in the case of Weberian historical sociology, or of ethnic boundaries or attachment, as ethno-symbolism does. Hence, the thesis will argue that the conceptual ambiguity of

“nation” identified in these two dominant perspectives is a good starting point to understand where the power of nation comes from as it is this ambiguity that enables the nation to be persistently reproduced through different political and social projects and practices.

This argument is elaborated in three main chapters in the thesis. The first chapter overviews how the conception of nation has been problematized in sociological and historical debates in general. Then the second and the third chapters focus on ethno-symbolism and historical sociology respectively to identify how these two approaches understand the power of the conception of nation, producing in return the knowledge of nation and nationalism.

CHAPTER 2

PROBLEMATIZING THE NATION:

SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL DEBATES

Nation has always been problematized as a sociological and historical category though making such a proposition simply means to start a comprehensive and unending discussion on the constitution of nation. This chapter will explain why this is so by highlighting firstly the difficulties in defining the nation on objective or subjective grounds, producing its objective knowledge, and problematizing it beyond the elite-mass dichotomy. The chapter will secondly focus the concept's encounters with history in terms of its constitution within as well as by history.

2.1 Sociology and Nation

2.1.1 Defining Nation

The scientific claims on the sources of nation have been made on two grounds. On the one hand, a nation has been perceived as a collectivity of people, which could be defined by objective criteria such as language, territory, or common origin. On the other hand, it has been elaborated as the perception of people who regard themselves as the members of a collectivity, as the voluntary choice of the people, i.e. a subjective criterion. In other words, while in the first category some measurable similarities are attributed to the collectivity that enable it to align its members, the second emphasizes the recognition of similarities by the members of the collectivity. A typical example of the first theoretical premise is that of Stalin. In *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin classifies four characteristic features for a collectivity to be a nation: a common

language, a common territory, a common economic life or cohesion, and a common psychological make-up.¹³ In his words, “a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.¹⁴ The classical example of the subjective definition of nation is that of the French philosopher Renan. He argues that nation should be conceptualized as the consent or desire of people to live together. Put differently, a nation is a collectivity of conscious individuals who accept subordination to the communal good and live together. For Renan, race, language, common interests, religious affinity, geography, military necessities, or other material determinants are not sufficient to explain nations, because a nation has charm or spiritual principles that captivate people. The spiritual principle comprises common glories in the past and a desire to achieve new glories in the future. Thus, the existence of the nation is based metaphorically on a daily plebiscite, which affirms members’ consent to achieving new glories.¹⁵

However, these two approaches to the conceptualization of nation do not give sufficient accounts for most scholars. A plethora of deviant cases make it impossible to register objective criteria for a nation. For example, language is proposed as such a criterion to detect national differences and to determine who is excluded from or included within national borders. For theorists of nationalism, however, despite language being an important component of nationhood and nationalist claims, it is not a determinative factor. People with the same language can categorize themselves with different nationalities, e.g., Austrian and German, and people with different languages can feel a belonging to the same national community, e.g., English and Welsh.

Furthermore, in some cases, speaking the same language is not enough to be accepted within a national community. Although Yiddish was a medieval German dialect,

¹³ Joseph Stalin, *J Stalin Works: 1907-1913, Volume 2* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1953), 03-306.

¹⁴ Stalin, *J Stalin Works*, 307.

¹⁵ Ernest -Renan, “What is a nation?,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 8-21.

Ashkenazic Jews were not regarded as Germans.¹⁶ Moreover, as proven with empirical evidence, populations of European states were not linguistically homogeneous. During the French revolution, for example, 50% of the population spoke French and only 12% of them spoke it correctly.¹⁷ In Italy in the 1860s, only 22% of the population used Italian for everyday purposes.¹⁸ For empires, the situation was even more dramatic. At the end of the 19th century, for example, significant part of the Russian population could not speak Russian.¹⁹ With respect to culture and territory, a definition of nation proves similarly impossible, as will be further problematized below. In a similar vein, prevalent in everyday discussions and enhanced with allegedly scientific studies, one trend in defining ethnicity is the genetic use of DNA. However, as established by serious academic scholars, there is no scientific support for the definition of national and ethnic collectivities by genetic analysis and there is no way for genetics to assess ethnic and national groupings.²⁰

Neither heterogeneity of territory nor fluidity of culture provides a stable ground for national collectivities. The subjective element shares a similar destiny with the objective criteria. In this strand of thinking, as argued by Walker Connor, the essence of nation only could be grasped by subjective criteria, namely psychological bonds. Thereby, a “nation” is a group of people who believe that they have common ancestry, constituting the “largest grouping that can be mobilized by appeals to common blood”.²¹ In this case, a nation implies a group of people perceived as extended family by its members. However, this conceptualization is problematized on the grounds that

¹⁶ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 22.

¹⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 60.

¹⁸ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 61.

¹⁹ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Cambridge: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1977), 87.

²⁰ Jonathan Marks, *Human Biodiversity: Genes, Race, and History*, (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1995), 65.

²¹ Walker Connor, *Ethno-nationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 202.

having a feeling of attachment to a particular nation is not enough to be regarded as member of that nation in most cases. A clear example of this is the experience of Franz Fanon. Regarding himself as a Frenchman, Fanon traveled from his home of Martinique to Paris for education, but he realized there that discrimination existed against him in spite of his devotion to France.²² Therefore, the conscious choice of Fanon was not enough for him to be a member of the French nation.

2.1.2 Objectivity of Knowledge

The controversy in the analysis of the concept of “nation” also hinges on whether nation could be regarded as an ontological category, i.e. a unit of analysis, or not. On the one hand, it is argued that the national question reflects theoretical impossibility; nation as an obscure concept could not be analyzed by itself. For instance, the prominent historian Charles Tilly says that nation “is one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon”.²³ This character of nation forced Tilly and his colleagues to abandon their attempts at analyzing state-making and the formation of nations separately. Instead, they focused on the development of the state in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. This attitude is common in historical sociology. From Anthony Giddens to Michael Mann, for these historical sociologists, “nation” as a concept involves too many other notions, from patriotism to ethnicity, and “nation” as a sociological category requires us to find stable criteria such as language and culture, upon which it is impossible to reach a final consensus. On the other hand, some scholars view “nation” as a concrete, real entity, or as an analytical tool borrowed from the social world for production of scientific knowledge. Although there are overwhelming multitudes of opinions on the definitive character of nation, most agree that “nation” is a sociological and historical entity that could be studied separately. Anthony Smith says that his ethno-symbolism perceives the nation as a

²² Horace B. Davis, *Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 209-212.

²³ Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 6.

real sociological community.²⁴ However, this perception results in tension between objectivism and constructivism or the very nature of production of knowledge of nations.

The problem here is that the idea of objective reality outside of the human mind and the claim upon objective production of its knowledge have failed to show that categorization of the social world has social power, i.e. produces social effect. Put differently, “the characteristics and criteria noted by objectivist sociologists and anthropologists, once they are perceived and evaluated as they are in practice, function as signs, emblems or stigmata, and also as powers. Since this is the case, and since there is no social subject who can in practical terms be unaware of the fact, it follows that (objectively) symbolic properties, even the most negative, can be used strategically according to the material but also the symbolic interests of their bearer”.²⁵ Thus, an objectively constructed category can serve for subjective political interest. How is it then possible to produce knowledge of a social category? Bourdieu suggests that the objective structure constructed by researchers in the objectivist movement, leaving aside the subjective elements to study a representation, should also be analyzed as a second representation.²⁶ The study of analytical tools thus helps to lessen the burden of the researcher by eliminating biases in analysis.

According to Bourdieu, this structural constructivist solution rests on an ontological position between anti-foundationalism and foundationalism. Foundationalism relies on the proposition that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, advocated by Marxism and positivism. Anti-foundationalism, however, argues that the world is socially constructed and objectivity is always problematic. Thus, constructivist structuralism, which is based on anti-foundationalist ontology, views

²⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 13.

²⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 221.

²⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1989), p. 15.

reality as a representation and analytical construction as a second representation.²⁷ The production of knowledge is therefore firstly an analysis of the representation of reality, and secondly an analysis of the analytical tool constructed before the analysis of reality.

Following this line, Rogers Brubaker offers a highly developed perspective on the notion of nation in *Nationalism Reframed*, where he problematizes the concept of nation as equated with a group and regarded as a real, substantial entity.²⁸ For him, the realist stance, including primordialist, modernist, and constructivist approaches, problematically takes the nation as a group of individuals, “capable of coherent, purposeful collective action” for autonomy or independence.²⁹ By doing so, realism reproduces and reinforces the nation.³⁰ For sophisticated analysis, the nation should be regarded not “as substance but as institutionalized form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but as contingent event.”³¹ In this context, “institutionalized form” implies relational settings that assume that properties of a nation are changing variables. “Nation” as a contingent event means its sudden emergence as a historical event, in contrast to a structural explanation.³² Furthermore, there should be a distinction between practical categories, i.e. everyday usage of concepts, and scientific categories, i.e. the scientific usage of a concept, as Bourdieu suggests.³³ While the common sense of people should be taken into consideration

²⁷ Bourdieu, “Social,” 15.

²⁸ Roger Brubaker, *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the National Question* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13.

²⁹ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 14.

³⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 16.

³¹ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 16.

³² Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 19.

³³ Rogers Brubaker, Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 4.

because they are the representation of reality, they should not be perceived as categories of social analysis.³⁴

Brubaker thus makes a clear distinction between analytical tools constructed by scientists to study the nation, i.e. a scientific category, and the social representation of reality, i.e. a group or collectivity, and offers the analysis of social representations with scientific categories. An example of this method is the study of the working class. Brubaker claims that today the working class is correctly perceived not as a real entity and object of analysis but “as a cultural and political idiom, as a mode of conflict, and as an underlying abstract dimension of economic structure”.³⁵ For Brubaker, even E.P. Thompson rejects the conceptualization of class as a real entity by saying that class is not a thing, but rather something that happens, which is fluency and relationship, although he problematically “ends up treating the working class as a real entity, a community, an historical individual” in *The Making of the English Working Class*.³⁶

Moreover, treating a group as an object of analysis is problematic in the sense that it disregards that group, making it a political project. This aspect of group-making could lead to some brutal outcomes, as in the case of *politique du pire*: “a politics of seeking the worst outcome in the short run so as to bolster their legitimacy or improve their prospects in the longer run”.³⁷ As an example, Brubaker gives the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The KLA attacked Serbian forces in early 1998, provoking Serbian counterattacks that targeted civilians. In the long run, this cycle of attacks and counterattacks led to increased groupness and support for the KLA among Kosovans.³⁸ In this context, scientific study should refrain from serving the political interests of political organizations and this can only

³⁴ Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 10.

³⁵ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 19.

³⁶ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 19.

³⁷ Brubaker, *Ethnicity*, 13.

³⁸ Brubaker, *Ethnicity*, 14.

be done by deploying scientific categories in place of practical categories.³⁹ With respect to nation, nationness or nationhood as changing variables should be taken in analysis in place of nation.⁴⁰ Furthermore, nation should be perceived as the outcome of nationalism, which is produced by political, economic, and cultural fields, as in the case of Soviet and post-Soviet nationalisms.⁴¹

In the problematization of collectivity with respect to objectivity, some constructivists choose to give up the centrality of collectivity in their analysis. For instance, Richard Jenkins regards identity as an essential concept in understanding the social world. However, the abandonment of traditional categories comes at a price: the ontological ground on which scientific knowledge is produced should be redefined within the boundaries of identity, and identity as a human attribute should be clarified accordingly. Following this premise, Jenkins argues that the distinction between objective and subjective classification becomes a problematic classification to be avoided.

For Jenkins, “identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people are, and, reciprocally, other people’s understanding of themselves and of others (which includes us)”.⁴² The creation of identity in this context results from the internal-external dialectic of identification.⁴³ The notion of the internal-external dialectic of identification implies the internalization process of interaction between self-definition and definition by others.⁴⁴ In this process, internal and external aspects act simultaneously and create identity.⁴⁵ In this sense, identity means both agreement

³⁹ Brubaker, *Ethnicity*, 15.

⁴⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 16.

⁴¹ Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 17.

⁴² Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity* (London: Routledge, 2004), 5.

⁴³ Jenkins, *Social*, 18.

⁴⁴ Jenkins, *Social*, 20.

⁴⁵ Jenkins, *Social*, 28.

and disagreement, and thus its meaning is not fixed; rather, it is prone to change. Therefore, Jenkins proposes that identity be understood as an identification or a process, rather than as a thing.⁴⁶

With respect to collectivity, Jenkins basically rejects the distinction between psychological approaches, which mostly privilege the individual as a substantial entity and position it as an ontological premise, and sociological approaches, which prioritize and analyze collectivity.⁴⁷ For him, collectivity and the individual occupy the same place in the process of identification and the notion of identity helps to understand how individual identity turns into collective identity. He explains the interaction of collective and individual identity with the concept of selfhood. Selfhood is an “individual’s reflexive sense of her or her own particular identity, constituted vis-à-vis others in terms of similarity and difference”⁴⁸ In this process, the internal-external dialectic of identification shapes selfhood through internalization of the social world; thus, selfhood manifests itself as a social entity. Furthermore, Jenkins emphasizes two indispensable components in the process of collective identity formation: similarity and difference. Similarity is an assumption of something in common, shared by members of a collectivity, while difference, which comes simultaneously with similarity, implies a boundary that separates the collectivity from the rest. While similarity defines criteria for membership of a collectivity, difference “creates a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong”⁴⁹ In this context, the collectivity represents itself as people who have some kind of similarity, or common behaviors and circumstances, as well as differences from other people, which take place at the same time as a result of internal and external dialectical processes.

At this point, Jenkins defines two kinds of collectivities: groups that define and identify themselves, and categories that are identified and defined by others. In other

⁴⁶ Jenkins, *Social*, 5.

⁴⁷ Jenkins, *Social*, 16.

⁴⁸ Jenkins, *Social*, 50.

⁴⁹ Jenkins, *Social*, 78

words, he distinguishes between people's awareness of their similarity, i.e. collective internal definitions forming groups, and people's perceptions of other people, i.e. collective external definitions forming categories.⁵⁰ However, because of internal and external dialectical processes, the collective identification of ourselves, i.e. the group, is also the collective identification of others, i.e. categories, and vice versa.

Objective criteria constructed for scientific analysis of a category thus naturally turn into subjective criteria for people to define themselves as groups. As an example, Jenkins offers a discussion on class in itself and class for itself. Workers with similarities in the sense that they are alienated from the means of production, thus having similar interests, are defined by Marx as a category or class in and of itself. However, the interests of these workers could not be realized if they do not become aware of their interests and transform into a class of itself or a group. The lack of awareness leads to political motivation; Lenin's "vanguard party" aims to inspire and produce the struggle for class to transform it into class for itself or a group.⁵¹ Thus, class, initially defined by others as a category, turns into a group. Jenkins argues that regarding a group or category as a sociological abstraction or analytical tool constructed by scientists is totally misleading. Sociologists, like everyone else, engage in identification of collectivity.⁵²

These recent approaches to the discussion of nation and nationalism mostly rest on the critical interpretation of traditional views. Academic studies on nation and nationalism generally take for granted concepts such as group, society, collectivity, and community. "Nation" is equated with one of these in accordance with the academic position taken by the researcher and the knowledge that is produced inherently carries the flaws of these controversial concepts. Obviously, human beings exist in a social world. However, the question of how this social individual should be

⁵⁰ Jenkins, *Social*, 82

⁵¹ Jenkins, *Social*, 87

⁵² Jenkins, *Social*, 82

categorized opens an ontological debate about the question of which criteria should be used in the construction of nation.

2.1.3 Nationalism and Elite-Masses Dichotomy

In order to place the concept of nation within social theory, nationalism is generally deployed by theorists. Their argument is primarily premised on the idea that nationalism as a doctrine, ideology, or discourse constructs the reality of nation. It follows that elites produce and carry nationalism, and also diffuse it among the masses in order to fulfill their own interests. In this equation, nation comes as a result of elites whose ideology manifests itself as nationalism. The problem here is twofold: first of all, the question of nation is confined to nationalism, although some other ideologies, like liberalism and socialism, use “nation” as a reference point for political mobilization, as will be mentioned below. Furthermore, the engagement of the masses with the elite brings the question of what determines the success or failure of a nationalist project of elites, and also why the masses should follow the ideologies of elites.

For the elite interpretation of “nation”, the work of Craig J. Calhoun is the best starting point. He argues that the controversy over nation results from any attempts to define nation privileging some collectivities, interests, and identities and damaging some others. This contested character of nation prohibits us from setting objective criteria for it.⁵³ Instead, nation should be regarded as the product of nationalism, i.e. a discursive formation, or “a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness, but also is problematic enough that it keeps generating more issues and questions, keeps propelling us into further talk, keeps producing debates over how to think about it”.⁵⁴

In a similar vein, Zygmunt Bauman proposes that nation is a myth generated by nationalism. The true reality is nationalism, but in order to produce itself, nationalism

⁵³ Craig J. Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 55.

⁵⁴ Craig J. Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3.

has to create an imagined reality: nation.⁵⁵ For him, however, the academic environment prioritizes nation over nationalism by following two different lines. First, it is argued that an objective definition of nation is possible with an inventory of traits belonging to the nation. However, such attempts lead to exceptional cases that show contentious and contested processes of drawing national boundaries rather than the spatial and temporal unity of people of a nation.⁵⁶ Secondly, nationalist movements are perceived as the representation of already formed collectivities. In this regard, although a national element exists, members of a nation do not have awareness. The national movement thus transforms the nation in itself into a nation for itself.⁵⁷ Leaving aside these two approaches, Bauman argues that nationalism implies the maintenance of a boundary by excluding others, as Barth argues. In this sense, nationalism implies the discourse of a big family, dividing the world into friends and enemies. What nationalism produces is an identity that oscillates between we-ness and they-ness. Therefore, the nation becomes contested, with an unsure and fragile definition. Nationalism, however, produces a national imagination with coercive power of state that promotes the uniform identity of the nation.⁵⁸ In this understanding, the production of the nation by nationalism is conducted by elites. Through the modernization process started in the 17th century a division occurred between the masses and elites.⁵⁹ The masses did not have consciousness; they were mainly crude and troublesome. They were thus mostly dominated by the elites who cared them and subordinated them to their own interest for the creation of a modern

⁵⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, “Soil, blood and identity,” *Sociological Review* 40, no. 4 (November 1992): 676.

⁵⁶ Bauman, “Soil,” 677.

⁵⁷ Bauman, “Soil,” 677.

⁵⁸ Bauman, “Soil,” 675.

⁵⁹ Bauman, “Soil,” 681.

and civilized totality. From this perspective, nationalism as an elite program aimed to form a homogeneous and unified totality serving for elite interests.⁶⁰

The view that nationalism is an elite project, a construction to serve the elite's own interest, is shared by Paul Brass. For him, nationalism is the conscious creation of elites who draw on, fabricate, and distort cultural materials for political and economic advantage.⁶¹ Elites are special carriers of nationalist consciousness, such as the urban bourgeoisie in Europe and Westernized elites in colonies. In this respect, the success, failure, or form that a nationalist movement takes depends on the character of elites.⁶² The role of elites also explains why some ethnic communities do not mobilize for state power.⁶³ The emphasis on elites who use social and cultural differences for their own interest brings about yet another question of whether elites are constrained by pre-existing cultural differences or not. In other words, do social and cultural differences limit the actions of the elite? In a discussion of the Pakistani separatist movement, Brass makes an instrumentalist critique of primordialism. For the primordialist, the differences between Hindus and Muslims were so great that it impeded the conjunction of them into a single nation.⁶⁴ Brass, on the contrary, argues that Muslim separatism was not pre-ordained; it resulted from conscious manipulation by the Muslim elite for economic or political gain. This argument, however, was challenged on the grounds that the religious differences between Muslims and Hindus had some effect on the separation of Pakistan. The clear indication was ever-increasing conflict about cows: Hindus worshiped the cow while Muslims ate it. The elites were thus constrained by some prior elements and it is hard to reduce the

⁶⁰ Bauman, "Soil," 683.

⁶¹ Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 8.

⁶² Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1974), 30.

⁶³ Brass, *Ethnicity*, 25

⁶⁴ Brass, *Ethnicity*, 75

difference between Hindus and Muslims and the separation of Pakistan to elite competition.⁶⁵

Moreover, analyzing nationalism through the lenses of elites paints social reality the color of the perception of elites, thereby failing to show the failure of elites to penetrate into the mind of the masses. As proposed by Joseph M. Whitmeyer, from the Soviet Union to France there are many cases in which elites could not promote popular nationalism.⁶⁶ Furthermore, it could be asked: if nationalism is produced through the manipulation of elites for their own interest, why should the masses follow them? From this perspective, Montserrat Guibernau criticizes the theories of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly, and Smith and proposes closer relations between elites and the masses. She classifies two roles of elites in the production of nationalism: providing cultural political and economic grounds for nationalist claims, and developing discourse that challenges the legitimacy of the existing structure. In this sense, the engagement of elites with nationalism does not only result from their self-interests, as Kedourie argues, but also from altruism and a desire for the freedom of their nationals.⁶⁷ Furthermore, she argues that the success of a nationalist movement depends on the support of the masses. Sub-state nationalism in this sense emerges with its own elite, culture, education, media system, and international recognition against the status quo of the nation state.⁶⁸ In this argument, however, it remains vague as to why elites should matter in the discussion of nation and nationalism if the elites have deep ties with the masses and if the masses are determinative in the success of the movement.

It seems that, because of these problems of viewing the concept of nation from an elite perspective, some scholars focus on the mass character of a nation by following

⁶⁵ Brass, *Ethnicity*, 77

⁶⁶ Joseph M. Whitmeyer, "Elites and popular nationalism," *British Journal of Sociology*, 53, no. 3 (September 2002: 330-332).

⁶⁷ Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: The Catalan Case* (Walton Hall: The Open University, 2003), 27.

⁶⁸ Guibernau, *Nationalism*, 27.

two lines of thought. First of all, it is argued that nationalism is a mass phenomenon and should be understood and studied accordingly. Mass national consciousness implies single group consciousness, which transcends all lesser divisions within the group, as Walker Connor suggests.⁶⁹ Secondly, even though nationalism is basically an elite construction, the effect of nationalism on the masses should be emphasized. Eric Hobsbawm argues that nation cannot be understood unless it is analyzed from below.⁷⁰ Nation and nationalism should thus be regarded as mass phenomena and should be studied as such. However, this conceptualization leads to a discussion about the definition of masses. As Conner puts it, the main question is “how broadly national consciousness must be shared by the mass before we can describe it judiciously as a nation”.⁷¹ A clear answer is almost impossible for the same reason as when making any attempt to write history from below: the masses of the 18th and 19th centuries were illiterate, not leaving any records. Their perception of the nation and nationalism could therefore not be sufficiently detected. In this context, for Connor there is no formula to determine when a nation comes into existence.⁷²

The theoretical debate on masses brings about another discussion with respect to the position of woman in a nation and nationalism. Involvement of women in the representative body in most of Europe is a recent development. Franchise was extended to women in Britain in 1928; in France it was 1944.⁷³ In a similar vein, there is not enough knowledge on women in nationalist movements. Because of that, women are usually excluded from analysis. Nira Yuval-Davis, however, positions woman at the center of the discourse of nationalism and grasps the reality of it with respect to man. She argues that despite of the blindness of theorists, women symbolically, biologically, and culturally reproduce nation and nationalism, and that

⁶⁹ Walker Connor, “The timelessness of nations,” *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no.1 (2004): 41

⁷⁰ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 10.

⁷¹ Walker Connor, “The timelessness,” 42.

⁷² Walker Connor, “The timelessness,” 42.

⁷³ Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (, London: Sage Publications, 2002), 3.

the ontological division between women and men plays an important role in the construction of nationalist discourse.⁷⁴ On theoretical grounds, she offers three arguments. First of all, the oppression of women is endemic and integral to social relations that rest on the difference of power between men and women. Secondly, the ontological difference between man and woman implies socially constructed gender, which precedes sex or biological differences. Lastly, the level of subjugation and oppression of women varies in respect to other social categories such as race or ethnicity; in other words, all women are not oppressed to the same extent or in the same ways.⁷⁵ In this regard, womanhood could not be understood without manhood, and vice versa. Oppression of women could thus be studied through the analysis of manhood.⁷⁶ The discourse of nationalism that bases itself on the masculinity thus also reflects the reality of the oppression of women.

2.2. History and Nation

It is a generally accepted premise that the past, whether as a domain of historical knowledge or of mythical knowledge of everyday life, has a deep relation with national questions, which necessitates any study on nation and nationalism to refer to historiographical inquiry. In this regard, two question could be asked: How should the historical inquiry of nation and nationalism be done? Why does the past play a significant role in nationalist discourse?

2.2.1 Historicizing Nation

With respect to the first question, John Breuilly's three kinds of nationalism provide a fitting starting point. These are nationalism as idea, sentiment, and action, targeted by historical investigation from very different angles. First of all, nationalism implies the idea, and thus historical inquiry relies on nationalist publications including books and essays. Secondly, nationalism is conceived as consciousness, i.e. sentiment,

⁷⁴ Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 1997), 2.

⁷⁵ Yuval-Davis, *Gender*, 4-5.

⁷⁶ Yuval-Davis, *Gender*, 1.

attitudes, and values, which are analyzed by historians with an emphasis on particularity of culture.⁷⁷ This is actually a largely untold story.⁷⁸ Finally, nationalism, as movement and organization aiming at specific interests, is studied by historians within the political sphere.⁷⁹ These forms of nationalisms and historical methods are distinct things that do not necessarily have relations with each other, thus causing the problem of definition.⁸⁰ To avoid such confusion, Breuilly suggests that we stick to the political sphere. What Breuilly says about nationalism reflects his critical review of the history of ideas. From this historiographical perspective, advocated by the early school of nationalism, including Carlton Hayes, and Hans Kohn, nationalism is viewed as an invented doctrine, propagated by intellectuals within politics.⁸¹ For example, Kedeuire argues that nationalism as a doctrine was invented in Europe in the beginning of the 19th century.⁸² In this sense, the invention implies that nationalism is logically contingent, i.e. nothing natural, and sociologically contingent, i.e. a thing not necessarily linked to modern times.⁸³ The inquiry of nationalism should therefore show the origin and development of the organizing principles from a contextual perspective, as Skinner suggests, by studying the works of intellectuals such as Hegel, Herder, and Fichte.⁸⁴ Breuilly criticizes the history of ideas on three grounds. First of all, it fails to explain how ideas are used and passed on; in other words, it misses the political effect of this intellectual work. Secondly, it reduces everything to an intellectual linguistic milieu, which cannot be checked. Thirdly, it

⁷⁷ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 404.

⁷⁸ John Breuilly, “Bringing History Back into Nationalism,” in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, ed. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılıyürek and Umut Özkiprimli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 15.

⁷⁹ Breuilly, *Nationalism*, 404.

⁸⁰ Breuilly, *Nationalism*, 420.

⁸¹ John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the History of Ideas,” *Proceedings of the British Academy*, no. 94 (1999): 191.

⁸² Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1960), 9.

⁸³ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 151.

⁸⁴ John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the History of Ideas,” 193.

forms a self-enclosed world of texts, which cannot be connected due to the lack of an external lever.⁸⁵ For Breuilly, nationalism should be taken as a form of politics and thus it should be fixed to the political movement seeking or exercising state power in order to impede confusion in the literature.⁸⁶ In this regard, nationalist arguments are based on three assertions. First, “there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character”; second, “the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values”; and third, “the nation must be as independent as possible.”⁸⁷ The ideological source of the nationalist way of thinking is, for Breuilly, the idea of the uniqueness of historicism, which dates back to Herder and Fitches’ advocacy of the particularity of society against universalist reason, as intellectual responses to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society.⁸⁸ In this context, historicism prioritizes itself on the grounds that “it is the only way to apprehend the spirit of a community; it is the principal way of learning the language of a particular society.”⁸⁹ Thus, the study of language, ordinary people, and the folklore of a society becomes a primary area of interest. Historicism takes a more concrete shape with its translation into the political realm, with an emphasis on authenticity, natural and unnatural duality, and the demand for a nation state. At this level, Breuilly pays attention to how nationalism becomes popular ideology; it requires simplification, concreteness, and repetition through the construction of stereotypes with symbols and ceremonies.⁹⁰ This is also the point where the conjunction of historicism and popular culture takes place. Historicism offers a large variety of reference, which is summarized and simplified with the symbols and ceremonies consumed in popular

⁸⁵ John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the History of Ideas,” 195-196.

⁸⁶ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 1-2.

⁸⁷ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2.

⁸⁸ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 70.

⁸⁹ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 57-58.

⁹⁰ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 64.

culture.⁹¹ The historicist emphasis of the uniqueness of society or culture gives self-referent symbols and ceremonies for the nationalist. Thus, rather than referring to transcendental reality, it enables nationalists to celebrate themselves.⁹² Following this theoretical approach, John Coakley brings a more detailed account of nationalist myths. To him, there are three types of historical myth of nationalist historiography: myths of origin, containing claims on the remote ancestry of the nation and its moment of birth; myths of development, divided as the golden age, the dark age, and the age of struggle; and myths of destiny for the national mission and the demand for the restoration of national territory.⁹³

From this perspective, it could be inferred that history as a science investigates nationalists' sentiments, ideas, and action. More precisely, the primary target of historical inquiry is the analysis of the nationalist version of historical reality, which contains both an analysis of nationalist ideology and the nationalist view of the past. However, this is a challenging enterprise in the sense that in most cases "it is difficult to find much in common between the beliefs of Herder and Fichte, Mazzini and Cavour, Nkrumah and Nehru, Nasser and Ziya Gökalp".⁹⁴ Furthermore, as Eric Hobsbawm suggests, "nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so. As Renan said: 'Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation'. Historians are professionally obligated not get it wrong, or at least to make an effort not to".⁹⁵ This insight, suggesting that the nationalist's distorted perception of the past obligates historians to show the contradictions in nationalist discourses, is the main theme of Hobsbawm's works. On the one hand, he attempts to grasp the reality of nationalism

⁹¹ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 66.

⁹² Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 64.

⁹³ John Coakley, *Nationalism, Ethnicity and the State: Making and Breaking Nations* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2012), 101.

⁹⁴ Kenneth Minoque, "Nationalism and Patriotism: Minoque's Theory of Nationalism," in *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. ed. Athena S. Leoussi (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 240.

⁹⁵ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 12-13.

in the eyes of nationalists; on the other hand, he shows the ambiguity and irrationality of nationalist perceptions of social reality. For example, in *The Invention of Tradition*, he argues that traditions are recent inventions and the invention of tradition became a widespread practice in the last quarter of the 19th century.⁹⁶ With invented tradition, which is mostly practiced when an old social pattern does not match an old traditional pattern, he means “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”.⁹⁷ In other words, the invention of tradition is a process of formalization and ritualization of recent inventions by referring to the past, thus creating the sense of continuity, i.e. an immemorial past. The nation is the most concrete form of invented tradition; through social engineering the nation is manifested as a natural entity rooted in remotest antiquity despite its novelty.⁹⁸ As an academic duty, it should thus be advocated that Israeli and Palestinian nationalism and nations are recent constructions due to the novelty of the territorial state, contrary to popular belief.⁹⁹

Nevertheless, it is hard to say that the truth claim is effective against nationalist myth. As Connor argues, nationalists embrace scientific evidence when it coincides with their perceptions, as in the case of Basque nationalism. Blood purity is thus enhanced with statistical data and the particularity of the Basque language is welcomed by the Basque to prove their uniqueness. This emphasis on uniqueness goes with the mythical claim that the Basques are descendants of Tubal, the grandson of Noah, or survivors of Atlantis or descendants of the Cro-Magnon.¹⁰⁰ The irrationality of myth and the rationality of scientific knowledge thus go hand in hand in the mind of nationalists. In addition to the persistence of mythical history with scientific

⁹⁶ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263.

⁹⁷ Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention*, 1.

⁹⁸ Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention*, 14.

⁹⁹ Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention*, 14.

¹⁰⁰ Connor, *Ethno-nationalism*, 217.

knowledge of history, it could be added that the objectivity of historical fact is a problematic issue for some scholars. For example, by stating Pierre Nora's phrase, "Memory is an absolute, while history is always relative", what Garth Stevenson suggests is that no history can be totally objective or definitive.¹⁰¹ To him, history is always written from a particular point of view and can always be contested. Historical fact is thus "an artifact shaped by the needs and preoccupations of a particular time, place, and ideological viewpoint".¹⁰² This is also the case for histories of nationalism; the same event, personality, or issue is used in different historical writings of different nations. Even within a nation, a thing belonging to the past could be rewritten in accordance with the political stance of the power holder.¹⁰³ Furthermore, it could be proposed that positioning the nation and nationalism as nationalists' sentiment, ideas, and action limits the scope of analysis. Nation is not a domain that only nationalists target. As Eric Hobsbawm argues, the concept of the modern nation has deep relations with the liberal discourse.¹⁰⁴ In a similar vein, Benedict Anderson tries to understand why even socialist revolutions define themselves in national terms, which, in some circumstances, leads to war among socialist countries in spite of the socialist proposition of overcoming national and regional differences with class consciousness.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, in the contemporary world it could be said that production of nation and nationalism does not need nationalist propaganda and agitation. As Michael Billig offers, in the form of banal nationalism, nationalism is flagged as unconscious daily practices.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 37, no. 4 (December, 2004): 904.

¹⁰² Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance," 904.

¹⁰³ Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance," 904.

¹⁰⁴ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 24.

¹⁰⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 8.

2.2.2 Obsession for History

It seems that the past, mostly in the form of mythical knowledge, has an inevitable relation with the question of nation and nationalism. It could thus be asked why the past is important for national propositions. Most scholars see a clear connection between historical writings and the nation-building process.¹⁰⁷ Berger, for example, argues that the creation of national historical consciousness is conceived as a necessary condition for the promotion of national feeling among fellows; in other words, nation builders want a longer and prouder history.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the history of national historiography goes hand in hand with the nation-building process. The 19th century marks the beginning of the objectification and professionalization of historical writing.¹⁰⁹ This is also the period in which the essentialization of so-called national character started. In this process, British historiography stresses its civilizing character, regarded as the outcome of its parliamentary tradition. French historiography propagates its tripartite motto of liberty, equality, and fraternity. German historiography relies on romantic history writing, emphasizing the superiority of its national identity. Italian historians celebrate their claimed ancient history. The construction of natural and eternal national character thus became a paradigm of 19th century historiographies. In a similar manner, the unique British tradition of liberal parliamentarism, the singular significance of the French Revolution, the powerful German state serving for true fulfillment of the individual, and the Italian references to the Roman Empire are used to prove the uniqueness of these states. Therefore, the particularity of the nation and the state is attached to the premise that one's own nation is superior to other nations.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ John Breuilly, “Bringing history back into nationalism”, in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*. ed. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılıyürek, and Umut Özkiprimli (Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.

¹⁰⁸ Stefan Berger, *Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1.

¹⁰⁹ Berger, *Writing the Nation*, 32, 54.

¹¹⁰ Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800* (London:Taylor & Francis, 1999), 9, 10.

History for state- or nation-building is, however, just one aspect of this obsession with history. For answers, Anderson says that the question of nation and nationalism should be approached as an imagined community, similar to the imagining of people about religion. In this regard, the birth of national imagining has a deep connection with history in terms of the perception of time. For Anderson, the emergence of national imagining becomes possible only after the transformation of three historical systems. The first of these occurs in religious communities, which start to fade away after the late Middle Ages because of two developments:¹¹¹ the horizontally expanding European perception of the diversity of forms of human life as a result of discoveries in the non-European world,¹¹² and the decrease in the power of religious language due to print capitalism.¹¹³ The second transformation takes place in the dynastic realm as the legitimacy of monarchies begins to deteriorate during the 17th century.¹¹⁴ Finally, an important transformation in the system of apprehension of time, which is fundamental for the national imaginary, replaces the previous perception of time. In traditional thinking, Anderson says, the simultaneity of past and future is perceived in an instantaneous present. For example, the sacrifices of Christ and Isaac are interpreted as simultaneous occurrences.¹¹⁵ In the modern perception of time, on the contrary, simultaneity is understood as occurrence at the same time in homogeneous empty time.¹¹⁶ National imagination rests on this simultaneity in the context that it is “conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history”.¹¹⁷ In this respect, the relations between death and the national imagination of history illuminate the role of history for nation and nationalism. The

¹¹¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 16.

¹¹² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 16.

¹¹³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 18.

¹¹⁴ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 21.

¹¹⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.

¹¹⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.

¹¹⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 25.

argument premised on the simultaneous birth of history and nation coincides with the retreat of the religious realm from social life, thus opening a place for national and historical thinking with respect to death. Michel de Certeau states that modern Western historiography only starts with the separation of the present time from the past time, thus enabling the organization of the content of history within relations between labor and nature.¹¹⁸ Historiography is born with the rift between the body, i.e. the past or the other, and discourse, i.e. decipher, simultaneously with modern medicine between the 17th and 18th centuries.¹¹⁹ From this line of thought, historiography refers to special needs for the West. “Death obsesses the West”, and historiography is “a labor of death and a labor against death”.¹²⁰ In other words, historiography implies the study of death and the remedy for the obsession with death. For Anderson, national thinking emerges only after the retreat of religious thought that responds to death, a great human tragedy, by connecting the dead and the yet unborn with religious stories. National imagination replaces this by forming an affinity with death in a secular way. Thus, national imagining is “a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning”, the formation of links between the past and future, and representation of eternity against the limited life of the human being.¹²¹

2.2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to comprehend the problematization of the power of nation in the contemporary debates on nations and nationalisms. “Nation” as a sociological and historical concept has been questioned within the multi-layered debates in social sciences, and the chapter has provided a brief overview of these debates to set a road

¹¹⁸ Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 2.

¹¹⁹ Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 3.

¹²⁰ Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 4.

¹²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 11.

map for the analyses of ethno-symbolism and historical sociology in the following chapters.

With respect to sociology, the chapter has first problematized how nation as social category should be defined. Questioning the objective and subjective criteria to define nation, it has underlined the hardships in identifying this. The problem of the definition of nation goes indeed hand in hand with the question of the objective production of the knowledge of nation which naturally invites one to problematize the ontological foundation of the theories on nation and nationalism. Put it differently on which ontological stand theoretical construction of nation should be positioned or how nation as sociological category should be constructed emerge as another challenges. The main problem here is the production of the knowledge of nation without the reification of national groups, or acceptance of national groups as a thing: an entity which resist social change.

Because of the ambiguity of the conception of nation, theorists focus on nationalism to explain the rise of national movements. Yet this strategy has brought about in return the problem of elite and mass dichotomy in the definition of the nation. The question here is mainly whether nationalism should be regarded as elite or mass phenomenon or whether the masses or the elite should be considered the source of the knowledge of nation. The emphases on elite problematically regard the mass as passive receiver of the elite ideology. For, how much the masses feel nations could not be measured enough: the masses mostly illiterate don't give records.

On historical ground, the main challenge is defined here as how to produce the historical knowledge of nation and nationalism which is different from nationalist versions of history. The second problem is to show why history is significant for national proposition both for scientific explanation or for nationalist propaganda. This proposition is also liked to the source of power of nation. The general agreement is that nation and nationalism coincide with the retreat of religious life, i.e. with the secularization of social life. Yet on which grounds the relations is constructed remains highly contentious. The last question identified here has been on the rise of nations and nationalism. The chapter has sided with the modernists in the well-known debate

between modernism and primordialism as the former seems more persuasive in proposing nations and nationalisms as modern constructs.

CHAPTER 3

NATION AS AN ANCHOR: THE PECULIAR CASE OF ETHNO-SYMBOLISM

Ethno-symbolism, by rejecting the reduction of the nation to a state or an economic structure, turns to culture to theorize nation as an independent variable to which state elites and masses refer to. It hence assumes nation as a homogeneous, coherent collectivity evolving from simple to complex by maintaining some ethnic properties that resist social change in the course of its historical progress. This attempt comes with a price though as ethno-symbolism is criticized on the ground that it reifies the nation.

This chapter aims to problematize the basic arguments of ethno-symbolism on nation from its founding father, Anthony Smith, to one of its contemporary theorists, Hutchinson. It starts with the Durkheimian epistemological and ontological premises of ethno-symbolism that ultimately leads to the reification of the nation together with the problems of evolutionism, collectivism, and idealism as argued by Malešević. Later, the chapter will focus on the ideas of Hutchinson that try to remedy these flaws through post-modernism. The analysis here will propose that Hutchinson's understanding of nation as a zone of conflict proves the impossibility of nation rather than the explaining the existence of coherent national collectivity. In his latest work, he emphasizes the role of warfare in the formation of nations by approaching historical sociology even though war experiences as mythomoteurs of collectivity have been also criticized by some scholars. Finally, the chapter will conclude that this

novel construction proves the impossibility of nation, although it saves ethno-symbolism from the reification of nation.

3.1 Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolism is a significant theoretical perspective in the wide literature on nationalism, represented by Anthony Smith, John Armstrong, and John Hutchinson. In the general framework, Anthony Smith, the founding father of ethno-symbolism, derives his theory from Armstrong's understandings of nation and nationalism, and his work is then followed by that of Hutchinson. However, Armstrong's studies mainly focus on pre-modern developments that pave the way for the formation of nation, rather than analysis of the modern nation and nationalism. Due to the fact that this thesis tries to illuminate power of the modern nation it focuses primarily on Smith and Hutchinson. With that in mind, the general themes of ethno-symbolism are assessed first in this section. Anthony Smith's theory will then be criticized, employing the work of Maleševic.

3.1.1 The General Themes of Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolism is generally defined as a fresh attempt to overcome the alleged problems of the modernist account by adopting some of its some beneficial aspects. Modernism, represented by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and John Breuilly, is the dominant theoretical perspective in the literature on nation and nationalism. It emphasizes the modernity of nation, the analysis of it within the political sphere, and the development of the mass character of nation and nationalism by advocating that it is essentially an elite or sub-elite project. Ethno-symbolism, in this regard, pays attention to the ethnic properties of national formation by sharing with modernists the idea that nation and nationalism are modern creations. However, it rejects the reduction of the question of nation to the political sphere by paying attention to its cultural aspects. For ethno-symbolism, the mass character of the nation shows the existence of national ties among people that precede nationalism and the formation of nation. Furthermore, this approach prioritizes ethnic elements, both in

the pre-modern period as a durable entity and in the modern period as an important component of national formation.

Ethno-symbolism also raises some constitutive theoretical debates with post-modernism, as in the works of Hutchinson. The everyday production of nation and nationalism within the interplay between hot and banal nationalism, together with the conflictual interpretation of national history, is deployed by Hutchinson to overcome some problems of ethno-symbolism. However, for Smith, ethno-symbolism is closer to modernism than post-modernism on the grounds that they both believe in ‘real’ sociological communities.¹²² In spite of these relations, ethno-symbolists have the same distinctive common features. Therefore, it is more beneficial to position ethno-symbolism as an autonomous approach to the concepts of nation and nationalism. In this context, first of all, ethno-symbolism views some similarities between ethnicity and nation, which make possible the study of nation in historical processes. Second, in place of the economic and political spheres, ethno-symbolism focuses on culture over long durations, which provides durable components over other forms of collectivities. Third, it starts from nation instead of from nationalism or states, and therefore it highlights the mass character of nations. Thereby ethno-symbolism makes nation one of the most significant defining characteristics of the modern world, one which overcomes other social bounds and manifests itself as an ontological reality to which ideologies, masses, and elites refer to.

3.1.1.1 Ethnicity and Nation

For ethno-symbolists, modernists make a sharp distinction between nation and ethnicity. While “ethnicity” refers to a cultural community or to people who have a sense of common descent, “nation” implies a political community that mobilizes for the seizure of political power. In this division, although ethnicity has some effect in national imagining, it is not necessary for nationalists to conduct a political movement for independence. Representing a contrasting strand of thought, ethno-symbolists prioritize the ethnic element as a vital component of the formation of nations. For

¹²² Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 13.

them, ethnic ties such as values and memories allow the sustaining of ethnic identity in the pre-modern world and the production of nation as a modern form of ethnicity.

The modernist argument relies on the claim that ethnicity and nation are different social phenomena; ethnicity is cultural, nation is political, and these two are not directly related to each other. In Gellner's account, nationalism as a political principle rests on the premise that the national and political units should be congruent.¹²³ In this respect, the similarity of the people with the holders of power, mostly in terms of ethnicity, creates shared goals and a motivation for political action. However, ethnicity is inessential; some nations have it while others do not. For example, Estonia did not even have a name in the 19th century, let alone an ethnic core.¹²⁴ Another modernist, Hobsbawm also provides some reflections on ethnicity. Similar to Gellner, however, he gives ethnicity a secondary role in national formation, as Smith claims.¹²⁵ For him, ethnicity with a sense of common origin and descent could be called a protonation, as in the case of the Kurds, the Somalis, the Jews, or the Basques. However, due to the political character of nation, which makes it chronologically modern, ethnicity has no historic relation with nation.¹²⁶

Ethno-symbolism, however, views ethnic characters as primary in both showing the persistence of nations in the pre-modern period and differentiating one from another. In this respect, it is assumed that ethnicity and nation share some communality that makes it possible to reach the knowledge of "nation" with analysis of "ethnicity". Furthermore, sticking to ethnicity enables ethno-symbolism to promote the character of nation as distinctive from other collective entities and to pursue national ties in the pre-modern world. Nevertheless, there is some controversy regarding the position of ethnicity in ethno-symbolism. For Smith, for example, ethnicity gives the internal

¹²³ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on The Past*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

¹²⁴ Ernest Gellner, "Reply: Do nations have navels?", *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 3 (November 1996): 367.

¹²⁵ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 17.

¹²⁶ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 64.

core for a nation, which separates it from other nations. John Armstrong, however, defines ethnicity as a boundary-making process. Thus, rather than an inner core, the maintenance of ethnic boundaries makes the persistence of the nation possible. Hutchinson tries to utilize both of these strands by favoring Smith's idea of an inner core and deploying boundary approaches to present the nation as a zone of conflict.¹²⁷

From this angle, Anthony Smith proposes an inner core for the definition of a nation, which separates it from other nations on a symbolic level and enables the analysis of national elements in the pre-modern period. The core or the *ethnie* is “a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata”.¹²⁸ Nation is “a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws”.¹²⁹ In this respect, symbols, myths, memories, and values are shared commonalities that serve as anchors to bind people together in the form of ethnicity, or of nation. Therefore, the study of shared commonalities makes it possible to pursue ethnicity in both the modern and the pre-modern period. John Armstrong, however, following Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth, argues that in place of an internal core, ethnic groups define themselves with boundaries that exclude others.¹³⁰ From this perspective, the sense of groupness as an attitude emerges from confrontations with others who are seen as alien. The emphasis on these mental boundaries, Armstrong argues, rescues his theory from the essentialization of ethnicity and allows defining it as a group of people whose cultural or biological content can change with historical progress as long as boundaries are

¹²⁷ John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 15.

¹²⁸ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 27.

¹²⁹ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 29.

¹³⁰ John Alexander Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 4.

maintained. Ethnicity thereby implies “a bundle of shifting interactions rather than a nuclear component of social organization”.¹³¹ In this sense, ethnic boundaries are the source of the durability of ethnic identities in the flow of history, which are reconfigured in the form of nations in the modern world. Therefore, modern nationalism alludes to the recurrence of ethnic boundaries and the continuation of ethnic consciousness.¹³²

3.1.1.2 Culture and La Longue Durée

Another important feature of ethno-symbolism is the analysis of cultural resources, namely symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual, and tradition, in the study of nation and nationalism. Stress is placed against the reduction of nation to political, economic, or technological variables; this is, in turn, Gellner, Breuilly, and Hobsbawm’s political unit, while it is Hechter’s economic inequality and Benedict Anderson’s print capitalism. In this context, John Armstrong proposes that myth, symbol, and communication constitute ethnic identity.¹³³ Symbols act as border guards for group members to separate themselves and as means of communication among members of the same group. The persistence of these symbols as a source of ethnic identification is in this sense only possible by their inclusion in the mythic structure.¹³⁴ The mythic structure is the totality of individual myths deployed for legitimizing power. Over long periods of time, mythic structures are enhanced by the fusion of other myths and begin to form a mythomoteur, the constitutive myth of polity.¹³⁵ They are thereby legitimizing myths, and the complex symbols disseminated by their communication network sustain ethnic boundaries.¹³⁶

¹³¹ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 5.

¹³² Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 4.

¹³³ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 283.

¹³⁴ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 8.

¹³⁵ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 9.

¹³⁶ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 12.

Anthony Smith borrows this cultural perspective from Armstrong, i.e. the myth-symbol complex. For him, cultural elements such as myth symbols or religions play vital roles in shaping collectivities by giving a common consciousness. Furthermore, they provide a distinctive symbolic repertoire containing language, religion, customs, and institutions and thus enhance the sense of difference. Finally, these shared values, memories, rituals, and traditions create a sense of continuity with the past.¹³⁷ From this perspective, the mythomoteur or the constitutive myth take on a broader emphasis with the distinction of dynastic mythomoteurs and communal mythomoteurs. Dynastic mythomoteurs are related to the office of the ruler, the ruling house, or the dynasty. These are instrumentalized for political propaganda against both external and internal threats by legitimizing the policies of ruling elites.¹³⁸ Communal mythomoteurs, however, reflect the myth-symbol complex of a whole population, which stands against neighboring communities, in many systems including city-states and diaspora communities.¹³⁹ Both dynastic and communal mythomoteurs offer an internal center for the community, which carries it throughout history despite crises that threaten its existence. Mythomoteurs are heavily deployed by Hutchison, as well, in his analysis of nation and nationalism. In his latest work, *Nationalism and War*, he regards warfare as a mythomoteur that constitutes the historical consciousness of communities. From this perspective, war, whether in the form of conquest, occupation, liberation war, or civil war, serves for the formation of a sacrificial community, i.e. the nation.¹⁴⁰

As said above, ethno-symbolism relies on the assumption that cultural elements such as myths and symbols are the most important factors for the persistence of ethnic ties in historical processes. In this context, it should also be mentioned that ethno-symbolists perceive history as a catalyst for ethnic and national formation. For them,

¹³⁷ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 25.

¹³⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), 60.

¹³⁹ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 64.

¹⁴⁰ John Hutchinson, *Nationalism and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 53.

the nation as a historical entity is the product of a long duration, i.e. *la longue durée*. Armstrong, for example, suggests that the Annales School's concept of "*la longue durée*" is "a means of perceiving modern nationalism as part of a cycle of ethnic consciousness".¹⁴¹ In this sense, "*la longue durée*" implies that the myth-symbol complex is shaped by historical experiences over long periods of time. Therefore, cultural elements and forms such as ceremonies and rituals, institutions, customs, styles, language, and other codes enable the long-term persistence of ethnic identities.

3.1.1.3 Study from Below

For ethno-symbolists, modernists problematically explain the formation of nation and nationalism from above. This criticism is twofold. First, they oppose the proposition that the nation is the invention of elites or states. Second, they reject taking elites or states as a source of knowledge in the analysis of nation and nationalism. In order to understand these two criticisms, it is beneficial to explore Gellner's understanding of nation, which is criticized by both modernists and ethno-symbolists.

For Gellner, nation and nationalism are totally modern phenomena that have nothing to do with the pre-modern period. In Gellner's words, "modernists like myself believe that the world was created round about the end of the eighteenth century, and nothing before that makes the slightest difference to the issues we face".¹⁴² In a clear distinction between pre-modern and modern, although national formation proceeds with communication or traditional language, the emergence of the nation is explained with the action of a political unit or state. In other words, nation is seen as the product of imposition of the high culture of elites on people as a nationalist project conducted by a political unit, i.e. the state. From this perspective, it could be said that this proposition reflects Gellner's ontological and epistemological position. For Gellner, the proposed definitions for nation with subjective and objective criteria would not be enough to formulate a nation. The nation can only be defined as the outcome of the imposition of high culture by the state as a nationalist project. Thus, his

¹⁴¹ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 4.

¹⁴² Gellner, "Reply: Do nations have navels?", 366.

ontological construction of reality is based on the interplay among industrial society, state, and nationalism rather than nation. Additionally, the epistemic source of nation is perceived as the political unit's activity via standardized literacy- and education-based systems of communication, i.e. nationalism. For him, nation thus has to be perceived as the construction of the state as a nationalist project and the analysis of nationalism should be regarded as the only source of knowledge of nation. Therefore, “nation” is a top-down construction whose knowledge can only be grasped from above through the analysis of nationalism.

However, this over-prioritization of nationalism as a project of a political unit causes dispute even among modernists. Miroslav Hroch questions Gellner’s argument that nationalism engenders nation and therefore nation is just a construction of elites. He proceeds: “If this were the case, we would have to explain why it occurred to nobody at the beginning of the nineteenth century to launch a campaign to persuade, for example, the Irish that they were in fact Germans, or to win over the Hungarians to the notion that they were actually Chinese. What explains the failure to create a Slavic nation, as the Pan-Slavists attempted, or an Illyrian nation? Why did the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation fail among the Slovaks, even though in the interwar period the Czechoslovak Republic possessed all the necessary means of effective agitation to put across this view of state and national identity?”¹⁴³ Hroch concludes that there should be a prior national consciousness upon which nationalist agitation takes place. Eric Hobsbawm also raises some criticisms of Gellner’s account, agreeing with Gellner that the nation is constructed from above but saying that, in order to understand nation and nationalism, they should rather be explained from below as assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people.¹⁴⁴

Nevertheless, this revision of the modernist account is not enough for ethno-symbolists. They take a more radical perspective by prioritizing nation and the

¹⁴³ Miroslav Hroch, “Real and Constructed: the Nature of the Nation”, in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 99.

¹⁴⁴ Hobsbawm, *Nations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.

underlying mass character of national consciousness. On the question of whether nation or nationalism comes first, Armstrong devotes his *Nations Before Nationalism* to proving the prior national elements that engender nationalism. According to him, “historically novel demands posed by nationalist movements must confront a lengthy record of human association in which persistent group identity did not ordinarily constitute the overriding legitimization of polity formation”.¹⁴⁵ With respect to knowledge of nation, Anthony Smith argues that the nation should be the source of knowledge taking into account the pre-existing traditions, memories, and symbolism among both the non-elites and elites.¹⁴⁶ In this context, it should be emphasized that Anthony Smith assumes the existence of a concrete body of nation. In this regard, Gellner’s epidemiological and ontological prioritization of nationalism is replaced by nation in ethno-symbolism. Because of that, nationalists are not nation-builders. They instead work “to rediscover, select and reinterpret the past or pasts of a given community, to reshape its conception of its present state and so help to regenerate the community”.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, ethno-symbolism gives importance to the formation of mass national consciousness, which stands against the elitist interpretation of modernists. From this line of thought, ethno-symbolists argue that elite propaganda for the formation of nation does not mean that people will accept elite projects without resistance.¹⁴⁸ In some cases, elite projects may be abandoned if the masses do not support them. Therefore, the elites have to adopt the myths, symbols, and memories of the masses in order to manifest themselves as representatives of the people. It needs to be mentioned here that Smith’s understanding of the mass character of nation is different from the studies on everyday nationhood, another non-elite interpretation of the conception of nation. He argues that the studies inspired by Michael Billig’s banal

¹⁴⁵ Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, 4.

¹⁴⁶ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 32.

¹⁴⁷ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 65.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 32.

nationalism have shortcomings on the grounds that they underestimate the historical dimension of the production of nation: “...nationalism is at once an elite and a ‘mass’ phenomenon: an ideological movement of elites that places ‘the people’ and its memories, myths, symbols and traditions at the centre of its concerns, and a popular movement that seeks expression and action through the ideals and goals of nationalist elites”.¹⁴⁹ This argument on the mass character of nationhood as an everyday production constitutes the basis of Hutchinson’s proposition. He says that national elements are produced and consumed in everyday life, but such everyday production and consumption have historical contexts, which, he argues, like Smith, enables him to separate himself from the post-modernists who advocate the idealist and sociological voluntarism of identity formation.¹⁵⁰

3.1.2 Criticism

Among the various criticisms of ethno-symbolism, the current thesis focuses on Siniša Malešević’s “Divine ethnies and sacred nations” to highlight the ontological and epistemological weaknesses of ethno-symbolism and its inadequacy to explain the power of national attachments in the modern world. Malešević argues that Smith’s approach derives from neo-Durkheimian ontology and epistemology, which reflects three problems: evolutionism, collectivism, and idealism.¹⁵¹ Due to these problems, the question of the power of the conception of nation remains vague in his theory. Smith assumes that because a collectivity is also a moral community maintained by shared values and norms ethnic attachments are a natural phenomenon. Manifested as a myth-symbol complex above the individual will, they cause people to think and act as members of a particular ethnie. These given and fixed ethnic boundaries take the form of national affiliation through modernization. Therefore, the resilience and worldwide appeal of nation and nationalism are not surprising; they are rather the

¹⁴⁹ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 74.

¹⁵⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 5.

¹⁵¹ Siniša Malešević , “Divine Ethnies and Sacred Nations: Anthony D. Smith and the neo-Durkheimian Theory of Nationalism,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, no. 10 (2004): 583.

necessary outcome of historical development. This is determinism, fatalism, and finalism, which reify, essentialize, and eternalize nation as Malešević claims.

Malešević argues that because Durkheim pays little attention to nation and nationalism, Smith's connection with Durkheim is implicit. However, Smith's theory on nation and nationalism can only be understood through engagement with the concepts of Durkheimian theory.¹⁵² In this context, Malešević explores three areas of resemblance between Durkheim's and Smith's accounts: their evolutionary interpretation of progress from pre-modern to modern, the centrality of morality in their interpretation of collectivity, and their analysis of nation as a religion. First of all, in Smith's account, the commonalities and differences between ethnicity and nation proceed in the same way as Durkheim's distinction between traditional and modern collectivities proceeds. With respect to differences, Durkheim conceptualizes traditional collectivities as a simple totality in which there is a low level of interaction in contrast to modern collectivities, which are more diverse and complex. Mechanical solidarity holds traditional collectivities together with the sense of similarity of people on the basis of extended family ties. Organic solidarity, however, makes integration possible in modern collectivities where there is more room for individual actions, although they are connected due to the division of labor. In Smith's account, ethnicity as a pre-modern collectivity is static, closed, and homogeneous, while the nation is a modern, dynamic, complex, heterogeneous collectivity.¹⁵³ With respect to similarities, Durkheim's "conscience collective" plays the role of "ethnie". Collective conscience is a common belief and sentiment of totality, which becomes less intense in modern collectivities but overcomes the division of labor and individual conscience in both traditional collectivities and modern collectivities.¹⁵⁴ Smith argues that ethnie cuts across nation and ethnicity, implying a sense of solidarity of collectivity that stands above class, religion, politics, or regional affiliations, especially in times of

¹⁵² Malešević , "Divine Ethnies," 564.

¹⁵³ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 566.

¹⁵⁴ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 567.

crisis, in the pre-modern and modern worlds.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, the difference between ethnies and nation runs parallel to traditional and modern collectivity. Furthermore, in this distinction there is an evolutionist understanding of collectivity. In Durkheim's theory, traditional collectivity evolves from a simple to a more complex and integrated entity that relies on a sophisticated division of labor. In Smith's work, the ethnicity, through modernization, evolves into a fully-fledged nation, i.e. from the "Gemeinschaft" of ethnicity to the "Gesellschaft" of nation.

Secondly, Malešević argues that morality occupies a central place in both Smith's and Durkheim's theories. In Durkheim's theory, in order to talk about society there should be individuals fully subscribing to a particular normative order that stands above individual will.¹⁵⁶ In this atomistic understanding, which disregards individual will on the behalf of a belief system, the tendency to morality is a constitutive and distinctive aspect of society. Therefore, the nation is a superior moral community that operates on the principles of organic solidarity.¹⁵⁷ Smith similarly believes in the existence of relatively unique sets of commonly shared trans-generational values, i.e. ethnicity, which derives from Armstrong's mythomoteurs.¹⁵⁸ Ethnicity is positioned against the economic and political perspective of modernists by relying on culture. It forms communal borders that define the dimensions and content of both group and individual morality. In this sense, ethnicity refers to a set of moral values beyond the individual will. In other words, being moral means to subscribe to a particular set of values shared by a group, which is the necessary cement for ethnic and national collectivity.

Thirdly, according to Malešević, the analysis of modern collectivities with respect to religion shows the most explicit connection between Durkheim and Smith. Durkheim argues that religion induces the integration of society as a moral community that

¹⁵⁵ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 556.

¹⁵⁶ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 572.

¹⁵⁷ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 574.

¹⁵⁸ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 571.

worships its own image. For example, in clans, totems function as the symbol of a clan, i.e. the sacred image of the people.¹⁵⁹ The “sacred” is necessary for the existence of “social” as a symbolic system of beliefs by giving strength to individuals and groups.¹⁶⁰ This perception of religious symbols as the cement of social life or the ontological basis of groups is deployed by Smith as “divine ethnies” and “sacred nations”. Smith says that modernization brings secularization of the world, which causes the deterioration of religious structure. This retreat of religion from social life creates an environment of collective and individual uncertainty. Nationalism arises as a secular equivalent to religious belief and overcomes that ambiguity.¹⁶¹ By offering nation as durable entity and an object of worship that connects the past, present, and future, it becomes a form of political religion, propagating eternity. Nation, in this sense, implies sacred communities on an ontological ground defined by sacred properties such as a chosen people, sacred territory, golden age, or glorious dead.¹⁶² People perceive national symbols as images of themselves that should be worshiped.

These three themes of Smith’s ethno-symbolism, Malešević argues, cause three problematic interpretations of nation and nationalism: evolutionary historicism, collectivism, and idealism. Smith responds to this claim in *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*.¹⁶³ First of all, Smith’s approach reflects the problem of evolutionary historicism, which advocates that collectivities naturally evolve from simple to complex structures. This premise leads to three ontological problems: determinism (the existence of a predetermined path), fatalism (the unalterable necessity of this process), and finalism (the existence of predetermined stages in history).¹⁶⁴ In this functionalist interpretation, ethnies are perceived as

¹⁵⁹ Malešević, “Divine Ethnies,” 576.

¹⁶⁰ Malešević, “Divine Ethnies,” 579.

¹⁶¹ Malešević, “Divine Ethnies,” 576.

¹⁶² Malešević, “Divine Ethnies,” 583.

¹⁶³ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*

¹⁶⁴ Malešević, “Divine Ethnies,” 582-583.

entities destined to be nations, i.e. there is a necessary relation between ethnies and nations. However, as per Malešević's proposition, this does not answer the question of why nations have to succeed ethnic groups. Additionally, this understanding disregards contingencies in historical development by reducing the change in linear development from "ethnie" to nation.¹⁶⁵ On the contrary, Malešević says that historical change is variable, uneven, and situational and that the process of nation formation is just one among many historical possibilities. Anthony Smith's response to this criticism is irrelevant. He limits his answer, merely emphasizing the impotence of social change in his theory. He fails to answer the question of why mythomoteurs engender nation rather than other forms of collectivities, such as clans or families.¹⁶⁶

Secondly, in Smith's account, morality is understood as a constitutive factor for collectivity, which is more powerful than the individual will. Nevertheless, the attribution of too much power to the collective force of group morality results in reification of the nation. Malešević argues that Smith advocates a holistic understanding of nation, which sees ethnic groups and nations as more than individual parts.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, the epistemological source of knowledge of nations is not ethnic or national attachments of concrete individuals; it is the analysis of the moral dimension of collectivity. This is actually the domination of collective action over the individual will.¹⁶⁸ A side effect of this perception is that collective action is essentialized and reified to an extreme.¹⁶⁹ The national and ethnic categories used in everyday life are deployed by Smith as an object of study with the assumption that members are fully aware of themselves as a group and have singular and recognizable wills. Additionally, it is assumed that the nation, as a homogeneous collectivity, sustains its essence without any individual or group resistance. Smith accepts that

¹⁶⁵ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 583.

¹⁶⁶ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 127.

¹⁶⁷ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 584.

¹⁶⁸ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 586.

¹⁶⁹ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 585.

there are holistic elements in his writings, but he says that Malešević exaggerates their importance in his theory.¹⁷⁰

Thirdly, Malešević says that Smith's emphasis on non-political and non-economic factors in the formation of nation results in idealism, conceiving of nation as a coherent collectivity cemented with sacred properties, which overlooks the conflictual and competitive dimension of social life. In this regard, Smith exaggerates the role of sacred elements to understand the nation, by eternalizing and essentializing "the sacred". In Smith's account, "the sacred" is an essential property of the nation, which makes it an independent entity upon which the other dimension of the social world moves. The sacred is also eternal, holding the ethnie as a durable entity in historical progress.¹⁷¹ This understanding fails to perceive the social conflict that may result from disputes over the sacred element of collectivity. The mythical historical past could be interpreted differently, which can cause conflict within the collectivity or with other collectivities because shared narratives of the mythical past and collective memories rely on large repertoires of the past, which possess both differences and similarities. Smith rejects the accusation that he eternalizes and essentializes the "cultural" with respect to the "sacred", but the critical problem remains: the mythical historical past could be a source of conflict in social life that results in division of the nation. Although Smith refers to the conflictual dimension of the mythical past, he insists that these conflicts take place in the national sphere, which is sustained by constitutive myth.¹⁷²

In spite of Smith's responses to Malešević's criticism, it could be said that Smith's theory has insurmountable problems. His approach relies on the existing nation as a real collectivity evolving from simple ethnic groups in the pre-modern world. Furthermore, his collectivist understanding of nation goes with a holistic interpretation of nation by disregarding the importance of social change engendered

¹⁷⁰ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 127.

¹⁷¹ Malešević, "Divine Ethnies," 587.

¹⁷² Smith, *Ethno-symbolism*, 34.

by individual will. In this respect, although there is room for social conflict and change, it remains within the sphere of national borders in the symbolic dimension. The problems of evolutionism, collectivism, and idealism in his theory also lead to reification, essentialization, and eternalization of nation. As a result, his theory problematically presents ethnies as the natural and the most powerful factors in the rise and persistence of nations and nationalisms in the modern world.

3.2 Hutchinson and The Post-Modernist Revision of Ethno-symbolism

One of the most significant contemporary figures in ethno-symbolic thought is John Hutchinson. If we define ethno-symbolism as a middle way between modernism and primordialism, his own ethno-symbolic approach could be positioned as another middle way between ethno-symbolism and post-modernism. From this perspective, it is argued that Hutchinson tries to overcome the problems ascribed to ethno-symbolism above with the deployment of post-modernist concepts to explain power of nation in modern world. Hutchinson perceives the nation as a zone of conflict engendered by a mythical past; therefore, he shows the conflictual aspect of the national zone where competition among rival groups takes place. Furthermore, he emphasizes the everyday production of nation and nationalism, which reduces the importance of the collectivist understanding of nation and nationalism. In this interpretation, national properties are produced as banal nationalism and turn into hot nationalism in times of crisis. Therefore, nationalism becomes a temporal awakening by overcoming other group attachments such as class or family. Borrowing from post-modernist insight, however, injures the ethno-symbolist approach because the “mythomoteurs”, or constitutive myths, become both the source of dissolution of nation and of formation of nation, thus losing the power to be a determinative factor for nation and the persistence of national identity. In this regard, this section analyzes Hutchinson’s version of ethno-symbolism and concludes that his theoretical revision proves the impossibility of nation as it is inadequate to explain the power of the conception of nation.

3.2.1 The Durability of Ethnic Identity in the Pre-Modern World

Hutchinson's theory is based on his critical review of the modernist account, relying on historical sociology. To him, modernism fails on four main grounds to explain the national question by assuming the nation as an outgrowth of modern organizational forms. First of all, it fails to show the power of pre-modern ethno-historical memories, whether real or imagined, in the formation of nation. Secondly, by overemphasizing economic and political aspects of the modern world, it fails to show the cultural aspects of nationalism that enhance a nation as a moral community. Thirdly, by failing to pay enough attention to cultural differences within nations, it cannot explain how cultural diversities lead to rival and symbolic projects. Finally, when regarding nation as a process toward a sovereign and unified society, it is not possible to show the variations between 'mature' nation states in the range of social spheres explicitly governed by national norms.¹⁷³

As an alternative, he suggests that the nation is a zone of conflict, which addresses the endurance of the sense of being embedded in much older communities, internal cultural revolutions, persistence of cultural differences within nations, and episodic revivals of nationalism. Following this guideline, Hutchinson's first attempt is to show that the pre-modern factors that shape ethnicity sustain ethnic identity and enable it to take the shape of political ethnicity, or namely the nation, in the modern period. To him, modernist understanding is premised on popular sovereignty and political integration of the masses as primary factors of the nation. This is a prioritization of the national question as ideology over nation as sentiment. In this line of thought, the nation manifests itself as a secular political unit aiming at an independent state on the basis of universal citizenship. This territorially consolidated unit, engendered by market economy and a bureaucratic state, is based on an intense network of communication by destruction of local and regional loyalties. The state, in this respect, plays a significant role in the homogenization of society on an ethnic basis through education and exclusion of other ethnic groups. In this new form of

¹⁷³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 2, 3.

community, standard language, literacy, and print capitalism enable the formation of an industrial society of strangers, in which national life is dominated by a mobile middle class. In contrast to this modernity of nation as political entity, the pre-modern period is interpreted based on depolitical ethnicity. In the pre-modern period, ethnicity is not a determinative factor for dynastic empires and monarchies, which are mainly structured on religions as a basis for social and political identification. With the division between heterogeneous and localized masses and elites, vernacular languages dominated by clerical languages and ethnic groups remain depolitical due to the limited penetration of the state. Hutchinson rejects this sharp division of modern versus pre-modern periods. From the ethno-symbolic standpoint, he offers that nation as a post-18th century formation is a novel species of ethnic group whose formation has to be understood based on *la longue durée*.¹⁷⁴ The multilayered aspect of ethnicity that results from many different sources of dynamism and unpredictability enables the survival of ethnic identities in times of crises in the pre-modern period. Thus, ethnic identities are enduring cultural phenomena in the pre-modern period.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, ethnicity is an important component of the formation of the modern nation by defining territorial extent, cultural character, and citizenship of the nation for both dominant and minority nationalities due to the vulnerability of the state. Thus, nation could be positioned as the product of factors that cut across the pre-modern/modern division.¹⁷⁶

In order to prove the durability and recurrence of ethnicities in the pre-modern world, Hutchinson employs both Anthony Smith's definition of ethnie in terms of a sense of being unique and John Armstrong's emphasis on confrontation on frontiers. Ethnicity, in this sense, implies "the moral community characterised by a sense of common origins, identification with a territory, and a commitment to a specific culture".¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 13.

¹⁷⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 10.

¹⁷⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 10.

¹⁷⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 14.

This subjectivity of ethnicity is expressed in the assemblage of myth, or a collective imaginative core that refers to the origin, location, golden age, degeneration, and regeneration of ethnicity. Social institutions such as states, churches, legal systems, vernacular languages, and literatures form populations as distinctive cultural communities, which differentiate themselves from others.¹⁷⁸ Memories revived in rituals for heroes and events, and symbols embedded in buildings, languages, legal codes, and religious texts, serve for the maintenance of the sense of ethnic community. Ethnicities are thus “historically pervasive and can be found in all periods of the premodern world, from oldest recorded civilisations through to the seventeenth century”.¹⁷⁹ In this regard, the four historical processes of religion, empires, interstate competition, and long distance trade and migration are decisive for the durability and recurrence of ethnicities.

With respect to religion, Hutchinson says that in spite of the belief that religions overcome ethnic differences, they actually are the catalyst for ethnic formation.¹⁸⁰ Traditions take root in adjacent and competing populations or states. This is engendered by the fact that, in order to reach people, all evangelist religions deploy the ethos and practices of existing cultures. This elasticity of religions or the tendency to schism and differentiation coincides with the demand of rulers for the consolidation of the population and the separation of the population from other communities. Thus, ethnic communities transform into rival faith communities. For instance, in early medieval Eastern Europe, rulers turn their pagan communities into religious communities in order to maintain their power. In this transformation, political rivalries mark the selection of the church; Mieszko of Poland converts to Catholicism by choosing a Slavic priest against the German crusade, the Serbian Orthodox Church is established against the Byzantines, and so on.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 15.

¹⁷⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 25.

¹⁸⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 16.

¹⁸¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 17.

Empires are also viewed against the durability and persistence of ethnic identity in the pre-modern period. However, Hutchinson argues that imperial territorial expansion and contradiction in rivalry with other empires reinforces ethnic consciousness, and the imperial political structure allows the maintenance of ethnic identities.¹⁸² In terms of imperial confrontation, the zones of conflict among empires drastically affect ethnic consciousness. Along these fault lines, while populations are intermingled, ethnicities are instrumentalized against each other, as well. For example, Croats regard themselves as defenders of Christianity against the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, and although they share the same language with Serbs, they differentiate themselves by their Catholic Christian identity.¹⁸³ In addition, imperial expansion requires a political structure that respects the local legal system and rules that enable communities to preserve their ethnic identities. For instance, in the Ottoman Empire, the millet system, which organized society in accordance with religious communities such as Jews, Serbian Orthodox, or Armenian Orthodox, also reflected the ethnic division of the community.¹⁸⁴

Inter-state competitions function as crystallizers of ethnic and national images of identities in the pre-modern world, as well. The development of military technologies with competition among states follows centralized political administrations, consolidated territories, culturally united populations, and prosperous economies.¹⁸⁵ In this context, warfare has a crucial role for ethnic consciousness by ethnicizing and mobilizing localized groups into a state army. As a result, ethnic identification takes the form of identification with a larger territorial homeland by creating opposing ethnic stereotypes.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 20.

¹⁸³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 20.

¹⁸⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 20.

¹⁸⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 22.

¹⁸⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 21.

Long distance trade and migrations are also important factors in the maintenance of ethnic attachment in the pre-modern period. Middlemen minorities, such as Jews, Armenians, and Indians, can stay outside of surrounding societies by controlling trade networks, thus protecting their own ethnic identities.¹⁸⁷ With respect to migration, the confrontation between the invaders and the indigenes or between steppe nomads and settled agrarian civilizations results in the formation of myths that serve for the consolidation of ethnic groups.

3.2.2 Ethnicities in the Formation of Modern Nations

To Hutchinson, nation is modern construction created by small elites who aim to survive with their population in the modern world order.¹⁸⁸ However, in periods of crisis such as war and revolution, historical ethnic identities are revived and redeveloped by intellectuals to become important components of the national consciousness of the masses. This is the response to the failure of existing regimes to protect their populations. As a result, the population turns into a moral community, which differentiates itself from other forms of collectivities on the basis of the sacrificial devotion of members. In this sense, periodic crises are significant turning points for nations. In these periods, for nationalism, as an episodic movement triggered by a sense of crisis that the nation is in decline or under threat, ethnic memories such as myths are recalled to consolidate and energize the population.¹⁸⁹ The nation thus manifests itself as a dynamic entity that is redefined and redrawn in accordance with the needs of the era and as the carrier of pre-modern ethnic sentiment.¹⁹⁰

In this regard, it should be mentioned that Hutchinson defines two kinds of nationalism. These are cultural nationalism and political nationalism, which cannot be conflated and which produce different and competing conceptions of nation, thus

¹⁸⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 23.

¹⁸⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 74.

¹⁸⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 135.

¹⁹⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 5.

resulting in diverging political strategies. Political nationalism aims to create a modern, independent, and secular state, which should exist together with multiple states in an international system. Cultural nationalism, however, targets the “moral regeneration of the historical ‘community’, attempting an inner renovation of the ethnic base, promoting high vernacular cultures, educational centres and grass roots economic, cultural and political self-help organisations”.¹⁹¹ Political nationalism is premised on the establishment of civic policy of citizens united by common laws within a territory. This is a cosmopolitan rationalist nation, looking forward to a common humanity transcending cultural differences. Furthermore, because the world is divided into developing cosmopolitan nations, these should have independent representative states.¹⁹² In this sense, the modern civilized national state is the primary motivation for political nationalists, which should be achieved even at the expense of tradition. Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, views the nation as a natural or organic entity, as a product of unique history, geography, and culture. This is “nation as a creative force that evolves through periods of decay and regeneration in competitive interaction with a world of similar groups”.¹⁹³ In this sense, the nation is a continuously mobile community, which should be regenerated with respect to the needs of the era in order to survive. Nevertheless, in spite of its emphasis on modernity, cultural nationalism aims to consolidate different sides dividing the nation, such as traditional and modern, agricultural and industrial, or scientific and religious dichotomies. For this enterprise, nationalist history serves a myth-making function by harmonizing myths with scientific knowledge. In this respect, the discovery of the history of a nation with reference to archaeology, folklore, philology, and topology is crucial for assessing the authentic role of a nation in history or the destiny of a nation. Artisans, from this angle, revive the collective experience of the

¹⁹¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 34.

¹⁹² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 12.

¹⁹³ John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (Milton Park: Taylor & Francis Routledge, 1987), 10.

people hidden in historical legends for the changing needs of each era.¹⁹⁴ This re-interpretation of the past also defines the political boundaries of cultural nationalism. For cultural nationalists, the glory of a country does not come from the state, but from the culture. The political aim is thus the revival of the nation by propagating love of community, celebrating cultural uniqueness, and rejecting foreign culture. In this regard, cultural nationalism moves in a network containing language societies, dramatic groups, political parties, and publishing houses; these are educated strata positioning themselves as counter-culture against the state.¹⁹⁵ For Hutchinson, what determines the formation of nation is not political nationalism but cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalists' power to mobilize and consolidate a population makes it the dominant ideology in the formation of nations. A nation thereby becomes a moral community whose roots date back to the pre-modern era, which sustains itself with ethnic memories.

3.2.3 Revivalist Revolution

For an elaborated understanding of the power of cultural nationalism, Hutchinson pays attention to the revivalist or cultural revolutions that shape the European intellectual world and form bases for cultural nationalism. In this sense, a revivalist revolution implies the marriage of the idea of progress and the sense of having roots in older history. It also means the revival of culture outside of religion and enlightenment, vernacularization of the social world, and celebration of culture in place of state. In this context, what triggers the revivalist awakening is the scientific revolution. The scientific revolution, starting from the 17th century, challenges the power of religions and results in cognitive and social legitimization crises. From this angle, the main problem is combining the idea of continuity with the past with the scientific process. Attempts are made to remedy this conflict between the traditionalist rejection of secularization and enlightenment and intellectuals' efforts

¹⁹⁴ Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, 15.

¹⁹⁵ Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, 17.

to form a secular, cosmopolitan political order.¹⁹⁶ Revivalism emerges as a third way, relying on secular intellectuals, reform-minded clerics, and the professional middle classes. For these intellectuals, the nation is a progressive entity whose truth could be grasped scientifically with history. With this premise, revivalism creates ties between progress and the past.¹⁹⁷

This romantic revivalism views the nation as a natural, unique, cultural entity, which is also necessary for individuals to realize their potential. The multiplicity of nations is thus a natural condition, in which each nation contributes to world progress in its own way. Sustaining and recovering cultures should thus be the primary duty of humanity.¹⁹⁸ In this sense, the major motivation of romantic intellectuals starting from the 17th century is the regeneration of European cultures.¹⁹⁹ Rejecting the hegemony of Christendom and enlightenment, revivalism searches for founding civilizations outside of Europe to trace the origins of communities. One of the early examples of such an enterprise is the discovery of the Hindu Aryan Sanskrit civilization as an original civilization of humanity by British Orientalists in the 1780s. This caused the proliferation of associations throughout Europe attempting to rediscover the history of communities with archaeology, philology, folklore, and comparative religion.²⁰⁰ The outcome of this new way of interpreting communities destroys the relationship between people and rulers, which is based on biblical figures and Greco-Roman antiquity. People as descendants of founding civilizations of the world now claim the right to dignity and to freedom from imperial rulers.²⁰¹

In the revivalist mentality, a nation develops through its relationship with nature as a unique community and thus it is directly linked to the land, which shapes the spiritual

¹⁹⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 60.

¹⁹⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 61.

¹⁹⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 47.

¹⁹⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 48.

²⁰⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 48.

²⁰¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 49.

and material character of the nation. Due to this importance of land, enquiries about sacred land help to discover the distinctive qualities of a nation. This extended perception of land also conveys the interpretation of land as a sacred and mysterious reservoir of the national spirit. It motivates revivalism for purification of the nation from foreign influence and regeneration of national attachment to the land.²⁰² Thus, land and habitats in the purest form should be protected from alien powers and nationalists should visit such sacred land to find the essence of their nations.

Vernacularization of the social world also has a special place for revivalists, which is the revolutionary awakening against dominant cultures expressed with secular and religious languages. Thus, the revival of vernacular culture by creating a unified network of exchange integrates society on the basis of national consciousness and protects national culture from foreign influence. With respect to the revival of local dialects, revivalism provides an internal core that can be used to mobilize people against the imposition of foreign languages. Furthermore, turning back to the local culture enables the resurrection of *Volksgeist*, i.e. the spirit of the nation embedded in rural folk living.²⁰³ In this sense, myths, fairy tales, songs, melodies, and proverbs are used to repair the deteriorated national spirit. Artists are the pioneers of this enterprise, such as “the encyclopaedic intellectuals, recorders of folk culture, dabblers in mystical cults, founders of cultural institutions (theatres, opera houses, schools of art) and active supporters in the reformation of everyday life (through national sports, dances, dress, applied arts and design)”.²⁰⁴

The revivalist emphasis on culture revolutionizes politics by changing the center of reference from state to community. It thus opens local sources that could mobilize the population even against the existing political structure. Revivalism mostly regards the state as a threat to the life of the community, which also destroys tradition, which is

²⁰² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 54.

²⁰³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 55.

²⁰⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 56.

vital for national culture.²⁰⁵ The outcome of deterioration of culture, as viewed by revivalists, is social conflict and anomie within the community, which can only be overcome by nationalizing young people as the educated leaders of society.²⁰⁶ Cultural and social organizations such as literary societies, musical choirs, and sporting associations help to train the youth as leaders of a political community of sacrifice, in which status is gained by service to the nation. Where nationalists see the state as a barrier for regeneration of the nation, nationalism as an ideology of educated young people does not hesitate to attack repressive governments.²⁰⁷

3.2.4 Nationalism as Mass Movement

At this point, Hutchinson sees revivalism as a minority project or “minority enthusiasm of intellectuals dependent on an educated stratum”.²⁰⁸ In order to be a hegemonic ideology, revivalism employs two strategies. First of all, revivalism as moral innovation provides populations a new map of identity and political prescriptions in periods of crisis. Secondly, as an ideology of revolutionary movements against hegemonic ideology, revivalism enhances its power by manifesting itself as a community of sacrifice, separating itself from other interest groups.²⁰⁹

For the first strategy, Hutchinson suggests that what makes national revivalism such a powerful force, i.e. a hegemonic ideology in the modern period, is its capacity to harmonize the tension between modernizers and traditionalists in the political realm with moral innovations.²¹⁰ When the traditional aristocratic structure begins to fracture as a result of unpredictable external and internal shocks brought about by the

²⁰⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 58.

²⁰⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 58.

²⁰⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 59.

²⁰⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 60.

²⁰⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 60.

²¹⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 46.

capitalist world system, traditional regimes introduce limited reforms for their survival.²¹¹ However, this innovation engenders a confrontation of two conflictual perceptions: those of traditionalists and of modernizers. While traditionalists reject the West, equated with the idea of progress, which they perceive as destroying indigenous values, modernizers adopt political nationalism, which holds a strict denial of tradition and regards progress as the only way for the survival of the population.²¹² Revivalism offers a third way by dressing modernization with traditional values: namely, the idea of progress with tradition. Due to this role of revivalism, Hutchinson define cultural nationalists as moral innovators who impede internal conflict “by evoking a national golden age and studying the experience of other countries”.²¹³ For revivalism, traditionalists wrongly perceive tradition as the passive repetition of custom. Traditionalists should accept that tradition continuously changes and is influenced by other civilizations, as in the case of the golden age of their own nation.²¹⁴ Revivalism also targets the modernizers’ uncritical admiration of Western models. Modernizers should accept that the success of the West relies on Western tradition, and they should look at their own traditions in order to be a modern nation.²¹⁵ In this sense, the nation is a realm in which modernism and traditionalism could be merged and the destructive conflict between them could be channeled into a co-operative reconstruction of the nation.²¹⁶ In other words, the traditionalist emphasis on continuity with the past and modernizers’ adherence to the idea of progress are combined with an interpretation of nation that has historical roots and evolves progressively in accordance with the needs of the era. Furthermore, Hutchinson argues, revivalism as a mediator between these two conflictual

²¹¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 65.

²¹² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 65.

²¹³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 66.

²¹⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 66.

²¹⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 67.

²¹⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 66.

interpretations inherits the conflict, thus oscillating across a modernist/traditionalist continuum.²¹⁷ Cultural nationalists are therefore ideological innovators who “articulate the shifting options for societies seeking to determine their path to modernisation, in a manner that balances their concern to preserve a distinctive identity with a drive for progress”.²¹⁸

For the second strategy, revivalism perceives the nation as a community of sacrifice; thus, the creation of a cult of sacrifice against the existing myths of the structure and system of authority is vital for nationalism.²¹⁹ This strategy serves dual purposes, allowing for the separation of nationalism from other status classes and making revivalist ideology a mass phenomenon in times of crisis. As said above, revivalism takes its power from combining traditionalist and modernist stances. This requires an alliance with existing structures such as state or traditional religious institutions, but revivalism can be subordinated to the interests of the state and religious or other elites.²²⁰ Revivalist projects therefore need an autonomous sphere in which to realize their purposes against other forms of dominance. In this respect, the construction of “a community of sacrifice with its separate mythos, capable of overriding established mythologies”, enables cultural nationalists to separate themselves from clerics and state elites.²²¹ In this interpretation of community, the devotion of the people to the nation, in the form of blood sacrifice, is regarded as the constitutive element of the nation. Thus, the sacrificial nation becomes an object of worship for nationalists, which differentiates them from the rest.²²²

This is also the moment in which revivalism as an elite project becomes a mass movement. Young nationalists represent themselves as the voice of the nation, who

²¹⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 68.

²¹⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 69.

²¹⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 46.

²²⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 69.

²²¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 69.

²²² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 70.

sacrifice themselves to the community to save it from danger. This semi-religious mission leads cultural nationalism to penetrate into the masses when the nation is challenged by an internal or external crisis, such as war or social revolution. Nationalists establish fresh national myths with their collective sacrifice against traditional enemies, which makes it possible to override traditional myths through the process of mythic overlaying.²²³ When the mobilized population reaches glory under the leadership of cultural nationalists, the new myth turns into official myth, inscribed in the popular consciousness through celebration of national days, ceremonies of remembrance, and education.²²⁴ However, the cultural nationalist construction of nation is a temporal construction. The nation is always broken down by unexpected shocks, such as wars, economic dislocations, ideological revolutions, mass migrations, and demographic changes. Nationalism is thus an episodic movement, recalling a national past offering cognitive maps, meanings, and inspiration in times of crisis.²²⁵

3.2.5 Masses in the Duality of Hot and Banal Nationalism

Hutchinson adds another dimension to his theory by borrowing Michel Billig's hot and banal nationalisms and arguing that analyzing nationalism with cultural nationalism is not enough to explain the mass character of nationalism. That is just the analysis of the nationalist version of nation and nationalism, which modernists do by viewing the nation as an elite phenomenon.²²⁶ By using the distinction between hot nationalism, or transformational movements produced by a sense of crisis, and banal nationalism, or the everyday consumption of nationalism, he proposes that nationalism produced in everyday life is the source of mass nationalism that can be used against both the state and elites.

²²³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 71.

²²⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 71.

²²⁵ Hutchinson, *Nationalism and War*, 10.

²²⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 115.

Hutchinson regards nationalism as a movement from below in contrast with the modernists' top-down explanation. He criticizes the modernist top-down account on three grounds, mostly focused on the statist interpretation of historical sociology. First of all, modernist scholars including Charles Tilly and Eric Hobsbawm date the emergence of the mass nation to the second half of the 19th century as a result of state centralization, which brings the integration of populations into a common economic and political space.²²⁷ In other words, the state, in the industrial world, is the primary factor for the creation of consolidated and homogeneous collectivity as mass nation.²²⁸ For Hutchinson this top-down approach does not explain why minority nationalisms develop against the state, as was seen to intensify in the period between 1870 and 1914.²²⁹ In the process of national formation, ethnicity plays a significant role. In this respect, attempts at state homogenization are viewed by ethnic minorities as a process driven by the interest of dominant ethnic identities. As a result, minority nationalism naturally develops against the state's homogenization policies. Secondly, for most modernists, military revolution causes the rise of national states, which maintain large popular armies to protect themselves in the competitive European state structure. The state, possessing both the institution of primary education and universal military conscription, facilitates the formation of the mass nation, which serves for the defense of the nation in times of crisis.²³⁰ According to Hutchinson, universal conscription generally results in national differentiation rather than national unity. Citing Cynthia Enloe, he proposes that ethnicity is an important element for conscription, because state elites are always concerned with the loyalty of ethnic groups within the nation. Thus, state elites are mostly ethnically selective in the conscription process, excluding minorities, which results in minority nationalism.²³¹ As a result, the mass nation cannot be understood from a militaristic explanation.

²²⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 118.

²²⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 119.

²²⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 119.

²³⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 118.

²³¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 120.

Thirdly, for modernists, the economic dominance of the state forms a homogeneous market in which the solidarity of the people increases. In this respect, the state offers the protection of property, regulation of internal and international trade, supervision of the money supply and financial institutions, supportive tax structures, and macroeconomic policies.²³² As a result, the national economy becomes a sphere of common fate, in which the population is harmonized into a single economic cycle.²³³ However, Hutchinson argues that “exchange and interest rates, trade policies and taxes have always had an uneven impact on regional economies and where such disparities are long term and are overlaid on ethnic differences, they can excite ethnic autonomist campaigns to control their own economic destiny”.²³⁴ With reference to Hechter, he supports his claim with the Scottish, Welsh, and Basque cases.²³⁵

Because of these inadequacies of the statist or elitist interpretations of nation, Hutchinson introduces banal and hot nationalism to explain the mass nation. Hot nationalism refers to the cultural nationalism emerging in times of crisis as an elite project, as described above. It is a didactic, transformative, and episodic movement, which “aims to instill the idea of the nation as a sacred and transcendent object of worship for which people must make sacrifices”.²³⁶ Banal nationalism, on the other hand, is the “nationalism of populations who ‘consume’ nationalism in a relatively unselfconscious manner as a guide to the conduct of everyday life as expressed in popular songs, political posters, stamps, banknotes, coinage and brand names of staple products”.²³⁷ Both banal and hot nationalism take their roots from a multi-layered cultural heritage as a defense mechanism to protect the distinctiveness of the national

²³² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 117.

²³³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 118.

²³⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 120.

²³⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 120.

²³⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 129.

²³⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 129.

culture, homeland integrity, economic power, and political autonomy in times of crisis.²³⁸

For Hutchison, four important domains of crisis provide the texture of national culture upon which banal and hot nationalism sustain their powers and merge together: warfare and military mobilization, economic dislocations, natural disturbances, and ideological threats create the layers of experience for national memory, which is used in the everyday production of nationalism and cultural nationalist mobilization. In times of such crises, the nation becomes the point of reference as a sacrificial community above regional, class, and religious differences. After the crisis fades, however, individuals return to their multiple competing loyalties, and nation as a unitary autonomous society remains a myth.²³⁹ Warfare is the most important agent for national crystallization, which continuously engenders the redefinition of populations with respect to each other. It is mostly the outcome of state failure to protect the nation against an enemy, which leads cultural nationalists to organize the masses as a community of sacrifice.²⁴⁰ For Hutchison, although his analysis is limited to Jews in Europe, economic revolutions and dislocations are other important sources of national revival for both banal and hot nationalism. In times of crisis, ethnic differences begin to be expressed in the form of economic tensions among groups, especially when the economic structure is disturbed. For example, due to uneven development, economic innovations in Eastern Europe create developed centers dominated by Jews and this causes waves of migration from the German countryside into these centers. Thus, economic competition turns into ethnic competition among Jews and Germans.²⁴¹ Furthermore, in the second half of the 19th century, large-scale economic crises in traditional national sectors as a result of financial speculations

²³⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 147.

²³⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 147.

²⁴⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 138.

²⁴¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 142.

enhance anti-Semitic nationalism in Europe.²⁴² Natural disturbances such as changes in population balances with famines, diseases, or ecological disasters also contribute to the formation of national memories. For example, the population explosion in Eastern Europe leads to competition for land, which brings about nationalist mobilization for independence among Magyars, Czechs, and Poles. The Great Famine in Ireland also enhances Irish nationalism.²⁴³ To Hutchinson, ideological competitions are another spring for national revival, encouraging religious confrontation among traditional enemies. As an example, he gives Protestant Britain and Catholic France viewing each other as threats against their respective constitutional values. Similarly, Irish nationals reject the British attempt to introduce secular education in the 1840s on the grounds that it undermines national values.²⁴⁴ From this analysis, Hutchinson concludes that nationalism is an episodic movement targeting the nation as a sacrificial community triggered by warfare, ideological threat, economic dislocations, or natural disturbances as an autonomous entity outside of the state. Due to these crises, hot nationalism as a self-conscious, elite movement and banal nationalism, unconsciously consumed, come into a mass nation for the survival of sacred national values.

3.2.6 The National Area as a Zone of Conflict

According to Hutchison, a nation is not a unitary homogeneous entity but rather a zone of conflict in which different interpretations of an ethnic past conflict.²⁴⁵ In other words, historical ethnicity is a multi-layered construction that enables nationalists to select verities of myth and symbols and to implement different modernizing policies. Furthermore, the multilayered aspect of ethnicity forms cultural clusters, which divide nations and engender long-running cultural wars within them.²⁴⁶ However, divisions

²⁴² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 142.

²⁴³ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 143.

²⁴⁴ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 144.

²⁴⁵ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 77.

²⁴⁶ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 78.

within nations do not lead to the fission of the population into separate communities due to the existence of common founding myths.²⁴⁷ Following these premises, Hutchinson suggests that cultural fault lines within a nation arise from collective experiences formed by historical events. His examples of these collective experiences are state-religious schisms in Russia, revolutions or civil wars in France, wars and colonization in Ireland, and the religio-national conflicts of the Czech.²⁴⁸

3.3 Finding the Social Power of Nation and Conclusion

As detailed above, Hutchinson defines “nation” as a moral community formed on the basis of a sense of common memory embedded in an older ethnic past. He also argues that the nation is the conflictual repertoire of the ethnic past. In this context, an important question must be asked: does it make sense to talk about both nations as cultural communities that organize around a common mythical past and nations as zones in which different interpretations of the mythical past conflict? In other words, how could an ethnic past be both an anchor for national identity and a source of conflict? Could the ethnic past as an ontological ground of national collectivity be maintained even if it produces differences within a collectivity that sometimes lead to the division of that national collectivity? This ontological duality in Hutchinson’s theory causes some criticism against his explanation for the power of the conception of nation in the modern world. The survival attempts of a national collectivity that deploys mythomoteurs to hold itself together in times of crisis can lead to the destruction of a nation. Nation as a survival mechanism therefore is not so rational and effective tool for the masses and revivalists as Hutchinson claims.

Hutchinson proposes that the sense of common values and consciousness holds the conflictual totality together, which reveals itself as characteristic of a nation in pursuit of an authentic past. In this sense, mythical symbols have important roles for the consolidation of division. “Such symbols offer a shared language through which differences are expressed and elaborated. By appealing to them as legitimising

²⁴⁷ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 103.

²⁴⁸ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 88.

devices, groups imply the existence of a larger and enfolding national entity in which they all participate and which, in turn, they acknowledge as exercising a coercive power over them”²⁴⁹ In France, the heroine Joan of Arc becomes the ethnic symbol of republicans, monarchists, and Bonapartists when France searches the past to find a common ground for these conflicting sides.²⁵⁰ Mir, autocracy, and orthodoxy are established as Russian characteristics, referred to as common denominators by both Slavophiles and Westerners. The irredentist Great Idea overcomes the Hellenic/Orthodox divisions in Greece.²⁵¹

However, mythomoteurs or symbols as anchors for national feeling are also sources of difference. As Hutchinson argues, the myth of Joan of Arc is interpreted differently by different cultural groups within France. For republicans, with the attempts of Michelet, Joan of Arc is presented as a heroine of France who fights against foreign invasion. For the Catholics, Joan of Arc is the savior of the Catholic Church. In this respect, Hutchinson says that the centrality of Joan of Arc makes the consolidation of the population possible, i.e. the claiming of the same symbol unites the different interpretations of that symbol. The same symbols for national solidarity, however, are also deployed to express differences, which sustain their power under the shadow of the symbols as in the case of republicans, monarchists, and Bonapartists in France, or Slavophiles and Westerners in Russia. Furthermore, symbols can even lead to the fission of nations. For example, in Ireland, the division between the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish paves the way for the establishment of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland because of the intensified sense of distance between these two groups.²⁵²

This dual function of the mythomoteur causes it to lose its role as the ontological criterion for the definition of nation. A mythomoteur, in this regard, becomes an ambiguous concept. It functions as anything to be used in the definition of a

²⁴⁹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 104.

²⁵⁰ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 104.

²⁵¹ Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 105.

²⁵² Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, 107.

collectivity. For instance, people breathing air could be used as the criterion for the formation and division of a nation. From this perspective, a mythomoteur should not be seen as a source of a sense of commonality uniting national collectivity. What it shows, rather, is the diversity of interpretations, which could function to highlight differences within nations that may result in the fission of those nations. Hutchinson's claims could be perceived as valid to explain nationalism only if the nation is taken as a given entity, such as French, Russian, and Irish nations. This is a prior acceptance of national categories used in everyday life. Different interpretations of the same ethnic past could then act freely without causing the division of the nation. However, his theory becomes problematic in the sense that it ratifies, essentializes, and eternalizes the nation, which Hutchinson rejects.

This problem with the centrality of mythomoteur in Hutchinson's theory also precludes it from explaining why the concept of "nation" is heavily deployed in the modern world. According to Hutchinson, warfare and military mobilization, economic dislocations, natural disturbances, and ideological threats re-configure individual identities as nationals of a particular nation within the framework of the duality of hot and banal nationalism. In a period of crisis, the nationalism produced in everyday life turns into hot nationalism that overcomes regional or class differences among people and becomes the dominant ideology. In this regard, the power of the concept of nation is found in the proposition that national consolidation is the only mechanism enabling the survival of individuals and collectivities in a time of crisis. Because of that, masses affiliate themselves with nations and follow the nationalist ideologies propagated by revivalists. However, this reading cannot explain the power of the idea due to the fact that the mythomoteur acts as a source of conflict, as well; therefore, it is not determinative for the worldwide appeal of the concept of nation. First of all, a revivalist strategy to mediate the traditionalist and modernist divide by offering a third way would not be realized because of the conflict over the interpretation of constitutive myths. Secondly, the revivalist's strategy that presents the nation as a community of sacrifice by recalling a national past could not be actualized, again because of the lack of a mythomoteur. Therefore, the revivalist's

desire to penetrate into the masses and mobilize them for national salvation becomes an unattainable goal.

CHAPTER 4

NEO-WEBERIAN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE QUESTION OF NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

In the literature on nation and nationalism, there is a great tendency to interpret the power of the concept of nation within the framework of the nation state, and it is generally agreed that the power of the nation results from the emergence of the modern state. In other words, the nation state is regarded as the source for the power of nation. The following question thus presents itself: what is the relation between state and nation and nationalism? Is it coincidental, or is there a necessary relationship between them? For the neo-Weberian understanding, although the context varies, the answer is obvious: the modern state plays a determinative role in the formation of nation, which is also the main source for power concept of nation.

The effect of the state in this sense is dual. First of all, it offers social space on the national and international levels where national interaction takes place as an interplay of different nations with the homogenization of populations within national borders. Secondly, whether consciously or not, modern state actions nationalize populations through education, integration of economy, and formation of bureaucratic militaristic and representative bodies. This priority of the state also explains main political motivations of national movements. Nationalist movements mobilize to form their own nation states, and if they fail to do so, they push for more regional autonomy. In this regard, the national reconfiguration of a population serves for the functional needs of modern states; states get resources from their populations by using nationalism to fund military power in order to be safe in an anarchical state system. The nation state form emerges as the most powerful social entity both within its border and in the

international system. Holding violence in its hands as a monopolistic entity, it creates and enforces the nation.

This prioritization of state as the holder of a monopoly of violence in the formation of nation narrows the scope of nation; the national question is squeezed into the functional needs of the modern state. Seen most explicitly in Giddens' docile nation, this perspective hides the conflictual aspect of ethnic and nationalist mobilization against the state. A similar problem also plagues Tilly's account. Though he elaborates on state-seeking or state-led nationalisms, his elitist perspective is not sufficient to answer why some nations divide into separate nations and why ethnic groups mobilize. In addition, there is no answer to why populations of states must be perceived as natural totalities on which nations are crystallized. Giddens places the nation within the demarcated territory of a state that engages with other war-driven nation states. Likewise, Tilly emphasizes national and international spheres, in which states act as racketeers. However, in the imperial era of European states, what separated the Irish from the English, Haitian slaves from French citizens, or Germans from Austrians remains highly imprecise in his theory.

Mann's conceptualization of the social world with respect to four powers enables him to give a more comprehensive account of power of nation. His problematization of nation and class especially illuminates the ideological and economic context of nationalism and expands national phenomena beyond the need for a militaristic state. Capitalism, modern ideologies, and political representation are, in this context, deeply involved with the national question, but in disregarding collectivity as an impossible entity and relying on state crystallization, Mann's account reflects the problems of the neo-Weberian account. In Mann's narrative, the concept of the state and its population are interchangeably deployed to refer to nation. In this problematic conceptualization of nation, national difference is naturalized and social interaction along the borders of nations is trivialized. These problems can be called methodological nationalism. It shows that "nation" could not be reduced to "state".

With this insight, this section briefly summarizes the main features of the Neo-Weberian account and problematizes the narratives of Anthony Giddens and Charles

Tilly on national formation in 18th and 19th century Europe and their explanations of the power of nation. From there, Michael Mann's complex explanation is then addressed. After elaborating on his theoretical perspective, his account is criticized on the grounds that it reflects the problems of methodological nationalism.

4.1 Main Themes of Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology

4.1.1 War, State, and International State System

By contributing to the formation of the modern state and state system, which promotes national feeling, and by enhancing the sense of nationality among communities of belligerent states, for some scholars, war-making is vital for nation and nationalism. From this perspective, the geopolitical structure of the state system that creates both the modern state and international system requires the state to wage wars. Therefore, the emergence of the modern state is the natural consequence of the state's attempts to survive. The birth of nation and nationalism is perceived as being concomitant with the war-making process, as well. Feelings of enmity and survival shape the minds of people and motivate them. Most importantly, the state produces national feeling to finance itself against its enemies. Therefore, the modern state becomes the primary responsible for power of nation. This thesis labels this state-centric perspective as neo-Weberian historical sociology by relying on Faruk Yalvaç's classification.²⁵³

Perceiving the modern state as the dominant form of political power, which is carved out in geopolitical struggle among states, the neo-Weberian approach necessarily moves toward the domain of international relations. However, its engagement is limited to the realm of realism on the grounds that the state's main motivation as a unitary actor is to conduct war campaigns for gaining more. This logic rests on the assumption that warfare would bring advantages in comparison to rivals in terms of money, goods, deterrence, and pleasure. The war-making process thus naturally

²⁵³ Faruk Yalvaç, "Tarihsel sosyoloji ve uluslararası ilişkiler: jeopolitik, kapitalizm ve devletler sistemi", *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 10, no. 38 (2013): 8.

generates both the modern state and the international state system.²⁵⁴ In this regard, Charles Tilly perceives the involvement of the state with organized violence as a necessary condition and therein lies the existence of the state. In this system, where survival operates as the primary principle, states are obsessed with increasing their military capacity by conquering new territories. Therefore, waging war becomes a natural outcome of insecure state systems. Furthermore, due to this constitutive principle, states require the constant extraction of resources from their populations to be prepared for war and structure their internal ordering accordingly.²⁵⁵ In this account, the increasing scale of war in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries leads to a series of transformations in the structure of states and the state system, ending with the birth of the national state as the most powerful state form. Tilly divides the process of transformation of the state by war into four periods: patrimonialism (until the 1400s), brokerage (between the 1400s and 1700s), nationalization (between the 1700s and 1850s), and specialization (from the 1850s to present). In the patrimonial period the state extracts tribute or rent and the waging of war is conducted by tribes, feudal levies, and urban militias. In the brokerage era war is funded by credits from independent capitalists and armies are hired from contractors. In the nationalization period, the administrative body of the state controls the appropriation of resources from the population and its armies and navies based on nationals' taxes. In the specialization period, the distinction between economy and military is sharpened and war-making turns into a specialized activity checked by a representative body.²⁵⁶ From the 16th century onward, the spiral of warfare accompanies the last three periods with increasing brutality. Measured with respect to the soaring number of casualties, wars become more coercive, more intense, and more destructive. Armies also grow in size and the means of war cost states more and more. As a result, few states survive

²⁵⁴ John M. Hobson, “Weberian historical sociology”, in *The State and International Relations: Themes in International Relations*, ed. John M. Hobson, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 182.

²⁵⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Press, 1990), 15.

²⁵⁶ Tilly, *Coercion*, 29.

in this highly competitive political structure, but even the survivors are challenged by revolution, rebellion, and civil wars, ending up with the nation state.²⁵⁷

In the same vein, accepting Tilly's premise that war-making is a catalyst for the modern state and state system, Theda Skocpol and Michael Mann revive Otto Hintze's distinction of the two functions of the state: keeping order within borders and waging war against external powers. These two functions of states are intertwined; there is a dialectical relation between external and internal functions. The state's attempts to find recourses to wage war against geopolitical rivals or reshape its internal structure and the dynamics of its internal structure determine its external strength against rivals.²⁵⁸ Giddens similarly pays attention to the advent of the nation state and war by making reference to Hintze.²⁵⁹

In addition to contributing to the formation of the state and state system, for neo-Weberians, war-making processes also make collectivities aware of their national identities. Head-on confrontation between collectivists develops a feeling of enmity and a sense of collectivity. However, this proposition has a shortcoming, as in the era of the rise of nationalism there were fewer wars in Europe in comparison to other periods. The period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the Great War was the heyday of nationalisms, yet Europe was relatively peaceful in that period. Only three wars, the Crimean (1853-6), Franco-Prussian (1870-1), and Russo-Turkish (1877-8), were waged. Because of this inconsistency, neo-Weberians are elective in naming the events that lead to national formation, as can be seen in Mann's works, detailed below.

4.1.2 Violence as a Catalyst of the Modern State

For the neo-Weberian school, the legitimate use of violence is the primary character of the state, organizing its relations with the population and engendering national

²⁵⁷ Tilly, *Coercion*, 185-186.

²⁵⁸ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge 1979), 29-30.

²⁵⁹ Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 2, The Nation-State and Violence*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985) 26-27.

formation in the end. In this regard, the state's involvement in war-making processes conveys the retreat of violence from social life and the monopolization of violence by the state. The national question rests on the internal pacification of civil life and monopolization of violence in the hands of the state.

Endowing the national state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, as Weber suggests, Tilly emphasizes organized violence as the character distinguishing the national state from previous state forms and other social institutions. From the 17th century, the state monopolizes violence through general seizures of weapons at the ends of rebellions, prohibitions of duels, control over the production of weapons, introduction of licensing for private arms, and restrictions on public displays of armed force. The state thus becomes the only legitimate actor controlling and enforcing violence within its borders. This reformulation of state resulted from a series of transformations in European history.

Between the 15th and 18th centuries, mercenary forces rented by lords or entrepreneurs were the primary means of coercion for European states. Starting from the 18th century, states began to conscript their own populations. The substitution of hired mercenary forces with a national standing army emerged from the functional interest of states. First of all, depending on the contract, the commitment of mercenaries to the crown was unreliable: they could rebel when they were not paid enough. Furthermore, the economic burden of mercenaries was too much for European states to bear. On the contrary, national armies were cheaper and more reliable, and they fought better.²⁶⁰

Parallel to this transformation, European states moved to direct rule from indirect rule at the beginning of the 18th century. In the European state structure, indirect rule implied that rulers governed their subjects through intermediaries such as the clergy, landlords, urban oligarchies, and independent professional warriors, which enjoyed autonomy from state power and the populations they imposed their power upon. Despite the nationalization of armed forces, however, states still had to allocate large amounts of money for military spending in the ever-increasing geopolitical tensions

²⁶⁰ Tilly, *Coercion*, 80-86.

of the 18th century. The main economic source for the state was taxation: the extraction of resources from the population through intermediaries. As a result, indirect rule brought extra costs to state appropriation processes. Additionally, intermediaries in some circumstances could resist state authorities by aligning themselves with ordinary people.²⁶¹ Therefore, states with national standing armies had strong stimuli to move toward a direct role. The French revolution was the most sensational example of this, which resulted in the formation of a centralized model for other states to imitate and the spread of this model all over Europe through the Napoleonic conquests.²⁶²

In Europe, going to war accelerated these transformations: war intensified the demand for men to enlist and increased the need for more resources, thus forcing the state to obliterate intermediaries and to form national armies. This also brought the expansion of the state into non-militaristic areas, which reciprocally increased the control of citizens over the state. Nationalization of the army, for example, necessitates that the state bargain with the population over recruitment and taxes. The establishment of direct rule created systems of surveillance, such as police forces, through which the state controlled civilian movements against its power and deterred industrial conflicts. Similarly, the state installed and regulated the education system, organized aid campaigns for the poor and disabled, built communication networks, and so on. In return, citizens made claims for protection, adjudication, production, and distribution.²⁶³

The monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and the pacification of the population is also the main thrust of Giddens' work, but in a different direction, he elaborates on the retreat of violence from social life, or the monopolization of violence, with the insulation of violence from labor and capital relations. For Giddens, the monopolization of violence by the state goes along with the exclusion of the dominant

²⁶¹ Tilly, *Coercion*, 103-105.

²⁶² Tilly, *Coercion*, 108.

²⁶³ Tilly, *Coercion*, 115-118.

class from access to exercising violence over subordinate classes. A clear indicator of this is the change in the character of labor contracts. In the traditional form of exploitation, the exploiters, to some extent, were agents of the state, who had the capacity to deploy the means of violence and threaten the subordinate classes below. Production relations were thus backed by the threat and the use of force. On the contrary, in capitalistic labor contracts there is solely economic mutual dependency, independent of explicit violence, between workers and employers. In this sense, employers and workers are dependent on each other, which goes hand in hand with endemic conflict among them. This feature of capitalist exploitation is the integral element of the capitalist state, upon which the separation of polity and economy rests, whereby the relation between capitalist and wage laborer is kept non-political. This character of production relation, as explained below, is also the key for Giddens in understanding the importance of nationalism in the modern world.²⁶⁴

Likewise, Mann perceives the retreat of violence as an important component of the modern state and the emergence of the nation. For Mann, however, violence cannot be reduced to the state, with gangs of paramilitaries, criminals, or youth causing more casualties in the modern period. Therefore, he rephrases the monopoly of legitimate violence as a monopoly of institutionalized violence to clarify the popularity of the modern state. Furthermore, he offers the separation of military and political power. The first refers to the social organization of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion. The second implies the centralized, territorial regulation of social life.²⁶⁵ With this distinction, Mann elaborates the functional differences of political and military powers. This innovation of Mann relieves the exaggeration of violence in modern state formations.

²⁶⁴ Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. I, Power, Property and the State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 179-191.

²⁶⁵ Michael Mann, "The Sources of Social Power Revisited: a Response to Criticism," in *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 351-355.

4.1.3 Autonomous State and Nationalism

For most neo-Weberians, the modern state expresses a duality in the national and international spheres that configures it as an entity autonomous from society. In this context, the state cannot be reduced to the interests of groups and classes. This conceptualization of the state, however, raises the question of to what extent a nation state could be separated from the nation when we take into account some examples of nationalist movements mobilized against states. This is also the theoretical point of the neo-Weberian school targeted by critics.

For Theda Skocpol, the engagement of the state with war is also the source of the autonomy of the state. In her critical elaboration of Tilly's theory, she argues that Charles Tilly and Marxists mistakenly reduce the state to the interest of dominant classes or groups and disregard the autonomy of the state. The autonomy of the state means that the state is an organization claiming control over its territory; it forms and pursues goals that are not direct reflections of social groups and classes.²⁶⁶ For her, this autonomy results from two main functions of the state: from class-divided socio-economic structures and from international systems of states. First of all, the function of the state within its class-divided socio-economic population is the maintenance of order, which in some cases forces action against the interests of classes, even against the dominant classes. States mostly preserve their existing economic structures that benefit the dominant class, as Marxists argue. However, the state's own interest in controlling the population, forming a standing army, and collecting taxes leads it to make some concessions to subordinate classes. It can accordingly take autonomous action against even the dominant classes.²⁶⁷ Secondly, with respect to the international system, the state must compete with other actual or potential states in militaristic terms. In these geopolitical relations, with inter-state domination and competition, the

²⁶⁶ Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back in*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.

²⁶⁷ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1979), 30.

state manifests itself as an autonomous entity pursuing its own interests.²⁶⁸ Resting on this proposition, Michael Mann also regards the geopolitical structure as the primary source of state autonomy. However, he adds that state autonomy relies on state institutions rather than the autonomy of elites. In this respect, the state is not an active place kept separate from the interests of society.²⁶⁹

An important question arises within the dichotomy of state and society: is it possible to talk about the autonomy of the state with respect to ethnicity and nation? Put differently, is it possible to regard the nation state outside of the ethnic and national fabric of society? For neo-Weberians, the answer is not as clear as in Gellner's proposition that national and political units should be concurrent. However, they emphasize the vertical similarity of society and political units. The concept of the nation state for them actually implies the conjunction of the state with the nation. However, taking into account the ethnic heterogeneity of European states, defining the nation with respect to the state is a severe challenge for neo-Weberians. Tilly therefore uses the concept of national state in place of nation state to emphasize the ethnic diversity of populations.²⁷⁰

Neo-Weberians generally perceive nation as the creation of modern states emerging from international struggle. However, in order to explain the failure of states to homogenize populations, they re-conceptualize their state-centered understanding, which in some cases leads to the definition of states as ethnically neutral or ethnically selective. Charles Tilly, for instance, defines two kinds of nationalism in his later works: state-led and state-seeking nationalisms, differentiated in accordance with the manipulation of ethnicity by elites starting from the 18th century. As detailed below, he perceives states seeking nationalism as a natural consequence of state-led nationalism, which is engendered by the ethnic selectivity of some states. Mann dates

²⁶⁸ Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back in*, 8.

²⁶⁹ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: Volume II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52.

²⁷⁰ Tilly, *Coercion*, 2-3.

the birth of the nation to the 16th century for the development of national consciousness without any ethnic emphasis, but he elaborates on the ethnic configuration of the representative body of state in the Austrian Empire in the 19th century as state-subverting nationalism. In the unification of Germany he also positions ethnic ties as the motivation for state-creating nationalism. In his later work, ethnicity appears more clearly as the main problem that challenges existing regimes. In the Ottoman Empire and Germany ethnicity brings about ethnic cleansing for minorities.²⁷¹

In these accounts, however, it remains unclear why ethnic differences are important issues in the formation of some states and why they have no power in others. The problem here is generally that if the nation is the result of state actions over its population, in some cases, why does the state fail to nationalize its population, leading to nationalisms that have different motivations than the nationalism propagated by the state? The more problematic version of this theoretical gap belongs to Giddens' functional reading of nationalism. It could be said that his theory has shortcomings to explain nationalisms working against the state. Therefore, it cannot answer why the conception of nation is important for people who are thinking outside of state ideology.

4.2 Giddens' Docile Nation

For Giddens, nation and nationalism are distinctive properties of the nation state and their relations are more than coincidence. Nation state and nationalism are interwoven and they are embedded together in the development of capitalism. The functional need of the state and capitalism reconfigure people to act and live as nationals of a state, who are in constant pursuit of ontological security. This is the source of power of the concept of nation. However, Giddens is criticized on the grounds that over-exaggeration of state power causes his theory to show the deviants and dysfunctions of the system.

²⁷¹ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Giddens defines nationalism as “a phenomenon that is primarily psychological — the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communalism among the members of a political order”.²⁷² A nation is “a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states”.²⁷³ For the development of the nation, there should be unified administrative expansion over a territory upon which sovereignty is claimed. In this sense, the transformation of the frontier into borders in four aspects, allocation, delimitation, demarcation, and administration, is crucial. First of all, there should be allocation of territories among states. Secondly, there is delimitation of territories with the identification of specific borders. Thirdly, but not necessarily, borders should be marked within the physical environment, namely demarcation. Finally, borders should be administered, i.e. there should be direct or indirect surveillance of the borders, such as customs officials and frontier guards, or the central coordination of passport information.²⁷⁴ The nation state in this respect is a bordered power that claims a formalized monopoly over the means of violence. More precisely, “The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence”.²⁷⁵

According to Giddens, the emergence of this form of state and its nation was directly connected to industrial capitalism, which evolved from the early development of capitalism from the early 18th to late 18th century.²⁷⁶ Marked with the commodification of land and products in absolutist states, the process of early

²⁷² Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 116.

²⁷³ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 116.

²⁷⁴ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 120.

²⁷⁵ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 121.

²⁷⁶ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 148.

capitalism led to the freeing of mass labor forces from feudal structures. This was the commodification of labor upon which the configuration of a new form of state as nation state and economic structure as industrial capitalism was placed. In the novel system, the tension among classes continues, but the dominant class does not have access to the means of violence that it previously had. Therefore, double-edged surveillance becomes the key component of economic production and state structure. On the one hand, the state turns into a nation state by expanding its administrative capacity through pacification of the population within its territory in the 19th century. On the other hand, people gain citizenship rights and civil, economic, and political rights through class struggle, which also brings about the surveillance of the people of state structures.²⁷⁷

From the 16th century, popular disturbances resulting from capitalist developments produced armies of the poor and jobless. Likewise, there was an increase in the number of organizations such as prisons, hospitals, and asylums existing for the separation of some part of the population from the rest, i.e. sequestration, as Foucault calls it.²⁷⁸ These two developments shaped the relations between the state and people in the sense that a novel form of governance as disciplinary power monitoring society in the form of sanitary organizations emerged. Disciplinary power is based on surveillance in the context of information keeping or direct supervision. In this respect, there are many commonalities between prisons, asylums, and capitalistic workplaces, as in the case of the architectural similarities between 19th century prisons and factories in Britain.²⁷⁹ The prisons served to adjust criminals or deviants to society, and workplaces were designed like prisons to make labor forces docile for stable economic production.²⁸⁰ While disciplinary power became the organizing principle of social organizations, there was a retreat of violence from public life, as

²⁷⁷ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 159-169.

²⁷⁸ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 182.

²⁷⁹ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 184-186.

²⁸⁰ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 186.

measured by the decrease in rate of public capital punishment.²⁸¹ This was the general trend in the modern way of life; the sanctioning capacities of the state changed from manifest use of violence to surveillance and economic compulsion, enabling stable economic return.²⁸²

In the nation state form, surveillance replaced the explicit use of violence in the organization of social life, but the expansion of the administrative power of a state brings a reciprocal relationship between those who govern and those who are governed. While state surveillance increased, the capacity of subordinates to affect their rulers was also enhanced. The people's control over rulers developed through struggles over the three basic types of citizenship rights: civil rights, political rights, and economic rights. These mean surveillance as policing, surveillance as reflexive monitoring of state administrative power, and surveillance as management of production in turn.²⁸³ The double-edged surveillance in nation state form also created a natural source for nationalism as discursive articulation. The expansion of citizens' rights with the increasing level of literacy makes possible the discursive articulation of information in the public domain as ideology, which rests on the questions of what should be regarded as political, what is general will, and how the history of society should be written. In this context, the political character of nationalism implies unification of the state, thereby connecting citizenship and sovereignty.²⁸⁴

For Giddens, nationalism is always about some common symbols that form the content of nationalism. Nationalism is a system of symbols generated by passion for historical territory upon which cultural autonomy is claimed with the myth of origin. Culture in this sense contains a divergent set of values that evolves naturally as the unique character of the nation through the medium of language. As proposed by Herder, and generally in German romanticism, this nationalist idea, mediated by

²⁸¹ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 188.

²⁸² Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 191.

²⁸³ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 202-206.

²⁸⁴ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 212.

sovereignty and citizenship, has become a strong force in the modern world.²⁸⁵ This premise of nationalism manifests itself whether in the form of national aggressiveness with the idea of sovereignty against foreign powers or as democratic ideals of enlightenment expressed with citizens' rights.²⁸⁶ Additionally, in nation state form, the state has great administrative and territorial unity in comparison to the past, but there should be cultural homogeneity of the population, as well. Therefore, producing a common language and common symbolic history, i.e. matching the political boundaries with the existing language communities, is necessary for the unity of nation states.²⁸⁷

Within this framework, Giddens emphasizes the psychological character of nationalism that also explains the creation of a symbolic past. In this regard, nationalism first of all provides the spirit of solidarity and collective commitment in times of crisis. Secondly and most importantly, it gives symbols for ontological security in day-to-day life, i.e. it relieves the existential contradiction of human beings.²⁸⁸ In the pre-modern way of life the daily routine of people was enhanced by moral support for tradition. In nation state form, however, deviances such as death, sickness, and madness, which psychologically disturb social life, are expelled from day-to-day life through sequestration, with the separation of existential contradiction from routines. In this process, social life turns into morally meaningless routines.²⁸⁹ At this point, nationalism fills the gap by providing ontological security through collective symbols such as common languages and common history.²⁹⁰

From this reading, it can be inferred that Giddens' argumentation on the national question rests on its functional pervasion in capitalism and the modern state.

²⁸⁵ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 217.

²⁸⁶ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 218.

²⁸⁷ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 219-220.

²⁸⁸ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 214.

²⁸⁹ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 196.

²⁹⁰ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 218.

Nationalism, nation state, and capitalist industrial production enhance, enforce, and create each other. Therefore, Giddens proposes that nationalism could not be regarded as a deviation from Western political thought as proposed by Elie Kedourie.²⁹¹ In this argument, however, the question about struggle against the nation state or capitalism remains unclear. There is no answer about ethnic mobilization against homogenization attempts of the state, or for anti-colonial movements. In addition to this problem, his emphasis on surveillance and the according understating of nationalism are severally criticized by Mann on two grounds. First of all, Mann argues that Giddens, like Foucault, provides an account of an all-powerful, all-surveilling, all-disciplining nation state by exaggerating its power. However, he does not explain when and where this Leviathan emerges and who controls it, or who is doing what to whom.²⁹² Secondly, Mann says that though there were some transformations in the repressive force of the state, i.e. the decrease of violence in everyday life and the overt usage of force, with the separation of a policing form of military power, as Giddens argues, the pacification of society through policing and internalized discipline was an achievement of the 20th century, not the 19th century. Although maintenance of order with less oppression was practiced in 19th century Europe, the overt use of violence with military power was still an important instrument.²⁹³ Additionally, there was not a total retreat of military force from the maintenance of order in domestic politics or separation of military force to war-making processes. On the contrary, military repression in the domestic sphere played a significant role in the 19th century and even in the 20th century. Mann divides the deployment of military power for domestic order into two periods. Between 1600 and 1800, state-controlled armies were primarily responsible for, first of all, policing, i.e. combating crime with simple weapons, and secondly for controlling riots by shows of explicit military force. From the beginning of the 19th century, however, central military armies increasingly started to share these

²⁹¹ Giddens, *The Nation-State*, 219.

²⁹² Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume III: Global Empires and Revolution, 1890–1945*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 359.

²⁹³ Mann, *Volume III*, 405-406.

domestic duties with paramilitary groups and police forces. Therefore, these three divisions of force within the domestic sphere coped with ascending levels of threats to order, such as food riots, smuggling, and labor disputes. Military repression continued, but it was accompanied by the growth of police and paramilitary forces.²⁹⁴ Giddens' theorization of nationalism within the process of pacification of society through surveillance in 19th century Europe thus has empirical problems that demonstrate the falseness of the theoretical propositions.

4.3 Tilly's Dual Nationalism

By putting the state at the center, Charles Tilly defines two kinds of nationalism: state-led nationalism and state-seeking nationalism. State-led nationalism “refers to the mobilisation of the population of an existing state around a strong identification with that state”, as in the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War, with the clashing of British and Argentinean nationalisms.²⁹⁵ State-seeking nationalism, on the other hand, “refers to the mobilisation of populations that do not have their own state around a claim to political independence”, as in Palestinian, Armenian, Welsh, and French-Canadian nationalisms.²⁹⁶ State-led nationalism emerged as the homogenization of populations out of rulers’ attempts to extract the means of wars from reluctant populations and the substitution of indirect rule for direct rule accordingly at the beginning of the 19th century.²⁹⁷ Inheriting heterogeneous subjects, European states started to integrate their populations with the process of the crystallization of national symbols, standardization of national languages, and organization of national labor markets.²⁹⁸ However, state-led nationalism also provoked the mobilization, formation, and claim-making of ethnic groups, “by legitimating the potent principle of correspondence

²⁹⁴ Mann, *Volume III*, 408.

²⁹⁵ Tilly, *Coercion*, 116.

²⁹⁶ Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992,” *Theory and Society*, 23, no. 1 (February 1994): 133.

²⁹⁷ Tilly, “States,” 142.

²⁹⁸ Tilly, *Coercion*, 116.

between people and state, by greatly increasing the advantages to any group of controlling its own state (not to mention the disadvantages of not controlling its own state), by more frequently situating cultural minorities within one state adjacent to cultural majorities in neighboring states, by diminishing state toleration of distinctive cultural enclaves, and by coercing assimilation of minorities, which in their turn threatened the positions of regional intelligentsias and bourgeoisies as cultural brokers".²⁹⁹ Therefore, state-led nationalism is the main source of production of state-seeking nationalism. Whenever rulers claim power over different ethnic groups, state-seeking nationalism manifests itself. It should be mentioned, however, that Tilly's emphasis on ethnicity expanded in his later work to include other social categories manipulated by cultural brokers or elites. By revising the elitist perspective of John Breuilly as a state-centric approach, Tilly argues that political brokers with investments in other languages, histories, and communities developed alternative perceptions of nation against state-driven top-down nationalism.³⁰⁰

These two distinctions have some shortcomings. First of all, Tilly's revision of political brokers falls into the trap of the elitist perspective. While perceiving the national question as a modern phenomenon, he totally divorces it from its pre-modern ties. As a solution, he sticks to ethnicity as a given concept manipulated by elites. However, as Rogers Brubaker argues, he does not explain why masses have to follow the elite perception.³⁰¹

Secondly, it is not clear why some states failed to achieve national homogeneity or why national homogenization conducted by a state might pave the way to state-seeking nationalism. If national homogenization was produced by state-led nationalism, should we not expect the assimilation of national differences into the state-enforced nation rather than state-seeking nationalism? As a matter of fact, Tilly

²⁹⁹ Tilly, "States," 142.

³⁰⁰ Tilly, "States," 304.

³⁰¹ Rogers Brubaker, "Charles Tilly as a Theorist of Nationalism," *The American Sociologist*, 41, no. 4 (December 2010): 379.

accepts the difficulty of this problem, stating that if there were a Nobel prize for political science, it would go to the person who could answer the question of under what conditions ethnic communities make claims to control their own states.³⁰² That question rests on the reality of the existence of a great number of ethnic groups in comparison to a limited number of states. Not all ethnic groups have their own state and not all ethnic groups aim to form their own state.

4.4 Michael Mann's Social Powers

Michael Mann, citing Flaubert, says that “Writing history is like drinking an ocean and pissing a cupful”, and that he aims to drink less but drink a thicker liquid, recounting human history from the beginning to the 21st century within four volumes.³⁰³ Mann’s tool is the analysis of the social world according to four sources of social power: military, economic, ideological, and political power. The question of nation and nationalism in this context is embedded in the development of four sources of power in the modern world. In this chapter, after assessing the main argument of his general theory, his analysis of nation and power of nation are addressed. At the end, a critical analysis of his theory is provided on the basis of methodological nationalism.

4.4.1 General Theoretical Framework

Mann’s massive story of human history begins with the problematization of society. For Mann, society is an impossible entity; it is neither a unitary social system nor a totality. Because of that, there are no sub-systems, dimensions, levels, or systematic properties to which society could be reduced.³⁰⁴ Due to this impossibility of society, the main subject of sociology, Mann finds another anchor for his theory: the analysis of sources of social powers. For Mann, societies are constituted of multiple

³⁰² Charles Tilly, “Ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union,” *Theory and Society* 20, no. 5 (October 1991): 569.

³⁰³ Mann, *Volume III*, 3.

³⁰⁴ Mann, *Volume III*, 1.

overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power wherein he recognizes the interrelation of four sources of social power: economic, military, political, and ideological.³⁰⁵

Social power comes from human nature: restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase the enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so.³⁰⁶ In this respect, in order to achieve their goals, human beings enter into power relations involving both cooperation and conflict with other people, and these relations generate societies.³⁰⁷ For Mann, though, power does not have one single character. There are three modalities of power that exist as dualities: distributive and collective powers, organized and diffused powers, and extensive and intensive powers.³⁰⁸

These three modalities of power generate different combinations of powers, or in other words complex power relations. However, the multiplicity of powers makes it hard to construct a generalizable theory of powers. Therefore, for a proper analysis, Mann turns to Marxist and neo-Weberian stratification theories. Both theoretical traditions share the premise that social stratification is the overall creation and distribution of power in society.³⁰⁹ These two traditions also emphasize three power organizations, namely class, party, and status. For Mann, however, there are four power sources: military, ideological, economic, and political. While class and status refer to the economic and the ideological, party should be separated as military and political. With this insight, Mann argues that these four kinds of powers should be the focal point for the analysis of the social world. They are the centers of intensification of power modalities in the form of the organization and determinative structure of

³⁰⁵ Mann, *Volume III*, 2.

³⁰⁶ Mann, *Volume III*, 4.

³⁰⁷ Mann, *Volume III*, 5.

³⁰⁸ Mann, *Volume III*, 7.

³⁰⁹ Mann, *Volume III*, 10.

social life, i.e. shortcuts to understanding human totalities throughout history.³¹⁰ These four sources of power are actually ideal types in a Weberian sense. They do not exist in pure form, but rather in impure mixtures within social life. Put differently, they are woven in and out of each other, so they have promiscuous relationships.³¹¹ Therefore, power sources generate overlapping, intersecting networks of relations with different socio-spatial boundaries and temporal dynamics, and these social power sources have a degree of autonomy from each other, especially in modern societies.³¹²

4.4.1.1 Ideological Power Source

Ideological power functions in three domains as discussed by the most prominent sociologists: Weber, Durkheim, and Bloch. First of all, it is argued that the social world could not be perceived directly through sense and perception. Categories and concepts of meaning are needed for social organization. Therefore, holding a monopoly over meaning is a significant source for social power as Weber suggests.³¹³ A shared normative understanding is necessary for social cooperation, as in the case of religion, as advocated by Durkheim. In this sense, ideological power provides the necessary cement for social cooperation. In other words, the monopolization of norms is a way to power.³¹⁴ Lastly, as Bloch claims, there is distinctive power in esthetic and ritual practices, which may contradict rationality. Song, dance, visual art forms, and rituals controlled by a group provide distinctive social power.³¹⁵ In general,

³¹⁰ Mann, *Volume III*, 30.

³¹¹ Mann, *Volume III*, 16.

³¹² Mann, *Volume III*, 15.

³¹³ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 22.

³¹⁴ Mann, *Volume I*, 22.

³¹⁵ Mann, *Volume I*, 23.

norms, meanings, and rituals and esthetics are the main source of ideological power; they give a distinctive source of power that persuades the masses to be dominated.

Ideological power also takes shape as organizational powers, which appear in two forms. First of all, it is autonomous and socio-spatially transcendental. It transcends economic and military political powers and sets sacred authority. It thereby develops a powerful autonomous role that makes possible the emergence of greater exploitation and cooperation of social totality. In this argument, Mann's classification mostly emphasizes the role of religion as an autonomous and transcendental power source. For him, religion arises because of its practical benefits for social integration. Religion creates a society like a community, which offers a distinctive socio-spatial method of dealing with emergent social problems. The second configuration of ideological power as organization is immanent morale. By intensifying cohesion and confidence, it strengthens the power of already established social groups.³¹⁶

4.4.1.2 Economic Power Source

Economic power is based on the satisfaction of needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of objects of nature.³¹⁷ The groups formed around these tasks are classes. A class is a purely economic power group and it has differential power in accordance with social stratification. A ruling class, for example, monopolizes economic power sources to dominate a state-centered society. From a broader perspective, economic organization implies circuits of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Production and exchange are the two important sources of economic power. Production is an intensive power form because it relies on the mass of workers laboring and expressing themselves through the conquest of nature. Economic organization is also complex, with extensive circuits of exchange into which millions may be locked by impersonal forces. Economic organization could therefore be positioned as a socio-spatial

³¹⁶ Mann, *Volume I*, 23, 24.

³¹⁷ Mann, *Volume I*, 24.

combination of extensive and intensive power, and of diffused and authoritative power.³¹⁸

4.4.1.3 Military Power Source

Military power takes its basic form from the necessity of organized physical defense and aggression. It concerns life and death, defense and offense.³¹⁹ Military organization is concentrated and coercive: it uses violence as the most concentrated instrument of human power in wartime. In most cases, though, the tactics of military organization are also deployed in peace time. For example, militarist social control is deployed in the coerced labor forces of plantations or mines, or in cities for the building of city fortifications, monuments, and roads. Military organizations exercise power over larger areas, which may even go beyond state territories. Throughout most of history, the military power of the state has had a greater range than economic relations or the state-controlled territories. In these external areas, military power is conducted as a terroristic form of power, which can subordinate locals to supply tribute or recognize suzerainty. Military power is thus socio-spatially dual: in the core, it exercises coerced control, while in surrounding territories, it terrorizes the population.³²⁰

4.4.1.4 Political Power Source

Political power derives from the usefulness of centrally administered, territorialized, and institutionalized social relations. All social power organizations have such benefits to some extent. Political power, however, is differentiated on the grounds that it is centralized as state power and functions within the demarcated boundaries of the state. The political power organization of a state is thus a centralized and territorially bounded organization.³²¹ Political power organization has dual forms

³¹⁸ Mann, *Volume I*, 25.

³¹⁹ Mann, *Volume I*, 24.

³²⁰ Mann, *Volume I*, 26.

³²¹ Mann, *Volume I*, 26.

socio-spatially. Domestically, it is a territorially centralized and territorially bounded power, able to exercise autonomous power. Internationally, the state develops relationships with other states as geopolitical diplomacy.³²²

4.4.2 State and Capitalism

4.4.2.1 Capitalism, National State, and Nation Class

As mentioned above, these four power sources are the determinants of social life throughout history. In some periods, though, some power forms become more dominant than the others. In the 18th century, military and economic power shape the Western social structure, while in the 19th century military power is subsumed by political power and economic power. Capitalism and its classes, and the state and its nation, become the dominant power sources, and they both carve out modern Europe. Nation and nationalism, in this context, are embedded in the development of economic power and political power sources in the 18th century.

For Mann, by 1760, economic power relations were dominated by capitalism. Following Marx, he defines capitalism as commodity production, in which every factor of production is a means rather than an ends, and all factors are exchangeable with each other.³²³ In the capitalist system, private ownership of means are guaranteed; laborers are free to sell their labor, but they do not have control over the surplus value.³²⁴ This claimed Marxist understanding of capitalism, however, deviates when Mann argues the notion of class. For Marx, Mann argues, class structure rests on effective possession of economic resources. In capitalist production, two main antagonistic classes emerge: capitalist owners and non-owning proletarians. The class conflict among them thus becomes the motor of modern development by generating its own ideologies, politics, and military struggles.³²⁵ For the formation of class, two

³²² Mann, *Volume I*, 27.

³²³ Mann, *Volume II*, 23, 24.

³²⁴ Mann, *Volume II*, 24.

³²⁵ Mann, *Volume II*, 26.

dimensions of class are required: objective economic conditions and subjective class consciousness. This is the famous distinction of class in itself and class for itself, i.e. class economically determined and class having socio-cultural consciousness. However, Mann argues that class just belongs to economic power relations, and with the other three power relations the modern form of social class takes shape. It is reductionism to prioritize economic production as the ultimate determinant of social life. Furthermore, class for Marx emerges as pure, political, trans-national, symmetrical, and dialectical. Capitalist production forms a pure trans-national class of capitalists and workers, who inherently conduct political struggles against each other. Mann says that this interpretation of class is an exaggeration on four grounds. First of all, economic sectors divide the working class into groups such as proletarians, industrial workers, peasants, and smallholders, and these groups conflict with each other rather than forming solidarity against capitalism.³²⁶ Second, economic production produces smaller segments of collectivities than class. Third, other strata and factions divide classes: there are professionals, merchants, factory owners and shopkeepers, and artisan masters within the bourgeois class; there are unskilled workers and skilled workers among the proletarians. Finally, the nation state cross-cuts the classes to create a national segment. Therefore, there is no trans-national proletarian or bourgeois class.³²⁷

Mann places special emphasis on this last point. For him, capitalism emerges within and between territories of states. Marx was thus wrong to assume trans-national working and bourgeois classes. Classes are socio-spatially structured by their domestic and geopolitical relations. In this respect, they can be analyzed in three forms. For trans-national classes, class struggle and organization surpass state boundaries with the global reach of capitalism and without reference to any state. State is thus irrelevant to class; classes can correct and manipulate the geopolitical conduct of states. This understanding of class is mostly shared by Marxists and

³²⁶ Mann, *Volume II*, 28.

³²⁷ Mann, *Volume II*, 29.

liberals.³²⁸ For nationalist or international classes, a class within a state perceives a class of another state as a threat to its economic interests. Therefore, it exploits others or competes with them through aggressive geo-economic and geopolitical policies. This perception of class is mainly used by recent Marxist and military schools.³²⁹ For national classes, class organization is limited to national boundaries. It has no serious geopolitical or geo-economic interests with respect to market or territory and no direct predisposition toward war or peace. Although there are some questions on nationhood, it is mainly inward-looking, divorced from international affairs.³³⁰ Among these three varieties of class interpretations, Mann suggests that although all forms have some weight, the nation class is the constitutive element of economic power in the 19th and 20th centuries. National class merges with nation through the structuring of the nation state and thus becomes the dominant actor.

In a broader sense, national class implies the middle class, consisting of the petite bourgeoisie, careerists, and professionals, as the primary actors for national crystallization of the state and propagators of the nation. At the beginning of the 19th century, nations came into existence with alliances between modernizing old regimes and the petite bourgeoisie. The middle class demanded ideological and political citizenship and thereby helped the conjunction of nation and state solidify into the nation state.³³¹ Throughout this period, the middle class became political citizens with the expansion of education, upon which the wealth of the middle class depended. Middle class families started to share in the cultural life of the nation and to distinguish themselves from the workers and peasants below them, pushing the state for political representation. When states became more centralized, modern, and secular, middle classes advocated for it against local/regional and religious

³²⁸ Michael Mann, *States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*, (Cambridge, Blackwell Publisher, 1988), 149.

³²⁹ Mann, Volume II, 32.

³³⁰ Mann, Volume II, 32.

³³¹ Mann, Volume II, 571.

community identities.³³² They also stayed loyal to the state when labor movements threatened the existing regime with the demand for political citizenship.

4.4.2.2 Mann's Modern State

Mann derives his theory of the modern state from Max Weber. Naming it institutional materialism, he offers a functionalist and institutional understanding of the modern state. As mentioned above, the aspect differentiating the state from other social organizations is its centralized and territorially bounded character. The modern national state, however, has multiple functions crystallized as national, representative, capitalist, or militarist. Furthermore, the modern state, with respect to its previous state form, diffuses its power through society, and in turn social groups gain a degree of control over state power. In this context, the nation state is highly engaged with civil society and represents its interests against other states in the geopolitical structure of the international domain.

For the definition of the modern state, Mann refers to Weber's analysis of three stages of institutional development of the state: political power, state, and modern state.³³³ First of all, political power is physical force territorially imposed by a ruling organization. Secondly, state is the continuous operation of political power by claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. Employing this explanation, Mann puts forward his own definition of state. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality in the sense that political relations radiate from a center to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making activities, backed up by some organized physical force.³³⁴ This understanding of state only differs from Weber's in one point. Mann argues that the state does not monopolize the means of physical force. Physical force is rather an autonomous force from state, even

³³² Mann, *Volume II*, 575.

³³³ Mann, *Volume II*, 54.

³³⁴ Mann, *Volume II*, 55.

in the modern state stage. This argumentation also lets him distinguish military power from political power as separate fields of power, as mentioned above. From this definition, Mann reaches four particularities of political institutions peculiar to all states. First of all, a state is a centralized institution over a delimited territory with binding power. Secondly, a state has duality in that it is person and place, i.e. power is invested, whether in political elites or institutions. There is also duality as the state is both center and territory, relying on relations between the center and the social world within a defined territory. Thirdly, the state does not have final unity or consistency due to the fact that it has multiple functions differentiated in accordance with the interests of social groups. Finally, the state is embedded in the geopolitical system, i.e. it requires political relations with other states. Therefore, the politics of a state in its own territory are entwined with geopolitics.³³⁵

In the modern stage of state, routine, formalized, rationalized institutions of state begin to penetrate into social life. This is a dual penetration: penetration of the state into social life with law and administration, and the penetration of citizens and parties into the state. Therefore, the state turns into a nation state, which represents the interest of citizens and pursues this distinct interest against the interest of citizens of other states.³³⁶

For Mann, having multiple institutions conducting multiple tasks, the state reveals the theoretical impossibility of a definition, and this becomes more complicated if it is taken into consideration that different states have different institutional structures. However, moving from institutional analysis toward functional analysis, or in other words analyzing the underlying functions of state institutions, can help us define the modern Western state in the 19th century. With this insight, Mann defines four higher levels of state crystallization. These are capitalist, militarist, and two highly engaged crystallizations: representative and national. These four functions of the modern state in the 19th century are interrelated and necessary for the existence of the modern

³³⁵ Mann, *Volume II*, 56.

³³⁶ Mann, *Volume II*, 57.

nation state. For capitalist crystallization, through commercialization and industrialization or competition, capitalist accumulation and private property are internalized in Europe. By the 1860s, almost all European states have become capitalist, although their economic development varies.³³⁷ Representative and national crystallizations revolve around citizenship. While the first pertains to the question of who will enjoy citizenship, the second one addresses where to place it. Representative crystallization is an outcome of the process of politicization of social life and depends on contestation, or the struggle against monarchy, and on participation, or the struggle for voting rights of many sections of society such as women or the working classes. Western history is an uneven movement from despotic rule to party democracy.³³⁸ For national crystallization the problem runs between local-regional party democracy and centralized representative democracy against despotic powers. In this dichotomy, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional minorities support the establishment of local regional representation against national centralization. Lastly, militarist crystallization relies on domestic and geopolitical repression as seen by the share of military spending of states. Domestically, militarism functions for representative and national crystallizations. Internationally it is pursued for national interest within geopolitical struggles.³³⁹

One of the most contentious questions in this respect is the autonomy of the state. Relying on the proposition of Theda Skocpol, Mann emphasizes war to explain the autonomy of states, which makes the state stand above the interests of class and other components of society. However, Mann adds that perceiving the state elite as a source of autonomy of the state disregards the reality that ruling elites could not be totally isolated from the social fabric from which they come. It is thus not persuasive to define state autonomy with respect to individuals. In its place, Mann offers that the autonomy of the state should be understood within the “autonomous logic of definite

³³⁷ Mann, *Volume II*, 82.

³³⁸ Mann, *Volume II*, 83.

³³⁹ Mann, *Volume II*, 86.

political institutions, arisen in the course of previous power struggles, then institutionalized and constraining present struggles".³⁴⁰

With this insight, for Mann, the modern state emerged in the 18th century as a militaristic organization, which took its modern appearance through processes of growth in its size, in the scope of its functions, in its administrative bureaucratization, and in its political representation.³⁴¹ Measured by state expenditures, there are two periods of growth in state size. The first is the 18th century with growth in military spending. "In earlier centuries, state expenditures had consumed under 3 percent of gross national product in peacetime, perhaps about 5 percent in wartime. By the 1760s this had risen to 10 percent in peacetime and 20 percent in wartime (30 percent in Prussia), and during the Napoleonic Wars it rose to 30 percent to 40 percent".³⁴² This was mainly due to the ever-increasing geopolitical risks that forced European states to undertake extensive military expenditures. Between 1740 and 1815, most states were fighting major wars, such as the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution, and the Napoleonic War, which consumed two-thirds of their time. The outcome was militarization of the state in that period, which demanded more manpower, taxation, and agricultural and industrial production.³⁴³ However, the upward military spending of the 18th century experienced a reversed trend in the 19th century. This occurred because, first of all, there were relative declines of the frequency and duration of European wars between 1815 and 1914. The Austro-Prussian, Franco-Prussian, and Crimean Wars required large armies, but only for short periods. Secondly, the developments in military tactics, organization, and technology decreased army costs in the 19th century. Finally, the effect of war in the 18th century continued in the 19th century and states had to repay the debts they had borrowed during wars.³⁴⁴

³⁴⁰ Mann, *Volume II*, 52.

³⁴¹ Mann, *Volume II*, 375.

³⁴² Mann, *Volume II*, 214-215.

³⁴³ Mann, *Volume II*, 371.

³⁴⁴ Mann, *Volume II*, 374.

Despite this decline in the military spending of European states in the 19th century, state expenditures continued to increase enormously. This was the second area of growth in state size: mainly in terms of civilian expenses. In European countries, state expenditure in civil functions skyrocketed, from about 25% in the 1760s to about 75% in the 1900s.³⁴⁵ The shift from military to civil activities derived from the expansion of the scope of state functions, which had been limited to armies and law and order before. State functions began to include education, transportation, postal and telegraph services, environmental activities, and agricultural and industrial subsidies.³⁴⁶ Through these novel state functions, new materials and symbolic communication infrastructures developed. The state penetrated into social life with the consent of the masses by relying on representation.

4.4.2.3 The Birth of Nation and Power of Nation

Like other neo-Weberians, as mentioned above, Michael Mann defines nation and nationalism with respect to the state. However, he differs in bringing class into the definition of nation. For him, nation is “an extensive cross-class community affirming its distinct ethnic identity and history and claiming its own state”.³⁴⁷ In this context, nation emerged with class and takes its modern shape through the configuration by the nation state. In this regard, he put emphasis on mass character of nation in place of elites. Contrary to Giddens and Tilly’s focus on elites he argues that although nation emerge as elite phenomenon, it evolves into mass movement especially in Industrial-Capitalist Phrase as detailed below. It can be seen also from detailed analysis below he study mass character of nationalism.

Nation is a product of developments in four sources of social power, through the transformation of these four power sources into four higher levels of state crystallization: capitalist, militarist, representative, and national, starting from 18th

³⁴⁵ Mann, *Volume II*, 375.

³⁴⁶ Mann, *Volume II*, 378.

³⁴⁷ Mann, *Volume II*, 215.

century nations. Therefore, nation and nationalism must be positioned as modern phenomena in many respects. At this point, however, it should be emphasized that for Mann, the sources of social power also verify the historical contingency of nationalism in addition to its modernity. In his critical analysis of Gellner's understanding of nationalism as the natural outcome of industrialization, Mann argues that nationalism has a more contingent character because it depends on "the specific inter-relations between a diversity of power relations, not merely economic ones".³⁴⁸ Therefore, nation and nationalism are necessarily modern phenomena that developed contingently as a result of interplay between four sources of social power.

To Mann, interest-driven theories like Marxism or neoclassical economics or rational choice theories cannot explain the intense collective passion generated by nationalism. In some circumstances nationalist movements express deep passion and solidarity to the extent that people will sacrifice their lives for the community, or they may use extreme violence and practice torture, killing, and even genocide against their enemies.³⁴⁹ For Mann, this is because of the configuration of nation as family. The nation possesses moral enthusiasm and passion, which organize it as a family on the basis of intense solidarity and emotion. In this respect, the power of nationalism comes from it generating a fictional family or supposed community of descent. Accordingly, nation as family is the principal moral and emotional agent of socialization, channeling love and hate.³⁵⁰ In times of crisis, this intense solidarity manifests itself in extreme forms, because the crises are perceived as threats to the whole collectivity, both the self and loved ones. Unjust bread prices, sales, land taxes, or conscription, for example, affect both women and men living on the same street, in the same village, or the same neighborhood. Although some people are not challenged by the crisis directly, they still feel its effects due to moral solidarity.

³⁴⁸ Michael Mann, "The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism," in *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*, ed. John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvi, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139.

³⁴⁹ Mann, *Volume II*, 227.

³⁵⁰ Mann, *Volume II*, 228.

Therefore, the moral enthusiasm of nationalism derives from the linkage between family and nation.³⁵¹

In this framework, nation and class emerge together with developments within four sources of social power, merged and evolved into a fully-fledged nation.³⁵² Three key transformations in Europe are important: nation state, capitalism, and discursive literacy. As detailed above, the nation state came into existence through four crystallizations. Transformations in economic and political power sources engendered nation and class within the borders of the state, while ideological power dispersed through discursive literacy and merged into nation and class. Ideological power also provided immanent collective morale and a transcendent message, i.e. a meaning system embodying ultimate values, norms, and ritual and esthetic practices. In this regard, for the emergence of nation, Mann periodizes two proto-national stages starting from the 16th century. In the 19th century, with the two further phases, militarist and industrial capitalist, national collectivities turned into fully fledged nations.

4.4.2.3.1 Proto-National Phase

In the proto-national phase, the development in ideological power is crucial.³⁵³ The transformation in ideological power is witnessed in the increasing rate of discursive literacy: the ability to read and write with the mastery of conversation and argument.³⁵⁴ Measured with change in percentage of signing literacy, the ability to sign one's name in the marriage register, discursive literacy doubled between the 17th and 18th centuries. In Sweden and New England, it reached 90% among males and

³⁵¹ Mann, *Volume II*, 227.

³⁵² Mann, *Volume II*, 3.

³⁵³ Mann, *Volume II*, 36.

³⁵⁴ Mann, *Volume II*, 36.

67% among females; it was respectively 60% and 45% among males and females in Britain, with 50% male literacy in France and Germany.³⁵⁵

Discursive literacy developed through six principal mediums. Churches propagated literacy from the 6th century. The military revolution of 1540-1660, triggering the demand for officers with full literacy and numeracy, enhanced the establishment of professional education. Higher bureaucrats of state administration became more secularized and educated in universities in place of churches. Massive expansion of commerce diffused literacy through contracts, accounts, and marketing methods. Increased demand for the profession of law, which doubled in the 18th century, engaged the public more with literacy. Finally, from the 17th century on, the writing, printing, and reading of literary products became prevalent among the middle class through capitalism. Newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets were printed and distributed starting from the 17th century. Academies, clubs, libraries, salons, taverns, and coffeehouses served as discursive discussion centers throughout Europe.³⁵⁶

Mann roughly divides the proto-national phase into two periods. The first proto-national stage started in the 16th century with the confrontation between Protestantism and Catholicism in the Counter-Reformation. In this era, the technical revolution in printing made the duplication and circulation of texts abundant and literacy rates rose. This was mainly because both Protestant and Catholic churches encouraged Bible reading and writing. In most countries the churches spread networks of discursive literacy and began to dominate elementary education until the end of the 19th century.³⁵⁷ These networks of literacy enhanced the sense of shared community among literate subjects of a country. Furthermore, in this conflictual period, different churches were configured in different states and regions with vernacular languages.

³⁵⁵ Mann, *Volume II*, 37.

³⁵⁶ Mann, *Volume II*, 37, 38.

³⁵⁷ Mann, *Volume II*, 37.

Thus, it intensified the sense of community among the literate middle class of a collectivity against collectivities represented by other churches.³⁵⁸

The second proto-national phase is the commercial statist phase, which began around 1700. Commercial capitalism and military state modernization took over the limited sense of shared community, and expanded and secularized it. Contracts, government records, army drill manuals, coffeehouse business discussions, and academies of notable officials all contributed to the expansion and enhancement of shared literate culture.³⁵⁹ In Europe, this development of discursive literacy took two different routes: commercial capitalist and military statist. Britain is an example of the commercial capitalist route. In the 18th century, rather than the state, the commercialization of agriculture and the expansion of overseas trade let literate groups increase, with membership varying among masters, ordinary men, merchants, and professionals. As a result, discursive literacy grew enormously, producing media for the old regime, the bourgeoisie, and the petty bourgeoisie.³⁶⁰ In Prussia and Austria, however, the development of discursive literacy was propagated by states. The army and administrative expansion increased the number of professionals, bureaucrats, officers, and universities. The Prussian and Austrian states, in this process, organized and controlled discursive literacy.³⁶¹ France represented a mixture of both routes. As a commercial and militarist state, the discursive literacy of France was triggered by bureaucratic and commercial demands.

With this transformation, values, norms, and ritual and esthetic practices reconfigured people and the petite bourgeoisie as class and nation. Ideological power gave immanent collective morale and a transcendent message to the collectivities, which

³⁵⁸ Mann, *Volume II*, 217.

³⁵⁹ Mann, *Volume II*, 38.

³⁶⁰ Mann, “The Emergence,” 140-141.

³⁶¹ Mann, *Volume II*, 38-39.

enabled them to define themselves and to separate themselves from other collectivities.³⁶²

4.4.2.3.2 Militarist Phase

In most of modern European history, fiscal crises provoked by military expenditures have shaped the political structure. Especially before 1792, militarism had a revolutionary effect, causing social discontent and the politicization of the petite bourgeoisie. Geopolitical pressure challenged states to find novel ways to levy taxes, loans, and conscriptions. As an outcome, it brought benefits to some privileged groups, such as profitable office holding, economic monopolies, bondholding, and tax and conscription exemptions. However, it put greater and greater burden on the population via taxes and conscription services, which led to social discontent and tensions, and the transformation of national politics at the end.³⁶³

With the fiscal-military crises of states, national politics paved the way for class struggle over representation. Militarism made state elites rationalize state administrations and remove privileged groups. These, actions, however, created factions within regimes. Broader taxpaying classes such as the working class, petite bourgeoisie, and peasants had the chance to question the legitimacy of the state. Pioneered mostly by the petite bourgeoisie or ideological elites, these groups demanded civil citizenship; if that failed, they pushed for political citizenship. Whether by following a revolutionary path as in France or through the radical transformation of state institutions, as in Austria, Prussia, and England, political representation thus became a reality of European politics in that phase.³⁶⁴

This was also the process through which nations as cross-class self-conscious communities came into existence. In fiscal-military crises, property owners did not have enough numbers to resist the extraction of the state, which necessitated that they

³⁶² Mann, *Volume II*, 227.

³⁶³ Mann, *Volume II*, 221.

³⁶⁴ Mann, *Volume II*, 224.

turn to the populace for cooperation with the slogans of nation and people. Through this process, the people and the nation became politicized; the meaning of nation extended from a privileged group to the citizenship of the people.³⁶⁵ Therefore, self-conscious nations were born out the struggle for representative government. In this early period of the militarist phase, however, nation did not have an aggressive tone. Nation and nationalism were mainly used against reactionary dynasties to establish universal freedom and peace, but two developments reconfigured nation and nationalism. First of all, fiscal and manpower needs forced states more toward universal principles of administration, military service, and morality: the national state. Secondly, the scale of war required states to mobilize all their people to fight each other. This was the birth of aggressive popular nationalism between Britain and France at the beginning of the 19th century, which later spread all over Europe. From that time onwards, nations would fight each other to the death and define each other with negative stereotypes.³⁶⁶ Despite the resistance of dynasties or regional and religious movements, the nation and nationalism irreversibly set up their principles. By about 1815 Britain and France had transformed into centralized nation states. Though the Austrian and Prussian states were less centralized, they had some kind of national appeal, as well.³⁶⁷

4.4.2.3.3 Industrial Capitalist Phase

For Mann, the development after the 1870s was decisive for popular nationalism, which turned into a mass movement involving workers and peasants. It took on a more aggressive, emotional tone as a consequence of militarism and ideological reconfiguration as extended family.

In the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, the industrial phase of capitalism strengthened nations by mobilizing peasants, workers, and the middle

³⁶⁵ Mann, *Volume II*, 225.

³⁶⁶ Mann, *Volume II*, 240.

³⁶⁷ Mann, *Volume II*, 247.

class. As mentioned above, in the 19th century, there was an expansion of the scope of state functions. States undertook major civilian functions, sponsoring communications systems, canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph systems, and especially schools. This was an increase in the infrastructural power of states; national collectivities were thereby naturalized and became more homogeneous within the boundaries of states. States mostly responded to the needs of industrial capitalism by enhancing the penetration of the state into society and by pushing for centralization.³⁶⁸ While a few states were centralized in the 19th century, the questions of who should be a full citizen, i.e. the national issue, and where citizenship should be located were the main challenges for states. In any case, states moved toward more representative and more national structures by containing their populations at the end of the 19th century.

In the industrial phase, nationalism developed in three main ways. First of all, populations, mostly unconsciously, became naturalized. Nations turned into extensive communities of interaction and emotional attachment as extended families.⁷³⁴ Secondly, citizens from middle and upper classes and from religious and linguistic communities moved into nationalist organizations. They positioned national interests and honor above everything else and did not hesitate to engage in conflict with other nations on the grounds of these values. Thirdly, national populations were confined within the limits established by the state, military elites, and nationalists.³⁶⁹ Moreover, as industrial capitalism shaped the modern state, two state administrative units dominated national society, which made national feeling even more aggressive and emotional. In the bureaucratic sphere, thousands of employees started to depend more and more on the state for their life, while in military institutions, millions of young men were recruited and disciplined. Together with their families these state-dependent populations formed the core of extreme nationalism, engendering emotional attachment to the nation. By connecting the nation with family on

³⁶⁸ Mann, *Volume II*, 331.

³⁶⁹ Mann, *Volume II*, 734.

ideological grounds, the nation was perceived by them as a mother or father, hearth and home, to which they pledged extreme loyalty.³⁷⁰

In this phase, nations came in three different types: state-reinforcing as in England, state-creating as in Germany, and state-subverting as in the Austrian lands.³⁷¹ These three types of nationalism carry strong potential for violence. State-subverting nationalism particularly turned into a more violent movement when the authoritarian regime did not grant regional and national autonomy or representation. State-reinforcing nationalism centered on inter-state war and threats and violence for diplomatic means.³⁷²

4.2 Problematization of Mann's Nation

Michael Mann, like other neo-Weberians, prioritizes the state as a social space and actor in the explanation of the national question. However, in his theorization, the state as social space is more central than the state as actor. In other words, Mann places the national question within the borders of the state with less emphasis on the state's conscious attempts to enhance the nation, contrary to Giddens' docile nation and Tilly's elitist perception. The main problem is still the elucidation of why some states fail to form integrated nations, triggering national movements that challenge the very nature of the existing states. His theory gives a weak account of nationalist mobilization leading to separatist nationalisms. As a solution, he focuses on ethnic and regional differences that have been produced through discursive literacy. This revision, however, brings an imprecise account of discursive literacy and ethnic groups. Mann's emphasis on discursive literacy does not explain nationalist groups' mobilizations against states. For instance, it is ambivalent about why discursive literacy engendered by the state in Austria produced ethnic awareness for Czechs and Hungarians. Mann modifies Benedict Anderson's account of literacy on the grounds

³⁷⁰ Mann, *Volume II*, 733.

³⁷¹ Mann, *Volume II*, 732.

³⁷² Mann, *Volume II*, 733.

that an increase in publication of books does not indicate the literacy of the people.³⁷³ Offering signing literacy as an indicator of transformation in discursive literacy, he conceptualizes discursive literacy as the primary means through which national imagination spread, but this inherits the problem of imagined communities. As Chatterjee criticizes Anderson, what remained for India to imagine while its discursive media was pervaded by the English language?³⁷⁴ The same issue could be posed in Mann's Austro-Hungarian case. If discursive literacy developed through the state in Austria, what remained for the Czechs to manifest as nation? In addition to these problems, it could be added that Mann deploys a functional understanding of state and gives a homogeneous integrated account of nation. This underestimates the conflictual aspect of nation. As elaborated in the previous chapter, Hutchinson argues that national claims have a conflictual character, which makes it difficult for nationalists of the same nation to reach a final consensus. In this context, he criticizes Mann for disregarding this contentious character of nation.

In addition to these problems, a main shortcoming of Mann's account is that Mann problematically starts with the acceptance of the populations of existing states of Europe as nations and digs through history for evidence. This understanding of history to enhance the statist perception of nation impedes him from comprehending the interconnectedness of social life across the borders of states and the national motivation of people against states. This can be called a fallacy of methodological nationalism. In this context, Mann perceives differences between states as differences of nations and thereby naturalizes and territorializes nation, thus ignoring the interconnectedness of social totality. Zimmer and Schiller define methodological nationalism as the misassumption that the nation state and its society are natural social

³⁷³ Mann, *Volume II*, 36.

³⁷⁴ Partha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community?" in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Benedict Anderson, Gopal Balakrishna (London: Verso Books, 1996), 216.

and political forms of the modern world.³⁷⁵ It equates state with society and perceives nation as an integral part of the modern nation state.

For Zimmer and Schiller, three variants of methodological nationalism pervade social science: ignorance, naturalization, and territorial limitation. First of all, scholars perceive the dichotomy between modernity and nationalism wrongly. Modernity is regarded as the primary force of modern life and nationalism is positioned as an epiphenomenon. Therefore, the importance of nationalism in modern life is trivialized. Classic social theory in particular conceives of nationalism as a transitory phenomenon that would vanish through the development of the social world. On the contrary, nationalism persists in the modern way of life in reality while modernization pervades the social world. Nevertheless, most scholars continue to underestimate the interaction between modernism and nationalism and narrate Western history without nationalism. Therefore, while ethnic cleansing and extreme nationalism are attributed to “the Rest”, the development of the West is presented as immune from nationalism.³⁷⁶ Secondly, methodological nationalism naturalizes the perception that the world is divided into separate nations and their states by taking national discourses, agendas, loyalties, and histories for granted.³⁷⁷ In this respect, scholars perceive the concepts of the national question as given and make them the object of study. International relations, for example, studies the nation state as an adequate unit of scientific analysis without paying attention to nation. In the same vein, economics rests on the studies of national communities and their economic interactions with other collectivities, as Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* suggests. Even the economic theories that aim to overcome the shortcomings of classical theories position nations as the unit of study. Therefore, nations are expressed as natural given entities of the social world.³⁷⁸ The naturalization of the social world as a totality of distinct national

³⁷⁵ Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences”, *Global Networks* 2, no. 4 (October 2002): 30.

³⁷⁶ Wimmer, Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” 304.

³⁷⁷ Wimmer, Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” 304.

³⁷⁸ Wimmer, Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” 305.

communities and their states is also reinforced when the process of nation state formation is isolated from the development of democracy and nationalism. These are dual segregations of nation and democracy from the nation state. Lastly, methodological nationalism confines its scientific study within the borders of the nation state, thereby disregarding trans-border interactions of the social world. It is prevalent among scholars to study populations, polities, economies, and cultures within the borders of states, but the modern state and its population cannot be separated from the external world.³⁷⁹

For a better understanding, these three kinds of methodological nationalism could be redefined as the ontological prioritization of state as a subject matter of study. In this sense, the nation state is regarded as the primary social reality in the totality of social relations. The production of knowledge therefore necessarily depends on the analysis of social space limited by the nation state. In this understanding, the interconnectedness of social relations is split according to nation state boundaries and these rough distinctions are accepted as a natural transformation. In this context, the theoretical construction of historical sociology, and more specifically Mann's, reflects the problem of methodological nationalism.

First of all, for neo-Weberians, the state manifests itself as the primary form of social reality, upon which the conceptualization of nation rests. In an anarchical state system, through war-making processes, the nation state evolves as the dominant and determinative form of power that transforms and subordinates its subjects as national subjects. In this regard, the nation state's population turns into a fully-fledged nation, like the French, British, German, or Austrian nations, due to the fact that the nation as a political community claims its own state. From this perspective, the main challenge is to answer the question of why the smooth transitions in England and France did not also happen in Austria and Hungary. In other words, why did the French and English people transform into French and English nations without splitting into ethnic communities, while in the Austrian Empire ethnic differences led

³⁷⁹ Wimmer, Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism," 304.

to the fragmentation of the nation? Mann argues that discursive literacy and state involvement in the ethnic issue, by employing Germans in state institutions, are the primary causes of the ethnic dissolution of the Austrian Empire. However, similar conditions existed for England and France at the time. As we know from Hobsbawm's elaboration above, at the beginning of the 19th century the populations of France and England were just as heterogeneous as that of Austria. Why did the Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Occitanians, Corsicans, and Flemings not crystallize ethnically during the French revolution to claim their own states?³⁸⁰ A similar question can be asked about the Welsh and Scottish peoples in the 19th century in the United Kingdom. This controversial problem results from the methodological nationalism troubling Mann's work. Mann starts with the acceptance of populations of contemporary modern states as nations and digs for evidence in history to verify this. In this reading, France and England are depicted as homogeneous nations, even in the 18th century, but Austria is described as ethnically diverse, which causes it to dissolve. The German population ethnically integrated to such an extent that it could found the Prussian state in the end.

In the same vein, Mann naturalizes the existing nation state by isolating four states from their colonial ties. In his account, capitalism, ideology, and politics are reduced to the current borders of states, excluding their colonial territories. In the period of industrial capitalism, as the national question became an important subject of European politics, European states enlarged their colonial powers. In this duality, Mann disregards the colonies and only emphasizes European nations. Mann conceptualizes class as nation class, whose "sense of nationhood is inward-looking — divorced from, and incompetent in, international affairs".³⁸¹ However, it seems odd to limit the bourgeois class within the borders of the state in the imperial century of European power. After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain expanded to Asia and Africa and added 26,000,000 km² of territory and 400 million people to its overseas

³⁸⁰ Connor, *Ethno-nationalism*, 94.

³⁸¹ Mann, *Volume II*, 32

empire.³⁸² France similarly accelerated colonization by taking Algeria and spreading into Africa. In the second half of the 19th century, the German colonial empire started to expand in Africa and the Pacific and China.³⁸³ How could it then be possible for the bourgeois class to stay isolated from imperialism? In addition, Mann separates the political development of Europe from its colonies. In the analyses of the French revolution and British industrial revolution he does not take into consideration the impact of colonial extraction. The triangular slave trade of the Atlantic Sea accounted for one-seventh of total British trade between 1714 and 1773.³⁸⁴ Likewise, the slave-trade and slavery gave some economic basis to the French revolution. In the 19th century, San Domingo provided two-thirds of the overseas trade of France, and it became the main area of confrontation between revolutionaries and the Ancien Régime.³⁸⁵ In this context, it could be said that what Mann's perspective lacks is an understanding of the political interaction of people under the rule of the French or English empires. For example, in Mann's reading, there is no discussion about what separated a person from San Domingo from French nationals. As Furet argues, Black Jacobins mobilized against the Ancien Régime with the slogan of equality just as French revolutionaries did.³⁸⁶ Even for French revolutionaries, the distinction for the Haitian French was not clear. The French masses supported the abolition of slavery for their Black brothers in San Domingo.³⁸⁷

³⁸² Timothy Parsons, *The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 3.

³⁸³ Woodruff D. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978)

³⁸⁴ Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Richmond: The William Byrd Press, 1994), 54.

³⁸⁵ C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and The San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1989), IX.

³⁸⁶ James, *The Black Jacobins*, XII

³⁸⁷ James, *The Black Jacobins*, 120.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: CIRCLING MINERVA

In this thesis, two schools of thought, ethno-symbolism and historical sociology, are registered to understand how and why the concept of nation has become so powerful in politics and in our daily life. To this end, the thesis has problematized their main premises and arguments on the sociological and historical construction of nation. It has concluded that in their aim to elucidate the power of the conception of nation, both approaches provide imprecise explanations. They reify, naturalize, and essentialize the nation and exaggerate its power. Yet, the thesis has also concluded that problems identified in the conception of nation in these two theoretical approaches also imply that it is this ambiguity that actually enables the persistent reproduction of nation through different political and social projects and practices in history.

To understand the power of the nation and nationalism, it is important to rethink how the historical knowledge of the nation is produced and reproduced by nationalist currents, a attempt that requires the evaluation of the debates on the historical inquiry to nation and the role of the past in nationalist discourses. Ethno-symbolist and historical sociological approaches move beyond the imaginaries of the nationalists in making sense of nations and nationalism. Historical sociology focuses on the state as the source of the objective reality of nation, and perceives nations and nationalisms within the framework of the middle classes. Ethno-symbolism on the other side regards *ethnies* as cultural representations that stand above the individual will, offering hence the knowledge of nation and nationalism as a semi-religious reality of

social life. The construction of the reality of the nation and nationalism and the production of this knowledge have thus gone beyond the nationalist interpretation.

Both ethno-symbolism and historical sociology accept the modernity of the nation even though they also recognize the persistence of some pre-modern elements in it. However, the question of in which context the nation should be placed as a modern construction is a source of dispute. Historical sociology sees the modernity of nation with respect to citizenship as the sovereignty of the people, which starts from the French Revolution. Ethno-symbolism, however, regards the politicization of pre-modern ethnic bonds resulting from the development of the modern way of life. All in all, they agree that the entrance of the concept of nation into the political lexicon did not start before the 18th century and that only at the end of the 19th century that European populations had become largely divided into national communities.

Ethno-symbolism and historical sociology share the idea that nations and nationalisms come into existence with the retreat of religious life, i.e. with the secularization of the human mentality, which is cemented by the vernacularization of intellectual life. With respect to the power of nations and nationalism, ethno-symbolism relies on the analysis of collective consciousness as religion on the grounds that the mythical past equates nationals by overcoming regional or class differences among the people, and works to protect the nation in times of crisis. The nation as a sacrificial community thereby implies the modern religious collectivity, which offers eternity to people, who suffer as ephemeral creatures. Therefore, the historical construction of the immortal national properties is consumed to the extreme by the nationals of the collectivity. Weberian historical sociology looks for the power of the nation and nationalism in the centralized modern state, which is constructed as a war machine. Nations and nationalisms are, in this line of thought, embedded in the international state system that enforces the conjunction of the national classes and states through dangers defined to threaten whole populations. National formation thus emerges as a necessary development for the survival of the state and the population within the ever increasing tensions of the international system.

From a sociological perspective, the first challenge is to find the criteria to define a collectivity as a nation. Put differently, the question is on which grounds a collectivity can be regarded as a nation. In a broader sense the objective and subjective approaches to nation end with the impossibility of defining the term. Two approaches problematized in this thesis are indeed widely employed by many scholars in the conceptualization of nation. As mentioned, ethno-symbolism regards ethno-mythic memories as the source of modern national formation with Durkheimian insight. Weberian historical sociology, on the other hand, emphasizes the state and international system for the definition of nation. Thus, the nation is either an ethno-symbolic cultural creation or a product of a nation state. In both strands of thought, however, the construction of nation has serious theoretical problems. Ethno-symbolism does not offer a persuasive account of how nation as a social totality and nation as a zone of conflict become possible. For historical sociology, nation as a creation of state cannot explain dysfunction or national movements against states. Therefore, both theories could not provide answer for the power of conception of nation. With this insight, ethno-symbolism, relying on Durkheimian ontology, reifies the nation. Historical sociology, by prioritizing the state through Weberian ontological construction, inherits the problem of methodological nationalism. What is common between these two accounts is that both narrate European nations with little emphasis on social context or the effects of the production of their knowledge.

The question of the definition of nation also brings forth the debate on the production of the knowledge of nations and nationalisms. The epistemological question here is how the knowledge of nation and nationalism is produced and what the source of that knowledge is, or whether the target of study should be the elite or the masses. For both accounts, namely for ethno-symbolism and historical sociology, the middle classes or the elites are the primary source of the epistemological knowledge of the nations and nationalisms, which is appropriated later by the masses. They mainly try to explain why the masses are involved in nationalism. The ethno-symbolist criticism of Gellner's elitist understanding has evolved into the analysis of the masses. Elites, in this account, are promoted as not the creators of nationalism, but the discoverers of national differences. In historical sociology, the elitist understanding generally leads

to a theoretical deadlock. Especially in Charles Tilly's account, there is no answer to why the masses get mobilized for the sake of the interests of the elites. Michael Mann's class-nation, however, offers a more concrete perspective on the mobilization of masses. For Mann, the penetration of the state into the population paves the way for the emergence of an inward-looking nation class, which presents cross-class interests against a belligerent nation state.

Yet, in both theories, the production of knowledge is limited to socially constructed national borders. Ethno-symbolism, relying on evolutionary historicism, collectivism, and idealism, reifies, essentializes, and eternalizes nation. It problematically deploys the so-called nation as a target of scientific study. Historical sociology produces, on the other side, methodological nationalism: ignorance, naturalization, and territorial limitation. National borders are seen as fixed and production of knowledge is done accordingly while social interaction is disregarded. Therefore, both accounts fail to understand the reality of the nation. This epistemological debate becomes indeed more problematic when the issue of gender is included in the analysis of knowledge of nations and nationalisms, but neither ethno-symbolism nor historical sociology gives a persuasive account of the sexual dimension of the question of nation and nationalism.

Nevertheless, it can be also proposed that the ambiguity of the concept of nation may be the source of its power. As the constitutive character of the national question, it can elucidate the very nature of the nation. This ambiguity makes the nation to reproduce itself day to day and mobilizes the masses to sacrifice themselves for their own imagined collective values. It is probably due to this ambiguity that the nation can reconceptualize itself in adjustment with social categories such as race, ethnicity, citizenship, and family. This ambiguity requires the selection of historical narratives to verify itself. Generally, it can be said that the power of the nation is built on its ambiguity. It acts as an empty signifier to which human imagination and memories can be attributed. Yet this claim should be placed on more solid ground with empirical data, which is beyond the aims of this thesis.

All in all, Eric Hobsbawm is right when he refers to Hegel's Minerva, the owl of wisdom, and says in 1990 that it hopefully circles around the question of nation and nationalism.³⁸⁸ It continues circling today and there are good signs that in the near future the question will be fully comprehended.

³⁸⁸ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 192.

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APPENDICES

TURKISH SUMMARY

Babil Kulesi hikâyesi, insan ve tanrı arasında vuku bulan bir çatışmayı konu alır. Aynı dili konuşan insanlar, bir araya gelip tanrıının gücüne karşı bir kule inşa eder. Buna öfkelenen tanrı, insanların dillerini farklılaştırarak onları lanetler. Karşılıklılık manasına gelen Babil, hikâyeye adını böylece verir. Aynılıklarına rağmen farklılıklarına odaklanan insanlar, birbirinden ayrışarak sonu gelmez bir savaşa girişirler.

Babil'in kadim hikâyesi aynı zamanda modern insanlığı anlatmak içinde kullanılabilir. Farklı milletlere hapsolan insanlık, bu yapay insanın çizdiği sınırlara göre düşünür ve hareket eder. Mutfak, kıyafet veya resim, günlük hayatı her şey millet kavramıyla tanımlanır. Dahası, ölmek ve öldürmek millet adına meşrulaştırılır ve kutsallaştırılır. Bu bağlamda değerlendirildiğinde akla, 'Millet kavramı neden ve nasıl günlük hayatı bu denli güçlü olmaya başladı?' sorusu gelmektedir. Başka bir deyişle insanlık nasıl oldu da farklı milletlere göre ayrışip, birbirlerini millet prizması ile görmeye başladı?

Bu tez çalışması Babil'in hikâyesinden yola çıkarak, millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründeki iki ana yaklaşım olan etno-simbolizm ve tarihsel sosyolojiyi analiz ederek, millet kavramının siyasette ve günlük hayatı neden bu kadar güçlü olduğunu anlamlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Weberyen tarihsel sosyoloji ve Durkheimci etno-simbolizmin savunduğu temel tartışmalardan hareketle devlet ve kültür kavramını irdeleyen tez çalışması, Weberyen sosyoloji ve Durkheimci etno-simbolizmin fikirlerinden beslenerek, millet kavramına ilişkin olan esneklik ve belirsizliğin milletin gücünü oluşturan temel etmen olduğunu, böylece milletin, milliyetçiliğin de

dahil olduğu çeşitli politik proje ve pratiklere göre kendini sürekli olarak yeniden üretilebildiğini savunur.

Millet kavramını tanımlamak için bir çabanın olmayışi milletin boş bir gösteren olarak farklı tarihsel bağamlarda yeniden üretilmesine olanak tanımaktadır. Bu çalışma, millet kavramının modern dünyada güçlü olduğu savını millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründeki iki yaklaşımı dayandırır. İlk olarak, ‘Liah Greenfeld’in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity’ kitabında millet kavramının aşamalı olarak günlük yazımı girdiğini gösterilir. Basılmış kitaplarda millet kelimesinin kullanım sıklığına bakarak ulaştığı bu sonuç sayesinde Greenfeld, 18. yy’den itibaren kademeli olarak millet kavramının birçok bağlamda insanların düşünce hayatını işgal ettiğini savunur.

Ayrıca modernist literatür, millet kavramının modern hayatı dair güncel bir tartışma yürütmemektedir. Benedict Anderson'a göre millet o derece etkilidir ki evrensellik iddiasındaki sosyalistler bile milli iddialarla siyaset yaparlar. Sinisa Maleševic ve Andreas Zimmer, milletin modern dünyanın en önemli unsurlarından biri olduğunu savunur ve millet kavramının neden bu kadar yaygın kullanıldığına bir cevap bulmaya çalışır.

Bu çalışma daha öncelikle ‘Milletin modern mi yoksa tarihi aşkın bir gerçeklik mi olduğunu’ netleştirmeye çalışır. Millet ve milliyetçilik dair literatürde süregelen, modernistler ve primordialistler arasındaki tartışmalardan John Coakley’nin önerdiği çerçeveyi benimseyerek, modernist literatüre yoğunlaşır. Coakley'e göre milletin modern bir kavram olduğunu savunan modernistler ile milli bağların tarihsel olarak dayanıklı ve kalıcı olduğunu; milletin diğer sosyal bağlardan daha baskın olduğunu savunan primordialism arasındaki ayrım gereksizdir. Çünkü modern millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründe, milletin tarihi aşkın ve en güçlü bağ olduğunu savunan akademik bir cenah bulmak nedeyse imkânsızdır. Milletin modern olduğunu savunan tartışmalar önemsenmeli, milleti genel geçer ve aşkın bir kavram olarak gören teoriler milliyetçilerin argümanları olarak ele alınarak araştırılmalıdır. Bu bağlamda asıl önemli olan tartışma milletin modern olmasının dayanağıdır. Bu çalışma, milletin kavram olduğunu kabul eden, etno-simbolizm ve tarihsel sosyolojiyi; bu teorilerin

dayandığı devlet ve kültür kavramlarını analiz eder. Sosyolojinin ve modern devletin yükselişinin, millet ve milletçiliğin gelişimiyle doğrudan ilişkisinin olduğunu; etno-sembolizmin etnik bağların kültürel bir doku olarak milli aidiyetleri tarihsel süreç boyunca güçlü kıldığı iddiasına odaklanır. Ayrıca milleti ‘etne’nin bir devamı olarak gören etno-sembolizm millet oluşumunu bir kültürel canlanma, tarihsel sosyoloji ise politik ihtiyaçlara yönelik sosyal alan sunan, devleti önceleyen bir yaklaşım sunar.

Bu teorik çerçevede tez çalışmasının ilk bölümünde, millet kavramı tarihsel ve sosyolojik tartışmalarla sorunsallaştırır ve sosyolojik açıdan milletin tanımlamasının teorik imkânsızlığı ifade eder. İlgili literatürde milletin tanımlanmasına yönelik tartışmalar mit, toprak, ortak köken veya ortak ekonomik hayat gibi objektif kriterler ile tanımlanabileceğini ya da subjektif, öznel bir kriter ile tanımlanabileceği ikilemine hapsolmuştur. Diğer bir ifade ile milletin tanımlanması sorununun milletin üyelerinin paylaştığı birtakım aynılıklar ile aşılabileceği savı ve insanların aynılık şuuruna sahip olmasının milleti tanımlayabileceği savı arasındaki gerginlik, milletin tanımlanması konusundaki ana ayrılık noktasıdır. Fakat iki düşünce için de kuramsal düzeyde milleti tanımlamak için önerilen sabiteler birçok sapma ile geçeriz kılınır ve akademik çevrede bir uzlaşının sağlanması imkansızlaşır.

Milletin tanımlanması sorunu, beraberinde milletin ontolojik bir kategori ya da bir analiz birimi olarak ele alınıp alınamayacağını tartışmasını beraberinde getirir. İlgili konu özü itibarıyle hakikat düzeyinde millettin var olup olmadığı tartışmasıdır. Günlük hayatı yaygın olarak birçok bağlamda kullanılan millet kavramı, millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründe de etnik kimlikten yurtseverlige dek bir çok anlamda kullanılmaktadır. Milletin sosyal bir gerçeklik olarak ele alınması gerektiği kanaati, millet tanımının imkânsızlığından dolayı başka bir toplumsal gerçekliğe indirgenerek incelenmesi gerektiği savı ile çatışır. Bu ikilem üzerinden yapılan bütün tartışmalar, millet kavramına ilişkin objektif bilgi üretiminin mümkün olup olamayacağının tartışmasını da içerir. Kavramların sosyal hayatı bir iktidar aracı olması ya da kendi başlarına iktidara sahip olmaları, millet kavramın gerçeklige karşılık gelen bir kavram olmasının yanında gerçekliği şekillendiren bir kavram olmasını da sağlar. Rogers Brubaker, millet kavramına ilişkin yaklaşımında millet olabilmek için bir bilgi

üretiminin yapılması gerektiğini savunur. Kavramların gücünden doğan ve millet kavramının yarattığı belirsizlikten hareketle, Richard Jenkins örnek olarak verilebileceği bir grup düşünce insanı ise kolektivite yerine kimliklere vurgu yapılarak bilgi üretiminin gerçekleştirmesi gerektiğini savunur. Ancak bu yaklaşım bile millet kavramının kapsayıcılığını daraltıp, verili kavramları tahakküm altına iter. Bu bağlamda millet kavramını tanımlama problemi göz önünde bulundurularak milletin analiz öznesi olarak ele alınmasının daha tutarlı bilgi üretimini mümkün kılacığı düşünülmektedir.

Millet bir kavram olarak tanımlamakta karşılaşılan zorluk, bilim insanlarını millet yerine milliyetçiliğin analizini yapmaya zorlar. Bu perspektifte doktrin söylem ya da ideoloji olarak ele alınan milliyetçilik, millet gerçekliğinin temel kaynağı olarak görülür. Ancak millet kavramının milliyetçiliğe indirgenmesi, millet üzerine üretilen bilginin kaynağına dair bir tartışmayı açığa çıkarmaktadır: ‘Milliyetçiliğe ilişkin bilgi kitlelerden mi yoksa seçkinlerden mi elde edilecektir?’. Milleti bir gerçeklik olarak kabul etmeyen bilim insanları için milliyetçiliğin propagandasını, ideolojisini geliştiren seçkinlerin analizi milliyetin bilgisine ulaşmak için yeterlidir. Seçkinlerin analizi yaklaşımı, kitleleri seçkinlerin penceresinden görerek kitlelerin kanaatlerini yok sayar ve kitlelerin, millet ideologlarının düşüncelerini kabul ettiğini varsayıarak kitle ve seçkinler arasındaki gerilimi görmezden gelir. Bunun yanında seçkinler üzerine yapılan vurgu, seçkinlerin toplumsal gerçeklik üzerinde sınırsız tahakküm kurduğu algısını oluşturur. Ancak tarihte birçok örnekte görüldüğü gibi seçkinler ve kitleler arasında birçok çatışma mevcuttur. Bir grup bilim insanı, Eric Hobsbawm bu kişilerden birisi olarak ifade edilebilir, seçkinlerin milleti yaratmadan güçlü bir etkisi olsa bile akademik tartışmalarda asıl odağın kitleler olması gerektiğini savunur. Fakat seçkinler yerine kitlelerin analizi edilmesi süreci bilimsel verinin elde edilmesi bağlamında zorluklar içermektedir. Kitlelerin bilgi üretiminde ve olaylar karşısında yorum üretiminde veri üretmemesi sorunu gündeme gelmektedir; kitleler üzerinde çalışılabilen çok az kaynak bırakmaktadır. Bu yüzden millet ve milliyetçilik üzerine çalışmalar zorunlu olarak seçkinlere yönelir. Tüm bu tartışmalar ışığında bu tez çalışması, millet olgusunun analiz öznesi olarak seçilmesi gerektiğini savunur.

Toplumsal bir olgu olan millet ve milliyetçiliğin analizinde kaçınılmaz olarak tarih bilimi ile ilişki kurulmasını gerektirir. Bu bağlamda, ‘Millet ve milliyetçiliğin tarihsel analizi nasıl yapılmalıdır?’ sorusu ile yola çıkılmalıdır. John Breuilly’e göre tarih perspektifinde milliyetçilik kavramı, dünden bugüne düşünce, duyu veya eylem olarak çalışılmıştır ancak kavramsal olarak yapısı gereği bir politik form olarak ele alınması gereklidir. Fakat Breuilly milliyetçiliği analiz ederken, milliyetçileri analiz ederek millet sorununun alanını daraltmış ve milliyetçilere göre milleti açıklamaktan öteye gidememiştir.

Çoğunlukla yanlışlar üzerine ve politik çıkarlara göre yazılan tarih, milliyetçilik ve millet gerçekliğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Çünkü yanlışlar üzerinden gözlemlenen hakikat milliyetçilerin gördüğü hakikattir. Ayrıca millet kavramı milliyetçilik haricinde sosyalizm ve liberalizm gibi birçok ideolojiye de referans oluşturur. Dolayısıyla milleti, milliyetçilik üzerinden açıklamak yetersizdir. Ek olarak Michael Billig’in ‘Banal Nationalism’ kitabında belirttiği gibi millet tasavvuru ya da milliyetçilik, milliyetçi propaganda olmadan da günlük hayatı üretilebilir. Bu bağlamda milliyetçilik üzerinden milleti kavramını değerlendirilmesi günlük hayatı üretilen bayağı milliyetçiliğin iskalamasına neden olabilir. Buradan hareketle bu tez çalışması, milliyetçilere göre milleti analiz etmekten fazlasını yapma gayretinde olup milletin bilgisine ulaşmaya çalışan etno-sembolizm ve tarihsel sosyolojiyi ele almaktadır.

Tarih- millet ve milliyetçilik ilişkisi bağlamında bir diğer önemli tartışma ise tarihin milliyetçilik için neden bu kadar önemli olduğu sorusudur. Bu bağlamda incelendiğinde Stefan Berger'in sunduğu modern tarih yazımının doğusunda, millet ve ulus devlet inşasının aynı tarihsel döneme denk gelmesi dikkat çekmektedir. İlgili literatürde Benedict Anderson gibi modernist bilim insanların sunduğu şekliyle, Berger'in modern tarih yazımında yer alan millet ve ulus devlet inşasına ilişkin genel mutabakat, dini hayatın politik ve günlük hayattan çekilmesinin millet ve milliyetçiliğin toplumsal hayatı yerleşmesini takip ettiği yönündedir. Ancak bu ilişki de millet ve milliyetçiliğin tarih ile kurduğu benzersiz ilişkinin inşası tartışma

konusudur. Devlet, kültürel uyumma, aydınlanma ve kapitalizm bu referans noktasını oluşturan özenelerden sadece bir kaçıdır.

Bu çalışma, millet ve milliyetçiliğe ilişkin literatür tartışmalarına yer verdikten sonra millet ve milletin gücünü artırmak için akademide oldukça yaygınlaşmış olan etno-simbolizm kavramını incelemektedir. Millet ve milletin gücünün ekonomi, yapı ve devlet ile açıklanılamayacağını savunan etno-simbolizm, kültür kavramına yönelik olarak devletin kitlelerin ve seçkinlerin üzerinde eyleme geçtiği bir millet kategorisi kuramsallaştırır. Anthony Smith, John Armstrong ve John Hutchinson'ın temsil ettiği bu yaklaşım milleti homojen, bütüncül, basitten karmaşığa doğru evirilen ve bazı etnik bağları koruyarak sosyal değişime direnen bir topluluk olarak tanımlar. Bu bağlamda millet ontolojik olarak başka bir sosyal gerçekliğe dayandırılmadan konumlandırılır ve bilgisi buna göre üretilir. Millet kavramını tanımlamak için kullanılan etnik merkez ya da etne; Anthony Smith'e göre kolektif bir özel ad, ortak bir soy miti, paylaşılan tarihî anılar, ortak kültürü farklı kılan bir ya da daha fazla unsur, özel bir yurtla bağ, popülasyon içindeki dayanışma duygusu gibi temel unsurlardan oluşur. Etnik merkez semboller, mitler, hafiza, değer, ritüel ve geleneğin bir örtüsü olarak karşımıza çıkar. Mitik yapılar olarak da tanımlanabilecek bu yapılar milli toplulukları ve etnik grupları bir arada tutan kurucu mitleri oluşturmaktadır. Etnik merkeze duyulan ayniyet, tarihsel süreç içinde millet ve etnik grupların dayanıklı ve değişime direnen varlıklar olarak hayatı kalmasını sağlar. Bu tanımla beraber etno-simbolizm seçkinler üzerinden yapılan millet ve milliyetçilik analizlerine karşı çıkar. Çünkü onlara göre millet seçkinlerin bir icadı değildir. Millet seçkinlerin keşfettiği bir gerçekliktir. İkinci olarak seçkinler millet ve milliyetçiliğin bilgisine ulaşmak için yetersizdir. Çünkü kitlelerin millet fikrini benimsemeleri seçkinlerin bunun savunuculuğunu yapmalarından daha önemlidir. Bu yüzden etno-simbolistler, millet ve milliyetçiliğin, tabandan kitlelere odaklanarak incelenmesini savunmaktadır.

Fakat milletin etnik merkez üzerinden tanımlanması ve bilgisinin buna göre üretilmesi bir takım teorik açımlara yol açar. Bu bağlamda en ilgi çekici eleştiri Siniša Malešević'in, Anthony Smith'e yönelttiği eleştiridir. Malešević'e göre

Smithci teorik yaklaşım Durkheim ontolojisi ve epistemolojisi üzerine kuruludur ve evrimci, kolektifçi ve idealist problemleri yansıtır. Malešević, Smith topluluklarını basitten komplekse evirilen yapılar olarak tanımlar ve önerdiği millet tanımının daha önce belirlenmiş, bilimsel dayanağı olmayan tarihsel aşamalardan geçtiğini, bu tarihsel aşamaların hiçbir şekilde değiştirilemeyeceği ve ileride de milletlerin kaderini belirleyeceğini ifade etmektedir. Bu işlevselci anlayış yüzünden millet ‘etne’den evirilirken tarihsel bir zorunluluk olarak ortaya çıkar ve diğer tüm tarihsel seçenekler saf dışı bırakılır. Ayrıca Malešević, Smith’ın hatalı olarak ahlaki toplulukların kurucu unsuru olarak ele aldığıni ve bu yüzden de milleti nesneleştirliğini ya da şeyleştirdiğini belirtmektedir. Bu bağlam içerisinde birey yerine topluluk araştırma öznesi olarak seçilir ve bireyin getirdiği değişim ve dönüşüm yok sayılır. Son olarak Smith ekonomik ve politik faktörleri dışlayarak millet oluşumunu kutsal elementlere bağlayarak idealist yaklaşım sunar. Kutsal olanın millet tanımında bu kadar merkezileştirmesi ise çatışma ve rekabet içeren toplumsal hayatı göz ardı ederek, milleti sonsuzlaştırır ve toplumsal değişimi göz ardı eder.

Smith’ın ‘etne’ üzerine kurguladığı millet tanımının yarattığı eleştirilere bir açıdan cevap oluşturacak John Hunchinson’ın teorik yaklaşımı ise milleti bir çatışma aralığı olarak kurgular ve etno-sembolizmi, post-modern millet ve milliyetçilik teorilerine yaklaşır. Buna yaklaşma göre millet çatışmalı anlayışları bünyesinde bulunduran kurucu mitlerden gücünü alır. Dolayısıyla millet mefhumu farklı geçmiş ve tarih anlayışlarını içeren bir toplamdır. Ancak bu durumda millet yine bir bütün olarak var olabilir. Çünkü bu ortak mitler doğal felaket, savaş, işgal gibi milletin varlığını tehdit eden olaylar ile olduğu için farklı kavrayışları bir arada tutabilirler. Milli uyanmayı sağlayan milliyetçiler sayesinde millet adanmanın merkezi haline gelir ve milleti olası çöküşlerden kurtarak yeni bir kurucu mit oluşturur. Ancak bu tanımlamada milleti bir arada tutan ortak hafiza, etnik geçmiş ya da etnik bilinç aynı zamanda milleti oluşturan grupları da ayıran bir unsur haline gelir. O halde Hunchinson’ın önerdiği milletin ayırmasını ve milleti bir arada kalmasını sağlayan kurucu mitler milleti tanımlamaktan uzak bir kavramsallaştırmadır. Örneğin Jan Dark miti Fransız halkını bir arada tutan bir mit iken aynı zamanda milletin cumhuriyetçi ve kralcılar olarak ayrılmasına da neden olur. Bu örnekte de görüldüğü gibi milleti bir arada tutan şeyi

belirlemek oldukça zordur. Hutchinson, milleti bir arada tutan dinamiklere ilişkin problemi millet kategorilerinin verisi kabul ederek, ulusun kendisinin bir çatışma olduğu savını bu yapay sınırlara yerleştirerek açıklamaya çalışır. Anthony Smith gibi mevcut millet kategorilerini nesneleştirir.

Bu çalışma son olarak millet ve milliyetçilik literatüründe, millet kavramının gücünü ulus devlet çerçevesinde tartışan ve milletin devletten kaynaklandığını savunan teorilere değinir. Bu akımın en güçlü temsilcileri, Weberci devlet anlayışına dayanarak modern devleti tanımlayan ve devlet kavramını modern hayatın merkezine yerleştiren Weberyen tarihsel sosyolojidir. Weberyen yaklaşımı göre modern devlet, milletin oluşmasında ve milletin güçlü bir kavram olarak modern dünyada kullanılmasında temel sebeptir. Devletin etkisi bu kapsamda iki yönlüdür. İlk olarak devlet ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde millet ve milliyetçilik için sosyal alan sunar. Böylece devlet sınırları içinde homojenleşen popülasyonlarının başka topluluklar, farklı uluslar olarak etkileşim yaşamamasını mümkün kılar. İkinci olarak, eğitim, ekonomik entegrasyon, askeri, bürokratik ve temsili organların olması gibi bilinçli ya da bilinç dışı, devlet faaliyetleri sayesinde devlet nüfusunu milletleştirir. Bu eylemlerin sonucu olarak devlet popülasyonları millete dönüştürür. Devletin bu özelliği milli hareketlerin temel motivasyonunu da açıklar. Milli şuur taşıyan toplumsal hareketler kendi ulus devletlerini oluşturmak için harekete geçer ve başarısız oldukları durumlarda ise bölgesel otonomi için çabalar. Bu çerçevede popülasyonların milletleştirilmesi, modern devletin ihtiyaçlarına hizmet eder. İç düzeni sağlamasının yanında devlet, anarşik uluslararası düzende hayatı kalabilmek için nüfusunu millileştirerek ihtiyaç duyduğu kaynakları vatandaşlarından temin eder. Böylece devlet ulusal ve uluslararası düzende en güçlü varlık olarak kendini gösterir. Şiddet tekelini elinde bulundurarak da millet üzerinde tahakküm kurar, onu güçlendirir ve canlı tutar.

Weberci tarihsel sosyoloji için savaş modern devletlerin uluslararası düzeni, insanlar arasında milli bilincin oluşması, rakip devletler ve milletlere karşı düşmanlığın köruklenerek milli hissiyatın canlı tutulması için oldukça önemlidir. Devlet düzeninin geopolitik yapısı, devleti savaşması için zorunlu kılar. Bu yüzden savaş, devletin

hayatta kalma çabasının doğal bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkar. Millet ve milliyetçiliğin doğuşu ise devletin savaş yapma gđdüsüne paralel olarak gelişir. Düşmanlık ve hayatta kalma düşünceleri insanların fikirlerini şekillendirir ve onları savaş için motive eder. Devlet bu noktada sürekli olarak yürüttüğü savaşları finanse etmek için milli hissiyatı toplumu içinde körküler. Bu çerçevede savaş gđdüsüyle hareket eden modern devlet, milletin gücünü belirleyen temel unsur olarak ortaya çıkar. Weberci tarihsel sosyoloji için meşru şiddet kullanımını, modern devletin popülasyonu ile olan ilişkilerini düzenleyerek ve ulus oluşumuna kaynaklık ederek, modern devletin temel ayırt edici karakteri olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu bağlamda devletin savaş süreçlerine dâhiliyesi şiddetin toplumsal hayattan çekilerek devlet elinde tekelleşmesine eşlik eder. Millet bu düşüncede şiddetin tekelleşmesi ve sivil hayat içinde barışın temini ile mümkün kılınır. Devletin ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde kazandığı bu karakter devletin aynı zamanda toplumdan ayrı otonom bir varlık olarak ortaya çıkışmasını da sağlar. Devlet sınıf veya grupların çıkarlarına indirgenemeyen bir varlıktır.

Ancak devlete millet oluşumunda ve millet kavramının gücü açıklamak konusunda bu derece vurgu yapılması ve devletin şiddet tekelini elinde bulunduran bir varlık olarak öncüllenmesi, millet sorununu sadece devletin işlevsel ihtiyaçlarına hizmet eden bir araca dönüşmesine neden olur. Giddens'ın uysal millet yaklaşımında açık şekilde görüleceği gibi bu anlayış devlete karşı gelişen etnik ve milliyetçi hareketlerin çatışmalı yapılarını saklar. Ek olarak Giddens'ın sunduğu teorik çerçeve devlete karşı hareket eden milliyetçilik akımlarına deðinmez. Weberci tarihsel sosyolojinin bir başka önemli temsilcisi olan Charles Tilly devletin, millet inşasına karşı gelişen milli hareketlerine deðinse de geliştirdiği çerçeve birçok açıdan tartışmalıdır. Teorik olarak, ‘devlet kurmak isteyen milliyetçilikler ve ‘devlet tarafından geliştirilen milliyetçilikler’ ayrimını öne süren Tilly ‘seçkinler’ arasındaki çatışmaların devlet dışı milliyetçiliklerin gelişmesinde rol oynadığının savunur. Ancak Tilly'in öne sürdürdüğü çerçevede, kitlelerin seçkinleri neden takip ettiğini aydınlatamaz. Tartışmalara ek olarak tarihsel sosyoloji yaklaşımının sürekli olarak günümüz devlet sınırlarının, 19. yy. millet sınırları olarak alınması durumunun teorik dayanağını bulmak oldukça güçtür. Emperyal dönemdeki 19. yy. Avrupa'sında devletin Haitiliyi Fransız'dan, bir Almanı Avusturyalıdan ya da bir İngiliz'i bir

İrlandalıdan ayırmasının sebebi bulunamaz. Başka bir ifade ile modern Avrupa devletlerinin hangi kriter üzerinden egemen oldukları popülasyonları ayırtıldığı, devlet kurmak isteyen milliyetçilikler ve devlet tarafından geliştirilen milliyetçiliklere yol açtığı açıklanamaz.

Bütün bu tartışmalar ışığında Weberci tarihsel sosyoloji içinde millet kavramının gücünü açıklamaya yönelik en kapsamlı teorik yaklaşım ise Michael Mann'e aittir. Mann, millet ve sınıf ekseninde geliştirdiği teorik yaklaşımla, ideolojik ve ekonomik açıdan millet ve milliyetçiliğe ışık tutarak millet olgusunun askeri devletin ihtiyaçları dışında da etkisinin olduğunu vurgular. Kapitalizm, modern ideolojiler ve politik temsiliyet bu çerçevede millet sorunu ile bir hayli ilişkilidir. Mann ontolojik düzeydeki teorik inşasını sosyal iktidarın dört temel kaynağı olarak nitelendirdiği ideolojik, ekonomik askeri ve politik iktidar kaynaklarının toplumsal tarihsel süreç hayatı belirleyen temel etmenler olduğunu savunur. Modern hayatı ise politik iktidar kaynağı olarak şekillenen modern devlet, ideolojik ve ekonomik iktidarın kaynaklarının şekillendirdiği sınıf ve milletin birleşerek modern milleti ortaya çıkardığını savunur. Millet bu noktada sınıf farklılıklarını yok ederek, farklı etnik kimlik ve tarihe sahip olduğu kanaatiyle devlet iddiasında bulunan toplulukları ifade eder.

Mann'in toplulukları imkânsız varlıklar olarak niteleyerek devlet üzerinden kurduğu inşa Weberci geleneğin genel problemlerini yansıtmasına neden olur. Mann'in teorik revizyonları neden bazı devletlerin popülasyonlarını millete dönüştüremediklerini açıklamaz. Bunun yanında ayrılıkçı milliyetçi hareketleri açıklamakta da yetersiz kalır. Ancak Mann'in teorisindeki temel sorun, Mann'in mevcut Avrupa devletlerinin popülasyonlarını millet kabul ederek tarihsel süreç içinde bu varsayıma kanıt aramasıdır. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller'in metodolojik milliyetçilik olarak tanımladığı çerçeveye göre Mann'in millet öykülenmesi incelendiğinde Mann'in teorik çerçevesinin bu eleştirinin temel problemlerini yansittığı görülür.

Mann milliyetçiliği doğu ve batı ayrimı üzerinden kotlayarak demokratik olan milliyetçiliği Avrupa'ya, şiddet ve savaş odaklı milliyetçiliği Doğu'ya atfeder.

Kolonyal bağlarından koparılarak analiz ettiği Avrupa devletleri popülasyonlarını millete demokratik mücadeleler yoluyla dönüştürür bu bağlamada ayrılcılık ya da etnik çatışma sadece Avrupa dışı devletlere özgüdür. İkinci olarak Mann modern insanlığı doğal olarak milletlere bölünmüş toplamlar olarak ele alır ve bu ayırmayı verili olarak kabul eder. Bu verili kategoriler üzerine yapılan analiz sonucunda milletler durağan varlıklar olarak tanımlanarak etkileşim ve dönüşüm yok sayılır. Son olarak Mann milleti devlet sınırlarına indirgerek, insanların sınırlar içindeki etkileşimi göz ardı eder ve toplumlar arasındaki etkileşimi küfürmsemektedir. Böylece Mann'in Avrupa milletlerini anlattığı öykülemesinde millet ve devlet kavramları birbirinin yerine geçen kavramlar olarak kullanılır. Bunun bir sonucu olarak ulusla farklılıklar doğallaştırılır ve sınırlardaki sosyal etkileşim önem丝毫不stirilir.

Sonuç olarak etno-simbolizmin kültür üzerinden sunduğu millet tanımı, milleti tanımlamaktan çok millet kategorisini verili kabul edip bilgisinin bu şekilde üretilmesine ve neticede milletin şeyleşmesine neden olur. Tarihsel sosyolojinin önerdiği devlet eksenli millet tanımı ise milleti devlet sınırlarına sıkıştırarak, devletin sunduğu çerçeveye hapseder. Bunun yanında etno-simbolizmin etnisite odaklı yaklaşımı Amerika milleti gibi etnik özü olmayan milletleri kuramsallaştıramaz. Devleti milletin temel dayanağı olarak gören tarihsel sosyoloji ise devlete karşı harekete geçen devleti olmayan milli hareketleri açıklamakta zorlanır. Bu çalışma bu tartışmalardan hareketle etno- simbolizm ve tarihsel sosyoloji yaklaşımının milletin gücünü anlamadığını ve öne sürdükleri kültür ve devletin geçersiz olduğunu öne sürer. Ancak bu iki teorinin açmazı milletin modern hayatı neden bu kadar güçlü olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Çalışmanın bu iki teoriyle verdiği sonuç milletin kavramsal belirsizliğinin hiçbir şekilde dindirilemeyeceğidir. Bu belirsizliğin milletin farklı toplumsal ve tarihsel bağlamlarda yeniden üretilmesini olanaklı kılarak milletin gücünü açıkladığını savunur. Millet kavramına ilişkin belirsizlik, insanların kendilerine göre millet kavramına anlam yüklemesini böylece millet kavramının değişen sosyal ve tarihsel koşulara göre günlük hayatı yeniden üretilmesini sağlar. Bu belirsizlik aynı zamanda millet kavramının ırk, vatandaşlık, aile, sınıf gibi diğer sosyal kategorilerin yerine geçmesine ayrıca millet ve milliyetçilik söylemlerinin

ihtiyaçlarına göre tarihsel öyküleme seçmesine neden olur. Böylece millet kavramı belirsizlik üzerine kendini inşa ederek boş bir gösteren olarak güçlü bir kavram olarak hükmünü sürdürmektedir.

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