TURKISH SALAFISM ON TWITTER:
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

TURKISH SALAFISM ON TWITTER:
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Although Salafism, as a global phenomenon, has been studied extensively especially in the last decades, there is a need to study local contexts. Despite the common characteristics and its transnational nature, every country has formed their local Salafism(s). The Turkish case has been underrepresented in the literature. This thesis utilizes primary sources, which is Twitter data, to explore on the activities and constituencies of the Turkish Salafis by employing social network analysis and quantitative text analysis. Because of the security concerns and the difficulties of doing fieldwork, this study limits itself to the digital space as its research field.

Keywords: Turkish Salafism, Global Salafism, Social Network Analysis, Quantitative Text Analysis, Computational Social Science

ÖZ

TWİTTER'DA TÜRKİYE SELEFİLİĞİ: SOSYAL AĞ ANALİZİ

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Son on yıllarda, selefilik akademik literatürde global bir fenomen olarak genişçe çalışılmaktadır. Selefiliğin genel özellikleri ve ulusaşırı etkilerine rağmen, her ülke kendi yerel selefilik formunu üretmektedir. Türkiye selefiliği literatürde yerini çok az bulmuştur. Bu çalışma birincil kaynaklara dayanarak, twitter verisi, Türkiye Selefileri'ni inceleyecektir. Twitter verisi sosyal ağ analizi ve nicel metin analizi metodları kullanılarak analiz edilecektir. Bu çalışma, güvenlik endişesi ve saha araştırmasının zorluklarından dolayı sadece dijital alanla sınırlandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye Selefiligi, Küresel Selefilik, Sosyal Ağ Analizi, Nicel Metin Analizi, Programlamalı Sosyal Bilimler

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

API   Application Programming Interface

ISIS   Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

JDP   Justice and Development Party

PKK   The Kurdistan Workers' Party

US   United States

UK   United Kingdom

YPG   The People's Protection Units

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although Salafism has a long history in the Muslim communities, Salafism, mostly due to its violent extremist side, has gained visibility in the public opinion with the catastrophic September 11 terrorist attacks. The entry of Salafist networks in Turkey could be dated back to early 1990s (Altun, 2016), however, Salafist ideas have been spreading in Turkey especially after the outbreak of Arab Awakenings and the Syrian conflict (Cakir, 2014). Global Salafism and its' national forms have been widely studied in the literature, but there is a lack of exploratory and explanatory analysis on Turkish Salafism when compared to other Middle Eastern countries.

This thesis aims to study Turkish Salafism on Twitter-sphere. The main research question is how Turkish Salafis represent themselves on Twitter. Sub questions could be listed as follows: what is the nature of their ecosystem whether centralized or decentralized, which subgroups of Global Salafism show existence on Twitter, which subgroup dominate the ecosystem, what are the most referenced websites and social media platforms in their tweets, and which themes come to the forefront in their tweets.

Epistemological stand of this study is interpretivist. Ontologically, interpretivist epistemology connects with objective and subjective. Therefore, human subjectivity is not detached from the reality. This makes the knowledge produced contextual. So, the method of this research focuses on meanings and context and this thesis uses conceptual framework instead of theoretical framework since Salafism, as a religious movement, is a complex social phenomenon and the interpretivist nature of this research brings it a research-then-theory approach.

In the second chapter, Global Salafism as a conceptual framework will be elaborated. This thesis situates Turkish Salafism in the literature of Global Salafism, which is a growing literature especially in the last decades. The literature on Global Salafism could be categorized under six themes; the formation of concepts, the primary figures, the sub-groups of Salafism, and the countries' experiences of Salafism, Salafism in the context of radicalism, terrorism and extremism, and Salafism within the context of Political Islam and Islamism.

As a continuation of Global Salafism chapter, Turkish Salafism chapter offers exploratory and explanatory analyses on the Turkish experience. At first, a critical review of Turkish literature on Salafism will be provided to show how Turkish academia study Salafism. Then, Radical Islamists will be examined to track their legacy on militant Salafi networks in Turkey. As a preliminary attempt, Turkish Salafism will be periodized into four stages; quietist and formation period-1990s, militanization and institutionalization- 2000s, transnationationalization and centralization-2010s, and decentralization and survival-late-2010s. It is seen that Turkish Speaking Salafi preachers have a wide sphere of influence among their followers, so their profiles examined mostly based on their speeches on YouTube, as a propaganda medium. In the last part, the discussions on the increasing trend in Turkish Salafism is evaluated based on experts' views and interviews.

The literature on Global Salafism and the exploratory analyses on Turkish Salafism will enable us to create a conceptual framework to come up with meaningful conclusions for the data analyses section. In this chapter, findings on the data will be presented. By using social network analysis and quantitative text analysis, the answers of the aforementioned research questions will be explored. When it comes to conclusion, the findings and suggestions for the future research will be summarized briefly. The conclusion part will directly address the main and sub research questions of this thesis.

1.1. Rationale for the Methodology

This study focuses on the online sphere due to some reasons. At first, as Salafi community is linked to terrorist groups, there is a security issue to study them in the field. Second, there is a scarcity of studies on the online sphere, hence this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by focusing on the online sphere.

There are many platforms to study Salafis in the digital sphere. However, this thesis limits itself only to the Twitter-sphere. Most Salafis use Twitter as a way of conveying their messages to the public. Facebook, Instagram and other platforms are less common when it comes to the Turkish context. Besides, collecting data from Twitter is relatively easier than other platforms. And, twitter data, mostly text data, tell us about their network and their worldview.

Studying twitter data allows us to take a big picture of the community through their own eyes. The data are created by themselves in their natural environment, the internet (Lazer et al., 2009). In the last decade, online sphere has been a hub for social movements and social networks (Watts, 2007). They address both their supporters and potential supporters via social media and websites. Arab Awakenings was the peak period in terms of using of online tools by social movements and non-state actors (Axford, 2011) (Alqudsi, 2012) (Hänska Ahy, 2016) (Smidi & Shahin, 2017). Online sphere provides them with a free and easy way of communication and organization (Cattle, 2016).

Two methods will be used to explore twitter data. The first one is social network analysis in Twitter-sphere to describe the Turkish Salafi networks and the second one is quantitative text analysis on obtained data from users to describe their set of ideas and to understand their ideological differences, if exist at all. These methods are very common in the field of computational social science.

Computational Social Science or Social Data Science has been growing especially in the last decade. This is caused by the existence of enormous generated-web data (Lazer et al., 2009). Researchers look at the online sphere to see the other side of the coin. The peculiarity of computational social science basically originates from its amalgam nature combining both computer science and social science. While computer science studies mostly method driven with large amount of data to predict anything, social science studies mostly question driven with small prepared data to explain social phenomena (Wallach, 2015). Computer science removes the limitations of social science regarding studying big data. On the other hand, social science makes sense of this data with its questions and theories where computer science is weak if compared to social sciences.

Social network analysis in digital space is a bourgeoning method which employs computational tools. As it requires software experience, it is not widely used by social scientists. Considering the huge amount of data in digital space, its importance in the social sciences could not be denied. However, it poses some weaknesses in terms of disinformation of automated accounts and the collection of the correct sample. So, the determination of seed accounts which constructs the sample for the research is of great importance. The quantitative text analysis, on the other hand, is a relatively traditional method which is widely used in social sciences. It tells the researcher a lot about the worldview, ideology and the political stance of the subject. There are widely used Qualitative Data Analysis softwares such as NVivo and MAXQDA[1]. They make easier to analyze obtained data from the digital space. However, this thesis used R programming language to analyze twitter text data. There are plenty of text analysis packages in the realm of "R". This thesis did not limit itself to use only one package, instead used a combination of packages mainly including "quanteda" and "tm"[2].

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[1] For more on NVivo and MAXQDA, see. Appendix C.

[2] For more on quanteda and tm package, see. Appendix C.

In general, social network analysis tells us about the important actors in the network, the level of connectedness, the existence of sub communities in the network, and the sphere of influence of the network. In addition to network analysis, text analysis tells us about the worldview of the community, highly referenced websites, authors, and hashtags. In text analysis section, themes are generated based on statistical results, and selected tweets regarding these themes provided with their critical discussions. Considering distinct features of these two methods, a combination of them allows us to grasp more about the nature of online communities.

There are there stages of methodology; data collection, data preparation and data analysis. Data was collected on October 2018 by using a Python package which allows us to retrieve data from Twitter. Python is a common programming language among software engineers and data scientists. However, data preparation and analysis were made by using R programming language. As R language is mostly preferred by social scientists, R packages were used for text cleaning and analysis. The codes used for text analysis will be added as an appendix to this study.[3] These codes may be considered as a sample for quantitative text analysis. Moreover, Gephi application was used to visualize the network data and to calculate metric results. This thesis prefers to use Gephi, Python and R[4], as they are all open-source, free and user-friendly platforms.

Regarding ethical issues, Twitter Social Network Analysis is a widely used method among both academics and researchers[5]. Twitter's terms of usage informs the users that the data created in this space will be shared with the public. The users implicitly give their consent to the researchers to use their data. However, the anonymity of collected data and the privacy of users should be protected.

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[3] See Appendix B.

[4] For more on Gephi, Python and R, see. Appendix C.

[5] For the earliest and the most comprehensive study in Turkish, see (Yalcinkaya et al., 2017)

1.2. Data and Collection Method

The data are extracted from Twitter via R and Python programming languages. There are plenty of ways to get twitter data. The most common one is applying Twitter directly to extract data. By using Application Programming Interfaces (API), the data may be obtained. However, this method has some limitations regarding time and volume. Due to ethical and commercial reasons, Twitter limits API usage day by day. Buying data from an intermediary data company would be another option. This is the most expensive way of getting data. Additionally, this method does not give the researcher an option to manipulate data during the collection process. One should trust the intermediary agency to use this path. For this thesis, the data was collected by using programming languages.

Sampling is the first step before extracting data from Twitter. It is very hard and time-consuming to get the whole population of Turkish Speaking Salafis in Twitter. Therefore, this study prefers to take a representative sample to infer about the population. Snowball sampling method was used to get the representative sample. It took more than two months to monitor and collect the representative accounts.

First, some keywords and its variations such as "*selefi*"(Salafist), "*akide*"(creed), "*tevhid*"(unity of God), "*idlib*", "*el kaide*"(al-Qaeda), "*al nusra*", "*tekfir*"(declaring someone as a non-believer), "*şirk*"(polytheism) were determined. These are the most common words among Turkish speaking Salafis (Korkmaz, 2016). While some of the keywords like *tevhid* and *şirk* are very commonly used among other Islamic communities such as Islamists or Sufis, additional attention was given to separate Salafis from others. Then, some important figures in Salafi community were searched on Twitter. In the global context, "*Usame bin Ladin*", "*Abdullah Azzam*", "*Makdisi*", and "*Cevlani"* were added to the lexicon; besides, "*Abdullah Yolcu*", "Ebu Hanzala", "*Huseyin Cinisli*", "*Mehmet Emin Akin*", and "*Mehmet Balcioglu*" were added to dictionary representing the local figures.

After searching for keywords and key figures in Twitter Search, nearly sixty accounts of Turkish speaking Salafis from different fractions were obtained. The initial sample includes both militant, political and quietist Salafis. Then, the leaders' accounts were added into the sample.

However, the aim was to find a lay person in the community. So, snowballing method was used to find these accounts. At the end of this process, 213 accounts including all fractions of Salafis and their prominent figures were obtained. Then, their whole public data from Twitter were extracted by using Python programming language.

Twitter data consists of all tweets of users, their creation time, hashtags, mentions, all followers and followings. The dataset has 69998 tweets. The quantitative text analysis section of this study will be based on this tweet data. When it comes to networks, a network matrix of sample accounts (213) were built to get the picture of their connectedness and clusters. It was generated from the follower's data. The social network analysis section will be based on this network data. Besides, the most common hashtags, tweet creation dates and the most common websites will be analyzed in the quantitative text analysis section.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL SALAFISM

2.1. Introduction

The term of Salafism has gained currency among public, government officials and academics especially in the last two decades. Regarding Islam and the Middle East, the agenda has been changed in almost every decade. Literature between late-1970s and early-1980s were under the shadow of the Iranian revolution and the concept of Radical Islam. Then, the concept of Jihad and Afghan war were added on the agenda. With an apparent change in trend starting from the 1990s, global Islam, global Jihad and Political Islam concepts have become a matter of debate. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" theory (Huntington, 1993) was the most striking argument together with the Roy's claim of "the failure of political Islam"(Roy, 1994). There was no confusion like today regarding concepts of Islamism, Political Islam, fundamentalism, and Salafism. The turning point was the catastrophic September 11 terrorist attacks. From that point on, Islam started to be studied in the context of terrorism, radicalization and extremism. Unfortunately, Islam was viewed as a source of terrorism and political violence.

At the end, Salafism, in its authentic nature, could be studied mostly after the mid-2000s as a byproduct of studies on jihadi-militant Salafi organizations like al-Qaeda. The fractions in Salafism were described thoroughly thanks to Wiktorowicz (2005), but Salafism in its Global and local forms were inquired thoroughly by Meijer (2009) in his edited book titled as "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement". Like September 11, Arab Awakenings and the rise of ISIS had profound effect on the studies of Salafism, radicalization, political Islam, Islamism, terrorism, and fundamentalism. In their last discussion, Roy (2017, p. 8) and Kepel

(Nossiter, 2016) disagree with each other on whether there is Islamization of radicalism or radicalization of Islam. This is the brief story of concepts regarding Salafism in the contemporary era.

However, Salafism has a long history with different phases from the early days of Islam to the contemporary era. In the earlier centuries of Islam, *Hanbali*[6] tradition tried to protect the lifestyle and creed of Islam to resemble their *salaf* (progenitors). To this end, they preferred not to interpret the main sacred texts which are *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. By following Hanbali tradition, Ibn Al Taymiyyah (1263- 1328) had formulated the first Salafi philosophy by emphasizing three points; shirk (polytheism), *kufr* (unbelief), and critics of orthodox theology with anti-nationalist tendency. Thus, fundamentals of this doctrine were constituted. Until Muhammed Ibn Abdalwahhab, the inspiring figure of Saudi government in the eighteenth century, Salafism was mostly shaped by its quietist form (Meijer, 2009, p.4). However, Abdalwahhab politicized Taymiyyah's philosophy to enable a base for his movement. This step could be regarded as the entry of political Salafism to the scene (p. 9).

When it comes to the modern era, the concept of Salafism was used by reformists, mainly Iranian Jamal al- Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Egyptian Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905). To challenge the West and to find a cure for the backwardness of Muslims, they synthesized an Arab-oriented Salafi revivalist ideology (Griffel, 2015). At the end, Salafism in its Wahhabi form came to the scene as a part of power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In return for Iran's exportation of Shi'ism[7], Saudis tried to export their ideology to increase their influence in the region   (Robinson et al., 2018, p.21). This step also faced the rise of jihadi-militant Salafism after the Afghan war as a reaction to Western countries, particularly to the US. Roy (2004) explains the rise and power of neo-fundamentalist movements in

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[6] One of the four major jurisprudence schools in the early centuries of Islam.

[7] Shi'a Islam is one of the two biggest branches in Islam alongside Sunni Islam.

the context of their universal, "de-territorialized" ideology and deculturized nature which has an Islamic understanding "beyond ethnicity, race, language and culture" (p. 272). Therefore, Roel Meijer (2009) named this era as global Salafism in his edited book which is one of the earliest and the most comprehensive study on Global Salafism alongside (Roy, 2004) and (Schulze, 1990). He called Salafism today as Islam's new religious movement.

In this chapter, the literature on Global Salafism will be elaborated with its sub-strands. As many literature on Salafism, there are also many related literature like contemporary Islamic movements, Islamic thought, Islamism and political Islam. There are also terrorism, radicalization, and extremism literature addressing Salafism, especially in the context of militanism and jihadism. However, as global Salafism literature is a bourgeoning and currently a novice one when compared to others, this thesis mainly addresses the Global Salafism literature in order to contribute to it. Besides, this study contends that looking at the complex religious social movements, sects or phenomena through only the lens of literature which equate religion with extremism, terrorism or radicalism may prevent us from grasping them in a healthy way.

Therefore, this thesis divides Global Salafism literature into six strands; the historical formation of the concept of Salafism, its primary figures, specific experiences of different countries and the subgroups of Salafism in those countries. From its violent extremist side, Salafism in the context of radicalism, terrorism and extremism will be discussed in an elaborative way. From the conceptual side, there is a part titled as Salafism in the context of Islamism, Political Islam and Fundamentalism.

2.2. The Formation of the Concept of Salafism

Studies inquiring the formation of the concept and basic tenants of the doctrine could be divided into two important branches. First of all, "Global Salafism" (2009),

as a founding book, provides extensive research on the Salafi thought, the history of Salafism and the transformation of the radical concept. Haykel identifies *tawhid* (unity of God) as the central position in the Salafi doctrine. *Aqida*(creed), *manhaj*(methodology), *ijtihad* (individual interpretation), and *shirk* (polytheism) are the other essentials of Salafi thought (p. 34). *Aqida* denotes to theology, *manhaj* to politics, *ijtihad* to law in terms of Haykel's classification (p. 51). In the book, Salafism is basically defined as the philosophy aiming to purify the Muslim community in accordance with the earliest version of Islam. Haykel warns the readers and researchers not to confuse the term Salafi with fundamentalism or Political Islam (p. 36). Most Salafis today, do not have any agenda to take a seat in the political scene or to capture the state (p. 35). One of the later chapters delves into the concept of al-wala'wa-l-bara' (loyalty to Muslims, hatred toward non-Muslims). This concept mostly embraced by Al Qaeda ideologues and can be a justification for violent extremism in their ideology. The author examines this concept within the ideological framework of Maqdisi, one of the leading figures in the al-Qaeda ideology. One more contribution of this book would be examining the intellectual roots of anti-Shi'ism in Salafi understanding. It is important to address this topic, as the spread of Salafism is correlated with rivaling Shi'ism in the region, especially in the contemporary era.

On the other side, Lauzière (2016) contributes to the literature with his book titled as "The Making of Salafism". The book, from its beginning to the end, aims to uncover the historical formation of the concept of Salafism. This feature of the book makes it unique and exclusive. He addresses the importance of studies based on primary literature and criticizes the secondary literature in terms of interlinking reformist movement in late nineteenth century with Salafi movement. This assertion is an ongoing discussion topic between Lauzière and Griffel (2015), as Lauzière reconsidered his suspicions and contradictions in the literature in his earlier article (2010). Griffel (2015), a well-known scholar of religious studies at Yale University, echoes Massignon's contention that Egyptian Muhammed Abduh and Iranian Cemaleddin Afghani as reformist modernists in late Ottoman era could be viewed as

Salafi in the conceptual meaning. However, Lauzière (2016) objects this assertion with naming them Salafi only in the feminine meaning of the concept in Arabic. His suggestion is deconstructing the concept at first, and then reconstructing it in accordance with its principal resources. Toward this aim, he takes Al Hilali, an eminent Salafi scholar in the contemporary era, as a case study. Looking at the concept through the eyes of primary sources with not denying the impact of social and political processes makes Lauzière's book a keystone in the literature.

2.3. Primary Figures of Salafism in the Contemporary Era

When it comes to important figures, Nasir al-Din Albani who is an Albanian Islamic scholar is woth researching because he is a twentieth-century scholar of Salafism and a supporter of anti-madhhab idea (Willoughby, 2015). In his article, Willoughby argues that Albani did not care about the social consequences of his pronouncements. As Albani is completely apolitical, his major focus is finding the "truth" through the texts. The article also compares Salafi figures in Islam and Tea Party in American context; the Founding Fathers (the Salaf) and the Constitution (the scripture) and contends that all such movements have some generic trends. This comparison is so important and interesting in terms of looking at the text-based movements (fundamentalists) regardless of their religious or national origin.

The study on the Iraqi scholar Numan al-Alusi and his writings on theology show the power of the printing press and the continuation of the legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah, who is an early figure of Salafism (Nafi, 2009). The article tries to inquiry the prominence of Alusi's book of Jalāʾal-ʿaynayn to understand his life and educational environment. According to Basheer, Alusi's book is undisputedly a founding text which emerged in modern Salafi doctrine in the Arab urban space. (Nafi, 2009)

There is also a debate in the literature on Abu l-Huda l-Sayyadi who is considered as the forgotten Salafi (Eich, 2003). Eich has started to argue about the position of

Abu l-Huda within the dichotomy of Salafis vs. obscurantist Sufis. Also, he considers Abu l-Huda as an Ottomanist rather than nationalist. Later, Weismann (2007) raises a debate on Eich's arguments with aimed to understand the impact of late Ottoman period transformations on modern Muslim politics. Then, Eich (2008) responses to Weismann by pointing to the role of human agency in knowledge production. He defends himself by stressing his effort to find a middle way for a controversial figure in the history. In his last work, Eich (2009) disagrees with Nafi (2009) on the comparison between Abu l-Huda and al-Alusi in terms of conceptualization of the 19th century Salafism.

Wagemakers(2009) profiles Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi who is one of the leading actors in al-Qaeda. While he is active in a jihadi-Salafi current, he has a strong purist side. To show his complex identity, the article discusses three major doctrines (al-wala wa-l-bara , kufr and jihad) in his ideology. The author argues that Maqdisi's popularity among Salafi community is coming from his specific integration of purist (apolitical) and jihadi (militant) Salafism. In addition to Wagemakers, al-Saud (2018) explores the influence of Maqdisi in jihadi-Salafism by referring his published books and articles.

On the other hand, there is a considerable literature on the leading figures of al-Qaeda. Riedel (2008) describes Ayman al Zawahiri as the thinker; Osama bin Laden as the Knight and Ebu Musab al-Zarqawi as the stranger. His classification is important in revealing the role of leaders in the organization. Zayyāt (2004) offers a critical biography of Zawahiri as an ideologue of al-Qaeda. His book has a special place in the literature as he personally has known Zawahiri for a long time. There are also notable biographies on Laden which reveal his transformation from a businessman to the leader of a terrorist militant-Salafi organization (Mockaitis, 2010) (Scheuer, 2011). There is also a remarkable biography on Zarqawi who is considered as the most violent Salafi in the contemporary era (Brisard & Martinez, 2005).

It is important to note that Internet and social media have changed the role of charismatic figures in Salafi trends. The concept of leaderless Salafism has been discussed in the literature (Ramsay & Marsden, 2015), especially for the militant Salafis. Under the terrorism literature, Ramsay and Marsden discuss the "new terrorism" thesis, which is globalized, decentralized and postmodern. On the other hand, Gendron (2017) evaluates the role of charismatic preachers on the Internet on the radicalization and recruitment process. Radical virtual communities may be a facilitator factor on transformation of passive activists to militant jihadists. To break the charismatic bond, he advises to focus on the appeal of both the messenger and the message.

2.4. The Subgroups of Salafism

The issue of subgroups of Salafism is also an important part of the literature. With many subgroups and understandings, there is a need to determine an anatomy of a Salafi movement. Until Wiktorowicz (2006), there was a conceptual crisis to identify Salafis with different inclinations, thankfully, he filled the gap in the literature by classifying Salafi factions into puris (quietist), politicos (political), and jihadis (militant) Salafis in accordance with contextual interpretation. This classification allows us to differentiate between Osama bin Laden who has militant creeds and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia who has political side. Before Wictorowicz's categorization, there was a confusion to name both violent militants and non-violent puritans under the same title, Salafi. According to the author, although they have a common religious creed, they differ from each other in terms of their interpretation of contemporary problems and their solutions. Characterizing the contemporary Salafism is also an important problematic within the literature. With case studies, Olsson and Poljarevic (2012) propose the manifestations of Salafism and religious approaches in the study of Salafism. On the other hand, Sedgwick (2012) looks at Salafism through the eyes of social mechanisms. The author tries to make contribution to the Meijer's (2009) study. Upon Meijer's observations on Salafism's capacity to empower and change identities and the resurgence of Global Islam,

Sedgwick stresses the importance of the social aspects of Salafism as it is neglected due to so much emphasis on the doctrine itself.

From jihadist's context, Kassim (2015) contribute to the literature by taking Boko Haram as a case study to reveal the religious philosophy of this ideology. After Kassim, Maher's (2016) book on Salafi-Jihadism provides a comprehensive look at the history of jihadi idea. The book regards itself as a continuation of Meijer's (2009) editorial book, which stresses the need for a study on Salafi-jihadi thought. Maher examines the idea through the lens of concepts which are jihad (struggle), takfir (excommunication), al-wala'wa-l-bara' (loyalty and disavowal), tawhid (unity of God), hakimiyya (sovereignty). This study is essential to our understanding of how militant Salafi organizations, like Al Qaeda or ISIS, recruit and legitimize their actions.

In this regard, it should be noted that there is a vast literature on the militant Salafi organizations, specifically on ISIS in the last years due to the increase in the security threat originating from these global terrorist organizations. Forefront studies on ISIS could be classified in terms of revolutionary perspective (Cockburn, 2015), historical and ideological evolution (McCants, 2015), terrorism and extremism strands (Stern & Berger, 2016) and field research (Weiss & Hassan, 2016).

Moreover, Hegghammer's (2017) edited book on Jihadi culture analyzes the phenomena from totally different perspectives. The author argues that examining daily life and artistic culture of militant Salafis would tell us a whole different story. He justifies the necessity of such a study with the idea that there is no shortage of studies on doctrines, tactics, resources, politics or operational stuff for militant Salafis, but, rituals, music tastes, poets, jokes and food of militant Salafis are almost non-existent in the literature.

2.5. Global Salafism and the experiences of various Countries

While there is an ongoing debate on the existence of Global Salafism, the local Salafisms are real cases which can be seen across the world. There is a vast literature on the specific experience of countries which has been growing especially in the last decade. Most of the literature was formed after 2010, in other words, the literature has been mostly shaped under the shadow of Arab Awakenings. This delay may be explained by overemphasizing Salafism in the security context after September 11 rather than within its local experiences with its different currents. In the literature, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Europe and North America are addressed; there is only gap in the Latin American context. It should be investigated why Salafis have lack of interest toward this region.

In the North America context, as most of the literature is composed of security-oriented articles and books on al-Qaeda or ISIS' strategy and domestic effects, there are a few studies looking at American local Salafism. Elmasry (2010), in his earliest article, elaborates on the rise of the first African American Salafis, who follow Wahhabi tradition. The entry of Salafism in America goes back to the early 1990s. While they have experienced a disruption after September 11, they are growing in the public since the late 2000s. The second piece will come after eight years from the first article and after the end of Arab awakenings and the fall of ISIS on the ground. Meleagrou-Hitchens (2018) offers an overview of historical evolution of the movement in the US based on primary resources and interviews. He evaluates that a specific American Salafism is growing in response to local and global events. Interestingly, he proposes to work with quietists Salafis, as moderates, in US to restrain the radicalization of Muslims.

In the European context, there is a growing literature which focuses on mainly Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, together with France. Two articles on Norwegian context investigate the impact of IslamNet and its civic engagement (Bangstad and Linge, 2015) (Mårtensson, 2012). In Swedish context, Olsson (2012)

problematizes the nature of Salafism in Sweden (2014) and determines its character as puritan or quietist (2012). While Amghar (2008) discusses the French Salafism through its ideological transformations, Adraoui (2018) narrows his scope by framing the issue of politics in quietist French Salafist communities. Adraoui questions the dichotomy between being aloof from politics and having a desire to shape the society. This study is of great importance in terms of understanding the mentality of apolitical Salafism especially within a non-Muslim majority country.

When it comes to Africa, in an article on African Salafism, Østebø (2015) inquires on the features and trends of African Salafism. With local varieties and African realities, the article focuses on the role of African agency, the quest for purity and the politicization of purity. Moreover, Østebø (2014) has an article on Ethiopian Salafism. He argues that labeling the Salafis as "extremists" is not very fruitful to approach Salafism as a phenomenon. Dumbe and Tayob (2011) also approach the issue from social and puritans' sides by examining Salafis in Cape Town. Their extensive interviews with a big number of Salafis and anti-Salafis enrich the content of the article.

From the purist side, Gilsaa (2015) provides an example from Tanzania by examining theological roots and political stance of Ansar Sunna movement. From violent side, Marchal and Sheikh (2015) try to articulate how Salafis in Somalia cope with civil wars and coercion. In the Nigerian context, while Hansen (2017) discusses the emergence of Boko Haram, as a violent extremist Salafi organization, from the post-colonialist perspective with a reference to radicalization literature, Thurston (2016) analyzes Nigerian Salafism and religious change in West Africa through the lens of literalist Islamic texts produced in the post-colonial period.

When it comes to North Africa context, Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine (2012) provide satisfying results from public opinion survey on Algerian youth to assess their view on Salafism and Sufism. According to the article, they prefer Sufism rather than Salafism in terms of peaceful change in their country.

From the political Salafism strand, Al-Anani & Malik (2013) provide an in-depth study on Egyptian Salafism. Arab Spring has reshaped the politics in the Middle East. Salafis have gained more visibility in the political scene. While Egyptian Salafism has a long history (Gauvain, 2010), its politicization process could be considered as a fruit of Arab Awakenings (Karakoç, Köse, & Özcan, 2017). Meijer's (2016) comparison between Al-Nour Party and ISIS would be a corner stone in political-militants comparisons. Drevon (2016) also inquires on the militanization and mobilization of Egyptian youth and draw attention to the role of online socialization on the recruitment process.

Tunisian Salafism is the most studied topic in Africa, especially within the context of democratization. This should be a direct result of Arab Awakenings. In their earliest study, Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta (2012) underline the importance and ingenuity of Tunisian Salafism. Merone & Cavatorta (2012) contribute to the literature with relying on primary sources and conducting field research to inquiry on the complexity of this phenomenon. Marks (2013) participates in the discussion by articulating the role of jihadi front in the political transition period. Two years later, Cavatorta (2015) questions how the liberal environment in Tunisia transforms the jihadi Salafis and ends the conclusion that they failed to integrate the transitionary steps in Tunisia; in contrast, militant Salafis would threaten the democratization efforts. At last, Karagiannis (2019) compares Al-Nour party, political Salafis, in Egypt and democratization reforms among Tunisian Salafis to understand how Salafis have chosen the democracy as a master frame while they have ultra conservative views on social and political issues.

Aside from Africa, the Middle East covers an important space in the Global Salafism literature. Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait are addressed as the country cases in the Middle Eastern context. In Jordanian context, Wagemakers (2018) offers some insights on the division in Jordanian Jihadist Salafis although that Syrian conflict would be an opportunity to unite them. Utvik (2014) names the politicization of quietist Salafis in the region as Ikhwanization, a

political Islamist movement in the region. He arrives of this conclusion by comparing Egyptian and Kuwaiti cases. Bonnefoy (2012) uses level of analysis (local, regional and international) to analyze the evolution of Yemeni Salafism. By combining International Relations theory and political sociology perspectives, he contends that Yemeni Salafism is a product of spontaneous events, grassroots mechanisms and transnational flows to the country.

Saudi Arabia is the homeland of Osama Bin Laden and most of the militant Salafis in 9/11. Although it is late, Hegghammer (2010), an eminent scholar of militant Salafi movements, offers a first ever history of Saudi jihadism. His book could be a keystone regarding global jihadist movement in terms of carrying out the fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and using the primary sources in Arabic.

When it comes to Lebanese Salafism literature, it is the most fruitful one. Pall has two books on this topic. While the earliest one (2013) inquires on the transnational nature of Salafism within the Lebanese context and his second book (2018) regards Lebanese Salafis as a network and show the effect of transformation in regional Salafism on the fragmentation of the Lebanese Salafi community. Also, Pall offers important insights on non-violent Salafis based on extensive fieldwork. However, Rabil (2014) studies militanization process of Lebanese quietist Salafis through the eyes of terrorism and radicalization literature.

In the Asia continent; China, Tatarstan, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Russia have also been covered in the literature. In his earliest study on Indonesia, Hassim (2010) discusses that puritan Salafism entered Indonesia in the last three decades. The contribution of the book is mainly based on the conceptual analysis and its preliminary insights on the future of Salafism in the region. Chaplin (2014) evaluates Indonesian Salafism as a "Saudization" which constructs an imaginary ideal in response to Indonesian "social corruption". Meanwhile, Woodward (2017) provides a good example on how Indonesian Salafis justify Arabization process by examining texts of Komaruddin Hidayat, an eminent figure in the Tarbiyah

movement, an Islamic movement based in Indonesia inspired by Muslim Brotherhood.

In the Afghan context, Hartung (2016) discusses global leadership on militant Salafis by comparing Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. Kuo's (2012) study on jihadist threat in Xinjiang has significant insights on Uyghur community. According to him, Uyghur Islam and identity are antithetical of Salafi understanding so that the perception on Jihadi-Salafi threat should be re-evaluated. Tatarstan has been studied as being a rival of Russian Islam within the region (Bustanov, 2017). In this article, the use of language by Tatar Salafis, so far ignored in scholarship, is greatly emphasized as a step towards the creation of national character of Tatar Salafism. For Indian context, Siyech (2017) stresses the diversity from violent extremists to non-violent ones. For the author, many of the Indian Salafis are inclusive, syncretic, and nationalistic.

In the last part, compared to other Middle Eastern countries, Turkish Salafism is less emphasized in the literature. While there is an article dedicated to characterizing Turkish Salafism (Hammond, 2017), most of the studies are commited to exlore and explain the militant Salafism phenomenon in Turkey either from the viewpoint of ISIS (Yalcinkaya et al., 2017) (Tezcur and Ciftci, 2014) (Tahiroglu & Schanzer, 2017) (Saymaz, 2017) (Eroglu, 2018) (Stein, 2016) or al-Qaeda (Orhan, 2010). Hammond's first attempt to explore Turkish Salafism is laudable; however, it fails to connect the legacy of existent religious groups to Salafism in Turkey. Besides, the important figures, so called preachers, should be examined in a detailed way. Also, transnational nature of Salafism in Turkey should be emphasized more to show the transitivity between the region and religious movements. As seen, the focus point of almost all studies on Salafism in Turkey is the militant Salafi current, however, there is a need to look at the quietist and political fractions in Turkish Salafism. In this study, Turkish Salafism will be elaborated covering its all subdivisions from quietists to militants. This may allow us to approach Turkish Salafism in a holistic way.

2.6. Salafism in the context of Radicalism, Extremism and Terrorism

2.6.1. Definitions

The use of "radicalization", "extremism" and "terrorism" terms has neither been clarified in the academic literature nor in government reports. As they refer to the similar phenomenon, they may be used as substitute to each other. Radicalization, in its original usage, is generally used to describe agencies' behaviors in the context of radical politics. However, the concept gained a new meaning after the September 11 attacks and with the spreading militant Salafism in the West (Sedgwick, 2010). Radicalization now mostly implies the process of participating militant Salafi movements for the cause of jihad (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017, p. 11).

Two different definitions come to the forefront in the radicalization literature. While Della Porta and LaFree (2012) assert that there is no consensus on the definition of radicalization, they compile the existing definitions as "a process leading towards the increased use of political violence"; "the strategic use of physical force to influence several audiences"; "increased preparation for, and commitment to, inter-group conflict"; "an escalation process leading to violence" (pp. 4-10). On the other hand, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) approach the term from different angles in terms of its function and its description. They put intergroup violence at the major focus of their definition. Radicalization is, functionally, intense preparation for violence among groups, but, in descriptive sense, it is the strong justification violence between groups by changing beliefs, feelings, and behaviors (p. 416). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) also differentiates radicalization between violence to point out non-violent forms of radicalization and extremism. According to them, radicalization should be regarded as activism if the action is legal and nonviolent, however, if it turns out to be illegal and violent political action, it should be named as radicalism (p. 82). When it comes to terrorism, they define it as the last stage of radicalization which is the most extreme and violent action targeting both civilian population and government security forces (p. 82).

2.6.2. Causes of Radicalization

There is an interdisciplinary and huge literature on the root causes of radicalization or extremism. To list the disciplines; economics, psychology, theology, sociology, political science, and communication science are only some of the disciplines addressing radicalization and terrorism motivations and processes. These approaches do not claim to explain the whole phenomenon, but they try to add one more dimension to understand the root causes of radicalization. Radicalization, because of its interdisciplinary nature, should be approached through the lens of a combination of these disciplines.

First of all, studies that explain the causal relationship between economics and radicalization are not sufficient due to the issues in data collection process and methodology. However, some scholars analyze terrorism, as a relative concept, thorugh the eyes of the Economics discipline. Kruger and Malečková (2003), address this issue to find a causal connection. However, they could not find any causal relationship between poverty, education and terrorism. They suggest looking at political situations and socio-psychological aspects of terrorism instead of economic explanations. They associate lack of civil rights with high participation in terrorism.

In opposition to this argument, Bruck's (2007) edited book titled as "The Economic Analysis of Terrorism" has a counter-conclusion. Blomberg et. al. (p. 29) contextualizes Tornell's (1998) argument that terrorist activities are initiated by those are unhappy with exist economic conditions to improve their conditions. According to this study, there is a relation between reduced economic activity and increased terrorist attacks. In other words, there is an increasing probability of terrorist activity in high income and advanced democratic countries experiencing economic recessions. So, they conclude that sufficient economic resources would reduce terrorist activities by using panel data set of 127 countries from 1968 to 1991.

From the psychological point of view, John Horgan provides rich explanations on the causes of radicalization and terrorism. Horgan's (2014) book titled as "The Psychology of Terrorism" is one of the leading studies on this subject. As opposed to conventional understanding of terrorist psychology, Horgan asserts that those who engage in terrorist activity do not necessarily have psychological problems. He developed three stages of IED (Involvement, Engagement and Disengagement) terrorism model by examining a great number of interviews, autobiographies, and biographies on religious or nationalistic motivated terrorists. Moreover, Koomen and Pligt's (2016) study on the psychology of terrorism offers a framework to explain the determinants of radicalization and terrorism including stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, culture, group dynamics and intergroup relationships, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Main Determinants of Radicalization (Koomen & Pligt, 2016)

Sociological approaches, in addition to economics and psychology, analyze the same phenomena at different levels of analysis which are society and collective action. While social movement theory does not offer a causal mechanism for radicalization or terrorism, Beck (2008) emphasizes the needs for studying terrorism, political violence or radicalization in the context of social movement theory by underlining collective action and social networks in terrorist groups. Wiktorowicz (2005) offers four key processes facilitating someone to join radical Islamic group as cognitive opening (becoming receptive to the new ideas), religious seeking (seeking meaning from a religious idiom), frame alignment (making sense of public representation) and socialization (indoctrination and identity construction by participation in religious lessons and activities). The case study on Al-Muhajiroun, a transitional violent extremist Islamic movement based in the UK, enhances his model's explanatory power.

In the theology discipline, after the tragic September 11, scholars have given more emphasis on this phenomenon. In this respect, Juergensmeyer's (2001) book titled as "Terror in the mind of God" and Stern's (2004) book titled as "Terror in the name of God" could be considered as two important examples in the literature. These two books examine the concept of terrorism through the eyes of all religions in the world based on in-depth interviews. They try to uncover the mindset of the religious inspired terrorism and identify patterns and motivations among religiously inspired terrorists. In 2011, Gunning and Jackson readdress the issue by questioning the validity of the term of "religious terrorism". Their study views the distinctions between secular and religious in the context of violence or terrorism as problematic. Instead, they offer alternative ways to approach the phenomenon. There is a recently published comprehensive book studying religious roots of terrorism with references to different religions such as Islam, Christianity and Hinduism and that compares various countries' experiences (Masaeli & Sneller, 2017). Since it is less common to question the relationship between religion and violence in the academic literature and a misread issue among public, policy makers and media, these studies are of great importance.

In this regard, the discussion on radicalization of Islam vs. Islamization of radicalism should be mentioned. Oliver Roy, an eminent scholar of Islam and radicalization, argues that "violent radicalization is not the consequence of religious radicalization, even if it often takes the same paths and borrows the same paradigms (that is what he calls "the Islamization of radicalism") (Roy, 2017, p. 8). He believes that fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to political violence as in the example of Hasidic Jews and quietist Salafis. On the contrast, Kepel sees Islam as the root of the radicalization problem and advices Roy to inquire more on the intellectual resources of Salafism (Nossiter, 2016).

2.6.3. Pathways to Radicalization

In general sense, the existing theories and models on pathways to radicalization could be classified into two approaches in terms of bottom-up and top-down. The role of external radicalizer, ideology, identity, social networks and leaders are some of the important points to explain the radicalization processes. Hoffman (2008 and 2010) focuses on top-down approach which attributes a key role on the recruiter or the religious figure in individual's radicalization process. According to him, this external relationship leads to individual to reject existing relations with friends and family, then participate in a violent extremist group and finally take part in an act of violence. However, as a proponent of bottom-up approach, Sageman (2004) gives an important role to one's interactions in physical social networks. According to him, interaction with peer groups would facilitate to embrace extremist ideology and belief which cause them to take part in violent actions.

In addition, there are linear models vs. non-linear models to explore the process of radicalization. One of most widely used linear model for militant Salafi radicalization belongs to New York Police Department (NYPD)'s Intelligence Division (Borum, 2011). This report builds a linear model to shed light on how Western citizens embrace Jihadi-Salafi ideology. The model consists of four process; pre-radicalization (before exposing to jihadi-Salafi ideology), self-

identification (exploring Salafi theology and affiliating with its adherents), indoctrination (intensification in beliefs and commitment to ideals), and Jihadization (taking action). This model is a simple and explanatory based on empirical data obtained by government officials.

Figure 2 NYPD model of Jihadization

Unlike linear models, the Joint Military Information Support Center (JMISC) offers seven interacting components as part of radicalization process, as shown in Table 1 (Borum, 2011). This table provides a comprehensive picture, as it combines push and pull factors, a need for belonging, the role of social networks, and the power of ideology.

Table 1 Seven components of radicalization process offered by JMISC

Factors	Explanation
Motivations	Motivations, as an initial incentive, are a combination of both push and pull factors. Discrimination is an example of push dynamics, and propaganda would be a source of pull dynamics.
Socially-Facilitated Entry	Engagement in social networks, such as schools, prisons and religious institutions, is considered as an important component of radicalization process. Schools, prisons and religious institutions would enable a fertile ground for one's radicalization process.
Splintering/Progression	Radicalization process is not a sudden phenomenon, it takes some time to take action.
Intensification	The role of recruiter or leader is emphasized in the literature. Also, in-group socialization intensifies and feeds one's beliefs and commitment toward the group.
Ideology	Ideology is not a commonly accepted component of radicalization process; however, it gives a set of ideas explaining what is true or not.
Threat/Defense	To rationalize their offensive actions to out-group, they should construct a narrative on threat perception. This pushes also individuals in the group attach more to their group.
Belonging/Identity	The need for belonging may lead one to affiliate with the violent extremist group. Also, a sense of identity provided by them may have an impact on one's radicalization.

2.6.4. Online Radicalization and Recruitment

With the increasing use of Internet and social media, one more factor leading to or facilitating radicalization has been added. In their earliest study, Awan et al. (2011) pointed out that the role of Internet should not be underestimated. However, the issue of whether the Internet is a communication tool or a catalyst factor in online radicalization has not been solved thoroughly yet in the online radicalization literature. There is no causal relationship between the usage of the Internet and the increase in radicalization in the last decades, but there is a consensus that the Internet may have a facilitator role in one's radicalization process.

In their empirical research, Awan et al. (2011) developed a model on a new media ecology in which Jihadist media, mainstream news media, states and audiences are main actors regarding radicalization (p. 124). Through these actors, a great deal of discourse on and of radicalization and a number of experiences on fear, anxiety, mistrust, and uncertainty appear in the information system (p. 124).

As a proponent of bottom-up approach, Sageman (2004) uses social network analysis in his famous book, "Understanding Terror Networks", to show how the al-Qaeda network mostly rely on personal contacts. While he does not undervalue the power of spreading ideology through the Internet, he gives more emphasis on the involvement in a friendship network to join a militant Salafi organization. The power of this study comes from its reliance on biographical data of 172 participants of militant Salafi movement. His second book titled as Leaderless Jihad (2008) provides rich discussions regarding the future of militant movements and the role Internet in evolving process of them. The book argues that Internet would transform the radicalization process by bypassing the leader or recruiter from the system. Instead, networks would allow the establishment of "general guidelines" which are performing as a "virtual glue" (p. 144). Sageman sees virtual environment as a marketplace in which an "invisible hand" coordinates spontaneously (p. 145).

Kirby (2007) approaches the role of the Internet as a facilitator of self-radicalization. It is a novel idea to view one's radicalization process only relying on the consumption of online materials. This means face-to-face interaction would not be a pre-requirement for one's radicalization process. While Weimann (2014) agrees with this argument partially, he opposes the claim that the process is entirely independent. According to him, the radicalization of lone actors would occur as a result of a combination of being exposed to online extremist propaganda and being inspired during his/her interactions with others online. Gill et al. (2015) supports Weimann's argument by stating that though the spread of Internet has not increased the volume of terrorist incidents, it has apparently altered the pathways of radicalization. Also, Behr et al. (2013) attributes a facilitator role to the Internet instead of a causal relationship regarding radicalization process. Both Behr's and Gill's studies rely on empirical datasets. Therefore, their studies gain an edge over the other studies based on secondary sources in the literature.

Some studies investigate the use of Internet by Salafi ideologues and leaders. Anwar al-Awlaki is the mostly referenced English speaking Salafi ideologue. His online materials have inspired individuals to adopt Salafi identities and facilitated online self-radicalization as we learn from real life in the American context (Brachman and Levine, 2011) Awlaki contributed to the global jihadi movement by enabling recruitment without physical contact. Even though he died, his works continue to inspire newcomers and motivate already radicalized individuals online. Archetti (2015) names this indirect relationship between the messenger and the audience as "imagined relationship" (p. 52).

In this respect, the difference between radicalization and recruitment concepts should be pointed out. As Neumann et al. (2007) remind the distinction by carrying out a case study that Irfan Raja, a 19-year-old student lived in London, was radicalized after being solely inspired from online materials, however, his decision to take action occurred only after his physical connection with other individuals

embracing militant Salafi ideology (p. 89). This case constitutes a good example to show the distinction between online radicalization and offline recruitment.

When it comes to the ISIS' period, the radicalization mechanisms have evolved in favor of online sphere due to ISIS' intensive use of online sphere, especially social media platforms. According to a recent empirical study based on 1600 Twitter accounts, Berger (2015) asserts that ISIS has three stages of recruitment process via social media. In the "first contact", ISIS recruiters publicly represent themselves and monitor potential newcomers with engaging "retweets" and "favorites" (p. 19-21). If the first contact could be accomplished, the recruiters try to create echo chambers in which the potential user is being exposed to the militant and extremist Salafi understanding and excluded from those who have mainstream understanding of Islam (p. 21). At the end of this step, the convert is invited to join private messaging platforms such as Telegram to guide him/her taking part in terrorist activities or migrating to the State (p. 22). This study is of great importance to show the possibility of both online radicalization and recruitment.

Conway (2017) also attributes a great role to the Internet in radicalization and violent extremization processes. Her article offers six suggestions to improve research on online radicalization. Her suggestions could be classified as follows: extending the scope of researches on violent extremists online by going beyond jihadi Salafism; giving more weight to the comparative researches in terms of not only ideologies but also groups, countries, languages, and social media platforms; strengthening the content and scope of analyses by including interviewing and digital ethnographic approaches; investing more on big data collection methods and analyses; going beyond the terrorism literature by communicating with computer science and the Internet studies literature; focusing more on the role of gender in online radicalization. These suggestions would navigate the existing literature on online radicalization, extremism and terrorism for future studies. Considering replicated studies in the literature, Conway's suggestions would bring a new breath in the discipline. Communicating with other literature would be tough in the first

place, especially with computer science; however, the growing data in digital sphere oblige us to take some actions towards new collaboration between social scientists and data scientists.

There is also a vast literature on the online materials of militant Salafi organizations. Online materials could be classified into three parts; official websites, online forums and social media. While the earlier literature focuses on official websites and online forums, the latter explores the usage of social media platforms by militant Salafi organizations.

Zelin's (2013) study provides a comprehensive look at the evolution of online militant Salafi materials since 1984. His study divides jihadi media into four periods: 1984-first period, mid 1990s-second period, 2000s-third period, late 2000s-fourth and last period. Khutbas (sermons), printed materials such as magazines and battlefield videotapes are important channels of jihadi media in the first phase. Abdullah Azzam was the forefront figure during this era and Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya were the major battlefields that jihadi media mostly talked about. In the second era, the jihadi media was centralized through top-down official websites and the materials were under monopoly. In the mid-2000s, interactive online forums have entered into jihad media sphere. In these forums, while the administrators have control over the activities, individuals can share their ideas and interact with like-minded people from a wide array of geography. In the last phase, the entrance and usage of social media platforms make jihadi media decentralized. After the late-2000s, individuals create their own contents such as texts, visualizations and videos and can share them via Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, as important social media platforms (p. 4).

Most of studies exploring the last phase of jihadi media use computational social science methods, as the collection of big data from social media necessitate using computational methods. In this respect, Berger's aforementioned study on online recruitment is also a great example of usage of Twitter by English-speaking militant

Salafis. Additionally, While Badawy and Ferrara's (2018) study is the first study on Arabic content using a dataset of 1.9 million tweets from 25.000 users across the globe, Yalcinkaya et al. (2017) also use computational methods to explore Turkish speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter. Similar to these studies, this thesis will explore Turkish Salafism in Twitter by using computational methods.

2.7. Salafism in the context of Islamism, Political Islam and Fundamentalism

Before delving into the Turkish Salafism literature, it would be appropriate to talk about Salafism in the context of political Islam and Islamism. There is a huge and long history of Political Islam literature in the global and local context. It has been evolving especially after Iranian Islamic revolution and the rise of political Islamist movements in the Muslim communities. Scholarly works on this topic could be categorized into three phases; 1980s and 1990s, 2000s and mid-2010s. Iranian revolution has more influence on the first phase, jihadi-militant Salafists on the second phase and Arab awakenings on the third phase. This part will overview the debates on Salafism within the context of Political Islam and Islamism literature to underline the difference between these concepts and to address the confusion on the usage of the concepts in the literature.

Roy (1994) is one of the earliest scholars who studied political Islam and its evolution before September 11 attacks. According to him, Political Islam which considers Islam as a political system is a modern phenomenon that emerged as in the 1930s. Hasan Al Banna, who is founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Abul-ala Maududi, who is founder of Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan, are two forefront figures during the formation period (p. 2). Roy does not approach contemporary Islamic movements within the framework Islam and politics in Islamic culture instead he proposes explanations from the viewpoint of modern social sciences. The author argues that the followers of political Islamist movements are mostly educated and non-traditionalist (p. 3). Based on Iranian and Afghan examples, he asserts that political Islamism has a third world tendency more than Islamic cultural

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characteristics. He asserts that political Islam has failed as they could not solve social and economic problems, however, neo-fundamentalist movements appeal more to the younger generations in terms of its emphasis on moral issues and degeneration in the society (p. 25). As a result, for the author, Islamism has been transformed into neo-fundamentalism in the 1990s (p.194). Apparently, he distinguishes the concepts of Salafism or fundamentalism from the Islamist understanding of Islam.

After Roy (1994), Esposito's (1997) edited book titled "Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?" could be seen another cornerstone in the literature before September 11. Interestingly, Esposito does not refer to Roy's aforementioned book. The book mostly shows US perspective on this topic. Esposito constructs his argument based on political process (p. 1) instead of cultural transformations, which is Roy's main focus. He compares extremist and moderate governments and movements and inquires the spillover effects of political Islam across the globe. Islamism is evaluated in terms of three aspects; as illegal opposition, as legal opposition and as transnational phenomenon. Salafism is referenced only to show transnational effect of Saudi Wahhabi Salafism in the region (p. 184). While concerns on the visibility of terrorist networks and freedom fighters among Islamists (p. 241) found a place in this early book on Political Islam, the book does not rush to equate "fundamentalism and terrorism" (p. 12). In the book, political Islam and fundamentalism could be used as a substitute of each other. This shows that there is no clarity in the usage of the concepts.

After September 11, Kepel's (2002) work on political Islam proposes the weakening of political Islam like Roy's (1994) argument. He asserts that the terrorist jihadi activism rising in the 1990s is a reaction to the failure of Islamist movements who failed to withhold power in their countries through the 1970s and the 1980s (p. 4). His book clearly differentiates jihadi extremism, which rises with Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s, from Islamist movements, which rise between the 1970s and the 1990s in the Muslim world (pp. 12-14). In contrast to Roy (1994 and 2004), he views

jihadi extremists as political reactionist movements rather than cultural revivalist movements.

One year later, Fuller (2003) inquires "the future of political Islam", which is the title of his book. According to him, Islamism and political Islam are sometimes used as a substitute of each other in some books (p.1). Fuller defines Islamists as those who quest for political and social implementations of Islam in the contemporary world (p.1). His definition covers a wide spectrum of Islamic understandings "from radical to moderate, violent to peaceful, democratic to authoritarian, traditionalist to modernist" (p.2). He also addresses Islamic Fundamentalism as a form of Islamism which has more literal inclinations to study the basic texts of Islam, Qur'an and Hadith. According to him, all fundamentalists are Islamists; however, Islamists do not necessarily have to be fundamentalist.

In 2004, Roy takes the stage again with his book titled "Globalized Islam". According to him, Globalized Islam refers to the relationship of Muslims to Islam which is reformatted by "globalization, westernization and the influence of living as a minority". By echoing his early argument, he views that "neo-fundamentalism is less political minded than Islamist movements" (p. 1). Islamists see Islam not simply as a religion but as a political ideology (p. 58). Therefore, the new wave of religious revival focuses more on society rather than political process (p. 3). He asserts that increasing trend in militant neo-fundamentalism originates from two factors; the spread of Salafi oriented private religious schools and the deterritorialization of Muslim population through migration (p. 2). He interestingly discusses that radical violence in Islamic movements and neo-fundamentalism are more associated with the westernization process rather than purifying religion by going back to the Quran (p. 6). When it comes to Al Qaeda, he evaluates its organization as a brand and one of the "new terrorist" organizations rather than an Islamic movement (p. 294), moreover, he likens the structure of the organization to a mafia (p. 322).

Like Fuller (2003), Volpi's (2010) edited book uses the concepts of political Islam and Islamism interchangeably. In the Reader, while Political Islam is defined as individuals' interpretation of the political and the religious in a specific socio-historical context, Islamism is referred as political activities of those people who give a priority to implement social and political orders of Islam based on their interpretation. Articles in the book titled "Political Islam: A Critical Reader" criticizes studying modern Islamism through the lenses of security-minded approaches (p. 1). The book also criticizes the argument which states Islamism is a modern phenomenon, so it inquires more its socio-historical context to show the legacy (p. 2). Burgat's article labels Al Qaeda, a militant Salafi organization, as a militant Islamist movement (p. 35). However, Denoeux's article questions the usage of "Islamic fundamentalists" and "Islamic radicals" by describing them as artificial constructs (p. 55). The author argues that applying the term "fundamentalism" to the Islamic context would be misleading, as it originates from American Protestantism at the end of nineteenth century. In the Islamic context, Salafism, close to fundamentalism, emerged at the late nineteenth century as a philosophy rather than a uniform movement (p. 58). In contrast to "Salafism" and "Fundamentalism", Islamism or Political Islam has gained currency after the 1970s with its political agenda (p. 60).

The first book which systematically examine the mainstream Islamist movements after Arab awakenings and the rise of ISIS by showing American perspective on this topic, Hamid and McCants (2017) "rethink political Islam" with twelve different country cases. The book's main focus is Muslim Brotherhood, which is a Sunni Islamist movement originated in Egypt, and its branches in the region. With narrowing the scope of the book, Iranian Islamism, as a Shia oriented movement, is excluded from the book. There are many references to Salafism in the book to compare the relationship and competition between Salafis and Islamists in the regional countries, specifically Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. One of the chapters in the book warns the readers not to label all religious movements from Boko-Haram to Brotherhood as Islamists (p. 289). Academicians

and policy makers are invited to rethink the distinction between Salafism as a legal-theological orientation and Brotherhood as a modern political ideology. According to the authors, while Islamic rituals and creed come to the forefront in Salafism, social and political influence of Islam dominate the Brotherhood's ideology. Also, the dichotomy between "extremist" and "moderate" are questioned to address epistemological risk in distinguishing a plenty of groups in the region (p. 290).

In the last part, Cesari's (2018) book titled "What is Political Islam?" tries to uncover the term again, while it is overemphasized in the literature. She inquires Political Islam in the nationalization context during the early twentieth century. She views Islamism or Political Islam as a product of nation-state construction. However, al-Qaeda and ISIS, as global jihadist organizations, are referred to as a recent and radical version of political Islam (p. 161). Rather than returning the early ages of Islam, they should be regarded as a global version of national form of Islam. Besides, she discusses Wahhabism, a political branch of Salafism, as a fundamentalist, literalist and exclusivist version of Islam (p. 163). It is seen that Cesari considers salafi-jihadi groups as a subset of political Islam as they aim to create a global ummah (community) with political agenda. And, she does not make an issue of equating fundamentalism with Salafism or Wahhabism, which is a debatable topic in the literature.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH SALAFISM

3.1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, Turkish Salafism is a underrepresented and bourgeoning topic in terms of both Global Salafism and radicalization literature. In this chapter, a critical review of literature on Turkish Salafism and Turkish literature on Salafism will be discussed. While a few studies focus on the nature of Turkish Salafism by looking through the lenses of its different branches, most of the Turkish literature addresses the notion of Salafism and its historical evolution without touching on the Turkish context.

In the second place, to understand the evolution of Salafism in Turkey, the history of Radical Islamist movements will be summarized. Most of the latest studies show that militant Salafis have used the legacy of radical Islamist movements in Turkey (Orhan, 2010), (Stein, 2016). *Hizbullah, Kaplancılar, IBDA-C* and *Tahşiyeciler* are the eminent groups which will be evaluated in the upcoming pages.

Then, as an original contribution to the literature on Global Salafism, Turkish Salafism will be periodized into four phases as 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, and late 2010s. This periodization part will articulate the evolution of Turkish Salafism through the eyes of eminent figures in the Turkish public. As there is a lack of exploratory analyses on popular Turkish Salafi preachers, a comparative content analysis on them will be provided based on YouTube videos. This part could be considered to complement Twitter data analysis on Turkish Salafism. Finally, the discussions on the increasing trend of Turkish Salafism will be elaborated in terms of the failure of

political and social Islam, the failure of Arab Awakenings, and the conflict in Iraq and Syria.

3.2. A Critical Review of Turkish Literature on Turkish Salafism

As mentioned before, there is a scarcity of scholarly publications on specifically Turkish Salafism with its holistic nature. According to the YÖK Turkish National thesis center, there is only one master thesis on Wahhabism and its constituencies in Turkey (Altun, 2015). However, there are a plenty of theoretical books on Salafism focusing on its historical roots (İşcan, 2006), the birth of its mentality (Unal, 2015) (Yilmaz, 2014), its crisis theology and social side (Evkuran, 2015), its position within the context of Islamic thought and contemporary motivations (Koca, 2016), its relationship with Sufism (Uludağ, 2015), its contemporary relations with Shia-Sunni dichotomy (Yönem, 2013), its hate and violent discourse towards Shiism (İşcan, 2013), its historicism (Kubat, 2004), its link with Wahhabism and Kharijitism (Yildirim, 2019).

Also, the edited book of Kavas (2014) provides a comprehensive approach on Salafism regarding its historical roots, theological sides, relations with Islamic sciences, evolutionary process, contemporary and global forms. Unfortunately, this book has no reference to Turkish Salafism. Interestingly, all abovementioned books and publications belong to theologians and published in the Turkish language.

On the other hand, a great deal of books are devoted to Turkish militant Salafism, especially ISIS. This should be a direct result of security issues in Turkey which have been originated from ISIS and its extensions in Turkey. All of these are studies belong journalists not social scientists. Taştekin (2016) evaluates the historical evolution of ISIS and its activities in the field. Then, Saymaz (2017) devotes his study on Turkish ISIS inquiring its organization and actions. He provides an extensive research on the activities of militant Salafis by relying on court records. The downside of this study is the lack of field research.

In this regard, Eroğlu (2018) fills the gap with his book titled "ISIS networks in Turkey: Radicalization, Organization and Logistics." The originality of this book originates from its approach to Turkish ISIS, which is bottom-up. His research mostly depends on field research and also court records. He examines different regions where ISIS supporters are active among locals. Ankara represents an example of radicalization as a result of urban transformation. Istanbul is an intersection point between ISIS and Turkish ISIS. Konya and Adana constitute examples of multilayered organization. Gaziantep and Adiyaman which have shared border with ISIS have decentralized cell structures. Besides, he discusses the general root causes for Turkish people to attend to ISIS from two angles; general and local factors such as ideology and material motivations, and facilitators such as media and visiting preachers.

When it comes to social media and magazines, Yalcinkaya's et al. (2017) study on Turkish ISIS preserves its uniqueness in terms of focusing on Twitter-sphere. This study evaluates the nature of Turkish speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter by analyzing their networks and discourse. One of the distinctive aspects of this study is that it is a product of a research group combining scholars of social sciences and computer science. Besides, its narrow focus on ISIS, as a militant Salafi organization, allows it to come up with rigorous conclusions. This study stresses the influence of Salafi preachers on users like (Eroğlu, 2018). It also finds that most of the content produced by 15 % of users; this means that most of the agenda is produced by a minority in the community. This may show a tendency toward centralization among users. Interestingly, the forefront agenda of users is PKK and YPG, religious issues come secondary. This may be viewed as a contradiction with their religiously inspired nature. In addition to Twitter, Korkmaz's (2016) study on Konstantiniyye, official magazine of ISIS in Turkish. Similar to Yalcinkaya's study, he reports that the sub themes of the Konstantiniyye magazine covers criticisms against PKK democracy, and Turkey, in addition to religious articles.

3.3. Radical Islam in Turkey

Iranian Islamic revolution in 1980 had spillover effects in the region in terms of radical understanding of Islam. In the historical context, Turkish Islam which can be defined as Sufi-oriented mainstream Sunni understanding of Islam had not allowed to spread radical views in Turkish public. There were established tariqas (school of Sufism) and communities which had already great influence on layperson in Turkey. Besides, Turkish State had a policy of imposing "Turkish Islam Synthesis" after the coup of 1980 (Toprak, 1990, p.10). Therefore, radical or revolutionary views on Islam had not gained enough support from the grassroots. However, these did not prevent radical religious movements in Turkey from emerging. *Hizbullah, Kaplancılar, IBDA-C* and *Tahşiyeciler* are some of the notable movements that have gained support from the public even if they were minority. To discuss whether they provide an infrastructure for militant Salafis in Turkey or not, their history and activities will be elaborated on in this part.

In the first place, *Hizbullah* was the most extremist Islamist movement during the 1990s. Under the influence of Iranian Islamic revolution, *Hizbullah,* which has no relation with Lebanese Hezbollah, idealized to establish an Islamic State in the south east of Turkey after the 1980s. Its nature was an amalgam of Iranian radical Islam and Kurdish nationalism (Karmon, 1998). Like other movements, they failed to achieve their aim to establish a shariah state within the borders of Turkey. However, they continue to their activities within the legal framework by establishing a legal party, Huda-Par, which is participating elections and gaining almost 100.000 votes from the region (Tahiroglu & Schanzer, 2017). Huda-Par leaders and supporters are known for their opposition towards ISIS or militant Salafi movements in Turkey. However, Ebu Hanzala, a leading preacher of militant Salafis in Turkey, is a son of leading figure in former *Hizbullah*. This connection would not be enough to associate militant Salafis with Huda-Par supporters. While adherents of Huda-Par have radical understanding of Islam, they try to find a solution by participating political processes, as opposed to militant Salafis.

Kaplancılar is also another group that was inspired by Iranian Islamic revolution. They aimed to establish an Islamic state in Turkey; however, they were based in Germany. During mid-1990s, they plotted unsuccessful bombing attacks in Turkey. Their religious understanding is not known much, but they proposed radical change in the political system through armed struggle against the established system (Cakir, 1990, pp. 183-186). After September 11 attacks in the US, both German and Turkish security officials took serious measures against Kaplan's organization. At the end, the organization has been deactivated.

Another interesting radical movement in Turkey is IBDA-C, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front. While it has Sunni understanding Islam and makes references to Necip Fazil too much, the group's mission was to takeover secular government and revive caliphate in Turkey again (Cakir, 1990, pp. 166-176). In the 1990s, they mostly targeted popular figures in the public ranging from intellectuals, artists and other religious charities (Tahiroglu & Schanzer, 2017). IBDA-C was accused of organizing 90 terrorist attacks during the 1990s (Karmon, 1998). The groups' insistence on armed struggle has enabled an infrastructure to the al-Qaeda networks in the 2000s. They plotted Synagogue bombings in Istanbul in 2003 with the cooperation of al-Qaeda's networks in Turkey. Different from previous groups, IBDA-C movement has positive inclinations towards militant Salafi networks in Turkey.

When it comes to *Tahşiyeciler*, they have a combination of two understandings which are totally clashing with each other; Nurculuk and militant Salafism. Nurculuk used to be known by its opposition to armed struggle in contrast to militant Salafism. The leader of this movement, Mehmet Dogan, explained his sympathy towards Usama bin Laden on TV screens. Turkish media, also, broadcast his video calling on to his supporters to make bombs and to participate in jihad. According to Stein (2016), a former follower of this group is claimed to be the top recruiter of Islamic State in Konya. This constitutes a clear example of transitivity between them and militant Salafi organizations in Turkey.

3.4. An Attempt at Periodization of Turkish Salafism

Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1980 had an inspirational effect on both Sunni and Shia Islamists in the region. In Turkey, *Hizbullah* and *Kaplancılar* were two of the important radical Islamist organizations in this period. However, Iranian spillover effect in the region has triggered Saudi Arabia to export its ideology which is Wahhabism, a quietist branch of Salafism. This rivalry is considered as the beginning of sectarian conflict in the Middle East in the contemporary era (Robinson, 2018, p. 20).

Salafism like Shi'ism has tried to find its roots in Turkey through Saudi educated Turkish preachers. They had financial power, but taking roots in a new sociology, which is mostly unfriendly with Salafi ideology, will take a time.

Looking back from now, the evolution of Salafism with its different branches ranging from quietists to militants could be periodized into four periods: Quietist and formation period-1990s, Radicalization and Institutionalization period-2000s, Transnationalization and Centralization period-2010s, and Decentralization and Survival period-after 2017. This periodization will be justified with the parameters of the introduction of influential Salafi figures, the regional events, the global events, the domestic events and the Twitter data obtained for this thesis.

3.4.1. Quietist and Formation Period: 1990-2000

In Turkey, quietist Salafism has grown among the public with Saudi support especially after the 1990s. After 1980, there was a quest for a Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Toprak, 1990, p.10). In this regard, religious networks were promoted, especially the Sufi-oriented ones. The understanding of Salafi-Wahhabism has tried to find a role for itself within this atmosphere. They have established associations, charity organizations and publishing enterprises.

Abdullah Yolcu was the first comer to spread Saudi oriented Salafism in Turkey. He is an Iraqi Turkmen and educated at Saudi religious institutions of modern Wahhabi ideologues. His first activities in Turkey were opening a publishing house and a commercial enterprise with Saudi financial support. With his words, he has tried to infiltrate into the established religious institutions in Turkey to grasp local understanding of Islam and to construct his discourse to purify the religious beliefs within the public (Altun, 2016). According to him, this should be done before spreading his da'wa (call), otherwise, the propaganda would not be successful.

As Salafis were marginal in Turkish public in this period and they did not have official institutions, Abdullah Yolcu came to the forefront among them. However, there are other Salafi figures and communities who establish unofficial sohbet (conversation) circles and Qur'an schools which could not be seen publicly.

3.4.2. Radicalization and Institutionalization of Turkish Salafism: 2000-2010

After September 11 attacks in the US, Global militant Salafi understanding has gained a momentum especially within the public espousing anti-American sentiments. Al Qaeda and Usama bin Laden have found a base and gained sympathy among radical Islamists in Turkey because of the existing strong anti-Americanism. Most of the militant Salafi networks have entered the Turkish religious public in this period (Orhan, 2010). This added one more variable in Turkish Salafism which is jihadi Salafism. While Saudi Wahhabism and Jihadi-Salafism originate from the same territory, they were divided from each other especially after September 11 attacks (Buyükkara, 2007).

In the 2000s, there were a number of bombing attacks carried out by al-Qaeda networks in Turkey. It is asserted that IBDA-C played a facilitator role for these terrorist attacks (Tahiroglu & Schanzer, 2017). As militant Salafis had not a base in Turkey before this period, the claim explains how they enter the scene with operational capacity. However, due to efficient police operations on al-Qaeda

networks, they would remain dormant until the outbreak of conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

Moreover, with the rise of the Islamist party in power, religious groups have experienced relative freedom in terms of institutionalization. Table 2 and Table 3 reveal that there is a correlation between the rise of Salafi institutions and the rise of Islamist party, Justice and Development Party, in Turkey. The researcher could achive to find the establishment date of bookstores, however, Salafi associations do not declare their date of establishment on their official website. This thesis, in this regard, relies on Altun's (2016) field study on Turkish Salafi institutions. According to Altun (2016), most of Salafi subcommunities established their associations after 2002 (p. 102), which is the date of rising Islamist power in Turkey.

While bookstores are mainly located in Istanbul and Ankara, association spread across the country ranging from Istanbul to Gaziantep. Mehmet Balcioglu, Huseyin Cinisli, Necmi Sari, Ubeydullah Arslan and Feyzullah Birisik are quietist figures come to the scene in this period. From militant side, Mehmet Emin Akin, Abdullah Kucuk, Murat Gezenler and Halis Bayuncuk are emerging figures proselytizing their Jihadi-Salafi ideology. If we add Hizbut-tahrir from the political branch of Salafism, it would be apparent that all branches of Salafism have gained visibility in this period.

Table 2 Salafi Bookstores established during institutionalization period

Name	City or Platform	Established
Guraba	Istanbul	1992
Karinca & Polen	Istanbul	1999
Ummukura	Istanbul	2002
Tevhid ve Sunnet	Istanbul	2002
Hadis Yayınevi	Bursa	2002
Medarik	Ankara	2002
Kitap ve Sünneti İhya Yayınevi	Ankara	2002
Kitap ve Sunnete Davet Yayinlari	Online Bookstore	2002

Table 3 Salafi Derneks(associations) established during institutionalization period (Altun, 2016)

Name	City
Guraba Dernegi	Istanbul
Ulfet Ilim Yayma Kultur ve Yardimlasma Dernegi(Ulfet-Der)	Istanbul
Kitap Ilim Kultur Egitim ve Sosyal Yardimlasma Dernegi(Kitap-Der)	Istanbul
Okur Ilim Kultur Egitim ve Dayanisma Dernegi (Okur-Der)	Istanbul
Uludag Egitim ve Arastirma Dernegi	Bursa
Ilim Arastirma Egitim Kultur D. ve Y. Dernegi(Ilim-Der)	Izmir
Asr-I Saadet Ilim Arastirma Yayma Dernegi	Gaziantep
Imam Ahmed Ilim Arastima ve Yayma Vakfi (Imam Ahmed Vakfi)	Sakarya
Tevhid ve Sunnet Ilimlerini Yayma Dernegi	Istanbul
Yarpuzlu Medresesi	Antalya

3.4.3. Transnationationalization and Centralization of Turkish Salafism: 2010-2017

After 2010, Arab Awakenings and conflicts in Syria and Iraq which share the same border with Turkey have transformed Salafism not only in Turkey but also in the whole region (Cavatorta & Merone, 2016). While some countries like Egypt and Tunisia have experienced politicization of Salafi networks (Karagiannis, 2019), this did not prevent the rise of militant Salafis and the creation of transnational networks mobilizing foreign terrorist fighters from and to the region. Turkey has been deeply affected from these transnational networks of foreign terrorist fighters as it is right adjacent to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.

In the past, Turkish foreign fighters participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghan wars as volunteer, however, their impact in Turkey was marginal when compared to this period. The establishment of ISIS and the Syrian opposition forces have created a haven for foreign terrorist fighters, and Turkey was a transition stop for them. Moreover, militant Salafis in Turkey have managed to create micro networks affiliated with the center (Eroğlu, 2018) (Saymaz, 2017).

The centralization was a strong necessity to mobilize foreign terrorist fighters and radicalize potential recruits. Militant Salafis have divided into two fronts; supporters of ISIS and allegiants of global al-Qaeda networks. Eroglu (2018) and Saymaz (2017) delve into the inside of network based on court records and field research and reveal how militant Salafis construct a central establishment which recruits people, mobilizes them, finances them, and provides medical assistance for them.

However, the global fight against ISIS on the ground and in the online sphere and the intense police operations and crackdowns against both local supporters and foreign terrorist fighters in Turkey (Yalcinkaya, 2017) cut the connections between the center and local support.

3.4.4. Decentralization of Turkish Salafism and Survival Period: 2017-Today

Quietist and Political Salafis continue their activities without any interruption, as they avoid propagating violent actions and taking part in terrorist activities, but militant Salafi networks from ISIS to al-Qaeda have been hampered intensely. However, their existence still continues in online sphere. Therefore, this thesis names this period as decentralization and survival period.

This thesis uses Twitter data to reveal the presence of Turkish Salafism as of October 2018. This study could be considered as a continuation of Yalcinkaya et al. (2017). Yalcinkaya's study focuses on Turkish speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter, but this thesis investigates quietist and political Salafis as well. Yalcinkaya's study asserts that there is a clear decline in activities of ISIS supporters as correlated with failure on the ground. In contrast, as shown in Figure 14, there is an incremental upturn in tweet activities after 2017.

Combining these two results shows us that Turkish Salafis, especially militant ones, have been disrupted and transformed in online sphere as of 2017. This thesis discusses that there might be two scenarios causing this difference. First, as

discussed above, this would be a direct result of their loss on the ground and online sphere. Technology companies have combated effectively against terrorist organizations especially in the last years by using artificial intelligence tools alongside global war on ISIS on the ground. In the second scenario, it could be contended that as they lose their legitimate representation among public, they may prefer to replace their social media accounts with more "legitimate" ones. It is seen that most of Salafis avoid being associated with al-Qaeda or ISIS, instead, they represent themselves as regular Salafi and Muslim. In this respect, the role of social media and the Internet on decentralization and transformation of militant Salafis could be an interesting research topic, as they are still a part of Turkish community and their activities should be monitored to witness their evolution.

3.5. Turkish Speaking Salafi Preachers with Their Own Words

The eminent preachers of Salafism in Turkey were educated in Saudi Arabia. Abdullah Yolcu, Mehmet Balcioglu, Ubeydullah Arslan, and Ebu Hanzala (Halis Bayuncuk) are prominent preachers. Necmi Sari, Huseyin Cinisli and Ebu Muaz could also be added as important figures (Guler, 2017). While they have important similarities, they also show some differences in terms of their tendency towards politics, the strictness of understanding and the way of expressing their ideas.

Abdullah Yolcu and Mehmet Balcioglu (Ebu Said Hoca) are the earlier figures in the Turkish context and they were educated at Saudi Wahhabi institutions and can be considered as ulama in traditional meaning. They are not in conflict with the political authority and support the Justice and Development Party as an obligation. Necmi Sari is an academic specialized in *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) studies and gives lectures on these issues. Huseyin Cinisli and Ubeydullah Arslan are important preachers rather than traditional ulama. Ebu Muaz is an interesting figure among this community. He does not strictly use the medium of social media considering that they are banned according to *Salafi fiqh* (Islamic

jurisprudence). He can be considered under the branch of Zahiri Salafism[8]. He stresses the word of *sahih* (authenticity) to turn back the pure way of understanding. He is the most productive figure after Abdullah Yolcu and Ebu Hanzala. When it comes to Ebu Hanzala, he is seen as a different portrait within the Salafi community. He is regarded as a *neo- Kharijite* rather than a Salafi figure among the scholars (Guler, 2017).

With the increased use of using communication technology, they effectively use the medium of social media such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter and blogs to propagate their ideology and to find a base within the Turkish religious environment. They use mainly Turkish during the preaches. However, they also promote to learn Arabic to read the primary sources of Islam such as *Qur'an and Hadith*.

As Abdullah Yolcu, Ebu Said Hoca and Ebu Hanzala are important figures within this community, this section will elaborate on their ideas and activities in Turkish community. First of all, Abdullah Yolcu established "Guraba Publishing Enterprises" in 1992 to promote a corrective conservative Sunni Islam taking Wahhabism as its model. He has moderate views on electoral issues which is a debatable topic about participation into politics. He advocates voting for Justice and Development Party as an obligation (guraba, "Seçimlerde Oy Kullanmalı mıyız? / Şeyh Abdullah Yolcu", 2015). He proposes that with his *ijtihad* on voting for Islamist authority, he paves the way for the establishment of *shariah*(Islamic law) in secular democratic Turkish politics (guraba, "Oy kullanma ile alakalı görüşümüze yapılan tenkitlere verilen cevap... / Şeyh Abdullah Yolcu", 2015). He criticizes the other Salafis who rejected to vote for Islamist authority and declared them as *Taghut* (idol) according to the Salafi terminology. Also, Abdullah Yolcu promotes an understanding of Salafism like Tunisian Salafism which stresses rebellion against

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[8] Zahiri Salafis rejects fiqh and reasoning. They are called as literalists, as they are strong adherents of reading canonical texts in Islam by abstaining from interpretation and anthropomorphism.

local Islamic traditions, practices, their relations to political system (Hammond, 2017).

Ebu Said Hoca (Mehmet Balcioglu) is also an important figure among Salafi *ulama* (scholars) in Turkey. He was also educated in Saudi Wahhabi institutions like Abdullah Yolcu. He widely uses the social media tools to publish his lectures. He has similar views like Yolcu on the issue of voting in a secular country. By emphasizing the principle of *ehven-i şer* (the lesser of two evils), he criticizes Muslims for not voting for Islamist authority with the motivation of not supporting democracy. He stresses the point that if we do not support the lesser of two evils, the worst one comes to the power and then this will harm our faith, in the end (Balcioglu, "Ebu Said Hoca "OY VERMEK İMANIMIZA ZARAR VERİR Mİ"", 2015). He has a strong criticism on Shia understanding and Sufi orders in Turkish Sunni community. He sees the current status of Turkish Salafism as a bourgeoning phase. The children of today's Salafis will spread this understanding, he advocates. He also criticizes the labeling of Salafis in Turkey as supporters of ISIS by stating the motivation behind labeling as insulting Salafis (Balcioglu, "Ebu Said Hoca - Türkiye de Selefiliğin Durumu", 2016)

However, Ebu Hanzala promotes Salafi ideology in a different angle. He poses more strict and radical views compared to Abdullah Yolcu and Mehmet Balcioglu. He intervened in politics and made comments in his preaches while preserving his quietist position. He proposes democracy as a religion so that if a believer supports democracy he turns into a non-believer (Hanzala, "Demokrasi Bir Dindir - Ebu Hanzala", 2017). He criticizes the view of *ehven-i şer* (the lesser of two evil) and equates voting with *shirk* (polytheism) within the salafi terminology (Hanzala, "' Seçimlerde oy vermeyip sahayı boş mu bırakalım'", 2015). Moreover, against the accusation of ISIS's affiliations, he declares that they do not have any connection with any other so-called jihadist movements in Syria and Iraq. He stresses that they are just Salafi inviters to their own understanding of Salafism. As the media and authorities equate Salafis and violent extremists, people will have prejudice against

them; thus, people do not listen to them (Hanzala, "Devlet Bize Neden IŞİD'ci diyor? - #EbuHanzala", 2019).

Apart from the quietist Salafism, there are also militant Salafi preachers in Turkey. The most prominent one is Mehmet Emin Akin. He is close to Al Nusra networks, known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham today, in Syria. He has strong opposition to moderate Salafis regarding participation to democratic process and the moderate views on democracy (Akın, ""Ak Parti'ye oy vermek vacip" diyen Demokratik Selefiler / Akidede hata olmayacak - Mehmet Emin Akın", 2015). He calls for jihad in Syria and Afghanistan therefore he is different from the former figures within the Salafi community (Akın, "Oy kullanmak / Onlar bizim ulü'l emrimiz değil! / Ömer Abdurrahman - Mehmet Emin Akın", 2015). Besides, the criticism against Shia and Sufi tradition is forefront in his discourse like Ebu Said Hoca. The rejection of philosophy, logic, esoteric understanding of Islam[9] is seen as an essential element of his understanding (Akın, "Tarikatçıların Şirk Sözleri: Mahmut Efendi'ye bir an bakmak 150 yıl ibadetten üstün-Mehmet Emin Akın", 2015 and "Mevlana'nın dini tahrifi: "Mesnevi Kur'an gibidir" (!) - Mehmet Emin Akın", 2016).

Furthermore, it would be appropriate to state some popular preachers in the Turkish public such as Nurettin Yildiz, Ihsan Senocak, and Alpaslan Kuytul, in this regard. They do not present themselves as followers of Salafist tradition. They have relatively moderate views than the aforementioned figures regardless of apolitical or militant Salafis. While some figures like Alpaslan Kuytul have an opposing stance to the Islamist authority, some like Nurettin Yildiz have relatively neutral stance. However, their way of reading of the primary sources of Islam are close to moderate Salafis regarding participation to democratic process, democracy and the role of women. Abovementioned preachers do not reject Salafis but accept them as brothers (Yildiz, "Oy kullanmak şirk midir, yoksa Müslümanın üzerinde bir görev mi? (Soru-Cevap)", 2014).

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[9] Esoteric approach in Islam quests for hidden meanings in canonical texts. As opposed to Zahiri tradition, esoteric understanding refers inner meanings.

3.6. Discussions on the Increasing Trend of Turkish Salafism

Based on this background on Salafism and its form in Turkey, we could elaborate why Turkish Salafism has been on the rise especially in the last decade. Rusen Cakir and Hilmi Demir are two important advocates of the idea that Turkish Salafism has been gaining prominence in the last decade. The recent developments in Turkey and its region prove them right. While Rusen Cakir mostly stresses upon the role of political authority both positively and negatively and the networks of Syrian jihadis in Turkey (Cakir, 2016), Hilmi Demir looks from the point of theological strand (Demir, "Nakşibendilik Selefileşiyor mu?", 2014).

Mustafa Ozturk is also another figure participating in the discussion as a theologist. He also stressed the role of Diyanet (Presidency of religious affairs in Turkey), theology departments in universities and Imam Hatip Schools (religious high schools). According to him, these institutions give religious education in such a chaotic way that paves the way to Salafi understanding in Turkey. Besides, he warns about the division between Kharijitism and Salafism in Turkish context. The important point is that Salafi discourse is not as strong as traditional Islamic understanding but people who do not like to deal with philosophy, logic and kalam (disputation) may find it easy and useful to read the basic texts without dealing with complicated issues (Ozturk, "Selefilik Türkiyede Yayılıyor Mu? - Kuran Bize Yeter", 2015). This implies that degeneration in intellectual culture promotes Salafism in public. Removal of the philosophy courses in the theology faculties is one of the important reasons in this regard (Kaplan, "İlâhiyat"lardan felsefe derslerinin kaldırılması cinayettir", 2013).

Related to these arguments, it could be contended that there are four reasons for the increasing trend in Turkish Salafism; two of them are national-domestic factors and two of them are transnational-regional. The national-domestic factors mainly depend on the evolution of social and political Islam especially in the last decade.

When it comes to transnational factors, the failure of Arab Awakenings and the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in specific, could be considered as the fueling factors of the rise of Salafism in Turkey.

3.6.1. Domestic Factors: The Failure of Social and Political Islam

While it is discussed that the established religious groups, tariqas and their social networks and their long tradition in society is a strong barrier against Salafism to take a root in public, the developments in the last decade paved the way of the Salafi networks. With the rise of Islamist power in Turkey, social Islamist[10] networks have found a fertile ground for their followers in terms of benefiting from the opportunities provided by the state and the government. This leads to the transformation of traditional orders. Even the groups who have strong opposition to the political Islamists, they have come to the same line with the Islamist authority. The politicization of social Islam makes their followers to do the same mistakes as politicians. Therefore, the corrupt nature of politics and nepotistic discriminations within the system may lead people to quest for more quietist and individualistic understanding of Islam.

Besides, the arguments of Hilmi Demir could be considered within this regard. He stressed the point that revival of Islamists eradicates traditional understandings of Islam within the Turkish public. As Islamists circulate and translate the Egyptian, Iranian and Pakistani texts which have different understandings than Anatolian Islam, the younger generations are subjected to Salafi texts more than traditional texts (Demir, 2014). This is one of the important reasons for fueling this ideology within Hanafi-Maturidi[11] territories. Regarding the lack of intellectual culture and

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[10] A branch of Islamism which gives more importance on social aspects of Islam by promoting educational activities and aid networks. In Turkey, most of religious community is regarded as social Islamist.

[11] Hanafi school is one of the four main schools in Islamic jurisprudence. Maturidism is one of the most influential theological school in Islam. It is known as the most rationalist school of its time, tenth century.

Islamic education in Turkish public, most of young generations and middle-class find Salafi understanding useful to experience religion in a basic way. The interview conducted by Yusuf Tunçbilek with a Salafi shows this tendency within society more clearly (Tuncbilek, "Selefilik Nedir? Hangi Şartlar Gençleri Selefiliğe Yöneltiyor?", 2016). Apart from these points, it could be discussed that there is a positive correlation between the rise of Social Islamist networks and the rise of Salafi networks. In secular atmosphere of Turkey, social Islamists Islamized people and revived the understanding of Islam with different ways and understanding. This may be a step toward the quest for the pure understanding of Islam. Like in the argument of social Islamism, political Islamism[12] may provide a basis by opening a space for religious groups in the public and give more freedom with respect to the previous periods. Because people experience more freedom regarding religious life, people may become more Islamized within this atmosphere. This may be considered as a facilitator for spreading Salafi understanding. There were some supporting points to this argument in the aforementioned interview with a Salafi.

On the other hand, Ruşen Çakir is the pioneer of the argument that the failure of political Islam[13] caused the rise of Salafi tendencies within the public. Political Islamist authority has been shaken by the accusations of corruption, nepotism and changing discourses regarding religious and political issues (Cakir, "Türkiye'de selefi cihatçılık neden ve nasıl güçleniyor?", 2017). Also, the instrumentalization of religion within politics may increase the appealing of quietist Salafism for people who want to experience true Islam (Cakir, "Yeni Selefilik tartışmasına devam", 2014). The Salafi networks may find a fertile ground in this chaotic environment. Furthermore, due to the fact that there are almost no religious groups free from the grasp of political authority, the Salafis are left lonely in the oppositional area. This may fuel their ideology in an indirect way.

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[12] A branch of Islamism which give more emphasis on the political aspects and implementations of Islam.

[13] This argument is echoed by Oliver Roy in his book titled as "The Failure of Political Islam" (1992). For a detailed discussion, see this book.

3.6.2. Transnational Factors: The Conflict in Syria and Iraq, and The Failure of
Arab Spring

After the conflict in Syria and Iraq, Turkey, due to its common border with this conflict zone, has become a hub for transnational militant Salafists. Due to the fact that there is a humanitarian crisis, the militant Salafis use this situation to spread their ideology. Most of the Islamist society has applauded their struggle against the Syrian regime forces. So, the spread of militant Salafi ideology may find a basis in Turkish culture. While the established form of Turkish Salafism is a quietist one, they may feed each other due to the similarity in primary sources and understandings.

Tezcur (2015) discusses that there would be several reasons behind the increasing trend in the radicalization of Turkish people. At first, he put a widespread moral anger against the ongoing conflicts in Syria among the Turkish public. This improves the reputation of militant Salafi organizations fighting in the Syrian opposition front. As a result of this sentiment, there are a plenty of humanitarian aid organizations which launch their campaigns to help them and gain a great deal of support from Turkish public.

After the failure of Arab spring, both political and militant Salafism have gained momentum in the Middle East and North Africa. The failure of finding democratic solutions leads people to find another way. While militant Salafists took part in Al Qaeda and ISIS networks, political Salafist like Nur Party in Egypt took part in politics. This increases the appealing of Salafi ideology transnationally. Turkey is also affected from this transnational effect. Besides, because of Syrian conflict and the establishment of ISIS, the border cities of Turkey became a hub for foreign fighters. These two factors fed each other and affected the rising trend of Salafism in Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. Social Network Analysis

This section will explore twitter network data in two different ways; visualizations and metrics. Clusters obtained from human classification (supervised) and machine classifications (unsupervised) were created to visualize the data. Besides, the users were classified in terms of their activity (dead or alive). As the data was retrieved on November 2018, the activities of users were checked again in July 2019. In the second part, some metrics including modularity, centrality, density and connectedness will be explained and reported.

It should be noted that during classification process, gender difference between users attracted the researcher's attention. The differentiation between them could be listed in terms of the parameters of the profile photos, bios and the narrative in the tweets. While (so called) female users mostly use women wearing a head scarf as a profile photo, (so called) male users prefer to upload a photo of a man with a beard. As Salafi theology restricts the visibility of woman in the public, the further elaborations on gender in terms of usage of online sphere would be an interesting research topic. Inge's (2016) recently published ethnographic study on "the making of Salafi Muslim woman" would be a pathfinder in terms of analyzing the Salafi movements based on the gender difference. The power of Inge's study originates from her two-years extensive fieldwork. When it comes to online sphere, there is a problem of validity of the data, as the accounts could be created by opposite gender or by those who aim to spread disinformation among the online community. The researchers should keep in mind these probabilities before delving into the analysis.

4.1.1. Visualizations

Figure 3 Network Visualization of Users based on Machine Classification

Figure 3 shows us machine classified clusters in the network. The clusters were generated by using modularity algorithm. This algorithm creates clusters based on their connectedness and relationship. Four separate clusters could be clearly seen in the network. The clusters could be considered as fractions in the community. The machine classification was checked and surprisingly it is found that the algorithm has successfully achieved to divide users in terms of real fractions. Blue nodes represent the militant Salafis close to Al Qaeda network. Red nodes are the users supporting Hizbut-tahrir fraction as well as Islamists. Orange nodes are followers of Ebu Hanzala community. Green users are a composite of quietist and political Salafi fractions. In the next figure, human classification will be showed.

Figure 4 Network Visualization of Users based on Human Classification

Colorization in Figure 4 is based on human categorization. Red nodes were assigned as militant Salafis, orange nodes for Ebu Hanzala supporters, green nodes for quietists, blue nodes for Islamists and dark blue nodes for Hizbut-Tahrir supporters. According to this figure, militant Salafis are the most dominant users in the community. Ebu Hanzala supporters follow them. Quietists and Hizbut-Tahrir partisans are seen as minorities in the network. Some prominent Islamist figures were added in the network to test their connectedness in the community. They are closely connected with militant Salafis according to this visualization. The white nodes are null accounts as of July 2019. Therefore, their fractions could not be determined. In the next figure, the activity of users will be explored.

Figure 5 Network Visualization of Users based on Activity

According to last check in July 2019, nearly half of the users were either suspended by Twitter or closed by the users. While blue nodes represent alive users, light orange nodes represent dead users. Most of the influential nodes are seen as null. Twitter is more sensitive to the reports, especially in the last years due to the security threats. The existence of non-alive users may be the result of this policy. On the other hand, some users prefer to change their profile after some time. They may also inform their followers about this change. It is a kind of migration. The motivation would be either finding "real" followers or becoming more anonymous. This behavior should be explored in a separate study.

4.1.2. Metrics

Network visualizations tell us about the shape of the network. However, there are some metrics to measure a network. These metrics are numerical values calculated from the graph structure. They allow analyzing social networks in terms of both the whole network and the nodes. A graph structure is a combination of nodes and edges. Nodes represent individuals in the social network, and edges show the relationship between nodes. Edges would be either directed or undirected. For example, while twitter networks are a combination of directed edges, Facebook networks are of indirect edges. So, directedness shows the reciprocity of the relationship. This thesis uses twitter data which is a directed graph and a combination of 213 nodes and 4557 edges.

Notable metrics which will be analyzed in this section are centrality, graph density, connectedness, degree distribution and modularity. These metrics will enable us to explore the eminent figures in the network, the characteristic structure of the network, relationship patterns between individuals, and the sub-communities in the network.

At first, centrality metric is a key concept in social network analysis. It measures the weight of node in the network, in other words, the important nodes would be revealed by centrality measurement. There are several ways to measure centrality. According to degree centrality, the important and weak nodes could be measured by the number of edges. While the number of outgoing edges from the node gives out-degree centrality, the number of incoming edges to the node gives in-degree centrality. The assumption here is that the more degree you have either in or out, the more importance you will have in the network. The highest number of in-degree is 93, out-degree is 107, and degree is 164. The average degree in the network is 44. Only 11 nodes exceed the 100-total degree in the network, in other words, 5 percent of individuals have connection with half of the community. Also, average path

length in the network is 2.4, which means an individual in the community can reach the whole network via 2.4 nodes.

Second, graph density metric divides the number of existing nodes and the maximum edges the network would have. That means the more edges, the more density. Density in our graph is 0,108. That means, there are many rooms in the network to be filled. Third, connectedness metric evaluates how the nodes have connected to each other. According to this metric, there is only one weakly connected component, and there are thirteen strongly connected components within the network. This means all nodes in the network have a high degree of connectedness. Fourth, another important metric is degree distribution. Degree was explained in the centrality metric. Degree distribution shows us the level of degree for all nodes. According to Figure 6, most of the nodes intensify between 30 and 80. The node having utmost degree is an outlier, as the second best is almost 40 degree less than it.

Figure 6 Degree Distribution

Figure 7 In-Degree Distribution

Figure 8 Out-Degree Distribution

In the last part, modularity metric will be analyzed. Modularity metric creates sub-communities from the network data by using an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. In the figure 1, the sub-communities visualized based on modularity metric results. According to Figure 9, there are four sub-communities in the network. The y axis represents the modularity class and the x axis represents the size i.e. the number of the nodes within the sub-community. The communities are generated by calculating the difference between the degree density in the probable community and the degree density in the random network. Based on modularity results, the nodes were controlled manually to check the accuracy of the algorithm. Surprisingly, the algorithm could successfully differentiate militant and quietist Salafis in the network. This metric would short-circuit to analyze big networks.

Figure 9 Modularity Metric Results: Four sub-communities

4.2. Quantitative Text Analysis

In this section, tweet data will be analyzed in terms of themes in the most frequent words, word clouds, tweet frequencies, data range of tweets, hashtags, most referred websites and social media platforms. Tweet data contain date of the tweets, hashtags in the tweets and texts of tweets. R programming language was used for most of the frequency analysis, but some visualizations were obtained by using excel functions. The codes used for this section will be provided in the appendix. From data cleaning to data analysis, all codes would be a sample for a prospective study on quantitative text analysis. Most of codes are replication and combination of existing codes, but the sequence and adaptation of the codes are special for this thesis.

After getting data from twitter, the next and the most difficult stage is data cleaning process. It consists of tokenization, lemmatization, building a corpus, and extracting stop words. As, there are a limited experience in Turkish texts, a special stop words list was created for this study. Then, frequency or other analysis would be enabled to do with the tidy data.

There are many approaches to study texts. This study will prefer to use dictionary-based approach, thematic analysis, word clouds, and topic modeling approach. These methods enable us to look at texts from different angles. Dictionary approach tells us about the frequencies of selected words within the text. Word clouds are visualizations of most frequent words within the text. However, topic modeling approach uses machine learning algorithms to infer meaningful topics from the text data. As topic modeling is a new approach and a developing methodology, it gives us a limited information and it may find meaningless topics at the end. So, topic modeling results will not be included in the findings section, it will be provided in the appendix. Also, as the results for word clouds and dictionary approach are similar to each other, word clouds will be provided in the appendix. The results for dictionary-based approach will be discussed in the next.

4.2.1. Dictionary Based Approach

In this section, the frequencies of selected words in different clusters will be explored. In the first place, the frequencies in all users will be shown. For this section, words on politics, theology and major figures among Salafis were selected from top two hundred words. This allows to look closer at the most frequently used words, thus, making some comparisons between users.

Figure 10 Frequencies of selected words in all users.

(From left to the right: Islam, Turkey, Syria, Hanzala, US, World, Aid, Tawhid, Idlib, Jihad, Russia, Turkish, Taliban, Israel, Iran, Assad, State, War, Erdogan)

Figure 10 shows the frequencies of selected words for all users. According to this figure, the frequencies of political words outweigh theological words in tweets. Turkey, Syria, US, Idlib, Russia, Israel and Iran are most frequently used country names among all users. Besides, Esed(Assad) and Erdogan are two political figures mostly mentioned in the tweets. This shows that Turkish Salafis mostly talk about the Middle eastern and periphery countries. Syria is a major focus of their agenda.

This result may be correlated with the dominance of militant Salafi accounts in the network, as stated in the network analysis section.

Regarding theology, *tevhid* (the unity of God) and *cihad* (a laudable struggle and effort) are seen at the top list of words. While *tevhid* is commonly used among all fractions, *cihad* is mostly referenced by militant Salafis. When it comes to notable Salafi leaders, Hanzala is the only Salafi figure mostly talked about in tweets.

4.2.2. Thematic Analysis

For this part, top words are classified into themes as shown in Table 4 and 5. The themes are Salafi theology, Salafi leaders, Muslim community, family-gender, Afghanistan-Taliban, conflict in Syria, conflict between Israel and Palestine, Politics in Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US. These themes were generated based on frequency results. Different from dictionary-based approach, these results will give a bigger picture regarding the discussion topics.

Table 4 Word Percentages based on thematic classification: All users

Themes	All %
Salafi Theology-Religious Practices	33,64%
Salafi Leaders-Figures	25,29%
Muslim Community	12,36%
Conflict in Syria-Idlib	8,39%
Politics in Turkey	7,72%
Family-Gender	3,49%
Politics in US	2,78%
Politics in Russia	1,62%
Afghanistan-Taliban	1,59%
Conflict in Palestine	1,57%
Politics in Iran	1,55%
TOTAL	100,00%

Additionally, Table 5 shows the statistical results for Salafi fractions in Turkey. As discussed in Chapter 3 on Turkish Salafism, there are three types of Salafis in Turkey; political, quietist, and militant. These are broad classifications to separate Salafi community in Turkey. All types contain several sub-communities with similar understanding. In table 5, Emin-Kucuk referred to the Salafi community leading by Mehmet Emin Akin and Abdullah Kucuk. Hanzala is a popular militant quietist leader among Turkish community. Nusra, Hanzala and Emin-Kucuk communities could be considered as militant Salafis, Hizbut-tahrir as political Salafis. While there are several sub-communities in quietists such as Yolcu, Balcioglu and Arslan, they will be analyzed under the same title.

Table 5 Word Percentages based on thematic classification: Salafi Fractions

Subgroups	Apolitical S.	Militant Salafis			Political S.
Themes	Quietists %	Hanzala %	Emin-kucuk %	Nusra %	Hizb-tahrir %
Salafi Theology	62,25%	28,54%	34,62%	25,75%	19,39%
Salafi Leaders-Figures	28,01%	50,76%	40,75%	18,49%	23,36%
Muslim Community	7,76%	9,58%	9,38%	16,16%	17,89%
Politics in Turkey	1,07%	11,12%	1,98%	10,31%	17,70%
Family-Gender	0,91%	0,00%	1,50%	7,25%	1,50%
Afghanistan-Taliban	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Conflict in Syria-Idlib	0,00%	0,00%	6,85%	10,28%	6,25%
Conflict in Palestine	0,00%	0,00%	3,43%	4,41%	6,18%
Politics in Russia	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	2,32%	3,19%
Politics in Iran	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	2,12%	1,95%
Politics in US	0,00%	0,00%	1,50%	2,91%	2,60%
TOTAL	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

First of all, as expected, almost all discussions among quietists refer to Salafi theology and leaders. Only one percent of the words are related to Turkish politics. They have no reference to other countries or conflict zones in the Middle East. It seems that they are consistent with their understanding which is remaining aloof from politics. Similar to quietists, Hanzala community is also staying away from politics except Turkish politics. Surprisingly, they almost have no reference to conflict zones in the Middle East. In general, Hanzala community is referenced as militant and labeled as supporter of ISIS in newspapers and reports. However, based on these results, Hanzala could be named as militant quietist to represent his understanding. Also, Hanzala community has the highest percentage (50%) on referencing leader's name. This shows the effect of Hanzala on his community.

As a political Salafi fraction, Hizbut-tahrir talk about political issues on the Middle East. Turkey comes at the forefront regarding politics. However, they are the most sensitive community on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like Hizbut-tahrir, Nusra community gives a great deal of importance to political issues. The only difference between Nusra and Hizbut-tahrir regarding politics is seen on the Syrian conflict. As Nusra is a branch of Al Qaeda in Syria, they talk much on the Syrian conflict.

Emin-Kucuk community stands out as it is different from both militant and quietists. This community mostly references its leaders (40.75%) but less than Hanzala community. Among militant Salafis, they have the least percentage on referencing politics, especially on Turkey. They have sensitivity on conflict zones in the Middle East but less than Nusra community.

Table 6 Word List for Thematic Analysis

Themes	Keywords
Salafi Theology-Religious Practices	Kuran(Qur'an), rabbim(My Lord), iman(belief), allahim(God), tevhid(unity), suresi(sura), ilim(scholarship), cihad(jihad), din(religion), dua(worship), ayet(verse), hadis(hadith), namaz(prayer), insallah(if God permits), dini(religious), muslim(Muslim), sunnet(sunna), islami(Islamic), rasulullah(the Prophet), amin(Amen), cennet(paradise), amel(practice), sehit(martyrdom), nakil(narration), oy(vote), ramazan(ramadan), davet(invitation), sirk(polytheism), hamd(praise), tefisir(interpretation of Qur'an), hilafet(caliphate), ibadet(religious practices), bayram(religious festival), sahih(authenticity), cehennem(hell), gunah(sin)
Salafi Leaders-Figures	Hanzala, Muhammed, abdullah, omer, rahimehullah, ebuhanzalahocasiz, seyyid, yildiz, kucuk, davud taskiran, azzam, kutup, hocaefendi, nureddin, tevvabin, teymiyy, ebuhanzalahoca, hizbuttahrir, yolcu, guraba, elbayburdi, Abdurrahman
Muslim Community	islam, musluman(Muslim), ummet(ummah)
Family-Gender	Kadin(woman), erkek(man), cocuk(child), kiz(girl)
Afghanistan-Taliban	taliban, afganistan(Afghanistan), afgan
Conflict in Syria-Idlib	Suriye(Syria), idlib, yardim(aid), esed(Asad), halep(Aleppo)
Conflict in Palestine	Israil(Israel), filistin(Palestine), kudus(Quds), gaze(Gaza), aksa(aqsa)
Politics on Russia	Rusya(Russia), sputniktr
Politics on Iran	Iran(Iran)
Politics on Turkey	Turkiye(Turkey), turk(Turkish), devlet(state), erdogan, siyasi(political), askeri(military), savas(war), esaret(captivity), laik(secular), milli(national), terror, istanbul, yargi(judicial)
Politics on US	abd(US), amerika (US)

Selected Tweets on Themes

In this part, tweets from all users will be listed to show the content of discussions on selected themes on social and political issues. Russia, US, Iran, Syria, Palestine and Afghanistan are the most referenced foreign countries in tweets regarding politics. Moreover, tweets on gender roles and family will be elaborated to show Turkish Salafis' view on social aspects of life. Tweets on Turkish context and theology will be omitted as they were discussed in the previous chapters on leaders' discourses.

Table 7 Selected Tweets on Russia

Date	Tweet
2017-10-26	#KafkasyalıMuhacirlereSahipÇık Rusya nın önüne diz kırıp oturanlar, Yarın kazığı yediğinizde ne yapacaksınız bu utanç size yeter
	# Look out for the Caucasian immigrants. Those who bend the knee before Russia, what will you do when you get the shaft tomorrow, shame on you
2018-01-26	Ve idlib. Rusya Türkiye den idlibinde muhaliflerden temizlenmesini istiyor ve bu sebeble Turkiye ye müsaade etti.
	And Idlib. Russia requests Turkey to clear the opponents in Idlib and therefore gave permission to Turkey.
2018-03-06	Suriye'de Rus savaş uçağı düştü 32 kişi geberdi harika birgün.
	A Russian military aircraft is downed in Syria, 32 people kicked the bucket- what a wonderful day.
2018-03-07	#Esed ve #Rusya'nın #DoğuĞûta'ya yönelik saldırılarda #Klor saldırısının yanında #Fosfor bombaları da kullanılıyor. #Şam
	#Phosphorus bombs are also used as well as #Chlorine attacks towards #East-Guta by #Esed and #Russia's
2018-04-14	Rusya'dan nefret ediyorum ama daha çok, Rusya'nın vicdanına sığınan Müslümanlardan nefret ediyorum.
	I hate Russia. However, I hate Muslims who find refuge in the conscience of Russia more.
2018-04-19	Bu çocuk bir bombardımandan kurtuldu, yine de gülümsemeyi başarıyor ... #Rusya ve #Esed bombardımanıyla dehşeti yaşayan dünyalar tatlısı Suriyeli çocuk acılarını ailesine hissettirmemek için gülüyor..#ChildrenOfSyria #Siri
	This kid escaped the bombardment; nevertheless he still manages to smile…The pretty Syrian kid terrified after bombardment by #Russia and #Esed smiles to prevent his family feeling his pain.
2018-07-02	Katil Rusya, Katil Putin...#WorldCup
	Killer Russia, Killer Putin ... # WorldCup

Table 7 (Continued)

2018-08-29	Rusya Dışişleri Bakanı Lavrov ayrıca, "terörist" olarak nitelendirdiği muhalif grupların kentteki sivilleri "canlı kalkan" olarak kullandığını söyledi. Bu da katledilecek sivillerin habercisi. Allah Suriye'deki sivilleri korusun.
	Besides, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the opposition groups, which he qualified as "terrorists," used civilians in the city as a "human shield". This is the messenger of civilians to be slaughtered. May Allah bless all civilians in Syria.
2018-09-04	Rusya idlib'i vuruyor.Allah'ım!Kafirlerin Kalplerinden güveni, bedenlerinden gücü al götür. Bedir'de yaptığın gibi köklerini kazıyacak, kuvvet ve şiddetlerini biçecek, topluluklarını dağıtacak bir güçle meleklerinden oluşan bir ordu gönder Mücahid kardeşlerimize
	Russia hits Idlib. Oh my God! Remove the confidence from the Hearts of the Infidels and remove the strength from their bodies. As you did in Badr, please send an army of angels to Our Mujahideen brothers in order to eradicate the enemies, to crop their strength and force, to dissolve their communities.
2018-09-30	Rusya İdlib konusunda neden endişeli?İdlib'de bir çoğu Rus ordusunda eğitim almış ve Rusya'ya karşı kin tutan savaşçılar var. Bu gruplardan biri de Muhalifleri eğiten "Malhama Tactical" adlı Kafkas kökenli profesyoneller.Liderleri "Ebu Selman Belarus"…
	Why is Russia worried about Idlib? There are warriors who are mostly trained in Russian army and who nurse a grudge against Russia. One of these groups is professionals of Caucasian origin which is called "Malhama Tactical", they train the opponents. Their leader is "Abu Selman Belarus"…

According to Table 7, most of discussions on Russia are related to Syrian conflict. They accuse Russia for being a killer because of its operations in Idlib, the northern city of Syria. Some tweets include prayers for people living in the conflict region. Russian Foreign Minister's explanation that terrorist groups utilize civilians as human shield is viewed as a harbinger of a massacre on Syrian civilian people.

They explicitly express their hate towards Russia and Muslims who expect for help from Russia. News on Russian airplane crush in Syria is reported with cheers. Russia is blamed by using phosphor bombs as well as chlorine attacks in the Eastern Ghouta. A child surviving from a bombing attack is depicted as smiling in spite of horrifying environment. Russian concern on Idlib is explained by the existence of former fighters of Russian military who feel rage towards Russia.

As shown in Table 8, Syrian conflict is a sensitive issue among Turkish Salafis. The reason for this would be that most of the oppositional forces come from Salafi

traditions. Al Nusra which is one of the biggest opposition forces serve for global al-Qaeda networks. However, there is a rivalry between groups. In their tweets, militant Salafis close to al-Qaeda depict the other forces like Ahrar us Sham (a Salafi branch in the Syrian Opposition Front) and Free Syrian Army as slaves of Russia in Syrian marketplace and call them to turn back to God. In contrast, other Salafi groups use more constructive and inclusive language toward those who struggle against Assad, Russia and Iran. Successful attacks of oppositional forces are welcomed with cheers. They try to raise awareness toward the ongoing conflict in Aleppo and Idlib among all Muslims in Turkey.

A militant Salafi close to al-Qaeda criticizes humanitarian aid efforts in the region by stating that while they transfer a lorry load of weapons to the region, we provide only pasta for local people. With parallel to regional developments, a user asks for support and announces that his page is reactivated for reporting events in Idlib and mediating humanitarian aids for local people. Some express his incapability to find a solution and assist to those who die in the region. And, a tweet complains that dying children in Syria are instruments for politicians, thesis for academics, and statistics for news agencies.

Table 8 Selected tweets on Syria

Date	Tweet
2015-08-19	#SONDAKİKAidlibin ziyara köyünü ceyşul fetih ordusu aldı çok sayıda kafir esed yanlıları öldü Allahu ekber
	#LAST MINUTE Ziyara village of Idlib has been conquered by the Army of Jaysh al Fath. Many of infidel Esed's supporters died. Allahu Akbar.
2015-08-25	Halebin başköy bölgesinde 1 tank 1 doçka ve 1 57lik top imha edildi ve çok sayıda esed askeri öldürüldü ve esir var Allahu ekber
	In Aleppo's Başköy region, 1 tank, 1 DSHK and a cannon of 1.57 were destroyed and many Assad soldiers were killed and captured . Allahu Akbar
2015-08-29	Allahu ekber.Bu suriye cihadi bizi kocatti resmen.!
	Allahu akbar. This Syrian jihad made us really older.!
2016-07-28	Uyan ey müslüman! #Aleppoisburning#SaveAleppo#HalepYanıyor#şimdisırabizde
	Wake up, muslim! #Aleppoisburning#SaveAleppo#itisourturnnow

Table 8 (Continued)

2016-09-24	Halep fotoğrafları kıyamet yakın diyor
	Photos of Aleppo say apocalypse is coming soon
2018-02-05	Suriyede katledilen çocuklar, siyasiler için kullanılabilecek bir koz,akademisyenler için hazırlanacak bir tez konusu,haber ajansları için istatistiklerde yer kaplayacak bir yığından ibaret.
	The children slaughtered in Syria means a girl that can be used for politicians, a thesis to be prepared for academics, and a stack of statistics for news agencies.
2018-05-30	Suriye'de örgüt adı yerine "halis niyetli mücahidler" diye dua ettiğinizde her halükarda dua yerini bulacaktır.Daha sonra da pişman olma ihtimalinizin olmadığı bir dua.
	If you pray as "mujahedeen of pure intention" instead of the name of the organization, your prayers will be accepted in anyway. A prayer that you will not be regretful later on.
2018-05-30	Suriye'de bel bağlanan grup liderleri finalde çıkıp "Reel politik böyle icab etti" diyerek ulusal hareketin içerisinde yer alacaksa öbür tarafta şehitlere vereceği hesabı da göz önünde bulundurmalı.
	If the leaders of the group who are relied on will be involved in the national movement at the end by saying "That is how the real politics required", they should take into consideration what to say to the martyrs at the day of reckoning.
2018-07-17	Suriye'de elinde son şarjör ile cihad eden yalnızca bir müslüman dahi kalsa ben kafirler kazandı demeyeceğim.
	I will not say the infidels won the war if there is only one Muslim fighting against infidels with his last ammunition clip in his hand in Syria.
2018-09-03	Suriye'de her düşüncenin,örgütün kendine ait bir "halk" tanımlaması var.100 kişi tevhid bayrağıyla çıkar sokağa"Halk şeriatı istiyor"denir.1000 kişi türk bayrağıyla çıkar"Halk türkiyeyi/laikliği istiyor"denir.Vs...
	In Syria, every doctrine has its own "people" definition. If 100 people go to street with a flag of tawhid, they say "The people want Sharia". If 1000 thousand people go to street with Turkish flag they say "The people want Turkey/laicism" etc.
2018-09-04	Gerçekten ey Dangalaklar! kesinlikle hepiniz Rusyanın Pazarındaki köleler ve parçalarısınız.Şimdi Emrolunana Uyun! Allaha dönün!Ve Sadıklardan Olun!(Not Hitabın esası Ahrar Öso Feylak vb gruplaradır.)
	You really Idiots! You are all absolutely slaves and pariahs at Russian Market. Now Obey what is ordered! Return Allah! And become faithful. (Note: The real address is to the Groups such as Ahrar, OSO, Feyla etc.
2018-09-05	* Rejim İdlib'e saldırır mı saldırmaz mı bilmiyorum!Lakin yakinen biliyorum ki; Allah kullarına zaferi vadetmiştir ve Allah verdiği sözde durur. Bugün mücahidler sebepleri yerine getirdiler ve kalplerini Allah'a bağladılar. Abdullah Muhaysini
	* I do not know if the regime will attack Idlib, but I know for sure that; Allah has promised a victory to His servants, and Allah keeps His promise. Today, the Mujahedeen have fulfilled the reasons and attached their hearts to Allah. Abdullah Muhaysini
2018-09-08	Adamlar Suriye tır-tır silah gönderiyorBiz Makarna gönderiyoruz.!~| Mehmet Emin Akın
	Those guys send trucks full of weapons to Syria. We sent macaroni! .!~| Mehmet Emin Akın
2018-09-09	Evimde otururken, suriye'deki kardeşlerimiz ölüyor diye bağırsam ne olacak
	It does not make any sense to cry out by saying my brothers and sisters are dying in Syria while sitting at home.

Table 8 (Continued)

2018-09-10	Selamunaleykum , sayfamız idlib olayları ve diğer infak faaliyetleri için yeniden aktif hale gelmiştir.Desteklerinizi bekliyoruz inşaAllah.
	As-salamu alaykum. Our page is activated again for Idlib events and other grant activities. We are waiting for your support inshaAllah.
2018-09-29	Suriyede Cihad bitti diyip Turkiyeye donen muhterem çok takvalı Mücahid arkadaşlar! Türkiyeden hala buraya fitne sokmanın pesindeler...Onlara tek sözüm;Hoşt hadi oradan sizi gidi fitneciler sizi!
	Pious Mujahedeen friends who returned to Turkey saying that Jihad in Syria is over! They are still trying to raise cain here even from Turkey... My only word to them is; whoa! you are the intriguers
2018-09-29	Neden HTŞ?Neden iran,rusya,amerika,israil,fransa değil?Çünkü htş Müslüman değilmi?Çünkü htş şeriat istiyor!Çünkü sizin gibi hain değilAma ne hikmetseRusyaİranAmerikaİsrailPkk ve sol örgütlerSizinle aynı görüşteSiz insan şeytanısınızAmacınız sadece Cihadı baltalamak
	Why Delegation of Tahrir al-Sham? Why not İran, Russia, US, Israel, French? Is Delegation of Tahrir al-Sham not muslim? Because it demands sharia! Because not a traitor like you! But heaven knows why, Russian, Iranian, US, Israel, PKK and left organizations are all in the same opinion with you. You are human devils. Your aim is just to sabotage the Jihad.

Table 9 Selected tweets on Iran

Date	Tweet
2017-08-30	HAMAS Lideri: 'İran Bizim En Büyük Destekçimiz, İlişkilerimiz Mükemmel'Ne diyelim Allah sevdiklerinizle sizi haşretsin
	HAMAS Leader: "Iran is our greatest supporter, our relations are magnificent" What can we say. May Allah gather you with your beloved ones in the day of judgement.
2017-10-21	iran pkk ile dirsek temasında,türkiye tek kürt müttefiki düşsün diye uğraşıyor.ya bu nasıl akıldır,inanılır gibi değil
	Iran and PKK are in close contact. Turkey is working for the collapse of its only Kurdish ally. What king of a logic is that, unbelievable.
2017-12-18	KUDÜS'E YOLA ÇIKSAK;İRAN ARKADAN VURUR.
	IF WE START A JOURNEY TOWARDS JERUSSALEM; IRAN MAY STAB IN THE BACK
2017-12-30	Ümmet İran için üzülmüyorAkıttığınız kanda boğulun.
	The Ummah does not feel sorry for Iran. Get Drowned in your own blood.
2018-02-10	İran, sözde tam 39 yıldır İsrail'i haritan silmek istiyor ama hala ilerleme yok. Aynı İran, tam 39 yıldır İslam kardeşliğinden bahsediyor ama öldürdüğü Müslümanın haddi hesabı yok.
	Iran has allegedly wanted to wipe İsrael of the map 39 years, but there is still no progress. The same Iran has been talking about the Islamic fraternity for 39 years, but the number of Muslims killed by Iran is innumerable

Table 9 (Continued)

2018-04-14	İran ruhban rejiminin kültür emperyalizmi Milli Görüş üzerinde iyi çalışmış ektikleri tohumlardan iyi hasat alıyor, Molla rejimi 1979 sonrası Türkiye İslamcılığını zehirlemekle genetiğini tahrip etmekle kalmadı Laik Alevileri bile kuşattı etkilemeyi başardı
	The clergy regime of Iran has worked on National Vision Movement of Turkey well with its cultural imperialism. They reap a good harvest of what they sow. Mullah regime has not only demolished the genetics of Turkish Islamists but also managed to have an impact of Secular Alevists.
2018-05-14	İran; dünyanın gözü önünde ortadoğuda yayılıyor! Ve girdiği her ülkede savaş var!
	Iran is spreading in the Middle East in front of the eyes of the world! And there is war in every country İran enters in!
2018-06-02	İran Amerika'dan daha kadim ve daha tehlikeli sinsi bir düşmandır .Türk tasavvufunu işgal işlemi çoktan bitmiş mesala Şemsli Tebrizi.Bistamlı beyazıd gibi.Şu aşamada Türk siyasi hareketlerin dede azımsanmayacak bir kökleşmeye girmiştir
	Iran is an ancient and more dangerous insidious enemy than America. The process of occupying the Turkish Sufism has already been finished, such as Shams-i-Tabrīzī and Bâyezid-i Bistâmî. At this stage, it has a substantial amount of roots in Turkish political movements.
2018-06-02	İran Suriye'den çekilecek miş.Adamlar binlerce Şii caferiyi Suriye'ye yerleştirdi 20 yıllık bir plan ve kökleşmiş bir Şii nüfus Suriye'yi teslim alacak
	Iran will withdraw from Syria. They have placed thousands of Shiite Caferis in Syria and a rooted Shiite population will take over Syria as a result of a 20-year plan
2018-06-12	Esed rejimi ve İran saldırısında gözlerini kaybeden bir çocuğun babasına feryadı. "Baba bana ne oldu? Gözlerim görmüyor."Hamaney şeytanı başta olmak üzere tüm zalimlere katlettikleri milyonlar adedince lanet olsun.
	A child who lost his eyes in the attacks of Assad regime and İran cries his father "Dad, what happened to me? I can't see". God damn all oppressors particularly the Khamenei in the number of millions of innocent people they have slaughtered.
2018-07-14	7 yıllık savaş sonunda İran'a, Hizbullah'a zerre kadar sempati duyan kim varsa bilinçli Allah düşmanı bir köpektir.
	At the end of the 7-year war, whoever takes a fancy with Iran and Hezbollah a little, is a dog which is a conscious enemy of Allah.
2018-10-13	Şeytan İran devrim muhafızlarından 3 asker öldürülmüş.
	Three soldiers from Satanic Iranian revolution guards were killed.
2018-10-17	İranlı idarecilerin çocukları "Büyük Şeytan" ABD'de yaşıyor
	Children of Iranian rulers live in the US "The Great Devil"

As an extension of sectarian conflict in the region, Salafis have a strong hostility toward Iran and Shi'a understanding of Islam. Table 9 shows selected tweets of Turkish Salafis regarding Iranian politics. They mostly regard Iran as a political enemy instead of a country with a different sect in Islam. Most of the tweets are

aiming to reveal Iranian secret agenda in the region. Iranian Revolutionary Guards are portrayed as demon. The expansionist cultural policies of Iran are viewed as poison to Turkish public. Iran's contradictory policies on Israel are presented to prove that they are the enemy of Muslims in the region. Some users curse on Iranian people. And, those who sympathize with Iran are illustrated as a dog and a conscious enemy of God.

Table 10 Selected tweets on Afghanistan

Date	Tweet
2017-04-04	Afganistan-Irak-Suriye-Yemen-Arakan'da ölen müslümanlar sadece sayısal istatistikten ibaret! Yazıklar olsun bize..!
	The number of Muslims who died in Afghanistan-Iraq-Syria-Yemen-Arakan is just considered as statistics! What a Shame on us ..!
2018-03-27	Misal Afganistanda imam maturididen daha maturidi olan taliban bunların dilinden neden kurtulamamaktadır?
	For example, why the Taliban in Afhanistan, who is more Maturidi than imam Maturidi, cannot get rid of their language?
2018-04-02	Filistinde işgalciler katliamlarına yenilerini eklerken aynı vakitte abd afganistanda 100'ü aşkın sivil katlediyor.Şehitler arasında kıyas yapmıyoruz,medyanın kaypaklığına dikkat çekiyoruz sadece.
	While the invaders in Palestinian are adding new ones to their massacres, at the same time, more than 100 civilians are slaughtered in Afghanistan. We are not making a comparison of martyrs; we just draw attention to the copping out media.
2018-04-04	Dindarların gazetesinden. Suriye'de Rusya vururken Esed, Afganistan'da Amerika Medresedeki mezuniyet törenini vururken, katliamı yapan Afgan jetleri oluyormuş (!)Subhanallah. Subhanallah Allah'ın azabından korkmuyorlar. Birgün, beğenmediğimiz o insanlara muhtaç olabiliriz.
	From the newspaper of the religious people. Assad while Russia is hitting in Syria, US is hitting graduation ceremony in a madrasah in Afghanistan. (!)Subhanallah. Subhanallah they are not afraid of the punishment of Allah. One day, we may need those people whom we don't like today.
2018-04-08	Başbakan B. Yıldırım'dan Afgan hükümetine destek geldi. Ülkemizdeki saray mollaları da Afgan hükümetinin yaptığı katliamlara ses çıkarmadığına göre gerçek gündemimize geri dönebiliriz: gençlerimizi deist yapıyorlar ya da ülkemizi bölmek isteyen ingiliş wohhabi edebiyatına devam.
	A support for the Afghan government from Prime Minister B. Yildirim . Since the palace mullahs in our country have not made any protests against the massacres of the Afghan government, we can go back to our real agenda: they are transforming our young people into deists or go on to use a pompous language of British wahhabis who wants to divide our country.
2018-07-02	Taliban işid conilerine daha fazla müsaade etmemeli afganistanda. Yoksa oranında suriyeye dönme olasılığı yüksek
	The Taliban should not allow ISIL Johnnies in Afghanistan anymore. Otherwise there is a high probability for Afghanistan to become like Syria.

Table 10 (Continued)

2018-08-05	Tsk, Afganistan'da talibana karşı nato ordusunda yer aldığı sıralarda halihazırda Abd-TR geriliminden dolayı türkler, dün Talibanın öldürdüğü 8 Abd askeri için sevinip zafer nidaları atıyor:/
	The Turkish Armed Forces are included in NATO army but at the same time currently Turks are shouting for victory against 8 US soldiers killed by Taliban due to US-TR tension.
2018-10-22	"#Afganistan'da #ABD helikopteri düşürüldü, onlarca asker öldü"
	"#US helicopter was downed in #Afghanistan, dozens of soldiers killed"
2018-10-23	Çin Doğu Türkistan'da,ABD Afganistan'da,Rusya Çeçenistan'da,İsrail Filistin'de,Onbinlerce müslümanı öldürüyor.Suriye, Yemen, Irak, Mısır, Libyavs.;müslümanların yaşadığı her yerdeyüzbinlerce insana kıyılıyor. Hiçbirini görmüyoruz;bir cinayete odaklandık:Kaşıkçı.
	China is in East Turkestan, the United States in Afghanistan, Russia in Chechnya, Israel in Palestine, They are killing tens of thousands of Muslims. Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Libya., Hundreds of thousands of Muslims are killed everywhere. We don't see any of them, we just focus on a murder: Khashoggi

Along with Syria, Afghanistan is being followed by Turkish Salafis on Twitter, as shown in Table 10. While Taliban is not a follower of Salafi ideology, Turkish Salafis feel sympathy with Taliban because of their struggle against the US. There is a legacy of relationship between Taliban and radical Islamists in Turkey. In the 1980s during the Afghan war, some Turkish foreign fighters supported Taliban against Soviet forces. The US' operations on civilians are condemned and US' helicopter crush is reported with cheers. Some warn Taliban against ISIS within the region as they may bring a regional conflict in Afghanistan like in Syria.

Table 11 Selected tweets on Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Date	Tweet
22.08.2016	Yeminler olsun ki Filistin'i özgür kılacağız...
	We swear that we will make Palestine free
6.10.2016	Gazze bombardımanından dönen İsrail savaş uçağı düştü
	Israeli warplane returned from Gaza bombing crashed.
16.03.2017	Kudüs'ün ezanı, İsrail'in selası olacaktır! #AzanFreeForQuds
	Jerusselam's azan will be the knelling of Israel.
14.07.2017	İsrail teröristtir. Her daim terörist olarak kalacaktır. *Topraklarımız terörden temizlenmeyene kadar hiç birimiz huzur bulmayacaktır.
	Israel is a terrorist and will always remain as a terrorist. * None of us will find peace until our land is fully free of terrorism.

Table 11 (Continued)

6.12.2017	Kudüs Programları, Mitingleri düzenleniyor ElhamdulillahAncak unutmayalım ki ;İsrail'i durduracak olan bu mitingler değil,Kendine Hayberi örnek almış Mücahidlerin, mübarek ameliyeleridir.İSRAİL GÜÇTEN ANLAR
	Jerusalem Programs, Meetings are held. Alhamdulillah, but not forget that these meetings will not be able stop Israel, Mujahideen, who took the Hayberi example, and their blessed deeds will be stopping İsrale. ISRAEL KNOWS ONLY POWER.
7.12.2017	İsrail ile tüm ilişkiler kesilmelidir..İthalat İhracat durdurulmalıdır...Devlet olarak tanıma kararı Askıya alınmalıdır..Çifte Vatandaş olupta İsrail de Askerlik yapanlar,yapacak olanlar Vatandaşlıktan çıkarılmalıdır..Tüm anlaşmalar Askıya alınmalıdırAlın size Savaşsız TEDBİR..
	All relations with Israel should be interrupted.. Import and Export must be stopped ... The decision to recognize as a country should be suspended.. Double Citizens who performed their military service in Israel should be removed from citizenship...All agreements should be suspended.. That is a PRECAUTION without a war for you.
14.04.2018	Türkiye'nin Kudüs, Gazze söz konusu olduğunda İsrail'e kızıyormuş gibi yaptığını konu Şam olunca kendini İsrail'in yanında konumlandırdığını #bilseniziyiolur
	It is better for you to #know that Turkey pretends to be angry with Israel when Jerusalem and Gaza is in question but when it comes Damascus Turke is positioned as an ally of Israel.
14.05.2018	İsrailin başkenti Cehennem'in dibidir.
	The capital of Israel is the bottom of Hell.
14.05.2018	Kudüsü başkent yapma teşebbüsü tüm ehli cihadın Filistine cihada gitmesiyle durdurulabilir. Yoksa bir sonraki adım Mescidi Aksa'nın külliyen gasbı olacaktır. İran Suriyeden derhal çekilerek Müslümanların yolunu açmalı, Kudüs gücünü israil hedefine göndermeli eğer yalancı değilse.
	The attempt to make Jerusalem the capital can be stopped when all the mujahideen goes to the Palestinian for jihad. Otherwise, the next step will be the complete seizure of Masjid Aqsa by violence. Iran should immediately withdraw from Syria and pave the way for the Muslims, and send the power of Jerusalem to the Israeli target, if not a liar.
29.05.2018	Filistin direniş örgütleri Gazze çevresindeki yerleşim yerlerini vurmaya başlamış Rabbim atışlarınızı isabetli kılsın
	Palestinian resistance organizations have begun to hit settlements around Gaza. May our Lord make their shoots hit on the clout.
22.07.2018	Filistin bir sınav kâğıdı… Her mümin kulun önünde
	Palestine is a test paper for every believer.
30.07.2018	Biz FİLİSTİN'in Sembolünü; Sere serpe sergilediği saçları Ve bacağındaki kot pantolonuyla Ahed Temimi olarak değil!Üzerindeki siyah nuruyla Ve inancını kanıyla ispat edip şehid olan Hedil el-Heşlemun olarak biliriz..!Vesselam...
	The symbol of Palestine as we know is not Ahed Tamimi wearing jeans and stylistic hair, it is Hedil el-Heslemun with a black light on him and who fall martyrs proving his faith with his blood. That's that.
9.09.2018	Şanlıurfa Halfeti nüfusuna kayıtlı Sabiha İrem Çevik, İsrail'de askerlik yapıp Hamas'a karşı mücadele ediyor. Yanlış okumadınız Sabiha İrem Çevik Şanlıurfalı bir İsrail askeri!İsraile Savaşmaya Giden Yahudi asıllı Türk Vatandaşı.
	Sabiha İrem Çevik, registered to the Halfeti of Şanlıurfa, is performing military service in Israel and fighting against Hamas. Sabiha İrem Çevik, an Israeli soldier from Şanlıurfa! a Turkish citizen of Jewish origin who went to Israel to fight.

Among Turkish Islamists, Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a symbol issue. While some approach the issue from humanitarian aid side, some others support armed struggle against Israel. Militant Turkish Salafis believe that the only solution would be to call all jihadi Muslims to jihad for Quds. From pacifist side, one recommends that all relations with Israel should be interrupted, those who have dual citizenship should be expatriated and all trade relationships should be suspended. A tweet in Table 11 depicts Palestinian issue as a test case, and the other one promises freedom of Palestine.

Table 12 Selected tweets on US

Date	Tweet
2017-06-29	Amerikan ın vurduğu camiyi isid vurdu diyenler. Sahtekarsınız, hainsiniz, amerikan uşağısınız.
	Those of you who say that the mosque hit by the American is hit by ISIL. You're a crook, a traitor, an American butler.
2017-11-13	YouTube, Amerikalı yetkililerin baskısı sonucunda ABD'de doğan ve 2011'de Yemen'de ABD tarafından şehit edilen Enver el Evlakî'nin videolarını kaldırma kararı aldıBir müslüman alim, ölümünden 6 sene sonra dahi ABD için bir güvenlik tehdidi oluşturuyor ama Türkiye'de tanıyan yok
	YouTube decided to remove the videos of Anwar al-Evlaki, born in the US and killed in Yemen in 2011 as a result of the pressure of American officials. A Muslim scholar, even six years after his death poses a security threat to the US, but no one knows him in Turkey.
2017-12-06	Amerika ve israile en sert twiti fırlatana bir cumhuriyet altını hediye.#KudusKırmızıCizgimizdir
	A gold coin is awarded to the person who writes the harsh tweet against US and Israel # JerusalemisourRedline
2018-04-14	"Batılılardan nefret ediyorum, Amerika'dan nefret ediyorum; ama daha çok Amerika'nın vicdanına sığınan müslümanlardan nefret ediyorum." ~| Şehid Seyyid Kutub#SavaşaHayır
	I hate westerners, I hate US; but more than that I hate muslims who seek refuge in the conscience of US." ~| martyr Sayyid Qutb #No to War
2018-04-22	Amerikalıları öldürmek için kimseye danışma Allah'ın bereketiyle ilerle ...« Şeyh Usame Bin Ladin »TakabbelAllah Şuheda
	Don't take advise from anyone to kill Americans, go on by Allah's blessings ... «Sheikh Osama Bin Laden» TakabbelAllah Shuheda
2018-05-31	Ekonomik krizi hafifletebilmek için İngiltereye, güvenlik sorunlarını çözmek için ABD'ye, ümmetin meselelerini hal etmek içinse BM'ye başvurulması,TR'nin TR'den yönetilemediğini ve laik sistem var olduğu sürece oy vermenin bir şeyi değiştirmeyeceğini anlamak için yeterli değilmi?
	Isn't it sufficent to understand only casting votes will not change anything as long as the secular system exists and Turkey is not ruled from Turkey which applies to UK for solving economic crisis, to US for security problems, to UN for the problems of the Ummah.

Table 12 (Continued)

2018-06-19	Onlar Amerikancı İslamı istiyorlar.Onlar abdesti bozan şeylere fetva veren, ama Müslümanların siyasi, iktisadi ve içtimai durumlarına fetva vermeyen İslamı istiyorlar...~| Seyyid Kutub (r.a)
	They want American Islam. They want Islam that gives fatwa to things that makes the ablution void, but does not give fatwa to the political, economic and social situation of Muslims ... ~	Sayyid Qutb (r.a)
2018-08-15	Amerika'yı boykot etmek istiyorsak öncelikle oralardan ithal edilen kanunları boykot edelim. Dünyayı ifsat eden Amerikan kanunlarına Hayır diyelim. Evliliğimizi boşanmamızı ticaretimizi miras paylaşımını ABD'nin saçma kanunlarına göre yapmayalım ve İslam şeriatine dönelim.
	If we want to boycott America, let's first boycott the laws imported from there. Let's say no to US laws that disorder all the world. Let's not perform our divorce, our marriage, our inheritance share, trade according to the absurd laws of the United States, and let us return to Islamic sharia.
2018-08-25	Amerika'ya karşı olduğumuz için övünüyor bazı müslüman kardeşler ama biz Amerika'ya zalim olduğu için değil bize ambargo uyguladığı için karşıyız. Halbuki en az Amerika kadar zalim olan Rusya ile dostuz. Unutmayın; "Düşmanlık ancak zalime karşı olur!" (Bakara 193)
	Some Muslim brothers are proud that we are against US, but we are not opposed to US as it is cruel, because we are against the embargo. However, we are friends with Russia, which is as cruel as America. Keep in mind; "But if they cease, then let there be no hostility except against the oppressors. (al-baqarah 193)
2018-09-04	Amerikan Kongresinin El Kaide Raporu'El Kaide 16 yıl öncesinde daha güçlü' Liderin Ölmesiyle Yıkılan değil Güçlenen bir topluluk.1.4 Trilyon Dolar HarcamaAsya Afrika Kuzey Afrika Ortadoğu Arap Yarım Adası ve birçok yerdeAmerikanın Korkusu
	The Al-Qaeda Report of the American Congress Al Qaeda is stronger than 16 years ago ' A community that strengthens after the death of its leader it is not destroyed. 1.4 Trillion Dollars of expenditure. Fear of US everywhere in Asia Africa North Africa Middle East Arabian Peninsula and many places
2018-09-11	Amerikaya zarar dahi verilemeyeceğini düşünen ZİLLETİ kabullenmiş nefislerin inadına#11Eylül mubarek olsun
	Out of spite of the souls who adopted ABASEMENT and who think that it is impossible to give any harm even to US May #September 11 blessed
2018-09-11	Bu gün günlerden İZZETSelam şehid atta'ya Bu şanlı kıyamınaAmerikayı titrettiKartal kanatlarıyla . . .
	Today is the day of DIGNITY.Greeting to martry Atta. This glorious rising shaken US with his eagle wings…
2018-09-11	Amerika'dan değil Allah'tan korkun!Abdullah Azzam
	Don't be afraid of US but Allah! Abdullah Azzam
2018-10-03	#ABD askerlerini taşıyan #C-130J #Super_Hercules tipi uçak #Afganistan'da düştü. Kazada en az 11 kişinin öldüğü ifade edildi.
	#C-130J #Super_Hercules type aircraft carrying US soldiers downed in Afghanistan. It is stated that at least 11 people were killed in the accident.

Table 12 (Continued)

2018-10-07	Suudi Arabistan mı kirli bir tezgah hazırladı, yoksa Amerika mı? ABD, seküler çizgiye giren Muhammed b. Selman'ı krallığa getirmek istediğini hissettiriyor. Böylece daha iyi ilişkiler ve kutsal mekanların kendilerince kontrolü...Neden olmasın?
	Is it a dirty ruse of Saudi Arabia or US? US makes us feel that he wants to enthrone Muhammed b. Salman who adopts secular approach. Thus better relations and control of holly locations by US… Why not?
2018-10-17	7 yıl önce 14 Ekim 2011'de Başkan Obama Abdurrahman Al-Awlaki'yi öldürmesi için bir drone görevlendirmişti (16).2017'nin başında, bu kez Başkan Trump, #Yemen'de kızkardeşi Nawar Al-Awlaki'nin (8) öldürülmesi ile sonuçlanan özel bir operasyon emrini verdi.
	7 years ago, on October 14, 2011, President Obama commissioned a drone to kill Abdurrahman Al-Awlaki.(16) At the beginning of 2017, this time President Trump ordered a special operation in # Yemen that resulted in the murder of his sister Nawar Al-Awlaki (8).

Turkish Salafists' hatred towards Russia was examined in the beginning of this section. This mostly originates from Russia's role in the Syrian conflict. Anti-Americanism among Salafis has a long history. September 11 attacks were a strong representation of this sentiment. In tweets, September 11 is celebrated, and the attackers are praised in the anniversary. Anti-Americanism is supported by the words of leading figures such as Usama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and Seyyid Qutb. "Do not fear America, but God", Azzam. "They want to Americanize Islam in order to weaken Islamic countries in terms of social, political and economic aspects", Qutb. "Do not consult anyone to kill an American, just move forward", Laden. "I hate America, but I hate more on Muslims allying with America", Qutb.[14] These words show how Turkish Salafis perceive US in their tweets which have violent, hostile and accusatory language.

A tweet in Table 12 calls for boycotting imported American laws which regulate marriage, trade relations and portion of the inheritance instead of boycotting American products. And, it finds a cure to go back to the shariah law. Secularization process in Saudi Arabia by Muhammed bin Salman is viewed as an American

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[14] The sources of these quotations could not be provided, as the researcher saw that users share these quotations without specifying their sources. Unfortunately, searching keywords from the quotations does not work to find their authentic sources.

project. Another tweet justifies why they do not participate political process by stating that Turkey is managed by foreign forces not by autonomy. Besides, Anti-Americanism is justified by a verse from Quran. This shows that they use both political and religious arguments to rationalize their position.

Additionally, Anwar al-Awlaki who is an influential figure in global jihadi movement is referenced a lot in tweets. He was an American citizen using social media effectively to call people for jihad. YouTube abolished his videos after six years of his death by blaming them as a facilitator of online radicalization. A tweet advertises him to Turkish audience who little know about him. Both Obama and Trump are reported as ordering operations in Yemen to kill Awlaki's family. US Congress's report on al-Qaeda is represented as the power of al-Qaeda which operates across the globe. It asserts that the death of Usama bin Laden consolidates the organization more instead of toppling it down. These two examples, Awlaki and Laden, require reevaluating the notion of leader in terrorist organizations.

Table 13 Selected tweets on Family and Gender

Date	Tweet
2018-06-29	Türkiye'de alenen haksızlığa maruz kalan üç kesim;Muvahhidler,kürtler,erkekler.Tabi eğer bu aidiyetlerden ödün verilmiyorsa.Misal muvahhid taviz vermiyorsa,kürt ben türküm demiyorsa ve erkek kadıncılık yapmıyorsa.Hele ki şu üçünü kendinde toplamış biri varsa vay haline.
	Three fractions who are explicitly subject to injustice in Turkey; Almohades, Kurds, men. Of course if they don't concede on these belonging. If Kurd doesn't say I am a Turk and a male does not act feminist. Most particulary pity on those who has all these three characteristics.
2018-06-30	"Hanımı olmayan erkek zavallıdır, ZAVALLIDIR"!Zengin de olsa böylemidir Ya Resulallah?'EVET, zengin de olsa böyledir' ☞ Beyhaki,Şuabuliman,5097
	"Pity for the man who doesn't have wife"! Even he is rich, is it so Oh you Prophet of Allah? "YES, even rich this is so" Beyhaki,Suabuliman,5097
2018-07-10	Erkekler şimdi artık kızın ailesiyle de değil devletle evleniyor.
	Men now get married with the state not the family of the girl.

Table 13 (Continued)

2018-07-11	Son iki yüz yıldır "eve ekmek getiren erkek/koca" imajının yıkılması için çalışılmaktadır.Erkeklerin madenlerde, limanlarda, lağımlarda, ağır işlerde çalışması istenmektedir.Kadınlara ise "temiz işler" verilmektedir.
	For the last two centuries breadwinner man/husband image has been tried to be destroyed. Men are required to work in mines, harbors, sewers and heavy works. Women are assigned "clean jobs".
2018-07-11	Çağımızın en önemli sorunu erkeğin "bacı"laşmasıdır.Bacılaşmış bir erkeğin kendini şiddetten başka bir yolla tanımlaması imkânı da bırakılmamıştır.Bacıerkek------} kendini şiddetle tanımladığında daha büyük bir bacılaştırmaya uğratılır.
	The most crucial problem of our age is man becomes like "sisters". A man becoming like a sister has no opportunity for defining himself other than violence------- When he defines himself with violence he becomes more like a sister.
2018-07-24	Concordance'a bakmaya üşenen öğrenci 2. sınıfa geldiğinde kütüphanede kızlı erkekli hadis tahlilleri yapmaya başlıyor.Kafalarına fethulbari ile vurasıcalar
	Those students who are even lazy to look concordance are starting to make hadith analysis in the library boys and girsl together. Hit their head with fethulbari
2018-09-12	Biz cocuklarımızı okula göndermıyoruz.. #KarmaEğitimŞart
	We do not send our children to school # CoedisaMust

In the last part, Table 13 shows Turkish Salafis views on family and gender which are social aspects of life. While marriage is strongly advised by reference to religious texts, they mostly complain about gender roles in marriage. Also, state's interference on marriage issues by law is depicted as marriage with state. Feminization of men is a forefront argument to criticize modern family structure. According to a tweet, those who follow traditional understanding of gender roles are facing with unfair treatment in Turkish public. Apart from gender roles, they oppose to mixed education system from primary school to university. Most of Turkish Salafis do not send their children to official educational institutions in which mixed and secular education is given.

4.2.4. Date Range and Frequencies

Table 14 Date Range for tweets

CLUSTER	ENTRY DATE	LAST DATE
all	21.10.2008	2.11.2018
Nusra(militant)	21.11.2010	2.11.2018
Hizbuttahrir(political)	12.12.2012	2.11.2018
Quietist(apolitical)	27.05.2013	2.11.2018
Eminkucuk(militant)	20.08.2013	2.11.2018
Hanzala(quietist militant)	20.04.2015	2.11.2018

Table 14 represents for entry date of users belonging to different fractions. The oldest community on Twitter is Nusra community which dates back to 2010. It can be said that as Syrian conflict began in 2010-2011, Nusra users have entered Twitter with the outbreaking of the conflict. While Twitter has been suspending militant accounts, it is surprising that Nusra users could still be alive after almost a decade. Emin-Kucuk, Hizbut-tahrir and Quietists have entered Twitter in the first half of the 2013.

The latecomers are Hanzala community. This is a surprising result, as Hanzala community has a well-developed social media strategy. The explanation would be either Twitter suspensions or the evolution of their social media strategy as of 2015. As the dataset for this study was gathered between June-August 2018, the early accounts of Hanzala community could not be covered in this study.

As Eroglu (2018) discussed in his book Turkish ISIS, Hanzala has changed his discourse and stand on ISIS as of 2015 to protect himself from being charged as a terrorist supporter. Therefore, Hanzala community may have extradited the past accounts and has created new accounts with no reference to either ISIS or al Nusra as of 2015.

Figure 11 Tweet Frequencies by day

It is important to look at tweet frequencies aside from entry date of accounts. Surprisingly, number of the tweets increase after the second half of 2017. This corresponds to the date of defeat of ISIS on the ground. This may show an agenda shift among Turkish Salafis. Their presence on Twitter has known from the beginning of 2010s. It is not normal to have such results as in Figure 11. One explanation might be that the evolution of Salafi accounts is correlated to the change in the Turkish political discourse on ISIS and al Nusra and the unfavorable developments in the conflict zones.

4.2.5. Hashtags

HASHTAG THEMES FOR ALL USERS

Bars: CONFLİCT İN SYRİA 916, SALAFİ THEOLOGY 843, SALAFİ LEADERS 559, TALİBAN 231, POLİTİCS ON US 79

Figure 12 Most Used Hashtag Frequencies in terms of Themes for All Users

Hashtags are vital elements of tweets and they enable users to promote their campaigns via Twitter. Therefore, the hashtags will be analyzed in this section. Like the most frequent words, hashtag topics could be classified into some themes; oppression in the country, Syrian conflict, Hanzala, Afghanistan and theology. Top hashtags are related to oppression against themselves. In the last years, security forces are conducting effective operations against religiously inspired terrorists. Therefore, social media strategy of ISIS supporters or sympathizers in Turkey has been evolved towards human rights and oppression issues in the last years. Ebu Hanzala was detained on 2017 again, so it is not surprising to see him at the top of the list. Hashtags on Syrian conflict such as #Idlib, #suriye(Syria), #Syria and #duncanakkalebugunidlib(Canakkale in the past, Idlib today) shows how much importance the user gives to Syrian conflict. However, there is no reference to Israeli-Palestinian conflict differing from top words themes. Surprisingly, there is no reference to jihad hashtags, instead tawhid is the most frequently used topic regarding theology. Also, Turkish Salafis are sensitive to events at Afghanistan and have sympathy to Taliban, according to Figure 12.

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4.2.6. Websites

In this part, the map of local websites, the mostly referenced news sites and social media platforms will be provided. These results were obtained from tweet data. Regardless of fractions, the results belong to all users. These findings are of importance in terms of future studies. The difference between official websites could be examined in a detailed way.

Table 15 The mapping of local websites among all users

Website	Fraction	Content
https://www.islahhaber.net/	Militant (Nusra)	News
https://www.tevhiddersleri.org/	Quietist Militant (Hanzala)	Theology
http://tevhiddergisi.net/	Quietist Militant(Hanzala)	Magazine
https://tevhidigundem.biz/	Quietist Militant(Hanzala)	News
https://kokludegisim.net/	Political (Hizbuttahrir)	News
http://islamdevleti.info/	Political (Hizbuttahrir)	Politics
https://www.haksozhaber.net/	Political (Hizbuttahrir)	News
http://www.hizb-turkiye.com/	Political (Hizbuttahrir)	Politics
http://www.tevhidvesunnet.com/	Quietist	Theology
https://www.ilimvecihad.com/	Quietist	Theology
https://www.kureselkitap.com/	Militant(Nusra)	Bookstore
https://www.kitapbilir.com/	Quietist	Bookstore
https://www.selamkitap.com/	Militant (Kucuk)	Bookstore
https://www.benlikitap.com/	Quietist	Bookstore

According to Table 15, the map of local websites contains all Salafi fractions; militant, political and quietist Salafis. The table shows the fraction and content of the websites. Websites of militant and political Salafis mostly have contents on political discussions and news from the field. However, quietist Salafis have no website on news and politics, instead, they have many online bookstores. This is not a surprising outcome, but it clearly shows the diverse agenda among Turkish Salafi community.

Table 16 Most referenced news sites in tweets.

News Site	Freq
Mepanews (al-Qaeda oriented news site)	165
Yenisafak (religious conservative)	111
Trthaber (national public news agency)	47
Haberturk (mainstream)	36
Yeniakit (religious conservative)	36
Milligazete (religious conservative)	18
Akittv (religious conservative)	17
Dirilispostasi (religious conservative)	4

While most referenced news sites vary, the worldview of the news sites is predominantly religious conservative as seen in Table 16. However, mepanews, Al Qaeda oriented news site, has come at the top of the list. It is surprising that there is almost no reference to mainstream and secular websites. This may show a tendency to create a separate world not only in the physical world, but also on the online

sphere. This might be accepted as a step toward radicalization in the radicalization models (Berger, 2015).

Table 17 Most referenced social media platforms in tweets

Platform	Freq
instagram	703
youtube	567
facebook	312
periscope	27
swarmapp	7

Table 17 reveals significant statistics on the usage of different social media platforms. Aside from twitter, Turkish Salafis have shown existence on Instagram, YouTube and Facebook, Periscope and SwarmApp. The users of last two platforms are seen as a minority in the community. While Twitter is very efficient micro-blogging platform to convey messages to public and to create a social network, it is less useful for sharing photos and videos because of limitations. However, Instagram and YouTube allow users to share photos, music videos, religious talks and propaganda videos etc. In the Chapter 3, a content analysis of popular preacher on YouTube was provided, but there is a need for a comprehensive study on visual contents of Turkish Salafi community based on the social media data. This may fill an important gap in the literature on Turkish Salafism.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis explores Turkish Salafism on Twitter-sphere by using computational social science methods. Twitter data allow us to look both the nature of their networks and their representation online. Due to lack of exploratory analysis on Turkish Salafism online, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on global Salafism, radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. There is a bourgeoning literature on global Salafism. However, Turkish context is unfortunately underrepresented. On the other hand, literature on online radicalization has been growing especially after September 11 attacks. As Stein (2013) underlines, Jihadi movements prefer to use mostly social media platforms instead of static official websites and forums, especially in the last decade. This requires studying militant movements through the lens of social media today.

The limitations on online studies are mostly originating from its computational methodology. There are four phases of this research; preparing sample by using snowballing method, collecting data from Twitter, cleaning and preparing data for analyses, and lastly inferring meaningful patterns from data. The most difficult phase was cleaning and preparing data, as it requires advanced computational knowledge. Two methodologies were used for analyses; social network analysis and quantitative text analysis. Gephi, a widely used social network analysis application, was used for visualization of networks and calculation of metrics. Python programming language is used during data collection process. All textual analyses are made by using R programming language with a combination of text analysis packages (quanteda, tm, snowball, topicmodels, tidytext, ggplot2).

This thesis can be divided into two parts; an evaluation of Global Salafism, and Twitter data analysis. The first part is also divided in two sections; Global Salafism as a conceptual framework and Turkish Salafism as a research topic. Presenting the findings based on social network analysis and quantitative text analysis are major components of the second section.

This thesis evaluates Global Salafism literature in terms of six strands; the formation of concept, the primary figures of Salafism in the contemporary era, subgroups of Salafism, Salafism in local contexts, Salafism in the eyes of radicalism, extremism and terrorism, and Salafism in the conceptual framework of Political Islam and Islamism. As most of discussions and studies investigate the violent face of Salafism, radicalization, extremism and terrorism literature is assessed in terms of their definitions, the causes of radicalization, the pathways of radicalization and online radicalization strands.

In Turkish Salafism part, an evaluation of Turkish literature on Salafism is provided along with discussions on the increasing trend of Salafism in Turkey. Radical Islamists' legacy is briefly examined to inquire whether there is a continuation or not. One of the original contributions of this study is the periodization of Turkish Salafism. Four phases are discussed in terms of formation period-1990s, institutionalization period-2000s, centralization period-2010s, and decentralization period-late 2010s. Profiling Turkish speaking popular preachers could also be considered as a preliminary effort within the Turkish Salafism literature.

In the second part of this thesis, findings are evaluated to grasp thoroughly the online presence of Turkish Salafis. As social network analysis would not be enough to find meaningful conclusions on the research topic, quantitative text analysis and thematic analysis were made to study the phenomenon thoroughly. Thus, both the nature of Turkish Salafis' network on twitter and the worldview of them were explored. The results will be summarized in the upcoming pages.

Findings based on data analyses could be summarized as follows:

- From quietists to militants, Turkish Salafi subgroups have different agendas on Twitter. Quietists have almost no reference to politics as consistent with their agenda. Militant Salafis could not be seen as a unified group instead there are lots of groups with different agendas. Some militant Salafis have no reference to Turkish context, but some write more on Turkey. Regarding politics, Turkey, Syria, Russia, US and Iran, which are mostly the Middle Eastern and related countries, are forefront discussion topics. Syrian conflict is a common theme among militant Salafis. Hanzala community has the most leader-centered discourse different from other branches.

- It can be inferred that there is no central mechanism among all Turkish Salafis for determining their agenda. Different agendas between various subgroups show a decentralized ecosystem on Twitter-sphere. Therefore, counter-narrative studies should examine all subgroups separately.

- There is a clear upturn in tweet frequency after 2017. This is a surprising result considering high usage of social media in the last decade (Yalcinkaya et al., 2017). This may tell us their evolution online after their loss on the ground and crackdown on them in Turkey. Based on this data, the last phase of Turkish Salafism could be named as decentralization and survival period. To observe the evolution of Turkish Salafis on Twitter, they should be monitored on social media platforms in the future studies.

- According to the most referenced websites in tweets, it is seen that Turkish Salafis create an echo chamber on Twitter. While they abstain to interact with mainstream understandings in physical world, they keep mainstream media out of their circles. This is explained as a step toward radicalization process in the literature (Berger, 2015, p. 21).

- In terms of references to social media platforms, Instagram and YouTube come to forefront. Different from Twitter, they allow spreading visual propaganda materials online. The future research should focus more on visual materials based on Instagram and YouTube data.

- Militants are more dominant in Turkish Salafi networks. Hanzala community, as quietist militant Salafi group, comes to the second in terms of dominance.

- Half of the sample is deactivated after one of year of data collection. This shows an important decay in the network. This may represent a success of operations against violent extremists online conducted by Turkish authorities and Twitter. On the other hand, transformation of existing users with a new brand would be another scenario.

- Only 11 users exceed 100-total degree in the network, in other words, 5 percent of individuals have connection with half of the community.

- Average path length in the network is 2.4, which shows the distance between users.

- Density in the network is 0.108, which reports the vacancy in the network.

- The degree of connectedness is high in the community, only one user is weakly connected; however, thirteen users are strongly connected.

- During the classification process, both genders' presence on twitter is realized. To explore more on gender difference, Inge's (2016) pioneering study would be a guide for the future researchers. This thesis warns of the complications of the online research in terms of the validity of sampling data. It should also be noted that disinformation and misrepresentation are widely encountered problems in online sphere.

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APPENDICES

A. SAMPLE CODES FOR TEXT ANALYSIS IN R

######## Quantitative Text Analysis: Quanteda, TM, and Ggplot2 ##########

############ Load Libraries ##########

```
library(quanteda) library(quanteda.corpora) library(quanteda.dictionaries)
library(spacyr)
library(dplyr)
library(tidytext)
library(tm)
library(ggplot2)
library(SnowballC)
library(tidyverse) library(tidytext)
library(data.table)
library(xtable)
library(stopwords)
library(topicmodels)
```

############Get the Data and Set the Directory#####
#get the list of the data files and set the directory
```
setwd("~/Desktop/Thesis/DATA_text and network/text_thesis/DATA/")
allfiles = list.files(pattern="*_data.csv")
```

#get the data for female users
```
data_female = lapply(female, read.csv)
data_female <- do_call_rbind(data_female)
tweet_female <- data_female %>% select(date, tweet)
```

###########Clean and Reprocess the Data#####

 # Make a corpus in tm

corp_female <- tm::VCorpus(tm::VectorSource(tweet_female$tweet))

 # Clean symbols from the data

toSpace <- content_transformer(function (x , pattern) gsub(pattern, " ", x))

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, toSpace, "/")

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, toSpace, "@")

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, toSpace, "\\|")

 # Convert the text to lower case

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, content_transformer(tolower))

 # Remove numbers

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, removeNumbers)

 # Remove english and turkish common stopwords

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, removeWords, stopwords("english"))

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, removeWords, stopwords("tr", source = "stopwords-iso"))

 # Remove your own stop word

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, removeWords, trstop)

 # Remove punctuations

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, removePunctuation)

 # Eliminate extra white spaces

corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, stripWhitespace)

Text stemming

```
corp_female <- tm_map(corp_female, stemDocument)
```

Make a corpus in quanteda

```
corp_female_q <- corpus(corp_female)
corp_female_t <- tokens(corp_female_q)
```

####### Most Frequent Words and term Frequencies######
One hundred most frequent words

```
dfm_female <- dfm(corp_female_q, remove_punct=TRUE)
top100_female <- textstat_frequency(dfm_female, n = 100)
```

frequencies of "allah", "hanzala", "suriye", "cihad" - these are matrixes, not numerics

```
sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t <- topfeatures(dfm_female, n = nfeat(dfm_female))
sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t[c("kadin", "evlilik", "aile", "cihad")]
```

term frequency ratios

```
sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t["erdogan"] / sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t["hanzala"]

sorted_dfm_female_rel_freqs_t <- sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t /
sum(sorted_dfm_female_freqs_t) * 100
```

by weighting the dfm directly

```
dfm_female_pct <- dfm_weight(dfm_female, scheme = "prop") * 100
```

#get bar plot word frequency

```
textstat_frequency(dfm_female, n = 15) %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = reorder(feature, -rank), y = frequency)) +
  geom_bar(stat = "identity") + coord_flip() +
  labs(x = "", y = "Term Frequency as a Percentage")
```

####### Topic Modelling########

#Prepare the dfm file

dfm_female <- dfm_female %>% dfm_trim(min_termfreq = 4, max_docfreq = 10)

#Convert the file for topic modelling

LDA_dfm_female <- convert(dfm_female, to = "topicmodels") %>%

  LDA(k = 20)

 # get top five terms per topic as a list

list_lda_dfm_female <- get_terms(LDA_dfm_female, 5)

Key Word in Context-KWIC

kwic_suriye_female <- kwic(corp_female_t, pattern = "kadın")

Wordclouds

#Non-colored

set.seed(123)

textplot_wordcloud(dfm_female, max_words = 100)

#Colored

set.seed(1234)

textplot_wordcloud(dfm_female, min_count = 6, max_words=100,

random_order = FALSE,   rotation = .25,

        color = RColorBrewer::brewer.pal(8, "Dark2"))

######### Hashtags Frequencies ########

hashtag_female <-

textstat_frequency(dfm(corpus(tm::VCorpus(tm::VectorSource(data_female$hashta

gs)),), remove_punct=TRUE), n=10)

Usernames and Mentions

#Get the most influential usernames

```
username <-
textstat_frequency(dfm(corpus(tm::VCorpus(tm::VectorSource(data_female$userna
me)), ), remove_punct=TRUE), n=10)
```

Get the mentions in the tweets

```
mentions <-
textstat_frequency(dfm(corpus(tm::VCorpus(tm::VectorSource(data_female$mentio
ns)), ), remove_punct=TRUE), n=10)
```

Date Range for Tweets

#Get the entry date for tweets

```
date_range <- min(as.Date(data_female$date))
```

Daily Tweet Frequencies

Transform the Data

```
date <- data_all$date
date <- as.Date.factor(date)
frequency(date)
date_dfm <- dfm(corpus(date))
```

Get the Frequencies

```
date_freq <- textstat_frequency(date_dfm)
```

Visualize the Statistics

```
date_freq %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = feature, y = frequency)) +
  geom_smooth(stat = "loess") + coord_flip() +
  labs(x = "", y = "Date Frequency as a Percentage")
```

Customized Turkish Stopwords list generated for This Thesis######

"ile", "gibi", "bazı", "ın", "yı", "deki", "yapılan", "sizi", "ki", "büyük", "karşı","b",
"sizin", "tarafından", "ait", "bizi", "biri", "bile", "acaba", "vardır", "ey",
"zaten", "altına", "eğer", "de", "da", "ta", "nin", "rağmen", "wwwyoutubecom",
"artık", "değil", "değildir", "bana", "ise", "öyle", "böyle", "için", "plusgooglecom",
"nun", "şu", "bu", "gerek", "tam", "tüm", "yerine", "ortada", "liler", "güzel",
"onu", "olan", "kadar", "yine", "diye", "hiçbir", "diye", "olduğunu", "yanında",
"hiç", "lazım", "den", "ben", "siz", "niye", "bunu", "ama", "ettiği", "nın",
"diyen", "nde", "olmak", "onun", "bunun", "şunun", "sana", "edip", "olsa",
"yani", "senin", "benim", "size", "bize", "olsun", "tarafta", "yapan", "bunları",
"tan", "dan", "gereken", "kez", "eden", "beni", "üç", "üzerinden", "sadece",
"yahu", "belli", "sonra", "tane", "olduğu", "ediyorum", "dediği", "öncesi", "sonra",
"dedi", "kaç", "t", "co", "önce", "başka", "bütün", "işte", "olabilir", "daha",
"olur", "sen", "diyor", "fazla", "olmuş", "her", "şey", "mı", "nın", "dan", "etmek",
"sen", "etti", "ortaya", "olarak", "burada", "kendi", "yaptığı", "birçok", "üzerine",
"biraz", "ilgili", "bir", "çok", "var", "yok", "hem", "diyerek", "seni", "in",
"nda", "ardından", "ve", "ne", "ü", "e", "te", "ya", "mi", "a", "mu", "mü", "deydi"
"status", "pic.twitter.com", "twitter.com", "https", "o", "http", "en", "el", "şöyle",
"nasıl", "son", "i", "gün", "bi", "tek", "bugün", "youtu.be", "kim", "devam", "iyi",
"ancak", "kabul", "çünkü", "iki", "yeni", "onlar", "fb.me", "neden", "ona", "göre",
"bin", "oldu", "aynı", "bizim", "veya", "adam", "doğru", "kişi", "şekilde", "ediyor",
"kimse", "içinde", "yıl", "ilk", "et", "yoktur", "hakkında", "etsin", "arasında",
"az", "şimdi", "onların", "s", "p", "html", "onlara", "onları", "der", "eder", "üzere",
"www.instagram.com", "olmayan", "v", "edin", "r", "rt", "fb", "di",
"youtu", "eh", "edenl", "dk", "youtub", "ese", "kişiy", "varsa", "twitter", "tr",
"indexphp", "hala", "wwwfacebookcom", "yerd", "c", "allah", "zaman", "biz",

B. HANDY RESOURCES ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

Computational Tools and Programming Packages

- Social Network Analysis: https://gephi.org
- Social Network Analysis: https://nodexl.com
- Quantitative Text Analysis: https://quanteda.io
- Topic Modelling Package: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html
- TwitteR Package: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/twitteR/index.html
- Ggplot2 Package: https://ggplot2.tidyverse.org

Online Lecture and Learning Materials

- Introduction to R for Social Scientists: https://clanfear.github.io/CSSS508/
- R for Social Scientists: https://datacarpentry.org/r-socialsci/
- Python for Social Scientists: https://datacarpentry.org/python-socialsci/
- Learning and Teaching Materials of Computational Social Science: https://compsocialscience.github.io/summer-institute/2019/teaching-learning-materials

Notable Books on Computational Social Science

- Social Research in Digital Age: https://www.bitbybitbook.com/en/1st-ed/preface/
- Quantitative Social Science- An Introduction: http://qss.princeton.press

Featured Qualitative Data Analysis Tools (Commercial Products)

- NVivo: https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/what-is-nvivo
- MAXQDA: https://www.maxqda.com/what-is-maxqda

C. A GLOSSARY ON SALAFI THEOLOGY

|	
al-wala' wa-l-bara'	It is defined as "loyalty" to God, Islam and Muslims alone and "disavowal" of other religions and non-Muslims. It is one of the five important doctrines of Salafism.
bid'a/bida'	innovation in Islamic belief and practices as illegitimate
Dar al-Islam	the territory of Muslims in which Islamic rule is applied
Dar al-Harb	the territory of war or non-Muslims
da'wa	call/proselytization to spread Islamic belief
fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence. There are four big schools of law (Shafi'i, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Maliki)
hadith	tradition or saying of the prophet Muhammad
ijtihad	interpretation of essential sources of Islamic law which are Qur'an and hadith
jihad	laudable effort or religious war. There are two types of jihad in terms of lesser and greater jihad. The lesser jihad refers to defensive or offensive war against non-Muslims, the greater jihad refers to self-improvement
Jihadi-Salafism	a subgroup of Salafism which claim jihad as the only way to self-fulfillment. Quietist Salafis reject them for their activism, and political Salafis for their query of violence which leads to fitnah
khariji/khawarij	Kharijites in English. It is regarded as the first sect emerged in the early Islamic society. Their formation goes back to the dissension after the assassination of the third caliph 'Uthman in 656. Their motto was that all rule should belong to God. Always used as a curse against opponents of Salafis.
kafir	non-believer
kufr	non-belief
madhhab	school of jurisprudence. Most Salafis reject to follow a madhhab
mushrik	someone who commits shirk which is giving associates to God and rejecting tawhid.
takfir	declaring someone as non-believer (excommunication)
tawhid	oneness of God.
Wahhabiyya	Wahhabism. It was a reform movement emerged in Saudi Arabia region. It is charactized by a return the Qur'an and Sunna. The movement focuses more on 'aqida and less on fiqh.

Source: (Meijer, 2009)

D. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

LDA Topic Modelling Results

Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5
başlatılan	caizdir	sabahları	duruşmayı	pazara
kültürünü	bahsetmek	inşaat	kalbimizi	toprakların
senedi	gidilir	değiştirdi	akpnin	evlenin
yönetmek	acıdır	yatıp	kurun	duha
اللَّهُمَّ	aysfzdmr	yerlerden	pilotu	irlandalı

Topic 6	Topic 7	Topic 8	Topic 9	Topic 10
bush	ederlerse	dönme	kedinin	fıkhını
ismimi	dostluğun	oğluyla	kağıtlar	sarayında
salihlerden	gutacuması	cezalandırma	kitabımızın	dramı
aşama	zorluklarla	telif	orhanbaylan	اللّٰه
irca	yoksunu	toplulukta	hiçe	tekfircilik

Topic 11	Topic 12	Topic 13	Topic 14	Topic 15
muhaberat	olmadığında	olmayacağız	tüccar	kaldıkları
ilgisini	peygamberimize	seyir	anahtarlıklarımızda	etmeyeceği
lezzetli	şerhtir	hâris	bahadirkurbano	zikredilen
başlıyorlar	unsurları	الإيمان	dinledim	teşri
başıdır	apo	konumunda	iyiydi	Haberıdlib

Topic 16	Topic 17	Topic 18	Topic 19	Topic 20
sorulara	كيفيت	kardeşimi	cumanız	davetçilerin
sünniler	elektronik	parçaya	azığı	ülkemiz
kemiği	bırakmasın	şerr	gördüklerinde	sabrını
kaos	muhammedi	rey	hıyanet	Hanife..özgürlük
uyumaz	hatırladım	kelimelerini	berakâtuhu	saldırır

Wordcloud Visualization of All Users

Wordcloud Visualization of Emin-Kucuk Community

Wordcloud Visualization of Hizbuttahrir Community

**Wordcloud Visualization of Hanzala Community**

Wordcloud Visualization of Nusra Community

Wordcloud Visualization of Queitist Community

Hashtag Frequencies_Quietist

Hashtag	Frequency
#dünçanakkalebugünidlib	9
#islam	6
#kuran	6
#tevhid	6
#müslüman	5
#sünnet	5
#islamiyetiyasamak	5
#ibadet	5
#takva	5
#ehlisünnet	5
#mümin	5
#dua	5
#islamgünlüğü	5
#tesettür	5
#kuranvetevhid	5
#hadis	5
#ramazanbayramı	5
#28şubatzulmübitsin	4
#idlibiçin	4
#arefe	4
#halepekoridoraçılsın	4
#çözümidamdeğilislam	4

Hashtag Frequencies_Hanzala

Hashtag	Frequency
#zulmesessizkalma	159
#ebuhanzalahocasız	152
#silivri4noludazulümvar	135
#delilsizmahkumiyet	104
#tevhiddenilinceaklıma	103
#tevhidinsesiolalım	81
#tevhiddersleri	76
#ebuhanzala	70
#tevhidgemisi	69
#boykotçözmeztevhidçözer	56
#tevhiddergisi	55
#ramazan	41
#tevhid	38
#ebuhanzalahoca	38
#tevhidtakvimleri	29
#tevhiddesleri	27
#putperesteğitimehayır	25
#tevhidvesünnet	22
#radyotevhid	21
#tevhidigündem	20
#tevhideiftira	15
#islamikimliğimedokunma	14

Hashtag Frequencies_Hizbuttahrir

Hashtag	Frequency
#suriye	11
#son28şubatolsun	11
#çözümidamdeğilislam	11
#yargızulmüdevamediyor	10
#hilafet	10
#idlibölüyor	10
#yargızulmünedurdiyelim	9
#yargızulmünedurde	8
#filistin	8
#rusajanlarısalmüslümanlarıal	8
#rusya	8
#kudüs	7
#yargızulmüneson	7
#buson28şubatolsun	7
#idlib	7
#hizbuttahrir	6
#syria	6
#yılmazçelik	6
#freeromanaandroshan	5
#doğuguta	5
#dünyahilafetenedenmuhtaç	5

Hashtag Frequencies_Nusra

Hashtag Frequencies_Eminkucuk

E. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

TWİTTER'DA TÜRKİYE SELEFİLİĞİ: SOSYAL AĞ ANALİZİ

Selefilik düşüncesi çok eski tarihlere dayansa da akademi, toplum ve devlet yöneticileri arasında ancak 11 Eylül terör saldırısı sonrasında görünürlük kazanmaya başlamıştır. Daha çok şiddete varan aşırıcılık yönüyle gündeme gelen Selefilik akımına hem küresel bir hareket hem de yerel bir hareket olarak yaklaşmak mümkündür. Selefilik, aynı zamanda, tek bir bütün hareket olarak düşünülmemektedir. Politik, apolitik ve militan olarak üç alt grupta değerlendirilen Selefilik hareketinin kavramsal oluşum süreci devam etmektedir.

Türkiye Selefiliği ise daha çok Irak Şam İslam Devlet'inin ve Suriye muhalif cephenin yükselişi ile daha çok gündeme gelmeye başlamıştır. Ruşen Çakır ve Hilmi Demir öncülüğünde dile getirilen Türkiye'de Selefilik akımının yükselişi özellikle medyada ciddi tartışma konusu olmuştur. Bu dönemde yapılan çalışmalar, Selefilik akımının daha çok militan yönüyle ilgilenmişlerdir. Fakat, Türkiye'ye Selefilik düşüncesinin girişi 1990 yıllarına rastlamaktadır. Suudi destekli vaizler aracılığıyla kendine yer bulmaya çalışan Selefilik o dönemler apolitik bir karakter sergiliyordu. Politik Selefilik akımın girişi ise ancak 2000'li yıllarda olacaktır. Akademik literatürde, Türkiye Selefiliğini bütünlüğü ve tarihsel dönüşümü içerisinde ele alan çalışmalarda sınırlılık görülmektedir. Bu durum, Selefi hareketlerin daha çok güvenlik kaygıları ile çalışılmasından kaynaklanabilir.

Bu tez, Türkiye'de Selefilik akımın Twitter platformu üzerinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezin temel sorusu; Türkiye Selefilerinin kendini Twitter nasıl sunduğudur. Twitter'daki sosyal ağ ekosistemlerinin merkezi olup olmadığı, Küresel Selefilik akımının hangi alt gruplarının temsil edildiği, hangi alt grubun ağ ekosisteminde baskın olduğu, en çok referans verilen web siteleri ve sosyal ağ

platformlarının hangileri olduğu, ve tweet içeriklerinde öne çıkan gündemlerin neler olduğu; bu tezin diğer alt soruları olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu sorulara cevap aranırken programlamalı sosyal bilimlerin araçlarından faydalanılırak, yorumsamacı epistemoloji ile metnin içerisindeki bağlama odaklanılacaktır. Selefilik kompleks bir olgu olduğu için kavramsal çerçeve ile konuya yaklaşılacaktır. Türkiye Selefiliği özelinde ise tarihi evrimi incelenecek ve dönemselleştirilmeye çalışılanacaktır.

Tez araştırmasının sadece Twitter platformuna odaklanışının bir kaç sebebi bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, Militan Selefilik üzerine yapılan araştırmalar medya kullanımını dönemlere ayırırken son on yılda sosyal medya kullanımının çok ciddi arttığını dile getirmektedir. Türkiye bağlamında Yalçınkaya ve ark. tarafından Türkçe konuşan İŞİD desteklerini Twitter üzerinden analiz eden çalışma, bu araştırmanın ilham kaynağı olmuştur. Bunun dışında Avrupa ve Amerika'da çoğunluklu düşünce kuruluşları tarafından yapılan çalışmalar sosyal medya platformuna odaklanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, Twitter hem ücretsiz hem kamuya açık hem de küçük topluluklar oluşturmaya fırsat sağlaması açılarından Türkiye Selefilerinin en çok tercih ettiği platformlardandır. Her ne kadar, son zamanlardaki güvenlik endişesi ise Telegram gibi kapalı platformlara geçiş gözlense de, Twitter'da kamuya açık bir şekilde faaliyetleri devam etmektedir. Son olarak, Twitter verisi üzerinden çalışmak diğer platformlara göre daha kolaydır ve zengin bir analiz imkanı sağlar.

Giriş bölümünde metod ve veri tanıtımı yapılmıştır. Bu tezde kullanılan metodlar başlıca; sosyal ağ analizi ve hesaplamalı metin analizi olarak sıralanabilir. Sosyal ağ analizi, kullanıcılar arasındaki bağlantıları keşefetmeye yardımcı olurken, hesaplamalı metin analizi ise onların dünya görüşlerini anlamak için önemli bir araçtır.

Sosyal ağ analizi ve hesaplamalı metin analizi, programlamalı sosyal bilimler alanında yaygınca kullanılan metodlardır. Programlamalı sosyal bilimler, internet ve büyük verilerin yükselişi ile beraber sosyal bilimlerin içinde gelişmeye ve kimliğini

bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu alanın en büyük handikapı, metodun kullanımı için gerekli olan araçların kullanımıdır. Verilerin elde edilmesinden analiz edilmesine kadar daha çok bilgisayar bilimcilerin kullandığı programlama dilleri kullanılmaktadır. Programlama dillerini öğrenme süreci ciddi bir odaklanma ile bir yıl alabilmektedir. Geleneksel sosyal bilimler daha çok araştırmacının kendisi tarafından hazırlanmış ufak verileri sosyal hadiseleri anlamlandırmak için kullanır. Geleneksel bilgisayar veya veri bilimi ise internette veya başka platformlardan elde edilmiş büyük ve dağınık verileri herhangi bir şeyi anlamlandırmak için kullanmaktadır. Programlamalı sosyal bilimler bu iki farklı akımı birleştirerek, sosyal bilimcilerin büyük verilerle çalışabilmesine alan açmaktadır. Sosyal bilimcilerin soru sorma ve anlamlandırma yetenekleri ile, bilgisayar bilimcilerin büyük ve hazır veriyi kullanma yetilerinin birleşimi gelecek çalışmalar için yepyeni bir alan açmaktadır. Zaten çevrimiçi dünyanın son on yıllarda fazlalıkla kullanılıyor olması sosyal bilimcileri buna mecbur etmektedir.

Arap baharı ayaklanmaları, Ortadoğu bağlamında sosyal medyanın sosyal hareketler tarafından yaygınlıkla kullanılmasına alan açtı. Çünkü, Twitter, Facebook ve İnstagram gibi sosyal media platformaları ücretsiz ve özgür bir alan sağlıyordu. Organizayon yapma, fikirleri yayma veya kampanya yürütme gibi konularda daha önce hayale gelmeyecek kolaylıklar sağlıyordu. Bunun yanında, Irak Şam İslam Devleti gibi küresel terör örgütleri için ideolojilerini yayıp insan kazanmak açılarından eşi bulunmaz bir araç olarak görülüp yaygınlıkla kullanıldı. Türkiye bağlamında ise Gezi Parkı eylemleri sürecinde eylemciler tarafından sosyal medyanın aktif bir şekilde kullanılması göze çarpmaktadır. Hem Ortadoğu hem de Türkiye bağlamında sosyal medya üzerinden sosyal hareketleri inceleyen çalışmalar ciddi görünürlük kazanmıştır.

Bu çalışmada kullanılan veri, Python programlama dili kullanılarak iki hafta içerisinde elde edilmiştir. Toplam 213 kullanıcı'dan 69998 tweet elde edilmiştir. Twitter'dan veri elde etmenin farklı yolları vardır. Twitter'in kendisinden yani API (uygulama programlama arayüzü) kullanılarak elde edileceği gibi aracı ticari

kuruluşlar tarafından para ile satın alınabilmektedir. Twitter'dan veri çekmek son zamanlarda hem etik hem de ticari sebeplerle sınırlandırılmıştır. Buna karşın, aracı kuruluşlardan veri satın almak ciddi masraflı olabilmenin yanında araştırmacıya veriyi manipüle etme imkanından mahrum bırakmaktadır.

Veri elde edilmeden önce iki ay boyunca örneklem oluşturmak için bir çalışma yürütülmüştür. Hedef gruba ulaşmak için Twitter'in arama paneli kullanılmıştır. İlk olarak; Selefi, kafir, idlib, İŞİD, al Nusra, el Kaide, akide ve menhec gibi Selefilerin yaygınlıkla kullandığı kelimeler aranmış ve kullanıcılar incelenmiştir. İkinci olarak ise küresel düzeyde Ebubekir el Bağdadi, Abdullah Azzam, Makdisi, Cevlani gibi lider figürler, yerel bağlamda ise Abdullah Yolcu, Ebu Hanzala(Halis Bayuncuk), Hüseyin Cinisli, Mehmet Emin Akın ve Mehmet Balcıoğlu popular vaiz ve önde gelen isimler olarak araştırıldı. Bunun sonucunda elde edilen topluluktan kartopu metodu kullanılarak hedef kitleye ulaşıldı. Elde edilen örneklem Türkiye'deki Selefi topluluğun lider kadrosu ve sıradan mensuplarını temsil etmektedir. Bütünlüğü yakalamak adına hem apolitik hem politik hem de militant Selefi topluluklar kendi alt grupları ile beraber örnekleme dahil edilmiştir. Bu açıdan daha önce Türkiye'de Selefilik üzerine yapılan çalışmalardan farklılaşmaktadır.

Daha sonra elde edilen bu veri ile sosyal ağ analizi için kullanılmak üzere bir ağ matrisi hazırlanmıştır. Bu ağ matrisinde, 213 düğüm(kullanıcı) ve 4557 kenar(ilişki) bulunmaktadır. Bu matris verisi üzerinden merkeziyet, derece dağılımı, modülarite, yoğunluk gibi önemli sosyal ağ analizi metrikleri hesaplanmıştır. Tweet içeriklerinden yani metin verisinden ise; en çok kullanılan kelimeler, etiketler, websiteleri ve sosyal medya platformları elde edilmiştir. Tweetlerin başlangıç tarihleri ve günlük frekans analizi de ayrı olarak çıkarılmıştır. Bu verilerin sonuçları ve tartışmaları dördüncü bölümde takdim edilmiştir.

İkinci bölümde, küresel Selefilik literatürü detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bu tez, Küresel Selefilik literatürünü altı ayrı dalda incelemektedir. Çalışmaların bir kısmı kavramsallaşma süreci ile ilgilenirken, bazıları ise günümüzdeki lider figürlere

odaklanmaktadır. Bir kısım literatür günümüz Selefiliğinin alt gruplarını tanımlamaya ve ayrıştırmaya çalışmaktadır. Ülkelerin yerel Selefilik tecrübeleri de literatürün önemli parçalarından birisidir. Beşinci olarak, Selefilik ile militant yönüyle ilgilenen radikalleşme, aşırıcılık, ve terörizm literatürleri detaylı bir hacme sahiptir. Son olarak, kavramsal karmaşa süreci devam eden politik İslam ve İslamcılık literatürlerinin 11 Eylül öncesi ve sonrası Selefilik kavramı ve akımına yaklaşımı incelenmiştir.

Kavramsallaştırma sürecini aydınlatan iki önemli çalışma önümüzü çıkmaktadır. Meijer editörlüğünde 2009 yılında yayınlanan 'Küresel Selefilik: İslam'ın Yeni Dini Hareketi' başlıklı kitabı bu konuda doyurucu makaleler içermektedir. Tevhid bu doktrinin merkezinde ele alınmaktadır. Haykel'e göre Selefi düşünce doktrini; akide, içithad ve menhec kavramlarıyla detaylandırılabilir. Burada, akide teolojiyi, içtihad hukuku, ve menhec ise politikayı temsil etmektedir. Bu kitapta, Selefilik ile fundemantalism ve politik İslam anlayışlarının karıştırılmaması özellikle vurgulanmaktadır. İkinci önemli kitap, Lauziere'nin 2016 yayınladığı 'Selefiliği İnşa Etmek' adlı kitabıdır. Kitap baştan sona kavramsal oluşum sürecini ele alması yönüyle ciddi önem arzetmektedir. Lauziere literatürü ikincil kaynaklara bağımlılığı yönüyle eleştirmektedir. 19. Yüzyıl sonundaki modernist reformcuları Selefi olarak adlandırmamayı teklif etmektedir. En sonunda, Selefilik kavramını yapısökümüne uğratarak birincil kaynaklar üzerinden yeniden inşa etmeyi teklif etmektedir.

Literatürün bir diğer kısmı ise çağdaş dönemde yaşamış Selefi liderlere odaklanmaktadır. Öne çıkan Selefi figürler şöyle sıralanabilir; Nasirüddin el Albani(apolitik), Numan el Alusi(apolitik), el Hilali, Ebu'l Huda al Sayyadi(apolitik), Ebu Muhammed el-Makdisi(apolitik militan), Üsame bin Ladin(militan), Eymen el-Zevahiri(militan), ve Ebu Musab el-Zerkavi(militan). Literatürde; Ladin ve Zerkavi örgüt yönetme yönleri ile, diğerleri ise düşünce liderliği yönüyle öne çıkmaktadır.

Selefiliğin alt gruplarını tanımlamak literatürün önemli bir köşetaşını oluşturmaktadır. Diğer durumda şiddete eğilimli olanlar ile politikadan kaçanlar aynı kavramla ile adlandırmak zorunda kalınacaktır. Wiktorowickz, 'Selefi Hareketin Anatomisini çıkarmak' adlı makalesinde bu konuya açıklık getirerek Selefiliği; politik, apolitik ve cihadçı olarak üç gruba ayırmıştır. Shiraz Maher'in 'Cihadçı Selefilik-Bir düşüncenin tarihi' adlı çalışması bu bağlamda Wiktorowickz'in katergorizasyonuna bir açılımda bulunmaktadır. Hegghammer'in editörlüğünü yaptığı 'Cihadçı Kültür' başlıklı çalışma olguya daha içerden bakma imkanı sağlar. Bu çalışma daha gündelik yaşamı açığa çıkarma eğilimini taşıması yönüyle literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlar.

Ülkelerin yerel Selefilik tecrübeleri de literatürde sıkça yer bulan konulardan birisidir. Buradaki tek istisna Latin Amerika ülkeleridir. Latin Amerikalıların Selefilik düşüncesine ilgisizliği, ya da Selefilerin Latin Amerika'ya ilgisizliği ayrı bir çalışma konusu olabilir. Kuzey Amerika literatürü daha çok güvenlik perspektifi ile şekillense de, Suudi Arabistan etkisindeki apolitik Amerika Selefiliğinin yerel dinamiklerle şekillendiği son yıllarda dillendirilmektedir. Avrupada Fransa apolitik Selefilerin müslümanların azınlıkta olduğu bir ülkede varlık mücadelesi incelemesi açısından öne çıkmaktadır. Bunun dışında, İsveç ve Norveç oluşan literatür de dikkati çekmektedir. Afrika Selefilik akımının etkisini yoğunlu olarka gösterdiği bir alan görülmektedir. En çok çıkan Tunus örneği ise, Arab Baharı sonrası demokratikleşme süreci bağlamında çalışılmaktadır. Ortadoğu'da Lübnan çalışmaların en yoğunlaştığı ülkedir. Bölünmüş yapısı içerisindeki farklı alt grup Selefilerin varlığını devam ettirmesi ilgi çekicidir.

Avrasya bağlamında Endonezya, Suudi etkisindeki Selefiliğin geliştiği ve ülkede yozlamış sosyal İslam anlayışına karşı yükselen bir hareket olarak görülmektedir. Bunun dışında, Uygur İslam'ının Selefilik düşüncesinin antitezi olduğunu iddia eden makale oldukça ilgi çekicidir. Hindistan Selefiliğini inceleyen makale yerel anlamda kapsayıcı ve farklılıkları ile beraber yaşama pratiği geliştirebilmiş bir örnekten bahsetmektedir. Türkiye Selefiliği'ne gelince konuyu ele sadece bir

makale görünmektedir. Her ne kadar militant Selefiliği ele alan çalışmalar olsa da bütüncül bakış açısına sahip çalışmaların eksikliği göze çarpmaktadır.

Radikalleşme, aşırıcılık ve terörizm kavramları literatürde birbirinin yerine kullanabilmektedir. Selefilik ile ilişkileri 11 Eylül terör saldırısından sonra daha çok gelişmiştir. Selefilik düşüncesinin militan yönüyle daha çok ilgilenmektedir. Literatürde, ekonomi, sosyoloji ve psikoloji gibi temel disiplinlerin nedensellik bulmaya çalıştığı bu olgu üzerinde henüz görüş birliğine varılamamıştır. Radikalleşmeye giden yolda ise yukarıdan aşağıya, aşağıdan yukarıya, doğrusal ve doğrusal olmayan modeler öne çıkmaktadır. İnternetin yaygınlaşması ile birlikte, İnternet ve radikalleşme ilişkisi çoklukla çalışılan bir konu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Burada her ne kadar nedensel bir ilişki kurulamasada İnternetin kolaylaştırıcı rolü üzerinde bir ittifak vardır. Yeni terörizm teorilerinin üzerinde durduğu lidersiz, postmodern ve merkezi olmayan yapılar düşünüldüğünde İnternetin önemi ortaya çıkacaktır.

Politik İslam ve İslamcılık literatürü de Selefilik literatürünün arkadaşlarından birisidir. 2000 yılları öncesinde ayrım çok net olmasa da, daha sonra bu ayrım daha net yapılmaya başlamıştır. Politik İslam, modern ve politik bir ajandası olan hareket olarak nitelendirilirken, Selefilik öze geri dönüşü salıklayan bir saflaştırma düşüncesi olarak yansıtılmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, Fundamentalism ile Selefilik arasındaki farkları üzerinde durulsa da bu konuda literatürde görüş birliği görülmemektedir.

Üçüncü bölümde, Küresel Selefilik literatürünün bir alt başlığı olarak düşünülebilecek Türkiye Selefiliği detaylı bie şekilde incelenmiştir. Bu bölüm, önce Türkçe literatürde Selefilik üzerine yazılmış eserlerin eleştirel incelemesini sunmakatadır. Daha sonra, militan Selefi hareketin Türkiye'ye giriş yaptığı 2000 yıllarından önce Türkiye'de varlık gösteren radikal silahlı İslamcı örgtüleri incelenerek aralarındaki geçişlilik sorgulanmıştır. Bu tarihi girişten sonra, literature orjinal bir katkı ve bir girişim olarak Türkiye Selefiliği dönemselleştirilmeye

çalışılmıştır. Yine bir ön girişim olarak, Türkiye'deki dinleyicileri üzerinde etkili olan vaizler kendi sözleri üzerinden karşılaştırmalı analiz edilmiştir. En son kısımda ise, Türkiye'de Selefiliğin yükselişi üzerine uzmanlar tarafından dile getirilen argümanlar tartışılmış ve bir bakış açısı sunulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Selefilik üzerine Türkçe literature bakıldığında alanın ilahiyatçılar ve gazeteciler tarafından domine edildiği görülmektedir. İlahiyatçı grup daha çok tarihi süreç, kavramsal tartışmalar ve diğer mezheplerle ilişkiler üzerinde dursa da çalışmların çoğu güncelden uzak ve Türkiye örneğine temas etmeyen çalışmalardır. Gazeteciler ise daha çok criminal vakalar üzerinden mahkeme kayıtlarına dayanarak daha çok İŞİD ve el Kaide örneklerini gün yüzüne çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Burada, Yalçınkaya ve ark. tarafınadan Twitter üzeriden İŞİD destekçilerine odaklanan çalışma farklılığı ile göze çarpmaktadır. Çalışma hem metodolojik olarak hem de içerik olarak zengin bir araştırma örneği ortaya koymaktadır. Konstantiye dergisinin analizini yapan Korkmaz ise alandaki önemli bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır.

Radikal İslamcılar çoklukla çalışılmış konulardan birisidir. Fakat, Radikal İslamcılar ile Selefiler arasındaki geçişlilik üzerine çalışmalar ise sınırlıdır. Eldeki verilere ve iddialara dayanarak IBDA-C ve Tahşiyeciler gibi silahlı mücadeleyi savunan hareketlerin 2000 yıllarından sonra militan Selefilere alt yapı hazırlıdağını söyleyebiliriz. Kaplancılar ve Hizbullah için bunu söylemek için elimizde yeterli veri yoktur. Bu konu irdelenerek detaylandırılabilecek ilginç bir çalışma konusu olabilir.

Türkiye Selelfiliği üzerine çalışmaların sınırlılığı ifade edilmişti. Tarihi gelişimi üzerinden bir dönemselleştirme ihtiyacı göze çarpmaktadır. Bu boşluğu doldurmak adına, bu tez Türkiye Selefiliğini dört döneme ayırmaktadır; 1990'lar- Apolitik ve Oluşum Dönemi, 2000'ler Radikalleşme ve Kurumsallaşma Dönemi, 2010'lar Ulusaşırılaşma ve Merkezileşme Dönemi, 2010 sonları ise Yerelleşme ve Hayatta Kalma Dönemi. Bu dönemselleştirme lider figürlerin ülkeye girişi, yerel dinamikler ve bölgesel dinamikler üzerinden gerekçelendirilmiştir. Son döneme geçişi

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göstermek için tezde kullanılan twitter verisinden faydalanılmıştır. Suudi destekli olarak 1990'lı yıllarda ülkede varlık göstermeye başlayan apolitik Selefilik anlayışı, 2000'li yıllarda militan el kaide ağlarının gelişiyle birlikte radikalleşme sürecini yaşadı. Bu dönem aynı zamanda dini özgürlüklerin artması nedeniyle kurumsallaşma dönemi olarak da adlandırılabilir. İŞİD'in yükselişi ülkeyi ulusaşırı ağların etkisinde bıraksa da, etkin polisiye tedbirlerle son yıllarda dağılma ve yerelleşme süreci öne çıkmaktadır.

Selefi vaizlerin ideolojiyi benimsedeki kolaylaştırıcı etkisi çoklukla ifade edilen hususlardan birisidir. Bu amaçla Türkiye'deki Selefi vaizleri ve önemli figürleri kendi sözleri üzerinden karşılaştırılmalı olarak ele alınmıştır. Burada militan ve apolitik figürler arasındaki farklılık açıkça göze çarpmaktadır. Bazıları oy vermeyi şirk koşmakla eş tutarken, diğer bazıları İslamcı hükümeti desteklemeyi vacip olarak görmektedir. Bu figürleri, ılımlılar ve radikaller olarak iki gruba ayırma her ne kadar indirgemeci olsa da olguyu anlamada kolaylaştırıcı olacaktır.

Türkiye Selefiliği bağlamında, son olarak, yükseliş trendinin arkasında yatan sebepler ilahiyatçılar ve gazeteciler arasında çoklukla tartışılan konulardandır. Öne çıkan argümanlar arasında; yerleşik İslami grupların ve politik İslamcı hükümetin yozlaşmış yapıları,ve bölgedeki çatışma bölgelerinden ulusaşırı yayılan Selefi etkisi öne çıkmaktadır. Ülkedeki dini eğitimin felsefe ve mantık gibi aklı öne çıkaran yaklaşımlardan uzaklaştırılması da Selefilik düşüncesinin yayılmasını kolaylaştıran bir sebep olarak görülmektedir.

Dördüncü bölümde ise, elde edilen verilerin tartışmalı analizi sunulmuştur. Bulunan bulgular aşağıdaki gibi sıralanabilir:

- Apolitik Selefilerden militanlara, Twitter'daki Türk Selefi alt gruplarının gündemlerinde farklılık görülmüştür. Apolitikler kendileri ile tutarlı olarak siyasetle ilgili olarak neredeyse hiç referansta bulunmamıştır.

- Militan Selefi alt grubu da kendi içinde bölünmüş ve gündemleri farklılaşmış bir yapı arzetmektedir. Bazı militan Selefiler'in Türkiye'nin bağlamına dair hiç referansı bulunmazken, bazıları daha çok Türkiye üzerine yazmaktadır. Siyaset bağlamında, çoğunlukla Ortadoğu ve ilgili ülkeler olan, Suriye, Rusya, ABD ve İran ilgili referanslar öne çıkmaktadır. Suriye'de devam eden çatışmalar daha çok militan Selefiler arasındaki yaygın bir temadır. Hanzala topluluğunda ise, diğer branşlardan farklı olarak, çoğunlukla lider merkezli bir söylem öne çıkmaktadır.

- Alt gruplardaki farklı gündemler dikkate alınırsa, Türkiye Selefilerinin Twitterdaki ekosistemin merkezi olmayan bir yapı arzettiği söylenebilir.

- 2017'den sonra tweet sıklığında belirgin bir yükseliş görğlmektedir. Bu, son on yılda sosyal medya kullanımının yüksek olması dikkate alındığında şaşırtıcı bir sonuçtur. Bu durumun ortaya çıkmasında öne çıkan senaryo; sahadaki yürütülen başarılı polisiye operasyonlar nedeniyle militant ve illegal görüntü arzeden hesapların yerini yepyeni daha legal görünen hesapların almasıdır. Bu tezin üzerinde çalıştığı veri daha çok, kendi adlandırmasıyla, dağılma ve hayatta kalma dönemini yansıtmaktadır.

- Tweet'lerde en çok atıfta bulunulan web sitelerine göre, Türkiye Selefilerinin Twitter'da bir yankı odası oluşturduğu söylenebilir. Fiziksel dünyada ana akım anlayışlarla etkileşime girmekten kaçınırken, çevrimiçi ortamlarda da kendi dünyalarını kurma çabaları dikkati çekmektedir. Bu durum, literatürde radikalleşme sürecine giden ön adımlar olarak görülmektedir.

- Sosyal medya platformlarına referansları incelendiğinde Instagram ve YouTube il sıralarda görünmektedir. Bu platformlar, Twitter'dan farklı olarak, daha çok görsel propaganda materyallerinin yaymak için kullanılmaktadır. Görsel material üzerine çalışmaların eksikliği gelecek çalışmaları bu konuya davet etmektedir.

- Twitterdaki ağ analizi militant Selefi hesapların ağı domine ettiğini göstermektedir. Apolitik militant olarak adalandırılabilecek Hanzala topluluğu, baskınlık açısından ikinci sırada gelmektedir.

- Örneklemin yarısı, verilerin toplanmasından bir sene sonra devre dışı kalmıştır. Ağdaki bu derecce bir bozulma; Türk makamları ve Twitter tarafından şiddet içerikli aşırılık yanlılarına karşı yürütülen operasyonların başarısı olarak görülebilir. Öte yandan, mevcut kullanıcıların yeni bir marka ile dönüşüm geçirmesi diğer bir senaryo olabilir.

- Ağda sadece toplam 11 kullanıcı 100 dereceyi geçmektedir, bir başka deyişle, hesapların yüzde 5'inin topluluğun yarısı ile bağlantısı vardır.

- Kullanıcılar arasındaki en kısa mesafeyi gösteren ağdaki ortalama yol uzunluğu, 2.4'tür.

- Ağdaki boşluk hakkında bilgi veren yoğunluk, 0.108'dir.

- Toplulukta bağlanma derecesi yüksektir. Yalnızca bir kullanıcı ağa zayıf bağlılığa sahiptir. Buna karşın, on üç kullanıcı ağla güçlü bir bağa sahiptir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Selefiliği gelişim sürecini devam ettirmektedir. Sahadaki gelişmelerle çevrimiçi platformlardaki aktiviteleri korelasyon göstermektedir. Son yıllarda başarı ile yürütülen polisiye operasyonlarla merkezileşme eğilimlerinin dağıldığı gözlemlenmektedir. Buna ragmen, şiddet içeren söyleme sahip olmayan apolitik ve politik Selefilerin faaliyetlerinde herhangi bir aksama görülmemektedir. Bundan sonraki evrimlerinin anlaşılabilmesi adına, çevrimiçi ortamlardaki faaliyetleri gözlemlenmeye devam edilmelidir. Bu çalışma literatürdeki bir boşluğu doldurarak, gelecek çalışmalar için bazı tavsiyelerde bulunmaktadır. Aşağıdaki sıralanan sorular, gelecek çalışmalar için fikir verebilir:

- Türkiye Selefilerinin Twitter kullanımı açısından cinsiyet farklılığı var mıdır? Bu farklılığın kullanıcı profili üzerinden ve kullanılan dil üzerinden analiz edilmesi son yıllarda gelişen cinsiyet farklılığına dayalı çalışmalara katkıda bulunacaktır. Bu nokta, sosyal medya çalışmalarındaki metodolojik zaafiyetler(dezenformasyon ve örneklem tespiti) dikkate alınmalıdır.

- Tweet içeriklerinde en çok referans verilen sosyal medya platformları İnstagram ve YouTube gibi görsel içeriği ön plana çıkaran araçlar olmuştur. Bu bulgu, metin ve ağ analizine ek olarak görsel materyaller üzerine çalışmanın önemi hakkında bize bilgi vermektedir. Görsel materyallerde ön plana çıkan unsurların bazıları fikir vermesi açısından şöyle sıralanabilir; neşid adı verilen müzikler, vaaz ve endoktrinasyon videoları, lider figürlerinin propagandası, geçmiştekilerin yadedilmesi(öldürülenler veya ölenler), cihad sahalarından görseller.

- Türkiye Selefilerinin sosyal medya kullanımı 2010-2017 yılları arasında en yüksek oranları bulurken, 2017'de ciddi bir kırılma görülmektedir. Bu durum sahadaki kayıpların bir sonucu olabilir. Bu çalışmanın verisi, 2017-2019 yılları arasında yeniden ve farklı bir hareketlenme olduğunu göstermektedir. Bundan sonraki gidişatın nasıl olacağının gözlemlenmesi tamamlayacı bir araştırma konusudur.

- Bazı araştırmacılar Türkiye'deki apolitik Selefileri Tunus Selefileri ile benzeştirmektedir. Türkiye Selefiliğinin karşılaştırmalı analizi konuyu daha derinlikli anlamak adına literature büyük katkı sağlayacaktır.

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