REFUGEE INTEGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CASE OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MURAT KENANOĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OCTOBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Yaşar Kondakçı
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat Tanrısever
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez (Bilkent Uni., PSPA) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak Kale Lack (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Murat Kenanoğlu

Signature :

ABSTRACT

REFUGEE INTEGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:

THE CASE OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY

Kenanoğlu, Murat
MSc, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Zerrin Torun
October 2019, 187 pages

This research aimed at contributing to the policy design for refugee integration in Turkey by presenting the potential contributions of the prioritization of labor market policies and entrepreneurship. Following the Syrian refugee inflow, Turkey was slow in constructing a framework to provide non-European asylum-seekers with a legal status allowing them access to education and health services, but even slower in access to the labor market. Moreover, Syrian refugees were met with policies that seek the provision of basic needs, with little regard for livelihoods support that would comprise the foundation of an official integration scheme. As a result, Syrian refugees' integration to various dimensions of Turkey, its institutions and society have been uneven at best. Hence, Turkey must establish a system aimed at facilitating access to jobs and most importantly to entrepreneurial initiatives for refugees. The study views that providing refugees pathways to self-sufficiency comprises a vital step to expediting their integration. In this regard, literature review is carried-out on the concept of integration and its evolution, followed by an analysis of integration policies in Sweden so as to provide comparisons with the integration policies designed and implemented in Turkey regarding Syrians under Temporary Protection, with a specific focus on labor market policies. Lastly, the study will present the results of surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep to observe whether the conclusion arrived in country comparisons hold true in field research. Correspondingly, this study

aims at contributing to the policy design for refugee integration through entrepreneurship in Turkey.

Keywords: Integration, Refugee, Labor Market, Entrepreneurship, Syrians

ÖZ

MÜLTECİ ENTEGRASYONU VE GİRİŞİMCİLİK: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ SURİYELİLER ÖRNEĞİ

Kenanoğlu, Murat
Yükseklisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Departmanı
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Zerrin Torun
Ekim 2019, 187 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki mülteci entegrasyonuna yönelik politika tasarımında, istihdam piyasası politikaları ile girişimciliğin önceliklendirilmesinin olası katkılarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamıştır. Suriyeli mülteci girişinin ardından Türkiye, Avrupalı olmayan sığınmacıların eğitim ile sağlık hizmetlerine ve işgücü piyasasına erişimlerini sağlayacak yasal statü ve çerçevesini tasarlamakta yavaş kaldı. Dahası, Suriyeli mülteciler, Türkiye'nin resmi mülteci entegrasyon planının temelini oluşturacak politikaların tasarlanmasından ziyade, temel ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasını öngören politikalarla karşılandı. Bunun sonucu olarak, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'ye, kurumlarına ve toplumuna entegrasyonu düzensiz gerçekleşmiştir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin mültecilerde istihdamı ve daha da önemlisi girişimciliği artırmaya yönelik bir entegrasyon sistemi kurması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Çalışma, mültecilerin öz yeterlilik kazanmalarına izin verilmesinin, entegrasyonlarını hızlandırmak için hayati bir adım olduğu düşüncesini korumaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada entegrasyon kavramı ve evrimi üzerine bir literatür taraması yapılmış, ardından Türkiye'de Suriyeliler ile ilgili olarak tasarlanan ve uygulanan entegrasyon politikaları ile bir karşılaştırma yapılabilmesi için İsveç'teki entegrasyon politikalarının karşılaştırmalı analizi yapılmıştır. Bu ülke karşılaştırmalarında işgücü piyasası politikalarına öncelik verilmiştir. Son olarak, bu çalışma, ülkedeki karşılaştırmalarda varılan sonuçların saha araştırmasında geçerli olup olmadığını

gözlemlemek için Gaziantep'teki Suriyeli girişimcilerle yapılan anketlerin sonuçlarını sunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Entegrasyon, Mülteci, İstihdam Piyasası, Girişimcilik, Suriyeliler

To my family and friends.

,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the support and help of my thesis advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun, without whom the thesis could not have been completed.

I also would like to thank the members of the examining committee, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak Kale and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez for their valuable comments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
SuTPs	Syrians under Temporary Protection
PES	Swedish Public Employment Service
EU	European Union
TAC	Temporary Accommodation Center
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
İŞKUR	Turkish Employment Agency
DGMM	Directorate General for Migration Management
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
FRiT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
MoFLSS	Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
TEC	Temporary Education Center
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
MEED	Migration and Emergency Education Department
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
VET	Vocational Education and Training

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

December of 2018 witnessed the endorsement of the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement that pertains to the multiple dimensions of international migration by the United Nations (UN). Outcome of almost a two-year long pursuit, The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (hereinafter The Global Compact on Migration) constituted a step at promoting a shared approach to managing international migration (UN, 2018). In detail, The Global Compact on Migration aimed at contributing to the mitigation of adverse situations that give way to migrant influxes at the countries of origin and the reduction of perils and vulnerabilities migrants face when taking part in migration (Ibid). However, it promised to be much more than an initiative aimed solely at the regulation of acts of migration between international borders. This is, in part, due to the fact that this Compact also addresses the concerns that destination countries have with regards to the underlying demographic, economic and social changes that migration give way (Ibid). As a result, it exerts to make sure that migrants can contribute, through the best of their human, economic and social capabilities, to the environments they are in, namely destination countries (Ibid).

Same month in 2018 also witnessed the endorsement of the Global Compact on Refugees (hereinafter The Refugee Compact), merely two-days before The Global Compact on Migration. The latter, similar to its forebear, promoted the need for cooperation in dealing with issues to acts of international border crossings, but this time allocated specific attention to refugees. By advocating burden-sharing, improved access to third country solutions, and support to countries of origin in order to yield safe return, the Refugee Compact constitutes the latest push for the design of a holistic

and comprehensive approach to tackling refugee influxes and the events give way to them (UNHCR, 2018). Similarly, the Compact on Refugees, as codified by the UN, also prioritizes, as an objective, the enhancement of refugee self-reliance, whether it be at the destination countries or the countries of origin (Ibid). As a consequence, one can see that both these Compacts are not merely concerned with the area between international borders, but also with the openness and conduciveness of national environments to the different set of cultures and capabilities newcomers bring with them. Unsurprisingly, this stance is an outcome of previous bad experiences, therefore is of the indication that poor policies for newcomer incorporation at the country of arrival, only add to the possibility of their disunion at these host states and increase the chances of them taking part in international migration once more.

In relation, in a January 2018 article aimed at promoting the endorsement of these two Compacts, Antonio Guterres, the Secretary-General of the UN, poses a question, "As a global community, we face a choice. Do we want migration to be a source of prosperity and international solidarity, or a byword for inhumanity and social friction?" (Guterres, 2018). This question by the Secretary-General offers an insight to the ways in which states, as the main actors of the international arena, approach international acts of voluntary and forced migration. At a time where the rhetoric pertaining to immigrants and refugees portrays them as a threat, hence contributes to their "dehumanization" (Hynie, 2018, p.268), Guterres' words can be deemed too sympathetic. Yet, the Secretary-General, in the same article, goes on to reproach of the fact that the deaths of thousands of people who were seeking better lives does not only constitute a tragedy but also a failure of outmoded policy approaches to migration and newcomer incorporation at host states. He asserts these deaths "…also represents the most acute policy failure: unregulated, mass movements in desperate circumstances fuel a sense that… governments not in control." (Guterres, 2018).

Referring back to the question posed by Guterres, one can comfortably assert that he has already made his choice. Asserting that new policies pertaining to the management of migration must recognize the benefits of migration, specifically to the economy, but also to host societies, Guterres indorses the integration of newcomers to new

societies in a manner that respects the diverse set of cultures and skill-sets they bring with them.

To elaborate, the number of international migrants worldwide reached two hundred fifty-eight million in 2017, an increase of approximately eighty-five million since the turn of the millennia (UNHCR, 2019; UN, 2017). Moreover, with sixty million, approximately one-fourth of all the international migrants were comprised of refugees and asylum seekers in 2018 (IOM, 2018). In turn, these substantial increases in migratory movements, whether voluntary or forced, intensified the "…multi-directional flows of people, ideas and cultural symbols" between states and deemed their national borders transitive (Castles, 2002, p.1143). Therefore, a state's recognition or repudiation of the existence of diverse set of cultures at its borders as well as within, while being self-induced, is also a deciding factor in the framing of rights and opportunities of the newcomer. In relation, this approach by the state determines the set of rules posed on newcomers, and these set of rules are of the concern of this research as they frame what could be constituted as an integration process.

To expand, dominant views of migration literature hold that an incorporation process commences with the provision of rights at entry and ends with the gaining of citizenship (Ager and Strang, 2004; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006; ECRE, 2002). Yet, the process of incorporation for newcomers do not progress in a linear manner as the previous sentence might suggest (Ager and Strang, 2004; Kuhlman, 1991). It is the inclination of this study that only through interaction between the newcomers and the host, that a process in which newcomers become a part, and does not have to be an indistinguishable part, of the host society. An outcome in which the newcomers gradually but surely become societally and economically self-sufficient, and the state benefits from the added-value created by diversity.

This is especially important with regards to refugees, as a state's approach to their expectedly temporary stay is more decisive for their future. With refugee situations lasting, on average, for twenty years (European Commission, 2019), the provision of rights and opportunities that enable their success in the countries of destination are not only relevant to the continuation of refugee's life but also act as a decisive factor

in keeping cohesion at these destination countries. Even more, these policies, since refugees at one time or another, are expected to repatriate, also assist with the re-construction of refugee's home country. This is where the main subject of this study becomes bluntly apparent. In more detail, as Castles makes clear, "No one foresaw the increased migration… would end up in the creation of multicultural societies." (Castles, 2002, p.1145). The fact that no state was able to anticipate this transformation, does not mean they should not celebrate it, especially in instances of refugee influxes, which by its nature, happens unexpectedly. Yet, at a time when general migration theories and assimilation theories birthed out of the notion that the international arena is regulated by nation-states fall short of being able to explicate the increasingly more complex migratory movements, the above mentioned Compacts prove to be a step in the right direction. In other words, these Compacts not only seek to promote a cooperation culture in the international arena, but also a culture of integration, and of respect towards diversity within country borders.

Deriving from the notion that diversity is a reality, the concept of integration as it has come to be known started to gain popularity in the 1970s. Its popularity, by luck or design, coincided with the rise of multiculturalism. Both these concepts to this are being viewed as a threat to the existence of nation-state and the process of nation-building (Ibid, p.1156). The rules of the game, in the process of integration, is still being defined by the host society, yet a reciprocal relationship is evident where the criteria framing this process is ever-changing and ever-transforming. As all concepts, integration is widely debated, with no one definition that is regarded to be reflective of what it constitutes (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Kuhlman, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Ager and Strang, 2004). Even in the lack of an unanimously agreed definition, however, there is widespread agreement as to what this concept entails when implemented as a process. Regarded as a two-way process (ECRE, 2002; Hague Programme, 2004; European Commission, 2004), integration implies reciprocity in exchange of ideas between the newcomers and the host, where both undergo some level of change. Similarly, it foregoes the old-fashioned notions that a state is mono-cultural, and that conformity is the only way to have a national identity. Hence, diversity is not only accepted but celebrated. Moreover, the process of integration is viewed to be taking place at multiple dimensions, each of which pertain to a different

domain of life such as the cultural, socio-economic or the legal, hence poses hardships as to the process' oversight, monitoring and measurement (Castles et al., 2000, 2002; Ager and Strang, 2004, 2008; Kuhlman, 1991; Goodman, 2015; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2015; Niessen and Schibel 2007; OECD and EU, 2015).The multidimensionality of the process of integration requires a holistic approach that attends to all dimensions as successful integration in one dimension, generally, does not mean success in another. Similarly, the two-way nature and the multidimensionality of integration, as the process holds, can only take place if the newcomer has equal access to opportunities provided by the institutions of the host state, and via the feeling of belonging by the newcomer to his or her new environment (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Hynie, Korn, and Tao, 2016; Phillimore and Goodson, 2008).

Going back to the concept and not the process, in the lack of a definition, it is operationalized in the way the country in question wants to (Penninx, 2005; Castles et al., 2002; Favell, 2001; Freeman, 1995; Guiraudon, 1998; Hammar, 1985; Soysal, 1994). In other words, countries of arrival, in their pursuit to integrate refugees, have the chance to respond to the needs of both its own society and the newcomer. Take the labor market, for example. While viewed to be an integral part of the process that aims to result in refugee's self-sufficiency and settlement, the labor-market plays a cross-cutting role (Bloch, 2000). Allowing the refugee to make use of his or her skills therefore become beneficial to the host and oneself, policies aimed at immediate labor market integration of refugees aid in native language learning, increasing interaction with the host and enhancing refugee's willingness to integrate (Ager and Strang, 2004). Similarly, even access to it, is viewed as being a prerequisite to kick-starting integration (Bloch, 2000). Hence, this study holds that best integration policy is one that matches the policies of the receiving country with that of the aspirations and feelings of the refugees (Bloch, 2000, p.75) but also their skills-set. Yet, in the lack of a widespread definition, the evolution of the concept of integration will be investigated through a literature review in the research.

Signatory to both Global Compacts specified above, the process of devising a national integration policy is nowhere more explicit, at the moment, than in Turkey. Opening its borders to the influx of Syrian refugees, Turkey is currently hosting more than three million five hundred thousand Syrians, more than any country in the world (DGMM,

n.d.) Staggeringly, however, Turkey, at the time the influx commenced, lacked a legal framework framing the rights and opportunities that is to be granted to persons seeking protection which were coming from non-European countries (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; İçduygu, 2016; Kale et al., 2018). That meant that Turkey developed an integration policy while simultaneously welcoming refugees. As a result, Syrians in Turkey are currently considered as being under Temporary Protection. The implications of this legal status on the integration of Syrians in Turkey are many and will be tackled in this research accordingly. It is important to note, however, that designing an integration policy is no small feat on its own and doing so while sharp increases in the number of concerned persons are taking place is even more commendable.

On the other end of the spectrum is Sweden, which has been in the process of designing and revamping, where it deems necessary, its national integration strategy since the early 1970s (Borevi, 2010). Positioning not only newcomers' access to labor market but their formal employment at the center of its integration policy, Sweden has often been revered as Europe's leading country example which celebrates diversity and upholds the concept of integration in its processes of refugee incorporation (Borevi, 2012; Castles et al., 2014). Therefore, since Turkey has just recently started to design a comprehensive national integration policy, who other than a country like Sweden, which has been in this pursuit of designing an integration policy for the last half-century, to provide a guiding light. In this regard, one of the aims of the research is to analyze how the current integration policies of Turkey for refugees fare in the light of the Swedish example, with a specific focus on labor market policies.

To support the findings arrived through the country examples, the research will also provide the results of the surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in one of Turkey's provinces where most Syrians live, Gaziantep. It is of importance to mention surveys were conducted with the assumption that entrepreneurial initiatives by Syrians in Turkey provide a gap-filling role in areas where policy is missing or have been belatedly designed.

In sum, the main aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the integration policies of Turkey, or lack thereof, with regards to Syrians in Turkey. The specific target of

the thesis is the analysis of labor market integration policies. In this pursuit, the research aims to provide an answer to the question; How does the current labour market integration of Syrians fare in the light of the Swedish example? Does the data from entrepreneurship behavior survey in Gaziantep provide any solutions for economic integration? In relation, this research holds the hypothesis that even though Turkey's receptiveness of the Syrian influx is commendable, the policy responses aimed at their integration have been designed belatedly and therefore led to integration outcomes that are uneven at best. Specifically regarding the labor market, the role of entrepreneurship in Syrians in Turkey in overcoming policy-gaps and unforeseen obstacles posed by underlying laws and regulations offers to be viable option to increasing the chances of formal labor market integration by Syrians in Turkey.

This research also has limitations. Primary limitation is the language barrier. This limitation is two-fold. The first is with regards to sources on Sweden as the laws, regulations and policy-papers utilized in this study have been taken from secondary sources or are translated by readily-available instant translation services on the internet. Second limitation pertaining to the language barrier is with regards to the conduction of surveys with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep. The services of a translator were utilized to prepare a survey with the questions and corresponding quantitative answers in both Turkish and Arabic. However, even then, the conduction of surveys with Syrian entrepreneurs posed hardships, as the surveyor did not know Arabic. This limitation was overcome with the training and employment of a Syrian surveyor. Second limitation pertains to the lack of available data with regards to Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey. In this instance, this gap has been filled via the results of surveys.

The thesis consists of a total of 5 Chapters, with Introduction (Chapter 1) and Conclusion (Chapter 5) comprising two Chapters. Following Chapter 1, the thesis will primarily provide a review of the literature on the concept of integration and its evolution in Chapter 2. As a continuation of the literature review, Chapter 3 will look at country examples of Sweden and Turkey, so as to provide two distinct cases in which integration as a concept has been operationalized to become a process. This operationalization will focus on the role of integration policy and its underlying processes in the face of situations which were deemed temporary, such is the case

regarding Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) in Turkey. Chapter 3 will also allocate specific attention to the role of the labor market and its cross-cutting role as a prerequisite for integration. In doing so, the thesis aims at pinpointing the shortcomings of the process of integration defined by Turkey's foremost pursuits to devising a comprehensive integration policy. Lastly, in Chapter 4, the results of surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in the province of Gaziantep will be provided as a basis for analysis of the ways in which deficiencies in Turkey's integration policies, especially with regards to the labor market integration of SuTPs, can be overcome via entrepreneurship. By doing so, this research aims at analyzing how the current integration policies, and specifically labor market integration policies, fare in light of the Swedish example. Furthermore, through the surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs, the success or failure of the operationalization of integration policies will be investigated.

The research is undertaken using the mixed methodology for the study and includes mostly qualitative information. Primarily, it includes case-study method where the country examples of Sweden and Turkey have been analyzed with regards to the evolution of integration policies and their current integration policies. To do so, resources from academia, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations and newspapers have been utilized.

Secondly, the survey method has been utilized. The surveys have been prepared to be conducted in the province of Gaziantep. The objective was to conduct a firm-level survey with the goal of better understanding the business environment in which Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep are operating their enterprises. Similarly, other goals include the identification of the reasons for refugee entry into the labor market as entrepreneurs rather than wage-employees, the employment they provide and the obstacles they face. In summary, surveys were conducted to offer an insight to the dealings of entrepreneur Syrians in the business environment in Gaziantep.

The survey comprises of four (4) sections, namely; A – General Information (4.2.1), B – Establishing a Business (4.2.2), C – Labor Force (4.2.3), and D – Doing Business (4.2.4). The survey is semi-structured, with forty (40) questions gathered under these four (4) headings which include eight (8) open-ended questions and eight (8)

conditional questions. The questions cover a set of topics such as finance and banking, taxes, rules and regulations, informality in the business environment as well as respondents' perceptions on obstacles to accessing certain services.

The conducted survey is not representative of all the Syrian population in Gaziantep, as twenty-two (22) surveys were conducted. The surveys were conducted in a period of two (2) months between 25 May and 25 July 2019. On average, it took between 30 and 45 minutes to conduct a single survey. This average time includes the explanation of the survey and the reasons for conducting it as well as answering any questions survey participants might have.

Similarly, since the findings are not representative, and obtained from a small sample size, margin of error is broad.

The selection of Gaziantep as the pilot province is due to four (4) main reasons.

Primarily, Gaziantep is currently hosting the second-most SuTPs in Turkey with roughly four hundred forty-five thousand registered Syrians, trailing only İstanbul (DGMM, n.d.). It is important to mention, however, that Gaziantep, due to its proximity to Syria started welcoming Syrians long before Istanbul ever did.

Secondly, the number of SuTPs equals to approximately twenty-two percent of the total population of Gaziantep which stands at roughly two-million people. This positions Gaziantep right after Kilis where the rate stands at around eighty-one percent, and Hatay with roughly twenty-seven percent (DGMM, n.d.)

Thirdly, Gaziantep is home to the second most companies established by SuTPs, trailing only Istanbul as specified by the Minister of Trade of Turkey (CNNTURK, 2019, Retrieved June 15, 2019).

Fourthly, Gaziantep is the first and only metropolitan municipality in Turkey to have a 'Syrian Desk' in its Chamber of Commerce which offers events on Turkish language training, technical knowledge, marketing, finance, trade and provides support with regards to necessary rules, regulations and laws in Turkey. Became operational in 2016, this is especially important as these Chambers comprise the point-of-registration for entrepreneurs, whether Turkish or foreigner, so as to operate a formal

company. Hence, Gaziantep's pioneering role in facilitating labor market entry for SuTPs allow it to be at the forefront of this endeavor.

All in all, positioned within the top three cities in Turkey with regards to the number of SuTPs, the ratio of SuTPs to the native population and the number of established companies by SuTPs, Gaziantep comes to the fore as one of the few provinces in which entrepreneurship in SuTPs could be best studied. Together with this, Gaziantep is an exemplary province where the private sector induced non-governmental organization (NGO) Chamber of Commerce have come together to improve labor market integration and entrepreneurial initiatives by the SuTPs. Through the Syrian Desk, Gaziantep forms the basis for a reciprocal exchange of ideas, therefore attest importance to the two-way approach that the concept of integration cannot be successful without.

It is important to note, when thought together with Istanbul which has the largest number of Syrians and Syrian enterprises, the number of refugee enterprises seem to have a positive correlation with the refugee population in a given city. Hence, as the Syrian population increase so does the number of refugee enterprises. This, in turn, shows that barriers to formal labor market entry are felt all provinces in a similar manner.

Limitations were faced while conducting these surveys. In this regard, conducting surveys with Syrian entrepreneurs proved to be difficult for four (4) main reasons.

Primary difficulty was the outdated information on refugee enterprises' address and contact number. The pursuit to make an appointment with the Syrian owner of an enterprise was unreciprocated because the available contact information was outdated. This led the surveyor to conduct surveys by going door-to-door, asking permission and explaining the reasons for conducting these surveys.

Second main reason was the lack of trust by SuTPs. Even though most participants had been involved in a survey since coming to Gaziantep due this province being a place where numerous international organizations and governmental bodies actively carry-out similar surveys, Syrian business owners were reluctant. Correspondingly, the reasons for this reluctance was viewed to be the current backlash Syrians are facing

due to increasing unemployment rates among the native Turks, and the rhetoric that ‘Syrians are taking out jobs’ as well as ‘Syrians are getting paid by the government of Turkey’. As a result, the lack of trust combined with the primary reason outlined above, thirty-two (32) Syrian enterprises declined to answer the survey.

Third main reason comprised of language barrier. This led the surveyor to employ and train a Syrian to be used as an alternative surveyor.

Fourth main reason was the cultural differences, such as having earlier weekends on Fridays, which is not customary in Turkey but in Syria.

CHAPTER 2

MIGRATION, AND THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW

> unless the image of
> from the resemblance
> representations become
> confound each other,
> the measure which
>
> Surely there can be no solidarity between others and us others unites itself with ours. But when the union results of two images, it consists in an agglutination. The two solidary because, being indistinct, totally or in part, they and become no more than one, and they are solidary only in they confound themselves.
>
> (Durkheim, 1893, p.62)

One of the founders of modern sociology, Durkheim's study of social integration in terms of the 'others' conformity with the values and norms of 'us' or with what Durkheim called 'collective conscience' formed the basis for the study of the concept of integration in the post-World War II era (Durkheim, 1893). Specifically, Durkheim's prevailing interest was to study the mechanisms of society, and how it stands the test of time, intact and also ever-changing. In line with this, studying Durkheim's works, Turner asserts that Durkheim views integration as "…the problem of coordinating and maintaining viable interrelationships among system units" (Turner, 1978, p.51). In relation, starting from the late 19th century Durkheim, through his book "Division of Labor in Society", ascribed a great role to the labor market in creating a platform for cohesion where societies to continue their development (Durkheim, 1893 p.63). The strong position of labor market in eliminating differences have since been recognized and prioritized as it allows for an interplay between natives and refugees and immigrants, expedites the learning of the local language and encourages confidence through self-sufficiency (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). Furthermore, studies show that employed refugees are more likely to adjust to the host

society than those who are not (Bloch, 2000; Shields and Wheatley-Price, 2003). However, it is of vital importance, prior to analyzing temporary protection schemes and their effects on labor markets in the study of refugee integration in Chapter 3, to have an in-depth look at the development of the concept of integration that followed Durkheim. Primarily, this chapter will focus on the literature concerning the interrelation of the host society with distinct groups of newcomers, and the expected change by the 'other' to fit into the preexisting norms and values of a society ('us'). These relations will be tackled through the lens of voluntary and forced migration in thesis, with a specific focus on refugees. Most importantly, the relation between 'us' and 'them' will be examined by looking at the evolution of the concept of integration that has been moving away from the highly cherished notion of nation-states and their monotonic view of state and society (Favell 1998; 2001; 2003; Gibney, 2004).

In providing a context, this Chapter will look at the evolution of the concept of integration by primarily focusing on general theories of migration, then the concept's implications in multiculturalism, followed by a look at other concepts that precede integration such as acculturation and assimilation. Lastly, an analysis of the concept as it has presently come to be understood and practiced will be outlined by looking at the literature on integration.

2.1. The Path to Integration

From an academic point of view, following the works of Durkheim, the evolution of the concept of integration commenced when the Chicago school of urban sociology attempted to undertake migration and integration research in sociology in the 1930s. In this School's view, however, integration was used in an assimilatory manner where non-discriminatory institutions work in a system "…imposing unity through a process which passes from initial contact between minority and majority groups, through conflict and transformation, to the final goal of assimilation." (Favell, 1998, p.3). Similarly, integration or as it was viewed, the inclusion of immigrants into societies was modelled as a sequence or cycle, therefore interpreting it as simplistic as a linear process. For long, these models have been dominated by the monocultural sequence ending in the newcomers' assimilation, which could have been called 'successful integration', today (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.4). However, it is this

research's stance that the means or the policies that were forcibly implemented does not justify the ends. Successful integration can only take place if regarded as both a process and the ultimate goal. In other words, as it will be further reiterated, acculturation or assimilation policies and those of integration differ.

Building upon the works of Durkheim and the Chicago school, Talcott Parsons developed the ideas further to compose a theory of action which attested a great deal of importance to the concept of integration. Defining it as a "mode of relation of the units of a system", Parsons ascribed onto integration also an action that is collective (Parsons, 1949, p.71). Parsons further asserted that integration is aimed at the avoidance of disruption of the system in the face of change, but a process that is also cooperatively supporting the continuity of all units functioning in unity within the system (Ibid). Kuhlman interprets Parsons' approach as focusing on the continuation of a social system, whereas current approaches to integration target the incorporation of a newcomer, like a refugee or an economic migrant, to a social system or, in general, to the host (Kuhlman, 1991).

Since Durkheim, many social scientists attempted to understand and define the concept. Even more, the concept went beyond the confines of sociology in 1930s and became an integral part of the study of migration under political science and international relations. Yet, no one definition of integration is unanimously accepted by social scientists and policy makers alike (Threadgold and Court, 2005). Kuhlman underlines that "Definitions of integration are sketchy or altogether absent" (Kuhlman 1991, p.1). In seeking a definition, Robinson labels integration as a vague and chaotic concept that is generally used for the refugee context (Robinson, 1998) to which Alastair Ager and Alison Strang agree, upon analyzing more than forty different definitions (Ager and Strang, 2008). The lack of a widespread and unanimous definition for the concept is best explained by Stephen Castles who draws attention to various understandings and concludes that "Meanings vary from country to country, change over time, and depend on the interests, values and perspectives of the people concerned." (Castles et al. 2002, p.112). However this together with the lack of a conceptual definition, in turn, spearheaded the evolution of the approach to the process of integration. In other words, it raised questions on whether it is even possible to have a completed and successful integration process.

As a response to this well-founded problem, integration started to be approached as an overarching term which oversees the process that requires constant monitoring and measuring through the use of indicators because it has under its scope numerous dimensions. This inclination found ground in academia as it has been underlined that the country of arrival must be exhaustive in getting across to the newcomers what is expected of them and must monitor the process's progress. It is regarded by the academics that first and foremost, a definitive answer to the question; "Integration into what?" must be provided by the country of arrival (Castles et al., 2002; Threadgold and Court, 2005; Favell, 2003). Correspondingly, the process of integration must be exhaustively monitored and measured, and when deemed necessary, result in a refurbishment of policies and practices (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008).

As previously mentioned, integration is a vague concept and at the very least requires a chronological analysis of how it morphed into what presently have come to be understood. In this regard, first and foremost theories of modern migration (2.2) will be touched upon as these offer the insights into the why the immigrant or refugee left their country of origin and seek entry into the country of destination. These reasons hold a vital position in the process of integration.

2.2. General Theories of Migration

Looking back, refugees and immigrants and the study of the relation between the host society and the newcomer became central in the modern world especially in the aftermath of the World War II. Going as back as ten-thousand years, humanity's outwards movement from Africa is being regarded as the first act of migration (Castles et al., 2005). In comparison, the study of approaches to incorporating immigrants and refugees, however, is fairly new. As Threadgold and Court puts it "The concept of 'integration' itself is tied to the evolution of a political response to refugee settlement and international migration." (Threadgold and Court, 2005). To be frank, the concept of integration, and other concepts that surround it like acculturation or assimilation which will be discussed in-depth in the next part (2.3), are all tied to the outcomes of immigration and refugee movements and the consequent impact these had on the order of things in the country of arrival.

This is especially important to note as approaches of integration regard, among other things, the reasons for emigration, the specific situation that gave way to the act to be a vital part of a newcomer's receptiveness towards the integration process in the country of arrival. This is because the reason for the migration act, for the most part, defines the status granted to the newcomer upon arrival. Correspondingly, entry constitutes to first challenge for the newcomer (Gibney, 2004, p.112-113), when states assign statuses to people according their 'mode of entry' which in turn shape the rights and opportunities provided to the newcomer, these have a decisive impact on the patterns of integration (Castles et al., 2002, p.127-128). For example, while a labor migrant's emigration is fueled mostly by poor economic condition at the origin and directed by job opportunities in the country of arrival, a refugee takes part in international border crossings to escape persecution, and rarely ever presented with the opportunity to choose their destinations. This in turn allows, generally, labor migrants to be more knowledgeable about their destinations and therefore ideally more prone to and receptive of integratory processes. In summary, the reasons for emigration is integral in the framing of many different processes of integration that different groups of newcomers, whether labor migrants, family reunion migrants or refugees undergo.

2.2.1. Theories of Migration

First of these theories is push–pull theories or supply-demand theories which comprise the most traditional way to analyze migratory movements. These theories are especially applicable to the process of distinguishing between migration and refugee movements, or voluntary and forced migration since the push and pull reasons are completely different but very apparent for the latter (Lee, 1966). These are considered to be macro level theories and look at international migration from the point of view of mass movements. These theories hold that push factors are generally those that are negative influences for the migrants therefore encouraging these groups to leave a country of origin based on "…political instability, a low standard of living, civil war…" whilst pull factors are considered those that are positive influences, and those that draw a movement of immigration towards a certain country based on "…a high standard of living, democratic political institutions, excess demand for labour…" (Gibney, 2004, p.11). Moreover, Portes and Böröcz assert that push factors are

hardships in economic, social and political circles within poverty struck countries, while pull factors are relative advantages in the more advanced countries (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p.607). Aside from voluntary movements, these theories are applied in-depth to explain the refugee movements at their onset, since push factors imply persecution in country of origin, and pull factors imply open-door policies and a secure environment in destination (Gibney, 2004, p.11). This is the case for all refugee movements at the beginning of the flow, as was the case with the Syrian Crisis of 2011 where millions of Syrians found safe haven in the likes of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

On the other hand, examples in voluntary migration are movements from Mexico to United States of America (USA) and from previous colonies of North African countries to the likes of France and Belgium (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p.607). Yet, there are apparent shortcomings of these theories such as their inability to explain why these movements happen in certain parts of the world but not in others even though similar discrepancies between states exist (Gibney, 2004, p.12). Similarly, these theories fall short of explaining why these movements happen between certain countries in a droning manner, while does not with certain others and further disregard specific country selections of immigrants on an individual level (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p.607-608). According to Portes and Böröcz, these neglect differences in collectivities, meaning the size and directionality of migrant flows and also the differences between individuals who are from the same country but choose to immigrate to numerous other states (Ibid). They assert that push-pull theories neglect the role of the historical connection between sending and receiving countries and simplify the act of migration into "invidious comparisons of economic advantage" while they take place "…out of a history of prior contact between sending and receiving societies." (Ibid, p.608). These authors also add that migration should be "conceptualized as a process of progressive network building." (Ibid, p.614). Gibney adds that these theories fail to "…capture much of the complexities involved in why people move between particular countries, when and where they do." (Gibney, 2004, p.12).

Receptive to similar shortcomings is what Castles calls the historical-institutional approaches. Accordingly, these approaches look at the "…role of large-scale

institutions, particularly corporations and states, in initiating and shaping migratory flows." (Castles, 2002, p.1149). Castles provides the mass inward labor migration to Europe in the post-1945 as an example to this approach since states needed cheap labor and a fuel for economic growth (Castles and Miller, 1998). However, in time these mass movements gained a mind of their own and gradually became harder to stop (Pillai et al., 1999). This is evident as even after the labor migration needs of Europe ended and policies limiting immigration were applied as immigrants were entering Europe using family reunification, therefore transforming these migratory movements to a different dynamic. In most cases, this approach to migration, similar to push-pull theories, cannot account for the reasons why people in some countries or regions continue to migrate while in other parts with similar institutions underlining migratory movements do not take place (Massey et al., 1993; Reniers 1999, p.680).

Another approach to understanding migration are meso theories which formed as a response to the voids in macro theories. Meso theories approach migration through the distinct systems that form between states over a period of numerous migratory movements that end in network building (Boswell, 2002). Networks in this sense imply the potential or actual migrants as well as social or religious institutions, while the system consists of the past, present and future movements between the country of emigration and immigration (Faist, 2001, p.51). Parallel with Gibney's critique of macro theories, meso theories also utilizes a post-hoc approach so as construe why a migratory movement from a certain state to the another continues. In other words, meso theories show a propensity to explaining a second event through the first event that took place. Correspondingly, these theories view that migration is an outcome of complex connections between states (Bilsborrow and Zlotnik, 1995, p.5) and therefore try to comprehend the reasons for continuous migration flows from the lens of economic, political and cultural exchange at state levels (Boswell, 2002, p.3). A well-versed example for this could be the Cuban immigration into the United States of America since the beginning of 1960s and onwards.

Other approaches to international migration are sociological approaches. Essentially, these approaches focus on the creation of cultural and social capital by immigrants and the eventual creation of linkages or networks between countries (Castles, 2002, p.1150). Cultural capital, in this regard, means the information the immigrant has on

other societies, their comparative advantages and information on how to reach these destination countries (Ibid). This knowledge stems from past and continuous migratory movements to these countries of destination. On the other hand, social capital refers to the connections the migrant has in order to immigrate to these countries, safe and sound (Ibid). In the 21st century, these approaches also became transnational in their focus (Faist, 2000). Migration according to this approach follow the 'migration networks' that have evolved between the sending and receiving countries, and disregards other views that migration is a "…one-time, one-way process." (Amelina and Horvath, 2017, p.5). Especially related to the settlement of newcomers in nation-states, transnational approaches to migration in sociology regard transnational linkages, or migration networks, as possessing an important role in newcomers' incorporation to the host. These linkages are essentially networks that have formed over a time and deeply influence a newcomers' way of life (Castles, 2002, p.1151). Also, especially important is the fact that this transnational approach offers a critique of nationalism and other notions of the nation-state (Amelina and Horvath, 2017, p.5). In general, unlike the historical-institutional approach, family reunion policies of Western European countries following the halt of labor immigration in the 1970s are conveyed better through this lens. In other words, family reunion comprised the social capital, while the past experiences of immigration into these countries starting from the late 1940s constituted the cultural capital (Martin, 1991). The downfall of these approaches is their lack of focus on economic reasons for taking part in a migratory act (Ibid).

Moreover, micro theories on migration focus on reasons for migration on an individual level. These theories focus on "…analysing how potential migrants weigh up the various costs and benefits of migrating." (Boswell, 2002, p.4). According to Boswell, the costs include all the financial and psychological resources invested by the newcomer in taking part in migration and eventually integrating into the country of destination." (Ibid). They are especially important for understanding labor migration since the advantages and benefits are ever-more apparent. These theories, at the same time, allow for the verification of macro and meso theories at an individual level since macro theories tackle the reasons for mass migration (Ibid). As a result, micro theories do not provide a general theory of migration at the levels of mass movements.

Additionally, there is also the migration systems theory (Castles et al., 2005, p.539). This approach takes both macrostructures such as interstate, inter-institutional or at policy level relations, and microstructures such as informal migratory networks at its center, therefore takes in its scope all macro, meso and micro theories (Ibid). This theory, therefore, offers a "…trend towards a more inclusive and inter-disciplinary understanding…emerging as a 'new mainstream of migration theory." and studies prior links at all levels between the receiving and the sending country (Ibid). One of this view's major downfalls is when faced with lack of data on migratory movements which hinders any chance of painting a comprehensive picture of the situation at hand (Ibid). Moreover, for example, building upon push-pull theories, Lee, in his pursuit to developing a general migration theory suggests that migratory movements are determined by four groups of factors (Lee, 1966). These are origin related or push factors, destination related or pull factors, personal factors and lastly, intervening obstacles such as the cost and easiness of transportation (Lee, 1966, p.49-50). Moving from the deficiencies of classical theories, de Haas asserts that Lee's factors point to the "…individual characteristics of migrants" and therefore assert that these factors ascribe importance to the reality that what could be considered a good trait in country of origin might not be viewed as such in the country of arrival (de Haas, 2008, p.8). In relation, as previously mentioned, factors that define the migrants' or refugees' reasons for participating in an emigratory movement as well as the reasons for immigrating to a certain state play into the processes of integration and its eventual success.

All in all, understanding the reasons for migration and the diversity of peoples it brings is an integral part of having success in the process of incorporation of immigrants and refugees to the host society. These theories help uncover and scrutinize the reasons for a given migratory movement so as to make informed decisions and design specific policies that cater to the newcomers' needs. As it has been underlined, however, any approach to understanding migration requires an emphasis on group and individual level analysis as well as an investigation of the underlying history and culture. It is of importance to keep in mind that past migratory movements, whether voluntary or forced, have paved the way for the creation of these theory and approaches. In turn, these approaches ascribed a great deal of importance to the reasons for emigration by

viewing these as being integral to the statuses granted to newcomers upon entry, hence the first step of integration.

2.3. Evolution of Integration as a Response

There is not one definition of integration that is unanimously agreed upon. This, to a certain extent, relates back to the fact that the context to which integration is to take place in the country of arrival is specific to the dominant-ideology, and the related expectations of that specific state, its society, and institutions (Penninx, 2005; Castles et al., 2002; Favell, 2000; Freeman, 1995; Guiraudon, 1998; Hammar, 1985; Soysal, 1994). Hence, the question of 'integration into what?' (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Kuhlman, 1991; Castles et al., 2005). The answer given to this question by the host country, in turn, comprises the causes for the emergence of differing meanings of integration and its processes. In simpler terms, integration is both a process and the ultimate goal, which in turn, is defined by the context it engenders in. On that note, as important as the question of 'integration into what?' becomes the question of 'integration by whom?'. The 'whom' in this question is as much about the culture of the newcomers, as the legal status provided to such migrants upon arrival, whether they are labor migrants or refugees.

It can be asserted then, that integration is, in some part, related to destination country's approach to diversity but also dependent on conditions such as reasons for immigration and the status provided to the newcomer upon entry. Moreover, policies that tackle immigration adjudicate the status given and the rights extended to the immigrant or refugee upon entry. These policies and approaches also define the process of incorporation of newcomers into the host society and its institutions' role in the settlement process. Evident from the history of migration in Europe in the 20th century, policies that have shaped migrant and refugee acceptance, and their incorporation into the host society were drawn within the confines that held nation-state at its core. As a result, diversity stemming from refugees and immigrants have long been seen as a threat in countries where stronger nationalist identities prevailed (Hynie, 2018; Coenders and Scheepers, 2004; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017). Currently, however, the nationalist approach to immigration and refugees falls short of explaining the increasingly complex structure these movements have gained,

especially in the post-1991 era (Castles, 2000). Castles argues that nation-state approach which is based on tighter border controls, and acts on the basis of sovereignty is no longer able to keep up with the increasingly more diverse and multidimensional face of immigration that makes it hard to be explained by a single approach (Castles, 2002, p.1145; Castles et al., 2005). Quoting Manuel Castells, the world has changed from a " 'space of places' " to a " 'space of flows' " (Castells, 1996, p.378-398). The question remains whether policies of incorporation in European states have caught up with this transformation.

Accordingly, in line with increasingly more complex study of migration since the beginning of the 20th century as presented in the previous section, approaches by states to newcomers and the policies that were put forth went through a transformation as well. Surely, the transition from one to a two-way process is evident where the concept of integration that views this process as being reciprocal started to also be upheld by most European institutions and countries (ECRE, 2002; Hague Programme, 2004; Committee of the Regions, 2004). These concrete steps helped define modes of incorporation, as Portes puts it, that are formed by the "…policies of the host government; the values and prejudices of the receiving society; and the characteristics of the coethnic community." (Portes and Zhou, 1993, p.83). Putting policies and values aside, the increased importance given to the characteristics of co-ethnic community is crucial as it regards that there already exists a similar community to that of newcomers', in the country of arrival (Ibid). This is an indicator of migration being an old phenomenon, and that nation-states, whether they follow purely nationalistic policies or not, are themselves already diverse. Similarly, this is also related to the appearance of multiculturalism as a policy-choice of approaching the incorporation process. The relation between multiculturalism and integration will be delved into under the 'Integration as a response' sub-section below. On another note, incorporation as used above is viewed as the act of becoming a part of a polity and utilized by some "…as a fairly neutral term to refer to the overall process by which newcomers become part of a society." (Castles et al, 2002, p.117). Incorporation in this paper is utilized to encompass all three conditions as put by Portes and Zhou, and as a means for explaining the newcomers' settlement processes defined by the relation between us and them, whether it is a one-way or two-way process.

The following section, therefore, looks at the evolution of what came to be understood as the process of integration through first looking at other concepts that precede it like acculturation, and most importantly assimilation, followed by integration's compatibility with the normative theory that is multiculturalism. Secondly, building upon the former, this section will look at various definitions of the concept of integration and its multidimensionality through a review of the literature on the concept

2.3.1. Responses to Newcomers

Migration is part of human life whether it is fueled by voluntary reasons or by reasons of fear and survival. Viewed from the point of states, the response extended by host states to the newcomers is of vital importance for the continuity of the well-being of all entities. In the case of nation-states, their policies have mostly focused at the relation between the newcomer and what could be called as the dominant culture (Threadgold and Court, 2005, p.8; Kuhlman, 1991, p.4; Castles et al., 2002, p.117). Left to deal with the transformation into a heterogeneous society as a result of migration, most notable of nation-states' approaches to newcomers have been acculturation and assimilation. With regards, most of the responses to newcomers up until what has come to be studied as integration regard that foregoing cultural identity has to be an overarching necessity for incorporation.

2.3.1.1. Acculturation

Acculturation is the acquisition of core competencies of the dominant culture and society by the newcomers (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006). Castles, on the other hand, asserts that acculturation is "The process by which immigrant groups adjust to different cultures." (Castles et al., 2002, p.113). Parks and Burgess define acculturation "…as the process by which one group or people learns from another, whether the culture or civilization be gotten by imitation or by inculcation." (Parks and Burgess, 1921, p.135). As a result, it can be deducted that acculturation has generally been regarded as a one-sided process in which diversity was approached from a view that necessitated cultural conformity by the newcomer.

However, acculturation also has a place in the concept of integration. In other words, there is consensus among integration studies, that the process of integration requires a level of acculturation to be successful, but acculturation does not guarantee integration (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.10). As a result of this nestled relation between the concepts, for long, the process of integration was used to "…imply a one-way adaptation or acculturation to the dominant culture and way of life." (Threadgold and Court, 2005, p.8). This is where lies acculturation's downfall. In most cases, it is utilized to define an incorporation process as being predominantly one-sided and solely be factoring in the notion of cultural dominance (Gordon, 2010, p.61). Correspondingly, Esser puts acculturation, or as he puts it socialization, as one of the four prerequisites for social integration along with placement, interaction and identification (Esser, 2000). He defines acculturation as a process through which an individual or a group obtains necessary cultural information so as to interact with the dominant society (Ibid). He emphasizes that integration cannot take place unless all four forms are applicable (Esser, 2000; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.3). Hence, integration is granted more complexity than acculturation. Once more, acculturation is viewed as being a part of the integration process but not the totality of it.

From another approach, Kuhlman asserts that, the term integration was not used in the study of migration until the 1950s. Instead, he asserts that acculturation was utilized to imply a "…culture change resulting from continuous, first-hand contact between two distinct cultural groups." (Kuhlman, 1991, p.4) Kuhlman building on this definition and potential outcomes points-out that there are three orientations or approaches to the acculturation process; those who require all newcomers to adopt the dominant culture, those that advocate the "melting-pot" where a mixture of cultures gain prevalence and lastly, those that endorse "ethnic pluralism" where the state becomes a place where distinct cultures co-exist (Ibid). Therefore, implications that separate integration from acculturation becomes apparent, once more. Kuhlman's definition has its roots in Redfield, Linton and Herskovits's definition of the term in 1936 in which they assert that acculturation is the process of "…groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups." (Redfield et al.,

1936, p.150). These authors go in length to differentiate between acculturation and other terms such as culture-change, assimilation and diffusion. They underline culture-change as an aspect of acculturation, assimilation as being a phase of acculturation and diffusion as not being necessarily cultural in its unfolding (Ibid, p.150-151).

Correspondingly, the authors suggest that the process of acculturation could occur in three instances. The first is when a culture is forced on or received voluntarily by a group, the second is in instances where no social inequality exists between groups, and the third instance is when there is inequality between group whether it is political or social (Ibid). While the first two instances are self-explanatory, the third instance requires further broaching. The third instance, according to Redfield et al. results in three outcomes. The first is when this inequality leads to a political dominance of one group over the other, a second outcome is when it results in political and social dominance by one group, and the third outcomes is when the social superiority of one group is recognized without the occurrence of political dominance (Ibid, p.151). As an outcome of all these instances, authors go on to argue that this process results in three possible outcomes (Ibid, p.152). The first, they underline, is acceptance in which the newcomers take over a greater portion of the host's culture that result in the loss of past heritage (Ibid). This is regarded as the result of the first instance where culture is forced or accepted voluntarily. Second outcome is adaptation where the dominant and the new culture interact to produce a working cultural whole and where opposing views are blunted into becoming amicable (Ibid). This, in turn, is the result of second instance. Third outcome, as regarded by the authors, is reaction where hostility towards the new culture prevails as a result of assumed inferiority of the newcomer by the host and the prevailing populistic appeal of the rejection of diversity (Ibid). Lastly, this result is an outcome of the third instance as explained above.

On the other hand, JW Berry, also accepting Redfield's definition, views acculturation to not only be a group but also an individualistic phenomenon (Berry, 1988). Berry when touching upon the interaction between the dominant group and non-dominant group (newcomers) asserts that "…both groups experience changes, and both need to be understood." (Ibid, p.3). However, Berry goes on to explain the that these changes, similar to but unlike integration, occur mostly at the side of the non-dominant as an

outcome of the continuous influence exerted by the dominant culture (Berry, 1988). He asserts that these changes occur in six kinds and lists them as; physical such as changes in population densities and urbanization; biological such as new diseases; political such as loss of autonomy and control over non-dominant group; economic such as the creation of new forms of employment; cultural such as dominant groups' enforcement of its culture; and psychological changes that take place at a subjective level (Ibid, p.4-5). This might look like being similar to the integration process and its multidimensional structure of how the process takes place, but Berry looks at the impact of these changes solely on the cultural front. In this regard, he also argues that the term adaptation and adaptation process is utilized synonymously with acculturation and acculturation process therefore once more merely implying an interest in cultural dimension (Ibid, p.6). Yet, as it will be viewed later, integration is much more. In this pursuit, Berry also puts forth three strategies for the acculturation process, and states that these strategies also lead to different adaptation related outcomes. These are termed by Berry as adjustment, reaction and withdrawal (Ibid, p.7-8). Adjustment, according to Berry, is the most intended strategy and aims at decreasing chances of conflict among the parties by bringing the newcomer "…into harmony with the environment." (Ibid, p.7). Reaction, on the other hand, is materialized through environment modificatory policies which could lead to increased harmonization as well as hostility at one another. Lastly, withdrawal strategy according to Berry is when the pressures that stem from the environment is reduced and, implies a sense of a let-it-be approach.

In accordance with everything he lays out, Berry proposes an acculturation model where different strategies employed in the adaptation process lead to different outcomes. To compartmentalize, Berry asks two questions; "Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics?" and "Is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with other groups?" (Ibid, p.7). Simplistic in his approach, Berry alleges that if a 'no' answer is given to the first question and a 'yes' to the second then the assimilation outcome is defined where absorption of the non-dominant to the dominant takes place. If the answers follow a 'yes' and 'yes' suit, Berry emphasizes that the outcome would be integration which he defines as having cultural integrity but also becoming an integral part of the larger society. He further

adds that a ‘no’ and ‘no’ answers would lead to segregation or separation of the group of newcomers (Ibid, p.8). Lastly, specifically looking at refugees but also relevant for all newcomers, Berry emphasizes that the changes that the dominant groups undergo is essential to understanding the changes the non-dominant group experiences since the changes of the latter is influenced to a great deal by the former (Ibid, p.4). He further adds that those who willingly get involved in the acculturation process such as immigrants could face less hardships than those who have little to say in the subject such as refugees (Ibid, p.10). All in all, according to Berry integration is one of the outcomes of the acculturation process and one that he prefers over other outcomes, thereby implying that integration is not the process but the ultimate goal. However, Kuhlman disagrees with the linear implications that acculturation leads to integration as Berry uses it and asserts that “…a continuum from separation to assimilation is more representative of reality” and further critiques that the non-dominant culture can only be maintained as long as it does not go oppose the dominant culture (Kuhlman, 1991, p.7). Once again, in Berry’s model, integration is viewed as an outcome of acculturation on a purely cultural level.

All in all, acculturation, by most scholars is viewed as an outcome of policies of nation-state which view diversity as a problem. In this regard, acculturation is defined as the relation between the dominant and non-dominant cultures within the confines of a state (Parks and Burgess, 1921; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006; Redfield et al., 1936). Similarly, acculturation is viewed to take place at a linear line where the newcomer eventually becomes dominated by the host’s culture (Ibid). On the other hand, for Berry it comprises an important part of the integration process and regarded as the response utilized Canada’s multiculturalist policies (Berry, 1988; Kuhlman, 1991, p.6). In this regard, one major critique of acculturation stems from the problem that it seems to run on the presupposition that the receiving society is mono-cultural, or that a clearly dominant culture exists, and therefore is ambiguous as to which culture the newcomers are expected to acculture with (Castles et al., 2002, p.117). For example, a country like France, even though due to the history of migration in the European continent, is itself already diverse and heterogenous, seems to still be clinging to the notion of monotony and that a single, dominant culture exists.

2.3.1.2. Assimilation

Assimilation is a concept that experienced widespread use since the 1920s. Two of the most important figures in the study of assimilation in social sciences, Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, published in their book in 1921, a definition of assimilation as a "…process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." (Parks and Burgess, 1921, p.735). They also add that "…assimilation is considered as a process due to prolonged contact." (Ibid, p.741). Parks and Burgess view assimilation as the final product of a process of social interaction that stem from primary contact with close circles such as friends, family and agreeable groups (Ibid, p.736-737). Correspondingly, the connotations implying a cultural dominance in assimilation is underlined by Parks and Burgess while they make a distinction between assimilation and amalgamation. The authors state that "The process of assimilation is of a psychological rather than of a biological nature." and further add that amalgamation is "…the fusion of races by interbreeding and intermarriage. Assimilation, on the other hand, is limited to the fusion of culture." (Ibid, p.737-741). Like in acculturation, fusion implies the subsume of a much bigger part of the pie by the dominant culture or even its absorption of the weak culture. Moreover, these authors differentiate between acculturation and assimilation as they assert the view that acculturation is the transmitting of social heritage or "the transmission of cultural elements from one social group to another" (Ibid, p.72-p.737). Thereby, acculturation is the act of transmitting in a linear-path but not complete cultural domination, while assimilation is the dissolution of one culture into another, therefore implying that acculturation is a process in which assimilation is the end result (Ibid). Interestingly, when compared with the interpretations of acculturation in the previous section, Berry's approach to assimilation as one of the phases in the process of acculturation resonates with Parks and Burgess's approach to assimilation. In other words, the culture fusion which implies a willingness to let go of one's own culture but also an openness to the host's culture in Berry's model would be defined as assimilation by Parks and Burgess.

Similarly, there has been numerous other definitions of assimilation which view it as a part of acculturation but as an extreme outcome of it (Berry, 1951; Fichter, 1957;

Rose, 1956). In other words, the process of acculturation, as these scholars state, has the probability to lead to assimilation. In this regard, Fichter emphasizes that assimilation is not a one-sided process because it is defined by the interaction of parties involved and asserts that it is a process where one part could be influenced more by the other (Fichter, 1957, p.229). The probability of the outcomes of acculturation processes that stem from levels of influence in Fichter's approach is problematic as it offers little on how to limit or regulate this influence so that it does not lead to the loss of cultural identity by the newcomers.

On the other end of the spectrum, Gordon states that assimilation takes place through the "meeting of people" by which he means the encountering of different cultures at a given platform, whether it may be the state or a more localized platform (Gordon, 1964, p.60-61). Correspondingly, Gordon identifies two approaches to assimilation. On the one hand, an approach that holds assimilation as the adoption of cultural behaviors, while on the other one that holds assimilation as the incorporation into the social structure (Ibid). In doing so, Gordon differentiates between dimensions of assimilation as 'behavioral assimilation' and 'structural assimilation' and further adds 'identificational assimilation' (Ibid, p.67). He defines structural assimilation as the newcomers' entry into relationships with the primary groups of the host, cultural assimilation as acculturation, and identificational assimilation as the taking on the peoplehood of the host society (Ibid, p.70). Among these, Gordon asserts that cultural assimilation is "…likely to be the first of the types of assimilation to occur…" (Ibid, p.77), and concludes that cultural assimilation should be adopted as an adjustive measure for immigrant incorporation. He further adds that structural assimilation is not desirable as it is a way of forced adjustment and may lead to exclusion (Ibid, p.77). Interestingly, unlike the likes of Brewton, Fichter and Rose, Gordon asserts that there are different levels of assimilation of which only one takes place through acculturation and implying that cultures exists on more than one level.

Moreover, Henry P. Fairchild asserts that assimilation, or synonymously used by him, social assimilation, is the;

groups representing afforded when…by cultures are admitted assimilation is the

> …process by which different cultures, or individuals or different cultures, are merged into a homogeneous unit… the process of immigration, representatives of external within the territory of another country. In essence, substitution of one nationality pattern for another.
>
> (Fairchild, 1944, p.276-277)

Consequently, he also implies a complete foregoing of the "characteristics of foreign origin" for the newer one (Fairchild, 1944, p.276-277). He adds that the foregoing must take place on the side of the "…weaker or numerically inferior group." (Ibid, p.277; Gordon, 1964, p.65). A critique can be targeted towards the presupposition by Fairchild that the receiving state is home to a homogeneous society with a monoculture, an idolized approach left from the notions of nation-states.

Penninx and Garces-Mascarenas assert that classical assimilation theories were the forerunners of integration studies and imply that these holds somewhat a rudimentary understanding of the real world (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016). They state that these theories "…defined settlement and incorporation as a more or less linear process in which immigrants were supposed to change almost completely to merge with the mainstream culture and society." (Ibid, p.3; Warner and Srole, 1945). Criticisms of these theories by the authors are threefold (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016). First critique stems from the concept's ambiguity with regards to what is meant by mainstream as it implies all states to be homogeneous. Secondly, they assert that the evident structural inequalities such as discrimination in the housing or labor market is disregarded by assimilation. And lastly, they point to the plurality of integration processes and that these processes require collective actors such as the state, civil society, public opinion and ethnic communities as well as contextual factors such as the economic situation at any given state (Ibid).

Viewing it as a mode of incorporation Castles argue that assimilation "…means encouraging immigrants to learn the national language and to fully adopt the social and cultural practices of the receiving community" (Castles, 2002, p.1155). Castles also emphasizes that assimilation seeks the eventual transfer of allegiance to the new

country and adoption of new national identity (Ibid). He further asserts, similar to Penninx, that assimilation as a concept implies making immigrants and refugees a part of the society through "…a one way, one-sided process of adaptation." (Castles et al., 2005, p.116). Accordingly, it is expected of the newcomer to forego their characteristics of linguistic, cultural or social nature and replace it with the ones of the dominant society, eventually becoming indistinguishable. Correspondingly, Castles underlines problems with this approach and asserts it devaluates other cultures and languages, presupposes that everyone receives equal treatment by the host and that it holds a disregard for the importance of family and community (Castles et al., 2005, p.116-117).

Threadgold and Court assert that assimilation with regards to migration is about eliminating differences as much as possible through dispersal policies, use of nation-state language, attendance at normal state schools by immigrant or refugee children (Threadgold and Court, 2005, p.7). They emphasize that assimilation denies a chance to multiculturalism and is individualistic in its approach (Ibid). Similar to Castles, they add that the process of assimilation and its enforcement does not consider the already existing racism and xenophobia in the host community.

Similar to Castles and Penninx, Bosswick and Heckmann also assert that assimilation is understood as being "…a one-sided process" which neglects the values and customs newcomers bring with them and expects newcomers to give up their cultural identity and give in to the values of the host (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.4-7). Providing historical context, authors emphasize that the term assimilation cannot be understood without drawing parallels with the rise of nationalism in Europe in the 20th century. Correspondingly, they emphasize that the term assimilation has been affiliated with "…ethnocentrism, cultural suppression and often with the use of violence to force minorities to conform." (Ibid, p.4). However, they add, that it could also mean "…the lessening of social difference between groups." (Ibid, p.6). Yet, they side with the use of the word 'integration' as this word implies, according to them, a scientific purpose and a chance to communicate better to policy makers and the public the process of incorporation without all the historical connotations that follow the concept of assimilation (Ibid).

Criticisms of assimilation are similar in nature to that of acculturation. This is not because these terms imply the same processes and end results but because they both view the process of incorporation as taking place on the cultural platform and see diversity as a threat to nationhood. Firstly, assimilation disregards the existing discrimination both at the civil society and legal levels. Secondly, assimilation is unclear with regards to which culture the newcomer is expected to integrate into. In other words, while a long-term incorporation process under assimilation might require the foregoing of cultural identity by the newcomer, it is ambiguous as to what this would mean. For the process of assimilation, the newcomer could be expected to change religions, or just learn the host's language and customs, yet how can the state, and a democratic state at that, measure this process's realization in a newcomer's family and private life?

For example, assimilationists policies and their shortcomings are evident in France's Republican Model by way of its reservations to the Article 27 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Article asserts "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right… to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language." (The United Nations General Assembly, 1966, Article 27). By not being party to this article, France, in parallel with its Constitution, is denying the presence of minorities and diversity within its borders. In turn, this allows the French Constitution to deny the existence of discrimination against minorities, refugees and migrants (Cholewinski, 2005, p.700). This is the approach of France's Republican Model which is defined by the way it views its citizenry as being indifferently the same (Castles et al., 2005, p.539). France, which looks at the process of incorporation from solely a cultural level is faced with problems with the socio-economic, and especially labor market, incorporation levels of newcomers. For example, the degree of Turkish immigrants' membership to trade unions in France was around 15 per cent in the early 2000s, whereas it was more than 90 percent in Sweden at the same period (Penninx, 2005). Penninx views this as a consequence of France not designing incorporation policies aimed at the socio-economic integration of newcomers at a national level and its denial of existing

discrimination (Ibid, p.142-143). Following the example of France and its Republican Model's relation with assimilation, the next section looks at a different approach.

2.3.1.3. Multiculturalism

Starting point for multiculturalism is the "…recognition that the ethno-cultural neutrality of liberal democracies is a fiction." (Clyne and Jupp, 2011, p.75). Specifically, and primarily, this is what differentiates multiculturalism from the likes of assimilation or its materialization in France's Republican Model. Similarly, multiculturalism by way of policies recognizing secular or religious organizations and advocating a path to naturalization for refugees and immigrants, aims to construct a newcomer's sense of belonging or identification to the country of arrival, a crucial aspect of any integration process (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.15). In this regard, multiculturalism, it seems, meshes well with the concept of integration, as it derives from the notion that diversity is an asset. In turn, this comprises a prerequisite for a successful process of integration to be realized, in the first place.

Castles argues that rarely any state foresaw that increased migration to developed countries of Europe since the end of the Second World War would end up in multicultural societies (Castles, 2002, p.1145). Previously nation-state centered views upholding the notions mono-cultural and mono-religious homogeneity went under a social and cultural transformation (Ibid). The regulation of ethnic difference through border controls as well as the subjection of minorities to processes of cultural homogenization which were identified as the course of action for nation-states, especially in Western Europe, have become contested through multiculturalism, starting from the 1970s (Ibid, p.1154). Correspondingly, a process of incorporation like assimilation which upheld the notion that immigration should not bring about change in the fabric of the receiving society came to be regarded as not reflective of reality (Ibid, p.1155). Expedited through labor migration in the 1970s, newcomers from non-Western countries initiated a transformation that deemed receiving countries increasingly more heterogeneous. In this regard, 1970s saw the introduction of official multiculturalist policies in some of these countries, starting with Canada in 1971, Australia in 1973 and Sweden in 1975 (Ibid, p.1156). Viewed "…as a threat to processes of nation-building.", Castles argues that "…multiculturalism should be seen

primarily as a Western society phenomenon." (Ibid, p.1156). He further asserts that multiculturalism rivals the highly cherished notion of cultural monotony in nation-states by encouraging the maintaining of cultural diversity and community formation and associating these with increased equality and anti-discriminatory measures (Ibid). In turn, he asserts that multicultural model of integration provides newcomers with the opportunity to keep their cultural identities while also integrating to a structural dimension like the labor market (Castles et al., 2005, p.539). It is important to note that Castles also views the preconditions of multiculturalism to be in alignment with those of the concept integration as he promotes, that it should be measured and designed in a way that it impacts all segments of society.

In line with this, Penninx asserts that multiculturalism is "…a set of normative notions" regarding the way in which a pluralistic society could be formed politically (Penninx, 2005, p.140). He further emphasizes that the premise of multiculturalism with regards to integration is one that asserts "…immigrants cannot become equal citizens unless the state and society accept that both individuals and groups have the right to be culturally different." (Ibid, p.140). In this regard, Penninx outlines that policies of multiculturalism, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s Europe, have viewed that "…the prevailing institutions and rules in society are historical and cultural products that are not neutral for newcomers and thus may need revision in order to accommodate newcomers." (Ibid, p.140). In this instance, it is clear that Penninx views multiculturalism to go hand-in-hand with the concept of integration, and its operationalization via policy and practice.

From a different standpoint, Bosswick and Heckmann emphasize that terms like integration, assimilation and acculturation are all tied to the notions of multiculturalism (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.6). The authors, further, assert that multiculturalism was popularized in Europe because it offered a new approach to the increasingly multi-ethnic societies that stem from newcomers, and add that multiculturalism is the "rejection of assimilation" (Ibid, p.7). Emphasizing that this change in the social fabric of a society, Bosswick and Heckmann underline that the adoption of multiculturalism requires the state to be recognizant of the "…political, cultural and social consequences." these changes bring about (Ibid, p.7). Interestingly, the authors further assert that multiculturalism views culture not to be static and pure,

but a result of numerous cultures coming together. In this regard, under multiculturalism "…the cultures of immigrants are seen as enriching the cultures of the host societies." (Ibid). Moreover, multicultural model is also seen as promoting tolerance and cultural diversity as the goal of policy, therefore granting preexisting ethnic groups with cultural and political autonomy (Ibid, p.7-8). On the other end of the spectrum, authors criticize multiculturalism as being inconsistent in its practice due to its confusing "…heterogeneous meanings and policies" and add that it sides with the group rather than the individual (Ibid, p.8).

Following these, it is important to show how these stances are operationalized. Castles argues that multiculturalist policies for integration are those that provide refugees and immigrants with cultural and political rights (Castles et al., 2013, p.19). He further states that this stance is engendered in two policy orientations. The first is state support to ethnic institutions and educational centers, while the second is the provision of exemptions from the requirements by law and regulations for members for religious as well as cultural minorities (Ibid). Similarly, the two orientations can also be labelled as positive and negative rights. The former is defined by the provision of state supports, mostly in the shape of funding, to minorities, immigrants or refugees as well as their institutions. And the latter is defined by the granting of exemptions in the law such as allowing leave in religious holidays or for halal and kosher food preparations (Solano, 2018, p.3). These policy inclinations and the rights extended accordingly in a multicultural model takes place in the local level as well. For example, at the municipal level this could mean increased support for newcomer's activities and the organization of art and cultural events so as promote diversity and increase the number of platforms for newcomer and host interaction (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.8).

It is also important to mention that the developments in the 1990s that gave way to increases in involuntary migration, as well as migration from non-European countries, multiculturalism has taken a backseat (Castles et al., 2005, p.539). This, according to Andersson, was a result of policies of multiculturalism being too focused on system integration through the granting of rights deemed necessary to newcomers in order to ensure equality of living standards and opportunity while accessing the likes of labor market, rather than social integration (Andersson, 2007). Hence, an increase in the visibility of differences between us and them, eventually leading to segregation and

discrimination. As it will comprise one of the focuses of Chapter 3, this is also the case in Sweden, a formally multiculturalist country, where segregation and discrimination are viewed as the two main problems hindering integration, especially in the labor market and housing (Borevi, 2013).

Moreover, the operationalized versions of multiculturalism have been critiqued as becoming too newcomer oriented therefore excluding the role of the greater society in the decision making process (Solano, 2018, p.10-11). This, interestingly, could turn an integration process into a one-sided process. Furthermore multiculturalism has been criticized to hinder the whole society's integration because it ignores the preconditions of having a "…common culture, language and identification" for the stability and continuity of a state and its society (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.8). It is also criticized because it encourages the "pre-modern customs and values" such as religious dresses, arranged marriages and polygamy (Ibid). Scholars have also pointed that policies of multiculturalism aid in increasing the visibility of differences between the natives and newcomers, intensifying "…ethnic stratification and ethnocultural conflict." (Ibid, p.5).

All in all, multiculturalism's approach to diversity is one that views it to be an asset and one that aligns with the concept of integration. When thought of in the same sentence as democracy, multiculturalism seems to offer a solution to the problem that is the 'tyranny of majority' by positioning newcomers, whether refugee or immigrant or minority, at the center of the discussion on rights and recognition. This is also one of the undertones of integration, that the process should revolve around an exchange of experiences and needs between the newcomer and the host. It is, however, of this research's view, and one that goes in parallel with the literature on integration, that policy level actions do not always yield expected results therefore require constant monitoring and evaluation of its underlying processes. It is only when the normative goals of multiculturalism are supported with a data-driven and an exhaustive integration framework that a process of integration can find success. In other words, multiculturalism, while attending to the cultural domain which comprises one of the dimensions of the concept of integration as it will be portrayed in the next section, does not, by itself, arrive at the successful bearing of an integration process.

Integration, both as the concept and the process, takes into consideration multiple domains, in addition to that of cultural.

2.3.2. Integration as the Response

Integration is about a process of incorporation. This reality is nowhere more apparent than in the study of the processes of integration in academia concerning immigrants and refugees. To elaborate, it is regarded that the "…conceptual and methodological issues are very similar" for both these groups and the integration process' dynamics, the institutions and groups involved as well as the social sectors concerned "…are more or less the same." (Castles et al., 2002, p.119). However, Castles, Korac, Vasta and Vertovec underline two main factors that differentiate the process of integration immigrants and refugees undergo. First factor is the fact that immigrants have the chance to plan, prepare and make use of their resources when taking part in the act of migration, whereas refugees cannot and are comparatively more prone to suffer from trauma and dislocation (Ibid). Second factor, the authors assert, is that the legal and institutional regime to which these two groups adhere to are considerably different (Ibid). While the first factor is universally accepted, the second factor's role is evident in academia. In this regard, corresponding to the second factor, numerous approaches to integration take into consideration differences in conditions such as reasons for exit from the country of origin, categories of entrant or the presence of a co-ethnic community in the country of arrival, and assert that these are important to consider when devising an integration process (Castles et al., 2002, p.128; Portes and Zhou, 1993, p.83). However, inclusion of these considerations, do not rummage the integration process as a whole but add additional dimensions to it. Going back, this ascribes integration the need for idiosyncratic processes that go in line with the specific characteristics of the groups of newcomers as well as the changes these different newcomers are expected to undergo (Castles et al., 2002, p.112). In relation, the distinction between an integration process for the immigrant and the refugee will be made when deemed necessary.

In integration literature, the ultimate and also the mutual goal as decided through a shared decision-making process with inputs from both the newcomer and host must exhaustively be propagated to the both sides (Threadgold and Court, 2005, p.5;

Castles et al., 2002, p.114; Portes and Zhou, 1993, p.82). In this regard, research has shown that the concept of integration must be tackled as "…an umbrella term suggesting a set of possible and overlapping processes and spheres." (Favell, 1998, p.201). This has led to many different approaches to and understandings of what integration is, what an integration process constitutes, what the overarching policies should be and how the process, if can be, evaluated, measured and improved.

It has been clearly underlined in the previous section that integration as it came to be understood presently is the end result of a variety of factors. Primarily, integration as a response is an outcome of the evolution of European countries' responses to diversity (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998; Vasta, 2009). Also, it is important to emphasize that the development of the concept of integration is parallel with the ongoing struggle between notions of nation-states and egalitarian liberal democracies in European countries as well as the notion of multiculturalism (Favell, 2013, p.55; Castles et al., 2002, p.114).

Furthermore, integration has evolved in academia to encompass a data-driven monitoring of certain indicators, therefore guiding it out from being merely a conceptual issue to a process that is policy-driven and engendered in monitorable and measurable practice level initiatives (Kuhlman, 1991; Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006; Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016). This, in general, is an outcome of the fact that integration is a complex issue that takes place in many dimensions. Equally as important, is the reality that policy, when put into practice, do not always yield the expected results, therefore requires constant monitoring because, in the end, what is expected of the integration process is positive outcomes at the practice level.

Keeping all these in mind, integration as a response, in this section, will primarily be tackled through the review of literature on integration in academia as it has given birth to analytical approaches that aim at bridging the gap between theory and practice, followed by a review of integration's relationship with multiculturalism.

In light of these, even though there is no single definition of integration that is widely accepted due to it being social process-based, the pursuit to define integration by

scholars and institutions have not slowed down (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Kuhlman 1991, p.1; Robinson, 1998). As it has been mentioned, in addition to the role of the preceding historical context and current realities within the state, definition of integration is dependent on where the newcomer is expected to integrate into, whether it may be labor market or to civic life (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Castles, 2002; Portes and Zhou, 1993). The process of integration has been regarded to require a move away from generalizations that acculturation and assimilation makes on the dominant culture, therefore has started to be defined through multiple dimensions that are independently important but striving for the same goal (Castles et al., 2005). This is to say that integration takes place at the individual, societal and institutional levels. In turn, scholars define successful integration in terms of newcomers having equal access to opportunities and resources provided by the state and its institutions, their participation in the sub-community and the host, and feelings of security and belonging in their new places of settlement (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Hynie, Korn, and Tao, 2016; Phillimore and Goodson, 2008). The concept requires further review of the literature to lay-out the variety of definitions and processes it takes for successful integration to be achieved, as regarded by scholars.

Favell takes as his basis John Rawls' philosophy of public discourse which sees integration as being about an ideal situation of discourse where all members, disregarding all their differences, agree on the public institutions of a given society (Favell, 1998). From Favell's stance, integration is regarded to be achievable in liberal democratic societies, hence the appearance of the concept as it came to be understood in the 1970s and onwards. On this note, he asserts that the rise of integration as the response was a result of the pursuit of these liberal democracies in "…finding constructive political solutions to the problems immigration raises" (Ibid, p.22). He adds that theoretical questions on integration is mostly about identifying "…the 'glue' of a particularly society - in each case here, a nation across its wider cultural, regional and class divisions." (Ibid, p.3), which he views as the main problem of integration. In simpler terms, Favell sees differences whether ethnic-based, idea-based or culture-based as a fact of life and that integration is about finding common ground through which people can be viewed as a unity even though inherently heterogenous. In this regard, Favell defines integration and the process it upholds as "…a search for the

'overlapping moral consensus' that citizens with conflicting cultural and ethical beliefs could agree to as the principles for regulating their social and political interaction." (Ibid, p.17). Interestingly, looking at numerous examples from academia and state policy constructions, Favell further asserts that integration policies in Europe are still framed using "…nation-state-centered and nation-society-centered reasoning." (Favell, 2001, p.350). In other words, Favell agrees that integration policies are designed in a state and context-specific manner. Furthermore, he argues that integration has come to be known as the totality of "…disparate range of state policies, laws, local initiatives, and societal dispositions – which could be implemented by many agencies at many levels – comes to be thought of as a single nation-state's overall strategy or policy of *integration*." (Ibid, p.351). This reality, in turn, is also the reason why a single, unanimously accepted definition for integration is hard to reach. In this ambiguity, Favell also asks the hard-hitting question; "Who or what is integrating whom and with what?" (Ibid). Underlining the state and the society as the two main actors, Favell argues that integration by policy actors in Europe is continually regarded to be the incorporation of the newcomer to a single, inseparable state and the unitary national society (Ibid).

William Bernard defines integration as both a process and the end goal (Bernard, 1973). In relation, Bernard underlines that integration is "…achieved when migrants become a working part of their adopted society, take on many of its attitudes and behavior patterns, and participate freely in its activities, but at the same time retain a measure of their original cultural identity and ethnicity." (Bernard, 1973, p.87). Bernard argues that the social adjustment a newcomer undergoes is identified as having two forms that are defined through the degree of expected social adjustment (Ibid). In other words, integration, as can be understood from his definition, allows the retainment of certain cultural and ethnic aspects of the newcomers by the newcomers. Therefore, according to Bernard, integration differs from assimilation in degree of adjustment. In other words, integration takes place when the newcomer also imposes change on the dominant culture to make it become more accepting of numerous social realities that they bring with them.

Similarly, Mekuria Bulcha agrees with Bernard's definition of integration. Underlining that the process of integration requires a two-way street approach, Bulcha

also puts importance upon the presence of the host society in the process and asserts that "…the parties involved must recognize and accommodate differences in culture, beliefs, and so on for integration to function." (Bulcha, 1988, p.85-86). Implementing this idea to African-context, Bulcha asserts that integration "…implies a mutual 'live and let live' attitude based on tolerance of differences, solidarity and positive interaction." (Ibid, p.86). The author adds that the relation is not perfectly balanced between the newcomer and the host and, is open to conflict-inducing realities such as discrimination (Ibid). Bulcha views integration as the middle ground between marginalization and assimilation. He further underlines reasons for integration to not take place and for the process to lead to marginalization. This, Bulcha asserts, could be the result of two reasons. Either the social system is lacking in capacity to welcome newcomers, eventually rejecting or segregating them, or the newcomers might be lacking motivation and willingness to participate in the process (Ibid, p.87). He, correspondingly, defines marginalization as the result of withdrawal by the newcomer or a community from various professions or from certain residential areas and as the result of a relationship of inferiority and superiority between concerned groups. Bulcha views marginalization as the "antithesis of integration" and provides the example of the current situation of economic migrants in the societies of modern West Europe as an example (Ibid, p.86). A more specific example would be Turks in Germany, who entered the country as part of labor migration policies in the 1970s and are considered to be marginalized by the dominant German society and feeling the effects of separation due to differing cultural and religious lifestyles (Mueller, 2006).

Harrell-Bond, while also referring to a lack of satisfactory definition for integration, provides a simple definition and argues it to be "…a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources – both economical and social – with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community." (Harrell-Bond, 1986, p.7). Accepting of this definition's simplicity, Harrell-Bond asserts that this definition would not hold in the face of data-driven analysis. The author, referring to the mutual conflict, states that the arrival of newcomers, if not approached correctly, could induce conflict on top of the pre-existing conflicts as well. Furthermore, touching upon the sharing of resources, the author also suggests that co-existence does not necessarily mean equal access to

resources and therefore may lead to exploitation of the newcomers by the dominant group (Ibid). Extensive research on the matter asserts that this happens to be the case for most newcomers, but especially refugees, as these groups are more prone to having higher unemployment rates and are generally more underemployed than the overall population (UNHCR, 2013a). Interestingly, Harrell-Bond justifies this simple definition by asserting that the lack of an agreement on the definition of integration has led to its association with the likes of assimilation and brought about resistance to the process by both sides (Harrell-Bond, 1986). Hence, a simple definition is better than no definition (Ibid).

Tom Kuhlman comments on Harrell-Bond's definition of integration and asserts that at the very least Harrell-Bond's definition looks at integration as something that happens to both the newcomers and the host society (Kuhlman, 1990). For Kuhlman, the problem is not only the lack of a definition for integration which he asserts to be "…sketchy and altogether absent" but also the lack of theoretical scrutiny that would define the factors that play into integration and ways of measuring the process (Ibid, p.1). Looking at UNHCR's definition which, Kuhlman asserts, defines integration as a process that leads to the assimilation of the refugee to the economic and social life of its new national community (Kuhlman, 1991). Yet the author asserts that integration differs from assimilation in degree, not in kind (Ibid). In doing so, Kuhlman emphasizes that integration, conceptually, falls somewhere between separation, which is used by him in a similar manner to marginalization or segregation, and assimilation. Interestingly, Kuhlman, also states that a newcomer's culture can only be maintained if it does not contend with the dominant culture (Ibid, p.7), therefore also emphasizing the downfall of the multicultural model of integration. Kuhlman regards integration to be a "…process of change caused by the settlement of migrants in a plural society." (Ibid, p.8). However discontent with the vague definitions of integration and the process it entails, Kuhlman offers his own.

> ways commensurate they attain a minimum permits them to psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in with their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if Standard of living which satisfies culturally determined requirements; if the socio-cultural change they undergo maintain an identity of their own and to adjust

> influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated.
>
> (Kuhlman, 1991, p.8)

To solely focus on definition of integration with a disregard on its specificity to refugees, Kuhlman's definition is one of the most comprehensive. Kuhlman ascribes a specific attention to the two-way process-based nature of integration, and its multidimensional aspect which takes place at numerous levels of society, culture and the state (Kuhlman, 1991). In providing an exhaustive definition, Kuhlman, to some degree, succeeds in answering the questions "integration into what?" and "integration by whom?" through the variety of dimensions he asserts the process to be taking place. These dimensions are apparent in the definition. Socio-economic dimension is considered when refugees' participation in the host economy, and cultural-religious is considered when the promotion of maintaining identity is emphasized. The legal-political aspect of the conversation is not included as the point-of-attention in the definition above is on the refugee, hence an official status and the rights that come with it are already provided. Most importantly, it is reiterated by Kuhlman that the process-based nature of integration requires it to be measured and monitored (Kuhlman, 1990; 1991; 1994). Kuhlman asserts that the conceptualization of integration is simply regarded as "…separate parts, while being incorporated into a larger whole, do not therewith lose their individuality." (Kuhlman, 1991, p.4). The analogy Kuhlman so accurately uses regard that integration is like the assembly of the components of a car, through which he ascribes integration an understanding of different parts coming together to work as a united whole (Ibid). In other words, Kuhlman's study of integration is directed towards understanding how newcomers, but for this study specifically refugees, can become a part of the social system without losing their individuality (Kuhlman, 1990; 1991; 1994).

In his pursuit, Kuhlman develops what he calls "A Comprehensive model of refugee integration" (Kuhlman, 1991, p.14). In this model are independent and dependent variables. The independent variables are those that are gathered under 'pre-flight

characteristics of the refugees'(A), 'factors related to their process of flight from origin' (B), 'characteristics of the region of settlement' (C), and 'policies related to refugees' (D). All independent variables have under their scope sub-variables which when combined together following the undertaking of necessary monitoring and data-collection, provide sufficient information on the independent variable itself. Therefore, these give information on the process of integration so as to allow for the measurement and, if necessary, the reconsideration of relevant policies (Kuhlman, 1991, p.14-15). Not all independent variables and their sub-variables will be outlined. Only variables and sub-variables specifically delved into by Kuhlman, in both independent and dependent variables, will be outlined.

First to be talked about are the independent variables. The preflight characteristics of refugees are threefold according to Kuhlman. Kuhlman, specifically, asserts that the third characteristic, ethno-cultural affiliation, is hard to define but is a requirement for measuring integration. The independent variables under here are native tongue, religion and place of birth (Ibid).

Another point of importance is on the third main independent variable, home-related factors ('characteristics of the region of settlement' (C)). Regarding the fourth sub-variable under home related factors (social stratification in the settlement region), Kuhlman asserts that studying the stratification process will allow the researcher to draw connections with the socio-economic class of the refugee and their integration. Kuhlman further adds that "…in plural societies C4 is correlated to C3." (Ibid, p.15), C3 being the ethno-cultural composition and C4 being the social stratification in the settlement region. An example of this phenomenon would be a refugee being discriminated on the grounds of ethnic background. Moreover, another interesting point is made by Kuhlman regarding the sixth and last independent sub-variable (auspices). The author asserts that this refers to the assistance provided to the newcomers by kin, co-ethnic groups. Interestingly, Kuhlman goes on to clarify that the characteristic that goes with lending a helping hand to newcomers is one that is an output of the host country, and not refugees' (Ibid).

The fourth and last independent variable is the policies which are threefold, and comprise of national policies, regional/local government policies and policies on

foreign donors (Ibid). With regards, national policies are those that are found in legislations such as Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) for Turkey, and partly in government statements. Second sub-variable here is the policies of the regional or local that may be different from that of national policies due to certain independence provided to local entities and, since integration is a local matter, also shows the possible deviations in the practice of national policies practically. The third sub-variable, according to Kuhlman, is the policies of agencies that help the integration process. He, however, differentiates between the likes of NGOs, bilateral donors and the UN agencies as these contribute to the process at different levels.

Interestingly, Kuhlman goes on to underline another main variable that is not independent but dependent on the four main variables and their sub-variables. Regarding this dependent variable, which he calls 'E', Kuhlman states that it is "An intermediate category… in which are grouped the events since flight - which on the one hand have been influenced by the same factors that affect integration, but on the other hand also influence integration themselves." (Kuhlman, 1991, p.14). In other words, 'E' is defined both by the exhaustive independent variables and dependent variables that are outlined in Figure 1. This main variable is called residence in host country and covers two sub-variables which are coined as length of residence and movements within the country of asylum (Ibid). The former refers to the role of time in the integration process, while the latter looks at whether the refugee moved around within the host country, the number of movements undertaken by the refugee and therefore the newcomer's mobility. On this note, Kuhlman states that "…the various groups of factors in the top part of the model affect one another, as do the different dimensions of integration." (Ibid).

Moving on from independent variables, Kuhlman underlines integration as a dependent variable and looks at integration as it effects the refugees and secondly, as integration effects the host society (Ibid). Kuhlman, in differentiating these, points that integration takes place and effects both the subjective and objective aspects or dimensions within both the refugee and host society (Ibid, p.14-19).

This comprehensive framework (see Figure 1) for refugee integration shows the multidimensionality of the process but also integration's continuous, non-linear and

uncertain nature. On this note, Kuhlman states "Conceptualizing integration is a much more tentative exercise, and a different list of dimensions may be quite feasible." (Ibid, p.17). However, similar to what this research has numerously upheld, Kuhlman chooses to focus on the economic integration in refugees therefore clearly identifying the answers to the question 'integration into what and by whom?'; into the economy, by the refugees. In line with the definition of integration provided above in italics Kuhlman suggest four criteria for assessing economic integration. The four criteria are, sufficient participation in the economy, an income enough for attaining the standards of living in the host setting, equal access to goods and services such as public services that are not defined solely by income levels (Ibid, p.19). As the fourth and last criteria, Kuhlman adds, the existence of an environment where the impact of the refugee on the host society does not affect the previous three criteria for the different groups within the host community (Ibid). As a result, Kuhlman shows that integration, or economic integration in this instance, impacts both the newcomer and the host, hence the two-way process nature of integration. Referring once more to the need to analyze integration processes using data, Kuhlman suggests that an "…appropriate unit of analysis must be selected" such as the household, the sufficient standard of living must be clear laid out to be able to measure the levels of economic integration (Ibid, p.20-21).

Heckmann, Bosswick and Schnapper are other scholars that encourage a transition from a normative approach to integration and build a more open ended and analytically approachable definition (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006; Heckmann and Schnapper, 2016;). The open-endedness of the definition, to a certain extent, goes in line with the popularized idea that a state can individually define what integration is and into what the newcomers are expected to integrate. In this line, Heckmann and Schnapper define integration "…as the inclusion of new populations into existing social structures of the immigration country." (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003, p.10). In another study, Bosswick and Heckmann define the concept of integration "…as the stability of relations among parts within a system-like whole, the borders of which clearly separate it from it environment; in such a state, the system is said to be integrated." (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.3). These authors also add that integration, or social integration as they put it, is the "…learning and socialization

process that takes place under certain conditions." (Ibid, p.6). In another study, Heckmann asserts that integration is "…a generations lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society." (Heckmann 2005, p.18). Touching upon the nature of integration as a two-way process, Heckmann underlines that this is not merely a moral or political reality but a reality that stems from the interaction between the newcomer and the host. He asserts that the "…'openness' of the receiving society is a necessary precondition for the integration of immigrants.", therefore underlining that barriers that pose an obstacle to integration such as discrimination, must be analyzed and included in the study of integration (Heckmann, 2005, p.14). In line with these definitions, Heckmann and other scholars consisting of Bosswick and Schnapper go onto distinguish between integration processes that take place at different dimensions. These dimensions of integration are structural integration, cultural integration (or acculturation), interactive integration, and identificational integration (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006).

Before going into what the four dimensions imply, it is important to mention that this approach underlines the multidimensionality of the processes of integration. Similar to Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx (2016), in this context, inequality in opportunity or one that results from discrimination becomes a key issue. Therefore, the exhaustive measurement of policies and practices so as to eventually reach a level in society where there is not the segregation or marginalization of the newcomer is vital to this process' success. Moreover, contesting the use of assimilation, Bosswick and Heckmann assert that assimilation implies the diminishing of social difference between groups, while "Integration is a concept that is adequate for scientific purposes as well as for communication with policy makers and with the wider public." (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.6). By asserting this, the authors underline an element of respect of cultures and diversity in integration.

To continue with the dimensions specified previously, structural integration is the "…acquisition of rights and the access to membership, positions and statuses in the core institutions of the settlement society" (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003, p.10). Some of the indicators that could be utilized to offer an analytical approach to this dimension are access to labor market, education and health services and political

citizenship (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.9). The second dimension, cultural integration, on the other hand, is regarded by the authors as a necessity for participation in the society, referring to the "…processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change of persons." (Ibid). Even though seemingly one-sided, or expecting of change solely by the newcomers, Heckmann and Schnapper underline that it is a reciprocal process and one that results in the change in the host's culture as well since the host's learning to live with the newcomer's culture is a requirement for integration (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003). Bosswick and Heckmann, emphasize that cultural integration does not mean the loss of culture but the recognition that "…bicultural competencies and personalities are an asset both for the individual and for the host society." (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.10) Furthermore, regarding the third dimension, interactive integration, Heckmann and Schnapper refer to both the host's and newcomer's private relations and participation in groups such as marriages and associations or organizations. For the fourth dimension, identificational integration, or social identification, authors touch upon a more subjective set of factors and underline the feelings of belonging or membership to a society, especially in the forms of ethnic and national identities as a necessity for this dimension of integration to be achieved (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006).

In addition to these dimensions that help pursue an analytical approach to integration, authors also add the three other factors that play into the process of integration (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003). The first addition is the societal definition of immigration situation which underlines the importance of how relevant actors in the national context are viewing the current situation of the entry of newcomers and the integration processes (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003, p.12). Second addition the authors make looks at the principles of social order, meaning all the "…direct and indirect integration policies" framing what is expected of the newcomer (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003, p.12). This according to the authors is different for each country, depending on how they approach the existence of newcomers, or diversity. In example, principles of social order will be different in France which is a "…republican, culturally unifying, universal model" and Sweden which "…rely heavily on the general welfare policies administered by the public sector." (Heckmann

and Schnapper, 2003, p.13-14). The third addition is on the sense of nationhood (Ibid). Authors consider the constitution related factors of attaining membership to a country and the newcomers' inclusion in the society as a reflection of the sense of nationhood that each state upholds. All in all, the four dimensions and the additional three factors mentioned above constitute the numerous lanes for designing and measuring relevant policies of integration by the host state as outlined by Bosswick and Heckmann. This is especially important since as mentioned in the beginning of the review of Bosswick and Heckmann's view of integration, the process takes a long time, sometimes generations to be completed.

Moving towards an analytical approach to facilitating the integration process, Bosswick and Heckmann assert that integration is "…the outcome of immigrants' actions.". However, they also add that it "…depends upon the opportunities and restrictions that immigrants encounter in the host society" that show themselves in economic and social conditions and are framed by the host country integration policies (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.11). In other words, they view integration to be the result of newcomer's willingness to integrate where the playing field is defined by policies of the host country, which themselves are an output of the host society's approach to diversity. Bosswick and Heckmann further point out an accurate definition of integration or the current situation the host is in as being key for devising a solution (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006). Hence, they point out that integration processes cannot be devised with a top-down approach, which it often is, and add that it usually fails since it lacks to view newcomers as active actors in the integration process (Ibid). This reality, according to the authors, makes the constant evaluation of integration policies and, therefore the reframing of the opportunities and limitations provided to the newcomers as a requirement for success (Ibid). However, the evaluation must also be reflective of the new ways that the host society learned to "…relate to its new members." (Ibid). In this regard, Bosswick and Heckmann go in length to lay out an analytical framework to monitoring integration by providing essential policy points that should be constantly evaluated, measured and improved, when necessary. For the first dimension, structural integration, Bosswick and Heckmann assert that labor market policies, policies related to ethnic entrepreneurship and self-employment, support for education, support for vocational and professional

training, housing and health policies, naturalization policies and promotion of civic and political participation as policy priorities (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p.13-15). To touch on some, labor market policies, according to the authors, must be general policies that aim at creating a conducive business environment, and point out that cities should "…develop programmes for training the unemployed…" (Ibid, p.13). For policies that encourage ethnic entrepreneurship and self-employment, Bosswick and Heckmann ascribe an important role to local chambers and local employers association and the development of startup initiatives, counselling on legal and tax matters (Ibid). Furthermore, referring to integration at the local level, they suggest that municipalities could put together programs that support ethnic small businesses (Ibid).

Furthermore, under the dimension of cultural integration, Bosswick and Heckmann encourage the creation of policies aimed at the provision of language training for children and adults as it eases mutual integration, supporting newcomer's culture so that a sense of belonging can take shape in newcomers (Ibid, p.15). Other policies authors suggest includes negotiating support for religious practice as religion comprises a vital part of cultural identity, and lastly, support for sporting activities as it provides the grounds for cultural interaction (Ibid). Regarding the third dimension, interactive integration, the authors assert that this dimension is experienced at a personal level and that policies under this dimension can only help to "…influence the conditions, likelihood and opportunities for people of different ethnic groups to meet and form relationships." (Ibid, p.15). An example of policies aimed at facilitating interaction among groups, as provided by the authors, is desegregated schools (Ibid). For the fourth dimension, identificational integration, Bosswick and Heckmann underline the role of municipalities in supporting newcomers' process of identification with the host country. Examples of these are policies of multiculturalism, of recognition of newcomers' secular and religious entities, and policies that promote a "…culture of naturalization, including citizenship ceremonies and events." (Ibid). The authors, however, specifically underline that the process of identifying with the host country cannot be forced and must be accepted willingly. All in all, the policy points specified for each dimension above provide the basis of an analytical framework to approaching integration, hence, once more, integration is

approached as a process framed by policies that require it to be monitored, evaluated and, if and when needed, revised.

Moving on, Penninx and Garces-Mascarenas define integration as "…the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration." (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.11). Comparing it to assimilation, the authors argue that integration offers a two-way approach where change is not just expected from the newcomers but also from the host society and its institutions. Correspondingly, Penninx emphasizes that integration requires two parties that are actively engaged in the process comprising of "…immigrants, with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society, with its interactions with these newcomers and their institutions." (Penninx, 2003, p.1). Penninx further reiterates the importance of this relation and that even though partners in this process, the two-sides are not equal. He adds that the receiving society has more say in the process through its already established institutions and structure (Penninx, 2003).

Moreover, drawing attention to integration's context-bound and country-specific nature, the differing approaches to this concept is resultant of three distinct "area of variation" (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.11). The first variation is underlined as the differing focuses of researchers when it comes to the object of the study. Under the first variation, the authors emphasize that there are two ways. The first one is approaching the concept from the newcomer's side and the changes in idea or culture they are expected to undergo, while the second way is by giving attention to the receiving society and its institutions (Ibid, p.11-12). Secondly, "Dimensions of the process of settlement that are considered" have varied. (Ibid, p.12) In other words, an approach to the multidimensionality of integration processes could be focusing on the legal-political dimension of incorporation concerned with legal residence and citizenship, another approach could be prioritizing socio-economic dimensions such as newcomers' access to health care, education or the labor market and while another on the cultural-religious dimension (Ibid, p.12). These, in turn, gave way to the good deal of definitions and approaches to integration that tackle the process of incorporation from a variety of dimensions. Finally, it is asserted that the level of analysis aimed at understanding the relation between "…individual newcomers and

collective groups of newcomers and civil society to the institutional level" (Ibid). In other words, the monitoring and evaluation of the process, once it has commenced, differed between researchers. All three variations have resulted with numerous understandings of integration. However, the authors assert that integration, unlike assimilation or acculturation, and even though viewed conversely by some, is not an obligation for acceptance and a process that follows a straight-line as it is promoted to be (Ibid). In other words, Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx assert that integration is still assumed to be as a path where the newcomer gives in to the host, and the receiving society remains almost unchanged. A third criticism by the authors is once again about the fact that the structure into which the newcomers are expected to "…merge is seldom clearly defined." (Threadgold and Court, 2005; Favell, 2003; Castles et al., 2002).

What Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx deduct from the many understandings of what integration is that, all the various approaches find their basis on the fact that integration has been tackled as a normative phenomenon (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.13). The country-specific nature of the process, the multiplicity of dimensions that could be integrated into, the ambiguity with regards to what the ultimate goal is, have all pushed academia and institutions to attempt to diminish the process' normative character and provide it with a more open-ended definition that is analytical (Penninx, 2005). Penninx emphasizes that "…any integration policy should be based on a thorough, scientifically-based knowledge of the processes… it should have a clear idea of what instruments it can use to possibly intervene, in which part of the process, and at what particular moment." (Penninx, 2005, p.138). In this pursuit, Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx provide a broader definition to integration as "…the process of becoming an accepted part of society" (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.12). In doing so, the authors ascribe importance to the process of integration with little concern of defining an end goal and secondly, unlike in a normative process, they hold back from defining a degree of or requirements for acceptance by the host society. They assert that integration takes places at three analytically ideocratic dimensions, namely, the legal-political, the socio-economic, and the cultural-religious (Ibid). The legal-political dimension concerns the State, socio-economic the Market and the cultural-religious dimension the Nation (Ibid,

p.15-16). In short, legal-political dimension is about the political rights and status related rights provided to the newcomer and could end in two extremes where at one the newcomer is not recognized by the society while at the other, he or she becomes a natural citizen (Ibid). The socio-economic dimension is about the social and economic situation of the newcomers and focuses on newcomer's access to institutions with regards to finding work, housing and health care. In this dimension, equality of opportunity is key. Lastly, the cultural-religious dimension is about the "…perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society" (Ibid, p.15) where, once again, two extremes can unfold depending on the nation's receptiveness to diversity; assimilation or, if the nation is a pluralistic system, acceptance of the newcomer's culture. It can be understood from the fact that it is concerned with religion and culture, that the third dimension is deemed to be the hardest to analyze and measure due to its subjective nature (Ibid). In other words, authors emphasize that cultural-religious dimension is less about objective differences but more about normative views of what is defined as being different or the 'other' (Ibid). Secondly, it is hard to measure because the effects of a newcomer labelled as being different could have unforeseen consequences at different levels. In other words, while simply at a societal level it might lead to having uncomfortable interactions with the other, the same prejudices might lead to discrimination in the labor market by employers (Ibid). One can conclude that the three dimensions are not independent from each other and continuously impact one another. Similarly, a newcomer can integrate into two dimensions but be excluded from the third therefore also showing that there are no guarantees in the integration process. Furthering the pursuit for an analytical approach to integration, Penninx and also Garces-Mascarenas go on to underline that these three dimensions must be applied and measured at three distinct but interrelated levels (Penninx 2005; Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016). The first is the level of individuals that is concerned with the situation of the newcomers with regards to the previously specified three dimensions (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.11). Secondly, the level of organizations both for the newcomers and receiving society such as non-governmental organization, churches and trade union which play an important role in filling the gaps in a state's integration policy (Penninx and Roosblad, 2002, p.197; Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.11). Lastly, the level of institutions which have two-kinds, with one being general institutions that are

accessible to both the host and newcomer, and the other being institutions that are for newcomers or formed by newcomers (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016, p.11). An example of the former in Turkey would be Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR), while for the latter would be Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM). Interrelation of these levels are emphasized as "Institutions' arrangements largely effect the scope of organizations' actions…Institutions and organizations, in turn, together create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals." (Ibid, p.18).

All in all, Penninx in his writings together with Garces-Mascarenas propose a framework where all three levels are measured by their relation to the three dimensions as specified. The three levels are the level of individuals, level of organizations and the level of institutions, while the three dimensions are the legal-political, socio-economic and the cultural-religious dimension (Ibid, p.15-16). Each of the three dimensions have different criteria, or indicators, to be utilized so as to monitor the integration process. Correspondingly, it is emphasized that focusing on three dimensions for integration instead of the likes of acculturation and assimilation which focuses solely on the cultural-religious dimension, move the focus of the process from merely being directed at the newcomers to be directed at their relationship with the host society (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016). Hence, viewing it as a truly two-way process.

Moreover, Penninx ascribes a great deal of importance to designing comprehensive integration policies through informed and purposeful policy making (Penninx, 2003; 2005). Correspondingly, looking at successful policies the author underlines eight elements that an integration policy framework must uphold (Ibid). Primarily, a policy should provide a vision for both sides that details the ways they could contribute to the process (Penninx, 2003, p.2). Secondly, integration policy should be coordinated with general immigration policies. Penninx asserts that immigration and integration policies impact each other a great deal and emphasizes that "…lack of a consistent and transparent immigration policy is an impediment to effective integration policies" (Ibid). He further asserts that "...poor integration policy has contributed to negative perceptions of immigrants, which in turn has led to the reinforcement of defensive immigration policies." (Ibid). Thirdly, the author underlines that states, breaking the

chains of the nation-state, should encourage the design of policies that recognize diversity as an asset (Ibid). Fourthly, the policies should reflect national realities (Ibid, p.2-3). In other words, even though going beyond the notions that nation-states hold dear is key, the process is still framed by a national context. For example, socio-economic realities such as resource distribution are totally different between a liberal market oriented and welfare states and polices must be indicative of these. As the fifth and the sixth, Penninx underline that integration policies must recognize the role of urban areas and recognize the role of local authorities and context in reinforcing integration processes (Ibid, p.3). Cities, in particular, undergo swift changes as most newcomers are directed towards the urban areas. For the latter, he emphasizes that integration mostly takes place at the local level. As the seventh element Penninx states that non-governmental institutions (NGOs) must be included in the process as these organizations are direct implementor of these policies but also themselves important political actors that help shape them (Ibid). The last element for Penninx is the need for delegating authority as a result of designing integration policies that define priorities for action in a number of domains (Ibid). All in all, pursuing an analytical approach, Penninx offers indicators to measuring the success of policies by using concrete data on how these policies unfold in the public sphere. Furthermore, Penninx underlines the need to include actors from the newcomer's and the host's side in the decision-making process so as to design informative, pro-active policies reflective of the developments in the field (Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx, 2016).

Castles argues that in most cases integration is wrongfully defined by alleviating the connotations of culture-loss or identity-loss that assimilation carries (Castles et al., 2000). Interestingly, he further asserts that a narrow understanding of integration could see its policies become "…often simply a slower and gentler form of assimilation." (Castles et al., 2013, p.268-269). However, he further makes the distinction on a theoretical level that integration is a two-way process where its success would "…include a harmonious, equal and welcoming society" and a show of willingness to integrate by the newcomer(s) (Castles et al., 2002, p.124). Presently integration has come to unanimously be seen as a process that must constantly be evaluated in order to obtain the best end result and undergo revisions in design and implementation when needed (Council of Europe, 1997; OECD and EU, 2015).

Furthermore, integration, due to it being a two-way process, requires the host to welcome change as well, also making them subject to evaluation. In this regard, Castles adds that integration processes are largely conditioned by structural factors such as the official status assigned to the newcomer upon arrival (Castles, 2002). Even though Castles asserts that the social processes refugees and immigrants undergo are similar in character, together with the fact that refugees take part in migration involuntarily therefore do not have the time to plan, and the difference in the status granted upon entry which shapes the rights and opportunities of the newcomer makes the experience different (Castles et al., 2002, p.119).

Castles encourages the constant analyses of both the shortcomings and opportunities that surround the process of incorporation by newcomers, hence a look at the factors that play into the designing of the process. In this pursuit, Castles offers a check-list of factors to help with "…identifying specific situations, needs and problems, and subsequently in the planning of immigrant and refugee services." (Ibid, p.128). Hence, the situation specific nature of integration processes. His check-list includes six (6) factors. These are Conditions of exit, Categories of entrant, Legal status, Characteristics of entrants, Characteristics of ethnic community, and Conditions of receiving context (Ibid).

'Conditions of exit' are socio-economic factors and political realities in the newcomers' places of origin that pushed them to move, therefore pose a need to look at the rates of poverty, presence of conflict and oppression at the country of origin. This condition, in example, could spearhead the design of situation-specific psychological aid at the country of arrival to newcomers, especially for refugees.

'Categories of entrant', as the second condition, implies evaluating a newcomer on the basis of their reasons for entry and to classify whether they are skilled or unskilled immigrant workers, refugees or asylum-seekers or merely students seeking education. In other words, it is the status they receive upon entry. The third condition is the legal status which frames, together with categories of entrant, the pathway to citizenship and residence status, access to health, education and labor market related rights as well as entitlement to social services.

The fourth condition is the 'characteristics of entrants' which is about the collection of qualitative and quantitative data on the newcomers. The collectible data is on "…age, gender, place of origin, nationality, ethnicity, presence of family members, English proficiency, educational background, religion, occupation and skill level, qualifications…, migration experience (voluntary/forced, legal/illegal)" (Ibid). This condition is especially important as it provides the process of integration with data induced approaches to designing relevant policies. Correspondingly, as it has been mentioned multiple times, the role of data in designing integration policies, monitoring their implementation and measuring their success have increasingly become a clearly identifiable difference of integration process (Castles et al., 2000; 2002; Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Kuhlman, 1991; Goodman, 2015; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2015; Niessen and Schibel, 2007; OECD, 2015). This, however, also constitutes the biggest shortcoming in the study of integration processes as lack of regularly held data on the issue poses a great obstacle.

Moving on, the fifth condition is the 'characteristics of ethnic community'. This condition requires a look at the presence of same ethnic communities at the country of origin prior to the arrival of the newcomers and, at this community's segregation, geographic distribution, presence of community leaders as well as the social and political divisions the ethnic community might be facing. Correspondingly, since Castles asserts that the process of integration is concerned with "…identity, belonging, recognition and self-respect." (Castles et al., 2002, p.114), the presence of an ethnic community is bound to help in this area and contextualize the specific services that could be offered. This condition finds a common ground with the approach of Portes and Zhou to integration in which the authors ascribe a great role to the pre-existing co-ethnic community in the country of arrival within the process of integration and for the facilitation of social cohesion (Portes and Zhou, 1993, p.83).

The sixth condition is the 'conditions of receiving context' which look at receptiveness (Castles et al., 2002, p.128). This condition considers host society's approach to newcomers, policies of the state and its institutions to newcomers such as access to certain representative rights or provision of language assistance upon entry, degree of physical segregation, discrimination and violence, existence of same or different ethnic communities as well as public opinion on diversity. Castles, however,

argues that this check-list would be helpful for designing policies that shape the process of integration for a certain group or individual but fall short of evaluating its success (Ibid). He further emphasizes that combining all the factors that are in the check-list could lead to the development of a kind of "Integration Matrix" as an answer to the check-list's downfall (Ibid).

Accordingly, Castles asserts that the evaluation of the process is key to its success. Hence, he encourages the creation of indicators of integration so as to constantly monitor and evaluate and undertake, if required, policy finetuning to achieve success. However, he argues that defining these indicators are tricky and asserts that defining these indicators is as problematic as finding a definition of integration. Conceptually, he argues, identifying indicators is dependent on defining "What it means to be 'integrated'…", hence as it was mentioned the question of "Integration into what?" (Castles et al., 2002; Castles, 2000; Threadgold and Court, 2005) must be answered. In other words, these indicators can only be accurately defined if the host is certain on what is expected of the newcomer and aware of factors that differ between a community, religion, class and gender (Castles et al., 2002, p.129). Furthermore, he asserts that indicators must also consider the relevant realities in the country of arrival that have an impact of on equal participation in various levels of society and institutions such as levels of discrimination and exclusion in the labor market (Ibid). He further emphasizes that these indicators must be exhaustive and span to a wide range of topics so as to provide the best possible picture of the process. Equally important, is the designing of these indicators as these must include inputs from community groups and newcomers, and not follow a top-down approach, hence another attribution to its two-way process nature (Castles et al., 2002).

Trailing his views on the conceptual problems, Castles tackles the issue of how to evaluate these indicators, therefore the underlying integration processes. First, he asserts that the indicators must make a "…distinction between the policy objectives and their effects", and underlines that what the policy might seek and what its real-life outcomes might not be the same (Castles et al., 2002, p.130). Providing an example, one can point to Robinson's study, where United Kingdom's programmes on the resettlement of Ugandan Asians in 1972 which aimed at their dispersal from neighborhoods in which pre-existing Gujurati Indians were living in so as to stop

ghettoization was not a success (Robinson, 1998, p.120-121). This was, according to Robinson, because the UK's policy did not take into consideration the wishes of the Ugandan Asian community to settle in these neighborhoods and make use of the existing ethnic networks (Ibid, p.121). The Ugandan Asians argued that these networks would speed up their integration processes. In the end, this clash of policy with practice foresaw comparatively less dispersal rates due to an unwillingness of the community to move away (Ibid). As a result, 37 percent dispersal rate was achieved (Ibid). This example also refers to the shortcoming of the UK government to include the community in question to the design-process of this programme, and therefore allowing the objectives of the programme come into question with regards to their feasibility.

Secondly, Castles argues, as he views integration to be a country-specific and newcomer-specific process, that the indicators must evaluate in a manner that is specific to groups and refrain from generalizations (Castles et al., 2002, p.131). This relates to, as it was mentioned in the check-list, the different and various realities of newcomers such as their reasons to move from their country of origin, their socio-economic situation and their demographics. Lastly, he points to the issue of prioritization or equal-weighing of aspects of integration (Ibid). In other words, since integration takes place at many levels, the indicators must be reflective of what the newcomer is expected to integrate into, whether it may be cultural integration or integration into the labor market. Through these questions, Castles et al. propose a set of indicators, some of which are quantitative (i.e. employment and education) and qualitative (i.e. personal satisfaction, role of community), and gather them under six (6) subheadings (Ibid). These are Indicators of education, training and employment, Indicators of social integration, Indicators of health, Indicators of legal integration, Indicators of political integration, Indicators of overall integration (Castles et al., 2002, p.131-132). In doing so, Castles argues that, in general, integration process takes place at the very least at six interconnected but independent levels. In conclusion, the author asserts that integration process takes a long time to be completed, if ever, and pinpoint lack of data, and the lack of information on the processes and factors for refugee integration as the primary obstacles to successfully measuring integration processes (Castles, et al., 2002).

Alastair Ager and Alison Strang are two of the forerunners in the pursuit to strip integration from its normative character and ascribe to it an analytical framework for the continuous monitoring of policies, and if needed, for their re-evaluation and revamping (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Strang and Ager, 2010). With regards, the authors proposed a framework that "…draws on elements of social theory (with respect to social capital and rights, for example), but in presenting a normative, simplified structure is an explicit attempt to bridge between such theorization and local programmatic practice." (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.591). The quote brings attention to the reality that policy-level decisions do not materialize perfectly to induce the results expected during the design of integration policies. In 2004, Ager and Strang published a study titled *The Indicators of Integration* with the aim of pinpointing "…the key factors that appear to contribute to the process of integration for refugees in the UK." (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.2). However, in doing so these authors contributed to the bridging of integration as a concept and integration at the national and local levels. In other words, through what these authors call a "Mid-level Theory", they offer a framework aimed at filling the gap between theory and practice, which they identified as being the most vital problem to integration's success, in general (Strang and Ager, 2010, p.592). It is important to note that Ager and Strang do not seek to offer a single unanimous definition of integration, but a framework to operationalize an informed policy-making and planning. In other words, the utilization of the framework, as authors suggest, could be undertaken "flexibly", depending on the targeted outcome for any given project on integration (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.2). In this sense, the authors' starting point reflects what has been underlined by academics and national policy papers alike; that integration process must be exhaustive in clearly defining what the newcomers are expected to integrate into and when the process of integration, in any given context, is considered to be completed (Castles et al., 2002).

In their inquiry to propose a new way to understanding and overseeing refugee integration, Ager and Strang identify four overall themes that the domains in integration are then based on. Correspondingly, the first theme is "achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health" (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.184). In doing so, authors underline areas that are considered to be

"…critical factors in the integration process." (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.3). Second theme they consider vital for their framework to cover is "assumptions and practices regarding citizenship and rights." (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.184-185). Correspondingly, the authors suggest that this theme provides the bedrock of the framework as these define and give way to expectations and obligation "…represents the basis upon which expectations and obligations for the process of integration are established." (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.4). The third theme which shape the domains provided within the framework are the social connection processes intra and inter groups (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.185). Ager and Strang emphasize that this theme, somewhat, provides the private face of integration, meaning that it underlines the "…importance of relationships to the understanding of the integration process" (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.3-4). This theme is especially hard to satisfy since it concerns the private lives of both the host and newcomers, therefore posing hardships to its monitoring and measurement. Referring to the third theme, the fourth and the last theme is "…barriers to such connection, particularly stemming from lack of linguistic and cultural competences and from fear and instability" (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.185). This theme, according to the authors, reflect a domain that acts as "…key facilitating factors for the process of integration." (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.4).

Ager and Strang, 2004, p.3

Figure 1. The Indicators of Integration Framework

Deriving from these themes, the authors construct four headings, which cover a total of ten core domains (see Figure 2) "…each of which considers one aspect of

integration." (Ibid, p.12). Before going into the headings and the relevant domains that correspond to them, it is vital to emphasize that Ager and Strang, in no way or form, ascribe these domains an importance that is gradually increasing in significance. They assert that all are equally vital in the process. Similarly, it is "…not proposed…that integration should happen in a particular order" therefore also rejecting the notion that integration is a linear process (Ibid, p.5). The authors assert as the definition of what being integrated is;

> An individual or group is integrated within a society when they: achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc. which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities, and are in active relationship with members of their ethnic or national community, wider host communities and relevant services and functions of the state, in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship in that society.
>
> (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.9)

However, it is important to note that Ager and Strang are not satisfied with a working definition, since they view integration process as in need of constant monitoring, measuring and, where required, updated in policy and practice. Before moving on to the headings and the corresponding ten domains proposed by Ager and Strang, it is important to note that their framework aims at identifying "…factors that distinguish the ways in which the concept of integration is operationalized in different contexts, and the influences on their emergence and impact." (Strang and Ager, 2010, p.593). In other words, the framework, at least its raison d'etre at the time of its inception, was not to be applicable solely to the United Kingdom context, but reflective and overarching of domains that exist in most processes of integration for refugees in most host countries.

It must be strongly emphasized that the authors view each domain as one aspect of integration therefore implying that only when implemented together that they can provide a successful end result (Ager and Strang, 2004). Correspondingly, only by looking at each domain one can understand how Ager and Strang define integration and approach the process of integration. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the authors propose a set of indicators that go with each domain which are called practice level and policy level indicators. This shows that the authors seek to tackle

the process from both a theoretical and practical side. In other words, one can assert on Ager and Strang's view that integration takes place at the conjunction where policy meets practice to form a comprehensive approach to the process. Reflective of this, indicators are split into two. With regards, in the design of the framework, policy level indicators are those that "…encourage a general understanding of what integration is, how it can be achieved and how progress can be measured" (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.5). While practice level indicators are those that aim at helping with "…the planning and delivery of services." (Ibid). However, it is important to note that all these indicators, other than those on employment, will be provided.

In this regard, the four domains that are employment, housing, education and health are gathered under the heading "Markers and Means" so as to reflect that access and success in these domains is vital to the process (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008; Strang and Ager, 2010). Correspondingly, these domains are considered markers as they mark a "…positive integration outcome" and means because favorable outcomes in these domains will most probably help the integration process as a whole (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.3). Starting off with employment, as it will also comprise the main focus of the study of Sweden and Turkey's integration policies in the next section, Ager and Strang emphasize that this domain has been recognized as being influential on many issues and even helpful in finding success in other domains such as the development of language skills. Employment is key to "…promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host society…restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance" (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.170) and help establish "…social roles, developing…broader cultural competence and establishing social connections" (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.14). With regards, the authors draw attention to the role of initiatives such as vocational training and further education that aid in increasing the employability of newcomers (Ibid, p.171).

The two core policy indicators under employment, as proposed by the authors, are data on employment and unemployment in refugees and average yearly earnings or income for refugees and/or their households (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.14). On practice level policies for employment, Ager and Strang propose looking at the services provided by employment agencies to refugees, the vocational training and

professional qualification recognition programmes and startup initiatives for local enterprises (Ibid). Furthermore, they emphasize the importance of gathering data on the number of local employers that employ refugees, average length of time for a refugee to find employment following the provision of refugee status and reported satisfaction with employment amongst refugees (Ibid). Regarding the housing domain, authors emphasize that this domain has a direct relation to the levels of fear and instability that is profound for any integration process (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.15). Correspondingly, a core policy level indicator authors suggest is looking at the rate of refugees living in houses they own (Ibid, p.15). For the practice level, the indicators suggested by the authors emphasize similarities with the policy level ones. With regards, the indicators suggest a look at the rate of refugees living in personally-owned houses as well (Ibid, p.15).

Regarding education, Ager and Strang view this domain "…as a significant marker of integration, and also as a major means towards this goal" and add that success in this domain effects the refugee's chances of finding employment, making social connections and learn the host language (Ibid, p.16; Ager and Strang, 2008, p.172). With regards, a core policy indicator authors suggest is looking at the proportion of children of refugee families finding success in different levels of education such as primary level, secondary level and their admission to university (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.16). On the other hand, with regards to a practice level policy, authors propose looking at data on the refugee children enrolled in pre-school education (Ibid). However, Ager and Strang point out that obtainment of education by refugees and their children are impacted by unsatisfactory aid in teaching host-society language, and discriminatory actions such as bullying and racism that increase their probability of exclusion (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.172).

The last domain under the heading means and markers is health. Consequently, Ager and Strang emphasize that a healthy newcomer is more likely to actively engage in a new society across all domains and that upholding positive outcomes in health as well as increasing access to health services proves that the refugee is able to access a very vital public service (Ibid, p.173). Correspondingly, a core policy indicator here, as proposed by the authors, is the rate of mortality and morbidity taken in comparison to the general population (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.17). These four domains included

under the means and markers heading are accepted by the authors as being of utmost importance to the integration processes. Ager and Strang assert that any operational definition of integration must touch on these domains and promote projects aimed at reiterating their role in the process. The authors further emphasize that due to the wide variety of possible outcomes in the attainment of these domains whether about income or education level, the host state must be exhaustive while also being recognizant of the realities on the ground when defining what constitutes successful integration in any of these domains (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.173). In other words, authors suggest the upholding of the role of country and population wide data in setting standards and framing the expectations of the host country, and therefore theoretically and operationally defining the integration process in a given context (Ibid).

The second heading is 'Social Connections' under which three domains reign. These domains are social bridges, social bonds and social links. Accordingly, Social Connection heading is about the various relationships and networks and their role in facilitating integration while also being about the processes of connecting the newcomer with the wider community (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.13). Primarily, the domain of social bridges is about the relations of the newcomer with individuals from other communities, ethnicities, or religions, which the authors coin the term of 'mixing' (Ibid, p.18). Underlining the importance of reciprocal, or a two-way street, interaction among the newcomers and the host, authors propose indicators for the aim of monitoring the conditions of social bridging. A core policy level indicator here is the rate of refugees who report 'mixing' with people from different religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds on a daily basis while a proposed practice level indicator is the rate of participation by refugees in sport and youth clubs, and similar facilities (Ibid, p.18). Passing onto the second domain under the Social Connection heading, social bonds focus on what all integration literature underlines as being vital to the process itself, the enabling of a sense of belonging to the refugee (Ibid, p.19). In other words, social bonds look at the construction of a sense of identity with a particular group, whether ethnic or religious in the host country, by the assessment of bonds that has formed between the newcomer and these groups (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.178). These bonds' role, or having success in affiliating with similar ethnic groups, have been documented to aid in the integration process (Hale, 2000). Here, integration's

difference from assimilation is underlined once more. In this pursuit, a suggested core policy level indicator is the current and total number of community organizations that are registered and formed by refugees and are in service for the last two years (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.19). A practice level indicator authors propose is looking at the number of refugees actively taking part in Refugee Community Organizations, (Ibid, p.19).

As can be understood, social bonds are hard to measure, and the actual bonds are hard to pinpoint due to its subjectivity in nature. Correspondingly, the potential sources for obtaining data, according to the authors, are relevant projects, local surveys and qualitative interviews (Ibid). The last domain under the Social Connection heading is social links, which refer to relation of refugees or individuals with the institutions of the state and the services they provide. In other words, unlike social bonds which look at the relations between the members of a certain group, and unlike social bridges that look at the relations between such groups, social links look at the reciprocal relation between individuals and the state (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.181). In this pursuit, the refugee's individual engagement with the services of governments at the local level and NGOs, engagement in civic duties and in political processes are considered as the "…'third dimension' of social connection (alongside bonds with one's own community and bridges to others) relevant to assessing integration." (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.20). With regards, a core policy level indicator identified by the authors here is the number of refugees with a membership to a political party or that have assumed political office through the membership (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.181). For a practice level policy the authors suggest looking at the rate of utilization of services offered by localities (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.20).

Moving onto the next heading called 'Facilitators', the authors draw attention to two factors that are viewed to facilitate the process of integration. The term facilitators derive from the stance of Ager and Strang in which they view participation by the refugee in the society and economy of the mainstream society as being facilitating of integration's success (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.181). As a result, the authors identify two main dimensions or factors which hinder inclusion in the economy and society by the refugee. These factors, if not tackled correctly by the host state, pose barriers to integration since the state is not investing in improving the human capital in

refugees resulting with differences among groups being reiterated (Ager and Strang, 2010, p.601). The first domain under Facilitators is language and cultural knowledge (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008). Ager and Strang assert that having the necessary language skills and being equipped with the cultural knowledge of the host country and its society greatly enhances chances of integration (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.182).

Specifically, with regards to language proficiency, the authors assert that the ability to speak the main language of the host community is central to the integration process (Ibid). This is especially evident for the domains under the heading of Social Connection, such as social bonds, social bridges and social links which require reciprocal communication between the refugee and the host, both at the individual and institutional levels. In other words, attested to the two-way interpretation of integration, Ager and Strang asserts that the lack of language proficiency by the newcomers is also a challenge for host communities. This impediment stems from the barrier it poses for newcomers to access key information, especially on essential services such as health or education, and a barrier to people who provide these services (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.181). Therefore, the authors ascribe a great deal of importance to actions taken for improving community integration, even touching upon the importance of translation and interpretation services in the early phases of integration (Ibid). On the same note, Ager and Strang point out that the role of both the refugees and host society having a "…broader cultural knowledge…" helps with "…enabling integration processes and outcomes." (Ibid). They further imply that the refugee must be well-knowledgeable about the national and local procedures and the customs of the host, whilst non-refugees must have knowledge of the situation and culture of refugees (Ibid). With regards, a core policy indicator proposed by the authors is the percentage of refugees with host language proficiency within two years of obtaining refugee status (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.21). On the other hand, a practice level indicator proposed is the number of refugees enrolled in host language's classes (Ibid). The second domain under Facilitators heading is safety and stability. This is especially important since personal and community safety is regarded as an integral part of integration, and vital for its success (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.184). A core policy level indicator provided by the authors here is the percentage of refugees living in areas with comparatively high crime rates (Ibid). On the other hand, a

practice level indicator here is the percentage of refugees reporting racial, cultural or religious harassment (Ibid).

Last of the headings is 'Foundation' which covers the domain of rights and citizenship (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.23). As it can be understood from the title, the authors view rights and citizenship domain as the bedrock of the integration process. Therein lies many disagreements as to the nature of what this domain entails. In other words, the answer to the question 'what is integration?' varies among countries due to the "…widely different understandings of citizenship but, more fundamentally, of nationhood across societies." (Ager and Strang, 2008, p.173). These differing understandings give way to different values which in turn frame how integration is approached in each state. On another note, the rights and citizenship are also important as the argument is made that the integration of a newcomer is a long-term process starting with the newcomers' arrival and one that concludes with the gaining of citizenship (ECRE, 2002). Correspondingly, core policy level indicators here are average length of successful asylum applications and the rates of citizenship applications by refugees (Ager and Strang, 2004, p.23). On the other hand, a practice level indicator proposed is the number of refugees voting in local and national elections (Ibid).

All in all, Ager and Strang view integration as a local process, and one that must constantly be overseen and measured. Correspondingly, integration is viewed by the authors as a process in which localities and other entities such as organizations or institutions could be successful through continuous assessment of indicators on the basis of comprehensiveness, flexibility, comparability and feasibility (Ibid, p.10). Interestingly, Ager and Strang emphasize that integration must be strategically monitored and developed, and not be constrained to set targets, but ones that are evolving depending on the context. And like Castles, these authors also underline that this can only be achieved with suitable and accurate data (Ager and Strang, 2004; 2008).

2.4. Conclusion

All in all, the aim of Chapter 2 was to provide an analysis of the evolution of the concept of integration as a response to newcomers. This pursuit was undertaken with a specific focus on refugees and their integration into the labor market. The concept's evolution into present day have been delved into by looking at other concepts of acculturation and assimilation that preceded it and, in some cases, were used synonymously. It is important to note that other concepts with similar connotations to that of acculturation and assimilation such as exclusion, absorption, adaptation, race relations cycle were not included in this review.

Furthermore, integration's compatibility with the normative theory that is multiculturalism has been assessed and will further be analyzed in Chapter 3 when looking at the example of Sweden which is regarded as a country approaching integration via the multicultural model. It is important to mention other models such as the republican model or transitional model were not included in the review.

The literature on integration shows that a universal definition for the concept of integration is ambiguous at best. This is related in the literature to the need for idiosyncratic applications of the concept to different realities. In other words, the concept of integration and the process it entails is country-specific but also specific to the group of newcomers concerned. In this regard, the construction of an idiosyncratic definition to integration and operationalization of it into a process is viewed as a two-way process where the host, with its population and institutions, takes an active role by also undergoing transformation together with the group of newcomers. The changes host undergoes, first and foremost, is demographic due to the inflow of newcomers, whether refugee or immigrant.

Furthermore, change also takes place via an increase in tolerance in the host society and institutions so as to carry-out integration related activities because without a tolerant policy, integration cannot happen. In other words, policies aimed at combating discrimination against newcomers, encouraging inter-ethnic interaction, providing services to newcomers in their native languages comprise some of the changes required for integration to take place. This change and increased tolerance by

the host has been identified as the primary difference of the concept of integration when compared with concepts like acculturation and assimilation. This is to say that integration can only take place through interaction, whether between institutions or peoples.

Similarly, the review of literature makes it apparent that the process of integration is not a linear path where the newcomers actions, when in line with the policies of incorporation at the host, leads to their successful completion of the process. To elaborate, integration as a concept and its realization through policies and practices concern both objective and subjective inputs. It is of vital importance to point out that integration cannot be successful with quick-fixes and requires careful but most importantly long-term planning. In turn, this poses challenges to the monitoring of the process of integration, and its measurement.

Furthermore, the literature on integration emphasizes that the concept is multidimensional. In other words, it takes place in numerous sectors of the state such as the legal, socio-economic and cultural. It is further reiterated in the literature that the country of arrival must be exhaustive in communicating what is expected of the newcomer in terms of their incorporation into a specified dimension for the process to have the chance to be successful.

Moreover, review of the literature on integration has viewed an inclination in academia aimed at the monitoring and measurement of integration goals using an indicators-based approach. In other words, the need for cooperation among the many institutions and the organizations of the host and the newcomer provides the basis for integration policies, and these policies are then materialized into practice so as to frame and define an integration process. However, it is clearly emphasized in the integration literature that policies designed specifically for integration purposes do not always materialize to yield expected results. Correspondingly, the indicator-based approach has been promoted in the literature as a possible solution to filling the gap between policy and practice. This is proposed by way of monitoring the rate of realization of policy by looking at practice-level outcomes. Similarly, this thesis also views indicators-based approach to be the most viable option to ensure the success of the process of integration.

On the other hand of the spectrum, lack of accurately and compatibly held data by states and relevant institutions as well as a lack of knowledge on the factual processes refugees and immigrants undergo prove to be the biggest shortcoming in the study of integration processes. Moreover, even though the multidimensionality of integration is continuously underlined, there is a lack of importance given to the numerous actors that take part in the process, one way or another. These might be different groups of people within the host, previously incorporated co-ethnic groups or the relevant institutions of the state. Upon the literature review, the research has also found that lack of data poses the biggest threat to this concept's evolution, development and application by different countries. This is because either insufficient data will lead to less than ideal policies and practices, or lack of data will prevent countries from even acting.

Another shortcoming of the concept of integration is that it is not consistent with the notions held by the nation-states, therefore limiting its applicability to countries with multiculturalist tendencies. It is this thesis' view that the principle of mono-culturalism and homogeneity are no longer reflective of reality and that nation-states must take a step towards constructing a path to recognize the variedness of experiences by minorities, immigrants and refugees alike. Their stance will only come under more scrutiny with the intensification of transnationalism, increased porousness of borders, and improved communication and transportation technologies which will give way to increasing number of newcomers.

In this regard, this thesis has strived to promote the vitality of the concept of integration, and its operationalization as a policy tool to respond to diversity. The role of structural factors like the labor market, housing, health and education sectors have been underlined as prerequisites to seeking successful integration. Out of these factors, labor market has been identified as being cross-dimensional and vital to the commencement of the whole integration process. It is also of this thesis' view, since it has also been reiterated in the literature, that labor market entry is key to finding success in all dimensions of integration as it promotes self-respect, cross-cultural and societal exchanges and even facilitates language learning by the newcomer.

Additionally, it is this thesis' view that integration requires long-term planning and patience but also the ability to quickly respond to the needs of newcomers as the process of integration starts at the moment of a newcomers entry into the host state. From this viewpoint, this thesis will further dive into country examples by primarily looking at the evolution of integration policies, or lack thereof, in Sweden and Turkey. The analysis will allocate specific focus on the labor market integration of refugees. It is important to note that in order to provide a common basis for these countries to be compared, integration policies and practices in the face of refugee situations that are deemed 'temporary' will particularly be looked at. Similarly, point of focus for the analysis of integration policies of Turkey will be on SuTPs, as the inflow of Syrians into Turkey comprises its first ever engagement with the notion of refugee integration.

CHAPTER 3

TEMPORARY PROTECTION SCHEMES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON INTEGRATION: EXAMPLES OF SWEDEN AND TURKEY

As it has been outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2 integration is multi-dimensional and requires a two-way approach where inputs from both the host and the newcomer must be taken into consideration in the transformation of the concept to an applicable and practicable process. As important to emphasize is the need for consistency and longevity in the process. Given these realities, the act of temporary receptiveness of refugees by way of temporary protection, issuance of temporary permits or provision of rights that are bound to a time limit poses serious obstacles to success of processes of integration.

Following the literature review on integration undertaken in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will provide an outlook on Sweden and Turkey's integration policy, or lack thereof, in the face of schemes of refugee acceptance that are temporary in nature. While the most obvious temporary scheme is 'Temporary Protection', there are other forms of refugee acceptance that encapsulate temporariness in reception, and therefore have similar implications on integration such as ambiguity as to what the future holds and uncertainty as to length of stay at the host country. In turn, these realities have a negative impact on the long-term commitment of the refugee to the process of integration at the host, but also host communities' acceptance of the refugee.

To first look at Temporary Protection, designed in the 1990s as a response to the Yugoslavian disintegration, unlike refugee status determination which is undertaken individually, this scheme is framed by group determination as a response mechanism to mass influxes of persons which have grounds to apply for protection (Beirens et al., 2016, p.4). In detail, temporary protection was described by the UNHCR as a

"…flexible and pragmatic means of affording needed protection to large numbers of people fleeing human rights abuses and armed conflict in their country of origin, who might otherwise have overwhelmed asylum procedures" (UNHCR, 1993, p.10). From this definition, one can assert two main points. The first is that it concerns the protection of large numbers of people (İneli–Ciger, 2017, p.157) and secondly, it is aimed as a clear-cut solution to the lengthy asylum procedures and the burden it would put on state institutions and on newcomers themselves (Beirens et al., 2016, p.5).

While beneficiaries of temporary protection are entitled to same rights as the refugees, states have always been reluctant of granting these rights as they are "…tools that enable social and political integration – mechanisms, in other words, that assist foreigners in transforming their state of temporary residence into home" (Gibney, 2000, p.697). As a result, similar to the conclusion on integration's idiosyncratic nature in Chapter 2, every state decided on the "…set of rights offered to the temporary protection beneficiaries, the duration of temporary protection and the end of temporary protection, differently." (İneli–Ciger, 2017, p.132). Additionally, it is also of importance to underline that the temporary protection scheme debouches from the notion that the conflict at the country of arrival will end soon, and newcomers will take part in voluntary repatriation soon after (Ghanem, 2005, p.109). Correspondingly, the decisions on the length of stay and rights granted were formed via a country's view towards integration's role in what is regarded as a temporary situation. As a result, these have led to differing approaches to be followed by countries in Europe. Evidently, these can be classified as, "non-integration, integration based on state needs and finally integration aimed at empowering… refugees and enabling them to prepare for return." (Onken, 2005, p.197).

Correspondingly, non-integration is the measure taken by states to deter 'temporary' newcomers from staying too long and also those who want to enter the country (Ibid, p.198). In relation, this is achieved by keeping these people in isolation, both physically and socially from the host population (Ibid). It is possible to make the point that Turkey's first response to Syrians by placing them in camps was effectively a pursuit in this manner. However, the sharp increase in the number of Syrians coming into the country following Turkey's 'open door policy', especially after 2013,

eventually contributed to this inflow to become an urban phenomenon. This spearheaded the evolution of Turkey's approach to integration as based on its needs.

Hence, integration based on state needs is defined as the granting of rights "…on a very discretionary basis" to persons under temporary protection and entails a one-way approach with little regard as to the newcomers' needs and labor market qualifications (Ibid, p.199). Regarding the labor market, an application of this approach is evident when newcomers "…are allowed to work only when no national… citizen can be found for the same job." (Ibid). Emphasizing that this leaves the persons under temporary protection in jobs they are over-qualified for, or even without jobs (Ibid), it is of this research's view, as it will be outlined in sub-section 3.2, that Turkey also suits this mold. Turkey has extended temporary protection to Syrians as specified by the LFIP in 2013 and the Temporary Protection Bylaw in 2014, hence pursuant of an 'integration based on state needs' approach (Ibid, p.181). The reasons lie in the temporariness of newcomers' status, and Turkey's primary expectation that the circumstances that gave way to the mass movements at the country of origin will conclude soon enough and newcomers will return. Hence, "No integration when people are supposed to return." (Ibid, p.182). The implications of this approach and its impact on the integration of newcomers, specifically to the labor market, will be discussed further under the section on Turkey (3.2)

The third approach 'integration aimed at empowering refugees and enabling them to prepare for return' is birthed from the notion that granting rights to the persons under temporary protection "…is not simply a matter of meeting the minimum standards set by international human rights instruments, but rather requires respect for the needs and reasonable aspirations of refugees'" (Castillo and Hathaway, 1997, p.7). The focus in this approach is divided between the domestic and abroad. For domestic, an integration policy is followed such as job-trainings (Onken, 2005, p.204-205). For abroad, a policy of aid that will help in a refugee's return and reconstruction of their country of origin which could mean providing accurate information about their country of origin (Ibid). Both the domestic and abroad matter as refugees "…who have been held in a legal and social limbo… will not be equipped to immediately reintegrate and to help with the reconstruction of their country." (Ibid, p.204). Similarly, it is of this research's view that, in the limited number of times Sweden has

evoked the temporary protection regime, this approach has been utilized. As it will be discussed, this is especially true for Kosovars that arrived in Sweden via Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (HEP) in 1998 and 1999.

Beyond the directive of temporary protection, there exists other forms of protection schemes that are time-allotted and applied by states (Beirens et al., 2016, p.4). While these can be country-specific protection statuses, these can also include the provision of temporary residency to persons who have a need for protection (Ibid). With regards, for the purpose of this chapter both the temporary protection scheme and the provision of residency and rights in a way that comprises temporariness and limited acceptance of refugees by the state will be tackled together. This is because their implications on the policies pertaining to integration, which is viewed as a long-term process, are similar (Onken, 2005, p.183).

In example, Sweden through a temporary law that was passed in 2016 changed its practice with regards to refugees and started offering them temporary residency permits instead of permanent residency. The provision of the latter was considered status-quo in Sweden, and the implications of this new law on integration will also be tackled together with implications of temporary protection status on Swedish integration under section 3.1.2 with examples of instances where temporary protection regime was adopted and met with integratory policies and processes in Sweden.

It is important to note, before delving into the development of Sweden's integration policy over time, the institutions responsible and the approach of Sweden to temporary situations in terms of integration that in no way or form the undertakings of Sweden can be compared to that of Turkey's. Even though the refugee population of Sweden comes out to approximately two and a half percent of the total population, whilst it stands at four-point-four percent for Turkey (World Bank, n.d.), Turkey by following an open door policy, welcomed more than three and half million Syrians. Sweden has never even come close to tackling the process of integration for these many persons in need of protection. In other words, magnitude-based comparisons with Turkey cannot be made as Turkey is the country hosting the most refugees in the world. Therefore, the research is about looking at the underlying policy and integration-

related responses aimed at newcomers' incorporation, especially to the labor market, in these two countries.

Furthermore, it is important to note that Sweden has been a country of immigration since the 1940s while Turkey has just recently started to be considered one. Even more, presently Turkey could be considered as a country of emigration, immigration and a transit country, all at the same time. However, for the sake of analysis, Turkey is viewed as a country of immigration, especially with regards to persons extended temporary protection since 2011 and will be tackled accordingly. At the same time, as it will be reiterated in the next section, Sweden has a history of developing its national integration policy and its underlying processes, and therefore offers an insight into the role of having a readily-available holistic integration policy as a response to newcomers' incorporation. As it will also be shown, this is not the case for Turkey. Before the Syrian crisis, Turkey did not have an asylum-regime for persons of non-European descent and a comprehensive integration policy in Turkey has been non-existent (Yavcan, 2016, p.3). In detail, Turkey's policies pertaining to refugees were shaped primarily by the 1951 Geneva Convention, to which Turkey held the geographical limitation. In this regard, any persons in need of protection that came to Turkey from non-European countries did not take part in integration but were considered to be in Turkey to be resettled in third countries (İçduygu, 2016, p.6). On the other hand, the Settlement Law of 2006 only allowed permanent settlement opportunities to persons of Turkish descent. As a result, these "…two legislative reservations accord refugees with a temporary protection status that disqualifies them from the prospect of long-term integration as a durable solution." (Ibid, p.20).

While Sweden's previous trials with the integration of people under acts that are deemed temporary in nature will be looked into together with the implications of the 2016 law, Turkey's section will only focus on the Syrian case. This asymmetry is derived solely because the Syrian case is the catalyst, transforming Turkey into a country of immigration and therefore constitutes the sole example where the design of an integration policy and processes of incorporation can be studied.

In this regard, in Chapter 3 differences in approaches to what is regarded as temporary situations by Sweden and Turkey and their implications on integration and the

provision of rights and services will be delved into so as to offer a comparison between policies of Sweden and Turkey. Correspondingly, the Chapter will allocate specific focus to labor market integration.

3.1. Sweden

Sweden has long been viewed as a country upholding an official affinity to multiculturalism, and subsequently to the design of multicultural policy (Borevi, 2013; Castles et al., 2013). Correspondingly, Sweden's pursuit of multiculturalism in its policies have started in the 1970s, parallel with this notion's popularity gain in the international arena (Andersson, 1998). However, the debate on integration through multiculturalism has been met with resistance since its birth, due to concerns of its effects on nation-building. However, form 1990s and onwards, concerns about multiculturalism changed face, as fear of terrorist attacks and religious fundamentalism has been increasing, and as the populist rhetoric that fuels this fear has been gaining ground in Europe (Wiesbrock, 2011, p.49).

While more and more countries are putting up barriers to discourage the arrival of newcomers, whether refugees or labor migrants, by way of restrictive and assimilatory policies, this has rarely been the case in Sweden (Wiesbrock, 2011, p.49). Putting aside a number of restrictive policies since 2016, Sweden still shines bright as a country persistent in the multicultural policies it follows, and long been accepted as an example of "positive immigrant multiculturalism in Europe." (Borevi, 2013, p.140). All in all, in line with Sweden's official identity as a multicultural country, integration to this day is prioritized in Swedish politics and positioned high on the political agenda (Andersson and Weinar, 2014, p.4).

Similarly, Sweden is one of the first countries to ascribe importance to integration starting from the 1960s (Dingu-Kyrklund, 2007, p.6). However, it was through the issuance of the 1975 Immigrant and Minority Policy that Sweden officially became multiculturalist state. This Policy comprised of "…an effort to create equality between immigrants and Swedes" and on giving the newcomers the choice of taking-on the Swedish cultural identity or maintaining their own identities (Swedish Parliament, 1975).

In continuing this trend, Sweden's trial with refugee integration has been framed by the provision of positive rights and with a resistance to the provision of negative rights. In other words, pursuits of multiculturalism policies in Sweden have consistently targeted newcomers' integration into the system, but not the society (Andersson, 2007; Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). In this regard, Sweden granted newcomers with rights so as to level the playing field and ensure their access to equal conditions and opportunities as the natives (Andersson, 2007). However, the shortcomings of these policies have become increasingly clearer, as positive rights disregard the existence of racism, discrimination, and in general, the existence of individual dispositions. Subsequently, the outcomes of these policies especially with regards to the labor market integration of foreign born people in Sweden in comparison to natives is low (Wiesbrock, 2011, p.48). Correspondingly, segregation and especially the comparatively worse labor market integration of refugees in comparison to labor migrants and natives, have been identified as the two most pressing issues in Sweden regarding integration (Borevi, 2013; Bevelander, 1999; 2004).

Sweden has been at the forefront of designing and implementing labor market policies, positioning it as a priority in kicking-off integration. This, for Sweden and for the rest of the EU, is especially accurate regarding refugees since they are most likely to be unemployed or work in temporary jobs and earn comparatively lower incomes (Bevelander, 2011, p.22). It is further emphasized that immigrants have, in general, a lower attachment to labor market when compared with native Swedes, and the results show a case for the worse for refugees (Ibid, p.23). However, it is important to note that what is considered a good level of employment rate is subjective to the country in question, as Sweden's employment rate is the highest in Europe with more than eighty-two percent (Eurostat, n.d.). In turn, less than ideal employment rates among refugees is only less than ideal in Sweden but would be considered a big success in a country like Turkey.

It is, therefore, of importance to look at the processes that shaped Sweden's outlook on integration by looking at Sweden's experience with migrants and refugees since the 1950s and the laws and regulations it has passed as well as the practices it has deployed related to the incorporation of newcomers to the society. Lastly, Sweden's

response to temporary situations, with a particular focus on the refugee and their integration into the labor market, will be tackled. The last part will not dwell in detail on the issues pertaining to housing, healthcare and education as Sweden is a welfare state, and has provided newcomers with access to education and healthcare as equally is it does to native Swedes. Similarly, accommodation is also being provided to refugees in Sweden as a result of it being a strong welfare state.

3.1.1. The evolution of integration policy in Sweden and its implications for refugees

Sweden was not always a country of immigration. The turning point was 1940s, coinciding with the Second World War, Sweden slowly transformed into a country of immigration. Similarly, starting from the end of 1940s, Sweden also started to be transformed from a homogenous country to a multicultural one, due to changes to its ethnic composition fueled by refugee and immigrant inflow (Eger, 2010, p.205).

Sweden's laws and regulations on refugees are based on and follows the 1951 Geneva Convention. The Convention was operationalized in Sweden following the country's ratification of the Convention, with the issuance of 1954 Aliens Act which formed the basis for the implementation of the Geneva Convention and created the refugee status in Sweden (Boguslaw, 2012). Correspondingly, the 1954 Aliens Act liberalized the obligations for work and residence permits, allowing people to enter Sweden freely and apply to jobs (Borevi, 2012, p.35). Moreover, the Act stated that the person of concern was directly provided with a resident permit if they were to apply to a job and gained employment (Ibid). In addition, the 1954 Act allowed newcomers to obtain permanent residence permits following a year-long stay in the country, and also made them eligible for the social security system and unemployment aid following one year of working and membership to a labor union (Boguslaw, 2012, p.32). These initiatives outlined in the 1954 Act comprised the primary steps taken regarding the integration of newcomers into Sweden, by Sweden.

By 1960s, immigrant and minority policies of Sweden started to be aimed at long-term planning and their integration via the provision of residence permits, non-mandatory language trainings and labor market initiatives was targeted (Dingu-

Kyrklund, 2007, p.14). In this regard, the Immigration Act was issued in 1968 which pursued an egalitarian approach where refugees, immigrants and natives were regarded as equal stakeholders in achieving equal opportunities and standards of living as natives (Borevi, 2010, p.12). Correspondingly, this meant that, in addition to labor market access by way of wage or self-employment, refugees would also be entailed to same standards as natives when it came to education, housing and health care. Swedish Immigration Board (or Commission on Immigration) was created to oversee matters on integration and immigration. This Board would go on to evolve into Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Agency) in 2000 (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.(a)).

The Swedish Parliament took steps to ensure a planned incorporation of newcomers in 1975. The decision by the Parliament upheld newcomers' incorporation via equality, freedom of choice and participation in politics, and continued suit with the Immigration Act issued in 1968 (Swedish Parliament, 1975). In this regard, equality meant that newcomers were to enjoy same rights as Swedes, freedom of choice meant that newcomers had the chance to choose assimilate or practice their own cultures, while participation meant that the government permitted newcomers with right to vote in municipal and parliamentary elections following a three-year presence in the country (Ibid). Together with the provision of language training to newcomers in the 1960s, this step in 1975 comprised the first framing of rights to be extended to newcomers so as to facilitate their successful integration (Ibid).

Following this, in 1985 the Swedish Immigration Board took over the integration processes for refugees. It promoted an integration policy that was built on the provision of language and vocational training, the distribution of refugees to numerous towns so as to ensure accommodation and giving municipalities the responsibility to carry-out integration related services (Westin, 2000, p.33). Furthermore together with the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket), the municipalities were tasked with providing housing (Ibid, p.23).

In 1994, as a response to mass inflow of refugees but also for humanitarian reasons, temporary protection scheme was introduced into the Aliens Act, through the Law on Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others (Swedish Parliament, 1994). The scheme

allowed temporary protection and residence permits to be granted to asylum-seekers for six-months at a time for a maximum of one-year (Ibid). The underlying process surrounding the Bosnians and Kosovars with regards to the temporary protection scheme will be further reiterated in section 3.1.2. Furthermore, in 1994 the refugee integration scheme was revamped allowing for improved flexibility such as allowing refugees to decide where they would like to live therefore permitting them free movement domestically (Boguslaw, 2012). Right after this development, Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, and entered into the Schengen area in 1996 extending the free movement area from Nordic to other countries.

Following this, the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament) decided on an overall integration policy and issued a government bill, called 'the future and diversity – from immigration policy to integration policy (1997/98:16)' (Government Offices of Sweden, 2002). The policy viewed ethnic and cultural diversity as an asset. The Swedish Integration Board was created in the same year and it was given the important task of promoting and monitoring integration policy and designing procedures for introduction upon the arrival of refugees (Ibid). However it was closed down in 2007.

Going into the new millennia, a new Citizenship Law was issued in 2001, permitting dual nationality (Borevi, 2014, p.716). By doing so Sweden recognized the belonging of refugees and immigrants to more than one country (Wiesbrock, 2011, p.59-60). Furthermore, this Law also changed the naturalization process, making it so that any foreign born person who has a permanent residence permit and without a criminal record can apply for Swedish citizenship within five-years (Parusel, 2009, p.5). More interestingly, the Law did not obligate acquisition of language skills, finding of employment, and knowledge of citizenship and social systems of Sweden as well as compulsory participation in introductory programmes as a prerequisite for application (Ibid).

Furthermore, 2003 saw the issuance of The Prohibition of Discrimination Act (2003:307) due to increased discrimination against foreign born people and especially refugees in the labor market (Attström, 2007, p.4). Moreover, in 2005, changes to the Aliens Act was undertaken (SOPEMI, 2008, p.280). Entered into force in 2006, these changes established introductory programmes that evolve around access to labour

market, rapid assessment of education and experience, and Swedish language instruction combined with job-oriented initiatives (Ibid). Even more, 'first-step jobs' (instegsjobb) for increased access to the labor market was introduced in July 2007, allowing new arrivals to combine language training with part-time employment (Ibid).

From an administrative stand-point, Swedish Integration Board closed down in July 2007, with all its relevant responsibilities dispersed to the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality which was formed in January 2007 to tackle issues on "…democracy, discrimination, integration and diversity, gender equality, citizenship, human rights, national minorities, youth policy and urban development." (EMN, 2009). The Ministry took steps to move towards the goal of granting swifter entry into the labour market (Ibid). In line with this, a seven-point integration strategy was promoted and published by Sweden in 2008 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009). The integration strategy was called 'Empowerment Against Exclusion' (Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration).

The seven-points are;

> …faster introduction for new arrivals; more in work, more entrepreneurs; better results and greater equality in school; better language skills and more adult education opportunities; effective anti-discrimination measures; development of urban districts with extensive social exclusion; common basic values in a society characterized by increasing diversity.
>
> (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009)

The strategy was operationalized as a national law via the issuance of the reform called, 'New policy for the introduction of newly arrived immigrants' (Nyanlända invandrares arbetsmarknadsetablering – egenansvar med professionellt stöd) that came into force in 2010 (European Commission, n.d.). The law further increased personal incentives for refugees and immigrants to both take up work and take an active part in employment preparatory activities so as to become prepared for the labor market (Ibid). Correspondingly, the reform provided the Arbetsförmedlingen (Swedish Public Employment Service - PES) with the responsibility of coordinating the introduction activities (Ibid). Similarly, the same institution was given the

responsibility to define an introduction plan in consultation with the newcomers, aimed at but not limited to the facilitation of refugees and immigrants alike into working and community life (Ibid). Furthermore, a new benefit payment was introduced and linked to the active participation of newcomers in introduction activities (Ibid). In other words, the reform aimed at newcomers, whether refugee or immigrants, who were drawn up an introduction plan upon entry to participate in civic orientation to learn about customs and citizenry in Sweden via the provision of incentives (Ibid). Disregarding some additions, the 2010 reform comprises the current policy for integration in Sweden.

In line with the integration seven-point strategy and the subsequent reform in 2010, asylum-seekers' access to work became swifter as Sweden started allowing them access to the labor market upon the day of arrival if they can prove their identity (EMN, 2010, p.5). Furthermore, Sweden's municipalities started to provide performance-based bonuses to newcomers if they are to receive passing grades in one-year in their Swedish studies (Ibid, p.15). Moreover, municipalities became responsible of providing civic orientation to newcomers, for a minimum of sixty-hours (Ibid, p.16). Also, it was codified such that civic orientation would be delivered in a language that the newcomer understands rather than in Swedish (Ibid). In 2011, Sweden distributed the responsibility for issues on integration to the Ministry of Employment from the Ministry of Integration (Ibid, p.10).

With the 2010 Reform and the abolishment of the office of the Swedish Minister of Integration in 2011, integration policy became a clear part of the policies on jobs, education and welfare (European Commission, 2014). Similarly, 2014 saw the launch of certain policy initiatives such as municipalities offering citizenship ceremonies so as to utilize naturalization as a means for facilitating integration, individually-tailored trainings by adult-education establishment (folkhögskolor) in Sweden which also offered language training as well as initiatives aimed at the host community to decrease the effects of xenophobia (Andersson and Weinar, 2014, p.8).

In 2014, the Syrian refugee inflow to Sweden commenced in ever-increasing numbers. Sweden received approximately eighty-thousand asylum applications (Swedish Migration Agency, 2015). With most of them from Syria with more than thirty-

thousand and, Eritrea with more than eleven thousand, only Germany received more asylum application than Sweden (Ibid). Staggeringly, by 2014, every sixth person in Sweden was born in another country (Ibid).

2015 was a record breaking year as more than hundred and sixty-thousand applications were received, comprising of more than fifty-thousand applications by Syrians, forty-thousand by Afghanis and twenty-thousand by Iraqis (Swedish Migration Agency, 2015). The numbers saw a sharp decrease in 2016, and Sweden received approximately twenty-eight thousand applications (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016). Aside from the EU - Turkey Deal that was struck in 2016, the main reason for the decline has been the changes in Sweden's law regarding asylum-applications and migration which could be tackled under two topics, tightened border controls and legislative changes (Swedish Institute, n.d.).

The tightening of border controls started to be implemented in the November of 2015 as a response to the number of asylum-applications and has been revised in January 2016 to continue its work as a means for temporary identity checks (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.). Interestingly, in 2015 Sweden introduced new activities to facilitate labor market entry of asylum-seekers while waiting for their applications to be processed but also upon receiving protection. The goal was to achieve quicker access to job markets, and increased interaction between the host and the soon-to-be refugee (EMN, 2016, p.1). These consisted of "…courses in Swedish, apprenticeships, community information and organised venues where asylum seekers engage together with the local community." (Ibid). Furthermore, the Swedish Government also introduced the programme 'fast track: quicker introduction of newly arrived immigrants' (Snabbspår–Snabbare etablering av nyanlända) in 2015. Specifically aimed at refugees and asylum-seekers with higher education and comparatively better work experiences, the programme allowed for swifter introduction of these people to the labor market so as to ensure faster labor market integration (Ibid, p.3).

On the other hand, limitations to family reunification were brought about, and Change in the Reception of Asylum Seekers Act (LMA) was accepted in 2016 which limited the opportunities of rejected asylum-claimants for reapplication (Isernia et al., 2018,

p.165-166). Moreover, the temporary law was issued in 2016 where the direct pathway to permanent residence permits were changed to the granting of temporary residence permits to refugees (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.). As a result, Sweden lost its recognition as having the most generous asylum-laws in the EU to having the minimum level due to, as Swedish authorities assert, limited burden-sharing by other European countries (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.). This law and its implications will also be further outlined in section 3.1.2.

3.1.2. Temporary schemes of refugee acceptance and implications on structural domains: specific focus on labor market

The current integration policy of Sweden is framed by the reform that was passed in 2010, and it centers around swift and fruitful labor market integration policies. However, temporary changes to residency laws in 2016 paved the way for issues pertaining to the temporariness of a refugee situation and its implications not solely for labor market integration, but integration as a whole, come under review. As mentioned before, the provision of a time-limited protection and extension of rights pertaining to these time-limits is not a new phenomenon in Sweden. Since the appearance of temporary protection scheme in 1992 through UNHCR's "Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Former Yugoslavia" as a response to Yugoslavian disintegration, Sweden accepted Kosovars in 1998 and 1999, and Iraqis in 2006 under the temporary protection scheme. Even though the response was aimed primarily at Bosnians escaping persecution, it is important to note Sweden did not practice this scheme on Bosnians but did practice measures to facilitate their repatriation. In relation, the Bosnian case will also be touched upon.

It is important to emphasize, once more, that temporary protection is designed primarily as a response to mass influx of persons in need of protection and offered a way to decrease the workload this influx may put on asylum schemes in the country of arrival. In relation, this section will delve into the Swedish approach shown to persons accepted under temporary protection, by specifically looking at the case of Kosovars in the last years of 1990s, and the Iraqis in 2006, but also the Bosnians of 1994 as it offers insight into a situation that was deemed being of temporary nature. Specifically, the approach to newcomers by the host's policies, the rights extended to

them will be looked into. Furthermore, space will be allocated to the analysis of the 2016 temporary law that was passed by Sweden and its implications on the labor market integration of Syrians.

In line with the changes to the Aliens Law that entered into force in July 1994, Sweden became able to provide temporary protection to people other than Bosnians if they have escaped a conflict induced region. According to the law, "Temporary protection will be granted for 6 months at a time for a maximum of 1 year. Persons in this category are treated as asylum-seekers during this period and are expected to eventually return to the country of origin." (Humanitarian Issues Working Group, 1995, p.42). With regards, the Kosovar case comprises the first time Sweden practiced the regime of temporary protection (Beirens et al., 2016, p.4). To elaborate, in 1999 the Kosovo crisis pave the way for the largest refugee flows since the end of the Second World War, making "…the lack of a regulatory framework for a situation of mass influx" in Europe clearer (Ibid, p.5). As a result, this has led to the publication of Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in Europe, in 2001 (Ineli–Ciger, 2017, p.144). However, the lack of a shared framework resulted in numerous states acting independently from each other, with each designing a state-specific scheme of temporary protection and therefore differing with regards to statuses granted, permitted duration of stay, asylum-procedures and underlying benefits and rights via integration policies (Ibid). Below is Sweden's experience with the provision of temporary acts to persons in need of protection.

To kick-off, it is important to note that Bosnians were the first to benefit from the temporary protection scheme in Europe, but not in Sweden (Beirens et al., 2016, p.4). Even though, Sweden took in Bosnians, it did so through humanitarian reasons (Ineli–Ciger, 2017, p.131). Correspondingly, Sweden followed the regular asylum procedures for Bosnians who were seeking asylum as they were viewed as refugees based on humanitarian grounds and temporary protection was not adopted (Koser and Black, 1999, p.529). This resulted in the granting of permanent residence permits to Bosnians by 1993 (Ibid). This was not the case in the rest of Europe and Sweden constitutes a singular example. Accordingly, by 1996 Sweden was hosting the second largest group of Bosnians in Europe with fifty-thousand, trailing only Germany which was hosting up to three-hundred thirty thousand refugees (McDonough et al., 2008,

p.31). By next years, the number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina reached approximately seventy-thousand in Sweden (Berg, 2002, p.55). With regards, the regular asylum procedures followed by Sweden allowed for most Bosnian asylum-seekers to receive permanent residencies in Sweden and enjoy most of the rights that native Swedes have (Ibid, p.57).

Moreover, specific to refugee integration schemes, Bosnians were "…offered housing in Swedish municipalities, instruction in Swedish language and the opportunity to take paid employment." (Ibid, p.55). Therefore, with regards to integration, Sweden chose to follow a policy of "…full integration, while also ensuring that voluntary return would be feasible when the situation allowed it." (Ibid, p.57). The similarities with regards to temporary protection comes into picture here. As have been mentioned before, temporariness of protection requires for the host state to design policies aimed at preparing the refugee for voluntary repatriation, if the refugee chooses to do so. Interestingly, even though it provided most Bosnians with permanent residency, Sweden also provided these refugees with the latest information on the situation in Bosnia, and also followed a policy of "…'look and see' visits…which enabled the Bosnians to go back temporarily and assess, themselves whether they thought it was safe to return" (Ineli – Ciger, 2017, p.136). These policies are generally those constructed for persons under temporary protection so as to facilitate refugee's voluntary repatriation as soon as possible and reflect the regarded temporariness of the situation at hand by the host. With regards to labor market integration, it is important to note that Bosnians came into Sweden at a time of decreasing and negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and increasing unemployment rates (Åslund et al., 2017, p.5). However, interestingly, the research has found that Bosnian newcomers climbed the ladder of employment comparatively fast "…reaching their long-term level of relative employment in about 5 years after immigration." (Ibid, p.27). This is evident even though Bosnian refugees of 1993-1994 started off with very high social assistance rates at their households (Ibid, p.29). Corresponding to improved labor market integration, the rate of social assistance showed an immediate decrease (Ibid).

Moving onto the refugee claims from Kosovo, Kosovars in Europe who were under protection were divided into two categories; Kosovars who came into the state by their own means and Kosovars who were transferred under Humanitarian Evacuation

Programmes (HEP) (Ibid, p.86; Ineli–Ciger, 2017, p.144). Sweden attended to Kosovars in the latter category and granted five-thousand Kosovars with temporary residence permits ranging from three-to-eleven months with possibility of renewal and provided them with temporary shelters and basic minimum treatment (Beirens et al., 2016, p.86). Moreover, the temporary protection status granted to Kosovars was done so with the option of either returning back to home country when the conflict concluded, or with the chance to apply for asylum individually (Beirens et al., 2016, p.477). With regards to integration, the temporary protection status allowed them access to Sweden's welfare system, therefore provided them with full integration assistance (Valenta and Bunar, 2010, p.476-477). This assistance by Sweden prioritized their immediate access to the labor market, unlike many other countries (Kerber, 2002, p.203) and was linked with "…extensive, state sponsored repatriation programmes" known as the "two-track policy" (Valenta and Bunar, 2010, p.477). The idea behind this policy response was that if refugees were to stay willingly or because of the continuation of the conflict, they should do so as integrated to the host. Similarly, if the conflict ended and Kosovars were to seek return, they should do so as prepared as possible to restore themselves and the country. In other words, the policy of Sweden combined full-time integration with state-induced aids to promoting repatriation and also preparing for it (Ibid).

It is important to note that this response by Sweden materialized only due to country's previous dealings with designing and implementing a holistic integration policy. In other words, Sweden already had an integration policy at time of Kosovars' arrival that positioned labor market as a priority. This meant that Kosovars who were willing to work had direct access to employment via the provision of residence permits. Similarly, as a cross-sectional issue, Kosovars who were accommodated in residence centers also had the chance to receive language trainings and assistance for up to twenty-hours (Liebaut, 2000, p.286). At the end of the conflict, most of the Kosovars returned. However, when the employment rates of Kosovars who stayed together with all refugees that arrived at Sweden between 1997 and 1999 the picture shows a strong upwards trend. Within a thirteen-year period, employment in refugee men increased from around twenty-eight percent to around sixty-five percent, while it showed an

increase from around eighteen percent to around sixty-one percent (OECD, 2016, p.43).

The next group of refugees granted with temporary protection statuses by Sweden were Iraqis. In 2006, approximately nine-thousand Iraqis applied for asylum in Sweden, out of approximately twenty-three thousand Iraqis that have applied for asylum in Europe (ECRE, 2007, p.3). The comparatively high number of applications could be attributed to the already existing co-ethnic networks in Sweden where approximately seventy-thousand Iraqis were living (Ibid), therefore pointing to the importance of already existing networks at the country of arrival. As a result, Sweden approved somewhere around eighty percent of all applications by Iraqis in 2006 (Ibid). Following a multiculturalist policy on integration, Iraqi refugees were granted access to labor market in less than four months (Ibid). On that note, Sweden was one of the only countries in Europe that was granting either refugee or temporary protection status to most of its Iraqi applicants. In relation, the Director of Sweden's asylum department, Fredrik Beijer, stated that "…even Iraqis with weak individual persecution claims now often get residence permits with full rights to work, and welfare for a practical reason." (Harris, 2007, Retrieved June 23, 2019). He further added "Sweden will not send them back and, figuring they will be in the country for a while, would rather try to integrate them." (Ibid). This quote by a high level director shows a consistent approach to that followed with regards to the Kosovars under temporary protection by Sweden. Once more, a two-track policy is evident, and an approach to temporary protection was adopted in which Sweden 'hopes for the best but expects the worst'. It is important to note, Sweden even offered financial aid to Iraqis willing to return to Iraq, but few accepted the offer in 2008, which led Sweden to start "…reducing their social assistance allowances" (Ibid).

Correspondingly, the difference of labor market integration between non-European and European newcomers are especially apparent in the case of Iraqis. In detail, while only around thirty percent of Iraqis that came into Sweden in 2006 had their first earnings within the first year of their arrival, the rate stood at around forty-five percent of all newcomers from Yugoslavia in the same year (Aslund et al., 2017, p.13). Regarding first real jobs, therefore entry to labor market, as low as eight percent of Iraqis that came into Sweden in 2006 found employment within the first year while

the rate was around twenty-one percent for newcomers from the countries of former Yugoslavia (Ibid). The rate for Iraqis who entered into the labor market after coming into Sweden in 2006 increased to approximately forty percent within a five-year period, while it comprised of around fifty-eight percent for newcomers from the countries of former Yugoslavia that came into Sweden in 2006 (Ibid). It is important to note that this is the case in all Nordic countries even in 2018, as Iraqis have the lowest employment rates with less than forty percent, on average (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019, p.164). Moreover, an analysis of the results of the introduction programme with regards to newcomers' country of origin for the period between 2012 and 2016 has shown that female and male newcomers from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iran and Syria are more likely to be employed than immigrants from Iraq are. Hence, this shows that country of origin as well as educational attainment level matters with regards to employment (Hernes et al., 2019, p.64).

So all in all, it is hard to find a correlation between low labor market integration rates and the temporary protection statuses in Sweden because Sweden by following a two-track policy provided persons under temporary protection with full integration assistance. In other words, the persons under temporary protection were provided with the same services and facilitatory measures as a refugee. As previously mentioned, this is the overall policy followed by Sweden where the goal is for both refugee and the temporary protected as well as the native Swedes to be provided with equal opportunity. It is true that their residency permits are time-bound but the path to apply for extension have always been liberal in Sweden, therefore most people under temporary protection status obtained extensions on their residency permits. While it is true that temporary residence permits effect the employability of a person, Sweden allowed persons under temporary protection to apply for permanent permits if they were to find employment, therefore linking pathway to permanent residency and citizenship to the ability of integrating into the labor market. This comprised Sweden's most viable approach to encouraging integration but also keeping social cohesion.

However, a critique of the labor market integration has been that it "….is slow and success limited, at least in the short run." (Aslund et al., 2017, p.38). Similarly, it is hard for newcomers for non-European countries to find a place in Swedish labor market and even when they do, rarely ever they reach the levels of native Swedes

(Ibid). This has been especially evident in the Iraqi case, as specified above. It is also important to note that Sweden has one of the highest employment rates and has an increasingly less need for low-skilled labor. Therefore, in comparing labor market integration rates within Sweden, one aims for the sky.

It is accurate to say that Sweden's previous pursuits to design and implement an integration policy that is primarily aimed at labor market integration bears fruit, even for cases of persons under temporary protection. As a result of changes to integration policy made by Sweden in 2010, the ten-year period which was thought to be the average for a newcomer to establish themselves in the labor market have been shortening. Figures in 2018 show that almost half of the newcomers that were granted permits in 2011 had found jobs within five-years while almost half of the men found employment within three-years (AIDA, 2018, p.90).

In the face of temporary situations as mentioned in this section and even though it is hard to put a finger on what a temporary situation entails in terms of a time-limit, Sweden is a state that is prepared for the scenario in which refugees could stay in the host country for a time that is longer than expected. In these instances, a response and a plan are required. A swift response has been shown to be only possible via an already existing integration policy and a comprehensively framed integration process, both of which Sweden has. This reality is even clearer with regards to the temporary law that was passed by Sweden in 2016.

In July 2016, a new but temporary law was issued which changed Sweden's refugee acceptance policy and had implications on refugee labor market integration. It was a reactionary attempt to "…the extraordinary refugee situation in 2015", namely the influx of Syrians (EMN, 2018, p.17). Even prior to 2015, in 2014, there were over eighty-thousand asylum-seekers in Sweden comprising mostly of Syrians and Eritreans (Swedish Institute, n.d.).

Following this in 2015, Sweden imposed tighter border controls making it harder to enter Sweden. In turn, this led to a sharp drop in the number of first time asylum application in 2016 (Swedish Institute, n.d.). As a continuation of this trend, it is emphasized that the 2016 law was issued for Sweden to abide to the minimum

standards as outlined by international and European Union (EU) law on asylum as well as to decrease the workload on its institutions (EMN, 2016, p.1). It was titled 'Law on temporary limitations to the possibility of being granted a residence permit in Sweden, 2016:752 (Lag om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige, 2016:752). The law was deemed to be temporary and asserted to be enforceable until 2019. However, after reconsideration in 2019, it was prolonged for another three-years. According to the law, refugees who applied for asylum are to be granted temporary residence permits instead of permanent ones (Ibid). This meant that refugees were to receive temporary permits for up to three-years, and persons in subsidiary protection for thirteen-months at a time, with possibility of extensions (EMN, 2016, p.1). The permit, however, is allowed to be extended for an additional two-years if the grounds for protection still persist (AIDA, 2018, p.80). Furthermore, it limited the asylum-seekers family reunification chances, therefore pushing Sweden to admit that the law was issued as a deterrent to stop more asylum-seekers from coming into Sweden (AIDA, 2018, p.80). The new law demanded that persons who applied for family reunification to prove that they can support not only themselves, unlike the previous law, but the family members that would be coming to Sweden if their application is granted (EMN, 2018, p.28). This was criticized heavily as hampering the newcomers' integration process (Ibid, p.18). Yet, through the analysis undertaken on Sweden's previous dealings with temporary protected refugees, the limitation to family reunification could be deemed to follow suit. This is because Sweden has always viewed labor market entry and employment to be the only viable pathway to integration. In this regard, the limitation on family reunification moves from Sweden's point of view that, if the refugee is unemployed then the refugee is not integrated.

On the other hand, the temporary residences can be transformed into permanent ones, if the refugee is able to prove self-sufficiency even before the three-year or the thirteen-month long temporary permits expires (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.). In other words, the 2016 law could be viewed as a way for Sweden to ensure that refugees who have found employment to be prioritized, hence another sign of the fact that Sweden prefers a working refugee because it holds the view that a refugee who is working is more prone to integrating. This step could also be regarded as a response

to the lower levels of employment in refugees when compared to native Swedes. Yet, only a handful of refugees have been granted permanent residency on the basis of self-sufficiency in the last three years (Ibid). Even more important is the fact that Sweden has shown, since then, a willingness to make the granting of temporary permits and limitations to family reunification the norm for all refugees other than those that are resettled refugees.

Even after 2016, asylum-seekers are still granted access to the labor market within a day of their arrival, but temporary permits were criticized as shifting the focus towards short-term employment (AIDA, 2018, p.62-63). Yet, even in the face of criticism, once again, a scheme that is temporary in nature such as the granting of temporary permits starting from 2016 in Sweden has been combined with strong labor market integration policies. As an answer to above-mentioned criticism, no significant impact of the granting of temporary permits on labor market integration have been found (Blomqvist et al., 2018, p.34). On the other hand, "…results show that a permanent residence permit increases the propensity of taking part in language training compared to the situation when a temporary residence permit is granted." (Ibid). This could be because persons of concern live in ambiguity as to the length of their stay in the country. However, Sweden still offers all refugees, regardless of the permanency or temporariness of their residency, full integration assistance. Specifically looking at the Syrians who came after 2016, the policies followed by Sweden and the rights and opportunities provided accordingly constitutes a policy-lesson for the likes of countries which have recently started to tackle the issue of integration.

Syrians who came after 2016, were provided with temporary residence permits for a length of three-years (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.(b)). This temporary residence permit grants Syrians with the right to work and live in Sweden and provides them with the right to health care similar to a person with permanent residency (Ibid). Syrians are then provided with temporary residence permit cards which grants them the ability to travel in and out of the country as long as their permit is valid, and they have a passport (Ibid). The temporary residence cards have a chip on them that contains the persons' fingerprints and a photo, hence making the process as formally registered as possible so that when a refugee interacts with governmental agencies or seek to benefit from health services, things can be run smoothly and as lawfully as

possible (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d.(c)). Furthermore, in order to obtain these cards, Syrian refugee has to provide the Agency with a standing address (Ibid). In relation, since housing is offered to Syrians who require it under the oversight of municipalities, the addresses provided by refugees are hardly ever false.

Following the provision of these cards to Syrians, they are expected to go to the Swedish Tax Agency, which once again registers into record the Syrian's standing address, his or her marital status, country of citizenship and place of birth to the population registry (Ibid). Hence, the refugee is considered as a part of the Swedish population. This process is required for the refugee with the temporary residence permit to attend 'Swedish for Immigrants' courses as well as to benefit from the Swedish social security system (Ibid). Moreover, this process ends with the provision of a Swedish identity document which provides Syrians with the right to open a bank account (Ibid).

Following this, Syrian refugees are designed an 'introduction programme' which is specific to the individual, adapted to their needs and encouraging of active job-seeking (PES, n.d.). Hence, the goal is for the refugee to learn Swedish and become self-sufficient as soon as possible (Ibid). The refugee is provided with an employment officer with whom they plan activities that best suit their needs such as access to Swedish for Immigrants courses, social orientation course, skills-building courses, job experience via placement, financial support while looking for work, consultation and guidance services for those who seek entrepreneurship (Ibid). The devised introduction programme for the refugee can be viewed via their smartphones (Ibid).

As an incentive for participation once enrolled in the programme, the Syrian refugee is permitted to apply for introduction benefits to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Ibid). The benefit comprises of monetary assistance that is received upon participation in the programme specifically designed for the person (Ibid). The refugee is required to report on activities every month and notify the PES if falls sick (Ibid). Furthermore, the refugee is provided with a per-diem during the devising of the programme which increases once the programme is devised and the refugee participates in activities (Ibid). The assistance is provided for a maximum of five-days per week (Ibid).

With regards to access to labor market, temporary residence permits provide Syrians with similar access to that of permanent ones. More importantly, if the Syrian becomes able to provide for oneself when the residence permit expires, they can apply for permanent residency. However, if they are not able to when the permit expires, the refugee is still able to apply for an extension if they still need protection.

All in all, Sweden's approach to Syrian influx has been one that linked the length of stay to active job-seeking with the overarching goal of making the refugee an official part of the labor force. Hence, an added value to the Swedish society. Moreover, assistance is provided if and only if the refugee is looking for work. On the other hand, any kind of integration-related process in Sweden takes into consideration the needs of the refugee by primarily listening to them and their ambitions and by way of identifying their skills and education so as to decide on the best way to move-forward. In example, refugees can enter their skills and become eligible for a skills validation scheme digitally, in turn employers can view and select a refugee for a job opening they might have (jobskills.se, n.d.). Evidently, once again Sweden is seeking to increase chances of refugee's employment through interaction between the host and the refugees themselves.

What is effectively seen through the example of Sweden in its approach to integration of Syrians are four-fold. Primarily, localities are extended great responsibility as they are the ones to provide housing to the refugee, oversee the provision of healthcare and make sure that education is provided to those children who require it. Secondly, active participation of the refugee in the integration process is encouraged by way of introduction programmes and the linking of the provision of social benefits to their active participation in courses but also in job-seeking. Moreover, if the refugee is highly-educated and skilled, they have the chance to be introduced to the labor market via the 'Fast-track" programme, which seeks the facilitated entry of refugee with desirable skills to the Swedish labor market, by putting refugees through a series of processes for skills evaluation (Pasquarello et al., 2019, p.15). Hence, a great utilization of refugee's skills. Thirdly, combatting discrimination via the issuance of laws and regulations but also via the actions aimed at increased interaction between the Swedes and Syrians. Fourthly, Sweden, even with regards to temporary situations and even in the face of increasingly restrictive policies, has the pathway to permanent

residency and naturalization open for Syrian refugees. Accordingly, Syrians who upon participating in the introduction programmes, find employment and deemed able to care for themselves become eligible to receive permanent residency, even prior to the expiry of temporary permits. Similarly, if their situation stays similar, the permanency has the chance to lead to citizenship in five-years. In this regard, sensitivity shown towards other cultures during the design of the introduction programmes combined with the potential eligibility for long-term stay shows why Sweden is viewed as the country with the most impressive approach to integration and refugee acceptance.

As analyzed in Chapter 2, initiatives by Sweden correspond to how the concept of integration is viewed in literature; a multidimensional process which views diversity as an asset. All these steps taken by Sweden correspond to Ager and Strang's heading called 'Markers and Means' (Ager and Strang, 2004). As a reminder, this heading cover access to health, education, labor market and housing, and achieving public outcomes together with the wider community in these are viewed to be sine qua non for integration (Ibid, p.3-5). In this regard, markers comprise of the domains of health, education, labor market and housing while means comprise of institutions that facilitate, improve and oversee access to these markers. In the Swedish case, for example, means are institutions such as the Public Employment Agency, Swedish Migration Agency or Tax Agency which oversee and pursue to facilitate and improve access to all markers by refugees and immigrants alike.

Moreover, the provision of language courses as well as numerous laws combating discrimination, fall under the domain 'Facilitators'. Furthermore, other similar initiatives are tax incentives to Swede employers in for refugee employment, and organizations of events and funding of refugee associations (EEPO, 2016). These, in turn, spearhead increased interaction between the host and the newcomer, therefore proving that Sweden views integration to be a two-way process and one that could only be achieved via strengthening the domain of 'Social Connection' between the host and the refugee.

In conclusion, referring back to the beginning of Chapter 3, Sweden chose and still chooses to integrate refugees even though their status views them as being temporary. Sweden also empowers them by taking steps to prepare them, if they choose to, for

return as evident from the past examples of Kosovars and Iraqis where a 'two-track policy' was followed. This is also relevant for the current example of Syrians to whom temporary residence permits are being granted. Speaking with regards to all, in Sweden the refugee is empowered via labor market trainings and by citizenship classes on democracy and civic participation, because Sweden wants them to become a part of the wider community if they are to stay. However, Sweden also provides them with necessary information regarding their home country's situation, offers financial aid to potential returnees and also promotes policies like 'look and see' and does not limit these person's ability to travel. Hence, integration is encouraged even in the face of temporary situations that might result in the repatriation of the refugee.

3.2. Turkey

The EU has long considered Turkey as a country of emigration or a country of origin for asylum-seekers (İçduygu, 2011, p.3; Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.3). This rhetoric has gained widespread use as a result of the mass labor emigratory movements by Turks to Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, more than six million Turks are currently living abroad, with approximately five million five hundred thousand of them residing in Western European countries (MFA, n.d.). Similarly, Turkey has been considered as a country of transit, and was one even before the Syrian crisis. In example, approximately "…half a million transit irregular migrants were apprehended" in Turkey in the thirty-years period between 1980 and 2010 (İçduygu, 2015, p.3-4). However, Turkey's position in migratory movements have been undergoing transformation to include country of immigration or destination country. This transformation had commenced in the 1980s and intensified following the end of the Cold War (Kale et al., 2018, p.1).

Yet, Turkey's transformation into a country of transit and country of immigration has never been more pronounced since the start of Syrians inflow in 2011 (İçduygu, 2015, p.3). After living with more than four million refugees and asylum-seekers mainly from the likes of Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, Turkey has de facto become a country of immigration (Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.3). Yet, only in 2017, through a Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) report, Turkey formally recognized country's transformation to a transit and a destination country due to its

geographical proximity to neighboring countries with political, social and economic problems (DGMM, 2017, p.56). The recent acknowledgment of this transition by Turkey, in turn, have prevented from even talking about the prior existence of "…comprehensive integration policies aimed at incorporating…refugees into the wider societal context of the country." (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.62).

Prior to the inflow of Syrians seeking protection, Turkey's response to newcomers were being shaped by the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1934 Resettlement Law followed by the 2006 Settlement Law (İçduygu, 2016, p.6). In this regard, the Settlement Law of 2006 oversee the granting of "…right to permanent settlement in Turkey only to persons of Turkish descent and culture." (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.65). The Settlement Law of 2006, therefore, limited the integration process to the people of Turkish descent. On the other hand, Turkey's geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention denied and still does asylum-seekers from non-European countries the granting of refugee status, hence the right to permanent residency, therefore leaving repatriation or resettlement as the only two options left (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.17). The reasons for Turkey keeping the geographical limitation could be asserted as the instability in the region and its fear of becoming the EU's 'dumping ground'" (Kirişçi 2004; Tokuzlu 2010). However, when thought together, an integration process for non-Europeans and people not of Turkish descent has long been lacking in Turkey. Similarly, it is therefore possible to assert that Turkey's view of migration has been one that upheld the "…nation-state approach of treating migrants as a security threat", especially those coming from countries in the Middle East (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.16). Similarly, it is this thesis' view that the policies designed since the start of the Syrian influx in 2011 show an inclination towards the view that the Syrian population must be threaded carefully as they pose a security threat to the Turkish way of life.

The temporary protection regime promoted by Turkey is an outcome of these past policy responses, or lack thereof, but also as a response to the view that the conflict that gave way to the Syrian influx would end in a short period of time (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.60; Kale et al., 2018, p.10; Yavcan, 2016, p.3; İçduygu and Sert, 2019, p.122). Yet, the combination of the two legislative restrictions, namely the 2006 Settlement Law and the 1951 Geneva Convention, together with the promotion of the

temporary protection which does not offer a pathway to permanent residency, naturalization or citizenship, disqualified Syrians "…from the prospect of long-term integration as a lasting solution." (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.65; İçduygu, 2016, p.6). As a result, even though a strong practitioner of the non-refoulment principle, Turkey did not allow Syrians to apply for asylum and neither provided them with "…a comprehensive migrant integration programme" upon entry (Kale et al., 2018, p.27). However, as time passed, the situation has resulted, primarily, in "protracted uncertainty" due to "…indefinite waiting, limited knowledge, and unpredictable legal status" and further initiated to "…demobilize, contain, and criminalize asylum seekers through the production of protracted uncertainty." (Biehl, 2015, p.57).

Currently, SuTPs in Turkey are, predominantly, located in cities with less than two percent living in temporary accommodation centers (TACs) - refugee camps - therefore making the integration of SuTPs an urban venture (Osseiran et al., 2018). The number of TACs gradually decreased since March of 2018, giving the signs that policies of isolation encouraged in camps have become obsolete, and the protracted Syrian conflict have pushed Turkey to prioritize policies aimed at keeping social cohesion as Turkish officials would emphasize, in urban areas (AFAD, 2018). Similarly, while Syrians living in camps are provided accommodation and their basic needs are catered, they have been living in minimal interaction with the host society, in a state of isolation. On the other hand, Syrians living outside of camps are required to fend for themselves, therefore making policies allowing them access to services is key to their integration and to keeping social cohesion. Yet, even though urban refugees need better access to services such as, housing, education and healthcare (Erdoğan and Ünver, 2015; Erdoğan, 2014), their "…integration prospects are higher compared to camp refugees" (İçduygu, 2016, p.15). This, in turn, shows an approximation by Turkey to the integration of SuTPs.

All in all, the last eight years have shown that Turkey lacks a comprehensive integration policy which attends to the multidimensionality of integration and offers long-term solutions (TBMM, 2018). It is this thesis' view that Turkey has been slow in designing an integratory response to the Syrians in need of protection and that Syrians are "…in an environment of uncertainty under a regime of 'permanent temporariness'" (İçduygu and Sert, 2019, p.123). The protracted stay of Syrians in

Turkey eventually required a move away from policies aimed at the provision of basic needs to a strategy that upholds livelihoods support. Similarly, integration policies designed since the start of the Syrian influx on access to health, education and labor market have been steadily improving, while the same cannot be asserted for housing (İçduygu, 2016, p.23). These improvements have especially been evident in some of the policy steps taken by the Turkish government allowing Syrians with access to the labor market and public schools, which will be outlined in section 3.2.1 (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.18). In this regard, it is this thesis' view that policy responses have been those that followed a policy of 'non-integration' when the Syrian population was confined to camps, followed by a policy of 'integration based on state needs', especially with regards to the labor market, when the SuTPs incorporation became an urban problem.

Correspondingly, primarily a chronological overview of the policy responses by Turkey to the Syrian inflow since 2011 will be outlined so as to provide the evolution of processes of integration designed for SuTPs' incorporation to Turkey, its institutions and society. Lastly, the implications of policies and processes of integration as a response to SuTPs with regards to the domains of health, education, housing and labor market will be provided. The last section will also allocate specific attention to the policies and processes for SuTPs integration into the labor market.

3.2.1. The evolution of integration policy in Turkey and its implications for refugees: The Syrian Case

Since 2011, the civil war in Syria saw the displacement of nearly thirteen million people, more than half of the Syrian population (UN, n.d.). Taking place, both, internally and externally, the latter has since spearheaded the influx of Syrian refugees to neighboring countries, specifically to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017). Out of the thirteen million Syrians, approximately five million six hundred thousand are currently registered under the United Nations mandate (UNHCR , n.d.). In turn, Lebanon is currently hosting approximately sixteen and a half percent while Jordan is hosting around twelve percent of all externally displaced Syrians (Ibid). On the other hand, Turkey is hosting approximately sixty-five percent

of all externally displaced Syrians (Ibid). However, the number of persons seeking protection did not increase overnight.

The influx of Syrians to Turkey commenced in April 29, 2011 with the arrival of two hundred fifty-two Syrians seeking protection via Hatay (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10; Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.3; İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.14). Subsequently, in May, the first tent camp was established in Hatay so as to provide temporary accommodation to the newcomers (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10). Not soon after, as the crisis in Syria intensified, Turkey followed an 'open door policy' accepting all the persons in need of protection (Ibid). At the beginning of the Syrian influx, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was tasked with running TACs, including the provision of health care (Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.4). The responsibility has since been handed to DGMM in 2018, showing a shift in stance towards treating the situation as an issue of harmonization rather than one that requires temporary containment (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10).

Within a year of the commencement of the inflow, in April 2012, Syrian refugees in Turkey started to be recognized as persons under the temporary protection, even in the lack of a legislative framework (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10; Kale et al., 2018, p.10). By the end of 2012, the number of Syrians who have succeeded in entry and registered stood at approximately hundred forty-eight thousand (UNHCR, n.d.). Furthermore, by December 2012, the number of refugees living in camps was standing at close to hundred forty-nine thousand, therefore showing the first signs of the refugee situation becoming an urban undertaking (AFAD, 2013). In the same year Turkey increased the number of its refugee camps and gradually increased their capacity to accommodate more than two hundred thousand refugees (Ibid).

In April 2013, the legislation on international protection, titled Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Law No. 6458 (LFIP) was ratified. This law constituted the first ever asylum law of Turkey, even though the process of keeping social cohesion and policies of incorporation were referred to as 'harmonization' (İçduygu, 2016, p.20; Özçürümez and Yetkin, 2014, p.453). It is this thesis' view that Turkey calls the process of incorporation of Syrians as harmonization rather than integration because of the cautiousness in its approach to tackling the Syrian influx. Moreover, Turkey

has chosen the word harmonization so as to alleviate any connotations of a threat of radical change to the fabric of the Turkish society, hence, to an extent, to keep social cohesion in fear of societal backlash. Furthermore, it spearheaded the establishment of the DGMM as the official body responsible for policy-design and management of all relevant processes on the refugee situation and their integration (Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.4). By May 2013, the number of refugees in camps had increased to hundred ninety-four thousand, of which seventy-five percent were women and children (UNHCR, 2013b). At the same time, more than two hundred ten thousand Syrians were residing in urban locations throughout Turkey, of which only hundred twenty three thousand were registered by the authorities (Ibid).

Even though LFIP created the first protection regime in Turkey, the rights and obligations of Syrians were framed via the Temporary Protection Bylaw that was issued in October 2014 as an addition to the LFIP (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10). The Temporary Protection Bylaw codified "…the legal framework and administrative procedures such as registration and documentation" and facilitated the "…access of Syrians to social services including health, education, and labor market." (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.18). Similarly, this led Syrians to be legally classified as being under Temporary Protection and provided them with Temporary Protection cards through which they became able to benefit from public services. It is also important to mention that this law did not codify a way to permanent residency or naturalization for SuTPs, hence hampering their chances to commit to Turkey's integratory measures for the long-term. Even though some ninety-two thousand Syrians, of which almost half are children, have been granted Turkish citizenship as of August 2019, the process of selection of Syrians to be granted citizenship or permanent residency is unknown and not codified to law by any means (t24, 2019, Retrieved August 5, 2019). Similarly, this Bylaw and the cards did not allow SuTPs with access to banking and financial services, which to this day stands to be problem for Syrians, resulting in variedness of response by financial institutions to SuTPs who wants to benefit from financial services (Memişoğlu, 2018, p.12)

Unexpectedly, 2015 saw a massive increase in the number of Syrians coming into Turkey to seek protection. To put it in perspective, the number of Syrians had increased to approximately five hundred sixty-thousand by the end of 2013, and to

roughly one million six hundred thousand by the end of 2014 (UNHCR, n.d.). However, by the end of 2015, Turkey was hosting approximately two million five hundred thousand SuTPs (Ibid). This meant an increase of almost a million newcomers. By 2015, Turkey had become the country hosting the largest number of refugees, trailed by Pakistan with one million nine hundred thousand, and Uganda with one million two hundred thousand (UNCHR, 2019).

In relation, 2015 comprises an important year in the inflow of Syrians to Europe. This year witnessed sharp increases in the number of people, mostly comprising of Syrians, trying to cross into Europe via the Mediterranean Sea route. The sea route, consisting of sea passages from North Africa, Cyprus and Turkey to the coasts of Europe, was utilized by more than one million people in pursuit of seeking asylum in Europe (RRMMP, 2016, p.27). Specifically, the Aegean Sea route comprised the busiest route of all. By the end of 2015, more than eight hundred fifty thousand people had reached Greece using Turkey's Aegean cost (Ibid). In turn, this led the EU and Turkey come together for a Joint Action Plan to limit irregular migration in 2015 (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10). However, the crossings into Europe continued in the first quarter of 2016 resulting in more than hundred fifty thousand new registrations in Greece by June (RRMMP, 2016, p.45).

Leading the EU to classify the influx as 'refugee crisis' (European Commission, 2016a), the inflow of masses of people into Europe, especially from Turkey subsequently led to the signing of the EU – Turkey Statement and Action Plan (EU-Turkey Deal) in March 18, 2016 (hereinafter the Deal). Entered into force immediately, the Deal could be considered as a success for the EU as it constitutes the main reason behind the decrease in the number of people crossing into Europe from Turkey. For comparison, in April 2016, a month after the Deal entered into force, merely three thousand five hundred people reached Greece using Turkey, instead of the roughly twenty-seven thousand in March 2016 (RRMMP, 2016, p.27). In general, the Deal saw the cooperation of both Turkey and the EU deepen, by way increased security in the Aegean Sea route so as to deter people from taking part in these irregular crossings (EC, 2016b). Furthermore, comprising of a total of nine action points, the Deal saw the operationalization of a return scheme for people trying to cross into Europe via the Aegean route, disbursement of a total of six-billion Euros in

two installments under Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT), and also included points attending to the revitalization of Turkey's accession and visa liberalization processes (Ibid). Looking back at it after three-years, it is possible to emphasize that the Deal served the interests of the EU comparatively better than it did Turkey's, since the number of crossings decreased amply while Turkey's accession talks are still at halt and the visa liberalization talks ended inconclusively.

Domestically, the 2015 Joint Action Plan and the subsequent Deal prompted Turkey's transformation from a transit country, to that of destination, especially with regards to SuTPs (Dimitriadi et al., 2018, p.2). Accordingly, increases in the number of SuTPs in Turkey continued. The number of Syrians reached approximately two million eight hundred thousand by the end of 2016 (UNHCR, n.d.). These events further emphasized the need to design a comprehensive integration policy, even though Turkey had already taken steps for labor market integration of SuTPs in January 2016 via the LFIP and the Temporary Protection Bylaw.

It was after five years through the issuance of the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection (hereinafter Regulation on Work Permits) in January 2016 that SuTPs pathway to gaining formal access to the labor market was finally clarified (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.18). With this Regulation, the conditions of work for SuTPs in Turkey became regulated. While the Temporary Protection Bylaw issued in 2014 gave Syrians the right to work and imposed sectoral and location-based restrictions "…the process to apply for work permits as persons under TP did not come into effect until 2016." (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.21). Correspondingly, SuTPs were "…enabled to be employed in seasonal agricultural work while their employment in other fields was conditionally allowed." (TNPA , 2017, p.17). Looking back at the Regulation on Work Permits, even though conditionalities to work in the health and educations sectors were at place, it comprised the first formal and palpable step taken by Turkey to kick-start the labor market integration of Syrians. The Regulation allowed SuTPs to apply for work permits to the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services (MoFLSS) six months following their registrations (İçduygu, 2016, p.6). Correspondingly, the rights and obligations defined through the Regulation on Work Permits, as well as its

implications on integration, which is defined as being based on state needs, will be further delved into in the section 3.2.2.

Together with the issuance of the Regulation on Work Permits and the signing of the Deal in 2016, the focus was evidently started to shift towards the potential incorporation of SuTPs. Evidently, "A Roadmap for the Integration of All Syrian Children into Turkish Education System" was adopted in August 2016, hence reiterating the idea that Syrian children's education in the Turkish curriculum will gradually become of increasing importance to the facilitation of their incorporation in the near future (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10). Similarly, the focus further turned from the working age population of Syrians to Syrian children by way of their incorporation to the Turkish education system. This is evident from the initiative in 2017 called Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Program that was undertaken with the cooperation of, MoFLSS, Ministry of National Education (MoNE), Turkish Red Crescent and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (UNICEF, n.d.). The CCTE Program's raison d'etre was to provide cash assistance to Syrians who were willingly enrolling to public schools and taking part in classes (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.10). Hence, this action proved to be the first instances of long-term planning becoming operationalized through, not only the issuance of laws, but the supporting of these rules and regulations via practice-level initiatives. This is because Syrian children were not only provided with a legal framework to access education but also were encouraged through cash assistance to enroll and take part in the national education system.

It is evident that Turkey's responses to SuTPs have undergone a transformation in the eight years since the influx started. While at the beginning situation was deemed temporary, as the crisis protracted Turkey started designing integration policies and planning for the long-term. This is especially accurate with regards to rules and regulations surrounding SuTPs labor market integration that came about after five years, in 2016. As the UNHCR emphasizes, this policy comprised the first time in history when a refugee group of this size was allowed access to the labor market of

the host country (UNHCR[1], 2016). The shift towards long-term planning is further reiterated with the steps taken towards the incorporation of Syrian children to public schools under Turkish curriculum.

3.2.2. Temporary Protection and implications on structural domains: specific focus on labor market

In the face of sharply increasing number of asylum-seekers coming from Syria starting from 2011, it became apparent that "…nationally, Turkey has to develop a comprehensive and multifaceted integration program which tackles the areas of decent work, housing, education, and health opportunities and services for the refugees and other migrants" (İçduygu, 2016, p.7). In this regard, Turkey took considerable steps first with the LFIP in 2013, secondly with the Temporary Protection Bylaw and thirdly, through the Regulation on Work Permits in 2016. These steps adhered to the lack of asylum-policy and a much needed national integration strategy in Turkey aimed at the smooth incorporation of newcomers. These laws and regulations were aimed specifically at persons under temporary protection and for those who are not of Turkish descent or coming from European countries.

This thesis argues that even though these regulatory and policy steps taken are in the right direction, it is this thesis' view that the policy responses were belated, and their implementation have been weak or unsatisfactory at best. Aside from structural factors of housing, healthcare and education, this is especially accurate with regards to access to the labor market of Syrians in Turkey. It is important to make the distinction, with regards to policies and processes of integration, that Turkey's response to Syrians should be tackled in two phases. The primary phase is one that is defined through refugee camps – TACs -, while the second phase is 2012 and onwards when SuTPs' incorporation also became an urban issue. Similarly, it is this thesis' view that the primary phase saw policies of 'non-integration' being followed especially with regards to education and labor market, while the second phase is defined through an approach of 'integration based on state needs', especially with

[1] Presentation by Damla Taşkın from UNHCR at 'Integration of the Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection into Turkish Labor Market: Challenges and Opportunities" Meeting on December 2, 2016.

regards to the labor market. In other words, Turkey, primarily, kept the Syrian population out of the Turkish education system, and prohibited their access to the Turkish labor market, hence chose to not take any action with regards to their incorporation to the Turkish society. This lack of action, while being a conscious decision, was fueled by the view that the Syrian crisis was to end soon.

Starting with the primary phase, Turkey's response to the Syrian inflow was one that aimed at their encampment therefore containment in isolation from the host community. The encampment policy was a direct result of the view that the Syrian crisis would end soon. Considered to be state of the art refugee camps (Yavcan, 2016, p.3), these camps constituted the first response by Turkey to Syrians in need of protection. The TACs offered SuTPs with basic humanitarian needs such as accommodation as well as services on healthcare, education, translation, and psychosocial counseling" (AFAD, 2014, p.45). With regards to housing, healthcare, education and employment, the services offered in these camps prior to 2013 must be outlined because policies of integration, or lack thereof, followed in these settings by Turkey are different than those outside of the camps.

In detail, housing to Syrians were provided in these camps through tents and prefabricated houses (Ibid). Healthcare services were provided via mobile hospitals which were established in all the camps (Ibid). And, Syrians staying in these camps were given AFADKART enabling them to purchase food and cleaning items at the grocery stores set up in these camps (Ibid). However, when it comes to education services, the policies of isolation start to become apparent.

The education services were primarily provided by Turkish and Syrian teachers in the camps (Ibid). With the introduction of temporary education centers (TECs) through the MoNE Circular 2014/21 on "Education Services for Foreign Nationals", the education services started to be legally provided to Syrians by these centers, both, in camps and in urban centers. However, these TECs were operational in the camps since 2011. The curriculum included courses on "…science, social studies, mathematics, computer studies, English, Arabic, and other foreign languages." (Ibid, p.49), with little to no pursuits to teach Syrians, Turkish. The instructions provided in educational centers in camps were in Arabic and a modified Syrian curriculum was used (Osseiran

et al., 2018, p.14). This was specifically done to prevent Syrian children from having any problems upon their return to Syria, as the crisis was deemed temporary (Dünya Bülteni, 2012, Retrieved July 20, 2019). Furthermore, aside from setting the legal basis for Syrian children's access to public schools taught in Turkish, the 2014 Circular indicated the first steps taken by Turkey towards an institutionalized and a long-term strategy aimed at educating the Syrian youth and incorporating them into the national education system (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.15). However, prior to the Circular in 2014, one can hardly argue for the existence of integration policies in the education of Syrians, and the prioritization of teaching Turkish to Syrians residing in camps.

Moreover, Syrian refugees in these camps were not allowed to earn an income therefore did not have access to the labor market (AFAD, 2013, p.12). This meant Syrians' isolation from also the labor force, negatively affecting their chances for future employment, as well. Even though there were vocational training, these trainings' link with the labor market was clearly missing (OECD, 2018, p.116).

Hence, the services offered when thought together with the predominant stance by Turkish authorities that the Syrian crisis was to end soon help make the case that these policies in camps, even though offered humanitarian assistance, were of isolation therefore 'non-integration'. To provide context, policies of non-integration are measures taken by states to deter 'temporary' newcomers from staying too long and is achieved by keeping people of concern in isolation, both physically and socially, from the host population. With regards, as the temporary situation protracted, the "…encampment policy of the Turkish government in the early years of the refugee influx failed to serve as a sustainable solution for hosting refugees." (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.14). It is therefore, of importance, to lay-out the difference in Turkey's approach to SuTPs as the situation lengthened in time.

In this regard, when looking at the integration policies implemented for Syrians living outside of the camps, the policies are apparently different than for camps. With regards to structural domains, the LFIP of 2013 and the subsequent Bylaw framing the Temporary Protection status of Syrians in 2014 codified the legal basis for rights and benefits provided to SuTPs living outside of the camps. Similarly, one has to look

at the policies of integration followed regarding structural domains of housing, healthcare, education and labor market.

To first start with housing, Turkey does not offer any public housing to SuTPs living outside of the camps (OECD, 2018, p.116). In turn, this means that these SuTPs have to provide for their personal accommodation and costs of living. Moreover, Syrians living outside of the camps were allowed, at first, to choose the city they preferred to live in and were required to register in these cities by providing an address so as to be granted access to public services, such as health and education (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.68). These, coupled with the fact that Syrians did not have a way into formal labor market until 2016 have resulted in "…overcrowding and poor conditions in certain neighbourhoods." (Ibid). Furthermore, it is viewed that often times numerous families share a single house (İçduygu, 2016, p.7), therefore resulting in registered home addresses to overlap, and sometimes being falsified. One positive policy step in this regard has been the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) initiative which is a cash-assistance scheme, providing Syrians with monthly money transfers by way of debit cards called KIZILAYKART (WFP, 2018) This could be viewed as the AFADKART for Syrians outside of the camps. Reaching and providing cash to more than one-million, ESSN cards assist refugees so they can cover their basic needs such as food, fuel and especially rent (Ibid). The initiative is financed by the money provided to Turkey following the signing of the EU – Turkey Deal in 2016. However, a clash is evident where the Syrian is cut-off from the ESSN cash assistance if the SuTP finds formal employment. Hence, it is viewed that to not lose assistance, SuTPs are pushed towards the informal market (WFP, 2018, p.43).

To pass on to healthcare, the nationwide healthcare services and the access of foreigners to these services were codified in 2013 through the LFIP, even though Syrians had limited access to healthcare services in the provinces they were in prior to this date (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.12). Regarding Syrians, the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation further ensured Syrians' access to health services which are provided by AFAD in coordination with the Ministry of Health (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p.67). Moreover, the circular 2014/4 and circular 2015/8 issued by AFAD have since regulated the provision and the coverage of these services to SuTPs, as these Circulars assert that Syrians who are not registered with the DGMM cannot benefit

from health services aside from emergency and primary services (Ibid). On the other hand, Syrians who are registered have unlimited access to health services in the province which they are registered (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.13). Barriers to SuTPs access to health services are listed as discriminatory practices, language barrier and unsatisfactory knowledge on Turkey's healthcare system as well as the geographical limitation to the provision of social and healthcare services (Ibid). It is important to mention that Turkey has since promoted a fast-track training course for Syrian doctors starting from 2016 to overcome the language barrier and ensure an improved access by SuTPs to health services (Ibid).

With regards to education, the Turkish legislation asserts that all children including children of foreign descent, have the right to free basic education and deems education until the twelfth grade compulsory (OECD, 2018, p.116). Similarly, Turkey granted Syrians access to institutions of higher education, as well (Ibid). However, there are currently more than a million Syrian children who are of school-age, making the domain of education a crucial aspect for keeping social cohesion in the long run, especially regarding the primary and secondary education (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.14). Prior to the MoNE's 2014 Circular, pathway for Syrian children to enroll in public school was not clear. Through the Circular in 2014, ministerial and provincial commissions were established to focus on the needs of Syrian children as well as to oversee coordination between international organizations and the civil society (Ibid). Furthermore, the provincial commissions were tasked with offering the right educational services to Syrian children such as determining the level in which refugee children were to enter the public educational system (Ibid). For long, an option to public schools were TECs where a curriculum based on Turkish teaching started to be provided following the establishment of Migration and Emergency Education Department (MEED) (Ibid). The Department is within the Directorate General for Lifelong Learning under the MoNE (Ibid). Correspondingly, MEED became the "…key unit responsible for planning, legislation, implementation, and coordination of education and complementary services" (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.15) to all refugees regardless of their duration of stay. It is important to mention that Turkey decided to gradually close down the TECs for a smooth transition of these children to the public education system due to comparatively worse quality of education in these centers

(İçduygu, 2016, p.6). As a result, a decrease in the number of TECs since 2016 is evident together with an increase in the number of Syrian children enrolled in public schools (MoNE, 2019).

However, the flow of students coming into public schools brought with them problems, as "…language barriers, together with the limited capacity of schools, pose serious challenges for the education of refugee children and youth." (İçduygu, 2016, p.16). This is especially accurate as TECs were offering courses in Arabic with limited provision of Turkish courses, and the education is seen in Turkish in public schools. Similarly, the interaction between the TECs and public schools is an interesting one. This is because the reason for TECs to be formed was due to the language barrier Syrian children would face in public schools. However, due to the low quality of Turkish language teaching in TECs, this transition from TECs to public schools comprises a recurring problem. It must be pointed out that the steps taken since 2016, prove a shift in Turkey's approach to refugees which involved long-term planning and a transition from secluded classrooms to mixed education in public schools (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.18).

Now, the point of focus for Turkey's integration process, the labor market. Labor market integration comprises a cross-cutting issue as correct labor market integration policies prove useful for cultural exchange between the newcomer and the host, facilitate language learning and help the newcomer gain self-sufficiency and keep self-dignity (İçduygu, 2016, p.26-27). More specifically, in a country like Turkey "…with its large informal labour market and shaky-functioning welfare state, a rapid and vigorous integration of refugees into labour markets is essential." (İçduygu, 2016, p.8). In this regard, in the face of more than two million SuTPs who are of working age, "Turkey faces two choices; it will either enjoy the new human capital resources by improving their integration process and benefit from their contribution, or else it will create a risky population seeking jobs in the informal sector." (Ibid, p.17). As a result, a gradually increasing focus has been provided to designing integration policies aimed at structural factors, especially the labor market integration, rather than those aimed at social inclusion (Ibid, p.24). With regards to SuTPs, the LFIP Article 89/4/b made it possible for those who have legal refugee status to be granted right to work six-months after their international protection claim (OECD, 2018, p.116). Moreover,

through the Temporary Protection regulation in 2014, Syrians were provided with the right to be granted work-permits (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.20). However, only through the Regulation on Work Permits, their legal pathway to obtaining work-permits was regulated (Ibid). This Regulation proved the shift in Turkey's approach to SuTPs from seeking humanitarian aid to livelihoods support, an integral part of integration (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.18).

The conditions provided by this Regulation can be tackled in seven points. Primarily, the Regulation obligates that the applicant must have a temporary protection identification card and a number that starts with '99' (Ibid, p.20). Secondly, the applicant has to have been in Turkey and registered for temporary protection for at least six months before the work-permit application is submitted (Ibid, p.20-21). Thirdly, the number of SuTPs employed in an enterprise cannot exceed ten percent of the number of Turkish employees with an exception in civil society organizations (Ibid, p.21). Fourthly, persons under temporary protection can only work in the province in which they are registered with the DGMM. However, the DGMM holds the right to authorize SuTPs' relocation to another province in case of an employment opportunity (Ibid). Fifthly, applications can be made online through the e-government website and only by employers for employees (Ibid). It is important to note that this Regulation in 2016 also provided a legal basis for entrepreneurial initiatives by SuTPs, allowing them to apply for a work-permit independently by themselves, if they were to formally establish and register their companies (Ibid). Sixthly, the Regulation allowed for exemption from obtaining work-permits to persons under temporary protection willing to work in seasonal agricultural and animal husbandry sectors (Ibid). Last but not least, Regulation on Work Permits brought conditionality to person under temporary protection seeking work in the health and education sectors. In other words, SuTPs who want to work in these sectors has to approach the relevant ministry to receive their permission before applying for a work-permit (Ibid).

The conditions and procedures as listed above, as well as the sectoral and geographical restrictions imposed on Syrians have pushed majority of SuTPs into the informal market and fueled their employment without formal authorization (Osseiran et al., 2018, p.21). However, it can be viewed that conditions and procedures themselves are very limiting. Together with these, a lack of public effort to documenting and

validating the skills of SuTPs further fueled informality, as even the Turkish government does not know the skills-set of Syrians it is currently hosting. This is mainly because the registration of Syrians was not undertaken in a detailed manner, where Syrians' qualifications and educational attainment levels, even by declaration, were not gathered. In turn, initiatives are being undertaken by the likes of international and private organizations to fill this gap (ILO[2], 2017; TOBB[3], 2017). Even after the Regulation on Work Permits, access to labor market still comprises one of the biggest obstacles hindering SuTPs integration into the working life of Turkey. It is accurate that important steps have been taken, yet the low levels of work-permits granted to SuTPs prove that problems still exist. When the presence of more than two million Syrians who are of working age is thought together with the fact that a mere thirty one thousand hundred eighty-five SuTPs were granted work-permits by 31 March 2019 (Bianet, 2019, Retrieved August 1, 2019), shows that "Turkey still needs to adopt policies and a clear roadmap to facilitate labour market integration of Syrian refugees" (Köşer Akçapar, 2017, p.8).

In this regard, it is accurate to assert that Turkey was late in providing a legal pathway to labor market entry to SuTPs. As a result, "This has led to the creation of a dual labor market where refugees are willing to work for two-thirds of the wages paid to locals." (Yavcan, 2016, p.4), therefore deeply affecting chances of keeping social cohesion in the long run. Furthermore, reports of abuse of Syrian workers as well as problems of discrimination and provision of low wages in the labor market by 2016 and onwards have been recorded (Carrera and Vankova, 2019, p.28). Similarly, it was further emphasized that "…those in employment need evening courses to pursue formal language-learning" but that these courses are rarely available (Ibid). Hence, asymmetry in the provision of a legal pathway to accessing the labor market with the insufficiency in the provision of necessary services to facilitate this access.

When viewed all together it is obvious with regards to the labor market integration policies promoted by Turkey that the country aims at integration based on its needs. This is evident in the ten percent quota, which was promoted to protect the local labor

[2] See 'ILO Workshop on the Validation of Informal and Non-formal Learning for Refugees'
[3] See 'Living and Working Together: Integrating SuTPs to Turkish Economies in Turkey'

force, as well as the imposed restrictions on sectors like education and health. However, it is even more apparent in the workings of the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR). While the ten percent quota is imposed on all employers, when an employer wants to surpass that quota to employ another SuTPs, he or she has to prove that the company could not find a Turkish citizen that satisfies the job requirements to be employed for the position. The issue is then passed on to İŞKUR, which has to get back to the employer at most in four weeks-time. It is only if İŞKUR deems the lack of a Turkish citizen who satisfy the vacant position's requirements accurate that an exemption to the employer to surpass the ten percent quota is granted (Özpınar et al., 2016). Hence, a great example of integration based on state needs in the face of a situation that has been deemed temporary. Moreover, long waits for the finalization of work-permit applications and the lack of right to work in this waiting period have also posed limitations to formal labor market entry, and pushed SuTPs into the informal labor market, hence increasing chances for their exploitation via low wages, and long working hours (İçduygu and Diker, 2017, p.24). Presently, it is viewed that this is the case. A 2019 Report has stated that up to a million SuTPs are employed informally and paid less than minimum wage in Turkey (CHP, 2019, Retrieved August 20, 2019).

Similarly, the low number of work-permits granted to SuTPs point to low levels of labor market integration, but also increased participation by SuTPs in the informal labor market. This in itself brought with it problems of discrimination, marginalization and exploitation (Carrera and Vankova, 2019). When combined with the fact that Turkey does not offer public housing to SuTPs, the late labor market entry policies have definitely impacted Syrians' integration negatively, as mentioned before, housing is a consisting problem. In this regard, it is proven that Turkey's integration policies, or lack thereof, have predominantly been framed by its approach to the Syrian influx as being temporary. This approach prevented Turkey from taking swift action by granting Syrians with immediate access to the labor market and eventually fueled SuTPs entry into the informal labor market.

However, the limitations have resulted in an unexpected outcome. According to the June 2019 declaration by the Minister of Trade, the number of Syrian companies in Turkey had reached fifteen thousand hundred fifty-nine (CNNTURK, 2019, Retrieved

June 15, 2019). It is important to note, also, that these companies account for almost one-third of all work-permits granted to SuTPs as they formally employ ten thousand forty-six Syrians. (Ibid). Hence, these numbers have pointed to the crucial role of refugee enterprises and entrepreneurship in tackling the low levels of labor market integration among SuTPs and also in filling gaps in integration policies regarding all structural factors. Interestingly, these figures show that these structural factors which comprise the barriers to formal labor market access are visibly easier to overcome in Turkey's case through entrepreneurial initiatives. Similarly, while it is accurate that the considerably low success rate for entrepreneurial initiatives in general make the establishment of these enterprises risky at best, the comparatively strong role of refugee enterprises in the formal labor market for refugees point to a consistent inclination by Syrians to still take this risk.

Similarly, entrepreneurship is also way for increased give-and-take between the host and the SuTPs, especially with regards to the language barrier which comprises the biggest obstacle SuTPs face in entry into the labor market (Building Markets, 2017, p.19). However, research also shows that active Syrian business owners, in time, find a way to overcome the language barrier (Building Markets, 2018). Evidently, the reasons behind this are regarded to be numerous, such as hiring Turkish-speaking personnel, learning the technical language, or benefiting from professional support catered to the needs of the Syrian business community (Ibid, p.11). Moreover, another option has been the Syrian and Turkish partnered companies (Ibid). As a result, one can assert that the advantages of entrepreneurship in refugees is evidently cross-sectional, influencing the acquisition of all structural factors of integration to not only the entrepreneur but to the employees of the refugee enterprise. Moreover, entrepreneurship have also been documented to facilitate cultural exchange and Turkish language learning (Ibid). SuTPs' slow but steady inclination towards entrepreneurial initiatives, due to barriers to labor market entry as an employee as well as the poor conditions in the informal labor market, is therefore evident.

All in all, Turkey's approach to the Syrian influx as being temporary can be viewed in two distinct integration policies, one with regards to camps and one for outside of the camps. The policies in camps have been one that followed 'non-integration' and aimed at dealing with the influx in isolation from the host community. This is

especially evident as Syrian children in camps were primarily provided courses in the Syrian language and followed the Syrian curriculum, with little regard to Turkish language training. The policy of non-integration is further reiterated as camp stayers did not have a legal pathway to earning incomes. However, as these camps started to close, and with the protraction of the Syrian crisis, the transition of Syrian children from temporary education centers to the Turkish national education system have started to be prioritized. As a result, more than six hundred thousand Syrian children out of a million have enrolled to Turkish educational institutions for the 2018-2019 education year (HDN, 2018, Retrieved February 4, 2019).

With regards to the integration policies followed by Turkey for SuTPs living outside of the camps, it is this thesis' view that these policies have primarily view the situation as temporary and predominantly prioritized the needs of the state rather than the Syrians. Regarding the former, Turkey's primary approach to the Syrian crisis as being temporary induced deeper problems with regards to the lack of Turkish language teaching to adults. It is stated that seventy percent of Syrian women cannot speak Turkish (UN Women, 2018), while it is worded by unofficial sources that ninety percent of all Syrians above the age of thirty-five cannot (Dursun, 2019, Retrieved March 9, 2019). In most cases, in the face of this language problem, Turkey offers adult SuTPs with Turkish courses via the leadership of the civil society or EU programmes but lacks a cohesive strategy. As a result, insufficient Turkish language level still poses the biggest barrier to SuTPs' access to employment (TÜRK KIZILAY, 2019, p.5). Similarly, it has been observed that entry into employment has a positive effect on language learning, even though the same the same report asserted that more than seventy-percent of Syrians do not have a command of Turkish (İNGEV and IPSOS, 2017, p.4).

On the other hand, while access to healthcare and education as they comprise the most basic human rights, were provided via Turkey's weak welfare system, the same cannot be asserted for labor market and housing. Turkey's approach to SuTPs' labor market integration has been framed by its policies of integration that prioritize the needs of the state and its people, rather than a combination of these with the needs of the Syrians. It must be mentioned that unregistered work has been popular in Turkey for a long time and is not a new phenomenon (Özçürümez and Yetkin, 2011, p.454).

However in the lack of a cohesive integration policy, unregistered employment only became more pronounced with the arrival of SuTPs. As explained through the example of İŞKUR's policy approach, it is this thesis' view that the Regulation on Work Permits, in addition to being designed five years late in the game, by way of the limitations and restrictions it brought to labor market access, reduces SuTPs chances of integration while encouraging informality, shadow economy, exploitation and also causing problems in finding suitable accommodation.

All in all, one can assert that Turkey, belatedly but surely, shifted its stance from viewing the Syrian crisis as being temporary to being long-term. Correspondingly, this shift has resulted in the issuance of laws and regulations pertaining to SuTPs' access to health, education, housing and employment. Yet, it can be viewed that in most cases, these laws and regulations were drawn up with the prioritization of the needs of the state such as making SuTPs less visible, rather than a combined effort that promotes the incorporation of the refugee to the workings and realities of the state. Similarly, it is this thesis' view that the laws and regulations were not reinforced with state-induced planning and support initiatives therefore resulted in less than ideal public outcomes. In other words, while certain markers such as healthcare and education were provided to SuTPs almost immediately, Turkey has performed poorly with regards to housing and SuTPs enhanced access to employment. Similarly, it is viewed that the performance of Turkey in the domain of 'Facilitators', consisting of the provision of language training as well as combating discrimination, have also been less than ideal, with problems in both are still-apparent.

3.3. Conclusion

As it was clearly emphasized in Chapter 2, the process of integration requires long-term planning that takes into consideration the needs of both the host and the newcomer. Yet, in the face of situations that are deemed temporary, the concept of integration seems to be at a stalemate. In this regard, the options for integration in countries of arrival are, therefore, limited by the deemed temporariness of the situation at hand. These options, in turn, include following policies of integration, policies of non-integration or policies of integration based on state needs.

One is able to see examples of implementation of all three integration policy approaches to situations that are viewed to be temporary in the country examples of Sweden and Turkey. The examples of Kosovars, Iraqis and lastly the Syrians, have shown Sweden's capability to approach temporary situations with policies of integration. In other words, Sweden was able to carry-out policies and practices of integration while also equipping refugees with the necessary tools to facilitate their repatriation. This was only made possible due to Sweden's readily-available integration policy that have been devised since 1970s and the 'two-track policy' it has followed, accordingly.

On the other hand, Turkey chose between a policy of non-integration and policy of integration based on state needs and transitioned from the former to the latter, purely because of the fact that Turkey did not have a pre-existing integration policy aimed at non-Europeans as well as Europeans alike. Hence, Syrians comprise its first real toil with the concept of integration for persons other than those of Turkish descent or European refugees. Correspondingly, Turkey followed policies of isolation regarding the SuTPs in camps, solely focusing on their return. However, the encampment policy proved unserviceable as the crisis lingered on and even hampered future chances of integration of Syrians.

Moving on from encampment due to protracted Syrian crisis, Turkey started implementing policies that were carefully designed so as to not bring about radical changes that could result in host society's broodiness. Hence, policies of integration that were designed based on the needs of the state became apparent. Subsequently, these policies, while offering some solutions, have mostly resulted in low levels of integration, especially to the labor market. Even more, since these policies lacked cohesiveness with each other, they started to work against each other. This, in part, was also a result of the comparatively late designing of these policies, as well as the reality that these policies did not take into consideration the specific needs of the Syrian community in Turkey. Furthermore, it is evident from analysis that Turkey lacked in designing support initiatives to help with the smooth implementation of these policies.

The analysis of country examples has shown that Turkey could learn from Sweden. As evident from Sweden, designing an integration policy is not an overnight endeavor and even though Turkey did take steps in the right direction and fared fairly well to the mass influx of Syrians, it did so in a delayed manner. While, as mentioned before, the magnitude of the refugee problem is nowhere near comparable between the two countries, this does not take away from favorable policy responses. It is, therefore, this thesis' view that there are certain areas that need immediate response and Sweden can provide a good example. Yet, referring back to the literature review in Chapter 2, Turkey has to find its own way to approach the process of integration that pertains to the need for idiosyncratic interpretations of integration. In other words, Turkey, while could take Sweden as a guiding light, must be determined to design an integration policy that is fully Turkish, that attest to the specificities of the Turkish way of life, whatever this may mean.

Primarily, it is important to assert that an analysis of these country examples have shown that integration policies of countries differ from one another, primarily, on the basis of how they approach diversity stemming from the inflow of newcomers. While Sweden is an example of a multiculturalist country since 1975, Turkey is defined as a nation-state. In part, as a result of this, Sweden has been in the continuous process of designing a national integration policy since the 1970s, while Turkey, through the Syrian case, has only recently commenced. Yet, when thought together with the literature review in Chapter 2, it is hard to talk about integration as a two-way process when the host country is upholding the notions of nation-state whereby the dominant culture expects to saturate the newcomers and their cultures. Hence, Turkey must commence with the design of policies of cultural tolerance so as to facilitate a transition to integration.

Secondly, the analysis of country examples has also proved that having a pre-existing national integration strategy is vital to being able to respond immediately to the inflow of refugees. When thought together with the fact that the process of integration for the refugee starts at the moment of their arrival, the lack of an integration strategy hinders a country's response time and therefore chances of refugees' integration into the host, both in the short-term and in the long. In country examples, it is viewed that while Sweden has a defined set of rules to immediately adhere to the many challenges a

refugee would face upon arrival, Turkey had to design these policy responses simultaneously while a gradual increase in the number of Syrians was taking place. Hence, the slow response time by and less than ideal integration outcomes in Turkey with regards to Syrians.

Thirdly, Turkey's integration pursuits are too scattered and must become cohesive and open to monitoring to yield better results. Sweden considers the personal needs as well as qualifications and devises a tailor-made programme aimed at increasing the employability and improving the language proficiency of the refugee, cohesively. This process unfolds via the access to Swedish for Immigrants courses, social orientation courses, skills-building courses, job experience via placement, financial support while looking for work, consultation and guidance services for those who seek entrepreneurship (PES, n.d.). Hence, accepting that integration is a two-way process and that the process of integration does not follow a linear-path but requires an overall effort to tackle its multidimensional structure. As important, a condensed view of approaching integration is required where, to refer back to the literature review in Chapter 2, an answer to the question 'Integration into what?' could be provided. A response of this kind is lacking in Turkey, since the temporary status merely grants access to labor market to SuTPs but does not provide any means for their smooth transition into the formal labor market. As evident from the low levels of work-permits granted to SuTPs since 2016, low levels of Turkish proficiency among adult SuTPs since 2011, one can assert Turkey has failed in achieving public outcomes together with the wider community due to a scattered approach to integration. Therefore, it is this thesis' conclusion that while the legal basis for SuTPs have been codified, the policies, as their real-world applications were not monitored, did not result in envisaged outcomes. In relation, as the literature on integration asserts, a successful integration process almost always requires constant monitoring of results yielded at the policy and practice levels. The same is obviously relevant in Turkey's case, as well.

An example of this scatter is the cash assistance initiative in Turkey, the ESSN, which provides SuTP households with monthly assistance to cover the costs of rent and food. However, while the assistance in Sweden is one that encourages labor market integration and formal employment, in Turkey, ESSN discourages SuTPs from

accessing the formal labor market and encourages their informal employment. This is because the provision of this humanitarian assistance is linked to unemployment, posing a barrier to formal employment in SuTPs. In other words, if the SuTPs finds formal employment, the aid is cut. The effects of this assistance on Turkish language learning is understudied, yet a survey conducted in 2019 by KIZILAY, the body responsible for overseeing the ESSN, shows that approximately seventy-nine percent of all cash assistance beneficiaries have basic level Turkish language command (TÜRK KIZILAY, 2019, p.2). However, as the focus of Turkey now shifted from humanitarian support to livelihoods support, a change in the regulations of cash-assistance can do wonders. Moreover, barriers to SuTPs employment such as the six-months waiting period to be eligible for work-permit upon arrival and unemployability during the lengthy work-permit application finalization period must be corrected. In Sweden, any refugee with a residency permit is allowed entry to the labor market directly if they can find a job. Moreover, an asylum-seeker is allowed entry to the labor market on the day of arrival if they are able to prove their identity. While as the ten-percent quota already poses a great barrier to SuTPs formal employment, it is this thesis' view that Turkey must gradually elevate this barrier so as to not cause backlash from its society as unemployment rates have been on the rise in Turkey.

Fourthly, Turkey must codify the pathway to citizenship for SuTPs or at least to their permanent residency which would imply a positive integration process. While a protracted temporariness is evidently hampering participating of Syrians in integratory measures, a clear pathway to citizenship or permanent residency would provide an encouragement to participate. Even though SuTPs are being granted Turkish citizenship or permanent residency, the legal basis for this act is non-existent and requirements are ambiguous at best. On the other hand, Sweden offers a pathway to permanent residency and eventual citizenship to Syrian with temporary residence permits very clearly and links it to the labor market outputs. In other words, if the Syrian becomes able to provide for oneself when the residence permit expires, they can apply for permanent residency.

Fifthly, Turkey must provide localities with increased responsibility in the integration processes of Syrians and provide a regulatory framework pertaining to it, rather than

carrying-out these responsibilities in an informal manner. In Sweden, municipalities are tasked with providing healthcare and educational services to the refugee, as well as accommodation. Furthermore, through the 2010 changes in integration policy in Sweden, municipalities gained the right to provide performance-based bonuses to newcomers and became responsible of providing civic orientation to newcomers, for a minimum of sixty-hours, so as to increase their knowledge on human rights, democratic values, and about the daily life in Sweden. Hence, Sweden views integration as a local process. On the other hand, the role of municipalities in the integration of SuTPs in Turkey is almost non-existent and results in numerous different approaches. While a city like Gaziantep has been working towards building bridges with the Syrian community (IOM, 2018), another city like Bolu is able to choose to opt out from providing Syrians with basic needs (Sputniknews, 2019, Retrieved March 15, 2019).

Lastly, Turkey must re-direct its focus on integration from one that prioritize the needs of the state to one that focuses on the two-way process of integration as the literature asserts and position the labor market at its focal point. In Sweden, the monetary assistance to Syrians is provided as long as they actively participate in the integratory measures designed pertaining specifically to their needs. In detail, participation in the 'introduction programme', in which the primary goal is to equip the persons of concern with the necessary skills to enter the labor force, sequentially results in increased per-diem benefits and also increases the chances of obtaining a permanent residency permit for the Syrian. So one can assert that while by putting conditionality to the provision of monetary assistance Sweden is increasing the chances of participation by the refugee to the programme, it is also investing in its future cohesion.

A saving grace that data shows is entrepreneurship in SuTPs in Turkey. This, to a certain extent, seems to offer a solution to the belatedness of policy-design that have hampered chances of integration of Syrians, by way of creating value for the Turkish economy, generating employment but also by encouraging self-sufficiency and self-dignity. When thought together with the 2017 study which found that seventy-five percent of all Syrians are thinking of staying in Turkey, even after the war ends (Erdoğan , 2017, p.38-39) the issue becomes more pressing. Hence, at a time when

repatriation of SuTPs seems a far, and Turkey's belatedness in designing integration policy responses have resulted in less than ideal public outcomes, entrepreneurship offers a viable solution to enhancing the integration process for SuTPs but also keeping social cohesion. With regards, this thesis views that if the barriers to Syrian entrepreneurs' entry into the labor market can be reduced, Syrians' formal employment opportunities will increase. This will be supported with survey findings as results show that Syrian enterprises show a clear inclination to employing other Syrians in their businesses. Hence, overall integration of SuTPs will therefore be facilitated as more will automatically have employment opportunities. Hence, Chapter 4 will seek to tackle this issue by providing the results of the surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep and analyze whether the problems mentioned as to Turkey's current integration policies are relevant to SuTP entrepreneurs.

CHAPTER 4

REFUGEE ENTERPRISES IN THE LABOR MARKET OF TURKEY: SURVEY FINDINGS

A review of the policy responses by Turkey to the influx of Syrians with regards to their integration in Chapter 3 have shown that while integration policies were designed in a delayed manner and also in a manner that puts the needs of the Syrians at the back-seat. The difference became apparent when compared with Sweden, a country that has been in pursuit to constantly improve its integration policies and seek to achieve equality in opportunity between the host and the newcomer. Similarly, a review of labor market integration policies in Turkey have also shown that entrepreneurship holds a very distinct position as it offers an alternative path to tackling issues of integration for Syrians. This is due to the fact that pathway to be granted work-permits being easier for Syrian entrepreneurs in comparison to Syrians looking for formal employment opportunities as the latter are left to the mercy of employers since they are the ones that can apply for Syrians' work-permits. Moreover, the additional economic advantages and returns refugee entrepreneurship brings is evident as more than one third of all work-permits issued to SuTPs since 2016 have been to SuTPs working in these refugee enterprises.

The studies carried-out to measure the impact of SuTPs on Turkish labor market further supports the gains that can be acquired by giving a primary role to entrepreneurship in refugees as a driver of SuTPs' integration into the formal labor market. On this note, Del Carpio and Wagner assert that the inflow of Syrians paved the way for increases in formal employment and spearheaded job creation, yet further emphasize that people with high-skills are generally underemployed in informal jobs (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). Furthermore, the authors assert that women get impacted the most from the introduction of new human capital by way of Syrian

influx, as seven women are displaced from jobs for every ten refugees (Ibid). Moreover, Cengiz and Tekgüç assert that the influx of Syrians to the labor market did not have any negative impact on the employment of natives, nor on their wages (Cengiz and Tekgüç, 2017). Similar to Del Carpio and Wagner, the authors also assert that the influx of Syrians have spearheaded the increase of formal employment among Turkish citizen (Ibid). Furthermore, Ceritoglu et al. have found that the impact of Syrian refugee on the Turkish labor market to be quite limited (Ceritoğlu et al., 2017). Similarly, these authors also assert that the influx have had considerable effect on the employment outcomes of native Turks but had limited impact on natives' wages (Ibid). Moreover, Ceritoğlu et al. emphasize that women, younger workers, and the less-educated have been affected the most (Ibid). Similarly, Balkan and Tümen found that the Syrians' presence in the labor market have spearheaded the decline of wages by four percent in the informal sector (Balkan and Tumen, 2016). Furthermore, the authors assert that local workers are being replaced by Syrian workers in the informal sectors (Ibid).

All in all, the findings with regards to the impact of Syrians on the Turkish labor market varies. Yet, most of these studies agree that Syrians are predominantly working informally therefore have limited impact on the formal employment opportunities of natives. However, as informal employment is a widespread problem even among the natives and has been for a long time in Turkey, the fact that Syrians are providing a substitute for native workers in the low-skilled sectors only adds to the problem which is increasingly becoming much more pronounced. In turn, refugee enterprises and refugee entrepreneurship prove to be a viable option to spearheading the much needed transition of SuTPs who are working informally to the formal labor market.

In this regard, Chapter 4 will provide the results of surveys that have been conducted with the Syrian owners of companies in Gaziantep. The survey was aimed at contributing to the process of labor market integration among SuTPs by way of underlining the vital role of entrepreneurship in facilitating Syrians' integration into the formal labor market. Furthermore, surveys targeted to define the obstacles and hardships Syrian entrepreneurs face so as to also pinpoint areas that should comprise the focus of any integration policy aimed at incubating and encouraging

entrepreneurship. Lastly, the survey results will be tackled in light of the conclusions arrived at the end of Chapter 3 so as to analyze whether the recommended policy-focuses for a comprehensive integration policy for Turkey holds true.

To do so, results of surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep will be provided in section 4.1. Lastly, alternative policy options, as derived from the main findings of surveys, that should be promoted by Turkey to encourage entrepreneurship among SuTPs will be provided (4.2.) and will be tackled with the conclusions outlined in Chapter 3 in mind.

4.1. Survey Findings

4.1.1. General Information

The survey participants included three different groups of Syrians (Figure 3). While all were SuTPs at the time of their arrival to Turkey, twenty-three percent of the respondents have, since establishing their companies, been granted Turkish citizenship, with eighteen percent of the respondents waiting for their citizenship applications to finalize. Moreover, fifty-nine of the respondents are still SuTPs.



Figure 2. Status of survey respondents

Out of the twenty-two Syrian enterprises who were surveyed, two were operating in the manufacturing sector, ten in the services sector, five in the retail sector while the other four were operating in fitness, advertisement, trade and education sectors.

Out of the Syrians with whom the surveys were conducted, the oldest was born in 1950 while the youngest in 1996. All of the respondents were males, and twenty of the twenty-two respondents were owners of the companies with the title owner, CEO

or general manager, while one respondent was the public relations manager, and another was the head of accounting in a family business.

Out of all the respondents, most came to Turkey between the years 2014 – 2016 with fifty-five percent, while thirty-two percent of the respondents stated that they came between 2011 – 2013, and fourteen percent after 2016.

Moreover, thirty-six percent of the respondents asserted that they did not know Turkish while sixty-four percent asserted that they did. Interestingly, none of the Syrians who arrived at Turkey after 2016 stated that they know Turkish. Out of the all the respondents who stated that they know Turkish, forty-three percent came to Turkey between 2011 – 2013 while fifty-seven percent between 2014 – 2016. More interestingly, out of the forty-three percent that came to Turkey between 2011 – 2013, eighty-three percent of them stated they have a Turkish language certificate from an accredited institution, namely, from Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Center of Ankara University (TÖMER), Gaziantep University, and Anadolu Center for language teaching.

Similarly, of all the Syrian respondents, thirty-six percent came to Turkey between 2014 – 2016. All have asserted that they know Turkish, but only three asserted that they have Turkish certificates, from TÖMER and Anadolu Center. Hence, it is viewed that time of arrival has an impact on native language learning as well as participation in language courses since SuTPs that arrived at Turkey after 2016 asserted that they do not know Turkish and have not participated in any of the Turkish language trainings. It is also important to note, as was visible in field visits to conduct surveys, speaking in Turkish and literacy are two different endeavors as most Syrians had a hard time reading and understanding the questions in Turkish. Hence, the translation of the surveys to Arabic was met with positivity.

Out of all the respondents, twenty-three percent have participated in a single vocational training course in Turkey, while twenty-seven percent asserted that they participated in more than one vocational training course. The remaining fifty percent stated that they did not attend any vocational training course. When the institutions from which SuTPs have received a certificate of vocational education and training

(VET) is analyzed, it is viewed that out of the fifty-percent who have participated in one or more VET, sixty-four percent attended the VET courses offered by Chambers, either Industry or Commerce, while the remaining thirty-six percent attended in VETs provided by namely, MoNE, Orange-NGO, Doctors without Borders and Marifah. Hence, the importance of Chambers become apparent in the provision of VETs as well as their ability to reach out to people comparatively better than other NGOs due their already existing networks and ability to take swift action.

Regarding education, nine percent asserted that they have an educational attainment level of less than high-school, while twenty-three percent asserted that they have an educational attainment level of high-school. Staggeringly, most of the respondents have an educational attainment level of university or above with sixty-eight percent. The educational attainment levels of Syrian entrepreneurs require an in-depth analysis to measure whether this finding is representative of the overall reality in Gaziantep's Syrian entrepreneurs.

Below are the survey results provided under the subheading that corresponds to them.

4.1.2. Establishing a Business

Out of all the respondents, sixty-eight percent are first-time entrepreneurs while the remaining thirty-two percent are experienced with establishing a business as they were running their own businesses in Syria before coming to Turkey (Figure 4). Similarly, thirty-two percent of all respondents who came to Turkey between 2011 – 2013, seventy-one percent established a business for the first-time in Turkey, as these people arrived in Turkey when the Temporary Protection Bylaw as well as the Regulation on Work Permits was not issued. The figure goes down to fifty-eight percent for Syrians who came between 2014 – 2016 but increases to hundred-percent for SuTPs who arrived in Turkey after 2016. This finding, to a certain extent, points that entrepreneurial initiatives by SuTPs were utilized as a means for overcoming the barriers to labor market entry by SuTPs in which only employers can apply for their work-permits



Figure 3. Share of answers to the question: "Were you an owner of a company in Syria before coming to Turkey?", in percentages

First time entrepreneurs view entrepreneurship as a viable option to the shortcomings of labor market integration policies and also a way to make the best use of their skills gained in Syria. All the respondents who ran a business in Syria before coming to Turkey (thirty-two percent) asserted that they established a business because they were entrepreneurs back in Syria and therefore wanted to pursue a similar undertaking in Turkey. However, with regards to first-time entrepreneurs, answers are numerous (Figure 5). While twenty percent of the first-time entrepreneurs asserted that they looked for a job but could not find one, thirteen percent stated that they established a business because they did not want to work informally. Moreover, other thirteen percent asserted that they were working in Syria in the same line of work in which they established a business in Turkey. Interestingly, fifty-four percent stated other reasons comprising mostly of 'I wanted to be my own boss' and 'I saw a demand in the market'.



Figure 4. First-time entrepreneurs' answers to the question: "Why did you decide to establish a company in Turkey?", in percentages

The issuance of the Regulation on Work Permits in 2016 might have pushed SuTPs to open their own businesses due to it being time-consuming and complicated (Figure 6). While only one of the SuTPs who came to Turkey between 2011 – 2013 established a business in Gaziantep, sixty-four percent of all the businesses were established following the issuance of the Regulation on Work Permits in January 2016, even though only fourteen percent of all business owners had come to Turkey after 2016 (Figure 6).



Figure 5. Answers to the question: "What year did you establish your company in Turkey?", in percentages

Company registrations show an upward trend since 2016, as most of the companies established by Syrians were registered at the time of their establishment (Figure 7). While 2015 comes to the fore as the year in which most companies were not registered, all of the companies established in 2019 are registered at the time of their establishment. The gradual decrease in the share of unregistered companies for each year after 2015 begs further questions as to whether the dissemination of the information on the registration processes for Syrian enterprises became successful.



Figure 6. Answers to the question: “Was your company formally registered at the time it started operations?”, in percentages

The lack of comprehensive knowledge from both the Syrian and the host institutions on the conditionality of access to labor market seems to pose an obstacle to Syrians’ company registration (Figure 8). As a result, Syrian entrepreneurs assert that they do not know the sectors in which a company registration requires a VET certificate. It was found that the institution responsible for company registration provided Syrian entrepreneurs with false information by asserting that they needed a Turkish partner. Furthermore, a Syrian entrepreneur complained about the amount of capital required to register a company at the Chambers and that he could not afford it at the time of his company’s establishment.



Figure 7. Answers to the question: “Why did you not register your company?”, multiple answers were permitted

Survey findings do not suggest an inclination towards forming partnerships by Syrians when establishing a business (Figure 9). While forty-five percent of the respondents asserted that they are the sole owner of their enterprise, thirty-two percent stated that their enterprise is run by two partners, and nine-percent of the respondents asserted that they are six partners. Interestingly, nine-percent of the respondents did not want to answer the question. Moreover, only nine percent of the respondents stated that their partner is a native Turk. When asked the reasons for establishing a partnership with a Turk, all of the respondents stated “So as to do by business better” therefore pointing to the experience of their Turkish partners in the sector their enterprises are operational in.



Figure 8. Answers to the question: “How many partners does your enterprise have?”, in percentages

Entrepreneurship proves to be viable option even for Syrians who worked in wage-employment in Turkey prior to establishing their businesses due to dissatisfaction with jobs and pay. More than half of the respondents asserted that the enterprise they have established in Turkey is their first occupation since their arrival to Turkey (Figure 10). On the other hand, forty-one percent of the respondents asserted that they worked in a different job or established a different company than they currently have. Out of these Syrian respondents, one-third asserted that they were business owners in their previous endeavor but had to close their shops, while the two-thirds asserted that they were wage employees. The wage-employees comprised of a shoe-maker, construction worker, researcher, sales manager, an employee as a trader and an employee in a marketing department. With regards to the reasons for quitting wage-employment, the employee who was working in trade and the sales manager emphasized that they could not reach the income level they expected to, while the shoe-maker and the construction worker stated that they were not happy with their jobs. Lastly, the employee in a marketing department and the researcher asserted that they quit because they wanted to establish a company.



Figure 9. Answers to the question: “Is this your first job or enterprise in Turkey?”, in percentages

Establishing a business is easier. Interestingly, the majority of survey participants asserted that they did not face any obstacles while establishing their businesses with sixty-eight percent (Figure 11). On the other hand, only thirty-two percent of the respondents emphasized that they faced difficulties. Out of this thirty-two percent, nearly forty-three percent came to Turkey between 2014 – 2016, while other forty-three came between 2011 – 2013. On the other hand, the remaining fourteen percent stated that they came to Turkey after 2016. In line with this, the respondents mostly asserted that they faced difficulties with access to finance and further emphasized that the lack of Arabic speaking personnel at governmental institutions posed an obstacle. Moreover, other obstacles include barriers to access banking services such as opening bank accounts, and lack of access to the education sector by Syrians. When combined with the year of arrival to Turkey with Syrians who faced obstacles while establishing their businesses, the data shows signs of symmetry as lessened effects of obstacles in accessing the labor market go in parallel with the issuance of laws and regulations such as the 2016 Regulation on Work-Permits.



Figure 10. Answers to the question: “Did you encounter obstacles / difficulties when starting your business?”, in percentages

Gaziantep is a thriving city in terms of its Syrian population and business opportunities. Eighteen-percent of all respondents came to Gaziantep to establish their

businesses from a different city, namely Hatay, Bursa, Halep and Kilis. More than two-thirds of all the respondents (seventy-three percent) emphasized that they chose to establish their businesses in this province, and not in another city because of Gaziantep's appropriate market size (Figure 12). Moreover, thirty-six percent asserted 'to stay close to my family and social circle", and thirty-two percent stated that there are 'more business opportunities' in Gaziantep.



Figure 11. Answers to the question: "Why did you want to establish your company in this city?", multiple answers, in percentages

4.1.3. Labor Force

Syrian entrepreneurs utilize their co-ethnic networks. Syrian business owners find their employees by way of relatives or referral the most with ninety-one percent, therefore pointing to high utilization rate of social circles and co-ethnic communities (Figure 13). Trailing this are private employment agencies with twenty-three percent of the respondents asserting that they found employees through these means. Interestingly, nine percent of the respondents provided employment to employees who were working for them back in Syria and a mere four-point-five percent asserted they did via İŞKUR.



Figure 12. Answers to the question: "How did you find your employees in the last two years?", multiple answers, in percentages

Syrian entrepreneurs employ other Syrians. Almost all of the respondents asserted that they are currently employing Syrians in their businesses with only a single respondent asserting that he is not (Figure 14). When thought together with the findings of Figure 10, it can be asserted that Syrian entrepreneurs are referred other Syrians for employment. Moreover, out of the ninety-five percent of the respondent who stated that they were employing Syrians, thirty-eight percent employ between one and ten, ten percent between ten and twenty, and five percent employ more than twenty Syrians (Figure 15). Moreover, forty-eight percent did not specify the number of Syrian workers they have under employment due to variety of reasons, which will become clearer in Figure 16.



Figure 13. Answers to the question: "Do you currently have Syrian(s) under employment?", in percentages



Figure 14. The number of Syrians under employment in enterprises who answered 'Yes' to the question: "Do you currently have Syrian(s) under employment?", in percentages

Informality in employment is widespread among Syrian enterprises. Staggeringly, almost all Syrian entrepreneurs declared that they employ informal workers (Figure 16). Ninety-one percent of all respondents asserted that that they employ informal workers, while a mere nine percent stated that they did not (Figure 16). When asked the reasons for employing informal workers, forty-five of all Syrian entrepreneurs who stated that they were employing informal workers pointed to the expensiveness of employing a registered worker (Figure 17). Similarly, thirty-five percent emphasized that the employee did not request it, and fifteen percent underlined the lengthy work-permit application and receival process as one of the reasons. Other answers include 'I did not see the need to apply for my employees' with ten-percent of the respondents and 'I do not know how to apply for a work-permit' with five percent. Moreover, twenty percent underlined other reasons. These include answers like 'work-permit not allowed for the sector', 'Obtaining a work-permit is too difficult', 'my employees are university students' and 'lack of Temporary Protection identification'. These answers come to show the gaps in the work-permit application process as well as the unforeseen obstacles that the Regulation brought about such as its lengthy waiting periods and high expenses of formal employment. Moreover, it is viewed that applying for work-permits is a process that is left to the mercy of the employer therefore has strong negative implications on the transition of the Syrian to the formal labor market.

Figure 15. Answers to the question: “Do you employ informal workers?”, in percentages



Figure 16. Syrian entrepreneurs’ reasons for employing informal workers, answers that best suit the respondent, multiple answers, in percentages

4.1.4. Doing Business

Unregistered businesses pose a problem for Syrian enterprises. As shadow economy has been a widespread problem in Turkey long-before the Syrian influx to Turkey began, the Syrian entrepreneurs with registered businesses also face competition from unregistered businesses (Figure 18). Correspondingly, seventy-seven percent of all respondent emphasized that they compete with unregistered businesses, while a mere fourteen percent stated that they did not. Moreover, nine percent asserted that they do not know.



Figure 17. Answers to the question: “Does your business compete with unregistered businesses?”, in percentages

Most Syrians are able to open bank accounts for themselves and their businesses. The survey results show that Syrians are not facing that many problems in accessing banking services, specifically with regards to opening bank accounts (Figure 19). While fifty-nine percent of the respondents asserted that they were able to open a bank account for themselves and also for the businesses, twenty-seven percent emphasized that they only opened a bank account for themselves (Figure 19). Interestingly, only fourteen percent of the respondents stated that they did not open a bank account, neither for themselves nor their companies. When asked for the reasons why they did not open an account, two-thirds emphasized that the banks did not allow because they were Syrians, while one-third asserted that he does not know how to open a bank account.



Figure 18. Answers to the question: “Have you opened a bank account?”, in percentages

Access to financing stands to be a problem for Syrian entrepreneurs, especially for those who have religious or cultural tendencies. None of the Syrian entrepreneurs

applied for credit or loans. Interestingly, when asked the reasons for not applying for credit or loan, the answer 'I did not feel the need to' comes to the fore as fifty-percent of the respondent asserted this as a reason (Figure 20). Trailing this are religious reasons with forty-one percent, and the lack of knowledge on how to apply with twenty-three percent. Moreover, fourteen percent asserted other reasons which include 'I did not think of applying for one'. This answer paves the way for questions as to whether Syrians knew of such a service that can be provided to them and their business.



Figure 19. Answers to the question: "What is your reason for not applying for credit/loan?", multiple answers, in percentages

A substantial number of Syrian entrepreneurs use informal means for undertaking monetary transactions. While half of the respondents stated that they do not engage in export-import activities, the remaining fifty-percent asserted that they use banks (forty-five percent) and hawala system (twenty-three percent) to carry-out monetary transactions (Figure 21). It became apparent during the interviews that Syrian entrepreneurs utilize the hawala system due to their religious sensitivities but also to overcome official transaction costs as well as barriers to sending money to Syria. As a result, twenty-seven percent of the Syrians entrepreneurs who are engaged in export-import activities use both the banks and the hawala system.



Figure 20. Answers to the question: “If you are engaged in export - import transactions, which channel do you carry out monetary transactions?”, multiple answers, in percentages

Syrian entrepreneurs are familiar with the customs and trade regulations of Turkey. In detail, thirty-six percent of the respondents asserted that they have moderate knowledge of the regulations, twenty-three percent stated they know these regulations (Figure 22). Moreover, nine percent emphasized they have an extremely well command of customs and trade regulations of Turkey. The respondents who asserted that they have an extremely well command is operating in tourism and retail sectors, respectively. On the other hand, four-point-five percent of the respondents stated that they have no command, while twenty-three percent emphasized that they have slight command of these regulations. Furthermore, four-point-five percent asserted that the question is not applicable to them because they are in the restaurant sector.



Figure 21. Answers to the question: “How well do you think you know the customs and trade regulations of Turkey?”, in percentages

Businesses of Syrian entrepreneurs get impacted negatively the most from tax laws and the lack of skilled workers in Turkey in comparison to labor laws and the

regulation on the employment of persons of Syrian origin. In detail, the impact of tax laws on Syrian entrepreneurs is evident as thirty-six percent asserted that it moderately interferes, twenty-seven percent asserted it interferes very much while fourteen percent stated they get extremely impacted by the tax laws (Figure 23). This finding can be attested to the fact that Syrians while back in Syria were participating in a totally different tax regime than they are in Turkey. Additionally, taxes were comparatively much lower in Syria. With regards to the low-skilled labor force, fourteen percent asserted that it does not interfere with their businesses, twenty-seven percent asserted that they it slightly interferes, while thirty-six percent stated it moderately interfere with their businesses (Figure 23). Moreover, the remaining twenty-three percent stated that it interferes with their businesses very much (Figure 23). Looking at the interference of regulations on the employment of Syrians to businesses, forty-five percent stated that it affects them less than moderately, and the remaining fifty-five percent stated that it interferes with their operation moderately or above, with fourteen percent stating that it interferes extremely. Lastly, fifty-percent emphasized that labor laws in Turkey interfere with their business less than moderately, while twenty-seven percent stated that it moderately interferes (Figure 23). The remaining twenty-three percent stated that it interferes with their businesses very much (Figure 23). All in all, these results portray a need to further analyze the ways in which these laws and regulations interfere with the businesses of Syrian entrepreneurs.



Figure 22. Answers to the question: “To what extent do the following issues interfere with your current business operations?”, in percentages

Most Syrian entrepreneurs do not engage well-enough with governmental institutions such as İŞKUR, KOSGEB but also Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality. In detail, fifty-five percent of the respondents asserted that they do not know İŞKUR, while a staggering eighty-six person asserted that they do not know of KOSGEB (Figure 24). On the other hand, ninety-one percent of all Syrian entrepreneurs asserted that they know of Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, and fifty-percent asserted that they know the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry and Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality (Figure 24). These findings are in line with the previous finding in which most Syrian entrepreneurs who participated in a VET programme did so through the Chambers. These findings further suggest that İŞKUR and KOSGEB must take action to increase their visibility even further, since Figure 20 above showed a good percentage of the Syrian entrepreneurs getting affected by labor laws.



Figure 23. Answers to the question: “Which of the following institutions do you know?”, in percentages

Lastly, when asked whether they have done any work with the above-mentioned institutions, nine-percent of the respondents answered positively. While half of them asserted that they worked as a translator for most of these institutions, the other half stated that they worked with the Chamber of Commerce as well as the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality.

4.2. Conclusion and Alternative Policy Options

With regards to the conclusion arrived at the end of Chapter 3, in which Turkey's integration policies were asserted to be designed based on the needs of the state, survey results clearly show that entrepreneurial initiatives have helped Syrians integrate themselves where there exist gaps in policy. In other words, entrepreneurial initiatives have helped Syrians overcome difficulties that are posed by regulations pertaining to their labor market entry such as obtaining work-permits and the ten percent quota. This is no more apparent than in the fact that over one-third of the work-permits issued to Syrians have presently been issued to Syrians working in these Syrian enterprises. Similarly, as survey findings assert that sixty-eight percent of all surveyed Syrian companies are established by first-time entrepreneurs, it can be stated, aside from providing employment to other Syrians, entrepreneurial Syrians fend for themselves where there are insufficient policies.

Furthermore, findings assert that Syrians in Gaziantep, which hosts the third largest Syrian population, have shown an eagerness to take the necessary steps to become a part of the formal business ecosystem. This is evident as thirteen percent of all first-time entrepreneurs assert as their reason to establish a business as not wanting to work informally, while twenty-percent assert that they looked but could not find a formal job.

Secondly, Chapter 3 concluded that Turkey must codify the pathway to citizenship or to permanent residency for Syrians. Interestingly, survey results have shown that the granting of citizenship is on-going as twenty-three percent of the respondents have already been granted Turkish citizenship, with eighteen percent of the respondents waiting for their applications to finalize. Yet, a clear pathway that hinge on a legal basis is missing as the reasons pertaining to why a Syrian respondent was granted citizenship before another is evidently unclear.

Chapter 3 concluded that low rates of Turkish language proficiency poses an obstacle to SuTPs access to formal employment. On the other hand, survey results have shown that entrepreneurs take part in language training and show a tendency to learn the language so as to have more maneuver space in the business environment. In this

regard, more than half of all survey respondents asserted that they have a command of Turkish and most of them asserted that they received a language proficiency certificate. In relation, the role of academia, through Gaziantep University, is clear with regards to the provision of Turkish language courses and certificates. Evidently, while low level of Turkish proficiency is evident among the total SuTP population in Turkey, entrepreneurs seem to have a comparatively higher inclination towards learning the Turkish language. It is also important to mention that survey results show a positive correlation between language proficiency and time since arrival, since none of the Syrian entrepreneurs who came to Turkey after 2016 asserted that they know Turkish but most of the Syrian entrepreneurs that came between 2011 – 2013 asserted they did.

Chapter 3 concluded that increased entrepreneurship by SuTPs would create employment opportunities and that any policy-response to facilitating the employment of SuTPs by a Syrian enterprise would yield intensified formal labor market integration. In this regard, it is this thesis' view that most important finding that pertains to the design of policies of integration is on the provision of employment by Syrian entrepreneurs. In other words, ninety-five percent of all Syrian companies that have been surveyed stated that they employ Syrians. However, when combined with the fact that ninety-one percent stated that they employ informal workers, the issue at hand becomes apparent. Accordingly, any policy step taken towards allowing facilitated formal labor market entry to Syrians who choose to work in a Syrian enterprise would directly have a positive effect in the number of registered workers. While it can be argued that this would lead to issues in cohesion, the fact of the matter is Syrian entrepreneurs are already employing Syrians but do so informally. Hence, transitioning this already existing but informal Syrian employees to the formal labor market would only yield positive results and gains. However, this finding must further be analyzed in-depth in a study that is representative to see whether it holds true.

Chapter 3 concluded that localities matter in the process of integration, as integration takes place at the local level. This is especially accurate with regards to information-dissemination as well as provision of Turkish courses and counselling or guidance. It is this thesis' view that future policy steps to be taken by authorities must consider the obstacles Syrian entrepreneurs face such as the lack of Arabic-speaking personnel as

well as lack of knowledge on the laws and regulations. Findings of the survey reiterate that Syrian companies are not able to reach their potential as a need for a better information-sharing mechanism between governmental institutions and Syrian entrepreneurs is apparent since most do not know İŞKUR or KOSGEB and the services they offer. Similarly, almost none of the Syrian respondents asserted that they cooperated in an initiative together with the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality. On the other hand, however, findings assert that Chambers in Gaziantep are doing a comparatively better job of reaching the Syrian population and facilitate the exchange of ideas with the Syrian population. This is especially evident since almost all of the survey respondents asserted that they know the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, and half of them stated that they know the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry and Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality. Similarly, survey results have shown that while half of the respondents attended in VET course, most utilized the Chambers to do so.

Lastly, it must be mentioned that the educational attainment levels of the surveyed Syrian entrepreneurs comprised a curious point. The survey findings assert that most of the Syrian entrepreneurs had an education level of university or above. Hence, a further study must be undertaken aimed at identifying the education attainment levels of Syrian entrepreneurs to that of the whole population of SuTPs in Turkey.

All in all, the shortcomings of this survey are apparent as it is not representative and has a broad margin of error. In this regard, it is important to note that additional research is required to be able to accurately measure and monitor the impact of policy steps taken by Turkey since the issuance of LFIP in 2013. Moreover, an in-depth analysis that is representative of the population of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey is required and could be undertaken as a PhD dissertation topic so as to map-out the contribution of Syrian entrepreneurs and their enterprises at the local and the national levels. However, the conclusions derived from the survey results when combined with the deductions made via the country comparisons of Sweden and Turkey, prove to be of use as they, in most cases, point to similar shortcomings.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This research has carried-out an analysis of Turkey' integration policies in light of the Swedish example as well as surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep, and specific focus was allocated to policies of labor market integration. In order to undertake this endeavor, primarily a review of the literature was attempted so as to outline the evolution of the concept of integration as a response to the influxes of newcomers. This review was undertaken by firstly looking at other concepts that precede it such as assimilation and acculturation. As a result, both assimilation and acculturation has been identified to predominantly pertain to the cultural aspect of the process of incorporation. In relation, both these concepts view a completed incorporation process as the overtaking of the dominant culture, and the newcomer becoming an indistinguishable part of the host society. It was identified that the operationalization of these concepts lacks primarily in recognizing the aspirations and attitudes of newcomers. Trailing this was a review of multiculturalism. It is seen that the concept of integration mashes well with multiculturalism, as the latter has been identified to target the provision of equality of opportunity for both the host and the newcomer. In relation, multiculturalism seeks the creation of pluralistic society, in which diversity is celebrated and migration is viewed to be a contributing factor to the host. It is important to mention other models such as the republican model or transitional model were not included in the literature review.

In the same Chapter, a review of the concept of integration has been undertaken. It was shown that a universal definition for integration is missing. It was reiterated that the lack of a definition finds its basis on the need for idiosyncratic applications of the concept of integration to different realities. In other words, the concept of integration and the process it entails has been identified as being country-specific but also specific

to the group of newcomers concerned. Furthermore, it is viewed that, unlike its predecessors, integration upholds a two-way approach where the host undergoes change together with the newcomer by taking an active role in facilitating newcomers' integration to the workings of their society. More importantly, the host has to be receptive and welcoming of this change, because the change host undergoes, first and foremost, is demographic. Furthermore, change also takes place via an increase in tolerance in the host society and institutions so as to carry-out integration related activities because without a tolerant policy, integration cannot take place. In other words, policies aimed at combating discrimination against newcomers, encouraging inter-ethnic interaction, providing services to newcomers in their native languages comprise some of the changes required for integration to take place. This change and increased tolerance by the host has been identified as the primary difference of the concept of integration when compared with concepts like acculturation and assimilation. This is to say that integration can only take place through interaction, whether between institutions or peoples. In this regard, the literature review has also shown that integration views cultural diversity as an asset and therefore celebrates it by providing a platform to the newcomers' culture to flourish at the country of arrival. Similarly, integration, while celebrating diversity, also acknowledges that each individual and group has a distinct culture and a diverse set of skills. In doing so, integration regards that a process of incorporation must adhere to the culture and skills-set that newcomers bring with them. In relation, it, therefore, is vital for Turkey to increase the number of avenues for cultural and idea exchange between the host society and newcomers. As it has been shown in this thesis, the level of interaction has been deeply affected by the belatedness of policy design but got gradually more encouraging and needs to become more intense in the near future. Evidently, this has been shown to be especially possible via the labor market, and the encouragement of refugee entrepreneurship.

It has been emphasized that integration takes place in numerous dimensions, such as the socio-economic, cultural and religious and legal, and pertains to domains such as housing, employment, healthcare and education as well as the issuance of laws and regulations pertaining to the protection of newcomers' cultures and language. In this

regard, this thesis has shown that the concept of integration, and its operationalization is, in its most fundamental form, is a policy tool to respond to diversity. The role of structural factors like the labor market, housing, health and education sectors have been underlined as prerequisites to seeking successful integration. Out of these factors, labor market has been identified as being cross-dimensional and vital to the commencement of the whole integration process. Hence, labor market entry is key to finding success in all dimensions of integration as it promotes self-respect, cross-cultural and societal exchange and facilitates language learning by the newcomer.

Similarly, it has been shown that integration recognizes that a process of incorporation does not follow a linear-path, and integration into one domain does not automatically mean successful integration into another. Furthermore, integration as a concept and its realization through policies and practices concern both objective and subjective inputs. While objective inputs concern those domains, subjective inputs are harder to measure and track as these are mostly concerned with cultural, religious or with family life. Hence, it is of vital importance to point out that integration cannot be successful with quick-fixes as in the case of Turkey and requires careful but most importantly long-term planning. The concept's operationalization into a process requires constant monitoring and measurement.

In relation, the review of literature has shown an inclination in academia towards the monitoring and measurement of integration goals using an indicators-based approach. The need for cooperation among the many institutions and the organizations of the host and the newcomer provides the basis for integration policies, and these policies are then materialized into practice so as to frame and define an integration process. However, it is clearly emphasized in the integration literature that policies designed specifically for integration purposes do not always materialize to yield expected results. Correspondingly, the indicator-based approach has been promoted in the literature as a possible solution to filling the gap between policy and practice, by way of monitoring the rate of realization of policy by looking at practice-level outcomes. Similarly, this thesis also views indicators-based approach to be the most viable option to ensure the success of the process of integration. From this viewpoint, the biggest

obstacle to the success of an integration process has been identified as lack of accurately held data and the lack of information on the factual or real-life processes the host and the newcomer undergo.

Following a review of the literature on integration and its evolution, as well as the identification of what a process of integration entails, Chapter 3 looked at country examples of Sweden and Turkey. The focus of analysis was on the development of integration policy and its current implications on the process of integration. The latter part was carried-out by specifically looking at the integration as a response in the face of refugee situations that were deemed temporary by the host, whether it may be the provision of temporary protection or temporary residence permits. Referring to the responses by Sweden to extension of protection to refugees that is time-limited, it was viewed that having an already designed framework for integration which clarifies the central focus of the process, the labor market for Sweden, as being integral to the ability to respond to refugee inflows immediately. Sweden by positioning labor market integration and employment at the center of its integration policy has been viewed to aim at providing an integration framework that targets the gaining of self-sufficiency by the refugee as soon as possible. Moreover, as evident from the examples of Kosovars, Iraqis and lastly the Syrians, even in instances where protection provided to refugees was temporary Sweden implemented a policy of full-integration, while also empowering refugees for their return. Through this two-track policy, Sweden has been asserted to provide refugees with an option; they can return back to their home countries when the reasons for escape are no more, but if they choose not to, they can still stay in Sweden as long as they show that they have been actively taking part in the integration process.

On the other hand, an analysis of Turkey's response to Syrians has deduced that Turkey has a long road ahead before a successfully designed comprehensive integration strategy pertaining to refugees' integration to the numerous dimensions of the workings of the Turkish state, institutions and its society can be mentioned. It is seen that, in the lack of a readily-available integration policy, Turkey's primary response of encampment, therefore of isolation, has been shown to hinder the

integration of Syrians. Similarly, it is viewed that Turkey's secondary response which upheld policies of integration based on state needs approach, which came at a time of protracted temporariness of SuTPs, further impeded the integration of SuTPs. Most importantly, Turkey's belatedness in designing a labor market integration policy have contributed to the unevenness of integration of SuTPs to different dimensions and domains. To expand, this unevenness is especially apparent in the low levels of Turkish language proficiency in Syrians and their less than ideal rates of formal labor market integration. Moreover, in Turkey's case, the belatedness has been combined with a sensitive approach to designing these policies. In other words, these policies evidently prioritize the locals in comparison to the newcomer and seek not to solve the issue of integration but to keep the status-quo via managing the situation. This is unlike the Swedish case which aim at the equality of opportunity as shown in Chapter 3. Similarly, as the survey results in Chapter 4 show, inclination towards entrepreneurship come to the fore as a result of this stance which does not offer solutions to problems faced by Syrians. To a certain extent, entrepreneurial initiatives can also be considered as actions aimed at overcoming these barriers and solving problems. Hence, a step taken by Syrians to take control of their own processes of integration.

Comparing the Swedish and Turkish examples, it can be asserted that the design of integration policy is not an overnight endeavor and that Turkey has a lot that it can learn from Sweden. Yet, once designed it still requires the constant monitoring of its implementation and measurement of results, so as to provide a feedback to the policy makers, hence facilitating policy improvement, accordingly. Similarly, the country examples have shown that Turkey's approach to integration lacks a central focus. To elaborate, for Sweden the point of focus consists of refugee's immediate access to the labor market so as to increase their chances of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, Turkey's policies for Syrians were designed with the dominant view that Syrians were in Turkey for a short time and with the aim of not bringing about radical change to the society, hence integration based on state needs. As a result, this has been shown to leave Syrians in a state of protracted temporariness therefore in limbo. Similarly, when compared with the Swedish example, the role of localities, namely

municipalities, in the integration process for Syrians in Turkey is ambiguous. Hence, integration in Turkey is approached in a centralized manner, disregarding the widely accepted notion that integration takes place, first and foremost, at the local level. On the other hand, Sweden has been shown to confer a great deal of responsibility to its municipalities, starting with the responsibility to provide housing and also ensuring refugee's active participation in introduction programmes.

Similarly, the country examples have shown that even though commendable steps have been taken by Turkey, these steps have been taken in a one-way manner where the aspirations and attitudes of SuTPs are mostly disregarded. This, as the research has shown, is primarily an outcome of the design of integration policy while at the same time welcoming large numbers Syrians coming into Turkey. Furthermore, the one-way manner in integration policy has been shown to also be an outcome of Turkey's approach to diversity. While Sweden has been considered a multiculturalist country since 1975, Turkey has long been defined as a nation-state. In part, as a result of this, Sweden has been in the continuous process of designing a national integration policy since the 1970s, while Turkey, through the Syrian case, has only recently commenced. Furthermore, another example of the one-sided manner in the design of integration policy in Turkey is regarding the laws and regulations pertaining to Syrians which do not provide a pathway to citizenship or permanent residency. Even though, further research has shown that naturalization of SuTPs has commenced, there are no guidelines as to what one must do to qualify for citizenship or permanent residency to be found. On the other hand, Sweden offers a pathway to permanent residency and eventual citizenship to Syrians with temporary residence permits very clearly and links it to their labor market outputs. In other words, if the Syrian becomes able to provide for oneself when the residence permit expires, they become eligible to apply for permanent residency.

Focusing specifically on the labor market integration policies, it can be asserted that these policies were designed and implemented in a delayed manner and hence negatively affecting the formal labor market integration of Syrians in Turkey. Similarly, the delayed policy response is viewed to be the main reason for Syrians'

entry into the informal labor market, leaving them vulnerable to being exploited. Moreover, it is viewed that the labor market integration policies of Turkey have been designed with a specific focus on the needs of the state, hence once more underlining the one-way design of these policies. In addition to the delayed response, obstacles posed by rules and regulations such as the ten percent quota on SuTPs' employment and lengthy work-permit application processes have been identified to be the most pressing policy-level issues that require immediate attention. Hence, any new policy must seek the gradual removal of these obstacles and take into consideration the hardships faced by newcomers for their improved integration into the workings of the host society.

In this regard, the obstacle posed by the clash of the provision of cash-assistance (ESSN) with formal labor market integration has been identified as the most pressing practice-level issue. To elaborate on cash-assistance, monetary assistance to Syrians in Sweden is provided as long as they actively participate in the integratory measures designed pertaining specifically to their needs. In detail, participation in the 'introduction programme', in which the primary goal is allowing formal entry to the labor force, sequentially results in better benefits and higher chance of obtaining permanent residency. So one can assert that while by putting conditionality to the provision of monetary assistance Sweden is increasing the chances of participation by the refugee to the labor market as soon as possible. On the other hand, the cash assistance initiative in Turkey, ESSN, is tasked with providing Syrian households with monthly assistance to cover the costs of rent and food. However, while the assistance in Sweden is one that encourages labor market integration and formal employment, in Turkey, ESSN discourages SuTPs from accessing the formal labor market and encourages their informal employment. This is because the provision of this humanitarian assistance is linked to unemployment, posing a barrier to formal employment in SuTPs. In other words, if the SuTPs finds formal employment, the aid is cut. Yet, as the focus of Turkey now shifted from humanitarian support to livelihoods, changes in the rules and regulations on the provision of cash-assistance has been identified as a priority area which requires immediate revamping.

In the face of policy and practice level obstacles to formal labor market integration, analysis shows that entrepreneurship by Syrians has come to the fore as a viable option to overcome the obstacles posed by laws and regulations in Turkey, and even increasing wage-employment by SuTPs in general.

Following an analysis of country examples, Chapter 4 includes the results of surveys conducted with twenty-two Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep between May 25 and July 25, 2019. The main findings derived from the survey results have, in most cases, supported the findings of the analysis of Turkey's integration policy in Chapter 3. The results have shown that a good portion of the surveyed Syrian entrepreneurs have chosen to establish companies to overcome the barriers posed by the regulations pertaining to their labor market access. These have been identified as the ten percent quota, lengthy work-permit application process and the requirement that an employer must apply for the wage-employee's work-permit.

Moreover, it was found that Syrian entrepreneurs find their employees mostly through relatives and friends, and they are more inclined to employ other Syrians. However, the results have shown that most of the employed Syrians are employed informally by these enterprises. Hence, showing that any policy pertaining to the hardships posed on Syrian entrepreneurship could have a major positive affect, on facilitating and intensifying labor market integration of SuTPs. Accordingly, any policy step taken towards allowing facilitated formal labor market entry to Syrians who choose to work in a Syrian enterprise would directly have a positive effect in the number of registered workers. While it can be argued that this would lead to issues in cohesion, the fact of the matter is Syrian entrepreneurs are already employing Syrians but do so informally. Hence, transitioning this already existing but informal Syrian employees to the formal labor market would only yield positive results and gains.

Syrian entrepreneurs' lack of knowledge of the governmental institutions such as İŞKUR, as well as the local body of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality point to the limited presence of these institutions in the daily lives of Syrian entrepreneurs. On the other hand, however, it has been viewed that NGOs, private sector initiatives and academia such as the Chamber of Commerce, International Labor Organization and

the Gaziantep University are playing a supplementary role, filling the gaps in policy and governmental oversight by way of initiatives such as vocational qualification recognition and provision of language trainings and certificates.

While country examples in Chapter 3 concluded that low rates of Turkish language proficiency pose an obstacle to SuTPs access to formal employment, survey results have shown that entrepreneurs take part in language training and show a higher tendency to learn the language so as to have more maneuver space in the business environment. It is also important to mention that survey results have shown a positive correlation between language proficiency and time since arrival, since none of the Syrian entrepreneurs who came to Turkey after 2016 asserted that they know Turkish but most of the Syrian entrepreneurs that came between 2011 – 2013 asserted they did.

Lastly, it must be mentioned that the educational attainment levels of the surveyed Syrian entrepreneurs comprised a curious point. The survey findings assert that most of the Syrian entrepreneurs had an education level of university or above. Hence, a further study must be undertaken aimed at identifying the education attainment levels of Syrian entrepreneurs to that of the whole population of SuTPs in Turkey.

All in all, in analyzing how the Turkish integration policies fare in light of the Swedish example as well as the surveys conducted with Syrian entrepreneurs in Gaziantep, this thesis concludes that Turkey has considerable steps to take. In line with the hypothesis laid out in Chapter 1, Turkey has been late in designing and implementing an integration policy for Syrians, hence leading to integration outcomes that are uneven at best. Similarly, as the hypothesis held, the specific focus on labor market integration policies have shown that, while their belated design has caused less than ideal formal labor market integration in Syrians, entrepreneurial initiatives by Syrians have succeeded in providing an alternative to policy-gaps. However, when thought together with the fact that Syrians comprise Turkey's first toil with the design of an integration policy, it can be asserted that what Turkey has done until now is commendable. Yet, there are certain points this thesis views to be vital to enabling the execution of future studies pertaining to the area of integration in Turkey. These consist of lack of

transparency and data on the situation of SuTPs in Turkey. In this regard, for example, the data on the number of work-permits granted to Syrians as well as the number of enterprises established by Syrians is not openly shared with the public, and when it is the data is viewed to be outdated. As a result of this, this thesis has strived to overcome the obstacles posed by the lack of data by conducting surveys with Syrian entrepreneurs. However, it is important to mention that the survey results are not representative. Yet, while offering an insight into the experiences and views of Syrians in Turkey, it is this thesis' view that a representative study should be undertaken in the future, as entrepreneurship in Syrians come to the fore as an understudied topic while also proving to be the most viable option to overcoming gaps and obstacles posed by laws and regulations on the labor market integration of SuTPs.

Lastly, to refer back to the question posed by Guterres as provided in the beginning of this thesis, the research has provided an inclination towards the choice that migration should be viewed as a source of prosperity. Specifically looking at refugees, the thesis has shown that this can only be achieved via the design and implementation of policies and practices that adhere to the many challenges they face and uphold their aspirations. This is especially important for refugees, as unlike labor migrants, they are not provided with a choice as to the countries they can seek asylum. Yet, like labor migrants, refugees' integration into the labor market has been identified by this research as the key driver of being able to achieve prosperity and has been underlined to only be possible through a comprehensive integration policy due to formal employment's cross-cutting and multi-dimensional nature.

REFERENCES

AFAD. (2013). Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 2013: Field Survey Results. AFAD. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from AFAD: https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2376/files /61-2013123015505-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-2013_print_12_11_2013_eng.pdf

AFAD. (2014). *Syrian Guests in Turkey (Rep.)*. AFAD. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency website: https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/3494/xfiles/syrian-guests.pdf

AFAD. (2018). Barınma Merkezlerinde Son Durum - Afet Raporu - Suriye - AFAD - Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı. AFAD. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from AFAD: https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/24_04_2018_Suriye_GBM_ Bilgi_Notu.pdf

Ager, A., and Strang, A. (2004). *Indicators of integration*. Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate.

Ager, A., and Strang, A. (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. *Journal of refugee studies*, *21*(2), 166-191.

AIDA. (2018). *Country Report: Sweden (Rep.).* Asylum Information Database. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from AIDA: https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/ files/report-download/aida_se_2018update.pdf

Akçapar, Ş. K. (2017). International Migration and Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century. *Perceptions*, *22*(4), 1-34.

Amelina, A., and Horvath, K. (2017). Sociology of migration. Retrieved May 25, 2019 from Researchgate https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320383211_Sociology_ of_migration

Andersson, R. (2007). *Ethnic residential segregation and integration processes in Sweden*. Retrieved May 3, 2019 from Divaportal: https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/ diva2:39365/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Andersson, R., and Weinar, A. (2014). *Integration policies: Sweden country report*, INTERACT RR 2014/14, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Åslund, O., Forslund, A., and Liljeberg, L. (2017). 4. Labour market entry of non-labour migrants–Swedish. *Nordic Economic Policy*, *115*.

Attström, K. (2007). Discrimination against native Swedes of immigrant origin in access to employment. In *International Labor Organization, International Migration Papers 86E*.

Balkan, B., & Tumen, S. (2016). Immigration and prices: quasi-experimental evidence from Syrian refugees in Turkey. *Journal of Population Economics*, *29*(3), 657-686.

Beirens, H., Maas, S., Petronella, S., and van der Velden, M. (2016). Study on the Temporary Protection Directive. *Final report. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs*.

Berg, B. (2002). From temporary protection to permanent residence: Bosnian refugees in Scandinavia. *International Studies in Human Rights, 68*, 55-72.

Bernard, W. S. (1973). Indices of integration in the American community. In *International Migration 11:3* (The Hague: Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration).

Berry, B. (1951). *Race relations: The interaction of ethnic and racial groups*. Houghton Mifflin.

Berry, J. W. (1988). Understanding the Process of Acculturation for Primary Prevention.

Bevelander, P. (1999). The employment integration of immigrants in Sweden. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *25*(3), 445-468.

Bevelander, P. (2004). Immigration patterns, economic integration and residential segregation-Sweden in the late 20th century. *Current Themes in IMER Research; 2*.

Bevelander, P. (2011). The employment integration of resettled refugees, asylum claimants, and family reunion migrants in Sweden. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, *30*(1), 22-43.

Bianet. (2019, July 24). Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Verilerine Göre Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler. *Bianet*. Retrieved August 1, 2019, from Bianet: https://bianet.org/bianet/in san-haklari/210836-goc-idaresi-genel-mudurlugu-verilerine-gore-turkiye-deki-suriyeliler

Biehl, K. S. (2015). Governing through uncertainty: Experiences of being a refugee in Turkey as a country for temporary asylum. *Social Analysis*, *59*(1), 57-75.

Bilsborrow, R., and Zlotnik, H. (1995). The Systems Approach and the Measurement of the Determinants of International Migration, w: R. van der Erf i L. *Heering (red.) Causes of International Migration, Brussels: ECSC-EC-EAEC*.

Bloch, A. (2000). Refugee settlement in Britain: the impact of policy on participation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies*, *26*(1), 75-88.

Blommaert, J., and Verschueren, J. (1998). *The diversity debate*. Routledge, London.

Boguslaw, J. (2012), Svensk invandringspolitik under 500 år: 1512–2012 (The History of Swedish Immigration and Integration Policy) (350 pages), Lund: Studentlitteratur

Borevi, K. (2010). 2. Dimensions of Citizenship: European Integration Policies from a Scandinavian Perspective. *Diversity, inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia*, *19*.

Borevi, K. (2012). Sweden: The flagship of multiculturalism. *In Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945–2010* (pp. 25-96). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Borevi, K. (2013). Understanding Swedish Multiculturalism. In *Debating multiculturalism in the Nordic welfare states* (pp. 140-169). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Bosswick, W., and Heckmann, F. (2006). Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 45.

Boswell, C. (2002). Addressing the causes of migratory and refugee movements: the role of the European Union. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from https://www.unhcr.org/3e19ac624.pdf

Building Markets. (2017, June). *Another Side to the Story: A Market Assessment of Syrian SMEs in Turkey* (Rep.). Retrieved June 5, 2019, from Building Markets: https://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/another_side_to_the_story_a_market_assessment_of_syrian_smes_in_turkey.pdf

Building Markets. (2018, July 25). *One Year Later: Revisiting the Contributions of Syrian Entrepreneurs in Turkey* (Rep.). Retrieved February 22, 2019, from Building Markets: https://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/bm_syrian_sme_update_one_year_later_final_2_072518.pdf

Bulcha, M. (1988). *Flight and integration: Causes of mass exodus from Ethiopia and problems of integration in the Sudan*. Nordic Africa Institute.

Carrera, S., & Vankova, Z. (2019). Human rights aspects of immigrant and refugee integration policies: a comparative assessment in selected Council of Europe member states. *Council of Europe*. Retrieved June 5, 2019 from European University Institute: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/62307

Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. *The Information Age. Economy*.

Castillo, M. A., and Hathaway, J. C. (1997). Temporary *Protection. Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff*.

Castles, S. (2000). International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century: global trends and issues. *International Social Science Journal*, *52*(165), 269-281.

Castles, S. (2002). Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization. *International migration review*, *36*(4), 1143-1168.

Castles, S., and Davidson, A. (2000). *Citizenship and migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging*. Psychology Press.

Castles, S., and Miller, M. J. (1998). The migratory process and the formation of ethnic minorities. In *The age of migration* (pp. 19-47). Palgrave, London.

Castles, S., De Haas, H., and Miller, M. J. (2013). *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Castles, S., Korac, M., Vasta, E., and Vertovec, S. (2002). Integration: Mapping the field. *Home Office online report*, *29*(03), 115-118.

Castles, S., Miller, M. J., and Ammendola, G. (2005). *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. New York: Guilford Press.

Cengiz, D., & Tekguc, H. (2017). Is It Merely A Labor Supply Shock? Impacts of Syrian Migrants on Local Economies in Turkey. In *ASSA 2018 Annual Meeting* (pp. 1-68).

Ceritoglu, E., Yunculer, H. B. G., Torun, H., & Tumen, S. (2017). The impact of Syrian refugees on natives' labor market outcomes in Turkey: Evidence from a quasi-experimental design. *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, *6*(1), 5.

Cholewinski, R. (2005). Migrants as minorities: integration and inclusion in the enlarged European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *43*(4), 695-716.

CHP. (2019, August 5). *Chp Genel Başkan Yardimcisi Veli Ağbaba: "Kayit Dişi Göçmen Emeği Ülkemizin hem Ekonomisini hem de Çalişanlarini Etkilemektedir"* [Press release]. Retrieved August 20, 2019, from CHP: https://www.chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskan-yardimcisi-veli-agbaba-kayit-disi-gocmen-emegi-ulkemizin-hem-ekonomisini-hem-de-calisanlarini-etkilemektedir

Clyne, M., and Jupp, J. (2011). *Multiculturalism and integration: A harmonious relationship*. ANU E Press.

CNNTURK. (2019, June 14). Bakan Pekcan: 15 bin 159 Suriyeli şirket var. *CNNTURK*. Retrieved June 15, 2019, from CNNTURK: https://www.cnnturk.com/ekonomi/bakan-pekcan-15-bin-159-suriyeli-sirket-var

Coenders, M. T. A., and Scheepers, P. L. H. (2004). Associations between nationalist attitudes and exclusionist reactions in 22 countries. *Nationalism and exclusion of migrants: Cross-national comparisons*, 187-208.

Council of Europe. (1997). *Measurement and indicators of integration*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

Davidov, E., and Semyonov, M. (2017). Attitudes toward immigrants in European societies.

De Haas, H. (2008) Migration and development: A theoretical perspective 1. *International Migration Institute*, (9). Retrieved May 1, 2019 from Researchgate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227539598_Migration_and_Development_A_Theoretical_Perspective1.

Del Carpio, X. V., & Wagner, M. (2015). *The impact of Syrians refugees on the Turkish labor market*. The World Bank.

DGMM. (2016). Türkiye göç raporu. Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, *Yayın, (40)*.

DGMM. (n.d.). Temporary Protection. Retrieved July 20, 2019, from DGMM: Goc.gov.tr website: https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27

Di Bartolomeo, A., Kalantaryan, S., and Bonfanti, S. (2015). *Measuring integration of migrants a multivariate approach*.

Dimitriadi, A., Kaya, A., Kale, B., & Zurabishvili, T. (2018). EU-Turkey Relations and Irregular Migration: Transactional Cooperation in the Making. *FEUTURE Online Paper, (16)*.

Dingu-Kyrklund, E. (2007). Joint Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement–Toronto. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from National Thematic Network on Asylum and Integration: http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Forskning/Citizenship,%20Migration,%20and%20Social%20Integration%20in%20Sweden.pdf.

Dünya Bülteni. (2012, July 31). Dinçer: Oyunun kuralı degişmemeli. *Dünya Bülteni*. Retrieved July 20, 2019, from Dünya Bülteni: https://www.dunyabulteni.net/egitim/dincer-oyunun-kurali-degismemeli-h221066.html

Durkheim, E. (1933). The Division of Labour in Society. Translated by *G. Simpson New York: Free Press.(Original work published 1893)*.

Dursun, S. (2018, September 3). 35 yaş üstü Suriyelilerin yüzde 90'ı hâlâ Türkçe öğrenemedi. *Gerçek Hayat*. Retrieved March 9, 2019, from Gerçek Hayat: http://www.gercekhayat.com.tr/kapak/35-yas-ustu-suriyelilerin-yuzde-90i-hala-turkce-ogrenemedi/

European Commission (EC). (2004). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: On Implementing the Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union*. Commission of the European Communities.

ECRE. (2002). *Position on the integration of refugees in Europe*. London: ECRE.

ECRE. (2004). *Guidelines for the Treatment of Iraqi Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe*. Retrieved June 12, 2019 from ECRE: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ECRE-Revised-Guidelines-on-the-Treatment-of-Iraqi-Asylum-Seekers-and-Refugees-in-Europe_April-2007.pdf

ECRE. (2007). *Guidelines on the Treatment of Iraqi Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe*, PP2/04/2007/extSHPC. Retrieved May 2, 2019 from ECRE: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ECRE-Revised-Guidelines-on-the-Treatment-of-Iraqi-Asylum-Seekers-and-Refugees-in-Europe_April-2007.pdf

EEPO. (2016). Challenges in the Labour Market Integration of Asylum Seekers and Refugees. *EEPO*.

Eger, M. A. (2009). Even in Sweden: the effect of immigration on support for welfare state spending. *European Sociological Review*, *26*(2), 203-217.

EMN. (2009). *EMN Annual Policy Report 2009: Sweden*. Retrieved May 24, 2019 from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/annual-policy/2009/26._sweden_annual_policy report_2009_version_22dec09_en.pdf

EMN. (2010). *EMN Policy Report 2010: Sweden*. Retrieved May 24, 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/annual-policy/2010/26.sweden_annual_policy_r eport_2010_final_version_12april2011_en.pdf.

EMN. (2016). *Country Factsheet: Sweden 2015* [Fact sheet] . Retrieved June 20, 2019 from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/europeanmigration_network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/27a_sweden_country_factsheet_2015.pdf

EMN. (2018). EMN Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2017 Sweden. Swedish Migration Agency. Retrieved May 2, 2019 from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/17a_sweden_arm_part2_2017_en.pdf

Erdoğan, M. (2014). Syrians in Turkey: Social acceptance and integration research. *Ankara: The Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre—HUGO*.

Erdoğan, M. (2017). Syrians-Barometer 2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey. *Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre*.

Erdoğan, M. M., and Ünver, C. (2015). *Türk iş dünyasının Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler konusundaki görüş, beklenti ve önerileri*. Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu.

Esser, Hartmut (2000), *Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen*, Band 2: Die Konstruktion der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

EU. (2004) *The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union*, European Union

European Commission. (2015). *Sweden: New administration abolishes the post for Minister of Integration.* European Web Site on Integration. Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/sweden-new-administrati on-abolishes-t he-post-for-minister-of-integration

European Commission. (2016). Managing the Refugee Crisis: Commission reports on progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. Retrieved July 12, 2019, from European Commission: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2181_en.htm

European Commission. (2016b). EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. Retrieved April 5, 2019, from European Commission: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press /press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/

European Commission. (2019). *Forced displacement: refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people* (IDPs) [Fact sheet]. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons_en.

European Commission. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country/sweden

Eurostat. (n.d.). Employment Statistics. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Employment_statistics

Fairchild, H. P. (1944). *Dictionary of sociology*. Rowman and Littlefield.

Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: implications for the study of citizenship and culture. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *23*(2), 189-222.

Faist, T. (2001). Beyond national and post-national models: transnational spaces and immigrant integration. In *New horizons in sociological theory and research*.

Favell, A. (1998). *Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain*. Palgrave, London.

Favell, A. (2001). Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique. *Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices*, *349*, 351-352.

Favell, A. (2003). Games without frontiers? Questioning the transnational social power of migrants in Europe. *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, *44*(3), 397-427.

Favell, A. (2013). The Changing Face of 'Integration' in a Mobile Europe. *Council for European Studies Newsletter*, *43*(1), 53-58.

Fichter, J. H. (1957). Sociology of Religion.

Freeman, G. P. (1995). Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. *International migration review*, *29*(4), 881-902.

Garcés-Mascareñas, B., and Penninx, R. (2016). Integration processes and policies in Europe. *Contexts, Levels and Actors*.

Ghanem, T. (2005). Following Repatriation: The Beginning of Homelessness?. In *Refugee Crises and International Response*, 105-139.

Gibney, M. J. (2000). *Outside the protection of the law: The situation of irregular migrants in Europe*. Refugee Studies Centre.

Gibney, M. J. (2004). *The ethics and politics of asylum: Liberal democracy and the response to refugees*. Cambridge University Press.

Goodman, S. W. (2015). Conceptualizing and measuring citizenship and integration policy: Past lessons and new approaches. *Comparative Political Studies*, *48*(14), 1905-1941.

Gordon, M. M. (1964). *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins.* Oxford University Press on Demand.

Government Offices of Sweden. (2002). Swedish integration policy for the 21st century. Retrieved May 8, 2019 from National Thematic Network on Asylum and Integration: http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Övrigt/Engelskt material om Sverige/integration policy.pdf

Government Offices of Sweden. (2009). *Swedish integration policy* [Fact sheet]. Retrieved June 20, 2019 from Government Offices of Sweden: https://www.government.se/contentassets/b055a941e7a247348f1acf6ade2fd876/swedish-integration-policy-fact-sheet-in-english

Guiraudon, V. (1998). Citizenship rights for non-citizens: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. *Challenge to the nation-state: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*, 272-318.

Guterres, A. (2018). *Towards a New Global Compact Migration*. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from United Nations Secretary-General website: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2018-01-11/towards-new-global-compact-migration.

Hale, S. (1993). The reception and resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in Britain. In *The international refugee crisis* (pp. 273-292). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Hammar, T. (1985). Dual citizenship and political integration. *International Migration Review*, *19*(3), 438-450.,

Harrell-Bond, B. (1986). *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford University Press.

Harris, E. (2007). Europe Struggles with Influx of Iraqi Refugees. Retrieved June 23, 2019 from npr: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7695224

Heckmann, F. (2005). Integration and integration policies: IMISCOE network feasibility study.

Heckmann, F., and Schnapper, D. (Eds.). (2016). *The integration of immigrants in European societies: National differences and trends of convergence* (Vol. 7). Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co KG.

Hernes, V., Arendt, J. N., Joona, P. A., and Tronstad, K. R. (2019). Nordic integration and settlement policies for refugees : A comparative analysis of labour market integration outcomes. Copenhagen: Nordisk Ministerråd. https://doi.org/10.6027/TN2019-529

Humanitarian Issues Working Group. (1995). *Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection. Retrieved* 8 March, 2019 from refworld: at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3300.html.

Hürriyet Daily News (HDN). (2018, September 26). Over 600,000 Syrian children schooled in Turkey: Ministry data. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved February 4, 2019, from HDN: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/over-600-000-syrian-children-schooled-in-turkey-ministry-data-137249

Hynie, M. (2018). Refugee integration: Research and policy. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *24*(3), 265.

Hynie, M., Korn, A., and Tao, D. (2016). Social context and social integration for Government Assisted Refugees in Ontario, Canada. *After the Flight: The Dynamics of Refugee Settlement and Integration*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 183-227.

İçduygu, A. (2011). Europe, Turkey, and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation. *Presentation at the Migration Working Group, European University Institute, 26.*

İçduygu, A. (2012). Turkey's evolving migration policies: A Mediterranean transit stop at the doors of the EU. *Population, Space and Place, 18*(4), 407-415.

İçduygu, A. (2016). Turkey: Labour market integration and social inclusion of refugees. European Parliament. *Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy*.

İçduygu, A., and Diker, E. (2017). Labor Market Integration of Syrians Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers. *Göç Araştırmaları Dergisi, 3*(1), 12-35.

İçduygu, A., and Sert, D. S. (2019). Introduction: Syrian Refugees–Facing Challenges, Making Choices. *International Migration, 57*(2), 121-125.

İçduygu, A., and Şimşek, D. (2016). Syrian refugees in Turkey: Towards integration policies. *Turkish Policy Quarterly, 15*(3), 59-69.

İneli-Ciger, M. (2017). *Temporary Protection in Law and Practice*. Brill.

İNGEV, and Ipsos. (2017). Suriyeli Mülteci Hayatlar Monitörü Özet Değerlendirme (Rep.). İNGEV. Retrieved 15 June, 2019 from İNGEV: http://ingev.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Multeci-Hayatlar-Monitor%C3%BC.pdf

IOM. (2017). World Migration Report 2018. Retrieved May 23, 2019 from International Organization for Migration website: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/fil es/country/docs/china/r5_world_migration_report_2018_en.pdf.

IOM. (2018, February 02*). Why Gaziantep Still Matters Seven Years After Start of Syrian Conflict* [Press release]. Retrieved June 14, 2019, from IOM: https://www.iom .int/news/why-gaziantep-still-matters-seven-years-after-start-syrian-conflict

Isernia, P., Urso, O., Gyuzalyan, H., and Wilczynska, A. (2018). *A Review of Empirical Surveys of Asylum-Related Migrants (Rep.)*. European Asylum Support Office. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from EASO: https://www.easo.europa.eu/easo-annual-report-2018.

Jobskills. (n.d.). Public Employment Services. Retrieved July 5, 2019 from jobskills: https://jobskills.se/.

Kale, B., Dimitriadi, A., Sanchez-Montijano, E., and Süm, E. (2018). Asylum policy and the future of Turkey-EU relations: Between cooperation and conflict. *FEUTURE Online papers, March*.

Kerber, K. (2002). The temporary protection directive. *European Journal of Migration and Law, 4*(2), 193-214.

Kirişçi, K. (2004). Reconciling refugee protection with efforts to combat irregular migration: the case of Turkey and the European Union. *Global migration perspectives, 11*, 7.

Koser, K., and Black, R. (1999). Limits to harmonization: The "temporary protection" of refugees in the European Union. *International Migration, 37*(3), 521-543.

Kuhlman, T. (1990). Organized versus spontaneous settlement of refugees in Africa: a contribution to the discussion from an economic point of view. Retrieved April 20, 2019 from Univsersity of Amsterdam: http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/12157/Scanjob?sequence=1

Kuhlman, T. (1991). The economic integration of refugees in developing countries: a research model. *Journal of refugee studies*, *4*(1), 1-20.

Kuhlman, T. (1994). *Asylum or aid? The economic integration of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the Sudan*. Avebury.

Lee, E. S. (1966). A theory of migration. *Demography*, *3*(1), 47-57.

Liebaut, F. (2000). *Legal and social conditions for asylum seekers and refugees in Central and Eastern European countries*. Danish Refugee Council, funded by the European Commission.

Martin, P. L. (1991). *The unfinished story: Turkish labour migration to Western Europe: with special reference to the Federal Republic of Germany* (Vol. 84). International Labour Organization.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., and Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. *Population and development review*, 19(3), 431-466.

Maunder, N., Seyfert, K., Aran, M., Baykal, G., Marzi, M., & Smith, G. (2018). *Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey* (Rep. No. 1). Retrieved June 23, 2019, from WFP Turkey Country Office: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000100401/download/

McAuliffe, M., and Ruhs, M. (2017). World migration report 2018. *Geneva: International Organization for Migration*.

McDonough, P., Kmak, M., and van Selm, J. (2008). Sharing responsibility for refugee protection in Europe: Dublin reconsidered. ECRE

Memişoğlu, F., (2018), The Syrian Community in Turkey: Perspectives, Prospects, and Policies, *PODEM*

Ministry of National Economy (MoNE). (2019, March). *Hayat Boyu Öğrenme*. T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü Göç ve Acil Durum

Eğitim Daire Başkanlığı. Online presentation. Retrieved June 7, 2019 from MoNe: https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2019_03/06145652_04-Mart2019_intern etsunu.pdf

Mueller, C. (2006). Integrating Turkish communities: a German dilemma. *Population research and policy review*, *25*(5-6), 419-441.

Niessen, J., and Schibel, Y. (2007). *Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners*. European Commission, Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security.

Nordic Council of Ministers. (2019). Integrating Immigrants into the Nordic Labour Markets (Rep.) (L. Calmfors, and Gassen, N. S. Ed.). http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/Nord2019-024

OECD and EU. (2015). *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD. (2016). *Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and their Children in Sweden*. OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD. (2018). *International Migration Outlook 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved June 20, 2019 from OECD: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en

Onken, V. (2005). The Social Implications of Temporary Protection in Light of the Imperative of Return: A Study of European Policies. *Refugee Crises and International Response*, 181-215.

Osseiran, S., Cloeters, G., Üçkardeşler, E., Biehl, K., Hohberger, W., and Paker, H. (2018). Syrians in Turkey. Retrieved May 20, 2019, from Istanbul Policy Center: https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/SyriansinTurkeyEN.pdf

Özçürümez, S., and Yetkin, D. (2014). Limits to regulating irregular migration in Turkey: What constrains public policy and why?. *Turkish Studies, 15*(3), 442-457.

Özpınar, E., Çilingir, Y. S., Düşündere, A. T. (2016, April). Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: İşsizlik ve Sosyal Uyum. *TEPAV*. Retrieved May 3, 2019 from TEPAV: https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1461746316-7.Turkiye___deki_Suriyeliler___I ssizlik_ve_Sosyal_Uyum.pdf

Park Robert, E., and Burgess, E. W. (1921). Introduction to the Science of Sociology. *Chicago, Illinois*.

Parsons, T. (1949). Essays in sociological theory; pure and applied.

Parusel, B. (2009). Sweden. Focus Migration. Country Profile No. 18. Retrieved May 14, 2019 from Focus Migration: http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP_18_Sweden.pdf

Pasquarello, J., Bevelander, P., Törngren, P. B., Emilsson, H., and Irastorza, N. (2019). Sweden's Response to Syrian-Conflict Refugee Settlement'. *University Technology Sydney*.

Penninx, M. J. A. (2003). Integration. The role of communities, institutions, and the state. *The Migration Information Source (on-line)*. Retrieved May 2, 2019 from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/migration-informationsource?cat=fundam entals.

Penninx, R. (2005). Integration of migrants: Economic, social, cultural and political dimensions. *The new demographic regime: Population challenges and policy responses*, 5, 137-152.

Penninx, R., and Roosblad, J. (Eds.). (2002). *Trade unions, immigration, and immigrants in Europe, 1960-1993: A comparative study of the attitudes and actions of trade unions in seven West European countries* (Vol. 1). Berghahn books.

PES. (n.d.). Etableringsprogrammet. Retrieved July 6, 2019 from Public Employment Services: https://arbetsformedlingen.se/other-languages/english-engelska/stod-och-ersattning/att-delta-i-program/etableringsprogrammet

Phillimore, J., and Goodson, L. (2006). Problem or opportunity? Asylum seekers, refugees, employment and social exclusion in deprived urban areas. *Urban Studies*, *43*(10), 1715-1736.

Phillimore, J., and Goodson, L. (2008). Making a place in the global city: The relevance of indicators of integration. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *21*(3), 305-325.

Pillai, R., Scandura, T. A., and Williams, E. A. (1999). Leadership and organizational justice: Similarities and differences across cultures. *Journal of international business studies*, 30(4), 763-779.

Portes, A., and Böröcz, J. (1989). Contemporary immigration: Theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes of incorporation. *International migration review*, 23(3), 606-630.

Portes, A., and Zhou, M. (1993). The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. *The annals of the American academy of political and social science*, 530(1), 74-96.

Redfield, R., Linton, R., and Herskovits, M. J. (1936). Memorandum for the study of acculturation. *American anthropologist*, *38*(1), 149-152.

Reniers, G. (1999). On the history and selectivity of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium. *International Migration*, 37(4), 679-713.

Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). (n.d.). Turkish Citizens Living Abroad. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from MoFa: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa

Robinson, V. (1998). Defining and measuring successful refugee integration. In *Proceedings of ECRE International conference on Integration of Refugees in Europe*. Antwerp/Brussels: ECRE.

Rose, A. M. (1970). *Sociology: The study of human relations*. Knopf.

RRMMP, R. R. (2016). Migrant Response Plan for Europe: Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route. *UN, January-December*.

Rudiger, A., and Spencer, S. (2003). Social integration of migrants and ethnic minorities: policies to combat discrimination. In *Conference on the Economic and Social Aspects of Immigration organized by the European Commission and OECD*.

Shields, M. A., and Price, S. W. (2005). Exploring the economic and social determinants of psychological well-being and perceived social support in England. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)*, *168*(3), 513-537.

Solano, P. (2018). Integration in Sweden. *Swedish Development Partner*. Retrieved May 3, 2019 from https://im.mild-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/integration_in_s weden.pdf

SOPEMI. (2008). *International Migration Outlook: Annual Report*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Soysal, Y. N. (1994). *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe*. University of Chicago Press.

Sputniknews. (2019, March 14). Bolu Belediye Başkanı Tanju Özcan: Bolu'da en rahat Suriyeliler yaşıyor. *Sputniknews*. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from Sputniknews: https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201904141038755844-bolu-belediye-baskani-tanju-ozcan-boluda-en-rahat-suriyeliler-yasiyor/

Strang, A., and Ager, A. (2010). Refugee integration: Emerging trends and remaining agendas. *Journal of refugee studies*, *23*(4), 589-607.

Swedish Institute. (n.d.). *The refugee challenge*. Retrieved June 13, 2019 from https://sweden.se/migration/#2015

Swedish Migration Agency. (2015). *Applications for asylum received, 2014*. Retrieved June 27, 2019 from https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.39a9cd9514a3460 77211b0a/1485556218186/Inkomna%20ans%C3%B6kningar%20om%20asyl%202 014%20-%20Applications%20for%20asylum%20received%202014.pdf

Swedish Migration Agency. (2016). Applications for asylum received, 2015. Retrieved June 27, 2019 from https://www.migrationsverket.se/ download/18.7c00d8e6143101d166d1aab/1485556214938/Inkomna%20ansökningar%20om%20asyl%202015%20%20Applications%20for%20asylum%20received%202015.pdf

Swedish Migration Agency. (n.d.(b)). Residence permits for those granted refugee status. Retrieved 4 July, 2019 from Swedish Migration Agency: https://www.migrations verket.se/English/Private-individuals/Protection-and-asylum-in-Sweden/When-you-have-received-a-decision-on-your-asylum-application/If-you-are-allowed-to-stay/Residence-permits-for-those-granted-refugee-status.html

Swedish Migration Agency. (n.d.(c)). Residence permit card. Retrieved July 4, 2019 from Swedish Migration Agency: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Residence-permit-card.html

Swedish Migration Agency. (n.d.). History. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from Swedish Migration Agency: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Migration-to-Sweden/History.html

Swedish Parliament. (1975). Regeringens proposition on riktlinjer för invandar- och minoritetspoltiken m. m. (1975:26). Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/regeringens-proposition-om-riktlinjer-for_FY0326

Swedish Parliament. (1994). Law on the reception of asylum seekers and others (1994: 137). Retrieved May 6, 2019 from Swedish Parliament: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ dokument-lagar/dokument/svenskforfattningssamling/lag-1994137-om-mottagande-av-asylsokande-mfl_sfs-1994-137.

T24. (2019, August 2). Süleyman Soylu, vatandaşlık verilen Suriyelilerin sayısını açıkladı. T24. Retrieved August 5, 2019, from T24: https://t24.com.tr/haber/suleyman-soylu-vatandaslik-verilen-suriyelilerin-sayisini-acikladi,833262

TBMM. (2018). *Göç ve Uyum Raporu (Rep.)*. Retrieved July, 2019, from Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İnsan Haklarini İnceleme Komisyonu Mülteci Haklari Alt Komisyonu: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/docs/2018/goc_ve_uyum_raporu.pdf

The United Nations General Assembly. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. *Treaty Series*, *999*, 171.

Threadgold, T. and Court, G.(2005) Refugee Inclusion: A literature review. *Produced for the Welsh Refugee Council and the Welsh Assembly Government*.

TNPA. (2017). Mass Immigration and Syrians in Turkey. Turkish National Police Academy Institute of Security Sciences. Center for Research on Immigration and Border Security (GÖÇMER).

Tokuzlu, Lami B. (2010). Burden-Sharing Games for Asylum Seekers between Turkey and the European Union. EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/05. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute*, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI).

TURK KIZILAY. (2019, March 3). *Survey Findings: Livelihoods* (Rep.). Retrieved May 8, 2019, from Türk Kızılay: https://cash-hub.org/-/media/cashhub-documents/resources/2019/mne_livelihoods_survey_findings_03042019.pdf

Turner, B. J. (1978). The Social Origins of Academic Sociology: Durkheim.

UN Women. (2018). *Needs Assessment of Syrian Women and Girls Under Temporary Protection Status in Turkey* (Rep.). Retrieved May 20, 2019 from Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Daynışma Derneği: http://sgdd.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/The_Needs_Assessment_ENG_WEB.pdf

UN. (2018). Draft Outcome Document of the Conference. *Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*. United Nations.

UN. (n.d.). Syria emergency. Retrieved July 20, 2019 from UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html

UNHCR. (1993). *Note on International Protection (submitted by the High Commissioner)*, A/AC.96/815, Retrieved May 1, 2019 from https://www.refworld.org /docid/3ae68d5d10.html.

UNHCR. (2013a). The labour market integration of resettled refugees, PDES/2013/16. Retrieved May 4, 2019 from https://www.unhcr.org/5273a9e89.pdf.

UNHCR. (2013b). Turkey Response Plan. Retrieved June 24, 2019 from UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/turkey_response_plan pdf.pdf

UNHCR. (2018). *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Compact on Refugee Part II*. United Nations.

UNHCR. (2019). Figures at a Glance. Retrieved July 20, 2018 from UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html

UNHCR. (2019). Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2018. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved May 22, 2019 from UNHCR: https://www.unh cr.org/5d 08d7ee7.pdf.

UNHCR. (n.d.). Syria Regional Refugee Response. Retrieved June 23, 2019 from UNHCR: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.229843291.614309455.1565170044-1289268181.1561192481.

UNICEF. (n.d.). The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Programme. Retrieved June 4, 2019 from UNICEF: https://www.unicef.org/turkey/en/conditional-cash-transfer-education-ccte-programme

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). *International Migration Report 2017: Highlights* (ST/ESA/SER.A/404).

Valenta, M., and Bunar, N. (2010). State assisted integration: Refugee integration policies in Scandinavian welfare states: The Swedish and Norwegian experience. *Journal of refugee studies*, *23*(4), 463-483.

Vasta, E. (2009). *The controllability of difference: social solidarity and immigrant integration*. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society.

Warner, W. L., and Srole, L. (1945). The social systems of American ethnic groups.

Westin, C. (2000). *The effectiveness of settlement and integration policies towards immigrants and their descendants in Sweden*. International Labour Office. Geneva

Wiesbrock, A. (2011). The integration of immigrants in Sweden: a model for the European Union?. *International Migration*, *49*(4), 48-66.

World Bank. (n.d.). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?locations=S E-TR.

World Food Programme (WFP). (2017). *The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) and the Grand Bargain* [Brochure]. WFP. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from WFP: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000021046/download/?_ga=2.19269944.1 000092108.1566467873-159808827.1566132875

Yavcan, B. (2016). On Governing the Syrian Refugee Crisis Collectively: The View from Turkey. *Near Futures Online*, *1*.

APPENDICES

TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezin asıl amacı, Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere ilişkin olarak Türkiye'nin entegrasyon politikalarının veya eksikliğinin bir analizini sağlamaktır. Tezin ana hedefi, işgücü piyasası entegrasyon politikalarının analizidir. Bu arayışta bu tez, şu sorulara cevap vermeyi amaçlamaktadır; Suriyelilerin mevcut işgücü piyasası entegrasyonu İsveç örneği ışığında nasıldır? Gaziantep'teki girişimcilik davranışı anketinden elde edilen veriler ekonomik entegrasyon için herhangi bir çözüm sunuyor mu? Bu bağlamda, bu araştırma, Türkiye'nin Suriyelilerin akını konusunda aldığı aksiyonlar övgüye değer olmasına rağmen, Suriyeli entegrasyonuna yönelik politika cevaplarının makul bir şekilde tasarlanmadığı ve bu nedenle de eşit olmayan sonuçlara yol açtığı hipotezini taşımaktadır. Özellikle işgücü piyasası ile ilgili olarak, Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerde görülen girişimciliğin, temel yasa ve yönetmeliklerin getirdiği politika boşluklarının doldurulması ve öngörülemeyen engellerin aşılmasındaki rolü, Suriyelilerin Türkiye'deki resmi işgücü piyasasına entegrasyon şansını artırmada önemli bir seçenek sunmaktadır.

Araştırma karma metodoloji kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir ve çoğunlukla nitel bilgileri içermektedir. Öncelikle, entegrasyon politikalarının gelişimi ve mevcut entegrasyon politikaları ile ilgili olarak İsveç ve Türkiye ülke örneklerinin analiz edildiği vaka çalışma yöntemini içermektedir. Bunu yapmak için, akademi, devlet kurumları, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve gazetelerden elde edilen kaynaklar kullanılmıştır.

İkincisi, anket yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Anketler Gaziantep ilinde yapılmak üzere hazırlanmıştır. Amaç, Gaziantep'teki Suriyeli girişimcilerin işletmelerini işlettikleri iş ortamını daha iyi anlamak amacıyla firma düzeyinde bir anket yapmaktı. Benzer

şekilde, diğer hedefler arasında ücretli çalışanlardan ziyade mültecinin işgücü piyasasına girişimci olarak giriş nedenlerinin belirlenmesi, sağladıkları istihdam ve karşılaştıkları engeller bulunmaktadır. Özetle, mevcut veri eksikliği karşısında girişimci Suriyelilerin Gaziantep'teki iş ortamına ilişkin fikir vermeleri için anketler yapılmıştır.

Bu araştırmanın sınırlamaları da mevcuttur. Birincil sınırlama, dil engelidir. Bu sınırlama iki düzeydedir. Birincisi, İsveç'teki kaynaklar ile ilgilidir. Bu çalışmada kullanılan İsveç ile ilgili yasalar, düzenlemeler ve politika belgeleri ikincil kaynaklardan alınmış ya da internette hazır bulunan anında çeviri hizmetleri tarafından tercüme edilmiştir. Dil engeli ile ilgili ikinci sınırlamaya, Suriyeli girişimciler ile Gaziantep'te anket yapılması sırasında karşılaşılmıştır. Tercümanlık hizmetleri hem Türkçe hem de Arapça olarak soruları ve bunlara karşılık gelen nicel cevapları içeren bir anket hazırlamak için kullanılmıştır. Ancak, o zaman bile Suriyeli girişimcilerle yapılan anket çalışmaları sırasında anketörün Arapça bilmemesi sıkıntı yaratmıştır. Bu sınırlama, Suriyeli bir anketörün eğitimi ve istihdamı ile aşılmıştır.

İkinci sınırlama, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli girişimcilerle ilgili olarak mevcut verilerin eksikliğine ilişkindir. Bu durumda, bu veri eksikliği anket sonuçları ile doldurulmuştur.

Tez toplam 5 bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş (Bölüm 1) ve Sonuç (Bölüm 5) iki bölümü oluşturmaktadır. Bölüm 1'den sonra, Bölüm 2'de entegrasyon kavramı ve evrimi hakkındaki literatür gözden geçirilmiştir. Literatür taramasının devamı olarak Bölüm 3'te İsveç ve Türkiye örneklerine bakılmıştır. Böylece, bir kavram olarak entegrasyonun bir süreç haline gelmesi için operasyonelleştirildiği iki ayrı durum göz önüne alınmıştır. Bu operasyonelleşme, entegrasyon politikasının geçici olduğu düşünülen durumlar karşısındaki rolü ve ortaya çıkan süreçler üzerine odaklanmıştır. Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyeliler (GKAS'ler) ile ilgili olarak. 3. Bölüm ayrıca, işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonun bütünsel bir entegrasyon için bir ön koşul olduğuna da dikkat çekmiştir. Bunu yaparken, bu tez Türkiye'deki politika yapıcıların belirlediği entegrasyon sürecinin eksikliklerini belirleyerek, kapsamlı bir entegrasyon politikası önerileri geliştirmeyi de amaçlamıştır. Son olarak, 4. Bölümde, özellikle

GKAS'ların işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonu göz önünde bulundurularak, Gaziantep ilindeki Suriyeli girişimcilerle yapılan anket sonuçları sunulmuştur. Bunu yaparak, bu araştırma mevcut entegrasyon politikalarının ve özellikle de işgücü piyasası entegrasyon politikalarının İsveç örneği ışığında nasıl uygulandığını analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Ayrıca, Suriyeli girişimcilerle yapılan anketlerle mevcut entegrasyon politikalarının başarısı veya başarısızlığı araştırılmıştır.

Daha detaylı olarak, Bölüm 2'nin amacı, yeni gelenlere bir cevap olarak entegrasyon kavramının evrimini analiz etmektir. Bu arayış, mültecilere ve bu kişilerin işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonlarına özel bir odaklanma ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Konseptin günümüzdeki evrimi, kendisinden önce gelen ve bazı durumlarda eş anlamlı olarak kullanılan kültürleşme ve asimilasyon gibi diğer kavramlarına bakılarak analiz edilmiştir. Dışlama, özümseme, uyarlama, ırk ilişkileri döngüsü gibi kültürleşme ve asimilasyon ile aynı çağrışımlara sahip diğer kavramların bu incelemeye dahil edilmediğine dikkat çekmek de önemlidir.

Ayrıca Bölüm 2.'de, entegrasyonun çok kültürlülük normatif teorisiyle uyumluluğu değerlendirilmiştir. Bu noktada, cumhuriyetçi model veya geçiş modeli gibi diğer modellerin incelemeye dahil edilmediği de belirtmek önemlidir.

Entegrasyon literatürü, entegrasyon kavramı için evrensel bir tanımın en iyi ihtimalle belirsiz olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu, literatürde, entegrasyon kavramının farklı gerçeklikler karşısında kendine has uygulamalarına ihtiyaç duyması ile ilgilidir. Başka bir deyişle, entegrasyon kavramı ve içerdiği süreç ülkeye özgü olduğu kadar, aynı zamanda ülkeye gelen yeni gelen gruplara da özgüdür. Bu bağlamda, entegrasyon sürecinin işletilmesi için kendine özgü bir tanımın oluşturulması gerekmektedir. Bu süreç, nüfusu ve kurumlarıyla birlikte, ev sahibinin yeni gelen grupla birlikte karşılıklı dönüşüm geçirerek aktif bir rol oynadığı iki yönlü bir süreç olarak görülmektedir. Belirtilen bu değişim yeni gelenlerin ülkeye girmesinden dolayı öncelikle demografiktir.

Ayrıca, entegrasyon ile ilgili faaliyetlerin yürütülebilmesi için ev sahibi toplumda ve kurumlarda toleransın artması nedeniyle değişim de gerçekleşmektedir, çünkü

hoşgörülü bir politika olmadan entegrasyon gerçekleşemez. Başka bir deyişle, yeni gelenlere yönelik ayrımcılığa karşı mücadele, etnik gruplar arası etkileşimi teşvik etme, yeni başlayanlara ana dillerinde hizmet sağlama amaçlı politikalar, entegrasyonun gerçekleşmesi için gerekli değişikliklerden bazılarını içermektedir. Ev sahibinin bu değişimi ve artan toleransı, uyum ve asimilasyon gibi kavramlarla karşılaştırıldığında entegrasyon kavramının temel farkı olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu, entegrasyonun sadece kurumlar veya halklar arasında karşılıklı etkileşim yoluyla gerçekleşebileceğini göstermektedir.

Benzer şekilde, literatür entegrasyon sürecinin doğrusal bir yol olmadığını açıkça söylemektedir. Detaylandırmak gerekirse, bir kavram olarak entegrasyon, politikalar ve uygulamalar yoluyla gerçekleştirilmesi zor hem nesnel hem de öznel girdileri ilgilendirir. Entegrasyonun kestirme çözümlerle başarılı olamayacağını ve dikkatli, detaylı fakat en önemlisi uzun vadeli planlama gerektirdiğini belirtmektedir. Buna karşılık, bu entegrasyon süreci için ve bu sürecin ölçümü ve izlenmesi için zorluklar doğurmaktadır.

Ayrıca, entegrasyonla ilgili literatür, kavramın çok boyutlu olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, entegrasyon yasal, sosyoekonomik ve kültürel gibi devletin birçok sektöründe gerçekleşmektedir. Literatürde entegrasyonun başarılı olması için, ev sahibi ülkenin, yeni gelenlerden, entegrasyon çerçevesi içinde, beklentilerini bu kişilere iletme konusunda kapsamlı ve detaycı olması gerektiği de yinelenmiştir.

Ayrıca, entegrasyonla ilgili literatürün gözden geçirilmesi sonucu, göstergelere dayalı bir yaklaşım kullanarak entegrasyon hedeflerinin izlenmesine ve ölçülmesine yönelik akademik çevrede de bir eğilim görülmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, ev sahibi ve yeni gelenlerin iş birliğine duyulan ihtiyaç, entegrasyon politikalarının temelini oluşturur ve bir entegrasyon sürecini çerçevelemek ve tanımlamak için bu politikalar uygulamaya geçirilir. Buna karşılık, entegrasyon literatüründe özel olarak entegrasyon amacıyla tasarlanan politikaların her zaman beklenen sonuçları elde etmediği de açıkça vurgulanmaktadır. Buna paralel olarak, gösterge temelli yaklaşım, politika ve uygulama arasındaki boşluğu doldurmada olası bir çözüm olarak

literatürde desteklenmiştir. Bu çözüm, uygulama düzeyinde sonuçlara bakarak politikaların amaçlanan sonuçlarının gerçekleşme oranının izlenmesi yoluyla yapılmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, bu tez aynı zamanda entegrasyon sürecinin başarısını sağlamak için göstergelere dayalı yaklaşımının önemine dikkat çekmiş ve bu yöntemin kullanımı teşvik etmiştir.

Öte yandan, ülkeler ve ilgili kurumlar tarafından doğru ve uyumlu bir şekilde tutulan verilerin olmayışı ve gerçek süreçler hakkındaki bilgi eksikliği entegrasyon süreçlerinin incelenmesinde en büyük engeli oluşturmaktadır. Literatür taramasından sonra yapılan araştırmalar, veri eksikliğinin, bu kavramın farklı ülkeler tarafından evrimi, gelişimi ve uygulanmasındaki en büyük engeli oluşturduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bunun nedeni, ilgili politikaların ideal uygulamalar ile sonuçlanmasının veri eksikliği nedeniyle izlenememesidir.

Entegrasyon kavramının bir başka eksikliği, ulus devlet kavramları ile tutarlı olmaması ve dolayısıyla uygulanabilirliğinin çoğunlukla çok kültürlülük eğilimi olan ülkeler ile sınırlanmasıdır. Bu tez, tek kültürlülük ve homojenlik ilkesinin artık gerçekliği yansıtmıyor olması ve ulus devletlerin azınlıklar, göçmenler ve mülteciler tarafından yaşanan deneyimlerin çeşitliliğini tanıma yolunda adım atması gerektiği görüşündedir. Ulus devletçiliğin, sınırların geçirgenliğinin artması ve gelişmiş iletişim ve ulaşım teknolojileri sonucu artan göçmen sayısı ile daha da fazla mercek altına alınacağını bu tezde belirtilmiştir.

Bu bağlamda, bu tez, entegrasyon kavramının canlılığını ve çeşitliliğe cevap vermek için bir politika aracı olarak operasyonelliğini teşvik etmeye çalışmıştır. İşgücü piyasası, konut, sağlık ve eğitim sektörleri gibi yapısal faktörlerin rolü, başarılı entegrasyon arayışının ön koşulları olarak vurgulanmıştır. Bu faktörlerden işgücü piyasasının, entegrasyon sürecinin başlaması için kesitsel ve hayati olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda, işgücü piyasasına katılımın, öz saygı kazanımını, toplumsal ve kültürlerarası etkileşimi teşvik ettiği ve hatta dil öğrenimini kolaylaştırdığı için entegrasyonun tüm boyutlarında başarı bulmak için hayati olduğu da belirtilmektedir.

Ek olarak, literatür entegrasyonun uzun vadeli bir planlama ve sabır gerektirdiğini belirtmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, bu tez daha önce İsveç ve Türkiye'deki entegrasyon politikalarının gelişimine veya eksikliğine bakarak ülke örneklerine dalmıştır. Analiz, özellikle mültecilerin işgücü piyasasına entegrasyonuna odaklanmıştır. Bu ülkelerin karşılaştırılması için ortak bir temel oluşturmak amacıyla, "geçici" kabul edilen mülteci durumları karşısında entegrasyon politikaları ve uygulamaları ele alınmıştır. Bölüm 2, İsveç örneğinden farklı olarak, Suriyelilerin Türkiye'ye girişi Türkiye'nin mülteci entegrasyonu nosyonuyla ilk etkileşimini oluşturduğundan, Türkiye'nin entegrasyon politikalarının analizi için odak noktası GKAS'lar olacağını belirterek sonlanmıştır.

Bölüm 3, entegrasyon sürecinin hem ev sahibinin hem de yeni gelen kişinin ihtiyaçlarını göz önünde bulunduran uzun vadeli planlama gerektirdiğini bir kez daha belirtmiştir. Ancak, geçici olarak görülen durumlar karşısında, entegrasyon kavramı bir çıkmazda görünmektedir. Bu bakımdan, hedef ülkelerdeki entegrasyon seçenekleri, geçici olarak öngörülen eldeki durumun süresi ile sınırlı hale gelmektedir. Bu seçenekler üç tanedir ve sırayla tam entegrasyon politikalarının izlenmesi, izolasyon politikalarının izlenmesi veya devlet ihtiyaçlarına dayalı entegrasyon politikalarını izlenmesini içerir.

İsveç ve Türkiye örneklerinde geçici olduğu görülen durumlara üç entegrasyon politikası yaklaşımının da uygulanmasının örneklerini görmek mümkündür. Kosovalılar, Iraklılar ve son olarak da Suriyeliler, İsveç'in geçici durumlara tam entegrasyon politikalarıyla yaklaşma kabiliyetini göstermiştir. Başka bir deyişle, İsveç entegrasyon politikalarını ve uygulamalarını yerine getirirken, aynı zamanda mültecilerin de geri dönüşlerini kolaylaştırmak amacı ile kendilerine gerekli bilgileri vermiş ve araçlarla donatmıştır. Bu araştırma, bunun ancak İsveç'in 1970'lerden beri entegrasyon politikası tasarımı ile uğraşması ve buna bağlı olarak takip ettiği "iki-yollu politikası" sayesinde mümkün olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir.

Öte yandan, Türkiye, izolasyon politikaları ve devlet ihtiyacına dayalı bir entegrasyon politikası arasında seçim yapmış ve zaman içinde bir öncekinden ikincisine geçiş yapmıştır. Bunun nedeni, Suriyelilerin, Türk kökenli veya Avrupa'dan gelen

mülteciler klasmanı dışında olmasıdır ve bu kişiler ile ilgili Türkiye'nin bir entegrasyon sürecini ilk defa oluşturuyor olmasıdır. Buna bağlı olarak, sürecin en başında Türkiye, kamplardaki GKAS'lar ile ilgili izolasyon politikalarını izleyerek sadece geri dönüşlerine odaklanmıştır. Bununla birlikte, kriz uzadıkça ve Suriyeli mülteci sayısı da artıkça kamplaşma ve izolasyon politikasının yetersiz kaldığı görülmektedir.

Uzun süredir devam eden Suriye krizi nedeniyle kamplaşmadan uzaklaşan Türkiye, ev sahibi toplumun tepkisine yol açabilecek radikal değişiklikler getirmeyecek şekilde özenle tasarlanmış politikalar uygulamaya başlamıştır. Böylece, entegrasyon politikalarının devletin ihtiyaçlarına göre tasarlandığı da belirginleşmiştir. Bu politikalar bazı çözümler sunarken, özellikle işgücü piyasası için düşük entegrasyon seviyelerine neden olmuştur. Dahası, bu politikalar devletin sektörleri arasında olması gereken bağdaşıklıklarından yoksun oldukları için bu sektörlerin birbirlerine ters olarak çalışmaya başlamasına önayak olduğu görülmüştür. Bu, kısmen, bu politikaların nispeten geç tasarlanmasının ve bu politikaların Türkiye'deki Suriye topluluğunun özel ihtiyaçlarını dikkate almadığı gerçeğinin bir sonucudur. Ayrıca, bu politikaların sorunsuz bir şekilde uygulanmasına yardımcı olmak için destek girişimlerini tasarlama konusunda Türkiye'nin yetersiz kaldığı analizlerden açıkça görülmektedir.

Ülke örneklerinin analizi, Türkiye'nin İsveç'ten öğreneceği politika aksiyonları olduğunu göstermiştir. İsveç'in tecrübelerinden anlaşılacağı gibi, entegrasyon politikası tasarlamak tek gecelik bir çaba değildir ve Türkiye doğru yönde attığı adımlar ile Suriyelilerin kitlesel girişine yönelmiş olsa da bunu gecikmeli bir şekilde gerçekleştirmiştir. İki ülkedeki mülteci sorununun büyüklüğü karşılaştırılabilir olmamakla birlikte, bu olumlu politika yanıtlarını ve önerilerini önemsiz kılmamaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu tezde entegrasyon konusunda derhal mukayyet olunması gereken belli alanların olduğu ve İsveç'in iyi bir örnek sunabileceği görüşü mevcuttur. Bölüm 3, Türkiye'nin, entegrasyonun kendi kendine özgü yorumlanması ihtiyacı ile paralel olarak, entegrasyon sürecine kendine has bir şekilde yaklaşması gerektiğinin altını ısrarla çizmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye, İsveç'i yol gösterici bir ışık olarak alabilecekken, bunun anlamı ne olursa olsun, Türk yaşam tarzının

özelliklerini belirten, Türkiyeli olan bir entegrasyon politikası tasarlamaya kararlı olmalıdır.

Bölüm 3'in vardığı sonuçlar birden fazladır. Öncelikle, iki ülke örneğinin analizleri, yeni gelenlerin akışından kaynaklanan toplumsal çeşitliliğe bu ülkelerin farklı yaklaştığını ve ortaya çıkan politikaların da bu yaklaşıma bağlı olarak, farklı olduğunu belirtmiştir. İsveç, 1975'ten beri çok kültürlü bir ülke olmasına karşılık, Türkiye ulus devlet olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, İsveç, 1970'lerden bu yana ulusal bir entegrasyon politikası tasarlama sürecine devam ederken, Suriye vakası ile Türkiye bu atılıma daha yeni başlamıştır. Yine de Bölüm 2'deki literatür taraması ile birlikte düşünüldüğünde, Bölüm 3 ev sahibi ülkelerin ulus devlet kavramlarını desteklerken, entegrasyon hakkında konuşmanın zor olduğuna dikkat çekmektedir. Bu nedenle, ilk olarak Türkiye, entegrasyona geçişi kolaylaştırmak için kültürel hoşgörü politikalarının tasarımına başlamalıdır. İkinci olarak, Bölüm 3, ülke örneklerinin analizi yoluyla, önceden var olan bir ulusal entegrasyon stratejisine sahip olmanın, mültecilerin ülkeye girişine hızlı yanıt verebilmek için hayati önem taşıdığını da kanıtlamıştır. Üçüncüsü, Türkiye'nin entegrasyon yaklaşımlarının fazla dağınık olduğunu ortaya koyan Bölüm 3, daha iyi sonuçlar elde etmek için tutarlı, belirli bir hedefi olan ve izlemeye açık politikaların gerekli olduğunu belirtmektedir. Dördüncüsü, Türkiye, GKAS'lar için vatandaşlığa ya da kalıcı ikamete giden yolu düzenlemelidir. Beşincisi, Türkiye, Suriyelilerin entegrasyon süreçlerinde yerel bölgelere daha fazla sorumluluk vermeli ve gayri resmi bir şekilde yerine getirilen bu sorumluluklara hukuki bir çerçeve ile resmiyet kazandırmalıdır. Son olarak, Türkiye, literatürün işgücü piyasasını odak noktasına konumlandırdığı gibi, Türkiye'nin de devletin ihtiyaçlarını önceliklendiren bir entegrasyon politikasından, iki yönlü bir entegrasyon sürecine odaklanan bir devlete dönüşmesi gerektiğinin de altını çizmiştir.

Bölüm 4'teki anket sonuçları, girişimciliğin Suriyelilerin entegrasyonu için tasarlanan politikalardaki boşlukları doldurmadaki rolünü açıkça göstermektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Suriyelilerdeki girişimciliğin, çalışma izni başvuru süreci ve yüzde on kotası gibi resmi işgücü piyasasına girişi kısıtlayan düzenlemelerin getirdiği zorlukların aşılmasına yardımcı olduğu görülmüştür. Bu, Suriyelilere verilen çalışma izinlerinin üçte birinden fazlasının şu anda Suriyelilerin açtığı işletmelerde çalışan Suriyelilere

verilmesi gerçeğinde de belirgindir. Benzer şekilde, anket bulguları ankete katılan tüm Suriyeli şirketlerin yüzde altmış sekizinin ilk defa girişimciler tarafından kurulduğunu ortaya koyduğundan, diğer Suriyelilere istihdam sağlamaya ek olarak, girişimci Suriyelilerin yetersiz politikalar karşısında kendi yolları ile entegrasyon sürecine dahil olduklarını göstermektedir. Dahası, anket bulguları, en büyük üçüncü Suriyeli nüfusuna ev sahipliği yapan Gaziantep'teki Suriyelilerin, resmi iş ekosisteminin bir parçası olmak için gerekli adımları atma istekliliğini de göstermektedir.

İkincisi, anket sonuçları Suriyelilerde Türkiye vatandaşlığı alma durumu olsa bile, vatandaşlık almaya hak kazanmak için gerekçelerin belirsiz olmasına bağlı olarak, yasal dayanağın eksikliğine de dikkat çekmektedir.

Bölüm 3, düşük Türkçe dil yeterlilik oranlarının, GKAS'ların resmi istihdama erişimine engel teşkil ettiği sonucuna varmıştı. Buna karşılık, anket sonuçları Suriyeli girişimcilerin dil eğitimine karşılaştırmalı olarak daha fazla katıldığını ve iş ortamında kolaylık sağlaması amacı ile Türkçe dilini öğrenme eğiliminde olduklarını göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda, ankete katılanların yarısından fazlası Türkçeye hakim olduklarını ve çoğu da ilgili bir kurumdan dil yeterlilik belgesi aldıklarını iddia etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, akademik çevrenin Gaziantep Üniversitesi aracılığıyla rolü, Türkçe dil kursları ve sertifikalarının sağlanması konusunda açıkça ortaya konmuştur. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye'deki toplam GKAS nüfusunda Türkçe yeterliliğinin düşük seviyede olduğu görülmekle birlikte, girişimcilerin Türk dilini öğrenmeye bu kişilere kıyasla nispeten daha yüksek bir eğilime sahip oldukları görülmektedir. Anket sonuçlarının, dil yeterliliği ile ülkeye varıştan bu yana geçen zaman arasında pozitif bir korelasyon gösterdiğini belirtmek de önemlidir. Bu kapsamda, 2016'dan sonra Türkiye'ye gelen Suriyeli girişimcilerin hepsi Türkçe bilmediğini, 2011-2013 arasında gelen Suriyeli girişimcilerin çoğunun ise Türkçe bildiğini iddia etmiştir.

Bölüm 3, GKAS'larda artan girişimciliğinin istihdam olanakları yaratacağı ve GKAS'ların, Suriyeli girişimciler tarafından istihdam edilmesini kolaylaştırmaya yönelik herhangi bir politika adımının resmi iş piyasası entegrasyonuna pozitif katkı sağlayacağı sonucuna varmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu tezin görüşüne göre, entegrasyon politikalarının tasarımına ilişkin en önemli bulgunun Suriyeli girişimcilerin

çoğunlukla diğer Suriyelileri istihdam etmesi olduğu yönündedir. Başka bir deyişle, ankete katılan tüm Suriyeli şirketlerin yüzde doksan beşi diğer Suriyelileri istihdam ettiklerini belirtmiştir. Bu bulgu, tüm anket katılımcılarının yüzde doksan birinin kayıt dışı işçi çalıştırdığını belirttiği gerçeğiyle birleştiğinde, eldeki sorun açıkça ortaya çıkmaktadır. Buna göre, bir Suriye işletmesinde çalışmayı tercih eden Suriyelilere resmi işgücü piyasasına girişin kolaylaştırılmasına yönelik atılan herhangi bir politika adımı, kayıtlı Suriyeli işçi sayısında doğrudan olumlu bir etkiye sahip olacaktır. Bunun sosyal uyum içinde sorunlara yol açabileceği iddia edilebilir olsa da meselenin gerçeği şu ki Suriyeli girişimciler zaten Suriyeli istihdam ediyorlar ancak bunu gayrı resmi olarak yapıyorlar. Bu nedenle, halihazırda var olan gayrı resmi Suriyeli çalışanların resmi işgücü piyasasına geçişi yalnızca olumlu sonuçlar ve kazanımlar sağlayacaktır. Ancak, bu bulgunun doğru olup olmadığını görmek için temsili bir çalışmada derinlemesine analiz edilmesi gerekir.

Bölüm 3, entegrasyon sürecinin yerelleşmesinin uyum için önemli olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Bu, özellikle Türkçe kurslarının ve danışmanlık ya da rehberliğin sağlanmasının yanı sıra doğru bilgi yayma konusunda da doğrudur. Bu tez, makamlarca atılacak gelecekteki politika adımlarının, Suriyeli girişimcilerin, Arapça konuşan personel eksikliği ile yasalar ve yönetmelikler hakkında bilgi eksikliği gibi önündeki engelleri göz önüne alması gerektiği görüşündedir.

Sonuç kısmını içeren Bölüm 5'te bulgular özetlenmiştir. Neticede, bu tezde, Türkiye'nin entegrasyon politikalarının İsveç örneği ışığında ve Gaziantep'teki Suriyeli girişimcilerle yapılan anketlerin sonucunda bir incelemesini gerçekleştirmiş ve işgücü piyasası entegrasyon politikalarına özel olarak odaklanılmıştır. Bu çabayı üstlenmek için öncelikle yeni başlayanların akınlarına cevap olarak entegrasyon kavramının evrimini ana hatlarıyla açıklamak için literatürün gözden geçirilmesine çalışılmıştır. Bu derleme ilk önce asimilasyon ve kültürleşme gibi öncelikli kavramlara bakarak yapılmıştır. Sonuç olarak hem asimilasyonun hem de kültürleşmenin konuya ağırlıklı olarak kültürel yönüyle yaklaştığı tespit edilmiştir. İlişkili olarak, bu kavramların her ikisi de tamamlanmış bir kaynaşma sürecini, baskın kültürün azınlık tarafından kabul edilmesi ve yeni gelenlerin, ev sahibi toplumun ayırt edilemez bir parçası haline gelmesi gerektiği fikrini korumaktadır. Bu kavramların

işlevselleştirilmesinin öncelikle yeni gelenlerin isteklerini ve tutumlarını tanımakta yetersiz kaldığı tespit edilmiştir. Buna karşılık, normatif bir teori olan çok kültürlülük de incelenmiştir ve entegrasyon kavramının çok kültürlülükle iyi bir uyum içinde olduğu hem ev sahibi hem de yeni gelen için fırsat eşitliği sağlanmayı hedeflediği tespit edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, çok kültürlülük, çeşitliliğin kutlandığı ve göçün ev sahibine hem ekonomik hem sosyal, katkıda bulunan bir faktör olduğu çoğulcu toplumun yaratılmasını gözetmektedir.

Aynı bölümde, entegrasyon kavramının bir incelemesi de yapılmıştır. Entegrasyon için evrensel bir tanımın eksik olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bir tanımın olmayışının temelini, farklı gerçekliklere entegrasyon kavramının kendine özgü uygulamalarına duyulan ihtiyaç üzerine kurduğu belirtilmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, entegrasyon kavramı ve içerdiği süreç, ülkeye özgü olduğu kadar, aynı zamanda yeni gelen gruba özgü olduğu da tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, entegrasyonun, önceki benzer terimlerden farklı olarak, yeni gelenler ile ev sahibi toplumların birlikte değişime uğradığı iki yönlü bir yaklaşımı desteklediği görülmektedir. Daha da önemlisi, entegrasyonun gerçekleşebilmesi için ev sahibi toplumların değişime açık olmaları gerekmelidir, çünkü bu değişim, her şeyden önce demografiktir. Ayrıca, entegrasyon ile ilgili faaliyetlerin yürütülebilmesi için ev sahibi toplumda ve kurumlardaki toleransın artışı gerçekleşmektedir, çünkü hoşgörülü bir politika olmadan entegrasyonun gerçekleşemeyeceği açıkça gösterilmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, yeni gelenlere yönelik ayrımcılık ile mücadele, etnik gruplar arası etkileşimi teşvik etme, yeni başlayanlara ana dillerinde hizmet sağlama gibi pozitif politikalar, entegrasyonun gerçekleşmesi için gerekli değişikliklerden bazılarını içermektedir. Ev sahibinin bu değişim ve artan toleransı, uyum ve asimilasyon gibi kavramlarla karşılaştırıldığında entegrasyon kavramının temel farkı olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu, entegrasyonun sadece kurumlar veya halklar arasında olsa da etkileşim yoluyla gerçekleşebileceğini söylemektedir. Bu bağlamda, literatür taraması aynı zamanda entegrasyonun kültürel çeşitliliği bir kazanç olarak gördüğünü ve bu nedenle yeni gelenlerin kültürünün ev sahibi ülkelerde büyümesi için bir platform sağlanarak kutlandığını göstermiştir. Benzer şekilde entegrasyon, çeşitliliği kutlarken aynı zamanda her bireyin ve grubun ayrı bir kültüre ve farklı becerilere sahip olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Bunu yaparken, entegrasyon, bir

politika tasarımı sürecinin, yeni gelenlerin beraberinde getirdiği kültür ve beceri setine bağlı kalması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin ev sahibi toplum ile yeni gelenler arasındaki kültürel ve fikir alışverişi için cadde sayısını arttırması çok önemlidir. Bu tez çalışmasında da görüldüğü gibi, etkileşim düzeyi politika tasarımının gecikmesinden derinden etkilenmiştir. Tersinin ise özellikle işgücü piyasası ve mülteci girişimciliğinin teşvik edilmesi ile mümkün olduğu gösterilmiştir.

Entegrasyonun sosyoekonomik, kültürel ve dini ve yasal gibi çeşitli boyutlarda gerçekleştiği ve konut, istihdam, sağlık ve eğitim gibi alanlarla ilgili olduğu kadar, ilgili yasa ve yönetmeliklerin çıkarıldığı da vurgulanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, entegrasyon kavramının ve operasyonelleşmenin, en temel şekliyle, çeşitliliğe cevap vermek için bir politika aracı olduğunu göstermiştir. İşgücü piyasası, konut, sağlık ve eğitim sektörleri gibi yapısal faktörlerin rolü, başarılı entegrasyon arayışının ön koşulları olarak vurgulanmıştır. Türkiye örneğinde ise, ilgili politikaların eksikliğine dikkat çekmiş ve Suriyelilerde girişimciliğin, bu mültecilerin kendi kendilerini entegre etme isteklerinin bir göstergesi olduğunu kanıtlamıştır.

Benzer şekilde, bu çalışma, entegrasyonun sürecinin doğrusal bir yolu takip etmediğini ve bir alana entegrasyonun otomatik olarak bir diğer sektörde başarılı entegrasyon anlamına gelmediğini gösterilmiştir. Bu, bir kavram olarak entegrasyonun hem nesnel hem de öznel girdileri göz önünde bulundurarak politikalar ve uygulamalar yapılması ihtiyacı ile derinden ilgilidir.

Bu bağlamda, literatür taraması, akademik çevrede, göstergelere dayalı bir yaklaşım kullanarak entegrasyon hedeflerinin izlenmesine ve ölçülmesine yönelik bir eğilim olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Benzer şekilde, bu tez de entegrasyon sürecinin başarısını sağlamak için en uygun seçenek olarak göstergelere dayalı yaklaşımı desteklemektedir.

Ülke örneklerinden ilerleyerek, Türkiye'nin Suriyelilere verdiği yanıtın bir analizi, mültecilerin Türk devletinin, kurumlarının ve toplumunun çeşitli boyutlarındaki entegrasyonuna ilişkin kapsamlı bir entegrasyon stratejisinin başarılı bir şekilde tasarlanması yolunda adımlar attığını ortaya koymuştur. İsveç ve Türkiye örnekleri

karşılaştırıldığında, entegrasyon politikasının tasarımının tek gecelik bir çaba olmadığı ve Türkiye'nin İsveç'ten öğrenebileceği çok şey olduğu söylenebilir.

Özellikle işgücü piyasası entegrasyon politikalarına odaklanarak, bu politikaların gecikmeli bir şekilde tasarlandığı ve uygulandığı ve dolayısıyla Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin resmi işgücü piyasası entegrasyonunu olumsuz yönde etkilediği bu tezde iddia edilmiştir. Politika ve uygulama düzeyinde resmi işgücü piyasası entegrasyonunun önündeki engeller karşısında, analiz Suriyelilerin girişimciliğinin Türkiye'de yasaların ve yönetmeliklerin getirdiği engellerin üstesinden gelmek ve hatta GKAS'ların resmi ücretli istihdamını arttırmak için uygun bir seçenek olarak öne çıktığını göstermektedir. Genel olarak. Benzer şekilde, 4. Bölümde verilen anket sonuçları, Suriyeli girişimcilerin Türk toplumuna ekonomik faaliyet yoluyla entegre olmaya, Türkçe öğrenmek istemeye ve ülkenin kurallarına ve yönetmeliklerine aşina olmaya nispeten daha istekli olduklarını da kanıtlamıştır. Bu şekilde bu çalışmanın sonuçlarını da desteklemektedir.

TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ■

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : KENANOĞLU.....
Adı / Name : MURAT.....
Bölümü / Department : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : REFUGEE INTEGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CASE OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY.....
.....
.....

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE**:** **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ■ **Doktora** / PhD ☐

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ■
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. ***** ☐

***** *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.*
A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature ..... **Tarih** / Date .....