

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERCEPTIONS: ELEMENTS OF SOFT POWER IN  
GERMANY'S AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

ABDULLAH MESUD DOĞAN

OCTOBER 2019



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERCEPTIONS: ELEMENTS OF SOFT POWER IN  
GERMANY'S AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY  
ABDULLAH MESUD DOĞAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OCTOBER 2019



Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Yaşar Kondakçı  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat Tanrısever  
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Nail Alkan (Ankara HBVU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_



**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Abdullah Mesud Dođan

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERCEPTIONS: ELEMENTS OF SOFT POWER IN GERMANY AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

Doğan, Abdullah Mesud

M.S., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

October 2019, 105 pages

This thesis examines on the importance of Public Diplomacy in German and Turkish foreign policy. The German Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy (*AKBP*) and the Turkish Public Diplomacy will be focused and analysed in the perspective of the constructive discourse. In this context, the focus will be on the characteristics of Public Diplomacy, which can be seen under foreign policy analysis. This thesis seeks to understand the conceptualization of *Soft Power*, according to Nye's studies, which are explained in his book "Bound to Lead" from 1990 and later in "Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics" in which he has defined, developed and proposed the concept of Soft Power. The concept of soft power analysis has proven to be one of the defining concepts in international relation studies, since its introduction to academic discourse in the first half of the 1990's. Despite the widespread use of this concept, the inherent characteristics of the concept could not be understood on a large scale. On this theoretical basis, the soft power elements of the respective countries are worked out and analyzed.

**Keywords:** Public Diplomacy, German Soft Power (*AKBP*), Turkish Public Diplomacy, Turkish Foreign Policy



## ÖZ

### KAMU DİPLOMASİSİ ALGILARI: ALMAN VE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA YUMUŞAK GÜÇ UNSURLARI

Doğan, Abdullah Mesud

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Ekim 2019, 105 sayfa

Bu tez, Alman ve Türk dış politikasında Kamu Diplomasisinin önemini incelemektedir. Alman ve Türk dış politika bağlamında kültürel tanıtım, iletişim kurma ve is birliği merkezli politikalara odaklanan bu tez, devletlerin Kamu Diplomasisi araçlarının tespiti ve Joseph Nye Jr. tarafınca “Bound to Lead” (1990) ve sonrasında derinleşerek çerçevelediği “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics” (2004) adlı kitaplarında *Yumuşak Güç* kavramı etrafında konstrüktivizm kuramı çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Uluslararası İlişkiler çalışmalarında, *Yumuşak Güç* kavramı 1990’lı yılların ilk yarısında Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinde mevcut olan tartışmalar sonucu ortaya çıkan kavramın hala gündemi belirleyen Dış Politika Analizi kapsamında yer edinmiştir. Akademik çalışmaların gündeminde olmasına rağmen, henüz kuramsal çerçevesi hakkında net bir sonuç ortaya çıkmamıştır. İşbu tezde bahsi geçen kuramsal temele dayanarak, ilgili ülkelerin *Yumuşak Güç* unsurları belirtilmiş ve analiz edilmiştir.

**Keywords:** Kamu Diplomasisi, Yumuşak Güç, Türk Dış Politikası, Alman Dış Politikası, Yumuşak Güç Unsurları

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to thank my academic advisor Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı for his guidance, advice and patience in this writing process and during my studies at the university. The numerous discussions on an intellectual and personal level will always be remembered as an enriching and constructive exchange. Mit Dank.

I would also like to thank to our group, *Thesis Christ*, for all the memories we shared. Repeating my thanks to each and every one of you, I should like to point out that everyone is unique and that our friendship will always show loyalty.

Without the support of many people and institutions, it could not have been realized in this form. I would like to thank them all for the experienced help.

Finally, I am eternally thankful to my family. Their constant encouragement is the source of my motivation and inspiration that keeps me going. I feel immensely fortunate to have such loving, caring and supporting family by my side. This could never be possible without you.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vii
LIST OF TABLES .....	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Methodology.....	6
1.2. Outline of the Thesis .....	7
2. THEORETIC CLASSIFICATION .....	9
2.1. Power and its Role in International Relations .....	9
2.2. Public Diplomacy as a subject of Political Science - International Relations .....	13
2.3. State of Research .....	14
2.3.1. Definitions of Public Diplomacy.....	15
2.3.2. The Most Important Approaches in Detail.....	19
2.4. Soft Power .....	21
2.4.1. Sources of Soft Power .....	22
2.4.2. Application of Soft Power .....	27
2.4.3. Possible Methods of Measurement - An Evidence Search.....	29
2.4.4. Limits and Criticism of Soft Power.....	30
2.4.5. Addressees of Public Diplomacy .....	32
3. GERMAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.....	35
3.1. German Public Diplomacy in the Historical Context.....	40
3.1.1. Development after Cold War Era.....	42

3.1.2. The Emergence of the <i>Dritten Säule</i> .....	45
3.2. Soft Power Elements.....	48
3.2.1. The Goethe Institute .....	48
3.2.2. Media Communication - Deutsche Welle .....	51
3.2.3. Scientific Cooperation's .....	54
4. TURKISH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY .....	61
4.1. The goals of Turkish Public Diplomacy .....	63
4.2. Public Diplomacy Instruments .....	66
4.2.1. Yunus Emre Institute .....	67
4.2.2. Media Communication - TRT World .....	75
4.3.3. Scientific Cooperation .....	78
5. CONCLUSION .....	82
REFERENCES .....	84
APPENDICES	
A. KMA DRAFT - PROTOCOL .....	97
B. INTERVIEWS .....	98
C. TÜRKÇE ÖZET/ TURKISH SUMMARY .....	101
D. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM.....	105

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Soft Power .....	18
Table 2. Public Diplomacy Categorisation .....	34
Table 3. Yunus Emre Branches Chronology.....	68
Table 4. Turcology Project Statistics .....	71
Table 5. Turcology Project Statistics .....	72

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AKP - JDP</b>	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
<b>AKP</b>	: Auswärtige Kulturpolitik
<b>AKPB</b>	: Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik
<b>BMBF</b>	: Federal Ministry of Education and Research
<b>BYGM</b>	: Agency, Press Information Office
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>FDI</b>	: Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GCRI</b>	: German Houses for Research and Innovation
<b>GDP</b>	: Gross Domestic Product
<b>GDR</b>	: German Democratic Republic
<b>GI</b>	: Goethe Institute
<b>KDK</b>	: The Office of Public Diplomacy
<b>PD</b>	: Public Diplomacy
<b>TIKA</b>	: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
<b>TRT</b>	: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
<b>YEI</b>	: Yunus Emre Institute
<b>YTB</b>	: The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
<b>YTKM</b>	: Yunus Emre Türk Kültür Merkezi

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

After the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, a foreign policy instrument experienced a renaissance that had previously almost disappeared into insignificance for several decades: Public Diplomacy. At present, the term is again “on everyone's lips”, because with an increased practical relevance, the interest of political science research in the subject increased. Because September 11 made it clear that even the world's only remaining superpower - especially on its own territory - is vulnerable and military power, as the most important part of the hard power of states, can no longer be seen as a guarantee for ensuring state security.<sup>1</sup>

Today, we are experiencing a paradigm shift: Increasing internationalization, changing societal structures, increasing global crises as well as flight and migration movements pose new challenges for cultural policy in an international context. The cultural interpretation and perception of social developments, of conflicts and global contexts has increased and thus the importance of education and culture in the context of communication. The alleged sovereignty that Europe and the USA had claimed for many decades is not easy to claim today. New global centres of power have emerged that develop their own narratives, which expand yesterday's values of scale and weight old ones differently. In this context, in many countries we are seeing a shift in civil society - opinions that may often diverge from the official ones, and in part restrict freedom of expression, persecute oppositionists. But the aim of this present scientific work is not to analyse the social structures and dynamics of societies, but to explain the concept of Public

---

<sup>1</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. New York, p. 3.

Diplomacy in the current discourse and to show the implementation of foreign policy goals - soft power - according to this new view.

Against this background, the foreign policy instrument of Public Diplomacy increasingly came into the focus of political practice and science. It describes the attempt of states, by means of strategically oriented communication measures, to generate approval and understanding of one's own country, or one's own politics in the population of a target state and, as a rule<sup>2</sup>, to improve one's own external image.<sup>3</sup>

Especially in the United States, which proclaimed the so-called “winning hearts and minds” after the terrorist attacks of 2001, the debate about a new dimension of Public Diplomacy, which meets the new challenges and threats, became louder.<sup>4</sup> But the Federal Government also recognized the growing importance of public diplomacy and the need to establish it as a fundamental component of its own foreign policy.<sup>5</sup>

However, the Public Diplomacy by no means describes a new phenomenon in International Relations discipline, since governments have always striven to achieve foreign policy goals by generating attention, gaining authority over political issues, or improving their own image in the perception of foreign states and populations, Great Britain, for example, attempted during the First World War

---

<sup>2</sup> This limitation is due to the fact that states can in certain cases, with the help of their Public Diplomacy, also strive for a negative external image, for example, in order to polarize against conflicts.

<sup>3</sup> For the demarcation of external image, stereotype, and image see maps Karten, Inga (2008): Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes, p. 160 – 165. The image of a state abroad includes stereotypes, prejudices, as well as images. The latter can be actively influenced, namely by means of Public Diplomacy.

<sup>4</sup> More in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3.

<sup>5</sup> Grolig W. and Schlageter R. E. (2007): Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy. In: Jäger T., Höse A., Oppermann K. (ed.) Deutsche Außenpolitik, p.547 – 569.



to persuade the United States to enter the war by means of a propaganda campaign designed especially for this purpose.<sup>6</sup> Although the historically charged propaganda term has now given way to the more neutral term Public Diplomacy, there are undoubtedly large overlaps between the two concepts, albeit not identical.<sup>7</sup>

Although it is a well-known and well-established concept, it nevertheless becomes clear that governments have increasingly attached importance to it in recent years. Shortly after taking office as US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice emphasized the importance of Public Diplomacy for US foreign policy.

Russia has also significantly strengthened its activities in the area of public diplomacy in recent years, as exemplified by the newly created television channel Russia Today TV, which has been running “government foreign propaganda”<sup>8</sup> in English since December 2005. China also hosted a big PR coup as host of the 2008 Summer Olympics. In the United Kingdom, there is a special *Public Diplomacy Strategy* (Foreign & Commonwealth Office)<sup>9</sup>; in France, too, there is a similar paper named *Strategy for Action* (Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 2006). In addition, France launched the international news channel France 24 in September 2006.

---

<sup>6</sup> Walt, Stephen M. (2002): The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in: Katznelson, Ira; Milner, Helen V. (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, New York, London, p. 197 – 214.

<sup>7</sup> Manheim, Jarol B. (1994): *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy*, New York. P. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Helmus, T. C., Elizabeth Bodine-Baron [et al] (2018): *Russian Social Media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe.* (URL:[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND\\_RR2237.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf)), p. 1 – 7.

<sup>9</sup> Pamment, James. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, p. 3.

The German government also responded to the increased relevance of public diplomacy, such as the relocation of the German Information Center (GIC) from New York to Washington, which was intended to increase the coherence of the publicity work of the embassy and information centre. In general, the growing significance of Public Diplomacy approaches as an important instrument of states' Soft Power is also based on the fact, that political decisions today require public legitimacy to a much greater extent than it was in the past. Transnationalization and globalization processes mean that this need for legitimacy is no longer limited exclusively to the domestic public.<sup>10</sup> If a government's situation that its policies are considered by the world to be highly illegitimate will most likely cause high political costs.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, governments are interested in making their policies appear morally right and welcome - not least through public diplomacy measures.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, what exactly is Public Diplomacy? The number of definitions, the boundaries and boundaries is endless. Public Diplomacy first describes very general political public relations work abroad, also uniting elements of the concepts of propaganda,<sup>13</sup> PR, Nation-Branding and Foreign Cultural Relations

---

<sup>10</sup> Gregory, B. (2005): Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms. American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington. (URL: [http://web.ccas.gwu.edu/dev/filehost/5/APSA\\_Panel6\\_Paper\\_8-23-05.pdf](http://web.ccas.gwu.edu/dev/filehost/5/APSA_Panel6_Paper_8-23-05.pdf)), p. 9 – 19.

<sup>11</sup> Nye, Joseph S. (2002): *The Paradox of American Power*. Oxford, p.73.

<sup>12</sup> Walt, Stephen M. (2002): The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in: Katznelson, Ira; Milner, Helen V. (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, New York, London, p. 197.

<sup>13</sup> Manheim, Jarol B. (1994): *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy*, New York, p. 5 – 6.

and in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy (AKBP), in English: Cultural Diplomacy.<sup>14</sup>

An elementary problem in research on Public Diplomacy is the focus on individual case studies that cannot draw an overall picture of the measures that are actually carried out in practice under the collective term public diplomacy of the diplomatic missions. Because these are the key players. Although guidelines can be drawn up and specified in foreign ministries, ultimately only the diplomatic missions abroad are responsible for the implementation, the daily interaction with the population and the media of the respective host countries. It is they who know the local conditions and adapt their instruments, ideally. Thus, it can be defined as the aim of the present thesis to work out about empiricism, not about theoretical ideal constructs, what *Public Diplomacy* really is.

The analytical part is preceded by a theoretical classification of the object of investigation, in which the most important concepts necessary for understanding the mode of action of public diplomacy are examined. Within the *Great Theories* of International Relations, the Constructivist proves to be particularly helpful, since it assumes that ultimately social perception and social communication as a medium allow the preferences that determine the foreign policy of a state to give a balanced representation. Accordingly, it makes sense to influence these preferences by means of public diplomacy in order to influence the foreign policy of the respective state. Also of central importance is the Soft Power concept already mentioned above, according to which, in addition to *Hard Power* military and economic resources, the attractiveness of a country or its political, social and cultural capital must count as a power resource, as well as the dominant PR theories - Public diplomacy is a form of governmental public relations in which the diplomatic missions perform - at least in part - tasks that are analogous to the activities of public relations agencies.

---

<sup>14</sup> Signitzer, Benno; Coombs, Timothy (1992): Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual divergence. In: Public Relations Review, vol. 18 no. 2, p. 137 – 147.

“Heavy reliance on media coverage as the sole source of data for the evaluation of public diplomacy strategies and programs is a serious deficiency in this and other studies.”<sup>15</sup> This issue, which is common to almost all previous studies on public diplomacy across countries, is addressed in the present study.

## **1.1. Methodology**

This chapter explains the research design and the research methods used in this study. In addition, the different approaches of Public Diplomacy analysis and approaches are presented in a differentiated way. As part of this thesis, a qualitative exclusion process is used to ensure that the focus of the research question is not missed.

The methodology of this thesis is mainly based on qualitative research method. In addition, interviews and short study visits were made to the governmental institutions in Germany and Turkey, as well as to experts who have been in the kitchen of implementing Public Diplomacy in the most important Soft Power actors. Internal materials and information of the Goethe Institute from the head office in Munich was made available here. In this context, I offered the opportunity to gain insights from the Bundestag Archive of the Foreign Affairs Committee / Subcommittee on Foreign Cultural Policy. It is an interdisciplinary study.

The qualitative research method was realised mainly by analysing the most relevant primary and secondary sources, such as subject-specific books, journals, articles, researches, official documents from governmental institutions of the countries observed.

As a supplement, interviews were conducted with personalities in the field of Public Diplomacy. Those interviewed worked in the diplomatic field, politics and Public Diplomacy research. Their many years of work experience is significant in that you are providing practical and realistic insights into the practice of PD.

---

<sup>15</sup> Gilboa, Eytan (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, in: Cowan, Geoffrey. Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, Los Angeles, p. 67.

Additionally, interviews were conducted with experts in the field of public diplomacy. The experts worked in the diplomatically, political and academically field of Public Diplomacy. Their many years of work experience is significant in that they represent practical and realistic views in the exercise of PD.

The Main Research Question:

Therefore the goal of this research paper is to analyse the elements of Soft Power in Germanys and Turkeys foreign policy. The following central research question has been derived from this goal:

“In what context do the Federal Republic of Germany and the Turkish Republic define and implement their Soft Power resources?”

Subsidiary Research Questions:

- In what context are the terms Power, Soft Power and Public Opinion related?
- Which instruments are defined under shaping the foreign policy politics in Public Diplomacy?
- What are the goals of the Public Diplomacy actors?
- What are their tools and implications?

## **1.2. Outline of the Thesis**

In this regard, after the introductory Chapter 1, the first part of the thesis is consisting of possible premises of foreign policy approaches, in order to analyse and understand the practice of Public Diplomacy in the international system of the 21th century. In this sense, Chapter 2 shows the important theoretical classification Power in International Relations Theory in the context of creating and implementing Public Diplomacy.

After this chapter, in which theoretical framework of the study laid out, comes the Chapter 3. As it is not possible to assess periodical apart from the historical conditions that surround it, the initially Public Diplomacy approach of Germany is examined. In this connection, there is an effort to understand what the cooperation, which emerged between culture, diplomacy and media within historically unique conditions.

The fourth chapter examines the Turkish Public Diplomacy. Similar to the previous chapter, first historical background is analysed. Subsequently, three areas are presented with their actors.

The study ends with a conclusionary part, that includes a general assessment of the whole thesis. This last chapter, which basically summarizes the research from every aspect, questions whether initial assumptions are verified or not, and mentions which answers produced to the research questions comply, conflict and-or exceed the major claims.

The historical context of the analysis of Public Diplomacy tools – Soft Power Elements would be from 2007 – 2018.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETIC CLASSIFICATION

This dissertation deals with the new foreign policy approach of Public Diplomacy. To that end, I will mention how Public Diplomacy became a part of the Foreign Policy Analyses. This section will be followed by the evaluation of the aspect of Soft Power elements of German and Turkish Foreign Policy, in order to understand how these states are using and shaping the policy of their own Soft Power tools in the theoretical perspective.

#### 2.1. Power and its Role in International Relations

“The concept of power is central to realist theory, yet there is still little agreement on how it should be conceived and measured. We still lack a firm conceptual foundation on which to base valid measures of national power [...]”<sup>16</sup>

The issue of regional leadership is closely linked to the issues of power and power hierarchies in the international system, which has recently encountered renewed interest in both political science and international relations and policy advice.<sup>17</sup>

This has certainly to do with the power shifts since the end of the Cold War and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this period, the US as the only remaining superpower has expanded its hegemonic position, while other states - including

---

<sup>16</sup> Walt, Stephen M. (2002): The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in: Katznelson, Ira; Milner, Helen V. (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York, London, p. 222.

<sup>17</sup> See the contract work for the US government of Rand Corporation (Treverton, Jones 2005).

new regional leaders - are gaining in importance in international politics, again other states, traditional middle or *old* regional leaders lose influence.

Power has always been a central category for the analysis of international politics, which from time to time receives increased attention as a function of political development and which is closely linked to the realistic school.<sup>18</sup> However, there is no consensus about the concept of power in science, and many research questions remain open. Thus, power can be defined in different ways, either through the properties or resources of states, or as a relationship between actors-states in which one actor-state influences or alters the behaviour of another actor-state.<sup>19</sup>

In the *realist school*, the first-named approach dominates defining power as a disposition over material resources, with military strength ultimately being the key power resource.<sup>20</sup> For example, Mearsheimer defines power predominantly in military categories:

“I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ultima ratio of international politics”.<sup>21</sup> Military strength builds on the latent power of a country - its economic resources and its population.<sup>22</sup> For the present, Mearsheimer uses the national product (in absolute terms) of a country to

---

<sup>18</sup> Stoll, Richard J.; Ward, Michael D. (Ed.) (1989): *Power in World Politics*, p. 6 – 8; Schmidt, B. C. (2005): *Competing Realist Conceptions of Power*, in: *Millennium*, no. 33, p. 522 – 548.

<sup>19</sup> More about the literature see Baldwin (2002), Walt (2002), Lukes (2005).

<sup>20</sup> Schmidt, B. C. (2005): *Competing Realist Conceptions of Power*, in: *Millennium*, no. 33, p. 523 – 529.

<sup>21</sup> Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, p. 56.

<sup>22</sup> For a critical analysis of the relationship between population and power resources, see Eberstadt (2004).



determine its latent power, since in addition to the economic resources and the population comes into play. Although economic wealth does not automatically enforce in military power, but is a prerequisite.

Other authors and institutions use a more complex concept of power.<sup>23</sup> For example, the *Strategic Assessments Group* of the CIA (SAG)<sup>24</sup> differentiates between power resources (capabilities), the conversion of these power resources through the national political process (including the use of external catalysts such as foreign capital) and the exercise of power of interest. Ultimately, however, it is also interesting here how power resources are converted into military power and used efficiently.

The most important source of power is economic power (measured by GDP), which, however, is expanded by human capital (indicator: average school attendance in years) and the technological level (expenditure per capita of the population for research and development). The most important indicator for measuring military power is the defense budget. Other authors are working with much larger indicator catalogues, but ultimately it is also about the convertibility of different power resources into military power.

While authors who are close to the realist school analyse different power resources in terms of their convertibility into military resources, other authors use a multi-dimensional concept of power. Joseph S. Nye tries to grasp different forms of exercising his power with the concept of *Soft Power*, that in contrast to *Hard Power*, as prevalent in the realist school, he has entered the public discourse. As a scientific concept, however, it raises problems and therefore encounters

---

<sup>23</sup> For further analysis, see Cline (1977; 1980; 1993).

<sup>24</sup> Treverton, G., Jones, S. (2005). Measuring National Power, RAND Corporation. (URL: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/2005/RAND\\_CF215.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF215.pdf)), p. 3 – 19.

criticism.<sup>25</sup> According to Nye *Soft Power* is: “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”.<sup>26</sup>

Barnett chose a different and, to some extent, more comprehensive approach to defining power and power relations.<sup>27</sup> The approach combines power resources (hard and soft power) with such relations and introduces a structural component as a new power factor. In a four-field matrix, authors distinguish between the dimension of power as the property of particular actors - states (power) and power as the result of social processes - social relationships that define the identity of actors - states, their interests, and their resources. On a second dimension, the authors distinguish between direct and indirect power relations. Both dimensions form a matrix on which four types of power can be distinguished:

- *Compulsory Power* is defined as the direct control of an actor over another actor, or the effects that actor or state A, achieves in actor or state B's behaviour. It includes both material and symbolic resources.
- *Institutional Power*, on the other hand, is exercised indirectly. Actor or state A influences the behavior of actor or state B via formal and informal procedures

---

<sup>25</sup> Some authors question soft power as a power category: Such as, “the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft.” (Ferguson 2003). In contrast to the concept of soft power, Lukes (2005), p. 486 – 492) introduces a so-called *third dimension of power*, by which he understands the ability to influence the beliefs and desires of other actors and thus to secure their allegiance. However, this kind of exercise of power should also be covered by the concept of Soft Power.

<sup>26</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. New York, p. x.

<sup>27</sup> The authors define power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate.” Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond (2005): *Power in Global Governance*, in: Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond (ed.), *Power in Global Governance*. New York, p. 8.

and rules (institutions). This includes institutions of global governance (or regional governance).<sup>28</sup>

- *Structural Power* is generally exercised through social processes and relationships that determine the positions of the actors involved in overarching structural settings. These can be explained by economic and social exchange processes at both global and regional levels.

If one weighs the arguments presented in the various theories, also with a view to the analysis of regional leaders, power can only be meaningfully analysed in a combination of power relations and power resources: the exercise of power presupposes resources. However, the true meaning of these resources can only be grasped through the behaviour of actors who enter into power relations.

## **2.2. Public Diplomacy as a subject of Political Science - International Relations**

Public diplomacy research is still a young discipline within political science research (see the chapter “State of Research”). It is a complex, partially diffuse field of research, which combines elements of various disciplines and is characterized by a high practical relevance. “This field is probably one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship”<sup>29</sup>, noted by Gilboa. It is therefore all the more necessary to provide the empirical analysis with an adequate theoretical framework within which the investigation proceeds. The aim of the chapter is first to clarify the concepts that will be of major importance in the further course of the investigation - which is not always unproblematic due to the ambivalences mentioned above.

---

<sup>28</sup> Baldwin, David A. (2002): Power and International Relations, in: Carlsnaes, Walter; Cracks, Thomas; Simmons, Beth A. (ed.), Handbook of International Relations, London. P. 187.

<sup>29</sup> Gilboa, Eytan (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, in: Cowan, Geoffrey; Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, Los Angeles, p. 56.

### 2.3. State of Research

The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the current state of scientific debate and summarize the relevant contributions. For this purpose, in the following chapters 2.3.1 and 2.3.1, a selection of the most important definitions of Public Diplomacy is presented, followed by a concise presentation and explanation of the important research results in the field of Public Diplomacy.

Public diplomacy has received and increased attention in recent years both in professional practice and in science. Scientists have been lagging behind in professional practice for a long time. While Public Diplomacy has been used in practice since the beginning of the twentieth century, it has only been dealing with the concept since the late 1960s. In the wake of the Cold War, academic engagement with the concept began in the United States. A scientific reflection of Public Diplomacy has been established since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 especially in the US and European countries.<sup>30</sup> The younger Public Diplomacy research is thus strongly normative: Its guiding principles<sup>31</sup> are , “*understanding*” and “*dialogue*” as well as “*relationships*” and “*networks*”. The main focus, however, is on relationships and their effects at the expense of exploring the process by which these relationships arise.

Other key topics are the strategic orientation of Public Diplomacy<sup>32</sup> and the “*War on Terrorism*”.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Snow, N., & Taylor, P. M. (2009): Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. In: N. Snow & P. M. Taylor (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. New York, p. 3 – 4.

<sup>31</sup> “Mission statements are - as a rule - socially shared (mental or verbalized) patterns of presentation of a desired or desirable and principally achievable future, which should be realized by appropriate action. Mission statements thus relate to future-oriented and action-relevant ideas of what is desired or desirable and at the same time feasible”, Giesel, K. D. (2007). Mission statements in the social sciences: concepts, theories and research concepts. Wiesbaden, p. 38.

<sup>32</sup> More under et al. Gregory, (2005), Auer (2016), Mor, (2006) and Taylor, (2009).

<sup>33</sup> More under et al Taylor (2009) and Zhang (2007).

In parallel, Public Diplomacy is brought together with *Marketing* (including Kendrick and Fullerton, 2004) and *Nation Branding* (including Anholt, 2003 and 2007, Szondi, 2008). These diverse approaches result from the similarity of Public Diplomacy to these forms of public communication.

The communications-science-oriented approaches towards Public Diplomacy are complemented by concepts from international relations. Thus, the authors discuss transformations in traditional diplomacy as well as their similarities with and differences from public diplomacy (inter alia Gregory, 2005, Melissen, 2005, 2006, 2008;). In addition, for many, the soft power concept developed by Nye (2004) has become a central concept in Public Diplomacy research (including Davis Cross & Melissen, 2013, Melissen, 2005, Nye, 2007, van Ham, 2001).

For the general state of research and its analysis, the dissertation by Auer is recommended, since it presents a statistical and empirical analysis on Public Diplomacy.<sup>34</sup>

### **2.3.1. Definitions of Public Diplomacy**

Out of the multitude of existing definitions, only a few of the most important are mentioned here. The order is chronological.

According to H. Tuch (1990):

Tuch defines Public Diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s

---

<sup>34</sup> Auer, Claudia (2016) Theorie der Public Diplomacy. Sozialtheoretische Grundlegung einer Form strategischer Kommunikation. In: Organisationskommunikation Studien zu Public Relations/ Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und Kommunikationsmanagement (Ed. Günter Bentele). Werl. P. 71 – 98.

ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies.”<sup>35</sup>

Tuch's definition is the one most cited in public diplomacy research. At the level of the process, it is broad, so there is only talk of a *communication process* with foreign publics. At the actor level, on the other hand, Tuch sets a significant limitation that still makes his definition one of the most useful: public diplomacy is made up of state actors, but here also implies Government-mandated actors such as diplomats. However, modern terminology increasingly softens this limitation.

According to Signitzer and Coombs (1992):

In contrast, Benno Signitzer and Timothy Coombs explicitly include transnational actors in their definition, they understand public diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions.”<sup>36</sup> Public Diplomacy aims to - as Signitzer and Coombs rightly say - influence public attitudes and opinions that directly affect foreign policy decisions by governments. On the basis of the liberal International Relations Theory, it will be explained below that the attempt of such an influence is justified and plausible. The basic difference to Tuch’s definition is the extension of the stakeholder group to private individuals and groups. While it cannot be disputed that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example, conduct publicity actions that share similar intentions as Public Diplomacy (state) actors, they are (international) *PR* measures to achieve policy objectives. Although delineation to classic *advertising* would still be predetermined (as advertising is not primarily aimed at influencing government behaviour, but rather at consumers' purchasing decisions), it must nevertheless take into account the fact that NGO’s

---

<sup>35</sup> Tuch, Hans N. (1990): *Communicating with the World. U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, New York. P. 3.

<sup>36</sup> Signitzer, Benno; Coombs, Timothy (1992): *Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual divergence*. In: *Public Relations Review*, vol. 18 no. 2, p. 137 – 138.

per se do not care for the outside image of their own intend nation. Rather, these usually pursue particular interests. Therefore, terminology should be reserved for state actors.

According to H. Frederick (1993):

Frederick describes Public Diplomacy as “activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens.”<sup>37</sup>

This definition identifies key areas of public diplomacy, namely, information, education, and culture, and again includes the important aspect of “detouring” citizens into the intended influence of foreign governments.

In the perspective of Jarol B. Manheim (1994):

“Strategic Public Diplomacy [...] is, within the limits of available knowledge, the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behaviour.”<sup>38</sup>

Manheim compares strategic public diplomacy with propaganda. What bordered on breaking the taboo in the German-speaking world - the term *propaganda* is still heavily burdened with history - is less problematic in Anglo-Saxon countries.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, such an explicit comparison is seldom found. Manheim thus belongs to the group of public Diplomacy researchers who have a *conservative*

---

<sup>37</sup> Frederick, Howard H. (1993): *Global Communication and International Relations*. Belmont, p. 229.

<sup>38</sup> Manheim, Jarol B. (1994): *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy*, New York, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> Bussemer, Thymian (2005): *Propaganda*, Wiesbaden, p. 172 – 188.

understanding of the subject. On the other hand, there are approaches that understand dialogue as a key feature of *modern* public diplomacy.<sup>40</sup>

Joseph S. Nye (2004):

Nye holds the probably shortest and most concise definition of public diplomacy ready, he speaks simply of “diplomacy aimed at public opinion”.<sup>41</sup>

But even these few words inherent in the fact that public diplomacy really is *diplomacy*. This self-evident fact simply excludes the above-mentioned *modern* terminology. Because diplomacy is run by diplomats (even if they occasionally rely on external service providers, such as PR agencies, ie temporarily mandating them), and not employees of NGO’s or citizens’ initiatives.

Table 1. Soft Power

	Behaviors	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	- coercion - deterrence - protection	- threats - force	- coercive diplomacy - war - alliance
Economic Power	- inducement - coercion	- payments - sanctions	- aid - bribes - sanctions
Soft Power	- attraction - agenda-setting	- values - culture - policies - institutions	- public diplomacy - bilateral and multilateral diplomacy

According to G. Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull (2008):

<sup>40</sup> Melissen, Jan (2005): "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice", in: Ders. (Ed.): The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations, p. 3-27.

<sup>41</sup> Nye, J. (2004): Soft Power. The means to Success in Word Politics. New York, p. 105.



A recent definition eventually finds itself at Cowan and Cull, following this is Public Diplomacy “an international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics.”<sup>42</sup>

In addition, Cowan and Cull’s definition is characterized by a very broad understanding of actors; the authors generally speak of “international actors”.<sup>43</sup>

The list could easily be continued many times over. The proposed definitions have in common is that an impact on the population of the target state must be present, so that public diplomacy can be the speech. It is about manipulating public opinion in the sense of the public-diplomatic state or influencing it in neutral terms. Public Diplomacy was thus close to the concept of propaganda from the beginning, which is why some authors (see the definition of Manheim) use both terms almost synonymously. The demarcation of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda is also one of the fundamental problems in the scientific debate. Numerous authors vehemently reject the view that it is merely an unencumbered, *modern* term for propaganda. In a separate section, this question will be examined in more detail. The abovementioned definitions already point to further contrarian views, for example regarding the inclusion of transnational actors within the scope of Public Diplomacy.

### **2.3.2. The Most Important Approaches in Detail**

In the following, the most important results of the scientific examination of Public Diplomacy are presented, arranged according to their respective authors. In order to be able to cope with the multitude of divergent definitions and interpretations of the object of investigation, numerous authors have categorized public diplomacy according to two criteria: time horizon and addressees. These two dimensions allow for differentiation, since, firstly, to achieve short-term goals, other

---

<sup>42</sup> Gilboa, Eytan (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, in: Cowan, Geoffrey; Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, Los Angeles, p. 6.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 55 – 60.

instruments are used than for the realization of long-term goals, and, secondly, the approach depends to a great extent on the respective addressee who is to be reached.

Thus, Leonard and Smewing (2002) define three different dimensions of Public Diplomacy: *Reactive Public Diplomacy* (News Management), *Proactive Public Diplomacy* (Strategic Communication), and *Relationship Building*.<sup>44</sup> These differ both in their purpose, as well as in the temporal magnitude of their sphere of influence. Reactive public diplomacy serves to respond to specific events with adequate public diplomacy measures, such as press releases or statements, within a short period of time (i.e., within hours or a few days). As a rule, this is classic media relations. By contrast, proactive public diplomacy aims to actively influence the topic agenda in the target state for weeks or months, ie. Agenda Setting.<sup>45</sup>

Relationship Building represents the long-term dimension of public diplomacy: over many years, relationships with the target society are to be built up, generating long-term mutual understanding and trust.<sup>46</sup> Nye takes up this categorization and describes the three dimensions of Public Diplomacy as “routine, daily communication”, “strategic communication” and the “establishment of multiplier networks”.<sup>47</sup>

Leonard also differentiates between “competitive” and “cooperative” public diplomacy.<sup>48</sup> For example, competing public diplomacy is run by states that pursue diverging national interests in the country of destination and seek to separate themselves from each other. Cooperative public diplomacy is pursued when a

---

<sup>44</sup> Leonard, M. (2002): Public Diplomacy. The Foreign Policy, London, p. 8 – 23.

<sup>45</sup> McCombs, Maxwell (2004): Setting the Agenda, p. 33 – 39; This can, Leonard following, take trains of a political campaign (Leonard / Sead / Smewing (2002), p. 15. A current example of the Federal Republic is the campaign *Germany - Land of Ideas*.

<sup>46</sup> Leonard, M. (2002): Public Diplomacy. The Foreign Policy, London, p. 7 – 21.

<sup>47</sup> Nye, J. (2004): Soft Power. The means to Success in Word Politics. New York, p. 107 – 118.

<sup>48</sup> Leonard, M. (2002): Public Diplomacy. The Foreign Policy, London, p. 22.

multilateral approach, for example in the propagation of Western values, seems most sensible. This variant manifests itself e.g. in joint public relations actions of the EU member states.

## **2.4. Soft Power**

Starting with Nye, this chapter first discusses the soft power concept. For the first time, the term emerged from Nye in the early 1990s in his book “Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” (Nye 1990) and was refined in several follow-up work. As a reference point in the entire scientific discourse on soft power “Soft Power. The means to success in world politics” (Nye 2004). In it, Nye deals with 150 pages with the soft power concept.

In sum, Soft Power, according to Nye, is a kind of power that relies on one actor not influencing another actor's decisions with compulsion, but taking it by his or her own attraction for himself and his or her positions, thereby making decisions of the other in his or her sense. Nye defines soft power as follows: “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”<sup>49</sup>.

Thus, soft power would be a form (or means) of exercising power that influences the behaviour of other actors through the ability of agenda-setting or attraction. At the same time, this form of exercising power is based on specific power resources, which are also covered by the concept of soft power. These power resources are, according to Nye (2004), the culture, the political values and the orientation or form of foreign policy.<sup>50</sup> This blurs the difference between resources and the mode of application of those resources.

---

<sup>49</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. New York, p. x.

<sup>50</sup> After Grant, Ruth W .; Keohane, Robert O. (2005): *Accountability and Abuse of Power in World Politics*, in: *American Political Science Review*, No. 99 (1), p. 37, public reputation is a form of soft power and, at the same time, a mechanism of power control (accountability) in the case of abuse of power.

Nye (2004) distinguishes soft power not only from military but also from economic power, which makes economic power an independent category of power or hard power in the form of economic incentives or sanctions, as opposed to military compulsion.<sup>51</sup>

In this respect, it is not surprising that the concept of soft power is often used and has become almost a fashion concept, but there is no consensus about its content.

### **2.4.1. Sources of Soft Power**

Nye's central concept - or the mechanism on which Soft Power is based - is attraction, that is, attraction or attraction. Because this mechanism is so crucial, Nye Soft Power even paraphrases with Attractive Power.<sup>52</sup> Those who are attracted, whether as a person or as a state, have the opportunity to assert their interests without using hard power, such as threats of violence or payments. the basis of which alone that an actor or his actions by other actors is seen as attractive, it is possible that these swivel on the price of attractive actor or act on their senses, Nye. It raises the question of what attractiveness arises and how it conveys. In Nye's definition are the resources that make them attractive "A country's culture, political ideals, and policies".<sup>53</sup> The prerequisite is that these three levels contain a common basis with other states and peoples. This common ground, though not always clearly stated in Nye's argumentation, is ultimately always values and norms; d. That is, culture can be a powerful soft power resource if it transports universal values and ways of life that are recognized worldwide<sup>54</sup>,

---

<sup>51</sup> Lukes, Steven (2005): Power and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds, in: *Millenium*, no. 33 (3), p. 486.

<sup>52</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in Word Politics*. New York, p. 6.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. x.

<sup>54</sup> Nye seems to assume that these (US) values are valued worldwide and therefore attractive. He doesnot provide a critical discussion as to whether this really be so. He also leaves open the question of how this worldwide recognition of certain values comes about.

such as democracy, open society, and freedom of movement. In terms of culture, Nye mentions American popular culture, “low culture”, Hollywood and consumer goods sold worldwide, as well as the American legal system and education system, art and music, the “high culture”.<sup>55</sup> He argues that US lawyer series in China raise awareness of the rule of law - which could ultimately lead to major changes in China rather than a constant push for rule-of-law reforms by foreign politicians.<sup>56</sup> Personal contacts, visits and exchange programs, for example in the academic field, also play a major role as they convey culture and thus values such as freedom, individualism and pluralism.

The soft-power resources of political ideals and policies are given concrete form by Nye elsewhere. That's how he understands political ideals “domestic policies and values”.<sup>57</sup> The way in which politics is made in the country is therefore crucial for its soft power. The same applies to the resource policy with a view to foreign policy, which he “the substance, tactics and style of our foreign policy” concretizes.<sup>58</sup> Not only culture and values, but also domestic and foreign policy and values are closely interlinked. If a country globally values respect for human rights, commitment to peace and such as democracy etc. are actively involved in its visible policies, both internally and externally, and in cooperation with others, such as those at international institutions, it works to enforce such universal values. Thus, this may also be a strong source of soft power. For example, Nye points out that, for example, the segregation of the 1950's, the US-imposed death penalty or Guantánamo are incompatible with the simultaneously propagated values of democratic governance and the rule of law, undermining US attractiveness.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, the active advocacy of peace and human rights “Substance” abroad or multilateral cooperation “tactics” and “style” with other countries in

---

<sup>55</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. New York, p. 11, 44.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68 – 69.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13, 55, 59.

international organizations could strengthen Soft Power.<sup>60</sup> As an example, he cites Norway - a small, relatively insignificant country in the global context - who has managed to create an image as a "force for peace" through development aid and strong engagement in United Nations peacekeeping missions.<sup>61</sup>

The connecting element of the three soft power resources culture, values and foreign policy is that they are considered attractive by people and states. However, these resources also differ, which Nye does not work out clearly: as a soft-power resource, culture and values tend to have a passive character. Targeted public policy measures can help communicate values and culture. They are then considered beautiful, desirable or worthy of imitation. An example of this are the mentioned lawyer series. However, the relationship between the country using soft power and that affected by it is a one-tailed receiver-receiver relationship; there is not necessarily an active exchange. Foreign policy as a resource, on the other hand, has a slightly different character. On the one side, the attractiveness of foreign relations results from the fact that the "substance" goals of a state are regarded as attractive - as in Nye's example of Norway's entry for human rights; that is the passive character of the foreign policy resource, more or less equal to the "radiance" of culture and values. On the other side, Nye calls the style of foreign policy action crucial to Soft Power. In this action, Attraction arises from the direct dialogue, from the interaction of people and states, in which the state, which acts multilaterally, cooperatively, inclusive and moderating, is perceived as attractive. Nye distinguishes *Soft Power* from the more common forms of power, such as military and economic power, collectively referred to as *Hard Power*, from the resources and behaviours specific to forms of power. However, he sees a practical and theoretical connection between the two forms of power: "Hard and Soft Power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree".<sup>62</sup> The relationship between the two forms of power he presents in a

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>62</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. New York, p. 7.

graph in which he shows a smooth transition between hard power and soft power and also sets out the means of exercising power.

A strong economic power can therefore not only exert pressure through sanctions or payments, but also have a high level of attraction.<sup>63</sup> Soft and Hard Power can also be mutually reinforcing or counteract each other. Nye clarifies this connection with examples around the Gulf War in 2003.<sup>64</sup> Some war reasons stemmed from classic power-political hard-power considerations. It was about the security of America, allegedly endangered by Saddam Hussein's regime, perhaps economic interests, the restoration or display of US power. On the other hand, according to Nye, the neo-conservative belief in the export of democracy and a transformation in the Middle East, ie ideals and values, also played a role.<sup>65</sup> In the preparation of the war and the discussion about its legitimacy, Nye further concludes that, despite an undisputed military strength of the US, the neglect or inept use of soft power, that is, the US's lack of diplomatic action, costs of the war shot up even before its beginning. Because the war was not covered by a United Nations mandate, but allies had to be "bought in", the war was already expensive in advance. The first Gulf War, on the other hand, was covered by a United Nations mandate, which brought considerable financial resources from other states to the US administration.<sup>66</sup>

Nye, who says of himself as a former Secretary of Defence "I would be the last person to deny the importance of maintaining our military strength"<sup>67</sup>, however, he does not argue for a distance from hard power but, especially with regard to the experiences of the Gulf-War, for a strengthening of soft power. It is clear to him that it needs both and that no country can unilaterally trust in a form of power. He

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>64</sup> On soft power and its significance for US foreign policy in the Gulf-War, see Reinold, Theresa (2008): *Soft Power in Foreign Policy: The United States and the Wars Against Iraq in 1991 and 2003*.

<sup>65</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in Word Politics*. New York, p. 26.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>67</sup> Nye, J. (2004): preface p. x.

also sees the clever and combined use of hard and soft power as the ideal to strive for. He calls this form of power “*smart power*”.<sup>68</sup> Nye illustrates the various forms of power with the image of a three-dimensional chessboard at the top level of which is the military power game, whose currency is the threat and pressure, and where forced diplomacy, war, and military alliances are used. On the chessboard, one level below is the economy. This level shows how it is influenced by payments or sanctions or pressure exerted. At the lowest level, Nye locates transnational relationships. They act bilaterally or multilaterally with the means already mentioned, with public diplomacy and within the framework of international institutions. Nye concludes, referring to his “chessboard”, the inevitability of a networked action in foreign policy: “If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them”.<sup>69</sup> His model of the “chessboard” on three levels has put together Nye in an overview. Here you can read for each level the already mentioned general actions, the currency for these actions and the concrete measures for soft power mediation.

In addition to Attraction, the “chessboard” also shows agenda setting as a soft-power behaviour. In comparison to Attraction, however, this area plays a minor role in Nye's argument, as does the Currency Institutions. This may be because agenda setting on the power continuum is already closer to hard power. In terms of agenda setting, Nye also talks about the deliberate manipulation of others - that is, behaviour that is closer to inducement than Attraction. The measures for the application of *Soft Power*, government policies the so called “High-Politics”, which are presented on the “chessboard”, will be explained in more detail in the following chapter.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 32, 147.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 7.



## 2.4.2. Application of Soft Power

Nye designs his soft-power concept not only as a scientist, but also as a politician. His text is, precisely against the background of the Gulf-War of 2003 and the actions of the second Bush administration, a call for a different political action. He therefore does not leave it to explain soft power theoretically. In the fourth chapter, “Wielding Soft Power,” he shows how, in his opinion, soft power can be exercised primarily through Public Diplomacy. This is presented as the tool governments have at their disposal to turn soft power resources into concrete leverage.<sup>71</sup> According to Nye, Public Diplomacy is made up of three areas: daily communication, which mainly involves routine work, such as explaining current policy decisions and reacting to political events; Strategic, more long-term communication that aims to promote long-term projects or create images, “advertising campaign” and the third area, Relationship Building.<sup>72</sup> This is about establishing a long-term network that is well-disposed towards one's own positions.

Nye admits that *Soft Power* is harder to use than military and economic power. With Public Diplomacy, especially short-term influence is not easy. In addition, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), companies and the media have an influence on the communication of culture and values and thus the sovereignty over this form of power - unlike, for example, the military - does not lie with the government. Nevertheless, he sees great potential for increased use of public diplomacy. He demands a faster and clearer reaction of embassies and governments to international news events, that is to say in the area of daily routine communication.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> See also Gilboa, Eytan (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, in: Cowan, Geoffrey; Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, Los Angeles, p. 61. In a later article, Nye explains this relationship in more detail Nye (2008): p. 95).

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>73</sup> Nye, Joseph S. (2008): Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. In: The ANNALS of the American

But as the main means of public diplomacy Nye calls for foreign broadcasters such as Voice of America, Russian Today, CCCTV or the BBC and foreign cultural institutions such as the Goethe-Institute. The latter are assigned to the third area, the Relationship Building, and, with their diverse educational, cultural and exchange offers, belong to the subcategory Cultural Diplomacy or to foreign cultural and educational policy.<sup>74</sup>

For Nye, it's important to make clear the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda - this difference is grounded in soft power. He says that simple propaganda often lacks credibility. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, must be credible by providing policy and image based on values, and also establishing long-term relationships and networks.<sup>75</sup> An important component of soft power, "Substance" and "Style" of foreign policy as a soft-power resource, Nye treats, albeit briefly, in the chapter "Wielding Soft Power".<sup>76</sup> He argues that cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, especially within international organizations such as NATO or the UN, is crucial to the credibility and reputation of a country (America) - and thus to its soft power "To put it bluntly, to communicate more effectively, Americans need to listen. Wielding Soft Power is far less unilateral than employing hard power, and we have to learn that lesson"<sup>77</sup>.

---

Academy of Political and Social Science. 616 (1), P. 101.

<sup>74</sup> For the various areas of public diplomacy there are a variety of concepts and terms that often overlap. An extensive overview can be found in Ostrowski (2010), p. 19 - 25.

<sup>75</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in Word Politics*. New York, p. 107; On the question of whether Public Diplomacy is only a less loaded term for Propaganda or whether there are real differences, as well as the question of the demarcation of Public Diplomacy to Public Relations (PR), there are very different views (to recommend Ostrowski (2010): p. 47-50).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110 – 111.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115, 125.

Nye sees foreign policy as one of three soft power resources and calls multilateral, communicative, inclusive foreign policy action, in addition to public diplomacy, as an instrument to exercise soft power. In view of this, however, this soft power area remains inadequately compared to the resources culture and values and the instrument Public Diplomacy.

#### **2.4.3. Possible Methods of Measurement - An Evidence Search**

This work faces the fundamental problem of measuring "power" or influence. Traditional indicators to call a country "powerful" are high population, economic and military strength, and social stability. Through these indicators, power becomes more measurable and concrete than in the category of soft power. However, just working with these categories shows that often those who are equipped with the above indicators often do not achieve the desired goals.<sup>78</sup>

Soft power in the beginning is an expensive strategy because the output is not immediately visible. Soft power is the power of attraction, but the effect of this attraction is very blurred.<sup>79</sup> After a bomb attack you can at least look at the destroyed target and overlook it at short notice, so that by no means have influenced the other side's actions, while you cannot observe an immediately visible effect in the application of soft power resources. Therefore, it seems that hard power can work faster.

“In the modern world, competition is led by business and innovation, not military force, and cultural success is measured by contributions to humanity and science.”<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, p. 3.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>80</sup> Bell, Daniel A. (2009): *War, Peace and China's Soft Power: A Confucian Approach*. International Council For Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, p. 27.

Soft Power, or power in general, is difficult to measure and prove. Due to the aforementioned theoretical blurring, any investigation of the subject from the outset seems doomed to failure and only blurred and inaccurate.

Since the receiver side in Soft Power especially in the definition of Joseph S. Nye's is of particular importance, since the difference to the conventional exercise of power is defined so that it is about soft power to create from the outset possible cooperation partners and not against the will. Having to operate the receiver, it is not enough to analyse only the transmitter side. Nevertheless, how is the receiver side measurable? Soft power can only be measured inaccurately via opinion polls; one has to be careful not to interpret too much into these opinion polls. Nevertheless, these are an important indication for the detection of soft power.<sup>81</sup>

Even if one could compare all opinion polls, one would have only one indication. An indication alone is not enough - just as a piece of leather is not football, so soft power cannot be attained only through numerous economic cooperation's.

Another indication that soft power can be measured is soft power resources. Joseph S. Nye himself suggests in his article published on the Foreign Policy website in 2006 that he also measures soft power based on resources (emphasizing repeatedly in this article that resources do not mean power yet, which he does not mean by example) useful tanks in the Vietnamese forests).<sup>82</sup>

This work focuses on Germany and Turkey soft power resources and application methods.

#### **2.4.4. Limits and Criticism of Soft Power**

In this section, major criticisms of Nye's soft-power concept from the current debate are worked out and discussed. The focus should be on a few constructive

---

<sup>81</sup> Nye, J. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, p. 18.

<sup>82</sup> Nye, J. (2007): Notes for a soft-power research agenda. In *Power in World Politics*, edited by Berenskoetter, Felix – Williams, Michael J., p. 162 – 166.

contributions that deal directly with soft power. Articles that consider soft power to be fundamentally irrelevant are not considered. One focus of criticism is the lack of conceptual precision in Nye mentioned above.

Soft Power is closely related to other terms, such as Propaganda and Nation Brand and Cultural Diplomacy. These concepts are closely related to soft power, and all play a role in the development of soft power. It is therefore not expedient to say in a field of soft power, this is propaganda, that is Cultural Diplomacy. Therefore, these terms are first subjected to a definition and delimitation, since they are sometimes strictly delineated, are partially application paths for soft power resources. To be able to perform soft power, you must act on as many of the relevant areas as possible.<sup>83</sup>

Nye's idea of soft power can only be considered successful if the value of a concept is measured by the breadth and frequency of its use. While the widespread use of the term flourished, this concept met with considerable criticism. Both in the public and in academic circles, Soft Power critics have highlighted the existence of ambiguity in this term. In academic circles, the concept of soft power was considered too dull Lukes (2005), too soft Ferguson (2003)<sup>84</sup> and too vague Bially Mattern (2007)<sup>85</sup> criticized. In general, therefore,

---

<sup>83</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew (1997): Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, in: *International Organisation*, vol. 51 (4), p. 513 – 553; for the term propaganda, see Gellner, Winand (2004): *Power and counter-power: Introduction to the theory of government*; On National Branding more under Anholt, Simon (2009): *The Media and National Image. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*.

<sup>84</sup> Ferguson, Niall (2003): What is Power?, in: *Hoover Digest*, no. 2, p. 36 – 37.

<sup>85</sup> F Berenskoetter, MJ Williams (2007): Why soft power isn't so soft: representational force and attraction in world politics, in: *Power in world politics*, p. 108 – 129.

there was a call for greater clarity in the concept, a call that was confirmed and repeated by Nye himself.<sup>86</sup>

#### **2.4.5. Addressees of Public Diplomacy**

The term public diplomacy originating from the USA is increasingly discussed scientifically in Germany in recent years. He describes the realization that in the age of mass media and growing mobility, a state can no longer see only governments and the diplomatic corps of other countries as addressees of its policies and the associated explanations and diplomatic acts. It is thus increasingly an imparting of one's own political stance and a sympathy with the civilian population of other countries.<sup>87</sup>

Nicholas Cull dates the origins of the PD to the year 1965, when for the first time the attempt of international actors came up to pursue and implement foreign policy goals by contacting the guarantors of other countries.<sup>88</sup> Public Diplomacy wants to expand the attractiveness of its own country as an implementation of Joseph Nye's soft-power concept through targeted communication of its own values and ideals, in order to directly influence public opinion in defined target countries. This is done with the intention to expand political and economic scope for action and to improve their own geopolitical position.

In a communicative overall strategy, various topics or messages are developed that are distributed to the entire population and the media in a target group-specific manner involving various state and non-state actors abroad. Public Diplomacy responds to the increased influence of public opinion and interest groups on

---

<sup>86</sup> Nye, J. (2007): Notes for a soft-power research agenda. In *Power in Word Politics*, edited by Berenskoetter, Felix – Williams, Michael. Routledge, p. 163.

<sup>87</sup> Ostrowski, Daniel (2010): *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit: Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Auslandsöffentlichkeitsarbeit*, p. 10 – 15.

<sup>88</sup> Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*, Los Angeles, p. 31.

political decision-making processes, triggered by globalization and the information society, and is seen as a form of mediatisation of foreign policy.

This coincides with the perceptions of perceptual research, according to which personal contact and exchange is the most intense and sustainable source of public diplomacy. Thus, events that involve people directly, as well as formats that create points of contact and recognition effects, while at the same time incorporating new aspects, can be considered particularly meaningful. For it is not the arts themselves asymmetric (i.e. representative) or symmetrical (i.e. communicative, dialogic) created, but it is based in the concepts and applications of the soft power actors – i.e. in the subject sets and formats of events and accompanying programs - what potential the arts is used.

If one tries to represent the influence of the opposing society hierarchically, then the population of the destination state would be at the top, i. its broad public. According to Moravcsik's preferences-oriented liberalism, influencing the preferences of this group represents the possibility of indirectly influencing the foreign policy of the target state.<sup>89</sup>

The second important group of addressees are journalists and media representatives, since they are significantly involved as media stakeholders in their content. Thus, they have a significant influence on public opinion. Multipliers represent the third important group that seeks to achieve public diplomacy. Similar to the journalists, they are also stakeholders who, through their influence - be it political, economic, scientific, cultural or civil society - are also regarded as “opinion leaders and educators”. Their attitudes “multiply” in the society of the target state, because they occupy key functions, and as policy makers define (political) positions.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> See the detailed remarks on Moravcsik's theoretic model.

<sup>90</sup> Ostrowski, Daniel (2010): Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit: Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Auslandsöffentlichkeitsarbeit. P. 38 – 39.

Table 2. Public Diplomacy Categorisation

<b>PD categorization according to Nye</b>
Establishing Network of Multipliers ↓
Strategical (Long-Term) Communication ↓
Routine (Daily) Communication

Based on this theoretical basis, the *Soft Power* actors of German Public Diplomacy and Turkish Public Diplomacy are analysed and explained.



## CHAPTER 3

### GERMAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The reunification of Germany in 1990 strengthened Germany's position in the world politics and was accompanied by greater responsibility within the international community, and especially within Europe. About the same time, Germany faced the challenge of integrating the public diplomacy approaches of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which the Federal Republic of Germany discovered as a strategic and structural continuity of public diplomacy: *Kulturinstitute der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* the German Democratic Republic were being pulled through a profound reform. The diplomatic missions were closed and current contracts were not renewed. Passive deactivation of the DRR structures was a feature that was obvious after reunification. While some or all of the smooth restructuring of the state was possible through this or similar methods, the potential of regional experts with important knowledge of former Eastern Bloc states has been wasted.<sup>91</sup>

The Federal Foreign Office describes the relevant purpose of its Public Diplomacy as follows:

“The goal is [...] to position Germany broadly and as holistically as possible in the consciousness of the world public. Good reputation gives Germany both political

---

<sup>91</sup> Golz, H. Georg (2004): *Verordnete Völkerfreundschaft. Das Wirken der Freundschaftsgesellschaft DDR-Großbritannien und der Britain-GDR Society. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen*, p. 15; Malchow, Birgit (1999): *Der Letzte macht das Licht aus. Wie DDR-Diplomaten das Jahr 1990 im Ausland erlebten*. Berlin: Edition Ost, p. 67 – 70.

and economic attractiveness and design possibilities. The following applies: Advertise for Germany means underline strengths, without exaggerating or pretending false facts. For Public Diplomacy is only successful in the long term if it has credibility and is convincing.”<sup>92</sup> The primary target groups are defined as “decision-makers and multipliers” as well as “interested publics abroad”. Thematically, the range of information should cover the areas of politics, economics, culture, education, sports and modern life.<sup>93</sup> The latter point points to the importance of a “modern” image of Germany, which is a frequently recurring motif in the programmatic descriptions of goals. Institutionally, the Public Diplomacy is responsible for the newly created “Department of Culture and Communication” in the spring of 2009 through internal restructuring.

“Culture and communication are core elements of credible and sustainable German foreign policy and directly reach the hearts and minds of people. They should bring people all over the world into contact with Germany, its culture, science and society and win them over for dialogue and exchange; make the identity of Germany and its society visible and tangible; To awaken an understanding of European values and thus to create a basic understanding on which foreign policy is based; convincing and coherent with German foreign policy, clarifying Germany's commitment to solving global challenges, and promoting German positions.”<sup>94</sup>

This description contains the basic objectives and functions of Public Diplomacy: Generating understanding and trust from foreign populations to create a positive base for and support for your own foreign policy.

---

<sup>92</sup> Bundesregierung (2018): Ressourcen. In: 21. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2017. P 18 – 23.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> Bundesregierung (2018): Ressourcen. In: 21. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2017. p. 8 – 9.

The central moment of the soft power concept (attraction) is taken up directly in the foreign ministry's target description:

“Interest groups, consumers, investors, students, tourists and interested citizens around the world are monitoring Germany's views on global issues, how we act in concrete terms and what Germany and its people stand for. We must not only satisfy this interest in Germany, but also use it to increase the attractiveness of our country.”(Auswärtiges Amt 2008, p. 9).<sup>95</sup>

It is therefore a stated goal to increase their own soft power by increasing their own attraction to foreign populations. As far as the outward target description of Public Diplomacy on the part of the Foreign Office. In the context of the survey, however, the internal definition of the term, which was referred to the employees in the so-called “Circular on Public Diplomacy”, was used.

This version of Public Diplomacy understanding is defined as “[...] the sum of all communication activities aimed at selected elites and multipliers, but also at the wider public in the world and with the long term goal to modernize our image, to refresh and thereby make Germany more attractive for partners, investors, consumers and tourists. In the short term, Public Diplomacy abroad accompanies and communicates German domestic and foreign policy, explains, in a manner understandable to the foreign public, the actions and decisions of German politics and promotes the support of our positions. Public Diplomacy differs from the well-known concept of *Politischen Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* (PÖA) in that it aims to go beyond the political dimension and comprehensively embrace Germany abroad, ie also as a business location, as a state of science and study, as a cultural nation, as a tourist destination To convey the quality of life.”<sup>96</sup>

The *Konzeption 2000* focuses on four key issues in the German *AKPB*:

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

- 1) Avoiding conflicts by setting up a value dialogue.
- 2) Building and maintaining a positive, civilian friendly, and modern image of Germany abroad.
- 3) The Promotion of foreign culture and education policy interests of Germany abroad.
- 4) Promoting European integration.

These strategic priorities characterize the current German PD strategy. For example, German diplomats have strengthened the already established dialogue with the Islamic world in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. It can be assumed that a cultural dialogue is at the heart of the German PD.<sup>97</sup>

The Federal Government reaffirmed these goals in 2011, but emphasized the special importance of education and research policy as an important PD dimension. In the context of European integration since the EU enlargement in 2004, this strategic point in German and European PD players has increasingly become the focus of the PD strategy. According to the *Zeitgeist* of globalization, the concept of PD in making foreign policy is highlighting the need for adaptation to the structures and instruments of foreign cultural and educational policy. Special attention will be given to public-private partnerships like the predominance of ngo's, and a dialogue-based communication approach, which will also be accompanied by a more intensive focus on the use of modern media, for example the use and influence of social media activities.<sup>98</sup>

In addition, the 2006 World Cup in Germany was an important step in the direction of a solid and confident foreign representation of the country. It is fair to say that an image has been built up, that Germany is a country of cultural diversity and having a fully young potential society. The World Cup was titled by the campaign "Germany - Land of Ideas", a common campaign by the federal

---

<sup>97</sup> See under chapter „Über uns“ in: (URL: [http://de.qantara.de/webcom/show\\_article.php/\\_c-349/\\_nr-1/\\_lkm-5/i.html](http://de.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-349/_nr-1/_lkm-5/i.html)) [Access on 29.12.2018].

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

government and German business community that wanted to modernize the image of Germany, increase attractiveness and reduce existing stereotypes. This is a good example for the concept of *Image Building* under PD strategies.<sup>99</sup>

This short historical review of the past ten years, contains a range of important cognitions into the practice of PD strategies of German foreign policy, which help us to understand today's PD exercises in Germany. The aggressive foreign policy approaches before and during the World Wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, after which Germany has become isolated, show that communication and culture based dialogue can not be imposed by one-sided approach, but can only be conveyed to an interested external audience. The development of the Federal Republic of Germany has shown that PD must consider good practices of past activities of the *Außwärtiges Amt*. Part of this critical self-reflection is the processing of Germany's history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a prerequisite for its representation and its image. The uncontrolled and uncoordinated transmission of messages to different target groups can be contradictory and lead to irreparable damage to the image and loss of trust at regional and international level. In the light of a growing networking of national and international areas, such as media, economies and educational programs, this strategy must also apply to the domestic public. To conclude, the heavy moral burden of the national socialist rule of Germany shaped the structure of the German PD: today's actors are anxious to bypass the impression of a centralized approach. This point will be discussed in the upcoming chapters. Therefore, the federal ministries finance and coordinate PD efforts in different ways. However, actors carry out most PD activities and operate largely autonomously. This description shows that concrete interests are pursued by means of public diplomacy, that should be aware of the German foreign policy.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Kamp, Klaus and Nieland, Jörg (2006): *Regieren und Kommunikation. Einleitende Anmerkungen zum Band. Regieren und Kommunikation. Meinungsbildung, Entscheidungsfindung und gouvernementales Kommunikationsmanagement*. Ed. Klaus Kamps and Jörg-Uwe Nieland, p. 9 – 16.

<sup>100</sup> Auer, Claudia and Srugies, Alice (2013): *Public diplomacy in Germany. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Paper 5, p. 25.

### 3.1. German Public Diplomacy in the Historical Context

The starting point for German Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy is the educational policy initiatives of the German Empire after 1871, which were aimed at the large number of Germans of German descent abroad, the Germans from abroad.<sup>101</sup> Through the foreign schools the *Deutschtum* should be preserved and cultural integration of these groups should be prevented in the respective countries in order to secure with the help of these Germans foreign and especially foreign economic interests of the *Reich*.<sup>102</sup> These schools were given a new quality in the German Reich by financial support in the context of a Reich Schools Fund established in 1878 in the Foreign Office.<sup>103</sup> In this way, the number of foreign schools increased from 15 in 1878 to 511 in 1913.<sup>104</sup> As early as 1881, the *Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein*<sup>105</sup>, in 1909 renamed *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*<sup>106</sup>, founded.<sup>107</sup> The renaming of the association can be seen as an

---

<sup>101</sup> Reinbothe, Roswitha (2000): Die Anfänge der auswärtigen Kulturpolitik in der Zeit des Kaiserreichs. In: Sprache Kultur Politik (Materialien Deutsch als Fremdsprache Heft 53), p. 55 – 81.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>103</sup> Füssl, K. Heinz (2004): Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. Bildung-Wissenschaft Politik, p. 51 – 52.

<sup>104</sup> Reich is a German word analogous in meaning to the English word kingdom or imperial realm. It is typically used to designate the imperial kingdom of Germany, which was founded in the Hall of Mirrors 1871 in Versailles; See Reinbothe (2000), p. 57. In a secret memorandum on foreign schooling drawn up by the Foreign Office, 900 foreign schools abroad were already assumed at this time, whereby the schools in the colonies of the German Reich were not added to this, since this one regarded as German territory; see. Reinbothe (2000), p. 57.

<sup>105</sup> General German School Association

<sup>106</sup> Association for German Studies Abroad

expression of an increasing cultural-propagandistic instrumentalization of the foreign school system.<sup>108</sup> The primarily cultural propaganda initiatives of the German Reich during the First World War and finally the German defeat led to the temporary end of educational and cultural policy activities of Germany abroad.<sup>109</sup>

After the World War I, a department for foreign cultural and educational policy (Department of Culture, Division VI) was created in 1920 for the first time in the Federal Foreign Office, which in the first phase, at least in scope. It showed a continuation of the 1907 founded school lecture, which was the *Deutsche Wissenschaft und Deutsche Schulen im Ausland*.<sup>110</sup> Until that time, there had been no central coordination point for foreign cultural and educational policy in Germany. After the end of World War I, foreigners were to be informed about German culture with a new interpretation, thereby achieving an advertising effect at the same time. That the foreign cultural and educational policy in the period before and during the First World War dominant concept of cultural propaganda should be overcome. At this time, Carl Heinrich Becker stated that Germany could be made of the delusion, with self-praise and press propaganda cultural policy. The former - imperialist influenced - cultural-political means are no longer an instrument of German foreign policy for internal and external reasons.

In the interwar period, the first intermediary institutions were founded, primarily to rebuild foreign relations through cultural-political initiatives. For example, the Academic Exchange Service (*Akademische Austauschdienst*) was founded in 1925

---

<sup>107</sup> Füssl, K. Heinz (2004): Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. *Bildungswissenschaft Politik*, p. 51.

<sup>108</sup> Bruch, Rüdiger (1982): *Weltpolitik als Kulturmission: Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbürgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges*, p. 30.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117 – 202.

<sup>110</sup> Wille, Barthold C. (1981): Die Enquete-Kommission des Bundestages. Anmerkungen zu ihrem Bericht über auswärtige Kulturpolitik. In: Düwell, Kurt/Link, Wemer (ed.): *Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871. Geschichte und Struktur*, p. 51.

to rebuild the professorial exchange with the USA that had been discontinued at the beginning of the First World War, and in the same year the German Academy for Scientific Research and Care of German Studies (*die Deutsche Akademie zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und Pflege des Deutschtums*, since 1932 the Goethe Institute).

The paradigm of the new interpretation initially shaped the foreign cultural and educational policy of the Weimar Republic.<sup>111</sup> Nevertheless, a return to cultural-political propaganda in the wake of Hitler's seizure of power could not be prevented, which can be traced back to a deficit on the propaganda concept during the Weimar Republic that was insufficiently substantiated.<sup>112</sup> Following the incorporation of the cultural department into the Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in 1933, cultural policy strategies were again used for propaganda purposes.<sup>113</sup>

### **3.1.1. Development after Cold War Era (1990 – 1999)**

In its answer to the Big Question the image of the united Germany as a nation of culture in a changing world, the Federal Government stated in 1993 that the foreign culture and education policy of the Federal Republic of Germany will be determined by fundamentally changed conditions, mainly by the German reunification, the end of the East-West conflict and the emergence of democratic structures in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>114</sup> After the German

---

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 63 – 78.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p.61.

<sup>114</sup> BT-Drucks. 1216504 Response of the Federal Government to the big question of the deputies Dr. Dorothee Wilms and other deputies and the parliamentary group of the CDU / CSU as well as the deputy Ulrich Irmer and the F.D.P. - Drucksache 12/5064 - The image of united Germany as a cultural nation in a changing world.



reunification, the question in particular of integrating the external cultural and educational policy of the GDR into the cultural-political structures of the Federal Republic of Germany turned up. Above all, questions of institutional integration emerged. With regard to the programs of the GDR, priority was given to the question of the continuation or cessation of the various initiatives pursued by the GDR. At the time of reunification, about 7,000 exchange students and exchange students were in the territory of the former GDR, which had to be supported by the cultural policy institutions of the united Germany.<sup>115</sup> The continuation of foreign schools of the GDR was a central task of the political actors after reunification.<sup>116</sup> The cultural institutes of the GDR, for example in Krakow and Bratislava, were to be maintained and restructured. De facto, however, a further introduction of the GDR language policy turned out to be problematic, especially against the background of a clear ideology in the field of teaching materials and the work of the GDR cultural centres.<sup>117</sup> The GDR cultural centers were therefore dissolved after reunification.<sup>118</sup> As a result of the closed-door meeting in October 1991, for the first time after the end of the Cold War threat, guidelines for foreign cultural and educational policy were developed in the form of eleven theses, from which geographic and programmatic priorities could be derived:<sup>119</sup>

- (1) The philosophy of the previous foreign cultural and educational policy is not in need of reform. Guiding principles such as equal dialogue, exchange and networked cooperation continue to apply to the united Germany.

---

<sup>115</sup> Unterausschuss Auswärtige Kulturpolitik (16<sup>th</sup> October 1991), p. 8.

<sup>116</sup> Unterausschuss Auswärtige Kulturpolitik (19<sup>th</sup> June 1991), p. 12.

<sup>117</sup> Schneider, Axel (1996): Abwickeln oder anknüpfen? In: Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch 46, no. I, p. 49.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>119</sup> Beyme, K. (2012): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik. In: Kulturpolitik in Deutschland, p. 201 – 223

- (2) Against the background of new priorities and greater involvement of the new Länder, consensus on both priorities and priorities should be established in the coming years, while maintaining budgetary constraints.
- (3) A focus of the foreign cultural and educational policy in the future would be the Central and Eastern European countries, whereby the reconciliation with Poland is a special task also in the context of this policy area.
- (4) The emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe is justified, in particular, by the high demand for foreign cultural and educational policy programs.
- (5) In terms of content, in particular, exchanges of persons should be eligible for training, school and youth exchanges, and academia. Politically important programs and offers, which helped to build democratic structures as a means of reform and modernization, took precedence over general cultural programs. Intellectuals from the social sciences and humanities, who could contribute most to the construction of these countries, should be mentioned here.
- (6) The focus in the area of language teaching was the result of the increasing importance of the German language worldwide. The respective funding programs should be further specialized in demand-oriented.
- (7) Overall, the system of intermediary organizations has worked very well, but improved coordination and coordination of intermediary organizations should improve the efficiency of work.
- (8) Representative Major events and projects, in particular, should be discontinued from a cost perspective in the future.
- (9) The control and evaluation of concepts and practices of foreign cultural and educational policy should be carried out primarily by self-control of intermediary organizations and embassies, and only secondarily through scientific monitoring with instruments of empirical social research.
- (10) The possibilities of sponsoring foreign cultural and educational policy are limited, since it can be used primarily only for major events.
- (11) The instruments for a North-South dialogue could be improved. More differentiation is required depending on the cultural distance between Germany and the destination country. The development assistance for a cultural infrastructure should be strengthened, however, to reduce the

promotion of the German language in most countries.<sup>120</sup> Due to the changed international security and power relations it can be seen that the German AKBP has adapted the definition of its goals and target regions to the changes. Accordingly, the image work of Germany, the destination countries and financing of the AKBP is to be foreseen.<sup>121</sup>

### **3.1.2. The Emergence of the *Dritten Säule***

A first approach of a German foreign cultural and educational policy after the Second World War was the creation of the cultural department in 1949 in the liaison office of the Chancellery to the High Commission of the Allies. The conditions for the later formation of cultural relations with foreign countries should be created.

During the Grand Coalition of 1967-1969, Willi Brandt, as Foreign Minister, coined the term “foreign cultural and educational policy” as one of the key three pillars of foreign policy alongside diplomacy in the narrower sense and foreign economic policy. Willi Brandt placed great importance on cultural exchange in the context of *Ostpolitik*; After the Cold War had been marked by cultural isolation, the policy of détente would correspond to the resumption of the former and the establishment of new cultural contacts.

After the government took over in 1969, Brandt placed the foreign cultural and educational policy in the context of détente and peace policy towards the communist states, which were under the control of USSR.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> Unterausschuss Auswärtige Kulturpolitik (16<sup>th</sup> October 1991), p. 334 – 37.

<sup>121</sup> Schneider, Axel (1996): Mittel nicht effektiv eingesetzt? Die Sitzung des deutschen Bundestages zur auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. In: Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch 46 (1996) 2, p. 8 – 10.

<sup>122</sup> Singer, Otto (2003): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und institutionelle Entwicklung seit 1945. Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages. Berlin, p. 6 – 7.

In the 1970's, under the reign of Social Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt, there was a significant change in foreign cultural policy: culture was announced as the third pillar of foreign policy alongside foreign trade policy and foreign policy. Since dialogue and exchange became key terms of the political papers of the time, foreign cultural policy should be operated as a two-way street.<sup>123</sup>

Another important turning point in the Third Pillar took place in 2000. In 2000, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the Federal Government drew up the second written strategy for foreign cultural policy, the *Konzeption 2000*. In this paper, the idea of peacekeeping and conflict resolution through instruments of foreign cultural policy was developed.<sup>124</sup> As Ruderkamp explains, “the paper takes into account the geopolitical changes after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the media revolution”<sup>125</sup>. Ruderkamp further states, that in the *Konzeption 2000*, the global cultural policy contributed to the main priority areas of foreign policy such as in the security policy, conflict-prevention and cooperative policies based on creating partnership.<sup>126</sup>

International cultural policy is not neutral but value-oriented. They actively promote democratization, human rights, sustainable development, economic growth and the protection of natural resources.<sup>127</sup> Compared to the previous strategy papers, the *Konzeption 2000* takes on a much more demanding position, which should be achieved by foreign cultural policy. It significantly expands the

---

<sup>123</sup> Denscheilmann, Heike (2012): Deutschlandbilder – Ausstellungen im Auftrag Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik. Wiesbaden. P. 39 – 40.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>125</sup> Runderkamp, Laurens (2012): Dutch and German International Cultural policy in Comparison. In: Siniša, Rodin/Topić, Martina (2012). Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism: European Perspective. Frankfurt am Main, p. 123.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 124 – 125.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 123 – 124.

responsibilities of the policy area and includes entirely new aspects, such as the idea of peacekeeping and conflict resolution through foreign cultural policy. Since the political field of foreign cultural policy is differently organized in different political systems around the world, the approaches to it are very different. Thus, the Foreign Office in Germany is not the executive organ of foreign cultural policy.

The organization of cultural policy topics is decentralized. Accordingly, the tasks and responsibilities in the field of foreign cultural policy are delegated to agencies that work under the mandate of the Federal Foreign Office. The respective actors in the fields of culture, media and science will be analysed in the next two main chapters.

AKBP identifies Germany as a cultural state worldwide, actively engaging in dialogue with the international community of states in order to establish links with other cultures and countries, to support them and to promote German interests abroad. In addition to political and economic relations, this makes an indispensable contribution to German foreign policy. In addition, she supports the integration of refugees in Germany.

Following a words of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1966-1969) Willy Brandt, it is referred to as a third pillar of German *Außenpolitik*. The two other pillars are the security policy and the foreign trade policy. In the meantime, the concept of foreign cultural policy has been extended to that of foreign cultural and educational policy.<sup>128</sup> The expenditure for the Federal Government's foreign cultural and educational policy in 2015 amounted to 1.673 billion Euro. The financial resources for the federal government's foreign cultural and educational policy totalled € 1.849 billion in 2017. With the other budgetary positions (e.g. German Archaeological Institute, DAI), the Foreign Office's share of these funds

---

<sup>128</sup> Zimmermann O. and Geißler T. (2018): Die dritte Säule: Beiträge zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik. In: *Aus Politik & Kultur* (16), p. 101 – 119.

is almost 57 percent. The other funds were distributed to the budgets of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media (BKM) with around 18 percent, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) with 19 percent, and the Federal Ministries for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) and Home Affairs, for Construction and Homeland (BMI).<sup>129</sup>

### **3.2. Soft Power Elements**

The most important actors of German Public Diplomacy are the Goethe-Institute in Munich, Deutsche Welle Media, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Bonn, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH) in Bonn, the IFA (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations) in Stuttgart, the Central Office for Schools Abroad (ZfA) in Cologne, the Archaeological Institute (German Archaeological Institute) in Berlin as well as political foundations, other civil society organizations and the private sector. The decentralized character of the intermediary organizations becomes visible at the locations of their respective headquarters. The actors are independent and largely free in their decisions; however, they act under the mandate of the Foreign Office and are responsible for reporting to it and achieving its overall objectives.

#### **3.2.1. The Goethe Institute**

In the following, the main actor of culture and language promotion of Germany is examined.

On behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Goethe-Institute carries out cultural-political tasks abroad. The formulation of a framework agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany, which is represented by the Federal

---

<sup>129</sup> Bundesregierung (2018): Ressourcen. In: 21. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2017. P. 24 – 26.

Foreign Office and the Goethe-Institute, governs the responsibilities and tasks of the Goethe-Institute worldwide.<sup>130</sup>

The tasks assigned by the Federal Foreign Office to the Goethe-Institute through the framework agreement are also reflected in the statute of the Goethe-Institute. According to the statutes, the purpose of the GI is “to promote knowledge of Germany abroad, to cultivate international cultural cooperation and to communicate a comprehensive image of Germany through information on cultural, social and political life (...) “. <sup>131</sup> This also gives rise to the three areas of work of the Goethe-Institute: language work, program work and cultural mediation. To implement the tasks formulated in agreement with the *Außwärtiges Amt*, the Goethe-Institute operates a network of 157 institutes in 98 countries.<sup>132</sup>

Another element which, in addition to the legal foundations defined in the Framework Agreement and the Articles of Association, sets out the purpose and tasks of the Goethe-Institute, is the mission statement formulated by the Goethe-Institute. The mission statement of the Goethe-Institute consists of a vision, as well as a formulation of the tasks and working methods. The individual components of the mission statement are formulated in a comprehensive and easy-to-understand way.

The mission statement can be used both for external and internal communication of the tasks and goals of the Goethe-Institute. All components are formulated in the first person plural and thus have a subjective character that shows the customers and cooperation partners the tasks, purpose and advantages of the Goethe-Institutes. In terms of internal communication, employees' awareness is

---

<sup>130</sup> Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Jahrbuch 2003/2004. München: 2004, p. 13 – 14.

<sup>131</sup> Goethe-Institut e.V. (2005): Satzung. München, p. 5.  
(URL:[http://www.goethe.de/mmo/priv/1223959 STANDARD.pdf](http://www.goethe.de/mmo/priv/1223959%20STANDARD.pdf)) [accessed on 30.10.2018]

<sup>132</sup> Goethe-Institut e.V. (2019): Jahrbuch 2018/2019. München, p. 8.

strengthened in the sense of the mission statement, to practice their activities and to communicate with the target group externally. The vision presents the Goethe-Institute as an institution that stands for a cosmopolitan Germany through its employees. It makes German culture, society, science and education accessible through dialogue with foreign cultures by “building bridges (...) across cultural and political borders.”<sup>133</sup>

The Goethe-Institute also presents its tasks and working methods. Thus, the tasks "(...) [setting] of the quality standard for German lessons worldwide [,] (...) gain access to knowledge and information about Germany (...) [,] [promoting] understanding for Europe and [the development] common European perspectives. “In order to fulfil these tasks, the Goethe-Institute attaches importance to direct contact between institute employees and members of foreign cultures and societies, as well as respectful interaction among employees and with cooperation partners. At the same time, the Goethe-Institute is always open to change, innovation and criticism.

The Goethe Institute is a worldwide cultural institute, which is commissioned by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. As an intermediary organization, it operates within the following two areas of work: promoting the German language abroad and supporting international cultural cooperation. In addition, the Goethe Institute provides for the conveyance of a current image of Germany.

The GI operates with 157 institutes in almost 98 countries. Due to the growing number of crisis and conflict regions, content and regional priorities have changed significantly. Escape, terror, tightening of laws for non-governmental organizations, censorship and prevention of participation in civil society processes must be actively addressed by a global cultural institute. Culture is not the playground for intellectuals and artists. It is an essential part of our societies.

---

<sup>133</sup> Goethe-Institut e.V. (2018): Jahrbuch 2017/2018. München, p. 1.



The GI is not the only actor of implementing PD, but it is the largest German mediator organization. The task is the promotion of the German language abroad, the maintenance of international cultural cooperation and the mediation of a comprehensive image of Germany. There are 157 institutes in 98 countries, including twelve transnational regional institutes as well as twelve institutes and the headquarters in Germany.

### **3.2.2. Media Communication - Deutsche Welle**

On 3 May 1953, the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) went on the air for the first time. His main task, according to Federal President Theodor Heuss in his speech to the listeners, was to “relax” the image of Germany abroad. This, he said, “must be done in such a sincere and tactful way.”<sup>134</sup> This excerpt from the speech of the Federal President shows the field of tension in which DW was involved right from the start: it was intended both to satisfy the ethical principle of independent factual journalism and to meet the demand for positive advertising for the young Federal Republic. Thus, the sender took a functional ambiguity from the beginning. This can only be explained by the special historical contexts to which DW owes its origin: the demarcation to the propaganda radio of the Nazi era, the division of Germany and the Cold War form the framework in which the station developed. Thus, DW is initially the product of a power struggle over the broadcasting sovereignty between the Federal Government and the state broadcasting corporations, which represented different concepts of a new media landscape in Germany after the end of the Second World War: while Chancellor Konrad Adenauer envisaged the establishment of a kind of government broadcaster, the state broadcasters based on the image of the BBC and pleaded for the establishment of an independent broadcaster.<sup>135</sup> The federal government and the federal states disputes focused on three public issues: the financing of the channel, the extent of government influence in the committees and the personnel

---

<sup>134</sup> Zöllner, O. (2006). A quest for dialogue in international broadcasting: Germany’s public diplomacy targeting Arab audiences. In: *Global Media and Communication*, 2 (2), p. 160 – 170.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170 – 179.

policy of the broadcaster, as well as the provision of broadcasting for the federal government.

The dispute ended in 1960 with the passing of the Federal Broadcasting Act (BRfG), which established the establishment of DW as an independent institution. Until then, it had acted as a branch of Northwest German Broadcasting and broadcast a still quite modest but quite successful program in German. According to the BrfG, DW's task was “to provide the broadcasters abroad with a comprehensive picture of the political, cultural and economic life in Germany” and to present and explain to them the “German conception on important questions”. The Federal Government was granted the right to announce laws, ordinances and other official reports. The government, the Federal Council and the Bundestag were allowed to send representatives to the most important committees of DW: the Administrative Council and the Broadcasting Council, which in turn was responsible for the election of the Intendant. The basic problem of the funding of the station was excluded. This had serious consequences for DW: for the coming decades, long-term planning was impossible; the broadcaster had to keep debating the amount of the donations with the federal government again and again.

One of *Deutsche Welle*'s most pressing problems in recent years has been and is its chronic underfunding. After the *Deutsche Welle* budget had been slashed drastically in the late 1990's, a small increase in budget funds was achieved in recent years, but it is far from coping with the growing tasks of *Deutsche Welle*.

In view of the numerous international crises and the many people who seek refuge in our country, the tasks and expectations of Deutsche Welle have risen rapidly. Independent quality journalism will become the gold dust of democratically constituted societies in the digital age of upgrading communicative propaganda platforms such as Russia Today or the Chinese foreign broadcaster. Deutsche Welle needs a clear political priority, which must be reflected in the budgetary estimates in order to be a reliable planning factor. Another 100 million euros for Deutsche Welle is the demand on the Federal Government and the Bundestag.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p. 177 – 183.

This would bring the necessary effectiveness of DW into a representable relationship to its mission. In December 2014, the Bundestag passed a resolution promising the broadcaster a long-term financing guarantee for the first time. After Deutsche Welle had to fight for decades with budget cuts, now clearly the fundamental issue in the room, so the current director of the broadcaster Peter Limbourg, how competitive Germany's broadcasting abroad should be - especially in times when many other countries invest heavily in their foreign media. Deutsche Welle “spreads journalistic offers worldwide [...] independently, comprehensively, truthfully, objectively and pluralistically”.<sup>137</sup> All objectives of Deutsche Welle are to “fulfill their duties enshrined in §4 DW law, such as promoting the understanding and exchange of cultures and peoples, German, European and other perspectives on key issues of politics, culture, To offer business and society a forum to make Germany understandable as a free constitutional state and to contribute to the promotion of the German language, culture and economy”.<sup>138</sup>

Deutsche Welle (DW) uses television, radio and online services to reach an international audience. The international channel is active in German and 29 other languages. A 24 hour TV program broadcasting is available in English, German, Spanish, Arabic and Turkish. At the DW headquarters in Bonn and at the Berlin location, around 1,500 permanent employees and once again so many freelancers from 60 nations work. Deutsche Welle received around 321 million euro in state funding in 2015 (including the DW Academy and project funding) and had expenditures of around 336 million euro.<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> Deutsche Welle (2018): Profil. Leitbild: Werte, Grundsätze und Visionen. (URL: <https://p.dw.com/p/6J8p>)

<sup>138</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>139</sup> Deutsche Welle (2015): Revenue and Expenditure Account, p. 1. (URL:<http://www.dw.com/downloads/35503639/en2015revenue-and-expenditure-accounteinnahmen- undausgabenrechnung.pdf>).

In the broadcasting sector, DW currently reaches around 66 million TV viewers and 40 million radio listeners per week. With its online offering, DW reaches around 29 million users, around 20 million of them via the various social media.<sup>140</sup>

The most important platforms are Facebook and YouTube. DW has grown particularly strongly in the digital Arab world. In addition to the DW-Arabic channel, it is above all special programs such as the Albasheer Show and Sulta5 with which DW reaches a broad audience.

Statements on the use of media and the Goethe-Institute dominate the statements that can be assigned to the category Instruments of German Public Diplomacy. The use of media is evaluated primarily from the perspective of the task of cultural dialogue, but also the structural change in the target country (democratization / civil society building). The impact of local media (eg through broadcast literacy programs) is more emphasized than an image-building function for Germany.

The *Deutsche Welle* is e.g. an increasing importance in crisis areas and in the support of democratization processes and the establishment of civil societies attests.<sup>141</sup>

### **3.2.3. Scientific Cooperation's**

Germany has a long tradition of scientific exchange with foreign institutions, which can be classified beginning in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was the industrial driving force of Europe in the second half of the 20th century and high-tech products were and still are an integral part of German exports. In this respect,

---

<sup>140</sup> K. Anheier, Helmut (2017): Die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik Deutschlands im internationalen Vergleich. In: Hertie School of Governance Internal Report July 2017, p. 20.

<sup>141</sup> Deutsche Welle (2015). Aufgabenplanung Deutsche Welle 2014-2017.  
<http://www.dw.de/popups/pdf/39314138/die-aufgabenplanung.pdf>.

as then, science and technology play a decisive role in the international political power of Germany in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In this context, first the historical background of the science diplomacy activities of Germany would be summarized in this chapter. After that, the institutional structure and main actors of this system would be provided and explained.

The research and innovation strategy of Germany and its international scope are described in two policy documents from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The first document is “High-Tech Strategy”, which was released in August 2006 and with the benefit of hindsight updated in 2010 under “*Ideas. Innovation. Prosperity. High-Tech Strategy for 2020*”. In 2008 the so called “Strategy for the Internationalization of Science and Research” was published in and updated in 2014 included the first definition of a grand strategy towards science and technology transfer and creation. It sets out for the first time the objectives in the international field.<sup>142</sup> In essence, the key point is that Germany’s position as a leading research center in Europe should be consolidated, and that it should develop the skills that should guide Europe’s research and innovation strategy as a whole. This ambitious approach conveys Germany’s claim to leadership in the field of technology and science on the European continent.<sup>143</sup> In order to meet these international goals, emphasis is placed on increasing the country's visibility and attractiveness to foreign researchers. The major research institutions have implemented programs to attract students of different fields, especially students of PhD level. In 2013, up to 30,000 researchers and scientists worldwide received support from scholarship programs of numerous research

---

<sup>142</sup> Ruffini, P. (2017): Science in Diplomatic Aparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches. In: Science and Diplomacy. Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, p. 51.

<sup>143</sup> According to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2008): p. 27. Germany wants to become the driver of European strategy development in research innovation policy. The official communication paper introduces also the “High-Tech Strategy” as a “model for Europe”. For instance see the brochure “Germany Inspires Innovation - Welcome to Europe’s leader in Science”, of BAMF.

institutions.<sup>144</sup> This policy is supported by a large budgetary effort at federal level and private funding. In the same year, research and development expenditure in Germany amounted to more than 80 billion euros, which corresponds to about 2.85% of GDP.<sup>145</sup> Strategic decisions in Germany also lead to the identification of partner countries with influence and cooperation is now considered as a priority. According to the official strategy papers from 2013, Brazil, China, South Korea and India have moved more and more into the center of attention of *Science Diplomacy*.<sup>146</sup> Comparison on the international level, Germany has already moved into second place after the United States of America, which appears in scientific co-publications.<sup>147</sup>

Structural forms for the pursuit of international science and research policy were adopted in 2008. The Ministry BAMF has received results and experiences from cooperation partners, such as submitted by the DAAD and the Max Planck Institute, which in turn were evaluated. As a result, the establishment of the German Houses for Research and Innovation (GCRI) followed as a scientific network. According to human resources, the focus was on recruiting local staff. According to the data of 2014, the scientific network consisted of 25 counsellors at embassies in 20 countries. That forms a relatively compact and modest German science diplomacy network. The importance attached to the European Research Area, which due to the activity of 3 counsellors in Brussels. From an Eastern European point of view, Germany confirms its historical position as a bridge between East and West of Europe by operating one counsellor based in Poland

---

<sup>144</sup> Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2008): Strengthening Germany's Role in the Global Knowledge Society. Strategy of the Federal Government for the Internationalization of Science and Research, p. 29.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>146</sup> Science Diplomacy is a subfield of Public Diplomacy, which emphasises its focus of the role of science in the context of cooperation within diplomacy.

<sup>147</sup> Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2014): International Cooperation-Action Plan of BMBF.

Warsaw and two in Russia, Moscow. The influence and importance of Eastern Europe, is a crucial part of Germany's foreign policy pillars in the context of balance of power in Europe.

According to the publications of the *Auswärtigesamt* and the Federal Ministry BAMF, the breakdown of German science counsellors are based in Europe with 8 positions, Asia with 7 positions and as in the third rank North America with 5 positions. The Minor represented areas are Africa and the Middle East with 2 positions and Latin America with 3 counsellor positions. The counsellor position is operating under the umbrella of the embassies. The framework in which the directors are appointed differs in the points; sending the directors directly by the BAMF; instructed by professional staff of the *Auswärtiges Amt* or the directors of the BAMF, who are seconded to the *Aufwärtiges Amt*. It should be noted that science counsellors at embassies are not always academicians or researchers. This practice seems to be explained by a tradition of independence from the state apparatus, which extends the scope for action of directors. Thus, negotiations and talks can take place without reservations of diplomatic action.<sup>148</sup>

In analogy to this conventional structure, another strong network holder is a suitable example of the German reputation abroad. For instance the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG), which finances studies and researches within Germany and abroad. The DFG is present with institutets in five countries.<sup>149</sup> Other major carriers of science diplomacy involved in public research have all overseas representations.

---

<sup>148</sup> Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2014): International Cooperation-Action Plan of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Bonn, p. 8 – 9.

<sup>149</sup> Several offices are running in Moscow, New Delhi, New-York, Tokyo and Washington. One of the earliest offices was launched in China Beijing, according to the cooperation agreement in 1988. It is a joint venture by the DFG and the National Natural Science Foundation of China.

The Fraunhofer Society is an important application oriented research organisation, which has seven representative offices and four liaison offices abroad.<sup>150</sup> It has throughout Germany 72 institutes; each focusing on different fields of applied science. The Leibniz Society has its own representative office in Brussels. In this context, the Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres is an important actor of operating research institutes outboards of Germany. The Helmholtz Association is represented in Beijing, Brussels and Moscow. Even also, the Max Planck Society has five institutes and one major research facility, with the focus of bio-chemical studies.<sup>151</sup>

Finally, the GCRI created since 2009 a unique tool of the science diplomacy of Germany. The locations, which are intended to summerize it under one roof, are in Moscow, New Delhi, New York and Sao Paulo. These he representations of research and innovation agencies are based in universities and in the field of the business sector.<sup>152</sup>

To give an instance, the GCRI in Sao Paulo hosts cooperations and representations of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the CLIB 2021 Cluster Industrial Biotechnology, the Brazi Academic Exchange Service office (DAAD), the German Research Foundation (DFG), partnerships of the Freie Universität Berlin and Georg-August University, the Technical University of Munich (TUM), UAS 7 - German Universities of Applied Sciences University Alliance Metropolis Ruhr (UMAR), the Westfalian Wilhelms-University, the Centre of Competence for Soil

---

<sup>150</sup> In China, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Russia, South Korea and India. The Fraunhofer Institute has also liaison offices in South America such as in Brazil and Argentina and in Asia, India, Malaysia. The Fraunhofer Institute operates six branches in the United States and three in Europe.

<sup>151</sup> Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (2015): Strategy paper of the AvHF, p. 3.

<sup>152</sup> The German Houses of Research and Innovation. Webpage.  
(URL: <https://www.dwih-netzwerk.de/en/who-we-are/>)



(TASK), Groundwater and Site Revitalisation of the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ).<sup>153</sup>

In addition, the German Public Diplomacy also pursues numerous cooperation's at the school level with the support of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD. *The network Schools: Partners of the Future*<sup>154</sup> comprises more than 1.700 schools in over 110 countries. PASCH - Schools: Partners of the Future was initiated in 2008 by the Federal Foreign Office in cooperation with the Central Office for Schools Abroad, the Goethe-Institut, the German Academic Exchange Service and the Educational Exchange Service of the Standing Conference. The school network includes 140 German schools abroad, 27 German profile schools (schools in national education systems with a pronounced German teaching and graduation profile), 1.096 DSD schools (schools in national education systems offering the German language diploma), 592 Fit schools (Schools in national education systems where German lessons are being taught / developed by the Goethe-Institute). Nearly 400 schools in Germany have partnerships with PASCH schools. In the school sector, Germany can score with this overarching concept, which includes German schools abroad and schools in national education systems and is not implemented in any of the analogue countries.

The *Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst* (DAAD) not only has its headquarters in Bonn and its capital office and associated artist program in Berlin, but also has a global network of 15 field offices and 56 information centres in a total of 60 countries. In 2018, around 147,000 students, graduates and scientists were funded. The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation combines the individual support of around 2,400 scientists annually with the expansion of a worldwide network of around 28,000 scientists from 140 countries.<sup>155</sup> The DAAD and the Humboldt

---

<sup>153</sup> Ruffini, P. (2017): Science in Diplomatic Aparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches. In: Science and Diplomacy. Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, p. 49.

<sup>154</sup> Named PASCH

<sup>155</sup> Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (2015): Strategy paper of the AvHF. P. 4 – 5.

Foundation are supporting the international mobility of young scientists, which is an important part of the workfields and activities of scientific diplomacy in Germany. The people who are commissioned in this context, such as teachers and scientists, work to a certain extent as science diplomats and filling the role of a bridging function between civil society and science related to the country they are delegated.

The science diplomacy activities in Germany are coordinated mainly by the BMBF and the *Außwärtiges Amt*. In this system, worldwide famous research institutions of Germany, such as the Fraunhofer, the Max Planck Institute, DAAD and *Deutsche Forschungs Gesellschaft* occupying a significant role with their research network worldwide. The numerous opportunities for cooperation covers a large field, that budding researchers and experts can accept many offers. The omnipresence of such a network fulfills the basic aims of science diplomacy. The attractive Germany is continuously promoted in this area.<sup>156</sup>

In addition, Germany has an active network of science diplomats in the countries that are crucial for scientific and technological cooperation and its resources. If one considers the goals of the German economy, especially in the area of cutting-edge technologies, it becomes clear that subsidies are being made available especially by the federal government.

Moreover, the main motives of the German science diplomacy strategy is to strengthen leadership within the European Union, ofcourse in line with its national interests. Germany has been a major player in Europe since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and has been increasingly exposed to civilian power based on historical facts of the last century.

---

<sup>156</sup> Ruffini, P. (2017): Science in Diplomatic Aparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches. In: Science and Diplomacy. Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, p. 47 – 54.

## CHAPTER 4

### TURKISH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This chapter looks for the actors of *Soft Power* in Turkish Foreign Policy in the historical context. Before analysing the characteristics of Turkish Public Diplomacy, it is advisable to examine the main framework of this policy in which it was designed, evaluated and implemented. It can be argued that the principles of Turkish Foreign Policy, have emerged from various structural parameters.

It is hard to imagine that the Turkish Republic inherited structural content from the Ottoman Empire. Although the founding cadre of the Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, tried to get as far away from the ideological and practical ideas and policies of the Ottoman Empire as possible in all walks of life. It is by no means obvious that the new state was founded on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Under the political leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a series of reforms have been implemented, including the granting of equal civil and political rights for women, the introduction of free and compulsory primary education, and above all, the transformation of Turkey into a secular nation-state with a strengthened European orientation. Atatürk ruled under a widespread notion, that saw the West as the future and Turkey's path to prosperity. Among them are the reforms in social and educational aspects, such as the change of the alphabet from Arabic writing to Latin and the Western-oriented clothing reform.<sup>157</sup>

Turkish *Soft Power* differs in form and content from that of other countries. The soft power potential of Turkey, extending from the Balkans through the Middle East up to Central Asia. This is unique for a modern nation-state, as these have a difficult link to communicate intensively with other cultures and nationalities.

---

<sup>157</sup> Huijgh Ellen and Warlick Jordan (2016): *The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of Turkey*. In: USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Los Angeles, p. 6 – 8.

Turkey has stems from the cultural and historical experience it has inherited. According to Kalin, the modern Turkey has inherited this property from the cultural and historical experience of Ottoman multiculturalism.<sup>158</sup> The cultural values represented by Turkey, as well as its historical depth, have mobilized regional dynamism and offered opportunities for the creation of new spheres of influence. The geographical area of Southeast Europe can be stated as a good example, because different nations of the Balkans have devoted more or less attention to Turkey than ever before. In the larger Eurasian land mass, the common point of understanding for Turks, Kurds, Bosniaks, Albanians and other ethnic groups as well as Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Assyrian communities, is the experience of living under the Ottoman rule they have shared and coexist together. The historical heritage brought these diverse groups together and allowed them to a share experience in all social aspects of life. Today, it can be stated that Turkey is the linchpin of this heritage.<sup>159</sup>

Ibrahim Kalin describes “Turkish democracy and its vibrant civil society as the main pillars of power in Turkey”.<sup>160</sup> The political liberation atmosphere in the early fifties of the last century, Turkey had different experiences in the area of political separation of powers. At this stage of the young republic, the multi-party system was introduced. The resulting democratic experience led to a transformation of Turkey, which made it a centre of attraction in the region. An increasing awareness and increasing attention towards Turkey’s geographical hinterland, such as the Balkans and the Middle East, depends on its ability to determine the balance between the interests of the geopolitical issues and to expand the positive influence of democratization in these regions.<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> Kalin, İbrahim (2011): Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. In: Perceptions 16 (3), p. 9.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 9 – 10.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

The political and akademical debates in Turke and even also the uprising and expanding of the this topic in international media, think tank groups, other academic platforms, has grown significantly. This can be clearly seen from the numerous publications in the academic literature alone.<sup>162</sup> In terms of the debate between tradition and modernity, for example, Turkey is perceived as a country that can unite traditional culture - the Ottoman heritage. This statement concerns the period from 2002 to 2011 during the period of the *AKP*<sup>163</sup> government.<sup>164</sup>

#### **4.1. The goals of Turkish Public Diplomacy**

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Turkish PD covers the mediation of Turkey's new foreign policy approach to the world. The experience of Turkish foreign policy is directly related to the transformation of these points into a strategic value that brought about a change and widening of their traditional foreign policy. Ahmet Davutoğlu, former foreign affairs chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister (2009-2014), has generally been considered as the main architect of the *AKP* foreign policy. Davutoğlu, who has an academic vita, can be taken into account as the theoretical basis for the foreign policy understanding of the *AKP* government. His famous book "*Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*"<sup>165</sup> was published in 2001.

---

<sup>162</sup> Şahin, M. and Çevik, B. Senem (2015): *Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi*, Ankara. This includes important articles about the changing of Turkey and its foreign policy.

<sup>163</sup> The Justice and Development Party is the key political party, which is in power since 2002.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>165</sup> The English translation is *Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position*.

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is historically and geographically an indivisible part, related to its geographical positioning. Turkey's international position will be tied to its influence and performance within this historical shaped "*hinterland*".<sup>166</sup>

The Turkish Public Diplomacy strategy can be defined from the text material of the *Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü* (KDK).<sup>167</sup> The establishment of the Office of Public Diplomacy in January 2010, re-emphasized the importance of public diplomacy as a tool to influence Turkey's international reputation. The Office of Public Diplomacy aimed to "ensure cooperation and coordination between public authorities and non-governmental organizations in their activities related to public diplomacy".<sup>168</sup> The Office of Public Diplomacy is an independent institution under the patronage of the Prime Minister's Chief Adviser, whose secretarial services are provided by BYGM.<sup>169</sup>

In this context, the KDK defines the soft power resources as follows:

- 1) One of the main sources of Turkish *Soft Power* is the experience with democratic structures. Ongoing institutionalisation of democracy and the positively adoption by the Turkish public, which strengthens Turkey's contributing to the regional and global stability and security.

---

<sup>166</sup> Davutoğlu, A. (2001): *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu*. İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, p. 119.

<sup>167</sup> The Office of Public Diplomacy within the Turkish Prime Ministry was transformed into the Directorate of Communications under the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. Following the referendum on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2017, the former offices of the Turkish Prime Ministry were restructured in the new presidential system; and partly redefined in your goals and tasks.

<sup>168</sup> Ekşi, Muharrem (2014): *Kamu Diplomasisi ve Ak Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası*. Yeni Medya ve Kamu Diplomasisi Aktörü Olarak BYEGM. *İletişim ve Diplomasi* 1(1), p. 184.

<sup>169</sup> KDK (2017): *KDK Chapter Aims*. 2018. (URL: <https://kdk.gov.tr/kurumsal/hedefler/9>).

2) Another feature of the important soft power resources lies in the historical perspective of the Turkish nation, which extends from the Balkans to Central Asia. The historical and cultural achievements and experiences have an impact on the populations in these regions.<sup>170</sup>

In the official statements of KDK and Kalin's article on Turkish Public Diplomacy, the terms "Türkiye'nin yeni hikâyesi" and "Yeni Türkiye" are of major importance. Based on this title, we see the conceptualisation of the goals of Turkish Public Diplomacy. The government policy underlying the period 2006 to 2011 can be understood as a foundation for the new design of Turkish foreign policy.<sup>171</sup>

Different institutions and organizations have different duties in the field of Public Diplomacy activities. Turkey's Public Diplomacy implementations considered as a whole, are carried out in cooperation with the KDK are shown as:

The state and decision-making actors include the Presidency, the Prime Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Culture and Tourism; TRT and BYEGM as media promoter; the Yunus Emre Institute as an actor of cultural exchange, and TİKA, which follows the relief and development activities.<sup>172</sup>

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget for 2017, almost one million Turkish lira was spent on public diplomacy for that year. Compared to the TİKA (380 million Turkish Lira), Yunus Emre Institute (120 million Turkish Lira) and YTB (220 million Turkish Lira) expenditures for 2017, the weighting and

---

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Kalın, İbrahim (2011): Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. In: *Perceptions* 16 (3), p. 10–16.

<sup>172</sup> Yıldırım, G. (2015): *Uluslararası Halkla İlişkiler Perspektifinden Kamu Diplomasisi*. İstanbul, p. 287.

differences within the Public Diplomacy institutions become clear.<sup>173</sup> This sum is in comparison to the GDP of Turkey in 2017 from 851 billion US Dolar to 800 million Turkish Lira Budget for Public Diplomacy.

#### **4.2. Public Diplomacy Instruments**

Media is one of the most important tools for controlling this communication process. The media is used as an instrument of public diplomacy to reach public opinion quickly, easily and effectively. Moreover, the new media, due to the widespread use of the Internet and the sectoral functioning of new types of media, such as social media platforms, also have an important role and impact in terms of scientific debate on public diplomacy. In terms of the functioning of traditional media, it expands new discourse on emerging channels of media including printed, audio-visual and visual media.

This conceptual framework should serve as a background for public diplomacy exercised by Turkey through its various institutions. Many public authorities directly or indirectly exercise this role. The main actors are TİKA (Turkish Agency for International Cooperation and Development), the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the official Turkish Television TRT, Yunus Emre Institute, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Investment and Assistance Agency, Press Information Office ( BYGM). These institutions are all involved in political, diplomatic, economic and cultural activities in the PD. It becomes clear that the division of work often overlaps. In order to increase the effectiveness of soft power efforts, the listed institutions must uphold effective coordinated interrelationships. The Office of Public Diplomacy in the Office of the Prime Minister carried out this task from 2010 to 2017.<sup>174</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> TC. Dışişleri Bakanlığı (2017): 2017 Yılı İdare Faaliyet Raporu; TİKA (2017): 2017 Yıllık Raporu.

<sup>174</sup> Ekşi, Muharrem (2014): Kamu Diplomasisi ve Ak Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası. Yeni Medya ve Kamu Diplomasisi Aktörü Olarak BYEGM. İletişim ve Diplomasi 1(1), p. 184 – 188.



In this context, the politicians of the AKP government recognized the importance of Public Diplomacy in the global politics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. During the second period of the AKP government from 2006 to 2011, the Turkish Public Diplomacy was institutionalised by the formation and financing of institutions. In this context, new institutions such as the *KDK*, the Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Institutional reforms were undertaken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With a new legal foundation, the staffing was expanded and new structures within the ministry redefined.

As the name implies, TIKA specified its goals, which they aimed to enforce abroad. From 2009 to 2011 cultural programs such as the Turkology project were handed over to the YEI. Since 2011, TIKA has focused on investments in international cooperation, construction and building of infrastructure. These institutions became new channels and mechanisms of Turkish foreign policy, who diversified the foreign policy making in terms of instruments, actors and methods. In addition, social and cultural components have been added to the Turkish foreign policy. The AKP government has multi-dimensionalized the Public Diplomacy approach.<sup>175</sup>

#### **4.2.1. Yunus Emre Institute**

As like the *KDK* institution, the Yunus Emre Institute<sup>176</sup> (YEI) was established in 2007. In comparison to its counterparts in other countries such as the *British Council* opened in 1934 and the the French Cultural Institute *Alliance Française*, opened in 1883, to cultivate cultural exchange by promoting language, culture, art and common values. These foundations, institutes are implementing their

---

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 188 – 193.

<sup>176</sup> Yunus Emre was a poet and Sufi who lived in the 14<sup>th</sup> century in central Anatolia. The lyrics of Yunus Emre are typically a sort of folk poetry. Nowadays, over the centuries he was and is considered as a poet who succeeded in making an easy and understandable use of Turkish.

understanding of foreign policy in social and cultural areas. In this context, YEI was established as an additional institute for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to act as a social and cultural instrument and actor of Turkish foreign policy in the field of civil society.<sup>177</sup> We must also mention here, that the YEI by no means acts as ngo and cannot be defined as ngo in the legal sense. Due to the lack of experience of state institutions in the field of PD and cultural diplomacy in particular, the Yunus Emre Foundation, founded in 2007, was only able to start work in 2009. The order of the financial basis and organizational tasks were very laboriously put into operation.<sup>178</sup> Similarly, YEI has not been able to define a work strategy since its inception until 2017. Therefore, at the request of these countries, YEI opened Yunus Emre Cultural Centres (YETKM) in different continents.

In addition, it was noted that the opening of cultural centers in the priority areas of foreign affairs was generally observed. In the wake of the opening of borders with Syria and the Arab world, one of the first *YETKM* were operated in Damascus, Cairo and Amman.

The official law of the YEI states the objective of the institution, which is “promoting Turkey, its language, history, culture and art, [...] developing friendship with other countries, to increase cultural exchange, offering the related information and documents within and outside the country to the use of the world, providing people who wish to be trained in Turkish language, culture and art with services abroad”<sup>179</sup>. According to this definition, it reflects the cultural diplomacy definition of the YEI. The institute was also built beyond politics and the parties of everyday life, since it was founded as a public financed foundation and had a

---

<sup>177</sup> Ekşi, Muharrem (2014): Kamu Diplomasisi ve Ak Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası. Yeni Medya ve Kamu Diplomasisi Aktörü Olarak BYEGM. İletişim ve Diplomasi 1(1), p. 194.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 195 – 198.

<sup>179</sup> Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2007): Yunus Emre Vakıf Kanunu. (URL: [https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/u152/20180227\\_1.5.5653.pdf](https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/u152/20180227_1.5.5653.pdf))

official administrative structure. The Board of Trustees, the Executive Board, the Audit Committee and the Advisory Committee were involved in the administration of the Institute. Most of the positions are staffed by public officials.<sup>180</sup>

The main actors of PD such as TİKA and YTB, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been involved in the bureaucratic organisation of the YEI to implement and coordinate the Institute tasks and to manage this institution. Since the institute opened cultural centres abroad, it applied an NGO-like working principle and not one directed state controlled agency. In this context, it wanted to give the cultural centres a civil identity. While the common method was to open centres outside of Turkey through the KMA agreements, which allowed enjoying diplomatic protection, from 2014 onwards the NGO model was applied.<sup>181</sup>

The first centre of the Institute was opened in Bosnia Herzegovina on 17<sup>th</sup> October in 2009 with the name Sarajevo Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre, which was the first step towards an enlargement in the Balkans. According to the behaviour during the first two years of the YEI, it can be interpreted that a strategic affinity to the Balkans. Just after the opening in Sarajevo in October 2009, the second centre was opened in Tiran, the capital city of Albania, in December 2009.<sup>182</sup>

As of 2017 there are 15 cultural centres in the Balkans.

Starting in the Balkans, the YEI opened its second priority area, which is the Middle East. Specifically starting in Cairo, Egypt in March 2010 centres followed up by Syria, Jordania and Lebanon. Related to the activities in Syria, the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre in Damascus, began to operate in 15<sup>th</sup> December in

---

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., Yunus Emre Institute Foundation Comission.

<sup>181</sup> Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2015): Yunus Emre enstitüsü 2015-2018 Stratejik Planı, p. 11 – 13; as an example, the cultural centers in London, Amsterdam and Tokyo can be shown. These foreign offices have an NGO status in the legal sense.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p. 13 – 14.

2010, which was closed due to the civil war and the decline of the relations between them.

In total, 55 centres have been opened in 45 countries over 9 years from 2009 to 2018 since of the establishment of YEI.<sup>183</sup> According to the 2017 – 2018 Strategic Plan paper, the institute plans to open new branches in Beijing, New York, Delhi, Mexico-City, Sydney, Karakas, Seoul and Athens between 2017 - 2018.

Table 3. Yunus Emre Branches Chronology

2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Sarajev o	Astana	Berlin	Amman	Baku	Algiers	Belgrad e	Karachi	Kiev
Tirana	Brussels	Buchare st	Amsterda m	Budapest	Cologne	Khartou m	Lahore	Moscow
	Cairo	Fojnica	Beirut	Alexandria	Lefkosia	Nyla	Mogadish u	Tunis
	London	Constan ce	Peć	Johannesbu rg	Mostar	Doha	Sao Paulo	
	Skopje	Pristina	Shkoder	Kabul	Podgorit sa	Komrat	Washingt on	
	“Damascu s”	Prizren	Kazan	Jerusalem	Rome	Kuala Lumpur		
		Tokyo	Paris	Rabat	Vienna	Zagreb		
			Tehran	Warsaw				
			Tiflis					
<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>

The activities of the YEI can be categorized into five areas. These five areas are, cultural exchange, Turkish teaching, scientific exchange, cultural diplomacy and institutional capacity building. In line with the YEI’s goal to make Turkish a world language, the main goal and function of the YEI cultural centres was to teach Turkish. The cultural centres initially served as language courses. The Institute aspired to become the sole and leading institution for the education of foreigners in Turkey. Thus, a standardization of professional Turkish training should be achieved. In this framework, teaching materials and the Turkish Aptitude Test (TYS) were developed and introduced. The latter is an EU-recognized certificate that is equivalent to the TOEFL and IELTS exams.<sup>184</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2017): 2017 – 2018 Stratejik Planı, p. 11 – 13.

<sup>184</sup> Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2016): 2023 Vizyonu Strateji Belgesi. Turkish proficiency exam (TYS).

This grants an internationally valid standard test. In addition to that, the Yunus Emre Institute organizes the “Turkish Summer School” during the summer. The organization started with this project in 2010 and covered almost all expenses of the participants, which in 2018 amounted to thousand students from 57 different countries. The students have the opportunity to get acquainted with the diverse culture of Turkey and participate in various cultural activities by visiting various cities of Turkey accompanied by them. The duration of the program is three weeks. Within these three weeks, the students will participate in Turkish courses from various universities. Student groups are divided into groups of twenty and receive free dorm room logistics. Among the prestigious universities are Istanbul University, Ankara Hacettepe University and Ege University. Finally, all groups meet at the end of the program in Istanbul to share experiences and impressions of Turkey. The main point of this summer school is that Turkish is used as a communication language, so that the speech skills can be improved and cultural closeness can be established.<sup>185</sup>

The YETKM organizes cultural arts festivals, which includes film and food festivals, traditional arts workshops, competitions in poetry reading, painting, music performances. In addition, academic events such as symposia, panel discussions and interviews are offered. Concerts and workshops of many kinds also find their place in the offers of the cultural centers. It becomes clear that the offers of the YEI do not only focus on language promotion, but also cultural exchange.

According to the figures of the Annual Report 2017, 700 events of the above-mentioned subject areas were held each year during the year.<sup>186</sup> This indicates that the YEI has very quickly integrated cultural diplomacy into their practice.

In addition, the Yunus Emre Institute carries out seven large-scale projects:

---

<sup>185</sup> YEE (2018): Yaz Okulu Programı hakkında. (URL: <http://turkceyazokulu.com/en/>)

<sup>186</sup> Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2017): 2017 – 2018 Stratejik Planı, p. 17 – 35.

1. The Turkology Project,
2. Turkish as a foreign language,
3. Reviving traditional Turkish craft in the Balkans,
4. The100 Turkish Libraries,
5. The Scientific Exchange Program TABIP.<sup>187</sup>


In addition, the Yunus Emre Institute has developed various projects implemented in 2014-2018, including the Turkish Education to Turkish kids of 4-7 age in Europe, and the Distant Turkish Teaching Program, which is an electronic based learning program. The Turkology Project aims to reach a large number of Students of Turkish Studies. In order to reach this target group, the YEI signs protocols with foreign universities that allow the YEI to send lecturers to the respective university. The responsibilities of the teachers include the academic teaching of the Turkish language and the communicative aspect of the YEI diplomatic mission. As part of the project, the Yunus Emre Institute has sent approximately 70 lecturers to 86 universities in almost 60 countries during the 2016-2017 academic year.<sup>188</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 28 – 35.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

Table 4. Turkology Project Statistics



The project also includes various grants, such as scholarships for successful students to train young future Turkologists. There is no concrete strategy for selecting cooperation universities, but it can be interpreted that in countries with no KMA agreement, the Turkology Project Protocols are used as alternatives. Although there is no establishment by the Turkology project in the host country, the lecturer employed there is a contact person for those interested. The Turkology project can also be seen as a precursor to the KMA agreement.<sup>189</sup>

<sup>189</sup> Attached is a draft protocol that has been used in bilateral relations by diplomatic negotiations.

Table 5. Turkology Project Cooperation's

Europe	Balkans	Middle-East	Africa	Asia	Far-East	America
Belarus	Bosnia-Hercegovina	Palestine	Algeria	Afghanistan	Japan	USA
Belgium	Bulgaria	Iraq	Morocco	Azerbaijan		Argentina
Czech Republic	Croatia	Qatar	Egypt	China		
Estonia	Montenegro	Lebanon	Senegal	Indonesia		
Italy	Kosovo	North-Macedonia	Sudan	Georgia		
Latvia	Romania	Saudi Arabia	Mozambique	India		
Lithuania	Serbia	Jordan	Ethiopia	Kazakhstan		
Poland	Moldavia	Yemen	Somalia	Mongolia		
Slovakia				Pakistan		
Ukraine						
<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

Another important strategy of the YEI is to teach Turkish as a foreign language in the host country schools where the cultural centers are located. In this context, several local governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina have decided to teach Turkish as a alternative second language from the 6<sup>th</sup> grade to the 13<sup>th</sup> grade. This form of language promotion is an exception, because the usual handling of this matter falls within the remit of the Ministry of Education.<sup>190</sup>

Several projects are implemented by the YEI, for instance the reconstruction and preservation of historical manuscripts dated back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. This should strengthen the historical relations of the Balkans with Turkey.<sup>191</sup>

<sup>190</sup> YEE Sarajevo Webpage. (URL: <https://saraybosna.yee.org.tr/tr>)

<sup>191</sup> Ađır, Bülent S. and M. N, Arman.(2016): Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era: Political and Security Dimensions, in Turkey's Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Sertif Demir (ed.), Roca Raton: BrownWalker Press, p. 143-166.



#### 4.2.2. Media Communication - TRT World

The globalization process has intensified the competition within the international relations in many areas such as economics, culture, security policy, diplomacy and television broadcasting. In this new era, the industrialized countries strive to dominate their theses and agendas on a global scale. As an institution that constitutes and disseminates global information, television is one of the key players in shaping the global agenda.

The power of the news to construct and reconstruct reality in the consciousness of the audience cannot be ignored. It is not in vain to say that pictures say more than a thousand words. The essence of soft power is the role in reconstructing the perceived reality in the minds of the audience over the image of another nation. News addresses all three types of Soft Power determinants, it is cultural, politics and foreign audience; and even also the medium is the message, which can be understood as Soft Power tools. The appearance in the overall-concept could have a psychological impact.<sup>192</sup>

TRT is a state-owned television station that conducts communications and information activities in the field of public diplomacy. The reason for this was to strengthen the institutions' control and influence over mass communication tools and new social media tools in global politics, especially in the 2000's. On the part of politics and the State Parliament, the increasingly important role of the media was perceived.

In addition, states increasingly tend to use the media as an actor in support of public opinion in relation to their own foreign policy. The external perception of the country from the international audience has to be highlighted at this point. With the entrance of social media, access to news and information has grown racy.

---

<sup>192</sup> Gilboa, Eytan (2000): "Mass communication and diplomacy: A theoretical framework." in: *Communication Theory*, Vol. 10/ No. 3, S. 277 – 291.

This led to an increased importance of the media. Moreover, the fact that global politics turned to an intellectual and opinion building competition led several states to apply a new structure to the media. In this context, Russia Today is a good implementation of influencing foreign audience in line with Russian interest. DW *Deutsche Welle* and Al Jazeera were already positioned to lead these international media competition. Therefore, Turkey entered into the international environment of the media competition with institutions such as TRT World. The TRT World station has been restructured under the good practice example of CNN or BBC.<sup>193</sup>

The notion that global media tools were needed to explain and defend their own political interests were developed within the context of creating PD under the AKP government. TRT's international channels have developed into an international political communication tool. Thus, TRT's function of building a communication bridge between Turkey and overseas has taken an important step. Especially since the station emits in English language, it clarifies the target audience, which is addressed.<sup>194</sup> These international channels are inter media channels of Turkey as it opens up to the world. In the PD, the state uses global television channels broadcast in various countries to create public opinion on specific topics, thereby preserving the support of the international community. Therefore, TRT is the indispensable communication instrument of the Turkish PD and can convey the attractiveness of the country to the outside world and raise political issues to an international level.<sup>195</sup>

After many years of preparation, the broadcaster TRT World has recorded its encrypted programs since May 2015 and has been broadcasting free since November 2015. The dissertation, which is one of the qualitative research methods, discussed the strategy of Turkish public relations, based on the work of the Office of Public Diplomacy and TRT World, which is considered part of it. In

---

<sup>193</sup> Baritci, F. and Aydeniz, H. (2019): Kamu Diplomasisi Aracı Olarak Medya: TRT World Örneği. *Erciyes İletişim Dergisi*, 6 (2), p. 1551 – 1556.

<sup>194</sup> TRT World (2019): Webpage. (URL: <https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/about/visions-mission>)

<sup>195</sup> TRT World (2017): TRT World Forum 2017 Report.

this context, TRT World's founding process, goals and objectives, budget, organizational structure, personnel policy, audience, positioning, news strategy, television programs, official website and social media accounts were examined using multiple data sources.<sup>196</sup> TRT World has established its professional team by hiring new correspondents in the existing representative offices of the TRT television network abroad. In addition, it realizes some of its broadcasts in the studios in London and Washington. In addition, the creation of a similar infrastructure in Singapore is planned. Live broadcasts are currently being broadcast with the offices of TRT in Jerusalem, Tehran and Moscow. The station employs 500 people, including experienced representatives of the world's most important organizations, as well as young people who have been trained and lived abroad and have a high level of English and journalism skills.<sup>197</sup>

The Areas of Focus demonstrate the strategic approach that TRT World seeks to pursue. These are to be listed as follows:

- 1) Foreign policy with particular emphasis on Turkey's relations with the United States, Europe, Russia, China, the MENA region, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, as well as other regions.
- 2) Security studies, with focus on a holistic approach that tackles issues ranging from societal risks like the rise of extremisms and radicalisation to energy security.
- 3) Media and communication studies with concentration on Turkey's public diplomacy as well as news narratives, framing, and agendas in relation to Turkey's affairs.
- 4) Migration and diaspora studies. This area will shed light on the role of migration in the major political and cultural processes of the contemporary

---

<sup>196</sup> TRT World (2019): Webpage, Areas of Focus.

(URL: <https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/about/visions-mission>).

<sup>197</sup> Devran, Yusuf (2015): Yeni Türkiye'nin Küresel Sesi TRT World: Fırsatlar ve Güçlükler. In: E-journal of Intermedia. 2, p. 288 – 294.

world as well as the management of mobility and the impact of humanitarian relief.

With effective reporting, TRT World has a great opportunity to increase its impact abroad. For this, enough TV content must be produced, which of course also affects the financing of the venture.

### **4.3.3. Scientific Cooperation**

This chapter focuses in particular on two aspects of scientific relationships. The first one is the Turkey Scholarship program organised by the YTB. The second one is the new project TABIP, which means Academic and Scientific Cooperation Project of Turkey. TABIP is a new approach of organizing *Science Diplomacy*. To the literature must be noted that it hardly find an academic approach or any data for analyses is available out of the TÜBİTAK publications in the period of 2017 – 2018. There are minor online resources and academic articles written about subject, but the main literature about *Science Diplomacy* is in English and focused on case studies of the USA or England. For the Turkish case of *Science Diplomacy* there is almost no qualitative and quantitative data and also no articles, since it is a new concept.

The UNESCO Science Report 2005<sup>198</sup> mentions three important policy documents regarding the development of Turkey's science and technology policy over the last 20 years. The first is the “Turkish science policy 1983 – 2003”, the second is titled under “Turkish science and technology policy 1993 – 2003” and the third is “Impetus in Science and Technology Project” dated in 1995.<sup>199</sup>

The Supreme Council for Science and Technology (BTYK), chaired by the Turkish Prime Minister in 1983, supported the development of a long-term

---

<sup>198</sup> UNESCO Science Report (2005): UNESCO Publishing: Paris, p. 9 – 10.

<sup>199</sup> Doğan, Elif Ö. (2015): *Science Diplomacy In The Global Age: Examples From Turkey And The World*. Dissertation. METU. Ankara, p. 167 – 168.

strategy towards the enlargement of science policy. This council developed concrete approaches to promoting science. The Council was made up of officials like policy makers dealing with the stated issues. The main actors of the Turkish PD in the area of so-called *Science Diplomacy* are the Scientific and Technological Council of Turkey<sup>200</sup> and of the University Council.<sup>201</sup>

In 2002, TÜBİTAK developed the Science and Technology Strategy Vision 2023, which aimed to formulate Turkey's science and technology policy for the period 2003-2023. This strategy paper has four sub-aspects: the National Technology Foresight Project; the Technology Capacity Project; Research Inventory Project and the National Infrastructure Project for Research and Development.

TÜBİTAK was founded in 1963. It is authorized to carry out, promote, organize and coordinate basic and applied research and development; to act as a financing agency for research and development activities; to support promising researchers through scholarships; and to organize international cooperation”.<sup>202</sup>

In addition to these activities, the YTB combined various university scholarships that provide foreign students from various countries through an individual foundation called Turkey Scholarships. The first implementation of the Turkey Fellowships took place in 2012 and can be regarded as one of the largest activities in the field of PD of Turkey in the field of Science-Scientific Cooperation. It complies with the Fulbright Fellowship in the United States and, with its number of applicants, is highly popular among students who wish to study. Similarly, the scholarships that foreign students received from several government agencies such as YÖK, TÜBİTAK and TİKA were formerly independent. Since 2011, YTB has been awarding these scholarships to make Turkey an attractive location for higher

---

<sup>200</sup> TÜBİTAK

<sup>201</sup> YÖK

<sup>202</sup> TÜBİTAK (2018): (URL: <https://www.tubitak.gov.tr/tr/kurumsal/politikalar/icerik-vizyon-2023>).

education. This goal serves directly the PD of Turkey and can be regarded as a positive image. These scholarships are allocated according to the foreign policy objectives of Turkey. Thus, in addition to the Turkish-speaking countries of Central Asia, there are also regions in the center, which previously were not in the traditional understanding of foreign policy. These include the regions of Africa and Latin America. Applicants from Somalia, Colombia and Indonesia increase the proportion of foreign students in Turkish universities. Surprisingly, the demand for the *Turkey Scholarships* increased promptly during 2003 to 2016.<sup>203</sup> Originally, YTB had a demand for the *Turkey Scholarships* of around 90,000 students per year, while between 2015 and 2016 there were 155,000 applications from 182 countries for the Turkey scholarships granted to 50,000 students between 2012 and 2016.<sup>204</sup> The increase in scholarships also increased the number of foreign students in Turkey. Turkey has entered the international education market as a new player.

The Yunus Emre Institute also conducts various activities to introduce to the world Turkey's academic, scientific and technological capacity and capability; increase the number of qualified manpower; help Turkey get one step closer to her development objectives, and; develop and guide Turkey's scientific and academic interaction strategies. To that extent, the Institute has developed the "Academic and Scientific Cooperation Project of Turkey" (TABIP) under the auspices of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and has rapidly started its work in scientific diplomacy.<sup>205</sup>

As of the end of 2017, Yunus Emre Institute had 54 Culture Centres in 43 countries in addition to 139 points of contact in more than 60 countries as part of its Turkology Project. One of the top priorities is to ensure that Turkish actors in

---

<sup>203</sup> YTB (2018): Türkiye Bursları/Scholarship official website

(URL: <https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/en/english-home/>) [Accessed on 15. September 2018]

<sup>204</sup> YTB (2017): 2017 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu. (URL: <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/faaliyet-raporlari>).

<sup>205</sup> The Project was launched in 2017.

public and private sectors who are running academic and scientific studies can also benefit from this international network and cooperation agreements that the Institute has secured in all parts of the world. In this context, findings, data, guides, knowhow and many more outputs which will be achieved by the network to be set up under TABIP, will be used to further improve scientific and academic interaction and global activities will be conducted to help achieve the goals that are mentioned here.

The mission of TABIP can be summarised as:

To explain and introduce Turkey to the world more efficiently by coordinating scientific diplomacy work of Turkey's relevant offices and organisations as well as of Yunus Emre Institute in a way that will cover all academic and scientific fields and to offer maximum possible contribution to Turkey's development targets and efforts in developing qualified manpower.

The vision of TABIP can be summarised as:

To ensure that this project is a sustainable, constantly expanding, effective, preferred, trusted and people sensitive project by using the global values we have developed with our stakeholders and partners and by fulfilling the requirements of the national objectives in our foundation.

In this framework, the academic and scientific exchange between Turkey and abroad should be promoted. This method is similar to German Public Diplomacy in the field of science. The Yunus Emre Institute is trying to capture new topics such as research through the YEE network. With the inclusion of the topics of research, exchange of science one tries to expand his audience. At the moment there are no data available which can summarize the field of action and the meaning more concretely.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

Research into Public Diplomacy represents a still young discipline in political science research. It is a complex, partly diffuse field of research that combines elements of various disciplines and is distinguished by a high degree of practical relevance.

In view of the central question of the dissertation, the answer in the theoretical part as well as in the presentation and explanation of the soft power elements has become clear.

As part of the Public Diplomacy concept, Joseph Nye's classification of the individual elements in education, culture, and media reveals clear boundaries to hard power. The impact of the media on society is of enormous importance. Communication science offers research a significant contribution to the understanding of mutual interaction.

Statements on the use of media and the Goethe-Institute dominate the statements that can be assigned to the category Instruments of German Public Diplomacy. The use of media is evaluated primarily from the perspective of the task of cultural dialogue, but also the structural change in the target country (democratization / civil society building). The impact of local media (e.g. through broadcast literacy programs) is more emphasized than an image-building function for Germany. Deutsche Welle is e.g. an increasing importance in crisis areas and in the support of democratization processes and the establishment of civil societies attests. With regard to the media implementation of the Turkish Public Diplomacy, TRT World, as a state broadcaster, it is not as politically independent as commercial broadcasters. This can improve the management of the channel. Such a



consideration can be degenerate. Thus TRT World should guarantee the legal independence of the editors. Thus, there is no doubt that TRT World is a monumental project for Turkey. In addition to experiencing TRT broadcasts, a professional approach to channel management can meet these challenges.

The aim of this study was to highlight the elements of Turkey's and Germany's soft power actors. In order to achieve this, interviews with government officials, academic sources and academics from Turkey, Germany have been conducted.

Just by taking a closer look at the period of the activities of the Turkish PD, it becomes clear that the Turkish institutes are still relatively new to the business. You have little experience in implementing Public Diplomacy. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that the concrete steps taken by the Turkish government over the past decade have had a positive impact on foreign policy, and thus on the PD. The orientation towards European institutions has many advantages. The lack of funding for the PD actors is also an important handicap, which has a negative effect on the results of PD activities. In correlation to the tasks and results of the Turkish PD, it can be said that a balanced result is existing.

## REFERENCES

### Primary Sources:

Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Konzeption 2000“, in: Auswärtiges Amt (Hg.): Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik, Berlin, p. 16 – 35.

Auswärtiges Amt (2010): Globale Bildungspartnerschaften, die Initiative Außenwissenschaftspolitik, Auswartiges Amt, 2010, p. 1 – 8.

KHK 480. (1992): Ekonomik, Kültürel, Eğitim ve Teknik İşbirliği Başkanlığı Kurulması. Vol. KHK/480.

KHK 656. (2011): Türk İşbirliği Ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığının Teşkilat Ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname. Vol. KHK/656.

PL 4668. (2001): Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun. Vol. 4668.

PL 5653. (2007): Yunus Emre Vakıf Kanunu. Vol. 5653.

PL 5978. (2010): Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun. Vol. 5978.

TRT World (2017): TRT World Forum 2017 Report.

UNESCO Science Report (2005): UNESCO Publishing: Paris, p. 9 – 10.

### Secondary Source:

Anholt, S. (2003). Brand New Justice. The upside of global branding, Butterworth-Heinemann Oxford.

Anholt, S. (2007). Competitive Identity (The New Brand Management for Nations,Cities and Regions), Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Arnold, Hans (1980): *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Ein Überblick aus deutscher Sicht.* München et al.: Hanser.

Auer, Claudia (2016): *Theorie der Public Diplomacy. Sozialtheoretische Grundlegung einer Form strategischer Kommunikation.* In: *Organisationskommunikation Studien zu Public Relations / Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und Kommunikationsmanagement* (et al. Günter Bentele). Werl.

Ayhan, Kadir Jun (2019): *The boundaries of public diplomacy and nonstate actors: A taxonomy of perspectives.* In: *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 63–83.

Baldwin, David A. (2002): *Power and International Relations*, in: Carlsnaes, Walter; Cracks, Thomas; Simmons, Beth A. (ed.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London, p. 177 – 191.

Baritci, F. and Aydeniz, H. (2019): *Kamu Diplomasisi Aracı Olarak Medya: TRT World Örneği.* *Erciyes İletişim Dergisi*, 6 (2), p. 1551 – 1576.

Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond (2005): *Power in Global Governance*, in: Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond (ed.), *Power in Global Governance.* New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 1 – 32.

Bell, Daniel A. (2009): *War, Peace and China's Soft Power: A Confucian Approach.* *International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies*, p. 26 – 30.

Beyme, K. (2012): *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik.* In: *Kulturpolitik in Deutschland.* Springer VS, Wiesbaden, p. 201 – 223.

Bruch, Rüdiger (1982): *Weltpolitik als Kulturmission: Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbürgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges.* Paderborn [a.o.].

Davis Cross, M. K., Melissen, J. (2013): *European Public Diplomacy: Soft power at work.* New York.

Davutoğlu, A. (2001): *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu.* Aksaray, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.

Denscheilmann, Heike (2012): Deutschlandbilder – Ausstellungen im Auftrag Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik. Wiesbaden.

Devran, Yusuf. (2015): Yeni Türkiye'nin Küresel Sesi TRT World: Fırsatlar ve Güçlükler. In: E-journal of Intermedia. (2), p. 281 – 294.

Dinnie, K. (2008): Nation Branding. Concepts, issues, practice, Butterworth-Heinemann, London.

Doğan, Elif Ö. (2015): Science Diplomacy In The Global Age: Examples From Turkey And The World. Dissertation. METU. Ankara, p. 167 – 168.

Ekşi, Muharrem (2014): Kamu Diplomasisi ve Ak Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası. Yeni Medya ve Kamu Diplomasisi Aktörü Olarak BYEGM. İletişim ve Diplomasi 1(1), p. 5 – 28.

Fan, Y. (2008): Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 147 – 158.

Fedoroff, N. (2009): Science Diplomacy in the 21st Century. In: Cell 136, p. 9 – 11.

Ferguson, Niall (2003): What is Power? In: Hoover Digest, no. 2, p. 18 – 57.

Flink, T., and U. Schreiterer. (2010): Science Diplomacy at the Intersection of S&T Policies and Foreign Affairs: Toward a Typology of National Approaches. In: Science and Public Policy 37 (9), p. 665 – 677.

Frederick, Howard H. (1993): Global Communication and International Relations. Belmont, p. 188 – 235.

Füssl, K. Heinz (2004): Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. Bildung-Wissenschaft Politik. New York.

Giesel, K. D. (2007): Leitbilder in den Sozialwissenschaften: Begriffe, Theorien und Forschungskonzepte. Wiesbaden.

Gilboa, Eytan (2000): "Mass communication and diplomacy: A theoretical framework." in: Communication Theory, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 275 – 309.

Gilboa, Eytan (2001): Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects, in: *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 1 – 28.

Gilboa, Eytan (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, in: Cowan, Geoffrey; Cull, Nicholas J. (Ed.): *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*, Los Angeles.

Golz, H. Georg (2004): Verordnete Völkerfreundschaft. Das Wirken der Freundschaftsgesellschaft DDR-Großbritannien und der Britain-GDR Society. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen.

Grant, Ruth W.; Keohane, Robert O. (2005): Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, in: *American Political Science Review*, no. 99 (1), p. 29 – 43.

Greenwald, A. (2010): Soft power fallacy. *Commentary Magazine*, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 75 – 80.

Grolig W., Schlageter R.E. (2007): Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy. In: Jäger T., Höse A., Oppermann K. (eds.) *Deutsche Außenpolitik*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 547 – 569.

Gudjonsson, H. (2005): Nation Branding. *Place Branding*, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 283 – 298.

Ham, P. van (2001): The Rise of the Brand State. The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, p. 6 – 19.

Huijgh Ellen and Warlick Jordan (2016): The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of Turkey. In: USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Los Angeles, p. 6 – 48.

Hülse, R. (2009): The Catwalkpower. Germany's New Foreign Image Policy.

Kalın, İbrahim (2011): Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. In: *Perceptions* 16 (3), p. 5 – 23.

Kamp, Klauss and Nieland, Jörg (2006): *Regieren und Kommunikation. Einleitende Anmerkungen zum Band. Regieren und Kommunikation. Meinungsbildung, Entscheidungsfindung und gouvernementales Kommunikationsmanagement*. Ed. Klaus Kamps and Jörg-Uwe Nieland. Köln, Halem.

Karten, Inga (2008): Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes, in: Jäger, Thomas; Viehrig, Henrike (ed.): Die amerikanische Regierung gegen die Weltöffentlichkeit? Theoretische und empirische Analysen der Public Diplomacy zum Irakkrieg, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 163 – 190.

Kathe, S.R. (2005): Kulturpolitik um jeden preis: die geschichte des Goethe-Instituts von 1951 bis 1990, Martin Medienbauer, Munich.

Kendrick, A. and Fullerton, J. A. (2004): Advertising as Public Diplomacy: Attitude Change among International Audiences. In: Journal of Advertising Research, September (7), p. 297 – 311.

Köhler, M. and Schüster, K. (2006): Handbuch Regierungs-PR: Öffentlichkeitsarbeit von Bundesregierungen und deren Beratern, Vs Verlag Für Sozialw., Wiesbaden.

Leonard, M. (2002): Public Diplomacy, The Foreign Policy, London.

Lukes, Steven (2005): Power and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds, in: Millenium, no. 33, p. 477 – 493.

Malchow, Birgit (1999): Der Letzte macht das Licht aus. Wie DDR-Diplomaten das Jahr 1990 im Ausland erlebten. Edition Ost, Berlin.

Manheim, Jarol B. (1994): Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy, New York.

McCombs, Maxwell (2004): Setting the Agenda, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, London.

Melissen, Jan (2005): The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice, in: Ders. (Ed.): The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations, p. 3 – 27.

Melissen, Jan (2005): Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Melissen, Jan (2008): *Between Theory and The New Public Diplomacy. The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Ed. Jan Melissen. *Studies in diplomacy and international relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3 – 23.

Melissen, J. (2007): *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York.

Mor, B. D. (2006): *Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy*. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2 (2), p. 157 – 176.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1994): *Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation*, in: *Center for European Studies Working Paper*, no. 52.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997): *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, in: *International Organisation*, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 513 – 553.

Nye, Joseph S. (1990): *Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, New York.

Nye, Joseph S. (2002): *The Paradox of American Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004): *Power in the Global Information Age: from Realism to Globalization*, Routledge, New York.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004): *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York.

Nye, Joseph S. (2007): *Notes for a soft-power research agenda*. In *Power in World Politics*, edited by Berenskoetter, Felix – Williams, Michael J., Routledge, p. 162 – 172.

Nye, Joseph S. (2008): *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*. In: *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 616 (1), p. 94 – 109.

Oğuzlu, Tarik. (2007): *Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy*. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61 (1), p. 81 – 97.

Olins, W. (2007): Making a national brand. In *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, edited by Mellisen, J., Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan., p. 169 – 179.

Öner, Selcen. 2013. *Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Challenges*. *Euxeinos* 10, p. 7 – 15.

Ostrowski, Daniel (2010): *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit: Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Auslandsöffentlichkeitsarbeit*.

Pamment, James. (2016): *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*.

Reinbothe, Roswitha (2000): *Die Anfänge der auswärtigen Kulturpolitik in der Zeit des Kaiserreichs*. In: *Sprache Kultur Politik (Materialien Deutsch als Fremdsprache Heft 53)*. Regensburg.

Ruffini, P. (2017): *Science in Diplomatic Aparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches*. In: *Science and Diplomacy. Science, Technology and Innovation Studies*, p. 47 – 81.

Runderkamp, Laurens (2012): *Dutch and German International Cultural policy in Comparison*. In: Siniša, Rodin/Topić, Martina (2012): *Cultural Diplomacy And Cultural Imperialism: European Perspective*. Frankfurt am Main, p. 117 – 130.

Şahin, M. and Çevik, B. Senem (2015): *Türkiye’de Kamu Diplomasisi ve Yumuşak Güç*, Mehmet Şahin ve B. Senem Çevik (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi*, Ankara, p. 1 – 17.

Sancar, Gaye Asli (2015): *Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era*, in: B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (ed.), *Turkey’s Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 13 – 42.

Schmidt, Brian C. (2005): *Competing Realist Conceptions of Power*, in: *Millennium*, no. 33, p. 523 – 549.

Schneider, Axel (1996): *Abwickeln oder anknüpfen?* In: *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 46, no. I, p. 49.



Schneider, Axel (1996): Mittel nicht effektiv eingesetzt? Die Sitzung des deutschen Bundestages zur auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. In: Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch 46 (1996) 2, p. 8 – 42 .

Schulte, Karl-Sebastian (2000): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung.

Signitzer, Benno; Coombs, Timothy (1992): Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual divergence. In: Public Relations Review, vol. 18 no. 2, p. 137-147.

Singer, Otto (2003): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und institutionelle Entwicklung seit 1945. Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages. Berlin.

Snow, N., and Taylor, P. M. (2009): Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. In: N. Snow & P. M. Taylor (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. New York.

Stoll, Richard J. and Ward, Michael D. (ed.) (1989): Power in World Politics. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.

Szondi, G. (2008): Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences.

Taylor, D. (2007): Brand Management. Řízení značky, Plzeň, Computer press.

Tuch, Hans N. (1990): Communicating with the World. U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas, New York, p. 2 – 34.

Vinocur, John (2007): Ms. Merkel Becomes Ms. Soft Power. In: International Herald Tribune, p. 15 – 19.

Walt, Stephen M. (2002): The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in: Katznelson, Ira; Milner, Helen V. (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York, London: Norton & Company, p. 197 – 234.

Wheeler, A. (2009): Designing Brand Identity: an Essential Guide for the Entire Branding Team, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey.

Wille, Barthold C. (1981): Die Enquete-Kommission des Bundestages. Anmerkungen zu ihrem Bericht über auswärtige Kulturpolitik. In: Düwell, Kurt/Link, Wemer (ed.): Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871. Geschichte und Struktur. Köln [a.o.], p. 51 – 343.

Witte, Barthold C. (2003): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik — die Dritte Säule der Außenpolitik, in: Wichard Woyke (ed.): Neue deutsche Außenpolitik, Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, p. 66 – 76.

Yıldırım, G. (2015): Uluslararası Halkla İlişkiler Perspektifinden Kamu Diplomasisi. İstanbul.

Zhang, J. (2007): Beyond anti-terrorism: Metaphors as message strategy of post-September-11 U.S. public diplomacy. In: Public Relations Review, 33 (1), p. 31 – 39.

Zimmermann O. and Geißler T. (2018): Die dritte Säule: Beiträge zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik. In: Aus Politik & Kultur (16). Berlin.

#### **Goethe Institut Internal Sources:**

Auswärtiges Amt & Goethe-Institut (2004). Rahmenvertrag. (URL: <http://www.goethe.de/mmo/priv/1527476-STANDARD.pdf>) [Accessed on 30.03.2019]

Goethe-Institut (2014). Leitbild. (URL:<http://www.goethe.de/uun/org/ltb/deindex.htm>) [Accessed on 23.10.2018].

Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Jahrbuch 2003/2004. München. 2004.

Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Jahrbuch 2005/2006. München. 2006.

Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Jahrbuch 2016/2017. München. 2017.

Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Jahrbuch 2018/2019. München. 2019.

Goethe-Institut e.V. (ed.): Satzung. München. 2005. (URL:<http://www.goethe.de/mmo/priv/1223959-STANDARD.pdf>) [Accessed on 30.10.2018]

### **Foreign Affairs Committee / Subcommittee on Foreign Cultural Policy:**

BT-Drucks. 1216504 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Dorothee Wilms sowie weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU sowie dem Abgeordneten Ulrich Irmer und der Fraktion der F.D.P. - Drucksache 12/5064- Das Bild des vereinten Deutschland als Kulturnation in einer sich wandelnden Welt.

BT-Drucks. 13/4618 Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Elisabeth Altmann (Pommelsbrunn) und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen Aktivitäten und Ziele der Bundesregierung in der auswärtigen Kulturpolitik; Nutzung der Potentiale für Demokratisierung und friedliche Konfliktbewältigung.

BT-Drucks. 13/4844 Antrag der Abgeordneten Elisabeth Altmann (Pommelsbrunn), Dr. Uschi Eid, Dr. Angelika Köster-Loßack, Albert Schmidt (Hitzhofen), Wolfgang Schmitt (Langenfeld), Waltraud Schoppe und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Auswärtige Kulturpolitik: Den Standort neu bestimmen und den Stellenwert erhöhen.

BT-Drucks. 1314851 Antrag der Abgeordneten Freimut Duve, Brigitte Adler, Horst Kubatschka, Dr. Uwe Küster, Eckart Kuhlwein, Dr. Elke Leonhard, Klaus Lohmann (Witten), Wieland Sorge, Dr. Peter Struck, Margitta Terborg, Siegfried Vergin, Gert Weisskirehen (Wiesloch), Rudolf Scharping und der Fraktion der SPD Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

### **Federal Ministry of Education and Research Sources (BMBF):**

Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 2008. Strengthening Germany's Role in the Global Knowledge Society-Strategy of the Federal Government for the Internationalization of Science and Research, (URL: <http://www.bmbf.de/pubRD/Internationalisierungsstrategie-English.pdf> ) [Accessed on 11.03.2018]

Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 2010. Ideas. Innovation. Prosperity – High –Tech Strategy for 2020, 19 p. 4 – 11. (URL: [http://www.bmbf.de/pub/hts\\_2020\\_en.pdf](http://www.bmbf.de/pub/hts_2020_en.pdf) ) [Accessed on 11.03.2018]

Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 2014. International Cooperation-Action Plan of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

### **Yunus Emre Institute Internal Sources:**

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2007): Yunus Emre Vakıf Kanunu. (URL: [https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/u152/20180227\\_1.5.5653.pdf](https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/u152/20180227_1.5.5653.pdf)) [Accessed on 05.06.2018]

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2015): Yunus Emre enstitüsü 2015-2018 Stratejik Planı.

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2016): 2016 Stratejik Analiz ve Değerlendirme Raporu.

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2016): 2023 Vizyonu Strateji Belgesi.

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2017): 2017 – 2018 Stratejik Planı.

Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (2018): Türkiye Akademik ve Bilimsel İş Birliği Projesi (TABİP) Katalog.

### **Electronic Sources:**

Aaker, D. A. (2003): Brand building (budování obchodní značky), Brno, Computer press. Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report, 2011. (URL: [http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural\\_Diplomacy\\_Outlook\\_Report\\_2011\\_-\\_04-01.pdf](http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_04-01.pdf)) [Accessed on 20.04.2019]

Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH). (URL: <http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/ambassador-scientists.html>) [Accessed on 16.07.2018]

Auer, Claudia and Srugies, Alice (2013): Public diplomacy in Germany. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 5. (URL: [uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectives\\_Paper\\_5\\_2013\\_German.pdf](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectives_Paper_5_2013_German.pdf))

Bundesregierung (2018): Ressourcen. In: 21. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2017. P. 24 – 26. (URL: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/21-bericht-der-bundesregierung-zur-auswaertigen-kultur-und-bildungspolitik-1569332>) [Accessed on 04.05.2019]

Deutsche Welle (2018): Aufgabenplanung Deutsche Welle 2014-2017. (URL: <http://www.dw.de/popups/pdf/39314138/die-aufgabenplanung.pdf>) [Accessed on 27.03.2018]

Deutsche Welle (2018): Profil. Leitbild: Werte, Grundsätze und Visionen. (URL: <https://p.dw.com/p/6J8p>) [Accessed on 27.03.2018].

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) – Jahresbericht 2018. (URL: [https://www.daad.de/medien/daad\\_jahresbericht\\_2018.pdf](https://www.daad.de/medien/daad_jahresbericht_2018.pdf)) [Accessed on 10.11.2018]

Eberl, N. (2007): Germany powers ahead to World Cup Victory in Nation Branding. (URL: <http://openpr.com/pdf/16287/Brand-Germany-powers-ahead-to-World-Cup-Victory-in-Nation-Branding.pdf>) [Accessed on 14.07.2018]

Fan, Y. (2009): Branding The Nation: towards a better understanding: (URL: <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/3496/1/NB%20Towards%20a%20better%20understanding.pdf>) [Accessed on 21.07.2018]

Gregory, B. (2005): Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms. American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington. (URL: [http://web.ccas.gwu.edu/dev/filehost/5/APSA\\_Panel6\\_Paper\\_8-23-05.pdf](http://web.ccas.gwu.edu/dev/filehost/5/APSA_Panel6_Paper_8-23-05.pdf)) [Accessed on 28.03.2018]

Helmus, Todd C., Elizabeth Bodine-Baron [et al] (2018): Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2237-OSD. (URL: [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND\\_RR2237.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf)) [Accessed on 04.02.2019]

KDK (2017). KDK Chapter Aims. (URL: <https://kdk.gov.tr/kurumsal/hedefler/9>) [Accessed on 02.02.2018]

Kyriacou, S. H., Cromwell, T., „The Concept and Benefits of Nation Branding.“ East- West Communications. (URL: <http://eastwestcoms.com/Concepts-and-benefits-of-nation-branding.htm>) [Accessed on 01.01.2019]

Melissen, Jan (2006): Reflections on Public Diplomacy Today. Paper presented at the Public Diplomacy Conference, Ankara. (URL: [http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20060206\\_cdsp\\_online\\_melissen.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20060206_cdsp_online_melissen.pdf).) [Accessed on 01.02.2019]

Szondi, G. (2008): Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences (Discussion Papers in Diplomacy), Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

(URL:[http://www.nbiz.nl/publications/2008/20081022\\_pap\\_in\\_dip\\_nation\\_branding.pdf](http://www.nbiz.nl/publications/2008/20081022_pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf)) [Accessed on 01.10.2018]

The German Houses of Research and Innovation (2019): Webpage. (URL: <https://www.dwih-netzwerk.de/en/who-we-are/>) [Accessed on 30.07.2019]

The German Houses of Research and Innovation (2019): Webpage. (URL: <https://www.dwih-netzwerk.de/en/who-we-are/>) [Accessed on 30.07.2019]

Treverton, G., Jones, S. (2005). Measuring National Power, RAND Corporation. (URL: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/2005/RAND\\_CF215.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF215.pdf)) [Accessed on 05.04.2019]

TRT World (2019): Webpage. (URL: <https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/about/visions-mission>) [Accessed on 25.06.2019]

YEE (2018): Yaz Okulu Programı hakkında. (URL: <http://turkceyazokulu.com/en/>) [Accessed on 10.09.2018]

YTB (2017): 2017 Idare Faaliyet Raporu. (URL: <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/faaliyet-raporlari>) [Accessed on 10.09.2018]

YTB (2018): Türkiye Bursları / Scholarship official website (URL: <https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/en/english-home/>) [Accessed on 23.09.2018]

## APPENDICES

### A. KMA DRAFT – PROTOCOL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ... ON THE ESTABLISHMENT, FUNCTIONING AND ACTIVITIES OF CULTURAL CENTRES	TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ HÜKÜMETİ İLE... HÜKÜMETİ ARASINDA KÜLTÜR. MERKEZLERİNİN KURULUŞU, İŞLEYİŞİ VE FAALİYETLERİ HAKKINDA ANLAŞMA
<p>The Reptblic of Turkey and the ... (hereafter referred to as the "Parties"); With the purpose of strengthening friendship and cooperation between the Parties; "</p> <p>Taking into account the "... signed between the Parties in ... on ... (hereafter referred to as the "Cultural Agreement") and especially its article ... •'</p> <p>Based on the "... signed between the Parties in ... on ... and especially its article ... ;</p> <p>Concerning the reciprocal establishment of cultural centres and their functioning and activities have agreed on the following:</p>	<p>Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile... (bundan sonra "Taraflar" olarak anılacaktır); Taraflar arasında dostluğun ve işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesi gayesiyle;</p> <p>Taraflar arasında... tarihinde ...'da/de imzalanan "...nı (bundan böyle "Kültür Anlaşması" olarak anılacaktır) ve özellikle anılan anlaşmanın... maddesini dikkate alarak;</p> <p>Taraflar arasında... tarihinde ...'da/de imzalanan "...nın hükümlerine ve özellikle anılan ...'nın ... maddesi temelinde;</p> <p>Karşılıklı kültür merkezleri kurulması ile bunların işleyişi ve faaliyetleri hakkında aşağıdaki hususlarda mutabakata varmışlardır:</p>

## B. INTERVIEWS

As a supplement, interviews were conducted with experts in the field of public diplomacy. Those interviewed worked in the diplomatic field, politics and public diplomacy research. Their many years of work experience is significant in that you are providing practical and realistic insights into the practice of PD.

The interviews took place as part of the *Chatham House Rule*. This means that it is allowed and free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. The interview was held by face-to-face meetings or written statements. The aim of this interview was not to launch a large-scale empirical study. Here, the focus was on the implementation of *soft power* elements. The respondents gained valuable experience through their expertise in the field of public diplomacy. This experience bears witness to the current state of public diplomacy actors. The following questions were at the center of the interviews:

1. How do you place the concept of Soft Power in the perspective of Turkey's Foreign Policy 2007-2017?
2. Can we talk about civilian elements as actors in Turkey's foreign policy? If so, how would you define it?
3. What changes or new gains does the Turkish Foreign Policy have?
4. According to the concept of Public Diplomacy, Turkey is "late comer". How would you respond to this hypothesis?
5. To what extent do the Soft Power Elements change in time? How static and how flexible are the actors of PD?
6. In this context, how can we classify the strategic role of those Actors?
7. What is your view on the expansion of the classical foreign policy understanding in Turkish Foreign Policy?



According to the answers, the following key messages emerged from the discussions:

The concept of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power elements was highly recommended and partly successful 2007 - 2013. In this period, Turkey began to create new policies towards Foreign Policy making; in fact, Neo-Ottomanism formed the frame of the new FP approach. Turkey grabbed the momentum of being successful in PD since 2003. It was supported by the countries of the region and the West. Turkey realized the importance of international diplomatic platforms. However, in 2013 both domestic and foreign policy started to turn in a different way. It was the turning point in Turkey's success story.

On the one hand, domestic tensions and problems comes to a brutal outcome during the Gezi protests. On the other hand the so-called Arab Spring began in 2011 and destabilized die TFP. The civil war in Syria and in particular the Syrian crisis compelled to leave Turkey's soft power politics and led to a return to hard power and security policies.

According to different explanations of the actors of Soft Power, the main definition by the interviewee was:

1. Institutions and organizations, which are active in the field of partner / complementary tools of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as TİKA, YTB, Yunus Emre Institutes, KIZILAY etc.
2. The second group is composed of civil actors - NGOs and business organizations such as TUSIAD, MUSIAD, Turkish NGOs operating abroad, TV series, Film sectors. Well according to the majority view, this area represents the weakest area in Turkey's Public Diplomacy.

The Turkish Foreign Policy gained many new perspectives during 2003 – 2013. One of the new achievements is the Diversification of foreign policy: both in terms of actor and subject. According to the surveyed, the socio-cultural field was added to foreign policy in this period.

Turkey, especially compared with Western countries is a late comer in the history of public diplomacy practices. The most important reason was that Turkey does not faced to a new strategy after Post Cold War era. The new government emphasized a the image of a new Turkey with a new story .However, compared with China and Russia also it said that Turkey is too late. One of the mentioned essential problems of Turkish PD is the lack of long-term strategic plans of the actors and governments. For example, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the Turkish PD failed to implement successful strategies and failed in the Middle East. In summary the interviewed persons are highlighting, that the recent developments in and around Turkey is influencing the effectiveness of Turkish PD in a negative way. It should be noted that there is a negative trend of Turkish PD prevailing.

### C. TÜRKCÖ ÖZET/ TURKISH SUMMARY

Geçmiş yuzyılın son kısmında özellikle Berlin duvarının yıkılmasıyla birlikte Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesiyle yeni küresel sistemin başlangıcı olarak kitlesel iletişim araçların önemi ve diplomasinin hassasiyeti farklı şekiller almıştır. Küreselleşen, sınırların adeta flulaşan yeni küresel sistem ortaya çıkmıştır. Tarihi Avrupa kıtasında Avrupa Birliğı'nin hızla yol alması, demir perdenin arkasında kalan toplumların Batı Avrupa'yla tekrar yakınlaşması sözkonusudur. Politikanın toplumsal tabana sahip örgüt ve oluşumların etkisi altında belirlendiğı 1990 yılında Berlin'de de görölmüştür. Sivil toplum, sivil aktörler ve kamuoyu temeline sahip grupların ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, küreselleşmenin ortaya çıkardığı önemli etkilerinden biri, devlet merkezli küresel sistem anlayışını devlet-dışı aktörler, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve medya platformlarının etkileşimin artması gibi farklı etkenlerin sisteme dâhil edilmesidir. Uluslararası ilişkiler sisteminin toplumsal yaklaşımının temelinde, yeniden şekillenmesi çerçevesinde *kamu diplomasisinin* de önem kazanması belirgindir. Uluslararası İlişkiler dsiplininde ilk akademik çalışmalar ve tartışmalar 11 Eylül saldırıları sonucunda, yabancı toplumların tanınması ve devlet politikasında hedeflerin doğru belirlenmesi konusunda kamu diplomasisi ve yumuşak güç kavramlarıyla ilişkili olarak ele alınmaya başlanmıştır.

Siyaset biliminin bir alt disiplini olan Uluslararası İlişkiler, Kamu Diplomasi analizi ile küreselleşme tartışmalarının beraberinde gelişmiş olup, devletlerin 1990 ve 2001 sonrası çok kutuplu dünya düzeni içerisinde başarılı dış politika uygulamasında yeni bir yaklaşımı ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, literatürde oluşan Kamu Diplomasi tanımı “yumuşak güce dayanan sivil toplum temelli, kamuoyu odaklı yeni diplomasi yaklaşımı” olarak özetle tanımlanabilir. Türkiye'de KD ağırlıklı olarak halkla ilişkiler ve iletişim disiplini altında tanımlanmaktadır. Türkiye'de akademik çalışmaların yeterli olmamasının sebebi

sözkonusu konunun yeni olmasıyla birlikte, Türkiye'nin dış politika yaklaşımının değişmesi sonucunda oluşan yapısal değişikliklerin tanımlanamamasıdır.

Bu çalışmada, Almanya'nın ve Türkiye'nin Kamu Diplomasisi araçlarının fonksiyonu, çalışma usulleri ve somut verilere dayanan, aşağıdaki sorular doğrultusunda analiz etmektedir. Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devletlerinin hangi bağlamda Yumuşak Güç kaynaklarını tanımlamakata ve kullanmaktadırlar? Yumuşak Güç unsurlarının hedefleri nelerdir ve hedeflerine ulaşmak için hangi uygulamaları takip ederler?

Bu tez, devletlerin Kamu Diplomasisi araçlarının tespiti ve Joseph Nye Jr. tarafınca "Bound to Lead" (1990) ve sonrasında derinleşerek çerçevelediği "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics" (2004) adlı kitaplarında *Yumuşak Güç* kavramı tanımından yola çıkarak analiz etmektedir. Nye kavramsal olarak IR çalışmalarında güç kavramını ikiye ayırmaktadır. Devlet politikası, yani yüksek derecede önemi olan ve realist bakış açısıyla değerlendirildiğinde devletin mutlak kullandığı ve varsaydığı güç unsurları arasında askeri ve ekonomik alanda olan aktörler üzerinden okumaktadır. Buna karşın yumuşak güç ise, diplomasi kanalları vasıtasıyla ki bunlar devlet dışı aktörleri de kapsamakta, ortak değerler, düşünceler ve başarı hikâyesi ile uygulanmaktadır. Yumuşak Güç kavramı disiplinler arası çalışmalardan oluştuğu buradan da anlaşılır. Kamu Diplomasisi bağlamında en etkili aktörler, kamu yararına çalışan ve devlet eliyle organize edilen kurumlardır. Bu çalışmada hedefi somutlaştırarak mecburen sınırlamaya gidilmiştir. Kamu Diplomasisi analizi altında Kültürel Diplomasi, Bilim Diplomasisi ve Diaspora Diplomasisi kavramları da yer almaktadır. Bu kavramlar Kamu Diplomasisi yaklaşımının birer alt disiplini olarak kabul edilir. Kavramsal farklılıklar IR literatüründe hala mevcut olup, farklı metotları zaman içerisinde geliştirmekte. Bu çalışmada, analiz edilen konu başlıkları arasında; aktörlerin yapısal oluşumu, kültür, medya ve bilimsel iş birliği perspektifinden yaklaşmıştır. Alman KD yaklaşımı, tarihsel birikime dayalı olmasının ötesinde, hukuki ve bürokratik deneyimiyle ön plana çıkmaktadır. Günümüzde kültür alanında yetkin bir şekilde faaliyet göster Goethe Enstitüsü, geçmiş asrın ilk çeyreğinde kurulmuş olup 2018 itibarıyla 80 yıllık bir deneyime sahiptir. Hakeza, "*die Deutsche Akademie zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und Pflege des Deutschtums*" 1932

yılında faaliyete geçmiş olup, DAAD olarak gündüzde bilimsel iş birliği alanında geniş ağıyla ve finansmanıyla uluslararası bilimsel iş birliği alanında çalışan önemli kurumlarından birisidir. Medya alanı teknolojinin gelişmesiyle beraber, günümüzde büyük kitlelere çok hızlı bir şekilde ulaşabilmektedir. Bu gelişmeler doğrultusunda Alman KD stratejisi tarafınca DW Deutsche Welle kanalı sosyal medya araçlarını da kullanarak son on yılda harcamalar kapsamında ve ürettiği program içeriği açısından ivme kazanmıştır. Türk Kamu Diplomasininin araçları arasında kültür alanı için Yunus Emre Enstitüsü kurulmuştur. Tıpkı Goethe Enstitüsü gibi, kendisini dil eğitime ve kültürel faaliyetler alanına yönelmiştir. Medya sektöründe TRT kendi bünyesinde İngilizce yayın yapan TRT-World kanalını kurmuştur. Yayın ve içerik açısından çok birikime sahip olmamayı geliştirmeye birçok alan sunmaktadır. Bilimsel iş birliği alanından Türkiye'nin en zayıf olduğu ve yapısal reformlara ihtiyaç duyduğu sektördür. Mevcut TÜBİTAK ve YÖK gibi çalışma alanlarını belirleyip nitelikli çalışmalarda yer alabilmesi için, gerek personel gerek kaynak temini hususunda geliştirmelere açık olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bilimsel iş birliği çalışmaları kapsamında son dönemde Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığının yürüttüğü Türkiye Bursları programı son derecede dikkat çekici veriler sunmaktadır. 2003 – 2016 yılları arasında kayıtlı verilere göre, söz konusu burs programına ortalama olarak başvuruda bulunan öğrenci sayısı yıl için 90.000 olarak hesaplanmıştır. Başvuruda bulunan öğrenci kitlesi çok renkli olup, 150 farklı ülkeden fazla ülkelere başvuruların yapıldığı tespit edilmiştir. Geleceği olan bu burs programı, Türkiye'nin yurt dışındaki yükseköğrenim tanıtımını yapıyla beraber, ülkenin bilimsel iş birliği zemininin temelini oluşturacak dinamizme sahiptir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin KD stratejisinin eksikliklere sahip olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Sebepleri arasından yetersiz kalan kaynak temininin ve kurulan yeni kurumların kurumsallık ve tecrübe açısından eksikliklerinin olmasıdır. Alman devletinin bu konularda geniş tecrübeleri ve maddi güçlülüğü sayesinde üstesinden geldiğini görebiliriz. Fayda maliyet dengesi açısından Türk Dış Politikası Kamu Diplomasisi tartışmalarının sonucunda yapısal reformlarla YTB, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü ve TİKA gibi kurumların kurulması ve zaman içerisinde kurumsal değişikliklere tabi tutulmasından istifade etmiştir. Türk Dış Politikası zamanın

ruhuna uyum sađlayarak geleneksel yaklaşımlarını deđiřtirmek zorunda kalmıř olup imkân ve kabiliyetini nüfuz alanını oluřturmak için kullanmaktadır.

D. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Social Sciences
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
- Enformatik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Informatics
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

**Soyadı** / Surname : Doğan  
**Adı** / Name : Abdullah Mesud  
**Bölümü** / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

**TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English)** : PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERCEPTIONS: ELEMENTS OF SOFT POWER IN GERMANY'S AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

**TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE:** **Yüksek Lisans / Master**  **Doktora / PhD**

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. \*
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. \*

\* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.  
A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

**Yazarın imzası / Signature** .....

**Tarih / Date** .....