

THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING IN IRAQ (2003-2011)

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GAMZE SARI

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Prof. Dr. İsmet Mıpcı,
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Master of Science

Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu (METU,IR)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun (METU,IR)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gülriz Şen (TOBB 'GV©,UWI)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Gamze SARI

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING IN IRAQ (2003-2011)

Sarı, Gamze

MSc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun

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The number of scholars has determined that international peacebuilding in post-conflict regions reflects a liberal agenda in the post-Cold War era. However, recent studies on international peacebuilding revealed that liberal peacebuilding had not attained the intended aim of helping post-conflict societies to turn from conflict to self-sustaining peace. Therefore, liberal peacebuilding has created debates and controversies. This thesis reviews the critical approaches to peacebuilding to address the limitations and shortcomings of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. Afterward, this thesis deals with how the universal values and reforms of liberal peacebuilding that were promoted in post-conflict Iraq influenced the democratization, economic, and security transformation of the country. Some questions like what the basis of peace was, what kind of a relationship the intervening actor had with the local actors, whether this peace provided strong state-society relations, are asked. Through an investigation of the US-led peacebuilding activities in the selected case study, this thesis seeks to criticize the lack of local legitimacy in the practice of liberal

peacebuilding. This thesis indicates that Iraqi case revealed that liberal peacebuilding strategies did not correspond with Iraqi state-society relationship and it created negative hybrid peace outcome of which was weak state-society relations based on ethnocentric, elitist, technocratic, free-market policies, because interveners implemented their prescriptions without regard to Iraq's historical background, different religious and ethnic identities. Therefore, this research points out the necessity for an alternative peacebuilding strategy that appreciates the local context profoundly for the creation of sustainable solutions in these post-conflict societies.

Keywords: Liberal Peacebuilding, Post-conflict, Iraq, local legitimacy

ÖZ

IRAK'TA LİBERAL BARIŞ İNŞASI KRİTİĞİ (2003-2011)

Sarı, Gamze

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Birçok araştırmacıların tanımlamasına göre çatışma sonrası bölgelerdeki uluslararası liberal barış inşası Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde liberal bir amaca hizmet etmiştir. Fakat son zamanlardaki uluslararası barış inşa çalışmalarındaki yeni bulgular şunu göstermiştir ki liberal barış inşası, çatışma sonrası ülkelerin çatışmadan kendi kendini sürdüren barışa dönüşmesine yardımcı olmamıştır. Bu nedenle liberal barış inşası tartışma yaratmıştır. Bu tez, liberal barış inşası gündeminin barış inşasını ve eksikliklerini gözden geçirmektedir. Sonrasında, bu tez, Irak'ta çatışma sonrası teşvik edilen liberal barış inşasının evrensel değerleri ve reformlarının ülkenin demokratikleşmesini, ekonomik ve güvenlik dönüşümünü nasıl etkilediğiyle ilgilidir. Barışın temelini ne olduğu, müdahale eden aktörün yerel aktörlerle nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğu, bu barışın güçlü devlet-toplum ilişkileri sağlayıp sağlamadığı gibi bazı sorular soruluyor. Seçilen vaka çalışmasında ABD liderliğindeki barış inşası faaliyetlerinin araştırılmasıyla bu tez, liberal barış inşası pratiğinde yerel meşruiyet eksikliğini eleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez, Irak vaka çalışmasında liberal barış

inşa stratejilerinin Irak devlet-toplum ilişkisi ile uyuşmadığını ve etnosentrik, elitist, teknokratik, serbest piyasa politikalarına dayanan devlet-toplum ilişkileri zayıf olan olumsuz hibrid barışı meydana getirdiğini göstermiştir. Çünkü, müdahale eden aktör Irak’a yönelik uygulamalarını ülkenin tarihi geçmişini, farklı dini ve etnik kimliklerini dikkate almadan uyguladılar. Bu nedenle, bu araştırma, çatışma sonrası toplumlarda sürdürülebilir çözümler oluşturmayı amaçlayan yerel bağlamda bir barışı inşa stratejisinin gerekliliğine işaret ediyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal Barış İnşası, Çatışma Sonrası, Irak, yerel meşruiyet

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
CBI	Central Bank of Iraq
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CMATT	Coalition Military Assistance Training Team
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPS	Facilities Protective Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGC	Iraqi Government Council
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IIA	Iraqi Interim Assembly
IIP	Iraqi Islamic Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPS	Iraqi Police Security
ISCI	Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISG	Iraq Survey Group
JAM	Jaysh al-Mahdi
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SOEs	State-owned Enterprises
SOI	Sons of Iraq
TAL	Transitional Administration Law
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent studies on international peacebuilding revealed that liberal peacebuilding has not attained the intended aim of helping post-conflict societies to turn from conflict to self-sustaining peace. It was contended that mainstream peacebuilding strategies were unfitting to address the multi-directional and structural problems of post-conflict countries. Instead, they may conduce to the persistence of those structural problems (Tschirgi, 2015). Many peacebuilding practices have returned to sporadic violence (Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Kosovo, Palestine) or have fallen into this danger (Sierra Leona, Liberia, Guatemala, Cambodia). Moreover, they did not demonstrate success in reaching their target populations. Instead, they are concluded with encouraging the interest of problematic elites and lack a connection with the local people's understanding of identity, foundations, rights, and needs and respect to their own socio-historical and cultural traditions. The locals express such criticisms of peacebuilding from Afghanistan to Kosovo (Richmond & Pogoddo & Ramovic, 2016, p.3). In this sense, the literature began to question the main suppositions of international peacebuilding. The new critical literature criticizes the basis of the liberal peacebuilding agenda by raising questions about what the basis of peace is and whether the model promoted by the international community is sustainable (Richmond, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2010; Chandler, 2010; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Pugh, 2013; Newman et al., 2009). The orthodoxy gives priority to the internalization of new

political norms and political values, such as the division of powers, responsibility, transparency, and elected executives. In this perspective, legitimacy is not taken into account as a central issue. Unlike orthodoxy, the critical approaches argue that legitimacy at the local level must be ensured by the institutions prioritized in peacebuilding. Although local legitimacy is necessary, it is not being sought. Therefore, one of the critical flaws of strategies promoted by liberal peacebuilding appears to be disregarding the significance of internal legitimacy (Roberts, 2013, p. 68).

The attempt to transform Iraq politically and economically is criticized or supported by indicating as almost the same examples of Germany and Japan which were redesigned under the US occupation or as similar examples Cambodia, East Timor, Kosova which were reshaped under UN control. However, Iraq is a unique case and deserves a unique approach. It is distinguished from the post-war success stories of Germany and Japan where the formation of democracy was not the original war target of the allied forces but instead, became an aim only post Bellum. It is also differentiated from the UN-controlled post-conflict societies such as Cambodia and East Timor where prolonged civil war escalated because of entrenched ethnic, socio-economic or religious dynamics. Moreover, for these countries, the primary task was the effective establishment of internal peace and stability rather than democracy promotion. However, the primary task for the Iraq case is a democratic intervention, which is military action by external forces in order to democratize the target political regime (Grimm And & Merkel, 2008, p.459). Also, Iraq is worthy of a unique approach due to involving three significant factors above all others. First, Iraq has a

historical background with structures of a totalitarian regime which is characterized by a command economy, a single party, a single ideology, and hegemonic power by the state. Second, Iraq is a rentier state. Oil which ensures a political and economic power has designed the political economy of Iraq's system of state patronage and its nonrational bureaucracy. Third, Iraq is a case of a failed state which has multi-ethnic and sectarian dynamics (Jabar, 2004, p.3).

More than ten years after the intervention, and subsequent three rounds of elections, Iraq was one of the most hazardous and corrupt countries in the world (Jawad, 2013, p.21). At this point, Hohe questions the international peacebuilding approach "In international eyes, elections give political leaders legitimacy to assume a mandate for governing the country and exerting power. In order to create a legitimate government for international purposes, elections are often conducted as single events and followed by the withdrawal of the international community, leaving behind an internationally-recognized new or old regime without local legitimacy" (2002, p.83). Instead, local actors are categorized into passive categories like 'recipients' or 'victims' (Mac Ginty, 2012). In this sense, this dissertation analyzes the liberal peacebuilding/state-building process after the US-led invasion in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 when the US left the country by problematizing the legitimacy of the local actors. It conceptualizes peacebuilding through questioning the viability of liberal peacebuilding in the war-torn state. Liberal peacebuilding is recognized here the establishment of liberal democracy and the free market. This thesis uses hybridity as a lens to examine the encounters between international and local actors. It operated the concept of 'local' to refer to actors, agencies that are representative of specific

sectors of post-conflict society in the political, economic, and security process. At this point, it takes account especially the dissatisfaction of local actors such as Sunnis, Kurds, Baathists, a range of non-state armed groups.

The questions like what the basis of peace was, what kind of a relationship the intervening actor had with the local actors, whether this peace provided strong state-society relations, are asked. Through an investigation of the US-led peacebuilding activities in the selected case study, this thesis seeks to criticize the lack of local legitimacy in the practice of liberal peacebuilding.

This thesis entails five chapters. After the first introductory chapter, characteristics of liberal peacebuilding and critiques of liberal peacebuilding approach are described in the second chapter. In the third chapter, this thesis seeks to analyze the shortcomings and limitations of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in the case of post-conflict Iraq between 2003 and 2011. In the fourth chapter, challenges to create legitimacy in democratization, development, and security realm are analyzed in post-conflict Iraq, and the main drawbacks of the practice in terms of inclusiveness of government, resource distribution, and level of controlling force in this kind of multiethnic society are drawn attention. In the direction of these challenges, it indicates what the basis of peace was, what kind of a relationship the intervening actor had with the local actors, whether this peace provided strong state-society relations. Basically, it demonstrates whether the liberal peacebuilding agenda model promoted by the external powers was sustainable. The last chapter will conclude the analysis of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict Iraq.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Foundations of Liberal Peace Thesis

The liberal peace theory is assessed with relation to democratic peace understanding, which is primarily connected with Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith (Paffenholz, 2011, p.139). In his book *Perpetual Peace*, Kant (1795) points that the Hobbesian state of nature¹ could be resolved with republican governments which are ruled according to republican representation, economic interdependence, and international law to sustain peace and prevent war. Therefore, democracies are peaceful and less prone to conflict than others, and currently, liberal peace is a fundamental part of the democratic peace debate (Paffenholz, 2011, p.140).

Drawing on Kant's 1795 essay 'Perpetual Peace,' Doyle (2005) emphasizes three pillars of why liberal states preserve peace with each other. Firstly, republican representative democratic governments are tending to form a liable relationship between the state and the voters. The representative government provides the division of powers and rotation of elites. This representative government has an understanding that liberal wars are only conducted for liberal goals. Second, liberal principles such as free speech and effective communication necessitate trust and accommodation toward liberal states and lead to distrust toward non-liberals. They

¹ Hobbes defines state of nature as a state of "war of all against all" and life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" under this condition. (Hobbes, 1968)

include acknowledgment of the legitimate rights of all individuals. When these principles are linked with public policy, it requires publicity. In this sense, officials behave according to the interests of electors. In this sense, in a broader meaning, these principles necessitate trust and accommodation toward liberal states and lead to distrust toward non-liberals. Thirdly, material incentives provide commitments between liberal states. That is, the spirit of commerce plays a supportive role in supporting peace for states. According to liberal economic theory, this cosmopolitan connection is enabled by an international cooperative division of labor and free trade when the states are administered by the rule of law and apply legitimate exchanges. Therefore, the interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials play an essential role in producing cross-cutting transnational linkage (pp.464-465). In this sense, Kant's ideas hinge on the significance of three institutions of international politics. Those institutions are liberal peace as democratic peace, international governance, and economic interdependence. In other words, democratization and marketization are accounted for as the best way for welfare and legitimation (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, p. 20).

Liberal peace is unambiguously is a normative concept. It adopts values of liberalism such as human rights, freedom, competition, and entrepreneurship. Also, the liberal system which has open markets and open society counteracts conflict by depending on accountability, cooperation, etc. (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, p.19). In this respect, the idea of liberal peace associates liberal with peace in the contemporary global community. Liberal peace concretizes a kind of humanitarianism that reflects conflict resolution, reconstructing, underpinning the rule of law, and reinforcement civil society with the

market economy. It points out that the attempts are conducted with transformational and rational policies towards conflicts in the South. In this sense, it is viewed as "a radical developmental agenda of social transformation" (Duffield, 2001, p.11). Therefore, the aim of liberal peace is to turn post-conflict societies into representative and steady states (p.11).

Based on this, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the leading administrator of the major peacebuilding organization, pointed out democratization. He declared in 2000 "There are many good reasons for promoting democracy," "not the least – in the eyes of the United Nations – is that, when sustained over time, it is a highly effective means of preventing conflict, both within and between states" (Paris, 2004, p.42). Annan's predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, gave similar opinions about the advantages of underpinning democracy in post-conflict societies, claimed that

Democracy fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built [and] is the only long-term means of both arbitrating and regulating many political, social, economic and ethnic tensions that constantly threaten to tear apart societies and destroy states (p.42).

It is significant that there are various forms of liberal peace. Richmond (2006) categorizes four main strands of thought within liberal peace context. These four strands are the victor's peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace, and civil peace. The victor's peace relies on military victory. The institutional peace, which is drawn from the Treaty of Westphalia relies on an attempt to anchor states in which states jointly decide on implementing or regulating their behavior. The constitutional peace based on the liberal Kantian argument that peace depends on democracy, free trade, and a set of universal values. Lastly, civil peace has its source in the

phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilization, protection of fundamental human rights and activation of civil society (p.293). All four strands about peace successfully propose third parties, which implement the transfer of external perceptions of peace into conflict zones (Richmond, 2006, p.296).

However, there are difficulties with different strands of liberal peace. The victor's peace has not the ability to control militant people because of its territorial and strategic overextension. Besides, the discourse of civil peace is dominated by state officials, although it asserts security and social justice context. The institutional peace has the challenge of conflicting voices and the bigness of a systemic project which necessities agreement of a broad variety of actors. It is applied by the UN, international financial institutions (IFIs) and organizations that have the aim of joint governance. It has difficulty to establish cooperation and harmony with those involved at the local level. The constitutional peace is observed as a threat to people that do not desire to allocate power at the local level and who do not want to obey legal structures. It is seen as a binary position which is based on territorial inside/outside and the identity of friend or enemy (Richmond & Frank, 2009, p.7).

Consequently, the diverse strands of thinking about peace, have come together on a modern conception of peace-as-governance. This is the most widespread type of peace implemented through a methodological peacebuilding compromise in conflict regions by international agencies (Richmond, 2006, p.299). However, actors use different aspects of liberal peace in the intervention. For instance, while the UN is inclined to focus on institutional peace, the US inclines to concentrate on the victor's

peace as well as constitutional peace. On the other hand, NGOs and agencies give their attention to civil peace, like significant donors such as Britain, Canada, Norway, and Japan that additionally highlight institutional peace (Richmond, 2006, pp.305-306).

Also, derived from the four strands of thinking within the liberal peace project, there are distinctive graduations. Conservative model, the orthodox model, the emancipatory model of liberal peace entail these graduations. The conservative model of peace is associated with top-down approaches to peacebuilding, operating forcible methods, and control through creating dependency. This model associates to a hegemonic and often unilateral. As a second discourse, although the orthodox model of liberal peace includes the aims of actors and interests, it also rests on values of local ownership and culture. This related to a stable, multifaceted, and state-centric peace. It characterizes not only a top-down method in which peacebuilding is directed by states, organizations but also a bottom-up approach, in which peacebuilding is driven with the involvement of civil society. Therefore, this model concentrates on needs-based and rights-based actions representing top-down and bottom-up perceptions. As a third discourse, the emancipatory model of the liberal peace adopts a more critical view to force, conditionality, and dependency, which the conservative and orthodox models operate through. Thus, it suggests a bottom-up understanding, allowing for a stronger need for social prosperity and justice. It parallels more with civil peace by allowing the inclusion of private actors and social movements instead of only state-led or international actors (Richmond, 2006, pp.300-301). However, although the emancipatory model of the liberal peace

provides better conditions in terms of local people, international organizations generally enter conflict zones somewhere within the conservative graduation and then desire to take action to the direction of orthodox peace (Richmond, 2006, p.303).

2.2. Characteristics of Liberal Peacebuilding

2.2.1. Evolution of Peacebuilding

The phrase peacebuilding was presented by Johan Galtung, who is a leading scholar of peace studies. For him, peace is the nonexistence of all forms of violence. He classifies typologies of violence as direct, structural, and cultural violence. Direct violence represents actions that serve to threaten life, such as killing, hurting. Structural violence presents injustice and exploitation built into the structure (Galtung, 1969, p.170). Cultural violence indicates the existence of common social norms which cause justification of direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1990, p.291). Concerning that, he makes a distinction between negative peace and positive peace. While negative peace refers to the deficiency of violence, positive peace is the nonexistence of structural and cultural violence and dominance of justice and equality (Galtung, 1969, p.183). He points out that peacebuilding creates positive peace by establishing structures and institutions that depend on fairness, equity, and collaboration (Galtung, 1976).

Conflicts in the post- Cold war era headed to new multilateral peace operations by the United Nations and other international organizations such as the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (Paris, 2004, p.18). Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) stated the latest taxonomy of peace operations for the post–Cold War era in the policy report issued as *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. He distinguished peace operations between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding. He described peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Paris, 2004, p.11). He pointed out certain tasks of peacebuilding as

Disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Paris, 2004, p.32).

After the Cold War, most of the peace processes that were positioned concentrated on the task of post-conflict peacebuilding with distinct and extensive functions rather than traditional peacekeeping tasks such as mainly cease-fire monitoring (Paris, 2004, p. 18).

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding have different goals. Peace enforcement is the threat or practice of non-defensive military power to sustain, or reestablish a cease-fire. While peacekeeping is mainly military action that focuses on cease-fire monitoring, peacebuilding is a much more diverse concept that includes not only military but also non-military purposes. Those purposes are the management

of elections; the reequipping of judges, and police officers; the encouragement of local political parties and non-governmental organizations; achievement of financial and monetary reforms; the restructuring of governmental foundations; and the provision of emergency humanitarian and financial aid (Paris, 2004, pp.38-39).

After the Cold War, peacebuilding operations in its post-conflict arrangement are characterized by the UN's ultimate peace and security action (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.5). Studies of peacebuilding operations are categorized into generations. First-generation of peacebuilding studies concentrated mainly on defining the characteristics of peacebuilding missions in the aftermath of the Cold War. They are mainly related with holding elections after peace has been accomplished based on democracy and functioning free-market economies. Little interest is paid to the long term reconstruction process. The second generation of studies came into place at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. They focused on defining the features of peacebuilding missions by evaluating the record of peacebuilding more systematically and examining its aims, expectations, and strategies. The permanence of peace after civil wars, the role of natural resources, the importance of local actors, the role of women are mostly examined. The third generation of peacebuilding studies critically dealt with tensions of state-building as a core element of peacebuilding to build effective and legitimate institutions in the aftermath of war (Paris & Sisk, 2009, pp.6-15). Security forces, economic systems, local autonomy, the problem of coordination with international institutions have been analyzed within the context of state-building operations (Paris & Sisk, 2009, pp.16-18).

In brief, Roland Paris (2004) notes that although there are many peacebuilding agencies and practices, the most notable characteristic of peacebuilding operations in the 1990s was the aim of maintaining constant peace in war-torn societies through democratization and marketization. "The typical formula for peacebuilding included promoting civil and political rights; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; promoting the development of independent 'civil society' organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country's borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state's role in the economy" (Paris, 2004, p.19).

Meanwhile, Barnett et al.. indicate distinctive understandings regarding the operationalization and conceptualization of peacebuilding. Different agencies come to act with different priorities and strategies. While some organizations focus on democratic elections and the rule of law, others emphasis demobilization and reforms related to private sectors (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007, p.44). Dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding are classified as stability formation, the rebuilding of state institutions, and concentrating on the socioeconomic dimensions of the conflict. The first dimension is to consolidate stability and prevent the fighters from reverting to war. Basically, peacebuilding goes beyond the task of peacekeeping by diminishing the means for actors to go back to conflict. That's why it involves disarmament, unification programs, security sector reform. The second dimension is to construct state institutions in order to ensure public goods, and

legitimacy. Public administration, transportation, education, and health infrastructure should be provided. However, it is crucial that the state should have legitimacy. The state institutions should be democratic, transparent, accountable. The third dimension concerns the socio-economic infrastructure that is necessary to reinforce economic improvement. It involves underpinning civil society organizations, gender empowerment, developing human rights, and stimulating economic progress (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007, p.49).

2.2.2. State-building as a Constituent of Peacebuilding

The modern state "exists when there is a political apparatus (governmental institutions, such as a court, parliament, or congress, plus civil service officials), ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a legal system and the capacity to use force to implement its policies." (Giddens, 1993, p.309). Building a modern state is not identical to peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding tries to establish an environment in which violence will not occur. It necessitates the improvement of the relationship between civil society and state institutions, but this requires establishing legitimate governmental institutions. In this respect, state-building is acknowledged as a core element of peacebuilding (Paris & Sisk, 2009, pp.14-15). However, state-building finds a place in the third generation of peacebuilding. Therefore, since after the Cold War, state institutions are mainly taken into consideration in peace operations (Newman, 2013, p.144). The role of external actors in establishing institutes for security, democracy, and markets are important for state-building. International expertise and capacity are benefited from.

Procedural and technocratic ways are prominent rather than human rights or civil society, although there is an effort to persuade local elites (Richmond, 2013, p.383).

For, twenty-first-century researchers, peacebuilding and state-building are recognized as complementary or even reciprocally reliant (Newman, 2013, p.141). Although there is mutual interdependency between state-building and peace historically, state-building is still a coercive process. State building involves enforcing a unified, centralized state and bringing independent regions under control, securing border zones and imposing regulation, taxation, and territorial control (p.146). On the other hand, peacebuilding is much more interested in norms, civil society and institutions with a focus on the rule of law. Peacebuilding has many overlapping characteristics with state-building, but it mainly includes normative issues (Richmond, 2013, p.383).

State-building is a narrow version of peacebuilding which aims to provide security and institutionalization (Richmond, 2013, p.389). It focuses on how the institutionalization process is achieved through two dimensions. The first dimension deals with a specific state's instruments to control society. That is, the degree of the state is the main focus that emphasizes control of the instruments of coercion and improvement of bureaucratic apparatus. The other dimension focuses on the kind of state, which means how the relationship between states and societies strengthen. Peacebuilding actions have inclined to highlight the kind of the state because human rights, equity, and democratization are more interested the kind of the state instead of its degree (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007, p.50). In other words, state-

building approaches propose institutions to attain peace. Thus, they are more interested in institutional and constitutional design rather than the normative side of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2013, p.381). As a result, state building and peacebuilding basically have the same aim to construct a peaceful order instead of structural violence, or benevolent authority (p.388).

2.2.3 Liberal Peacebuilding

Contemporary peacebuilding approaches have an understanding of multidimensional initiatives, concerning social, economic, and institutional needs to maintain peace in post-conflict societies. Almost all post-cold war peacebuilding operations have included missions interconnected to the offer of security, development, humanitarian assistance and underpinning governance and the rule of law. Such activities have encompassed support in economic development and regulation, promoting and enabling democratic practices, consolidation institutions of justice and legislation, establishment public service delivery, supporting civil society, fostering human rights and reconciliation (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009, p.7). These activities are an "illustration of the liberal peacebuilding agenda: the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with modern states as a driving force for building peace" (p.3). The doctrines of liberal peacebuilding are "liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market values, the integration of societies into globalization and centralized secular state" (p.12). Because building institutions depend on democracy and market economy,

contemporary peacebuilding approaches are often defined as liberal peacebuilding, and they are recognized as a liberal project (p.7).

In this sense, the post-cold war peacebuilding has allowed third parties to enforce the liberal peace framework with very specific conditions such as the adaptation of free markets, the holding of elections, and the provision of human rights (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009, pp.7-12). However, most ongoing liberal peacebuilding operations have been based on the conservative or orthodox model rather than the emancipatory model. While the peacebuilding operations in Cambodia, Angola, and East Timor are mostly placed in the orthodox frameworks, others in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq, can be situated somewhere between the hyper-conservative, and conservative frames, maybe accessing slowly orthodox model (Richmond, 2006, p.306).

Generally, liberal peacebuilding discourse is described by certain assumptions. Firstly, the basic supposition for liberal peacebuilding is that it is broadly recognized as a 'paradigm,' (Paris, 1997), 'framework'(Richmond, 2009) or 'project' (Jabri, 2010). It is asserted that referring to liberal peacebuilding as a paradigm points out that long-lasting peace necessitates processes of economic and political liberalization for war-torn societies. On the other hand, the main elements of peacebuilding as a framework or project are liberal democratic political processes such as gaining of human rights, strengthening of civil society, and neoliberal economic procedures which include mainly privatization of public businesses, and bringing down the barrier for international trade (Selby, 2013, pp.60-61). The second common ground,

the liberal peacebuilding is viewed to concretize "the moral-political outlook of liberal internationalism" and "the principles of liberal peace" (Selby, 2013, p.61). The implementation of liberal peacebuilding is supposed to be based on liberal discourse. The third supposition is that liberal peacebuilding has a hegemonic character because most international agencies primarily try to universalize the liberal state model. Their agenda is viewed as highly standardized and centrally organized to promote peace in war-torn states (p.61). Fourthly, agents for liberal peacebuilding projects are considered as a decentralized multiplicity of actors and institutions. For example, the United Nations, International financial organizations, or non-governmental organizations are the main actors. However, amongst them, the liberal peacebuilding is regarded as mainly a UN-led project (p.62). The fifth common premise is that the implementation of liberal peacebuilding faces local challenges. In liberal peacebuilding discourse, the sixth assumption is that this liberal peacebuilding project frequently routes to illiberal tools. This means that the liberal peace project is mainly applied using coercive methods by underestimating local values and domestic situations (p.63). Lastly, liberal peacebuilding discourse represents peacebuilding as a distinct, identifiable sphere of action and as the dominant component of current war-ending practices (p.64).

Liberal peacebuilding reveals two strands: (i) Wilsonian and (ii) hegemonic neo-liberal approaches. Firstly, Wilsonian liberal peacebuilding is the classical model of liberalism which relies on the promotion of procedural democracy and market economics to establish peace within and between states. Indeed, there is a link between consolidated democracies and stable, peaceful societies. This rests on the

idea that while consolidated market democracies are the most stable and securest, undemocratic societies that do not have fundamental human rights, responsible governance or economic alternatives are more likely to engage in conflict. Thus, liberal peacebuilding is grounded on the idea that democracy and free economy lead people to figure out their differences peacefully, and it allows practices for progress, accountable governance, and fulfilling people's needs and wishes. It does not use coercive techniques because it considers that people would accept liberalism (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009, p.49).

Secondly, hegemonic neo-liberal peacebuilding has a similar aim for establishing economic and political liberalism. Nevertheless, it does not share the main principles of the Wilsonian model. Hegemonic neo-liberal peacebuilding involves a top-down approach in which the interests, as well as political and economic values of the international actors, are imposed on the target societies. Essentially; this approach is systemic because of its emphasis on working of an international functional market for global market actors rather than local actors. Hegemonic peacebuilding is a means for global capitalism. It does not primarily serve the welfare of the target society or peace. Instead, it serves to underpin the dysfunctional international system and structural adjustment by controlling disobedient parts of the world in the name of liberal peace. Concerning that, hegemonic neoliberal peacebuilding does not support open political discourse. In contrast, the statement of political ideas is suppressed and dissuaded. As a result, in reality, contemporary peacebuilding corresponds to a liberal hegemonic approach rather than the Wilsonian liberal approach (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009, p.49).

2.3. Critical Approaches to Liberal Peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding attempts in post-war societies have created debates and controversies. Some questions like what the basis of peace was, what kind of a relationship the intervening actor has with the local actors, whether this peace provides strong state-society relations, are asked. The number of scholars has determined that in the post-Cold War era, international peacebuilding reflects a liberal agenda in some post-conflict regions such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009). However, recent studies on international peacebuilding reveal that liberal peacebuilding project has not attained the intended aim of helping post-war societies to turn from conflict to self-sustaining peace. It is far from removing the root causes of conflict and establishing the liberal-democratic state (Paris 2004; Duffield 2001; Richmond 2006; Fukuyama 2004).

At this point, Paris (2010) states that "the simple answer is that alternative strategies – that is, strategies not rooted in liberal principles – would likely create more problems than they would solve " (p.357). Paris adds a substantial self-reflexive and self-constraining component:

No society has a single, unambiguous set of governance structures (traditional or otherwise) that can be automatically activated. Consequential decisions must, therefore, be made to privilege some structures and not others – and, as much as peacebuilders might view themselves as referees in such decisions, in fact, they will always be ‘players’ only by virtue of their relative power in the domestic setting of a war-torn state (p.359).

Selby argues that the idea of liberal peacebuilding is ambiguous and therefore, it forms a challenging, and limiting starting point to examine current peacebuilding operations. For him, liberal peacebuilding discourse overemphasizes current peace operations, and devalues the significance of state, policies and geopolitics to make peace (Selby, 2013, pp.58-60). Although the theoretical framework of practices is seen to be liberal, the consequences of peacebuilding practices are illiberal. For example, the case of Sudan or Sri Lanka, Iraq, or Afghanistan does not carry essential characteristics of liberal peacebuilding (Selby, 2013, p.79).

In this sense, the scope of critiques against liberal peacebuilding is wide-ranging and involves various concerns and problems. Tadjbakhsh points out the polarization of liberal peacebuilding debate: a clash between "efficiency-based, problem-solving investigations" and a "legitimacy-based critical approach." While problem-solving approaches aim to set the strategies of liberal peacebuilding and establishing liberal doctrines of universalism, egalitarianism, human rights and democracy as universally, critical approaches question the liberal project itself (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, p.2).

Problem-solving approaches take that liberal model is suitable because cosmopolitan, principles of universalism, egalitarianism, human rights, and democracy create conditions for freedom of the individual. The tools of liberal peace, such as local participation, could ensure facilities for the shortcomings. For them, the problem is its hegemonic imposition. In other words, how and why it is enforced is an essential criticizing point. For example, they criticize the advantages of neoliberal

development models or competition by claiming that it leads to intensifying particular conflicts instead of providing necessarily peace (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, pp.124-125). Although such approaches may lessen certain violent conflicts, they do not fundamentally question the global structures that lead to insecure conditions (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p.6).

Critical approaches challenge expectations regarding and expose contradictions within the liberal peacebuilding itself. From that standpoint, different critical approaches have the same statement that liberal peacebuilding is reduced to a technocratic approach by failing to recognize local and indigenous institutions (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, pp.3-4). Therefore, critical approaches try to explore "who benefits from certain types of practices, what linkages exist between local actors and global structures, and why certain voices and experiences are marginalized in policy debates" (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p.6).

On the other hand, critical approaches do not only deal with improving critiques but also they try to recommend a reconstructive agenda within the present global order. The first phase for the reconstructive program is to contest predominant conceptions of common sense such as disadvantaged, weak, powerless, voiceless. The second phase is related to ontological matters. The questions they search are what the relevant entities are and how we should recognize the situations in which they occur (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p.7). Specifically, they ask "what the relationship is between the intervener and the recipient of intervention," "What the ideational and

material context is in which peace operations function" and "what counts as an issue in the study and practice of peace operations" (p.7).

For the first question, critical approaches acknowledge that there is a complicated relationship between the interveners and recipients which makes them bound. For the second question, the ideational and material context of peacebuilding operations is important because the global economic order determines the relationship between inside-outside and peacekeepers are set by other components of the global and economic system, such as ethical frameworks, training, and procedures. For the third question, whereas problem-solving approaches look at which issues exist there and explain them to peacekeepers, critical approaches question these issues in detail because they cannot be autonomous of the agencies, on the contrary they are established by certain elements such as ideology, material incentives or geography (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, pp.7-8).

In this thesis, the framework of Tadjbakhsh and Richmond is used because their framework is an innovative contribution that provides appreciated nuance to the current liberal peacebuilding debate (Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p.247). Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011) summarize different typologies of the critical approach: the communitarian strand, the social constructivist strand, the critical international theory strand, the post-colonialism strand. This framework includes essentially problems of the legitimacy of turning an ideal into a doctrine for action rather than efficiency problems based on the local context.

2.3.1. The Communitarian Critique

The communitarian critique of liberal peacebuilding deals with the legitimacy of liberal peace as a cultural project. It critiques the universalization of liberal values, and it asks the question of whose peace is and whose value is. Therefore, communitarian critique is against the efforts to derive the legitimacy of social, economic, and political activities from abstract liberal principles. It desires concrete and particular actions for each community and tradition (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.223).

The communitarian perspectives do not mean a rejection of peacebuilding. In contrast, they are entirely matching with the general definition of peacebuilding as the reinforcement of "the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behavior that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social, and economic development" (Smith, 2004, p.20). Communitarians claim that the imposition of liberal peace disrupts the essential moral value of the communities, rather than emancipating individuals from societal limits. They refuse the role of international law, standards, and institutions for peacebuilding. They prefer that local actors establish and sustain peace for themselves rather than doing this with mostly international assistance. In other words, external actors should not take primary responsibility to reconstitute the state. In this sense, this situation leads to conflict between the interventionists who are united in a liberal consensus and the others who have the aim of resistance. Therefore, for communitarians, liberal peacebuilding only accelerates this kind of situation instead of an externally pushed

transformation. Rather than that, local actors should reach agreement related to their economies, institutions, cultural identities, and territorial sovereignties. Then, peacebuilding would be procedural instead of interventionary (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, pp.223-224).

According to Paris, political democracy and market democracy do not correspond in everywhere and every time. The political and economic marketplace, which leads to competition, does not necessarily create a self-regulating country. When legislative and administrative institutions are built well, the competition could provide efficiency. However, expansion of problems could ascend, when societal conflict becomes so intense, and this cannot be prevented with existing institutions. In this sense, more competition fosters this societal conflict and it can cause violence (Paris, 2004, p.159). Similarly, Snyder asserts that democratization can lead to political violence connected to conditions of nationalism, and ethnic conflict because democratization provides political participation by the building of politically new groups that have different ideologies and interests (Synder, 2000, pp.20-21).

On the other hand, Richmond (2011) claims that the key feature of liberal peacebuilding reflects the neoliberal marketization of peace without engagement with subjects of this peace. He calls this rejection 'romanticization of local' which is an involuntary result of liberal peacebuilding. Rights gain more importance than needs. The local culture which does not comply with universal institutional and normative forms of liberal peace is recognized as the other by the peacebuilders. Although it seems that there is an effort for local engagement, blindness to main

features, such as cultural and welfare matters shows a dehumanizing character. The romanticization of the local takes place in four forms. The first form is that the local is observed as exotic and unknowable. The second type is the claim of lack of capacity in which the local is viewed as incapable of a productive role. The third is the claim of local deviousness and indelicacy. The fourth form is that the local is seen as the repository of indigenous capacity that the international actors can cooperate. In all four forms, the local is not acknowledged as an agency apart from negative ways, and this represents ‘a form of Orientalism’ (pp.152-153). For Richmond, neoliberal development leads to a lack of social welfare by treating locals as voiceless (p.160). Therefore, liberal peacebuilding represents the imposition of a hegemonic agenda that does not represent the needs and take into account the welfare and customs of the civic level. This is ultimately pacification, rather than the construction of a self-sustaining and multidimensional peace (p.166).

2.3.2. The Social Constructivist Critique

The social constructivists criticize the reduction of making peace to a bureaucratic, technical exercise. Liberal peacebuilding does not see the social process, which is the production of norms and ideas locally (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.224). However, the more communal grassroots involvement necessitates the application of local customs and values because in this way, it contributes to the extermination of root motives of the conflict and creation of sustainable peace (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, pp.73-74).

Constructivism suggests several beneficial tools to apply peacebuilding by going beyond the liberal framework. First, it believes that intersubjective ideas and knowledge have constitutive effects on social reality because interests are shaped by specific identities and norms (Wallis & Richmond, 2017, p.3). Also, the culture which is intersubjective is conceived as the primary explication of change and has real constitutive power (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, pp.73). Second, history which helps to establish social reality is important for constructivism, and it leads to a possibility of change. Change might arise in the form of new constitutive rules, the progress, and transformation to new social structures, and of agent-related origins of social processes. Therefore, it provides an expansion of alternative norms, and socio-political relations. Third, constructivism emphasizes how discourse, including argumentation, deliberation, and compromise, can help to stimulate shared understandings because it concentrates on the effects of social communication on social relations. This keeps the scope for challenging the dominant liberal discourse. Finally, constructivists underline the role of language, which is an important tool for intersubjective meanings and social reality. By examining the relationship between language and power, they emphasize how power motivates the way that knowledge and the construction of identities can be used to distribute capacities (Wallis & Richmond, 2017, pp.3-4).

In this sense, social constructivists question the utilitarian efficiency approach of liberal peacebuilding in which inputs (financial resources, institutional reforms, donor pledges, international commitment, technical assistance,) are built and from which normative outputs (peace, development) are considered to arise. They point

that normative aims, such as peace and development, are not always reached by the rational input/output formula. In this respect, social constructivists focus on both material and communicative ideas, norms, information, or culture (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.224). Morgan states that both material and non-material (norms, values, etc.) dynamics are profoundly interconnected. However, these dynamics could not develop in post-conflict countries to establish a secure environment because peacebuilding attempts mainly pay attention to the political at the expense of normative conditions of individuals, groups, communities. On the contrary, reintegration and rehabilitation should be focused on in war-torn countries in which shared intersubjective beliefs were damaged (Wallis & Richmond, 2017).

Roland Paris (2010) asserts that critiques about liberal peacebuilding are misinterpreted. This misinterpretation deemphasizes the idea of liberal peacebuilding instead of the concentration on the weakness of modes and methods of liberal peacebuilding. He argues that 'the key principle of liberalism - individual freedoms, representative government, limits on arbitrary power' – propose expansive institutional plan and policymaking. Therefore, he states that "the challenge today is not to replace or move 'beyond' liberal peacebuilding, but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal framework" (pp.356-362). As also indicated by Lederach (1998), the necessity to build on the cultural and contextual resources for peace and conflict resolution is underlined. For this to be accomplished the international community needs to adopt a new mindset that moves beyond a simple prescription of answers and modalities that comes from outside the setting "and

focus at least as much attention on discovering and empowering the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for building peace that exist within the context" (p.95).

2.3.3. Critical International Theory Critique

International critical theory does not necessarily critique the assumptions of liberal norms in liberal peacebuilding. It involves two main aspects. The first one is the cosmopolitan aspect, which has the intention of improving universal international norms and institutions. The other one is a Marxist-derived aspect that inquires such liberal projects' capacity for emancipation (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.225).

The former aspect involves Kantian optimism towards modernity embedded in the basic principles of liberalism. When it is compared with the communitarian critique, the problem does not arise from not paying enough attention to culture, local life forms, or sovereignty in reconstruction efforts. The problem is that this reconstruction relies on the wrong agenda. Fundamentally, critical theory attacks the liberal international agenda as being 1) conservative, 2) hegemonic and 3) imposing inequalities (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2007, p.226).

From the critical theory perspective, firstly, the liberal peacebuilding agenda is conservative because it strengthens contemporary global political and economic order and preserves the status quo instead of changing it. It enforces an outdated Western type of sovereignty and statehood based on universal humanitarian principles. Besides, the model of liberal peacebuilding is dominant in the

contemporary world because it maintains the hegemony of existing hierarchies of power. Secondly, liberal peacebuilding highlights an unjust world order with the international organizations universalizing the interests of hegemon powers. The term hegemony concentrated on by Antonio Gramsci, and Robert Cox means not only military or economic coercion but also cultural and ideological dominance. Thirdly, from the critical theory position, liberal peacebuilding strengthens inequalities both between nations and within them. Inequality between nations occurs because the priority is given to the interests of intervener countries rather than the local interests of host countries. In this respect, northern states manage interventions according to their resolutions as to when, where, and how to intervene. Also, inequalities take place between people within nations because of the primary goals of liberal peacebuilding. On the one hand, democratization remedies lead to competition, losers, and winners; on the other hand, marketization remedies give rise to socio-economic inequalities (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, pp.226-227).

The second aspect of critical thinking, that is, the Marxist derived post-modern theory, according to Lyotard (1984) who is a famous postmodernism rhetorician, is mainly about the reactive attack against modernism and a new search for historical means and concepts. Post-modernists precisely inquire about assumptions related to the emancipatory potential of modernity and mechanical rationality embedded in peacebuilding (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.228). Postmodernism questions not only Western hegemony and enforcement of liberal models from outside, but whether this western model is indeed desirable for actors (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.229).

Firstly, from the post-modernist viewpoint, liberal peace's presumptions, which are essential for freedom and modernization, are criticized (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.229). In this sense, Vivienne Jabri (2010) argues that the liberal peace project which is designed in the framework of modernization is not a project of peace as such. According to her, this is a project of dispossession rather than acknowledging the self-determination of others. Drawing from the ideas of Habermas, Kant's notion of perpetual peace is the uncompleted project of cosmopolitan modernity. The Habermasian view accepts the idea of the modern state and its sovereignty. However, it moves on a new form of cosmopolitanism which transcends the state in terms of responsibility and perceives the human self in terms of rights. In this respect, when wars occur as reactive humanitarian crisis conditions, international actors become the point of the juridical and political direction instead of the state concerned. Therefore, for Habermas, peace conditions are controlled, and domesticated domain of the international actors through enforcement of the law in the name of civil society, and this liberal project does not provide the cosmopolitan ideal in operationalization. In brief, this project is a search for depoliticizing of selfhood (pp.45-48).

Moreover, from an emancipatory human security perspective, the important point is the perceptions of people rather than the presence of power or state itself. Legitimacy is not provided with good governance or social capital. Other than those vehicles, it is guaranteed by the justice, the outcome of the distribution of public goods and freedom of speech. In this sense, emancipation is connected to local values. Therefore, from the emancipatory human security perspective, the legitimacy

problem of liberal peacebuilding could be solved by paying more attention to individuals' perceptions of needs and wishes rather than the state or institutions (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p.128).

Secondly, the post-modernist perspective questions the mechanical rationality of peacebuilding. For them, the idea of 'social engineering' (Paris, 1997) which is imposed by the western model, relies on a false idea of 'positive,' 'objective' or 'scientific' knowledge about social phenomena. Paris claims that

Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of the social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization (1997, p.56).

In the neo-Gramscian understanding, peacebuilding is questioned as part of a transnational neoliberal project which "reflects the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global politics." According to neoliberal lines, global reconstruction relies on the World Bank and IMF activity intending the completion of the world market and universal enforcement of social relations concerning capitalist reproduction. This is implicitly maintained with the macroeconomic framework and regulatory improvement (Taylor, 2010, pp.156-158). Similarly, Richmond (2006) states that the agenda of peace is mainly carried based on the intervening actors' interests or goals without depending on problem-solving or emancipatory peace (p.310). Besides, he claims that the aim of emancipation is essentially supplementary to liberalism. However, he points out that current liberal approaches do not give enough attention to bottom-up policies and do not enable individuals emancipation from oppression, domination, and hegemony (Richmond, 2007, p.461).

2.3.4. Post-colonialist Critique

Post-colonialism is interested in the process of decolonization, which brings new views on the relationships between the hegemon and the subaltern, the colonizer and the colonized, the West and the Third World by critiquing power and knowledge construction. As stated by Ilan Kapoor (2008), decolonization has the intention of eradicating hegemonic power in all its forms (p.xiv). He proposes that democratic post-colonial politics are democratic for 'establishing an ethical and dialogic relationship with the subaltern, by being ever-vigilant about the disguises of power, by clearing discursive spaces for bottom-up and insurgent subaltern action' (p.xvi). In this respect, the post-colonial theory is inclined to focus on discourses, knowledge, and perceptions rather than the political direction (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p.230).

Kristoffer Lidén (2011) asserts that the current liberal peacebuilding fails to interpret post-conflict countries on their own terms, and thenceforth recommends that the post-colonial theory offers a necessary corrective to liberal peacebuilding discourse. As also put forward by Darby, liberal peacebuilding is "cast in the colonial mould of intervention from above and outside" in the non-Western world. It is a colonial approach that the understanding of Western societies is imposed on non-European societies. He draws attention to the otherness of the non-Western world, which causes problems in the international order. For example, Iraq revealed that imperialism continues to be an important dimension of the world system (Darby, 2009, pp. 699-701).

Moreover, Roberts emphasizes that liberal democratization, which is a guide for conflict resolution and state-building, has a neo-imperial understanding which aims not to end violence. Democratization is inclined to create tensions between the state and the public and disagreement in civil society. It shows characteristics of negative peace by creating a trust deficit in political conditions and little modification in social context on the civilian side. At this point, he claims that superficial components of democratization, like safe elections, are viewed as an important visible step without taking consideration of social practices. Therefore, "One size does not fit all" in the social, economic and political progress of the Non-Western World (Roberts, 2008, pp.63-77).

Jabri (2007) highlights another detail with the conception of 'matrix of war.' She states that wars create a global matrix of war (p.1). The main defining feature of the global 'matrix of war' is that "its manifestations are distinctly transnational, involving state as well as non-state agents, possessing the capacities to transcend the domestic/international divide so that the global terrain is rendered the remit of their operations" (p.42). The term global matrix of wars is based on Foucault's understanding of relations of power (p.35). In this sense, borrowing from Michel Foucault, the matrix of war rests on sovereign power, which has disciplinary and governmentalizing activities in which peace is conducted mainly for security through a top-down approach. This governmentalization of other societies by liberal intervention is conducted in the form of military force, surveillance, and disposition of populations, creating compliant locals. In this sense, the liberal peace project

might be recognized as the basic of the matrix of war, which is used as another technology in the government of populations (Jabri, 2010, pp.53-54).

2.4. Hybrid Forms of Peace

Liberal peacebuilding strategies that produce violence in some post-conflict societies have been associated with the shortcomings and limits (Cooper & Turner & Pugh, 2011). The local turn in peacebuilding targets to address the failure of liberal assumptions and it provides a significant opportunity for the reassessment of the limitations of existing epistemologies and methodologies of peace (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.780). It highlights everyday elements and underlines the interaction of the local and external (Hughes & Öjendal & Schierenbeck, 2015; Richmond, 2015; Donais, 2015). At the forefront of the local turn in peacebuilding is the use of the concept of hybridity (Dinnen & Kent, 2015). As described by Mac Ginty and Richmond, "Hybridity is a condition that occurs, in large part, contextually; it is a constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of power in a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry, domination or accommodation" (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2016, p.220). Hybridity is a beneficial starting point for new ways of conceptualizing peacebuilding. It changes the attention of peacebuilding from efficiency to legitimacy by challenging the narrow understanding of the formal institutions of the state (Tschirgi, 2015, p.80).

According to Richmond, "hybrid forms of peace represent a juxtaposition between international norms and interests and local forms of agency and identity" (2015,

p.50). Hybrid forms of peace emerge from the interaction between the external and the local actors in post-conflict societies. Besides, Mac Ginty describes detailly hybrid peace as a result of the interaction of four factors. These factors are "the compliance powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the incentivizing powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore, or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking" (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp.8-9). Local actors can be national elites, local security groups, ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and group leaders during the transition (Mac Ginty, 2010, p.392).

Richmond (2015) classifies hybrid peace as either positive or negative. A positive hybrid peace reveals contextually rooted processes in which social and political injustices are addressed across international and local contexts. It has noteworthy legitimacy from the local level (p.51). It positioned in the everyday. Also, it is empathetic and emancipatory because an external power does not contaminate it; instead, it is ensured by an external power and described by its subjects (p.62). Conversely, a negative hybrid peace symbolizes the domination of power and norms from the international over the state or society without reinforcing the sources of local legitimacy or concentrating on the roots of political and social injustices (p.51). The negative hybrid form of peace is characterized as structurally violent by the subject's as adoption of alien norms, and the political system of the global capital is dictated (p.60). It is artificially created by a top-down intervention, and this artificiality causes to counterfeit developments of democratization and liberation.

Though it frequently emphasizes emancipatory discourse, it is instrumentalized for the sake of national elites who behave according to the demands of external powers. In other words, the political system is often controlled, and the constitution is drawn up by the Western powers without truly localized hybridity (p.233). In this sense, it yields non-emancipatory and non-empathetic peace where oppressive social, economic, political or military structures locate, and elite or particular group interests are protected based on the preferences of international, elites or global capital (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p.63).

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the debates liberal peacebuilding and revisited the critical literature on the liberal peacebuilding. First, I explained the foundational basis of the liberal peace thesis. Second, I presented the evolution of peacebuilding and state-building as a constituent of peacebuilding. Later, I indicated the characteristics of liberal peacebuilding. Third, I evaluated the critiques of liberal peacebuilding under the four dimensions: the communitarian, the social constructivist, critical international theory, the post-colonialist critique. Fourth, I assessed the alternative approaches, particularly focusing on hybrid forms of peace. From this assessment, I utilized legitimacy based approaches and hybrid forms of peace in my analysis because it is a useful lens to understand and examine the interfaces or encounters between international and local actors.

CHAPTER 3

BUILDING LIBERAL PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

3.1. Historical Background

Iraq, previously known as Mesopotamia has borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south, Jordan to the west, Syria to the northwest, Turkey to the north, and Iran to the east (Kirmanj, 2013, p.2). Iraq is characterized by ethnic and religious differences. Kurds as an ethnic minority make up at 15 to 20 percent of population of Iraq. The other ethnic community, Arabs are divided into different sects. Iraq's Shi'a form the majority of the population with 60 to 65 percent. The Sunni forms about 20 percent of Iraq's population (Munson, 2009, p.17). While predominantly Arab and Shi'a Muslim are located in southeast Iraq, the population of northeast part is mostly Kurds and Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the western part of the country consists of mostly Arab and Sunni Muslim. Although there is some condensation in terms of ethnic groups in parts of the country, every ethnic and religious group lives in every province of Iraq (Gunter, 2013, p.3).




Figure 1.1. Iraq's major ethnoreligious groups (Kirmanj, 2013)

The British built Iraq from the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. For administrative aims, the British divided the three Ottoman provinces Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, into fourteen provinces. By the time four new provinces were formed and after the United States intervention in 2003, Iraq was administratively separated into eighteen provinces (see Figure 1.2) (Kirmanj, 2013, p.2).



Figure 1.2. The Provinces of Iraq (Kirmanj, 2013)

Iraq experienced two models of political reconstruction in its modern history. The first model was implemented by Britain, and the monarchical system of governance was founded called the Hashemite authority. This system encompassed all national power groups in the political and economic process of the state. In this sense, this system ensured the establishment of effective management of the countryside. While it integrated middle classes through education, civil service, it marginalized the peasantry. Consequently, the contradiction between urban and rural caused the destabilization of state. Conversely, the second model is the Baath model which was implemented by the Baath Party in 1968, a mechanism for inclusion of all social groups in the political process. It applied the socialist program, in which all urban

and rural poor were entitled health, education, housing services (Ismael & Ismael, 2006, p.57).

However, when Hussein Saddam came to power in 1979, the command economy was turned into a type of crony capitalism. He created totalitarianism and kinship, and this led to the formation of the thick ruling clan class (Ismael & Ismael, 2006, p.57). Before the US invasion, Saddam designed almost thirty-five years of Iraqi history. He implemented ethno-sectarian policies, which led to two fractures in Iraqi society, which are those of Arab against Kurd and Sunni versus Shiite. It is significant to emphasize that the two distinctions are not symmetrical. The ethnic divide between Arab and Kurd has a significant influence on the weakening of political and social unity. Kurdish people have a strong desire for nationhood and independence. On the other hand, the communal split between Sunnis and Shiites is a conflict between Arab and Arab, and it does not reflect ethnic particularism. The Shiites have never requested autonomy since the Ottoman period in which the Sunni minority had the power to rule. With the rising of multi communal cities and secular education, there is a sense of Iraqi identity and Arab instead of sectarian identifications. In this respect, Iraq's sectarian divisions do not reflect the same intense conflict with the Arab-Kurdish split (Dawisha, 2006, p.162). On the other hand, under these sectarian divisions, tribal-urban conflict and the personal desires of leaders led to the dividing of Iraq's groups. The opportunistic leaders opened the way for conflicts in Iraq. Tribal and local elites waited for support from the rulers in Baghdad for patronage, and they acted according to rules of the central authority. For example, oil revenue ensured this situation by funding patrimonial distribution. In

this sense, the presence of patronage and formation of client-patron networks was a significant issue in Iraq under Saddam (Munson, 2009, pp.24-25).

It is assumed that Iraq has the fourth-biggest petroleum reserves in the world. The government revenue mainly comes from oil export profits, and these profits constitute over two-thirds of country Gross domestic product (GDP). However, because of oil price volatility, government revenues show sharp differences from year to year (Gunter, 2013, p.4). When it is compared, Iraq's national income depends on the export of a single natural resource more than the population of any other country. Iraq could be considered as formed by two economies, including oil and non-oil, while 98 percent of the labor force locates in the non-oil economy, 2 percent of the labor force work in the oil economy. In the non-oil economy, services account for about 76 percent, manufacturing accounts for 13 percent and agricultural accounts for 11 percent (p.13).

After the invasion of Iraq, problems of the Iraqi economy and society were huge and it necessities a physical and industrial infrastructure because Iraqi economy was disrupted by the 1991 Gulf War and suffered by economic sanctions. They had devastating effects on the country. For example, they led to an inefficient state sector, unproductive agricultural sector, and extensive unemployment. Moreover, Iraq had been turned to a low-income economy because of destroyed infrastructure and the inadequacy of oil exports under sanctions. Before the 1991 war and sanctions, the economy was mainly reliant on oil. In 1990, the oil sector accounted for 75% of the GDP, and it could pay imports of the leading consumer and industrial

products. However, the ban against oil exports produced a 72% decline in per capita GDP. Similar to income, there was a sharp fall in living standards. Moreover, sanctions caused the scarcity of foreign exchange and depreciation of the Iraqi dinar. This situation gives rise to the relative price of tradable goods. Also, there was a drastic rise in malnutrition. These indicate that interveners took control of the fundamentally devastated economy (Yousif, 2006, p.493).

3.2. Political Transformation

In October 2002, the US President gained a power to use the armed forces against Iraq by Congress, to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," and to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (US Public Law 107–243, 2002). UNSC Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously on November 8, 2002, to give Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been embarked on in numerous preceding resolutions (S/RES/1441). On 8 November 2002, instantaneously after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1441, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and France issued a joint statement proclaiming that Council Resolution 1441 did not authorize any "automaticity" in the use of force against Iraq (S/2002/1236).

Besides, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General in an interview in 2004 highlighted that the United Nations charter does not confirm the US-led invasion of Iraq because the Charter let a nation take military action only with Security Council resolution

endorsing the invasion (El-Shibiny, 2010, p.6). He stated that "It is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view, and from the Charter point of view, it was illegal" (UN News, 2004). At this point, the US-led invasion of Iraq was illegal from the respect of the UN charter. Besides, Arab Muslims had the same opinion with Annan, and they were surprised at the assertion of United States to invade Iraq unilaterally without UN Security Council's confirmation (El-Shibiny, 2010, p.6).

Despite UN charter, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was led away to accomplish an ideological plan. On 26 February 2003, George W. Bush asserted that "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions" (Dodge, 2010, p.1269) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The elimination of the regime and removing the ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to prevent them for being transferred to terrorists were the main immediate goals. In other words, as declared by the Bush Administration, the fundamental aim was the building " The building of a new Iraq that is prosperous and free" (Dale, 2008). However, in 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) published a final report, and after 16 months of investigation, it was concluded that there were no chemical weapons, no biological weapons and no capability to construct nuclear weapons (Bryan, 2005).

With time, the attention of OIF changed from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership provide security, build a system of governance, and encourage economic development. In this respect, the

character of the invasion has evolved from major combat operations to a multilayered counter-insurgency and reconstruction endeavor (Dale, 2008). In this sense, by the US annexation of Baghdad in April 2003, thirty-five years of tyranny had been removed. Nonetheless, in two years after the intervention, Iraq turned from a rogue state to a collapsed state. The intervention led to the emergence of at minimum 140 diverse interest groups (Dodge, 2006, pp.142-143). Most Iraqi municipalities and cities obtained governing councils that were elected by elections. In this sense, occupation brought about the proliferation of local self-government councils. At the national level, the unitary Baath Party was changed by an abundance of political parties. These encompass ideological directions from left to right and represent secular and religious aims. However, the ethnic, sectarian, or ideological differences maintain if democracy is ensured (Dawisha, 2006, p.170).

In this sense, the task of the US was much more complex and contradictory because of the falling of government institutions. The US-guided the new political order with liberal justifications by eliminating the former members of the old regime and replacing them with the people who support the US agenda. However, there was increasing suspicion towards occupying powers' administration, and Iraqis demanded to manage this process. In this sense, the US encountered the dilemma of which Iraqis should carry through this role and how they should be selected. These were not evident (Dodge, 2006, pp.143-144).

3.2.1.Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

After the invasion of Iraq, Saddam had been removed, and the first phase of the US was the abolition of the Iraqi state. Therefore, the transformation of the US policy towards Iraq began on 8 May 2003, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had been founded with the letter of American, and British Permanent Representatives to UN Security Council and Paul Bremer initiated to run the CPA on 8 May 2003 (Dodge, 2013, p.1203). This letter indicated the main goals which Bremer should follow and unlimited executive power and vast resources were granted to fulfill the mission successfully (p.1207). "The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for economic reconstruction, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to such representative institutions of government, as appropriate" (S/2003/538). This letter demonstrates main remedies at the center of Liberal Peacebuilding (Dodge, 2013, p.1203) and CPA policy recommendations were relied on four neoliberal units of analysis, the individual, the state, the market, and the democracy, which have a primary role in Liberal Peacebuilding (p.1189).

On the other hand, the responsibilities of the U.S. and the U.K. were clarified in detail in three UN resolutions after the invasion of Iraq. Firstly, on 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1483, which explicitly

recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as 'occupying powers.' The Coalition was called upon "to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory including, in particular, working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability." Also, this resolution mandated that occupying powers work to create the conditions for Iraqis to "freely determine their political future." After defining their obligations, UNSC resolution 1483 stated an initial description of the UN's role in post-conflict Iraq. The leading role of the UN is arranging the UN humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, fostering protection of human rights, helping to promote national and local institutions, legal and judicial reform for representative governance. It removed all UN sanctions and created development fund, international advisory, and monitoring board by supporting the establishment of internationally acknowledged representative government by the Iraqi people (UNSC Resolution 1483, 2003).

By June 2003, the occupying powers had established the Coalition Provisional Authority and CPA as a transitional government, embarked the transitional administration after overthrowing Saddam (Lacher, 2007, p.242), and Bremer accepted Liberal Peacebuilding approach given ideational consistency with strictly liberal, Washington consensus terms (Dodge, 2005, p.709). Firstly, Paul Bremer, who was head of CPA, saw the state as a primary threat to his efforts at Liberal Peacebuilding. This view caused a radical reform of the state. The power of state institutions was intentionally minimized with the de-Ba'athification order (p.1206). According to this order, individuals who were associated with the Baath party were dismissed from the top three levels of government. This led to between 20,000 and

120,000 unemployed people that were associated with Baath party in the sovereign body of state (Dodge, 2013, p.1206). In this sense, Ba`athist components' thread was removed and formerly exiled politicians who have a link with the US-controlled in the new regime. A new area was opened for the new ruling elite in Iraq. Nevertheless, the new political elites were not reinforced by the whole society in the conflicting political arena (Dodge, 2005, p.715).

3.2.2. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)

In July 2003, the Iraqi Government Council (IGC) was founded in collaboration with the UN when the US government understood that the state structure had shrunk and there were no consistent and robust institutions to reform. The CPA endorsed IGC as 'the most representative body in Iraq's history.' Delegates of IGC were selected according to ethnic make-up in Iraq. Hence, 13 Shias, five Sunnis, a Turkoman, and a Christian involved in IGC (Dodge, 2005, p.715). Notably, the people who were affiliated with the Baath party and representatives of the opposition to the occupation were dispensed from the IGC (Lacher, 2007, 242). This selection process led to consternation in Iraqi society, and it was criticized for developing sectarianism in Iraqi political area. This selection demonstrates the application of primordial understanding of Iraqi society, which triggers dividing sectarianism in Iraqi politics (Dodge, 2005, p.715). The Council had the power to arrange a draft constitution, to manage policy, and to nominate and discharge ministers. However, all its propositions could be vetoed by the coalition (Gregory, 2004, p.230).

On August 14, 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1500 and looked with favor on the founding of the Governing Council of Iraq with the statement of "an important step towards the formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government that will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq." Also, this resolution formed the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (UNSC Resolution 1500, 2003). After then, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1511 on October 16, 2003 to strengthen explicitly the UN's political role, confirm the legitimacy of the Iraqi Governing Council which represented the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period, provide more international assistance for financing Iraq's reconstruction, foster other member states to contribute of Iraqi police and security forces and determinate a timetable for the end of Iraq's occupation (UNSC Resolution 1511, 2003).

3.2.3. The Iraqi Interim Assembly

The rising enforcement from the UN Security Council for sovereign power to be delivered to an Iraq governing body, the growing alienation of the Iraqi population from the CPA and escalation of political violence opened the way to transferring sovereignty from the Bush administration to Iraqi people (Dodge, 2005, p.716).

On 15 November 2003, with the signing of the November 15 Agreement by Paul Bremer, the terms for the transition to interim Iraqi government and drafting a Transitional Administration Law were set out. This agreement points out that republican, federal, democratic government, freely elected national Assembly

prepare to draft of the constitution, and Kurdistan is recognized as an official regional government. According to this agreement, till 28 February 2004, CPA and IGC should draft a Transitional Administration Law (TAL), and till 31 May 2004, the Iraqi Interim Assembly (IIA) that eliminate the CPA and IGC would be elected (Pallock, 2004, pp.19-20).

On June 8, 2004, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1546. The resolution endorsed the interim Iraqi government to the Iraqi control and responsibility by acknowledging a formal end of occupation and cancellation of the CPA by June 30, 2004. It clarified that this assembly would operate as the Transitional Government of Iraq. It gave full authority to the interim Iraqi government for the determination of Iraqi security forces and control over finances, aid, and reconstruction. Moreover, this resolution provided a wide-ranging mandate for the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and a United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by diversifying its activities such as regulating elections, drafting a national constitution and managing a comprehensive national census (UNSC Resolution 1546, 2004).

The U.S. and the U.K.'s nearly 13-month occupation of Iraq came to an end, and the Interim Government of Iraq took sovereignty on 30 June 2004. This new government comprised of mainly exiled party individuals rather than technocrats. The most leading figure, Ayad Allawi, was the leader of the Iraqi National Accord, the vice president, Ibrahim Jaafari, was the president of the Al Dawa Party, one of two foremost Shia parties. The other vice president, Rowsch Shaways, was a leading

member of the Kurdish Democratic Party. CPA employed the same incompetent people who did not gain the trust of the Iraqi population in the council for the government. In this sense, the new governing elite, who was close to the US, was formed to replace the Baathist regime (Dodge, 2005, p.718).

To increase the legitimacy of the interim government, Allawi started to hold the Iraqi National conference on 18 August 2004 to elect a council that would be representative of some essential parts of Iraqi's national political forces. However, only the two core Kurdish political forces of northern Iraq and expatriate Arab political forces were included in the council. Sunni and Shi'ite Arab political forces which were located in central and southern regions and opposed occupation were excluded. In addition to this, several civil society groups and tribal leaders that were looking for power in transition were not included in the advisory council. That means that the US and exile Iraqis formed the council according to their interests and excluded important national forces from the peacebuilding process. As a result, this led to the legitimacy of the rejectionist camp among all Iraqis and increased the support for the boycott to the planned January elections (Ismael & Ismael, 2006, pp.58-59).

After the transfer of sovereignty, the first Iraqi election which was held on 30 January 2005 created two winners. The first one was the United Iraqi Alliance which encompassed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution, ruled by Abdel Aziz el-Hakim and the Dawa Party ruled by Ibrahim al-Jafari, won 51% of votes and took 140 seats out of 275. In this sense, this alliance could pass a law without any need of

a coalition. The second one Kurdish list took about 26% of votes and became second. Despite the US support, Allawi's list captured just 14% of the votes, and he would have no chance of becoming future prime minister (Ismael & Ismael, 2006, pp.60-61).

The other general election which brought permanent government was made on December 2005. There were four winners in this election. The same political alliance continued as the first United Iraqi Alliance and second Kurdish Alliance. The third was Tawafuk which involves the Iraqi Islamic Party and other secular groups. The more secular centrists took just 9 percent and a mainly Sunni secular list, the Hiwar was the fifth one. In this sense, Iraq's first permanent government was formed with ethnic and sectarian differences (Marr, 2007, p.43).

The next parliamentary elections were made in March 2010. The Iyâd 'Allâwî's al-Iraqiya faction which was established in 2009 indicating both Shia and Sunni parties took 91 seats. Secondly, Nûrî al- Mâlikî's State of Law coalition that was founded in 2009, mostly representing Mâlikî's Islamic Da'wa Party took 89 seats. Subsequently, final results granted 70 seats to Ibrâhîm al-Ja'farî's National Iraqi Alliance which predominantly represent the SCIRI and the Sadrist groups, and 43 seats to the Kurdistan Alliance which represent the PUK and KDP (Ismael & Ismael, 2015, p.69).

Thereby, by November 2010, a political resolution came to an end with the persistence of Shi'ite al-Mâlikî as Prime Minister, Kurdish Jalâl Tâlabânî as

President and Sunni Usâmah al-Nujaifi as Speaker of Parliament. In other words, as a result of the 2010 election, the Shia–Kurdish cooperation that had power since 2005, was maintained. Nevertheless, the political condition of Iraq has persisted fractious and fragile, with the agreement between Shia and Kurdish parties due to predominantly disagreements over the nature of federalism, the provisions of a new oil law and territorial disputes until President Obama’s altogether departure of American troops in December 2011 (Ismael & Ismael, 2015, p. 69).

3.2.4. Constitution-making

In the constitution-making process of the post-conflict Iraq, the revolutionary tradition was applied. It implies that constitution-making means structuring completely new rules and institutions by eliminating the old political system (Dann & Al-Ali, 2006, p.425). At this point, external actors and international law dominated the national constitutional process in post-conflict countries because it was considered that the nation has not the ability to deal with constitution-making (p.427). However, there are different types of external influence, namely total, marginal, and partial degrees of influence. Total influence means that the national actors do not have any impact on the constitutional process. Marginal influence means that external actors are participated in the constitutional process just by giving voluntary advice from experts. In this case, the control and substance of the constitution depend on the national actors. The third partial influence falls in between total and marginal influence. In this case, whereas the authority of main issues is in the hands of national actors, external forces play a role in procedural

ways in the constitution-making process (pp.428-430). The Iraqi case falls under the partial degrees of influence because not only external powers but also local actors directed the constitution process.

The Iraqi constitutional process was initiated when the state was under the external intervention after the invasion, and the state acquired its sovereignty before the constitution. In this sense, the drafting process for the constitution was directed by two different and successive legal regimes (Wolfrum, 2005). In March 2004, the Law of Administration for the Transitional Period (TAL) was drafted by the Iraqi Governing Council. For preparing the TAL process, the U.S. officials also took part in the CPA (Dann & Al-Ali, 2006, 436). However, the UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which transferred authority from the occupying powers to the interim Iraqi government, did not mention the status of the TAL (Dann & Al-Ali, 2006, p.437).

TAL pointed that it would govern Iraq from the establishment of the Iraq interim assembly until the national elections. It stipulates that after a permanent constitution was drafted, it had to be put in a national referendum and accepted by the majority of Iraqis. According to TAL, the assembly was required to draft the permanent constitution no later than 2005, and this draft should be offered to Iraqi people's approval no later than 2005. The TAL described Iraq as a single state with federal structures, and it provided an independent judiciary and foresaw civilian control of military and security services. It offered equal rights for all Iraqi people, without discrimination based on gender, sect, nationality, religion. (Law of Administration,

2004). TAL was a reconciliation between integrationist, centralizing desires of the CPA and many Sunni Iraqis on Iraqi Governing Council, and the pluralist, decentralist idea of a new Iraq which recognized Kurdistan region. According to TAL, Iraq was first formed as a federal entity with 14 provinces and recognition of Kurdistan as autonomous (O'Leary, 2010, p.191).

After the Transitional National Assembly was elected on 30 January 2005, the Constitutional Committee was formed of 55 members of political parties which were deputized in parliament to prepare a draft constitution. After completion of the drafting process, it was negotiated in the Leadership Council that consisted of a group of the country's most leading politicians (Dann & Al-Ali, 2006, 438). On the other hand, there were direct and indirect external impacts on the constitutional process. For example, the United Nations experts gave advice for some drafts. Moreover, the US officials played an essential role in the Leadership Council's meetings by supporting the exclusion of the Sunni community from the council because the Sunni was in favor of a central state in Iraq which were not suitable for US interests (p.441).

The permanent constitution of Iraq approved the Iraqi federal system, and a Kurdistan region was established by sixteen of the eighteen governorates. Since then, Kurdistan is federacy, and it has a federal relationship with the federal government which other existing entities do not have. Also, it has the power to vote any unilateral change (O'Leary, 2010, p.196). However, elections were boycotted by most Sunni Arab politicians, by the United Iraqi Alliance which consists of a coalition of Shiite

religious parties and by the Kurdistan Alliance. While Shiite Arabs and Kurdistan alliance share a common desire for the decentralized federation, most Sunni Arabs voted against the Constitution, viewing it as facilitation of the establishment of regions within Iraq (p.195).

According to the 2005 constitution, Iraq is separated into 18 provinces, three of which, Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah, are united under a Kurdish regional government. Although Iraq is a federal system, sub-national entities are active merely in the Kurdish regional government. For the other parts of the country, the national government in Baghdad rules and takes almost all decisions (Gunter, 2013, p.2).

Comparing to TAL, region formation was elucidated and simplified. Art.117 states that "This Constitution shall affirm new regions established following its provisions." Also, the constitution facilitates the aggregation of governorates into a region in two ways. According to art. 119, it could be either provided with the demand by one- third of the council members of each of the appropriate governorates or petition of one-tenth of the voters in each of the relevant governorates. Moreover, regions were permitted their powers under Art. 121. Regional authorities have the right to change the function of federal legislation within that region. They are responsible for internal security services for the region (O'Leary, 2010, p.197).

This constitution made provisions to reinforce standing governorates not structured in a region. Firstly, it applied this by decreasing the exclusive powers of the federal

government. Secondly, it extracted governorate councils from the management of federal ministries and ordered the establishment of their independent finance. Thirdly, it allowed a federal law to facilitate governorates to delegate powers to the federal government. Other than this, although it seems that there is asymmetry in powers between governorates and regions, there is no obstacle for governorate, and it depends on governorate decision to adopt in the region. Regions and governorates can create different levels of autonomy or cooperation with the federal government, and they can change federal legislation by using the right to veto (O'Leary, 2010, p.198).

3.3. Economic Transformation

Market liberalization is a fundamental component in the economic dimension of liberal peacebuilding. In post-conflict states, economic patterns of transformation are directed by external agencies on a large scale. The economic process proposes macro-economic strength, lessening the role of the state, dependence on privatization and on exports and foreign investment to arouse economic growth, encouraging private competition and wealth (Pugh, 2005, p.25). In this sense, the path for economic development for war-torn states derived from Washington consensus from the late 1990s (p.23). Washington consensus composed of fundamentals of macroeconomic reform such as liberalization, stabilization, and microeconomic reforms such as privatization, encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI). Mainly, it includes fiscal discipline, financial liberalization, deregulation, foreign direct investment, privatization (Looney, 2004, p.2).

After the invasion, elements of the Washington consensus began to be applied in post-conflict Iraq. However, the challenge of rebuilding the Iraqi economy was twofold. Firstly, restructuring a post-conflict economy, after then transformation a centralized economy into a market economy were necessary (Crocker, 2004, p.73). After the invasion, Leszek Balcerowicz, the designer of Poland's post-communist reforms and chief professional on transitional economies, argued that "Iraq's present condition is no more difficult than of the Central European Countries at the start of their transition to free markets" (Looney, 2004, p.8).

In this sense, economic liberalization was more essential than democratic representation for CPA elections were not held until 2005 (Dodge, 2010, p.1201). Bremer stated, "If we do not get the economy right, no matter how fancy our political transformation, it will not work" (Dodge, 2013, p.198). In order to form liberal peace, economic reform is a predominant part of Liberal Peacebuilding. By the end of 2003, the CPA had proclaimed plan for the transformation of Iraq to the US Senate. This plan put down the establishment for a revolutionized economy that would transform the economic procedures of the whole region (Schwartz, 2007, p.27).

In order to implement the plan, CPA forces pointed out the reports of international organizations to ensure more legitimacy. They claimed that CPA orders to open Iraq's economy are proper with the UNSC 1483 and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proclamation to the Security Council of 17 July 2003. They asserted that

these orders were produced in collaboration with IGC, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Herring & Rangwala, 2006, p.227). The CPA orders which have the direction to denationalization was supported in the report by Annan. The report indicated the necessity for the move from a state-planned economy to a free-market economy. It had a further suggestion to a suitable route for maintainable growth in Iraq. At this point, it claimed that Iraq requires a market-oriented situation that fosters integration with the global market. However, local actors' involvement and political support were seen necessary for this kind of substantial transformation. (S/2003/715). Also, during the market liberalization of Iraq, the UN Security Council removed all economic sanctions (UNSC Resolution, 1483) before Bremer presented the liberalization of the Iraqi economy in June 2003.

CPA adopted a rapid liberalization of markets and prices. In other words, the CPA was a proponent of shock therapy. Reforms intended to free prices and thus, to support the movement of resources to great return actions, because reforms were based on the idea which prices reveal relative social lacks in settings of competition. When prices could not make this properly, resources would not move to activities with the highest social rates of return. As a result, outcome and income would become lower than what is achieved. Based on this understanding, the free movement capital and goods were promoted. On the other hand, the defenders of shock therapy are inclined to see the state as inefficient, unprofitable, and burden. Also, in shock therapy, state intervention is not desirable because the government's attempt to adjust the market failure might lead to enlarge the failure and increase inefficiency (Yousif, 2006, p.492).

The first action of the US was the integration of Iraq into the global economic system. Before US invasion, the Iraqi economy consisted of mostly state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it was not attractive to foreign investors. In this sense, to attract foreign private capital and reestablish the domestic economy, interveners adopted two core strategies. Firstly, they applied the investment climate strategy, and it changed the whole economic situation of Iraq. This attitude includes aid programs, business directives, and institutional reorganizing. Secondly, they promoted a more interfering stand towards the private sector. For this stand, international organizations offered programs for particular business clusters to reinforce market linkages and reorganize business organizations (Constantini, 2018, p.64).

For the implementation of neoliberal reforms, CPA realized the interconnectedness of policies and institutional provisions. Bremer assumed that the spread of government subsidies was observed in the whole economic system, from the business sector to the household sector and from the real economy to financial and monetary system, and from prices to different procedures. Nonetheless, the CPA accepted interconnectedness as a rationale to implement radical rearranging through all parts of the economy and society. CPA intended to alter the relationship between politics and economy at the domestic and external ground rather than returning to pre-war conditions. This transformation included a modification in the relationship between the private sector and the state, Iraq and interveners, foreign business and finance and international organizations (Mahdi, 2007, p.12).

As a result of these policies, Saddam's socialist central planning model was exposed, and Iraq's form of capitalism could be progressed from central planning to state-guided capitalism. In this kind of model, the government attempts to guide the market by fostering specific industries that are significant sources of employment (Gunter, 2013, p.5). At this point, the CPA adopted the pattern from Eastern Europe's post-communist economic transformation to progress Iraq private sector. The CPA's plan, 'Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People', indicated that "the unique recent experience of the Central and East European countries from their transformations should be helpful in this regard." Therefore, the CPA organized a 'Lessons Learned' meeting in Baghdad to attract expertise about the economic transformation of Central and Eastern European countries. As a result of these experiences of communist transitions, the CPA advisor contended that "Iraq must move to a market system as quickly as possible by encouraging the growth of private firms" (Dobbins, 2009, p.206). The CPA transformed the economic structure and issued 100 binding orders to ensure a free market economy. The significant ones were trade openness (Order n.54), independent Central Bank (Order n.56), the formation of foreign own private banks (Order n.94) (Constantini, 2003, p.265).

On the other hand, Iraq began to restore its relationship with the IMF in 2004. After the invasion, Iraq's multifaceted and bilateral debt which remained from the Saddam period was approximately \$137 billion. In November 2004, the Paris Club creditor of states decided to cancel up to 80% of Iraq's debt to them by 2008, if the IMF program was admitted. At this point, Iraq accepted the Paris club offer and got \$436

million emergency 'post-conflict' aid from IMF (Herring & Rangwala, 2005, p.676). Hence, the stand-by arrangement contracted with IMF on December 23, 2005, set a number of performance criteria such as the net international reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq, ceiling on lending to the government and the private sector by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), ceiling on government imports of petroleum products, ceiling on the government wage and pension bill, floor on the revenue of oil-related state-owned enterprises (Looney, 2006, p.38). These criteria intended to achieve public welfare and political and social stability. Thus, it could move towards a more market-oriented economy to reintegrate into the world economy (Herring & Rangwala, 2006, p.230).

3.3.1 Foreign Investment

Until 2003, foreign investment was not permitted in Iraq, because the Ba'ath regime was antagonistic to foreign investment. However, there was a weak attempt to support foreign investment in 2002, and the Baath government adopted the new law on investment. The law was labeled the Arab investment law, and there was permission for only Arab investors (Shubber, 2009, p.4).

After the invasion, the CPA clarified that foreign capital and proficiency are necessary for the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. All foreign investment law reformed with the CPA General order 39 in September 2003. This caused a radical change in the Iraqi investment rule. With this original order, full foreign ownership and unrestricted foreign direct investment (FDI) in all economic parts excluding oil

and land, was allowed for up to 40 years. Furthermore, this order allowed unlimited and untaxed profit transfer by foreign entities (International crisis group, 2004, p.8).

This policy was again adopted in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. In the article 2 of the federal investment law , "the encouragement of investment and the transfer of modern technology, in order to take part in the process of the development and growth of Iraq, as well as the enlargement of its bases in industrial production and services and their diversification" was foreseen (Shubber, 2009, p.10). This federal investment law proposed strong motives, resources, and securities, such as dispensation from taxation and fees, non-nationalization of investment tasks (p.12). In this respect, this law adopted a very liberal approach similar to the CPA order. It can be seen that Article 29 of the Federal Investment Law is very similar to Section 6 of the CPA Order 2003 which indicated that Foreign investment might take place with respect to all economic sectors in Iraq, except the foreign direct and indirect ownership of the natural resources sector, involving primary extraction and initial processing. Besides, this Order did not use to banks and insurance companies (pp.25-26).

The federal investment law was institutionalized in the Investment Law.13 in 2007, which included privileges and guarantees details for investors. They had the right to bring capital and profit, replacement shares and bonds in the Iraqi Stock Exchange, access accounts in or outside the country for a certified investment project. The law also provided the right of residency for foreign investors and workers who are not from Iraq and let them send salaries outside of the country. Moreover, it freed

investment projects from taxation and fees for ten years (Constantini, 2013, p.266). As a whole, the laws related to investment transformed Iraq into "the most liberal regime in the Middle East" (International crisis group, 2004, p.8).

Iraq took a noteworthy share of FDI. Before 2003, the net inflow of FDI was negative, but it became positive in 2004 and reported for nearly 2.5 percent of GDP by 2009, despite violence and instability. In this sense, flows of FDI correspond with the progression of the political situation. From 2003 and 2004, FDI came mainly from the UK and the US. In 2005, the flow of FDI weakened because of insurgency. The majority flow of FDI concentrated on the oil and gas sector, especially in the Kurdistan region in 2006 and 2007. The subsequent years, investment projects spread to other governorates depending on the security situation, although the Kurdistan region received the most considerable number of projects (Constantini, 2013, pp.268-269).

Oil and gas, real estate and multisectoral projects were three most attractive sectors, and they receive almost 84 percent of total FDI flows in 2009. Respectively, the oil and gas sectors attracted almost 38 percent of total FDI. Following that, almost 27 percent of total FDI flows were obtained by the estate sector that covered the building of luxury housing parts, hotels, and shopping malls. The third most attractive sector was multisectoral projects, which get almost 20 percent of total FDI. On the other hand, other sectors, such as industry, transportation, and agriculture appealed only marginal FDI (Constantini, 2013, pp.270-271).

3.3.2. Financial and Monetary Reforms

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) pursued the aim of transforming Iraq into a market economy. The transformation of the financial and monetary structures involved this aim. The CPA asserted that the renovation of the banking system is fundamental to the economic improvement of the country (Dobbins, 2009, p.207).

Restructuring the banking sector and financial system is vital for regular economic activity because it provides investment, capital movement, and stable instrument to pay wages to civil servants, police officers, and other service employees. In this sense, the CPA drafted commercial banking law to rule private banks and opened an independent Central Bank and Trade Bank to make secure international transactions. This implementation shows a departure from banking exercises in the Saddam era, where there were no independent banks (Crocker, 2004, p.76). The requirements of the Bank Law were shaped according to the Western method of bank regulation. Central Bank of Iraq gained full legal and operational power. Indeed, the Iraqi banks had powers like modern banks in the international financial system. Central bank regulations were improved by giving independence to follow stable monetary and exchange rate policy (Looney, 2004, p.2).

Moreover, the CPA introduced foreign banks into Iraq. They function in Iraq as either a subsidiary with up to 100 percent possession or as a branch with the permission of the CPA Order Number 38. Their activities would be controlled under the law the same as national banks. CPA advisor Peter McPherson stated to Bremer

that "International banks are keys to the economic development of Iraq." Also, he explained its benefits by pointing that it brings technology, know-how, new capital; rising efficiency; permit for better entry to international financing sources (Dobbins, 2009, p.210).

3.3.3. Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises

Before the occupation, Iraq was under the massive state control and restraints on commercial activities. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were affected by these obstacles. They deteriorated and were technologically worn. Moreover, they had high production costs and overstaffing. That is why they did not attract many investors. Although they had inadequate investment and repair, they played a key role in large part of the sectors (World Bank, 2004). The reason for SOEs' survival was that the Iraqi government was granting \$500 million in annual subsidies (Dobbins, 2009, p.223). The economy of Iraq composed of 192 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 43 mixed-ownership, which were tendency of high cost and low-quality producers. SOES provided not only essential facilities such as water and electricity but also a significant degree of all consumer goods and industrial inputs. Moreover, SOEs were major institutions that provided jobs after the national government. Almost 650.000 people worked for SOEs (Gunter, 2013, p.164). Saddam located the persons that are loyal to him and from his family in SOEs. In this sense, the SOE- dominated economy helped to prevent opposing parties financially and personally. SOEs permit the state to take the profits rather than the private

sector. Saddam worked to canalize these funds to him and his supporters. In this sense, SOEs were a tool for making large scale corruption easier (p.165).

For creating a free market, the CPA had a plan against Baathists' state-centric commercial activities until 30 June 2004. In an earlier time of occupation, Bremer pointed out the necessity of the privatization of Iraqi entities. He stated that resources are distributed effectively from the market rather than state enterprises (International Crisis Group, 2004, p.6). However, oil and land were excluded from this implementation. The CPA entrusted the oil sector to private contractors. These contractors keep tribes to protect oil installations. This method failed because tribes began to compete with each other, and this led to shifting from foreign contractors to indigenous security forces toward the end of 2004 (Luft, 2005).

SOEs reform is significant because it raises competition in the economy, characterizes the role of the state in the economy, makes flexible labor market easier, creates a new job and develops governance of enterprises (World Bank, 2004). On the other hand, the SOE plan led to 103,000 staff to be retired or discharged in 2004, 7,500 each in 2005 and 2006. The Iraqi government decreased subsidies to SOEs by \$88 million beginning in 2005 (Dobbins, 2009, p.226).

3.3.4. Infrastructure

The mission of the Coalition Provisional authority was stated as rebuilding Iraq. In this reconstruction process, the infrastructure pillar takes the majority of the funds,

because when infrastructure fixes well, development of the economy is thought to follow naturally (Brown, 2005, p.761). Similarly, a leading U.S. official pointed out that "Power is the central issue, without it, you do not have security. You don't have an economy. You don't have trust in what we're doing. What you do have is more anger, more frustration, more violence. We're not going to solve anything here until we first find a way to get more electricity to the people" (Chandrasekaran, 2003).

Infrastructure sectors should carry four goals. These are constructing technical and directorial capacity, attaining quick physical renewal, renovating service transfer, and setting effective procedures and institutions (Rohland & Cliffe, 2012, p.10). On the other hand, infrastructure construction does not necessitate security as a precondition, but it is necessary for the encouragement of the private sector and saving from the resource and time cost of construction balloons. The US military did not give importance to ensure security for infrastructure construction projects and left security provisions to costly private military contractors. Hence, construction organizations had to depend on costly private contractors to protect projects, and they could be paid between \$400 and \$600 per day, occasionally up to \$1000 per day (Mardirosian, 2010, pp.29-30). As a result, "Deteriorating security conditions had severely slowed work and driven costs higher in every reconstruction sector" (SIGIR, 2009, p.179). Nonetheless, the condition did not recover, and by mid-2004, some subcontractors retracted from the projects (p.185).

There were many complaints about many areas of infrastructure, such as water, electricity. According to the report of the Christian Peacemakers, In 2009, just 50

percent of the Iraqi people benefited twelve or more hours of electricity a day. On the other hand, according to the EU – Iraqi Government Joint Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013, "Access to clean water fell from 83% in 1990 to 77% in 2007, and over 80% of households did not improve their drinking and cooking water" (Al-Assaf & Ali & Brand-Jacobson, 2010, p.85). These indicate that the intervener's agenda does not create reliance on the ability of the new administration in Iraq to provide the needs of the country.

3.4. Security Transformation

The stable security environment is one of the most significant issues for the implementation of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. In post-conflict situations, violence and illegal activities rise, and local security conditions are frequently insufficient to ensure stable security. Thus, conflict environments cause two problems to the international arena: the short-term need to fulfill the security gap, and the long-term object of rebuilding the local security sector (Coutts, 2001, p.2).

In the post-conflict, though the formal occupation finished in 2004 with sovereignty handover to the government of Iraq, while the US sustained to play a key military and a lesser level political and economic role in Iraq (Herring, 2011, p.28). The U.S. and its Coalition partners encountered three major challenges which inextricably connected to Iraq's past, to reform the Iraqi security sector. These were impoverishment and overcoming the insurgency, guiding modern, capable new Iraqi security forces by concentrating on the quality instead of the quantity and

constructing qualified civilian-led security bodies relied on democratic principles (Khalil, 2006, p.9).

3.4.2. Security environment

The security environment of Iraq was very distinct and complex. It was described by a plurality of threats resulting from the struggle for power among sectarian opponents, Sunni insurgents, radical Islamic terrorist groups, Shi'a militia. All these different parts reflected a variety of goals, programs, and potentials. In the north, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and other groups struggled to ensure the authority of land and natural resources, especially in Mosul and Kirkuk. In the south, where Iranian venture is productive, Shi'a groups conflicted one another for political and economic control. On the other hand, Sunni insurgents fought against the Shi'a-dominated government in the west part of the country. Terrorist groups, which was the most active one, is al Qaeda was struggling to build an Islamic caliphate in Iraq. In Baghdad, the central zone of Iraq, the security environment is described by ethno-sectarian struggle and criminal movement (Jones & Elsea & Serafino, 2010, p.4).

In this kind of environment, according to the report of the Iraq Study Group, the conditions were worsening in Iraq, and the primary challenge to stability was sectarian conflict (Iraq Study Group Report, 2006). In this sense, the central government in Baghdad did not provide national security and did not have control over the use of force. Insurgents and militias played a prominent role as a noteworthy threat to Iraqi stability and security (Jones & Elsea & Serafino, 2010, p.34).

Militias that do not include Iraq security forces which were established by the CPA, Iraqi federal law have been one of the most significant threats. The largest militia with 50,000 soldiers was the or Kurdish militia peshmerga struggled against Saddam Hussein and US-led coalition for independence. Another major militia is the 2 Organization which is the 10,000- armed part of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It is mainly located in the south-central Shiite district of Iraq in the backing of the divisions around Ayatollah Sistani (Open society & United Nations Foundation, 2004, p.32).

Insurgent groups seem to divide into three main groups as previous Baath party followers and Sunni militants; Shiite militants, such as those depended on the Mahdi Army of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr; foreign combatants, comprising unconnected foreigners dependable to the former administration, people connected with the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam, reportedly linked to al-Qaeda, and other terrorist factions (Open society & United Nations Foundation, 2004, p.36).

After the invasion, the core of government comprised of the parties in the parliament and the main Sunni and Kurd opponent groups. The Government of Iraq was dominated by prominent Shi'a parties (Da'wa and ISCI); the main opponent groups were the Sunni the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the Sons of Iraq (SOI), and the Kurdish bloc, entailing of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) parties in 2006 election (Gompert & Kelly & Watkins, 2010,

p.10). After the US invasion, the most important threats facing Iraq were generally accepted as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Sunni insurgent groups, Shi'a militias, and other neighboring countries' connection, mainly Iranian backing of al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade (Jones & Elsea & Serafino, 2010, p.23).

In June 2004, the CPA passed Order 91 which involves all groups that have kept arms for Iraq's nine main political parties, excluding the insurgent Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. In this sense, all militias were brought under the control of the government. According to the program of the CPA, militia members could decide to participate in new security services of Iraq or turn back to civil life (p.33). However, many of the members continued to locate in the militia and the security situation worsened in post-conflict Iraq.

Especially, when the occupation downfall in 2004–2007, interveners were in anxiety because there was no operative police and intelligence agencies and Iraq were in the condition that "resembled the pure Hobbesian state where all are at war against all others, and any security is self-provided. Iraq appeared to be slipping steadily toward chaos." There were 1,000 roadside bombs explosion every week by mid-2006 (Macdonald, 2014, p.227). In this sense, General David Petraeus, an expert on counter surgency was appointed to command forces in Iraq in January 2007, and more than fifteen thousand additional troops and six US combat flowed Baghdad by the summer of 2007 due to confronting with collapsing of Iraq's legal state. These ensured the declining of the Sunni insurgency (Munson, 2009, p.213). By 2008 the major operations were ruled by the Iraqi government by relying on American troops,

and these troops were increasingly used to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. Overall, although forces did not show effective performance, they provided withdrawal of the militias that surrounded the city and life turned to normalcy in appearance and the resident felt relief from the density of militia (p.221).

In December, 2008, President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq," (Iraq SOFA) in Baghdad (Bassiouni, 2010, p.2). According to this agreement, US combat troops should be displaced out of Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and out of the country by December 31, 2011 (p.17). Besides, this agreement ensured more accountability for US forces (p.19). Subsequently, insurgent and militia attacks scaled-down noticeably in 2008 and 2009. However, this environment changed when Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, representing Shia political factions, decreed the arrest of the Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, immediately after the last US troops left the country on December 2011. The dismissal of the most influential Sunni leader from the government led to political turmoil and resurgence in the insurgency. As a result of these situations, January 2012 became the bloodiest month for Iraq since 2001 (Higashi, 2015, p.127).

3.4.3. Military Reform

Walter L. Slocombe, the previous Administrator for National Security and Defence for the CPA, stated that Iraqi people had been ‘grotesquely over-militarized’ beneath the authority of the Ba’athist rule. At this point, the goal of the US military reform program was to establish ‘an armed force that will be professional, non-political, militarily effective and truly representative of the country’ (Sedra, 2007, pp.12-13). To implement this reform, Bremer signed the CPA Order Number 2, ‘Dissolution of Entities’ in May 2003, and this order dissolved many Iraqi institutions, involving the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. It dismissed all members of the previous military and declared that the coalition arranged to establish a New Iraqi Army (NIA) as the first phase to form national self-defense of Iraq (Dobbins, 2009, p.57).

Firstly, the CPA determined that the new Iraqi army would include volunteer people that was different from the Saddam era. In this sense, it created an army which reflected the ethnic, religious, and provincial variety of the country. To train soldiers, the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) was established. Besides training efforts, the CPA formed the Office of Security Affairs, which acted as the CPA’s defense policy office to build the Ministry of Defense (Dobbins, 2009, p.63).

In October 2003, affiliates of Iraq’s Governing Council demanded a faster handover to Iraqi armies. The critical local figure, Ahmad Chalabi claimed that merely Iraqi people would have the authority to develop the security condition. However, senior

CPA representatives refused, remarking that the security forces of Iraq had no the ability to carry this duty (Dobbins, 2009, p.66).

The CPA order led to the escalation of the insurgency by alienating the Iraqis who could not assist themselves or their families, by providing that there was not adequate security to conduct on healthy living and by forming insurgents who oppose the US (Pfifner, 2010, p.76). In the spring of 2004, the army which was created by the CPA passed a test with the insurgency from Sunni people in Fallujah. Nonetheless, through the increase of violence in Fallujah, more than a quarter of the newly qualified Iraqi army refused to accomplish their duties or united with the insurgents (Open society & United Nations Foundation, 2004, p.32). At this point, desertion appeared as a problem owing to low salary and down falling security in the country (Dobbins, 2009, p.70). This condition indicates that under US supervision, although soldiers were trained rapidly, their quality was ineffective. One of the critical reasons is the unclear nature of the army mission. Although a domestic role was always part of US Central Command's (CENTCOM) foresight, until early 2004 the CPA and the bulk of its interlocutors on the IGC sought to emphasis the force on external defense (Rathmell, 2005, p.40).

3.4.4. Police Reform

The US military and the CPA did not decide to dissolve the Iraqi police force like the army (Dobbins, 2009, p.71). In May 2003, the CPA record claimed that the Iraqi Police had not the capability to sustain law and order maintain autonomously. This

necessitated the support and supervision of the Coalition Force because they underwent years of disregard, oppressive command arrangement (p.72). Initially, the CPA determined to make Iraqi police security (IPS) principal Iraqi internal security agency and initiated to give the responsibility of urban security (Rathmell, 2005, p.45).

Therefore, the CPA improved a twin-track method to police transformation because of the instant necessity for police force. This method included retaining previous police officers and ensuring basic level training (p.46). The other part of the police renovation approach was the improvement of institutional capacity. This other part includes rearranging the force, forming specialized units, and educating the leadership (p.47). The transformation began with returning of more than 15,000 officers to duty by mid-July, and by August 2003 there were 32,000 police. However, this number was not enough for security, and according to the reform program, the goal was establishing a 70,000-participants Iraqi police force for 18 to 24 months (Dobbins, 2009, p.74). However, this problem persisted, and Iraqi Police Service staffs levels were 50 percent or less than from program estimation in late September 2003 (p.75).

At the beginning of the CPA administration, private contractors implemented police training. This method functioned effectively in other post-conflict societies. In those societies, the other allies helped the US for training to provide a secure environment. Nonetheless, those situations did not come into place in Iraq. (Dobbins, 2009, p.76). This issue was stated in the assessment of the CPA's International Police Assistance

Team in 2003. According to this assessment, the Iraqi police were not capable of ensuring security and order. Further, it pointed out that the police needed to be readjusted to become competent and fulfill immediate policing functions (Rathmell, 2005, p.45).

However, in the next year, problems did not reduce. There was a loyalty problem. For example, 3,200 of the city's 4,000 police left their jobs in the northern city of Mosul in early November 2004 in response to a wave of attacks on police stations and government services (Sedra, 2007, p.14). Moreover, there was a shortcoming related to IPS senior leaders and managers. This weakness of IPS was observed in Karbala, Fallujah, Mosul, in 2004 (Rathmell, 2005, p.47).

3.5.Conclusion

This chapter revised the political, economic, and security transformation in the post-conflict Iraq after the US invasion. Under the political transformation, first, the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its policies are indicated. Subsequently, the process of formation of the Iraqi Governing Council and the Iraqi Interim Assembly is shown. Lastly, the constitution-making procedure is introduced. Under the economic transformation, CPA rapid liberalization policies based on foreign investment, financial and monetary reforms, privatization of state-owned enterprises, infrastructure are reviewed. Under the security transformation, police and military reforms presented after the describing of the security environment in post-conflict Iraq.

CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE OF PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

After the invasion, US policy was grounded on the idea that a superior military force would soon be satisfactory to regime change and therefore the US introduced democratization under President Bush's guidance. In other words, regime transformation and the reform of the state would be accomplished through the use of military force. To ensure these aims, liberal peacebuilding was a foremost principle for the rebuilding of Iraq through the creation of liberal democracy and the free market (Yousif, 2006).

Paris claimed that transition democratization and marketization in war-shattered societies might cause unexpected consequences in which peace could under internal risk. War-shattered societies might have pathologies including: the problem of 'bad' civil society; the behavior of opportunistic 'ethnic entrepreneurs'; the risk that elections can serve as focal points for destructive societal competition; the danger posed by local 'saboteurs'; and the disrupting and conflict-inducing results of economic liberalization (Paris, 2004, p.159).

The reasons why the process of democratization and marketization can be remarkably destructive, are severe societal conflicts, the nonexistence of natural conflict dampeners and the deficiency of well-organized governmental institutions that show the weakness of war-torn countries (Paris, 2004, p.168). A security dilemma in which societal groups do not rely on the state to protect them against

enemies could be formed because of ineffective institutions. At this point, some groups could arrange organizations for self-defense. In contradiction to this situation, some other rival groups mobilize to guard themselves. This situation can lead to an ethnic war (p.173). Hence, Paris' attitude acknowledges that democratization and marketization can worsen societal bonds and advocates that institutionalization has essential significance before liberalization to prevent this kind of challenge (p.179).

The primary priority of the US-led coalition in Iraq was not merely rebuilding the state and providing legitimatization for the domination of violence. More importantly, it was to create a legitimate public power, satisfactorily autonomous of the occupiers to appreciate public respect and the inclusion of the diverse ethnic and religious communities (Luckham, 2004, p.497). Nevertheless, CPA applied universal liberal principles to transform the Iraqi state without taking into account the history of Iraq, which had faced 13 years of severe sanctions and three wars for twenty years. Hence, CPA's remedies were not adequate to maintain the Iraqi state without creating functioning state institutions (Dodge, 2013, p.1211). In this sense, Sultan Barakat points that "uniquely, Iraq was deliberately deconstructed in order to be reconstructed to a new model" (Barakat, 2005, p.567). At this point, the US-led coalition is observed the cause of the problem rather than the solution. In this sense, the legitimacy of the entire peacebuilding agenda is questioned if it is regarded as a way for the US hegemonic agenda (Luckham, 2004, p.485). In this respect, Richmond and Pogoddo claimed that "A peace dominated by liberal peacebuilding rests on external support and international, rather than local legitimacy. It results in a poorer quality peace in the local context" (2016, p.11).

In this chapter, the methods adopted by the interveners are examined, and challenges for constructing local legitimacy in the areas of the democratization, economic, and security realms are analyzed. Particularly, inclusiveness in the democratization, resource distribution, level of controlling force are paid attention because these are crucial points to build legitimacy in war-torn states (Higashi, 2015, pp.19-20). After this, what the basis of this peace was built, what implications it had, and whether the liberal peacebuilding agenda model promoted by the external powers was sustainable are answered. Basically, the viability of the liberal peacebuilding procedure will be questioned in the post-conflict Iraq as indicated by the Secretary- General's 2001 statement, 'No Exit Without Strategy',

Peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution', which includes building 'the social, economic, and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts (S/2001/394).

4.1. Challenges in the Democratization Realm

Democratization reform is considered a significant remedy for the resolution of ethnic struggles in post-conflict societies by the international community. According to the UN, democratization attempts to "constitute a comprehensive approach covering the broad range of new peacebuilding priorities: top-down international regulation of elections, institutional management, and economic management; but also bottom-up assistance to a democratic political culture through civil society building" (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

In the post-conflict societies, the holding of elections is the essential first phase toward the forming of an efficient political system and representative democracy.

The institutionalization of free and fair elections ensures the construction of democratic culture. Most importantly, holding elections and drafting a constitution help to establish a new government structure by forming legal and institutional roots (Jeong, 2005, p.114). However, although electoral systems are the tools that have the potential to create a positive change in peacebuilding, elections or drafting constitutions cannot easily take place in socially divided and politically polarized societies (p.115). Therefore, they do not always assure a stable political order if there are weak social institutions, and they might even reinforce divisive politics with additional prominence of ethnic divisions (p.116).

In this sense, although the democratic process provided significant moments for post-conflict Iraq, it could be argued that the liberal democratization project failed in certain points in the post-conflict Iraq. It created a legitimacy problem due to the absence of bottom-up social alteration. In other words, primarily social, economic, religious, and ethnic dynamics were not taken into consideration by the liberal democracy model in Iraq. In this respect, comprehensive models of democracy which embrace equality associated concerns such as citizen empowerment through more participation in the political process making (Bridoux & Russell, 2013).

In this sense, a lack of equality related concerns can associate with the rapid democratization model. This model does not regulate the relationship between modern and traditional institutions. Therefore, the model chooses the establishment of liberal institutions through intervention in suppressed societies. Such an intervention does not take into account their distinctive historical, political, and

economic features. On the other hand, the slow democratization model highlights the reinforcement of the state's capacity and institutions. Moreover, it necessitates a citizenship culture that fosters the competency of the state and the operation of administrative institutions (Hampson & Mendeloff, 2007, pp.686-688). Thus, legitimacy is guaranteed, and the ethnic and religious structures in the society are taken account. However, the ideological devotion of the US to a rapid democratization model which creates legitimacy problems could be seen in the representative structure and constitution-making process in post-conflict Iraq.

The representative structure which was created by the CPA increased distrust and ethnic-sectarian separatism in post-conflict Iraq. As a first job, the CPA began the process of de-Baathification. This process was affected by the politics of sectarianism and was questioned for two critical points. Firstly, only the Shiite sect involved in the leadership of the Supreme National Commission for De-Ba'thification. The Kurds did not gain this privilege (Ghanim, 2011, p.82). The Shiite group acted in political and sectarian revenge against the Sunni Ba'athists by benefiting from their monopoly power in the commission. In this sense, while they accepted many of the Shiite former Ba'athists to the new regime, they did not give the same chance to former Sunni Ba'athists. Second, the policy of de-Ba'thification was implemented by considering the Ba'th unjustifiably as a party on behalf of the Sunnis. However, the majority of the Ba'athists were Shiites, while the Ba'th Party embraced the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and other minorities (p.83).

After the de-Baathification, the CPA dedicated itself to the elite formation in the governing structures (Dodge, 2005, p.714). A governing council that was set up by the CPA in July 2003 consisted of thirteen Shia Arabs, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkoman, and one Assyrian. However, most of them were the people who lived in exile and opposed to Saddam Hussein (El-Shibiny, 2010, p.81). In this sense, the US had a strong sympathy for the Iraqi National Congress, (INC) which is one of the key opponent groups in exile in Iraq. Ahmed Chalabi and his leading supporters that have no ideological or institutional lines in Iraq. (Dodge, 2010, p.711).

On the other hand, the new elites which formed the bulk of members of the Council shaped the politics on the premises of 'us as a group.' While 'us' refers to the Shiites or the Kurds, 'them' refers to the Ba'athists or even the Sunnis. In this condition, the Ba'athists were delegitimized. Conversely, the new elite was legitimized because they had the right to rule the country (Ghanim, 2011, p.77). However, the new elite that was created by the interveners had limited administrative capacities. (Dodge, 2005, p.718). Moreover, this ruling elite was seen as pursuing their self-interests, instead of concentrating on reconstruction in the Council. In this respect, they were both dispossessed of the support of all Iraqis and were not acknowledged by the people (Pollack, 2004, p.19). In this sense, the CPA preferred collaborating with key fellows of the Governing Council instead of remaining impartial in the electoral process. This method shows the nature and limitations of the US peacebuilding and in particular, the state-building attempt in Iraq (Dodge, 2015, p.718).

When sovereignty passed to Iraqis with the creation of the new Iraqi interim government on June 30, 2004, Ayad Allawi became the prime minister of the interim government. However, he was not in Iraq for the past 30 years. He was directly linked to occupying powers and was not supported by the Iraqi people. According to an opinion poll entrusted by the US in 2004, he was the least admired politician and more than 50% Iraqis did not desire his authority. Moreover, another poll that is made before granting sovereignty on June 28, 2004, indicated that solely 11% of Iraqis had a positive attitude to the US administration, but this confidence was 47% in November 2003 (Ismael & Ismael, 2008, p.57).

It was clear from the way that the members of the new government had been selected according to the understanding of primordialism. Thus, Iraqi exiles had come to control the way US officials. At this point, it shows that the selection of representatives was of a contentious nature because it introduced explicit sectarianism that had not been realized mostly in the political arena of the Saddam regime. Moreover, this had the potential to destroy the successful process of government because the sectarian and religious attachment was seen to be more essential for becoming government council members instead of talents (Dodge, 2015, p.715).

Moreover, there was widespread use of patron-client relationships, which indicates neo-patrimonial characteristics in structuring the political arena, because of the inadequacy and incoherence of the Coalition ruling structure. One of the elements that led to this result is national parties. Political parties tried to acquire clients by

distributing benefits for their supporters in the absence of the state, which ensures security and effective services. Political parties were able to ensure jobs or security or direct access to resources to loyal people owing to their control of state institutions. This ability of parties was mainly surrendered of ministries which were selected by IGC because IGC members selected 'their sons or brothers in law' to assign minister (Herring & Rangwala, 2006, p.129). Moreover, political parties with representation in the IGC were treated as brokers between the local populations and the CPA. This kind of brokerage was observed mainly in the employment area. It was better to take a letter of recommendation (tazkiyya) from CPA affiliated parties to gain precedence for employment by participating in the parties or giving money (p.131).

Other than the representative structure, the constitution drafting process was shaped primarily by the interveners. The interveners chose the commission which was responsible for drafting the permanent constitution. Moreover, they formed the restrictions and interfered directly in the constitutional negotiations to protect the US interests (Al-Ali, 2014). Also, the constitution process, which consists of two procedures, had controversial points in terms of ethnic-sectarian dynamics. Firstly, until the ratification of the new constitution, Iraq had been administered considering the Transitional Administrative Law. At this point, Bremer stated that a "significant round won in favor of a secular Iraq" (Bremer & McConnell, 2006, p.303). However, it was not felt like a victory by some Iraqi people. The bulk of the Shiite Iraqi clerics, most remarkably Ayatollah Sistani, argued against the legitimacy of the TAL and rejected its validity. He claimed that "This law, which has been written by an

unelected council under the occupation and its direct influence, restricts the national [body] due to be elected at the beginning of the new year to draft Iraq's permanent constitution" (Open society & United Nations Foundation, 2004, p.49). Similarly, the Shi'a politician Ali Allawi asserted that "It is western provenance and its Kurd-centrism seemed to open the country to dismantling its Arab identity and to partition" (Allawi, 2007, p.224).

On the other hand, the approval of the new Iraqi constitution in the October 15 referendum did not indicate reconciliation on the country's future. A two-thirds majority in two refused the constitution (Papagianni, 2007, p.255). One of the most crucial features of this constitution was leading to a radical change in the state itself by adopting federalism in contradiction of the previously very centralized totalitarian model (Marr, 2007, p.42). The defining structure of the state is a very core point because the federal process proposes a complex range of political resources and restrictions to all of the key players in Iraq (Cameron, 2007, p.166). At this point, there were disagreements about the model of government. The most significant issue was related to the situation of Kurdistan. The goals of Kurdish people and the CPA contradicted with each other. The desire of the CPA was forming the governorates as the building blocks of the federation instead of separate, and more powerful ethnic or religiously described regions. At this point, the establishment of the Kurdistan region did not get along with the CPA's aim. Therefore, the CPA wanted to the dissolving of the Kurdistan region and to prevent the forming of regions from governorates (O'Leary, 2010, p.192). On the other hand, while among the Arab Sunnis, centrists wanted a stronger central government, decentralization was desired by some other

groups in power such as the Kurdish Alliance and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). In interviews guided by the United Nations Office for Project Service in 2008, 51.7 percent of the Sunnis considered that federalism would cause division of Iraq and 46.8 percent supposed that it would trigger civil war (Munson, 2009, p.188). After 2008, Prime Minister Maliki became the leading defender of the central authority by opposing the 'excessive' decentralization that "leads to division" (Al-Qarawee, 2014).

This constitution left some issues to be resolved most significantly the nature of federalism and the power of the central government (Marr, 2007, p.52). In this sense, the constitution is questioned in terms of federal characteristics. It can be argued to be incomplete because it does not include some provisions in the original drafting such as the formation of the Federation Council (articles 65 and 137), arrangement and work of the Federal Supreme Court (article 92) and Higher Juridical Council (article 90), methods for the foundation of the regions (article 118). However, these are significant to describe the future reality of federalism in Iraq. Moreover, federalism is criticized by being unclear on what is proposed by the constitutional text. For instance, the distinction between a governorate and a region is not detailed (Cameron, 2007, p.156). Although regions are intended to have a higher status, Kurdistan, in many parts of the constitution, as a governorate has a status and power similar or same to regions (p.157). Also, federalism is criticized by being asymmetrical because while Kurdistan is the sole federal region, the rest of Iraq is constituted of governorates. It is allowed to form an indefinite number of regions in the future because there is no specified limit for governorate. It is likely to occur for

a single governorate or a group of the governorate. In this sense, the regionalization element of the constitution has contradictory features that could create problems in the future to shape federal Iraq (Cameron, 2007, p.158).

All these main discussions about the state structure are based on the tripartite federal structure of Iraq. However, although the unitary political body is not applicable in Iraq, a strictly three-block federal structure which consists of the Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis is not suitable. Because there are many minorities and ideological, tribal, demographic, and urban-rural differentiations who do not feel to belong to any of these three blocks. In this sense, they should also be recognized to shape federal structure (Cameron, 2007, p.159).

4.2. Challenges in the Economic Realm

The liberal market attitude was another aspect that caused the failure of peacebuilding in post-conflict Iraq. Before the US invasion, the Saddam regime ensured the relative wealth of the Iraqi people with social state strategies that would maintain the legitimacy of the despotic authority (Bromley, 1994, p.141). In this political practice, which is also termed the 'oil curse,' political authorities in natural resource-rich countries keep political power and legitimacy by allocating resources to important bureaucrats, leading military personnel and regional leaders with interrelated to tribes or ethnic groups in their control. In this order, which is named the state model of distributing rents, providing they deliver complete public services

and meet essential needs with subsidies, the people can be prevented from pursuing legitimacy (Alnasrawi, 2001, pp.210-211).

After the invasion, new economic dynamics that were built in the framework of liberal peacebuilding directed the local actors to seek legitimacy in the economic sphere, unlike the Saddam era. The US's strategy concentrated on the comprehensive free movement of labor and capital, reorganizations on foreign trade, and the privatization of state enterprises. These reforms led the economy of Iraq to be one of the most accessible and unregulated in the world (Yousif, 2006, p.491). In this sense, Pugh et al.. point that in war-torn states, lack of social welfare and ensuring it to market creates the empty shell of the state (Pugh & Cooper & Goodhand, 2004). This situation was experienced in Iraq, and Iraqi public support had not been secured for the program of economic liberalization. As indicated by an opinion poll in Iraq in November 2004 by the International Republican Institute, 65% of the population approved a significant role for the state in the economy, and only 5% wanted a lesser economic function for the state (Herring & Rangwala, 2005, p.233).

The significant situation which caused to pursue of legitimacy was decentralization as an institutional reform by external powers. It affected many economic dynamics in Iraq by forming a federal administration. While decentralization is assumed as ensuring democratic participation and efficient administration, it maintains volatility at the local level when ethnic or religious groups resist decentralized governance due to their different interests (Costantini, 2013, p.266). One of these dynamics is related to the distribution and controlling of natural resources. According to the 2005

constitution, oil and gas revenues are controlled by the central government, but Art 111 and Art 112 created fragmentation and confusion between Baghdad and the predominantly Kurdish city of Erbil. Art. 111 proclaims that oil and gas resources are owned by the Iraqi people, regardless of their location (O'Leary, 2010, p.192). However, according to Article 112, while the central government asserts that it has monopoly power with the right to sign oil concessions in Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government claims that it has this right. Both assertions are correct because of the ambiguity of the article, which grants the federal government and regional government to give the power to explore the present fields and the right to sign oil concessions. These caused confrontations between the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government, which has accomplished to sign oil concessions with foreign companies since 2005 (Jawad, 2013, p.22).

On the other hand, the decentralization process and FDI flows have a reciprocal relationship. The polarized distribution of foreign direct investments boosted the disintegration process by broadening the gap between FDI-rich and FDI-poor governorates. Therefore, these foreign direct investments intensified competition between Iraqi governorates, where there is no mediation by the central government (Constantini, 2013, p.273). These spatial inequalities correspondence with ethnoreligious partitions, which creates danger for the country's cohesion (p.264).

Moreover, dependence on the oil economy continued in the rentier Iraqi state after Saddam. Neither the private sector nor the state could direct development efficiently, and they have directed the profound neo-patrimonial allocation of resources through

sectarian, ethnic, and party attachments. According to 2014 World Bank report, "there was no transformation in the structure of [Iraq's] GDP; ... the share of oil rents in GDP remained broadly stable from the mid-1990s to the present, despite the tumultuous events during this period" (Constantini, 2018, p.64).

In this sense, the formation of the neoliberal rentier system could not gain significant success. The expansion of the rentier economy led to risks for economic reconstruction. Somewhat limiting state intervention, protectionist procedures, and the widespread control the state was extensive in central areas, and the state was seen as a receiver of rents and as an economic actor. In this sense, as a critical matter in the country, the abundance of natural resources fosters a struggle for power of the state. Also, the natural resources had been used to finance the excessive public expenditures of the state instead of maintaining its investment capacity (p.71). As oil exports were the primary resources, 90 percent of government spending was delivered from them (Dodge, 2013, p.1209). Therefore, the development of the Iraqi's private sector attained small success despite the earlier optimistic anticipations. (p.69).

Expansion of the rentier economy shaped the sectarian-based patronage, and it led to an increase in corruption in the country. Iraq has been mislaying \$4 billion to corruption every year since the invasion (Looney, 2008, p.428). Transparency International's Corruption's Perception Index indicates that Iraq is the 175th out of 182 countries in 2010 and 2011 (Dodge, 2013, p.1209). This corruption fostered to

enlarge the informal sector after the 2003 invasion. The increase in the informal sector shows the decline of the formal labor market (Looney, 2008, p.436).

Besides, there were limited subsidies and no consistent system performing as a safety net during this period of transition to ensure public services and basic needs, unlike the Saddam era. In this respect, Iraqi Trade Minister Abdul Falah al-Sudany points out the detrimental effect of the cutting of government subsidies on local people "This means that...five items (will be distributed): Sugar, flour, rice, milk and cooking oil, which is cut in half from the ten items a significant portion of the Iraqi population rely on." Trade Minister Abdul Falah al-Sudany emphasized how these economic reorganizations were experienced by the Iraqis and caused a substantial decline in the standard of living of Iraqi people (Fitzgerald, 2010, p.6).

4.3. Challenges in the Security Realm

Although violence is not a unique situation in Iraq's history, the harsh increasing in political violence is unique, and this was a consequence of the political developments in 2004 and 2005 (Kuoti, 2016). In other words, shortcomings in the political engagement fostered conflicts in Iraq. Generally, in post-conflict societies, firstly, when the political process is perceived illegitimate by any group, their tendency to participate does not actualize. Secondly, if the desired conclusion is not yielded, groups are likely to find a defect from the system. In this sense, if they disregard the order, they are prone to participate in the conflict. Thirdly, if the groups feel that

their desires and views are not paid attention to, and their needs are not ensured, they search for new alternatives to reach their aims (Munson, 2009, p.167).

Since 2003, Iraq has dealt with numerous evolving armed conflicts rather than a single conflict between two different edges, mostly because of shortcomings in the political engagement. The threat groups could be divided into four categories: the Baathists (pro-Saddam Hussein), the Sunni nationalists, the Sunni Islamists (pro-al-Qaeda), and the Shia Islamists (pro-Iran) (Gunaratna, 2011, p.111). The combatants involve the Coalition and Iraqi government forces; the Kurdish peshmerga; Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq's (ISCI) Badr Organization; the Mahdi Army; the Fadila Party militia; the tribal, insurgent and local militias that make up the Awakening Councils; the groups in the Reform and Jihad Front (RJF); and the groups under the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) authority. Moreover, many of them are internally segmented, and structurally, local forces have a weak relationship with their central command (Herring, 2011, p.27).

The main reason which created challenges in the security realm was initial political developments which were based on mostly exclusion of the Sunnis rather than an inclusionary political process. Firstly, the Sunnis viewed de-Baathification as an intentional exertion to vindicate against them (Gunaratna, 2011, p.112). Secondly, several predominantly Sunni Arab political factions and parties, such as the Muslim Scholars Association, the Iraqi Islamist Party and some Arab nationalist groups, boycotted the elections. Their boycott caused extremely low voter turnouts in mostly Sunni provinces, with 29% participation in the Salaheddin province and a merely

2% in the Anbar province (Papagianni, 2007, p.265). As a result of the boycott, Sunni parties gained only 20 seats in the National Assembly. Thirdly, the constitution was approved with a referendum by October 15, 2005, although it was mainly rejected by the majority of Sunnis. Those steps that did not take into account the Sunnis' participation reinforced their hatred toward the new system, and they validated their attacks on the system and government by accusing them as illegitimate. While Sunni nationalists and Islamists had anxiety due to the Shia ruled government of Iraq, the Shia groups struggled with both the Sunni factions and the US-led coalition (Gunaratna, 2011, p.112). At this point, the Sunnis began to look for power in areas other than the political arena where they did not attain power through the democratic process.

Although they did not give a violent response at first, subsequently the Sunni elites embraced a new strategy to eliminate the Iraqi government because of unfair political arrangements. In this sense, statelessness militarized the sectarian minority by creating a sectarian minority. The Sunnis attacked the Shi'as and Kurds through car bombs, suicide bombers, ambushes. In the Hobbesian understanding, the weaker come together against, the stronger (Macdonald, 2014, p.226). Therefore, they decided to move together with other Sunni linked extremist groups such as Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq and al-Qaeda to disperse looser Iraqi administration (Kuoti, 2016).

Besides the exclusion of the Sunnis, the other issue which led to a challenge in the security realm was the persistent existence of parallel structures, namely, the militias.

The CPA assumed that in 2004, sixty thousand to one hundred thousand militia members depended on nine separate Shi'a and Kurdish groups. The CPA considered that these militia members must be coped with, and they tried to convince leaders to disband forces. However, the CPA could not achieve success because the Iraqi leaders supported these armed groups. Most of Iraqi leaders were backed by an armed group. Many of these militias permeated the government ministries under the protection of political parties. The separation of ministerial spoils located single parties and their militias to manage critical functions. For example, the Health Ministry, as well as agriculture, education, and transport portfolios were controlled by Sadrists. On the other hand, the Mahdi Army ensured protection for the Health Ministry buildings. Moreover, these militia members were enlisted in the ministry's official Facilities Protective Services (FPS) (Munson, 2009, p.207).

Besides, although significant reforms were implemented to transform Iraqi security forces, factionalization was the major problem. The Iraqi Police Service was directed by officers who have a commitment to their sect or militia instead of the national administration, although the CPA vetted recruits. For example, militia groups such as the Shi'a Badr Brigade and the Kurdish peshmerga claimed authority over their regional environment (Sedra, 2007, p.14). Moreover, Shi'a militias settled great parts of the army to enhance their collective interests (p.13). The Sunni reacted to these situations, and they accused Shi'a forces within the government for barring them from the government and state. Also, this environment was criticized not only by the Sunnis but also by the CPA. A senior US officer announced that "there are extremist

elements of Badr and of the Mahdi Army who are using their positions in the police against the Sunni population" (Munson, 2009, p.208).

4.4. Negative Hybrid Peace in Post-conflict Iraq

Hybridity had been designated and instrumentalized by interveners and was adjusted with a post-conflict Iraq by rarely embracing local (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2015, p.220). The four components of the model of hybridization which are the coercive authority of the liberal peace, the incentivizing power of the liberal peace, the ability of local actors to challenge the liberal peace, and the ability of local actors to provide options to the liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 92) could be observed in post-conflict Iraq. Since the invasion, architectures of liberal peace settled into a far more forceful and insensitive form of structural power for the locals (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.777). In this respect, counter-insurgency methods connected to peacebuilding and development strategies are unlikely to result in any positive hybrid peace, although they may emerge to manage conflict in the short term. It is observed that the liberal peacebuilding agenda started in 2003 has represented hybrid politics causing to at best a negative hybrid peace which hinge on mostly hybrid forms of politics that concretize existing power structures and hierarchies (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.230). The International Crisis Group report points out the local deficiency of peacebuilding in post-conflict Iraq

The cost of insufficient local involvement and consultation was several-fold: mistaken priorities, a disconnect between Iraqi aspirations and rebuilding efforts, and a lost opportunity to empower Iraqis, reform their institutions and, more generally, strengthen local capacity (International Crisis Group, 2004).

External powers recognized the elites' interests, and Iraqi politics was rearticulated based on sectarian lines. Paradoxically, although the US had a democratization aim, they were showing revengeful politics by fostering the procedure of de-Ba'athification (Ghanim, 2011, p.85). Once the CPA controlled power, it disbanded the Iraqi army, ended jobs of 50000 bureaucrats and closed the state-owned enterprises. In this sense, the US dismantled the state and led to a profound security vacuum and administrative turmoil. The Sunni elites recognized this situation as not only a regime change but also a revolution in which they transformed into a new underclass (Zakaria, 2007, p.264).

The democratization in which all factions of society accept free and fair elections necessitates a prior homogenization of the population. Without this, outcomes of elections are not likely to be recognized and might foster for either start off or a return to the factional struggle. This claim could be observed following the 2005 elections in Iraq (Rear, 2008, p.141). Moreover, the constitution does not reveal a national consensus because of the lack of negotiation and the exclusion of Sunnis (Herbert, 2018). In this sense, because of the deficiency of an inclusive transition leading to the January 2005 parliamentary elections and the October 2005 constitutional referendum and institutionalization of identity politics by strengthening of the Shia political actors, the Sunni Arabs were forced to reinvent themselves as a sectarian group. For instance, one Sunni political actor asserted, "we awoke one day and suddenly discovered that we are all Sunnis" (International Crisis Group, 2013). That means that the Sunnis had to politicize themselves as Sunnis

according to the political system, which was formed on the basis of identity politics (Haddad, 2014, p.151).

Although elections are doubtless one of the vital elements of legitimacy, this legitimacy does not remain permanent for the local population without delivering promises and services. This linkage between elections and serving was reflected in the Iraqi electorate concerning the aim of participating in the election. A citizen mentions: "I do not trust anyone of the candidates. I consider them as a group of thieves coming to get financial benefits for themselves and their political parties as Iraq is going to witness a campaign of reconstruction." A local from Basra states: "I will not participate in the upcoming elections. What happened in the past is the best proof. We challenged the enemies and the security situation, yet regrettably, those we voted for did not give us the simplest things, and that is services." These comments show that the elitist power-sharing political design did not indicate success to enable expected legitimacy (Ghanim, 2011, p.151). Besides, the record of governments was abysmal, and patron-client relationships embraced the distribution of resources by the government. The main cause for that is the political parties which allocated the spoils of government-cabinet portfolios and the jobs and resources (Dodge, 2007, p.35).

Moreover, the CPA's market shock therapy that indicates the desire of the external powers to reconstruct the economy of Iraq profoundly strengthened and provoked sectarian cracks boosted insecurity because its policies were obviously ill-suited to Iraq's conditions, neglecting social cracks and technical restrictions (Yousif, 2007,

p.57). In this sense, these reforms were disadvantageous and damaging to local recovery in the labor and welfare sectors. They led to the alienation of the local population and discouragement of the sense of local ownership over the peacebuilding process (Fitzgerald, 2010, p.4).

In post-conflict Iraq, state-society relations were directed by sectarian leaders, that gain their legitimacy from representing their group, instead of broad citizens owing to the political environment which was shaped by the interveners (Herbert, 2018). Wozniak described this type of effort as ideological blindness. This causes the problem of legitimacy (Wozniak, 2017, pp.814-815). Similarly, Klein claims that ideological blindness had three particular impacts. It damaged the probability of reconstruction by detaching skilled people; it prevented activities of secular Iraqis and led to the rise of counteraction (Klein, 2007, p.352). Moreover, state-society relations have been disrupted by weak state capacity to meet basic needs and public services. Increasing poverty, inequality, and corruption reduced trust in the state (Herbert, 2018).

Besides, in terms of security, "the eruption of political violence and enormous humanitarian calamity accompanying Anglo-American occupation saw ceaseless efforts to rhetorically identify all challenges to the new state project as foreign in origin and anti-Iraqi" (Ismael & Ismael, 2015, p.217). The intervener's efforts ignored the existence of local opposition within Iraq to the occupation. As a result, these efforts were merely strengthened by the eruptions of transnational Islamist

factions, involving an emergent al-Qaeda franchise under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (p.217). Therefore,

What the CPA did not do is halt Iraq's descent into civil war. With the return of sovereignty, violent resistance to the occupation devolved into an even more violent conflict between Sunni and Shi'ite extremist groups. Concerning security, arguably the most important aspect of any post-conflict mission, Iraq comes near the bottom in any ranking of modern postwar reconstruction efforts (Dobbins, 2009, p.326).

Overall, the US-led restructuring process in Iraq was noticed by the development of identity politics, which clustered along sectarian lines (Mansour, 2016). Specifically, the dissatisfaction of the local actors based on identity was explicitly observed. Sunnis were not provided strong political representation since 2003 because of the exclusion of representative Sunni leaders with the de-Ba'athification process, the refutation of the post-2003 democratic processes by many Sunnis (Herbert, 2018). As a consequence, Sunni Iraqi citizens were abridged in participating in the political process. However, Sunnis alleged that they were rightful rulers of Iraq and that they could best direct the country since Ottoman times. In the new democratic system, they asserted that they should persist at the core of government (Munson, 2009, p.158). One of the Sunni citizens Chiad stated that in Iraq, "We do not have a representative state. We do not even have a state" (Mansour, 2016).

As a result of these processes, a variety of non-state armed groups surfaced in Iraq looking to gain resources and power in the absence of strong governance (Herbert, 2018). A resister from the Sunni zone clarified that his inspirations were revenge for civilian deaths led by Coalition troops, the fear of Shia domination, religious

liability, and retribution for the misuse of the Sunni rule. He emphasized that "the world must know that this is an honorable resistance" (Munson, 2009, p.148).

On the other hand, although Kurds were very effective in the political process, obtaining autonomy, land, and resources, their impact decreased notably because of their rejection of Iraq's political system, and boycott of parliament (Herbert, 2018). In the Kurdish parliament, Barzani rejected propositions that Iraq be characterized as an Arab nation. He stated that "Let Arab Iraq be part of the Arab nation. We are not, and We will not accept that Iraq's identity is Islamic." He further claimed that "This is a golden chance for Kurds and Kurdistan. If we do not do what is important for Kurdistan, there will be no second chance. We will not make our final decision in Baghdad; the Kurdish parliament will decide" (El-Shibiny, 2010, p.174).

In this sense, peacebuilding attempt which was constructed along hybrid politics led to take direction to negative hybrid peace in post-conflict Iraq in which peace is neither liberal nor emancipatory. The state became externally dependent and subjected to international capital (Richmond & Pogoddo, 2016, p.8). In this sense, it is observed that a constructed hybrid political order in which national elites govern country for international favors. It is questioned whether there was truly localized hybridity because Western powers frequently guaranteed the political system, constitution, and economic structure. (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2015, p.233). At this point, peacebuilding attempts focused on rapid political and economic transformation without paying attention to local legitimacy and therefore, did not produce either an efficient state or sustainable peace. As emphasized by Campell and Peterson (2013)

"state-building and peacebuilding have been merged into a technocratic set of projects and programs that tend to strengthen the capacity of the central government, not state-society relations, responsiveness or accountability" (p.343). Similarly, Richmond points out that liberal peacebuilders build capacity-less, virtually liberal, post-conflict states by expecting the following and responding positively from society. They recognize local politics as deviant and local economies as corrupt. Thus, they build democratic processes with almost immediate effect, and they did not succeed in ensuring welfare for the local population (Richmond, 2008, p. 294).

Moreover, post-2011 developments indicated the discontent from the side of local actors and confirmed a lack of legitimacy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was continued to be accused because of exclusionary sectarian policies by Sunnis. As a result of the Shia-dominated government's disappointment of the inclusionary political process, tens of thousands of Sunnis took part in anti-government protests, and this process permitted the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) to reorganize. In 2013, it enlarged into Syria and rebranded again as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by enlisting thousands of Sunnis. By June 2014, a third of the country was taken control by ISIS. The rise of the ISIS led to more divided Iraqi society with the participation of tens of thousands of men, mostly Shia, to new and old militias. Besides, the increase of ISIS caused interference a second time. Between 2015 and 2017, the territory was progressively regained from ISIS by the Iraqi security forces, Kurdish peshmerga and Shia armed groups supported by airpower ensured by US-led coalition. In December 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi proclaimed retaken control over all Iraqi territory (Hamasaheed & Nada, 2019).

However, the end of the occupation by the Islamic State (ISIS) and regaining of the whole territory did not bring stability to Iraq. Since 2018, violent protests of Shiites began to rise. It could be the greatest threat apart from Kurdish separatism and Sunni jihadism for the Shia-dominated government. The main accusation of demonstrators was against Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. They accused him of being incapable of controlling the violence of the police, military, and paramilitary units, involving Iranian Shiite militants reinforced by Iran. At this point, the leader of the Shiite clergy in Iraq, great Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, conveyed his support with the demonstrators by stating that "the people of Basra suffer from a lack of public services", and by urging "federal and local authorities to take the demands of the citizens seriously and to find solutions urgently." Therefore, the Iraqi political elite confronted the most critical existential challenge since the US invasion (Adriaenssens, 2018).

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter evaluated challenges in the democratization, development, and security realm in post-conflict Iraq. The main drawbacks of the practice in terms of inclusiveness of government, resource distribution, and level of controlling force in this kind of multiethnic society, are analyzed. Formation of negative hybrid peace with rapid political and economic transformation without taking account of the legitimacy of local actors specifically Sunnis, Kurds, Baathists, armed groups were attained until the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. Besides, it is indicated that

situations did not progress post-2011. The exclusionary political process, the emergence of ISIS, and the rising of demonstrations exacerbated the conditions in post-conflict Iraq.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis reviewed the critical peacebuilding approaches to address the limitations and weaknesses of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. Subsequently, the implementation of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict Iraq was examined. Through an investigation of the US-led peacebuilding activities in the selected case study, this thesis seeks to criticize the liberal peacebuilding attempt to create legitimacy at the local level. Iraq's case showed that liberal peacebuilding policies did not correspond with Iraq's state-society relations, and this created negative hybrid peace because the interveners did not take into consideration Iraq's historical background and different religious and ethnic identities while applying the prescriptions of liberal peacebuilding.

In the democratization realm, de-Ba'athification and a new representative model had been implemented through rapid democratization. In this sense, external powers mainly engaged with the local, narrowly at the elite level and the turn to the significant local has been mostly superficial in the practice of peacebuilding. Therefore, this transformation led to a political power struggle between different ethnic and religious groups in the post-2003 period. On the other hand, in the economic sphere, free-market economic reforms were presented in Iraq. However, the mix of a rentier and decentralized state with free-market reforms led to more societal contestation in Iraq where different ethnic, sectarian group of people live. In this sense, these kinds of policies have generated more violence between those

groups and lack of legitimacy between the state and society due to lack of inclusion. Although new reforms related to security forces were implemented to create a secure environment, they did not have the adequate capacity to prevent violent situations because of the shortcomings in the political engagement and ethnic-sectarian factionalization. In this respect, reconstructing security forces is only one part of sustainable peace. The high violence rooted in political requires a political solution.

In this sense, this thesis problematizes the lack of appreciation for the local in the implementation of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict states. It shows the challenge of constructing legitimacy in democratization, economic, and security realms in multi-ethnic societies. This study indicates that reforms in post-conflict Iraq were implemented to realize the liberal peace agenda and not to achieve sustainable peace and development. It argues that a more deep understanding of the heterogeneous nature of local actors is necessary to ensure sustainable peace. Therefore, legitimacy should be taken into consideration for the achievement of sustainable peace without forceful and insensitive means. The contribution of the dissertation to the literature is to reveal the entire picture of the implementation of liberal peacebuilding and question the viability of this process in war-torn societies. Generally, this research points out the necessity for an alternative peacebuilding strategy beyond the superficial mainstream technocratic approach, which appreciates the local context profoundly for the creation of sustainable solutions in post-conflict societies.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Giriş

Bu tez, ABD'nin yerel aktörlerin meşruiyetini sorunsallaştırarak ABD'nin Irak'taki işgalinden sonra 2003 ve 2011 yılları arasında liberal barış inşası / devlet kurma sürecini analiz ediyor. Savaş sonrası devlette liberal barış inşasının uygulanabilirliğini sorgulayarak barış inşasını kavramsallaştırıyor. Ayrıca, liberal barış inşası burada liberal demokrasinin ve serbest piyasanın kurulmasıyla anlatılmak istenmektedir. Bu tez uluslararası ve yerel aktörler arasındaki karşılaşmaları incelemek için bir mercekle olarak hibridite kavramını kullanmaktadır. Yerel kavramını, politik, ekonomik ve güvenlik sürecinde çatışma sonrası toplumun belirli sektörlerini temsil eden aktörlere işaret etmektedir. Bu noktada özellikle Sünniler, Kürtler, Baasçılar, bir dizi devlet dışı silahlı grup gibi yerel aktörlerin memnuniyetsizliğini dikkate alır.

Barışın temelini ne olduğu, müdahale eden aktörün yerel aktörler ile nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğu, bu barışın güçlü devlet-toplum ilişkileri sağlayıp sağlamadığı gibi sorular sorulur. Seçilen vaka çalışmasında ABD liderliğindeki barış inşası faaliyetlerinin araştırılmasıyla bu tez, liberal barış inşası pratiğinde yerel meşruiyet eksikliğini eleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu tez beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk giriş bölümünden sonra, ikinci bölümde liberal barış inşasının özellikleri ve liberal barış inşası yaklaşımının eleştirileri açıklanmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde, bu tez 2003 ve 2011 yılları arasında Irak'ın çatışma sonrası durumunda liberal barış inşası gündemindeki eksiklikleri ve kısıtlamaları analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dördüncü bölümde, demokratikleşme, kalkınma ve güvenlik alanında meşruiyet yaratmanın önündeki zorluklar bulunmaktadır. Çatışma sonrası analiz edilen Irak ve uygulamanın hükümetin kapsayıcılığı, kaynak dağılımı ve bu tür çok ırklı toplumdaki kontrol gücü seviyesi açısından temel sakıncaları dikkat çekiyor. Bu zorluklar doğrultusunda, barışın temelinin ne olduğunu, araya giren aktörün yerel aktörlerle nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğunu, bu barışın güçlü devlet-toplum ilişkileri sağlayıp sağlamadığını gösterir. Temel olarak, dış güçlerin desteklediği liberal barış inşası gündem modelinin sürdürülebilir olup olmadığını göstermektedir. Son bölüm, çatışma sonrası Irak'taki liberal barış inşasının analizi ile sonuçlandırılır.

Politik Dönüşüm

ABD'nin Nisan 2003'te Bağdat'ı işgal etmesiyle otuz beş yıllık tiranlık sona erdi. Bununla birlikte, müdahalenin ardından iki yıl içinde Irak, haydut bir devletten çökmüş bir devlete döndü. Müdahale en az 140 farklı çıkar grubunun ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Ayrıca işgal yerel özyönetim konseylerinin çoğalmasına neden oldu. Ulusal düzeyde, üniter Baas Partisi yerini birçok siyasi parti aldı. Bu partiler, soldan sağa ideolojik yönleri kapsamakta ve laik ve dini amaçları temsil

etmektedir. Ancak, demokrasi sađlandığında etnik, mezhepsel veya ideolojik farklılıklar sürmektedir.

Haziran 2003'e kadar işgalci güçler Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi'ni geçici bir yönetim olarak kurdu ve Saddam'ı devirdikten sonra geçici yönetimi başlattılar. Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi'nin başkanı Paul Bremer, liberal değere bağlı olarak liberal barış inşa etme yaklaşımını benimsedi. İlk olarak, Paul Bremer, devleti liberal barış inşası için birincil tehdit olarak gördü. Bu görüş devletin radikal bir reformuna neden oldu ve devlet kurumlarının gücü, Baas partisi bağlantılı insanların yönetimden uzaklaştırılmasıyla kasıtlı olarak azaltılmıştır.

Temmuz 2003'te, Irak Geçici Hükümet Konseyi, ABD devlet yapısının çökmüş olduğunu ve reform için güvenilir ve sağlam kurumların olmadığını fark ettiğinde BM ile işbirliği içinde kuruldu. Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi, Irak Hükümet Konseyi'ni Irak tarihindeki en temsilci yapı olarak onayladı. Bu nedenle Irak Geçici Hükümet Konseyi'ni, Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi tarafından belirlenen 13 Şii, beş Sünni, bir Türkmen ve bir Hristiyan oluşturdu.

Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin, egemenliğin Irak'a verilmesi konusundaki baskısının artması, Irak toplumunun Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi'nden uzaklaşması ve siyasi şiddetin artması, egemenliğin Bush yönetiminden Irak'a devredilmesine yol açtı. 15 Kasım 2003'te Geçici Koalisyon Otorite adına Paul Bremer ve Irak Geçici Hükümet Konseyi adına Celal Talabani tarafından 15 Kasım Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla Irak'taki siyasi yapılanma süreci daha net bir şekilde

ortaya çıkmaya başladı. Böylece egemenliğin yeni bir Irak yönetim organında olduğu, bir anayasa oluşturma ve serbest seçimler yapılması kararlaştırılmaya başlandı.

ABD ve İngiltere'nin yaklaşık 13 aylık Irak'ta işgali sona erdi ve Irak Geçici Hükümeti 30 Haziran 2004'te egemenliği aldı. Kasım 2010'a gelindiğinde, Şii al-Mâlikî'nin Başbakan, Kürt Celâl Tâlabânî'nin Cumhurbaşkanı ve Sünni Usâmah El-Nujaifi'nin Parlamento Başkanı seçilmesiyle siyasi süreç belirginleşti. Başka bir deyişle, 2010 seçimlerinin bir sonucu olarak, 2005'ten beri iktidarda olan Şii-Kürt ittifakı sürdürüldü. Ancak, Irak'ın siyasi durumu, federalizmin doğası, yeni bir petrol yasası ve toprak anlaşmazlıklarının hükümleri, 2011'de Başkan Obama'nın Irak'taki Amerikan birliklerinin tamamen geri çekilmesine kadar hüküm sürdüğü anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle, Şii ve Kürt partileri arasındaki ittifakla kırılgan ve zayıf kalmaya devam etti.

Irak anayasa süreci, devlet işgalinden sonra dış müdahale altındayken başlatıldı ve devlet, anayasa öncesi egemenliğini aldı. Bu anlamda, anayasa taslak oluşturma süreci iki farklı ve ardışık rejim tarafından yönetildi. Mart 2004'te, Geçici İdare Kanunu, Irak Hükümet Konseyi tarafından hazırlandı. Bu kanun, geçici meclis kurulmasından ulusal seçimlere kadar hüküm süreceğini belirtti. Ayrıca bu kanun, daimi bir anayasa taslağının hazırlanmasından sonra ulusal referanduma sunulması ve Iraklıların çoğunluğu tarafından onaylanması gerektiğini öngörüyor. Geçiş Millet Meclisi 30 Ocak 2005'te seçildikten sonra, Anayasa Komitesi, anayasa taslağını hazırlamak için mecliste görevlendirilen 55 siyasi parti üyesinden oluşmuştur. Irak'ın

daimi anayasası Irak federal sistemini onayladı ve on sekiz valilikten on altısı tarafından Kürdistan bölgesi kuruldu. O zamandan beri Kürdistan bir federal yapı olarak ve diğer mevcut bölgelerin sahip olmadığı federal hükümetle federal bir ilişkisi vardır.

Ekonomik Dönüşüm

Piyasa liberalleşmesi, liberal barış inşasının ekonomik boyutunda temel bir bileşendir. Çatışma sonrası ülkelerde, ekonomik dönüşüm kalıpları büyük ölçüde dış kurumlar tarafından yönlendirilmektedir. Ekonomik süreç, devletin rolünü azaltan, özelleştirmeye ve ihracata bağımlılığı ve ekonomik büyümeyi teşvik etmek için dış yatırımlara bağımlı olarak, özel rekabeti ve serveti teşvik eden makro-ekonomik istikrar önermektedir. Bu anlamda, 1990'ların sonlarından itibaren savaş sonrası devletler için ekonomik kalkınmanın yolu Washington konsensüsünden türetilmiştir. Washington konsensüsü, serbestleşme, istikrar, mali tasarruf gibi makroekonomik reform unsurları ve özelleştirme, doğrudan yabancı yatırımları teşvik etmek gibi mikro ekonomik reformlardan oluşmaktadır. Esas olarak, mali disiplin, vergi reformu, finansal serbestleşme, doğrudan yabancı yatırım, özelleştirme, serbestleştirme, döviz kurlarını içermektedir.

Müdahaleden sonra, Washington konsensüsünün unsurları çatışma sonrası Irak'ta uygulanmaya başladı. Bununla birlikte, Irak ekonomisini yeniden inşa etmenin zorluğu iki yönlüydü. Öncelikle, çatışma sonrası ekonominin yeniden yapılandırılması, daha sonra merkezi bir ekonominin piyasa ekonomisine dönüştürülmesi gerekiyordu. ABD'nin ilk işi Irak'ı küresel ekonomik sisteme

entegre etmek için girişimlerde bulunmaktı. 2003'ten önce, Irak ekonomisi kamu iktisadi teşekküllerinden oluştuğu için yabancı yatırımcılara hitap etmiyordu. Bu anlamda, yabancı özel sermayeyi çekmek ve iç ekonomiyi yeniden tesis etmek için, Geçici Koalisyon Hükümeti iki temel stratejiyi benimsemiştir. Birincisi, yatırım alanında benimsedikleri stratejilerle Irak'ın bütün ekonomik durumunu değiştirdiler. Bunlar, yardım programları (vergi), işletme direktifleri ve kurumsal yeniden yapılanmayı (merkez bankasının oluşturulması) içerir. İkincisi, özel sektöre yönelik daha müdahaleci bir duruş sergilemişlerdir.

Güvenlik dönüşümü

İstikrarlı güvenlik ortamı, çatışma sonrası toplumlarda barış inşası için en önemli konulardan biridir. Çatışma sonrası durumlarda, şiddet ve yasa dışı faaliyetler artmakta ve yerel güvenlik koşulları, istikrarlı güvenliği sağlamak için sıklıkla yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, çatışma ortamları uluslararası topluma işlevsel olmayan yerel kurumların bıraktığı güvenlik boşluğunu kısa vadeli olarak doldurma ihtiyacı ve yerel güvenlik sektörünü yeniden inşa etmenin uzun vadeli hedefi olmak üzere iki soruna neden olmaktadır.

Resmi işgal 2004'te sona ermesine ve egemenlik Irak hükümetine geçmesine rağmen, çatışma sonrası Irak'ta ABD büyük bir askeri ve daha az derecede siyasi ve ekonomik rol oynamaya devam etti. ABD ve Koalisyon ortakları, Irak güvenlik sektörünü yeniden düzenlemek için Irak'ın geçmişiyle ayrılmaz bir biçimde bağlantılı üç ana zorlukla karşılaştı. Bunlar, isyanı engelleme, kaliteye odaklanarak

yeni modern Irak güvenlik güçleri yetiştirme ve demokratik ilkelere bağlı nitelikli sivil güvenlik kurumları kurmaya dayanıyordu.

Çatışma Sonrası Irak'ta Barışın Doğası

Demokratikleşme reformunun, çatışma sonrası toplumlardaki etnik mücadelelerin uluslararası toplum tarafından çözülmesi için önemli bir çözüm olduğu düşünülmektedir. BM'ye göre, demokratikleşme, geniş kapsamlı yeni barış inşası önceliklerini kapsayan kapsamlı bir yaklaşım oluşturmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bu anlamda, demokratik süreç çatışma sonrası Irak için önemli anlar sağlasa da, liberal demokratikleşme projesinin çatışma sonrası Irak'ta belirli noktalarda başarısız olduğu söylenebilir. Aşağıdan yukarıya doğru bir sosyal değişimin olmaması nedeniyle bir meşruiyet sorunu yarattı. Başka bir deyişle, öncelikle Irak'taki liberal demokrasi modelinde sosyal, ekonomik, dini ve etnik dinamikler dikkate alınmadı. Fakat, eşitliği benimseyen kapsamlı demokrasi modelleri, siyasi süreç yapımına daha fazla katılarak vatandaşların güçlendirilmesi gibi kaygıları beraberinde getirmektedir.

Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi'nin oluşturduğu hızlı demokratikleşme modeli ile yapılan temsili yapı, çatışma sonrası Irak'ta güvensizliği ve etnik-mezhepsel ayrılıkçılığı arttırdı. İlk iş olarak, Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi Baaslaştırma sürecini başlattı. Bu süreç, mezhepçilik politikasından etkilendi ve iki kritik nokta açısından sorgulandı. Birincisi, yalnızca Şii mezhepleri, Ulusal Baaslaştırma Komiserliği önderliğinde yer aldı. Kürtler bu imtiyazı alamadılar. Şii grubu, Sünni Baasçılara

karşı komisyondaki tekel güçlerinden yararlanarak siyasi ve mezhepsel intikam aldı. Bu anlamda, Şii eski Baasçıların çoğunu yeni rejime kabul etmelerine rağmen, eski Sünni Baasçılara aynı şansı vermediler. İkincisi, Baasçıların yönetimden arındırılması politikası Baas üyelerinin Sünniler adına bir parti olarak düşünülmesiyle uygulandı. Ancak, Baasçıların çoğunluğu Şiiler iken, Baas Partisi Sünnileri, Şiileri, Kürtleri ve diğer azınlıkları kucakladı.

Baaslaştırmadan sonra, Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi kendini idari yapılarda elit oluşumuna büyük ölçüde önem vermiştir. Temmuz 2003'te Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi tarafından kurulan bir yönetim kurulu on üç Şii Arap, beş Sünni Arap, beş Kürt, bir Türkmen ve bir Asur'dan oluşuyordu. Ancak, çoğu sürgünde yaşayan ve Saddam Hüseyin'e karşı çıkan insanlardı. Bu anlamda ABD, Irak'ta sürgündeki kilit rakip gruplardan biri olan Irak Ulusal Kongresi üyeleri Ahmed Çelebi başta olmak üzere karşı büyük bir sempati duyuyordu.

Böylece, Irak sürgünleri ABD yetkililerinin çıkarını kontrol etmeye gelmişti. Bu noktada, temsilcilerin seçiminin çekişmeli bir yapıya sahip olduğunu gösteriyor, çünkü Saddam rejiminin siyasal arenasında henüz gerçekleşmemiş olan mezhepçiliği ortaya koyuyor. Dahası, bunun başarılı bir hükümet sürecini yok etme potansiyeli vardır çünkü hükümet konseyi üyeleri olmak için mezhepsel ve dini bağların yetenekler yerine daha önemli olduğu görülmüştür.

Demokratikleşme alanındaki sıkıntılar dışında, ekonomik alanda da önemli ölçüde yrel meşruiyet oluşmasını engelleyen durumlar görülmektedir. Bu durumda, liberal

piyasa tutumu, çatışma sonrası Irak'ta barış inşasının başarısız olmasına neden olan bir diğer yöndü. ABD işgalinden önce Saddam rejimi, Irak halkının göreceli zenginliğini despotik otoritenin meşruiyetini koruyacak sosyal devlet stratejileri ile sağladı. 'Petrol laneti' olarak da adlandırılan bu siyasi uygulamada, doğal kaynak bakımından zengin ülkelerdeki siyasi otoriteler, kaynakları önemli bürokratlara, önde gelen askeri personele ve bölgesel liderlere kendi ülkelerindeki kabileler veya etnik gruplarla ilişki içinde bulundurarak siyasi güç ve meşruiyette tutarlar. Devletin tam kamu hizmeti sunmalarını ve sübvansiyonlarla temel ihtiyaçları karşılamalarını sağlayan bu düzende insanların meşruiyetlerini sürdürmeleri engellenebilir.

Yapılan reformlarla birlikte ademi merkeziyetçilik süreci ve doğrudan yabancı yatırım akışları karşılıklı bir ilişki içindedir. Doğrudan yabancı yatırımların kutupsal dağılımı, zengin ve fakir valilikler arasındaki boşluğu genişleterek dağılma sürecini artırmıştır. Dolayısıyla, bu doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar, merkezi hükümetin arabuluculuk yapmadığı Irak valilikleri arasındaki rekabeti artırdı.

Kiralayıcı ekonomisinin genişlemesi, mezhep tabanlı patronajı şekillendirdi ve ülkedeki yolsuzlukların artmasına neden oldu. Irak, işgalden bu yana her yıl 4 milyar dolar yolsuzluğa yol açtı. Uluslararası Şeffaflık Örgütü'nün Yolsuzluk Algı Endeksi, Irak'ın 2010 ve 2011'de 182 ülkenin 175'inde olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu yolsuzluk 2003 işgalinden sonra kayıt dışı sektörün genişlemesini sağlamıştır. Kayıt dışı sektördeki artış, resmi işgücü piyasasının düşüşünü göstermektedir.

Demokratik ve ekonomik alan dışında, güvenlik alanında zorluklar yaratan asıl sebep, dahil edici bir siyasi süreçten ziyade Sünnilerin dışlanmasına dayanan ilk siyasi gelişmelerdi. Birincisi, Sünniler Baasileşmenin aleyhinde hakaret etmek için kasıtlı bir çaba olarak görüldü. İkincisi, çoğunluğu Sünni Arap siyasi fraksiyonları ve Müslüman Alimler Derneği, Irak İslamcı Partisi ve bazı Arap milliyetçi grupları gibi partiler seçimleri boykot etti.

Sünnilerin dışlanmasının yanı sıra, güvenlik alanında bir zorluğa yol açan diğer konu, milislerin kalıcı varlığıydı. Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi, 2004 yılında, altmış bin ila yüz bin milis üyesinin dokuz ayrı Şii ve Kürt grubuna bağlı olduğunu varsaymıştır. Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi bu milis üyelerinin başa çıkılması gerektiğini düşündü ve liderlerini güçlerini dağıtmaya ikna etmeye çalıştılar. Ancak, Irak partilerindeki liderler bu silahlı grupları destekledikleri için Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi başarı sağlayamadı. Irak liderlerinin çoğu silahlı bir grup tarafından desteklenilmeye devam etti.

Demokratik, ekonomik ve güvenlik alanındaki dönüşüm ve zorluk yaratan durumlar incelendiğinde Hibriditenin, müdahaleciler tarafından araçsallaştırılmakta olduğu görülmektedir. Nadiren yerel halkla bütünleşilerek çatışma sonrası Irak'ta uyarlanmıştır. Çatışma sonrası Irak'ta liberal barışın zorlayıcı gücü, liberal barışın teşvik edici gücü, yerel aktörlerin liberal barışa direnme kabiliyeti ve yerel aktörlerin liberal barışa alternatif sağlama kabiliyeti olan hibridizasyon modelinin dört bileşeni görülebilir. Müdahaleden bu yana, liberal barış mimarileri bölge halkı için çok daha zorlu ve duyarsız bir yapısal iktidar yerleştirmiştir. Bu bakımdan, barış inşası ve

kalkınma stratejileriyle bağlantılı isyancı yöntemlerin, kısa vadede çatışmaya yol açsalar da, herhangi bir pozitif hibrid barışla sonuçlanma olasılığı düşüktür. 2003 yılında başlatılan liberal barışı oluşturma gündeminin, mevcut güç yapılarını ve hiyerarşilerini somutlaştıran çoğunlukla hibrit politika biçimlerine dayanan negatif bir hibrid barışı ortaya çıkaran hibrid politikaları temsil ettiği görülmüştür. 2004 Uluslararası Kriz Grubu raporu, çatışma sonrası Irak'taki yerel barış inşasının yerel eksikliğine işaret eder. Bu rapora göre, yetersiz yerel katılım ve istişarenin maliyeti fazlaydı. Bunlara yanlışı öncelikler, Irak'ın istekleri ile yeniden yapılanma çabaları arasında bir bağlantı olmaması ve Iraklıları güçlendirme, kurumları yeniden düzenleme ve daha genel olarak yerel kapasiteyi güçlendirme fırsatını kaybetmesi örnek verilebilir.

Çatışma sonrası Irak'ta dış güçler elitlerin çıkarlarını tanıdı ve Irak siyaseti mezhepsel çizgilere dayanarak yeniden dile getirildi. Paradoksal olarak, ABD demokratikleşme hedefine sahip olsa da, Baaslaşma sürecini kurumsallaştırarak ve güçlendirerek intikamcı politikalar sergiliyordu. ABD önderliğindeki koalisyon hükümeti iktidarı ele geçirir geçirmez, Irak ordusunu dağıttı. 50000 bürokratin işine son verdi ve kamu iktisadi kuruluşlarını kapattı. Bu anlamda ABD, devleti parçaladı ve derin bir güvenlik boşluğu ve idari kargaşaya yol açtı. Sünni seçkinler bu durumu yalnızca bir rejim değişikliği değil, aynı zamanda onları yeni bir alt sınıfa dönüştüren bir devrim olarak da kabul ettiler.

Toplumun bütün kesimlerinin özgür ve adil seçimleri kabul ettiği demokratikleşme, nüfusun önceden homojenleşmesini gerektirir. Bu olmadan, seçimlerin sonuçlarının

tanınması muhtemel değildir ve hizip mücadelesine geri dönüşü tetikleyebilir. Bu iddia, Irak'taki 2005 seçimlerinin ardından görülebilir. Dahası, anayasa, müzakere eksikliği ve Sünnilerin dışlanması nedeniyle ulusal bir fikir birliği ortaya koymuyor. Bu anlamda, Ocak 2005 milletvekili seçimlerine ve Ekim 2005 anayasa referandumuna yol açan kapsayıcı bir geçişin olmaması ve Şii siyasi aktörlerinin güçlenmesiyle kimlik politikalarının kurumsallaştırılması nedeniyle, Sünni Araplar, kendilerini bir mezhep grubu olarak yeniden icat etmeye zorlandılar. Bu durum bir Sünni siyasetçinin “bir gün uyandık ve aniden hepimizin Sünni olduğumuzu keşfetti” ifadesiyle de daha iyi bir şekilde anlaşılabilir. Bu, Sünnilerin kendilerini kimlik politikaları temelinde oluşturulan siyasal sisteme göre Sünniler olarak siyasallaştırmaları gerektiği anlamına gelir.

Seçimler kuşkusuz meşruiyet unsurlarından biri olsa da, bu meşruiyet vaatler ve hizmetler sunmadan yerel halk için kalıcı değildir. Seçimlerle yapılan oylama arasındaki bu bağlantı, seçimlere katılma hedefiyle ilgili olarak Irak seçmenlerine de yansdı. Bu konuda bir vatandaş "Ben adaylardan kimseye güvenmiyorum. Irak'ın yeniden yapılanma kampanyasına şahit olacağı için onları kendileri ve siyasi partileri için finansal fayda sağlayacak bir grup hırsız olarak görüyorum." Basra'dan bir vatandaşa göre ise : “Gelecek seçimlere katılmayacağım. Geçmişte olanlar en iyi delildir. Düşmanlara ve güvenlik durumuna meydan okuduk, maalesef, oy verdiklerimiz bize en basit şeyleri yani hizmetleri vermediler. " Bu yorumlar, elitizm odaklı siyasi tasarımın beklenen meşruiyeti sağlayacak başarıya ulaşmadığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, devlet tarafından kaynak dağılımı da patron-müşteri ilişkileri

çerçevesinde belirlendi. Bunun temel nedeni iş ve kaynakları tahsis eden siyasi partilerdir.

Ayrıca, dış güçlerin Irak ekonomisini radikal bir şekilde yeniden yapılandırma arzusunu belirten Geçici Koalisyon Otoritesi'nin piyasa şoku terapisi, sektörel çatlakları güçlendirdi ve güvensizliği artırdı. Bu anlamda, bu reformlar dezavantajlı ve işgücü sektörlerinde yerel toparlanmaya zarar vericiydi. Bu nedenle bu politikalar yerel halkın yabancılaşmasına ve barış inşası sürecindeki yerel mülkiyet duygusunun cesaretinin kırılmasına yol açılar.

Ayrıca, güvenlik açısından, Amerikan işgaline eşlik eden siyasi şiddetin ve muazzam insani felaketin patlak vermesi, yeni devlet projesine yönelik tüm zorlukları menşeli ve Irak karşıtı olarak belirsizce belirleme çabaları gördü. Müdahilin çabaları, Irak'taki yerel muhalefetin işgalle ilgili gerçeklerini görmezden geldi. Sonuç olarak, bu çabalar uluslararası İslamcı grupların yayılma imkanını arttırdı. Bu nedenle, Koalisyon otoritesinin, Irak'ın iç savaşa girişini durdurmadı. Egemenliğin Irak halkına geçmesiyle, işgale karşı şiddetli direniş, Sünni ve Şii aşırılık yanlısı gruplar arasında daha da şiddetli bir çatışmaya dönüşmüştü. Çatışma sonrası misyonunun önemli bir yönü olan Irak, savaş sonrası yeniden yapılanma çabalarının herhangi bir sıralamasında en alt seviyeye yaklaşır.

Bu anlamda, hibrid politikalarla inşa edilen barış inşası girişimi, barışın ne liberal ne de özgürleştirici olduğu çatışma sonrası Irak'ta “negatif hibrid barışı” oluşmasına neden oldu. Devlet dış güçlere ve uluslararası sermayeye bağımlı hale geldi. Bu

anlamda, yapılandırılmış hibrid politika düzeninin ulusal seçkinlerin uluslararası çıkarlar için yönettiği görülmektedir. Bu nedenlerle, batılı güçler sıklıkla siyasi sistem, anayasa ve ekonomik yapıyı güvence altına aldığından, gerçekten yerleşmiş bir hibriditenin olup olmadığı sorgulanır.

Sonuç

Demokratikleşme alanında, idari kurumları Baas Parti'sine yakın olan insanlardan arındırma ve yeni bir temsilci model hızlı demokratikleşme yoluyla uygulanmıştır. Bu anlamda, dış güçler esasen yerel ile, dar bir düzeyde elitlerle ilişkileri oluşturmaya gayret göstermiş ve kayda değer bir şekilde yerel halka dönüş barış inşası pratiğinde yüzeysel olmuştur. Bu nedenle, bu dönüşüm 2003 sonrası dönemde farklı etnik ve dini gruplar arasında siyasi bir güç mücadelesine yol açmıştır. Öte yandan, ekonomik alanda Irak'ta serbest piyasa ekonomi reformları başlatıldı. Bununla birlikte, merkezi olmayan bir devletin serbest piyasa reformları ile tanıştırılması, farklı etnik ve mezhep gruplarının yaşadığı Irak'ta daha fazla toplumsal çekişmeye neden oldu. Bu anlamda, bu tür stratejiler, bu gruplar arasında daha fazla şiddet yaratmış ve kapsayıcılık eksikliğinden dolayı devlet ile toplum arasında meşruiyet eksikliği yaratmıştır. Her ne kadar güvenli bir ortam yaratmak için güvenlik güçleriyle ilgili yeni reformlar uygulanmış olsa da, bu reformlar siyasi engajmanı ve etnik mezhepsel hizipleşmesindeki eksiklikler nedeniyle şiddet olaylarını önleme kapasitesine sahip değillerdi. Bu açıdan, güvenlik güçlerinin yeniden yapılandırılması sürdürülebilir barışın yalnızca bir parçasıdır. Yoğun şiddet, meşruiyeti tetikleyen ve politik bir çözüm gerektiren politik koşullardan kaynaklanmaktadır.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Sarı
Adı / Name : Gamze
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