

CITIES OF POST-POLITICS: DEPOLITICIZATION OF URBAN POLITICS IN
THE CONTEXT OF ISTANBUL'S MEGA-PROJECTS

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ABSTRACT

CITIES OF POST-POLITICS: DEPOLITICIZATION OF URBAN POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF ISTANBUL'S MEGA-PROJECTS

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This thesis analyzes the process of depoliticization of the urban political space in different means. With the help of the urban post-political literature and Jacques Ranciere's political theory, the thesis aims to evaluate the foreclosing moments in the urban space through discourses made by the state-elites in the Istanbul's mega-projects, the Third Bosphorus Bridge and the Istanbul Airport. It is argued that the mega-projects have also dramatic effects on the urban political space besides their tremendous socio-economic consequences. In this sense, this thesis aims to contribute newly emerging urban post-political literature and fill the gap in terms of foreclosing moments against the political through not only consensual participatory mechanisms but also elites' urban populist discourses. Moreover, it is equally important to show the Ranciere's political theory which post-political approach is originated. Secondly, the thesis tries to interpret why today's local government have turned their attention to construction of the mega-projects. Lastly, the Istanbul's mega-projects are evaluated with their importance for the politics of the urban space with the question of what democratic politics is.

Keywords: mega-projects, post-politics, Ranciere, urban politics, depoliticization

ÖZ

POST-POLİTİKANIN KENTLERİ: İSTANBUL'UN MEGAPROJELERİ BAĞLAMINDA SİYASETİZLEŞEN KENTSEL POLİTİKA

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Bu tez kentsel siyaset mekanlarında farklı araçlarla sürdürülen siyasetizleştirme sürecini analiz etmektedir. Kentsel post-politika literatürü ve Jacques Ranciere'in siyaset teorisinin yardımıyla bu tez, İstanbul'un mega-projeleri olan Üçüncü Köprü ve İstanbul Havalimanı'nda devlet elitleri tarafından üretilen kentsel mekandaki kapatma anlarını değerlendirme amacını gütmektedir. Mega-projelerin, muazzam sosyo-ekonomik sonuçlarının yanı sıra kentsel siyaset alanının üzerinde de çarpıcı etkilerinin bulunduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu anlamda, bu tez, yeni ortaya çıkmakta olan kentsel post-politika literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı ve siyasetin kapanma anlarını yalnızca fikir birliği üreten katılımcı mekanizmalarla değil aynı zamanda elitlerin kentsel popülist söylemleriyle de ele alarak literatürdeki boşluğa katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, öncelikle post-politika literatürünün ayrımının göstermek amacıyla genel anlamda kent siyaseti teorilerinin değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Dahası, post-politika literatürünün önemli parçasını oluşturan Ranciere'in yaklaşımının ortaya koyduğu siyaset teorisini de göstermek aynı derecede önemlidir. İkinci olarak bu tezde, günümüzün yerel yönetimlerinin dikkatlerini neden mega-projelerin yapılmasına çevirdiği yorumlanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Son olarak İstanbul'un mega-projelerinin, demokratik siyasetin ne olduğu sorusu bağlamında kent mekanı politikaları için önemi incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: mega-projeler, post-politika, Ranciere, kentsel politika, siyasetizleşme

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims the question what makes politics significant in relation to interventions to urban space. It tries to interpret the governance practices and discourses produced through Istanbul's Third Bridge and the new airport, in other words, Istanbul's mega-projects. In this context, the thesis focuses on the debates over post-politicization processes which different perspectives on urban discuss struggles over the politics of the urban space. Moreover, the post-political city perspective is evaluated with the one of the key thinkers within the theory, Jacques Ranciere in order to examine what politics means today. In doing so it also aims to shed light on the forms of depoliticization. From this point of view, recently developed post-political city theory is analyzed in relation to analyzing the consequences of Istanbul's mega-projects in terms of urban politics.

Since the end of the Keynesian welfare state, cities have been frontal arena, on the one hand, for restructuring of the political-economy of space with various dramatic interventions on the built-environment, and on the other hand, radical transformation in the politics of urban space. In broad sense, the radical changes within the built environment during the neoliberal era can be listed in three phases: Firstly, there has been micro and macro scale gentrification of the city space which was witnessed not only in the places experiencing urban decay but also through commodification of the new landscapes with the emergence of the gated communities. Secondly, there has been remarkable attention to the attractiveness of hosting mega-events and constructing prestigious exposition centers. And lastly, the neoliberal mode of interventions has turned its attention to iconic mega-projects that dominates contemporary urban landscapes (Karaliotas, 2013).

In parallel with these developments in the urban space across the world, the neoliberal urbanization of Turkey followed these patterns over nearly 40 years. Moreover, the extent of urban interventions has reached radical levels when the Justice and Development Party (the JDP) came to power in 2002. Although the JDP has been giving significant importance to the local development, for the president in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Istanbul has a particular significance. For him, Istanbul is not only Turkey's 'display window' but also the city has been the locomotive of the party's development perspective, which emphasizes the global identity of the city ("İstanbul Türkiye'nin özetidir", 2017). In this context, the city has witnessed dramatic urban renewal considered as "flagship projects" targeting not only rehabilitation of the urban space that experienced urban decay with the deindustrialization such as ports and waterfronts, but also destruction of slums in order to create space for accumulation of urban rent through gentrified housing (Öktem, 2006, p.59). Moreover, the city's landscape has witnessed transformation through highlighting social and cultural attractiveness of Istanbul with new expo-centers and colossal stadiums which were eventually mobilized for hosting mega events such as Turkey's consequent application for Olympics throughout 2000s (Bilsel & Zelef, 2011). Lastly, the city has experienced a sequence of mega-projects from 2010 and onwards when Turkish economy struggles with the torment of 2008 financial crisis.

Indeed, these developments have had huge effects for the socioeconomic of the urban space as well as dramatic outcomes for the politics of the urban space. Moreover, in the light of the results of these projects, this thesis aims to evaluate what Erik Swyngedouw (2011), inspired by the political thought of Jacques Ranciere, defines as the post-politicization process. According to this approach urban politics is constricted in the neoliberal perspective of urban space and depoliticization of the space is realized through consensual practices by adopting means of representative institutions and governance. Nevertheless, the thesis aims to show that these mega-projects are not only subject of good and bad governance or mechanisms of capital accumulation by making urban space a place for extraction of the rent but also it has a political meaning, which indicates rethinking the urban space as the space of struggle between different urban futures, where one is prevail and others are foreclosed. In other words, the

existing power system is mobilized to depoliticize the urban political space in order to negate the alternatives. Therefore, with this purpose, the motives that makes contemporary urban politics anti-political and anti-democratic can be traced. In this sense, this thesis aims on the one hand, to contribute recently developing urban post-political theory, and on the other hand, to rethink urban space through “re-centering” politics to urban space in relation to consequences of mega-projects (Swyngedouw & Dikeç, 2017, p.3). In this sense, the thesis centered on the discursive practices of the state elites which aspire to foreclose the alternative movements and questioning perspectives against the mega-projects of Istanbul.

With this motivation, the structure of thesis consists of five more chapters in addition to this introductory one. In Chapter 2, the foundational theoretical framework will be discussed. The initial point of the analysis is to open a debate on what makes post-political urban theory distinct from the other prominent approaches on urban politics. In parallel to this purpose, at first, Ranciere’s conceptualization of politics and the interpretations of his political theory in approaching space is presented in an attempt to search for what makes the politics significant in terms of politics of space. Besides, it also contributes on entering the discussion on the depoliticization of urban politics through the practices of what Ranciere refers as the police which is the forms of foreclosing the political. Moreover, the chapter also draws attention to the distinction of post-political standpoint with the mainstream urban political approaches, the urban growth machine, urban regime theory, and Marxist account of urban politics. Afterwards, the modes of post-political consensual governance regime are analyzed and followed by the examinations on the different cases in the United Kingdom, Spain and Russia. Overall, the chapter is concluded with the suggestion of that the consensual practices is the one form of the foreclosing the political. With more assistance Ranciere’s political thought, Chapter 3 revisits his political theory in general in order to emphasize the other forms of the disavowal of politics. Therefore, the chapter introduces Ranciere’s basic concepts with the purpose of integrating his ideas on politics within his general point of view. Therefore, the chapter, on the one hand, discusses the definition of politics and democracy in Ranciere’s theory, and on the other hand, it also evaluates what would anti-democratic and anti-politics mean, thus, ends with the introducing four forms of disavowal of the political. Chapter 4 tries to

bring the discussion on what is the significance of mega-projects for contemporary urban politics. In this context, the question of why city governing has turned its attention to construction of mega-projects is discussed. Moreover, the chapter also tries to answer what makes urban mega-projects as research question. Chapter 5 constitutes the core element of the research. The chapter aims to show the post-politicization moments in the Istanbul's mega-projects through introducing the actors and their main objections toward the projects. It continues with the discourse analysis of the state elites' that constantly marginalizes the opposition with the public declarations. Concluding chapter revisits the final endings of the thesis. In an attempt to synthesizing the urban post-politics and its theoretical background with the moments of disavowal of the political in the urban space in Istanbul's mega-projects case, the thesis insists that the post-politicization process is not only about the consensual governance mechanisms but also about the urban populist discourses produced to eliminate alternatives and disagreeing voices.

CHAPTER 2

REVISITING URBAN POLITICS

Ranciere's conceptualization of politics is indeed not an urban political theory itself rather it offers an alternative approach to the how to perceive today's politics in general. The crucial moment is that politics does not indicate power relations or conflict of particular demands derived from different interests. Politics is the sphere which the wrong is pointed and equality is verified. Therefore, the urban space becomes political by becoming the arena where the politics may take place. In this sense, urban post-political literature aims re-centering politics at the urban political theory by taking urban space as the site for political encounter, political subjectification by the conflict of different views on the appropriation of the space (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017). Thus, the post-political urban theory aims to propose an alternative perspective to the approaches which take urban politics as the evaluation of the government's institutional practices. Moreover, the post-politicization indicates the endless struggle of the views on the organization of governance rule which instrumentalizes politics to a techno-managerial and biopolitical attempt to arrange daily lives within the cities (Swyngedouw, 2017). In this sense, the post-political condition is not only institutional practices that aim to emerge artificial consensus between parties but also foreclosure attempts which the dominant discourses constantly eliminate the alternative movements by making their voice as noise.

In this context, this chapter shall be discussed firstly what makes politics important in terms of approaching to the space. Therefore, the prominent theories on urban politics and space shall be evaluated. Moreover, it aims to shed light upon the question of what makes post-politics a form of depoliticization. Secondly, prominent forms of

depoliticization within the post-political city literature shall be discussed by highlighting the examples experienced in the different cities around the world.

2.1 Politics and Police Order at Urban Space

At a broader level, literature of post-politics refers to a debate on what is politics and what is not. Post-political condition refers to a relentless conflict over the form of governance that articulates the neoliberal techno-managerial governing regime and biopolitical interventions to the political scene. However, the post-political condition does not mean disappearance of politics in the contemporary world (Swyngedouw, 2017). On the contrary, it is an attempt for rethinking the complex nature of contemporary politics and revitalizing the politics as a way of struggle. In general terms, the scholars on the discussion concern with the disavowal of politics, democracy and emancipatory struggles against the evacuation of the political. The discussion in the field benefits from various thinkers but the prominent thinkers can be marked as Jacques Ranciere, Alan Badiou, Slavoj Zizek. However, these thinkers show some differences on their approaches to the politics. Firstly, Badiou's approach to the politics, which can be summed up as a process of emancipation, shows similarities with Ranciere and Zizek. For Badiou, politics is not the echoing of the determinant; on the contrary, it is a stage where equality is presented. He defines politics as "collective action, organized by certain principles that aims to unfold the consequences of a new possibility which is currently repressed by the dominant order". Thus, the rupture with the existing order is the site where emancipatory politics may exist instead of representative processes (or what he calls as capitalo-parliamentarism) where all the popular energy is channelized towards the results of the elections (Badiou, 2008, p. 31). However, the difference of Badiou in defining the politics is his favor for political militant who is the member of an intellectual discipline that works towards the possibility of the politics rather than a militant who is a member of a party (Power & Toscano, 2010). On the other hand, Ranciere approaches to the politics as power of anyone and everyone who indicates the disagreement with the existing order. Moreover, Badiou identifies the democracy as the form of state and way of life in contemporary world whereas for Ranciere (2011a) democracy is the staging equality and politics which is tested, verified and put in question in engagement with the

dominant social order. Although Žižek agrees with the deontological space that is defined by the antagonism, he puts the class struggle at the heart of the question rather than the democracy and politics (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). In this context, as shall be detailed in the following chapters, Rancière's conception of politics and democracy might illuminate the conditions that urban politics faces today by asking questions on what is democratic or antidemocratic, what is political and what is not.

For Rancière, the end of politics signaled by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the early 1990s. The end of the Soviet system spread two parallel ideas. Firstly, it appeared as the end of the only alternative to the liberal democracy and, secondly, as the end of the Marxist alternative to the mainstream political philosophy (Nash, 1996). What is at work for the space of the political was replaced with the conception of “an exercise of politics synchronous with the rhythms of the world”, a world that declared the triumph of capitalism and free market when the Warsaw Pact dissolved (Rancière, 1995, p.6). Moreover, the role of political philosophy has been reduced to find the space for what is proper for politics which crystalize with the various forms of the disavowal of politics. In this sense, the end of politics indicates the what Rancière refers as the post-democratic condition in modern era.

What does post-politics/post-democracy mean? What is its importance in Rancière's political thought and how does it affect the political conditions of today? Broadly speaking, the post-politics refers to the subordination of the political to the unquestioned framework of representative democracy and the doctrines of neoliberal economics (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). In other words, political confrontations are reduced to policy problems which is managed by the experts and is legitimated participatory stakeholder mechanisms to reduce to scope of possible solutions to the plausible options for neoliberalism. In this sense, what ‘initial scandal of politics’ is this negation of equality, negation politics as ‘there is no part of those who have no part’ amongst the field of experts and professional politicians (Rancière, 1999, p.14-15). In Rancière's thought, equality is to be understood as neither definable condition nor sociological nature of human existence, but it is ontologically given and, it is verified and affirmed with the performative actions when the wrong is exposed to enumerate what is plausible in the eyes of state and society, or in other words, distribution of the sensible. The negation of equality follows with the dissolution of

people as the concept that individuals partake to verify equality and, the people is replaced by the blurred numbers and digits, more precisely, by so-called population with its opinion polls, check and balance mechanisms and public surveys. In this context, Ranciere (1999, p. viii) argues:

One may object that the whole point is that politics purged has once again found the proper place for deliberation and decision-making concerning the common good (...). The problem is that these are very places where the disenchanting opinion spreads that there isn't much to deliberate and that decisions make themselves, the work proper to politics simply involving an opportune adaptability in terms of the demands of the world marketplace and the equitable distribution of the profits and costs of this adaptability.

This subordination does not only include ideological instruments, moreover, it is embodied in institutional forms that includes privatization, coordination between corporate agendas into public policy through close formal and informal networks within the decision-making procedures such as public-private partnerships and build-operate-transfer models (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). At that point, Ranciere argues the paradoxical legitimization of the state, which is “reinforced by the very affirmation of its own impotence, of its lack of choice faced with the world-wide necessity it is dominated by” (Ranciere, 1999, p.113). On the other hand, the domination of capitalism and its necessities within the national and local institutions have further consolidated by the dissolution of democracy that includes its own core element, the verification of equality, is negated by in the name of democracy itself with the consensual democratic action and post-democracy. In this sense, for Ranciere (1999, p. 102), post-democracy is “the government practice and conceptual legitimization of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests”. In this sense, politics is reduced to what Ranciere calls as the police order which not only comprehends the power activities operated by the state institutions, but also includes all the symbolic functions which constitutes existing order in the social. Then, as Ranciere (1999, p. 29) concludes,

The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are

assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise.

Lastly, it is necessary to discuss that what makes police order a spatial phenomenon? It has been already emphasized that the role of police order in Ranciere is attributed to allocation of places and roles. In this sense, the space does not only function as a arena for exercise of power but it also includes the efforts conducted by the police order to create spatial fixes of partitioned places which makes plausible voices to be heard and rest of them remain noises (Dikeç, 2005; Karaliotas, 2014). In this sense, anti-democratic politics are the means of reducing the volume of disagreeing voices into sounds that cannot be meaningful demands. Hence, from the perspective of police, society is a sum of individuals dedicated to the distributed, specified missions in which occupations are performed to make “some places are places of noise, others of voice; (...) public spaces are designated for the mingling of peaceful souls and not for the protestors of injustice, and so on” (Dikeç, 2005, p. 174).

2.2 Revisiting Urban Politics and Means of Neoliberal Urbanization

Towards the 21th century, new urban politics perspectives emerged in response to changing economic and political environment after the crisis of Keynesian welfare system. The prominent approach was the ‘public choice theory’ developed in the North American cities which puts urban societies under a vulgar race for capital. According to the public choice paradigm, the best urban policy management would be that offers the minimal taxation while providing quality in public services (Şengül, 2009). Eventually, the residents would choose the optimal alternative to increase their well-being. In this sense, if local governments would like to foster their economy, they must deal with the servicing the efficiency and attracting investment rather than engaging politics with the redistributive and egalitarian means (MacLeod, 2011). Eventually, public choice theory targeted the disappearance of politics in urban space, however, theories in two mainstream paradigms objected the goal of wiping the politics. Firstly, pluralistic perspectives of urban growth-machine and urban regime theory shall be detailed and afterwards Marxist perspective on urban politics in the intercity competition shall be discussed. In this context, at first, the approaches for the pluralist

account of urban politics at the birth of intercity competition and neoliberal governance shall be summarized. Afterwards, the Marxist perspective on neoliberal urbanization will be open to debate and later, it will be proceeded with the discussion about what could post-political approach contribute to ongoing discussion on urban politics.

2.2.1 Urban growth-machine and Urban Regime Theory

One of the prominent perspectives towards intercity competition and modes of neoliberal governance developed with the approaches of the ‘city as a growth-machine’ and ‘urban regime’ theories by detailing the conditions of urban politics within the global competition between cities. Against the public choice theory claims in which direct attention for achieving prosperous city within the brutal competition is solely about selecting efficient policies that improves local economy, the urban growth-machine theory unfolds political economic formation of the coalitions that drives cities towards economic development by different means in urban politics. For the growth-machine theorists, urban politics is about competing interests and visions on city and each part of its landscape represent the ultimate impression of triumphant viewpoint and benefit. According to the prominent scholar in the city as a growth machine theory, Molotch (1976, p.309), “a city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite”. Although they compete on different perspective for issues, the key consensus that connecting elites towards their common interest is the concept of growth (Molotch, 1976). Therefore, as long as growth continues, the city would not be in a position in the intercity competition. Interlocal competition is legitimized by the flexible capital’s fluidity that puts jobs and taxes base at risk (Cox, 1999). Since the land represents aggregate of interests, each parcel of the landscape represents what is plausible for that use of land in terms of growth.

In this context, urban politics is determining what is plausible for land use. Therefore, urban politics is about aggregation of ideas on how to grow a city, not only for rentiers and urban entrepreneurs but also for media corporations and governing officials (MacLeod, 2011). That ‘growth-machine’ distributes and redistributes these ideas.

Eventually, the growth-machine coalition needs to convince people for importance of growth in terms of their welfare (Jonas & Wilson, 1999). Thus, nature of politics in the growth-machine theory is nested on the what Molotch (1976, p. 314) called ‘we-feeling’ which indicates various tools to create an ideological apparatus for local boosterism. This ‘we-feeling’ is created by the constellation of different actors whose aims are attracting rent towards their land. Therefore, the cluster of agents becomes a form of coalition that aggregates the ideas, which may be particularly different but are consensually the ally of the local growth since each part of the community grows while the others cannot benefit from the missing stimulators. Although the members of the coalition in single place might be inconsistent in many aspects, the coalition at a higher scale is achieved in relation to intense competition between cities. Under the banner of the key ideological tool, the fear of losing jobs in the absence of growth is promoted by different fields manipulated by the growth coalition. For Molotch (1976, p.316), the commonly appealed ideological tool consists of media and newspapers since they generally represent themselves as the “voice of the community”. Since media and newspaper are not local decision-makers, they do not intervene with the local planning matters such as how to manage the long-term planning. Rather, what become crucial is whether city prospers, and in cases where it does not, they become the space for the coalition to make their demands visible. Therefore, the ideological tool harmonizes different parts of the community around the main discourse on growth. Moreover, Cox (1999, p. 23-24) makes a distinction between ideologies: on the one hand, the “territorial ideologies” stipulate unities of interest as central discourses, while on the other hand, it needs to be adapted “ideologies of the local community” indicating the belief system that mobilize ‘we feeling’ at the local level. The territorial ideologies are the interests on a place, which are agreed by the all parts of the community. What unifies the coalition may be different regardless from their particular interests. It would be claims on risk of losing tax and job due to the interlocal competition, it might indicate attracting the central government subsidies. However, the territorial ideologies need to be coherent with the ideologies of local community, which has been sharing all the parts of the community. In this sense, Cox approaches to local in a more active way. Since, the application of territorial ideologies may collide with the values in the community, the coalition must consider the ideologies at the local level.

Another prominent pluralist account of urban politics is the urban regime theory. According to urban regime analysis, the modern urban politics is composed of various and vast patterns of interdependence, which puts politics as a critical position in terms of establishing necessary cooperation among the different elements in the community (Stoker, 1995). Similar to the growth-machine perspective, the regime analysts put emphasis on the coalition-building that aims the local growth and development at the heart of their critique. However, the fundamental difference is the attribution of importance to the structures such as economic forces, which “shape and are shaped by political arrangements” (Stone, 1993, p.2). Under the pressure of external structural forces and complexity among the actors in relation, governing capacity could not be captured by the merely electoral means, but it needs to be created and maintained by the partners of the regime (Stone, 1993).

In urban regime theory, politics is not about aggregation of preferences and interests as in the mainstream pluralist paradigm. Politics is about governing power alongside the other institutions in the regime and, how in that process consensually agreed ideas become prominent (Stoker, 1995). Since the preferences are fluid and formed in the dynamic social interactions, interaction that people engage shapes preferences “including understanding about what is feasible and what is not” (Stone, 1993, p.11). However, people do not engage in politics equally. Those with superior resources have the opportunity to manipulate and rally their cause. The resources are not only financial, they also include managerial capacity, technical expertise, etc. (Stone, 1993). In this sense, urban politics is not about a subordination relationship since the complex nature of the urban system would not let the domination of a particular group to another, but the politics is about capacity to do (Şengül, 2009).

Although growth-machine perspective is clearly voluntarist since involving urban politics is about having an idea on the use of land in terms of growth and about willing to participate the aggregation of ideas on local development, urban regime theorists acknowledge the inadequacy of popular control over the coalitions and of the government’s incapacity to response the needs of disadvantaged groups (Stoker, 1995; Jessop, Peck & Tickell, 1999). Moreover, the participation in the local growth coalitions and urban regimes are generally close to the ordinary people whereas the bourgeois organizations enjoy relatively huge sphere under the name of public-private

partnerships. Increasing number of consultant firms, development agencies and elite associations in different economic sectors (such as chamber of commerce or of industry) make easy for elites to influence the local state and manipulate decisions of the coalition towards the market-led initiatives. Therefore, the identifying urban policy's vision is clearly driven by small number of bureaucrats, bourgeoisie and consultants. In this sense, on the one hand the growth coalition with its small council of elites creates a vision of business-friendly city by different means, on the other hand, the members of the regime or the coalition represent themselves as the only legitimate partner whose voice needs to be heard of. Thus, urban regime and growth coalition becomes the ultimate stakeholder that can manipulate the decision-making process whereas the disagreeing voices are moderated or eliminated. In this context, the capacity to influence urban politics is reduced to the specific political sphere and defined actors. However, the regime and growth coalition theories underestimate the relationship between the legitimate stakeholders and decision-makers against the those who has no part of that process. The partners of the coalition and regime require a unity of the whole and leave no sphere for politics that debates around the policies may occur. In conclusion, the elites posit no alternatives except the what neoliberal agenda pushes with its market-led solutions to the urban problems and the disagreeing voices are the ones that either needs to be convinced or be excluded.

2.2.2 Urban Entrepreneurialism and Marxist Approaches Neoliberal Urban Governance

The Marxist account of urban politics is voluminous but, in this part, it shall be tried to set forth common concepts that touch upon the urban politics in the literature. The very first common concept is the defiant proclamations of neoliberalism and the intense infiltration of its agenda in every aspect of social life including multiscale transformation of social life towards the commodification in favor of the capital. On the other hand, neoliberal agenda needs concrete strategy of institutional arrangements which are the crucial tool for realization of its aims. To define what the neoliberalism is, the best generalization would be the creation of forms of intervention related to the governance, which are premised on the extension of market forces towards brutal

competition distributed within the different social and spatial parts. Neoliberalism has been a pretentious and comprehensive doctrine for globalized competition and state rescaling in national and local scale (Brenner, 2004). Moreover, it has been characterized as a miracle formula for global economies of the world, which are vulnerable to the capitalism's disordered nature. The neoliberal agenda was pointed to crisis-torn economies of the ex-Soviet Union, Asia, Africa and Latin America as pure and simple model for salvation in the global economy. Conditioned with a commitment to intense extension of competitiveness, economies of the world set sail for aggressive form of state downsizing, austerity financing and new forms of public service (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

Prior to detailing the condition of urban politics in neoliberal era of globalized capitalism, it is necessary to explain briefly the indicators of neoliberal strategy in order to understand the motives that shape urban landscape and urban policy making in today's capitalism. For this purpose, Brenner and Theodore (2002) give an important sight for capturing the manifestations of neoliberal ideas in this sense. For them, it is needed deserve particular attention to two issues directly related to neoliberalization process. Firstly, neoliberalism claims the dramatic duality between state, market, and social organization and, secondly, premised upon the universal consensus on policy implementation models indicates that identical results would follow if particular frame of mentality in governing deployed. In other words, if the doctrine of neoliberalism is strictly followed, the outcomes would be perfect as expected. Thus, as what is social is separated from governing, the matter is only between 'good' and 'bad' management of government bodies. In this sense, 'the art of governing' becomes a technical issue within the closed doors of so-called competent experts and institutions varying according to the expertise domain to solve identified problems. Neoliberalism proposes its doctrine for growth as "one-size fits all" which indicates the insistence on fixed strategies would follow similar outcomes all the time in everywhere (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.353). This consensus on strategies have been resulting what is at stake as economic field which wisdom of elites in bureaucracy and non-governmental organizations specialized in economy and management. Duality between competent and ignorant is consolidated around between who knows how to manage the city or the nation towards development and who does not

understand (or supposed to be have no idea) on economy, with the intention of depoliticization blocking the alternatives and oppositions to the neoliberal model.

The advancements in the neoliberalization of the state are, indeed, bounded to the developments in the mode of urban governance. In other words, there is a clear interconnectedness between the changing structure of state and interventions to the urban landscape, thus, the management of the city. the neo-Gramscian approach analyze how the state is rescaled, reorganized and positions itself at the urban level (Brenner, 2004). The capitalist accumulation strategies' hegemony is at the center of the analysis and struggles for the securing an accumulation strategy, which determines the reorganization of the state, is central for analyzing urban politics (Jessop, 1997). Neil Brenner analysis this interconnectedness in two forms. Firstly, the reorganization of the state according to dominant mode of capital accumulation simultaneously brings the spatial restructuring of the state (Brenner, 2004). Against the mainstream perspective on the globalization which consist of flow of ideas, goods, people, money, culture and capital as a result of the deterritorialization, Brenner (1999, p. 432) insists on the "reterritorialization" that is the process of rescaling forms of territorial organization. In this sense, state institutions adopt "state spatial strategies" to promote particular form of capital accumulation and organize itself in relation to hierarchies between scales in targeted locality and to territorial division of labor which distributes jurisdiction spheres, moreover, these reorganization is formed according to "state spatial projects" that unifies the partitioned, differentiated institutional bodies and transforms it according to the needs of the aimed goal (Brenner, 2004, p.93). For example, state spatial projects may target the recalibration of administrative boundaries such as decentralization or centralization whereas the state spatial strategies adjust the means of intervention to the designated geographies such as whether the interventions to the city should take a redistributive role in terms of wealth. Furthermore, spatial reorganization of the state is not fixed, static result of various interactions amongst capitalism, national and local state, and inherited scalar and organizational structure of the state institutions. Brenner points out that state spatiality is process rather than a container (Brenner, 2004). This is followed by the second assumption of the "embeddedness" of neoliberal restructuring process of the state in relation within the inherited institutional organization from legacies of previous

restructuring developments in targeted geography (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 349). Therefore, the neoliberalization of the space needs to be analyzed through the inherited institutional landscape that neoliberalism settles in, historical territorial organization against the previous and regime alliances in search for their demands to be met. In this sense, the result is “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism which respectively means the state selectively decision on the destruction of the inherited regulatory bodies and creation of new institutional environment (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.381). Lastly, from this analytical standpoint, Brenner concludes that we are living in a times of “planetary urbanization” since the crucial problems that the humanity faced today is global, moreover, urban is represented as both cause and solution of these destructive troubles such as climate crisis, income inequality and poverty (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, p.151). As neoliberalization of the urban governance intensifies across territories, new forms of institutional environment create a process of urbanization with different means such as cluster of population in metropolitan areas or shanty districts containing sweatshops. However, the planetary urbanization does not establish fixed form of habitats and settlements rather it is a relational process in terms of realization of existing socio-economic relations (Brenner & Schmid, 2015). Moreover, even the rural areas do not exist without their articulation to the planetary urbanization with the agricultural industry, seasonal worker networks or export-oriented agricultural foods. Eventually, the conclusion of this perspective is that:

The urban is thus no longer defined in opposition to an ontological Other located beyond or ‘outside’ it, but has instead become the very tissue of human life itself, at once the framework and the basis for the many forms of socio-spatial differentiation that continue to proliferate under contemporary capitalist conditions (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, p.174).

In this sense, politics became urban since there is no other choices which one may escape the reality of urbanization process. This approach to the realities of urbanization that is experienced today might enlighten the political-economic power relations which neoliberalization process place the capitalist dynamics to the urban space. However, what makes urban space political seems like a destiny of politics since being political ought to be challenging the planetary urbanization. On the contrary, the reading with political standpoint side by side with the urbanization might point out the

significance of urban space as the arena of politics where the distant ideas on urban futures clash with each other.

Another critical perspective on the capitalist dynamics of the urbanization is developed by David Harvey. For Harvey, the urbanization process is capitalistic since it becomes the matter of reproduction of capitalist economy. What makes urban is critical explained by the built environment's position at the heart of capitalist dynamics. The amount of surplus required for the urbanization is produced by the capitalist mode of production. The overaccumulation of capital needs urbanization to absorb the excess capital. Therefore, the generated surplus is channelized towards the landscapes in order to settle in. In this sense, the urban space become not only space of reproduction of labor power but also it is the space which spatial dynamics of capitalism is realized with the urban rents and property markets (Merrifield, 2002). In this sense, urban space become the arena of class struggle. Under capitalist urbanism, the city has evolved into a unit which is an inseparable part within the process of capital accumulation. It is a site of clash between classes since this accumulation of capital can only be realized at the expense of a "creative destruction" of existing built environment which indicates the annihilating already existed use values in order to create new use and exchange values side-by-side with the "accumulation by dispossession" with capitalist policies and monopoly of state power in terms of aiming settlements of vulnerable groups or/and commodifying the land to generate new forms of rent (Harvey, 2005, p. 144 & 1989a, p. 106). Moreover, Harvey clearly captures the transformation that the capitalism evolved into neoliberalism from the Keynesian welfare state. Since it is mentioned, there is direct relationship between the dominant mode of capital accumulation and patterns of urbanization. This creates Harvey's (1989b) comprehensive analysis on entrepreneurial city governance and urban politics which is one of the prominent approaches amongst the Marxist literature on urban politics. The entrepreneurial means are mobilized by various actors and different means but there are general tendencies in the urban politics in the competitive environment. Firstly, entrepreneurialism is depend on the "public-private partnership" which seeks growth of local economy with the use of governmental authority; secondly, the nature of the entrepreneurialism in the public-private partnership is nested on the its speculative essence opposed to long-term, comprehensive planning; and lastly, this

speculative nature leads to the reduction of urban politics as a struggling deliberations on a place rather than other holistic possibilities towards the city (Harvey, 1989b, p.7). As a result, at first, the national and local governance witnessed a “roll-back neoliberalism” which aimed welfare system by the deregulations and, afterwards, “roll-out neoliberalism” was introduced in the pursuit of technocratic economic management and of depoliticization of it. (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 388-389). In this sense, the technocratic neoliberalism works twofold. Firstly, managing and succeeding in competition has become about having a grasp of neoliberalism; secondly, the uneven development is legitimized since the failures are matter of not being ‘good’ in economics. Therefore, business elites and financial institutions are in a privileged position in terms of exerting influence on local agendas with the means of tax amnesties, guarantees, direct subsidies, exceptional planning procedures, etc. (MacLeod, 2011). In this context, the political struggle in urban spaces are related to the dynamics of capitalist appropriation of the landscapes. For Harvey (2012), the alternatives to the commodification of the city named as “the right to the city” movements which indicate the collective struggle against the capitalist type of urbanization by the inhabitant of the city. Although it may sound as a recall of welfare state of mid-1900s, for Harvey, this right to the city movements needs to be united under the banner of demanding democratic control over the production and distribution of surplus capital (Harvey, 2012 & Kuymulu, 2013).

The shift of urban policy perspective towards the growth and entrepreneurialism has been crucial in debates of urban politics. The neo-Gramscian approach and structural analysis of Harvey’s are key to understand dynamics of capitalist urbanization socio-spatial consequences. Moreover, these perspectives put state form at the focus point of their analysis. However, Henri Lefebvre defines space’s pivotal role in a twofold way: On the hand, space is about the organization of capitalist surplus production and urbanization, and on the other hand, it is the sphere of struggle between two worlds that cannot be mediated. In his critique on the perspective that embraces the urban as a container of social relations, Lefebvre objects with identifying these approaches as they are abstracting space that leads disembodiment of space from social context which makes space as a social organism that is consist of the everlasting struggle between daily life uses and exchange values about the appropriation of space (Lefebvre, 1991).

In this context, the space is social space with the coherent order of social life and historically produced social relations (Schmid, 2008). So then, how is space produced by the social? The production of space is determined and designated by the spatial triad that reciprocally interact with each other. The social space is emerged with the relations between, firstly, “spatial practices” that is composition of perceptions beyond measure within the space of daily life and collective attributions to the particular spaces such as seeing people lying down on the grass; secondly, “representations of space” indicates the designed, ideal space determined by the technocrats who have a good grasp of knowledge on lived, perceived and conceived forms of spaces and; lastly, “the representational spaces” that are the spaces directly experienced through symbols, images, signs and discourses in daily life (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38-39). At this point, politics emerge from the interactions within the triad since there is relentless conflict between use and exchange value throughout the engagements. Although the dichotomy between use and exchange value encompasses all the parts in the production of space, Lefebvre gives particular attention to the role to the representations of space and the representational spaces which is the sphere that bureaucrats, planners and technocrats manipulate the use value within the capitalist urbanization. In this sense, democratic urban movement, in other words, “the right to the city” necessarily need to challenge the imposed by the capitalist discourses produced by the bearers of dominant mode of production (Lefebvre, 1996). Furthermore, this challenge against the existing order takes its power form the experiences in the representational space, in other words, daily life since it may lead to collective struggle despite the differences, in contrast to the partial nature of structures such as class, gender, race and level of income (Purcell, 2014). In this sense, what Lefebvre proposes for the methodology of urban politics is the challenging doctrine to already-existing order of capitalist urbanization. Moreover, similar to Rancierian conception of politics, the radical democratic politics in the right to the city must be program that needs to transcend and aim to alter existing social order. The urban strategy of democratic politics needs to adopt a doctrine and discourse at first:

A political programme of urban reform not defined by the framework and the possibilities of prevailing society (...). In other words, reform thus understood is not limited to reformism. This programme will therefore have a singular and even paradoxical character. It will be established to be proposed to political forces, parties. One could even add that preferentially it

would be presented to 'left' parties, political formations representing or wishing to represent the working class. But it would not be established as a function of these forces and formations. It will have in relation to them a specific character which comes from knowledge, a scientific part. It will be proposed (free to be altered) by those who take control of it (Lefebvre, 1996, p.155).

Secondly the democratic politics requires the dominant technocratic perspective to be overthrown by the “Mature planning projects which consist of models and spatial forms and urban times without concern for their current feasibility or their utopian aspect” (Lefebvre, 1996, p.155). Therefore, Lefebvre acknowledges that on the one hand, politics needs to be formed inside of the existing order, in other words, as Ranciere notes politics requires to be moved on the police, “It acts in the places and with the words that are common to both, even if it means reshaping those places and changing the status of those words”, on other hand, political movement requires a wholesale contestation to the patterns of dominant mode of urbanization proposed by capitalism (Ranciere, 1999, p.33).

The analysis remarkably grasps the background that put cities under attack of capitalism, however the post-political approach would be critical in understanding how capitalism depoliticize, marginalize and seclude the possibilities that includes non-market alternatives. As contemporary cities are growing and world's landscape is highly urbanized, the politics is evaporating while the social space is under intense hegemony of policy by means of consensual participation regimes and the discourses disavowing and foreclosing proper politics in contrast to its ancient definition once understood as the confrontation arena within public, encountering space of democratic negotiation between equal parts and staging disagreement (Swyngedouw, 2010). It is equally key to understand the political environment that disallows politics with dramatic interventions to annihilate the wrong and possibilities for the appropriation of city as well as the results of the dominant mode of production which represent itself the sole doctrine for growth and development. In this sense, the following section is going to try an alternative approach to the existing critical approaches which reduced urban politics to the analysis on the interventions with policies and institutions to show the expose the complexities of contemporary urban politics that we witnessed today.

2.3 Urban Post-political and the Deficit of Democracy in Deliberative Consensus-led Urban Politics

In parallel to Lefebvre's opposition against the perspective that analysis space is a container which takes space as the merely reflection of the social realities, for Ranciere, space of the police order indicates a void container of relations which pretends its distribution of the sensible as fixed, properly allocated and rational container with the embodiment of the legitimate existing social condition represented as "the natural order of things" (Dikeç, 2005). Indeed, the post-political approach does not devalue the analysis on the struggles within the power relations or the conflict of interests rather it is an attempt to rethink what makes urban as the political space of encounter. Moreover, the post-political arguments also help us to identify what is democratic and what is undemocratic or anti-democratic. It is a claim against the political movements that negates proper politics. Contemporary urban policy is consisting of numerous assemblages that delegitimize alternatives and critiques, wipe disagreement and dissensus out, neutralize the rising insurgency and oppositional movement. This is the condition of what Erik Swyngedouw (2010) as the post-politics and post-democratic city. The post-political approach concludes that urban space is become a place of policy rather than space of proper politics.

2.3.1. Urban Governance in Neoliberalism and The Role of the Elites in Participation

The available research since the neoliberalism has intensified over the 1990s has been implying the restructuring of the urban governance forming new institutional environment about involving private actors in urban policymaking. Especially, large scale urban projects make it easier to realize how the dynamics or reconfigured governance practice, organization of the elites and spatial networks are at work (Swyngedouw, 2009). Apparently, more and more practices have been taking place that bring together the decision makers who have the right to say in about the interventions to the urban space and private market actors. In this sense, such practices have been referring as the state rescaling or government-beyond-the-state which

established and highly powered by supra-national institutions or the state, moreover, these newly created organizational bodies operate under or above the scale of national state (Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2005).

There are two prominent phenomena in this new participatory governance regimes that results in post-politicization of urban politics and depoliticize urban policymaking processes. Firstly, there are deregulation and devolution of powers and responsibilities normally attributed to the state which result in highly privatized public services (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010, Peck & Tickell, 2002). Parallel with the urban entrepreneurialism and its effect of branding and labelling cities in order to compete at global rankings, the urban megaprojects and mega events are subject to detailed planning processes and participatory practices (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002). Secondly, there has been an increasing pressure to consolidate regulatory arrangements from the supranational institutions such as the EU, the World Bank and the IMF, moreover, as crisis tendencies are more exposed to the popular opinion after the 2008 Crisis, neoliberal process of constitution “has entailed the cumulative deepening of neoliberalization tendencies, as regulatory trajectories have become increasingly interdependent”, eventually at a distance from the ordinary citizens living in the cities (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p.106).

Nevertheless, this does not minimize the role of the state in decision making processes. In fact, the decline of Keynesian welfare institutions that redistributes wealth in terms of shrinking the income level gap have replaced with another type of institutional bodies that deals with specifically “aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). Moreover, the approach of the state actors to the discursive power of national states has transformed into new strategies that consist of interconnected policy making regimes operated around locations and scales, the flow of ideas in expertise, knowledge, profession and technology by local, national and transnational elites who connect local issues to the transnational network or regimes (Peck & Theodore, 2010). Therefore, this result in the absolute importance of managerial perspective on the policy-making processes which is filled by on the one hand, neoliberal regimes of techno-managerial administrative apparatuses, on the other hand, impotent participation within the consensual governance attempts under the name of

deliberative or participatory democracy (Swyngedouw, 2011). Moreover, the attempt to acquire consensus with the means of governance apparatuses indicates that even the dissensus and disagreement has begun to be seen as the administrative problems that require to be solved.

The post-political consensual political approaches have started to take part in the current debates in the critical literature in urban studies. The common conclusion of these researches is that the disagreement has not been disappeared from the urban space rather it is carefully conducted through variety of partnership and participatory governance arrangements and blurred institutions which are, in a self-proclaimed way, inclusive toward vague goals and objectives. In this context, in the following section, the prominent cases in the urban post-politicization shall be discussed.

2.3.2 Post-political Urbanization Around the World

One of the growing literatures on post-political and consensual urban policymaking can be found in the United Kingdom. Allmendinger and Haughton (2012, p.91) presents the shift in the UK's spatial planning system towards the promises on strengthening consensus-led approaches which result not empowered space of debate for encounter of different urban futures rather planning system is developing as a "system focused on carefully state-managed processes with subtly but clearly defined parameters of what is open for debate. This system gives the superficial appearance of engagement legitimacy, whilst focusing on delivering growth expedited through some carefully choreographed processes for participation which minimize the potential for those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing". In this sense, in their analysis on the UK spatial planning approach has turned into post-political consensus-led urban politics in disavowing dissensus, moreover, the politics is reduced to conflict of interest around which policy to choose in order develop within the demarcated boundaries of neoliberal agenda. The new paradigm of spatial planning, introduced by the New Labour government in 2002, has emphasized, on the one hand, deliberative and participatory means to resolve or balance when the interventions face potential conflicts, and has gave significant attention to governance agencies to identify themselves as mediator of different views while achieving sustainable development

goals and social justice, on the other hand, this has resulted in “win-win-win” solutions to the turbulent policy arenas where there are any losers amongst public, private, and citizens when the country develops in pursuing social, economic and environmental goals in parallel to the plausible options recommended by the neoliberal growth doctrine (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012, p.95). Moreover, the shift in the spatial planning paradigm resonates two consequences that contribute to the post-politicization of urban politics. Firstly, there has been devolution of functions and powers normally attributed to the national state, however, the rescaling of governmental powers does not go parallel with the localism whereas spatial planning is strictly manipulated by the central government’s needs and desires, even if the consensual governance processes have been proposed as the solution for achieving proper deliberative democracy (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012). Secondly, there has been an emergence of “soft spaces” that sometimes, especially within the case of the megaprojects’ policy implementation replace the formal planning procedures, in this sense, these soft spaces create informality in the planning which erases the policy strategies agreed upon the targeted zone whereas they have little accountability or responsibility since these institutions are quasi-public that fall outside of realm of public inquiry (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010, p.809).

Moreover, MacLeod points out the role of transnational urban elites in the flow of ideas with the case of the redevelopment planning of a New Urbanist town in Inverness, Scotland. The New Urbanism is an urban design perspective which is introduced in the North American cities by various architects concerned with the returning to pedestrian friendly neighborhoods by carefully planning accessible streets, public spaces and bicycle paths, moreover, it is combined with the smart growth perspective which opposed to the uncontrolled urban fringe and opening up the industrial zones in the peripheries of cities (MacLeod, 2013). In Scottish case, the consensual development clustered around the labors of NGOs, consultants firms and landlords towards the realization of New Urbanism and smart growth perspective are the only solution the town faced with the uncontrolled suburban sprawl because Inverness attractiveness is very high due to its high rank in the quality of life amongst the UK cities since 2000s, thus, while it welcomed the growth, the city also witnessed huge boom in population and urban sprawl toward the peripheries (MacLeod, 2013).

The local government appoints a New Urbanist guru to develop proper plan for the town, however, participatory mechanisms work as means for the appointed planner to “conscripting” rather than participatory or deliberative (MacLeod, 2013, p.2211). In this sense, the consensual practices work as means for de-subjectification of citizens who may raise their concerns on the on-going project, rather, the participatory mechanisms become the means of convincing for civil community composed of non-governmental organizations and local landlords gathered around the appointed planner. Additionally, Etherington and Jones (2018) emphasizes the increasing role of state or quasi-state actors. In their analysis on the Sheffield City, they represent how the depoliticization constrain debates on the policy discussions with devolution attempts in the UK with the transfer of powers to the local agencies. They point out different examples turns into conflict and opposition, which are depoliticized with different means. The round-table events are organized to discuss and express concerns on the role of quasi-state actors asserting various projects in order to articulate the UK’s northern cities to connect global competition with an empowered private sector and skilled population, however, participators concerns on the social inequalities within the city are blockaded by the consensual perspective on promoting growth and the context of austerity and cuts in the welfare system which were “state projects” for orienting actors toward economic development activities defined by the state (Etherington & Jones, 2018, p.58).

Another post-political moment is brought up by the emphasis on the use of mega-projects in the urban policy with, on the one hand, securing consensus, stimulating consumption and promoting growth, investment, on the other hand, these form of urban policy is implemented by the exceptional measures in planning and judicial bounds which are ended up with democratic deficit, absence of transparency and democratic control over the projects. Interestingly, the concerns on the mega-projects’ role on the post-politicization process is pointed out by the various researches conducted in economically less developed countries compared to Western Europe. In their analysis on Valencia’s mega-projects in Spain, Tarazona Vento (2017) points similar outputs of autocratic consensual post-politicization with the modes of governance. Similarly, the Valencia’s projects are managed by the quasi-public soft spaces to carry efficient management rather than establishing spaces for dissensus and

debate. However, she represents additional phenomenon, the populist discourses on the urban politics accompanies the techno-managerial governance. As 2008 economic crisis, the Valencia's regional government decides the implementation of mega-projects since it is the crucial for generation of wealth, moreover, these projects are represented as the clear way for development "benefited by the society as whole" (Tarazona Vento, 2017, p.75). Moreover, these projects are asserted for the Valencians' common interests whereas the groups who opposes the projects are declared being un-Valencian, moreover, the oppositional groups are declared as the fuzzy "external enemies" such as the central government (Tarazona Vento, p.79).

Another research has conducted in two Russian cities, Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod, to analysis how mega-projects and mega-events contribute the post-politicization process. Makarychev and Yatsyk (2015) indicates the role of relationship between transnational institutions and national elites in implementing mega-projects. Distinctively from other examples, the post-political process is centered on the municipal and regional governmental structures which were under pressure of the, on the one hand, Kremlin's state-centric governance model, on the other hand, there has been a list of requirements from the FIFA when the organization declared the Russia as the sole host of the World Football Cup 2018. For instance, the authors note that the antagonisms intensified when the location of new stadium construction announced by the governor in Nizhny Novgorod since the location of the stadium was not matched with the local government's on-going transportation projects, moreover, there has been growing skepticism on the finance of the stadium would suspend the budget for the construction of these transportation facilities. Nevertheless, the space of public debate is foreclosed with the discourses reflecting mega-projects and the World Cup as a "gift to the city" by the national and local governments, moreover, the stakeholders in the governance processes were "specially invited groups of municipal employees – teachers, junior officials – who were meant to approve decisions that had already been made" (Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2015, pp. 150, 154).

So far, it can be concluded that the post-politicization process involves mandates of the central and local state institutions, so-called deliberative consensual practices with quasi-public governance mechanisms, and pressure of transnational elites and organizations towards local and central authorities which propose no alternative

choices except the defined ones or create nonfunctional governance system with null stakeholders. Indeed, the representative and deliberative mechanisms can be one of the drivers of the post-politicization process, however, bearing the four forms of disavowal, Swyngedouw (2011, pp. 370-371) contents that “An emerging body of thought has begun to consider the suturing of ‘the political’ by a consensual mode of governance that has apparently reduced political conflict and disagreement to either an ultra-politics of radical and violent disavowal, exclusion and containment or to a para-political inclusion of different opinions on anything imaginable (as long as it does not question fundamentally the existing state of the neoliberal political economic configuration) in arrangements of impotent participation and consensual ‘good’ techno-managerial governance”. Moreover, although the para-politics might be the dominant mode of disavowal in the liberal democracies, the remained forms can also be found when the police order forecloses public space through various discourses.

CHAPTER 3

JACQUES RANCIERE, POST-POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY

As an Algeria-born French critical theorist, Ranciere developed his ideas on politics and democracy under the times of 1968 Paris Riots as a student of Louis Althusser. His political thought aims to disclose what is proper politics and democracy, moreover, how the great philosophers of past cleverly produced various ways to wipe democracy away, whether it was intentional or not. Besides, conceptualization of liberal democracy cannot escape his intense critiques as well. In this sense, Ranciere stands out as an anti-philosopher, by committing himself to destroy intellectual foundations of the political philosophy, which was only being used as a tool for disavowal of equality, depoliticization and hating democracy.

Ranciere's ideas were moved away from his former mentor Louis Althusser during the period of 1968. However, the crucial moment of break was not about the events of May 1968 but in fact it took place following the creation of Paris VIII, which created a philosophy department full of Althusserians and Ranciere analyze this as "creation of an institution, an institution where we were, in one sense, the masters" (Ranciere, 2003, p. 195). From this moment, Ranciere's critical voice stands out against the Althusser's scientific elitism in which he attributes privilege to scientific knowledge. The break with Althusser is significant for Ranciere since the critique created an open space to develop his theory on equality which is the cornerstone of his analysis. Ranciere's idea on the equality enables the analysis on the politics and democracy, moreover, it also allows to evaluate not only urban politics but also voluminous fields of research such as history, aesthetics or culture. In this sense, Ranciere's opposition to the meaning of science in Althusser's theory needed to be discussed to understand the logic behind the Ranciere's equality.

The beginning point of the relation between knowledge and ideology is Althusser's evaluation of the state. According to him, Marxism's classical definition on the "state apparatus" is too "descriptive" that it approaches state apparatus in a way which only practices repressive execution and intervention on the behalf of the interests of the ruling classes. (Althusser, 2001, p.137-138). However, the state's role in the domination of ruling classes is more complex in Althusser's perspective and he distinguishes state apparatus into two. On the one hand, repressive state apparatus, "functions by violence" in a physical or non-physical form when the state and ruling class exercise domination such as colonialism with its administrative and material oppression; on the other hand, ideological state apparatus, which "functions by the ideology", produces and ensures cohesion in the society by the values constructed beneath the ideology of the ruling class (Althusser, 2001, p.145). In this context, Ranciere (2011b) reveals the two functions of ideology in Althusser's thesis: firstly, ideology is represented a mystified version of the objective knowledge, which is manipulated and serviced by the ruling class and secondly, the only capable principle to reveal the knowledge is science. However, for Ranciere (2011b, p. 142) the dominant ideology is not only nested in discourses of ideologues or in the system of representation of the students but, on the contrary, it is "a power organized in a collection of institutions (the system of knowledge, information, etc.)".

In this sense, his critique on Althusser about the creation of Paris VIII as a legacy that shall pursue Marxist cause becomes clear. There is no university that would be capable to escape from the ideology since knowledge is about the distribution of "what to learn" and ways of use that content. Ranciere (2011b, p. 142) notes: "what the university teaches is not 'science' but a selection of scientific knowledges that have been articulated into 'objects of knowledge'". Moreover, the distribution of objects of knowledge also includes those who are capable to learn and to realize this knowledge and those who are not. Therefore, according to Ranciere, it results in the rejection of equality. Against the Althusser's glorified scientific knowledge, he points the opposite and claims for the presumption that everyone is equally capable to think and acquire knowledge. Thus, the break with Althusser took place when "Althusser stood for a certain power of the professor, the professor of Marxism who was so distant from what

we had seen taking place in the student and other social movements” (Ranciere, 2003, 1995).

In the following parts, the general topics that Ranciere elaborates in his political thought shall be discussed in order to create a space for further discussion on post-politics. In this sense, on the one hand, the intellectual basis consisted in Ranciere’s analysis shall be touched upon, on the other, the concepts that would be necessary in post-political analysis are needed to be evaluated.

3.1 Equality and the Political

The assumption of equality in capability of thought and equal appropriation of knowledge relies on the individual’s relationship within their daily life. The realization of this form of equality in logic can be realized by associating the objects of knowledge with experiences deduced from the daily practices. This way of thinking comes to Ranciere when he analyzes Joseph Jacotot, a revolutionary French instructor lived in the France’s Bourbon Restoration period and was marginalized and exiled to Belgium where he was appointed to teach students that does not speak French. Jacotot’s miracle, for Ranciere, is his role of emancipatory educator, which can only be achieved by the role of “ignorant schoolmaster”; one does not use traditional techniques between those who poses knowledge and those who stultified by the educator, but rather emancipates the pupils by different means of teaching without transmitting knowledge (Ranciere, 1991). Jacotot’s unusual method premise upon the presumption that knowledge is not a matter of mental capability, rather he uses the methods that links the objects of knowledge to the individuals’ experiences and impressions in their lives. Moreover, instructor’s role is merely affair of ensuring enough concentration and projecting the ideas on the object to deepen the brainwork. The results of Jacotot’s method is, for Ranciere, remarkable:

Take it and read it, he says to the poor person. I don’t know how to read, answers the poor person. How would I understand what is written in the book? (...) Would you know how to recognize the letter O that one of my students – a locksmith by profession - calls ‘the round’, the letter L that he calls ‘the square’? (Ranciere, 1991, p.22-23).

In parallel with his critique on Althusser's privileged science, Ranciere argues that everyone is capable to think and argue. This "self-dissociation" from the necessary roles of individuals in the division of labor, equality in logic is not related to the place that individuals perform and occupy in the society, moreover, no one is solely obliged to make reasoning in the role they are subjected to (Hallward, 2006, p.37). The division of labor in related to thought activity clearly strengthens the position of elites when the proper role of knowledge is distributed. Therefore, individual's emancipation is about freeing themselves from the distribution of the proper knowledge that forces people to think on the subjects related to role they occupy in the society. Perhaps, at this point, the event that took place in the Aventine Hill, which Ranciere frequently sets forth throughout his works, could be explanatory about the role of equality of intelligence and emancipation. The Roman plebeians retreated to one of the seven hills of Rome to be heard of their demands. For the Roman senators, the event was shocking since plebs are not capable to think and thus consistently tell their discontent:

the position of the intransigent patricians is straightforward: There is no place for discussion with the plebs for the simple reason that plebs do not speak. They do not speak because they are beings without a name, deprived of logos – meaning, of symbolic enrollment in the city (Ranciere, 1999, p.22).

In other words, the patricians claim was to reject the equality in logical being. Consequently, the Aventine Hill case reminds that "social inequality is unthinkable, impossible, except on the basis of the primary equality of intelligence" (Ranciere, 1991, p. 87). Moreover, what radically shook the patricians is more than the demanding the plebs' voice to be heard of. It was the plebs recognition as equals with the ruling aristocracy and oligarchy as an equal being who is able to think and speak in the public sphere. Although what Ranciere deduce from the Jacotot's method might sound similar to liberal approaches to equality, Ranciere's emancipation through equality is not an end-state or an ontologically given pre-condition. In his own words:

Equality is not a goal that governments and societies could succeed in reaching. To pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the pedagogues of progress, who widen endlessly the distance they promise that they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom- or it is nothing (Ranciere, 2003, p.223).

Therefore, presumption of equality becomes a way of fighting against the established order and status-quo, which constantly strengthens its position by rejecting the equality and enouncing its qualifications for the hegemonic position. As a result, equality becomes something that is asserted, tested and verified. However, the burdens of this presumption are not hauled by isolated individuals, and politics steps in precisely at this point. Politics is a struggle for staging the equality rather than debates over representative institutions, legal structures or organizations (Hallward, 2006). The reason, for Ranciere, is clear since institutionalization of politics creates another system of distribution of roles and of knowledge corresponding to the attributed roles and occupations. This eventually leads to another forms of inequality. Following the Foucauldian aspect, for Ranciere, the use of bio-power by the state apparatuses refers to the police order, which distributes what is sensible in terms of deciding and creating an order by “distributing places, names and functions”. Moreover, this distribution is accompanied by the defining “the constitution of parties and their parts” (Nash, 1996, p.173). However, the sphere of police order is not the sphere of politics. The very first thesis in the Ranciere’s (2001, p.1) ‘Ten Thesis of Politics’ is that “politics is not the exercise of power”. In his perspective, this reveals the political philosophy’s fault; i.e.: the withering away of the politics by superposing it with the question of legitimacy and its well-deserved use of power. Therefore, the political philosophy reduces the scope of politics into the sphere of police order which, in fact, constantly aims to negate the possibility of the political.

The only possible condition that we can speak of politics is the existence a whole that “constitutes itself other than as collection of existing parts” (Ranciere, 2003, p.198). Politics is the stage that challenges the status-quo of the police order by the asserting claims, which do not pertain the claimants’ role in the existing order. Similar to the Althusserian concept of “interpellation”, which subjectifies individual by means of transforming and recruiting according to the ruling ideology, Ranciere thinks politics as process of becoming a subject (Althusser, 2001, p.174). Although the subject in Althusser is constantly interpellated by the ideology, politics exists and begins when there are counted parts of society and when this enumeration is exposed as a miscount (Ranciere, 1999). Politics exists since the equality imposed by the status-quo – or by

the police order, as Ranciere calls it – is inevitably false representation of equality. Therefore, politics is about the unveiling this counting as false. Politics arrives when one reveals the existing counting as incorrect with the evidence against the claim that everyone is equally included in the community. As Ranciere notes this:

Politics begins when it is possible to say ‘we’. It may be ‘we citizens’, ‘we worker’, ‘we proletarians’, ‘we woman’ and so on. (...) a subject of enunciation creates an apparatus where a subject is named precisely to expose a particular wrong, to create a community around a particular dispute (Nash, 1996, p.174).

Bearing the mentioned words of Ranciere in the mind, two constituent elements of politics, could be deduced: pointing the wrong and installing the ‘we’, or the people. In other words, politics is ‘the *demos*’ pointing at the wrong. So far, Ranciere’s politics can be summarized as a belief for people that have a potential as well as capability to take another role from the ones they have been occupying and the proper politics begins when the powerless assert their voice to be heard of. This is a point where Ranciere radically keeps its distance from the deliberative democracy of modern liberal approaches and, consensual politics and communicative action theories proposed by critical thinkers, mainly Jürgen Habermas. For example, against the Rawls’ rule of law which superimposes equality in terms of defending rights of individuals or against the Habermasian communicative action, which assumes potential of the consensual politics with dialoguing in rational debates, Ranciere argues that what they indicate as politics is nothing but a misrepresentation of politics as a struggle between equal stakeholders (Hewlett, 2007). However, the nucleus of politics is the disagreement between those whose voice can be heard of and those cannot. Therefore, the politics does not signal the end of dispute or its aim is not to clean the obstacles in front of the formal equality. On the contrary, it is only when the disagreement shows up, politics begins. Therefore, it is needed to be evaluated what is meant by wrong and the *demos* constructed around pointing at the wrong. The following section will concentrate on what the wrong indicates and what the position of the *demos* is in Ranciere’s political thought.

3.2 The Wrong of the Demos against the Order of the Police

Since politics is about the creating a stage for the nonvisible to become visible, for Ranciere “a wrong in the first sense is nothing but the constitution of politics, the encounter between the logic of the police and the logic of the verification of equality” (Nash, 1996, 176). What makes the wrong so critical in terms of politics to occur? Could each wrong can create a space for politics to begin? Moreover, does Ranciere attribute an essence to the politics even though he charges the tradition of political philosophy by determining foundations for politics? In this part, I shall briefly discuss such questions.

First of all, let’s begin with the last question; whether Ranciere gives a foundational principle for politics and what he opposes in the thinkers of political philosophy. For Ranciere, from the times of great scholars of the Ancient Greece to the modern political philosophy there has been a fundamental wrong (Ranciere, 2003). His critique of political philosophy begins with Plato and Aristotle and continues with the contemporary scholars of political thought such as Arendt. What he refers as “the initial scandal of politics” is that political philosophy has been a search for social order or an attempt of legitimization of particular social order that attributes new roles and creates a new division of labor. (Ranciere, 1999, p. 15). In other words, political philosophy has been targeting an *arkhe*, a substance to the identities, occupations or social groups that people hook up to be counted in the existing police order. Moreover, these approaches take society as wholly counted. For example, Plato puts a societal principle that presumes a kind of organic division of labor where soldiers, artisans and priests occupy role in the city according to their categorized substances. For Plato, if the roles are blurred and the individuals mix the tasks that order has already assigned to them, the result would be a form of non-uniformed equality in chaos. However, politics find a place since what is represented as the proper equality is not the true equality. Rather it constantly misses the parts of the uncounted (Nash, 1996). Therefore, at this precise juncture, there lies one of the forms of the negation of politics, in Plato’s optimal society, there is no part of those who have no part. On the other hand, in Ranciere’s perspective, there is no foundation for politics because relations in the community would not ultimately be determined by any social order such as natural or divine laws (Ranciere, 1999). Politics is staged when the natural

order of the laws, which presumes social order with its own distribution of the roles, are disrupted by the claims of the wrongness that order acknowledged as the natural order; in other words, how things need to be. To sum up, the pointing of the wrong in the social order is precisely result of the lack of any foundational principle, of the claims of the political philosophy which cannot embrace every part in the society. There would be always uncounted, unheard, non-visible when the police order distributed the role in social order. Therefore, the dispute around the wrong is the appearance that staging of the equality takes visible in the daily life. According to Ranciere, “At the heart of politics lies a double wrong, (...) over the relationship between the capacity of speaking being who is without qualification and political capacity” (Ranciere, 1999, p.22).

Secondly, the wrong as a builder of politics must be separated from legal or judiciary, religious and militaristic forms of wrong (Nash, 1996). Moreover, could one say every wrong have a potential for creating a space which politics would able to emerge? The wrong differs from the ones that is subject to legal processes since the relations with definite parts. This indicates that the parties involved in the judicial procedures are already there. In Ranciere’s (1999, p.39) account, what is apparent is clear: “parties do not exist prior to declaration of wrong”. Moreover, the wrong cannot be tamed by the compromises, consensual practices, mediators of judicial apparatus. On the contrary, in the account of police order, the only way for tackle the wrong relies on the practices of depoliticization by means of negating the equality, pointing the wrong and hearing those who have no part at the established police order. Therefore, it is what the contemporary liberal politics is missing by the practices under the names of deliberative democracy, which presumes the consensus by the consultations between existing and plausible parts counted in the police order. In this context, what democratic politics can imply is the manifestation of the wrong that is result of the inequality across the society. What is the relationship between the inequality and the wrong? As a political manifestation of the wrong, inequalities within the police order, indeed, prior to the signals of the wrong. In the chaotic society of dissensus in Ranciere’s account, the political wrong is infinite since the possibility to verify equality is infinite and resistance to the police order is a question of process (Ranciere, 1999). However, although the inequalities may yet to be recognized and the wrong is

not staged, inequalities still exist. Moreover, even in democratic political atmosphere which negates the debates around the wrong by depoliticizing disagreements, there are clearly inequalities may yet to be recognized (May, 2008).

Lastly, the political is the manifestation of the wrong which represents a conflict between universality thesis of the police order against the particularity of the individual's experiences composed of the engagements in daily life (Zizek, 2004). Clearly, the politics begins when the universal claims of the police order is exposed as misrepresentation by the those who have no part in the social body. In other words, while the police order distributes roles and occupations according to the attributed characteristics in society, it needs to be universal to comprehend the parts of the social body as much as possible in order to make the distinction between those who obey and those who rule. However, the social order eventually contradicts with the practices in daily life since the equality is constantly tested, verified, confirmed or neglected within the police order. Ranciere (1999, p.32) calls these two logics as "police logic" and "egalitarian logic"; when they met it gives the rise of politics. Moreover, the egalitarian logic precisely needs not to stay within the boundaries that the police order sustains power relations, on the contrary, it needs to directly challenge to the police logic. Ranciere (1999, p.32) gives an example of workers' strike which becomes political when "reconfigures the relationship that determine the workplace in its relation to the community". Furthermore, it represents the difference between the Foucauldian analysis of power relations within the society. The concept of power allowed Foucault to say, 'everything is political'. However, in Ranciere's account, 'nothing is political itself' since politics does not mean the uses of power (Ranciere, 2001). Power relations are produced, reproduced and sustained within the police order; however, egalitarian logic of politics acts against the existing social order.

Another founder element of the politics is the creation of the demos. For Ranciere (2001), democracy cannot be a form of political regime in terms of designated institutions and facilities deciding who have the capacity to rule. The rule of the demos is neither an abstraction for collection of free individuals, nor it sum of people that participates to the political institutions. The demos is a subject without any ontological essence since it only appears when the those who have no part stands together to address the wrong (Paic, 2019). In this sense, rather than definable and tangible

institutions of a ruling regime, democracy is identical with the politics. It is the rapture in the ongoing social order when the equality is staged. Similarly, the rule of the demos does not exist prior to the moment when the wrong is addressed and when the politics is staged. Moreover, the demos is at the center of this process as organizer, synthesizer, and container. Democracy is the transforming force by the demos that is the collection of people who considered as incapable to make an argument about the ongoing rule of the police order (Hewlett, 2007). Similar to the politics, demos can only be defined by the lack of any *arkhe* which demarcates the boundaries of parts. Indeed, every police order needs an *arkhe* to legitimize itself, therefore, its counting of the parts always subject to the miscount. In this sense, the demos is the power of a those who consider themselves as not counted. It is not the power of majority or the population, “but the power of anyone at all” (Ranciere, 2009, p.49).

Although Ranciere’s concept politics and democracy would be seen in a chaotic status, which surrounds police order constantly by the verification of the equality, this kind of definition is not accurate. Indeed, the demos is at the status of “disproportionate and anarchic” because there is a lack of any *arkhe* or any substances completely corresponding to the people even though every police order try to identify its subjects’ roles by attributing the substances that hold people in the community in their determined places (Ranciere, 1995, p.94). The real democracy is anarchic because of the two different reasons based upon the lack of the any ontological foundation. Firstly, Ranciere puts emphasis on the active and activist role of the ordinary people that have capacity to disrupt the police order (Hewlett, 2007). At this point, he charges the political vision of the liberal democracy and its institutions which encourages people to believe in representative mechanisms. Clearly these institutions are strengthening the inequality determined by the police order that decides who to partake and to be potential stakeholder. This contrasts radically with what the Ranciere (2001, p.5) indicates: “the one who speaks when s/he is not to speak, the one who part-takes in what s/he has no part in -- that person belongs to the demos”. In other words, democracy is anarchic since there is no ultimate determiner that decides who to partake in the political space. Moreover, the police order’s distribution of the roles in partaking inevitably leads a wrong. Second characteristic that make democracy anarchic reveals itself when Ranciere analyzes the era of French president François Mitterrand.

According to him, what is the legacy of the Mitterrand era is the end of politics by means of consensual practices in the formal democracy (Ranciere, 1995). With the end of the promise, the expertise in the statecraft increased side by side with the end of radical interests within the party politics. Therefore, the question of democracy reduced into twofold question: whether to expose democracy as ungovernable, which cannot be trusted as voices of the many do not enable society to prosper. According to Ranciere, this is what today's condition of post-democracy, the declaration of unworkable nature. This nature of democracy is corrected by the governing it within the reasonable uses in its own ungovernability among the limitless needs and demands in a chaotic society (Ranciere, 1995). In post-democratic era, the disagreement between the competing visions of the world is substituted by a regime of enlightened technocrats (Zizek, 2004). For Ranciere's (2009) perspective, we do not live in democracy since it is not a state regime. On the contrary, we live in an oligarchic rule which is legitimized by the suffrage. Moreover, chosen ones take the attention when they purpose the best options in social problems which is represented as affairs of expertise in relation to the needs that is required to survive in brutal capitalist competition and logic of profit. Furthermore, consensus is reached by the various form of depoliticization by means of strict desire to everyone returning to their normally occupied roles distributed by the police order. Therefore, we live in post-democratic era where the disagreement has been withering away and equality is no more central question in the political space. Post-democracy is the end of politics, which constantly negates the possibility to address wrong, to stage equality and to form demos. Post-democratic account of democracy as unworkable relies on the discourses that is blocking the rise of the politics. However, "Democracy is neither a society to be governed, nor a government of a society, it is specifically this ungovernable on which every government must ultimately find out its base" (Ranciere, 2009, p.49). Therefore, it is the lack of any foundation that makes democracy anarchic and ungovernable.

The term post-politics is borrowed from the Slavoj Zizek (1999a) who makes an addition to the analysis the three form of disavowing politics that Ranciere sets forth. So far, it can be concluded that in Ranciere's theory, politics is the democracy. Thus, the post-democracy is the post-politics. In parallel to Ranciere's depoliticizing means of the traditional political philosophy *arkhe-*, *para-*, and *meta-* politics, Zizek adds a

fourth one with *ultra*-politics. Since politics is about the staging equality, addressing wrong and collectivization of the demos, what is aimed with the post-political way of depoliticization is to shut down the stage of equality, to negate the wrong and to block the formation of the demos by different means. In the following part, the four forms of depoliticization or disavowal of politics shall be discussed.

3.3 The Forms of the Disavowing Politics

The meeting between the logic of equality and the logic of police has been well acknowledged by the political philosophy. However, the problem relies on the issue of the how to interpret this encounter. So far, the scandal of the political philosophy has been revealed: their attribution for the proper foundation to existing police order. According to Ranciere (1995, p.19), “Depoliticization is the oldest task of politics, the one which achieves its fulfilment at the brink of its end, its perfection on the brink of the abyss”. The forms of depoliticization are thus a way of acknowledging the difference between counted and uncounted parties but they simultaneously attempt to establish a legitimacy to social order and to close the possibility of politics. Yet, as it is mentioned, politics can only rise when the equality of anyone is put forward and this is exposed only within the image of wrong. On the contrary, the political philosophy disavows politics with superposing the police order to the politics that compromises whole surface in the community in order to overcome inequalities in the existing social body and prevent the anarchic appearances of equality. The forms of disavowing politics somehow legitimize the distribution of the sensible by the police order which determines the roles and occupations within the unequal hierarchies at the existing social order. Paradoxically, the thinkers of the political philosophy represent the police order as natural but the political philosophy leans on its existence to the loss of this “naturalness” (Ranciere, 1999, p.64). On this basis, Ranciere develops his idea on the disavowal and elimination of politics by analyzing three great figures of the political philosophy who has been the prominent actors in the literature: Plato, Aristotle and Marx. Therefore, in this part, the 3 forms of the disavowal of politics that Ranciere

(1999) enounces in his book, in the *Disagreement*, shall be discussed. Lastly, Zizek's (1999a) contribution of a fourth one to these forms shall be evaluated.

Archipolitics, promoted by the Plato, relies on a holistic police order that claims harmonious and undivided community (Van Puymbroeck & Oosterlynck, 2014). It “replaces the democratic configuration of politics with nothing leftover” and closes the space for disagreement that politics may emerge by the those who have no part at the defined police order (Ranciere, 1999, p.65). In Plato's city, an individual can only be good at one task since time is limited. Therefore, the division of labor is inevitable for society to prosper. In this sense, the good democracy is about involving in the community as a part that finds its substances in the division of labor according to proper natural characteristics matching individuals' skills. The politics would not be essential need when the roles and occupations are distributed since the society functions at the optimal level. Moreover, justice and wrong is reduced to the disfunction and disorder within the police order which disrupts the “perfect equilibrium of the healthy city”. In this context, justice is the workers that are returning their traditional posts in the police order (Ranciere, 2004, p.9). Moreover, the republic functions with the measures defining on the one hand particularity, which characterizes the individuals according to their skills instead of their experiences and on the other hand universality of the properly distributed division of labor that covers whole surface of the society. The demos that points the wrong is reduced to a virtue of keeping the one's role in the division of labor in the mind (Ranciere, 1999). Therefore, according to Ranciere, the critical Platonic question is about who or which occupations enable individuals to participate in political life (Ranciere, 2004).

To sum up, archipolitics is one the ultimate form of depoliticization, which presumes the natural conditions of being according to their occupations in the division labor. In this sense, the natural law of being is superimposed to the governing of the city that results in the hierarchy in the community and who is proper to speak in the political life. Therefore, all parts of the city would be counted. There are parts that have the time to develop ideas on good governing, on preparing for war, on making shoes and on harvesting the corps. In this context, the police order of Plato's republic distributes the roles and occupations, rupture within this division of labor lead to the ‘bad democracy’. As a result, the community that functions harmoniously resembles to an

organic society that allows for no space for staging equality, addressing the wrong and consequently the installment of the demos may disappear. The undivided community is consistently marching towards a prosperous city at the expense of the disavowal of politics. Every part of the society is spending their time on the tasks perfectly fitting their roles and skills. Politics are attributed to sphere of the philosophers who have enough time to think and discuss the societal problems and to decide proper operation of the division of labor as Ranciere concludes: “There can be no time out, no empty space in the fabric of community (Ranciere, 1999, p. 68). Thus, the community does not allow for void that any political movement can emerge when the wrong is exposed (Zizek, 2004).

Parapolitics, developed in the works of Aristotle, acknowledges that society is not harmonious, but rather divided into different divisions. Nevertheless, similar to the other political philosophy approaches, it does not hesitate to couple the politics with the police order and its existing inequalities and hierarchies by transmitting politics to the superficial competition between different parties and perspectives. Although parapolitics embraces the discord between different parts within the community, it attempts to depoliticize by channeling the disagreement to the artificial representative space sprawling between defined parties and agents which compete to occupy the place designated to the executive power (Zizek, 2004). The equality of anyone is acknowledged by the Aristotle, says Ranciere (1999, p.70), even if the rulership of the most virtuous would be desirable, “but this natural order of things is impossible wherever you have a city where ‘all are by nature equal’”. However, for Aristotle, society is internally divided among one inescapable wrong that is inequality in terms of wealth: “In every city there are rich and poor. (...) But what no regime can do is make people simultaneously rich and poor. The question of politics begins in every city with the existence of the mass of the *aporoï*, those who have no means, and the small number of the *euporoï*, those who have them” (Ranciere, 1995, p.13). Therefore, the crucial problem of the parapolitics is the how to achieve the rule of the good within the society split by the inequality. In this sense, the demos is reduced to one of the parties in the political conflict that competes over “the occupation of ‘offices’”, the substance of the city (Ranciere, 1999, p.72). The effect of wrong that makes space for

political is reduced to an inegalitarian logic which attributed politics as politics is specified within the place of institutions.

To do so, parapolitics is one of the prominent forms of depoliticization in neoliberal era that sends the politics off to the institutions as in the deliberative and consultative procedures between the designated stakeholders. According to parapolitics, this specified fields of the politics are the places which the political competition can occur. Contrary to Ranciere's politics, in parapolitics, the bad democracy is the condition that is these institutions are absent and the wrong is chaotically already there. Whether it would be a tyrant or a Leviathan, the parapolitics accounts the annihilation of those who have no part is crucial since the anarchic equality would not lead any social order.

Metapolitics, for Ranciere (1999, p.81), is "situated symmetrical in relation to archipolitics". What is similar is the denial of the any political sphere that belongs to the proper true politics. In archipolitics, the politics is denied with the radical hierarchy that the division of labor reigns according to the needs of the society in terms of prospering and survival. In metapolitics, the political is negated by the unrepairable inequality and the absolute wrong which "destroys any political deployment of the argument of equality" (Ranciere, 1999, p.81). More radically opposed to the parapolitics, it rejects the transmitting political sphere to the specific institutions since the all social inequalities are the result of the one prominent source of inequality. As one can foresee, the Ranciere's target is some forms of Marxism, especially state socialisms, that sees representative institutions of liberal democracy as misdirection from the primary source of inequality amongst classes. The proper politics thus is unrevealing the essence of inequality and the distractions from the central question of inequality. It may be contradicting with the Marxism idea on the egalitarian society, however, Marxism is only metapolitical in relation to its assumption that is the impossibility of equality within the capitalist police order and, is the intrinsic division in the society as a result of the one dominant source of inequality (Van Puymbroeck & Oosterlynck, 2014). Similarly, neoliberal ideology also is included in the ways that depoliticize the political atmosphere. For example, it attacked the Keynesianism's state interference to the economy as the primal enemy of the inequality between individuals since it did not enable the private entrepreneurialism and competition by different means which inhibits individuals from the maximization of their capability

and from the pursuit of interest. Therefore, the demos is reduced to the individuals in the market relations and the absolute wrong is the prevent the demos to develop particular skills for the survival within the capitalism. Moreover, uneven development among the globe is attributed to the ‘bad installation of neoliberalism’ or bad management of the economy in terms of norms of the neoliberal doctrine. Consequently, the wrong and the solid source of inequality is reduced to the failure in meeting requirements in the competition around the globe.

Lastly, Zizek (1999a) adds ‘ultrapolitics’ to these three forms of disavowal of politics in the Ranciere’s work. The most absolute depoliticization mode, ultrapolitics, aims to distract the politics to exist with the means of ‘militarization of politics (Zizek, 2004). It redefines and limits politics among the debates between Us and Them. As the Other is radically opposed to the society’s norms, there is no political sphere that the politics may open to the demands of the other whose voice is drastically muted. As a result, the depoliticization is legitimized by the constant war between two defined parties whose logics could not meet.

Since the politics is equal to democracy, an anti-democratic operation constantly needs instruments for the depoliticization, and the political philosophy has been coming to the assistance for negating the democratic possibility and politics. For Ranciere, the elimination of politics by the political philosophy with the approach that “identifies the politics with the police order” on the one hand, creates an imitation of ‘bad politics’ on the other (Ranciere, 1999, p.65). In order to understand the scandal that is at the core of neoliberal ideology to prevent politics is the representation of this form of negation which the order of the police present itself is the mere way of doing politics. In this context, one can grasp fictional myth relies on the depoliticization by the neoliberalism. However, what defines the post-political condition is not one of these forms of disavowal, on the contrary, it is the historical and local combination of these four forms archi-, para-, meta- and ultrapolitics. In the table below Van Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck (2014) summarizes the forms of depoliticization and their diagnosis and replies to the political problems in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. “the matrix of depoliticization” which summarizes the approaches to the politics that four types of disavowal use. (Van Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck, 2014, p.100)

		DIAGNOSIS	
		Society is not internally split	Society is internally split
REPLY	Policing through a Specifically Political Sphere	ULTRA-politics	PARA-politics
	Policing through the Denial of any Specifically Political Sphere	ARCHI-politics	META-politics

3.4 Prospects of Ranciere’s Post-politics

The post-political perspective to the politics of today offers us a brand-new approach towards the complex nature in the state policies at different level. Its post-foundational paradigm can help us to reveal how the possible alternatives to the neoliberal ideology is depoliticized at various scale with the help of modes of disavowing politics. This chapter attempted to touch the Ranciere’s theory on politics and democracy to unveil his thesis on the depoliticization of politics by the tradition of political philosophy. Furthermore, following chapter shall be touched the importance of the analyzing so-called the black box of the state policies with a post-political perspective.

Ranciere’s claims on politics is clearly distinct in terms of approaching what is post-political condition what is witnessing today. To define, the post-politics in contemporary world is the various attempts to prevent emerge of proper politics by blocking constituting elements of the political. As it has already detailed, for Ranciere, the political requires the establishment of demos that is not given entity rather it can only be founded by unwanted parts in the society who show their dissensus on the subject of wrong and demand their voices to be treated as equal. Therefore, the society in contemporary capitalism would not enable imagining opposing voices of

disagreement. In this sense, the post-political condition is constructed upon “harmony and consensus; what it produces is nothing other than pseudo-events within the confines of the given”, moreover, its strategy to pursue this goal is composition of different forms for disavowing politics to “repress all forms of disruptive resistance” (Taşkale, 2013, p.73). Moreover, he also acknowledges that the history of political thought is composed of attempts of disavowal of politics. In this sense, Žižek (1999b) argues that the political thought literature historically is composed of attempts of disavowal of politics within the structured social order where each part designated to a place. Thus, the police order’s distribution of roles and occupations tries to foreclose the space where proper politics may emerge in the disguise of the demos, the people. Similarly, Laclau (2005) acknowledges the absence of foundation in defining what constitutes people. He highly criticizes the contemporary approaches to the people since they take people “as something that was constituted before representation (Laclau, 2005, p. 163). However, for post-politics, the democratic struggle is not about who to hegemonize the police order rather it is a struggle between two camps, the dominating one claims the naturalness of this order and the another camp objects when they cannot proper place within the distribution of roles (Žižek, 2007).

In this sense, urban politics and urban political space is under attack of the post-political attempts to foreclose politics. The urban space has been the prominent space where the political can find a chance to emerge. In a similar way, Žižek (1999b, p.27) argues that “politics proper is a phenomenon which appeared first time in Ancient Greece” when the inhabitants of the city gathered, discussed and the city became a place where the “member of the demos (those with no firm determined place in the hierarchal social edifice) demanded a voice: against those in power, in social control, they protested wrong (...)”. However, as Agamben (2005) argues, the society in contemporary cities has been witnessing “a shift form the model of the *polis* founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or *agora*” to a new form perception of a city which “invested in a process of depoliticisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public”. In this sense, neoliberal urban mega-projects in contemporary capitalism may have the key to understand the both possibility of the political and foreclosing attempts. As Taşkale (2013, p.74) points out

“neoliberal post-politics is the art of foreclosing the politicisation of subjectivities”. With this perspective, besides the social and economic results, the urban mega-projects have a political significance for urban space where methods of disavowing politics are instrumentalized by means of depoliticization.

Ranciere’s account of politics is different in many aspects of contemporary philosophers. The politics is neither an event that may rise the ideas on communism as in the Badiou’s works nor it is an end of history as in the Marxist approaches. When the politics and equality is staged, nothing remains the same and democracy is only possible when addressing wrong and staging equality. Therefore, the one of the critical legacies of Ranciere might be that conceptualization which indicates what anti-democratic and anti-political movement is. Therefore, the analyses with the point of Ranciere’s view on the modern politics may lead a passage to understand today’s grid and complex world which the political problems arise within the different axes.

CHAPTER 4

THE QUESTION OF MEGAPROJECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION, ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND URBAN POLITICS

With the death of Soviet Union, the followers of ‘democracy’ in the West declared the end of ideologies and the end of politics. Unintentionally, what they signaled is that capitalism and its strategies have transformed in a new form. In this context, this new form, called as neoliberalism, also unfolded itself in urban space so that approaches on urban politics within the neoliberal mode of reasoning have been reflecting the new conditions of what might now be defined as post-political or post-democratic consensual governance that relentlessly forecloses alternatives for thinking another urban politics apart from what the neoliberal doctrine offers. As MacLeod (2011, p.2629) indicates, the urban politics of today seems to be centered on “a purported consensus around economic growth alongside a proliferation of entrepreneurially oriented governing regimes” which means the subordination of what is political to the doctrines of neoliberal agenda in urban policy making.

Similarly, at the end of 1990s, politicians and researchers declared “the end of cities” with the innovations in infrastructure and information technologies which permitted to disappear place as a sphere of economic activity (Sassen, 2000, p.1). Since then, general perspective on the cities as disappearing spaces has been putting forward alongside the intense globalization and its transnationalization tendencies. Moreover, even in today, some analysis claimed that more advances in information technologies becomes widespread, the less cities become important because its agglomeration of different industries becomes less significant as the borders withering away. Especially, the Internet has helped the denial of cities and advantages living in urban space and even it is claimed that it would trigger the reverse migration towards rural since “why

deal with the high real estate prices, traffic, crime, pollution, and difficulty of living alongside millions of other people?” while the one has access to workplace in distances or workplace might not exist in some cases (Estes, 2012). Indeed, these claims has been a widespread phenomenon that has become an evident over the last decades as a result of the what is commonly called the globalization. In this sense, to begin, it is needed to take a look at how the critical urban theorists evaluate the concept of globalization analysis in different perspectives. Moreover, how the globalization and neoliberalism is related in pressuring cities towards development within a harsh competition will be touched upon. As the world market become more globalized, neoliberal tactics would become more critical in city governing. Thus, urban politics in city governing during globalized intercity competition and its effects on local governance is needed to be opened for debate.

Hereby, following sections shall bring the questions on the consensually agreed perspectives of today’s capitalism that puts cities under different pressures. For this purpose, it is aimed to revisit briefly on the founding scholars and texts which evaluate contemporary conditions of cities. Therefore, first section will bring the debates on globalization, intercity competition and urban entrepreneurialism. Secondly, various prominent methods of urban neoliberalism shall be evaluated. And lastly, the importance of post-political/post-democratic approach to urban politics will be opened to discussion.

4.1 Cities in a Globalized World

The concept of globalization would be convenient start point for the discussion towards the effects of neoliberalism on city politics since the two concepts neoliberalism and globalization has seen somehow interchangeable in evaluating today’s world. On the one hand, “globalization has been naturalized as the inevitable pathway to economic prosperity and success. If a national economy is not performing well, it must be because the economy is not having ‘enough’ economic globalization”, on the other hand, from Seattle to Genoa, it became perspective for anti-globalization movement as a cause for all socioeconomic decay (Yeung, 2002, p.288-289). What is at stake is the consensus on globalization as a political and economic fix which

determines the economic growth, uneven development, and environmental downfall which are the perspectives that give sight for analyzing the condition of the cities eventually.

4.1.1 Defining the Globalization and Its Myths

Various critical scholars have highly engaged in the question of what the phenomenon of globalization means in understanding today's world. Briefly, what they generally agree is that globalization, one way or another, is the advanced form of capitalism which can be understood as restructuring of the state, of the civil society, of the politics consistent with the priorities of large-scale, transnationalized, internationally mobile capital (Gill, 1995). Moreover, the nature of capital is internal to bourgeoisie's begging for globalized world market. David Harvey (1995) points Marx and Engels giving us a remark in the Manifesto of the Communist Party for the desire of bourgeoisie to erase the boundaries between nations and economies:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country (...). All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. (Marx & Engels, 1948, p.12).

In this sense, we can deduce, firstly, globalization is a process rather than a political-economic condition which restructures geographies and spaces towards the capitalist development at various scales (Harvey, 1995). Secondly, globalization depends on a perspective of a world that is ahistorical, economic, materialistic consistent with what bourgeoisie requires from the nations whose survival relies on their compatibility to the expectations of world market from the nations' economies (Gill, 1995). Lastly, competitiveness is integral to the capitalism which constantly seeks for alternative

markets, various advantageous resource zones to maximize profits which results in an interdependent world market. As a result, globalization is the spread of the idea of the globally integrated economic system of capitalism and its world market.

Litonjua (2008) summarizes the images that flatters of globalization consensually agree upon. At first, erasing bonds that draw the line between nations' economies, globalization is natural process, inevitable, progressive, irreversible and it is humanity's march into future. Indeed, globalization is indispensable for bourgeoisie to effectively increase their profits but what is implied with the idea is the meaninglessness of the resisting the process. The prominent closures of the resistance and political possibilities is centered on the claims on constantly increasing innovations in technology. As technology advances more and more people of the world would be globally integrated. However, what the claims forget is that inventions in technology is highly related to the profitability instead of the desires and needs of ordinary people. Secondly, globalization is put forward as a process that serves benefit for all with the growth and development of countries and, that promotes democracy with the spread of parliamentarism (Litonjua, 2008). On the one hand, competition with economic efficiency, welfare, and democracy collaborate towards a myth of infinite, eternal social progress, on the other hand, non-market alternatives are marginalized, and global initiatives are represented as civilized tools for the good government (Gill, 1995). Therefore, there is no alternative but being consistent with the globalized capitalism. However, as shall be detailed in following chapters, overlapping the democracy and politics to the parliamentarism is scandalous for democracy since it would depoliticize ideas on the political alternatives and would close the debates on the essence of democracy and politics. Nevertheless, the empirical studies have shown how the privileged classes whose wealth and income increased within the globalized capitalism. For example, in U.S., income inequality has grown into a record-high when the richest 1% of families hold the 38.6% of country's total wealth in 2016 (Egan, 2017).

Eventually, what seems to be emerging today an intensification of the commodification at different scale in the pursuit of capitalist development and growth. However, regardless of their grounding principles, globalization is not a universal, comprehensive end-state. Rather, "(...) globalization is first and foremost a descriptive

category denoting, at the most general level, the spatial extension of social interdependencies on a worldwide scale” (Brenner, 2004, p.31). In this context, is there any privileged or prominent scale? What are the conditions of cities in globalization process and how it does affect the cities? Framework that shape today’s understanding of urban governance would be outlined by answering those questions.

4.1.2 Scales and Cities of Globalization

To understand scales in which globalization puts forward, historical background is needed to be discussed. At first, under the pressure of increase the speed of capital accumulation and speed up circulation of capital, capitalism needed to eliminate all the spatial barriers and destroy established geographical landscape with different means. The rigidity of Fordist type of capital accumulation with its long-term investments and inflexibility in the labor market would not open enough space towards means to overcome the crisis of 1970s. Therefore, spatiality of the globalization is outcome of this process what Harvey defines as “flexible accumulation” which relies on the flexibility on the one hand, in labor processes and consumption patterns on the other hand, new ways of financialization intensified commercial, technological innovation (Harvey, 1989a, p. 147). Moreover, new techniques in finance and communication enabled capital to be unbound from their geographical contexts and regulatory institutions of nation states.

In this sense, as capital’s flexibility increases, the major existing urban centers has been under threat of facing deindustrialization and disinvestment that would result in urban downfall eventually as transnationalized capital flows towards the less developed countries where the costs and risks are minimized. At this point, Brenner (2004) indicates the recalibration of the urban policy framework to emphasize place and scale specific projects in the post-1970s period. As crisis deepened, deindustrialized and distressed cities became crucial targets in terms of urban policies which aimed acquiring state’s financial aids and removing barriers to investment for large cities. On the other hand, foreign direct investments had been targeted in developing countries to pursue economic growth by means of urban policies and investments in build environment. Moreover, urban mega-projects (the UMPs)

pioneers in this hunt for capital. According to Thomas Frey, a self-proclaimed futurism expert, mega-projects are about to have 24% of global GDP within a decade (Frey, 2016). Besides, according to research on the Business Insider, 6 of the world's biggest 9 projects are constructed in various non-Western countries including United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China and Hong Kong that mostly include urban infrastructure projects such as airports, highway and bridge constructions (Desjardins, 2017). Similarly, contemporary mega-projects that were build and has been building remarkably concentrated on Istanbul's infrastructure and its articulation with the global market which is seen essential for economic development of Turkey in the global market. Naturally, Istanbul could not escape from the trend emerging in the cities of the globalizing world. Moreover, Istanbul's urbanization story resembles in many aspects with the articulation of the Turkish economy to the world market. Indeed, Istanbul has been a prominent city throughout the centuries in terms of urban life, economy and culture. In this sense, it would not be exaggeration to say that Istanbul's itself is a mega-project. (Yapici, 2017). However, since the beginning of 1970s, as the neoliberal agenda pushes the national economies towards the privatization, deregulation and enabling flexible capital, the landscape of Istanbul had to absorb and reflect these transformations as well as its counterparts around the globe. As neoliberalism intensified in following years, Istanbul became the focus point integrating to the free market economy. On the one hand, while the employment in the service sector dramatically increased, the traditional manufacturing sector located in the central districts was displaced to the peripheries as a result of the enormous rise in the share of the foreign direct investment. For example, in the late 1990s, Istanbul attracted 41.8% of the total FDIs in Turkish economy as well as the share of manufacturing in total FDIs in the economy depleted from 91.5% to 62% and, service sectors' share rose from 8.4% to 36.7% while Istanbul attracted 95% in all banking and finance investment (Berköz, 2001, p. 986; Özdemir, 2002, p.252; Enlil, 2001). On the other hand, although the globalized neoliberalism restructures national and local economies, it also penetrates the urban life. In this sense, Istanbul's articulation to the globalized world market and neoliberalization of the local government concluded in two prominent results reflected in the city's landscape. The very first one is the accumulation regime grounded in the continuous urban renewal and gentrification. Istanbul's attraction of the service sector employment resulted in the introducing new

types of employment and brought the new habits of consumption (such as numerous shopping malls, gated communities, gentrified neighborhoods with luxurious cafes and restaurants) which shows remarkable similarity across the other globalizing cities. Moreover, tensions between the rising white-collars and workers in the service sector ended up with the demand for secluded communities against the outcomes of rising gap between different levels of income. When the local and national governments' vision of Istanbul as a prominent tourist destination is added, what became visible in terms of globalization and neoliberalization is the displacement of the industry and shantytowns into either neighboring cities or outskirts of the Istanbul which resulted in a dramatic social exclusion (Keyder, 2005). The second result is the intensification of capital clustered around the UMPs. Beside the symbolic importance referring to the glorification of the nation, the mega-projects aim to create an image of global city. Similar to the increase of the finance and service sector in Istanbul's local economy in late 1990s, the term mega-projects introduced in 1999 by the metropolitan mayor's handbook entitled as "2023 Istanbul Vision" (Yapici, 2017). At first, the mega-projects were only exhibited as large-scale urban renewal projects (such as "Galataport" and "Haydarpaşaport" waterfront redevelopment projects), but today, for Turkish society, the term urban mega-projects mainly indicate enormous infrastructure projects such as tall bridges and massive airports.

With the increasing importance of long-range connectivity of markets under conditions of flexible capital, urban infrastructural investments have become highly important elements in urban policy. At the first glance, the scale of these UMPs is beyond the local and national rather it furthers the engagement within the global, single market. However, it reflects how local and the global are deeply intertwined, moreover, rather than pre-given geographical condition, the scale is mediated, redefined, and contested (Swyngedouw, 1997). Therefore, the scale of globalization is neither ontologically defined nor politically impartial. In this sense, Yeung (2002) proposes two elements which is nested in the relationship between the globalization and the scale: firstly, the scalar switchability which is fluxional, depending on attention given to the particular elements within a case; secondly, discursive spatial practices that legitimizes the globalization and its targeted reasons and results. In this sense, the scale is globalization cannot identifiable as the discourses vary according to given importance

within the context of the case, especially to the needs of transnationalized flexible capital. Similarly, discourses may bypass some scales or oppositely, every scale can be pointed out within the single case.

At this point, the focus of decision-makers in urban policy has lost their sense of scale as well. In the competition between cities, all resources have been hauled in order to creating business friendly cities for capital in local, national and global scale. Within the competition, cities are taking an entrepreneurial standpoint with the means of neoliberalism (Harvey, 1989b). Using neoliberal tools and perspectives on urban policy, local and national governments aim to attract external financial sources, foreign direct investments and to legitimize the nation states' favoring particular city or cities amongst the others in the single country. Especially, the UMPs are represented as an important element of urban policy in reinforcing cities' relative position in the competitive environment. Moreover, since their agglomeration of the massive economic and political resources include variety of global, national and local elites simultaneously work for a single goal, they become not only very catalyst of new kind of urban regulatory and governmental structures are produced and changed but they also become the lens for how depoliticization is articulated to the existing political environment (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002). Doubtlessly, the massive amount of capital and given importance for local and national economies by the elites make it necessary to introduction of the new regulatory and organizational structure. Therefore, despite the neoliberal rhetoric that promotes minimal state interference and market-led initiatives, the UMPs include intense state mobilization towards the channeling and redistributing public funds, selective regulatory environment to create public-private partnerships and targeting the spaces of investment to create rent (Brenner, 2004). However, the other side of the coin is that this huge mobilization of the state power and the capital also needs an elimination of the alternatives that may put the projects in doubt. The depoliticization of the urban mega-projects goes side by side with the restructuring of the organizational system. In this sense, organizational structure as well as discourses of the elites aims to create an environment where the dissensus towards the projects are silenced. The realization of the UMPs takes places at the expense of exterminating the other possibilities that may open space for thinking alternative perception of city and space.

4.2 Urban Mega-projects as a research question

Although urban growth policies based on large scale project development have been a widespread phenomenon in local governments, the attention has been given to differences and outcomes of these mega-projects in a comparative scope (Ren & Weinstein, 2013). To understand the different logic that has become a global urban concept in the last years, prominent researches focus on ‘the newness’ of the UMPs by comparing them with the Fordist ones, which dominated cities of the welfare state. To begin with a comprehensive definition of urban mega-project, the illustrative description would be about what makes them ‘mega’ in a contemporary perspective. Flyvbjerg (2014) defines the mega-projects as large-scale complex expedition that cost billions of dollars or more, take many years to realize, involve numerous public and private stakeholders, and transformational which ambitiously aims to change the structure of society. Their characteristics can be pointed out what Flyvbjerg calls as ‘Machiavellian mega-projects’ meaning that underestimated costs, ignored environmental impacts, exaggerated economic development claims are intrinsic to the the UMPs (Flyvbjerg, 2005, p.18). Furthermore, they are generally implemented with the public-private partnerships, introduction of new methods of financing is very common which generally indicates that the risks are taken by the public and benefits are seized by the private (Orueta & Fainstein, 2009; Swyngedouw, et al., 2002). According to Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), one of the most significant difference is that the mega-projects remain at the center of development strategies of cities, but local and national governments tend to avoid conspicuous disruption. The contemporary ‘era of do no harm’ perspective contrasts with Fordist type of mega-project development which local and national governments took an active role in promoting these projects and were confronted by the public reluctance as a consequence of the massive displacements (Alshuler & Luberoff, 2003). Nevertheless, impact of the policy making process and these projects on the build environment and on the socio-economic conditions of cities remain as questions to be answered. To point their significance for urban policy, Lehrer and Laidley (2009) notes the new strategy of the UMPs in terms of scope, which intends flexible and multi-use urban environment with multiple complexes and, focuses on areas where are experienced urban decay and lost

its significance as result of deindustrialization. Besides, the UMPs of today consist on massive infrastructure projects that commodify the indigenous lands which were unexploited. Moreover, comprehensive socio-economic conclusions of the new strategy are pointed by the Swyngedouw et al. (2004). Firstly, the UMPs generally implemented with the exceptional measures in planning secondly; local participation is problematic; thirdly, mega-projects are poorly integrated into the wider urban scale; fourthly, they enhance socio-economic polarization; and lastly, they reflect the shifting of power in governing local governments (Swyngedouw et al., 2004).

Beyond the newness of the today's the UMPs, researches focus on why city and national government's responses to urban development have returned mega-project building. The reasons for the contemporary enthusiasm to build such economically risky projects have been tried to be explained by the numbers of scholars. According to Flyvbjerg (2014), four sublims of the UMPs can be listed as follows: technical desire of engineers to build ambitious projects with the help of rapid technological innovation; politicians' eagerness to leave a mark with monumental symbols of their causes; economic opportunity for all the stakeholders such as business elites, trade unions, and aesthetic pleasure for planners and designers. Besides the actors' ambitions to build mega-projects for their satisfaction, the UMPs are inherently means of neoliberal system to reproduce itself. As David Harvey (1989a) noted, the consensual agreement in developed world is that cities have to take entrepreneurial stand point to economic growth or to keep their development since rather than local economies relied on subsidies and full employment strategies of national governments, the post-Fordist accumulation strategy of neoliberal economy have turn into what he calls 'flexible capital' that flows around the markets in the globe in an attempt to find enabling conditions to settle in for a while (Harvey, 1989b). In this sense, economic structuring after 1980s put cities in competitive position to acquire such a huge amount of capital and the UMPs are an effort to reinforce the cities' competitive position. Under the conditions of brutal inter-city competition, these urban mega-projects have increasing role for creating infrastructural foundations to catalyze a city's attractiveness and to ease economic activity for flexible capital and, also served as "an institutional mechanism through which national, regional, and local states channel public funds into strategically located, market-oriented development initiatives"

(Brenner, 2004, p.219). Whether they are object of national or local democracy or both? what is the policy tactics of political elites to make the UMPs 'plausible' object in the eyes of the people in order to make these projects visible in public space. When the political elites choose their strategy to implement the UMPs, is there any significant difference between local and national strategy to acquire consensus on these projects? When the opposition against project raise their concerns, how do elites negate dissensus within the institutions of liberal democracy? As a result, analyzing practices and uses of democracy at the discourses of the local and national political elites through the lens urban policy making of mega-projects as a research object may provide beneficial clues on those questions.

In this context, it is also crucial to claim that the UMPs have also significant impacts on politics of urban space. On the one hand, the rhetoric of mega-projects willing to embrace discourses on plurality, on the other hand, the various forms and uses employed in the UMPs prohibits its oppositional and challenging movements and practices with different means such as fragmenting different parts by offering choices or marginalizing and total exclusion from the participatory processes (Lehrer & Laidley, 2009). They are generally agreed by 'silent majority' of locals (Swyngedouw et al., 2004). As the UMPs become more and more vital for cities to attract capital, exclusion of the challenging attempts to mega-projects by various tools have clearly become general phenomena. This exclusion depoliticizes any ventures with discourses and practices centered on consensual opinions, stakeholder arrangements of incapable participations and idea of 'good governance' (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). This process is referred as post-politics, which focuses on modes of depoliticization through discourses and governance practices.

The need for focusing on the UMPs impact on urban politics primarily for two reasons. Firstly, process of building and realizing mega-projects opens a window on patterns of discourses that shape urban space since they have been indispensable for city and national development. Therefore, strong commitment of powerholders to these projects reveals the ways of interference to cities. Secondly, the stakes which make normally camouflaged powerful actors visible are high (Altshuler & Luberhoff, 2003). Drawing on the literature of post-politics and post-democracy in Jacques Ranciere's thought, this research tries to evaluate the neoliberal political agenda of national and

local political elite's discourses to de-politicize public sphere. While the UMPs are represented as vital way for inter-city competition and national development, the practices taken by the political elites to implement these projects result in closure of the political imagination to challenge mega-projects. Moreover, process in building mega-projects signals the end of politics with on the one hand efforts for consensual politics, on the other hand, vulgar urban populism of the disavowing politics which is the composition of the distribution of sensible in Ranciere's theory.

4.2.1 Urban Mega-projects in Developing World

In today's world, sound of urban mega-projects has been seen as an essential part of countries of so-called developing world. The economies and cities of these countries are represented as a mega-project wonderland which reflect the ambitions of these countries to serve themselves as agreeable partners for capitalist free market with their economic potentials and enthusiasm. Like cities in the West, inter-city competition dominates the cities of the developing world. Capturing the global flexible capital is also crucial for the economies of these countries and mega-projects has become a key tool for attracting capital with its clustering various types of resources and financial support. Additionally, the UMPs have been shown as exemplary method for the development by the prominent institutions of the capital. For instance, McKinsey Company, one of the most prestigious consulting firm for public and private sectors, implies the developing world's need for mega-projects since the global economy requires spending 57 trillion dollars on infrastructure by 2030 to achieve anticipated global GDP growth, which two-thirds of it needed to be met by developing countries (Garemo, Matzinger, & Palter, 2015). Similarly, a pretentious 'to-do list' for successful infrastructure mega-projects was prepared by World Bank with an urgent call for mega-projects because: "the potential rewards are well worth the effort" as if most of the mega-projects did not fail to meet its goals and some of them devastated economies of developing countries (Alves & Picarelli, 2018). Beside the think-thank opinions, the investments by the financial capital supports this paradigm of thinking in contemporary capitalism. According to World Bank reports (2017; 2018), the finance of the mega-projects in the developing world have funded by the international

debts on a large scale, which equal to 55% in 2017 and 40% in the first half of the 2018 within the total infrastructure investment. Moreover, capital institutions with lesser scale aid these projects in emerging economies. For example, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have been investing numbers of projects in order to furthering progress towards “market-oriented economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative” in Europe’s periphery. Turkish mega-projects have been subject to such attempts of financing, in some cases almost %15 of the mega-project’s cost loaned by the institution (“Data on the EBRD's work in Turkey”, 2018).

So far, the UMPs’ significance is shared by cities across the globe. Even though the driving force that makes cities choose to build the UMPs is similar among cities, the mega-projects in developing world shows some unique characteristics in each case, in terms of political impact. On the one hand, the UMPs in these countries have become essential part of their economy, on the other hand, political consequences of these projects differ according to their specific conditions of responding to urban problems and, to their institutional and political background.

First of all, ‘do no harm’ way of implementing contemporary mega-projects might be valid for Western and North American countries, however, Orueta and Fainstein (2009) argues that instead of competing with urban decline due to deindustrialization, developing countries have been experiencing their particular way of urban development which does not always socially and politically harmless. Rapidly developing countries frequently struggles with opposition against the UMPs, but the realization of mega-projects depends on different political conditions. For example, Chinese metropolitanization with the clustering of power, authority and resources enables the city government to challenge opposition; however, India’s inter-party competition within the local government system can led a deadlock to implement if mega-project faces strong opposition. (Ren & Weinstein, 2002). Although one may argue that Chinese way of authoritarian city government system led to dissolution of the oppositional outcries, it went hand by hand consensual political making with the allocation of resources to disband dissensus rather than purely physical power; similarly, even though Indian political deadlock seems to be achievement of representative democracy against the brutal capitalism, it was also about the getting

voters' favor in forthcoming elections rather than good deeds of local elites. Secondly, they generally are quick solutions to fix both national and urban problems instead of long-term planning targets. As Min Joo (2013) indicates, the mega-project building serves as rapid way for challenging economic and political challenges. Therefore, it includes high level of informalization which gives extensive freedom in implementation to developers. To do so, exceptional procedures within the existing institutions of representative democracy or establishing mediatory institutions to go around the laws and regulations are common. In other words, exception in formal procedures becomes the rule (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). Lastly, although researches in developed countries acknowledge state's role is varied and complex and the level of involvement of central government differs among countries in many cases, for developing countries local governments serve a subordinate status and nation-state plays a crucial role in financing, legitimizing and instrumentalizing which allowed national participation in urban networks and plugging the nation-state to global economy (Orueta & Fainstein, 2009; Grabbauer & Camprag, 2019; Bunnell, 2013). Moreover, the leaders of developing countries do not hesitate to build the UMPs. Most of these projects are clustered in the figures of political elite. It represents open, market-friendly and globalized visual against authoritarian image for foreign capital; besides, it becomes a "moral guarantee against failing" for the country's citizens (Bogaert, 2018). Thus, rather than participatory and consensual decision-making procedures, extensive promotion of the UMPs by the kings, princes or so-called illiberal leaders depoliticizes the implementation process (Barthel, 2010).

Although there are decisive motives that are consensually agreed by all rulemaking institutions which shape cities' build environment, there are lots of differences as well as shared concerns among geographies. As a result, researching the UMPs in particular country illuminates what does it mean and what is its significance for cities and for urban politics under the contemporary neoliberal capitalism.

4.3 The Disavowal of Urban Politics Through Mega-Projects

From the growing literature on post-democracy, the instruments that is taken to implement and realize the urban mega-projects can be linked to process of

depoliticization with various means. Mega-projects have been considered as one of the prominent figures of neoliberalism, especially for developing countries. On the one hand, neoliberalism has created various forms of governance brutally in favor of the capital that indeed has consequences in urban policy making and governance. On the other hand, neoliberalism entails the extension of market values to the all spheres of life and, with the help of the post-democracy literature, one may acknowledge the ideological inferences of neoliberal agenda by foreclosing alternatives to the hegemonic discourse (Tarazona Vento, 2017).

In this sense, in a highly competitive atmosphere at the global scale, submissions of cities to the capital as a place where welcomes business environment and creates deferential space to consume and to invest signals mega-projects for the ideal solution to increase cities relative position among the global ranking with the fostered economic growth and the attraction of huge amount of capital. In this context, the literature has been growing with the great influence of Swyngedouw's works on urban post-political condition that analyzes neoliberalization process of urban governing undertaken by the wide variety of organizations alongside government (MacLeod & Jones, 2011). For Swyngedouw (2010), the post-political condition is the urban governance regime focuses on policing, controlling and accentuating the requirements of neoliberal agenda that annul democracy, evacuate the political proper which meant to be dissensual public encounter and exchange. Instead, since the urban policy is wrapped up with the solutions proposed by the neoliberal ideology, what is witnessed is an extraordinarily identical city landscapes although cities are in position that highly competitive, cosmopolitan and globally connected, moreover, large-scale urban projects are the crystallized structure that reflects very dynamics of post-political forms of governmentality, reconfigured elite network and parameters of competitiveness that there is no alternative discourse is constructed (Swyngedouw, 2010).

From this perspective, urban mega-projects have the key to the understanding how the political is disavowed with various means. Mega-projects have proved to be useful objects of inquiry since it gives a great sight to generate consensus, inclusion, exclusion, and to displace dissensus to the hands of the experts and technocrats and, most importantly discourses of the state-elites (Tarazona Vento, 2017). In this sense,

Istanbul's mega-projects shall be analyzed with the intent of further thought about what the post-democratic condition is and how cities are under attack by the discourses and administrative tools of neoliberal ideology.

CHAPTER 5

DISCIPLINING DISAGREEMENT: POST-POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE ISTANBUL'S MEGA-PROJECTS

5.1 Historical Background

5.1.1 The 19th Century Istanbul and the Fin-de-siècle

As every old city around the world, Istanbul has passed many changes throughout history. From the capital city of Eastern Roman civilization to the official end of Ottoman Empire with the movement of newly founded republic's capital to Ankara in 1924, the city has been inhabited by the mosaic of cultural, ethnic and religious composition and has retained a highly significant position in the economies of both empires with its location and thriving urban life. Until modern era, as Keyder notes (2000) Istanbul has been a global city not only with its prosperous economy but also with its vast urban fabric and dense population. While Ottoman Empire started to decline in the 19th century, Istanbul's economic and geographical position developed into more and more precious since the city became the center of commercial and trade with the outside markets while simultaneously Istanbul's ports became the major destination for the import in the articulation of the Ottoman economy to capitalism. Furthermore, Istanbul was not only a port-city, it also had a great commercial market life. Due to its location at the crossroad between the East and the West, the city attracted merchants and travelers from China and India to Italian city-states (Keyder, 2000).

From Medieval era to the 19th century's fin-de-siècle, the population of the city blossomed. Even tough, the exact number of city's inhabitants cannot be calculated until mid-1800s since the population census did not included all citizens such as women, children and men in military service, the population is estimated around 300.000 citizens at the end of 16th century whereas the pre-World War Istanbul was inhabited by the one million citizens including 130.000 foreigners and 450.000

Christians (Gül, 2013, p.31; Keyder, 2000, pp. 10-18). Although the Istanbul's population has always consisted of various cultures such as Muslims, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Romanies, the city's urban shape was divided with crowd enclave neighborhoods separated according to ethnicity or religion. In this sense, the prominent urban problem was the huge fires that threaten these neighborhoods. Even, one large-scale fire may annihilate more than one neighborhood to the ground. Thus, reconstruction of destroyed neighborhoods was one of the main objectives in the city management. Moreover, this separation of districts was also reflected in the division of labor within the city; the Christians were generally occupying the jobs in the trade or luxury commerce. This caused huge tensions between the Muslim and the Christian population because when the trade with European markets intensified the non-Muslim minority were the ones who benefited almost all of the new economic sources due to their networks in Europe (Keyder & Öncü, 1994).

Nevertheless, Istanbul witnessed various interventions to the urban sphere during the 19th century due to the urgent problems. Similar to growing cities of Europe, the increase in the population has required adequate infrastructure facilities such as sewers. Moreover, fires became more dangerous as city was more crowded and housing were traditionally constructed with wooden materials. Additionally, the loss of massive territories in the European borders of the Empire resulted in the migration of Muslims living in these regions, thus caused dramatic housing crisis in the city. Furthermore, the narrow and labyrinth-like streets did not allow proper transportation facilities. In this context, there were serious attempts to solve these crucial problems of the city. The first municipality of the Istanbul's districts was created in 1855 by taking its European counterparts as an example¹. The municipality was empowered similar to the proper modern municipality system such as construction of roads, water supply, sanitation. Moreover, this municipality also had powers to create financial resources (Gül, 2013). However, this model could not be successful pioneer for other districts of Istanbul due to lack of economic support from the central government because of the financial crisis in mid-1850s.

¹ “6. Daire-i Belediye” was the first municipality emerged in the Istanbul's districts. It had the responsibilities of naming avenues and streets, maintenance and construction of waterways and sewer, cleaning and lighting services (Tekeli, 2013).

Towards the end of 19th century, the Empire's economy was about the collapse due to the huge debts to the European banks caused by the defeat at 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War. Nevertheless, Istanbul remained as a global city since its economic articulation to capitalism was intensified. This brought about two outcomes: on the one hand, the massive investments on the country's infrastructure which was either absent or inadequate in relation to different facilities and on the other hand, the re-centralization of the state (Tekeli, 2013). With these two motives, the Ottoman state aimed to connect rest of the empire to the Istanbul and to articulate the empire's economy through Istanbul. Therefore, the empire's territories witnessed the advancements on the agriculture, railway and mining during the last years of the 19th century. Even though these developments had results in the empire's capital, the transformation was limited due to lack of capital accumulation (Tekeli, 2013). Firstly, there were radical changes in the built environment since the integration to the capitalist economy brought the rise of bourgeois neighborhoods with stone and brick houses which was in contrast with the traditional religious or ethnic divisions between districts and their wooden urban fabric (Tekeli, 2013). Secondly, the articulation to the international trade network resulted in iconic urban structures such as Sirkeci and Haydarpaşa train stations, bank headquarters and increasing numbers in the embassy buildings whereas the enlarged tramway lines and establishment of ferry company fed the commercial life between and within different sides of the Bosphorus. Moreover, Istanbul in the last years of 19th and early 20th century experienced a kind of primitive mega-project era which were not realized because of the financial incapacity. For example, the railway bridge construction was proposed between train station in the two sides of the Bosphorus that would connect the rail line from Berlin to Baghdad. However, it remained only as project due to empire's economic conditions that did not allow speculative and expensive investments (Gül, 2013). Nevertheless, the rising Islamism towards the end of the empire was giving space for these radical ideas since the ideology of Islamism needs symbolic structures that represents the ideology's magnitude in relation to modernization that Ottoman society experienced with the articulation to the capitalism and Westernization of the society. Moreover, the Islamist urban life and traditional neighborhoods continued to exist side by side with the European life style in the international commercial urban centers which were enlarging with the incoming foreigners, growing number of bureaucrats as a result of established new state

institutions with modernization attempts and enriching non-Muslim Ottoman subjects (Keyder & Öncü, 1994).

5.1.2. From Old capital to Modern Global Istanbul

The defeat in the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had dramatic consequences for the capital of the empire indeed. Perhaps, since the Roman era that the city has been found among the world capital, Istanbul lost its significance as global city. Tekeli (2013) lists the national and global reasons for the decay of the city: Firstly, Istanbul witnessed an urban warfare environment and civil war at the city in 1909 due to clashes between the supporters of monarchy and constitutionalists. Secondly, the Balkan Wars in 1912 caused huge flux of migrants from the Balkan territories of the empire, and thirdly, during the World War Istanbul lost the commerce networks and was invaded by the Allied forces and experienced occupation climate. Last but not the least, the Turkish War of Independence transferred the capital of the nation to Ankara since the city was occupied by the Allies and monarchy was sit on the throne in Istanbul. In this context, the population of the city shrunk whereas the Muslim Turkish population dominated the city which led to loss of multiculturalism in the city (Tekeli, 2013).

Table 5.1. The Istanbul's population in millions and its rank among the most populated cities²

<i>Years</i>	<i>Population (millions)</i>	<i>Rank among most populated cities</i>
1500	0.2	6
1700	0.7	1
1825	0.7	6
1875	0.9	6
1900	0.9	19
1950	1	70
2010	12.7	14

² Jedwab and Vollrath (2015, p.27) lists the top 30 mega cities and their respective population. In 1950, Istanbul could not make it on the list, thus, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's (2001) population data and Chandler and Fox's ranking (1974, p. 337) work was used to complete the lack of data.

Within this conjuncture, the newly founded republic turned its attention to Anatolia, especially Ankara at first glance. For Keyder (2000), the reason for such a shift has two motives. At first, the Istanbul's modernization experience was seen as an alien phenomenon that is distant to realities of Turkey since the majority who benefited from this process were non-Muslims and secondly, the founders of new nation state would like to keep distance from local traditions affiliated with Islamism, which Istanbul witnessed with many religious sects, cults and orders (Keyder & Öncü, 1993). Moreover, the Great Depression in 1929 deteriorated the international trade and commerce since vulgar capitalism with borderless and unregulated pursuit of profit in 19th century gave way to the more protectionist economic policies with the crisis. Moreover, the Great Depression convinced that liberal policies were too risky for the new republic, thus, the elites preferred "national developmentalist" perspective that cities were articulated to the necessities of national economy. (Keyder & Öncü, 1994, p. 387). In this sense, Istanbul became a neglected and out of date old capital. For example, there were not any large-scale investments of public buildings in Istanbul until 1940s. Similarly, the share of financial support to Istanbul in the national development plans was lower compared to the other Anatolian cities (Gül, 2013). Additionally, the republic's industrialization efforts passed over the old capital with a single exception, Paşabahçe glass factory (Keyder & Öncü, 1993). Moreover, the city witnessed huge renewal the between 1930s and 1950s in terms of both republican ideology's reshaping and the necessity for rebuilding damaged city., Thus, the master plan proposed by the French urban planner, Henri Proust was targeting emergence of monumental public squares and demolition of a number of Ottoman urban legacies through the construction of large boulevards and coordinated public transportation system, which contradicts with the narrow streets and road of the traditional neighborhoods . To sum up, the city lost the thousand years of its magnificence and Istanbul started to be considered as a just another Anatolian city in the republic.

Nevertheless, with the post-Second World War conditions and Turkey's changing national political atmosphere revitalized Istanbul once more during 1950s. On the one hand, the peaceful international regime and stable, even prosperous, economic conditions enabled Turkey to articulate the capitalist new world order when the new

government with liberal economic priorities took the power. Moreover, the Marshall Plan's import-led economic barriers and increasing mechanization caused a rural crisis which was sustaining traditional agricultural methods. In this sense, the cities of Turkey experienced huge flow of migration from the rural parts of the county with the demise of precedented agricultural-depending economy. Indeed, Istanbul one of the major destinations of migrants, the city's population increased from 1.078.399 in 1945 to 2.293.823 in 1965 and to 3.904.588 in 1975 (İBB, n.d., p.5; İBB, 2001). Moreover, the inequal distribution in the share of population between Istanbul and other cities of Turkey was constantly increasing.

Table 5.2. Istanbul's population and its comparison with the national population³

<i>Years</i>	<i>Percentage of Istanbul's share in respect to national population</i>	<i>National Population (millions)</i>	<i>Istanbul's population (millions)</i>
1960	6.78%	27.755	1.882
1975	6.26%	40.348	3.904
1990	12.74%	56.473	7.195
2000	14.77%	67.804	10.018
2017	18.37%	82.003	15.067

The problems that arose with increasing number of inhabitants became clear in 1950s. The pressure of housing problems in the city was solved with the informal establishment of squatter (*gecekondu*) neighborhoods by newcomers but still the parts of the inner city were struggling with the traffic congestions. Moreover, Tekeli (2013, p.219) argues that 660.000 inhabitants of the city were living in squatter houses in 1963. Although the government let squatter districts alone for a degree, its solution to the urgent traffic problem was legacy of Proust's master plan which foresaw the destruction of some historical parts of the city to create large avenues and boulevards (Gül, 2013). Indeed, the reason for this agglomeration of population and problems were the boom of industrialization without proper management. The 19.2% of small and medium sized enterprises and 42.9% of big enterprises in Turkey located in

³ Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.; İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2001

Istanbul (Tekeli, 2013, p.186). Similar problems with the housing crisis and transportation problems remained until the 1990s when the Turkey's economic neoliberalization and cities' restructuring according to the needs of capital intensified.

5.1.3. Globalizing Istanbul

The importance of build environment for capital in terms of urbanization is brilliantly pointed out by David Harvey (1978). On the one hand, the capitalists accumulate more capital and reinvest it into other forms of capital. On the other hand, when the investments result in surplus of capital then overaccumulation causes fall of profits since the amount of surplus capital cannot find enough advantageous investment choices. This is clearly contradicting with the capitalist perspective that continuously search for profitable enterprises. Therefore, the result leads to the circuits of capital whereby capitalism solve the overaccumulation crisis in terms of transferring the surplus of capital from the circuit that the capitalist invest in the means, which is necessary to produce and reproduce capital such as research and development investments making extraction of capital more productive. "The secondary circuit of capital" attract the flow of capital from the first circuit where the excess capital makes no profits within the equilibrium (Harvey, 1982, p.236). It absorbs the excess capital and connects it to the investments in built environment resulting in the stimulation of consumption and, thus relate capital to the production.

Similar conclusion can be made for the urbanization patterns in Turkey as the country's neoliberalization intensifies with the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the JDP) government under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The attraction to the neoliberalizing economy took two forms since the JDP government seized the country's executive and legislative branches. At the beginning, the JDP's success at elections was generally attributed to the great crisis of 2001 when Turkish economy turned into deep depression and the major political parties of the 1990s lost their trust in the eyes of the citizens. The JDP's modes of therapy were, on the one hand, implementation of the brutal neoliberalization of the economy with privatizations and foreign direct investments (the FDIs) and on the other hand, establishing political stability which was understood as one-party rule and discrediting the cohabitations of

coalition government that has been blamed for the crumbling economy. In 2001, the JDP party leader and future prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted that

Turkey has been worn by the coalition governments. The government had stability in 1950-60 period when there were single party rules. An important rupture took place in 1984 – 1991. This is the result of governments established by the coalition governments for the last ten years. The current period is the leap period. Turkey entered the peak period. We will realize this jump in the first elections and save the country from coalition governments” (“Koalisyonlar Ülkeyi Yıprattı”, 2001).

In the economic policy, the privatizations have been a driving force for the neoliberalization under the JDP rule⁴. The 90% of the total income from privatization took place under the economic policy that has been active since 2002 when the JDP took the power (Çakır, 2008). Moreover, the second feature in the economy was the articulation to the free market economy and global trade with open-market policies. For example, the new legislation on foreign investments passed in 2003 during the first months of the JDP government. The new legislation, law number 8469, replaced the ‘outdated’ law, law number 6224, which was highly regulating the foreign investments with the prohibitions on monopoly for foreign companies and bound the foreign investments to a committee which examines in terms of whether the investment is compatible to requirements listed in the law. Therefore, from 2002 and onwards, Turkish economy witnessed enormous levels of foreign direct investment compared to the pre-JDP period.

⁴ Indeed, the neoliberalization process of Turkey has long history before the JDP government. The country was introduced the neoliberal programme with the 24 January Decisions announced by the coup d’état government in 1980, which was to ensure that the market-based initiatives was the main determinant in the distribution of the national economy's accumulation and resources, moreover, to ensure integration with world markets. Nevertheless, the practices of programme has intensified through 1990s, especially with the ANAP government that accelerated privatizations and disbanded organized labor movements. When the JDP took power in 2002, neoliberal policies for the Turkish party politics has become a norm and the challenging labor movement has already lost their previous power.




Figure 5.1 FDI Rates of Turkish Economy from 2000 to the 2018⁵

It is expected that the interventions to the build-environment cannot be untouched while the general structure of economy was neoliberalizing. The excess in the accumulation of capital invested in the build-environment reshaped the landscapes of cities, while the major cities in Turkey began to be represented as business-friendly, global cities. The prominent intervention model was the urban redevelopment and gentrification projects which were compatible with the demands of enlarging middle-class and of the bourgeoisie aiming for generation of rent from the urban spaces. Although the newly elected Prime Minister Erdoğan declared the need of local government reform in terms of duties, responsibilities, budget, finance, participation of the non-governmental organizations and local growth, the populated cities witnessed significant number of urban redevelopment and gentrification projects which aimed to solve the tensions between classes due to the increasing gap between high and low income levels (“Erdoğan Acil Eylem Planı’nı açıkladı”, 2002). These projects were located on the central zones within the cities which experienced urban decay, squatting or contained industrial complexes or ports. Besides, in order to increase the position of cities within the global competition, the JDP government tended to give an importance to the projects that have cultural significance such as Formula 1 Circuit, Atatürk Olympic Stadium and football stadium constructions almost all major cities in Turkey.

In short, the JDP government’s urban policy is centered on the commodification of the land. The generation and distribution of rent from the various projects have been

⁵ Source: World Bank, 2019a

central issue in urbanization. However, the commodification of urban landscape was also the result of the vulnerabilities due to the neoliberalization process. As Turkish economy witnessed high percentage of growth rates, the policy did not create an economy that generates the foreign currency. Instead it created economy that constantly absorbs the foreign currency from the abroad. Since the economy cannot create profitable spheres where the excess of capital may settle in to the first circuit, the overly accumulated capital has flown into secondary circuit which resulted massive boom in the construction sector. Although the perspective of construction as the driving force of the economy is not unique for the Turkish case since it generates a vast number of exchanges between different sectors in the economy, its highly speculative nature may result in disastrous consequences when the control is absent in relation to social, environment and political issues (Balaban, 2011). The enormous investment to the build-environment can be seen at the Figure 5.2.




Figure 5.2 Building Permits Statistics 2002 to 2018⁶

The prominent effect of the construction led growth is the stimulation of the consumption, especially within the city centers. For example, in addition to increasing

⁶ Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2019.

residential building stock, the number of shopping malls jumped from 12 malls in 1995 to 448 in 2018 (Çalışkan, 2018). However, the financial crisis of 2008 hit the Turkish economy drastically. The economy has been centered on the consumption on the one hand, has been depending on the investments in build-environment on the other. Moreover, the Turkish lira's value eroded in the exchange market due to the U.S.'s recall of the dollars with the increasing interest rates in 2013 (Sönmez, 2017). Eventually, the FDI rates never go back to the enormous rates that were witnessed between 2002 and 2008, and it has been steering at the levels close to the 2008 rates. Nevertheless, the investment into the build-environment did not experience such a drop back., On the contrary, the amount of building permits consistently increased until the Turkish economy hit the crisis in 2018 once again.

The 2008 crisis transformed the Turkish economy from the one that puts the FDIs to the center on the economic growth to a brand new one, which operates with the “debt-ridden speculative growth” where the rate of increase in total external debt exceeds the rate of the GDP (Yeldan & Ünüvar, 2015). The depressed Turkish lira has been keeping alive with the imports of foreign currency by means of external debts. But what makes it speculative? The answer may be found out if the conditions of the firms in construction sector are examined. The two tables presented in the above might give the clue about the new condition between finance and construction sectors. On the one hand, the FDI rates have never recovered from the glorious levels of the 2002-2008 period, thus, indicating the absence of profitable enterprises for the excess capital., However, on the other hand, the building permits of the real-estate market has continued its increase until 2018. Therefore, it might be concluded that the excess capital could not find enough paying sectors except the construction and related markets. However, the consequences of this trend do not signal good news for the economy. According to research prepared by the Association of the Turkish Construction Material Industrialists, the amount of debt stock in foreign currency of the construction and real estate sector is 51.8 billion dollars, which was loaned by the national and the foreign banks, whereas the private sector's gross external debt is 305.9 billion dollars (“İnşaat sektöründe korkutan tablo”, 2018 & “Turkey's net external debt stock”, 2019) The highly indebted firms in the construction sector has been speculative since the firms with the foreign debts are pursuing the fluctuations in the foreign

exchange rates aiming to minimizing the loss due to decreasing value of lira (Sönmez, 2017). Therefore, the date of the announcement of the projects in 2011 would not a coincidence since the country's economy was struggling with the post-2008 crisis outcomes.

As Harvey (1978, p.107) points out “a general condition for the flow of capital into the secondary circuit is, therefore, the existence of a functioning capital market and, perhaps, a state willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large-scale projects with respect to the creation of the built environment”. In this context, as the Turkey's economic crisis intensifies after 2008 financial crisis, more and more state-led interventions in favor of capital to the cities' landscapes have become indispensable for the functioning of the neoliberal economy. Under this conjuncture, the Turkish society have met with numerous mighty megaprojects, colossal both in terms of the scale of the projects and the financial volume. Although Istanbul's Third Bridge⁷ and New Airport⁸ projects have been subject to intense debates since 1990s, the final declaration was made prior to 2011 elections. The previous debates were centered on various topics such as whether Istanbul needs another airport or bridge, whereabouts of their locations and the cost of construction. The late 1990s governments argued that the Third Bridge was a must due to the city's increasing traffic congestion and blamed the popular opposition for being ignorant about the details of the project (“3. Köprü olacak o kadar!”, 1998). Even Erdoğan, then the mayor of Istanbul, said that the Third Bridge would be serious mistake for the city since it meant to be generation of rent form the city's northern forests (“Erdoğan 3. köprüye böyle itiraz etmiş”, 2017). Moreover, the government officials declared for the necessity of public-private partnership model because of the financial incapacity that Turkish economy was facing: “We don't have the resources to build that bridge. Now, highways should bring foreign capital instead of borrowing by build-operate-transfer method” (“3. köprü 800 milyon dolara mal olacak”, 2002). Yet, the bridge project was suspended due to the

⁷ The name of the Third Bridge was announced as the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge. However, it shall be called as the Third Bridge throughout the research

⁸ The New Airport Projects is also called the Third Airport Project. The name of the airport was announced as the Istanbul Airport. Within this work, the projects names are used equivalent

budget concerns and political instability as result of the ever-changing cabinet members. The final announcement of megaprojects was made prior to general elections in 2011 which the JDP got the highest vote percentage in the party's history. The third bridge was going to be the widest suspension bridge with four highway lanes in each direction and two lanes of railway (ICA, 2013).

Similarly, the need for another airport in Istanbul has been a concern as the population of Istanbul increased. The new airport of Istanbul, firstly, became a subject of interest in 2010 by the Prime Minister Erdoğan with the urgent need for another airport since the current two buildings do not meet the demands due to increasing aviation traffic and passenger number (“Üçüncü bir havalimanı görürseniz şaşırmayın”, 2010). Similar to the case of the Third Bridge, the announcement of the airport project was prior to general elections in 2011 amongst the large-scale projects planned for other cities of Turkey under the election campaign title ‘Turkey is ready, aim is 2023’ (“Erdoğan iki şehir projesini açıkladı”, 2011). The reasons for the necessity for megaprojects are listed in the JDP's election manifesto prepared for upcoming 2011 general elections. Parallel to the JDP's ‘Vision 2023’, the megaprojects are represented as the main part of global city discourse which centered on the attracting the international flowing capital with not only tourism but also with the setting locational advantages of the Istanbul in the international trade (12 Haziran 2011 Seçim Beyannamesi, n.d.). The Third Bridge was opened in 26th of August 2016 and the Istanbul Airport has been active since 29th of October 2018.



Figure 5.3 The Third Bridge of Istanbul⁹

⁹ Source: Yavuz Sultan Selim Köprüsü ve Kuzey Çevre Yolu İşletmesi, 2016



Figure 5.4 The Istanbul Airport¹⁰

Although the mega-projects of Istanbul include one more project, however, it has not been realized so far. The mentioned project is ‘The Canal Istanbul’ which is about construction of artificial sea way to solve the maritime traffic by creating an alternative route to Istanbul’s Bosphorus that connects Black Sea with the Mediterranean trade routes. Currently, the canal project is undergoing environmental impact assessment report. Yet, in some cases the mega-projects are presented as collection of developmental projects for Istanbul and the canal project is also concerned with the other projects in debate. Therefore, there will be mentions to the Canal Istanbul in some cases within this research. In this sense, although the scope of the research includes only realized projects, thus, does not include the canal project, there shall be mentions in the parts of the research. In the following sections, the challenges and the social movements shall be discussed together with the main actors and their objections against the case of the new airport of Istanbul and the Third Bridge.

¹⁰ Source: İGA, 2019.



Figure 5.5 Istanbul's Large-Scale Projects at 1998, 2007 and 2019¹¹

¹¹ Source: Megaistanbul, 2019.

5.2. The Third Bridge of Istanbul: The Projects, Debates and Post-political Condition

Since the mega-projects of Istanbul have become subjects of public debate, the various oppositional movements are activated towards the different topics of disagreement with the planning and types of implementation of these projects. In general, these objections came from the already-existing organizations such as chambers of profession and non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, there are movements that particularly target the Istanbul's mega-projects. Concerning environmental hazard due to the mega-projects, the prominent organization is the 'Northern Forest Defense' which is significantly active since the beginning of the projects. These movements actively try to expose their challenges to the projects and aims to create space for public debate by increasing awareness with media outlets and policy reports. In this section, there shall be tried to categorize the forms of wrong that are brought by oppositional movements towards the projects' different concerns. However, each project also raised unique question in their decision-making process, thus, produced the unexpected actors of challenge. Therefore, when it is required to be touched upon, these actors and their objects of concern shall try to be analyzed.

5.2.1 Whether does Istanbul Need Another Bridge? Matters of Fact and Matters of Concerns

When the project of the Third Bridge announced, Binali Yıldırım (2010), the Minister of Transportation, listed the reasons of necessity for construction of another bridge that connects two sides of the Bosphorus. According to the minister, the goal of the projects has two main motives; on the one hand, with the Third Bridge project the solution to the increasing heavy traffic problem in the city with moving national and transnational transportation to the out of inner city would be found. This argument was supported by the ministry data, according to which numbers in the vehicle ownership was increased 65% between 2001 and 2010 and the heavy vehicles that travel across Asian and European cities were putting extra pressure on the inner city traffic. Thus, if necessary precautionary measures would not be taken the consequences would be hazardous. On the other hand, the project is not only vital for Istanbul but also for

Turkey, as well as Asian and European countries since the city's location connects two continents' trade and transportation. However, the heavy vehicles were required to wait until midnight to pass the existing bridges which eventually increases costs for commodities (“3. köprü'nün güzergahı belli oldu”, 2010). Therefore, towards the beginning of the opening of the bridge the heavy vehicles and intercity buses were banned to travel across the two bridges at the inner city (“Kamyon, otobüs ve TIR'lar kent içine giremeyecek”, 2016). In this sense, the bridge is located in Garipçe on the European side and in Poyrazköy on the Asia where are close to the Black Sea. Moreover, the Third Bridge would be the connection to the new airport of Istanbul and plan of two cities with the realization of the Canal Istanbul (“Erdoğan iki şehir projesini açıkladı”, 2011). To sum up, the government's reasoning depends on the facts which clearly indicates the urgent solutions for the inextricable traffic conditions of the city.



Figure 5.6 The Third Bridge and Northern Marmara Motorway ^{12 13}

¹² Source: “Kuzey Marmara Otoyolu Projesi için Başbakanlık Genelgesi”, 2016

¹³ The yellow line is marking the Third Bridge and Northern Marmara Motorway whereas the white lines are showing the existing two bridges within the city center.

However, matters of concerns rose with the discourses on the necessity of the Third Bridge as a solution for Istanbul's traffic. Although the city's traffic congestion remains as an undeniable fact, the opposition intensified with question of whether the construction of another bridge would be the proper treatment for the problem. For example, the policy report prepared by the Chamber of Urban Planners (The 3rd Bridge Project Evaluation Report, 2010), stated that Istanbul's traffic problem could not be solved with the enhancing motorway biased transportation policies. In the report, the need for effective public transportation is emphasized with the supportive evidences. When the Bosphorus crossings are analyzed with respect to modal preferences, the bridges are used by 81% of these trips while seaway is only preferred for the remaining 19% (The 3rd Bridge Project Evaluation Report, 2010, p.15). The motor vehicles carry the 24% of the entire Bosphorus crossing demand. However, among the composition of the motor vehicles, the real source of the congestion are the private vehicles with a huge share of 82%. In other words, although 82% of all vehicles crossing the bridges are private vehicles, these vehicles only carry the 24% of the entire demand. This, again, shows that the main intended group of the bridges are the private vehicles rather than the individuals (The 3rd Bridge Project Evaluation Report, 2010, p.15)

Moreover, the report also touches upon the government's claim on the moving transit travels of long vehicles to the outskirts. According to the report, the percentage of transit traffic is only between 2% and 3% among the total crossing shares within the Bosphorus (The 3rd Bridge Project Evaluation Report, 2010, p.20). Similar declarations were made by all the chambers working under the umbrella of The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (the TMMOB). For instance, The Chamber of Architects stated that the Third Bridge would be the declaration of Istanbul's death (Korkut, 2010). Similar conclusions were made by The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats (the TEMA) in their reports. The TEMA report also points out the construction of another bridge would not solve the crisis rather it only reinforces the existing patterns on transportation which is based on motor vehicle use instead of public transit (Gerçek, 2014). Nevertheless, it does not mean that all the chambers were objecting the bridge project. For instance, the vice-chairperson of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey noted that the third bridge will result in the ease of transport

vehicles entering the European border gate. Stating that the position of the bridge is extremely accurate, and he gave the following information: "Turkey's export target is \$ 500 billion according to 2023 targets. To achieve this goal, the transportation infrastructure needs to be strengthened. If we stay with the same ports and the same routes, we have no chance of achieving our export target" ("3. köprü Türkiye'yi lojistik üs konumuna getirecek", 2010). Similarly, the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce concluded that the Third Bridge Project has been planned in line with the needs of our country and cities and it is a new route which connects the Asia and Europe continents with the North Marmara Motorway (ICA, 2014).

5.2.2 The Environmental Crisis: The Istanbul Airport and The Third Bridge

In a similar way the discussion about why Istanbul need another airport began when the government publicized the project. The announcement was made by the Prime Minister Erdoğan with the necessity for third airport since the existing two could not meet the increasing demands in the air transportation ("Üçüncü bir havalimanı görürseniz şaşırmayın", 2010). Moreover, the Minister of Transportation, Binali Yıldırım, noted that the expansion of existing two airports would not reach the intended increase to meet demands since "If we take into consideration the developments in aviation, we will reach around 150 million passengers in 2023 only in Istanbul. Therefore, it is not possible to direct and manage this passenger with the existing airports" ("Üçüncü havalimanının yerini belirledik", 2012). Moreover, Yıldırım's successor Minister of Transportation, Ahmet Arslan, announced closure of the one of the existing airports, the Atatürk Airport, since the new airport will use the same air corridor ("Atatürk Havalimanı'na AVM açıklaması", 2017).

The key concern on the new airport's location is its hazardous effect for the green areas in the north of the city which contain flourishing flora and fauna. Especially, the project area includes various of lakes, lagoons and ponds. Moreover, the Terkos Lake, which holds the 22% of total clean water resources of Istanbul has been under threat due to construction activities and pollution on its headwaters (TMMOB, 2014, p.8). Besides, the project arena overlaps with the migratory routes for many bird species. Moreover, perhaps most critically, the implementation of both projects requires

removal of trees in enormous numbers. In this sense, the environmental impact assessment report (the EIA) of the both projects acknowledge the deforestation. The EIA of the Third Bridge mentions that “much of the route passes through areas of forestry and the loss of trees and habitat represents one of the main impacts associated with the Project”, similarly, the Istanbul Airport project covers 7.650-hectare zone which contains 6.172 hectare of forest (AECOM, 2013a, p. 1; Kuzey Ormanları Savunması, 2015, p.25). Moreover, these areas are hosting endemic plants which is unique for Istanbul’s northern forests (Tolunay, 2014).

Numerous environmental organizations declared public statement against the implementation of these projects regarding their possible environmental degradation. Moreover, the Northern Forest Defense and the TEMA has prepared detailed report on the consequences of these projects. Although these reports highlight the danger of loss of habitats, the responses in the EIA reports and the state declarations are centered on the reforestation (Kuzey Ormanları Savunması, 2015). Additionally, the environmental organizations actively appeared in public space to oppose these projects. For example, Northern Forest Defense has been actively working in the subject of environmental devastation throughout Turkey even though the establishment of the organization began with the Istanbul’s mega-projects (Kuzey Ormanları Savunması, 2014).

5.2.3 Exceptional Measures in the Projects

Since the both projects proceeded into implementation levels, they were aimed to pursue by exceptional measures within the legal framework. The state of exception began at the same time for both projects. In 2009, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality prepared 1/100.000 scaled Master Plan which is the ultimate guide for the future development strategies of the city. According to the Chamber of City Planners (2010, p.13), the Master Plan foresees “Expanding Istanbul on the east-west axis and along the Marmara Sea linearly with a multi-centric design (establishing central business districts at intervals) while sticking to environmental sustainability principles”. However, most critically, the Master Plan did not include any of the mega-projects whereas the plan has modified in exceptional ways.



Figure 5.7 Istanbul's Master Plan in 2009¹⁴

The environmental impact assessment reports for both projects were tried to be bypassed with a law amendment in the national parliament. The law amendment was aiming the planned projects to be excluded from the EIA reports that had included the national investment program, however, the Constitutional Court rejected the amendment. (Gürcanlı, 2013). Yet, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization tried to change the regulatory framework of the EIA reports which foresees exceptions for large-scale projects, nevertheless, the court decided to stop the alterations (“AVM’ler HES’ler ÇED’den muaf olacak”, 2014). Although, the project had not any final plan, the Third Bridge project began in 2013. Moreover, the modification on the Master Plan was absent whereas the changes tried to be made by 17 development plans in different districts scaled in 1/5.000 (“3. Köprü’de Olmayan Plana 17 Dava”, 2012).

The Istanbul Airport project has witnessed similar struggle between the EIA reports and exceptional planning measures. Although the EIA report exposes the environmental dangers of the projects, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization approved the project, yet the court stopped the execution. The bidding of the project proceeded without the EIA Report. Additionally, the suits against the plans brought by the Chamber of Architects were eluded by the making minor changes within the plan

¹⁴ Source: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2009

(Kuzey Ormanları Savunması, 2015). Another actor that was exposed to state of exceptions was the local people living in the villages. The Housing Development Administration (the TOKİ) was authorized to execute the expropriation for the airport project. However, the villagers found that the TOKİ's expropriation payments was very low compared to land values, thus, the court concerning the dispute among parties decided the halt of expropriation process ("Üçüncü havalimanı kamulaştırmasına durdurma", 2014). However, state authorized the TOKİ with the power of urgent expropriation which can only be executed during the times of war and natural disaster.

5.3 The Struggles of Urban Problems Through Mega-projects in Istanbul

The interventions in order to solve the critical problems within Istanbul has been sustained by mega-projects for many years. Indeed, what triggers increasing number of mega-projects is the neoliberalization of city spaces and the neoliberal perspective in approaching urban problems, which blocks non-market alternatives. In parallel to the development in its counterparts, the neoliberal discourses in approaching Istanbul's landscape emerged after 1970s crisis. In this sense, rent and commodification of land focusing urban policy have become a main driving force in decision makers' perspective. This resulted in the appearance of the neoliberal mega-projects within city's build-environment which indicates the construction of Istanbul's first and second Bosphorus bridges. The 1980 military coup enhanced the neoliberalization process both in economy and urban space. For example, approval of the Second Bosphorus Bridge was realized by the local government appointed by the military government (Yapıcı, 2017). After the repressed period under military coup, in 1990s, numerous mega-projects have become subjects of public debate. Although many of them were not realized due to economic recession and lack of stability in national and local governments and the governments proposed various projects under the banner of global city including waterfront development projects, infrastructure projects for the Turkey's bid to 2000 Olympics, and underwater tube tunnel project to the Bosphorus (Çobanyılmaz Öztürk, 2017). Moreover, during the JDP period, many of these unrealized projects become main topic of discussion in urban politics of Istanbul. For instance, the tunnel projects under Bosphorus (the Avrasya Tunnel) and the railroad line project that connects two continents under sea level (the Marmaray) would be

realized under the JDP government even though they were announced yet did not begin before the JDP took power (Megaistanbul, 2019).

However, many of the projects have been tried to be implemented despite the opposition movements against the projects. The emergence of alternative perspectives that put ideas on how the city should be governed represents the possibility of the politics that its space opens up by the decision makers and elites' insistence on mega-projects. One of the early signals of resistance to the neoliberal perspective to the city space was manifested in Sulukule neighborhood gentrification project which dispossessed the Romani community inhabiting there. Main motivation for the project was the improvement of the quality of life in the old town whereas the activist put an alternative voice and demanded adequate municipal services instead of replacing Romani community which gives the unique identity to the neighborhood (Uysal, 2012). Similar attitudes from the oppositional movements have grown as the number of mega-projects increased in Istanbul's landscape. Most of the counter movements have been creating citizen platforms that targets the hegemonic discourses from the elites in legitimizing these projects. For instance, there has been a complex debate on the waterfront development project on the old Haydarpaşa Train Station which has been a prominent public space for the citizens of Istanbul. Haydarpaşa Solidarity for Society, City and Environment was created in May 2005 with the participation of professional chambers, trade unions and non-governmental organizations against the Haydarpaşa Train Station which declared as 'Haydarpaşa is becoming Manhattan' (Haydarpaşa Büyük İnsanlığı Yardıma Çağırıyor, 2015).

Even though the inhabitants attempt to organize against the implementation of mega-projects, the most radical opposition arose as spontaneous movement against one of the proposed mega-projects which aimed the commodification of a public space in Istanbul. Gezi Park protest in Taksim Square began as a movement against Taksim pedestrianization project that turns the green public space into a shopping mall and its facade would imitate the old Ottoman artillery barracks existed prior to the republic. The importance of Taksim Square and Gezi Park as a public space can be traced back to the late Ottoman and republican period. The Taksim District and its square historically were spaces of representation for both non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the Ottoman times and for secular and socialist movements that means the district

witnessed modernization attempts as well as labor demonstrations during republican era (Batuman, 2015). Therefore, the Taksim Project can be considered as “commercialization and political sterilization of public space” (Erensü & Karaman, 2017, p.27). Besides, the project also reflects the JDP’s vision of the Islamist landscape which is exposed when the Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the construction of the Taksim Mosque next to the shopping mall. With all these developments, the occupation of the Gezi Park and Taksim Square does not only indicate the counter-hegemonic movement against the dominant social order but also it means the appearance of alternative common perspectives towards urban life. Erensü and Karaman (2015, p. 33). points out that:

During its occupation from 1 to 15 June 2013, Gezi Park housed

occupiers in hundreds of tents and groups from a variety of political causes, including environmentalists, feminists, Kemalists, nationalists, socialists, communists, anti-capitalist Islamists, anarchists, pro-Alevî, pro-LGBTQ and pro-Kurdish-rights groups, and even football fan groups. Park occupiers established a clinic, a communal kitchen, a nursery, a library, a communications office and a market garden. Monetary exchange was banished from the grounds. In short, park residents were impatiently rushing to produce and proliferate what had been under attack over the previous decade

In this sense, it can be concluded that the proposal of urban mega-projects leads to emergence of a political space where the two different perspectives on urban policy can clash with each other. Although the mega-projects put the points of view to the urban space in question, the police order constantly works for foreclosure of these disagreeing voices. In other words, the mega-projects open the space for possibility of politics whereas the police order always at work to disavow the any attempts for political subjectification.

5.4 The Participatory Mechanisms, Distribution of Stakeholders and the Para-politics of the Mega-projects

For both the Third Bridge project, the Northern Marmara Motorway and the Istanbul Airport Projects, the consultant firms of contractor companies have prepared

'Stakeholder Engagement Plan' (the SEP) in order to decide the means of determine the stakeholders that have concerns on these projects. The regulatory codes on the environmental impact assessment report only requires the 'People's Participation Meeting' in terms of participation mechanisms (Çevresel Etki Değerlendirmesi Yönetmeliği, 2014). The participation meeting indicates the meeting organized by the city's governor and contractor firms at a central location and proper hour since it is needed to be accessible to the relevant individuals that are most affected by the project. The meeting's aim is to inform the public about the projects in question and noticing people's opinions and suggestions. Moreover, although there are no legal codes for the requirement for the Stakeholder Engagement Plan, the SEPs have prepared for both projects due to the contractor companies' concerns on the compatibility with the World Bank's Equator Principles that designates principles of social responsibility and environmental risk management for projects (ENCON, 2018). However, according to the World Bank data (2019b; 2019c) neither the Third Bridge and Northern Marmara Motorway nor the Istanbul Airport have any support from the World Bank or any transnational financial resources. The Third Bridge's investment costs have been subject to debate so far since the government have not declared so far but according to state-owned media monitoring agency, the expenditure of the bridge is approximately 3 billion dollars whereas the 2.316 billion dollars of it has met by the debts ('İlklerin köprüsü 3 yaşında, 2019; the Worldbank, 2019b). Additionally, the expenditure for Istanbul Airport has been publicized within the environmental impact assessment report that states 6.5 billion dollars of investment for the first phase, moreover, the CEO of the consortium of contractor companies declared that total investment expenditure shall cost 10 billion dollars when the project would have completed which includes 4.891 billion dollars' debts (the World Bank, 2019c; Altaylı, 2018). Nevertheless, it can be concluded that these reports foresee consensual measures that would need to be taken. According to those reports, the SEPs' intention is multilayered. They point out the SEPs would allow to identify all the possible stakeholders and to provide an effective participation system with the establishing meaningful and reliable relationships based on open dialogue (ENCON, 2018; ENVIRON, 2015). In this sense, the SEP reports were prepared for the Third Bridge,

the Istanbul Airport and the Northern Marmara Motorway¹⁵ that have determined the stakeholders in different areas.

Table 5.3 The Debt Information of the Third Bridge and Northern Marmara Motorway¹⁶

Debt Provider	Type	Local/International	Amount (million \$)
Garanti Bank	Commercial	Local	386
İŞ Bank	Commercial	Local	386
Halkbank	Public	Local	386
Vakıfbank	Public	Local	386
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası	Commercial	Local	386
Ziraat Bankası	Public	Local	386

Table 5.4 The Debt Information of the Istanbul Airport¹⁷

Debt Provider	Type	Local/International	Amount (million \$)
Garanti Bank	Commercial	Local	319
Denizbank	Commercial	Local	531.7
Halkbank	Public	Local	1063.4
Vakıfbank	Public	Local	1063.4
Finansbank	Commercial	Local	319
Ziraat Bankası	Public	Local	1595

Curiously enough, the consultant firm prepared the SEP draft before the finalization of the ESIA report of the Third Bridge. The draft tries to identify possible stakeholders

¹⁵ There are two different Stakeholder Engagement Plans for the Northern Marmara Motorway, prepared one for Asian and one for European part of the Project but both include the Third Bridge. Although the two reports include some differences in approaching issues in local scale, the sections on participation and stakeholders are identical, thus, the reports are treated as uniformed.

¹⁶ Source: The World Bank, 2019b

¹⁷ Source: The World Bank, 2019c

amongst the state institutions, local actors and non-governmental organizations. Although the affected municipalities, neighborhoods and villages are listed within the draft report, interestingly, draft also is determining numerous of possible non-governmental organizations that might be considered as stakeholder. What makes it interesting is its comparison when another Stakeholder Engagement Report was prepared for the Istanbul Airport and the Northern Marmara Motorway since it redefines and reduce the number of non-governmental stakeholders under the title of “stakeholders and key other actors” (ENCON, 2018, p.15). The final paper of the Third Bridge’s Stakeholder Engagement Plan has been not publicized so far, yet, the Istanbul Airport’s and the Northern Marmara Motorway’s SEPs can be considered as identical when they approach to identifying stakeholders amongst NGOs. The non-governmental stakeholders are shown in Table 5.5 and table 5.6, respectively with the draft of the Third Bridge SEPs and the final SEP reports of the Istanbul Airport and The Northern Marmara Motorway.

Table 5.5 The possible stakeholders among the non-governmental organizations determined in the draft of the SEP of Third Bridge¹⁸

The chambers under the umbrella of the TMMOB¹⁹	the TMMOB	Chamber of Architects	Chamber of CityPlanners	Chamber of Landscape Architects	Chamber of Environmental Engineers	Chamber of Forest Engineers	Chamber of Survey and Cadastre Engineers	Chamber of Agricultural Engineers
The Other Chambers of Profession not included in the TMMOB	Association of Turkish Consulting Engineers and Architects	Architects' Association						
Environmental Associations	Greenpeace	The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and Habitats (the TEMA)	The Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (the ÇEKÜL)	Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society (the TÜRÇEK)	Doga (Nature) Association	Clean Energy Foundation (the TEMEV)	WWF - World Wildlife Fund	The Nature Conservation Centre (the DKM)

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¹⁸ Source: AECOM, 2013b, pp. 23-25

¹⁹ The list of chambers also includes Chamber of Chemical Engineers, Chamber of Metallurgical Engineers, Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, Chamber of Petroleum Engineers, Chamber of Meteorological Engineers and Chamber of Geological Engineers

Table 5.5 The possible stakeholders among the non-governmental organizations determined in the draft of the SEP of Third Bridge (continued)

The Employer Chambers and Associations	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (the TOBB)	The Association of Packaged Water Association (the SUDER)	International Freight Forwarders Association					
Labor Unions²⁰	BELEDİYE-İŞ	BEM-BİR-SEN	BTS	GENEL-İŞ	HAK-İŞ	KESK	ORMAN-İŞ	YOL-İŞ
Social and Cultural Associations	The Turkish Cultural Foundation	Human Rights Association (the İHD)	Social Volunteers Foundation (the TOG)	Human Rights Common Platform				

²⁰ List of labor unions also includes HİZMET-İŞ, İNTES, KAMU-İŞ, KAMU-SEN, TES-İŞ and TÜRK-İŞ.

Table 5.6 The Key Actors in the Participation determined in the Northern Marmara Motorway and the Istanbul Airport Projects²¹

Key Actors in the Northern Marmara Motorway Project	Key Actors in the Istanbul Airport Project
Environment Foundation of Turkey	Environment Foundation of Turkey
WWF - World Wildlife Fund	WWF - World Wildlife Fund
Global Environment Organization (GEO)	Global Environment Organization (GEO)
Turkish Marine Environment Protection Association (The TURMEPA)	Turkish Marine Environment Protection Association (The TURMEPA)
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (the TOBB)	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (the TOBB)
YOL-İŞ - Union of Turkish Roads, Building, Construction Workers	HAVA-İŞ - Civil Aviation Workers Union

In this context, the report distributes the roles for reasonable stakeholders whereas the more radical oppositional perspectives are turned into senseless noise. The prominent voice of the alternative approach such as the chambers of the TMMOB or the North Forest Defense are marginalized in the eyes of the decision-makers. Indeed, it does not mean that all the mentioned key NGOs in the final report are supporters of the project. For example, the WWF has been active opponent for all of the projects since the beginning due to environmental devastation in the Istanbul's northern forests and water resources that have been inhabited by the numerous animals, moreover, even the organization shares the similar points with the oppositional movements with declaring that Turkey needs to adopt sustainable development goals and create alternatives for public transit instead of triggering motor vehicle use (WWF, 2010). Nevertheless, the represented opposition can only be found as the environmental movements rather than chamber who have radical claims and arguments to the way that local decision-makers' perspective on Istanbul's needs.

Despite these conditions, the participatory mechanisms are fully effective on the People's Participation Meetings. Although projects would have clear effects on every citizen of Istanbul, the potential stakeholders are determined as the near neighborhoods

²¹ Source: ENCON, 2018, p. 5; ENVIRON, 2015, p.3.

and villages. In the SEPs, the debates on the projects are categorized under various topics. The prominent disagreement of the villagers caused by the expropriation and the pollution caused by stone quarries. For instance, the Istanbul Airport project resulted in the dispossession of two villages and one of the dispossessed villagers noted: “they say it was a fortune bird, let us feel it. These lands were given by the Atatürk to those who came here during the 1924 exchange. If we are to be expropriated, why they do not ask us?” (İstanbul'a Dünyanın En Büyük Havaalanı, 2012). Moreover, the participatory mechanisms are also subjected to exceptional measures to marginalize the unwanted, for example, the date of the meetings needs to be declared ten days before the meeting day but the meeting for Istanbul Airport was declared just three days and was not publicized by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in contrast with the regulatory framework (Çevresel etki değerlendirmesi yönetmeliği, 2014; Halk 3. Havalimanı ÇED toplantısını yaptırmadı, 2015). Furthermore, according to Northern Forest Defense, the company has been trying to run a fictitious meeting process with specifically picked village headmen without allowing the full participation of the villagers. Additionally, the meeting for the Canal Istanbul project has experienced similar incidents that would support these claims. During the meeting for the Canal Istanbul, some villagers and headmen were forced to stay outside of the meeting place, moreover, when company officers claimed for the comprehensiveness of the meeting and one of the participants stated that “you filled the meeting with the same people brought here from the Third Airport.” (“İstanbul ÇED toplantısında içeride tartışma dışarıda protesto vardı”, 2018).

In this sense, the participatory mechanisms on the one hand, distribute the reasonable stakeholders for the projects, on the other hand, the participatory mechanism are being selective for stakeholders at the meeting even though the scale of these projects' effect cannot be reduced to villages overlapping with the construction area. Nevertheless, due to the cluster of actors, problems and concerns around these projects, these projects need not only para-political depoliticization through the means of participation but also require the depoliticization of public space with the mobilization through urban populism and its discourses. In the following section, the research shall be centralized on the discourses of state elites towards the depoliticization of public space of discussion.

5.5 Urban Populism and the Disavowal of politics in the urban space

Besides para-political approaches to politics with deliberative mechanisms, another form of depoliticization is a kind of urban populism that became key feature in the post-political disavowing politics in the urban space. As it is previously mentioned, the ultra-politics does not attribute any split within the society. The society is composed of individuals who are subjected to the same problems in urban life. Moreover, what unifies the society in discourse is that there is absence of internal troubles, tensions or conflicts whereas the enemy of the society is always marginalized and externalized. In this sense, I would like to posit what Swyngedouw (2010, p.10) indicates as the “urban populism” as a key symptom of ultra-politics since it conceptualizes the society as a whole with the discourses on ‘the people’ or ‘the inhabitants of a city” that rejects any notion of split within the society and urban life is under threat by catastrophes of competition, underdevelopment and the flee of capital. Moreover, these discourses are produced and reproduced by what Ernesto Laclau (2005) calls as the empty signifiers, similar to the populist politics in general politics. The discourses bounded with empty signifiers have various outcomes, even though they are always consisting of a “signifier without signified” which indicates the impossibility of definition of the signified or the signified may be ambiguous (Laclau, 2005, p.36). Nevertheless, firstly, it might result in a unified mobilization of the partial interests in the society towards a common goal or threat. Secondly, it harmonizes the different demands and makes it common discourses against what is aimed to achieved. Thirdly, the threat is also blurred whereas it invokes a common predicament. By this means, the goal is communized whereas enemy is externalized at the expense of ultimate exclusion. In this sense, for instance, on the one hand, the Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım²² signals that “we made airway as people’s way”, moreover, his predecessor Ahmet Davutoğlu declares that Istanbul Airport will be the largest airport in the world even though some groups try to prevent it” (“Üçüncü

²² Turkey had five different Minister of Transportation since 2007. When the projects announced, it was Binali Yıldırım’s first term that was between 2007 to 2011.

Moreover, Yıldırım had the same office between 2011 to 2013 and 2015 to 2016. In 2016, its term ended due to his appointment by the President Erdoğan to the Prime Minister office when his predecessor resigned

havalimanının açılış tarihi belli oldu”, 2016; “En kudretli yumruğumuzla hadlerini bildireceğiz”, 2015). On the other hand, the President Erdoğan (“Bu ülkeyi artık fitneciler yönetmiyor”, 2014) criticizes the oppositional attempt in the Istanbul Airport case through legal framework which was slowing down the construction process and, he blames the courts as they create an ‘parallel judiciary’²³, moreover, he continues:

Could he/she be such a patriot? Could he/she be such a nationalist? Who will this airport serve? Turkey and all humanity. It will be one of the top 3 airports in the world and there shall not spend a penny from the state pocket. Completely, the contractor companies shall undertake this. They will invest \$ 46 billion here. What happened to their patriotism, nationalism?

Moreover, the marginalization of the oppositional movements also includes the discourses centered on the JDP’s perspective of political Islam. Indeed, the discussion of political Islam is beyond the subject of this research, however, the political Islam’s prominent discourses on the mega-projects in relation to Istanbul’s past can be listed throughout discourses. Furthermore, the political Islam enables the formation of united and artificial ‘people’ under the umbrella of religion. For instance, during one of the election campaigns, the President Erdoğan visits the opposition party’s booth where someone question the name of the Third Bridge, whereas Erdoğan blames that person with sectarianism which divides the nation ²⁴(“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan 'hayır' çadırına ziyaretini anlattı”, 2017). With this motivation, the Third Bridge’s construction started at the 29th of May which is the day that Ottoman Empire took the Istanbul.

In this sense, another aspect of post-political strategy within the public space is the ultimate marginalization of the opposition thorough closure of the debate in public space. Indeed, this form of closure includes on the one hand, the securitization of physical space with the different means. For instance, the journalists stated the prohibition on taking pictures of the construction site with the security guards (Pişkin,

²³ In Turkish context, the term ‘parallel judiciary’ does not indicate a group of oppositional judiciary members. Rather it signifies a group working as alternative to state within the state

²⁴ The debates on the name is about the Ottoman sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim who is seen as murderer of 40 thousand Alevi in the empire’s territories.

2017). However, on the other hand, this closure of the political also includes the marginalization of the oppositional movement by mobilizing hostilities within the discourses in elite. For example, the President Erdoğan (“Erdoğan: 'Bunlar bu ülkenin kalkınmasını istemiyorlar'”, 2015) stated that:

On the one hand, we said that two bridges are not enough, let us take a third step with Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge with a third bridge, (...). At the same time, let's combine the Asian and European Side with the Third Airport, both Sabiha Gökçen and the Third Airport. We said it should be taken care of for a modern Istanbul, modern Turkey with all of these means. We take these steps, but they do not accept, there is discomfort. In other words, I am uncomfortable with people who cannot accept these beautiful steps in their own country. Whether they want to or not, we will continue our journey decisively on this right path we believe.

Similarly, the opposition against the project is also condemned as the opposition against the country's development. One of the former Minister of Transportation²⁵, Lütfi Elvan, indicates the state's will to struggle against those who feel discomfort since they disrupt the Turkey's reliability and stability in the eyes of the world (“Yasa dışı dokümanın internette yayınlanması engellenir”, 2014). Even more radically, when they criticize the Istanbul Airport, the President (“Bunların acil operasyona ihtiyacı var”, 2014) also aims the journalist at the target since:

It is not reasonable that those who say I am a child of this country; I am a citizen of this country feels discomfort against such steps (...). Sitting in the corner and writing at the table does not work. Go to the place where the construction of the airport, see how the construction machinery works there, get information from the relevant persons, write the post after it. But unfortunately, indigestion is too much. It's a giant project, you're looking at it, scratching it for two days.

Moreover, the marginalization of the oppositional movements also includes the discourses centered on the JDP's perspective of political Islam. Indeed, the discussion of political Islam is beyond the subject of this research, however, the political Islam's

²⁵ Turkey had five different Minister of Transportation since 2007. When the projects announced, it was Binali Yıldırım's first term that was between 2007 to 2011. Moreover, Yıldırım had the same office between 2011 to 2013 and 2015 to 2016. In 2016, its term ended due to his appointment by the President Erdoğan to the Prime Minister office when his predecessor resigned.

prominent discourses on the mega-projects in relation to Istanbul's past can be listed throughout discourses. With this motivation, the Third Bridge's construction started at the 29th of May which is the day that Ottoman Empire took the Istanbul. Furthermore, the JDP's political Islam also includes a kind of artificial anti-imperialism which has been produced with the duality between developed Western nations and their attempt to stagnate Turkey's development. For Erdoğan, one of the oppositional voices also come from the global actors who are discomfort due to the mega-projects ("3. Havalimanı projesinin temeli atıldı", 2014).

Although the populism in general addresses elites that have the total responsible for all the catastrophes that people encounter, "urban populism is not about challenging the elites, but calling on the elites to undertake action" (Swyngedouw, 2010, p.11). Moreover, the post-political call for elite is indicating the rejection of alternative strategies. Instead, they are keen to agree on the policies proposed by elites that consensually follow neoliberal strategies. In this sense, the problem is attributed to the policy and political experts that have sole capability rather than making the issue to subject of debate. For example, general secretary of the MÜSİAD, one of the pro-government and Islamist business associations, has mentioned that "the third bridge could have been used by the inhabitants of Istanbul at 7 or 8 years ago at least, unfortunately it could not exceed the form of idea size with the pressure of some lobbies. We are glad to follow today's developments" ("MÜSİAD: Üçüncü Köprü Ekonomiyi Canlandırır", 2008). Moreover, this call is also coming from the elites who posit themselves as they aware the problem and have the proper solution for it. The similar case arises when the President Erdoğan made statement about the Third Bridge. As it has been stated, even though the share of transit commutes between Asia and Europe that do not have destination in Istanbul constitutes 2 or 3 percent within the all commutes, Erdoğan has pointed out to the importance of the Third Bridge as the solution to all problems regarding the commutes between two continents (The 3rd Bridge Project Evaluation Report, 2010, p.19; "Cumhurbaşkanının görevleri anayasada belli", 2014). In this sense, the urban populism can also be considered as a call for elites by the elites.

The urban populism also includes *arkhe*-politics that gives essence for roles in society. As it has been revealed, the *arkhe*-politics is about strict distribution of roles and

occupation in society. It is in other words, a kind of ultimate division of labor distributed among the individuals. The prominent form of giving *arkhe-* to the roles in the society is between the expert and ignorant. In this sense, the elite's positions are reinforced with the discourses on expertise and the alternatives are dismissed since either they do not know how to run the policies, or they do not understand the conditions. Similarly, the Minister of Transport, Yıldırım (“Binali Yıldırım: İnsanların gönlünde makamınız varsa o makam en üstün makamdır”, 2019) states that:

In the next 5 years, we will increase the share of the rail system to 48 percent. There will be a total rail transport system of 518 kilometers. Increasing to 48 percent means that the share of the road is falling to 48 percent. Total is 96 percent and, 4 percent is left. It is maritime transport. Some of them say, Istanbul's problems can be solved 100 percent by sea transport. No such thing. I'm a sailor. I've spent my life in this business. The number of crossings is certain. There used to be 2 bridges, now 3 bridges. Not enough, we also did Marmaray, we made the Eurasia Tunnel. There are 5 passages at the moment.

The duality between those who are ignorant and who are expert is also creating another form of disavowal between the one that acknowledges the realities of Turkey and Istanbul and, another group that is distant from the city and country. Therefore, the opposition is completely marginalized even their possible subjectification as people of the nation or citizen of a city is dismissed. For example, according to the President Erdoğan (“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Son hafta yeni yönetim sistemini açıklayacağım”, 2018; Bunların acil operasyona ihtiyacı var, 2014):

Those who do not understand the Canal Istanbul, they can neither understand Istanbul nor Turkey. Therefore, they do not have such vision, imagination or bother. I have a problem with that, and it have not started now. It started when I was Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. I said, apprentice, foreman. If you have that experience with apprentice, foreman, you would acknowledge that but if you do not have that experience, you cannot.

Moreover, this *arkhe-* politics not only distributes the proper roles of the experts but also determines the reasonable role for the ignorant. In this sense, from a highly neoliberal perspective, in a statement of Erdoğan, the role of the citizen is attributed to consumer who have two choices against the statement of those who questions the necessity for the Third Bridge and its expensive toll fees: “My brother, one way or

another, you would pass the bridge that suit yourself. Don't go through the expensive one” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İmar barışına müracaat edenlerin sayısı 1 milyonu aştı”, 2018).

To sum up, the depoliticization of urban politics has been maintained by not only consensual mechanisms but also by occupancy of the discourses that constantly try to eliminate any possibility of politics with marginalizing oppositional voices. Although the actors involved have been tried to diversify throughout discourse analysis, the dominant discourses of disavowal have been made by the President Erdoğan and the former Minister of Transportation and former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. Interestingly enough, the other Ministers of Transportation have played rather inactive role during the process whereas their public declarations merely include statistical facts and point out the importance of mega-projects for the development of the city and the country. Nevertheless, the strategy of the urban populism in the Turkish mega-projects case by different ways of discourses has been tried to show. Urban populism tries to create artificial forms of people and enemy whereas the possibility of staging the people with creating alternatives have been marginalized.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis argued that the hegemonic discourses produced by the state-elites around what is plausible for urban politics in an attempt to foreclose the alternatives that might give opportunity for proper politics to emerge constitute the discursive framework of contemporary city governing. This is especially the case when the policies are presented as the mega-projects. The numerous attempts to silence the opposition tried to be documented. This thesis aimed to discuss the theoretical and discursive framework for post-politicization of urban politics in terms of evacuation of politics in the urban space by focusing on the cases of the Third Bridge and Istanbul Airport. Even though the police order also enables to proper politics to occur, it is equally important to show that the police is also constantly evacuating the politics, thus, eliminating alternatives which makes its interventions as anti-democratic. Therefore, to answer the conditions of today's democracy, it is equally important to expose the anti-democratic politics, as Ranciere (2009, p.71) remarks:

What is meant when it is said that we live in democracies? Strictly speaking, democracy is not a form of State. It is always beneath and beyond these forms. Beneath, insofar as it is the necessarily egalitarian, and necessarily forgotten, foundation of the oligarchic state. Beyond, insofar as it is the public activity that counteracts the tendency of every State to monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere.

In this sense, the evacuation of politics in the urban space through discourses, in other words, the monopolization of the public space, which may lead to alternative urban futures emerge, is the exact opposite to what democracy means for Ranciere. For this very reason, the perspectives within the policy reports and the discursive framework produced in the Istanbul's mega-projects cases set forth in order to expose the post-political attempts in approaching urban politics by the police order of the state. It should be noted that the police order, indeed, cannot fully foreclose the oppositions and alternatives., Moreover, the police order is not only composed of the

practices of the state., Otherwise Ranciere's perspective would be only another analysis on the authoritarianism. And yet his analyses also show how the police order compromises all the activities that distributes in terms of what is plausible in the eyes of the society. In this respect the state-elites' attitude within the police order shows us the discursive framework that the police order holds on. In this context, with the help of the discourses of the elites produced during the Istanbul's mega-projects cases, one can examine in what sense today's urban politics is democratic or not in Turkey. Besides, what today's approach to the urban space by the police order makes anti-democratic is its constant marginalization of the alternatives that is not plausible for the neoliberal mode of accumulation through creation of urban rent, commodification of environment resulting in the consolidation of the Istanbul's role within the global city competition whereas the wealth is redistributed in favor of capital.

In this context, in Chapter 2, the post-political theory was briefly discussed in terms of its uniqueness amongst the voluminous urban politics literature. With the discussions on the role of elites and examples from the different cities, it was concluded that the post-politics is twofold; on the one hand, the techno-managerial and state elites aims to silence the disagreement through consensus within the governance structures, and on the other hand, the post-politicization is also maintained by the radical and ultimate attempt to disavowal of politics through urban populist discourses. Chapter 3 brought Ranciere's theoretical framework into debate in search of what politics is and what it is not. Therefore, Chapter 3 summarized Ranciere's theory in general in terms of origin of his theory on politics and democracy. Chapter 4 was an attempt to answer why today's cities are turning their attention to large scale urban mega-projects. In this sense, it was emphasized the role of globalization and urban entrepreneurialism whereas there are some critical differences in the meaning of mega-projects for a developed and a developing country. Lastly, Chapter 5 brought the debates over the Istanbul's mega-projects which became the space for state elites to eliminate proper politics with the urban populism and its discourses.

6.1 On Some Limitations and The Possible Future Researches

In the thesis, the emphasis is given to the role of state-elites in terms of evacuation of politics by discourses. However, the post-politicization process also involves discourses produced by trans-national elites in dictating some forms of urban interventions as the only alternatives for the development of a city or a country in parallel to neoliberal ideology. This research has only focused on the process crystallized on Istanbul's mega-projects whereas it might miss the changes in the institutional regimes and global networks of elites. This being said, the national and local dynamics in relation to politics of urban space were tried to identify. However, further analysis can be focused on policy mobility analysis that has been flowing by the trans-national elites.

Secondly, the post-politicization is a process, similar to neoliberalization, it is both historically and geographically specific and produced in conjunction to the neoliberalization of the state and society in a particular country (Karaliotas, 2013). Therefore, focusing on solely Istanbul's mega-projects did not enable analyzing the post-politicization process of the city which may have ruptures, continuities and path-dependent character. Therefore, the alternative analyses on Istanbul's (or other cities', indeed) urban history with the moments of depoliticization and neoliberalization can be helpful in fulfilling the missing part in the literature and this thesis.

Lastly, the major claim of this thesis was to show the discursive character of the police order and post-political process, as well as addressing to the radically harsh relation between the oppositional movements and the urban populism that aims to silence their disagreeing voices. The characteristics of the oppositional movements were mentioned throughout the chapter 5 to a degree. Bringing the comprehensive analysis on the all the oppositional actors in these projects is beyond the scope and scale of this thesis yet it is equally important to understand the flip-side of the post-political discourses since they may expose the counter-hegemonic strategies against the police order while simultaneously display possible urban political futures that fall outside of the institutional politics.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

POST-POLİTİKANIN KENTLERİ: İSTANBUL'UN MEGAPROJELERİ BAĞLAMINDA SİYASETİZLEŞEN KENTSEL POLİTİKA

Bu tez, siyaseti kentsel alana yapılan müdahalelerle ilgili olarak neyin siyaseti önemli kıldığı sorusunu sorgulamaktadır. İstanbul'un Üçüncü Köprüsü ve yeni havalimanı, bir başka deyişle, İstanbul'un mega-projeleri ile üretilmiş olan yönetim uygulamalarını ve söylemleri yorumlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda tez, kentle ilgili farklı bakış açılarının kentsel alanın politikaları üzerindeki mücadelelerini tartışan post-politika süreçleri üzerindeki tartışmalara odaklanmaktadır. Dahası, post-politik kent yaklaşımı, teori içindeki ana düşünürlerden biri olan Jacques Ranciere ile bugün siyasetin ne anlama geldiğini incelemek amacıyla değerlendirilmektedir. Bunu yaparken, aynı zamanda siyasetizleşme biçimlerine de ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu açıdan bakılarak, yakın zamanda geliştirilen post-politika kent teorisi, İstanbul'un mega projelerinin kentsel politika açısından sonuçlarının analiz edilmesiyle bağlamında analiz edilmektedir.

Keynesyen refah devletinin sona ermesinden bu yana şehirler, bir yandan yapılı çevreye yapılan dramatik müdahalelerle mekanın politik-ekonomik yeniden yapılandırılmasının, öte yandan, kentsel mekan siyasetinin radikal dönüşümünün ön cephesini oluşturmaktadır. Geniş anlamda, neoliberal dönemde yapılı çevredeki köklü değişiklikler üç aşamada sıralanabilir. Birinci olarak, yalnızca kentsel çöküş yaşanan alanlarda değil aynı zamanda yeni alanların metalaştırılmasıyla gerçekleştirilmekte olan soylulaştırma örneklerinden bahsedilebilir. İkincisi, mega etkinliklere ev sahipliği yapma ve prestijli fuar merkezleri inşa etmenin çekiciliğine dikkat çekilmektedir. Ve son olarak, neoliberal müdahale yöntemleri dikkatini çağdaş kent manzaralarına egemen olan ikonik mega projelere yöneltti (Karaliotas, 2013). Dünyadaki kentsel alandaki bu gelişmelere paralel olarak, Türkiye'nin neoliberal kentleşmesi de bu kalıpları yaklaşık 40 yıl boyunca takip etmiştir. Dahası,

2002 yılında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (JDP) iktidara geldiğinde kentsel müdahalelerin kapsamı radikal seviyelere ulaşmıştır. JDP yerel kalkınmaya iktidardaki başkanlık için önem vermiş olmasına rağmen, Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, İstanbul'un özel bir önemi vardır. Onun için İstanbul sadece “Türkiye'nin vitrini” değil, aynı zamanda kentin küresel kimliğini vurgulayan partinin gelişme perspektifinin lokomotifi olmuştur (“İstanbul Türkiye'nin özetidir”, 2017). Bu bağlamda kent, sadece limanlar ve su kenarları gibi sanayileşme ile kentsel bozulmaların yaşandığı kentsel alanın rehabilitasyonu değil, aynı zamanda birikim modeli için soylulaştırma yoluyla kentsel rant alan oluşturmak amacıyla gecekonduların tahrip edilmesiyle çöküşe uğrayan kentsel alanın rehabilitasyonunu hedefleyen “bayrak projeler” olarak kabul edilen dramatik kentsel dönüşüm projelerine tanık oldu (Öktem, 2006, s.59). Dahası, kentin çehresi, Türkiye'nin 2000'li yılların sonunda Olimpiyatlara başvurusu gibi mega etkinliklerine ev sahipliği yapmak için harekete geçirilen yeni fuar merkezleri ve devasa stadyumlarla İstanbul'un sosyal ve kültürel çekiciliğini vurgulayan bir dönüşüme tanık olmuştur (Bilsel ve Zelef, 2011). Son olarak kent, Türkiye ekonomisi 2008 mali krizinin acılarıyla mücadele ettiği dönem olan 2010 ve sonrasında bir dizi mega-projeyi deneyimlemek zorunda kalmıştır.

Nitekim, bu gelişmelerin kentsel alanın sosyo-ekonomisi ve kentsel alanın siyaseti için çarpıcı sonuçlar doğurarak büyük etkileri olmuştur. Bu projelerin sonuçları ışığında bu tez, Jacques Ranciere'nin politik düşüncesinden ilham alarak Erik Swyngedouw'un (2011) post-politika süreci olarak tanımladığı kavramı değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu yaklaşıma göre, kentsel politika, neoliberal kentsel mekan perspektifine indirgenmekte ve temsili kurumlar ile yönetim araçlarını harekete geçirmek suretiyle konsensüel uygulamalarla mekanın depolitizasyonu gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, tez, bu mega-projelerin yalnızca iyi ve kötü yönetim meselesinin veya kentsel alanı rantın çıkarılması için bir yer haline getiren sermaye birikimi süreçlerinin konusunun olmadığını aynı zamanda kenti yeniden düşünen perspektiflerin arasında birinin hüküm sürdüğü, başkalarının haciz edildiği farklı kentsel gelecekler arasındaki mücadele alanı olarak politik mekanı ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, mevcut güç sistemi alternatifleri olumsuzlamak amacıyla kentsel siyasi alanı dışlamak için seferber edilmiştir.

Bu amaç ile tezin yapısı, bu özet başlığının dışında altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş başlığının devamında, ikinci bölümde, temel teorik çerçeve ele alınmaktadır. Analizin başlangıç noktası olarak, post-politik kent teorisini, kentsel siyasetle ilgili diğer önde gelen yaklaşımlardan farklı kılan şeyler üzerine bir tartışma açmaktır. Bu amaca paralel olarak, ilk önce Ranciere'in siyaseti kavramsallaştırmasına ufak bir giriş ve onun siyaset teorisinin mekana yaklaşma konusundaki yorumları, siyasal olanı mekan siyaseti açısından neyin önemli kıldığını araştırmak amacıyla sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. Ranciere'in siyaset kavramsallaştırması aslında kentsel bir siyaset teorisi değil, günümüz siyasetini genel olarak nasıl algılayacağına alternatif bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Ranciere için önemli olan, siyasetin güç ilişkilerini veya farklı ilgi alanlarından kaynaklanan belirli taleplerin çatışmasını ifade etmemesidir. Politika, yanlıştın işaret edildiği ve eşitliğin doğrulandığı alandır. Dolayısıyla kent alanı, siyasetin yaşanabileceği bir alan haline gelerek siyasallaşmaktadır. Bu anlamda, kentsel post-politika literatürü kenti siyasal karşılaşma alanı olarak ele alarak kentsel mekan teorisinde siyaseti yeniden merkezlemeyi, mekanın yorumlanmasındaki farklı bakış açılarına dayanan siyasal öznelleşmeyi göstermeyi amaçlar (Dikeç ve Swyngedouw, 2017). Dolayısıyla, kentsel post-politika teorisi, devletin kurumsal pratiklerinin değerlendirmesi olarak kentsel siyaset alan yaklaşımlara alternatif bir bakış açısı önermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, post-politika siyaseti şehirlerdeki günlük yaşamları düzenlemek için tekno-yönetsel ve biyo-politik yönetim araçlarının düzenlenmesi konusundaki görüşlerin sonsuz mücadelesini göstermektedir. Bu anlamda, post-politik durum yalnızca taraflar arasında yapay bir uzlaşma sağlamayı amaçlayan kurumsal uygulamalar değil, aynı zamanda egemen söylemlerin alternatif hareketlerini sesini gürültü olarak nitelendirerek sürekli olarak ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlayan kapatma girişimleridir. Bu bağlamda, bu bölüm öncelikle siyaseti mekana yaklaşma açısından önemli kılan şeyin ne olduğu bağlamında tartışmaya açmaktadır. Bu nedenle, kentsel politika ve mekan konusunda öne çıkan teoriler değerlendirilmektedir. Dahası, post-politika koşullarında nelerin bir tür siyasetlesizleştirmeye yol açtığı sorusuna ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. İkincisi, siyaset sonrası kent literatüründe öne çıkan bir depolitizasyon biçimleri, dünyadaki farklı şehirlerde yaşanan örnekleri vurgulayarak tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, Ranciere'nin var olan düzenin siyasetinin açığa vurma biçimleri olan 'polis' olarak adlandırdığı uygulamalar yoluyla kentsel politikaların siyasetlesizleştirilmesi tartışmasına da katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, bu bölüm aynı zamanda ana akım kentsel politik

yaklaşımlar, kentsel büyüme makinesi, kentsel rejim teorisi ve Marksist kentsel siyaset yaklaşımı ile kentsel post-politika bakış açısının ayırımına dikkat çekmektedir. Daha sonra, post-politik uzlaşmacı yönetim rejimi araçları incelenmekte ve ardından İngiltere, İspanya ve Rusya'daki farklı örnekler üzerine yapılan incelemeler ele alınmaktadır. Genel olarak, ikinci bölüm, rızaya dayalı uygulamaların siyaseti yasaklamının yalnızca bir şekli olduğu önerisiyle sonuçlandırılmaktadır.

Ranciere'nin politik düşüncesinin daha fazla yardımıyla üçüncü bölüm, siyasetin reddedilmesinin diğer biçimlerini vurgulamak için genel olarak Ranciere'in siyaset teorisini gözden geçirmektedir. Bu nedenle bölüm, Ranciere'in fikirlerinin onun siyaset düşüncesine nasıl bir bağlam içinde konumlandığını göstermek amacıyla Ranciere'in temel kavramlarını tanıtmaktadır. Cezayir doğumlu bir Fransız eleştirel teorisyen olan Ranciere, 1968 Paris İsyanı döneminde, Louis Althusser'in öğrencisi olarak siyaset ve demokrasi konusundaki fikirlerini geliştirmiştir. Siyasi düşüncesi, münasip politika ve demokrasinin ne olduğunu, ayrıca geçmişin büyük filozoflarının kasıtlı olsun veya olmasın demokrasiyi inkar etmenin çeşitli yollarını nasıl ürettiğini açıklamayı amaçlar. Ayrıca, liberal demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılması da bu yoğun eleştirilerinden kaçamaz. Bu anlamda Ranciere, eşitlikten mahrum etmek, siyazetsizleştirme ve demokrasiden nefret etmek için kullanılan bir araç işlevi gören siyaset felsefesinin entelektüel temellerini yıkmayı amaçlayan bir anti-filozof olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Ranciere için Althusser ile 68 Paris sonrası kırılma önemlidir. Çünkü eleştirel analizinin temel taşı olan eşitlik teorisini geliştirmek için açık bir alan yaratmıştır. Ranciere'in eşitlik konusundaki fikri politika ve demokrasinin analizini mümkün kılarken, aynı zamanda sadece kentsel politikaları değil aynı zamanda tarih, estetik ya da kültür gibi çeşitli araştırma alanlarını da değerlendirmeyi sağlar. Bu anlamda, Ranciere'in Althusser'in teorisindeki bilimin anlamına muhalefeti Ranciere'nin eşitliğinin ardındaki anlamını anlamak için tartışılmıştır. Eşitlik fikirleri, düşünme kabiliyetinde eşitlik varsayımı ve eşit bilgi birikimi, bireyin günlük yaşamındaki ilişkisine dayanır. Bu eşitlik biçiminin gerçekleştirilmesi, bilgi nesnelerinin günlük uygulamalardan elde edilen deneyimlerle ilişkilendirilmesiyle gerçekleştirilebilir. Bu düşünce tarzı, Fransa'nın Bourbon Restorasyon döneminde yaşayan ve Fransızca'yı bilmeyen öğrencilere öğretmek üzere görevlendirildiği devrimci bir öğretmen olan Joseph Jacotot'yu analiz ederken Ranciere'in gözüne çarpar. Jacotot'nun alışılmadık metodu, bilginin zihinsel bir yetenek meselesi olmadığı

varsayımı üzerine kuruludur; bilgi nesnelere, bireylerin yaşamlarındaki deneyimlerine ve izlenimlerine bağlayan yöntemleri kullanarak herkesin her şeyi öğrenebileceğini varsayar. Bu nedenle eşitlik varsayımı, yerleşik düzene ve statükoya karşı mücadele etmenin bir yolu haline gelir. Buna karşın var olan düzen, eşitliği reddederek ve hegemonik pozisyon için niteliklerini güçlendirerek pozisyonunu sürekli güçlendirir. Sonuç olarak eşitlik ilişkisel bir şekilde iddia edilen, test edilen ve doğrulanan bir şey haline gelir. Siyaset, temsili kurumlar, yasal yapılar veya kuruluşlarla ilgili tartışmalardan ziyade eşitliği sağlama mücadelesidir (Hallward, 2006). Ranciere bunun nedenini, siyasetin kurumsallaşmasının, atfedilen rollere ve mesleklere karşılık gelen başka bir rol ve bilgi dağıtım sistemi oluşturması nedeniyle açıklar. Bu sonuçta kaçınılmaz olarak başka bir eşitsizlik biçimine yol açar. Sonuç olarak, siyaset mücadelesinin tarihi sonsuz bir eşitlik mücadelesidir. Her ne kadar Althusser'deki özne sürekli olarak ideoloji tarafından çağrıldığından özneleşmiş olsa da siyaset, toplumdaki çeşitli kısımların sayılmaya başlamasıyla oluşan sayılan kısımlar oluşmasıyla ve bu sayımın yanlış sayım olduğunun ifşa edilmesiyle ortaya çıkmakta ve başlamaktadır (Ranciere, 1999). Politika, statükonun dayattığı eşitlik - veya Ranciere'nin dediği gibi polis düzeni tarafından - kaçınılmaz olarak eşitliği yanlış temsil etmesinin ifşasıdır. Dolayısıyla politika, bu sayımı yanlış olarak ortaya koymakla ilgilidir. Siyaset, görünmezlerin görünür hale gelmesi için bir aşama oluşturmakla ilgili olduğundan Ranciere için yanlış, “ilk anlamda bir olumsuzlama, politikanın oluşumundan başka bir şey değildir, polis mantığı ile eşitliğin doğrulanması mantığı arasındaki karşılaşma” alanı olmaktadır (Nash, 1996, 176). Toplumun sayılmayan kısmının, mevcut sayımı, herkesin topluma eşit olarak dahil olduğu iddiasına karşı delillerle yanlış olarak gösterdiğinde siyaset meydana gelir. Ranciere'nin sözlerini akılda tutarak, siyasetin iki kurucu unsuru çıkarılabilir: yanlış işaret etmek ve 'biz'i veya halkı kurmak. Başka bir deyişle, siyaseti kuran yanlış işaret eden “demos” tur. Eşitlik mantığı ile polis mantığı arasındaki buluşma, siyaset felsefesi tarafından kabul görmüştür. Ancak, sorun bu karşılaşmanın nasıl yorumlanacağı konusuna dayanmaktadır. Şimdiye kadar, siyaset felsefesinin skandalı ortaya çıkmıştır: onların mevcut polis düzenine uygun bir temel için atfedilmeleri. Ranciere'ye (1995, s.19) göre, “Siyasetsizleşme, felsefenin en eski görevidir, sonuna dek yerine getirilmesini sağlayan, en uç noktaların eşiğindeki mükemmelliğidir”. Bu nedenle, depolitizasyon biçimleri, sayılan ve sayılmayan taraflar arasındaki farkı kabul etmenin veya reddetmenin bir yoludur, ancak aynı zamanda toplumsal düzene

meşruiyet sağlamaya ve siyaset olasılığını kapatmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Fakat, bahsedildiği gibi, politika ancak herhangi birinin eşitliği öne sürüldüğü zaman ortaya çıkabilir ve bu yalnızca yanlışın imajında ortaya çıkar. Aksine, siyaset felsefesi, mevcut sosyal bedendeki eşitsizliklerin üstesinden gelmek ve anarşik eşitliklerin görünmesini engellemek için polis düzenini toplumdaki bütün yüzeyi tehlikeye sokan politikaya yerleştirmekle siyaseti reddetmektedir. Uyuşmazlığı ifade etmeyen politikanın biçimlerini; mantıklı olanın, mevcut toplumsal düzende eşitsiz hiyerarşilerdeki rolleri ve meslekleri belirleyen polis düzeninin dağılımını meşrulaştırır. Paradoksal olarak, siyaset felsefesinin düşünürleri, polis düzenini doğal olarak var olduğunu ifade eder; ancak siyaset felsefesi, bu “doğallığın” kaybolmasına dayanır (Ranciere, 1999, s.64). Bu temelde Ranciere, literatürde öne çıkan aktörler olan siyaset felsefesinin üç büyük figürünü analiz ederek siyasetin olumsuzlama ve yok olma konusundaki fikrini geliştirir: Plato, Aristoteles ve Marx. İlk olarak, archi-politika, iş bölümünde mesleklerine göre var olma koşullarını doğal olarak varsayan, nihai bir siyasetlesme şeklidir. Bu anlamda doğal olması, toplumda hiyerarşi ile sonuçlanan ve siyasi hayatta konuşmaya uygun olmayan kent yönetimine eklenmiştir. Bu nedenle, şehrin tüm sakinleri sayma işleminde sayılacaktır. Platon tarafından geliştirilen archi-politics, uyumlu ve bölünmemiş bir topluluk olduğunu iddia eden bütünsel bir polis düzenine dayanır (Van Puymbroeck ve Oosterlync, 2014). Aristoteles’in eserlerinde geliştirilen para-politika ise toplumun uyumlu olmadığını aksine farklı bölümlere ayrıldığını kabul eder. Bununla birlikte, diğer siyaset felsefesi yaklaşımlarına benzer şekilde, siyaseti polis düzeniyle ve mevcut eşitsizlik ve hiyerarşilerle siyaseti farklı partiler ve bakış açıları arasındaki yüzeysel rekabete aktararak birleştirmekten çekinmez. Her ne kadar para-politik toplumdaki farklı bölümler arasındaki uyuşmazlığı kucaklasa da anlaşmazlığı, tanımlanmış taraflarla yürütme yetkisi üzerinde hareket eden ve siyasi pozisyonları elde etmek için yarışan ajanlar arasında yayılan yapay temsiliyet mekanına yönlendirerek siyasetlesirmeye çalışmaktadır (Zizek, 2004). Meta-politikada siyaset, mutlak eşitsizlik ve “eşitlik argümanının herhangi bir politik konuşlandırmasını yok eden mutlak yanlıştır” ile olumsuzlanır. (Ranciere, 1999, s.81). Para-politikaya daha radikal bir biçimde karşı çıkarak, tüm toplumsal eşitsizliklerin arasında öne çıkan bir eşitsizlik kaynağı olduğu için siyasi kurumları belirli kurumlara iletmeyi reddetmektedir. Ön görülebileceği gibi, Ranciere’in hedefi bazı Marksizm biçimleri, özellikle de liberal demokrasinin temsili kurumlarını sınıflar arasındaki birincil eşitsizlik kaynağından saptırma olarak gören

devlet sosyalizmleridir. Son olarak, Zizek (1999a) Ranciere'in çalışmalarında bu üç politikayı reddetme biçimine ek olarak ultra-politikayı ekler. En mutlak siyasetsizleştirme yöntemi olan ultra-politika, siyasetin varlığını siyasetin militarizasyonu yoluyla dağıtmayı amaçlamaktadır (Zizek, 2004). Biz ve Onlar arasındaki tartışmalar arasındaki politikaları yeniden tanımlayarak sınırlamaktadır. Öteki, toplumun normlarına radikal bir biçimde karşı çıktığı için, siyasetin sesi sert şekilde susturulan diğerinin taleplerine açabileceği hiçbir siyasi alan yoktur. Sonuç olarak siyasetsizleşme, mantığı asla bir zeminde buluşamayacak olan iki tanımlı taraf arasındaki sürekli savaşla meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Özetle, bölüm, bir yandan, Ranciere'nin teorisindeki siyaset ve demokrasinin tanımını tartışırken, diğer yandan, demokratik ve siyaset karşıtı politikaların ne anlama geldiğini değerlendirmekte ve bunu dört siyaseti reddetme biçimleriyle sonuçlandırmaktadır.

Dördüncü bölüm, çağdaş kent politikaları için mega projelerin önemini ne olduğu tartışmasını yapmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, kent yönetiminin neden dikkatini mega projeler inşa etmeye çevirdiği sorusu tartışılmaktadır. Dahası, bölüm aynı zamanda kentsel mega projeleri araştırma sorusu yapan şeyleri cevaplamaya amaçlamaktadır. Küreselleşme kavramı, neoliberalizmin kent siyaseti üzerindeki etkilerine yönelik tartışmalar için uygun bir başlangıç noktası olacaktır, çünkü hem liberalizm hem de küreselleşme kavramları bugünün dünyasını değerlendirirken bir şekilde birbirinin yerine geçmiştir. Bir yandan, küreselleşme ekonomik refah ve başarının kaçınılmaz yolu olarak doğallığa kavuştu, eğer bir ulusal ekonomi iyi performans göstermiyorsa, ekonominin 'yeterli' ekonomik küreselleşmeye sahip olmadığı iddia edilse de, öte yandan, Seattle'dan Cenova'ya, küreselleşme tüm sosyo-ekonomik bozulmaların bir nedeni olarak küreselleşme karşıtı hareket perspektifine dönüştü. Küreselleşme ve neoliberalizm ile tehdit altında olan şey, kentlerin durumunu analiz etmeyi öngören bakış açılarının küreselleşme ve neoliberalizme endeks ekonomik büyümeyi, dengesiz kalkınmayı ve çevresel çöküşü belirleyen siyasi ve ekonomik bir sabit olarak ele alan görüş birliğidir. Bu anlamda, öncelikle küreselleşmenin, farklı ölçeklerde kapitalist kalkınmaya doğru coğrafya ve mekânları yeniden yapılandıran politik-ekonomik bir durumdan ziyade bir süreç olduğu ortaya konabilir (Harvey, 1995). İkincisi, küreselleşme, burjuvazinin ihtiyaç duyduğu şeyle tutarlı olarak ülkelerin hayatta kalabilmesi ulusların ekonomilerinden dünya pazarının beklentilerine uyumlarına, tarihi, ekonomik, materyalist bir dünya perspektifine

dayanmaktadır (Gill, 1995). Son olarak, rekabet gücü sürekli olarak alternatif pazarlar arayan kapitalizmde, birbirine bağılı bir dünya pazarında sonuçlanan karları en üst düzeye çıkarmak için çeşitli avantajlı kaynak bölgelerinin sömürülmesi ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Sonuç olarak, küreselleşme, küresel olarak bütünleşmiş ekonomik kapitalist sistemi ve dünya piyasası fikrinin yayılmasıdır. Esnek sermaye koşulları altında piyasaların büyük ölçekli bağlantısının artan önemi ile birlikte kentsel altyapı yatırımları, kent politikasında çok önemli unsurlar haline geldi. İlk bakışta, mega-projelerin ölçeği yerel ve ulusal sınırların ötesindedir, bunun yerine küresel, tek pazar içindeki etkileşimi tetiklemektedir. Bununla birlikte günümüz küresel kapitalizmde mega-projeler, yerel ve küresel olanın, önceden coğrafi şartlardan ziyade derinlemesine iç içe geçtiğini, ölçeğin kesin olarak tespit edilememesine aracılık ettiğini, yeniden tanımlandığını ve itiraz edildiğini yansıtmaktadır (Swyngedouw, 1997). Dolayısıyla, küreselleşme ölçeği ne ontolojik olarak verili ne de politik olarak tikel bir konumdadır. Bu noktada, karar vericilerin kentsel politikadaki odağı ölçek algılarını yitirmiştir. Şehirler arası rekabette, yerel, ulusal ve küresel ölçekte sermaye için iş dostu şehirler oluşturmak amacıyla tüm kaynaklar harekete geçirilmektedir. Yarışma içinde şehirler neoliberalizm araçlarıyla girişimci bir bakış açısını sahiplenmektedirler (Harvey, 1989b). Neoliberal araçları ve şehir politikasına bakış açısını kullanarak yerel ve ulusal hükümetler dış mali kaynakları, doğrudan yabancı yatırımları çekmeyi ve ulus devletlerin tek ülke içindeki diğer şehirleri tercih etmesini meşrulaştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Özellikle, mega-projeler şehirlerin rekabet ortamındaki göreceli konumlarını güçlendirmede kentsel politikanın önemli bir unsuru olarak bulunmaktadır. Üstelik, muazzam ekonomik ve politik kaynakları bir araya getirmeleri, çeşitli küresel, ulusal ve yerel elitlerin aynı anda tek bir amaç için çalışmasını içerdiğinden, yalnızca yeni tür kentsel düzenleyici ve hükümet yapılarının katalizörü olmakla kalmıyor, depolitikleştirmenin mevcut siyasi ortama nasıl ifade edildiğinin göstergesi haline gelmektedirler. Kuşkusuz, elitlerin büyük miktarda sermayesi ve yerel ve ulusal ekonomiler için önem verilmesi, yeni düzenleyici ve örgütsel yapının tanıtımını gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu nedenle, asgari devlet müdahalesini ve pazar önderliğindeki girişimleri teşvik eden neoliberal söylemlere rağmen mega-projeceler, kamu fonlarını kanalize etmek ve yeniden dağıtmak, kamu-özel ortaklıkları oluşturmak için seçici düzenleyici ortam ve rant yaratmak için yatırım alanlarını hedeflemek için yoğun devlet seferberliğini içermektedir (Brenner, 2004). Bununla birlikte, madalyonun diğer tarafında devlet iktidarının ve sermayenin bu devasa

seferberliğinin, projeleri kuşkuya sokabilecek alternatiflerin ortadan kaldırılmasını gerektirmesi bulunmaktadır. Kentsel mega-projelerin depolitizasyonu örgütsel sistemin yeniden yapılandırılması ile yan yana gider. Bu anlamda, elitlerin söylemlerinin yanı sıra örgütsel yapı da projelere yönelik muhaliflerin susturulduğu bir ortam yaratmayı amaçlamaktadır. Mega-projelerin gerçekleştirilmesi, alternatif kent ve mekan algısı düşüncesine yer açabilecek diğer olasılıkların yok edilmesi pahasına gerçekleşir.

Beşinci bölüm, araştırmanın ana kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölüm, aktörleri ve projelere yönelik ana itirazlarını tanıtmak suretiyle İstanbul'un mega projelerindeki post-politika anlarını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Devlet elitlerinin söylem analiziyle, kamuoyunda yapılan açıklamalarla muhalefeti sürekli olarak marjinalleştiren bir süreç olduğu iddia edilmektedir. İstanbul'un mega projeler örneğinde kentsel post-siyaset ve onun kentsel alandaki siyasetin reddedilme anlarıyla olan teorik arka planını sentezlemeye çalışırken, tez post-politika sürecinin sadece fikir birliği yönetim mekanizmaları ile ilgili olmadığı fakat aynı zamanda alternatifleri ortadan kaldırmak ve itirazların sesini gürültüye çevirmek için üretilen kentsel popülist söylemlerle de ilgili olduğu konusunda ısrar edilmektedir. Sonuç olarak bu tez, devlet elitlerinin kent siyaseti için neyin uygun olduğu konusunda ürettikleri hegemonik söylemlerin, münasip siyasetin ortaya çıkması için fırsat verebilecek alternatifleri yok etmek maksatıyla çağdaş kent yönetiminin söylemsel çerçevesini oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu özellikle kentsel politikaların mega-projeler olarak dayatıldığı bir durumda gözler önüne serilmektedir ve muhalefetin sesini susturmak amacıyla yapılan çeşitli söylemler de kurumsal katılımcı mekanizmalar ile birlikte gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Her ne kadar polis düzeni, siyasetin münasip bir şekilde gerçekleşmesini imkan sağlasa da, polisin politikanın gerçekleşmesine yol açabilecek iddiaları sürekli olarak tasviye etmeye çalıştığını, dolayısıyla müdahalelerini anti-demokratik kılan alternatifleri ortadan kaldırdığını göstermek de aynı derecede önemlidir. Bu anlamda, siyasetin kentsel alandaki söylemler yoluyla boşaltılması, bir başka deyişle, alternatif kentsel geleceklere yol açabilecek siyaset alanının domine edilmesi, demokrasinin Ranciere için ne anlama geldiğinin tam tersidir. Bu nedenle, politika raporlarındaki perspektifler ve İstanbul'un mega projeler davalarında ortaya çıkan söylemsel çerçeve, kent politikalarına devletin polis düzeni ile yaklaşma politikasının ardından giriştiği teşebbüsleri ortaya koymak amacıyla ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır.

Tezde, devlet seçkinlerinin siyasetin söylemlerle tahliye edilmesindeki rolüne vurgu yapılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, post-politika süreci ulus-ötesi elitlerin bazı kentsel müdahaleler biçimlerini neoliberal ideolojiye paralel olarak şehir veya ülkenin gelişimi için tek alternatif olarak dikte etme konusundaki söylemlerini de içermektedir. Bu araştırma yalnızca İstanbul'un mega-projelerinde ortaya çıkan sürece odaklanmıştır, ancak kurumsal rejimlerdeki ve seçkinlerin küresel ağlarındaki değişiklikleri de araştırma konusu olarak gösterilebilir. Post-politika neoliberalleşmeye benzer bir süreçtir, hem tarihsel olarak hem de coğrafi olarak spesifiktir ve belirli bir ülkedeki devletin ve toplumun neoliberalleşmesiyle birlikte üretilir (Karaliotas, 2013). Bu nedenle, yalnızca İstanbul'un mega-projelerine odaklanmak, kentin süreklilik ve kopuş karakterelerine sahip olabileceği post-politika sürecinin analiz edilmesinde yeterli olamamaktadır. Bu nedenle, İstanbul'un (ya da diğer kentlerin) kentsel tarihine, depolitikleşme ve neo-liberalizasyon araçları ile ilgili alternatif analizler literatürdeki ve bu tezdeki eksik kısımların yerine getirilmesinde yardımcı olabilir. Son olarak, bu tezin ana iddiası, polis düzeninin ve siyasi sonrası sürecin söylemsel karakterini göstermenin yanı sıra, muhalif hareketler ile onların kabul etmeyen seslerini susturmayı hedefleyen kentli popülizm arasındaki sert ilişkiyi ele almaktır. Muhalefet hareketlerinin özellikleri ve iddiaları beşinci bölüm boyunca bir dereceye kadar belirtildi. Bu projelerde tüm muhalif aktörlerin kapsamlı analizini getirmek bu tezin kapsamı ve ölçeğinin ötesinde olsa da, post-politika söylemlerinin karşıt tarafını anlamak için eşit derecede önemlidir.

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