

GEO-POLITICAL REASONS BEHIND THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

GEO-POLITICAL REASONS BEHIND THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the geo-political reasons behind TTIP, which was negotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) from 2013 to 2017, from the viewpoint of the EU by exploring the dynamics of the decades long transatlantic relationship under three geo-political reasons as “*sustaining transatlantic hegemony*” in terms of overcoming the “weakened West” notion, controlling the other regions in the world, strengthening the “Atlantic basin”; “*dominating the global trade*” in terms of setting the global trade standards, defending or challenging the multilateral trade system; and finally, “*overcoming the problems within the EU*” in terms of enhancing the maneuver flexibility of the EU administration, assuring a whole and secure Europe and finally the “energy union” policy. In this paper, the transatlantic relationship will be analyzed in three periods including 1945 to 2013, which marks the time from the beginning of relations till the start of the official TTIP negotiations; 2013 to 2017, in which the official

negotiations were held; and finally, from 2017 to present in which, the negotiations were frozen and relations deteriorated.

Keywords: TTIP, Transatlantic, EU, US, RTA

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ AÇISINDAN TRANSATLANTİK TİCARET VE YATIRIM ORTAKLIĞININ (TTYO) JEO-POLİTİK NEDENLERİ

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Bu tezin amacı, Avrupa Birliği (AB) ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) arasında 2013 - 2017 yılları arasında müzakere edilen TTYO'nun arkasındaki jeo-politik nedenleri, "zayıflamış Batı" kavramını aşmak, dünyadaki diğer bölgeleri kontrol etmek, "Atlantik havzası"nı güçlendirmek" amaçlarını içeren "*transatlantik hegemonyayı sürdürmek*"; küresel ticaret standartlarını belirleme, çok taraflı ticaret sistemini savunma veya meydan okuma amaçlarını içeren "*küresel ticareti domine etmek*"; ve son olarak, AB idaresinin manevra esnekliğinin artırılması, AB'nin bütünlüğü ve güvenliği, "enerji birliği" politikasının sağlanması amaçlarını içeren "*AB içindeki sorunları aşmak*" olmak üzere üç jeopolitik sebep altında on yıllardır süren transatlantik ilişkinin dinamiklerini AB'nin bakış açısını temel alarak

arařtırmaktadır. Bu alıřmada, transatlantik iliřki  dnemde analiz edilecektir, iliřkilerin bařlangıcından TTIP mzakerelerinin resmi olarak bařlamasına kadar geen sreyi kapsayan 1945 – 2013 yılları arası; resmi mzakerelerin yapıldığı 2013-2017 yılları arası; ve son olarak, 2017'den gnmze kadar olan, mzakerelerin donduėu ve iliřkilerin ktleřtiėi dnem.

Anahtar Kelimeler: TTYO, Transatlantik, AB, ABD, BTA

To my precious İnci

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
BITA	Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, China, South Africa
CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CAATSA	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
DAESH	al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (“Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or the Levant)”)
EC	European Community
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists Group
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union

FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
INSTEX	Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges
ISDS	investor-state dispute settlement
ITA	Information Technology Agreement
JCPOA	Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MFN	Most-favored nation
MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NTBs	Non-tariff barriers
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
S&D	Socialists and Democrats Party
TISA	Trade Agreement in Services
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The efforts to enhance global free trade and eliminate barriers have always been a lively discussion that whether regionalism or multilateralism is the most effective strategy for achieving global free trade (World Economic Forum, 2014). Schlemmer (2019), argues that the move will be towards plurilateralism and regionalism in the form of regional and mega-regional agreements, thus creating the “micro-constitutions”, since the idea of a unified global order and super globalization are mutually exclusive in the existence of the sovereign states which seems to continue to exist. According to the 2014 report of World Economic Forum (WEF), the first wave of regionalism started in 1960s but failed due to multilateral approach adopted by the US. However, by the 1980s, the US changed its stance about regional trade agreements and led to the second wave of regionalism. In this last wave, the world has seen many immense projects including the European Union (EU), the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, etc. In the report, Norman Angell describes the recent trend and changing perceptions of international politics very well: “international finance is now so interdependent and tied to trade and industry, that political and military power can in reality do nothing”. (WEF, 2014) Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are the means to achieve trade liberalization, thus enhanced cooperation. They are a broad class of international agreements that include common markets, customs unions, free trade agreements

(FTAs), and economic unions (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Gao (2009) says that FTAs are the new gold-rush.

In this thesis, the research question is “What are the geo-political reasons of the EU to negotiate TTIP?” along with the research purposes, “to find out EU’s geo-political motivations to negotiate TTIP”; “to separate economic and geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP” and finally, “to understand whether the priority is economic or geo-political in EU’s motivations”.

Different authors put different emphasis on the reasons to conduct a RTA. The reasons range from economic to political. Baccini et al. (2011) accept the general economic and global affairs reasons to ratify a RTA and adds the role of domestic institutions (Mansfield et al. 2002; 2008; Baccini, 2011, cited in Baccini et al., 2011) such as interest groups (Mattli 1999; Chase 2005; Dür 2007, cited in Baccini et al., 2011), bureaucratic interests (Elsig 2007, Elsig and Dupont 2011, cited in Baccini et al., 2011) and international shocks (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003, cited in Baccini et al., 2011). In terms of international political gains, Baccini et al. (2011) make a list of non-trade motivations. They include corruption, labor standards, environmental protection, human rights, democracy, and military cooperation. Among these, environmental protection, military cooperation and labor standards have been the most used motivations so far. (Baccini et al., 2011).

According to Blackwill and Harris (2017), geo-economics is “reemerging as a favored form of geopolitical combat for some of the world’s most powerful states and shaping the outcomes of some of the world’s most important strategic challenges”. In my thesis, I will focus on geo-political reasons for the EU to ratify

TTIP with the US. While it is possible to summarize the essence of the EU-US relations during the Cold War as the stabilization of Europe, today the US and the EU are both challenged by many different issues such as climate change, radical movements, the rise of China and Iran's nuclear activities etc. along with economic challenges. Thus, a narrow scale deal would not satisfy the partners and the need to renegotiate TTIP is more viable as the power centers in the political economy changed.

This paper aims to categorize the geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP in three categories by analyzing each in a historical context. First reason is sustaining the transatlantic hegemony. One of TTIP's primary goals is to consolidate the US and the EU, especially against emerging economies such as BRICS. As the European Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht once pointed out, the US and the EU need TTIP, because the world has changed, and China, India, and Brazil today play a different role in the global economy than they did fifteen, ten or even five years ago. According to him, "the global center of economic gravity is shifting" (De Gucht, 2013). In TTIP, geo-politics outweigh economic gains in the ratification of agreements. Political-military relations is one of the geo-political reasons in which trade liberalization can enhance the related capacity and help the parties to internalize security externalities (Gowa 1994, cited in Mansfield et al., 2002). Military disputes are another important motivation. (Mansfield et al., 2002) Through liberalization of trade, economic development enhances and this decreases the tendency for conflict in the long term. (Khouri, 2008) This is one of the main reasons why the US and the EU are eager to sign agreements with Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region countries. For the political-military dimension of TTIP, NATO is already a strong link between the EU and the United States, but this is only one side of the relationship, and transatlantic relationship is still dominated

by an economic and trade agenda. Thus, under this first reason, the partners have three basic motivations as overcoming the “weakened West” notion, strengthening the Atlantic basin and controlling the other regions of the world. The parties still do not have a strategic partnership to allow them to make real-time instantaneous responses by making common assessments on daily changing issues. A partnership such as TTIP will enable to identify problems that can be solved in the long term and to adopt a common attitude towards security and other challenging issues outside the economic sphere. To ensure the renewal of the West, both symbolically and practically, and by eliminating “weakened West” belief, which is even more pronounced after the challenges from emerging economies, a clear strategic agenda was crucially needed (Hamilton, 2014). Thus, TTIP originated also from this need. In addition, the commitment of the parties to each other as well as their commitment to standards of liberal democracy and human rights in their international order-keeping discourses would be reinforced by TTIP.

The second reason is to dominate the global trade by setting the global trade standards and affecting the multilateralism efforts within WTO. Due to emerging economies, the transatlantic duopoly cannot determine global standards and rules as it did before. For many years, China and India have challenged the US and the EU. India became the sixth largest economy in the world in 2016, ahead of the UK (Griffith et al., 2017). Rising forces' appetite for creating power centers and new collaborations continue at full speed. Till now, more than five hundred FTAs have been signed in the global system and more than three hundred and twenty of them are active (Griffith et al., 2017). WTO's goal of increasing international trade by creating a norm and rule union at the global level is being damaged by different standards and rules of the FTAs. Bhagwati's (2008) “spaghetti bowl” still prevails. It seems impossible to solve the deadlock in the Doha round soon because at least

one of the parties has to give up its veto power in order to do so (Griffith et al., 2017). All these developments continue to weaken the global position of the US and the EU. Moreover, global economic crisis in 2008 is also a reason why the US-EU economic co-operation is to be strengthened by a large-scale agreement, such as TTIP and the subsequent developments have caused major losses and worries on both sides of the transatlantic. Mansfield and Milner (2012) state, there is a general assumption that hard economic periods create protectionist measures, but they object this generalization with their findings. They argue that the more democratic a country is, the more the country gains from trade liberalization, thus, the more it would have a tendency to ratify trade agreements during hard economic periods. (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Furthermore, it is clear that the global free trade could not be achieved at all, when the political-economy motive for protection was sufficiently large at one point in the long history of mankind (Aghion et al., 2007).

The global financial crisis of 2008 was seen as the internal crisis of neoliberalism and believed that it showed its own contradictions, weaknesses and limits (Strange and Worth, 2012). According to Schmidt and Thatcher (2014), leaders have made little attempt to rethink the neoliberal ideas and those ideas are still dominating the policies. Jäger (2018) takes this further and explains that capitalists took advantage of the crisis to implement their more radicalized, neoliberal forms of integration in Europe. Schmidt and Thatcher (2014) explain this resilience on neoliberal ideas in five line of analysis “the flexibility of neo-liberalism’s core principles; the gaps between neo-liberal rhetoric and reality; the strength of neo-liberal discourse in debates; the power of interests in the strategic use of ideas; and the force of institutions in the embedding of neo-liberal ideas.” (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2014) all of which can be found in the goal of dominating the global trade around the neoliberal trade agenda of the EU and the US.

The third reason is the problems within the EU including the motivations to sustain a whole and secure Europe, to enhance the maneuver capability of the decision makers and finally, to reach the goals of Energy Union initiative of the EU. Ensuring the EU's territorial integrity against the revisionist policies of Russia in neighboring Europe is thus an important goal. The EU intends to strengthen its transatlantic cooperation and re-draw the attention and policies of the US from the Middle East and the Far East to Europe. Moreover, for some authors, another motivation of the EU is that it will create a decision-making mechanism within the EU and the US that walks around democratic ways. Baccini and Urpelainen (2014) argue that, in developing countries, leaders conduct trade negotiations with major powers to implement reforms that they cannot do due to domestic political opposition, and a lack of credible commitment. This assertion is applicable to the EU in terms of a motivation for the decision makers to consolidate Union's lifelong targets and eliminate future public critics by creating joint regulations with the US in TTIP. With TTIP, a number of rules that cannot be ratified by national or subnational governments will be able to be applied since the rules that will be included in TTIP will be submitted to approval in the legislative councils on both sides within the framework of all or nothing principle (Baker, 2014). Much debated investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) should also be considered in this context. Baker (2014) gives as an example for what ISDS will provide for the companies, consider an American company doing business in Mexico which thinks that the Mexican government implements unfair regulation that increases the cost of its products. The American company will be able to report the situation to a special panel, not to Mexican judicial authorities. However, the idea of a special panel should not always be considered negative. For example, in some seemingly democratic countries which lack of a fair judicial system, such alternative mechanisms constitute a confidence for foreign investors. In addition to all these agenda as attempts to solve the increasing problems within the EU, it should be

mentioned that the EU's energy policy also enlarges TTIP expectations for the EU. The need for diversification of energy resources as a security measure is strongly felt as a result of the political crises caused by Russia and insecurity towards the Middle East market. In this context, it is understandable that the EU administration wants to implement TTIP as soon as possible to eliminate the quota applied to liquid natural gas imported from the US.

Finally, one of the added values of this research is to analyze TTIP as a perfect reflection of transatlantic relations. From the first raw ideas about developing a great scale agreement to bond the partners strategically to sustain the hegemony of the Western democracy and to the recent deterioration of the partnership, TTIP process tells lot about the transatlantic relations in the framework of economic, sociocultural, historical and geo-political developments. Another added value of my thesis is that this thesis clearly shows that TTIP should not be evaluated without thoroughly considering the geo-politics between the EU and the US rather than only considering the transatlantic economy or the EU's goal of securing its territories by strengthening the Atlantic bonds which are significantly loose compared to the post World War II period. TTIP is not merely about a security concern and thus, it is not a security agreement. The partners have NATO for these concerns. Moreover, TTIP is also not merely an economic agreement since the transatlantic economy does not have much space to enhance further. In this sense, TTIP is an "economic agreement nested within a broader geo-strategic context" (Aggarwal, 1998). Therefore, it is not true to say that TTIP is economic NATO (Hamilton, 2014). Although, there is a visible division of labor between NATO and TTIP, it is not possible to measure it in reality (Griffith et al., 2017). The geo-strategic results that TTIP will create prevent it from being a merely economic deal. In addition, if successful in the future, TTIP will form a "transatlantic pole" that resembles the "western block" of post-World

War II, which thickens the line between the transatlantic pole and the rest (Hamilton, 2014).

In this thesis, my ontological position is interpretivist. Different reasons to ratify RTAs in different countries are shaped by their current and historical positions in world politics and global economy. Sometimes same reason involves different scopes and effects for countries. The reasons to negotiate TTIP can be interpreted same as for the EU and the US, however, the background of the reasons and the extend of pursuing the goals to negotiate TTIP is different at the both sides of the transatlantic. My epistemological position is also interpretivist. I have read through the secondary resources, the academic articles, official reports and statistics from the EU and the US sources, the newspapers and online articles to understand what the geo-political reasons could be for EU to negotiate TTIP.

In my methodology, I used secondary data sources by employing the criteria of the date of publication, credential of the author, depth of analyses and the contribution of the text to my research.

CHAPTER II

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS FROM 1945 TO 2013

2.1 The Background of the Transatlantic Relations

In accordance with the subject of this thesis, the starting point of the transatlantic relationship is taken as post World War II. After 1945, the isolation policy of the US towards Europe was terminated due to Soviet threat and the concern of losing a massive market like Europe. After becoming a victorious power in the World War II, the US was eager to establish the capitalist structures in Western Europe (Jäger, 2018) and under the economic and political development agenda of Europe, the transatlantic relations were intensified by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aids. After these concrete measures, the establishment of a stable international financial order, the Bretton Woods system was next (Jäger, 2018). The military dimension of the relations has gained an institutional identity with the establishment of NATO in order to eliminate the security concerns of Europe. In the early years of the relationship, military relations remained at the forefront in accordance with the spirit of the period, and US intervention in Europe was at its highest. However, after 1950, this intense US intervention in Europe started to cause discomfort and

integration efforts were started for the independence of Europe, politically and economically. However, according to Bohle (2005):

This assumption (of an autonomous European capitalism) was already refuted in the 1970s by Nicos Poulantzas, who argued that at the core of the new phase of imperialism was the relationship between American capital and the rest of the developed world, rather than the capitalist peripheries. Through foreign direct investment, American capital has penetrated the European social formations. Acting as a powerful social force within these societies, it led to a transatlantic realignment of European bourgeoisies and states.

The Bretton Woods system dissolved in the early 1970s by terminating the exchange rate stability and capital controls and oil price increases made the global economy worse. The European integration was damaged very badly and for a while, it became very hard to find a new road map for European leaders. The US decided to raise interest rates very high in 1979 and this led to a great crisis in Europe. While Keynesian approaches were popular to solve the crisis at that time, Europe had many routes to take; a social democratic Europe which was advocated by trade unions; and the neoliberal route which basically supported the market liberalization; and neo-mercantilist route which additionally proposed to create structures to turn European companies into global players, capable of expanding outside Europe (Jäger, 2018). According to Jäger (2018), in 1980s, a combination of these routes were started to take and the capital gained a comparative advantage in the upcoming policies. Van Appeldoorn (2001) identifies these routes as three different visions of European order: neoliberalism, which has sometimes been called “classical liberalism” or “19th century liberalism” (Cerny, 2008); neo-mercantilism; and social democracy.

Eventually, the European integration took its latest form as a neoliberal structure after the single market and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. According to Strange and Worth (2012), starting with the Treaty of Rome (1957), all treaties of the EU are charters for neoliberalism. Cafruny (2009) states that the US played an essential role with its economic and political-military dimensions in Europe's transition to neoliberalism, but European big business, the nation-states, or the EU did not play a passive role in this transition and neoliberal policies have reflected the preferences of the most powerful fractions of European capital (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Carchedi, 2001). Moreover, Cafruny and Ryner (2007) assert that "the neoliberal European project is not a conspiracy—a fully thought out blueprint immanently implemented, and globally mastered, by its agent". According to Appeldorn (2001), the neo-mercantilist vision was the initial drive towards the creation of the European single market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, Stephen Gill (2001) describes the eventual EU integration as 'disciplinary neoliberalism' rather than a neo-mercantilist and/or social democratic project. Storey (2006) claims that there are counter tendencies and tensions within the EU due to some who still believe the persistence of social democracy after terms such as 'social cohesion' and 'social inclusion' gained popularity within EU discourse. He gives the 'Lisbon Agenda' adopted by the European Council in March 2000 as an example of this popularity: "The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (Storey, 2006). According to Hertz and Leuffen (2011), despite the institutionalization and reforms made by treaties, the EU is dominated by the material interests of the members. Baç and Cihangir (2012) states that the most powerful ones dictate the decisions and if this intergovernmental integration continues, EU institutions will not enable the EU to become a global leader and the member states will remain as the main actors, deepening the political crisis of the

EU (Underhill, 2011). However, Baç and Cihangir (2012) also states that the European integration has different patterns in different policy areas which proves that the multi-speed Europe arguments are right. The authors claim that through this multi-speed integration, EU's ability to strengthen multilateralism in international politics is verified (Baç and Cihangir, 2012). Cross (2016) provides another verification that when the EU completes its unification in an area, it becomes a leading global actor who gains leverage against the US. According to her, in Paris Accords, the EU arrived at a position of leverage to be the leading global actor in this specific area, but this competition success brought the problem of weakening the transatlantic relations within multilateral climate negotiations (Cross, 2016).

When reviewing the transatlantic relations, it is necessary to make three distinctions as military, political and economic relations. In this thesis, the geo-political agenda of the partners in TTIP, which can be seen as the best reflection of EU-US relations in recent years, will be examined. In this agenda, political dimension of transatlantic relations will be reviewed and economic and military dimension will be mentioned briefly in relation with geopolitical dimension. The two great powers are now in a race with other rising powers such as BRICS in order to gain primacy in world politics and geopolitics is the main battlefield in current international affairs as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) has once stated:

Geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy. The United States...now enjoys international primacy, with its power directly deployed on three peripheries of the Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy. America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained (Brzezinski, 1997).

The US and the EU have one of the most complex and multilayered relations that any two states in the world can have (Hamilton, 2014). Since the World War II, the partners are tied around common political, historical and ethnic backgrounds by their official narrative in advocating liberal democracy and free market capitalism against movements such as fascism and communism surrounding them and threatening their existence. After the end of the Cold War, the decreasing political-military relations between the two sides in NATO were thought to bring an end to the partnership; however, the US had different plans. After the breakdown of Communism, from 1994 on, the US forcefully re-entered the European scene to achieve what Zbigniew Brzezinski called a 'double enlargement', i.e. to expand NATO into former Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the transformation of its military tasks from fighting against communism to striking out-of-area zones in the name of humanitarian intervention (Bohle, 2005). According to Cafruny (2009), the US "transformed NATO from a containment-oriented and defensive alliance to an instrument designed to promote the forward expansion of American power across the European continent and into central Asia" starting from the mid-1990s and this inevitably increased Europe's geopolitical dependence on the US and neoliberal social forces across the continent gained a significant support.

Despite common historical backgrounds and values, the partners have distinct differences. The EU has always set its agenda heavily around a neoliberal ideal but it did not abandon its distinctive institutions and values shaped by centuries of experience in an effort of "institutional copying" (Cafruny and Ryner, 2007). Thus, the claims that the EU is "Americanized" or "Anglicized" lack a rational foundation (Cafruny and Ryner, 2007). Moreover, according to Wills (1999), the US is often depicted as a "bully" in international relations, who forces other states to act in its

own interest. According to Manners, the EU is defined as the “Normative Power”, which generally chooses dialogue and consultation to disseminate norms to the international system (Manners, 2002). Moreover, while the US is a “single” actor who can act fast with one voice over its territory, the EU is not a single actor with the operational capacity to respond spontaneously to international developments, but it is a constantly developing and ever-evolving structure to keep its members together and to advance their common interests. Therefore, before the TTIP negotiations were frozen, it can be said that the operational effectiveness of the EU-US relationship depended on the continuous development of the EU. Moreover, before President Trump’s election, disagreements in the negotiations were emerging on issues such as consensus among EU members, political will or the capacity of the EU, but after Trump being elected, the disagreements emerged due to the US administration's anti-TTIP attitude.

2.2 The Emergence of the TTIP Idea

Although, some authors assert that despite the decision to ratify an agreement is often based on geopolitical considerations, the ultimate success of the agreement is seen more on economic and commercial considerations. (WEF, 2014). The TTIP negotiations officially started in 2013, but the foundations of such an agreement date back and the economic and commercial considerations were at the forefront at

the beginning. In a speech in Berlin in December 1989, US Secretary of State Baker, stated that the US and the EU need “working together to achieve, whether in a treaty or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links” (Piening, 1997). This proposal led to the Transatlantic Declaration and in 1990, the parties signed the declaration and promised to strengthen the mutual economic partnership. In 1995, a follow up agreement was made with the “Treaty of Madrid on a Transatlantic Agenda” and a series of resolutions and negotiations were held. Treaty of Madrid did not envision a free trade zone, but a framework for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of barrier, thus the purpose was not to form a free trade zone but to bring the two economic superpowers closer to a free trade zone (Wigger, 2008). Two more significant steps were taken after Madrid Agreement. The first step was "The New Transatlantic Market" agreement proposed by the European Commission in 1998 ("European Commission backs New Transatlantic Marketplace", 1998). However, France vetoed this agreement due to its concerns about its audio-visual industry (Ružeková, 2016). In November 1998, the Commission prepared an action plan known as the “Transatlantic Economic Partnership”, but due to the fact that this plan was a narrow plan, it did not achieve the desired development in bilateral trade (Ružeková, 2016). Then, the main aim of all steps taken by partial agreements between the two sides was to reduce the effects of administrative and non-tariff barriers and thus to provide mutual recognition and harmonization. While these steps also did not create significant positive effects, according to Baç and Cihangir (2012), the institutionalization of transatlantic relations throughout the 1990s could be seen as a part of EU’s role in building a multipolar world and furthermore, Mahncke et al. (2004) explain that this role is a natural extension of the “Union’s own example of integration through pooled sovereignty”.

The efforts made by the partners regarding TTIP cannot be evaluated without the developments in WTO. In the period following the 9/11 events, various obstacles were encountered in the Doha Round and international trade negotiations were deadlocked. Until 2003, the consensus within both the GATT and the WTO could be realized by the agreement of the so-called Quad (the US, the EC (European Community)/EU, Japan and Canada) parties. After the WTO ministerial meeting held in Cancun in 2003, two developing countries, India and Brazil, entered the Quad, replacing Japan and Canada, and formed other groups, including G5 (with Australia), G6 (adding Japan) and G7 (adding China), along with the other three countries (Eliasson and García-Duran, 2017). After the gravity changes in the international political economy, the US changed its policies in an effort to sustain its dominant position.

In 2006, former US President Bush announced a new foreign policy and declared that priorities would be results-oriented partnerships rather than international bureaucracy, legislation and rule making. Within this framework, in 2007, the USA and the EU established the Transatlantic Economic Council and initiated the process to start the official TTIP negotiations. In 2008, the United States began conducting two parallel initiatives at the same time after starting CPTPP negotiations with its other eleven partners. According to some, the basis of functionalist-based policy changes in the United States was to form an economic NATO, as the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said before, and thus to formulate the rules of global trade. However, these policies were interrupted by the 2008 global crisis and caused great damage on both sides of the Atlantic and produced a “secular stagnation” as Summers (2016) states. The economic assets and the leverage that China and, to a lesser extent, other developing countries had, changed the strategic plans of the US and the EU regarding transatlantic and

shaping the global economic order. The slow economic recovery in Europe and the concessions made by the WTO members in Bali in December 2013 to facilitate trade were not sufficient for the revision of global trade relations and, alternatively, a liberalization agreement between the US and the EU emerged (Straubhaar 2014). According to Straubhaar (2014), the reason for the emergence of this alternative was that it would be easier to conclude an agreement between the two partners, which were already connected by common values and history, rather than waiting for other members to reach an agreement. Thus, although there were various economic reasons to officially launch the TTIP negotiations, the main motivation was the concern created by the global crisis and the disappointment and dissatisfaction regarding the WTO negotiations. For this reason, according to Young (2017a), TTIP negotiations are related to the framework and speed of other preferential trade agreements and, if succeeded, it;

...can spur other countries to conclude agreements with the participating states, replicate provisions across multiple agreements, negotiate incompatible domestic adjustments, and deal with political mobilization against one agreement that can spillover to affect another (Young 2017a).

The TTIP negotiations were compared, by many, to the efforts of the EU and the US to establish the WTO in the past. When the GATT failed to make progress in Uruguay negotiations, the EU and the US imposed a mandatory option on developing countries by threatening them to restrict their access to the transatlantic market if they did not sign the WTO agreement. Thus, some believe that the partners did the same with TTIP in order to make progress in Doha negotiations.

As a result of all these developments, the High Level Working Group (led by the EU Commissioner for Trade and the US Trade Representative) was established by the US and the EU to evaluate the economic benefits of both sides after a trade liberalization agreement. High Level Working Group examined some further options for the trade liberalization, not only the removal of customs duties but also the elimination of non-tariff barriers and the harmonization of compliance standards. As a result, in the thirty-ninth G8 summit, the EU and the US leaders announced that they would start official TTIP negotiations and on July 8, 2013, the negotiations began.

For TTIP if there is a topic that advocates and opponents agree with, it is that TTIP would be a “game changer” deal. The partners had high expectations and strategic goals and if they succeed to re-negotiate the deal after a policy change in the US, TTIP will be “the first show of the new world of trade” as the former general director of the WTO, Pascal Lemy (2017), once called. According to TTIP advocates, the opportunity to influence and standardize the international economy is increasingly diminishing due to rising economies and many different power centers. If the two superpowers succeed in signing TTIP, they would restore the Atlantic Cooperation. If they fail to sign TTIP in the future, they will destroy the transatlantic relationship of trust and faith, which has already diminished considerably.

2.3 The Relations until 2013 in the Framework of TTIP

2.3.1 Dominating the Global Trade.

The International Trade System has been significantly influenced by the dominant trend of multilateralism and the increasingly deepening globalization movement over the years following the World War II. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later World Trade Organization (WTO), has been signed to end the old fashioned national markets, especially protected by customs walls, and the non-discrimination principle among the member countries has been adopted as a basic principle. According to Nesadurai (2002), WTO, which institutionalized the neoliberal ideas associated with globalization, has substantial authority on national governments. RTAs, with their nature, are exceptions from the WTO system but due to the increase in the number of RTAs, the international trade system cannot be thought independent of these agreements. Thus, they are often seen as shortcomings of multilateralism. The most important feature of the RTAs is that they set aside some privileged commercial relations between the parties and exclude the third countries from these privileges. For this reason, RTAs are perceived as a threat in terms of multilateral trade relations in the WTO framework.

The motivations to ratify RTAs vary widely; economic elements are considered dominant motivations but as we see from the combination of one small and one developed country agreements in FTAs, political elements sometimes supersede economic elements. However, these elements are often seen to be intertwined. It is important to identify geo-political motivations behind these agreements since their implications do not affect only signatory parties but also international political economy as well. These agreements are now used as strategic weapons in the hands of policy makers. Wars are prevented, alliances are formed between centuries-long enemy states, however, new enmities and reasons of wars are also emerging due to their effects on wealth and security, all of which make us to think and research more on them and future implications for international political economy. In this section of my paper, I will examine the geo-political reasons and the developments that led to these reasons and brought the transatlantic partners to declare the official start of the TTIP talks in 2013.

In TTIP, one of the most prominent geo-political reasons which were often expressed by both the parties and the third countries involved in the global economy, was setting the global trade standards and promoting these standards by setting a base for trade agreements anywhere in the world. The impetus gained after the World War II by RTAs leads us to think that these agreements, which already affect about fifty percent of world trade, will affect all the commercial links in the future. While the entire world is signing preferential trade agreements with a great appetite, it was unthinkable for two close partners, such as the EU and the US, not to introduce the giant transatlantic market into such an agreement and to show “a sample model” to the world. However, TTIP was beyond the ordinary regional trade agreement, even when looking at the scale alone. Thus, it would be inadequate to mention only economic goals. If successful in the future, TTIP is claimed to take

the authority from the democratically elected governments and the existing legal systems in many areas in the third countries, with its new rules structure and new legal system (Puslecki, 2018).

The EU and the US have been friends and collaborators for a long time and they have been the biggest rivals of each other. Among the most important reasons why they wanted to make such an ambitious and massive trade deal was not only to open up their markets more to each other, and to harmonize the trade rules, but also to spread these rules and their competition conditions all over the world. As once former US Secretary of State Kerry said, this agreement would create “habits of cooperation” and penetrate in the relations of the two sides and enable them to lead the world together” (4 May 2015 Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade Washington DC – Centre for Strategic and International Studies Statesman's Forum). Americans and Europeans have long established global rules together, but the emerging economies and the challenges from these countries, especially in the post-World War II era, have combined with the destructive effects of the global financial crisis, and have raised considerable doubts whether the West will be able to regain its former power. In the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis, the financial and economic credibility of the West was greatly damaged. During this period, the current Chinese Deputy Premier, Wang Qishan, said that “teachers now have some problems” (Asghar, 2008). According to Ikenberry (2011), the widespread belief that, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the liberal democracy of the West would continue to rise weakened due to alternative models of state capitalism and the unwillingness of developing countries, such as Brazil and India, which are likely to increase their global role, to adapt to the West (IkenBerry, 2011). Arab Awakening, in contrast to what was expected at the beginning as making the region more democratic and creating new models of administration which were more

integrated with the West, led to a greater chaos (IkenBerry, 2011). In view of all these developments, it is becoming increasingly difficult to set the global standards and achieve the highest trade benefits for Europe and the US under the Pax Americana ideological framework (Hamilton, 2014). In the near future it is quite possible that the Atlantic bi-gemony will decline further (Pelkmans et al., 2015).

It would be wise to go back to 2003 to see how TTIP made into transatlantic agenda. In 2003, a break in multilateral trade governance occurred at the WTO Ministerial in Cancun (Garcia-Duran et al., 2016). The basis of this break goes back to 2001, when some members started to show dissatisfaction from the current system. Despite concessions to developing countries, both GATT and WTO decisions were largely dominated by the US. The US later continued to dominate multilateral trade governance in cooperation with the EU, Japan and Canada (called as “Quad” by some) (García-Duran and Eliasson, 2017). During the Cancun talks, India and Brazil, which pioneered a new coalition called G20, challenged the Western leadership in trade governance by rejecting the agricultural agreement proposed by the EU and the US and since 2004 new consensus groups have continued to form: ‘the New Quad ’(EU, US, India and Brazil), the G5 (with Australia), G6 (with Japan) or G7 (with China) (García-Duran and Eliasson, 2017).

This period led to a new period in which power structures were changed and new partnerships were established, but there was no leadership structure to conclude the Doha Round. This period reinforces the assumption that the EU and the US have started to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, such as TTIP, as they clearly saw that they began to lose their leadership positions in international trade governance (García-Duran and Eliasson, 2017). Until recently, the world trade system was shaped by the US and the EU through the GATT and the WTO. With the inclusion

of Russia and China in the WTO system, it was thought that the WTO principles would be fully global. However, it has not been as expected and there have been significant disagreements between the developing economies and the West, leading to strong collaborations among developing countries. In particular, BRICS countries do their best to prevent the EU and the US from realizing their goals of setting the global rules and standards. At this point, there is a tripolarity in which the developing countries also have veto power in the WTO, instead of a transatlantic duopoly, as in the past, consisting of the EU and the US (Griffith et al., 2017).

According to Strange and Worth (2012), the global economic boom from the early 1990s to late 2000s helped the European integration to reach its peak. The authors define this period as a “neoliberal period beyond Europe” and further state that a critical dimension of this period was that much of the developing world including new regionally embedded but increasingly global powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, the so-called BRIC powers incorporated into the global neoliberal order through both regional economic integration such as Mercosur and ASEAN and through membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Strange and Worth (2012). There are no BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South African Republic) countries in TTIP and CPTPP and according to Griffith et al. (2017), it is doubtful that these countries will eventually be drawn into these agreements in some way. First of all, strong commercial responses have been given to these agreements. For example, China has started the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations simultaneously for its exclusion from CPTPP. With this agreement, China plans to incorporate ten ASEAN countries and their five FTA (Free Trade Agreement) partner countries (Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand) into RCEP, benefiting from its own gravitational pull (Griffith et al., 2017). The authors claim that China has also incorporated the “Belt

and Road Initiative” into its plans to strengthen its trade and energy infrastructure in South and Central Asia. Thus, the possibility that China would accept the CPTPP rules largely decreased. Sixteen countries in the RCEP now account for almost twenty five percent of global exports and thirty percent of global GDP. The RCEP is scheduled to be completed in 2019, and even if the CPTPP agreement had been completed by realizing its full potential, the major overlap between it and the RCEP would not let CPTPP to achieve leverage against China as expected from it. Similarly, if TTIP creates discriminatory effects for those excluded, such discrimination may lead to strong co-operations, rather than adopting the TTIP rules, as well as shaking the status quo with newly established regulatory standards.

According to Aggarwal and Evenett (2015), there are some response alternatives for countries left outside the mega regional trade agreements which include the creation of a rival block, the unilateral adoption of its rules and standards, joining the club, or a multilateralization of its rules via a comprehensive WTO agreement. The decisions of the third countries vary according to the relative political importance of the exporters, the intensity of the exports of third countries to the PTA countries and the relative importance of trade in the economies of third countries (Dür, 2007). It is clear that TTIP is seen as a threat to China and to other emerging economies, and will continue to be responded accordingly. However, it is expected that these new strong partnerships will help to upgrade the world trade rules in the long run (Aggarwal and Evenett 2015; Guoqiang and Petri 2014; Schott et al. 2016 in De Bièvre and Poletti, 2016).

The last of the multilateral trade negotiations, Doha Round, has been in a dead end since 2001. As 2008 global financial crisis dramatically showed the crisis of neoliberalism, Strange and Worth (2012) state that the weaknesses of neoliberalism

were apparent long before global financial crisis of 2008 with the failure of Doha Round , when “the developed and developing countries, regions and blocs showed common unwillingness to embrace further moves towards market deregulation”. Although this has created a belief that global trade liberalization is ending, signing of Bali package at the ninth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in December 2013 denied this belief for a while. It still seems impossible to complete the Doha Round due to reorientation of power between the developing economies and the West, and it is doubtful that any multilateral negotiations would be successful, resulting in the WTO's trade liberalization objective. Under these circumstances, Steinberg (2002, in Eliasson and García-Duran, 2017) makes the “exit tactic” analogy for TTIP. According to the author, “Old Quad”s (the US, the EU, Japan and Canada) establishment of a preferential market through bilateral agreements and the confrontation of third countries with the threat of isolation will lead third countries to lower their expectations for WTO negotiations and to make multilateral or at least plurilateral concessions (Eliasson and García-Duran, 2017). An example is that after the start of the TTIP negotiations, at WTO Ministerial Meetings in 2013 in Bali and in 2015 in Nairobi, mini-package agreements were made and so, WTO's negotiation tool was prevented from becoming fully dysfunctional (Falconer, 2015; Hamilton, 2014 in Eliasson and García-Duran, 2017). By looking at the progress made at Doha Round, it can be said that the support and willingness of WTO members to liberalization is quite different. This difference is particularly evident in some modern trade issues, such as competition, intellectual property and financial services. As Peter Mandelson (Keynote address at the Caplin Conference on the World Economy, 2014), former European Commissioner for Trade, said for this difference between members;

If GATT had been a club of self-described liberalizers, the WTO had become a club of guardians of the global trade rule book. For members who

see global trade liberalization as a work in progress the WTO can be a frustrating place to be, moving as it seems to do at the speed of the slowest of its members.

This comment sums up the frustration around Doha Round for trade liberalists regarding the lack of multilateral talks in increasing the trade volume and wealth by liberalizing the global trade.

Another expectation from TTIP was to revitalize the Doha Round and the multilateral system. The most well-known example that led to this expectation is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed between the US, Canada and Mexico. When the Uruguay Round stumbled in 1990, the three countries started negotiations for a free trade agreement in 1992 and completed the negotiations in only fourteen months and put NAFTA into effect in 1994. NAFTA catalyzed the multilateral system and led to the re-start and successful completion of the Uruguay Round (Hamilton and Blockmans, 2015). Another example of the positive effects of plurilateral agreements on the multilateral system is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) which was concluded at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996 with twenty nine participants including the European Community (EC). According to Mann and Liu (2009), the initiation of ITA agreement started with the dialogs of business sectors among three participants. Today, number of ITA participants is eighty two, representing about ninety seven per cent of world trade in IT products. The commitment of the agreement is to completely eliminate tariffs on IT products covered in the Agreement. ITA participants commit for duty-free treatment to all WTO members on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis, thus the benefits of the agreement spread to the entire WTO membership, making it the foundational multilateral regulation in IT sector.

Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are another important aspect to consider for the benefits of RTAs such as TTIP. NTBs are not included in multilateral agreements. In this case, the greatest benefit of welfare from any RTA could be to reduce non-tariff barriers. It is conjecturally not possible to address NTBs in the existing WTO system. From this perspective, it is clear that the multilateral system is not the best alternative to deep regional integrations. Although the TTIP talks officially began in 2013, the expectation for a major deal in which the EU and the US could further strengthen their existing partnerships was prevalent for two decades. Nevertheless, no revival occurred in the Doha Round. If TTIP is signed in the future, it will be a new experience for global trade. Hamilton and Blockmans (2015) argue that TTIP will be a more effective agreement than CPTPP in determining global standards and benchmarks due to regulatory coherence. They argue that the impact of TTIP, which they describe as CPTPP+, will be higher on Asian economies, than the effects of CPTPP on the European economy.

The scale that regional integration efforts have reached brings along some problems. Former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy put that “while bilateral tariff reductions can ultimately be multilateralized, a plethora of bilateral trade agreements will produce a multitude of regulatory standards with which businesses will struggle to comply” (Lamy, 2017). One of the most important issues in international trade for businesses is the cost of cross-border trade due to different customs procedures, duties, red tape etc. and cross-border trade costs will be increased in a world where such diverse deep agreements and regulations exist. This will limit the trade-facilitating effects expected from RTAs. Furthermore, a possible negative effect of TTIP was claimed to be its consumption of political energy. According to some authors, the use of limited political energy in the negotiation of mega-regional agreements would reduce multilateral efforts.

The scale and the interests of the parties are making TTIP a unique case what Morse and Keohane (2014) call a ‘contested multilateralism’ (or ‘counter-multilateralism’). According to some, TTIP is creating a regime with its regulatory dimension that challenges the WTO not with bilateralism, but with a different multilateralism. However, according to pro-TTIPers, TTIP will not only support the multilateral system but will also extend the multilateral system to new members and new areas. Even the successful completion of the Doha Round will not lead to the resolution of some issues that are not covered by Doha Round but are critical for both the transatlantic partners and the global economy. For example, in some areas, such as investment and clean technologies, it is interpreted that there will be WTO members who will want to implement the provisions of TTIP, and thus TTIP will facilitate the work of the WTO. Therefore, some authors argue that the EU and the US should support both multilateral liberalization and transatlantic initiatives that they could include issues not addressed in multilateral agreements. With the help of this WTO+ agenda, they believe that higher trade standards will be reached. According to another interpretation, if successful in the future, it is possible for TTIP to accelerate multilateral liberalization if it creates a trade diversion rather than of trade creation. However, this may only be valid if third countries accept compliance with TTIP rules and other major trading powers do not work against TTIP.

The number of FTAs, which was only forty seven in 1994, reached two hundred and ninety one by January 2019, according to WTO data. According to Griffith et al. (2017), the EU and the US started initiatives such as CPTPP and TTIP to reinvigorate the impact they have lost in the WTO by consolidating all existing FTAs into a larger number of mega-FTAs. The authors also claim that another important goal of the mega-FTAs is to control China’s rise by surrounding it. For

example, in terms of CPTPP, some domestic Chinese academics and party members stated that the US wanted to use this agreement as an economic arm to rebalance its power in Asia Pacific. One of the well-known journalists of China, the People's Daily author Ding Gang stated a common opinion about the TPP in China by saying that "... (the) TPP is superficially an economic agreement but contains an obvious political purpose to constrain China's rise "(Griffith et al., 2017). However, according to Griffith et al. (2017), it was not geo-strategic to surround China by CPTPP while India was not included in CPTPP. In this case, it would be inevitable that China and India would block against CPTPP and sharpening the boundaries between blocks by creating such blocks, could create more competition and conflict. This contradicts the goal of controlling the regions that the West has intended to do in the first place. Furthermore, it can be said that TTIP and CPTPP are in conflict in geo-strategic terms. If it is intended to surround China with the CPTPP, it does not seem reasonable to do this without the EU (Griffith et al., 2017). Therefore, although Griffith et al. (2017) claims that TTIP and CPTPP are geo-strategic agreements, it is not likely that they had geo-strategic goals at the beginning.

The initial objectives of the TTIP and CPTPP changed during the time they were negotiated and as the actors changed, the agreements took on new forms. However, these two agreements are mixed in some areas due to their participants and coverage areas and have developed conflicting objectives in some areas. According to the authors, it is hardly possible for TTIP to re-establish transatlantic hegemony, even if it has achieved its ambitious targets. BRICS countries continue to form non-Western blocks with state-led capitalism models, which do not fully comply with the neoliberal economic order. Although the basic principles of the WTO are still valid, the differences between RCEP, TTIP and CPTPP can be worsened further

(Griffith et al., 2017). China also pursues special motivations in the ratification of its agreements. China's "peaceful rise" goal is a striking example since it uses its FTA network to support its strategic allies through this strategy. (Gao, 2009) According to Gao (2009), FTA partners of China are chosen for their strategic value, rather than their economic potential. This example shows how politics has gone global and transformed trade into its handmaiden and the divisions and the problems between the great powers of the old manifest themselves among the commercial blocks now.

Karel De Gucht (2013), European Trade Commissioner, explained the geo-strategic objectives in the center of TTIP as "... because the world has changed. China, India and Brazil play a much different role in the global economy today than they did fifteen, ten or even five years ago. The global center of economic gravity is shifting". According to Gamble (2012), global power relations began to change dramatically after three decades: "the 'liberal peace' (in the 1990s), the 'liberal wars' (after 9/11), and financial and economic crises (since 2007)" (Novotná et al., 2015). The emergence of BRICS and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and the six-year financial crisis, which shook Western economies, made a steady recovery very difficult (Novotná et al., 2015).

2.3.2 Sustaining the Transatlantic Hegemony.

When we look at the beginning of the problems between the partners, we see a crack occurred between the US and the EU, in part after 9/11. This crack was further deepened by Obama's strategic pivot toward Asia policy and this worried Europeans that the US might have less interest in Europe and less cooperation with Europe. Therefore, the transatlantic market that TTIP would enhance and TTIP's commitment to adhering to western standards and norms would constitute a trust that Europe was the primary strategic partner of the US. The turmoil in Ukraine also influences the region and demonstrates the fact that there are still old hostilities and problems in Europe and NATO regions in the south and east. The views that European peace was permanent became invalid. It can be said that Europe will continue to face problems related to security and stability due to Russia's policy in the region. According to Walt (1998-1999), some of the reasons for the weakening of ties between Americans and Europeans are the disappearance of the Soviet threat; the fact that the US economic interests in Europe are not as big as before; and the lack of support for the Atlantic community as it used to be. Therefore, the reason why some defended the TTIP vigorously was the reaction to the slow disappearance of the international order of post-World War II and the desire to return to this order and the Washington Consensus. Thus, TTIP could be seen as a response by transatlantic partners to the disappearance of "their" international order. The US and the EU started TTIP negotiations to establish a stronger partnership than their existing partnerships, to achieve great economic gains, to cope with their new competitors in emerging economies, and to create standards and principles that will form the basis of the international system.

The EU and the US claim that they have been pioneering the requirements of peace, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law all over the world since the World War II. For this reason, pro-TTIPers believe that the agreement will help strengthen the transatlantic partnership and help the EU and the US to continue to guard the world peace. Although the EU and the US have joint efforts and consensus in many areas, their approach to some regions, such as the Middle East and Asia, is uncoordinated and unclear. The partners have important common interests in the Middle East. These interests are security-related interests often narrated in the official languages of the partners, such as combating terrorism, ensuring peace, preventing religious terrorism and radical groups, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring the safe and stable delivery of oil and gas to international markets. However, the views of the two sides on how to ensure these interests are sharply differentiated, especially on the two fundamental issues in the Middle East: Iran and Israeli-Palestinian war. According to the EU, the stability of the region is possible with Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution is necessary. In this context, Jerusalem is seen as the capital of both states. However, according to the US, the spread of terrorism and weapons will only take place with the implementation of US security policies. Moreover, Trump recognized Jerusalem unilaterally as the capital of the state of Israel and moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

When we look at the politics of the partners towards the Asia-Pacific region, it would not be wrong to say that there is a great power struggle behind US' pivot. In recent years, the total defense budget of Asian countries has exceeded the total defense budget of all of Europe (Hamilton, 2014). Both sides have different approaches to this region. Europe's Asia policy is largely related to market and investment opportunities, but there are some comments that Europe should play a

more active role by using its soft power in matters such as the rule of law in the region (Hamilton, 2014). For the US, the pivot towards Asia in the time of President George W. Bush and President Trump's Asia policy, despite his anti-globalization rhetoric, to put a possible trade agreement with China ahead of US' trade relations with Europe, shows that the US' interests in Asia are huge. The policies developed in power wars are largely shaped around geo-economics, and it is clear that China has a great weight at the center of these policies (Hamilton and Blockmans, 2015). However, according to Hamilton (2014), the determinant of US' interests are to continue to be the guarantor of global security and stability rather than economy "which contain the seeds for severe political confrontation and possible great power conflict".

2.3.3 Problems within the Union.

Another reason which led the EU to start the negotiation of TTIP in 2013 was the growing problems in the continent and in the Union. Moreover, EU's inability to solve the problems of the European continent can cause many problems such as inefficient competition with both regional and other external actors, growing separatist debates on the continent, and dysfunctional energy markets, all of which may affect not only the European continent but also Eurasia and the Middle East (Hamilton, 2014). Therefore, Europe's greater cooperation with the US on the

existing problems of the continent is of great importance for stability in the future. It is also clear that an agreement such as TTIP will greatly increase the required cooperation and convergence between the US and the EU. According to Simon (2017), it is natural that the US would want to reposition itself in Asia with China's rising so much, but the lack of interest in the European continent may have been due to the fact that the US is sure of the soundness of EU institutions and the ability to maintain order on the continent. Adding the war fatigue in the Middle East and the increasing demands of Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to the change of US policy in Asia, it is also possible that the US can move further from Europe (Simon, 2017). According to Niblett (2015), the challenges for the future of European economic and political integration are not precisely due to the extent of the current crisis, but because all crises have arrived at the same time. Furthermore, Eralp (2010, Introduction) argues that "The 'institutional fatigue' faced by the EU was reinforced by the recent economic crisis." Of course, the US' move away from the European continent creates another uncertainty about the future (Simon, 2017).

The fact that the US is one of the strong actors in the global energy market is an important reason why TTIP is crucial for the EU. European countries, especially Eastern European countries, are energy dependent. Increasing transatlantic energy trade through TTIP is an important benefit for the EU. The Commissioner Gucht once said;

...Also particularly in light of today's energy crisis, with falling oil prices and threats of closing the gas tap, TTIP is a strategic asset. If the US can guarantee unrestricted oil and gas exports to the EU, it can lessen its dependence on Russia and promote the search for own (alternative) energy possibilities.

The US meets 80% of its energy use with its own resources. The US natural gas industry began operations in 2016 and quickly spread to the world. In the present situation, 20% of US LNG exports are to Mexico and 19% to South Korea. These countries are followed by China, Japan and Chile. In the near future, the US is expected to become a natural gas exporter and reach ahead of Russia and Saudi Arabia and become the world's largest producer of oil and liquid natural gas. The US aim is to become the largest LNG exporter in the world and the largest supplier in Europe by 2025. The US is currently unable to export natural gas to countries that do not have an FTA with the US. Therefore, the EU will not be able to import energy from the US unless an FTA comes into force. Currently, the EU is dependent on an unpredictable energy supply. The expectation that TTIP would be signed led Russia to renew its agreements with many European customers in favor of customers. However, even if TTIP is signed and US energy exports begin, it may take a long time to complete the appropriate infrastructure. Therefore, TTIP advocates believe that the strong will for TTIP on both sides of the transatlantic will help investors make infrastructure investment decisions today. Yet, not everybody is happy about a considerable energy flow from the US to the EU. In a gas flow, there are parties in the US that will be disturbed by this move that will make EU companies more competitive in the global market. Concerned about the rise in gas prices, US stakeholders, particularly some chemical companies, are lobbying for the reduction of US gas exports.

Moreover, it should be noted here that both sides think differently about clean energy. Clean energy was one of the challenging topics in the TTIP negotiations and caused strong public reactions on the EU side. An urgent call from the mother nature after the rapid ice melt in Greenland showed that mankind should solve its disagreements on climate, energy, water, pollution etc. as soon as possible if it

wants to survive on this planet and it is obvious that this urgent task can only be achieved with multilateral organizations which will try to find global solutions to these problems that no country can handle on its own (Barfod, 2019). Hamilton (2014) compares the relationship between the transatlantic partners to the “dialogue of the deaf”. According to Americans, Europeans' adoption of climate change more than anybody causes them to close their eyes to energy dependence and the need for a clear common energy policy. According to Europeans, Americans are too obsessed with energy independence and therefore ignore the risks of climate change and do not support groundbreaking solutions to energy (Hamilton, 2014). However, these views do not mean that there is a polarization on both sides of the Atlantic. It is clear that it is only an agenda item in which both sides will spend a significant portion of their political energies during and after the negotiation process, and perhaps will have less agreement on compared to other agenda items.

By looking at the motivations of both sides for TTIP, it is clear that the EU is more willing considering the problems within the continent and the Union, let alone the motivation of sustaining the global hegemony, and the multilateralization efforts which basically turned old hostilities in Europe into decades long “Union” around common values and welfare.

2.4 Economic Figures on the Transatlantic Economy

The EU and US markets together account for three-quarters of global financial markets and more than half of the world trade. Considering the economic relations between countries in the world, we can say that no other commercial artery is as integrated as transatlantic trade (Hamilton, 2014). Foreign direct investment between partners is as high as \$ 3.7 trillion and annual EU-US trade in goods and services is around \$ 1 trillion (Puślecki, 2018). If the TTIP had been completed with great ambitions hoped at the beginning of the negotiations, it could surpass the CPTPP economically, which is the largest bilateral trade and investment partnership to date, since the transatlantic bloc accounts for forty-six percent of the global economy, half of global GDP and seventy percent of global FDIs.

TTIP is not an agreement solely for the reduction or abolition of customs duties between partners. This can also be understood by looking at the current tariff rates that it seeks to co-operate beyond. According to WTO data, the average customs duty rate applied by the US to the EU is 2.5%, while the average customs duty rate applied by the EU to the US is 5.2% (Herrman, 2014). Therefore, the further drop will not cause a significant increase in trade. However, as both sides often emphasize, significant benefits can be achieved by eliminating or at least reducing non-tariff measures. For example, according to Stelzer (2013), the EU's tax on chemical products from the US is 1.2%, while non-tariff barriers correspond to a tax rate of 19.1%. Furthermore, Herrman (2014) argues that when we look at the composition of transatlantic trade outside of the non-tariff barriers, it is clear that

TTIP will not provide significant cost advantages to companies since the companies of both sides have been producing with very effective costs and competing with each other for a long time. According to Krugman, a free trade agreement can have significant effects if the markets of the two sides are highly inefficient and they have not competed before (Herrman, 2014). In this context, when looking at TTIP, it is quite appropriate to question the geo political motivations behind TTIP.

When looking at the projections regarding the economic effects, it was calculated that TTIP would not create big growth on both sides. According to a study conducted by the Center for Economic Policy Research funded by The European Commission, the EU is estimated to grow by 119 billion euros per year, the US by 95 billion euros and the rest of the world by 100 billion euros (Kharpal, "US-EU Trade Deal: Rosy Picture, but Long Road Ahead", 2013). Although these figures were quite impressive at first glance, the figures could be realized in the year when TTIP was fully implemented, for example, in 2027 (Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2014). In other words, the EU economy could grow only 0.036% per year for 14 years and this is not a promising figure (Herrman, 2014).

According to an innovative study conducted by Balistreri et al. (2015) using the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and involving foreign multinationals and foreign direct investments in a multiregional framework with imperfect competition, the impact of TTIP on outsiders was calculated as negative for those outside of China. China will not be affected by TTIP. The reason for this is that China's export structure is predominantly specialized in the manufacturing sectors where the EU and the US will not be very strong even after TTIP (Latorre and Yonezawa, 2017). Moreover, Latorre and Yonezawa (2017) find that there is an "Asiatic Pattern" where Japan and India will almost never be affected and Southeast

Asia will be less affected, but despite this, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan African countries will be the most affected, as the export structures with the focus on agriculture, food and mining will be severely damaged. The authors argue that other developed countries and Latin America will also be less affected by TTIP since both the export structures of these countries and the close commercial ties that the Latin American countries have with the US and the other developed countries with the EU and the US minimize the potential negative effects (Latorre and Yonezawa, 2017). The authors analyzed their projections within both the ambitious scenario and the modest scenario options and never reached a conclusion in the form of a zero sum game and in all scenarios, they claim that the world economy will gain (Latorre and Yonezawa, 2017). According to Pauwelyn (2015), in the case of regulatory convergence, it is possible that TTIP will create positive spillovers in many ways in third countries and this will turn TTIP into a kind of public good. For instance, there will be some benefits from the commitments to be made regarding the mechanisms of transparency, the prevention of the non-competitive behavior of the firms and the reduction of subsidies, and these will automatically positively affect all the actors in the world markets as these practices will not only take place between the EU and the US Pauwelyn (2015). According to another interpretation, despite the public reaction to TTIP in the EU, removing the export barriers on energy products will be the biggest gain for the EU.

CHAPTER III

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS FROM 2013 TO 2017

3.1 Dominating the Global Trade

Freund and Ornelas (2010) explain the reasons to sign a RTA in the context of heterogeneity. As a country gets larger, the difference of preferences among citizens grows and national policies become less satisfactory. Regional agreements are thus a way to reap some of the economic benefits of size without surrendering much national sovereignty. (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). In the context of the nature of the EU, member countries have already transferred a significant part of their economic freedom in the joint mechanism of the Union and citizens in various member countries protest against the content and the scale of TTIP by harshly criticizing the EU institutions since the beginning of the official negotiations. As the uncertainty increases during hard times, Naoi and Urata (2013) argue, with or without considering the bad economic conditions, protectionist opposition to the agreements can emerge from two sources of uncertainty. First source emerges regarding the

forthcoming distributional effects of the agreement, which stimulate voters and interest groups about their losses from the agreement; and second, the policy campaigns of the biggest potential losers of the agreement, who are well-organized and resourceful and who can build a protectionist coalition with uncertain losers. (Naoi and Urata, 2013) TTIP was always criticized for its lack of openness and transparency. Public did not have much channel to be informed about the agreements, except the well organized and resourceful potential losers; the media, bureaucracy and politics that politized and biased elites hold to convey their preferences to the public. (Naoi and Urata, 2013) Political leaders face two pressures from their public, first, some interest groups want protection; second, they need voters' approval to be reelected. Thus, they must balance their stance in international agreements between these two pressure sources (Milner, Rosendorff and Mansfield, 2003). RTAs can provide the leaders to be elected for office in competitive political countries. Public would have less tendency to blame leaders, abided by the terms of agreement, for bad economy if the leader previously conducted an agreement to liberalize trade, since voters would view them as competent economic stewards, even during recessions (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). While such agreements provide public a mechanism, a transparent way to monitor their leaders, leaders can overcome their reassurance problem through this mechanism. (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Freund and Ornelas (2010) argue that leaders evaluate the effects of a possible FTA on the average voter, while Baccini and Urperlaine (2014) argue that the median voter prefers economic reform.

A country's regime type and its checks and balances mechanisms play important roles in the decision process. (Mansfield and Milner, 2012) Abovementioned reasons are applicable only to countries that have some degree of democracy thus they are also applicable to the EU and the US. There are different sets of

motivations for autocracies. In autocracies, leaders generally tend to consider protectionist demands from interest groups since RTAs decreases rents that they provide to their supporters (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Furthermore, they do not need to reassure public since there is no competition for office (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Baccini and Urpelainen (2014) give two conditions for democracies that when met, a leader engages into agreement process. According to them, in order to launch the process, a leader must want economic reform. However, there would be a domestic political opposition and the agreement should help her to overcome this opposition (Baccini and Urperlaine, 2014). Based on these conditions, if the leader is reluctant for an economic reform, the process would not take place. However, if she wants, but there is an insignificant opposition, reform can be implemented without an agreement. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, cited in Naoi and Urata, 2013) survey across USA to understand citizens' behavior towards trade policy. They conclude that citizens' opinion is formed through their perception of how trade affects the national economy, rather than their individual well-being (Naoi and Urata, 2013). They call this perception as "socio-tropic" in which a public opinion is formed rather than an individual opinion and it is shaped by the mass media reports on national economy (Naoi and Urata, 2013). Thus, opposition that leaders face in ratifying an agreement is a collective affected opinion that calls for a partisan treatment in order to be changed.

Leaders as well as voters benefit from international trade agreements. However, one of the most significant political reasons and also a political effect of ratifying an agreement is that its ability to decrease tendency of war. Since the end of the world War II, we are witnessing unprecedented alliances between historic enemy states. In the early 20th century, nationalism and conflict were the primary motives among states but after 1945, it was replaced by trade cooperation, not just for economic

gains, but also for political gains. For the EU and the US, TTIP would be a significant step to ensure century long partnership and collaboration considering the transatlantic ties which are not clearly as strong as in the past. An example of a weakening of ties between the US and the EU could be given in the field of finance. The fact that some EU countries have recently joined China's new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite the strong opposition of the US (Griffith et al., 2017) shows that “common interests” on both sides of the transatlantic are not as strong as they were. China wants to create a new global governance system and thus, launched a new multilateral tool; the AIIB (Gu, 2017). Through AIIB, Chinese leaders want to pursue China’s nonintervention policy through financial aid programs and thus announced that the AIIB would not impose conditions on its investment (Peng and Tok, 2016). However, the US is dominating the WB’s lending. Thus, at least in rhetoric, China aims fair governance in multilateral institutions (Peng and Tok, 2016) but the US believes that the reform is only a step towards hegemonic transition (Bustillo and Andoni, 2018). However, according to Bustillo and Andoni (2018), AIIB cannot be considered as a step towards hegemonic transition, since the other MDBs would help and cooperate with AIIB which simply mean that AIIB is only a progress towards a more multilateral financial world order where even Japan and the US finally, reluctantly, agreed to co-operate with the AIIB.

For European perspective, participation in multilateral financial institutions is a way to exercise “soft power” thus, in 2016, EBRD signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and EIB signed a framework for cooperation on environmental challenges with the AIIB (Bustillo and Andoni, 2018). According to Renard (2015), until the creation of AIIB, China was seen as a reformer of the multilateral system, but now, after AIIB and initiatives such as the BRICS-NDB, China is increasingly

being labeled as a ‘soft revisionist’. In the area of trade, the RCEP is an example of how China is determined to create an alternative to the US and EU hegemony. However, it can be said that some Western countries are included in the East-based partnerships and some of the Eastern countries participate in Western-led initiatives, and there are more frictions in the West and the rest than in the past. Xiaotong (2015) states that TTIP poses a risk for China, and as reported by some key Chinese trade officials, it is argued that the RTAs China negotiates may become multilateral. Xiaotong (2015) also argues that the steps to liberalize trade in response to TTIP may mean multilateralization at the end of the day. Hamilton (2014) shows evidence as how RTAs facilitate multilateralism. When China and India realized that the CPTPP would be completed and saw that the EU was negotiating RTAs with their Asian partners, they accepted the WTO trade facilitation agreement. According to Baldwin and Seghezza (2010), regional integration agreements have neither a facilitating effect nor a preventive effect on multilateral liberalization. On the one hand, while reducing the willingness of the partners of the regional trade agreement to make concessions in the multilateral system, on the other hand, they increase the benefits from successful multilateral negotiations for initially uninvolved countries. In particular, the emerging economies could be persuaded to make concessions (Baldwin and Seghezza, 2010). According to Morse and Keohane (2014), TTIP is the biggest challenge the WTO has ever faced, rather than a deal that will facilitate the recent challenges of the WTO. TTIP can be defined as “contested multilateralism” (or counter-multilateralism) due to its goal of determining global rules and standards. According to De Bièvre and Poletti (2016), TTIP is a new form of “competitive regime creation” that challenges the existing corporate status quo of the EU and the US, namely the WTO system. However, the aim is not to replace multilateralism with bilateralism, but to develop an alternative to multilateralism.

Thus TTIP, if succeeded as planned at the beginning, would be a unique agreement that either it might substitute for the WTO's rules and standards setting mechanism or it might help WTO to end disagreements and act fast to facilitate international trade. The current global economy has more than three hundred and twenty active RTAs. These agreements, all of which operate in different rules, resemble what Bhagwati (1995) called a “spaghetti bowl” when they are made into a diagram (Griffith et al., 2017). This complexity may be fatal for businesses because it means high cross border trade costs. This may lead to the realization of international trade below its potential. This is contrary to the WTO’s and RTAs' essential goal of increasing the trade volumes by facilitating international trade rules. The apparent narrative of the CPTPP (the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, formerly known as Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP) and the TTIP participating countries is to solve this spaghetti bowl. Furthermore, in current global relations, companies look for guarantees to do business in other countries. One of these guarantees is the existence of common trade rules in the world. Thus, after the negotiations started, it was hoped by TTIP advocates that TTIP standards would be copied in other parts of the world. Therefore, the EU and the US, at the institutional level at least, both believed that TTIP would be supported by international businesses to a great extent. Although the biggest goal of TTIP was to determine global trade rules, both sides mutually recognized their different trade rules and practices rather than providing a harmonization between them, as De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016) have pointed out. This eliminated the goal of setting common global rules. This also means that the third countries will not feel any pressure or motivation to change their current trade rules and standards to adapt to transatlantic system if TTIP will be successful in the future. As a result, TTIP will not be able to achieve one of its most prominent goals. If TTIP could harmonize domestic policies of the EU and the US, including consumer safety, intellectual property, and investment policy, this agreement would become a global lowest common

denominator and strengthen the hands of these two forces in their relations with the rising powers.

3.2 Sustaining Transatlantic Hegemony

The disruption of TTIP negotiations in 2016 strengthened the perception that the principles of post-World War II and the foundations that support the multilateral institutions have disappeared. One of the reasons for this perception is emerging economies' belief that they will not be able to achieve the highest welfare and growth for themselves by the current economic order imposed by the US and the EU, and that it is their turn to dominate the global order. In this context, "rise of the rest" notion is very strong among emerging economies. Furthermore, the economic and financial crisis that had the worst impact on Europe after the Great Depression of 1929 and the increasing reluctance of the US to police in the critical parts of the world have strengthened the "weakened west" perception in emerging economies (Hamilton and Blockmans, 2015). Even if the US and the EU could not destroy this perception at a time, it was another important reason to start TTIP negotiations to reduce it and to end the recent challenges against international organizations and security agreements, which have been controlled by the US and EU for a long time.

In this context, it was clear that TTIP could serve as a new anchor for transatlantic relations. It could also be seen as a symbol of renewal and challenge for the US and the EU against “weakened west” notions, which have been frequently voiced recently. Although it was unlikely that TTIP would be able to achieve all of its economic and geostrategic ambitions, the EU would achieve its goal of strengthening its ties with the US. There are no other two blocs in the world that are as close as the US and EU in areas such as foreign policy, security and intelligence. Therefore, some authors argue that the strategic importance of TTIP is to complement NATO, and that the transatlantic partnership can overcome the challenges it is facing both in the Pacific and the Middle East. The US' new Asia-Pacific and Middle East policies are not the only reasons for the loss of the old depth of US and EU cooperation. The relations were badly damaged when a political scandal occurred between the EU and the US in 2013 when former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward Snowden reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was monitoring and collecting data from EU citizens and companies, as well as some politicians such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Still EU citizens and companies are not sure that their data is secure when using US based applications or doing business with US-based companies.

3.3 Problems within the Union

A distinct feature of international trade agreements is that it allows governments to circumvent the democratic process and implement the arrangements they want to bring through them. The US and the EU would also benefit from this. From the EU's point of view, the benefit was greater, as TTIP would create a vast maneuvering area in the face of increasing separatist debate and the resistance of civil society. Like all international agreements signed by democratic governments, TTIP would be able to provide the EU administration get what it wants in some areas where it wanted to realize but would never get enough support, as it would be put to public vote with all or nothing proposal. The EU administration's willingness for TTIP was always interpreted differently and thus saw a significant public reaction during the negotiation process. According to anti-TTIP non-governmental organizations and citizens, the EU administration would make a lot of concessions on TTIP and that EU standards on consumer rights, health and environment would decline. Although the EU leaders repeatedly assured them that they would not go below the current standards, the anti-TTIP public was not convinced. According to TTIP supporters, this negative scenario was unlikely to happen, let alone the legal background would not allow doing that, one of the goals that the EU wanted to achieve with TTIP was to spread EU standards that it prides itself on in some areas, such as environmental awareness, consumer rights, the rule of law, and public health. However, according to another comment, the maneuver possibility would be achieved through the non-tariff barriers which were succeeded to be legalized by civil society organizations and the EU citizens as a result of tough struggles in order to protect consumers and the environment. According to De Ville and Siles-Brüge

(2016), if TTIP and the reciprocal recognition of the regulation take place, this will reduce the regulatory stringency on both sides, as ‘is driven by both a philosophy and a discourse that idealize the efficient operation of markets and seek to minimize the constraints imposed by democratic decision-making in public policy.’ The fact that administrations of both sides see non-tariff barriers such as regulation and certifications as red tape that reduces liberal trade, not as rules for environmental and consumer protection, signals that regulations will not be as stringent as before. This justifies the concerns of NGOs and consumers.

Starting from the Obama period, hesitations have been shown about the “Wider Europe” approach in both the US administration and some EU countries and support for this approach has decreased. After the global crisis, enlargement and the absorption of new members became difficult economically and financially. Compared to the early years of the EU, the fact that the new applicants were poorer, and whether these countries, mostly from the Eastern European bloc, were able to fully implement the EU values, also interrupted the enlargement process. Thus, during the negotiation process, according to some, the TTIP was believed to be very useful, especially in order to reduce the increasing separatist movements after the Brexit and to gather support for the EU from large segments. The support to be provided with the growth and employment expected to increase after TTIP would accelerate the completion of the Single Market, which the EU has long wanted to implement. In this sense, TTIP could be an important opportunity not only for the EU but also for EU members and institutions to reestablish their diminishing power in global governance.

After the World War II, Western Europe and the US have positioned themselves as the guardians of the system of international rules. However, it is not a remote

possibility that the rise of new powers and the serious economic, political, and social challenges and domestic reactions that both sides are experiencing may cause these two superpowers to become rule takers, rather than rule makers. From this point of view, it is clear that the partners should act fast to sustain their old dominant positions. The EU made it clear during the negotiation process that its purpose by TTIP was to define global rules. In the Commission's Textual Proposal on the State of the TTIP that leaked to the public in January 2015 stated that;

...the E.U.'s main objective for including SOE (state-owned enterprises)-related disciplines in the TTIP is to develop a joint platform of rules which could be used in other agreements/forums to address concerns raised by the development of state capitalism. (European Commission, 2015)

Thus, the EU, at the institutional level, believed that the rest of the world would not remain indifferent to this massive deal. Moreover, as the former US Vice President Biden said in Munich Security Conference in 2015, the main purpose of TTIP was 'to help shape the character of the global economy'. However, a couple of months later former US President Obama went one step beyond that and said "strong, high-standards trade agreements . . . are vital to establishing rules for the global economy that help our businesses grow and hire." in his statement on Senate Passage of Trade Promotion Authority and Trade Adjustment Assistance.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS FROM 2017 TO PRESENT

In 2016, TTIP negotiations were in a dead end and in 2017, President Donald Trump announced that they had withdrawn from the CPTPP talks and could terminate the TTIP negotiations completely as “he sees the international relations not as sustained international cooperation for mutual benefit but rather as a zero-sum game” (Barfod, 2019). Moreover, considering President Trump’s anti-globalization rhetoric with his systematically pulling the US out of its multilateral commitments in “The Paris climate deal, UN female reproduction programs, the Iran nuclear deal, the UN Global Compact for Migration, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) (dating from 1874), cutting back US aid to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and support to the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine. etc.” are worrying examples for the future of the multilateral system which was heavily dominated by the US and emerged the question whether the EU would fill the multilateral vacuum left by the US (Barfod, 2019). According to Zakaria (2017), ‘Trump appears to be walking away from the idea of America at the center of an open, rule-based international order. This would be a reversal of more than 70 years of U.S. foreign policy’. As some intellectuals believe that the crisis in multilateralism emerged as a consequence of a crisis in transatlantic relations, Smith

(2018) rejects this idea and asserts that there is no connection between changing transatlantic relations and the “contemporary crisis in multilateralism”. According to him, significant disintegrating and fragmenting forces worsen the US-EU relations which are “uncertain, fluid and thus by implication unstable” and an ongoing crisis in multilateralism fuels further crises in multilateral cooperation (Smith, 2018).

Last year President Trump imposed new tariffs for steel and aluminum imported from the EU, and threatened to implement the same for European cars. The EU responded by imposing taxes on US \$ 3 billion imports, including motorcycles, orange juice, bourbon, cigarettes and denim products. In order to ease the tensions, European Commission president Juncker had a meeting with Trump in Washington. The presidents reached to a new deal. According to this deal, the EU would increase the amount of soybeans imported from the US and the partners would start new trade conversations. According to the joint statement, the goal of new trade conversations was to realize “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods”. In January 2019, Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström presented a draft to the EU member states for elimination of tariffs for industrial products and for the conformity assessment. Conformity assessment is the text of the conditions for the sale of any product in the EU and it was prepared with the intention of being next to the text of the agreement during the negotiations of the Commission. The decision taken by the European Council to reopen trade negotiations in April 2019 was not unanimous. France vetoed and Belgium abstained. According to Macron, in a trade agreement it would be unfair for one party to implement strict environmental standards while the other does not. Therefore, France does not approve any trade agreement with the US who withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement. Thus, France vetoed the new trade negotiations,

but it was overruled as the majority voted “yes”. Macron also demanded that TTIP be declared obsolete. However, some EU members prefer the TTIP negotiations to stay on the table as an option. Although France could not stop the opening of the negotiations, it may block the results as unanimity is required for any trade agreement to be valid in the EU. While the EU decided to start trade negotiations, it was also announced that the EU would suspend the negotiations if President Trump did not withdraw the tariffs on steel and aluminum or imposed new taxes.

The EU Commission wants to keep the scope of the new trade agreement simple to avoid the reactions and discussions that took place during TTIP negotiations. Therefore, the main objective is the abolition of customs duties on industrial goods, which will provide almost equal gains to both sides, and no negotiations with the agricultural and construction standards. Compared to the large and broad objectives of TTIP and the possibility of influencing the world economy and politics, the new agreement remains very narrow. The EU's agricultural sector is not a matter of negotiation in the renewed trade negotiations, and it does not compromise its high standards. However, in order to close the \$ 150 billion trade deficit with the EU, the US insists that the agricultural sector be included in the agreement and continues to threaten to impose high taxes. Another development delaying the realization of the new trade agreement is the US's current priority to sign a trade agreement with China. The fact that most of the US negotiators focused on the agreement with China raises a capacity problem for the new trade agreement between the EU and the US. All these developments lead to comments that the realization of a possible trade agreement is still a distant possibility, although not as much as TTIP. The EU is highly protective of its agricultural sector, which it has intensively subsidized but the US wants to eliminate customs duties in this sector and sell its own agricultural products to Europe. This has become a very sensitive issue in Europe. With the

opening of the gates to the US, the concern is that genetically modified products and chlorine-washed chickens will enter the EU market, and these are two of the areas where the most public reaction was taken during the TTIP negotiations. It seems that the only way for the US to sign a trade agreement with the EU is to include the agriculture sector in this agreement. However, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stated that they agreed that there would be an agreement on the removal of taxes only on “non-auto industrial goods.

There is no trust and sympathy among the EU elites for Trump. In a speech, Guy Verhofstadt, the EU Parliaments Brexit negotiator and the former Prime Minister of Belgium, stated that Europe was receiving threats from three fronts, two of which, as much mentioned before, were Islamic radicalism and Russian revanchism (Breitbart News, 2017). The third had just emerged, and this was the American President Trump (Breitbart News, 2017). Trump recently called the EU a "brutal trading partner" and Bernd Lange, the chair of the European Parliament's trade committee, said the new talks were merely a charade to reduce transatlantic tension and prevent Trump from impose high taxes on automobile imports (Burchard, 2019). In April 2019, the Trump administration stated that tax could be imposed on aircraft subsidies of \$ 11 billion from the EU, and a customs duty of up to 25% on European car imports ("US proposes tariffs on \$11bn of EU products", 2019). The EU has announced that for now, they would seek to retaliate stated that new taxes could be applied to \$ 20 billion of US imports in response to US threats (Blenkinsop, "Exclusive: EU tariffs to target 20 billion euros of U.S. imports", 2019). The tensions between the partners are deteriorating the economic ties and concerning the businesses in the vast transatlantic market. President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi said at the meeting of the Council of Europe in April 2019 that the possibility of a recession in the EU is still low, but warned leaders for

economic uncertainty (Ewing, 2019). He stated that the reason was the slowdown in international trade due to tension between the US and the EU. Along with the increasing tax burden on consumers in the EU, the future investment and production plans for the producers in the EU has become blurry and pessimistic which is always a setback for the economic growth.

4.1 Dominating the Global Trade

TTIP has been frozen since the President Trump taking office. He never officially mentioned ending TTIP, but after taking the office, the US withdrew from CPTPP talks and President Trump has questioned the NAFTA. His anti-globalist approach to the trade agreements froze the TTIP talks as EU trade commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom stated in 2016 after Donald Trump was elected as the President (Blenkinsop, "U.S. trade talks in deep freeze after Trump win, says EU", 2016). The TTIP negotiations have been completely abandoned, and all proposals made by Brussels to the US are narrower than TTIP. The EU's negotiation mandate specifies that "The negotiating directives for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership must be considered obsolete and no longer relevant." (Deha, "EU Open Renegotiates Trade Tariff with US", 2019). However, as the geo-political motivations to negotiate such a massive deal are rooted from decades-long alliance and stay still alive around the joint goal of raising the "West" again, the partners

will find a way to repair the recent damage on transatlantic alliance and then restart TTIP negotiations in the future. If the transatlantic bond is not further strengthened and the TTIP is completely abolished in the future, it will be easier for the rising powers to challenge the current global order as they currently challenging by international cooperations such as BRICS and institutions such as AIIB. This possibility that the rising powers would challenge the current global order was seen as a chaotic result at the very beginning by TTIP parties, thus during the Obama period, the steps were fast, but the Trump administration had a different opinion on globalization than the previous government.

In a UN meeting in 2018, Trump declared that the US now rejects the globalization doctrine ("US President Trump rejects globalism in speech to UN General Assembly's annual debate | UN News", 2018). Thus, current introverted policies of the US and the punitive actions of Trump administration to global trade may harm the ongoing globalization process which was once initiated by the US. According to globalization supporters, globalization cannot survive without global rules. The best way to improve these rules in the current circumstances is a multilateral agreement, but this is currently unlikely. Therefore, a large-scale bilateral agreement like TTIP is the second best option. Even if Doha Round was successful, it was not able to decide on all issues and therefore could not solve the economic issues that were critical to the EU and the US. TTIP could have been a pioneering effort to extend the multilateral system to new areas and new members (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). However, one of the weaknesses of the agreement was always seen as its lack of openness. This weakness raised doubts as to whether a global alignment would be achieved on the target scale. From the very beginning, TTIP could be used as common ground for other global powers but the nature and the *raison d'être* of TTIP was to strengthen the transatlantic bond of the EU and the US as well as

sustaining the domination of transatlantic hegemony. Thus, the openness of TTIP would mean abandoning these goals and turning TTIP into a multilateral platform where the EU and the US would have to struggle for their interests as they already do in WTO.

TTIP's realization of global standard setting target was unlikely due to, at one hand, the slowness and unwillingness of both the EU and the US towards the regulatory harmonization, some part of which was caused by the negative reactions at home, and at the other hand, some emerging economies', such as BRICs', wisely use of their economic power to challenge the status quo. According to De Ville and Siles-Brugge (2016), it was not realistic to be economically one hundred and twenty billion euros better off after TTIP, as claimed by the European Commission, and that the figures were too optimistic. The authors claim that at one point, the Commission gave up the economic numbers as the justification of TTIP and put the geopolitical justification into the foreground in the official narrative. The authors find the US and the EU's goal of being "global standard setters" also optimistic, and TTIP's ability to achieve such a goal would be possible through regulatory harmonization, and that such a harmonization was the least plausible scenario. The reasons for that are the previous transatlantic cooperation and the current institutional constraints. However, in the case of "mutual recognition" or "conformity testing", which are the other methods for regulatory convergence, they argue that it will not be possible or will be too difficult for TTIP to determine global standards.

Looking at the current global trade system, the weight of the RTAs, which regulate more than fifty percent of world trade, will increase even further, given that the Doha Round has been on hold for a long time. Moreover, the mega regional trade

agreements will become even more important in the following years. CPTPP, which currently has eleven member countries including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, covers 13.5% of the global economy and RCEP consisting of ten Asian countries including Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam; and their six FTA partners including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, covering 30% of the world GDP, are as important as TTIP and are ambitious regional integration efforts in setting trade standards. Another RTA, the Trade Agreement in Services (Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) negotiated between the EU and India since 2007; TISA, which is currently negotiated by twenty three WTO members, including the EU, and covers nearly 70% of the world trade in services (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). These agreements and all other deep integration agreements increase efficiency in all aspects of the modern economy, such as investment, environment, climate, animal welfare and privacy, where multilateral negotiations are inadequate, superficial or slow.

Moreover, the fact that the transatlantic economy is currently the world's largest economy can soon be history. China's share of global trade will surpass the sum of all transatlantic trade and China will be the largest trading power in the world alone (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). Thus, since the beginning of his term in office, President Trump has consistently criticized China and launched a trade war by identifying it as a big problem for the American economy ("A quick guide to the US-China trade war", 2019). Although the US is still the largest export partner of the EU, its share in the last few years has decreased from 27 % to 20 % and in the same period, China's share in EU exports almost doubled (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). In EU imports, the US is now in third place and in the long term, it is

calculated that the transatlantic economy will shrink further (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). Looking at the 2050 estimates, if the current order continues and the US and EU do not make a significant commercial maneuver, the Chinese economy will be equal to the total transatlantic economy, and other emerging economies will become more integrated into the global economy (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). Moreover, according to Hamilton and Pelkmans (2015), it is estimated that by 2050 the world population will increase by four billion, ie the global market will expand to four billion people and as time goes by, it is becoming more and more difficult for the West to maintain high standards for consumer, environment and health, and to spread the rules of liberal order. Therefore, in the Obama period, considering the current economic difficulties of the West and the rising powers, it was seen necessary for the future to make a plan and act together on both sides of the transatlantic. The TTIP talks were accelerated in Obama administration considering if the action was not taken as soon as possible, the possibility of such a great cooperation for the partners would not be born again.

4.2 Sustaining Transatlantic Hegemony

According to Ikenberry (2011), the idea that western liberal democracy is on the rise is challenged by several developments such as “the rise of alternative models of state capitalism; reluctance by emerging powers that are also democracies, such as

Brazil and India, to associate themselves fully with the West; and the turmoil that has followed the initial promise of the Arab Awakening.” Therefore, it is increasingly challenging for the US and the EU to set the rules alone and to benefit from global economy as they used to. It seems thus essential for them to establish an effective partnership.

Another problematic issue in efforts to establish an effective transatlantic partnership in short term is the nuclear accord signed with Iran in 2015. The unilateral withdrawal of the US from the P5 + 1 accord created a new crack in transatlantic relations. In 2018, President Trump declared sanctions on the grounds that Iran failed to comply with the provisions of the nuclear agreement (Landler, "Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned", 2018). Although some EU countries have supported the US decision, the EU administration opposes these sanctions by arguing that Iran is in compliance with the provisions of the agreement and declared that they will continue to fulfill the obligations of the agreement and continued to trade with Iran since these sanctions had affected the European companies quite badly. However, it is not possible to make payments using the US dollar through SWIFT within the global financial system dominated by the US. Therefore, in order to avoid being subjected to US sanctions, representatives of France, Germany and the UK and representatives of Russia and China came together with the representative of Iran on 28 June 2019 in Vienna under the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in a meeting ("Chair's statement following the 28 June 2019 meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", 2019). In this meeting, it was reported that the new private electronic messaging and payment channel INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges), which is independent of the USA, was put into operation and the first commercial transactions were made through this

channel ("Chair's statement following the 28 June 2019 meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", 2019). This step means the EU's financial and commercial rebellion against the US and shows that the EU is now free from the influence of the US in its commercial and financial external relations. On the one hand, the EU is confronted with the US on economic sanctions imposed on Iran, but on the other hand the EU is very uncomfortable with Iran's ballistic missile attempts since the EU is concerned that Iran's ballistic missile capabilities will serve nuclear purposes and requires it to be restricted ("Don't Allow Missile Programme Concerns, United States Pull-out to Erase Benefits of Iran Nuclear Deal, Political Affairs Official Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases", 2018). At the end of 2018, with the support of the US, it brought the issue to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to stop Iran's ballistic missile program, however, Russia vetoed the application and prevented a decision against Iran (Brzozowski, "EU condemns Iran's missile launches, 'hostile' activities", 2019).

For Syria policy, it is clear that with President Trump's announcement that the US will withdraw its troops from the region, The US does not want to map Syria's future and leaving the scene to Russia, Iran and Turkey ("Transatlantic Security Cooperation Toward 2020", 2019). However, Syrian policy within Europe is not clear. It is clear that European countries do not want US to retreat yet. Countries such as Germany, France and UK are insisting on the UN-led Geneva process which envisions a political transition in Syria, but it is not very clear what kind of a political transition they want (Samaha, "Europe's Syria quagmire", 2019). On the other hand, countries whose agendas are somewhat dominated by nationalist domestic policies such as Italy, Hungary and Poland want Europe to get along with

Assad again to solve the increasing refugee problem (Samaha, "Europe's Syria quagmire", 2019).

The EU's rhetoric for Syria was that there should be no intervention from outside and that Assad should withdraw from the administration so that Syrian regime should be democratized. Moreover, the fundamental issue that shaped the EU's Syrian policy was the emergence of DAESH and its attacks in countries such as France, Belgium, Germany and England (Engel, "This map shows ISIS expanding reach across Europe", 2015). EU's primary goal has been to prevent refugees from entering Europe. EU's passive Syrian policy can be attributed to one of the weak aspects of European integration which is the common security and foreign policy. The EU has no army and is therefore completely dependent on NATO and the US. Their presence in Syria depends on the operational capacities of member countries and thus to determine a common policy on security and foreign policy is not as effective as in other areas. However, it is easier and more effective to determine a policy on the refugee issue.

For almost two decades, power wars are moving within the framework of large scale trade agreements. Currently, there are six large scale agreements that will greatly affect the global economy. These are; the TTIP, currently frozen, between the US and the EU, CPTPP, currently in force between Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), signed by the EU with Japan, which entered into force in February 2019, Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) negotiated between the EU and India since 2007; TISA, which is currently being negotiated by twenty three WTO members including the EU and covering 70% of the world's trade in services (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015), and the

possible US-China agreement, which began last year as a result of President Trump's announcement of a trade war against China. President Trump wanted to terminate this agreement with a formal agreement before the midterm elections but the tension between China and the US is still escalating. The US is currently imposing 25% tax on US\$250 billion worth of goods from China and in August President Trump announced that the tax rate will be raised to 30%, every remaining Chinese import will have 15% tariffs levied on them instead of 10% as previously planned and he would order US companies to exit China ("Timeline: Key dates in the US-China trade war", 2019). Before these harsh sanctions of the US, China had announced that it would impose additional retaliatory tariffs against about US\$75 billion worth of US goods ("Timeline: Key dates in the US-China trade war", 2019). However, China's Vice-Premier Liu requested that planned increase in tariffs from 25% to 30% on US\$250 billion of Chinese goods be delayed to avoid escalating trade tensions ahead China's National Day on October 1, which is also the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and President Trump agreed to delay the tariff increase till October 15, still before expected high level trade talks in Washington in late October (Wang, "China welcomes Donald Trump's 'goodwill' act of postponing tariff increase", 2019).

When we look at these agreements and negotiations currently or formerly led by the US and the EU, it seems that the partners have abandoned the multilateralism they have defended since the World War II, and they follow the new global order (Hamilton and Blockmans, 2015), in Bhagwati's spaghetti bowl. The expected results from all regional integration efforts of the US and the EU are to determine the new geo-economic boundaries, to balance the positions of emerging economies in the new order and to stop China's rapid progress. However, in the essence of the EU, there is the subjection of interstate relations to the rule of law, therefore it is

only natural for the EU to advocate and practice multilateralism (Krishnamurthy, 2018).

China has been accused of not supporting collective actions taken by other countries such as United Nations peacekeeping actions, aiding impoverished countries, and global arms control initiatives along with international environmental cooperation (Kennedy, 2015). Thus, China has been seen as benefiting greatly from the open global economy until recently and as the free-rider of the multilateral system. Moreover, with the acceleration of recent large scale trade negotiations, the country has begun to signal its readiness to open its economy more than ever before. China's attempt to use its great economic power to dominate other areas, for example, to increase its military presence in the South China Sea, or to strengthen its own companies by keeping the currency's value low in order to increase its political power has been seen as a major problem for the West from the beginning. Therefore, the fact that China had asked to participate in the TISA talks (Donnan, "China in push to join US-led \$4tn services trade talks", 2013), had made concessions for an agreement to end the trade war with the US and wanted to accelerate the negotiations with the EU since 2013 has been well received by the West. However, both the US and the EU need greater evidence regarding further expanding China's economy to the global economy, ie, further subordinating the rules of the international liberal order as planned by the partners. According to Hamilton and Blockmans (2015), when you look at the current trade policies of the US and the EU from this perspective, the more integrated, united and interconnected the international liberal order shaped by the partners is, the more in tune the rising economies will be with this order and its rules and if the US and the EU want to maintain the "West and the rest" rhetoric and want to exclude China from existing trade talks, there may be major threats to the global system.

In history, there are examples that trade wars can turn into real wars. Although according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the largest economic benefit from the US-China trade war is for the EU ("Trade Wars: The Pain and the Gain", 2019), the EU administration worries about a further move to advance this trade battle since the negative macroeconomic impacts of the US and China trade war may adversely affect all companies in the West, including EU companies. Recently, US President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping of China held a meeting at the G20 held in June in Osaka and decided to resume the trade talks they suspended "for the time being" as President Trump said in a press conference ("G20 summit: Trump and Xi agree to restart US-China trade talks", 2019). In addition, as a significant concession, the trade ban applied to the Chinese technology company Huawei in May 2019, was announced to be terminated and US technology companies could trade with Huawei again and trade ban has not been lifted yet (Grabham, "What does Huawei's trade ban mean for your Huawei or Honor phone?", 2019). Furthermore, the fact that increase in tariffs from 25 per cent to 30 per cent on US\$250 billion of Chinese goods will be delayed to avoid escalating trade tensions till October 15 and there will be high level trade talks in Washington in late October ("Timeline: Key dates in the US-China trade war", 2019) will alleviate the concerns for some time that trade wars will undermine global growth, for example the Fitch Rating Agency warned recently that the U.S.' new tariffs on Chinese \$300 billion worth of imports will shrink global output in 2020 by nearly 0.4 percentage points ("US-China Trade War Escalation Could Knock 0.4pp Off World GDP by 2020", 2019). Despite the new truce between two rivals, the financial circles do not seem to be very positive about the timeline or the results of the Chinese-US trade talks. According to Dumenil and Levy (2011), the neoliberalism is in a crisis and new policies and adjustments are required in the wake of the "great contraction" period. The success is depended on

US upper classes' capability to perform the necessary adjustment and China's willingness to collaborate (Dumenil and Levy, 2011).

The US shows a great deal of interest and gives priority to Asia, and it has opened a trade war against China. For some, the biggest factor in this is the fear that emerging economies will benefit from the environment of instability created by the decline in the global power of the US. More importantly, the fact that economic power and disruptive technologies are no longer only under the command of the West and have spread to emerging economies have led to significant increases in military capabilities and expenditures of these countries. The EU and the US are concerned that this new situation will be used not only to terminate their hegemonies in the global economy, but also to end the institutions that they pioneered after World War II and still try to dominate. However, according to Strange and Worth (2012), "the relative decline of the US as the dominant state power does not necessarily signal the decline of neoliberalism as a broader power matrix in the contemporary political economy." For transatlantic relations, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to re-attract the US into the TTIP negotiation schedule in the short or medium term, particularly due to new economic centers in Asia. However, it is also possible that the US may return to the reaffirmation of transatlanticism with a policy change after the trade agreement with China, which is hoped by President Trump to be signed in a short time and is expected to complete the current trade war (Kimberley, "Trump knows ending the trade war will help him win in 2020", 2019). Nevertheless, there is no indication of a policy change towards transatlanticism by President Trump yet. The fact that transatlantic relations have deteriorated in recent years and that the old partners have been distanced from each other has strengthened the belief of TTIP supporters that relations should be renewed and nurtured and that EU-US ties will settle in a new perspective with the

signing of the agreement. If, in upcoming years, TTIP is accepted and signed as originally planned, it will be a very ambitious and global agreement. This could lead to the strongest transatlantic cooperation in the post-World War II era as the “second anchor” after NATO, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said.

According to Simon (2017), the current power in Europe has now shifted to Germany and Russia, away from the US. In addition to the reluctance of the US for the security and stability of Europe, as Simon (2017) correctly states, Germany and Russia do not have sufficient power in this regard. As a result, there is now a lack of leadership in Europe. Although Germany and Russia have the power to dominate some parts of the continent, they are insufficient to establish hegemony throughout the continent. While Germany is active in Western and Central Europe, it is insufficient in terms of the dynamics of the Mediterranean and Balkan Peninsula. It is clear that Russia is increasing its influence in Eastern Europe but, it is very difficult for it to affect Western Europe. The US is active in every corner of Europe. Simon (2017) argues that many Europeans have accepted the US leadership since the post-Cold War era, and that this was developed as a counter-balance to the more invading German and Russian leadership. As a leader for the EU, the US has left great space for the EU to act autonomously, while at the same time ensuring stability from a distance. In this context, the Anglo-American motto is dominance and not power distribution. The author also states that this power distribution has a number of contradictions. For example, the US does not leave the continent even if it reduces its ties with it.

Even though Germany is now the leading country in Europe politically and economically, it avoids the use of force and the constraints in EU institutions and

processes prevent Germany from showing its full power. Russia, on the other hand, has invaded the Crimea and increased its presence in Ukraine and Syria, but has many social and economic weaknesses. All these contradictions show that a single country on the continent does not have undisputed power (Simon, 2017). Considering Simon's comments, it can be concluded that the EU has so far been able to live within the limits of the US, and that its stability and peace will be compromised if deprived of the US' non-interventionist leadership. Particularly after the World War II, the US gave the EU the opportunity to maintain and spread European values in areas such as the rule of law, equality before the law and personal freedoms, and served as a balancing and protective leader against the Soviet threat. Thus, if the US abandons the guardianship of the continent, it will be inevitable that Europe will have an unstable and insecure environment and the Russian threat will become more evident. As a result, it was quite understandable why the EU, at the institutional level at least, wanted to sign TTIP in its broadest scope as soon as possible and to re-establish its weakened ties with the US on a solid and long-term basis. However, we cannot ignore the difficulties the US economy experienced after 2008 crisis, the fact that Europe's confidence in the US has diminished considerably and that this distrust remains after the NSA and Facebook scandals, the US' inability to leverage the emerging economies as much as before, rising nationalist parties and anti-American reactions within the EU, and finally the differences of opinion of both sides on the Middle East. It is highly doubtful that the EU needs US leadership as much as it used to, or if the US is eager for that position again, that the EU will accept it again, and determine its policies according to the rules of US hegemony.

4.3 Problems within the Union

The fact that Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014 and attacked the territorial integrity of Ukraine, one of the largest countries in Europe, created a great reaction and anger in the West. This has initiated sanctions against Russia over the last five years and non-recognition policies for the Crimea. The main reason for the reactions of the annexation of Crimea is the collapse of the assumption that the European continent is whole, safe and free and that it will always be. The invasion of Crimea is a violation of many international treaties by Russia. Russia made commitments to the Council of Europe in the Budapest Treaty of 1994 to respect and protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Hamilton, 2014). In addition, in the 2002 NATO-Russia Rome Declaration, Putin made commitments on behalf of Russia with stating that;

... to 'observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security', and to affirm the basic principles set forth in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, to 'creat[e] in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence', and to show 'respect for [the] sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security'(Hamilton, 2014).

In an op-ed published in the Guardian in February 2019, the open support of some western countries to Ukraine and their reactions to Russia were published. In this article, the foreign ministers of eleven countries stated that the West should not

leave Ukraine to its fate, “Providing help and assistance to Ukraine is crucial as Ukraine’s security is linked to the security of the whole of Europe “(Hunt & Klimkin, "The west must not abandon Crimea and Ukraine to Russian aggression | Jeremy Hunt, Pavlo Klimkin and nine other foreign ministers", 2019). European Council President Donald Tusk, in his speech to the Ukrainian Parliament in February 2019, stated that “there is no Europe without Ukraine.” and the EU would never recognize the Russian invasion of Crimea and that it would continue its sanctions against Moscow ("Tusk: No Europe without Ukraine (Video)", 2019).

Problems within the EU are not limited with the Russia’s aggressive attitude against the continent. The lack of diversification in energy sources are another concern for both the EU and the US. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline, at the heart of the EU's Energy Union initiative, is an essential part of the EU's energy expansion plan. According to the EU, this pipeline will ensure a unity of energy within the framework of stable and free market principles (Długosz & Jakubik, "Brussels and Nord Stream 2. Intergovernmental agreement – the way out of a deadlock?", 2017). The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is currently being constructed along a route from Russia to Germany along the Baltic Sea. The first pipeline, Nord Stream, was completed in 2011. Nord Stream, which spans 1222 kilometers, is the longest submarine pipeline in the world and has an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of liquid natural gas ("GAS PIPELINE: Nord Stream"). Nord Stream 2 will double this capacity by the end of 2019 if completed (Pallardy, "Stakeholders confident in Nord Stream 2's year-end deadline", 2019). The construction of the line is blocked at EU level. The Eastern European countries led by Poland have created a blocking majority, claiming that with the support of Washington, this pipeline will make the EU's energy independence open to Russian intervention (McBride, "Nord Stream 2: Is Germany 'Captive' to Russian Energy?", 2018). Countries that move

along with Germany, such as Finland, and Sweden, claim that this line will improve Europe's energy security because there will be no possible interruptions created by unstable, problematic routes (Sherman & Wettengel, "Gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 links Germany to Russia, but splits Europe", 2018) such as Ukraine. An example of possible interruptions is Russia's stopping of gas flow through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 due to problems with Ukraine (Kirby, "Russia's gas fight with Ukraine", 2014).

The EU's dependence on Russian gas has always raised controversy among transatlantic circles, especially in the US administration. Between 2016 and 2017, gas exports from Russia to Europe increased by 5% (Gazprom, "Delivery statistics"). As of 2017, 37% of Europe's natural gas needs are supplied from Russia ("Russian share of European gas market to keep growing", 2019). With Nord Stream 2 pipeline, this rate will increase much more, making it almost impossible for Europe to take a political and military stance against Russia in the event of any possible disagreements. The US has been criticizing Germany's new pipeline agreement with Russia from the beginning. In 2018, President Trump, during a breakfast with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, said "We're supposed to protect you from Russia, but Germany is making pipeline deals with Russia. You tell me if that's appropriate. Explain that." and he implicitly threatened that they would not protect Europe against the Russian threat if Germany did not give up the Nord Stream 2 agreement (Keating, "Trump To Europe: Drop Nord Stream Or We Won't Protect You From Russia", 2018). In this context, German companies such as Uniper, Wintershall, Engie, OMV, and Shell, working with Gazprom in the construction of Nord Stream 2, were threatened by the US administration that sanctions could be imposed (Detrick, "U.S. Threatens to Sanction German Firms Constructing Russian Gas Pipeline", 2019). The American Ambassador to

Germany, Richard Grenell sent a letter to these companies warning them that they could be sanctioned under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Detrick, "U.S. Threatens to Sanction German Firms Constructing Russian Gas Pipeline", 2019). One of the reasons for this is to prevent the increase of Europe's dependence on Russia, and more importantly, it wants Europe to buy most of its liquid gas from the US because the US has become one of the biggest exporters of liquid gas in recent years. Therefore, the prevention of Nord Stream 2 is based on a highly strategic motivation for the US, driven by the desire to control the European market.

Despite the sanctions and the threats from the US Government, The US does not want to supply all of the energy needs of the EU market, but it wants to control it. President Obama, one of the biggest supporters of the TTIP, once stated that the EU should not rely solely on the US for energy problems (Emmott & Strupczewski, "Obama tells EU to do more to cut reliance on Russian gas", 2014). However, the EU does not currently pursue such a policy. The basic plan of the EU is to increase energy security by diversifying the energy supply. Russia has no desire to meet all EU gas needs. Gazprom Vice President Alexander Medvedev, who participated in the Russian-German raw material conference, held in Potsdam in November 2018, said, "We in Russia are ready to supply as much gas as Europe needs. And we do not aim to claim 100 percent of this additional import. There is a place for supplies of US LNG, as well as of other gas from other sources if it appears" ("Gazprom Sees Place for Both Russian Gas, US LNG in Europe - Deputy Chairman", 2018) and thus stated that the US has a place in gas imports of the EU as well.

Within the scope of the "Energy Union", the European Commission has announced that it will increase the steps to reduce dependence on Russia, the largest gas

exporter. Germany is working on the possibility of building two additional terminals on the North Sea coast in which they can import LNG from the US in order to eliminate the high-dose criticism it receives. The US administration sees the possibility that the EU will reduce its demand for Russian gas after the Crimean crisis as a psychological weapon that can be used against Russia. In this regard, John Boehner, the speaker of the House of Representatives, urged the American government to liberalize its natural energy. However, the fact that Putin did not impose a restriction on energy exports to the EU despite all the problems and the uncertainty of the TTIP or another possible FTA negotiation make it uncertain when US energy will be the main EU energy imports. Since the Crimean intervention of 2014, the EU and the US have imposed economic sanctions on Russia, which have negative impacts on the entire Russian economy. Among these sanctions, five of the six largest Russian banks were prevented from borrowing medium and long-term loans from Europe. The US has restricted Russia's technology exports to oil production and rock oil off the Arctic coast. Boeing and United Technologies began stocking titanium, as Russia is the largest producer of this rare metal. In response to all EU and US economic sanctions, Russia has banned food imports from the US and Europe, but has not imposed a limit on gas, although it supplies almost half of Europe's gas needs (Amadeo, "How Ukraine's Crisis Threatens the EU", 2019). After the sanctions of the US and EU, foreign direct investments to Russia decreased by \$ 75 billion and this equates to almost four percent of Russia's GNP (Amadeo, "How Ukraine's Crisis Threatens the EU", 2019). The stock market fell by twenty percent and the national currency Ruble depreciated by fifty percent (Amadeo, "How Ukraine's Crisis Threatens the EU", 2019). Sanctions caused a recession in Russia. Although the Ukrainian crisis has increased Putin's falling popularity to 80% in Russia, the economy has shrunk considerably (Amadeo, "How Ukraine's Crisis Threatens the EU", 2019).

The EU side and the civil society groups are not sure whether there will be a renegotiation of TTIP. However, in an interview with Bloomberg in March 2018, the US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross stated “He terminated the trans-Pacific deal; he didn’t terminate TTIP. That was meant quite deliberately and quite overtly as a message that we’re open to discussions with the European Commission” signaling that the US could still sit at the table for a trade agreement with the EU (Bravo and Chatterley, 2018). However, almost a year has passed since President Trump and EU Commission President Juncker's joint statement ("Joint EU-U.S. Statement following President Juncker’s visit to the White House", 2018) for a new and narrow agreement and there is no significant progress. Moreover, given the US presidential elections and the fact that Donald Trump has shaped his election campaign around trade wars, it is doubtful that there will be any real progress in the near future.

France argues that the condition of the US to include agricultural products in a possible trade agreement should never be accepted, and that no agreement should be made unless the US sign the Paris Climate Agreement. Germany, on the other hand, is concerned about the possible harm that President Trump’s new tariffs will create in the automobile sector, not the agriculture. If there is a group within the EU that insists on maintaining friendship with the US, despite the hostile statements from President Trump incompatible with long-term transatlantic partnership, they are German carmakers and Germany is currently the most influential country in determining EU policies and directions. According to a survey conducted by the German Commerzbank with 2000 German companies, China is considered the most reliable commercial partner of Germany (Yu, "China more reliable than US as trading partner, say German firms", 2019). According to the survey report, the credibility of the US has been severely damaged by the policies seen as the

manifestation of protectionism after Trump became the President. The report also states that about 70% of German firms physically located in the US are very worried about the latest developments, some of which are considering moving their production facility outside the US, and one of the possible locations is China (Yu, "China more reliable than US as trading partner, say German firms", 2019). Another current trade dispute between the EU and the US is the issue of subsidies given to American Boeing and European Airbus brands, which they have been fighting over for fourteen years. According to the decision of the WTO dated May 2018, the subsidies given by the EU to Airbus caused damage on Boeing in the world market and thus on the US (Swanson, "U.S. Readies \$11 Billion in Tariffs on E.U.", 2019). In return, the US aims to retaliate by introducing new tariffs on \$ 11 billion worth of European product and the EU side then made a statement that they had prepared an American tariff list in response to the subsidies that the US had given to Boeing (Swanson, "U.S. Readies \$11 Billion in Tariffs on E.U.", 2019). The subsidy dispute between the partners escalated the tariff war and decreased the possibility to sign a narrow trade agreement despite the joint statement made by two sides in 2018.

Although the EU side was determined to achieve some results in trade relations until October 2019, when the new Commission will be chosen, and the US administration until November 2018, when the midterm elections were held, the conditions that change almost daily did not allow even the narrow scope trade agreement option the partners found instead of the TTIP. In May 2019, after a meeting with the US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, Cecilia Malmström stated that "I don't think the U.S. is ready to start on the tariff negotiations" and signaled that a negotiation process will not take place soon between the parties (Horobin, "EU Says U.S., Focusing on China, Not Ready for Trade Talks",

2019). President Trump has also set a 180-day deadline for the negotiations he planned to hold with the EU and Japan and put the parties under pressure to agree to his own conditions (Leonard & Donnan, "Trump Delays EU, Japan Auto Tariffs for 180 Days for Talks", 2019). During his last trip to Japan, President Trump demanded that trade agreements with the EU and Japan be completed before the 2020 Presidential elections (Leonard & Donnan, "Trump Delays EU, Japan Auto Tariffs for 180 Days for Talks", 2019). This shows that the tension in transatlantic relations will not decrease soon.

However, despite all its negative attitudes and discourses, the US government disagrees with the EU's view that their relations with the EU are currently bad. When US Vice President Pompeo was asked why President Trump described the EU as a "foe", he tried to alleviate President's discourse by saying "I think what President Trump meant there was that there are places where we think the US economy has not been treated fairly" ("Mike Pompeo: the US "has not been treated fairly" by Europe", 2019). In addition, when decades old partnership is believed to have come to the point of breakdown, he gave a kind of assurance that the US-EU friendship and partnership is still going on by stating;

There are all kinds of things where we might have a moment where we don't share a common path forward. But it's always the case that our shared value sets our shared understandings of the world, our perceptions of common threats to democracy and freedom and liberty around the world. Those always prevail and they will here again too ("Mike Pompeo: the US "has not been treated fairly" by Europe", 2019).

However, the EU side, at the institutional level started to show some signals that the EU is not that much willing to bond the ties as it used to be. Merkel's statement that

they should take their destiny into their own hands ("Merkel: Europe must take fate in hands", 2017) can be seen as a clear sign that the EU is now looking for alternative policies to attain its goals without a strategic partnership with the US but it is also possible that Merkel's new discourse may have rhetoric of election in response to the expectation that Eurosceptics will increase the number of seats and become a blocking power in the upcoming European Parliament elections. In the Parliament elections held in May 2019, the European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) parties lost their majorities, while pro-EU parties such as the liberal party (ALDE) and the Greens won new seats ("European Election 2019: Results in maps and charts", 2019). However, Eurosceptic parties such as ECR, EFDD and ENF also increased the number of seats ("European Election 2019: Results in maps and charts", 2019). The EU parliament has become quite fragmented. This change will have an impact on the EU's trade policies as the parliament gives the approval to any FTA together with the Council. However, this fractured structure of parliament and the increasing number of Eurosceptics that are not warm about the FTAs may have made the approval of highly politicized agreements such as TTIP almost impossible. It is also possible that other powerful actors, including the US, will try to exploit the recent fragmentation of the EU and the confusion of members' separatist ideas on foreign policy and security. The first step for the EU is therefore to engage in power wars by striving for the continuation of unity and redefining common interests and policies.

After Trump became the President of the US in 2017, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have disagreed on many issues, such as Iran' nuclear power, trade and climate change, and the EU's common policy development process has slowed down considerably. The fact that Trump has seen Germany as one of its worst allies, especially because of the large trade deficit with Germany, its low level of

defense spending, and its commitment to transport the Russian gas into Europe via the Nord Stream 2 line, has affected the transatlantic relations very badly. In this sense, President Trump does not see the EU as a reliable partner but sees it as his rival and demonstrates his hostile attitude, which he shows towards the US' biggest rivals, towards the EU as well. Along with decades of friendship, the EU and the US occasionally acted as rivals, but almost always took a common stand on critical issues and EU security issues. With the Trump era, the US has moved away from multilateral agreements, for example, has not signed the Paris climate agreement, has taken decisive steps to question the functions of NATO and the WTO and to reduce its military assistance or to withdraw it from certain regions in particular from the Middle East. Although the number of US troops in Europe has remained untouched and the security fund created during the Obama era to deter Russia has been increased, the European side is taking Trump's NATO threats very seriously. The nationalist emphasis that Donald Trump made during the presidential election races showed at first that he would not be like other American presidents who embraced globalization doctrine. When we take the "principled realism" concept "that is guided by outcomes, not ideology" mentioned in the National Security Strategy Document published in 2017 ("National Security Strategy of the United States of America"), together with Trump's UN speech in 2018 where he refused globalization doctrine ("US President Trump rejects globalism in speech to UN General Assembly's annual debate | UN News", 2018), it is clear that the Trump administration has pursued an anti-globalization policy from the very beginning and thus abandoned some foreign policy practices.

Another problem between the partners is that President Trump constantly questions Article 5 of NATO's joint commitment of defense and threatens to protect only those countries that fulfill their defense spending obligations. The European

military industry is fragmented and the US has the upper hand in technology, in addition, there is vast discrepancy between American and European defense budgets all of which make the Europe heavily dependent on the highly restricted U.S. market (Cafruny, 2009). Trump's serious criticism of NATO's existence and his refusal to even criticize Russian President Putin has greatly diminished the confidence that Europeans would be protected by the US in the event of a crisis. Since NATO's main function is the US commitment to European security, NATO will not make sense in the absence of this commitment, and decades of close cooperation will disappear. Therefore, it is doubtful whether there will be a transatlantic partnership in the near future, let alone renegotiating TTIP. The Trump period has not yet ended the transatlantic partnership, but brought it to freezing. However, if Trump is not re-elected, it can be said that the frozen transatlantic relations will be much better than today, even if they are not completely restored. For now, the most critical and even threatening attitudes and rhetoric towards the EU at the US institutional level are within the Trump administration. In the Trump administration, the most stringent position belongs to President Trump. Therefore, if Trump is not re-elected and the candidate of the Democratic Party takes the office, even if the TTIP negotiations are not reopened quickly, the idea of reopening will likely to be brought up again.

For some authors, the US is now shaping its global policy according to a bipolar worldview consisting of itself and China and this will clearly affect the EU very badly since the two rivals, the US and the China, would want the EU on their side for its economic power and massive market opportunities while the EU wants to keep its values shaped around humanism, the rule of law and multilateralism (Demertzis et al., 2019). Others, by going further, believe that the tensions between the rivals that remain at the level of trade wars can lead to a real war in the long run.

However, it seems that China will continue to form deals with individual EU countries for a while until the new European Commission is formed. The leaders of China, France, Germany and the EU Commission, who met in Paris in March 2019, reiterated their commitment to trade relations and the multilateral system (Willsher, "Emmanuel Macron hosts Xi Jinping in attempt to strengthen EU-China relationship", 2019). It can be said that the EU is closer to China currently than it is to the US in terms of trade cooperation, especially as a result of the President Trump's rejection of multilateralism and the tension escalating in the trade relations between the EU and the US, especially after the freezing of TTIP. Of course, this means a new problem in the transatlantic relationship. In an interview in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that "the global governance system should not be monopolized by a single country" ("Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese President Xi Jinping", 2015) which is a shared belief in the EU. Thus, the rhetoric of China and the EU coincides regarding 'multipolarity' and 'multilateralism' (Scott, 2013), and this emerged a great prospect for managing the conceptual differences on global governance than ever before (Ujvari, 2017). At the meeting in Paris in March 2019, it was also decided to support Belt and Road Initiative, one of the foreign policy instruments developed by China against US hegemony, on condition of equal partnership (Willsher, "Emmanuel Macron hosts Xi Jinping in attempt to strengthen EU-China relationship", 2019). Although such decisions are made in order to reduce the EU's dependence on the US and become more autonomous, to find new strong partners and fill the void from the US in a sense, it creates US reaction and a new crack in transatlantic relations each time. While the question of how the EU would respond to the instability and hostile attitude in the US administration's discourse and actions was always a matter of curiosity, it is now a great wonder how the US will respond to these major EU policy changes. In the same period, President Trump said that he was looking forward to signing a trade agreement with the UK after Brexit (Kentish, "Trump promises to 'very, very

substantially' increase trade with UK after Brexit", 2019), which indicated that the hostile attitude towards the EU would continue for a while. According to Demertzis et al. (2019), there are two paths before EU if a nightmare scenario comes to life in the future; liberal democracy and the US on one side, and multilateralism and China on the other side, both of which sides do not include social justice in their agenda.

4.4 Projections for the EU

As a result of all differences and tensions between the partners, Europe is now in a highly challenging policy shift and it is time to question EU's next steps regarding its position in international politics and its relations with the US. According to Strange and Worth (2012), the EU currently has three problems. First, a crisis of political identity and legitimacy which manifested itself in the failure to agree on a constitutional treaty in the mid-2000s while the Lisbon Treaty is only achieved by avoiding the problem of political identity and democratic deficit (Gamble, 2006); second, a deep division between western and the eastern Europe despite the initial optimism that there was an historic opportunity to extend the EU project to the borders of Asia and the Middle East; finally third, European regionalism has developed with a crisis of social democracy related to globalisation but more to the EU's prioritising of a neoliberal economic model of open regionalism (Strange and Worth, 2012).

Moreover, the US foreign policy does not make things easier for EU to focus on its problems. For example, the fact that the US administration has not yet determined a clear position on Russia prevents the EU from establishing a clear framework for the future of its relations with Russia. While the EU wants US security guarantees to continue, it also does not want the relations between the US and Russia to deteriorate. China is another uncertainty for the EU. In the power struggle between the US and China where the tension increases every day, the EU is trying to find a balance between the geopolitical pressures of the US, which has been a close partner for decades, and China's economic power. The recent US pressure on the EU to impose sanctions on Huawei has increased damage in transatlantic relations. In addition, the US' foreign policy on power struggles and trade wars means that it will reduce the burden on itself regarding crisis management and counter-terrorism. In this case, it is clear that some of the responsibilities previously undertaken by the US regarding crisis management and the fight against terrorism will be assumed by other regional actors, including Europe. The idea that not only the Republican Party but also the Democratic Party in the US has a tendency to reduce the burdens of the US has started to settle in some political circles in the EU. That is why the US will likely to continue this policy after President Trump, and in this case, one of the steps that EU should take next is that it needs to make more autonomous decisions on crisis management and security.

Another next step that EU should take next is more unity, however, while transatlantic relations have deteriorated so much and there is no better strategy than more unity in front of the EU, it is doubtful that the members can organize better than ever and develop a security and defense policy completely independent from the US. Brexit and the recent European Parliament elections have also shown that there are many disagreements in Europe and they seem to increase in the near

future. Even at present, their approaches to Trump are quite different from each other ("GMF Private Breakfast-Conversation: Is Donald Trump a Unifying or a Dividing Factor in the EU?", 2018). Some have overwhelmingly supported Trump's rhetoric, others have opposed it, while some others have clearly decided to wait and see. This shows that Trump has not been a unifying actor for Europe, as some political commentators previously predicted. Furthermore, according to Riddervold and Newsome (2018), in the EU, in addition to the rise of populism and Brexit debates, there is a common impetus among member states to seek special relationships with the US in a more uncertain environment which only undermines the EU's unification in global policies and its deeper integration. Smith (2018), attributes the partly failure of TTIP to the crisis of multilateralism that "renders it unclear which EU will show up in transatlantic and other multilateral forums, and because member states sought special deals in parallel to a common EU position". From Merkel's statement, it can also be understood that they should take their destiny into their own hands ("Merkel: Europe must take fate in hands", 2017) that Germany wants to follow this policy of reunification, but so far no practical steps have been taken.

Another obstacle to the reunification of the EU is the different perception of threat and different ideas on transatlantic relations. Furthermore, while the US wants the EU to act more autonomously, it also thinks that the actions of the EU on this issue are damaging the transatlantic relationship. For example; it accuses the EU of failing to meet the requirements of its transatlantic partnership because the EU does not buy American defense products while establishing its own defense industry base (Ivanovitch, "Don't blame China for unraveling US-Europe relations", 2019). Another issue is that none of the EU countries has the power or willingness to lead other members. It is also possible that, in the event of a move away from the US,

the EU members which still attach great importance to transatlantic relations, such as Poland or the Baltic countries will have to choose between the US and the EU. This could jeopardize the EU's existence.

With President Trump taking office, US-EU relations have settled in an ambiguous and volatile framework. In summary, President Trump thinks that the EU has benefited from the US and he will no longer allow it. In this case, the EU side has entered the negotiation process of the transatlantic relationship, let alone TTIP or a new narrow trade agreement. As another reason for this major change in the relationship, some authors argue that the ideological approach to globalism between the Trump administration and the EU is significantly different. They argue that the Trump administration's anti-globalist stance has consequences such as not supporting pro-globalist actors and organizations, such as the EU, and even seeing them as “foes” (“Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on trade”, 2018). For the first time after the World War II, an American President plans to withdraw from the EU security guarantorship while questioning the friendship of the EU and calling transatlantic relationship a bad deal for the US. While European left-liberal intellectuals have always worried about America’s aggressive stance in world politics (Bohle , 2005), the concerns spread to greater community in Europe after TTIP negotiations and President Trump’s rhetoric and policies are the most obvious justification of these concerns.

On the EU side, there is a very firm view that President Trump is not supportive and sincere in his relations with the EU. The reason for this view is not only due to tariff threats or that TTIP is frozen, but because President Trump has described the EU, the best US partner for decades, as a foe and eagerly supported Brexit, which has left the EU in a very difficult situation (“Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on

trade", 2018). In a speech she delivered in February 2019, Malström stated “We do have concerns about certain aspects of the trade policy pursued by the current U.S. administration but there is also a strong unanimity that we should have a positive agenda with the U.S.” (Amaro, "Dutch prime minister is convinced the US and the EU will reach a trade deal", 2019). However, US-EU relations have continued to change direction very rapidly in the recent period. There are some other developments that may lead one to think that the US-EU partnership, which has lasted for decades and is unlike any other partnership in the world, is nearing the end. For example, in a May 2019 speech, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that in a world dominated by the US, China and Russia, EU countries should come together and fight for their own corner (Kornelius, Oltermann, & Fried, "Merkel: Europe must unite to stand up to China, Russia and US", 2019).

President Trump openly supports Eurosceptics and renationalization in Europe. In addition, he makes sympathetic statements against some anti-globalization, pro-independence countries in Europe, while making harsh statements against Brussels. According to Trump, western civilization is in danger of decline in the face of radical Islamic terrorism (Thrush & Davis, "Trump, in Poland, Asks if West Has the Will to Survive", 2017), and concepts such as the rule of law and democracy come after the concept of security. The European Union, on the other hand, is based on the concepts of democracy and the rule of law and still defends them in the foreground in official discourse. Thus, a further question in this research may be how the EU would find a common value ground with the US, if it still wants to revive the partnership. The answer is clearly not easy; especially in the short term while President Trump increasing the dose of his anti-global, anti-EU rhetoric. One of the issues that have recently strained the relations of the two sides is the difference in their value priorities, for example regarding the Middle East.

However, preserving the status quo somehow in the short term and waiting for President Trump's time in office to pass will not be beneficial and will damage transatlantic relations even more. At present, both sides of the transatlantic spend their energy on keeping their partnerships at a certain level, while avoiding developing a common agenda and coordination.

It is clear that if Donald Trump is re-elected in the November 2020 election, he will continue to pursue ambitious and tense trade policies designed around the motto of "America First", but if he is not elected and one of the Democratic Party candidates is elected, the tensions will be low if any and more predictable even if the ongoing trade policy against China is maintained. However, it is doubtful that the TTIP process can be started with the EU. In the case that Donald Trump is re-elected; the EU may have to choose either high tariff to be applied to its automobiles or to open its agriculture market to US origin products. Moreover, the tensions in EU-US and US-China trade relations will not decrease and world trade and global GDP will be affected negatively. As a result, the existence of both NATO and the WTO can be widely questioned.

President Trump has announced one tariff increase after the other disregarding the negative results on the global economy. In May 2019, Trump stated that if Mexico did not stop illegal migration, the US would impose a new tax of 5% on imports from Mexico and that this tariff could climb to as high as 25% in a short time (Karni & Swanson, "Trump Says U.S. Will Hit Mexico With 5% Tariffs on All Goods", 2019). The US recently raised tariffs on Chinese imports worth \$ 200 billion, and President Trump also announced that the US could impose tariffs on imports of automobiles from Europe and Japan if they did not conclude a trade agreement with the US (Karni & Swanson, "Trump Says U.S. Will Hit Mexico

With 5% Tariffs on All Goods", 2019). The growth rate of the US economy at the beginning of May 2019 was 3.2%, but it is now estimated to have fallen to 3.1% (Tankersley, "Trump Bets the U.S. Economy on Tariffs", 2019). Investors' concerns about the uncertainty and tension caused by the US government indicate that this decline may continue in the near future. The Federal Reserve chairman, Jerome H. Powell, stated at a press conference on May 1, 2019 that "risks were moderated somewhat", with the rise of expectations for a trade agreement with China (Smialek, "Fed Leaves Interest Rates Unchanged as Low Inflation Persists", 2019). Accordingly, even the expectation of an agreement positively affected the American economy. However, shortly after this speech, tension with China increased again and the prospect of a trade agreement was considerably reduced.

Furthermore, some experts in finance environment argue that Trump's unpredictable policies and tensions created by trade wars are not only limited to the damage to the American economy, but to the level that affects the entire global economy. This is because the tariff increases from the US and the retaliations made by other powers have started to adversely affect global trade (Bovino , Roache, & Broyer, "The U.S. – China Trade War: The Global Economic Fallout", 2019). For example, the new tariffs on imports of Chinese origin products will cause major damages to industries based on these products such as mobile phone manufacturers, sporting goods companies and retailers. Another example is the automobile industry. Automobiles and their parts account for more than a quarter of US trade with Mexico. The rough times for the American automobile industry are again on the way. In an article in the Washington Post, it says;

President Trump is telling advisers and close allies that he has no intention of pulling back on his escalating trade war with China, arguing that

clashing with Beijing is highly popular with his political base and will help him win reelection in 2020 regardless of any immediate economic pain (Costa, Dawsey, & Sullivan, "I don't see him crying uncle': Trump believes China tariffs will help him win reelection", 2019).

Accordingly, President Trump will not back down from this policy in the near future despite the possible damage to the global economy and objections from his own party.

Although Trump's protectionist political rhetoric was applauded on his electoral base before he became president, trade was not often an important issue in American public opinion. Thus, while Trump entered the race for the second term, in a survey by The Pew Research Center, only 39% of respondents said global trade was one of the most important policies in 2019 (Enten, "Americans have turned against Trump on trade", 2019). Accordingly, global trade has been the lowest rated top policy so far. In an open-ended survey conducted by CNN in March 2020, only 1% of respondents stated that global trade was the most important policy (Enten, "Americans have turned against Trump on trade", 2019). The trade wars, which started in the first half of 2018 by raising tariffs, did not change President Trump's approval rate among the voters. Since 2018, the approval rate is still at 42-43%. Therefore, it is highly doubtful that global trade policies will allow Trump to be re-elected (Enten, "Americans have turned against Trump on trade", 2019).

While many of the 2020 presidential candidates have not yet made clear statements about their foreign policy agendas, a news report on what is happening in the current agenda of a group of progressively described Democrat candidates has shown that Trump's America First approach is damaging to human rights and democracy, and that if the Democrats win the election, the US will fight again for democracy (Kirby, "Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order", 2019).

More importantly, they stated that they would work to reverse the damage Trump has caused to the alliances and strengthen their cooperation in the field of foreign policy. They stated that they would also work to strengthen the foundations of the world order established after the World War II and “make the America *world leader* again” (Kirby, "Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order", 2019). Democrats have described the US traditional rivals China and Russia as foe and planned to stop the rise of these two powers with the help of their former alliances. Angry at Trump's questioning the existence of NATO, the Democrats also signaled that the US would stick to its security commitments in certain parts of the world (Kirby, "Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order", 2019). When it comes to trade and the economy, the Democrats do not think very differently from Trump. Democrats want to reform their trade agreements and invest more in US sectors to increase employment. Although some democrats have found the Trump policies justified in terms of trade agreements, but they call trade wars declared against Europe and China quite wrong (Kirby, "Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order", 2019). Of course, although not all Democrat candidates think the same way, it is clear that they want to change Trump's policies and want to deal with foreign trade and foreign affairs more softly than Trump. In this context, the presence of a Democrat in the post-Trump presidency will help bring relations with the EU to a much better level than in the current situation, helping to reintroduce the TTIP.

TTIP is such a unique agreement that its geo-political motivations will certainly outweigh its economic results if succeeded in the future. However, it is clear that such a massive scale agreement will not be able to be concluded in the near future, as the US is very sensitive and uncompromising on agricultural products and the EU on automobiles (Tran, "US-EU Trade Negotiations: Talking Past Each Other",

2019). Nevertheless, a narrow agreement would make both sides happy in the short term because President Trump wants to create a success story ahead of the elections, while the EU wants to eliminate the possibility of an ever-increasing trade war with the US and reduce tension. New negotiations to reduce transatlantic tension are likely to fail even before they begin, as the scope of the negotiation mandates of both sides are different (Tran, "US-EU Trade Negotiations: Talking Past Each Other", 2019). The mandate of the Commission includes only industrial products and the conformity assessment agenda, while the mandate of the US includes a wide range of topics, including services, agricultural products, and currency manipulation. The US expanded its negotiation chapters by going beyond the joint statement made by President Trump and Commission President Juncker in July 2018. However, since the EU side does not have such intention and commitment, it does not have any obligation. The EU side is so far from the idea and intention of a large-scale negotiation that the TTIP is declared obsolete in the current narrow-scale negotiation mandate.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to map the background of the EU-US relations through a perfect reflection, the TTIP. The research question I asked at the beginning of the thesis that what the geo-political reasons of the EU are to negotiate TTIP is answered as: sustaining transatlantic hegemony, dominating the global trade and finally, solving the problems within the EU. At the beginning, my research purposes were, to find out EU's geo-political motivations to negotiate TTIP; to separate economic and geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP and; to understand whether the priority is economic or geo-political in EU's motivations. I reached my purposes with first, clearly defining the above mentioned three geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP ; second, separating the economic and geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP by evaluating the economic scale and some projections regarding the transatlantic economy; and finally, I found that the priority is geo-political, by looking at the current tariff schedules between partners which are already at a very low level; the decades long economic cooperation between the countries which is already very strong; and the efforts of the EU side to sign a trade agreement with the US even after hostile approaches and increasing tensions initiated by President Trump.

After the deterioration of the transatlantic relations, especially from 2017, a difficult question the EU countries are now asking themselves is how far they can sustain their own security and multilateral trade system without the US. Without the US, the EU is likely to lose enormous power in foreign policy and global trade, and even if they cooperate with other powerful actors in the world, this will not provide them with as much power as they do with the US. This is because a common history, struggle and values lie at the heart of the relationship with the US. Their transatlantic relationship on this basis provided a partnership far beyond the financial, commercial and military assistance and assurances of any other country to the EU. Although EU leaders are now developing security policies by forming a European-wide army in case NATO breaks down or is not as functional as before, it is not possible for them to achieve military capabilities of the US in the short or medium term. According to Commission's data, the real military capability of the EU is estimated to be ten percent of the United States (European Commission, "European defence - industrial and market issues: towards an EU defence equipment policy", 2003) ... In 1990s, the Kosovo War was an example of how weak the military capabilities of Western Europe and made the overwhelming imbalance between the American and European military capacities evident (Bohle, 2005). According to Cafruny (2009), EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) originated in the late 1980s and in the Maastricht Treaty, the language regarding common foreign and security policy is vague reflecting UK's priority of the transatlantic relationship, sharp differences between members regarding the unification of Germany and policy towards former Yugoslavia and France's traditional views on using CFSP as a means of countering U.S. power. Cafruny and Ryner (2003) also claim that CFSP "serves to institutionalize Europe's subordinate position in the transatlantic relationship."

If the EU had a strong bond and consensus in terms of foreign and security policies in the current situation, the post-US period would not have been so worrying about the future of the Union. According to Baç and Cihangir (2012), in EU's history, especially in economic areas such as the introduction of the euro, the EU's single position in the WTO and its power in the international financial institutions, the integration was successful enough to enable the EU to speak with one unified voice, showing the EU as an equal leader in its relations with the US. However, it seems that separatist ideas in the EU are at the highest level since its establishment and prevent a strong common stance. Furthermore, some domestic turbulence has occurred in each country, which has led them to focus on the future of their country rather than on the future of the Union, for example, Brexit in England, the questioning of the party system in Germany and the actions of yellow vests in France create uncertainties about who will be the leading country in the Union's future (Puglierin, "The Next Two Years in EU-U.S. Relations", 2019).

Another important external factor is the role of the US in European integration. In addition to the financial assistance provided by the US to the European countries after the World War II, which lost their power both financially, politically and socially, security assurance has made united Europe possible and has so far provided considerable support for political unity and after the US exit from this picture, it is feared to confirm the suspicions that the EU is actually an unstable structure (Puglierin, "The Next Two Years in EU-U.S. Relations", 2019). Some left leaning social and political theorists such as Hauke Brunkhorst (2005), Roberto Unger (2005) and Ulrich Beck (2006) believe that EU as “ a cosmopolitan alternative to rampant neoliberalism” could “re-regulate the world society”, an idea first asserted by Habermas in 1998 (Strange and Worth, 2012). According to Bohle (2005), during the invasion of Iraq by the US, left leaning West European

intellectuals believed that EU would act as “a civilized counterbalance to an openly imperialist America” assuming that Europe was projecting a multilateral world order based on international law and cosmopolitan human rights, while the US projected differently. However, during the dramatic breakdown of former Yugoslavia, the Western Europe could not handle the violent breakdown and later, instead of exporting welfare capitalism based on multilateralism and human rights, it pushed Eastern countries towards neoliberal reforms to peak its influence over the East European economy, thus missed a historical opportunity to act in accordance with its soft power ambitions in politics (Bohle, 2005). Peter Gowan (2000) states that the Kosovo War was nothing but a mean for US’ aim to reassume Europe’s leadership by subordinating Western Europe and multilateral institutions to NATO, undermining Europe’s attempts for regional autonomy. Moreover, Habermas (2009) argues that any other integration picture other than full political integration means the failure of the EU in offering an alternative model to neo-liberalism.

Considering the background of transatlantic relations and how they transformed today, it is clear that it seems impossible that the US-EU relations will return to the back in the near future. It is also clear that the anti-globalist, anti-EU rhetoric of President Trump, who wants to consolidate its electoral base, will increase as the US presidential election approaches. At this stage, the only way for the US and the EU to approach each other again is if a major crisis jeopardizes the interests of both sides, for example, President George W. Bush's adoption of neoconservative policies after the 9/11 attacks and President Barack Obama's attempt to consolidate transatlantic relations after the Russian invasion of Crimea (Puglierin, "The Next Two Years in EU-U.S. Relations", 2019). However, Riddervold and Newsome (2018) explain that the US and the EU had disagreements and tensions at different levels over different issues before, such as how to deal with terrorism, the US never

questioned transatlantic relationship, its commitments to this relationship and the importance of multilateral institutions, all of which make the current situation differs from previous crises. According to Biscop (2018), “US grand strategy is now in flux”. The “America first” approach was not only adopted by President Trump but by every American Presidents before him and they also preserved the multilateral system while the State Department has brutally downsized during Trump administration and President Trump, in his 2017 speech at the UN General Assembly, called for “a great reawakening of nations” instead of promoting multilateralism (Biscop, 2018). According to Eralp (2019), in this turbulent change of international system in which the rise of a multipolar system and the proliferation of populist authoritarian tendencies battle, it is very critical for the EU to foster multilateralism. Thus, the EU should find its former energy regarding the multilateralization in global scale and complete “unity” vertically and horizontally in the continent to strengthen its hand against the US and the rising powers. While it is a wise policy shift to approach China more strategically and economically recently despite discontent in the US administration, it should diverse and increase its efforts in cooperation with other powerful actors.

In conclusion, while it seems impossible that the US-EU relations will return to the back in the near future, the geo-political reasons to negotiate TTIP rely on a very long partnership and on a common historical and ideological cooperation that cannot be completely ended by a populist conservative narrative. Besides, the democratic candidates in the US made clear that the President Trump’s policies regarding old allies are wrong and the US will keep its commitments in NATO. TTIP is very important in terms of its ability to redefine the globalism with its rule and standard setting goal and if succeeded in the future, it will lead the US take part once again in the globalism doctrine. It is such deal that in order to sign a trade

agreement; the parties should set a joint agenda and cooperate not only in trade but also in foreign policy. Moreover, powerful actors have taken their places in competition within blocs which will clearly be the next steps in international political economy such as RCEP and CPTPP, but the most powerful actors, the EU and the US still are not in a bloc and this only strengthens the hands of their rivals. Besides, increasing trade war tensions between the partners will not be eased by a narrow scale agreement since the scope will be very narrow to tackle upcoming disputes in various issues. A massive agreement such as TTIP could be the only way to settle any current disputes and to prevent future disputes since harmonization of rules and regulations would not create such disputes. The tariff escalation threatens the liberal international order which was always advocated by the EU and the US, and thus threatens the multilateral system and its winnings by increased international trade. Another problem is the irreversible erosion of trust in the transatlantic relation in this trade war. Thus, in my conclusion part of this thesis, I have to state that I strongly believe the geo-political reasons analyses in this thesis and the recent outlook of global economy will lead to renegotiation of TTIP in the future.

The time to renegotiate TTIP will not be near for the EU as it has to consider its power in global politics and its internal problems and how they block the EU from engaging in partnerships with an upper hand. It seems that the EU still has a long way to go back its fundamental values based on multilateralism due to the separatist movements and increasing nationalist narrative. Moreover, multilateralism is still the only way for the EU to exist with its ambitious unification strategy in economy, finance, foreign policy, security and defense. The long term strategy to renegotiate the TTIP does not mean that the EU should continue with its current strategies regarding the transatlantic relations. As a unified Europe will have more chance to

sustain its hegemony in global economy and politics, it should start to make new geo-political, military and energy plans and engagements with a stronger unity and without a possible US involvement. I strongly agree with Biscop (2018) in his proposal that the EU should cooperate with other powers and form temporary coalitions, for example in the area of climate change, whenever interests overlap in order to pull other powers into multilateral institutions from which the US is withdrawing or institutionalize new formats of cooperation. Finally, I also think that at a later but not a far stage, the EU should re-consider US role in its plans given that the US shows enough commitment and approaches the EU as an equal power.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĐİ AÇISINDAN TRANSATLANTİK TİCARET VE YATIRIM ORTAKLIĐININ (TTYO) JEO-POLİTİK NEDENLERİ

Giriş

Bu tezde, araştırma sorusu olarak Avrupa BirliĐi (AB)'nin TTYO'yu müzakere etmesinin jeopolitik nedenleri araştırılmış ve AB'nin TTYO'yu müzakere etme konusundaki jeopolitik motivasyonlarını bulmak; TTYO'yu müzakere etmeindeki ekonomik ve jeopolitik nedenleri ayırmak ve son olarak, AB'nin motivasyonlarında önceliĐin ekonomik mi yoksa jeopolitik mi olduğunu anlamak hususunda üç araştırma amacı ele alınmıştır.

Bu makale, TTYO'yu müzakere etmenin jeopolitik nedenlerini, her birini tarihsel bağlamda analiz ederek üç kategoride sınıflandırmayı amaçlamıştır. Birinci neden, transatlantik hegemonyayı sürdürmektir. TTYO'nun öncelikli amaçlarından biri, özellikle Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney Afrika (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -BRICS) gibi gelişmekte olan ekonomilere karşı Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve AB ortaklığını pekiştirmektir. Bu jeopolitik amaç doğrultusunda ortaklar “zayıflamış Batı” algısının üstesinden gelmek, Atlantik işbirliğini güçlendirmek ve dünyanın diğer bölgelerini kontrol etmekten oluşan üç temel motivasyona sahiptir. AB ve ABD halen günlük olarak değişen konularda ortak değerlendirmeler yaparak gerçek zamanlı anlık tepkiler vermelerini sağlayacak stratejik bir ortaklığa sahip değildirlir. TTYO gibi bir ortaklık, uzun vadede çözülebilecek sorunları tespit etmeyi ve güvenlik ve ekonomi dışında kalan diğer zorlu meselelere karşı ortak bir tutum benimsemeyi sağlayacaktır. Batı'nın hem sembolik hem de pratik olarak yenilenmesini sağlamak ve gelişmekte olan ekonomilerin meydan okumalarının ardından daha da belirginleşen “zayıflamış Batı” inancını ortadan kaldırmak için net bir gündem ihtiyaç ortaya çıkmıştır (Hamilton, 2014). Bu nedenle, TTYO aynı zamanda bu ihtiyaçtan da kaynaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, tarafların birbirlerine bağlılıklarının yanı sıra, uluslararası düzen söylemlerinde yer alan liberal demokrasi ve insan haklarına bağlılıkları da TTYO ile güçlenecektir.

İkinci neden, küresel ticaret standartlarını belirleyerek ve Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ) içindeki çok taraflılık çabalarını etkileyerek küresel ticarete hakim olmaktır. Gelişmekte olan ekonomiler nedeniyle, transatlantik duopoli daha önce olduğu gibi küresel standartları ve kuralları belirleyememektedir. Bugüne kadar, küresel sistemde beş yüzden fazla Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması (STA) imzalanmıştır ve üç yüz yirmiden fazlası aktif durumdadır (Griffith vd., 2017). DTÖ'nün uluslararası

düzyeyde bir norm ve kural birliđi oluřturarak uluslararası ticareti arttırma hedefi STA'ların farklı standartları ve kuralları nedeniyle gerçekteřememektedir. Bhagwati'nin (2008) “spagetti kasesi” hâlâ geçerliliđini sürdürmektedir. Doha turundaki çıkırmazı kısa sürede çözmek imkansız görünmektedir zira bunu yapmak için taraflardan en az birinin veto yetkisinden vazgeçmesi gerekmektedir (Griffith vd., 2017). Tüm bu gelişmeler ABD ve AB'nin küresel konumunu zayıflatmaya devam etmektedir.

Üçüncü neden, bütün ve güvenli bir Avrupa'yı sürdürme, karar vericilerin manevra kabiliyetini arttırma ve son olarak AB'nin Enerji Birliđi girişiminin hedeflerine ulaşma motivasyonlarını da içeren AB içindeki sorunlardır. Bu nedenle, Rusya'nın AB'nin komşularındaki revizyonist politikalarına karşı AB'nin toprak bütünlüđünün sağlanması önemli bir amaçtır. AB, transatlantik işbirliđini güçlendirmeyi ve ABD'nin dikkatini Orta Dođu ve Uzak Dođu'dan tekrar Avrupa'ya yeniden çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, bazı yazarlar için AB'nin bir başka motivasyonu, TTYO'nun AB içinde demokratik yolların etrafını dolařan bir karar alma mekanizması yaratacađı yönündedir. TTYO ile, ulusal veya alt ulusal hükümetler tarafından onaylanamayacak bir takım kurallar uygulanabilecektir çünkü TTYO'ya dahil edilecek kurallar, her iki taraftaki yasama meclislerinde ya hep ya hiç ilkesi çerçevesinde onaylanacaktır (Baker, 2014).

Bu araştırmanın katma deđerlerinden birisi, TTYO'yu transatlantik ilişkilerin mükemmel bir yansıması olarak analiz etmektir. TTYO süreci, büyük ölçekli bir anlaşma geliştirme konusundaki ilk ham fikirlerden başlayarak ekonomik, sosyo-kültürel, tarihi ve jeopolitik gelişmeler çerçevesinde, transatlantik ilişkiler hakkında çok şey anlatmaktadır. Bu tezin bir başka katma deđeri ise, TTYO'nun, AB ve ABD arasındaki jeopolitikaları göz önünde bulundurmadan yalnızca transatlantik

ekonomiyi ya da AB'nin, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası döneme göre oldukça zayıflamış olan Atlantik ilişkileri güçlendirerek topraklarını koruma hedefini göz önünde bulundurarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini açıkça gösteriyor olmasıdır.

Transatlantik İlişkinin Kısa Tarihi

Bu tezin konusu doğrultusunda, transatlantik ilişkinin başlangıç noktası II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası olarak alınmıştır. 1945'ten sonra, ABD'nin Avrupa'ya karşı izolasyon politikası, Sovyet tehdidi ve Avrupa gibi büyük bir pazarın kaybedilmesi endişesi nedenleriyle sonlandırılmıştır. II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan zaferle çıkan taraflardan biri olan ABD, Batı Avrupa'da kapitalist yapılar kurmak için istekli hale gelmiş (Jäger, 2018) ve Avrupa'nın ekonomik ve politik kalkınma gündemi kapsamında transatlantik ilişkiler Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Yardımları vasıtasıyla yoğunlaştırılmıştır. Bu somut önlemlerden sonra, istikrarlı bir uluslararası finansal düzenin, Bretton Woods sisteminin kurulmasına başlanmıştır (Jäger, 2018). İlişkilerin askeri boyutu, Avrupa'nın güvenlik kaygılarını ortadan kaldırmak için Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (North Atlantic Treaty-NATO)'nün kurulmasıyla kurumsal bir kimlik kazanmıştır. İlişkinin ilk yıllarında, askerî ilişkiler dönemin ruhuna uygun olarak ön planda olmuş ve ABD'nin Avrupa'ya müdahalesi en yüksek seviyeye ulaşmıştır. Bununla birlikte, 1950'den sonra, Avrupa'ya yapılan bu yoğun Amerikan müdahalesi rahatsızlığa yol açmaya

başlamış ve Avrupa'nın bağımsızlığı için siyasi ve ekonomik açıdan entegrasyon çabaları başlatılmıştır. Bretton Woods sistemi 1970'lerin başında döviz kuru istikrarını ve sermaye kontrollerini sonlandırmak suretiyle ortadan kalkmış ve aynı dönemde gerçekleşen petrol fiyatlarındaki artışlar küresel ekonomiyi daha da kötüleştirmiştir. Avrupa entegrasyonu çok ağır hasar görmüş ve bir süre için Avrupalı liderler için yeni bir yol haritası bulmak çok zorlaşmıştır. ABD, 1979'da faiz oranlarını yükseltmeye karar vermiş ve bu da Avrupa'da büyük bir krize yol açmıştır. Krizi çözmek için Keynesyen yaklaşımlar popüler olsa da, Avrupa'nın yönebileceği birçok yol ortaya çıkmıştır; sendikalar tarafından savunulan sosyal demokratik bir yol; temel olarak piyasa liberalleşmesini destekleyen neoliberal yol; ve ayrıca Avrupa şirketlerini Avrupa dışına doğru genişleyebilen küresel oyunculara dönüştürecek yapılar oluşturmayı öneren neo-merkantilist yol (Jäger, 2018). Jäger'e (2018) göre Avrupa, 1980'lerde, bu rotaların bir kombinasyonu kullanmaya başlamış ve sermaye, gelecek politikalarda karşılaştırmalı bir avantaj kazanmıştır. Van Appeldoorn (2001) bu yolları Avrupa düzeninin üç farklı vizyonu olarak tanımlamaktadır: bazen "klasik liberalizm" veya "19. yüzyıl liberalizmi" olarak adlandırılan neoliberalizm (Cerny, 2008); Neo-merkantilizm; ve sosyal demokrasi.

Sonunda Avrupa entegrasyonu, tek pazar ve Maastricht Antlaşması'ndan sonra neoliberal bir yapı olarak en son halini almıştır. Transatlantik ilişkileri incelerken, askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler olarak üç ayırım yapmak gerekmektedir. Bu tezde, son yıllarda AB-ABD ilişkilerinin en iyi yansıması olarak görülebilecek olan TTYO kapsamında ortakların jeopolitik ajandası incelenecektir. Bu ajandada, transatlantik ilişkilerin politik boyutu gözden geçirilecek ve ekonomik ve askeri boyut, jeopolitik boyutla ilgili olarak kısaca yer alacaktır. TTYO müzakereleri resmi olarak 2013 yılında başlamıştır, ancak bu tür bir anlaşmanın temelleri bu

tarihin çok öncesine dayanmaktadır ve ekonomik ve ticari kaygılar başlangıçta ön planda yer almıştır. Otuz dokuzuncu Sekizler (G8) zirvesinde, AB ve ABD liderleri resmi TTYO müzakerelerine başlayacaklarını duyurmuşlar ve 8 Temmuz 2013 tarihinde müzakereler başlamıştır.

TTYO

TTYO için, savunucularının ve muhaliflerinin hemfikir olduğu bir konu varsa, bu da TTYO'nun “oyun değiştirici” bir anlaşma olacaktır. TTYO'nun, DTÖ'nün eski direktörü Pascal Lemy (2017)'nin de dediği üzere “yeni ticaret dünyasının ilk gösterisi” olacağına inanılmaktadır.

TTYO'nun, hem anlaşmanın tarafları hem de küresel ekonomiye dahil olan üçüncü ülkeler tarafından sıklıkla dile getirilen en belirgin jeopolitik nedenlerinden birisi, küresel ticaret standartlarını belirlemek ve dünyanın herhangi bir yerindeki ticaret anlaşmaları için bir temel oluşturarak bu standartları teşvik etmesidir. II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Bölgesel Ticaret Anlaşmaları (BTA) tarafından kazanılan ivme, zaten dünya ticaretinin yaklaşık yüzde ellisini etkileyen bu anlaşmaların gelecekteki tüm ticari bağlantıları etkileyeceğinin düşünülmesine neden olmaktadır. Tüm dünya, büyük bir iştahla tercihli ticaret anlaşmaları imzalarken, AB ve ABD gibi iki yakın ortağın dev transatlantik pazarını böyle bir anlaşmaya dahil etmemesi ve tüm

dünyaya “örnek bir model” göstermemesi düşünülemezdi. Amerikalılar ve Avrupalılar uzun zamandan beri birlikte küresel kuralları belirlemişlerdir, ancak gelişmekte olan ekonomiler ve bu ülkelerin meydan okumaları küresel finansal krizin yıkıcı etkileri ile birleşmiş ve Batı'nın eski gücünü yeniden kazanabileceğiyle ilgili ciddi şüpheler oluşturmuştur. 2008 küresel krizinin ardından, Batı'nın finansal ve ekonomik güvenilirliği büyük ölçüde hasar görmüştür. 2008'deki küresel finansal kriz, neoliberalizmin krizini çarpıcı bir şekilde göstermiştir; Strange ve Worth (2012), neoliberalizmin zayıflıklarının küresel finansal krizden çok önce, Doha Turu'nun başarısızlığıyla birlikte “gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler, bölgeler ve blokların, pazarın kuralsızlaştırılmasına yönelik daha fazla hamle yapmak konusunda isteksizlik gösterdikleri zaman ortaya çıktığını ileri sürmektedirler.

Bu, küresel ticaretin serbestleşmesinin sona ermekte olduğuna dair bir inanç yaratmış olsa da, Aralık 2013'teki DTÖ Dokuzuncu Bakanlar Konferansında Bali paketinin imzalanması bu inancın bir süre reddedilmesini sağlamıştır. Gelişmekte olan ekonomiler ve Batı arasında gücün yeniden paylaşılmasından dolayı Doha Turu'nu tamamlamak hala imkânsız gibi görünmektedir ve çok taraflı müzakerelerin başarılı olacağı şüpheli hale gelmiştir. Bilindiği gibi, TTYO'dan bir diğer beklenti de Doha Turu ve çok taraflı sistemi canlandırmasıdır. Bu beklentiye yol açan en bilinen örnek ABD, Kanada ve Meksika arasında imzalanan Kuzey Amerika Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmasıdır (North American Free Trade Agreement -NAFTA). Uruguay Turu 1990'da tıkanıldığında, üç ülke 1992'de bir serbest ticaret anlaşması için müzakerelere başlamış ve müzakereleri sadece on dört ayda tamamlayarak NAFTA'yı 1994'te yürürlüğe koymuşlardır. NAFTA çok taraflı sistemi katalize etmiş ve yeniden başlamasına ve Uruguay Turunun başarılı olmasına yol açmıştır (Hamilton ve Blockmans, 2015).

Ortaklar arasındaki sorunların başlangıcına bakıldığında, ABD ile AB arasında kısmen 9 Eylül 2001 saldırılarından sonra bir çatlak oluştuğu görülmektedir. Bu çatlak Başkan Obama'nın Asya'ya yönelme stratejisi ile daha da derinleşmiş ve bu da AB'yi ABD'nin Avrupa'ya daha az ilgi duyması ve Avrupa ile daha az işbirliği yapması konusunda endişelendirmiştir. Bu nedenle, TTYO'nun geliştireceği transatlantik pazar ve TTYO'nun batı standartlarına ve normlarına uyma konusundaki taahhüdü AB'de, ABD'nin AB'yi hala ana stratejik ortak olarak gördüğüne dair bir güven oluşturacağına inanılmıştır. Ayrıca, Ukrayna'daki kargaşa da bölgeyi etkilemiş ve Avrupa ve NATO bölgelerinde hala eski düşmanlıkların ve sorunların varolduğunu göstermiştir. Avrupa barışının kalıcı olduğu görüşü geçersiz hale gelmiştir. Rusya'nın bölgedeki politikası nedeniyle Avrupa'nın güvenlik ve istikrarla ilgili sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalmaya devam edeceği açıktır.

ABD ve AB, mevcut ortaklıklarından daha güçlü bir ortaklık kurmak, büyük ekonomik kazanımlar elde etmek, gelişmekte olan ekonomilerdeki yeni rakipleriyle baş etmek ve uluslararası sistemin temelini oluşturacak standartlar ve ilkeler oluşturmak için TTYO müzakerelerine başlamıştır. AB'nin 2013'te TTYO müzakerelerine başlamasına neden olan bir diğer sebep de kıtada ve Birlik'te artan problemlerdir. Ayrıca, AB'nin Avrupa kıtasının sorunlarını çözememesi, hem bölgesel hem de diğer dış aktörlerle verimsiz rekabete; kıtadaki ayrılıkçı tartışmaların artmasına; ve işlevsel olmayan enerji piyasaları gibi birçok soruna neden olurken bunların yalnızca Avrupa kıtasını değil aynı zamanda Avrasya ve Orta Doğu'ya da yayılabilecek problemler olarak ortaya çıkmalarına neden olmaktadır (Hamilton, 2014). Bu nedenle, Avrupa'nın kıtadaki mevcut sorunlar konusunda ABD ile daha fazla işbirliği yapması gelecekteki istikrar için büyük önem taşımaktadır. Ayrıca, TTYO gibi bir anlaşmanın ABD ile AB arasında gereken işbirliğini ve yakınlaşmayı büyük ölçüde artıracığı açıktır.

ABD'nin küresel enerji pazarındaki güçlü aktörlerden biri olması da, TTYO'nun AB için çok önemli olmasının bir diğer nedenidir. Avrupa ülkeleri, özellikle Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri, enerjiye bağımlı konumdadır. TTYO ile transatlantik enerji ticaretinin artırılması AB için önemli bir avantajdır. ABD şu anda kendisi ile STA imzalamamış olan ülkelere doğal gaz ihraç edememektedir. Bu nedenle, bir STA imzalanmadıkça AB, ABD'den enerji alamayacaktır.

Transatlantik Ekonomiye İlişkin Bazı Veriler

AB ve ABD piyasaları birlikte küresel finansal piyasaların dörtte üçünü ve dünya ticaretinin yarısından fazlasını oluşturmaktadır. Dünyadaki ülkeler arasındaki ekonomik ilişkiler göz önüne alındığında, başka hiçbir ticari arterin transatlantik ticaret kadar entegre olmadığı söylenebilir (Hamilton, 2014). Ortaklar arasındaki doğrudan yabancı yatırım 3.7 trilyon dolara kadar çıkmaktadır ve yıllık AB-ABD mal ve hizmet ticareti 1 trilyon dolara yakındır (Puślecki, 2018). TTYO müzakereleri başlarda ümit edilen büyük hedeflerle tamamlanmış olsaydı, transatlantik blok küresel ekonominin % 46'sını, küresel Gayrisafi Yurtiçi Hasıla (GSYİH)'nin yarısını ve küresel doğrudan yabancı yatırımların %70'ini oluşturduğu için, bugüne kadarki en büyük ikili ticaret ve yatırım ortaklığı olarak lanse edilen Trans-Pasifik Ortaklığı için Kapsamlı ve İlerlemeye Açık Anlaşma (The

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership –CPTPP), TTYO'nun ekonomik olarak gerisinde kalacaktır.

TTYO, yalnızca ortaklar arasındaki gümrük vergilerinin azaltılması veya kaldırılması için imzalanmak istenen bir anlaşma değildir. Bu aynı zamanda mevcut tarife oranlarına bakılarak da anlaşılabilir. DTÖ verilerine göre ABD'nin AB'ye uyguladığı ortalama gümrük vergisi oranı % 2,5 iken AB'nin ABD'ye uyguladığı ortalama gümrük vergisi oranı % 5,2'dir (Herrman, 2014). Bu nedenle, oranlarda daha fazla düşüş ticarete önemli bir artışa neden olmayacaktır. Bununla birlikte, her iki tarafın da sık sık vurguladığı gibi, tarife dışı önlemleri ortadan kaldırarak veya en azından azaltarak önemli faydalar sağlanabilir. Örneğin, Stelzer'e (2013) göre, AB'nin ABD'den gelen kimyasal ürünler üzerindeki vergisi % 1,2 iken, tarife dışı engeller % 19,1 vergi oranına tekabül etmektedir. Herrman (2014)'a göre ise, tarife dışı engellerin dışındaki transatlantik ticaretin bileşimine baktığımızda, her iki tarafın şirketlerinin hâlihazırda oldukça etkin maliyetlerle üretim yaptıkları ve uzun süredir birbirleriyle rekabet ettikleri için TTYO'nun şirketlere önemli maliyet avantajları sağlayamayacaktır. Krugman'a göre, bir serbest ticaret anlaşmasında iki tarafın piyasalarının yüksek derecede verimsiz olması ve daha önce rekabet etmemiş olmaları durumunda söz konusu serbest ticaret anlaşmasının önemli etkileri olabilecektir (Herrman, 2014). Bu bağlamda, TTYO'nun ardındaki jeopolitik motivasyonları sorgulamak oldukça doğru olacaktır.

İlişkilerin Bozulması

Başkan Trump göreve geldiğinde, ABD-AB ilişkileri belirsiz ve değişken bir çerçeveye oturmuştur. Özet olarak Başkan Trump, AB'nin uzun süredir ABD'den faydalandığını ve artık buna izin vermeyeceğini ifade etmiştir. Bu durumda, AB tarafı, TTYO'nun veya yeni dar kapsamlı bir ticaret anlaşmasının değil esasen transatlantik ilişkinin müzakere sürecinin içindedir.

İlişkideki bu büyük değişimin başka bir nedeni olarak Trump yönetimi ile AB arasındaki küreselliğe ilişkin ideolojik yaklaşımın önemli ölçüde farklı olması da gösterilmektedir. Trump yönetiminin küreselleşme karşıtı duruşunun, AB gibi küreselleşme yanlısı aktörleri ve örgütleri desteklememek, hatta onları “düşman” olarak görmek gibi sonuçları olduğu da savunulmaktadır ("Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on trade", 2018). II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra ilk kez bir Amerikan Başkanı, AB'nin dostluğunu sorgularken ve transatlantik ilişkiyi ABD için kötü bir anlaşma olarak adlandırırken AB'ye verilen NATO güvenlik garantisinden çekilmeyi planlamaktadır. Avrupalı sol-liberal entelektüeller, Amerika'nın dünya siyasetinde her zaman saldırgan bir tutumu olduğunu ifade ederek but tutum konusunda her zaman endişelenmiş olsalar da (Bohle, 2005), TTYO müzakereleri sonrasında bu endişeler Avrupa toplumunda da yayılmış ve Başkan Trump'ın söylemleri ve politikaları bu endişeleri haklı göstermiştir.

AB tarafında, Başkan Trump'ın AB ile ilişkilerinde destekleyici ve içten olmadığına dair keskin görüşler bulunmaktadır. Bu görüşlerin nedeni sadece tarife tehditleri veya TTYO'nun dondurulmuş olmasından değil, Başkan Trump'ın yıllarca ABD'nin en iyi ortağı olan AB'yi bir düşman olarak tanımlamasından ve Brexit'i hevesle desteklemesinden kaynaklanmaktadır ("Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on trade", 2018).

Sonuç

Bu tezde, AB-ABD ilişkilerinin arka planını bu ilişkinin kusursuz bir yansıması olan TTYO ile anlatmaya çalıştım. Tezin başında, AB tarafında TTYO'yu müzakere etmek için jeopolitik sebeplerin neler olduğunu sorduğum araştırma sorusu bu tezde şu şekilde cevaplanmıştır: Transatlantik hegemonyayı sürdürmek, küresel ticarete hükmetmek ve son olarak da AB içindeki sorunları çözmek. Başlangıçta bu tezdeki araştırma amaçları AB'nin TTYO'yu müzakere etme konusundaki jeopolitik motivasyonlarını bulmak; TTYO müzakerelerindeki ekonomik ve jeopolitik nedenleri ayırmak ve AB'nin motivasyonlarında önceliğin ekonomik mi yoksa jeopolitik mi olduğunu anlamak olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu amaçlara, ilk olarak TTYO'yu müzakere etmek için yukarıda belirtilen üç jeopolitik nedeni açıkça tanımlayarak; ikinci olarak, ekonomik ölçeği ve transatlantik ekonomiye ilişkin bazı tahminleri değerlendirdikten sonra ekonomik ve jeopolitik nedenleri ayırarak; ve son olarak, ortaklar arasındaki vergi oranlarının halihazırda

çok düşük bir seviyede olması, ortaklar arasında on yıllardır süren ekonomik işbirliğinin zaten çok güçlü olması ve AB tarafının, Başkan Trump tarafından başlatılan düşmanca yaklaşımlara ve artan gerilimlere rağmen hala ABD ile bir ticaret anlaşması imzalama çabalarının olması gibi faktörleri göz önünde bulundurarak AB'nin TTYO müzakerelerindeki önceliğinin ekonomik değil jeopolitik nedenler olduğu kanısına vararak ulaştım.

Transatlantik ilişkilerin arka planı ve bugün ilişkinin dönüştüğü durum göz önüne alındığında, oy tabanını konsolide etmek isteyen Başkan Trump'ın ABD başkanlık seçimleri yaklaşırken küreselleşme karşıtı, AB karşıtı söylemlerini arttıracığı açıktır. Bu aşamada, ABD ve AB'nin birbirlerine tekrar yaklaşımlarının tek yolu, örneğin, George W. Bush'un 9/11 saldırıları sonrasında neo-muhafazakar politikaları benimsemesi ve Barack Obama'nın Rusya'nın Kırım'ı istilası sonrasında transatlantik ilişkileri pekiştirme girişimi gibi büyük bir krizin her iki tarafın çıkarlarını tehlikeye atmasıdır (Puglierin, "The Next Two Years in EU-U.S. Relations", 2019). Bununla birlikte, Riddervold ve Newsome (2018)'a göre, ABD ve AB'nin daha önce örneğin terörizmle nasıl başa çıkılacağı gibi konularda farklı düzeylerde anlaşmazlıklar ve gerilimler yaşamıştır ancak ABD hiçbir zaman transatlantik ilişkiyi, bu ilişkiye ve uluslararası kurumlara olan yükümlülüklerini sorgulamamıştır. Bu da mevcut gerilimleri önceki krizlerden farklı kılmaktadır. Biscop (2018) 'e göre, "İlk önce Amerika" yaklaşımını yalnızca Başkan Trump dile getirmemiş, diğer tüm Amerikan Başkanları da bu yaklaşımı savunmuş ancak aynı zamanda çok taraflı sistemi korumuştur. Başkan Trump döneminde ise Dışişleri Bakanlığı dramatik şekilde küçültülmüş ve Başkan Trump BM Genel Kurulunda 2017 yılında yaptığı konuşmada çok taraflılığı teşvik etmek yerine "ulusların yeniden uyanması" çağrısında bulunmuştur (Biscop, 2018). Eralp (2019) 'a göre, çok kutuplu bir sistemin yükselişinin ve popülist otoriter eğilimlerin çoğalmasının

mücadele ettiği uluslararası sistemin bu çalkantılı değişiminde, AB'nin çok taraflılığı teşvik etmesi oldukça kritiktir. Bu nedenle, AB çok taraflılaşıma konusundaki eski enerjisini küresel ölçekte yeniden bulmalı ve ABD'ye ve yükselen güçlere karşı elini güçlendirmek için kıtada “birliği” dikey ve yatay olarak tamamlamalıdır. ABD yönetimindeki hoşnutsuzluğa rağmen, AB'nin son zamanlarda Çin'e daha stratejik ve ekonomik olarak yaklaşmak akıllıca bir politika değişikliği olsa da, diğer güçlü oyuncularla işbirliği içinde çabalarını çeşitlendirmeli ve arttırmalıdır.

Sonuç olarak, ABD-AB ilişkilerinin yakın gelecekte eskiye dönmesi imkânsız gibi görünse de, TTYO müzakerelerini başlatan jeopolitik nedenler çok uzun bir ortaklığa ve popülist muhafazakâr bir söylem ile bir anda sona ermeyecek olan ortak bir tarihi ve ideolojik işbirliğine dayanmaktadır. Ayrıca, ABD'deki demokrat parti adayları, Başkan Trump'ın eski müttefiklerle ilgili politikalarının yanlış olduğunu ve ABD'nin NATO'daki taahhütlerini sürdüreceğini açıkça belirterek Başkan Trump'ın yeniden seçilmemesi durumunda ilişkinin daha hızlı onarılacağına dair işaretler vermişlerdir.

TTYO, küresel kural ve standart belirleme hedefi göz önüne alındığında küreselliği yeniden tanımlayabilme kabiliyeti açısından oldukça önemlidir ve gelecekte başarılı olursa, ABD'nin bir kez daha küreselleşme doktrini içinde yer almasına yol açacaktır. Zira böylesine büyük bir ticaret anlaşmasını imzalamak demek tarafların kritik konularda sürekli olarak ortak bir gündem belirlemesi ve yalnızca ticarete değil dış politikada da işbirliği yapmaları anlamına gelmektedir. AB'nin küresel politikadaki gücünü ve iç sorunlarını ve bu sorunların AB'nin avantajlı bir pozisyonla TTYO'ya girmesini nasıl engellediğini değerlendirmesi gerektiğinden, TTYO'nun yeniden müzakere edilmeye başlanacağı zaman pek yakın

görünmemektedir. Görünüşe göre AB'nin önünde, ayrılıkçı hareketler ve artan milliyetçi söylemler nedeniyle, çok taraflılığa dayanan temel değerlerini yeniden tesis etmek için hala çok uzun bir yol bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, çok taraflılık, AB'nin ekonomi, finans, dış politika, güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki iddialı Birlik stratejileriyle varlığını sürdürmesinin tek yoludur. Bununla birlikte, TTYO'nun yeniden müzakere edilmesine yönelik uzun vadeli strateji, AB'nin transatlantik ilişkilerle ilgili mevcut stratejilerine devam etmesi gerektiği anlamına gelmemektedir.

Daha da birleşmiş bir Avrupa, küresel ekonomi ve politika alanındaki AB hegemonyasını devam ettirme konusunda daha büyük bir şansa sahip olacağından, AB tarafı, ABD'nin olmadığı yeni jeopolitik, askeri ve enerji planları ve angajmanları yapmaya başlamalıdır. AB diğer güçlerle işbirliği yapmalı, çıkarlarının örtüştüğü her durumda diğer büyük güçleri ABD'nin günden güne uzaklaştığı çok taraflı kurumlara çekmek için örneğin iklim değişikliği alanında geçici koalisyonlar kurmalı ya da yeni işbirliği mekanizmaları geliştirmelidir. Son olarak, daha sonraki, ancak çok uzak olmayan bir aşamada, ABD'nin yeterli taahhüt göstermesi ve AB'ye eşit bir güç olarak yaklaşması durumunda AB, kendi planlarında ABD'nin rolünü yeniden değerlendirmeli ve transatlantik işbirliğini yeniden canlandırmanın yollarını bulmalıdır.

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Doktora / PhD

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