TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICERS' VIEWS ABOUT THE
CIVILIANIZATION REFORM PROCESS IN TURKEY
(1999-2016)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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Master of Science in Political Science and Public Administration
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September 2019, 186 pages

This study inquires into the impact of the legal and constitutional reforms in civil-military relations field in Turkey, enacted since 1999 in order to curtail the military's political and institutional autonomy on the perceptions of the military officers in terms of the internalization of civilian supremacy. In that sense, this study based on data collected via face-to-face interviews analyzes and reflects the views of a group of mostly high-ranking officers related to the internalization of the notion of democratic civilian control.

The thesis highlights some significant constraining elements for the internalization of the notion of democratic civilian control among the officers on the basis of the findings in the interviews. These are the prevailing traditional dilemmas related to the primacy of national security and regime related issues among the officers, perceptions of civilian control as not yet consolidated as a tradition, the skeptical views of the officers regarding the democratization process in Turkey, and aspects of military education and ideological socialization norms of the military feeding conventional values among the officers. The research concludes that civilian control

should also be carried out democratically because not every civilianization process might result in democratization.

ÖZ

SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: SUBAYLARIN TÜRKİYE'DEKİ
SİVİLLEŞME REFORM SÜRECİNE BAKIŞLARI HAKKINDA BİR ANALİZ
(1999-2016)

Koydemir Avcı, Fatma Serap
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Canan Aslan Akman

Eylül 2019, 186 sayfa

Bu çalışma, 1999'dan bu yana Türkiye'de ordunun siyasi ve kurumsal özerkliğini azaltmak için başlatılmış sivilleşme reformlarının, subayların sivil üstünlüğe ve reformların içselleştirilmesine yönelik algıları üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda yüz yüze görüşmeler yoluyla toplanan verilere dayanan bu çalışma, demokratik sivil denetim kavramının içselleştirilmesiyle ilgili, çoğunlukla üst düzey bir grup subayın görüşlerini analiz etmekte ve yansıtmaktadır.

Bu araştırma, subaylar arasında demokratik sivil kontrol nosyonunun içselleştirilmesini engelleyen bazı spesifik unsurları, mülakat bulguları temelinde vurgulamaktadır. Bu faktörler, Türkiye'de temelde ulusal güvenlik ve rejimle ilgili konularla alakalı subaylar arasındaki yaygın geleneksel ikilemler; sivil kontrolün gelenek halini almamış olması, subayların Türkiye'deki demokratikleşme sürecine ilişkin görüşleri- yani, subayların demokratikleşme sürecinin, devlet işleyişinin her alanında devam ettiğine inanmamaları-; son olarak ise, subaylar arasında geleneksel değerleri besleyen askeri eğitim sistemi ve ideolojik sosyalleşme olgusu olarak sıralanabilir. Çalışma ortaya koymaktadır ki sivil kontrolün demokratik bir şekilde yürütülmesi de önemlidir çünkü her sivilleşme süreci bir demokratikleşmeyle sonuçlanmayabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: sivil-asker ilişkileri, demokratik sivil kontrol, askeri özerklik, Türk ordusu, subayların bakış açıları

To Gülce and Lara

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP   Justice and Development Party

AP   Justice Party

BİLGESAM   Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies

CESID   Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa

CHP   Republican People's Party

DECAF   Democratic Control of the Armed Forces

DGM   State Security Court

DP   Democrat Party

DYP   True Path Party

EMASYA   Security, Public Order and Assistance Units

EU   European Union

FETÖ   Gülenist Terror Organization

MBK   National Unity Committee

MGK   National Security Council

MGSB   National Security Policy Document

MHP   Nationalist Action Party

MSP   National Salvation Party

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Kurdish Workers Party
RP	Welfare Party
RTÜK	Radio and Television Supreme Council
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces
TSSEA	Research on Social and Political Trends
YAŞ	Supreme Military Council
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Question(s), Scope and the Significance of the Study

This thesis deals with a specific component of democratization challenges in Turkey where, the military's guardianship role over the political system has impeded the establishment of the necessary societal and elite consensus over democratic norms. Even after the completion of the Turkish transition to democracy following the last military regime (1980-1983) in the 1980s meant that this challenge to democratization would complicate the consolidation process. As students of democratization have forcefully contended, subordinating the military to elected governments is a key (necessary but not sufficient) condition for democratic consolidation (Valenzuela, 1992, p.87). Since the late 1990s, the consolidation of Turkish democracy process was facilitated by the European Union (EU) accession process where the EU acted as an external anchor speeding up the momentum of change in many areas of democracy. After the official declaration of Turkey's "candidate status" in 1999 for EU membership, a number of crucial legislative and constitutional reforms were passed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) in the face of a strong determination held by the political elites to make up for the deficiencies in the quality of Turkish democracy. Thereafter, the EU Commission decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey starting in January 2005 on grounds that it had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria which called for, above all else, a fully functioning democratic regime.[1] The weight of the Turkish military in domestic political dynamics was a major point of criticism from EU actors and institutions. A democratic framework of civil-military relations in which

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[1] The Copenhagen criteria included stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en)

the military's role is confined to external security has been the norm in Western democracies; yet, the Turkish military's political influence and institutional prerogatives in the past enabled it to constrain and supervise domestic politics in Turkey.

All past military interventions in Turkey, albeit followed by short-lived authoritarian periods, were met with the disapproval of Western Europe leading to the temporary suspensions in its relations with EU. Given the significance of civilian control over the military for democratization from a theoretical perspective, and also for EU political conditionality imposed on candidate and accession countries, in the Turkish reform process towards civilianization especially under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government since 2002 constituted a crucial terrain of democratization process. There have been several studies on the consequences of these democratic reforms for civil-military relations in Turkey. These studies demonstrate two different approaches, and concomitant conclusions, regarding the implications of reforms both on the political and institutional autonomy of TSK and on Turkish democratization. The proponents of the first approach claimed that the political autonomy of the Turkish military was substantially reduced and that the military was finally subordinated to civilian supremacy during the government of AKP (Heper, 2011, pp. 248-250; Narlı, 2009, p.74; Aydınlı, 2009, p.581; Aydınlı et. al, 2006, p.6). This claim was also supported by certain events during which the government challenged the *de facto* power of TSK over political developments, and as it undermined the long-standing impunity accorded to the military officers. On the other hand, the proponents of the second approach who tended to be more cautious regarding the long-term effect of these formal reforms and the new balance of civil-military relations held that although civil-military relations were heading towards a democratic model, the subordination of the Turkish military as an institution to civilian authority through legal reforms would not be sufficient for democratizing civil-military relations (Cizre, 2004, pp.119-120; Aknur, 2013, pp.132,147; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.262; Gürsoy, 2011, p.293; Toktaş and Kurt, 2010, p.389; Sarıgil, 2011, p.273; Michaud-Emin, 2007, p.18). This second approach also considered the reform process insufficient to produce a thorough transformation in the Turkish military's traditional orientation to intervene in domestic politics owing to

its historical legacy, the prevailing security culture and the military's mind-set regarding politics and national security (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.256).

This study examines the impact of those civilianization reforms (legal and constitutional amendments) enacted since 1999 during Turkey's EU accession process in order to carry civil-military relations to a more democratic level on perceptions among the Turkish military officers. The major research question of this thesis is: "How military officers perceive and evaluate the legal and constitutional reforms to curtail the Turkish military's political and institutional autonomy during the EU accession process in terms of the internalization of the norm of civilian control over the military in Turkey. What are the possible reasons for the differences in their attitudes towards those reforms?"

This thesis attempts at exploring answers to this question by reviewing the relevant debates during the reform process and by analyzing the insiders' perspectives towards the reform process through an empirical analysis of a selected group of officers. Other related research questions were formulated in the following way:

- In the perception of the officers, is the package of constitutional changes sufficient to reach a democratic civil-military relations in Turkey? From the perspective of the officers, has there been a significant change in institutional culture of TSK during reform process?

- What other factors can be identified behind the recent transformation in Turkish civil-military relations besides the EU accession process?

- In the views of the officers, do the traditional dilemmas of TSK which put it into an ambivalent position between its traditional mission regarding internal security and regime related issues and its pro-western reformist position continue?

Some scholars dealing with the military problem in Turkey held that the failure to consolidate democracy was, among others, due to the failure of civilian politicians to promote professionalization of the military and have a consensus over civilianization (McLaren, 2008, p.21). While some studies reflecting a variety of perspectives have

so far been conducted on the reform process impacting the political role of the Turkish military, they mostly focused on explaining the process of civilian control over the military enabled by legal reforms. In other words, they generally tend to pursue the issue from the perspective of civilians by taking into consideration civilian motives, incentives, mindset and achievements. Moreover, studies on civil-military relations are mostly descriptive and based on particular assumptions; without empirical insights. That is to say, there are not much studies with few exceptions providing empirical analyses. Hence, as a leading analyst of TSK put it, Turkish military is still "a black box waiting to be opened in scholarly terms" (Gürcan, 2016, p.iii). Thus, there seems to be a need for dealing with and reflecting on the perceptions and attitudes of the military, especially commanders, during and especially after the reform process with regard to these democratic reforms and to the "new" status of the military in civil-military relations. There are also few studies and researches have to date been undertaken to investigate the impact of the reforms on the Turkish military as an institution from the perspective of the officers mainly due to the constraints involved in studying the military as an organization. However, owing to the fact that the military side of this relationship is significant given the historical weight and central role of the military in Turkish politics both during the military-led authoritarianism and democratization processes. Thus, one of the major objectives and contribution of this thesis is to present an analysis based on empirical data to shed light onto the perceptions of the military officers.

For analytical concerns of this thesis, two specific reasons which justify the evaluation of civil-military relations in political science need to be mentioned. The first refers to the idea of conflict which covers six interdependent and interpenetrated dimensions of civil-military relations: economy, finance, technology, culture, society, and politics (Kümmel, 2002, p.67). This indicates that civil-military relations indeed offer a rather large, diverse domain of study. However, two interrelated subjects, namely (i) civil-military problematique and (ii) the relation between democratization process and the position of its military, make the issue of civil-military relations worthy of political research. Termed by Feaver as "civil-military problematique", the concept of civil-military relations signals a tension between civilians and the military. Feaver defined the civil-military problematique as a reconciliation effort between a

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strong military having the ability to do anything and civilians trying to subordinate the military. In that sense, a problem of political agency arises: "How do you ensure that your agent is executing your will, especially when your agent has guns and enjoys more coercive power than you do?" (1996, p. 149).

This civil-military problematique is a consequence of the functional differentiation and specialization within a society over time. Therefore, the military is referred in simplest terms as such specific segment of the society that is mandated by the society or through its government to provide security for the society. However, the military, which is the instrument of a given government, as a sub-group of the larger society commands substantial power resources which can be used to surpass those of the government (Kümmel, 2002, p.68). Therefore, the underlying problem of civil-military relations is the probability of the military becoming a menace to the society while it is an institution created to protect the same society (Akay, 2009, p.9). Societies on one hand want to have strong and effective security forces to protect them, but on the other, they need to impose limitations on the military's power so as not to impose its desire on society (Feaver, 1999, p.214).

Establishing effective democratic civilian control by weakening the military autonomy especially in political systems where the armed forces have played significant political roles and suspended democratic processes through military coups has been a central component of the democratization process. In the relevant literature, transition to democracy is completed by the transfer of power from (military) authoritarian rulers to elected actors (civilians). The next phase of democratic consolidation is a longer process, that of institutionalizing democracy and civilian supremacy, beyond the mere withdrawal of the army to its barracks. In a consolidated democracy, non-elected officials and military cannot exercise policy-making power; there should be no tutelary controls over the policy process (Valenzuela, 1992, p.63). Accordingly, consolidation is the phase where an elected civilian government can itself formulate and implement military and defense policies and manage the military's activities (Serra, 2010, p.28). As Linz and Stepan also explained, the erosion of the political roles of the military is essential for the completion of the transition process:

Democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate the new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial powers generated by the new democracy do not have to share *de jure* power with other bodies (1996, p.3).

The military undermines the democratic consolidation when "it asserts itself as a tutelary power or creates its own autonomous space and takes areas of political decision-making away from the government (Serra, 2010, p.16)." In fact, democratic consolidation is possible with the elimination of the "exit guarantees" laid down during transitions. Exit guarantees indicate that "authoritarian power holders are almost always able to determine the conditions for their extrication from government and to obtain certain guarantees of a share of power in the coming democratic political order" (Özbudun, 2000, p.106). These "exit guarantees" have "four perverse elements" in post-transitional settings: the existence of tutelary powers, existence of reserved domain of authority and policy-making, significant distortions in the electoral process, and non-accountability of the military for its actions during military rule (Valenzuela 1992, pp.62-70). According to Valenzuela, tutelary powers mean that nonelected elites share the policy-making power with elected government. Reserved domains challenge the specific areas of governmental authority as nonelected political actors have privileged access to critical realms of the state. The military is also likely to manipulate the electoral process by excluding some groups (1992, pp.62-67). In Turkey, TSK gained significant exit guarantees after each military intervention and the Constitution of 1982 strengthened all these exit guarantees. Among these, the composition and powers of the National Security Council (MGK), exclusion of the military budget from auditing via Court of Accounts, subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the prime minister, and the structure of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) could be considered as the exit guarantees of TSK which "enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic regime" (Özbudun, 2000, pp.105-112).

After the 1990s, new democracies emerging out of military regimes faced serious risks and challenges where the military has a long tradition of political intervention and retains its extensive political and economic privileges. In such cases, establishing civilian supremacy was a complex process that requires skilled political

leadership, unity among civilian political forces, and civilian expertise on national security matters (Diamond et al., 1997, p.xxix). Clearly, democratic consolidation also needs an institutional framework of democratic civilian control over the military (Przeworski, 1991, p.29). Moreover, this process needs time for civilian and military elites to adapt new structures of authority and develop mutual trust. Particularly crucial is to convince military officers into adopting expanded civilian control which will ensure the nation's security or institutional prestige and integrity of the military (Diamond, 1999, p.113). Hence, it is necessary to change, by persuasion or political learning, the mindset of the military community to achieve a more democratic civil-military relations.

By using Pridham's (1995, pp.168-169) concepts of positive and negative consolidation, Agüero held that civilian elites should learn the ways to progress from negative to positive consolidation. "Negative consolidation" symbolizes the elite satisfaction achieved as a result of the prevention of military rebellion against the process of democratization. On the other hand, "positive consolidation" indicates conscious, long-term efforts by civilian elites to develop policies and the norms by creating a concordance between the military and the goals and institutions of the new democratic regime (1995, p.165). In this context, Agüero used another term "positive reincorporation," to refer to a situation in which;

> while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Using civilian leadership to develop the framework for such a positive incorporation, in which military feels its institutional interests are guaranteed, may ultimately facilitate the expansion of attitudinal change among members of the armed forces in support of a democratic regime (1995, p.165).

From this viewpoint, a degree of autonomy is considered important for securing the military's support for new democratic institutions, and also a pre-condition for their professional behavior, and the pursuit of their mission (Agüero as cited in Serra, 2010, p.26). Related to this, Serra contended however that the ultimate level of consolidation might entrench itself by controlling military's training, its definition as a profession, and its institutional features. Overall, democratization can be possible only after producing a change in mindset of the military and their loyalty to the democratic regime (2010, p.26).

Two important concepts of the analysis in this thesis derived from the literature on civil-military relations are the "civilian control" over armed forces and the "military autonomy." As the relevant literature of the past decade on the issue has come to underline, civilian control refers democratic civilian control of the armed forces in civil-military relations literature. This "democracy" emphasis is significant because not every civilian control is emerged as democratic. Thus, the term "democratic control of the armed forces" (DECAF) was formulated by Western agencies such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU (Cizre, 2004, p.107).[2] In this sense, civilian control refers to the control of the security and defense matters and control of the military based on democratic principles by civilian institutions (Rukavishnikov and Pugh, 2006, p.136). It also refers to a situation where "all decisions of government, including those relating to national security, are to be made or approved by officials outside the professional armed forces in a democracy by popularly elected office-holders or their appointees (Kohn, 1997, p.142)." The objectives of civilian control are "to protect the human rights of all members of society, to align the goals of political leaders and military leaders, to legitimize the use of force, and to curtail the discretionary powers of the military within certain parameters and to avoid autocratic rule (Born, 2006, p.155)."

Back in the 1950s, Huntington also divided civilian control into two categories. Subjective civilian control referred to efforts at maximizing civilian power. However, this maximization always means maximization of "the power of some particular civilian group or groups." In this type, civilian control is related to interests of these civilian groups. On the other hand, objective civilian control denotes maximizing military professionalism. This type of civilian control is the best way to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps. In this perspective, subjective civilian control civilianize the military, objective civilian control militarize the military. Moreover, the antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics, subjective civilian control presupposes this

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[2] It should be stressed that the term civilian control using in this study connotes democratic civilian control and civilianization reforms which were directed to the officers as interview questions are considered within the framework of DECAF.

involvement because in objective control military is politically neutral. However, in the subjective definition of civilian control, varied civilian groups aim to maximize their power in military affairs (1957, pp.80,83-84). These definitions of Huntington created a distinction in theoretical approach when compared to the explanations of Morris Janowitz. Rukavishnikov and Pugh mentioned these two distinct theoretical approaches on how civilian control could be applied. The first one, the "political science approach", was represented by Samuel Huntington; the other, "sociological approach", was pioneered by Morris Janowitz. In the former, military professionalism depended on formal body of laws and regulations, and a formal chain of command. The other approach assumed that "civilian control of armed forces could be completely realized only when the military is integrated into the broader network of societal relations" (2006, p.133). This thesis focused on both formal arrangements and military attitudes towards these, benefiting from both approaches. That is to say, the effects of formal body of laws and regulations, i.e. constitutional changes, on the military in Turkey could be evaluated through Huntingtonian lens. However, the first approach excludes the necessity of perceptions of the military towards civilian control over the military. In that sense, Janowitz's approach is also necessary to uncover the military's attitudes which cannot be treated separately from the relations of TSK with the society, and the roles and missions attributed to TSK throughout the history, as well as its response to the changes.

The second key concept, military autonomy, is used as the opposite of the term civilian control. According to Pion-Berlin, military autonomy refers to the relative independence with which the armed forces could act. There are both institutional and political dimensions to the military's autonomy. The military's professional independence and exclusivity, i.e. a "sense of organic unity and consciousness" of the armed forces (Huntington, 1957, p.10) are the components of institutional autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.84). On the other hand, political autonomy includes military's aversion towards, or even defiance of, civilian control (Abrahamsson; O'Donnell as cited in Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.85). Hence, political autonomy denotes its ability to rise above civilian authority, challenge, circumvent or avoid it (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.85). Serra asserts that the adjustment of armed forces to the progress in democratic consolidation could be directly linked with the reduction of areas of

military autonomy by making them compatible with the rule of law: "Military reform cannot be isolated from the process of transition or general democratic reform" because advanced military reform is linked with progress in the general process. Thus, the general democratic reform and military reform should be implemented together. Otherwise, like any other institution, the military will oppose a reform which they believe only concerns and impacts them (2010, pp.40-43). From this point of view, it can be contended that in Turkey, the EU membership prospect provided a favorable climate for carrying civil-military relations onto a more democratic level by reducing the military's political and institutional autonomy since the path to EU membership involved a total democratization effort to be realized in all constituent elements of the state and the society.

Related to the major research question of this study, a major analytical concern underlying this thesis is the conception that the democratization reform process related to the changing parameters of civil-military relations in Turkey ushered in two dilemmas for the TSK. The Turkish military has historically played a pioneering role in the Westernization process and viewed this as a mission for itself. In the past, military interventions were justified on grounds of protecting the political system and the state against anti-democratic threats. However, the recent reforms restricted the autonomy of TSK and weakened its hand in the mission of protecting the state and democracy in Turkey. Hence, reforms process were in conflict with its traditional mission and institutional interests. In the face of this dilemma, even if reforms apparently undermined the military's position and interests, the EU accession process and the commitment of the military to the democratic regime prevented the Turkish military from opposing the reform process (Gürsoy, 2012, p.5). However, while the military commanders extended full support to the EU-driven reforms, they considered as their red lines two untouchable republican principles of secularism and unity of the state (Unitary state) (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.455). It can be argued that since democratization reforms after 1999 also brought about "ideological fault lines and social, economic and political interests to the center stage," the dilemma of the Turkish military was indeed deepened (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.260). Hence, the major concern of this thesis in terms of analyzing the reactions and attitudes of the officers to the reform process touches on a critical

aspect of democratization in Turkey especially under the AKP period. As part of the second dilemma, the TSK was suspicious about AKP because it was perceived as the continuation of the islamist Welfare Party (RP). However, at the same time, the AKP was implementing a pro-Western agenda from which TSK would not sacrifice as well. The reaction of TSK to some policies of the AKP such as the legal changes which made it easier for graduates of Imam and Preacher Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları) to enter universities (in 2003) and which lifted the headscarf restrictions as well as some developments such as the presidential elections in 2007 and the AKP closure case in the Constitutional Court (which was not accepted) in 2008 can be attributed to the suspicion of TSK about the AKP government. In all these situations, the TSK tried to act as a veto power in domestic politics.

It is thus important to highlight the dilemmas facing the TSK as they indicated that despite the military's centuries-long Westernization mission, the Turkish military has been rigid on certain changes. Hence, a transformation in the established culture within the military is likely to be as important as the constitutional arrangements. It would be naïve to believe that the democratization of civil-military relations can be achieved only through constitutional amendments; hence discussing only the impact of these arrangements is not a comprehensive approach. This perspective misses the spirit of the military culture, which resists change on grounds of providing stability and reducing uncertainty (Siegl, 2008, p.104) and which espouses a conservative ideology (Dunivin, 1994, p.534), and it also underestimates the proactive role of the military in Turkish politics. Establishing a democratic civilian control over the TSK is likely to be more challenging because it had assumed a tutelary role for years, and internalized its role in its institutional culture. Thus, it can be contended that passing legislative changes in order to fulfill the EU membership requirements is likely to be insufficient. The risk is that such reforms may remain on paper if military officers retain a strong tendency to watch and intervene in politics (Gürsoy, 2012, p.2). In other words, to carry the armed forces from the most interventionist position to the most democratic stage, changes within the mindset of the military community impacting on the very definition of the military profession and its attitudes towards society stands out as a major challenge for democratizers (Serra, 2010, p.52). As explained below and in the following chapters, for

democratic consolidation, mindset change and a durable consensus between civilians and military over the military's mission seem to be crucial along with institutional change to understand the impacts of reforms. Hence, the major issue is not only about civilian control over the military and reducing the military's previous privileges; rather changes within the mindset of the military community and the military culture are also important to achieve attitude change in military and to more democratic civil-military relations (Serra, 2010, p.52). It should be also noted that change in military attitude cannot be thought independently from worldwide factors such as globalism, end of the Cold War, change in security perceptions, and rise of professionalism in the military. These dimensions have been influential elsewhere in changing military duties, military organization, changing definition of the military service as a profession and the view of societies toward the military.

The thesis also aims at identifying those factors (through the perceptions of the officers) influencing the military's approach or receptivity towards certain reforms in order to develop certain insights on the changing mindset of the Turkish military during the reform process. Hence, the research aims at uncovering and interpreting the attitudes of the military commanders towards the civilization reforms during the period of 1999 - 2016. In particular, it analyzes the reflection of those reforms weakening the hand of the military vis-a-vis civilians on domestic political matters. Hence, the present study intends to fill a gap in the existing literature on civil-military relations during democratization and also to contribute to the existing approaches and arguments on the impact of legal and institutional reforms on the military in the Turkish democratization process. This study asserts, as its primary hypothesis, that "there are certain factors that condition and constrain the officers' internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy over the armed forces." These are the prevailing traditional dilemmas related to the primacy of national security and regime related issues among the officers, perceptions of civilian control as not yet consolidated as a tradition, the skeptical views of the officers regarding the democratization process in Turkey; i.e. whether the officers believe that democratization process is going on in every sphere of the polity - not just in the civil-military domain - and aspects of military education and ideological socialization norms of the military feeding conventional values among the officers.

1.2. Research Procedure

This thesis is based on a qualitative research methodology. Although this methodology is a measure of relative values, it provides a general outlook about what is investigated (Dey, 1993, p.10). Selected issues, cases or events can be studied in depth and detail through qualitative methodology. A wealth of detailed data about a relatively much smaller number of people and cases via qualitative methods could be produced (Patton, 1987, p.9). In that sense, qualitative research methodology is based on collection of empirical data such as life history, interviews, cultural texts and case studies that define routine and challenging moments and meanings in lives of individuals (Denzin and Yvonna, 2003, p.5). This thesis is also a case study within the qualitative research methodology because it relies on the analysis of a face-to-face interview survey of twenty-two officers. In political science, experiments are not always possible so rather than experimental evidence, observational evidence can be derived from case studies (Crasnow, 2012, p.656). Case study is useful from the most microcosmic to the most macrocosmic levels of political phenomena. At a micro level, political personalities, particular leadership positions and small leadership groups can be studied. At the other level, there are case studies of particular systems of international politics, crises in international relations, and the like (Eckstein, 2011, p.118). Therefore, case studies provide considerable parts of our knowledge about the social and political world (Vennesson, 2008, p.223). Case studies aim at obtaining more detailed information from few exemplars of the phenomenon in question or some particular problem or situation. In other words, regardless of the unit of analysis, one can have a chance to describe that unit in depth, in detail, in context, and holistically via a qualitative case study (Patton, 1987, p.19).

Describing and categorizing the phenomena, and showing how concepts used in the study interconnect are the core of qualitative analysis; so, these questions of how, why and as well as what in an analysis become important (Dey, 1993, p.30). The first step in a qualitative analysis is to describe the phenomenon under study. "To describe is 'to set forth in words', to 'recite the characteristics' of a person, object or event" (Dey, 1993, p.31). From this point of view, it can be said that this thesis is

partly based on a descriptive study because several concepts such as civilian control, political autonomy, and institutional autonomy are described and elaborated. This thesis is exploratory as it considers "how" and "why" questions in every chapter. For example, this thesis considers such questions "why reforms were carried out" and "what they were aiming for"; "whether or not the officers has accepted civilian control, or why and how it has taken place"; "what are the red lines of the army about military autonomy and political autonomy" and "how and why these red lines were shaped." Another method used in this thesis is process-tracing which is "a procedure for identifying steps in a casual process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context" (George and Bennet, 2005, p.176). Process-tracing contributes to defining political and social phenomena and to estimating causal claims (Collier, 2011, p.823), i.e. revealing the relations between possible causes and observed outcomes (Vennesson, 2008, p.231). This method is used especially in Chapter 3 to monitor the cause and effect relation and/or causal chain(s) between the role of the military in the political history of Turkey, cultural heritage of TSK, military coups in Turkey, roots of the political and institutional autonomy of TSK and changes that were triggered by the reform process. Thus, the main concern is not only on what happened, but also on why and how it happened by evaluating the links between different factors. Process-tracing is at the same time a method "to evaluate empirically the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them (Vennesson, 2008, p.233). This is useful especially for Chapter 4 of the thesis while interpreting the responses of the interviewees because their responses cannot be evaluated independently from their general beliefs, legacies, objectives, missions and values of the military as an institution.

The data used in the thesis are obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Process-tracing is also applied for capturing secondary data such as attitudes and military doctrine of TSK. To collect such data, speeches of high-ranking officers and chiefs of general staff and newspapers were analyzed and they were used as direct quotations within the study. Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews with active-duty and predominantly retired officers between January - April 2016. It

is a fact that retired officers speak more freely on politically sensitive questions (Fitch, 2001, pp.67-68). Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-two officers in total in Ankara and Istanbul by the author. Only one officer who was retired did not accept face-to-face interview and this officer sent his handwritten responses through post to the author. (The details of the research procedure are provided in Chapter 4). In general, the interview questionnaire aimed at clarifying the following questions:

-How do the officers define, evaluate and explain the reasons of the changes in civil-military relations in Turkey?

-Which reforms have been more positively viewed or unambiguously approved by military officers compared to others and which factors are at work to shape the military's subjective evaluation of its mission?

-Do the officers share a common approach and attitude towards the changing nature of the TSK's institutional autonomy and political autonomy and their components?

The unit of analysis of this thesis is individual high-ranking officers. Accordingly, a scholarly effort was made in this study to capture individual attitudes, thoughts and perceptions of a group belonging to an institution, the TSK. In that sense, to reach generalizable conclusions on TSK as an institution based on a different analytic, i.e. macro level, could lead to very risky and misleading results. That is to say, this research based on interviews uncovered the insiders' perspectives and subjective evaluations of a selected and limited group of military officers to analyze the process of reforms assessing by the officers. Therefore, being aware of this limitation, certain inferences could still be drawn from the date collected in order to get insights into the perceptions of a group of officers about the impacts of the civilianization process and how the reforms reflected on TSK members. The justification for the selection of this particular sample as well as the limitations of the sample (which mostly comprises retired generals)for generalizable conclusions for the Turkish military are explained further in Chapter 4 where the research process and the data is provided in detail.

1.3. Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1, "Introduction", lays out the significance of making reforms in civil-military field for democratic consolidation and importance of civilization in democratic consolidation by referring to civilian control and military autonomy. It also presents the research questions, hypothesis and research procedure. Chapter 2, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces During Democratization" overviews demilitarization processes of some countries in order to gain insights into the reforms on civil-military relations during democratization. A theoretical background is introduced related to major dimensions, determinants and implications of the military's political and institutional autonomy. Chapter 3, "The Context and the Transformation of the Military Autonomy: AKP Governance and the EU Process" dwells on the recent history of Turkey in terms of civil-military relations by referring to the factors affecting the Turkish military's autonomy. Then, reforms for EU membership are covered as they relate to the political autonomy or institutional autonomy by integrating the military's approach towards these reforms and the impacts of these reforms on the democratization process in Turkey and on the military's political autonomy. A literature review is provided to highlight different approaches by scholars about the impacts of the EU reforms on civil-military relations in Turkey. Chapter 4, "Analysis of Officers' Views and Perceptions towards the Civilianization Reforms" provides empirical evidence about the attitudes of the officer corps towards reforms on civil-military relations in Turkey based on the interview survey. The data obtained from the interviews are supported by analysis about other dimensions behind the democratization process in Turkey such as political stability, case-trials of military officers on charges of plotting coups and the Turkish society's perception of TSK. Finally, Chapter 5, "Conclusions", provides a general summary of the thesis; overviews the research questions, and analyses the hypotheses. It underlines the contributions of the thesis, highlights some new paths for future studies, and introduces a postscript about the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016.

CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING
DEMOCRATIZATION

As explained in Chapter 1, one of the most important issues to promote democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings relates to the area of civilian control over the armed forces, in particular to the curtailment of the military autonomy. In fact, establishing democratic control of the armed forces and reducing military's interventionist capacities are two facets of the same phenomenon; i.e. it is likely that as civilian control increases, military autonomy tends to decrease. This Chapter reviews the major dimensions, determinants and implications of the militaries' political and institutional autonomy. It also highlights significant aspects of the reform processes in democratizing contexts.

2.1. The Challenge of Subordination of the Military to Elected Politicians during and after Transitions

The concern with securing the subordination of military forces to political authority has existed in countries big or small, and regimes ranging from full-fledged democracies such as the United States and France to totalitarian dictatorships such as the communist Soviet Union and China or the fascist Germany and Italy. In many other countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with various mixes of democracy and authoritarianism, civilian control has had particular significance in institutionalizing democratic civil-military relations. During transitions to democracy from military-authoritarian regimes, for example in Latin America, in the 1980s and 1990s, the militaries obtained means of autonomy for themselves which prevented civilians from exerting full control over military affairs. This situation presented an important roadblock to democratic consolidation in the region for a long time because the militaries retained the de facto and institutional autonomy to monitor the political process, and in most cases "remained professionally concerned with internal security" (Agüero, 1992, p.179). These measures were referred to as the

"exit guarantees" in the relevant literature which included reserved domains, tutelary powers, manipulation of the electoral process by the militaries and any situation in which governments are formed without elections (Valenzuela, 1992, pp. 62-70). Due to the weight of these exit guarantees, civil-military relations fell short of the acceptable standards of democratic regimes regarding the role of militaries in the domestic politics of some countries.

The limits to civilian oversight over the military's institutional and political autonomy in most cases stemmed from the legacies of the military regimes and transition processes themselves (Agüero, 1992, p.179). For example, the militaries in Brazil and Chile were still in a critical position to exercise oversight over politics and held tutelary powers. In some cases, they resisted civilian projects to subjugate them and they even revolted against the attempts to hold them responsible by prosecuting them due to their misdeeds during military regimes. This was the case in Argentina in the 1990s where some sections of the military could effectively overturn this process and force civilians to overturn amnesty laws. This case was quite striking since in Argentina where the military had emerged from the transition as considerably weakened in terms of credibility and legitimacy (Agüero, 1992, p.153). Nevertheless, nowhere in the South American cases where democratization progressed in the 1990s, there were no real threats of coups d'état. Hence, the democratization processes on civil-military relations progressed with certain similarities and differences in each country under the influence of different factors.

The Turkish case of the democratic transition after the 1980 military intervention was initiated by the military itself. Thus, the Turkish Armed Forces retained significant powers over domestic politics and kept its prerogatives which bolstered its autonomy vis-a-vis civilians following the transition. There was no new coup attempt in Turkey as well until the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016 (which was planned by an outside actor which infiltrated into the military) (the February 28 intervention in 1997 and 2007 e-memorandum were new types of military interventions into civilian politics), yet the weight of the military over domestic politics and capacity to monitor and direct politics was significant in 1990s, only to visibly decrease in the 2000s

under the EU reform process.[3] The prerequisites for civilian control are formulated differently by different scholars. According to Agüero, for effective democratic civilian control, civilians should be able to formulate defense policies and should supervise the implementation of this policy to weaken the prevailing military views about "civilian incompetence," and thus eliminate military institutional resistance to democratic leadership (1995, pp.19-20, 33). Furthermore, threats which have a potential to empower the military must be overcome or neutralized, and at the same time, defense or security-related missions must be allocated to the military; a reasonable budget must be created and deficiencies in military education and socialization must be corrected by civil authority (Fitch, 1998, pp.37-38, 40). Armed forces tend to prefer preserving its autonomy via managing the military education system as a natural reaction against the efforts to expand civilian control over the military organization (Serra, 2010, p.45).

The requirements for a democratic civilian control were also outlined by various scholars in the literature. The first is democratic governance itself. The role of the military must be defined in national policy, but advice about military missions from uniformed leaders could be accepted. The second requirement is the existence of functioning mechanisms of government by which civilian authority governs military forces. Civilian authority must ensure the military subordination to the governmental structure, but not simply to the president or prime minister. The third element is countervailing power; civilians must resist in two ways against interference by military. On one hand, civilians can come up with other armed bodies in society (such as militia, police, or an armed populace). On the other hand, civilians may employ their knowledge in a way to hold soldiers accountable, and legally punish them where possible or feasible (Kohn, 1997, pp.5-6). Democratic civilian control must be established as a tradition in order to make military as politically neutral and to prevent possibility of military intervention in politics. Consequently,

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[3] There was an attempted coup d'état in Turkey on 15 July 2016, not by the full command chain of TSK, but by a clique of soldiers. The so-called "post-modern coup" of 28 February 1997 was not a direct military intervention but an indirect intervention due to various pressures on the government which eventually resigned in three months.

it was contended that patience, civilian courage, military acquiescence, and public support demanding stable relationship depending on cooperation and mutual respect are required to foster civilian control (Kohn, 1997, pp.1-2).

2.2. Military Autonomy and Democratization of Civil-Military Relations

The concept of military autonomy was analytically divided into two realms referring to institutional and political autonomy as defined by scholars. Stepan, a leading name in the area, described institutional autonomy of the military by using the term "military prerogatives". In that sense, military institutional prerogatives include

> those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes [that] they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relation between the state and political or civil society (1988, p.93).

As Huntington explained, in the interests of its own professional development, the military considers itself different from civilian institutions because it has a sense of organic unity and consciousness by which it claims its institutional autonomy (1957, p.10). The management of violence, their restricted entrance, rigorous training, hierarchy, and rules of conduct are the dimensions which differentiate them from those outside of their field (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.84). Valenzuela provided an extensive list of the indicators of high military (institutional) autonomy. Fixed budgetary resources, which cannot be assessed by democratic government officials, refers to the basic sources of funding for the armed forces; military has an exclusive control over the expenditures of its budget, intelligence gathering and storing of information; elected authorities or their representatives have no or only control on paper about officer promotions, training programs and military doctrine; seniority is the most significant dimension for designation of top-ranking officers and there is a military way of life even in family life via separate housing units for officers, hospitals, schools, clubs, and credit unions (1992, p.87).

As for political autonomy, it refers to the military's capacity and propensity to "act as if it were above and beyond the constitutional authority of the government" (Pion-

Berlin, 1992, p.85). As Pion-Berlin put it, "the degree of political autonomy is a measure of the military's determination to strip civilians of their political prerogatives and claim these for itself" (1992, p.85). Furthermore, autonomy can be either offensive or defensive. Offensively, it symbolizes political purpose, so the military aims to limit the government's prerogatives while its own decision-making powers are expanded. Defensively, it refers to institutional purposes where the military's core professional functions are protected by the military against unwelcome interference by outsiders (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.85). Both in Latin America and Turkey, the justification of military interruptions of democratic rule was based on grounds of military guardianship over national values and interests and feelings of professional superiority over civilians (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.293). The Turkish military used the national unity and territorial integrity, feeding from Kemalist principles, as a justification for political interventions. The militaries in Latin America perceived themselves as the guardians of national security doctrine against regional power brokers (Pion-Berlin, 2011, pp.294-295).

Pion-Berlin investigated military autonomy levels of five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Chile) in ten domains of decisions: personnel decisions, force levels, military training and doctrine, military reform, military budgets, arms production and procurement, defense organization, intelligence gathering, internal security, and human rights. These dimensions were critical to defense and/or reflect points of contention between the government and the armed forces (1992, p.87).

The first dimension is *personnel decisions* including promotions, retirements, and appointments. These are important because they have effects to shape the professional and ideological direction of the armed forces. Thus, establishing the military's own lists about personnel decisions symbolizes high military autonomy. On the other hand, if the military offers two or more officials for each position to a presidential choice and senate confirmation, it refers to a lower level of autonomy. Approval, rejection, or independent recommendation of the president still means lower military autonomy. The second one is *force level.* Democratic governments would prefer small, less costly forces because diplomacy takes priority for the

solution of regional conflicts. Hence, increase, reduction or stability in total force levels are simply measures for military autonomy level (Pion-Berlin, 1992, pp.87-88). The third dimension is *military training or doctrine* which can be related to the creation of *esprit de corps* in the military; here the military prefers its own closed, disciplinary, and conformist nature of the military institutions instead of civilian universities having the unpredictable and divisive influences. Thus, if civilians are prohibited from teaching courses in military academies or higher war colleges and the transfer of soldiers to civilian institutions of higher learning are prevented, then the military autonomy is higher. However, if civilians can create their own curriculum, officers can take courses outside the military institutions and civilians can redefine the military's central defense/security doctrines, then military autonomy is lower (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.88). The fourth is *military reform* including redeployment of troops, operational transformations, upgrading of weapon systems and reorganization of research institutions and training procedures. In fact, the idea of change makes the military resistant to government-initiated reforms, so they want to be the creator of their own designs. In that sense, military autonomy is higher where civilians cannot influence the reform process and it is lower where military and civilians prepare reform proposals together and the civilian defense ministry develops and carries out its own reorganizational plans (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.88). The fifth dimension is *military budget* considered as another indicator for military autonomy. In this area, the level of military autonomy can be defined by providing a measure of annual disbursements of defense funds and military allotments as a percentage of central government expenditures (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.88). The sixth dimension of the military autonomy is *arms production and procurement*: The military prefers full control over the domestic production of defense-related goods. On the other hand, civilians prefer to privatize the arms industry and/or bring it under direct civilian control. Thus, higher and lower military autonomy can be inferred according to the control of defense industry (Pion-Berlin, 1992, pp.88-89). The seventh dimension is *defense organization*. If civilians supervise a single defense ministry, military autonomy is lower but if military controls the defense ministry or there are separate line ministries, then military autonomy is higher (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.89). The eight dimension is *intelligence gathering* as a significant element of military autonomy because it can become a powerful component of the state's

security apparatus. In that sense, military autonomy level can be considered as higher when the military operates its own intelligence gathering process. However, government-controlled information gathering symbolizes the limited military autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.89). The ninth dimension is *internal security*. In internal security matters, if the scope, frequency, and intensity of the nation's internal security affairs are formulated by the military, it means the military has higher autonomy. On the other hand, military autonomy is lower where governments are in control of such things and where the possibility of a military intervention is not a matter or accepted only as a last resort (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.89). The tenth and last indicator for military autonomy is *human rights*: In democracies, it is argued that officers are citizens first and therefore subject to the higher laws of the land and of the international community. Nevertheless, the military defends that their missions are different from the civilian life because of war conditions, so they demand their own jurisdiction. In this situation, if the military has its own judicial system, then military autonomy is higher, but if the military is fully subject to civilian laws, it represents lower military autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.90). Pion-Berlin grouped these areas in terms of the axes of levels of autonomy and professional-political continuum as in Table 2.1. (1992, p.93).

On the basis of these criteria, Pion-Berlin stated that in the 1990s, the armed forces emerged as more powerful in Brazil and Chile than in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. Moreover, armed forces in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru possessed much more control over education, doctrine and training but exhibited less control over budget, force levels and defense organization. In Brazil, the armed forces remained as a significant political actor because during the democratization process which was a successful state-led capitalist development period between 1968 and 1979, the military controlled the substance, pace and intensity of the changes. Although not as high as in Brazil, in the 1980s, there were higher levels of military autonomy in Chile. Although the Chilean Armed Forces also set the rules for disengagement, they could not exert full control over the pace or outcome of the transition. Uruguay and Peru where military autonomy was moderate, the militaries were regarded as responsible for poor economic performance which led to the erosion of their legitimacy. Finally, the low level of military autonomy in Argentina after the transition was based on a

combination of three reasons: the junta's failures, decrease of military morale after the defeat in Malvinas War and resultant loss of all powers to set pace and dimensions of the transition to civilian rule (1992, pp.90-92).[4]

Table 2.1. Defense Issues, Military Autonomy, and Professional-Political Continuum

		Professional	Professional-Political	Political
LEVELS OF AUTONOMY	High	• Junior-Level Personnel Decisions • Military Doctrine • Military Education • Military Reform		• Human Rights
	Medium		• Arms Production/Procurement • Military Budget • Defense Organization	• Internal Security • Intelligence Gathering
	Low	• Force Levels	• Senior-Level Personnel Decisions	

Nevertheless, the balance of power shifted in favor of civilians in the above mentioned five Latin American democracies during the past two decades. Civilian control was achieved both legally and practically, and the militaries respect this situation. Pion-Berlin looked at specific changes to explain this new type civil-military relations in Latin America; the construction/re-organization of the defense ministries, military downsizing, militaries' loss of control in terms of formulating national policies, military court jurisdictions, internal security forces and civilian supporters,

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[4] Malvinas War was between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982 to control of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and resulted in defeat of Argentina.

new type of top commanders who are presidentially authorized and new type of military missions which are controlled by civilians (2005, pp.26-27). In general, reasons triggering this power shift in favor of civilians in Latin America depended on two major international developments. At the end of the Cold War when communism demised and was no longer a threat, the internal security perception changed. That is to say, with the effects of forging elite consensus on democratic government and market economy, there was no need for the military's protection against Marxist or populist left. Thus, it brought new role definitions to the government and the military. Meanwhile, international financial institutions and the United States insisted on military budget cuts and military downsizing to support neo-liberal economic reforms (Ruhl, 1998, p.258).

Specifically, Chile emerged to have more democratic civil-military relations than Brazil because Chilean legal barriers which were created by the Constitution of 1980 were more robust. Additionally, Chilean political parties had higher organizational strength than those in Brazil and politicians in Chile have more commitment to popular sovereignty and social reforms. Thus, Chilean politicians could make more useful calculations for weakening the political power of military and survival of the democracy (Hunter, 1997, pp.146-147). In contrast, Hunter argued that although Peru followed the same pattern with other Latin American countries to reduce the military prerogatives, the demilitarization process was more troublesome and slower because of the economic crisis and unprecedented guerilla violence inflicted by Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru. These examples indicated that to reduce military power and achieve more democratic civil-military relations, countries should have a minimal level of political and economic stability (1997, pp.171-172).

Outside of Latin America, Spain stood out as a significant example to understand the construction of democratic civil-military relations. Linz and Stepan argued that Spanish democracy was already consolidated in 1982 by the election of Socialist Party. After the 1981 coup attempt, General Milans del Bosch and Colonel Tejero were imprisoned. It highlighted the completion of consolidation because neither the military nor the civil society attempted any politically significant movement asking amnesty for these two names (1996, p.108). This underlined the significance of

attitudes of the military and reaction of the civil society against a military-related issue for democratic consolidation.

To recognize how important the reform process is in constructing democratic civil-military relations, institutional reforms carried out in Spain can be explained briefly. Zaverucha started his analysis of the democratization process of civil-military relations in Spain by examining the status of the central intelligence service of the country (Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa-CESID) founded in 1977. The organizational affiliation of the agency was gradually weakened: A Ministerial Order in 1982 defined the fundamental duty of the CESID as to supply the Prime Minister's intelligence needs; then CESID was organically affiliated with the Defense Minister, but functionally subordinated to the Prime Minister in 1984 with a Royal Decree. Now, in democratic Spain, it was forbidden to use the intelligence service apparatus to ensure internal security. Furthermore, since 1978, all Defense Ministers had been civilians in Spain (Zaverucha, 1993, pp.286-289). Zaverucha also explained the developments about defense matters in the democratic consolidation process of Spain. In 1981, the Organic Law No. 4 provided that the government had the authority to assign or remove the military in engaging missions to uphold public order. Then, in 1984, the Organic Law brought some changes such that the Defense Minister had certain responsibilities related to defense and military policy. However, only the Prime Minister and Parliament had the authority to approve defense laws and budgets, and declare and conduct war. Moreover, police forces and the military were separated in the Constitution of 1978 and the number of civilians in the police force was increased. There was a single jurisdiction over both civilian and military offences after 1978; and the jurisdiction of military courts was restricted only to discipline, desertion, spying and indecent conduct. Hence, civilian courts were automatically competent to try coup attempts (1993, pp.290-295).

A similar process about reforming the judicial system started in 1984 in Argentina (Zaverucha, 1993, p.295) during which civil-military relations progressed toward a democratic model after 1983 (Fitch, 2001, p.79). The Argentinean military's old-style prerogatives were eliminated; the powers of the civilian minister of defense were reinforced; military salaries and budgets were reduced; and the ministries took over

the control of the military industries from the individual services. Perhaps, the most significant indicator of the military's subordination to civilians was the trials of military officers because of human rights violations during the military regime (Fitch, 2001, p.79).[5] Scholars like Pion-Berlin and Hunter concluded that professionalization and revisions of the military's institutional roles directing it away from the internal security issues were also very important factors which facilitated the military's withdrawal from politics (Diamint, 2003, p.44). The toughest test of the military about reduction of military autonomy was its role in internal security. In Argentina, with the 1988 National Defense Law, missions of the military and military intelligence agencies were limited to external security matters and military planning about internal conflicts was forbidden. However, these restrictions were not entirely implemented and the military in some cases was employed to uphold public order. Overall, however, there were consistent limitations on the internal security roles of the military. Although there were conflicts between the military and politicians about internal security issues, the military used democratic channels and methods rather than military revolts or disobedience to the civilian regime (Fitch, 2001, pp.80-81).

Pion-Berlin identified a visible change in the militaries' attitudes towards the acceptance of democratic norms in Latin America. That is to say, although armed forces disagreed with civilians, they implemented civilians' decisions. In addition, there was a new generation of officers who deferred to the positions of democratic authorities. This new generation also distinguished military's discreditable practices of the past from their institution, history, rituals and traditions. However, due to the lack of well-trained civilian staff in defense ministries and lack of attention to defense among civilians and politicians, the process of fully institutionalizing democratic civilian control in the region was slow (Pion-Berlin, 2011, pp. 294, 300, 301). To achieve this aim, a set of strong, well-staffed, civilian-led organizations to devise, advise, and manage defense policies, as well as to exert oversight on military operations are needed. This issue is important and is highlighted by many authors (Diamint, 2003, p.44). The ability of civilians to develop expertise in defense issues to surpass the military in this regard by strengthening defense ministries proved to

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[5] Military regime ruled Argentina between the years of 1976-1983, and these trials were started under democratically elected government of Raul Alfonsin.

be no easy task for many countries (Agüero, 1992, p. 178). As Pion-Berlin indicated, a longer-term structured relation needs stable and supportive encounters between political officials and military personnel (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.301).

Stepan, identified two problematic issues relevant to democratic civilian control of the military: articulated military contestation against the policies of democratic leadership and military institutional prerogatives. Articulated military contestation includes some potential conflict areas such as human-right violations committed by the previous authoritarian regime. Regarding institutional prerogatives, the military reacts to initiatives of democratic government about a new type of organizational mission, military structure and military budget (1988, p.68). Concerning the articulated military contestation, Stepan used military institutional prerogatives to explain the military autonomy levels of Argentina, Uruguay and Spain. In this respect, he charted a civil-military relations model in democracies by using the areas where the military was privileged or autonomous. He maintained that military prerogatives refer to the military's peculiar right or privilege within the state apparatus, its internal governance, and extra-military areas. There are eleven low, moderate and high levels of potential military prerogatives. Low level symbolizes the de jure and de facto effective control of the prerogatives by the officials and sanctioned procedures and institutions by the democratic regime. Despite the de jure rejection of the military's prerogatives, if the democratic government cannot effectively exercise this prerogative, then, the military prerogatives would not be categorized as low but as moderate (1988, p.93). Stepan explained military autonomy levels in some areas such as military's role in intelligence, promotions, defense organization, and internal security in a similar way as Pion-Berlin. Different than the military autonomy dimensions listed by Pion-Berlin, Stepan underlined some other important dimensions: the role of the chief executive of the military, active duty military participation in the cabinet, the role of legislature and police, the role of civil servants in the security field, and the military's role in state enterprises and legal system (1988, pp.94-95). After explaining both concepts of military contestation and military prerogatives, Stepan combined them as the second step of his model. In his opinion, it is possible that military can go from a high prerogatives position to lower one without contestation. Such a situation would occur in the

restoration path of re-democratization. Another possibility is the combination of low articulated contestation and high military prerogatives. Figure 2.1. presents combination of these two dimensions analytically (1988, pp.98-99);

Figure 2.1. Two dimensions of civil-military control

Stepan's model helps to find the location of a democracy after a transition period in terms of civil-military relations and recognize the types of civil-military problems in this democracy (1988, p.102). Stepan applied this model for Spain, Argentina and Uruguay and identified types of civil-military relations in these countries by using dimensions of military contestation and military prerogatives. Spain was the only country which came close to building a mutually accepted civilian control in the 1980s. Uruguay also made significant progress in reconstructing the military prerogatives. The problem in Uruguay was the resistance of military to their physical appearance in courts on human rights. De jure, Argentina had lower military prerogatives as in Uruguay but de facto civilian governments came to enjoy less control over the military than Uruguay (1988, p.121).

Serra introduced a specific model to sketch the continuum of military autonomy during the process of establishing civilian control. It was argued that the adjustment of the armed forces to the process of transition to democracy can be studied by

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identifying the reduction of military's reserve domains in areas of autonomy to make them compatible with the rule of law. In this context, he specified seven stages at work during the transition and consolidation processes (2010, pp.43, 48).

At the stage of *the control of political power* which is the first stage of transition, the president or head of state is usually from the military. Decision-making bodies composed of armed forces and military representatives occupy many political posts. Military personnel also occupy, control and operate the internal security apparatus, including the information and intelligence services (Serra, 2010, p.44). At the stage of *the military as guardians of national essences* which is the second stage of transition, the armed forces think that they are independent from the state administration and above politics and parties. They do not consider themselves as an arm of government, but they act according to what their mission demands (Serra, 2010, p.44). Armed forces can limit reforms or veto particular actions at the stage of *the military as constraints on government policy* which is the third stage of transition. In such cases, the military usually has full autonomy and directly intervenes in politics and the organization of the state (Serra, 2010, p.44). At the first level of consolidation, military is the *defender of their organizational and operational autonomy*. This level usually emerges when the military has lost or is losing the probability of intervening in politics and state maintenance. They respond to this situation by keeping civil authority out of those fields. They consider to be the reserved area of the military general staff (Serra, 2010, pp.44-45). In the second stage of the consolidation, *formal, but partial, acceptance of civil supremacy*, the military is subject to the laws. However, they reject certain orders and act on their own initiative which is not desired or ordered by civil authorities (Serra, 2010, p.45). At the level of *the retaining of ideological controls over the military* which is the third stage of consolidation, the military subordinates to civil supremacy in a way civil authorities control their organization and operations. Nevertheless, the military strictly tends to control their professional profile and values via managing the military training and accessing to the officer class (Serra, 2010, p.45). The last stage of the consolidation is *democratic civil control over the armed forces*. In this situation, the military policy is defined by civilians: The Minister of Defense and the legislature could exert control over the armed forces and the judiciary system includes military

justice. However, this level is not an end and does not refer to a context in which no tension and conflict exist, which points to the fact that governments tend to follow an active military policy even in consolidated democracies (Serra, 2010, p.45).

In this consolidation process, Serra proposed a series of norms as a reform guide of the military. First of all, to make progress, government should manage political events related to the reform. At the same time, government should control changes in the military's professional profile or activity. Secondly, studying and specifying both departure point and destination in terms of the political situation at the start of the reform and during its implementation are necessary before starting a process of reform. Thirdly, if there is no prospect of continuity, it is very difficult to carry a process of reform to conclusion. Lastly, it is necessary to change the profession's profile, ideology and general ambience of the society about their approach to the general process of modernizing ideas and habits (2010, pp.63-65). Hence, it is obligatory that military community and its very definition of the military profession and attitudes towards society should change in order to carry armed forces from the first or the most interventionist positions to the final, most democratic positions (Serra, 2010, p.52).

In order to achieve consolidated civil-military relations, Serra underlined four strategies on the part of civilians. The first one is applying a general programme that responds to the need to advance along the three axes. The second one is the scheduling and sequencing of measures in the programme. That is to say, for example, the curricula of military academies should not be changed before ensuring the subordination of the military to the government. Hence, just making constitutional amendments is not enough; so, a regulation should be applied before proceeding to the next measures. Third, defense policy and military must be considered as a state policy, not of a party policy, which is valid at a particular time period. Fourth, if the government takes the initiative in the whole process, both the reform programme and its implementation become easier; so, the government should set the stages and orders of the process. In that sense, the general aim should be to reach a context where the military does not question civil supremacy

rather than to achieve a stage where problems in civil-military relations do not exist (2010, pp.155-157).

Serra, who exemplified his model through the Spanish case, identified 1982 as a turning point in the consolidation and military reform in Spain. From the beginning of the transition to autumn 1982, there was considerable progress in terms of reducing military intervention in political life, military autonomy and establishing democratic relations. These advances, however, were made at the cost of a high level of conflict because of a coup attempt in 1981 and another coup attempt prior to the elections on 28 October 1982. The end of the 1981 coup trials and the 1982 elections marked the period of democratic consolidation, in which the government could implement proper plans on redesigning of military and defense policy and the implementation of the reforms for consolidation (2010, pp.35, 37). Thus, Spain achieved democratic consolidation in 1982 when the Spanish security policy was integrated into the Western European Union (WEU), cooperating with NATO and there were new accords with the United States. In 1989, the Spanish Armed Forces was formed like a branch of the state administration with the Law Regulating the Conditions for Military Personnel. At international level, there were also some other developments affecting the Spanish military which included the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War (2010, p.37).

To sum up, Pion-Berlin, Stepan and Serra highlighted the fields of examination to draw a general picture of civil-military relations in a country. While democratization reform programmes were similar in most instances, the outcomes varied by country depending on specific national contexts and dynamics, with some leading to more, and some leading to less, democratic civil-military relations. Ultimately however, the level of military subordination to civilian authority and change in military attitudes tend to shape the nature of democratic civil-military relations in a country. Therefore, it can be argued that those countries whose militaries internalized the reforms and changed their attitudes achieve more democratic civil-military relations, underlining the necessity to change the military attitude. Although there are similar challenges in Turkey with

other countries, it is necessary to look more closely to the underlying factors of the political and institutional autonomy of the military in the Turkish case. Furthermore, it is significant to discuss the effectiveness of reforms and the nature of the process which create an mindset change in TSK.

2.3. The Significance of the Officers' Perceptions and Consensus between Civilians and Officers

Focusing on military's perceptions which are indicators of acceptance or rejection of reforms reducing military autonomy is an important issue to consider the process in establishing more democratic civil-military relations. Changes in military attitudes determine whether a country has a democratic regime or whether there is still military domination behind a civilian facade. As Kümmel pointed out, the issue of civilian control of the military is largely considered from a civilian perspective. Nevertheless, the military side should also be evaluated, i.e. as to how to change the viewpoint of the military. In that sense, the agreement or consent of the armed forces to be operable and efficient raises two main requirements of a legitimate civilian control (2002, pp.71-72). Bland also touched on this issue by stating that civilian authority has democratic legitimacy, but the armed forces have the guns. He added, "even if the idea of civil control is embedded in the officer corps, one cannot avoid the conclusion that it resides there because officers accept it, not because the civil authority has imposed it" (2001, p.531). This demonstrates that democratic civilian control and military's perceptions on this control are one within the other. In practice, military attitudes are formed by interacting with other actors, so their attitudes do not exist in isolation (Fitch, 2001, pp.67, 71, 78). That is to say, trust in civilians and politicians, political stability, relations of the armed forces with other actors, its cultural structure, history and missions, culture of the society and national and international threat status of the country are the dimensions which should be considered while evaluating changes in military attitudes.

Subjecting the militaries to new laws does not automatically bring about the subordination of the military to civilian authority (Pion-Berlin, 2001, p.11) because subordination of the armed forces necessitates internalization of these laws. There

are "us-and-them" classifications in the military culture, i.e. "them" being the enemy, the criminals, the general public, the media but also the managers as well as the politicians (Soeters, Winslow and Weibull, 2006, p.247). It can be argued that overcoming this distinction increases possibility of subordination of the military and creates a mindset change in the military. For this reason, civilians should be more involved in defense issues and there should be more civilian experts in the field of defense policy (Fitch, 2001, p.80). Serra asserted that in order to guarantee military loyalty to democracy, there must be sufficient changes in the values and professional profile of the military while military policies are implemented in the period of consolidation (2010, p.30).

Moreover, for a mindset change to take hold to promote military subordination to civilians, politicians must be resolute and committed especially when the changes in military's institutional autonomy such as downsizing, promotion, recruitment are in question. The consistency and commitment of civilians about military reforms are significant because more time is needed for a change in the military's value system or their professional profile (Serra, 2010, p.38). As Serra explained, if the military sees "a light at the end of the tunnel" about their privileges and professional profile changes, they adopt a positive attitude to the democratic system. For this reason, the political class should retain its credibility in its relation with the armed forces and disposed to carry process of democratization on all fronts (2010, p.33, 38). For example, in Brazil, the military tended to be more visible and it demanded more from the government especially between mid-1993 and mid-1994 because of the weakness of popular support for the president (Hunter, 1997, p.144). There were significantly ambivalent attitudes on the part of Brazilian citizens toward democracy due to corruption among civilian politicians and the impeachment crises (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp.171-172).

The attitude of the military in the framework of civil-military relations mostly manifests itself in two areas. Usually, high-ranking officers think that they have the right to be of opinioned on political issues, and often, they do not abstain from speaking out by expressing the attitude of soldiers on these. According to Hunter, one of the most significant manifestations of the Brazilian military's failure to fully

internalize the norm of political subordination in the 1990s was that a considerable part of the officer corps still thought that they had a right to define "permanent national objectives and make pronouncements on and oversee developments of broad political and social significance." These actions were the indicators that officers still considered themselves as the defender of the nation and the watchdog of the government (1997, p.144). Secondly, they did not trust civilians or consider them capable. The second attitude could already be seen as one of the reasons for the first attitude. For example, General Leonidas Pires Gonçalves who was the Minister of Army in Brazil in 1986 once stated that

> I am a military man who has also a political aspect so I have a right to express this aspect and nobody can deny this right of me. I am both a soldier and Minister. As a Minister, I consider that I have the right to say some things about political issues (Stepan, 1988, pp.104-105).

The reason behind this discourse relied on the military's feeling of distrust towards politicians. Many officers considered civilian politicians as such people who were partisan and had electoral considerations rather than having "national interest" (Hunter, 1997, p.144). Like their European counterparts, Latin American militaries perceived politicians as lacking ability, selfish and corrupt and considered themselves as more talented, unselfish and ethical (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.298).

In the Turkish case, it needs to be underlined that there has been a strong military tendency to consider politicians unprofessional (Heper, 2011, p.248). TSK always defined itself as a "highly professional institution, superior to civilians and politicians" (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.297). That is to say, military officers considered civilians less capable as they became professionalized. The TSK defined the civilian world with those words; "praetorianism, instability, inefficacy, careerism, populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.156)." If these were the views of military officers, then it was not complicated to understand transformation of the idea of professional superiority to political intervention. In other words, if the military thinks that they are more capable, then they feel responsible to intervene "for the sake of nation" (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.298). However, as explained, this attitude has changed in most Latin American democracies. Similarly, it was argued that Turkey where officers in the 2000s came to believe that "civilians have

the right to be wrong" because on the whole, they did not see themselves as guardians to save the nation from the ineptitude of politicians (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.301; Heper, 2011, p.241).

When military interventions based on such grounds as national unity, national security, territorial integrity and ideology, the main discourse of the Armed Forces was usually to restore political stability. According to Pion-Berlin, in Latin America, during military regimes, militaries believed that political stability would be achieved only if the military were in charge. On the other hand, in Turkey, the TSK returned its barracks when order and stability were restored (2011, p.296). In that sense, in Turkey both military regimes after 1960 and 1980 interventions started a reform path to democracy; and through making a new constitution, they organized the conditions and modalities of the transition and secured a significant political influence (Özbudun, 2000, p.24). Thus, it can be contended that changes in considerations over political stability has impacts on the perceptions of militaries. The situation in Turkey after 2002 was also striking because a political party, i.e. AKP, which won 13 elections in 16 years has meant political stability. Moreover, political stability in a country also affects perception of the society about its military (Aydınlı, 2009, p.581). Although TSK was always "the most trustworthy institution." The Turkish public did not give any credit to the military for the latest intervention (the so-called e-memorandum of April 27 in 2007). Moreover, people started to act more in line with long term aims with institutionalized political parties and at the end, people tended to agree with civilian control over the military (Hunter, 1997, p.145). Hence, "a cultural shift in public attitude and opinion" is also important along with structural changes because the society starts to question conventional values constituting public good (Moskos, William and Segal, 2000, p.4).

As explained, one of the most important issues in the democratization process is reduction of the military's political and institutional autonomy. However, militaries are likely to extend control over their organizations and attempts from outside by entrenching the elements that set them apart from the rest of society (Serra, 2010, p.43). Even in consolidated democracies, some circumstances such as time and place, personalities, personal or political ambitions of senior military officers and

leading politicians, and conditions that give the military prestige and weight in public opinion have an influence on the balance between the military and civilians. War and security are also significant while balancing this relationship because during or after a crisis or war, the military can limit civilian influence in military affairs by using its expertise or public standing. But even beyond such circumstances, democratic civilian control is associated with how each side sees its role, set of ideas, institutions, and behaviors. The possibility of military interference in political life includes all these dimensions (Kohn, 1997, p.4). Consequently, in general, habits and perceptions are also as important as constitutional and institutional factors for democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.5). In other words, the attitude of the military towards democratization process is as vital as all other steps.

Although democratic civil-military relations depend on the civilian executive control of the military, this does not simply mean the maximization of civilian power at the expense of the military (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, 2002, p.36). Therefore, in order to establish a democratic control over the armed forces, besides controlling of the definition and development of defense policy by civilians, the military should limit itself to implementing decisions of civilians (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, 2002, p.38). For instance, the Brazilian military resisted democratic civilian control over the military by keeping its military prerogatives (Zaverucha as cited in Castro, 2002, p.100). In that sense, it is controversial whether democratic civilian control initiatives directly create positive perceptions among military members continuing in the line of this civilian control of the military. Hunter contended that two policy strategies are important in the establishment of democratic control of the armed forces. The first one is extending the influence of public officials over policy spheres affecting military autonomy, and the second is to support the military officials for self-control by imposing on them non-political roles and norm of subordination to civilians. While former includes outside regulations of the military institution, the latter involves generating changes in the military and restricting their professional responsibilities (1997, p.142).

A crucial base of democratic civilian control must be the military institution itself. The military should stand for political neutrality in the sense of avoidance under all

circumstances any interference with the constitutional functioning or legitimate process of government, and considering itself as the part of the people and the nation rather than a particular party, agenda, or ideology (Kohn, 1997, p.6). According to Fitch, the absence of military prerogatives does not simply refer to democratic civil-military relations; so, there are three attitudinal dimensions of civil-military relations in a democracy. Those are political subordination of the armed forces, subordination of the armed forces to the rule of law and to the policies established by civilian authorities (2001, pp.61-63). Analyzing the extent of attitudinal change in the armed forces is important to assess the extent of subordination of the military to civilian authority. The significance of forming new military attitudes is related to the distinction between formal laws and actual practices for democratic civil-military relations because it is difficult to expect from the military to carry out everything in the law without experiencing an attitudinal change (Beetham, 1994, p.31). For instance, in Brazil, Article 142 of the Constitution states that one of the tasks of the military is to "maintain law and order" upon authorization from the government. Legally, it can be seen as an improvement over earlier constitutions; practically, however, the armed forces intervened in domestic affairs by limiting agrarian reform or crushing labour strikes (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.98).

In the Turkish case, before it was amended in 2013, Article 35 of the Internal Service Code of the Armed Forces stipulated that "the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.295)." The general view was that this article provided a basis for military interventions in Turkey. However, this article was amended in 2013 and the words "protect" and "safeguard" were replaced with "defend"; and "threats and dangers from abroad" and "deterrence" were used to emphasize the military's role in external defense rather than its former domestic political role (Bardakçı, 2013, p.421). It is obvious that this article can no longer be a basis for military interventions by this constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the guardianship role of the military was somehow cultivated in the military culture independent of whether the military adopted it as a mission or it was imposed. Here, the vital point is that it was embedded in the institutional culture of TSK. It is very

difficult to make changes in the larger cultural framework of the military but as a response to change in a society's culture, the advance of technology, and the impact of leadership, this military culture is also likely to change over time (Murray, 1999, p.28). Thus, in order to change this guardianship role of the military, which has become a part of military culture for years, it is undeniable that military attitudes have to become more democratic.

Any change in military culture is likely to be also conditioned by international and internal developments. Several processes can be cited including improving standards of living; increasing social, economic, and spatial mobility; advancing urbanization; enhancing average levels of education; differentiation and specialization in the working world; accelerating technological advances; individualization; and, last but not least, emergence and strengthening of world-societal and cosmopolitan values and orientations" (Kümmel, 2006, p.428). This reflects shifts in the normative system, value-order of societies in such a way that the individual commitment to community-determined and community-oriented lifestyles and traditions are diminishing, whereas adherence to ideas and conceptions of self-realization is increasing. Depending on these developments, in the most advanced and modern societies, there is a demilitarization trend which refers to a "war-free society" (Moskos, 1990) and even a "post-military society" (Shaw, 1991) (Kümmel, 2006, p.428). Similarly, Inglehart underlined a shift in modern societies from materialistic to post-materialistic attitudes and value orientations. With a traditional emphasis material security and wellbeing have replaced with participation, aesthetics and self-fulfillment. A significant and growing portion of society adopted those new values (1977, pp.3, 22, 42, 363). This triggered a public pressure towards transparency and public participation in all issue areas which bears on a pressure towards the democratization of security politics and of the armed forces themselves (Baechler as cited in Kümmel, 2002, p.79).

Thus, in this new world order, changes in the perception of threat and security are significant in terms of ushering changes in the value attributed to the military by civilians and in the role of the military. The findings of a study in Germany demonstrated that people give less importance to military security than income

security, social security, job security and ecological security. Military security takes place at the end of the list even among the soldiers (Kümmel, 2001, p.25, 30). A similar study in France produced results similar to that in Germany where the French people relegated the values associated directly with military and national security to the bottom in the list of priorities (Vennesson, 2003, pp.37-39). Hence, security started to refer mostly to social security, income security, security against crime and violence in the early 2000s (Fleckenstein, 2000, p.84).

Regarding professionalization of armies, after the Cold War ended, a transition started from the mass army to the professional force as a new standard model for military mobilization (Burk, 2006, p.118). It is necessary to introduce different definitions of professional military to reveal its effect on changes in military attitude In Huntington's view, "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within state" (Huntington, 1957, p.84). The positive correlation asserted by Huntington between loyalty to military ideal and professionalism is problematic. The definition of military ideal may vary by country and may even lead to military involvement in politics. For instance, the Turkish military adopted as its mission the protection of and nation and political stability from all kinds of threats as its role which ultimately became the military ideal. Thus, TSK was always involved in politics for the sake of this ideal. Thus, it can be argued that professionalization depending on Huntington's definition may not automatically provide a genuine democratization in civil-military relations.

Moskos also made a professionalization definition through classification in military organization with regard to orientation of employees such as Institutional vs. Occupational. On the one hand, in institutional orientation, the primary commitment is to the military institution. Leisure time activities, family issues, residence and marketplace economy are relatively irrelevant. Military and its values duty, honor, country are the most important things. In this type "military [is] more than just another job." On the other side, in occupational orientation, there are segmental commitment to military institution, separation of workplace and residence, and importance of marketplace economy. In this case, working in the military is considered "just another job." As he stated that even conventional military systems

have some occupational imperatives (Moskos, 1988, pp.15-26; Moskos, 1981, pp.2-4).

Overall, the above explanations are important in terms of revealing the effect of different military organizations on the process of military socialization because "military organization mainly strengthens the attitudes and values" (JeluSic, 2006, p.356). On this specific subject, it is more appropriate to explain professionalism as the new duty definitions of the armies. When we look at the professionalization in terms of the new task definition, it is possible to consider two important organizational changes. First of all, the performance of military organizations is incrementally moving away from violence and aggressive behavior, i.e., because of new missions and tasks; the traditional aggressive, warrior-like culture is gradually transforming (Soeters et al., 2006, p.247). The role of the military expanded to include such tasks as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention (Kümmel, 2002, p.77), so relations between the military and civilians were improved. Secondly, military service is no longer perceived as serving to the society, but as a profession for monetary gain to earn money. Short-term contracts break the idea that "one is part of the military for the rest of one's life, and hence the idea that it is worth sacrificing 'everything' in order to be a military person" (Soeters et al., 2006, pp.243-244). In the Turkish case, Gürcan's (2016) study based on in-depth interviews and surveys with Turkish military officers supported the above conclusions and demonstrates changing military culture starting especially from lower ranks in TSK. According to the findings of this research, changing perceptions in the lower ranks included the change from a collectivist mentality to an individualistic one; change from "absolute obedience to the orders" to "respect for the superiority of the law;" the change from value centric officership to focusing on financial goals and careers (2016, p.25). Thus, these changes seem to suggest a "new" trend different than the old values and institutional culture in TSK starting from the younger new generation.

Overall, then, changes in the organization and role of the military, perception of security and threats, security policies, and in the values attributed to the military by societies have provided the basis for transformation of the military culture. This

transformation makes military more open to communication/dialogue and more intimate with the civilian world and values. It can be evaluated that with this kind of developments, there will be a change in institutional culture of the military which has significant impacts on shaping views and perceptions of the military members. Although the change of military culture leads to change in perceptions of the military members, it should be noted that each country has its own civil-military relations premised on its own dynamics and historical facts. Meanwhile, in most Latin American countries and in the preceding case of democratizations elsewhere (as in Spain), the military autonomy in the intelligence service, judicial system, defense matters, internal security and control of the military budget and promotions were effectively reduced through legal reforms. Moreover, military attitudes have had significant importance in the democratization processes. Changes in international level, perception of the society, military duty, military organization and military culture have different effects on perceptions of the military.

Before proceeding with the dynamics of the legal process of Turkish reforms and their effect on the military's political orientation, the Turkish military's prerogatives stemming from historical and cultural dynamics and its perceptions of the changes in its traditional prerogatives need a closer look. Hence, the Chapter 3 sets out to offer a review to prepare the ground for the discussion of the factors influencing the military's perception, which is theorized as a major factor in the establishment of successful and democratic civilian control over the military.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONTEXT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY AUTONOMY: THE AKP GOVERNANCE AND THE EU PROCESS

Referring to a period of approximately 150 years, i.e. from 1850 to 2000; the first half recorded the severe decline and eventual collapse of the monarchical Ottoman Empire whereas the second half witnessed the founding (in 1923) and rise of the Turkish Republic. The referred period witnessed no less than six coups d'état or military rebellions (in 1875-76, 1908-09, 1913, 1919-22, 1960, 1980), and various interventions short of coups (most recent ones in 1971 and 1997). Since the founding of the Republic, and particularly after 1960, the influence of the Turkish Armed Forces within the government apparatus had grown in line with its ever-expanding autonomy following successive interventions.

3.1. The Historical Background of the Turkish Army's Political Role

Tracing the political role of the military back to mid-1800s, the accelerating modernization movement set the Turkish military as the guardian of modernization (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.2). The military became, particularly from the second half of the 19th century, both the recipient and later the pioneer of reform movements (Demirel, 2004, p.128). The interventionist mode of the military could be traced back to the reign of Selim III (reigned 1789 to 1807, killed by Janissaries) who attempted to reform the military by establishing the European-style new troops (the so-called "New Order"). Violently opposed to the reforms, the military made itself felt as a distinct clique with particular interests. The Janissaries opposed any reform which might diminish their power within the polity (Hale, 1994, p.16). The Janissaries had then already become an actor who opposed the power of the Palace, remained indifferent to military missions, and played significant political and social roles (Karpat, 2010, p.314). Set against this background of the Ottoman-Turkish history,

the military's role in domestic politics had reasonably been continuous to the late 1990s (Ahmad, 1993, pp.2-3).

Having started in the 19th century, the politicization of the military continued into the early 1900s. Ahmad noted that Abdulhamid II (reigned 1876 to 1909 when dethroned by the military) politicized the military; promoted the officers on loyalty to the Palace rather than on merit; and wrought a rift between the so-called "schooled officers" i.e. educated in the Western-style war academy and the "rank-and-filers", i.e. the officers rising from the rank and file soldiers. Abdulhamid's reign also experienced the anti-Sultan activities of the Committee of Union and Progress strongly supported by junior "schooled" officers; then a fierce contention for power, rebellions and interventions in 1908-1912 (1993, p.5). Such turbulence culminated in the Sublime Porté raid of 1913 when the military became the dominant power in the political system and shaped both the destiny of the Empire and subsequently that of the Republic (Demirel, 2010, p.4).

In the Republican era (from 1923), the military enjoyed a high level of political autonomy except for the times when it actually governed country. In the so-called "single party period" (i.e. 1923 to 1946), the goal of to keep the military away from partisan politics was realized (Lerner and Robinson, 1960, p.26). Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü the founding fathers of the Republic, both as two prestigious commanders of the Turkish military, the military as an institution was a central pillar of the state. The Turkish military also acquired vital importance for the survival of the regime. Indeed, Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Code of 1935 obligated the armed forces to "protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic, as determined by the Constitution." Many Turkish officers over the decades interpreted this mandate broadly, allowing them to determine what the threats to Turkey were and how best to counter them (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.295).

The Democrat Party (DP), founded in the aftermath of World War II by former parliamentary deputies from the long-ruling Republican People's Party (CHP), took over the power after an election victory in May 1950. Two prominent founders of the DP, Menderes and Bayar became the Prime Minister and the President of the

Republic respectively. None had a military background in contrast to their arch-rival İnönü, the head of the CHP, Atatürk's closest war-time mate and successor. DP government was successful especially with their economic program in the early 1950s through which private enterprises engaged in industry and agriculture were developed. Nevertheless, economic decline which rose after the second half of the decade was accompanied with the growing authorization and ministration of the government (Hale, 1994, p.96). While Prime Minister Adnan Menderes attempted to reduce the role of the military and the bureaucracy, he wanted to upgrade the power and impact of the developing entrepreneurial groups, businessmen, and merchant-landowners; so at the end of this policy, on one hand, a new economic middle class developed, on the other hand, prestige and effect of the military-civilian bureaucracy weakened (Karpat, 1988, pp.138-139). In addition, his disregard of the military's needs and underestimation its social standing alienated the officers from the government (Hale, 1994, pp.96, 99). However, according to Karpat, attitudes of the military and Menderes towards each other were not sufficient to provoke the Armed Forces into the 1960 intervention because the DP also made a special effort to meet the military's basic demands, rejuvenated the upper echelons of the Armed Forces and modernized its weapons and training systems, especially after Turkey entered the NATO alliance. Thus, complaints of the military against the DP depending on professional concerns was not a significant motivation for a coup (1988, p.139); so, it is also necessary to examine the other reasons of the military intervention in 1960. The essence of the DP, which consisted of a coalition of diverse anti-CHP forces, was the first factor behind the 27 May military intervention. Because of this essence, the DP tried to keep its ranks mobilized against the CHP voicing concerns of the specter of a return of the CHP to power (Turan, 1988, p.73). Second, the new holders of power aimed to question the previous period; so the DP became more authoritarian with each election victory; and absolute victory in the 1954 elections led to the use of power with un-checked authority of the DP (Mücek, 2009, pp.45-46). The conflict between the DP and the public bureaucracy was another factor that finally caused the failure of the democratic regime since the bureaucracy continued its CHP loyalties under multi-party politics through resisting the DP's efforts to consolidate its political power (Özbudun, 2000, p.31). There were public unrest, student demonstrations, and clashes between students and police in the country

toward the end of this chaotic period when the military intervened in the politics by the coup of 27 May 1960 (Özbudun, 2000, p.31). In some important respects, the military intervention in 1960 was different from subsequent interventions since it was planned and carried out by junior officers (Harris, 1988, p.183). The junta (called the National Unity Committee) carried out the 1960 military coup and led by Cemal Gürsel, a guardian type of regime established; so, the government started to re-establish the dominance of civilian-military elites (Tachau and Heper, 1983, p.17, 21).

Following the 1960 coup d'état, the Constitution of 1961 was designed to prevent the re-emergence of partisan regimes based on massive parliamentary majorities. Its provisions aimed at curbing the power of the elected governments. To this end, a second parliamentary chamber (the Republican Senate) was established and an electoral system based on a strictly proportional system of representation was adopted. Additionally, the military reached "a more institutionalized channel for access to the topmost political authority" through MGK (Tachau and Heper, 1983, p.22). This Council founded by law in March 1962 was an advisory body on internal and external security issues (Zurcher, 2004, p.245). After the ban on political activity was lifted, new parties registered for the elections later in 1961 (Zurcher, 2004, p.245).

The 1971 military ultimatum was not a direct military intervention in the politics (Harris, 1988, p.187). There were extreme left- and right-wing groups as a result of the more liberal atmosphere under the Constitution of 1961 which led to increased acts of violence such as political murders, kidnappings, bombings, and bank robberies, especially by extremist youth groups (Özbudun, 2000, p.33). Thus, the military re-engaged in political affairs at the end of the 1960s because of the growing challenge of political violence in Turkey (Harris, 1988, p.185). In March 1971, MGK's military members wanted the right-wing government of Süleyman Demirel to be more decisive or resign (Harris, 1988, p.186). As a result of these developments, Demirel government resigned and a non-partisan government headed by the veteran CHP politician Nihat Erim was formed (Özbudun, 2000, p.34). In that sense, via MGK and a cabinet directed by a "neutral" figure, Nihat Erim, the military tried to

rule the country (Karpat, 1988, p.147). The 1971 intervention demonstrated the resilience of old conflict between the centralist bureaucratic elite and the periphery forces (Özbudun, 2000, p.35). This also ushered in a rift within the military between leftist groups and more status-quo oriented groups. After the intervention the Constitution was not suspended, the National Assembly was not dissolved, and political parties allowed to remain (Özbudun, 2000, p.24). Nevertheless, the military autonomy within the state apparatus considerably increased via the 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments (Özbudun, 2000, p.111). There were many amendments to the Constitution aiming to make it less liberal; in addition to establishment of state security courts, MGK's power was expanded and the Council's advisory function was strengthened (Zurcher, 2004, p.260).

The growing political violence and terrorism which claimed more than five thousand lives between 1975 and 1980 were the immediate reasons for the 1980 military intervention (Özbudun, 2000, p.35). At a deeper level, there was a growing ideological polarization in Turkish party politics between the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP) on the right and many small radical groups on the left (Özbudun, 2000, p.36). In addition to that, as noted by Özbudun, there were narrow majorities in the parliament and the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions caused great difficulty in initiating new policies. Perhaps the extreme example was TBMM's failure to elect a President of the Republic in 1980 for about six months from end of the March to September (2000, p.37). Moreover, several opportunities for the Justice Party (AP)-CHP coalitions were missed in the second part of the 1970s because the AP leader Demirel, along with the other right-wing parties, accused the CHP of identification with the extreme left while the CHP and other leftists considered the AP, in cooperation with the MHP, as the party intending to bring fascism to Turkey (Özbudun, 2000, pp.39, 41-42). Considering these situations, there were two significant reasons for the 1980 military intervention. The first factor was the anarchy which relied on the absence of governmental authority and was considered a greater menace in the sense of integrity of the state (Evin, 1988, p.203). The second factor was the fragmentation and conflict within and among civilian institutions and the military feared that such fragmentation would affect it as an organization (Evin, 1988, p.204).

The new Constitution of 1982 was an instrument through which TSK introduced radical changes to almost all spheres of public life, consolidated its political autonomy, and restricted the fundamental rights and freedoms (Burak, 2011, p.152). Thus, the military takeover of 1980 was in a sense the culmination of institutionalization of military tutelage because the military established a limited democracy which would not require another total military intervention (Demirel, 2010, p.5).

A crucial difference between the military interventions of 1960 and 1980 was that the former was carried out by a group of middle-ranking officers while the latter was planned by the General Staff in consultation with the field commanders (Karpat, 1988, p.149). Another important difference could be detected between the two military regimes in terms of their attitudes toward civilian political forces. While the National Unity Committee (MBK) regime of the 1960s cooperated closely with the CHP, the MGK regime in the 1980s did not cooperate with any political party or any other civilian political institution (Özbudun, 2000, p.25). This increased the legitimacy and social acceptance of the intervention in 1980 (Karpat, 1988, pp.150-151). The 1980 intervention established a "guardian regime" in which the military eliminated corrupt and squabbling politicians, restored the machinery of government, and redistributed political power and economic rewards; so, it was not surprising General Evren who led the coup and after became the President in 1982 looked upon the military as the "most patriotic institution" and the officers as "the most ardent upholders and guardians of the ideals of Atatürk" (Tachau and Heper, 1983, p.28).

After the 1980 military intervention, while all political parties were abolished and all mayors and municipal councils (over 1700 in all) were dismissed; the freedom of press, and of trade unions (banning political strikes, solidarity strikes and national strikes), individual rights and liberties were curbed and the political and civil rights and liberties (such as freedom of speech and freedom of association) were constrained in the Constitution of 1982 in light of "national interest, public order,

national security, danger to the republican order and public health." [6] Additionally, politicians before 1980 were banned from politics for ten years and the new party founders needed the approval of MGK. Hence, the military specifically MGK headed by the Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren who led the military coup, was the centre of all power (Zurcher, 2004, pp. 278-279). Through the new constitution, military gained important exit guarantees to ensure that "the authoritarian power holders are almost always able to determine the conditions for their extrication from government and to obtain certain guarantees of a share of power in the coming democratic political order." MGK as a tutelary power has been an exit guarantee for the military since 1960 and with the Constitution of 1982, the constitutional status of MGK was enhanced. In this period, the decisions of the Council were taken into consideration primarily by the government. Moreover, a guardianship system through ambiguous constitutional references that broadly defined the military's mission in national security could be evaluated another exit guarantee for the military (Özbudun, 2000, pp.105-110).

The most profound contradiction marking Turkish democracy in the 1990s was the demonstrated inability of civilian politicians to control the military. In the 90s, there was a rise of political Islam in Turkey and an apace polarization between secularists and Islamists continued (Zurcher, 2004, p.290). By the end of 1990s, the military was highly concerned about the "religious reactionism" (irtica). Political Islam were considered as a challenge to the fundamental principle of the republic: construction of a secular Western identity for Turkey (Sakallıoğlu, 2002, p.197). During the islamist RP and the center-right True Path Party (DYP) coalition between the years of 1996-1997, the RP promised to build a mosque in Taksim square was given by the RP, the heads of religious brotherhoods in their religious attire were welcomed in the prime minister's official residence by the leader of RP, Necmettin Erbakan. In such an environment, there were societal reactions against the Islamist RP and Necmettin Erbakan government on the grounds of "religious reactionism" and the military, during an MGK meeting on February 28, presented to government a list of measures that the government should take. However, this list had some requests

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[6] Article 13, Article 23, Article 26, Article 28 and Article 33 of the Constitution of 1982 listed conditions for these restrictions.

which meant political suicide for RP. Premier Erbakan who could not withstand these pressures was forced to resign, and a new government was formed which seemed more suitable to the military. The February 28 intervention is often labeled as a "post-modern coup" (Aydınlı, 2011, p.228) or "soft-coup." Hence, on 28 February 1997, a new form of military intervention was experienced in Turkey because the so-called "February 28 Process" was carried out by not an outright suspension of democratic process but through the ultimatum of MGK. This time, commanders mobilized like-minded people in the media, higher education, business community, unions, and even politicians with the aim of blocking the existing government from exercising power (Aydınlı, 2011, p.228). This indirect intervention was also a turning point in civil-military relations in Turkey since the military achieved a newfound momentum and, as a result, the military became much more active in domestic politics (Michaud-Emin, 2007, pp.37-38).

3.2. The Military's Position on the EU Accession Process and Civil-Military Relations During the Reform Process

It was argued by several scholars that in Turkey, it was hard to control the tutelary powers of the military for civilians until the reform process started in 1999 due to major two reasons. First of all, politicians feared provoking the military which could lead to another military intervention. Secondly, most were of the opinion that such reforms would be unpopular with the citizens (Demirel, 2004, p.128; Sarıgil, 2009, p.711). Then, the EU accession process in the 2000s became a driving force for establishing democratic civilian control, because the role of the military in Turkish politics was intensely criticized by EU (Aydınlı, Özcan and Akyaz, 2006, p.5). Thus, the first and most important factor triggering reforms in the context of civil-military relations was the declaration of the EU membership candidacy and the subsequent accession process (Gürsoy, 2012, p.29). Following the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, the EU accession process affected Turkey's foreign policy and economic affairs. The EU acted as a powerful external anchor triggering internal change (Erdenir, 2012, p.130) through the required constitutional and legal reform process toward democratization. Then, the Turkish political elite considered the 1999 Helsinki summit as the advent of a great opportunity for transforming the

administrative and legal systems towards democracy. President Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, and the leader of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yılmaz were the most significant politicians in 1999. They recognized that some major changes in the government's struggle against the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the violent Kurdish separatist group known as the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK); relations with Greece; and the power structure of the Turkish state were inevitable for the revival of relations with EU. They were also aware that these issues could not be resolved in a way to facilitate democratization without the support of TSK (Aydınlı, Özcan and Akyaz 2006, p.6). After 1999, there was a supportive attitude to EU membership both among the public and within the ranks of the military (Gürsoy, 2012b, pp.9-10). The prospect of EU membership gave a hope to Turkish elites and society and united them around a grand consensus that EU membership might surpass the nation's deep fractures. Moreover, this process gave the military and civilian elites the opportunity to play their own roles: "preparing Turkey for EU membership" (Aydınlı, Özcan and Akyaz, 2006, pp.5-6). Thus, the possibility of EU membership partially balanced out in one sense, the potential negative attitudes towards introducing reforms in the field of civil-military relations (Gürsoy, 2012b, p.10).

In this period, the Chiefs of General Staff mainly had a positive attitude about the EU accession process. For instance, General Hilmi Özkök (the Turkish Chief of General Staff between 2002 and 2006) stressed that Turkish military would always support EU membership and the reforms enacted in this process (Aydınlı, 2009, p.588). A statement made by General Özkök in 2003 clearly illustrates his views on the extent of mind-set change that the EU process triggered in the Army:

> In recent years, the military had sound reasons to oppose some changes in the Constitution and other relevant legislation, but the fact that it did not done so is because it came to believe that such opposition would adverse implications on Turkey's efforts to become a full member of EU (Heper, 2005, p.225).

In addition, in this process, the TSK began to question some of the values it conventionally attached considerable importance such as the guardianship and security role of the military. Hence, there was a mind-set change towards these values. For instance, General Özkök reflected that there was a need for

reinterpreting Atatürkism (Heper, 2011, p.242). He pointed out that "Atatürkism does not only mean wearing his badge. The important thing is to look at the direction Atatürk looked at and think as he thought" (Ergin, November, 3, 2002). Similarly, General Özkök questioned the past and made the following statement about military interventions:

> On May 27, March 12 and September 12, the Army intervened in politics but I wonder what the result was? .. Did the interventions reach its goal? No! If they had been successful, the politicians removed from the power by those interventions would never return. However, these names later turned back to the politics, even became Prime Minister and President. So, military interventions are not the solution" (Doğan, August, 27, 2003).

Then, İlker Başbuğ (the Turkish Chief of General Staff between the years 2008-2010) also positively reflected the perception of the TSK on the EU process and he stated that:

> The TSK has no adverse views about the EU. The TSK has been a supporter of modernity and progressiveness. Full membership in EU is a tool for the goal of Atatürk that rising above the level of contemporary civilization. In addition, the TSK should not be related with daily events because it is disturbing us. When this is the case, we have to defend ourselves" (Bila, September, 17, 2008).

Aydınlı argued that General Başbuğ's other speeches where he referred to scholarly work on civil-military relations to highlight the position of TSK in a globally accepted civil-military relations standard were also indicative of a paradigm shift in terms of civil-military relations in Turkey. Furthermore, General Başbuğ emphasized the ultimate authority of civilian leadership and he indicated that military was ready to change (2009, p.593).

Similarly, Karaosmanoğlu argued that new communication channels with democratic countries at both societal and state levels were created through the EU accession process. Contributing to democratization process of civil-military relations in Turkey, these channels of communication were used actively at both level. Moreover, the prospect of the EU accession process turned up the pressure for further democratic developments; certain segments of the society, NGOs and intelligentsia claimed for these developments (2011, pp.260-261). Thus, in such a free debate environment, there was an increase in articles questioning militarism and a growth at number of

anti-militarist web pages (Narlı, 2009, p.63). As a result of effects of these developments, in the early 2000s, the Turkish military tried to be more interactive with civilians and as transparent as possible and "brainstorming" or "brown-bag" meetings of the Chief of General Staff and the press can be the example of this initiative (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.452). The purpose of these meetings was to inform both domestic and foreign public opinion accurately and completely about the issue closely related with Turkey (Milliyet, September, 23, 2000). Moreover, EU Working Group in the early 2000s was launched by Office of the Chief of General Staff with the aim of mapping the military's actions during the harmonization process with EU (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.453).

In line with the pre-accession strategy for Turkey, an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey was drawn up by the EU Commission in November 2000, and accepted by the European Council in 2001. Then, the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU acquis was presented by the the Ecevit-led coalition government (1999-2002) to the EU Commission. Ultimately, before the AKP government, a major constitutional package and a new Civil Code in 2001 and three more packages of constitutional reforms in February, March and August 2002 were adopted by the TBMM (Bac, 2005, pp.19-23). These reforms ushered in the civilization process to restrict the political privileges of the armed forces and shift of the balance of power in favour of civilians (Gürsoy, 2012c, p.193).

Then, with the AKP's victory in the general elections of 2002, Turkish–EU relations took a paradoxical turn (Bac, 2005, p.24). The AKP was born out of the 28 February process, and it was still perceived by the secular actors as the continuation of the islamist RP. However, the AKP's ruling elite tried to break this perception by keeping away from Islamist policies and calling themselves a "conservative democrat" rather than a religious party (Aknur, 2013, p.136). Conservative democratic identity synthesized rational and moral values and believes in superiority of law (Akdoğan, 2003, pp.100-101). Moreover, as Cizre reflected, the new party on the stage created "a need for a better understanding of the possibilities and challenges for establishing a new set of rules of the game and a more democratic definition of the civil-military equation in Turkey" (2011, pp.59-60). The AKP used the EU membership as a

leverage to overcome domestic obstacles and anti-democratic elements (Coşkun, 2013, p.101) especially in the civil-military domain. That is to say, the EU reform process made the government strong in its relations with the military. There were two significant motivations of the AKP in this reform process. First of all, the AKP used the EU accession process to keep distance from political Islam; hence, the AKP guaranteed its "ideological commitment" to democratic values. Secondly, it used this process as a strategic move vis-à-vis the military. That is to say, Europeanization process was considered as an opportunity to reduce the TSK's political powers which had for long suffered (Sarıgil, 2007, p.48).

Indeed, after the AKP came to power in following the November 2002 general elections, it overtook the reforms process with determination. The fourth and the fifth harmonization packages were adopted. The most important factor accelerating the reform process towards civilization was Turkey's EU accession process. A series of crucial reforms were passed in many fields, as required by the Copenhagen political criteria (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, p.29). These reforms covered increased legal protection of social, cultural and political rights of all Turkish citizens independent of religious and ethnic origin, the role of the military in Turkish politics, and freedom of expression in Turkey (Bac, 2005, p.21). The timeline from 2001 to 2004 was quite important in the sense of political reforms because between these years, Turkey adopted nine harmonization packages, including a new Civil Code and a new Penal Code (Bac, 2005, p.22). The following section discusses those reforms carried out specifically in the field of civil-military relations.

3.3. The Components of Political Autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Post-1999 Reforms

Özbudun characterized the autonomy of the Turkish military through the concepts of "tutelary powers" and "reserved domains" in the literature (Valenzuela, 1992). The military's tutelary powers were based on its claim to territorial integrity, national sovereignty, law and order, social justice, secularism, and guarantorship of the constitution. Specifically, in Turkey, the structure and role of the MGK, YAŞ decisions closed to appeal and other applications and institutions related with

guardianship role of TSK such as military jurisdiction system, military intervention in politics can be evaluated as the tutelary powers of TSK. Reserved domains which conferred high degree of military autonomy can be listed as follows: exclusion of the military budget from auditing via Court of Accounts, subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the prime minister, military education system and appointments and promotions of the military staff (2000, pp.106-112). Thus, in general, while tutelage powers coincide with political autonomy, reserved domains mostly overlap with institutional autonomy of the military.

The guardianship role of TSK has been one of the most significant factors that fed the political autonomy of the Turkish military. Turkish military's historic heritage generating its ideology should be the starting point to understand the autonomous role of the Turkish military (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.441). Following the Independence War which led to the founding of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish military was considered as the main agent of the Kemalist project in the sense of protection of the Republic's values and particularly the secularist character of the state (Burak, 2011, p.165). The guardianship role of TSK and the power and privileges stemming from this role depended on two main sources. The first one was the political culture inherited from the Ottoman state and the second one was the belief that the Turkish military is the major actor of the state ideology, secularism and democracy. Because of this point of view, the military has not sympathized with popular politics as a societal activity and electoral power of the periphery; it always claimed to be above the political struggles (Cizre and Walker, 2010, p.93; Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.296). A statement of General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, (the Chief of General Staff between the years 1998–2002), highlighted this guardianship role internalized by the military; "if necessary the guardianship role of the military over politics in Turkey will continue for one thousand years" (Heper, 2011, p.248). In that sense, the autonomy and behind-the-scenes power of TSK were always considered above politics and supranational (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.154). The Turkish military legitimized its guardianship role with a political culture that "mythologizes and sanctifies a benign political role for the armed forces" (Cizre, 2003, p.215). According to Laçiner, Turkish militarism was shaped at the end of the Ottoman Empire because the military considered itself as the main actor of the modernization

due to its role in the establishment of the Republic. Through this doctrine, the Turkish military assimilated all opponents (2004, pp.17-18). Altınay also claimed that the concept of "nation-in-arms" was one of the main elements of the Turkish militarism, and this conscription that made the military service a constant feature of the Turkish nation (2004, p.188).

The second factor explaining the reason behind the political autonomy is the security theme in Turkey. There has been a widespread belief that "the military protects us against the internal and external enemies" and this understanding assigns some features such as unquestionability and mysteriousness to the military as an institution (Narlı, 2009, p.61). Accordingly, for many years, the most trusted institution has been TSK in Turkey.[7] A speech made by General Başbuğ in 2009 also revealed this perception in TSK:

> In fact, the trustworthiness of an institution is based on evaluations of the responsibility and effectiveness of the institution. TSK is always the most trusted institution in the surveys. The Turkish Armed Forces have gained the trust of our nation through ensuring security by not avoiding any sacrifice in the risky geopolitics of our country. At the same time, TSK is a trustworthy institution in such an environment in which there are rapidly changing social, economic and political structure. TSK is for the common purpose of 'serving the nation' (Bianet, April, 14, 2009).

In addition to conservative realism which is one of the components of rational mindset of the Turkish military professionals in security matters, people generally believed that Turkey has an important geo-strategic position, so it is surrounded by hostile states that hate Turkey and the West still tries to divide the country. Through such a security culture, the fear of society has always been kept alive against external and internal threats, and the military has remained a "very popular and unique image" throughout the years (Narlı, 2009, pp.63-64). Therefore, TSK defined and decided the situations threatening security of the nation; and by this way, it legitimized and perpetuated its own veto power in politics (Cizre and Walker, 2010, p.93). For instance, in the inauguration speech of August 2006, General Yaşar

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[7] There are several surveys that reveal this situation. For instance; one is able to reach Eurobarometer Surveys on http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Survey/index/instrument/STANDARD

Büyükanıt (the Chief of General Staff between the years 2006-2008) referred to such issues: the late era of the Ottoman State, Sevres Treaty, situation in Cyprus, new tactics of the PKK, and role of the military. General Büyükanıt declared that:

> Although it is in good faith, some argue that Turkish Republic will have to confront the Treaty of Sevres. I would like to state clearly that although some circles may have such an endeavor and others may have such expectations (to confront Turkey with the Sevres Treaty), I do not think that there is any power that can force Turkey to confront the Treaty of Sevres once again (Narlı, 2009, 73).

Besides the geo-strategic position or external enemy threats, the internal security role of the military should be also separately explained with regard to its guardianship mission because, as stated by Burak, the internal enemy rhetoric which was based on Kemalism was continually used by the military to enhance its power on the political ground. The military's internal enemy concept stems from two sources: political Islam or the threat of religious reactionism, and ethnic issues such as Kurdish nationalism and the case of PKK (2011, p.159). These internal enemy concepts of the Turkish military created the second dilemma era for TSK. EU reforms pawed the way for expanded freedoms for those groups which TSK has been "struggling" against for years. Therefore, the military fell into an ambivalent position; i.e. its purpose to reach democracy and its guardianship role conflicted with each other (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.260). For example, the statement of the General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu in an interview in 2005 demonstrated this dilemma that "we have argued that Turkey should be a member state of EU in an honorable way. TSK has never been against the full membership to EU. However, the important thing in this process was to enter EU without damaging our national and geographic integrity" (Bila, December, 31, 2005). In the same interview, he also displayed the concerns about the Kurdish nationalism:

> Kurdish nationalism, Kurd, Kurdish and education in Kurdish are always emphasized by the EU. What would be the integrity and unitary structure of the nation if Kurdish education will be the case? It damages the structure of Turkey. Hence, this process should be managed very well and must be balanced. Turkey does not have to fulfill every request of EU since there is no end of it (Bila, December, 31, 2005).

These issues considered as problematic areas by the military were reflected to the politics via the National Security Policy Document (MGSB) or so-called the Red

Book adopted in mode and format from the United States after Turkey's NATO membership. In the past, the Secretariat General of the MGK used to prepare this document, and the prime minister was almost forced to approve it (Bayramoğlu, 2004, p.91). Moreover, it was not shared with the parliament on ground of confidentiality. The document both defined the enemies and organized the military accordingly. In that sense, the military could engage in domestic politics and acted as a political power (Yıldız, 2005, p.14). Hence, the preparation of this document and what were considered as security threats had central importance.

Moreover, Article 35 of the TSK Internal Code was also used in the concept of internal enemy in legitimizing military's political autonomy in Turkey (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.161). This Article originally stated that "the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p.295)." It described the role and duties of the Turkish military in national security; so, it legitimized the military interventions in politics (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.161). On the basis of this article, political parties, ethnic groups, religious groups, the Armenian issue, civic activities around the country or even water scarcity were regarded as potential enemy. In addition, the generals made political statements both on domestic politics and foreign policy issues that led to the politicization of the Turkish Armed Forces (Burak, 2011, p.160). Related with its guardianship role stemming from national security framework, the definition of the internal security was also important because the conventional definition provides ample opportunities to TSK to be involved in politics. In fact, the concept of internal security contained several issues such as anti-terrorism, maintenance of public order, political activities and public debate; so Turkish military had wide latitude in policy making and law enforcement about these concepts (Cizre, 2004, p.108).

Throughout the 2000s, several legal amendments were also passed by the TBMM in an effort to reduce TSK's internal security role to democratize civil-military relations in Turkey. In July 2013, the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Code was amended (Turkey Progress Report, 2013, p.10) and the duties, role of the military and definition of the soldiership were redefined to read "the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers to

come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfill the duties abroad with the decision of the Parliament and help maintain international peace" (Hürriyet Daily News, July, 31, 2013). Thus, with the amendment, the words protect and safeguard were replaced with "defend"; and "threats and dangers from abroad" and "deterrence" were used in order to emphasize the military's role in external defense rather than its former domestic political role (Bardakçı, 2013, p.421). Moreover, the definition of soldiership was "to preserve Turkish homeland, independence and Republic". With the same amendment, this definition was changed and soldiership referred to the obligation of learning and performing the military art (Milliyet, July, 30, 2013).[8] However, TSK's legal and operational responsibility for command of domestic security operations was expanded with the amendments to the Law on the Personnel of TSK adopted in June 2016. This change also limited the prosecution of armed forces personnel involved in counter-terrorism operations. This issue raised the concerns of EU about the reduced judicial and administrative oversight of military personnel (Turkey Progress Report, 2016, p.14).

The other legal basis of the military's tutelary role in internal security was the secret protocol on Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (commonly called EMASYA), which consisted of 27 articles concerning the implementation of Article 11/D of Law No. 5442 on Provincial Administration (Aksoy, 2010, p.175), signed by the General Staff and the Ministry of Interior in 1997. This protocol equipped the military authorities with "the ability to carry out raids in internal security operation areas as well as routine and autonomous operations and actions in other provinces without request from civilian authorities" (Akay, 2010, p.107). This protocol was annulled in 2010 by the AKP government (Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.10). In that sense, transparency and civilian control in the internal security issues were provided because public order in part of the country was not militarized, armed forces were not an executive power and the relationship between public and military

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[8] With the Decree No:681 published on January 6, 2017, Article 19 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Code was amended. Before this change, the article provided that "orders must be given in uniform." After the amendment, this article was changed to "the subordinates must comply with the orders of military superiors and civilian superiors without uniform or with uniform" (Anadolu Ajansı, 2017; Resmi Gazete, 2017).

administrators was not reversed anymore (Aksoy, 2010, p.176). Moreover, MGSB, which was known as the "Red Book" or "secret constitution," prepared in 2010 differed from the previous ones because it was prepared mainly by civilian authorities (Turkey Progress Report, 2011, p.12). This situation was evaluated as an indication of progress in consolidating the principle of civilian oversight of security forces by European Commission (Turkey Progress Report, 2011, p.14). Moreover, "religious reactionism" was no longer mentioned as an internal threat in this document (Cumhuriyet, April, 29, 2015).

Another field where significant amendments passed towards controlling tutelary power of TSK and transforming civil-military relations into a more democratic stage was constitutional and legal amendments regarding the role and the function of MGK. MGK was first introduced in the Constitution of 1961 and was not a decision-making body at that time rather it developed views in order to assist the overall national security policy (Michaud-Emin, 2007, p.27). In its original composition, there were ministers to be determined by law, chief of the general staff and representatives of the forces (Army, Navy, and Air Forces) and it was chaired by the president. With the Constitution of 1982, the cabinet was obliged to consider the recommendations of the Council as a priority and for the first time, senior commanders had the majority over civilians (Michaud-Emin, 2007, pp.27-28). Accordingly, in the new formulation, under the chairmanship of the president, it was composed of the prime minister; the chief of the general staff; the minister of national defense, the interior, and foreign affairs; the commanders of Army, Navy, Air Forces and Gendarmerie (Özbudun, 2000, p.108). The MGK was the major bastion of political autonomy as a constitutional body of tutelage of TSK. Article 19 of the Law No. 2945 stated that "the ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretary-General of MGK" which gave MGK limitless access to civilian agencies (Toktaş and Kurt, 2010, p.390).

The role of the military in MGK was significant for military's political autonomy because decisions of MGK were formed in relation to the definition of the concept of

national security. Therefore, this concept of national security had been crucial to assess the role played by MGK in Turkish political life. National security was defined in Law No. 2945 on MGK and Secretariat-General of MGK, as the

protection of the constitutional order of the State, its nation and integrity, all of its interests in the international sphere including political, social, cultural and economic interests, as well as the protection of its constitutional law against all internal and external threats (Güney 2015, p.116).

In this regard, any matter considered relevant to national security was included in MGK's agenda (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.446). Sakallıoğlu noted that the military's role in MGK further consolidated the military's political influence. In fact, through decisions of the Council, at times even curricula in schools were determined, television stations' broadcasting hours were regulated, certain television stations were closed down, bureaucratic appointments of the Ministry of Public Works in the southeast were made; electoral alliances between political parties before the 27 March 1994 local election were proposed and the substance of the laws on terror and capital punishment were expressed (1997, pp.157-158). Therefore, the legislation on MGK by which the military had rights on the internal politics was very important in order to reduce autonomy of the Turkish military.

With another constitutional amendment of October 2001 during the three-party coalition government relating to Article 118 of the Constitution, the advisory status of MGK was introduced. The phrase of "giving priority consideration" changed and the Council of Ministers would "evaluate" the decisions of MGK (Gönenç, 2004, p.107), and the number of civilians in MGK was increased from 5 to 9 (Bac, 2005, p.26) by including the deputy prime ministers and the Minister of Justice (Özbudun, 2007, p.193). With the seventh harmonization package (Law # 4963), adopted in July 2003, under Article 25, MGK started to meet every two months instead of every month (Özbudun, 2007, p.194). Under this law, Article 27 also amended the requirements for the appointment of the Secretary-General; so a military person could no longer be reserved for the post of Secretary-General (Bac, 2005, p.26) and the passage of the law changed as "Secretary-General can be appointed either from among high-ranking military officers or from among high-level civilian bureaucrats;" consequently, a civilian was for the first time appointed as a Secretary-General of

MGK in 2004 (Özbudun, 2007, p.194). Lastly, Article 19 of the Law No. 2945 on MGK and the Secretariat-General of MGK which provided that "the Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council" was abrogated (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, pp.17-18).[9]

There were some other significant changes in terms of the tutelary role of MGK such as domination over the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK). The RTÜK which was founded in 1994 by Law No. 3984 had some significant duties such as supervising the implementation of broadcasting principles formed under the national security policy (Erdal, 2010, p.47). With the sixth harmonization package adapted on July 2003 (Law #4928), the representative of the Secretariat-General for MGK was removed from the Board of Supervision and later, with the eighth harmonization package adopted on July 2004 (Law #5218), the membership of the Secretary-General of the MGK at the High Communication Council was eliminated (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, pp. 14-18).

The last component of the political autonomy of TSK was the judicial system including State Security Courts (DGMs), Military Court of Appeals (Askeri Yargıtay), and the Supreme Military Administrative Court (Askeri Yüksek İdare Mahkemesi). These military courts constituted an important realm of Turkish military's political autonomy. These courts were used with the aim of increasing the action and authority of MGK "concerning the establishment, functions, and actions" of jurisdictional organ (Erdal, 2010, p.37). Thus, military courts attributed a political role and a social prestige to the military and in one sense; they also shaped the existence of TSK because they symbolized the military's unity and dignity (Cizre and Walker, 2010, p.95).

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[9] With the 2017 referendum, General Commander of Gendarmerie was removed from the MGK. With the Decree No:703, Law No. 2945 on the MGK and the Secretariat-General of the MGK was abolished. Additionally, with the Presidential Decree No:6 published on July 15, 2018, Organization and Duties of the Secretariat-General of the MGK was reformed (T24, 2018). However, the Secretariat continues to carry out works to prepare the national security policy document.

DGMs were first introduced in 1973 into the Turkish legal system to deal with crimes against the security of the state by the constitutional amendments (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009, p.45; Özbudun, 2000, p.111). The Constitutional Court annulled the legislation in 1976 and the DGM jurisdiction was temporarily came to an end for a time (Bjornberg and Richmond, 2003, p.26). However, DGMs were reconstituted after the 1980 military intervention thus enabling the Armed Forces to have a voice in criminal trial of civilians. One of three judges in these courts was a military officer (Gürsoy, 2012, pp.14-15). The composition of these courts was an important indicator for political autonomy tutelary power of the military in Turkey. First of all, the military judge in the DGMs was removed with an amendment of Article 143 of the Constitution on June 18, 1999; then, they were totally abolished in 2004 (Özbudun, 2007, p.186) in term of full membership in EU with the aim of strengthening human rights, democracy and fair trial. A Military Court of Appeals (Divan-ı Temyizi Askeri) was established and it was based on 1914 Provisional Law (Kardaş, 2010, pp.63-64). After the foundation of the TBMM, on the basis of Law No. 237, dated 1922, a new Military Court of Appeals consisting of a president, two military members, and two jurists was established (Erman, 1974, p.308). In the Constitution of 1961, the Military Court of Appeals was accepted as a high court and the Supreme Military Administrative Court was introduced for the first time via the constitutional amendment of 1971 (Erdal, 2010, p.36).

In order to end the military courts' jurisdiction over civilians, Article 6 of the seventh reform package (Law # 4963) amended Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts; military courts could no longer try civilians as well as juveniles held responsible for "inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience, discouraging the public from military duty and undermining national resistance" (Turkey Progress Report, 2003, p.20). Through another amendment adopted in June 2006, if a civilian person committed an offence together with a military person, they could not be tired in military courts in peacetime and they also had the right of retrial in military courts (Turkey Progress Report, 2006, p.7). By the

2010 constitutional reform;[10] jurisdictions of the military courts were limited only to military service and military duties; hence, following this amendment, "crimes against state security, the constitutional order and the functioning of this order were now to be dealt with by civilian courts." EU Commission evaluated these limitations of jurisdiction of military courts as the increasing transparency (Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.75) and as a progress on civilian oversight of security forces (Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.12).[11]

This particular constitutional reform in 2010 also opened all decisions made by the YAŞ, except for promotions and retirement for non-vacancy, to legal review[12]. There was those claims that, this mechanism was used by TSK to expel those soldiers who were identified with certain religious or ethnic groups from the Armed Forces. In that sense, YAŞ decisions were the tool in the hands of TSK for its guardianship mission in terms of struggling with those elements against the republican principles. The third Decree of 31 July 2016 changed the composition of YAŞ. The deputy Prime Minister and the ministers of justice, foreign affairs and interior became members of the YAŞ. After this change, while the number of civilian members increased to ten, the number of military members fell to 4 rather than twelve.[13]

The constitutional provision providing immunity for the perpetrators of the 1980 coup d'état was removed from the Constitution through 2010 Constitutional reform package (Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.11).[14] After that, the judicial process

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[10] The amendment package, consisting of 24 articles, was submitted to a mandatory referendum and in the referendum of 12 September 2010; the text was adopted by a parliamentary majority barely over the three-fifths (330 votes) (Özbudun, 2011, p.147).

[11] In April 2017, there was a referendum in Turkey which resulted with majority of constitutional amendments. As a part of these constitutional amendments, the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the Military Court of Appeals were abolished. Correspondingly, two military members of the Constitutional Court were dismissed.

[12] YAŞ decisions were out of judicial review in 1982 Constitution. The related article number is Article 125 of the Constitution.

[13] On July 15, 2018, the Presidential Decree No:8 introduced an amendment that ministries of treasury and finance and national education were included in the YAŞ.

[14] The related article was provisional Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution. The second paragraph of this article which was stated that " it cannot be claimed that the decisions taken in the period of the military

began to try the leading actors of the military coup of 12 September, and the symbolic name was General Kenan Evren. In addition, the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Gendarmerie were put to trial before a high tribunal for the offences committed in the course of their official duties (Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.11).

3.4. The Components of Institutional Autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces and Post-1999 Reforms

The political autonomy of TSK also feeds its the institutional autonomy. Military indoctrination based on military education system and ideological socialization in which TSK has had a limitless control played a significant role in the reconstruction of guardianship mission of the military (Aydınlı, 2009, p.586). Military culture strengthened by military indoctrination also symbolizes collective identity and institutional interests and behavior of the officers (Sarıgil, 2011, p.273). As the guardianship role of Kemalist principles and reforms were indoctrinated into military students through military training and education, officers came to consider themselves as a privileged class who has a right to intervene in politics when they see any deviation from untouchable principles (Aknur, 2013, p.145). The following speech of a Commandant of the Military Academy to the cadets exemplified this particular outlook:

> Always bear in mind that you are superior to everyone and everything and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and superior qualities. You have dedicated your life to country without reservations, you are selfless and honest. As officers of an army which has inscribed the most glorious pages of the Turkish history, you are different from your contemporaries outside, and from other officers elsewhere in the world (Birand, 1991, p. 44).

Birand's insightful study, which was an analysis of TSK from the inside based on interviews with students of military high schools and War Academy and their commanders, revealed the significance of military training and military doctrine on the attitudes of the officers. In the interviews, a school commander underlined idea-moral classes that do not exist in other armies but given to TSK such as principles of

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regime and the decisions taken by the decree law are unconstitutional" was removed with an amendment with the Law no. 4709 on 3 November 2010 (Adalet Bakanlığı, 2011, p.95).

Atatürk, separatism, guardianship of the nation. The statements of the school commanders "rebuilding / reconstruction of the students" are important to understand the mission and the scope of the military training in TSK at that time. A school commander defined the way to this rebuilding as adjusting the current training system according to themselves. Classes and books to be read in the military schools were determined by the Chief of General Staff and the Ministry of National Education did not know the contents of these books. Moreover, the education of young commander candidates in military schools was concentrated in five points: military information, world knowledge, social aspects, discipline and ideology. This ideology contained defending the nation against both external and internal threats and rejecting all other ideologies except principles of Atatürk. Birand defined the aim of this kind of military training as creating the "ideal Turk"[15] (Birand, 1986, pp.60-65). Birand also highlighted that except the written texts, indoctrination in war schools was largely carried out through spiritual terms. Certain themes were carefully addressed in the speeches of the commanders, the conversations on special days or the speeches in the ceremonies. The basis of this indoctrination was to tell the candidates how they differed from the "outsiders;" i.e. from civilians (1986, p.80).). Military high school students who were at their last semester stated that they did not trust politicians since politicians might lie and deceive the society for their own sake and so they would be against the politicians if the politicians have attitudes that contradict the values the military believe (1986, pp.51-52).

Related to the military's sense of superiority, the Turkish military also perceived a "lack of professionalism" on the part of politicians (Heper, 2011, p.248); so, the claim of weaknesses of the Turkish political system and poor political leadership were one of the most important reasons of the military interventions in Turkey (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.457). Military officers' disdain and distrust toward the politicians and politics were also results of this sense of superiority, and this attitude makes the DECAF more difficult (Sarıgil, 2011, p.275). Moreover, the military perceived that "praetorianism, instability, inefficacy, careerism, populism, lack of

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[15] After July 15, 2016, with the Presidential Decree No:669 published on July 25, 2016, there were significant reforms in military education such as Foundation of National Defense University which is subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense; closure of military high schools; and subordination of war academies and Staff College to the National Defense University.

prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility" are the hallmarks of the civilian world (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.156). In their interviews with Birand, military high school students who were at their last semester stated that they did not trust politicians since politicians might lie and deceive the society for their own sake and so they would be against the politicians if the politicians have attitudes that contradict the values the military believe (1986, pp.51-52). According to Pion-Berlin, if this perception refers to views of military officers, then it is not difficult to understand the relation between military's belief in their superiority stemming from sense of professionalism and political intervention. Hence, the military's sense of superiority may undermine adherence to the democratic rule of law and civilian control (2011, p.298).

One of the first significant dimensions of TSK's institutional autonomy and reserved domains concerned the YAŞ decisions in terms of appointments and promotions and the responsibilities and appointment powers of the Chief of General Staff. As mentioned before, senior level promotions and appointments were one of the most important prerogatives of the military in Turkey because although officially the President of the Republic had the final say on the appointment of the Chief of General Staff, the appointee was nominated by the military. The appointments of the Commanders of the four Forces and the Chief of General Staff had additional political importance. In this process, the Chief of General Staff was constitutionally appointed by the President of the Republic in the last instance; nevertheless, the succeeding Chief of General Staff was decided by the incumbent Chief of General Staff, in consultation with a number of senior commanders and this name was proposed to the Prime Minister. Force commanders were selected with the final say of the Chief of General Staff (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.161).[16]

This can be considered as another important dimensions of institutional autonomy and reserved domain in the sense that the appointment of Chief of General Staff

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[16] There was a crucial development with the Decree No:681 published on January 6, 2017. Formerly, the appointment process of forces commanders was initiated by the General Staff; but under Decree-Law 681, the Ministry of National Defense was designated as the initiating mechanism, the prime minister signed off on, and the president approved a new commander. Additionally, general and admiral cadres previously reviewed by the General Staff for assessment in YAŞ meetings would now be determined by the Ministry of National Defense.

was not subject to political authority. Furthermore, in Turkey, the Chief of General Staff reported to the Prime Minister in terms of accountability, and this situation was criticized by EU on the grounds that in liberal democratic regimes, the Chief of General Staff should report to the minister of national defense (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p.452). Nevertheless, with the third Decree of 31 July 2016 following the declaration of the state of emergency, the force commanders were subjected to the Ministry of National Defense and the authorization of giving order to top commanders without observing the chain of command was granted to the civilian executive (Turkey Progress Report, 2016, p.13).[17]

The lack of scrutiny over the military (defense) expenditures was accepted as another indicator of military institutional autonomy and reserved domain because civilians cannot review the military expenditure if the military has a high institutional autonomy. According to some authors, the privilege that existed on military expenditures had contributed to the emergence of TSK "as an autonomous social class" (Bayramoğlu, İnsel and Laçiner, 2004, p.10). For this reason, ensuring transparency over military expenditures was crucial for reducing the military autonomy and establishing civilian control over the defense sector. With the seventh harmonization package in 2003, new provisions were adopted to enhance the transparency of defense expenditures (Turkey Progress Report, 2003, p.19). The Court of Accounts (Sayıştay), upon request of the Parliament, was empowered to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organizations including the state properties owned by the armed forces also with seventh harmonization package (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009, p.78). Then, with the eighth harmonization package which went into force in 2004, the last sentence of Article 160 of the Constitution which read that "the procedure for auditing, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, of state property in possession of the Armed Forces shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principles of secrecy required by national defense (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 160)" was abolished (Akay, 2010, p.75). Lastly, with the adoption of the Law on the Court of Accounts in December 2010, external ex-post audits of military expenditure and audits of extra-budgetary

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[17] With the Presidential Decree No:1 published on July 10, 2018, the Chief of General Staff was also attached to the Ministry of National Defense.

resources earmarked for the defense sector, including the Defense Industry Support Fund could be provided (Turkey Progress Report, 2011, p.11); thus, transparency in audit was provided. However, EU Progress Reports (2014, p.8; 2015, p.11; 2016, p.14; 2018, p.17) found the legal framework for overseeing military expenditures insufficient due to a lack of access to audit reports by the Turkish Court of Accounts on the security, defense and intelligence agencies.

3.5. The Impact of EU-led Reforms on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Optimism and Caution in Scholarly Analyses

There have been various analyses of the changes deriving from the democratization reforms on civil-military relations in Turkey. It is possible to present two different groups of opinion with different perspectives on this issue. The first group suggested that there has been a democratization trend in civil-military relations in Turkey in the sense of subordination of the military as an institution to civilian authority through legal reforms. However, scholars in the first group tended to be more cautious regarding that legal reforms are not the only factor for democratizing civil-military relations; so, they also considered organizational, attitudinal and cultural change for TSK as a necessity to achieve a fully consolidated democracy. It was claimed that pure institutional changes would mean underestimating the root of the causes of democratic control of the armed forces because militaries are not "ideology-free and purely defensive institutions with no institutional spirit, no history, and no ideological and alliance capabilities to help them retain societal support and political prerogatives" (Cizre, 2004, p.121). On the other hand; the second group of scholars considered EU-led reforms and constitutional changes on military's political and institutional autonomy satisfactory and they claimed that TSK had become professionalized and civil-military relations in Turkey had become more democratic.

As exemplifier of the first approach, Cizre argued that a simple list of institutional reforms of civil-military relations is not sufficient to identify unspoken and maybe undetectable systems legitimizing the military's ability to influence. She held that for the democratic control of the armed forces, it is necessary that reforms create a new military culture with substantial changes ideologically and historically. The

democratic control of the armed forces in Turkey was attempted in a purely institutional way. In fact, issues such as the position of the Chief of General Staff, the role of MGK, the composition and jurisdiction of the DGMs, and the emergency rule in the Southeast, which are used to detect any balance shifting towards civilian control, demonstrate this institutional reform effort. Hence, Cizre concluded that although democratic control was achieved according to EU's institutional requirements, full civilian control over the military was not yet established (2004, pp.119-120). She drew attention to ongoing de facto power of TSK. For instance, after the constitutional amendment of October 2001, which expanded the civilian members within MGK, confined the role of council to recommendations. As the Regular Report of 2001 stated that de facto power of the military and need to monitor "the extent to which the constitutional amendments will enhance de facto civilian control" (2001, p.19). Thus, in this example, a majority of civilians in the Council remained a purely institutional approach and as such it was not satisfactory for democratic control of the armed forces (Cizre, 2004, p.121).

According to Cizre, the reason why DECAF could not be achieved was based on the idea that a single model can be suitable for each country. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners have used civilian control of the military as a main priority. It has also been considered a common norm of European identity-building, good governance and security (2004, p.110). She argued that this post-communist state model mismatched with the source of legitimacy of TSK and international security design of Turkey. Similarly, the TSK has been influential since the establishment of the state and received great support from the Turkish society. So, all these sources gave the opportunity through non-repressive methods for continuing domination of TSK in Turkey (2004, pp.111-114). Lastly, as Turkey became an ally of the United States on international security since the September 11 attacks, this also encouraged TSK to be ready and strong in terms of culture and machine rather than civil-military balance. Here, the risk was that military preparedness and capability can be used as instruments by the military to enhance internal and external status of the institution (2004, pp.115-116).

Along similar lines, Aknur reminded us that since coming to power in 2002, the AKP governments passed legal and institutional changes in order to reduce the military's power in politics. First, through the EU reforms TSK lost its formal (institutional) mechanisms, such as MGK. Second, because of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials,[18] its informal (non-institutional) mechanisms such as public speeches and press conferences were limited. Third, the consolidation of the AKP's power in government and its "de-securitization policies", which referred to removing security subjects from the military's sphere of control, also reduced the military's internal security role. Finally, the 2010 constitutional amendments and change of Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Code reduced its institutional power. According to Aknur, Turkey then became closer to democratic civil-military relations. However, TSK still had a mindset through which it considered itself as the ultimate guardian of the state. In that sense, military's "firmly-rooted institutional mindset" and "non-internalization of civilian control in the military" were still the main problems for a consolidated democracy (Aknur, 2013, pp.132, 147). She argued that even though TSK seemed to have accepted government policies, this did not mean that the military changed its mindset in some main issues such as being the ultimate guardianship of the state and protecting the Republic from internal and external threats. This national duty of the military was deeply rooted in TSK and because of ongoing ethnic separatism and regional security challenges, it was difficult to change to this culture (2013, p.144).

Likewise, according to Gürsoy civil-military relations in Turkey were evolving into the dominance of civilians. Indirectly, 1999 and 2005 EU-induced reforms weakened the authority of the armed forces and the failure of website declaration of the General Staff in 2007 reinforced this weakening of TSK. "Ergenekon" case was the second event that leveraged civilians against the military (2011, p.297). Nevertheless, she

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[18] Hundreds of people including journalists, academics lower- and higher-ranking active and retired officers were imprisoned on allegations of attempts to justify a military coup against the AKP government through creating chaos by attacking religious minority groups, planting explosives in mosques and assassinating prominent individuals or bombing a newspaper in Turkey. Balyoz was the most prominent coup plan in the Ergenekon case. The first trial in Ergenekon case was in October 2008 and in Balyoz case was in December 2010. A former Chief of General Staff, İlker Başbuğ, was imprisoned in the context of internet memorandum trial within the Ergenekon cases in 2012. Then, it turned out that all these cases were fabricated by Gülenist community actors who integrated into the judiciary.

claimed that although legal amendments challenged the prerogatives of the military compared with previous Turkish political history, the military autonomy did not go through a significant change in Turkey. There were some attempts to reduce the autonomy of TSK in four specific fields, namely the internal security roles of the military, civilian supervision of the defense budget and arms procurement, functions of the military courts, and senior-level personnel decisions. However, despite these EU harmonization reforms enacted since 1999, TSK continued to have important privileges and spheres of autonomy such as coordination of defense sector and role in intelligence. As long as civilians continue to use the TSK against internal threats and military considers itself guardian of the "home", legal amendments cannot be put into practice (2011, p.304); so it was argued that there must be more reforms and democratic practices in those areas. In other words, the EU reforms were not enough to reach the level of ideal-type democracies in terms of civil-military relations in Turkey. She cautioned that if civilians commit to reforms and increase civilian supervision of the military, Turkey would accomplish the democratic control of the armed forces (2011, pp.293-294, 302).

As part of the cautious approach Karaosmanoğlu criticized the mainstream civil-military relations perspective because of its binary and power-based analyses and its ignorance of international structural changes and security culture. Although there was a power struggle between the military and civil authority, this approach was limited because it was inefficient to explain the periods of collaboration between these two actors (2011, p.261). It was claimed that there had been a transformation in the relations between civilians and TSK in recent years and an effective collaboration between these two actors since the July 2007 general elections. Karaosmanoğlu stated that this collaboration was different than civil-military relations shaping with the reform process between the years 2002-2006. Although reforms adapted before July 2007 made the civil-military relations more democratic; and yet military influence continued through public statements of the high-ranking military officers. For instance, there was an "electronic memorandum" on April 2007 by the Chief of General Staff General Büyükanıt (between the years 2006-2008) in

order to criticize the process of presidential election.[19] However, the AKP government consolidated its legitimacy through the victory in the July 2007 general elections (2011, p.253). The "e-memorandum" posted on the military's website read that:

> It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to undermine the fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently. The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (BBC News, April, 28, 2007).

At the time of the presidential elections in 2007, although many expected a conflict between the military and the government or a coup d'état or, at least, in a substantial military invasion into politics but none of these occurred. Instead, Karaosmanoğlu argued that a new pattern which included a common understanding and collaboration between the military and the government emerged (2011, p.254). Moreover, in a difficult security environment such as the invasion of Iraq and Middle Eastern sub-system and the cross-border military operations into northern Iraq required diplomacy, non-military activities highlighted the need for politicians' greater involvement in security policy-making (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.261). Therefore, Karaosmanoğlu held that although civilian control over the military was not yet fully internalized, civil-military cooperation on security was in progress. Because according to him, in unconsolidated democracies such as Turkey, the construction of civilian control needed a cultural change shaping around open communication channels (2011, p.262).

Considering the above-mentioned effects, it was also argued that neither the ruling party nor opposition parties gave priority to the democratic control of the armed forces after the year 2005. Moreover, the culture of political elite and Turkish society, resisted to a full reformation process for more democratic civil-military

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[19] It is a statement placed on the website of Chief of General Staff and penned by General Büyükanıt against to the election of the candidate of the AKP government, Abdullah Gül, as President because the Presidential Palace-Çankaya was considered as a symbol of secularism and Gül was perceived as a threat for it. As a result, Gül was elected as the President.

relations. In other words, they argue that the EU accession process has empowered civilians over the military, but it has remained just an external support because of some historical facts of Turkish politics like giving military excessive place for shaping security culture. Because of such deficiencies, European norms for democratic civil-military relations could not be fully internalized (Toktaş and Kurt, 2010, p.389). The authors claimed that the EU reforms were related more to structure than substance. That is to say, those reforms did not aim removal of the military from internal security issue or its guardianship role (2010, p.392). When the issue is about unitary and indivisible character of the state, the military did not hesitate to use both formal instruments like MGK and informal mechanisms ranging from public speeches to informal contacts with bureaucrats and politicians. Thus, this critical situation indicated the importance of mindset change in the military (2010, p.399).

Similarly, Sarıgil also underlined the significance of organizational culture of the TSK. In his opinion, legal amendments are necessary, but they are not sufficient because of the organizational culture of the military which shaped the military's interests and behavior in the politics. More specifically, two endogenous elements of the organizational culture of TSK were significant for democratic change: ideology and attitude toward politicians. TSK has had a constant ideology based on Kemalism when compared to many other militaries. These internally oriented ideological tendencies of TSK made civil-military relations more complicated in Turkey due to strong distrust by the military officers toward the politicians and politics. This attitude created a major obstacle for the democratic civil-military relations (2011, pp.273-275).

Michaud-Emin also focused on the importance of change the mindset of the military through analyzing the reforms both in formal and informal means of power and influence of TSK. Informal political and economic means of military influence, a societal distrust in the political system, cultural factors that emphasize the military's influence in society; and new political dynamics that triggered the Turkish military to take a more direct role in Turkish politics were historical indicators of the military retaining its influence over civilians at certain points (2007, p.26). In other words, if

the military sensed a serious national security threat, it would take action in an "executive" manner, independent of any legally restricted role (Michaud-Emin, 2007, p.38).

In addition to the above-mentioned scholars who held a cautious approach towards the impacts of reforms, there has been a more optimist group of scholars who claimed that TSK became professionalized and civil-military relations in Turkey appeared more democratic through the EU-led democratization reforms. For example, Heper suggested that from the late 1950s to 2002, the TSK played a greater role in politics referring to external threat, secularism, national unity and territorial integrity discourses. However, Heper claimed that the military started to be professionalized after 2002 in Turkey. He used the term professionalization to refer to the fact that the military started to question the necessity or logic of intervening in politics. Commanders signalled that they would not act like previous commanders to intervene in politics. This made the military closer to the idea that "civilians have the right to be wrong" (2011, pp.241-242). For Heper, a review of the approaches of post-2002 Chiefs of General Staff for instance; Hilmi Özkök (the Turkish Chief of General Staff between 2002-2006), Yaşar Büyükanıt (the Turkish Chief of General Staff between 2006-2008), and General İlker Başbuğ (the Turkish Chief of General Staff between 2008-2010) provided ample evidence for an attitudinal change in the Turkish military in that commanders no longer considered themselves as national political overseers and they even started to trust civilians. Thus, it was concluded that the relation between TSK and the AKP government had been transformed almost to a liberal model of civil-military relations than ever before (Heper, 2005, p. 227). Heper attributed the changing attitudes of members of TSK in the post-2002 period to three factors. Firstly, democracy in TSK started to be considered as an end, not as a means. Secondly, TSK started to refer Atatürkism as a critical thinking style rather than a dogmatic one. Thirdly, some issues such as change and critical thinking became normalized for the military. For instance, General Büyükanıt declared in 2007 that:

> In our current stage of progress, we should realize that several of our past 'rights' have proven to be wrong. Those who are not conscious of this fact, always repeat

themselves. One should question even some military traditions that not many have the courage to challenge (As cited in Heper, 2011, pp.250-251).[20]

Heper introduced two reasons for this attitudinal change in the military: rendering Turkey a full member of EU and coming to power of the AKP in 2002. Considering itself as a pioneer of modernization, TSK has already supported the idea of full membership and developed friendly relations with the government (2005, p.217). The AKP government conducted a balanced and cautious policy towards the military. Initially, the AKP government refrained from addressing issues that TSK was keenly opposed to and avoided from criticizing TSK about sensitive issues for the military. Moreover, the AKP government considered military's opinion on issues that military had expertise. Finally, just as the military, the AKP government also tried to develop a *modus vivendi* with the military (2005, pp.222-223). Therefore, there was a working relationship between the AKP government and the military after 2002 (2005, p.227).

On the impacts of cultural change, Narlı explained political and security culture levels and changes in the mindset and socialization of the officer corps. A primary indicator of change in the political culture was the increasing number of academic studies on civil-military relations. Daily and weekly published editorials and articles were on newspapers and journals about disapproval of military interventions in politics, lack of transparency in defense policy and lack of civilian power on defense issues (2009, p.71). The last indicator of change in political culture was a newly evolving belief giving the responsibility of protecting democracy and secularism to regular civilian institutions rather than calling up the military. Narlı held that the e-memorandum failed to achieve the expected effect and did not result in the resignation of the government. On the other hand, the manifestations of the changes in the mindset of the officer corps are not as clear as the indicators of change in the political culture. The increased number of officers joining graduate study programmes at various universities was an indicator of the cultural change among

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[20] Heper also explains the 2007 e-memorandum which was penned by Büyükanıt. According to Heper, after the declaration of e-memorandum, Büyükanıt accepted results of the elections with grace and this stance of Büyükanıt verified that he was concerning the principle of civilians having the last word (2011, p.243). After that issue, on May 4, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Büyükanıt came together informally at Dolmabahçe Palace. Heper interprets this meeting as the building of mutual trust and working relationship (2011, p.244).

the officer corps. Moreover, the TSK were willing to cooperate in executing the EU harmonization reforms in terms of civil-military relations (2009, p.73).

A power shift in civil-military relations in favour of the former was also suggested by Aydınlı. It is contended that the military's "manipulation resources" have been reduced mainly throughout the recent years of the EU accession process and there was a more democratic pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey; the last three Turkish Chiefs of General Staff were the evidence that TSK had started to internalize this paradigm shift (2009, p.581). Aydınlı identified two groups in the military: conservative majority group and smaller progressive group. According to him, those two groups had the same ultimate goal to reach the modern, Westernized and Europeanized Turkey. They could be differentiated by the extent of their cautiousness degree. The first group considered itself as the guardian of the Republican regime, its territorial integrity and its political parameters such as secularism, a unified national body, and the national security over politics. The second group who supported the ongoing transformation and modernization of the nation abstained from changes in civil-military relations. This group was always more involved with integration with transnational organizations and global markets, EU accession process as well as solid relations with NATO and other Western security institutions (2009, pp.587-588). In Aydınlı's opinion, military leadership was avoiding confrontation with political leadership, and military authorities exhibited more accommodation (2009, pp.590-591). Thus, these changes in discourse and in actions of the military people demonstrated that the conservative group considering TSK as the guardian of the state in the military was losing its significance (Aydınlı, 2009, p.594). Moreover, the perception of the Turkish society towards the armed forces and the politicians was also changing due to the relative political stability and the presence of solid political leadership. As the society started to trust civilian politicians, the Turkish military was relegated into a secondary position (Aydınlı, 2009, pp.586-587).

Finally, Aydınlı et. al also contended that there was a grand consensus between the civilians and the military after the EU harmonization reforms. Due to democratic conditionality of EU, civilians came to enjoy greater control over the military. For

instance, the balance of power on MGK shifted in favor of civilian members; civilians started to draft MGK papers; civilians had control over military expenses, promotions, and dismissals; military officers were removed from non-military councils; military judicial institutions were subjected to civilian oversight (2006, p.6). It was argued by the authors that military officers considered the EU membership as the ultimate level of the modernization process for which they had played an active role for years. Additionally, they also hoped that the EU accession process could solve the domestic challenges of Islamism and Kurdish separatism (2006, p.2). In that sense, accommodation between civilians and the military could be seen as a result of a simple cost-benefit analysis along with strong loyalty to Kemalist ideology. In this view, although Kemalism was sometimes seen as a barrier due to concerns such as sovereignty, statism, and nationalism, it proved to be adaptable to new situations (2006, pp.8-9).

Overall, as this brief review of the civil-military relations literature in Turkey demonstrates that research of the early 2000s in Turkey had been mostly and optimistically affected by the EU accession process; hence, an extensive literature described the reform process or civilianization process as a way of democratization. However, this approach, in one sense, ignored how civilian governments carried out this process. In the establishment of civilian control process, civilians might use democratic means or they pursue an oppressive and authoritarian attitude. In that sense, not every civilianization might result in democratization and both the early literature on consolidation and the Turkish scholars' research could be criticized in this respect. Hence, for Turkish case, the term "reforms required for EU accession" can be used rather than democratization reforms. In addition, some of these studies accepted legal reforms sufficient for democratic civilian control. In contrast, some others referred to the historical values of the military and consider the change of military culture necessary for the construction of democratic civilian control. However, in both approaches, few studies were based on concrete evidence; i.e. generally, they were mostly descriptive and at most, they developed an argument on the statements and speeches or behaviors of the chiefs of general staff. Nevertheless, these studies have been significant in terms of highlighting the methods which able to assess the impact of democratization reforms on the

extension of civilian control or the reduction of military autonomy. Moreover, these studies are useful in order to understand phenomena in international literature in the context of Turkey. For example, they make it easier to highlight the dimensions of the military autonomy of the Turkish army. The contributions of this study to the relevant civil-military relations literature in this regard is introduced and explained in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4

THE ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICERS' VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS THE CIVILIANIZATION REFORMS

4.1. Overview of the Research Procedure

This chapter explores the perceptions of a group of mostly high-ranking military officers regarding the democratization reforms (legal and constitutional amendments) and civilianization process enacted since 1999 during Turkey's EU accession process. In this context, the major research question of this thesis regarding the effect of the democratization reforms on restricting the military autonomy on the perception of the military officers needs to be restated: "How military officers perceive and evaluate the legal and constitutional reforms to curtail the Turkish military's political and institutional autonomy during the EU accession process in terms of the internalization of the norm of civilian control over the military in Turkey. How has this process changed the traditional mindset of the officers regarding TSK's traditional missions?" Within the framework of these questions, the hypothesis holds that "there are certain factors that condition and constrain the officers' internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy over the armed forces." The prevailing traditional dilemmas related to the primacy of national security and regime related issues among the officers, perceptions of civilian control as not yet consolidated as a tradition, the skeptical views of the officers regarding the democratization process in Turkey; i.e. whether the officers believe that democratization process is going on in every sphere of the polity - not just in the civil-military domain - and aspects of military education and ideological socialization norms of the military feeding conventional values among the officers are likely to condition and constrain the officers' internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

At the organization stage of this thesis, efforts were made to reach respondents via personal contacts and e-mails. At the time of interviews, the author had been working at one of the major think-tanks at Ankara, Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM),[21] for almost four years as a socio-cultural research specialist. Hence, this position provided the researcher the opportunity to spend time with high-ranking retired and active duty officers, who were in contact with BİLGESAM. Moreover, the author co-wrote a book, several articles and reports about civil-military relations while working at BİLGESAM. This created a professional network consisting high-ranking officers. For the interviews, this network was used to reach the soldiers by the author. Therefore, high-ranking officers were contacted on the basis of the researcher's experiences in this organization and familiarity with some of the mentor figures. The questionnaire form was e-mailed to the respondents prior to the meeting to get their consent and to make them familiar to the interview questions. The face-to-face interviews lasted approximately 90 minutes each, and the officers interviewed were generally helpful, interested and cooperative. Anonymity to protect privacy was important especially in the case of the military officers here; hence, the names of respondents were kept confidential. Thus, each respondent is represented with a random number in this thesis. A detailed information regarding rank, force, retirement status, and interview dates are provided in Appendix-B.

The face-to-face interviews were semi-structured. Therefore, in addition to closed-ended questions, open-ended questions were also asked allowing the respondents to express themselves. The questionnaire form initially consisting of 27 questions was expanded to 31 questions by adding four more questions which were mentioned predominantly during the first few interviews. Questions were prepared on the basis of dimensions of the concept of military autonomy in the literature. This concept is analytically divided into two corresponding to institutional and political autonomy aspects as defined in relevant literature. Especially, the military autonomy dimensions introduced by Pion-Berlin, Stepan and Serra were used by adapting

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[21] BILGESAM was established in 2008 in Istanbul and had a branch office in Ankara until 2016. It is a strategic research centre engaging in scientific research especially on the security strategies of Turkey. There are several retired high-ranking officers on its advisory board. Some of its employees were also retired soldiers. The webpage is available on http://www.bilgesam.org/

these dimensions to the conditions in Turkey in the questionnaire form. In order to reveal the extent of military autonomy, military budget, promotion and appointment system, arms production and procurement, defense organization, internal and external security issues, the role of the military in political system and existence of military in judicial system were used as domains of autonomy. As many scholars identified military autonomy level according to the role or the existence of the military influence in those areas, these dimensions were explained in detail in Chapter 2.

The first eight questions in the questionnaire form are related to the respondents' various service background characteristics including their rank, force type, length of service, retired or active duty status. Respondents were also assessed according with whether they worked closely with civilians while in military etc. and academic achievement. The main body of questions (i.e. Question 9 forward), though mixed, addresses either "political autonomy" or "institutional autonomy" of the military in Turkey.

In order to tap into the attitudes and the views of the officers on the political autonomy matters, sixteen questions were asked under the headings of regime-related matters, national security related issues and military justice related issues. In order to demonstrate the perception of the officers on the institutional autonomy matters, seven questions were prepared including the topics such as military indoctrination and defense organization and military budget. Additionally, probing questions were used in this questionnaire form; hence, some questions contained one or more sub-questions. The questionnaire form is attached in the Appendix-A.

The following section in this chapter first presents the general findings. For each question, most frequently expressed opinions are given. Then, these general findings are integrated into the discussion based on the theoretical issues elaborated in the thesis and they are assessed in light of the literature on civil-military relations in Turkey.

4.2. The Findings

4.2.1. Background characteristics of the respondents

The first eight questions in the questionnaire form were related to the respondents' various service background characteristics such as length of service, force type, their retirement rank and year, season of retirement, their last position prior to retirement, information about whether they worked closely with politicians or not, whether they worked in civilian life after retirement or not, and whether they had any academic degree or not. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of respondents by force, rank and retirement status.

Table 4.1. Officers interviewed by force, rank and retirement status

	Army		Air Force		Navy		Gendarmerie		
	Retired	Active-duty	Retired	Active-duty	Retired	Active-duty	Retired	Active-duty	
Admiral					1				
Major General	1	1					1		
Colonel	8	1						1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		1						
Major	1								
Captain	2	1							
First Lieutenant						2			
Total	13	3	1		1	2	1	1	22

Although in-depth face-to-face interview is one of the best ways to measure military perceptions directly, it is perhaps the most difficult to obtain. Institutional rules limiting public statements by military officers or requiring permission of one's superior to participate in external research severely limited the accessibility to potential respondents and thus number of interviews. Thus, it was considered that retired officers may speak more freely on politically sensitive questions (Fitch, 2001, pp.67-68). From this point of view, a common feature of the interviewees in this

research was that they were predominantly retired officers (16 out of 22), both because they were more accessible before interview and could express their ideas freely in such a study. It was assumed that being retired or active in the military has no significant influence on attitudes of the officers. The stance of officers, formed via the military culture, continues after the retirement since military culture symbolizes a unique way of life (Dunivin, 1994, p.533). It is also likely to differ from any other organization's culture as it demands 24-hour long commitment from its personnel, and socializes them through the process of deconstruction of their civilian status and the process of new identification (Soeters et al., 2006, pp. 241-250). Moreover, in the Turkish case, "even in retirement, the overwhelming majority of the top leadership in the Turkish military spends its post-service years within military housing and compounds, tended to by military personnel, and isolated from civilians" because of their complete sense of belonging and life-time commitment towards the military (Aydınlı, 2009, p.590). Thus, it is likely that retired army officers and active-duty soldiers are likely to hold similar views because military mindset does not necessarily disappear or transform after retirement due to its unique properties.

Another important point of consideration here was the fact that the vast majority of retired officers participating in this study were working in the TSK at important stages of the EU process. There were only two officers who retired before 2000, in 1998 and in 1999. Besides, half of the respondents were retired in the mid-2000s and the other half were retired in the early 2010s. Therefore, most of the respondents witnessed the turning points in terms of civil-military relations while working in TSK and had the chance to make observations from the inside the military. The longest length of service among the officers was forty-two years and the shortest one was six years, considering those six officers on active duty.[22]

When the reason of the retirement of the respondents was asked, except two officers, all of the others stated that they retired upon their own request.[23] One officer who sent his handwritten responses through post did not write any reason

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[22] This is the Question 1 and it reads "How long did you serve in the Turkish Armed Forces?"

[23] This is the Question 4: "Did you retire upon your own request?"

and the retirement reason of another officer was non-vacancy. Another common feature of the interviewees was that most of them were high-ranking officers except those respondents who were on active duty.[24] The choice of officers as respondents relied on Huntington's argument that the core of civil-military relations is the relation to the state of the officer corps who constitutes the management cadres of the military. Therefore, a study of civil-military relations primarily rests on an understanding of the nature of officer corps (Huntington, 2006, pp.5-6). Another common characteristic of interviewees is that they are mainly members of the Land Forces.[25] Respondents were mostly composed of members of the Army in reference to Lipson's thesis that "great sea powers can be democratic, whereas great land powers cannot". He states that navies strike at a distance from home; thus, they do not function internally. Land power on the other hand can be used within domestic arena in order to crush a popular uprising or dissolve a legislature (1964, pp.182-183). Therefore, it seemed more important to tap into the attitudes of the members of the Army who would be in a more ambivalent relationship with democracy as a system.

Five of the officers, among the twenty-two, stated that they had an opportunity to work closely with politicians when they were in active duty.[26] This question was formulated to understand whether working closely with civilians has a positive effect on trust in civilians and the acceptance of the reforms. When the responses of these five officers were evaluated, it was found out that the perceptions of the officers towards the EU-induced reforms were not different from the general perceptions over the reform process. That is to say, they did not have more positive attitudes than the rest towards those reforms over which officers held generally more cautious attitudes. As for the trust in civilians, the two of the officers stated they did not trust civilians, while the other three took a neutral approach.

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[24] This is the Question 3: "In which year and at what rank did you retire?"

[25] This is the Question 2: "In which service did you serve?"

[26] This is the Question 6: "Did you have any opportunity to work closely with politicians when you were in active duty?"

More than half of the participants had an academic degree of at least master's level.[27] Moreover, four of the officers stated that they worked as an instructor in different schools within the military education system.[28] As will be analyzed in the following sections, the statements made by these officers who were directly within this military education system and socialization process were significant. All four officers stated that the military education system and the socialization process imposed on the soldiers some notions which paved the way for military tutelage and political interventions.

4.2.2. Officers' views on political autonomy matters

In order to explore the attitudes and the views of the officers on the political autonomy matters, sixteen questions were organized under the headings of regime-related matters, national security related issues and military justice related issues. These headings were formed by taking into account the clusters in the theories of military autonomy of Pion-Berlin and Stepan and in the fields over which the Turkish Army had political autonomy for years. In that sense, each question under these headings can be directly related with political autonomy dimensions of TSK. That is to say, the political autonomy components of TSK were mostly based on regime-related issues such as Westernization mission of TSK, military interventions in politics and the trials of the officers after 2010; national security and military justice matters such as determination of national security threat, role of the military in protection of national interests and limitation of competence of military jurisdiction in Turkey.

Regime-related issues

There are eleven regime-related questions and four of them are related to EU accession process and its effects on civil-military relations in Turkey. The thesis accepts this process as the main anchor in initiating changes in civil-military relations. In that sense, it was significant to explore the views of the officers on the

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[27] This is the Question 8: "Do you have any academic works or degrees?"

[28] This is the Question 5: "What was your last position prior to retirement?"

issues related with the EU accession process. The first question about the EU accession process was asking the officers' views in general on Turkey's EU long-term membership and the effects of the accession process on Turkish politics.[29] All respondents, except two, expressed positive views on the EU process. The commonly shared perception on this issue held that, the EU was an opportunity for Turkey to develop in every field; i.e. the prospective EU membership would contribute to our economic, social and legal development. There were two different groups among the supporters of the EU accession process who had different views on one matter: The first group underlined the importance of the democratic criteria of the EU; yet they also stated that they would be against Turkey's EU membership if Turkey were to waive "certain things" for full accession to EU. These were defined as "red lines" of Turkey; that is Cyprus issue, relations with Greece and mother tongue-based education. Officers within this first group also highlighted cultural differences between Turkey's and the EU's norms; so, they suggested that some values need to be adapted to us; i.e. freedom of expression, arrangements of opinion and thought crimes and human rights. Freedoms were considered among the respondents as challenging issues for Turkey since it was emphasized that the perception of threat is higher in Turkey than in EU countries due to the location of Turkey. Thus, this first group of respondents supported the EU membership under some conditions. The second group within the supporters of EU membership stated that, regardless of the concerns of the first group such as Cyprus issue, relations with Greece and mother tongue based education, the EU process does not lead any negative outcome or effect on Turkey. On this issue, only two respondents opposed the EU process because they stated that the EU does not have any intention of getting Turkey into the Union.

Another question was asked to capture the general perception about EU process in TSK besides the respondents' own opinions. This question analyzed differences of opinion in the military, as progressives and conservatives, in terms of the

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[29] This is the Question 9: "May I hear your views on Turkey's EU accession process? Do you think full accession to EU will positively or negatively affect Turkey? Why?"

perspective of change.[30] The common views expressed on this question indicated the existence of such a distinction in the TSK. According to the majority of the respondents, this differentiation which could not be thought apart from the trends in the world can be made in the form of old generation vs. new generation. The new generation was described as more inquisitive and innovative. However, the old generation was defined as a higher level of institutional commitment, not open to change and perceiving the EU process as a struggle of civilians with the military. However, these respondents who pointed out the distinction between old generation and new generation differed in terms of their perception about these two generations. The first group stated that the system should continue through benefiting from the old generation and their "intimate knowledge." The other group gave more significance to the new generation and had the idea that the trend of the traditional structure in which there are those officers who are more conservative, and supporter of the status quo is decreasing since people have different worldviews and goals now. On the same issue, according to a less frequently voiced proposition among the respondents, this kind of distinction could not be made in TSK. The main discourse of this group was that TSK was already the pioneer of Westernization, so the military as a whole could not think otherwise and remain adverse to the EU membership.

Another regime-related question tried to understand officers' views about changes which were introduced in the EU harmonization process, particularly in the area of civil-military relations.[31] Although most officers supported the Turkey's EU membership, the perception of the EU-induced reforms on civil-military relations were more negative. Subjecting the expulsion decisions regarding officers by YAŞ to legal review was generally considered to be positive among the officers. It was evaluated positively in order to eliminate any injustice and to have a more transparent and accountable structure. The reform of the audit of the Court of Accounts over TSK was another positively considered issue. Respondents believed

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[30] This is the Question 28: "Is it possible to make a distinction in the military, such as progressives and conservatives, in terms of the perspective of change?"

[31] This is the Question 10: "Many changes were introduced in the EU harmonization process, particularly in the area of civil-military relations. How do you view such reforms? Which do you think the most positive and most negative arrangements were in the military sphere?"

that this reform showed Turkish people and politicians that the Armed Forces was too much sensitive and careful in the use of its budget and resources. Too much interference of politicians with the appointments and promotions was perceived as a negative arrangement. The risk of politicization of cadres and the concern that non-qualified people could be brought to positions they did not deserve were cited as the reasons of this negative perception.

A commonly shared perception held by the majority of the respondents that came to the fore in this question was the conviction about the existence of a significant change in civil-military relations, but also that this must be an "comprehensive change"; i.e. all institutions, operations and systems should move to EU standards simultaneously. According to the respondents, all new arrangements impacting on civil-military relations could remain symbolic unless there were a comprehensive change in all institutions, operations and the system in the country. i.e. it is important whether the democratization process is going on in every sphere of the polity - not just in the civil-military domain -. These respondents claimed that there was not yet such an "inclusionary democratic" change in Turkey. The statements of a retired Major General who served in the Army for thirty-five years revealed this opinion in a striking way: "If you try to change something obsessively, you can't go anywhere and this change would just remain symbolical. Military courts were abolished but then, what about the Specially Authorized Courts (Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler)? "[32] The Specially Authorized Courts were introduced after the abolition of the DGMs (Katoğlu, 2010, p.39) with the aim of fighting against "coup plots and military tutelage" (Ete, 2012). These courts were considered by the liberal critic as a problem for the democratic system and in the legal and judicial history of Turkey (Ensaroğlu, 2012) and were interpreted as the continuation of DGMs due to their special powers (Katoğlu, 2010, p.51). Under the AKP period, Ergenekon and Balyoz trials of military officers on charges of plotting coups were also heard within these specially authorized courts with specially authorized prosecutors. Thus, this Major General drew attention to these specially authorized courts in this context.

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[32] Respondent No.14; interview was conducted on February 11, 2016.

The major reason for such critical views was the negative perception of the purpose of some of the reforms. For instance, it was noted that what was going on was not a genuine democratization process, but a party control with particular emphasis on the Ergenekon trials. Therefore, the generally shared view that civilianization and democratization were different things can be evaluated in this regard. The following statements of another retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years demonstrated this difference:

> Civilianization and democratization are different things. Not every civilianization brings democratization. When we take a look at what has been done in the past, we can certainly see that there was a clear civilianization but that did not bring the democratization with it. Democratization in civilian-military relations does not just mean the military's compliance with the rules of law. What is important here is the internalization of the democracy culture by the political system. Otherwise, the situation becomes one of the sides' becoming dependent on the other by invoking the legal system. The military would, of course, be accountable to the civilians. People will have the final word. However, democracy should have been internalized by then.[33]

Another question was posed to the respondents to obtain their views on this argument that the focus on the reforms and democratization process should not just be on TSK, but on every domain and all institutions.[34] This question was significant in connection with the hypothesis of the thesis as democratization not expanding in every domain and the institution in the country was considered as one of the reasons that constrain the officers' internalization of the changes in terms of civil-military relations. All respondents who answered this question agreed with this argument in the question. As it was mentioned in the question, the common idea among the respondents was that the democracy culture must take root in the whole society and in all institutions. Therefore, it was underlined that while trying to break the military tutelage, politicians should not move away from democratic practices and create their own guardianship areas. A retired Captain who served in the Army for twenty-seven years explained his views on the subject as follows:

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[33] Respondent No.09; interview was conducted on February 12, 2016.

[34] This is the Question 29: "The point emphasized in previous interviews was that democratization in civil-military relations was necessary but that the focus should not just be on TSK, but democratization should be in every domain and all institutions. What is your view on this?"

> The operations carried out against TSK were not conducted for all institutions since TSK was an effective institution and so it was seen necessary to suppress the Armed Forces. Maybe this suppression attempt was correct considering the events such as 28 February, but those who ended the tutelage became the new owner of this tutelary power in a different way. At the moment, politicians have replaced the military tutelage.[35]

Similarly, a retired Colonel who served in the Army for thirty years pointed out that,

> It doesn't matter whether civilian or military. What is important is that the democratic culture prevails in the whole society and that everyone (civilian and military) plays its own role. As seen recently, civilian leaders are trying to use everyone, including the military, (legislative, executive and judicial elements) in the direction of reinforcing their power. This is not democracy.[36]

This kind of critical reactions of the respondents directly referred to the claims of increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government and its anti-democratic implementations in recent years. As a prominent scholar of Turkish politics stated during the first decade of the twenty-first century, there was a belief among scholars that Turkey was becoming a consolidated pluralistic democracy. However, these hopeful consideration disappeared in the second decade, with growing criticism and skepticism about the government's democratic orientation and policies. Thus, approximately the last ten year of the AKP government was defined as a reversal of democratic achievements since governance became more particularistic and personalized in the context of oppressive policies (Somer, 2016, p.1). When the Ergenekon process, which was interpreted by the officers as political cases, was added to this period, it caused the emergence of a negative approach among the soldiers towards the level of democracy in the country and towards those EU led changes carried with the claim of the democratization in civil-military relations.

Another regime-related question allowed further elaboration of the views above. This question explored the evaluation of the officers about the proposition that whether there had been a significant change in civil-military relations with the EU reform

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[35] Respondent No.21; interview was conducted on February 25, 2016.

[36] Respondent No.05; interview was conducted on March 14, 2016.

process in Turkey?[37] On this particular question, except one respondent, all officers stated that there had indeed been a significant transformation on civil-military relations in Turkey in the recent period. However, there were two different views about the direction of this transformation. The first minority group including three respondents described this period as a transformation in which civilian control increased. According to this group of respondents such a transformation was necessary within a framework of a democratic state tradition. Moreover, as another reason of this transformation they stated that there was a recognition in TSK that both TSK and the political will are the organs of the state. This acceptance also revealed that both soldiers and civilians should be able to contact to each other in the framework of their duties and responsibilities and with democratic discipline. Indicators of this recent transformation were (listed by the first group) the striking absence of statements and public speeches by the top commanders about political issues (as a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years stated that the military is on the "mute mode"[38]), the soldiers' recognition of the final say of civilians, and increased accountability of the military.

According to opinion of the second (the largest) group who held skeptical attitudes on the issue (eighteen officers in total), the change was in fact a movement of reducing the competence and prestige of the Army. That is to say, the change was evaluated as an intimidation and coercion of TSK. Although it was not directly mentioned, the government was held responsible for this. That is to say, it was understood from their subsequent explanations that they thought that it was the government responsible for such a negative change. Some officers also described this transformation as the result of the emergence of past reactions towards TSK and five of them used the term "revenge." Such a perception here indicated the struggle between the political tradition of the AKP government over the years and the military which was against this tradition for the sake of principles of the Republic. According the officers, the notorious Ergenekon trials were also significant here; due

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[37] This is the Question 17: "Do you think there has been a change affected by the EU reform process in Turkey in the military's relation with politics and with the government (particularly in the last 10-15 years)? If such a change has occurred, what factors have brought about such transformation?"

[38] Respondent No.19; interview was conducted on February 16, 2016

to the general impressions over TSK's interventionist orientations coming from the past, there was a weak belief in the general public that the Army could not be involved in a formation like Ergenekon. Thus, TSK could not make the necessary explanations about the process; so, it was a revenge of the government on the soldiers by using the law. A retired Captain who served in the Army for fifteen years explained the roots of this "revanchist" view in the following way:

> After 1923, the guardian of the established system has always been TSK. In this process, a number of conservative groups were negatively affected and carrying a grudge. We became polarized necessarily; so I actually observe the change in this last period as a revenge of the process that has been going on since 1923.[39]

A Colonel on active duty for thirty years in the Gendarmerie made another explanation as a reason of this perception of "revanchism":

> The reforms alleged that they were made in line with the EU harmonization process were almost made to take revenge by the cadres who regard TSK as an enemy with its secular structure. These unfounded reforms did not provide a positive development (if they were sincere, a project with short, medium and long term goals based on a comprehensive scientific work would be put forward, not by omnibus bills introduced very hastily in one night). These reforms shattered the national and traditional structure of TSK and served to those to whom TSK's weakening in our current geography would serve.[40]

Similarly, statements of a retired Major General who served in the Gendarmerie for thirty-four years also expressed this "revanchist" perception as follows:

> The change of the authority which accepts the congratulations on August 30 ceremonies, presented as something important, and the comparison of such ceremonies to those held in Moscow, Beijing or North Korea underlie the perspectives of certain groups vis-à-vis the National Salvation War.[41] Under the cloak of "eliminating the militarist look" in the country, they were questioning TSK and the historic mission of the cadres who conducted the National Salvation War. If

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[39] Respondent No.15; interview was conducted on February 22, 2016.

[40] Respondent No.18; interview was conducted on March 15, 2016.

[41] The amendment to the "Regulation on Ceremonies on National and Official Festivals" published in the Official Gazette on 8 September 2010 was applied at the ceremony on 30 August 2011 and President Abdullah Gül accepted the celebrations as the Commander-in-Chief. Until then, congratulations were used to be received by the Chief of General Staff and the force commanders. This development was interpreted as the civilianization of the 30 August Victory Day Commemorations at that time.

they had watched the military parades in London, they would not have made such a comparison.[42]

Another question inquired into the respondents' views about the factors behind the transformation in civil-military relations if they had thought that such a change has occurred in Turkey.[43] When the views on both aspects of the transformation were evaluated together, the reasons that were thought to be effective in this transformation were as follows: the EU-led constitutional arrangements, intimidation of TSK, the fear of TSK members due to Ergenekon trials, political stability, and decrease in the trust of society towards TSK due to Ergenekon trails, rising new public trends in the world, e.g. freedom and transparency. Effects of all these factors were discussed in detail in the discussion and evaluation section. On this issue, only one respondent who was a First Lieutenant on active duty for six years in the Navy came up with the conclusion that it is early to talk about a transformation.[44] According to this particular officer, the struggle between civilians and soldiers was still continuing and that 2007 e-memorandum which was penned by General Büyükanıt against the nomination of Abdullah Gül's presidency was an indicator of this struggle.

Another question, formulated as one of the significant indicators of transformation (if any), inquired into the perceptions of the respondents about the abstaining of high-ranking officers from speaking to the press on polity issues.[45] The responses given to this question are significant in terms of revealing whether the officers are willing to leave the political sphere to civilian authority or not. More than one half of the respondents stated that they were content with this situation since soldiers should not speak to the press about political or other current developments. There was a general perception among the officers that making public speech was not what the soldiers were required to do. If the soldiers spoke to the press, the only condition

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[42] Respondent No.22; interview was conducted on January 16, 2016.

[43] This is the Question 18: "If such a change has occurred, what factors have brought about such transformation?"

[44] Respondent No.07; interview was conducted on February 13, 2016.

[45] This is the Question 23: "Recently, we observe that the high-ranking soldiers do not speak to the press on political, international etc. developments unless necessary. How do you view this: positive or negative?"

was that this speech must inform the public about the topics in the military's own remit. Additionally, this explanation should only be made by the Chief of General Staff. The rest (five respondents) stated that TSK should share its view with the public when necessary, especially on matters concerning the security of the country and on those issues that it did not approve. These five officers drew attention to the democratic and political context in the country. According to them, Turkey was not a "super-democratic" country or a "mature democracy" or there was no freedom of the press; as a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-two years stated that "silence of the soldiers was not true on the basis of not informing the public at least while so many wrong decisions and steps were taken in the military and political area on the basis of the country's strategic decisions."[46]

Another regime-related question again related to the issue of military's interference with politics concerned the perception of the officers about the possibility of any military intervention in politics in Turkey.[47] This question, as in the previous question, was significant to understand how much the officers related themselves with political sphere. More than half of the officers shared the view that military interventions were not much likely at the moment, but also were not completely unlikely in the future. Thus, in their opinion, the military's interference with politics might be again on the agenda if certain conditions would arise. The situations that would provoke a military intervention to be on the agenda were listed as follows: degeneration of democratic values in the country, an impending civil war, a chaotic environment as in the 1980, the demise of separation of powers, and of rule of law. These views underlined the guardianship role of TSK, and it indicated that these officers still considered TSK as the guardian of the regime. As a major reason of this situation, one respondent stated that:

> The military expands its power in times of social decline and crisis, because it is almost always the most close-knit organization in every country that may survive through the overall social crisis. Keeping the military subordinate to the other powers

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[46] Respondent No.02; interview was conducted on January 31, 2016.

[47] This is the Question 25: "Do you think the military's interference with politics is now a thing of the past, or is it likely that circumstances in the country may come into being which may require the military to intervene in the government? What would be included in such circumstances?"

within the society requires that all other powers must be stable and in harmony. When stability or order is weakened, the military may reappear as a dicting force.[48]

Still, another opinion on this issue, voiced by seven respondents, was that there was no longer a possibility of military intervention in Turkey. Supporters of this opinion noted that the military was aware of the fact that governing a country in the 21st century with military rule would result in long-term losses. It was also mentioned that because of the prevailing political stability under the AKP government, the hands of civilians were strengthened; so the relations between TSK and civilians were balanced and therefore a military intervention was not possible. The statements of one of the respondents best summarized this view: "The AKP has been the government since 2002; so we can say that the public has confidence in the discourses of the AKP government. If a government wins the elections consistently, the Turkish Armed Forces have to accept this will.[49]" On this issue, a prominent view among the respondents on the public's perception about military interventions was likely held that people no longer favored military coups. The reason behind this view was similar with the claim that there was no possibility of military intervention in Turkey. However, according to opposite view, which was expressed only by three respondents, Turkish people still held the perception that "soldiers would come and save us." All these views about the effect of political stability and the public's perception on the military interventions demonstrated that officers participated in this study started to realize that support of the general public is now on the side of the elected politicians, and that should be respected.

It was also argued here that although it seems that the Turkish people did not currently support military interventions, they could become the supporter of the military interventions one day again when the military was considered as the strongest authority in the country. A Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army elaborated on this in the following way:

Turkish people worship power. And whoever is strong, the people stand beside him / her. When the institution of X reaches the power to make a coup, the coup, to be

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[48] Respondent No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

[49] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

made, is supported by the people. When the day comes, and another institution becomes stronger, this time the people stand next to it, and be against the institution of X.[50]

This view underlined here held that the Army was not strong enough compared to the past to intervene in politics at the moment and the general public supported the political authority which was considered as more powerful. However, it was interpreted that independent from the institutions like the government or the military, the people would always take sides with the strongest; so Turkish people could support the military interventions in one day when they thought that TSK was the strongest authority in the country again.

On the issue of military interventions, four additional questions to probe the responses were asked specifically related to the amendment to Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of TSK which justified previous interventions on the grounds of "protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic, as determined by the Constitution", determination of national threat elements and exclusion of religious reactionism from internal security threat. The amendment to Article 35 was positively perceived by a large group of respondents. It was expressed that internal security should be in the responsibility of the Police and Gendarmerie. However, the fact that the Armed Forces were used in internal security threats in the Southeast by the AKP government after this amendment was considered as a contradictory to this amendment. Specifically, the focus of this contradiction was operations were carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces and General Directorate of Police in cooperation between August 2015 and March 2016 against the members of the PKK in Sur, Cizre and Nusaybin. In that sense, the Military was used in an security operation within the framework of internal security. The statements of a Major General on active duty for thirty-five years in the Army explained this perception of contradiction as follows:

> TSK has no role in internal security. But when needed, TSK is used in internal security with the orders of the governors and politicians. We're coming to the same point again. We think we can change the facts by changing things in the constitution.

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[50] Respondent No.20; interview was conducted on March 3, 2016.

In that sense, the amendment of Article 35 is no different from the way a traffic law was amended.[51]

Moreover, it was stated that Article 35 of Internal Code was not a justification for the military interventions since if the military were to make an intervention in politics, it would still be justified with the first three articles of the constitution. Therefore, it was argued by some respondents that the amendment to Article 35 was a "symbolic" change. For instance, one respondent who again referred to it as "ridiculous and symbolic" pointed out that it is related with the government's efforts to gain a point against the Army.[52]

It is important to note that the generally agreed idea among the respondents held that civilians and the military should be in cooperation while identifying the internal threat elements. Additionally, it was agreed that in this process, civilians should have the final say. That is to say, the threat elements should be identified by civilians with advice from soldiers. The most prominent factor as an internal security threat was religious reactionism for the majority of the respondents to whom this question was addressed. According to these respondents, the removal of "religious reactionism" as an internal threat from the "National Security Policy Document" did not have an equivalent in practice since as long as the principle of secularism remained in the constitution, regardless of the removal of the " religious reactionism" from this document, it always remains as a threat element in Turkey.

In connection with the issue of military interventions, another question was asked in order to capture the officers' attitudes towards the trial of General Kenan Evren who served as the seventh President of Turkey from 1980 to 1989 and as 17th Chief of the General Staff.[53] A provisional Article 15 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 had long provided impunity for the military regime by excluding decisions taken during the military regime and the administrators from judicial review. In that sense, this issue can be directly related with political autonomy of the military. This impunity

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[51] Respondent No.16; interview was conducted on January 18, 2016.

[52] Respondent No.15; A retired Captain who served in the Army for fifteen years.

[53] This is the Question 31: "What do you think about trial of Kenan Evren?"

provided for the military was an important "exit guarantee" during the transition. The process of trial of General Evren began with the removal of the related article on 3 November 2010 which provided impunity for the perpetrators of the 1980 coup d'état. Abolition of this provisional article was brought to the agenda in the 2010 referendum. The AKP's rhetoric at that time was that they were always opposed to military coups because they evaluated military coups and tutelage as a violation the will of the people. Thus, the AKP government supported this change with the claim of eroding the military's autonomy in the bureaucracy. In that sense, this question was significant to evaluate the views of the officers on this issue. However, this question was directed to fewer people than other questions since this question was added to the questionnaire form after the study started. All seven respondents who responded to this question stated that they found this trial symbolic since they questioned the real aim of this action. According to these respondents, if the issue were really about a military coup, a more inclusive trial process would have to be run; i.e. those who were responsible for leading the country into a coup environment, mostly politicians of that period, should also be put on trial. Thus, it was critically expressed that the whole responsibility of the intervention was attributed only to the military.

Finally, the last two questions related with military interventions were about arrests of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials after 2007. A total of 400 soldiers from the Turkish Army were on trial in the Ergenekon and Balyoz prosecutions in 2012. 72 of these soldiers were general and admiral, 271 of them were officers, and 54 of them were non-commissioned officers (OdaTV, May, 15, 2012). The most significant issue was that a former Chief of General Staff, General Başbuğ, was imprisoned in the context of internet memorandum trial within the Ergenekon trials in 2012. The impact of these cases was discussed in the literature in two different ways. The first was that these cases were critical for expanded civilian control over the military since it paved the way for struggling with the tutelage of the military in the name of protecting the Republic and republican values. The second was that these cases adversely affected the military structure due to the trial of a large number of high ranking officers. The claim that the Ergenekon was a conspiracy against to TSK, negatively affected the soldiers' trust in civilians. Thus, it was important to ask questions about

these cases, to understand from which perspective the officers looked at these matters.

The first question explored the perceptions of the respondents about whether Ergenekon was a part of the civilianization process or a civilian attempt into the liquidation of the military or conspiracy/set-up against the military.[54] The common point of view in responses to this question was that Ergenekon was a politically motivated trial and a conspiracy plotted to reshape TSK. Statements of a respondent explained this perception: "I believe that there is a loss of prestige, in the process of Ergenekon, and that it will return to the institution in a negative way."[55] Respondents also agreed that Ergenekon trials constituted a turning-point in civil-military relations in Turkey. However, according to the respondents, this turning-point did not help democratization or civilianization, instead it resulted in intimidation and fear of members of TSK. The striking statement of a respondent about this issue held that "there is no precedent in the world that a non-democratic method results in democracy. Therefore, perceiving this process as democratization is betrayal to its core."[56] Similarly, a retired Major who served in the Army for twenty-six years defined this process as a "Turkish Style Democratization" due to its "unlawful and unethical methods."[57]

According to the responses provided on this issue, it is possible to evaluate this turning-point under two dimensions in accordance with its internal and external effects on TSK. The Ergenekon trials had internally negative effects on TSK: Respondents stated that after the Ergenekon cases, the power of TSK has been weakened; the morale, motivation and commitment of the soldiers were reduced, and the trust of the soldiers towards the institution were shaken. Moreover, as one

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[54] This is the Question 26: "Do you think the arrests of Balyoz and Ergenekon represent a breaking point? How do you read the process as a military officer? Some segments take this as a part of the civilianization process, other segments view it as the liquidation of the military or a conspiracy/set-up against the military. How do you think this process reflected onto the strength/competence of the Turkish Armed Forces?"

[55] Respondent No.20; a Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army.

[56] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

[57] Respondent No.10; interview was conducted on February 12, 2016.

respondent stated "TSK realized that it was not sufficiently united to protect itself or its staff."[58] The Ergenekon cases had also externally negative effects on TSK: Some respondents stated that the society's confidence in the Army declined, because it was understood that TSK whose top commander was arrested was not a power element within the state. At the same time, civilians established full domination over the military and they played the role of "protector of the military." The following statement of one respondent best summarized this view:

> Can you imagine that the military is protected by someone? Some fifteen years ago, some four-star generals were telling what the government must do on a specific matter. However, now the top brass, retired or in active duty, beg protection from some power groups.[59]

It was argued here that with the claims of the government that the Ergenekon trials was a conspiracy against TSK, the military expected the support of the government in terms of trials of the soldiers; i.e. in a sense to prove their innocence. This situation was evaluated by these officers as a situation which undermined the Army's reputation in the general public and its power.

The second question about Ergenekon process explored the officers' views on the TSK's attitude and approach during the arrests and trials.[60] The common point of view in responses to this question was that the attitude of the Armed Forces was wrong since it did not adequately protect its own staff and remained silent. On the condition of remaining within the bounds of law, TSK should have given more support to soldiers who were detained. The best summarizing statement on this subject belonged to one respondent was that:

> The Army's attitude was wrong. We trust each other in the Armed Forces and entrust our lives to each other. When that was the case, sitting and being quiet while someone is harming your individual blatantly, was not suitable. It must be done that what is necessary. It's ridiculous to interpret this as interfering with the case. Who

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[58] Respondent No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

[59] Respondents No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

[60] This is the Question 27: "Do you approve of the military's attitude and approach during the arrests and trials?"

> didn't intervene in this case, especially press organs? The politicians also intervened. Everyone intervened except TSK.[61]

On the other hand, one-third of the respondents stated that they found the attitude of TSK correct during this period. In their opinion, TSK proved how much importance it attaches to the law and democracy as an institution by remaining within the bounds of law even in the unlawful practices in litigation and detention processes. One respondent stated that "TSK tried to comply with the law even at the cost of sacrificing own children since the beginning of the process."[62] On the basis of the responses, it can be claimed that, the notion of protecting the institutional integrity and unity of TSK was at the forefront in the responses of this group. That is to say, the reason behind the approval of the attitudes of TSK to remain silent in this process was the belief that the Armed Forces might be fall into a much worse position in the eyes of the public if it had taken an active stance in defense of the arrested soldiers.

When these two questions about Ergenekon trials are evaluated together, it can be said that the respondents considered Ergenekon and Balyoz cases as politically motivated cases targeting TSK as an institution instead of considering them as a path of democratization. That is to say, the vast majority of the officers assessed these cases negatively and they were of the opinion that these cases adversely affected TSK. In that sense, it can be claimed that the way the government handled and approached these trials negatively affected the officers' trust in civilians and the reform process.

National security-related issues

National security was a significant issue directly related with the political autonomy of the military in Turkey because it largely stemmed from the guardianship mission of the TSK based on national unity and the Kemalist republican's principles. Besides the discourses of geo-strategic position or external enemy threats, the internal

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[61] Respondent No.15; a retired Captain who served in the Army for fifteen years.

[62] Respondent No.16; a Major General on active duty for thirty-five years in the Army.

enemy rhetoric based on Kemalism has two dimensions: political Islam or the threat of "religious reactionism", and ethnic issues such as Kurdish nationalism and the case of PKK. All these "threat" dimensions provided a political ground for the past military interventions.

There were three national security-related questions in the questionnaire; the first one inquired into the respondents' opinion on the role and influence of the military in security decisions.[63] It was a commonly shared idea among this group of officers that the political will of the government should have the final say on security issues. However, the in-depth opinions also revealed the existence of an ambivalence towards this issue. Most of the respondents did not support the idea that the soldiers should remain only in the advisory position on security issues. On this issue, the predominant view was that the TSK as an institution had priority say in every domain concerning national security related issues. It was also stated that civilians should initially take into consideration the recommendations of TSK about security issues and should establish its policies in accordance with these recommendations. The reason behind this idea appeared to be the conviction that officers consider themselves more competent than civilians in all matters related to security. Therefore, they perceived it as one of their justifiable rights to demand that their advice on security should be taken into consideration by civilians. At the result, civilians have the right to say the last word, but this "last word" should stem from or depend on recommendations of TSK.

The argument of the officers interviewed who did not agree with the above idea of TSK's advisory role in security issues was that soldiers should take part in process of the creation of security decisions, but not in taking the decisions. In other words, they underlined that the policymaker was the civilian authority and that the task of the military was only to implement these policies. This view can be differentiated from the former one because in this case, the "last word" of civilians could be different than the recommendations of the military.

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[63] This is the Question 19: "How do you think the relation between civilians and soldiers should be? For example, should soldiers play an influential role in the security decisions made politicians, or should soldiers be in an advisory role who express views and suggestions only when asked?"

Another question, which inquired into their views on the TSK's role in national security, was about the role of the military in the protection of national interest.[64] [65] Here again, there were two groups who differed in their views in the responses given to this question. The first group stated that the Armed Forces should play a more active role in the protection of national interests. In their opinion, the way to do this was warning civilians more actively and even informing the public if necessary about those issues that the military consider to might be a threat to the interests of the country. Following the example in this question, the majority of the respondents who had the idea that civilians and the public should be informed by the military described the "solution process" as the failure of the government. They also stated that this failure also revealed the significance of the military in the field of internal security. In that sense, according to them, the competence of the governors in the field of security was insufficient so governors need the consultancy and recommendations of the soldiers on technical issues related with security. Moreover, governors during this period were criticized due to their status as being at the service of the government not the state. This differentiation was significant for the respondents since in their views as an operation under the order of a "governor of the government" had the potential to shift away from technical issues and move closer completely political concerns.

The other group underlined that the military could freely speak to the civilians on legal platforms like MGK, but civilians have right to have the final say since in the last instance, civilians have the mandate to govern the country. That is to say, if they warned the politicians about those issues threatening national interests already, it means that the military has done its duty. Hence, they believed that it is not the duty of the military to make a public statements on security issues. Instead, soldiers

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[64] This is the Question 30: "At what level should the military have a voice in the protection of national interests? What institutions should engage in such process? Only between the military and politicians? (For example, it is known that during the "initiative/solution process", the military has been aware of and warned the politicians about the armaments being stockpiled. But, should the military have been more protective? Or should the military inform the public more and be involved more in the process, or not?)"

[65] On this question, claims about the armaments being stockpiled of the PKK during the "initiative/solution process" which was the AKP's opening initiative to resolve the Kurdish question through nonviolent means (the exact content of which was never fully disclosed) was given as an example since there were those claims about this period that the military warned the politicians about this armament issue and the government did not take into consideration.

could explain why they thought differently than the politicians with their documents and analysis.

The last question about the national security issue tried to explore the opinions of the respondents about the numerically civilian-dominated MGK structure.[66] MGK which had a limitless access to civilian agencies was the major bastion of political autonomy as a constitutional body of tutelage of TSK. The role of the military in MGK was significant for military's political autonomy since decisions of MGK were formed in relation to the definition of the concept of national security. Therefore, the view of the officers about the legislation on MGK by which the military had rights on the internal politics was very important. In general, looking at the responses of the officers, it can be said that perceptions on the structure of MGK dominated numerically by civilians were very positive since in their opinion determining national security policies is not a technical but a political issue. Additionally, this change was considered significant to fulfill a democracy criteria. Thus, they underlined that MGK should be dominated by civilian politicians, and it was even contended that in MGK, there can only be the civilians. If necessary, the top commanders may be invited to MGK to give their opinion and advice. A Colonel on active duty for twenty-three years in the Army explained why this change is necessary as follows:

> It is so natural for a Council to make decisions on national matters concerning the security of the country to be formed, guided and dominated by the politicians elected by the people of the country. If we are talking about democracy and the EU standards as a country, we need to put aside the professional and personal sensitivities and emotionality and think realistically.[67]

Similarly, the statements of another respondent summarized the positive attitude of the officers towards the civilian dominated MGK structure:

> I think that the message to be given here is that; the civilian authority has taken over the soldiers in every channel. I think giving such a message is also necessary

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[66] This is the Question 11: "Do you think an MGK structure dominated by civilians is more appropriate for Turkey? Why?"

[67] Respondent No.03; interview was conducted February 1, 2016.

because as a result, in the ideals we believe and in democracy, the military authority must be subject to civil authority.[68]

Although the positive attitude of these officers towards the change in the structure of MGK brought to mind the idea that the military's trust in civilians might have increased, there was no such an emphasis which can be related on this issue in the officers' responses. In fact, two of respondents in this group stated that they supported this change regardless of the competence of civilians. Therefore, the emphasis was that it was a necessity to break the military's political habits carried from the past and to achieve the standards required by democracy. In interpreting the issue in this way, it can be said that the importance attributed to this change in the structure of MGK has a symbolic significance. Thus, it was interpreted as a reform that should be in consolidated democracies.

On the other hand, those respondents whose opinion differed from the first group also did not support a military-oriented MGK structure. However, this group of respondents questioned this reform in some other aspects. According to them, if the aim was to reduce the effectiveness of the TSK and to exclude it from decision-making, it would not be a positive development. Rather than the numbers of civilians and soldiers, the main emphasis here was that the views of the military on security issues should be taken into consideration by the civilians in this Council. That is to say, if the soldiers were able to express their views on national security to civilians who then took these views into account, numbers did not matter. Along these lines, it was also argued that, the main aim of MGK was to bring together the experts to discuss about national security issues, so a balance between the number of soldiers and civilians was a minor issue. A retired Admiral, who served in the Navy for forty two years, and at top level in the General Secretariat of MGK pointed out that not only the Soldiers but also experts of the relevant issue such as from the Police Department or Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a word and gave their briefings in the Council. Thus, "the perception on MGK was that the soldiers had dominated the table and hit the fist on the table yet it was never be the case."[69] Another

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[68] Respondent No.20; a Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army.

[69] Respondent No.13; interview was conducted on January 16, 2016.

predominant view held by the officers was that the important thing while discussing this issue was mentality of the actors in the Council, not the number of civilians or soldiers; in order to understand whether or not there was difference between the previous structure and the present one, instead of looking at the numbers, the decisions which have been taken by military-dominated MGK structure and the present ones should be compared.

Military Justice-Related Issues

On this issue, respondents were asked two separate questions in order to investigate their approaches towards legal system which is the major dimension of democratization. The first one was explored the officers' views on the limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts?"[70] This question investigates the views of the respondents about the specific amendment in the relevant law (Law # 4963) which stated that military courts could no longer try civilians, and soldiers will be tried in civilian courts for military offenses except military service and military duties. The issue of military courts are related with political autonomy of the military because they strengthened the military tutelage. During the interviews, Military Court of Appeals and the Supreme Military Administrative Court had not yet been abolished. Therefore, some respondents expressed their opinion on the existence and jurisdiction of these military courts.

In general, the attitude towards the reform on the limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts was positive among the respondents because according to them these courts were not objective since they subjected to TSK's personnel policies and acts. Because of the same reasons, there was no serious objection to the idea that the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the Military Court of Appeals should be abolished. However, half of the respondents stated that military disciplinary court should continue to exist in order to deal with disciplinary issues within the military. According to these respondents, the abolition of this military disciplinary court would disrupt the military discipline since "military life is different than the civilian life." One respondent explained this difference in the following way:

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[70] This is the Question 15: "How do you assess the limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts?"

"Military systems are different from other systems. The basic function is to fight. In other words, trying to kill without dying. When such a function is fulfilled, it is natural that civil legal processes are invalid."[71]

The last question related with the legal system explored the views of the respondents about the amendment in 2010 which was opened the decisions of dismissals of military staff by the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) to judicial review.[72] Besides appointments and promotions, the purge of soldiers from the military are also determined in YAŞ. This mechanism was used in the past by TSK to expel those soldiers who were identified with certain religious or ethnic groups from the Armed Forces. In that sense, YAŞ decisions were the tool in the hands of TSK for its guardianship mission in terms of struggling with those elements against the republican principles. This is the most commonly supported change among all others made during the EU reform process. Except three of the respondents, all the others approached this development positively. The commonly stated reason behind this positive attitude was the belief that this practice was not legal and fair since there were subjective decisions and victimizations as a result of YAŞ decisions which were closed to legal review. The statements of one respondent summarized the general view among the respondents towards this process as follows:

> In the past, the practice was that if the military hierarchy could not bring any evidence to court for the expulsion of an offender, they would take the file to the YAŞ for expulsion. This was totally contrary to the notion of rule of law. The victim did not even know what he was charged with, he had no chance to defend himself, or face with the accusers. The poor victim would get a paper saying that "you have been expelled from the military for indiscipline, immorality, or disloyalty to Atatürk's principles and the Constitution, etc." It was a mockery of law, but a tragedy to victims.[73]

Another minor reason behind the positive attitudes towards this amendment was that the military expulsions were controlled only by a certain dominant group within TSK; so through this amendment, expulsion decisions which were mostly based on

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[71] Respondent No.18; a Colonel on active duty for thirty years in the Gendarmerie.

[72] This is the Question 16: "Do you approve of the amendment that all decisions made by the High Military Council (YAŞ), except for promotions and retirement for non-vacancy, are now subject to legal review? Why?"

[73] Respondent No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

ideological formations of the members of the dominant group were opened to legal review. One of the respondents expressed this opinion as follows:

> The dominant group at the top of TSK did not grant the right to life to those who were not in their view, opinion and ideology. Thousands of officers and non-commissioned officers were dismissed from the Army in the 1960 coup and during the 28 February process by the decisions of the YAŞ and could not seek their rights within the legal framework. It allowed the ruling group to continue to control TSK.

At this point, it should be noted that only a few of the respondents stated that the problem in these decisions originated from ideological basis of these decisions. That is to say, the negative reactions to YAŞ process before the amendment was mainly due to the fact that those soldiers who were expelled from the military was considered a victim because they could not defend themselves and could not appeal to any higher authority. Thus, number of those respondents who held the view that soldiers who were not the supporter of the dominant ideology in TSK was a problem was not high. That is to say, there was no awareness that this mechanism would support the political autonomy of TSK. Instead, respondents supported this reform because they believed that it has the potential to eliminate the unjust treatment.

On the other hand, three respondents who have objected to this change highlighted the structural conditions of Turkey such as denominational differences, ethnic differences and religious reactionism. In their opinion, it was necessary to protect TSK from such structural risks, but this change risked that military personnel dismissed from TSK could return to the Armed Forces again. In that sense, they were totally against this reform by readopting political autonomy of the military. A First Lieutenant on active duty for eight years in the Navy explained the issue as follows:

> It is very difficult for someone who passed the security investigation stages to enter TSK and be dismissed afterwards. Therefore, those who were expelled from the Armed Forces are the ones who are dismissed by the concrete evidence. For example, they were pro-terrorist or there was a crime that they committed morally.[74]

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[74] Respondent No.06; interview was conducted in February 23, 2016.

Another respondent explained his views in the following way:

> If there are denominational differences and ethnic conflicts in the TSK like in the country and for instance there were those who make Kurdish propaganda inside of the institution, you have to cut this wound completely. If they were come back with a court decision, there would be some people in the Army that you have to keep an eye on themselves forever.[75]

4.2.3. The Officers' views on institutional autonomy matters

Under this heading, there were seven questions which can be grouped as military indoctrination-related issues and defense organization and military budget-related issues. These topics were the main dimensions of institutional autonomy of the military since they represented the military's professional independence fields for years in Turkey.

Military indoctrination-related issues

Here, military indoctrination refers to military education and training system and ideological socialization process within the TSK. The four questions of this section did not directly ask the views of the officers on the military education system and socialization process. Instead, views of the officers on those dimensions were explored through those issues which were considered to be reshaped by military indoctrination. Those issues were: the necessity of a norm change within TSK, the position of TSK above the institutions, necessity of obeying all orders issued by civilians and trust in civilians. The first question related to this issue was formulated to understand whether the constitutional changes alone would be sufficient for the internalization of these reforms by the soldiers; i.e. whether constitutional changes led a change in the mindset of the officers.[76]

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[75] Respondent No.13; a retired Admiral, who worked in the Navy for forty two years.

[76] This is the Question 24: "In the context of civil-military relations in Turkey, do you think some cultural changes are needed in the military in addition to the constitutional changes such as EU led reforms? Can we say that soldiers have really internalized the reforms and changes introduced in the EU process?"

The commonly agreed view on this issue among the respondents was that there was a need for a cultural change in the military in addition to the constitutional changes. Cultural change could be evaluated here as a mindset change, value and norm change and ideology change among the officers and within TSK. The remaining few respondents stated that constitutional amendments would be enough since in their opinion, members of TSK already knew that their mission was to serve this country and they had a broad vision of democracy.

Responses given to this question can be grouped under four main discourses. The first group who included one-third of the respondents supported the idea that there was an internalization process of the EU induced reforms and that there was a new type of civil-military relations in TSK. It was also argued that changes were not been yet fully internalized since this was a very long process and required a cultural change. However, democracy was not under any threat in this situation and that the new generation would expedite this internalization process. Additionally, this cultural change should not be considered separate from civilians; i.e. the idea here was that civilians should also adopt democratic norms and that their steps should be transparent. The second common view stated by one fourth of the respondents was that the TSK had not internalized the changes. They argued that the "struggle" between civilians and soldiers in terms of to keeping the military within its fields of duty; i.e. to reduce its autonomy was still continuing. Additionally, the new generation who wants a transformation within the cultural formation of the TSK has to rise to top ranks for a change in the military culture and internalization of these changes. The third opinion held by four respondents was that TSK internalized the changes. In their opinion, TSK was an institution that already supports the Westernization of the country. It was stated that TSK proved its pro-democratic values by not objecting to the amendments of civilianization or to Ergenekon trials. The last view, expressed by fewer respondents, held that constitutional changes were sufficient for the acceptance of these changes so there was no need for changes in the military culture.

There was a significant stand in some of the responses which should be underlined here. According to this, at a time when a cultural change was believed to be

happening, the TSK could regain its leading role in Turkish polity. As one of the respondent put it:

> Especially the terror issue in the Southeast Anatolia, the Kurdish issue, can create new turning-points in civil-military relations as in many other subjects in Turkey. In other words, how this issue turns out could make military the lead actor once again as we cannot foresee now. A cultural change may turn out to be in an unexpected way.[77]

Another question related to military indoctrination asked the respondents' views about the claim of Turkish Armed Forces to position itself above institutions and politics?[78] In this question, the common opinion which was mentioned by more than half of the respondents was that such a perception exists in TSK because they believe that the basis of military service were based on patriotism and the protection of the homeland. It was also emphasized that officers gained this perception starting from military high-school during military education and socialization process in the military. The statements of one respondent explained the reason behind this perception as follows:

> Our profession needs to have a notion. Especially for the members of the Army, it is a profession putting their head in the lion's mouth so to speak. Therefore, there must be a higher notion to legitimize this profession. Patriotism is a very noble feeling in this sense.[79]

Similarly, a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-one years also explained the reason behind such a military education system and socialization process including these notions such as patriotism and protection of the homeland as follows:

> What can you do to send a people to death? You can give them a lot of money but if you can't give that much money to them, you instill in them chauvinism: We say to the soldiers that, you're a hero, everything is in your hands and we are just behind

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[77] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

[78] This is the Question 21: "What do you think of the claims that the Turkish Armed Forces has for years positioned itself above the institutions and politics?"

[79] Respondent No.07; first Lieutenant on active duty for six years in the Navy.

you. There is no other way to expose people to bullets. All these notions formed an institutional chauvinism.[80]

Half of the respondents who accepted that there was such a perception in the military that TSK positioned itself above the institutions and politics stated that such a perception was understandable. Reason behind this perception was introduced as a historical fact: in the late Ottoman and the early Republican era, the military education system was better than the general education system in the country. Thus, there was a perception in the military for years that education system in the military was more qualified than in civilian life. This perception directed soldiers to consider themselves superior to civilians, and TSK as superior to other institutions and politics. However, most of the respondents in this group stated that this perception had begun to change in recent years with the increasing educational level and intellectual capacity of civilians. This emphasis on the education can also be associated with increasing confidence in politicians and civilians.

On the other hand, one fourth of the respondents did not accept the term above politics. In their opinion, what was meant here was the term "non-political." This, however, did not mean that TSK was superior than politicians or politics. On the contrary, it was used to express that TSK does not interfere in politics and is not affected by polity issues. That is to say, TSK cannot be politicized and politics cannot spread into the institution since politicization of TSK might cause very serious negative consequences. From this perspective, it was not acceptable for TSK to consider any political party as an enemy or friend, or to feel close to any of them.

Another question inquired into whether officers believed military indoctrination shaped the views of soldiers about civilians. This question explored the approaches of the officers to the norm that "soldiers should unconditionally obey all orders from civilians?"[81] The commonly cited response to this question among the respondents

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[80] Respondent No.12; interview was conducted on February 25, 2016.

[81] This is the Question 20: "Do you think the concept of 'absolute obedience' within the military applies to the orders issued from the civilians? In what context could such orders be questioned or challenged? Or, should soldiers unconditionally obey all orders from the civilians?"

was that it did not matter whether the order came from civilians or soldiers; it was sufficient to obey an order if it came from your superior. The statement of a respondent summarized this perception: "In the concept of absolute obedience, the orders of those who are hierarchically in the position of superior are fulfilled within the scope of absolute obedience."[82] However, there was only one condition: the order should be a legal one. Although it was less supported than the other opinion, the opposite view was that absolute obedience should not be valid for all orders from civilians. It was noted that soldiers should warn and persuade civilians about why such orders should not be obeyed. A retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-two years summarized this issue by stating that:

> This issue may vary depending on the circumstances, the nature of the order, its form and suitability of the order for the law. Orders contrary to law do not apply within the Armed Forces itself. In other cases, for example, where the government thinks differently from the soldiers but it said "do it", the soldier should say that they think differently and try to convince the government because I think soldiers are more competent in foreign policy and national security issues than civilians.[83]

The last military indoctrination-related question was formulated to understand the level of trust of officers in civilians. This question explored perspectives of the officers about civilians differently.[84] Except three respondents, all others referred to politicians as civilians and five of them referred to the AKP government while expressing their views on civilians. Six respondents also evaluated civilian experts in the field of security. This distribution indicated that civilians were generally perceived as politicians among the officers and civilian experts were beginning to be taken into consideration by soldiers on security-related issues. More than one half of the respondents mentioned that they did not trust civilians in governing the country, handling the well-being of the country and defense policies. As, a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Air Force twenty-three years argued that "Within the state institutions, there are few systematic organizations as military with regards to

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[82] Respondent No.03; a Colonel on active duty for twenty-three years in the Army.

[83] Respondent No.04; interview was conducted on February 22, 2016.

[84] This is the Question 13: "How competent do you think civilians/politicians are in governing the country, handling the well-being of the country and defense policies? Do you have confidence in them on these matters? Why?"

planning, working and execution levels."[85] The main reasons cited were the following: The financial interests of civilians may override their primary objectives; they may use their positions for their own interests. Civilians may sacrifice some values to remain in a certain position; there are nepotism and bribery in politics; there are not enough qualified civilian experts regarding security domain. The idea that civilians had different threat perception than the soldiers was asserted as the most significant reason behind this low level of confidence towards civilians. One respondent explained the issue in the following way:

> No, I do not trust civilians. The people who will rule the country probably set it as an ideal from childhood, but for whatever reason I do not know, their financial interests overcomes their own goal on this way somehow. They begin to use the privileges provided to them for their positions for their own interests besides serving the country and the nation.[86]

One-fourth of the respondents stated that they trusted the civilians. In their opinion, there was no reason not to trust civilians because they were also competent and the military now understood that it was impossible to deal with security issues alone without politicians. Only one respondent stated by referring the government that there was no other option than to trust a government which was elected a number of times by the Turkish people. Statements of one respondent demonstrated the general views of the officers in this group:

> I categorically reject the notion or claim that the military people are more competent in governing the country, or love the country more, or are in any way better than civilians. This is utter non-sense. Why should civilians be less competent? If you exclude civilians from handling such affairs, such competence will not develop in civilian bureaucrats or politicians. Therefore, once in charge and given adequate time, they will competently do the job. Indeed, most probably, they do better than the military, because civilians are open to the world, better informed of the world, and have better grasp of the country's interests, because they think of the security only as one dimension of the countries affairs while the military is only preoccupied with security and tends to disregard all other (and probably more important) dimensions.[87]

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[85] Respondent No.17; interview was conducted on January 31, 2016.

[86] Respondent No.06; a First Lieutenant on active duty for eight years in the Navy.

[87] Respondent No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

Similarly, another respondent explained that there was no such a perception in the TSK that underestimates civilians:

> Another urban legend is that the military loves and cares about the country the most and that if you left it to the civilians they would sell the country. I don't think any of the members of the military think like that. In other words, I don't think the system within the Turkish Armed Forces considers civilians this way.[88]

Defense organization and military budget-related issues

Under this heading, attitudes and views related to defense organization and military-budgetary related issues which are the main dimension of institutional autonomy of the military were dealt with by three questions. The first question was organized to understand which elements listed by the officers when asked to them if there were any areas where civilians should not be involved. Besides, in order to keep the issue within the scope of defense organization, the issues of appointments and promotions were specifically given as an example.[89]

The subjects characterized by the respondents as the military prerogatives can be classified under two topics. The first was about "internal affairs" of the military such as military discipline and training, promotions and appointments, and dismissals. The other one which was defined as "technical issues" was generally about professional affairs of the military such as length of the military service, selecting weapons systems, deployment of troops, total manpower and controlling military operations. All these issues listed under the professional affairs can also be evaluated in the scope of national defense policy, so this situation demonstrated that there was a general trend among the officers that they considered those national defense related elements as "technical issues" within the military field.

Among these, the most prominent issue was decisions on promotions and appointments. One of the most controversial areas in the defense organization is the

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[88] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

[89] This is the Question 22: "Are there any decisions which must absolutely not be interfered by the civilians and must remain the military's prerogative? Why? Particularly, what should be the minimum ranks/positions that civilians must be involved in military promotions and appointments? What consequences would arise from any actual interference below such minimum?"

military promotions and appointments because the appointments of the Commanders of the four Forces and the Chief of General Staff had political significance. Although officially the President had the final say on the appointment of the Chief of General Staff, the succeeding Chief of General Staff was decided by the incumbent Chief of General Staff, in consultation with a number of senior commanders and this name was proposed to the Prime Minister. Additionally, force commanders were selected with the final say of the Chief of General Staff. In that sense, views of the officers towards this appointment procedure is a significant issue to reveal the views of the officers towards this one of the institutional autonomy dimensions.

One-fourth of the respondents stated that politicians should not be involved in promotions and appointments at any rank. One third of the respondents expressed the opinion that politicians should be involved in the appointments to those ranks with whom politicians work with. That is to say, civilians should have a will in the appointments at the level of soldiers who directly work with civilians. This level was stated as the position of the Chief of General Staff and Force Commanders. Thus, more than half of the respondents were in favor of no or limited civilian intervention in the promotions and appointments. The reason stated for this reaction was the view that politicians cannot make objective evaluations easily because they could not monitor job performance of the military personnel. It was also underlined that such a situation risks the politicization of the military; i.e. soldiers may attach more importance to serving politicians than fulfilling their primary duties. There were only two respondents who were not close to the idea that, if civilians got involved in the appointments, the process would become politicized. They stated that political power had the right to decide in the strategic positions.

Another question under this heading addressed another controversial issue by asking the view of the respondents towards subordination the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense.[90] [91] In Turkey, the Chief of General Staff used to

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[90] This is the Question 12: "What do you think of subordinating the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense, as an important point in civil-military relations? (Should it be subordinated? Under what terms and conditions? Is it possible with in Turkey?)"

be reporting to the Prime Minister in terms of hierarchy, and this situation was criticized by EU on the grounds that in liberal democratic regimes, the Chief of General Staff should report to the Minister of National Defense. On this question, one-third of the respondents stated that, without any condition, it was appropriate to subordinate the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense. According to this group, this would eliminate bureaucratic obstacles and prevent a potential double-headed authority problem. That is to say, the Chief of the General Staff was separate from the Ministry of National Defense but it was serving like the Ministry of National Defense. One respondent approached the subject in another way and stated that "That change would be a major milestone in establishing civilian control over the military, in functioning, the Minister of Defense could definitely devote much time and labour to the military affairs than the Prime Minister can."[92] Another prevalent view was that the Chief of General Staff may be subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense, on the condition that the structure of the Ministry of National Defense should be adjusted accordingly, and the number of civilian experts in the domain of security should be increased. This view can be interpreted as the officers still do not consider civilian experts in the field of defense qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient. The last group consisting of one-third of all the respondents, who opposed the subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense considered that TSK should be independent from politics, and if it was subordinated, there is a risk of politicization of TSK. The stated reason behind this concern was mostly about national security. It was considered that the commanders under political influence may not be able to make decisions independent of politics on issues related to national security.

The last question of this section, focusing another amendment related to the institutional autonomy of TSK, explored the officers' views on the effective supervision mechanism on military expenditures and the budget of the Turkish Armed Force established with an amendment in 2010 to the Law on Court of

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[91] At the time when this question was asked, the Chief of General Staff had not yet been placed under the Ministry of National Defense. With the Presidential Decree No:1 published on July 10, 2018, the Chief of General Staff was also attached to the Ministry of National Defense.

[92] Respondent No.19; a retired Lieutenant Colonel who served in the Army for nineteen years.

Accounts.[93] The significance of this question was that reserve domains over military expenditures constituted a crucial dimension of institutional autonomy of the military due to the lack of transparent control mechanism over the military expenditure. For this reason, ensuring transparency over military expenditures is crucial for reducing the military autonomy and establishing civilian control over the defense sector. This was the second widely agreed change among all others made during the EU reform process. More than half of the respondents shared the opinion that this was a necessary change. A respondent who held a positive attitude towards this development reflected this agreement in the following way:

> In my opinion, it is a natural practice that the military expenditures are under the control of civilians and supervised by them. It is necessary for the officials of the Court of Accounts to supervise the military units with an impartial eye and good faith for transparency.[94]

Besides this positive attitude, respondents underlined that there should be civilian experts who are able to supervise military expenditures. Only four respondents had a negative attitude about this reform since they believed that it was a so-called necessary practice which aimed to control TSK because they claimed that there was not much change in practice after this change.

In this section, general findings of the research were presented, and for each question, most frequently expressed opinions were introduced. In the next section, these general findings are analyzed in accordance to the theoretical issues raised in this thesis to contextualize the Turkish case in the literature on civil-military relations.

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[93] This is the Question 14: "An amendment in 2010 to the Law on Court of Accounts established an effective supervision mechanism on military expenditures and the budget of the Turkish Armed Forces? How do you assess such arrangement in practice?"

[94] Respondent No.03; a Colonel on active duty for twenty-three years in the Army.

4.3. Discussion and Evaluation

4.3.1. The Officers' views on the reforms: more easily accepted changes vs. more cautious ones

As the preceding section made clear, some changes and reforms in the context of civil-military relations explored in this study were more easily accepted by the officers while the officers had more negative attitudes towards some other changes. There were also some ambivalences in terms of their approach to these reforms.

The subjects about which respondents overwhelmingly held positive attitudes in the context of political autonomy were as follows: subjecting all expulsion decisions of YAŞ to legal review, a civilian-dominated MGK structure, abstinence of high-ranking officers from speaking to the press on polity issues. Limitation of military jurisdiction also supported by most respondents. Moreover, the amendment to the Article 35 was positively perceived by a large group of respondents. In the context of institutional autonomy, supervision mechanism on military expenditures and the budget by the Court of Accounts and subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Security and obeying all the orders issued from civilians as long as they are legal subjecting were those changes positively welcomed by most respondents. All of these issues were very significant and critical since they were the necessary reform fields frequently underlined in the EU progress reports for a democratic civil-military relations.

Although all these reforms were welcomed by most respondents, there were some paradoxical stances on the responses of the respondents. For instance, there was a paradox on the issue that despite the positive attitudes towards amendment in the Article 35, there was also a wide-spread perception that the military should have a voice in terms of organization of the internal security. Therefore, according to the responses of in the interviews, officers does not want to give up its role in identifying the threat elements in internal security. However, it was agreed by the most respondents to transfer the defense mission against these threats to the institutions responsible for the internal security such as Gendarmerie and Police.

A similar ambivalence existed in the determination of national security and threat assessment. The general perception about threat assessment in the interviews was that there should be a cooperation between civilians and the military on threat assessment. Additionally, according to the respondents, civilians should have the final say in this process. However, how cooperation was defined is important here. That is to say, respondents had negative attitudes towards the idea that the soldiers should remain only in the advisory position on security issues. At this point, the predominant view was that civilians should firstly take into consideration the recommendations of TSK about security issues and should establish its policies in accordance with these recommendations. Therefore, it is controversial to what extent officers considers themselves as an advisor and to what extent this situation can be described as cooperation. According to the self-perception of some respondents about this issue, it would be more accurate not to define the military in this situation as an advisor. The term, "decision-support-element", used by a retired Colonel who served twenty-seven years to the Army best illustrated how officers define themselves in this situation.[95] Thus, according to respondents' views, the military wants to take an active role in the determination of security policies, regardless of internal security or national security. The prevention of the operations to Syria in 2015 by the military was given as an example by the respondents in the interviews to support their own view about being a "decision-support-element."[96] In their opinion, the Army approached this Syria issue with "common sense." [97] [98]

Another point that should be emphasized here is that respondents had positive perceptions about limitation of the competence of the military courts because even if

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[95] Respondent No.11; interview was conducted on February 9, 2016.

[96] The government had ordered the TSK to enter Syria on June 18, 2015 due to the developments in the north of Syria based on an official authorization approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 2 October 20014. The TSK had stated that this official authorization was not sufficient for a cross-border operation and that a written order was required. After the written order, the General Staff explained to the politicians the international risks to enter Syria and the operation was postponed.

[97] However, this issue was considered as a confrontation of the civilian authority and the military at that time since military tried to find a backdoor without executing the order entering the Syria. Hence, the military acted as more than just an advisor in this issue.

[98] Considering the current operations in Syria, it can be said that the military seems to be doing only its duty in line with the civil policies. The reasons behind this change are the subject of another study.

military courts appeared to be independent, their members were subject to TSK's personnel policies and acts; so they were not found to be objective. However, the most commonly accepted view among the respondents was that, these courts should not be abolished. That is to say, most respondents agreed that civilians should not be tried at these courts but they should continue to try soldiers in cases where a military matter was the subject. Military courts were a significant realm of political autonomy of TSK since they strengthened the military tutelage especially by trying civilians. In that sense, this reform can be interpreted as a transformation in the political autonomy of TSK. On the other hand, the views of majority of the respondents about the idea that military disciplinary court should continue to exist in order to deal with disciplinary issues can be evaluated as a cautious approach of the officers towards an element of the institutional autonomy of TSK.

All these paradoxes should be considered in terms of the framework of the main research question of the thesis which asked "what is the perception of the group of officers in the sense of the internalization of norm of civilian control." In particular, through recent reforms such as dominating civilians in appointments and promotions of the military personnel, using the military forces only against external threats after the amendment in Article 35, the abolition of military courts, and the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense civilian control over TSK seemed to be extended. However, regarding the above mentioned ambivalences among the views of the officers, it can be claimed that there is still some obstacles for a fully internalized democratic civilian control norms among the officers involved in this study.

The subjects towards which the respondents generally expressed negative attitude were: trust in civilians, attitude and approach of both TSK and civilians during the Ergenekon arrests and trials. Lastly the conviction of exclusion of the Armed Forces from the organization of the internal security and the determination of national security threat elements were the issues that the respondents generally expressed negative attitudes. All respondents stated that there are some decisions which must remain within military's prerogatives. These decisions can be classified under two topics related to internal affairs and professional affairs of the military which were

mostly defined as "technical issues" by the respondents. Under the topic of internal affairs, the most prominent issue was decisions on promotions and appointments because it was underlined that such a situation would risk of politicization of the military. The other one was about professional affairs of the military such as the length of the military service, selecting weapons systems, deployment of troops, total manpower and controlling military operations. Moreover, there was another issue which can be evaluated on the opposite side of the democratization. Although almost all respondents supported the EU accession process, according to more than the half of the respondents these changes have not been yet fully internalized by TSK. The term of "internalization" mostly connotated "cultural change" for the officers. They stated that for the internalization of these changes, a cultural change is inevitable for soldiers and generation change may eased this process. Thus, the perception of the individuals who were able to observe the military institution from the inside was that the reforms of EU accession process had not been yet fully internalized by TSK.

It should also be underlined that the proposition which holds "military interventions are now a thing of the past" was supported less by the respondents than the counter-proposition which asserted that it was likely that circumstances in the country could arise and require the military to intervene in the politics. The common opinion in responses to this question was that military interventions were not much likely at the moment, but also that they were not completely out of question. This approach is one of the most concrete examples for the struggle of civil-military relations in Turkey. It also points to the guardianship role of TSK, which the Army has maintained for years, because it was one of the most important heritages of TSK. According to the respondents, lack of democratic values in the country was indicated as the most important reason that would prepare the ground for a political intervention by the Army. This perception also demonstrates that officers still considered the Turkish military as the guardian of the regime. Needless to say, this guardianship mission of TSK has been one of the major obstacles of the consolidated civilian control over the military in Turkey. Moreover, despite the large number of studies which demonstrated decrease in public trust in TSK in general public, compared to the past, some of the respondents still held the view that "the

Army comes and saves the day" was still relevant in the public perception. However, these interviews were conducted before the attempted coup of 15 July 2016. Hence, to what extent this perception has changed after the reaction of the people against this attempt needs to be evaluated in a different study.

When the findings are grouped in terms of the positive and negative attitudes of the respondents, it can be claimed that several changes in the field of political autonomy (amendment in Article 35, the role of the military in internal security regarding to transferring the defense mission against internal threats to the institutions responsible for the internal security such as Gendarmerie and Police, civilian domination in MGK, top commanders not making political statements on media, and changes in the scope of the jurisdiction of the military courts to exclude civilians) were more easily accepted. On the other hand, the officers were more cautious and held more conservative attitudes towards changes in institutional autonomy matters (military training and doctrine, selecting weapons systems, deployment of troops, total manpower, personnel decisions, the role of soldiers in determining security policies and threat elements, scope of the military courts in terms of military-related matters). Thus, there was a higher tendency among the officers in this study to support military autonomy in terms of institutional autonomy domains. This situation is an example for "defensive autonomy" of the term of Pion-Berlin since the army tends to develop a protective attitude towards the areas that it considers as its core professional function within the framework of its institutional objectives (1992, p.85). Generally, the main reason behind this attitude is the idea of professional superiority over civilians. That is to say, soldiers expect the politicians to take their opinions or suggestions with priority about the issues on which they consider that they are professional. They tended to consider military domain is so different from civilian domain. They also believed that these issues on which they regard they are professional are in the scope of military domain and there are not enough civilian experts in this domain. A respondent summarized this view as follows:

> Security is a science itself and civil authority is very insufficient as is today and under the influence of daily politics. This situation increases security risks. What is essential is that civilians become competent to manage and ensure the security of the country. Today, when it comes to external security, only the Armed Forces comes to mind. None of civil servants performing duty in the Ministry of National

Defense are specialized in strategy, security and defense. They are engaged in the issues such as logistics and recruitment.[99]

Another reason of this kind of "defensive autonomy" among the officers is that the Armed Forces tend to expand its boundaries in the institutional autonomy domain if civilians attempt to reduce the power of military. That is to say, the military defensively prefers extensity control over its internal organizations and tries to attempts from outside. It also tries to consolidate the elements that set them apart from the rest of society (Serra, 2010, p.43). Thus, the military strictly tends to control their professional profile and values via managing the military training and access to the officer class (Serra, 2010, p.45). This argument also points out the significance of military indoctrination. Military education strengthens institutional values continuously. Among the elements evaluated in this research under the title of military indoctrination, there were still distrust in civilians among the officers in this study. In terms of trust in civilians, there were some ideas in the interviews supporting the general arguments in the literature. For instance, the retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-two years stated in the Question 13 that "It would be more correct to use the word non-trustworthy for all of them, for both the government and the oppositions, concerning trust in politicians."[100] Similarly, another officer stated in the Question 21 that "Power is temporary. They can falter to stay in power. They can say 'white' for something and another day they can say 'black' for same thing."[101]

Under the heading of military indoctrination, the high level of conformation among the respondents on that "TSK consider itself above the institutions and politics" was one of the views that necessitates a cultural change in the corporate values of TSK for a more democratic civil-military relations in Turkey. This perception was one of the main reasons of the guardianship role of TSK for years. The response of an officer explained this perception in TSK as follows:

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[99] Respondent No.05; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for thirty years.

[100] Respondent No.02; interview was conducted on January 31, 2016.

[101] Respondent No.20; a Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army.

When you think like an officer, you see yourself as a person who thinks deeply about the matters of the state, hence they would like their opinions to be appreciated for it and it is only natural. I don't see anything wrong with a Turkish officer to take this as a mission when you compare them with other professions.[102]

As discussed in the general literature, the contribution of the socialization process within TSK to the formation of this perception were also underlined by the respondents. For instance; the statements of a respondent demonstrated the effects of military indoctrination on this perception: "An injection like 'Chiefs of General Staff and presidents emerge out of this nest and play a role in the future of the country' is done during the military education and socialization process within the Army even though it is not often."[103] Additionally, another respondent stated that

In the student life, training such as 'you will defend this country and if it is needed, you will lay down your life' is given and of course, it is effective in the formation of such an understanding. You turn to 14-15 and your personality and your character is shaped according to that.[104]

In addition, one of the most common responses among the officers to the Question 22 that "Are there any fields which must absolutely not be interfered by civilians" were the military training and education system because these areas were defined as "technical" and it was stated that an external intervention to the military education and training is likely to endanger the internal functioning of TSK. Civilian control in the military training, which is considered as one of the main elements of democratic consolidation, is still one of the areas where the military effectively dominates.

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[102] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

[103] Respondent No.04; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-two years.

[104] Respondent No.06; a First Lieutenant on active duty for eight years in the Navy.

7. Democratic civil control of the armed forces	
6. Retention of ideological control by the military	**CONSOLIDATION**
5. Formal, but partial, acceptance of civil supremacy	
4. Defenders of organizational and operational autonomy	
3. Forces that constrain the policies of government by limiting reforms and vetoing particular actions	
2. Guardians of national essence	**TRANSITION**
1. Military control of political power	

Figure 4.1. Stages in the reduction of autonomy and gradual civil control over the military

When the findings of this research evaluated according to Figure 4.1. based on Serra's scheme, the perceptions of the officers can be evaluated at the third level of consolidation which is the level of "retention of ideological control by the military." However, some exceptions should be mentioned here. Serra mentions that at the second level of transition, the armed forces think that they are independent from the state administration and above politics and parties. They do not consider themselves as an arm of government, but they act according to what their mission demands (Serra, 2010, p.44). Some findings of the interviews can be related these mentioned dimensions of the second stage of the transition: These were commonly shared views among the officers that "military is above the politics" and "it is likely that circumstances in the country may come into being which may require the military to intervene in the politics." In that sense, it can be argued that according to findings of the interviews, officers involved in this study still has some features of the transition stage. However, as it was stated in the interviews, this perception is beginning to be broken by the increase of education and intellectual capacities of civilians which ensure increase in trust in civilians among the officers. Similarly, officers was still protective in the organizational and operational areas, which can be considered as institutional autonomy in a sense. That is to say, there is a tendency among the officers towards controlling their professional profile and the values via

managing the military training and access to the officer class. This situation demonstrated once again that changing the values and norms seems more difficult and complicated. All these above mentioned arguments also support the hypothesis of the thesis, because it indicated that there are some constraints that prevent the officers to fully internalize civilian control. These obstacles can be mostly associated with political context and dilemmas in Turkey.

4.3.2. Impact of political context and military's traditional dilemma on view of the officers towards changes

As mentioned in the preceding section, when the perceptions of the officers on Turkey's EU accession process were analyzed, all respondents except two of them expressed positive views on the EU membership. However, one needs to make qualifications regarding the officers' positive perceptions on the EU process. That is to say, while attitudes towards the EU process seemed generally positive, respondents mostly held the view that a distinction can be made between progressives and conservatives in TSK regarding their views of the EU-led reforms and changes based on these reforms. It was stated by the majority of the respondents in the interviews that there was a group in TSK that resisted changes.

This kind of resistance to changes in the EU process can be interpreted as bi-directional. The first direction of this resistance was that EU process was approached more cautiously among the officers in the sense of changes towards TSK, even though the EU process was supported in order to develop Turkey in every field; i.e. it was perceived as an opportunity to achieve a more democratic and economically developed Turkey. That is to say, officers had very positive views about the EU process but became cautious about this line when the reforms started to affect TSK itself. Different views in the responses to Question 9 and Question 10 also revealed this dilemma. In Question 9, which explored the views of the officers towards EU process, except two of them all other respondents held a positive attitude towards the EU process by stating that they supported this process. However, in Question 10, which explored the officers' views towards those EU led changes in the civil-military field, the perspectives of the respondents on reforms

about civil-military relations in the EU process shifted to a negative evaluations; i.e. the rate of those who stated that they welcomed these changes decreased by three quarters compared to those who said they supported the EU process. This situation can be interpreted as the officers were more cautious with more protective instincts towards those EU led changes "targeting" their institutions while they were evaluating the EU process as an opportunity for Turkey.

The second direction of resistance was about the framework of the expanded freedoms that come with full accession to EU. This situation indicates the conventional dilemma for officers. Those groups (religious groups and ethnic minorities) which TSK was "struggling against" for years and which were perceived as a threat to the unity of Turkey by TSK, gained more "freedom" in the framework of the EU accession reforms. TSK considers democracy as an essential element of modernization; however, that same democracy refers at the same time to ideological fault lines such as increasingly visible religion as a social force. Thus, the military fell into a paradoxical situation; i.e. its purpose to reach democracy and its guardianship role conflicted with each other (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.260). Therefore, respondents supported the EU process but secularism and national unity are untouchable areas for them. For instance, some respondents argued that Turkey is within a special position because "Turkey struggle with PKK, so some practices in Europe which has the possibility of jeopardizing the national integrity of the country are not appropriate for this country."

As a result, the EU accession process can be considered as a two-fold issue and the EU induced reforms still creates dilemmas for the officers. The officers believed that EU will improve Turkey in all areas and so they mostly supported this process. However, according to perception of the officers in this study, the Armed Forces had to "make sacrifices" in terms of accepting reforms in military domain and not the deal with those issues that the military have given much importance for many years such as Kurdish issue and religious reactionism. As a result of these dilemmas, officers were in a state of inner conflict between TSK's traditional mission in terms of internal security and regime related issues and its pro-western reformist position.

The widespread argument in the relevant literature was that in recent years, TSK's autonomy had diminished and civilian control had expanded; as a result, there were more democratic civil-military relations in Turkey. The general opinion in the interviews was also that there has been a change in recent years in civil-military domain. However, what should be emphasized here is that according to the findings of the interviews, this transformation needs to be contextualized and interpreted in relation to distinct domains of autonomy. For instance, this transformation in civil-military relations in Turkey was also considered by the respondents a process of discrediting and intimidating of TSK instead of a genuine democratization of civil-military relations. Such a view among the officers can be related with Ergenekon trials.[105] The whole process damaged the confidence of the military officers in politicians and in democracy. Therefore, it is very difficult to accept that a transformation described as an intimidation can be truly internalized.

According to the findings of this research, the factors that were thought by the respondents to be effective in the transformation of civil-military relations in Turkey also confirmed the reasons of the same transformation given in the relevant literature. These factors can be listed as the democratization movement initiated by the EU process, political stability, Ergenekon trials and the negative perception of the society towards the military due to these cases. Respondents emphasized the positive effects of the EU procedures on the democratization process. However, diverging from the discussions in the literature, there was a tendency as the results of the interviews to evaluate the Ergenekon trials and accordingly change in the perception of the Turkish society towards the Army as the most important reasons of the intimidation process of TSK.

Besides, decreasing the high level of public trust in the military, which was the source of legitimization of the military's interventions in politics and its tutelage (Gürsoy, 2012b, pp.6-7), Ergenekon trials led to an exceptional public debate about the political role of the Army (Bardakçı, 2013, p.415). However, at the same time, it produced a negative outcome on democracy since it induced polarization among

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[105] The dates of the interviews overlapped with the fact that the Ergenekon cases might be a conspiracy of the Gülenist conspiracy within the state apparatus. Ultimately, the Ergenekon case was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. All defendants were also acquitted at the trial on 1 July 2019.

political parties and between these two groups who believed that the AKP government was struggling with gangs, and that it was punishing its opponents (Gürsoy, 2012b, pp.6-7). As a whole, this process was also damaged TSK as an institution. As the interviews indicated, respondents also focused more on the negative impacts of Ergenekon trials on the military's "professional capacity." It was also stated by a respondent that "the continuing effects of this process will also be seen in the long term. Imprisoning a Chief of General Staff as a member of a terrorist organization is not tolerable by any military in the world as much as it is not tolerable in Turkey."[106]

The Eurobarometer surveys ask their respondents in several countries how much they trust in their military; so the results are useful to understand changing trend in terms of military trust in Turkey with the effects of Ergenekon prosecutions (Gürsoy, 2012b, p.11). According to these surveys, in the early 2000s, there was a generally supportive attitude towards TSK among Turkish public. However, this supportive attitude started to change after 2007. The average trust in the military was close to 87 percent before 2007 but dropped to 82 percent in 2008 (seven months after the first Ergenekon investigation). This rate was 77 percent in 2009 and 70 percent in 2010 (Standard Eurobarometer, 2004-2010).

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[106] Respondent No.09; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-three years.

Table 4.2. Trust in the Armed Forces in Turkey, 2004-2010 (Eurobarometer Surveys Results)

	Percent Trusting the Military in Turkey	Percent Not Trusting the Military in Turkey
2004/10	89%	10%
2005/10	88%	9%
2006/09	86%	12%
2007/10	84%	12%
2008/04	82%	16%
2009/11	77%	20%
2010/10	70%	27%

According to the results of a nationwide survey on "Social and Political Trends in Turkey," of Kadir Has University between the years 2011-2016, trust in TSK continued to decrease gradually with some exceptions. Table 4.3 introduces these percentages.

Table 4.3. Trust in the Armed Forces in Turkey, 2011-2016 (Kadir Has University Surveys Results)

	Percent Trusting the Military in Turkey
2011	59.9%
2012	56.3%
2013	51.7%
2014	57.7%
2015	62.4%
2016	47.4%

Trust in TSK dropped to 47.4 percent according to the 2016 results and with this proportion TSK was at the second place. On the other hand, the most trusted

institution was for the first time the presidency with 49.4 percent (Kadir Has University Research on Social and Political Trends - TSSEA, 2011-2016). Thus, not only the trust in the Army decreased, but also it shifted to politicians. This can be evaluated as a significant message of the general public both for the politicians and the military. The decreasing trust level of the society in TSK was evaluated by the respondents as one of the most negative consequences of the Ergenekon trials. Considering whether the military is the most trusted institution in a country is considered as one of the democratization criteria, it can be claimed that the respondents did not fully internalize democratic norms in this respect.

4.3.3. Factors constraining the internalization of civilian supremacy among officers

As explained, constitutional reforms alone are not likely to be sufficient for establishing democratic civil-military relations in context where civil-military relations fall short of those of consolidated democracies. It is often argued that there is need for a much longer socialization process in Turkey. In other words, the attitudes of the military towards the changes are as important as the legal reforms. Besides constitutional and legal amendments, the EU Commission also underlined the significance of the approach of the military towards reforms as a criterion to evaluate the progress of democratization level in Turkey. In fact, the EU Commission underlined on several occasions that the constitutional amendments alone would not be sufficient for a full democratic control over the military. For instance, the EU Commission's Progress Report of 2004 indicated that "since 1999, civilian control of the military has been strengthened," yet it continued to state that despite these positive developments, the military continues to enjoy a degree of autonomy through a series of informal channels by expressing "their opinion on political, social and foreign policy matters in public speeches, briefings or statements to the media" (Turkey Progress Report, 2004, pp.15, 23). The political influence of the Armed Forces was criticized in the Progress Reports until 2012 because of public comments and statements of the military officers (Turkey Progress Report, 2007, p.9; Turkey Progress Report, 2008, p.9; Turkey Progress Report, 2010, p.12; Turkey Progress Report, 2011, p.14). However, the statement "there was further

consolidation of the principle of civilian oversight over security forces" was used for the first time in 2012 Progress Report. The EU Commission noted a "further consolidation" in civil-military relation in Turkey because there was no longer direct or indirect pressure of the General Staff and no military comment on political issues beyond their professional remit (Turkey Progress Report, 2012, p.12; Turkey Progress Report, 2014, p.11; Turkey Progress Report, 2015, p.11).

This study hypostasized that there are certain factors that condition and constrain the officers' internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy over the Armed Forces. According to this hypothesis, this thesis highlights some significant constraining elements for internalization of democratic civilian control among the officers on the basis of the findings in the interviews which inquired into the subjective evaluations of the retired and active duty officers regarding the process of reforms. These are the prevailing traditional dilemmas related to the primacy of national security and regime related issues among the officers, perceptions of civilian control as not yet consolidated as a tradition, the skeptical views of the officers regarding the democratization process in Turkey; i.e. the officers believe that democratization process is not going on in every sphere of the polity, and aspects of military education and ideological socialization norms of the military feeding conventional values among the officers. These factors are likely to condition and constrain the internalization of democratic norms regarding civil-military relations.

The first and the most important factor is that traditional dilemmas related to national security and regime related issues continue among the officers. That is to say, internal and external defense and polity matters have high potential to affect and reshape the relations. Civil-military relations in Turkey are mostly explained through certain developments related with defense and especially polity matters by scholars of this field. In terms of polity matters, civil-military relations in 2000s are mostly explained in the literature through dividing it into specific periods in relation with specific polity events. For instance, generally, periods are grouped as follows: 1999-2002;[107] 2002-2006;[108] 2007-onward.[109] Similarly, the EU accession process,

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[107] The Helsinki Summit, which officially declared Turkey's candidacy for the EU.

general and presidential elections, public referendums, cross-border operations and some important trials such as Ergenekon or Kenan Evren trial are used to explain how "sunny" or "cloudy" civil-military relations are in Turkey. This conventional structure of civil-military relations in Turkey can also be related with the contextual dilemmas of TSK which put it into an ambivalent position between its traditional mission regarding internal security and regime related issues and its pro-western reformist position. The major traditional dilemma based on the findings of this study was that the reform process in the recent period was considered as a revanchist move by the civilian politicians due to the past practices of TSK and as an intimidation process of the military. Indeed, this was reflected in this group of officers' perspective on the Ergenekon trials and its consequences. That is to say, such a perception here indicated the struggle between the political tradition of the AKP government over the years and the military which was against this tradition for the sake of principles of the Republic. For this reason, the reforms made in civil-military relations were not perceived as a democratization process, but thought as an effort to weaken TSK. This seems to be one of the major obstacles to the internalization of recent reforms by the officers.

Another traditional dilemma which constrains the internalization of democratic civilian control was the national security issue. In the interviews, most respondents stated that not all EU norms are suitable for Turkey under all conditions because the perception of threat is higher than EU countries due to the location of Turkey. Hence, necessity for the weakening of threat perception is more significant in a country like Turkey where the military was a main authority in the domestic politics for years with the emphasis on internal and external enemies. Because of this emphasis, the military has held a "very popular and unique image" for years in the country. Thus, this situation is also significant in terms of changing the way the society looks at security theme and TSK. The idea that the country is always under threat in terms of national security has potential to constrain the internalization of civilian supremacy over military because in cases where the perception of threat is

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[108] AKP's victory in the general elections of 2002 and EU-induced reforms.

[109] Presidential election cries and e-memorandum, Ergenekon cases. 2016 is also another breaking point due to the 15th July coup attempt.

constantly high, the Army is always on the alert and tends to perceive all kinds of movements as a threat including reform process. For example, regarding the Kurdish issue, it was argued that when the PKK first emerged, both the politicians and the Army could not interpret the nature and capacity of this organization correctly. The authorities tended to call it as a "handful of bandits" ("bir avuç eşkiya"). Due to this lack of misdiagnosis, the responsibility of combating against the PKK was completely assigned to TSK by the governments (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.257). This issue has also been moved to the international level and became a subject of the threat assessment of the military in terms of the national integrity of the country. Later, there was a territorial disintegration fear in Turkey after de facto Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, with the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. The top commanders of TSK kept the fear of territorial disintegration alive in the years of 2006 and 2007 (Narlı, 2009, p.73).

However, under the AKP governance, the developments such as the "solution process" which was the AKP's opening initiative to resolve the Kurdish question through nonviolent means (the exact content of which was never fully disclosed) carried out with the PKK brought the political aspects of these issues to the forefront. The next period was significant in terms of revealing the attitudinal change in TSK. In this period, the military's attitude towards the Kurdish issue became compatible with the political policy, thus making it suitable for the continuation of the positive environment created by the EU process. For instance; the speech of General Başbuğ at the Turkish War Academy on April 15, 2009, was evaluated as an attitudinal change about "Kurdish problem." General Başbuğ focused more the "people of Turkey" instead of "Turkish people." He also stated that the terrorist was also a human being (NTV, April, 15, 2009). Therefore, the policies carried out towards national security in the country were also effective in shaping the perceptions of military officers. The view among the officers in this study that threat perception of civilians are much more contextual compared to the military constrains civilian control over the military. On this issue, statements of a respondent demonstrated how the civilian world and the differences in threat perception are perceived by the officers:

The military's own structure is intended to make everything predictable. The missions of who does and what to do, step by step are clear to minimize the uncertainty in the battlefield. Compared to this, civilians can work more comfortably in more uncertain environments. The soldier does not like uncertainty and considers it suspiciously.[110]

The second constraining factor of the internalization of democratic civilian control by the officers is that civilian control had not been consolidated yet as a tradition among the officers in this study. In ideal, the political stability that has existed in Turkey for many years, and the new generation which was defined by the officers as more democratic and open to change are the factors that contribute to civilian control as a tradition. However, although political stability was perceived as a positive factor in the relevant literature to ensure that the reform process is carried out consistently, a group of respondents mostly focus negative consequences of it. This difference pointed out the nature of political stability within a country. Political stability can be either democratic or authoritarian. Even if it was not directly stated by the officers, they mostly defined political stability in Turkey as authoritarian. Those respondents mostly focused that the ruling party used political stability as an instrument to control TSK in a negative way because "as power increases, the tendency of authoritarianism is increasing instead of democratic attitude."[111] Some respondents tended to evaluate political stability with the issue of intimidation of TSK. That is to say, those respondents thought that political stability did not bring democratization in civil-military relations; on the contrary, it was used as an instrument to control TSK in a negative way; i.e. the AKP became more authoritarian in this process and created a fear on the military members especially through Ergenekon trials. This was a significant explanation, because it revealed that the political stability which is considered as an asset for the sustainability of the reform process in the literature, at the same time might be a barrier to the democratic transformation of civil-military relations. Similar views of another respondent also reflected this approach:

When the AKP first came to power, EU was a good tool for legitimization both nationally and internationally. The AKP government used it as a tool to pressure the

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[110] Respondent No.20; a Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army.

[111] Respondent No.05; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for thirty years.

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opponents and they got the military and some institutions under control. Therefore, it is not democratization but a party control issue.[112]

Hence, it was thought by the respondents that the government used political stability as a leverage in its power struggle against the Army.

Moreover, there were those claims that although the AKP was a pro-EU party at the beginning of its political life, after 2011 with the AKP's third general election victory, there was a new concept for Turkey, namely "De-Europeanization" which refers slow Europeanization; i.e. the decrease in motivation about EU. That is to say, after the AKP ensured its place in the Turkish political life, it started to use EU reforms for its empowerment in Turkish political era (Sipahioğlu, 2017, p.52). This kind of developments also negatively affected the idea of internalization of civilian supremacy of the officers because they restarted to question the purpose of the reforms in civil-military relations.

Another important element in the continuation of civilian control as a tradition is the new generation in the Armed Forces. As it was stated in the interviews that, the new generation is more democratic in the sense that this generation cares for democratic values and human rights more, supports a transformation in TSK, has a higher tolerance for change and it is against the status quo; so, they will expedite internalization process of the reforms and civilian control. The statements of a respondent revealed the different views of the old and the new generation in terms of tolerance for change:

> When we make a distinction between the old and the young generation necessarily a difference emerges. I would say that the first one wants change, and the other conservative wing does not want change since this second group associates the changes reducing military autonomy with loss of prestige within the society.[113]

These changing values in the new generation can be evaluated together with the discussions of professionalization. Based on the Institutional / Occupational distinction of Moskos (1988, pp.15-26; 1981, pp.2-4) for the military organization, it

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[112] Respondent No.10; a retired Major who served in the Army for twenty-six years.

[113] Respondent No.20; a Captain on active duty for ten years in the Army.

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can be said that the new generation in the Turkish Army started to carry occupational values more. As it is stated in the interviews, there are low levels of institutional belonging and commitment among the new generation. In this new structure, military officers started to consider working in the military as "just another job." In particular, the increase in contract-based recruitment in the recent years in TSK might increase this perception. In other words, radical professionalism, based on the citizen-soldier understanding, has started to leave its place to the pragmatic professionalism with the new generation. Statements of a retired Colonel best illustrated the different perspectives of the old and the new generation on the values attributed to the military as a profession:

> There was more dedication in our time. Now the young people have the view that soldiers should not be the only group with the right to speak about the future of Turkey. In my opinion, civilians who work with the soldiers for the future of Turkey are insufficient but young officers are questioning, "Do only we love this country? Civilians should work as much as the military does and we should do what we need to do". Thus, new generation has other goals now, similar with the trends in the world.[114]

On the same issue, another officer stated that "the new generation is definitely more questioning. They are questioning about their job descriptions. They question the things that we used look at as is."[115] In this context, it can be considered that the new generation's approach to democratization of civil-military relations will be more positive than the old generation. However, as stated in the interviews, this new generation have to achieve to high ranks for a change in the military culture since the hierarchy, which is the basic norm of the Turkish Army, is based on the absolute obedience of the decisions made by the high command. Therefore, younger generation who was defined as more optimist about transformation in the military has not reflected those values to the military culture yet.

The third element constraining the internalization of democratic civilian control by the officers is that the officers participated in this study did not genuinely believe that there was a comprehensive democratization movement in every field in the country.

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[114] Respondent No.04; a retired Colonel who served in the Army for twenty-two years.

[115] Respondent No.07; a First Lieutenant on active duty for six years in the Navy.

This is important to develop a mutual trust between politicians and the military. In other words, the military should be convinced that military reform is being implemented together with a general democratic reform; otherwise, like any other institution, the military will oppose a reform which they believe only impacts on them (Serra, 2010, pp.40-43). There was a point that a particular group in the interviews asserted in their responses that it was very difficult to talk about justice, law and thus democracy in the country. This view was generally based on the negative effects of the authoritarian government which triggered a democratic breakdown started at the second decade of the 2000. The idea held by the majority of the respondents that there would not be any objection to the reforms in the "ideal system" in which democracy was expended in all institutions and domains can be interpreted as a crucial context for the internalization of reforms among the officers. This demonstrates that the officers perceived the existing situation in Agüero's terms as negative consolidation: Elite satisfaction differs from positive consolidation which means policies and strategies by creating a concordance between the military and the goals and institutions of the new democratic regime (1995, p.165). In this regard, this factor mostly stood as a constraining factor of the internalization of civilian supremacy among the officers.

The last factor constraining the internalization of civilian supremacy includes military education structure and ideological socialization process. They are the critical elements that provide the production and reproduction of military values. According to the findings of this study, it can be argued that military education and ideological socialization process within the military still reproduce those values which include military's guardianship mission and doubtful approach towards civilians. In that sense, these systems within the military can be evaluated as a constraining factor of internalization of civilian supremacy among the officers. Therefore, changes and reforms in military education and ideological socialization process might have the potential to positively reshape the approaches of the officers towards civilians and the expense of democracy. For this reason, for a mindset change among the officers, these systems should be redesigned to weaken the cores of the autonomy elements of TSK. For example, throughout the Turkish history, there has been a strong military spirit that included the idea that "every Turk is a born soldier" (Altınay,

2004, p.186). Besides, there has been a traditional respect to the military because people believed that "the military protects us against the internal and external enemies" as a result of such belief, the military become "a type of mystical and unquestionable institution" (Narlı, 2009, p.61). What is significant here is that these notions were emphasized for years in the education system and ideological socialization of TSK. Therefore, it is not enough to change the perception of society alone in order to break this perception. Statements of one respondent supported this argument as follows:

> I don't have the same values and perspective as I graduated from high school because I worked as separated from civilian life. That's why the soldiers who graduated from military schools and started to work inevitably move away from society. This is one of the biggest problems. As we move away from society, we also move away from understanding what they want. Therefore, we are trying to do something based on our own biases about the society.[116]

To sum up, among the officers, prevailing caution towards some democratization reforms and ambivalence on the nature of the democratization process indicate that despite legislative and constitutional reforms, norms that will facilitate fully democratized civil-military relations in Turkey has not yet been fully accepted by the officers.

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[116] Respondent No.07; a First Lieutenant on active duty for six years in the Navy.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Summary and Key Findings

In the era of multi-party politics, the coup d'état of 27 May 1960 became a turning point in civil-military relations of contemporary Turkey. In fact, after 1960, the TSK became a primary force of the domestic politics especially through the MGK. Moreover, the Turkish military gradually strengthened its centrality and autonomy, away from civilian control through constitutional amendments. The February 28 intervention in 1997 and 2007 e-memorandum were new types of military interventions into civilian politics. Hence, regime changes, democratic transitions, direct and indirect military interventions have had a significant effect on civil-military relations and on democracy since 1960.

The EU accession process facilitated the consolidation of Turkish democracy process after the official declaration of Turkey's "candidate status" in 1999 for EU membership with a number of crucial legislative and constitutional reforms. Civil-military relations was one of the realms significantly affected by these reforms. This thesis explored the views of a group of Turkish military officers vis-à-vis the democratization reforms (legal and constitutional amendments) enacted since 1999 during Turkey's EU accession process in order to carry civil-military relations to a more democratic level. That is to say, the research aimed at inquiring into and interpreting the perceptions of a sample of mostly high-ranking commanders selected for this study regarding the civilization reforms during the periods of 1999 - 2016 in the context of a qualitative study.

The main research question of this thesis was formulated as, "How military officers perceive and evaluate the legal and constitutional reforms to curtail the Turkish military's political and institutional autonomy during the EU accession process in

terms of the internalization of the norm of civilian control over the military in Turkey. What are the possible reasons for the differences in their attitudes towards those reforms?" This thesis was also based on analysis of second-hand sources on civil-military relations and empirical data. In order to reach the empirical data, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-two active-duty and predominantly retired officers in total in Ankara and Istanbul by the author. Because the findings represented the individual attitudes, thoughts and perceptions of these twenty-two officers, generalizable conclusions on TSK as an institution could be still very risky, and this was the major limitation of this thesis. Being aware of this limitation, certain inferences were drawn in order to get insights into the perceptions of a group of officers about the impacts of the civilianization process and how the reforms reflected on TSK members.

To begin with, according to the findings of this research, the reform issues on which the most majority of the respondents had significantly positive attitudes in the context of political autonomy towards were as follows: subjecting all expulsion decisions of YAŞ to legal review, a civilian-dominated MGK structure, abstinence of high-ranking officers from speaking to the press on polity issues. Reforms on the limitation of military jurisdiction were also supported by most respondents. Moreover, a large group of respondents positively perceived the amendment to the Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of TSK which replaced the words "protecting" and "safeguarding" with "defending" and reorganized military's domestic security missions. Reforms on the ssupervision mechanisms on military expenditures and the budget by the Court of Accounts and subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Security and obeying all the orders issued from civilians as long as they were legal subjecting were also changes supported by most of the respondents in the context of institutional autonomy of the military. The subjects towards which the respondents generally expressed negative attitude were: trust in civilians in general, attitudes and approach of both TSK and civilians during the Ergenekon arrests and trials. Lastly exclusion of the Armed Forces from the organization of the internal security and the determination of national security threat elements were the issues that the respondents generally expressed negative attitudes. There were some areas which were regarded by the respondents to be

within the military's prerogatives such as promotions and appointments of the officers, military discipline and training, length of the military service, selecting weapons systems, deployment of troops, total manpower and controlling military operations. Respondents confirmed less the proposition that "military interventions are now a thing of the past" than the counter-proposition which asserted that some circumstances in the country might require and enable the military to intervene in the politics. The common opinion among the officers on responses to this question was that military interventions were not very likely at the moment, but they also cautioned that they were not completely out of question.

When these findings were taken into consideration in the light of the discussions in the general literature, it can be claimed that the officers included in this study mostly internalized the changes regarding the political autonomy. However, it should also be noted that the officers were more sensitive towards those issues related to internal organization and structure of TSK which fall within the scope of the institutional autonomy of the military. In that sense, the extent to which the officers was ready for these areas related with institutional autonomy to be under full civilian control still remains controversial. Therefore, it can be contended on the basis of this research of the perceptions of the officers that the officers participated in this study has not yet fully internalized the changes towards curtailing its institutional autonomy.

The reasons why the officers were more cautious towards those changes associated with institutional autonomy can be grouped under two headings. The first reason of this attitude was military's perception of professional superiority over civilians: Confirming the relevant literature, looking at the respondents' views, soldiers expected the politicians to take their opinions or suggestions with priority about the issues on which they considered themselves professional experts. Especially, on the issue of national security, officers tended to consider themselves more competent than civilians. They also believed that the issues on which they regarded themselves professional were in the scope of military domain (institutional autonomy) and that there were not enough civilian experts in this domain. This kind of perspective is also associated with trust in civilians among the officers since more

than one half of the respondents stated in the interviews that they do not trust civilians in governing the country, handling the well-being of the country and defense policies. As a result, the officers were cautious towards those changes attempted by civilians, whom they did not trust and did not consider competent in matters concerning the military and security. The second reason of such a protective attitude towards institutional autonomy matters among officers results from military education and ideological socialization within the military. As explained in Chapter 2, the officers participated in this study also confirmed the situation of maintaining institutional autonomy elements through controlling the military education system against expanding civilian control efforts. However, the literature suggests that exerting control over the military's training, its definition as a profession and its institutional features were the key elements to reach the highest level of democratic consolidation in terms of civil-military relations. Hence, democratization could be expanded only after producing a permanent transformation in the norms and orientation of the military regarding these areas (Serra, 2010, pp.26, 45). The findings from the interviews demonstrated that there was mostly a negative attitude towards three specific questions under the title of military indoctrination: according to respondents' own evaluations the military's trust in civilians was higher than it was in the past but there were still distrust in civilians among the officers; there was a high level of perception among the officers that the TSK considered itself above institutions and politics and changes and that reforms have not yet been fully internalized because there was a need for cultural change in the military besides constitutional changes. In this regard, expressions of the respondents about the role of the military indoctrination process in the Armed Forces to the formation of such perceptions were also significant. Hence, regarding the cautious attitude of the officers participated in this study in terms of the institutional autonomy areas which is directly related with military indoctrination, it is not possible to identify signs of the ultimate internalization of democratic norms in this domain.

As explained in Chapter 2, democratic civil-military relations at a consolidated level are only possible through the internalization of civilian control by the military. Therefore, while defining a process as a "civil-military cooperation" or "civil-military harmonization", it is important to consider this aspect of the process. Hence,

besides reducing the military's previous privileges, it is crucial to ensure a significant cultural change in terms of mindset change, value change and ideology change among the officers and within TSK to reach a consolidated and sustainable civilian control over the military. At this point, it needs to be specifically noted that culture changes take place in a very long term.

Another commonly held argument in the relevant literature was that in recent years, the TSK's autonomy had been diminished and that civilian control had expanded; as a result, more democratic civil-military relations in Turkey had become. The general opinion in the interviews was that there has been a change in recent years in civil-military domain. However, it should be underlined here that majority of the respondents defined this process also as an intentional course of action by the government to discredit and intimidate TSK instead of reflecting a genuine democratization of civil-military relations. The Ergenekon trials (starting from 2008) were one of the most central factors in the formation of this kind of perception among the officers. The interviews were conducted during a period when the claim that the Ergenekon trials might be a conspiracy of the Gülenist Terror Organization (FETÖ) within the state apparatus. In 2019, the Ergenekon case was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the whole process seemed to damage the officers' trust in politicians and commitment to democracy.

The changes both in the civilian and military sides of the relationship are likely to have the potential to determine and shape the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey. The civilian side had the capacity to influence this relationship through the EU process, political stability, the empowerment of elected civilians, and changing public attitudes towards the military. On the other hand, the military side affected this relationship via its organizational culture which was mostly shaped by its security culture elements and military indoctrination. Hence, it can be contended that although the EU accession process had an enormous impact on the democratic transformation of civil-military relations, it was not the only factor. There were other factors such as changes in the national security environment, in public perceptions about the role of the military in Turkish society, in political stability, in empowerment of elected political leadership and case-trials of military officers on charges of

plotting coups. In that sense, it was necessary to consider these contextual factors in the discussion of the impact of the reforms in the framework of democratic control of the armed forces on the transformation of military autonomy and changing officers' mindset. Therefore, in analyzing the perceptions of the officers regarding the civilianization reforms, this thesis considered other significant factors which may potentially affect and change the military culture. In the interviews, military education and ideological socialization process were referred as one of the main factors shaping the organizational culture of the military in terms of strengthening military values. Meanwhile, following July 15, 2016, with the Presidential Decree No:669 published on July 25, 2016, there were significant reforms in military education such as Foundation of National Defense University which is subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense; closure of military high schools; and subordination of war academies and Staff College to the National Defense University. When these changes in the military education system were associated with the claims of the officers in the interviews that the new generation was more democratically-oriented in the sense of caring more for democratic values and human rights, supporting a transformation in TSK and having a higher tolerance for change, a future picture of how the balance will be in civil-military relations will need to be redrawn. Yet, for now it can be concluded that in order to facilitate consolidation of democracy through democratizing civil-military relations, military culture needs to be transformed by changes in the military education system and institutional autonomy of the military needs to be limited through new reforms.

Overall, then, one should always keep in mind that the military held considerable influence over polity matters by controlling historical, sociological, and ideological means in Turkey more than legal regulations. In that sense, mindset change within the Armed Forces towards these changes are as important as constitutional changes and legal reforms. Nevertheless, according to findings of this research, certain factors conditioned and constrained the officers' internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. In that sense; traditional dilemmas related to national security and regime related issues among the officers, civilian control not being established as a tradition, the views of the officers regarding the democratization process in Turkey; i.e. the officers believe that democratization

process is not going on in every sphere of the polity, and aspects of military education and ideological socialization norms of the military feeding conventional values within the military. Thus, related with those factors, significant elements seem to be necessary for internalization of democratic civilian control by the officers in accordance with the findings in the interviews.

Firstly, this thesis demonstrated that the EU accession process, parliamentary and presidential elections, public referendums, cross-border operations and some important trials such as Ergenekon trials or the prosecution of General Kenan Evren had direct effects on the perceptions of the military in Turkey. In that sense, such developments had the potential to reshape the views of the officers towards civil-military issues. This is because the views of the officers towards civil-military relations remain under the direct influence of national security matters in Turkey. In that sense, for a mindset change, officers must move away from the idea that the country is always under threat in terms of national security since in cases where the perception of threat is constantly high, the Army is always on the alert and tends to perceive all kinds of movements as a threat including reform processes.

Secondly, for a long-term change in military mindset, civilian control must be considered as a tradition. That is to say, officers, civilians and even general public must accept the idea that a democratic civilian control over the military exists in the country and will always continue. In this regard, the political stability that has existed in Turkey for many years, and the younger generation which was defined by the officers as more democratic and open to change are the factors likely to contribute to civilian control as a tradition. However, it should be underlined that a minority group of respondents stated that political stability negatively affected civil-military relations since it was used as an instrument to control TSK; i.e. the AKP became more authoritarian and created a fear on the military members especially through Ergenekon cases. In that sense, rather than political stability itself, the nature of political stability (i.e. democratic or authoritarian political stability) is much more important. In this study, the respondents mostly identified the prevailing political stability with increasing authoritarianism in Turkey, and with partisan interventions into the military in recent years. Hence, authoritarian type of political stability and

civilian control stand as a constraining factor for the internalization of civilian control over the military.

Thirdly, for an internalization of the notion of civilian supremacy, military education and ideological socialization process need to be redesigned to weaken the cores of the autonomy elements of the TSK. In addition, the isolated status of the military from society should also change. The military officers should be educated in civilian universities, be deployed in peace operations, and be involved in activities where they may be in more contact with civilian life. These developments have the potential to increase trust in civilians among the soldiers, and increase the likelihood that soldiers might better observe society's expectations from TSK.

Lastly, the officers need to believe that there is a comprehensive and genuine democratization movement spreading to every field and institutions in the country; otherwise the military would oppose a reform which is believed only has impacts on the Armed Forces. According to findings of the interviews, a commonly shared view was that it was very difficult to talk about justice, law and thus democracy in Turkey at the time of the interview period. Hence, it can be concluded that such a perception among the officers restrained internalization of reforms carried out in civil-military relations. This means that Turkey needs both "civilianization" (transferring of political power from the military to civilian elites) and "democratization" (strengthening check and balance system among the executive branch, parliament, and civil society through effective oversight and monitoring mechanisms) (Gürcan, 2018, p.3).

Perceptions of the officers on the reform process and especially on the recent period in civil-military relations, i.e. the idea held by the majority of the officers that the recent changes did not serve democratization process but it was an intimidation process of TSK, can be evaluated in the framework of subjective civilian control in Huntingtonian sense as it was explained in the Introduction. In other words, an important finding based on the perceptions of the officers' participated in this study was that there has been a subjective civilian control in Turkey because civilians proceeded to intervene in the military domain in a very "partisan way" through for

example the notorious cases of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials which weakened the prestige, morale and the unity of the military. One should remember at this point the thesis of Huntington who identified subjective civilian control with the concern for the maximization of power of some particular governmental institutions and social classes (1957, p.81). Interviewed officers in this study also shared similar views with these attributions of subjective civilian control. For instance, one of them described recent transformation as a party control. Moreover, according to perceptions of the officers, civilians violated military structure and its professionalism with using law especially in the scope of Ergenekon trials. That is why some officers evaluated some reforms as symbolic and within a revanchist framework of civilian control through considering it as an subjective civilian control which underestimates the military domain and military professionalism and try to maximize civilian power.

Moreover, studies published in the early 2000s with the impact of the EU process in Turkey created an extensive literature describing the reform process as a way of democratization in Turkey. However, this trend started to take a different direction due to developments such as the claims of authoritarianism of the AKP government starting from its third period and the almost discontinuing EU process. So it is a necessity to be cautious when discussing civilian control and even when using the term civilian control in the Turkish case because one should not ensure that civilian control would be always democratic. This is significant because civilian control might be emerged as democratic or authoritarian and authoritarian civilian control might not lead desirable results in terms of civil-military relations. This differentiation was applicable for this study because criticism and reactions of the officers in the study demonstrated that they perceived civilian control in Turkey as an authoritarian type. Hence, it is very difficult for the officers to internalize such a civilian control which was considered as authoritarian. That is to say, because of the perception about authoritarian type of civilianization, officers extended a resistance against these EU-led reforms and it is an expected result of undemocratic civilianization process for any country. In that sense, this situation revealed that in the case of democratic civilian control military is not the only responsible actor. If the military officers did not internalize the norm of civilian supremacy, one should not ignore the responsibility of the civilians in such an outcome. If the civilians involve in military domain by using

undemocratic tools and if they rule the country in an authoritarian way, it would not be fair to attribute the existing problems in civil-military relations only to the military side. The attitudes of civilians, their governing patterns of the country, and their approaches to civil-military relations can either facilitate or complicate the process of officers' internalization of the norm of civilian supremacy. In this study, therefore, it was found out that these factors resulted in a complication of establishing democratic civilian control.

In conclusion, it can be contended that the main issue in civil-military relations in Turkey cannot be reduced to the issue of maximization of civilian control over the Armed Forces. The real concern should be to build democratic civil-military relations which is also perceived as "democratic" and internalized by the military. In that sense, not only constitutional changes and legal reforms but also a mindset change among the military which is itself conditioned by a number of factors seems to be crucial for promoting consolidated civilian control and hence for democratization. The main challenge for civilians in this regard is to take steps to build democratic civilian control rather than authoritarian one.

5.2. The Contributions of the Thesis and Suggestions of New Paths for Future Studies on Civil-Military Relations

Although there are several studies about civil-military relations in Turkey, very few are based on concrete evidence; i.e. generally, they are mostly descriptive and at most, they develop an argument on the statements and speeches or behaviors of the chiefs of general staff. In that sense, the first and the most significant contribution of this thesis was providing empirical evidence. This study analyzed not only exogenous factors but also endogenous factors of changes in the Turkish civil-military relations through this empirical evidence. Hence, internal insights were provided and the extent of mentality change of the officers were explored albeit on the basis of subjective evaluations of the officers.

Secondly, this thesis arrived at some key findings which would be worth considering for those who are interested in this field or for policymakers through evaluating its

empirical evidence. For instance, while the officers were more easily accepting changes in some military autonomy elements, in some areas they were concerned about protecting the elements of military autonomy. Moreover, this study revealed the importance of experiencing a cultural change as well as constitutional change for more democratic civil-military relations. These conclusions highlighted those areas which need to be underlined for democratization through transforming civil-military relations in Turkey.

As the last contribution, this study brought a new perspective to the commonly-held argument in the existing literature which long held that because the autonomy of the Turkish military was now substantially reduced, there was higher democratic norms in civil-military relations in Turkey. Although officers generally had not a problem with constitutional changes in terms of civil-military relations, they interpreted the recent transformation in civil-military relations as an intimidation process of the TSK in the context of controversial trials during a politicized process under AKP government. In that sense, this thesis demonstrated that it is possible to discuss the recent transformation in civil-military field which was evaluated as democratization in the general literature with a different perspective. That is to say, consolidation literature initially assumed that civilianization brings democratization. However, findings of this study demonstrated that this assumption is not applicable for every case. In fact, this study criticized this approach because this assumption is very risky for Turkish civil-military relations because considering the perceptions of the officers, the recent transformation in civil-military relations can be defined as subjective civilian-control which connotates authoritarian civilian control mostly. Related with this fact, this study also indicated that legal and constitutional changes are not sufficient alone for democratic civilian control and the process of the internalization of the norm of civilian control is shaped and affected by type of civilian control. So, this research also highlighted the difference between the democratization and civilianization. Therefore, it also made some theoretical contributions.

There are three new paths for future studies in the scope of the research question of this thesis to improve civil-military relations research field. It was one of the

significant results of this study that while the changes in the field of political autonomy based on both formal and informal mechanisms were more easily accepted, the officers were still more cautious and held conservative attitudes towards changes in terms of institutional autonomy matters. In this regard, the first new path, while discussing democratization level of Turkey in terms of civil-military relations, could be developing new views focusing on institutional autonomy matters of the military instead of over-emphasizing political autonomy issues based on especially informal mechanisms.

The second is periodically repeating the same research with the same interviewees in order to explore attitude changes (if any) within the Turkish officers as a trend analysis. It would also be useful to reveal the perspectives of the officers towards those changes, such as abolition of military courts, subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense, civilian domination in promotions and appointments, and Foundation of National Defense University which was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense; closure of military high schools; and subordination of war academies and Staff College to the National Defense University which was made after the interviews had been conducted. Changes and revisions made in the military education system have a special importance since it is directly related with basis of the institutional autonomy of TSK.

The third is applying the same survey to the "new generation" from different ranks and forces within TSK since there was a common idea both in the literature and in the results of the interviews that younger generation has more democratic orientations and has higher tolerance for democratic change. In that sense, a similar study conducting with newly recruited officers would make it possible to evaluate this argument through comparing the findings across generational change. This would provide insights into extent norm change in the military.

5.3. Postscript: The Failed Coup Attempt of 15 July 2016

At the time of the completion of the interviews, an aborted coup took place against the AKP government, organized and led by the Gülenist officers among the officers corps. This thesis analyzed the period until 15 July 2016 attempted military uprising because the interviews were completed in early of 2016. The post-15th July attempt was defined as another period in terms of civil-military relations in Turkey because it was a unique event dissimilar to previous interventions. However, certain facts about the aborted coup 15 July 2016 needs to be briefly addressed in terms of the scope of the thesis.

On 15 July 2016, there was a military uprising led from outside of the TSK aiming to bring down the government in Turkey. It was a failed military intervention because not only thousands of people flooded to the streets against it but also the majority of the officers corps sufficiently stood against it. This attempted coup did not take any support from the political elites including opposition parties and from the larger part of the military. This attempt was different from the previous military interventions in Turkish history in four important aspects. First of all, this military uprising was not carried out within the military hierarchy (Gürsoy, 2017, p.197); it was a "small clique comprising Gulenist officers" (Gürcan, 2018, p.8). Secondly, key state institutions had been invaded in order to create a "parallel state" with the aim of controlling the mode of governance of Turkey. Thirdly, the coup attempt also led to bloodshed and violence as many civilians and military personnel were killed. Lastly, there was a strong resistance of Turkish people, political parties, media, and civil society against the coup and there was a clear message of these groups that they were committed to democracy (Keyman and Gürcan, 2017, pp.5-6).

After the 15 July military uprising, the institutional structure of TSK was dramatically altered. It was stated that unitary identity of TSK, identified with the generals, was transformed to a fragmented one. The prestige of the Turkish generals was weakened, both in the eye of the military and in political bureaucracy. Moreover, such features of the officers "sympathy for NATO, satisfaction with and separateness from the civilian sphere, distrust of and a desire to be above politics, a

high sense of moral responsibility, an aristocratic approach to officership, the notion of soldiering as a way of life, and a feeling that military schools groomed eliteness" should no longer be considered resist to change (Gürcan, 2018, pp.2,15).

Moreover, the TSK was politicized in a new way after this date because there was a new internal security threat of Turkey called as FETÖ which had been organized secretly within TSK itself. In the sense of the elimination of the cadres of the "parallel structure" from TSK, civilians came to interfere with the TSK to a large extent. Due to these developments civil-military relations was transformed to "Presidency-military" relations format and there was a "monopoly of civilianization" which collected all civilian monitoring and oversight mechanisms under a single roof (Keyman and Gürcan, 2017, p.26).

Overall, the 15 July coup attempt took place as a result of the politicization of TSK through external interventions and disrupted its institutional and hierarchical integrity. In consequence, the TSK became dominated to erode its institutional and political autonomy by the government which was saved from the military coup attempt. In parallel to the findings of the thesis, this transformation was again carried out in a way that would damage the democratization in the field of civil-military relations and in general. The 15 July coup attempt should not be interpreted in a way that the TSK still claims political autonomy. On the contrary, it highlights that the problems of the civilianization process which is not simultaneously continuing with a genuine democratization might have negative impacts on the military. Hence, the whole process reminds once again the necessity of critically reflecting on the relationship between civilianization and democratization.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

F. Serap Koydemir Avcı

The purpose of this interview in the context of my research for Master's Thesis is to capture soldiers' observations, views and assessments on the changes underway in civil-military relations in Turkey particularly in the context of EU harmonization process, i.e. reflect the perspectives of soldiers. The 31 questions below were finalized with the approval of my thesis advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Canan Aslan Akman. Should you have any question or suggestion, you may contact her at (0312) 210 5799 or aslanc@metu.edu.tr. Your views and information obtained through this interview will only be utilized for scientific purposes, only during this thesis research and analyzed under the supervision of my thesis advisor. Your personal data will absolutely be kept confidential.

Thank you very much for sparing your time and sharing your views with us. The questions are as follows.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How long did you serve in the Turkish Armed Forces?
2. In which service did you serve?
3. In which year and at what rank did you retire?
4. Did you retire upon your own request?
5. What was your last position prior to retirement?
6. Did you have any opportunity to work closely with politicians when you were in active duty?
7. Have you worked in civilian life after retirement, where?
8. Do you have any academic works or degrees?
9. May I hear your views on Turkey's EU accession process? Do you think full accession to EU will positively or negatively affect Turkey? Why?
10. Many changes were introduced in the EU harmonization process, particularly in the area of civil-military relations. How do you view such reforms? Which do you think the most positive and most negative arrangements were in the military sphere?"
11. Do you think an MGK structure dominated by civilians is more appropriate for Turkey? Why?
12. What do you think of subordinating the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense, as an important point in civil-military relations? (Should it be subordinated? Under what terms and conditions? Is it possible with in Turkey?)
13. How competent do you think civilians/politicians are in governing the country, handling the well-being of the country and defense policies? Do you have confidence in them on these matters? Why?
14. An amendment in 2010 to the Law on Court of Accounts established an effective supervision mechanism on military expenditures and the budget of the Turkish Armed Forces? How do you assess such arrangement in practice?
15. How do you assess the limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts?

16. Do you approve of the amendment that all decisions made by the High Military Council (YAŞ), except for promotions and retirement for non-vacancy, are now subject to legal review? Why?

17. Do you think there has been a change affected by the EU reform process in Turkey in the military's relation with politics and with the government (particularly in the last 10-15 years)?

18. If such a change has occurred, what factors have brought about such transformation?

19. How do you think the relation between civilians and soldiers should be? For example, should soldiers play an influential role in the security decisions made politicians, or should soldiers be in an advisory role who express views and suggestions only when asked?

20. Do you think the concept of 'absolute obedience' within the military applies to the orders issued from the civilians? In what context could such orders be questioned or challenged? Or, should soldiers unconditionally obey all orders from the civilians?

21. What do you think of the claims that the Turkish Armed Forces has for years positioned itself above the institutions and politics?

22. Are there any decisions which must absolutely not be interfered by the civilians and must remain the military's prerogative? Why? Particularly, what should be the minimum ranks/positions that civilians must be involved in military promotions and appointments? What consequences would arise from any actual interference below such minimum?

23. Recently, we observe that the high-ranking soldiers do not speak to the press on political, international etc. developments unless necessary. How do you view this: positive or negative?

24. In the context of civil-military relations in Turkey, do you think some cultural changes are needed in the military in addition to the constitutional changes such as EU led reforms? Can we say that soldiers have really internalized the reforms and changes introduced in the EU process?

25. Do you think the military's interference with politics is now a thing of the past, or is it likely that circumstances in the country may come into being which may require the military to intervene in the government? What would be included in such circumstances?

26. Do you think the arrests of Balyoz and Ergenekon represent a breaking point? How do you read the process as a military officer? Some segments take this as a part of the civilianization process, other segments view it as the liquidation of the military or a conspiracy/set-up against the military. How do you think this process reflected onto the strength/competence of the Turkish Armed Forces?

27. Do you approve of the military's attitude and approach during the arrests and trials?

28. Is it possible to make a distinction in the military, such as progressives and conservatives, in terms of the perspective of change?

29. The point emphasized in previous interviews was that democratization in civil-military relations was necessary but that the focus should not just be on TSK, but democratization should be in every domain and all institutions. What is your view on this?"

30. At what level should the military have a voice in the protection of national interests? What institutions should engage in such process? Only between the military and politicians? (For example, it is known that during the "initiative/solution process", the military has been aware of and warned the politicians about the armaments being stockpiled. But, should the military have been more protective? Or should the military inform the public more and be involved more in the process, or not?)

31. What do you think about trial of Kenan Evren?

APPENDIX B: DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS

Respondent No	Rank	Force	Retirement Status	Interview Date
01	Colonel	Army	Retired	January 26, 2016
02	Colonel	Army	Retired	January 31, 2016
03	Colonel	Army	Active Duty	February 1, 2016
04	Colonel	Army	Retired	February 22, 2016
05	Colonel	Army	Retired	March 14, 2016
06	First Lieutenant	Navy	Active Duty	February 23, 2016
07	First Lieutenant	Navy	Active Duty	February 13, 2016
08	Colonel	Army	Retired	March 24, 2016
09	Colonel	Army	Retired	February 12, 2016
10	Major	Army	Retired	February 12, 2016
11	Colonel	Army	Retired	February 9, 2016
12	Colonel	Army	Retired	February 25, 2016
13	Admiral	Navy	Retired	January 16, 2016
14	Major General	Army	Retired	February 11, 2016
15	Captain	Army	Retired	February 22, 2016
16	Major General	Army	Active Duty	January 18, 2016
17	Lieutenant Colonel	Air Force	Retired	January 31, 2016
18	Colonel	Gendarmerie	Active Duty	March 15, 2016
19	Lieutenant Colonel	Army	Retired	February 16, 2016
20	Captain	Army	Active Duty	March 3, 2016
21	Captain	Army	Retired	February 25, 2016
22	Major General	Gendarmerie	Retired	January 16, 2016

APPENDIX C: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Türkiye, 1999 yılında Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyeliği için aday ülke statüsünü kazandıktan sonra, bir takım yasal ve anayasal değişiklikler yapılarak, ülkedeki demokrasi seviyesi yükseltilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, sivil denetimin arttırılması ve ordunun özerkliğinin azaltılması hedefiyle sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında da bir takım değişiklikler yapılmıştır. Bu tez, 1999-2016 yılları arasında yapılan bu değişikliklere yönelik, on altısı emekli altısı muvazzaf olmak üzere toplamda 22 subayın bakış açısını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın temel olarak araştırma sorusu şudur ki "1999'dan bu yana Türk ordusunun siyasi ve kurumsal özerkliğini azaltmak için başlatılmış sivilleşme reformları, Türk ordusundan bir grup subayın sivil üstünlüğe ve reformların içselleştirilmesine yönelik algılarını nasıl etkilemiştir? Bununla ilişkili olarak, subayların bu reformlara yönelik farklı tutumlarının arkasında yatan olası nedenler nelerdir?" Bu reformların sonuçlarıyla ilgili olarak ilgili literatürde birçok çalışma mevcuttur. Bu çalışmaları genel olarak iki farklı bakış açısı altında toplamak mümkündür. İlk görüşü savunanlara göre, Türk ordusunun özerkliği kademeli olarak azalmış ve ordu sivil üstünlüğe tabi kılınmıştır (Heper, 2011, ss. 248-250; Narlı, 2009, s.74; Aydınlı, 2009, s.581; Aydınlı et. al, 2006, s.6). Reformların etkilerini uzun süreli değerlendirmek gerektiği iddiasıyla daha ihtiyatlı olan diğer grup ise, Türkiye'de sivil-asker ilişkileri daha demokratik bir modele evrildiğini değerlendirse de Türk ordusunun sivil otoriteye tabi olması için yasal reformları tek başına yeterli görmemektedir. (Cizre, 2004, ss.119-120; Aknur, 2013, ss.132,147; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p.262; Gürsoy, 2011, p.293; Toktaş ve Kurt, 2010, s.389; Sarıgil, 2011, s.273; Michaud-Emin, 2007, s.18). Bu grup yasal reformların yanı sıra, Türk ordusunun siyasete müdahale geleneğini besleyen ve tarihsel süreçlerle şekillenmiş geleneksel yapısında da değişiklik olmasını gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, hem yasal reformların etkilerini incelediği hem de süreci şekillendiren diğer faktörleri de göz önünde bulundurduğu için her iki görüşü de benimsemektedir. Yani, çalışmada AB uyum süreci kapsamında yapılan reformların yanı sıra, bu süreçte etkili olduğu düşünülen diğer faktörler de değerlendirilmiştir.

Türk ordusunun yaşadığı ikilemlerin demokratik bir sivil kontrolün inşası üzerindeki olası etkileri göz önüne alınmalıdır. Türk ordusu Batılılaşma misyonunda yıllardır öncü bir rol oynamıştır. Ne var ki sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında yapılan son dönemdeki reformlar, devleti ve demokrasiyi koruma misyonlarında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin (TSK) elini zayıflatmıştır. Ordunun içinde bulunduğu ikilemlerden ilki şudur ki ordu, bir taraftan AB reformlarına Batılılaşma misyonu çerçevesinde tam destek vermektedir ancak laiklik ve devletin bütünlüğü olan iki önemli kırmızı çizgisinden ödün vermek istememektedir (Güney ve Karatekelioğlu, 2005, s.455). İkinci olarak ise TSK, özellikle kuruluşunun ilk yıllarında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisine (AKP) şüpheyle yaklaşmış çünkü parti o dönemde ağırlıklı olarak İslami çizgideki Refah Partisinin devamı olarak algılanmıştır. Öte taraftan AKP, ordunun ödün veremeyeceği Batılılaşma misyonun da yürütücülüğünü yapmıştır. Dolayısıyla ordu, AKP'ye yönelik tutumlarında bir ikileme düşmüştür. Bu ikilemler ortaya koymaktadır ki sivil-asker ilişkilerinin demokratikleşmesinin ancak anayasa değişiklikleriyle yapılabileceğine inanmak naif bir yaklaşımdır. Bu bakış açısı, istikrar sağlama ve belirsizliği azaltma temelinde değişime direnen ve muhafazakar bir ideolojiyi destekleyen askeri kültürün ruhunu ıskalamaktadır (Siegl, 2008, s.104; Dunivin, 1994, s.534). Bu bağlamda, demokratik bir sivil kontrol için ordunun bakış açısının ve kültürel değerlerinin değişmesi ve askerlerin yapılan reformları içselleştirmesi önemlidir.

Tüm bu açıklamalar ışığında bu tez, çalışmaya dahil olan subayların, "sivil üstünlük" nosyonunu içselleştirmesinin önünde bazı kısıtlayıcı engeller olduğunu, dolayısıyla yasal reformların demokratik bir sivil kontrol için tek başına yetersiz kalacağını varsaymıştır. Askerlerin bakış açısında yaşanacak bir değişikliğin gerekli olduğu varsayımı hakkında bir sonuca ulaşmak için de nitel araştırma metodolojisi kapsamında subaylarla yüz yüze yapılan mülakatların ampirik verilerden faydalanmıştır. Literatürde yer alan çalışmalar, sivil-asker ilişkileri konusunu genellikle sivillerin bakış açısından onların motivasyonlarını ve başarı ya da başarısızlıklarını ele alarak açıklamaktadır. Bunun yası sıra, çalışmaların çok büyük bir kısmı tanımlayıcıdır, yalnızca belirli varsayımlara dayanmaktadır ve yine birkaç temel istisna dışında ampirik verilerden yoksundur. Bu sebeple, iddia edilebilir ki literatür, askerlerin tutumunu ya da bakış açısını yansıtan araştırmalar bakımından

kısırdır. Dolayısıyla, bu tezin en büyük katkılarından bir tanesi ampirik verilere dayandırarak, askerlerin sürece bakış açılarına ışık tutmasıdır. Çalışmada kullanılan ampirik veriler 16'sı emekli altısı muvazzaf olmak üzere toplamda 22 subayla yüz yüze yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlarla elde edilmiştir. Mülakatlar İstanbul ve Ankara olmak üzere Ocak-Mart 2016 tarihleri arasında iki şehirde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmada ağırlıklı olarak emekli subayların görüşlerinden faydalanılmış olması ve çalışma bulgularının yalnızca 22 subayın görüşünü yansıtıyor olması, bulguların TSK'ya genellenebilirliği açısından bu tezin başlıca kısıtlılığıdır. Ancak, emekli askerlerin fikirlerini daha özgürce paylaşabilecek olmaları ve kendilerinin herhangi bir kurumsal izne tabi olmadan bir araştırmaya katılabilmeleri ağırlıklı olarak emekli askerlerin tercih edilmesine neden olmuştur. Ayrıca subayların çoğunlukla askeri kültürden etkilenerek şekillenen bakış açısının, emeklilikten sonra da devam ettiği varsayılmıştır (Dunivin, 1994, s.533). Aşağıdaki tablo, çalışmaya katılan subayların emeklilik durumu, dahil olunan kuvvet yapısı ve rütbesi anlamında dağılımını göstermektedir:

	Kara Kuvvetleri		Hava Kuvvetleri		Deniz Kuvvetleri		Jandarma	
	Emekli	Çalışan	Emekli	Çalışan	Emekli	Çalışan	Emekli	Çalışan
Amiral					1			
Tümgeneral	1	1					1	
Albay	8	1						1
Yarbay	1		1					
Binbaşı	1							
Yüzbaşı	2	1						
Üsteğmen						2		
Toplam	13	3	1		1	2	1	1

ASKERİ ÖZERKLİK VE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİNİN DEMOKRATİKLEŞMESİ

"Sivil kontrol" ve "askeri özerklik" bu tez çalışmasındaki iki temel olgudur. Sivil kontrol terimi, ilgili literatürde demokratik sivil kontrol anlamında kullanılmaktadır. Buradaki "demokratik" vurgusu önemlidir çünkü ordu üzerindeki her sivil kontrol demokratik olmayabilir. Bu sebeple, "orduların demokratik sivil kontrolü" (democratic control of the armed forces-decaf) terimini kullanmak özellikle Türkiye gibi demokrasisi tam anlamıyla sağlamlaştırılmamış ülkeler için önemlidir. Bu tez özelinde sivil kontrol terimi ve sivil kontrolün sağlanması adına yapıldığı değerlendirilen reformlar demokratik sivil kontrol kapsamda ele alınmıştır. Sivil kontrol temel olarak, güvenlik ve savunma ile ilgili konuların ve ordunun demokrasi prensibi ile sivil kurumlar tarafından kontrol edilmesidir (Rukavishnikov ve Pugh, 2006, ss.136). Huntington sivil kontrol olgusunu öznel sivil kontrol (subjective civilian control) ve nesnel sivil kontrol (objective civilian control) olmak üzere ikiye ayırmaktadır. Öznel sivil kontrol belirli bir grubun ya da grupların gücünün en üst seviyeye çıkartılması anlamına gelirken, nesnel sivil kontrol askeri profesyonelleşmeyi en üst seviyeye taşımayı amaçlamaktadır. Huntington'a göre nesnel sivil kontroldeki profesyonelleşme, askerin daha çok askerleştirilmesi dolayısıyla siyasete müdahalenin olabildiğince ortadan kalkmasıyla sonuçlanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Huntington demokratik bir sivil-asker ilişkiselliği için nesnel sivil kontrolü gerekli görmektedir (1957, ss.80,83-84). Askeri özerklik ise sivil kontrolün karşıtı olarak kullanılmaktadır. Pion-Berlin askeri özerkliği, silahlı kuvvetlerin hareket edebildiği görece bağımsızlık alanı olarak tanımlamakta ve siyasi özerklik (political autonomy) ve kurumsal otonomi (institutional autonomy) şeklinde bu olguyu iki farklı şekilde ele almaktadır. Kurumsal özerklik, ordunun kendi profesyonel alanındaki bağımsızlığını ve bu alandaki organik birlik ve bilinç duygusunu ifade etmektedir. Siyasi özerklik ise, ordunun sivil kontrole karşı olan isteksizliğini ve hatta buna karşı çıkmasını içerir (1992, ss.84-85).

Askeri özerkliğin boyutlarının belirlenmesi ve demokratik sivil kontrolün sağlanması için bu boyutların hangi seviyede olması gerektiği konusunu aydınlatmak adına bu çalışmada temel olarak Pion-Berlin, Stepan ve Serra'nın açıklamalarından faydalanılmıştır. Pion-Berlin askeri özerkliği 10 alanda incelemekte ve bu anlamda

hangi alanların ne şekilde askeri özerklik kapsamına dahil edilebileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bunlardan ilki personel kararlarıdır. Eğer terfi ve atamalarda asker kendi listesini hazırlıyorsa askeri özerklik yüksek, asker bir pozisyon için bir ya da iki isim belirliyor ve bunu sivil onaya sunuyorsa askeri özerklik düşüktür. İkinci alan kuvvet seviyesidir. Eğer ki askeri personel anlamında kuvvet seviyesi artıyorsa ya da aynı kalıyorsa askeri özerklik yüksek, küçülüyorsa ve daha az maliyetli bir yapıya bürünüyorsa düşüktür. Üçüncü alan askeri eğitim ve doktrindir. Şayet bu yapı kapalı, disiplinli ve itaatkarsa askeri özerklik yüksek, siviller bir müfredat oluşturabiliyorsa ve askerler sivil okullarda da eğitim alabiliyorsa düşüktür. Bir diğer özerklik alanı askeri reformlardır. Askeri özerkliğin yüksek olduğu durumda silah sistemi, konuş durumu gibi konularda yapılacak reformlara asker karar verirken, askeri özerkliğin düşük olduğu durumda siviller ve askerler reform sürecini birlikte hazırlamakta ve savunma bakanlığı süreci yürütmektedir. Bir diğer alan ise askeri bütçedir ki bu alandaki askeri özerklik askeri harcamaların genel bütçedeki payına bakılarak belirlenmektedir. Askeri özerkliğin bir diğer boyutu silah üretimi ve alımıdır. Askeri özerkliğin yüksek olduğu durumlarda ordu, savunma sanayi ürünlerine yönelik kontrolü elinde tutmak isterken, diğer durumda savunma sanayi özelleştirilmiştir. Askeri özerkliğin yedinci boyutu savunma organizasyonudur. Milli savunma bakanlığını ordu kontrol ediyorsa askeri özerklik yüksekken, karşıt durumda düşüktür. Bir diğer boyut istihbarat bilgisinin nasıl toplandığı ile alakalıdır. Eğer ki asker kendi istihbaratına sahipse askeri özerklik yüksek, değilse düşüktür. Askeri özerkliğin bir diğer boyutu da ordunun iç güvenlikteki rolüyle ilgilidir. Askeri özerkliğin yüksek kabul edildiği durumda iç güvenlik meseleleri ordu tarafından belirlenirken, düşük askeri özerklik durumunda iç güvenlikle ilgili meselelerde kontrol sivillerin elindedir ve herhangi bir askeri müdahale ihtimali söz konusu değildir. Askeri özerkliğin son boyu ise insan haklarıdır. Eğer ki ordu kendi yargı sistemine sahipse askeri özerklik yüksek, değilse düşüktür (Pion-Berlin, 1992, ss.87-90).

Stepan askeri özerklik alanlarını çoğunlukla Pion-Berlin ile benzer şekilde açıklarken, ondan farklı olarak genel kurmay başkanının rolünü, meclisteki muvazzaf askerlerin varlığını, ordunun yasamadaki rolünü, savunma alanındaki sivil uzmanların varlığını ve ordunun devlet işletmelerindeki ve yargıdaki rolünü de askeri özerklik alanlarına dahil etmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, bu tez özelinde Stepan'ın en

büyük katkılarından biri demokratik bir sivil kontrol için askerin imtiyazlarının azaltılmasının gerekliliği yanında, askerin rızasının da bu süreçte önemli olduğunu öne sürmüş olmasıdır. Stepan'a göre, askeri imtiyazların en aza indirgenmesinin yanında askerin de buna rızasının olduğu bir durumda ancak demokratik sivil kontrol inşa edilebilir (1988, ss.98-99).

Serra ise demokratik sivil kontrolü geçiş (transition) ve sağlamlaştırma (consolidation) aşaması olarak ikiye ayırır ve bu iki adımın kapsadığı 6 seviyeden bahseder. Geçiş sürecinin ilk seviyesinde ordu, siyasi gücün denetimine sahiptir; ikinci aşamada ulusal temellerin koruyucusu olarak var olur ve geçişin son aşamasında hükümet politikaları ve reformları üzerinde kısıtlayıcı bir güce sahiptir. Demokrasinin sağlamlaştırılması aşamasında ise ilk önce ordu örgütsel ve operasyonel özerkliğini savunma güdüsüyle hareket etmektedir. Bu aşamada askerler, kendi inisiyatiflerinde olduğunu kabul ettikleri alanlara sivillerin müdahalelerini engellemeye çalışarak tepki göstermektedirler. Sağlamlaştırmanın daha sonraki aşamasında sivil üstünlüğün resmen ancak kısmen kabulü söz konusudur. Daha sonraki aşamada, ordu kendi örgütlenmesi hakkındaki konularda sivil denetime rıza göstermeye başlar ancak, ideolojik yapısının denetiminin sivillere geçmesine direnç gösterir. Bunu da mesleki profilini ve değerlerini savunarak ve askeri eğitim sistemini muhafaza etmeye çalışarak gerçekleşmektedir. Sağlamlaştırmanın son evresinde ise ordunun demokratik sivil denetimi sağlanır ancak bu asker ve sivil arasındaki gerilimin bittiği anlamına gelmez; ordunun hükümet politikalarını etkileme ve kurumsal çıkarlarını koruma girişimleri bu süreci şekillendirecektir (Serra, 2010, ss.44-45). Serra'nın sağlamlaştırmanın üçüncü aşaması olarak tanımladığı kısım, yani ordunun askeri eğitim sistemini kullanarak askeri ideolojiyi elinde tutuma çabası, demokratik sivil kontrolün inşasında askeri eğitim sistemine ve bununla şekillenen mesleki değerlere yaptığı vurgu sebebiyle bu tez için önemlidir.

TÜRKİYE'DE ORDUNUN SİYASİ ÖZERKLİĞİNİ BELİRLEYEN TEMEL UNSURLAR VE SİYASİ ÖZERKLİK BOYUTLARI

Türkiye'de ordunun siyasi özerkliğini belirleyen ve besleyen ilk unsur onun muhafızlık rolüdür. TSK'nın ideolojisini şekillendiren tarihsel olarak devraldığı miras, onun siyasi özerkliğini anlama noktasında bir başlangıçtır (Güney ve Karatekelioğlu, 2005, s.441). Türk ordusunun siyasi özerkliği Osmanlı'nın son dönemine kadar uzanır çünkü o dönemden itibaren ordu kendisini modernleşmenin öznesi olarak görmüş ve o şekilde hareket etmiştir (Laçiner, 2004, s.17). Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı takip eden dönemde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması ile birlikte ise ordu, Cumhuriyet değerlerinin ve spesifik olarak laikliğin koruyuculuğu rolünü üstlenmiştir (Burak, 2011, s.165). Ordunun siyasi özerkliğini besleyen bir diğer unsur ise Türkiye'deki güvenlik söylemidir. Ülkede yıllar boyunca "ordu bizi iç ve düş düşmanlardan korur" algısı hüküm sürmüştür ki bu durum ordunun sorgulanmamasına neden olmuştur (Narlı, 2009, s.61). Bunun yanı sıra, Türkiye'de yıllarca ülkenin jeopolitik konumu nedeniyle düşmanlar tarafından kuşatılmış olduğu algısı da işlenmiştir ve bu algı ordunun hep göz önünde popüler bir kurum olmasına neden olmuştur (Narlı, 2009, ss.63-64). Bu algılar sebebiyle TSK, ulusal güvenlikteki tehdit unsurlarını belirleyerek ve süreci yöneterek iç siyasette bir veto gücüne sahip olmuştur (Cizre ve Walker, 2010, s.93). Güvenlik konusundaki bu durum, iç güvenlik unsurlarına da yansımış; TSK Milli Güvenlik Savunma Belgesini ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler İç Hizmet Kanununun 35. maddesini kullanarak iç güvenlikte bir hayli söz hakkı kazanmıştır. 35. maddede ordunun görevi, ülkeyi ve cumhuriyeti korumak ve kollamak olarak belirlenmiştir ki bu geniş koruma ve kollama tanımı (Pion-Berlin, 2011, s.295) TSK'nın siyasete fazlaca müdahil olmasına neden olmuştur (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, s.161).

TSK'nın siyasi özerklik unsurları 35. madde, yine güvenlik sebebiyle ordunun iç siyasete müdahil olmasının önünü açan Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK), sivilleri de yargılayabilmesi sayesinde ordunun siyasete müdahale edebilmesine imkan sağlayan yüksek askeri mahkemeler ve son olarak belirli bir grubun orduyla ilişiğini kesmek adına kullanıldığı iddia edilen Yüksek Askeri Şura (YAŞ) kararları şeklinde sıralanabilir. 2000'lerin başından itibaren ordunun siyasi özerklik alanlarının

kısıtlanması adına çok sayıda yasal ve anayasal değişiklik yapılmıştır. En önemlilerinden biri 35. maddenin değiştirilmesidir. Bu maddede TSK'ya yüklenen devleti koruma ve kollama görevi yalnızca dışarıdan gelen tehditlere karşı ülkeyi savunma şeklinde değiştirilmiştir (Bardakçı, 2013, s.421). Bir diğer değişiklikle ise, MGK'nın sttaüsü tavsiye verici bir kurum olarak düzenlenmiş (Gönenç, 2004, s.107) ve MGK'da siviller sayıca üstünlük kazanmıştır (Bac, 2005, s.26). Askeri mahkemeler alanında yapılan düzenlemeyle de 2004 yılında Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri (DGM) kaldırılmış (Özbudun, 2007, s.186), AB 7. Uyum Paketi ile birlikte ise sivillerin askeri mahkemelerde yargılanmasının önüne geçilmiştir (Turkey Progress Report, 2003, s.20). Son olarak ise, 2010 yılındaki anayasa değişikliği ile terfi ve kadrosuzluk nedeniyle emekliye ayırma hariç, YAŞ'ta alınan kararlara yargı yolu açılmıştır.

TÜRKİYE'DE ORDUNUN KURUMSAL ÖZERKLİĞİNİ BELİRLEYEN TEMEL UNSURLAR VE KURUMSAL ÖZERKLİK BOYUTLARI

TSK'nın siyasi özerkliğini belirleyen unsurlar çoğunlukla kurumsal özerkliğini de beslemektedir çünkü örneğin, askeri eğitim ve sosyalizasyon süreci ordunun hamilik rolünü sürekli yeniden inşa etmektedir (Aydınlı, 2009, p.586). Bu anlamda kurumsal otonominin temelleri değerlendirilirken, yukarıda bahsedilen siyasi özerklik kaynaklarının askeri endoktrinasyon süreciyle şekillendiği unutulmamalıdır. Askeri endoktrinasyondan beslenen askeri kültür de kurumsal değerleri, kurum çıkarlarını ve davranışları belirleyen önemli unsurlardan bir tanesidir (Sarıgil, 2011, s.273). Askeri endoktrinasyonun ayrıca, askerlere kendilerini kurumlardan ve kişilerden profesyonel anlamda üstün gören bir vizyon aşıladığı da iddia edilmektedir (Aknur, 2013, s.145). Bunun yanı sıra bu sistem, askerlere bazı manevi değerler aracılığıyla dışarıdaki insanlardan yani sivillerden ne kadar farklı olduğunu anlatmaktadır (Birand, 1986, s.80). Tüm bunlar askerin kendi alanına giren konularda kendini yetkin görmesine ve sivillere karşı güvensizliğe neden olmaktadır.

TSK'nın ilk kurumsal özerklik alanı, YAŞ sürecindeki terfi ve atamalardaki hakimiyeti olmuştur. Genelkurmay başkanları genellikle kendinden sonra görevi devralacak isme karar vermiş, kuvvet komutanları da yine Genelkurmay başkanı tarafından belirlenmiştir. Genelkurmay başkanının başbakana bağlı olması ise, ordunun bir diğer kurumsal özerklik alanı olarak tanımlanabilir. Ancak 2016'daki bir değişiklik ile kuvvet komutanları Milli Savunma Bakanlığına (MSB) bağlanmış ve bu tarihten sonra da bu alanda birtakım değişiklikler yapılmıştır (Turkey Progress Report, 2016, s.13). TSK'nın son kurumsal özerklik alanı ise, harcama bütçesi ve bunun denetimidir. Askeri harcamalardaki ayrıcalık sebebiyle ordu, özerk bir sosyal sınıf olarak değerlendirilmiştir (Bayramoğlu, İnsel ve Laçiner, 2004, s.10). Bu alanda 2003, 2004 ve 2010 yıllarında yapılan değişikliklerle askeri harcamalarda şeffaflık sağlanmıştır.

ARAŞTIRMA BULGULARI VE TARTIŞMA

Araştırma bulguları temelinde, katılımcıların ağırlıklı olarak olumlu tutum sergilediği ve siyasi özerklik alanı içinde değerlendirilebilecek konular şunlar olmuştur: YAŞ kararlarına yargı yolunun açılması, MGK'da sivil üstünlüğün artması, üst rütbeli subayların siyasi konular hakkında açıklama yapmaması, askeri mahkemelerin yetkilerinin kısıtlanması ve 35. maddenin değişmesi. Subayların kurumsal özerklik çerçevesindeki değişiklikler anlamında çoğunlukla olumlu tutum sergilediği konular ise şunlardır: Askeri harcamaların Sayıştay denetimine tabi olması ve Genelkurmayın MSB'ye bağlanması. Subaylar ayrıca, sivillerden gelen her emrin hukuk çerçevesinde olduğu sürece yerine getirilmesi gerektiği yönünde ağırlıklı görüş bildirmiştir. Öte taraftan katılımcıların olumsuz tutum sergilediği konular ise şu şekilde sıralanabilir: Sivillere güven, Ergenekon sürecinde hem ordunun hem de sivillerin tutumu ve silahlı kuvvetlerin iç güvenlik organizasyonundan ve iç güvenlik tehdit unsurlarının belirlenmesi konusundan dışlanmaya çalışıldığı algısıdır. Ayrıca, katılımcıların hepsi ordunun kendi içinde alması gereken kararlar olduğunu belirtmiş; orduyu ilgilendiren teknik konuları ve atama ve terfi gibi ordunun iç işleyişiyle ilgili meseleleri buna örnek olarak vermiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, katılımcıların yarısından

fazlası yapılan değişikliklerin ordu tarafından henüz içselleştirilmediğini bunun için orduda kültürel bir değişim yaşanması gerektiğini ifade etmiştir. Burada belirtilmesi gereken bir diğer konu ise, askeri darbelerin geçmişte kaldığına yönelik inancın karşıt görüşe göre daha az desteklenmiş olmasıdır.

Subayların verdiği cevaplar gruplandığında, siyasi özerklik alanına giren konuların, kurumsal özerklik alanına giren unsurlara göre daha kolay kabul edildiği söylenebilir. Yani, subaylar arasında kurumsal özerkliği koruma anlamında daha yoğun bir algı söz konusudur. Bu durum, Pion-Berlin'in de ifade ettiği şekliyle "savunmacı özerklik"tir (defensive autonomy) çünkü ordular kendi profesyonel alanlarına girdiklerini düşündükleri konularda daha korumacı bir tutum sergilerler (1992, s.85). Bu tutumun arkasındaki sebep genel olarak askerlerdeki mesleki üstünlük algısıdır. Katılımcılar, kendi profesyonel alanlarına girdiğini düşündükleri konularda, sivillerin onların tavsiyelerini öncelikle dikkate almalarını beklemektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, subaylar askeri alanda yeterince sivil uzman olmadığına inanmaktadır ki bu da kurumsal özerkliğe yönelik korumacı tutumlarının bir diğer sebebidir. Bu algıyı besleyen bir diğer unsur ise, askeri endoktrinasyon sistemidir çünkü bu yapı askeri eğitim sistemi ve sosyalizasyon süreci ile beraber askeri değerleri yeniden şekillendiren ve bir arada tutan bir yapıdır. Bu çalışma özelinde askeri endoktrinasyonun subayların bakış açısına etkilerini anlamaya yönelik yöneltilen sorular da değerlendirildiğinde, sivillere güvensizlik, TSK'nın kurumların ve siyasetin üzerinde olduğu inancının TSK'da hala mevcut olduğuna yönelik algı ve sivillerin karışmamasını ve ordunun kendi içinde karar almasını gerektiren alanlar olduğuna yönelik algı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu da askeri eğitim ve sosyalizasyon sürecinin hala özerkliği besleyen unsurlara sahip olduğunu göstermektedir.

Çalışmanın bir diğer önemli bulgusuna göre, subayların büyük bir kısmı Türkiye'de son dönemde sivil-asker ilişkileri anlamında bir değişim yaşandığını ancak bunun TSK'yı sindirmeye yönelik bir hareket olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bazı katılımcılar, bunu ordunun geçmişte yaptığı uygulamaların bir sonucu olarak değerlendirirken, birkaçı ordudan intikam alındığını belirtmiştir. Son dönemdeki değişikliği sivil kontrolün artması olarak değerlendiren az sayıdaki katılımcının görüşü de dikkate alındığında, yaşanan değişikliğin sebepleri olarak katılımcılar şunları belirtmiştir: AB

uyum süreciyle birlikte yapılan reformlar, siyasi istikrar, Ergenekon yargılamalarıyla TSK'nın ve askerlerin korkutulması ve sindirilmesi ve son olarak da bu süreçle birlikte TSK'ya yönelik toplumda azalan güven.

Bu bulgular, tezin hipotezi ile birlikte düşünüldüğünde subayların demokratik sivil kontrolü içselleştirmesinin önündeki engelleri anlamak adına önemlidir. Bu kısıtlayıcı faktörlerden ilki, ordunun iç/dış güvenlik ve siyasi alanla ilgili geleneksel ikilemlerinin hala devam ediyor olmasıdır. Araştırmada katılımcıların bir kısmı, AB sürecine olumlu baksa da bu süreçle birlikte gelen reformların Türkiye'ye uyarlanarak alınması gerektiğini çünkü Türkiye'nin iç ve dış güvenlik anlamında tehdit unsurlarının Avrupa ülkelerine nazaran fazla olduğunu belirtmiştir. Bu anlamda, tehdit unsurları ya da tehdit unsurlarının fazla olduğuna yönelik algı ne kadar yüksekse, askerlerin bunları bir kenara bırakıp reform sürecinin içselleştirilmesine odaklanması da o kadar zor olacaktır.

Demokratik sivil kontrolün subaylar arasında içselleştirilmesini kısıtlayan bir diğer sebep ise, ülkede sivil kontrolün hala bir gelenek halini almamış olmasıdır. Bunun gerçekleşmesi için idealde siyasi istikrarın varlığı en önemli unsurlardan bir tanesidir. Ancak bu çalışma özelindeki bulgular incelendiğinde iddia edilebilir ki ülkedeki siyasi istikrar subayların sivil kontrolü benimsemesini zorlaştırmıştır çünkü subaylar siyasi istikrarı otoriterleşen bir hükümet yapısıyla eş değer algılamaktadır. Subaylara göre, iktidar partisi AKP, siyasi istikrarı orduyu kontrol etmek için bir araca dönüştürmüştür. Dolayısıyla, literatürde demokratik sivil kontrolün sağlamlaşması adına bir gereklilik olarak işlenen unsur, tam tersi bir etki yaratmaktadır. Sivil kontrolün bir gelenek halini alması için söz konusu olabilecek bir diğer boyut ise TSK'da demokratik normlara daha fazla değer veren ve değişime daha açık şeklinde katılımcılar tarafından tanımlanan yeni nesil düşük rütbeli subaylardır. Bu unsurun kısıtlayıcı bir faktör olmasının sebebi ise, bu genç subayların henüz kurum kültürüne etki edecek ve onu değiştirecek seviyede üst rütbelere gelememiş olmalarıdır. Bu genç subayların yüksek rütbelere gelmesi sonucu belirtilen normları kurum kültürüne dahil edebilmeleriyle bağlantılı olarak sivil kontrol bir gelenek halini alabilecektir.

Subaylar arasında sivil üstünlüğü kavramının sağlamlaşmamasının bir diğer sebebi ise, subayların ülkede topyekun bir demokratikleşme hareketi yürütülmediği yönündeki inançlarıdır. Katılımcıların büyük bir kısmı, ülkede demokrasiden, adaletten ve hukuktan bahsetmenin oldukça zor olduğu yönünde fikir beyan etmiştir. Ülkenin tüm alanlarına ve kurumlarına sirayet eden bir demokrasi ve reform hareketi olmadığını düşündükleri için de bunun yalnızca TSK'yı sindirmeye yönelik bir girişim olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Bu da reform sürecinin içselleştirilmesini zorlaştırmıştır. Sivil üstünlük kavramının subaylar arasında içselleştirilmesini engelleyen son unsur ise askeri eğitim sistemi ve sosyalizasyon sürecidir. Bu yapıların, hala askeri özerkliği besleyen unsurlar taşıması söz konusudur ki bu da subaylar arasında bir algı değişikliğinin ya da bakış açısı değişikliğinin önünü tıkamaktadır.

Tüm bu bulgular değerlendirildiğinde varılabilecek en önemli sonuçlardan bir tanesi, subayların son dönemde sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında yaşanan değişimi TSK'nın sindirilmesi ve bunun bir parti kontrolü olduğu şeklindeki değerlendirmelerinin, Huntington'ın öznel sivil kontrol terimiyle örtüşüyor olmasıdır. Subayların görüşleri, özellikle Ergenekon gibi süreçlerle orduya demokratik olmayan bir yöntemle müdahale edildiği ve bu durumun belirli bir grubun gücünü maksimize etme çabası olduğu teziyle beraber Huntighton'ın nesnel sivil kontrol terimi ile eşleşmektedir. Bununla bağlantılı olarak varılabilecek bir diğer sonuca göre, 2000'lerin başında bu alanda yapılan çalışmalar çoğunlukla AB sürecinin etkisiyle, yapılan reformları ve değişiklikleri demokratikleşme adımları olarak tanımlama eğilimdedir. Ancak hem literatürde var olan AKP'nin özellikle 3. döneminden itibaren otoriterleşmeye başladığı yönündeki tezler (Somer, 2016, s.1) hem de bu çalışmanın bulguları ortaya koymaktadır ki sivil kontrolü tartışırken hatta bu terimi kullanırken dahi oldukça dikkatli olunmalıdır çünkü sivil kontrol hem demokratik hem de otoriter olabilir. Subayların algısına göre, Türkiye'de inşa edilen sivil kontrol otoriter kalıplardadır ve bu şekilde algılanan bir sivil kontrolün içselleştirilmesi de oldukça zordur. Bu da ortaya koymaktadır ki demokratik bir sivil-asker ilişkiselliğinde hem siviller hem de ordu önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu sebeple, askerlerin sivil kontrolü içselleştirmemiş olmasının tek sorumlusu askerler değildir; sivillerin bundaki rolünü de yadsımamak gerekmektedir. Sonuç olarak, çalışma bulguları göstermiştir ki

Türkiye'de sivil-asker ilişkileri basitçe ve yalnızca sivil kontrolün maksimize edilmesi anlamına gelmemektedir. Asıl mesele, askerlerin de içselleştirdiği demokratik bir sivil kontrol sağlamaktır. Bunda da yasal ve anayasal değişimler tek başına yeterli değildir; ordu da yaşanacak bir kültürel değişime de ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.

APPENDIX D: THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICERS' VIEWS ABOUT THE CIVILIANIZATION REFORM PROCESS IN TURKEY (1999-2016)

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ■   **Doktora** / PhD ☐

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.   ■

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