

“THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH PUBLIC WORKFARE PROGRAMME AS A
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE TOOL FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE”

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THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH PUBLIC WORKFARE PROGRAMME AS A
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ABSTRACT

THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH PUBLIC WORKFARE PROGRAMME AS A SOCIAL ASSISTANCE TOOL FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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This thesis examines the design and implementation features of Public Work Programmes (PWP) that are used as tools to generate employment through labor-intensive projects and mitigate economic and social difficulties. Along the thesis two main objectives of PWP, namely, tackling structural unemployment and poverty alleviation, are particularly highlighted and discussed. Through the selected country examples (Argentina, India, South Korea and South Africa), from a comparative perspective, main features and objectives are examined. In accordance with the international country examples and the literature review possible issues and the measures to be taken for improving the effectiveness of PWP are discussed.

In this thesis, Turkish Public Work Programme is examined in terms of its implementation and effectiveness. Through the administrative records and legislative framework, this study aims to reveal the main implementation process in Turkey. In addition to these, a field study has been conducted with the implementers from İŞKUR and PWP'S contractors with the aim to assess the Turkish Public Work Programme and to identify the main characteristics and challenges in the implementation process. Finally, recommendations have been proposed on the basis of the findings of the field study in order to increase the effectiveness of Turkish Public Work Programmes particularly in reaching out to the vulnerable groups.

Keywords: Public Work Programme, labour-intensive projects, structural unemployment, poverty alleviation.

ÖZ

SOSYAL YARDIM ARACI OLARAK TÜRKİYE'DEKİ TOPLUM YARARINA PROGRAMLARIN KARŞILATIRMALI PERSPEKTİF ÜZERİNDEN ANALİZİ

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Bu tezde Toplum Yararına Programların genel uygulama ve düzenlemeleri incelenmiştir. Programlar temel olarak emek yoğun projeler yoluyla istihdamı artırmak böylelikle ekonomik ve sosyal zorlukları azaltmak amacıyla uygulanmaktadır. Tez boyunca, Toplum Yararına Programların iki ana amacı olan yapısal işsizlik mücadele ve yoksulluğu azaltma konuları detaylıca belirtilmiş ve tartışılmıştır. Seçilmiş ülke örnekleri (Arjantin, Hindistan, Güney Kore ve Güney Afrika) yoluyla karşılatırmalı bir yaklaşım genel özellik ve amaçları incelenmiştir. Ülke uygulamalarının yanı sıra literatür taraması yoluyla da Toplum Yararına Programların muhtemel sorunları ve etkinliğini artırmak amacıyla alınan önlemler ortaya konulmaya çalışıldı.

Tezde ayrıca Türkiye uygulanan Toplum Yararına Programlar da uygulama ve etkinlik bağlamında incelenmiştir. İdari kayıtlar ve yasal mevzuat çerçevesinde Türkiye'deki uygulama süreçleri ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, İŞKUR ve yüklenici kurum uygulayıcıları ile bir alan araştırması yapılmıştır. Alan araştırması yoluyla Türkiye'deki Toplum Yararına Programların genel değerlendirmesi yapılmış ve uygulamadaki işleyişine ilişkin konular ortaya konulmuştur. Alan araştırmasında ortaya çıkan bulgular sınıflandırılmış olup buna uygun olarak, Türkiye'deki başta kırılgan grupların programa katılması olmak üzere

Toplum Yararına Programların etkinliđinin artırılması amacıyla bazı önerilerde bulunulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplum Yararına Programlar, emek-yođun projeler, yapısal işsizlik, yoksulluđun azaltılması.

To my Daughter...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Context and Background.....	1
1.2. Research Question and Objectives	5
1.3. Methodology.....	6
1.4. Limitations of the Study.....	8
1.5. Overview of the Thesis	9
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE.....	11
2.1. The ‘Workfare’/ Activation Focus	12
2.2. Main Features of PWPs	15
2.3. PWP Objectives and Implementation Areas	16
2.4. PWP Categories	17
2.5. Scope of PWPs.....	18
2.6. Targeting, Self-Selection & Eligibility Requirements.....	22
2.7. Method of Wage Payment.....	25
2.8. The Gender Dimension of PWPs	27
2.9. Monitoring and Evaluation.....	31
2.10. International Examples and Comparison Samples	34
2.10.1. India	35
2.10.2. Argentina	38
2.10.3. South Korea	40

2.10.4.	South Africa	41
2.11.	Implication for Turkey.....	43
3.	THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TURKISH PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMME	45
3.1.	Introduction	45
3.2.	A General Overview of Turkish PWP Projects	46
3.3.	Eligibility Rules for Participants.....	47
3.4.	Legislative Framework	48
3.5.	Features and Status of Public Work Programmes in Turkey	50
3.6.	Wage Level, Mode of Wage Payment and Vested Benefits	52
3.7.	Right to Leave	54
3.8.	The Link Between the Social Assistance System and the Public Works Programme	55
3.9.	Selection Methods	56
3.10.	Targeting Mechanism.....	60
3.11.	Scopes of PWP Projects in Turkey	68
3.11.1.	Environmental Cleaning.....	71
3.11.2.	Renewing Public Infrastructure.....	72
3.11.3.	Environmental Cleaning in Schools.....	73
3.11.4.	Maintenance, Restoration and Cleaning of Schools	73
3.11.5.	Restoration and Preservation of Historical and Cultural Heritage:	74
3.11.6.	Afforestation	75
3.11.7.	Park Landscaping	75
3.11.8.	Valley and Stream Improvement.....	75
3.11.9.	Work to Prevent Soil Erosion (Soil Conservation).....	76
3.11.10.	Cleaning Mosques and Quran Courses	76
3.12.	Comparison and Evaluation of Turkish PWP Scopes	76
3.13.	Monitoring and Evaluation.....	78
3.13.1.	Monitoring	78
3.13.2.	Evaluation.....	79
4.	UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMME; A FIELD STUDY IN TURKEY	82
4.1.	Definition / Objectives of PWP Projects	86

4.2.	Assessment of the Legislative Framework	92
4.3.	Selection Method	96
4.4.	Targeting Mechanism	99
4.5.	Assessment of Contractors	107
4.6.	Programme Scopes	113
4.7.	Impacts on Participants' Employment Status	116
4.8.	Conclusion.....	122
5.	CONCLUSION	125
5.1.	Findings of Field Study.....	127
5.1.1.	Excessive Demand	127
5.1.2.	Targeting Mechanism and Institutional Coordination.....	128
5.1.3.	Assessment of the Legislative Framework	130
5.1.4.	Duration and Re-participation.....	130
5.1.5.	Timing	131
5.1.6.	Right to Leave	131
5.1.7.	Monitoring and Evaluation	131
5.2.	Recommendations	136
5.2.1.	Wage Rate and Benefits	136
5.2.2.	Selection Methods and Eligibility Criteria	136
5.2.3.	Institutional Coordination.....	137
5.2.4.	Changes in Legislation of PWPs	137
5.2.5.	Monitoring and Evaluation	138
APPENDICES		
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 1 / SORU FORMU 1		147
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 2 / SORU FORMU 2		149
APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE 3 / SORU FORMU 3		151
APPENDIX D: TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY		153
APPENDIX E: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM		163

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Scope of PWPs	20
Table 2. Rates of Selection Methods	60
Table 3. The Number of Participants of Public Work Programme	64
Table 4. Rate of Participants Based on Age and Year	65
Table 5. Rate of Participants Based on Regions and Gender.....	66
Table 6. Number and Rate of Participants Based on Priority Groups	67
Table 7. PWP Participants According to PWP Scope.....	77
Table 8. Summary of Interviewees	84
Table 9. Cross Country Comparison.....	133

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EGS	Employment Guarantee Schemes
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
ILO	International Labour Organization
İŞKUR	Turkish Public Employment Agency
JVC	Job and Vocational Counsellors
MGNREGA	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
PWP	Public Work Programme
SGK	Social Security Institution
World Bank	WB

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Context and Background

A basic definition of a Public Work Programme (PWP) is as a programme that provides income support in return for work. Although PWPs provide income support, they also focus on generating employment through labour-intensive infrastructure projects or social services. There are many examples of PWP implementation around the world that fit this definition, as well as in Turkey. While PWP projects in Turkey have many similarities with those in other countries, they also have their own distinctive features.

PWPs have a long history, going back to the pharaohs of Egypt, and even England's 18th-century Poor Employment Act, aiming to hire surplus labour to build canals and roads, and to drain marshes, which can be considered as examples of early and rudimentary PWPs. Another historical example of PWP implementation is from Germany, where a PWP was used to support post-war construction between 1946 and 1948. In the United States during the 1930s, the New Deal Programme was applied in the construction of large-scale public works such as bridges, hospitals and schools, and this too might be cited as another historical example of PWPs (Ninno, et al. 2009). Nonetheless, the majority of countries around the world have conducted PWPs for different reasons and at different levels of development (middle or low income) since late 1960s.

PWPs have become increasingly popular throughout the world since 1970s. There are several reasons behind this popularity. Firstly, PWPs are relatively straightforward to implement as a policy tool in workfare systems where individuals must comply with various conditions in order to receive benefits. PWP activities are suited to the concept of tying benefit provision to work that is of benefit to the public (Kalman 2015). Another reason for the popularity of PWPs is that through this instrument, governments are able to provide employment and income support to the poor while at the same time generating and

rehabilitating infrastructure which reduces poverty and enhances economic activities (Gehrke 2015).

In addition to these, rapid and massive implementation possibilities in response to sudden shocks or natural disasters add a “quick response” feature to PWPs. Contrary to the many Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs), PWPs are suited for a quick response to temporary economic shocks or unexpected natural disasters shortly after they occur (Betcherman & Islam, 2001).

A country’s income level plays a significant role in terms of the design and implementation of PWPs. For instance, PWPs operate as an active labour market intervention only in upper-middle- and high-income countries. Moreover, high- and middle-income countries implement PWPs mostly in response to macroeconomic shocks where unemployment suddenly increases. On the other hand, many low-income countries implement PWPs extensively over long periods, in cases of periodic weather shocks and seasonal economic contractions that affect well-being and labour demand (Subbaro et al., 2012).

Another important aspect of PWPs is the improvement of the status of vulnerable populations, including women, by providing income support. Many PWPs explicitly target women, persons with disabilities, the elderly or the long-term unemployed. Particularly increasing women’s participation in PWPs substantially improves child welfare and women’s health and status.

There have been many elaborative studies that analyse PWPs in detail in other countries. The World Bank (WB) has a particular focus on this issue. It published a comprehensive book entitled “Public Works as a Safety Net: Design, Evidence and Implementation” (2012). Besides the WB’s study, several specialists and senior economists have also conducted specific studies on PWPs. Kalanidhi Subbarao and Carlo del Ninno (2010 & 2012) have written cornerstone articles on PWPs. Furthermore, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has published guidelines for PWPs. Anna McCord is also an eminent expert who has conducted numerous studies in a range of areas.

Although PWPs are used as a tool to generate employment and mitigate economic and social difficulties, there are crucial points in designing PWPs that affect their efficiency. The selection method and determining the scope are two major factors in efficiency. It is very

important to select the most needy in order to mitigate poverty, and determining the scope of work to be carried out is essential in establishing the implementation structure. Beside the targeting mechanism, scopes of PWPs, ensuring transparency and accountability of PWPs is crucial. PWPs require strong checks and balances in order to eliminate possible errors, fraud and corruption.

The scope of PWPs has also diversified over time. Initially, they mostly covered infrastructure-related activities. However, over time, in order to maximize beneficial impacts of PWPs, numerous scopes have been included in their implementation, such as technology-related activities (ILO Report, 2011).

PWP projects have been implemented in Turkey since 2007. While in the first two years the number of participants was negligible, by 2009, the numbers had noticeably increased. Turkish PWP projects became widespread after the macroeconomic crisis in 2008. The unemployment rate increased sharply in 2008 due to the global economic crisis and PWP projects became prevalent as a response to negative impacts of economic fluctuations in the Turkish labour market.

Initially, the name of the Turkish PWP was “Work Programme for the Benefit of Society (*Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programı*)”. However, currently the name of the PWP is “Programme for the Benefit of Society (*Toplum Yararına Programı*)”. In contrast to the international examples, Turkish authorities refrain from using the word “work” due to various concerns, such as the misconception of participants that PWP projects constitute regular, long-term employment.

Apart from discussions of perception, Turkish PWP projects were originally implemented for a period of up to three months. However, as the PWP wage rate is equal to actual minimum wage level, demand to participate in PWP projects increased dramatically over time. In response to increased demand, policy makers developed a targeting mechanism to include women, men over the age of 35 and persons with disabilities as priority groups within the scope of the PWP projects. According to this targeting mechanism, if there are sufficient numbers of applicants whose statuses are within priority groups, then all the participants must be selected from among those priority groups. Since 2013, the prioritization of a particular

group of people has been a rule, and as a result of the implementation of the targeting mechanism, the number of women participating in these programmes has increased constantly. While implementing PWP projects and in addition to the targeting mechanism, in order to reach vulnerable groups, subsidiary rules were brought into the regulation in the form of address and income controls. The first rule aims to restrict family participation. Accordingly, only one person who resides at the same address can participate in PWP projects. The second rule concentrates on the income level of the household. Although the control relies on statements from participants, it is important to establish a rule to specify the income level stipulation. By setting down the rules, policy makers tried to reach more in-need households and disseminate the income support feature of PWP projects. According to the rule, applicants whose household income is three times higher than the current minimum wage are not allowed to participate. These rules are also preventive measures to decrease political pressures in rural areas and reduce misuse of PWP projects, as well as to exclude the non-poor from participating in PWP projects.

Although there are many criticisms of Turkish PWP implementation, particularly regarding selection of participants and determining contractors, there have been some favourable developments in terms of monitoring and evaluation. In 2014, an evaluation study was conducted by Meltem Dayıođlu and her study highlights the impacts of PWP projects on the employment status of participants, as well as income level and working hours which are explained in detail in the third chapter. However, decision makers have not taken her recommendations into consideration, particularly those on geographic targeting where PWP implementation causes different impacts in different regions. There is no action or initiative to activate a geographic targeting mechanism. Although some measures have been taken in terms of the monitoring phase, the fact that neither İŞKUR authorities nor the contractors take these measures particularly serious, and because they have different approaches, the impact of those measures in implementation is limited.

Through country examples and a critical assessment of their implementation in Turkey, this thesis aims to evaluate the selection method and scopes of PWP projects, and also tries to understand the possible impacts of PWP projects on participants. Thereafter, these evaluations will also identify outputs and design policy implications in order to improve the effectiveness of PWP projects. In order to address this question, the study identifies the features of a proper PWP in the second chapter, and makes a comparison in terms of countries at different income

levels and circumstances in detail. Furthermore, the study highlights both the general outline and specific conditions of Turkish PWP projects with the help of statistics and institutional records as much as possible. In addition, a field study was conducted through in-depth interviews with decision makers, PWP implementers, and practitioners on the contractor side in order to find out whether PWP projects function properly, and to identify how PWP projects affect the profiles of participants in terms of their employment status after participating in a PWP.

Nevertheless, a well-designed PWP is essential for the success of programme. Selection methods, targeting mechanisms and scope of programme are the main factors in designing a PWP. Therefore, in this thesis both the international and Turkish cases are examined in terms of the given context and their functionality and effectiveness are analysed. This thesis aims to contribute international literature by examining the detailed implementation process in Turkey as well as determining the most effective measures that would facilitate vulnerable groups in Turkey being reached effectively.

1.2. Research Question and Objectives

The overall objective of this study is to assess the general practice of Public Work Programmes (PWP) from a comparative perspective. Through a comparative analysis, this study aims to examine PWP projects in Turkey in terms of revealing the main implementation process of PWP projects in Turkey, their effectiveness in terms of asset creation and assess the PWP projects impact on participants' employment status as well as effectiveness in reaching vulnerable groups. In line with these objectives, in this study, both international and Turkish cases will be examined in detail.

PWP projects have been implemented in Turkey for more than 10 years. In contrast to the international examples, there are limited numbers of elaborative studies that analyse their results based on administrative records, though there are small-scale scientific studies on the impact analysis of PWP projects. Furthermore, there is a lack of research that compares the Turkish Public Works Programme with cases in other countries, and this impedes understanding of the implementation process in Turkey. Considering these points, it is crucial to take all significant aspects of Turkish PWP projects into consideration in order to identify an adequate implementation mechanism for the Turkish case. In addition, this study will

consider the effectiveness of PWP projects in terms of reaching their beneficiaries, that is, the vulnerable groups in society.

For these reasons, the research question of this study is as follows: *From a comparative perspective, what are the critical features of the Public Work Programme (PWP) projects in Turkey that help to generate decent employment, and what measures may provide better quality PWP projects, particularly for the most vulnerable groups in the labour market?.* In line with the research question, this study aims to compare the Turkish case with other countries in order to identify the current situation of PWP in Turkey, and to discuss employment rights such as sick pay and maternity leave. Moreover, through the institutional data the demographic feature of PWPs is examined with the changes in implementation rules such as in targeting mechanism. Particularly, the data is analysed in terms of the implications on women participation as well as regional differences. Ultimately, the field study conducted as part of this study aims to understand what kind of measures should be taken in order to improve the participation of vulnerable groups in PWP projects.

1.3. Methodology

Turkish PWP projects have become prevalent and extensive in less than ten years. The enlargement and development of Turkish PWP projects was observed explicitly in first handed by author of this thesis within the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR). The large amount of expenditure on Turkish PWP projects from the unemployment insurance fund was an important indicator in choosing to examine PWP projects in Turkey as a subject for this thesis. In this regard, increasing the effectiveness of the Public Works Programme in terms of providing better quality PWP projects and reaching the most vulnerable groups were the foremost motives in conducting a study in this subject. This study used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to promote the validity of findings and provide a full picture in terms of PWP implementation in Turkey. In many cases, while discussing and explaining the main features, functioning and implications of Turkish PWP projects, making personal remarks or comment was particularly avoided. All comments rely on either international literature, institutional records or views collected through interviews.

A comparative outlook was adopted in order to ensure the objectivity. A review of existing literature was conducted in order to identify the historical development, main features and

implementation of PWP in different country contexts. In addition, in order to have a full grasp of the case of Turkey, institutional records and documents, policy reviews, reports, legislations and other relevant material were reviewed.

Although several studies conducted in other country contexts reveal the main objectives, implementation areas and general characteristic of PWPs, there are many differences in Turkish PWP projects. Moreover, even if the institutional records and documents provide insight into the main features of the PWP projects in Turkey, there is still a necessity to conduct a field study to reveal the peculiarities of the functioning and implementation of PWPs, as well as the measures adopted in terms of reaching the most vulnerable groups. It is not possible to identify the gaps between the legislation and practice by looking only at previous studies and institutional data. Although, they provide insight to the general implementation process it is not possible to make a certain assessment about Turkish PWP project without conducting a field study with the implementers who substantially involved in the implementation process of PWP projects in Turkey.

Therefore, in this thesis, a field study was conducted with the authorities from General and Provincial Directorates of İŞKUR, as well as contractors in the form of in-depth interviews with key informants responsible for the implementation of PWPs in order to complement the literature review and institutional records. Field study mainly focuses on the efficiency of PWP projects in Turkey. The first consideration is whether PWP projects in Turkey are implemented in parallel with the actual written aims of regulations. According to the Active Labour Market Services Regulations, the aim of PWP projects is to bring in the unemployed, particularly those who have difficulties in finding employment. To this end and through the regulation, the İŞKUR specified target groups which include women, persons with disabilities and older workers. One of the focal points of the in-depth interviews conducted was to evaluate the degree of consistency of implementation, comparing this with the written aims of regulation. The questions in the interviews aimed to identify if there is any deviation between practice and regulations, as well as to find solutions to increase the efficiency of PWP projects. In addition, the study aims to gather personal opinions of the interviewees on the scopes of PWP projects in terms of both efficiency and functionality. Another expected outcome is an evaluation of the contractors in terms of their asset creation, and identifying whether PWP participants replace actual long-term employees or not.

The field study was conducted in Ankara in May 2019, with 10 respondents. The participants were selected from three different institutional positions. Three of the interviewees were staff at the General Directorate of İŞKUR who are in charge of the central regulation and coordination of PWP projects. Four of the interviewees were selected from İŞKUR provincial directorates. Both these sets of interviewees actively participate in implementation of the entire process. They directly implemented programmes, including from selection to monitoring phases. The last group consisted of contractors. The persons in this group are external implementers of PWP projects who predominately decide the scopes of PWP projects and are the ones who put them into action.

Because all provinces have a similar implementation processes in terms of selection methods, and determining the scope of work and contractors, Ankara is a sufficient representative on which to focus in-depth interviews. Field study conducted face-to-face at the interviewees' offices. The interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes.

1.4. Limitations of the Study

This study has limitations in terms of both its scope and focus, geographically as well as quantitatively. During the field study, interviews have been conducted with the implementers from İŞKUR and contractors side instead of participants. Although the field study focused on the administrative and institutional issues it also aimed to assess the impact of PWP in terms of participants' employment status. Due to the difficulties to reach the beneficiaries of PWPs through İŞKUR and Social Security Institution records, and to have a full picture on the basis of the accounts of a limited number of participants, the focus of field study remain limited with implementers' own opinions.

In addition, there had been a geographic limitation in that the field study was conducted only in Ankara. Considering that the geographic regions have a significant impact in PWP implementation in terms of participant decisions it is important to conduct the field study in different regions, but due to the difficulty of contacting other regions' implementers and time limitations within the thesis, this study had to limit its focus to Ankara. However, in order to partially overcome the geographic limitation, implementers from the contractor side were selected from different regions within Ankara.

Another limitation of this thesis is the number of respondents from the contractors. There are more than 30 contractors that are currently implementing PWP projects in Ankara region but only three institutions' officials were involved in interview. Because the authorized person from İŞKUR side did not provide the communication informations of more contractors this study had to limit its focus with three interviews with the contractors.

1.5. Overview of the Thesis

The following discussion is divided into four main chapters: Conceptual Framework; Design and Implementation Methods in International Literature The Design and Implementation of Turkish Public Work Programme, Understanding the Nature of Public Work Programme; A Field Study in Turkey and Conclusion.

Objectives, Design Feature, Implementation and Rationale of Public Work Programmes chapter aims to clarify and explain the main structure of PWP projects through existing major studies on the issue, comparing and contrasting the prevalent implementation examples from several countries. This chapter also explores the scope of PWPs implemented throughout the world. Moreover, a section specifically focuses on the gender dimension. This chapter also reveals the general framework of monitoring and evaluation features of PWPs.

Four countries are examined, in the second chapter, in detail: India, Argentina, South Korea and South Africa. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is the largest PWP in the world. Besides its scale, it is also significant because of its right-based approach, in that it universally guarantees 100 days of employment for anyone who demands it (Imai, 2006). The India, Argentina and South Korea cases have been chosen as examples due to their similar development contexts to Turkey's. In addition, these countries implemented PWPs just after extensive macroeconomic crises at various times, which is another important similarity to Turkey. The last country examined here is South Africa, which has long-standing implementation experience dating to 1994, and where PWPs are used as a remedy for long-term structural unemployment (Devereux & Solomon, 2006). In addition, it has good practices in terms of increasing women's participation in the labour market through PWP implementation.

The Design and Implementation of Turkish Public Work Programme chapter focuses on the Turkish experience of PWP projects, and includes developments and restrictions occurring in the last 10 years. The scope of the PWPs implemented in Turkey is taken into consideration with similarities and differences with the cases of other countries. In this chapter, a thorough analysis of the targeting mechanism as well as its outcomes and effects is conducted. A detailed explanation of evaluation studies, as well as changes in the monitoring phase are explained in detail as well.

Understanding the Nature of Public Work Programme; A Field Study in Turkey chapter examines the current situation by interviewing various representative subjects. The study conducted with ten respondents who are implementers from different institutional sides. The sections of this chapter classified according to interviewees responses which are Excessive Demand, Targeting Mechanism and Institutional Coordination, Assessment of Legislative Framework, Duration and Re-participation, Timing, Right to Leave and Monitoring and Evaluation.

Finally, the Conclusion chapter discusses the main findings emerging from the field study, as well as recommendations to improve the implementation of PWP projects. An overall assessment is provided in the conclusion chapter. The main findings gathered from the field study are discussed and recommendation are provided in order to improve possible beneficial impacts of PWPs on participants primarily, and to all parties more widely.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE

Many programmes and policies are used widely by governments throughout the world in order to tackle unemployment issues. Each programme and policy has different aims, target groups and implementation methods. One of these, and the subject of this thesis, is Public Work Programmes (PWPs). PWPs are used to remedy unemployment and often to achieve poverty alleviation. This chapter will attempt to scrutinize the origins, backgrounds, general structures as well as country implementation examples of PWPs in order to understand the rationale behind why and for whom governments need to use such programmes. It will also reveal the differences in use of programmes across countries with different levels of income.

PWPs have a wide range of implementation areas over extended periods of time. As such, there are good and bad examples of implementation. The administrative capacities of countries and the situations that they confront are highly relevant in PWP design and implementation. This chapter will specify different reasons for usage and categorise countries, and will also look into the scope chosen when implementing PWPs. Furthermore, it will examine the selection method of participation, which is one of the most important factors of a PWP in terms of its success. A sub-section in this chapter will also examine different methods of wage payment depending on the development level of a country. Yet another focus point of this chapter will be the gender dimension in terms of its effect on increasing women's labour participation. The end of this chapter will concentrate on the monitoring and evaluation of PWPs, identifying shortcomings in programmes and offers measures to improve the benefits of programmes.

2.1. The ‘Workfare’/ Activation Focus

The industrial revolution heralded tremendous transitions in western society, with expansion of economic competition, a shift from country life to urbanization, industrial growth, population growth as a result of declining mortality, and the abolition of restriction on marriages. The number of dislocated workers, who often had no residence anywhere and who were seeking paid work, grew rapidly (Kaufmann, 2013). These obvious changes in living conditions can be dated roughly to the beginning of 19th century. From then onwards, unemployment rates rose steadily and due to the adverse effect of these economic and social changes, new protective measures were implemented through state policies.

In the late 1960s, a work-related social policy approach started to use the term “workfare”, combining the words “work” and “welfare”. Mainly, workfare arose due to the concern that welfare entitlements erode the employment habits, job skills and work ethic of the poor. Workfare policies insist on job search and placement for welfare recipients and these policies became more widespread during the 1980s (Peck, 2003).

Workfare originated in the United States and become popular in Europe, but European policy makers use the term “activation” instead of workfare. Both are supply-side oriented and both target people on social assistance more than those on unemployed benefits. Activation benefits are conditional on taking part in work, and relies on the use of sanctions (Lodemel, 2012).

Workfare policies have a diversity feature that incorporate many activities, such as offering training and work support to the unemployed. However, it also attaches conditions to income benefits, for instance requiring individuals to engage in job-seeking tasks/responsibilities, accepting any job offered to them, or engaging in unpaid work. These requirements revise the terms of unemployed income benefits that were previously based primarily on need and legal rights. Workfare policies in the United State were a part of a legislative revision of welfare law. One of the initial approaches to the income support was “no work, no welfare” and gave a five-year lifetime limit on welfare benefits for families of non-workers. These regulatory features combined with welfare to work programmes and offers of in-work support, such as childcare and transportation. Under the European Employment Strategy, European workfare programmes also aimed to reduce benefits for the unemployed, but reductions in social assistance have tended to occur less directly compared to United State (Brodkin, 2013).

According to workfare policies in the case of unemployment, state protection is granted as a last resort rather than as a universal characteristic. Beneficiaries were expected to alter their behaviour in order to promote their own employability and responsibility. Along these lines, according to the workfare approach, unemployment is not caused by a lack of demand, but by the individual characteristics of the economically inactive, thus recipients need to be compelled to work or participate in community or training schemes in return for their benefits (Daguerre, 2010).

There are several work-related activities that may feature within workfare programmes. This might include the requirement to engage in unpaid work experience as a condition of receiving social assistance, under the name “work for benefits”. Activity can also be in the form of subsidized employment, where participants are paid directly by the employer or government. Participants may be required to attend vocational or educational activities as a workfare activity. Usually, one of these activities are a mandatory requirement for the participant to receive welfare (Crisp & Fletcher, 2008).

Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMP) are implemented to enhance the labour supply (i.e. training), increase labour demand (i.e. PWPs), and improve the functioning of the labour market (i.e. employment services). ALMPs date back the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, and were promoted as a remedy for cyclical and structural unemployment in parallel with the rise of workfare and activation approaches. Thereafter, ALMPs were used in many other countries. ALMPs are typically classified into four categories in the literature: job-search assistance, (labour market) training, private sector employment incentives, and public sector employment. The last category covers employment programmes in the public sector focusing on the direct creation and provision of public works or other activities that produce public goods or services (Kluve, 2016).

Public Employment/Work Programmes (PWPs) or Employment Guaranteed Schemes are one of these state policies considered to be in under ALMPs. Typically, these programmes create temporary jobs for workers, and given the fact they include work, they are easily aligned to the workfare approach. These programmes have multifaceted outputs such short-term jobs for workers to boost their income, and creation of public goods in the form of new infrastructure or improvements of existing infrastructure, or delivery of services (Ninno et al., 2009).

Some authors consider the works commissioned by the pharaohs of ancient Egypt, or the experience of 4th century B.C. in India as examples of PWPs (Ninno et al., 2009). Historically, the establishment of contemporary PWPs can be dated to 19th-century Europe. During this era, in England, workhouse relief, to which the able-bodied poor were restricted after England's 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, explicitly self-targeted the poor by aiming to "provide pay and conditions less eligible than the meanest available alternative. (Through the Act, able-bodied poor were used to build canals and roads, and drain marshes.) (Subbarao, 2003). Since the mid-1970s, PWPs have evolved into mainstream policy instruments for employment creation and poverty alleviation directed toward particular segments of the population (Devereux & Solomon, 2006). Workfare programmes launched in East Asia soon after the macroeconomic crisis in 1997, Latin America in 2002, and after the tsunami in many Asian countries in 2005 are all contemporary examples of PWPs used to mitigate the negative effects of a shock among the most vulnerable population. India is one of the earliest modern examples in developing countries of PWP implementation, and it has aimed to provide temporary employment during the agricultural slack season since 1950s shortly after independence. Moreover, many African countries also implement PWPs when hit by major drought, and this was expanded in 1980s. (Subbarao, 2003).

Despite different implementation methods in different countries, workfare-style policies are pragmatic tools for directing participants through processes of "assessment", "job search", "work preparation" and "work experience" (sometimes mandatory unpaid work). Work requirements are also widely used in poverty-alleviation programmes around the world. A historical example is the English system, instituted by the Poor Law of 1834. But workfare policies remain popular in both developed and less developed countries in the contemporary era. A number of states in the United State, for example, demand that welfare claimants enrol in either a training or work programme in order to receive benefits. Similarly, India relies heavily on PWPs as a tool for providing poor relief. (Besley & Coate, 1992). The following section explore the details of the main feature of PWPs, and provides a detailed explanation about the aims, target groups and characteristic of the implementation processes.

2.2. Main Features of PWPs

PWPs are large-scale programmes that increase the demand side of the economy. In most instances, PWPs offer short-term alternatives to ordinary jobs. Historically, these programmes have mainly been targeted at people with previous work experience. Several Western countries adopted different types of PWPs during the depression years (1931-36) and again during milder recessions. In more recent times, two main different types of PWPs have been used. In poor countries (i.e. India), where the unemployment benefit system does not provide universal coverage and benefits are in most cases too low to protect the unemployed against poverty, PWPs have been used as an alternative welfare provision. In higher-income nations experiencing economic crisis (i.e. South Korea) emergency PWPs are used in situations where alternatives are either insufficiently developed and/or national finances are unable to fund a dramatic increase in claims for existing benefit schemes (Lodemel, 2012).

High-income countries mostly use PWPs as a part of a workfare system. In this type of system, beneficiaries typically have to comply with various conditions in order to receive benefits. Gaining work experience or engaging in activities for the public good (for free or at very low wages) are examples of the conditions that beneficiaries may have to meet. Those countries use PWPs for macroeconomic reasons or as temporary measures against high unemployment or short-term shocks. In practice, the provision of benefits is tied to working for the public good, and via financial sanctions which compel the unemployed to participate programmes (Kalman, 2015).

As a part of a workfare system, high-income countries use a large variety of activation programmes. These programmes differ from free public employment services in terms of their obligatory feature for relevant target groups. In activation programmes, attending an interview with job and vocational counsellors (JVC) is mandatory. Also, searching and applying for job vacancies either under the direction of counsellors or independently, and participating in training or job-creation programmes are mandatory under this type of programme. It is mandatory to accept job-creation programme for the target groups, but when an activation programme offers an activity, the system becomes equivalent to a PWP where the pay is somewhat below market wage rates in order to ensure that the demand for places can be satisfied. High-income countries are less likely to implement PWPs in general and try to distinguish between individuals to determine those at risk of poverty in the absence of benefits,

and those who have alternative income sources (family members, etc.). In developed countries, the use of PWPs is being reduced due to the impact of negative evidence in analyses and evaluations. For them, PWPs are costly and other labour market interventions have proved to be more efficient, primarily due to substitution and crowding-out effects (Kalman, 2015). However, in less developed countries with weak administrative capacities to record family needs and incomes, PWPs are sufficient to delivering poverty relief to needy families (OECD Employment Outlook, 2005).

2.3. PWP Objectives and Implementation Areas

Along with high-income countries, according to Subbaro (2003), in countries with low levels of income, PWPs are undertaken with four objectives. The first is to provide benefits to the poor and these benefits should be nearly equal to the wage rate which may prevent poverty from a worse scenario. The second is to time PWPs so that they confer consumption-smoothing or stabilization benefits on programme participants. The third is to build much-needed physical infrastructure such as irrigation infrastructure or roads in rural areas, though the PWP must be well-designed to achieve this. The fourth is to target specific geographic areas that have high unemployment and poverty rates. The design of PWPs, particularly the wage rate, timing and targeting methods are crucial to their effectiveness (Subbaro, 2003).

In addition to these four objectives, the estimation of the implementation period of a PWP is essential in reaching the purpose of programme. In order to maintain the predictability, PWPs require longer-term public work schemes, or repeated access (i.e. respond to weather-related covariate risks on each occasion); this can be considered to be the fifth objective in low-income countries (Koochi-Kamali, 2010).

Separate from the income level of a country, the majority of PWPs focus on “reducing poverty” or “addressing structural unemployment challenges”. Other main goals of PWPs include reduction of seasonal and/or cyclical unemployment, direct job creation, tackling regional and structural labour market problems, helping certain workforce-groups in disadvantaged situations, combating poverty, providing income transfers for the poor, and adding a certain stimulus to the economy.

Alongside their implementation for poverty alleviation and tackling negative impacts of economic crises, PWP are also seen in response to sudden disasters such as an earthquakes or other natural disasters where alternatives are either insufficiently developed and/or national finances are unable to fund a dramatic increase in claims for existing benefit schemes (Lodemel, 2012). PWP can be very effective shock absorbers as the programmes are quite useful intervention instruments in responses to adverse situations at a particular moment before it is too late. PWP can respond swiftly in order to mitigate the effects of sudden shocks. In the aftermath of a disaster, PWP can provide unskilled manual employment to households that have lost access to labour opportunities. Programmes launched soon after the tsunami which hit many Asian countries in 2005 are examples set up to mitigate the negative effects of a disaster among the most vulnerable population. Bangladesh also has a long history of operating continuing cash and/or food-for-work programs that act as important countercyclical tools in response to disasters, as does India (Subbaro et al., 2012).

2.4. PWP Categories

As mentioned above, the goals of PWP differ in terms of a country's economic circumstances and the necessities of the programme vary. PWP have transformed over time, even within countries, to respond to changing realities and varying objectives. They have been divided to several categories by different authors. In the WB's book, PWP are categorized into four scenarios:

- High- and middle-income countries subject to covariate shocks, typically macroeconomic in nature
- Low-income agrarian countries subject to periodic weather shocks and seasonal variation affecting well-being and labour demand
- Countries emerging from long-term conflict or those otherwise considered to be a fragile setting
- Countries in emergency situations following natural disasters (Subbaro et al., 2012).

On the other hand, McCord (2004) broadly divided PWP into three categories in terms of the scale of PWP, the length of programmes including employment guarantee schemes (both demand-side interventions) and temporary public works employment at times of acute labour market disturbance, arising from natural or human-made disasters or short-term fluctuations in demand for labour resulting from shifts in the business cycle (McCord, 2004).

The WB's categorization method considers the income level and the social situation of a country, while McCord categorizes PWPs in terms of their scale and duration. Both divide natural disasters into a separate category. The first counted long-term conflicts as a separate category. A country's own particular case and the variety of necessities and resources it has determine the PWP category in which it exists.

Countries with low levels of income (such as India) have used PWPs as an alternative in the absence of other forms of welfare provision since the major aim is to reduce poverty in society. This use may suit the second scenario of the WB's categorization where PWPs are mostly implemented in poor regions where the population faces widespread poverty in general or seasonally.

The most frequent goal of PWPs is to increase labour demand in order to affect income transfer and hence reduce poverty. In many cases, in order to succeed in this goal, programmes create infrastructural assets, and may also entail secondary objectives relating to supply-side improvements such as skill transfers.

The following sections provide detailed exploration of PWPs in terms of their particular scopes, comparison of selection methods, determination of wage rate in different circumstance and the method of payment, and also looks more closely at the gender dimension and explores the monitoring and evaluation phases of PWPs. Although PWPs provide short-term income support mostly through unskilled work, it is very important to determine a reasonable wage rate, useful scope for the PWP that will benefit community and region needs, and the generation of demographic patterns among participants for the success of PWPs in terms of reaching vulnerable groups. There also needs to be a well-designed monitoring and evaluation process in order to mitigate possible adverse effect of PWPs.

2.5. Scope of PWPs

PWPs have a long-standing tradition and have recently become increasingly popular in developing countries. According to a WB study, 94 countries around the world operated at least one PWP in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). Although most PWPs respond to a crisis, there are various other reasons to implement a PWP. One PWP objective is temporary employment, another is to generate or maintain labour-intensive infrastructure projects or social services

(Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015). These aims mostly determine the scope of PWPs and the majority of them are implemented one time only.

Implementing a PWP can provide substantial safety nets in the short term. As massive employment programme can be implemented in a relatively short period and a nationally funded programme can be rapidly administered locally with the participation of non-profit /non-governmental institutions. However, according to McCord, due to their temporary scope of work, PWPs have limited effect on transient rather than chronic poverty (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008).

When looking at the scope of PWPs, most of them have been implemented in response to wide-reaching shocks such as a natural disaster or seasonal labour demand shortfall. In particular, in some of the countries where there are high fluctuations in agricultural activity, PWPs are implemented extensively. Many PWPs have been implemented during drought seasons. Besides that, at times of other natural disasters such as earthquake or flooding PWPs are implemented because of their rapid response characteristic and ability to mitigate some of the worst effects.

The scope of a PWP varies depending on the aims of implementation and the development levels of a country. PWPs have been widened and the work undertaken has changed over the course of time. PWPs have been strongly associated with infrastructure and construction “works”, but this has evolved, with examples of work in the social sector, environmental services, and multi-sectoral, community-driven programmes (ILO Report, 2011).

As seen above, the selection of the types of projects depend on the program’s objectives. The objectives of a PWP vary depending on the labour cost, timing and duration of the programme as well as the potential for participation of women, young people and people with disabilities (Subbaro et al., 2012). The scopes also vary depending on the nature of the labour market crisis in clarifying the designated group to alleviate (chronic or acute), the intended participant population (universal or targeted) and the timescale of the intervention (long or short term).

The intended outputs of PWPs are crucial in deciding what kind of assets to create and maintain while implementing the programmes. The main aim of numerous PWPs is to maximize the favourable impact on participants, thus lead them to create assets that benefit

participants- Table 1 is a combination of different PWP scopes that different countries have implemented at least once in order to maximize the favourable impact on participants.

Table 1. Scope of PWPs

Infrastructure	Rehabilitation and maintenance of rural and urban roads
	Digging and protection of irrigation canals and drains
	Pavement of market yards
Environment	Afforestation
	Drainage of waterlogged areas
	Renovation of traditional water bodies
	Conservation Measures
Social	Childcare centres
	Nursing houses
	Community centres and libraries
	Teaching children about cultural assets
Community Works (Multi-Sectoral)	Recreational facilities (theatres, parks, playgrounds)
	Housing for low-income and vulnerable groups
	Garbage collection
Training-Related Activities	Vocational Training
	Raising awareness about sanitation through educational programs
Technology-Related Programmes	Computer-literacy
	Backlog in digitalizing the databases
	Resolving computer problems

Author's own compilation (Subbaro et al., 2012 & McCord, 2003 & Kostzer, 2008 & Kwon, 2002)

The scopes of programmes range from physical infrastructure to complementary services, such as increasing literacy or social support. Infrastructure and environmental related activities have enormous potential to employ a large numbers of poor for long periods and often these two scopes are interrelated. For instance, the construction of a dyke against rising sea levels is related to both infrastructure and environmental activities. On the other hand, there are also social scopes of PWPs, such as childcare services or nursing homes. It is possible to widen the ranges of social services through the effective use of knowledge of local organizations according to their needs.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that many PWPs incorporate training elements, however, the emphasis on training of participants often cannot help them find employment or become self-employed due to lack of skills. Although there is a lack of empirical evidence of both short- and long-term employment outcomes of PWPs, overall evidence indicates that the direct employment effects of PWPs are rare (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015). In the case of Jefes y Jefas in Argentina, for example, Galasso & Ravallion (2004) estimated that the programme reduced Argentina's unemployment rate by about 2.5% during the immediate aftermath of the crisis.

An early review by McCord (2005) concluded that the training provided under the EPWP is unlikely to improve skills and reduce unemployment because of the limited demand for low-skilled and unskilled labour in South Africa, and because the training offered is inadequate. Moreover, with a mean duration of 3 to 4 months' employment, McCord posited that there was not sufficient time for skills transfer. Thus, the EPWP is likely to be ineffective in raising participants' skill levels to meet labour market demands. Evidence from the mid-term review of the EPWP reflects this concern. The mid-term review shows that the majority of EPWP beneficiaries continue to be employed in EPWP projects after their initial participation instead of moving across to the private labour market.

Effects similar to those of the EPWP were also found in the Jefes y Jefas programme in Argentina. While Jefes y Jefas creates a multitude of training opportunities, participation is optional. Studies assessing the employability of Jefes y Jefas participants found only limited evidence of their re-entering the private labour market in the short run (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015).

The studies indicate that training may help a limited number of workers to exit PWPs into sustainable employment. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Employment Report (2011), there are two strategies that can be singled out to increase and sustain the employment impact of PWPs and infrastructure investments. The first strategy is by creating assets and producing economic infrastructure, PWPs extend employment generation and with the "crowd in" factor, it can create more employment opportunities. The second strategy is to increase the employment-intensity of regular infrastructure investments. The share of the equipment costs may be confined, and the investments are used as a tool of public policy to achieve pro-poor development and labour-intensive growth (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

2.6. Targeting, Self-Selection & Eligibility Requirements

In many circumstances, states play a crucial role in the implementation of PWPs. Through public employment agencies, states provide direct employment to complement social protection for the unemployed, and particularly to those on the poverty line in many countries. Particularly in developing countries, in order to alleviate poverty and reach the poor, governments use targeted interventions while implement PWPs. Unlike universalism, which transfers resources equally to all members in society, targeting may be more cost-effective and equitable (Imai, 2016).

One of the major problematic issues of PWPs is their targeting mechanism. There are people who are poor and non-poor where PWPs are implemented. The targeting problem is to find an indicator or a mechanism that maximizes the coverage of people in the poor group, and minimize leakages to the non-poor. Minimizing the errors in selection is extremely difficult due to imperfect information and incentive effects. It is very difficult to collect accurate information about income level, asset ownership or the expenditure of participants. It is hard to set a cut-off point or poverty line that separates the eligible from the ineligible. Besides, there is always a moral hazard effect that an incentive effect may trigger individuals. Non-eligible participants may choose to participate in PWPs, despite not being in need, as a result of incentive effects (Devereux, 1999).

In order to reach the most vulnerable groups, there has to be explicit eligibility criteria. The criteria differ according to target groups. The target groups may be identified on the basis of their socio-economic status, such as income level, vulnerability, food insecurity, employment or demographic status, as well as specified statuses, such a veterans. Once a target group has been identified, PWPs usually establish a set of eligibility or ineligibility criteria to select participants (Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments, 2016).

The most common targeting method is the self-selection method, which uses the wage rate. PWPs differ from other social assistance programmes in that they use self-targeting. If the PWP wage level determined is slightly beneath the market wage, there are no additional managerial or material costs for the selection process and people will self-select to participate in programmes. As well as the self-selection method, there are geographical (poorest regions, chronically food insecure districts or villages, post-disaster-affected areas) and categorical (ex-

combatants, returnees, indigenous communities, ethnic minorities) methods. In addition to these means-tested income-based measures, there are community-based methods which use participatory community approaches to identify those eligible according to agreed criteria (Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments, 2016).

In theory, self-selection/self-targeting transfers do not require costly administrative monitoring and significant leakage to non-poor participation is not expected. Common self-selection features include the (low) quality of a subsidized foodstuff or a work requirement that carries a high opportunity cost of time for the relatively better-off. The cost (benefit) of participation is made an increasing (decreasing) function of one's pre-participation income or wealth, so that only the needy find project participation attractive (Barrett & Clay, 2001).

The self-targeting method, in theory, is cheaper and more accurate than alternative targeting methods. When PWP targeting methods are based on a relatively low wage level, self-targeting can be created easily. According to the WB, PWPs can easily be made self-targeting by paying wages below market rates (World Bank, 2001). As long as implementers keep the wage rate lower than actual market wages, this will lead the poor to put themselves forward for a PWP without state intervention, while the relatively less poor will not find the PWP attractive because of the low wage level, and will not seek to participate in it. Compared to other targeting mechanisms, such as community-based selection or mean-testing, the administration mechanism is simpler and it is more cost-effective.

On the other hand, the sole use of the self-selection method may not be efficient in reaching the neediest groups in poor regions, particularly when the demand for participation is very high. Beside excessive demand, the manual labour required on PWPs is prohibitive for groups such as the very old and very young, the chronically ill and the disabled. These people may be in greatest need of public assistance, yet they are unable to benefit from PWPs. This is why all countries have applied some kind of targeting and rationing of employment opportunities (Lal et al., 2010). In order to ensure the efficiency of the programme during the implementation of PWPs, there are eligibility requirements that must be met to become a participant of programme in various countries.

Excessive demand is an important factor in conceiving targeting mechanism in PWPs. In many cases, the self-selection method is not sufficient to meet all requests. Separately from the wage

rate, due to excessive demand, PWP require a means to prioritize provision and ration access. For instances, PWP may use household or participant ranking based on poverty or vulnerability, based on criteria established by the government, and give priority to the most vulnerable households in participating in the programmes. The use of lotteries and random selection of participants by communities are other types of selection methods (Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments, 2016).

In particular, some PWP explicitly target women, disabled or indigenous people or older workers which are mentioned in the categorical methods above. The appropriate form of categorical targeting depends on social priorities. If the objective is to provide experience and eventual incorporation into the labour force, the programme should target unemployed youth, since they will have a longer-term payoff from labour force participation. If the objective is poverty reduction and social protection, female-headed households in rural areas may be a more appropriate target (The Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), 2016). Since the work requirements generally exclude the most vulnerable (women with children, elderly, and many of those with serious disabilities), quotas are a useful tool for selecting categorical groups. Essentially, the quota system defines a minimum proportion in a certain PWP for a predetermined group and thus encourages the engagement of those vulnerable groups in programmes.

Another targeting mechanism in PWP is geographical targeting. Particularly in agricultural communities, fluctuation of household income is directly tied to the seasonal cycle. Most of the time, poor households suffer from sudden shortfalls in consumption and nutritional status during seasonal periods where drought occurs. The geographical targeting method is useful in this case and the targets are determined as regions affected by seasonal drops or environmental alteration. Thus, it enables poor participants to smooth out their consumption, so reducing their exposure to poverty risk. The stabilization benefit of a PWP can be higher in slack seasons when unanticipated decline in farm activity occurs in a bad agricultural season. It is important that the risk-coping benefits of a PWP can be as important as the transfer benefit to poor households who have limited options or cannot afford to insure themselves (Subbarao, 2003). Nevertheless, eligibility requirements can also have negative effects on participants in terms of the opportunity costs they imply. The work requirement may lead to the diversion of labour away from a participant's own production activities (agricultural or small-scale household production) into public works employment in order to gain immediate cash income (Barrientos

& Hulme, 2008). The WB noticed that since poor people can rarely afford to be totally idle, they often give up some form of income to join a workfare scheme (World Bank, 2001).

Therefore, to receive benefits, the household member must provide a standard set of information and supporting documentation (birth certificate, national identification number) to the municipal employee handling the registration. The beneficiary is supposed to sign a statement swearing that the information provided is correct. Before making the monthly payments, cross-checks with other databases are carried out using ID numbers to ensure that the beneficiary is not participating in another programme of the Ministry, receiving unemployment insurance, does not have a formal sector job, and is not receiving a cash transfer from another programme of the national government (Devereux & Solomon, 2006). Due to the fact that jobs are provided to heads of households, presumably the majority of participants should consist of men; however, the higher opportunity cost of alternative work for men increased the share of female beneficiaries.

As seen above, the wage rate is the most critical factor when designing a targeting method. However, it is not sufficient to simply select the neediest to participate in PWPs. Even in the same country, a fixed wage rate may cause different impacts across different regions. Besides, political and legal constraints may make it difficult to maintain the programme wage at levels less than the minimum wage, which in turn causes mismatching in the selection process (Subbarao, 1997). At this point, alternative targeting methods like community-based selection, or demographic and geographical targeting may become an important part of selection methods for PWPs and play a significant role in reaching the poorest and vulnerable groups.

2.7. Method of Wage Payment

If one of the efficiency indicators of PWPs is considered an increase in the overall level of jobs provided to the target population (Ninno et al., 2009), it supports the Keynesian argument of government intervention that when there is a low demand for labour in the private sector, PWPs and other forms of government expenditure can be used to raise overall level of outputs and employment. On the other hand, the neoclassical approach claims that government expenditure does not add employment to the economy but rather replaces existing employment. In the case of PWPs, the wage rate may lead to crowding out private investments if the PWP sets its wage rate higher than the market wage offered in the private sector. In that

case, those employed in the private sector will switch to public work. A high PWP wage may attract the non-poor to participate in place of the poor and thus may cause the replacement of private sector employment with the public sector employment. The dispute between these two theories on governmental expenditure reveals the importance of the design of PWPs. In order to increase the effectiveness of PWPs, it is crucial to choose a wage rate that does not lead to crowding out in the private sector and allows the programme to create employment, rather than replace it (Eichner, 2013).

On the other hand, the method of wage payment may also be crucial in terms of the efficiency of decreasing fraud and making a programme more transparent. Payments can either be in cash or in kind. Wage rates depend on the countries' own regulations and labour market situation. Most countries prefer the wage level to be slightly lower than the prevailing wage level in order to incentivise the self-selection method. However, the availability of food aid sometimes makes paying wages in kind preferable. Payment in early PWPs in India and Bangladesh was largely in kind, usually in the form of food staples made available through donations. In Lesotho and Zambia, payment of 50% of the wage in kind (food) attracted more women than men to project sites (Subbarao, 2003). A slightly different 'coupon system' payment system has been implemented in Ethiopia. In this payment system, coupons are the instrument of payment and those coupons can be exchanged for food at specific stores (Subbarao, et al., 2010). Of these three forms of payments, the cash payment system allows participants to spend the cash any way they like. However, in the coupon system the participants' choice is restricted to a specific range of items, but this payment method may exclude spending earnings on demerit goods such as cigarettes.

The common practice is based on daily payment, but per-item rates and task-based payments are especially attractive to women, and allow several members of a large, poor families to share the work. In some African countries, women prefer task-based payments since it permits them to combine household chores and income earning opportunities (Koochi-Kamali, 2010). Lastly, recent developments in the technology of finance systems provide a new opportunity to participants in that rather than in-kind or cash payment, new models of cash delivery are now in use. Cheques, bank accounts, electronic delivery systems and biometric smart cards are the new form of payment systems. Unless there is difficulty in accessing a financial instrument such as opening a bank account, or a lack of electronic devices especially in rural

areas, these new payment methods may help eliminate intermediaries, ensure proper accountability and help prevent fraud and/or underpayments (Subbarao, et al., 2010).

2.8. The Gender Dimension of PWPs

Women are increasingly targeted as beneficiaries of different kinds of ALMPs. Due to their disadvantaged status within household and communities, women need to be empowered both economically, socially and politically. Women are one of the most common groups in society that many anti-poverty programmes consider on a preferential basis. Below is a more detailed explanation of how women's participation improves their own well-being as well as that of their children and other dependents. Therefore, in this thesis, a separate gender dimension section has been included in order to understand the various impacts of PWPs on women, who constitute a significant vulnerable group in many low- and middle-income countries.

The main aims of PWPs are to mitigate the adverse effects of severe economic crises and natural disasters, reduce poverty and create assets for the public good which increase living standards, particularly in poor areas (Subbaro et al., 2012). Among the poor, women are over-represented, and they face more difficulties in escaping poverty. In many countries, because of cultural, social and economic constraints, women's access to the labour market, particularly wage employment, is limited. Considering women's position in line with the aim and benefits of PWPs, women must be integrated into PWPs more intensively.

The effectiveness and success of a PWP relies on a gender sensitive design and the proportion of women who participate. Swamy (2003) listed three main reasons why the role of women is important when implementing a PWP. The first reason, according to the author, is that equal access to social protection and a safety net is an objective in its own right. The second is that evidence on intra-household resource allocation shows that a woman's participation in the labour force and her control over resources is associated with substantially larger improvements in child welfare, and, women's health and status. The third reason is that there is some evidence that in times of economic crisis, women may be more severely affected as they are considered secondary earners, whereas men are viewed as bread winners (Swamy, 2003).

PWP wage rates are quite important as a determinant factor in a woman's decision to participate in a programme or not. Around the world, most PWPs set the wage below or at market wage in order to bring about the self-selection process and incentivise the poor to participate. However, the market wages for women are generally lower than that of men, and this differentiates women's decisions from men. Even though a PWP wage is set lower than the general market wage, if the market wages for women are lower than the general market wage, then non-poor women may participate more than poor women (Swamy, 2003).
Efficiency

Another influential point in the decision of women to participate in PWPs is the mode of payment. As stated above, task-based payment or per-item rates sometimes attract more women to PWPs. Women sometimes prefer to participate in PWPs while working hours and work conditions allow them to also carry out their household duties. If a PWP permits them to combine housework and income earning opportunities, more women may be attracted to participate.

Among these factors, the distance of the workplace may be counted as significant factor in reducing women's participation in a PWP. Effective childcare services may mitigate the adverse effect of long-distance travel between the workplace and home. Otherwise, women who have a childcare responsibility may not be able to participate in a PWP, even if they need to. Another factor which decreases women's participation is the rules of the selection methods. If the resources are restricted and the main criteria to become a participant is to act as the head of a household, women's participation will surely decrease. Explicit directives to employ women or community participation while selecting participants may influence female participation (Swamy, 2003).

An issue that may improve women's participation in PWPs is the right to claim sick pay and family responsibility leave. In the South African case, beneficiaries who work four or more days per week in the programme have the right to claim sick pay and family responsibility leave (3 days a year). Women also can take up to four consecutive months of unpaid maternity leave (Subbaro et al., 2012). In India, the MGNREGA mandates a quota for women to ensure locally available employment and also allows for spaces to feed and take care of children. The Jefes programme in Argentina aims at creating productive employment for vulnerable women. *Jefes* programme activities include bricklaying, building and carpentry which are not

traditionally performed by women. Moreover, many *Jefes* programmes provide free childcare for participants and counselling for families for drug abuse or domestic violence problems and family planning (Antonopoulos, 2007). Due to those arrangements, women's participation rate in *the* programme was up to 60% in its first year, and in its second year went beyond 70%, which exceeded expectations considerably (Pavlina & Randall, 2007).

Another study in South Africa shows that although the government conducted a successful promotion for women's participation in PWPs, cultural bias within communities limited their participation. Particularly in the construction industry, the perception that those work activities are "men's work" tends to reduce women's participation in PWPs. Even when women have been participating in PWPs in construction activities, they have not been doing the same tasks as men, but undertaking rather lighter duties. However, the wage rate is still an important component in the decision to participate in a PWP. Consequently, in one case, again in South Africa, where men refused to accept the jobs as they felt the wage rate was excessively low, a team building a road, a typical construction activity, consisted entirely of women (Adato & Haddad, 2001).

Moreover, ILO research indicates that the number of women participants involved in construction activities varies for several reasons. Although in most cases the rate of women's participation in construction was developed and increased over the course of PWP implementation, still women's participation in the construction phase is a complex and dynamic process. According to the discussion paper, in several African countries, women's domestic work (household work plus cultivation of one's own family farm) is a major hindrance to their participation in public works. Likewise, several surveys indicated that in different countries and regions, younger and unmarried women have a higher likelihood of working in PWPs. The general situation of young unmarried women is that they have no obligation to supply food to the household and therefore they do not have their own land to cultivate. When they have no responsibility to help with the household's land or their mothers, then these women have more available time and flexibility to work in construction (Dejardin, 1996).

Another aspect of increasing women's participation in PWPs is the increase in school attendance. Although there is a risk that when PWP wages are higher than the market wages, households may pull their children out of school in order to help with household chores or

other unpaid family work, studies shows that the ability of households to invest in education has increased. The *Jefes* programme in Argentina led to a 1.8% increase in school attendance, which translated to 34,000 more children attending school. In addition to the *Jefes* programme, a study (according to 938 respondents) in India showed that 35% of the participants felt that their children's education had benefited from their participation in MGNREGA. Moreover, in South Africa, participation in PWPs raised the percentage of households with regular school attendance of all children from 67% to 90% (Lieuw-Kie-Song et al., 2016).

In addition to the social and cultural status of women, economic status is also an important determinant factor for women's decision to participate in a PWP. Again in the same ILO report, it is stated that in regions where farming generate high income and there are alternative income sources (seasonal work on coffee and rice fields), women were less likely to work in construction activities. In contrast, in other regions where women suffer more from poverty, notwithstanding social barriers, more women participate in PWPs (Dejardin, 1996).

Another influential factor in women's participation in PWPs is the decision-making procedures. In the ILO report, in which all the PWP examples are from Africa, the local community is involved intensively in the decision making process. Most PWPs set up beneficiary or user communities, often reflecting the local, traditional, political and economic power elites and thus most of the time exclude women. In order to increase women's participation, it requires putting more women in communities (Dejardin, 1996). Yet another measure that aims to increase women's participation in PWPs was taken from an Indian PWP whose design and implementation rules were set by the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantees Act. According to this act, priority is given to women in such a way that at least one-third of the beneficiaries are women who have registered and requested work under the Act (Ministry of Law and Justice of India, 2005). Moreover, in India, during a PWP, in cases where the number of children below the age of six years accompanying the women working at any site is five or more, provisions are made to nominate one women worker to look after those children. The person nominated to do this is paid the statutory minimum wage (Chakraborty, 2007). As can be seen in this rule, gender equality is an important objective of the Act, where traditional reflections are to exclude or isolate women in the decision process of the community.

In conclusion, it is crucial to design a PWP in response to the specific need of women, such as like child care or separate toilet facilities. Furthermore, gender-specific targeting through the definition of women's quotas is also an important factor in increasing women's participation. Building gender awareness among contractors, consultants and PWP participants into all training programmes in terms of skill-building is also a key factor in sustainability of increasing women's participation in PWPs. Gender awareness is also helpful in breaking prevailing gender stereotypes of women in labour participation. As a development approach, gender mainstreaming is the essential determinant of the rate of women participation in general. National and international commitment is crucial for mainstreaming policies to establish national or sub-national gender institutions/gender focal departments, such as dedicated ministries of women's empowerment/gender equity. As a human right, gender budgeting and the collection of gender-disaggregated data are main points of gender mainstreaming, which have enormous impacts on PWPs in terms of the gender dimension (Holmes & Jones, 2010).

2.9. Monitoring and Evaluation

PWPs have proved to be relatively successful in employing large numbers of individuals. However, studies suggest that programmes could have been more effective if better they were better designed and monitored (ILO Report, 2009). Although PWPs are being widely implemented in many countries, the outcomes of programmes are mostly questionable and ambiguous. There are many risks that may occur when implementing a PWP, like diverting participants from other productive activities, or undue interferences from local authorities, such as corruption and misuse of cash. In order to mitigate these adverse interferences in PWPs, programme authorities need to analyse the labour market situation in detail, establish effective monitoring and ensure local authorities are carrying out their duties.

In the past, PWP implementers used to focus on the generation of evidence for their impact on human, social and economic development indicators. Attention is now turning to issues of service delivery quality, value for money, risk management and accountability within PWPs (Barrett & Kidd, 2015). Although it is very important to anticipate human and social development outcomes, poorly defined PWPs lead to the non-poor being paid. This leads to the abuse and exploitation of vulnerable groups and individuals, misuse of public funds and

operational inefficiency. Therefore, strong monitoring and evaluation phases would increase the successful implementation of PWPs.

The terms of monitoring and evaluation have different implications. Monitoring is the process of identifying and tracking performance indicators and reviewing implementation over the life of the programme. The basic aim of monitoring is to inform the managers (and other stakeholders) about the progress, and of achievements, shortcomings or deficiency of PWPs through the collection and review of programme data. On the other hand, evaluation comes at the end of the programme and assesses the impact with links to outcomes. Evaluation involves the objective and systemic assessment of the design, implementation and results of the programme (Samson et al., 2006). Evaluation complements the monitoring system and it is crucial in improving the programme, to inform stakeholders about its performance and to draw lessons for other programmes.

In other words, monitoring provides information on how much money is spent, how many beneficiaries are reached by the programme, and how efficiently the programme is serving them. Unlike monitoring, programme evaluations are often one-off efforts directed at answering a few key questions about programme implementation, targeting accuracy, and/or impact. Monitoring is a continuous process that covers most programmes and identifies whether a programme is being implemented as expected or whether the outcomes of the programme show are showing progress or not. Compared to evaluation, monitoring involves low annual cost and it aims to improve a programme and its accountability. However, evaluation is an infrequent undertaking that covers a few programmes and identifies the change in outcomes resulting from a programme, and whether the programme is reaching its intended target group or not. Furthermore, evaluation provides information for major decisions such as starting, ceasing, expanding or reducing a programme (Grosh et al., 2008).

It is very important to use a robust monitoring system in order to improve the productivity, effectiveness and impact of a particular PWP. Productive and effective PWPs need to have clear objectives, and at the end of its implementation and as a result of the PWP, there should be a creation of valuable public good. In addition to this, the impacts of PWPs vary due to different choices in design parameters (e.g. wage rate) and the implementation structure (which depends on certain circumstances). These parameters vary the impacts of PWPs in terms of poverty reduction, temporary income gain, one-off shock coverage, etc. (Ninno et al.,

2009). Evaluation of public works are necessary to: a) provide feedback during the life of the programme to help improve its effectiveness; b) make projects accountable to the public; and c) help inform government decisions about spending allocations (Ninno et al., 2009).

In addition, according to a study, monitoring and evaluation serve three major objective types: strategic, operational and learning. Due to limited sources, when implementing the strategic plan of a PWP, monitoring and evaluation may serve to ensure that PWPs allocate the budget to the neediest geography or groups, etc. Effective programme monitoring may help operational objectives by identifying and measuring performance indicators. These indicators provide periodic feedback on the success of implementation as well as indications of problems that arise. Lastly, monitoring and evaluation also results in implementers learning from the PWPs and enables them to compare best practices that provide a model for learning. Learning objectives also aim to benefit the broader international community, instead of a specific programme manager or other stakeholders (Samson et al., 2006).

Even though there are many PWPs with different aims and intended outcomes around the world there are core administrative processes that policy makers should consider when planning monitoring and evaluation phases. Registration of the programme, participant enrolment process, payment method and complaint/grievance management may be regarded as core administrative processes. There are plenty of policy options managers can use to respond to the needs of each PWP, taking into consideration institutional, social, environmental, economic and political context that the PWP faces.

Nevertheless, a good, well-designed monitoring and evaluation process should address the following issues:

The first and foremost necessity is providing sufficient information to participants, the communities that host them and other relevant stakeholders, like contractors. This is one of the basic aims of monitoring and evaluation. PWPs should have a mechanism in place to ensure that they do not result in unintended negative effects, such as food insecurity, or participants disregarding their own agricultural activities. In other words, programmes should be carefully designed to minimize conflicts with activities pursued by local communities. (e.g. existing traditions, or collective work like harvesting) (Vinet & Calef, 2013).

Another important point in monitoring and evaluating a PWP is designing it in such a way that it encourages the employment of women or members of vulnerable groups. This point will also have influential household impacts in terms of intra-household decision making, family relations and gender issues. Labour market conditions is the main indicator in setting wage rates of PWPs, and payment methods are crucial in designing the programmes. The outputs and impacts of PWPs in terms of whether a PWP achieves its stated objectives, or whether there is any mechanism in place to ensure assets will be maintained over the time are focal points of the monitoring and evaluation phases. Lastly, the participant selection process is a critical point that the monitoring and evaluation mechanism should take into consideration. It is very important for a PWP to reach its target groups. The presence of unbiased and clear information regarding targeting and selection methods and the access of participants to the information are very important in recruiting the right participants (Vinet & Calef, 2013).

Ultimately, the main purpose of monitoring and evaluation processes is to ensure that each function is carried out correctly for each participant. Thus, it is important to design the rules explicitly, define the necessary indicators and track them periodically in terms of targets. A PWP may be efficiently implemented and the direct and indirect outcomes may enhance a community facing severe difficulties like massive unemployment or natural disasters.

2.10. International Examples and Comparison Samples

PWPs have been used successfully in a wide range of countries, for a variety of purposes. In Asia, they have been implemented in countries as diverse as South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan and India. They have been extensively used in Latin America, for example in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Honduras. In Africa, apart from South Africa, PWPs have been implemented in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Egypt. The general concept of PWPs as state employment is diverse. Policies may be a response of large-scale direct employment-creation schemes, or may be more limited interventions focusing on supply-side issues and the development of a more skilled and experienced labour force through public employment (Overseas Development Institute, Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit Briefing Paper, 2004).

The priorities of PWPs and their implementation methods may differ from one country to another. Differences in income is the main factor that leads to discrepancies between countries

when implementing PWPs. The majority of the middle-income countries implement PWPs, when unemployment increases sharply due to macroeconomic economic crises. Low-income countries mostly implement PWPs in order to combat severe drought and reduce poverty among mass population. Additionally, timing, payment methods and the status of contractors also differs from country to country. PWPs have been implemented for a long time in some countries, while in others, they are relatively new or have been implemented at certain periods but have not become continuous.

Below is an examination of PWPs in a selection of countries. India was selected because it offers some of the most comprehensive PWP examples in the world, and has been implementing them for more than 40 years. Over the course of time, changes have occurred in implementation methods. Thus, the Indian example is useful assessing the general background of PWPs. Argentina and South Korea are examples which have close links with macroeconomic crises. Both implemented PWPs just after extensive macroeconomic crises at different times. In addition to these countries, South Africa is chosen as it implements PWPs as a remedy for long-term structural unemployment and provided good implementation examples in terms of increasing women's labour participation through PWPs. There are different approaches in all countries that can provide important insights into the Turkish PWP case, and that can constitute examples to reform the PWP system in Turkey in order to increase its effectiveness.

2.10.1. India

The Indian case is very important in order to understand the development of PWPs, as the country has used PWPs for a long time, and the process has evolved. Since gaining independence in 1947, there have been numerous endeavours by national and state governments to guarantee livelihood security and protect vulnerable masses against famines and other adverse shocks (Dey & Imai, 2015). Among these endeavours, Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGS) was the first attempt of a PWP in India which aimed, in general, to guarantee livelihood security and poverty alleviation. Historically, it was conceptualized as a demand by a movement that emerged against the state in the Maharashtra region, on account of drought in the late 1960s and especially in the early 1970s (Patel, 2006). Following this movement, an EGS was launched in 1965 in the Maharashtra region by the Chair of Maharashtra State Legislative Council and social activists (Overseas Development Institute,

Policy Brief 6, 2006). Since its inception there have been many changes in features such as selection and payment methods. These changes and new measures taken within the process will be discussed.

The EGS was subsequently expanded after the large drought in 1971 in India and the need for widespread employment relief. Among many attempts in the post-independence period, the longest lasting EGS programme in India was the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, which started in 1979 in Maharashtra and remained in operation for around 25 years (Dey & Imai, 2015). The EGS, in general, incorporated three dimensions in its design. The first was that work would be given on demand to all. The second, the scheme has a statutory right, protected by law. The third, it had a separate and autonomous EGS fund, accrued from taxes levied on urban professionals used to finance this scheme (Patel, 2006).

In 2005 the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) was adopted across the country and through that Act, the programme became a constitutional right for all citizens. In 2009, the Act was renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) which provides the largest employment scheme in the world.

The main objective of the Act is to enhance livelihood security in rural areas by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed paid employment in a financial year to every household whose adult volunteer will do unskilled manual work. MGNREGA's aim goes beyond solely poverty alleviation as it identifies employment as a legal right; this is slightly different to other PWPs implemented in India in the past. According to this Act, work is to be made available to anyone who asks for it within 15 days of receiving an application to work, failing which the state government is liable to pay unemployment allowance. Through this rule, the aim of PWP is to embrace the principle of the right to work (Ministry of Law and Justice of India, 2005).

The programme was expanded quickly. In 2006-7, 200 of the poorest districts were covered out of a total of 619 districts (907 million person days generated, benefiting 21 million households). In 2007-8, 330 districts were covered (1,437 million person days generated, benefiting 33 million households) and, in 2008-9 all districts were included (2,163 million person days generated, benefiting 45 million households). In 2009-10, 1,765 million person days were generated, benefiting 39 million households; a remarkable achievement. Women

constituted 49.5% of all persons working in 2009-10 which is well above the original 30% target (International Labour Organization, Brief no 2, 2010).

In India the target group is defined as all adults in the household, regardless of caste, gender, income group, self-targeting or targeted based on low wages and unskilled work. Although there is geographical targeting, the main rule is rather universal. Thus, every household in rural areas is entitled to participate in programmes, irrespective of its income (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015). On the other hand, there is a targeting mechanism to ensure the rights of vulnerable groups, such as persons with disabilities, primitive tribal groups, nomadic tribal groups, denotified tribes, women in special circumstances, senior citizens above 65 years of age, and internally displaced persons participate in the programmes. Programme officers procure the services of resource agencies/civil society organizations working for the disabled/vulnerable. These agencies are responsible for assisting the implementers in identifying disabled and vulnerable persons, mobilizing them and ensuring that have participate in PWP in India (Ministry of Rural Development Government in India, 2005).

Nevertheless, in the Indian case, due to a universalistic approach, the decision as to whether or not to participate is left to participants. However, they keep the wage rate constantly below the market wage and implement the programme in certain regions where poverty is most prevalent, and thus may require some people to travel a long distance for few days of temporary work. The regional implementation and relatively low wage level instinctively target a specific group of people, those how are most in need, even though universally everyone can participate (Imai, 2016).

In the Indian case, the scope of all PWPs relate to environmental services, and most of them are related to agricultural activities. Although there are PWPs whose scopes are relevant to environmental services, there are also different scopes of PWPs that can be categorized as social infrastructure, such as educational or cultural activities.

As seen from the general feature of the PWP in India, the programme targets the poorest districts involved in agrarian activities, and has lasted more than 40 years. These features show that the programme fits the WB's third categorization, which defines low-income agrarian countries where seasonal weather shocks and variation affecting well-being and labour demand can occur. Besides that, its length and massive structural design features are well in

conformity with McCord's first two categories which are based on the scale and length of PWPs.

2.10.2. Argentina

Meanwhile, there are PWPs being implemented following economic crises in regions where the economic conditions are relatively better than in India. In Argentina, due to rising poverty related to the increase in unemployment caused by the effects of the 1995-1996 recessions, a number of labour market reforms were planned. The *Trabajar* programme was settled through those reforms. The *Trabajar* programme provided six hours per day of public works temporary employment to members of poorer households not receiving unemployment benefit, training or other assistance, primarily in small-scale local development projects, which were also implemented to benefit the poor. After 1999, the programme began shrinking for budgetary reasons and subsequently reached fewer participants. In 2001, it gave way to the *Jefes* programme (Kalman, 2015).

In 2001, the Argentinian economy plunged into its most severe crisis in history. The unemployment rate, which had been accelerating in the years prior to the financial crisis, peaked at 21.5% in May 2002. The worsening living conditions prompted thousands of people to join peaceful protests in December 2001. A broad coalition of groups of unemployed, progressive labour, human rights, and small business organizations promoted a national campaign run exclusively by volunteers demanding that the government implement a jobs programme for the unemployed (Tcherneva, 2012a).

The experiences of “Jefes de Hogar Desocupados programme” (“Heads-of-Household Plan”) introduced during the 2001 crises showed that a massive employment programme could be implemented in a relatively short time and that a federally funded programme could be speedily administered locally with the participation of non-profit/non-governmental institutions (Chakrabarti, 2013).

According to Plan Jefes, the Government of Argentina promised a job to all heads of households satisfying certain requirements. In order to qualify, a household needed to have a child under the age of 18, a person with a disability, or a pregnant woman; the household head had to be unemployed; and each household was generally limited to only one participant in

the program. The programme provided households with 150 pesos (approximately 1\$) a month for four hours of work a day, five days a week. Programme participants were mainly engaged in the provision of community services and/or enrolled in worker training programs administered by local NGOs (Tcherneva, 2012b).

Basically, Plan Jefes offered a voluntary job opportunity, including completing basic education, to unemployed heads of households in a community project which was federally funded but locally administered. The program's total spending peaked at 1% of GDP, with nearly 2 million participants. It was equivalent to about 5% of the population and 13% of the labour force (Tcherneva, 2012a).

The main goal of this programme was not infrastructural development but the provision of community services (community kitchen, handicrafts and other activities). As a result, women's participation rate was above 70%. In the first year of its implementation, the programme saved about 10% of the participants from sliding into extreme poverty, but evaluation also questioned the programme's effects on growth, as household consumption did not increase in the long term (Kalman, 2015).

Argentina's targeting mechanism was based on the head of household. Male or female household heads with children who are either 18 years of age or younger or disabled are defined as eligible. Likewise, households in which the female head, spouse, concubine, or cohabitant partner of the male household head suffers from serious health conditions are also eligible. However, coverage errors were substantial due to the inability of the programme to verify the unemployment status of the applicants based upon this criterion. Over half of Argentina's employment is in the informal sector, but the programme could only verify formal sector job status with confidence (Koochi-Kamali, 2010).

According to Kostzer (2008), Argentina's *Jefes* programmes is divided into six major categories in terms typology. The first is community projects which involve a wide range of activities related to local development, both in terms of support and production of public good, like child or elderly care, health programme supports or sewerage and irrigation schemes, construction and maintenance of schools and hospitals, forestry, parks maintenance, and building of community centres and sports halls. The second category is microenterprises projects that participants initiate on an individual or collective basis, such as housing

maintenance, carpentry or small metal workshops. The third category covers programmes where participants choose to go back to school to finalize their formal education. Although vocational training is listed as the fourth category, only 4% of participant take part in this type of programme, and because of lack of a specific programme there have been implementation problems. The fifth and sixth categories are administrative work at municipalities, or in the private sector, respectively, which exclude those involved in schooling or training. In this type of programme, participants can be considered employed, or at least employed part-time at 20 hours per week (Kostzer, 2008).

2.10.3. South Korea

Another PWP example similar to Plan Jefes is the Korean case. After the financial crisis in 1997, the Korean government carried out economic and social reform. Among those reforms, PWPs were targeted at unemployed people, those with low income and those not eligible for unemployment benefits. The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs coordinated the Public Work Projects under the supervision of the Committee of Unemployment Policy chaired by the Prime Minister. Most of the work projects are allocated to local governments. At the local level, the city/district governments administered the PWPs (Kwon, 2002).

PWPs provided jobs to those who otherwise would have lost their source of income. In South Korea, other schemes and programme were not well equipped to function as an ultimate safety net of income support for the newly employed. Therefore, whether PWPs actually cover the major target groups at high risk of unemployment, especially the low skilled, the long-term unemployed, and poor unemployed heads of the household is an important indicator that measures the distribution effect of PWPs (Lee, 2000). The amount of spending devoted to the PWPs was higher than any other social assistance programme in South Korean history. The total number of participants varied in each year, but, for example, in 1999 PWPs provided on average 400,000 jobs at a certain point in time, which accounted for a 2% unemployment rate reduction (Kwon, 2002). In South Korea, an income support measure, PWPs were implemented counter-cyclically and on a temporary basis allowing them to mitigate immediate social impacts and avoiding long-term pervasive effects such as higher structural unemployment (ILO, EC-IILS Joint Discussion Paper Series No.2, 2011).

In South Korea the scope of PWPs are totally different compared with India, but have some similarities with those in Argentina. In the South Korean case, although there are some PWPs related to forestation or new construction of small public facilities such as community parks (which can be counted as environmental services), mainly the scope of PWPs relate to public works like teaching children on cultural assets or more saliently providing assistance in resolving computer problems.

More profoundly, in the South Korean case, PWPs are divided into four categories. The first is the infrastructure-maintaining projects, including cultivating forests, building small public facilities and repairing public utilities. The second is the provision of a work force to social service and charity organizations, such as community centres and welfare institutions. This sort of work includes a variety of jobs, such as maintaining the facilities of those institutions and teaching children in after-school classes. The third is environmental clean-up work, which includes roadside cleaning and rubbish collection. The fourth is information technology-related projects where the young people and those who are computer-literate are targeted. In this category, PWPs provide timely help for many central ministries and local authorities, which have a great deal of backlog in digitalizing their databases (Kwon, 2002).

Both the Argentina's and Korean PWP examples are fit perfectly in the first categorization of the WB where defined macroeconomic circumstances play a major role in the implementation of PWPs. Separately from the scale and duration of PWPs, the sudden fall in demand for labour also comprises similarities to the categorization of McCord.

2.10.4. South Africa

In South Africa, the first PWP was established under the name of The National Public Works Programme in 1994. Unlike the Indian case where unemployment is largely cyclical (e.g. seasonal due to slack periods in agricultural production), in South Africa the causes of unemployment are structural and historical (Devereux & Solomon, 2006). The programme aimed to provide rapid and visible relief for the poor, and to build the capacity of communities for development, ranging from basic infrastructure such as roads to income-generating projects such as communal agricultural undertakings (Phillips, 2004).

In July 2002, the government agreed that a 'massively expanded' PWP would form a key component of a comprehensive employment strategy. Since that time, PWPs have almost come to dominate the current social protection and labour market discourse, representing the policy instrument of choice to address both poverty and unemployment in South Africa (McCord, 2004). In 2004, the South African Government initiated the programme under the name the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) with the aim of creating 4.5 million work opportunities. The EPWP was implemented by governments in infrastructure, social, non-state and environment and culture sectors. EPWP objectives centre on poverty reduction, employment, infrastructure provision and growth. Intensive methods were used in the provision of public goods and services (Knysna Municipality, EPWP Policy, 2016). The comprehensive structure of South Africa's PWPs and their mode of implementation are important in understanding the shortcomings of PWPs. The measures taken against these shortcomings are good examples to aid understanding of the implementation of PWPs.

In South Africa, the self-selection method is used to determine participants. However, this is not sufficient to ensure the efficient rationing of the extremely limited number of jobs created through PWPs. Unclear policy guidance on selection criteria may exclude the poorest from participation due to socio-economic power inequalities or the existence of political divisions. Therefore, frequently combinations of lottery and community selection techniques are used to select participants. However, a survey indicated that based on the lottery technique, up to 30% of the participants who were recruited were already employed rather than unemployed (McCord, 2003b).

In order to overcome the inefficiency of the self-selection method, South Africa's EPWP uses categorical targeting to include women, young people and people with disabilities. Women, young people and the disabled are the official targets for PWPs, with the objective being the recruitment of 60% women, 20% aged between 18 to 25, and 2% disabled. In South Africa, both young children and the elderly are identified as in need of support on the grounds that they are not able to provide for themselves by way of wage labour. Therefore, age categories are applied to benefits, sometimes in conjunction with gender. The Old Age Pension applies, with a means test, to women from the age of 60 and men from the age of 65. It is also possible to use categories of ethnicity, race or language in targeting benefits (Leatt et al., 2005).

Lastly, South African PWPs were originally conceptualized as an instrument for asset and employment creation through the promotion of a community-based PWP and changing the rules governing the provision of infrastructure to increase labour intensity across all government departments with responsibility for infrastructural delivery. Although the initial aim was to increase labour intensity in South Africa, PWPs focused instead on more conventional programmes driven by communities. According to the National Empowerment Fund of South Africa, PWPs primary goals are to create/maintain infrastructure, reduce unemployment, create productive jobs, educate and train workers, build community capacity, strengthen local government and community-based institutions, and lastly generate sustainable economic development (McCord, 2003a).

2.11. Implication for Turkey

This chapter shows that there are many PWP implementations, and that the objectives differ from region to region. Many PWPs are initiated after sudden economic shocks. These kinds of PWPs are mostly implemented one time only. The Korean and Argentinian cases are implemented for this reason. However, there are also many PWPs whose implementation reason is adverse environmental impact or structural unemployment. In these cases, PWPs tend to be repetitive in nature. India has the longest-standing tradition of PWP implementation, having done so since 1970s. In addition, South Korea has also been implementing PWP projects for more than twenty years, expanding implementation areas over time. Although the Turkish case has similar reason for implementation, at its inception, in terms of macro-economic difficulties as in South Korea and Argentina, the continuity of PWPs in Turkey separates it from these cases, and converges more with South Africa.

The variation of objectives is strongly related to level of income. While low-income countries mostly use PWPs as a tool for poverty reduction, middle-income countries use them to remedy macroeconomic crises. At this point, again, South Korea and Argentina use PWPs as a remedy to economic difficulties, where India and South Africa use PWPs for more structural issues such as long-term unemployment and severe poverty. In Turkey, PWP implementation aims to reduce unemployment and also provide income for participants. In this context, it has features of both objectives, which will be examined in detail in next chapter.

There are important points that need to be considered in order to implement a successful PWP. Setting a wage rate below the market wage is crucial in reaching vulnerable groups. In addition to the wage rate, defining specific target groups or geographical regions are substantial factors in reaching the neediest groups. The wage rate and defining target groups are becoming more important aspects in countries with weak administrative capacities due to lack of ability to determine whether participants are eligible or ineligible. All countries have their own rules in identifying eligibility criteria. Only the Indian case is unique, in that it has a right-based approach to its PWP, though it still designs its PWP projects with geographic targeting as well as setting the wage rate below the market wage. The selection method is also an important tool while selecting the poor, and South Africa uses the lottery method in order to manage excessive demand. The Turkish case also has a detailed targeting mechanism and different selection methods, which will be scrutinized in the following chapter.

On the other hand, high-income countries refrain from using PWPs due to their high cost and crowding-out effects, and they have developed different intervention methods that are more efficient compared to PWPs. Nevertheless, PWPs are still a prevalent policy tool for many countries and Turkey is one of the countries implementing PWP projects.

Furthermore, gender sensitivity is an important dimension in terms of reaching the most vulnerable groups in the community. For this reason, India and South Africa impose a quota for selecting participants. Women with children also became a priority condition in Argentina. In this context, the next chapter also examines gender participation in the Turkish case.

The next chapter will also analyse and examine Turkish PWP projects in line with the general concepts of PWPs through a literature review. In the next chapter, country examples are also used in comparing a situation with different samples, and reveal the current situation in Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TURKISH PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMME

3.1. Introduction

The Turkish Public Employment Agency (İŞKUR) implements PWP projects in Turkey. Since 2007, PWP projects have been implemented actively, and over two million individuals have been involved in PWP projects over five million times. Since PWP projects started, more than 100,000 programmes have been implemented throughout Turkey. PWP projects are implemented in all regions in Turkey. In 2018, more than 350,000 participations occurred. More than 200,000 participants have already been involved in PWP implementation since June 2019. The majority of the programmes implemented are in the scopes of environmental and school cleaning.

Although the regulatory base for the programme was designed in 2005, PWP projects were actively put into practice in 2008 when the global economic crisis started, and the unemployment rate reached the highest ever levels, prevailing from 2009 to the present. In this context, PWP projects are a rather new employment measure for Turkey compared to other countries, whose PWPs date back to as early as the 1970s or earlier. Nonetheless, the use of PWP projects by İŞKUR is increasing rapidly each year.

The implementation of PWP projects throughout Turkey has many similarities but also differences with other countries, though there are more similarities with low-income countries. From a broader perspective, implementation in Turkey is in line with international implementation examples. The main focus of PWP projects in Turkey is to create temporary employment for a certain period of time and provide income support to unemployed people. İŞKUR is the responsible institution for implementing Turkish PWP projects. An unemployment insurance fund managed by İŞKUR allocates the entirety of financial resources for Turkish PWP projects. At the beginning of their implementation, the Department of Active

Labour Market Service conducted the entire process, but later the Department of Employment Services took over the implementation process.

Turkish PWP projects have been implemented for more than 10 years all around the country. PWP projects provide income opportunities for certain groups of people who have minimal opportunities to access labour markets formally. On the other hand, due to the poor design of PWP projects, many non-poor participate in them. A detailed explanation and examination of the PWP process in Turkey is provided in the following sections.

3.2. A General Overview of Turkish PWP Projects

In order to implement successful PWP projects, it is necessary to allocate a budget which includes funding flows. Then, setting the wage rate, the selection process, timing and duration, determining the scope, monitoring and evaluation processes are key in implementing a PWP successfully.

There are no strict rules on implementing a new PWP in Turkey. According to the Unemployment Insurance Act, 30% of the annual premium income from the unemployment insurance fund is allocated to the General Directorate of İŞKUR each year with the aim of increasing labour force employability, reducing the risk of unemployment and taking measures to promote employment (Unemployment Insurance Act, article 48, 6th and 7th paragraphs). This resource is distributed to four different areas: training courses, entrepreneurship programmes, on-the-job training programmes, and lastly PWP projects. A part of this fund is allocated to PWP projects among other ALMPs. The General Directorate of İŞKUR distributes this financial resource to the provincial directorates without setting criteria or defined rules. The percentage of resources allocated to PWP projects has increased significantly. In 2009 it accounted for around 20% of total resources, but 92% in 2015 (Calculated by Author from İŞKUR's Data). Compared to other ALMPs that are run by İŞKUR, PWPs are far more able to provide immediate employment to its participants. Mainly because of this functionality, decision makers prefer to implement more PWPs each year rather than other ALMPs. Moreover, due to the higher expenses compared to other ALMPs, the percentages have been significantly increased in the course of time. Following financial allocation, provincial directorates implement PWP projects at the local level. The scope, timing, target groups and

other features of a PWP are generally determined by local dynamics with decisions taken mutually by İŞKUR and contractors.

In the process that follows, İŞKUR makes an announcement on its website in order to inform the candidate participants, and includes the scope of the PWP, the institutions responsible for conducting it, the number of persons to be recruited for the PWP, etc. The selection process of the applicants follows the announcement process. Once the participants are selected, the PWP project is launched with duration of up to 9 months.

A relatively weak aspect of PWP implementation in Turkey is the monitoring and evaluation processes. In brief, the regulation provides for a monitoring process under the provincial employment boards which govern under the presidency of the governor in each city. The board assigns two people, one from İŞKUR and a second from other agency or public institutions, as auditors of the PWP. As there is a lack of sanctions which can be applied against contractors, effective monitoring does not exist in Turkey. On the other hand, ambiguous targeting and implementation methods of PWP projects make evaluation of the outcomes and assessment of how accurately the unemployed people benefit from PWP projects less effective.

The Public Works Programme budget is allocated from the unemployment insurance fund, rather than the national budget. This differs from the Indian case, which is funded from tax revenue. PWPs are offered for anyone who is unemployed and there are no condition required from participants to receive unemployment insurance payment. As the PWP target group is wider than the unemployment insurance fund focus group it is convenient to allocate PWP expenditure from national budget. In this context, there are many criticisms from various labour market social partners (such as unions, employers and NGOs) about the use of this fund. Purportedly, those fund resources are being put back into employment activities through the implementation of PWP projects throughout Turkey. However, there are issues that need to be considered and re-designed, such as selection process, targeting mechanism as well as the monitoring and evaluation processes.

3.3. Eligibility Rules for Participants

There is an important rule, both in the active labour force regulation and the related Communique, which states that in order to prevent an existing job being filled by a PWP

participant, a participant cannot participate in a PWP where they have worked with the PWP contractor within the previous year. The primary objective of this rule is that despite the fact that PWP projects provide temporary jobs, one of their main aims is to stimulate employment level in the country. Under this rule, people who have already worked with the contractor within the previous year are excluded from the PWP, and this enables other candidate participants to participate in the PWP who have not previously worked with that PWP contractor.

According to the ALMP Regulation, the first and foremost requirement to become a participant in a PWP is to be unemployed. As long as a person is unemployed and registered with İŞKUR, they can apply to a PWP to become a participant. In other words, while implementing a PWP project, given that PWP projects require minimum skills, there are no eligibility requirements like education level, professional experience or other qualification certificates to participate. However, in order to reach more vulnerable groups, some eligibility requirements are specified in the Turkish case, such as giving priority to women or people with disabilities.

Following this brief introduction, the particular features of Turkish PWP projects in terms of legal framework, features and status of PWPs in Turkey, mode and amount of payment, right to leave, the link between social assistance and PWP projects, selection methods, targeting mechanism, scope of PWP projects and monitoring and evaluation will be examined.

3.4. Legislative Framework

The legal basis of the Turkish Public Works Programme has its origins in the Labour Force Adaptation Services Regulation, adopted in 2005. This regulation was renamed the Active Labour Market Services Regulation in 2013. The Regulation relies on the Unemployment Insurance Fund Law and the Turkish Employment Agency Law. Through the Turkish Employment Agency Law, İŞKUR became the authorized institution in regulating and implementing vocational training and other courses or programmes in order to raise the eligibility of unemployed people. On the other hand, the funding required to implement those courses and programmes is met by the unemployment fund through the article number 48 of the Unemployment Insurance Fund Law.

Even though the name of regulation was changed in 2013, no fundamental changes were made to the rules and implementation of Turkish PWP projects. The new regulation clarified ambiguous issues that occurred while implementing and adjusting certain unclear rules which may have obstructed uniform implementation in provinces across Turkey. Following the modification of this regulation, the Communiqué on PWP projects was adopted in the same year. This Communiqué is the first comprehensive official paper that defines the implementation rules, in-depth design, and rights and duties of all three parties, namely İŞKUR, contractors and participants.

The regulation and subsequent Communiqué set out the main framework of Turkish PWP in legislation. According to the Active Labour Market Services Regulation, the aim of the PWP is to bring the unemployed, particularly those who have difficulties in finding employment, into the labour market; prevent them from becoming too distant from working habits and discipline; and to provide temporary income support through activity or service for the benefit of society directly, or through a contractor in certain periods or places where unemployment rates are extremely high (ALMP Regulation, article 62).

According to its definition, the main aim of this Programme is to make the unemployed employable, and to ensure the transition from the unemployed status to being a participant in the labour market. While including this aim in its main definition, probably the legislator particularly refrains from using the term “short-term employment”, instead using “temporary income support” due to the possibility that the participants may expect to transfer from temporary employment to permanent employment if the word “employment” is included in the title.

Furthermore, in the Public Works Programme legislation, there is no particular reference to the Labour Law, despite the fact that the Public Works Programme specifically embodies an employment relationship. This may be because if they do not define the relationship between the participant and contractor as an employment relationship, then there is no need to mention issues such as maternity leave. İŞKUR authorities might think to refer to the Labour Law in the Public Works Programme regulation and Communiqué may leave the responsibility that the Labour Law designates. Through the disregard of Labour Law, İŞKUR probably set the Public Works Programme as an exception of Labour Law. This standpoint explicitly gives

more flexibility to İŞKUR and the contractor while implementing a PWP project in terms of labour rights and duties that the employers (in this case the contractors) must observe.

3.5. Features and Status of Public Work Programmes in Turkey

Initially, this programme was named “Work Programme for the Benefit of Society (*Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programı*)”. Nevertheless, this programme is named “For the Benefit of Society Programme (*Toplum Yararına Programı*)” in 2013. The reference point of the Turkish Public Works Programme title differs slightly from similar PWP examples in other countries. For instance, Argentina’s PWP is named “*Programme for Unemployed Male and Female Heads of Households*” and the most recent programme running in India is named “*Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes*”. Both PWPs clearly refer to employment issues in their titles, either by using the term “employment” or “unemployment”. In the Turkish case, while at the beginning of the implementation, the word “work” was included in the title of the Programme, the legislators avoided using the word “employment” in the title. Probably the main reason for this was the concern that participants would misconstrue PWP projects as a regular and permanent type of employment. Therefore, the word “work” may be removed from the title of the programme.

This approach is mostly reflected in the fact that many people were recruited as temporary workers for a public institution, and after a while their status was changed to permanent workers. According to legislative intention mentioned by decision makers at İŞKUR and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the perception of the participants that there is the possibility of permanent work after participating in a PWP project may impair the effectiveness of the PWP.

Another issue with the Turkish Public Works Programme is the change in the responsible department at İŞKUR. In line with the change in the title of the PWP, the responsible department in İŞKUR was also changed. Statutory Decree 665 issued in 2011 resulted in deep structural change in institutions in general. With this amendment, responsibility for the implementation of the programme was taken over by the Department of Employment Services from the Department of Active Labour Services.

This amendment is important in understanding how İŞKUR's institutional approach to PWP projects changed with the change in the title of the Programme. Officially, until the statutory decree, PWP projects were counted as an ALMP. However, after the amendment it was counted as an employment service instead of an ALMP. Therefore, the responsible department changed.

These changes are not coherent concerns relating to the perception of participants, where they may see a PWP project as regular and permanent employment type. Although the responsible department and the title of programme changed, no significant changes in the implementation of PWP projects have occurred since then. İŞKUR tried to address misconceptions of the Public Works Programme by removing the word "work". However, they officially count PWP projects as an employment service, which precipitates the misconception enormously.

There is no uniform decision on the part of social actors on the status of PWP participants over whether they are workers or just programme participants. The state approach to the issue is to keep them as programme participants as long as they can. However, the long duration (9 months) and the repetitive feature of PWP increases the demand of participants to alter the status to a permanent job. It may consider that the people, who regularly participate in PWP projects every year and do not seek employment in the private sector due to the extended length of the PWP projects are justified in their demand for permanently employed status. It is assumed that PWP implementation distorts the future labour market expectations of participants, because they become highly depended on PWP projects, and this does not fit with the intended temporary employment and income support feature of PWP projects. In order to mitigate these drawbacks, in September 2017 a new time limit rule stated that a person can participate in PWP projects for a up to a maximum of 24 months. This limited the potential for endless participation and may have reduced the expectation of participants that permanent employment would be an outcome.

The main income of almost all participants is the wages from PWP projects, and during the PWP period the participants' main focus is to work in the PWP. They do not look for any other employment, and this defines them as workers. However, most of the rights of a PWP participant differs from those of other workers. That is why, in order to maintain a distinction between existing workers and PWP participants at contractors, İŞKUR authorities prefer to use the term "participant" rather than "worker". In this way, İŞKUR is being cautious over

possible complications. No matter what they call the PWP participants, it may be explicitly stated that PWP participants are actually excluded in terms of the rights held by other workers or other rules that are determined by the Turkish Labour Law and other relevant regulations. However, there are no court decisions that recognize this phenomenon and currently the implementation of PWP projects maintains that they are participants, not workers.

3.6. Wage Level, Mode of Wage Payment and Vested Benefits

PWPs are a useful tool to protect people from financial difficulties. Considering that participants receive the current minimum wage during a PWP project's implementation period, particularly in poor regions, it is an important income opportunity for participants. A PWP project's wage rate is the highest institutional financial support compared to other social assistance programmes currently implemented in Turkey.

When compared to all ALMPs run by İŞKUR, PWP projects ensure the highest payment for their participants. In terms of payment methods, PWP projects diverge from other ALMPs. The rationale behind the payment relies on two objective criteria. The first objective of payment is to cover transport expenses of unemployed people. Thus, İŞKUR endeavours to make unemployed people available for participation in a course or programme. The second objective is to help the unemployed person meet their daily subsistence needs, such as lunch or other daily needs, while attending the courses. The distinction between PWP payments and other programmes/courses is that ALMP payments facilitate the attendance of courses, whereas PWP payments aim to increase levels of income. As well as these, İŞKUR also pays the participants only short-term insurance payment to ensure their safety while attending a course or programme.

While the purpose of all payments is to ensure that people remain available over the period of programme or course, PWP projects aim to provide temporary income support to participants rather than solely supporting their essential costs during the period of a programme. This is the most distinctive feature of PWP projects compared to other programmes and courses run by İŞKUR.

In addition to the logic of payments, the amount and timing of PWP payments are also different from other programmes. All other course and programme payments are calculated on a daily

basis, while PWP projects are calculated on a monthly basis. Apart from this, in the payment of PWP projects, days off are paid, while in other programmes, the participant is only paid for days attended.

Furthermore, the long-term insurance payment is only paid for PWP participants, and not for other ALMPs (these payments help a person to qualify for the state pension). This is another important feature of PWP payment distinguishing it from other ALMPs. This characteristic of payment means that PWP payment is beyond the aim of ensuring that a person is simply available to attend a programme or course.

Despite differences in the logic of payment and vested benefits like long-term insurance payment, for most participants the wage level is the most important factor in deciding to participate in a PWP. There are international debates on the wage level of PWP projects. Many studies indicate that there is no optimum wage level in theory, but in practice, any level slightly lower than the prevailing market wage for unskilled labour may be appropriate. However, it is important to bear in mind that the programme wage should not be set at such a low level that it stigmatizes the work, thus leading to “poor but proud” people going hungry rather than taking part in PWP projects (Lipton, 1996).

In the Turkish case, wage levels are set at the same level of the actual minimum wage. The relatively high wage level in Turkey leads to non-poor people to applying for PWP projects as well as vulnerable groups.

In Turkey, different geographical regions have different levels of development. In this regard, the minimum wage payment of the PWP projects diversifies the profile of possible participants. In relatively high-income regions, mostly poor and needy unemployed apply to PWP projects, though in poor regions demand from the non-poor is increasing.

Payments are made through the banking system. This has been a rule since PWP projects were launched. There is no single bank that must be used country-wide, rather the bank used for payment is determined by the contractor and it is usually the same bank used for payment to other workers.

The Provincial Directorates of İŞKUR are only able to make the payment after the contractors send the payroll. The payrolls are prepared monthly by contractors and delivered to the provincial directorates of İŞKUR. The main difficulty in the payment cycle concerns the delays in the preparation of payrolls. According to the Communiqué, the first PWP payment should be ready within the first seven days of the following month. However, the preparation of payrolls are often delayed by a lack of capacity at the contractor or insufficient allocation of human resources at the PWP projects for the preparation of these documents. This is the biggest issue that participants struggle with almost every month in terms of the PWP payment system. In many cases, the first payments can be delayed by up to 50 days, and these delays may systematically continue until the end of programme.

İŞKUR does not make a payment before receiving payrolls from contractors and all the information concerning payrolls are recorded in İŞKUR's digital information system. Only then is the money transferred to the contractor's bank account which is equal to the monthly amount of expenditure for the total number of participants. Until now, there are not fraud in any PWP projects that appear in the court. In this context, in September 2017, a new clause was added to the Communiqué and defined a sanction stating that if a contractor fails to pay a participant's social insurance payments, the suspension period would be 36 months instead of 2 years.

Even though there are some delays in the monthly payment system and there have been occasional instances of fraud in implementation, the PWP payment method is still functioning reasonably and the amount of payment is adequate.

3.7. Right to Leave

Another important point alongside the wage level of PWP projects is the right to leave during the PWP periods and the payment conditions of the leave. During a PWP, participants have a right not to attend a programme for up to 14 days. Paternity/maternity leave and marriage license, as well as days off clarified with a medical report or an official document are included in these 14 days. In all circumstances, payment is not made to PWP participants on days of leave. Due to social security regulations, the Social Security Institution will pay for the participant's pension premium only if a participant provides a medical report.

The rules above concerning leave are rather strict and put participants in a difficult situation. This issue manifests itself in women participants, particularly those who are pregnant or have young children. There are no regulations or privileges for pregnant women or rest periods for nursing mothers in PWPs. For women participants who have babies and/or young children, there is a big challenge in terms of balancing work and family. In many international cases nursing mothers are allowed to take periodic breaks to breast feed their babies, such as in Zambia (Dejardin, 1996). However, in the Turkish Public Works Programme there no regulations that promote women's rights.

3.8. The Link Between the Social Assistance System and the Public Works Programme

At the beginning of the Public Works Programme implementation, policy makers associated the Programme with social services. In the first version of the Communiqué, there was a regulation which makes a link between social assistance beneficiaries and the Public Works Programme. In this first version, there was a rule that stipulated that people benefiting from social assistance were not able to participate in any PWP projects. According to article 8 of the Communiqué, social assistance beneficiaries had to give up their assistance if they wanted to participate in a PWP. This rule was the basis of the link between PWP projects and the social assistance system in Turkey.

Through the regulation, İŞKUR authorities intended PWP projects to become an efficient instrument in the fight against poverty. According to İŞKUR authorities, the link between the social assistance beneficiaries and PWP participation requirements would be a remedy to the dilemma in the social assistance cycle in Turkey. However, the former Ministry of Family and Social Policy requested that this rule not be implemented soon after the article was enacted in the Communiqué. The Ministry claimed that the rule preventing participation in PWP projects while receiving any kind of social assistance was too general and made no consideration about the distinction between types of social assistance. This claim has reasonable grounds when considering there are various types of social assistances which can be either financial or in kind. As a result, İŞKUR made a modification in the selection requirement for participants. According to the new rule, there would be no requirements for participants, regardless of whether they received social assistance or not. Together with the modification in the Communiqué, the final list of all PWP participants was to be sent to the former Provincial Directorate of Family and Social Policies, which would then decide whether those PWP

participants would continue to receive social assistance beneficiaries or not. This method ensured the link between social assistance and PWP projects became more appropriate in terms of identifying participants who may still need to receive social assistance while participating in a particular PWP. On 14th of November 2014, with a new amendment in the Communiqué, this rule was revoked completely. This paved the way for participants to participate in a PWP while receiving any kind of social assistance.

In the last decade, use social assistance programmes has peaked and become prevalent throughout the country. There are many critics of the improvement process of social assistance programmes in Turkey. According to a study, social assistance beneficiaries reported that the top three most effective methods of poverty reduction were provision of economic growth, promotion of employment possibilities by the government, and inclusion of more family members in working life, which implies women and child labour (Çoban et. al., 2011). In accordance with these studies, PWP projects may be an important tool in helping social assistance beneficiaries however removing the social assistance beneficiaries from priority group while selecting the participants contradict with this aim.

3.9. Selection Methods

Similar to the examples in other countries, in the Turkish Public Works Programme, there is a challenge in identifying people's needs more accurately and from a more comprehensive perspective. The selection methods and target groups are very important in reaching the most vulnerable people who are most in need of PWP projects, particularly in relatively poor regions. In the Turkish case, there have been several changes in the PWP selection methods over the course of time.

Initially, the selection of the participants was performed by a draw at random in the presence of a notary public. There was not any age, gender or disability status requirement in selection methods in terms of giving priority to particular groups in the participation process. At the beginning of PWP implementation in Turkey, the duration of a PWP was too short. The maximum duration of a PWP was only 3 months. Due to this limited period, İŞKUR authorities anticipated that the self-selection method would gain functionality itself. They presumed that those looking for a regular job would not apply for such short-term work, and only those who truly needed urgent income would participate in temporary work. In addition to this, because

PWP projects do not require any skills, there would be no need to establish a selection committee which might cause unnecessary bureaucracy. All these assumptions and the preferences of İŞKUR authorities indicate that the self-selection method would implicitly be effective from the very beginning of PWP implementation in Turkey.

However, with the passage of time, the period of implementation was increased to 9 months. In addition to this, the waiting periods between two PWP projects became shorter, and the perception of participants changed, seeing PWP projects as a permanent employment option rather than temporary. Because of these changes, non-poor people started to apply for PWP projects. Consequently, during the selection process the decision mechanism started to struggle with the number of requests. Although there are no studies evaluating the number of non-poor participants among the total number of participants, it is estimated from the complaints coming from local residents and the implicit feedback from the provincial directorates, that non-poor participation in PWP projects has increased due to the extended period of PWP projects and their relatively high income opportunity compared to other employment activities. Excessive demand for PWP projects has led local politicians and high-level bureaucrats to become more involved in the selection process in one way or another. Under newly introduced conditions, a new selection method allowed contractors and İŞKUR authorities to select participants for a PWP project directly, rather than selection being governed by the luck of a draw. The selection method of PWP projects is divided into three different methods as follows:

The first method is mentioned above, whereby all the participants are selected by a draw in the presence of a notary public. In the second method, all participants are selected by interview. The official name for this method is the “listing method”. It may be that, because there is a negative perception in the term “interview,” which reminds to many people in Turkey favouritism, İŞKUR authorities did not prefer to use it. In fact, no matter which term they use, all the processes in this method embrace the undesirable effects of favouritism. In this method, the decision makers’ priority may deviate in terms of their local relations with people who want to participate to PWPs. Most of the time, in the listing method, their focus and priority in selecting participants takes the form of doing favour to the ones they know, instead of evaluating all candidates based on objective criteria such as needs or poverty degrees. The third method for the participants is a combination of methods one and two. The first time this hybrid method arose, 70% of the participants were selected by a draw in the presence of a

notary public and the remaining ones were selected using the listing (interview) method. However, in order to restrict use of the listing method, the rates between two methods have been changed slightly with the Communiqué on the Public Works Programme adopted in 2013. According to the new Communiqué, the new proportion of participants to be selected using the listing method is 20%, with the proportion selected by draw in the presence of a notary public method set to 80%.

Considering the required specifications for an unskilled labour job, the most objective selection process would be to select all participants by a draw in the presence of a notary public. Unlike the Indian case where the decision as to whether or not to participate is left to participants, Turkish PWP project wage rate is equal to market wage. Thus generate excessive demand and in order to transfers resources equally to all members in society, this method is more cost-effective and equitable. Simply because anyone who is willing to participate in a PWP, given the simple requirements of the work, can do everything a PWP would require of them. That means, intrinsically, a PWP does not need a selection committee or an evaluation process. On the other hand, this method excludes the assessment, and does not necessarily reach the neediest and most vulnerable groups, though in cases of excessive demand, it is the easiest, fastest and cheapest way to select participants. However, due to interest group pressure and political expectations, the determination of the participants has become the most complex and compelling process in the PWP cycle.

PWP projects can be a very useful tool, whether a person is poor or non-poor in rural areas where employment opportunities are scarce. In this context, a programme with at minimum wage for 9 months during the school year (September to the end of June) might be the best job opportunity for the majority of that population. These kinds of advantages increase the number of possible candidates who want to participate in a PWP, thus causing difficulties in the selection process.

In the changes of the selection method, excessive demand and external interventions played an important role. The reasons for court orders for convicted criminals may also play a role in the change of the selection method. During the selection process there needed to be a distinction otherwise, it could be possible to select a person accused by the child abuse when implementing a PWP with the Ministry of Education in a school. This kind of possibilities cannot be eliminated if the only selection method were the draw in the presence of notary,

there would be no possibility to examine the reasons for court orders. Thus, it would cause an inconvenient situation while implementing a PWP. That is why the selection methods needed to be changed and the listing method was introduced. Even though this prediction somewhat valid, the selection method for PWP projects is not impartial, and especially when using listing as a selection method, political intervention can significantly influence the determination of participants.

The reasons mentioned above are related to political concerns, and have stronger impacts on the changes to the selection method. Another reason for the changes to selection method is the demand of contractors to employ only male participants in PWP projects due the scope of those projects. If the only selection method were a draw in the presence of notary public, there would always be the possibility of selecting a female participant. The listing method may result in the exclusion of women from PWPs, and most of the time, in agreement with the contractors, local politicians may use this method against women participation.

The first and the primary reason the contractors demand male participant lies behind the scope of PWP projects. Particularly the scope of PWP projects run with municipalities cover the renewal public infrastructure. In this scope, mostly asphalt paving, maintenance of the sewerage systems and irrigation canal renovation activities are implemented. These activities require physical strength, and this is why the municipalities demanded male workers in implementing PWP projects.

The decision on which selection method is to be used for a PWP is out of the control of the provincial directors of İŞKUR. In almost all cases, the governor of that province decides which selection method will be used for PWP projects. On top of this, if the listing method is used, then the provincial directorates of İŞKUR have very limited influence on the process of participant selection. It is evident that in the listing method, the selection process is conducted by the provincial presidency of the ruling party and the governor of that province. Together, they prepare a list determining PWP participants with very limited involvement from the provincial directorates of İŞKUR. The selection process becomes highly politicized with the listing method. Political intervention leads to more non-poor participation in PWP projects.

The below table shows the selection method preferences of provincial directorates for PWP projects in the past three years. Majority of them, at 67%, preferred using the listing method.

Only in 10% of all PWP was the hybrid method used, and 23% of all PWP projects used a draw in the presence of notary public. These rates explicitly indicate that the majority of PWP participants are selected through local dynamics where politics is frequently involved in the process.

When looking at the last three years' preferences of provincial directorates, it is seen that there was a fluctuation in 2016 in terms of selection method, and the listing method decreased to 50% in total, but in 2017 the listing method rose up again to 72%.

Table 2. Rates of Selection Methods

	2015		2016		2017		2018	
Listing Method	2,286	72%	1,459	50%	4,840	72%	3,234	64%
Draw	499	16%	1,002	35%	1,483	22%	1,431	28%
Hybrid (20% / 80%)	409	13%	431	15%	408	6%	360	7%

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

In 2017, 26 provinces among 81 preferred to use the listing method only as a selection method. Only two, Afyonkarahisar and Nevşehir Provincial Directorates, used the draw in the presence of notary public method. Lastly, the table indicates that there is no significant difference between the regions in terms of preferring the selection methods.

3.10. Targeting Mechanism

Due to excessive demand, some crucial changes have been made by İŞKUR in order to alleviate the non-poor participation. In order to reach the vulnerable groups among the applicants, a new targeting mechanism was developed in the Communiqué.

Although there are still three different selection methods, it was still a major challenge to recruit the most vulnerable groups due to biased interventions from local interests and politics. In order to decrease these interventions, particularly when the listing method was chosen as a selection method, a target group was identified and decision makers were forced to select that group first instead of other people who applied to a given PWP. While developing this kind of target group, the aim was to reach the most needy and vulnerable people during the selection period.

With this objective, the Communique designated the target group under the name of “priority group”. Women, men over the age of 35, persons with disabilities, ex-convicts and veterans injured during the fight against terrorism but not counted as retired are included in this priority group. The characteristics of the participants were identified precisely as far as possible and so as not to introduce difficulties in determining if an applicant is in the priority group or not. Thus, the determination of the priority group is limited to age and gender, and it stipulated an objective document that people can take from hospitals or other government agencies, depending on their situations.

According to the targeting mechanism, applicants are divided into two groups. One group contains those in the priority group and the other group includes men under the age of 35. In this system, the major rule is that if there are enough applicants in priority group during the selection process, the committee must consider only the priority group.

In other words, following the targeting mechanism requirements, if there is a sufficient number of applications whose status matches the priority group, it means all the participants must be selected from the priority group. If there is an insufficient number of applicants in the priority group, only then can these PWP projects be filled with men under the age of 35.

The main intention of the targeting mechanism is to exclude men, particularly younger ones, from participating in PWP projects. According to İŞKUR decision makers’ opinions, the young men are able to find new employment easier than any other jobseekers. In addition, while implementing a PWP, women, people with disabilities and relatively older men are observed as facing more difficulties in terms of entering the labour market. As a result of these rational ideas, the targeting mechanism was adopted in order to increase the number of participants in priority group.

The targeting mechanism resulted in changes in participant demographics. When the demographic characteristics of participants are examined in all PWP projects implemented between 2007 and 2018, it is seen that until 2013 male participation rates were above 70% in all PWP projects. This disproportional rate in terms of gender distribution may be considered as a disruptive factor in the effective implementation of Turkish PWP projects. The rates reversed gradually after the targeting mechanism was adopted.

The imbalance in terms of gender rate differentiation is a problem in other countries as well. In order to resolve the problem, most countries give priority to women at the design or recruitment stage of PWP projects. In some projects, a minimum percentage of female participation is set in the project guidelines (Ninno et al., 2009). In the Indian case, according to the MGNREGA, priority is given to women in such a way that at least one-third of the participants are women who have registered and requested work under the Act. Contrary to these measures, in the Turkish case, there are no rules in terms of a minimum percentage of female participation, but in the targeting mechanism women are counted in the priority group.

Beside women, relatively older people, aged over 35, are also included in priority groups. Similar to this measure, in the South Korean case, priority is given to the head of the household, those who are at prime working ages, i.e. 30 to 55, and age becomes a factor on the aggregate scores in the decision making process (Lee, 2000). The Turkish targeting mechanism brought in age as a feature to give priority separately from householder, a status which is more useful in terms of gender equality.

Again similar to many international cases, in addition to age and gender specification, there are other features which give a person priority in the selection process, such as disability or being an unskilled worker. Although in the Turkish case no significance is afforded to being an unskilled worker in terms of priority due to ambiguities in quantifying this, disability and veterans injured during the fight against terrorism are counted as reasons to be included in the priority group which the targeting mechanism defines.

Apart from priority groups, in September 2017, an additional rule was added to the targeting mechanism. In order to decrease demand, a rule settled that only one person residing at the same address can participate in a PWP at the same time. This address control rule may be considered as an objective measure to decrease excessive demand.

In addition to address control, two other significant rules have been put into practice in order to eliminate the participation of non-poor people. The first rule prevents participation in PWP projects from household whose income is three times higher than the current minimum wage. This rule covers all the individuals who live in the same household. The explicit aim of this rule is to prevent the non-poor from participating in PWP projects. However, due to difficulties

of ensuring institutional coordination while determining the possible revenues of households, it is hard to implement this rule properly. In almost all cases, this rule is applied through a participant statement that declares household income is less than three times the minimum wage. Although İŞKUR may be able to identify the people who live in the same household via the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, and may be able to access some records of individuals, such as being registered at the Social Security Institution, it is not easy to determine all the revenue of a household. Other income, such as rental income or other sorts of revenues, as well as income from unregistered work is not easy to determine. Even so, this rule is an important element to disqualify a large number of non-poor from participation in PWP projects.

The second rule focuses on decreasing the repetitive nature of PWP projects, but it still has a close relation with the targeting mechanism as its aim is to decrease excessive demand and non-poor participation in PWP projects. Since the Communiqué was enacted, participants can participate in the same contractor's PWP project for 18 months at most. This rule was brought in to avoid limitless access to PWP projects for each participant. However, it appears that participants have organized themselves to shift contractors when the participation limit is reached, and it is possible for a certain participant to participate in PWP projects without end. In order to address the endless re-participation cycle, in 2017, this rule was changed and regardless of which contractor's PWP project a participant has participated in, all participants may only participate in PWP projects for 24 months. The intended objective of this rule is to decrease the repetitive feature of PWP, as well as eliminating non-poor participation in PWP projects.

It is indicated that the targeting mechanism is directly influenced by the participants' demographic characteristics. It can be argued that the ratio of female participation and the age range are notably increased. The following table shows the number of participations on a yearly basis in terms of gender distribution.

Table 3. The Number of Participants of Public Work Programme

PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMMES						
Year	Number of Programmes	Participant Information				
		Male		Female		Total
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
2007	16	173	95%	9	5%	182
2008	14	132	95%	7	5%	139
2009	1,627	33,229	73%	12,238	27%	45,467
2010	1,901	32,697	78%	9,369	22%	42,066
2011	2,424	50,434	79%	13,651	21%	64,085
2012	5,022	144,902	75%	47,096	25%	191,998
2013	4,722	141,925	72%	55,257	28%	197,182
2014	5,191	136,047	63%	80,061	37%	216,108
2015	7,380	241,496	56%	187,737	44%	429,233
2016	3,372	91,895	53%	81,100	47%	172,995
2017	5,160	122,793	46%	144,131	54%	266,924
2018*	4,770	106,988	47%	119,725	53%	226,713

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

As seen from the table, the number of participants increased until 2014. There were increases in every year between 2009 and 2014, except for in 2010. In 2012, 2013 and 2014 the number of participants increased to around 200,000, peaking in 2015 with over 400,000 participants. However, the following year saw a remarkable decline in the number of participants, though expenditure on PWP projects continued to increase. In the last two years, the number of participants settled at around 250,000.

The table indicates that until 2017, the number of male participants was higher than the number of female participants. Though from 2010 the number of female participants constantly increased, the participation rate of women did not exceed 40% until 2015. In the following years, the percentage of women participants increased constantly and in 2017, for the first time, female participation rate was over 50% and stayed at a similar level in 2018 as well. It can be argued that the increasing rate of female participation is a concrete and direct result of the targeting mechanism. The designated rules of the targeting mechanism forced both the İŞKUR provincial directorates and contractors to recruit more women in the PWP projects.

Another result of the targeting mechanism in the demographic characteristic of PWP projects can be observed in the age range of participants.

Table 4. Rate of Participants Based on Age and Year

Age Range	2014			2015			2016			2017			2018*		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
15-19	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%
20-24	7%	4%	11%	7%	4%	11%	7%	5%	11%	5%	6%	11%	5%	6%	11%
25-29	9%	5%	13%	7%	5%	12%	5%	5%	11%	4%	6%	10%	4%	7%	11%
30-34	8%	7%	16%	6%	7%	14%	5%	7%	12%	3%	8%	11%	4%	7%	11%
35-39	11%	8%	19%	9%	9%	19%	9%	10%	18%	8%	11%	19%	7%	10%	17%
40-44	11%	7%	18%	9%	9%	18%	9%	9%	17%	8%	10%	18%	8%	9%	17%
45-49	8%	4%	12%	7%	5%	12%	7%	5%	13%	7%	7%	14%	8%	7%	14%
50-54	5%	1%	6%	5%	3%	8%	6%	3%	9%	5%	4%	9%	6%	4%	9%
55-59	2%	0%	2%	2%	1%	3%	3%	1%	4%	3%	1%	4%	3%	2%	5%
60-64	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%	0%	2%	1%	1%	2%
65 +	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Total	63%	37%	100%	56%	44%	100%	53%	47%	100%	46%	54%	100%	47%	53%	100%

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

The above table shows that the average age ranges between men and women have increased. The majority of both male and female participants' age range is 35-44. Although it is not on the table in 2012 and 2013, most of the male participants were in the age range of 25-34, whereas for women it was 30-39. In addition, female participation rate increased in the majority of age groups

Another interesting trend can be seen in specific changes in female participants' inter-regional rates. The targeting mechanism also has an impact on female participation rates in terms of region, and this fact falls is shown in the table below on an annual basis.

Table 5. Rate of Participants Based on Regions and Gender

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018*	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Marmara Region	48%	52%	39%	61%	33%	67%	39%	61%	35%	65%	32%	68%	36%	64%
Aegean Region	55%	45%	37%	63%	39%	61%	49%	51%	44%	56%	39%	61%	42%	58%
Mediterranean Region	57%	43%	53%	47%	49%	51%	47%	53%	48%	52%	42%	58%	47%	53%
Central Anatolian Region	76%	24%	72%	28%	65%	35%	53%	47%	48%	52%	42%	58%	44%	56%
Black Sea Region	72%	28%	67%	33%	60%	40%	54%	46%	51%	49%	42%	58%	42%	58%
Eastern Anatolian Region	85%	15%	82%	18%	75%	25%	68%	32%	65%	35%	59%	41%	54%	46%
Southeast Anatolian Region	83%	17%	81%	19%	72%	28%	68%	32%	65%	35%	61%	39%	58%	42%

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

The above table clearly shows that there is a large difference in different regions in terms of gender participation rates. The female participation rate among total participants is higher in the western regions of Turkey. In the eastern regions, female participation rates are relatively lower. In 2013, the Eastern Anatolian Region had the lowest female participation rate with only 15%, and over the years there was a modest increase, peaking at 46% in 2018. Only the Eastern and Southeast Anatolian regions did not exceed a level of 50% in terms of female participation in all given years. In contrast, the highest female participation rate was seen in the Marmara region with 68% in 2017, and it maintained the highest rate of among all years in the table. Beside the Marmara region, the Aegean region was the second region where female participation rates were above 60% in 2017.

The western part of Turkey has more employment opportunities and higher market wage level compared to the minimum wage. Therefore, the PWP wage level does not attract non-poor men to participate in PWP projects. However, in the eastern part of Turkey less income opportunities lead more men to participate in PWP projects. This rate also shows that more people in eastern regions are willing to participate in PWP projects and this affects gender rates overall.

The final set of data reflects the effects of the targeting mechanism in terms of demographic characteristics. The following table consists of the number of participants, separating them based on whether they were in priority groups or not.

Table 6. Number and Rate of Participants Based on Priority Groups

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018*	
Female	47,096	25%	55,257	28%	80,061	37%	187,737	44%	81,100	47%	143,038	54%	119,725	53%
Male over age 35	60,993	32%	63,586	32%	80,504	37%	140,204	33%	59,991	33%	86,316	32%	76,458	34%
People with disabilities	3,446	2%	4,314	2%	652	0%	11,019	3%	4,476	3%	7,278	3%	7,257	3%
Ex-Convict	1,121	1%	1,033	1%	1,329	1%	2,309	1%	1,020	1%	1,468	1%	1,523	1%
Veterans injured during the fight against terrorism	0	0%	0	0%	12	0%	15	0%	7	0%	15	0%	10	0%
Male under age 35	79,342	41%	72,992	37%	53,550	25%	101,292	24%	31,904	17%	36,477	14%	30,530	13%

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

The number of males under the age of 35 decreased rapidly after 2015. Notwithstanding, the participation rate of the given group was over 40% in 2012, the data indicates that lost their majority in 2014 compared to other participant groups with different characteristics. In addition, in the last year the participation rate of who are under the age of 35 decreased to 13%, that group's lowest rate ever.

In contrast, the participation rates of men over the age of 35 and women increased steadily. In 2014, 74% of total participants were comprised of these two groups and their number of participations was about 80,000 each. In the last year, the female participation rate increased to 53% while the participation rate of men over the age of 35 became 34%.

According to the table, the number of people with disabilities increased considerably in 2015, reaching approximately 15,000. The targeting mechanism is an important tool to include people with disabilities in PWP projects.

Lastly, ex-convicts and veterans injured during the fight against terrorism had total participation rates lower than 1% in all given years. The number of participations of ex-convicts rose to 3,000 in the last year but still the rates are negligible.

Consequently, the targeting mechanism directly influenced the demographic characteristics of participants in terms of both gender and age. This mechanism has had a direct effect on the participation numbers of women and people with disabilities. When it is combined with income checks, it may be assumed that the mechanism has led to more vulnerable groups participating in PWP projects.

3.11. Scopes of PWP Projects in Turkey

The scopes of PWP projects are crucial in terms of reaching the main aim of PWP and creating valuable assets for the public good which increase living standards, particularly in poor areas at the end of a PWP implementation. Logically, the scope of the programme should be defined by geographical location, timing (seasonal, only in certain months of the year, etc.) length/duration and expected number of participants.

Certainly, in the Turkish case there have not been any preparatory works undertaken while specifying the scope of PWP projects. There are nine different scopes that are written both in regulation and the Communique, and there is one more scope that is extensively implemented in provinces, but not a part of legislative framework: mosque cleaning and Quran courses. Although in many cases, the General Directorate determines the number of participants, the period of a programme, and even in some contracts that the provincial directorates should implement the PWP. However, it is not involved in the process of determining the scope of PWP projects. In addition, there are no criteria that set rules defining under what circumstances which kind of PWP scope should be determined as a PWP.

There are many intersection points between Turkish PWP projects and international cases in terms of the scope of programmes. Park landscaping, afforestation and soil conservation in the Turkish case can be given as examples that are similar to international cases. However, there are significant differences in terms of methods of project identification which is key to determining the scope of a programme. Some countries, such as India, have a transparent community participation in sub-project identification and the subsequent sub-project implementation. Contrary to the community participation approach, in Turkish PWP projects there is no transparency in determining the scope of a programme. In addition, the frameworks of programme scopes are determined very strictly by regulations and there is no flexibility in decision mechanisms when determining the scope of a PWP, or adjusting one in line with the

recent needs of current conditions. Furthermore, even if the scope of programmes has been defined very strictly, the contractors do not employ the participants as they are supposed to according to the requirements of that specific scope. The lack of a monitoring system in Turkish PWP projects and the political factors are the main reasons for these unfavourable situations in terms of both the rigidity of determining and improper implementation of the scopes of programmes.

Nevertheless, compared to international cases the scope of programmes in Turkey has some unique points as well. The most distinctive feature is landscaping in schools, and the maintenance, restoration and cleaning works in schools which remain loyal to the Ministry of Education. These two scopes, in a way, are the distinguishing features of Turkish PWP projects, and determining PWP project durations, the month range, and the annual budget allocation is largely based on these two scopes. The school year and the number of schools are the foremost factors that design the implementation of PWP projects in Turkey. Additionally, the re-utilization requirements are also determined in accordance with these two scopes. According to the regulation, if participants have been involved in a PWP for up to 9 months, that means they have to wait 3 months in order to participate in a new PWP, which is equal to the summer vacation period of schools.

In addition to these two scopes there is one more being implemented in Turkey but not mentioned in the regulation or Communiqué, which is cleaning of mosques and Quran courses. This scope also differentiates Turkey from other countries too. Obviously political factors have given rise to this, and in order not to draw public reaction it was not included in legislation as a new scope. Although in some international cases local religious institutions are involved in PWP implementation to help with coordination or acting as a contractor for a PWP in order to decrease the poverty and to create valuable assets, there are no traditional examples of religious institutions that directly belong to the central government and have their own financial sources to carry out necessary work like cleaning the house of worship.

Alongside the differences and similarities of programme scopes considering the activities that the participants carry out, there are not any activities to provide skills to participants. In parallel to this, until September 2017, while determining the scopes, there was a consideration that the participants are not required to have any qualification or vocational competence. In addition, PWP projects do not embrace any vocational training programme or activity that may possibly

provide skills for participants. However, since September 2017, a temporary scope has emerged that requires a security certificate. This new condition was created on the demand of Ministry of Education, as it made a request to activate PWP participants in security duties, in addition to cleaning. Even though becoming a security guard require specific skills, İŞKUR temporarily accepted the implementation of the scope of security related activities for two school years from 2017 to 2019. Hence, a protocol signed by three Ministries, including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education and former Ministry of Labour and Social Security in October 2017.¹ According to the protocol, nearly 10,000 people were recruited into PWP projects in the scope of security services for two school years. Although the scope of security in schools is defined as temporary for 2 years it is assumed that it will become a permanent practice. If the Ministry of Education does not allocate more resources for school services, PWP Projects will continue to subsidise them, including security. The requirement of a certificate is explicitly contradictory to the aims of temporary income support through unskilled work in PWP projects. However, political preferences are in this direction and thus lead to the misuse of the unemployment fund and induce an exception in the scope of PWP projects for the time being.

Apart from security work, almost all scopes of PWP projects rely on psychical strength suited to unskilled labour such as cleaning or maintenance of buildings, afforestation, and rehabilitation of the parks. These scopes and work carried out by participants do not lead to them becoming skilled or qualified in order to integrate and remain in the labour market easily. In addition to these, due to the lack of monitoring system in PWP projects, it is not possible to create a valuable asset while implementing PWP projects.

There are nine different types of scopes and one additional scope as already stated. These nine scopes are listed in article 63 of the Labour Market Services Regulation, and the last scope originated with a directive written by the General Directorates of the Provincial Directorates.

- Environmental Cleaning
- Renewing Public Infrastructure
- Environmental Cleaning in Schools
- Maintenance, Restoration and Cleaning of Schools

¹ <http://www.meb.gov.tr/toplum-yararina-program-protokolu/haber/14709/tr> (11.05.2019)

- Restoration and Preservation of Historical and Cultural Heritage:
- Afforestation
- Park Landscaping
- Valley and Stream Improvement
- Work to Prevent Soil Erosion (Soil Conservation)
- Cleaning Mosques and Quran Courses

The chapter will continue with a detailed explanation of PWP scopes in Turkey.

3.11.1. Environmental Cleaning

This scope has the highest recognition level among the PWP scopes in worldwide examples. This scope relies on physical strength and allows participation of all kinds of people, including women and those with disabilities, and it has been widely chosen as a PWP scope. Environmental cleaning is commonly determined as the scope for Turkish PWP projects as well.

As stated above, there are no explicit explanations about what participants should do in any PWP projects in terms of scope. There are ambiguous issues concerning the responsibilities of participants in terms of what to do, and this is particularly obscure in environmental cleaning. In this context everything between pollution control and sewerage and sewage treatment can be subjects of this scope. In order to preclude potential benefit to private land or individuals, İŞKUR authorities narrow down the range of this scope and specify that places people can freely access can be the subject of environmental cleaning.

In substance, participants carry out simple cleaning work in public areas within the scope of environmental cleaning. In this scope, the crucial point is to define which areas are counted as public places in terms of PWP implementation. For instance, the surrounding area of a governor's office could be called a public space, but if people do not have permission to access that area freely and if any area implements security checks before entering, it cannot be the subject of the environmental cleaning scope in the opinion of İŞKUR authorities.

Nevertheless, even though it is stated in regulations that while PWP is implemented, private and closed areas cannot be the subject of the environmental cleaning scope due to the lack of monitoring and blurred interpretations of the scope characteristics. In many cases, participants have carried out duties irrelevant to the scope. It is reported that many contractors employ participants as general servants, having them check documents or even clean toilets, which is clearly not environmental cleaning.

Until now, there have been no existing studies on what kind of works are or should be carried out in the scope of environmental cleaning. Misinterpretations and questionable implementations lead to contractors using PWP projects to carry out duties within their own institution, replacing actual workers with PWP participants. This occurs mostly with the scope of environmental cleaning as a result of its ambiguous definition.

3.11.2. Renewing Public Infrastructure

This scope includes various forms of infrastructure development activities. In this scope, projects can include laying of asphalt, water pipe and parquet stone paving, as well as developing water drainage systems and improving the sewage system. In the Turkish case, municipalities mostly chose this scope for PWP projects.

Unlike in other country examples, the budget for PWP projects is solely allocated for the labour costs in Turkey, and that is why there is no imbalance the labour costs and other expenditures. In some cases in South Africa, in construction-based PWP projects, contractors used only 10% of the total budget for labour costs, and the rest was spent to other expenses like procurement of raw materials or other required materials (Thwala, 2007). Similarly, in the Indian case there are also issues concerning the balance between labour costs and other expenditures. Due to the imbalance in the share of labour costs in total budget, both countries restrict the cost of materials and administrative expenses to a certain percentage of the total budget. In Turkish case, while there are no problems in terms of the share of labour costs in the total budget, a lack of proper planning and participatory decision making mechanisms in determining local needs obstructs the creation a valuable asset at the end of PWP projects.

In addition to the low potential of creating valuable asset in the implementation of PWP projects, in the public infrastructure scope, there are more difficulties in the selection process than in other scopes. Due to the heavy psychological nature of the work, most contractors demand male workers and İŞKUR's approach to this demand differs from one province to other. Here, the provincial director's approach is the determinant factor, and if they look at the Public Works Programme as a social assistance programme, and reject the idea of discriminating the labour division based on the PWP project's scope, then they will insist objective selection methods. However, the majority of the directors' approaches are to select male participants for this kind of PWP scope.

3.11.3. Environmental Cleaning in Schools

The third and fourth scopes are peculiar to the Turkish case. Due to privatization and subcontracting policies, the state itself does not directly employ cleaning workers. Thus, there is a gap concerning cleaning work at public schools, and the cleaning of schools has become an issue across Turkey, particularly in suburb and rural areas. PWP projects are ideally suited to solve this situation. By implementing PWP projects, the state can employ people without using the central budget and also does not need to bind itself to any work contracts or other responsibilities related to job security. As mentioned before, the maximum length of a PWP project is set to particularly coincide with the public-school year calendar. Initially, the maximum length was 3 months, and over the course of time this limit was gradually increased to 6 months at first, then to 8 months and finally to 9 months. This fits exactly with the school year calendar from September to June. Besides, in the Active Labour Services Regulations, two scopes were listed specifically for schools to allow environmental cleaning in a closed area. As mentioned above, only if the area is freely open to all people can a PWP project be implemented in the scope of environmental cleaning. In order avoid this rule, a new scope brought in via the Communiqué specifically defines the environmental cleaning of schools.

3.11.4. Maintenance, Restoration and Cleaning of Schools

The fourth PWP scope is particularly for work within schools. The most significant distinction between this scope and the others is that this is the only scope which allow the implementation of a PWP project in an indoor area. In order to restrain the misuse of PWP projects, the

regulation only allows PWP projects to be implemented in certain areas, with a specific definition of open areas. However when it comes to schools, the open-area stipulation is disregarded, and this leads to the extensive use of PWP projects in schools. The regulation specifically designates work in closed areas at schools only, so that other state institutions and contractors cannot request PWP projects and then subsequently use participants as servants, drivers, etc.

Moreover, due to the specific features of the scope, the rule that forbids a participant to work in a PWP project if they worked with that PWP contractor in the previous year is not applied for this scope. This means people who used to work as a cleaner or servant in a school under the parent-teacher association responsibility are allowed to participate in a PWP project, regardless of their previous work position.

All school cleaning activities are the subject of this scope. PWP project participants are responsible for everything from cleaning classrooms to gardening. All auxiliary duties at schools (i.e. all those not including education duties) can be a subject of this scope. The range of activity, indoor activity, and the exception of replacement rule are the main feature of this scope.

3.11.5. Restoration and Preservation of Historical and Cultural Heritage:

The unique contractor of this scope is the Provincial Directorates of Culture and Tourism. There are several international examples of this scope. In South Africa, for instance, there are sub-sectors that define the scopes of PWP projects, and one of these is Art, Heritage and Culture. The underlying objectives of this sub-sector is to enhance cultural heritage and rehabilitation of natural resources (Mokgohloa, 2005).

Considering the prevalent historical heritage of Turkey, this scope is ideal for Turkey. However, it never becomes a prominent scope in PWP implementation. One possible reason for this is the timing issue. Due to the work involved in this scope, it would be mostly conducted in summer months, and this short implementation period leads to limited implementation overall.

3.11.6. Afforestation

This scope suits the aims of PWPs around the world as well as in Turkey. First of all, this scope depends on relatively high levels of physical activity which increases the need for labour, and almost all work is in outdoor areas, thus making the scope well suited to the Turkish case.

Since 2015, this scope has seen a wide range of implementation areas in Turkey. In 2015, İŞKUR and the former Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs signed a protocol to implement PWP projects in the scope of afforestation with a quota of 120,000 people. Pruning and planting trees, terracing, and reforestation activities are included in this scope.

3.11.7. Park Landscaping

This scope is one of commonly implemented under the Turkish Public Works Programme. It has similar features to environmental cleaning. The prior condition for implementing a PWP project in this scope is similar to environmental cleaning in that the park needs to be freely accessible to all people. Given this precondition, the major contractor for this scope is municipalities because they are responsible for parks. Almost all the municipalities, from large cities to local districts in Turkey implement PWP projects in this scope.

3.11.8. Valley and Stream Improvement

The last two scopes are typical PWP scopes implemented around the world, especially in developing countries. It covers the improvement of the conditions of valleys and streams which are located all around Turkey. Implementing PWP projects in this scope may help to protect wildlife and sometimes even makes access to clean water easier in some regions. When implementing a PWP project in this scope, the contractors differ depending on the size of the project. Furthermore, when the project involves large areas regional directorates of forestry are the programme contractor. Sometimes the same scope can be implemented with municipalities as well, but the areas covered by the PWP project will be significantly smaller.

3.11.9. Work to Prevent Soil Erosion (Soil Conservation)

The last scope of PWP projects implemented in Turkey is very similar to the previous scope. Again, this scope is one of most frequently implemented in other country examples. The main contractor of this scope is also regional directorates of forestry as well. In this PWP scope, the main aim is to prevent soil erosion where such risk exists.

3.11.10. Cleaning Mosques and Quran Courses

In addition to these scopes, there is one more that is implemented in Turkey regularly. This additional scope comes into practice with a directive to provincial directorates from the General Directorate of İŞKUR. The directive states that provincial directorates are free to implement PWP projects with mosques and Quran courses which are affiliated with the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In accordance with this directive, new PWP projects started to occur with Quran courses and mosques across all provinces. In this scope, projects are similar to those carried out with schools. In this PWP scope, participants either clean the indoor places or make landscape mosque courtyards.

3.12. Comparison and Evaluation of Turkish PWP Scopes

There have been 11 different PWP scopes of implementation since the Public Works Programme has been implemented in Turkey. Aside from the school security scope, none of them are listed as temporary scopes. Nine of the scopes are explicitly defined both in the regulation and the Communiqué. The school security scope is also legislated, but in a provisional article at the end of the Communiqué. On the other hand, the cleaning mosques and Quran courses scope began to be implemented through a directive from the General Directorate and is not presented as an official scope in any İŞKUR document. Until 2018, cleaning mosques and Quran courses was included under the name of other scopes in official papers, and since then, it has been included under the environmental cleaning scope.

The following table shows the number of participants according to scope. Environmental cleaning accounts for the majority of participants in all years. Afforestation and Maintenance, Restoration and Cleaning of Schools are the second and third most common PWP scopes. There have also been significant participation scopes of renewing public infrastructure and park landscaping. Restoration and preservation of historical and cultural heritage, valley and

stream improvement, and work to prevent soil erosion (Soil Conservation) demonstrate modest participation compared to other scopes. Implementation of the school security scope began in 2017, and in the first year more than 9,000 participants were involved in that scope. Participant numbers in the cleaning mosques and Quran courses scope has steadily decreased over the years. This scope has been deliberately included under the environmental cleaning scope, and since provinces enter data under this scope, it is impossible to separate participants working on environmental cleaning or on cleaning mosques and Quran courses.

Table 7. PWP Participants According to PWP Scope

	2015	2016	2017	2018*
Afforestation	126,460	25,727	46,529	28,275
Environmental Cleaning	105,931	53,924	163,817	188,118
Cleaning Mosques and Quran Courses (Other)	56,475	21,411	75	–
Work to Prevent Soil Erosion (Soil Conservation)	386	1,490	8,308	1,831
Renewing Public Infrastructure	27,867	16,272	34,789	20,443
Maintenance, Restoration and Cleaning of Schools	99,485	49,346	56,205	5,344
Environmental Cleaning in Schools	1,556	12,049	11,498	1,077
School Security	-	-	9,339	1,741
Park Landscaping	8,537	8,776	37,492	25,544
Restoration and Preservation of Historical and Cultural Heritage	2,246	1,769	7,334	2,457
Valley and Stream Improvement	290	1,167	7,018	1,023

Author's own compilation based on İŞKUR Internal Statistic Data

Table 8 shows that one of the main contractors involved in PWP implementation is the Ministry of Education. It implements three different types of scope with more than 60,000 participants. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is another important contractor due to extensive usage of PWP projects in the afforestation scope. We may estimate that municipalities and the Directorate of Religious Affairs are the two major contractor who implement PWP projects in the scope of environmental cleaning.

Although there are 11 different PWP scopes, the school-related, afforestation and environmental cleaning scopes account for the majority of all PWP participants. It is important to diversify the scopes in order to create valuable asset for the public. Furthermore, it is also beneficial to develop the skills of participants, even if this is done in a limited way. However due to lack of impact analyses, it is difficult to comment on whether these scopes are beneficial or not. The following section looks at this issue more closely.

3.13. Monitoring and Evaluation

The Turkish Public Works Programme has legal arrangements for monitoring all PWP projects through local unit officers who are authorized by the governor. However, it cannot be claimed that this monitoring is sufficient to prevent misuse and impropriety. In addition to this, İŞKUR does not evaluate PWP projects institutionally, but as a part of a European Union project an evaluation study had been carried out by Meltem Dayıođlu, and she produced a subsequent report in 2014.

3.13.1. Monitoring

The legal grounding of monitoring originates from the Article 13 of the Law on the Turkish Public Employment Agency. The main aim of this article is to define and clarify the authority and responsibility of an inter-institutional board that consists of local provincial directorates relevant to the employment scope named the “*Provincial Employment Board*”. One of the responsibilities of the board is monitoring all ALMP activities, including the Public Works Programme. Furthermore, in reference to the Article 13, there is a regulation which defines the rules and principles of the monitoring process. According to the regulation, all PWP projects must be monitored at least once during their implementation. The supervisory board established by the Provincial Employment Board is in charge of monitoring PWP projects.

Although monitoring comprises many different aspects like identifying and tracking performance as well as making quality-based assessments, supervisory board monitoring is rather narrow. The board’s first and foremost concern is to make sure that participants are attending the programme regularly. The board’s second main concern is to ensure that participants are working in relevance to PWP scopes. Apart from these two concerns, the supervisory boards do not observe or analyse whether PWP projects are efficient in terms of gender equity or as a remedy to poverty, etc. The quality or necessity of assets created as a result of PWP project also is not questioned in the monitoring phase.

The main reason for this situation is that the supervisory board largely depends on governmental institutions, and sanctions are rarely imposed due to political concerns. As result, there is a decrease in the importance of monitoring PWP projects, and an increase of

misuse of PWP projects for irrelevant activities. In order to restrict the effect of local relationships and create a set of objective rules in monitoring, changes were introduced in a Communique in 2016. According to these new arrangements, all PWP projects must have expected outcomes before they start. In accordance with the PWP scope, the İŞKUR Provincial Directorate and contractor must clarify the expected outcomes a PWP project together. In pursuit of those outcomes, whether they are in progress or not, supervisory boards monitor all PWP projects periodically, depending on the features of the outcome.

PWP projects were previously designed using general frameworks with the collaboration of the Ministry of Education but without a specific number of schools or regions. Following the new arrangements, before implementing a PWP project, contractors must now clarify specific outcomes. All PWP projects must be designed with relevant outcomes in the chosen scope before they are implemented. In this example, from school names to how many classes will be the subject of a PWP project are specified before the project starts. By doing this, authorities expect to increase the precision and explicitness of PWP projects before they are implemented. This allows a supervisory board to observe more specific outcomes while monitoring.

In parallel with the process of designing specific outcomes for each PWP project, a new system was developed to monitor all PWP projects through the General Directorate. A new input field was added to the system, where the expected outcomes of each PWP project could be tracked by the İŞKUR Provincial Directorate to monitor the progress of each project. This provides the ability to monitor all PWP projects from a central unit. However, since 2016 İŞKUR authorities have not assessed any figures to improve the efficiency of PWP projects. Therefore, even though there has been some progress in regulations in terms of monitoring, the results of monitoring are not taken into consideration in the design of PWP projects, either locally or centrally.

3.13.2. Evaluation

Although decision makers claim that PWP projects are not good value for money and there are misapplications, particularly in the selection process, none have sought to evaluate those mistakes or produce a written report on them. Only a European Union Project named *“Improving the Quality of Public Employment Services-I”* provided a report evaluating Turkish PWP projects written by Dayıođlu.

The evaluation process in the report used two methods: İŞKUR's institutional registration and mini field research. More than 750,000 records were examined, revealing the basic characteristics of participants. There was also a comparison between two groups; those who participated in a PWP, and those who did not participated in a PWP project. By using different methods Dayıođlu tried to analyse the possible effects of a PWP project on participants. According to the report, compared to non-participants, participants are less educated and mostly live in the eastern part of Turkey. According to the author, due to high levels of implementation in the east of Turkey, PWP projects are not only used as ALMP but also used as a transfer payment in terms of decreasing social inequity. She emphasizes that through geographical targeting, PWP projects may reach more unemployed people.

In addition to those comments, Dayıođlu also used Social Security Institution (SGK) records in order to determine whether PWP project participants had a job before and after finishing a project. She stressed that PWP projects have a very limited effect in terms of finding a job after the project is over, comparing those who participated in PWP projects and those who did not. However, when she analysed the records from a gender perspective she found different results. According to the report, there is a positive effect in women finding a job after a project. Conversely, participating in a PWP project has a negative impact on men, which means men tend to find more jobs if they do not participate in PWP projects. Another interesting point that the report stresses is that PWP effects differ depending on geography. While in western regions of Turkey, PWP projects have a positive effect on finding subsequent employment, in east regions they have no effect.

Besides results based on institutional records, the evaluation report also featured field research. The field study only consisted of participants selected by a draw in the presence of a notary in order to eliminate unobservable effects which occur mostly as a result of misuse in selection methods. The main aim of field research was to determine the differences between pre- and post-PWP participation in terms of working hours and income, data not recorded by İŞKUR. However, the research found that there were no effects in terms salary income or working hours.

These results are very important in reshaping the PWP implementation cycle, particularly from a gender and geographical perspective. However, there are no substantially influential points in the report in terms of implementing PWP projects in general because the decision makers

do not want to change the existing PWP mechanism. This has led to increasing malpractice in PWP projects and weak monitoring and evaluation, allowing these negative factors to perpetuate. Though there have been several developments in terms of measures to strengthen the monitoring system, as a result of a lack of strong will in the decision making mechanism, these measures have not been seriously taken into account.

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF PUBLIC WORK PROGRAMME; A FIELD STUDY IN TURKEY

The main objective of the field study conducted for this thesis is to understand and evaluate the ongoing process of PWP projects in Turkey from the implementers' point of view. In this thesis, in-depth interviews were used to achieve this objective. As part of the field study, 10 interviews were conducted with those who are substantially involved in PWP implementation. Interviewees have different positions in regard to their role in the PWP implementation process.

The field study focuses on implementers rather than participants. The main objective of the study is to reveal a holistic discussion of PWP projects. There are many challenges in the implementation of PWP projects, from choosing the contractors to identifying the quotas given to them and even the start date of a project. Besides, there are many ambiguities in the scope and selection process of PWP projects. Furthermore, the targeting mechanism and legislative arrangements are also controversial. These issues mainly occur at the level of implementers/implementing institutions. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the administrative and institutional issues in the implementation of PWP projects, and therefore the participants of specific programmes are beyond the scope of this study. It is important to note that the decision makers in İŞKUR are also hesitant about contacting with participants. It has been observed during the field study that they tend to be unwilling to stay in touch with the participants and collect their views about PWP projects in order not to reveal any negative feedback from them. Thus, in the field study, interviewees were selected from the implementer side, and include İŞKUR and contractor authorised personnel.

The individuals were selected from different positions in order to gather different point of views about the functioning of PWP projects. There are three main authorities selected, including the General and Provincial Directorates of İŞKUR, as well as the contractors

substantially involved in the implementation process. As detailed below, these three organizations embrace the main functioning of PWP projects.

The General Directorate of İŞKUR is the main authority for the planning of PWP projects and provision of legislative arrangements. It is also responsible for management, budget preparation and allocation between the provinces. Yet another function is observing the impact of PWP projects throughout Turkey. Notably, the General Directorate has a key role in designing PWP projects. The General Directorate has the most influential position on designating the main features of the Public Works Programme in Turkey.

The Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR, in turn, is the local authority for all operational processes of PWP projects. Provincial Directorates implement PWP projects in accordance with the direction of General Directorate of İŞKUR. In many cases, the quota and the contractors are determined by the General Directorate in advance. Although they have limited power in determining the contractors, all decisions are made by provincial directorates while implementing PWP projects, i.e. selection process, monitoring, payment, etc. Almost all the procedures are conducted by provincial directorates with the collaboration of contractors.

Lastly, another key actor in implementing PWP projects are the contractors. They are crucial in accomplishing the objectives of PWP projects. Their approach and attitude are determinant on the scope of PWP projects and the conditions under which participants work. Contractors work directly with participants and mainly specify the duties and work of participants. In addition, contractors have a critical role in the follow up of PWP projects. Their employment decisions are inextricably linked to the sustainability of PWP projects.

Consequently, the field study includes respondents from three different organizational levels. With this approach, in-depth interviews have been conducted with 10 respondents from different organizations. As can be seen in Table 9 below, among them, three interviewees work in the General Directorate of İŞKUR. Two of these are in managerial position who finalized the legislation changes and decide on a solution to the conflicts that arise during implementation across provinces. The other is a specialist, and is responsible for the preparation and coordination of all process concerning PWP projects in the employment services department.

Table 8. Summary of Interviewees

	Institution	Position	Responsibility	Gender	City
Respondent 1	General Directorate	Specialist	Planning & Designing the PWP	Male	Ankara
Respondent 2	General Directorate	Coordinator	Planning & Designing the PWP	Male	Ankara
Respondent 3	General Directorate	Head of Department	Planning & Designing the PWP	Female	Ankara
Respondent 4	Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR	Provincial Deputy Director	Implementer	Male	Ankara
Respondent 5	Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR	Departmental Manager	Implementer	Male	Ankara
Respondent 6	Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR	Officer	Implementer	Male	Ankara
Respondent 7	Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR	Officer	Implementer	Male	Ankara
Respondent 8	Provincial Directorate of National Education	Officer	Implementer	Male	Ankara
Respondent 9	Municipality	Officer	Implementer	Female	Ankara
Respondent 10	Bilkent City Hospital	Officer	Implementer	Male	Ankara

Four of the interviewees work at İŞKUR provincial directorates. They are responsible for all actual and ongoing processes. They implement the Public Works Programme through the legislation and directives given by the General Directorate. They have direct contact with both contractors and participants. Provincial directorates are the main coordinators of PWP projects in the implementation phase. Again, two of these interviewees are in managerial positions. One of them is deputy of the respective Provincial Directorate and the other one is the department manager responsible for PWP implementation. The other two are technical staff who track, coordinate and designate all operations from the beginning to end of the PWP cycle.

Three interviewees are from contractors. All of them are the main coordinators in their institutions responsible for the implementation of PWP projects and have more than three years' implementation experience. One works in Bilkent City Hospital, another works in a

municipality, and the last is from the Provincial Directorate of National Education. They are all involved in PWP implementation from selection process to the scope of PWP projects, as well as payment operations, etc. In this regard, all of them have enough experience to discuss the ongoing processes of the Turkish Public Works Programme.

All the interviews were conducted face-to-face at the interviewees' offices. The interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes. None of the interviewees refused the request of interview during the study. Only one of the contractors' officers from the municipality did not respond to a phone call. The contact with the interviewees from the General and Provincial Directorates was made with the permission of the head of the Employment Service Department. The provincial deputy director established the connection with contractors. The interview that conducted with interviewees obtain from the Middle East Technical University Human Subjects Ethics Committee.

Three different questionnaires were prepared, which have similar questions, but differ slightly according to the position of the respondent. All of the questionnaires were semi-structured. Due to the ambiguous nature and different approaches in the implementation of PWP projects, the questions were carefully designed and did not contain explicit opinions on the assessment of PWP projects. In order to collect more and confidential data about PWP implementation in Turkey, the semi-structured interview method was used. It is assumed that with a little guidance of interviewees in the semi-structured method, interviewees may respond in more detail and with more clarity.

All the questionnaires consist of the same three main parts (See: Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). The first part aims to reveal the general objectives of the Public Works Programme and its legislative framework through the interviewees' own opinions. The legislation questions were not asked to contractors as they do not participate in legislation-making process.

The second part of the questionnaire is the most comprehensive. It is divided into four subparts, in order to examine the implementation process in all aspects (i.e. method selection, targeting mechanism, scope of programme, etc.) from the points of view of the respondents. The questions in this part about selection methods, targeting mechanism, contractors and scope of PWPs were asked to all positions.

The questions in the respective subparts also have small distinctions specifically for each position. One of the additional questions posed to Provincial Directorate interviewees is about whether they have any difficulties with contractors or not. On the other hand, a question only asked to interviewees in contractor positions in the contractor subpart aims at getting their suggestions in terms of increasing their possible contributions to PWP projects. Additional questions were asked in the selection methods subpart to the contractor interviewees, about whether the PWP participants are those they need, and if not, how the number of required participants can be increased. Besides these additional questions and the ones which distinctively were not asked to contractor's interviewees there are not any major difference in this part.

The aim of the third part was to evaluate the perception of interviewees about the impact of PWP projects on the employment status of participants. There are no differences in the questionnaire for General Directorate and Provincial Directorate interviewees in this respect. However, there are two additional questions for interviewees from contractors. The aim of these questions is to evaluate their employment choices related to PWP implementation as well as how the Public Works Programme may alter their recruitment situation. The first asks whether they have employed any participants after completing a PWP project, and other one asks if PWP implementation did not exist, would they employ any workers for that specific position or not.

A detailed analysis of interviews is provided in the following sections. The analysis below is divided into seven parts in order to address the different issues in more detail: objectives/definitions of PWP projects; assessment of legislative framework; selection method, targeting mechanism; assessment of contractors; programme scopes; and impacts on participants' employment status.

4.1. Definition / Objectives of PWP Projects

This section aims to reveal the interviewees' own understanding of the Turkish Public Works Programme. It is key to discussing the general concept of PWP projects and useful in evaluating the consistency of the responses. Therefore, this section will analyse the interviewees' own explanation of PWP, as well as its objectives.

There are explicit differences in the approach to the definition of the PWP Project in Turkey depending on the position of the interviewee. Interviewees from İŞKUR responded to the definition question with an academic approach:

PWPs have been created with a Keynesian understanding² (R2)

We can define PWPs as income-generating public welfare jobs used when there is a structural problem in the labour market's supply and demand balance, and the balance breaks down, thus increasing unemployment.³ (R6)

Both of the respondents defined a PWP as a tool to increase the labour supply and decrease the unemployment margin. According to Eichner (2013), PWPs support the Keynesian argument of government intervention, and rightfully, PWP expenditure can be used to raise overall level of employment. From this point of view, the respondents have reasonable explanation about PWPs.

Another interviewee from İŞKUR General Directorate defines the Public Works Programme as a fast intervention tool.

When there is an emergency, there is a chance to provide employment within 7 days. When there is a flood, immediate intervention can be made. If you provide new staff to the public sector or provide incentives to private sector to create employment, these measures are not as sufficient as PWP.⁴ (R1)

This definition has also place in PWP literature. According to Subbaro (2012), one of the main categories of PWPs is the one implemented in response to natural disasters. According to the interviewee, the Public Works Programme is the only tool that may respond within seven days after a flood occurs. It is not possible to react quickly through public employment or incentives given to the private sector to respond to that natural disaster.

Another common highlight about the objectives of the Public Works Programme is its temporary income support objectives.

² Keynesyen anlayışla oluşturulmuş.

³ İşgücü piyasasında arz-talep dengesinde yapısal bir sorun bulunduğu ve dengenin işsizliğin artması yönünde bozulduğu dönemlerde uygulanan, çalışanlara gelir getirici kamu yararına işler olarak tanımlanabilir.

⁴ Bir olay olsa 7. Gün istihdam sağlanıyor. Bir yerde sel oluyor. Hemen müdahale. Kamu kurumlarına kadro versen ya da teşvik olsa özel sektörde olağan yollardan istihdam yaratma şansı TYP kadar yok.

The Public Works Programme is being implemented to provide temporary income support to those who are detached from the labour market.⁵ (R3)

(The Public Works Programme's aim is) to avoid people leaving the labour market, and to employ disadvantaged groups for a certain period by providing them with temporary income support, particularly in public sector jobs.⁶ (R5)

Interviewees also emphasize the Public Works Programme's aim of targeting disadvantaged people. Women's participation is one of the main references while identifying the objectives of PWP projects, and there is strong emphasis on women's status as housewives. Also, people with disabilities were underlined in disadvantaged groups.

The Public Works Programme is being implemented for certain age groups, particularly for women, to support the expenses at home.⁷ (R8)

The Public Works Programme's is good for women who are housewives, wanting to be useful and wanting to see the outside world.⁸ (R9)

The Public Works Programme is a tool to enable people who have been excluded for some reason to re-join society, such as those with hearing or speech impediments.⁹ (R10)

The most distinctive point of the views above is that all these are expressed by contractors. Presumably, they are the ones who are in touch with participants most intensively, and have an opportunity to observe their social status. In contrast to contractors, the İŞKUR side has a

⁵ Çalışma hayatından kopmuş kişilere geçici gelir katkı desteği amaçla uygulanmaktadır.

⁶ Çalışma hayatında dezavantajlı grupların belirli sürelerde özellikle kamu işlerinde geçici süre istihdam ederek, kısa süreli gelir desteği sağlamak, kişilerin işgücü piyasasından uzaklaşmamasını sağlamak.

⁷ Belli bir yaş aralığında ve genellikle ev hanımlarına yönelik yönelmiş düzenlenmiş, eve katkı olsun diye düzenlenmiş programlar.

⁸ Ev kadınları için bir şey yapamayan, dışarıyı görmek isteyen kişiler için evet TYP güzel.

⁹ Toplumda dışlanmış (gözü görmeyen, konuşması yamuk, dışlanmış kişiler) program sayesinde topluma kazandırılıyor.

limited observation period and does not evaluate participants, apart from their working status. Nevertheless, in the following questions the İŞKUR side also refers to housewives.

On the other hand, one of the interviewees highlighted an unfavourable effect of the Public Works Programme on youth employment.

The Public Works Programme causes atrophy in young people. If they start working in a hairdresser, they become a proficient hairdresser. That does not happen here. A young person waits for the next PWP project after finishing the first one.¹⁰ (R9)

According to the interviewee, the Public Works Programme causes a reluctance among young people to work in the private sector because of the projects' repetitive feature. The responses bring up the age restriction subject more broadly, particularly in the targeting mechanism subpart. It is an important point that, according to the interviewee from contractor, young people should be channelled into other ALMPs, instead of PWP projects.

There are also other statements about the repetitive nature of PWP projects, in addition to youth participation drawbacks. The essential point that they stress is the frequent change in the re-participation rule. However, responses differ and contrast.

The rules written according to legislation should not, particularly regarding participation periods, be updated to create an amnesty (not resetting the participation period)¹¹ (R5)

Re-participation is an important issue. Increasing the resets in re-participation is seriously decreasing the importance of this issue. The re-participation periods should be brought back.¹² (R6)

The first view is explicitly against making concessions to increase the re-participation period of participants. On the contrary, the second view demands that the re-participation rule be

¹⁰ Gençleri köreltiyor. Kuaföre girse usta olur. Burada öyle bir şey söz konusu değil. TYP bitince çocuk bizi bekliyor tekrar TYP'den çalıştırıyoruz.

¹¹ Mevzuatta yazan kuralların özellikle faydalanma süresinin af mahiyetinde sürekli güncellenmemesi (faydalanma sürelerinin sıfırlanmaması)

¹² TYP yararlanma süreleri önemli bir konu. Yararlanma süresi ile ilgili sıfırlanmalar arttıkça konuya bakılan ciddiyet de önemli ölçüde düşmektedir. Tekrar yararlanma süreleri geri getirilmelidir.

revoked and bring limitless opportunity to everyone. Some respondents claimed that because skills are not gained through PWP projects, the necessity for them is disappearing. Therefore, as long as people want to participate they should have the right to participate. On the other hand, given their length (up to 9 months) and short waiting time between projects (3 months), other respondents claimed that PWP projects are increasing dependency of participants on the Programme, thus deviate from the temporary employment feature.

There is considerable debate about the re-participation issue in the literature. It is a lengthy debate, and in many international cases, the solution was either to decrease the length and wage rate of PWP projects, or bring restrictions on the re-participation rule. In the Turkish case, due to the length and relatively high payment compared to other ALMPs, there needs to be a restriction on re-participation and this should not reset every time the legislation is changed.

Generally, all the interviewees acknowledge that the Public Works Programme aims to increase employment and targets disadvantaged groups. However, they underline its misuse as well as mistargeting, mostly due to political intervention.

At the moment, it is about winning the election. It is being implemented for political reasons.¹³ (R3)

The aim of the Public Works Programme is political. It is being implemented for a political motive. Apart from certain contractors or very narrow target groups, the Public Works Programme is being implemented for political aims or to decrease unemployment due to economic difficulties.¹⁴ (R1)

One should not benefit from the Public Works Programme because one has a political circle.¹⁵ (R2)

However, it serves a political purpose, i.e. collecting more votes.¹⁶ (R7)

¹³ Şu an olan seçim kazanmak. Daha siyasi nedenler uygulanıyor.

¹⁴ TYP'nin amacı siyasi. Siyasi saik ile uygulanıyor. Belli kurumlar dışında ya da çok özel hedef gruplar dışında siyasi amaç ya da ekonomik gidişat kötülüğü nedeniyle işsizliği azaltmak amacıyla uygulanmaktadır.

¹⁵ Siyasi çevrem var diye TYP'den yararlanmamalıyım.

¹⁶ Ancak daha çok oy toplamak gibi siyasi bir amaca hizmet ediyor.

Currently, the Public Works Programme is being implemented to meet the public institutions labour need under local political pressure to increase employment in that region.¹⁷ (R5)

Beginning with the budget allocation and determining contractors, it can be seen that political preferences have significant roles. The majority of municipalities that implement PWP projects belong to the ruling party's administration. Yet the number of participants is distributed to cities without any objective criteria. The voting rate for the political party in power is considered as a hidden benchmark criteria (that is, that higher quota is given to cities which vote more for the party in power). More importantly, political influence becomes apparent in the selection process. An interviewee explicitly indicated that a political circle has an important role in determining participants. It is also a well-known fact that PWP implementation enormously increases before local or general elections, as well as referenda. Moreover, it has already been mentioned at the beginning of the Chapter that the decision makers are unwilling to stay in touch with the participants once the PWP is completed. Most probably, their unwillingness stems from the possibility that the information collected from the participants may be used against İŞKUR. It is noteworthy to mention that this approach is strongly related to their highly political involvement, and it also has negative implications for monitoring and evaluation. It is not possible to conduct a proper monitoring and evaluation in conditions where no contacts are kept with participants.

In general, interviewees have contrasting view about the objectives and definition of the Public Works Programme. In the main, they mentioned increasing the overall demand, PWP being a quick tool of intervention, as well as its temporary characteristics. Meanwhile, they also made comments about the targeting mechanisms, mostly for women participating in PWP projects. Other important points are the re-participation issue and political impacts on implementation.

The interviewees' definitions of the Turkish Public Works Programme are a very useful indicator when comparing and categorizing within international cases. Both the economic and natural disaster motives raised in the responses have similar characteristics to the international examples. In addition, all the interviewees were fully aware of the temporary feature of PWP projects and the drawbacks of mistargeting.

¹⁷ Son durum itibariyle TYP uygulanan kamu kurumlarının işgücü ihtiyacının karşılanması, yerel siyasetin baskıları ile yöredeki istihdamın bir süreliğine de olsa artırılmasıdır.

Complaints about political interventions were expected. There was a wide response that PWP projects are implemented for political motives. Interviewees made remarks explicitly on this issue. This is a key finding of this thesis. It is crucial to know and be aware of the root problems of programmes when designating possible measures. While respondents concentrated on the definition of the Public Works Programme as reducing unemployment and providing temporary income to individuals, responses also raised misuse in the name of political intervention. Up to this point, there were no significant difference in terms of the respondents' positions.

4.2. Assessment of the Legislative Framework

The main objective of this section is to understand whether there are lacks or deficiencies in legislation that obstruct proper and adequate implementation of PWP projects.

Among some respondents, there is agreement that legislative framework is sufficient. However, there is a lack of capacity to enforce the implementation of the legislation.

It (the legislative framework) is sufficient, if implemented properly.¹⁸ (R3)

The Communique is sufficient, but the consistency between the legislative framework and practice is problematic.¹⁹ (R2)

According to the respondents who found the legislative framework sufficient, actual implementation and the written legislation differ. Although in general, the legislation is sufficient to design the essential rules of a PWP project, when it comes to implementation, there are misinterpretations of legislation that deviate from the implementation of legislative directives.

There are also contradictory views that express deficiencies in the legislation. According to these views, there is a lack cooperation between provincial and general directorates when creating legislation framework. Also, a lack of work definitions causes broad interpretations of the scopes of PWP projects.

¹⁸ Yeterli. Düzgün uygulanırsa.

¹⁹ Genelge yeterli ama genelgenin anlattığı ile fiiliyat ne kadar tutarlı. Orası sorunlu.

There is a scope for a programme project, but no work definition. This is a huge insufficiency. Everyone interprets it as they wish.²⁰ (R1)

There are deficiencies in many issues. This arises because the preparation legislation was not based on cooperation and input from implementing units in the provinces. The biggest lack in the legislation is that the projects are not responding to concrete needs.²¹ (R6)

According to an interviewee, although there is list of PWP scopes in the legislation, there is no clear job description for them. This leads to a significant discrepancy between the intention of legislation and actual implementation. Therefore, everybody interprets the scope of PWP projects as they wish.

PWP scopes are an important issue that separate PWP projects from other ALMPs in terms of unskilled work. However, there are many different types of work carried out under PWP projects, such as secretarial, driving, and even engineering. One of interviewees from the contractor side has even stated that they employed participants for hospital secretarial work, and selected the participants from among graduates. Interviewees from the General and Provincial Directorates are also aware about the preferences of contractors.

We have commissioned secretarial duties. We have employed graduates. 30 secretaries. Patient record system, etc.²² (R10)

Participants are employed in positions like office worker, secretary and public relations positions.²³ (R7)

There is no scope for mosque cleaning in the legislation. The environmental cleaning scope is understood in such broad terms that it paves the way for the implementation of this kind of work.²⁴ (R1)

²⁰ Uygulama alanı var ama iş tanımı yok. Büyük eksiklik. Herkes istediği gibi yorumluyor.

²¹ Birçok konuda ciddi boşluklar mevcuttur. Bu da mevzuatın yazılışında taşrada uygulayıcı birimlerin katılımında bir çalıştay esasıyla oluşturulmadığından olmuştur. Mevzuattaki en büyük eksiklik projelerin birer ihtiyaca karşılık verilmemesidir.

²² Sekreter işlerini yaptırıldı. Üniversite mezunu çalıştırdık. 30 tane sekreter. Hasta kayıt vs.

²³ Katılımcılar birçok kurumda büro, sekreterlik ve halkla ilişkiler gibi pozisyonlarda çalıştırılmaktadır.

This is an important indicator that confirms there is no consistency between the legislation and actual situation. Although implementation has positive outcomes both for contractors and participants, according to the regulation, PWP projects should not involve these activities. There are other ALMPs that can be used for this purpose. However, given their length and higher wage rate, contractors prefer to use PWP projects for the different purposes. Additionally, this situation demonstrates that Provincial Directorate has no sanctioning power to prevent contractors employing the participants in certain occupations, which is explicitly provided for in legislation. The lack of İŞKUR control results in the widening of the variety of occupations.

Due to lack of ability to prevent misuse, an interviewee requested the harmonization of the legislation with the actual situation.

Mosque cleaning should be added. There is lack of imams in villages. For instance, in uplands. Nobody lives there in winter. Provide PWP projects outside that time. Is everyone going to be a state employee? A temporary attendant mosque imam could be added.²⁵ (R4)

This consideration highlights one of the key points about the job descriptions for participants. According to legislation, work definitions are not explicitly included, thus expose the implementers to ambiguity. The lack in the legislation may lead to deviation from the main aims of PWP projects, and needs to be considered as a priority when making legislative amendments.

Apart from job descriptions, the most comprehensive responses on the matter of legislation were made regarding the selection method and targeting mechanism. The clear point on these subjects was mostly about who should be in the priority group, in addition to comments suggesting the creation of new rules while implementing the listing method in the selection phase. Though there are elaborative questions about these subjects in the next part of questionnaire, it is important to note that interviewees responded to these issues without guidance.

²⁴ Mevzuatta bırakın imamlığı camii temizliği adı altında program konusu yok. ama çevre temizliği diye genel anlaşılıyor ve uygulamada bu tip işlerin önü açılıyor.

²⁵ Camilerin temizliği eklenmeli. Köylerde mesela imam eksikliği var. Yaylalarda mesela. Kışın cemaat yok. O sürelerde verme. Onun dışında ver. Hepsine devlet kadrolu mu çalıştırsın? Geçici cami imam görevlisi eklenebilir.

I think, there should be readjustments to age groups, both for men and women. The age requirement for women should increase from 18 to 30.²⁶ (R7)

A new system needs to be setup to compel beneficiaries of social assistance to participate in PWP projects.²⁷ (R5)

Both recommendations cover important aspects of the targeting mechanism. However, due to political concerns, there is no regulation that makes a connection between social assistance and the Public Works Programme. As mentioned in Chapter 3, through the legislation there was an attempt to make a link between the social assistance system and the Public Works Programme. However, due to limitations in specifying which kind of social assistance a participant receives, decision makers removed the rule from the legislation.

Beside the targeting mechanism, there were specific recommendations made about the selection mechanism, particularly regarding the listing and geographical targeting methods.

It is necessary to specify scoring criteria when the listing is used as a selection method.²⁸ (R1)

Participants who expected to work in a forest should only be selected from a nearby town or village where the forest is.²⁹ (R5)

These are important comments for PWP implementation. These kinds of preferences directly affect the profile of participants. At the same time, scoring instruments may require strong institutional capacity, and thus may impede the fast response feature of PWP projects.

Lastly, there were significant comments on the issue of leave, which directly affects women's ability to participate in PWP projects. Again, Chapter 3 clearly indicates that the strict

²⁶ Öncelikli gruplara da kadın ve erkek yaş dengesinin düzeltilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Kadınlarda yaş durumu 18'den 30'a çıkarılmalı.

²⁷ Sosyal yardım alanların listeye kesin gireceği bir sistem olmalı

²⁸ Mülakat olunca puanlama kriteri getirilmeli.

²⁹ Orman işinde çalışacak kişilerin sadece ormanın bulunduğu mahalden (köy, kasaba) seçilmesi.

regulation on leave days leaves participants in difficult situations. According to the rule, participants have a right not to attend a programme for up to 14 days. Paternity/maternity leave and marriage license, as well as days off clarified with a medical report or an official document are included in these 14 days. In all circumstances, payment is not made to PWP participants on days of leave. In this circumstances, participating in a PWP project with a baby or young children is particularly difficult for women.

The 14-day upper limit for leave is an issue that should change according to the programme duration. Breast-feeding and maternity leave issues must be added to the legislation.³⁰ (R6)

This is another important point regarding the promotion of women's participation in PWP projects. In the following section, interviewees made many comments about women's participation in PWP projects, particularly with regards to the targeting mechanism. However, only one of them mentioned this issue in this part of interview. It may be because, the interviewees are used to this issue, and so they did not want to mention it. Another possible explanation is that they have not come face to face with examples of participants who needed to look after their baby or children. Even so, this request is the foremost issue that needs to be taken into account when changing the legislation, and women should be given the rights already guaranteed by law.

Throughout this section, respondents highlighted the deficiencies of the legislative framework. Many responses from the Provincial Directorate implicate the lack of coordination with the General Directorate while creating the legislation. On the other hand, contractors explicitly highlighted the conflicts between practice and legislation, Nonetheless, important issues have been raised in terms of selection criteria and maternity leave.

4.3. Selection Method

The objective of this section is to discuss selection methods, possible challenges while selecting participants and to determine the most effective methods according to the

³⁰ 14 günlük izin-rapor üst sınırlaması projelerin süresine göre değiştirilmelidir. Kadınlarda süt izni ve doğum sonrası izinler mutlaka kapsama dahil edilmelidir.

interviewees, as well as to make a comparison of the possible effects in participant profiles when wage level and vested benefits change.

In this part, the interviewees answered the questions in relation to the targeting mechanism. In fact, these two subjects are strongly interlinked due to the similar outcomes that have an effect on the profile of participants. The questions mostly focus on three methods of selection: draw in the presence of a notary public; listing method; and the combination of these. The field study aimed to scrutinize these methods extensively. Therefore, this subpart mostly focused on selection methods and the possible effects of wage level and vested benefits on participant profiles. Responses that related to the targeting mechanism will be analysed with questions posed on the targeting mechanism.

Firstly, almost all the participants indicate that a draw in the presence of a notary public is fairer than the listing method. However, as it is impossible to separate the needy from non-needy participants, the listing method is favoured more.

It seems fair to use a draw in the presence of a notary in the selection process, but the drafted participant may have apartment, farm, etc. In that case, it is not fair.³¹ (R1)

You cannot do anything for a poor person when it is a draw in the presence of a notary.³² (R2)

You cannot select the right person in the listing method due to pressure. A draw in the presence of a notary is chance. When it is draw in the presence of a notary, even if you know that someone is extremely needy you cannot select them because they are not drawn. You cannot prevent the wrong people from being drawn.³³ (R3)

Another concern over using a draw in the presence of a notary public is the difficulties of placing the participant in terms of geographic location.

³¹ Noter kurası çekilince herhangi birinin ismin çıkması adil görünüyor ama ismi çıkan kişinin apartmanı var, çiftliği var. O zaman adil olmuyor işte.

³² Noter olunca garibana bir şey yapamıyorsun.

³³ Liste yönteminde baskı yüzünden doğru kişiyi alamayabilirsin. Noter kurası şans. & Noter kurasında ise aslında çok ihtiyacı olduğunu bildiğin halde kurada çıkmadığı için alamıyorsun. Seçimde noter olursa abuk sabuk tipler girmesi engellenemez.

But, reconsidered in this way, the schools are spread across different places in one district. If the majority of participants come from the same neighbourhood, what should I do? I cannot place them.³⁴ (R8)

On the other hand, there are drawbacks of using the listing method as well. According to the interviewees, this method leads to pressure on İŞKUR, particularly from politicians and management groups.

There are consistent pressures requesting favouritism in the listing method.³⁵ (R1)

Unfortunately, the listing method in particular selects people with influential backing.³⁶ (R7)

Moreover, in some cases, even where the rules are enforced very strictly by provincial directorates.

We exclude people who have an income of more than three times the minimum wage. We do this strictly. However, later a phone call can change the results.³⁷ (R4)

Similar to the case of the ambiguous determination of the work definitions, the Provincial Directorate cannot enforce the income rule regulation when the listing method is implemented. According to the statements, the provincial directorates involuntarily select people who have an ineligible income status. More explicitly, the phone call reference suggests political pressure from a different angle.

All these selection methods have advantages and disadvantages, but in order to increase the participation of needy people, interviewees made various suggestions that will be elaborated in the Targeting Mechanism section.

³⁴ Ama şöyle düşünün 170 okulun tamamı dağınık. Noterde hepsi aynı bölgeden çıkarsa ben ne yapacağım? Yerleştiremem ki.

³⁵ Liste yönteminde sürekli torpil baskısı oluyor.

³⁶ Maalesef özellikle Liste yönteminin adı herkes tarafından torpillilerin olduğu liste olarak anılıyor.

³⁷ Geliri 3 asgari ücreti geçen varsa çıkarıyoruz. Bunu harfiyen yapıyoruz. Ancak sonradan tel açılıp değiştiriliyor.

Lastly, one of the most prominent topics of this subpart arose with the last question. There are different opinions about the possible effects of changing the amount and method of payments. The main reasons lying behind these differences is geographical discrepancy.

The region we are located in is relatively rich. People have to come from far away. There are not many people who want to come here and work. If we decrease the wage we cannot find anyone to participate. It is already hard to bring them here.³⁸ (R10)

There are very few people who are not in need. In short, a change in wage rate will not have much effect.³⁹ (R8)

It will not change. People need even that one lira. We can find participants no matter what wage rate you provide.⁴⁰ (R9)

Even though this field study uses a small sample, it identifies one of the key features of the Public Works Programme. According to the interviewee from Bilkent City Hospital, due to the location of the hospital, any decrease in PWP wage affects the decision to participate enormously. Given the relatively large distance from when the participants reside, they imply that no one would want to participate in a PWP project if the wage rate decreases. However, other interviewees on the contractor side indicate that there would be no significant changes if the wage rate decrease due to the fact that there is extensive poverty in the region where the PWP projects are implemented.

4.4. Targeting Mechanism

In this section, the targeting mechanism of the Turkish Public Works Programmes will be discussed. Considering the objective PWP projects is to reduce poverty and tackle unemployment, it is very important to design an accurate targeting mechanism. A discussion

³⁸ Bizim olduğumuz bölge görece zengin bir bölge. Uzaktan gelmek zorunda kalıyor insanlar. Burada oturup bu işi yapmak isteyen pek yok. O nedenle ücreti düşürürsek burada çalışacak kimseyi bulamayız. Zaten zor getiriyoruz.

³⁹ İhtiyacı yok diyebileceğim sayısı çok az. Kısaca bizim buralarda fark yada etki etmez pek.

⁴⁰ Değişmez. Adamların bir liraya bile ihtiyacı var. Hangi ücreti verirsiniz verin bir katılımcı buluruz.

of the detail of the current targeting mechanism of the Turkish Public Works Programme follows.

The first and foremost underlying issue concerning the targeting mechanism is that there needs to be a restriction on women's priority. Almost all the interviewees agreed that an age restriction must be stipulated for women's priority. In addition to women, there are comments about the age restriction for men. One of the possible reasons for the male age restriction is that older men have more difficulty in finding a job compared to younger men, which makes older men more vulnerable. The second possibility is that older men have less time until retirement, and an increase in age restriction for men may help support their retirement. Following to the responses about female age restriction, a response about male age restriction is related to the retirement issue, and recommends the male age restriction be 50 years old.

There needs to be an age restriction for women as well. There should not be priority for women younger than 35 years old. 41 (R3)

There is no advantage to women. The scope of women targeting is so big that everybody in the priority group do not have much of an advantage.⁴² (R2)

In my opinion, the age restriction needs to be more than 18 years old.⁴³ (R7)

I am against the absence of an age restriction for women. Women who are older than 35-40 years old should have priority. I do not want to see a woman who is 20 years old in front of me.⁴⁴ (R9)

Beside these arguments, interviewees offered different ranking methods in order to reach the neediest women.

⁴¹ Kadınlarda da yaş sınırı olmalı. 35 yaş altı kadın önceliği olmamalı.

⁴² Kadınlara herhangi bir avantaj olmuyor. O kadar büyük ki; herkes öncelikli çok bir avantaj kalmıyor.

⁴³ Kadınların yaş şartının 18 den daha fazla olması kanaatindeyim.

⁴⁴ Kadınların yaş sınırı olmamasına karşıyım. 35 – 40 yaş üstü kadın öncelik olmalı. 20 yaşındaki genç kızları getirmesinler.

There could be a distinction to prioritize women in terms of those who reside in a women's shelter or women who have lost their husbands.⁴⁵ (R3)

Women who have lower educational levels could be prioritised. Instead of all women, only those with just primary school education could be prioritised.⁴⁶ (R1)

Women's participation is an important aspect of PWPs. There are also different rules in order to increase women's participation across the world (Subbaro et al., 2012). However, in the Turkish case women's prioritization is over generalized, thus inducing occasional misuse. Due to over generalization, many women who are not looking for a permanent job in private sector are becoming a target group and among those women who participate in PWP projects are not willing to work in private companies after finishing those projects. In addition, PWP projects are not effective in helping young women increase their skills compared to other ALMPs, like on-the-job training or vocational education. Below are the interviewees' explicit statements about the misuse of PWP projects.

The aunts and grannies who never wanted to work their entire life are going out of their homes. They are not willing to work after the PWP project finishes; therefore they may not be the right people to target.⁴⁷ (R3)

She is in the target group because she is a woman, but her husband is the district governor.⁴⁸ (R1)

Alongside the women prioritization issue, interviewees highlighted new priority groups that need to be added to the targeting mechanism. Similarly to the women age restriction, many of the interviewees suggested increasing the age restriction in prioritisation of men. These recommendations mostly combine with retirement issues, such as a short time remaining before pension qualification.

⁴⁵ Kadın sığınma evlerindeki kadınlar, eşi ölmüş vb. ayrıma gidilebilir.

⁴⁶ Kadınlarda eğitim seviyesi düşük olanlar öncelikli olabilir. Tüm kadınlar yerine. İlkokul mezunu olanlar olabilir mesela sadece.

⁴⁷ Hayatında çalışmak istemeyecek teyzeleri, neneleri evden çıkarıyor. Programdan sonra çalışmak istemeyecek o nedenle bu gruptaki kişiler doğru olmayabilir.

⁴⁸ Kadın olduğu için hedef grupta ama eşi kaymakam.

I do not understand why there is a restriction of 35 years old. It should be more like 50 years old. The people who are close to retirement should be in the target group. The people who want to stick to the official age of retirement should also benefit from PWP projects.⁴⁹ (R1)

Also in men, income level, number of children, marriage status, etc. need to be identified. Prioritization needs to be 45 years old instead of 35.⁵⁰ (R3)

It should be 45 for men.⁵¹ (R8)

Age restriction for the male target group needs to be increased.⁵² (R5)

The long-term unemployed is also a prominent prioritization group stated by interviewees. According to interviewees, identification of such a new group requires collaboration with the Social Security Institution. A person with no work record for more than a year should be considered as long-term unemployed and should have priority to participate PWP projects.

Long-term unemployment should be added. Measurement is important here. Prioritisation could be created through the records of the Social Security Institution.⁵³ (R1)

We need to increase the participation in PWP projects of people who do not even have one day of work recorded at the Social Security Institution.⁵⁴ (R6)

⁴⁹ 35 yaş üstü erkek neden var anlamıyorum. Yaş sınırı daha büyük olmalı. 50 yaş falan olmalı. Emekliliğe yakın kesim olmalı. EYT olanlar yararlınsın.

⁵⁰ Erkeklerde de gelinine, çocuk sayısına göre, tek başına yaşayan erkek ise vb. alınması. 35 yerine 45 yaş üstü öncelikli olmalıdır.

⁵¹ Erkek için 45 olmalı.

⁵² Erkek hedef grup yaş oranını yükseltilmesi.

⁵³ Uzun süreli işsizler eklenmeli. Ölçüm önemli tabi burada. SGK kayıtları üstünden desteklenerek bir öncelik verilebilir.

⁵⁴ Son 1 yıl içerisinde 1 gün dahi SGK'sı olmayan iş arayanların katılabildiği Toplum Yararına Programlarının sayısını artırabilsek mesela.

Apart from the suggestions about age restriction and long-term unemployment, there were also suggestions about people with disabilities.

Depending on the contractors and scope of the programme, people with disabilities could be considered separately. People with disabilities could be considered as part of social responsibility.⁵⁵ (R3)

In each programme, a quota of 10% could be stipulated for people with disabilities.⁵⁶ (R5)

In the Turkish Public Works Programme, the participation rate of people with disabilities has been less than 3% over the last 8 years. Although they are listed in the priority group, in practice, the total share of people with disabilities almost negligible.

Another substantial issue concerning the targeting mechanism indicated by the interviewees is social assistance beneficiaries. However, there were contrasting views on this issue among the interviewees. On the one hand, some interviewees recommend prioritising social assistance beneficiaries, while others preferred not to include social assistance beneficiaries in the target group.

Social assistance beneficiaries. Because, they are getting aid from the state. Instead of that aid, they should work through state money. It should increase the transition into the labour market.⁵⁷ (R3)

It would be useful if there were a requirement that social assistance beneficiaries have to apply to PWP projects. This would decrease the expectation and habit of complimentary aid.⁵⁸ (R5)

On the other hand, there are opposite views about social assistance beneficiaries.

⁵⁵ Programın kurum türüne ve uygulamasına göre eski hükümlü engelli konusu ayrıca değerlendirilebilir. Engelliler daha çok sosyal sorumluluk gibi düşünülmeli.

⁵⁶ Her programda yüzde 10 oranında engelli katılımcı şartı getirilebilir.

⁵⁷ Sosyal yardım alanlar. Çünkü onlar devletten yardım alıyor. Onun yerine devlet parası ile çalışın. İş hayatına geçişi artırsın.

⁵⁸ Sosyal yardım alanlara TYP başvurularının zorunlu kılınması faydalı olacaktır, karşılıksız yardım beklentisini ve alışkanlığını azaltacaktır.

I think it is more logical to prioritise those not receiving state aid rather than those who are. Beneficiaries are already above the hunger threshold.⁵⁹ (R6)

There is a confusion among social assistance beneficiaries. They are confused about which money to take. They do not know what to do between the three months waiting period, and so let themselves continue receiving social assistance.⁶⁰ (R8)

These remarks recall the main characteristics of the segregation feature of PWPs in terms of country income level. As PWPs create temporary jobs for workers, they are a useful tool in the workfare approach. High-income countries prefer to use PWPs as a part of workfare system. These countries mostly tie the provision of benefits (i.e. social assistance) to work for the public good, and via financial sanctions enforced on those who receive unemployment insurance fund payments, or social assistance in this case (Kalman, 2015). However, it is necessary to distinguish individuals in terms of their own need in the workfare approach and this requires institutional capacities. Nevertheless, less developed countries are not capable of recording family needs and incomes with their institutional capacities. Therefore, unconditional PWPs are sufficient to deliver poverty relief to needy people (OECD Employment Outlook, 2005).

On this basis, some of the interviewees recommended approximating the Public Works Programme with the workfare approach. On the other hand, some preferred to preserve the unconditional feature of the Public Works Programme through the discussion of whether the social assistance beneficiaries are in the target group or not. Nevertheless, the debate about institutional capacity will continue in the final subject of the target group subpart.

Lastly, many interviewees put emphasis on the income test issue. So far, all the remarks, suggestions and opinions concerned a specific determinant group or a characteristic that restrict the conditions to qualify for the target group. However, the determination of a target group through income level is a new aspect separate from other methods of specifying the target group.

⁵⁹ Sosyal Yardım alanlar yerine alamayanlar daha mantıklı bana göre. Çünkü alanların zaten açlık sınırı düzleminde bir artışı var.

⁶⁰ Sosyal yardım alan insanların kafası karışıyor. Sosyal yardım alan hangi parayı alacağını şaşırıyor. Aradaki 3 aylık sürelerde ne yapacaklarını bilememeleri nedeni ile sosyal yardım alanlar bırakın onu almaya devam etsin.

Many of the interviewees state the necessity of a link between the poverty and degree of need to participate in a PWP project. Almost all the participants defined needy people as being in a degree of poverty. According to the interviewees, increasing the participation of the poor is essential in reaching the aim of the Public Works Programme. Thus, the measurement of poverty came into prominence as a targeting mechanism. Below are statements from the İŞKUR side relating to system integration in specifying the target groups through income level.

We need to make the income test more comprehensive. The Ministry of Family does not share income information. I suppose it would be more accurate to integrate the social assistance services with the Public Works Programme. The income test is important. Doing the test in a single institution would help increase the number of needy people.⁶¹ (R3)

People who are poorer. The income/wealth issue is important. It may be easier to determine the income/wealth issues through integration with the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity and Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) systems.⁶² (R2)

In order to increase the number of needy people, participants may be preferred according to level of household income. In order to reach this target group, the SASF, local authority, association of people with disabilities, institutions that pay the disability pensions and municipalities may provide their support.⁶³ (R5)

As seen from the statements, a proper method of reaching the poor requires an integration model with several institutions. It is not easy to coordinate different institutions in determining the target group. Therefore, many low-income countries such as India implement PWPs with a universalistic approach. However, they also keep the wage rate below the market wage, thus enabling the self-selection method (Imai, 2004). Contrary to India, in Turkey, participants receive the actual market wage. Moreover, the Public Works Programme provides the highest level of income compared to other ALMPs run by İŞKUR. Justifiably, interviewees from

⁶¹ Gelir kontrolünü daha kapsamlı yapmak lazım. Aile tarafı gelir bilgilerini vermiyor. Ülkenin sosyal yardım hizmeti ile TYP birleştirilip bütünlük bir iş yapılırsa daha doğru gruba yapılabilir. Gelir testi önemli. Tek kurumda yapılarak sonunda bu programlara katılan ihtiyaç sahiplerini artırabilir.

⁶² Daha dar gelirli kişiler. Gelir varlık mevzuu önemli. SYGM, SYDV sistemleri ile entegre olarak gelir ve servet tespiti kolaylaşabilir.

⁶³ İhtiyaç sahiplerinin Katılımlarını arttırmak için katılımcıların bulunduğu hanelerdeki gelir seviyesi düşük olanlar tercih edilebilir. Hedef gruplara SYDV'lerden, mahalle muhtarlarından, engelli derneklerinden, engelli maaşı ödemesi yapan kuruluşlardan, belediyelerden destek alınabilir.

İŞKUR recommend a system that ties the Public Works Programme with the social assistance system, making it easier to overcome excessive demand.

In addition to interviewees from İŞKUR, contractors have similar opinions. According to interviewees from contractors there needs to be an income test in place of declarations made by participants. In addition to that, İŞKUR should take more responsibility in measuring the income level of possible participants.

As I said earlier, a Job and Vocational Counsellor should recruit according to profiles. I should not think about it. In the interview, we are asking participants whether their income is more than 4800 lira or not. When they say "no", they pass. There is no check. Why should I check? They are already poor. It is the duty of İŞKUR consultants.⁶⁴ (R9)

We need to take a statement of income. There has to be certification at the beginning. They make an address change. They move to their neighbour. Would the income change? We need to measure the household income.⁶⁵ (R10)

If it is possible, integration of PWP projects with social assistance services would explicitly raise the objectivity of determining the target group. However, due to lack of collaboration between institutions and lack of general institutional capacities, this integration will take a long time to be accomplished.

Presently, already defined priority groups, i.e. women, people with disabilities, etc. can be determined easily while selecting participants. However, additional rules about selecting criteria such as address requirements or household income level are not implemented effectively due lack of institutional control. In practice, in many cases, İŞKUR gives responsibility for the evaluation of participants to the contractors.

The majority of suggestions requires high institutional cooperation. The biggest grievance stated by interviewees is the request of the non-needy to participate in PWP projects, and

⁶⁴ Söylediğim gibi İMD profile göre almalı. Ben düşünmemeliyim. İŞKUR danışmanları eğitilmeli. Mülakatta evine 4800 liranın üstünden para geliyor mu diye soruyoruz. Yok deyince hop geçti. Kontrol yok. ee bunu ben niye yapayım? İŞKUR yapsın. Bilgisayar kullanmayacak. Zaten fakir. İŞKUR danışmanının görevi.

⁶⁵ Gelir beyanını almak gerekiyor. Aile içinde gelir olayını ilk başta belgelemek gerekir. Adres değişikliği yapıyor. Komşuya gidiyor. Geliri değiştirmiş mi oluyor? Hanedeki geliri ölçmek lazım.

therefore the suggestions posit increasing the institutional capacity to distinguish the needy from the non-needy.

4.5. Assessment of Contractors

Contractors are one of the main pillars in implementing PWPs. Their approach to PWPs is key, both for outcomes and for operations. Although the contractors may be public institutions their structural characteristics differ greatly. Contractors will vary the timing, duration and scopes. Some contractors are more involved in political interests, like municipalities. In addition to that, some other contractors require strict timing and periodization in order to achieve successful PWP implementation. In this subpart, all the questions posed to interviewees considering these factors will be examined.

Referring to the responses, there was a drawback concerning the scopes of the programmes. The main debate is over whether contractors are employing the participants in order to create public good through PWP projects, or employing them for the contractors' essential duties which would need carrying out even in the absence of a PWP project.

Should the need of the contractors be met through the Public Works Programme or permanent employment?⁶⁶ (R2)

Those using it for their own internal work seem problematic for me.⁶⁷ (R1)

They have hundreds of their own workers for the same jobs, however through the temporary work, contractors receive unearned socio-political income.⁶⁸ (R6)

PWP projects should focus on needs, they should not facilitate the permanent employment of officer and workers jobs.⁶⁹ (R5)

⁶⁶ Burada yüklenici kurumların ihtiyaçları TYP ile mi karşılanmalı yoksa sürekli istihdamla mı karşılanmalı?

⁶⁷ Kendi iç işleyişi ile ilgili iş yapan yerler bana sıkıntılı geliyor.

⁶⁸ Kendilerinde aynı iş için yüzlerce personel olmasına rağmen bu geçici süre ile istihdam olan kişiler üzerinden sosyo-politik rant elde etmek istemektedirler.

⁶⁹ TYP'ler ihtiyaç odaklı olmalı, hali hazırda memur ve işçi olarak daimi statüde çok sayıda çalışanı bulunan kurumlarda memur ve işçinin işini TYP katılımcılarına yaptırarak mevcut personele haksız bir rahatlık kazandırılmamalı.

These are important remarks in terms of PWP aims. Generally speaking, in the literature, PWPs are implemented for macroeconomic reasons, seasonal variations in labour demand, or in emergencies following natural disasters (Subbaro et al., 2012). None of these reasons justify the implementation of PWPs for work that existing workers are doing. However, according to interviewees, the jobs that the contractors already have to do independent from PWP projects are being done through PWP projects.

Another prominent issue for contractors is timing concerns. According to interviewees, the timing period of PWP projects need to be carefully designed according to the type of contractor. Otherwise, PWP implementation will be ineffective.

PWP projects implemented at times where tree trimming cannot be carried out are contrary to their aims.⁷⁰ (R1)

I think it is very convenient to implement a PWP for afforestation in sowing and planting season.⁷¹ (R7)

The start time of the projects is ridiculous. Should a PWP project start after schools open? Later, after schools have closed, they work for 20 days.⁷² (R8)

The Directorate of National Education and the Regional Directorate of Forestry came to the forefront in relation to the timing issue. The school term and weather conditions transparently set forth the periods of PWP projects, and these fit perfectly for these contractors. Therefore, the timing issue was mentioned in relation to these two contractors.

In addition to the timing discussion, many of the interviewees mentioned these contractors in terms of suitability as well. However, in this discussion, there is a contrast between the interviewees, particularly from the contractor of the Regional Directorate of Forestry. The

⁷⁰ Ne ağaç ne de budama yapılamayan dönemlerde verilen TYP'ler amaca aykırı.

⁷¹ Bence; ekim dikim zamanında yapılmak suretiyle orman müdürlükleri çok uygun.

⁷² Projelerin başlama tarihleri saçma. Okullar açıldıktan sonra TYP'mi verilir? Sonra okul kapandıktan sonra 20 gün çalıştı.

following are responses to the question “Which contractors are the most suitable for the aims of PWPs?”.

The most suitable one is the Directorate of National Education. There is benefit to the public. It could be municipalities. Forestry is not suited to the aim of PWP. There are no workers when implemented in winter.⁷³ (R1)

The Directorates of National Education and Forestry, and partially the municipality (as they have parks and gardens.)⁷⁴ (R3)

The Directorate of National Education is the most suited institution. School cleaning and security is a general need. It could be municipalities. Roads, parks and gardens touch all sides of society. Planting trees, forestry is rather consistent.⁷⁵ (R2)

These three responses are from the General Directorate of İŞKUR. All of them mentioned three contractors: the Directorate of National Education, the Directorate of Forestry, and municipalities. Their main benchmark is whether the contractors reach the public or not. There is a common consensus on national education and municipalities. However, due to improper timing, an interviewee claimed that forestry is not a suitable scope for PWP. On the other hand, interviewees from provincial directorates responded differently than the general directorate.

More PWP projects could be implemented with schools, universities and muftiates. There is some speculation among the public about the fact that municipalities are misusing the PWP projects. Participants are being employed in improper areas, both in courthouses and municipalities.⁷⁶ (R5)

If I should give bad examples: The Directorate of Culture; there is no cultural heritage or environmental cleaning. The Ministry of Education; we take over the duties from parent-teacher associations. Courthouse; what are the hundreds of people doing in one building?⁷⁷ (R7)

⁷³ MEB amaca en uygun. Halkta bir karşılığı var. Belediyeler olabilir. Orman TYP’leri ise amaca uygun değil. Verilen TYP’de çalışan olmuyor.

⁷⁴ MEB, orman, kısmen belediye (Park ve bahçeler olduğu için)

⁷⁵ MEB en uygun kurum. Genel bir ihtiyaç okul güvenliği ve temizlik. Belediyeler de olabilir. Yollar, park bahçeler toplumdaki tüm kesimlere hitap ediyor. Ağaç dikimi, orman hadi tutarlı.

⁷⁶ Özellikle okul, üniversite, müftülüklerle daha fazla program yapılabilir. Belediyelerde ise TYP’nin suiistimal edildiğine dair halk arasında olumsuz söylentiler bulunmakta. Katılımcılar adliye ve belediyelerde TYP konusuna uygun olmayan işlerde çalıştırılmaktadır

I would say district governor. They call the needy people through SASF. Hospitals are a bad example. It is problematic in places that really require skills.⁷⁸ (R4)

The contractors' responses differed from the responses from Provincial Directorate interviewees. In addition, an interviewee was against implementing a PWP project with the Ministry of National Education as it impacted on the responsibility of another institution. Moreover, universities, muftiates and district governorships were suggested as being suitable contractors to implement PWP projects. However, because of issues of misuse and the fact that skills are required, municipalities and hospitals were looked upon negatively.

It is not possible to evaluate whether a contractor is good or bad as a whole. Although many of the interviewees claim that Directorate of National Education is the most suitable contractors for PWP, one of the interviewees stated that there are mistakes in planning.

It is necessary to establish a protocol with the Directorate of National Education to restrict the provision of PWP participants at schools where they already have 3-4 servants, and prioritize the schools where they have no servants.⁷⁹ (R6)

In addition to this view, there were more comments about the surplus employment through PWPs in contractors.

If they need 10 people, we should not give them 15-20 people. At most, it should be 11.⁸⁰ (R2)

I do not know how, but we should not send 500 participants if the contractor has 50 employees.⁸¹ (R1)

⁷⁷ Kötü örnek vermek gerekirse; Kültür müdürlüğü: ne kültürel miras var ne çevre temizliği. Milli eğitim: okul aile birliğinin görevi devraldı resmen. Adliye: yüzlerce kişi bir binada ne yapıyor?

⁷⁸ Kaymakamlık derim. Kaymakamlık SYDV üzerinden ihtiyaç sahiplerini çağırıyor. Hastanelerde kötü örnek mevzuu. Gerçekten eğitim gerektiren yerlerde çalıştırmaları sorunlu.

⁷⁹ Milli Eğitim kurumlarında da 3-4 tane Hizmetlisi bulunan okullara ilave katılımcı dağılımları yapılmasının önüne geçilmesi için Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı protokolüne hiç Hizmetlisi olmayan okullara öncelik verilmesi gerekliliği ibaresi eklenmesi fayda sağlayacaktır.

⁸⁰ 10 kişi ihtiyacı varsa oraya 15-20 kişi vermemeliyiz.

⁸¹ Yüklencinin, nasıl yapılır bilmiyorum ama 50 tane çalışanı varsa 500 katılımcı göndermemeliyiz.

It is understood from the responses that many contractors are implementing excessive numbers of PWP projects compared to their institutional capacity. It is hard to manage large group of people if there are not enough human resources. Besides, if PWP scopes are channelled to existing jobs which are already being carried out by permanent workers, this may lead to unproductivity.

In addition to the excessive number of participants, there is another important issue about the determination of PWP scopes. One of the main concerns of the interviewees was the issue that PWP scopes cover indoor areas where there are no public interests.

It should not be used for building cleaning. It is ridiculous to clean the Social Security Institution building, with wages being cut from a worker. It is irrelevant to public service. There is no relation between benefiting society and serving tea.⁸² (R1)

In particular, I am against implementing PWP projects at places with just one building.⁸³ (R7)

This issue shares common ground with the discussion of the lack of work descriptions in the legislation. In the first part, some of the interviewees mentioned that because the work definition of the scope is lacking, there are misinterpretations in implementation. These responses are a reflection of this deficiency and come back into focus in this section.

Lastly, suggestions for increasing the productivity of contractors relate to monitoring issues. Many of the interviewees referred to the lack of auditing the contractors, or worse, the lack of sanctioning power over contractors for the results of auditing.

An auditing mechanism must be ensured. Even though there is auditing, there are no sanctions after auditing. Therefore, auditing is non-functional.⁸⁴ (R2)

⁸² Bina temizliđi amacı için kullanan kurumlar olmamalı. İşçiden yapılan kesintiyi SGK binasını temizlemek için kullanınca saçma oluyor. Halka hizmetle ilgisi yok. Toplum çıkarı için çay götürmek çok bağlantılı deđil.

⁸³ Özellikle düz bir binadan oluşan yerlere TYP verilmesi taraftarı deđilim.

⁸⁴ Denetim mekanizması sağlanmalı. Kontrol etsek de sonra yaptırım yok. O yüzden denetimler göstermelik.

Controls need to be increased. İŞKUR should have a say in this field. There are no sanctions, even if contractors employ participants in contravention of the legislation. Therefore, İŞKUR cannot audit the activities.⁸⁵ (R3)

One of the interviewees highlighted the municipality's political involvement as a difficulty in implementing PWP projects.

For sure, municipalities. The reason is that they are political institutions. First you do the work, then adapt the legislation to that.⁸⁶ (R7)

Again, political intervention comes to the forefront. The lack of auditing and sanctioning power has a close relation with the political issue. İŞKUR does not have enough power to force contractors to implement PWP projects properly, according to the legislation. This is reflected in determining the number of participants to the design of the scope of PWP projects. In order to decrease this influence, an interviewee suggested changes in implementation.

We need to restrict the contractors. We need to ensure that contractors share the expenses. We need to take strict measures on what follows.⁸⁷ (R1)

These are valuable recommendations. Currently, İŞKUR provides PWP projects to almost all public institutions, regardless of their suitability. Most of the contractors implement PWP projects for their internal cleaning work. The determination of the number of participants is not carried out by the contractors, it is decided on by politicians. They do this without considering the capacities of the contractors, leading to supernumeracy. Due to lack of auditing, İŞKUR cannot interfere with contractors at this point. Notwithstanding, every year the number of participants and contractors increases. It is necessary to take measures that will benefit PWP implementation. Besides restrictions on contractors, making the contractor share expenses may be useful in decreasing misuse. When contractors need to pay for participants, they will not be willing to employ more than they need. This may ensure productivity and prevent the overuse of PWP resources.

⁸⁵ Kontroller artmalı. İŞKUR'un söz sahibi olması lazım. Mevzuata aykırı konularda da katılımcıları çalıştırma hiçbir şekilde yaptırım yok. Bu nedenle etkinlikleri denetleyemiyor.

⁸⁶ Belediyeler tabiki. Tartışmasız. Nedeni; siyasi bir oluşum olması. işi yapacaksın sonra mevzuata uyduracaksın.

⁸⁷ Yüklenici kurumları kısıtlamalıyız. Giderlere ortak olmasını sağlamalıyız. Devamlar ile ilgili sıkı tedbir almamız.

4.6. Programme Scopes

The final subpart covers programme scopes. This issue highly interwoven with assessment of contractors, because apart from environmental cleaning, almost all the scopes relate to a certain contractor. Therefore, the responses have many similarities to the previous subpart. Nevertheless, programme scopes also received new recommendations and considerations. In general, interviewees indicated that programme scopes are sufficient. However, some of them are more useful, and some are not implemented accurately. All interviewees from the general directorate of İŞKUR mentioned schools as a useful programme scope. It is most likely that this is the most beneficial scope that generates valuable assets, in terms of cleaning schools and providing a sterilized environment for students. Moreover, job definition of this scope is clear enough and contractors do not attempt to depart from the rule systematically, as in municipalities.

Schools are important. After that, environmental cleaning, and then forestry.⁸⁸ (R1)

The ones related to schools. Parks, gardening and forestry. The scopes related to nature are logical. Because participants can contribute more easily. An asset comes into existence. Motivation increases.⁸⁹ (R3)

I think that the Ministry of National Education, schools and municipalities are productive.⁹⁰ (R2)

In addition to schools, environmental cleaning, and maintaining parks and gardens are counted as a good practice. A common theme of interviews from the General Directorate of İŞKUR is rating scopes in terms of their connection to society. According to them, schools, parks and gardens are the main public spaces, and through non-skilled work, it is possible to create an asset for everyone. On the other hand, contractors responded to the questions from the perspective of improving participants' skills.

⁸⁸ Okul en önemli. Sonrasında çevre temizliği sonra ağaçlandırma.

⁸⁹ Okullarla ilgili olanlar. Park bahçe ve ağaçlandırma. Doğayla ilgili konular mantıklı. Çünkü bu konularda vasıfsız şeyleri daha kolay yapar katılımcılar. Ortaya ürün çıkar. Motivasyon artar.

⁹⁰ MEB, okullar, belediyeler verimli diye düşünüyorum.

I do not think PWPs add value to people. Ok, there is employment, but there is no added value.⁹¹ (R8)

Do we have to recruit primary or secondary school graduates? Sometimes we need a secretary, an IT specialist. How can we recruit for these positions? We cannot immediately hire a new person in place of a retired worker. We need to get permission for these gaps.⁹² (R10)

There should be mechanism to gain occupations. We should teach excel/word. Office services should provide.⁹³ (R9)

There are no similarities between the contractors and General Directorate. This may be because each side responded through their own observations and experiences. The General Directorate mostly focused on providing temporary work, and by doing that, creating an asset that is of benefit to society. On the other hand, contractors assume that PWP projects should increase the participant's skills. Also, through PWP projects, they should employ more skilled workers to fill their regular labour demand. Because of difficulties in employing a person in public institutions, contractors want to remedy their workforce gap using PWP projects. However, this approach of contractors is not conducive to the aim of the Public Works Programme. Beside contractors and General Directorate, the interviewees from the Provincial Directorate had different approaches. According to them, there is a need for alteration in programme scope as well as to add new scopes.

It would be better to change the scope name of "environmental cleaning" to "environment and building cleaning".⁹⁴ (R7)

Mosque cleaning should be added.⁹⁵ (R4)

⁹¹ İnsana bir şey kattığını düşünmüyorum. Tamam, istihdam oluyor ama ayrıca bir değer katmıyor.

⁹² Hep mi ilkokul ortaokul alacağız. Sekreter, bilişimci ihtiyacımız oluyor. Bunları nasıl alacağız? Emekli olan adam yerine pat diye adam alamıyoruz. Bu boşluklar için izin almalıyız.

⁹³ Meslek edindirme olsun. Excel / Word öğretelim. Büro hizmetleri verilsin.

⁹⁴ Çevre temizliği yerine çevre ve bina temizliği olarak değiştirilirse daha isabetli olabilir.

⁹⁵ Camilerin temizliği eklenmeli.

In particular, there could be more programmes implemented with schools, universities and muftiates.⁹⁶ (R5)

Responses differ depending on position. The main responsibility of provincial directorates is to implement PWP projects in accordance with the legislation. Therefore, their main concern in terms of programme scope is to adapt implementation to the legislation. Although there are programmes defined in the legislation under “building infrastructure” or “mosque cleaning”, these scopes are implemented in one form or another. As a result, their responses recommend altering scopes or adding new ones.

At this point, again the topic is connected to the lack of auditing. According to the interviewees both from the General and Provincial Directorates, due to the lack of monitoring and sanctioning power of İŞKUR, it is not possible to regulate the scopes in accordance with legislation.

We request the project. Then, we do not control them. Even if we did control them, there are no sanctions. Therefore, audits are non-functional.⁹⁷ (R2)

Controls need to be increased. İŞKUR has to have a voice. There are no sanctions when participants are employed contrary to legislation. Therefore, effectiveness cannot be audited.⁹⁸ (R3)

There need to be limits drawn when doing environmental cleaning. Sanctions should be implemented seriously.⁹⁹ (R1)

There was only one peculiar comment from a contractor, stating there is strong control in terms of what the participants are doing in PWP projects.

⁹⁶ Özellikle okul, üniversite, müftülüklerle daha fazla program yapılabilir.

⁹⁷ Proje getiriyoruz. Sonra onları kontrol etmiyoruz. Kontrol etsek de sonra yaptırım yok. O yüzden denetimler göstermelik.

⁹⁸ Kontroller artmalı. İŞKUR’un söz sahibi olması lazım. Mevzuata aykırı konularda da katılımcıları çalıştırma hiçbir şekilde yaptırım yok. Bu nedenle etkinlikleri denetleyemiyor.

⁹⁹ Çevre temizliği yapılacaksa yapacağı işler kesin sınırlarla çizilmeli. Cezai yaptırımlar ciddi olarak uygulanmalı.

Programme scopes are implemented as effectively as possible. When auditing is tight, there's nothing else to look for other than efficacy.¹⁰⁰ (R9)

Although a contractor claimed that there is a strong audit and therefore programme scopes are implemented effectively, there is still doubt over this. Interviewees strongly indicated that the effectiveness of programme scopes depends on contractors. Due to lack of auditing and sanctions from İŞKUR, contractors are allowed to implement PWP projects in any scope, even it contravenes the regulations. Therefore, even if a contractor applies a robust audit on participants, that does not mean PWP projects are implemented properly.

Although there are specific programme scopes defined in the legislation, due to lack of auditing and sanctioning power, there are many other scopes being carried out in the implementation of PWP projects. It seems that provincial directorates have accepted this contradiction and suggest harmonizing the legislation and the situation on the ground. On the other hand, contractors did not identify any problems with their implementation.

4.7. Impacts on Participants' Employment Status

The last part of the field study aimed to evaluate the interviewees' perception about the impact of PWP projects on participants' employment status. The main concept of the Turkish Public Works Programme is more likely to be a large-scale direct employment creation programme. There is no aim to develop skills for participants through public employment. It was implemented shortly after the global macroeconomic crisis began in 2007 due to an increase in unemployment. Although this starting point has similarities to the case in Argentina and South Korean, the Turkish Public Works Programme became permanent, in contrast to the PWPs in those countries. PWP projects have been implemented for more than ten years and the Public Works Programme as a whole goes beyond a limited intervention programme. Due to the length and repetitive nature of PWP projects, the possible impacts on the labour market and employment status gain importance. However, according to interviewees from the İŞKUR side, there are no positive impacts on employment status.

Almost all the interviewees agree that PWP projects cause laziness in participants in terms of looking for employment and willingness to work in the private sector. According to the

¹⁰⁰ Olabilecek en etkili şekilde konular uygulanıyor. Denetim sıkı olunca etkinlik için başka bir şey aramaya gerek yok.

responses, there no differences in participants' employment status after they have participated in PWP project.

Those willing to work in the private sector do not come to PWP projects. When they come, they grow lazy. They will not go to the private sector again.¹⁰¹ (R1)

There is a perception that PWP projects offer an easy job. After finishing a PWP project, participants are not willing to go back to the private sector.¹⁰² (R2)

The expectation in Turkey is that they will get a permanent position. So they do not look for work. They wait for a new PWP project.¹⁰³ (R3)

In addition to the views of interviewees from the General Directorate, there were first-hand experiences about participant behaviours from the Provincial Directorate.

Those who work in the public sector cannot adapt to the private sector. Numerous persons prefer to wait for PWP projects, even when we provide a job opportunity.¹⁰⁴ (R7)

I know hundreds of counselees who are quitting private sector jobs and looking for PWP projects.¹⁰⁵ (R6)

Besides the impressions regarding the preferences of participants between the private sector and PWP projects, there are also claims that due to not gaining any skills through PWP projects, participants cannot adapt to the private sector.

Because they do not gain any skills, there is no chance of getting a job, and therefore they will not be able to find a job.¹⁰⁶ (R1)

¹⁰¹ Özel sektörde çalışmak isteyen kişiler TYP'ye gelmiyor. Gelen tembelleşiyor. Yeniden özele gitmezler.

¹⁰² TYP'de rahat iş algısı var. Buradan çıkınca özele gitmek istenmiyor.

¹⁰³ Türkiye'de beklenti kadro. O nedenle işe girmiyor. Yeni TYP bekliyor.

¹⁰⁴ Kamuda çalışmaya alışan kişiler özel sektöre adapte olamıyor. Bir çok kişi bu konuda iş imkanı sunmamıza rağmen TYP'yi beklemeyi tercih etti.

¹⁰⁵ Özel sektörden çıkıp 9 aylık bir Toplum Yararına Program¹⁰⁵ arayışına giren yüzlerce binlerce danışan tanyorum.

PWP projects should add value to participants. There should be education or work training as part of the Public Works Programme.¹⁰⁷ (R2)

The Public Works Programme does not provide an occupation to participants and it prevents them from searching for jobs in the private sector.¹⁰⁸ (R7)

Additional education and modules would provide contribution to participants after finishing a programme.¹⁰⁹ (R5)

Although there is no aim in PWP projects to develop the skills of participants, according to the interviewees including this would have a positive impact on participants' employment status. Additionally, it is understood from the responses that the duration of PWP projects also affect participants' employment decisions.

After 9 months, the participant perceives the 3-month period as a holiday. They do not rush to find a job.¹¹⁰ (R7)

The long duration of PWP projects has unfavourable effects. When you've worked for 9 months, you get through the summer somehow.¹¹¹ (R1)

Actually, from these responses it is understood that instead of PWP project length, the short waiting period between projects has more of an impact on participants' employment decisions. Both of the interviewees above gave the example of hitting the waiting period over the summer period. School term times are the most prominent factor in these short waiting times and repetitive nature (because of the school scope in Turkish PWP projects). Short waiting times and their repetitive nature increase participants' dependence on the programmes and make

¹⁰⁶ Çıkınca bir vasıf kazanmadığından yeniden işe girmek için becerin yok ve bu nedenle iş bulamayacak.

¹⁰⁷ TYP'de kişiye değer katabilmeli. İçerisinde eğitim veya iş öğretme olmalı.

¹⁰⁸ Herhangi meslek edindirmediğini ve kişilerin özel sektörde iş aramalarının önüne geçtiğini düşünüyorum.

¹⁰⁹ Kişilerin vasıflarını arttırıcı ek eğitim ve modüllerin bulunması program sonrasında kişilere fayda sağlayacaktır.

¹¹⁰ Yılda 9 aylık bir uygulama sonrasında kişi diğer 3 ayı hem bekleme süresi hem tatil olarak algılıyor. İş telaşına düşmüyor.

¹¹¹ TYP'nin uzun olması olumsuz etkiliyor. 9 ay çalışınca yazı bir şekilde geçiriyorsun.

them reluctant to look for a permanent job in the private sector. There are responses that recommend taking measures to decrease the length while increasing the waiting period between PWP projects.

There needs to be a 4-month restriction and participants should only participate in PWP projects for 4 months in a 12-month period. This means there would be no hope of participating in a PWP project for 8 months.¹¹² (R6)

With the same frequency, we could scale down the duration to 3 months and provide 1,000 PWP projects. In this case, necessarily participants would have to look for a job in the private sector or elsewhere. They will look for other work because of the fear of only being in the programme for 3 months.¹¹³ (R2)

At this point, discussion about the re-participation rule emerges once again. In the section on Objectives/Definition of PWP projects, the interviewees mentioned the frequent changes to re-participation rules. Once again, this rule came into existence as a result of the impact assessments of PWPs. According to one interviewee, the duration does not impact the participants' employment status. However, the re-participation rule does.

The duration of a PWP project does not affect the employment point much. A new PWP project after finishing another PWP project is affects the employment process. There should be no flexibility in the 18-month utilization rule.¹¹⁴ (R3)

The long duration, repetitive nature and re-participation opportunity has led many people to integrate into the PWP cycle on an annual basis. There are people who have participated in PWP projects for more than 5 years. For these reasons, all the interviewees on the İŞKUR side claimed that the Public Works Programme does not have an impact on changing the participants' employment status. On the other hand, contractors have different experiences. Although they highlight good examples regarding the impact of programme, those examples are not sustainable, and cannot be extended to further programmes.

¹¹² 4 ayda sınırlandırılması ve bir katılımcının 12 ay boyunca yalnızca bir defa bu 4 ay kadar yararlanması sağlanabilse, kişi kalan 8 ayda TYP ümidiyle beklemeyecektir.

¹¹³ Süreyi aynı sıklıkla 3 aya indirerek 1000 TYP verebiliriz. 9 ay yerine 3 ay yapmalıyız. Bu durumda ister istemez özel sektöre ya da farklı arayışlara girmek zorunda kalır TYP katılımcıları. 3 ay sonra çıkacağım diye başka arayışa girer.

¹¹⁴ TYP süresi istihdam noktasında fazla etkilemiyor. TYP sonrasında yeni TYP olması istihdam sürecini etkiliyor. 18 ay yararlanma süresinin değiştirilip esnetilmemesi lazım.

There are people who missed the application while working in the PWP. We employed them through parent-teacher association. This time, the people who work in association became permanent workers. Their bad luck turned to good.¹¹⁵ (R8)

In the first project, our director felt pity and employed 40 participants. Later, this became a problem for us. Everyone started to apply with that hope.¹¹⁶ (R9)

Through a company yes. We employed 53 among 90 participants at a city hospital. But cleaners will lose their jobs. Unfortunately, instead of them, those with influence are going to start.¹¹⁷ (R10)

All the contractors gave an example of the changes in participants' employment status. However, none of them embraced an institutional approach. Even the example from school-parenting association issue has no relevance with PWP. It is more a recognition that if there are not any PWP projects, schools would find other ways to employ people. On the other hand, the municipality had an individualistic approach, but due to the repetitive nature of PWP projects, it is not possible to accept every participant to the municipality. Lastly, the example of the city hospital is more likely to be an effective example. Although it may appear effective, because of an improper selection method, people who have certain skills are recruited for PWP Projects, and this is problematic. Also the scope was not implemented properly. Only because payment is higher than other ALMPs, participants preferred to be hired through PWP Projects, and employment at the end of PWP project cannot be counted as a success.

Lastly participants offer suggestions in order to increase the effectiveness of the Public Works Programme on participants' employment status.

We should give priority to the group who are neither in employment nor in education or training. We're not doing occupational work in programme, but we can teach an occupation.¹¹⁸ (R1)

¹¹⁵ TYP çalışanı iken müracaat tarihini kaçıran oldu. Onları okul aile birliği üstünden çalıştırdık. Bu sefer de orada çalışanlara kadro verildi kadrolu oldular. Şansızlığı şans oldu.

¹¹⁶ İlk projede başkanımız kıyamadı 40 kişiyi aldı. Sonra başımıza bela oldu. Herkes o umutla başvurmaya başladı.

¹¹⁷ Ama şirket üstünden evet. Yeni açılan şehir hastanesine. 90 bitirenin 53'ü aldım. Ama temizlikçiler çıkacak. Onların yerine torpilli başka kişiler girecek maalesef.

¹¹⁸ NEET'lere öncelik verebiliriz. Mesleki bir iş yaptırıyoruz ama meslek öğretebiliriz.

PWP projects should add value to an individual. There should be education or occupational training within them. This would lead to finding a job after finishing the programme.¹¹⁹ (R2)

There should be vocational training. PWP projects should be implemented in a certain occupation. This way, participants may find job after finishing the programme.¹²⁰ (R9)

There needs to be positive discrimination for those who are separated from the labour market. Additional education and modules that increase skills may be support the participant after finishing the programme.¹²¹ (R5)

It may start with not including the young people in the programme. For example, it may start with not including women who are under 30 years old. There could be priority for the age group of 40-50 years old.¹²² (R6)

The main feature of the last suggestions regards either integrating vocational training within PWP projects or specifying new target groups based on different characteristic, such as age group or working status. There is a wide range of general opinion that state PWP projects are not helpful to participants in finding a permanent job. In order to overcome this concern, many of the interviewees recommend a combination of vocational training and PWP projects.

Nevertheless, according to the respondents, PWP projects do not increase the employability of participants. Moreover, PWP projects may lead participants to be unwilling to work in the private sector, given the ease with which they can participate in a PWP project. Furthermore, the length and repetitive feature of PWP projects increase the participants' dependency on programme. The location where PWP projects are implemented may be an important factor in terms of participant decisions. PWP projects have a significant impact on employment activity generally in relatively small regions where economic activities are not strong. However, there

¹¹⁹ TYP'de kişiye değer katabilmeli. İçerisinde eğitim veya iş öğretme olmalı. TYP'den yararlanan kişiye yapılan iş teklifini kabul etmeyene yaptırım olmalı.

¹²⁰ Mesleki eğitim verilmeli. Herhangi bir mesleğe yönelik TYP düzenlenmeli. Böylece çıkınca özelde iş bulsun.

¹²¹ İşgücü piyasasından uzak kalmış dezavantajlı gruplara pozitif ayrımcılık yapılmadığı. Kişilerin vasıflarını artırıcı ek eğitim ve modüllerin bulunması program sonrasında kişilere fayda sağlayacaktır.

¹²² Örneğin gençlerin programa kesinlikle ve kesinlikle dahil edilmemesi ile başlanabilir. 30 yaş altının kadın asla faydalandırılmaması gerekmektedir. 40-50 yaş arası gruba öncelik verilebilir.

are no institutional mechanisms for employing participants after finishing a PWP project. There are examples, but none of them are sustainable or repeatable”.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter is divided into seven sections according to answers raised in the field study. There are three groups representing different parts of the implementation process of Turkish PWP projects. There were different approaches for different groups in some question, but for some questions different groups had similar answers.

The answers concerning the definition of PWP projects comprise all the international features defined in literature of PWPs. They included both the income assistance and temporary employment feature of PWP projects, both for structural unemployment as well as for natural disasters. Many of the answers also defined vulnerable groups as the target of PWP projects. While defining the objectives of PWP projects, many of the interviewees preferred to explain the deficiencies of the projects, like increase in dependency to due to repetitive cycles and the frequent changes in the re-participation rule. Moreover, almost all the interviewee highlighted the misuse of PWP projects as a result of political intervention, which is the main reason for many misinterpretations and misuse in the implementation process.

In the assessment of legislative framework section, many interviewees acknowledge that the legislative framework is sufficient but there are contradictions in the implementation process rule. A prominent point raised by the study is that the lack of job definitions in scopes lead to misinterpretation while implementing PWP projects. In this context, one of the contractors admits that they employed participants for certain occupations, which explicitly indicates that there is misinterpretation in implementing PWP projects. Moreover, there is conflict between General and Provincial Directorate representatives in the phase of creating the legislation, and Provincial Directorate representatives complain about not being consulted when changes in legislation are made. There were also recommendations about possible changes to targeting mechanisms.

One of the important issues raised in the field study was the right of leave. This issue is discussed in both the second and third chapter, specifically in discussing the women’s

participation, and this was exposed again through the responses, which demanded the provision of more leave days for women in terms of their needs.

Interviewees made many comments about the selection method for PWP projects, and mainly they stressed the pressures in using the listing method. There was also an important differentiation between the contractors in terms of geographic targeting. The responses show that change in the wage rate may have a different affect in selecting the non-poor in different regions. Nevertheless, in the targeting mechanism section, many of the respondents recommend bringing in an age restriction for women, as with men, in order to eliminate young women who could find a job in the private sector. In addition, a new target group was proposed, namely social assistance beneficiaries. The amendment in target groups and additional target group recommendations came from both the General and Provincial Directorate sides. Contractors mostly think that reaching vulnerable groups is the responsibility of İŞKUR, and for them they do not see any responsibility to make an arrangement to reach to them. However, almost all the contractors recommend that PWP projects include more vocational training to meet their needs. This approach denotes that the contractors understanding of PWP projects differs, and that they try to utilize PWP projects, even though the aim of programme is inappropriate to their request. They are willing to recruit secretaries and IT specialists through PWPs, and the İŞKUR side interviewees complained about the misuse, particularly in the scope of PWP projects, due to these requests. However, due to lack of sanctioning power, they are unable to prevent misuse.

There are also other deficiencies raised by the field study, like mistiming and surplus employment. These issues were always raised by the İŞKUR representatives. None of the contractors commented on surplus employment. These issues are about planning, and are mostly designed by the General Directorate of İŞKUR. Political motives deviate from planning and coordination between the local needs and central expectations, and İŞKUR officers are influenced by this process.

Lastly, according to İŞKUR representatives, PWP projects do not have a major impact in the employment status of participants. Moreover, sometimes PWP projects affect a participant's decision to look for a job in the private sector. On the other hand, although contractors claim that some participants' find a job as a result of their PWP project background, there are no

institutional structures that raise possibility of the participant finding a job in the private sector after finishing a PWP project.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

PWPs have long-standing implementation history across the world. The main objectives of the programmes are to tackle unemployment and to reduce poverty. There is a wide range of diversification among countries in implementing PWPs. Some countries use PWPs as conditional transfer programmes with high institutional organization. On the other hand, some countries implement PWPs as labour-intensive projects. Another diversification concerns the continuity/duration of PWPs. Some countries implement them on short-term basis in response to transient shocks (e.g. earthquake, flood, etc.) in order to tackle temporary difficulties. Others aim to address chronic poverty through complementary programmes with other types of social programmes in order to protect vulnerable groups.

This thesis has investigated the critical features of Turkish PWP projects and examined the measures that could possibly provide better quality outcomes, particularly in reaching the most vulnerable groups. In this context, the research question of this thesis was *From a comparative perspective, what are the critical features of the Public Work Programmes (PWPs) in Turkey that help to generate decent employment, and what measures may provide better quality PWPs particularly to the most vulnerable groups in the labour market?*. Through analysing international cases, a comparative perspective was adopted in order to identify best practices that would guide the implementation of PWPs in the case of Turkey. The countries were chosen for this thesis based on their feature about prevalence, long-lasting, reason that they came into surface as well as the similarities in terms of country development levels compared to Turkey.

In this thesis, Indian, Argentinian, South Korean and South African PWP implementation methods have been examined. Each country has different objectives, design features, targeting mechanisms and implementation arrangements. The examination of these country examples shows that South Korean and Argentinian PWPs were implemented in response to macroeconomic shocks on a temporary basis. On the other hand, both the Indian and South

African cases used PWPs in response to repeated periodic environmental shocks like localized drought or floods. They also have antipoverty or poverty reduction objectives. These examples demonstrate that each PWP implementation needs specific arrangements in terms of a country's own conditions. Population, geographic position, level of development and labour market conditions are crucial in designing PWPs and their objectives.

Throughout the thesis, the main features, functioning and implications of PWPs have been examined. There are certain issues that need to be taken into consideration in the implementation of all PWPs. Determining the wage rate, scope, timing and duration of PWPs, the labour intensity and credible monitoring and evaluation systems need to be considered prior to launching a PWP.

The wage rate is one of the most important factors in generating demand for participation. In the literature (Subbarao, 2003 & Kalman, 2015 & Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments, 2016 & World Bank, 2001) it is stated that to ensure that everyone who wants to participate in PWPs can do so, the wage rate should be set lower than the prevailing market wage. Thus, there will be no additional requirements for eligibility while implementing the PWP. However, if there is still excessive demand for PWPs, geographic targeting is offered so that the programme can be implemented in poor areas.

The quick response feature is also an important aspect of PWPs. Many PWPs can be launched soon after a natural disaster to mitigate the negative effects of a shock among vulnerable groups. The timing and duration are also crucial in designing PWPs. Many PWPs focus on reducing poverty so that the predictable timing and repetitive feature become prominent while implementing PWPs. The fast response characteristic and timing methods vary depending on the aim of PWPs.

The Turkish case shares many similarities in terms of the general features of PWPs but it has also unique implementation methods, design features and arrangements. Even though the Turkish case started in response to macroeconomic shocks in 2007-08, the repetitive nature and extensive implementation areas all around the country constitute unique characteristics. The striking feature emerges mainly in the scope of PWP projects. The prevalence of school related PWP scopes are distinctive features compared to other cases. Besides, PWP projects in Turkey have a strong subsidiary feature in terms of replacing the essential duties of public

institutions. The repetitive nature and lengthy durations of PWP projects intensify the subsidiary feature of Turkish PWP projects. These unique features separate the Turkish case from international cases. More importantly, these features revoke the temporary feature of the Turkish Public Works Programme. In addition to these, high wages increase the demand. Together with the high demand and permanent nature, PWP projects come to the fore among the other ALMPs which İŞKUR implement.

5.1. Findings of Field Study

The field study aimed to understand and evaluate the ongoing process of Turkish PWP projects. In accordance with this aim, in-depth interviews were carried out with different representatives from the İŞKUR General Directorate, Provincial Directorate, as well as contractors. Throughout the field study, the aim was to gather the respondents' opinion about the Turkish Public Works Programme in terms of its general objective, legislative framework and implementation process, including selection method, targeting mechanism as well as scope of programme projects. In addition to this, it also aimed to evaluate the perception of the respondents in terms of the impact of PWP projects on the employment status of participants.

The following part of this chapter will set out the main findings of the field study, and recommendations will follow the findings.

5.1.1. Excessive Demand

The foremost finding of the field study is the existence of excessive demand for Turkish PWP projects. All the participants in some way indicated and implied the existence of excessive demand for PWP projects. The main reason behind this is the high wage rate of PWP projects, set at the actual minimum wage level. Considering the responses from the field study, there is also a perception that PWP projects involve easier jobs compared to private sector jobs, which is another factor that increases demand. The expectation of getting a permanent job in the public sector through PWP projects is also a cause to prefer them over other ALMPs or jobs in the private sector.

It is revealed by the field study that excessive demand is the foremost obstacle that prevents the most vulnerable groups being reached. PWP quotas are limited, so that not all the demand

is met. Excessive demand generates interventions in the Public Works Programme in many areas like the selection mechanism and quota allocation. Many people who want to participate in PWP projects request pressure groups or local political authorities to assist them in being selected. This generates extensive political intervention, particularly in the selection process, as well as in the quota allocation demands of the provinces. As the wage rate for Turkish PWP projects is set as equal to the existing market wage, many non-poor prefer to participate in PWP projects, and this creates difficulties in reaching the most vulnerable.

Another issue raised in the field study concerns a trigger factor for increasing the demand, namely long-term insurance payments. According to the respondents, many participants are participating in PWP projects for fulfil their obligations in order to gain their right to a state pension. This motive increases demand enormously.

Most of the responses from the field study indicated that decreasing the wage rate would be ineffective as there are still more poorer than the quota. The location where PWP projects are implemented is the main factor that influences the participants' decision of whether to still participate in a PWP project, even if the wage level was below the minimum wage. Only in relatively wealthy areas would decreasing the wage rate be effective in excluding the non-poor from participation. However, as there are many poor who demand to participate in PWP projects, even a decrease in wage rate would not be sufficient to alleviate the excessive demand.

5.1.2. Targeting Mechanism and Institutional Coordination

A targeting mechanism is a useful measure to decrease demand, particularly in the case where a lower wage rate than the market wage is not sufficient to alleviate excessive demand. Given the high wage rate in Turkey, it is crucial to use a targeting mechanism in addition to the self-targeting method. Indeed, categorical targeting is one of the additional measures that is used extensively in Turkish PWP projects.

However, the respondents of the field study indicated that there are also deficiencies and implementation problems in regard to categorical targeting. Many of the respondents draw attention to the extensive eligibility criteria in categorical targeting. Since all women have a priority to participate in PWP projects, many needy individuals may be excluded from

participation. They highlighted the overgeneralization of the category of women. Many interviewees suggested restricting the eligibility criteria for both men and women.

In addition, many of the interviewees recommended establishing a new target group consisting of social assistance beneficiaries. This issue is also important in terms of generating a link between the social assistance system and the Public Works Programme where there is a requirement for institutional coordination. Many of the respondents highlight that this link would be useful in determining the needy through detailed institutional records.

However, there has been no progress in establishing a link between the social assistance system and the Public Works Programme. The main reason for this is the administrative reluctance and lack of willingness to cut the social assistance of beneficiaries and avoid political pressures. However, the entire category consists of poor who have already passed a means test.

PWP projects would be a useful tool in generating additional income and decreasing the social assistance expenditure by facilitating the participants' integration into the labour market. Therefore, it is essential to constitute a new category for social assistance beneficiaries.

The logic behind this suggestion is to identify and reach the vulnerable group more easily and precisely by using other institutional records. If social assistance beneficiaries are defined in categorical targeting subsequently, the system integration between İŞKUR and General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SASF) becomes stronger.

Similar to integration with SASF, there are also the drawbacks that the respondents highlighted in regard to the lack of institutional coordination in determining the income status of participants. Although there are eligibility criteria under income checks, due to the requirement of extensive integration with different institutions, like the Social Security Institution, the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs institutions related to the Treasury, it is not possible to determine the income status of participants objectively. There were many remarks about making additional institutional arrangements to ensure sufficient income checks in order to reach vulnerable groups.

5.1.3. Assessment of the Legislative Framework

Another distinctive point about the Turkish Public Works Programme that was raised in the field study is the misinterpretation of PWP legislation, particularly in defining the limitation of scopes. Many contractors misuse programme scopes. Moreover, they did not conceal this issue in the field study. According to the answers from contractors, many PWP projects are being used for occupations such as secretariat or other duties which are irrelevant to the aims of the Public Works Programme. Besides, both the respondents from the General and Provincial Directorates are aware of this issue and mentioning the misinterpretation of the legislative framework. According to them, the legislative structure is adequate for the aims of the Public Works Program. However, in implementation, due to misinterpretation and lack of sanctioning force, many contractors misuse programme scopes and use PWP scopes to carry out their own work.

5.1.4. Duration and Re-participation

Another prominent issue concerning Turkish PWP projects concerns duration and re-participation. According to respondents, when a lengthy project duration is combined with short waiting periods between projects, participants start to perceive waiting periods as time off. Many of the participants engage in different economic activities during this short waiting period and do not look for permanent work. In many cases, the short waiting period is acceptable to participants who prefer to wait for a new PWP project instead of looking for a job. Many respondents in the field study strongly emphasised that the long duration and re-participation rules increase the dependency of participants. Therefore, these issues need to be considered and redesigned in order to reduce the dependency on PWP projects.

In the field study, there was a strong emphasis on the fact that short waiting period also gives a strong repetitive feature to the Turkish PWP projects. Although there is a rule that prevents participants from participating in PWP projects endlessly, frequent rule changes have led participants to benefit from the Public Works Programme for many years without limitation. Many respondents criticized the changes in the re-participation rule and stated that rule changes provide opportunity for endless participation. Although each change in the regulation restricts the re-participation rule, as past participation is not considered, each change provides a new right to participate.

5.1.5. Timing

Timing is another key point raised during the field study. According to respondents, there is no timing consideration in Turkey in the implementation of PWP projects. Weak timing planning lead to programmes being implemented in irrelevant seasons. For instance, many PWP projects related to harvesting or cultivation are implemented outside the agricultural season. Furthermore, in many cases, school PWP projects are launched after the beginning of the school year and continue while schools are closed. Also, political concerns are very influential in determining the start date of a PWP project, as many PWP projects have been launched before elections.

In order to increase the effectiveness of PWP projects in Turkey, it is necessary to identify their timing periods in terms of their scope. Particularly, those related to seasonal variations must be determined. According to the respondents, the duration of PWP projects could be specified according to PWP scopes.

5.1.6. Right to Leave

Another major issue concerning the Turkish Public Works Programme that needs to be reconsidered is related to leave conditions. In the context of a length of 9 months, 14 days of leave is limited for all participants. According to the respondents, women face particular difficulties as there is no right to maternity leave. The respondents underlined that women also have difficulties in participating in PWP projects as they have no right to take breastfeeding leave.

Considering the women's participation in PWP projects have significant household impacts in terms of intra-household decision-making, family relations and gender issues, it is essential to redesign leave in PWP projects in line with gender sensitive policies.

5.1.7. Monitoring and Evaluation

Lastly, the lack of monitoring and evaluation of Turkish PWP projects was raised as a crucial point in the field study. According to the respondents, one of the major problematic areas of Turkish PWP projects is weak auditing. Moreover, the respondents underlined that there is no

power to control contractors. İŞKUR authorities are not able to enforce the sanctions when misuse by contractors is identified.

Over ten years' of implementation, there is no evidence that indicates the Turkish Public Works Programme impacts on human, social and economic development in Turkey. It is crucial to understand the degree of operational sufficiency and possible misuse of public funds. However, thus far, İŞKUR has not been involved in any effective and comprehensive monitoring activities. Moreover, the approach of the decision makers, who do not consider interviewing the participants for this study appropriate, implicates that they are not concerned with strengthening the monitoring process either.

This finding from the field study indicates that the evaluation phase of Turkish PWP projects is weak and inefficient. According to respondents, although it is necessary to identify a concrete project before implementing a PWP, İŞKUR provincial offices do not control them while being implemented, and do not evaluate their results.

Overall, this thesis aimed to analyse PWPs from a comparative perspective and considered the Turkish PWP as a social assistance tool. Table 9 below provides an overview of the main features of PWPs through a comparative approach based on the country examples discussed in Chapter 2. The table separates the countries into two different income levels. In the table, India and South Africa are classified as low-income countries, while South Korea, Argentina and Turkey are classified as middle-income countries.

The most significant difference between these two groups are the timing periods of implementation. While low-income countries implement PWPs in repetitive and long-lasting cycles, middle-income countries implement PWPs for limited periods of time. However, Turkey differs from other middle-income countries. Although the PWPs are mainly implemented in Turkey in response to the macroeconomic crises and in order to tackle with unemployment, the repeated feature has placed more emphasis on poverty reduction.

Another important aspect revealed by the Table is that, in low-income countries, PWPs are implemented for seasonal or structural unemployment issues, while macroeconomic difficulties lead to the implementation of PWPs in middle-income countries. The aims of poverty reduction and gender sensitivity are common in all countries except South Korea, however technology-related activities only apply in South Korea. Lastly, only in low-income

countries a community-based approach is prominent, which is closely related with the selection of participants and determination of the scope of PWPs.

While a PWP is one of the easiest policies public administrations can use to provide jobs to people, it is not sufficient to meet all the demand. Therefore, it is extremely important to design PWPs carefully. The first priority should be to generate effective mechanisms to reach out to those who are in most need. Among this group, the design of PWPs must be gender sensitive and aim to increase women's participation

Table 9. Cross Country Comparison

	Low-Income Countries		Middle-Income Countries		
	India	South Africa	South Korea	Argentina	Turkey
Long-lasting/Repeated Cycle	+	+			+
Certain Period Implemented			+	+	
Tackling Seasonal Unemployment	+				
Tackling Structural Unemployment		+			+
Poverty Reduction Aspects	+	+		+	+
Seasonally Adjusted/Environmental Related	+	+			
Gender Sensitivity	+	+		+	+
Reflects Macroeconomic Crises			+	+	+
Community-Based Approach	+	+			
Technology-Related Activities			+		

Source: Authors own classification

The analysis of different countries based on their income level allows to see the main points of distinction in terms of the aim of PWP implementations. There are two main reasons to implement PWPs which are tackling with unemployment and poverty. When the priority is to reduce the unemployment, the employability feature becomes prominent. On the other hand, when the focus is poverty alleviation, inclusion-based approaches become more important.

In this context, the transition from welfare to workfare is a turning point for social policy studies, which also has significant implications for PWPs. During this transition, many

countries shifted their welfare state policies to more market-oriented policies. In this process, individuals' availability for work has become important to increase their welfare, and a shift of responsibilities from the state to the individuals has marked this transition. This is an ambivalent decision and still there are policies that converge to welfare policies. Although there is a decrease in welfare state policies, still states maintain some policies that support individuals to increase their income level, which means their welfare. However, starting point and the logic of these policies shifted from welfare to workfare. More recently, states have been looking to the issue of welfare through a market perspective. PWPs started to be used as a last resort in many high income countries in response to this paradigm change. The main eligibility requirement for participating to PWPs is the availability to seek jobs actively. In this context, the main approach is providing alternative mandatory activity to ensure that individuals are available to work immediately, while decreasing welfare provision. When the market cannot offer enough jobs to individuals, PWPs rise as an alternative policy to give the responsibility to the individuals instead of market or state. By providing PWP to individuals, the state evades the responsibility of creating new employment opportunities or ensuring job security of individuals, at the same time as decreasing the unemployment benefits in terms of both the amount and covering periods. Nevertheless, PWPs have become a popular tool particularly in the developed countries and are important examples of the workfare approach.

On the other hand, many countries implement PWPs for poverty alleviation. In this approach, PWPs are used as a social assistance tool, where there are no or insufficient alternatives. In this circumstance, the main eligibility criterion becomes the degree of poverty, which thus leads to the rise of self-selection mechanism as well as categorical targeting in low-income countries.

Considering these approaches together, it is observed from the developments in the course of time that Turkish PWP projects are not stable. The differences between legislation and practice ensure a flexibility to the PWP projects. Additional programme scope in the name of Mosque and Quran Courses or women's inclusion are concrete examples of this flexibility. Although flexibility is preferred in workfare approach to enable customized provisions, Turkish PWPs do not fit into workfare approach in general due to the absence of the mandatory feature. Until now, there are no compulsory activities, even for the ones who receive unemployment insurance. Therefore, it is indicated that the inclusion feature mostly dominates as the main objective of the PWPs in Turkey.

The inclusion feature is related with the aim of poverty alleviation and it is essential to integrate the PWP with the social assistance systems. Turkish social assistance system is well developed in itself in terms of identifying specific needs. However, its connections with different policies are still weak. Many social assistance beneficiary prefer to work informally in order to continue to receive social assistance and due to lack of connections with different institutions informality increases while receiving social assistance. Specific to PWP projects, decision makers intentionally avoid to make a link between PWP participation and social assistance system. PWP participation is not used as a determinant factor while defining the beneficiaries' need for social assistance. In addition, the information about the beneficiaries' conditions and the type of social assistance are also not shared with İŞKUR. It is very important to determine the needy social assistance beneficiaries and a tailored method should be adopted for different needs and conditions of different individuals. Participating to PWPs, on its own, should not be a criterion to cut the social assistance of individuals. On the other hand, social assistance beneficiaries should not be an aggregate target group for the PWPs. in order to avoid a person not to participate in PWPs due to the cut in social assistance, each case should be independently examined. In the absence of integration between social assistance system and PWPs, it is not possible to implement PWPs as a social assistance tool in Turkey. Both of them should mutually support each other.

Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the Turkish PWP projects explicitly contribute to the inclusion of participants by providing temporary income gain. As the focus is not on increasing the employability of participants, there are no skills improvement feature while implementing PWPs. Selection methods and expected impacts are also coherent with the inclusion feature and even in the name of programme, the term of work is deliberately not mentioned. In this context, it is important to analyse the possible methods to strengthen the link between social assistance system and PWP projects in Turkey. In addition, it is also important to analyse PWP projects in Turkey in terms of their employability feature. Due to constraints to reach the participants, this feature could not be analysed in detail and there should be more studies particularly focusing on the impact of participants' employment status.

5.2. Recommendations

5.2.1. Wage Rate and Benefits

- In order to decrease the excessive demand, decreasing the wage rate appears to be crucial. When the wage rate is set at a lower level than the market wage level, excessive demand can be reduced and consequently political interventions may decrease. Therefore, PWP wage rates should be decreased and made equal to vocational education courses payments.
- Apart from the wage rate vested benefits need to be redesigned in terms of insurance payments. The removal of long-term insurance payments will contribute to a decrease in excessive demand.

5.2.2. Selection Methods and Eligibility Criteria

- It is essential to remove the listing method from the selection methods in order to reduce political intervention.
- It is necessary to redesign the categorical eligibility criteria and to restrict coverage. There needs to be an intensive evaluation process carried out by job and vocational counsellors to prioritize both men and women in terms of their willingness to integrate into the labour market after completing a PWP project.
- In order to reduce excessive demand as well as channel young women into more productive programmes, the eligibility requirement needs to be adjusted to cover women who are at least 30 years old.
- On the other hand, in order to reach the most vulnerable groups among women over 30 years, priority requirements need to be coordinated with the degree of poverty, supported by institutional records. Women with children or single women may have an additional priority among the category of women.
- The age requirement for men should also be restricted in order to decrease excessive demand. PWPs aim to assist individuals who have difficulties for integration into the labour market. Older men have more difficulties compared to young men, and need additional support to deal with unemployment. A PWP is an effective tool to create direct employment and useful in specifying a targeting method to reach more of the

people who are in need. Thus, the increase in the age restriction for men to 45 years will be useful in reaching vulnerable groups.

- In order to increase the participation the disabled, a quota system needs to be implemented and at least 10% of all participants should be selected from this group.

5.2.3. Institutional Coordination

- There must be a comprehensive central institutional based control system for determining the income checks in the selection process in order to reach vulnerable groups.
- One of the top priorities should be to establish integration with the Social Security Institution and to monitor possible registered wage earning of all household members of participants.
- İŞKUR must promote coordination with the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SASF) to determine the degree of poverty.
- Together with this integration, it is necessary to extend the categorical targeting and design a new category for the groups who receive social assistance.
- A new priority group should add to categorical targeting with no work record for more than a year.
- The İŞKUR General Directorate needs to define standard procedures in terms of carrying out income checks on participants and disseminate these to provincial directorates.
- It is also essential to integrate municipalities and the related institutions with the Treasury in order to determine the participants' degree of poverty.

5.2.4. Changes in Legislation of PWPs

- In order to eliminate the misinterpretation of programme scopes in implementation, job descriptions should be written in legislation in more detail. Furthermore, there should be precise sanctions in the legislation that target the exploitation of programme scopes by contractors.

- Taking into account the temporary feature of PWP projects, the duration of programmes should not be more than 3 months and a requirement should be established stating that participants can only participate in PWP projects once a year.
- Alternatively shortening the duration of all PWP projects to 3 months, imposing a more restrictive re-participation rule, and separating all applicants into two groups (those who have not participated in a PWP project in their lives, and those who have) could be another option. In this measure, the project length may remain up to 9 months.
- It is necessary to conduct a comprehensive needs analysis by the İŞKUR General Directorate for each scope, to define the sufficient timing and duration criterion.
- Timing should be determined according to the features of scopes and geographic patterns. School PWP projects should not be started after September and there should not be any new programme that starts in other months to prevent mistiming. Additionally, afforestation scopes need to be designed very carefully based on seasonal variations. Afforestation scopes timing may vary depending on region.
- PWP projects in Turkey must provide sick and family responsibility leave for women. In addition to that, free childcare service and consultation for problems and family planning should also be a part of PWP projects.

5.2.5. Monitoring and Evaluation

- The monitoring and evaluation aspect of Turkish PWP projects needs to be redesigned. The minimum expectations from each scope need to be analysed and measurable objectives put forward. It is essential to estimate the results/outcomes of PWP projects, therefore new measurement rules need to be established.
- Evaluation studies must be conducted in all regions. Scopes, duration and timing need to be considered differently, and every aspect must be analysed during evaluation studies. These studies should have a periodical cycle and findings must be made available to the public. For this purpose, new adjustment needs to be set in the regulation and make evaluation studies obligatory for provincial directorates, and to report these to the general directorate.

PWP projects have been implemented in Turkey for a long time. Though there are many similarities with international cases, the Turkish case has its own unique features in terms of duration, repetitive cycles, content of programme, etc. Unfortunately, due to lack of regular monitoring and evaluation of PWP projects, there is no adequate information about their impact. However, from the field study, it is understood that there are deficiencies, particularly in reaching the vulnerable groups. Along with the recommended measures below, it is expected that the Public Works Programme be renewed and redesigned, and thus lead to an increase in the participants' income as well as generate economic activity. With the help of the modest contribution of this thesis, it is anticipated that a more sustainable and productive Public Works Programme can be established in Turkey in the future.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 1 / SORU FORMU 1

Mevzuat Deęerlendirmesi

- TYP'lerin amacını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Sizce neden uygulanmaktadırlar?
- Sizce TYP mevzuatı (Yönetmelik ve Genelge) yeterli midir?
- Sizce TYP Mevzuatında eksiklik ya da düzeltilmesi gereken unsurlar var mıdır?
- Mevzuata ilişkin önerileriniz nelerdir?

Uygulamanın Deęerlendirilmesi

Katılımcı Seçimi

- TYP'lerde katılımcı seçim yöntemleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinin adil ve şeffaf olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinde sorun ya da zorluk yaşanmakta mıdır? Eğer varsa ne gibi sorunlar yaşanmaktadır?
- Sizce katılımcı seçimi için en etkili yöntem ne olabilir?
- TYP'lerde asgari ücretin altında ödeme yapılması katılımcı profillini deęiştirir mi? En çok ihtiyaç duyanların katılmasına etki eder mi?

Hedef Grup

- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasını nasıl deęerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasının kadınların TYP'lere katılmasında etkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
- Hedef grupta olmayıp yer almasının uygun olduğunu düşündüğünüz özellikli bir grup var mıdır? (Örn. Sosyal yardım alanlar) Neden?
- Hedef grup uygulamasının ihtiyaç sahiplerinin katılımını artırdığını düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünmüyorsanız, katılımı artırmak için neler yapılabilir? Hedef gruplara nasıl ulaşılabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

Yüklenici Kurum

- TYP uygulanan yüklenici kurumlar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- Sizce yüklenici kurumların TYP'nin başarıya ulaşmasındaki katkıları nelerdir?

- TYP'nin amacına en uygun yüklenici kurumlar hangileridir? Neden? İyi ve kötü örnekler nelerdir?
- Yüklenici kurumların TYP'nin başarıya ulaşmasındaki etkilerini artırmak için önerileriniz nelerdir?

Program Konuları

- TYP program konularını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hangi program konularının daha etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?
- Kaldırılması ya da eklenmesi gereken program konuları olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
- TYP'lerin program konularına uygun olarak uygulandığını düşünüyor musunuz? Düşünmüyorsunuz;
 - En çok hangi konularda program konularına aykırı uygulamalar olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?
- TYP konularının etkinliğinin artırılması için önerileriniz nelerdir?

TYP'lerin Kişilerin İstihdam Durumuna ve İşgücü Piyasasına Etkileri

- TYP katılımcılarının program sonrasında işgücü piyasasına girmesinin kolaylaştığını düşünüyor musunuz? Neden? Örnek verebilir misiniz?
- TYP sürelerinin uzun olmasının katılımcılarının işgücü piyasasındaki diğer fırsatlar karşısında tercihlerini etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- TYP uygulamasının istihdama etkisi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- TYP'lerin işgücü piyasasına katılımı olumlu etkisini artırıcı ne gibi önlemler alınabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 2 / SORU FORMU 2

Mevzuat Değerlendirmesi

- TYP'lerin amacını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Sizce neden uygulanmaktadırlar?
- Sizce TYP mevzuatı (Yönetmelik ve Genelge) yeterli midir?
- Sizce TYP Mevzuatında eksiklik ya da düzeltilmesi gereken unsurlar var mıdır?
- Mevzuata ilişkin önerileriniz nelerdir?

Uygulamanın Değerlendirilmesi

Katılımcı Seçimi

- TYP'lerde katılımcı seçim yöntemleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinin adil ve şeffaf olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinde sorun ya da zorluk yaşanmakta mıdır? Eğer varsa ne gibi sorunlar yaşanmaktadır?
- Sizce katılımcı seçimi için en etkili yöntem ne olabilir?
- TYP'lerde asgari ücretin altında ödeme yapılması katılımcı profillini değiştirir mi? En çok ihtiyaç duyanların katılmasına etki eder mi?

Hedef Grup

- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasının kadınların TYP'lere katılmasında etkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
- Hedef grupta olmayıp yer almasının uygun olduğunu düşündüğünüz özellikli bir grup var mıdır? (Örn. Sosyal yardım alanlar) Neden?
- Hedef grup uygulamasının ihtiyaç sahiplerinin katılımını artırdığını düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünmüyorsanız, katılımı artırmak için neler yapılabilir? Hedef gruplara nasıl ulaşılabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

Yüklenici Kurum

- TYP uygulanan yüklenici kurumlar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- Sizce yüklenici kurumların TYP'nin başarıya ulaşmasındaki katkıları nelerdir?
- TYP'nin amacına en uygun yüklenici kurumlar hangileridir? Neden? İyi ve kötü örnekler nelerdir?

- Yüklenici kurumların TYP'nin başarıya ulaşmasındaki etkilerini artırmak için önerileriniz nelerdir?

- En çok zorluk yaşadığınız yüklenici kurumlar hangileridir? Neden?

Program Konuları

- TYP program konularını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hangi program konularının daha etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?
- Kaldırılması ya da eklenmesi gereken program konuları olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
- TYP'lerin program konularına uygun olarak uygulandığını düşünüyor musunuz? Düşünmüyorsanız;
 - En çok hangi konularda program konularına aykırı uygulamalar olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?

- TYP konularının etkinliğinin artırılması için önerileriniz nelerdir?

TYP'lerin Kişilerin İstihdam Durumuna ve İşgücü Piyasasına Etkileri

- TYP katılımcılarının program sonrasında işgücü piyasasına girmesinin kolaylaştığını düşünüyor musunuz? Neden? Örnek verebilir misiniz?
- TYP sürelerinin uzun olmasının katılımcılarının işgücü piyasasındaki diğer fırsatlar karşısında tercihlerini etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- TYP uygulamasının istihdama etkisi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- TYP'lerin işgücü piyasasına katılımı olumlu etkisini artırıcı ne gibi önlemler alınabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE 3 / SORU FORMU 3

Genel Değerlendirme

- TYP'lerin amacını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Sizce neden uygulanmaktadırlar?

Uygulamanın Değerlendirilmesi

Katılımcı Seçimi

- TYP'lerde katılımcı seçim yöntemleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- İhtiyaç duyduğunuz kişiler programa katılıyor mu? Katılmıyorsa, katılımlarını artırmak için neler yapılabilir?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinin adil ve şeffaf olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
- Katılımcı seçimlerinde sorun ya da zorluk yaşanmakta mıdır? Eğer varsa ne gibi sorunlar yaşanmaktadır?
- Sizce katılımcı seçimi için en etkili yöntem ne olabilir?
- TYP'lerde asgari ücretin altında ödeme yapılması katılımcı profillini değiştirir mi? En çok ihtiyaç duyanların katılmasına etki eder mi?

Hedef Grup

- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hedef grup (Öncelikli liste) uygulamasının kadınların TYP'lere katılmasında etkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
- Hedef grupta olmayıp yer almasının uygun olduğunu düşündüğünüz özellikli bir grup var mıdır? (Örn. Sosyal yardım alanlar) Neden?
- Hedef grup uygulamasının ihtiyaç sahiplerinin katılımını artırdığını düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünmüyorsanız, katılımı artırmak için neler yapılabilir? Hedef gruplara nasıl ulaşılabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

Yüklenici Kurum

- Yüklenici kurumların TYP'nin başarıya ulaşmasındaki etkilerini artırmak için önerileriniz nelerdir?

Program Konuları

- TYP program konularını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Hangi program konularının uygulamaktasınız?
- Hangi program konularının daha etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?
- TYP konularının etkinliğinin artırılması için önerileriniz nelerdir?

TYP'lerin Kişilerin İstihdam Durumuna ve İşgücü Piyasasına Etkileri

- TYP katılımcılarının program sonrasında işgücü piyasasına girmesinin kolaylaştığını düşünüyor musunuz? Neden? Örnek verebilir misiniz?
- TYP sonrası katılımcıları kurumunuzda istihdam ettiniz mi? Neden?
- TYP olmasaydı aynı işler için kişi istihdam etmeniz gerekecek miydi?
- TYP sürelerinin uzun olmasının katılımcılarının işgücü piyasasındaki diğer fırsatlar karşısında tercihlerini etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- TYP uygulamasının istihdama etkisi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- TYP'lerin işgücü piyasasına katılımı olumlu etkisini artırıcı ne gibi önlemler alınabilir? Önerileriniz nelerdir?

APPENDIX D: TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

SOSYAL YARDIM ARACI OLARAK TÜRKİYE'DEKİ TOPLUM YARARINA PROGRAMLARIN KARŞILATIRMALI PERSPEKTİF ÜZERİNDEN ANALİZİ

En basit tanımıyla Toplum Yararına Programlar (TYP) bir iş karşılığı geliri desteği sağlayan programlar olarak tanımlanabilir. Literatüre göre TYP'lerin temelde iki amacı bulunmaktadır. Amaçlarından ilki program katılımcılarına doğrudan bir iş yaratarak gelir desteği sağlamak böylelikle yoksulluğu azaltma amaçlanmaktadır. Bir diğer amacı ise yine doğrudan iş yaratma amaçlı emek yoğun projeler yoluyla ülke genelinde yapısal işsizliği önlemek ve istihdamı artırmak amacıyla uygulanmaktadır.

Tarihsel antik dönemde piramitlerin yapılması literatürde bir örnek olarak veriliyor olsa dahi modern anlamda bilinen TYP örnekleri 1970'lerde yavaş yavaş ortaya çıkmıştır. TYP'ler dünyanın çok çeşitli ülkelerinde uygulanmış ve halen birçok ülkede uygulanmaya devam etmektedir. TYP'lerin dünya genelinde popülerleşmesinin ve yaygın olarak uygulanmasının arkasında birkaç neden bulunmaktadır. 1970'lerde yaşanan refah devleti odaklı yaklaşımdan çalışma odaklı yaklaşıma geçişle beraber; sosyal yardımların en yoğun olarak uygulandığı refah devleti döneminde istihdama geçiş ve sosyal yardım programlarından çıkış için istihdam odaklı¹²³ yaklaşımlar içerisinde oldukça kullanışlı bir araç olarak TYP'lerin kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. TYP'ler yaygın olarak uygulanan sosyal yardımların şarta bağlanması noktasında oldukça kullanışlı bir araç durumundadır (Kalman 2015). TYP'ler yoluyla sosyal yardım alanların azaltılması ve herhangi bir iş yapmaksızın yardım almanın önüne geçilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Özellikle gelişmiş ülkelerdeki geniş sosyal yardım yararlanıcıların bu programlara yönlendirilmesinin uygun olacağı düşünüldüğünden popülerliği hızla artmıştır. TYP'lerin popüler olmasının arkasındaki bir diğer neden ise hükümet politikaları yoluyla yoksullara gelir desteği sağlamada noktasından kolaylık ve kişilerin doğrudan devlet eliyle istihdam edilmelerine imkan tanınması olarak gösterilebilir (Gehrke 2015).

¹²³ "Workfare" kavramı yerine kullanılmıştır.

Bu özelliklere hızlıca uygulamaya konulabilen bir uygulama olması da TYP'lerin tercih edilmesinde önemli bir nedendir. Başta doğal afet ve makroekonomik sorunlar nedeniyle bir ülkede ortaya çıkan olumsuz sonuçların azaltılması için çok kısa sürede ve hızlıca uygulanmaya başlayabilmeleri de oldukça önemli bir özelliktir. Diğer birçok aktif işgücü piyasası programlarına (AİPP) göre TYP'lerin çok daha hızlı ve çabuk düzenlenebilmesi ayırt edici bir özelliktir. TYP uygulamasının erken başlamasının yanı sıra, program düzenlenecek alanların kapsamının belirlenmesi, hangi hedef kitle ile program düzenlenebileceğine ilişkin süreçlerin net bir şekilde belirlenebilmesi bakımından oldukça işlevsel programlardır (Betcherman & Islam, 2001).

TYP uygulamaları ülkelerin gelir durumlarına değişkenlik gösterebilmektedir. Dizayn süreçleri, programların amacı, uygulanacağı süresi ve programın bitiminde yeniden uygulanması gibi TYP'nin özelliklerini belirleyen hususlar ülkelerin gelir durumları ile bağlantılı olarak değişebilmektedir. Orta ve üst gelir grubundaki ülkelerin TYP'leri AİPP'ler içerisinde bir müdahale aracı olarak kullandığı söylenebilir. Bu grupta yer alan ülkeler çoğunlukla makroekonomik krizler sonrası TYP'leri uygulamaya başlamıştır. Makroekonomik nedenlerle uygulanmaya başlayan TYP'lerin orta ve üst gelir grubundaki uygulamalarının uzun yıllar devam etmediği, krizin etkilerinin ortadan kalkması ile birlikte sonlandığı yapılan literatür çalışmasında görülmektedir. Diğer yandan düşük gelir grubundaki ülkelere TYP'ler yaygın olarak uygulanmaktadır. Düşük gelir grubundaki ülkelere mevsimsel değişiklikler nedeniyle oluşan ekonomik daralmalara çözüm olarak bir kaynak transfer aracı gibi TYP uygulamaları yapılmaktadır. Mevsimsel etkilerin yanı sıra yoksulluğun yaygın olduğu olumsuz durumlar için de bu olumsuzlukların etkilerini azaltmak amacıyla da TYP'lerin uygulandığı belirtilebilir. Yoksulluk ve işsizliğin görece daha yüksek olduğu düşük gelir grubundaki ülkelere uygulanan TYP'lerin uzun yıllar devam ettiği ve sürekli olarak tekrar eden programlardan oluştuğu söylenebilir (Subbaro et al., 2012).

TYP'lerin bir diğer önemli özelliği kırılgan grupları net tanımlayarak belli gruplar için öncelikli olarak uygulanabilmesidir. Kadınların da içerisinde bulunduğu kırılgan nüfusa geçici gelir desteği sağlayarak onların ekonomik statülerini yükseltme amacı oldukça önemlidir. Birçok ülkede uygulanan TYP'lerde açıkça kadınlar, engelliler ve uzun süreli işsizleri ve yaşlıları hedef gruplar içerisine almaktadır. Bu noktada kadınların TYP'lere katılmasına ilişkin özel araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Yapılan araştırma sonuçlarına göre farklı ülkelere TYP'lere

katılan kadınların çocuklarının refahı ve kadınların kendi sağlık ve statülerinde olumlu yönde önemli etkiler sağladığı görülmektedir (Swamy, 2003).

TYP'ler her ne kadar doğal afet ve ekonomik sorunlara hızlı birer müdahale aracı olarak uygulanabilir olsa ve katılımcılarının gelirlerine doğrudan katkı sağlaması bakımında oldukça önemli özellikleri bulursa da doğru dizayn ve denetim süreçlerini de barındırması oldukça önemlidir. TYP'lerin doğru ve faydalı bir etki göstermesi için çok dikkatli şekilde dizayn edilmeleri gerekmektedir. Bu kapsamda program konuları, hedef grup ve seçim yöntemi ile uygunluk tespiti ve denetim ve değerlendirme süreçlerinin TYP'lerin başarıya ulaşması için çok iyi dizayn edilmesi gerekmektedir (ILO Report, 2009).

TYP'ler ülkeden ülkeye değişkenlik gösteren çok çeşitli program konuları bulunmaktadır. Program konuları ayrıca dönemsel olarak da oldukça çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Altyapı projelerinden çevre temizliğine, sosyal konulardan teknoloji bağlantılı birçok konuda çeşitli ülkelerde TYP düzenlemiş ve düzenlenmektedir. Program konularının belirlenmesinde ülkelerin gelir durumları oldukça önemli bir etmen olmaktadır. Program konuları belirlenirken asıl amaç TYP'ler yoluyla katılımcılara ve buldukları çevreye en çok yarar sağlayıcı programın belirlenmesidir. Bu bağlamda program konusu seçiminde içinde bulunulan durum önemli değişken olup işgücü piyasasının durumuna göre yoksulluğu azaltma amacıyla tüm nüfusu veya bir bölgeyi kapsayan projeler yapılabileceği gibi müdahale süresinin uzun yada kısa tutulması da koşullara göre ayrı değerlendirilmelidir (Subbaro et al., 2012 & McCord, 2003 & Kostzer, 2008 & Kwon, 2002).

Diğer yandan hedef grupların belirlenmesi de TYP'lerin etkinliği ve başarısı için oldukça önemlidir. Bu kapsamda programları düzenleyen kamu kurumlarının rolü çok önemlidir. TYP uygulanırken yoksul olmayanların programlara katılmaması beklenmektedir. Bu nedenle çeşitli önlemler alınmaktadır ancak her durumda yoksul olmayanların programlardan yararlanması noktasında belli sınıtlar mevcuttur. Kişilerin gelir durumlarını belirlemek idare için oldukça zor olup oldukça kapsamlı kurumsallaşma gerektirmektedir ve maliyeti oldukça yüksektir. Programa uygun olmayan kişilerin belirlenmesi için bu nedenle çeşitli önlemler gerekmektedir. (Devereux, 1999). En yaygın önlemlerin başında program ücretinin düşük tutularak katılımcıların kendiliğinden seçim yönteminin belirlenmesidir. Bu kapsamda piyasa fiyatının bir miktar altında bir ücret ödenerek yoksul olmayanların programlara kendiliğinden katılmasının önlenmesi beklenmektedir. Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments, 2016).

Ancak tek başına bu yöntemin kullanılması kırılgan grupların programa katılımını artırmak için yeterli değildir. Bu nedenle birçok ülkede kadınlar, yaşlılar veya belli özelliklere göre özel hedef gruplar öncelikli olarak belirlenmiştir (Lal et al., 2010). Bunun yanı sıra coğrafi hedeflemede kullanılmaktadır. Ülkenin yalnızca yoksul bölgelerinde TYP uygulanarak diğer bölgelerde yoksul olmayanların programa katılmalarının önüne geçilmeye çalışılmaktadır (Subbarao, 2003).

Hedef grup uygulamasının yanı sıra denetim ve değerlendirme süreçleri de TYP'lerin aksayan yönlerini görmek ve daha etkili önlemler alabilmek için oldukça önemli süreçlerdir. Geçmişte TYP uygulayıcıları çoğunlukla programların insana, sosyal ve ekonomik gelişime etkilerine bakarken artık verilen hizmetin kalitesi, risk değerlendirmesi ve hesap verilebilirlik ön plana çıkmıştır. Bireyin ve sosyal gelişim sonuçlarına önem verilse de yalnızca bu yaklaşım ile yoksul olmayanların katılımını önlemek mümkün olamamaktadır. Bu nedenle kamu kaynaklarının yanlış kullanılmaması ve kırılgan grupta yer alan kişilerin program yoluyla istismar edilmemesi için güçlü ve işleyen bir denetim ve izleme sürecin olması gerekmektedir (Barrett & Kidd, 2015).

TYP'lerin genel özellikleri, uygulama süreçleri, önlemler ve denetim hususlarının yanı sıra karşılaştırmalı analize katkı sunması adına tezin içerisinde ayrıca dört ülke örnek uygulaması da yer almaktadır. Bu kapsamda TYP uygulamaları yönünden incelenen ülkeler ise Hindistan, Güney Kore, Arjantin ve Güney Afrika'dır. Ülke seçimi sırasında ülkelerin genel ekonomik gelişmişlik seviyesi, TYP uygulamasına başlanma nedeni ve dünyada yaygın uygulamaların başında gelip gelmediği hususları dikkate alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda örnek ülkeler arasında yer alan Hindistan günümüzde uygulanan güncel örnek bakımından TYP'lerin en uzun süreli ve en kapsamlı uygulandığı ülkedir. Hindistan ayrıca uyguladığı TYP'leri hak temelli bir yaklaşımla uygulaması bakımından diğer ülke örneklerinden nitelik bakımından ayrı olması nedeniyle de seçilmiştir. Arjantin ve Güney Kore'de uygulanan TYP'ler makro ekonomik krizler sonrasında uygulanmaya başlamıştır. Ayrıca TYP'lerin uygulandığı dönemdeki ekonomik gelişmişlik seviyelerinin Türkiye'ye benzer olması da önemli bir seçim kriteri olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Her iki ülkedeki TYP'lerin çıkış nedenlerinin ve ülkelerin ekonomik durumlarının Türkiye ile benzerlikler taşıması nedeniyle incelenmesi uygun görülmüştür. Son örnek ülke uygulaması ise Güney Afrika'dan seçilmiştir. Söz konusu ülkede TYP'lerin çok yaygın ve uzun yıllara dayanan uygulama alanının bulunması ve özellikle

kadınların TYP'lere katılımını artırıcı aldıkları önlemler nedeniyle tez içerisinde ülke örneği olarak yer almıştır.

Tez boyunca örnek ülkeler kendi aralarında karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda Hindistan ve Güney Afrika'da düzenlenen TYP'lerin diğer ülkelere göre daha uzun süreli ve tekrar eden bir özellik gösterdiği görülmektedir. Arjantin ve Güney Kore'deki TYP uygulamalarının ise makroekonomik nedenlerden kaynaklandığı söylenebilir. Bu ülkelerde uygulanan TYP'lerin makroekonomik sorunlar ortadan kaldıktan sonra TYP uygulamasına son verdikleri ve tekrar eden bir döngü içerisinde olmadıkları tez boyunca vurgulanmıştır. Hindistan ve Güney Afrika'da uygulanan TYP'lerin temel amacı yoksullukla mücadele etmektir. Bu kapsamda Hindistan'da uygulanan TYP'ler daha çok mevsimsel işsizlik ve yoksulluğu azaltmak amacıyla dönemsel olarak ve belli bölgelerde uygulanmaktadır. Diğer yandan Güney Afrika'da ise yüksek ve katı yapısal işsizlikle mücadele için TYP uygulaması tüm ülke genelinde yaygın şekilde uygulanmaktadır. Ülkelerin karşılaştırılması sırasında öne çıkan bir diğer husus; Güney Kore hariç tüm ülkelerde uygulanan TYP'lerin katılımcı seçiminde cinsiyet hassasiyeti bulunduğu tespitidir. İncelenen tüm ülkelerde, Güney Kore hariç, kadınların katılımı TYP'lere katılımının artırılması için özel önlemler alındığı görülmüştür. Diğer yandan Güney Kore TYP uygulamasında teknoloji ile ilgili programlar düzenlendiği tespit edilmiştir. Bu bakımından da Güney Kore TYP konuları diğer ülkelerden farklılaşmakta ve teknoloji bağlantılı uygulamalar gerçekleşmiştir. Tez boyunca incelenen ülke örneklerinin birçok özelliği Türkiye'de uygulanan TYP'ler ile benzerlikler taşımaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra uygulamada Türkiye'de temel bazı farklılıklar olduğu da söylenebilir. Ülkelerin gelir durumları üzerinden bir değerlendirme yapıldığında söz konusu örneklerin Türkiye ile benzeyen ve ayrışan yönleri daha net ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye'de uygulanan TYP'ler makroekonomik kriz sonrasında işsizliğin azaltılması için uygulanmaya konulmuştur. Bu yönüyle Güney Kore ve Arjantin örnekleri ile benzerlik taşımaktadır. Ancak tekrar eden ve sürekli hale gelen yapısıyla birlikte söz konusu ülkelere ayrılmakta ve Hindistan ile Güney Afrika örneklerine daha çok yaklaşmaktadır. Tezin ilerleyen bölümlerinde detaylıca incelendiği üzere gelir durumuna göre yapılan katılımcı seçimi özellikleri dikkate alındığında yoksullukla mücadele bakımından da bir araca dönüştüğü ifade edilebilir. Bu yönleriyle güncel durumda TYP'lerin her ne kadar çıkışı makroekonomik zorluklarla mücadele olsa da gelinen aşamada yoksulluğu azaltma yönünden etkilerinin daha yüksek olduğu söylenebilir. Bu ve benzeri değerlendirmeler ile tez boyunca Türkiye için yararlı sonuçlar çıkarmaya çalışılmıştır. Farklı ülkelerde TYP uygulaması

sırasında deneyimlenip katılımcılara sağladığı fayda ve programların genel etkinliği bağlamında sonuç alınan hususlarla ilgili Türkiye bağlamında çıkarımlar tezin üçüncü bölümünde detaylı şekilde yer almaktadır.

Literatür taraması ve ülke örneklerinin karşılaştırılması bölümünün ardından Türkiye’de uygulanan TYP’lerin detaylı inceleme ve analizinin yer aldığı bölüm bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu bölümde Ülkemizde uygulanan TYP’ler tüm detayları ile yer almaktadır. Türkiye’de uygulanan TYP’ler 2007 yılında başlamış olup o tarihten bu yana kesintisiz olarak uygulanmaktadır. İlk yıllarında dikkate değer sayıda katılımcı bulunmamaktadır. 2009 yılı ile birlikte katılımcı sayıları oldukça yüksek bir seviyeye ulaşmaya başlamış olup birçok kişi TYP’lerden yararlanmaktadır. Türkiye’de TYP’lerin ilk ortaya çıkış nedeni 2007-2008 yıllarındaki küresel ekonomik krizin Türkiye’deki olumsuz etkilerini azaltmak olsa da ilerleyen yıllarda tekrar eden ve süreklilik kazanan yapısı ile yoksulluğun azaltılması ve yapısal işsizlikle mücadele gibi amaçlar da kazanmıştır. Bu bağlamda Toplum Yararına Programların uluslararası ülke uygulamaları ile birçok benzerliği ve kendine özgü tarafları bulunmaktadır.

Türkiye’deki TYP’lerin uygulama süresi 9 aydır. Bu süre oldukça uzun bir süre olup aynı zamanda asgari ücret düzeyinden ödeme yapıldığı düşünüldüğünde katılmak için talepte bulunan kişi sayısı oldukça yüksektir. Katılım talebinin yüksek olması TYP’lere asıl ihtiyacı olan kişilerin seçimini zorlaştırmaktadır. Uluslararası ülke örneklerinde olduğu gibi TYP ödemeleri asgari ücretin bir miktar altında olmadığından yoksul olmayan kişilerin daha çok başvurmasına neden olmaktadır. Yoksul olmayanların TYP’lerden yararlanmak istemesi durumu beraberinde birçok olumsuzluğa neden olabilmektedir. Bu olumsuzlukları azaltmak ve TYP’lerden yararlanma ihtiyacı daha yüksek olan gruplara ulaşabilmek için hedef grup uygulamasına geçilmiştir. Buradaki esas amaç toplumda daha dezavantajlı kesimde olduğu düşünülen grupların TYP’lerden öncelikli yararlandırılmalarını sağlamaktır. Bu amaçla 2013 yılında kadınlar, eski hükümlüler, engelliler ve terörle mücadelede malul olmayacak şekilde yararlananlar ve 35 yaş üst bireyler öncelikli grup olarak belirlenmiştir. Söz konusu uygulama ile bu grupta yer alanlardan yeteri kadar başvuru olması halinde yalnızca bu gruptan katılımcı seçilmesi kuralı getirilmiştir. Böylelikle yoksul olmayan ve TYP’ye katılma ihtiyacı bulunmaya kişilerin kendiliğinden dışarıda bırakılması amaçlanmıştır. Uygulamada yaşanan sorunlara ve istisna maddesine rağmen söz konusu değişiklik sonrasında TYP katılımcılarının demografik özelliklerinde belirgin değişimler yaşanmıştır. Kural öncesinde erkek ağırlıklı

katılımcı listeleri oluşmakta iken birçok bölgede kadınların toplam katılımcılar içerisindeki oranı %50'nin üzerine çıktığı görülmüştür. Hedef grup uygulamasının yanı sıra bu grup içerisinde yer alıp aslında yoksul olmayan katılımcıların da TYP dışında bırakılması ve daha çok sayıda yoksula ulaşabilmek için ayrıca ilave kurallar getirilmiştir. Bu kurallardan ilki TYP'den yeniden yararlanma kuralına ilişkindir. Söz konusu kurala göre bir katılımcının TYP'lerden en fazla 24 ay yararlanabilme hakkıdır. İlgili kurala göre TYP'lerden 24 ay süreyle yararlanan katılımcıların TYP'lerden yeniden yararlanma imkânı bulunmamaktadır. Yoksul olmayanların katılımını azaltmak amacıyla konulan diğer kuralların kısa tanımları ise adres ve gelir kontrolüdür. Adres kontrolü kuralında; aynı hanede yaşayan kişilerden yalnızca birinin TYP'lerden yararlanabilmesi kuralı getirilmiştir. Söz konusu 2017 yılında uygulamaya geçirilmiştir. Aynı tarihte getirilen ikinci kural ise gelir kontrolüdür. Söz konusu kurala göre aynı hanede yaşayan tüm kişilerin toplam gelirinin asgari ücretin 3 katından fazla olması halinde TYP'lerden yararlandırılması esastır. Gerek adres kontrolü gerekse de gelir kontrolüne ilişkin kuralların uygulanmasında ciddi sıkıntılar yaşanmaktadır. Katılımcılar adreslerini değiştirerek başvuru yapmakta, gelirlerini doğru beyan etmemektedirler. Suiistimallerin önlenmesi ve söz konusu kuralların en doğru şekilde uygulanabilmesi için idari olarak çeşitli kontrol mekanizmalarına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Ancak söz konusu idari olarak kontrollerin sağlanmasında da ciddi zorluklar bulunmaktadır. Hem adres hem de gelir durumlarına ilişkin kişilerin verilerine ulaşmada yaşanan güçlükler nedeniyle söz konusu kurallar standart ve tek düze bir şekilde tüm illerde aynı düzen içerisinde uygulanamamaktadır. Özellikle gelir kontrolü noktasında iller arasında farklı farklı uygulamalar bulunmaktadır. Hanede yaşayan kişilerin ücret gelirine ilişkin verilerin tespiti için Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu verileri baz alınmaktadır. Ancak kayıt dışı çalışmalardan elde edilen gelirle bilinmemektedir. Aynı şekilde kira, faiz vb. gelirlerin tespiti de çok sağlıklı olmadığından geliri yüksek olan kişilerin programlara başlamasının önüne geçilemeyen durumlarla karşılaşılabilir.

Türkiye'de uygulanan Toplum Yararına Programlarının diğer ülke uygulama örneklerinden belli anlamlarda ayrışmaktadır. Ülkemizdeki uygulamanın en özgün yanı olarak okulların genel temizliği ve bakım onarımı ile ilgili konularda TYP düzenlenmesi gösterilebilir. Türkiye'deki TYP'lerin hemen hemen tüm idari süreçleri okullarla ilgili program konularına göre belirlemektedir. Okulların açık kaldığı süre boyunca TYP devam edebilmesi amaçlandığı için TYP'lerin azami süresi 9 aya çıkarılmıştır. Aynı şekilde okullar açıldığında TYP'leri uygulamaya başlayabilmek için bekleme süreleri 3 ile sınırlı tutulmuş olup okulların genel faaliyet takvimi takip edilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde detayları yer alan program konusunun yanı

sıra çevre temizliği, kamusal alt yapının yenilenmesi ve ağaç dikme gibi konularda da TYP uygulaması yapılabilmektedir.

Türkiye’de uygulanan TYP’lerin süresinden bağımsız katılımcıların 14 günlük izin süresi hakkı bulunması özellikle kadın katılımcıların programlara katılımı ve devam ettirilmesinde çocuk ve yaşlı bakımı gibi diğer sorumlulukları nedeniyle zorluklara neden olmaktadır. Diğer yandan sosyal yardım alanların TYP’lere katılmasına ilişkin herhangi bağlantı olmaması yoksulluğun azaltılması ilkesini zayıflatmaktadır.

TYP’lere katılımcı seçim yöntemi olarak Türkiye’de 3 farklı yöntem uygulanmaktadır. Kura ve liste yöntemleri veya bu iki yöntemin karışımı şeklinde 3 yöntem bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu yöntemler kendi içerisinde farklı avantaj ve dezavantajlara sahiptir. TYP’lere katılım noktasında aşırı talep bulunması halinde liste yöntemi kullanılır ise; katılımcı seçiminde oldukça yüksek müdahale riski ile karşı karşıya kalınabilmektedir. Liste yönteminde yoksul olmayanları programlara katılma ihtimali artış gösterdiğinden mümkün olduğundan kullanılmaması yönünde tez içerisinde önerilere yer verilmiştir. Diğer yandan, kura yönteminin uygulanması halinde de herhangi bir müdahale olmamasına rağmen ihtiyaç sahibi olmayanların TYP’lere katılma ihtimali yine de bulunmaktadır. Her iki seçme yönteminin kullanılması durumda da oluşabilecek olumsuzlukları engellemek ve yoksul olmayanların katılımını en az seviyeye indirme için hedef grup uygulaması, gelir ve adres kontrolü ve yeniden yararlanma kuralında yukarıda değinilen çeşitli düzenlemeler yapılmıştır.

Tezin içerisinde Türkiye bölümünde son olarak ülkemizde düzenlenen TYP’lerin denetim ve değerlendirme süreçlerine ilişkin değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır. Her ne kadar mevzuatta denetim mekanizması kurulmuş olsa da etkin olarak uygulanmadığı düşünülmektedir. Değerlendirme sürecine ilişkin ise çalışmaların çok daha zayıf kaldığı düşünülmektedir. Bugüne kadar TYP’lerin etkinliğini ölçen ve eksik yönlerini tespit edecek çok sınırlı sayıda çalışma yapılabilmektedir. Kurum tarafından geçtiğimiz 15 yıl içerisinde yalnızca 1 değerlendirme raporu hazırlanmıştır. Söz konusu raporun çıktıları ve önerilerine ilişkin uygulamada herhangi bir düzenlemeye gidilmemiştir. Denetim hususunda ise İl İstihdam ve Mesleki Eğitim Kurulları bünyesinde işleyen bir sistem olsa da denetim sırasında tespit edilen ve ortaya çıkarılan eksiklik ve yanlışların giderilmesi noktasında Kurumun yaptırım gücünün zayıf veya eksik kalması nedeniyle denetimler işlevsiz kalmaktadır.

Tez çalışma boyunca ülkemizdeki uygulamanın mevzuat bağlamında detaylı incelemesinin yanı sıra, Türkiye’de düzenlenen TYP’lerin uygulama doğasını anlamak için alan araştırması yapılmıştır. Söz konusu alan araştırmasında TYP’nin işleyiş süreçlerinde idari olarak bulunan ve karar mekanizması içerisinde yer alan üç ayrı grupta yer alan kişiler ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat yöntemi ile yapılmıştır. İŞKUR Genel Müdürlüğü, İl Müdürlüğü çalışanları ve Yüklenici Kurum personeli ile olmak üzere toplamda 10 kişi ile görüşme yapılmıştır.

Alan araştırması için hazırlanan soru formunda görüşmeler üç bölüme ayrılmıştır. İlk bölümde TYP’lerin genel amaçlarının ne olduğuna dair görüşülen kişilerin yorumu istenmiştir. Böylelikle TYP’leri nasıl tanımladığı ve sınıflandırdığına ilişkin görüşlerin derlenmesi hedeflenmiştir. Alan araştırmasının ikinci bölümünde ise daha kapsamlı olarak TYP işleyişine ilişkin sorular yer almıştır. Bu bölümde genel olarak hedef grup uygulaması, program konuları, seçim yöntemi, uygulamanın genel kuralları gibi hususlarda idari anlamda uygulayıcıların görüşleri toplanmaya çalışılmıştır. Son bölümde ise görüşülen kişilerin TYP uygulamasının etkinliği hakkında görüşleri alınmaya çalışılmış ve TYP’lerin istihdama etkisine ilişkin çıkarımlar yapılması hedeflenmiştir.

Yapılan görüşmeler neticesince ortaya çıkan bulgular sonuç bölümünde tartışılmıştır. Genel olarak plana çıkan bulgular programlara aşırı talep olduğu, hedef grup uygulaması çok genel grupları içermesi nedeniyle bazı durumlarda işlevsiz kaldığı, adres ve gelir kontrolü başta olmak üzere mevzuatta yer alan kuralları uygulama noktasında kurumlar arası koordinasyon eksikliğinin bulunması hususları öne çıkmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra mevzuatın yeterli olduğu ancak bazı durumlarda yoruma açık olması nedeniyle kötüye kullanımlara zemin hazırlayabildiği, program süresi uzun olduğu ve yeniden yararlanma ile süreçlerde sürekli yapılan güncellemelerin katılım hakkını arttığı hususlarına değinilmiştir. Diğer bulgular arasında TYP’lerin başlama ve bitiş tarihlerinde yaşanan zamanlama sorunları, özellikler kadınların süt ve doğum izni olmak üzere genel izin hakkı yetersizliğine ilişkin bulgular sonuç bölümünde detaylıca incelenmiştir.

Özetle Türkiye’deki TYP’lere katılmak noktasında katılımcıların aşırı talebi bulunmaktadır. Bu husus katılımcı seçiminde yoksul olmayanların katılması için yapılan müdahaleleri özellikle katılımcı seçim yönteminin liste yöntemi olarak belirlenmesi halinde artırmaktadır. Söz konusu talebi azaltmak için TYP süresinin azaltılması, hedef grupta yer alanların daraltılması ve yeniden yararlanma sürelerinin azaltılarak uygulanması gerektiği hususları ön

plana çıkmıştır. Ayrıca, katılımcılarının başta gelir durumu olmak üzere işgücü piyasasındaki konumunu ve TYP'lere ihtiyaç düzeyini belirlemek amacıyla kurumlar arası koordinasyonun önemli olduğu ve geliştirilmesi gerektiği ifade edilmiştir. TYP'lerin başlama tarihlerinin zamanlamasına ilişkin program konusuna göre farklı tarihler belirlenmesinin önemi belirtilmiştir. Kadınların TYP katılımını artırmak ve program sürecinde desteklemek için izin sürelerinde yeniden düzenlemeye gidilmesi gerektiği de öne çıkan hususlar arasındadır. Mevzuatın yeterli olduğu ancak uygulamada farklı yorumlar getirildiği belirtilmiştir. Bu hususu önlenmek için program konularında yapılacak işin tanımı başta olmak bazı küçük eklemeler yapılması önerilmiştir. Ancak etkin bir denetleme ve yaptırım gücüne sahip olunması halinde söz konusu mevzuatın daha etkin ve doğru uygulanabileceği de önerilen hususlar arasında yer almaktadır.

Bu tez çalışması ile dünyada TYP uygulama usul ve esasları ortaya konarak Türkiye benzeri ülke örnekleri yoluyla uygulama süreçleri anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra Türkiye'deki uygulama detaylı şekilde incelenmiş ve yapılan alan araştırması ile mevcut sorun ve çözüm önerileri üretilmeye çalışılmıştır. Böylelikle daha iyi ve etkin TYP sürecine küçük de olsa bir katkı sunulması hedeflenmiştir.

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