

EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS AND CIVIL WARS: THE CASE OF LEBANON
(1975-1990)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the impact of Syria, Israel and Iran to the Lebanese Civil War in the years of 1975-1990 and investigates the civil war based on foreign intervention point of view. It considers the developments from regional perspective and argues that although the Civil War emerged due to political and social structure of Lebanon, it became more complicated and chaotic as a result of the intervention of the regional countries for more power in the region. These countries realized Lebanon as strategic for their interests and they used the Civil War emerged in Lebanon as an opportunity. They penetrated into the Lebanese domestic politics by generating alliances with different groups in Lebanon.

Israel was concerned about the fact that Palestinians used Lebanese land as base for their organization and it wanted to secure its northern borders, south Lebanon. For Syria, Lebanon was strategically important in its regional predominance and it always wanted to keep control of Lebanon. Iran increased its attention especially in the 1980s to Lebanon to spread its Islamic revolution and influence Shiite population in the country. The Civil War ended after the Taif Agreement in 1989 as

a result of the effort of Syria, after years of witnessing the power struggle of these two countries in Lebanon.

Keywords: Lebanese Civil War, Foreign Intervention, Israel, Syria, Interest

ÖZ

DIŞ MÜDAHALELER VE İÇ SAVAŞLAR: LÜBNAN VAKASI (1975-1990)

Sunay, Selçuk

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, 1975 ile 1990 yılları arasında vuku bulan Lübnan İç Savaşı'na Suriye, İsrail ve İran'ın müdahalelerini analiz etmekte ve iç savaşı dış müdahaleler bağlamında incelemektedir. Gelişmeleri bölgesel açıdan ele alan çalışma, iç savaşın çıkma sebeplerinin Lübnan'ın siyasi ve toplumsal yapısından kaynaklansa da uzayıp karmaşık bir hal almasını, Suriye ve İsrail'in bölgesel anlamda güç mücadelesi sebebiyle müdahalelerinden kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır. Suriye ve İsrail, Lübnan'ı stratejik çıkarları açısından hayati görmüşler ve İç Savaşı bu çıkarları korumak için bir fırsata dönüştürmüşlerdir. Lübnan iç siyasetine, ülkedeki farklı gruplarla ittifak kurmak suretiyle müdahale etmişlerdir.

İsrail, Lübnan'daki Filistinli varlığını, bu ülkeyi örgütlenmede bir üs olarak kullanmalarından dolayı güvenlik problemi olarak görmüş ve kuzey sınırları olan güney Lübnan'ı kontrol altına almak istemiştir. Suriye ise bölgesel üstünlük mücadelesinde Lübnan'ı hayati olarak görmüş ve kontrol altında tutmayı amaçlamıştır. İran ise özellikle 1980'lerden itibaren Lübnan'a ilgisini artırarak İslam devriminin etkisini artırmayı ve ülkedeki Şiiler üzerinde etki kurmayı amaçlamıştır. Nitekim, İç Savaş, bu iki ülkenin etkisini artırdığı yıllara tanık

olduktan sonra, 1989 yılında Suriye'nin ve girişimiyle Taif Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasının ardından sona ermiştir ve ülkede Suriye'nin etkisi devam etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lübnan İç Savaşı, Dış Müdahale, İsrail, Suriye, Çıkar

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| ADF | Arab Deterrence Forces |
| IDF | Israeli Defense Forces |
| LAA | Lebanese Arab Army |
| LCB | The Lebanese Central Bank |
| LNM | Lebanese National Movement |
| LF | Lebanese Front |
| NB | National Bloc |
| NF | National Front |
| NLP | National Liberal Party |
| SLA | South Lebanon Army |
| UAE | United Arab Emirate |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon |
| USSR | The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| PLA | Palestinian Liberation Army |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The number of civil wars increases and they last longer in duration. Soon after the World War II, civil wars take place more than interstate wars.¹ As the diagram below shows, the number of civil wars increase especially after World War II. Civil wars last quite long with about seven years on average while international wars last only about eleven months.² Besides, they are so bloody with more than 25 million casualties since 1945.³ Civil war is quite common and widespread, it causes tremendous suffering. Neighboring states are almost always involved and they are influenced. Therefore, civil war undermines regional stability. Besides, civil war engages the interests of distant powers as well as international organizations.

The problems occurred due to internal conflict are reassessed by policymakers at national and regional level.⁴ Civil wars have significant repercussions in its vicinity and neighboring countries are affected at a considerable extent. Besides, they affect the stability and security of the region in which it takes place. Brown states that

¹ Sarkees M., Wayman F., and Singer J. D. "Inter-State, Intra State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, 2003, p. 60.

² Collier P., Hoeffler A., and Söderbom M., "On the Duration of Civil War", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2004, p. 253.

³ Hironaka A., *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak states, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 2.

⁴ Micheal Brown, *International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA), 1996, p.3.

civil war is an important problem in international relations field as it has significant regional contagion effect.⁵

Considering its importance in the field, this study examines the Lebanese Civil War that took place between 1975 and 1990. Lebanese Civil War took for 15 years period of time, which is almost double the average length. What was the reason that this civil war took for so long time? Were the foreign interventions the reasons of the long duration of the Lebanese Civil War? In this work, we analyze the civil war in terms of foreign interventions and try to understand to what extent Syrian-Iranian and Israeli interventions were influential in the Lebanese Civil War as well as regional developments.

Beginning with a definition of civil war itself; according to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is an armed conflict which results in more than one thousand deaths; challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurs within the recognized boundaries of that state; involves rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state.⁶ It is important how the civil war started in the first phase and what dynamics or reasons gave it strength to last. In addition, it is also important to consider the foreign intervention as well as foreign aid in civil wars to have a better understanding of the developments and events.

From this point of view, foreign interventions are important and crucial in explaining civil wars. Sambanis and Doyle explain the relationship between external intervention and civil war duration.⁷ They focus on the foreign intervention in the shape of military or economic assistance in favor of the either rebel groups or the existing governments. They come to the conclusion that in only 57 intervention

⁵ Brown, *ibid.*, p.3.

⁶ Micheal W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 779-802.

⁷ Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding," 779-802.

out of 190, foreign interventions brought the end of the civil wars. These authors state that foreign interventions have significant impact on the civil war duration. In other words, foreign intervention increases the war duration. Regan also agrees with Doyle and Sambanis. He states that external intervention occurs when there is a reasonable expectation of success, the projected time horizon for intervention is short and domestic opposition to intervention is minimal.⁸




Figure 1. Occurrence of External Intervention to Civil War

There are also other scholars stating that one-sided intervention shortens the duration of a civil war. For example, Betts expresses that impartial or neutral interventions are not effective as these kind of interventions necessitate the foreign power to ensure enough forces to be dominant in the war.⁹ Conversely, biased interventions have capacity to change the balance in the civil war. Regan stated that the external assistance to the incumbent should have capacity for dominance and

⁸ Regan Patrick, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 60-61

⁹ Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 25.

this way it shortens the duration of a civil war. However, foreign interventions on the insurgent's side should have capacity towards parity and it causes longer civil wars.¹⁰ Despite the fact that each statement of Regan is true, his results were that foreign interventions, regardless of its types, extended the duration of the civil wars. In addition, Mason, Weingarten and Fett's examination tells us that early intervention results in the prolonging of the civil war while later intervention increases the chance of negotiated settlement.¹¹

As it was mentioned above, civil war take longer period of time and at this point it is also important to note that non-state actors are also quite influential in the civil wars.¹² They have great contribution to conflict and tensions arousing as different parties are inclined and eager to cooperate with them. States, which want to be more influential for their objectives and interests cooperate with NSAs and they use them as their proxies. The reason why they can successfully cooperate is that their aims with the states sponsoring them are in the same direction. We can assess the existing literature by asking some questions to understand the external state's objectives and how and why these actors are useful for them. Besides, we can also assess how the external states assist and support their allies.

Belgin San-Akca and Zeev Maoz state that there is the tendency of state to use indirect and limited approach to influence regional rivals by cooperating with their internal enemies.¹³ This strategy causes escalation of tensions between two states.

¹⁰ Patrick, "Third-Party Interventions," 60-61; Hironaka Ann, *Neverending Wars*, 2.

¹¹ T. David Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten, and Patrick J. Fett, "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars," *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 2 (June 1999): 264.

¹² Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, "Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare," *Small Wars Journal* (December 2014): 1.

¹³ Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, "Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946-2011," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (December 2012): 720-722.

Navin Bapat claims that states are successful in following the strategy to maintain hegemony over their rivals by supporting their internal opposition to protect their interests.¹⁴ Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham claims that states tend to advocate resistance movements, which are moderate in their competition with their opponents in the aim of destabilize them without aiming to demolish them.¹⁵ For our thesis, it is important that these scholars claim that states are not inclined to demolish their rivals to reach their interests, instead they tend to follow more limited objectives.




Figure 2. Prolonging Civil War

¹⁴ Navin A. Bapat, "Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups," *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 1 (December 2011): 196.

¹⁵ Idean Salehyan, Kristian S. Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," *International Organization* 65 (Fall, 2011): 712.

The Lebanese Civil War emerged as a result of domestic problems stemming from political and social structure of Lebanon. In other words, the reason why conflicts started in Lebanon between the Muslims and Christians were mainly due to the structure of Lebanese political system based on sectarian participation and social structure which includes different religious and ethnic groups. However, it can be said that the regional powers, Syria and Israel participated in the Civil War from the very beginning by generating alliances with different groups to consolidate their disposition and strengthen their dominance in the region. These interventions and power struggle of the countries made the Civil War more complicated, catastrophic and insoluble for 15 years. In this thesis we try to analyze these two countries' politics and aims in the region by explaining domestic and regional dynamics and developments.

It is necessary to study the penetration of these countries during the Civil War from a regional perspective as the power struggle between countries and groups are regional and the international dimension of the conflict is less influential. Through this way, why the Civil War took for so long and how Syria and Israel became influential and reasons of conflict will be clear. It would be wrong to disregard the influence and role of the international powers in the Lebanese Civil War. However, in this study, the subject was studied from regional dominance and struggle for power perspective rather than international perspective.

At this point, Fawaz A. Gerges' statement is important to understand the importance of regional developments rather than international developments in this case. According to Gerges, regional developments have affected the Lebanese politics more than the developments in global stage.¹⁶ He states that it was more about inter-Arab conflict than East-West dichotomy. Therefore, he takes attention to regional developments than the developments in the global stage. At the last stage, Lebanese

¹⁶ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Cold War in the Middle East : Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967-73*, Ed. by Nigel J. Ashton., (New York: Routledge, 2007) p. 99.

foreign policy was affected by regional developments not by global developments in the Cold War period. Local disputes were more influential in Lebanese politics than the superpower competition.

Moreover, Gerges also states that the conflicts occurred in Lebanon were due to different perceptions of the communities living in Lebanon in regard with regional countries. This was also shaped depending on these communities' interests and they established alliances either with Syria or Israel accordingly. Besides, he states that long-lasting civil war came to an end in 1990 when the Lebanese politicians accepted the Syrian unconditional hegemony. It is clear that neither the US nor the Soviets intervened in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s to stop the Civil War in real sense. Therefore, they recognized the importance and primacy of regional actors.

In this respect, it is important to explore how the Civil War emerged and what were these countries' regional objectives and strategies. Starting from the independence in 1943 what kind of developments took place in Lebanon until the beginning of the Civil War in 1975? How were the Muslim-Christian relations and how the Presidents and governments administered the country that led to two devastating Civil Wars (1958 and 1975-1990) in such a short period?

After conceiving this period from independence to the Civil War, it is also important to understand the dynamics and developments during the Civil War. What were the interests of groups such as the Maronites, Druzes or Sunni Muslims and their motivations that they took their sides accordingly? In addition, what were Syrian and Israeli objectives and interests in the region and why Lebanon was important for them? During the Civil War, to what extent these two countries' interventions were detrimental? What were these two countries' reasons behind their interventions? These questions are quite important to understand why Lebanese Civil War took for a long period of time and why the events and developments became complicated after the penetration of these countries. This

thesis aims at analyzing the questions above and explore the role of foreign involvement in the civil war's duration.

Lebanon has a political system based on sectarian participation. It has a fragmented and complex socio-political structure due to its multicultural population. The number of groups existing in Lebanon act more like tribes in accordance with pre-mordial relations. The groups are deeply divided in terms of sectarian, ethnic and religious lines.¹⁷ Each group in Lebanon has different understanding of Lebanon's role in regional and international areas. Besides, each group seeks their own interest thus creating different alliances within and outside of the country. This socio-political structure resulted in jeopardizing Lebanon's unity, and left it vulnerable to foreign influences.

The Civil War emerged as a product of power struggle within the country due to the social as well as political structure of Lebanon. Since the independence in 1943, political system was biased and unjust, and was established in order to protect the dominance and power of the Maronites in the country. Confessionalism, which is based on the division of the political power among religious groups, was implemented in the country. This system was firstly implemented after 1932 census¹⁸ in the mandate period until the Taif Accord in 1989, which ended the Civil

¹⁷ The population of Lebanon is quite heterogenous. The ethnic structure is various and there are many people from different religions and sects. Even though most of the people speak Arabic, the entire population is not Arabs. The estimated number of Sunni Muslims was about 700.000 in the 1980s which was approximately quarter of the population. Today, the Sunni population decreased and they consist of only 20 percent of the total population. Sunnis mainly live in big cities and coastline. Shi'i's in Lebanon is the greatest group in terms of its population. Most of them are villagers and workers. They live in the Beka Valley and South Lebanon. The Shi'i population is approximately one million and they consist of about 40 percent of the population in Lebanon. They had to migrate to Beirut's ghettos due to civil war. They are an important organized group in Lebanon with the strong militia. İlber Ortaylı, "19. Yüzyıl Sonunda Suriye ve Lübnan Üzerine Bazı Notlar," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 4 (1984): 3-4.

¹⁸ The only census that was taken based on sectarianism in Lebanon. According to the census carried out in 1932, Christian Maronites were 28.8 percent, Sunnis were 22.4 percent and Shi'is was 19.6 percent.

War. It was in favor of the Maronites in Lebanon and promoted their positions in the country. According to the system, the President was of Christian Maronite, Prime Minister was of Sunni Muslim and the Chairperson of the Parliament was of Shiite Muslim. In the parliament, the Christians were represented more than Muslims by 6-5 formula. Christians were more powerful politically and socially than the Muslims in the confessional system and it did not change in time despite the increase of Muslim population in the later periods. Michael C. Hudson stated that “the President is not only a balancer but a representative of the most influential group in the country.”¹⁹ To clarify it, the political system was in favor of the Maronites and granted privilege for them.

The political structure resulted in the occurrence of hatred between different ethnic and religious groups in Lebanon. These groups are directed by a number of families and these families are generally strong and rich people called “zaim” in the political circle of Lebanon. The *zaims* come from the strong families and they were always important in the political system as inheritance is given importance in Lebanon. Thus, family and family connections were quite determinant in the policies and strategies implemented in the country.²⁰ These families were quite popular and effective since the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Hourani states that urban politics of the Ottoman provinces can only be understood considering it with the term “politics of notables”. This kind of structure exists when peasant in the countryside produces for a landowner.²¹ These families reside in the city and

¹⁹ Michael C. Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics,” *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 2 (1969): 259.

²⁰ Hourani explains that when Ottomans conquered Arab lands, it preserved local customs. In this regard, when authority was maintained with local help, a ‘politics of notables’ gains strength. In addition, he says that the term notables that he uses is political and he means by the term that the ones who play crucial political role as intermediaries between the government and people and having certain power in urban population as leaders. For more information, see, Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables” in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 48.

²¹ Hourani, “Ottoman Reform,” 45.

dominate the society gaining power from their existence in the cities. They have been quite active and determinant in the Lebanese politics since especially the second half of the 19th century as they have access to authority and they acted as the representatives of the society.²² In addition, although one party of notables can create coalition including both rural and urban part, there emerges different notables due to conflicting interests. These families gaining strength from their ability to access authority, and power, perform their actions in the way they wanted. Because of this reason, their actions and decisions are not certain and change time to time.²³

Explaining domestic politics of Lebanon and how the traditional ruling structure and strong families had impact in the conflicts occurred since the 19th century, it is now in point to explain the political developments in Lebanon in the 19th century. The conflict and hatred between the Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon go back to the middle of the 19th century. Mehmed Ali Pasha's son Ibrahim Pasha ruled Syria and Lebanon in the years between 1831 to 1840. After he was defeated in this region, he left but his policies continued affecting the region.

After his rule ended, the Ottoman Empire tried to maintain stability and security in the region and strengthen its authority within the framework of Tanzimat reforms. However, the developments that took place resulted in the occurrence of competition and hatred between the Maronites and Druzes. Before the Egyptian administration, the Druzes were the dominant group and the Ottoman government gave privileges to them in the administration. During the Mehmed Ali Pasha's period, the Maronites started to gain power and they wanted to protect this changing dynamics in the region in favor of them. The Druzes wanted to re-gain their power that they started losing it during the Egyptian administration period.

²² Hourani states in his article that the political influence of these notables rests on their access to authority and they have such power that they are not dependent on the ruler. This way, they hold and are accepted as natural leaders of the society. Hourani, "Ottoman Reform," 46.

²³ Hourani, "Ottoman Reform," 46.

In 1843, the Double Kaymakamate administration system was declared and Lebanon was divided into two administrative regions, north and south.²⁴ The Druze political supremacy in Lebanon ended and conflicts increased between the Muslim and Christian groups. The region was divided into two based on sects for the first time. Although relative stability was maintained in Lebanon, the new system based on sects deepened the hatred and competition between different sects.

After the Crimean War in 1853 to 1856, the Reform Edict of 1856 resulted in the occurrence of conflict and instability in the Ottoman Empire. The Reform Edict increased the religious hatred in the Ottoman-Arab regions and Muslim people were dissatisfied with the reforms that wanted to be undertaken in favor of the Christians. They were concerned that the Christians could be more powerful.²⁵ In 1858, conflicts started between landlord class and the farmers and it turned to sectarian conflict. As a result, sectarian conflicts took place in the south of Lebanon. The Maronite farmers rebelled against Druze landlords and conflicts spread to other parts and turned to a civil war in 1860. Starting from 1861, a new administration system called Mutasarrifate was implemented in Lebanon. Until the 1920s, this system maintained stability of Lebanon and except small conflicts at the local level, there were no wider conflicts. However, this administrative structure laid the foundation of sectarianism and sectarian participation that was implemented in the later periods.

For this reason, starting from the 1840s, Lebanon experienced significant administrative reforms and changes which resulted in the occurrence of power struggle and enmity between the Maronite and Druze groups. Especially after the

²⁴ Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 9.

²⁵ Leila Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 110.

1860s with the Mutasarrifate period, foreign countries became more influential in the region and France developed relations with the Maronites and advocated them. After World War I, France's mandate period started and in the independence period of Lebanon starting from 1943, we see conflict and struggle to be dominant between these groups. We can claim that this competition between them rooted back to 1840s. In this period, power balance in the region changed in favor of the Maronites and Druzes were not happy about their lose of dominance, privilege as well as power. After Lebanon gained its independence, the unjust political structure were generated and the hatred continued between these groups since then.

The strong families that we mentioned above generated alliances with foreign powers and the intervention of foreign powers became easier throughout the Civil War. For example, the Lebanese Front was established under the leadership of Beshar Gamayel in 1976 in order to protect the Christians and became influential during the Civil War until the assassination of Gamayel in 1982. They aimed at exerting effort against the Muslims in the country. The Progressive Socialist Party, representing the Druzes was established by Kamal Jumblatt in 1949 and it was the main party against Syria in the Civil War. Towards the end of the Civil War, the party changed its position and became the supporter of Syria.

It was quite influential during this period and established *de facto* government in the areas under its control and it existed until the end of the Civil War. It changed its side depending on Druze interest. Another important group was called the Amal Movement formed by Musa as-Sadr in 1974 and it was a party expressing the demands of the Shiites. The leader of the party was Nebih Berri, Chairperson of the parliament. They were quite influential in south Lebanon and followed strategies in parallel with Syrian politics. This organization grew bigger after Israel's bombardment in the 1980s and it received support from Syria. Its aim was to increase the influence of the Shiites in Lebanon and get more prosperity.

Due to political and social structure of Lebanon mentioned above, the Civil War initially started as the Christian-Muslim struggle for more political power in Lebanon. However, it was not only struggle between these groups, and in time it turned out to be a struggle of Syria and Israel for more dominance in the region as well as their threat perceptions and provided a ground for them in the later periods. Realizing the conflicts before and after the Civil War in Lebanon as an opportunity to increase their influence, Israel and Syria became a reason of the sustaining the problems and conflict, and they intervened in Lebanon by creating political and military alliances with the local groups in the country.²⁶ The historical, political and social characteristics of Lebanon were important in the emergence of the Civil War as mentioned above. Weak and fragile political as well as social structure complicated events and stability and peace in the country could not be maintained. Different religious groups in Lebanon wanted to protect their own interest and established their own political parties. They did it by establishing alliances with foreign countries.

In addition to the political and social structure of Lebanon historically, after gaining the independence in 1943, the First President, Bishara al-Khoury accepted the new constitution “National Pact”, which maintained the balance of the confessional system in 1926. The Muslims and Christians had difference in opinions and wanted to follow different foreign policy. While Muslims wanted to develop better relations with the Arab world, Maronites were exerting efforts to have a close relationship with the West as they realized themselves a minority in a small country in the Arab world. In other words, the groups had different views especially on the foreign policy and followed different policies. This system as well as other regional and local problems concluded with the occurrence of perpetual conflict and crisis.

As mentioned above, political power is based on religion, sect, and family and it resulted in the establishment of political parties mostly along religious lines. In

²⁶ Tom Najem, *Lebanon: The politics of A Penetrated Society* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 30-38.

other words, different religious groups had their own parties and sometimes one group even separated within itself. Some political parties received foreign aid and their religion and sect dimensions were more dominant.²⁷ In addition to the corrupted political structure, the army was also not impartial in Lebanon as it was divided based on religion. Most of the commanderships were chosen from the Maronites and soldiers consisted of the Shiites. Soldiers took sides of their sects or religion in course of internal conflicts. This fragmentation caused the weakening of central authority and dominance of sect or parties of which militias forces were powerful. This structure left Lebanon vulnerable to the foreign penetrations.

Although the Civil War emerged due to political and social structure of Lebanon, regional countries, Syria and Israel were influential during the Civil War. The reason is that the political developments and events in Lebanon have repercussions in the region in terms of regional balances and developments. For this reason, Lebanon is an important actor in the region for Syria and Israel and they were interested in the developments in Lebanon. For example, south Lebanon was considered strategic and crucial for the security of Israel and it established a security zone in this region. For Syria, maintaining the unity of Lebanon was vital and it generated its policy and strategy in Lebanon depending on that.

There are a number of studies on Lebanese Civil War. Although there are similarities compared to those studies with this thesis, there are also differences. The existing studies mainly focus on the Civil War from domestic conflict perspective and the inter-groups struggle. They work on the developments in Lebanon before and after the Civil War. Some other studies explore the influence of Syria and Israel to the Lebanon and the Civil War by giving special importance to Syria and Israel domestic politics and their regional objectives. They consider the

²⁷ İrfan C. Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı ve Filistin Sorunu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), 5.

developments from Syrian side and how it implemented foreign policy in the region in general.

In addition, most of the studies on the Lebanese Civil War explain the events and developments in connection to the characteristics of Lebanon and its weak and fragile political system. However, they do not merely focus on the fact that Syria, Israel and Iran were the main reason of complicating the events and developments for their interests and struggle for power in Lebanon and region as well. Regional dimension of the events and conflict is quite important and it can be stated that the Civil War in Lebanon can be better understood by analyzing this side of the events.

This study has benefited mainly from some studies on Lebanese history and politics. Kail C. Ellis' book *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century*²⁸ was quite important as it demonstrates how regional struggle took place in Lebanon and in Muslim-Christian conflicts. Besides, the book also explains Palestinians as well as Israeli-Lebanese relations and Israel's security understanding and policy in Lebanon. This book also tells us important information from the Civil War period.

Taku Oseagawa's book called *Syria and Lebanon: International Relations and Diplomacy in the Middle East*²⁹ was also quite beneficial for this study as it explores the Syrian-Lebanese relations starting from the year of 1970 when Hafez Asad came to power and how Syria maintained its stability, became influential in the region as well as Lebanon.

²⁸ Kail C. Ellis, "The Regional Struggle for Lebanon," in *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville: Florida University Press, 2002).

²⁹ Taku Osoegawa, *Syria and Lebanon: International Relations and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

L. Carl Brown's *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*³⁰ was quite important in this study as it includes the parts called Israeli Foreign Policy and Syrian Foreign Policy. From these chapters of the book, Syria's and Israel's foreign policies were understood and what their objectives became clarified. In addition, the book also talks about the Middle East foreign policy of the US and Soviets in the Cold War era, which provides us necessary knowledge on how these great powers were not influential in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).

Fawwaz Troboulsi' book called *A History of Modern Lebanon*³¹ is also one of the books used in this study. The book mainly covers the history of twentieth century of Lebanon. The book is especially important for us in this study as it covers how the conflicts occurred in this century in Lebanon and how it paved the way for the Civil War. The book is also quite beneficial to understand the political structure as well as people of Lebanon. In addition, the regional role and importance of Lebanon is demonstrated.

The book written by David Hirst called *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, the Battleground of the Middle East*³² was also beneficial for this study as it explores the impact of regional countries in Lebanese politics and how they pursued their political and strategic objectives. This book gives us important information on how Syria and Israel maintained their policies and what their aims were in Lebanon.

From this perspective, this study is quite important as it demonstrates how Israel, Syria and Iran were influential and what was their regional objective and strategies in penetrating into the Lebanese politics. It is quite important as to how the

³⁰ L. Carl Brown, *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

³¹ Fawwaz Troboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

³² David Hirst, *Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2010).

penetration of these countries and their alliances made the events more complicated and complex and how their struggle for power exacerbated the conflicts in Lebanon. After researching, it is clear that Lebanon became an arena for Syria and Israel where enmities came to the scene and they challenged each other for regional hegemony to maintain their own interest. Although, Lebanon has weak, fragile political and social structure, it was foreign influences that became the main reason of the continuation and long-lasting civil war.

For this purpose, the characteristics of Lebanon and the political structure of Republic of Lebanon was explained above. Understanding the political structure and how the confessionalism, which was sectarian based political system, was implemented and created unjust political participation was discussed. It is quite important to understand how the Civil War emerged due to the unjust political structure of Lebanon. The National Pact, started to be implemented in 1943, was also explained as it protected the unjust political system.

The subjects explained provide a ground for us to understand mainly the political structure of Lebanon since the independence and how it resulted in generating enmities between groups and how Lebanese political system was fragile and weak. As the establishment structure was not based on strong roots and just participation, this resulted in chaos and catastrophe many times and finally Lebanon faced with a long-lasting Civil War, where inter-group conflicts occurred and Israel and Syria penetrated in the domestic politics.

After that, in the second chapter following this part, pre-Civil War period in Lebanon starting from its independence in 1943 until the beginning of the Civil War in 1975 was analyzed. The developments in the independent Lebanon before the Civil War is crucial to understand why and how the Civil War emerged. How the opposition was suppressed by using the political power and it led to the demonstrations of Muslims were explained. How stability tried to be maintained in

the country after 1958 Civil War was explained and the continuation of the actual political problems were shown in this chapter.

This helps us understand how the unjust political participation and marginalization of opposition continued in the country. In addition, the Palestinian refugee issue especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were explained as it had repercussions in the Civil War period and increase of Israeli security concern on the developments in Lebanon. Besides, Israeli intervention towards the beginning of the Civil War in connection with the Palestinian issue is also discussed in this chapter.

The third chapter, which is specifically on the Civil War, starts with a number of events that took place in Lebanon and how conflicts grew bigger between Muslim and Christian groups in Lebanon. Then, it provides information about the actors and their sides of the Civil War to have a better understanding about the Civil War. The Muslims' Lebanese National Movement and the Christians' National Front were explained and different groups within these formations were explained. In addition, the Maronite-Syrian collaboration in 1976 and the reason of this cooperation, which changed the fate of the Civil War was explained.

Throughout the Civil War, inter-group conflicts were also influential and, in this chapter, conflicts occurred in between Maronite groups were also discussed. Then, the chapter deals with the occupation of Israel and development between the years of 1978 and 1982. After demonstrating the reflections of Israeli occupation in 1982, Sabra and Shatila massacres were explained briefly and especially after 1984, how Syria became more influential and Israel lost its impact in Lebanon were demonstrated. Then, the Taif Agreement and conciliation efforts by Syria were explained at the end of this chapter.

The fourth chapter mainly tells us the main objectives of Israel, Syria and Iran over Lebanon and how and to what purpose they maintained their policies in Lebanon. In

this chapter, we also focused on the domestic developments in these countries and analyzed their political, economic, social interests from a wide perspective. Understanding their regional objectives and power struggle as well as their domestic politics, clarifies why they intervened in Lebanon and where Lebanon was in their regional strategies.

In the conclusion part which is the last chapter, it is stated that Syria and Israel were the regional actors influencing the developments throughout the Civil War and Lebanese Civil War turned into a Syrian-Israeli struggle for power in Lebanon where they seek to increase their interest and regional objectives.

This thesis is a significant study in terms of explaining a civil war where regional powers also participated in. Syria and Israel had interests in the region and they had their own perception of developments in Lebanon. The study focused on the intervention of these two countries and revealed the fact that these two countries' intervention and influence resulted in the increase of conflicts in Lebanon and for this reason, the Civil War lasted for 15 years of time. In this respect, this study is beneficial in understanding a civil war from regional perspective and how regional countries used a state's weakness in favor of their interests. The Civil War emerged as a product of number of domestic reasons, such as political and social structure of Lebanon, however, it became worsened due to the influence of these regional countries. Demonstrating this point makes us grasp the Civil War in Lebanon in the years between 1975-1990 in a better sense.

CHAPTER 2

PRE-CIVIL WAR PERIOD IN LEBANON: POLITICAL TURMOIL LEADING TO CIVIL WAR

In this chapter, pre-civil war period is explained starting from the independence of Lebanon in 1943 to 1975. It is important to understand the pre-civil war period to make a better analysis. While examining this period of Lebanon, we try to keep in mind these questions: what were the situation of the different religious groups or sects in Lebanon? What dynamics were influential in the pre-civil war period and what were the causes that led to the civil war? To what extent regional countries were effective in Lebanese domestic politics in this period. And did the regional developments have repercussions in domestic politics of Lebanon? Understanding this period in this respect provides us a ground to analyze better the foreign interventions during the civil war period.

After Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, a new stage for the country started. In the new stage, Lebanon experienced many conflicts and enmities between domestic groups and regional powers. After the independence, sectarian-based political structure, confessionalism³³ was preserved and feudal structure was strengthened in the country. Besides, the families that were influential in Lebanese domestic politics continued to enjoy their power. Moreover, as well as competition between different groups, inter-group conflicts were another problem in the Lebanese political system. In this period, the quota system applied to the sects also resulted in the rise of competition and enmities between groups.

³³ Confessionalism is the political system implemented in Lebanon, based on sharing of political power between the religious communities regarding 1932 census carried out by France. For more information about confessionalism: Fawwaz Trouboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 88-109.

There was unjust implementation between religious groups by the state itself. Although Muslims were assigned to state jobs, mostly Christians occupied the strategic positions of the state such as army commandership and security general directorate. Dominant families and groups continued to be influential in Lebanese state affairs and they wanted their people to be assigned to important state positions in the independence period. This favoritism resulted in a struggle between some families and groups and some Muslim and Christian frictions occurred in the streets of Beirut.

In this period, representation system changed continuously due to this competition between groups. From 1947 to 1961, the election system for the parliament was changed five times and the number of the members of the Parliament also changed depending on the competition between groups. The main reason of instability in the Lebanese political system was that when one group was more dominant, it wanted to marginalize others and it did not want other groups to be influential in the parliament in the next elections. There was a balance between three religious groups namely the Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and the Maronites. The Maronites were concerned about the Palestinian refugees; which were Sunni Muslims, as the confessional system could be changed.

2.1. Marginalizing Opposition: Beginning of Conflict between Groups (From 1943 to 1958 Civil War)

Bechara El Khoury became the first President after Lebanon achieved its independence. Khoury gained support from the families that were important in Lebanese politics. He gained the support of influential families and groups from various regions so that he could consolidate his authority. However, the competition between families and groups further increased and competition was escalated in his period. For example, when Khoury cooperated with one of the Sunni families namely Mukaddem Al Ali and the Keramis, the influential Maronite Frangieh family put an end to the collaboration with Khoury.

As Khoury did not want opposition groups to exist in the parliament, he changed the election system and divided Lebanon into five different election regions and announced one list for the election. In this way, the main opposition leaders, Edde and Jumblatt could not take place in the parliament. Besides, many other important families in Lebanese politics could not win the elections. After the 1947 elections, Khoury gained the majority of the seats in the parliament. However, he lost the social support in the country as a result of the domestic developments.

After 1947, the Arab nationalists exerted efforts to unite Syria and Lebanon, and in this process Khoury's power was weakened. Besides, the Arab-Israeli war in 1947 triggered the spread of Arab nationalism in the region. Many refugees moved to Lebanon as a result of this war and the Arab nationalists forced Lebanon to implement more decisive policy toward Israel. After a couple of years, the power of regime weakened as it was dealing with the competition between Maronite, Sunni and Druze families as well as the opposition of Arab nationalist in Syria. However, Khoury won the 1951 elections again thanks to the new regulations in the election system. This time Khoury could not restrain the opposition parties' leaders in the parliament. When disputes arose about the re-election of Khoury, which was not allowed according to the Lebanese constitution, street fighting started in between groups. Although the fighting spread over the country, the military stood neutral.

In addition to the incidents in the streets, the opposition in the parliament also grew considerably. Camille Chomoun was the leader of the opposition against President Khoury from the very beginning since 1947 when constitutional regulations were passed which made the re-election of Khoury possible. Especially after Khoury was elected in 1951 again, the opposition groups started to collaborate and established better relations to challenge Khoury's presidency. Especially after Prime Minister Riyad Sulh was killed, there was no leader who was with Khoury and supported by Muslims. Lebanon experienced nation-wide strike and opposition groups wanted

Khoury to withdraw. In the face of strong opposition, Khoury could not stay long after this time and he was forced to offer his resign from the presidency in 1952.³⁴

After the withdrawal of Khoury, the Lebanese parliament gathered and assigned the opposition leader Camille Chamoun to the presidency. Camille Chamoun received the support of all the opposition groups against Khoury's government.³⁵ This alliance emerged as a result of common interests and objectives. However, this alliance did not last long and it was broken as the interests of groups conflicted with each other. Kamal Jumblatt endorsed reforms in the business field and soil reforms in the country. Sunnis wanted to develop Lebanon's relations with Arab states in relation to rising Arab nationalism. Some Maronites were against Chamoun's presidency.³⁶

Jumblatt was the main supporter of the Chamoun during his electoral campaign. Therefore, Jumblatt wanted Chamoun to follow his ideas and policies during his time of office. Jumblatt also wanted to investigate the activities of Khoury. However, as Chamoun did not take the demands of Jumblatt into consideration, they fell out with each other. Jumblatt was the biggest opposition of Chamoun in his tenure.³⁷

Chamoun implemented some executive and judiciary reforms during his period of office. Democratic institutions were developed and women obtained the right of election. The political parties, opposition, and the press were liberalized and had the right to continue their actions without any disturbance. He followed liberal

³⁴ Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Essex UK: Hutchinson, 1985), 70-75.

³⁵ Cobban, *The Making of Modern*, 75.

³⁶ Sandra Mackey, *Lebanon: Death of a Nation* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 104-107.

³⁷ Mackey, *Lebanon*, 107.

economic policies and Lebanon was significantly developed in trade and banking. Free trade and free foreign currency were applied and vast sums of money entered Lebanon with the help of these liberal economic policies followed by Chamoun.³⁸

Despite economic developments of the country, great opposition emerged in domestic politics that existed in the previous periods. The number of opposition groups against Chamoun increased and as well as Jumblatt, some Maronite families took the side against Chamoun. He tried to marginalize oppositions in the 1953 elections. Both Druze and Sunni families objected this effort. Therefore, after 1953, Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, Sunni Kerami and Yafi family and Shiite groups, as well as Maronite Frangieh family, cooperated in order to topple down Chamoun. Besides, Arab nationalists also exerted effort to subvert Chamoun in order to undermine his good relations with the West by putting forward the Arab identity of Lebanon.³⁹

In addition to these developments, Gamel Abd Al-Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952 and the idea of Arab nationalism came to the front again. This had repercussions in Lebanon as well. After the assassination of Prime Minister Sulh, the effect of the Muslims in the country weakened and they could not protect their positions. Some Sunni leaders such as Abdullah Selam and Rashed Karami adopted Nasser's Pan Arabist idea and wanted to spread it to the country. When Egypt had the conflict with Britain and France on Suez issue, Prime Minister Selam suggested freezing diplomatic relations with those countries. Since this suggestion was not accepted by the Christians, Prime Minister resigned. However, Chamoun formed a new government shortly after.⁴⁰

³⁸ Mackey, *Lebanon*, 108.

³⁹ Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), 65.

⁴⁰ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), 205-215.

The reaction against Chamoun's power grew even bigger in the Suez War. Chamoun continued its political and diplomatic relations with the occupiers. Moreover, the Arab nationalists protested Chamoun, even more, when he declared that he accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. The acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen as an obvious violation of the National Pact by the opposition groups. They published a memorandum against Chamoun as a warning. However, he sustained its rapprochement policy with the USA.⁴¹

Before the 1957 elections, the Muslim leaders and other opposition groups formed a new opposition group called the National Front. (NF) This newly formed opposition group included such leaders as Yafi, Selam, and Sunni Rashed Kerami, Kamal Jumblatt and some Christians supporting the former President Khoury. However, Chamoun had considerable support in the country from businessmen to most of the Christians and some Muslim groups as well. Some Druzes supporting Jumblatt started armed attacks as they were not satisfied with the developments and support for Chamoun, some sort of chaos started in Lebanon. Some Muslim groups endorsed Nasser's idea of Pan Arabism and rejected Lebanese identity.⁴²

2.2. 1958 Civil War: Inhibiting Further Conflict After the Intervention of the US

The tension between groups brought Lebanon to the edge of civil war. Besides, Chamoun's attempts to be elected as the president again were disliked by the opposition groups. However, Chamoun himself was opposed to the re-election of Khoury in 1952. Oppositions warned Chamoun that they would hold street demonstrations if he tried to be re-elected. Thereupon, about 300 political and religious leaders gathered in Lebanon at Mufti Muhammed Alaya's house and they

⁴¹ Salibi, *The Modern History*, 205-215.

⁴² B. J. Odeh, *Lübnan'da İç Savaş*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1986), 168.

admitted that they would act against Chamoun's power together.⁴³ The tension between the government and the opposition turned into a violent conflict and clashes took place in Beirut. The opposition took control in West Beirut, Tripoli, and some other regions. Opposition groups established an independent administration in the regions where they took control. Lebanese Army Commander Fuad Chehab stated that the duty of the Lebanese army was not to secure a government of Lebanon; instead, its duty was to protect the country against foreign threats. He did not refrain from intervening in the developments.⁴⁴

Chamoun appealed to the United Nations (UN) and blamed Egypt and Syria (the United Arab Republic, UAR) on intervening in domestic affairs of Lebanon as the conflicts were intensified and the army stayed neutral in this conflict as well. UN decided to send an observation committee to Lebanon to inspect the situation in the country.⁴⁵ Observation committee stated that the conflicts occurred in Lebanon due to the Chamoun's attempt to be re-elected rather than outside influences. The committee did not find any proof that Egypt and Syria directly intervened in Lebanon politics.⁴⁶ Chamoun blamed the observation committee and called on England and the US in the view of the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect Lebanese regime. Chamoun sent a message to the US that Western-oriented Chamoun government would have been toppled down if the US would not have helped his government.⁴⁷

⁴³ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, 66-67.

⁴⁴ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, 67.

⁴⁵ Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention in the Lebanon," *The American Journal of International Law* 53, no. 1 (January 1959): 112.

⁴⁶ Odeh, *Lübnan'da İç Savaş*, 175-177.

⁴⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI, "Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs (Waggoner) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Rockwell).",

In 1958, American soldiers entered Lebanon and Eisenhower claimed in the Congress that the USSR, Syria, and Egypt undermined the stability of Lebanon by intervening in domestic politics. The Security Council declared that the US soldiers would reside in Lebanon until the stability and security of the country were reassured.⁴⁸ Besides, Eisenhower stated that Chamoun asked for the protection of Lebanon's independence, unity and American citizens living in Lebanon.⁴⁹ Despite the US intervention, the conflicts were not wiped out completely in Lebanon. The opposition did not lift their military control in their regions. However, the US intervention cut the connection of opposition with the outside world and inhibited foreign aids that they were given. The US realized that the conflict in Lebanon was due to the domestic problems and developments and the opposition would be ready to cooperate with the US.⁵⁰

The real reason for the conflict was the attitude of Chamoun in the Suez War and his attempt to be re-elected as President. For this reason, the US tried to cooperate with local and regional powers. The US became a mediator in the presidential conflict between the government and the opposition. The US convinced Chamoun to leave his chair when his period of office ended. As Chamoun lost the support of the US, he admitted the presidency of Fuad Chehab in 1958. Fuad Chehab was elected as the president on September 22, 1958, with the support of Christian and

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d3> accessed on October 17, 2018, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1958-1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI-XIII, "Background to the Crisis in Jordan and the Introduction of British Forces, January 1–July 17, 1958; U.S. Economic and Military Aid to Jordan; U.S. Support for the Establishment of the Arab Union; The Crisis in Iraq and the Jordanian Request for U.S. Military Support; U.S. Support of the Introduction of British Forces Into Jordan", <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/ch3>, accessed on October 19, 2018, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ Wright, "United States Intervention," 112-113.

⁵⁰ Wright, "United States Intervention," 112-113.

Muslim forces. The US withdrew its forces from Lebanon when the Presidency issue was resolved peacefully.⁵¹

2.3. Period of Stability (1958-1970): Efforts to Restore the Country after the 1958 Civil War

When President Chehab came to power, a period of stability started in Lebanon compared to previous years. After his coming to power, the US withdrew its soldiers from the country. President Chehab made the great effort to establish better relations with the Arab countries. He tried to restore the negative impact of civil war politically, economically and socially.⁵² Instead of developing the Maronite awareness, he gave importance to Lebanese identity during his period. He tried to constitute a political system in which all the sides could find a chance to be represented. In the 1960 elections, the total number of Parliamentarians was increased from 66 to 99 in order to offer a chance to all the groups to be represented in the parliament.⁵³

Despite the Maronites opposition, the Muslims could obtain more ministries in the government. President Chehab believed that the Muslims had to be given more right in the administration so as to maintain security and stability in the country. In addition, the Chehab government gave primary importance to the economic development of Lebanon. He endeavored to eliminate the economic imbalance in the country. A number of plans were made for new investments and five-year

⁵¹ Micheal Hudson, *The Precarious Republic, Political Modernization in Lebanon* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1985), 105-116.

⁵² Fawaz, *An Occasion for War*, 128-129.

⁵³ Fawaz, *An Occasion for War*, 132-133.

development plans were designed. His government invested in many areas that would help to develop Lebanon.⁵⁴

The Lebanese Central Bank (LCB) was established in this period and it wanted to be independent of the political power. In this way, the Central Bank could take a decision against economic crises without being influenced by the government oppression. Chehab's main objective was to make Lebanon a center of finance and he was successful in this aim compared to the previous periods. Lebanon also followed an impartial foreign policy in this period. Arab countries advocated Lebanon's policy and they did not intervene in domestic problems of the country. As a matter of fact, the Chehab government could provide relative stability in Lebanon.⁵⁵

From independence to the 1958 civil war was a period in which domestic competition between sects, groups, and families increased. Based on the Muslim-Christian competition, some influential families also participated in the conflicts in order to protect their interests and sometimes collaborated with other groups. The Muslim groups influenced by Nasser's Pan Arabist ideas opposed the Chehab's government as well as they did in the past. With the intervention of the US, the possible civil war in this period did not take place. However, the political and social reasons for the turmoil still existed. Especially after the integration of Egypt and Syria in 1958, the influence of Pan-Arabism covered Lebanon as it did to the other Arab countries. Although some sort of relative stability was maintained in Lebanon during Chehab's period, conflicts still existed in the country.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Fawaz, *An Occasion for War*, 133.

⁵⁵ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, 177-180.

⁵⁶ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, 138.

The Chehab period ended in 1964 when Charles Hilu came to power. Chehab contributed to the modernization of Lebanon in terms of every aspect. When Hilu came to power, he declared that he would follow Chehab's policies. Therefore, his term was considered as the second Chehab period. He continued economic investments and he exerted efforts to increase the dialogue between sects and groups in Lebanon.⁵⁷

2.4. 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Impact of Palestinian Issue

1967 Arab-Israeli war had crucial impacts on Lebanon and the existence of Palestinian refugee affected the domestic politics. President Hilu was in his third year in office and 1967 Arab-Israel war undermined the reforms and policies in Lebanon. Although he tried not to be biased in the war and did not take a side, this regional development damaged the stability of Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees started to be organized against Israel. Lebanon found itself in the middle of chaos. However, the fact that Lebanese groups perceived Palestinian issue differently and difference in opinion resulted in conflicts in the last years of Hilu's power. In these years, Palestinian refugees were organized and became quite influential in the developments. They had the great contribution to the process to the civil war in 1975.⁵⁸

It is necessary to explain the Palestinian issue from the beginning when Israel established. The Palestinian issue became an international matter especially after World War II and had a crucial impact on regional countries. After Israel was established in 1948, there were important developments in the region and these developments also affected Lebanon due to its political and demographic structure. The first Arab-Israeli War occurred in 1948 and it ended with a ceasefire in 1949.

⁵⁷ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, 140.

⁵⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları* (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1994), 105-106.

Since then Palestinian refugee issue has been still ongoing and has regional and international repercussions. Arab states could not protect Palestinian territories from Israel. After the war, Egypt closed the Suez channel to Israel's ships. Israel complained about Egypt in the UN Security Council and a decision on opening the channel to Israel's ship was taken by the council in 1951.⁵⁹

However, the crisis did not come to an end. The problems and tensions increased in the border and the Suez channel. Gamel Abd Al-Nasser declared that he nationalized the Suez channel in 1956. Britain and France confronted with a huge financial loss due to the nationalization of the Suez channel and they decided to cooperate with Israel. According to their plan, Israel would attack Egypt and Britain and France would intervene to the Channel region on the pretext of Israel's attack on Egypt. Israel started to occupy the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 and Britain and France gave an ultimatum to Egypt. After it was rejected by Egypt, they started air attacks on Egypt. However, after the US and USSR became involved in the events, the crisis did not grow bigger. After the 1956 War, Nasser and his ideas became more popular in the Arab world. However, these two wars did not help Palestinians to reach their objectives at all.⁶⁰

The Palestinians looked for other strategies after the defeat of 1948 and 1956 wars. Palestinian issue has been conducted by the leadership of Arab countries until this time. Palestinians looked for an armed struggle against Israel instead of depending on an Arab country. The Palestinians were organized especially after the 1956 war for their national issue. Firstly, Al-Fatah was established and it initiated an armed struggle to save the Palestinian territories. However, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which is known as the Six-Day war impaired the Palestinian struggle. The conflicts

⁵⁹ Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi*, 108.

⁶⁰ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994* (İstanbul: İmge Yayınları, 2006), 535-541.

occurred on the border of Egypt and Syria with Israel and many disagreements as a result of the 1956 war caused the 1967 war.⁶¹

Egypt and Syria waged war against Israel to vanish it from the map. Israel acted quickly and started attacking Egypt's air bases. Israel increased its power after this development and became even more stronger, and occupied the Sinai Peninsula in the west, Golan Heights in the north and Palestinian populated Gaza and West Side.⁶² The ceasefire was signed in 1967 and the UN took 237 and 242 Resolutions to end the crisis. The UN stated in the resolutions that war was not a solution and occupying a territory cannot be accepted. There had to be an immediate solution for all countries to live together peacefully. The UN also wanted Israel to leave the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. The UN also talked about the refugee problem and they wanted an immediate solution to this issue. This decision did not talk about the Palestinian right to establish a state in their territories. Also, the statement that Israel should leave the occupied territory was not clear and it would cause disputes among sides in the future.

As the Arabs lost the 1967 war, the Palestinians lost hope of getting help in their fight against Israel. Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza after the defeat of Arabs and the Palestinians chose Lebanon as its center in their fight against Israel. In addition, in 1970, conflicts occurred between the Jordanian army and the Palestinians and Lebanon was the only place where they could be organized and sustain their fights against Israel. The Palestinians were organized both militarily and politically in Lebanon. The Palestinian issue was heard in the world and became popular as a result of these developments. In a decision taken by the UN General Assembly, in order to maintain stability and security of the region, it was emphasized that Palestinians should be taken into consideration and the rights of

⁶¹ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, 547.

⁶² Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, 547.

Palestinians should not be ignored. In 1974, it was decided that PLO was the official representative of the Palestinians.⁶³ In this regard, Palestinians had a legal representative at the General Council of UN. Besides, the problems in Palestine would be solved directly with the official representative.

Especially after the second Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the number of Palestinian refugees dramatically increased and about three hundred thousand of them migrated to Lebanon. Lebanon was already dealing with conflicts and tension between sects and different groups. Palestinian refugees contributed to these problems as not all the groups had similar views about them. Palestinian refugees did not receive enough aid in Lebanon and they faced strict oppressions.⁶⁴ Therefore, the process of armed organization was accelerated. They were having bad conditions in the places where they settled. For this reason, the support from Palestinian refugees to armed resistance organizations increased. The Christians in Lebanon reacted to these developments and did not like the organization of Palestinians both politically and militarily.⁶⁵ Palestinians started to use Lebanon as a base in the fight against Israel, as well as intervening in the political structure of Lebanon.

Especially after 1967, there were a number of Palestinian organizations in Lebanon. Most of them were established by an Arab country and dependent on an Arab state.⁶⁶ After the defeat of the 1967 War, Palestinian organizations were more radicalized and they increased their attacks to Israel from Lebanon. Palestinians decided that armed struggle was the only way for their liberation. After Jordan took

⁶³ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 49.

⁶⁴ For detailed discussion, see M. Lütfullah Karaman, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Çıkmazında Filistin Sorunu* (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 1991), 25-30.

⁶⁵ William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2016), 325-327.

⁶⁶ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 328.

out Palestinians from its territory, Lebanon was the only place for the Palestinians to continue their fight against Israel. This resulted in further deepening the conflict between the Maronites and the Palestinians. After the intervention of the Maronites to Palestinian activities and response of Palestinians, the intervention of Syria and Israel to Lebanon became unavoidable.

The 1973 Arab-Israel war left no solution in the way to peace and the war was stopped after the intervention of great powers. In the following period, Egypt-Israeli cooperation influenced Palestinians. The Camp David agreement was signed in the year of 1978 in between the US, Israel, and Egypt. According to this agreement, Egypt would re-take the Sinai Peninsula gradually, the autonomy of the Palestinians living in West Front and Gaza would be considered and negotiations would be started. However, this agreement did not protect the right of Palestinians; it rather guaranteed the borders of Israel and Egypt. Besides, the US guaranteed economic aid to these countries. Arab countries protested this agreement and their relations with Egypt deteriorated.⁶⁷

2.5. Rise of PLO's to Power and Israel's Intervention

As Charles Hilu failed to prevent the organization of the Palestinians, the nationalist Maronites stopped supporting him. They established an alliance called the National Bloc (NB), in order to protect the Lebanese identity and take Palestinian refugees under the control. On the other side, leftist groups in the leadership of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt increased the pressure against the government in order to protect the Arab identity of Lebanon and give more priority to Palestinian refugees.

There was no consensus on how to treat Palestinians in Lebanese society. It was a matter of debate. It was mainly about Lebanon's identity. According to Kamal Jumblatt, as Lebanon was a part of Arab world, Palestinian issue was of their issue

⁶⁷ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 330.

as well. However, NB consisted of Raymond Edde, Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gamayel's Kataeb Party followed a firm policy against the Palestinian refugees. They tried to control the refugee camps and this created some sort of reaction amongst Muslims. For this reason, Palestinians participated in the Lebanese political life and further conflict occurred in between Maronites and Palestinians in the coming years.

In the 1968 elections, both sides won the elections in their regions, which divided Lebanon's parliament in between opposition groups. Therefore, governing Lebanon became almost impossible. In addition, armed conflicts took place between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians which resulted in the emergence of unrest in the parliament in the years of 1968 and 1969. Israel's army attacked the Beirut Airport and dispelled some civil aircraft. As Lebanese army stayed indifferent to this attack, Sunni Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi had to resign. Street demonstrations supporting Palestinians against Israel started in Lebanon.⁶⁸

Conflicts in Lebanon continued in 1969 as well and as the fact that the Lebanese army did not give importance to Palestinian refugees, so the new Prime Minister Kerami also resigned. After this development, as the Muslim and Christian sides did not agree on the Palestinian refugee problem, Lebanon stranded without a government for a long time period. The Maronite-Palestinian conflict became a nation-wide problem and it was not possible that the Maronites could solve Palestinian issue on their own. The reason was that some Muslim groups in the country were protesting the priority of Christians in governing the country. After the conflicts started in the country both Israel and Syria tended to strengthen their positions.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 330.

⁶⁹ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 331.

Syria aimed at increasing its strategic dominance against Israel with the help of Lebanese and Palestinian forces to stop Israeli occupation in Golan Heights. In this period, in favor of Syria, the Muslims gained power against the Maronites but the problems still continued to exist. Israel supporting the Maronites increased the air attacks against Palestinian refugee camps, especially in South Lebanon, Beirut and Saida. The fact that PLO gained power militarily disturbed both Maronites and Israel. In order to stop the spread of influence of Palestinians, Lebanese army also increased its oppression against the refugee camps. However, especially Syria and other Arab states started to force Lebanese Christians. As a result, the Lebanese army had to compromise with PLO. Cairo Agreement was signed after this process in 1969. Palestinian forces had a right to train soldiers and to hold guns in the refugee camps thanks to this agreement. Palestinians agreed on not intervening in Lebanese domestic politics.⁷⁰

As a result of the Cairo Agreement, while Muslims compromised with Hilu, the radical Maronites sided against both Hilu and Chief of Defence Bustoni. Pierre Gemayel blamed Hilu for giving concessions to the Palestinians. In 1970, with the force of National Bloc, Jean Njaim was assigned as the chief of Defence, who was supporting to take rigid precautions against Palestinians. After his inauguration, conflicts started in Lebanon between the Lebanese army and Palestinian groups.⁷¹

As Hilu's time of office ended in this period, Suleiman Frangieh was elected as the President of Lebanon in 1970. He assigned Saim Selam as Prime Minister and the new government decreased the oppression against the Palestinians. The National Bloc decided to take action on their own as the government did not oppress Palestinians.⁷² Conflicts between Maronites and the Palestinians started due to this

⁷⁰ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 331.

⁷¹ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*, 331.

⁷² Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 25-35.

decision. Although Israel supported the members of National Bloc, they could not succeed as Palestinians had wide support in the country. Israeli soldiers organized a raid in 1973 and three leaders of Al-Fatah were killed. Conflicts continued and Syria also participated in the events. After President Frangieh gave privileges in favor of Palestinians, the conflicts could be ended. However, this resulted in the rapprochement of Israel and Gemayel. The conflicts continued until 1975 and it turned into a total conflict in which all the groups in Lebanon participated in.⁷³

To sum up, starting from the independence in 1943, sectarian-based political structure continued to be implemented and quota system in the parliament raised the competition between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon. Besides, the Maronites in this period wanted to be more powerful and for this aim, they assigned Christians for the strategic positions. The Maronites marginalized the opposition groups to be stronger in the political system. In this period, the main problem that the Maronites considered was the increase of the Palestinian population. They thought that confessional system would be changed against them.

In this period, we see that when the President is inclined to develop better relations with the Muslims and give right to them, the stability and peace of Lebanon could be reached. However, when the Maronites tried to marginalize them and give less rights, then conflicts aroused. The president of Lebanon also worried to loss of support and his policies were influenced accordingly. For example, when Khoury tried to develop good relations with Muslims, Frangieh family stopped cooperation with him. For this reason, Khoury changed the election system, which divided Lebanon into five election area. Although Khoury won the 1947 elections, he lost support and, in this period, Arab nationalists exerted efforts to unite Syria and Lebanon. 1947 Arab-Israeli war also contributed to the rise of popularity of Arab nationalism. From the very beginning of Lebanon's independence, we see the impact of Syria's role as well as regional developments such as the 1947 Arab-Israeli war.

⁷³ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 33.

Sunni Muslims in Lebanon aimed at developing good relations with the Arab countries. President Chamoun took seat in 1952 and he tried to Westernize the country. In his period, Lebanon experienced significant developments in trade and banking. However, he was also undermined by the opposition groups as he wanted to develop Lebanon's relations with the West. Muslims wanted to be closer with the Arab countries and spread Arab identity in the country. For this reason, their view conflicted in this sense. Gamal Abd-al Nasser's Pan-Arabist ideology was also influential on the Sunni Muslims in Lebanon. It also shows us that Lebanon was influenced significantly by the regional developments. In this period, Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Muslims were against it and they claimed that it was against the National Pact. This also shows us the international dimension of the developments in Lebanon.

Due to these difference in opinions between Muslims and Christians, conflicts started and spread to the country and these developments paved the way for 1958 Civil War. Independent administration units were established by the opposition groups in their area of control. President Chamoun blamed Egypt and Syria on intervening in domestic politics and appealed to the UN. UN sent an observation committee and it did not find clear clue that these two countries intervened in Lebanese domestic politics. Chamoun sent a message to the US that his government was western oriented and it was challenged by the groups against it. In 1958, American soldiers came to Lebanon. Conflicts decreased after this development and the US convinced Chamoun to leave his office. Because Chamoun wanted to be re-elected in this period and it created problems in Lebanon. Chamoun's re-election was against the National Pact. As it is seen, conflicts could be stopped after the intervention of the US. It can be claimed that in this period, Lebanon's problems were also popular and it was not limited with the regional dimension. The US also intervened and played an important role in the developments in domestic politics of Lebanon.

Fuad Chehab's period that started in 1958 is quite important in the history of Lebanon. His policies were more democratic and liberal. He developed good relations with Arab countries. Muslims were given more power in the Lebanese state. After his policies and activities, stability and peace could be maintained in Lebanon. Compared to previous period of Khoury and Chamoun, the fact that he was not only Western oriented and knew the realities of the region in which there are Arab countries, he developed good relations and performed just policies in Lebanon gave him chance to maintain stability. We see regional importance and dimension at this point.

After him, Charles Hilu was elected as the President and he was determined to continue Chehab's policies. However, 1967 Arab-Israeli war took place in his period and Palestinian refugee issue had crucial impacts and repercussions in domestic politics. Israel occupied Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza and West Bank. UN's resolutions in this period warned Israel and wanted it to stop the occupation in the regions after 1967 and it gave importance to Palestinian refugee issue. It is clear that 1967 Arab-Israeli war significantly affected Lebanon and Palestinian issue had crucial impact in domestic politics. After 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinians were organized in the Lebanese territory, especially in the south Lebanon and it resulted in the important developments in the later periods. Maronites were uncomfortable about the Palestinian refugees and starting from 1967, conflicts increased between the Maronites and the Palestinians in Lebanon. As a result of these developments, Israel and Syria raised attention to the developments in domestic politics of Lebanon.

As Charles Hilu was believed not to perform well against the developments in Lebanon, National Bloc was established by other Maronite groups. There was disintegration between Christians. In this period, Leftist groups in the leadership of Jumblatt also challenged the government and advocated Arab identity. In 1968 elections, these two sides won elections in their areas and Lebanon was divided in between these groups. For this reason, ruling Lebanon was even harder. Armed

struggle between Lebanese army and Palestinians started after this elections and Israel attacked Beirut airport. Street demonstrations to support Palestinians started especially after the Lebanese army stayed neutral as a result of Israeli attack to airport.

Due to these developments, Israel and Syria wanted to strengthen its position in Lebanon. For Syria, occupation of Golan Heights was important and it had to be strong in the region against Israel to re-take it. In this period, Israel performed air attacks against Palestinians in the south Lebanon as PLO's military power disturbed it and was considered as a threat in its north. However, Syria and other Arab countries advocated Palestinians against Israel and the Maronites. Cairo Agreement was signed in 1969 and Palestinians had a number of rights such as training soldiers and holding guns in the refugee camps. This shows the regional dimension and regional countries especially Syria were quite influential in the domestic developments of Lebanon. In 1970, Jean Njaim was elected as Chief of Defence as a result of the efforts of the National Bloc and rigid policies against Palestinians started to be implemented. In 1970, Frangieh was elected as the President and he was not so strict against Palestinians. National Bloc was strict and harsh against the Palestinians and for this reason, conflicts occurred in Lebanon. Israel organized a raid and some members of Al-Fatah was killed. Syria also participated in the developments. Even before the Civil War, we see active involvement of Syria and Israel and they directed the developments in Lebanon.

As it is seen, in the process of the Lebanese Civil War, there were a number of reasons for conflict. The political system wanted to be changed and Palestine-Israel conflict was transferred to Lebanon. Israel's alliance with some Maronite groups also contributed to this process. Israel wanted to take Palestinians out from its border lines and undermine their military and political organizations. In addition, the Maronites considered the Palestinians responsible for the conflicts and they had different views on them. Therefore, they used oppression and force against refugees. This also contributed to the process of civil war. Israel wanted to stop the

influence of Syria in Lebanon and to control PLO. Israel also wanted to be in good relations with the Lebanese government in which Maronites were dominant. Therefore, Israel supported Maronite families both politically and militarily. The Maronites did not want to identify themselves as Arab identity. Therefore, starting with Emile Edde, Gemayel, Chamoun cooperated with Israel and took military support from them. Lebanon was an important country in the region and foreign powers wanted to increase their position in the country. All these developments happened in the process of a long-lasting civil war that started in 1975.

CHAPTER 3

THE CIVIL WAR (1975-1990)

In this chapter, the developments that took place during the civil war is explained with special emphasis and focus on foreign powers. While studying the civil war itself, some points were given more importance. How did the civil war start? How did the Palestinians affect the developments in Lebanon? What were the role of Syria and Israel? By considering these questions, studying the civil war makes us understand the developments in a better sense. This way, we can better understand the impact of foreign regional countries, Syria and Israel. We first start the chapter with the developments before the civil war initiated.

After that, we explain the sides of the civil war. Then, Syrian interference in the beginning of the civil war assessed. Due to the Syrian rise of influence in Lebanon, Israel intervened in Lebanon in the later periods of the civil war. This process was also explained in this chapter. However, brutal Sabra and Shatilla massacres resulted in the increase of reaction against Israel. In addition, assassination of Basher Gamayal, who was Israel's closest and strongest ally, resulted in the decrease of Israel's impact in Lebanon. Starting from this point, Syria increased its influence in Lebanon gradually and towards the end of 1980s, especially after the Taif Agreement was signed, Syria was the dominant power in Lebanon.

3.1. Developments towards Civil War

The Lebanese Civil War was quite devastating and bloody and lasted for a long time. More than 100.000 people died in 15 years and hundreds of thousands of people wounded. Most of the people who lost their lives were civilians in the civil war. Besides, about 1.5 million Lebanese people moved from their places and about

700.000 people had to leave Lebanon.⁷⁴ Both Syria and Israel actively involved in the civil war and they were influenced by the effects of the war both economically and militarily. The civil war emerged due to several reasons but when we looked closely at the developments, it was clear that Israel and Syria regarded Lebanon as important in the region and both countries wanted to maintain their dominance in order to protect their interests. This prepared the ground for the long-lasting catastrophe and chaos in Lebanon.

There were a number of developments happened in Lebanon that started the conflicts and paved the way for civil war. In the beginning, an armed fight between the Phalangist soldier and a Palestinian resulted in the occurrence of conflict between Christians in Beirut and Tal al-Zatar refugee camp guerillas in July 1974.⁷⁵ The conflict could have been stopped after the interposition of security forces. After this event, the fishing right in Saida was given to a company called the Proteine owned by the Maronite leader Chemun and Sunni and Shiite demonstrators protested this implementation. The army participated in the event and stopped the demonstration. However, the Palestinians supported the demonstrators.

President Chemun wanted to deport Palestinians from Lebanon and wanted to hold a referendum on this issue. Due to the conflict aroused in Lebanon, 18 demonstrators died and the Prime Minister wanted soldiers to leave the zone. While Sunni politicians protested the soldiers as they attacked civilians, the Nationalist Maronites supported the attacks carried by the army. The difference in opinion in between these groups grew bigger especially after the death of Palestinian supporter Shiite politician Maruf Saad on March 6.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, 539-542.

⁷⁵ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 66-70.

⁷⁶ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 4-6.

The Phalangist Party administration sent an official committee in the leadership of President Pierre Gamayel to pay a visit to Arab countries namely Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia as they realized that the security and stability of Lebanon can be maintained only if security and stability of the Middle East were reassured.⁷⁷ Gamayel also talked to Arafat and leader of Al-Fatah organization and stated that they advocated the establishment of Palestine. As well as Palestinian issue, Gamayel was also concerned about the growing radical leftist wing in the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt's supporters criticized the structure generated by the 1943 National Pact.

In April, 1975, a group of politicians demanded to re-share the administrative and military structure according to the new population of sects. The Maronites strictly rejected this demand that stipulated to limit the power of Maronite President and to share the high-level commandership between Muslims and Christians in the army. Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt promoted this demand. Reformist opposition groups gathered in the leadership of Jumblatt declared a 14-article request. Some of these requests were dispersing Phalangist militias, respecting the rights of Palestinians and declaring Lebanon as an Arab country.

However, these requests were not replied and President Frangieh established a military government in the leadership of retired Sunni General Nureddin Refai. Sunni politicians rejected this appointment; thus, Refai had to resign.⁷⁸ Despite the opposite attitudes of Gamayal and Chamoun, Suleiman Frangieh asked Rashid Karami to form a new government in early 1975.

In April 1975, Gamayel's supporters attacked a bus going to Tel Al-Zatar refugee camp in front of St. Maron Church and 27 refugees lost their lives. After this attack,

⁷⁷ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 67.

⁷⁸ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 8.

street fights started between the Palestinians and Christian militias. As conflicts spread to other regions, Prime Minister Sulh blamed Israel and stated that 100 people lost their lives in the street fights.⁷⁹ The Muslims accused the government and claimed that the army was cooperating with the rich Lebanese and massacring the people opposing them.⁸⁰ Instead of resisting against Israeli attacks in the south, Lebanese army assaulted civilians.

However, Christians stated that the army was doing its duty and protecting its people. They claimed that PLO militants participated in the events that took place in Saida and blamed Palestinians for intervening in Lebanon's internal affairs. Saida crisis caused the occurrence of conflict between the Muslims and Christians.

Karami made an effort to admit both Jumblatt and the Kataib Party about the government that he would establish. In this process, conflicts continued and about 100 people died in the strife around Beirut and this accelerated the effort to form a new government. After phalangist leaders and Jumblatt supporters agreed on a new ministry system, the Karami government was established in July 1975. Although the government was established, conflicts continued and ceasefire efforts worked out. In the conflicts from April to July, 2314 people died and more than 6441 people have been wounded.⁸¹

Lebanon was moving towards a civil war between the Muslims and Christians without any solution. In August, conflicts started in Zgarta and Tripoli between the supporters of Frangieh and Karami and spread to Beirut at short notice. Although conflicts stopped with the effort of President and Prime Minister, the conflicts were once spread to Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Maronite forces encircled Palestinian

⁷⁹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 9.

⁸⁰ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 16.

⁸¹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 12.

refugee camps and the Palestinians attacked Christian populated regions such as Zahle and around. Shiite militias organized in the leadership of Musa Sadr also participated in events. While the conflicts continued between Maronites and Muslim groups, Israeli forces started air attack against Palestinians in the south and Beirut.⁸²




Figure 3. Lebanon's Pre-Civil War map⁸³

⁸² Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 69.

⁸³ Retrieved from, <https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/interactives-extras/maps/lebanons-divisive-sectarian-pastprecivil-war/2387/> accessed 25 October, 2019.

3.2. Actors of Civil War and Their Sides

The Lebanese civil war can be described as a war between the Muslims and Christians in general terms. Therefore, religion was an important criterion in the division. However, there was no direct religious division as well. The position of Christian components amongst the Palestinians as well as Armenians', which were Christians, efforts to be impartial should not be disregarded.

In this respect, on the one side, there were mainly Druzes, Palestinians Nasserist, Ba'athist, Communist party supporters and Shiite militias bound to Musa Sadr in the leadership of Arafat and Kamal Jumblatt. Kamal Jumblatt, Arafat, and al-Khatib supporters organized the opposition under the name of Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The most powerful group in LNM was the organized and trained Palestinians that had more than 8000 militants. However, as they were divided as the Iraq supporters, Syria supporters or Marxists, they could not act together. Arafat's organization Al-Fatah was the strongest organization in the opposition. The Druzes also had significant military power in this group. There was about 3000 organized and trained militants attached to Jumblatt. Most of them provided the security of the Druze regions. The Nasserist militias in the leadership of Abraham Klilat came after the Druzes in terms of military power. There were also considerable amounts of Shiite soldiers belong to Imam Musa Sadr.⁸⁴

On the other hand, the Christians established a common commandership called the Lebanese Front. This group consisted of mainly Maronite groups. Phalangist militias in the leadership of Gamayel family, Frangieh's Marada Brigades, Chamoun's militias bound to National Liberal Party, and some other militias attached to Etienne Sakr and Georges Adwan. Gamayal had about 6000 well-trained and equipped soldiers. Phalangist party had about 60.000 members. In addition, the organization had more than 10.000 militias. The second biggest organization in

⁸⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 29.

Maronite groups was the Chemun's militias bound to the National Liberal Party (NLP). They were known as Chemun's Tigers. Other groups had less than 1000 militias.⁸⁵

Besides, these groups had the potential to triple the number of militias they had when conflicts started. The Lebanese Front (LF) supported the dominance of Maronites and if it was not possible, they would want to divide the country. They were against Syria, Palestine and rejected the Lebanese Arab identity. The other group wanted to lift the political, economic and military dominance of the Maronites in Lebanon.

3.3. Syrian Influence in the Beginning of the Civil War: The Syrian-Maronite Cooperation

At the beginning of the Civil War, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) was more organized and exceeded the Lebanese Front in terms of the number of militias they owned.⁸⁶ They had about eighteen thousand militias and this maintained their dominance over the Christians. Towards the end of 1975, LNM had control in most of the fronts. Palestinian militants encircled the most important Christian city Zahle and they had control over the strategically important region in between Suf and Kesrivan. In January 1976, LNM took the control of Saadiyat, Jiyeh and Damur cities. In February, Sunni lieutenant Ahmad Al-Khatib established Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) and declared that he would fight in order to re-organize the Lebanese army depending on the power of sects.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 29.

⁸⁶ Karol R. Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976 Civil War in Lebanon," *Asian and African Studies* 20, no. 2 (2001): 202.

⁸⁷ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 206.

In March, the conservative Sunni Beirut garrison commander, General Abdelazez Al Ahdab planned an unsuccessful military coup. Kamal Jumblatt regulated both forces to act together.⁸⁸ After this united force attacked Baabda in which the Presidential Palace located, Frangieh had to leave the region. The Lebanese Front lost the war and at the end of March, the Phalangist militias were removed from the center of Beirut and government centers were taken under the control. In addition, most of the Christians were removed from the Lebanese Mountain and Junieh, which was known as the center of Maronites, they were taken under their control. Besides, they also took control of the Bikfaya and around, which was Gamayal's city.

Gamayel was an important figure in the Lebanese Front and was supported by Israel. The fact that Bikfaya was taken under control of Muslims meant that Maronite and Israeli influence on Lebanese politics were weakened. Jumblatt invited his supporters to a breakfast celebration to Bikfaya. However, these positive developments for the Muslims were strictly rejected by an ultimatum sent by Hafiz Asad.⁸⁹ Jumblatt went to Damascus to learn and continue operations and an important meeting was held in between Asad and Jumblatt in early 1977. Jumblatt stated in this meeting that political power was given to Maronites after the Mandate administration and they administered Lebanon arrantly. They neither respected tradition nor were good in administration. He said that Syria should allow them to discipline Maronites and they had the power to execute an army attack. Jumblatt said that in a few days, Maronites would be beaten and they would be enforced to admit the new rules and order. However, Asad stated that both regional and global powers would not let Maronites lose the war. Jumblatt continued operations after

⁸⁸ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 208.

⁸⁹ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 205-206.

the meeting and did not take into consideration what Asad claimed. Asad blamed LNM for dividing the country and stopped arms aid.⁹⁰

There were limited relations between Damascus and Maronite groups since the beginning of the Civil War and Damascus played an important role in protecting President Frangieh. The Maronite forces advocated the limited intervention of Damascus to the Civil War. Christians left the policy of dividing the country and Syria in order to ensure the country's political identity, prevented Muslims to take control of the country. After these developments, relations between Syria and Frangieh started developing. Syria played a significant role in stopping military coup attempt committed by General Azez Ahdab in March in order to force Frangieh to resign.⁹¹

After Asad-Jumblatt meeting, Frangieh did not reject Syria to send its army to Beka, which was under the control of Arafat and Jumblatt forces. Asad convinced Frangieh that his aim was to maintain the unity of Lebanon. In this way, Syria could send its army to Lebanon starting from April 1. Syrian soldiers targeted Arafat and Jumblatt who continued attacks in Mount Lebanon. However, Syrian army interference could not deal with the power and influence of LNM.⁹² In May, Presidential elections were held under the observance of Syrian soldiers and Asad supported Elias Sarkis to win the elections.⁹³

After this election, Syrian soldiers attacked against Palestinians and Druze militias. After this attack, most of the Christian groups except Gamayal supported Syrian

⁹⁰ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 209.

⁹¹ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 215.

⁹² Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 38-55.

⁹³ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 209.

military intervention. After the military intervention, LNM started to be fragmented and pro-Syrian Saika and Shiite groups supported the occupation. They took the side of Syria and started to fight against Palestinian and other Muslim groups.⁹⁴ Gamayal supporters were afraid of the continuous intervention. As LNM lost power, Maronite militias started to organize attacks against them on many fronts. Under these circumstances, LNM forces started to lose the war against Syrian-Maronite alliance.

With the help of Syria, the Maronite militias assaulted Tal Al-Zatar, which was one of the biggest headquarters of Palestinians. After two months of struggle, Palestinians had to surrender Maronite militias. After gaining Tal Al-Zatar, Maronite and Syrian military operations were intensified.⁹⁵ The Lebanese Front confiscated the headquarters in Jasar al-Basha, Naba, and Karantina. Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat could not resist after these attacks and they had to compromise with them. In the meetings in the mediation of Saudi Arabia, they admitted the Riyadh Agreement in 1978. The Riyadh Agreement was quite important in terms of legitimization of the existence of Syrian soldiers in the country and was against LNM's demands.⁹⁶

After this agreement, the Arab Deterrence Forces (ADF) consisted of 30.000 soldiers would be established by Arab League and PLO guerrillas would stay in Lebanon respecting the sovereignty and security of Lebanon. There were 25.000 Syrian soldiers in ADF.⁹⁷ In other words, it was consisted of essentially Syrian

⁹⁴ Odeh, *Lübnan'da İç Savaş*, 62-63.

⁹⁵ Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 211.

⁹⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 225.

⁹⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 226.

soldiers and Syria secured its existence in Lebanon and controlled Lebanon militarily.




Figure 4. Lebanon’s Map During the Civil War⁹⁸

As indicated above, in the meeting between Asad and Jumblatt, Jumblatt wanted a couple of days to beat the Maronite forces. Asad claimed in the meeting that the problem was not between Muslims and Christians or in way they knew. The problem was a revenge that went 140 years back. Asad also pointed out that the policy and strategy that they followed was to serve Israel’s interests and wanted

⁹⁸ Retrieved from, <https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/lebanon-s-divisive-sectarian-past-civil-war/2388/> accessed 25 October, 2019.

them to stop military attacks and operations so as to protect Lebanon from the partition. The Maronite forces were willing to divide the country instead of admitting the defeat. Asad changed his policies in order to prevent the division of Lebanon. However, Gamayal was endorsing the division of Lebanon.⁹⁹

Etienne Sakr who was the leader of the party called the Cedar Guardians also stated that the Lebanese nation was neither Arab nor Syrian; it can be divided as two states as Muslim and Christian according to religion. Sakr perceived the Syrians and Palestinians as the enemy of Lebanon and they made an alliance with Israel. He rejected military intervention of Syria in Lebanon.¹⁰⁰ Prominent historian Al-Bustani also advocated the division of Lebanon and creation of a Christian populated state. However, Syria did not accept these intentions and requests. In his speeches, Asad stated that Lebanon was the territory of Syria historically and in any case of territorial division, Syria would make a claim on these territories.¹⁰¹

As Syria was against LNM and took the side of Maronites, Pierre Gamayal went to Damascus and held a meeting with Hafiz Asad. He asked for Asad's support in this meeting.¹⁰² While the Maronites wanted Syria to intervene in the conflict, Muslims asked for some time so that they would beat the Christians and force them to make an agreement in favor of Muslims. However, Syria did not want Sunni groups in Lebanon to be dominant and powerful and regarded this against its interests.

⁹⁹ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 211.

¹⁰⁰ Mordechai Nisan, *The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz)* (London: Routledge, 2003), 20-50.

¹⁰¹ Zeev Schiff, "Dealing with Syria," *Foreign Policy*, no. 55 (Summer, 1984): 98.

¹⁰² Sami Moubayed, "Lebanon's Phalange Party: Back from the Grave?," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 21, no 1, (January/February 2002): 1.

In this respect, Asad did not let Muslims win the civil war and he also gained the support of the US and Israel. Starting from the beginning of April, Syrian soldiers came to Lebanon and Syrian occupation started. After this point, Syria wanted to be permanent and tried to legalize the occupation. The Civil war turned to be an advantage for Syria to exist in Lebanon with its soldiers.¹⁰³

3.4. Syria-Israel Agreement on the Litani Border

The fact that Palestinians supported Maronite-opposed groups increased tensions between the Christians and Palestinians and conflicts increased between Israel and Palestinians in Lebanon. According to the agreements in 1969 and 1973 between the Lebanese government and Palestinians, the Palestinians had the right to continue their activities outside their camps and enter south Lebanon right next to Israel. They also had the right to use guns to protect themselves against Israel's attacks. Gamayal and Chamoun wanted to stop the Palestinian activities in Lebanon and removed Palestinian groups.¹⁰⁴ These objectives were in favor of the Christians living in not only Lebanon but also Israel.

At the beginning of the civil war, Israel trained the Maronites and increased military aid to them. Besides, Israel threatened Lebanon and intensified air attacks. The US and France warned Syria that without disregarding Israel's interests, a permanent solution for the conflict cannot be found. Some Maronites were concerned about the participation of Israel to the civil war as they thought that Israel wanted Lebanon to be divided. This group was the moderate Maronites opposed to Gamayal. As Syria developed its relations as mentioned above and followed its policies against Palestinians, Israel accepted the existence of Syria in Lebanon.¹⁰⁵ The Syrian

¹⁰³ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 211.

¹⁰⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 226.

¹⁰⁵ Sorby, "Syria and the 1975-1976," 210.

military intervention came to the scene, negotiations started in between Israel and Syria in the mediation of Jordan King Husain and some American diplomats. According to the unwritten agreement called the Red Line Agreement (1976), Syria would not send air force to Lebanon and place missiles sent from soil and its soldiers more than one brigade.¹⁰⁶ Besides, Syria would not send its soldiers to South Lebanon.¹⁰⁷ In this framework, Israel accepted the limited intervention of Syria until the Litani River.

Asad adhered to this agreement and as Syria started actively fighting against the Palestinians, Israel stopped attacking Lebanon. Israel started to observe the developments from outside and was happy about the imperturbation in its border. It was a positive development for Israel that Syria used guns against Palestinians and many Palestinians lost their lives in these conflicts. The civil war was coming to an end after Syria's intervention and Israel and the Maronites looked for a way to remove Syrian forces from Lebanon after then.¹⁰⁸

Although conflicts between the Christians and Muslims ended after the Syrian intervention, Gamayal and Chamoun supporters were still against Syria. Syrian soldiers deployed in Lebanon under the name of the Arab Deterrence Forces put the flags of the Baath Party in the region that they controlled.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, their reluctance to leave the country raised suspicion between some Maronites against them. The Lebanese Front wanted to deport the 200.000 Palestinians who entered

¹⁰⁶ Itamar Rabinovich, "Israel, Syria and Lebanon," *International Journal* 45, no. 3 Israel and the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990): 531.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel Pipes, "Asad's Art of the Double Game," in *Modern Syria: From Ottoman Rule to Pivotal Role in the Middle East*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz, Joseph Ginat, and Onn Winckler (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1999), 276.

¹⁰⁸ Schiff, "Dealing with Syria," 101.

¹⁰⁹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 225.

the country illegally during the civil war in May 1977.¹¹⁰ However, Asad did not accept this request. The reason was that Egypt's Head of State Sadat solved problems with Israel and Syria looked for an ally to re-take Golan Heights and Palestinians were the only organized group. However, Asad's policy to use the Palestinians in his fight against Israel resulted in reactions of some Maronites in Lebanon.

Conflicts occurred after Syria established barricade in front of the Lebanese army's barracks in Fayadiye. After these soldiers started attacking barracks, about 200 people died and many were wounded. After this development, the Syrian army started operations in order to take the control of East Beirut. Christian forces defending East Beirut started street fights against Syrian soldiers. Syria also performed an operation to the main headquarter of the Lebanese army in Yazde.¹¹¹ After that, conflicts spread to Mount Lebanon. Asad insisted on the claim that Syrian soldiers would stay in Lebanon until their duty is over. Chamoun expressed his idea that Syrian soldiers could not stay in Lebanon until an uncertain time.

While the conflicts continued in between Syrian and Maronites groups, in May 1978, previous President Frangieh announced that he made peace with Rashed Karami. The Karami family was known as the supporter of Syria. While the Gamayal family emphasized the importance of Israel and West, the Frangieh family gave importance to develop good relations and cooperation with Arab countries in order to secure the interests of the Maronites in Lebanon.¹¹² As Frangieh was willing to compromise with Syria, the Maronites were divided in itself. As a result, street fight in between Maronites started and in June 1978, Frangieh's son and Tony

¹¹⁰ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 232-233.

¹¹¹ Veysel Ayhan and Özlem Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış, Direniş ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler* (Bursa: Dora Yayınları, 2009), 93-111.

¹¹² Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 93-111.

Frangieh were killed.¹¹³ In the same night, Syria sent soldiers to Edhen and fought against Lebanese Front militias.

Frangieh warned the members of Kataib party and wanted them to lay down arms and resign from the party. Frangieh waged war against the Kataib Party and the leader Gamayal. Syria occupied Chekka and Batroun as well as north of Mount Lebanon. These occupations resulted in the weakening of the Gamayal's side. Chamoun and Gamayal talked to Israel in order to stop expansionist policies of Syria. Israel increased military aid to Lebanese Front to stop Syria's influence over Lebanon to some extent. However, as this help did not work and failed to stop Syria, Israel became inclined to occupy Lebanon.¹¹⁴

3.5. Israeli Occupation in Lebanon

After conflicts occurred between Syria and the Maronite group, and as Israel's support to the Maronites against Syria's existence in Lebanon did not work, Israel became inclined to intervene in Lebanon. The Druzes, as well as Maronite Frangieh, Sunni politicians, Shiite groups, and PLO, started to advocate Syria's policies, especially after Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated in March 1977. The Likud Party had the right to establish the government in Israel after the 1977 elections and they followed rigid policies. Menahem Begin became the Prime Minister of Israel and he was supporting the occupation of Lebanon.

After the Likud Party came to power, the Palestine-Israel conflict existed in south Lebanon was intensified. The Squadron leader Saad Haddad, who was responsible with south Lebanon, made cooperation with Israeli forces in fighting against Palestinian forces and this cooperation resulted in the increase of the tensions.

¹¹³ Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 93-111.

¹¹⁴ Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 93-111.

Israeli forces and Saad Haddad organized common operations in Lebanon.¹¹⁵ In 1978 spring, Israel started to occupy south Lebanon. March 11, PLO militants organized an attack in the south of Haifa. Pretending this development, Israel occupied Lebanon from sea, overland, and air with 20.000 soldiers on March 14, 1978. Israel claimed that this occupation targeted Palestinian insurgents.¹¹⁶

In the first two days of occupation, 10% percent of Lebanon was occupied by Israel and in a short period of time, occupation spread to the Litani River, which was considered historically Israel land by Jews. PLO militants withdrew to the north of Litani river. Israeli side elucidated that this occupation covered only south of Lebanon and was an operation of deterrence. They aimed at stopping attacks targeting civilians so far and protecting them from new ones. What Israel aimed was beating Palestinian resistance and generating a safe zone in their borders in Lebanon side and responding to Syria's influence.¹¹⁷ They also aimed at increasing the influence of Maronite forces which were close to Israel and strengthening their positions in government.

This occupation resulted in the migration of many Lebanese Shiites to Beirut and oppression by Syria on Maronites declined. Israel's occupation in Lebanon was quite devastating. Thousands of houses, shops and many towns were destroyed. Besides, about 250.000 people became refugees and more than 2000 people lost their lives.¹¹⁸ The American President Jimmy Carter objected Israeli occupation and

¹¹⁵ Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, "(In)security Zones in South Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 64-70.

¹¹⁶ Chris Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon," *Third World Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (October 1986): 1354.

¹¹⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 77.

¹¹⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Kader Üçgeni*, trans. Bahadır Sina Şener (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 231.

stated that they should not allow Israel's occupation in Lebanon.¹¹⁹ UN discussed the issue and according to 425 Resolution¹²⁰, Lebanon's borders, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, as well as political independence, should be respected. According to resolution, Israel was asked to stop its attacks and remove its soldiers from Lebanon immediately. They decided to deploy Peace Forces in south Lebanon in order to ensure the control of Lebanese government in the region again and in order to maintain international peace and security.¹²¹

After the UN's resolution, Israel started to withdraw its forces in April. UNIFIL¹²² troops settled in the territories that Israel's soldiers withdrew. Israel left the control of Litani to Israeli borders to Saad Haddad's forces. After the conflicts between UNIFIL forces and Saad Haddad, UNIFIL could not be influential in south Lebanon. Haddad established a paramilitary structure in the region with the economic and military support of Israel. UNIFIL stand back from the region and conflicts continued until 1982.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 121.

¹²⁰ UN Resolution 425 Decrees, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/70/IMG/NR036870.pdf?OpenElement>

¹²¹ John Hillen, "The Role of UNIFIL after an Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," in *The Last Arab-Israeli Battlefield? Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon*, ed. Patrick Clawson and Micheal Eisentadt (Washington: Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 48.

¹²² United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in 1978 as a peacekeeping force by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. For further information, see <https://unifil.unmissions.org/mission-leadership>, accessed on October 23, 2018.

¹²³ Hillen, "The Role of UNIFIL," 50.

3.6. Developments Between 1978-1982

After the occupation, Muslim and Maronite groups aimed to hold the control over their regions and this struggle between groups dragged Lebanon again into tense conflicts. At the beginning of the 1980s, disputes emerged in between Gamayal and Chamoun families. The Baath regime supported Chamoun family and its objective was weakening the Lebanese Front in itself. The Tigers Army in the leadership of Chamoun's son Dany Chamoun tried to widen its area of influence against the Phalangists. Conflicts occurred in between these groups and in July 1980, Phalangists attacked the main headquarter of Tigers Army. After this attack, Gamayel supporters succeeded in between Maronite groups as they were more disciplined and bigger in terms of numbers. Besides, they had the support of Israel.¹²⁴

Maronite militias developed a new cooperation between each other after having control of the Mount Lebanon and East Beirut. Gamayel had the leadership of the army and Lebanese Front declared its political objectives with a manifesto that they published in 1980. According to their manifesto, the 1943 National Pact would be changed, the central administration system would be left and a federal or confederal system would be established.¹²⁵ They also aimed at removing all the Syrian and Palestinian forces. After targeting Syrian forces, conflicts increased between Syrian forces and Christian militias in Mount Lebanon. Both sides wanted to control Zahle which was on the Beirut- Damascus road. Zahle was located on the center of Mount Lebanon and strategically important city in Lebanon.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 123.

¹²⁵ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 190.

¹²⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 251-252.

In addition to tensions and conflicts between Syria and Christians in Mount Lebanon, conflicts also occurred between Syria and PLO. PLO had the support of the Sunnis and street fighting took place in Tripoli between PLO and Syria.¹²⁷ There were problems between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baath regime in Syria and it spread to Lebanon. Some Sunni groups participated in the Syria-opposed group. Lebanon was also influenced by the war started between Iran and Iraq. In 1982, there were conflicts and combats between different groups prevailed all over Lebanon. There were many different groups fighting and who was fighting with who was uncertain and the aim of these fighting groups was uncertain in this year. The civil war was so complicated and chaotic. The Shiites blamed Palestinians as they supported Saddam Husain and PLO blamed Syrian regime for inhibiting their resistance. Besides, the Maronites were divided in itself and they claimed that they were fighting both against Syria and Palestinians.¹²⁸

3.7. Israel's Effort to be Permanent in Lebanon: Second Occupation

In August 1981, the Begin government was established and Ariel Sharon was assigned as Ministry of National Defence. According to Sharon, any possible attack to Lebanon would not be limited to south Lebanon. According to him, the occupation would cover Beirut and Arafat's headquarter and after toppling down him, Gamayel would come to power and there would be a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.¹²⁹ Another objective of foreseen occupation was to decrease the influence of Syria. After decreasing Syria's influence, radical Maronites would come to power and Israel would easily cooperate with them.¹³⁰ Israeli forces had

¹²⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 253.

¹²⁸ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 254.

¹²⁹ Ze'ev Schiff, "Fifty Years of Israeli Security: The Central Role of the Defense System," *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 440.

¹³⁰ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1357-1358.

two main objectives. First, they would struggle with the Palestinian groups deployed in south Lebanon and remove them from the region. Second, they would perform airstrikes against Syrian forces.¹³¹

In the Litani Operation in 1978, Israel failed and did not succeed in what it aimed. After this operation, General Rafael Eitan became Chief of Defence. Eitan criticized the decision of ceasefire in 1981. According to him, the problem can only be solved by the use of force and he was against any peaceful solution.¹³² Especially after 1981, when Sharon was the Ministry of National Defence, occupation plan was supported in the government. Sharon secretly went to Beirut in January 1982, in order to observe the region and regulate an occupation plan.¹³³

Starting from 1982, Israel put its forces to the border and especially when assassination attempt was performed targeting Israel's Ambassador Shlomo Argov, it constituted a ground for Israel's aims.¹³⁴ PLO did not claim responsibility for the attempt. After a short while, it was understood that the action was held by militants bound to Abu Nidal. According to Prime Minister Begin, the attack was performed against Jews and Argov represented Jewish people and the state of Israel. Therefore, it was not important who performed the attack. What was important was that the existence of Palestinians in Lebanon was problematic according to him. Israel decided to attack Lebanon and at the beginning of June, it started air attacks against Palestinians. After executing airstrikes, Israel started the first phase of occupation

¹³¹ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1357-1358.

¹³² Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1357-1358.

¹³³ Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi*, 543.

¹³⁴ The Associated Press, Shlomo Argov, 73, Ex-Israeli Envoy; His Shooting Prompted an Invasion," *New York Times*, February 25, 2003, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/25/world/shlomo-argov-73-ex-israeli-envoy-his-shooting-prompted-an-invasion.html>, accessed on October 19, 2018.

plan in June 1982, in Lebanon.¹³⁵ Israeli troops aimed at generating a secure region primarily. The operation was administered by the Chief of Commander Eitan and Minister of National Defence Sharon.¹³⁶

The Palestinians could resist for a short period of time against Israel bombardment from air and overland. Israel attacked civilians and settlements, and destroyed towns. After controlling borders, they targeted regions under the control of Syria in south Lebanon. Although the ceasefire was maintained with the mediation of the US and USSR, Israel continued attacking until it provided its control over the Damascus- Beirut land route. After this point, Israel had to engage in the street fight with Palestinian forces so as to remove Syrian and PLO soldiers from West Beirut. In order to weaken them, Israel first blockaded West Beirut from overland, air, and sea. Water, food, and electricity were not given to the city and PLO did not have any support from regional or global countries.¹³⁷

Although the US called for a ceasefire, Israel permanent removal of Palestinians from Lebanon laid down as a condition. Israel continued attacking Beirut at the same time. As the blockade and attacks continued, PLO had to accept the plan regulated by the US Special Representative that envisaged the removal of Palestinians from Lebanon. After that, Israel also was convinced about the plan called Habib Plan in 1982.¹³⁸ According to this plan, Palestinian soldiers would leave West Beirut and be sent to some other countries such as Syria, Iraq, Tunisia. In addition to the Palestinians, Syrian soldiers would also leave West Beirut. The

¹³⁵ Ayhan and Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış*, 127.

¹³⁶ Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi*, 543-544.

¹³⁷ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1351-1366.

¹³⁸ Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 131-135.

Civilian Palestinians staying in Lebanon would respect the law and keep living in Lebanon. International forces consisting of American, French and Italian soldiers came to Lebanon and abandonment started in August 1982. More than 15,000 Palestinian guerrillas and some civilians left the country.¹³⁹

As a result of Lebanon's occupation, Israel obtained its goal, and PLO and its leader Arafat left Lebanon. Syrian influence was limited and military control until Beirut was maintained. According to the Israeli government, after the occupation, peace was brought to Lebanon and good relations were developed with the new government of Lebanon in the Presidency of Gemayel. It was assumed that with this alliance, Israel and Lebanon would follow common strategy and politics. However, this equanimity did not last long and Gemayel was assassinated on September 14, 1982.¹⁴⁰

As well as removing Palestinians from Lebanon, Israel also aimed at undermining the Syrian influence in Lebanon and signing a peace agreement with the government. In the first days of occupation, there was no overland conflict between Syria and Israel. On June 4, Israel's airplanes made two Syrian airplane crashes. Syria was not prepared against a possible Israeli attack. Syria mobilized its reserves after Israel's threat. After Habib Plan, Syria lost 85 airplanes and it only controlled Beka Valley and Tripoli. Israel controlled south Beka Valley, Damascus-Beirut road, Beirut and other Lebanese territories.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ H. Thomas Davis, *40 Kilometers into Lebanon: Israel's Invasion, A National Security Affairs Monograph* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 101.

¹⁴⁰ "Bachir Gamayel 1947-1982," Bachir Gamayel Foundation, accessed August 10, 2018, http://www.bachirgamayel.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=75, accessed on August 10, 2018.

¹⁴¹ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1361.

However, Syria still continued its influence over Lebanon. Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Syria would not accept any imposition threatening the security, unity, and sovereignty of Lebanon.¹⁴² In addition, after the occupation, the groups supporting Syria were also removed from Lebanon. Syria followed another strategy and tried to advocate Shiite groups and wanted them to resist against Israel. It aspired to create a new front in south Lebanon that can limit and deal with the presence of Israel. In this way, Israeli troops would be limited in south Lebanon and Syrian troops would be away from conflict zones.¹⁴³

3.8. Sabra and Shatila Massacre and Gemayel's Assassination

When Israeli troops occupied Beirut in July 25, 1982, Maronite leader Gemayel declared his candidacy instead of President Sarkis whose period of office would finish in September. Most of the Christian member of parliaments advocated Gemayel's candidacy. On the other hand, Druze leader Velid Jumblatt, most of the Sunni member of parliaments and Shiite leader Nebih Berri were against Gemayel. While Israel advocated Gemayel's candidacy, Syria was strictly against him and accused him as traitor. After announcing his candidacy, Gemayel went to Saudi Arabia and tried to get the support of some Arab countries' Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴⁴ Gemayel was elected as the President of Lebanon on August 23, 1982.¹⁴⁵

Hereby, Arafat and his supporters were removed from the country and Gemayel was elected as the President with the support of Israel. Gemayel stated that he

¹⁴² F. John Devlin, "Syria Policy in the Aftermath of the Israel Invasion of Lebanon," in *The Middle East After the Israel Invasion of Lebanon*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 304.

¹⁴³ Devlin, "Syria Policy," 308-315.

¹⁴⁴ "Bachir Gamayal 1947-1982."

¹⁴⁵ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1365.

would work for the unity and independence of Lebanon and establish good relations with the neighboring countries. In addition, he would exert efforts to remove all the foreign powers from the country. Gemayel went to Nahariya in order to have a meeting with Sharon and Begin on September 8, 1982. Sharon and Begin forced Gemayel to sign a peace agreement with Israel.¹⁴⁶ However, Gemayel stated that Lebanese Muslims would not accept such an agreement and it would deteriorate Lebanon's relations with Arab countries primarily Saudi Arabia. He stated that after some time when stability was maintained permanently in Lebanon, he could bring the agreement to the agenda.¹⁴⁷

By September, Palestinian and Syrian troops withdrew completely from West Beirut. After that, the International Peace Forces also drew back from Lebanon. Gemayel was getting ready for the presidency until he was killed in East Beirut when he went there to join a meeting in Phalangist building on September 14. Phalangist militias blamed Palestinians for the assassination. On September 16, the roads going to Sabra and Shatila refugee camps were closed by Israeli soldiers and Phalangist militias attacked these camps. They executed the brutal massacre and killed more than 800 people mostly women, children and elders. Not only Christians but also Israel was responsible with the massacre that took place in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. It was certain that while Phalangist was performing this massacre, Israeli soldiers advocated and helped them.¹⁴⁸ After Gemayel was killed, Lebanese Parliament gathered again to elect the new President. Beshar's brother Amine Gemayel was elected as the new president by getting 77 out of 80 votes of the participating member of parliaments.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 99.

¹⁴⁷ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 99.

¹⁴⁸ Davis, *40 Kilometers into Lebanon*, 101-115.

¹⁴⁹ Mowles, "The Israeli Occupation," 1365.

Israel's intervention to Lebanon was an important turning point in the history of Israel. Some Jewish groups supporting military operations rejected this intervention and criticized the administration. Members of Peace Now movement¹⁵⁰ opposed the occupation and more than 400.000 Jewish participated in the demonstrations and protested the Israeli government. Especially after Sabra and Shatila massacres, the establishment of an independent investigation committee was decided.¹⁵¹ A report was prepared by the President Kahan of the Israel High Court of Justice and Israel and its military units were regarded as responsible about the massacres. The Kahan Report also wanted some politicians and soldiers primarily Begin and Sharon to resign. Some of them had to resign and were dismissed.¹⁵²

After this report, many critics arose about the Lebanese occupation. Before the occupation, Jews assumed fighting for their own security; however, according to them, Lebanese occupation was not about the security of Israel and it was only due to the politics of Likud. They protested him and organized demonstrations in Tel Aviv against Likud. Consensus between Jews in Israel was damaged by Lebanese war. According to Likud's side, there could be no peace with Arabs as Likud was exerting efforts to maintain its control over the historical territories of Israel and leaving these territories could not be possible; for this reason, there could be no peace. Therefore, they approved the policies that were implemented by Likud in Lebanon.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Peace Now movement was established in 1978 by the members of Israeli Army. For more information about the movement, see "Who We Are," Peace Now, accessed August 15, 2018, <http://peacenow.org.il/en/about-us/who-are-we>

¹⁵¹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 272-273.

¹⁵² Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 274.

¹⁵³ Daniel C. Diller and John Moore, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 41.

As indicated above, Israel's primary objectives in Lebanon were to remove PLO and Syrian soldiers and to constitute a friendly and allied government. After Beshar Gemayel was killed, it was not possible for Amine Gemayel to make this objective of Israel real. Amine had no leadership in Lebanese Front and he faced with the strong opposition of Druze, Shiite and Sunni leaders. Suleiman Frangieh did not recognize the Presidency of him. In other words, most of the Lebanese people and groups were against the power of Amine Gemayel.¹⁵⁴

After the occupation, the difference in opinion between sides continued, problems were deepened and Lebanon was going towards conflicts again. Conflicts occurred in Chouf between Druzes and Lebanese Front and spread to other regions as well in December 1982.¹⁵⁵ Conflicts also emerged between Shiite organization called Amal and Lebanese Army in April 1983. After this conflict, Shiite soldiers left the army and participated in the Amal Organization.¹⁵⁶ Syrian soldiers supported Druze and Shiite militias fighting with Lebanese Front in Mount Lebanon and Bekaa.

Shiites living in south Lebanon started a military resistance against Israel and it was quite important. At the beginning of the occupation, Shiites stayed neutral and did not participate in the conflicts between Israel and PLO. However, as Israel did not tend to put an end to the occupation and the oppression implemented to the Shiites resulted in the military resistance of the Shiites. Shiites considered south Lebanon as their homeland and rejected the existence of Israel there just as Maronites and Druzes. As the government did not tend to protect south Lebanon and used south Lebanon for bargaining with Israel, Shiites turned their face to Asad and developed relations with Syria.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 276.

¹⁵⁵ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 277.

¹⁵⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 316.

¹⁵⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 279-285.

Israel faced hard times and difficulties as the resistance continued. If Israel wanted to continue the occupation, it would come across with a number of options. First, it had to fight with Syrian and Palestinian forces in Bekaa and north of Lebanon. Second, it would keep staying in Lebanon and legalize the occupation and establish a secure zone in south Lebanon.¹⁵⁸ As it was understood that Syria would not withdraw its soldiers, Israel increased its force on Emin Gemayel in order to sign a one-sided agreement. Opposition came against this oppression implemented by Israel on Gemayel. However, Gemayel was acting as if he was the leader of the Maronites not the President of Lebanon. He ignored the requests of other groups. Israel forced Gemayel to sign an agreement and he could not deal with it. He signed an agreement in May 1983 which was against the interests of Lebanese people.¹⁵⁹

According to the agreement, belligerency came to an end between Israel and Lebanon. Both sides agreed on creating secure zones and Israel would withdraw from Lebanon at the same time with Syria in 8 or 10 weeks.¹⁶⁰ The sides would take necessary precautions in order to prevent using the regions against other side's territories. The agreement met with the requests of Israel. Syria did not recognize the agreement and announced that it would not hold any meetings with the Lebanese government and withdraw its soldiers. Opposition groups declared that they were against any agreements with Israel.¹⁶¹

The main concern of the opposition groups was losing their autonomy and the territories that they controlled. After Israel occupied Chouf, the Maronites entered in the Druze region and it resulted in the rapprochement between Jumblatt and

¹⁵⁸ Odeh, *Lübnan'da İç Savaş*, 323.

¹⁵⁹ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 107.

¹⁶⁰ Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 94-98.

¹⁶¹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 311.

Syria. For this reason, the Druzes did not accept Israeli-Lebanese agreement. In addition, the Shiites were concerned about the Israeli occupation to be permanent. After the occupation, all the sides were concerned and not happy.¹⁶² The previous difference in opinions came to the scene and all the groups had different views. Attacks organized by Shiite militias targeted Israeli, American and French soldiers. As the attacks increased, the US withdrew its soldiers. Gemayel had politics of developing good relations with the US from the very beginning. However, the politics failed after the US withdrew its soldiers. Although Gemayel wanted to develop good relations with the US, there was only Israel left.¹⁶³

After the US withdrew, as a result of the force of Syria and other opposition groups in Lebanon, Gemayel announced that he did not recognize Israeli-Lebanon agreement.¹⁶⁴ Amine Gemayel also announced that cooperation between Israel and Lebanon ended. However, Israeli forces kept staying in Lebanon. Israel drew back until Litani River by 1985. Israel's policy of generating secure zone failed with the resistance of Shiites.

3.9. Agreement Between Israel and Lebanon, and Its Repercussions

Lebanon was divided between Israel and Syria and these two countries had the area of influences in the country at the end of 1982. While Syria developed good relations with most of the groups in Lebanon except the Lebanese Front, Israel established good relations only with the Maronites bound to the Lebanese Front and Haddad's forces. The Druzes, Sunnis, and Shiites living in Mount Lebanon and south Lebanon wanted Israel to leave their territories. Although Shiites were pleased that PLO was removed from the region, they were concerned about the fact

¹⁶² Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 99.

¹⁶³ Odeh, *Lübnan'da İç Savaş*, 124.

¹⁶⁴ Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 99.

that Israeli occupation lasted for a long time. The Druzes aimed at protecting Chouf and did not fight with Israel in order to protect it from other groups. Chouf was an important area in between Maronite region and Israel. The Lebanese Front aimed at establishing a strategic corridor in between them by capturing Chouf. Due to this aim, Maronite and Druze relations deteriorated.¹⁶⁵

In December 1982, after assassination against Velid Jumblatt, the Druzes made a counter attack in Chouf. Both groups aimed at capturing the control of Chouf. The Druzes were in advantageous position politically and militarily. Syria advocated Druzes living in Syria to give support to Druzes. The Druzes living in Tel Aviv tried to inhibit Israel to give support to Maronites. As Druzes were few in number, their influence in Lebanese politics would decrease if they lost the control of Chouf. For this reason, Druze leaders fought at any cost in order not to lose Chouf. They had the political and military support of Druzes living in both Syria and Israel.¹⁶⁶

In September 1983, Israel's soldiers withdrew, and Palestinians and Druze militias getting Syria's support attacked against the Lebanese Front. They had the control of about 60 settlements. Many Christians had to leave the city and most of Chouf was taken under their control. Druzes started another attack in order to capture Souk Al Gharb located in Aley region. This city was located in Damascus-Beirut road and Christian populated area.¹⁶⁷ As it was in a strategically important location, the Lebanese Army wanted American help to protect the city. American forces attacked Souk Al-Gharb and around, and inhibited Druzes to capture the city under the name

¹⁶⁵ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 256-259.

¹⁶⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 275-279.

¹⁶⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 279.

of peace mission in September 1983.¹⁶⁸ As the US participated in the civil war in Maronites side, Syria increased its relations with Druze and Shiite groups.

The leader of Shiites Amal Militias Nebih Berri stated that they would fight against Israel if they did not leave the country. They wanted Israel to put an end to the occupation of south Lebanon. When the conflict started between Shiites and the Lebanese army, Shite militias gave support to Druzes and Palestinians and fought with them against Lebanese Front and the Lebanese army.¹⁶⁹

3.10. Towards the End of the Civil War: Taif Agreement

Israeli invasion in 1982 further intensified the conflicts and problems between groups in Lebanon. At the end of 1983, conflicts occurred in Chouf and Aley between Druzes and Christians, and spread to Beirut. In 1984, conflicts emerged between Shiite militias and Palestinians over the control of refugee camps. In addition, street fighting also took place in Tripoli between Sunni groups. At the beginning of 1985 when Israel performed second withdrew, conflicts occurred between Muslim and Christian groups in Saida region. Amine Gemayel intervened in the conflict in Saida and wanted Samir Caca, Lebanese forces commander, to remove its troops from the region. However, it was rejected by Caca and conflicts occurred between them. Although Samir Caca was kicked from Ketaib Party, he could maintain his power in the army and he wanted to develop relations with Israel.

It was not Christian-Muslim civil war anymore, every group in its territory tried to maintain their own dominance over other groups, sects or religion. In this sense,

¹⁶⁸ Ronald F. Baczowski, "Tactical Lesson For Peacekeeping U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984," *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/beirut.htm>, accessed on September 18, 2018.

¹⁶⁹ Chomsky, *Kader Üçgeni*, 424.

many conflicts took place all around the country in these years between different groups.¹⁷⁰ At the end of 1984, Druze forces took the control of Chouf with the help of PLO militias. In return for this, Druzes gave support to PLO in order to return to refugee camps in Beirut. However, conflicts took place between PLO militias and Arafat-opposed groups. While conflicts continued between Palestinians, armed attacks took place between Shiite militias and Palestinian groups. Nebih Berri stated that they would not allow the period in which PLO was active in the state before 1982. Druzes stayed neutral at the beginning of the civil war started in between Shiites and PLO militias. However, Druzes were concerned that Shiite militias would be dominant in Beirut. They started giving support to Palestinians starting from June 1985. The worst collision between these groups happened in November 1985 and 65 people died and more than 400 people were wounded in the streets of West Beirut.¹⁷¹

In 1985, Shiite Christian conflicts took place in Zahle. In Tripoli, conflicts took place between pro-Syrian Alawite Arabs and Sunni Arabs. These conflicts happened from intermittently until 1989. Besides, divisions and conflicts also happened between Lebanese Christian groups. These conflicts took place mainly in between Gemayel supporters and Caca supporters. When Caca agreed with Gemayel disputes aroused in Lebanese Front. Elie Hobeika was elected as the new leader of Lebanese Front. Tensions between these groups turned into collusion in 1985.¹⁷²

What happened in Lebanon towards the end of the civil war was all about chaos and tension. Shiite militias bound to Amal was against both Druzes and Sunnis as well as PLO militants. In addition, Amal-Hezbollah conflict intensified the civil war in

¹⁷⁰ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 315.

¹⁷¹ For detailed discussion, see Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 295-311.

¹⁷² Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi*, 18-19.

south Lebanon and Beirut. The civil war of Muslim groups continued in the years of 1987-1988 and the Maronites also fought in between each other. Conflicts between Israel supported South Lebanon Army forces and insurgents continued at the same time. Syria tried its forces to move away from Israeli borders and it intervened in the Civil War constantly in order to increase its influence in the country. Syria especially supported Shiite forces in this period. Besides, the conflict between pro-Arafat groups and Abu Musa forces did not stop.¹⁷³ The cost of the Civil War was getting bigger for all the sides and they were inclined for possible conciliation.

All the groups were influenced by the permanent conflicts and costs were getting even bigger for them. Therefore, they looked for a possible conciliation. As well as Muslim groups, some Maronite politicians were also inclined to change the political system of Lebanon. However, President Gemayel and Maronites in the leadership of Michel Aoun were against this change in the political system. This efforts and works came to an end after President Gemayel discharged Prime Minister Hoss and assigned Michel Aoun on behalf of him. However, Aoun was a Maronite and Prime Minister was always from Sunni Muslim.¹⁷⁴ This resulted in protests and reactions amongst Muslims. Prime Minister Hoss claimed that discharge was not legal and he established a new government. Gemayel established a new government in the leadership of Aoun. The leader of Lebanese Front Caca stated that they supported Aoun's government. Muslims put aside their problems and gathered against Aoun and waged war against him. Aoun protected his position as he had support from France and Saddam Husein. In addition, Frangieh acted in Sunni and Shiite sides in order to make Syria stop the conflicts in exchange for delegation of authority of Christians to Muslims. Phalangist militias and Chemoun supporters were against the division of Lebanon and two state solutions.

¹⁷³ Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi*, 20.

¹⁷⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 345-352.

As the crisis intensified, the Arab League acted to solve the problem of the effect of Syria. Syria wanted to solve the problem with the help of the Arab League as Syria wanted other Arab countries to recognize the dominance of Syria in Lebanon. In addition, Syria realized the Lebanon problem as the military problem as well as regarding its economic dimensions. In this way, the economic cost of the crisis would be paid by other Arab countries as well. Besides, Syria would gain the support of the US in this way. After the participation of Arab countries, an agreement known as Taif Agreement was signed in between Lebanese Christian and Muslims and 70 members of Parliaments in September 1989 in Saudi Arabia. This agreement conveyed new changes in favor of Muslims.¹⁷⁵ This agreement was ratified in Lebanese Parliament in November 1989.¹⁷⁶ It also included alliance relations between Lebanon and Syria. It was quite clear that Israel's Lebanon policy failed.

According to this conciliation between Muslims and Christians, it was admitted that Lebanon political structure was religiously based and it would be updated based on the equality of Muslims and Christians. In this respect, implementation of 6/5 political power sharing since the Mutasarrafiya period was changed. Although the Maronites would keep Presidency, legislative prerogative was given to Parliament, Prime Minister and Chairperson of Parliament. The sect quota was lifted in the army and civil service and the power of appointment was given to the parliament. The number of parliaments increased from 99 to 128 and Muslims and Christians were represented by the equal number of member of parliaments. Cabinet would be established by considering the different groups of Lebanon. It was emphasized that the duty of army was to protect the security of the country from outside threats. Authorization of appointment of high-level bureaucrats and officers and

¹⁷⁵ Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 37.

¹⁷⁶ For detailed information on Taif Agreement, see "The Taif Agreement," in appendices. https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf.

determining yearly budget and political and economic policies were given to parliament. Parliament elections were held in August 1992 for the first time after 1972. Shiite influence increased in the parliament and Alawites were also represented in the parliament with 2 members of parliaments.

The Taif Agreement envisaged developing good relations between Lebanon and Syria and stopping Israeli occupation. Syria was responsible with the modernization of the Lebanese army. Syria accepted to work with the Lebanese government in order to disarm all the groups in Lebanon except the groups dealing with the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon. Phalangist Maronite militias opposed the agreement. They criticized the fact that there was no withdraw plan of Syrian troops and lifting the authorization of President over army and parliament.¹⁷⁷ Military government Prime Minister General Micheal Aoun did not recognize the agreement and wanted all the foreign powers to leave the country.

While Aoun supporters established their own administration in east Beirut, Syrian soldiers established their own administration in west Beirut. Conflicts continued between the years of 1989 and 1991. Conflicts occurred at the beginning of 1991 between Micheal Aoun and Lebanese Front and it resulted in the weakening of Christians economically and militarily. Aoun was supported by Iraq and Iraqi invasion in Kuwait changed the balances in Lebanon. Syria took the US side and with the support of the US, Syria toppled Aoun's government.¹⁷⁸

Most of the Maronites did not participate in the elections held after the Taif Agreement. For this reason, candidates who were supported by Syria won the elections. Therefore, Rashed Karami's government established in the first election after the Taif Agreement was known as pro-Syrian government. Taif Agreement

¹⁷⁷ Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 36-38.

¹⁷⁸ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime*, 603.

provided an opportunity for Syria to maintain its penetration in Lebanon. The Taif Agreement was not prepared only by the Arab world and Syria.¹⁷⁹ Syria tried to develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and these countries were in good relations with the US. The Cold War ended in these years and the US was the only great power and it was inclined to the problems of the Middle East and developed good relations with Arab countries. After the Taif Agreement, Syria was influential in Lebanon in military and politics. Saudi Arabia was important economically in the country. In 1989, Syria solved the Lebanese problem in its favor.



Figure 5. Lebanon's Map After the Civil War¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 193-202.

¹⁸⁰ Retrieved from,

The Taif Agreement was signed in October 1989 and previous MPs elected Maronite leader Rene Muavrad as the President in November. Muavrad was killed after three weeks. 2 days after his death, Elias Hiravi, who was in good relations with Syria, was elected as the President.¹⁸¹ After this point, Syria's penetration in Lebanon increased gradually. Lebanon and Syria developed special relations after the Taif Agreement.

In conclusion, throughout the Civil War, we see the intervention and influence of Syria and Israel. The policies of these two countries were quite influential and directed the developments in Lebanon. The reason why the Civil War started was due to inequality between Muslim and Christian groups in the country. Christian Maronite president protected the hegemony of Christians and this resulted in the problem and revolt between Muslims. Palestinians were also determinant factor in the start of the civil war as they supported the Muslims in Lebanon.

Muslims wanted to re-share the administrative structure based on the new population. The Maronites strongly opposed it and they wanted to continue their prerogatives in the Lebanese political structure. Conflicts started between the Maronites and the Palestinians and Muslims blamed Israel about the developments. Christians blamed the Palestinians that they participated and intervened in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. Israel in this period started air attacks to Palestinian refugee camps and these attacks were quite brutal, targeting civilians and towns.

In the beginning of the civil war, dominance of the Muslims were undermined by the politics of Syria. Syria in this period did not want Lebanon to be divided in between fighting groups in the civil war. For this reason, Syria took stand against the Muslims and supported the Maronites in the belief that Lebanon could be

https://www-tc.pbs.org/wnet/wp-content/blogs.dir/2/files/2008/08/wa_img_lebanon_hb_map3.gif, accessed 25 October, 2019,

¹⁸¹ Ellis, "The Regional Struggle," 37.

divided if Muslims continue to be dominant and strong against the Christians in the country. Hafez Asad established an alliance with President Frangieh and Syrian existence militarily in Lebanon started. As a result of the Syrian-Maronite cooperation, Muslim side gathered under the Lebanese National Movement became fragmented and divided. Syria critically changed the course of events in the beginning of the civil war. Riyadh Agreement was signed and Syrian soldiers in Lebanon was legitimized legally. Asad could influence the other Arab countries by claiming that Muslim dominance in the civil war could divide the Lebanon, which served the interests of Israel.

In the Civil War, Palestinians supported the Muslims and this resulted in the conflicts between Palestinians and Israel. For this reason, as in the beginning of the Civil War, Syria was acting against the Palestinians, Israel accepted the existence of Syria in Lebanon. In 1976, Israel and Syria agreed on the Red Line Agreement. Israel accepted the existence of Syria in Lebanon and Litani River was determined as the border between these two regional countries. However, when the Civil War was coming to an end after the Syrian intervention, Israel and the Maronites started talks and both sides wanted to finish the existence of Syria in the country. For this reason, as Syria did not want to leave the country, tensions escalated. Chamoun and Gemayel asked for help from Israel against the expansionist policies of Syria in Lebanon. Israel gave support to the Maronites to end the Syrian existence. However, as it did not work, Israel occupied Lebanon and the Civil War became more detrimental and lasted. As it is seen, competition between these two regional powers are seen obviously and due to their politics and aims on Lebanon, the Civil War continued.

Israel claimed that it occupied Lebanon due to the Palestinian threat to create a safe zone in its northern borders. Besides, Israel gave support to the Maronites. Israeli occupation ended after the UN action, 425 resolution and Israel started withdrawing its soldiers from Lebanon. Although during the Civil War, Israel and Syria were influential, at this point, we also see the influence of the UN.

Jimmy Carter, who was the President of the USA in this period also criticized the occupation of Israel. However, Israeli occupation further resulted in the continuation of the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon. There were also difference in opinions between prominent Maronite families. For example, Gemayel was more dominant and developing good relations with Israel, thus supported Israel. With the support of Israel, he declared a manifesto which resulted in the start of conflict between Muslim and Christian groups. Due to Israeli support, the Maronites could impose their wishes and desires and it resulted in the conflict in the country.

It should be also emphasized that there was also conflicts between Muslims. PLO was supported by the Sunnis in Lebanon and Syria was disturbed by it. Syria was developing its relations with the Shiites in this period and strengthening Sunnis in Lebanon could be a threat to its existence and dominance in Lebanon. Some Sunni groups supported the Syria oppose groups. It is clear that there were disputes and conflicts between Muslims and Christians as well as within these groups. Muslims and Christians were fighting in themselves as well. Conflicts spread all over Lebanon in 1980s and the Civil War was quite catastrophic.

When the Begin government was established in 1982, Ariel Sharon was assigned as the Ministry of National Defence. These statesmen also influence the politics of Israel. They thought that when the Maronites were more powerful in Lebanon, the power of Arafat and influence of Syria could be limited. Israel used the Maronites as a card against its enemies namely Syria and the Palestinians. In this period, Israel's policies were more inclined for the occupation again. As assassination attempt was performed targeting the Israeli ambassador, Israel alleged it and put its forces to the border and started air attacks in Lebanon. After securing its borders, Israel turned to the areas which were under the control of Syria and wanted to control them. It shows the competition between Israel and Syria to be more dominant in Lebanon. Habib Plan was signed and Palestinians wanted to be sent to

other countries. However, Syria's dominance did not come to an end and Israel could not reach its aims in Lebanon although many Palestinians left the country.

Gamayel was elected as the president of Lebanon mainly with the support of Israel. Due to the fact that Palestinians were regarded responsible with the assassination of Gamayel, Israel and Phalangist soldiers attacked Palestinian refugee camps. Israel's support was clear to the Maronites and it changed the dynamics in the Civil War. Some Jews in Israel opposed the occupation. The Likud government in Israel was blamed and it was stated by the opposition group that Israel did not look for its own interest but only performed the politics of Likud government.

After Israeli occupation in 1982, conflicts in Lebanon became more complicated and chaotic. Shiites were disturbed about the occupation of Israel and they cooperated with Syria. The US did not support the Gamayel's government and Gamayel only had Israel left to get support from. For this reason, the power and dominance of Syria increased in this period. With the actions and politics of Shiites in Lebanon and their cooperation with Syria, Israel's policy in Lebanon failed and after this point, the Syrian influence were more explicit in the country.

Most of the parties in Lebanon wanted Israel to leave Lebanon, Syria became more influential and dominant especially after 1983. Israel's soldiers had to withdraw from the country for this reason. Druzes increased its power in domestic politics and tried to take the control of the city of Souk al-Gharb as it was a critical point in the Damascus-Beirut road. Lebanese Army had to ask for help from the USA. The USA forces inhibited the Druze capture in Souk al-Gharb. As there was the US and the Maronite cooperation in this period, Syria cooperated with Druze and Shiite groups.

It should be also emphasized that Israeli intervention caused conflicts in the cities of Chouf and Alley and conflicts spread to other parts of Lebanon. In 1984, conflict occurred between Shiites and Palestinians. Especially after Israeli withdraw started,

conflicts between Muslim and Christian groups increased as they fought to take the control of the regions that the Israeli soldiers withdrew. Conflicts even occurred inside these groups and they wanted to maintain their power in their regions.

All the groups were harmed by the Civil War and they were inclined for a cooperation. When Gamayel assigned Michel Aoun as the prime minister, problems occurred as he was not Sunni Muslim. Muslims gathered and came against the Aoun's government. Syria wanted to solve the problems with the participation of the Arab League as it wanted its existence to be legitimized. Taif Agreement was signed after Syria's effort and the participation of the Arab countries.

The political structure of Lebanon changed and the system became more equal between Muslims and Christians. Sec quota in the army and civil service was removed and Shiite influence increased in the parliament. The Taif Agreement decreased the influence of Israel and Syrian Lebanese relations were developed. Syria became an important actor in Lebanon and pro-Syrian government was established in the leadership of Rashed Karami in 1991. It should be also stated that in these years the Cold War ended and the US wanted to develop good relations with the Arab countries. This was also a factor in the end of the Civil War and Syrian effort brought the Civil War to the end.

CHAPTER 4

SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY ON LEBANON

As it is clear from the previous chapter, developments in Lebanon cannot be separated from the neighbor countries, Syria and Israel. In this chapter, why Lebanon was important for these countries is analyzed and their strategies and reasons of decisions are explained. These countries were the main actors throughout the Civil War as mentioned earlier. It is crucial to look at their foreign policy strategy to understand their penetration to Lebanon in regard to their regional objectives. Starting from the very beginning of the Civil War, Lebanon was influenced by these countries. Especially after 1977, the country was affected by these countries aiming at increasing their influence for their interests through their allies in the country.¹⁸² In this chapter, domestic politics of these countries and how their interventions were reflected are also explained.

The Civil War and foreign interventions are analyzed in three phases depending on the crucial developments that took place during the events. First phase of the Civil War covered the years 1975 and 1976. The second phase, in which Israel was influential and ended with the developments after the intervention of Israel covers the years from 1977 to 1984. The last period of the Civil War starts with the year 1984 and 1990, in which Syria was quite influential and Israel lost its effect in Lebanon.

Our main question in this thesis is that why Lebanase Civil War took for long period of time? As an answer to this question, we regarded the regional

¹⁸² Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 212-214.

developments and analyzed the influence of the foreign powers in the duration of the Civil War. We, now, try to analyze the foreign policy of Israel and Syria in Lebanon. Considering this aim, we ask some questions in analyzing their foreign policies and interferences in Lebanon. The questions are; why did Syria and Israel intervened in Lebanon? What were their aims and interests in Lebanon that they closely followed the developments and intervened in Lebanon? How did they establish alliances in the country to reach their aims? To what extent their policies affected the course of events in the Lebanese Civil War? Did their alliances affect the length of the Civil War and how? How their domestic politics affected the action of governments and they implemented their policies based on domestic developments in Lebanon? These questions are important and this chapter aims to answer these questions. This way, to what extent the policies, alliances and strategies of these countries really affected the duration of the civil war and course of events might be understood.

4.1. First Phase of the Civil War (1975-1976)

In the beginning of the Civil War, Syria always followed the developments in Lebanon closely and Asad's regime focused on two main objectives in Lebanon. First, it wanted Lebanon to be united. Second, it wanted Palestinians to be organized and strong to be a possible threat in the southern part of Lebanon against Israel.¹⁸³ Syria followed a practical strategy during the Civil War, it was not ideological or religious. When it was needed, Asad could easily shift alliances for the sake of Syria's interests. In the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, Syria tried different strategies and methods. It initially intervened diplomatically, then it supported some groups in Lebanon. As a last resort, it intervened directly with its

¹⁸³ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 70-72.

soldiers.¹⁸⁴ In this period, Arab League's agreement gave legitimacy to Syrian intervention in Lebanon.

In the first years of the Civil War, Israel was not effective as much as Syria. When Syrian intervention took place, Rabin's government also thought of intervening in Lebanon and risk a conflict with Syria. However, Israel had developed good relations with Egypt at that time and it did not want it to be deteriorated due to the developments in Lebanon. For this reason, Israel accepted the Syria's interference conditionally. However, Syria's dominance and increase of PLO's strength interrupted Israel and it started following policies to increase its influence in the country.¹⁸⁵ At the end of this period, Syria increased its position and Israel became vulnerable in the Lebanese politics.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were two sides in general terms, the revisionist Muslim bloc and status quo Christian bloc. When Asad implemented policy of mediation, comparatibly stability was achieved for a short period of time and ceasefires was achieved between the fighting sides.¹⁸⁶ Syria supported its allies militarily in this period. A Palestinian group supported by Syria crossed the border from Syria to maintain the order in Tripoli, which was in the north of Lebanon.¹⁸⁷ Initially, Asad's government supported the revisionist bloc in Lebanon and gave support to them.¹⁸⁸ However, as the LNM gained strength and the unity of Lebanon

¹⁸⁴ Latif Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 65.

¹⁸⁵ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 213.

¹⁸⁶ Margaret G. Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," in *Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East*, ed. Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: Praeger, 1988), 84-85.

¹⁸⁷ Naomi Joy Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-976 Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 158-159.

¹⁸⁸ Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," 85.

was in danger, Syria started fighting against them as a possible division of Lebanon was against the interests of Syria.¹⁸⁹ Syria negotiated the intervention before it performed it with Israel and the US and convinced them that the intervention was on behalf of Lebanese government.¹⁹⁰ President Frangieh asked Syria to intervene on behalf of Lebanese army.¹⁹¹ With the admission of Arab League, Syria became a legitimate force in Lebanon.

Israel also wanted to increase its existence in this period as Syria was becoming dominant in Lebanon. Before the Civil War, Israel violated Lebanese soil two times due to the presence of PLO.¹⁹² In the first year of the Civil War, the number of these violations significantly increased.¹⁹³ Israel tried to develop good relations with the Maronites especially in the south.¹⁹⁴ It followed a policy called “Good Fence” policy and developed close relations with the Christian villages. This way, they could easily pass the border for commercial purposes.¹⁹⁵ Israel started providing guns to the Maronites in this period although it accepted the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. During this period, both Syria and Israel supported the Maronites in Lebanon.

¹⁸⁹ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 196.

¹⁹⁰ Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 85-87.

¹⁹¹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 195-197.

¹⁹² Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 59-61.

¹⁹³ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 60-61.

¹⁹⁴ Benni Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2011* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 499-502.

¹⁹⁵ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 345.

4.1.1. Syria's Policy, Interests, Objectives and Allies in Lebanon

Lebanon is a crucial country for Syria and it plays a major role in its foreign policy with the aim of regional predominance. Syria regarded Lebanon as its own territory historically and always wanted to keep control over Lebanon. It is clear that Syria had interests in this country and wanted to secure its interests there. Syria does not only consider its relations with Lebanon strategically and analyzing this relationship from strategic point of view would be misleading. In between these countries, there are historical, social, cultural and economic ties and they are quite strong. Therefore, Syria actively involved in the Lebanese Civil War. This involvement sometimes brought advantages and sometimes disadvantages. Syria's policy is also shaped by the regional developments and has an effect on the region as well. For example, Syria's main foreign policy was to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel until the Civil War.

After Hafiz Asad came to power in 1970, Syria could maintain internal stability as the regime subordinated and delimited the activities of non-governmental actors. Syria changed its policy to acquire hegemony in the region as the isolation lifted. Therefore, foreign policy strategy of Syria changed in this period. Syria started to maintain an active foreign policy in the region as it became a regional middle power. Asad made Syria an important regional actor in the Middle East due to the regime he established. Asad tried to maintain the security and strength of his regime and he tried to legitimize his authority.

When Asad took power, one of the main problems that he faced was to change the negative attitude towards Alewites. He made a mistake that in the 1973 constitution he did not take Islam as a reference point. As a result of this, many Syrian people reacted against Asad. He brought the rule that the head of State of Syria had to be Muslim aiming to appease the reactions. After that, he also issued fatwa (Islamic religious law) from Shiite leader Musa Sadr in Lebanon and he tried to convince

people that Alewites are in fact Shiite Muslims.¹⁹⁶ He also sent religious messages and paid attention to the Islamic elements in his speeches. He was quite pragmatic in his policies and he aimed at maintaining the unity of his country. Maintaining his regime in Syria, he took help from Lebanese Shiite leader Musa al-Sadr to demonstrate his regime's Islamic side. It can be claimed that there was a close relationship between Asad and the Shiites in Lebanon and it was also influential in the intervention of Syria to the Lebanese Civil War.

According to Eyal Zisser, when the history of Syria and Asad regime as well as Baath Party in Syria is regarded, it is a fact that pan-Arabism as an ideology were more dominant than pan-Syrianism.¹⁹⁷ They believe that comprehensive Arab unity is necessary and this can be supplied with the leadership of Syria. First step towards this goal is the Syrian dominance in the neighbor countries namely Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. Following Baath ideology helped Asad maintain his regime by getting the support of Muslims as well as other groups in the Syrian society. Ideology was seen as an important factor that ties different groups in the country together. Asad was using the developments in these countries to take attention to them and this way he was making busy the public opinion and foreign statesmen as to strengthen his own authority in Syria. He tried to change the negative perception of the people to his own authority.

Maintaining the security of the regime and stability in the country, Syria could be freer in its foreign policy. After stabilizing the regime and maintaining authority, there was no strong opposition voice in the country so that Asad's foreign policy was stronger and more confident. He was quite a smart and pragmatic person and his characteristics were reflected in Syrian foreign policy during this period. Syria generated an alliance with Egypt until 1979 to be stronger against Israel. At the

¹⁹⁶ Eyal Zisser, *Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 10.

¹⁹⁷ Zisser, *Commanding Syria*, 7.

same time, both of these countries were aiming to be the leader of the Arab world. Therefore, they were also competing with each other as well as their cooperation. When Egypt signed an agreement in 1979 with Israel, Syria became alone against Israel. In 1980s, Syria allied itself with Soviets and took arm aids from them.

Domestic politics and developments were quite influential in shaping the foreign policy. Asad tried to legitimize his authority and he tried to make Damascus as a leading capital in the Middle East politics. In Syrian politics, Arab-Israeli conflict and its relations with super powers were influential. Asad believed that negotiating with Israel was unnecessary and he tried to inhibit the Arab countries that were trying to sign an agreement with Israel. He supported a comprehensive peace that all the Arab countries included in. He tried to maintain “strategic equality” with Israel.¹⁹⁸ He wanted to develop Syria in technology, politics, and education fields as well as military. He was suspicious about the relations between PLO and Israel and he advocated the radical side of the PLO rather than moderates. This way, he tried to control PLO. However, after 1973 Arab-Israeli war, he started developing relations with Israel and left his previous firm attitude.

Asad was interested in the Palestinian issue to legitimize his own power. However, he did never passionately support the Palestinians as it could harm interests of Syria. According to him, territory losses in 1948 and 1967 were due to the radical Arab nationalist leaders of Syria in that period.¹⁹⁹ His foreign policy was shaped depending on Israel. He wanted to maintain power balance in the region against Israel. Main goal was to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel. Besides, his support for Palestinians resulted in the support of the Arab world for Asad. The main gain of his foreign policy was to be dominant actor in Lebanon against Israel.

¹⁹⁸ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 68.

¹⁹⁹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 57-58.

He used the emphasizing the Arab nationalism, struggle against Israel and defending the rights of Palestinians as its fight against Israel in the region.

The civil war occurred in Lebanon was an opportunity for Syria to be more influential in the region and country. In this respect, it bestows a clear vision that after 1970, deep involvement of Syria started especially as a result of the outbreak of the Civil War of 1975-1990. In other words, the Civil War generated a ground for Syria to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs. In this period, Lebanon became backyard of Syria.²⁰⁰ Syria perceived the Lebanese Civil War as a threat to its national security as the unity of Lebanon was in danger, and its foreign policy was determined accordingly.²⁰¹ In addition, Syrian politicians were concerned about the possible intervention of Israel after the outbreak of the Civil War. In order to prevent this possibility, they established an alliance with Christians, Maronites against a possible strong victory of Muslim groups and PLO as this could lead to Israeli intervention to Lebanon.²⁰²

Besides, it can be stated that the reason of Syrian intervention can be analyzed in terms of sectarian point of view. Syria's Alawite regime was concerned about the rise of Sunni power in Lebanon and its possible influence and repercussions over Syria's Sunni population. This could eventually result in the domestic rebellion against Syria's Baath regime.²⁰³ Syrian leaders wished to maintain the unity of Lebanon and the Lebanese Christian leaders in the first period of the civil war were generally tended to align themselves with the Syrian regimes.

²⁰⁰ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 70-73.

²⁰¹ Osoegawa, *Syria and Lebanon*, 2.

²⁰² Osoegawa, *Syria and Lebanon*, 3.

²⁰³ Osoegawa, *Syria and Lebanon*, 3.

Especially after the 1967 War, Israel was the main enemy and threat for Syria. Syria generated its foreign policy in the region considering this threat. After the state of Israel was established in 1948, demography of the region changed as more than a million Palestinians migrated to the regional countries. After Jordan cleaned its soil from Palestinian refugees, Israeli-Syrian conflict moved to Lebanon. The refugees started to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon. For this reason, in 1976, Syria intervened in the domestic politics of Lebanon through the Arab Deterrent Forces to appease the conflicts.²⁰⁴ With perpetual conflict between groups and turmoil between Syria and Israel, Lebanon became a ground of direct Israeli-Syrian military confrontation.

Syria in this period considered Lebanon as strategically important for its interests in the region. It aimed at controlling the Bekaa Valley to decrease the possibility of an attack from Israel in the West. Besides, Damascus used its control over Lebanon as a deterrence factor to maintain its power and position in the region. In peace talks, it was collaborating with Lebanon and through Hezbollah, it developed good relations with Iran. Besides, Syria regarded Lebanese economy as supplementary instead of opponent. Lebanon's labor force was provided by Syrian people.²⁰⁵

Syria intervened in Lebanon in the beginning of the civil war with the aim of maintaining the unity of the Lebanon and wanted to generate force over the PLO by advocating the existing government. Syria was already generating a policy against Israel and its policy in Lebanon became a part of this policy which focused on undermining the strength of Israel in the region. After 1973 Arab-Israeli war, due to rapprochement between Egypt and Israel, Syria lost its strategic ally. For this reason, in order to balance this situation which was against the interests of Syria,

²⁰⁴ Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon 1970-1983* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 56.

²⁰⁵ Rabinovich, *The War*, 114.

Asad wanted to make Syria powerful and strong militarily in the region.²⁰⁶ Israel's negotiations with Egypt favored the Palestinians and Egypt against Syrian interests. Besides, Asad also focused on re-taking the Golan Heights through negotiation.²⁰⁷ Asad thought that controlling Lebanon and being dominant over the PLO's campaign against Israel, he could maintain balance in the bilateral negotiations over issues that were important in the region with Israel.²⁰⁸

As well as maintaining the strategic balance against Israel, which was Syria's main foreign policy objective in this period, Syria's intervention also minimized the threat of dividing the unity of Syrian society which had different religious and ethnic group in itself similar to Lebanese society.²⁰⁹ Asad government was a minority Alewite and the Asad rule was dependent on only Asad's clan not on wide Alewite population. For this reason, possible threat could come from Alewites as well as other religious groups.²¹⁰ Moreover, Syrian intervention also gave economic incentive to Syria as there were hundred of thousands of Syrian workers in Lebanon and instability in the country put their work at risk. Thanks to the intervention, Syria could access to Lebanese market and capital.²¹¹ Although the military intervention brought great cost to Syria, it became clear that the intervention was worth economically.²¹² Considering its costs, advantages and disadvantages, Asad's

²⁰⁶ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 60-64.

²⁰⁷ Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," 79-81.

²⁰⁸ Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," 81.

²⁰⁹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 234-237.

²¹⁰ Nikolas Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 70.

²¹¹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 235-236.

²¹² Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 236.

government chose the intervention option as it was better serving Syrian interests both economically and politically especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Asad was committed to Syria's political allies in the Lebanon at the beginning of the events. Although he advocated President Frangieh, he also wanted him to accept the early elections. He supported him against LNM militias which was against his presidency in this period.²¹³ On May 1976, Elias Sarkis won the election for the presidency against Raymond Edde, who was supported by the LNM.²¹⁴ Sarkis met with the LF's leaders and tried to persuade them about Syrian intervention.²¹⁵ Prime Minister Karami was also under the influence of Syria in this period and this also helped Syria legitimize its intervention.²¹⁶ As it is seen, Syria maintained political influence over the Lebanese statesmen and this way it also increased its influence over the security forces in the country.

Asad relied on Palestinians initially to conduct military intervention. A group called Saiqa was trained and armed by Syria.²¹⁷ There was also Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), which was controlled by Asad. PLA was performing activities taking orders from Asad in this period.²¹⁸ Although Palestinians were under the control of PLO and its leader Yaser Arafat, PLA was bound to Syria.²¹⁹ However, this created

²¹³ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 195.

²¹⁴ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 201.

²¹⁵ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 230.

²¹⁶ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 202.

²¹⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 10.

²¹⁸ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 202.

²¹⁹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 206.

problems and Saiqa was expelled from PLO as it was fighting against Palestinians.²²⁰ For this reason, there were divisions between the Palestinians.

When Syrian intervention took place tangibly, Asad was willing to ally with any group, Christian or Muslim that he could protect the interests of Syria. Syria's intervention against the LNM made Lebanese Arab Army and the PLO take side with them. However, Asad could undermine this developing relationship.²²¹ Amal took Syria's side from the very beginning and performed actions against the LNM.²²² Besides, most of the Christians in Lebanon accepted the intervention of Syria.²²³ Asad allied Syria with this group or tried to passivate them in this period.

Syria procured political, logistical as well as military indorsement to its allies. Asad advocated the Lebanese politicians who were in line with the Syria's policies. He tried to inhibit the dominance of any of the sects in case it could threaten the interests of Syria in Lebanon.²²⁴ He made sure that the policitians which allied themselves with Syria stay in power. In the beginning of 1976, Rashed Karami gave up from the idea of resigning with the Asad's efforts.²²⁵ President Sarkis was elected as a president after Frangieh and he accepted the Syria's intervention based on the terms of the Riyad Peace Agreement signed in October 1976.²²⁶

²²⁰ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 216-217.

²²¹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 212.

²²² Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 190.

²²³ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 228-230.

²²⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 42.

²²⁵ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 44.

²²⁶ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 59.

Political support provided by the Syria's government also aimed at legitimizing its actions and policies in Lebanon. In the mid of 1975, Asad prepared the Damascus Agreement with Prime Minister Karami and Arafat. According to this agreement, Karami let PLO control the regions where Muslims lived around Beirut. This way, PLO's actions were also legitimized through Syria's policy.²²⁷ Cairo Agreement also strengthened the legitimacy of the PLO in Lebanon. This way, they easily performed their actions for the liberation of Palestine and continued their actions in the southern part of Lebanon. As the Lebanese government accepted the use of force of PLA and Saiqa, they were also legitimized officially in this period.²²⁸ As it is seen, existence of Syria in Lebanon and its allies were legitimized with the acceptance of Lebanese government.

In addition to political support, Syria also provided safe haven for PLO related Palestinian groups in its territory to freely continue its actions and preparations. Besides, Syria trained and armed these groups.²²⁹ After the PLO officials signed the agreement in 1976, Asad opened the route to give help for the PLO forces through Syria.²³⁰ In the beginning of the Syria's intervention, PLO and LNM defend themselves with the antitank missiles taken from Syria.²³¹ During the intervention, Syria avoided possible rise of tensions with the Lebanese government officials. Asad advocated its allies and the government during the intervention.

²²⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 59.

²²⁸ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 163-164.

²²⁹ Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 72-75.

²³⁰ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 59.

²³¹ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 213.

As it is seen, towards the end of 1976, Syria maintained control over Lebanon politically, economically as well as militarily thanks to the Riyadh Agreement signed in October 1976. This agreement could be signed as the Syria supported the existing regime in Lebanon. Asad's policy in Lebanon was influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this reason, despite its costs, Asad could convince notables and the society of Syria about the intervention. In this period, Syria initially used mediation, then intervened through its allies. However, as tensions escalated, Syria had to directly intervene in Lebanon militarily to put an end to the conflicts. Syria wanted to protect the existing regime rather than change it. As Syria initially tried mediation and indirect intervention, it could legitimize its intervention easily in the mid of 1976 and was accepted from both the Lebanese government and Arab League. Asad's strategy was quite realist.

In this period, it followed the principal that state had neither eternal allies nor perpetual enemies.²³² Asad was shifting his policy and advocating different groups based on Syria's interests. Asad changed his allies in the beginning of the civil war between Muslims and Christians as well as Palestinians groups. These policies helped Syria protect its interests in Lebanon and in the region. However, Syria had problems domestically due to its intervention in Lebanon. A terror campaign was held against Asad by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. They used the Lebanese intervention as a cause to take action immediately against him.²³³ At the end of 1976, Syrian supported politicians were in power in Lebanon and stability could be maintained. The stability could be maintained especially after the Syrian intervention and the LNM lost power significantly in Lebanon.

In the beginning of the Civil War, as it was explained above, Syria was more effective in Lebanon. Syria initially developed its political relations with the

²³² Augustus Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 33-35.

²³³ Van Dam, *The Struggle*, 72.

Maronites in Lebanon in order to be dominant in the country. Syria could be more influential compared to Israel in this period. Until the intervention took place, Asad followed a strategy of supporting its allies indirectly. Syria tried to be far from the events corporally as much as possible. Israel was more active in the southern Lebanon compared to other parts due to its priority. It was the north of Israel and Israeli government gave special importance to this region as possible threat could be directed against Israel. Even in the years before the Civil War took place, Israel performed a number of attacks in the south of Lebanon against the Palestinians due to security concerns.²³⁴ Israel gave support to the militias of Army of Free Lebanon and it became strong and influential after the Israeli support in Lebanon.²³⁵

Syria could develop good relations and establish alliances with many different groups in Lebanon and it owed its success in this period to this strategy and ability. Syria's policy was quite realist, and flexible, it was not ideological. Syria shifted alliances when it was necessary for its interests. It could develop good relations with the government, Christians, Muslims as well as Palestinians. Israel was not as successful compared to Syria in this period. After the Riyadh Agreement, developing better relations with Syria, PLO was stronger and more effective in Lebanon. Israel's influence was quite limited as the Rabin's government allowed the Syrian presence in the country. The dominance of Syria in the beginning of the Civil War was dissatisfied by Israel and it tried to increase its influence over Lebanon in the later periods.

4.1.2. Israel's Strategy and Politics in Lebanon

Israel was concerned about the developments in Lebanon as Palestinians gained more power and became influential as well as rise of Syrian influence in Lebanon.

²³⁴ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 61.

²³⁵ Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 105-106.

Israel perceived south Lebanon strategic and crucial for its national security. It did not want Palestinian organization near its borders, which breeds Palestinian militias. For these reasons, Israeli officials considered the Civil War as an opportunity to weaken the power of Palestinian resistance and activities as well as securing its borders.

Lebanon was strategically important for Israel historically and it was stated by David Ben Gurion in May, 1948, when the state of Israel was established.

*...we should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria... The weak point of the Arab coalition is Lebanon [for] the Moslem regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be established, with its southern border on the Litani river. We will make an alliance with it.*²³⁶

In addition, Ariel Sharon in December, 1981 expressed that

*We have to establish a buffer zone in Lebanon as it is clear that the Lebanese government will do nothing to stop terrorism. The establishment of such a zone will obviously mean the annexation of part of Lebanese territory.*²³⁷

We understand from these statements that Lebanon was strategically important for Israel since the very beginning and they considered the Christians there as their natural allies. For that reason, especially when the PLO became influential in

²³⁶ David Ben-Gurion to his General Staff, quoted in Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle- The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (London: Pluto Press, 1983), 162-163.

²³⁷ Micheal Jansen, *The Battle for Beirut- Why Israel invaded Lebanon* (London: Zed Press 1982), 120-121.

Lebanon, they allied themselves with the Maronites during the Civil War in order to protect their own interests.

Conflicts started between Israelis and Palestinians in the soil of Lebanon. The reason of the conflict was essentially the agreements signed between Lebanese government and the Palestinians in the years of 1967 and 1973 with the mediation of the Arab countries. Israel also wanted to control Syrian effect in the country and prevented it to spread towards south. It created a “Red Line” at a point in the middle of Sidon and Tyre near Syrian border.²³⁸

In the beginning of the Civil War, Israel increased its existence militarily and politically in Lebanon and gave support to Lebanese forces as well as Saad Haddad’s militias in order to protect the Christian regions in the south against Palestinian militias. Israel also provided training service for Maronite militias in Israel for the struggle against Palestinians. In order to maintain its position in the south, Israel implemented Good Fence policy in 1976 allowing Lebanese to go to Israel and get medical treatment as well as shopping.²³⁹

As well as Christians, Israel wanted to lift the rights given to the Palestinians and deport them from Lebanon. Israel started to give aid to the Christians in Lebanon when the Civil War started. As Christians was not active and could not maintain its superiority over Palestinians in the beginning of the Civil War, Israel started to advocate them and train them militarily. However, Israel started to implement rigid policies due to the fact that Christians were losing the Civil War. In early 1976, Israel started attacking some towns and Palestinian refugee camps and threatened Lebanon to perform military intervention. Israel’s goal was to strengthen Christians

²³⁸ Kail C. Ellis, *Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2002), 33.

²³⁹ Ellis, *Lebanon’s Second Republic*, 33.

against PLO-Muslim cooperation. In addition, Israel wanted to demonstrate to other actors that Lebanese crisis would not be solved without Israel.²⁴⁰

When Israel occupied Lebanon in its fight against Palestinians in March 1978, it resulted in the fear that Israel would be permanent in the region. After the effort of UN Security Council, Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanon in June 1979 and left the region to the militias bound to Saad Haddad. Israel occupied the region claiming its security. According to these agreements, Palestinians were allowed to sustain their activities outside the refugee camps. In addition, they were allowed to south Lebanon, which was the border line of Israel and they had right to own guns in order to protect themselves from the Israel's attacks.

Although Israel wanted to increase its cooperation with Christians in this period, some Christians were concerned about the Israeli policies. These groups were against the division of the country and they perceived that Israel was in cooperation with some Maronites to divide the country. Syrian support for Christians in the beginning of the Civil War undermined the Israel's objectives and presence in Lebanon. Syria maintained its policy in favor of the Maronites and wanted them to be active in Lebanese politics. As mentioned in the previous part, Syria cooperated with Maronites against Palestinians and started combat against Palestinians. For this reason, Israel had to admit the presence of Syria in Lebanon. Israel wanted Syrian troops to keep away from Israeli border and not to place missiles. Israel was convinced about the Syrian intervention to some degree. They regarded the Red Line, which covered the regions until Litani border.²⁴¹

When Syrian intervention took place in the beginning of the Civil War, Israel had three options that it could choose. First, it could also intervene in Lebanon and take

²⁴⁰ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 70.

²⁴¹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 147.

a risk of waging war with Syria. Second, let Syria to be the dominant power in Lebanon without any condition and third, admit Syrian intervention by putting some conditions.²⁴² Israel went for the last option and connected with Syrian officials through third parties. After the conflict ended in 1976, as Syria was dominant, Israel was not satisfied about the case and its weak position in Lebanon. For this reason, competition between these regional powers started to be more influential in Lebanon.²⁴³

As a result of the elections in May 1977, Begin came to power in Israel and it brought Israeli-Maronite relations that had started to some extent in the previous period of Begin to higher level. In the south of Lebanon, which was strategically important for Israel, a proxy militia was supported under the command of Haddad. They aimed at conducting attacks against PLO.

When Syria started attacking Palestinians, Israel stopped attacking Lebanon. After Syria maintained supremacy over Palestinians, Israel regarded this development as an opportunity to maintain hegemony in the south Lebanon and occupied some villages in the region. Israel was concerned about the greater presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon and stated that it would not tolerate such presence. In addition, south Lebanon was crucial for Israel and it wanted to control this region. Considering this concern, Syria gave guarantee that operations would be limited to other regions and away from south Lebanon.²⁴⁴

When Syria intervened in Lebanon in June 1976, Rabin government in Israel followed a policy that could possibly protect the already existing Lebanese political system. There was difference in opinions within the Rabin government. While one

²⁴² Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 343.

²⁴³ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 212.

²⁴⁴ Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı*, 74.

side endorsed intervention, the other side opposed it. For example, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was in the side that supported the intervention. He supported direct intervention to possibly establish two state in Lebanon, one Christian and the other one Druze.²⁴⁵ However, Prime Minister Rabin opposed this idea of intervening and he wanted to protect the status quo in order to challenge rise of PLO's power in Lebanon.²⁴⁶ When the Syrian intervention took place in June 1976, Prime Minister Rabin followed his policy of reinforcing the existing system in Lebanon. However, he also communicated with Syrian policymakers through third parties.²⁴⁷ In this period, surprisingly their policies were in line with Syria as both of these countries wanted to protect the status quo in Lebanon. Syria also intervened in Lebanese domestics affairs to protect the government in the country.²⁴⁸

Rabin's policy toward Lebanon was advantegous for Israel due to a number of reasons. A policy against Syria could escalate tensions between these countries and therefore result in another Arab-Israeli war as it would directly bring Israel against with Syria in Lebanon.²⁴⁹ Also, Syria was following a policy against PLO, which was Israel's enemy, in this period. Moreover, Rabin's policy was also in line with the USA in this period. The USA welcomed the stability of Syria starting from the 1970s and Israel's policy, which was overlapping with the Syria was welcomed by the USA.²⁵⁰ However, towards the end of 1976, Israel realized that this policy

²⁴⁵ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 343.

²⁴⁶ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 343.

²⁴⁷ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 344.

²⁴⁸ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 498-500.

²⁴⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 343-344.

²⁵⁰ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 344.

resulted in the consolidation of power of Syria as well as PLO. This development put the Israel's position at risk against its enemies in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In this first period of the Civil War in Lebanon, Israel mainly cooperated with the Maronite leaders and their militias in Lebanon. Israeli and the Maronite officials gathered in the beginning of the Civil War.²⁵¹ After a number of meetings, Israeli officials decided to give support to Pierre Gamayel and his militias. These militias were bound to his son Bashir Gamayel.²⁵² Israeli officials later decided to advocate Gamayal and his militias took part after a period of time especially when Gamayal demonstrated that they fought against Palestinians. After this point, Israel started to send weapons to the Maronites through Jounieh port to Beirut.²⁵³ In 1976, Israel also implemented a policy called Good Fence in the southern border close to Christian regions in the aim of helping them control trade and receive medical care.²⁵⁴ This way, Israel maintained the development of an ally to cooperate with in the south under the Lebanese army.²⁵⁵ Thanks to this policy, Christian militias also could easily go to the southern part of Lebanon from Lebanon.²⁵⁶ At the end of the year of 1976, Rabin government had two main allies in Lebanon, namely; Christian militias called Phalange based in Beirut and other small group of independent Christian militias acting on its own in the southern border.

²⁵¹ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 503.

²⁵² Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 503.

²⁵³ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford / St. Martin's, 2012), 349-351.

²⁵⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 65.

²⁵⁵ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 202.

²⁵⁶ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab*, 349.

What Israel mainly provided to its allies was giving logistical support and indursing them militarily. Pierre Gamayal stated in one of the meetings that he was not happy about asking help and support from Israel.²⁵⁷ Rabin's government provided political support in this period to the Christians and its allies became more powerful in the country. Israel also communicated indirectly with the Asad's government and guaranteed that Syria's intervention to Lebanon aimed at protecting the Christians in Lebanon.²⁵⁸

Israel openly provided support to the Christians in this period especially in the southern part as it regarded this region strategically important. They gave special importance to arming the Christian militias and started providing missiles and obsolete tanks.²⁵⁹ Israel invested in the strengthening the Maronite militias about \$ 150 million in the first years of the civil war.²⁶⁰ Israel's Good Fence Policy ensured many opportunities to the Maronites residing in the south of Lebanon.²⁶¹ In some villages near Israeli border, the electricity and water supply of the Christians villages were even provided by Israel.²⁶² Israel had dominance in the coasts of Lebanon and this made the continuation of the support for the Christians through the Christian controlled port Jounieh.²⁶³

²⁵⁷ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 504.

²⁵⁸ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 344-345.

²⁵⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 344.

²⁶⁰ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 344.

²⁶¹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 65.

²⁶² O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 65.

²⁶³ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 218.

Israel gave strong military support to the Christian militias. They trained them and also intervened directly with its armed forces to inhibit the rise of strength of Palestinian militias. Israel mainly focused on training the Christian militias in this period.²⁶⁴ Israel Defence Forces also conducted cross-border raids to attack the Palestinians in the south in order to control its soil from possible Palestinian attacks.²⁶⁵ However, this attitude of Israel and consistent Israeli attacks in the Lebanese territory resulted in the increase of dislike amongst the Lebanese society against Israel. Israel also supported its allies by maintaining blockade in the ports controlled by Muslims with its naval power to include Tyre and Sidon.²⁶⁶ In this first period, Israel mainly focused on undermining the power of PLO in the south. It can be said that Israel focused on the southern part of Lebanon in the first years of the Civil War and directly performed arm raids as this part of Lebanon was crucial for the security of Israel. However, Israel provided support to the Christian indirectly without intervening with its soldiers, it only trained them. This is due to the priority of the Israeli officials. They gave more importance to its security in the south of Lebanon.

At the end of 1976, Rabin's government realized that the policy that they followed in Lebanon since the beginning of the civil war as well as the Syrian intervention and rise of area of influence resulted in the decrease of the influence of Israel as well as its allies in Lebanon. However, Israel's aim of strengthening the status quo in Lebanon was accomplished with the help of Syrian politics. The fact that the Rabin government accepted the Syrian intervention helped Christians in Lebanon protect their power. In this period, Israel reached its objective thanks to the action of Syria. However, after some time, Israel was cautious about the growing power of Syria in Lebanon and it tried to develop influence over Christian militias in the

²⁶⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 67.

²⁶⁵ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 499.

²⁶⁶ Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 219.

country. As we mentioned previously, while Israel intervened directly with its military force in the south, it indirectly supported the Christian Maronite militias in Beirut. This way, Israel tried to avoid increase of tensions with Syria as Syrian policies were also helping and in line with Israel's objectives.

Moreover, Israel had problems in this period in maintaining harmony between its allies. In the north, Israel supported Christian militias called Phalange, which was quite a hard militia power. Before the events started in the country, Phalange was the most powerful and great in number compared to other militias powers in Lebanon.²⁶⁷ However, Phalange was modeled as the Nazi Party and it was quite uncomfortable for Israeli officials. Pierre Gamayel went to Berlin in 1936 and he was influenced by this trip to establish his own Fascist party.²⁶⁸ However, Phalange was against the PLO in Lebanon and it was a beneficial ally for Israel to fight against them to secure its northern borders. As it was mentioned before, the Civil War started with a fight between the Phalange militia and Palestinian militants and these two groups always fought all through the Civil War.

In the southern part of Lebanon, Israel wanted to increase the power of Christians and this way, they could be also influential in other parts of the country. Compared to other parts of Lebanon, southern part was more useful and logical for Israel to give support for as it was quite a united ally. In the south, Christians as well as Shiites were not happy about the presence of the PLO and there was possible ground of action for Israel already. Israel also extended its Good Fence policy to some Shiites living in this region.²⁶⁹ Israel advocated and cooperated with Maronite Christian Major Saad Haddad to bring the militia that Israel gave support to in his

²⁶⁷ Marie Joelle Zahar, *"Fanatics, Mercenaries, Brigands... and Politicians: Militia Decision Making and Civil Conflict Resolution"* (PhD diss., McGill University, 1999), 108.

²⁶⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 45.

²⁶⁹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 65.

authority.²⁷⁰ Major Haddad called his force and it was quite useful for Israel to take advantage of this power to protect his interest in Lebanon.²⁷¹ It was controlled by a Christian officer.

Israel mainly supported the groups that were inclined to use violence in this period. The actions and activities of Phalange militias for example resulted in the rise of tensions during the Civil War and they maintained a campaign especially against Palestinians as well as Muslims. Starting from January 1976, Phalange militias were performing attacks to remove Muslim and Palestinian forces from Beirut and around.²⁷² The Christian Maronites asked for arms to fight against the Palestinians in this period.²⁷³ It can be said that in this period when the Civil War started initially, Israel's policy succeeded as it aimed at reinforcing the existing system. This policy succeeded also with the help of Syria's policy.

In this period, we see that although Syria and Israel were opponents in the region, their aims and interests for Lebanon were in the same direction. Rabin's policy of supporting Syria's intervention worked out and protected Israel's interests by strengthening the existing political structure in Lebanon. However, in the later stages of the Civil War, conflicts and difference in opinions took place between these countries.

²⁷⁰ Nicholas Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel* (New York: Random House, 2011), 24.

²⁷¹ Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 105-106. The successor of this group was the South Lebanese Army and there were Shiite and Druze members in this group in the 1980s. For more information see Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 102-106.

²⁷² Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," 83-85.

²⁷³ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 345-347.

Israel realized that its position and presence in domestic politics of Lebanon were becoming weaker as Syria was more influential in the country. Syria's intervention was legalized after the acceptance and support of Israel and the Arab League and Syria were now so influential and dominant actor in the country. Besides, PLO became more powerful as they freely continued their activities beyond the Israel's red line policy.²⁷⁴ For this reason, although Rabin thought that his policy was successful, Israel's rival in the Arab-Israeli conflict was more powerful and influential in Lebanon, which was strategically, economically and culturally important in the Middle East.

4.2. Second Phase of the Civil War (1977-1984)

As it is seen in the beginning of the Civil War, Lebanon was influenced by the regional powers, Syria and Israel.²⁷⁵ The reason why the Civil War still continued was that there was no dominant group which could achieve victory and foreign countries' alliances with different groups in Lebanon. Syria developed new alliances with its opponents in the LNM. They joined the alliance of the Syria and PLO against the Maronites.²⁷⁶ Due to the Syrian existence in the country, and PLO's rise of power as well as domestic developments resulted in the adaptation of interventionist policies by Israel in this period. As it was disturbed by the Syria and the PLO's influence in Lebanon, Israel changed its policy in Lebanon and followed a more active and interventionist policy in this period after what happened in 1975 and 1976 regarding the domestic developments.

²⁷⁴ Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 285-287.

²⁷⁵ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 213.

²⁷⁶ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 67.

When Menachem Begin came to power in 1977, he strongly supported the Maronites in Lebanon.²⁷⁷ There were already an alliance with the Maronites in the time of Rabin government. However, it was more developed when Begin came to power. In the south, Israel developed better relations with Saad Haddad and they conducted ground operations against PLO and improved his control.²⁷⁸ In Beirut, Israel supported Gemayel to consolidate his Phalange control and bring them together under him under the name of the Lebanese Forces.

After Fatah's raid into north of Israel in 1978, Rabin started Operation Litani to undermine PLO's power and to establish a security zone inside Lebanon in its border.²⁷⁹ After this operation, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed to south Lebanon in order to maintain a buffer between Palestinian and Israeli forces.²⁸⁰ This operation was not as successful as the Israeli expected so. Rabin government realized that the PLO forces could be undermined and destroyed only if the operation would cover other parts and extend beyond the southern borders of Lebanon. Besides, they thought that if the political stability of Lebanon could be maintained, the power of PLO could be undermined.²⁸¹ However, in this period, Israel was not as influential to achieve these victories in Lebanon.

In 1981, Begin and Likud coalition gained more seats and as a result of this elections, cabinet consisted of the members inclined to support intervention compared to previous period of non-interventionist members. For this reason,

²⁷⁷ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 504.

²⁷⁸ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 218.

²⁷⁹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 74.

²⁸⁰ Creveld, *The Sword*, 288.

²⁸¹ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the*, 387.

government applied an interventionist policy after this election.²⁸² Due to the insuccess of the previous period in fight against the rise of PLO's power, Ariel Sharon, the Defence Minister of this government, planned a possible invasion in Lebanon when he became the Minister.²⁸³ The IDF started an operation called Peace for Galilee in June 1982.²⁸⁴ Although prospected plan was entering only 25 miles, it moved to Beirut. Israel undermined the power of PLO and guaranteed that they would withdraw from the country. In addition, Bashir was elected as the president with the support of Israel. The influence and existence of Syria was confined in the Beka Valley and a part of Beirut. Syria followed a policy that could undermine Israel's power in Lebanon by providing support to its allies that were against Israel. In September 1982, Gemayal was assassinated.²⁸⁵ Phalange militias, supported by Israel, performed Sabra and Shatila massacres. After Israel left Beirut, Phalange militias stayed alone and had to fight against Syria by themselves without the support of Israel. Its ties with Israel came to an end in 1983. In this period, Iran also started supporting Syria and Syria followed an active policy against the IDF.

4.2.1. Syria's Objectives and Politics

Syria's aim was to maintain the pro-Syrian government in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion. Asad could secure the interests of Syria in this period. First, he gave importance to the existence of Syria in Lebanon to maintain stability and this way he decreased the possibility that the conflict could spread to Syria.²⁸⁶ Asad also

²⁸² Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 507.

²⁸³ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 396-397.

²⁸⁴ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 509-510.

²⁸⁵ David M. Rosen, "Lebanon's Elias Sarkis, Bashir Gemayel," in *Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East*, ed. Barbara Kellermann and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: Praeger, 1988), 27.

²⁸⁶ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 519.

wanted to balance Israel's power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria developed alliance to fight against Israel in Lebanon and it was quite beneficial for the interests of both Syria and its allies.

During the Israeli invasion, Syria maintained its close relations with Lebanese state-level politicians as well as some other allies. Before the invasion, Elias Sarkis was the president of Lebanon and he was supported by Syria. Syria supported him as he did not have any ties with any militias and he was a reformer. For this reason, he was bound to the Syrian support during his term of office.²⁸⁷ Amin Gamayal was elected after the assassination of Bashir Gamayel in 1982 and he was elected mainly thanks to the Syrian and Muslim support as he was moderate toward other groups despite being a Christian.²⁸⁸ After the invasion, Israel started to withdraw and it lost its influence in Lebanon. Syria became more dominant after these developments. Amin Gamayal was under the orbit of Syria and he became their man in Lebanon.²⁸⁹

Asad developed good relations with many different groups in Lebanon and it became even wider after the invasion of Israel. Although Syria aligned with the status quo power in Lebanon in 1976, as resistance against its existence in Lebanon grew, it developed relations with the reformist Muslim bloc. After the invasion, Druzes developed good relations with Syria and gave support to Syria with its three thousand soldiers as well as Shiite Amal, which had thirty thousand militias in 1982.²⁹⁰ Syria also maintained its alliance with the Palestinian forces. Syrian and Palestinian relations were not good as Asad realized that Arafat supported Islamists

²⁸⁷ Rosen, "Lebanon's Elias," 23.

²⁸⁸ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 118.

²⁸⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 414-416.

²⁹⁰ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 113.

fighting against the Syrian Alawite regime. In 1982, Iranians also started working with Muslims in order to gain support for its Islamist revolution and stop Israeli occupation.²⁹¹ At the end of 1983, Asad developed better relations with more groups in Lebanon and he became more influential in the country compared to the time before Israeli invasion took place.

After Israeli invasion, Syria supported its allies politically and logistically. Syrian military existence was indirect in this period. Israeli invasion limited Asad's political support for its allies in Lebanon. When Israel initially invaded Lebanon, Asad's forces first tried to secure its existence especially after its air defense network was destroyed in the Bekaa Valley. They fought against Israeli advancement to the Damascus Beirut highway. When Israel's siege took place, Syria and the PLO exerted efforts together with the support of Arab League to send their soldiers.²⁹² Although Syrian forces were forced to withdraw from Beirut, Bashir Gamayal's assassination was quite positive development for Syria and Amin Gamayal's presidency was a success. Syria re-gained its dominant position in Lebanon. Islamists gathered in the Bekaa Valley after the Israeli invasion and they were supported by Syria financially and militarily and their militias were also trained by Syria. In 1983, Syria directly provided military support to its allies against the Lebanese Forces.²⁹³ Asad's realist politics worked out and Syria were quite influential in 1984 in the country.

After Israeli invasion, Syria reached its objective of protecting and reinforcing the existing government in Lebanon. Syria was successful as it generated alliances with many groups in the country. Israel loss of political support after Bashir's assassination and Palestinian massacre in the camps resulted in the collapse of

²⁹¹ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 552.

²⁹² Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 536.

²⁹³ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 536.

support of Israel in the country. As Syria could generate alliances with many groups in Lebanon, it could be more influential and the president Amin was under the influence and orbit of Syria. Asad reached its aim of developing alliances and being influential in Lebanon against Israel, its main enemy in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the region as well.

It is not certain or known whether Hafez Asad really wanted the annexation of Lebanon or not. However, we know that he wanted to maintain the unity and power of Lebanon under Syrian control.²⁹⁴ Asad did not face with strong opposition in maintaining its control over Lebanon. He was quite successful. However, in 1978, the Likud Party in Israel gave military support for Maronites, and they challenged Asad in Lebanon. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, a pro-Israeli government was established in Lebanon. Syrian soldiers had to withdraw from most of the territories of Lebanon. This development took place after one of the biggest challenges of Asad authority in domestic politics, the revolt, which was suppressed brutally, of Muslim Brothers in Hama.

Hafez Asad's authority was challenged by Muslim Brothers in Syria and radical Baathist's who opposed Asad's policies.²⁹⁵ These two groups were not influential until the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. However, this started to change after Asad intervened in Lebanese politics. Besides, some of the Asad supporters also changed their sides after Asad intervened in Lebanon. Most of the Sunni people rejected the fact that Syrian army had to fight in Lebanon instead of Golan Heights, which was occupied by Israel. In addition, they believed that Syrian government made compromise with the Christians in Lebanon. They opposed the fact that Syria was cooperating with the Christians instead of its natural ally, Palestinians.²⁹⁶ This

²⁹⁴ Zisser, *Commanding Syria*, 179.

²⁹⁵ Zisser, *Commanding Syria*, 86, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 92-93.

²⁹⁶ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 98-99.

opposition actions sometimes used violence against Asad's regime and they performed bomb attacks. Moreover, some generals, who are Alawites, were assassinated. Although Asad's regime took many precautions, these attacks continued and there were many terrorist attacks in between 1976 and 1982.²⁹⁷

Critics against Asad regime increased in 1977 when it was thought that the Civil War was ending. Especially in 1978 as Syria did not succeed in the Civil War and due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, oppositions started criticizing the Asad's regime more. Chief of Defence Staff talked about the legitimacy problem of the regime and stated that people gave support to fight for Golan Heights but they cannot explain the casualties in Lebanon. In 1982, attacks started again by Muslim Brothers and they gained support of the cities such as Aleppo, Hama and Hums. The worst fighting took place in Hama in 1982 and the regime forces brutally suppressed the attacks. Muslim Brothers lost their power after this brutal suppress. After this period, in 1983, Asad had a heart attack and the struggle for power in Syria only took place between the Asad and his kinsmen.

Israel raised its control over Lebanon, Syria had domestic opposition problems and Asad's illness resulted in the weakening of Syria and Asad's authority. Asad was considered as weak in Golan, however strong in Lebanon and it was seen negative in domestic politics. The reason why Syria became weak in Lebanon was also due to economic problems. After the intervention to Lebanon, economic growth rate decreased in the country. During the Civil War, almost half million Lebanese and Palestinians had to move to Syria. Besides, cost of the Civil War for Syria was quite high and it was not easy to compensate. However, Asad still maintained its power and authority in Syria. Despite the opposition in the country, Asad did not give up his Lebanese policy as his regime suppressed the opposition brutally.

²⁹⁷ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 174-176.

Asad aimed at making Syria as a new center of the Arab world by intervening in Lebanon and making it its orbit. Palestinians did not want the authority of Syria on them and for this reason, Asad tried to decrease their power initially. However, this resulted in the increase of sympathy for Arafat and more Palestinians supported him. Failure in Lebanon damaged the image of Syria in the Arab world and although the USA officials gave importance to Syria on regional developments, they focused more on the peace between Israel and Egypt. Syria needed Soviet support and it signed an agreement with Soviets in 1980. In order to get support and help from them, Syria was inclined to sign an agreement, which it was against in the previous decade.

4.2.2. Israel's Objectives, Strategy and Allies

The reason why Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 was that it wanted to strengthen the power of the Christian dominated status quo system, dispell the PLO and withdraw the Syrian forces from Lebanon.²⁹⁸ Begin aimed at annexing the West Bank and Gaza into Israel.²⁹⁹ For this reason, weakining the PLO's power and being influential in Lebanon's political system, Israel thought that it could easily take the control of the regions where Palestinians lived.³⁰⁰ Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 in pursuit of these objectives.

Until the invasion, Israel did not have ally in the government in Lebanon. However, starting from the invasion, Israel and the Lebanase government developed a long lasting allignment. Thanks to the Israeli invasion and support, Bashir Gamayal was elected as the president of Lebanon. Israel even bought some votes for Bashir Gamayal to be elected as the president. However, he did not really help Israel to

²⁹⁸ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 509-510.

²⁹⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 396-398.

³⁰⁰ Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Touchstone, 1985), 15.

achieve its aims in Lebanon. In many occasions, Gamayal and his militias revealed that he would not act depending on Israeli interests. There were different thoughts and opinions in the Israeli government between Sharon and Begin. Sharon had close relations with Gamayal and for him, Israel and Phalange alliance was so important.³⁰¹ The intelligence warned that Gamayal only developed good relations with Israel to protect his political power in Lebanon and when he was elected, he would turn his face to the Arab world and stay far from Israel.³⁰²

Although his term of office was not so long as he was assassinated, some of his actions during the Israeli invasion validated the Israeli intelligence. He did not attack the PLO with the IDF and he stated that he would stay neutral between Syria and Israel.³⁰³ In a meeting between Gamayal, Begin and Sharon, Gamayal stated that he would not follow Israel's directives. Before his assassination, though, Israel and Gamayal agreed on a plan that they would clean the Palestinians in west Beirut.³⁰⁴

Despite Gamayal's negative attitudes towards Israel, Begin government focused on developing good relations with the Lebanese government. However, this policy failed when Gamayal was assassinated. Israel supported Sarkis to be elected as the new president. Bashir Gamayal's brother Amin won the election and he became the president of Lebanon.³⁰⁵ He did not participate in the Maronite militias that his brother commanded and he developed ties with the Muslims starting from the

³⁰¹ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 538-539.

³⁰² Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 398.

³⁰³ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 538-539.

³⁰⁴ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 540.

³⁰⁵ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 546-547.

beginning of the events.³⁰⁶ In Amin's period of office, a treaty was signed and Israel accepted to withdraw to south Lebanon in 1983. In 1984, Amin went to Syria and developed good relations with Asad. Israel had no strong allies in the Lebanese government.

Israel only allied itself with the Lebanese Force and SLA in this period. The forces that the Israel allied itself was consisted mainly of the Phalange militia. By 1982, Lebanese Force had more than eight thousand militias.³⁰⁷ LF and Israel exerted common effort to clean the Palestinian refugee camps before the death of the Bashir Gamayal. After he was assassinated, Israel increased the violence of its actions and Sabra and Shatila massacres took place.³⁰⁸ LF blamed Israel of the massacre after it took place.³⁰⁹ SLA was a force supported by Israel to maintain the security of the south Lebanon to help IDF. SLA could only protect the border with the help of Israel in the south.³¹⁰ SLA had about two thousand militias under their command.³¹¹ Its commander Saad Haddad died in 1983 and it was an important development in domestic politics of Lebanon as Israel lost one of its primary allies in Lebanon.³¹² Although the SLA and Phalange developed close relations before the Israeli invasion, after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Phalange blamed them and their relations were deteriorated before 1983.

³⁰⁶ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 118.

³⁰⁷ Rosen, "Lebanon's Elias," 26.

³⁰⁸ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 542.

³⁰⁹ Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 277-278.

³¹⁰ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 555.

³¹¹ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 77.

³¹² O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 135.

Israeli support for its allies and Bashir Gamayal was through political statements referincing interest of Israel in Lebanon. Starting from 1978, Begin stated that they had to protect the Christians in Lebanon as Syria gained more power and Israel strengthened its forces in Golan to ensure a cease fire between Syria and Phalange.³¹³ In 1981, Begin stated in his talk in Knesset that survival of the Lebanese Christians was a necessity and vital for Israeli interests.³¹⁴ Before the Israeli invasion, with the help of the support of Israel, Gamayal and his militia challanged the existence of Syria. In order to ensure his presidency, Israel bought some votes in Lebanon.³¹⁵ When Bashir Gamayal was elected, Israel wanted to sign an agreement to legitimize its existence. However, this policy failed when Bashir was assassinated.

Israel also supported SLA militias politically. In 1979, Haddad stated that south Lebanon was an independent Christian territory. Government discharged him and other people under his control in the Lebanese army.³¹⁶ Israeli government still supported the SLA to be powerful in the south, established a government and collected taxes.³¹⁷ Israel tried to unite the SLA to the Lebanese army to achieve its recognition legally in the government.³¹⁸ When the agreement was abolished in 1984, the recognition policy of SLA also failed.

³¹³ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 505.

³¹⁴ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 505-506.

³¹⁵ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 538-539.

³¹⁶ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 87.

³¹⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 87.

³¹⁸ Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 479-482.

Israel supported its allies, LF and SLA logistically as well. Until 1982 invasion, Israel's contribution to LF was about \$25 million every year.³¹⁹ Reagan government in the US also gave \$10 million to the LF.³²⁰ Starting from 1977 to 1982, Israel sold about \$118 million cost arm to its allies in Lebanon.³²¹ Israel started collecting taxes to support the SLA after the invasion. Based on the Good Fence policy, Israel provided opportunity to Christians to work in Israel and improve commerce and Israel also gave electricity and water to some Christian villages in the south.³²²

Before the invasion, Israel performed common attacks with SLA against Syria. For example, in one of the battles between Phalange and Syria, Israel toppled two Syrian helicopters.³²³ The SLA and LF militias were trained by Israel in Israel's territory. Israel trained more than a thousand Lebanese officers. After the invasion, Israel directly supported the Phalange in Beirut however, this support did not last long as Israeli forces started to withdraw by the end of 1983.³²⁴

In 1982, Israel gave military support to its allies in Lebanon and it aimed at changing the president instead of overthrowing the regime totally. Israel wanted to protect the existing political structure, confessional system, as it ensured the hegemony of the Christians in the country. However, Israeli Lebanese policy failed

³¹⁹ Zahar, *"Fanatics, Mercenaries,"* 119.

³²⁰ Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 204.

³²¹ Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2005), 214.

³²² O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 65.

³²³ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 506.

³²⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 127.

significantly. The PLO still existed in Lebanon, Syria became stronger and its existence were more concrete after 1982 invasion, Christians lost power in the domestic politics and radical Hezbollah militants came to the country.³²⁵ Israel's invasion was quite costly for Israel. After Bashir Gamayal's assassination, Begin had no political ally left in Lebanon. Israel's invasion also undermined the possibility that Israel could develop good relations with other groups in the country. Israel could ally itself with Shiite militia in the south in 1982, Amal. The PLO was the common enemy of Israel and the Amal. Amal gave support to the Israeli efforts against the PLO.³²⁶ However, Israel showed no desire to develop alliance with Amal. Israel wanted to unite the Shiites with the SLA. Amal participated in the Muslim groups fighting against the invasion of Israel in the south Lebanon. Israel and Phalange alliance were also broken by the end of 1983. Israel's only ally was the SLA in Lebanon after this development.

As Begin government lost its only legitimate ally in 1982, it followed violent policy in Lebanon after this point to increase its influence. After Sabra and Shatila massacre, the reformist groups in Lebanon namely Syria, Muslims and the PLO blamed Israel and its ally the SLA.³²⁷ After the massacre, one of the biggest demonstrations took place in Tel Aviv and the government was criticized.³²⁸ It was hard for Israel to increase its influence in Lebanon through the policy it followed. It was violent and took attention of other groups in Lebanon as well as Israeli people. Israel's aim of limiting the Syrian dominance, weakening the PLO's power and establishing a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon could only be achieved for a short

³²⁵ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 558-559.

³²⁶ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 120.

³²⁷ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 546-547.

³²⁸ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 548.

period of time. In 1984, Lebanese government was close to Syria and Israel's existence was limited in the south especially after 1983.

4.2.3. Iran's Strategy and Policy

Iran increased its attention for Lebanon in 1982 and it aimed at overthrowing the existing regime in order to constitute a regime, which is Islamic based on its perspective.³²⁹ Lebanon was an opportunity for Iran to spread its Islamic revolution and fight against Israel.³³⁰ When Israeli occupation took place, the Iranian strategy was spreading Islamic revolution and developing relations with other countries.³³¹ Iran sent its forces to Lebanon with Syrian approval to spread Islamic resistance. Besides, Iran also wanted to advocate the Palestinians to harm and disrupt the development of Arab bloc as it would support Iraq.³³² Although Syrian and Iranian aim in Lebanon confronted, they cooperated with each other as it was beneficial for both countries. Iran was an important ally for Syria in this period considering regional competition and threats.³³³ Iran realized that having the support of Syria, which is quite important in the region would inhibit the development of an understanding that Iran-Iraq war was Arab-Persian war. Besides, with the help of Syria, entering Lebanon gave opportunity to Iran to influence Shiite population of

³²⁹ Hezbollah's objective was establishing an Islamic state and expelling the foreigners. Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God From Revolution to Institutionalization* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 242.

³³⁰ Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, (Syracus, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 18.

³³¹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 41.

³³² Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 42-43.

³³³ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 89-90.

Lebanon.³³⁴ Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) entered in Lebanon in June 1982 in order to sustain its objectives in Lebanon.

Iran's influence was bound to Syria in this period. After Israel started invasion of Lebanon, Iran started an Islamic resistance with the agreement of Syria. In August 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini met the Shiite Ulamas in Lebanon and tried to convince them to go to Lebanon and fight against Israel.³³⁵ Amal in Lebanon was the main of the IRGC, and they entered in the Bekaa Valley in the leadership of Husayn al-Musawi. Musawi was influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran and he was not satisfied with the Nabih Berri's secular thoughts. Before Israeli invasion, he left Amal and many prominent Islamists also followed him.³³⁶

Besides, some Lebanese Shiite clerics participated in the same school with Ayatollah Khomein in Iraq and Iran.³³⁷ The IRGC, Islamic Amal in the leadership of Musawi generated the Islamic resistance movement that was popular between Shiites in Lebanon and they played a vital role in the fight against Israel's occupation. This coalition adopted the name Hezbollah after 1984.³³⁸ PLO in the leadership of Yasser Arafat also was an important ally for Iran in this period. There was an agreement between Khomeini and Arafat in 1972 which stated that Fatah would train Iranian revolutionaries in the south Lebanon in the camps.³³⁹ They were

³³⁴ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 90.

³³⁵ Hamzeh, *In the Path*, 24.

³³⁶ Marius Deeb, *Militant Islamic movements in Lebanon: Origins, social basis and ideology (Occasional papers series)* (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), 2-3.

³³⁷ Hamzeh, *In the Path*, 18-21.

³³⁸ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 47-50.

³³⁹ Robert Baer, *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 130.

trained by the Fatah in 1970s and the commander of the IRGC, Mohsen Rafiqdost was also trained in Fatah's camps.³⁴⁰ When Iranian revolution took place, Arafat ordered Fatah to advocate Iranian revolution.³⁴¹ Starting from 1983, Iranian forces started conducting attacks against Israel and advocated Palestinians in Lebanon.

Although the IRGC established an alliance with the Islamic Amal movement, Iran was not so close to Amal due to some difference in opinions. Amal's ideology under Nabih Berri was secular and against Islamic revolution. Besides, Berri was inclined to develop relations with other groups. Amal did not want to support the PLO as it considered them as meance to Shiites' region.³⁴² Iran supported group in Lebanon, though, grew bigger on the basis of Amal's cooperation.³⁴³

Iran's advocacy was bound to Iran in this period and it supported its allies indirectly. It maintained political backing with the help of Syrian government. As Iran had good relations with Asad, this fact provided area of action in the Bekaa Valley where they generated their resistant force. Iran's financial support was vital in this period. It was about \$100 million annually.³⁴⁴ Moreover, Iran's embassy in Damascus had about \$400 million annual budget and there were more than 200 workers.³⁴⁵ These numbers show the importance that was given to Lebanon. Initially IRGC tried to spread its ideology amongst Shiites in Baalbek through

³⁴⁰ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 29-32.

³⁴¹ Baer, *See No Evil*, 129-131.

³⁴² Norton, *Hezbollah*, 32.

³⁴³ Azani, *Hezbollah*, 47.

³⁴⁴ Carl Anthony Wege, "Hizbollah Organization," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17, no. 2 (1994): 155-157.

³⁴⁵ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 31.

religious classes given in schools.³⁴⁶ After the invasion, 1500 IRGC guards established a training center in Bekaa Valley.³⁴⁷ Considering the positive effects of this strategy, Iran had vital force to increase its influence in the civil war.

Starting from 1982, Iran's strategy resulted in important results in Lebanon. In contrast to other foreign forces, Iran was the only actor which aimed at overthrowing the regime in the country and establishing an Islamic regime. Although Iran was quite far from this objective in the first years of its existence in the country, it succeeded in generating the grow of resistance movement. However, their strength and existence were still problematic and there was rival Shiite Amal in the country.

Islamic resistance in Lebanon was bound to Iran and in Baalbek, where IRGC had training camps, Iran forced the local population on Islamic lifestyle.³⁴⁸ For example, the IRGC did proselytism, alcohol was banned and they controlled women wearing. Town square of Baalbek was named after Khomeini.³⁴⁹ During the propaganda, they mainly used Iranian flag and consciously disregarded the Lebanese flag. Resistance continued to grow as it was against the Israeli invasion especially after 1983. Iran's regime overthrow objective through its allies in 1982 and 1983 caused significant results. By using the Shiite community in Lebanon, Iran was successful in establishing Islamic resistance movement although its success was far from overthrowing the regime in Beirut. Although there were problems, it had significant repercussions in the development in Lebanon.

³⁴⁶ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 44-46.

³⁴⁷ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 44.

³⁴⁸ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 44-45.

³⁴⁹ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 44-45.

4.3. Last Phase of the Civil War (1984-1990)

In the year of 1982, most of the Lebanese soil was occupied by Israel and Syria. In this period, Gemayel developed good relations with the west and Syrian-Lebanese relations deteriorated. Palestinian influence in the south Lebanon came to an end after the occupation of Israel and Shiite community started its activities there as they regarded south Lebanon as their traditional soil. Israel occupied Lebanon in 1982 to combat against PLO activities and support a pro-Israeli President in the country. Besides, they aimed at putting an end to the Syrian military existence.³⁵⁰ In other words, Israel's objective was to secure its national interest. Although Israel's intervention was condemned by the international community, it continued its policy and decreased the Syrian area of influence.

When the power of Syria declined towards the year of 1982, it was when Israeli occupation started. Israel started attacking PLO bases. Its main objective was to maintain the stability of south Lebanon which was its border line. Israel wanted to maintain Maronite dominance in the country under the confessional system, abolish PLO and to finish the Syrian existence in Lebanon. Begin government wanted to sign a peace agreement with Lebanon when Gemayel, pro-Israelist president, came to power. This policy also helped Israel to make Greater Israel possible by annexing the West Bank and Gaza, his regional strategy. However, after Gamayal was assassinated, Israel's strategy of creating a friendly government in Lebanon collapsed. When Amin Gamayel, Bashir's brother, came to power, he signed a treaty with Israel in 1983 and Israel accepted to withdraw its forces to south with the diplomatic effort of the US. Towards the end of 1983, Israel did not have any political groups supporting Israel in Lebanon and it was apparent that Lebanon was moving to Syrian orbit again.

³⁵⁰ Joseph Alpher, "Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process," *International Affairs* 70, no. 2 (April 1994): 236.

Starting from 1984, the Israeli influence over Lebanon weakened and it gradually withdrew its forces confining to only small security zone until 1985. Israel's policy failed in early 1982 after the death of President Beshir Gemayel and its influence was limited with the south Lebanon unlike Syria, which established alliances and became influential in the country. In this period, inter-group conflicts happened and Syria followed a strategy of reinforcing the government through pro-Syrian groups in Lebanon.

Starting from 1984, Lebanon turned into a war zone between Israel and Syrian-Iranian alliance. Syria became increasingly more dominant and influential in Lebanon as a result of Asad's policies. Iran also supported Syria, through its ideology and strategic purposes were in the same direction with their allies. Israel withdrew its forces gradually until the end of 1985 and its forces were confined to only five miles security zone in the south. Syria was more influential in this period in Lebanon thanks to its alliance with Iran. Towards the end of the Civil War, Syria achieved success in its Lebanon's politics and became permanent regional power. It could maintain a pro-Syrian government in the country. Asad was successful due to his strategy of generating alliances with many groups and consistently supporting the reinforcement of the Lebanese existing government and political structure. Iran became also an important actor in the region thanks to its alliance with Syria in this period.

Israel's influence was only limited with the southern Lebanon. Israel continued to give importance to southern Lebanon due to security concerns. Israel was not a significant and effective country in Lebanon in this period. For this reason, events and developments took place under the orbit of Syria and Iran. Iran was quite pragmatic and its influence was spread to Lebanon and continued even after the Civil War ended with Hezbollah.

After Israeli invasion failed, Syria became even more influential in the events that took place in Lebanon and the civil war became more chaotic and complicated as

inter communal and confessional conflicts took place in the country. For example, there were conflicts between three different Maronite factions, Shiite Amal and Hezbollah and Muslims were divided based on regional lines in 1985.³⁵¹ In 1987, Syria sent seven thousand soldiers to Beirut to maintain security and protect the existence and power of its allies in Lebanon. Due to the conflict occurred between Amal and Hezbollah, Syria again directly intervened in the developments. When the Amin Gamayal's end of term of office approached, a Maronite faction tried to prevent and inhibit of Syrian influence by trying not to elect a president with the support of Syria.³⁵² In this year, the government was divided between Prime Minister Aoun and existing Prime Minister All Hoss as the president gave the presidential power to new Christian Prime Minister.³⁵³ It was the first time that Lebanon experienced official division between fighting groups.³⁵⁴ Syria and its allies in the country advocated the Al-Hoss government. Starting from this year, the Civil War was the struggle between these two governments.

After Israeli forces left Lebanon, Syria took initiative to be more effective in the country and exerted efforts to sign a trilateral agreement in 1985 between Amal Movement, Lebanese Christians and Druzes. The aim of this agreement was to bring an end to the Civil War, to adjust Lebanese political system and to increase the influence of Syria over Lebanon. However, this agreement was cancelled after 18 days as President Amin Gamayel was against the agreement.³⁵⁵ After this failure,

³⁵¹ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 251.

³⁵² O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 174-176.

³⁵³ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 267.

³⁵⁴ Zahar, "*Fanatics, Mercenaries*," 113.

³⁵⁵ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 120.

Syrian influence and image were affected negatively and Syria did not try to find a solution to Lebanese conflict inside the country.

As well as struggling with Christians, Syria also had to deal with Shiites. After Hezbollah received the support of Iran especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Amal movement, which was an ally of Syria from the very beginning, started losing its power. Hezbollah was quite influential in Lebanon on Shiites and increased its power in the country. Hezbollah wanted to control Shiite parts of Lebanon and challenge Amal in south Lebanon. As a matter of fact, in 1990, struggle between Shiites took place in east of Sidon. Hezbollah held a number of operations in between 1984 and 1987 and it abducted western Civilians in these years with the support of Iran. In this period, Asad also had to deal with the rising Shiite group in Lebanon. However, this challenge was not so tense as both Iran and Syria have their own interests and they did not want their relations to be deteriorated.³⁵⁶

Syria gave special emphasis on the Presidency as it symbolizes the unity and legitimacy of Lebanon and Syria always tried to bring a pro-Syrian president to Lebanon to protect its interests. Amin Gamayel refused to be under the influence of Syria in his last years of office and he undermined the Trilateral Agreement prepared by Syria. When the time of his office came to an end, Syria tried to make Suleiman Frangieh the President of Lebanon. However, this policy failed and crisis even deepened in Lebanon in this period. Although Syria advocated him, many Christians rejected his presidency and they became successful in this aim. As there was no any other candidate in this process, Amin Gamayel announced that he assigned Michel Aoun as the new president of Lebanon in 1988.

Syria declared that it recognized Salim al-Hoss as the Prime Minister after the death of Rashed Karami. After this one-sided memorandum of Syria, Lebanon divided

³⁵⁶ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 144-147.

into two. For the first time in its history, Lebanon could not elect a President and there was duality- two Prime Minister, two Government and two General Staffs. Michel Aoun struggled with Syria and wanted to put an end to its authority and power in Lebanon. He started the Liberation War in 1989 and this way he thought to be popular and get the support of the Arab world as well as international society against Syria. Conflict started between Syrian army and Christian militias in this period. Syria was stronger after receiving the support of Druzes.

In the last years of the Civil War, Al Hoss government supported by Syria and its allies, grew and include other groups as well. It gained the support of the Arab community. Taif Agreement gave legitimacy to this government. The Taif Agreement addressed the request of the Muslims and decreased the power of the Christians in the country. It divided the parliament equally between Christians and Muslims members.³⁵⁷

4.3.1. Syria's Objectives and its Allies

Syrian government continued to support the existing government in Lebanon. However, Syria supported the reformist ideas rather than status quo Christian understanding. Although Asad supported the political structure based on 1943 National Pact, he advocated the idea to make Lebanese political system divided equally between the Christians and Muslims.³⁵⁸ Asad wanted to be more powerful in Arab-Israeli conflict and one of his strategy to reach this objective was to establish and protect pro-Syrian government and be influential in Lebanon.³⁵⁹ In

³⁵⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 193-194.

³⁵⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 71.

³⁵⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 339-341.

addition, being dominant in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria aimed at re-taking the Golan Heights.³⁶⁰

Syria realized that being influential in the country and the government in Lebanon, Israel's power and existence in the region could be undermined. When its allies existed in the southern Lebanon, Asad thought that it could use it against Israel in their negotiations over Golan Heights.³⁶¹ The newly developing Syrian Iranian relations was a positive development for Syria as it lost an important ally, Egypt in its fight against Israel and Iran could replace Egypt's place.³⁶² Asad continued to be pragmatic and logical. His policy was limited and only aimed at confining Israel and being dominant in the Arab Israeli conflict.

Asad sustained and maintained its alignments with different groups as well as government in this period as well. Towards the end of 1990, Asad's coalition of allies consisted of many different groups. Since 1982, soon after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Syria re-generated influence in Lebanon. Syria was influential on President Amin Gemayal and MNF in 1984.³⁶³ Syria was more influential compared to previous years in the Civil War in Lebanon.³⁶⁴ Although Syria was quite influential on Gemayal's government, Gemayal still took decision in 1988 that he appointed Michel Aoun as Prime Minister to make Christians dominant over Muslims in the country.³⁶⁵ However, Syrian side and its allies were quite strong and

³⁶⁰ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 199-200.

³⁶¹ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 284.

³⁶² Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 90.

³⁶³ Cleveland, *A History of the*, 389.

³⁶⁴ Cleveland, *A History of the*, 389.

³⁶⁵ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 267.

influential in Lebanon and al-Hoss government gained victory over the Christian side.

Although Syria advocated its allies, it did not want them to be independent from Syria. For this reason, the way how Syria gave support for its allies was limited. They always stayed bound to Syrian support. For example, Syria supported Hezbollah to ensure that its competitor Amal would not challenge the dominance of Syria in the country. Syria followed a similar strategy for Palestinians. In 1990, Iran and Syria negotiated and signed second Damascus Agreement between Amal and Hezbollah when the conflicts between them came to an end. The Taif Agreement maintained the legitimization of the Al-Hoss government and Syria was influential during the process.³⁶⁶

Syria mainly secure cross-border routes and sent arms to its allies in Lebanon. However, government did not give significant support economically to its allies. Syria owed about five billion dollars debt to Iran towards the end of the Civil War.³⁶⁷ Syria's allies in Lebanon generated their own resource as Syria was not with them economically. They relied on Soviet arms. Syria also significantly ensured arms to Iran in this period.³⁶⁸ Syria's major allies Druzes and Shiite Amal organization had primarily internal resources. However, it had negative impacts often for the Syria's allies to fight against other competing groups. For example, it was hard for Amal to fight against the Hezbollah, which was financed by Iran.³⁶⁹ Although Syria was not with its allies economically, Syria's location and its power to control routes helped its allies and they became more influential in the country.

³⁶⁶ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 75-76.

³⁶⁷ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 99-101.

³⁶⁸ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 95.

³⁶⁹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 144-145.

Syria's military support was significant in this period and it started maintaining many troops since the very beginning of the Civil War mainly in the Bekaa Valley.³⁷⁰ Before 1987, Syria intervened when it was necessary to support its allies and consolidated the regime. In 1987, when its allies could not ensure the security of Lebanon, Syria sent seven thousand troops in order to maintain stability on behalf of the Lebanese government.³⁷¹ In 1988, Syrian troops conducted operations even in Sidon, which was close to the southern borders. Israel was not effective in this period that it could not prevent these operations near its borders, which it did not tolerate before.³⁷² Besides, Syria destroyed Aoun's forces in order to ensure the victory of Hoss government in 1990.³⁷³ As a result of these developments, Syria's existence and power became apparent and its opponents had to disarm.

Syria reached its aims in Lebanon and became the most influential foreign power. It consistently supported its allies politically and militarily. Syria promoted the existing government in Lebanon although it targeted minor changes in the confessional system. Syria's intervention scope changed especially after 1987 when it realized the inability of its allies to secure Beirut and around. Israel's failure was also influential in the extension of Syria's scope. Syria's consistent support left opponents vulnerable and towards the end of the Civil War, there were no groups left against Syria and its allies.

Syria became more dominant in Lebanon after 1984. In the beginning of 1987, Syria sent its troops to Beirut to maintain security and protect its ally forces of

³⁷⁰ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 519.

³⁷¹ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 263.

³⁷² O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 174-176.

³⁷³ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 112.

Amal against Hezbollah.³⁷⁴ In 1988, presidential succession calamity occurred when the Maronites tried to elect Amin Gamayel as the new president of Lebanon.³⁷⁵ When General Michel Aoun was elected as Prime Minister, this resulted in the division of the government for the first time between two groups, Prime Minister Aoun supporters and Prime Minister Al-Hoss supporters.³⁷⁶ Syrian officials supported the pro-Muslim al-Hoss government. After this development, the civil war would continue with the struggle between these two divided governments.

In this period, Syria followed a policy of supporting the government in Lebanon with permissive understanding. Asad advocated the reforms that would create equality in political power in the country. By supporting and generating pro-Syrian administration in Beirut, Syria aimed at balancing Arab-Israeli conflict in favor of Syria. In this period, the perception that domination of Beirut would make Israeli influence limited continued. Having an alliance in south Lebanon, Asad had power to enforce its demands in the future negotiations over the Golan Heights.³⁷⁷ Asad was quite pragmatic in its policy in Lebanon and he aimed to be influential in Lebanon to make the Arab-Israeli conflict advantageous for Syria. Asad developed Syrian relations with any groups in this period and became quite influential by 1985 than any other time since 1975.³⁷⁸ However, Gamayel appointed Michel Aoun as the Prime Minister in September 1988 as he felt pressure from the Maronites. They aimed at establishing dominance over Muslim community. Pro-Syrian al-Hoss

³⁷⁴ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 174-177.

³⁷⁵ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 182-187.

³⁷⁶ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 267.

³⁷⁷ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics*, 284.

³⁷⁸ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the*, 389.

government backed by Syria, won at the end and continued his administration in Lebanon.

Finally, Taif Agreement was signed in 1989, which put an end to the Civil War. Syria's aim in general throughout the Civil War was to maintain the unity of Lebanon and to strengthen Palestinian resistance against Israel in south Lebanon.³⁷⁹ Syria's policies were practical and served for its interest rather than being ideological. From April 1975 to end of 1976, Syrian intervention followed three level strategies. First, diplomatic mediations were implemented, then indirect intervention was applied through proxy militias and then they directly intervened in Lebanon with its soldiers.³⁸⁰ Syria had to admit the agreement in Taif to maintain the stability and peace in Lebanon. The role of Asad was not high in this agreement. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries played an important role in the Taif Agreement.

Syria considered this agreement appropriate and useful for its interests. According to the Taif Agreement, political reforms would be implemented. Some of Maronite president authority would be given to the Muslim Prime Minister and a new regulation based on Muslim-Christian equality would be done. Central authority would maintain its power in Lebanon and militias would be removed. Syrian forces would be limited to Bekaa and Beirut-Damascus highway. Presidential elections would be held again and a new government would be established based on national consensus. This consensus did not bring a real solution to the Lebanon's problems as it was prepared based on 1943 National Pact and same problems continued after the Taif Agreement.

³⁷⁹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 72.

³⁸⁰ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 65.

Syria isolated the Michel Aoun's government through diplomatic and military channels and it tried to bring a pro-Syrian president for Lebanon after the Taif Agreement.³⁸¹ In November 1989, Maronite Christian Rene Muawad was elected as the President of Lebanon with the efforts of Syria. However, after about two weeks, Muawad was assassinated and Syrian image was again affected negatively. Lebanese Parliament gathered again and elected Elias Hrawi as the new President. Hrawi had good relations with Syria. This was a success for Syria as Hrawi was elected officially and he was a pro-Syrian. He was also recognized by Arab world as well as international community.

After this development, a legitimacy fight started between Aoun and Hrawi. The year Hrawi took office was a year of fight against Aoun. Aoun did not admit the decisions taken in the Taif Agreement.³⁸² Division between Christians weakened Aoun and in 1990 Syria became more dominant in this fight. Aoun also lost the support of Arab world and international community due to mistakes he did. Besides, in Gulf War, Syria took the USA's side and for this reason Syria took the support of the USA in Lebanon. After Aoun was defeated, Syria's influence and dominance increased again in Lebanon. When Aoun lost power in October 1990, Syrian against groups lost their powers and in the following period the country experienced Syrian dominance.

In general, Syria wanted to make Lebanon its orbit without annexating it and this way protect its interests. Syria wanted to be the leading country in the Middle East and in Palestinian issue, it wanted to maintain its authority and protect its economic interests and security of the region in general. Especially after Operation on Galilee in 1982, Syria could maintain its power and influence in Lebanon and challenge Israel by lifting political isolation, military weakness as well as domestic conflicts

³⁸¹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 135-137.

³⁸² Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 135-137.

in the country. It was a success for Syria that Israel withdrew from south Lebanon gradually and became dominant in an Arab country. However, Lebanon was not totally controlled by Syria and different groups always existed in the country. This resulted in chaos and perpetual conflict. The reason why Syria could not take the control of Lebanon entirely was due to Israel. Israel was also influential in the country and fighting against Palestinians. Syria could not take the control of south Lebanon in real sense as well as Maronite Christians. Besides, local powers were quite strong and determined and they challenged Syria during the Civil War. Besides, Lebanese conflict was quite confusing and many problems were due to the structure of Lebanese state from the very beginning.

Last part of the Taif Agreement is about the Lebanese-Syrian relations and it was stated that exclusive relationship between Lebanon and Syria is recognized in the agreement. It explains that the future of these two countries would be determined through the bilateral cooperation agreements. As it is seen, Syrian dominance was accepted and recognized through this agreement. After the Taif Agreement, precautions taken continued to increase the relations and an agreement called Treaty for Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination was signed in 1991, and Lebanese policies in security and economy became in line with Syrian policies. Syrian interests and hegemony were the main concern in these developments and Syria reached its aim in this period.

4.3.2 Iran's Policy and Objectives

Iran tended to follow foreign policy strategy after implementing some revisions in understanding regarding Islamic revolution. Lebanon was quite an important country for Iran in this respect due to its Shiite population.³⁸³ After Khomeini died in 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei came to power and Hashemi Rafsanjani became the

³⁸³ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 29-30.

president. In this period, Iran started following pragmatist policies.³⁸⁴ In the same year, the pragmatist wing of Hezbollah also won and this organization started implementing Iran's pragmatist policies.³⁸⁵ The pragmatist policies that Iran followed were in the same direction with Syria in Lebanon. For this reason, Iran as well as Hezbollah had opportunity to develop their relations with Syria and there was this environment that these sides could collaborate with.

Iran's main ally in Lebanon was Hezbollah as well as some other small groups such as Tawheed. Although its relations with Hezbollah was closer in the beginning of 1980, however, this started to change towards the end of the 1980s, and the organization started acting more independently and it did not espouse Islamic ideology.³⁸⁶ These two sides were still allies and despite competition for dominance towards the end of the civil war, they always advocated the Iran-Hezbollah alliance.³⁸⁷ While the pragmatists claimed that they should develop better relations with Syria, revisionists wanted to advocate Islamic revolution. Hezbollah became dominant and successful in its resistance in the south in Lebanon and it started to be represented in the Lebanese political system instead of rejecting it.³⁸⁸ Hezbollah had around 10.000 fighters at the end of 1980s.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁴ Hamzeh, *In the Path*, 109-110.

³⁸⁵ Hamzeh, *In the Path*, 109-110.

³⁸⁶ Joseph Alagha, "Hezbollah's Conception of the Islamic State," in *The Shi'a Worlds and Iran*, ed. Sabrina Mervin (London: Saqi Books, 2011), 96.

³⁸⁷ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 142-143.

³⁸⁸ Alagha, "Hezbollah's Conception," 104.

³⁸⁹ Wege, "Hizbollah," 155.

The fact that Iran supported Islamist groups in Lebanon resulted in the occurrence of conflict with Syria in the middle of the 1980s. Iran developed its relations with the group called Tawheed, which was a Sunni, and it backed the revolution in Iran.³⁹⁰ Tawheed engaged in combat with the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), which was backed by Syria and for this reason Syrian troops also fought with them.³⁹¹ As there was conflict and difference in opinions between Hezbollah and Amal, Syria decided military intervention in this period. What Iran did was triggering diplomatic talks and performance to put an end to the conflicts. Problems between Hezbollah and Amal ended with the sign of a ceasefire agreement in 1990 based on pragmatist policies that these countries followed.³⁹²

Iran increased its influence by collaborating with Syria in order to protect Hezbollah. This way, Hezbollah achieved political legitimacy and Iran could support it politically. Iran mainly was dependent on Syrian support in this period in order to advocate Hezbollah.³⁹³ Towards the end of 1980s, Iran enhanced the status of the leadership of Hezbollah. Besides, Hezbollah leaders sometimes were brokers between Syria and the other groups in Lebanon.³⁹⁴ Iran and Hezbollah was moderate and they turned into the same direction with Syria. This way, Hezbollah's armed resistance was legitimized especially after the Taif Agreement in 1989.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁰ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 49-52.

³⁹¹ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 129-132.

³⁹² Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 90.

³⁹³ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 129-133.

³⁹⁴ Azani, *Hezbollah*, 80-81.

³⁹⁵ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 129.

Iran's support for Hezbollah was significant to the strengthening of the organization's power. Iran gave about 16-20 million dollars aid annually to Hezbollah. Thanks to this support given by Iran, Hezbollah could provide social services to the Shiites. It gave Hezbollah some sort of loyalty when there were no Lebanese states by providing social services necessary.³⁹⁶ Besides, Hezbollah fighters was paid high amount of money compared to others. Israeli supported SLA's commander complained that Hezbollah fighter's salary was three times higher than their salaries.³⁹⁷ It should also be indicated that Hezbollah tried to develop domestic sources for funding in this period. However, its fast growing became possible mainly thanks to the support of Iran.

In this period, Iran tried to secure its existence and influence in Lebanon by allying itself with Syria. Iran's influence was mainly dependent on Syria. Hezbollah's revisionist vision brought Iran and Syria to the edge of conflict many times before the Khomeini's death. After his death, Iran's policy became moderated and they followed a limited objective in Lebanon. Iran's sustainable position was thanks to its moderated policy and cooperation with Syria.

After the Israeli intervention, Syria and Iran followed different objectives. Asad focused on a limited objective in order to increase Syrian influence in Lebanon and balance power presence in favor of Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Iran's government wanted to spread Islamic revolution and Lebanon was a strategic country in this objective with its Shiite population. Iran at the beginning wanted to overthrow the Lebanese government. However, Iranian officials understood that it was not possible for its allies to reach this aim, it changed its policy and followed pragmatist policies in Lebanon. Iran's policy especially in President Rafsanjani period changed from being revisionist to pragmatist. Besides, it developed good

³⁹⁶ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 79-82.

³⁹⁷ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 180.

relations with Syrian supported groups in Lebanon and Iran worked and contributed for the increase of Syrian influence in Lebanon.³⁹⁸

Having looked at Syria's and Iran's foreign policy, however, there is a significant difference. While Syria only tried to increase its influence in Lebanon and cooperated with many different groups, Iran followed its revisionist objective and it cooperated with Shiite radicals. After Iran changed its strategy to a more pragmatist one in the late 1980s, Hezbollah did not use terrorism and violence against Israel and its allies in the south Lebanon.³⁹⁹ Hezbollah changed its politics and tried to increase the use of non-violent means to increase its influence especially starting from 1990.⁴⁰⁰

Iran could increase its influence in Lebanon thanks to the Syrian acceptance of Iranian activities.⁴⁰¹ Iran was a good ally and helping Syria in its fight in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taif Agreement was supported by the Arab League and Asad was encouraged by especially Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to end its relations with Iran.⁴⁰² However, Asad thought that Iran was more effective in supporting Syria against Israel compared to Saudi Arabia. For this reason, Syrian-Iranian alliance continued despite its negative repercussions against Syria. It is clear that Iran-Hezbollah coalition was quite effective and influential in Lebanon, however it

³⁹⁸ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran*, 154-155.

³⁹⁹ Blanford, *Warriors of God*, 65-66.

⁴⁰⁰ Alagha, "Hezbollah's Conception," 104.

⁴⁰¹ Robert Baer, *The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower* (New York: Broadway Books, 2009), 193.

⁴⁰² Marie Joelle Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional Means: Lebanon's Taif Agreement," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 573.

should not be disregarded that it became possible with the support of Syria and its acceptance of Iran in the country.

Syria was quite successful and took advantages in Lebanon towards the end of the civil war. Syria shared similar cultural identity, such as language and historical experience coming from Ottoman rule as well as French mandate. Syria's alliance with the Soviet Union and its support for Syria in the UN also advocated Syria in this period.⁴⁰³ After the collapse of the USSR, Syria was in advantageous position especially as there was growing response to invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and this way Syria could destroy the opposition forces against the Syrian supported Lebanese government. Thus, international community tended to accept the Taif Agreement in Lebanon.⁴⁰⁴ Syria benefited economically and politically after the civil war ended. Syrian citizens working in Lebanon earned more than a billion dollars every year and Syrian army received money by smuggling.⁴⁰⁵ Asad achieved its objective and Syrian dominance was maintained in Lebanon. This provided an advantageous position for Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁴⁰³ O'Ballance, *Civil War*, 140.

⁴⁰⁴ Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional," 573.

⁴⁰⁵ Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional," 573.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Lebanon has complex and weak political structure since its independence and many conflicts occurred between different groups and sects. As each group aimed to secure their own interests, they developed various alliances inside and outside the country. This structure left the country vulnerable to the foreign interventions and Lebanon became a battleground for Syria and Israel where they tried to save their regional interests and implemented their strategies in the Civil War in the years between 1975 and 1990.

As well as domestic problems, regional and international problems paved the way for long-lasting catastrophe in Lebanon. The Civil War emerged as a product of local disputes and structure of the country, however, the reason why it took so long was the dispute and power struggle between Syria and Israel and their aims that were analyzed in this thesis. Syria and Israel struggled with each other to have more dominance in the region as Lebanon was a strategic neighboring country for them. Controlling Lebanon was crucial for their foreign policy interests.

Syria maintained domestic stability when Asad came to power in 1970 and with the change of foreign policy strategy; it aimed to be more influential in the region. The Civil War paved the way for Syrian strategy to be an influential actor and deep involvement to Lebanese domestic politics started. Syrian officials were concerned about Israel being active in Lebanon and for this reason; they implemented their strategies regarding this fact. Their policy was shaped based on security understanding in relation with Israel. It can be also claimed that the intervention of Syria was also due to internal security concerns as well as regional dominance aims. In other words, Syria's Lebanon policy was mainly shaped with the security

concern in connection with Israel. Syria did not want Israel to be powerful in Lebanon due to regional disputes with this country.

Israel regarded the Civil War as an opportunity to weaken the Palestinian organization and resistance in Lebanon. It exerted efforts to protect the Christian parts of Lebanon and provided services for Maronites. Israel also wanted to observe the Syrian presence and it generated a “Red Line” to protect its borders. South Lebanon was strategically important for Israel to protect its own territories. After the establishment of the state of Israel, Palestinian refugee issue came to the scene and Palestinians used Lebanon soil as their base where they organized and continued their combat. This resulted in the rise of concern of Israel and it wanted to secure its northern borders.

These two regional countries intervened in Lebanese domestic affairs and regarded the Civil War as an opportunity to preserve their interests. It is clear that the Civil War happened due to the political and social structure of Lebanon. However, it became more complex and chaotic after the intervention of Syria and Israel and lasted for 15 years. This was a regional power struggle between Syria and Israel and they had to be influential in Lebanon in order to be a powerful regional actor in the Middle East. They realized that they had to be influential in Lebanon to be a powerful actor in the region. They perceived that their security in the region started from not only their borders but also Lebanese territory. For that reason, they looked for ways to generate alliances with the powerful groups in the country. However, their aims in Lebanon were different and thus they followed different policies and strategy in the country.

Lebanese Civil War became a regional issue in this period, it was not just a conflict or war between Lebanese groups from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, it lasted for long period of time due to the struggle of these regional countries and it came to an end with the effort of Syria by the Taif Agreement in 1989. This study shows that religion, ethnicity or sect is not a determinant factor for all of the actors

aforementioned in this period, in contrast, their interest and security were determinant factors and they took their sides accordingly. Syria did not hesitate to generate alliances with Maronites and after a few years with Muslims. In addition, Israel did not take into consideration the security of Maronites, their only concern was limiting the presence and power of Syria and PLO.

Starting from the very beginning, Syria was more involved in the developments and it generated alliances with many different groups based on its interests. Syria reinforced the existing political structure and this way it legalized its existence in the country. Asad followed quite a pragmatic strategy. As Israel realized Syrian policy also in line with its interests, it supported the Syrian policy in Lebanon. However, when Israel realized that its power and influence decreased and the power of PLO rose, it started following a more active and interventionist policy in Lebanon. Due to these developments, the Civil War experienced more catastrophic and destructive years in later period.

Besides, Asad followed its allies indirectly as much as possible to pretend it only wanted stability and security of Lebanon. This way, it was a reliable foreign power in the country. When it was needed and vital, it directly intervened in the Lebanese politics in line with Arab countries and legalized its existence in Lebanon. This was quite pragmatic policy and brought Syria success in Lebanon. Asad could develop its relations with the government, all other confessions as well as Palestinians. While Asad followed indirect policy in Lebanon and gained trust of many different groups, Israel's directly intervention in the southern Lebanon took reactions and Israel became vulnerable as it started losing its allies. Besides, Israel's intervention was based on violent means different than Syria.

Israel's two main competitor namely Syria and the Palestinians became strong and powerful in Lebanon. When Israel realized this fact, it started following an active policy. This shows the regional characteristics of the developments in the Lebanese Civil War. Israel was trying to establish dominance over Syria and the Palestinians

as it wanted to be strong in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When its policy failed, Israel followed more active policy and it resulted in the making the events and developments more complicated in the Civil War.

As Israel's influence weakened and its policy failure, it intervened in Lebanon in 1982. However, Syria could maintain and protect its influence in Lebanon especially after Bashir Gamayal was assassinated. He was the only hope and ally of Israel in Lebanon to increase its power inside the country. Besides, Israel's brutal massacres in Sabra and Shatila camps took reactions both in the region and international level. Syria's ability to generate alliances with different groups continued especially after the Israel's invasion. Despite Israel's invasion, Syria still was the only dominant power in Lebanon.

Iran increased its influence in Lebanon especially after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran aimed at establishing an Islamic regime in the country in order to spread its Islamic revolution. Iran's influence increased in Lebanon with the help of Syria. Iran also supported the Palestinians in Lebanon in order to undermine the development of Arab bloc in favor of Iraq against Iran. Iranian and Syrian aim conflicted, though they established a strong alliance as their enemy was common, Iraq and Israel. Iran wanted to increase its influence through the Shiite population. Iran sent its soldiers to Lebanon in 1982 in order to pursue its objectives.

Iran played a significant role in Lebanon in the fight against Israel with its Islamic ideology as well as its discourse. Khomeini's talk with the Shiites in Lebanon had significant impact in generating reaction against Israel's presence in the country. Islamic Amal played an important role in the fight against the invasion of Israel in 1982. We also see that Iran developed good relations with Arafat in this period in order to be powerful against Israel and undermine its presence. It should be also indicated that the IRGC generated alliance with Islamic Amal movement in Lebanon in spite of some difference in opinions as their interest and enemies were the same. Amal's ideology was secular and it was against Islamic revolution.

However, both parties gained strength in Lebanon thanks to this alliance. Iran increased its influence through military indirect as well as financial support. Although Iran aimed to overthrow the regime and establish an Islamic government in Lebanon, different than other regional powers, it could increase its influence with the help of Syria and the Shiites groups in Lebanon.

After Khomeini died in 1989, Iran started following pragmatist policies and Hezbollah also started generating its policies in line with Iran. In this period, Iran's pragmatist policies were in line with Syrian policies. For this reason, there was an environment that both Syria, Iran and Hezbollah could cooperate closely. Hezbollah became the closest ally of Iran and it started following more independent policies from Iran towards the end of 1980s. Although they had some difference in opinions and conflicting interests, it is clear that they gave importance to Iran-Hezbollah alliance and followed strategies in the direction of developing it. Hezbollah became influential and active in southern Lebanon and it started to be represented in Lebanese political system.

Both Iran and Hezbollah towards the end of the 1980s started following pragmatists period and tried to avoid possible conflict with their allies to be able to protect their interests in Lebanon. Iran tried to maintain its good relations in this period as well to increase its impact and protect Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fact that Hezbollah and Iran became moderate forces in Lebanon and gave up their policies in the first years of 1980s gave them strength and especially after 1989 Taif Agreement, Hezbollah became stronger in the country.

Iran was an important ally in this period in the increase of influence of Syria especially after it started following pragmatists policies and gave up radical, revisionist ideology. Although Syria was supported by Saudi Arabia in the Taif Agreement, it did not tend to end its relations with Iran as its alliance with Iran was quite pragmatic and useful for its interests.

Towards the end of the Civil War, Syria achieved its objectives thanks to its direct support to its allies. It advocated its allies politically, militarily and logistically. Syrian government always aimed at reinforcing the existing government and political status quo in Lebanon only with major change requests towards the end of the Civil War as it was implicated in the Taif Agreement. When Israel's influence decreased, Syria started intervening in Lebanon directly and secured its effect in the country. When Israel was vulnerable, Syria found a ground to perform its aims the way it wanted. In the last years, thanks to active and realist foreign policy of Syria, there were no opposition groups which faced the existence and power of Syria in Lebanon.

Lebanese Civil War in this period had significant regional contagion effect. It can be considered based on the external intervention and military as well as economic assistance to the rebel groups and government itself, it is seen in the Lebanese case. Both regional powers which their policies and strategies are assessed in this thesis gave military and economic support to their allies in Lebanon. As exists in the literature it is argued that foreign intervention takes place when there is reasonable expectation of success, projected time horizon for intervention is short and domestic opposition to intervention is minimal. In the beginning of the civil war, when Syria initially intervened in the civil war, Muslims were dominant and they were close to the success. However, Syria decided to advocate the existing government as it did not want to risk the unity of Lebanon. Besides, it is seen in the intervention of these countries that when they intervened with consensus of important actors in the events, the possibility of the success of intervention increases.

However, it should be noticed that the Muslims were quite strong in the first phase of the civil war and they were quite close to the success. However, Syria still intervened in the developments as it considered its security was at risk. It might be said that there was no expectation of success in real senses. Syria intervened, though, with care and it tended to take it shorter and wanted to make its intervention

legal by getting acceptance of the government itself and other regional countries as well as Arab League. For this reason, besides time horizon, domestic opposition and expectation for success, we can add norm that whether the intervention is legal or not. It is significantly quite important in fact in terms of regional stability and domestic politics of the intervened country in addition to intervening side.

During the civil war, Syria seemed to take into consideration this reality better while Israel was destructive and its intervention took reaction of the Maronites as well as Muslims. In other words, as Doyle argues about short projected time of horizon for intervention and minimal opposition to intervention in the country, we can claim that Syria conducted policies and strategies in line with this principle while Israel seemed to be lasting power in Lebanon being there only for its own interest.

Considering the claim that while the foreign intervention is impartial or neutral, it is not effective, biased intervention has capacity to change the balance in the civil war. After studying the Lebanese Civil War, we see that the intervention of Syria took place after it perceived the developments in the country as threat. Due to security concerns, Syria supported the Maronites in fear that Lebanon could be divided due to rise of Muslims. In other words, Syria's intervention was biased and directly supported the Maronites in order to preserve its national interests.

In the beginning of the civil war, Syria was the only external power intervening in the civil war and after this intervention, civil war was coming to an end. However, as Israel was not happy about the rise of power of Syria in Lebanon, it also wanted to increase its power and influence in the country. Israel developed good relations with the Maronites against Palestinians and Syria. It provided significant aid and help to them. In sum, the interventions of these countries were direct and supporting one side of the civil war, resulting in the longer duration in the civil war by changing the balance.

In addition, when the external assistance to the incumbent has capacity for dominant, it shortens the duration. As it is seen in the Lebanese civil war, Syrian support for the Maronites in the beginning has capacity for dominance and civil war was coming to an end. However, after Israel entered in the events, it changed the developments. Besides, when foreign intervention advocates the insurgent's sides, if it has capacity for parity, it causes longer civil wars. After Israel allied itself with the Maronites in Lebanon, Syria started advocating the Muslims and this support had capacity for parity which resulted in longer civil war.

We can also analyze the foreign interventions to the civil war based on whether it is early intervention or not by considering the claim that early intervention causes the prolonging of the civil war. When the intervention is in the late phases of the civil war, it increases the chance for negotiated settlement. In the Lebanese Civil War, in 15-year period, we see the intervention of Syria and Israel from the very beginning. In this context, their early interventions also resulted in the prolonging the civil war, which is in line with our argument.

In the beginning of the civil war, Muslims was the dominant side and they were almost becoming the winner of it. As it was explained in this thesis, Muslims leaders even went to Damascus to talk to Asad and claimed that the political structure was generated to protect the interest of the Maronites and they were winning the civil war. Asad wanted them to stop their actions as international powers would not accept their victory. We do not know what would happen if the Syrian intervention had not taken place. However, it took place very early and it can be claimed that this intervention changed the dynamics and course of events, thus resulted in the prolonging of the civil war.

The regional developments were quite influential in the emergence and duration of the civil war as well. The Palestinian existence was one of the reasons of the emergence of civil war. Its existence and organization especially in South Lebanon was due to the regional developments such as Arab-Israeli conflict and their

disposal from Jordan. Besides, they became an important actor during the civil war with their organization and actions. Israel's intervention was due to their presence and actions with regard to security concerns. In addition, the Iranian revolution in 1979 also affected the developments in Lebanon as Iran tended to intervene in Lebanon with the help and support of Syria. The civil war in Lebanon resulted in escalation of tensions and regional instability.

As well as regional developments and foreign interventions, domestic developments were quite significant during the Lebanese civil war. Israel increased its existence and influence in Lebanon starting from 1978. However, especially after Bashir Gamayal assassination, its influence decreased in Lebanon as he was almost the only ally of Israel. For this reason, in addition to discussion and argumenets above, one should always keep in mind that as well as foreign interventions and regional developments, domestic politics and developments are also quite determinant in the civil war.



Figure 1. Occurrence of External Intervention to Civil Wars




Figure 2. Prolonging Civil War

Table 1. Pre-Civil War Period

| Rise of Tensions (1943-1958) | Efforts to Maintain Stability (1958-1967) | Developments towards Civil War (1967-1975) |
|---|---|--|
| 1- Domestic Developments | 1- Domestic Developments | 1- Regional Developments |
| Sectarian-based political Structure | Period of stability in President Chehab and Hilu periods | 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and Israeli occupations |
| Marginalizing Muslims | Moderate policies to the Muslims | Palestinian refugee issue |
| Chamon's policy of developing relations with the West | Establishing better relations with the Arab countries | Cairo Agreement in 1969 |
| Acceptance of Eisenhower's Doctrine | Emphasizing Lebanese identity rather than Maronite identity | 1970 Black September in Jordan |
| Establishment of National Front in 1957 | Political, economic and financial developments | Radicalization of Palestinians and attacks targeting Israel from Lebanese soil |
| 2- Regional Developments | 2- International Developments | 2- Domestic Developments |
| 1947 Arab-Israeli war | 1958 Civil War and the US intervention | 1968 elections dividing the parliament between opposition groups |
| Increase of Palestinian population | | Difference in opinion between groups on the Palestinian issue |
| Abdel Nasser's Pan Arabist ideology | | 1968 elections dividing the parliament between opposition groups |

Table 2. Civil War and the Foreign Interventions

| First Phase of the Civil War (1975-1976) | Second Phase of the Civil War (1977-1984) | Third Phase of the Civil War (1984-1990) |
|---|--|--|
| 1 A- Syria's Aims | 1- Israel | 1- Syria |
| Keeping Lebanon united and making Palestinians organized | Disturbance of Palestinian gain of power and Syrian presence | Effort to reinforce the government through its allies after decrease of Israeli influence |
| Syria's intervention on the approval of the Arab League and request of the President Frangieh | Begin coming to power in 1977 and improvement of relations with the Maronites as well as adapting interventionist policies | Capacity to develop relations with different groups such as Amal Movement, Christians and Druzes |
| 1 B- Domestic Developments | Israeli Occupation in 1978, Operation Litani after Fatah's raids to northern Israel | Division of the government between Aoun and Al Hoss in Lebanon |
| Asad coming to power in 1970, maintaining stability and implementing pragmatic foreign policy | Peace for Galilee, assassination of Bashir Gamayel, and Sabra and Shatila Massacres in 1982 | Power gain of Al Hoss government receiving support from Syria and other Arab community |
| Considering Lebanese economy as supplementary | 2- Syria | Syria implementing policy of supporting the existing government with reformist understanding |
| 2- Israel | Advocating pro-Syrian government, Amin's presidency | 2- Iran |
| Good Fence policy advocating the Maronites | Dealing with domestic rebellions against Asad government | Actions were bound to Syria and supporting radical side of Amal |
| Supplying arms aid to the Maronites | 3-Iran | Conducting attacks against Israel and supporting Palestinians |
| Limited policies towards Lebanon, decrease of area of influence | Increase of attention to Lebanon after 1982 to spread Islamic revolution and influence Shiite population by establishing alliance with Syria | Vital financial support equal to \$ 100 million annually |

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
APPENDICES

A. PICTURES FROM THE CIVIL WAR



Picture 1: The destructiveness of the Lebanese Civil War⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁶ Retrieved from; <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-01/lebanons-civil-war-1/11163522>, in November 15, 2019.



Picture 2: A refugee from the civil war washing her granddaughter's only dress in Beirut.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁷ Retrieved from; <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-01/an-image-from-lebanons-civil-conflict-1/11163648>, in November 15, 2019



Picture 3: The ravage of the civil war on civilians⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁸ Retrieved from; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/lebanon-photograph-woman-whose-image-symbolised-disintegration>, in 15 November, 2019



Picture 4: Destroyed neighborhoods of Beirut in the beginning of the civil war⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁹ Retrieved from; <https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/young-lebanese-still-shaped-by-decades-old-civil-war-1.63263807>, in December 3, 2019



Picture 5: Lebanese Muslim militias in the west Beirut⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰ Retrived from; <https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/young-lebanese-still-shaped-by-decades-old-civil-war-1.63263807>, in December 3, 2019



Picture 6: Rescuers trying to save the survivors of a car bombing in Sin-el-Fil, northeast of Beirut in 1986⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ Retrieved from; <https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/books/ct-prj-confessions-rabee-jaber-20160323-story.html>, in December 3, 2019

B. THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE TAIF AGREEMENT⁴¹²

The Taif Agreement

This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.

First, General Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles

- A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.
- B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.
- C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.
- D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.
- E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.
- F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability.
- G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.
- H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].
- I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies:

The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber may vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.

⁴¹² Retrieved from; https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/-Lebanon/the_tauf_agreement_english_version_.pdf, in November 15, 2019.

3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:
 - a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.
 - b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
 - c. Proportionately between the districts.
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic:

The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.
3. Issue decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.

10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister:

The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.

D. Cabinet:

The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

The following are among the powers exercised by it:

- 1- Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and its abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister:

The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him individually

F. Cabinet Resignation:

Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:
 - a. If its chairman resigns.
 - b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.
 - c. If its chairman dies.
 - d. At the beginning of a president's term.
 - e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.
 - f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism:

Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.

To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies election the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:

- a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
- b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:
 - a. The president of the republic.
 - b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
 - c. The prime minister.
 - d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.

[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law:

Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development:

A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.

5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.

G. Information:

All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:

1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding

Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to

Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.

C. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, 1975 ile 1990 yılları arasında vuku bulan Lübnan İç Savaşı'na Suriye ve İsrail'in müdahalelerini analiz etmekte ve iç savaş dış müdahaleler bağlamında incelemektedir. Gelişmeleri bölgesel açıdan ele alan çalışma, iç savaşın çıkma sebeplerinin Lübnan'ın siyasi ve toplumsal yapısından kaynaklansa da uzayıp karmaşık bir hal almasını, Suriye ve İsrail'in bölgesel anlamda güç mücadelesi sebebiyle müdahalelerinden kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır. Suriye ve İsrail, Lübnan'ı stratejik çıkarları açısından hayati görmüşler ve İç Savaş bu çıkarları korumak için bir fırsata dönüştürmüşlerdir. Lübnan iç siyasetine, ülkedeki farklı gruplarla ittifak kurmak suretiyle müdahale etmişlerdir.

İsrail, Lübnan'daki Filistinli varlığını, bu ülkeyi örgütlenmede bir üs olarak kullanmalarından dolayı güvenlik problemi olarak görmüş ve kuzey sınırları olan güney Lübnan'ı kontrol altına almak istemiştir. Suriye ise bölgesel üstünlük mücadelesinde Lübnan'ı hayati olarak görmüş ve kontrol altında tutmayı amaçlamıştır. Nitekim, İç Savaş, bu iki ülkenin etkisini artırdığı yıllara tanık olduktan sonra, Suriye'nin çabasıyla 1989 yılında Taif Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasının ardından sona ermiştir.

Son yıllarda çatışma türlerine baktığımızda, iç savaşların önemli ölçüde önemini artırdığını ve yaşanan iç savaşların süresinin oldukça uzun olduğunu görüyoruz. Devletler arasında çıkan savaşlar ortalama 11 ay sürerken, iç savaşların ortalama 7 yıl sürdüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Ayrıca, 1945'ten beri yaşanan iç savaşlarda yaklaşık 25 milyon kayıp verilmiştir. Önemli ölçüde yaygın olan iç savaşların bölgesel etkileri de görülmektedir ve neredeyse hepsine komşu ülkeler katılarak, iç savaşları önemli derecede etkilemişlerdir. Dolayısıyla, iç savaşlar bölgesel istikrarı olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir. Artmakta olan önemini göz önüne alarak, iç nedenlerden ortaya çıkan iç savaşlar uzmanlar tarafından ulusal ve bölgesel planda yeniden analiz edilmektedir. Brown'ın ifade ettiği gibi iç savaşların yaşandığı bölgeler olumsuz

yönde etkilenmektedir. Dolayısıyla, iç savaşlar önemli bir çalışma alanı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, çalışmamızda 1975-1990 yılları arasında yaşanan Lübnan İç Savaşı analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. 15 yıl süren bu iç savaş, bölgesel gelişmeler ve dış güçlerin müdahalesi çerçevesinde ele alınmış ve iç savaşa Suriye-İran ve İsrail'in ne derece etkisi olduğu araştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Sambanis ve Doyle dış müdahale ve iç savaşın süresi arasındaki ilişkiyi ele almakta ve dış güçlerin iç savaşta yönetime veya muhalif gruba yönelik askeri ve ekonomik desteklerine odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, şunu da ifade etmektedirler ki 190 iç savaş vakasında yalnızca 57'si dış müdahaleler neticesinde sonlanmış. Dolayısıyla, dış müdahalelerin iç savaşların süresi noktasında önemli etkileri olduğu açıktır. Regan da Doyle ve Sambanis'e katılmakla birlikte şunu ifade etmektedir: müdahaleler başarıya odaklı bir şekilde gerçekleşmekte ve müdahale eden dış devlet, müdahale süresini oldukça kısa tutmaya çalışmakla birlikte ülke içinde muhalif grubun sınırlı düzeyde olduğu durumlarda müdahale etmeye yönelmektedirler.

Ayrıca, tek taraflı müdahalelerin iç savaş süresini kısalttığını söyleyen uzmanlar da bulunmaktadır. Betts yanlı ya da nötr müdahalelerin etkili olmadığını söylemektedir. Bu karşın, taraflı müdahalelerin iç savaşta dengeyi değiştirme potansiyelinin olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Regan ise yönetime yönelik dış desteğin üstünlük kurma kapasitesi olursa iç savaşın süresi kısaltmakta olduğunu, muhalif gruba yönelik desteğin eşitlik sağlama potansiyeli varsa bunun iç savaş süresini uzatacağını söylemektedir. Mason, Weingarten ve Fett ise iç savaşın ilk aşamasında gerçekleşen müdahalenin iç savaşı uzattığını, daha geç gerçekleşen müdahalenin ise uzlaşma olasılığını artırdığını ifade etmektedirler.

Devlet dışı aktörler de iç savaşlarda önemli ölçüde rol almaktadır. İç savaş boyunca etkisini artırmak isteyen dış devletler, bu aktörlerle ittifak kurmak suretiyle kendi menfaatlerini artırmaya yönelik kullanılmaktadırlar. İttifak kurabilmelerinin sebebi aynı zamanda bu gruplarla olan ortak görüşleri ve çıkarlarıdır. İç savaşların bu

boyutunu, dış devletin amacı, devlet dışı aktörlerin bu amaca ulaşmaya yönelik ne ölçüde katkı sağladığı ve dış devletlerin bu aktörleri nasıl desteklediği gibi sorular sorarak anlayabiliriz.

Belgin Şan Akça ve Zeev Maoz'un belirttiği üzere devletler dolaylı ve sınırlı yaklaşım geliştirmek suretiyle bölgesel çatışmalara, içerideki bir grupla ittifak kurmak suretiyle müdahil olmaktadır. Bu strateji ise çatışmanın artmasına neden olmaktadır. Navin Bapat ise devletlerin çıkarlarını korumak amacıyla rakiplerinin rakipleriyle ilişkilerini geliştirmekte başarılı olduğunu söylemektedir. Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham'ın ifade ettiği üzere devletler muhalif grupları rakiplerine karşı onların tamamen yıkmaktan ziyade zayıflamalarına yönelik destekleme eğilimindedir. Tezimiz için önemli olan nokta ise devletlerin rakip devletleri yıkmaktan ziyade sınırlı bir şekilde zayıflatmaya yönelik destekleme eğiliminde olmalarıdır.

Lübnan İç Savaşı'nın, Lübnan'ın 1943 yılında bağımsızlığını almasından itibaren önemli ölçüde devam eden çeşitli siyasal ve toplumsal yapısından kaynaklanan sorunlar nedeniyle çıkmış olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Çatışmalar temel olarak Hıristiyan ve Müslüman unsurlar arasında görüş ayrılıkları ve siyasal üstünlük kurmaya yönelik politikalar nedeniyle çıkmıştır. Lübnan siyasi yapısı kurucu "Milli Pakt" çerçevesinde mezhepsel temsile dayandırılmıştır. Ancak, bu iç savaş, Suriye'nin ve İsrail en baştan itibaren aktif bir şekilde müdahil olmasıyla daha karmaşık bir hal almıştır. İran ise İslam Devrimi'nden sonra Lübnan'a Suriye'nin desteğine dayanarak müdahil olmuştur ve 1980'lerden itibaren Suriye-İran ittifakı görülmektedir. Bu ittifakın Lübnan'da önemli yansımaları olmuştur. Biz, bu çalışmamızda bu devletlerin müdahalelerini bölgesel gelişmeler bağlamında analiz etmeye çalıştık ve bu ülkelerin bölgesel güç mücadelesi çerçevesinde Lübnan'daki çıkarlarını korumak amacıyla iç savaş bir fırsata dönüştürdüklerini savunduk.

Bu bakımdan, bölgesel gelişmeler çerçevesinde incelediğimiz çalışmamızda, Fawaz Gerges'in görüşleri de önemlidir. Büyük güçlerin bu iç savaşa etkisi elbette vardır.

Ancak biz bu çalışmamızda bölgesel gelişmelerin ve bölgesel devletlerin etkisinin daha fazla ve belirleyici olduğunu iddia etmekteyiz. Nitekim, Gerges'a göre bölgesel gelişmeler, küresel gelişmelere kıyasla Lübnan İç Savaşı'nı daha çok etkilemiştir. Ona göre bu iç savaş Doğu-Batı karşıtlığından çok Araplar arasında yaşanan bir çatışmadır. İç savaş sırasında büyük güçlerin rekabetinden çok bölgesel gelişmeler belirleyici olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, gelişmeleri bölgesel gelişmeler çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Gerges ayrıca şunu da ifade etmektedir ki çatışmalar Lübnan'da yaşayan grupların bölgesel güçlerle ilgili farklı algılarından ve düşüncelerinden kaynaklanmıştır. Bu ise grupların çıkarları çerçevesinde gelişmiştir ve Suriye-İran ya da İsrail ile ittifak kurmuşlardır. Şunu da belirtmektedir ki uzun süren iç savaş ancak Lübnanlı politikacıların Suriye'nin hakimiyetini kabul etmeleri sonucunda neticelenmiştir.

Bu çerçeveden yola çıkarak, Lübnan İç Savaşı'nın nasıl çıktığını ve bu bölgesel güçlerin amaçlarını ve çıkarlarını analiz etmek önemlidir. Bunu anlayabilmek için ise şu soruları yanıtlamak gereklidir: Lübnan'ın 1943'te bağımsızlığını kazanmasından itibaren iç savaşa kadar ülkede ne gibi gelişmeler yaşanmıştır? Ülkede Hıristiyan-Müslüman ilişkileri nasıldır ve bağımsızlığından itibaren yönetime gelen Cumhurbaşkanı ve hükümetler nasıl politikalar izlemişlerdir ki bu kadar kısa sürede 1958 ve 1975-1990 yıllarında iki savaş dahi yaşanmıştır? Marunilerin, Dürzilerin, Sünnilerin çıkarları nedir ki ittifaklarını ve taraflarını ona göre seçmişlerdir? Suriye ve İsrail'in iç savaş boyunca hangi politikaları iç savaşın çözümsüz ve sürekli hale gelmesine katkı sağlamıştır? Bu soruların cevaplanması, Lübnan İç Savaşı'nı daha iyi analiz etmek için önemlidir. Ayrıca, Lübnan İç Savaşı'na dış müdahalelerin ne derece etki ettiğinin anlaşılması bakımından da gerekli görülmektedir.

Lübnan'ın mezhepsel katılıma dayalı bir siyasi sistemi vardır. Birçok farklı etnik grubu içinde barındırması nedeniyle toplumsal yapısı oldukça kırılmalı bir özellik göstermektedir. Lübnan'da bulunan bu gruplar kabile anlayışıyla hareket etmektedir ve aile bağları önemli derecede belirleyici bir rol oynamaktadır. Ayrıca, bu

grupların Lübnan'ın bölgede ve uluslararası planda bulunan konumuyla ilgili farklı anlayışları ve beklentileri vardır. Dolayısıyla, bu gruplar kendi çıkarlarını temel alarak ülke içinde ve dışında farklı ittifak sistemleri geliştirmektedirler. Bu yapı ise Lübnan'ı dış müdahalelere açık bir hale getirmiştir.

1975 yılında başlayan iç savaş, Lübnan'ın toplumsal yapısı ve siyasi sistemi nedeniyle gruplar arasında ortaya çıkan sürekli bir çatışma ortamından beslenerek ve bölgesel gelişmelerin de etkisi altında ortaya çıkmıştır. 1943 yılında bağımsızlığını aldığı tarihten itibaren Lübnan siyasi sistemi Marunileri korumaya ve onların baskın grup olmalarını sürdürmeye yönelik oluşturulmuştur. Ülkede siyasi gücün mezheplere göre bölüştürüldüğü bir siyasi sistem olan *confessionalism* uygulanmıştır. Bu sisteme göre Cumhurbaşkanı Maruni Hıristiyan, Başbakan Sünni ve Meclis Başkanı ise Şii olacaktır. Mecliste Hıristiyanlar, Müslümanlara göre 6'ya 5 oranında daha fazla temsil ediliyordu.

1932 yılında yapılan nüfus sayımına göre belirlenen bu oran, ilerleyen dönemlerde Müslümanların nüfusunun artmasına rağmen, Marunilerin ayrıcalıklı pozisyonunun korunabilmesi adına uygulanmaya devam edilmiştir. Ayrıca şunun da belirtilmesi gerekir ki, ülkede yürütmenin esas gücünü Cumhurbaşkanı elinde bulunduruyordu. Nitekim, Hudson'a göre Cumhurbaşkanı ülkedeki en etkili grubun da temsilcisi durumundaydı. Özetle, Marunilerin siyasi sistemde ayrıcalıklı konumları bulunuyordu ve bu düzen korunmaya devam edilmiştir.

Yukarıda anlatıldığı üzere Lübnan'ın bu siyasi yapısı dini gruplar arasında düşmanlık duygularının gelişmesine ve çatışmaların çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu gruplar belirli aileler tarafından yönlendirilmektedir ve Lübnan'da aile bağları çok önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Güçlü ve zengin ailelerden oluşan bu gruplar zaim olarak bilinmektedir. Lübnan'da uzun yıllardır etkisini sürdüren bu aileler belirleyici bir rol oynamaktadır. Tarihsel arka plana baktığımız zaman, bu ailelerin Osmanlı döneminden beri etkilerini sürdürdüklerini görmekteyiz. Osmanlı Devleti'nin bu bölgelerdeki yönetimini ve bu ailelerin etkisini Hourani, seçkinler

siyaseti (politics of notables) olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu yapı, köylülerin kırsalda toprak sahipleri için üretim yaptığı durumda ortaya çıkmaktadır ve bu bahsedilen aileler ise gücünü şehirde yaşamaktan almaktadırlar. Özellikle 1850'lerden itibaren hem bölgesel hem de Osmanlı Devleti'nin kendi iç siyasetindeki gelişmeler nedeniyle başlayan süreçte etkisini artıran bu aileler, varlıklarını sonraki dönemlerde de sürdürmüşlerdir. Yönetimde etkisi olan bu aileler toplumun temsilcisiymiş gibi hareket etmişlerdir. Ayrıca, zaman içerisinde çatışan çıkarlar nedeniyle birçok seçkin aile ortaya çıkmıştır ve kendi çıkarlarına göre siyaset izlemişlerdir. Bu nedenle onların politikaları döneme göre değişiklik arz etmiştir.

Lübnan'ın sosyal yapısının tarihsel oluşum sürecini anlattıktan sonra, 19. yüzyılda Lübnan'da gerçekleşen önemli gelişmelere değinebiliriz. Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın oğlu İbrahim Paşa 1831 yılından 1840 yılına kadar Lübnan'ı yönetmiştir. Yönetimi sona erdikten sonra bile uyguladığı politikaların Lübnan'da önemli yansımaları olmuştur. Osmanlı Devleti, burada istikrarı ve güvenliği sağlamaya ve Tanzimat reformları çerçevesinde yönetimde etkisini artırmaya yönelik politikalar izlemiştir ancak başarılı olamamıştır. Osmanlı Devleti'nin izlediği politikalara rağmen bölgede Maruniler ve Dürziler arasında çatışmalar yaşanmıştır. İbrahim Paşa yönetiminden önce baskın grup olan Dürzilerin gücü sınırlanmış ve Marunilere verilen imtiyazlar sayesinde bölgede dengeler değişmeye başlamıştır. İbrahim Paşa döneminden sonra da bu gelişmelerin devam etmesini isteyen Maruniler ve kaybettikleri gücü geri kazanmak isteyen Dürziler arasında düşmanlık duyguları gelişmiştir.

1840'lardan itibaren uygulanmaya başlanılan Çifte Kaymakamlık Sistemi Lübnan'ı kuzey ve güney olmak üzere iki bölgeye ayırmıştır. Böylece bu bölge mezhepsel temelde ilk kez olarak bölünmüştür. Üstelik uygulanmaya başlanan bu yeni sistem kısa bir süre istikrarı görece sağladıysa da gruplar arasında cereyan eden çatışmalar artarak devam etmiştir. 1856 yılında ilan edilen Islahat Fermanı'yla birlikte gayrimüslimlere tanınan hakların genişletilmesiyle beraber Lübnan da önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. Bu gelişme sonucunda ise Müslümanlar arasında tepki gelişmiş ve çatışmalar devam etmiştir. 1858 yılında toprak sahipleri ve köylüler

arasında başlayan çatışmalar artarak devam etmiş ve bölgenin geneline yayılmıştır. 1860 yılında yaşanan iç savaşın ardından 1861 yılında Mutasarrıflık olarak bilinen yeni bir sistem uygulanmaya başlamıştır ve 1920'lere kadar görece istikrar bölgede sağlanabilmiştir. Ancak, bu dönemde uygulanan yönetim sistemleri, mezhepsel ve dini ayrışmanın önünü açtığını ve gelecekte gruplar arasında ortaya çıkan çatışmaların tohumlarını attığını söyleyebiliriz.

Görüldüğü üzere, Lübnan'ın yukarıda bahsettiğimiz toplumsal yapısı ve yönetim sistemi nedeniyle gruplar arasında güvensizlik ve daha fazla siyasi güç amacıyla çıkan çatışmalar ve bölgesel gelişmeler 1975 yılında uzun soluklu bir iç savaşın yaşanmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak bu iç savaşın karmaşık bir hal alması ve daha uzun sürmesinin önünü bölgesel çıkarlarına ulaşabilmek amacıyla Lübnan İç Savaşı'na müdahil olan Suriye ve İsrail başta olmak üzere İran'ın müdahalelerinden kaynaklandığını söyleyebiliriz. Bu ülkeler siyasi ve askeri ittifaklar kurmak suretiyle Lübnan'daki gelişmelere müdahil olmuşlardır.

1943'te bağımsızlığını aldığı tarihten başlayarak, Lübnan'da mezhep tabanlı siyasi yapı ve parlamentoda kota sistemi uygulanmaya devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, bu dönemde Maroniler ülkede daha güçlü olmak adına stratejik pozisyonlara Hıristiyanları atamışlardır. Bu dönemde onlara göre asıl sorun ise, Filistinlilerin gücünü artırmalarıydı ve bunun ileride sorunlara yol açabileceği düşünülüyordu. Filistinlilerin gelmesiyle artan Müslüman nüfusu sayesinde siyasi sisteminin kendilerine karşı değiştirileceğini düşünüyorlardı.

Bu dönemde Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Müslümanlara yönelik politikasını ülke içi siyasette önemli etkileri olduğunu görmekteyiz. Müslümanları ülkede ve siyasi sistemde marjinalleştirmeleri ve daha az hak vermeleri gruplar arasında çatışmaların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Müslümanlara yönelik politikaları döneme göre değişiklik göstermiştir ve onların politikaları diğer Maruni güçlü ailelerle ilişkilerini de etkilemiştir. Örneğin, Khoury Müslümanlar ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirmeye çalıştığında, Frangieh ailesi onunla işbirliğini durdurmuştur.

Bu nedenle Khoury, Lübnan'ı beş seçim alanına ayıran seçim sistemini değiştirmiştir. Ancak yine de Khoury 1947 seçimlerini kazanmasına rağmen desteğini kaybetmiş ve bu dönemde Arap milliyetçileri Suriye ve Lübnan'ı birleştirmek için çaba harcamışlardır. Ayrıca, şu hususun da belirtilmesi gerekir ki Lübnan'ın bağımsızlığının ilk yıllarından itibaren, Suriye'nin rolünün ve 1947 Arap-İsrail savaşı gibi bölgesel gelişmelerin etkisini görmekteyiz.

Lübnan'daki Sünni Müslümanlar, Arap ülkeleriyle iyi ilişkiler geliştirmeyi amaçlıyordu. Chamoun 1952 yılında Cumhurbaşkanı olarak seçilmiş ve ülkeyi Batılılaştırmaya yönelik politikalar izlemeye başlamıştır. Onun döneminde Lübnan ticaret ve bankacılık alanında önemli gelişmeler kaydetmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bu dönemde Lübnan'ın Batı ile ilişkileri de zayıflamıştır. Lübnan'da yaşayan Müslümanlar Arap ülkelere yakın olmak istemişlerdir. Bu nedenle görüşleri bu anlamda çelişmektedir. Ayrıca, Gamal Abdülnasır'ın Pan-Arabizm ideolojisi de Lübnan'daki Sünni Müslümanlar üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Nitekim, Lübnan, bölgesel gelişmelerden önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. Bu dönemde Chamoun Eisenhower Doktrini'ni de kabul etmiştir. Müslümanlar buna karşıydılar ve bunun Ulusal Pakt'a aykırı olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir. Chamoun'un Eisenhower Doktrini'ni kabul etmesi bize Lübnan'daki gelişmelerin uluslararası boyutunu da göstermektedir. Ancak görüldüğü üzere bu etkiler bölgesel gelişmelere oranla oldukça sınırlı ölçüde olmuştur.

1958'de Fuad Chehab'ın Cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesiyle başlayan dönem, Lübnan tarihinde oldukça önemlidir. Chehab'ın politikaları daha demokratik ve liberaldir. Bu dönemde o Arap ülkeleriyle iyi ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. Müslümanlara devlet yönetiminde daha fazla güç verilmiştir. Chehab'ın izlediği politikalar ve faaliyetler sonucunda Lübnan'da istikrar ve barış sağlanabilmiştir. Bir önceki Khoury ve Chamoun dönemine kıyasla, Arap ülkeleriyle iyi ilişkiler geliştirmiştir.

Chehab'dan sonra Charles Hilu Cumhurbaşkanı seçilmiş ve Chehab'ın politikalarını sürdürmeye devam etmiştir. Ancak 1967 Arap-İsrail savaşı bu dönemde

gerçekleşmiş ve ayrıca Filistinli mülteci sorununun iç politikada önemli etkileri olmuştur. İsrail Sina Yarımadası, Golan Tepeleri, Gazze ve Batı Şeria'yı işgal etmiştir. BM'nin bu dönemdeki kararları İsrail'i uyarmış ve 1967'den sonra bu bölgelerdeki işgali durdurması istenmiştir ve Filistinli mülteci sorununa önem verilmiştir. 1967 Arap-İsrail savaşının Lübnan'ı önemli ölçüde etkilediği ve Filistin sorununun iç politikada çok önemli bir etkisi olduğu açıktır. 1967 Arap-İsrail savaşından sonra, özellikle güney Lübnan başta olmak üzere Filistinliler ülkenin genelinde örgütlenmiş ve daha sonraki dönemlerde onların varlığı önemli gelişmelere neden olmuştur. Maruniler Filistinli mültecilerden rahatsız olmuşlar ve 1967'den başlayarak Maruniler ve Lübnan'daki Filistinliler arasında çatışmalar artarak devam etmiştir. Bu gelişmeler sonucunda İsrail ve Suriye, Lübnan'ın iç politikasındaki gelişmelere dikkat çekmiştir.

Charles Hilu'nun Lübnan'daki ortaya çıkan sorunlara karşı iyi bir performans göstermediğine inanıldığından, Ulusal Blok diğer Maruni gruplar tarafından kurulmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Hıristiyanlar arasında bölünmeler görülmektedir. Bu dönemde Jumblatt önderliğindeki Sol gruplar da hükümeti zorlamaya başlayarak Arap kimliğini savunmuşlardır. 1968 seçimlerinde bu iki taraf kendi bölgesinde seçimleri kazanmış ve Lübnan bu gruplar arasında bölünmüştür. Böylece Lübnan'ı yönetmek daha da zor bir hale gelmiştir. Lübnan ordusu ile Filistinliler arasındaki silahlı mücadele bu seçimlerden sonra başlamış ve İsrail Beyrut havaalanına saldırmıştır. Filistinlileri destekleyecek sokak gösterileri, özellikle Lübnan ordusunun İsrail'in havaalanına saldırısı sonucunda tarafsız kalmasının ardından başlamıştır.

Bu gelişmeler nedeniyle İsrail ve Suriye, Lübnan'daki konumunu güçlendirmek istemişlerdir. Suriye için Golan Tepeleri'nin işgali önemliydi ve İsrail'e karşı bu bölgenin yeniden ele geçirilmesi için Lübnan'da ve bölgede güçlü olması gerekiyordu. Bu dönemde İsrail ise, FKÖ'ye ve kuzeyindeki bir tehdit olarak kabul edildiği için Güney Lübnan'daki Filistinlilere karşı hava saldırıları gerçekleştirdi. Ancak Suriye ve diğer Arap ülkeleri Filistinlileri İsrail ve Marunilere karşı

savunmuştur. 1969'da Kahire Anlaşması imzalanmış ve Filistinlilerin mülteci kamplarında asker eğitimi ve silah tutma gibi birtakım hakları sağlanmıştır. Bu gelişmelerde bölgesel boyutun etkisini ve özellikle Suriye'nin, Lübnan'ın iç gelişmelerinde oldukça etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. 1970 yılında, Ulusal Blok'un çabaları sonucunda Jean Njaim Savunma Şefi seçilmiş ve Filistinlilere karşı katı politikalar uygulanmaya başlamıştır. 1970 yılında Frangieh Başkan seçilmiş ve Filistinlilere karşı önceki dönemde uygulanan katı politikalar yumuşamıştır.. Ulusal Blok Filistinlilere karşı katı ve sertti ve bu nedenle Lübnan'da çatışmalar yaşanmıştır. İsrail tarafından düzenlenen bir baskın sonucunda El-Fetih'in bazı üyeleri öldürülmüştür. Suriye de gelişmelere katılmıştır. İç Savaştan önce bile Suriye ve İsrail'in Lübnan'daki gelişmelere aktif bir şekilde müdahalesini görmekteyiz.

Görüldüğü gibi, Lübnan İç Savaşı'na giden süreçte, çatışmanın birkaç nedeni vardı. İç etken olarak siyasi sistem değiştirilmek istenmiş ve bölgesel etken olarak ise Filistin-İsrail çatışması Lübnan'a taşınmıştır. İsrail'in bazı Maruni gruplarıyla ittifakı da bu sürece katkıda bulunmuştur. İsrail, Filistinlileri sınır bölgelerinden uzaklaştırmak ve askeri ve siyasi örgütlerini baltalamak istemiştir. Buna ek olarak, Maruniler, Lübnan'da çıkan çatışmaların sorumlusu olarak Filistinlileri görmüşlerdir. Bu nedenle mültecilere karşı baskı ve güç kullanmışlardır. Bu da iç savaş sürecine katkıda bulunan önemli etkenlerdendir. İsrail, Lübnan'da Suriye'nin etkisini durdurmak ve FKÖ'yü kontrol etmek istemiştir. İsrail ayrıca Marunilerin egemen olduğu Lübnan hükümeti ile iyi ilişkiler kurmak istiyordu. Bu nedenle İsrail, Maruni ailelerini siyasi ve askeri olarak desteklemiştir. Maruniler kendilerini Arap kimliği olarak tanımlamak istememişlerdir. Bu nedenle Emile Edde ile başlayan Gemayel ve Chamoun İsrail ile işbirliği yapmış ve onlardan askeri destek almıştır. Lübnan bölgede önemli bir ülkeydi ve yabancı güçler ülkedeki konumlarını artırmak istiyordu. Bütün bu gelişmeler 1975'te başlayan uzun süreli bir iç savaş sürecinde olmuştur.

İç Savaş boyunca ise Suriye ve İsrail'in müdahalelerini ve etkilerini görüyoruz. Lübnan'daki gelişmelerde bu iki ülkenin politikaları oldukça etkili olmuştur. İç Savaş'ın başlamasının nedeni, ülkedeki Müslüman ve Hıristiyan gruplar arasındaki eşitsizlikten kaynaklanıyordu. Hıristiyan Maruni Cumhurbaşkanı Hıristiyanların hegemonyasını korumuş ve bu Müslümanlar arasındaki sorun ve isyanla sonuçlanmıştır. Filistinliler de Lübnan'daki Müslümanları destekledikleri için iç savaşın başlangıcında belirleyici faktörlerden olmuştur.

Müslümanlar değişen nüfusa dayanan idari sistemdeki temsili yeniden paylaşmak istemişlerdir. Maruniler buna şiddetle karşı çıkmışlar ve Lübnan siyasi yapısındaki imtiyazlarını korumak istemişlerdir. Maruniler ile Filistinliler ve Müslümanlar arasında çatışmalar başlamış ve gelişmelerden İsrail'i sorumlu tutmuşlardır. Hıristiyanlar Filistinlileri Lübnan'ın içişlerine karıştırdıkları ve müdahale ettikleri nedeniyle suçlamışlardır. İsrail bu dönemde Filistinli mülteci kamplarına hava saldırıları başlatmış ve bu saldırılar sivilleri ve kasabaları hedef almıştır.

İç savaşın başlangıcında, Müslümanların üstünlüğü Suriye tarafından zayıflatılmıştır. Suriye bu dönemde Lübnan'ın iç savaştaki gruplar arasında bölünmesini istemiyordu. Bu nedenle Suriye Müslümanlara karşı tavır almış ve Müslümanların ülkedeki Hıristiyanlara karşı baskın ve güçlü olmaya devam etmeleri halinde Lübnan'ın bölünebileceği inancıyla Marunileri desteklemiştir. Hafız Esad, Lübnan'da Cumhurbaşkanı Frangieh ve Suriye'nin varlığı ile askeri bir ittifak kurmuştur. Suriye-Maruni işbirliğinin bir sonucu olarak, Lübnan Ulusal Hareketi altında toplanan Müslüman taraf parçalanmış ve bölünmüştür. Suriye, iç savaşın başlangıcındaki olayların gidişatını önemli ölçüde değiştirmiştir. Riyad Anlaşması imzalanmış ve Lübnan'daki Suriyeli askerler yasal olarak meşrulaştırılmıştır. Esad, iç savaştaki Müslüman hakimiyetinin İsrail'in çıkarlarına hizmet edecek olan Lübnan'ın bölünmesiyle sonuçlanabileceğini iddia ederek diğer Arap ülkelerini etkileyebilmiştir.

İç savaşta Filistinliler Müslümanları desteklemişler ve bu da Filistinliler ve İsrail arasındaki çatışmalarla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu nedenle İç Savaş'ın başlangıcında olduğu gibi Suriye de Filistinlilere karşı hareket ediyordu, bu nedenle İsrail Lübnan'da Suriye'nin varlığını kabul etmiştir. 1976'da İsrail ve Suriye bir anlaşma imzalayarak işgalin sınırlarıyla ilgili anlaşma sağlamışlardır. Böylece, İsrail Lübnan'da Suriye'nin varlığını kabul etmiş ve Litani Nehri bu iki ülke arasındaki sınır olarak belirlenmiştir. Ancak Suriye müdahalesinden sonra iç savaşın ilk safhası sona erdiğinde, İsrail ve Maruniler arasındaki ilişkiler gelişmiş ve her iki taraf da ülkede Suriye'nin varlığını bitirmek istemişlerdir. Ancak, Suriye ülkeyi terk etmek istemediği için gerginlik yaşanmıştır. Chamoun ve Gamayel, Lübnan'daki Suriye'nin yayılcı politikalarına karşı İsrail'den yardım istemiştir. İsrail, Suriye varlığını sona erdirmek için Marunilere destek vermiştir. Ancak, bu politikanın işe yaramadığını gören İsrail, Lübnan'ı işgal etmiş ve iç savaş daha karmaşık bir hale gelmiş ve devam etmiştir. Görüldüğü gibi, bu iki bölgesel güç arasındaki rekabet açıkça görülmektedir ve bu iki ülkenin politikaları ve Lübnan üzerindeki amaçları nedeniyle iç savaş devam etmiştir.

İsrail, Filistin'in kuzey sınırlarında bir tehdit olması nedeniyle Lübnan'ı işgal ettiğini iddia etmiştir. Ayrıca, İsrail Marunilere destek vermiştir. İsrail işgali BM'nin 425 sayılı kararının ardından sona ermiş ve İsrail güçlerini Lübnan'dan çekmeye başlamıştır. İç Savaş sırasında daha çok İsrail ve Suriye'nin etkisi görülse de bu noktada BM'nin gelişmelerde önemli bir rolünün olduğunu görmekteyiz.

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