

EFFECTS OF NEOLIBERAL ISLAMIST CONSERVATIVE POLICIES ON
URBAN SPACE: MOSQUES IN ISTANBUL

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ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF NEOLIBERAL ISLAMIST CONSERVATIVE POLICIES ON URBAN SPACE: MOSQUES IN ISTANBUL

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This thesis tries to demonstrate that the dense mosqueization in the cities of Turkey depends on the neoliberal and Islamist conservative policies and urban space is densely used as a tool to consolidate Islamist conservatism. In this direction, the concepts of neoliberalism and conservatism are discussed and the New Right arising from the combination of these two concepts is examined. Since (social) space is a (social) product, the dialectical relationship of spatial organization with social structure and the effects of the modes of production on the production of space are discussed. Also, neoliberal and Islamist conservative aspects of urbanization in Turkey were examined and the mosque, which is also the most important spatial element of Islam, came forward as an important structure of urbanization of Turkey during the last 20 years. Mosques are built as large and imposing structures in the most visible points of the cities and in the areas of great importance in social memory, regardless of the need. In this context, due to its historical importance, Istanbul stands out as a city where urban

identity is desired to be moved to an Islamist conservative point and interventions in this character are quite high on urban space. Within the scope of the study, Istanbul urban area was examined and the quantitative and spatial data of public institutions were used for case study analysis. When the Islamist conservative city and society imagination supported by neoliberal urban policies is examined through Istanbul, it can be seen that the regulations made in the zoning legislation to increase the mosqueization are completely away from the principles of urbanism, scientificness and rationality, and Islamist conservative policies are completely contrary to the definition of secular and democratic social law state in the Constitution.

Keywords: Islamist conservation, neoliberalism, urban space, Istanbul

ÖZ

NEOLİBERAL İSLAMCI MUHAFAZAKAR POLİTİKALARIN KENTSEL MEKANA ETKİSİ: İSTANBUL'DA CAMİLER

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Yüksek Lisans, Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler Ana Bilim Dalı

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Bu tez çalışması kapsamında Türkiye kentlerinde son yıllarda yaşanan yoğun camileşmenin neoliberal ve İslamcı muhafazakar karakterde politikalara bağlı olduğu ve kentsel alanın İslamcı muhafazakar ideolojinin pekiştirilmesinin bir aracı olarak kullanıldığı ispatlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda neoliberalizm ve muhafazakarlık kavramları ele alınmış, bu iki kavramın birlikteliğinden ortaya çıkan Yeni Sağ irdelenmiştir. Mekan aynı zamanda toplumsal bir ürün olduğu için mekânsal organizasyonun toplumsal yapıyla olan diyalektik ilişkisine ve üretim biçimlerinin mekan üretimi üzerindeki etkilerine değinilmiştir. Ayrıca Türkiye kentleşmesinin neoliberal ve İslamcı muhafazakar boyutları incelenmiş, İslamcı muhafazakarlığın en temel mekânsal ögesi olan camilerin son 20 yılda Türkiye kentleşmesinde de önemli bir role sahip olduğu görülmüştür. Camiler, ihtiyaçtan bağımsız olarak, toplumsal hafızada büyük öneme sahip alanlarda ve kentlerin en görünür noktalarında büyük ve heybetli yapılar şeklinde inşa edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda İstanbul, sahip olduğu

tarihsel önemi sebebiyle, kentsel kimliđi İslamcı muhafazakar bir noktaya taşınmak istenen ve kentsel mekanda bu nitelikte müdahalelerin oldukça fazla olduđu bir kent olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Çalışma kapsamında İstanbul kentsel alanı bu doğrultuda incelenmiş ve İstanbul'un kentleşmesine büyük etkisi olan kamu kurumlarının sayısal ve mekansal verileri saha çalışması analizleri için kullanılmıştır. Neoliberal kentsel politikalarla desteklenen İslamcı muhafazakar kent ve toplum tahayyülü İstanbul üzerinden incelendiğinde görölmektedir ki camileşmeyi arttırmak üzere imar mevzuatında yapılan düzenlemeler şehircilik ilkelerinden, bilimsellikten ve akılcılıktan tamamen uzaktır, İslamcı muhafazakar karakterdeki politikalar ise Anayasa'da yer alan laik ve demokratik sosyal hukuk devleti tanımına tamamen ters düşmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamcı muhafazakarlık, neoliberalizm, kentsel mekan, İstanbul

“Karanlıđa teslim olmayacađız!”

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HDA	Housing Development Administration
IPDEU	Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization
PRA	Presidency of Religious Affairs
PMO	Pendik Mufti Office
UCTEA CCPIB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects Chamber of City Planners Istanbul Branch
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
RCSP	Regulation on Construction of Spatial Plans (Mekansal Planlar Yapım Yönetmeliği)
RPPM	Regulation on Principles of Plan Making (Plan Yapımına Ait Esaslara Dair Yönetmelik)
ZRPA	Zoning Regulations on Planned Areas (Planlı Alanlar İmar Yönetmeliği)
MP	Motherland Party
WP	Welfare Party
NVM	National Vision Movement
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
VP	Virtue Party
FP	Felicity Party
JDP	Justice and Development Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
AMM	Ankara Metropolitan Municipality
IMM	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
MNE	Ministry of National Education

MEU	Ministry of Environment and Urbanization
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
GDRE	General Directorate of Religious Education
REIT	Real Estate Investment Trust

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Scope

In the modern world, the city is one of the most visible areas of contradictions and inequalities. The conflict between classes does not only occur in urban space, but the urban space itself is the subject of this conflict. Domination and dominance over space also require a power struggle. Each power has a strategy to establish domination over space. It is of great importance to establish control over the space for every social group aiming to protect its power. In other words, every power struggle is also a struggle to control over space. In this sense, urban space has a decisive role at the point that capitalism has reached today. Capitalism, starting from the 1970s, has dominated a new model of economy and production under the name of neoliberalism, and this new model has brought radical changes and transformations on urban space. Accordingly, Lefebvre states that the success of capitalism depends on its discovery of space (Lefebvre 1976). Space, in this sense, started to play a key role both in the urbanization of neoliberalism and the sustainability of neoliberalism.

One of the features of the urban area that provides a solution to the accumulation crisis is the fact that it became a source of “rent” and profit and this makes the city the focus of the capital class under the neoliberal policies. Besides, the reconstructed space has an ideological purpose. It reflects partly the current ideology of the power groups and

institutions in the society, and partly the market forces. Instead of the symbols that refer to the publicity, the capital class fills the space with elements that refer to its class and ideological roots. In this context, it should be said that neoliberalism has a high tendency to cooperate with other ideologies. Accordingly, Lefebvre states:

(Social) space is a (social) product. ...the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power (1991, 26).

Especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, The New Right, which was defended by neoliberalism in the economic field, and advocated by conservatism in the social field, led to the development of these two different ideologies collectively. In this context, conservatism ensured that family, religion and social discipline are drawn forward in the social sphere, in response to the state power and intervention that neoliberalism withdrew from the economic sphere.

In the neoliberal period, the crisis with the decrease of state power has turned into an advantage by the religious practices. Religious movements rising in the cities have a close relationship with the neoliberal period because they are fed by uneven urban service provision. In this sense, conservative change gives priority to changing the political structure together with society. Every element that is effective in shaping social life is also important in terms of conservatism. Religion takes an important part in these elements. For conservative ideology, which seeks for stationarity and control, religion is the unchanging moral law of the changing world. Besides religion, morality and social values are the tools that neoliberal governments with conservative discourse often use to legitimize their policies.

With the declaration of the Republic, egalitarian and rational policies were followed and starting from the 1930s, statist policies were put into practice. However, after the Second World War, Turkey has started the transition to free-market policies with the preference of the West Block. "Moderate Islam" has been activated in the Middle East countries with the "Green Belt" project, which the imperialist countries put into

practice in countries such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan with the cooperation of religious groups, religious politicians and sects.

Moderate Islam in Turkey has been put into practice in many different ways starting from the 1950s. The most important of these are Imam-Hatip schools, coups, the politicians and political parties in relation with the religious communities and sects. Religiosity was effectively used by imperial powers to create a religious society. Moderate Islam policies, which began to be implemented in the 1950s, were gradually used by the right powers to neutralize the secular policies and Islamist conservatism strengthened since 1970. The Islamist conservatism, which merged with neoliberalism during the JDP period that began after the 2000s, entered its period when it was most effective. Moreover, after the 2000s, moderate Islam was replaced by comprehensive Islamism.

And neoliberalism, an economic attitude introduced after 1970 in developed capitalist countries, was first put into practice in the 1980s during the Motherland Party period in Turkey. And in the period of the Justice and Development Party starting from the beginning of the 2000s, it has become the dominant policy by spreading rapidly to all areas of social life. As an Islamist conservative political party, the JDP has been the implementer of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies and has strengthened its existence since the day it came to power using these two reinforcing concepts. The JDP government, which has been going on for nearly 17 years, has shaped the social structure with conservative policies that are in harmony with neoliberal policies. At this point, it is useful to mention that conservatism of the JDP is Sunni-Islamist and as it does not cover all segments of society, it does not cover all sects of Islam. As a result of this, the JDP, which has set out with a democratic, inclusive and conciliatory political discourse, has become more authoritarian, discriminatory and Islamist day by day, and has reached a point that completely ignores the different segments of society.

After the neoliberal economic policies took effect in Turkey with the JDP period, it is seen that urbanization is realized by the profit-oriented and investment-oriented practices brought by neoliberal policies instead of the rational and scientific

applications of the planning discipline. The conservative capital groups, which gained power during the JDP rule, had no difficulty in shaping cities and making profit from urban space. Together with the neoliberal urban policies, Islamist conservatism also has a great impact on shaping the urban area in this period. In the cities of Turkey and in the social life of the country, there have been harsh conservative interventions. In addition to the opportunities created for certain capital groups by the government, religionization has increased in social life and social structure. The Presidency of Religious Affairs increased its Sunni-Islam oriented policies as a very active institution and the Islamist transformation aimed at the social structure was supported by the changes made in the national education system. The most striking religionization move in the urban space was realized with mosques. Mosques are used by Islamist political power in everyday life to establish dominance and to make its presence visible physically.

Mosques, the most important spatial element of Sunni Islam, stand out as an element in the urbanization of Turkey worthy of examination at this point. Because the cities of Turkey are subjected to an intense mosqueization, regardless of the need. As an urban element, the mosques went beyond being urban equipment during the 2000s and turned into structures used in the consolidation and expansion of Sunni Islamist conservatism. Independently of the other cities in Turkey, Istanbul and Ankara have a 25-year history of Islamist local governments starting with the Welfare Party administration and continuing with the JDP administrations. During this 25-year period, changes were made at the spatial, social and cultural levels. Istanbul's Islamic city identity has been emphasized in every discourse and action. In this sense, Istanbul is worth considering as the city where the most mosque construction is done. In Turkey, for every social group with Ottomanist and Sunni Islamist references, Istanbul has special importance. Because Istanbul is the promised land in the popular history narrative of Turkish nationalism and Islamism. That's why this thesis concentrates on Istanbul urban land in terms of mosqueization.

At this point, it should be noted that the political rise of Islam in Turkey's social agenda after 1980 holds an important place and it is important to examine this subject from the space perspective. In this study, the increasing Islamist conservatism after 1980 has been investigated in relation to urbanization policies and processes of space production. Because, the urbanization of Turkey after 1980 is a form of urbanization aiming to accumulate capital over space, and it is also urbanization reinforcing the Islamist conservative ideology over space. In this context, the thesis will focus on how social life and urban space change in the context of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies. In addition, it will be examined how urban space is handled by the government which aims for an Islamist conservative transformation in the social structure.

The hypothesis of the study is that mosques that need to be built as a place of worship are being used to make Islamist conservatism visible, dominating and permanent in the cities of Turkey as a result of Islamist conservative policies. Accordingly, a number of research questions were created to guide the study. These questions are as follows and help the work progress in a framework:

- What is the relationship between neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism?
How do these two concepts handle space?
- What are the main characteristics of urbanization in Turkey after 1980?
- Is urban space used as a tool of Islamist conservatization in Turkey?
- What is the importance and place of mosques in the urban spatial organization in Turkey?
- What is the importance and place of mosques in the urban spatial organization of Istanbul?

1.2. Research Methods

In this study, different types of research methods are used to ensure the reliability and objectivity of the study. In total, five different types of research methods are used: literature review, data set analysis, GIS study with related data set, development plan announcement review, and backtrack scan of online newspapers.

The first of these methods is literature review. Within this method, comprehensive data from recent academic publications, online documents, books, and scientific researches are tried to be collected within the scope of the study. The formation of the theoretical framework and the transfer of the concepts discussed within the scope of the thesis are provided by this method.

Daily newspaper news was used in order to include data on the subject matter and to have indicators for the period in backtrack researches. Periodic data were obtained with this method, which was applied at certain points of the study, and important discourses were reached.

In addition, a number of datasets, which are useful to examine, were used in the study. These data sets were obtained as a result of interviews with public institutions such as Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects Chamber of City Planners Istanbul Branch, Pendik Mufti Office and each data set was used with reference to the relevant institution. In addition, the same data sets were used as a base in GIS studies and spatialization study was performed in GIS environment.

Finally, the development plans announced on the official websites of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and the Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization, the two institutions authorized to approve development plans within the provincial boundaries of Istanbul, were examined. The research on the development

plan approval processes, which is the most effective form of intervention on urban space, was conducted through these two institutions.

1.3. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, following the Introduction Chapter 1, the theoretical framework for neoliberalism and conservatism is established. Fundamental principles of neoliberalism and conservatism, which are considered as two separate topics, are discussed and the relationship between these two concepts and space is discussed. Finally, the discussion of the concept of the New Right, which emerged as a result of the partnership of the two concepts, is given. Also, the spatial organization of Islamist conservatism was mentioned.

Following Chapter 2, where the basic conceptual framework is presented, Chapter 3 includes the discussions and conceptualizations conducted by Henri Lefebvre on critical urban theory. The relationship between space and production of space and the relationship between the mode of production and space, which has an important place in terms of the study subject of the thesis, are examined.

Then, Chapter 4 is the section where the urbanization of Turkey is handled. In this section, regulations related to mosques in the zoning legislation in Turkey examined and neoliberal Islamist conservative aspects of urbanization in Turkey were discussed in two periods. The first period covers the period from 1980 to 2000, the period when neoliberal policies are densely implemented in Turkey. The second period covers the period after 2000, the period when Islamist conservatism became permanent. Finally, the place of the mosques in the urbanization of Turkey is mentioned.

Chapter 5 is the chapter in which the case study is located. The case study focuses on the urban area of Istanbul. In this section, starting from the post-2000 period, the development plans offering new mosques in Istanbul have been suspended, the data

obtained from public institutions are interpreted and the spatial analysis by the GIS is created. At the end of the chapter, an experiment was conducted according to the current legislation on mosques and the picture that will emerge when the mosqueization is in full compliance with the legislation in the Istanbul urban space is included.

Finally, Chapter 6 includes evaluations of the study. Here is a brief summary of all the issues covered by the thesis. In addition, findings of the study were given.

CHAPTER 2

THE RELATION BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM

For the reason that this thesis focuses on the consequences of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies, it is essential to examine the concepts of neoliberalism and conservatism in detail. Even if neoliberalism and conservatism have different historical backgrounds and different aspects, these concepts have also common aspects in shaping the conjunctural structures they dominate. As the first chapter of the thesis that includes understanding and comprehension, this chapter will focus on neoliberalism and conservatism both as ideologies and policy-making tools.

2.1. Defining Neoliberalism with Fundamental Principles

Neoliberalism, defined by Bourdieu (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 350, Bourdieu 1998) as “utopia of unlimited exploitation” and by Harvey (2015, 19) as “embedded liberalism”, is the dominant political understanding starting to rise from the 1970s and became one of the fundamental grounds of right ideology today.

Keynesianism, the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, was the dominant theoretical framework in economics and economic policy-making in the period between 1945 and 1970 (Thorsen and Lie 2007, 8). The period after 1970 was the scene of domestic social and economic crises in the United Kingdom, France, Italy,

and the USA. The capitalist world economy was in the decline of the profit rate and entered a 'structural crisis'. Neoliberal ideology has emerged as the strategical and political answer against the "Keynesian welfare state" crisis which occurred as the reason of the collapse in Keynesian policies with the help of the import substitution industrialization at the end of the 1970s and "it owes its strength to its ideological appeal, but neoliberalism is not merely an ideology, it purports to rest on the scientific foundations of modern liberal economics" (Clarke 2005, 58). Thereby, Keynesian economic policies including the state intervention in the economic field are replaced by neoliberal economy policies defending "competitive free market without the state intervention" and in the early 1970s, the global capitalist system has become increasingly "neoliberalized" (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 342).

The cure proposed by the monetarists, led by Milton Friedman and Frederick August von Hayek, demanded the restoration of the free market and the strong state. These regulations started to show up during the Margaret Thatcher government in the United Kingdom and the Ronald Reagan government in the USA and defined as "there is no alternative (TINA)" discourse by Thatcher (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381). The new social order, neoliberalism, emerged, first within these countries, but then gradually exported to the periphery.

As George states the central value of Thatcher's doctrine of "TINA" and of neoliberalism itself is the notion of competition: competition between nations, regions, firms and of course between individuals (1999). George also argues that neoliberalism aims to apportion the resources, whether physical, natural, financial or human, with the greatest efficiency. According to this ideology, public is unprofitable and what is essential is competition. When it comes to equality and balance, the defeat of the weak against the powerful is the balance of nature and "there is no alternative" (George 1999).

The biggest difference that neoliberalism brought is that everything has a market value. This set of economic policies, in Marx's terms, are the following:

Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc. – when everything, in short, passed into commerce. It is the time of general corruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time when everything, moral or physical, having become a marketable value, is brought to the market to be assessed at its truest value (Marx 1992, 32 cited in Günay 2010, 14).

Because neoliberalism is entitled as “neo” form of “liberalism”, the link between liberalism and neoliberalism should be mentioned. Neoliberalism is interpreted as the restoration of economic liberalism (Heywood 2014, 67). It can be defined as the strong return of liberalism. The transformation of liberalism to neoliberalism has sometimes been through the preservation and maintenance of certain values that existed in liberalism, while at the same time it has content that overwhelms some values of liberalism. As David Harvey argues, neoliberalism is not the rejuvenation of liberalism in general, however it is a distinctive economic theory which has replaced a more moderate “embedded liberalism” (2015, 19). In other words, the period in which Keynesian economic policies were practiced was not a period that was completely isolated from liberalism; on the contrary, it was a period in which liberalism remained embedded.

However, Harvey also states that neoliberalism is, above all, a theory of political-economic practices and this theory argues that the best way to improve human well-being is strong property rights, an institutional framework based on free market and free trade, and release in individual enterprise (2015, 10). Since Harvey's definition includes the fundamental values of liberalism, it is clear that neoliberalism has a common ground with liberalism.

In the recent critical literature, Harvey also stands out by giving the neoliberalism concept a wide-ranging definition in his book named *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to

create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit (Harvey 2005, 2).

As Brenner and Theodore also state “the linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development” (2002, 350). In this context, neoliberal doctrines are to justify “the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the privatization of public services and assets, the dismantling of social assistance programs, the enhancement of international capital mobility, and the intensification of interlocal competition and during the 1980s, neoliberalism was established as the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalization” (Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011, 15).

As mentioned above, according to the neoliberal perspective, increase in social and individual freedom is attached to *the right of private property, entrepreneurship, and free-market logic*. Proper operation of the system is only possible with privatization of public services and public property, reduction of the state supervision on the capital and encouragement for foreign capital. In this meaning, neoliberal economic paradigm claims that everything has a market value and all the resources should be involved in the market. In the context of these transformations, the role of the state is defined as the mechanism for the recapitalization and the structure putting into practice the new regulations. Thereby, “welfare state” leaves its place to “regulatory and entrepreneur state”. In this context, according to Heywood, the aim of neoliberalism is to stop the tendency of the large state and state intervention that marked the 20th century, and if possible, reverse it (2014, 67). Heywood also states that the market is morally and

practically seen above all kinds of political control and the market is capable of regulating the economy on its own (2014, 68).

As conclusion, neoliberalism proposes to privatize public goods and services, to flex trade arrangements, to reduce capital and labor controls of the state and to remove all obstacles to foreign investments for the development of social and individual welfare. It refers to a production system based on flexibility in production processes, organization of labor and market conditions. Neoliberalism, by its flexible nature, unconditionally approves market-oriented global capitalism (Heywood 2014, 69).

2.1.1. The Relation between Neoliberalism and Globalization

Neoliberalism is generally associated with the concepts of globalization and hegemony. Although there are different meanings to globalization, common sense is that globalization is inevitable and this inevitability takes an ideological position with neoliberalism, one of the most important ideologies created by globalization. Globalization is therefore not a neutral ideological force, but rather a force with neoliberalism and it strengthens the market despite the state (Heywood 2014, 38).

What sets the conditions for spreading globalization is the disappear of the Bretton Woods contract, which had been in force since 1945, and the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. With this situation, the return to the idea of the economic order based on the free market and free trade principles has taken place and it can be said that globalization and neoliberalism started to walk hand in hand (Heywood 2014, 69). Yet, as AlSayyad stated, globalization and neoliberalism are not the same, neoliberalism is one of the reasons of globalization (Çelik 2012, 10). Moreover, neoliberalism is both an economic tool and an ideology that the global economy uses to achieve some of its goals.

The main driving force behind the neoliberal ideas and structures is economic globalization. With the help of globalization, national economies have turned into a connected global economy, the production has gained international character and the capital has flown among countries freely. Phillip Bobbitt claims that this situation has a significant contribution to the displacement of “the nation state” with “the market state” (2002, cited in Heywood 2014, 69). As neoliberalism expanded, globalization of the world economy occurred as a result. The importance of the territorial part of any country has declined, the connections “across the world” or “beyond the borders” are both expanded and diversified (Heywood 2014, 38). The aim of neoliberal globalization was to create a global capitalist economy.

Moreover, neoliberalism does not only correlate with globalization, but it also associates with other ideologies and social forms. As Peck argues, “rather than standing alone, neoliberalism tends to exist in a kind of parasitical relation to other state and social forms (conservatism, authoritarianism, social democracy, etc.), in the hybrid contexts of which the form and consequences of its associated restructuring strategies are shaped” (2004, cited in Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011, 17). Accordingly, AlSayyad argues that there is also a very strong link between religion and neoliberalism (Çelik 2012, 15). Neoliberalism maintains its permanence through partnerships with other forms of governance and ideologies.

2.1.2. Neoliberal Urbanization: The Key Role of Space

Capitalism, starting from the 1970s, has dominated a new model of economy and production under the name of neoliberalism, and this new model has brought radical changes and transformations on urban space. According to Ersoy, during the neoliberal period, while the cities were deindustrialized, factors such as unemployment, financial management, which increased on a national and local scale, and market-oriented privatization dominated urban processes (2001). One of the most important factors driving urban development in the neoliberal period with Ersoy's statements is the role

played by the city in the spatial division of work at the national and global levels (2001, 38). In other words, each city has a certain role in the framework of growth strategies followed in an economic whole.

After the practice of welfare state and socialism as an alternative to liberal capitalism; in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, socialism has been replaced by the rapid construction of market capitalism, in the developed capitalist countries, the welfare state is replaced by development strategies that prioritize market conditions under the leadership of the new right, in the periphery countries, import substitution strategies have been replaced by open growth strategies (Şengül 2002, 8). The response to the emerging crisis has been the neoliberal strategies produced in both the central and peripheral countries. In this process, while state-centered development strategies were replaced by market-centered growth strategies, the planning institution that guided urbanization was also subjected to intense attacks (Şengül 2002, 8). After the neoliberal economic policies took effect, it is seen that urbanization is realized by the profit-oriented and investment-oriented practices brought by neoliberal policies instead of the rational and scientific applications of the planning discipline.

Neoliberal policies and globalization had also affected the conditions of the nation-state. According to Ersoy, globalization and neoliberal policies, in contrast to nation-based growth strategies, include an approach that proposes to move beyond the boundaries of nation-state (2001, 40). As Serter argues, the increased transportation and communication opportunities provided a new opportunity to the capitalist class in industrialized countries and the capitalist class began to use the whole world as a market and labor force field, to control and intervene in this large sphere (2018, 94).

At this point, it should be noted that globalization and neoliberalization processes have also direct and important consequences on cities. When it comes to neoliberal urbanization, a global and local restructuring of cities with a market and capital-oriented approach should be mentioned. Neoliberalism can be defined as the form of urban governance in which the boundaries between the public and private sectors have been removed, competition is increased, space is handled like a thing that produced.

In the neoliberal urbanization process, while the opposition power of the labor sector declined, the capital sector increased the accumulation and circulation rate as a result of the new production model spread around the world. The rapid increase in the accumulation speed and amount of the capital sector compared to the previous eras made it necessary to experience accumulation crises. However, the capital and capitalist class have discovered a new area, the urban space, to overcome this crisis based on over-accumulation in the neoliberal period (Serter 2018, 95).

Accordingly, Lefebvre strongly states that the success of capitalism depends on its discovery of space (Lefebvre 1976). He argues that the existence of capitalism depends on the urban space and he explains the relation between capitalism and space as follows:

But what has happened is that capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing *Capital*, it has succeeded in achieving ‘growth’. We cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means: by occupying space, by producing a space (Lefebvre 1976, 21).

Lefebvre also argues that “an epochal shift has occurred within capitalism: production no longer occurs merely in space; instead, space is itself now being produced in and through the process of capitalist development” (2009, 185). Space, in this sense, started to play a key role both in the urbanization of neoliberalism and the sustainability of neoliberalism.

Brenner, Theodore (2002), Peck (Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011) and Tickell (Peck and Tickell 2002) who examine the effects of globalization and neoliberal policies on urban space, emphasize the “creative destruction” of capitalism and define the competition-prone approach of globalization and neoliberal policies as a process of demolition and reconstruction:

Although the neoliberal restructuring projects of the last three decades have failed to produce a coherent basis for sustainable capitalist growth, they have nonetheless profoundly reworked the institutional infrastructure and regulatory norms upon which Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was grounded. The concept of creative destruction is presented to describe the geographically uneven, socially regressive, and politically

volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change that have been crystalizing under these conditions (Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011, 16).

Neoliberal urbanization is both predicated on and realized through uneven development and its natural state is defined by an unevenly developed topography (Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011, 17-18). Uneven development is the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions that exist within the structure and character of capital, therefore, what is achieved by capital through neoliberal policies is the production of space in its own image (Smith 2017, 21-24). It can be said that uneven development is the embodiment of neoliberal urbanization.

Harvey, accordingly, mentions that capital accumulation rising with the neoliberal policies is a highly geographical issue, and he argues that the maintenance of capitalism as a political-economic system is only possible if the urban space is the solution to the emerging accumulation crisis (2011, cited in Serter 2018, 95-96). One of the features of the urban area that provides a solution to the accumulation crisis is the fact that it became a source of “rent” and profit and this makes the city the focus of the capital class under the neoliberal policies. In this way, it is possible to reduce and increase the existing rent with the interventions on urban land. Neoliberal urbanization has developed as a result of the capital entering the economic crisis in the production process, and in order to increase their profits, the investments are directed to the urban environment and urban space which are highly profitable.

Moreover, Harvey points out that space is being restructured continuously in modern cities (Giddens 2000, cited in Güllüpınar 2012, 19). The reconstructed space has an ideological purpose. It reflects partly the current ideology of the power groups and institutions in society, and partly the market forces. Competition among capitalists causes excessive capital accumulation and this leads to crisis; the way to ensure stability is the investment of capital in the built environment.

As a matter of fact, according to Harvey, urbanization is the mode of organizing the space of capitalism. It is a way of structuring the physical environment and organizing human and social relations in space and capitalism does it in an unjust and unequal

way, in favor of the rich (Harvey 1985). As a solution to the crisis of production, the capital class reproduces itself through investments in the urban area and the built environment.

In the direction of the main motives of neoliberalism, an entrepreneurial organization model has been dominated instead of a managerial organization model on urban land. In contrast to the managerial organization model, only the motives of the capitalist class dominate the urban space in the entrepreneurial city model (Harvey 1989, cited in Serter 2018, 101). In the neoliberal period, the city is shaped completely according to the demands of the capital sector in power and as a result of this, planning paradigm shifts from long-term, public-interest oriented approach to short-term, capital-interest oriented approach. Instead of the symbols that refer to the publicity, the capital class fills the space with elements that refer to its class and ideological roots (Serter 2018, 122).

As a result of the neoliberal policies, the competition among cities has come to the forefront, and the interest in metropolitan areas has increased and cities have become a tool to serve economic, social and political purposes. Especially the urban renewal and transformation projects in big cities, large-scale urban projects, gated communities and luxury housing projects and the increase in the number of shopping centers are the product of this process. What is contended is marked urbanization of neoliberalism as cities become strategic targets for neoliberal policy experiments and cities have become the incubators for the reproduction of neoliberalism as a living institutional regime (Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011, 24-25). A neoliberal city, accordingly, is the area of uneven and unjust development in favor of the capital.

2.1.3. The Association of Religion and Neoliberalism in Neoliberal Urbanization

In the neoliberal management and economy model, the capital sector's arrangement of urban space in a way to prioritize its interests is important in terms of the relationship

between neoliberalism and other concepts, ideologies and governance models. Accordingly, AlSayyad states that there is a very strong link between religion and neoliberalism (Çelik 2012, 15). With the neoliberalism, the increasing tendency of the current religious trends in the world has had some consequences for the cities. AlSayyad argues that the collapse of state power under the neoliberal economic paradigm left a space to be filled by religious groups only (2015, 22).

The postmodern paradigm, which can be defined as the opposite of the modern, has been also used in many areas in accordance with the ideological construction of the neoliberalism. As a method, the postmodernism claims to break away from or overcome modernism and conflicts with the rational mind of modernism. Postmodernism advocates that the claim of a godless self is impossible, and it is based on the thesis that the absence of god will be a moral and spiritual deprivation (Serter 2018, 124).

In the neoliberal period, the crisis with the decrease of state power has turned into an advantage by religious practices. The domination of religion and religious forms and structures in social life and social space has increased with reference to traditionalism and anti-rationalism. In this sense, postmodernism in coalition with neoliberalism has prepared the infrastructure that will allow conservative ideology to come to life. As the most important pillar of this infrastructure, the spatial domination of religious beliefs and structures referring to history and religion instead of rationalism has increased rapidly in urban space (Serter 2018, 125). Furseth says that these religious movements rising in the cities have a close relationship with the neoliberal period because they are fed by uneven urban service provision (2015, 60-61). In the neoliberal period, the urban space is filled with the prescription of the postmodern paradigm based on the concepts of religion, tradition, and locality.

For nearly four decades, cities have begun to occupy an increasingly central place in the reproduction, transformation, and ongoing restructuring of neoliberalism. In this sense, religion also played an important role in shaping the cities parallel with

neoliberalism. In the following parts of this study, the relation between religion and the urban space will be handled in detail.

2.2. Defining Conservatism

Conservatism emerged as a political attitude and a movement at the end of the 18th century against the idea of Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It is an anti-modern and traditionalist political movement. It can be defined as the political expression of the return to the “ancient regime” to reconstruct pre-revolutionary political beliefs and values (Vural 2007, 16).

Conservatism, defined as a way of thinking in general to preserve the existing situation, is characterized as one of the right-wing political ideologies that resist social change and advocates the preservation of social and cultural values. The philosopher Edmund Burke, who formed the theoretical foundations of conservative ideology and pioneered the other conservative thinkers, published “Reflections on the Revolution in France” (1960) in 1790 and the book is considered as the basic book of conservatism.

Yıldırımaz says that conservatism is a contemporary way of thinking. According to him, it is contemporary, because the existence of a world to be preserved for conservatism only takes place on condition when restoration or modernism exists and threatens it. It is a way of thinking because there are no forms of action and areas that have been planned in advance. It has a certain attitude, but it is possible to understand the direction of this attitude only when they are attacked by a modernist project. These attitudes can be explained as an intervention that will take place to ensure that the characteristics of the past are included in the value and approval of the day. Culture is the most decisive factor for conservatism. The cultural norms of societies are the only reality that cannot be abandoned or ignored for their past, present and future (Yıldırımaz 2003, 9-10).

As another definition, conservatism is based on the reaction of the political, social and cultural structures that the capitalist modernization process has disintegrated, or more precisely, the reaction to the continuity of the meaning and values loaded on those structures (Bora 2008, 53-55).

Since the first period of political conservatism, even though it does not define an ideal order, these are the beginning of the elements that it argues without changing: continuity of history and traditions in the form of a chain, indispensability of religion, community engineering, defense against all forms of revolution and defending the gradual change, immunity of private property as sacred, the freedom of every society to produce its own ideal system, importance and immunity of intermediate institutions (Mannheim 2002 and Özipek 2005, cited in Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 85).

While Heywood describes conservatism as the most modest ideology among all political ideologies, perhaps because of this situation, he also states that it is remarkably flexible and can quickly recover itself. He says that conservatism is in continuous development because it does not bind itself to fixed idea systems (Heywood 2014, 83-84). Heywood also states that conservatism is built on a set of political understandings that emphasize the importance of human nature, the society in question, and the importance of specific political values. In this context, conservatism in itself fundamentally contains tradition, human shortage, organic society, hierarchy and authority, and property (Heywood 2014, 86). Nisbet also defines the basic dogmas of conservatism as follows: devotion to history and traditions, mind and prejudice, authority and power, freedom and equality, property and life, religion and morality (2007, cited in Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 87).

Considering its historical background, it is seen that the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and Industrialization have come to the forefront of the phenomena of the theorization process of political conservatism. The political conservatism that matures through these processes; while defending the historical values, society, pragmatism, private property, intermediary institutions, traditions, religion, existing authority and order; it rejects all kinds of revolution and social engineering, individualism and pure

science and rationalism. In this sense, it can be said that it is a system of thought rather than an ideology because it defines itself over the opposite of conservatism.

In the context of this thesis, the most important points in conservatism will be examined as follows: individual, family and community, tradition and history against revolution and change, religion and property.

2.2.1. Fundamental Principles of Conservatism

2.2.1.1 Individual, Family, and Community

Conservatives think that human beings are essentially limited and seeking security. People are familiar with what is known, tried and tested. Human rationality is unreliable, referring to the belief of the first sin in the Christian tradition and moral degeneration is hidden within every human being (Heywood 2014, 89). The pessimism of human nature in conservative thought brought about the idea of human deficiency and the insufficiency of human mind alone. Because the human mind alone is insufficient, it needs tradition and authority.

Özipek notes that in contrast to the concept of perfectibility which expresses optimism in Enlightenment, conservatism has a pessimist philosophical ground about human nature and human mind (2004, 45). Vural also states that conservatives generally accept the cosmological principle about the universe. According to this principle, God is at the center of everything, the cause of existence and the measure of everything is not human, it is God (Vural 2007, 14).

As a guardian and bearer of traditional morality, the family has great importance in the conservative thinking that emphasizes society and its structures. Because the family functions as one of the basic educational institutions and empowers people in their

sense of belonging and community¹. For the conservatives; from family to religious and non-religious communities, from charitable traditional institutions to professional organizations for economic solidarity, all intermediary institutions in which the individual belongs are seen as institutions that protect and mature the individual and transfer it to the future (Şeyhanlıođlu 2011, 95).

The importance that conservative thought gives to social order also manifests itself in its attitude to change. The actors of social change such as religion, culture, and tradition are superior to the actors of political change such as ideology, revolution, and state. Therefore, conservative change gives priority to changing the political structure together with society (Çetin 2004, 102). According to conservatism, the individual cannot shape society, but society shapes the individual. The main means of social life is not individual freedom but authority. People can only reach welfare and happiness under the authority of family, community, church (or another religious structure similar to church) and guild (Şeyhanlıođlu 2011, 95).

Therefore, according to conservatism, in the model of society based on the hierarchy of family, community and intermediary institutions, there is no supremacy or priority of the state and the individual. Because the individual is not seen as a self-sufficient being due to “his limited creation and his first sin”, on the other hand, society and intermediary institutions are very important institutions that produce and protect the individual, giving identity and personality.

2.2.1.2. Tradition and History against Revolution and Change

From the point that conservatism has established its existence to the present day, the anti-revolution principle of conservatism has been one of the common principles of all conservatives, even though it has had different defenders.

¹ The word “community” is used here to refer "cemaat" in Turkish.

According to Bonald, the replacement of social institutions with force as in the revolution brings disaster and long-term self-defeat, on the other hand, real and lasting change can be the result of heavy, long, continuous processes (cited in Nisbet 1990, cited in Serter 2018, 30). In the same way, Burke states that the spirit of revolution, instead of creating a benefit in the present situation and time, ultimately results in despotism, and believes that the laws and institutions formed as a result of traditions must be kept on an absolute condition (2016, cited in Serter 2018, 30). For the conservative philosopher, Kirk, who wants change to be through the conservation of society, it is the absolute necessity to postpone change rather than violate moral laws if the intended change foresees injustice against any human being (Özipek 2004, 95).

In this context, the idea of revolution and change in conservatism can be expressed with these aspects: parallel with the demands of the society, bottom to top, under the guidance of the intimate knowledge coming from the tradition and the history, a gradual renewal without harming any social organism. Otherwise, revolution and change can only be destructive.

At the root of the trust in tradition in conservatism, there is a belief that it is not possible for any human to understand everything with his/her limited mind. According to Burke, tradition tells people more than mind about society and social homework (Tannenbaum and Schultz 2008, 384). Along the same line, Burke defines people as “the product of history and traditions” (Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 90). As Heywood points out, the tradition in conservatism reflects the wisdom of the past, and the institutions and practices of the past have passed the test of time, so the institutions and practices of the past must be preserved in the name of the interests of the living and future generations (2014, 87). Thus, the order maintains its continuity.

For conservatives, history is not dead or not past, it is like a living being (Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 93). While the conservatives determine their position in the future, they see the past as an indispensable, lively and deep treasure. For the conservatives who attach importance to history, the ancestors on the stage of history are also important. The words of Burke are important in this regard:

People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors (1960, 31).

In conservative thought, history and tradition are seen as important values as the mind and science, which enable the society to take the direction and position for the future with the help of the experiences of the past (Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 94). History in conservatism, like tradition, is nothing but experience. Tradition gives people a sense of belonging and being rooted. These feelings are also strong because they are based on historical background and based on experiences in history. On the other hand, change is a journey to the unknown. While the tradition brings belongingness and trust, change brings uncertainty and distrust (Heywood 2014, 87).

2.2.1.3. Religion and Property

Every element that is effective in shaping the social life is also important in terms of conservatism. Religion takes an important part among these elements. According to Burke, one of the most important conservative thinkers who expressed religion as a social power:

We know, and what is better, we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort (1960, 87).

For conservative ideology, which seeks for stationarity and control, religion is the unchanging moral law of the changing world. Burke believes that society is shaped by divine law or natural law and defines man as a “religious animal” (1960, 88).

However, when we look at conservative thinkers, while religiousness is an important element, we see that not all conservatives are religious. Regardless of their state of faith, all conservative thinkers attach great importance to religion. The secret that underlines this importance is the social structure that conservatives often emphasize. Conservatism is different from religiousness. Religion is one of the most important

traditional institutions that provide social cohesion and reinforce social ties. Religion performs a socially unifying and integrative function.

One dimension of the importance of religion for conservatives is related to the communities. In social life, the community has a role as the most important value of religion. According to conservative thought, the social structure is disrupted without communities acting as mediators between the individual and the society, connections between individuals break, and an atomized social structure appears (Demirkanoğlu 2017, 298). The idea that no society, community or group can exist independently of religion belongs to conservative thought (Demirkanoğlu 2017, 295).

As an institution that makes sense of the world and provides control, religion holds a very important place both in the right ideologies and conservatism. The most important struggle in the Age of Enlightenment was the destruction of religious thought patterns. This provided that human can make sense of the world by his/her free will. However, the basic idea of political conservatism is based on religion and traditions. Religion acts as the cement of society and plays a role in regulating natural inequality among individuals. For this reason, according to conservative thought, religion must exist.

Conservatism gives also great importance to the preservation of property and the existence of the free-market (Şeyhanlıoğlu 2011, 99). One of the biggest common denominators of conservatism, besides the emphasis of religion, is the understanding of property. On the one hand, property is the basis of the family, which is the main unit of the society, on the other hand, property gives individual a certain position in society (Demirkanoğlu 2017, 292).

According to the perception of conservatism, property gives people a sense of trust and relaxation in this unpredictable and uncertain world. It allocates a source of protection to individuals (Heywood 2014, 94). Heywood states that those who have their own property, naturally respect the property ownership of others and this is the first condition for the establishment of social security and order (2014, 94). Thus,

property is not only an individual issue but also a social issue. For example for the family institution to survive, it is essential to ensure the continuity and the reproduction of private property to assure future generations (Serter 2018, 47). Therefore, there is a significant relationship between property, family, and tradition in conservatism.

2.2.2. Spatial Elements of Islamist Conservatism

After thinking about the basic principles of conservative ideology, it will be useful to mention the way that conservatism handles the space through spatial elements. However, in this part, only the Islamist conservatism will be examined in terms of the spatial organization because of the research subject of the thesis. As the area where social relations are produced and the dominant ideology is reinforced, the importance of space in terms of conservative ideology will be mentioned.

Lefebvre defines the connection between space and social structure with the definition “(social) space, (social) is a product” (Lefebvre 2014, 56). In this respect, religion, which has great importance in the social sense of conservative ideology, has also great importance in the production of space. As far as the Islamic world is concerned, there are some common points in the form of the Islamic cities. In all the cities spread over a wide area, the traces and basic characteristics of Islamic civilization come to the forefront (Demirci 2003, 130).

It is seen that the first urbanization process in Islamic civilization was experienced in Medina after the migration from Mecca and the word Medina means “settling down, building a city and a high place to build a castle” in Arabic (Biçakcı and Yıldırım 2018, 544). Many institutions and constructions have been used strategically in order to make Islamic culture and rituals prevail in newly established or conquered cities. The mosque, which is the temple of Islam religion and the most important spatial representation tool, has been the most important element used in shaping urban space and everyday life. Mosque has a key role in Islamic spatial construct.

According to Marçais, the mosque is not only a place of worship but also a court, prison, school and accommodation place (cited in Goddard 1999, cited in Serter 2018, 47). In addition to its religious role, mosques in the Islamic city are the places where political and social roles are fulfilled, besides, mosque is the most important public building in Islamic civilization (Biçakcı and Yıldırım 2018, 548).

As a start point, Stefano Bianca explains the relation between Islamic religious activity and spatial construct as:

Compared with other religious traditions, the distinctive feature of Islam is that it has given birth to a comprehensive and integrated cultural system by totally embedding the religious practice in the daily life of the individual and the society (cited in Omer 2012, 11).

The mosque is also a monumental building for the Islamic city, and it is the physical form of conservatism that emphasizes sociality and religion continuously. According to Lefebvre:

Monumental space offered each member of a society an image of that membership, an image of his or her social visage. It thus constituted a collective mirror more faithful than any personal one (1991, 222).

Besides the importance of mosques, the neighborhoods substantially shape the cities in the Islamic civilization. In each neighborhood, people with a common language, religion, and family live side by side. Islamic cities, in a sense, owe the preservation of identity, religious belief, and ethnicity to these spatial organization. At this point, it is seen that Islam, which gives importance to privacy and holiness of the family, is the most important factor in the formation of these neighborhoods (Rezvani and Raefard 2015, cited in Biçakcı and Yıldırım 2018, 549).

The neighborhood is centralized with the Grand Mosque, the square and the commercial places around it. These spaces develop a high sense of belonging to the neighborhood, allowing human relationships. According to this, it can be said that the houses and settlements that emerged during the process of Islamic civilization were not developed by themselves, they developed according to the modes of living and the rules of religion (Biçakcı and Yıldırım 2018, 549).

İnalçık states that privacy, which is a principle of Islam religion, can be used to explain many features of the Islamic city (1995, 258). Privacy, as the most basic element of the settlement, starting from the house shapes the entire settlement. The features that stand out in the construction of houses are courtyards and closed form. By the help of the arrangement of the houses, labyrinth-like road systems in most Islamic cities is designed to make family and family groups' lives safe, confidential and private, and turned into dead-end streets (cul-de-sac), in particular, to ensure privacy and security (Can 1992, 116). Can states that in most of the Islamic cities, the main road network is in a radial form spreading from the mosque (1992, 16).

A large part of the commercial activities in the city of Islam also gathered around the Grand Mosque in the city center. In fact, in the city of Islam, there is a tight junction between the mosque and the bazaar (Can 1992, 117). With this tight junction between the bazaar and the mosque, it is aimed to organize the commercial life in the bazaar according to Islamic rules (Demirci 2003, 139). This is an indication of the interconnectedness of commercial and religious life.

As a conclusion, it is revealed that the most important spatial element that determines the spatial construct of the Islamic city is the mosque. The mosque is a structure that organizes and regulates space, social structure, and social relations. The city life shaped around the mosque develops as an extension of the mosque.

2.3. The Association of Neoliberalism and (Neo)Conservatism: The New Right

Liberalism and conservatism have importance not only for being the dominant ideologies of our time but also for creating a synthesis of themselves. With the economic crisis that erupted in the early 1970s, the golden age of capitalism ended. Throughout the world, Keynesian economic policies, social state, and publicity began to be abandoned. The new form of capitalism, the New Right ideology, rose through

two fundamental ideologies and discourses that grounded on liberalism and conservatism: neoliberalism and neoconservatism.

In the foundations of liberal ideology, which is the historical root of neoliberalism, it is seen that there are strong roots on which the coalition with the conservative ideology will rise (Serter 2018, 35). Conservative discourse has become apparent as a complement to the neoliberal policies along with authoritarian tendencies and as a means of maintaining the contradictions of neoliberalism. Conservatism is not separated from the structure of neoliberalism. Religion, morality and social values are the tools that neoliberal governments with conservative discourse often use to legitimize their policies.

It would be useful to identify the two components on which The New Right understanding is based. The first of these is neoliberalism, which rejects the weighted role of the public sector in the market; the second is neoconservatism, which gives importance to traditional values based on family, religion, and nation. Neoconservatism defends that the power and intervention of the state, which is rejected from the economic field by neoliberal policies, should be directed to the social space for the reestablishment of authority and discipline. Neoconservatism, blended with liberalism and not completely detached from the values defined by Burke, has shifted towards the market economy and developed a sociality that recognizes individual freedoms.

On the other hand, the New Right thought contains discrepancies and contradictions in many ways. Neoliberalism defends values such as freedom, choice, rights, and competition; while conservatism advocates values such as authority, discipline, reverence, and homework. In fact, the New Right is the unification of two ideological traditions, whose opposites are obvious (Heywood 2014, 103).

However, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, The New Right, which was defended by neoliberalism in the economic field, and advocated by neoconservatism in the social field, led to the development of these two different ideologies collectively.

In this context, conservatism ensured that family, religion, individual freedom and social discipline are drawn forward in the social sphere, in response to the state power and intervention that neoliberalism withdrew from the economic sphere (Güler 2016, cited in Çolak 2016, 356).

The underlying cause of The New Right ideology being more authoritarian than its predecessor, liberalism, is the human nature approach of conservatism. According to conservatives, human nature is not optimistic. Human is defective and not capable of making the most rational decisions in his/her name. Because individual gains the characteristic of being an individual within the society, the society is prioritized by the individual. While liberal thought criticizes this understanding of conservatism, conservative thought completes the social gap in liberalism in this way. Moreover, religion is another institution that liberalism did not use effectively in previous periods. Religion, which has an important place in conservatism, has been an important part of this coalition in terms of the social order. The existence of religion in the New Right ideology also used as a postmodernist criticism against the rational mind of modernism.

Like society, family has also a critical role in the New Right ideology. The source of the individuals, who will not clash with the market economy, provide the cheap labor force needed by neoliberalism, contribute to the accumulation of capital and give approval to the authoritarian and anti-democratic laws and practices of the power, is the family. Therefore, the family is religious and conservative as the government wants and authority, discipline, and obedience start from the family.

In this context, the free market society of neoliberalism aims at minimizing the weight of the state in the economic sphere and ensuring that the atmosphere of freedom is in the economic sphere. On the other hand, the disciplined and religious society of conservatism is intended to make the authority of the state which is attracted from the economic sphere to be felt more intensely in the social sphere.

In summary, when the New Right is viewed in terms of its contradictory concepts, it appears that this synthesis has emerged not as tension, but as the result of a division of labor. Furthermore, these contradiction areas combine the free-market economy of liberalism and the authoritarian state understanding of conservatism and ensure that these areas where the state is withdrawn can be filled by moral and religious values and symbols.

In the following parts of this study, the coalition of neoliberalism and neoconservatism will be mentioned as neoliberal Islamist conservative ideology and starting from Chapter 4, the role of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies in shaping the cities and society of Turkey will be discussed.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ON CRITICAL URBAN THEORY

This chapter will focus on understanding the production of space. Lefebvre's conceptualization of space will be examined and used to understand the relation between the term social and spatial. The dialectical relationship between social processes and spatial practices defined by Lefebvre may enable to understand the social, economic and political importance of space. As a result of the discussions, this chapter will become the theoretical background to comprehend the key role of space for the social structure and the modes of production.

3.1. The Emerge of Critical Urban Theory and Henri Lefebvre

At the beginning of the 1970s, the critical social theory had a paradigmatic shift and in the same period, it has witnessed the emergence of important theoretical studies and debates dealing with space and addressing the space. New questions with a critical approach started to appear in the contemporary urban theory field in the context of urban development and the stages of urban development.

It mostly happened thanks to the theorists from Marxist tradition such as David Harvey, Manuel Castells, and especially Henri Lefebvre. It was no coincidence that these studies were revealed by Marxist theorists. Because the order in which capitalist production and capitalist social relations dominated was in great depression at that

time and in search of the way out of this crisis. Therefore, the situation has created the need to reassess the space problem and the relations between capitalist development and space. The common concern of these writers was to understand the function of the space and the city which had strategic importance in terms of commodification under capitalism.

According to these theorists, cities were the most important places including the production, circulation, and consumption of the commodities at the same time. Moreover, cities were not only the places that commodification processes occurred, they were also commodified and included in this commodification process. Capitalism was using the urban space to make profit and cities were transforming constantly. Therefore, it was a need to understand the socio-political patterns, socio-spatial organizations and administrative systems of the cities in parallel with the meaning of the cities for capitalism.

Henri Lefebvre handled the urban space as the subject of capitalist development. The *Urban Revolution*, *The Production of Space*, and *The Right to the City* are the most important texts of Lefebvre on the urban issue. He is one of the sources that influence the next theorists who attempt to conceptualize the city as a spatial unit and space as a social product.

Lefebvre made a spatial contribution to Marxist Theory by publishing the book “*The Production of Space*” (1991, 2014) in the year 1974 and manifested a comprehensive and multilateral space theory (Ghulyan 2017, 2). The book has been highly influential in interdisciplinary social analyses of space. The importance of the theories and concepts of Lefebvre within the scope of this study is the link, the relation and the connection between space, production and society concepts and this link works dialectically.

As Misoczky and Misoczky de Oliveria point out that “Lefebvre’s writings contain relevant contributions to understand the contemporary phenomenon of neoliberal urbanism and, at the same time, his politics of the possible can contribute to explain

the restless urban struggles and spatial practices of social movements” (2018, 1015). Therefore, it would be helpful to say that the role of space and the way it is produced are extremely determinant to understand the social structure. Both in this part and in the forthcoming parts of this study, Lefebvre will be the theorist to ground on. In order to understand the production of space and the political and strategical importance of space, Lefebvre’s conceptualizations will be argued in this chapter. Even though his analysis is quite comprehensive, the chapter will be limited with the concepts and discussions that may enable to understand the production of space and urbanity in relation to the mode of production and social relations.

3.1.1. (Social) Space and the (Social) Production of Space

According to Lefebvre, space is not just a natural, material void waiting to be filled with contents, it is something socially produced. For him, it is both a product and a process of social activity (1991, 2014). It is obvious that space and the production of space theories of Lefebvre created an essential ground for both theoretical and solid discussions.

As Lefebvre argues, space contains the relations of production and the social relations of reproduction. He defines the connection between space and social structure with this statement:

(Social) space is a (social) product. ...the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power (1991, 26).

It is necessary to note that space is not only constituted by social processes, but it is also constitutive of social processes. Lefebvre defines space as a social product and accordingly, every single mode of production produces its own space:

If space is produced, if there is a productive process, then we are dealing with history; here we have the fourth implication of our hypothesis. The history of space, of its production qua ‘reality’, and of its forms and representations, is not to be confused

either with the causal chain of ‘historical’ events, or with a sequence, whether teleological or not, of customs and laws, ideals and ideology, and socio-economic structures or institutions. But we may be sure that the forces of production (nature; labor and the organization of labor; technology and knowledge) and naturally, the relations of production play a part - though we have not yet defined it – in the production of space (1991, 46).

Thus, and so, new spaces formed in the process of the production of space create new social relations. Lefebvre claims that urban space is essential in terms of the reproduction of society and different social systems creates different spaces. Capitalism, in context of production of space, builds its very own representations via built environment and the spatial practices occurs as a result of the interaction between these representations and social relations (Güllüpinar 2012, 13).

By defining the urban space as the subject of capitalist urbanization, Lefebvre claims that space always preserves its political and strategical substance (Gottdiener 2001, 254). As Lefebvre states insistently, capitalism makes its existence sustainable under the changing conditions by occupying space and producing space (1976, 21). Thereby, he emphasizes the importance of the analysis of how space is produced in capitalist societies and which kind of contradictions appears during these production processes. Also, he defines that contradictions between the capitalist production relations and production powers have reached to a different condition on space (Lefebvre 2014, 75). Accordingly, capital brings in a different functionality to space and turns it into a commodity, in other words, commodifies it. Lefebvre notes this process by these words:

But what has happened is that capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing *Capital*, it has succeeded in achieving ‘growth’. We cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means: by occupying space, by producing a space (1976, 21).

As a result of bringing a different functionality to space, spaces of capital come to exist and capitalist mode of production results in the commodification of space. During this repetitious organism, space that became commodity is essential for capital in terms of its economic value. According to Lefebvre, discovering the urban space and commodifying/using the urban space are the reasons that capitalism sustained its

existence also in the 20th century (Şengül 2001, 14). This view of Lefebvre shows that space becomes purpose of capitalism and it transforms it from the place that capitalist production is made to the thing that capitalist production uses (Şengül 2001, 15).

3.1.1.1. Use Value and Exchange Value

At this point, examining the aspects of space as a commodity would be useful to understand its importance in capitalist production. Lefebvre uses the theories of Hegel and Marx as the base (1991, 411) and he also defines the space as a commodity with a duality of the abstract and concrete aspects of labor. For Marx, the commodity is the unit that embodies the basic qualities of capitalist society. Marx defines the commodities as a product of labor that contains two opposing qualities simultaneously as “*use value*” and “*exchange value*”. The concrete labor produces the use value of a commodity, and the abstract labor determines its exchange value. The principle of development of capitalism is the contradiction between use value and exchange value. According to Lefebvre “everyday life cannot be understood without understanding the contradiction between use and exchange (use value and exchange value)” (1991, 356).

Use value is the usefulness of commodity in terms of the needs of the user and it is basically defined by the physical properties of the commodity. On the other hand, exchange value is the reduction of all physical and utilization qualities to a quantity, generally of money. According to Lefebvre, this abstraction is a “concrete abstraction” that occurs every day in the fields of production and social relations. As a result, the abstraction of labor forms “abstract space”, which is the most important concept of space production in capitalism for Lefebvre (1991, 307). Abstract space will be handled in detail in the following parts of this chapter.

The key idea of Lefebvre in *The Production of Space* is that space is not a thing, it is a product to be used or to be consumed, and it is also a means of production (1991, 85). Space is part of a dialectic production, as Lefebvre states “space is at once result

and cause, product and producer” (1991, 142). Social space contains the social relations of production and reproduction, and people do not only produce social relations and use values, but also produce social space (Fuchs 2018, 134-135).

3.1.1.2. Triadic Analysis of Space

Lefebvre claims that production and reproduction are hidden in the social space. To understand the meaning, the design and the experience of the social space in capitalist societies, he introduces three concepts: *spatial practices*, *representations of space*, and *representational spaces* (1991, 38-39). Space is produced in a dynamic relationship between all these three concepts and there is a dialectical relationship between the elements involved in the production of space.

Spatial practice (perceived space) is simply deciphering a society’s space because the spatial practices of a society map out its space and it embodies the unity between daily reality and urban reality (Lefebvre 1991, 38). These practices address the physical flows and interactions that take place in the space for production and reproduction. Capitalism constructs its representations in space through a built environment and spatial practices are the result of interaction between these representations and social relations. As Ghulyan explains “spatial practices are equal to perceived space because spatial practices provide direct experience to space” (2017, 22).

Representations of space (conceived space) is defined by Lefebvre as “space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic sub-dividers, and social engineers... the dominant space of any society (or mode of production)” (1991, 38-39). He deepens this definition by stating that representations of space can be defined as conceived space and “any representation is ideological if it contributes either immediately or ‘mediately’ to the reproduction of the relations of production. Ideology is therefore inseparable from practice” (as cited in Zieleniec 2018, 6). Representations of space is designed space’s itself and it is captivated by knowledge and power. Therefore, it is

the type of space that is dominant in a certain type of production, more precisely, in a certain type of society.

Spaces of representations (lived space) as the active center of daily life, it contains actions and implies time. Lefebvre argues that this is “space as directly lived through its associations and images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” (1991, 39). Spaces of representations are not similar to spatial practices and representations of space in terms of productivity. They are not observed in daily life frequently, they break down the dominant prejudices and they show that a different world is possible (Ghulyan 2017, 24). However, spaces of representations combines the previous two concepts, and it is experienced passively. It is based on the childhood and it is subjective.

Wilson concludes Lefebvre’s triadic analysis as follows: spatial practices are the social practices through which space is materially produced, representations of space are the ways in which space is abstractly conceived, and representational spaces are the phenomenological spaces of lived experience (Lefebvre 1991, cited in Wilson 2013, 367).

Lefebvre’s triadic analysis (spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representations) and the dialectical relation among these concepts not only provides a theoretical structure for the analysis of urban capitalism, but also sharply defines the space as a thing produced. And social space is constituted by the dialectical relationship of these three levels. He tries to combine physical, mental and social aspects of space and he notes that the triadic analysis is “the history of space as it proceeds from nature to abstraction” (Lefebvre 1991, 110).

3.1.1.3. Spatial Periodization

Based on the triadic analysis, it will be helpful to mention the spatial periodization of Lefebvre for comprehending how different modes of production effects space and spatial organization. This periodization corresponds to periodization of mode of production in Marxist Theory (Ghulyan 2017, 4). Boer with the help of Shield suggests a scheme that combines the modes of production in Marxist Theory and the periodization of Lefebvre (as cited in Ghulyan 2017, 5).

As Lefebvre presents clearly and Boer also agrees that if the production of space inescapably tied to modes of production, then it is expected to see different types of space for different modes of production (Boer 2015, 123). In the context of Table 1 below, Boer explains that the relationship of each mode of production is far from a linear progression, instead their relationship is dialectical (2015, 124). There are no strict borders between these modes of production and social relations, in fact there is interpenetration and this situation can also be observed in Lefebvre’s triadic space analysis.

Table 1: Marxist periodization of history in terms of space (Boer 2015, 123)

Mode of Production	Space
Hunting and gathering, agriculture and husbandry (tribal society, primitive communism or the horde)	absolute space (nature)
Neolithic agriculture (the <i>gens</i> or hierarchical kinship societies)	absolute space
Asiatic mode of production (*oriental despotism* and divine kings)	sacred space
Ancient or classical mode of production (the <i>polis</i> or oligarchic slave-holding society)	historical space (political states, Greek city-states, Roman Empire)

Table 1 (continued)

Feudalism	sacred space
Early capitalism (classical and monopoly forms)	abstract space (politico-economic space)
Late capitalism	contradictory space (global capital versus localized meaning)
Communism	differential space (future space revaluing difference and lived experience)

By taking into consideration the table above and benefiting from Lefebvre, it will be helpful to handle the space periodization in detail. However, this study pays regard to the relationship between the mode of production and the dominant ideology of the last 20 years in terms of forming the space and the society. Therefore, the focus will be on abstract space and contradictory space because the main scope is to examine the outputs and yields of capitalist modes of production both on space and social structure. However, before examining the periodization of spaces, especially abstract space and contradictory space concepts of Lefebvre, it would be useful and integrative to form a framework starting from absolute space.

The origin of absolute space is agro-pastoral space, “a set of places named and exploited by peasants, or by nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists” (Lefebvre 1991, 234). The main feature of the absolute space is that human life is in a close relationship with nature and natural space. It is the space of ancient civilizations, which emerges from the “fragments of nature” such as caves, mountains, rivers. As Lefebvre states “absolute space is thus also and above all the space of death, the space of death's absolute power over the living” (1991, 235). Absolute space “is lived rather than conceived, and it is a representational space rather than a representation of space”

(Lefebvre 1974/1991, cited in Wilson 2013, 367). When this space is conceived, its prestige decreases and disappears.

The distance between absolute space and abstract space is filled by the long evolution of “historical space”. During this evolution, with the help of private property and exchange relations, the appropriation of nature is replaced by the domination on nature (Wilson 2013, 367). The concept of absolute space also corresponds to sacred space, because it has a very wide scope. As in this case, there is not a certain limitation of the transition from one place concept to another in the space descriptions of Lefebvre. In his book *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre did not devote a separate chapter to sacred space and historical space. However, sacred space and historical place have an important place in his periodization.

The emergence of the sacred space corresponds to the establishment of the religion. The absolute space turning into sacred space becomes religious and political, it contains religious institutions (Lefebvre 2014, 248). In the social space, the distinction was made between the city in the center and village on its periphery. As a reason of that, “the vastness of pre-existing space appears to come under the thrall of a divine order” (Lefebvre 1991, 235).

From the emergence of city-states to the early medieval period, production and reproduction of absolute (and sacred space) occurs. In the early medieval period, a new space was established in Rome which displaced the absolute space. The emerge of historical space is concluded by Lefebvre’s words as follows:

It may thus be seen that during the supposed emptiness of the late imperial or early medieval period a new space was established which supplanted the absolute space, and secularized the religious and political space, of Rome. These changes were necessary though not sufficient conditions for the subsequent development of a historical space, a space of accumulation. The 'villa', now either a lordly domain or a village, had durably defined a place as an establishment bound to the soil (1991, 253).

What led to the emergence of historical space was the change in the quality of private property and the distinction between public and private. According to Lefebvre, the destruction of the sacred or absolute place was carried out by the barbarians who

invaded Rome (2014, 243). This invasion allowed the production of a new space in several ways.

Also, the emergence of historical space from absolute space is characterized by the growing material and representational abstraction of social practice (Wilson 2013, 368). The shift from historical space to abstract space occurred as a result of the commodification of land and labor and the development of industrial capitalism (Wilson 2013, 368). After a general statement for absolute, sacred and historical space concepts of Lefebvre, abstract space will be handled in detail.

Abstract space is the key concept of Lefebvre in the book *The Production of Space*. For Lefebvre, abstract space is the space of capitalism and it aims to be homogenized and fragmented. The fragmentation and homogenization of abstract space are the results of the commodification of space. It is defined as “a product of violence and war” by Lefebvre, therefore it is political; and because abstract space is instituted by a state, it is institutional (1991, 285). Abstract space, as a product of violence and war, is used as an instrument to crush and destruct differences (Lefebvre 1991, 285). Despite of this instrumental notion, abstract space is not homogeneous, it aims the homogeneity and it enforces homogeneous (Lefebvre 1991, 287):

Abstract space, which is the tool of domination, asphyxiates whatever is conceived within it and then strives to emerge (Lefebvre 1991, 370).

Homogeneity of abstract space can be observed as the parcellization² of space into homogeneous blocs. As a result of this parcellization, productive activity is separated from the reproduction of social relations. Work, residence, and leisure spaces are designed as separated spaces and space is commodified as a result of this. Space is removed from the specific sides and reduced to homogeneous parts. Commodification gives an economic role to space and turns it into a property, brings exchange value of space over the use value of space (Stewart 1995, 614). Abstract space is the space that

² Parcelization can shortly be defined as fragmentation of private properties. For a detailed information, Stewart (1995, 614) gives a reference to the book “*La Pensee Marxiste et la Ville*” (1972) of Henri Lefebvre.

capitalists invest and return a profit, on the other hand, absolute space is used in everyday life. Capitalism prioritizes the exchange value providing profit against the use value of everyday life experience. In conclusion, value of space is defined by the amount of income it brings. Use value and social values of space fade into insignificance against the exchange value of space.

In his diagnosis of abstract space, Lefebvre states:

Formal boundaries are gone between town and country, between centre and periphery, between suburbs and city centres, between the domain of automobiles and the domain of people. Between happiness and unhappiness, for that matter. And yet everything ('public facilities', blocks of flats, 'environments of living') is separated, assigned in isolated fashion to unconnected 'sites' and 'tracts'; the spaces themselves are specialized just as operations are in the social and technical division of labour (1991, 97-98).

According to Lefebvre, space is not a neutral mass but covers the areas of production and reproduction. The dominant social structure and mode of production form the spatial structure. Abstract space and abstract labor are the results of a series of economic, social and political developments. Abstract space has three elements implying one another and concealing one another: *the geometric*, *the visual*, and *the phallic formant* (Lefebvre 1991, 285-287).

The geometric formant represents the neutrality and homogeneity of space with Euclidean geometry and this geometry enables a reproducible order. *The visual formant* is the most invidious of these three formants. The domination of the visual provides an illusion of transparency, the illusion that things are exactly as they look (Stewart 1995, 614). This also leads the surveillance and male dominance. People are no longer able to sense things; they are only able to sense the signs of things. As Lefebvre notes "in this space, things, acts, and situations are forever being replaced by representations" (1991, 311). *The phallic formant* is also a reminder of men power. The verticality symbolizes the dominance of masculine forces. It consolidates the power of the corporation and the state (Stewart 1995, 614). According to Lefebvre, the dominance of the commodification of space represented in the art world by Picasso

(1991, 302). He makes a statement for his three formants in relation to Picasso's art as follows:

Picasso's cruelty toward the body, particularly the female body, which he tortures in a thousand ways and caricatures without mercy, is dictated by the dominant form of space, by the eye and by the phallus - in short, by violence (1991, 302).

However, abstract space is envired with contradictions despite its tendency towards homogeneity. Wilson states that Lefebvre refers, on one hand, the existence of abstract space as a commodified space in which every element has an exchange value and is individually parcellized, and on the other hand the status of abstract space as a political space in which the state aims to create a homogeneous society and control the differences (2013, 368-369). Lefebvre believes that the most basic quality of the space produced by capital is contradiction and differential space will be born from these inner contradictions of abstract space.

At this point, it would be useful to mention those contradictions of abstract space which will lead to differential space. Lefebvre states that "differences endure or arise on the margins of the homogenized realm" (1991, 373) and he notes the contradictions of abstract space, which lead the born of differential space from abstract space, as follows: the contradiction between *quantity and quality*, *global and fragmented*, and *use value and exchange value* (1991, 352-400). Differential space foregrounds quality over quantity and use value over exchange value (Lefebvre 1990, cited in Fuchs 2018, 148).

Space is the projection of every social element from the social production relations to the dominant ideology. The space produced by power and the current mode of production is the only thing that determines every aspect of life. For the spaces of capitalism, this situation shows itself as commodification and abstraction through homogenization. Space is content of information about the current mode of production. However, the question is how space serves the current mode of production and how the dominant social structure uses it. This is socially determinant. Because space is a

social production, the transformation of space has interrelation with the transformation of society, power, production relations, and whole life.

CHAPTER 4

ISLAMIST CONSERVATISM RISING ON NEOLIBERAL POLICIES IN TURKEY

In this chapter, urbanization in Turkey will be discussed in terms of neoliberal Islamist conservative urban policies. With the help of the dialectical relationship between space, dominant ideology and mode of production, the effects of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism and the changes and transformations on urban spaces and social structure of Turkey will be examined.

4.1. Legal and Spatial Aspects of Islamist Conservatism

In Chapter 2, information about the spatial organization of Islamist conservatism was mentioned and the mosque came to the forefront as the most important spatial element. Related to Chapter 2, this chapter looks at the legal and spatial aspects of Islamist conservatism in Turkey, and the spatial organization of conservatism through places of worship in Turkey will be discussed. In the first part of this chapter, the zoning legislation starting from the Ottoman Empire period, including the proclamation of the secular and democratic Republic, to present will be handled and, the evolution of the regulations in the zoning legislation related to mosques will be examined.

In the second part of the chapter, spatial aspects of Islamist conservatism after 1980 will be handled together with the urbanization dynamics of the country. The neoliberal

and Islamist conservative dimensions of post-1980 urbanization will be examined and the place of mosques in the post-2000 period as a symbol of Islamist conservatism will be discussed.

4.1.1. Regulations Regarding the Mosques in the Zoning Legislation since the Ottoman Empire

With the declaration of the Republic in 1923, the management of the Ottoman Dynasty has ended in Turkey. While the capital of the country was Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire³, Ankara was declared as the capital after the proclamation of the Republic. Since Istanbul was the capital during the Empire, it was known that the legislation related to zoning was mostly directed towards the zoning of the capital Istanbul. Until the Tanzimat Reform Era, there are no regular and compiled laws and other legal regulations. However, before the Tanzimat, there were two institutions that controlled urban development: The Sultan and the religious institutions (Uluengin and Turan 2005, Ergin 1995, cited in Ersoy 2017, 5-6).

When Istanbul was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1453, “the built environment of the city appeared to be a largely abandoned settlement consisting of Hagia Sophia, a few important churches and administrative structures, an imperial palace, and the main axes and forums joining them” (Ersoy 2017, 7). In order to give the city a new identity and appearance, new buildings were built to serve social, administrative and religious purposes, and steps were taken to transform the existing Byzantine city into an imperial capital to represent the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Ersoy mentions the efforts of “Islamization” and “Turkification” of the built environment of the city

³ The Ottoman Empire was a Turkish-Islamic state with a theocratic and monarchic state structure based on religion. The administration was based on the absolute authority of the Sultan who was supposed to have sovereignty from God. The Sultan's duty was to apply the Shari'a (the law of God) and to ensure the validity of the Islamic principles. The Ottoman State had a dual legal system, Sharia and customary law. The law of Sharia was the Islamic law, which was found to be the field of application because the religion of the state was Islam. Therefore, the Islamic religion had a great importance in the legal and spatial structure of the Empire.

and underlines that these Islamization and Turkification studies are not completely separated from the Byzantine past (Ersoy 2017, 9). The important religious structures of the Byzantine city, such as Hagia Sophia, were either preserved or similar structures were built in the same places. In this urban spatial structure, the major religious structures were the main elements, and, in each period, new magnificent religious and public structures were built depending on the power of the Empire.

A significant part of the zoning movements in the Ottoman period took place from the Tanzimat Period to the proclamation of the Republic. The regulations and laws announced during this period are as follows (Ersoy 2017, 40):

- Certificate (İlmühaber) dated 1839
- Regulation on Buildings (Ebniye Nizamnamesi) dated 1848
- Declaration (Beyanname) dated 1848
- Regulation on Buildings (Ebniye Nizamnamesi) dated 1849
- Regulation on Streets (Sokaklara Dair Nizamname) dated 1858
- Regulation on Piers (Rıhtımlar Nizamnamesi) dated 1863
- Regulation on Streets and Buildings (Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi) dated 1863
- Regulation on the Duties of the Road Improvement Commission (Islahat-ı Turuk Komisyonu Vazafinin Mübeyyin Talimatname) dated 1866
- Regulation on the Construction of the Buildings to be Built in Istanbul and Bilad-ı Selase (İstanbul Bilad-I Selasede Yapılacak Ebniyenin Suret-i İnşayesine Dair Nizamname) dated 1875
- Buildings Law (Ebniye Kanunu) dated 1882
- Buildings Law (Ebniye Kanunu) dated 1891

When the regulations regarding the mosques in the legislation above are examined, a number of regulations are first found in the Certificate dated 1839. In the mentioned document, there are the statements of “...if necessary, a square will be designed in the appropriate places and a plan will be prepared in such a way that these squares will be formed around the existing mosques and similar buildings as much as possible” and

“if there are mosques and useful masjids⁴ on the roads to be corrected, mosques and masjids will be left as they are...” (Ersoy 2017, 41-42). As can be understood from here, it is stated that squares will be formed as public spaces and these public spaces will be designed around mosques.

Secondly, when the Regulation on Buildings (Ebniye Nizamnamesi) dated 1848 is examined, it is seen that Article 6 states that during the construction of a new mosque, the streets will be constructed with a width in accordance with the Regulation, Article 7 states that after the fire disaster, the openings and courtyards in front of the mosques will be arranged according to the Regulation, and Article 28 will not permit building construction in the courtyards of the mosques (Ersoy 2017, 45,47). These regulations show that there is an aim to create large public open spaces in the urban area of Istanbul. In parallel, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation on Buildings dated 1849 contain the same contents as the Regulation dated 1848 (Ersoy 2017, 57).

Article 10 of the Regulation on Streets and Buildings (Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi) dated 1863 combines the Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation on Buildings dated 1848 and 1849. Article 10 stipulates that if new mosques, tombs, schools, and similar public buildings are constructed, the streets in which they will be located will be constructed according to the defined widths, and mosques, madrasas and other religious buildings in the places that had a fire disaster, open spaces will be left in front of them with accordance to the Regulation (Ersoy 2017, 75).

After the Regulation dated 1863, firstly, Article 5 and Article 58 of the Buildings Law (Ebniye Kanunu) dated 1882 contained a clause on mosques. According to Article 5, it is forbidden to construct buildings in the courtyards of the places of worship and in the places abandoned for other public interest, and it is also forbidden to privatize these places by any means. According to Article 58, no tax shall be levied on the repair of all religious facilities, schools, barracks and hospitals, and that in any case a license

⁴ Masjid is a place of worship for Muslims as well as a mosque. It can be defined as small mosque. There is no minaret and pulpit in masjids unlike the mosque. They are small places used to pray and it can also be found in places that are not public.

shall be issued without charge (Ersoy 2017, 96). The Buildings Law of 1882 is a comprehensive zoning law consisting of 12 sections and a total of 99 articles including one temporary. There is another important issue regarding this law. With Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Buildings Law of 1882 it is stated that the size of the area to be left for the public uses without compensation cannot exceed one quarter of the size of the property and that the left land will be used only for the construction of public uses such as roads, schools, and police stations. “Beginning with this regulation, all zoning laws until 1985 included that in the places where the cities will be developed, the land that the property owners will leave to the public is allocated for common use such as roads, squares, parking lots, schools, police stations, and green spaces. However, with the Zoning Law numbered 3194, which came into force in 1985, mosque was added in the use of common service areas for the first time” (Ersoy 2017, 101).

The Buildings Law of 1891 is almost the same as the Buildings Law of 1882. Article 5 and Article 58 of the Law dated 1882 and the Law dated 1891 have the same content (Ersoy 2017, 103-109). Law dated 1891 was in force for 10 months and was subsequently repealed. The Buildings Law dated 1882 came into force again, some articles were amended and remained in force until the first 10 years of the Republic (Ersoy 2017, 117). After the proclamation of the Republic on 29.10.1923, the Ottoman Empire, a Turkish-Islamic state based on religion, was replaced by a secular and democratic Republic. Consequently, there have been major changes in the legal and spatial structure after this date.

Law numbered 642 was adopted in 1925, proposing amendments to some articles of the Buildings Law of 1882 (Tekeli 2010, cited in Ersoy 2017, 118). According to Article 12 of this law, it is said whether the buildings allocated to public and official services such as religious buildings and schools are required to be built in the areas considered as fields and if necessary, their spaces and areas shall be determined by the Cemiyet-i Umûmiye-i Municipality (Ersoy 2017, 121).

The 1930s was a period in which the superstructure institutions taken over from the Ottoman Empire were re-established in accordance with the ideology of the new

Republic. “In this period, it is seen that modern legal, administrative and institutional reforms were implemented with a brand new understanding in the field of zoning, planning, and municipalism” (Ersoy 2017, 124).

The Municipal Building and Roads Law numbered 2290, which came into force in 1933, has such a background as the first zoning law of the Republic. The most important feature of this law is that it was the first Republican law. With this law, different uses in the city are mentioned and their size according to the future population of the city is given. Accordingly, 50 m² for housing, garden and road, 4 m² for commercial and industrial areas, 4 m² for green areas and playgrounds, 2 m² for public institutions and military areas, 3 m² for hospitals, cemeteries, hotels, baths and etc., 2 m² for school areas and libraries will be reserved per person and depending on the characteristics of the place, these sizes could be increased by 2% (Ersoy 2017, 138). When this distribution is examined, it is seen that the use of religious facilities is not included. “This distribution contains clues to the secular and positivist ideology of the new Republic” because while the libraries are being used as the mandatory use of space, there is no provision for the development plans for places of worship and this field is left entirely to civil society (Ersoy 2017, 152).

With the amendments made in 1934 and 1944, the Law numbered 2290 has been in force for 24 years. In 1957, the Zoning Law numbered 6785 entered into force. Article 42 of the law states that the land to be left to the public free of charge for joint use as a result of the zoning arrangement is the “land readjustment share (LRS)” and that this share may not exceed 25% of the land area before the regulation (Ersoy 2017, 203). In the same article, it is stated that the portion allocated as LRS will be used for public services such as roads, squares, parks, parking lots, playgrounds and green areas. The road and greens area phrases in the Law numbered 2290 has been replaced with more different uses in the Law numbered 6785, and the police station phrase in the Buildings Law dated 1882 has been removed. Moreover, the LRS rate of 15% determined by the Law numbered 2290 was increased to 25% in this law. With the regulation that was added to the Law numbered 6785 in 1973, definitions such as LRS share, LRS rate,

amount allocated to public services and calculation of this amount have been stipulated. Following the Law numbered 6785, the Zoning Law numbered 3194, which was still in force, came into force in 1985. From this point onwards, assessments regarding the legislation after 2000 will be initiated starting from the Law numbered 3194.

Article 18 of Law numbered 3194 stipulates for the first time that LRS areas can also be used as mosques and the proportion of land allocated as LRS cannot exceed 35%. In 2003, within the framework of the European Union Harmonization Laws, the term “mosque” was changed as “place of worship” with Article 9 of Law numbered 4928 and the Zoning Law numbered 3194 updated accordingly. Despite this positive change to freedom of belief, this change was ineffective as it was not implemented without discrimination. By adding “place of worship” with the 2003 amendment, it was made possible to construct religious buildings belonging to different religions and different sects of religions such as djemevi, church, synagogue, etc. in the areas that were left free to the public use. However, this law has been applied to the privilege of a single sect belonging to a single religion, as previously, contrary to international and national law⁵. Between 2003 and 2014, only a few churches and synagogues were built, and djemevis were never given the status of a place of worship (Yıldırım 2014, 13-14). Therefore, this change in the law does not provide any change in the perception of mosque and masjid-oriented places of worship. In fact, with the subsequent regulations, it has been seen that the urban space has been progressing towards increasing the density of mosques and masjids.

As of 2014, the places of worship were connected to the regulations issued by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MEU). These regulations are the Regulation on the Construction of Spatial Plans (RCSP) published in the Official Gazette dated 14.06.2014 and numbered 29030 (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi 2014) and the Zoning Regulation on Planned Areas (ZRPA) published in the Official Gazette dated

⁵ For more information about the right to build a worship place and the practice in Turkey see also (Yıldırım 2014)

03.07.2017 and numbered 30113 (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi 2017). The related parts of these two regulations regarding mosques and places of worship are as follows:

ZRPA Article 44 (ğğ) : Place of Worship: The facilities where people gather in order to worship and benefit from religious services and the complex of these facilities belong to the religious facility provided that it is compatible with the architecture of the religious facility and including equipment such as housing, library, soup kitchen, recreation hall, condolence place, dormitory and course structure, *gasilhane*, *şadırvan* and toilet, open or closed parking areas (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi 2017).

RCSP Article 12 : In the development plans, as a religious facility, the small mosque can be planned in the service impact area that should be reached on foot considering the distance of approximately 250 meters and the middle (neighborhood) mosque approximately 400 meters. Masjids can be built within a service area of approximately 150 meters according to the settled or mobile population (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi 2014).

According to Article 12 of the RCSP, an arrangement is made according to a particular belief group in society. However, worship places where people gather to worship consist of places of different religions and beliefs. In the statements here, it is seen that places of worship are defined in terms of mosques and masjids. It is understood from this statement that not all belief groups in the society are treated equally and this situation contradicts the principle of equality stated in the Constitution.

In addition, Article 19 of the ZRPA stipulates that almost all of the public uses in the urban space should have a masjid. According to the same Article, the public and official buildings such as shopping malls, office buildings, offices, administrative buildings, factories and similar industrial facilities, wedding halls, restaurants, casinos, cinemas, theaters, museums, libraries and congress centers, dormitory buildings, sports and cultural structures and facilities, educational buildings, hospitals and similar health facilities, transportation structures and facilities such as airports, ports, terminals, railway stations, subway stations, fuel stations, hotels and similar tourism facilities, housing parcels having more than seventy five independent sections, national park, nature park, regional park, recreation area, picnic area, outdoor sports areas should be designed with a sufficient amount of space for a masjid. Similarly, in Article 26, in order to meet the needs in public places, in Article 35, in order to meet the minimum needs of the users in fuel stations, in Article 47, not less than 30 m² in

passages and shopping malls, the provision of a masjid area is stipulated. As a result of this regulation, it is arranged to include a masjid in each urban equipment proposed by development plans.

In this section, the status of mosques and worship places within the zoning legislation from the Ottoman Empire to the present is examined. It can be seen that the final arrangement, the RCSP, involves the harsh interventions of political Islam through spaces that represent its ideology. The provisions of this regulation on religious facilities are discriminatory and exclusive. This situation contradicts international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights and national legislation and universal principles concerning equality and freedom of belief. The language and the criteria used in the provisions of the RCSP, regarding especially the religious facilities, contradict the condition of the state and regulatory institutions to respect and maintain equal distance to all the diverse values of the society defined in the Constitution.

4.1.2. Spatial Organization of Neoliberal Islamist Conservative Policies in Turkey

At the beginning of this section, it will be useful to talk about the history of Islamist conservatism in Turkey. The development of Islamist conservatism in Turkey is based on the project called “Green Belt” designed by the USA for the Middle Eastern countries in the 1950s. During the Cold War, USA policy emerged as supporting a moderate, controllable Islam in the Middle East and using it against the USSR and communism.

The project basically aims to Islamization of these countries. The internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries, including Turkey, were intervened within the scope of this project and right-wing governments were supported externally to put Islamist policies into practice. This period indicates a period in which political Islam gets stronger and

Sunni Islamist themes put forward both in Turkey and in other countries. Islamic piety which gained momentum after 1980 both in Turkey and in other countries dates back to and rooted in “Green Belt” project. With the Moderate Islam model, the secular system established after the proclamation of the Republic in Turkey began to go back.

When it comes to urbanization, starting from the causes would be useful. Urbanization is caused by economic, political, technological and sociological reasons. It is not possible to distinguish these factors that interact with each other. The urbanization of Turkey also took place under the impact of these factors. Keles examines the causes specific to Turkey’s urbanization under three titles: impulsive, transmitting and attractive forces (1996, 47-52).

The impulsive forces of urbanization in Turkey are mostly related to the economic conditions in agricultural production. Since the 1950s, agricultural mechanization and capitalization, fragmentation of agricultural lands, low productivity in agriculture, and a decrease in agricultural income have caused the peasant to break away from agriculture and push out (Keleş 1996, 47-48). The transmitting forces of urbanization in Turkey refers to the development of the means of transportation. As a reflection of globalization, Turkey has also experienced improvements in transportation and communication sectors (Keleş 1996, 49-50). Increasing mobilization increased urbanization. And the basic attractive force of urbanization in Turkey is industrialization. As the cities of Turkey industrialized, an increase in the population towards the cities was observed (Keleş 1996, 51-52).

Urbanization in Turkey was quite slow before 1950, it has gained speed after 1950. Slum phenomenon, one of the main characteristics of urbanization in Turkey, has emerged with the impacts of Marshall Aid and agricultural mechanization, which led the labor section left the rural area, built its own living space in the city and invented various solutions to hold on to life in the city (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 82). Until the 1980s, housing and business cooperatives were other important forms of space production. After the 1980s, new and powerful actors appeared in space production. The construction and transformation of urban space have accelerated and radicalized.

In the 1950-1980 period, urban population growth was generally observed in industrial cities. After 1980, besides industrialization, tourism and terror incidents in the east of the country were effective in the increase of urban population. In the 30-year period between 1960 and 1990, the urban population increased fourfold from 6.9 million to 31.4 million, and the urbanization level, which was 25.2% in 1960, was 55.4% in 1990 (Keleş 1996, 42).

In the period after 1980, when the basic urbanization policy was rapid urbanization and integration with the world, i.e. globalization, cities of Turkey has been discovered by the capital. Besides the modernity-tradition dilemmas of the society, sects, communities, belief systems that have been hidden for years have diversified and sprouted (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 195).

The ideological transformation experienced in Turkey with political Islam and conservatism, which has increased power since the 1980s, is associated with the transformation of the economic functioning quite well. The change from a statist economy to the neoliberal economic model brought about an Islamist conservative transformation. In this context, to examine the relationships that neoliberalism and conservatism made with space to establish an ideology and dominate that ideology is important to understand the transformations of cities of Turkey.

Even if the roots of Islamist conservatism in Turkey dates back before the 1980s, the rise of Islamist conservatism took strength from the neoliberal policies of the 1980s. 1980 is periodically important because certain political and economic breaks in the world have been also effective in Turkey in terms of social transformation and urbanization. Starting from the 1980s, neoliberalism has increased its power and lifted its effectiveness thanks to urban space and Islamist conservatism, in parallel, has become more perceivable and observable in daily life thanks to neoliberal policies. Urban space has had a key role in both the rise of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism in Turkey.

Because urbanization is a phenomenon that occurs within the time, space and human triangle, it is also meaningful in terms of showing the stages of change in society. In the following parts, the urbanization of Turkey will be handled to understand the changes in society and social life.

4.1.2.1. Neoliberal Islamist Conservative Aspects of Urbanization between 1980 and 2000

The 1980s refers to a period in which not only Turkey, but also the world was going through a complicated economic and financial transformation. This transformation was not only limited to the economy field, but also brought about social, political and socio-cultural transformation. The oil crisis that broke out in 1974 was overcome with an understanding of free economy. For this reason, liberal policies have been readopted and could spread.

One of the most important and critical events of this period in terms of Turkey is the Military Coup of 12 September 1980. The Coup was terminated the 43rd Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, reorganized the state through a new and anti-democratic constitution that prohibits, and restricts the activities of political parties, trade unions, and professional organizations. As Çavuşoğlu states “the rhetoric and actions of the 1980 military intervention showed that it was aiming to create a classless and fused mass” (2016, 181).

The New Right movement in Turkey has started to gain momentum with neoliberal and Islamist conservative elements in the 1980s and began to transform the values of neoliberal and Islamist conservative elements into concrete political goals. This movement, which started to find its way in political practice in the world with Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the USA was represented by Turgut Özal, and the Motherland Party (MP) government led by him, in Turkey. Özal came to power with a 45% support in the 1983 General Elections (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu 2019).

The general philosophy of the MP, and “Özalizm”⁶, is summarized with the following statements from the Party Program:

We are a nationalist, conservative political party based on social justice and competitive free-market economy (Anavatan Partisi 1983, 9).

The MP has entered politics by claiming that it represents both the center-right and center-left. As stated in the Party Program, the previous political views of their supporters are not important (Anavatan Partisi 1983, 9). Therefore, the MP is, in fact, a reaction to the formation of the center by the army and this reaction has found its reflection throughout the country. The Military Coup of 12 September 1980 provided the necessary ground for the Özal period. With the 1982 Constitution, the power of the state has been dominated, an authoritarian and centralized understanding has been ensured, and a wide range of action has been created for the Özal Government.

The 1990s were spent with political unrest and coalition governments. Political Islam's march toward power resulted in the establishment of Necmettin Erbakan, from the Welfare Party (WP), as the prime minister in 1996 who was the first political Islamist prime minister. But before that, the influence of the 1994 Local Elections is quite large on the rise of conservative ideology in Turkey. At this point, it would be useful to talk about the history of the WP.

Congregations, communities and sects supporting the Democratic Party in the 1950s and the Justice Party in the 1960s against the Republican People's Party (RPP) started their political fight by establishing their own parties in the 1970s under the roof of the National Vision Movement⁷ (NVM) with the idea of making Islamic rules dominant in the society (Karatepe 2014, cited in Aşgin 2018, 255). In this respect, the first

⁶ The neoliberal policies called as Reaganism in the USA and Thatcherism in the United Kingdom was named as “Özalizm” in Turkey, because similar policies were first implemented by Turgut Özal.

⁷ In the Erbakan movement, the ‘national’ emphasis stands out. Except from the name of National Vision Movement, Erbakan used this concept as a clear qualification for political party names, institutions and organizations such as the “National” Order Party, “National” Salvation Party, “National” Newspaper and “National” Youth Foundation.

permanent political party with clear Islamic references was the National Order Party (NOP) established in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, and it can be said that with the establishment of the NOP in 1970, the politics with religious references emerged directly (Özbudun and Hale 2010; Eser 2013, cited in Aşgın 2018, 256, 288). After a short time from the establishment, in the year 1971, NOP was closed by the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office on the grounds of contradiction to the Constitution and the principle of secularism.

After the closure of NOP, National Salvation Party (NSP) was formed in the year 1972 as another Islamist political party rooted from NVM. NSP was closed with other political parties after the Military Coup of 1980. And the Welfare Party (WP) was formed in 1983 after the closure of the NSP with the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan again. Erbakan was the founder and leader of several important Islamist political parties in Turkey under the principles of the NVM. The political representations of NVM began with Erbakan being an independent deputy from Konya in the 1969 elections and continued with the National Order Party (1970-1971), the National Salvation Party (1972-1981), the Welfare Party (1983-1998), the Virtue Party (1997-2001) and the Felicity Party (2001-today).

According to the WP Party Program, the basic purpose is defined as follows:

Our main goal is to raise our nation above the level of contemporary civilization.

To achieve this goal;

- a) Development and reconstruction of our country in all areas,
- b) Cultural and spiritual development will strive.

These efforts will be made by taking into consideration our national characteristics and features (Refah Partisi 1985, 36).

In addition, Article 6 of the WP Party Program has a separate title as “family” and the family emphasis on conservative ideology shows itself with the following statements:

Family is the basis of the nation. Family is also the basic unit of our national education. Spiritual education and development of individuals start in family (Refah Partisi 1985, 38).

With the importance of the family, it is also stated that a new system will be developed in the field of National Education. This system is mentioned in detail under Article 19 of the program, titled as “National Education and Teaching”. It is stated that religious education is the foundation of spiritual development and that it constitutes great importance in terms of national development, therefore the number of religious officials will be increased and widespread religious education will be provided (Refah Partisi 1985, 48-49).

According to Macit, one of the basic elements that give rise to the NVM was the sects and congregations such as the Nakşibendi, Kadiri, Haznevi and Nurcular, and İmam-Hatip schools (2017, cited in Aşgın 2018, 291). The NVM legitimized Islamist politics and the fact that the Islamist groups were organized around a political party and became candidates and partners for political power.

NVM, with its developmentalist, conservative, Islamist and liberal discourse, has spread to broad sections of the society through its staffing, and has expanded its field of action based on religiosity (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 204). NVM won the 1984 Local Elections in Van and Şanlıurfa, won the 1989 Local Elections in Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Sivas, Şanlıurfa, and Van and made a big leap and won the 1994 Local Elections in 28 cities including Istanbul and Ankara. The elected mayor of Istanbul was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Melih Gökçek was the mayor elected for Ankara. During this period, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the Provincial Head of the WP in Istanbul. Following this success in the 1994 Local Elections, the WP became the first party in the 1995 General Elections with a rate of 21.4% (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu 2019).

For the first time in the political history of Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamist leader in terms of political philosophy and personal identity, became the Prime Minister of the country. However, the government period of the WP led by an Islamist prime minister was short-lived. The WP was closed by the Constitutional Court with the Military Intervention of 28 February 1997 because of “the acts against the principle of the secular Republic” again. The period from 1997 to the 1999 elections, there was

the Motherland Party-Democratic Left Party coalition government, and the period from 1999 to the 2002 early elections, there was the Democratic Left Party-Nationalist Movement Party-Motherland Party coalition government. The coalition governments will not be established for many years after the 2002 election and there will be one-party governments.

After the closure of the WP, which is the NVM's political representative, the NVM has not withdrawn from the political scene. The Virtue Party (VP), which has the same political references with WP, was founded in 1997 under the chairmanship of İsmail Alptekin. The VP was also closed in 2001 when the VP was proved to be a continuation of the closed WP. Then, as the continuation of the VP, the Felicity Party (FP), was established in 2001 under the leadership of Recai Kutan. In the same year, the conflicts between “the traditionalist” and “the reformists” started to rise in the FP, and the reformists established the Justice and Development Party (JDP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The JDP won the 2002 General Elections and continued as the ruling party until today.

As summarized above with the important points, the rise of the Islamist movement in the political history of Turkey began in the 1970s. The congregations, sects, and religious organizations substantially gathered under the name of National Vision Movement, established political parties, and gained political representation and power. During the 30 years between 1970 and 2001, parties were formed, and parties were closed. These political parties, taking their roots from Islamism and aiming the Islamization, necessarily needed to go to a division. After the division in the Movement, it can be said that targeted stability for many years was reached with the JDP. Because since its establishment, the JDP is the ruling party in Turkey. The political line and the policies of the JDP and impacts of these policies on the cities of Turkey will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

After mentioning the political actors and important developments of the period between 1980 and 2000, discussing the developments and policies starting from the

period of Özal, including the rise and closing of the WP and the foundation of the JDP would be helpful to understand the urbanization of Turkey.

Decisions on the new economic policy of 24 January 1980 in this period are an important step towards consolidating neoliberalism. With this economic program known as the January 24 Decisions, Turkey has made a transition from import substitution industrialization to the international capitalist economy. Urban and public services have paved the way for marketization. Boratav summarizes the main elements of this neoliberal program as follows:

A foreign exchange policy operated in accordance with real devaluations, an import regime that moves step-by-step towards liberalization, expensive exchange, cheap credit and tax refund, making exports a national priority supported by incentives and subsidies, removal of price controls and subsidies for most basic goods, macro policies for narrowing domestic demand (2009, 149).

The environment formed by the 24 January Decisions after 1980 is defined by Şengül as “urbanization of capital” (2001, 64-65). As Şengül argues, the capital was also urbanized during the previous periods, but it was much more effective after 1980 than the previous periods so that its efficiency reached a hegemonic dimension (2001, 66). Urban space has become the main target of capital in line with the needs of international capitalist economy. With the policy change that was made after 1980, the government decided to stop industrialization as the main target and directed a large proportion of investments to the production of built environment. This process of deindustrialization has made cities new investment areas and the city became commoditized by turning the land into a field of earning.

With the Development Law numbered 3194 and published in 1985, the municipalities and governors were given the authority to approve the plans and the cities started to be planned growth and development-oriented. Urban lands have become the area of investment for large capital groups, and government policies are built on maintaining this situation. Not only the capital groups, but also the low-income groups started to gain from the space through the zoning amnesties, the first of which was issued in 1948 and reached the number of 14 in 40 years (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 187,188,192).

In the post-1980 period, with the change of the state's mass housing supply, the cities began to grow in the form of articulation of urban parts. According to the planning practice of the neoliberal period, new residential areas detached from the city were produced by the Housing Development Administration (HDA), which was established in 1984 with the Mass Housing Law numbered 2985. This situation brought suburbanization. Serter mentions that suburbanization is a strategic tool in terms of the period and states that the detached and inward-enclosed neighborhood construction overlaps with the urban construction of conservative ideology (2018, 177-178).

In the same period, urban public spaces (such as forests and pastures) have been zoned for construction and private ownership has been expanded while most of the urban services have been privatized. This gap in the field of urban service was filled by structures belonging to the cults, communities and religious systems (Islamist associations, foundations, etc.) which have great importance for the conservatization of everyday life (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 195, Serter 2018, 181).

Many new developments have been seen in Turkey after 1980. During this period, social transformations occurred, and economic neoliberalization took place. The rise of Islam is one of the most important developments in this period. Arrangements in the field of education in order to support the rise of Islam are worthy of consideration in terms of their contribution to religionization.

In this period, the integration of political Islam with capitalism was made possible by the neoliberalization of Islam. The gap that emerged from the withdrawal of the state from the economy and the public sphere was filled by the representations of conservative ideology. The relationship between free-market economy and Islamic values is one of the prominent dynamics of this period.

As a reflection of neoliberal ideology's economic policy, the flexible production systems attach importance to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the market of Turkey, the production is spread towards Anatolia and paved the way for the rapid development of SMEs (Serter 2018, 187). In this way, the Islamist

conservative capital from Anatolia part of Turkey gained strength against the central capital. The conservative Islamist capital gained a great advantage and magnitude in this period when trade liberalized, and competition increased with the effect of neoliberalism.

The most critical point of the development of the communication networks established by Islamist capital and the economic activities carried out by these networks is the establishment of MÜSİAD as an alternative to TÜSİAD in 1990. The common feature of the founders of MÜSİAD is that their roots are based on Islamist associations, sects, and communities, and mostly the National Vision Movement, which began to be influential in the 1960s (Serter 2018, 189).

The 1994 Local Elections has great importance in terms of the cities of Turkey and the rise of Islamist conservative ideology in Turkey. With the WP's election to the local governance of Istanbul and Ankara, these two big cities were included in the conservative transformation ongoing in Anatolia. Nevertheless, there has not been a comprehensive conservative transformation in Istanbul and Ankara, as in the Anatolian cities. However, in these two cities, the urban space has begun to be shaped in line more with neoliberal policies. Islamist conservative policies began to be effective and visible in these cities mostly after 2000.

The 1990s, as mentioned above, was a period in which favorable conditions were achieved for the strengthening of the conservative ideology. The Islamist economy, which was able to develop thanks to the neoliberal policies of the Özal period, increased the amount of capital during the rise of the NVM, and thus ensured its existence in the social, economic and political fields. The period after 1980 was a period when certain religious community structures, neoliberal-conservative coalition, and political Islam created changes and transformations in the social space and everyday life.

The period between 1980 and 2000 is a period in which political Islam, which will be the founding actor of hegemony, warms up to local and central politics (Çavuşoğlu

2016, 181). The process which has been going on since 1980 has been a period in which neoliberalism becomes permanent and it increases its intensity gradually, and Islamist conservatism makes itself more visible in daily life and urban space.

4.1.2.1.1. Urbanization of Islamist Conservatism and Symbols of Islamist Conservatism between 1980 and 2000

After looking at the general situation of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies in the post-1980 period, it would be useful to look at how Islamist conservatism became urbanized and how it became visible and effective in everyday life. Islamist conservatization and religionization of the national education system will be the first subject. Starting from one of the most important regulations in this sense, with Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution, religious culture and ethics education became a compulsory course in schools. This change in the education system has been reinforced in the urban area with an increase in the number of Imam-Hatip schools⁸ and Quran courses. In this period, efforts were made to increase the number of Quran courses. Religious and educational facilities were encouraged, and tax facilities were provided (Duman, 2008 cited in Serter 2018, 182).

⁸ Imam-Hatip schools are established to train religious officials such as imam and preacher. The first of the schools that can be called as Imam-Hatip school was opened in 1924 under the name of Imam Hatip Mektepleri in 29 centers to train "intellectual religious officials". Imam-Hatip schools were closed by the state in 1930 due to lack of students. Between 1930 and 1948, religious education was given in Quran courses opened by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The Democrat Party, which came to power after the 1950 elections, reopened the Imam-Hatip schools as it was promised during the election campaign. In 1951, it was decided that Imam-Hatip schools should be a 4-year secondary school and a 3-year high school department, providing education for 7 years. In the following period, it has developed beyond the aim of raising religious officials and has become widespread throughout the country. At this point, the national education system has a dual structure. Necmettin Erbakan said that at the congress of the Welfare Party in 1996, the political Islamist administration that had risen after the 1950s owed to the investment in Imam Hatip schools and Qur'an courses ("Liberallik zor zanaat II", haber.sol.org.tr, 29.01.2010). Information about the next developments is given in the following sections.

Table 2: Developments in Imam-Hatip Schools by Years (Sarpkaya 2008, 3)

School Year	Number of Schools			Student		Teacher
	Secondary School	High School	Total	Male	Female	
1951-1952	-	-	7	876	-	27
1955-1956	16	7	23	2.504	-	108
1960-1961	-	-	36	4545	3	337
1965-1966	30	19	45	13.478	-	594
1970-1971	71	40	111	48.455	853	1.547
1975-1976	171	72	243	76.786	852	2.933
1980-1981	374	333	707	177.745	23.259	7.768
1985-1986	376	341	717	201.295	36.730	11.439
1994-1995	446	396	842	354.792	229.453	15.731
1999-2000	-	604	604	66.776	67.448	15.922

According to Table 2, Imam-Hatip schools show a steady increase in the number of schools, teachers, and students during the period from the 1951-1952 school year to the 1999-2000 school year. It is observed that this increase stagnated during military intervention periods but still did not decrease. It is also seen from Table 2 that the rapid increase in the number of these schools stopped after 1980. In the 1980-1981 school year, the number of total Imam-Hatip schools was 707 and in the 1987-1988 school year, it was 717. During these years, only 11 new Imam-Hatip high schools were opened. It is known that many of these schools were opened in the form of high school sections of the previously opened Imam-Hatip secondary schools (Sarpkaya 2008, 5).

However, according to Öcal, although the number of Imam-Hatip schools has not increased much during the MP governments, existing schools have responded to a large number of students' demands by opening branches in different districts or neighborhoods of the province or district centers where they are located. After the 1980 coup, in 1988 and 1989 high school sections of 38 Imam-Hatip schools were opened (Öcal 2015, 88).

Accordingly, Sarpkaya claims that the social model of the political Islamists overlaps with the social model aimed by the Military Coup of 12 September 1980. For this reason, after the 1980 coup, the number of Imam-Hatip high schools remained almost constant, while the religionization in the educational system increased. Although there is no big increase in the number of schools, religious education has been indirectly provided with curriculum changes and legal arrangements (Sarpkaya 2008, 6). In the years that followed, the political power continued to shape the national education system in accordance with its political-ideological goals. Religionization policies and practices based on commercialization of education and “one religion-one sectarian” approach have continued without any loss.

At this point, it would be useful to look at the state of the Quran courses during the 1980-2000 period. Öcal mentioning that the coming to power of the Democrat Party in 1950 is an important development about the Quran courses and religious life, and also interprets the period between 1950 and 1960 as “a process of relaxation in terms of religious life and religious education”. Some of the developments in the field of religion with the coming of the JP are as follows: the language change of the Azan from Turkish to Arabic, opening of Imam-Hatip schools, the liberation of Quran education and teaching. As a result of this, the number of Quran courses in Turkey has increased from 127 to 301 between 1950-1960 (Öcal 2004, 91).

Table 3: Number of Open and Closed Quran Courses between 1951 and 2001 (Öcal 2004, 92-93)

School Year	Number of Courses		Total
	Open	Closed	
1951-1952	-	-	158
1955-1956	-	-	237
1960-1961	-	-	326
1965-1966	-	-	485
1970-1971	-	-	786
1975-1976	-	-	1037
1980-1981	2610	163	2773
1985-1986	3335	327	3662
1991-1992	4557	889	5446
1994-1995	4985	1059	6044
1995-1996	5011	1507	6518
1996-1997	5241	1146	6387
1997-1998	4890	1624	6514
1998-1999	3705	2851	6556
1999-2000	3498	2963	6461
2000-2001	3119	3189	6308

According to Table 3, the number of Quran courses in Turkey has reached 786 in the year 1971. In spite of the military coup in 1980, the number of courses continued to increase, and the 1996-1997 school year was the period when the number of courses reached its highest level. It can be said that the increase in the number of Quran courses between 1994 and 1997 was related to the Welfare Party policies.

With “8 years of uninterrupted compulsory education law” numbered 4306 approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 16.08.1997 and published in the Official Gazette dated 18.08.1997 and numbered 23084, the secondary school sections of all vocational high schools, including Imam-Hatip high schools and Quran courses were closed. In short, starting from 1997, to be able to attend Quran courses and Imam-Hatip high schools, 8-year primary school graduation precondition was introduced (Öcal 2004, 97). The requirement of 8 years of uninterrupted compulsory education brought by the law numbered 4306 resulted in a decrease in the number of Quran courses and Imam-Hatip schools. In 2000-2001 school year, the number of open courses reached the lowest level and the number of closed courses reached the highest level.

Another urban element that the political Islam rising with the political power after 1980 used to make physical presence visible and to establish dominance in everyday life was mosques. Özcan, who examined the rates of “mosqueization” in the period from 1970 to 1988, stated that the number of mosques in the provincial centers increased until 1981 and then increased decreasingly (1990, 6).

Table 4: Number of Mosques between 1981 and 2000 (T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2006)

Years	Number of New Mosques	Total Number of Mosques	Number of Mosques per Thousand People
1981	-	47645	-
1981-1984	7022	54667	-
1985	2393	57060	1.12
1986	2400	59460	-
1987	2072	61532	-
1988	1415	62947	-

Table 4 (continued)

1989	1728	64675	-
1990	1325	66000	1.16
1991	674	66674	-
1992	1528	68202	-
1993	473	68675	-
1994	848	69523	-
1995	690	70213	-
1996	1080	71293	-
1997	1125	72418	1.15
1998	1354	73772	-
1999	584	74356	-
2000	646	75002	1.1

According to Table 4, it is seen that in the period from 1981 to 1990, the amount of mosqueization has increased compared to the following years. The low increase trend between the years 1991-1995 is changing in 1996. In 1996, 1997, and 1998, more mosques were built each year than the previous year. In terms of the rise and spatial visibility of political Islam in Turkey, the 1981-1988 period is important. Because during this period, the population of the country increased by 20% and the number of mosques increased by 32%⁹ (Özcan 1990, 7). In addition, when compared to the population growth rate by decades and the rate of the mosqueization by decades, the following table appears:

⁹ For detailed information on population-mosqueization ratio between 1981 and 1988 (Özcan 1990, 6-7)

Table 5: Comparison of the Population¹⁰ Growth Rate and Increase in the Number of Mosques¹¹ (TÜİK 2019, Özcan 1990, T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2006)

Years	Population	Number of Mosques	Periods	Population Growth Rate	Increase in the Number of Mosques
1980	44.736.957	47.155	-	-	-
1990	56.473.035	66.000	1980-1990	26%	40%
2000	67.803.927	75.002	1990-2000	20%	14%

Table 5 shows that while the population increased by 26%, the number of mosques increased by 40% between 1980 and 1990. This situation has occurred as 20% population increase and 14% increase in the number of mosques between 1990 and 2000. For the period of 1980-2000, the most intense mosqueization of the period is between the years 1981 and 1987. These data are extremely important in terms of the religionization of society. Starting from the national education system, comprehensive religion-oriented regulations are made in the period of 1980-2000. These regulations shaped space and social structure is shaped through space.

4.1.2.2. Neoliberal Islamist Conservative Aspects of Urbanization after 2000

The most important political subject of Turkey in the period after 2000 has been the establishment of the Justice and Development Party in 2001. Starting from the first election in 2002, the JDP has been a party that has been in power without interruption

¹⁰ Source of population data is (TÜİK 2019)

¹¹ The number of mosques in 1980 could not be obtained from any source. The number of the mosques for the year 1980 was calculated as an average value by using the number of mosques in 1971 and 1981 given in the work of Özcan (1990, 6), and 47.155 is gained as the average value.

and has been in the majority of local administrations throughout the country. Therefore, the most important determinant of policies and urbanization after 2000 was JDP policies.

One of the events that played an important role in the JDP's victory in the 2002 General Election was the economic crisis that was taking place at the time. The JDP, which was founded in 2001, won the 2002 General Elections with 34% of the votes in the year following its establishment with the promise of responding to the expectations of consistency and stability common in the society against the coalition governments that had been experienced in the previous years.

The JDP, which defines itself as a “conservative democrat” political party in the Election Declaration of 2002, states repeatedly in the same declaration that it embraces the requirements of neoliberal ideology (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 2002). Conservative democrat statement has entered political literature in Turkey with the JDP and conservative democracy can be defined as the adaptation of Islamic order and rules to neoliberal policies. In this context, it can be said that JDP has a character close to NVM, which is the origin of JDP founders and founder members, but it is a version of NVM nicely adapted to the neoliberal capitalist economy.

Before examining the long-standing political continuity of the JDP and its urbanization policies, it would be useful to touch on its conservative democrat character. JDP defines itself as “conservative in the sense of protecting Turkey's cultural heritage, democrat in the sense of defending modern institutions and values” (Erler 2007, 130). In fact, defending modern institutions and values are not related to conservatism but to neoconservatism. Because, as mentioned earlier, neoconservatism is based on adaptation to modern conditions while conservatism is trying to protect the traditional against modernism. As Bora states, the JDP is a right-wing mix, like the MP. Like the MP, the JDP is the bearer of a composition created by the symbols, representation relations and signs of the Turkish right. The MP established it in 1983 conditions without relying on a specific spine. However, the JDP established it by bending the NVM spine in this direction (Bora 2002, 29).

The goal of the JDP's economic understanding of the neoliberal economic system is clearly stated in the 2002 Election Declaration (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 2002). In different parts of the Declaration, restructuring the state by speeding up privatizations, giving the state a regulatory and supervisory function by being excluded from all kinds of economic activities, the enormous importance of foreign investment for the development of Turkey, and the importance of the structural transformations of globalization are emphasized. In addition, the emphasis on conservatism is also given place in many parts.

Since it is a political party that has been in power for 17 years, it is worth mentioning quickly what the JDP obtained from the election results. The number of votes and the number of deputies in the general elections since 2002, the first election of the JDP, were as follows: 34.28% vote rate and 363 deputies in 2002, 46.58% vote rate and 341 deputies in 2007, 49.83% vote rate and 327 deputies in 2011, 40,87% vote rate and 258 deputies in the first election in 2015 and 49,50% vote rate and 317 deputies in the second election in 2015, 42,56% vote rate and 295 deputies in 2018 (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu 2019).

It also would be useful to look at the vote rates that the JDP gained in the local elections in terms of understanding the JDP representation in local governments as well as the central government. The results of the local elections for the JDP since 2004, which were handled as metropolitan municipality, mayorship, and municipal council, are as follows in Table 6.

The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, which is the biggest city of Turkey, and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality which is the second largest city and also the capital of Turkey won by the WP candidates in the 1994 Local Elections, by the VP candidates established as a result of WP's closure in the 1999 Local Elections, and by the JDP candidates from the reformist group separated from the VP in the 2004 Local Elections. In 2009 and 2014, the candidates of the JDP were again the winners of Istanbul and Ankara Metropolitan Municipalities. However, in the 2019 Local Elections, the candidates of the main opposition party RPP, became winners of the

metropolitan municipalities in these two cities. After 25 years, the RPP candidates won the election for the first time in these two big cities and local governments moved from the right political parties that came to the forefront with their conservative identities, to a social democrat political party that defined its ideology as “Atatürk's modernization revolution and six arrow principles, and universal rules of social democracy” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2019).

According to Çavuşoğlu, the JDP's high vote rates in all of the general elections after 2002 and the fact that it repeatedly came to power alone, created a large radius of action for the JDP and the economic policies of the JDP period have been considered successful by many sections of the society, including TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD (2016, 225-226). The conservative democratic identity of the JDP is in line with the intertwining of the concepts of religion, nation, and state. As mentioned before, according to Bora, three states of the Turkish right are nationalism, conservatism, and Islamism (2008) and based on this definition, Çiğdem states that Islamism, which was previously dominated by right conservatism, evolved into a rightism dominated by Islamism in the period of JDP (as cited in Çavuşoğlu 2016, 226).

Table 6: Local Election results for the JDP by years (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu 2019)

Election		Years			
		2004	2009	2014	2019
Metropolitan Municipality	Vote Rate of JDP	46,06%	42,19%	45,54%	44,06%
	Number of Won Metropolitan Municipalities	12	10	18	15
	Rate of Won Metropolitan Municipalities	75%	62,50%	60%	51,72%
	Total Number of Metropolitan Municipalities	16	16	30	29
Mayorship	Vote Rate of JDP	40,10%	38,64%	43,13%	42,55%
	Number of Won Municipalities	1750	1442	800	742
	Rate of Won Municipalities	54,80%	49,67%	59,22%	54,76%
	Total Number of Municipalities	3193	2903	1351	1355
Municipal Council	Vote Rate of JDP	40,32%	38,16%	42,87%	42,56%
	Number of Won Aldermanships	16637	14732	10530	10173
	Rate of Won Aldermanships	48,25%	45,48%	51,37%	49,04%
	Total Number of Aldermanships	34477	32392	20498	20745

During its 17-year ruling period, the JDP has been the implementer of a coalition of neoliberal economics and conservatism. However, this long period of power is not

homogenous, but it has breaking points in itself. The first years of the JDP government have determined by a domestic policy that emphasizes freedoms. Inflation has regressed rapidly, large amounts of foreign resources have been entered into the country, and considerable economic success has been achieved in comparison to the previous periods.

In this context, Serter divides the power of the JDP into two periods: 2002/2007-2008 reconciliatory period and 2007-2008/2018 authoritarian period (2018, 218-223). The reconciliatory period refers to a period in which the JDP has expanded its social support through positive developments in economy and politics, and the authoritarian period refers to a period in which the JDP began to make politics in a narrow political spectrum and placed the religion on the main axis of its political practices. The JDP effectively used the urban space in the authoritarian period in order to dominate its authoritarian and radicalized conservative ideology and shape the urban space according to this ideology. The legal and physical arrangements concerning the urban space with the changing contents and devices have transformed the urban space and everyday life and supported the coalition of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism.

During the JDP governments, construction sector has the most significant role in the economic policies and shaping the cities of Turkey. It is obvious that in the post-2000 period, the basic urbanization policy is based on the construction sector. In parallel with the bringings of neoliberalism, the inclusion of non-commodified sites into the market by means of construction activities has radically transformed both urban and rural areas and has created an important economy and capital during this transformation (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 244). While the number of dwellings (houses) was 161.920 in 2002, it reached 1.377.061 in 2017; on the other hand, the population of the country in 2002 was 65.022.300 and it was 80.810.525 in 2017 (TÜİK 2019). The number of dwellings increased 8.5 times while the population of the country increased by 24%.

The conservative and Islamist aspects of the Anatolian capital, which started to rise after 1980 and mentioned in the former parts of the study, were strong and the

Anatolian capital became stronger during this period. Çavuşoğlu points out that the appearing of this Islamist capital model, which has been strengthened in the JDP period, came to exist in urban and daily life with mosque building associations, the capitalization system of Islamist holdings, aid and solidarity kermesses, the organization of housing cooperatives, and the Ramadan tents (2016, 229). Legitimizing the relationship between Islam and capitalism became possible with religious references. In addition, many companies have increased their economic capacity in order to benefit from the profit and market opportunities provided by the increasing construction sector throughout the country. The point that needs to be underlined here is that many firms, which had been on the rise during the JDP period, had previously established ties with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is an important political figure and took place in different positions during the JDP period, over Islamist conservative communication and relationship networks (Serter 2018, 226).

Islamist urban management model started to be implemented in a small number of cities at the end of the 1989 Local Elections, and with the 1994 Local Elections, it has spread across the country, including the local governments of Istanbul and Ankara. After 1990, the urbanization has continued increasingly and the demand for houses and urban infrastructure has increased. In this respect, construction has emerged as a suitable sector for the development of Islamist capital. The role of HDA is critical in this sense. With the extraordinary powers granted to HDA, it has become possible to confiscate many urban areas such as privately owned and built-up areas, or school areas, health facility areas, parks, old industrial areas and to obtain privileged development rights from these areas. In addition, HDA has gone beyond being just a housing producing institution and transformed into the spatial intervention tool of the ruling party. It has become a focal point of aiming to reduce the rent-difference¹² in

¹² The concept of rent-difference introduced by Smith (1996, cited in Penpecioğlu 2017, 170) emphasizes the difference between the low rent caused by the low exchange valued urban land and the highest rent that can be achieved with the new uses and constructions developed on this land. As Penpecioğlu states developments such as urban transformation, gentrification, the increase of shopping centers and the spread of gated, luxury housing projects in the cities are all the capitalist urbanization patterns that have been processed in order to reduce the rent difference (Penpecioğlu 2017, 170-171).

housing production with its wide and privileged powers in terms of planning (Penpecioglu 2017, 170).

After 2000, urban policies for the cities of Turkey did not include long-term strategies, planned development, demand and need estimations for different segments of society, however they include supply-side urban policies for the reproduction of capital, rent-oriented urban projects which are the product of these policies and the urban expansion and transformation processes required by these projects (Penpecioglu 2017, 163). Planning has also become the tool of urban policies that are focused on rent. The neoliberal-conservative ideology adopted by the JDP during its ruling period has seen urban space as an area of capital accumulation and therefore chose the centralization as a strategy as well as giving importance to the construction sector. The central government has been defined as the new actor of politics and its powers have been increased through legal regulations that will increase its efficiency in the planning field (Serter 2018, 229, Penpecioglu 2017, 171-172).

The important legal arrangements for the centralization of powers in the JDP period are as given in Table 7 below. The point attempted to cite with the legal regulations mentioned below is that increasing the powers of central government institutions has brought quite critical consequences in terms of urbanization in Turkey after 2000. Increasing and restructuring the powers of HDA, supporting large-scale urban projects aimed at closing the rent-difference, allocating and selling public land to private sector, supporting built environment production in coastal areas and tourism centers, distribution of planning powers between state institutions specialized in different sectors and paving the way for unintended interventions in urban space are the developments in planning and urbanization in this period (Penpecioglu, 67).

Table 7: The legislative arrangements increasing the centralization in the planning field after 2000 (Serter 2018, 229, Penpecioğlu 2017, 172)

Laws	Years	Authorities
Mass Housing Law (numbered 2985) and 11 other laws*	During the 2000s	To make, to have it made and to amend plans in all scales and all types, to approve the plans when the relevant municipality or metropolitan municipality does not approve, to provide loan for mortgage, to construct mass housing projects in disaster areas, housing projects in slum transformation regions, and luxury housing projects, to establish companies operating in the housing sector or to become partners with financial institutions, etc.
Industrial Districts Law (numbered 4737)	2002	To make or to have it made development plans in industrial districts
Tourism Promotion Law (numbered 4957)	2003	To declare Culture, Tourism, Conservation, and Development Zones and to make, to have it made and to approve plans in all scales and all types in these areas
Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Privatization Administration (Official Gazette Number: 25301)	2003	To process the subdivision and amalgamation of the real estates in the privatization program and make arrangements for the preparation of development plans, to prepare necessary reports and board decisions on development plans
Metropolitan Municipality Law (numbered 5216)	2004	To make, to have it made and to approve 1/5000 or 1/25.000 scaled master plans, to approve implementary development plan, subdivision plan, and zoning improvement plan
Decree-Law on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (numbered 644)	2011	To make, to have it made and to approve Spatial Strategy Plan and Environmental Plan, Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan, to approve plans in all scales and all types
Decree-Law on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology (numbered 635)	2011	Location selection and expropriation of Technology Development Zones, preparation, and approval of development plans for Technology Development Zones
* The planning authorities of TOKI are regulated by 11 other laws. These laws are: law numbered 4767, 4864, 4964, 4966, 5104, 5162, 5229, 5234, 5327, 5273, and 5609.		

All these arrangements are important for the central government to shape the urban space and to participate directly in the rent processes, and have increased the returns of the construction sector, which is also seen as a way out of the economic crises experienced during the JDP government.

In the post-2000 period, also the confiscation of property was frequently experienced. Many neighborhoods have been forced to evacuate through urban transformation projects, and these neighborhoods have been included into capital accumulation for new users. With the Law on the Transformation of Areas Under Disaster Risk numbered 6306 enacted in 2004, HDA has acquired much more power this time in the urban transformation field and with the law numbered 5366, the historic neighborhoods of Istanbul such as Tarlabaşı, Sulukule and Fener Balat have been included in urban transformation and renewal projects and reproduced. With the Article 73 of the Municipal Law numbered 5393, areas with or without construction and lands with or without zoning are defined as urban transformation areas or urban development project areas, and in this direction, even the non-urban areas are included in the urban rent system.

During the post-2000 period, the population of the country reached 75 million and the urbanization level reached 70% (Çavuşoğlu 2016, 254). Construction has emerged as the only sector. As Balaban cites, two significant growth in the construction sector occurred in the periods when Turkey is ruled by powerful right-wing parties and is subjected to neoliberal reforms aimed at integration: the first growth period was when the MP came to power and the second growth period was when the JDP came to power (Balaban 2017, 28-29). There was not only the reproduction of residential areas through urban transformation, but also the big construction investments and rent production in the urban areas are promoted. Especially in Istanbul, the new airport (Istanbul Airport), the new Bosphorus Bridge (Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge), or even the new Bosphorus Project (Kanal İstanbul), not only created new urban rent areas, but also caused large amounts of irreversible natural destruction. These projects are destructive and costly projects that will change the physical structures of cities and

destroy areas of vital importance of cities. The costs of urban transformation projects and national mega projects have reached tens of billions of Turkish Liras (Serter 2018, 232). Moreover, the implementation of these high-cost projects has been accelerated by judicial decisions. Between the years 2000 and 2010, the number of urgent expropriation decisions was introduced 105 times in the scope of law numbered 2942 and the number of urgent expropriation decisions increased to 28 in 2011, to 160 in 2012 and to 250 in 2013 (Oruç 2014, cited in Serter 2018, 232).

The non-structured areas of the cities, which were shaped in parallel with the interests of the capital sector, were also included in the creation of rent during this period. Ecological boundaries have ceased to be considered as thresholds in the planning process. The law numbered 6292, also known as 2B law, made possible the amnesty of the occupied forest lands surrounding the cities. Highlands, pastures, meadows, coasts, in short, natural and public areas are zoned for construction with the laws, bag laws¹³ and decree-laws enacted in various years and brought changes in the laws such as Development Law, Environment Law, Pasture Law, and Forest Law. Non-commodified parts of the country were bought and sold in the post-2000 period and all these areas are included in the real estate market. Therefore, the period after 2000 is a period in which ecological damage has increased considerably. Many historical heritage sites have been translated into a construction site under the name of development. Agricultural areas, forests, and coasts were capitalized during this period. The cities became big construction sites and the growing construction sector surrounded the cities from the center to periphery.

During the post-2000 period, the privatization and the sale of public areas, which are the property or responsibility of the state, have gained momentum. In areas such as schools, hospitals, and parks, legal means such as urgent expropriation or urban

¹³ Although the “bag law” term is not a legal term, it is used to define legislative arrangement that changes a large number of laws that are not related to each other at once. During the first period of the JDP (2002-2007), only two bag laws were enacted. However, from November 2015 to November 2017, this number increased to 23 (“Son 2 yılda torba yasalardaki rekor artışın arkasında ne var?”, 20.12.2017, www.bbc.com).

transformation have been used to reproduce the space and capital accumulation processes have been made possible in these previously publicly owned areas.

Cities have become increasingly uneven and differentiated places with the effects of planning housing projects, commercial areas, shopping malls, private universities in the areas which are not zoned in the upper scale plans and in the central regions where urban rent is high, entitling right of construction beyond the rights defined in the development plans, suggesting uses contrary to upper scale plans with partial planning. According to Çavuşoğlu, with the increase of capital accumulation opportunities over the space, it is seen that the cities have new class maps and diversified divergences (as cited in Çavuşoğlu 2016, 257).

In this context, the unity of conservative capital and neoliberalism is the main determinant of developments that have been in Turkey after the 2000s and the policy that marked this period is construction-based growth model. The neoliberal transformation of the country, which started in the post-1980 period, was completed in this period, and neoliberal economic policies were manifested in every aspect of life. The next chapter will examine how Islamist conservatism has been implemented with the policies, regulations, and structures in the post-2000 period and how the wave of Islamist conservatism, which started to show its effect after 1950 and gained momentum after 1980, reached a level in the post-2000 period.

4.1.2.2.1. Urbanization of Islamist Conservatism and Symbols of Islamist Conservatism after 2000

The importance given to Islamist conservatism through religious education, religious services, and religious structures in the 1980-2000 period has reached a different dimension in the post-2000 period. The discourses and actions related to religion and Islamist conservatism have increased day by day and the religionization and the spatial expansion of religionization have increased. This increase brought about a social

transformation. In this sense, an overview of the arrangements about religious services, religious education, religious institutions, religious structures and the conservatization conducted over all these arrangements will be useful.

During the JDP government, radical changes were made about religious education and the existence of religious institutions. First of all, when the religious education field is examined, the first major change is the amendment made in the National Education Basic Law numbered 1739 in 2012. With this amendment, Quran lectures and Muhammad's Life courses started to be included in the curriculum of secondary schools and high schools as an elective course (Aşlamacı 2017, 185). Another change was the decision of the Board of Education and Discipline in 2017 to increase the hours of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge course from one hour to two hours per week in secondary schools starting from the 2017-2018 school year (Aşlamacı 2017, 186).

As mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter, Quran courses and the secondary school sections of all vocational high schools, including Imam-Hatip high schools, were closed. Since 1997, to be able to attend Quran courses and Imam-Hatip high schools, the precondition of 8-year continuous compulsory education was introduced. As a result of this, Imam-Hatip secondary schools were closed. However, in 2012, 4+4+4 education system was started to be implemented with the regulation made in Article 25 of the law numbered 1739. According to the new system, compulsory education was extended to 12 years and after 4 years of compulsory primary education, the transition to Imam-Hatip secondary schools was made possible. In this way, the secondary school parts of the Imam-Hatip high schools, which were closed in 1997 with the 8-year continuous compulsory education, were reopened.

Moreover, another regulation has been experienced regarding the transition of Imam-Hatip high school graduates to higher education. The fact that many party members, for example the JDP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has graduated from an Imam-Hatip high school, has made many attempts at the transfer of Imam-Hatip high school graduates to the university. The JDP has started initiatives since 2003 to facilitate the

transition of Imam-Hatip high school graduates to the university. However, the final regulation on the transition to higher education and the coefficients was done in 2011 with the amendment made in Article 45 of the Council of Higher Education Law numbered 2547 and the application of different coefficients in the university entrance and placement procedures was completely ended (Aşlamacı 2017, 191). The graduates of the Imam-Hatip high school have been allowed to enter all departments of all universities, if they get enough points, without any hindrance.

Table 8: Imam-Hatip schools and students between 1996-2018 (Aşlamacı 2017, T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2019)

School Year	Secondary School		High School		Total Number of Students
	Number of Schools	Number of Students	Number of Schools	Number of Students	
1996-1997	601	318.775	601	192.727	511.502
1997-1998	604	218.631	605	178.046	396.677
2002-2003	-	-	536	64.534	64.534
2003-2004	-	-	452	84.898	84.898
2010-2011	-	-	493	235.639	235.639
2011-2012	-	-	537	268.245	268.245
2012-2013	1099	94.467	708	380.771	475.238
2013-2014	1368	209.194	851	493.501	692.695
2014-2015	1597	385.830	1017	546.443	932.273
2015-2016	1961	524.295	1149	555.870	1.080.165
2016-2017	2777	657.020	1408	634.406	1.291.426
2017-2018	3286	723.108	1604	514.806	1.237.914

According to Table 8, the number of students in Imam-Hatip high schools started to increase again in 2003. The number of students studying in these schools increased approximately 6 times between the years 2003-2012. However, the main quantitative increase occurred in 2012, following the legal regulations about these schools. As of 2016-2017 academic year, the total number of students studying at the secondary schools and high schools of the Imam-Hatip schools reached 1.291.426. When it comes to 2017-2018 academic year, it is seen that the total number of students going to Imam Hatip schools for the first time in 15 years has decreased slightly.

At this point, it would be useful to look briefly at the developments in higher religious education. As Aşlamacı states, in 1996, a total of 2927 quotas were allocated to the first and second education programs of 23 faculties of theology, and this number was reduced to 972 in 2004 including the quotas of the Department of Religious Culture and Moral Education Teaching. With the change in the Presidency of Council of Higher Education in 2007, at least one faculty of theology was opened in almost every city in a few years and the number of quotas allocated to these faculties increased to 17.433 in 2013 (Aşlamacı 2017, 196-197).

With the additional Article 3 added to Law numbered 633 by Law numbered 4415 dated 1999, it is stipulated that students can only register for long-term Quran courses if they are graduated from primary education and that students who complete the 5th grade of primary school can register summer Quran courses (Aşlamacı 2017, 203). Thus, all Quran course activities carried out by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) were restricted to the age limit. Students who are not graduated from primary education are prohibited from registering long term Quran courses, and students who do not complete primary school 5th grade are prohibited from registering summer Quran courses. However, the age-limiting amendment on Quran courses dated 1999 was repealed with the Decree-Law numbered 653 published in the Official Gazette dated 17.09.2011 and numbered 28057 and the Regulations of Presidency of Religious Affairs on Education and Teaching of Quran Courses and Student Dormitories and Pensions published in the Official Gazette dated 07.04.2012 and numbered 28257

(Aşlamacı 2017, 204). With these arrangements, the Quran teaching was provided in the mosques as well as the Quran courses without any age or time limitation and widespread religious education activities for wider masses were enabled.

Table 9: Number of Quran Courses opened by the PRA between 2014-2018 ¹⁴ (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2019)

Years	Number of Courses			
	Group A	Group B	Group C	Group D
2014	8	86	908	17.607
2015	10	79	100	14.595
2016	14	86	490	12.600
2017	14	68	414	12.557
2018	14	68	395	13.869

Following the legal regulation for the abolition of the age limitation in the registration of Quran courses in 2011, the “04-06 Age Group Religious Education Project” was initiated by the PRA. As of 2014-2015 school year, 15.265 students in 554 courses opened for 4-6 age groups are educated and the number of students reached 55.321 in the 2015-2016 school year (Aşlamacı 2017, 205). With this regulation, the age of the state-supported religious education was reduced to 4 years.

In addition to all these, the PRA is one of the institutions that has increased its efficiency in parallel with the developments in the country in recent years. PRA, mentioned in 2018 Activity Report as “to enlighten the society about religion with

¹⁴ According to Article 18 of the Directive of Presidency of Religious Affairs on Quran Education and Training Courses, Student Dormitories and Pensions “in order to increase the efficiency of education and to take into account the assignments Quran courses are determined as A group, B group, C group, and D group. The physical structure of the building, number of students, capacity, number of classrooms and educational status are taken into consideration in this determination”.

genuine knowledge based on the basic sources of Islam and to carry out works related to the principles of faith, worship, and morality and to manage places of worship” (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2019), carries out its activities with the appropriations given by central government budget laws. Taking a look at the change in the budget of the PRA, which increases its budget every year compared to other public administrations and central government units, will be useful in terms of giving an idea of the operational capacity.

Table 10: Budget of PRA between 2010 and 2018 (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2019)

Years	Annual Appropriation Budget	Annual Additional Appropriation	Annual Written Off Appropriation	Total Annual Appropriation	Total Annual Expense	Annual Overspending
2010	2.650.530.000 ₺	43.613.833 ₺	406.966.252 ₺	2.287.177.581 ₺	2.733.045.030 ₺	464.508.707 ₺
2011	3.178.992.500 ₺	173.618.733 ₺	394.733.733 ₺	2.957.877.500 ₺	3.392.977.569 ₺	458.307.866 ₺
2012	3.891.166.000 ₺	1.824.014.456 ₺	1.445.620.780 ₺	4.269.559.676 ₺	4.254.370.352 ₺	44.512.502 ₺
2013	4.604.649.000 ₺	1.939.354.638 ₺	1.583.110.007 ₺	4.960.893.631 ₺	4.971.484.729 ₺	49.429.533 ₺
2014	5.442.784.190 ₺	2.309.848.612 ₺	2.021.988.338 ₺	5.730.644.464 ₺	5.705.466.534 ₺	98.237.086 ₺
2015	5.743.383.000 ₺	359.759.070 ₺	2.545.105.522 ₺	3.558.036.548 ₺	6.037.761.338 ₺	2.497.755.829 ₺
2016	6.482.979.000 ₺	1.543.363.180 ₺	1.579.945.457 ₺	6.446.396.723 ₺	6.517.292.081 ₺	89.767.699 ₺
2017	6.867.117.000 ₺	465.827.366 ₺	179.915.004 ₺	7.153.029.362 ₺	7.246.972.684 ₺	111.988.234 ₺
2018	7.774.183.000 ₺	190.628.633 ₺	2.796.807.029 ₺	5.168.004.604 ₺	8.356.119.703 ₺	3.200.491.902 ₺

As can be seen in Table 10, the PRA budget has increased exponentially between 2010-2018. In 2015 and 2018, it is seen that the annual overspending is quite high. The fact that the budget support given by the central government to the institution which works towards the Islam religion and the increase in the budget expenditures

are increasing every year is valuable in terms of showing the importance given to this field.

Another issue that needs to be mentioned here is the budget of the Ministry of National Education (MNE) and how the MNE budget is shared among school types and general directorates. Table 11 shows that the budget of the MNE has also increased by years. It is observed that the budget allocated to the General Directorate of Religious Education (GDRE) from the budget of the MNE has increased. Moreover, while the ratio of the MNE budget to the central government budget decreases, the ratio of the GDRE budget to the MNE budget increases by years. The MNE increases its share for religious education every year. However, the share of the budget of the ministry in the central government budget started to decline after 2016.

Table 11: MNE and GDRE budgets between 2011 and 2018 (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 2012-2018)

Years	Annual Budgets of the MNE	Amount (₺)	Annual Budgets of the GDRE	Amount (₺)	Ratio of the MNE's Budget to GDP (%)	Ratio of the MNE Budget to the Central Government Budget (%)	Ratio of the GDRE's Budget to the MNE's Budget (%)
2011	Reserved Budget	34.112.163.000	Reserved Budget	-	2,63	10,91	1,98%
	Budget by Year-End	32.071.347.633	Budget by Year-End	634.280.917			
	Expense	35.318.623.937	Expense	700.422.894			
2012	Reserved Budget	39.169.379.190	Reserved Budget	-	2,73	11,16	3,33%
	Budget by Year-End	27.868.771.559	Budget by Year-End	928.095.027			
	Expense	41.349.652.264	Expense	1.025.999.354			
2013	Reserved Budget	47.496.378.650	Reserved Budget	-	3,03	11,76	3,53%
	Budget by Year-End	38.794.319.178	Budget by Year-End	1.369.659.785			
	Expense	47.748.463.182	Expense	1.949.540.642			
2014	Reserved Budget	55.704.817.610	Reserved Budget	-	3,24	12,81	2,65%

Table 11 (continued)

	Budget by Year-End	43.307.810.403	Budget by Year-End	1.146.556.783			
	Expense	53.958.739.281	Expense	2.753.812.007			
2015	Reserved Budget	62.000.248.000	Reserved Budget	-	3,16	13,11	4,40%
	Budget by Year-End	42.869.443.418	Budget by Year-End	1.886.181.153			
	Expense	62.247.314.539	Expense	3.644.593.146			
2016	Reserved Budget	76.354.306.000	Reserved Budget	-	2,93	13,38	6,25%
	Budget by Year-End	62.153.242.273	Budget by Year-End	3.885.523.460			
	Expense	73.999.964.372	Expense	4.979.728.355			
2017	Reserved Budget	85.048.584.000	Reserved Budget	-	2,8	13,18	7,11%
	Budget by Year-End	68.003.743.424	Budget by Year-End	4.833.734.686			
	Expense	82.939.009.200	Expense	6.021.400.698			
2018	Reserved Budget	92.528.652.000	Reserved Budget	-	2,69	12,13	7,32%
	Budget by Year-End	70.441.869.017	Budget by Year-End	5.157.226.189			
	Expense	99.439.651.308	Expense	7.700.817.736			

According to the report prepared by the Union of Education and Science Workers, one third (35%) of the 92 billion Turkish Liras budget allocated to MNE in 2018 for education investments was allocated to religious education and thus, the share of the GDRE in the budget of MNE increased by 68% compared to 2017 (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası 2018, 7). As stated in the same report, the MNE, which increased its share in religious education to 7.7 billion Turkish Liras, allocated almost all of this resource (96%), which corresponds to 7.32% of its budget, for Imam-Hatip high schools (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası 2018, 7).

It should be noted that increasing the number, quota, and share of budgets of the schools in which religious education is given is a very important issue. Because it is obvious that this situation does not cover every part of society and results in the religionization of society. Nevertheless, and therefore, many new arrangements and

incentives have been made regarding the education and training of the Islam religion during the JDP government, which has been continuing since 2002.

To examine the religious education and the impact of religion in education is essential to highlight the importance of religion in conservatism and to scope the relation between Islamist conservatism and religion in Turkey as a part of this study. It is observed that religious education in the national education system has been increased during the administration of the Islamist conservative powers and there have been quite radical arrangements in terms of religious education. Religionization and Islamist conservatization are reinforced by many different policies produced in many different fields.

Moreover, the cooperation of the MNE with religious foundations and associations, especially the PRA, stands out in this period. While no association, foundation, community or sect should be associated with the national education system, the structures known to have Islamist references and known to be close to the power have had a great number of concessions in the field of national education and have partnered with the state (“TÜRGEV Kurs Açıyor Maaşı MEB Karşılıyor”, halktv.com.tr, 13.02.2016, “MEB’den TÜRGEV’e Dev Kıyak”, sozcu.com.tr, 16.12.2015, “Bilal’in TÜRGEV’i ile Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Artık Resmen Ortak”, haber.sol.org.tr, 16.12.2015). News about the collaborations established within this scope are reflected in the press. Through various arrangements, foundations and associations have been opened to provide education in schools, and it has been made possible to integrate foundations and associations into the education system and to establish partnerships with central administration units (“Vakıf ve dernek adı altındaki tarikatlar okullarda 'değerler eğitimi' verecek!”, arxiv.toplumsal.com.tr, 30.09.2017). In this context, contracts between the associations such as TÜRGEV, TUGVA, Ensar Vakfi or the sects such as Nur Cemaati, İlim Yayma Cemiyeti, Süleymancılar Cemaati, and the MNE were also reflected in the press (“Eğitim politikasını onlar belirliyor: Milli Eğitim değil tarikat yuvası”, birgün.net, 17.07.2018). With the protocols signed with religious associations and foundations, the MNE prepared the groundwork for the

religionization of education and signed another protocol named “Dersimi Camide Yapıyorum” with the Edirne Provincial Office of Mufti affiliated to the PRA. Within the scope of the protocol, primary and secondary school students were taken to the mosques for the Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge course (“MEB ile Edirne İl Müftülüğü “Dersimi Camide Yapıyorum” protokolü imzaladı”, t24.com.tr, 16.04.2019). Moreover, President of Religious Affairs Dr. Ali Erbaş stated that they are trying to turn mosques into educational centers, and they will start the application of “mosque lessons” (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Erbaş: Camilerimizi eğitim merkezleri haline getirmeye çalışıyoruz”, haberturk.com, 02.04.2019).

It is seen that in the post-2000 period there were serious transformations in the field of religious services and national education. Arrangements for the conservatization of the education system have increased over the years, and the Ministry of National Education and the Presidency of Religious Affairs have come forward as the two most important executives of the studies related to Islam. Both institutions are constantly being rearranged in order to disseminate and clarify conservatism by the state. The mosque lessons as the last of the studies aimed at making conservatism and Islam religion more visible in everyday life, in the education system and in the public sphere has the characteristics of being the last stage of conservatism. With this practice, two different urban service units, school and mosque, has been intertwined and merged. Mosque is given the characteristics of a school and school is given the characteristics of a mosque. Developments in the field of religious structures and mosques will be handled in detail in the following part of the study.

4.1.2.2.1.1. The Key Role of Mosques as Spatial Representation of Islamist Conservatism

Mosques are the most important urban elements of the 2000s used by Islamist political power in everyday life to establish dominance and to make its presence visible physically. As an urban element, the mosques went beyond being an urban equipment

during the 2000s and turned into structures used in the consolidation and expansion of Islamist conservatism. The President of Religious Affairs, which is one of the most important institutions of the period in terms of the dissemination of Islamist conservatism, Dr. Ali Erbaş expressed his thoughts and objectives about mosques as follows:

Mosques are not only the places to be prayed, but also where children in the neighborhood receive religious education starting from a young age. Therefore, there should be no neighborhood in our cities which is left without a mosque (“Diyamet İşleri Başkanı Erbaş: Camiler sadece namaz kılınan yerler değil”, aa.com.tr, 10.12.2017).

In 15 years, starting from 2002, 12.080 new mosques were built in Turkey, and the total number of mosques in the country has reached 88.021 in 2017 (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı 2017). This number is much higher than the number of hospitals and schools in the country. For example, in the year 2017, the total number of hospitals in Turkey (including public, private, and university hospitals) was 1518, and the total number of schools was 65.568. Looking at the number of mosques by years will be meaningful in terms of having an idea about the increase. As seen from Table 11, around 2000 new mosques were built in some years. The average number of new mosques per year is 800.

Table 12: Number of Mosques between 2002 and 2017 (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı 2017, T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2019)

Years	Number of Mosques	Number of Mosques per Thousand People
2002	75,941	-
2007	79,096	1.12
2008	80,053	1.11

Table 12 (continued)

2009	80,636	1.11
2010	81,984	1.11
2011	82,693	1.10
2012	84,684	1.12
2013	85,412	1.11
2014	86,101	1.10
2015	86,762	1.10
2016	87,381	1.09
2017	88,021	1.08

According to Article 12 of the RCSP, a categorization is made between small mosques, neighborhood mosques, and masjids. According to the regulation, 250 meters for a small mosque, 400 meters for a neighborhood mosque, and 150 meters for a masjid is specified to be appropriate distance. According to the same regulation, approximately 500 meters for a playground, an outdoor sports field, a family health center, a nursery, a kindergarten and a primary school functions, approximately 1000 meters for a secondary school, and approximately 2500 meters for a high school is defined as appropriate. When constructed in accordance with the regulation, the mosque will be the most common equipment in the urban area, which means that even among the equipment areas defined in the legislation, mosque is in a privileged position.

Another prominent issue within this general framework is that during the JDP government, Islamist conservative ideology has increased its visibility in urban areas and interfered with the place through religious structures that transform daily life. These interventions have been used to dominate the conservative ideology, to underline the opposition of modern life brought by the Republic, and to make certain references to the pre-Republic period, i.e. Ottoman period (Serter 2018, 249). From this point on, it will be useful to look at relevant implementations.



Figure 1: The Presidential Palace (right) and the Millet Mosque (left) in Ankara (Source: baskahaber.org, 06.07.2015)

The Presidential Palace was built as the new administrative center instead of the Çankaya Palace in Ankara, which was the administrative center of the Republic since the first establishment. The Presidential Palace was built on the lands of the Atatürk Forest Farm, the most important symbol space of Ankara and the Republic. In addition, the Millet Mosque was built next to the Palace as a move to consolidate the Islamist conservative identity. The area where the palace and the mosque took place is called as the Presidential Complex¹⁵ with a reference to the Ottoman spatial organization. By building a palace as a center of administration, adding a mosque next to it and by integrating the palace, which is the administration center of the Islamist conservative

¹⁵ “Complex”, which is “Külliye” in Turkish and also known as “Islamic-Ottoman social complex”, is an important element of the Ottoman spatial organization. Starting from the first appearance of Islam, the complexes that emerged as structures containing many functions integrated with the mosque were given great importance also in the Ottoman period. According to Turkish Language Society, the definition of the complex is “whole of the structures surrounding a mosque such as a *masjid*, an *imaret*, a public fountain, a library, a hospital etc.” (Güncel Türkçe Sözlük, sozluk.gov.tr, 03.05.2019).

ideology, with the mosque, which the ideological representation of the Islamist conservative ideology, the mosque is used with a function beyond being equipment.



Figure 2: The North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex in Ankara (Source: diyanethaber.com.tr, 09.05.2019)

Beyond the representation of conservative ideology in space, the use of the mosque as an ideological device took place at different scales in this period. High-visibility iconic mosques built in many cities of Turkey, and these mosques took their place in the urban area as powerful symbols of Islamist conservative ideology. The North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex is an example of this situation. The Complex is built on a 65.000m² area with 15.000 people capacity and the biggest congress center of Turkey¹⁶. However, the complex is constructed without considering the relation with the settlement areas. Although it was built without considering the relation with the settlement areas as urban equipment, it has an important point in terms of its location. Positioning at the entrance of the city of Ankara is of great importance for visibility,

¹⁶ Informations about the North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex is obtained from the several news on the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality's web site (ankara.bel.tr).

because it refers to Islamist conservatism as the first architectural element seen in the entrance to the capital city of Turkey.

Similar to the construction of the North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex, projects, where visibility is considered, were also built in Istanbul. The Çamlıca Mosque, built on Çamlıca Hill in Istanbul, is a striking example in this sense. The Çamlıca Mosque is also a symbol of Islamist conservatism like the North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex. As mentioned in the earlier chapters of the thesis, the mosque is located in the center of the city in the traditional conservative Islamic city model. However, in the example of the Çamlıca Mosque, it is seen that the visibility and the size of the mosque are beyond the functionality and accessibility of the mosque.



Figure 3: Çamlıca Mosque in Istanbul (Source: ntv.com.tr, 03.05.2019)

Another example with similar features to the North Ankara Central Mosque and Complex and the Çamlıca Mosque is the Diyarbakır Central Mosque and Complex. This mosque, which is given the title of one of Turkey's largest mosques, has a capacity of 20.000 people and covers 28.000 m² area including units such as multi-purposed

hall, car park, exhibition hall, library, museum, tea garden (Diyarbakır Merkez Cami Yaptırma Derneği 2018).



Figure 4: Diyarbakır Central Mosque and Complex in Diyarbakır (Source: diyarbakirmerkezcami.org.tr, 05.04.2018)

One of the big scaled mosque projects is constructed in Turkey's third largest city İzmir. The Nevvar Salih İşgören Grand Mosque, built in Konak, the central district of İzmir, has a capacity of 15.000 people and covers an area of 14.000 m² (Nevvar Salih İşgören Vakfi 2017). According to the statements of Nurettin Memur, Chairman of the Board of Nevvar Salih İşgören Foundation, the mosque is the largest mosque of the Balkans, the Middle East, and Turkey with 43 meters dome width (“İzmir'e 15 bin kişilik cami inşa ediliyor”, aa.com.tr, 27.12.2017).



Figure 5: Nevvar Salih İşgören Grand Mosque in İzmir (Source: izmircsb.gov.tr, 30.04.2019)

It appears that during this period, big and flashy mosques are built in the largest cities of Turkey. It is seen that the mosque element, which is the worship place of the Islam religion, is used in the urban area with dominant and high visibility through mentioned projects in different cities of the country during the JDP governments. Mosque is no longer an equipment unit which is used to meet the need of the population living in settlements for worship. It has become the most important iconic representation of conservative ideology with large projects and high-cost investments.

Another issue with the mosques is the construction of mosques in university campuses. Head of Religious Affairs of the period Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez states that a mosque would be built on each university campus and the mosques would be inserted to the heart of the life, the city, and the individual (“Her üniversite kampüsüne bir cami geliyor” radikal.com.tr, 21.11.2014), and Deputy Prime Minister of the period Bekir Bozdağ states that the presence of mosques in universities is as important as the presence of faculties (“‘Cami Fakülte Kadar Önemli’ Demek Üniversite Yapısını Anlamamaktır”, m.bianet.org, 02.08.2012). An important statement of the JDP government's approach to universities belongs to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He states in his statement that it would be more appropriate to use the term “complex”

instead of the term “university” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Kampüs yerine ‘külliye’ desek daha güzel olur”, hurriyet.com.tr, 07.01.2015). In this context, the Akdeniz University Mosque which is built on 35.000 m² area and mentioned as one of Turkey's largest domed mosques (diyanethaber.com.tr, 27.02.2019), and Uludağ University New Mosque which has a capacity of 20.000 people and mentioned as the third biggest mosque of the country (uuyenicamii.com, 03.05.2019) are the examples for understanding the scales of these university mosques.

The mosque for each university project initiated during the third government period of the JDP is valuable as it is an indicator of the conservatization journey of the country. As universities are the areas where science is being produced and academic life is maintained, the fact that religious buildings located on university campuses is an application to differentiate the definition of the university as stated by the important political figures of the period. The contributions of universities, which are the fields of scientific research in the universal sense, to the rational and scientific progress of the society are also doomed to be left under the influence of religion.

During this period, the mosque is also used as an Islamist conservative symbol to organize daily life. One of the most important examples that can be given to the reconstruction of city centers and daily life with mosques is the demolition of the Provincial Bank Building, which was a registered building built in 1935 in Ankara, and the transformation of Hergelen Square into a square with religious references by Melike Hatun Mosque. The Provincial Bank Building, an important building of the Republican period, was demolished for the sake of a spatial transformation targeted by a new mosque building although there were many mosques within walking distance. The square and the surrounding are remodeled with a mosque and a registered building was demolished to make the new mosque more visible.



Figure 6: Melike Hatun Mosque in Ankara (Source: hakancavusoglu.com, 27.10.2017)

A similar application was carried out with the Taksim Mosque built in Taksim Square in Istanbul. Taksim Square, which is one of the most important touristic places of the city and which has an important place in the history of both the city and the country, has been transformed into an area where conservatism is built on by building a mosque at the most visible point of the square. Beyond being a touristic area, Taksim Square, which is a public space also densely used by the local people, is chosen for the mosque project, because it was an appropriate move to increase the dominance of conservative ideology in space and in daily life.



Figure 7: Taksim Mosque in Istanbul (Source: tr.sputniknews.com, 25.01.2019)

Another issue related to mosques is the development plan process. After 2000, the conversion of the areas allocated as park area or social equipment area according to the upper scale plans to the religious facility area with the amendments on the development plans has frequently seen. Even the park areas are rearranged in a way to include a mosque. It is seen that there are a lot of amendments in development plans approved by local governments and central government proposing religious facility area, and it is observed that the proposed religious facility areas in these plan changes are generally obtained by reducing the other types of equipment areas. In this period, open spaces and green areas in the cities were reorganized to build more mosques. A review on the subject specific to Istanbul takes place in the next chapter.

To conclude, it is seen that in the post-2000 period, the mosque has been used in many different ways in order to increase the visibility of Islamist conservatism in the urban area and to make it dominant in the ideological sense. Space was reorganized by the power to strengthen the conservatism. Everyday life and urban setup had a character in which the mosque was prioritized. The mosque is now used as a symbol and a tool

and it went beyond being a type of urban equipment and a place of worship. The mosque is now transformed into a symbol with the power of Islamist conservatization and it is used to make the political Islam visible, popular and consolidated.

CHAPTER 5

THE CASE STUDY: MOSQUES IN ISTANBUL

In the previous parts and chapters of the thesis, the coalition of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism has been tried to be examined and understood in terms of the consequences for the cities and the social structure of Turkey. Chapter 5 will completely focus on Istanbul and what kind of role mosques have in the conservatization of Istanbul urban area after 2000. Although the data examined in all the parts of this chapter are divided into different periods, the whole chapter generally handles the post-2000 period and tries to concretize how space is shaped by the policies of this period.

5.1. Neoliberal Islamist Conservative Urban Policies in Istanbul and the Essential Role of Mosques in Conservatization of Urban Space

Istanbul is one of the oldest cities in the world with thousands of years of history due to its unique location on the Asian and European continents and its location at the intersection of important trade routes. Throughout history, Istanbul has always been the largest market of the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East (Keyder 2000).

Istanbul is located in the northwest of Turkey, surrounded by the Sea of Marmara on the south and by the Black Sea on the north, and divided along the Bosphorus. Thanks

to the Bosphorus, Istanbul is an intercontinental city and it contains two sides: the European side and the Asian side. As it is one of the oldest cities in the world, it had been the capital of the Roman Empire in the year 330, the capital of the Byzantine Empire in the year 395 when the Roman Empire lost political and economic power and divided into two, and the capital of the Ottoman Empire in the year 1453. In addition, Istanbul was the center of Islam from the year 1517 when the Caliphate passed to the Ottoman Empire, to the year 1924 when the Caliphate was abolished. With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Ankara has been the country's capital and the capital period of Istanbul has ended.

For the year 1950, the population of Istanbul is 1.166.477, while the population of Turkey is 20.947.188. In 2015, the population of Istanbul occurred as 14.657.434, and the population of Turkey became 78.741.053. In 65 years, between the years 1950-2015, the total population of Turkey increased 3.7 times, on the other hand, the population of Istanbul increased by 12.5 times. With a population of 15.067.724 as of the year 2018 (TÜİK 2019), Istanbul is not only the largest city of Turkey, but also one of the world's biggest cities.

Table 13: Population of Istanbul and Turkey between 1990 and 2018 (TÜİK 2019)

Years	Population		Ratio of the Populations
	Istanbul	Turkey	
1990	7.309.190	56.473.035	12,94%
2000	10.018.735	67.803.927	14,78%
2007	12.573.836	70.586.256	17,81%
2008	12.697.164	71.517.100	17,75%
2009	12.915.158	72.561.312	17,80%
2010	13.255.685	73.722.988	17,98%

Table 13 (continued)

2011	13.624.240	74.724.269	18,23%
2012	13.854.740	75.627.384	18,32%
2013	14.160.467	76.667.864	18,47%
2014	14.377.018	77.695.904	18,50%
2015	14.657.434	78.741.053	18,61%
2016	14.804.116	79.814.871	18,55%
2017	15.029.231	80.810.525	18,60%
2018	15.067.724	82.003.882	18,37%

The administrative structure of the province of Istanbul has been changed many times throughout its history and took its final form in 2008. In accordance with the law numbered 5747 adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 06.03.2008 and published in the Official Gazette dated 22.03.2008, Istanbul has 39 districts today. There is a total of 40 municipalities within the borders including the IMM, and the total area of the province is approximately 5400 km².

Since the 1980s, when neoliberal policies became the dominant economic approach, Istanbul has been one of the places where the effects of these policies are felt most. In addition, the fact that the local government has been in conservative political parties since 1994 has a great impact on the urbanization of Istanbul. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, the process which has been going on since 1980 has been a period in which neoliberalism becomes permanent and it increases its intensity gradually, and conservatism makes itself more visible in daily life and on urban space. In this section, the local and central policies that shape Istanbul urbanization in the post-2000 period will be discussed in order to make an analysis of the post-2000 policies of the neoliberal-conservative coalition which strengthened its existence and increased its visibility between 1980 and 2000.

As an important step for the planning and urbanization of Istanbul, 1/100.000 scaled Istanbul Environmental Plan was approved by IMM Council in 2006. Objections to the plan and lawsuits filed by professional chambers have been inconclusive and the plan was reapproved in 2009. This plan is the most important basis that should guide the urbanization of Istanbul. However, many public institutions making and approving development plans, such as the IMM, district municipalities, the HDA, the IPDEU, play an important role in the transformation of the Istanbul city macroform in defiance of the Istanbul Environmental Plan.

Although there is an upper-scale plan approved in 2009, many planning activities are carried out in contradiction with the upper scale plan decisions in Istanbul. The natural, cultural and historical areas of the city are destroyed by large investments covering large areas and privileged zoning rights and rent are created with these projects. In the urban area of Istanbul, the symbols of neoliberal-conservative urbanization have increased in the post-2000 period. As a result of the neoliberal policies followed by Islamist conservative approach, the process of privatization has accelerated, and the destruction of natural and historical areas has increased. Planning has been made a means of transferring resources to certain groups. In this sense, publicly owned areas such as ports, hospitals, stadiums, and schools have become tools that will bring high rent¹⁷. Through the partial development plans, the values and areas belonging to the public were allocated to various capital groups with privileges.

Furthermore, in addition to the transformation of public spaces in the city center regarding to create rent, it is seen that the Northern Forests area, which is a forest region that has natural resources of the city and which should be protected according

¹⁷ For example, privatization of the coastline from public use and opening to privileged construction as in Galataport and Haliçport projects, opening the publicly owned areas with high land value such as Istanbul Electric, Tramway, and Tunnel Establishments Garage area, Ali Sami Yen Stadium area, Bakırköy Mental and Neurological Diseases Hospital area, Zeytinburnu Tank Factory area, Mecidiyeköy Liqueur Factory area to reconstruction, destruction of forest areas with projects like Maslak 1453, Istanbul Airport replacement of the natural texture with concrete construction as in Yassıada

to the upper scale planning decisions, has been destroyed and opened to construction in this period. Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, which is also known as the 3rd Bridge, the North Marmara Highway, which is the connection road for the 3rd Bridge, and Istanbul Airport, which is also known as the 3rd Airport, have been damaged the northern part of the city in a way that cannot be compensated again, a large amount of forests and trees have been cut down and the rent created by these projects has been shared among the capital groups close to the government. Moreover, all of these projects contradict the upper scale plan decisions. This attack on forest areas, which started in the previous years, did not remain on a small scale in this period, but was carried out through private universities, private schools, and most importantly mega urban projects¹⁸. In this respect, it is possible to say that the forest areas located in different parts of the city including the Northern Forests area are used as new capital instruments.



Figure 8: An air photograph from the area of Maslak 1453 Project located in Fatih Forest Area in Sariyer District (Source: twitter.com/ozcanyukseki)

¹⁸ For detailed information about mega projects in Istanbul, see also www.megaprojeleristanbul.com



Figure 9: An air photograph from the construction area of Istanbul Airport (Source: cumhuriyet.com.tr)

During almost 25 years, IMM administration was ruling by right-wing Islamist conservative parties and the longest part of this ruling period, 17 years, was handled by the JDP. The JDP, which also forms the central government, has had a wide range of movement in the cities where it has also acquired local government and led to the development of the Istanbul urban area on the neoliberal-conservative axis which was the dominant ideology for 17 years.

Since Istanbul is also one of the most important cities in the history of the Ottoman Empire, it has undergone a great transformation with nationalist and Ottomanist references, during the JDP period. Because, Istanbul is the promised land in the popular history narrative of Turkish nationalism and Islamism (Bora 2000, 61). According to Bora's quotation, Istanbul, which is portrayed as an Islamic city according to Islamist thought, is a lost city, because the modernization and Westernization that came with the foundation of the Republic degenerated Istanbul's identity. The degenerated identity of Istanbul necessitates the reconquest of Istanbul

in terms of Islamic ideology, and this necessity comes into prominence as a considered goal by Islamist conservative ideology from the 1950s onwards (Bora 2000, 61).

After the WP won the IMM in 1994, Istanbul had an Islamist municipality administration and changes were made at the spatial, social and cultural levels. Istanbul's Islamic city identity has been emphasized in every discourse and action. The 1994 dated words of former Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regarding the mosque project to Taksim Square, the most important square of the modern Istanbul, are as follows:

The key point of Istanbul tourism is that region. Once a person comes to that region and sees the (mosque) project, he/she will realize that he/she is in an Islamic city. Gradually revealing the historical and cultural texture of our city, I think that the tourist coming to Istanbul will understand that they are in a Muslim city (Erdoğan 1994, cited in Bora 2000, 62).

In Istanbul, a city of such importance in terms of Islamist ideology, the conservative ideology of Islamist rule for 25 years made it possible to shape the city towards the dream of being an Islamic city. The biggest dilemma for Istanbul is the overlap between the dream of the Islamic city and the dream of a global city. However, the effort for both dreams has never diminished. Moreover, the neoliberal-conservative coalition, which makes it possible to make efforts for both goals, has manifested itself very efficiently at this point. The Anatolian capital, which gained strength after 1980, has grown more and more by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by Istanbul, the global city. In this sense, Istanbul is basically designed to provide a large capital and economic accumulation (Bora 2000, 73). The JDP has adopted the global city project of Istanbul like its antecessors and has continued to work with greater determination and speed for the realization of this project than any previous government has shown. One of the main reasons for the concentration of domestic and foreign investments in Istanbul after 2000 was because of the envisagement of Istanbul as a global city.

The JDP, which came to power in Istanbul in the 2004 local elections, defined itself as neoconservative, and defined neoconservatism as a claim for democracy, free-

market economy, and individual liberties (Öktem 2006, 59). Erdoğan evaluates Istanbul as the showcase of Turkey, and the JDP argues that Turkey's future depends on the future of Istanbul. In this context, the central government and the local governments of Istanbul work in great harmony, and besides local governments, Istanbul has special importance also for the central government.

As noted in the previous parts of this study, the construction and real estate sector in Turkey has been identified as the driving force after 2000. In relation to this, it is seen that in the post-2000 period, great importance was given to urban transformation projects and construction investments in Istanbul. Projects aiming at the transformation of squatter areas, storage areas, old industrial areas, harbors and historical station buildings in Istanbul city center have increased and the most valuable areas of the city in natural, historical and cultural terms have been destroyed for the interests of certain capital groups. Urban transformation and urban regeneration have become the main strategy for urban development. The most striking examples are the projects carried out in Sulukule and Tarlabası. In Sulukule, the registered buildings were demolished with urban transformation, and the genuineness and authenticity of the region were destroyed by gentrification policies. In Tarlabası, hundreds of neighborhood residents were forcibly evacuated and displaced by the urban transformation. With dozens of projects like Sulukule ve Tarlabası, not only rent has been created for certain capital groups, but also the city has been distorted and people have been left homeless. Urban transformation and urban renewal projects have a great impact on the urbanization of Istanbul after 2000.

Table 14: Construction Permits and Occupancy Permits for Istanbul and Turkey between 2014-2019 (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 2014-2019)

Years	According to construction permits, January-December				According to occupancy permits, January-December			
	Number of building for Istanbul	Number of dwelling unit for Istanbul	Total number of building in Turkey	Total number of dwelling unit in Turkey	Number of building for Istanbul	Number of dwelling unit for Istanbul	Total number of building in Turkey	Total number of dwelling unit in Turkey
2014	20408	209902	137632	1014678	14347	141188	123409	766527
2015	19008	193744	122243	870515	15268	146846	108893	724331
2016	18998	213526	131848	986119	15940	158709	110401	750336
2017	21140	254598	155148	1323118	16339	160471	116767	820526
2018	9089	80539	101510	643125	15881	154740	123776	870501
2019*	1501	13668	13574	75183	4956	60657	31111	245819

* The data for 2019 are from January to March.

During the period, housing investments and production have accelerated, and housing supply far exceeded the demand. With gentrification, urban transformation, parcel-based transformation, transfer of public spaces to the private sector, high construction rights, and large housing projects Istanbul has had the largest share in Turkey's housing production. When the housing production of Istanbul in the last 5 years is examined, 2018 appears as the critical year. The number of building construction permits issued in 2018 in Turkey decreased by 36.7%, while in Istanbul there has been 57% reduction. However, even in 2018, Istanbul has the largest share in terms of construction permits and occupancy permits (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 2014-2019).

Another important detail of urbanization in Istanbul is the construction of skyscrapers and shopping centers. As of 2016, the number of skyscrapers in Istanbul is 121. In the

pre-1994 period, only 4 skyscrapers were built, and 117 skyscrapers were built during JDP central government and local governments (“İstanbul ‘uzaya çıktı’: 14 yıllık AKP iktidarında 83 kilometrelik ‘dikey mimari’”, diken.com.tr, 30.01.2017). These data are an important indicator of the increasing construction density and decreasing urban equipment area of Istanbul. Because, urban equipment areas such as green areas, health facility areas, education facility areas, and disaster gathering areas within the city are transformed into trade areas, their floor area ratios are increased, and these areas are used as skyscrapers and shopping malls by privatization. In a press statement made by the Turkey Tradesmen and Artisans Confederation, it is stated that shopping centers, residences, and skyscrapers were constructed in 416 out of 493 regions designated as disaster gathering areas (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu 2018). Before 2002, there were 14 shopping malls across the country, but this number has changed to 114 shopping malls only in Istanbul in 15 years (“Türkiye'deki AVM sayısı açıklandı”, haber.sol.org.tr, 14.03.2018). All these developments also show that the city has developed without any rational planning approach and it has been organized in a way to create resources for certain construction companies and capital groups.

Particularly after 2016, there has been a significant increase in the opening of the military areas within the city for construction. The military areas, which are the natural part of the Northern Forests and are among the limited green areas in the city center, were transferred to HDA or certain capital groups and zoned for construction. According to the information provided by the North Forest Defense, 15.7 hectares of the 17 hectares of military areas in Istanbul constitute a whole with forest areas. There are 195 military areas with a total area of 225 million m², 172 of which are in the city and 23 of which are in the forests (Kuzey Ormanları Savunması 2017). It is seen that these areas are evaluated in a way to provide rent, like other forest areas, they are opened to construction and the need for green areas in the city is ignored for this cause. Moreover, these policies are largely sacrificed for the sake of building new housing or commercial areas in the city, even if there is a surplus of production in terms of housing.

In fact, the important points of Istanbul's urbanization show that the political party in power has been determined to support the capital segment as its primary policy. Urban space has been used as a means of rent, and even natural areas that had not been used as a rent-making tool in the previous periods were offered to the privileged use of capital groups. These capital groups have an important aspect. As mentioned in the previous parts of the thesis, Anatolian capital -the conservative Islamist capital- gained a great advantage and magnitude after 1980 when trade liberalized, and competition increased with the effect of neoliberalism. When it comes to after 2000 period, Islamist capital groups have achieved quite rapid growth with the help of their Islamist conservative relationship networks with the ruling party and its staff.

In order to concretize this situation, it is useful to refer to some data. When MÜSİAD was established in 1990, the number of members was 12, this number exceeded 1387 in 2000, 2136 in 2004 and 6500 in 2012 (Tanyılmaz 2014, 165). Between 2013 and 2016, the number of members increased by 60% from 7,500 to 12,000 (“MÜSİAD Kabına Sığmadı”, sabah.com.tr, 04.05.2016). It is mentioned in the previous chapter that the common feature of the founders and members of MÜSİAD is that their roots are based on Islamist associations, sects, and communities. During the JDP period, companies of this character did not remain as Anatolian Capital but became a monopolistic capital (Tanyılmaz 2014, 177). Therefore, as the representative of this capital fraction, the JDP has been a 'facilitator' in generating rent and gaining income over Istanbul. Islam and capitalism are brought together in great harmony and in the social sphere, an Islamist bourgeois class has become visible.

In the urban area of Istanbul, the public has suffered great losses with the privatization of public lands, the transformation of reinforcement areas and the destruction of natural-historical-cultural areas. Since the projects and construction activities initiated in these areas are distributed only among certain capital groups and companies, these groups and companies have made extraordinary gains during the period of JDP's local and central administration. Some of outstanding contracting companies and real estate investment trusts (REITs) are Ağaoğlu Group of Companies, Cengiz İnşaat, Limak

Group, Kolin Group, Çalık Holding and Torunlar Group. Of course, the companies that increased their capital volume by consuming public resources in this period are not limited to these. There are many more companies or REITs that have undertaken unlawful, contrary to upper scale plan decisions and non-public works in the urban area of Istanbul. The common feature of these companies and REITs is that they have no difficulty in getting their share from the urban and rural areas of Istanbul where the political party in power and local government has sold the city parcel by parcel and hectare by hectare. In the post-2000 period, which is also called as the JDP period, neoliberal policies were implemented in a way that would benefit certain capital groups with close relationships with the political party in power, and the visibility and volume of Islamist conservative capital increased.

The second element that comes to the fore after this point is the conservatization of space by the use of Islamist symbols and structures spatially and culturally. The creation and dissemination of urban rent in Istanbul after 2000 was at the center of urban politics, while at the same time the city was surrounded by symbols of Islamist conservative ideology. The Islamist conservatism, which has been increasing its influence with central policies during the JDP rule since 2002, has been equally effective in shaping the urban area of Istanbul. In this context, mosques seem to stand out as the most important spatial element. In particular, the visibility of mosques in urban space has increased, and the urban space has been shaped by mosque-oriented policies.



Figure 10: A view of the construction of the Taksim Mosque (on the right) in Taksim Square, Istanbul (Source: yenisafak.com)

In this context, the project for the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square, first voiced by the former mayor of the city, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 1994, was initiated in 2017. This intervention, which will conservatize the identity of one of the oldest squares of the city and affect the memory of the space, is one of the most critical Islamist conservative moves of the post-2000 period.



Figure 12: Selimiye Mosque in Edirne
(Source: yapi.com.tr)



Figure 11: Mimar Sinan Mosque in Ataşehir
(Source: arkitera.com)

A similar example of giving conservative identity to Taksim Square through the mosque is the huge Mimar Sinan Mosque built at the entrance of Ataşehir, one of the financial centers of the city. This mosque is highly criticized in terms of site selection due to its location in front of the high buildings and it is also criticized for its design as a replica of Selimiye Mosque, one of the most important works of Mimar Sinan in Edirne. From this point of view, it is understood that the important thing is not to leave an original work in terms of the right location and design. As it is important to reorganize the urban area of Istanbul to have an Islamist conservative identity, Ataşehir, one of the financial centers of Istanbul, has been given a different identity with a huge mosque. Another move took place in Kadıköy, one of the districts where the ruling party had the lowest votes. The change in the development plan regarding the mosque construction on the embankment area on the coast of Kadıköy was realized in 2015 and it was stated that the planned mosque will have a base session of 11.232 m² and a capacity of 20.000 people.



Figure 13: A model of Kadıköy Grand Mosque Project on the coast of Kadıköy, Istanbul (Source: hurriyet.com.tr)

The change in the development plans proposing the conversion of green area and sports area to mosque area was approved by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization on 02.11.2015 and the area was converted into a mosque area. It was stated by the former Mayor of Kadıköy that there were 9 places of worship in the immediate vicinity of the area, and the plans were subject to litigation (“Kadıköy rıhtıma cami onaylandı”, hurriyet.com.tr, 29.11.2017). However, it is seen that in the post-2000 period, mosques are more than meeting the need for worship but are used as an intervention tool for the identity of the urban space. Considering a mosque project of this scale to the highly visible and observable point of Kadıköy is an important example of the transformation of the space in the axis of Islamist conservatism.

The most important example of this period in terms of establishing an ideological hegemony through mosques is the undoubted Çamlıca Mosque. Although information

about Çamlıca Mosque was given in the previous chapters of the thesis, it will be useful to mention in this section as well. Because Çamlıca Mosque is also critical because it is the symbol work of the ruling party. In 2013, the Minister of the Environment and Urbanization of the period, Erdoğan Bayraktar, stated these words for the Çamlıca Mosque:

The purpose of creating a mosque in Çamlıca is to leave an iconic work for the ruling period of JDP (“Erdoğan Bayraktar: “Çamlıca Camisi AKP’nin simge eseri olacak”, haber.sol.org.tr, 20.02.2013).



Figure 14: Çamlıca Mosque in Istanbul (Source: ntv.com.tr)

The Çamlıca Mosque, which is the symbol work of the JDP, has a capacity of 60.000 people with an area of 15.000 m² and it is constructed by excavating 1 million m³ of excavation of Çamlıca Hill, which is natural site area¹⁹. In the example of the Çamlıca

¹⁹ Also see for the information about the architecture of the mosque (“Cumhuriyet tarihinin en 'tartışmalı'sı: Çamlıca Camii”, hürriyet.com.tr, 02.07.2016). In the same source, Master Architect Engineer Doğan Hasol comments about Çamlıca Mosque as follows: “It was a structure that could attract attention with its dimensional size. The traditional approach to site selection is that the mosque is in the middle of the urban settlement. But the chosen place is outside of the urban settlement”. Again, in the same resource, Master Architect Engineer Dr. Doğan Tekeli states that, an area that must be

Mosque, it is seen that the visibility and the size of the mosque are beyond the functionality and accessibility of the mosque. As it is understood from this point, the mosque has been reduced to an ideological and iconic structure rather than meeting the need of masses for worship.

The construction of new mosques was not the only factor in the conservatization of Istanbul's urban area. Istanbul, which has a history of thousands of years and where civilizations of different religions existed throughout history, has many historical and cultural monuments that are also under protection. Although these works are not limited to mosques, which are the places of worship of Islam religion, in January 2019, the IMM Council decided to revive the 12 historical complexes, masjids, and mosques in Beyoğlu, Fatih and Üsküdar districts. Even in conservation works, instead of choosing the ones that have priority of protection among the different structures belonging to different periods of the city, those who were the worship places of Islam religion such as the complex, mosque and masjid were prioritized. This practice also stands out as an application to increase the visibility of Islamic religious facilities in the urban area of Istanbul.

In addition to building new mosques and reviving old mosques, the conversion of non-worship areas into worship areas as in the case of Kadıköy Grand Mosque is another issue. Especially, there are many examples in which urban green areas and park areas are converted into worship areas. Moreover, open and unstructured areas such as green spaces and park areas are of great importance in cities with dense construction such as Istanbul. It is even worse for the population living in the region to convert these urban equipment areas into mosques, which are different types of equipment, and open them for construction. In this sense, as an example, the following are aimed at converting the areas reserved as green areas according to the upper scale development plans into mosque areas by means of development plan changes or rearranging green areas to

protected as green area according to the decisions of the current development plan is hastily constructed without social consensus.

include mosques. The examples related to this subject are as follows and the result of the legal proceedings related to these examples is not known:

- Arrangement of the park area in the neighborhood of Validebağ Grove, which is a natural protected area in Üsküdar, Istanbul, as a religious facility (“Bir Park Daha Cami Oluyor”, arkitera.com, 17.10.2014)
- Adding religious facility area to Göztepe Park located in Kadıköy District, Istanbul (“Göztepe Parkı’nda camiye onay çıktı”, hurriyet.com.tr, 23.11.2012)
- Arrangement of the children's park located in the Merkez Neighborhood in Bağcılar District, Istanbul as a mosque area (“Çocuk parkı cami olacak”, sozcu.com.tr, 14.01.2015)
- Addition of religious facility area to Eyüpsultan District, Yeşilpınar Regional Park in Istanbul (“İstanbul'da bir park daha cami ve katlı otopark yapılması için imara açıldı”, gazetemanifesto.com, 22.12.2018)

In this section, the findings conveyed after the findings of neoliberal urbanization are examples to concretize Islamist conservatism in the urban area and are important for understanding the domination of an Islamist fabric in the city. What is aimed here is to create conservative areas on urban space rather than creating areas that meet the worship needs of the Muslim population in the city. The thoughts expressed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Mayor of IMM in 1994, for Taksim Square were reinforced again by Erdoğan, who is the President of the country in 2019, with the statements declaring that Istanbul is actually “İslambol”. (“Erdoğan: Artık burası İslambol'dur”, haber.sol.org.tr, 16.03.2019). Istanbul has been shaped by policies aimed at increasing the spatial visibility of Islamist conservatism in 25 years. From 1994 to 2019, discourses and actions aimed at conservatizing the urban space continued consistently.

After 2000, neoliberalization and Islamization of the urban space were intertwined in Istanbul. The green areas and forests of the city have been destroyed with rent-oriented projects and mega projects, privileged benefits were provided to capital groups close

to power, urbanization policies, which contradict rational and scientific approach and democratic values, were followed by development plans and parliamentary decisions produced by public institutions which primarily should work for the public interest. Planning discipline was ignored with practices contrary to the upper scale plan decisions and the city developed far from planned development. It is easily understood from the mosque-oriented policies that the needs of the different segments living in Istanbul, which has a population of more than 15 million, are not cared. In order to understand the conservatization that has occurred in the urban area of Istanbul, it will be useful to make a detailed examination of the mosques. In the following parts of this chapter, analyzes will be conducted in Istanbul in the context of mosques in the post-2000 period, and the impact of mosques, which are the most important spatial elements of conservatism, in shaping the urban area on the conservative axis will be examined

5.1.1. Mosques as an Urban Equipment

As mentioned in Chapter 4, mosques are urban equipment areas. According to Article 5 of the RCSP, which is under the title of “Definitions and Principles of Spatial Use”, mosques are included under the title of social infrastructure with the uses such as education and health facilities, squares and playgrounds.

According to information from the Presidency of Religious Affairs, distribution according to the number of mosques in Turkey and in Istanbul are as follows:

Table 15: Number of Mosques in Istanbul and Turkey between 1992 and 2018

Years	Istanbul	Turkey	Years	Istanbul	Turkey
1992	2.174	68.203	2006	2.889	78.608
1993	2.180	68.675	2007	2.944	79.096
1994	2.203	69.523	2008	3.006	80.053
1995	2.264	70.213	2009	3.032	80.636
1996	2.354	71.293	2010	3.087	81.984
1997	2.596	72.419	2011	3.113	82.693
1998	2.689	73.772	2012	3.190	84.684
1999	2.692	74.354	2013	3.223	85.412
2000	2.691	75.002	2014	3.269	86.101
2001	2.712	74.856	2015	3.317	86.762
2002	2.775	75.941	2016	3.356	87.381
2003	2.787	76.445	2017	3.403	88.021
2004	2.828	77.151	2018	3.446	88.681
2005	2.855	77.777			

According to Figure 15 and 16, the change in the number of mosques in Istanbul and Turkey by years is as follows:




Figure 15: Change in the number of Mosques in Istanbul between 1992 and 2018




Figure 16: Change in the number of Mosques in Turkey between 1992 and 2018

It is seen in the graphs generated using the data in Table 15 that change in the number of mosques in Turkey between the years 1992-2018 has shown a steady increase,

except for 2001. The number of mosques in Istanbul has increased every year, with the highest increase between 1996 and 1997. Following this general data, detailed analysis will be provided in the following sections.

5.1.1.1. Examination of Development Plan Announcements of Public Institutions Proposing Mosques

Urban planning legislation in Turkey enters the jurisdiction of many agencies and organizations. However, the basic law in this field is the Zoning Law numbered 3194, which was published in the Official Gazette dated 09.05.1985 and numbered 18749 and entered into force. In this law and its related regulations, the physical plan hierarchy and the authorities and obligations related to the construction and approval of these plans are determined.

In Article 6 of the Law numbered 3194 titled as “Principles Related to Development Plans – Planning Hierarchy”, it is stipulated as follows:

Plans can be made as “Regional Plans” and “Development Plans” in terms of their scope and objectives. Development plans are prepared as "Master Plans" and "Implementation Plans". Implementation plans, if necessary, can be made in stages.

According to this provision, development plans are prepared in two different ways: Master Plan and Implementation Plan. In addition, according to Article 6 of the RCSP published in the Official Gazette dated 14.06.2014 and numbered 29030, which is included in the planning legislation states the following:

Spatial plans are prepared as Spatial Strategy Plans, Environmental Plans and Development plans in terms of their scope and objectives. Accordingly, the planning levels consist of the Spatial Strategy Plan, the Environmental Plan, the Master Plan and the Implementary Plan, respectively.

According to this provision, the levels of the plan types are determined.

Another related regulation in the Law numbered 3194 is the Article 8. This article stipulates the following:

Development plans consist of Master Plan and Implementary Plan. If applicable, the master plan and implementation development plans of the places within the municipal boundaries shall be prepared or made by the relevant municipalities by ensuring compliance with the regional plan and environmental plan decisions. It goes to validness by being approved by municipal council. These plans shall be announced simultaneously for one month at the places of announcement determined by the mayor and on the web pages of the related administrations as of the approval date. Plans can be appealed within a one-month announcement period. The municipal council examines the objections and plans sent to the municipal council by the mayor within fifteen days and makes a final decision.

Article 33 of the RCSP on the same subject provides the following provision:

The environmental plans and development plans shall be posted on the announcement places determined by the administrations and posted on the web pages of the administrations to be visible to everyone for a period of thirty days within fifteen working days at the latest after the approval.

As it can be understood from these provisions, the development plans approved by the approval institutions shall be announced in the announcement places and web pages of the related administrations for a period of one month. This period is the period given to the public in order to be informed by the announced plans and to submit objections.

Within this scope, in this part of the study, the plans approved by the two most active institutions in terms of planning of the city of Istanbul, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) and the Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization (IPDEU), from 2015 to June 2019 will be examined in terms of proposing mosque as a place of worship or religious facility. These planning studies carried out independently of the upper scale decisions of the 1/100.000 scaled Istanbul Environmental Plan, which came into force after being approved in 2009, are of great importance for understanding the changes taking place in the urban area.

5.1.1.1.1. Development Plan Announcements of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality between 2015-2019

In accordance with Article 8 of Law numbered 3194, IMM announces the development plans approved by the Municipal Council on its website. (Istanbul Metropolitan

Municipality 2019). The documents of the plans that have been approved and announced since October 2004 are archived on the website of the development plan announcement. Within this archive, a period of approximately 5 years starting from 2015 will be examined. The general situation regarding the plans that have been approved and suspended from 2015 until June 2019 is as follows:

Table 16: Number of plans approved and announced by IMM between 2014-2019 (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 2019)

Years Months	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
January	26	51	49	76	42
February	46	25	43	17	29
March	48	35	37	75	66
April	32	37	67	28	87
May	28	33	33	45	21
June	30	38	65	9	12
July	19	28	27	47	-
August	37	6	41	29	-
September	18	22	19	19	-
October	56	38	44	47	-
November	40	28	25	28	-
December	39	45	32	22	-
Total	419	386	482	442	257

To start with the data on Table 16 regarding the 2015 plans, as understood from the IMM archive, a total of 419 plans were approved and announced by the Municipal Council in 2015. Among these plans, 4 out of 26 plans approved in January, 2 out of 46 plans approved in February, 5 out of 48 plans approved in March, 5 out of 32 plans approved in April, 3 out of 28 plans approved in May, in June 1 out of 30 approved plans, 5 out of 19 approved in July, 1 out of 37 approved in August, 1 out of 18

approved in September, 5 out of 56 in October, 6 out of 40 approved in November and 2 out of 39 plans approved in December offer mosques. In 2015, 40 of the 419 plans approved and announced in 2015 have identified new mosque areas in the urban area of Istanbul.

When the year 2016 is analyzed, it is seen that 386 plans were approved and announced by the Municipal Council during the year. Of these plans, 4 out of 51 approved in January, 4 out of 25 approved in February, 1 out of 35 approved in March, 5 out of 37 approved in April, 3 out of 33 approved in May in June 7 out of 38 approved plans, 2 out of 28 approved plans in July, 2 out of 6 approved plans in August, 4 out of 22 approved plans in September, 7 out of 38 approved plans in October, 3 out of 28 approved plans in November and 2 out of 45 plans approved in December offer mosques. In total, 44 mosques out of 386 plans approved and announced in 2016 have identified new mosque areas in the urban area of Istanbul.

For the year 2017, 482 plans were approved and announced by the Municipal Council during the year. Among these plans, 6 out of 49 plans approved in January, 7 out of 43 plans approved in February, 4 out of 37 plans approved in March, 11 out of 67 plans approved in April, 10 out of 33 plans approved in May, in June 7 out of 65 approved plans, 4 out of 27 approved in July, 7 out of 41 approved in August, 19 out of 19 approved in September, 2 out of 44 in October, 6 out of 25 approved in November and 7 of the 32 approved in December suggest new places of worship as mosque. New mosque areas were identified in Istanbul urban area with 70 out of 482 plans that were approved in 2017.

When the year 2018 is examined, it is seen that 442 plans were approved and announced by the Municipal Council during the year. Among these plans, 17 out of 76 approved in January, 1 out of 17 approved in February, 13 out of 75 approved in March, 5 out of 28 approved in April, 6 out of 45 approved in May, 2 out of 9 approved, 7 out of 47 approved in July, 1 out of 29 approved in August, 4 out of 19 approved in September, 4 out of 47 approved in October, 2 out of 28 approved in November and 1

of the 22 plans approved in December proposes mosque. New mosque areas were identified in the urban area with 63 out of 442 plans approved and announced in 2018.

When the first half of 2019 is examined, it is seen that 257 plans were approved and announced by the Municipal Council during the 6 months in question. Among these plans, 8 out of 42 plans approved in January, 9 out of 29 plans approved in February, 12 out of 66 plans approved in March, 10 out of 87 plans approved in April, 1 out of 21 plans approved in May and none of the approved plans in June suggests mosque. In total, 40 of the 257 plans announced and approved in the first half of 2019 identified new mosque areas in the urban area.

From January 2015 to June 2019, a total of 1986 development plans were approved by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. A total of 257 of the 1986 development plans proposes mosque. With 13% of the plans approved since 2015, new mosque areas have been proposed in urban areas independent of the upper scale plans and in addition to those proposed by the upper scale plans.

Table 17: Distribution of development plans of IMM including mosque by years and by districts of Istanbul (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 2019)

District Name	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019 (until June)	Total
Adalar	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arnavutköy	1	2	8	4	1	16
Ataşehir	-	-	3	1	2	6
Avcılar	-	1	1	-	2	4
Bağcılar	2	2	2	2	2	10
Bahçelievler	-	2	1	-	1	4
Bakırköy	2	1	-	-	-	3
Başakşehir	2	-	1	-	1	4
Bayrampaşa	1	-	1	1	-	3
Beşiktaş	1	-	1	2	-	4
Beykoz	-	-	1	-	2	3
Beylikdüzü	1	-	1	-	-	2
Beyoğlu	-	1	-	-	-	1
Büyükçekmece	-	2	2	-	1	5
Çatalca	1	2	2	1	1	7
Çekmeköy	3	-	2	-	1	6
Esenler	1	-	-	-	-	1
Esenyurt	1	1	2	1	2	7
Eyüpsultan	3	2	2	4	1	12
Fatih	-	-	1	3	1	5
Gaziosmanpaşa	-	1	-	-	-	1
Güngören	-	2	-	1	-	3
Kadıköy	1	-	2	-	-	3
Kağıthane	-	1	2	1	-	4
Kartal	4	5	2	3	3	17
Küçükçekmece	6	2	2	-	1	11
Maltepe	2	2	4	1	1	10
Pendik	1	3	4	9	3	20
Sancaktepe	2	1	3	6	5	17
Sarıyer	-	1	1	1	-	3
Silivri	1	1	2	2	1	7
Sultanbeyli	-	1	2	-	-	3
Sultangazi	-	1	2	2	-	5
Şile	-	3	1	1	1	6
Şişli	-	1	1	2	-	4
Tuzla	-	2	4	4	2	12
Ümraniye	2	-	4	4	3	13
Üsküdar	-	-	-	1	2	3
Zeytinburnu	2	1	3	6	-	12
Total	40	44	70	63	40	257

It would be useful to look at the distribution of the plans approved by IMM according to districts. In Table 17, it is seen that most mosque was proposed in the district of Pendik. However, it is not correct to say that the number of plans and the number of mosques is equal. Because these plans include also holistic plans that are not based on parcels, it can be said that new mosque areas have been created more than the number of plans suggesting mosque area. For example, with “1/5000 scaled Master Plan for the area in Pendik District, located between Ankara Street and TEM Connection Road” announced between 19.10.2016-17.11.2016, within the boundaries of the plan, a total of 952.1 hectares of planning work has been carried out and 33 separate places of worship (mosques) have been organized as understood from the plan sheets. In the following parts of the chapter, detailed analyzes related to Pendik district will be included in the section where spatial analyses are performed.

5.1.1.1.2. Development Plan Announcements of the Istanbul Governorship Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization between 2015-2019

Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization announces the development plans approved by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in accordance with Article 8 of Law numbered 3194 on its website (İstanbul Valiliği Çevre ve Şehircilik İl Müdürlüğü 2019). The documents of the plans that have been approved and announced since August 2014 are archived on the website of the development plan announcement. Within this archive, a period of approximately 5 years starting from 2015 will be examined. The general situation regarding the plans that have been approved and suspended from 2015 until June 2019 is as given in Table 17.

Unlike the plans approved by IMM, most of the plans approved and announced by the IPDEU, which is a directorate of the MEU, are holistic plans. New residential areas are established, and the existing residential areas are being restructured within the

scope of urban transformation studies. In this context, it can be said that the MEU, the central government unit, does not differ much from the local government unit IMM.

Table 18: Number of plans approved by MEU and announced by IPDEU between 2014-2019 (İstanbul Valiliği Çevre ve Şehircilik İl Müdürlüğü 2019)

Years Months	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
January	1	3	5	6	4
February	4	8	4	4	8
March	7	4	9	3	5
April	7	5	9	3	9
May	6	4	8	6	5
June	9	9	4	9	3
July	9	0	5	6	-
August	7	7	9	5	-
September	5	6	7	10	-
October	6	7	4	5	-
November	13	10	2	10	-
December	4	8	8	7	-
Total	78	71	74	74	34

When the plans approved in 2015 are examined, it is seen that the only plan approved in January, 2 out of 4 plans approved in February, 2 out of 7 plans approved in March, 3 out of 7 plans approved in April, 6 in May 2 of the 9 plans approved in June, 4 of the 9 plans approved in July, 3 of the 7 plans approved in August, 2 of the 5 plans approved in September, 6 approved in October 2 of the plans, 7 of the 13 plans approved in November and 2 of the 4 plans approved in December offers mosques. In total, 33 mosques out of 78 plans were approved and announced in 2015 and new mosque areas were identified in the urban area of Istanbul.

Secondly, when the plans announced in 2016 are examined, it is seen that 2 out of 3 plans approved in January, 3 out of 8 plans approved in February, 2 out of 4 plans approved in March, 3 out of 5 plans approved in April, in May 1 out of 4 plans approved in June, 3 out of 9 plans approved in June, 3 out of 6 plans approved in August, 1 out of 6 plans approved in September, 1 out of 7 plans approved in October, in November 1 of the 10 plans approved and 1 of the 8 plans approved in December recommend mosque. There are no plans announced in July. In total, new mosques were identified in the urban area with 21 out of 70 plans approved and announced in 2016.

Looking at 2017, 2 out of 5 plans approved in January, 1 out of 4 plans approved in February, 5 out of 9 plans approved in March, 1 out of 10 plans approved in April, 8 out of 8 plans approved in May 2, none of the 4 plans approved in June, 1 of the 5 plans approved in July, 6 of the 9 plans approved in August, none of the 7 plans approved in September, 3 of the 4 plans approved in October, None of the 2 plans approved in November and 2 of the 8 plans approved in December offer mosque. In total, 23 plans out of 74 plans approved in 2017 identifies new mosque areas in the urban area.

When the year 2018 is examined, it is seen that 2 out of 6 plans approved in January, 1 out of 4 plans approved in February, 1 out of 3 plans approved in March, none of the 3 plans approved in April, 2 out of 6 plans approved in May 3 of the 9 plans approved in June, 3 of the 6 plans approved in July, 2 of the 5 plans approved in August, 2 of the 10 plans approved in September, none of the 5 plans approved in October 4 of the 10 plans approved in November and 4 of the 7 plans approved in December propose mosque. In total, with 24 of the 74 plans announced and approved in 2018, new mosque areas were identified in the urban area.

Finally, when the first half of 2019 is examined, it is seen that 34 plans have been approved and announced during the 6 months. Among these plans, 1 out of 4 plans approved in January, 3 out of 8 plans approved in February, 2 out of 5 plans approved in March, and none of the plans approved in April, May and June, suggest mosques.

In total, with 6 out of 34 plans that were approved and announced in the first half of 2019, new mosque areas were identified in the urban area.

From January 2015 to June 2019, a total of 331 plans were approved by the MEU for a period of 4.5 years. 107 of the 331 plans propose new mosques. With 32% of the plans approved since 2015, new mosque areas have been proposed in the urban area independent of the upper scale plans and in addition to those proposed by the upper scale plans.

Table 19: Distribution of development plans of MEU including mosque by years and by districts of Istanbul (İstanbul Valiliği Çevre ve Şehircilik İl Müdürlüğü 2019)

District Name	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019 (until June)	Total
Adalar	-	-	3	-	-	3
Arnavutköy	2	-	2	2	-	6
Ataşehir	-	-	-	-	-	-
Avcılar	-	2	-	2	-	4
Bağcılar	3	-	1	-	-	4
Bahçelievler	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bakırköy	2	2	3	3	1	11
Başakşehir	4	1	-	1	1	7
Bayrampaşa	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beşiktaş	1	1	-	1	-	3
Beykoz	3	-	1	2	-	6
Beylikdüzü	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beyoğlu	2	1	1	2	-	6
Büyükçekmece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Çatalca	-	-	-	-	-	-
Çekmeköy	-	-	1	-	-	1
Esenler	-	1	-	1	-	2
Esenyurt	1	-	-	-	-	1
Eyüpsultan	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fatih	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gaziosmanpaşa	3	4	-	1	-	8
Güngören	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kadıköy	1	3	1	-	2	7
Kağıthane	1	-	-	1	-	2
Kartal	-	-	1	1	-	2
Küçükçekmece	1	1	2	-	1	5
Maltepe	-	1	-	1	-	2

Table 19 (continued)

Pendik	6	-	1	-	-	7
Sancaktepe	-	-	1	-	-	1
Sarıyer	-	1	2	3	1	7
Silivri	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sultanbeyli	-	-	1	-	-	1
Sultangazi	-	-	-	-	-	-
Şile	-	-	-	-	-	-
Şişli	2	-	-	-	-	2
Tuzla	1	1	1	-	-	3
Ümraniye	-	1	1	1	-	3
Üsküdar	-	1	1	-	-	2
Zeytinburnu	-	-	-	2	-	2
Total	33	21	24	24	6	108

However, it is often to see in the MEU announcements that there are many plans announced more than once. For example, although the district of Bakırköy has come forward as the district where 11 plans offering the highest number of mosque areas, the number of different plans announced in 11 announcements is actually 3. Therefore, it would be useful to consider this information when reading MEU data and no spatial analysis will be performed in any district.

5.1.1.2. Spatial Analysis of Mosques by Years

The spatialization of the quantitative data obtained in the previous parts of the study is of great importance in terms of seeing the place of mosques in the organization of Istanbul urban space. For this reason, this section will include the spatialization of the data obtained from IMM, PRA, Chamber of City Planners Istanbul Branch (CCPİB), and Pendik Mufti Office (PMO). As mentioned before, the situation of Pendik district, which is prominent in IMM announcements, will be mentioned in detail. Only the studies related to the current situation are included in the analyses related to Istanbul. Because the information obtained from IMM, PRA, CCPİB, and PMO only allows to analyze spatiality for the current situation and there is no spatial data for previous years.

The number of mosques in Istanbul is 3446 as of 2018 according to the current situation data. According to Figure 17, the distribution of mosques throughout the city is concentrated in Fatih. The Historical Peninsula, where Fatih district is located, is the region that the Ottoman Empire used as the center, and it is usual that the most religious structure is located in this region. Apart from Fatih, Üsküdar and Beyoğlu districts stand out as regions where the number of mosques is concentrated. This is also normal, because it is seen that the residential areas in Istanbul were concentrated in the region which could be defined as the “historical core” until the 1950s. The region, which is defined as the historical core, was established in three main regions: the historical peninsula on the European side, Karaköy, and Beyoğlu on the north of the historical peninsula, and Üsküdar and Kadıköy on the Anatolian side.

In addition to the spatial representation of the mosques created within the scope of this section, the analysis also includes service impact areas determined as 400 meters according to Article 12 of the RCSP located under the title of “Walking Distance”. Following the general view covering the provincial borders, the spatial distribution of mosques along with their service impact areas will be closely examined in order to provide clearer information about the current situation. Figure 18 shows the service impact areas of existing mosques according to the relevant legislation.

As another demonstration, an analysis focusing on the city center, which includes mosques and service impact areas, is used. According to Figure 19, there are overlaps across Istanbul in terms of mosque service delivery in many areas where settlement and construction are concentrated. These overlaps are not limited to the districts of Fatih, Beyoğlu, Üsküdar, and Kadıköy, but indicate that the mosque service is more than needed throughout the city.

In the following pages, with Figures 17, 18 and 19, the current status of mosques and service impact areas throughout Istanbul are given.



Figure 17: Spatial distribution of mosques in Istanbul as of 2018

5.1.1.2.1. Pendik District as a Subscale Sample

As mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter, Pendik was the prominent district in the examinations regarding the development plans announced in the IMM between 2015-2019. Pendik district is worth exploring because it is not one of the historical core districts of Istanbul. In this section, after brief information about the settlement history of Pendik district, the spatial analysis will be given.

Pendik is adjacent to Tuzla in the east, Sultanbeyli in the north, Kartal in the west and the Marmara Sea in the south. The district has an area of approximately 190 km² and has a coastline of 7.5 km (Pendik Belediyesi 2019). Pendik is located in a region with an improved land and sea transport links, close to the outer border of the Istanbul Metropolitan area (Figure 21).

After the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Empire, Turks from Anatolia came to settle and established villages in Pendik. Due to the ongoing struggle during the War of Independence, the population of Pendik has decreased considerably. The present demographic structure has emerged with the migrations it has taken from different periods to the present. With the 1924 Turkey-Greece Population Exchange, the migration movements from Anatolia as of the 1930s, and the migration from both Anatolia, Germany, and Balkan countries as of the 1960s, the population of Pendik reached 235.000 by the 1990s (Pendik Belediyesi 2019). While the population was 4.000 in 1935, with the second wave of migration from abroad, it became 14.000 in 1960 and it reached 30.000 in 1970.

Since the 1970s, Pendik's summer place structure began to deteriorate, mansions and cottages on the beach began to be replaced by multi-storey buildings. With the implementation of the Great Istanbul Master Plan which was approved in 1980 and brought new regulations to the industrial development in Istanbul, Pendik's population of 60.000 reached 235.000 in 1990 and Pendik was separated from Kartal by the Law numbered 3392 published in the Official Gazette numbered 19507 on 04.07.1987 (Pendik Belediyesi 2019). Transportation routes connecting Istanbul to Anatolia and

Thrace in the 1990s mostly determined the distribution of residential areas. The settlement of the immigrant population is located in the west along the E-5 Highway in the direction of Avcılar-Büyükçekmece; and in the east, it expanded to Bostancı, Maltepe, Kartal, Pendik and Gebze. According to TÜİK records, 2018 population of the district is 693.599 and Pendik is the 4th most populous district of Istanbul according to 2018 data (TÜİK 2019).

When the results of the local elections are examined in terms of providing information about the demographic structure of Pendik, the following table is as follows: the Social Democrat Populist Party with 31.6% vote rate in 1989, the WP with 30.1% vote rate in 1994, the VP with 32.2% vote rate in 1999, the JDP with 44.2% vote rate in 2004, the JDP with %43,4 vote rate in 2009, the JDP with 52.9% vote rate in 2014 and the JDP with 54.7% vote rate in 2019 (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu 2019). The results of the local elections are in parallel with the general elections between 1989 and 2019. While the administration of the district municipality was a political center-left party between 1989 and 1994, after 1994, it was transferred to the conservative right-wing WP, the VP and the JDP, which can be defined as a follow-up of each other. For Pendik, the results of the 1989-2019 local elections are also in parallel with the results of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. In this sense, Pendik has a demographic structure suitable for examination at district scale.

In spatial analysis for the Pendik, periodization is determined according to this approach: the year 1987 and the period before that year, since Pendik became a district in 1987, the period between 1987-2000, since the year 2000 was also used as a period in the previous parts of the thesis, the period after 2000, since the present situation will also be examined. Accordingly, the satellite images of Pendik district over the years are as follows:




Figure 20: Change of settlement area of Pendik District by years (Source: Google Earth)

When the satellite imagery is examined in terms of settlement area development, it is seen that the district developed on the northeast axis. In 2016, the unstructured area within the borders of the district remained very small. Data on the delivery of equipment services will be included in the next section. However, since the distribution of mosques in Istanbul is examined in the previous section, the current situation of the distribution of mosques in Pendik district borders and spatial analysis of the distribution of mosques by years will be included.



Figure 21: Location of Pendik district in Istanbul




Figure 22: Spatial distribution of mosques in Pendik as of 2018




Figure 23: Spatial distribution and service impact areas of mosques in Pendik as of 2018




Figure 24: Spatial distribution of mosques in Pendik by periods – First Period: Before 1987




Figure 25: Spatial distribution of mosques in Pendik by periods – Second Period: Between 1987-2000




Figure 26: Spatial distribution of mosques in Pendik by periods – Third Period: After 2000

As of 2018, there are 140 mosques in Pendik. 36 of these mosques were built before 1987, 61 of them were built between 1987-2000 and 43 of them were built after 2000. Figure 15 shows that almost all of these mosques are evenly distributed over the densely structured area. When evaluated according to the service impact area analysis in Figure 16, there is no problem in terms of access to the mosque in the densely populated area of Pendik district, on the contrary, service areas overlap at many points. However, according to the information gained from the website of Pendik Municipality named as “Projects of Pendik”, there are 10 new mosques that the construction year of which are 2019 (Pendik Projeleri 2019).

When the spatial distribution of mosques throughout the district is analyzed by the data obtained from the PMO, Figure 24 shows that in 1987, when Pendik became a district, mosques were concentrated in the northwest of the district. With the implementation of the Great Istanbul Master Plan which was approved in 1980 and brought new regulations to the industrial development in Istanbul, Pendik's population of approximately 60.000 reached 295.651 in 1990. The population of the year 2000 is 389.657. In parallel with the increase in population, according to Figure 25, the number of mosques increased considerably between 1987-2000. The mosques, which were concentrated in a line close to the coastline in the northwest until the year 1987, were distributed throughout the district by the year 2000. Figure 26 shows the distribution of the current situation in years.

As a result, it is seen in these analyzes starting from the Istanbul city scale to the Pendik district scale that 140 of 3446 mosques in Istanbul urban space are located in Pendik district. When the service impact areas of the mosques in both Istanbul and Pendik districts are examined, it is seen that the service provision of the mosque contains spatial overlaps. In the next section, the meaning of spatial overlaps will be examined by examining the adequacy of mosque areas in terms of urban equipment standards.

5.1.1.3. Change in the Service Delivery of Mosque as an Urban Equipment by Years

In order to conclude the analyses made in the previous sections of the Chapter, this section will examine the service delivery of the mosque areas. A study will be carried out on how the density of mosques in the urban area changes over the years by comparing the standards set by the legislation on mosques as an urban equipment area and the current situation in Istanbul. At the end of the chapter, 100% compliance to the legislation will be tested.

The data used in this section of the Chapter were obtained from IMM by the application made to the related directorate. The m²/per person as urban equipment area for mosque is defined in the RCSP. With Article 11 of the related regulation under the heading of “Principles of Making Spatial Plans” and under the sub-heading of “Standards”, it is stipulated as follows:

The minimum standards and area sizes specified in the Annex-2 Table of this Regulation shall be complied with in the urban, social and technical infrastructure areas taking into consideration the conditions and future requirements of the planned area or region in the construction and changes of the development plans.

Including the ANNEX-2 Table, Table 19 given below shows the standard area sizes to be taken as basis for the development plan studies to be carried out for any settlement. Accordingly, for a settlement such as Istanbul which has a population of over 500.000 m²/per person for small worship places, medium worship places and large worship places and complexes is 0.75. The standards in Table 19 have been in force since 2014.

Table 20: Urban infrastructure standards identified by RCSP (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi 2014)

ANNEX-2 TABLE		Standards and Minimum Area Sizes Table on Minimum Social and Technical Infrastructure Areas in Different Population Groups							
POPULATION GROUPS		0 - 75.000		75.001 - 150.000		150.001 - 500.000		500.001+	
		m2/per person	Min. Unit Area (m2)	m2/per person	Min. Unit Area (m2)	m2/per person	Min. Unit Area (m2)	m2/per person	Min. Unit Area (m2)
EDUCATION FACILITIES	Kindergarten	0,50	1.500-3.000	0,50	1.500-3.000	0,60	1.500-3.000	0,60	1.500-3.000
	Primary School	2,00	5.000-8.000	2,00	5.000-8.000	2,00	5.000-8.000	2,00	5.000-8.000
	Secondary School	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000
	Day High School	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000	2,00	6.000-10.000
	Boarding School		10.000-15.000		10.000-15.000		10.000-15.000		
	Industrial Vocational High School, Multi-Program High School	2,00	10.000-25.000	2,00	10.000-25.000	2,00	10.000-25.000	2,00	10.000-25.000
	Special Education, Rehabilitation and Counseling Centers		2.000-4.000		2.000-4.000		2.000-4.000		
	Public Education Center, Advanced Technical School for Girls		3.000-5.000		3.000-5.000		3.000-5.000		
OPEN AND GREEN AREAS	PLANNING WITHIN THE DISTRICT BORDERS	Playground	10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00	
		Park							
		Square							
		Neighborhood Sports Area							
		Botanical Park							
		Recreation Area							
	Recreation								
	PLANNING WITHIN THE PROVINCIAL BORDERS	Zoo	5,00	5,00	5,00	5,00	5,00	5,00	
		Urban Forest							
		Afforestation Area							
Fair, Market and Festival Area									
Hippodrome									
HEALTH FACILITIES	Family Health Center	1,50	750-2.000	1,50	750-2.000	1,50	750-2.000	1,60	750-2.000
	Grade Health Facilities		3000		3000		3000		
	Mouth and Dental Health Center		110 m2 per unit		110 m2 per unit		110 m2 per unit		
	Birth and Child Care Center		130 m2 per bed		130 m2 per bed		130 m2 per bed		
	State Hospitals								
	Specialized/Training and Research Hospitals								
	Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Hospitals								
Health Campuses	220 m2 per bed	220 m2 per bed	220 m2 per bed						
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACILITIES		0,75		1,00		1,25		1,50	
RELIGIOUS FACILITIES	Small Worship Place	0,50	1.000	0,50	1.000	0,75	1.000	0,75	1.000
	Medium Worship Place		2.500		2.500		2.500		
	Big Worship Place and Complex		15.000		15.000		15.000		
TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (Excluding Road and Parking Lot)		1,00		1,25		1,50		2,00	

However, before 2014, the Regulation on Principles of Plan Making (RPPM) was in force starting from 1985 to 2014 and the standards identified by the related regulation was different. With Article 16 of the RPPM under the heading of “Principles of Plan Making”, it is stipulated as follows:

In the making and amendment of development plans of all sizes to be prepared, the minimum standards specified in the table in ANNEX-1 are complied with in consideration of the conditions and future requirements of the planned town and region.

ANNEX-1 Table in the repealed regulation is given below:

Table 21: Urban infrastructure standards identified by RPPM (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İdari İşler Başkanlığı Hukuk ve Mevzuat Genel Müdürlüğü 1985)

Urban, Social and Technical Infrastructure*				
Population	0 - 15.000	15.000 - 45.000	45.000 - 100.000	100.000 - +
Kindergarten+Preschool	1 m ² /per person	1 m ² /per person	1 m ² /per person	1 m ² /per person
Primary School	4 m ² /per person	4 m ² /per person	4,5 m ² /per person	4,5 m ² /per person
Secondary School	3 m ² /per person	3 m ² /per person	3 m ² /per person	3 m ² /per person
Active Green Area	10 m ² /per person	10 m ² /per person	10 m ² /per person	10 m ² /per person
Health Facilities	2 m ² /per person	2 m ² /per person	3 m ² /per person	4 m ² /per person
Cultural Facilities	0,5 m ² /per person	1 m ² /per person	2 m ² /per person	2,5 m ² /per person
Social Facilities	0,5 m ² /per person	0,5 m ² /per person	1 m ² /per person	1,5 m ² /per person
Public Education Center	0,4 m ² /per person	0,4 m ² /per person	0,4 m ² /per person	0,4 m ² /per person
Religious Facilities	0,5 m ² /per person	0,5 m ² /per person	0,5 m ² /per person	0,5 m ² /per person
Administrative Facilities	3 m ² /per person	3,5 m ² /per person	4 m ² /per person	5 m ² /per person
Technical Infrastructure	1 m ² /per person	2 m ² /per person	3 m ² /per person	4 m ² /per person
*The projection population, which is the basis of planning, will be taken into account in the field calculation.				

As can be seen from Table 21, the standard for religious facility areas in RPPM, which was repealed in 2014, is 0.5 m²/person regardless of the population. As of 2014, the square meters of worship places per person have been increased by 50% in places where the population is more than 150.000 thousand. However, the values of the health facility area, which is 2 m²/person up to 45.000 population, 3 m²/person for 45.000–100.000 population, and 4 m²/person for over 100.000 population, have been changed with RCSP. It has been changed to 1.50 m²/person up to 500.000 population and 1.60 m²/person for over 500.000 population. The social and cultural facility areas described as two separate units in the RPPM were combined in the RCSP and the square meter of these uses per person was also reduced. When the two regulations are compared, it is seen that the only urban equipment m²/person that increased is religious facility area.

It is not known which objective and scientific reasons are the basis for reducing m²/person in almost all uses but increasing it only for religious facility area.

The data used in the examination is obtained from IMM and belongs to three different periods: 2003, 2014 and 2017. Therefore, for the data of 2003 and 2014, RPPM standards will be the basis and for the data of 2017, RCSP standards will be the basis. The data of these three periods does not have unity, but a common language has been tried to be achieved within thesis study.

Table 22: Mosque and Masjid Areas and m²/person in Istanbul and Districts in 2003

COMPLIANCE STATUS OF THE PRESENT MOSQUE AREAS IN ISTANBUL AND 39 DISTRICTS BASED ON THE LEGISLATION IN FORCE			
DISTRICTS	Regulation Standard: 0.50 (m ² /person)		
	PRESENT SITUATION FOR 2003		
	Area (m ²)	Population	Area per Person (m ² /person)
ADALAR	6.498	17.738	0,37
AVCILAR	18.369	235.113	0,08
BAĞCILAR	68.959	559.694	0,12
BAHÇELİEVLER	89.867	472.679	0,19
BAKIRKÖY	58.488	208.223	0,28
BAYRAMPAŞA	66.799	246.646	0,27
BEŞİKTAŞ	46.082	191.776	0,24
BEYKOZ	80.009	201.409	0,40
BEYOĞLU	73.826	234.964	0,31
EMİNÖNÜ	97.448	55.548	1,75
ESENLER	58.642	394.423	0,15
EYÜP	87.546	246.110	0,36
FATİH	261.110	407.991	0,64
GAZİOSMANPAŞA	138.385	678.984	0,20
GÜNGÖREN	43.682	271.874	0,16
KADIKÖY	165.242	661.953	0,25
KAĞITHANE	74.796	345.574	0,22
KARTAL	138.543	407.034	0,34
KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE	168.051	589.139	0,29
MALTEPE	87.215	358.231	0,24
PENDİK	309.110	380.132	0,81
SARIYER	83.754	237.458	0,35
SULTANBEYLİ	99.494	175.771	0,57
ŞİŞLİ	69.323	271.003	0,26
TUZLA	56.197	108.329	0,52
ÜMRANİYE	170.255	449.762	0,38
ÜSKÜDAR	184.724	496.402	0,37
ZEYTİNBURNU	42.227	244.062	0,17
TOTAL	2.844.641	9.148.022	0,31

Table 23: Mosque and Masjid Areas and m²/person in Istanbul and Districts in 2014

COMPLIANCE STATUS OF THE PRESENT MOSQUE AREAS IN ISTANBUL AND 39 DISTRICTS BASED ON THE LEGISLATION IN FORCE			
DISTRICTS	Regulation Standard: 0.50 (m ² /person)		
	PRESENT SITUATION FOR 2014		
	Area (m ²)	Population	Area per Person (m ² /person)
ADALAR	4.634	16.052	0,29
ARNAVUTKÖY	136.801	225.670	0,61
ATAŞEHİR	51.098	408.986	0,12
AVCILAR	26.022	417.852	0,06
BAĞCILAR	110.690	754.623	0,15
BAHÇELİEVLER	88.092	599.027	0,15
BAKIRKÖY	54.126	221.594	0,24
BAŞAKŞEHİR	135.315	342.422	0,40
BAYRAMPAŞA	75.584	269.809	0,28
BEŞİKTAŞ	42.071	188.793	0,22
BEYKOZ	136.671	248.071	0,55
BEYLİKDÜZÜ	51.553	262.473	0,20
BEYOĞLU	76.776	241.520	0,32
BÜYÜKÇEKMECE	81.039	223.324	0,36
ÇATALCA	41.969	67.843	0,62
ÇEKMEKÖY	45.471	220.656	0,21
ESENLER	54.219	458.857	0,12
ESENYURT	75.985	686.968	0,11
EYÜP	116.780	367.824	0,32
FATİH	377.929	419.266	0,90
GAZİSOMANPAŞA	56.897	498.120	0,11
GÜNGÖREN	47.546	303.371	0,16
KADIKÖY	65.803	482.571	0,14
KAĞITHANE	67.923	432.230	0,16
KARTAL	130.983	450.498	0,29
KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE	131.104	748.398	0,18
MALTEPE	25.903	476.806	0,05
PENDİK	175.304	663.569	0,26
SANCAKTEPE	88.137	329.788	0,27
SARIYER	66.439	337.681	0,20
SİLİVRİ	77.471	161.165	0,48
SULTANBEYLİ	91.225	315.022	0,29
SULTANGAZİ	50.776	513.022	0,10
ŞİLE	43.013	32.823	1,31
ŞİŞLİ	49.100	272.380	0,18
TUZLA	81.882	221.620	0,37
ÜMRANİYE	139.622	674.131	0,21
ÜSKÜDAR	183.022	534.970	0,34
ZEYTİNBURNU	147.078	287.223	0,51
TOTAL	3.502.055	14.377.018	0,24

Table 24: Mosque and Masjid Areas and m²/person in Istanbul and Districts in 2017

COMPLIANCE STATUS OF THE PRESENT MOSQUE AREAS IN ISTANBUL AND 39 DISTRICTS BASED ON THE LEGISLATION IN FORCE			
DISTRICTS	Regulation Standard: 0.75 (m ² /person)		
	PRESENT SITUATION FOR 2017		
	Area (m ²)	Population	Area per Person (m ² /person)
ADALAR	6.514	14.907	0,44
ARNAVUTKÖY	189.557	261.655	0,72
ATAŞEHİR	151.620	423.372	0,36
AVCILAR	52.020	435.682	0,12
BAĞCILAR	148.983	748.483	0,20
BAHÇELİEVLER	106.502	598.454	0,18
BAKIRKÖY	65.118	222.370	0,29
BAŞAKŞEHİR	214.870	396.729	0,54
BAYRAMPAŞA	53.381	274.197	0,19
BEŞİKTAŞ	87.146	185.447	0,47
BEYKOZ	170.582	251.087	0,68
BEYLİKDÜZÜ	74.359	314.670	0,24
BEYOĞLU	151.098	236.606	0,64
BÜYÜKÇEKMECE	124.157	243.474	0,51
ÇATALCA	53.976	69.057	0,78
ÇEKMEKÖY	62.119	248.859	0,25
ESENLER	62.727	454.569	0,14
ESENYURT	160.683	846.492	0,19
EYÜP	174.666	381.114	0,46
FATİH	764.477	433.873	1,76
GAZİSOMANPAŞA	83.610	497.959	0,17
GÜNGÖREN	55.109	296.967	0,19
KADIKÖY	108.827	451.453	0,24
KAĞITHANE	107.540	442.694	0,24
KARTAL	156.239	463.433	0,34
KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE	186.127	770.393	0,24
MALTEPE	114.034	497.586	0,23
PENDİK	275.163	698.260	0,39
SANCAKTEPE	129.221	402.391	0,32
SARIYER	122.836	344.876	0,36
SİLİVRİ	97.107	180.524	0,54
SULTANBEYLİ	138.999	329.985	0,42
SULTANGAZİ	121.977	528.514	0,23
ŞİLE	78.954	35.131	2,25
ŞİŞLİ	79.383	274.196	0,29
TUZLA	113.312	252.923	0,45
ÜMRANİYE	209.285	699.901	0,30
ÜSKÜDAR	346.553	533.570	0,65
ZEYTİNBURNU	85.945	287.378	0,30
TOTAL	5.484.776	15.029.231	0,36

Firstly, when the data of 2003 are examined, it is seen in Table 22 that in 2003 the number of districts in Istanbul is 28 and the total population is 9.148.022. According to IMM data, the current situation analysis conducted in 2003 states that there are 2077 mosques and 172 masjids throughout the city. These religious facilities cover an area of 2.844.641 m². However, according to PRA data, only the number of mosques in Istanbul for the same year is 2787.

According to the current situation analysis in 2003, a total m²/person for mosques and masjids in Istanbul is 0,31 m². Table 22 shows that the highest religious facility area is located in Pendik district and it has the highest degree in terms of the sum of mosque and masjid areas with 309.110 m². In addition, among the 28 districts of Istanbul in 2003, Eminönü, which is located in the historical core, is first with 1,75 m²/person, Pendik is second with 0.81 m²/person and Sultanbeyli is third with 0.57 m²/person. The fact that Eminönü, which is a historical district, is followed by two districts with the date of being 1987, shows that the existence of religious facilities is important in the newly constructed places.

Another data set obtained from IMM is dated 2014. According to Table 23, the number of districts in Istanbul for 2014 is 39 and the total population is 14.377.018. When the religious facility information in the data set is grouped according to the type, it is seen that there are 2609 mosques and 178 masjids in the whole city for 2014. These religious facilities cover an area of 3.502.055 m² in total. However, according to PRA data, the number of mosques in Istanbul for the same year is 3269.

According to the 2014 current situation analysis, there are 0.24 m² of mosques and masjid areas per person in Istanbul. This decrease is also related to increasing the number of districts to 39 as of 2008. According to Table 23, it is understood that the highest mosque area is located in Fatih district and it has the highest degree in terms of the sum of mosque and masjid areas with 377.929 m². However, this situation is also related to the annulment of Eminönü district in 2008 and its inclusion in Fatih district. After Fatih, Üsküdar has the second highest religious facility area and Pendik has the third. This is normal since the districts of Fatih and Üsküdar are located in the

historical core. The fact that Pendik comes after these two districts, as mentioned before, shows the importance given to the existence of religious facilities in newly urbanized places.

Among the 39 districts of Istanbul in 2014, Şile ranks first with 1,31 m²/person, Fatih is second with 0,90 m²/person, Çatalca is third with 0.62 m²/person. In the previous data set, the religious facility area of Pendik district, which was 309.110 m², decreased to 175,304 m² in 2014. As it is known that there is no destruction of mosques or masjids to reduce the total area by half, the reason for this decrease is not understood.

When the 2017 data are analyzed according to Table 24, the number of districts in Istanbul is 39 and the total population is 15.029.231. IMM data do not include the number of mosques and masjids in the city for 2017. However, the total area of religious facilities is 5.484.776 m² for 2017. According to PRA data, there are 3403 mosques in Istanbul for the same year. According to the 2017 current situation analysis, there are 0.36 m²/person of mosques and masjid areas in Istanbul. With the increase of the number of districts from 28 in 2003 to 39 in 2008, this ratio decreased to 0.24 in 2014 and increased by 50% per person within 3 years in 2017. According to Table 24, it is understood that the highest religious facility area is located in Fatih with 764.477 m². After Fatih, Üsküdar has the second highest religious facility area and Pendik has the third. In addition, among 39 districts in Istanbul, Sile ranks first with 2.25 m²/person, Fatih is second with 2.76 m²/person, Çatalca is third with 0.78 m²/person in terms religious facility area in 2017.

It is a big problem that two different data do not match up with each other. The data of IMM, which is an important local government unit and which should have clear data on the units located in the urban space, and the data of PRA, which is the central administration unit and which should have clear data on mosques, are not equal. In order to ensure the reliability of the analyses, contact was made with the institutions, but no information was obtained to correct the data set. Therefore, both data types were included in the study as separate information.

As for the latest comments regarding this section, it is seen that the compliance with the standards determined by the legislation is tried to be ensured. However, within the standards set by the regulations, the reason for the increase in the square meters for the religious facility is not understood while all of the square meters related to all the other uses are decreased. Moreover, uses such as education facilities, health facilities, and recreation areas are more essential for the residents of a city, because these uses are common for every resident regardless of religious preferences.

With the arrangements made by the central government units under the control of political power, increasing the square meter per person of the religious facility areas can only be read as a move that will facilitate the ideological transformation of the space. The Republic of Turkey, according to Article 2 of the Constitution, is a democratic, secular and social law state. The fact that the most important structure in the spatial organization is the religious facility area, or even the mosque, which is the religious facility area of a certain sect of a certain religion, contradicts the state of secular, democratic and social law.

This situation also contradicts the principle of “realizing healthy and planned urbanization” which is defined as a duty assigned to the state by the provision of Article 23 of the Constitution. Healthy and planned urbanization is carried out in line with the planning and urbanism principles by considering the needs of every segment of society. However, in contradiction with the freedom of religion and conscience stipulated by Article 24 of the Constitution, the dynamics of urbanization have progressed in the last 25 years to reinforce the dominance of religious structures and spatial domination of Islam. The analysis and the data examined within the context of Chapter 5 are in line with this situation and the experiment in the next section is the final stage of the ongoing situation.

5.1.1.3.1. An Experiment: Construction of Mosque in Istanbul with Full Accordance with the Legislation

As mentioned in the previous parts of the thesis, RCSP, which is included in the current zoning legislation, contains regulations regarding mosque and masjid areas. The most important of these arrangements is the provision defined by Article 12. According to Article 12 of RCSP:

In the development plans, as a religious facility, the small mosque can be planned in the service impact area that should be reached on foot considering the distance of approximately 250 meters and the middle (neighborhood) mosque approximately 400 meters. Masjids can be built within a service area of approximately 150 meters according to the settled or mobile population.

In accordance with this regulation article, the spatial distribution of a mosque at 400 meters in the settlement areas of Istanbul will be tested. In this analysis, first of all, the settlement area of Istanbul was determined (Figure 27). Then, the distribution of the existing mosques within the settlement area of Istanbul is shown (Figure 28). Following the distribution of the existing mosques, settlement area of Istanbul was divided into 400-meter squares and it was thought that a mosque would be located in the center of a square. If there is a mosque in every 400 meters, the general view of the city will be as in Figure 29. The image in Figure 30, which is closer to the city center, was created because it is more legible.

As of 2018, the number of mosques in Istanbul is 3446. This number will be 6772 when the mosqueization in accordance with the regulation article is completed. This figure shows that the current legislation does not have a scientific basis. The distance between the two mosques defined by the regulation, which is 400 meters, is as short as the distance between the bus stops²⁰. Moreover, while the bus stop is an element used by all the inhabitants of the city, the mosque is an element used by a certain part of the urban residents. The fact that an urban element like a mosque is considered equal

²⁰ For the standards determined as a result of the studies carried out by Turkish Standards Institution in order to reach international standards in the transportation system, see also (Türk Standartları Enstitüsü 2011)

to a public transportation stop is an indication that it is determined with an attitude far from being scientific, and also against urbanism and planning principles. Even more, legislation article defines 400 meter distance for middle (neighborhood) mosques. However, there is another distance defined by the same regulation. Small mosques can be planned in the distance of approximately 250 meters. If mosqueization is realized in full accordance with legislation, there will be 17365 mosques in Istanbul. Therefore, the mosque density will be much higher than the 400 meter distanced mosqueization. Once again, it is understood that how the legislation provision is far from applicability and rationality.




Figure 27: Settlement area of Istanbul




Figure 28: Distribution of existing mosques on the settlement area of Istanbul

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Within the scope of the thesis, how the coalition of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism deals with social structure and urban space was examined and the effects of neoliberal Islamist conservative central and local policies on social structure and urban space were discussed. As a result of Islamist conservative policies in the urban area of Istanbul, increasing mosqueization was examined and as a result of the study, some findings were obtained.

The way the capitalist mode of production deals with urban space is in a state of constant change and transformation. In different periods of capitalism, the function of urban space in the capital accumulation process changes and transforms. Late capitalism can be defined as a period in which all social, political and economic structures fall under the influence of neoliberal ideology. While all social practices were commoditized, urban space became a priority commodity, and built environment production was the only driving force of the capital accumulation process. Cities are equipped with many projects at different scales, far from holistic planning approach. In this process, the state was in constant alliance with capital and in the neoliberal process, the intervention of capitalism in the cities was much more destructive. In short, cities have been transformed into a means of creating resources for capital. In the neoliberal period, the urban space became not only the place where labor was exploited, but also the object of the surplus of production.

Urban space had another feature in the neoliberal period. It is used by the power in order to dominate and consolidate its ideology. Since the governments that implement neoliberal policies are also conservative, urban space is equipped with structures and symbols representing conservatism. It is seen that these two concepts, which are thought to be quite different from each other, have been acting within the coalition since the mid-1970s. Open, competitive and unregulated markets brought by neoliberalism have been quite effective on urbanization of Turkey and Islamist referenced parties became the implementers of neoliberal Islamist conservative policies by winning local administrations.

While this administration approach supports the Islamist conservative capital through the construction sector, it also aims to achieve spatial and social transformation by using Islamic signs and symbols. All kinds of inequality and devastation created by capitalism through neoliberal policies are presented in a way that is acceptable in conservative perspective and neoliberalism has used conservatism effectively in producing social consent.

The concept of private property on which neoliberalism is based has become the most important part of this coalition, as it is the most important element of conservatism that reinforces the existence of the individual in social life. Increasing privatizations, declining publicity, and increasing private ownership promoted by neoliberal policies were supported by the conservative perspective.

The neoliberal Islamist conservative structure has benefited from many different elements to maintain and consolidate its existence. Religionization policies and practices based on the “one religion-one sectarian” approach became more effective day by day. It is seen that the importance given to Islamist conservatism through religious education, religious services, and religious structures in 1980-2000 period has reached a different dimension in the post-2000 period. The discourses and actions related to religion and conservatism have increased and the religionization and the spatial expansion of religionization have increased. These regulations shaped space, and social structure is shaped through space.

Religionization and Islamist conservatization are reinforced by many different policies produced in many different fields. Legitimizing the relationship between Islam and capitalism became possible with religious references. In addition, many companies have increased their economic capacity in order to benefit from the profit and market opportunities provided by the increasing construction sector throughout the country. Even the identity of the capital groups has shifted to a conservative line.

Moreover, the cooperation of the public institutions with religious foundations and associations stands out as another important point. While no association, foundation, community or sect should be associated with the public services, the structures known to have Islamic references and known to be close to the power have had a great number of concessions in the field of national education and have partnered with the state.

The neoliberal Islamist conservative ideology has seen urban space as an area of capital accumulation, and therefore chose the centralization as a strategy as well as giving importance to the construction sector. The legal and physical arrangements concerning the urban space with the changing contents and devices have transformed the urban space and everyday life and supported the coalition of neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism.

The neoliberal Islamist conservative structure has also effectively used space to stabilize and consolidate its existence. Mosques are the most important urban elements of the 2000s used by Islamist political power in everyday life to establish dominance and to make its presence visible physically. The mosques went beyond being just urban equipment during the 2000s and turned into structures used in the consolidation and expansion of Islamist conservatism. In the past 17 years mosqueization rate in Turkey shows very clearly that the mosque has become a tool to reinforce the presence of political Islam through urban space. Mosques are also used as a tool to underline the opposition of modern life brought by the Republic and to make certain references to the pre-Republic period.

Beyond the representation of Islamist conservative ideology in space, the use of the mosque as an ideological device took place at different scales in this period. Iconic mosques with high visibility built in many cities of Turkey, and these mosques took their place in the urban area as powerful symbols of conservative ideology. It is seen that the visibility and the size of the mosque are beyond the functionality and accessibility of the mosque. Because mosques are used as structures that symbolize oppression and domination.

In addition, religious buildings are not only used as mosques, but are also built to accommodate many different uses under the name of the Complex. Even in the university campuses, mosques are built. The fact that educational life, social life, and public activities are under the influence of religious structure can be read as the harsh intervention of conservative ideology in daily life.

To conclude, it is seen that in the post-2000 period, the mosque has been used in many different ways in order to increase the visibility of Islamist conservatism in the urban area and to make it dominant in the ideological sense. Space was reorganized by the power to strengthen the Islamist conservatism. Everyday life and urban spatial organization had a character in which the mosque was prioritized. The mosque is now transformed into a symbol with the power of Islamist conservatism and it is used to make the political Islam visible, popular and consolidated.

The review of the current legislation on mosques includes findings on the legal legislation that underpins the city planning discipline. It is seen that the provisions of the legislation are not prepared from a rational or scientific point of view. While each article of the zoning legislation is expected to be arranged in a way that suggests a livable, healthy environment, taking into account the needs of different groups in the city, and taking decisions determined through analysis and synthesis processes, the items examined within the scope of the thesis show that these arrangements are formed with an understanding far from a scientific approach supported with urbanism principles.

With the arrangements made by the central government units under the control of political power, arrangements related to religious facility areas can only be read as a move that will facilitate the ideological transformation of the space. The Republic of Turkey, according to Article 2 of the Constitution, is a democratic, secular and social law state. The fact that the most important structure in the spatial organization is the religious facility area, or even the mosque, which is the religious facility area of a certain sect of a certain religion, contradicts the state of secular, democratic and social law. In addition to be a case of domination, it is exclusive and discriminatory.

This situation also contradicts the principle of “realizing healthy and planned urbanization” which is defined as a duty assigned to the state by the provision of Article 23 of the Constitution. Healthy and planned urbanization is carried out in line with the planning and urbanism principles by considering the needs of every segment of society. However, in contradiction with the freedom of religion and conscience stipulated by Article 24 of the Constitution, the dynamics of urbanization have progressed in the last 25 years to reinforce the dominance of religious structures and spatial domination of Sunni Islam.

Another issue that should be mentioned at this point is that, with Article 7 of Law numbered 6360 dated 12.11.2012, Article 7 (n) of the Metropolitan Municipality Law numbered 5216 has been amended. After this amendment, local administrations are authorized to build mosques, as well as to build buildings for health, education and cultural services and to be responsible for public buildings. This arrangement, which was the first in nearly 170 years of zoning history, is more than giving new responsibility to local governments. At the point where Islamist policies have come today, building a mosque has become a public task while it should be a civil initiative. This situation is contrary to the Constitution for Turkey which is a secular and democratic state.

The studies carried out within the scope of the thesis show that both central and local government units cause urban planning to be a fragmentary and parcel-based process. The decisions of the upper scale plan are ignored for such interventions and the urban

space is shaped in line with the demand and interest of certain groups. However, planning activities should be carried out from a perspective that covers the whole city and prioritizes public interest.

In this process, where urban space is produced/reproduced/consumed in such an unfair and anti-democratic way, space also includes the imposition of ideology and religion. Therefore, it is seen that space is an area where unequal power relations in society are placed and melted in daily life and in this respect space is political. Therefore, space should be considered as a field of struggle. It is clear that this struggle will not rise over existing contradictions and inequalities. However, these contradictions and inequalities should be taken as a ground for fair, equal and inclusive cities to emerge. Within further studies, countries that have the same constitutional status as Turkey can be examined in terms of the implementations related to places of worship.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Modern dünyada şehirler çelişkilerin ve eşitsizliklerin en belirgin olduğu alanlardır. Sınıflar arasındaki çatışma sadece kentsel mekanda meydana gelmez, aynı zamanda kentsel mekânın kendisi de bu çatışmanın konusudur. Mekân üzerinde egemenlik bir güç mücadelesini gerektirir. Her güç, mekân üzerinde hakimiyet kurmaya yönelik bir stratejiye sahiptir. Gücünü ve kalıcılığını korumayı amaçlayan her sosyal grup için mekân üzerinde kontrol oluşturmak çok önemlidir. Başka bir deyişle, her güç mücadelesi aynı zamanda mekân üzerinde kontrol sahibi olma mücadelesidir. Bu anlamda, kentsel alan kapitalizmin bugün ulaştığı noktada belirleyici bir role sahiptir. 1970'lerden başlayarak kapitalizm, neoliberalizm adı altında yeni bir ekonomi ve üretim modelini benimsemiştir ve bu yeni model, kentsel alanda radikal değişiklikler ve dönüşümler getirmiştir. Buna göre, Lefebvre, kapitalizmin başarısının mekânı keşfetmesine bağlı olduğunu belirtir (Lefebvre 1976). Mekân, bu anlamda, neoliberalizmin kentleşmesinde ve neoliberalizmin sürdürülebilirliğinde kilit bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır.

Mekânın güç ilişkileri açısından sahip olduğu bu kilit rolün yanı sıra, kentsel alanın birikim krizine çözüm sağlayan özelliklerinden biri de “rant” ve “kar kaynağı” haline gelmesidir ve bu durum kentin kendisini neoliberal politikaları benimseyen sermaye sınıfının odağı yapmaktadır. Ayrıca, yeniden yapılaşmış alan ideolojik bir amaca da sahiptir. Kısmen toplumdaki güç gruplarının ve kurumların mevcut ideolojisini,

kısmen de piyasa güçlerini yansıtır. Kamusalılığı temsil eden simge ve semboller yerine, sermaye sınıfı mekanı sınıfına ve ideolojik köklerine atıfta bulunan unsurlarla doldurur. Bu bağlamda, neoliberalizmin diğer ideolojilerle işbirliği yapma eğiliminin yüksek olduğu belirtilmelidir.

Bu bağlamda, Lefebvre'ye göre, mekan üretim ilişkilerini ve yeniden üretimin toplumsal ilişkilerini içermektedir. Lefebvre'ye göre, mekan toplumsal bir üründür ve her üretim biçimi kendi mekanını üretmektedir. Böylece, mekanın üretim sürecinde yaratılan yeni mekanlar aynı zamanda yeni toplumsal ilişkiler ve yapılar oluşturmaktadır. Lefebvre kent mekanının farklı sosyal sistemlerde farklı biçimler aldığını belirtir. Kapitalizm, mekan üretiminde, kendi temsillerini yapıları bir çevre aracılığıyla inşa etmektedir.

Özellikle 20. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde, ekonomik alanda neoliberalizm tarafından savunulan ve sosyal alanda muhafazakarlık tarafından savunulan Yeni Sağ, bu iki farklı ideolojinin kolektif olarak gelişmesine yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda muhafazakarlık, neoliberalizmin ekonomik alandan aldığı devlet iktidarına ve müdahalesine cevaben sosyal alanda aile, din ve sosyal disiplinin öne çıkmasını sağlamıştır. Neoliberal dönemde, devletin müdahalesinin azalmasından kaynaklanan kriz, dini uygulamalarla bir avantaja dönüştürülmüştür. Kentlerde yükselen dini hareketlerin neoliberal dönemle yakın bir ilişkisi vardır, çünkü neoliberal politikalar sebebiyle ortaya çıkan eşitsiz kentsel hizmet sunumu dini hareketlerin görünür olmasına ve artmasına fırsat doğurmuştur. Bu anlamda neoliberalizmle ortaklık içerisinde olan muhafazakarlık, siyasal yapıyı toplumla birlikte değiştirmeye öncelik vermektedir. Toplumsal yaşamın şekillendirilmesinde etkili olan her unsur muhafazakarlık açısından da önemlidir. Bu unsurlar arasında ise din oldukça önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Durağanlık ve kontrolü arayan muhafazakar ideoloji için din, değişen dünyanın değişmeyen ahlaki kanunudur. Dinin yanı sıra ahlak ve sosyal değerler, muhafazakar söylemleri olan neoliberal hükümetlerin politikalarını meşrulaştırmak için sıklıkla kullandıkları araçlardır.

Türkiye’de Cumhuriyetin ilanıyla birlikte eşitlikçi ve akılcı politikalar izlenerek 1930'lardan başlayarak devletçi politikalar uygulamaya koyulmuştur. Ancak, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Türkiye’de Batı Blok’unun müdahaleleriyle serbest piyasa politikalarına geçiş başlamıştır. Emperyalist ülkelerin Türkiye, İran, Afganistan gibi ülkelerde dini gruplar, dini politikacılar ve cemaatlerin işbirliğiyle hayata geçirdiği “Yeşil Kuşak” projesi ile Orta Doğu ülkelerinde “İlimli İslam” hayata geçirilmiştir.

Türkiye’de İlimli İslam’ı kalıcılaştırmaya yönelik olarak hamleler 1950'lerden başlayarak birçok farklı şekilde uygulamaya koyulmuştur. Bunlardan en önemlileri İmam Hatip okullarının açılması, darbeler, dini cemaatlerle ilişki içerisinde olan politikacılar ve siyasi partilerdir. Dindarlık, dini ve kontrol edilebilir bir toplum oluşturmak için emperyal güçler tarafından etkili bir şekilde kullanılmıştır. 1950'lerde uygulanmaya başlayan İlimli İslam politikaları, laik politikaları etkisiz hale getirmek için sağ iktidarlar tarafından kademeli olarak kullanılmış ve İslamcı muhafazakarlık, 1970'lerden itibaren giderek güçlenmiştir. 2000'lerin ardından AKP’nin kurulmasıyla birlikte neoliberalizmle birleşen İslamcı muhafazakarlık, en etkili olduğu dönemine girmiştir. Dahası, 2000'lerden sonra, İlimli İslam'ın yerini kapsamlı İslamcılık almıştır.

1970'ten sonra gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde ortaya çıkan ekonomik bir tutum olan neoliberalizm Türkiye’de 1980'lerde Anavatan Partisi döneminde etkili bir şekilde uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. 2000'li yılların başından başlayarak AKP döneminde, sosyal yaşamın tüm alanlarına hızla yayılarak egemen politika haline gelmiştir. İslamcı bir muhafazakar siyasi parti olarak, AKP neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar politikaların uygulayıcısı olmuştur ve bu iki güçlendirici kavramı kullanarak iktidara geldiği günden itibaren varlığını güçlendirmiştir. Yaklaşık 17 yıldır devam eden AKP iktidarı, toplumsal yapıyı neoliberal politikalarla uyumlu İslamcı muhafazakar politikalarla şekillendirme gayretinde olmuştur. Bu noktada, AKP muhafazakârlığının Sünni İslamcı olduğunu ve toplumun tüm kesimlerini kapsamadığı gibi İslam'ın tüm mezheplerini de kapsamadığını belirtmekte fayda var. Demokratik, kapsayıcı ve uzlaşmacı bir siyasi söylemle yola çıkan AKP, gün geçtikçe daha otoriter, ayrımcı ve

İslamcı bir çizgide ilerlemiş ve toplumun farklı kesimlerini tamamen görmezden gelen bir noktaya ulaşmıştır.

Türkiye'de neoliberal ekonomik politikaların AKP döneminde yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra, kentleşmenin, planlama disiplinin akılcı ve bilimsel uygulamaları yerine neoliberal politikaların getirdiği kar odaklı ve yatırım odaklı uygulamalarla gerçekleştiği görülmektedir. AKP döneminde güç kazanan İslamcı muhafazakar sermaye grupları, kentleri şekillendirmede ve kentsel alandan kar elde etmekte hiç zorluk çekmemişlerdir. Neoliberal kentsel politikalarla birlikte İslamcı muhafazakârlığın da bu dönemde kentsel alanı şekillendirmede büyük etkisi olmuştur. Türkiye'nin kentlerinde ve toplumsal yaşamında sert muhafazakar müdahaleler gözlemlenmiştir. Devlet tarafından belli sermaye grupları için yaratılan fırsatlara ek olarak, sosyal yaşamda ve sosyal yapıda dinselleşme artmıştır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Sünni İslam odaklı politikalarını arttırmış, oldukça aktif bir kamu kurumu haline gelmiş ve toplumsal yapıya yönelik İslamcı dönüşüm, milli eğitim sisteminde yapılan değişikliklerle desteklenmiştir. Kentsel alanda en dikkat çekici dinselleşme hareketi ise camilerle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Camiler, İslamcı siyasal iktidar tarafından gündelik hayatta egemenliği sağlamak ve varlığını fiziksel olarak görünür kılmak için kullanılan yapılara dönüşmüştür.

Sünni İslam'ın en önemli mekansal ögesi olan camiler, Türkiye'nin kentleşmesinde bu noktada incelemeye değer bir unsur olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Çünkü Türkiye kentleri, ihtiyaçtan bağımsız olarak, yoğun bir camileşmeye maruz kalmaktadır. Kentsel bir donatı olarak camiler, 2000'li yıllarda kentsel donatı olmanın ötesine geçerek Sünni İslamcı muhafazakârlığın konsolidasyonu ve genişlemesinde kullanılan yapılara dönüştürülmüştür. Türkiye'deki diğer şehirlerden bağımsız olarak, İstanbul ve Ankara, Refah Partisi yönetimi ile başlayan ve AKP yönetimleri ile devam eden 25 yıllık İslamcı yerel yönetim geçmişine sahiptir. Bu 25 yıllık dönemde söz konusu kentlerde mekansal, sosyal ve kültürel seviyelerde değişiklikler yapılmıştır ve İstanbul'un İslam kenti kimliği her söylemde ve eylemde vurgulanmıştır. Bu anlamda İstanbul, en çok cami inşaatının yapıldığı şehir olarak incelemeye değerdir. Ayrıca Türkiye'de,

Osmanlıcı ve Sünni İslamcı referansları olan her sosyal grup için İstanbul'un özel bir önemi vardır. Çünkü İstanbul, Türk milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılığın popüler tarih anlatımında vaat edilmiş topraklardır. Bu nedenle tez çalışması kapsamında camileşme açısından irdelemek adına İstanbul kentsel alanı belirlenmiştir.

Bu noktada, 1980'den sonra İslam'ın Türkiye'nin sosyal gündemindeki politik yükselişinin önemli bir yer tuttuğu ve bu konunun da mekan perspektifinden incelenmesinin önemli olduğu belirtilmelidir. Bu çalışmada, 1980 sonrası artan İslamcı muhafazakarlık, kentleşme politikaları ve mekan üretim süreçleri ile ilişkili olarak incelenmiştir. Çünkü 1980'den sonra Türkiye'nin kentleşmesi, mekan üzerinden sermaye biriktirmeyi amaçlayan bir kentleşme biçimidir ve aynı zamanda İslamcı muhafazakar ideolojiyi de mekansal olarak güçlendiren bir kentleşme biçimidir. Bu bağlamda tez, neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar politikalar bağlamında toplumsal yaşamın ve kentsel alanın nasıl değiştiğine odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, toplumsal yapıda İslamcı muhafazakar bir dönüşümü hedefleyen iktidar tarafından kentsel mekanın nasıl ele alındığı incelenmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, çalışmanın güvenilirliğini ve nesnellliğini sağlamak için farklı araştırma yöntemleri kullanılmıştır. Bunlar kısaca literatür taraması, kamu kurumlarından edinilen veri setlerinin incelenmesi, ilgili veri setleriyle mekansal analizlerin oluşturulabilmesi için GIS ortamının kullanılması, kamu kurumları tarafından askıda ilan edilen imar planlarının incelenmesi ve gazete ve haberlerin geriye dönük olarak taranmasıdır. Alan çalışması kapsamında ilk olarak İstanbul kentleşmesinde büyük öneme sahip olan iki kamu kurumu olan İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve İstanbul Valiliği Çevre ve Şehircilik İl Müdürlüğü tarafından son 5 yılda onaylanarak askıda ilan edilen imar planları incelenmiştir ve bu imar planları arasında cami öneren planların sayısı sorgulanmıştır. Ayrıca İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nden edinilen ibadet alanı donatı verilerinin yıllara göre değişimi ve mekansal olarak dağılımı incelenmiştir. Kent bütününe ait mekansal verilerin yalnızca mevcut duruma ait olması sebebiyle Pendik İlçe Müftülüğü'nden edinilen ilçe bütünü için ve farklı yıllara ait olan verilerle ilçe ölçeğinde camileşmenin mekansal analizleri yapılmıştır. Son olarak ilgili

mevzuatla belirlenen camileşme standartlarının bilimselliği ve uygulanabilirliği sorgulanmıştır.

Tez kapsamında 2. ve 3. Bölümler’de kuramsal tartışmalara yer verilmiş ve teze altlık oluşturacak kuramsal çerçeve belirlenmiştir. Buna göre 2. Bölüm’de neoliberalizm ve muhafazakarlık kavramlarının temel ilkeleri tartışılmış, daha sonra İslamcı muhafazakarlık için mekansal anlamda tartışmalar yürütülmüştür. Bu noktada geleneksel İslam kenti için en önemli kentsel mekansal öğenin cami olduğu görülmüştür. Ayrıca neoliberalizm ve muhafazakarlığın koalisyonu olarak adlandırılabilir Yeni Sağ ile ilgili aktarımlar da bu bölümde yer almaktadır. 3. Bölümde ise mekanın toplumsal önemini ve üretim biçimleriyle ilişkisini somutlaştırabilmek adına Lefebvre’in kavramsallaştırmalarına ve konseptlerine yer verilmiştir. Bu bölüm mekanın toplumsal yapıyla ve üretim biçimiyle olan ilişkisini anlamak, kapitalizmin mekan üretiminde, kendi temsillerini yapıyı bir çevre aracılığıyla inşa ettiğini görmek açısından önemli bulgular içermektedir.

Bu iki bölümde elde edilen bulgular doğrultusunda bir sonraki bölümde Türkiye kentleşmesinin neoliberal ve İslamcı muhafazakar yönleri ele alınmıştır. Tez kapsamında, neoliberalizm ve İslamcı muhafazakarlığın koalisyonunun sosyal yapı ve kentsel alanla nasıl ilgilendiği incelenerek neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar merkezi ve yerel politikaların sosyal yapı ve kentsel mekan üzerindeki etkileri ele alınmıştır. İstanbul’un kentsel alanındaki İslamcı muhafazakar politikalar sonucunda artan camileşme incelenmiş ve çalışma sonucunda bazı bulgular elde edilmiştir.

Kapitalist üretim tarzının kentsel mekanla ilgilenme şekli sürekli değişim ve dönüşüm halindedir. Kapitalizmin farklı dönemlerinde, kentsel mekanın sermaye birikimi sürecindeki işlevi değişir ve dönüşür. Geç kapitalizm, tüm sosyal, politik ve ekonomik yapıların neoliberal ideolojinin etkisi altına girdiği bir dönem olarak tanımlanabilir. Tüm kamusal alanlar metalaştırılırken, kentsel alan öncelikli bir meta haline gelmiş ve yapılaşmış çevre üretimi sermaye birikimi sürecinin tek itici gücü olmuştur. Şehirler, bütünsel planlama yaklaşımından uzak, farklı ölçeklerde birçok proje ile donatılmıştır. Bu süreçte devlet, sermaye ile sürekli ittifakta olmuş ve neoliberal süreçte,

kapitalizmin şehirlere müdahalesi çok daha yıkıcı bir boyuta ulaşmıştır. Kısacası, şehirler sermaye için kaynak yaratma araçlarına dönüştürülmüştür. Neoliberal dönemde, kentsel alan yalnızca emeğin sömürüldüğü yer olarak kalmamış, aynı zamanda kamusalıkların ve doğal kaynakların da sert bir biçimde sermayeye konu edildiği yer haline gelmiştir.

Neoliberal dönemde kentsel mekanın bir başka özelliği daha vardır. Kentsel mekan iktidar tarafından kendi ideolojisini baskın kılmak ve kalıcılaştırmak için kullanılmaktadır. Dünya genelinde neoliberal politikaları uygulayan hükümetler aynı zamanda muhafazakar karakterde olduğu için, kentleşme süreçleri devam eden ülkelerde kentsel alanda muhafazakarlığı temsil eden yapılar ve semboller artmıştır. Birbirinden oldukça farklı olduğu düşünülen bu iki kavramın 1970'lerin ortasından beri koalisyon içinde hareket ettiği görülmektedir. Neoliberalizmin getirdiği açık, rekabetçi ve kontrolsüz pazarlar, Türkiye'nin kentleşmesinde oldukça etkili olmuş ve İslamcı referanslara sahip siyasi partiler yerel yönetimleri kazanarak neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar politikaların uygulayıcısı olmuştur. Bu yönetim yaklaşımı, inşaat sektörü yoluyla İslamcı muhafazakar sermayeyi desteklerken, İslami yapı ve sembolleri kullanarak mekansal ve sosyal dönüşümü sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Kapitalizmin neoliberal politikalarla yarattığı her türlü eşitsizlik ve yıkım muhafazakar bakış açısıyla kabul edilebilir bir biçimde sunulmakta ve neoliberalizm muhafazakarlığı toplumsal rıza üretiminde etkin bir şekilde kullanmaktadır.

Neoliberalizmin dayandığı özel mülkiyet kavramı, bireyin sosyal yaşamdaki varlığını pekiştiren en önemli muhafazakârlık unsuru olduğu için bu koalisyonun en önemli parçası haline gelmiştir. Özelleştirmelerin artırılması, kamusalıkların azaltılması ve özel mülkiyetin desteklenmesi gibi neoliberal politikalar muhafazakar bakış açısıyla desteklenmiştir. Ayrıca neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar yapı, varlığını korumak ve pekiştirmek için birçok farklı unsurdan yararlanmıştır. “Tek din – tek mezhep” yaklaşımına dayanan dinselleşme politikaları ve uygulamaları gün geçtikçe daha etkili hale gelmiştir. 1980-2000 döneminde din eğitimi, dini hizmetler ve dini yapılar yoluyla İslamcı muhafazakarlığa verilen önemin 2000 sonrası dönemde çok daha etkin

bir boyuta ulaştığı görülmektedir. Din ve muhafazakarlık ile ilgili söylem ve eylemler artmış, dinselleşme ve dinselleşmenin mekansallaşması artmıştır. Bu düzenlemeler mekanı, mekan ise toplumsal yapıyı şekillendirmektedir.

Dinselleşme ve İslamcı muhafazakarlık, birçok farklı alanda üretilen birçok farklı politika ile pekiştirilmektedir. İslamiyet ile kapitalizm arasındaki ilişkiyi meşrulaştırmak dini referanslarla mümkün olmuştur. Ayrıca, pek çok şirket, büyüyen inşaat sektörünün ülke genelinde sağladığı kar ve pazar fırsatlarından yararlanmak için ekonomik kapasitelerini arttırmıştır. Sermaye gruplarının kimliği bile muhafazakar bir çizgiye kaymıştır. Dahası, kamu kurumlarının dini vakıflar ve dernekler ile işbirliği başka bir önemli nokta olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Hiçbir dini dernek, vakıf, topluluk veya cemaatin kamu hizmetleriyle ilişkilendirilmemesi gerekirken, İslami referanslara sahip olduğu ve iktidara yakın olduğu bilinen yapılara milli eğitim alanında çok sayıda imtiyaz tanınmakta ve devletle iş birliği yapmaları mümkün kılınmaktadır.

Neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar ideoloji, kentsel alanı sermaye birikimi alanı olarak görmüş ve bu nedenle merkezileşmeyi de bir strateji olarak seçmiş ve inşaat sektörüne önem vermiştir. Değişen içerik ve araçlarla kentsel alana ilişkin yasal ve fiziksel düzenlemeler yapılmış, bu sayede kentsel alan ve günlük yaşama müdahale kolaylaştırılmıştır. Neoliberal İslamcı muhafazakar yapı, varlığını kalıcı kılmak ve pekiştirmek için mekanı etkili bir şekilde kullanmıştır. Camiler, hakimiyet oluşturmak ve İslamcı muhafazakarlığın varlığını fiziksel olarak görünür kılmak için İslamcı siyasal iktidarın günlük yaşamda kullandığı 2000'lerin en önemli kentsel unsurlarıdır. Camiler 2000'li yıllarda kentsel donatı olmanın ötesine geçerek İslamcı muhafazakarlığın pekiştirilmesinde ve genişlemesinde kullanılan yapılara dönüşmüştür. Geçtiğimiz 17 yılda, Türkiye'deki camileşme oranı, açıkça caminin, siyasal İslam'ın varlığını kentsel alanda güçlendirmek için bir araç haline geldiğini göstermektedir. Camiler, Cumhuriyetin getirdiği modern yaşamın karşıtlığını vurgulamak ve Cumhuriyet öncesi döneme belirli atıflarda bulunmak için bir araç olarak da kullanılmaktadır.

İslamcı muhafazakar ideolojinin mekansal temsil aracı olmanın ötesinde, caminin ideolojik bir araç olarak kullanımı bu dönemde farklı ölçeklerde gerçekleşmiştir. Türkiye'nin pek çok şehrinde yüksek görünürlüğe sahip ikonik camiler inşa edilmiş ve bu camiler kentte muhafazakar ideolojinin güçlü sembolleri olarak yerlerini almışlardır. Caminin görünürlüğünün ve büyüklüğünün caminin işlevselliği ve erişilebilirliğinin ötesinde olduğu görülmektedir. Çünkü camiler, baskı ve tahakkümü sembolize eden yapılar olarak kullanılmaktadır. Ek olarak, dini yapılar sadece cami olarak kullanılmamakta, aynı zamanda Külliye adı altında birçok farklı kullanımı içerecek şekilde inşa edilmektedir. Bugün gelinen noktada üniversite kampüslerine dahi cami inşa edilmektedir. Eğitim hayatının, sosyal yaşamın ve kamu faaliyetlerinin dini yapının etkisinde olması, İslamcı muhafazakar ideolojinin günlük yaşamdaki sert müdahalesi olarak okunabilir.

Sonuç olarak, tez kapsamında yapılan analizler ve araştırmalar neticesinde 2000 sonrası dönemde caminin, İslamcı muhafazakarlığın kentsel alanda görünürlüğünü arttırmak ve ideolojik anlamda baskın hale getirmek için birçok farklı şekilde kullanıldığı görülmüştür. Mekan, İslamcı muhafazakarlığı güçlendirecek şekilde yeniden düzenlenmektedir. Gündelik hayat ve kentsel mekansal organizasyon caminin öncelik verildiği bir karaktere sahiptir. Artık cami, İslamcı muhafazakarlığın gücü ile bir sembole dönüşmüş, siyasal İslam'ı görünür, popüler ve kalıcı kılmak için kullanılan bir araç haline gelmiştir.

Camilerle ilgili mevcut mevzuatın gözden geçirilmesi, şehir planlama disiplininin temelini oluşturan yasal mevzuat ile ilgili bulguları içermektedir. Mevzuat hükümlerinin akılcı veya bilimsel yöntemlerle hazırlanmadığı görülmektedir. İmar mevzuatının her maddesinin, şehirdeki farklı grupların ihtiyaçları göz önünde bulundurularak, analiz ve sentez süreçleriyle belirlenen kararlar doğrultusunda, kentte dair öznel durumlar göz önünde bulundurularak yaşanabilir, sağlıklı bir çevre önerecek şekilde düzenlenmesi beklenirken imar mevzuatının tez kapsamında incelenen kısmı, bu düzenlemelerin şehircilik ilkeleriyle desteklenen bilimsel bir yaklaşımdan uzak bir anlayışla oluşturulduğunu göstermektedir.

Merkezi hükümet birimlerinin siyasi iktidarın etkisi altında oluşturduğu dini tesis alanlarıyla ilgili düzenlemeler ancak mekanın ideolojik dönüşümünü kolaylaştıracak hamleler olarak okunabilir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Anayasanın 2. maddesine göre, demokratik, laik ve sosyal bir hukuk devletidir. Mekansal örgütlenmedeki en önemli yapının dini tesis alanı, hatta belli bir dinin belli bir mezhebinin dini tesis alanı olan cami olması, laik, demokratik ve sosyal hukuk devleti ilkesi ile çelişmektedir. Bu durum tahakküm içermesinin yanı sıra, dışlayıcı ve ayrımcıdır.

Bu durum ayrıca, Anayasa'nın 23. maddesinin hükmü ile devlete verilen bir görev olarak tanımlanan “sağlıklı ve planlı kentleşmeyi gerçekleştirme” ilkesiyle de çelişmektedir. Sağlıklı ve planlı kentleşme, toplumun her kesiminin ihtiyaçlarını göz önünde bulundurarak planlama ve şehircilik ilkeleri doğrultusunda gerçekleştirilir. Ancak, Anayasanın 24. maddesinin öngördüğü din ve vicdan hürriyetine aykırı olarak, son 25 yılda kentleşme, dini yapıların baskınlığını ve Sünni İslam'ın mekânsal hâkimiyetini güçlendirmek yönünde ilerlemiştir.

Bu noktada belirtilmesi gereken bir diğer husus, 12.11.2012 tarihli 6360 sayılı Kanunun 7. Maddesi ile 5216 sayılı Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kanununun 7. maddesi (n) bendinin değiştirilmiş olmasıdır. Bu değişiklikle birlikte belediyelere sağlık, eğitim ve kültürel hizmetlerin yer alacağı binalar inşa etmenin ve kamu kurumlarına ait binalardan sorumlu olmanın yanı sıra cami inşa etme yetkisi verilmiştir. Türkiye'nin yaklaşık 170 yıllık imar tarihinde bir ilk olan bu düzenleme, yerel yönetimlere yeni bir sorumluluk vermekten daha fazlasıdır. İslamcı politikaların bugün geldiği noktada, cami inşa etmek sivil bir girişim olması gerekirken kamu görevi haline getirilmiştir. Bu durum laik ve demokratik bir devlet olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Anayasasına aykırıdır.

Ek olarak, tez kapsamında yürütülen çalışmalar, hem merkezi hem de yerel yönetim birimlerinin kentsel planlamanın parçalı ve parsel bazlı bir süreç olmasına neden olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu tür müdahaleler için üst ölçekli plan kararları göz ardı edilmekte ve kentsel alan, belirli grupların talebi ve ilgisine göre şekillendirilmektedir.

Halbuki planlama faaliyetleri tüm kentin ve kentlinin ihtiyaçlarını gözeten bir perspektifle kamu yararı öncelikli olarak yürütülmelidir.

Kentsel mekanın böylesine adil olmayan ve demokratik olmayan bir şekilde üretildiği/ /tüketildiği/yeniden üretildiği bu süreçte, mekan aynı zamanda hakim ideoloji ve dinin dayatmasını da içermektedir. Dolayısıyla mekanın toplumdaki eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinin yer aldığı ve gündelik hayat içerisinde eritildiği bir alan olduğu ve bu sebeple de politik olduğu görülmektedir. Bu nedenle, mekan çelişkiler ve eşitsizlikler içeren bir mücadele alanı olarak düşünülmalıdır. Bu çelişkiler ve eşitsizlikler, adil, eşit ve kapsayıcı şehirlerin ortaya çıkması için bir zemin olarak kullanılabilir.

APPENDIX B: THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Dağ

Adı / Name : Elif Simay

Bölümü / Department : Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce / English**) : Effects of Neoliberal
Islamist Conservative Policies on Urban Space: Mosques in Istanbul

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE : **Yüksek Lisans / Master** **Doktora / PhD**

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date