

FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: RECEP TAYYIP  
ERDOĐAN AND ANGELA MERKEL

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FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: RECEP TAYYIP  
ERDOĞAN AND ANGELA MERKEL

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## ABSTRACT

### FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN AND ANGELA MERKEL

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This thesis analyzes to highlight Erdoğan and Merkel's influence on foreign policy making vis-à-vis Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region. In this respect, a new political leadership model called SNA Leadership Model is developed to analyze two leaders' influence on foreign policy making in the selected case studies. Under this model, this thesis also highlight how background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel shape their approaches and behaviors. As a result of this holistic and multidimensional analysis, it is possible to conclude that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel have been prominent political figure in the Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region thanks to their foreign policy formulation their vision and values, which sourced from their countries' and personal background.

**Keywords:** Political Leadership, Foreign Policy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Angela Merkel, Syrian Refugee Crisi

## ÖZ

### DIŐ POLİTİKA VE SİYASAL LİDERLİK: RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĐAN VE ANGELA MERKEL

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Bu tez, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in Suriye Mülteci Krizi ve Batı Balkan bölgesi özelinde izlenen politikaların oluşmasındaki liderliklerinin etkisini araŐtırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, seçili vaka çalışmalarında iki liderin dış politika yapımına etkisini analiz etmek için SNA Liderlik Modeli adı verilen yeni bir siyasi liderlik modeli geliştirilmiştir. Bu model kapsamında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in geçmiş yaşantılarının yaklaşım ve davranışlarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini de içermektedir. Bu bütünsel ve çok boyutlu analiz sonucunda Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in kendi ülkelerinin ve kişisel geçmişlerinin de etkisiyle Suriye mülteci krizinde ve Batı Balkan bölgesinde önemli bir siyasi figür oldukları sonucuna varmak mümkündür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Siyasal Liderlik, Dış Politika, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Angela Merkel, Suriye Mülteci Krizi

*To My Mom Prof. Dr. Şefika Şule ERÇETİN who is source of love and power in  
our family...*

*To my sister Dr. Nihan POTAS who encouraged me endlessly...*



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi
BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMZ	The Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CSU	Christian Socialist Union
D-8	Eight Developing Countries
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DAESH	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
DEP	Demokrasi Partisi
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi
EC	European Council
EMU	European Monetary Union
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HADEP	Halkın Demokratik Partisi
İHL	İmam Hatip Liseleri
KFOR	The Kosovo Force
KfW	German Development Bank
LTA	Leadership Trait Analysis
MÇP	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi

MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi
MTTB	Milli Türk Talebe Birliđi
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PYD	Democratic Union Party
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
SEA	Single European Act
SEECF	The South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECF)
SEETO	South East Europe Transport Observatory
SFOR	The Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TIKA	Türk İşbirliđi ve Koordinasyon Başkanlıđı
TÜİK	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu
UÇK	Kosovo Kurtuluş Ordusu
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YEE	Yunus Emre Enstitüsü
YTB	Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlıđı

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, leadership was one of the most controversial areas of study and was the subject of a great amount of academic research. Both theorists and practitioners have invested a great deal of effort into analyzing the concept of leadership. These works contribute to the various approaches associated with leadership, while the definitions help to clarify what is meant by the word itself. Whereas, it is impossible to find a widely accepted definition of leadership in the literature. So, debates over definitions of leadership shape leadership literature. As well as the notion itself, approaches and types of leadership are very diverse which is limitation of this thesis. Among these types of leadership, political leadership is one of the controversial subfield both in political science and international relations. Although leaders have been quite a popular as a subject of analysis, it is quite skeptical as a subject of analysis in international relations which is undeniable actor of foreign policy making.

In different periods within the course of history, visibility and influence of leaders have been changed. The last two decades can be deemed as an era of strong political leaders in international relations. Amongst those leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel could be regarded as unique in terms of their background and leadership style. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan so called “Reis” or “Usta” in Turkey has been actively involved both in local and national politics since he was 17 years old. He was former mayor of Istanbul from the Refah (Welfare) Party and has won twelve elections in the last fifteen years with the AK Party which he founded himself. Also in the 2014 presidential election, he gained half of the votes to become president. It could be argued that he changed the political atmosphere in Turkish history in a way no one else has done.

On the other hand, Angela Merkel came from Eastern Germany and had a physics education background, which is quite rare for politics. After reunification, she was also very active in politics within the CDU, she worked as a Women and later Environment Minister in the Kohl cabinets and she was the first woman Chancellor of German history since 2005. Now she is called as a 'Mutti' (Mother) of Germany and the silent leader of Europe. Depend on the 2017 election of Germany; she is going to serve as a Chancellor in next four years. In the same way as leadership style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Angela Merkel's leadership has had a significant on German and Europe's history.

They are the only leaders in Europe who have served as a leader for more than ten years and they have also had to cope with regional and global crisis such as the Eurocrisis and Arab Spring. Also, they have been the most effective figures in their foreign policy making. While Angela Merkel was playing key role in the Eurocrisis, Erdoğan has been the main actor in regional crisis such as Arab Spring. Turkish and German foreign policies has experienced ups and downs, two leaders have been bold, unique and influential actors in world politics. There is no doubt, two leaders' background and long term support from their people make them unique subject to analyze. Therefore, subject matter of this thesis is role of their leadership and background in Turkish and German foreign policy in Syria refugee crisis and stabilization and harmonization of Western Balkan region.

### **1.1. Research Design**


This thesis is a consequence of an ambition to highlight Erdoğan and Merkel's influence on foreign policy making vis-à-vis Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region. As mentioned in the beginning, Erdoğan and Merkel are chosen as leaders in this thesis because they are the only long serving leader in the Europe which also bring limitation for the thesis because it is not possible cover everything in their reign. That's why, Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region are chosen as case studies. Firstly, Syrian refugee crisis is chosen because it is multifaceted, international crisis which two countries played an important role under lead by Erdoğan and Merkel where we can see their leadership under

pressure and complex crisis (Heisbourg, 2015; Turhan, 2018). Secondly, stabilization and harmonization of Western Balkan is chosen as a second case study because of two reasons which are Syrian refugee crisis prevail that stability of the Western Balkan is one of the vital region for both countries and Western Balkan as a region has common ground zone for Turkey and German regarding security (Tahirovic, 2014; Reka, 2018).

Thus, the research question is:

**How leadership and background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel affect foreign policy making through selected case studies of Syrian Refugee crisis and Western Balkan policies?**

This research question overlaps with different questions such as the following; how leaders' background shapes their leadership approach and behavior? how does leaders' background embody their foreign policy making?



*Figure 1.* Research Design

In order to understand outline of the thesis structure which will be given in the below, it should be emphasized that this thesis is not comparative leadership studies. Different geography, historical background, political systems and political culture are encountered as main difficulties to compare political leaders (Lijphart, 1971). Also, leaders do not impact the foreign policy behavior of their state equally under all circumstances create hinder to compare two distinct leaders (Breuning, 2007). In other words, specific circumstances bring specific options for them to shape their foreign policy uniquely.

*The second chapter* after the introduction discusses how the notion of political leadership has been changed through centuries. Within the political leadership literature, there will be discussion of Ibn Khaldun, Machiavellian, Weberian and Carlyle approaches as traditional approaches, then contemporary literature would be given in five categories. Then, there would be touched upon political leadership and foreign policy literature. In the last part of Chapter 2, as a unique feature of the thesis, there would be SNA (Suay Nilhan Acikalin) Leadership Model developed by myself as a new framework to analyze leadership style of Erdoğan and Merkel. This model is composed of four dimensions, which are contextual background of leaders' country, background of the leader, approaches and behaviors of the political leaders and reflections of background of leader on foreign policy making which will be examined detailed way in Chapter 2. In order to seek answer of research question, following chapters are designed depend on SNA Leadership Model dimensions.

*The third chapter* is contextual background of two countries as given in the SNA Leadership Model to understand social and political dynamics where leaders have been leading. The chapter starts with a comparison of the two countries legal system which includes modes of government, legislative, executive and the judiciary. There are both formal and informal constraints and dynamics of countries which play an important role in leaders' style and its reflection on foreign policy. Although Germany and Turkey shared similarities, they have a different structure of government as well as political culture that also explains the rationale behind the two leaders' relationship with their followers. In addition to this, the Chapter 3 also gives a snapshot of the world, region and two countries circumstances between 90s till 2000s when two leaders arose as a leader.

*Both fourth and fifth chapters* of the thesis composed of dimension two of SNA Leadership Model. As well as the contextual background of countries, mapping out not only personal life but also cornerstones in political lives are vital in SNA Leadership Model. As mentioned, biographies of leaders are second dimension of SNA Leadership Model however only background is not enough to understand how it affects their approaches and behaviors therefore each chapter will cease

with analysis of background with given approaches and behaviors in the third dimension of SNA Leadership Model.

That's why, the fourth chapter of the thesis is the biography of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from childhood until his presidency, which also discusses the unique characteristics of him such as powerful rhetoric and ideological development. It also highlights the cornerstone of his political career from his prison days to coup d'état in 2016 through to the domestic transformation of Turkey and foreign policy approach vis-à-vis perception of him by followers. In the last part of his biography, there will be analysis of their background how it mirrors to his approach and behaviors based on third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

*The fifth chapter* would be about Angela Merkel's leadership from childhood to Chancellery era. As well as Erdoğan's biography, Merkel's biography touches upon vital moments of her early life in East Germany which shapes her world view and political vision later. Political career in this chapter also give insights of German politics after reunification. Merkel's biography also discusses the transformation of German politics under a women leader in three coalition government since 2005. Like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's biography, Merkel's biography chapter will be ended up with how her perception has been changed through years. In the last part of her biography, there will be analysis of their background how it mirrors to her approach and behaviors based on third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. As mentioned in the research question, because of length of their leadership era, both leaders have experienced various domestic and international crisis and phenomenon through years. Therefore, it is not possible to grasp all international events in this thesis which is why, as a limitation, only two case studies are selected are the Syrian refugee crisis and the Western Balkan policies in order to examine how their leadership and background reflected foreign policy making of Erdoğan and Merkel.

*In chapter six*, there is an analysis of the Turkish and German foreign policy in the Syrian refugee crisis under Erdoğan and Merkel. Chapter will cover refugee crisis between 2011 and 2016 to analyze how two leaders reacted to crisis in different

time and space context. Chapter 6 also discusses how Erdoğan and Merkel mobilize “ansar” and “willkommenkultur” notions through foreign policy making. In addition to this, chapter also highlight background of Turkey-EU deal and role of two leaders. At the end of the Chapter 6, there will be analysis of leadership of Erdoğan and Merkel’s leadership in this crisis through the SNA Leadership model’s fourth dimension.

*Chapter seven* is about Turkish and German policies towards Western Balkan in Erdoğan and Merkel era. Western Balkan region has been always focal for Turkey and Germany in terms of history and security. There is no doubt, Syrian refugee crisis illuminated importance of the region once more for two leaders. That’s why, Chapter 7 will analyze their policies within four indicators which are: trade& investments, development aid, education and culture, military & defense, and regional initiatives. Giving the changing conditions of Western Balkan after the Syrian refugee crisis, there will be analysis of two leaders’ foreign policy in the region with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

*Chapter eight* is the conclusion will reexamine the chapters as a brief summary and discuss the answers to the research questions and sub questions that are discussed throughout the thesis in terms of the SNA Leadership Model.

## **1.2. Contribution of the Study**

This thesis aims to contribute to literature on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel under framework of both political leadership and role of political leaders in foreign policy literature by providing new political leadership model called the SNA Leadership Model.

The existing literature is analyzed in two categories:

1. Literature on discussion of political leaders and their foreign policy making
2. Literature on leadership of Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.



Firstly, literature of political leaders and their foreign policy making is very broad. The analysis of foreign policy decisions through the lens of the individual leaders is embedded in the interdisciplinary field of psychology, sociology and psychoanalysis. Scholars try to understand dynamics of personalities as case studies and what motivates them (Post, 2003). Development of the literature can be seen in both using qualitative and quantitative methods in the field. In the quantitative method, two approaches are dominated the field which are operational code and leadership trait analysis (George, 1969; Hermann & Milburn, 1977; Hermann, 1983, 2003; Hudson, 2005). Under these two competing approaches, there are various works to classify and compare leaders based on certain political beliefs and psychological traits as main dynamics in foreign policy making.

Leadership trait analysis and operational code have been widely used in literature. First of all, George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making” is one of the main works in operational code and how it theorise (1969). Another important study in this approach is ‘The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War’ by Walker (1977). More recent works in this area is using computer- coding system, are Marfleet and Miller, “Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council” (2005), Malici and Malici writes “The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors (2005) and Renshon’s article called Stability and change in belief systems: The operational code of George Bush (2008).

On the other hand, Margaret Hermann applies Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) to different leaders through the years. For example, Sub-Saharan leaders (1987), Hafez Al Assad of Syria (1988), Saddam Husein and Tony Blair (2003). In addition to this, different scholars preferably use LTA to analyse role of leaders in foreign policy making. Dyson makes analysis of Tony Blair’s Iraq Operation Decisions with LTA (2006) and also in other article Dyson compares different leaders’ choice on different cases which are Vietnam and Iraq (2007). Keller compare Kennedy and Reagan with LTA on foreign policy making (2005). As well as nation leaders, head of international organisations are subject of analysis in

the literature. For example, Kille and Scully analyse UN secretaries with LTA (2003). In addition to this, Turkish leaders are also analysed with Leadership Trait Analysis from Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Cuhadar et al., 2017; Ak, 2012; Kesgin, 2012, 2020).

In addition, different scholars such as Jerrold M. Post keep two competing approaches, a third and alternative method. In Post's (2005) book of "The psychological assessment of political leaders with profiles of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein" theoretical approaches and combined with an analysis of personality through trait analyses and an integrated personality approach with the case study of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein. However, this book also analyzes each leaders' profile and does not to suggest any comparison based on international events. In 2015, Jean Krasno and Sean La Pides edited a book named "Personality, Political Leadership and Decision Making" which includes twenty-one leaders as case studies. Each case study examines personality and how it impacts on decision-making process. This book also is considered as an example of the second category of my literature review because one of the chapters within the book is dedicated to Angela Merkel and how her background affects her decisions. Michel Brecher and his book "Political Leadership and Charisma: Nehru, Ben Gurion and other 20<sup>th</sup> century Political Leaders" is one of the recent books published in 2016 analysing Indian and Israeli leaders through comparisons between their countries.

Starting with literature on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership, there are almost thirty books on Erdoğan, which are mostly in Turkish. Bahadır Turk's "Muktedir-Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2014)" introduces a political portrait of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish right wing tradition through speech analyses of him. Yalçın Akdoğan concentrates on Erdoğan's leadership with Weber's charismatic leader approach in his book "Siyasi Liderlik ve Erdoğan (2017)", Hüseyin Besli and Ömer Özbay write "R. Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Liderin Doğuşu (2010)" about his biography embedded with his political manoeuvres. Also, Çiğdem Akyol wrote Erdoğan's biography in German book called as Die Biografie Erdoğan (2016). There is no authorized biography of Erdoğan however

different works written from different perspectives of authors. On other hand, English literature on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is highly limited. Metin Heper and Toktaş authored an article “Islam, modernity, and democracy in contemporary Turkey: The case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” also in 2013 Heper wrote Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a comparative work. Görener and Ucal pen an article “The personality and leadership style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: implications for Turkish foreign policy” focus how his personality and leadership weight on foreign policy decision making. Recently, a provocative article written by Şefika Şule Erçetin and Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın called “Is President Erdoğan really dictator? The Illusion of the Opposition Parties in Turkey” analyzes the different definitions of dictatorship and tested whether Erdoğan’s leadership is a dictatorship or not. Also, Erçetin wrote an “Understanding Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkey with Plasma Metaphor of the Fourth State of Matter” uses plasma leadership as a theoretical framework in order to understand his unique leadership. Harun Aras writes a master thesis called “The leadership phenomenon in Turkish and Russian foreign policies: The comparison of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin” which explore dynamics of foreign policy making based on three criterias which are to cope with reaction to political constraints, openness information and personal motivation (2015). Hande Oba writes a doctoral thesis “Operational Code Analysis of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through charismatic leadership property: European Union- Middle East” analyzes his foreign policy decision with operational code (2019). In addition to this, Soner Çagaptay has two recent books “The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the crisis of Modern Turkey” (2017) which narrates his biography and how they shaped Turkey’s future. Second book of Cagaptay is Erdoğan’s Empire: Turkey and Politics of Middle East analyzes Turkish foreign policy in Middle East under Erdoğan (2020). Therefore, literature on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can be considered as bounded by ideological bias where scientific work to analyse his leadership is limited. Also, it csn be said that Erdoğan’s leadership has been analyzed in different fields such as communication or sociology.

On the other hand, compared to literature on Erdoğan's leadership it can be said that English literature on Merkel is broader in scope. Firstly, there are different biographical books about her. Stefan Kornelius who is former advisor of Angela Merkel, author of the authorized biography "Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World" (2013) which is one of the most detailed book about her life and leadership style. Secondly, since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been an increase in the amount literature about her mainly discussing Merkel's leadership under the framework of women leadership and gender studies. Ferree analyzes Merkel's leadership through gender perception in his article called "Angela Merkel: What is it Mean to Run as a Woman" (2006). Sarah Elise Wiliarty who has been working on different dimensions of Angela Merkel and her leadership, writes about "Gender as a Modernising Force in the German CDU" to understand the dynamics of the CDU and influence of Merkel within the party in terms of gender equality (2013). Other literature mainly discusses how Chancellor Merkel shaped foreign and domestic policies including the Eurocrisis. Mushaben outlines how Angela Merkel changed the paradigms of German foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia, Europe and US in the article "Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and Triangulation of German Foreign Policy" (2009). Also Jonathan Olsen gives comparison for managing coalitions in his article "Leadership in Grand Coalitions: Comparing Angela Merkel and Kurt Georg Kiesinger" (2011). Crawford and Czuzcka take the Eurocrisis as a turmoil to test her leadership in their book "Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (2013)". Şuay Nilhan Açıklan write a thesis about her leadership in the Eurocrisis with chaos theory "Leadership in Chaos: Angela Merkel and the Eurocrisis (2015)". Lastly, one of the more recent books, "Angela Merkel: Europe's Most Influential Leader (2016)" written by Matthew Qvortup starts with her childhood years up to Ukranian crisis in order to provide a clear analysis about how her leadership was shaped and how her leadership influenced her decision making through different crises. As well as Erdoğan's leadership, her leadership has been analyzed in different fields such as communication and psychology.

Through analyzing the brief literature, two inferences should be mentioned. Firstly, although there is extensive literature about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they were

mostly written in the purpose of ideologically criticized or praised his leadership. In other words, there limited scientific attempts to understand his leadership and its reflection on his foreign policy making. On the other hand, literature related with Angela Merkel is more scientific such as analysis of her performance as a women leader or comparing with former Chancellors. As a common point of literature of two leaders' is analysis of their leadership vis á vis international event is highly limited. In addition to this, there is no work which analyse leadership of Merkel and Erdoğan depends on their foreign policies in relation to international events in the literature. So, although two leaders are long served leaders in the region, there is only limited and ideologically written literature about them. In this respect, this thesis brings both a new political leadership model and unique analysis of two leaders' foreign policy as a contribution to the field.

### **1.3. Methodology**

In terms of methodology, through this thesis qualitative interpretive research is kept with an inquiry process of understanding. Although definitions vary, the aims of qualitative research are generally directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world, by analyzing people's social and material conditions, their experiences, perspectives and background (Ritchie et al., 2013, p. 22). As well known, qualitative research covers a broad range of approaches, which are linked to different beliefs about what there is to know about the social world and how to find out about it. In this point, it should be noted that this thesis is not comparative studies between systems, countries and leaders. Descriptions and detailed information related with systems, countries and leaders are given as a background to understand dynamics of approaches, behaviours and reflections of leaders in foreign policy, which also constitute the main limitations of this thesis. Also, foreign policy making is quite complex process including different actors that's why this thesis only takes leaders as a centre of analysis.

Within those different approaches under qualitative research, the researcher in this thesis prefers to use interpretive qualitative research that does not start from a cause-and-effect, but rather engages with a very different type of puzzle that can

be described as an ontological (Lamont, 2015, p. 43). The interpretivists' approach to research, on the other hand, is marked by a continually evolving research design from beginning to the end. The interpretivists seek to describe many perceived realities that cannot be known a priori because they are space and time context. Thus, research will emerge through process. When perceived realities change, the research design adapts again (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988, p.513). In other words, interpretivists have bypassed many issues which main to the more conventional understandings that dominate quantitative research and various versions of qualitative research (Given, 2008, p.461). In interpretive research, the researcher is trying to understand what a thing 'is' by learning what it does, how particular people use it, in particular contexts. In other words, interpretive research focuses on context based meanings, rather than looking generalized meaning abstracted from particular contexts (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, p.23). In order to grasp the essence of context; interpretive approach provides a deep insight into "The complex world of lived experience from the perspective those who has been part of it" (Schwandt, 1994, p. 118).

This explains why collecting data for qualitative research is one of the priorities of this thesis. There are different tools to collect data for qualitative research: focus groups, interviews, Internet based research and archival & document (Lamont, 2015). In this thesis, descriptions, accounts, opinions are gathered through two tools, which are interviews and speeches, which are primary documents under archival and official documents. As the most important part within those tools is undoubtedly interviews. Author made interviews with selected people from Turkey and Germany including academicians, high level bureaucrats, politicians which vary depending on the content of chapters. Interview participants are Robin Alexander, Egemen Bağış, Ahmet Büyükgümüş, Ravza Kavakçı Kan, Prof.Dr. Lüdger Kühnhardt, Ozan Ceyhun, Mustafa Erkan, Josef Janning, Yavuz Selim Kıran, Stefan Kornelius, Paul Ziemiak, Wolf-Ruthard Born and Interview participant 1 and 2. All these interviews were done with permission of Middle East Technical University Applied Ethic Research Center.

Through these interviews, the researcher is aware of that there are interview multiple perceived and/or experienced social “realities” concerning what happened, rather than a singular truth or narrative. In this view, the researcher would assume that event narratives are varying based on the perspective and background of persons being interviewed (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, p.4). This reality also encourages researcher to ask different types of questions in the following as Janesick categorized (2014, p. 303).

1. Structural/paradigmatic

- Could you describe how to be ambassador work with two leaders?

2. Follow-up/clarifying

- Can you tell me what do you mean by Merkel’s wait and see policy?
- In one of your interview, you mentioned the importance of Turkey-EU deal after the 2015 refugee crisis to close Balkan Route. What do you think about this agreement?

3. Experience/example

- As a former chairman of the Junge Union, you had the chance to work with Chancellor Merkel. How would you assess her youth policies?

4. Comparison/contrast

- How would you see differences and similarities of Turkish and German foreign policy in Western Balkan region?

In addition to interview questions, to get clear data from person being interviewed, seven points in terms of ensuring validity in qualitative studies are considered that Joseph Maxwell emphasizes (2008, pp.244-245) which are intensive long-term (field) involvement, rich data, respondent validation, search for discrepant evidence and negative cases, triangulation, quasi-statistics. As touched upon before the interpretive qualitative approach suggests researcher do not see social realities as “scientific” in the conventional sense of that term. However, they emphasize the idea that research is a moral and practical activity that shares much in common with other forms of inquiry such as those practiced by ordinary people including the researcher in their day-to-day lives (Given, 2008, p. 459). In other

words, the interpretive researcher believes that researchers should drop their concerns about knowledge and research itself.

As Bryman mentions (2016) qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data and that predominantly emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. In this respect, it emphasis is placed on the generation of theories and rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular in preference for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world; and embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals' creation (2016, p.36). In this respect, as a unique feature of this thesis, the SNA (Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın) Leadership Model was developed as a new approach to analyze leaders' style and its consequence on foreign policy. The model is composed of approaches, behaviors and reflections on foreign policy making. Once more, it should be noted that this thesis doesn't aim to compare systems, countries and leaders. Whereas, with limitation of this thesis, explaining countries and leaders' background are only contextual information as a background for main aim of the thesis. Consequently, this thesis is a result of attempt to understand influence of two leader's style and background in Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan policies, which uniquely contribute to the literature in terms of analyzing scheme, content, methodology and discussion in the conclusion.



## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Leadership and politics are two nested notions. Since human beings started to live together as a society, problems governance of society have challenged humanity. How we can regulate society is the main question to push humanbeing to think more about different aspects of society. Also, this question triggered another, which is “who” lead people is the center of the study of politics (Wiatr, 1988). In other words, the notion of leadership has existed since the earliest times of humanity. Geography and culture have named leaders with different words such as Great Man, King or Sultan. The first known use of term of leadership was in 1821 (Kelly, 2014). As Bass (1990) suggests that the ‘study of leaders and leadership is contiguous with the rise of civilization (1990). The reasons why there are various of definitions and approach of leadership can be only explained by its nature which has been transformed, changed and even experienced evolution along with the development of humanity which produces its own notions, definitions and also institutions as a reflection. Thus, it should be accepted that political leadership is a **dynamic notion** that product of culture, time and space. Within this diversity of approaches of leadership, there are different tools to understand its dynamic however the most important difference of political leadership is embedded its nature. That’s why, it is not easy to develop generalizations with limited analytical frameworks to study political leadership. As Elcock (2001) suggests political leaders are, by contrast, *sui generis*. In this respect, each political leaders should be analyzed uniquely in their time and space context.

Interestingly, this nature of political leadership brings its own advantages and disadvantages for studying in a paradoxical way. While Elgie (2016) emphasizes diversification of epistemological and ontological literature, Bennister (2016)

claims that diversification makes political leadership more attractive for researchers, which provides different tools to use without setting priority. In addition to this, Bennister also suggests that the field of political leadership is highly challenging and fascinating where researchers can be creative in terms of methodology and choose different tools (2016). On the other hand, Hart and Rhodes (2014) define the field of political leadership as an astonishing and bewildering enterprise. They also discuss contradictions within the literature of political leadership through the years which are leaders-leadership, democrats-dictators, actors and context where they examine limitations of each contradictions and suggest that the field of political leadership is not about those contradictions. Political leadership has been studied in comparative and developmental manner between 1940s to 70s. Until the 2000s, the rise of constructivism, neo institutionalism and rationalism approaches in decision-making dominated the field. Hart and Rhodes called this situation as ‘lose of way’ for field in terms of subject and methodology (2014). In the last years, researchers have focused on leaders at an individual level and analyzed the political outcomes of their decisions.

As mentioned, political leadership literature has its own epistemological and ontological diversity which led to categorization of the literature into two which are traditional and contemporary. Thus, this chapter is going to explain the changing nature of the understanding of political leadership through the Ibn Khaldun (1377), Machiavelli (1513), Carlyle (1841) and Weber (1900) approach under traditional approaches. Then, there will be categorization of contemporary research on political leadership in terms of content. In the next part of the Chapter 2, there will be literature review of role of political leaders in foreign policy analysis. Lastly, the SNA Leadership Model would be introduced.

## **2.1. Traditional Approaches in Political Leadership**

### **2.1.1. Asabiyyah: Ibn Khaldun on Leadership**

Ibn Khaldun is one of the distinguished scholars who wrote a masterpiece on the fall and rise of power and society. He was born in 1332 then he received a

traditional education that was typical for his family's social status. Ibn Tafrakin, the ruler of Tunis called him to be the seal-bearer of his captive Sultan Abu Ishaq as an opportunity to experience politics. A few years later, in 1352, Abū Ziad, the Sultan of Constantine, marched into Tunisia and captured it. In 1362 he left for Granada, Spain where he became friendly with the rulers and scholars of Islamic Spain (Hozien, 2010).

Ibn Khaldun returned to North Africa where he later became the Chief Adviser to the throne. The appointment gave him enormous power, influence and authority. He also developed an interest in writing and composed several poems. Eventually he was appointed to the position of the Chief of Justice, a post in which he showed great ability. Ibn Khaldun spent his later years in Egypt and died on the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 1406 in Cairo. Through his life, he experienced uncertainty of politics; the fecklessness of rulers; the abrupt changes of fortune, the supremacy of the ideal in the constant, an unceasing search for ilm, knowledge, and therefore the ultimate triumph of the human will and intellect against all odds (Ahmad, 2004).

The concept of "*Ilm Al- Umran*" (the science of human social organization) and his influential work *Muqaddimah* is deemed as "the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place" (Toynbee, 1934). In order to understand leadership approach of Ibn Khaldun, his understanding of human nature, umran (civilization) and asabbiyah (group feelings) are key through discussing the development of societies because his approach to leadership and traits of leadership come with the question of why people need political leadership (Sidani, 2008).

Firstly, Ibn Khaldun (1974) suggests that man has an ability to develop and ascend: "The world of man is the most noble and exalted of the worlds of existent things" (p.355). Also, a man is different from other species with his perceptual ability to think through three levels which are the intellectual, experimental and speculative intellect. Most importantly, he suggests that human nature firstly pursues his/her basic necessities which generally led to animal tendencies which is why human beings need to restraining their influence and strong authority (Sidani, 2008). Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun claims that cooperation is a necessity when

leading great numbers of people therefore restraining influence is also a condition to achieve this. Secondly, Ibn Khaldun suggests that the history is not there just to tell what actually happened. We should focus on the “inner meaning” of historical events. In order to achieve this, Ibn Khaldun claims that social, political, economic, cultural and physical conditions which gave shape to “umran” (civilizations). He defines ‘Umran’ as follows, “Wherever people are interacting with each other, no matter on how limited a scale, there is umran. Umran would become more sophisticated due to its the division of labor. Thirdly, asabiyyah is the group feeling which Ibn Khaldun (1974) suggests that is the most vital element in his approach to leadership.

*Leadership exists only through superiority, and superiority only through group feeling. Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, derive from a group feeling that is superior to each individual group feeling. Each individual group feeling that becomes aware of the superiority of the group feeling of the leader is ready to obey and follow him.*

The word asabiyyah was generally used to define bonds through blood ties however Ibn Khaldun also mentions that there is no need to have blood ties to have a high degree of asabiyyah within the group of people. Any individual can have more than one asabiyyah with different groups. Ibn Khaldun clearly emphasizes that leadership could only exist with asabiyyah. In other words, Ibn Khaldun claims that leader-follower relations are vital for any leader. Although most scholars suggest that Machiavelli was the first thinker who defined personal qualities of leaders, before him Ibn Khaldun had offered personal qualities of leaders. He called those qualities perfecting details and summarized them as generosity, forgiveness of error, patience and perseverance, hospitality toward guests, maintenance of the indigent, execution of commitments and respect for the religious law (1974). Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun also emphasizes the differences between leader and royal authority which impose power to rule by force.

Actually in the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun didn't have intention to develop leadership model. He develops a leadership framework within dynamics of society and nations. Especially, it should be interpreted role of leaders and leadership through his cyclical theory of nations, which shows the fall and rise of nations.

That's why it has also implications for his conception leadership and also discusses the post leadership period. Emergence of leadership can be formulated as follows;

**Blood ties + clientship + alliances = Asabiyyah = Emergence of leadership (traits and behaviors of leaders)**

The emergence of leadership has expected outcomes as Ibn Khaldun mentions which are obedience and organizational stability for society. Also, the emergence of leadership process has an opposite effect. In other words, the disintegration of asabiyyah would lead to the destruction of leadership.

The importance of Ibn Khaldun work on nations and leadership has had a groundbreaking effect on contemporary leadership literature in terms of two respects. The first one is that Western scholars who are limited with similar culture and structure of society have produced almost all literature on leadership. However, Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah could be considered as a product of Muslim society is a unique contribution to literature in order to understand the role of religion and culture regarding the notion of leadership. Cultural and religious differences become more visible when it comes to analyzing how followers perceive leaders.

### **2.1.2. Prince of Machiavelli: The age of Great Man and Ultimate Power**

As Bell (2014) says that with Machiavelli political theory of leadership comes to maturity. There is no doubt that Machiavelli was one of the greatest thinkers, not only of his age, but also today. He was born on May 3, 1469, in Florence and came from wealthy and prominent family, occasionally holding some of Florence's most important offices. Niccolò Machiavelli was a diplomat for 14 years in Italy's Florentine Republic until the Medici family returned to power in 1512, after Machiavelli was dismissed and briefly jailed. He left a still remarkable and valid work of piece called 'The Prince'. Leadership is not only the focal point of this book however the characteristic of leadership and how leaders should keep his power have been articulated successfully within the narrative of the book. In other words, The Prince and The Discourses are normative books on what leaders

should do (Blondel, 1987). His approach to leadership in terms of power and relations make this book provocative and also controversial still today. In order to understand the contribution of Machiavelli on traditional leadership literature, there would be analysis of his position in terms of power, virtú and diplomacy, which were embedded in the political atmosphere of his age.

Machiavelli talked about power only in the political or social context. His position on power is quite different than scholars of his age who use the notion of power highly linked with moral capability of ruler. For Machiavelli, authority and power are different sides of the coin and he adds that political rulers should be concerned about staying in power. Depend on this; he defines power as a political activity, which every ruler should learn to use. He has quite a strong position where he suggests that any prince has to keep his power, through his famous words “End justifies the means” which is interpreted that it is plausible and correct for an individual to do anything to obtain a desirable outcome.

In addition to this, power is also the ultimate way of gaining the obedience of society. Machiavelli presents to his readers a vision of political rule purged of extraneous moralizing influences and is fully aware of the foundations of politics in the effective exercise of power. Machiavelli was not in the same camp as scholars who linked morality and power. He mentioned that The Prince should have specific qualities called as ‘virtú’ to stay in power which given in the Table 1.

Table 1  
*The Qualities of the Prince*

Liberal (with money)	Miserly
Generous	Rapacious
Cruel	Compassionate
Faithless	Faithful
Effeminate and cowardly	Bold and brave
Affable	Haughty
Lascivious	Chaste
Selfish	Caring
Hard	Easy
Grave	Frivolous
Religious	Unbelieving

Source: Machiavelli, 1965: 84–5.

As it's seen in the list of virtú, Machiavelli has a quite different position on moral issues and its relations with power. Even he suggests that a flexible disposition is the best for the Prince to survive within all circumstances so Machiavelli believes that a leader should have a different moral code.

*A prince must know how to make use of the nature of the beast, he should choose from among the beasts the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot defend itself from traps, while the fox cannot protect itself from the wolves. It is therefore necessary to be a fox, in order to recognize the traps, and a lion, in order to frighten the wolves (Machiavelli, 2008).*

Machiavelli also highlights a kind of dilemma within his own distinctive position regarding morality and virtue. He also advises a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary. On the other hand, he must be careful not to acquire the reputation of being a wicked man which will destroy his reputation (Machiavelli, 1998). It is not a simple contradiction because Machiavelli also claims that a prince should not only aim to stay in power but also have glory and win. Machiavelli puts forward an idea to overcome this contradiction as follows;

*It is desirable to be considered liberal; it is sensible to seem merciful and not cruel; it is essential in general to appear meritorious. The solution is thus to become a great simulator and dissimulator, learning the skill of 'cunningly confusing men' and making them believe in your presence (Machiavelli, 1998).*

Machiavelli also admits that to keep positive qualities as a virtú a prince should give them up when it is only necessary. In this respect, it is important to mention the notion of 'fortuna' to have depth to understand the relationship between the importance of power and virtú for any leader. For him, fortuna is the enemy of political stability and order. He makes a metaphorical reference to Fortuna as a river and said that it is "one of our destructive rivers which, when it is angry, turns the plains into lakes, throws down the trees and buildings" (Machiavelli, 1965). That's why, Machiavelli contends that the prince should seize and take advantage of what fortuna brings and ought to have foresight and minimize the negative influence of fortuna through virtú. In other words, this is what virtú provides: the ability to respond to fortune at any time and in any way that is necessary.

Diplomacy is the third dimension of Machiavelli and his approach to political leadership. For him diplomacy is embedded with art of war (Berridge et al., 2001). He says that states always have enough military power and until have it, they should be able to use deceptions, tricks and schemes. Even after they acquire powerful military power, diplomacy should remain as a powerful tool for leader. It is not surprise that he has been considered as the founder of diplomacy today. He was aware of the power of diplomacy as a former diplomat and defines it as essential for the state to maintain power and build a reputation on an international level. He also noted that foreign policy is directly linked to domestic policy. Furthermore, he suggests that any state should play a dual role for the security of the state. His suggestion is to be a fox and lion at the same time.

*Further, the ruler ... should make himself the leader and defender of his less powerful neighbors, and endeavor to weaken the stronger ones, and take care that they are not invaded by some foreigner no less powerful than himself (Machiavelli,1965).*

### **2.1.3. Thomas Carlyle and the Great Man Approach**

Thomas Carlyle was a Scottish writer, philosopher and historian. Carlyle was born in 1775 in Dumfriesshire, a rural area of Western Scotland. Carlyle, who has a very good educational background, became a teacher after graduating from Edinburgh University. After a few years, he returned to university. In fact, he was a historian however it should be noted that before the establishment of political science, there were historians and thinkers who contributed to political science literature (Bell, 2014). Thomas Carlyle has theorized that the past must provide for great men to guide the narrative of history. The Great Man of History occupies an important place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century historiography and philosophy (Talbot, 2017). The Great Man Theory suggests that certain people or men are placed on earth as a gift of God to provide the necessary lightening to improve the existence of humanity. In the spring of 1840, Thomas Carlyle gave a series of six public conferences on the role of the heroes in the history. The following year, these lessons were put together in a single volume book entitled "*On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History*", and the Great Man theory emerged.



**Lecture 1:** The Hero as Divinity: Odin. Paganism: Scandinavian Mythology

**Lecture 2:** The Hero as Prophet: Muhammed: Islam

**Lecture 3:** Hero as Poet: Dante; Shakespeare

**Lecture 4:** Hero as Priest: Luther, Reformation; Knox, Puritanism

**Lecture 5:** Hero as Man of Letters: Johnson, Rousseau, Burns

**Lecture 6:** Hero as King. Cromwell. Napoleon: Modern Revolutionist

For historians like Carlyle, history has a purpose. However, this goal can be realized by only great man. The great man or hero is the center of Carlyle's philosophy of history. In his words,

*The Commander over Men; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men. He is practically the summary for all of us of all the various figures of Heroism: Priest, Teacher, whatsoever of earthly or of spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to command over us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to do (1841).*

It should be noted that Thomas Carlyle's thesis was under the shadow of a revolutionary world especially French Revolution. Carlyle argues that great Man shaped history by the vision of their minds, the beauty of their arts, the supremacy of their leadership and, most importantly, by their divine inspiration (Eckmann, 2005). According to Carlyle, Great Man have become leaders for others. The history of mankind is the history of great men. In other words, everything obtained in the world is the result of the practical realization of Great Man sent to the world and the concretization of their thoughts. Carlyle (1841) states the situation in his book as below:

*...Universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modelers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history...*

This definition of Great Man by Carlyle can be considered as almost uncertain because Carlyle never mentioned the how a hero could be identified. However, at the same time he emphasized that a Great Man will emerge when there is a

necessity (Bell, 2014). In other words, the context gives birth to new leaders. In addition to this, Carlyle claims that ambition is not a good characteristic for a Great Man. In contrast, he believes that if anyone has exaggerated ambition it shows him as small not Great. He also analyses a series of studies of individual leaders including Cromwell and Napoleon Bonaparte. Carlyle comes up with two different comment about two leaders. For him, Cromwell is a charismatic leader and fits with his Great Man approach while, although Napoleon has important military victories but he is not a Great Man at all.

#### **2.1.4. Weber and Types of Leadership**

As mentioned before Machiavelli was not only the provocative author of *The Prince* but also a symbol of his age regarding power politics and history vis-à-vis the unification of Italy and conditions of Europe. Centuries later, Weber and his work on charisma and political leadership opened a new page in the literature of political leadership. Max Weber, who lived between the years between 1864 and 1920 is also important in order to understand his approach to notions within this political and historical atmosphere as he carried out a wide range of studies on history, economy, religion, politics and sociology. Weber, whose ideas are the source of inspiration for many studies, is among the leaders of sociology. Weber's views and concepts about, political power and leadership are among the milestones of the leadership literature (Weber, 2008). Weber's approach of political leadership would be explained through discussions over authority as a source of power and charisma.

##### **2.1.4.1. Authority and Power**

Weber discusses four types of social action and four key elements of a legitimate social order (Satow, 1975) and reveals the existence of three different types of legitimate authority and the existence of organized institutions in this framework (Weber, 1986). Table 2 summarizes Weber's typologies.

Table 2  
*Weber's Typology*

<b>Weber's Typology</b>		
<i>Social Action</i>	<i>Legitimacy</i>	<i>Authority</i>
Purposive-Rational	Legal	Rational - Legal
Traditional	Traditional	Traditional
Affectual	Affectual	Affectual
Value-Rational	Value-Rational	

Source: Satow, 1975.

For Weber, within those typologies authority is an interesting one, “Organized domination requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate power” (1986). That's why, Weber raised the question of why people accept those commands authority over them and suggests three types of authorities:

- *Traditional authority*: The legitimacy of authority comes from the established beliefs and traditions of society. This is generally seen in the society or institutions that depend on their traditions. In other words, traditional authority is based on the belief that the traditions and the legitimacy of those who hold authority in accordance with these traditions is venerable. “Domination that rests ... upon piety for what actually, allegedly or presumably has always existed” (Weber, 2009). In such a system, the masters appointed by the traditions are obeyed; not the laws. The legitimacy of the orders given by the masters depends on the fact that these orders are not against the traditions. Since the leaders are not chosen according to their competences, organizations are weak enough to ensure sustainable success. In this kind of authority, the general staff of the administrators and the administrative organization is composed of individuals who are faithfully tied to the manager, not the civil servants.
- *Legal-rational authority*: The source of authority comes from rationality and rules. Authorities are used in an organization according to the rules set. “the rule of general laws applying to all citizens of the state” (Weber, 2009). In addition to this, Weber claims that although bureaucratic rule was not, and is not, the only variety of legal authority but it is the purest one (2009). Within the

framework of these rules, the legitimacy of authority is accepted. In other words, if the validity of the power of command is based on the norms of rational rules valid for all there is a legal authority here. In such a system, those who use the power of command are legitimate as long as they act in accordance with rational rules. Those who are under the authority obey the rational rules, not those who hold the power of command.

- *Charismatic authority*: The source of this kind of authority is one's extraordinary individual characteristics, skills and abilities. Charismatic authority in essence, contains affectual action and mystery, not logic. Individuals with charismatic authority are people who have devoted their lives to a venerable purpose and who can lead societies through leadership. For Weber, charisma comes with extraordinary leaders who bring new and challenging solutions to social crisis and attract followers with those solutions. Followers should accept a leaders' authority with faith and loyalty (2009). Also he suggests that the "Extraordinary quality of a person, is.... regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged or presumed" (2009). Besides, they have superior qualifications compared to ordinary people. From a superficial point of view, a confused point is the belief that charismatic leaders must have certain and truly extraordinary characteristics. The important point here is to spread a firm belief in the populace that the charismatic leaders have extraordinary qualities. Every society creates charismatic leaders because of a certain environment prepared by historical, traditional and socio-economic conditions. There are similarities between the characteristics of charismatic leaders and the expectations, hopes, beliefs and tendencies of the members of the community living in a certain time and place.

## **2.2. Contemporary Research on Political Leadership**

Influence of traditional approaches on development of contemporary literature is mentioned by Bell as in the follows;

*Leadership studies the scene is more a limestone plateau than a river system making its way to the sea in well-defined channels. Thus, the various streams run with apparent force only to disappear and re-emerge in unexpected places and with renewed vigor, and then disappear again(2014).*

As is obvious from these words, although contemporary research on political leadership has a footprint of traditional approaches, the accumulation of knowledge has been diversified depend on their focus. For this reason, there will be overview of literature depending on the categorization as follows; **social, methodology, rhetoric, psychology and modeling.**

*Social:* Weber and his charismatic approach influenced the development of the societal aspect of political leadership literature. The category of societal approaches basically focuses on leaders and follower relations vis-à-vis the dynamics of society where a leader flourished. MacGregor Burns (2004) is one of the pioneering scholars in this category who defines political leadership based in the competing interests of society and in their transformation through a political resolution. Also, Burns emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the political leader and their followers, and the balance (or otherwise) of this relationship. He has two different types of political leadership called ‘transformational and transactional’ which are distinguished by their focus. Transactional leadership occurs when a leader engages in an exchange process with subordinates. On the other hand, definition of transformational leadership associates achieving goals in the long term with their followers (Burns, 1978).

Robert Tucker is another scholar who focuses on the societal aspect of leadership regarding the perception of leadership. He spawned a fresh definition of political science, which based on leadership rather than power which is why his view of political leaders is one who gives direction, meaningfully participating in the giving of directions to the activities of political community (1995). Tucker basically builds his political theory on leadership as follows “Politics in its essential nature is the leadership of a political community and all the activity, including participatory activity by citizens, that may enter into the process of leadership”(1995, p. xv). Couto summarizes his approach to political leadership step by step which are leaders must define collective problems, looking for support his/her collective problems, prescribing policies as solutions and finally designing actions and assigning responsibility (2010).

*Methodology:* As mentioned in the beginning, the field of leadership is quite blurred in terms of its limits and methodology. During the years, as well as other social science disciplines, mathematical and statistical methodologies have been introduced to political leadership. Bunce (1980) is one of the leading scholars who assess the impact of political leaders with statistical data. In his words, “My guiding concern, then, is not "who rules," but whether who rule matters in terms of government policy (p.373). He also aims to create similarities and deviations in order to make comparative studies across the leaders but also nations. In his work, Bunce takes leaders as a case study from USA and Soviet. He concentrates policy outcomes in shifting budgetary priorities as a dependent variable within different leaders because it being an important policy area for both East and West and easy to compare in numbers.

Blondel is another scholar who has intent on developing a systematic scheme for analysis of leadership through his books called ‘World Leaders’ (1980) and ‘Political Leadership’ (1987). For Blondel, there are a few indicators which can be applied to nations and range of political systems. In terms of empirical analysis, this work brings a new typology of political leaders depend on two dimensions: the extent of their concern with maintenance or change in the society and the scope of the political message they want to use in the political system. In Blondel’s edited last book called Political leadership, parties and citizens: the personalization of leadership (2010) engages with vital role of personalization of leadership. Rather than various environmental factors, they directly emphasize the personality of the leader, personal relations and the dynamism between political leader and followers. Different authors use different case studies in order to assess impact of personalized leadership within different countries such as Thatcher, Blair, Mitterand, Jacques Chirac, Le Pen, Berlusconi, Bossi, Wałęsa, Lepper, Koizumi and Thaksin. Their study shows that the relevance of personality in political leadership has increased during the last fifty years.

*Rhetoric:* The capability of persuasion of any leader is quite important. It has led to development of literature related with the methods of linguistics, communication and most importantly discourse analysis. Literature of rhetoric-

based contemporary political leadership generally developed in the US rather than Europe where parties seemed to have more influence than leaders. Max Atkinson's "Our Masters' Voices" focuses on the use of discourse and the analysis of symbolism in political leadership (1984). He defines various techniques to analyze audience and leader relations, which are applause and approval. In addition to this, he emphasizes the significance of speech making which is central to the politician's craft and an essential aspect of political leadership (Webley, 1986). Atkinson's this book and some works could be considered as the guiding book in terms of explaining techniques in the literature. Furthermore, John Gaffney also considers the image and style of leaders as an effective elements of leadership (1991; 2001). He builds his approach based on the idea of how leaders emerge from subcultures and he specifies how leaders rhetorically construct a privileged relationship with their audience. In this respect, as Gaffney explains;

*A political leaders' persona is a construction that performs like an actor... A political leader is not a person we see but a persona projected by the real person and his or her entourage – advisors, spokespersons, speechwriters; a persona that is fashioned, mediated, received, perceived and misperceived, 'imagined' (2014).*

Also he points out that the different questions which should be addressed by scholars that are how do leaders persuade followers?, what is the role of discourse and rhetoric of a leaders' image, and of his or her style, in that persuasion? What elements of this make up an image? In his last book Gaffney gives the example of the UK Labour Party in the 2010–2015 under Ed Miliband's leadership and his One Nation Narrative (2017).

*Psychology:* Psychology is an indispensable component of an analysis of leaders' profile. Although, Freud was also a pioneer scholar who applied psychoanalysis to analyze political leadership, he co-authored with William Bullitt on a book on Woodrow Wilson which was published after his death. Basically, they suggest that Wilson's drawbacks in his psychology led to his catastrophic foreign policy (1966). Freud and Bullitt criticized Woodrow Wilson for his religiosity and self-righteousness, concluding that the manner in which his moral absolutism withered in the face of amoral European diplomacy caused much damage to world affairs (Milne, 2009). Also, the Treaty of Versailles was the biggest disappointment as a

result of Wilson's failure to make the Allies live up to Wilsonian principles. They explain this failure with a moral collapse and mental degeneracy where the outcome of his inner psychological conflicts; ergo and variation of Oedipus complex (Tuchman, 2014). As is seen from the book content, a psychoanalysis of a leaders' profile is quite tough because it is generally considered as attack on personalities rather than scientific approach. In addition to this, it is also problematic to diminish the decision-making process of any leader to only his psychology.

Though there have been enormous criticisms towards Freud's book on Wilson, the psychological literature of political leadership has grown steadily. Erikson (1993) works on a post Freudian psychoanalysis theory and has developed eight stages of man from childhood to the later stages of adulthood. Through the years, due to the limitations of the psychoanalytic studies of leadership, this literature has been criticized. He exemplified the power and vitality of adult life with two biographies, those of Martin Luther and Mahatma Gandhi. For example, Erikson's study of Luther is called *Young Man Luther* (1958) gives much space to a psychoanalytical discussion of Luther's relationships with his father and his feeling of identity crisis after his education in a monastery. He claims that Martin's position against to the Holy Roman Church can only be understood in the context of his initial disobedience to his father while Erikson suggests Luther was not rebellious by nature. Then he suggests that the identity crisis and his background mostly shape his position towards the Holy Roman Church. In other words, Erikson was trying to say, history is essentially the acting out of individual psychologies (Butler-Bowdon, 2010).

Owen and psychiatrist Davidson explain the approach of hubris syndrome which is manifested through a variety of symptoms and is triggered by power (2009). Hubristic traits and the hubris syndrome appear after the acquisition of power. Fourteen symptoms of hubris syndrome identified by Owen and Davidson are as follows: using power for self-glorification; an almost obsessive focus on personal image; excessive self-confidence, accompanied by contempt for advice or criticism of others; loss of contact with reality; speaking as a messiah; reckless and



impulsive actions; and hubristic incompetence where supreme overconfidence leads to inattention to detail. In their work, Owen and Davidson investigated the psychological profiles of the UK Prime Ministers and US Presidents in power in the last hundred years. They found seven US presidents who have hubristic traits: the two Roosevelts, Woodrow Wilson, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and George W. Bush. However, the only one of these presidents they identified as displaying hubris syndrome would be George W. Bush. Among UK prime ministers; Herbert Asquith, David Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair displayed hubristic traits, with Lloyd George, Chamberlain, Thatcher and Blair suffering from hubris syndrome.

Lastly, James David Barber's book called 'The Presidential Character' is a psychobiography to explain the personalities, styles and character of modern presidents (1972). Barber's psychobiographies try to analyze patterns in the early lives or political careers of leaders and how to change through socialization and how it affects their office period as a leader.

*Modeling:* Modeling could be deemed as one of the newest areas in the political leadership literature. The models and structure of a system in the political leadership are highly interlinked with the skills of leader. In the book called 'The President as Leader' (1998), Hargrove develops a model of presidential leadership, synthesizing political leadership and providing a dynamic set of relations. This model basically combines the skills of leader. Hargrove focuses on how successful leaders combine political arts and skills with moral leadership vis-à-vis the presidency model. Hargrove's model for political leadership covers five elements as follows; skill in context, discernment, character as skill, cultural leadership and teaching reality.

As well as Hargrove, Skowronek makes a contribution to model of presidency in terms of leadership. His book named *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton* (1997) highlights the fundamental leadership problems, which presidents have faced throughout American history. In other

words, it led to new ways of understanding the different dynamics of various American presidents within different times. For example, Skowronek makes it possible to understand why Bill Clinton can have so much in common with Grover Cleveland or Dwight Eisenhower. On the other hand, Fred Greenstein surveys each president's political skill, vision, cognitive style, organizational capacity, ability to communicate, and emotional intelligence--and argues that the latter is the most important in predicting presidential success. Greenstein takes twelve modern American presidents from FDR to Barack Obama (2009).

### **2.3. Overview and Challenges of Political Leadership Literature from Traditional to Contemporary**

The definitions of political leadership have evolved through time. Political leadership is a dynamic notion which has influenced and from its context, of society, time and place. Ibn Khaldun as a Muslim scholar who suggests that *asabiyya* is the most important element to have in a leadership in terms of relations between followers and a leader. In addition to this, he claims that strong *asabiyya* creates initial obedience for a leader, intensification of authority and stability. Machiavelli takes leaders as a subject matter and discusses the virtues which they should have and concludes that any leader should have different virtues to keep his power and stability in their reign. Most of scholars have criticized Machiavelli and his so called immoral position on political leadership, while Cassirer says that *The Prince* should be considered as technical book where we cannot separate moral and immoral (1984). *The Prince* and *The Discourses* could not be considered as a pure theoretical political leadership. Rather, he had political aims to become an advisor of Medici family. That's why, Blondel suggests that Machiavelli's position in the book was written from this narrative perspective rather than as a simple observer within society. As mentioned above Machiavelli was criticized for his immoral position vis-à-vis the necessary virtues for leaders that he defined in his book which cannot be considered scientifically.

Max Weber's notion of charisma is still a groundbreaking approach in political leadership. Within three authority types; charismatic authority emphasizes

extraordinary characteristics of individual, whose mission and vision inspire followers. More importantly, Weber claims that crisis times in society need charismatic leaders who can successfully manage and adapt to new systems. Weber's charismatic authority approach has been criticized in three aspects; charisma is not only personal attribute of leader but mostly dependent on the perception of followers. Secondly, through the centuries too much attribution of god-gifted leaders has become questioned. Lastly, the personal charisma of leaders could cause ignorance of other factors in the emergence of leadership.

In addition to this, Carlyle expounds the theory of the Great Man which suggests that "The history of the world is but a biography of great men." Like Weber, Carlyle claims that effective leaders are those gifted with divine inspiration and the right characteristics. Leading with Herbert Spencer, the Great Man theory has been criticized because of two main reasons. Mainly, they suggest that the emergence of leadership is highly sourced from its society and its characteristics. In other words, no great man shapes their society but in fact societies shape their leaders and foreign policy making.

*As traditional and contemporary theories and approaches are analyzed, there are two distinctive problems. One of them is that traditional theories take an individual's uniqueness as a focal point. It does not mean that they ignore leader-follower relations but they perceive followers as taking a passive role where leaders have magnetism. Secondly, traditional approaches could be useful to explain their age and culture where scholars came from. However, it has become insufficient to understand changing dynamics of societies and international system after 20<sup>th</sup> century and beyond. There is no doubt, although traditional approaches have limitations, it triggered a huge amount of contemporary literature as categorized as given in the above.*

Under societal dimensions of literature which includes transactional and transformational leadership, there is a considerable amount of literature, mention the role of society in political leadership. Especially with influence of globalization, leaders' relations with society have become more complicated

which reflected on leaders' perception of collective problems and solutions. That's why the literature of the societal dimension of political leadership has a tendency to ignore new challenges within societies. Secondly, new methodologies have been introduced to the literature of political leadership. Scholars have tried to determine patterns for different leaders from different countries and also statistical methods are starting to be used in the analysis. Generalization is not easy because each leader can be considered as a product of their cultural background. In addition to this, a simple methodology is not enough to analyze the multidimensional structure of leadership.

Thirdly, literature related to rhetoric capability of leaders has been developed in recent years. The main focus of scholars who worked on rhetoric deal with use of language and its influence on followers. However, only consideration of rhetorical capacity could be misleading to anatomize political leaders'. Fourthly, a psychological analysis of leaders might be the most controversial part of the literature because most of works based on secondary and even tertiary sources about leaders such as memoirs of people who work with them. Furthermore, psychoanalysis of leadership and a link with his/her policy making is quite a reductionist way of thinking. Thus, both problems create controversy regarding the validity of works. Lastly, system modeling is one of the most widespread sub areas of political leadership literature in recent years. Leadership success within the presidential system has been analyzed in many studies using case studies. It can be considered as a new angle in the analysis of leadership but it also hinders an efficient understanding of different situations and how it reflects the context in which the leader holds office.

In the above, the general picture of traditional and contemporary political leadership literature was given. It is not easy to grasp the multidimensional analysis of leaders because of its nature. In addition to this, the international system within which political leaders lead their nation is now chaotic which characterized by high level of interdependency, networked structure and unpredictability. In other words, not only has the nature of political leadership

changed but also the international system with its actors has been changed. In this respect, role of political leaders in foreign policy literature should be revisited.

#### **2.4. Political Leaders and Foreign Policy**

In the dynamic and complex structure of foreign policy making, it is not easy to grasp all actors and their role throughout this process. There is no doubt that political leaders are undeniable actors of foreign policy making, although foreign policy analysis literature is not very focused on individual leaders rather than emphasizing structural factors (Horowitz & Fuhrmann, 2018). Tendencies of scholars have changed through the years. The 1960s and 70s are fruitful times for studying leaders from the perspective of psychology and organization in order to analyze international relations (Snyder et al., 2002). The origins of foreign policy analysis based on two works which are 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics' by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954), secondly 'Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics' by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965). Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin's work called Decision Making as an approach to study international relations suggests that the individual who acts on behalf of the state takes state action (1962). One of the main assumptions needs to focus on the decision unit who pursued a specific objective (1954; 2002). It is obvious that through 70s, American policymakers and scholars started to interest in psychological traits of foreign leaders in order to assess future motives of leaders (Stuart, 2008). In this respect, literature related with analyzing role of leaders in foreign policy making is quite extensive.

Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout separated between the psychological and the operational milieu for studying the policies and process involved in foreign-policy making (1965). Also, they found that the agents involved in a decision making process would be determined by psychological milieu and the operational milieu would shape process. Upcoming methods had been developing from these two different focal points.

As touched upon in the beginning, the analysis of foreign policy decisions through the lens of the individual leaders is embedded in the interdisciplinary field of psychology and scholars try to understand dynamics of personalities as case studies and what motivates them (Post, 2003). One of the main method which was applied to analyze political leaders with content analysis of their speeches. However, this method was suffering from absence of clear structure for coding and comparing (Stuart, 2008). Operational code analysis was originally brought up by Nathan Leites to analyse Soviet Politburo members' political strategies (1950) then Alexander George developed the method of 'operational code of analysis' in his work called 'The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making' (1969). The method is basically classifying and comparing of individual leaders based on certain political beliefs which are assumed to influence the leader's perception of the world and how they make foreign policy decisions in two dimensions which are philosophical and instrumental (George, 1969). In order to identify this process, Alexander developed sets of questions for each dimensions.

George's refinement of Leites' operational code constructs a study of Henry Kissinger and Vietnam War in the 1970s (Walker, 1977), and then used Holsti's typology in a study of the operational codes of U.S. presidents and secretaries of state (Walker & Falkowski 1984; Holsti, 2006; Renshon, 2009). Through the years, operational code has refined and having automated by different scholars as an expanding of agenda of analysis (Walker, 1990; Walker et al., 1999). Also various studies have applied the operational code analysis to US presidents and secretaries of state (Walker & Falkowski, 1984; Walker et al., 1999; Renshon, 2009). In addition to this, operational code analysis was applied to non-Western leaders in order to explain certain policy decisions. One of the recent article by Kai He and Huiyun Feng focuses on Xi Jinping's foreign policy with operational code belief scheme (2013). Besides, Özgür Özdamar choose six different leaders from across the countries who attached them with political Islam ideology and analyze them through operational code (2017). Lastly, Dyson and Parent analyze Putin's foreign policy through operational code scheme as a recent contribution to operational code literature (2018).

The other prominent method of analysis of role of political leadership in foreign policy making that has been widely used is leadership trait analysis (LTA). This framework was developed by Margaret Hermann and contributed on the role of personality characteristics in foreign policy making (Hermann, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 2003). In this approach, personality is conceptualized as a combination of seven traits: belief in an ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in group bias, selfconfidence, and task orientation (2003). According to Hermann (2003), those seven traits led to emergence of specific behaviors of leaders. Starting with, leaders who have high belief in their ability to control events and need for power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints whereas leaders low in need for power and/or who do not believe they can control events are expected to respect constraints. In addition to this, conceptual complexity and self-confidence are directly linked to openness to information. Thus, Hermann claims that leaders with high scores on both traits and leaders who have high complexity and low self-confidence are expected to be open to information, however leaders with low scores on both traits and leaders with high self-confidence and low complexity are expected to be closed to information. These two opposite traits combine with a leader's motivation for leading to produce a typology of eight different leadership styles, which Hermann argues, provide a profile of how "Leaders relate to those around them and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions" (2003).

Margaret Hermann's method have been widely used throughout the field to assesses various leaders in last twenty years (Mastors, 2000; Preston, 2001; Taysi and Preston, 2001). Margaret Hermann herself applied LTA to Sub-Saharan leaders (1987) and Hafez Al Assad of Syria (1988). Not only national leaders but also UN secretaries have been examined through LTA by Kille to understand how personal leadership influence international peace and security (2006). Also, one of the well known piece of work which applied LTA is Stephen Dyson's 'Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair's Iraqs Decision' article suggests that the UK's decision to engage in the Iraq war can be attributed to the personal characteristics of Tony Blair (2006). Furthermore, Turkish leaders are also examined with

Leadership Trait Analysis. Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin and Ozkececi-Taner writes “Examining Leaders’ Orientations to Structural Constraints: Turkey’s 1991 and 2003 war Decisions” that analyze Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decisions for 1991 and 2003 Iraqi decision with LTA and structured- focused comparisons (2017). In addition to this, Barış Kesgin writes about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his foreign policy between March 2003 and May 2013, he makes analysis with software that calculates leadership trait score which developed by Hermann (2020).

Jerrold M. Post who is founder of CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior brought qualitative approach to leadership assessment in foreign policy analysis literature a form of political psychobiography (2003; Hudson, 2005). Post’s (2014, p. 329) ‘Personality Profiling Analysis’ in the book chapter called ‘Conceptual framework and organization design for an integrated political personality profile’ suggests analysis of leadership in the context of the five main dimensions, including the bottom slices. These dimensions are 1) Psychobiography discussion: 2) Personality, 3) World View, 4) Leadership Style, 5) Outlook. In this study, a selection of the first sub-dimension was made. Through this approach, Post aims to prevail political personality with characterization of three specific personalities, which are narcissistic, the obsessive– compulsive and the paranoid personality (2014). In addition to this, he exemplifies these political personalities with political leaders who are Saddam Husein, Menacham Begin and Josef Stalin respectively (2003, 2014).

As mentioned in the beginning, political leadership in foreign policy analysis literature is quite wide ranging therefore it is not possible to recover all literature that could be deemed as a limitation of this thesis. When literature is examined it can be said that two competing way of methods seems to be preferred which are operational code and leadership trait analysis. These two dominant approaches that given in the detailed way focuses on psychological assesment of leaders and how it affects on foreign policy with mostly in quantitative perspective. On the other hand, Post’s contributed to analysis of psychological assessment for political leaders in foreign policy in more quantitative method through psychobiographic



approach. Whereas this thesis does not have aim to compare and contrast leaders's beliefs and motivations. Also this thesis does not have aim to understand their psychological traits and their affects are not part of scope of research questions. Even, this thesis is not looking for any specific psychological conditions and cognitive process as a reason behind decisions of leaders however this thesis focuses on approaches, behaviors and their reflection on foreign policy decisions which could be also considered as a limitation and contribution of this thesis.

## **2.5. The SNA New Political Leadership Model**

Political leaders and foreign policy literature and main approaches are already given in the previous sections. Depend on research question and scope of this thesis, there was search for tool to analyze research question. However, existent literature on political leadership and foreign policy are not linked with thesis scope. Because of this, the idea of developing a new leadership model composed from multidisciplinary and new notions emerged. There is no doubt, unique and dynamic leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel encouraged researcher to develop this new model. In this respect, it should be touched upon models and developing model would be useful to understand the unique contribution of this thesis. There is no doubt, modeling plays a crucial role in scientists' attempts to understand the world (Toon, 2016). Also Hutten (1954) and Braithwaite (1953) are firstly recognized and underlined the importance of models in science within different aspects as follows;

- models as tools for thinking and theory development
- models as providing descriptive vocabulary
- models as incomplete and “not literal”—that is, as leaving out things and potentially being misleading.

In addition to this, the recent discussion related with why models are useful in the different fields of science mostly focus around the general agreement among philosophers of science that models give us knowledge because they represent some real-world ‘target systems’ (Frigg, 2002; Giere, 2004; Mäki, 2009; Ramadas,

2009; Coll & Lajium, 2011). In other words, models are representation of way of thinking, models are always interpretive not simply driven by the phenomena (Bailer-Jones, 2009). It should be noted that models are both products of and tools for particular kinds of thinking (Morrison & Morgan, 2000; Winsberg, 2001). Through modeling, there is also simplifying complex phenomenon- simplified representation (Heyck, 2015). This simplifying can be done in different ways such as involve scaling down or up, reducing the number of variables or components, idealizing or abstracting from of concrete situations, making something new and strange more familiar through analogy or representation in a more familiar, easy form, visualization and more (Coll & Lajium, 2011; Heyck, 2015). In light of this, model building can be considered as not only art but also craft which composed of mixture of elements from inside and outside of original field of investigation (Moris & Morgan, 2000).

As touched in the previous section, there are different analytical tools and models that can be used for foreign policy analysis especially with the intensive use of information technologies. These frameworks have in common three main elements with different degree of depth in analysis. These elements are: (1) individual actors, who do what like collation and influence; (2) the cognitive process either it is related to agenda setting or one of the stages of the policy cycle; (3) political environment or what are the conditions surrounding the policy making process like political; social or economic conditions (Hamza & Mellouli, 2018).

The SNA Leadership Model is developed as a new tool to analyze foreign policy patterns of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel's in Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan policies with four dimensions. In other words, the SNA leadership model is developed as a tool to understand behavior patterns of leaders in foreign policy making in a limited manner. There are various elements which determinant of foreign policy making in leadership level such as institutional structure of state, history, personality of leader, psychological elements of leader vs. however this model within this thesis only consider background of countries and personal background of leader and selected approaches and behaviors are limitation of this thesis. In other words, this thesis scope only focuses on

approaches, behavior of leaders which create specific foreign policy patterns of leaders. Elements within of these four dimensions are not only limited with traditional notions of international relations but also bring terms from various disciplines.

In the SNA Leadership model, first dimension is contextual background of countries where leaders are leading which included mode of governance, political system and informal political characteristics of countries. Also, it includes historical perspective would be briefly given in order to draw picture of conditions when first they are came to power. Second dimension is biography of the leader, which would provide insights from childhood, young ages and early political life. This dimension is also inspired by Jerald M. Post's "Personality Profiling Analysis" in the book chapter Conceptual framework and organization design for an integrated political personality profile as following 1) Psychobiographic discussion, 2) Personality, 3) World View, 4) Leadership Style, 5) Outlook (2014 p.329). Third dimension is approaches and behaviors of the leader which are unique notions which integrated through multidisciplinary perspective. Fourth and last dimension would give six patterns of foreign policy of the leaders sourced from third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

The visual of the SNA Leadership Model is shown in the below as Figure 2. In the Figure 2; each circle represents each dimensions of the SNA Leadership, which called as D1, D2, D3 and D4. Also, lighting points on each dimension circle indicates subtitles in the dimensions. Eight lighting point indicate that four approaches and four behaviors in the third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. Lastly, six lighting points refers to six reflections in the fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.



*Figure 2.* Visualisation of the SNA Leadership Model  
 Source: Original picture is taken from Freepik and redesigned by author

**2.5.1. D 1. The Contextual Background of the Leader's Country in Which the Leader was Born and Raised**

In order to understand and install meaning of a leader’s behavior, socio-political and cultural context of the country of leaders are undeniable factor and what makes leadership meaningful is the contextual background of the leader's country. It is also the leader who adds new meaning to the contextual background of their country. The socio-political and cultural context of the country creates sociological, political, cultural and psychological conditions for leadership. These elements are fundamental determinants of the perceptions and judgments that cause a person to be adopted and accepted as a leader in a society. A person who is perceived as a leader in one society might not be seen as a leader in another society, or even in the sub-societies, groups and organizations that make up the leader's society. The socio-political and cultural context of the country, which gives meaning to leadership, also determines the type of the leadership. A leader has to know and properly evaluate the socio-political and cultural context of society has passed down over time. This is a precondition for influencing people, providing unity of power and action, pursuing clear goals and creating the future, as well as renewing the socio-political and cultural context and its elements. The socio-political and

cultural context is also product of the accumulation of the past and a process of constantly creating and renewing thoughts by leaders.

In this process the leadership is the ability to reach people's hearts through words that best express values. Thus the leader is someone who can play the role of both evaluating and knowing socio-political and cultural context and its elements as a product, and also being able to propose, reshape and recreate socio-political and cultural visions. For these reasons, it can be said **“The leader is an element of the socio-political and cultural context that adds new meanings to the socio-political and cultural context”**. In light of this reality, contextual background of leaders' country is first dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

#### **2.5.2. D 2. The Background of Leader**

Marijke Breuning suggests early years and experiences could be used as a guide to understand motivations of leaders (2007). In this respect, the SNA Leadership Model analyzes the background of the leader based on two sub-categories which are cultural and the historical background of leaders and world view and political ideology. In the first sub-section, the leader's family, socialization processes, student years, political career, success, failures and critical events in life are discussed. In addition, the physical appearance, life, working hours and working style, the way to evaluate the leisure time and esthetic sensitivity is defined in this sub-section. The second sub category, is world view and political ideology of the leader. In the Chapter 4 and 5 will be Erdoğan and Merkel's personal background.

#### **2.5.3. D 3. Approaches and Behaviors of the Political Leadership**

Third dimension is one of the most original sections of the SNA Leadership Model which will composed of approaches and the behaviors of political leaders. Höfler says “Approach may be defined as the basic philosophy or belief concerning the subject matter being considered” (2005). It is the set of assumptions or point of view held by individuals concerned with their field. The SNA Leadership Model is holistic multidimensional model regarding giving new perspective how understand,

perceive and analyze the notion of leadership. Chowdhury defines “Holism is a state of mind that an individual harbours at a particular point in time. This state of mind enables a consultant to appreciate systemic characteristics through all interactions and in all social systems covertly and/or overtly” (2019, p. 4). Chowdhury also says “Being holistic means developing systems ‘state of mind’ which enables the practitioner to chart interrelationships, recognise emergence and work with and challenge different mental models reflecting alternative boundary judgements” (2019). Constructs are described as multidimensional when their indicators are themselves latent constructs (Edwards, 2001, p. 145). Multidimensional constructs are useful to provide holistic representations of complex phenomena. A multidimensional construct represents a theoretically meaningful, overall abstraction that relates these various latent constructs to each other (Law et al., 1998). Political leaders who adopt such an approach naturally deal with events and facts in a holistic multidimensional way. In this sense, leaders both try to perceive the big picture and do not ignore the details, which is birth of multidimensional and dynamic nature of the holistic approach that leaders adopt in their behavior. Because of this, multidimensional and holistic perspective played key role to determine four approaches and behaviors. Thus, first part of third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model is composed of four approaches of leaders.

- Approaches

- Be aware of chaotic nature of system

Social systems are complex systems composed of various actors with endless actors in which international system is not exception (Root, 2013). In the holistic and multidimensional approach, the following are expected from a politic leader: to be aware of the system, to explore the basic elements that affect the system, to explore the relationship of these factors affecting the system periodically, and to take into account the power of network in decision making. It is important for leaders to be aware that they do operate within a complex system, that actions can have unanticipated effects, and that one would perhaps sometimes do well to

approach goals indirectly and by multiple paths in order to reduce the risk of failure, adopting careful and cautious policies informed by the possibility of dangerous nonlinear consequences (Jervis, 1997). The most important factor is to draw a multidimensional leadership profile beyond the usual leadership traits which includes all types and models with the ability to be used (Erçetin et al., 2013; Erçetin et al., 2014).

- To think kaleidoscopic and catalytic

Catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking is important for leaders. Catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking refers to a high level of awareness and sensitivity regarding the fluidity and intensity of continuous change. The adoption of such a thought system is to be sensitive to events where the phenomenon can always come from different perspectives. Such a form of thinking tells us that reality is a temporary arrangement, and this arrangement tells us that events that make up the phenomenon involve changing things about them to create a new reality. These approaches are a way to make a difference with people. This thinking style allows leaders to grasp the higher levels of commitment and performance of the people. Indeed, Petrini considers metaphor for kaleidoscope creativity; "To reorganize parts to create a new reality" (1991, p. 27). Similarly, Harris (2009, p. 78) emphasizes that catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking as an emergent event, in combination with a change in perspective, can create entirely new possibilities. At the same time, Harris defines catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking as planning based on what is 'not there yet'. In today's complex and uncertain world, Bennet (2016, p. 86) emphasizes that leadership and leadership characteristics change rapidly and intensely according to time and situation.

- Be Glocal

According to Oxford Dictionary of New Words; glocal sources from Japanese word of 'dochakaku' (Tulloch, 1992). Later, American sociologist Roland Robertson bring the notion of glocal and glocalization which means to stress the dual character of the globalization process, as being 'globalization' and

'localization' simultaneous (1992). In other words, glocal change means social change in a global and local context. It is important for leaders to demonstrate a high level of awareness and sensitivity to what is happening in the global context. In particular, it is vital to estimate the projections of these developments in their own countries and to develop policies. At the same time, the globalization of local social, cultural, economic and political values also increase the power of leaders and expands the sphere of influence. Indeed, according to Erçetin and the others (2017, p.76) 'glocal' leadership requires a "glocal strategy" to be created, which means politicians, peoples, firms, and NGOs should think globally and act locally. Similarly, leaders require glocal strategy to promote their local values in globalization.

- To have unique values for humanity

Sagiv and Roccas define values as cognitive representations of basic motivations (2017, p. 3-13). They emphasize values represent desirable goals and reflect what people consider important and worthy in their life. Values are playing key role as a determinant of their personal attitudes and behavior (Rokeach, 1973). What makes leaders different from others is the values that they make and adopt. Leaders with these values in many areas of events, facts, objects, people, define the set of criteria. These criteria are generally shared in society, adopted, and confirm the consensus transformed into strings. Thus, while values make it easier for the society to determine the purpose, direction and action area, it also provides criteria for judging others. The values presented by the leader can be produced from the historical cultural base of that society, from the current context to the future. Of course, the values that leaders have are consequences of all their background and experience; it reflects the goals they find important and valuable to achieve with society.

Especially leaders, who perceive their country as a global power, or aim to be themselves to world leader, try to create unique values for humanity that can be universally accepted. Stückelberger says that the context of different geographical conditions, ethnic identities, religious convictions, gender diversity, generational



transformations, technological innovations and forms of organization of communities lead to contextual values which can be in conflict to each other (2016). Therefore, it is not easy to create unique values for humanity and convert them into values adopted by large masses of people outside their own country although human being is naturally part of world and interconnected with other people in the world (Raines, 2013). While determining the level of acceptance of the content of values all over the world; this increases the power and influence of the leader both in his own country and in the international context.

- Behaviors

Weick says, behavior is set within a web of relationships where dynamic interaction is a key feature (1991, p. 21). Also, behavior is observable activity in a human, the aggregate of responses to internal and external stimule (Flexner et al., 1987). From this perspective, in the framework of ‘The contextual background of the leader's country’ and ‘The Background of Leader’ as dimensions of the new SNA Political Leadership Model are playing influential role in the following four leadership behaviors in the third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

- Produce entangled solutions

Producing entangled solutions is defined by an important feature of the universe was revealed in 1982 by Alain Aspect and his group. Aspect has proved that the universe has experimentally invisible bonds and that the objects are connected to each other in the way we hoped, and that no one can intrude in the essence of the matter. If the microparticles are able to make immediate contact with each other, the reason for this is not that they send signals to each other, but rather they act as a single unit; separation is an illusion. ‘Entanglement’, in other words, signifies a relationship so intensely and densely connected that it becomes difficult to speak about the existence of separate phenomena, requiring such phenomena to be thought of instead as forming a wider unified system, or even as a kind of ‘nondualistic whole’ (Elbe and Buckland-Merret, 2019). Thus, is necessary to see chronic problems in such a context to produce concurrent solutions. Both problems

and solutions that will be produced will affect the whole of the international system as a problem or solution and thus affect all actors. It is very important for a political leader to produce policies with this awareness. The policies that the leader produces with human, moral and legal values will ensure that, even if not immediately, it will be successful because of the deeper level of reality.

- Be determinant of uncertainties

Being determinant of uncertainties means to be flexible and ready to make a timely transformation; and uncertainties abound. It is one of the most important behaviors that political leaders have to put in order to capture temporality and to react to situations in a timely manner (Erçetin, 2016). In this respect, especially times of crisis is quite important for leaders when unpredictability is peaked where surviving within national and international platforms are the top priority. As Petzinger mentioned that during crisis period there will be emergence of 'dynamic tension', which brings multidimensional potential and advantages for all actors (1999). These kind of times can be deemed as a test for leaders who show that they are capable to see this potential and advantages that balance between domestic politics and international arena in terms of security and stabilization. Being a timely is one of the important aspect of be determinant of uncertainties. Also being flexible plays an important role. Bauman defines flexibility as a liquidity in postmodern society where changing and transformation as a normalcy (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008). That's why leaders should be flexible to make timely decisions otherwise it can create irreversible consequences for their countries and the international system. In this sense, it can be said that leaders take their influence and power in the international system from shaping the trends and interactions that occur rather than controlling the behavior of the international system. Therefore, leaders should be determinant of uncertainties as a normalcy through various scenarios, designs along with their countries' priority and interests. Thus, leaders should set new policies and agendas based on new circumstances through uncertainties.

- Be Simplexity

Simplexity is one of the four behaviors in the SNA Leadership Model. This notion was borrowed from Jeffrey Kluger's (2008) book called *Simplexity: Why Simple Things Become Complex (and How Complex Things Can Be Made Simple)*. Kluger says in the following "A groundbreaking new concept that reveals the hidden ways the world really works. From the micro to the macro, simplexity is a startling reassessment of the building blocks of life and how they affect us all." Miguel Pina and Rego discuss notions of complexity, simplexity and simplicity as follows;

*We suggest that whereas 'complexity' and 'simplicity' have generally been considered as independent and even contrary notions in management thinking, knowledge from the complexity sciences indicates otherwise, that we should take simplicity and complexity as interdependent and mutually-constituting, as expressed in the notion of "simplexity" (2010, p.86).*

In fact, as complexity theorists mention that complexity arises from simplicity (Gribbin 2005, p. 97). In this context, Gribbin defines simplexity is a notion located between complexity and simplicity. Furthermore, Berthoz (2012) explains simplexity as more than mixing complexity and simplicity as follows;

*The word connotes the remarkable fact that biological devices, or processes, appeared in the course of evolution to allow animals and people to survive on our planet. Given the complexity of natural processes, the developing and growing brain must find solutions based on simplifying principles. These solutions make it possible to process complex situations very rapidly, elegantly, and efficiently, taking past experience into account and anticipating the future.*

After this general overview of simplexity with various scholars, in leadership context simplexity can be defined as set of behaviors that analyze synchronizing events in national, regional and global scale while in order to bring multidimensional solutions. As how Bethoz defines simplexity, political leaders are expected to be dynamic, creative and unexpected through express their unique leadership styles, vision and intelligence opposed to conventional approaches of leaders. Political leaders must have the ability to think complexly, but also have the ability to turn complexity into a lean. It needs to be simple, clear and goal-oriented to meet complexity. Influence of simplexity can be found in their

rhetorics as well. Lassiter claims that usage of language is complex process, which would be matured by simplex process which should be simple but rich in terms of meanings and content in order to energize masses (2019). In other words, leaders should use of simple language to explain complex phenomena to people.

- To create the attraction field

This behavior is to know that the influence and power of leadership depends on interacting with others and the nature of these interactions. Multidimensional interactions always have serious risks for political leaders. This is because it is not always possible to predict how the interactions will develop and what kind of effects will have. Political leaders are aware of this and do not fear interactions. Even the political leaders are the luck makers that make up the attraction field of that is expanding from each interaction. They increase their social networks through interactions, making people feel their presence and duty at any time through instant interactions. They evaluate their interactions in order to increase the power of political capitals that consist of peoples, experiences, and phenomenon. They use the latest technology effectively for this purpose.

#### **2.5.4. D 4: Reflections of Backgrounds on Foreign Policy Making**

Third dimensions of the SNA Leadership Model are composed of approaches and behaviors which source from contextual background of leaders' country and personal background. Fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model is reflections of previous three dimensions on foreign policy making. As well as approaches and behaviors in the third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model, six foreign policy reflections have been chosen as dynamic notions which product of multidisciplinary leadership literature and Erdoğan and Merkel's foreign policy choices. For example, when first fourth dimension is writte, there were only five reflections however through researching for the case studies, personal diplomacy was emerged as the six reflection which completed the SNA Leadership Model. In other words, selected six foreign policy reflections are dynamic reflection which is contribution and limitation of this thesis.

- *Negotiator*: Negotiation is one of the basic functions of diplomacy. Definitions of negotiation have been varied through the years which have a common to emphasize that negotiation is two-way communication aims to reach an agreement between actors which is multifaceted process (Meerts, 2015; Barston, 2019). Karns and others underline the relationship between diplomacy and negotiation as in the follows; “Diplomacy is a tool in international governance, while negotiation is an instrument of diplomacy” (2010, p.3-4). In this respect, leaders can be considered as one of the influential actor in negotiation while most of scholars point out ability of negotiation as a vital component of leadership (Rubin, 2002; Zohar, 2015).

The ability of negotiation brings different behaviors, which make leaders great negotiator. Changing international environment created more complex environment, which also reshape negotiation ability of leaders as well. Leaders should use new sets of strategies. Firstly, leaders should be flexible as much as possible in order to understand different scenarios and possibilities to reach an agreement. Secondly, leaders should be creative which also related with strategy of flexibility. Thirdly, leaders should improve personal relationships with other leaders in order to have social cues about other negotiator. Fourth, leaders should be patient and not to give up negotiation and lastly leaders should be tenacious in negotiation in which process persistent is important (Rubin, 2002; Mastenbroek, 2002). In other words, negotiation is one of the undeniable components of leaders’ foreign policy reflection.

- *Connectivity*: As the international system is highly chaotic, all actors become more interdependent each other. As well as dependency, the numbers of actors have also been increasing. In other words, the boundaries between global and local become invisible (Tomé & Açıklan 2018). Nested and more connected structure of international system pushes leaders to reconsider how they perceive the world system. Gelb defines connectivity as “The art of connection — creating and maintaining genuine rapport with others — is the key to building relationships, resolving conflict, and making creative possibilities come true” (2017, p. 26). In addition to this, Olson & Singer discuss how connectivity

related with leadership as follows; “It is one of the three core leadership actions, along with contribution and collaboration, that fit with our complex and highly dynamic world” (2004, pp: 45-48). In light of this, leaders must address and anatomize the dynamics of regional and global events through the notion of connectivity, which could be understood in three levels, which are transactional, relational and social. Inevitable connectivity between different actors who foster interdependency between phenomena, which should be grasped by leaders. In other words, that any events that happen between two actors would affect both regional and global. That’s why, leaders have able to use connectivity as a power in foreign policy decisions in order to produce long term policies.

- *Personal diplomacy*: Political leaders became more visible and influential actor in foreign policy making through last decade (Nuswantoro, 2010; Hinnebusch, 2018). In such an environment, the notion of “personal diplomacy” has become more meaningful. Personal diplomacy means diplomatic efforts “When a particular national leader tries to sort out an international problem on the basis of their own personal relations with, and understanding of, other national leaders” (Robertson, 2002, p.147). There is no doubt, political leaders are surrounded by social environment which composed of other political leaders from different countries (Dumbrell, 2013). In this respect, personal interactions between political leaders can play an important role in international relations under certain structural, bureaucratic and psychological conditions (Ülgül, 2019). Thus, leaders’ personal connections and communications with other leaders play an important role in foreign policy making. As said, the connections of leaders in the international system, the nature and intensity of these connections are important. These connections can be intensified through face-to-face meetings and phone calls (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012). This can be considered as an important driving force, not only in terms of the international system, but also in strengthening the current situation of the leader in his country.
- *Entrepreneurship*: According to Schumpeter’s (1942) view, an entrepreneur is a person who is willing and able to convert a new idea or invention into a successful innovation. Although the notion of entrepreneurship sounds like it is

related to business and management, it is an emergent characteristic of political leadership. As touched upon, international system gives more multidimensional role to individual actors especially to leaders. There is an increasing interest in political entrepreneurs, individuals who change the direction and flow of politics (Klein et al., 2010). Leaders are expected to be more risk taker and flexible in decision-making process. In light of these, entrepreneurship has been considered as indispensable characteristics of leaders. There are various entrepreneurial qualities are given as follows; have a vision, being extraversion, focused and decisive, opportunistic, agreeableness persistent, kaleidoscopic perspective and having confidence (Harper, 2006; Obschonka & Fisch, 2018). Entrepreneur leaders who have these qualities should have lead process of affranchising the capabilities of societies and enabling them to identify and take ownership of the idea and pursue it through making something extraordinary happen through change process (Praszkier & Nowak, 2011). As Rumelt writes, “In a changing world, a good strategy must have an entrepreneurial component which must embody some ideas or insights into new combinations of resources for dealing with new risks and opportunities” (2012). Thus, entrepreneur leaders are expected to seek innovative policies in foreign policy making.

- *Solution seeking:* Crises have been a natural part of the international system. In the new century, crises also become multifaceted and interconnected, which is not only armed, conflicts but emerge in every arena in world politics (Ahmed, 2011; Avenell & Dunn, 2016). Due to nature of crises, it implies greater influence than expected, as leaders are heart of crisis diplomacy as decision makers. As Bjola underlines that entropy sources from international crises demand strong leadership (2015). From this perspective, leaders first should define a crisis with different aspects, then create feasible environment through making up teams and focus on solutions. In other words, leaders must come to the table as part of the solution seeking resolutions which aim to solve common problems considering the larger picture and looking for long term solutions in the best interest of all parties (Farrell, 2013). Leaders can only maintain to be solution seeker through depth and multidimensional approach towards different set of solutions. Thus, solution seeker leaders are not only keeping solution

seeking as an approach but also having solution focused mindset (Mussman, 2006).

- *Peace orientation:* As mentioned in the solution seeking part, crises are natural part of international system. As well as crises, peace is also one of the notion has been identified in international relations with different manner. There are numerous definitions of peace however in the SNA Leadership Model takes Galtung's definition of two types of peace positive and negative (1996). Positive peace is that which is built upon positive relationships and interactions of human society. Establishing structural conditions that facilitate an environment built on positive interactions and engagements between actors is vital for peace. Negative peace, on the other hand, is a focus on the reduction of violence, or efforts to solve current problems of conflict and discord (Galtung, 1996). Peace is not exception which should be redefined in 21st century through enlarging and deepening vis-à-vis new security threats (Beyer, 2018). Depend on Galtung's definition leaders are important in two ways, which are providing an environment, and be agenda setter. Mainly, leaders should provide both national and international environment along with international organisations and other nations (Reychler & Stellaman, 2005). Also, leaders can be agenda setter, which includes new types of security issues such as immigration, hybrid wars, radicalization, environmental degregation and digital security while they put peace as a top priority (Bachmann, 2012). Consequently, leaders should be peace oriented in his/her policy making both in foreign policy.



## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEADER'S COUNTRY**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, The SNA New Political Leadership Model consists of four dimensions which are the contextual background of the leader's country in which the leader was born and raised, the personal background of leader, the approaches and behaviors of the leader and the reflections of background of leader on foreign policy making. In this respect, this chapter is dedicated to first dimension that is the contextual background of the leaders' country where the leader was born and raised. A leader, to understand, to analyze and to install meaning to an undoubtedly approach to behavior should reveal the socio-political and cultural context of the country where they were born and grew up. What makes leadership meaningful is its the contextual background of the leader's country. It is also the leader who adds new meaning to the contextual of his/her country. This chapter composed of two sub dimensions which are the political systems of Turkey and Germany and political atmosphere when Erdoğan and Merkel came to power for the first time.

#### **3.1. Political Systems of Turkey and Germany**

Green-Pedersen and Walgrave mention, it is essential to understand dynamics under the decisions of leaders (2014). In this respect political systems identity card of any country which have a high impact on the development of the socio cultural texture of politics and society. It is important to analyze role of political system in decision making process of leaders as legal constraints. In other words, the political system could be taken as stable element within decision making process regarding institutions and material capability where leaders are considered as unpredictable actor as human being. In order to analyze, Erdoğan and Merkel's

leadership in foreign policy, understanding of political system of Turkey and Germany are indispensable part of this thesis.

Although the two systems have some similarities, they are categorized as two different systems depend on mode of governance. It should be noted that Turkey have undergone transformation from parliamentary system to “Turkish model” of presidential system since the 2017 referendum. However, depend on the limitation of this thesis, parliamentarian system of Turkey was considered before 2018 when referendum was realized. Thus, the different political systems of Turkey and Germany could be deemed as one of the main determinant of boundaries for decision making process of Merkel and Erdogan which is main subject of this chapter.

Table 3  
*Political Systems of Two Countries*

	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Republic of Turkey</b>
Mode of Government	Federal	Unitary
Legislative	Bundestag and Bundestrat	Turkish Grand National Assembly
Executive	The Bundeskanzler	President
Judiciary	Federal Constitutional Court	Constitutional Court

As seen in the above, the two countries have structural and institutional differences. In this respect, three main comparisons could be given as the main differences of German and Turkish political system which are federalism vs unitary system, chancellorship democracy vs. parliamentary system and coalition culture.

**3.2. Federalism vs. Unitary System**

The Federal structure of Germany is clearly mentioned in the Basic Law which can be considered as one of the most complex political systems all around the world. There is no doubt that two historical elements played an important role which are authoritarianism and the weakness of the Weimar Republic (Green et al., 2011; Roberts, 2017). Article 20 to Article 37 of the Basic Law regulate the federative structure of Germany and the Länder. Article 20 could be considered as

the one of the vital articles in the Basic Law which states that “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state”. Meanwhile, Article 79(3) guarantees that provisions of the Basic Law influence the federal nature of state and that the participation of Länder in the federal legislative process is unamendable. Also, some other articles of the Basic Law provide a constitutional basis for federalism including financing and policy areas where they can have independent policies.

The political status of the Länder can be given as in the following;

- Having a right to legislate in various policy areas and possessing residual powers however their policy areas became stricter after 2006 reforms where federal government clearly give responsibilities of federal government, concurrent areas of responsibility and joint tasks.
- The Länder have a legislative responsibility in the following areas; education, policing, system of courts, aspects of broadcasting, transport and highways, regional economy, aspects of environmental protection, cultural matters, provision of social services, the system of local government (Roberts,2017)
- The Länder participate in the process of federal legislation in Bundestrat except foreign and defense policy.
- In required cases, the Länder share authority with the federal government through joint tasks.
- The Länder has an obligation to execute laws that are made by federal or Land authority.
- The financial sources of the Länder come from different taxes and grants.
- The Länder are collectively represented in policy making in the federal level via Bundestrat where all legislation must be consulted.

Regarding political status is regulated with the Basic Law, Germany’s federalism is quite different from other federal systems in the world. The main difference lies beneath the aim of federal system which is one of the most unified federal systems in all over the world (Sturm, 2018) while the system ensures the principle subsidiarity (Çiçek, 2011). In addition to this, the German federal system has

included both dependency and independency within system. Especially, after 2006 reforms there are a clear new direction for the system: more shared -rule, less self-rule (Burkhart, 2009).

*The unitary system of Turkey* has its own historical background. Based on the political culture, Turkey has adopted a centralized government system since 1923. The word of unitary is referred to indirectly in the Turkish constitution. Article 3 states as follows “The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish”. This means that country and nation are part of this indivisible unity. The unitary state of indivisibility is understood. The unitary state, on one country, one nation is subject to one sovereignty. Therefore, in the unitary state, the constituent elements are an indivisible whole. This principle is closely related to the concept of sovereignty. The Turkish nation is the owner of all the constitutional sovereignty. In other words; unlike the federal system, the nation's federal sovereignty with units under the center as in the system is not divided. Depending on the unitary structure, it can be divided into administrative departments such as provinces and districts but these are simple administrative divisions and have only administrative powers (Eryılmaz, 2002; Çiçek, 2011).

The unitary and strongly centralized Turkish system is seen through any decision making process as well. Like Germany’s historical elements in constitution making, Turkey’s historical background plays an important role in maintaining a centralized and unitary system. Consequently, local authorities and administrative units have been operating under close supervision of the central administration in Turkey. On the other hand, compared to Germany, Turkey has only a legislative body, which is the Turkish Grand National Assembly and not a subsidiarity principle.

Thus, the first and main difference between Turkey and Germany comes from mode of government, which has a direct reflection on legislative bodies. However, it should be noted that, when it comes to representation of people this difference is

the same for both countries. Both in Turkish and German system, people are represented as a whole.

### **3.3. Chancellor Democracy vs. Turkish Parliamentary**

*The Chancellorship* is a leading position within the German political system. According to Art. 63 the Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag and appointed by the federal president. Firstly, the president nominates a candidate and then the members of the Bundestag vote in a secret ballot. In fact, the power of the Chancellor is given through Art.65, which states that the chancellor determines the guidelines of policy within government operates known as “**Richtlinienkompetenz**”. This article of the Basic Law is, in fact, one of the most important articles in terms of Chancellors’ power on decision-making process. Depend on the same article, the Chancellor has the right to nominate ministers, determine the allocations of functions and coordinate the cabinet (Collins, 2002). Chancellors’ main power is the ability to set the parameters of the policy during government (Green et al., 2011). As Goetz suggest the ‘guideline’ power make enable the Chancellor to involve himself/herself in any policy issues and to determine both the government approach and policy detail (2003). When the power of president and Chancellorship position compared that the two are of unequal political weight as the distribution of power favors the Chancellor. The Chancellor holds a powerful position compared to both the parliament and the President (Schmidt, 2008).

Because of this, the notion of chancellor democracy that has been used is not a legal one but is instead a political term also related to “**Richtlinienkompetenz**” which was first used by journalist in Konrad Adeneur era to symbolize how he was powerful on decision-making process in government (Helms, 2011). His attitude to having a strong central coordination of government policy, chancellorial control over the activities of ministers, an executive-dominated Parliament and a marginalized opposition made the chancellorship into the unrivalled center of power in the political system (Goetz, 2013). Although the Constitutional article seems to give enormous power to the Chancellorship position, coalition culture

and system of German politics generally push leaders to make more negotiation with coalition partners through give a space for ministers (Paterson & Southern, 1991). In other words, as mentioned, the constitutionally anchored chancellor principle assigns leadership to the federal government. At the same time, however, the structural principles of the Cabinet Government and the responsibilities of the departments place clear limits on the Chancellor's claim to leadership (Glaab, 2010).

*Turkey* changed the parliamentary system with presidential system through 2017 referendum which came into effect in 2018 however as touched upon. This thesis is only considering the parliamentarian system of Turkey. Turkish parliamentary system has had its own historical developments since the 1921 constitution. The 1982 Constitution adopted a parliamentary system as a governmental system based on the principle that the executive required by the parliamentary system should be independent and separate from the legislature branch and tried to establish a strong executive by increasing the powers of the president (Bulut & Akın, 2018). The 1982 Constitution was the last one, which regulated the Turkish parliamentary system except for the 2007 referendum.

Article 104, which enumerates the powers of the president of the republic, is the longest article of the Constitution, and endows the president with powers in legislative, executive and judicial domains. Fendoğlu mentions that although the 1982 constitution officially adopted a parliamentary system, due to the rights and power of president 1982 the constitution was closer to the semi-presidential system (2010). The president has noteworthy power in some specific areas such as; authorization to appoint the judges to the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the judges of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and his deputy and certain members of the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Özbudun,2010).

Furthermore, the president appoints prime minister from the elected deputies from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The prime minister then nominates ministers for appointment by the president. The prime minister

supervises the implementation of government policy. Members of the Council of Ministers have a joint and equal responsibility for the implementation of this policy. In addition to this, each minister is responsible for the conduct of affairs under his/her jurisdiction and for the actions of subordinates. As well as Chancellor Adeneur, President Turgut Özal can be shown as an example who used their competencies and rights fully and more effectively on governments. Also, it should be noted that in the 2007 referendum, Turkish people voted for constitutional change on, “will president elected by citizens directly or TGNA?” which resulted in “Yes” in favor of election of president by citizens.

Obviously, the two countries have different legal boundaries on leaders and the decision-making process. Germany’s Richtlinienkompetenz articles give power to chancellors while putting limits on other constitutional articles and political culture. On the contrary, Turkey’s 1982 constitution created a two-headed executive power with a powerful president and prime minister position. So; it can be said that that for both countries, leaders are important figures who decide their power fully or not.

### **3.4. Coalition Culture vs. Strong Leadership**

Verba and Almond define political culture as being made up of a multitude of attitudes, values, and feelings that give the political process order and meaning; political culture is thus the subjective psychological dimension of politics (1963). In this respect, legal boundaries directly influence political culture. In order to understand coalition culture of Germany, the electoral system needs to be understood. The electoral system is defined by the Electoral Law of 1956 and includes five general principles which are general, direct, free, equal and secret. Mainly, the electoral system is a proportional system with 5 percent of the threshold. In other words, it is required that a party obtains either at least 5 percent of second voters or three constituency seats to qualify for a distribution of list seats. The second distinction of the electoral system of Germany is that surplus seats (Überhangmandate) could be created (Roberts, 2016). This distinction is

normally a feature of constituency representation of system. Thus, Germany has in fact got a mixed electoral system (Scarrow, 2003).

Although the system is proportional, which did not, led to multiparty system in the Bundestag thanks to 5 percent of threshold. However, the proportional system makes it difficult to have a party majority which inevitably led to a coalition governments forming. As Schmalfluss clearly explains in order to form a government in Germany the winning party has to form a coalition, which makes up more than half of all MPs. 50 per cent of MPs are elected by a single member plurality in single-seat constituencies while the other 50 per cent are elected through proportional representation (2010). Thus, due to the electoral system those absolute majorities are very much the exception in Germany. Also, because there is no political culture for minorities, all that remains is coalition governments (Faas & Klingerhöfer, 2019). In last 50 years of German history was only 1957 election when CDU/CSU had a majority under Chancellor Adenauer who still chose to form a coalition government.

In addition to electoral system of Germany, history has been also quite influential in shaping German political culture as well. Because of the Nazi period and then divided Germany created general opposition to one party leadership. In other words, the authoritarian previous regime caused a tendency to consider competition and conflicts between parties as “dysfunctional”; and there was desire to avoid winner-take-all outcomes and situations allowing a group or political party a monopoly on policies (Matakovic et al., 2015). Consequently, even big parties like CDU and SPD support small parties and want to form a coalition government. Of course, these two elements have created culture of “consensus building” in German politics as well. The principal of consensus was established during the early days of the federal republic. A consensus between not political parties but also all stakeholders became a key feature of German politics. The former Ambassador of Germany to Turkey and State Secretary Wolf Ruthard Born emphasizes the role of compromising and consensus culture in German politics with these words; compromising and consensus are as important as constitutional boundaries in German politics (Personal Interview, 2019). Therefore, in such a



political culture, leaders should always have a consensus between coalition partners and other stakeholders. It also shows that the Chancellor's Richtlinienkompetenz has its own limits (Smith, 1991). As expected, a consensus culture also brings some challenges to decision-making process of the German leader in terms of dealing with crisis and fast decision making.

*Turkey's political culture* has a tendency towards having a strong leadership rather than a coalition government. As touched upon in the constitutional differences, Turkey has a more centralized political system which is quite compound. When it comes to the influence of history, Özbilgin notes that political leadership in the Ottoman era was shaped by long service only changing with radical changes (2011). Due to the trauma of the long wars in the Ottoman period and geographical challenges the notion of "being and one together" has always been emphasized as a priority in Turkish political culture (Berkes, 1964; Heper, 1985). In other words, the existence of a strong state is generally more important than anything for Turkish people. In other words, the Turkish people made a positive correlation between a strong state and strong leadership. This has also been consolidated by modern republic times as well. Since the 70s, the economic and social crisis, terrorist attacks and the subsequent foreign policy issues have been identified with weak governments and the short-term coalition governments of Turkey.

Furthermore, the Turkish people have been attached to their leaders personally. There is deep relationship between leader and followers in Turkey. The main example is Atatürk who is framed as a leader with exceptional integrity and charisma across all aspects of his life by Turkish people (Özbilgin, 2011). Not only Atatürk, but also late years in Republican period, personal rule characterized politics and had inordinate power even in the multiparty period (Heper, 2000). Other examples in contemporary Turkish politics where former President Süleyman Demirel was called as "father" by Turkish people (İnan, 1995). Also, Heper suggests that most of the time Turkish people vote for leaders not for political parties or ideologies (2000). It can be said that Turkish political culture is still a leader-based one. From the perspective of society, leadership sustains political stability, not by the fragile party mechanism. Depend on this political

culture, leaders are seen as a cult and people have a higher expectancy from the leaders. This reality creates advantages and disadvantages for leaders in Turkey.

Consequently, structural and cultural differences have a vital role in determining a leader's environment in the countries in order to understand the dynamics and the process of decision making. Although there are similarities between Turkey and Germany, the main divergent characteristics of the state structure and culture make a very contrasting picture. On one hand, Germany's structure and culture does not allow for a very strong personal or party leadership in relation to konsensuspolitik while Turkey allows more opportunity for a strong leadership to have a unified and strong country.

### **3.5. Political Atmospheres in the World, Turkey and Germany at 90s till mid of 2000s**

As mentioned in the Chapter 1, this thesis does not have aim to compare states or systems. That's why, analyzing of two countries circumstances in 90s are given with aim to provide background where dynamics influenced how two leaders came to power. In order to understand countries background, atmosphere of international system should be mentioned. States are natural actor of international system which are interacting with each other. In other words, actors and system mutually constructed each other therefore it is not possible to understand any countries' circumstances in specific time without global context. In this respect, there would be a limited summary of how world and Europe looked like in 1990s and later political atmosphere of Turkey and Germany would be given separately.

1990 and its decade are remarkable date for world and especially to the Europe. There is no doubt, major events were dissolution of USSR and fall of communism changed the course of history which challenged all aspects of world politics. Dissolution of USSR was followed by dissolution of Yugoslavia which had resulted in emergence of new sovereign states in Central Asia, Balkans and Eastern and Central Europe. Obviously, the new world was not characterized by the bipolar Cold War world system. In addition to this, triumph of liberalism in the

West against communism also triggered decolonization in Africa. Numerous African countries became independent and ended era of colonization. As a result of emerging of new states, ethnic and regional conflicts emerged across the Balkans and African continent. Triumph of liberalism fuelled with capitalism while forces of globalization replaced complex interdependency of bipolar Cold War. With this concept, as famously well known the world was seen as a global village with neither boundaries nor frontiers (McLuhan et al., 1968). The revolution in communications and information technology has eliminated time and space barriers between actors. Even scholars like Francis Fukuyama claimed that it is “End of history” when Western liberal democracy is the final form of mode of government (1989).

As touched upon in the beginning, European Community (EC) was not exception within this evolution. Europe and European Community were in the edge of dramatic changing as well. In order to understand this transformation, internal issues should be mentioned which are British budgetary question, pressure for internal question and tasks for single market (Dinan, 2010). Delors’ leadership played key role to bring internal issues and influence of globalization as a encouraging factor transforming of European Community to Union (Dinan, 2010; Ross and Jenson, 2017). After 1981 and 1986 enlargement in EC, Single European Act fostered not only single market process but also strengthened decision-making process and social cohesion (Keohane & Hoffman, 1994). After Single European Act (SEA), Maastricht Treaty brought more widening and deepening integration in different policy sectors from foreign policy to education (Kahraman, 1997). Although reunification of Germany triggered fear of British and French governments vis-à-vis European integration, Delors took the opportunity to push for German membership in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), an objective that was already on the agenda of framework of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and finally ended up with political union thanks to support of French President Mitterand (Smith, 2009). Thus, 90s in all over the world was quite challenging and transforming which includes fall of communism, dissolution of USSR and Yugoslavia, decrease of power of central government institutions in many states across the world – from Colombia in South America to Somalia in

Africa and Afghanistan in Asia meanwhile deepening of the European Union with the creation of the new currency, the Euro, which aimed to create more unified continent (Agnew, 2005).

Turkey and Germany as a part of world and Europe were influenced by the global circumstances. However, due to unique socio-political and cultural structure of each country would be analyzed separately. The socio-political and cultural context of the country can be said to create the sociological, political, cultural and psychological conditions for leadership. It shows that the socio-political and cultural context of the country, which gives meaning to leadership, also determines the type of the leadership that arises. For these reasons, it can be said that “the leader is an element of the socio-political and cultural context that adds new meanings to the socio-political and cultural context”. In light of this, following parts would be political atmosphere of Turkey and Germany from beginning of 90s to 2000s which is analyzed in the categories are domestic politics, economic and foreign policy.

### **3.5.1. Turkey**

In the international system, Turkey has always been considered as a vital agent but it is always viewed as a middle power. Turkish politics have been influenced and have also influenced both regional and world politics. “It’s middle power status is intertwined with the size and population of the country, its economic power and its military sphere as well as its geographical strategic importance” (Koutri, 2011). In this context, Turkey’s geopolitics, demographic structure, multi-ethnic identity and history makes Turkey a unique nation state in international. The Turkish foreign policy has experienced traditions and ruptures since 1923 under the influence of internal and international dynamics. It’s not easy to summarize and explain all of Turkey’s historical patterns which is why in this there will be political atmosphere of Turkey from the 1990s to 2002 when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first entered national elections with the newly founded AK Party including with some references and important notes from the history.

### **3.5.1.1. Domestic Politics**

As Lesser says; contemporary Turkish politics cannot be understood without reference to the history (2009). Since 1923 Turkey's democratization process and political stability have experienced many catastrophic events such as a coup d'etat in 1960 and 1980. Along with political turbulence in Turkish modern history, economy and foreign policies have also had their own ups and downs. For this reason it is vitally important to provide those dynamics to understand the rise of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and AK Party.

Firstly, the political atmosphere of Turkey in 90s was influenced by end of the Cold War which led to elimination of left movements (Hale, 2002). Two new actors became more visible in Turkish politics, which are the conservatives and ethnic nationalist movements. Between 1987 and 1991, Turgut Özal had strong public support. In 1991, Mesut Yılmaz became the chairman of the ANAP (Motherland Party) and later Prime Minister who took Turkey to early election. In this election, Süleyman Demirel formed a government with social democrats until the death of Özal in 1993 when Süleyman Demirel became president of Turkey. Tansu Çiller was his successor. However once more scandal of corruption and economic crisis hit Turkey. Tansu Çiller and newly reformed coalition with CHP (Republican People's Party) once again took Turkey to early election in 1995.

Although the military was the dominant actor in Turkish politics, there was an increase in the number of monthly journals and an emergence of religious networks associated with local power centers and a shift of emphasis within the Islamic movement in favor of the traditional Sufi orders (Ayata, 1991). Because of 1994 Banking crisis and failed policies of government in Turkey, conservative Refah Party (Welfare Party) became popular as an alternative in Turkish politics. In the 1994 local election, the Refah Party led by Necmettin Erbakan won the control of big cities including İstanbul with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A year later, the Refah Party won the most of voters in the 1995 general election, which turned out to be one of the biggest events, both in Turkey and abroad. This is because for the first time, a conservative party had the chance to dominate executive positions.

Tansu Çiller had formed coalition government with Mesut Yılmaz that survived only a month and later the Refah Party became a new coalition partner of Çiller. However, just a year later, Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign by post-modern coup that Cengiz Çandar called 28<sup>th</sup> February Process. It was not only a military intervention but also led to stratification within the society. This process led to huge protests from both seculars and conservatives camps. There have been measures ranging from curbs of the Islamist state-run preacher training schools known as İmam Hatip Liseleri (İHLs), to the closure of private Qur'anic schools and courses and restrictions which the military believed were being used to inculcate anti-secularist values (Jenkins, 2007). 28<sup>th</sup> February Process ended with the closure of Refah Party and Erbakan's ban from political life with a decision of the Constitutional Court. However social and political tension would continue in the 1999 election and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) as a successor of Refah Party entered election.

Division and high tension between conservatives and seculars and unbalanced civil-military relations were not the only political and social problem of 90s. In addition to this, the 90s was remarkable for Turkey's serious terrorism problem with terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and tension with the Kurdish originated political parties. The Iraqi war, the Kurdish refugee influx and support of Syria to PKK complicated Turkey's Kurdish question (Kirişçi, 2004). However, heavily military conflict was continuing in Southeastern part of Turkey. 22 Kurdish originated MPs had entered to TGNA in 1991 election who formed first pro-Kurdish party called HEP with SHP. HEP succeeded by the DEP which were shut down by Constitutional Court. The 1993 attack to bus carrying unarmed civilians and soldiers could be considered as turning point in fighting against terrorism. At the same time, 22 MPs of HEP were arrested. HADEP (People Democracy Party) had been established by Murat Bozlak, could participate in 1995 and 1999 elections.

Under this atmosphere, the last election in Turkey of 20<sup>th</sup> century was held in 1999 which ended up with coalition government composed of the DSP (Democratic Left Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP

(Motherland Party). As well as previous coalition governments, this coalition government was far from bringing stability to the country. The main achievement of this coalition was enhancing the EU reform process of Turkey by changing necessary legislation amendments after the Helsinki Summit (Aybars et al., 2018). 1999 was also a cornerstone for fighting against terrorism when Turkish forces captured Öcalan who was the leader of the PKK and brought him back to Turkey. He was sentenced with the death penalty however due to Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit being against the death penalty and pressure from the EU, the Turkish Court of Appeal upheld the death penalty decision. There is no doubt, his capture almost ended the military dimension of the problem but political and social dimension left still problematic. In addition to this, three events also shaped the political and social conditions in 1999. One of them was happened in March 1999, Mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was got prison sentence and sent to jail. Two months later, Merve Kavakçı who was the first member of TGNA with headscarf was dismissed from the parliament without allow to take an oath. Ravza Kavakçı Kan who is sister of Merve Kavakçı and deputy of AK Party from Istanbul remind these days as following;

*Four events if you ask me 90s of Turkey's politics; lynching of Ahmet Kaya who was Kurdish singer by other artists because he wanted to sing Kurdish song, sending Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to prison, dismissal of Merve Kavakçı from TGNA because of headscarf and Gölcük earthquake where even humanitarian aid was not allowed from conservative NGOs regarding fighting against radicalization (Personal Interview, 2020).*

So, the general picture of social and political atmosphere in Turkey was; division between seculars and oppressed conservatives under the dominance of military at the same time there was also an unsolved terrorism problem with the PKK at its peak. Sabri Sayarı claims that regarding the implications the Kurdish issue was the main item in both domestic politics and foreign policy agendas of Turkey in 90s (1997). Through 90s, no single party won majority in the parliament. Turkey suffered from lack of leadership as well.

### **3.5.1.2. Economic**

Between 1990 and 2001, Turkey had experienced three economic crises. Temiz and Gökmen identify economic conditions of Turkey with by high regulation, restricted interest rates, controlled foreign exchange operations, limited foreign asset holding, low intensity of competition, barriers to foreign entry and insufficient liquidity, chronic inflation and a deficit in balance of payments (2009).

Firstly, 1994 was marked by the banking crisis which sourced from wrong decisions related to capital liberalization from 1989 with overvalued Turkish liras through emissions of money. Celasun argues that huge requirements from the public fell by 6 percent, inflation rose to three-digit levels, the sector borrowing in 1993 and early 1994, combined with Central Bank lost half of its reserves (1999). In addition to this, an increasing in public expenditures and the inability of the Treasury to make borrowing triggered a greater crisis. Thus, inherent fragility and wrong policies created the necessary conditions for 1994 crises. April decisions in 1994 were successful to end panic and had good results for short term however results were severe for Turkish economy in the long term. The Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70 percent against the US dollar in the first quarter of 1994 and The Central Bank had to intervene led to lost more than half of its international reserves (Özatay, 2000). Even the IMF agreement failed to find sustainable solutions for the crises. As Öniş mentioned that every economic crisis also bring political breakdowns in Turkish political history (2010). That's why not only economic consequences of 1994 Banking crisis, but also political result is quite important which led to rise of the Islamist Welfare Party and later on 28 February process (Öniş, 2010).

Secondly, Asian and Russian financial crises hit the Turkish economy starting in late summer of 1998. Foreign investors once more withdrew their investments from Turkey (Yeldan, 2006). Because of this, capital inflows into Turkey went down and economic growth slowed down from 7.5% in 1997 to 2.5% in 1998 (Görmez & Yiğit, 2009). The slowdown in growth further undermined the confidence of foreign investors. This crisis was followed by a devastating



earthquake, which hit the industrial heartland of Turkey in 1999, resulted in deteriorating in Turkey's economic performance. The strong fall in capital inflows and the devastating earthquake pushed the economy into a deep recession (Ertuğrul & Selçuk, 2001). In 1999, the economy shrank by 3.6% while budget deficit reached 12% of GDP and public debt rose to 40% of GDP (Brinke, 2013). In 1998, Turkey designed a stabilization program to reduce inflation. The IMF and domestic policy makers attributed inflation to large budget deficits, so the stabilization program included strategies for debt reduction and an ambitious privatization scheme. Furthermore, the program included the privatization of large state-owned enterprises such as Türk Telekom, budgetary discipline and the regulation of the banking and financial system (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003).

However, the first wave came on November 2000 when ten banks declared their bankruptcy led to a withdrawal of foreign investors. While Turkey was dealing with the shock, the second wave happened in February 2001 when a political crisis between former PM Bülent Ecevit and former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer resulted in a complete shutdown of the economy in terms of foreign investors and public debt (Ergocun, 2020). 2001 economic crisis was the worst crisis Turkey ever had. The government's first step was to create a new economic team with Kemal Derviş, a senior World Bank officer. On March 2001, Kemal Derviş was appointed as Minister of Economic Affairs. Miller described Kemal Derviş as an outsider, a nonpartisan technocrat with significant international experience (2006). Kemal Derviş personally symbolized the emergence of a new kind of politics in the era of financial globalization (Öniş & Rubin, 2003). In other words, a Kemal Derviş as an individual played a critical role in forming a bridge between the domestic political sphere of the country and international financial community. The full details of Derviş 's plan for the Turkish economy was set out in the Letter of Intent of 3 May, which marked a substantial new step in Turkey's economic reforms. Brendenkamp, Josefsson and Lindgren summarized the key elements of the plan as follows:

- Restructuring of the state-owned and failed private banks,
- More ambitious budgetary targets

- A revitalized privatization program, covering the telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, sugar, and tobacco sectors.
- Statutory independence for the CBT, with a mandate to move toward formal inflation targeting.
- Incomes policies, including tight control of public sector pay and a more active role for government in influencing private pay settlements (2009, p.67).

Consequences of Kemal Derviş's reforms are actually controversial. Economy shows some improvements from autumn 2001 however overall picture was totally bleak. The period between 1994-2002, unemployment rate more than doubled, food poverty among the urban poor increased significantly, and the World Bank found that the lives of the poor were particularly stretched by the consequences of the crisis and austerity measures (Turkey- Poverty & Coping after the Crisis, 2003; Miller, 2006). The decade was full of economic crises, which made the political system more fragile. More importantly, severe economic conditions became the main reason for society looking for new political leadership in the early elections. Thus, combination of Ecevit's health issues and splits within the DSP led to an early general election, held on 3 November 2002.

### **3.5.1.3. Foreign Policy**

At the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of USSR and the political activism of Turgut Özal challenged traditional Turkish foreign policy approaches (Kirişçi, 2017). Thanks to this uniqueness, multidimensional and proactive foreign policies were a marker of President Özal's era (Taşpınar, 2008; Hale, 2013). Post Özal period could be discussed in two time periods; 1993-1999 and 1999-2002. 1993-1999 is marked with a coalition era in foreign policy. Political turbulence of domestic politics also found its reflection in foreign policy. In general, this era was summarized by the problems of Syria and Greece from outside and the PKK from inside vis-à-vis the rising power of Welfare Party. In the period of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party, who came to power with the discourse of independent foreign policy which based on four principles; distinctive foreign policy, protection of human rights, Leader Turkey and advance level cooperation

with Muslim countries (Yıldız, 2017). Along with his vision, Erbakan was trying to develop anti-Western alternatives. For example, The D-8 (Developing Eight) was established by Erbakan which consists of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. However, the direction of the foreign policy was challenged by the 28<sup>th</sup> February post-modern coup d'état, the Syrian crisis, Greece and the negative attitudes of the West.

Through this period, Turkey's relations with Syria were quite important between two countries. Tension was sourced mainly from Syrian support for the PKK and distribution of Euphrates' water. As a reaction to Syria, Turkey started military cooperation with Israel at the same time Syria started military cooperation with Greece. Tensions increased with Turkey's decision to send troops which ended up with deportation of the Öcalan and Adana Agreement. In addition to this, Greece's aggressive attitude towards the islands and the Kardak Crisis continued till İsmail Cem era. Furthermore, this period was also problematic for Turkey's EU membership. Helmut Kohl and Wilfried Martins declared that the EU is a civilizational project and Turkey has no place (Hale, 2000). Thus, threats from Syria, Greece as well as internal and external issues led to a more security based foreign policy where the army increased its power within foreign policy making.

When it comes to 1999, thanks to the changing political dynamics of Turkey and EU with new government has transformed Turkish foreign policy. From 1999 till 2002, Turkey had one priority; Europe. It should be noted the role of İsmail Cem as a Minister of Foreign Affairs in this transformation was undeniable. As a reflection of these dynamics, the security based foreign policy and the role of actors had been replaced in foreign policy. Starting from the 1999 Earthquake, Turkish and Greek rapprochement took place. Thanks to softer approach of Schröder government in Germany with a decision not to veto of Greece in Helsinki Summit, Turkey granted his candidate country status towards EU membership (Eralp, 2000). Ozan Ceyhun former member of European Parliament(MEP) and now Ambassador of Turkey to Austria emphasized the role of Schröder in this process "Schröder's positive approach directly changed the situation" (Personal Interview, 2020). This development carried very powerful

incentives to the reform process in Turkey (Altunışık, 2011). Through this reform process, government passed 34 constitutional amendments, including the reduction of police powers of detention, expansion of human rights, lifting of the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts and increasing civilian representation in the National Security Council (NSC) (Larrabee & Lasser, 2003). Finally, reforms in the penal code were introduced, including outlawing of death penalty. Thanks to those reforms, Turkey complied with political criteria of Copenhagen Criteria. Europeanization initiatives of Turkish foreign policy diminished security based approach and role of military in foreign policy. In other words, process encouraged Ankara's political elites to develop a more democratic, proactive and less hard-security foreign policy.

In addition to Europeanization process; due to ideological background and vision of coalition partner Nationalist Movement Party, Turkey launched to pursue more active policies in Central Asia. Under Devlet Bahçeli, his Nationalist Action Party continued to put more emphasis on 'Turkic unity' than the other parties (Hale, 2013). Turkey had been one of the main actors after end of the Cold War Especially cultural and historical projects had been prioritized through TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination of Agency). However, the 2001 economic crisis struck Turkish foreign policy as well. The economic interdependency of Turkey to IMF made Turkey unable to pursue more proactive policies in all around the world. However, it can be said that although political turbulence in domestic politics, Europeanization process was conducted successfully in order to start Turkey's negotiation process.

### **3.5.2. Germany**

Germany can be deemed as one of the country who has deep state history within European continent. 20<sup>th</sup> century brought two devastating wars and created divided Germany. After years of sufferings for Germans, on 28 November 1989, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed a "Ten Point Plan" a series of measures on "immediate assistance" for the GDR and the development of "confederative structures" between the two German states. He emphasized that "Reunification –

that is, regaining Germany's state unity – remains the political aim of the federal government" (Hekmut Kohl's Ten Point Plan for German Unity, 1989). The first free elections to the GDR People's Chamber took place on 18 March. The election campaign focused mainly on the shape and speed of unification with the Federal Republic. The election result, a victory for the conservative Alliance for Germany, was a clear vote in favor of the fastest possible unification. Lothar de Maizière (CDU) had been elected to be successor of Modrow as the new Prime Minister of the GDR on 12 April 1990, the treaty introducing monetary, economic and social union was signed in Bonn on 18 May which completed the integration of GDR was officially.

Throughout the 90s, Germany's main political agenda was based on how to deal with reunification and its political influence. Also, the reunification of Germany created its own political dynamics and political figures. Not only reunification itself but also its economic and social difficulties had been main challenges for Germany. In addition to reunification, Europe Community and regional issues also affected Germany's foreign policy. In other words, since reunification till 2005 when Angela Merkel became Chancellor, Germany's political atmosphere was shaped under influence of two elements which are achieving political and economic unity and the second institutional continuity with respect to West German socio-cultural and economic practices, ensuring political stability (Lang et al., 2017).

### **3.5.2.1. Domestic Politics**

German Unification took place on 3<sup>rd</sup> October of 1990, and the first all-German was held on 2<sup>nd</sup> December of 1990. The achievement of national unification was soon shadowed by a series of difficulties which is not easy to mention because of problematic nature of causality issues in IR (Lang et al., 2017). Unification was not easy as Kohl had represented before reunification. In the coming years after unification, he also admitted as follows "As far as inner unity goes, the economic and social challenges will admittedly take longer and cost more than most, including myself, had originally assumed" (Larres, 2001). In this respect, two

main issues in domestic politics that were bureaucratic and social problems until 2000s.

As Dennis and Kolinsky explains after reunification, main issue was about how to absorb new Länder of former GDR in terms economical, political and social (2004). There was the main fear on about the decline of power or competences of the Länder vis-à-vis the federation by politicians and experts (Gunlicks, 2002) which means there would be strong of centralization and 'loss of substance' for Länder. As well as the consequences of reunification on the restructuring of the federal system, ongoing European integration was another element in discussion. Unification processes and outcomes was embedded in the wider context of accelerated European integration, as reflected in the transition to a European Union by way of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (Lang et al., 2017). The concrete example of these discussions was obviously debate on the location of the new government. Although with unification Berlin had become the capital of the united country, they had huge discussion to determine whether government remain in Bonn or should move to Berlin. On 20 June 1991, narrow majority decided to move capital from Bonn to Berlin. These kind of various bureaucratic problems took time to have consensus for solving and implementing.

Moreover, reunification also influenced the party system in Germany. After reunification, there are two different party systems at the Länder level: a four-party system in the old Länder, consisting of the larger CDU (CSU in Bavaria) and SPD and the smaller Bündnis 90/Greens and FDP whereas a three-party system in the new Länder, consisting of the CDU, SPD and PDS (Gunlicks, 2003). This bipolarity in the German system became apparent in the late 1990s. Also, voters' behaviors have played an important role to understand changing in political party system. In this respect, Amir Abedi points out 1998 and 2005 election which led to breaking in political party system where voters' behavior changed unexpectedly (2017). For example, while Germany has experienced the rise and persistence of new parties with eastern roots, like the PDS, which emerged both in East and West as known Die Linke (Lang et al., 2017). It can be said that, two parties dominating government formation at the federal level, CDU/CSU and SPD still do better in the

West, while *Die Linke* continues to accrue higher vote shares in the East (Abedi, 2017).

There is no doubt, reunification had a social dimension as well. While, social system had been debated, there have been some realities naturally occurred. Since the night when the Berlin Wall fell down, a huge numbers of Eastern Germans rushed to Western Germany as an immediate result of reunification. Almost one million people changed place of residence inside Germany during the first three months of reunification (Wild & Jones,1994). With more concrete numbers, the population of the East (excluding Berlin) declined from 14.6 million in 1991 to 12.7 million, while the West German population increased by about 5 million which created unavoidable social problems (Burda & Weder, 2017). Together with economical challenges, this era was unable to produce a fusion of the two Germanys; no real feeling of togetherness has emerged (Fitzpatrick, 2019). The initial optimism expressed by politicians who predicted a smooth merger has given way to a more pessimistic outlook. This social division is not an easy problem, which could be solved through legal ways like economic and political one. As Anderson claims perhaps this is the lasting legacy of unification: dehomogenization, and consequently a broadening of the sense of what is, and what is means to be German (2010).

### **3.5.2.2. Economics**

Economic cost of reunification had been felt till 2000s. It is not easy to separate economic issues from political and social costs of reunification which were quite interdependent each other and holistic however two economic issues became visible during post reunification till mid of 2000s; are slow growth and unemployment. Firstly. after reunification, growth rate of Germany had been decreasing steadily. Actually, West Germany financed economic costs of unification through federal debt and they provided 1:1 exchange rate between East Mark and Deutsche Mark, which led to a large amount of cash to buy western consumer goods. As expected it created an economic boom with GDP growth exceeding 5 percent in 1990 and 1991 (Vitols, 2005). As a result of debt financed

growth and high interest accompanied with global slowdown, Germany experienced a sharp recession in 1992/93. In overall, The GDP growth rate was only 1.6% between 1995 and 2001 (Gaskart, 2014). This unfavorable development in economic growth has been accompanied by a dramatic deterioration in the employment situation made economy worse (Vitols,2005). While the Treuhandanstalt liquidated firms in the East, unemployment naturally increased (Donnelly, 2012). Just after the reunification, in 1991, almost three million eastern Germans who were one-third of the former GDR's work force, had been either unemployed or on reduced working hours which later turned a protests towards Kohl (Steininger, 2001). At the beginning of the millennium Larres mentions that the situation continued in the new Länder in the east than in the old Länder in western Germany (in the east in 1999 unemployment was 17.6 per cent compared to 8.8 per cent in the west (2001). Paralleling with unemployment issue, wage difference between East and West Germans was another problem in post reunification process. As Steininger mentions after reunification their wages were generally only 40 per cent of those in the western part of Germany (2001). Also economic consequences of reunification were severed by European integration process of Germany. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty, followed by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty put strict boundaries on Germany's ability to respond to its domestic economic problems, particularly unemployment.

Kohl's euphoria on reunification turned to burden for Schröder governments too. Although in the year of 2000, there were signs of decreasing of unemployment with minor numbers, Germany was still behind EU countries in terms of unemployment, inflation rate and growth rate in 2002. In 2002 when unemployment rate peaked at 13,4% Schröder decided to implement economical reforms called Hartz reforms. Mainly, reforms included following points which are

- 'Laws for Reform of the Job Market' (or Hartz reforms) would be enacted in stages between January 2003 (Hartz I) and January 2005 (Hartz IV).
- "The first three parts of the reform package, Hartz I-III, are mainly concerned with creating new types of employment opportunities (Hartz I), introducing



additional wage subsidies (Hartz II), and restructuring the Federal Employment Agency (Hartz III).

- The final part, Hartz IV, would be implemented in 2005 and resulted in a significant cut in the unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed” (Krebs & Scheffel, 2013).

Personal-Service-Agentur was established as temporary agencies to match unemployed people with employers which was grant for new entrepreneurs, known as the ‘Ich-AG’ to create new businesses. In addition, they brought in benefit cuts of up to 30% if a person on unemployment benefits refused to take up a reasonable offer of work (Hopp, 2019).

When economic indicators are analyzed, Hartz reforms could be considered as successful in improvement in some issues such as training and job creation while several new measures were suggested in Hartz such as placement vouchers, assignments to private placement providers, and fixed-term contracts for older workers were not successful (Jacobi & Kluge, 2006). Also, the division between East and West remained by then in the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of reunification, Unemployment in the East was still higher than in the West, and economic growth is too slow. It can be said that more than 20 years after unification, divisive resentments between East and West are still alive and some Eastern regions are depopulated (Leisering, 2012).

### **3.5.2.3. Foreign Policy**

Germany’s political atmosphere until 2005 when Merkel became Chancellor, was also highly dependent on the domestic and economic circumstances of country. Although reunification can be considered as an internal issue for Germany, the reunification triggered processes of far-reaching societal and political change across Federal Republic as a whole, and the degree to which these transformations can be linked to Germany’s changing role in Europe and as a global actor (Lang et al., 2017). In the post reunification process the German question reached a new level within Europe. There were many fears that a reunified Germany would

destabilize Europe but from 1990, the reunited Germany's foreign policy has been largely characterized by its continuity. Therefore, it could be said that Germany's foreign policy in the post reunification era was shaped by integration of the EU and NATO vis-à-vis unification process and the use of tools through the emerging challenges such as the War in the Balkans and the Iraq crisis. By the mid of 2000s, Webber suggests that German foreign policy was still strongly Western-oriented, multilateralist and Euro-centric (Webber, 2001; Belkin, 2008).

Political process of the reunification was highly dependent on EU integration which had an impact on German foreign policy. Germany always seeks to align themselves with the EU's foreign policy vis-à-vis US's foreign policy. There was one exception which was the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany although the EU did not recognize them until 1991. Germany did not seek any leadership or central position within the European Community until the conflict in the Balkan (Pradetto, 2006). Europe's inability and unwillingness to intervene in the Balkans triggered debates within Germany as a part of collective security in the region. Due to the pressure of the NATO member countries and anti-genocide war campaigns within Germany for the first time since WWII, Kohl government decided to deploy its military to prevent genocide with multilateral coalition. 424 members of the Bundestag said "yes" to Bundeswehr participation regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, while forty-eight members of Parliament (mostly Greens and PDS) voted "no" with sixteen abstentions (Friedrich et al., 2000). There is no doubt, it was also a strong message to NATO as reliable and a strong partner in the long run.

In the 1998 election, SPD formed a coalition government with the Greens which lead by Schröder as chancellor. Although Kohl generally maintained low profile towards EU and NATO, Schröder and foreign minister Joschka Fischer's approach had been visible and bold who was publicly stating German's interest and desire (Belkin,2008). Just a year later, the Schröder government was faced with Kosovo war. After the Srebrenica genocide in the Bosnian war, Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher said that we need to separate the "never again war" and "never again genocide" discussions and reminded people that Auschwitz and Srebrenica are the

same. In 1998, the 13<sup>th</sup> German Bundestag approved the NATO aerial operations with 500 “yes” against 62 “no” votes and 18 abstentions (Suchanek, 2015). As well as the Bosnia decision, this decision was also deemed as breaking from the past of German foreign policy. With the Balkan wars we realized for the first time that there are situations in which one has to intervene militarily," said Ludger Volmer, the former president of the Green Party who went on to serve as the Germany's Deputy Foreign Minister (2010). “This breach was all the more significant because the new Schröder coalition government contained strong pacifist tendencies in both the Green and the Social Democratic parties” (Harnisch, 2001, p.52). In addition to this; Schröder kept a more positive relationship with Russia and directly claimed a seat for Germany in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), supporting Turkey’s EU membership process as well as had rapprochement policies for Eastern neighbors. Probably the veto of Schröder’s government for Iraqi invasion was the most serious breaking point which led to a severe crisis with Washington and between allies of NATO (Schöllgen, 2004). As a reaction, opposition leader Angela Merkel wrote an article and suggesting that Germany should be loyal to its allies.

Lastly, the decision of coalition under Kohl and then Schröder on use of Bundeshwehr in Balkan conflicts also opened up a discussion about Germany’s foreign policy tools. Including the pre-unification process, Germany has played a civilian power role in world politics. Maull defines civilian power as a necessity when cooperating with others in the pursuit of international objectives through the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction (1990). Although liberals suggest that the Bunderswehr could be used to prevent a war, Kosovo decision of Germany was a move towards using the military as a tool.

When we analyze the foreign policy of Germany since the unification of 2005, it could be analyzed within two parts depending on the two coalitions under Kohl and Schröder. Although Kohl preferred to follow more transatlantic patterns while focusing on European integration and unification domestically, Schröder brought

more German interest in his foreign policy making with unexpected policy decisions as a response to regional crisis. In short; when the 2005 election was happening, Germany's transatlantic relations was almost at the bottom, under the shadow of massive protests based on Hartz reforms and rising unemployment (Seifert, 2006; Leaman, 2009). While Schröder was still trying to overcome these problems as well as refugees from Balkan countries at the same time the CDU had a new leader, Angela Merkel who made herself distinct from huge scandal of Kohl within CDU (Sheeler & Anderson, 2014).

### **3.6. Turkey and Germany in 90s: Seeking a New Leadership**

The two countries have their own formal and informal constitutive elements in policy making. Turkey and Germany were on the brink of transforming themselves at the end of 90s. Turkey experienced the most devastating times of republic history when Turkey's desire for Europeanization was shadowed by terrorism, economic crisis and political instability. Obviously, there was social outrage for the new government and political leadership. As Öniş and Keyman mentioned that the "Turkish election of 3 November 2002 was a peaceful, democratic expression of the deep anger felt by Turkish voters toward a political establishment known more for economic populism, clientelism, and corruption than for democratic accountability" (2003, p.95). In addition to this the 2002 election results should also be analyzed from a sociological perspective. Social stratification within society which began on the 28<sup>th</sup> February and unbalanced civil-military relations triggering voters to vote for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Justice and Development Party (AK Party) as a new hope when political parties and political elites in Turkey were no longer considered as part of the solution, but the cause of the problems (Açikel, 2003). Ravza Kavakçı Kan describes Turkey's conditions in 90s as follows;

*Violation of basic rights was the normalcy and part of Turkey in 90s for minority groups who are conservatives, Alevis, Kurds or such as Armenian, Romanian people who want to say I am also part of this country as myself had been considered as others not real citizens of Turkey that's why Erdoğan and AK Party were seen as a hope for changing (Ravza Kavakçı Kan, Personal Interview, 2020).*

Thus, Erdoğan and his newly established party successfully consolidated economic, social and political conditions of Turkey in 2002.

On the other hand, Germany had its own momentum to change national and Europe history in the beginning of 90s. Social, economic and political problems sourced from thirty years of divergence within the country peaked in the 90s. Kohl's reunification premises could not meet the realities of society and economy. Although the Schröder government made a huge effort to recover German economy which was not enough. Then, May 2005 the Chancellor, had to asked for the dissolution of the Bundestag and a new election after a decline in support for his economic reforms. As well as Turkish voters, German voters were looking for a new leader who can find solutions for economic, political and social issues. In this respect, opposition leader Angela Merkel was considered more competent in generating new jobs, and voters thought she had a better plan for Germany's future (Brettschneider et al., 2006, p.493). Merkel developed her campaign completely based on the country being at a crossroads in terms of economic and socially (Schmitt-Beck & Faas, 2006). It can be said that the results of the 2005 election, German voters clearly expressed that Angela Merkel as a new hope in German politics. Thus, Erdoğan and Merkel came to power in very devastating and turbulent times in their countries. There is no doubt that this reality gave them both advantages and disadvantages through the years which will be analyzed in later chapters.

## CHAPTER 4

### RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN'S BIOGRAPHY

In the SNA Leadership Model, personal background of leaders is second dimension which is one of the element to shape foreign policies. In this respect, within the scope of this thesis, Chapter 4 would be about biography of Erdoğan which composed of his early childhood, families and cornerstones of political life. In the last part of the Chapter 4, there would be analysis of Erdoğan's leadership with third dimension which includes four approaches and behaviors. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in İstanbul in February 1954 as the first children of Ahmet and Tenzile Erdoğan. Ahmet and Tenzile Erdoğan had another son and a daughter after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He and his family are originally from Rize. His father Ahmet Erdoğan lost his father at the age of. He left from Rize and he settled next to his relatives in Zonguldak. After four years of working, he emigrated to İstanbul. Ahmet Erdoğan was a religious person who works as a captain at Deniz İşletmeleri. He was a sailor known as a loyal, trustworthy man and authoritarian father. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described his father in the documentary titled 'Usta'nın Hikâyesi' as a trusted and believed person (2013).

Also he described his father as an "authoritarian father" and he stated that the seriousness of his father had an important role in the development of his character.

*As soon as you swear, you pay the bill very heavily. My father settled with us from time to time, "we paid the bill heavily, but we won and it greatly affected us as his strictness has had a huge impact on the formation of our characteristics (Ustanın Hikayesi, 2013).*

It should be said that Erdoğan's memories of his father were not only of being punished when Erdoğan or his brother swore. For example, it is emphasized that his father liked the times when his father took him for a ride in Galata and

Tophane, and he realized the love and affection of his father underneath his tough personality (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan kimdir—Biyografi Ansiklopedisi, 2019). In his speech at the opening of İmam Hatip School, which carries the name of his father in Bayrampaşa in 2016, he says;

*The story of my father is actually the story of millions of noble hearted fathers in the past and present of this country ...Captain Ahmet Erdoğan's 85 years of life symbolizes labor, dignity and working for his family at the same time spent living upright stating that he has the greatest of honor; it is the greatest dream of leaving this legacy to their children (Erdoğan, Bayrampaşa'da Babasının Adını Taşıyan Eğitim Kompleksinin Açılışını Yaptı, 2016).*

Some writers discuss what he says about his father in this context extensively, especially Dindar (2014), who tries to analyze Erdoğan's leadership processes with a Freudian approach. Also, İnel (2015) who describe Erdoğan as “an authoritarian and resentful person based on the relationship with his father in the context of "allegiance and anger" in the context of examining. İnel (2015) states that one of the forms of reckoning Erdoğan speaks of is hanging the 5-6 years old child – probably from his foot! These analyses are not considered concrete and scientific approach to understand the influence of his childhood on his leadership which are misleading and limited. Such an approach means to ignore the effects of mothers, siblings, other relatives and the very close environment on a person's personality.

Who is the mother Tenzile Erdogan? It is stated that Tenzile Erdoğan is a beloved woman by her neighbors and other relatives. It is said that she was a very compassionate, loving, helpful, faithful lady who worried about her neighbors, helped them through their illnesses and bad situations. Tenzile Erdoğan's love and affection towards her children, especially to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is well known. It was told that she sat praying whilst waiting for him come back home almost every night until the morning during the turbulent periods of the September 12<sup>th</sup> military coup. It is well known that many young people did not return home to their mothers in street clashes, interrogations, arrests and prisons during this period (Ülke Tv, 2017).

Erdoğan has a great love, respect and affection for his mother and at every opportunity, he mentioned it. Particularly on May 8, 2011, the speech he made at

the Kahramanmaraş rally that is on a mother's day, he reveals his feelings and thoughts on this subject. He said that everyone should show great love and respect for mothers. In his speech, Erdoğan said,

*Heaven is under mother's feet which should be kissed. There is the smell of heaven under the feet of mothers, it smells. I kiss. I think you're kissing. Does it look like mother? Heaven is under the feet of mothers, not fathers, it is very important for us that every day is mother's day (Liderler Anneler Gününü Kutladı, 2011).*

He repeated this and stated it at every opportunity and this had a significant impact on the development of the AK Party as a major women's movement.

Erdoğan stated that he had a very active childhood (Ustanın Hikayesi, 2013). He was playing games with friends such as long donkey and dodge ball, at home, checkers, nine stones and candles on the tower and create a fire with joy. Regarding a question about whether he was riding a bike or not, he answered that, "Unfortunately we were not in a position to buy bicycles" (Ustanın hikayesi, 2013). In a parliamentary group meeting which held in 2007, he defined the family as a material and spiritual umbrella that transcends mother, father and children, including grandparents, aunts, uncles and even neighbors protecting and owning them. Erdoğan's childhood memories in his speeches reveal that he spent his childhood in an environment where he felt safe, colorful, excited and active despite some absences and deprivations. Memories and writings indicate that there was a caring father and a mother who showed eternal love and affection.

Erdoğan started Piyale Paşa Primary School 1960. It is stated that he sold water and bagels in his primary school years to earn school allowance. Years later, entrepreneurship was a personal trait that differentiated him from other leaders throughout his political life where he reflected in political life. 'Namaz' in the 5<sup>th</sup> was turning point for Erdoğan's life. The school principal İhsan Hoca watched namaz performance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and he recommended to Ahmet Erdoğan his son should be sent to the İmam Hatip school. Ahmet Erdoğan accepted this suggestion and after graduating from primary school in 1965, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan passed the free boarding exam and enrolled to İmam Hatip School



in Istanbul (Dünden bugüne Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın yaşamı ve siyasi kariyeri, 2018).

#### **4.1. In İmam Hatip School**

İmam Hatip School is one of the cornerstone in Erdoğan's life. At this stage, it is necessary to mention some of the difficulties or limitations of being an Imam in Turkey. Even though it was a successful time and he entered exams and studied for a total of 7 years, negative social perceptions and barriers for entrance to the university were the most prominent issue for him. For example, alumni of İmam Hatip schools had the right to attend certain higher education institutions. Those who want to be enrolled other programs must take additional courses.

Erdoğan explained these days as follows “People say graduates of Imam Hatip schools will be the dead washer or will you deal with the funeral” (Ustannın Hikayesi, 2013). He also took high school examinations as an extra and graduated from Eyüp High School as well. Erdoğan used the diploma of Eyüp High School during the university entrance process. In the following years, although barriers for alumni of İmam Hatip schools were partially removed. After the 28<sup>th</sup> February Process brought similar difficulties and constraints for Imam Hatip schools. At the same time, obstacles, such as the inability to work in the public sphere with headscarves continued for a long time. Obviously, that such an injustice constitutes for the students of Imam Hatip schools and of their families which been effective in terms of the development of courage and determination as a leadership and characteristics. Erdoğan's İmam Hatip School years were very important in his life as he emphasizes this on every occasion. Separation from home was not easy to survive as a child, a teenager and a student in an environment where there were many challenges. Despite all these difficulties, Erdoğan was not willing to accept only an ordinary form of existence in those years. Instead of spending the weekends at home, he earned money by selling water and bagels outside then; he spent most of his money on books. His favorite authors were Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's books and poems by Mehmet Akif Ersoy, as well as Russian classics, especially Tolstoy which later influenced his thoughts.

He quickly became one of the most remarkable students at school who was loved and praised by his teachers. Erdoğan's teacher Hüseyin Atilla Şener, Yusuf Karaca and Yusuf Köse describe Erdoğan as a very sociable and respectful student. They also mentioned that Erdoğan never forgot them even during his presidency (Ünlülerin Öğretmenleri—Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN - Tufan KÖSE, 2018). These characteristics should be emphasized as some of the important qualities of Erdoğan as a person and who maintain his ties.

Erdoğan also participated in many social activities in the school. He was successful football and basketball player in the school (Besli & Özbay 2014, p. 18-29). Erdoğan was also good at reading poems who won prizes many contests. In the last two years of high school, he became the chairman of the debate club and won competition within Istanbul high schools for two consecutive years. In these debates, Erdoğan developed sophisticated skills to use verbal and body language effectively. At the same time, as explained by Besli and Özbay, he went to Milli Türk Talebe Birliği-MTTB (National Turkish Students Union) where he had new the social environment in which gained his first political and intellectual experiences (2010). MTTB was an important organization and youth movement that affected the lives of many young people and Turkish politics, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to understand political meaning of MTTB in his life, political atmosphere in Turkey within 60s as a decade.

The 1960s began with a military coup which was a period that ended with another military memorandum-coup. In 1945, Celal Bayar, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan who were expelled from the CHP and they founded the Democratic Party (Erer, 1966). Ali Adnan Ertekin Menderes had who won the 1950 elections with an election victory, became the prime minister defined this movement as “White revolution” (Kartal, 2003; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). 1960 military coup removed him from the government. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were executed on the 16<sup>th</sup> September 1961. Depend on where and how the cases are viewed, they can be discussed in many different dimensions. This situation also affected Turkey's international reputation. Indeed, Norman Stone mentions that, “at that time even

pressure from Pope, President Eisenhower and Queen of England couldn't hinder their executions and coup d'état actually didn't solve any problem" (2011, pp. 170-171). There is no doubt, this period also left trauma, and the execution of the prime minister and ministers created a serious context of victimization that hurts social conscience.

The years before and after the coup d'état can be considered as the trigger for long term social polarization between, right-leftist, secular-Islamist. Besli and Özbay (2014) stated that left-wing youth was in high demand due to the political environment created by the 60s revolutions in those years which were able to organize quickly, dominate the press and engage in conflict with the right wing within university campuses for dominance. On the other hand, Ortaylı and Küçükkaya (2017, p.195) stated that a group consisting of all kinds of opposition outside the parliament and can be defined as "68 generations". Army was effective in another military coup in 1971, known as the "12 March Memorandum" (2017). 12<sup>th</sup> of March Memorandum was considered as consequence of internal problems within army (Erdoğan, 2017). During this period, leftist militants Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan were executed on the 6<sup>th</sup> May 1972. In other words, this era started with a military coup and closed with another military coup. Besli and Özbay explain that the Islamist youth managed to stay out of the right and left conflicts in the same period and they created an intellectual sphere and an original language based on a nationalistic view as a political understanding (2014). They also suggest that that Erdoğan was one of the young people who pursue his political career along the lines of the MSP and realize his intellectual development through this intellectual process. It is precisely for this reason that Erdoğan does not fully coincide with the culture of "allegiance" and "unconditional obedience" stipulated by the policy of Milli Görüş (National Vision).

#### **4.2. First Political and Intellectual Experiences of Erdoğan: National Turkish Student Union**

National Turkish Student Union (MTTB) was established in 1936 then was closed and reopened in 1946. Between 1946 and 1980 of MTTB is named under two

periods called as Period III (1946-1965) and IV (1965-1980). Within the general political atmosphere of Turkey between 60s and 70s, MTTB had different meanings for youth generation. Erdoğan became part of MTTB in the Period IV. Historical, managerial and intellectual characteristics of Period IV can be summarized as follows;

*Since 1965, MTTB has continued its activities in a nationalist structure. It organized meetings and campaigns in the field of combating communism. The first thing to consider; "National Unity" idea is based on solid elements and rooted. Rasim CİNİSLİ was elected as the Chairman of the General Assembly held on 18 March 1965. Rasim CİNİSLİ has experienced a rebirth in a sense. Because this period; It is regarded as the beginning of becoming an organization connected to national spirit and national consciousness. With the regained nationalist and sacred Anatolian youth, the positive works of MTTB were accelerated and set in line with the history and mission of unity MTTB (MTTB | Milli Türk Talebe Birliği , 2019).*

The 'Grey wolf' logo representing MTTB was replaced by a "book" since the first time it was established during the period of the 53<sup>rd</sup> term President Rüştü Ecevit. The periods of Abid Özmen and Rüştü Ecevit in MTTB when Erdoğan first served as the manager of facilities and then cultural activities manager, concentrated on the concept of the "National Youth". Besli and Özbay (2014) stated that young students had the opportunity to develop themselves in such areas as "culture, education, tourism, photography, sports book, cinema, and theater clubs". During the same years, İsmail Kahraman was the president of MTTB and would later become deputy, minister and chairman of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) from AK Party. Not only İsmail Kahraman but also many people in different administrative levels of the Union later took very important positions in the politics of Turkey.

Erdoğan graduated from İmam Hatip School in 1973 and then he was enrolled in Eyüp High School to meet the requirements for university entrance. In the same year, he had won the Aksaray School of Economics and Commercial Sciences whose name changed to Marmara University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences later. Meanwhile, his passion for football continued. In 1975, he was transferred to the IETT football team from the neighborhood team as a permanent player and started to earn money by playing football. His father, Ahmet Erdoğan, considers his son's relationship with football as a temporary

situation and did not take it seriously until the transfer offer from Eskişehirspor. When he found out, he was very angry and refused. His father was not convinced about the transfer offer from Fenerbahçe Club in 1976. Erdoğan's life began to evolve to completely different direction. In many interviews, Erdoğan mentioned the transfer issue from Fenerbahçe, and stated that he missed many opportunities because of his father. At the same time, he continued his political activities in the youth branches of the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)- National Salvation Party and continued his duties in the MTTB. Erdoğan's years in MTTB continued until 1976 when he became the Head of MSP Beyoğlu Youth Branch.

### **4.3. Marriage, MSP Years and 1980 Coup**

For Erdoğan, especially in his political life, 1976 is a remarkable date. When he was elected as chairman of the Istanbul Provincial Youth Branch at the age of 22. This was a significant responsibility and an important task. While he was giving speech, he came across a young lady named Emine Gülbaran at a meeting organized by the party in 1977. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explains his emotions at the time, “She was sitting in the front line, she got my attention, love was emerged in there I believe love is lost yourself in your love” (Başbakan Erdoğan Eşi Emine Hanımla İlk Nasıl Tanıştı, 2013). Emine Gülbaran was at the time the second president of the “Idealist Women's Association, which she founded with Şule Yüksel Şenler, a pioneer figure among religious women in İstanbul. They got married on July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1978. They have four children, Ahmet Burak, Necmeddin Bilal, Esra and Sümeyye respectively. In an interview with Erçetin and Açıkalın (2016) First Lady Emine Erdoğan answered the question of how her marriage to President Erdoğan affects her social life as follows;

*My husband's life is a life dedicated to the cause. He made this commitment and also had his family as companion. Being the wife of a leader, of course, also has important responsibilities on me. While trying to enhance myself intellectually and in faith, also I tried to make an extra effort in the fields where I can contribute to the society. Intellectually and after all, we were never such people who pursued only their own personal wellbeing. It was in fact this sense of togetherness that made me and Tayyip Bey come together. Therefore, my marriage, the social awareness that I brought from my family, altruism and other resembling feelings helped to nurture brand new environments that I came across. I had the opportunity to meet with different social circles, which has enriched my human experiences.*

There is no doubt that Emine Erdoğan as a leader's wife gives unconditional support of her husband's political activities. She has been very effective in social projects and diplomatic activities as First Lady.

1977 and 78 were also critical for the MSP. The MSP became a key party in the Parliament with 48 MPs winning in the 1973 elections, which resulted in the formation of a CHP-MSP coalition government. Bülent Ecevit was elected in 1977 after the coalition was disrupted. A group within the MSP demanded the investigation of the causes of defeat in the election, the identification of those responsible, and their accountability. This request also included the revision of party management. On 15<sup>th</sup> October 1978, at the 4<sup>th</sup> Grand Congress of the Party, two lists were prepared. In the main list, Erbakan was leader while second list was prepared under the leadership of Korkut Özal (Besli & Özbay, 2010). One of the supporters of the second list had been Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who was the youngest delegate as the head of Istanbul Youth Branches but the second list was not successful in the congress. However, Erdoğan's opposing, combative and innovative attitudes greatly affected the delegates and audience. In the following years, Erdoğan continued to criticize and reject the way of politics in the MSP more strongly. Erdoğan served as the head of the MSP Beyoğlu and Istanbul Provincial Youth Branches until 12 September 1980, when political parties, including the MSP, were closed down by the military coup again.

For the third time in the history of the Turkish Republic, military made a coup as it seized power on the grounds of "security reasons" within the chain of command in the military. As Stone (2011, p. 171) emphasizes, the political picture of Turkey was not promising in 1980. Turkey was suffering from inflation, debt, low growth rate and energy shortages and political instability was peaked with a presidential election. This is the period in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's mother, Tenzile Erdoğan, prayed until the morning and waited for her son to come home safely as Erdoğan told later. After the military coup, political parties were closed; party leaders were exiled and six political bans were imposed while 650,000 people were detained (Toprak, 2005; Celep, 2014).

Execution of young people like Erdal Eren and leftist Necdet Adalı and idealist Mustafa Pehlivanoglu, once again caused social trauma in Turkey. Following the coup, the 1982 Constitution was prepared and put into force by the military. In other words, Erdoğan's childhood and young age years were passed in a context of coups and many painful social deep traces. As a reflection of this memory related with military, the biggest revolution in civil-military relations took place since the 2000s when he and his party came to power (Güney, 2017, p. 201). Erdoğan worked as a consultant and senior manager in the private sector for a period of 12 September, coup when political parties were shut down. Besli and Özbay stated that Erdoğan continued political activities in the provincial youth organization; gathered in houses during this time (2010). Through this years, Erdoğan also completed his military service in 77th infantry regiment in 1982 at Hasdal, İstanbul.

#### **4.4. Return to Politics with the Welfare Party**

Erdoğan returned to politics with the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), which was founded in 1983 as a Chairman of Beyoğlu District of Welfare Party and just a year later he became Chairman of İstanbul Provincial and then he became a member of central and administrative board. After being elected to this position, Erdoğan developed a new organizational structure that would be used as a model for other political parties. In this period, he worked to increase participation of women and the youth in politics. In the 28<sup>th</sup> December 1986 parliamentary elections, the Welfare Party nominated him as an Istanbul candidate, but he was not selected. Similarly, Erdoğan was not elected on the 26th March 1989, despite his success as a candidate for the Mayor of Beyoğlu. However, success in this election for party, "Istanbul Model" was developed by Erdoğan as a very important example of new strategies and methods in Turkish politics. However, this strategy also brought new problems within the party regarding the role of women and youth participation.

The influential role of women in election activities was first realized during Erdoğan's candidacy for the mayor of Beyoğlu. In this process the establishment

of the women branch of the party in provincial and district organizations was accelerated. Erdoğan has fought very hard against his party to bring women to political life. In addition to this, he was supporting them in their personal development such as taking their driver licenses, courses on civil defense and getting a university education. As well as his election strategy, his attitude also got reaction from people in the party who did not support these kinds of programs. In his later years, Erdoğan included these two important elements (women and youth) in the AK Party's fundamental founding philosophy that transformed the AK Party into a female and youth movement. Ravza Kavakçı Kan underlined his approach “Almost in all levels in politics, he has supporting women and young people. He is himself biggest example of this approach where he always takes women next to him in the pictures and everywhere to make them visible (Personal Interview, 2020).

Erdoğan's experience with youth influenced on how he perceives youth and Youth Branch of the AK Party. AK Party Youth Branch has one of the highest number of members for the youth branch with almost 2 million (Tunç, 2019). In a personal interview with Ahmet Büyükgümüş who is Chairman of AK Party Youth Branch and the deputy from Yalova in the 27<sup>th</sup> Term emphasizes the importance given by Erdoğan. He also stated that the AK Party Youth Branch is kind of school and the people who grew up and worked in the youth branches would have important positions such as deputy, mayor and diplomats later on. Büyükgümüş also claimed that this is what distinguishes the AK Party from other parties in Turkey (Personal Interview, 2019). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also changed the constitution which hindered right to be elected before 18 years old in 2017.

*We have made historical investments, counting global injustice by trusting our young people. We entrust our 2071 vision to them because we trust our young people. In the April 16 public voting, we equalized the election right of young people with the election age. Since we trusted our young people, we reduced the election age to 18. AK Party is trusting you. The youth for the future to create a modern Turkey. There aren't any party which trust youth likewise AK Party (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Gençlere Seslendi: Kapınıza Geldiklerinde Bunları Söyleyin, 2018).*

In 1991, the government decided to hold early general elections a year before. The Welfare Party, the Nationalist Labor Party (Milli Çalışma Partisi) and the



Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi) formed an election alliance and participated in the election under the banner of the Welfare Party (Aydın & Dalmis, 2008). Besli and Özbay (2014, p.72) underlined that Erdoğan as a Chairman of Istanbul was uncomfortable with the decision of the Party's Headquarter on very important issues such as forming alliance and acting through a top-down approach. Besli and Özbay also stated that a group who went to the Headquarters to consult and discuss of these issues were accused not to be loyal by the party in later years (2014).

When the elections were over, Erdoğan as the first candidate from the Istanbul won the elections but his misfortune continued. Due to the preferential voting system, his certificate was taken from him upon the request of his party and given to colleague Mustafa Baş. Interestingly, when conflict between traditionalist and reformists emerged within the party, Erdoğan and Baş were in the same camp. Also, he was elected as a deputy candidate in 2002 from the AK Party. In fact, this also shows Erdoğan's understanding of leadership, it indicates that he held the interests and principles above his personal issues. Erdoğan has repeatedly and for many people shown that he has put his party interests and principles above his personal affairs.

Erdoğan continued to encounter multidimensional problems with the party's headquarters. Erdoğan achieved an in-party democracy both in Istanbul Provincial Administration while he continued to actively work for the participation of women and youth in politics. That's why, he was perceived as a threat in his party's headquarters. One year before the municipal elections in 1993, the atmosphere was changing in all parties as well as in the Welfare Party. 1993 was also an important turning point in Turkish political history when President Turgut Özal passed away that closed an era in Turkish politics. A new association called Local Administrations was established which started training on issues related to local government (Miş, 2018). In later times, important educational activities such as political schools became institutionalized and added a different dimension and depth to politics in Turkish political life. For example, Erdoğan founded the Political Academy in 2008 under AK Party which was an initiative of the AK

Party goes far beyond his experiences in the Welfare Party. Until 2017, more than 60 thousand people with different background were trained in the academy and 25 thousand of the participants were successful in completing the training education (Siyaset Akademisi, 2019). Through this process Erdoğan learned that he was a candidate for the Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality one day before the deadline. From this point of view, it is understood that the Headquarters made this decision through tough discussions until the last day.

#### **4.5. The Mayor of İstanbul Municipality**

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was elected as the Mayor of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality with a rate of 25% in the 27 March 1994 local elections. Istanbul election is one of the turning points in his political career. There is no doubt, being mayor of Istanbul made famous both in Turkey and abroad. It can be said that this election triumph based on two elements, which are new election strategies and implementation through participation of women and young people and projects for Istanbul (Miş & Aslan, 2014). Firstly, reasons of his success in 1994 local elections were embedded in his campaign strategy. Through campaigning, Erdoğan reached to middle and lower class of Istanbul residents personally which other parties hadn't tried before (Besli & Özbay, 2014). One of the dramatic and remarkable memoir of election campaign with prostitutes in the hotel within Beyoğlu district that he explained later;

*Through campaigning process, we visited all hotels in Beyoğlu. The one I visited there were many prostitutes who were eating lunch and preparing for the next day. They didn't believe that candidate of Welfare Party visited them, they were laughing then I said to them we will take out and rescue you from this life. Then one of them started to cry and said you can't rescue us anymore but I have daughters you can rescue them that's why I would vote for you and I would beg other people to vote for you (Hayat Kadınlarından Erdoğan'a Tüyleri Diken Diken Eden Cevap, 2019).*

Miş and Aslan emphasized that Erdoğan didn't only go to conservative neighbours but also visited all provinces of Istanbul and talked with them face to face (2014). Also, Erdoğan almost visited all taverns in Beyoğlu for the elections (Özkoylu, 2009). As underlined, women's actively participation to election campaigning was

started with him in 1989 Beyoğlu election, 1994 was not exception. Erdoğan wisely used women in order to reach more people and families across Istanbul.

Second element of his success was his projects and the leadership in municipality. When Erdoğan took a mayoral position with a debt of 2 billion dollars, he outlined problems of Istanbul and his possible solutions to Istanbul citizens (18 Sene Önce Bugün Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Kararlık Mesajı, 2016). “We should solve this problem hand in hand together, we should rescue this ship together. I am responsible for votes of 10 million, If I don't govern this way, I can't pay their rights” (Çakır & Çalmuk, 2001). Then he formed a group of advisors for himself to discuss solutions for problems of Istanbul. Not only for himself but also he provided a training courses about urbanization, environmental engineering, history and aesthetic (Miş & Aslan, 2014). Furthermore, Erdoğan rejects top down governing structure and create more participated understanding of local governance (2003). In order to facilitate dialogue between citizens and municipality, he established ‘Beyaz Masa’ (White Desk) which people can call and tell their problems and ideas about municipality (İstanbul Beyaz Masa 25 Yaşında, 2019; Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Beyaz Masa'ya Tebrik, 2019).

Thanks to his political talent, teamwork and his successful management of human resources and financial issues, he produced innovative solutions to the chronic problems of İstanbul such as water, urbanization, garbage and environmental pollution. On the other hand, it should be noted that he had some policies such as the prohibiting of the sale of alcohol in mayoral facilities, which created controversy in public discussions (İBB Yönetiminde Erdoğan ve İmamoğlu'nun ilk 100 günü, 2019). Regardless of ideological positions or political configuration, mayoral position was the biggest turning point of his political life.

#### **4.6. Rhetoric Power of Erdoğan- Poems and Beyond**

As touched upon in the contextual background of the countries, the picture of Turkey's in 90s in terms of domestic politics, economy and foreign policy was fragmented and instable. In 1996 the Welfare Party and the True Path Party

(Doğru Yol Partisi) formed a coalition government, which faced post modern coup in the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997 which later called as 28<sup>th</sup> February Process. During this meeting the generals presented a document to Prime Minister Erbakan detailing several steps to be taken against rising political Islamism in the country. Erbakan didn't sign the document and resigned in June 1997. (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Cinar, 2003; Gumuscu & Sert, 2009).

At that time, Erdoğan was prominent political figure as a mayor of Istanbul. While he was serving as a mayor; during his speech to the public in Siirt on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 1997, Erdoğan was sentenced to 10 months in prison for reading a poem in a book published by a government agency recommended to teachers by the Ministry of National Education which is poem of Ziya Gökalp's titled Asker Duası (Soldier's Prayer) for the 1912 Balkan War. A part of poem, which led prison sentence for him as in the following;

*The minarets are our bayonets; the domes are our helmets  
Mosques are our barracks, the believers are soldiers  
This holy army guards my religion  
Almighty (Gökalp, 1989).*

This conviction later led him to a much higher level of other political leadership positions. In the following years, he read the same poem in parliament several times as prime minister and president.

Rhetoric and strong oratory have been discussed as one of the most important, critical personal traits that a leader should have. Rhetoric involves many complex processes which means having many different skills. For this reason, it may not be sufficient to consider it as an innate leadership feature. A person who influences the crowds with a strong oratory undoubtedly uses many skills at the same time by effectively using phonetic and dramatic arts, physical, physiological, psycho and socio-acoustics. Salicru summarizes influence of strong oratory ability of leaders on masses as follows;

*Powerful oratory is much more than speaking. It evokes the noblest values and principles, brings forth our sentiments, moves souls, stirs passions and emotions, and inspires and commits others to take courageous and virtuous action to shape the*

*future and change the world. A good speech can turn crises into opportunities and even initiate massive cultural changes in large organisations (2017, pp.99-100).*

Why using poets are important in speeches as a way of communication is embedded in cognitive process. As a matter of fact, the findings on the relationship between brain and language in recent years provides important clues on this subject. As Nabben (2014, pp.94-95) noted, when we use simple sensory language, the network easily spreads. This does not require a lot of effort for the brain, because most are getting ready automatically. All content is personal meaningful. Nabben likens the brain processes of such language use to the effortless and perfect flow of water.

It can be said that strong oratory is one of the distinct characteristics of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His Imam Hatip school years were effective for gaining and developing a significant part of Erdoğan's rhetoric skills in this regard. At the same time, it is necessary to add another important skill; selecting and determining the content of the speech. Other skills allow the conversation to be listened to with admiration. In his oratory skills with there is no doubt poems have special place for him. Speaking poems means using the above-mentioned skills at the highest level. Erdoğan is a leader who reads very effectively. Erdoğan doesn't read poems only he likes poems but also he is aware of how its influential. Even Erdoğan has produced a poetry tape and sold it to thousands as commentators. Erdoğan by himself underline how he likes poems in his speech to youth people and says "I love poems and poems also love me I can't write but I can read" (Erdoğan: Ben Şiiri Severim, 2003). At that point, it should be noted that poets he chose were also influential element in his thinking world, ideology and political involvement. For example, Erdoğan read Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's poem with great admiration during his university years. In 1975, they met each other in his jubilee program. Erdoğan was one of two young man who would introduce him to his poems. Necip Fazıl first listened to the other youth, and even became annoyed that he was praised him too much, and interrupted his speech while Erdoğan had only handwritten papers in his hands and Necip Fazıl said this young man do my presentation with the poem of "Letter from the Dungeon to Mehmet ". That jubilee would be a start for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Erdoğan travelled to in many

places. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, one of these writers, later said “I am a poet writer and Tayyip is reader” affected Erdoğan's entire political life (Şiirserver Başbakan, 2011). It was an important milestone in his life that will be highly effective in leadership processes.

The short documentary called Erdoğan: Man of the Nation underlines importance of poem in his life through views of some poets. For example, the poet Ömer Özbay who is also co author of book with Hüseyin Besli called “Bir Liderin Doğuşu: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” emphasizes that Erdoğan not only read poems but also lived the poems he read. Özbay also states that the habit of reading poetry is reflected in Erdoğan's body language and that a prosody meter may be felt in his walk. Discipline of the habit of reading poetry, rhythm sense and energy can influence the masses of large people intensively and strongly (Ülke Tv, 2017). Also, an interview participant 2 stated that Erdoğan did not read poetry artificially and he love reading poetry and he internalized poems which he read (Personal Interview, 2019). The same source stated that Erdoğan reflects his feelings and thoughts on poems with sincerity. This “authenticity” makes Erdoğan reveal everything he does and says as a part of himself and makes those who adopt him feel it. “In other words, for Erdoğan poems are language of leadership, language of possibility is the language of hope, inspiration, speculation and creation that anticipates possibilities and the action needed to reach goals, desires, outcomes or dreams” (Salicru, 2017 pp. 103-106).

In later years, his speeches crowned by poems led to critical moments not only his political life but also in the context of international relations. Some of the most prominent of these are as follows. Erdoğan founded the AK Party after he got out of prison; in 2002 elections, the Supreme Board of Elections officially said that “You are politically banned, you cannot enter elections” and vetoed him. In this period, one of the most troubling periods of his political life, once more he preferred to use poems to communicate with his followers through Sezai Karakoç's poem called Sürgün Ülkeden Başkentler Başkentine (From Exile to Capital of Capitals). The same poem also left its mark on the AK Party's 4<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2013 while thousands of people were in tears.

*Don't you ever say fate for beyond fate there's fate  
Whatever they might do, there is a providence coming from the empty sky  
So what if the sun sinks, there is an architect restoring the night  
If I am burnt there's a fortress built of my ashes  
There is victory growing defeat by defeat  
In you, there's the key to reaching the secrets of all secrets  
In your breast there is a vein that summons your exiles to return  
I won't give up hope in you, there's a tree called mercy in your heart  
Beloved  
Most Beloved (Sılay,1996)*

He doesn't only use poems in his speech towards Turkish people. He successfully uses poems in his speeches in foreign visits as well. In January 29, 2009, at the World Economic Forum session in Davos, criticized Israeli President Shimon Peres which remembered as “One Minute”. After session, he had organized press conference and finished his speech with a line of poem “I have soft start, but I'm not docile sheep” from Mehmet Akif Ersoy’s poem called Zülmü Alkışlayamam (I can't applaud the persecution) in order to describe why he criticized him and left the session (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Davos dan Sert Çıkışının Ardından Basın Açıklaması Yapıyor Canlı, 2009). Another example can be given in trilateral meeting of Turkey, Iran and Russia to find solution for Syrian crisis, Erdoğan concluded his speech with quotation from Bani Adam poem of famous Persian poet Shirazi

*Adam's children are limbs of one body  
That in creation are made of one gem.  
When life and time hurt a limb,  
Other limbs will not be at ease.  
You who are not sad for the suffering of others,  
Do not deserve to be called human (Erdoğan Şirazi'nin Şiiriyle Gönderme Yaptı,  
2018)*

Second distinctive characteristics of his speech is content. In this respect, Erdoğan use tangible data, charts and maps during his speeches within both national and international platforms. When he is giving speech to Turkish people in domestic events, almost every speech of him started with what AK Party government have been done in Turkey until that day (Erdoğan AK Parti Grubunda 16 yılın Muhasebesini Yaptı, 2018). For example, even in his rally in provinces of cities such as Küçükçekmece which is provinces of Istanbul, he started his speech with how Turkey paid its debt to IMF under AK Party period and continue that “we increased student scholarship from 45 lira to 470 lire for undergraduates and

establish 140 new universities across Turkey” (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Biz İcraat Kadrosuyuz, 2018). Interview participant 2 suggests that Erdoğan’s favorite part in his own speech is accomplishments of his government in different cities to make people's lives better that’s why he takes concrete numerical data by demonstrating that rendition, to tell of his efforts for them (Personal Interview, 2019).

When author asked how Erdoğan kept his rhetorical ability powerful through years to same source, he emphasized that first he had a natural ability to know how to react and how to convince other people. He went to get information by working, so that the high level of political and technically equipped. The same source added that the natural ability, the political and technical equipment provided by intensive and continuous work, especially when asked and spoken, has a multiplier effect on people. Furthermore, Erdoğan like to emphasize the originality of the old words as much as he enjoyed reading poems and anecdotes due to his love for literature; historical figures. Interview Participant 2 also said that he was incredibly happy to say his life and words to the lessons that needed to be learned from them (Personal Interview, 2019). One of his opening speech towards young people, he gave anecdote from the history in order to explain how unity of nation is important.

*When the famous traveler Marco Polo described Kubilay Han with stones of bridge, Kubilay Han asks which stone holds the bridge between these stones. When Marco Polo said that the unity, the integrity, that is, the arch that keeps the bridge standing, not the individual stones, Han quits, 'Then, why are you talking about the stones since the morning, what is the important thing?' Marco Polo's answer is very exemplary. "But without stones, there is no belt" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın O sözleri dakikalarca Alkışlandı, 2015).*

In this sense, Erdoğan's was the first and only politician, prime minister and president to talk with poems, anecdotes and revive historical figures in both national and international platforms. As a result, Erdoğan's power rhetoric in speaking is kind of clothing the words with blood and flesh. Erdoğan’s speech creates a tremendous impact and energy in the masses; poems also strengthened with Erdoğan and he brought poems together with his political and artistic identities with all his emotions and thoughts to a wide public. There is no doubt, are conservative and the Islamic line are the intellectual and philosophical sources that feed Erdoğan's rhetoric including poems.



#### 4.7. From Prison to Prime Ministry

After the decision of prison sentence for Erdoğan, there were headlines in the newspapers such as, “his political life is over, and he cannot even be a muhtar. Erdoğan, who was politically banned, went to Samsun with the invitation of the Samsun mayor six days before his imprisonment. He was greeted by a massive group of people just like a prime minister in Samsun. Erdoğan visited various districts and towns, asked for his party to vote for the April 18, 1999 general and local elections. Erdoğan made an unforgettable speech for his convictions and the political ban against him as follows;

*We need these hands you want to break. They do this because they don't know some realities. They will be the grains of our blend one day. We will be patient; we did not enter this path for enmity. We've entered this way with love we've entered this path to be loved (Kırılmasını istediğiniz ellere de ihtiyacımız var Gün ola harman ola Bir gün olacak onlarda bizim, 2017).*

After his speech, he was reminded that he would go to prison six days later and “There are some dungeons that would be palaces for people, but there are also some palaces that would be worse than dungeon for people” and he asked the public to give answers to his prison sentence through voting for his party (İstanbul Büyükşehir eski Belediye Başkanı, 2017). Prison years can be deemed as one of the main cornerstones in his political life. When Erdoğan went to prison, thousands of people gathered in front of Pınarhisar Prison near Kırklareli, Ravza Kavakçı Kan describe the day of 26 March 1999 “I was there, normally weather was so cold but there was such crowded that you couldn't feel cold even we are sweating and thousands of people want to go to prison with him” (Personal Interview, 2020). As Ravza Kavakçı Kan reminded these days, followers of Erdoğan had been felt injustice with 28 February process and later his prison sentence. However, Mayor Erdoğan encouraged masses in front of prison with speech which ended up with these words from lyrics of famously song in his campaign “We walked on the same way, we got wet together under raining, now songs i am listening everything remind me of you. I wish future of Turkey will be bright. Allahısmarladık!”(Besli & Özbay, 2014). Many years later this song is still used in his campanings.

Four months in prison, he spent his time to study politics, economics and English. Throughout the four months people never let him alone. He received more than 30.000 visitors and thousands of letter from all over the Turkey (Yılmaz, 2001; Heper & Toktaş, 2003; Besli & Özbay, 2014). Later Erdoğan said that “Although there have been many times when our friends believe that I will be in leader of the party sooner or later but idea of establishing a new party except national outlook was developed for me in prison times” (Besli & Özbay, 2014). Actually, the political environment when he went out from prison was quite rough in Virtue Party, which faced clash between Modernists and Traditionalists (Teazis, 2010; Özdemir, 2015). There is no doubt, Erdoğan was supporter of modernists, in 2000 Abdullah Gül was nominated to chairman position for upcoming congress of Virtue Party. However, he lost against Recai Kutan and new path was emerged for modernists. A year later in 2001, Virtue Party was closed with decision of Constitutional Court. The evolution of the new party by modernists became more important leading by Erdoğan, which also supported by other politicians from central parties (Altuntaş & Demirkanoglu, 2017). It should be noted that during all these process. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was banned from active politics however he played important role in establishing the new party.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, together with his friends, established the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) on August 14, 2001. Ibrahim Kalın who is spokesperson of Presidency of Turkey, explain the meaning of party name vis-à-vis Erdoğan’s main vision for Turkey.

*The balance between identity issues on the one hand, and services and good governance, on the other is thus a distinguishing characteristic of the AK Party’s political identity. This is reflected in the two words of the Party’s official name: justice (adalet) and development (kalkınma). While “justice” refers to issues concerning identity, equal representation, democracy, civil liberties, human rights, and religious freedom, “development” denotes Turkey’s aspirations to become an affluent society and a prosperous country. Widening economic opportunities have opened up new opportunity spaces for new social agents and set in motion new modes of social mobility (2013).*

AK Party entered the election with the slogan of “Everything is for Turkey” (Göksu, 2019). AK Party leading by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the first election as soon as the party was established in 2002 general election with the nation's

favor and trust through wide public support which was enough to bring AK Party to power alone however Erdoğan, who could not become a parliamentary candidate in the November 3, 2002 elections due to a court ruling then joined the Siirt province parliamentary renewal election on March 9, 2003 when the legal obstacle in front of his candidacy was lifted. Receiving 85% of the votes in this election and Erdoğan had entered the parliament as the 22<sup>nd</sup> Term Siirt Deputy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Prime Minister on March 15, 2003 who is the longest performing prime minister for 11 years and 17 days without interrupt in multiparty system (Uslu & Altaş, 2018).

After 18 years in power, it is not easy to analyze all aspects of Erdoğan's era that's why it is examined in different ways in various sources. Most of scholars prefer to choose specific time, event and topic content to analyze his leadership. However, in analyzing his leadership in broader sense is quite rare. For example, BBC News (2018), under the leadership of Erdoğan, discussed the AK Party era in four different periods. The first term is between 2002 and 2007 when its vote rate increased to 46.5%. The second period is the process leading to the party's 50% vote in 2011 for the first time from the election of the 11<sup>th</sup> President of the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in 2007 and the AK Party have influence in all executive organs of the state. Third period from 2011 to 2014 when Erdoğan became the first elected president the first president elected by citizens' vote. Fourth period covers since 2014 until today (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Türkiye'nin yakın tarihine yön veren siyasetçi, 2018). In other words, periodization can be changed depend on cornerstones of Erdoğan's era. In this thesis, it is tried to cover the period of time from the childhood and youth until his prime ministerial. In the upcoming part would be about his influence on economic, domestic politics and foreign policy as both prime minister and president till 2018 through selected events which can be also considered as limitation of this thesis.

#### **4.8. Economic Transformation of Turkey**

17 years onward from AK Party's first election, still foreign and domestic public opinion asked the same question "how Erdoğan can sustain his power?" Economy

might be one of the answer for this question. There is no doubt, transformation of Turkey under AK Party and Erdoğan's leadership should be emphasized. As mentioned in the Chapter 2 of contextual background of countries, when AK Party came to power, Turkey was experiencing the worst economic crisis in its history, which absolutely changed the election result of 2002. AK Party won this election with 35% as a hope for Turkish people to recover from heavy economic crisis (Gökçe et al., 2002, p.22) where Erdoğan established his campaign mostly on economy. As mentioned, economic depression was one of the reason voters chose AK Party in 2003 (Yıldırım, 2017). In this respect, within seventeen years, Turkish economy has been under transformation which is undeniable dimension of AK Party period should be mentioned vis-à-vis his leadership. Although AK Party came to power in 2002, economic policies were under the control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) until May 2008. (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011). When economic developments are analyzed based on three economic indicators which are GDP, unemployment, foreign trade and poverty rate.

Firstly, Turkish economy had been increasing steadily in first 5 years of AK Party period. It grew at almost 6% per capita per annum), its fastest per capita growth since the 1960s (Acemoglu and Ucer, 2015). Also, GDP growth had a reflection on per capita as well. As Dani Rodrik underlined that real GDP (or GDP at constant prices) rose by 64 percent during 2002-2012, and real GDP per capita increased by 43 percent (2013). Öztürk underlined that GDP per capita tripled from \$ 3.400 in 2002 to \$10.500 in 2010. Turkey is also projected to graduate from "middle income country" status and enter to the league of rich countries by 2012 (2011, p. 3). Even though there was depreciation in terms of dollar and TL in GDP after 2008, the value in TL increased continuously. When global crisis hit all countries in 2009, the Turkish economy managed to maintain high growth rates (Kutlay, 2015). In other words, high economic growth and a single-digit inflation environment are characteristics of AK Party era economy (Kutlay, 2015; Öniş, 2012). Related with GDP growth, it should be noted that Turkey became the sixth largest economy in Europe in 2010 and the seventeenth largest in the world, gaining a respectable seat in the G-20 (Kalın, 2013).

Secondly, unemployment is one of the vital indicators of economy. In 2002, unemployment rate of Turkey 10,4 % which started to decline after 2005 thanks to job creation policies. Then, there was opposite trend and unemployment was reached to the peak of the last seven years in 2009 with a rate of 12.6% (Öztürk, 2011). After 2009, the rate of unemployment declined again and in 2012 the lowest rate of all years was observed (Gil-alana et al., 2019). It is seen that the GDP increases while the unemployment rate increases. Yağci defines unemployment as a structural problem of Turkish economy and claim that at the end of 2016, overall unemployment reached to 12% while youth unemployment was 23% are high numbers for Turkish economy (2017). President Erdoğan openly made call for employment mobilization in February 2017.

*We are today launching an employment mobilization with you. There was a call I made for each and every member of the TOBB in 2010. We achieved a record-breaking increase in employment with the addition of 1,4 million new jobs by 2011. Today I repeat this call by updating it (We are Launching a new Employment Mobilization with TOBB Members, 2017).*

Although These statistics emphasize that Turkey can improve employment conditions and reduce unemployment levels not only economic policies but also private sector contribution, unemployment has been still one of the main structural issue of Turkish economy (Yıldırım, 2017).

Thirdly, as a component of high growth rate, foreign trade rates of Turkey have been steadily increasing since 2003 due to widening of Turkish foreign policies that prioritize trade (Kutlay, 2011; Civan et al., 2013). A new multidimensional approach in the foreign policy grounded as re-defining the country's position as a central power rather than peripheral power thrust Turkey into a new era where Turkey enjoyed in new bilateral relationships, strongly motivated by economic and commercial demands in AK Party's term (Babacan, 2011). When, statistics of Turkish foreign trade is analyzed, it can be said that export and import numbers are increasing together. In 2002, Turkey's export was \$36 billion reached to \$156 billion in 2017 which means more than 10% increasing per year (TİM İhracat Rakamları, 2017). While in 2002, import of Turkey was \$52 billion increased to

\$234 billion which also creates sensitive balance for economic growth (TÜİK,2020).

Fourth and last indicator is poverty rate can be considered as one of the main dimension of economy. Actually statistics of poverty rate was started to be collected in 2002 with AK Party. World Bank revisited its poverty line across the world and set three different categories for underdeveloped, developing and developed countries which are relatively 1,90\$, 3,20\$ and 5,50\$ per day (Arabacı, 2019). Depend on the World bank categorization, Turkey had 3.1% of poverty line in 2002 was reduced to 0.6% of poverty line (Poverty gap at \$3.20 a day (2011 PPP) (%) – Turkey). Kılıçaslan and Işık suggests that decreasing in poverty rate is based on increasing state aid, transfer incomes and welfare payments (2017). Sharp changing in the poverty rate can be seen obviously as an indicator which directly affects daily life of Turkish people.

Although, there have been controversy about how different indicators in the economy have been interpreted. Compared to 90s, Turkish economy has been improved during the AK Party period. On the other hand, although there are some chronic structural problems such as inflation and unemployment, Turkey's economy seem to grow in quantity and quality during AK Party period (Öniş & Güven, 2011; Yıldırım, 2017). In this respect, it should be noted that economic recovery of Turkey during AK Party period is still one of the biggest advantage of Erdoğan who has continuously emphasized his efforts to keep economy in positive trends. Influence of economic success of the AK Party on polss still show that economy is the main reason of voter's choice in favor of AK Party (İşte Seçmenin AK Partiyi Tercih Nedeni, 2014; Schmidt, 2015; Sayarı, 2016).

#### **4.9. Erdoğan as a Reformer**

Erdoğan's world of view has been shaped by severe economic conditions and sociopolitical traumas through his life which makes him to be reformer in any field of social and political life which embedded with injustice and oppress. After he came to power, his reformist side had been quite visible with the pro-EU approach.

He has carried out reforms involving legislative and structural changes, especially related to democratization (Saatçiođlu,2011). In this context, comprehensive constitutional and legal arrangements have been made on issues directly related to human rights, in particular the constitutional amendments of 2001, 2004 and 2010. The application of the State of Emergency on 19 July 1987 in Southeastern part of Turkey was terminated in 2002 (Kayaođlu, 2016). The abolition of the State Security Courts which were established in 1983, the right of individual application to the Constitutional Court was introduced and the application of “probation” was initiated. Also, the death penalty was in abolished by 2004 reforms.

Also, changing nature of civil-military relations under Erdođan should be underlined. AK Party governments used EU’s criteria as an important tool for reducing the political influence of the military (Özpek, 2014). 1961 constitution made possible to military authority in Turkey, allowed military dominated structure -National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK) (Sarıgil, 2010). The seventh harmonizing package, which includes fundamental reforms to balance civil-military relations in terms of functioning, duties of MGK, was put in force (Sarıgil, 2010). Related reforms remove military from governmental positions (Haugom, 2019, p. 4). Another important reform of Erdođan is well known “Kurdish opening” or legally name is ‘National Unity and Brotherhood’ Project. Recep Tayyip Erdođan first used term of ‘Democratic opening’ in 2009 (Başlangıçtan Bugüne gün gün Açılım Süreci, 2014). Democratic opening includes a set of reforms, which related with minority rights in Turkey. Minority rights are one of the EU norms, which was pointed as weakness of Turkey in different progress report. Kurdish people are main subject of democratic opening and its reforms. Simply, democratic opening brings more rights to Kurdish people. For example, government, using Kurdish in, established Kurdish TV channel, allow to give Kurdish names for local places, Kurdish courses and even establishing Kurdish Language and Literature department were allowed (AK Parti Tanıtım Medya Başkanlığı, 2010). Fourteen radio stations and TV channels have been given permission to broadcast in Kurdish and Arabic and related restrictions have been lifted (Progress Report, 2010). It can be said that Erdođan has put his entire political career into this process by taking everything into consideration. In an

interview with Prof. Lüdger Kühnhardt, stressed that Erdoğan made very tough reforms in domestic politics as a leader and it is clear that he changed Turkey (Personal Interview,2019).

Even Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was awarded because of his reform efforts. In 2004, Prime Minister Erdoğan was awarded with the Quadriga Award in a ceremony held at the Konzerthaus in Berlin by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder which symbolizes vision, courage and responsibility. The award-winning foundation is dedicated to those who break walls and cross borders with the courage of Quadriga. Erdoğan was awarded because of the steps taken in the area of democratization reforms in Turkey. because of his reforms. Erdoğan's reforms in domestic politics gave him the nickname 'reformer' by West (Uslu, 2010; Farcas, 2019).

During Turkish political history, presidential elections have always created political and social crisis especially in 1961 and 1982 constitutions were in effect. In search of a solution to this situation (although four constitutional amendments were on the agenda) the proposed amendments in the 1973, 1980 and 2000 presidential elections were rejected by parliament. In 2007, the constitutional amendment which includes fundamental changes in the presidential elections and election system were approved. That amendment was adopted until the Turkey Grand National Assembly members to be chosen by the President of the period were chosen by the people. (Bozlağan, 2016; Miş & Duran, 2017). In fact, this situation means the realization model in Turkey. Erdoğan was selected as the first President of the Republic, for the first time and received 51.8% in the first round of the vote in the political history of Turkey on the 10<sup>th</sup> of August 2014 (Erçetin & Açıkalın, 2016). In his first speech as President he said:

*Today is a new day of Turkey's institutions. I keep underlining. I'm going to be the president of 77 million, not only for those who voted for me. I'll be a president who embraces 77 million in conversation. I will be a president who works for his country, nation and flag as I have done all my life (30 Mart Balkon Konuşması,2014).*



#### **4.10. Erdoğan's Legacy in Foreign Policy: Paradigm Shift or Enriching Horizons**

Foreign policy during the AK Party period might be considered as one of the main controversial fields where Erdoğan played significant role. In fact from the beginning of the AK Party legacy, Erdoğan gave hints on how his foreign policy would be formulated. After the 2002 election; although he was politically banned, he he immediately visited fourteen EU member states. During the same period, Erdoğan also visited Russia, the USA, Kazakhstan and China to meet with the heads of state. During these visits, Erdoğan was the only chairman of the AK Party so it was the first time in Turkish politics that the leader of a political party who was banned as a member of parliament was treated like a prime minister. Due to the limitation of this this part would be analyzed under three subcategories are 360 degree perspective, world is bigger than five and humanitarian diplomacy.

*360 Degree perspective* is a metaphor of Erdoğan himself and is used to explain his way of seeing the world (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü İbrahim Kalın'ın Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kabine Toplantısı Yaptığı Açıklama, 2019). Along with 360-degree perspective of Erdoğan, Turkey started to pursue more proactive and multidimensional foreign policy. Here should be parenthesis where need to mention Ahmet Davutoğlu who was former Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister as apart of his decision making environment. Davutoğlu had been influential actor in foreign policy making during AK Party period (Murinson, 2006; Cop & Zihnioglu, 2017; Kesgin, 2020). Due to scope of this thesis, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a chief executive is only taking as a focal for the analysis. In personal interview with Participant 2 underlined that Erdoğan sees Turkey's relations with the region and the world in a different way which is illustrated by a Rumi metaphor. It means that leg of the compass is static which is fixed and rooted in Turkey, meanwhile, the other leg draws a huge wide circle around the globe" (Personal Interview, 2019). In other words, Erdoğan does not limit Turkey's interest with certain regions but also focuses to increase interaction with every part of the world (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: TRTWORLD kameralarının vizörünü güce ve güçlüye değil; mazlumlara ezilenlere odaklamalı, 2016). As

expected, during the last 17 years, Turkey has developed various tools to become more proactive in the international system. Number of visits to foreign country by him is also another example of 360 Degree foreign policy approach of him. Between only 2003 and 2014, he paid official visit to 5 different continents, 93 different countries total 305 invitations (Öymez, 2014).

Also, Erçetin (2016) emphasized self-confidence, which emerged, as the most important emphasis in every discourse of Erdoğan as potential power of the Turkish people, is one of the most important determinant element in foreign policy. In this respect, Erdoğan emphasizes Turkey's new foreign policy on December 7, 2009 in the United States with these words;

*We are a country capable of speaking with the east, speaking with the west, and speaking with the north and the south at the same time. We can't pretend to do one and ignore another. We are seeing all of them; we will see all of them* (Erdoğan'dan İsrail ve Avrupa Birliği'ne Eleştirisi, 2009).

As stated in Kanat Ankara developed its relations with the European Union and other Western partners in the first half of the 2000s in the foreign policy of the AK Party period and strengthened its cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran, Iraq and Syria in the second half (2010). Balcı and Miş also stressed that “Mediation, facilitation roles and alliance of civilizations in the solution of regional problems have increased its prestige and appreciation for all its efforts to promote world peace in the initiative” (2008). In other words, Erdoğan was trying to pursue proactive, entrepreneurial and multidimensional foreign policy.

This change in Turkish foreign policy can be also shown with concrete numbers diplomatic missions of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached 242, which makes Turkey the fifth country in the world with the most extensive diplomatic network in the world. TİKA had 12 overseas offices in 2002, is operating with 61 Program Coordination Offices in 59 countries by the end of 2018. There has been a 7.5-fold increase in the number of international students studying in Turkish higher education institutions in the last 10 years from all over the world (Şahin & Çevik, 2015). According to the 2018 figures, Turkey has become one of important

destination for 148 thousand international students, 17 thousand of whom are with Turkish scholarship. Turkish Airlines flight to 124 countries, 306 cities and 310 destinations as of 2018 (YÖK Başkanı Saraç: Türkiye'deki Uluslararası Öğrenci Sayısı 148 Bini Aştı, 2019; THY dünyada en çok ülkeye uçan havayolu ünvanına sahip, 2019).

Erdoğan's Turkish foreign policy was criticized regarding paradigm shift which was based on breaking away from EU and West (Murinson, 2006; Koprulu, 2009). However, it is not easy to say that Erdoğan broke away from EU. Erçetin (2016), in her study titled, "Understanding Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkey with Plasma as a Metaphor of the Fourth State of Matter" explains Erdoğan's foreign policy approach that he began to follow in the context of leadership. "Turkey's new foreign policy is not dependent on a single axis, as in the plasma or is not patched". Erçetin suggests that it is not axis shift but axis expansion. In this perspective, Erdoğan does not ignore EU perspective but he prefers to adopt his foreign policy depending on conditions and context as well.

*The World is Bigger Than Five* can be deemed as one of the most challenging foreign policy mottos of any. Erdoğan first used this motto in 2013 to express his world view and understanding of leadership depend on justice and equality (Aral, 2019). As Interview Participant 2 mentions, "His personal and political life is based on justice because he suffered from injustice in politics, society and even in the business life" (Personal Interview, 2019). As expected, his emphasize on justice found a reflection in his foreign-policy making. Yavuz Selim Kıran, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey explains how Erdoğan's background influences Turkish foreign policy in these words; "The most important characteristic of President Erdoğan is his support for justice and equity in the world that shape his rhetoric and actions" (Personal Interview, 2019). Thus, his motto of "World is bigger than five" is a consequence of his perception of the world. Although some claim that he uses this rhetoric as a matter of domestic politics, he clearly expresses his ideas in different international platforms. Moreover, he does not solely rely on the rhetoric but also applies action in foreign policy. Once more Mr. Kıran touched upon this reality "It should be noted that

unity in his rhetoric and action make Turkey's position stronger in the world" (Personal Interview, 2019).

"We must create a fairer and more livable world for all" as President Erdoğan emphasize in every speech towards international audience which can be considered as challenge to the status quo in international relations. In other words, Erdoğan provides a set of possible changes with his motto and he also mentions his reform suggestions. In his article in Foreign Policy Magazine he underlined that global leadership is desperately needed and that the structure of UNSC should be improved which does not reflect the world that cannot be left up to only five countries (2018). In this respect, Deputy MFA Yavuz Selim Kıran says "First people objected our rhetoric of World is bigger than five which is big and challenging argument actually but through years more people gathered around us and our rhetoric" (Personal Interview, 2019). Combination of rhetoric and action reflects a meaningful and humanitarian perspective in Turkish foreign policy. As a consequence of this justice based approach of Erdoğan, humanitarian based diplomacy is not a coincide.

*Humanitarian diplomacy*, which puts human beings at the center of diplomacy of, is expected result of his justice based life understanding of Erdoğan. In his words, being voice of oppressed people in the world can be seen as starting point of his humanitarian diplomacy. One of the concrete example of his approach is undoubtedly his Palestine policy. In every platform, he raises the rights of Palestinian people and criticized Israeli's expansionism of Israel. There is no doubt, famously known "One Minute" in 2009 Davos Meeting in 2009 is still in people's mind and heart. President Erdoğan requested one minute from David Ignatius who was chairman of the panel but Ignatius did not want to give right to speak and Erdoğan insisted to keep his speech to Simon Peres as follows,

*You are very loud. You're older than me, I know it's a signal of a psychology of guilt that your voice sounds so loud. My voice won't sound so loud. Let him know that. When it comes to killing, you know how to kill. I know how you killed and shot the kids on the beaches. When you enter Palestine on top of tanks, you have prime ministers who say 'I consider myself happy'. And you give me numbers. I also give the name, maybe you have those who are curious. I think it is also a crime of*

*humanity to get up and applaud those who killed children* (Başkan Erdoğan'dan Tarihi Duruş! Tam 10 yıl oldu, 2019).

The event was widely featured in the world press. Erdoğan became the most searched person on the internet after “One Minute” (One minute oturumu Davos’a internette arama rekoru kırdırdı, 2009). After this event, Turkish-Israeli relations were the worst of last decade. Erdoğan was the voice of oppressed people although it jeopardized bilateral relations of Turkey with other countries. As Egemen Bağış mentioned “He says the truth which is side of justice and humanity if he knows it’ll be risky” (Personal Interview, 2019). Not only politically but also Turkey became the most generous country along with its foreign policy. Depend on the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report; Turkey made humanitarian aid costs to \$8.6 billion dollars is one of the world's most generous countries according to the amount of humanitarian spending per capita compared to the national income (2019). It should be noted that Turkey’s humanitarian aid is not only for a specific region but it spreads from Balkans to Manila from Africa to Myanmar. In addition to this, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data, Turkey is hosting more than 3.6 million people who have been forced to flee from their own country. Since 2011, approximately \$40 billion has been spent to provide all kinds of services and assistance to refugees. Küçükcan (2011) suggests “Turkey is a source of inspiration and that Prime Minister Erdogan's tone of quiet, oppressed and the homeless people”.

Thus, the Turkish foreign policy under Erdoğan’s leadership cannot be analyzed using a one sided approach due to time and space which showed quite adoptive reflexes. That’s why, his influence on Turkish foreign policy could be named within the main notions which are the 360 degree approach, the world is bigger than five and humanitarian diplomacy. As interview participant 2 mentioned Erdoğan has always looked at all geographies as what we can do together. He also continued that his foreign policy couldn’t be separated from his background, which put justice as a priority always that is why Erdoğan will inevitably rebel against Karabakh, Bosnia or Palestine. In this perspective, regardless of having a positive or negative evaluation, it can be said that Erdoğan brings his own unique approach to Turkish foreign policy (Personal Interview, 2019).

#### **4.11. Analysis of Erdoğan's Biography with The SNA Leadership Model**

In the beginning of this chapter, biography of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is given under the second dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. In this respect, this part covers analysis of his approaches and behaviors depend on third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. It should be noted that examples of given approaches and behaviors also constitute limitation of the thesis.

##### **4.11.1. Approaches**

*Be aware of chaotic nature of system:* As mentioned in the SNA Leadership model, political leader should be aware of the system, its components and their relations between them in order to make more efficient decisions. First of all, for any political leader, his/her own society is one of the most chaotic system which include different interest groups. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has involved in politics since his young ages which enable him to see different parts of society in different time and space context. In other words, he has been in the field with people more than forty years (Tuğ Kızıltoprak, 2018). Thanks to his long-term experience in the politics, Erdoğan knows various actors, its dynamics and especially reactions of Turkish society. His background and awareness of Turkish society shape his policies.

AK Party has organizational structure for election policies which prioritize locals. In every election, candidates of cities are chosen through discussion with representatives, influential figures and NGOs of the cities by headquarter (AK Parti Tüzüğü, 2019). Then, election promises of the party would be given separately for each cities. In addition to this, although AK Party has general election strategies for Turkey, it also develops tailor made election campaign based on regions and cities. For example, the campaign song in 2009 is composed of different melodies which represent cultures of seven region of Turkey, also AK Party prepared Kurdish song for Kurdish people in 2015 election (Göksu, 2019; AK Parti'nin Kürtçe Seçim Şarkısı Belli Oldu, 2015).

In national level, he is aware of various actors in decision making process. Because of his background he believes that role of military should be minimized in Turkish politics. That's why, one of his immediate reforms after 2002 were related with civil-military relations. The first stage consisted of institutional reforms which includes displacing the military from formal positions of power in the political process. The MGK became an advisory body under civilian government control and the military lost its influence in higher education and the media (Aknur, 2013; Haugom, 2019). While he was minimizing role of military, number of NGOs has been increased which led to voice of civil society in decision making process (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Heper & Yıldırım, 2011).

Although Erdoğan's foreign policy in Syria is criticized, it should be noted that Erdoğan point out chaotic nature of Arab Spring and Syrian civil war and its consequences for the region and world as in the following; "Efforts to make stabile region can't be think as an independent from fighting against terrorism to DAESH and PKK, what is happening today is also depend on the what happened in Iraq is part of whole region (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Sert Tepki, 2016). Furthermore, he underlines that he is aware of relations between domestic and international actors vis-à-vis Turkey's policies in Syria are also part of Turkey's long lasting fighting against terrorism problem.

Thus, it can be said that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with his long term political experience and personal background; he is highly aware of chaotic nature of his country and international politics.

*To think kaleidoscopic and catalytic:* Being aware of chaotic nature of system is also related with second approach of the SNA Leadership model which is thinking kaleidoscopic and catalytic means high level of adoption to changing with creativity. One of the important cornerstone of Erdoğan's political life was actually result of this approach. Bülent Arınç, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and a group of their friends called as 'modernists' started to criticize traditional approaches and strategies, which were used by Refah Party that didn't catch spirit of time. However, Abdullah Gül was hindered by Erbakan and his

supporters modernists group decided to separate their ways from the Fazilet Party (Yıldız, 2004; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006; Erdoğan'ın Siyasi Hayatının Dönüm Noktaları, 2017). When he established the AK Party he said that “We took off our national Outlook shirt” in order to signify their separation from traditional Islamists (Cizre, 2008; Çınar, 2017; Nas, 2018).

Another example of his kaleidoscopic and catalytic thinking can be given from his innovative campaigning strategies of local elections in 1994. He was the first politician who use youth and women actively in campaign field (Besli & Özbay, 2014). It should be noted that, until 1994 election, there was no women candidate from Refah Party (Aydın & Taşkın, 2016). In addition to this, the answer of the question of how Erdoğan won every election in last eighteen years also embedded his approach to think kaleidoscopic and catalytic. Erdoğan is constantly renewed, his party cadre and election strategies (Erçetin, 2016). He clearly states his approach as in the following;

*We continued our way by constantly renewing ourselves as a team that only leaned our back on Allah and our nation and we will continue. As Yunus Emre said, 'We loved, we fell in love, we were loved, we became lover. We will be born again and again (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Önemli Açıklamalar, 2019).*

In order to adopt himself and his party to changing dynamics, Erdoğan uses different tools such as information technologies (Dilber, 2018). In 2018 election, President Erdoğan announced that AK Party would follow digital campaign and call for other parties to do in order to stop environmental degradation (Özkır, 2019). Erdoğan's biography is analyzed, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exposes a leadership profile that is continuously changing in order to grasp and being pioneer in changing dynamics of the new age (Erçetin, 2016; Spinella, 2018).

As defined in the SNA Leadership model, kaleidoscopic and catalytic thinking allow leaders to reorganize parts to create new realities. Since AK Party came to power in 2002, foreign policy shifting under Erdoğan challenged the regional balances and create a new reality for Turkey and other actors. There is no doubt, Turkey's Euphrates Shield Operation as a first operation to Syria altered the dynamics of Syrian civil war and regional balances (Ülgen & Kasapoğlu, 2016;



Yeşiltaş et al., 2017). In other words, Turkey created a new reality in the field for all actors. President Erdoğan explained Turkey's unexpected and challenging actions as a "We had run out of patience, we had to do our job by ourself" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Fırat Kalkanı Açıklaması, 2019). Thus, to think kaleidoscopic and catalytic is not easy approach for leaders due to multidimensional tasks they have to cope, President Erdoğan can manage to keep this approach both in domestic and international level.

*Be glocal:* As defined in the SNA Leadership model, approach of glocal leadership requires think globally and act locally. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's vision for Turkey and world can be deemed as concrete result of his glocal approach. President Erdoğan bring Turkey's richness and uniqueness as a main source of power of his vis-à-vis Turkey's role in globe. In this respect, he is promoting Turkey's value in various ways. In economical perspective, President Erdoğan suggests that "Although main driver of globalization is economy, globalization can be only sustainable with using local values of different cultures" (Erdoğan: Din Üzerinden Siyasete Karşımız, 2004). He has encouraged Turkish businessmen to widen their horizons to the different parts of the world. In this respect, business associations positioned as actor within foreign policy (Kanat, 2010; Atli, 2011). One of the vivid example of his approach is attending his visits to foreign countries with businessman (Harte, 2012). From this perspective, President Erdoğan's effort to create Turkey's brand is another vital reflection of his glocal approach. In 2014, in the opening ceremony of Turkish brand called "Turkey Discover the Potential", he declares that "The campaign will contribute to the growth of Turkey's image abroad and will function as the symbol of Turkey's global power (Ürünlerimizi yeni logo ve gücü keşfet sloganı ile tanıtacağız, 2014). He also mentioned that meaning of Kilim figures in the newly designed of Turkey is a clear manifestation of richness of national identity that the government aims to construct and convey to global audiences (Nas, 2018).

In addition to this, his encouraging and supportive policies behind Turkey's increasing role in defense sector is another example of glocal approach. While Turkey's defense industry has been encouraging to be transformed nationalized, it

also became more competitive in global market (Eceral, 2017; Yeşiltaş 2019). President Erdoğan emphasize his glocal approach in defense sector; “The increasing acceptance of defense industry and security products produced in our country worldwide indicates the correctness of the steps we have taken” (Türk savunma sanayisi görevde gösterisi yaptı, 2019).

While globalization transforms politics and political leadership, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan successfully bring local values and richness of Turkey to global community as a undeniable actor.

*To have unique values for humanity:* President Erdoğan could be considered as one of the eminent political figure who is defined with his value based approach by national and international public. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlighted importance of universal values through Islamic interpretation since his first days in politics. As Interview Participant 2 underlines that nothing is more important than human in his political life (Personal Interview, 2019). This approach has inevitable reflection on his policy making both in domestic and international level with the emphasis on justice. Besli and Özbay suggests that biggest motivation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is being voice of oppressed and forsaken people (2010). Establishment of the AK Party is also depending on the set of values. Constitution of the AK Party expresses that AK Party considers moral values which are internalized by Turkish citizens as a guiding principle (AK Parti Tüzüğü , 2019). Erdoğan suggests that the AK Party is a conservative party, produces politics compatible with universal values and is not a religious party. Erdoğan also explained that “All religions and many ideologies are in a structure that sanctifies human values and gives importance to human rights as it is today” (Erdoğan: Din Üzerinden Siyasete Karşımız, 2004).

In Turkey, flag is one of the most important values of Turkish people in historical manner which is considered as a sacred symbol of their sovereignty and unity (Soysal, 2010). McManus underline Turkish flag sacredness in Turkey that you can see Turkish flag in everywhere from balcony to childrens’ textbook even on the mosque which is quite rare within international context (2018). At international

summits, organisers put countries' flag on the ground as an indicator of their position in photo shoot however Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's regular move to pick up the flag from the ground and put his pocket became hitherto within national and international public (President Erdogan picks up the flag again, 2014). Once more he has been emphasizing importance of flag as a value for Turkish people while bringing one of Turkey's value to global audience and attention.

In the SNA Leadership Model, it was mentioned that due to different cultures and geographies, it is not easy to bring set of values which would be kept by people from different countries. In this respect, it can be said that President Erdoğan managed to formulate his foreign policies depend on set of values for humanity. In 1994 one of his speech he underlined that "We are not short distance runner, our fight for all humanity for all humanbeings" (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Geçmişte Yaptığı Konuşmalar, 2019). In light of this, "World is bigger than five" is concrete and long term policies of him in order to have more effective UN with through universal values (Aral, 2019). President Erdoğan prioritize set of values for humanity such as Myanmar and Syrian refugee crisis. In his words, "Turkey has been voice of the oppressed people in every geography" (Erdoğan: Türkiye Her Coğrafyada Mazlumların Sesidir, 2017) which human values of President Erdoğan shaped his ideology, world view and current policies of Turkey.

#### **4.11.2. Behaviors**

*Produce entangled solutions:* Entangled solutions basically means that understanding problems and producing solutions at the same time. President Erdoğan's high level awareness of system also help him to produce entangled solutions. In 2002, when AK Party come to power, Turkey was struggling with economic, social and political problems. President Erdoğan is aware that these problems depend on each other that's why solutions should be whole pattern. President Erdoğan had started to implement economic and democratic reforms which brought political stability in the upcoming years (Karagöl, 2016). As well as domestic reforms, he also started a new phase in Turkish foreign policy as an undeniable part of domestic transformation with endeavoring EU reform process

(Çınar, 2006; Avcı, 2011). In other words, Erdoğan addressed the Turkey's current problems with reforms through policy changing both in domestic and foreign policy in a scyhnorized way.

Since his early years in politics, President Erdoğan supports the idea of presidential system which was realized completely in June 2018. Due to limitation of this thesis, Erdoğan's Presidency under Presidential system will not be included. However, Erdoğan's presidential model and emphasis can be deemed as a product of his entangled solutions. Erdoğan describe the presidential model as in the following words;

*In the new governance model, there is a structure that is lean, the authorities are decreasing, adapting to innovations quickly, enabling the development of human resources, clear areas of authority and responsibility, performing digital transformation, fast decision-making processes, globalizing competitiveness, and institutionalizing a common mind (Erdoğan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemini, 2018).*

In other words, Erdoğan defends presidential system because of its efficiency, flexibility and capability to produce entangled solutions for the problems. Erdoğan doesnt not only have producing entangled solution as a behavior but also bring concrete version as a new governance model for Turkey.

In addition to this, he is approaching to international crisis as in the same way. In 2011, when refugee flux started to Turkey due to conflicts in Syria, President Erdoğan stressed that refugee crisis is not only humanitarian crisis but also political, economical and social crisis which world have to deal with it (T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Güvenli Bölge formülü, Suriyeli mültecilerin geri dönüşleri için en pratik çözüm yoludur, 2019). In order to solve this problem, President Erdoğan brought up different solution alternatives from provide humanitarian aid to safe zone through international consensus (3 milyon Suriyeli yerleşecek: Türkiye'nin güvenli bölge önerisi, 2019). Although safe zone was not accepted by other countries, it is still one of the possible alternative on the table while conflicts get intensified. Producing entangled solutions is more than necessary behavior for political leaders to survive in chaotic circumstances of system.

*Be determinant of uncertainties:* The SNA Leadership Model suggests that leaders should understand existential concerns of individuals and societies during the time of uncertainties and to bring new policies and actions in a timely and flexible way. As explained, Erdoğan's early political life has been full of difficulties. Even in order to explain his and his friends' determinancy about them to survive in politics, he has famously said that "We set off on this road by wearing our shroud" (Başbakan Erdoğan: Biz bu yola kefenimizi giyerek çıktık, 2011). Likewise, his life, he has been gone through lots of national and international crisis as a leader of Turkey. There is no doubt, terrorism has been long term existential threat for Turkey. Güven make speech analysis to Erdoğan's speech between 2011-2012 related with terrorism issue which reflects his flexibility in order to solve problems with any possible solutions leading by him (2015). In other words, in order to address terrorism problem of Turkey, Erdoğan as a leader of the country was the actor who can be determinant for uncertainties and ready to discuss different policy options.

In addition to this, 15<sup>th</sup> July coup d'état attempt can be given as an another example where President Erdoğan once more managed to be determinant of uncertainties. On the night of 15th July, his words in Facetime call which are "There is no power higher than the power of the people, let them do what they will at public squares and airports. I will join the nation there" changed the fate of the country (Karagöz & Kandemir, 2016). After his Facetime call, thousands of people rushed to streets, airport and other public places (Chirica, 2017; Abuyounis, 2018).

Turkish foreign policy leading by Erdoğan become more diversified. Especially, his personal initiatives played an important role in this diversification. Erdoğan does not hesitate to take action in international issues as well as determinant of uncertainties. His initiatives in Western Balkan countries can be given as tangible example of his behavior. For a long time, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has had different clash of interests and problems sourced from war. This situation inevitably has created problems and unpredictability with high tension in the region (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). In this respect, Erdoğan personally involved and took action to establish tripartite mechanism between Turkey, Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Serbia. This mechanism brings leaders together to discuss regional issues under the same umbrella which eased unpredictability.

President Erdoğan show reflexes to words unexpected crisis and uncertainties related as a determinant of unpredictabilities which societies suffered from. Also, he does not vacillate to take an action towards international problems.

*Be simplicity:* Most of the approaches and behaviors in the third dimension of the SNA Leadership mostly focus on complexities of leaders' domestic and international environment. Be simplicity as a behavior that leaders should be simple and plain in terms of policy making and explain to his/her followers while dealing with chaotic environment. In this respect, President Erdoğan also can bring up simple and goal oriented solutions from minor to macro issues which he has to deal with it. For example, when he became mayor of Istanbul had to cope with complex environmental problems. Erdoğan produced a series of simple but effective solutions to address Istanbul's complex issues including waste recycling, cleaning the Golden Horn and provide water pipeline from Sakarya to Istanbul (Habertürk, 2019). His simple and synchronous action plan solved the main problems of Istanbul.

Although state level problems have more complicated nature, Erdoğan encourage to bring series of solution plans which are simple and effective. To exemplify, education policies have been one of the controversial issue for AK party period in terms of quality, governance, finance and democratization (Çelik & Gür, 2013). Regarding constant system changing in university entrance exam, President Erdoğan underlined that new system should be simple and easy to understand by everyone (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Açıkladı: Yüzde 45'in Kafası Karışık, 2017).

In terms of systemic perspective, Erdoğan is also supporter of more simple and efficient decision making process. Since his mayoralship era, Erdoğan has been one of the main supporter of minimizing bureaucracies to have healthier relations between state and citizens. In the 58<sup>th</sup> Government Program, bureaucratic procedures and obstacles were placed on the abolition (Neziroğlu & Yılmaz, 2013).

Also, the Government's 2003 Emergency Plan was mostly based on reduction of bureaucratic formalities (Yılmaz & Güler, 2016). So, Erdoğan encourages to bring more simplicity to all levels of governance.

Furthermore, be simplicity as a behavior also includes that leaders should explain complex situations with simple language. As emphasized in his biography, his undeniable rhetoric capacity generates dynamic communication with his followers. Especially, in a very critical moments of crisis, compared to other world leaders Erdoğan prefer to communicate his people directly. Especially, using maps, charts and statistics in his speaking create more simple and concrete language. Interview participant 2 suggests that Erdoğan is a master of rhetorics who can use both inflated and simple language at the same time (Personal Interview, 2019). President Erdoğan can manage complex situation with set of simple but interdependent policies in different level and explain in a simple and understandable language for all people.

*To create attraction field:* One of the vital source of leaders' power relies on interacting with his followers. In other words, leaders should create dynamic interaction field with people. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been in politics actively in almost thirty years which makes harder to keep same energy and dynamism with his people. For many years, he won all elections he entered with clear and ultimate support of Turkish people. When election results are analyzed it can be said that Erdoğan and AK Party has been increasing or at least keeping the same percentage of the votes (Görener & Ucal, 2011; Miş & Aslan, 2014; Çarkoğlu & Yıldırım, 2015). It is definitely result of attraction field with people.

Erdoğan wisely create attraction field with his followers in different ways. First of all, as underlined in simplicity behavior he is constantly communicate with people. Interview participant 2 claims that Erdoğan with some exceptions, gives a speech in a daily basis (Personal Interview, 2019). Secondly, he is aware of how personal and face to face communication with voters are influential since his early political life (Özkır, 2019). Since 1994 local elections, Erdoğan adopted this reality as a motto of his political life; "Our duty is to run and run without leaving a single

voter, a single household whose door is not knocked” (Tüm Kapılar Çalınacak, 2012; AK Parti Sakarya 6. Olağan İl Kongresi, 2016). In his Sultangazi rally in 2015, he saw a family who were watching him from the balcony, made a tea gesture to ask do you have tea i would come and visit you. Video shows his sincere and friendly gestures to family became cult for a long time (Erdoğan’ın Çay isteme hareketi paylaşım rekorları kırdı, 2015).

Through the years, this approach makes him able to seize its power within the society. Most of his voters consider him as “one of us” (Aydın & Taşkın, 2016). The Economist Magazine mentions observation of Kurdish women in his Van rally in these words “Tayyip is one of us, he treats us as equal” (The Enduring Popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 2009). In addition to this, he meets with reeves in presidential palace in every month. He underlines importance of meeting in these words;

*The vision of becoming a great state begins primarily at the local level. If the horizon and direction of our smallest administrative units, villages and neighborhoods are not in the same direction, we cannot achieve healthy growth* (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Muhtarlara Seslendi: Büyük Devlet Olma Vizyonu Yerelden Başlar, 2015).

Even Erdoğan uses anti-smoking campaign as a way to create attraction field with people too. During his visits, if he sees anyone who is smoking, he stopped and take their smoking package with their names and phone numbers and ask to make promise to him not to smoke again (Hoe et al., 2019).

President Erdoğan also achieved to create attraction field with not only Turkish people but also masses outside of Turkey. His speech regarding human rights and claim of being voice of oppressed people increased his popularity in the abroad. After the Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gained huge popularity where his pictures put on the streets in Arab countries (Öniş, 2012). In addition to this, people in African countries considers him as a leader of Ummah thanks to his humanitarian aid to region and defending their rights in international platforms (Due-Gunderson, 2018; Tol, 2019). Thus, Erdoğan can be considered as a master to establish real and organic relationship with people from Turkey and other parts of the world through different ways wisely.



#### **4.12. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Reis, New Sultan or Survivor**

In the context of the subject and the scope of this thesis, Erdoğan's biography has been discussed within a certain period of time. It is very hard to mention every details in his life, which is only milestones, were chosen. A young man from Kasımpaşa who can play football at a professional level became one of the most distinct world leaders. His life has been full of ups and downs. There is no doubt, during this journey; his family and poems have accompanied him. Imam Hatip era and MTTB played important role in his early political life which started from the bottom to Istanbul mayorship. He has been reformer in his movement and later all aspects of politics. His friends and almost all supporters were crying and called him as a Reis (leader) during his last rally before the imprisonment which was not first and last for him.

Later in beginning of the new century, he established the AK Party with his friend with the motto of “Everything is for Turkey”. The 2002 election was the starting moment for him and the AK Party. Erdoğan reminded that even he cannot be muhtar but he became Prime Minister and then first President of Turkey elected by the people. Due to his increasing power in domestic and international politics, some of world media called him as “New Sultan” (Cagaptay, 2017; McKernan, 2019). On the other hand, his struggles domestically were not easy as like his political life. He witnessed coups and the military involvement of 1960,1971, 1980, February 28 1997, April 2007 E-memorandum. The last one was the 15<sup>th</sup> July 2016 coup d'état attempt, which was different than others. For the first time in Turkish history, people were mobilized against military with only flags after his Facetime call and successfully managed the coup. There is no doubt, it was momentous for his political life and Turkey. The 2017 referendum results on constitutional change that decided on if the new Presidential regime will replace the parliamentary regime ended up with “Yes” vote with 51,8%. Now, after many years of his leadership era, public called him a survivor and the voice of an oppressed people meanwhile opposition claim that he is a leader with autocratic tendencies (Malsin, 2016; Trofimov, 2016).

## CHAPTER 5

### ANGELA MERKEL'S BIOGRAPHY

In the SNA Leadership Model, personal background of the leaders is given as the second dimension which influence approaches, behaviors and foreign policy decisions of the leader. In this respect, along with the research question Chapter 5 would be about biography of Angela Merkel. The first section will be about early life of Angela Merkel in East Germany. The second section will be about her early political career after reunification. The third part will be about Merkel as a party leader and the last part will examine the catastrophic events in her Chancellery era. In the fourth part, there would be analysis of her leadership with third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model that covers four approaches and behaviors, last part would touch upon the controversy on her leadership from different perspectives.

Angela Dorothe Krasner was born in Hamburg, which was part of West Germany, in 17 July 1954. She has both older brother and younger sister named Marcus and Irene, Marcus was born in 1957 (three years younger than Angela) and her sister Irene was ten years younger than her. A few weeks after her birthday, her family moved to Quitzow-East Germany because of her father's job. Angela Merkel's Father-Horst Kasner or his earlier name Horst Kazmierczak with a Polish descent who was a Protestant Pastor in the local church and also teacher of young protestant pastors. Quitzow was a very small place with only 400 residents who were mostly uneducated. Until the tension arose between West and East, they could travel to the West and Angela Merkel had the chance to spend time with her grandmother in Hamburg. When she was two years old, she could speak German almost perfectly however she did not show fast development in her physical ability such as walking. She described herself as a bit of spastic when she was children (Koelbl, 1999).

Her memories related with her father are also quite distinctive to highlight her childhood. Three years later, when they moved to Templin, which was bigger than Quitzow, Horst Kasner's work responsibilities increased. He became head of the Templin Theological Seminary. In addition to his workload, it was obvious that pastors were not a favorite of East German authorities. As Qvortrup claimed although he had good relations with Albrecht Schönherr, all his activities were watched by the Stasi (2016). Father Kasner worked hard and in general did not have enough time to spend with his family. Merkel explained her feelings about father's job as follow "The worst thing was that he said he would be at home at this time but could come to have hours later" (Koelbl,1999).

She explains her father's personality in these words; "He had a very logical, very rational approach to things and perfectionist even for details (Koelbl, 1999). On the other hand, Langguth's book triggered some controversy that her father and family were part of the elite in German Democratic Republic. He claimed that they had two cars and a chance to take trips to Italy which was unlikely in East German (2005). Not only Langguth but also Ruetter (2005) suggests that Merkel's father seemed to have been on good terms with the public authorities in East Germany even though he remained critical of the regime. Qvortop mentioned in his book he was later known as the "Red Kasner" but he was not a Communist as we understood today. He had sympathy towards main principles of socialism (2016). Those claims have never been refused or commented by Angela Merkel or her father. Qvortrup also put forward opposite claims about him which is Kasner was classified as an opponent of the regime by Stasi in back door speeches and allowed students to discuss political issues in a critical manner (2016).

They were living in Waldhof neighborhood in Templin, which is a house for children with special needs. Angela Merkel explained her experience living in such an environment "I learned to appreciate that happiness has got nothing to do with health, although they were the most unfortunate people in health but most positive people (Qvortop, 2016). Also, Horst Kasner's job influenced her approach to religious. She was also raised as a Lutheran Protestant and she says that "I believe in God and religion is also my constant companion, has been for the whole

of my life” (Merkel: I believe in God, religion is my companion, 2012). In addition to this, his perfectionism came across with his discipline and rationalism that can be also observed in Angela Merkel’s leadership. Stock suggests that her father had always high expectations of his children which fuelled her political career as well (2005). She always described their relations as “Loving, friendly but distant” (Koelbl, 1999). Obviously, Horst Kasner was an influential figure in her life as a hard working pastor in East Germany. In 2011, Horst Kasner passed away.

Her mother- Herlind Kasner was a Polish descent like her father. She was an English teacher but she did not work after marriage which was not usual in East Germany where the regime had a working class tradition (Crawford & Czucka, 2013). As some journalists later discovered that she always wanted to work however she could not get a positive response from his husband and the education authorities of communist regime who saw teaching English and Latin as a counter-revolutionary and bourgeois (Packer, 2014; Qvortrup, 2016). Their economic situation could be considered as suffering because Pastor Kasner only earned 600 East German Marks which is under the minimum wage 655 East German Marks. There is no doubt that gifts from grandmother of Angela Merkel who was living in West Germany compensated of their economic suffering.

In the absence of her father in daily life, Herlind Kasner played very crucial role in her childhood education who imparted a passion for learning to Merkel (Packer, 2014). Maybe the most important thing she did with Angela Merkel’s children was debriefing her to hinder brainwashing by East German schools. Angela Merkel later called this routine as “bespoke” and emphasized her gratitude to her mother for this (Qvortrup, 2016). Until, her mother was passed away in 2018, she still taught English in Templin in her 80s. In an interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in 2015, Merkel said that she had talked on the phone with her mum regularly, she told me about relatives, acquaintances, friends, so that I am not disconnected from all this normal family life (Angela Merkel’s mother, Herlind Kasner, dies aged 90, 2019).

Her early childhood was a happy one. She says her childhood memoirs with her two siblings, “There was no dark shadow over my childhood” with the exception of vivid memories about the construction of the Berlin Wall (Packer, 2014). Merkel remembers her feelings on August 13, 1961 when the construction of the Berlin Wall started. Later she explains these days; “Everybody was shocked, there is nothing to do, all of my family feel powerless” (Kornelius, 2013).

In all levels of her education, she was most successful student with the highest marks. She went to a local primary school Goethe Schule where she met an organization called the Young Pioneers. Young Pioneer and later FDJ (Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend-FDJ) were kind of young organization to cultivate the young generation with Communist virtues (Elshout, 2009). She was not allowed by her family to join in the very early ages. For this reason, she was not chosen as Pupil of The Year, even though she was the best. She couldn’t be deemed as best without being a member of the Young Pioneers (Qvortrup, 2016). Later, she joined the Young Pioneers and the (FDJ). She accepted that she was member of FDJ and even she says that, “I enjoyed being FDJ because they were the only who can organize leisure activities” (Ehrlich, 2013). In 2013, Georg Reuth and Günther Lachman claimed in their book that Angela Merkel is served as a secretary in propaganda and agitation division of FDJ. All these claims were denied by Steffen Seibert who is spokesperson of Angela Merkel (Angela Merkel was Close Communism than thought, 2013). Kornelius, and also Qvortrup noted that she was very good at mathematics and Russian while she was not physically so strong and active (2013; 2016). When Angela was in the eighth grade, she competed in East Germany’s Russian-language Olympiad and won at every level, from school wide to countrywide. She got her high school degree in Gymnasium, which was an elitist school in GDR. She had been one of the best in the class and was very active in FDJ.

When she was in her teenage years, she became more keen about life and trying to do something new. Although she was living in an oppressive environment, she liked travelling and meeting new people from different countries. “She was regarded as someone with keen appetite for life, ready to try anything, outgoing

and positive” (Kornelius,2013, p.24). Merkel travelled to Prague, Budapest, Sofia and even Batumi with her family and friends. Maybe one of the most vivid memories of her travelling was with her family to Czechoslovakia when she was 14. They rented an apartment in Kronokose where she became friends with the son of the landlord. She tells her memory about her new friend in the Evelyn Roll interview as follows on son of landlord of house where they were staying, “He took out one stamp from the collection which was a portrait of Novotny’s who was topped down after the Prague Spring” (2015). It was obvious that she was not far from political events outside of East Germany. Though East Germany was part of USSR, it was not like other communist countries under USSR. When she was 14 years old she could listen to the broadcast of a West German presidential election secretly and even she remembered that they could watch both West German and East German TV channels. (Crawford & Czucka, 2013; Qvortrup, 2016).

She has been always impressed by physics and chemistry were a prestigious, non-ideological subject, providing her with the greatest possible academic freedom. She preferred to study physics because, as Kornelius wrote, she did not want to expose herself politically (2013). In 1973, she started to study physics at Karl Marx University in Leipzig which was a very large city compared to Templin. Also, the university is a prestigious one where Nietzsche, Heisenberg and Hertz graduated from. A year later in 1974, she met with Ulrich Merkel who would become her first husband . Two years later, they started to live together and they got married in 1977. Angela Merkel says early marriage is necessity in East Germany to find accommodation while Ulrich Merkel recalls this marriage in his interview as a “love marriage”(Eines Tages zog sie aus, 2004). Being a couple for them was not so long term and in 1981 as Ulrich Merkel recalls “Suddenly she packed her bag and left, we split up as a friendly (Eines Tages zog sie aus, 2004). Father Kasner did not like this divorce. It was obvious that divorcing was not something that should be expected from pastor’s daughter.

An article changed Merkel perception about GDR. Rudolf Bahro’s, highly criticized article, on the East Germany caused controversy within the regime. The effect of article turned to student protests where Angela Merkel did not participate

but kept a critical view towards East Germany in his article. In the same year, after finishing their education in Leipzig both Angela Merkel and Joachim Sauer found jobs in the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. They had lived a house very close to Wall. Later she described her feelings about the Berlin Wall when she was living in Berlin through her speech in an honorary Phd ceremony at Harvard University with the following words;

*I lived near the Berlin Wall. I walked towards it every day on my way to home from my institute. Behind it lay West Berlin, freedom. Every day I had to turn away just before reaching freedom. I don't know how often I thought that I couldn't take it any more. It was really frustrating (Chancellor Speech at Harvard,2019).*

It is obvious that her perplexed feelings about the Berlin Wall, Bahro's article and political development in West Germany were influential in shaping her political view but one person would affect her the most; Dr. Joachim Sauer who is now her husband. They met in a trip to Prague. Their closeness and conversations were mostly about political development in East and West Germany. As Qvortrup says, "Things were beginning to happen and happen fast for Angela's political awakening" and it was also fuelled by Gorbachev reformist policies regarding reunification (2016).

There is no doubt that, 35 years in the GDR as highly influential in her personal and political life. Thus, although there has been lots of controversy regarding her GDR life, she often describes her memoirs and feelings regarding the regime and her life. Maybe some of the strongest words on her life in GDR are those told to the German photographer Herlinde Koelbl in 1991;

*I never felt that the GDR was my home country, I have a relatively sunny spirit, and I always had the expectation that my path through life would be relatively sunny, no matter what happened. I have never allowed myself to be bitter. I always used the free room that the GDR allowed me (Packer, 2014).*

In this respect, quietness and not being a risk taker became natural characteristics of Angela Merkel, likewise almost all East Germans. In later years, Merkel was not a bold political figure like Kohl or Schröder, she always prefers to keep a low profile behind the leader. She also learned to keep private things to herself and not to say openly what she really thinks which makes her faceless politician (Reutter,

2006). Merkel has also been known for her wait and see policy where there is no risk taking as a result of background. In our interview with Mustafa Erkan who is former Turkish politician from SPD and now a special advisor to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu also mentions that Merkel is not a leader who immediately reacts, as she tends to wait for the right time and right place (Personal Interview, 2019). Furthermore, her long year quietness in East Germany affects her interest and ability to make big speeches for thousands of people. Also, Sheeler and Anderson also underlined that “She forcefully laid claim to her espoused rational, scientific discourse, and built a reputation as another European “iron lady” (2014, p.491). As well as Sheeler and Anderson, Stefan Kornelius emphasized this reality and suggests that Angela Merkel has never been a great rhetorician, generally she prefers to give rational and clear evidence based speeches as Kornelius emphasized (Personal Interview, 2019). Furthermore, the political atmosphere of East Germany influenced Merkel’s perception of democracy and freedom which is indispensable value in her political life. Almost all speeches given by her in both home and abroad touch upon the importance of democracy and freedom as values. In other words, as she said, she knows the meaning and value of democracy and freedom not being granted. Also, thanks to her natural scientist background, she has assumed a very different approach to political events compared to other politicians who have a social sciences background. As a natural scientist, her brain works like clockwork or a computer that works based on facts. She has had a much more comprehensive attitude towards crises and political events. Her strong sense of rationality that many perceive as "cold" tends to alienate people and is hardly appealing in politics (Reutter, 2006). In other words, Merkel’s personal life in GDR influenced her worldview and perception. Also, educational background of her became determinant of her political tendencies and later leadership.

### **5.1. After fall of Berlin Wall**

Her political life started with complete coincidence. In 1989 when Berlin Wall came down, there was a chaotic environment in Berlin. Later, Merkel remembered that night when she was in sauna with her friends as was her routine, she had



learned the borders were opened when she came out. Then she returned home not too late.

In the coming days, when Merkel's political views had matured along with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Angela Merkel wanted to be an architect of a new future of Germany. First, she had gone to the Democratic Awakening (DA) office after she met with Pastor Rainer Eppelman which was not really look like political party. She wanted to be part of a real political party. She tried her chance in the Social Democrats because at that time her political views cannot be only defined with right or left. However, she did not find what she was expecting. Then she went to the Liberals where she had almost the same experience as with the SPD. Finally, she preferred to go back to the DA while they became more institutionalized party. "She liked the name and the fact that she found so much there that was incomplete, waiting to be shaped" (Kornelius, 2013, p.32). Therefore, in February 1990, she became the press secretary of the Democratic Awakening Party. Her biggest advantage was, of course, the number of languages that she can speak fluently. Although her position seems not very influential, she used it very wisely. Her first political crisis was on the way; Der Spiegel revealed that Wolfgang Schnur was a Stasi agent in March 1990. It created a momentous shock within party and Merkel was the only person who could stay calm, later described those days as "I threw all Western journalists from the room and says that now we can think clearly" (Merkel & Müller-Vogg, 2005). Although she did her best to manage the scandal, it led to the DA's failure in the election that was not a surprise for her.

The Democratic Awakening was a small center-right party and they formed a coalition called "Alliance for Germany" (Fulbrook, 1991) which was the first and last election of the German Democratic Republic. However, election night was another milestone for Merkel's political career. She had left early from the election dinner of DA and walked to the CDU's election party and but she could not get in. Then she went back to the DA's place, Lothar de Maiziere was there and she finally met with him. He promised to the DA to bring them into the coalition process as well. She tried her chance for the second time that night and went again to the CDU's party and she met with Thomas de Maziere who was the cousin and

advisor of Lothar de Maiziere. She was right, three days later she was offered to be the deputy spokesperson of the East German government. She accepted the position in the Lothar de Maiziere government and she started work as a deputy to Matthias Gehler, who opened new doors for Merkel. She had chance to gain experience in international forums and discussions for the first time and she travelled to most of the European capitals and Moscow. During her duties, also she had chances of travelling with and having close relationship with Lothar de Maiziere who would be effective in her political life later.

In October 1990, after reunification Merkel became a member of CDU where she started a new political career. While the German reunification was completed successfully, her second goal was to enter the federal parliament was realized. With the help of Günther Krause, in December 1990 she was placed on the CDU party list in Mecklenburg West-Pomerania (Angela Merkel: From physics to Politics, 2012; Qvortrup, 2016). It should be noted that Günther Krause was one of the key East German politicians in CDU as a cabinet minister in the federal government (Thompson & Lennartz, 2006). However, this process was not easy for her. She had strong rivalries like Klaus Herrman and Hans-Günter Zemke. Krause was determined to have her as a leading candidate and to take the support of Udo Timm and Andrea Köster (Qvortrup, 2016). In the selection meeting, Zemke was leading in the first round; Merkel was second, but in the second round Merkel got 280 votes while he could win only 274. Almost a month later, after reunification Angela Merkel managed to be member of federal parliament from the CDU.

## **5.2. The Youngest Minister- Women and Youth**

Angela Merkel's district victory opened the way towards she had always wanted; a meeting with Helmut Kohl. As many times before, she had wisely used her network and asked for Hans Geisler's help to meet with Helmut Kohl. They had met in Congress of CDU in Hamburg and Kohl invited her to Bonn to talk with her again which showed that Helmut Kohl had already thought giving a position to Angela Merkel in his cabinet. Obviously, Kohl needed a women politician from

East Germany. Clemens pointed out this reality “Admitted that Kohl’s initial patronage resulted from him wanting an Eastern woman in his cabinet while Schauble noted that he chose her as General Secretary in party because she represented something ‘new and refreshing’” (2006). In other words, she was in right place in right time. While she was rising in an unstoppable way, her feelings were also perplexing because she became part of the in the game with famous politicians. So, she was appointed as Minister of Women and Youth in 1991. She expressed her feeling about her position to Norbert Blüm as follow, “I know integral calculus, talking with him shouldn't be tougher than this” shows her mixed feelings and fear in this environment” (Qvortrup, 2016).

Likewise, other women politicians in Germany and the world, Merkel also started her career with the Women and Youth Ministry position, although she did not have a perfect profile for this ministry as a divorced woman without children. Merkel successfully used her ministry position as a springboard for her future (Kunin, 2008). She used her chance wisely to travel with Helmut Kohl and she built wide ranging network from media to foreign politicians. In her 2005 interview, she clearly stated that she did not know her ministerial position subject but this challenge is also opportunity to learn the mechanisms of power (Merkel & Müller-Vogg, 2005). Public and media had been harsh towards her, they called Merkel as “Kohl’s Mädchen (girl) which she doesn't like at all. In order to abolish this view, she ran the ministry in her way and has been determined and goal oriented.

Maybe the toughest issue she had faced in her Women and Youth Ministry was in relation to the abortion law. Everyone knows that abortion law is always problematic for any politicians in conservative parties. Merkel was in liberal side personally but she had to find a third way between the conservatives who supported a complete ban and the liberals within the CDU, Green Party, Free Democrats and Social Democrats. She put forward the idea that women who want to have an abortion should have a counseling service first and decided later which gained support from both sides. However, it was not easy as she thought as the Constitutional Court needed to approve as well. She had herself signed the appeal for court and it was her absolute triumph.

At the same time, Germany and the CDU/CSU were in the crisis. The country was suffering from an economical crisis due to sharp rise in deficit spending after reunification (Bibow, 2001). Kohl had to increase taxes as a solution to current crisis (and his economic policies were protested by Eastern rooted ministers led by Maiziere except Angela Merkel (Münter & Sturm, 2002). Maiziere resigned and Kohl nominated Angela Merkel for Party Chairwomen in Brandenburg. She had her own first defeat by Ulf Fink but it was not a retreat for her. In September 1991, she became deputy party leader instead of Lothar de Maiziere who was first person helped Angela Merkel in politics. One year later, Christian Wulff who later would become the 10<sup>th</sup> President of Federal Republic of Germany introduced Beate Baumann to her who became Merkel's personal secretary and one of the closest people to her. Kornelius underlines her role in Merkel's political life as follow "Except perhaps for her husband Joachim Sauer, no one knows Merkel better, no one else knows exactly where to find her or to keep track of her political activities so meticulously" (Kornelius, 2013, p.47).

### **5.3. Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Nuclear Power Plants**

Because of economic crisis, Kohl had to form coalition with minor election success in 1994 where Merkel was appointed to Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Nuclear Power Plants. This ministry had more sophisticated and cautious responsibilities compared to Ministry of Youth and Women when Germany hosted the Climate Summit in 1995. Helmut Kohl gave significance to this conference because he had proposed to be the host country (during the previous Rio De Janeiro Conference). Then Kohl underlined that "This was the most important international conference that would be held on German soil for foreseeable future" (Kornelius, 2013). Shortly before the upcoming UN Climate Summit, Angela Merkel wrote in a German newspaper in the follow:

*With good reason, it is expected from governments and politicians, that they do not longer close their eyes to the pressing scientific results that climate protection requires rapid and vigorous action (FAS, 1995).*

She further calls for a clear negotiation outcome from the UN Climate Summit: "The greenhouse gas emissions do not only have to be stabilized, but have to be

reduced as quickly as possible” (FAS, 1995). This conference was difficult mission for someone who did not have enough international experience however, she used the same strategy as she had in abortion law during her Ministry of Youth and Women. She was looking for a third way for the two sides. Angela Merkel divided the delegations into different groups with the idea of India’s delegation leader Kamal Nath (Kornelius,2013) which Merkel and Kohl government finished the conference with success again with the Berlin Mandate. It included the Kyoto Summit and an obligation for developed countries to sign binding rules which not only changed climate policies in world but also Merkel’s image and popularity abroad. The Berlin Summit revealed that her unexplored crisis management and negotiation capacity. As Kornelius underlines that “A new characteristic emerged, one that she hadn’t previously acknowledged: the pleasure of competition, the excitement of victory” (2013, p.55).

In 1995, Merkel brought a proposal for restrictions on cars which would increase the smog level which objected by Minister of Transport and Minister of Industry and Chancellor Kohl. Kohl made her cry in front of other ministers. She remembered that day and said “I couldn't stop my tears” (Merkel & Müller-Vogg, 2005). Two days after that cabinet meeting, she managed to compromise with two ministers and her proposal was accepted. There is no doubt, Kohl’s attitude was cornerstone for her and she noticed that she has to be tougher.

Another remarkable event in her second ministerial office was the transportation of radioactive waste to a permanent storage (Reutter, 2005). In 1998, it became known that the radiation could be leaked while transferring between places however the nuclear power companies did not mention about this crucial intelligence to the minister and continued this dangerous transfer. Leader of opposition party who was Gerhard Schröder could not miss the opportunity to criticize her harshly and asked for her resignation. However, Kohl could not put her in danger just four months before the election and Merkel refused to step down as a minister. Through these years, she became more experienced and she learned how to play political games (Clemens, 2006). Thanks to her achievements, organizational skill, and her capacity to learn easily she was appointed as a made

general secretary of the CDU in the same year (Wiliarty, 2008). Angela Merkel as a General Secretary experienced an electoral defeat and political scandal of Kohl between 1998-2000 which made her more tough politician on the way to leadership of the CDU. Merkel was able to transform herself from junior politician to leader of Germany and also Europe.

#### **5.4. Angela Merkel as a CDU Leader**

1998 and 1999 were not very bright times for the CDU. A year before the 1998 election the CDU was the leading party in only 4 states out of 16 while the economy was started to collapse. After long years in power, people got bored from Helmut Kohl and were looking for a new face (Langenbacher & Conradt, 2017). In other words, the electoral defeat of CDU was based on Kohl's public image as well. He peacefully accepted this defeat and Wolfgang Schäuble became the chairman of the CDU while Merkel was elected as secretary general of the party. In 1999, the party seemed to be recovered and won the important states in the elections. However, the same year the most dramatic scandal of CDU became public. Helmut Kohl had put campaign contributors' money illegally in a bank account of the party to the tune of 2 million DM (Pulzer, 2001; DeLeon and Green, 2004). In simple words, Helmut Kohl financed the CDU campaign by secret bank accounts and hidden donations. At the beginning of the scandal, he didn't react to criticisms. He probably thought that it would be forgotten and there were three years until another election however just after this scandal Merkel made a political maneuver to distance herself from Helmut Kohl.

She wrote an op-ed about the scandal before the Christmas day that altered everything for Schäuble and Kohl. The first page of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung put Merkel's criticism on the headline: "Merkel: Kohl's era is irretrievably over". Whilst people had been waiting for a defensive article from Merkel who was the Secretary General of the CDU, she clearly said that "Kohl caused damage to the Party, the Party ought to learn to stand on its own feet without Kohl" (Harmed the Party, 1999). Neither Kohl nor Schäuble expected such an article from her which was an earthquake within the party. The girl who

had been crying in cabinet meeting now bringing them down. The first reactions from them turned into a fight between Schäuble and Kohl. Weeks later, Schäuble had to admit that he had also received money from Schreiber. “With this first important distinction in place, Merkel puts on the mantle of women’s moral authority, casting herself as the party member best suited to lead the CDU” (Sheerson & Anderson, 2014).

Merkel’s second hit to Kohl was her declaration to media which revealed that she checked bank account that had more than 2 million DM (Qvortrup, 2016). The same day, she clearly expressed that Kohl should be resigned from his position as honorary chairman. Kohl admitted these wrongdoings and said “If the consequence of this action was a lack of transparency and perhaps, violations of rules on party financing, then I regret that. I did not want this, I had wanted to serve my party” (Karacs, 1999; Smith, 2003). Although she was criticized by Kohl’s loyalists within the party, her maneuver increased her visibility from the German public. Langguth says that she should thank Karlheinz Schreiber for the information about illicit donations as they helped become what she is today (2009). Even years later, most of journalists underlined that Kohl never forgave Angela Merkel because of her betrayal (Pfister, 2014). Years later, Kohl’s wife reportedly tried to stop Merkel to speak at his funeral (Sanderson & Johnson, 2017). In the middle of scandal, Wolfgang Schäuble was also pushed to resign from his office. Even because of this corruption scandal, Wolfgang Hullen, “head of the Christian Democratic Union parliamentary delegation’s finance and budget department for long years committed suicide (Beckwith, 2015).

After such a crisis, the CDU obviously needed the a figure to improve the image of the party. Angela Merkel was the right person who can survive in a corruption and political scandal at the party. Through this time, Merkel had already planned local conferences to inform them. In the 2000 CDU leadership contest, Merkel had many advantages compared to others who has 10 years’ experience as an elected member of the Bundestag, 8 years’ experience in two different ministerial position and experience of being deputy chairwomen of the CDU party since 1998. Also, because of her gender, she could be deemed as a symbol of a white page for the

party. Overall, when compared with other women in the CDU who competed for the CDU leadership, Merkel is obviously advantageous. Not only other women candidates but also R  he, Merz and Stoiber were not strong enough to challenge her. Sheeler and Anderson emphasize that “As one of only 101 women who have navigated the party structure in Germany since reunification, Merkel is clearly a trailblazer” (2014, p. 482). In April 2000, she was elected as CDU leader with 95% of the votes of 935 delegates (Five key moments in Merkel’s career, 2018).

### **5.5. CDU in Transformation**

The biggest and broader programmatic changes have been realized since she became party leader (Green, 2015). In order to understand party transformation, it is vital to explore the internal dynamics of the CDU. Firstly, as said in the previous chapter on the contextual background of country, the consequences of unification also challenged political parties and party system in Germany. The new social, political and economical conditions pushed the CDU to reform itself regarding profile and programming. Although the CDU was considered as a cadre party, it became a catch-call party which means a party directly aimed at catching all the votes from the diverse voters (Wiliarty, 2008, p.83; Hornig, 2013). “Attitudes toward gender, child rearing, and sexuality had changed over the postwar decades, 17 million East German citizens had joined the republic, and the CDU needed to be catch up” (Hockenos: Merkel Transformed the CDU, 2009). From this perspective, Merkel’s leadership was a seminal moment for CDU. Angela Merkel transformed the CDU step by step. Since 2000 when Merkel became party leader there were catastrophic in three main policies: **gender and family policies, immigration policies and economy.**

Firstly, Merkel as a first chairwoman in CDU who has never emphasized her gender through gender based political rhetoric (Davidson-Schmich, 2011). However, she could manage to change perception about **gender and families** within the CDU. 1990 Reunification Treaty brought new challenging to gender equality where GDR was dominated by egalitarian approach was completely different from West Germany which led to increasing in women employment



(Bosch, 2015; Holst & Wieber, 2014). After reunification women in East Germany have been part of the working class and this new population creates its own policies within the party. However conservative politicians didn't catch this changing and kept their classical family model representing women as responsible for housework. Due to changing social dynamics and influence of Angela Merkel, the party shifted their policies towards, not only housewives but also to include women who actively work and single mothers.

*The modernization of the party's position on working mothers has helped the CDU appear less backwards looking than it was previously and has likely contributed to the party's increasing popularity among female voters (Wiliarty, 2013).*

CDU proved that they have also transformed itself despite its traditional stance for clear gender roles which can be seen obviously from policies of Ursula von der Leyen, whose tenure as Family Minister under the Grand Coalition in moving the CDU beyond its established views on family policy (Green, 2013).

In addition to this, Angela Merkel gave a statement which mentioned that CDU is respecting unmarried couples, single parents, family with adopted children and even same sex relations, so, the CDU announced its respect of non-traditional lifestyles as well (Fitzpatrick, 2018). Angela Merkel was the person who opened the way for the bill of same sex marriage albeit she voted against the bill in the parliament which was surprising but understandable where she knows that her vote wouldn't change result but she successfully gave message to her party as well. After voting she says that "I hope that with today's vote not only that mutual respect is there between the individual positions, but also that a piece of social peace and togetherness could be created" (Noack, 2017).

Also, as expected Merkel's chairwomanship the CDU increased the number of women executive positions within the party. In all her four terms, women are dominated one third of the positions in the CDU and the cabinet. "Having Merkel as chair of the CDU, however, has made a significant difference in the kind of access that women have to informal channels of political power" (Wiliarty, 2010, p.178). According to the statistics, within the 16 federal states of Germany in 1991 North Rhine-Westphalia had the lowest percentage of CDU women members with

16.1% depending on 2018 numbers and around 29% of federal ministers, ministers of state, state secretaries and department heads are women (New German Cabinet, 2018). Also, the proportion of women in the Bundestag is just over 30 percent at present (Iglhaut, 2019). In personal interview with Paul Ziemak who was a former chairman of the Junge Union and is now General Secretary of the CDU, said that the

*Junge Union hosted a group of young politicians from different countries. A young woman said to Chancellor Merkel, she inspired her to go into politics. In this moment, I realized that Merkel inspires young women all over the world not only in Germany (Personal Interview, 2019).*

Also, having Annegret Kramp Karrenbauer as a leader after her in the party could be deemed as one of the biggest example of how she transformed the CDU in terms of women leadership because Merkel is always seen as an exception within the party and no one really imagines that there would be another women leader for Germany after her. On the other hand, Merkel's encouragement for women also reflected in the voting behavior of women as well. In the last two Bundestag elections, women were considerably more likely prefer CDU/CSU. For example, in the 2017 election only 30% of men backed the CDU according to the exit polls, which were down from 39% compared to 2012. Support among female voters, although there has been decrease compared to the 2013 election, is still more than male voters with 37% (Arnett, 2017).

The second policy area is **immigration policy**. Traditionally the CDU preferred to ignore immigrant issues and focus on how Germany will not be an immigrant country. Merkel retained the commission within the party to reconsider immigration policy of CDU. For her, there should not be an "ignorance" policy towards Germany's reality. Peter Müller who was the chair of the commission said that the "CDU no longer saw immigration as a matter of "whether", but of "who and how many" (Clemens, 2009). Thanks to Angela Merkel, the CDU became aware of that immigration issue as more than a single policy area which is linked to sociopolitical issues as well. "Migrants were an economic necessity in the old federal republic and still are now for demographic reasons" (Wagener, 2014). Moreover, the immigration issue had another controversial dimension for CDU,

which is multiculturalism in terms of religion and ethnicity. As Christian conservative party, the CDU had been skeptical towards multiculturalism and supported the full integration of foreigners without forming any parallel societies (Joppke, 2002). However, Angela Merkel as a consensus builder is aimed to have moderate party policy towards immigration. Despite the CDU's 2005 election manifesto, emphasizing Christianity as a value-based system for individuals and society, the participation of Islam in German society is mentioned explicitly. Mushaben underlined her role in transformation of immigration policy of the CDU with these words; "I contend that it has displayed her strongest leadership skills in the very arena that triggered decades of vociferous opposition and resistance to change within her own party: immigration and asylum" (2017).

In 2005, Angela Merkel and the new CDU introduced a bill about immigration with the SPD including the famously known welcoming culture. In order to encourage to pass the bill, Merkel bring herself as an example with migration background from East Germany (Leise, 2007; Mushaben, 2017). This new perception of CDU towards immigration issue would take step forward after the Refugee Crisis in 2015. Angela Merkel's decision to keep the border open has been brave, but also catastrophic for CDU's position on immigration policies. It later became a huge problem between the CDU and the CDU's sister party CSU. Immigration policies of the CDU have still been the main debate in German politics in relation to the refugee crisis and the rise of the right wing.

The third and last issue is the **economic policies** of the party. From the very beginning of her leadership in CDU, she had been very insistent on reforming of the CDU's economic policies. Although Merkel's demands on policy change on unemployment were envisioned by tax reform, individual social insurance accounts and combined welfare-jobless benefits because of resistance within the party failed until 2002 (Clemens, 2009, p.128). She was tenacious, especially about the unemployment issue. The "New social market economy" included tax reform, social insurance and welfare benefits. "Her 2001 congress speech thus remained vague on what was new in the new social market economics, and disavowed any plan for a 'revolution' in CDU policy, in any direction" (Adam,

2001). The 2005 election was kind of test for her whether German people support their economic plan or not. “As the social consequences of the radical tax reform proposed by CDU candidate Angela Merkel’s tax expert, Prof. Paul Kirchhof, became clear, the CDU/CSU increasingly lost support” (Henning, 2005). In other words, the 2005 election results revealed that voters did not favor harsh capitalism which kept by the CDU so the economic plan should be revisited (Dyson, 2010; Marc Clemens,2013). In 2005, she took over Germany with 11% unemployment rate, almost zero percentage of growth rate while public debt is rising (Odendahl, 2017). Although under this negative atmosphere for CDU, the result of the 2005 election was tool for Angela Merkel in order to put pressure on the party, which abandoned economic policies of the CDU. Between 2002 and 2005, Merkel expanded her power within the party and also cooperated with the CSU and within three years she backed and insisted on a new plan about investment and job creation (Brown et al., 2005). Thanks to her economic reforms, Germany did not have any damage from the Eurocrisis and remained the strongest economy in the union.

In addition to specific policy areas, it should be noted that Merkel brought her own style to party politics as well. During her chairwomen era, she adopted a style called ‘collecting cards’ from her rivalries, which is also quite an influential element for success of her and the CDU. In other words, she managed to take the best political cards from each party such as environmental policy from the Green party and more liberal policies from Social Democrats and adopted for her party program which is one of the main reason behind her victory in elections. Although her party leadership seems to be in turbulence in different crisis, for a long time she managed to use this style, which also increased the power of CDU as a catch all party.

For many years traditional and conservative notions generally marked with CDU. Merkel’s leadership and transformation power within the party can be summarized in two ways. Merkel brought, not only changes in policy programs, but also changed perceptions within party and towards party. In other words, Merkel challenged the worldview of traditional conservatives which led the CDU to talk

about more contemporary issues from the new angle. It started to open its doors to the modern middle class in society which extended the CDU as a catch all party. Naturally, Merkel's rise to power encouraged the 'modernization' of CDU. Clemens point out new profile of voters which aimed by CDU as follows;

*The federal CDU's new cultural profile aimed at the upwardly mobile urban middle class did not prevent Land and local functionaries from adopting traditional, often hardline, even chauvinistic, rhetoric meant to placate long-time supporters or woo the socially marginalized lower middle class (Clemens, 2009, p.134).*

Therefore, in this case the new CDU would be open to Catholics and Protestant Christians, conservatives, liberals and Christian-socials, women and men from different regions, from all social classes and democratic traditions of Germany.

### **5.6. The Personalisation of the CDU-Votes for Merkel**

Role of Merkel in transformation of the CDU created different political directions for the party as well. Although she had been considered as an outsider in within the CDU in 90s, after 2005 the CDU has been identified with Angela Merkel (Aggarwal, 2014). This trend within the CDU has become more visible with every election since 2005. Langenbacher emphasizes that Merkel's non-ideological and calm attitude has put her image in a very different stage within the political parties (2015). This situation led to two consequences which are personalization of CDU campaigns and rising of Angela Merkel as a leader of Germany and Europe without alternative.

Firstly, her cult image and secure feeling which shared by different range of voters made her as unbeatable by her rivalries (Langenbacher, 2015). In other words, Angela Merkel has her autonomy within the CDU as a leader. Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle investigates the influence of personalization in election campaigning which claim that Merkel ran as an incumbent and the CDU campaign heavily focused on her (2014). Study by Brettschneider and friends on Merkel's public image in the 2005 election, found that German voters consider Merkel as "More competent in generating new jobs and voters thought she had a better plan for Germany's future" (2006, p.496). Their claim is also supported by surveys, for

example in 2006 just after devastating election results, Angela Merkel's job approval then spiked to a record 80 per cent in while pollsters attributed it to her modest, non-partisan style, a honeymoon effect and optimism about the economy. CDU/CSU ratings rose to 40 per cent (Clemens, 2011). Other surveys also showed that Merkel was more popular than the CDU (Deutschland trend, 2017). In the same study, they also found out that Angela Merkel is mentioned almost twice as much as her party in the headlines while her rival Frank-Walter Steinmeier was never mentioned to this extent (Deutschland trend, 2017). Also, Clemens analyzes her independency from CDU regarding the personalized approach. Merkel's campaign based on almost entirely on her success as a chancellor and almost nonpartisan (2011). In other words, Merkel managed to represent herself as an ultimate leader of CDU. Actually, one of the consequences of this personalization was felt when she declared that she would step down from party chairwoman when people reacted with shocking and unpredictability (Merkel to give up CDU Chair after 18 years, 2018). As well as CDU chairwomanship, when she declared that she will not seeking reelection again in 2021, German public found itself in a discussion called what will happen after Merkel? (Sorkin, 2018; Skidmore, 2018).

Secondly, the Eurocrisis and Syrian refugee crisis made her leader of Europe. There is no doubt, Germany is increasing its visibility and role to get more responsibilities for policy making of EU leading by Angela Merkel (Açıklan, 2016; Meiers, 2015; Van Esch, 2017). There is no doubt, Merkel showed leadership for Europe in the Eurocrisis. Her rhetoric related with 'More integrated' Europe increased her visibility as a leader of Europe. Also, the Syrian refugee crisis dragged her to make risky decision for Germany and EU where she took responsibilities. Whether her decisions are criticized or not, Merkel once more took risks on behalf of EU actually. Her image of 'Ultimate leader of Europe' has been prevailed by herself. Especially, the Eurocrisis and the Syrian refugee crisis polished her image as a leader of Europe as well. Thus, she started as an outsider within CDU, but after 18 years, she accomplished to build own her image from the eyes of party voters, German and European public.

## **5.7. Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany and Leader of Europe**

Although she was leader of CDU, she had to wait to be chancellorship candidacy for few years. While the 2002 election was coming, there were some doubts about her ability to manage everything, which hindered her chance to be a candidate for the chancellorship. When the famously known as Chancellorship Question (Kanzlerin Frage-K-Frage) comes up, there were different alternatives, which were the same politicians as her rivalries for the CDU leadership. For example, Friedrich Merz was the first person who declared his candidacy within party candidacy but he did not have any public administration experience. On the other hand, Edmund Stoiber was another candidate who was leaders of CSU and had administrative experience. Within all the discussions and gossip in the media, Angela Merkel never said something directly but the public also had an opinion that no one is supporting her and that she did not have enough experience. During that time, even media made rumors about a coup against her. Just a few days before the CDU Executive Board meeting, she had met with Stoiber secretly and then she publicly announced that she was supporting Stoiber (Packer, 2014). Stoiber was a candidate of the CDU in the 2002 election who had strong right wing positions on domestic and international issues. Although he made gains in the provinces, Schröder won the national election as the more experienced politician. The CDU once more missed the chance of being part of the government with a small percentage. This defeat was definitely a great moment for Merkel's party leadership and candidateship for the upcoming election.

She wisely used this election defeat to regain and power within the party and parliament group of the CDU. Meanwhile, between the two elections, in 2004 President Johannes Rau stepped down and Schäuble had already expressed his interesting in this position while Angela Merkel keep someone in her mind who was Horst Köhler. Merkel found a brilliant way to eliminate Schäubel from the race. Merkel acted like she was supporting Schäuble but she also already knew that the FDP and Koch would not support Schäuble's candidacy. After their expected reactions, she brought up three alternatives including Köhler who got support from the FDP and became the new president in 2004.

Her final two rivals for the Chancellorship candidacy were Laurenz Meyer and Friedrich Merz. Meyer was the General Secretary who attacked the Schröder government and became the victim of another scandal within the party. Meyer stands accused of continuing to receive payments from a company he once worked for, energy giant RWE company (Kauder New CDU Secretary General, 23.12.2004). Following his resignation, Merz wrote a letter to Merkel and mentioned that he was not going to participate in re-election for party executive. In other words, now the way was clear for her chancellorship. In the September 2, 2005 which was just before the elections, issue of Science magazine, the following headline appeared: 'Germany Poised to Elect First Scientist-Chancellor'. The article of headline is looking for answers How scientist Angela Merkel would become Chancellor of Germany and how scientific world would be influenced from this (Vogel, 2005). So, this article can be considered as an indicator that Merkel would be Germany's new Chancellor in soon.

2005 German election was extraordinary in terms of its consequences. Based on election results, the two major parties (CDU and SPD) came out about equally strong, with 34.2 and 35.2 per cent of the valid vote respectively while The FDP did well (9.8 percent), as Left Party wo took 8.9 percent (Schmitt & Wüst, 2006). Although election results created a kind of deadlock, CDU and SPD managed to form coalition leading by Angela Merkel. Since 2005, 15 years of Merkel's Chancellorship are known as Merkel I, II, III, IV. In this part, there will be discussion on Merkel's biography as a chancellor, which is composed of the cornerstone events of her era in domestic and foreign policy. There will not be brief policies and their implications as this is not gist of the thesis. It should be noted that within these years, only the refugee crisis will not be discussed in this section which will be examined as a case study in the Chapter 6.

### **5.8. Merkel I- Grand Coalition in Action (2005-2009)**

When Angela Merkel became Chancellor in 2005, the political atmosphere in Germany was given as suffering the consequences of Hartz reform and social problems sourced from reunification as mentioned in the Chapter 3 (Seifert, 2006).



That's why, the constitutional reforms of federal system, welfare and tax system were the main issues of her first government. In this regard, Chancellor Merkel's consensus builder characteristic has played a vital role where and she had to make a consensus with not only SPD but also other actors in German politics such as the Bundestag and Bundestrat (Kornelius, 2013). Olsen emphasized her role as a consensus builder as follows, "The Chancellor thus becomes a mediator, seeking to find consensus and solutions among the different positions" (Olsen, 2011, p.348). However, she had also been personally influential in some domestic issues as well. Merkel's government made some important reforms in the area of federalism (itself a legacy of the 1966–69 coalition) that were seen as absolutely necessary to help overcome the familiar problems of Reformstau that had plagued German governments since Helmut Kohl (Olsen, 2011, p.350). Furthermore, she achieved one of her main goals of reducing unemployment and improving the economy, which were the main problems of Germany when she came to power. Almost 5 million people were officially registered as an unemployed and public debt was almost 70% of GDP and that definitely violated the Maastricht Criteria (Botman & Danninger, 2007, p.3). Basically, she raised VAT and reduced corporate taxes which made it easier to create employment (Olsen, 2011). The 2008 global financial crisis which began in the USA hit Germany too. However, thanks to the future-based reforms of the Merkel government, Germany did not feel any catastrophic effects. "Angela Merkel has successfully guided Germany into a thriving economic powerhouse and propelled herself into leader" (Steckenrider, 2013 p.226).

Not only economic reforms, but also her efforts on environment and nuclear policies should be noted in her first term. As mentioned she was one of the architect of the Berlin Agreement in 1995 as a minister. In 2007, Germany hosted the World Economic Summit of the G8 countries. Merkel managed to persuade the G-8 leaders to accept the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and also to agree to the necessity of binding the CO<sup>2</sup> reduction target EU's emissions reduction targets (Thalman & Wettengel, 2018). The German press called her "Klimakanzlerin" (Climate Chancellor) (Schmidt-Mattern & Detjen, 2019). In addition to this, she changed her nuclear energy decision after Fukushima

accident. She announced her decisions to quit the technology by 2022 with those words “Fukushima changed my attitude towards nuclear energy” (2011). Although she was criticized because of her U-Turn in her nuclear policies which was poorly evidenced, she was decisive and determinant (Merkel Gambles credibility with Nuclear U-Turn, 2011).

Therefore, although she tried to focus on foreign policy in her first term, thanks to her consensus building and pragmatism, she was relatively successful to deal with domestic issues.

### **5.9. Merkel II- Eurocrisis and Beyond (2009-2013)**

Depend on the election results, the German people wanted to see Merkel as chancellor but with different coalition partner. Liberals and the Left could not have a majority to form a coalition and Merkel became the first postwar chancellor to lead two fundamentally different governing coalitions which was also a chance to show her out-weighted leadership (Helms, 2011). The Eurocrisis started in Autumn 2009 with the bankruptcy of Greece would become the defining characteristics of the Merkel II government. The Eurocrisis was, and would become one of the most challenging economic and political quagmires within EU history. There is no doubt, the Eurocrisis with its domestic and foreign policy reflections are cornerstones in her political career. Açıkalın analyzes Merkel’s leadership during the Eurocrisis with chaos theory. In the first phase of the Eurocrisis between 2009 to May 2010, Chancellor Merkel’s approach was a really cautious one and she explicitly claimed that there is no short-term and easy way as a solution to this crisis (Açıkalın, 2015). She did not speak in the worst times of the crisis until mid-2011 when she could see all the possibilities for the solution of the crisis. Her calm turned to have an action in a short time and came up with a rescue package for debtor countries with austerity measures and Germany’s strong economy became the unofficial role model consequent to which she started to lead not only Germany but also Eurozone member countries (Fabre, 2012).

Also, Chancellor Merkel came to the stage with a “More Europe” vision, which aim to have more integrated European Union and Eurozone (Merkel demans more Europe!, 2012). Qvortop in his book mention that there is no doubt that Merkel is the most influential leader in the Europe after the Eurocrisis (2016). In June 2010, German government had to introduce an austerity package, which envisioned a deficit reduction of about 82 billion euros over four years. In this issue, she had a huge disagreement with her coalition partner FDP. 2010 was marked with the presidential crisis for Angela Merkel when President Horst Köhler resigned and Chancellor Merkel failed to take supports of her government for Christian Wulff in two rounds and Christian Wulff could be elected in third ballot (Conolly, 2010).

On the other hand, time shows that the Eurocrisis is not over yet. Between 2011 and 2013 when the second wave of the crisis threatened the fate of the Euro in terms of social and politica lconsequences. The Eurocrisis became multidimensional, more dynamic and nonlinear and the Chancellor had to show multitasked leadership where Chancellor Merkel had to convince other actors and public about the urgency to rebuild the Eurozone system. As she emphasized strongly “If Euro fails, Europe will fail” will be never forgotten (If Euro Fails, So Will the Idea of European Union, 2010). Albeit Merkel’s assertion to strict austerity put her in a tough position in the eyes of public. Between June 2012 Summit and October 2012 Summit, she designed and explained outline of her Europe vision. Merkel’s clear and determinant vision, leadership put her and Germany in the position of leader of Europe. “Although Germany’s Eurozone policy has shifted from unilateral hesitation to more collective decisions, not even Paris could oppose the German role in Eurozone crisis management” (Schieder & Guarneri, 2018). It should be noted that among German Chancellors, Merkel is the only one who does not have an EU politics experience before her Chancellorship. In other words, she did not have any vision or strong EU sentiments however she has learned how to conduct EU policies through the Eurocrisis.

When she was battling with the Eurocrisis and its consequences, military reforms were one of the major political decisions she made. It is important to understand why this decision and Merkel’s support were important for domestic politics.

Although the CDU has been transformed, some issues are still very sensitive within the CDU including policies related with military. Since the reunification, changing international security environment and the power balances naturally influenced the structure of the Bundeswehr. After the following crisis in the Balkans and the Bundeswehr duties under NATO and UN also influenced the military capacity of Germany. In 2010, together with Ministers of Defense Thomas de Maiziere, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg and Ursula von der Leyen, Merkel initiated a new reform package for the military. Reforms were mainly aimed at strengthening the structure and functionality of the Bundeswehr as a professional army through the demographic and financial context (Fuchs, 2013). In terms of the scale of reforms, it was biggest reform that Bundeswehr had. The main change under the reform package was reduction of the number of troops to 180,000 through the suspension of conscription that was replaced by voluntary civil service within the Bundeswehr and the community (Dyson, 2011). Also, the reform package aimed to increase Germany's ability to contribute to crisis management operations by removing the distinction between the forces devoted to support, stabilization and attack operations. Kate Connolly emphasized that these reforms were pushed through by the then defense minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, with Merkel's backing, despite the opposition they faced from many conservative politicians (2015). Even later, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen launched a child-care service with flexible working hours in the Bundeswehr with Merkel's support (German Defense Minister von der Leyen seeks to make Bundeswehr more family friendly, 2014). Thus, Angela Merkel changed the structure of Bundeswehr more than 50 years.

In 2011, Germany held a non-permanent seat in UN Security Council when the Arab Spring started in the Yemen and following countries. Libya was not an exception. The first protests in Libya had been surpassed by Gaddafi forces in mid February and resulted in countrywide unrest. The EU responded to the Libya unrest quickly and the EU member states put in place measures to repatriate citizens. After the official commencement of the no fly zone, on the 26<sup>th</sup> February 2011 the German air force rescued 134 employees of German company. However, the political crisis of Libya would come later for voting of the UN Council

Resolution 1973 that include military intervention to Libya. On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the German Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Peter Wittig lifted his hand to signal Germany's abstention. By voting to abstain, Wittig formalized the most controversial German foreign policy decision of recent years. A few years later Germany's NO to Iraq intervention, Germany was once at the crossroads with alliances. Opperman suggests that in the eyes of Western allies Merkel failed to meet the expectations of its European partners to accept a leadership role in solving the crisis (2012). As well as European partners, criticism toward her was harsh by Joschka Fisher with following words; "Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East ... German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe's future" (Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention, 2011).

In the midst of those criticisms, Merkel stepped out and explained to the German people why the Germans decided to veto Libya bombardment.

*As everyone knows, Germany will not take part in military measures," she said. "That is why we abstained in the vote. But we share the goals of the resolution unreservedly. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality (Merkel Explains Berlin Abstention, 2011).*

Also, the local election was another element in this decision. At that time, Angela Merkel was aware that most German people doesn't want to extend German mandate in Afghanistan as well, which is why she did not want to drag Bundeswehr to unpredictability (Kohtamaki, 2009). With that decision and argument once more Angela Merkel did surprise her counterparts in Germany and abroad. She also demonstrated that new foreign policy under her legacy would take German interest as a priority regardless of alliances.

### **5.10. Merkel III-Wir Schaffen Das (2013-2017)**

The 2013 election was her ultimate triumph which he CDU reached the number of seats that just needed only 9 seats to form government alone but coalition was formed with the SPD. The German public already called her "Mutti" who can

protect Germany and even Europe from any fatal crisis like Eurocrisis (Knight, 2013). In other words, everyone expected that although the consequences of the Eurocrisis were still being felt, Merkel's second grand coalition would be fine. However, the third term of Angela Merkel might be considered as the toughest one.

In 2013, the Ukrainian crisis started as a dispute between the pro-EU and pro-Russians group in Ukraine, which was triggered by President Viktor Yanukoych who suspended the EU membership process of Ukraine. Mass protests started on November 2013 and toppled Yanukoych from presidency in February 2014. However, it was not the end but the beginning of a new regional crisis in South Ukraine where is pro-Russian. A month later Russia annexed the Crimea through an unrecognized referendum in Crimea. Since her Chancellorship, Merkel's relationship with Russian President Putin has always been complicated and interesting. The Merkel-Putin relationship is defined by wariness, mutual suspicion, if also mutual respect (Smale & Higgins, 2017). Germany's close economic links with Russia since the reunification have brought dense web of consultation and cooperation mechanisms between the two governments which were held once a year until 2013 through (Seibel, 2015).

In contrast to her wait and see policy, she responded to the Ukrainian crisis immediately and declared that Russian's take over as an unacceptable for Germany (Forsberg, 2016). Following President Obama's speech about the Ukrainian issue, Germany decided to implement sanctions. Through the diplomatic process, Merkel has been playing a leading role amongst the European leaders as well as with Washington and Moscow. Merkel insisted on keeping her phone contact with Putin many times to try to convince him to pull back his soldiers from the Ukraine (Pond & Kundnani, 2015). Chancellor Merkel made a tremendous effort to find a diplomatic solution for the crisis including a visit to Washington which also handled possible peace talks within Russia and Ukraine till the downing of the Malaysian airlines by pro-Russian groups in Ukraine. In 2014, Thanks to Merkel's leading initiative the Minsk Agreement was achieved but violated by Russia who was the subject of harsh economic sanctions when Minsk II was signed (Forsberg, 2016). Judy Dempsey's word as following well explains

how Merkel shoulder leadership once again prior to Minsk II agreement. “She has taken on the biggest foreign policy challenge, if not the biggest gamble, in her political career” (2015).

It should be noted that the Ukrainian crisis is the biggest geopolitical confrontation of Germany since the Cold War, which has made it tougher for Merkel. Unfortunately, some local conflicts have been still part of the Ukraine when it comes to 2018 with the violation of Russia though the Minsk agreement is still valid. As Harnisch summarized as

*Merkel's credit, her persistence bore fruit in the Minsk II-agreement, which still forms the basis for any conflict resolution today. In the words of the then Foreign Minister Steinmeier, Germany aspired the role of Europe's "Chief facilitating officer" (2017).*

Ukraine was not the only crisis in her third term. She incurred damage from Germany's biggest ally- USA. Actually, Merkel's approach to USA as a Chancellor actually had two dimensions; personal and public. In her youth age, America was an idealized place for freedom and democracy for her. On the other hand, her professional approach to USA in case of foreign policy had been affected by her personal ideas as well. Also, her approach to the US politically, her criticism towards Schröder government during Iraq crisis. She wrote an article in Washington Post titled “Schröder does not speak for all Germans” and emphasized her support on the Iraqi war. Hence, especially after Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor Merkel's era was expected as reconciliation for German- United States relations. However, starting with her oath as Chancellor she directly criticized Guantanamo. “An institution like Guantanamo can and should not exist in the long term. Other ways and means must be found to deal with these prisoners” (Milne & Dinmore, 2006). Her strong position against Bush's methods on the war of terrorism was actually a very pragmatist maneuver because the White House had no more places to hide because of isolation. Consequently, the White House hesitantly accepted her criticism. Equally, Chancellor Merkel has been clear that the new relationship between Germany and the US had never been implied as unlimited in practice in any way. “Consultation cannot mean US guidance, and

that common analysis does not automatically lead to common action in the end” (Guerot, 2006, p.5).

Angela Merkel admires the United States and its democracy promotion role and she has never forgotten her first summer holiday with Joachim Sauer in San Diego and later she conceded in Congress that her experience was completely different for her. The Obama era could be considered as better compared to Bush and era for leaders’ level. Even in 2011 when President Obama awarded Merkel with a Presidential Medal of Freedom, during the award speech Merkel remarked thus;

*I grew up in the part of Germany that was not free, the German Democratic Republic. For many years, I dreamt of freedom, just as many others did. Also the freedom to travel to the United States. And I already had planned this out for the day that I would reach retirement age (Jackson, 2011).*

However, Obama and Merkel relationship was shaken by NSA Scandal which emerged in 2013 that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), together with the British Government Communication Headquarters, had carried out a massive program of surveillance of German citizens including Chancellor Merkel. As said earlier, the scandal had two implications for Merkel; personal and political one. She is personally disappointed with US, which she sees as a symbol of democracy and liberties. Also, as a leader of the country she had to explain German people what is going on with between “friends”. This scandal ended up with a huge disappointment for the Germans, as Kundnani summarized that “Many Germans are no longer convinced that the United States is a friend” (2016). Once more within ten year German- American relations fell apart again. However, his unwillingness to close Guantanamo and NSA surveillance scandal including tapping Merkel’s cell phone in Germany disappointed German people (How NSA Spied on Merkel Cell Phone from Berlin Embassy, 2013).

Merkel’s third term definitely was marked by political crisis with Russia, Europe and USA.



## **5.11. Analysis of Angela Merkel's Leadership Approaches and Behavior with The SNA Leadership Model**

The SNA Leadership model consists of four dimensions. Merkel's biography is given in the context of second dimension of the model. There is no doubt, Merkel's biography gives different angles and hints to understand her leadership. In this respect, this part of the chapter aims to analyze Merkel's approaches and behavior within framework of the SNA Leadership Model with examples from her background, leadership and policies.

### **5.11.1. Approaches**

*Be aware of chaotic nature of system:* The SNA Leadership defines this approach of leadership as an awareness of leader in the system, actors and their interactions. In case of Angela Merkel, it can be said that one of the vivid example of her awareness of chaotic nature of system is Merkel's own political life. Unlike other politicians, social science background and she involved in politics after her 30s. However, the key point of her success embedded in her awareness of chaotic nature of society and politics of Germany. In 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell down, she knew that reunified Germany would be a new environment where would be new chances for her in politics (Qvortrup, 2016). She started her political career as a spokesperson of Democratic Awakening Party in GDR which was new and small one but it helped her to learn how politics work and who was influential in the system. Then she became member of CDU and later became minister in the new cabinet in a very short time. As Kornelius underline that she learned politics on her way to Chancellorship (2013). In other words, Merkel succeed to become Chancellor of Germany who knows both West and East Germany, interests' groups and how they have been reacting each other. She mentioned her awareness in her words; "What the *Wessis (Western Germans)* know, we can learn but what we know, they can't learn: our training facility has closed for good" (Scally, 2018).

Also, Angela Merkel is aware of different actors in German politics and how they are interacting with each other though she does not have typical CDU culture background which composed of traditional family, business oriented and Catholic doctrine (Green & Turner, 2016). As the biggest economy of Europe, business interest groups are one of the powerful groups in Germany (Grünbacher, 2017; Paster, 2018). Chancellor Merkel learned both to cope and use them wisely. First, she got support of business interest groups for her policy package against Schröder's Hartz Reforms when she first came to power (Clemens, 2007). Then, she wisely used business sector position as a support for her new immigration policy in 2005 with argument of German industries needs immigrants as a labor force (Maletzky, 2017). Josef Janning underlines that "Merkel is quite aware of who is who and how much they have influence in German politics" (Personal Interview, 2019). In other words, Merkel's success lies in her consummate mastery of the German political system (The Merkel Model-how to keep succeeding in German politics, 2017).

Though coalition is the main characteristic of German political culture, it is not always easy to form and sustain it. Second example of her approach to be aware of chaotic system from her success in coalition talks. As Kornelius and Qvortrup touched upon she is good in negotiation and never leave the table first. Angela Merkel managed to form four different coalitions with SPD (three times) and FDP since 2005. Probably one of the longest negotiations took place after 2013 election with two months when ended up with Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD. In addition to this, she experienced crises of dissolution of coalitions which are sourced from different political views within parties as well but every time she managed to keep coalition. So, it can be said that Angela Merkel is quite aware of her political partners as an actor in German politics who shows high ability in coalition building (Angela Merkel's Chance, 2005). Merkel's Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety was great example of her awareness of chaotic system in the international level. Her performance in 1995 UN Climate Summit which was successfully ended with agreement between actors who had prioritized their national interests. Although she was inexperienced politician at that time, she was aware that different actors,

their interests and interactions which she successfully manipulated and ended up with concrete results (Schwägerl, 2007).

Chancellor Merkel has been aware of chaotic nature of domestic and international politics which help her to keep power for a long term as a Chancellor of Germany and inevitable leader of Europe.

*To think kaleidoscopic and catalytic:* Approach of thinking kaleidoscopic and catalytic covers leader's ability to adopt herself to changings and developments through creative way. Actually, Angela Merkel is herself representing changing in German politics and society as women from Eastern background which gives her more flexibility and great chances to prevail her kaleidoscopic and catalytic way of thinking in policy making. In this respect, first example can be drawn from her efforts to modernize the CDU. Niedermayer defines the CDU before Merkel as following; "It was a party that was boring in some ways, but also guarded the state with clear principles. Conservative, Christian values were at the top with liberal economic policies" (Merkel CDU'ya nasıl bir miras Bırakıyor, 2018). Whether some claims that Angela Merkel does not have vision for Germany and CDU she underline her vision for CDU in these words "We need to find solutions for the world of tomorrow" and ensure that the CDU is the party of "Germany's strong center" (Merkel says climate change and digitalization top challenges, 2019). From this perspective, Merkel has been encouraging the party to adopt itself to new Germany and the world regarding family, environment, gender and economical issues through years (Skard, 2015; Langenbacher, 2019). While she was leaving party leadership, she clearly leave a new CDU thanks to her kaleidoscopic and catalytic way of thinking in 2018.

As expected the CDU's new image under Merkel found reflections on her election campaign as whereas German election time is known as "boring" in terms of election strategies. Once more, Merkel managed to suprise people with her kaleidoscopic and catalytic way of thinking. For example, she unexpectedly paid a visit to Döner kebab restaurants in 2009, 2013 and 2017 elections which is not common within CDU politicians (Angela Merkel Döner Kesti, 2009; Kostidis,

2013; German Chancellor Angela Merkel cuts, eats döner kebab in Berlin, 2017). In other words, Merkel's visit to döner kebab restaurant can be considered as innovative strategy which emphasize that new CDU can reach all segments of societies.

Not only CDU but also Germany has been under transformation with her leadership in many ways. One topic is quite important to understand her role as a kaleidoscopic and catalytic thinker which is digitalization of Germany. Merkel pointed out natural consequence of Germany's aging population is lack of desire to have innovation in digital technologies (Heineman, 2018). In this respect, Chancellor Merkel initiated strategy to make Germany as a center of artificial intelligence in the world as she said (Brady, 2018). Five-point digital plan of Angela Merkel includes digital competence, infrastructure, innovation and digital transformation known as Industry 4.0, digital society, minimizing bureaucratic culture (The Digital Strategy of German Government, 2018). Angela Merkel is one of the leader in Germany who started this digital revolution where no doubt her scientist background plays significant role to catch technological revolution in the world. Probably her friendly moments with AI Robot in the fair is enough to memorize her initiative in digitalization.

To think catalytic and kaleidoscopic can be deemed as one of the vital properties of leaders who should bring fresh and innovative solutions compared with previous leaders. There is no doubt, Merkel with her leadership and biography constitute biggest example of thinking kaleidoscopic and catalytic.

*Be glocal:* The SNA Leadership Model defines glocalization as global locally or experiencing globalization from local perspective. Angela Merkel is one of the leader who is keeping glocal approach in both domestic and international policies. In this respect, Merkel's encouraging economic policies towards Germany's flagship sectors is one of the main example of Merkel's glocal approach. Especially, the cult of "Made in Germany" has been promoted by her in the global market. For example, Merkel has made a great personal effort to promote German business only in China through 11 trips to the country in the past 13 years,

including visits to second-tier cities at the forefront of German investment (Zhen, 2018). Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel is keeping policies which invest more on promotion of German production as a pioneer in the world. Consciously, many commercials emphasizing that a product or was "Made in Germany" or uses "German technology" which equals to quality and sustainability (Haucap et al., 1997). As exemplified in the kaleidoscopic and catalytic approach, digitalisation initiative of Merkel also emphasizes "Made in Germany policies" (Jones, 2018). When Volkswagen's emission scandal hit to cult of "Made in Germany" in 2015 once more Merkel took the stage and she made sure that "It is of course a dramatic event which is not good, but I think the reputation of Made in Germany is not so shaken that we are no longer considered as a good place to do business (Merkel: VW scandal won't damage Germany's reputation, 2015).

Merkel also has been contributing to make Germany's environmental politics as a leader in global scale with glocal approach where she had been leading since her ministerial position in 1994. Merkel's governments since 2005 set national and global environmental issues which are climate change and greenhouse gas emission as top priorities (Weidner & Mez, 2008). In other words, Merkel mentioned that Germany sets national agenda for environmental policies with understanding that they are part of world as well where they contribute global issues with local policies (30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Federal Environment Ministry, 2016). Thanks to her efforts and success in addressing the environmental policies with glocal approach, she has been called as the first German "climate chancellor" (Hübner, 2017).

Broader sense, Angela Merkel could manage to transform German economical system as a "model" for all EU member countries with glocal approach. There is no doubt, it is not possible to know whether Merkel had such aim in the beginning of the Eurocrisis, her leadership paved a way ended up with "German model" for everyone. Dullien summarizes the "German model" which has large current account surplus, low unemployment rate and acceptable economic growth as a result of combination of nominal wage restraint, supported by labour market reforms which create huge controversy within Europe public (2013).

Angela Merkel indirectly advertises German model in different platforms. Merkel's ambitions of installing culture of stability and solidity in Europe led to have European Fiscal Compact in 2012. Stephan Pühringer analyzes her speeches between 2008 and 2014 who finds that after the beginning of 2009 Merkel started to promote the installation of the German debt brake to European Union and Merkel pointed out European austerity policy as a shining example of a German "culture of stability" (Pühringer, 2015). Also, Ulrich Beck was one of the eminent figure who underlines emphasis of "German Model" and Merkel's undeniable leadership. Chancellor Merkel has seized the euro crisis as "Her occasion, 'the propitious moment' to restructure power relations in Europe (2013). Even Stefan Kornelius suggests that "Even her leadership style which is sometimes considered as slow turning to source of stability for Germany" (Personal interview, 2019). In other words, Merkel successfully formulate her glocal approach to policy making in different levels. As given in different examples, Merkel is keeping glocal approach in her leadership in a strong manner.

*To have unique set of values:* Having a unique set of values is one of the characteristic in the SNA Leadership model. Background of Merkel shaped her leadership traits including approaches and behaviours, no doubt her life in GDR especially had been milestone for her values. First of all, Merkel's background in oppressive regime of GDR made democracy and freedom as main values of her (Kornelius, 2013; Pazzanese, 2019; Sokutu, 2020). Merkel never hesitate to mention her experience in GDR and importance of freedom and democracy for humanbeing as in the follows; I know how to live under non- democratic regime. Don't forget, freedom can never be taken for granted" (Chancellor's Speech at Harvard, 2019), and she also said that "We stand stripped of any excuses and are required to do our part of freedom and democracy" (Berlin Wall Anniversary: Merkel Warns Democracy is not self-evident, 2019).

Refugee crisis in 2015 was one of the critical moment of the German history when she accepted refugees in sake of human rights (Schmid, 2016; Areilza, 2018). Although any European leaders refused to take refugees which is controversial today. Hasselbach claims that in the very beginning of the crisis, Merkel chose

values rather than interests (2016). Her actions were clearly guided by the belief in the righteousness of upholding European solidarity, and in defending more universal values of humanity (Helms, 2018). Few years later she noted;

*I'd make all the important decisions of 2015 the same way again," Merkel said. "It was an extraordinary situation and I made my decision based on what I thought was right from a political and humanitarian standpoint (Merkel: No regret over refugee policy despite political costs, 2017).*

Merkel's decision to accept refugees to Europe inevitably created negative effects in Germany. One of the political and social consequences of refugee crisis are AfD and increasing popularity of right wing. Depends on the polls, while 62% of AfD supporters voted for the party because of general disappointment with established parties the arrival of refugees (Gratowski, 2016). Increasing right wing in Germany was followed by increasing number of attacks to people with foreigner background. Tolerance and respect to minorities are undeniable part of Merkel's set of values (Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to European Parliament, 2015). That's why, Chancellor Merkel wasn't late to respond this trend in German society with these words; right-wing populism in Europe is "poison" for society and Western values, this generation born after the Second World War will have to prove they have learned the lessons of history" (Schütz, 2018).

Merkel's value based leadership and policies have been also known recognized in international level. She obviously gave importance to trust in her dialogue with other leaders. Although both Merkel and Obama praised US-German relations as a strong friendship in this event, two years later NSA scandal challenged her value based approach in policy making. Snowden's documents revealed that NSA has been taping cell phones of German's politicians including Angela Merkel. It was unexpected crisis for her who emphasize friendship and trust in her policies towards US as an ally. Merkel expressed her feelings as following "Spying among friends is never acceptable, there needs to be trust between the U.S. and European nations" (Butnick, 2013). She did not hide her angry and disappointment towards Obama which is obviously moment was breaking for Angela Merkel's values of trust and friendship. Another example can be given from Merkel and Erdoğan's relationship. Egemen Bağış emphasizes that "Two leaders have been familiar with

each other and even in the worst times of Turkish- German relations, they trust each other” (Personal Interview, 2019).

Also, it should be noted that Merkel’s perception on religion and how she reflects role of Christian values in her policy making. Merkel constantly emphasizes the conservative and Christian values as the leader of the CDU (Struve, 2015). One of her interview she answered the questions related with role of religion in her life and leadership as following;

*Brigitte: Would you say that you are a religious person?*

*Merkel: Yes*

*Brigitte: Do you pray regularly? Or is it more an ethic guideline?*

*Merkel: As well as. I am a religious Christian. That also shaped my basic attitude. I think that we people have the task to go towards other people and create something with them. At the same time we are humans that make mistakes. The Christian belief is also an important support at work. It tells me to not be too full of myself.*

*Brigitte: Is there a place for religious values in politics?*

*Merkel: Of course. Belief is not reserved for only a little corner in life or a day during the week.*

*Brigitte: You can really live that in your everyday life?*

*Merkel: I try to. My faith is always with me, not only when I am in church (Angela Merkel im Brigitte Talk, 2013).*

Angela Merkel has been identified with set of values and even accused to be stucked for values rather than interests. Merkel’s policy proposals will demonstrate a ‘fresh approach’ grounded in shared values such as freedom, community, and social justice (Sheeler & Anderson, 2014). Her persistence and strong emphasis on common values of West, Christian world and her unique interpretation on policies became one of the strong characteristics of her leadership.

### **5.11.2. Behaviors**

*Produce entangled solutions:* The SNA Leadership Model features producing entangled solutions as a new term to leadership which means producing concurrent solutions to various problems. Both national and international media consistently emphasized role of Merkel’s scientist background in order to justify her behaviors. Producing entangled solutions could be exemplified from this perspective.



Through her Chancellorship, Merkel faces various domestic problems. Housing has been increasingly one of the core problems in Germany within last years. Germany has suffered from housing shortage and increasing price of renting which led to mass protests (Noll & Weick, 2015; Knipp, 2019). Chancellor Merkel has been aware of necessity to find concurrent solutions to combat housing issue. She officially announced that “The government aims to build 1.5 million new flats by 2021. It has set aside over 5 billion euros for social housing which is planned to build over 100,000 new social flats by 2021” (Was die Bundesregierung für den Wohnungsmarkt tut, 2019). Her plan also brings raising housing allowance for poor households and overhauling building regulations to make it easier to build more quickly. The government will also give its own land to municipalities at a subsidized rate in order to build affordable housing (Germany sets out measures to tackle affordable housing shortage, 2018). In addition to this, Merkel nudged private sector to address this problem with government and suggested tax reform which will encourage private sector (German Press Agency, 2019). Chancellor Merkel’s entangled solutions to housing which create social problems as well are one of the vivid example of her leadership behavior.

Merkel’s producing entangled solutions behavior also reflected her foreign policy choices. Russia and Germany have had always special relations in the history. Background of Chancellor Merkel in GDR and Russian speaking ability make her position more unique within German chancellors who created dynamism in trade and energy (Meister, 2013; Siddi, 2016). Ukrainian crisis was one of the icebreaker moment between Germany, Russia and EU. Chancellor Merkel was considered as the only European leader who could convince President Putin to take back Russian soldiers (Cassidy, 2014). Merkel initiated set of entangled solutions for peace in Ukraine. As the crisis has unfolded, when Putin agreed to Merkel’s proposal to establish a “contact group” known as Normandy Four which includes France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Later, Merkel declared a plan which included economic and political measures against Russia together with EU and US which failed and led to Minsk II Agreement (Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on the situation in Ukraine, 2014). In both agreements she played as a great mediator role along with her set of solutions in different ways

(Dempsey, 2015). Since 2014, Normandy Four contact group meetings are still ongoing where Merkel is still playing eminent role.

Angela Merkel is a leader who can produce entangled solutions to domestic and international crisis to address multidimensional consequences. She displayed a high degree of analytical objectivity and disdain for the confines of tradition or dogma, along with an openness to innovation, especially to ‘new and consistent solutions (Clemens, 2006).

*Be determinant of uncertainties:* The SNA Leadership Model suggests that leaders should be determinant of uncertainties in his/her environment during times of crisis. This behavior is accompanied by flexibility and capability to make transformation. Angela Merkel has an image of stability and trust from the eyes of German people (Bennhold & Eddy, 2018). There is no doubt, her behavior to be determinant of uncertainties is the reason why people perceive Angela Merkel as a symbol of stability and predictability.

There is no doubt, the Eurocrisis was one of the biggest unpredictability which Europe and Germany experienced. Through the crisis, Merkel played eminent, bold and decisive role to save Eurozone although her wait and see policy had been criticized in the beginning. Especially after 2010, while EU had been floating within unpredictabilities how first measures would affect Greece and Eurozone Merkel took risks and came up with plans to redesign Eurozone structure regarding budget discipline and fiscal union where she directly underlines that the only way to survive such a huge crisis is to have more integrated Europe (Glencross, 2013; Merkel Demands More Europe, 2012). As expected, Merkel’s leadership to be determinant of uncertainties have been criticized still today regarding its long term social and political consequences however it does not change the reality that Merkel showed flexibility and risk taker attitude.

Merkel’s call for more integrated Europe was not only for restructuring the Eurozone. Merkel also want to be determinant of uncertainties in political side of

the union after the Brexit and election of Trump in the US. Angela Merkel voiced her strong desire to be determinant future of Europe as follows;

*We Europeans truly have to take our into own hands- naturally in friendship with the US, in friendship with Great Britain, as good neighbors with whoever, also with Russia. We have to know what we Europeans must fight for our own future and destiny (Paravicini, 2017).*

Chancellor Merkel extends her vision for Europe as more integrated in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. In her speech in European Parliament, she addresses her position as following; “Only by taking a united stance will Europe be strong enough to make its voice heard in the global arena and defend its values and interests” that point out her support for European Army as a complimentary part of her vision. Also Chancellor Merkel states in her speech “We ought to work on the vision of one day establishing a proper European army. Yes, that’s how things stand (Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel top the European Parliament, 2018).

Although, Angela Merkel is well known with her wait and see approach as a rational leader, she has been pursuing policies to determine uncertainties in the crisis along with flexible and risky decisions.

*Simplicity:* The SNA Leadership Model suggests that leaders always face complex situation where they should simplify these complex problems and produce simple but various solutions as much as possible. Another dimension of simplicity is about giving simple and understandable speeches which simplify complex situation to his/her followers.

Tax issue has been one of the core debate in Germany within last years. German income tax system is highly complicated compared to other countries. (Barbaro & Suedekum, 2006). Since Merkel became chairwomen of the CDU, she has been criticizing Schröder regarding tax system. As well known, Merkel had been supporting simplifying tax system which would bring flat tax system (all people should pay same percentage of taxes) (Mills, 2007). In 2009 election, she builds economic dimension of her election campaign on her tax reform promises that

were “Simple, low and fair” (The Parties Tax Angle, 2009). In 2017, once more Merkel brought simplifying tax system promises in her election campaign where she suggested phase out of solidarity tax which was taken since the reunification (Riedel, 2015). Although it is controversial that how much Merkel has been successful to implement her policies about tax system, her desire to build more simple and understandable income tax system for Germans has been clear.

As defined, simplicity also refers to language of leaders which should be simple as much as possible towards their followers in order to explain complex situation. Merkel is not like other political leaders who like big speeches in front of masses, her rhetoric is shaped by her pragmatism and scientific background. Not only Helms but most of scholars agree on her language style is definitely combination of simple, clear-cut and firm arguments (Sheeler & Anderson, 2014; Stefan Kornelius personal interview, 2019). Even some parts of her various speeches became motto in German politics. For example, in 2009 election she used a simple sentence as following “ Wir haben die Kraft” (We can have strength), then in the Eurocrisis her words on demand for “More Europe” became motto of her policies. In addition to this, although refugee crisis was mostly connected with cultural issues compared to previous crisis she had to deal with, she enriched her clear and simple speeches included more cultural and emotional notions (Bischof & Dorer, 2016). As well known, “Wir schaffen das” (We can do it) sentence became hitherto in the Syrian refugee crisis and later. In other words, she is successful to keep simplicity as a behavior in her rhetoric as well. Sheeler and Anderson emphasize her unique rhetoric style as follows; “Merkel’s rhetoric echoed her scientific background. She routinely spoke of how ‘systems functioned,’ of testing new concepts, and of surprising male colleagues by injecting ‘rational thought’ into discussion” (Sheeler & Anderson, 2014).

As underlined in two examples, she has been showing simplicity behavior to complex issues in domestic and international level where Merkel’s personal background is undeniable factor in her simplicity behavior both in policies and rhetoric.

*To create attraction field:* The SNA Leadership model underscored importance of interaction between leader and followers. This interaction zone should be kept as dynamic by leaders. Strategies of leaders can be varied depends on cultures of countries. Germany has strong culture of stability, continuity and confidence in security and politics (Duffield, 1999; Bohn & De Jong, 2011). In this respect, expectations of citizens shaped by this long lasting political culture in Germany where Angela Merkel 's leadership profile is perfectly fit for stability expectation of German voters.

Merkel's biography actually shows that she had been building her image and attraction field with German people through the years because she was not early comer in the politics. The first and vivid shining of Angela Merkel was in Kohl scandal as a symbol of stability and trust for public. Merkel's attitude in Kohl's scandal can be deemed as a first signal that she would not be only Kohl's girl in politics. With her op-ed in the news against Kohl, she showed that CDU deserve new kind of leadership which is more transparent and more inclusive (Watts, 2014). Separation of Merkel from Kohl also proved that Angela Merkel is capable to lead the CDU and will be strong as much as Kohl which was just beginning for her. In the upcoming years she also managed to establish attraction field with other Europeans thanks to her performance in different crisis.

Second moment in her political career when she had deep and interactive dynamism with her followers was the Eurocrisis. She immediately became symbol of stability and confidence within German people especially after the Eurocrisis. Perceptions of German people about how they consider her has been observed in different polls through the years. In 2013 after devastating Eurocrisis, 80% of German people approve her leadership regardless their political party (Khazan, 2013). When she became made her German's Mutti (Steckriender, 2013; Mushaben, 2017). Also, her leadership helped her to create attraction field with other Europeans. Merkel is not only Mutti of Germany but "Queen or Savior of Europe" (Angela Merkel- the queen of Europe, 2013; Qvortrup, 2017). In other words, Merkel's leadership went beyond the German borders. She managed to compose attraction field with other Europeans. It should be noted, her leadership

in the Eurocrisis also led to negative reactions within European public. In her official visit to Greece led to mass protesting due to austerity policies (Wearden, 2012; Smith, 2014). However, it also shows that she created this interaction field in both ways.

As touched upon in the simplicity, Merkel mostly prefer to make more calm and argumentative based speeches that's why her gestures are important element as a complimentary to communicate with people (Holladay & Coombs, 1993; Talley; 2012). To exemplify, her hand gesture called as Merkel-Raute or Merkel diamond might be considered as famous gesture of her all over the world (Connolly, 2013). The biggest poster of German history which made by pictures of many CDU voters composed of Merkel diamond without her face in 2013 election as the main election campaign element. Eric Langenbacher argues that this strategy aims to focus on Merkel's reliable and approved political leadership which "Encapsulates Merkel's appeal – no drama, trustworthiness, sound management, studiousness, and hard work" (2014). In other words, the Merkel-Diamond as a nonverbal way of communication represents for her unagitated, calm and solid political leadership for German people.

Thus, although refugee crisis hit her positive interaction with her followers. Merkel represents stability, calm, steadiness and prosperity in Germany" said by Thomas Walde, who hosts a weekly politics show on NBC News' German partner broadcaster ZDF (Smith, 2017). Angel Merkel might not be considered as a charismatic figure from the eyes of traditional definition of charisma (The mystery of Mrs. Merkel, 2009; Kettle, 2011; Stefan Kornelius- personal interview, 2019). However, through the years she managed to create attraction field with Germans and other Europeans.

## **5.12. Is Merkel Blame for Crises at Home and Union? AfD& Pegida and Brexit**

After almost a decade with crisis had passed when she was departing for upcoming election in 2017, the public image and appearance of Chancellor Merkel has

changed in Germany and foreign countries. Merkel's diplomatic maneuvers and leadership style are criticized as a reason for new political and social problems in Germany and European Union. Firstly, Merkel's policies were accused to trigger far right movements in Germany. The main criticism towards her policies had been so strong within the CDU/CSU bloc and this has started to change since the economic crisis. An increasingly strong right-wing opposition within the CDU/CSU has emerged, which considers Angela Merkel is too much "too social democrat" and they established Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) at the end of 2012 (Kemper, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the parties are economists who are against the policies of Angela Merkel to bailout Greece with German taxpayers in the Eurocrisis. Just 6 months after AfD established, they gained get 4.7% under the threshold of 5% vote in 2013 election.

The AfD prompted its political position with their manifestation on democracy and core values which starts with "We want to reform Germany and return to the roots and principles which were fundamental to its economic recovery and subsequent decades of economic and social progress" and finish with "Only the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany can end this illegitimate state of affairs" (Manifesto for Germany, 2017). Depend on AfD's main political tenets, they also outlined main goals if they became the power such as restoration of national currencies and renationalization of decision-making process in EU (Lewandowsky, 2014). Between the 2013 and 2017 election, the AfD enlarged its popularity within society through its populist rhetoric. In 2017, they managed to enter the Bundestag as the third largest party with the motto of "Hunt down the government, Mrs Merkel, and get our country and people back" (Vela, 2017). They have successfully used Angela Merkel as a tool to mobilize voters who do not approve of her position on different issues especially on immigration because they know that the CDU/CSU personalized the 2013 election with the focus of Angela Merkel and her image of Mutti.

Secondly, new right wing movement is PEGIDA (Patriotic European against Islamisation in the West) movement, which formed in Dresden, October 2014 (Alkan, 2015). Contrast to AfD, PEGIDA was established by ordinary people. In a

very short time, they got huge support from the society. Dostal outlined the timeline of this support (1) a Facebook page was put up on 11 October 2014; (2) the first rally against “Islamisation” took place in Dresden, with 350 participants, on 20 October; (3) the number of participants in the Dresden rally grew continuously week by week to up to 25,000 participants on 12 January 2015 (2015). As well as the founders, the political profile of its supporters can be defined as the typical middle class of Germany who are educated, mostly men and do not feel close to any political movements based on interviews who clearly expressed that Merkel’s policies and CDU led to alienation from their own people (Dostal, 2015). Chancellor Merkel called upon the German people to turn their backs on people who are cold or even have hate in their hearts, and who claim the right to be called German for themselves alone and seek to marginalize others (Gräßler, 2015). In her recent visit to Dresden, thousands of protestors shouted “Go Merkel” while she was speaking out against far right movements.

While the new right wing party challenged German politics, UK brought their own EU membership to the referendum due to post Eurocrisis policies of EU. However, one of the most prominent reasons which is referred to by the media and some scholars is that Angela Merkel and the German leadership after the Eurocrisis which addressed by Schweiger who mentions that

*The leadership style of the German government that ignored these domestic sentiments in the UK (and in other member states) consequently contributed its fair share to the first instance of EU disintegration now developing (2018).*

Paul Lever underlined this reality that Angela Merkel’s European policies have not made Germany loved (2017). In addition to this, some scholars claim that, especially her open door policy to refugees and strict and supranational policies on economic integration were used as excuses in the Brexit referendum (Fleischhauer, 2016; Bittner, 2018). Wolfgang Streeck says that there is no doubt that this is a major reason why Brits said “yes” was Merkel’s policies (2016). Even Karnitsching’s taking the approach of one more step ahead in his Politico article suggests that Merkel is not just a savior of Europe but rather a destroyer with her politics (2018). In other words, they affirm that Germany, under Merkel’s



leadership is a reason for increasing anti-EU sentiments within the UK. After the Eurocrisis, Brexit was the second structural crisis that could led to disintegration when Merkel is looking for a stronger and deeper integration for the sake of the European Union.

Merkel's first reaction after the Brexit referendum was;

*I had big regret over UK's decision, but the remaining 27 members of the EU should be "willing and able to not draw quick and simple conclusions from the referendum...which would only further divide Europe, countries should 'calmly and prudently' analyze and evaluate the situation, before making the right decisions together (Millman, 2016).*

Through the negotiations for deal, as always, she insisted that she would fight not to have a Brexit without a deal until the last moment while she also emphasized that she is open to any options that do not violate EU principles and integration. Also, Merkel was the person who convinced president Emmanuel Macron, who argued that Brexit should not be delayed any longer if they do not present proper alternatives. She has also been influential in negotiating the Ireland issue within the Brexit deal.

Merkel III coalition is marked by internal and international challenges. Compared to Merkel I, II, third term was the most controversial. "When she prepares to leave politics, Germany's Angela Merkel left her mark at home and abroad" (Fitzpatrick, 2018). Throughout the third coalition while the Chancellor Merkel has been struggling to lead Germany and bring the EU together, she has been blamed for the rise of the extreme right and left movements including the anti-EU ones which show that how she became influential across and European politics.

## CHAPTER 6

### FROM ANSAR TO WILKOMMENKULTUR: SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are the longest serving leaders in the Europe if Russia is not considered as a part of the Europe who have experienced various regional and global turbulences since the beginning of 2000s. As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, how the leadership styles of Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan determined foreign policy choice with the SNA Leadership Model as a top decision maker are examined using two cases. Syrian refugee crisis is one of those case studies, which would be analyzed in this chapter. The Syrian refugee crisis was not only challenging for Germany and Turkey but also had a significant impact on the Europe and the world. The Syrian refugee crisis is not solely a social crisis but it also has a political and military dimensions. In this respect, two countries- Turkey and Germany under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel have been the key players in this crisis through multidimensional realities, which will be discussed in this chapter. In the first part of the chapter, there would be responses of Turkey and Germany separately through ansar and welcoming culture covers 2015 refugee crisis. Second part would be background of Turkey-EU deal. Last part would analyze foreign policy choices of Erdoğan and Merkel with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

#### **6.1. Syrian Refugee Crisis in a Timeline and How Turkey and Germany**

##### **Respond**


Protests in Arab countries started with Tunisia and Yemen and had a spill over effect in Egypt and Syria in 2011 with demand of better life. However, within those countries Syria has its own distinctive characteristics. The diversity of ethnic

and minority groups in Syria turned into a nightmare because, not only local groups, but also some other regional and foreign interest groups intervened in conflicts in Syria who are Kurdish Autonomy in the northern Syria while the Free Syrian Army emerged from the street protests and former Syrian army members with various fractions. On the other hand, DAESH and Jabhat Al Nusra who is a radical Islamic force is composed of militant from around the world who aim to impose Sharia law in the areas they occupy. In addition to this, soldiers of national armies like Russia, US and other European countries became part of the Syrian civil war to fight against terrorism. This diversity of opposition groups makes the nature of Syrian civil war more chaotic as these groups have different independent interests while they also have similar and interdependent interests. Under the shadow of chaotic civil war, Syrian people have suffered from violent that led to huge displacement along with thousands of casualties. There is no doubt, displacement especially affect neighboring countries had shelter thousands of refugees. So, Turkey is one of the most affected country in the region.

## **6.2. Between 2011-2015**

### **6.2.1. Turkey**

Turkey as one of the neighboring countries has its own 911 km border with Syria and an undeniable part of this crisis as it has provided valuable protection for Syrian refugees since the beginning when public protests started on 26 January 2011 against the Bashar al Assad regime (Ostrand, 2015). In March 2011 the Syrian army was deployed to quell to peaceful demonstrations in different cities that killed many civilians can be considered as a trigger for starting of refugee flow to Turkey and other regional countries. The first and official response of Turkish government toward this brutality was opening the borders started in April 2011. The first comers were small groups however within a few months the numbers increased day by day which can be seen in Figure 3. As drawn in the Figure 3, numbers of refugees are increased that reached to almost 4 million within eight years.



*Figure 3. Number of Syrians under Temporary Protection by Years in Turkey*  
*Source: Computed and created by author with World Bank Statistics*

In addition to keep an open door policy Turkey also started to construct camps on the border in May 2011. Prime Minister Erdoğan says that “It is not possible for us to close our doors to our Syrian brothers, we are following what were happening in Syria with anxiously” (Erdoğan: Suriye İç Meselemiz, Gereğini Yapmak Durumundayız, 2011). Also, Turkey was also keeping contacts with Assad to convince making reforms in Syria which would be failed (Bağcı & Açıkalm, 2015). While Syrian refugees crossed the border, in August 2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus to encourage Assad to make reforms however the government failed to realize reforms once again.

The siege of Jisr al-Shughour in Northwestern Syria led to a major inflow of refugees into Turkey that pushes to declare of the **Open Door Policy by Turkey**. In the beginning, Turkey launched an open door policy dependent on a short term emergency plan with the main aim of providing shelter for refugees. The Open door policy did not give refugee status like in European countries. Turkish government had accepted them as a guest which was later re-regulated with law making. AFAD (Head of Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) was chosen as the main responsible government institution in Turkey responsible for

organizing shelter and the humanitarian aid to refugees. Although AFAD is responsible for natural disasters, it WAS restructured immediately following flux of Syrian refugees within border cities of Turkey. AFAD has ensured that the needs of the refugees have been met by utilizing the capabilities of various government agencies and ministries (Kanat & Üstün, 2015).

April 2012 is important month when highest number of over 25.000 refugees came into Turkey in a single day (Şimşek, 2016). In the upcoming months, conditions severed in Syria and conflict split to Aleppo led to around 200,000 Syrians fleeing to Turkey. In May 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan made a speech during his visit to city of Kilis on border;

*Until now, 40.807 Syrians came to Turkey, you are our brother, you can stay until you want to go to your home when the conditions would be secured in Syria. We are doing our best to show your situation to the world and working with international community to end this violence as soon as possible, Assad is getting weaker day by day (Başbakan Erdoğan Türkiye'ye sığınan Suriyelilere seslendi, 2012).*

A year later, Turkey brought legislative regulation on the status of the refugees which dated back to 1967 Protocol (Özden, 2013). In April 2013, Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the Law on Foreigners and International Protections- 'The first inclusive and updated act about migration related issues' which established the General Directorate of Migration Management (GDMM) under which the Ministry of Interior was adopted. Temporary Protection Regulation. On October 22, 2014, the Temporary Protection Regulation was issued. Although Turkey's temporary was criticized domestically, 2014 EU Progress Report underlined the importance of this law as in the following;

*The entry into force of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and related implementing legislation represented significant progress in the area of migration, as it introduced a comprehensive legal and institutional framework on migration and asylum with a view to bringing Turkey in line with EU and international standards (Progress Report of Turkey, 2014).*

Following 2014, DAESH expanded its territory including Mosul and announced caliphate in the lands of Syria and Iraq, which ended up with a refugee flux to regional countries which ethnically dominated by Yezidis. In the same year, Turkey held a presidential election after 2007 referendum which allowed election

of President by citizens. The newly elected President Erdoğan welcomed Yezidis delegation who came to Turkey as a refugee “We never make separation between ethnic groups and religions, our open door policy is for everyone who under persecution” (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Yezidileri Kabul Etti, 2014). Also, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized Turkey’s ansar culture and said that “You are muhajir and we are ansar you are not burden for us”. Ansar culture of Turkey can be deemed as one of the cultural and religious reasons for the open door policy of Turkey towards Syrian refugees which is taken as an influential element in Erdoğan’s foreign policy making (Aras & Duman, 2019).

#### **6.2.1.1. Ansar Culture and Turkish Hospitality**

Turkey’s approach to asylum seekers is based on the religious values of the Ansar and Muhajir relationship in the cultural context, who is an Ansar and Muhajir? The Ansar are the helpers, the supporters, and the protectors. The muhajir is one who has migrated, migrant, or one who goes to settle in other places than his own country (Abou El Wafa, 2009). However, the story of Ansar goes back to the first centuries of Islam. Historically, Ansar refers to the people of Medina, who supported the Prophet Mohammad and the accompanying Muslims (migrants) who migrated from Mecca, which was under the control of the pagans. The metaphor of Ansar originally comes from a temporary situation as the Muslims later returned to Mecca after their forces recaptured the city from the pagans (Kaya, 2016).

On the other hand, being Ansar has different interpretations in Islam and social life in Muslims is to share home, food with unconditional acceptance of siblings only for Allah’s sake without expecting any response. Also, Ansar is to divide bread as much as it is possible with a brother, in fact to fulfill the necessity of being a human being in general that is, to share with him without selfishness, to be with him, to lift him by hand and to be joyful in his life. In Muslim Sharing is to know that something does not decrease as you share it, and that you are blessed as you share. In other words, being an Ansar is to speak to the heart even if you do not know the same language, and to carry it in the heart for a common future as one people. Ansar culture was mentioned by prime Minister Erdoğan on Islamic

culture with Anatolian hospitality. Interview participant 1 who gave an interview mentioned that one of Turkey's main characteristic is their generosity which comes from their Muslim identity (Personal Interview, 2019).

In this respect, since the beginning of Syrian refugee crisis, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly emphasized Ansar culture of Turkish people and how it welcomes refugees. "We are ansar you are muhajir here" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Bizler Ensar sizler muhacir ,2014). In other words, the ansar and muhajir approach has been naturally taken by Turkish people and the Turkish government in the refugee crisis (Aras & Duman, 2019; Erçetin et al., 2017). In addition to this, Ansar culture of Turkish people and government does not only include Muslim or Turkish muhajirs. Depending on AFAD numbers, not only Yezidis but also a huge number of Kurds have poured Turkey after DAESH attacking to Kurdish villages along with the border. According to the Turkish authorities, 188,000 refugees fled to Turkey and the influx "flat-lined" at approximately 192,000 within only three days (AFAD, 2013). In other words, Turkey accepted refugees regardless their ethnic identity or religion differences. As İçduygu and Nimer (2019) mention that although Turkish government initially adopted an encampment policy depend on the last data currently only 1,7% of the refugees in Turkey are in camps (UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet October 2019, 2019). It shows that Turkish people also got used to live together with refugees as a part of their cities and daily life.

Whereas, Murat Erdoğan touched upon other side of the coin about refugees, suggests that usage of notion of "guests" for refugees has both negative and positive reflections in Turkey. He claims that positive meaning show clemency towards people while negative meaning of 'guest' is leaving their rights to host country (2015). This contradictory feeling of Turkish people also can be found in different field research. For example, one of the field research find that 59% of participants within Turkish people define Syrian refugees as a people who fled from violence and persecution (KONDA Barometresi: Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Bakış, 2016). On the other hand, negative image of 'guest' also reflected to society. The research that addresses the views of the society about the permanence of Syrians, 84% of the society see Syrians as guests, that's why, when the war is over

they should be sent back to their country and not be given Turkish citizenship (Erdoğan, 2014). Even sometimes this negative perception turned to protests and attacks to Syrians which could be considered as minor compared to all society (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015; Ekici, 2019).

In this respect, various field studies in different time show numbers about “How Turkish people perceive Syrian refugees? Regardless negative public opinion, notion of ansar culture is one of the leg of Turkey’s open door policy which is encouraging factor for government. Thus, Turkey has been dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis since the first day. As a consequence of Turkey’s open door policy, numbers of Syrian refugee reached to 4 million who have lived as a part of society. Furthermore, as President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey spent 40 billion USD to refugees within eight years (Başkan Erdoğan: 40 Milyar Dolar Üzerinde Harcadık, 2019).

### **6.2.2. Germany**

As emphasized in the beginning; timing of Syrian refugee crisis is very different for Turkey and Germany. As a neighbor country, Turkey had to cope with a refugee influx from the very first day of the crisis. On the other hand, Germany has had its own experience, which was intensified after 2015 when the thousands of refugees came across the German border. Mainly, multilateral policies of Germany in Syria, Merkel preferred to use diplomatic ways to stop violence and flow of refugees. The German government made humanitarian aid through neighbor countries of Syria who host the biggest numbers of refugees. Since the Arab Spring in 2010, the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) has increased its co-operation with four countries in the Middle East which were Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Palestine; co-operation with Syria was suspended in 2011. Germany mostly frequently engaged in projects local as following; 603 million euros for Jordan, 103 million euros for Yemen and 275 million euros for Lebanon in 2012–2015 (Frymark & Gotkowska, 2016).



Only humanitarian aid and regional cooperation were not enough to hinder refugee flow to Europe. Because of intensifying violence and conflicts across Europe through expansion of DAESH, a huge number of refugees had to flee neighboring countries. In connection to the response of the EU towards the Syrian crisis, Germany was the first country who declared that they would accept 5,000 refugees in March 2013 in a program called the Humanitarian Admission Program (Orchard and Miller, 2014). At first, program was only applied to refugees in Lebanon then was extended to refugees in other host states. At the end of 2013, the Permanent Conference of the Ministers of the Interior decided to extend this program and take in another 5,000 refugees (Schwarz, 2019). In July 2014, the Conference of Permanent Conference of the Ministers of the Interior approved the admission of another 10,000 Syrian refugees, adding up to the number of 20,000 Syrian refugees in total through UNCHR. Depend on the decision, priority was given to persons who a) deserved special protection (children with parents, endangered women, religious minorities, as well as a maximum of 3% severely ill), b) had “relations with Germany” via family, knowledge of the German language, previous visits or relations with Syrian institutions, and c) persons who wanted to further qualify themselves in order to later contribute to the reconstruction of Syria. The first group of 107 highly vulnerable refugees arrived to Germany in September 2013 (First group of Syrian refugees flies to Germany, 2013).

In addition to the Humanitarian Admission Program at the national level, Germany also started a private sponsorship scheme in 2013 within 15 out of the 16 federal Länder (National Audit Office, 2016). This sponsorship program provides sponsorship to Syrian citizens who have lived in Germany to sponsor their relatives from Syria in order to bring them to Germany. Sponsors have to make a declaration of commitment and demonstrate that they have necessary sources to cover the costs of refugees travelling to, and staying in, Germany. Most Länder only implemented the scheme until 2015, but some Länder accepted applications until the end of 2016. Thus, the main points of German solution to refugee crisis between 2011 and 2015 could be summarized as a focus on structural humanitarian assistance through EU mechanisms and the limited acceptance of asylum applications to Germany. Also, it should be noted that the acceptance rate

of Germany was very low. Although the asylum seeking process is under Dublin regulation was suspended for Syrian refugees, which allowed officials to process asylum claims regardless of whether the applicant had entered the EU through another member state. Until 2015, Germany was following the EU response to Syrian crisis through these mechanisms however, 2015 was turning point for Germany and Angela Merkel's leading to keep different attitudes within European leaders to provide more effective find different solution against influx of refugees.

#### **6.2.2.1. 2015 Refugee Flux to Europe**

Four years after the first refugees crossed the border of Turkey in January 2015, the total population of refugees in Turkey reached to 1.622,839 (UNCHR). Meanwhile Turkey opened its biggest camp in Suruç with 35, 000 people capacity. Although Turkey had to close its border of Cilvegözü and Öncüpınar due to intense fighting in Aleppo, Between January 2015 and December 2015 more than one million people came to Turkey for sheltering. 2015 was not as important for the statistics but it was marked as a breaking point for Turkey and Europe regarding the refugee crisis. An increasing number of refugees in host countries in a year led to a decrease of humanitarian aid percentage of UN to host countries which created a domino effect and refugees were looking for better places to live. At the same time, Macedonia made a momentous decision to allow passage to only a handful of asylum seekers with identification papers from Syria and Iraq (Thousands Stranded in Greece after Macedonia opens border for 250 migrants, 2016).

Thousands of refugees reached to Austria by foot through the public roads. On the night of September 4, Germany and Austria had to decide to open their borders for these refugees in order to avoid a humanitarian disaster. There is no doubt, Merkel's responsibility and political leadership played major role in this decision, as Germany would offer temporary residence to refugees arriving in her country. Television footage of cheering Germans who were welcoming new arrivals, encouraged more refugees from the Middle East to make their way to Germany via the Balkan route. This historical decision of Merkel has its own back door

realities, which should be mentioned in order to understand her vision and leadership in this crisis.

The decision to keep the European borders open could be deemed as the most controversial decision of Chancellor Merkel in her political career (Jacob, 2018). Actually, the German federal government planned to receive 300.000 refugees in 2015 and made a budget distribution dependent on this forecasting. Mayer explains that asylum applications to Germany were 96% from Syrians and 88.6% from Iraq (2017). Stateless people, such as Kurds and Palestinians from Syria, fleeing the Syrian civil war and terror of the Islamic State group, also maintain the high protection rate of 80.2% (Mayer, 2017). Thus, refugees was not only composed of Syrians but also Afghan, Iraqis and others.

No one really knows actually what happened at that day in Berlin. What were motivations of Merkel to make this decision or how this decision making proceed within government? Ludger Helms claims that she showed convictional leadership because she prioritized the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, she did not have personal gain, she ventured criticisms and lastly her policy had an ethical component (2018). However, Robin Alexander who is the writer of the book called “Die Getriebenen” (The Driven) explains what happened in that day in detail. He suggests that “There was no driver in driver seat but the refugee crisis is the main driver behind decisions when no one is taking any responsibilities” (2017). He also said that;

*They did not have a plan on crisis day; Germany was already skeptical to Dublin rules and had dropped it as we knew. She needed German solution as basically she could not close the border. The decision of taking take thousands of refugees from Hungarian motorway is not planned (Personal Interview,2019).*

So, at the beginning there was a decision to open the borders as thousands of refugees in Hungary wanted to go to Germany paradoxically and there was also already written order that closed to borders. Merkel and her ministers were not brave enough to go with the original orders, as they feared the images of rejected refugees along the border would harm them politically; so comments about

Merkel's open door policy decisions are not realistic. Merkel is neither saint nor witch (Alexander, 2017; Personal Interview, 2019).

In this respect, it can be said that three main decisions of Merkel formed her policies to the crisis. The first was her announcement that Germany would follow an open door policy along with labor force integration. Secondly, she suspended the enforcement of the EU's Dublin Agreement because although EU had drafted the solution before it did not work which brought further burden to Germany and lastly changed the German constitution on the subject of asylum application. A few days after her open door policy decision, Angela Merkel was encouraged by the Germans' readiness to warmly receive the refugees and she made her famous speech starting with "Wir schaffen das" (We can do it) (Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 2015). Angela Merkel has asserted that the contemporary crisis will define this decade" (Nougayrede, 2015). As well as her decision, her speech to German public was also quite influential and challenging. Compared to her previous political crisis, she was more a risk taker, defiant and focused on the solution. Her sentences now became of the biggest motto of her supporters and opponents to criticize. Although Robin Alexander and most journalists suggests that her decision to keep the border open whether rational nor planned, there is no doubt she was taking a risk to be a solution seeker while the EU failed to do so.

However, Merkel's decision on that day was not enough to solve refugee crisis while numbers are increasing day by day. Merkel also did not dare to say that that this was an exceptional decision. Instead, she prefers to use the positive attitude of German vis-à-vis 'welcome culture' which fuelled by German society' cheering and welcoming warmly the refugees in the train stations, within weeks, that changed. Due to the unexpected number of refugees created a kind of fear and unpredictability for Germans.

Unexpected refugee flow to Europe and reckless attitude of European Union brought crisis to Chancellor Merkel's hand whose open door policy resulted in controversy in both Germany and EU. The notion of willkommenkultur was

playing important role to determine her policies regarding immigration which would be analyzed in detail as well as Ansar understanding of Turkish government.

#### **6.2.2.2. Willkommenskultur and Germany's Open Door Policy**

In order to understand the role of welcoming culture in this refugee crisis, it should be underlined that Germany is the migration country since end of the Cold War. Especially after reunification, the integration of migrants has become a priority issue for German politics. However, the scope of these policies had been generally centralized in a negative way from public opinion (Haman & Karakayalı, 2016). In 2005, led by Chancellor Merkel, the idea of "Willkommenkultur" was developed to improve perceptions about immigration in German society while the reforms were done in immigration law. The notion is developed deliberately as a tool to manipulate society through political agenda, namely, to enhance the acceptance of German society being a country of immigration (Trauner & Tourton, 2017). In this context, since 2005, the notion of "welcome culture" started to be used more often by other German politicians and the media as well. This notion also reflects Merkel's approach within official and unofficial tasks. The concept of "welcome culture" is incorporated into official declarations (Liebe et al., 2018). For example, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) developed a governmental definition on "welcome culture" which is that "New migrants are welcomed with an appealing framework and thus recognised in society. Welcome culture extends to all new legal immigrants" (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013).

When Refugee crisis hit the Europe borders; likewise, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used "Ansar culture" as a religious notion to justify the Turkish government's open door policy and the guest approach to refugees, Chancellor Merkel was also very successful in mobilizing the notion of culture of welcome to explain her decision to the German public. The notion of "welcome culture", which is domestic migration-related concept, became an international motto of the crisis thanks to Merkel's word of "Wir Schaffen das!" (Alkan, 2019). In addition

to this, Merkel's visible and concrete role in the welcome culture also encouraged civil society initiatives in Germany as well. "Germany under Merkel's leadership, is occupying an important political and rhetorical position within media narratives" (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016).

Chancellor Merkel was not alone for her open door policy actually. CEOs from different sectors and business people clearly expressed their supports and positive attitudes along with Chancellor Merkel's open door policy and suggest that refugees could create an economic miracle for Germany in this century. For example, Deutsche Bank said the influx of refugees was "The best that could happen to Germany (Why Germanys will continue to welcome refugees despite calling multiculturalism, 2015). Furthermore, NGOs, local volunteers played a vital role in facilitating different level of societies to be part of welcome culture. Warmly welcoming of thousands of people in train stations was an international symbol of welcome culture while the other EU member countries had a discussion over distribution of refugees (Connolly, 2015). Moreover, various independent local aid organizations were organized by volunteers to provide adequate humanitarian aid like shelter, food and clothes. Interestingly, Karakayalı and Kleist conducted field research about volunteers between 2015 and 2016 and they found that age group of volunteers had been diversified between 20 and 60 which includes all segments of the society. (2016). There is no doubt, photos of volunteers were referred to as a reflection of German 'welcoming culture'. Angela Merkel praised German's welcoming culture in the TV program and said that "I am proud that we are giving a friendly welcome to refugees," and insisted that taking them was her "damned duty" (Angela Merkel: 'It's our damned duty to help refugees' 2015). Moreover, almost all political parties, trade union and more importantly media became part of the welcoming campaign and even some far right newspapers made an Arabic version of their newspaper such as BILD. Thus, German society in its all aspects seemed to be happy with Merkel's open door policy and react in a very positive and humanitarian way in the beginning.

It can be said that willkommenkultur and ansar culture shared the same essence. Though, it should be noted that ansar culture of Turkish people is mostly religious

and historical in manner while willkommenkultur was created with political aims and conducted consciously (Liebe et al., 2018). However, two leaders perfectly mobilize and interpret those two notions in their decision making process. In other words, Erdoğan and Merkel constituted a common language through social ties and cultural background between them and societies to explain their vital decisions about refugees.

### **6.3. On the way to Turkey-EU Deal**

Unfortunately, the welcome culture was not long lasting in Germany society. A few months after the refugee influx the number of refugees in Germany reached 476,649 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). From the eyes of public, Angela Merkel's open door policy had got out of control. She did not point out that this was an emergency decision and as a result, more and more came where numbers of refugees became uncontrolled, uncoordinated and unregistered. Even though authorities in the local areas had tried to do something extraordinary for months. In this respect, Ozan Ceyhun says that

*There was disorganized situation when numbers were increasing. For example, they send number refugees to villages but there is no plan for their accommodation and other services. Local government use sport center for their accommodation where local people cannot use facilities anymore and Germans doesn't like when their existence of refugees affect their daily life (Personal Interview, 2020).*

At the same time, The EU member countries were split because of the relocation of asylum applicants. Justice and Home Affairs made the forceful decision to relocate 160,000 asylum applications rather than 40,000, which paved way to high tension between member countries (European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees, 2015). It ended up with suspension of Schengen regulation through closing borders of France, Germany, Austria and Sweden.

Alexander Robin said that this uncontrolled situation and most importantly the EU's failure to solve the problem pushed Angela Merkel to find new ways to solve the problem by herself (Personal Interview, 2019). Different alternatives that were discussed in the public media were increasing humanitarian aid for African

countries and increasing the budget for hosting countries for Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, any of the scenarios could not hinder the influx of refugees to Europe in the long term. Due to, unprecedented number of Syrians in Turkey, Turkey found itself at the very epicentre of debates on the management of the refugee crisis, alongside another key player, Germany (Turhan, 2018). This reality made Turkish-German cooperation indispensable. That's why, Angela Merkel once more took a leading role and regarded Turkey as a potential partner to solve problem. Angela Merkel was aware that Turkey could be the only partner to have solution through Balkan route and Mediterranean coast. Now, Erdoğan and Merkel become undeniable partners for looking solutions to refugee crisis.

Erdoğan's visit to Brussels on 4-5 October 2015 who gave a message in his speech in Egmont Royal Institute in Belgium as follows "Although Turkey who have hosted largest number of refugees in the world, we still keep open door policy. In this respect, we internalize European values than existant member countries in terms of human right" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Belçika'da Egmont Uluslararası İlişkiler Kraliyet Enstitüsü Konuşması, 2015). In trilateral meeting with Tusk, Juncker and Schulz; Juncker presented a first draft of the envisaged EU-Turkey Action Plan about refugee crisis, which included several incentives, such as the reinvigoration of the accession negotiations and the bringing forward of the previously agreed Visa Liberalisation Dialogue (AB ile Türkiye, Mülteciler ve Vize Konusunda Prensipite Anlaşığı, 2015). However, Turkey and EU could not agree on €1 billion which would be partially covered by the IPA (Instrument for the Pre-Accession Assistance) funds allocated to Turkey. While Vice President, Frans Timmermans, and the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Johannes Hahn paid a critical visit to Ankara on 14 October and asked for €3 billion which was not partially covered by Turkey's pre-accession funding. It was obvious that the EU was in rush to make a deal when Turkey insisted to mention that the refugee deal and the EU's membership process are separate issues (Elitok, 2019).

Endless discussions over funding issues and visa liberalization met with complex EU decision-making structure made it much more difficult to reach a deal. In this



process, negotiating with Germany became more important for Turkey because Germany has the highest number of refugee arrivals to the EU and is also a key player in shaping EU policy (Okyay & Zaragoza-Christiani, 2016). On October 18, Angela Merkel visited Turkey where she stated that leaders and EU need to be more committed to have more cooperation in burden sharing for refugee crisis, fostering Turkey's EU membership and visa liberalization (Merkel presser with Turkish President Erdoğan in Istanbul, 2015). After this visit, Merkel visited Turkey five times between the 16<sup>th</sup> of October 2016 and the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May 2016 (Özcan, 2018).

Reaching the deal with Turkey was not easy as the EU expected. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of November Turkey had a general election and the AK Party's victory with 49.5% strengthened President Erdoğan's hand in negotiations with Germany and EU. In the upcoming meeting after the elections; EU member countries under pressure from Germany with Merkel which decided to give €3 billion to assist Syrian refugees also accepted to foster Turkey's EU membership, facilitating Turkey becoming part of the Schengen zone. In return, Turkey would increase security measures on borders with EU. The EU declared an arrangement of EU 28+Turkey summit. Following month, Tusk came to the G20 Summit in Antalya under the influence of sensitive public after terrorist attack. A leaked recording from Antalya shows the vulnerability of EU through negotiations with President Erdoğan who says that Turkey is a key country for the future of Schengen and the European project (Turkey's Erdogan threatened to flood Europe with migrants:, 2016). Finally, in the scheduled EU 28+Turkey Summit of 29 November in Brussels, a detailed final version of the Action Plan of 15 October was legalized. Meanwhile, by January 2016, only 500 refugees were actually resettled from Greece and Italy because of obstacles. In the first report on the relocation plan was published in mid-March 2016, the Commission called upon member states to increase their pledges and shorten the time for the acceptance process (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016). In March 2016, Balkan Countries closed their borders but it did not change situation for Germany whereas numbers of people can still reach to Germany through Macedonia route. While negotiations between Turkey, EU and Germany was still ongoing, numbers of refugees in Germany had been steadily increasing which put

pressure on Merkel when she was also mid of her election campaign (Stefan Kornelius- Personal Interview, 2019).




Figure 4. Numbers of Refugees in Germany Between 2014-2019  
Source: Computed and created by author using data from BAMF

In March 2016, Turkey and EU leaders met again to finalize the agreement that was expected however Dutch PM Rutte who was President of Council, Angela Merkel and Ahmet Davutoğlu brought about a new agreement. The main scheme of new agreement could be summarized as follows; Turkey and the EU agreed on the “1:1” deal, which means that “For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek Islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU” (EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, 2016). In brief, the deal aims to hinder the huge number of irregular crossings of refugees from Turkey to Greece through Aegean Sea. In return, depending on the fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap, visa requirements for Turkish citizens to the EU’s Schengen Zone would be lifted at the latest by the end of June 2016. Also, €6 billion in total was to be granted to Turkey in support of refugees’ assistance. The deal also includes a clause saying that Chapter 33 would be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, 2016).

Compared to the 2015 Joint Action, new four points were installed through a trilateral meeting in that night which are; one to one mechanism, increasing quota for resettlement per year, Turkey's determinant role for choosing refugees, and increasing funding from €3billion to €6billion. It created huge tension and controversy by the public in terms of how the new agreement is prepared applicability and legality (Adam, 2016; Barker, 2016; Alexander, 2017; Weber, 2017). Robin Alexander 's book can be considered as the only source highlighting details about that night. Alexander claims that Angela Merkel accepted, not only refugee agreement with Turkey, but also completely changed her political destiny vis-à-vis German society and EU member countries and he suggests, "This decision actually lies beyond her authority because she decided on behalf of EU member countries" (Alexander, 2017) while Angela Merkel defined Turkish proposal as a breakthrough (Rankin, 2016).

Criticism towards agreement is a never-ending story. First of all, some scholars suggest that this deal is violation of international law (Bačić-Selanec 2015; Rossi and Lafrate, 2017; Lehner, 2019). Besides, German and EU public see it as a giving up sovereignty of the EU to Turkish authorities who also believe that Turkey will use refugee cards to the EU as leverage to get what they want (Alexander, 2017; Robin Alexander-Personal interview, 2019). On the other hand, agreement from the Turkish perspective is considered in two different ways. One side claims that the Turkey-EU deal makes Turkey as a gatekeeper of Europe and asks why we have to keep refugees for them. Although, the deal gave a new path or fresh breath Turkish-EU relations, they suggest that Turkey's EU membership cannot be part of bargaining. Yet, after the first week of agreement number of refugees who illegally used Mediterranean Sea dropped drastically. Depend on the European Commission report; the daily average irregular crossings from Turkey into the Aegean islands fell from 1794 people per day in the period from January to March 2016 to 80 people per day (EU-Turkey Statement One Year On, 2018).

The Post agreement process was a great platform to see her leadership style through her political narrative that changed many times. As mentioned she had used humanitarian sensitivity through the words "We have to solve this situation

with human rights and humanitarian values. Asylum seekers do not have a right to choose where they go” (Hardy, 2016). Then she brought Germany a saving European values approach, “We must find a European solution that works. We need a Europe in which common challenges are met by solidarity and common action” (Hardy, 2016). Finally, she explained the agreement with Turkey through an “alternativeness” argument in order to close Balkan Routes to the rest of the Europe and the world. “What is at stake tomorrow and the day after tomorrow is whether we can get a deal that, for the first time, gives us a chance to get a sustainable, pan-European solution to the refugee issue” (Merkel says EU-Turkey summit decisive to solving migrant crisis, 2016). On the other hand, President Erdoğan emphasized importance of cooperation between Turkey and EU in burden sharing of refugees. However, Erdoğan also underlined that visa liberation is undeniable part of this agreement.

Despite ongoing criticisms from public, whenever two leaders meet underlined importance of agreement. They underline importance of the agreement in common press conferences in the following,

*I would like to particularly express our appreciation to Germany's sensitivity on the humanitarian aspect. Turkey and Germany eased the situation during the peak times of the refugee influx by taking responsibility and making compromises, Erdoğan said. Merkel also said, Turkey had put forward an effective performance in the refugee crisis (Karagöz, 2018).*

#### **6.4. Analysis of Two Leaders Foreign Policies with SNA Leadership Model's Dimension Four**

As in first quarter of 2020, Syria is still under ongoing civil war, 5.6 million Syrians have been living as a refugee mostly in neighboring countries and more than 500.000 people have been killed since 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2019), it is simply one of the most catastrophic and multidimensional humanitarian crises of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Turkey and Germany under Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leadership have been at the center in the stage of politics. The two leaders have considered local and global dynamics through ongoing civil war.

There is no doubt, leaders' policy choices shaped course of Syrian refugee crisis and ongoing civil war. In order to understand analysis of their foreign policy with reflections of background of leader, there should be emphasized two main points related with Erdoğan and Merkel's background. First of all, Erdoğan and Merkel had personal background of being immigrant. Erdoğan and his family moved from Rize to İstanbul and experienced difficult conditions in his early life. As well as Erdoğan, Angela Merkel had been always outsider as immigrant from East Germany. Second common point between Erdoğan and Merkel is giving importance of religion vis-à-vis humanitarian values. As touched upon in their personal background, they are strongly emphasized their belief and its role in worldview and policymaking. There is no doubt, these two factors could be deemed as similar sources of their foreign policy choices. In the upcoming part, foreign policies of Erdoğan and Merkel in Syrian refugee crisis would be analyzed with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model that are negotiator, connectivity, personal diplomacy, entrepreneurship, solution seeker and peace orientation.

*Negotiator:* As mentioned in the beginning of chapter, number of refugees had been increasing in Turkey within very short time of period. Erdoğan started to underline that share burdening should be done through international cooperation with Turkey since the beginning (Kirişçi, 2014). After 2015 summer was turning point for the crisis reached to Europe with millions of refugees. From this date, Syrian refugee crisis turned to new negotiation phase between Erdoğan and Merkel and Europe.

After numbers of refugees were increasing in Europe while EU hesitated to act in order to stop flux, it can be said that Erdoğan wisely use crisis to turn new chance to restart frozen Turkey-EU relations. In other words, the refugee crisis or specifically, the Merkel decision to have agreement in early September opened up a 'window of opportunity' for creating new dynamics in EU-Turkey relations (Krumm, 2015). EU's member leading by Germany and Merkel who didn't have any alternative were aware that having agreement with Turkey only the solution. It should be noted that pressure on Erdoğan and government regarding refugee issue

was not problem as much as Europe's at that time. However, Stefan Kornelius point out that Merkel is aware of President Erdoğan is tough negotiator but she also knows that there are always incentives which were economy for Erdoğan that's why she also brings economy as a part of negotiation" (Personal Interview, 2019). In this respect, Erdoğan successfully used Turkey's strong position for refugee issue and negotiated with EU in favor of Turkey's interest in enlargement process. Erdoğan got revitalization of Turkey's membership process, financial aid to refugees and progress on visa liberalization (Dempsey, 2017). Later years, Turkey-EU deal itself became negotiation card for Erdoğan (Fieldman, 2015; Fiuza, 2017).

Merkel had been leading figure since the crisis started, her attitudes and policies created controversy within the EU while some member countries closed its border to refugees. As well as Erdoğan, Merkel also called EU to make burden sharing and have effective relocation agreements within EU (Janning, 2016). In different words, due to ineffective policies of EU and increasing number of refugees day by day encouraged her to work with Turkey. Although Angela Merkel seemed to be in disadvantaged position in negotiating with Erdoğan and Turkey, she actually could manage to use her position in negotiations with other EU member countries. As Reiners and Tekin mention Merkel's successful negotiator in EU summits as follows; "Merkel was well prepared for the meetings and was successful at building coalitions with other member states in case of Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey-EU deal" (2020).

Stefan Kornelius underlined that "Merkel is aware that it is not easy to convince others within EU in the Syrian refugee crisis because even small states want to be against her" (Personal Interview, 2019). Although she did not convince other EU member states to keep open door policy as well as Germany, she prevailed her leading position once again within EU leaders. In addition to this, after Turkey-EU deal came into force, numbers of deaths in Aegean Sea and refugees dramatically were reduced which made her position stronger. Her visit to Turkey just after Turkey-EU deal, she says "I am convinced that it's in German, European and Turkish interests, and especially in the interests of those who are fleeing war and

persecution” (Zalan, 2016). Obviously, inevitable agreement with Turkey for Merkel prevailed Merkel’s negotiator characteristic and eminent role in EU crisis management. Stefan Kornelius commented that “Merkel is pragmatic leader in negotiation she just focus on what I want?, what others want? How we can reach common point” (Personal Interview, 2019).

Consequently, Erdoğan and Merkel were tough negotiator through Syrian refugee crisis in two perspectives. Erdoğan wisely negotiated with Merkel and EU along with Turkey’s EU membership process. Meanwhile, Merkel negotiated with both Erdoğan and EU member countries to defend her open door policy and Turkey-EU deal.

*Personal diplomacy:* Personal diplomacy becomes center of diplomacy especially in times of crisis (Ülgül, 2019). Syrian civil war and Syrian refugee crisis could be one of the vivid examples of how personal diplomacy is important in the world politics. There is no doubt; Erdoğan and Merkel are one of the world leaders who has been in the power more than 15 years which is advantage for them to know each other personally. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel can be deemed as the most important players determine future of Syrian crisis. First, President Erdoğan as a leader of country who welcomed Syrian refugees since 2011 started to seek personal diplomacy through bilateral&multilateral meetings and intensive phone calls with UN General Secretary, President of USA, Vladimir Putin and related countries’ leaders (Kaliber & Kaliber, 2019).

Especially; after 2015 when Europe faced Syrian refugee crisis, Merkel took a leading role about Syrian refugee crisis within EU leaders because of this frequency of communication between Erdoğan and Merkel visibly increased (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan Telefon Diplomasisi, 2019). It should be reminded that personal diplomacy also based on mutual gestures and trust between leaders (Vogt, 2016). Egemen Bağış emphasized their mutual gestures and trust “Trust between two leaders can be seen in refugee crisis together although Turkish-German relations are in low course” (Personal Interview, 2019). Turkey-EU deal can be seen as a result of mutual personal diplomacy vis-à-vis trust between

Erdoğan and Merkel (Smale, 2016). Also, continuity and realization of Turkey-EU deal is also based on personal diplomacy between Erdoğan and Merkel (Mutabakat sonrası sahada son durum ne? Hüseyin Bağcı | Habertürk Manşet - 24 Ekim 2019, 2019). Erdoğan underlines the importance of his personal diplomacy with Merkel in his visit to Berlin as follows; “We are and will strengthening of this momentum that we caught mutually with Chancellor Merkel” (Merkel ve Erdoğan’ın Ortak Basın Toplantısı, 2018).

Syrian refugee crisis is not only marked with personal diplomacy between Erdoğan and Merkel but also two leaders’ personal diplomacy with other leaders in order to find solutions. For example, Merkel personally take responsibility to convince European leaders to reach deal with Turkey (Walker & Troianovski, 2015). On the other hand, Erdoğan conduct personal diplomacy with Vladimir Putin and the Presidents of USA in terms of securing areas and controlling flow of refugees through the years (Baev & Kirişçi, 2017). Thus, personal diplomacy is one of the main reflections of two leaders’ foreign policy in Syrian refugee crisis. Both Merkel and Erdoğan have conducted personal diplomacy in two ways which are emphasizing relations between them and other leaders.

*Connectivity:* Syrian refugee crisis is composed of political, social, economic and legal consequences in a nested structure would affect region and global in the long term. Through the years, Syrian refugee crisis crossed continent from where it sources to Europe which shows how its evolving including millions of individual and various numbers of states. Because of this, role of connectivity in foreign policies of Merkel and Erdoğan cannot be denied which can be explained in two ways are domestic politics and regional& global scale.

Firstly, open door policies were risky decision for both Merkel and Erdoğan Contrast to Erdoğan, Merkel faced more immediate and serious challenges within Germany and EU. Angela Merkel’s open door policy created political and social crisis within both Germany and EU. Serious criticism came from within her party - state premier of Bavaria and leader Horst Seehofer of sister party demanded Angela Merkel to limit number of refugees was the first hit from the domestic



which endangered her legacy and upcoming election (Seehofer attacks Merkel and Austria over migrant crisis, 2015). In addition to this, German politics have experienced a rise of far right movements like PEGIDA and AfD based on anti refugee policies (Benedikter & Karolewski, 2016; Lees,2018). Meanwhile, a number of EU countries (UK, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) clearly rejected the acceptance and relocation of refugees, and some others (Austria, France, and Finland) kept unwilling attitude for common policies. Even some scholars and journalists suggest Angela Merkel's open door policy caused Brexit as detailed touched upon in the Chapter 5. More importantly, the emergence of xenophobia became the main problem in the German society. In a report on the Status of German Unity released by the cabinet on Wednesday leaders expressed concern about the increasing incidents of anti-immigrant and right wing attacks, especially in eastern states that were part of the GDR (Federal report laments rising xenophobia in Germany, 2016). Although in such challenging domestic conditions Angela Merkel could manage the crisis which are directly connected with domestic politics of Germany who could survive in 2017 election.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's decision of open door policy risked his political career as well. "It was not rational decision at all, his humanitarian perspective dominate his decision" (Interview Participant 2, 2019). Within first few years, Turkish public mostly supported open door policy (Kirişçi, 2014; Makovsky, 2019). One of the main advantages of Erdoğan is his party –AK Party has fully supported his open door policy with all terms. As well as German society, Turkish society stated to question refugee status and discussions over citizenship and even it turned to biggest obstacle for him in the elections. However, it should be noted that negative reactions towards refugees in Turkey did not become the political base of any party like in Germany. There is no doubt, Erdoğan masterly communicated with his follower and minimize effect of changing attitudes of society in the election.

In regional and global scale, Merkel and Erdoğan were aware that Syrian refugees could bring social, political and economical advantages and disadvantages. As mentioned Erdoğan's immediate response of open door policy made Turkey an

indispensable player in the crisis as a game changer (Okyay & Zaragoza-Christiani, 2016). It fostered the role of Turkey's as leverage against possible scenarios for Syria and region in terms of politically and militarily. Alternative solutions for Syrian refugee crisis are composed of interdependent solutions for Syrian refugee crisis at a regional and global level. Turkey-EU deal under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership started a new path for Turkey's EU membership. Whether timing can be changed, fostering the process of visa liberalization would be one of the biggest acquisitions of Turkey. Also, Turkey became more visible with its humanitarian foreign policy in the world.

On the other hand, Angela Merkel might be considered as disadvantaged because of huge criticisms however Merkel managed to bring Germany as a model country in terms of humanitarian values. As Merkel says "It was an extraordinary situation and I made my decision based on what I thought was right from a political and humanitarian standpoint" (Angela Merkel im Interview: Bundeskanzlerin verteidigt ihre Flüchtlingspolitik, 2017). Also she increased Germany's power within her counterparts from EU as a savior of European project (Slominski & Trauner, 2018; Elitok, 2019). Thus, two leaders risked their government with open door policy in the beginning however, their policies have been evolving vis-à-vis advantages and disadvantages sourced from influence of connectivity of Syrian refugee crisis both in domestic and regional&global scale.

*Entrepreneurship:* Syrian refugee crisis as an unexpected situation created imbalances where demand for leaders has been more visible in decision making. However, crisis times need unique leadership and its reflection in foreign policy making. In this respect, abilities of entrepreneurial leadership play significant role to cope with crisis. Merkel and Erdoğan have showed entrepreneurial leadership since the first day.

In 2011, when Syrian civil war broke out and thousands of people gathering in Turkish-Syrian border, Prime Minister Erdoğan suggested to create "buffer zone" for refugees where should be taken care by international cooperation. His buffer zone suggestion was the first new idea while world leaders ignore the situation.

Veysel Kurt explains two main reasons behind Erdoğan's plan for creating a safe zone, which are keeping civilians exposed to mass murder of the Assad regime in a sheltered area, and stopping the influx of refugees (2019). In addition to buffer zone plan, Erdoğan also suggested to have no-fly zone as a complimentary plan for buffer zone as follows;

*The buffer zone and the no-fly zone are permanent. Because you cannot declare the buffer zone if you don't have no-fly zone. It is a very serious risk. May Allah protect us, it will be second Srebrenitsa. After that, you cannot get up and pay the price of thousands of people (Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Konuşmasının Tam Metni, 2012).*

Although buffer zone plan of Erdoğan was not accepted at that time, he was the first leader who brought buffer zone and no-fly zone for refugee crisis as an entrepreneur leader.

Furthermore, Erdoğan also brought creative policies about reconstruction of Syria. Along with Turkey's military operations to Syria, Turkey also launched reconstruction process in selected cities from providing infrastructure to education for normalization of life (Aslan, 2019). In light of his policy, Turkish municipalities in the region became pioneer in coordination with AFAD and Kızılay. For example, Turkey build various schools, hospitals to Jarablus even teachers who will work in these schools provided by Turkey in every level of education except higher education (Aslan, 2019). In other words, Erdoğan effectively coordinated various local actors including municipalities, governorships and NGOs to implement his unique policies which aim to keep Syrians within their own cities.

On the other hand, Angela Merkel made her leadership visible through her entrepreneur policies in the refugee crisis. Actually, she had launched two policy programs which are admission program and 5000 quotas for refugees before 2015 refugee influx to Europe. In September 2015, the German government had linked the notion of solidarity to a permanent relocation mechanism for asylum seekers within the EU through while suspending Dublin agreement (Gressel, 2015). In other words, although her decision to suspend Dublin agreement was criticized by other EU members and public, she showed bold profile to bring different policies

compared to EU members (Pries, 2019). Moreover, Merkel also brought up new policy, which was calling employers for hiring more refugees was creative way to bring other actors to solve refugee crisis. Merkel's leading position to make call for employers aimed to tackle with both negative image of 'refugees' and meet demand of labor force of industry (Prodhan & Rinke, 2016). At the same time, Merkel's coalition government also managed to remove restrictions for integration of refugees to labor force (Allen, 2016). For example, number of employees within refugees tripled since early 2017 after Merkel's call. Between October 2017 and October 2018 alone, the number of employed asylums from the top eight sending countries alone grew by 47 percent, from 203,000 to 298,000 (Fluchtmigration, 2018). In other words, Merkel is successful to develop entrepreneurial policies to solve refugee crisis both in Germany and EU.

After almost ten years since the first crisis started, Erdoğan and Merkel can be criticized to have open door policy though both leaders could manage to develop multidimensional policies as entrepreneur leaders who makes them political and social entrepreneurs.

*Solution seeker:* As well as entrepreneur leadership, being solution seeker is one of the vital reflections in foreign policy making of leaders. Syrian refugee crisis is a multifaceted crisis which need be solved through different solutions and international cooperation. Also, Syrian refugee crisis is not short time crisis in a specific context contrary it requires long term and effective solutions. That's why, Erdoğan and Merkel had to adopt solution seeker attitude to see the crisis from different angles with kaleidoscopic and catalytic thinking in order to produce long term solution process.

Turkey was one of the first countries that faced the refugee flux while Turkey had been under also terrorist attacks of DAESH and PYD whose violence was also source of refugee flux to Turkey. A series of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil triggered Turkey to change its involvement and position regarding the Syrian conflict (Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2015). Actually, as touched upon Erdoğan successfully sees different dimensions of refugee crisis and mention that buffer

zone plan both aimed to clean border from terrorist organizations and stop the refugee flux. In other words, President Erdoğan was aware that only humanitarian aid to refugees wouldn't solve crisis (Presidential Spokeperson Kalın: The refugee crisis has not gone away, 2016). That's why, President Erdoğan declared Euphrates Shield Military operation in 2016 as a solution to changing security and political environment. Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield Operation followed this operation in upcoming years. Jarablus, Al-Bab, Idlib and Azaz which controlled and reconstructed by Turkish army became attraction center for Syrian refugees for returning (Aslan, 2019). Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu underlined this reality and gave numbers as follows "More than 346,000 Syrians have returned to areas of Syria which were cleared of terrorists in Operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch" (Bayar & Geldi, 2019). In other words, President Erdoğan has been solution seeker to solve refugee crisis through multidimensional solutions including military operations and reconstruction projects in border towns of Syria.

Angela Merkel is also solution seeker in Syrian refugee crisis which focuses different perspectives of crisis while looking for solutions (Horn, 2016; Chazan, 2018). Through years, refugee crisis might be considered over when there were no thousands of refugees in front of European border anymore. However, millions of new refugees had been forcibly relocated again due to intensification of conflicts whereas Turkey and other neighboring countries declared that they cannot absorb another 4 million refugees. Also EU and Germany cannot handle with crisis like 2015 refugee crisis. Once more Merkel as a solution seeker leader agreed to build camps on the border. Depend on the decision, Germany would establish camps along with Austria border which called 'transit centers' at points along the border where arriving migrants would be screened and any determined to have already applied for asylum elsewhere in the European Union would be turned back (Bennhold & Eddy, 2018; Janssen, 2018). With this initiative, Merkel managed to both keep coalition government and met demands of her sister party CSU who put pressure on her regarding refugee issues.

Merkel and Erdoğan have been solution seeker in the Syrian refugee crisis, their policies aimed to solve the problem vis-à-vis easing the pressure in their domestic politics. In this respect, both leaders persuade various policies in the same crisis depend on changing conditions.

*Peace oriented:* The SNA Leadership Model prioritizes being peace oriented for leaders while international system is evolving with new security challenges. As Galtung's negative and positive peace definition, leaders should provide environment for sustainable peace and also hinder existant conflicts. In this respect, Syrian refugee crisis and role of leaders should be analyzed with its political and social dimension. Erdoğan and Merkel was not only solution seeker for the Syrian refugee crisis but also they have peace orientation in their foreign policy choices. Especially, two leaders' political initiatives were implementation of their peace agenda in Syria. In other words, Syrian refugee crisis cannot be solved without political solutions to Syrian civil war. That's why, Erdoğan and Merkel's policies focuses on also how to stop Syrian civil war. This part would be discussed in two categories which are; personal initiatives of Erdoğan and Merkel and mutual initiatives.

Starting with President Erdoğan who kept both humanitarian and military policies in this crisis, political dimension of his policies can be deemed as result of peace oriented leadership of him. As well as Turkey was keeping open door policy, Erdoğan made Turkey as a part of peace process. Within first days of the crisis in 2011, Erdoğan showed personal effort to convince Assad to stop violence through Davutoğlu visits (Bağcı & Açıklım, 2011; Demir, 2017). After Erdoğan stated that Assad is illegimate leader of Syria, Turkey actively became part of numerous international initiatives respectively Friends of Syria Group (2012), Geneva I (2012), Geneva II (2014), Astana Peace Process (since 2015), Vienna Process (since 2015), Lausanne Talks (2016), Sochi Peace Talks (2018) and Nur- Sultan meeting (2019). It can be said that Turkey is natural part of almost all peace talks of Syrian crisis but definitely especially Erdoğan's personal participation and initiatives in peace talks should be emphasized here. Erdoğan personally

participate trilateral meeting with Russia and Iran and emphasized that his efforts on peace as follows;

*I believe that it will provide a glimmer of hope for Syria to regain stability. We have reached a consensus on helping to implement an inclusive, free, fair and transparent political process that will be carried out under the leadership and ownership of the Syrian people (Soçi'deki üçlü zirve sonrasında ortak açıklama, 2017).*

Erdoğan as a leader of Turkey has been both initiator and part of peace process with other countries.

Although Germany is not neighbor of Syria like Turkey, Germany under Angela Merkel leadership has been part of peace process. In the beginning, Merkel claimed that Assad should be part of peace process however she changed the policies and rhetoric (Merkel says Assad must be involved in Syria talks, 2015). Later, Germany has been part of following peace process respectively Friends of Syria Group (2012), Geneva I (2012), Geneva II (2014), Astana Peace Process (since 2015), Vienna Process (since 2015), Lausanne Talks (2016) and Nur- Sultan meeting (2019) In addition to this, Merkel personally took initiatives to accelerate peace process with President Putin and French President Hollande as a trilateral meeting in 2016 (Scally, 2016).

Lastly, especially after Turkey-EU deal, Merkel and Erdoğan started to work together to have sustainable peace in Syria more closely. In 2018, Merkel and Erdoğan declared that “We are in favor of a four way meeting with the presidents of Turkey, Russia and France and myself because the situation in Syria is still fragile” (Ausaf, 2018). In first meeting of four-way talks was in Istanbul, Erdoğan and Merkel underlined that peace should be provided as soon as possible which would be followed by constitutional committee and fair elections (Syria Summit: Chancellor Merkel calls for free elections alongside Russia, Turkey and France, 2018). Moreover, Merkel and Erdoğan also initiated second four way meeting with Prime Minister of UK and President of France at the end of 2018 which set to have meeting in 2019 (Simsek, 2019). Thus, Merkel and Erdoğan both separately initiated peace process with similar and different actors as a peace oriented

leaders. Also, both leaders participated peace process which is facilitated through international actors.

Consequently, as discussed, the two leaders kept the same approach but they made decisions with different leadership styles and tools. Regarding their unique styles and tools, the two leaders showed that were capable of seeing connectivity between regional and global issues. Negotiation is the vital part of solution process to any crisis and of course to finalize with entrepreneurial way of decision making with the ultimate goal of peace. This crisis elevated them as the most important leaders in the crisis till today while Syria is still suffering from civil war.



## CHAPTER 7

### STABILIZATION AND HARMONIZATION OF WESTERN BALKANS

*Through hosting around 4 million refugees in Turkey, we have contributed security of Europe and especially Balkans*  
(Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, 2019)

*If Germany closed its border with Austria, the outcome might be escalation of already rising tensions in the Balkans. I don't want to see military conflicts becoming necessary*  
(Merkel, 2015)

Chapter 1 mentioned that two cases are selected to analyze how two leaders' background and leadership affect their foreign policy making. Stabilization and harmonization of Western Balkans is chosen as the second case study because of its strategic importance for Turkey and Germany especially after emergence as a migration route from Turkey to West especially Germany in the Syrian crisis (Arman, 2017; Šabić, 2017). In other words, attention and policies of two leaders towards the region is not limited with refugee crisis but also consequence of long term interests. This chapter would analyze the general foreign policies of Turkey and Germany under their leadership with four sub dimensions which are trade & investment, development aid, education and culture, military & defense. Then, there will be part which explains how Syrian Refugee Crisis influenced Western Balkan as a region and lastly, there will be analysis of their foreign policies with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

*Western Balkan* is both a geographic and political term which was developed by European and US policymakers which means plus Albania and Slovenia, which means Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Croatia (Bugajski, 2017). However, this chapter only covers the five non-EU countries in the region (Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania) because EU member countries politics operate in different frameworks that is not part of this thesis content. That's why throughout this chapter, the notion of the

Western Balkans only represents those five countries which colored in the Figure 5.



*Figure 5. Map of Balkans*

The dissolution of Yugoslavia led to political, social and economical instability across the region. The mid 1990s was marked by Bosnian and the Kosovo war which ended up with NATO and the UN intervening. There is no doubt, reminiscent of ethnic conflicts are still-hunting the in the region, sovereign states have been trying to normalize the region. Dynamics in the Western Balkan are shaped by ethnic, historical, economical, geographical and political elements. Also, different global actors are playing key roles to determine policies in the region. At the beginning of the 2000s the EU became the main actor in the region through democratization (Rupnik, 2011). However, after the Eurocrisis the EU's dominant position started to be weakened while Russia increased its visibility in the region through ethnic ties (Tüysüzoğlu, 2012; Clark & Foxall, 2014). After the mid 2000s, even China pursued proactive policies through trade and investments

(Hansel and Fayareband, 2018). Besides these actors, Germany and Turkey are one of the influential actors in the region. Turkey, with its long-standing historical ties and relations with the region became more active after the 2000s. Although the EU's influence was weakened, Germany could manage to bring concrete policies to the region (Wanninger, 2016).

## **7.1. Turkey's Presence in Western Balkans**

Turkey's long and deep ties with the Western Balkan states which constituted Turkey in a very special position compared to other countries in the region. Turkey has pursued joint foreign policy initiatives within the region since end of the Cold War. Especially, during the conflicts in the 90s, Turkey kept cautious but was active in diplomacy and military actions in the region with the US and international organizations (Oran, 2013). Turkey's contemporary relations with the region have been transformed by a series of policy changes. By 2003, Turkey launched more proactive policies in the region. There is no doubt, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership is the most influential elements in this policy changing. "As you know, Turkey is also Balkan country with its historical, religious and cultural ties that's why peace and stability of the region is the most important thing for us" (Erdoğan, 2019). There are numerous institutions that are directly influential in Turkish foreign policy vision vis-à-vis Erdoğan's vision such as the TIKA, the YTB and the Turkic Council (Petrović and Reljić, 2011; Vračić, 2016; Bekar, 2019) Therefore, Turkey's presence in Western Balkan is analyzed through different sub titles: trade&investment, development aid, education&culture and military&defense cooperation in the region which are analyzed in detail.

### **7.1.1. Trade and Investments**

Having intense economic relations is the center of Turkey's proactive foreign policy and Erdoğan's approach to Western Balkan countries. Trade and investments are the main components of economic relations. First of all, the numbers of imports and exports have been increasing with Western Balkan countries since 2003. In this respect, the free trade agreement between Turkey and

countries played a major role in increasing the trade volume. The figure 6 in the below shows the numbers of export and import between Turkey and Western Balkan countries year by year. Generally, Turkey's overall commercial ties with the region have tended to increase. The trade volume between Turkey and the Western Balkans was around \$1 billion in 2005 which increased to \$ 3.1 billion (TÜİK). Secondly, an investment by Turkey is the second dimension of economic relations with Western Balkan countries. Details of economic relations with each countries would be given in the below.




Figure 6. Trade Volume of Turkey with Western Balkans  
 Source: Computed and created by author using by World Bank Statistics

Turkey and **Serbia** signed the Free Trade Agreement in 2010, and since 2015; mutual imports of industrial products have been made duty-free. On the other hand, although there are customs duties on agricultural products, the Most Favored Nation status (MFN) is applied in certain products (Larson et al., 2014). The trade volume between Turkey and Serbia in 2018 was approximately \$ 1.2 billion. This shows that between 2005 and 2018 trade volume was almost tripled. In the case of investment numbers, in 2011 Turkish investments were just \$ 1 million (Türkiye ile Sırbistan Arasındaki Ticaret Hacmi Hedefi 5 Milyar Dolar,2019). In the last seven years this number reached to \$ 200 million, which is today operated by more

than 800 companies (Ay, 2019). Turkish investments in Serbia reached significant levels in a short period of time, while the number of Turkish companies, which were 130 in 2015 exceeded 800 today (Gül, 2019). As is seen in the Figure 6, Serbia has the biggest trade volume within Western Balkan countries which also created some controversy within the region because the population of Serbia is mostly Christian and past dissent between Turkey and Serbia.

In 2018, Turkey's trade volume with **Northern Macedonia** reached its highest level with \$ 500 million. In recent years, mutual efforts towards the development of bilateral economic and commercial cooperation have been fruitful and Turkish investments in Northern Macedonia have increased rapidly in the last thirteen years. Approximately 100 investors keep the Turkish capital in northern Macedonia. The actual and planned total investment of these companies exceeds EUR 1.3 billion (İstanbul Sanayi Odası - Investment and Business Opportunities in North Macedonia Country Day organized by ICI was Discussed, 2019). Compared to other countries, Northern Macedonia is the second country with the highest Turkish investment. There is no doubt, Northern Macedonia has the second highest investment from Turkey is that the government itself declared investment call and made reforms to make the bureaucratic process easy for investors.

**Kosovo** has the lowest trade volume with Turkey within Western Balkan countries. Turkey-Kosovo Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2013 but the Turkish exporters faced a levy of 10% tax in exports to Kosovo. Because of this, the trade volume between Turkey and Kosovo could not fully reach its potential. The full implementation of the FTA newly came into effect in 2019 (Beksaç & Aliju, 2019). Thus, Turkish exporters will be able to compete on equal terms with exporters from other countries in the region which already have customs-free access to the Kosovo market under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Furthermore, the total Turkish investments in Kosovo amount to EUR 367.8 million. In 2012 and 2013, although Kosovo was the country who attracted most FDI, Turkey is ranked as a third in total, after Germany and the UK between 2007 and 2013.

The Free Trade Agreement with **Bosnia and Herzegovina** entered into force in 2003 which is the most liberal FTA that Turkey signed in the region. Thanks to the agreement, customs and tariffs that have been reset since the beginning of 2007. The positive trade trend between Turkey and BiH expanded through the improvement of the Bosnian trade balance which reached to \$493.4 million between 2009 and 2014, Bosnian exports to Turkey more than tripling from \$52.1 to \$171,4 million, while Turkish exports to BiH increased by 40% from \$226.6 to \$322 million (Pavlovic, 2015). The biggest growth in the Bosnian-Turkish trade exchange was noticed before the global economic crisis in 2011 the growth amounted to 21.1%, and after the decision of the Turkish government to allow the imports of 15,000 tones of beef from BiH in 2014 and 2015 (Bosna'dan 15 bin ton et geliyor, 2014). On the contrary, the number of Turkish investments in Bosnia is relatively low compared with the other four Western Balkan countries due to the complex bureaucratic structure of the country (Nurođlu & Nurođlu, 2016; Interview Participant 1, 2019). According to data from Turkey, for Bosnia and Herzegovina the outbound investment amount is only \$204 million between 2005 and 2017 (T.C Ticaret Bakanlıđı, 2019).

Lastly, the Free Trade Agreement with **Albania** was signed in 2008 when the Trade balance was \$33 million (TÜİK, 2019). As Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşođlu mentioned in his speech the trade volume between the two countries is \$411 million which is composed of imports from Albania which were \$24 million, whereas exports to Albania were \$387 million in 2018 (Bakan Çavuşođlu, 2018). Since the FTA was signed, trade volume has been increasing in general however, while Turkey's exports have been increasing, imports from Albania have been decreasing. At the same time, Turkish investment in Albania reached \$2,5 billion in 2018 (Bakan Çavuşođlu, 2018). Compared to other countries, Albania has the highest Turkish investment within five countries.

Consequently, the numbers related to export and import ratio reveals two main trends aspects in Turkey's economic presence in the Western Balkan countries. Also, Western Balkan countries have mostly suffered from lack of infrastructure as a chronic issue made them less attractive for foreign investments.

Consequently, the general picture of Turkey's economic presence in the Western Balkan countries reveals four important points. Firstly, through the years, Turkey has increased its export rate with five countries while those countries have also increased their export percentage to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey does not have religion as criteria to make an investment as generally claimed by the EU public. As mentioned above, Turkey's biggest trade volume is with Serbia while most investment is located in Kosovo and Macedonia. Thirdly, although due to a lack of infrastructure foreign investments in the region are progressing very slowly, Turkish investments have created huge work opportunities for local communities (Ekinci, 2014). Fourthly, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan personally plays important role behind pro-active economic policies of Turkey in the region through encouraging businessman. So, Turkey has been increasing its economic presence in the Western Balkan since 2002.

### **7.1.2. Development Aid**

*One day, TIKA officers went to far villages in Macedonia, a very old woman approached them asked why you are so late? Officers didn't understand but she replied that we have been waiting you for 100 years. Yes, we left from this region a century ago but people are still waiting us. Now, we are in there with our development aid and humanitarian aid (Cumhurbaşkanımız Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Türkiye Türkiye'den Büyüktür, 2016).*

Development aid has been one of the most important dimensions of the Turkish foreign policy in Western Balkan countries. President Erdoğan believes that sustainable peace and prosperity could be achieved through the improvement of infrastructure and social welfare. "We don't pursue religion based politics in Balkans but especially give importance to development of region" (Bıogradlıja,2019). Turkey's development aid programs in the region started at the end of the 1990s, depending on OECD numbers of Turkey's development aid to Western Balkan states reached to \$154,6 million total which is the highest number within the regions (Western Balkans and Turkey 2019, 2019).

The TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) has been playing active role in facilitating development aid in the different sectors within countries (Şahin & Çevik, 2015; Turan & Karafil, 2017). Although, the TIKA was

established as a response to meet the need of an organization that can practice and coordinate operations to be carried out in this area since 1992. TIKA's activities have been increased after 2003 when the AK Party came to power. In 2002, the TIKA had 12 overseas offices, which reached, to 61 in 59 countries conducting in 150 countries. Yılmaz and Kılıçoğlu underlined that increasing role of TIKA in AK Party period is also related with its foreign policy vision and goals (2017). In this respect, development aid of turkey would be given within TIKA's work which also covers historical restoration, culture and social projects as well. For that reason, the TIKA has very broad working areas which are given country by country below.

- Macedonia: Turkey opened a TIKA's office in Skopje in 2005. Until 2018, TIKA funded more than 900 projects in different fields from education to health, from agriculture to rural development to strengthen administrative and civil infrastructures through improving institutional capacity (TIKA'nın Makedonya'daki projeleri 900'ü aştı, 2018). The TIKA also attaches great importance to the protection of the cultural heritage form Ottoman Empire in Macedonia.
- Kosovo: Since 2004, office of TIKA has been actively working in Kosovo. There have been more than 700 projects realized until 2019 from education to health, culture and agriculture (Sulaj & Aliju, 2019). The most prominent projects of TIKA was Sheep and Goat Reclamation and Development of Production, providing education and equipment in beekeeping, opening vocational training courses for women. Furthermore, restoration of Mehmet Akif Ersoy's house and renovation of Sinan Pasha Mosque which costs €1.2 million only can be deemed as visible projects (Vračić, 2016).
- Albania: Although the TIKA Albanian office was opened in 1996, number of activities increased since 2003. In Albania, TIKA mostly focused on the health sector and improving the technical structure of governmental institutions. In the health sector, 44 projects were implemented for the renovation of hospitals and health centers, equipment support and the establishment of medical analysis laboratories (TIKA Annual Report 2018, 2018). While the TIKA provided uniforms and equipment for the Albanian Police Service personnel, the



Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was provided with technical infrastructure support to ensure that its activities continued to be more efficient and of higher quality. Furthermore, Turkey also sent immediate humanitarian aid such as the flood disaster Shkodra (TİKA Arnavutluk'ta 447 Projeyi Hayata Geçirdi, 2018).

- Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnia is one of the most important countries for Turkey in the Western Balkans and, as expected, the TİKA is the most visible face of Turkey's pro-active foreign policy in the country (Santrucek, 2019). The TİKA's office in Sarajevo has been operating since 1995 which is one of the oldest offices in the region which conducted 850 projects until today (Yılmaz & Kılıçoğlu, 2017, Brlyavac & Biogradlija, 2019). The most visible sector of TİKA's work, is the restoration of the Ottoman architectural heritage, including bridges, mosques and other monuments destroyed during the war. The Restoration of the Emperor's Mosque in Sarajevo, was implemented by the TİKA between 2014 and 2015 and ceremonially reopened by Bosnian presidency member Bakir Izetbegovic and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Also, the TİKA's main goal in Bosnia is to carry out more developmental projects such as reduction of the unemployment rate in Bosnia through supporting agriculture and livestock (TİKA Annual Report 2018, 2018).
- Serbia: Office of the TİKA in Belgrade was opened in 2009 which has implemented 223 projects in Serbia so far, consists of 35 percent improvement of educational infrastructure, 5% agriculture and animal husbandry, 16% health infrastructure development and 14% restoration. Compared to other Western Balkan states, Belgrade TİKA office mostly focuses on projects related with health sector such as hospital construction, providing ambulances and medical equipment (Keskin, 2017). TİKA aims to contribute peace and development between societies with its social, economic and cultural activities (TİKA Sırbistan 223 Projeyi Hayata Geçirdi, 2017).

### **7.1.3. Education and Culture**

Because of insufficient economic conditions in Western Balkan countries, young people living in rural areas to a large extent do not have a good education (Ekinci, 2017). With its historical and cultural ties with the region, Turkey is one of the countries who support their education in different ways. President Erdoğan emphasizes that Turkey is a Balkan country with its history and culture. That's why, Turkey's education and cultural policies in the region are realized through opening education institutions in countries and funding projects and to provide bursaries and scholarship for students. Those policies have three main institutional components which are Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Maarif Foundation and Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) which are important important player in Turkey's education and cultural initiatives in the region (Uğuz & Saygılı, 2018).

Firstly, one dimension of Turkey's education policies in the region can be named as "domestic initiatives" which means that Turkey establishes education institutions like schools and universities in those countries. There are two universities in Bosnia and Northern Macedonia under the sponsorship of Turkey that are considered as leading universities in the region (Ekinci, 2017). In addition to universities, Maarif Foundation with mission of carry out comprehensive educational activities throughout the world based on the common values of humanity and Anatolian tradition of wisdom which started to play a more eminent role in formal education institutions in the Western Balkan as well. The Maarif Foundation opened total of 22 schools and 1 dormitory which have been operating in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia (Dünya'da Türk Maarif Vakfı, 2019). These schools provide education both in English and Turkish (Bekar, 2019). Kosovo has the highest number with 8 schools meanwhile Serbia does not have any Maarif foundation schools yet within the region

Funding projects in education is one of the important dimensions of Turkey's domestic initiatives by various institutions. YTB is one of the institution which provides funding to projects. For example, in 2018, 35 projects were funded for

related communities which costs 1,9 billion Turkish liras on projects in Albania, Bosnia, Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo. Within those countries, the biggest funding budget went to Northern Macedonia with almost 900 million Turkish liras and the least was Serbia with 30 million Turkish Liras (YTB Faaliyet Raporu, 2018). The Academy of Rumeli, Mevlana Cultural Exchange Program and Balkan Youth School can be deemed as the best examples of YTB projects for those who are educated in literature, history, art and culture can participate in these programs (Bekar, 2019).

Western Balkan origin students to choose Turkey such as geographical proximity, cultural familiarity and historical ties between Turkey and their countries that contributes to student mobility between these countries and Turkey (Kondakçı et al., 2016). That's why, the second dimension of Turkey's education policies in the region is giving scholarship to students from those countries who will take education in Turkish universities. Number students from those countries between 2003 and 2018 can be considered as consequences of Turkish policies. In 2003, there were only 608 Albanian students in Turkey and now the figure is 1148, also number of Serbian students increased from 164 to 751 within these years (YÖK, 2019). The establishment of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) strengthens Turkey's attraction for students through the Türkiye Scholarship Program which started in 2012. Türkiye Scholarship Program has special position within YTB structure that constitutes one of the main pillar of Turkey's education and cultural policies (Bekfelavi, 2017; YTB Hakkımızda, 2019). In this respect, the total number of students from those countries was 2948 in the 2012-2013 semesters and reached to 4564 in 2018-2019 semester (YÖK, 2019). According to data of Higher Education Council (YÖK), the most significant increase can be seen in the numbers of Albanian students.

Cultural and historical ties between Turkey and the region could be considered as Turkey's biggest advantage in the region compared to other actors which make Turkey able to have more influential soft power. Both governmental and NGOs are supporting the proliferation of Turkish culture in Western Balkans in different ways. As a governmental organization the Yunus Emre Foundation (YEE) plays

an important role in spreading Turkish culture across those countries through workshops, cultural exchanges, and Turkish language courses, which are open to all ages and levels (Sunnie-Rucker-Chang, 2014). Although there are many different projects carried out in those countries, a few prominent examples are given in the following. In order to spread the Turkish language, in Bosnia's Zenci-Doboj, Herzegovina-Neretva and Bosansko-Posavinski cantons, Turkish classes are offered as a second elective course from the 6<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> grade. Under this project, only in Bosnia, 10 thousand students in 130 different elementary and high schools have been learning Turkish (Güzel, 2016). In addition to this, the YEE organized 135 activities in Kosovo between 2014 and 2018 which were mostly cultural programs and Turkish courses (Yılmaz & Pacolari, 2019). Another important project of the YEE is the restoration and preservation of cultural heritage in the Balkans sponsored by Ziraat Bank like TIKA which is the preservation and restoration of manuscripts destroyed during the war which shows Turkey's deep historical and cultural ties with the Western Balkans. The project was carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia (Güzel, 2016). As a result of this project, ten thousand manuscripts and five thousand printed documents were preserved.

#### **7.1.4. Military and Defense Cooperation**

The Western Balkan countries have a crucial importance for Turkey in terms of regional security and Turkey's security itself which makes Turkey's cooperation with regional countries in military and defense field is immense. Following the regional conflicts in the Western Balkan after 90s, Turkey has been already actively involved in military and defense cooperation. Although Turkey has bilateral military and defense cooperation with those countries, as a NATO member and EU candidate Turkey is also part of multilateral initiatives as well. The military and defense policies of Turkey have developed in the AK Party period in two ways; involvement of peacekeeping operations while supporting those countries which included the donation of military equipment and training of officers in Turkish military academies (Kelkitli, 2013). Thus, military and defense cooperation between Turkey and Western Balkan countries are more than a

complementary element of Turkish foreign policy but is mostly a determinant factor in the development of relations.

*Albania:* The military and defense relationship between Turkey and Albania has been one of the strongest relations within those five countries. First of all, Turkey's only naval base outside of Turkey is located in Albania which called Pashalimani since the 1992. It still operates for training Albanian officers. Turkey supported Albanian's NATO membership in 2009. After Albanian's NATO membership, Albanian soldiers started to serve in Afghanistan with Turkish army (Kelkitli, 2013). Although Albania became an active NATO member in 2009, Albania has depended heavily on Turkish assistance in the training and supply of defense technology, as well as the reconstruction of Albania's military bases and their maintenance (Xhaferi, 2017). As a part of Turkey and Albania cooperation yearly framework, Turkey constantly sends military equipment and supply assistance to Albanian army.

*Kosovo:* The strategic and military relationship is one of the crucial areas of Turkey and Kosovo relations. Since the foundation of UÇFK (Kosovo Liberation Army), Turkey provides immense education to soldiers of Kosovo and provides substantial military aid both in armament and technology. In 2011, Turkey and Kosovo signed the Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement which covers the implementation of joint research, development, production, and modernization of military systems and equipment as well as military visits to unit headquarters and institutions (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Kosova Cumhuriyeti Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Antlaşması, 2011). Therefore, Turkey had a profound role in preparing the Kosovar Security Forces for their transformation to the Kosovar Army by providing military education. Turkish army under the KFOR is the main organization that educates Kosovo Security Forces whose name was changed from Kosovo Army after 2018, students from Kosovo can get their military education in the Turkish War College both in Ankara and Istanbul (Operations and missions: Past and Present, 2019). According to contributing nations list in the KFOR mission currently 246 Turkish soldiers are serving in KFOR mission (KFOR Contributing Nations, 2019). Turkey strongly supports Kosovo's aims to engage in

NATO and applies an active diplomacy by lobbying international institutions and NATO members (Newman & Visoka, 2018).

*Bosnia and herzegovina:* Turkey have been closely cooperating with Bosnia in military and defense fields as well. Primarily, Turkey is part of EUFOR ALTHEA which replaced NATO led SFOR in 2004 (Knauer, 2011). There is no doubt, Turkey made significant efforts to help Bosnia's participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Turkey lent assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina for the strengthening of its military establishment through the granting of military equipment and materials as well as training Bosnian military professionals in Turkish military schools. The Turkish government has been supporting young BiH military professionals by organizing 10-15 annual short-term field trainings in various military fields (Petrović & Reljić, 2011).

*Northern macedonia:* Turkey has been one of the most strong supporters of Macedonia's accession to NATO (Petrović & Reljić, 2011). Turkey participated actively in three NATO operations in Macedonia as in the following; Essential Harvest (2001), Amber Fox (2001-2003) and Allied Harmony (2002- 2003). When the NATO mission was substituted by Concordia crisis management operation under EU authority, Turkey also contributed with personnel, and members of the gendarme units participated in the Proxima Police Force EU mission in Macedonia (Önsoy & Udum, 2015). Furthermore, on the 24 December 2010, Turkey and Macedonia signed an Agreement on Military-Financial Cooperation. Over the years, Turkey has donated military equipment and provides military education in Turkey (Duridanski, 2011). Also since 2012, YEE gives Turkish classes to soldiers in Macedonian army (Vračić, 2016).

*Serbia:* In contrast to other countries, Turkey's military relations with Serbia do not have a peacekeeping operation dimension. Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement on military cooperation in July 2004 which envisages cooperation on training military officers, organization and equipment (Babuna, 2014). In 2007, Serbia also asked for Turkey's help for NATO membership (Ekinci, 2013). Turkey has expressed an interest in the refurbishment of Ladjevci

airport near Kraljevo town, in Central Serbia and in its transformation into a dual-purpose airport (Petrović & Reljić, 2011). In 2010, Turkey and Serbia relations entered a new phase in all levels which includes military cooperation based on building strategic partnership was realized through military training agreement signed in April 2010 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Sırbistan Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Savunma Sanayii Anlaşma, 2011). The agreement includes training in specialized centers and the exchange of trainers, among other foreseen activities.' A similar agreement was signed in 2011 as well.

## **7.2. Turkey in Regional Initiatives**

The Turkish foreign policy under President Erdoğan's leadership in the region is not only composed of bilateral relations with each country but is also actively involved with regional initiatives which are political and economic projects to have a more prosperous and stable Western Balkans. The most visible one is the tripartite mechanism of Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia that started in 2010 in order to strengthen trilateral relations and tackle a number of regional problems (Kırcı, 2017). This mechanism opened a new page in Serbia and Bosnia relationship while Turkey plays an active mediator role in the region. Because of political issues, there was not any presidential level meeting between 2014 and 2018. On January 2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Bosnian Presidency Member Bakir Izetbegović with the agenda of stimulating relations. In addition to this, the three presidents also agreed on infrastructural and transportation projects, such as linking Sarajevo and Belgrade through an inter-connecting highway with support of Turkey (Mulalic, 2019).

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Bosniak member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Council Bakir Izetbegovic announced that the agreement was reached on the long-talked Sarajevo-Belgrade Highway Project will be built on the two routes previously discussed which are Sarajevo-Zenica-Tuzla-Brcko-Bijeljina-Belgrade and Belgrade-Pozega-Visegrad-Sarajevo

routes and thus a full tour was decided to be in the form. President Erdoğan underlines the importance of the highway project,

*I believe that the steps to be taken on the motorways will lead to very important developments between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Road brings life together, road is civilization (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Saraybosna-Belgrad otoyolu bölgeyi çekim alanı haline getirecek, 2019).*

Turkey is also part of a tripartite mechanism with Bosnia and Croatia that was established in 2010. It has same agenda as the Bosnia, Serbia and Turkey trilateral mechanism in which Turkey has been actively involved.

The South East European Countries Cooperation Process (SEECP) established in 1996 which, is another important multilateral initiative in the region. The SEECP established based on multilateralism and effective cooperation in the Balkans where Turkey has prominent role as a founding member (Bechev, 2012). Although it was started before AK Party period, Turkey's influence started to be more visible with President Erdoğan in SEECP. Turkey chaired the SEECP with the motto of "From Shared History to Common Future" in 2010 (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016). The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) has operational task of SEECP for developing regional cooperation, Turkey is also a founding member of the RCC which contributes to budget and organization.

Over the years the multilateral military cooperation has been enriched with other countries in the region. In 2006, at the Third Meeting of Defense Ministers of the Southeast European Countries in Skopje, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey signed a Framework Agreement on the Establishment of the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). A year later, the Chiefs of Defense of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia and Turkey signed an agreement known as the "Scope of Responsibilities of Balkan CHOD Conference on Military Cooperation" (Bekiarvo & Petkov, 2018).



### **7.3. Turkey's Policies in Western Balkan in a Nutshell**

The 90's was quite dramatic for the region after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts which created turbulence ended up with intervention of NATO and the UN. Particularly, those five countries had suffered from destabilization. Although, Western Balkans had been always a priority for Turkey who did not have intense relations with the region during the Yugoslavian period. Turkey's policies to Western Balkan countries were transformed in the AK Party period in economy&trade, education&culture and military&defense dimensions. In economy, Turkey's trade volume and investments were increasing with five countries. Not only trade and investment, but also development aid from Turkey has been vital contribution in the region through the TIKA. On the other hand, during the AK Party period Turkey enriched its tools to imply education and culture policies that constructed a positive image of Turkey (Purtaş, 2013). Strategically, Turkey is also an indispensable part of military cooperation with those five countries including training military officers, to provide equipment and diplomatic support to NATO membership.


Also, Turkey had been increasing its diplomatic efforts and capability through multilateral regional initiatives. The influence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cannot be denied in those foreign policies. There is no doubt, influence of leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan composed of background of Turkey and his personal background which were analyzed in Chapter 3. Ibrahim Kalın who is spokesperson of President Erdoğan says that "Turkey under Erdoğan's leadership approach world and foreign policy with 360 degrees' view depend on Turkey's historical roots (2018). In the case of the Western Balkan, President Erdoğan underlined their importance for Turkey many times with those words "Without stability in the Balkans, Turkey does not have a peaceful atmosphere, with this understanding, we are closely interested in the problems in our hearts' geography" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Gönül Coğrafyamızdaki Sıkıntılarla Yakından İlgileniyoruz, 2019). Reflections of Erdoğan's leadership in stabilization and harmonization of Western Balkan region would be analyzed in the last part of this chapter.

## **7.4. Germany**

Germany is one of the influential actors in the region and increased its power after reunification. There is no doubt, Bosnian and Kosovo conflict had a devastating influence of German politics through the controversy between ‘never again’ war and ‘never again’ Auschwitz. As Berenskoetter and Giegerich emphasize that Kosovo War was watershed moment for Germany (2010). Not only political issues but also flow of migration from region sourced by regional conflicts became main issue for Germany (Bağcı, 1994). Through years, Germany tried to regulate and reduce migration flow with diverse policies. There is no doubt, Germany’s policies conducted to the region within the EU framework. Angela Merkel’s era brought new kind of approach to the region. Unlike previous German leaders, Angela Merkel prefers to have more proactive policies in the region not only focusing on existent issues but also developing diverse policies in different fields. Interview participant 1 also claimed that German power and influence became more visible and powerful after Angela Merkel (Personal Interview, 2019). As touched upon, the Syrian refugee crisis increased the importance of the region for Germany once again. In light of this, German’s changing foreign policy towards Western Balkan would be analyzed in trade&investments, development aid, education and culture and military and defense. Each category would also include the role of the EU membership process of Western Balkan countries and its influence on the relations.

### **7.4.1. Trade&Investments**

As Europe’s strongest economy, Germany’s economical relations with Western Balkan countries are the most important dimensions of its foreign policy making in the region. In 2006, Germany’s total trade volume with those countries was \$3.1 billion, which increased to \$11.9 billion in 2019 (Statische Bundestam, 2019). Also, Germany is within the top five countries who makes foreign direct investment in Western Balkan countries. As well as Turkey, Germany’s bilateral trade relations have been varied in the different countries which can be seen in the Figure 7.



*Figure 7. Trade volume of Germany with Western Balkans*  
Source: Computed and created by author using by World Bank Statistics

In a similar way to Turkey, **Serbia** has the highest trade volume with Germany at around \$5.1 billion which was \$2.2 billion in 2005 (Statische Bundestam, 2019). This number is composed of \$3,47 billion imports and \$2,60 billion exports. If we analyze the details of the number of exports and imports, Germany is the first country has the highest amount of exports from Serbia while Serbia's import meanwhile Germany comes as a second in export number. On the other hand, Serbia is only 48<sup>th</sup> in Germany's export and 49<sup>th</sup> in import of Germany. The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) has been approved by Serbia in 2007. Since then, Serbia has shown enormous growth rate and has become an attractor for investments. Germany is the sixth country as an investor with 7% of total investment in Serbia (Nuroğlu & Nuroğlu, 2019).

*Northern macedonia* is placed as the second country after Serbia in terms of trade volume with Germany. In 2006, trade volume between Germany and Northern Macedonia was \$738 million which increased to \$4.3 billion in 2018. The exports of Germany to Northern Macedonia is triple of import numbers, which are around \$1,1 billion. Germany is the first country both in imports and exports of Northern Macedonia. More than 200 companies with German capital operate in Northern

Macedonia (Germany and North Macedonia: Bilateral Relations, 2019). As well as Serbia, Macedonia has also adopted new laws to ease investment in the country. According to the World Bank's Doing Business 2018 Report, Macedonia is ranked 10<sup>th</sup> while Austria and Germany are leading countries in FDI stock (Foreign Direct Investments in Northern Macedonia, 2020)

*Bosnia and herzegovina* is the third country within Western Balkan countries for Germany in terms of trade volume. In 2006, trade volume between Bosnia and Germany was around \$1 billion, which reached to \$2.2 billion in 2018. Germany occupies first place in Bosnia's exports and imports although Bosnia is only ranked in 68<sup>th</sup> and 70<sup>th</sup> for Germany. Compared to other countries, the trade volume between Bosnia and Germany was not increased as much as Macedonia or Serbia. A bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement entered into force on the 11<sup>th</sup> November 2007 (Vanhonnaeker, 2015). Thanks to agreement, Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH) shows that FDI inflows in 2018 amounted to \$442 million equal to 2.3% of GDP. The highest inflow of investments to Bosnia in 2018 was from Russia (\$80 million), Croatia (\$60 million), the Netherlands (\$94 million), Austria (\$87.1 million) and Germany (\$83.7 million) (Over €300 Million Foreign Direct Investments in BiH Last Year, 2019). Interview Participant 1 underlines that although Germany does not have big investments within Bosnia like Serbia, they have car factory in Sarajevo which created huge employment opportunity for people (Personal Interview, 2019).

Germany and *Albania* share \$441 million trade volume in 2018 compared to \$171 million in 2006. The ranking of Germany in Albania's both export and import is fourth while Albania has very minor shares in German's export and import (Yarimoğlu & Gür, 2016). Also, Germany is the tenth-largest direct investor in Albania, with annual direct investment in the lower double-digit million range (Germany and Albania: Bilateral Relations, 2019).

Lastly, *Kosovo* has the lowest trade volume within five countries with Germany reached to around only \$308 million. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany figures show that Kosovo was 112<sup>th</sup> among Germany's trading partners in 2018.

Also, German exports to Kosovo in 2018 totaled €235 million and imports from Kosovo €26 million. However, the Kosovan figures for German exports are very different, putting German exports to Kosovo at €393 million and German imports from Kosovo is €25 million. In the case of foreign direct investments, Germany is in the fifth within the top five countries who made investments in Kosovo (Nuroğlu & Nuroğlu, 2019).

Depend on the numbers, Germany is the main player in the region in terms of trade and investments. Compared to other actors, Germany has more influence on the market with an enormous trade volume for the region. Interview participant 1 also endorses this reality and suggests that almost the whole of the Western Balkan economy depends on German's economy (Personal Interview, 2019). When five countries in the Western Balkan region is analyzed separately, Germany is not always the first country in ranking for exports and investments. For example, Germany is ranked the 1<sup>st</sup> country in Bosnia through trade and Macedonia has the highest investment. Thus, Germany is the giant partner of the region economically.

#### **7.4.2. Development Aid**

As underlined, Germany has deep political and economic relations with the region with advantages of geographical proximity and EU factors. Likewise Turkey's TIKA, and Germany successfully used German institutions to realize development aid projects in different field such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)<sup>3</sup>, German Development Bank(KfW), Also, Germany reserves the biggest amount of money to the EU multilateral development aid which represents the most important source of the Official Development Assistance(ODA) in the Western Balkans (Balcer, 2019). That's why German institutions carry out the largest number of EU funded projects in the region (Balcer, 2019).

Germany is one of **Kosovo's** main bilateral donors in the field of development cooperation. Since 1999, Germany has provided around €600 million for emergency relief measures, humanitarian assistance and technical and financial

cooperation projects (Germany and Kosovo: Bilateral Relations, 2019). Development cooperation mainly focuses on public administration, democratization and civil society, energy, sustainable economic development and employment creation. In addition to this, various projects that promote democracy, human and minority rights, peaceful conflict management and the rule of law received a total of €2.2 million in funding under the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 2018 (Germany and Kosovo: Bilateral Relations, 2019).

Germany is one of the country's main partner in the field of development aid for **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. As well as other countries, KfW Entwicklungsbank and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) are playing key role to facilitate development aid. Since September 2010, the GIZ office in Sarajevo supports the accession process by promoting regional collaboration among the South-East European countries in the fields of foreign trade, biodiversity, energy efficiency, modernisation of municipal services, legal reform and EU integration (GIZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018).

Germany has been contributing to **Albania**'s development since 1988 through development aid. Thanks to the influence of Merkel leadership sectors have been diversified. Germany's development cooperation mostly focuses on water, energy supply, sanitation and waste-management. In addition to this, rural and agricultural enterprises receive loans, subsidies, further training and consulting services are important areas for development aid of Germany (Jovičić, 2015). For example, only in 2016 Germany and Albania developed cooperation projects through which GIZ reached to €9 million which was distributed within 195,000 business, 120 farmers and 2200 directly business development services (Cassens, 2015; Mlloja, 2017). Also, Germany's development cooperation initiatives are mostly combined with vocational schools to create a functioning sector.

Development cooperation with **Serbia** began in 2000, the German Government has provided over €1.8 billion which made as Germany the largest bilateral donor in the country. In 2017, Germany only allocated €30 million to Serbia in order to facilitate sustainable growth and job creation (1,8 Billion Euros in 18 Years of

German- Serbian Development Cooperation, 2018). Cooperation focuses on the following areas: promoting environmental protection, sustainable economic development, democracy and civil society. Development cooperation projects in Serbia are mostly implemented by the KfW Entwicklungsbank and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

Lastly, development cooperation with **Northern Macedonia** generally focuses on environmentally friendly infrastructure projects and modernising agriculture along with EU standards (Doetsch et al., 2015). In addition to this, Germany supports the structure of government and civil society through projects in municipalities with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation (IRZ) and the Civil Peace Service (CPS).

As well as with trade and investment, Germany is also one of the main partners of those five countries in development aid and cooperation. Germany has development cooperation to facilitate the country's infrastructure development. Furthermore, Germany is also providing aid and cooperation in those countries through the EU membership framework. This cooperation is composed of infrastructure and political systems, which are aligned with EU standards. From this perspective, Germany plays a major role in those five countries development process and encouraging their political alignment towards EU.

### **7.4.3. Education and Culture**

The education and culture policies of Germany can be understood with concept called "zivilmacht" (civillian power) of Germany, which emphasizes soft power rather than military power in foreign policies. (Maull, 1990; Szabo, 2017). As specified in the trade and investment section, Germany is both the main partner and attractor for those countries economically. In other words, job opportunities in Germany and German companies in the Western Balkan became an attractor for people from the Western Balkans especially the younger generation which led to a migration issue (Youth are deserting Balkan countries, 2016). This dimension of

soft power of Germany is completed with education and cultural policies of Germany in two ways which are promoting German language and support vocational schools. This approach became more visible after Merkel through German foundations that are quite influential in conducting education and cultural projects in the Western Balkan.

Germany's education and cultural policies in **Bosnia** are highly influential because of the two countries' strong ties sourced from the guest workers and civil war refugees who contributed to Germany's positive image in Bosnia. It creates clear interest in the German language and German culture (Interview Participant 1, 2019). In order to promote cooperation, a cultural agreement between Germany and Bosnia was signed in 2006. German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) opened its office in Sarajevo which provides lecturers at the University of Sarajevo and the University of Banja Luka. Also, The Goethe-Institut in Sarajevo is working actively nationwide with the educational and cultural programs, which include the German Reading Rooms in Sarajevo and Banja Luka (Martens, 2005; Interview Participant 1, 2019). German is taught at many of the country's schools as a second foreign language, after English and Turkish.

**Serbia** is another Western Balkan state, which has intense cultural relations with Germany. The Goethe-Institut Belgrade offers broad programs from exhibitions, and lectures to theatre. German artists and performers are frequent guests at Belgrade's theatre, music and film festivals. Also, improving vocational education is one of the priorities for Germany in Serbia (Nuroğlu & Nuroğlu, 2019). Academic and scientific exchange is another important aspect of cooperation through DAAD since 2008. Not only DAAD, but also other German foundations such as Konrad Adenauer, Henrich Böll, Friedrich- Ebert, Friedrich Nauman which are working actively in Serbia.

Germany's education and culture policies in **Northern Macedonia** are multi-dimensional. It can be said that cultural events are more diversified compared to education policies. The German Embassy organized a film festival in coordination with the Goethe-Institut that supports exchange with German artists in exhibitions



and concerts (Germany and North Macedonia: Bilateral Relations, 2019). Germany is also part of multilateral cultural initiatives such as the Franco-German cultural cooperation which conducts projects together with the French Embassy, Institut Français and the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO).

Although Goethe-Institut does not have an office in **Kosovo**, Germany has pursued a highly involved education and cultural cooperation policies. A cultural agreement between Germany and Kosovo has legalized cultural exchange between the two countries since 2013 (Himmrich, 2020). The language learning centre in Pristina was converted into a Goethe-Zentrum in February 2018 in response to the demand for German language courses. Along with English, German is the most widely spoken foreign language. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has a lecturer working at the University of Pristina and provides scholarships for studies in Germany. Also, under Partners for the Future initiative (PASCH), four schools receive support from Germany (Ammon, 2019).

Cultural and education cooperation between Germany and **Albania** is based on an agreement that was signed in 26 November 2015. The promoting of German language is also very effective in Albania. There is a bilingual section at the Sami Frasheri Grammar School in Tirana where mathematics and geography are also taught in German (Language Education Policy Profile: Albania, 2016). Also, Germany promotes scientific and academic exchange through a number of universities in Albania. Compared to other countries, large numbers of Albanian university graduates have opportunity to complete an International Parliamentary Internship in the German Bundestag (Germany and Albania: Bilateral Relations, 2019).

#### **7.4.4. Military&Defense Cooperation**

Peacekeeping operations in the region were the first operation Germany was actively involved after the reunification which is historically important for Germany. White Paper of Germany mentioned that Germany's strategy on security policy in the Western Balkans is essential for the security of Europe and Germany

(White Paper 2006, 2006). In this respect, the military cooperation of Germany with Western Balkan countries in both bilateral and multilateral framework has become an indispensable part of foreign policy. There is no doubt, that regional and global challenges also encourage Germany to make more military cooperation in the region. Angela Merkel stated the security of the region is also the security of the Union and Germany as a component part (Colibasanu, 2017).

Germany's cross-border intervention in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** was the country's first post-Cold War operation and an operation to protect peace. This operation, which started in 1995 and continued until 2012, is also Germany's longest running cross-border operation (Vatandaş, 2013; Glatz et al., 2018). In addition, for many years Germany have funded conflict prevention projects through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. There is no doubt, Germany is military equipment exporter to Bosnia. Based on last report of exports of military equipment of Germany to Bosnia is around €734 thousands (Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2018: Rüstungsexportbericht, 2018).

Only Germany's ongoing operation in the Western Balkans is the **Kosovo** operation, carried out by NATO in conjunction with the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) which has been going on since 1999, is the first operation of the Bundeswehr that used offensive tactics, in the context of the NATO bombings. Germany also plays a crucial role in assisting Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) in terms of training for members of the KSF, focusing on human resources, planning, logistics and NBC weapon protection (Hamilton,2014). Also in 2014, Kosovo and Germany signed amendments to the memorandum of cooperation which are regulated and defined the work of the German consultants who undertake the task of logistics advice to the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (Minister Haki Demolli and German Military Attaché, LTC. Martin Herrmann signed amendments to the memorandum of cooperation, 2015). Lastly, Germany military equipment exports to Kosovo are €58 thousands (Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2018: Rüstungsexportbericht, 2018).

Bundeswehr, due to the rising ethnic conflict in **Macedonia** between 2001 and 2003 participated in three NATO operations which are the Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony and EU operation called Concordia (Vatandaş, 2013). Besides the operations, Germany also gives assistance to Northern Macedonia; In the Strategic Review of Republic of Macedonia document clearly mentions that Germany is one of close partners in cooperation activities which includes regular consultation, education and training and joint exercises and operations (2018). Also, former German Defense Minister Leyen underlined that 200 Macedonian soldiers trained in Germany and the Macedonian troops they increased the level of relations between the two countries. This level of cooperation increased the development of Macedonia's European perspectives deepened the Macedonian-German relations (Almanya Savunma Bakanı Leyen Makedonya'da, 2018).

Germany's giant trade and investment relations also reflects on the military and defense cooperation with **Serbia**. Bundeswehr supports the Serbian army in terms of training of officers and military education (Defence Cooperation with Germany | Ministry of Defense Republic of Serbia, 2018). Germany also exports military equipment to Serbia that costs around €110 million only in 2018 (Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2018: Rüstungsexportbericht, 2018). The two countries also participated in a joint operation in Mali under the EU's CFSP framework (EUTM Mali Mission, 2020).

The last one is the German military and defense cooperation with **Albania**, which is a member of NATO. The modernization of the Albanian army has been the main priority of the government where Germany is one of the most important partners after the USA in terms of training and providing military equipment. In the 2018 data, Albania purchased military equipment from Germany that cost around €276 million (Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2018, 2018). The former German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen visited Albania in order to deepen mutual relations while her counterpart thanked her for the generous support and assistance that

Albania. Germany has special role as guarantor of security and stability in the region (Minister Xhacka in Germany: Justice Reform has frightened anti-reformist actors, 2019).

### **7.5. Germany in Regional Initiatives**

Although Germany has deep relations with the Western Balkan region, it is also actively involved in multilateral initiatives in the region. Angela Merkel clearly expressed her position to have a more proactive and independent German foreign policy cases. There is no doubt, the Western Balkan region is a chance for Germany to show its new approach in foreign policy which is why Merkel has been quite involved personally. In this respect, Germany has been involved in regional cooperation in three dimensions. Firstly, Germany boosts the cooperation in the region through EU in different fields which are regulated statements, political and technical meetings by launching and supporting numerous regional organizations (Minic,2018). In other words, Germany clearly supports the EU's membership process of Western Balkan countries EU membership process in terms of regional arrangements.

Secondly, it supports the functioning of regional organizations and initiatives. The SEECP and then the RCC is one of the main mechanisms where Germany is a part of the cooperation like Turkey. Thirdly, a German initiative called the Berlin Process is one of the most important initiatives that Angela Merkel started in 2014 aiming to step up regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and contributing their integration into the European Union. Timing was not coinciding for Angela Merkel which was the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War and the events in Sarajevo in 1914, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated intergovernmental meetings with the aim to improve regional cooperation (Flessenkemper, 2017). The first conference took place in Berlin and gathered the heads of states, foreign ministers and ministers of economy of the Western Balkan countries and other participants – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia – and representatives of Austria, France and Germany and the European Commission (Madhi, 2018). It

was stated that the participants agreed to establish a framework for a period of four years as mentioned in the Declaration of Berlin Process;

*Make additional real progress in the reform process, in resolving outstanding bilateral and internal issues, and in achieving reconciliation within and between the societies in the region of the Western Balkans* (Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans, 2017).

A series of this Berlin Process has been taken place in different countries through years. “This is all completely fostering the regional cooperation from infrastructure to business which is vitally important for everyone” (Western Balkans Summit: Common press conference by Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister, and José Manuel Barroso, 2014). Although public opinion is that Berlin Process is not a new approach to regional initiatives, Minic and Mahdi claims that Berlin Process brings not only original initiatives, but also better coordinates the work of the already existing regional initiatives like the Regional Cooperation Council, CEFTA, the Energy Community and the SEETO (2018). There is no doubt, the important point related with Berlin Process is relies on the completely commitment of Chancellor Merkel as initiator, the cooperation of the six Western Balkan (Flessenkemper, 2020).

## **7.6. Syrian Refugee Crisis and Western Balkans**

Actually, refugee issue is not new for Western Balkan region because of huge number of displacement sourced from ethnic conflicts in 90’s (Greider, 2017). An influx of Yugoslav refugees in the early part of the decade resulted in the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is almost dysfunctional today. However, Syrian refugee crisis was completely different case in terms of origins, numbers and pace. As mentioned in the Chapter 6, the large number of irregular migrants passing through the Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary increased dramatically. This route is later called as “Balkan Route” (Desperate Journeys UNCHR, 2017). Pressure on the Macedonia and Serbia to address the flows grew, particularly amid reports of migrants suffering abuse at the hands of authorities and being struck by trains along railway lines. In November 2015, as a response to refugee flow, both governments enacted legislation

allowing migrants to register “intent to seek asylum” upon entry and receive a 72-hour temporary permit to be in the country. Conditions became severe day by day for Western Balkans.

German Chancellor Merkel warned that the refugee crisis could spark a new conflict in the Balkan in any time because it created extraordinary pressure on the governments in the region, while lack of EU-wide solution, the countries worried that refugees would be wrecked in their territories once Austria, Germany and others had closed their borders (Šabič, 2017). In 2016; the situation started to change, routes of refugees increasingly diversified as countries tightened border control, including introduction of a new border regime in Hungary, the construction of a wall between Hungary and Serbia and the provision of Hungary to return to the other side of the wall those detected within 8 km of the border.

Number of refugees were reduced significantly in 2016 thanks to EU – Turkey deal (Bregu, 2019). However, new Balkan route naturally emerged which is Albania and BiH to Croatia (Puric, 2018; Pundy, 2019; Minca & Umek, 2019). As Weber suggests that actually Balkan Route was not closed, it just changed routes of refugees (2017). Being forefront of refugee crisis as transit countries, Western Balkan countries found themselves in a bottleneck.

While most of the refugees left from the region, the impacts of the crisis on the Western Balkans are still felt after two years. The movement of thousands of people has renewed hidden tensions between and within individual Balkan countries, while creating strains between the Balkans as a region and the European Union. Responses to the crisis also prevailed vital outcome for the relationship between countries in the region and migration management in Europe more broadly. Positive one; due to crisis Balkan countries started to have more dialogue between them however EU failed to do. Weber described that situation in the following “The crisis response of the Western Balkan countries became more “Europeanized,” that of the EU became increasingly “Balkanized” over the winter, ending in total disintegration” (Weber, 2017, p.7). It also affected Western Balkan countries’ relation with EU. Most of the Western Balkan states having an image

that they are frontier of Europe which serve as security provider for the EU but not considered as an equal partner (Cocco, 2017; Šabić, 2018). On the other hand, Western Balkan experience countries are still undeveloped in terms of means and the capacity to deal with large-scale migration (Bechev, 2016). Morvai and Djokovic claim that despite the past experiences of the Balkan countries, like the member states of the European Union, have failed to respond appropriately with any major policies have been developed and no one has advocated for different migrant policies and treatment of refugees (2018). This incapacity and failure of EU's inability also led to political crises within Western Balkan countries (Arman, 2017). In addition to this, the crisis shows that political landscape and security of Western Balkan are still fragile and highly interlinked with EU especially Germany and also Turkey (Bechev, 2016). Thus, Syrian refugee crisis once more proved that how region is vital for Turkey and Germany in terms of political, economy and security.

### **7.7. Analysis of One Region Two Leader with SNA Leadership Model**

In relation to the discussion is about Turkey and Germany competitor or possible partner in the region, it should be noted that Turkey and Germany are one of the key players in the Western Balkan. As explained through chapter, Erdoğan and Merkel change their country's approach in the region. Firstly, Turkey has deep historical ties with Western Balkan region which makes Turkey closer to region (Koç & Önsoy, 2018). On the other hand, Germany has a geographical proximity and historical connections especially after Bosnian war. In light of these background, within the course of last fifteen years, the Syrian refugee crisis inevitably influenced political and social dynamics in the region that has increased the attention of both countries and leaders. In other words, the stability and harmonization of the Western Balkan countries is an undeniable part of interests of Turkey and Germany which clearly expressed by the two leaders. That's why, this part of the chapter would analyze foreign policies of Erdoğan and Merkel with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

*Negotiator:* Negotiation is indispensable part of fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership. Stabilization of Western Balkan region has been quite fragile sourced from past ethnic clashes, economic issues and political disagreements because of this, negotiation and third party negotiator become more vital in terms of facilitating platforms to have dialogue. Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have played negotiator role in both NATO and EU membership process of these countries and regional disputes.

As touched upon in the chapter, Turkey has been cooperating in military terms with each country in the region. This cooperation is not solely technical assistance but also political support to NATO membership process of Bosnia. It should be noted Turkey's strong position in NATO make President Erdoğan's role as a stronger negotiator. For example, since the Albanian accession process to NATO started Erdoğan clearly declared his support. "I want to stress Turkey's resolve for Albania's integration into NATO, in the upcoming Bucharest summit we will support Albania's NATO bid (Turkey Supports Albania's NATO Bid, 2008). A year later Albania managed to become member of NATO where Turkey and Erdoğan had played important role (Lami, 2017). In addition to this, Turkey has been supporting NATO membership of Northern Macedonia which was emphasized by President Ivanov to stress lobbying power of Turkey (Newsroom, 2018).

Merkel has become one of the key negotiator in the Western Balkan. She explained her visible role as follows "Is one of the duties of our foreign policy – certainly, you need to negotiate first with the surrounding environment in Western Balkan to have peace" (Merkel: Peace in the Balkans- very fragile, 2018). In this respect, Angela Merkel has almost become a negotiator between these countries and the EU which is not common amongst former Chancellors in Germany. Kornelius emphasized that "She is tough negotiator because she is aware that she is leader of Europe and one of the biggest economy" (Personal Interview, 2019). The recent and vivid example can be given from EU membership of Northern Macedonia. Merkel personally interfere the relations and make pressure on both side to make their duty. For example, name dispute between Greece and



Macedonia, Merkel encouraged to have agreement with Greece in order to continue EU and NATO membership process (Angela Merkel backs 'Macedonia' renaming referendum, 2018). Also, she has made pressure on EU to speed up negotiations with Northern Macedonia on pathway to EU membership as follows “We Europeans sometimes need too long. It’s not necessarily a question of how much but of how long it takes” (Rinke, 2018). In the last EU candidacy crisis between Albania, North Macedonia and France, Merkel says that “I want to tell the states of the Western Balkans that they too have a prospect for membership in the European Union” (2019).

Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a negotiator respectively have utilized strong positions of Turkey and Germany in NATO and EU in order to provide stabilization and regional harmonization.

*Connectivity:* The SNA Leadership model brings connectivity as a vital feature for leaders while formulating foreign policy making which exhibits leader’s ability to see role of nested relationship between local, regional and global phenomenon. Especially, Western Balkan region is one of interconnected region in ethnicities, social, political and economic, which also linked with Europe and Asia. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel have been aware of characteristics of the region and developed their foreign policies through connectivity perspective.

President Erdoğan is aware both connectivity within region and with these words; “Fate of the countries and peoples in the Western Balkan region is never indifferent, disconnected.” (Başbakan Erdoğan Bursa’da İftara Katıldı, 2010). He considers Turkey as a Balkan state and the Balkans as a part of Turkey’s heart geography. Actually, these words can be considered as foundation of his overall foreign policy approach in the region. As explained in the chapter, Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership does not focus on only one country, rather Turkey pursues multidimensional foreign policy almost in all countries. For example, Turkey and Bosnia have historical religious ties however President Erdoğan has personal strong relations with Serbian Aleksandar Vučić, while Turkey has growing trade and cultural relations with Northern Macedonia and almost all countries. In other

words, Erdoğan has been keeping positive relations with countries' integration to contribute stabilization and harmonization in the region.

Furthermore, Erdoğan emphasized Turkey's role in this connectivity and how mutual relations are important for Turkey. To exemplify, almost in every balcony speech of after his electoral victory President Erdoğan send his greetings to Balkans and underline that "I would like to thank my brothers in Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and all cities in Europe whose hearts beating with us" (Demirtaş, 2017). Even in 2011, balcony speech after elections he said that "Today not only Turkey but also Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus won this election (Başbakan'dan üçüncü Balkon Konuşması, 2011). In other words, Erdoğan reflect his understanding of connectivity in the Western Balkan while referencing Turkey's deep historical ties which makes the relations stronger.

Angela Merkel's special interest to the Western Balkan region can be deemed as a result of her awareness of connectivity in the region. Angela Merkel gives attention to three aspects of connectivity of the region, which are their interconnected relations, interdependency between Germany and EU. In her words "We have to facilitate coexistence in the Western Balkan region" (Fortschritte in der Westbalkan-Region, 2019). As well as Erdoğan, Merkel also adopts multidimensional policies in all countries with the region regardless of religion or ethnicity. Moreover, regular immigration flow from Western Balkan countries to Germany has constructed main connection between two countries. Even, at the beginning of the 2000s the main European receiving country of Balkan immigration was Germany (Bonifazi et al., 2014). That's why, Merkel is aware that any destabilization of the region would led to unexpected and unstoppable immigration flow to Germany (Kraske, 2019). The region has a significant importance for not only for Germany but also for EU due to concerns about radicalization, organized crime and drugs trafficking, and immigration (Dursun-Özkanca, 2019).

Kornelius suggested that "Merkel is one of the connected leaders because she is highly engaged in EU politics and other multilateral initiatives which aim to bring

all actors in policy making in the region” (Personal Interview, 2019). In light of this, Germany managed to use EU integration process in the region as a tool for stabilization of Western Balkan policies in the EU level. Merkel clearly expressed her support to integration process of regional countries to EU. There is no doubt, Syrian refugee crisis made EU more vulnerable about on stabilization of Western Balkan region Angela Merkel addressed her concern related with region through reminding recent turbulent past, numerous unresolved economic, territorial, confessional and ethnical problems with refugee crisis are again putting the Western Balkan to the center of security challenges (Gordic et al., 2017). An interview participant 1 emphasizes that if Germany economy is doing well, Western Balkan economy is also doing well so stability of Western Balkan is key for Europe’s stability (2019). Merkel uses this approach to support their EU membership process. As she says, “Europe will only be truly united when all the countries of the Western Balkans join the EU” (Merkel: Truly united Europe includes Western Balkans, 2019). In other words, importance of Western Balkan region for Germany is not confined with temporary crisis that's why Merkel developed multilevel and multidimensional foreign policies for Western Balkan region.

Consequently, foreign policies under Erdoğan and Merkel aimed to intensify their mutual relations as a part of connectivity reality between Western Balkan and their countries.

*Personal diplomacy:* The SNA Leadership Model prevails personal diplomacy as one of the reflections of background of leaders in foreign policy making. Last fifteen years, world politics has showed tendency to have more strong political leaders. This reality also triggered personalization of diplomacy by leaders.

As touched upon in the Syrian refugee crisis, Merkel and Erdoğan have showed visible personal diplomacy effort, which includes bilateral meeting and constant phone calls. In case of Western Balkan policies, two leaders are again on the stage as the main actors who have personal influence in foreign policy making for the region. Begin with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, there should be two points should be

mentioned. Firstly, President Erdoğan has personal attachment with Western Balkan especially with Bosnia because of previous closeness with Alija Izetbegovic. Erdoğan explain his special interest to this region while emphasize his last meeting with Izetbegovic as follows “He held my hands in our conversation here and said, 'Our prayers are with you', and then he made the will: Protect my Bosnia. These places were always for sons of Fatih Sultan of Ottoman that's why we continue to support all the Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this will.” (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Aliya İzzetbegović'in vasiyetini açıkladı, 2018). Interview Participant 1 give another example to compare previous Turkish foreign policy before and after President Erdoğan

*In Dayton Peace Process, there was pressure on Alija Izetbegovic to be more flexible about conditions. Through negotiations, first call was from Americans and later Süleyman Demirel called us to be more flexible about Dayton like Americans. All I can say that, Erdoğan would never ask such things from us (Personal Interview, 2019).*

In other words, Erdoğan point out his personal connection as one of the main reasons of Turkey's multidimensional and entrepreneur foreign policy in the region.

Secondly, Erdoğan keep his person-to-person communication with all leaders in the region.

*From leading Bosniac politicians in Bosnia, including the president of SDA, Bakir Izetbegovic to Albania's Prime Minister Edi Rama, Kosovo's president Hashim Thaci, Macedonia's former-Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and Serbia's President Aleksandar Vučić have all established a personal relationship with Erdoğan (Novakovic, 2019).*

Erdoğan wisely build personal relations and use this personal network in regional problems to strengthen Turkey's position in Western Balkan as an undeniable partner for countries. In other words, Erdoğan's personal relations and effective tools in Turkish foreign policy. Also, it should be noted that most of leaders in the region also benefit from their personal diplomacy in favor of investments and trade relations. For example, Kosovo Prime Minister underlined role of Erdoğan's personal diplomacy in the opening ceremony of Air Albania as follows “There is no doubt, without President Erdoğan's initiative and generous support, we would

not be here today” (Arnavutluk Başbakanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın cömert desteği olmadan bugün burada olmazdık, 2018).

On the other hand, Angela Merkel also prefers to build personal relations with leaders in the region. Nougayrede emphasizes her personal activism in the region as follows “Germany’s weight, its history, and the chancellor’s personal activism in framing Balkan questions as strategic European ones is well known” (2015). There is no doubt, she has started to communicate more actively with each leader in the region even in the interregional issues. For example, Merkel was the only European leader directly calls Prime Minister of Albania and Serbia for protests after a football match in Belgrade in 2014 (Nougayrede, 2015). Also, she intensifies her personal diplomacy network through the Berlin Process. To exemplify, personal link between the German chancellor Angela Merkel and BiH’s authorities was built also during the Berlin Process that convince for targeted but crucial German support for BiH to fulfill one of the conditions on the EU path in 2016 (Klemenc & Pulko, 2016).

Another example can be given in case of independence and nation building of Kosovo. In 2011, Chancellor Merkel was the only European leader to publicly call for the dismantling of Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo (Himmrich, 2011). Later, she has been personally supporting recognition of Kosovo by other EU countries. Prime Minister Haranidaj underlined Merkel’s personal role in western Balkan as follows “Your leadership has been crucial to the many processes that the Western Balkans are going through, thus we seek to be a strong voice for the prosperous future of Kosovo” (Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj holds a bilateral meeting with Chancellor Angela Merkel, 2018).

Thus, personal diplomacy of Erdoğan and Merkel could be considered as huge part of the Western Balkan policies of Germany and Turkey. Their personal influence sphere also reflects mutual relations with each country.

*Entrepreneurship:* Entrepreneur leadership is an emergent property for leaders in dynamic international system. Leaders should prevail more innovative and creative

policies rather than traditional policies. Foreign policies of Erdoğan and Merkel in Western Balkan are distinctive with its multidimensional nature as entrepreneur leaders.

To begin with Erdoğan's policy changing in Western Balkan as a reflection of his desire to widen Turkey's horizon in Middle East, Balkans and partially Caucasus where Turkey has historical background (Aydın, 2009). This advantage combined with Erdoğan's ideology and worldview made easier for Turkey to pursue multidimensional and innovative policies in Western Balkan. Since 2002, Firstly, economic dimension of the relations is the biggest one. Trade and investments rate have been increasing with Western Balkan countries. In this respect, Turkey doesn't separate countries depend on religious and race. Secondly, Turkey also pursues education and culture policies in a very efficient way. It can be considered one of the policy are where President Erdoğan bring up innovative approach compared to previous years. To exemplify, Turkish municipalities and NGOs organized iftar programs in different part of Western Balkans with Turkish youth which bring youth generation of countries (Muhasilovic, 2018; Üsküp'te gençlik iftarı düzenlendi, 2019). Also, diverse projects within education and culture from restoration to language courses can be considered as unique examples within countries. Moreover, Diyanet (Directorate for Religious Affairs) has been one of the influential element of foreign policies of Turkey in the region which train imams, giving consultancy through Attachee offices (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2019). In other words, Turkey has also developed tailor made policies for each country, which shows the entrepreneurial leadership through different actors to pursue innovative policies which touch directly daily life of people in Western Balkan.

Although Germany has special relationship with Western Balkan countries especially after 90s, Merkel's special interest and importance led to have more entrepreneurial foreign policies in the region. As the biggest economy of Europe, Germany became the main trade partner of Western Balkan countries as well as number of investments in diverse sectors. Besides, Merkel launched a new legal arrangement for labor immigration from Western Balkan to Germany called The

Western Balkan Regulation which ease process of getting work visa in Germany (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). While Germany keep economic dimension of relations as the most powerful tool, also bring education and culture policies. Especially, language schools and cultural activities through Goethe Institute are part of multidimensional policies. Furthermore, Angela Merkel also pursue policies in Western Balkan under the framework of European Union enlargement perspective. There is no doubt, Berlin Process can be seemed as the notable initiative by herself in order to consolidate economic and regional integration (Prelec, 2017). So, Merkel developed more sophisticated and innovative policies than traditional Germany's humanitarian foreign policies in Western Balkan through entrepreneurial leadership.

Erdoğan and Merkel have been approaching Western Balkan region in a entrepreneurial way in order to bring more diverse and multidimensional policies which strengthen their positions in the region vis-à-vis other actors.

*Solution seeking:* Solution seeker leader have always prioritize bringing solutions to issues through various diplomatic tools. Fragile political and economical structure of the Western Balkan is already mentioned in the chapter. Lack of sustainable peace and social and economic development are deemed as main problems in the region. In light of this, that multidimensional foreign policies of Erdoğan and Merkel in the region mostly aimed to achieve sustainable peace, economic and social development. Peace oriented policies of Erdoğan and Merkel would be analyzed under the peace orientation subtitle that's why solution-seeking part would analyze two leader's role as a solution seeker in regional economic and social development.

President Erdoğan is aware that social and economic development are key issues in the region where Turkey contributed as in his words; "Turkey's doesn't have any other agenda in the Western Balkan other than stability and development" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Bosna Hersek'teki Stav Dergisi'ne mülakat Verdi, 2020). That's why, Turkey increase its development aid through AK Party era (Weise, 2019). Various examples of Turkey's foreign policy aim to foster economic and

social development in the region are given in the chapter. Mainly, Turkey provided development aid for building infrastructure projects, universities, improving education and restoration. More importantly, Erdoğan also encourages Turkish businessman to make investment, which provides opportunity for employment (Muhasilovic, 2016). One of the visible examples can be given from Serbia where Turkey had biggest investments in the Western Balkan region. Turkey's ambassador to Serbia Tanju Bilgiç says that "Only in Belgrade Turkish companies created job opportunities for 15.000 Serbs" (Türk şirketleri Belgrad'ı yatırımlarla fethediyor, 2018). Another example of Erdoğan's solution seeker policy is undoubtedly Sarajevo-Belgrade Highway Project which initiated by Erdoğan himself. The project carries out normalization of relations between Serbia and Bosnia while providing a highway on one of the main route in the region (Turkey's President Attends Launch of Serbia-Bosnia Highway Work, 2019). Various examples can be given from all countries in the region.

Angela Merkel's policy formulation also aims to find solutions for social and economic development in the region. German political and corporate foundations having a strong presence in the region especially while Germany is the biggest donor of bi- and multilateral development aid for the Balkans among the EU member states (Töglhofer & Adebahr, 2017). There is no doubt, Germany's one of the biggest contribution to economic development is reducing youth unemployment rate in the region. Actually, this problem is double sided for Germany because high number of youth unemployment also trigger immigration flow from the Western Balkan to Germany. Improving vocational training and academic qualities to reduce youth employment was decided to be implied in Final Declaration of Conference on the Western Balkans (2014). Along with this decision, Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH leading to create opportunities for people in the Balkans which made donation to vocational education and training in the Western Balkan budget equivalent to \$6 million (Bartlett & Pagliarello, 2016). For example, training of nursing in Serbia and Bosnia are concrete examples of Germany's role to improve vocational training (GIZ in countries of the Western



Balkans – job prospects on site and in Germany, 2015). President Aleksandar Vučić emphasized Germany’s solution seeker role in Serbia’s economic development as follows “From dual vocational training to digital infrastructure, Germany is providing impetus for the modernization of Serbian society, politics and industry” (Serbia is a close partner and will remain one, 2018).

Peace and economic development are chronic problems in the Western Balkan countries. Erdoğan and Merkel has been solution seeker in the region to address these problem with different tools and approaches.

*Peace orientation:* The SNA Leadership model features peace orientation as a reflection to foreign policy through Galtung’s definition of positive and negative peace. The Western Balkan region is characterized by a set of unresolved issues such as the constitutional and state issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia's name issue with Greece, and the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue (Samardžija, 2014). In this respect, Merkel and Erdoğan who have intense personal influence through personal diplomacy play important role to facilitate sustainable peace and to hinder possible military conflict.

As expected, President Erdoğan wisely uses his personal communication with leaders as peace oriented leader. Aras called Erdoğan’s peace efforts in the region as Erdoğan’s peace diplomacy in last ten years (2010). Erdoğan address his feelings regarding peace in the Western Balkan in these words; “I can say that, as Balkan peoples, if you are united among yourself, if you are together, if you are brothers, it is so strong, you are safe, you will be so prosperous” (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Sırbistan ile yeni bir dönem başlıyor, 2017). Interestingly, he also reminds historical role of Turkey’s as a successor of Ottoman Empire in the region “This sixty years’ period, known as Ottoman peace for him, is still sought after today in a wide geography stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to West Africa” (Erdoğan: Türkiye tarihi sorumluluklarından asla kaçamaz, 2006).

Aras interprets that President Erdoğan wants to build a new Turkish peace in the Western Balkan (2010). As given in the chapter, one of the main examples is Turkey, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina tripartite dialogue initiatives is the basis of good neighborly relations in the Balkans. Also, Erdoğan plays constructive role in the internal issues in Bosnia has led to an atmosphere of compromise. In addition to this, due to efforts of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia announced they would send ambassadors to each other mutually in the trilateral meetings in Turkey (Kırcı, 2017). Interview participant 1 underlines that “Erdoğan’s dialogue and development aid to each country in the region are example of his peace orientation” (Personal Interview, 2019). In addition to this, Turkey is also influential actor in terms of hindering possible escalations in the region. Erdogan talked about the tension between Serbia and Kosovo after Marko Djuric, the head of Belgrade’s office for Kosovo, was detained in Northern Kosovo (Duran, 2018). Although President Erdoğan has been criticized and blamed with exploiting fragile structure of Western Balkan, it can be said that he has been contributing regional peace through building platforms and hindering immediate escalation.

Angela Merkel prioritizes to have sustainable peace while developing German foreign policy in the Western Balkan. In this respect, she addresses the complicated political structure of Western Balkan with these words “Peace is very fragile, we need to resolve all of them so that there is no tension that can erupt at any point” (Merkel: Peace in the Balkans – very fragile, 2018). Like President Erdoğan, Angela Merkel established interstate platforms for the Western Balkan countries- Berlin Process with motto of “Partnership for Peace” (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016). Kornelius claims that Merkel is peace oriented leader because she is not fan of military intervention to other countries (Personal Interview, 2019). That’s why, Angela Merkel reacts to immediate disputes in the region which sources from Serbian proposes on partitioning of Kosovo with scenarios of recognition of North Kosovo as a part of Serbia and joining of Albanian part of southern Serbia to Kosovo (Gray, 2018). Within these discussions, Angela Merkel harshly criticize such discussions and attempts in the Western Balkan and clearly express that “The territorial integrity of the states of the Western Balkans has been established and is

inviolable” (Kostreci, 2018). Moreover, Merkel also stopped escalation between Kosovo and Serbia again about Serbia’s deny for Kosovo’s seat in Interpol while Kosovo’s taxing imports from Serbia while calling two sides to ease tension (Germany Sounds Warning on Balkan Risks, 2018). Angela Merkel has been considered the only leader within EU who concern and directly engage with regional countries as a facilitator of peace.

Erdođan and Merkel seems to have different policy tools to contribute peace in the Western Balkans however both leaders have been willing to ease interstate tensions through multilateral platforms and immediate reaction with personal diplomacy channels.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

The notion of political leadership is old as human history. Through the centuries, the meaning and approaches of political leadership have changed that explains why political leadership has its own epistemological and ontological diversity. World has been under social, economic and political changing and transformations. Last ten years is marked with strong leaders' era in the world. Long tenure and strong support from his/her followers can be shown as a characteristic of strong leaders. Political leadership become spot once again in the history across different continents. Among those leaders, two longest served leaders have shown unique leadership profile both in their countries and international system who are Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel.

Leadership styles and policy making of Erdoğan and Merkel have been analyzed from different perspectives with various approaches and theories. In addition to this, Erdoğan and Merkel's leadership in foreign policy have been studied with different case studies. However, existent literature are lack of holistic approach to their leadership in foreign policy making vis-à-vis role of their biography, country's background as determinant of their foreign policy making. To explore the missing gap of this holistic approach for Erdoğan and Merkel's leadership in foreign policy making, this thesis addresses the research question of “**How leadership and background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel affect foreign policy making through selected case studies of Syrian Refugee crisis and Western Balkan policies?**”. This study is interpretive qualitative research which was conducted based on primary documents, speeches and interviews.

The object of this study is to analyze role of background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel in foreign policy making in Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region regarding the sub questions of how leaders' background shapes their leadership approach and behavior? and how does leaders' background embody their foreign policy making?. To this end, author discussed in the Chapter 2, notion of political leadership has been evolved since 13<sup>th</sup> century till today covers Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Carlyle and Weber which also shaped contemporary political leadership approaches in the literature of political leadership and role of leaders in foreign policy making including operational code and leadership trait analysis.

In the framework of this thesis, author developed a new political leadership model called the SNA (Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın) Leadership Model as a unique contribution of this thesis which is a multidimensional approach inspired by various works in order to highlight the influence of the two leaders' leadership and background in foreign policy making through holistic and multidimensional view. Though this model has similar elements with previous works on leadership in foreign policy, it brings a unique structure with four main dimensions that are the contextual background of the leader's country in which the leader was born and leading the background of leader, approaches and behaviors of the leader and reflections of leaders' background on foreign policy making. Formation of the model is a product of long term efforts to bring a new and fresh perspective to the literature. Especially, selected approaches, behaviors and reflections are inferences from Erdoğan and Merkel's existent literature and inspiration from their biographies. In other words, building a new model emerged as a result of synchronous working on their background and theoretical studies. Following chapters were designed based on structure of the SNA Leadership Model.

In the Chapter 3, author discussed contextual background of Turkey and Germany as an impetus for leaders' foreign policy making as designed in the SNA Leadership Model which covers in the three dimensions which are federalism vs unitary system, chancellorship democracy vs. parliamentary system and coalition culture. As a main divergence, the federal and unitary structure of two countries

can be one of the determinants of leaders' foreign policy making as a legal constraint. In addition to this, Germany's chancellor democracy based on "richtlinienkompetenz" article gives power to chancellors while coalition culture can be considered as always factor which encourage leader to find a consensus between partners. On the other hand, author suggested that Turkey's 1982 constitution created two headed executive power with a powerful president and a prime ministerial in position where Turkey has strong centralized system and coalition government is seen as negative political outcome. Besides legal constraints, the political culture of the two countries are influential for leaders foreign policy making. Germany's both legal structure and culture does not allow very strong personal or party leadership vis-à-vis konsensuspolitik while Turkey allows more place for strong leadership to create a unified and a strong country. In the Chapter 3, author pointed out momentum when two leaders's power arised. Both Germany and Turkey's circumstances were analyzed within three subtitles domestic politics, economic and foreign policy. It was suggested that Turkey and Germany from the 90s until end of the decade was full of political instability and economic recessions while there were numerous foreign policy issues need to addressed which created conditions to be ready for new leadership.

Along with Turkey and Germany's contextual background, the SNA Leadership Model brings Erdoğan and Merkel's personal background as second dimension (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Author claimed that although it is not possible to perceive how much their backgrounds are influential, leader's family, student years, political life and phenomenon shape approaches and behaviors of leaders which are playing important roles to shape foreign policies of leaders. Within such context, when author analyzed personal background of Erdoğan and Merkel; it can be said that their world view, political stance and policy making are highly influenced by their background. In other words, personal background of Erdoğan and Merkel showed that they have a vision for themselves and their country which shaped by their background. They have power to transform crisis to opportunities in different space and time context. These common points in their life have been formulating to be aware of chaotic nature of system, think kaleidoscopic and catalytic, be glocal and have unique values for humanity as an approaches in their

leadership. In addition to this, these approaches constituted specific behaviors which are producing entangled solutions, be determinant of uncertainties, be simplicity and to create attraction field behaviors of Erdoğan and Merkel as third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

As mentioned, two leaders are the longest served leaders in the Europe who experienced different phenomenon while leading Turkey and Germany. Among these events, there is no doubt Syrian refugee crisis is one of the critical and impactful phenomenon where two leaders play undeniable role. In Chapter 6, author first assessed responses of Erdoğan and Merkel to Syrian refugee crisis in different timeline vis-à-vis social context of open door policies with the notion of ansar and welcoming culture. Then, author examines role of Erdoğan and Merkel in Turkey-EU deal which signed on 16<sup>th</sup> of March 2016. Role of their background in foreign policy making on the Syrian refugee crisis are analyzed with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. Both Erdoğan and Merkel are great negotiator through the crisis. The Turkey-EU deal can be considered as one of the concrete examples of their negotiation power between each other and actors. Also, Erdoğan and Merkel are aware that leaders see that the Syrian refugee crisis is not only a refugee crisis but also a security and social crisis, which could lead to conflict in the region through connectivity. They also developed entrepreneurial policies from buffer zone plan to refugee quotas program as a solution for the crisis. There is no doubt, having personal diplomacy is the most visible characteristics of foreign policies of Erdoğan and Merkel in the Syrian refugee crisis who have been in contact through immediate phone calls and summits while they made personal initiatives with other actors. In addition to this, The Syrian refugee crisis also prevails that two leaders are solution seeker that focus humanitarian, political and social aspects of solution. Both Erdoğan and Merkel consider Syrian civil war as a source of Syrian refugee crisis. That's why two leaders managed to bring different alternatives to end the conflict in Syria through bilateral and multilateral platforms.

On the other hand, Western Balkan policies of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel for stabilization and harmonization is chosen as the second case study in

the Chapter 7 which is strategically important for two countries' security. Through this thesis, the term of Western Balkan is only confined with five countries which are Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Author examined Western Balkan policies of Turkey and Germany into four categories which are trade&investment, development aid, education&culture and military& defense cooperation later touched upon regional initiatives of two leaders. Author claimed that importance of the Western Balkan region became more visible with the Syrian refugee crisis for both countries. In this respect, role of their background in foreign policy making on the Western Balkan region are analyzed with fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model. Erdoğan and Merkel are important negotiator in the region through NATO and EU membership who encourage countries of Western Balkan integration while coping with issues between countries in the region. Both leaders are aware of connectivity of the Western Balkan region with their own countries in terms of history, security and economy, which increase nested relationship with their countries. Furthermore, Erdoğan and Merkel have been successful to develop multidimensional policies which touch daily life of citizens of the Western Balkan countries. As well as the Syrian refugee crisis, strong personal diplomacy of Erdoğan and Merkel displayed important role. Two leaders build personal connection with each leader in the region that wisely use in immediate issues. Also, the policies of Erdoğan and Merkel towards disputes between Western Balkan countries is shaped by the characteristic of solution seeker who encourage more dialogue and cooperation between actors. Lastly, overall policies of Erdoğan and Merkel contributed to stabilization and harmonization of Western Balkan who established common platforms for countries in the region in order to solve long lasting disputes.

In conclusion, this thesis presents that background of country, personal background, approaches and behaviors have reflections on leaders' foreign policy making. The author studied the question of "How leadership and background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel affect foreign policy making through selected case studies of Syrian Refugee crisis and Western Balkan policies?". To this end, author developed the SNA Leadership Model with four dimensions as mentioned. It should be noted that approaches, behaviors and reflections are



chosen for the SNA Leadership Model are limitations of this thesis. In other words, other scholars can analyze this research question with different approaches, behaviors and reflections or the SNA Leadership Model can be modified with for different research questions which is dynamic and flexible likewise nature of leadership. Also, it can be used to analyze other leaders.

As a result of this holistic and multidimensional analysis, it is possible to conclude that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel have been prominent political figure in Syrian refugee crisis and Western Balkan region. They managed to formulate foreign policies along with their vision and values which sourced from their countries' and personal background. In addition to this, Recep foreign policies of Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel in the Syrian refugee crisis and the Western Balkan region would have influence future of their countries, region and global politics. Consequently, research question, theoretical framework and findings of this thesis would contribute to role of political leaders in foreign policy literature and works on leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel as an inspiration for other researchers.

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## **Interviews**

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Kornelius, S. (2019, July,5). Personal Interview.

Künhardt, L. (2019, September 17). Personal Interview.

Ziemiak, P. (2019, June 19). Written Interview.

## APPENDICES

### A. MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER PERMIT

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ  
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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06 MART 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof.Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI

Danışmanlığını yaptığımız Şuay Nilhan AÇIKALIN'ın "Siyasal Liderlik ve Dış Politika" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve 081-ODTÜ-2019 protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

  
Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ

Başkan

  
Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Üye

  
Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sunoğlu DEMİR (4.)

Üye

  
Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKCI

Üye

Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK

Üye

  
Doç. Dr. Pinar KAYGAN

Üye

  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT

Üye

## B. CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name : Açıkalın, Şuay Nilhan  
Nationality : Turkish (TC)  
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### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU International Relations	2015
BS	Bilkent Uni. International Relations	2012
High School	Özel Ayşeabla Lisesi, Ankara	2007

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014- Present	Akito Danışmanlık Organizasyon	General Director

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

### PUBLICATIONS

- Erçetin, Ş.Ş. & Açıkalın, Ş.N. (Eds).(2019) Chaos, Complexity and Leadership. Springer. Dünya'nın en iyi 50 Karmaşıklık Kitabı listesine girdi <https://bookauthority.org/books/best-complexity-theory-books>.
- Tomé, L. & Açıkalın, Ş.N. (2019). Complexity Theory as a New Lens in IR: System and Change. In Ş.Ş. Erçetin, N. Potas (Eds.) *Chaos, Complexity and Leadership 2017*. Springer Proceedings in Complexity, Ch 1.



3. **Açıkalm, Ş.N.**, Erçetin, Ş.Ş., Potas, N., Çevik.M.S., Neyişçi, N. & Görgülü D. Measurement Of Social Integration: Syrian Women In Turkey. *Oxford Refugee Journal*. ACCEPTED
4. **Açıkalm, Ş.N.** Erçetin, Ş.Ş., Potas, N. & Güngör, H. (2018). Gençlere Bilimi Anlatmak Üzerine Bir Deneyim: Uluslar Arası Gençlik ve Bilim Merkezi. *Mersin Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 14(1): 436-449 DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.17860/mersinefd.401155>.

### C. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Liderlik çalışmaları dünya tarihinde çok eskilerden günümüze kadar uzanan geniş bir zaman ve mekan içerisine dağılmış bir alan yazını temsil etmektedir. 20. ve 21. yy liderlik alanında çalışan akademisyen ve uygulayıcılar açısından önemli bir dönemi teşkil etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, liderlik kavramı, sayı, içerik ve bağlam olarak giderek artan, akademik çalışmanın temel konusu olmuştur. Siyasal liderlik kavramı ve çalışmaları siyaset bilimi alanında uzun yıllardır önemli bir alt çalışma alanını oluştururken, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında “dış politika yapım süreçlerinde liderlerin rolü” alt alanı önemli bir gelişme göstermiştir. Liderlerin dış politikada karar almaya olan etkisi üzerine yapılan çalışmaların güçlü siyasal liderlerin var olduğu dönemlerde da arttığını söylemek mümkündür.

Son 20 yılda siyasal liderlerin dış politika belirleme süreçlerinde etkililiğinin ve görünürlüğü artmıştır. Bu liderler arasında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel biyografileri ve liderlik özellikleriyle öne çıkan iki önemli liderdir. Türk siyasetinde “Reis” olarak bilinen Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, genç yaşlardan itibaren aktif siyasetin içerisinde olmuş; İstanbul Büyükşehir Başkanlığı’ndan AK Parti kurucu lideri olarak 2002 yılından beri Başbakanlık ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı görevlerini üstlenmiştir. Halen Cumhurbaşkanlığı görevini sürdüren Erdoğan, Türk siyasi tarihini değiştiren liderlerden birisidir. Öte yandan, Alman Şansölyesi Angela Merkel, Doğu Almanya geçmişinin yanı sıra bilim insanı olarak Almanya tarihinde Şansölye görevine gelen ilk kadın liderdir. Alman halkının “Mutti” (anne) olarak lakap taktığı; Şansölye Merkel 2005’ten beri aralıksız seçimlerle görevini sürdürmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel 2020 Haziran ayı itibariyle Avrupa bölgesi içerisinde en uzun süredir seçimle göreve gelmiş ve halen görevde olan liderlerdir. Görevde oldukları süre boyunca iki lider ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel birçok krizle karşı karşıya kalmış ve liderlik sergilemişlerdir. Bu krizler arasında; Arap Baharı, Avro Bölgesi Ekonomik Krizi ve Suriye Mülteci Krizi gibi olguların bölgesel ve küresel anlamda çok

önemli etkileri olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bütün bu yönleriyle, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel siyasal liderlik ve dış politika konusunda eşsiz bir bilimsel çalışma kaynağı oluşturmaktadırlar. Alan yazında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel ile ilgili önemli sayılabilecek ölçüde çalışma mevcuttur. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ile ilgili çalışmaların ağırlıklı olarak ideolojik temelli olduğu ve genel olarak Türkçe ile sınırlı kaldığı söylenebilir. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın dış politikası üzerine yapılan çalışmaların ise belirli yaklaşımlarla sınırlı olduğu gözlenmiştir. Aynı şekilde alan yazında Angela Merkel ile ilgili çalışmalar ağırlıklı olarak Almancadır; akademik olanlar kadın çalışmaları ve parti siyaseti bağlamında analiz edilmiştir.

Bu bağlamda, bu tezin araştırma konusu Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in geçmişlerinin ve liderliklerinin, Suriye Mülteci Krizi ve Batı Balkanlar örnek olaylarındaki dış politika yapım süreçlerini nasıl etkilediğini ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu tez çalışmasında, temel araştırma sorusunu iki alt araştırma sorusu tamamlamaktadır. Bunlar; liderlerin geçmiş hayatları liderlik tutum ve davranışlarını nasıl etkilemektedir? ve liderlerin geçmiş hayatları dış politika kararlarını nasıl etkilemektedir? Bu araştırma ve alt araştırma soruları ekseninde incelenen Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in uzun yıllardır görev yapması nedeniyle, göreve başladıkları tarihten 2019 yılına kadar ki dönem ele alınmıştır. Bu tez aynı zamanda iki liderin dış politikadaki rolüyle ilgili var olan alan yazındaki bilgi ve veri yetersizliğine bir alternatif oluşturmaktadır.

İki liderin Suriye Mülteci Krizi ve Batı Balkanlar özelindeki dış politikalarının analizini yapmak amacıyla “SNA (Şuay Nilhan Açıkalin) Liderlik Modeli” bu tez çerçevesinde geliştirilmiştir. Dört boyuttan oluşan bu model; liderlerin ülkelerinin bağlamında geçmiş yaşantılarının tutum, davranış ve dış politika yapımlarına etkilerini içermektedir.

Bu tezde metodoloji olarak yorumlayıcı nitel araştırma benimsenmiştir. Yorumlayıcı nitel çalışmalarda, genellemelerden daha çok zaman ve mekana bağlı olarak çıkarımlara odaklanılmıştır. Bu nedenle, yorumlayıcı nitel araştırmalarda çalışma süresince toplanan veri araştırmanın sonucu açısından oldukça önemlidir.

Bu tez kapsamında veri toplama aracı olarak görüşme ve doküman analizi seçilmiştir. Yazar, Türkiye ve Almanya'dan en üst düzeylerde görev yapan bürokratlar, siyasetçiler, gazeteciler ve akademisyenlerle görüşmeler gerçekleştirmiştir. Katılımcılara farklı sorular yöneltilerek kendilerinin tezin araştırma konusu çerçevesindeki görüşleri, deneyimleri ve anıları sorulmuştur. Yeniden belirtmek gerekirse, tüm bu açılardan da, bu tez alan yazında yeni tartışmaların açılmasını sağlayarak; alana önemli bir katkı getirmek amacıyla yazılmıştır.

Liderlik kavramı geçen yüzyıllarda araştırmacıların ilgi odağı olmuştur. Bu ve daha pek çok nedenle liderlik çalışmaları oldukça dinamik bir alandır. Öte yandan “siyasal liderlerin” bir araştırma konusu olarak başlı başına özerk ve nev-i şahsına münhasır olduğunu vurgulamak gerekir. Siyasal liderlik alan yazını pek çok değişik biçimde incelenebilir. Bu bağlamda klasik ve modern olarak ayrı ayrı da incelenebilir. Klasik siyasal liderlik alan yazını İbn-i Khaldun, Machiavelli, Carlyle ve Weber üzerinden özetlemek mümkündür.

İbn-i Haldun'un 14.yy'da siyasal liderlik ve süreçlerini Mukkadime kitabında tarihsel olarak ilk alan yazına kazandıran kişi olduğu söylenebilir. İbn-i Haldun'a göre liderlik kavramının anlaşılması için “ümran” ve “asabiye” kavramlarının anlaşılması gerekir. İbn-i Haldun'a göre liderliğin ortaya çıkması için kan bağı, toplumsal birliktelik ve asabiye'nin olması gerekmektedir. Bu iki kavram liderlerin ortaya çıkışından sonra, lidere itaat ve saygıyı sürdürmek için en önemli etkenlerdir. İçerik ve kavramsallaştırma açısından İbn-Haldun'un Mukkadime'si liderlik alanında 14.yy yazılmış alan yazındaki en eski çalışmalardan biri olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. 15.yy'a gelindiğinde Machiavelli, “Prens” adlı çalışmasında, Prens olarak adlandırdığı liderin özelliklerini tanımlamıştır. Machiavelli'ye göre Prens'in bazı kişilik özelliklerine sahip olması gerekir; bu noktada tarihçilerle ayrışan bir ahlak algısına vurgu yapmıştır. Buna ek olarak, diplomasi ve savaşın Prens için önemini de vurgulamıştır. Prens liderlik ve siyaset bilimi alanında çığır açan bir çalışma olarak kabul edilmiştir.

18.yy'a gelindiğinde, Thomas Carlyle Büyük Adamlar teorisini ortaya atmıştır. En sade anlatımıyla, bir tarihçi olarak tarihin amacı olduğunu ve bu amacın büyük adamlar tarafından gerçekleştirilebileceğini ifade etmiştir. Carlyle, bu düşüncesini siyasal liderlik alanına taşıyarak; liderleri diğer insanlardan üstün ve ruhani bir yanı olan kişiler olarak görmüştür. Klasik alan yazının son düşünürü Max Weber'dir. Weber'e göre sosyal düzeni sağlayan üç temel otorite vardır; geleneksel otorite, yasal otorite ve karizmatik otorite. Bunların arasında; karizmatik otorite liderle özdeşleştirilmiştir. Weber'e göre genelde karizmatik liderler sistemlerin çıkmaza girdiği kriz dönemlerinde ortaya çıkar ve toplumların kendisi tarafından yaratılır. Karizmatik lider gücünü toplumun akıl almaz derecede olan güveninden alır.

19.yy'dan sonra siyasal liderlik alanındaki çalışmalar artmıştır: Bu nedenle modern siyasal liderlik yaklaşımlarını yazarlardan çok, konularına göre incelemek çok daha uygun görünmektedir. Bu tez çalışması kapsamında modern siyasal liderlik alan yazını araştırma konularına göre toplumsal, metodolojik, retorik, psikolojik ve modelleme olmak üzere beş kategoride incelenmiştir. İlk olarak toplumsal kategoride Burns'un başını çektiği araştırmalar siyasal liderliği, toplumsal gelişimi açısından incelemiştir; lider-izleyen ilişkisi bağlamında farklı liderlik tiplerine değinmişlerdir.

Metodolojik çalışmaların olduğu ikinci kategoride temel araştırma konusu ağırlıklı olarak siyasal liderlik çalışmalarının araştırılmasında kullanılan metodolojiler üzerinedir. Metodolojik alan yazındaki çalışmalar siyasal liderlerin analizi ve kıyaslanması açısından başta Bunce olmak üzere genellemeler ve temel sınıflandırmalardan bahsetmiştir. Üçüncü kategori olan retorik, liderlerin ikna ve söylem kapasitelerine yoğunlaşan akademik çalışmaları kapsamaktadır. Bu bağlamda yapılan çalışmaların pek çoğu söylem analizi, liderlerin imajı, retorik kapasitesi ve vücut dili gibi farklı unsurların etkililiği konusundadır. Dördüncü kategori, siyasal liderlerin psikolojik yönüyle ilgilidir. Bu kategoride yer alan akademik çalışmalarda liderlerin geçmiş yaşantıları temel alınarak psikolojik varsayımlar üzerine kurgulanarak liderlik davranışları ve politika yapım süreçlerine irdelenmiştir. Bu bağlamdaki çalışmaların diğer kategorilere kıyasla

kişilik analizleri nedeniyle daha çok tartışmaya açık olduğunu vurgulamak gerekir. Sonuncu kategori olan modellemede, temel olarak liderin var olduğu siyasal sistemin yapısal sınırlılıklarının liderin karar alma süreci üzerindeki etkisini incelemeye odaklanmıştır. Alan yazın ağırlıklı olarak başkanlık sistemi ve Amerikan başkanları üzerine yapılmış farklı karşılaştırmalı çalışmalara dayanmaktadır.

Yüzyıllar içerisinde farklı coğrafya ve kültürlerde birden çok anlam ve karşılık bulmuştur. Klasik ve modern siyasal liderlik alan yazınına bakıldığında; iki temel sorunla karşılaşıldığını söylemek mümkündür. Birincisi; klasik siyasal liderlik yaklaşımları liderlik süreçlerinde lideri yani bireyi başat olarak merkeze almıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, izleyenler olarak toplumları göz ardı etmese de lider-izleyen ilişkisinde toplumları daha pasif bir noktada konumlandırmıştır. İkinci olarak; klasik yaklaşımların yazıldıkları dönemin ve kültürün önemli bir yansıması olarak kabul edilmekle beraber, 21.yy da ki liderlik ve toplumsal süreçleri açıklamakta yetersiz kalmışlardır. Modern siyasal liderlik alan yazınında ise farklı araştırma konularında yoğunlaşan akademisyenler çok boyutlu bir araştırma yöntemi belirlemekten uzak kalmışlardır. Klasik ve modern siyasal liderlik alan yazını 21.yyda değişen ve kaotikleşen uluslararası sistemde var olan liderlerin karar alma süreçlerini açıklama konusunda zayıf kalmaktadır.

Dış politika karar alma süreçleri doğası gereği oldukça karmaşıktır. Bu süreçteki tüm aktörleri ve etkilerini analiz etmek bu çalışmanın temel kısıtlarından birisidir. Hiç şüphesiz ki, liderler dış politika karar alma süreçlerinin de başat aktörüdür. Bu anlamdaki alan yazın 1970 ve 1980'ler sonrasında oldukça ilgi görmüştür. Sapin'in 1954 deki çalışmasında liderler ülkeler adına karar veren bireyler olarak tanımlanmış ve bu bireylerin de temel araştırma konusu olması gerektiği gündeme getirilmiştir. Bundan sonraki süreçte liderlerin karar alma süreçlerinin analiz çalışmaları multidisipliner temelli bir yapı olmak üzere operasyonel kod ve psikoanaliz olarak iki ayrı alanda yoğunlaşmıştır.

Bu bağlamda ilk çalışmalar liderlerin söylemlerini analiz etmeye yönelikken, analiz yönteminde temel bir yapı ve açık kıyaslama olanağı olmaması operasyonel

kod yönteminin ortaya çıkmasını sağlamıştır. Nathan Leites tarafından geliştirilen operasyonel kod yöntemi döneminde SSCB liderlerine uygulanarak başlamıştır. Kod analizini ise Leites'in çalışmasını geliştiren George ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu yöntemle 21.yy'daki farklı ülkelerin liderleri de analiz edilmiştir. Diğer bir yandan, liderlik kişilik analizi yöntemi operasyonel kodla beraber en çok tercih edilen bir analiz yöntemidir. Margaret Hermann tarafından geliştirilen liderlik kişilik analizi temel olarak 3 soru ve 8 cevaba dayandırılmıştır; Lider sınırlamalara saygı mı duyar, baş mı kaldırır? Lider bağlamsal bilgiye açık mı kapalı mı? Liderin motivasyonu sorun mu yoksa ilişki mi odaklı mı? Bu üç sorunun cevabı aranırken ise içerik analizi yapılır sonuçlar analiz edilir. Uzun yıllardır birçok farklı liderin dış politika kararlarının analizinde kullanılan bu yöntem başta Hermann olmak üzere farklı akademisyenler tarafından geliştirilmiştir. Dış politikada liderlerin rolü alan yazınında son olarak Post'un geliştirdiği Kişilik Profilleme Analizi 'de son dönemde tercih edilen yöntemlerin arasına girmiştir. Bu modele göre, liderlerin psikobiografileri, kişilikleri, dünya görüşü, liderlik tipleri ve bakış açılarından oluşmaktadır.

Belirtilen bu üç yöntem, uluslararası ilişkilerde dış politika analizlerinin alan yazınına tamamını kapsadığı söylenebilir. Ancak bu tez çalışmasında, bu üç yöntemden hiçbiri benimsenmemiştir. Özellikle bu tez konusu ve amacına bağlı olarak liderlerin karşılaştırılması değil sadece analizlerinin yapılmış olması nedeniyle bu yöntemler bu tez için benimsenmemiştir. Buna ilaveten, bu tez çalışma konusu anlamında liderlerin kişilik özellikleri ve bilişsel süreçleri de bir faktör olmadığı için de bu yöntemlerin hiçbiri tercih edilmemiştir. Model inşası sosyal bilimlerde karmaşık gerçekliğin sadeleştirilmesi ve yorumlanması anlamında önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, tezin araştırma sorusu kapsamında "yeni bir siyasal liderlik modeli" geliştirmek fikri ile birlikte "SNA Liderlik Modeli" ortaya çıkmıştır.

SNA Liderlik Modeli Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in Suriye Mülteci Krizi ve Batı Balkanlar özelindeki politikalarını analiz etmek amacıyla geliştirilmiştir. SNA liderlik modelinin ilk boyutu liderlerin doğduğu ve liderlik sergilediği ülkelerin bağlamsal arka planını oluşturmaktadır. Bu kapsamda; bu

boyut ülkelerin yönetim sistemleri, anayasal düzenlerini vermekle beraber süregelen siyasal kültürleri ve liderlerin iktidara geldiği dönemdeki siyasi, ekonomik ve dış politikadaki atmosferini içermektedir. SNA Liderlik Modeli'nin ikinci boyutu liderlerin geçmiş hayatları ve biyografilerini temsil etmektedir. Geçmiş hayatlarının içeriğinde çocukluktan bugüne yaşamlarının dönüm noktaları, siyasi hayatları ve kendi öne çıkan kişisel özellikleri vardır. Üçüncü boyut; çok boyutlu ve holistik perspektif liderlerin yaklaşım ve davranışlarını oluşturan boyuttur. Bunlar; kaotik sistemin farkında olmak, kaleydoskopik ve katalitik düşünme becerisine sahip olmak, global olmak, insanlık için özgün değerleri benimsemektir. Sırayla bu tutumları açmak gerekirse; kaotik sistemin farkında olan liderler, aktör çeşitliliğine ve bunlar arasındaki etkileşime ilişkin farkındalıkları yüksek olan kişilerdir. Kaleydoskopik ve katalitik düşünme becerisine sahip olan liderler, uluslararası sistemdeki çeşitliliğin farkında olup değişime ve farklılığa ayak uyduran ve buna uygun politika geliştirebilen liderlerdir. Global liderler; küreselleşmenin hem evrensel hem de yerel etkilerinin olduğunu kavrayan, ülkesinin eşsiz kültür ve geçmişlerini küresel sistemde geliştiren liderlerdir. Son olarak, insanlık için özgün değerleri benimseyen liderler için değerler izledikleri politikalar üzerinden önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Onlar söz konusu değerleri ile sadece kendi ülkeleri için değil tüm insanlık için önemli ve kritik projeler üretilirler. İnsanların yaşamlarına anlam katacak politikalar üretirler.

Üçüncü boyuttaki davranışlar ise, dolanıklık bağlamında çözümler üretmek, belirsizliklerin belirleyicisi olmak, karmaşıklıkta yalınlık ve çekim alanı yaratmaktır. Sistemin karmaşık yapısını gören liderler, sorunların karmaşık yapılarına çözümler konusunda aynı anda eşzamanlı ve dolanıklık bağlamında çözümler üretmeyi başaran liderlerdir. Liderler aynı zamanda doğal olarak belirsizlikleri olan sistemde belirsizliklerin belirleyicisi olmak zorundadırlar. Belirsizliklerin belirleyicisi olan liderler için kriz zamanları hem test hem de fırsatları içerir. Doğası gereği kaotik olan uluslararası sistemdeki karmaşık krizlerin üstesinden gelebilen liderlerin en önemli özelliği karmaşıklığı yalınlaştırarak uygulanabilir çözümler üretmektir. Bunu benimseyen liderler, bu karmaşık süreçleri izleyenlerine sade ve yakın dille aktarabilme yeteneğine sahip



olmalıdır. Son olarak, liderler liderlik algılarını güçlendirmek için izleyenleriyle sürekli dinamik şekilde yenilenen bir çekim alanı oluştururlar.

SNA Liderlik Modelinin dördüncü boyutu ise geçmiş yaşantılarının dış politikalara yansımadır. Dördüncü bölüm müzakerecilik, bağlantılılık, kişisel diplomasi, girişimcilik, çözüm odaklılık ve barış odaklılık olmak üzere altı alt dış politika özelliğini kapsamaktadır; Diplomasinin en önemli kavramlarından biri olan müzakerecilik, liderlerin dış politikalarının da önemli belirleyicilerinden birisidir. Güçlü liderler güçlü müzakereciler olup müzakere sürecinde karşı tarafın özelliklerini iyi bilen, esnek ve gerçekçi müzakere sürdürebilen kişilerdir. Üçüncü boyuttaki tutum ve davranışlarla ilintili olan bağlantılılık kavramının dış politika açısından en önemli özelliği yerel, bölgesel ve küresel açıdan olayın bağlantılılığını ve derinliğini görebilen ve buna göre dış politika geliştiren liderlere vurgu yapmasıdır. Kişisel diplomasi ise özellikle son yıllarda uluslararası ilişkilerde öne çıkan bir kavramdır. Ağırlıklı olarak liderlerin dış politikada inisiyatif aldığı diğer dünya liderleriyle kişisel ilişki geliştirerek yürüttüğünü esas alan bir kavramdır. Girişimci liderler, dış politikada klasik alanların dışına çıkarak çok yönlü ve çok boyutlu dış politika oluşturan, sadece ülkesinin politikasını değil dış politikada çok taraflılık açısından oluşturulacak inisiyatiflerinde özendiricisi, kurucusu olan kişilerdir. Liderler dış politikada çözüm odaklılık ilkesini temel alarak politika üretip krizlerin ve sorunların çözümünde aktif rol oynarlar. Son olarak, siyasal liderler izledikleri bütün dış politika hamlelerinde pozitif ve negatif barışı sağlamayı esas alır. Diğer bir deyişle, hem var olan krizlerin çözümüne katkı sunarlar; hem de barışın tesisi için uluslararası organizasyonlar ve farklı mekanizmalarda önleyici politikalar geliştirirler.

Bu tez çalışmasının sonraki bölümleri SNA Liderlik Modelinin sahip olduğu farklı boyutlar esas alınarak kurgulanmıştır. Bu açıdan, ilk boyut olan ülkelerin bağlamsal geçmişi liderlerin dış politikada karar alma süreçlerinde önemli bir etkidir. Türkiye ve Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti özelinde bakıldığı zaman iki ülkenin siyasal sistemlerini inceleyerek başlamakta yarar vardır. Üç boyutta incelenen siyasal sistemleri; üniter vs. Federal, Şansöler Demokrasi vs. Parlamenterizm ve koalisyon kültürü vs. Güçlü liderler şeklinde incelenmektedir.

İlk olarak, iki ülke aynı sınıfta kategorize edilse de yönetim yapısı açısından iki farklı yapıya sahip olduğunu vurgulamak gerekir. Bu noktada, bu tez çalışmasının Türkiye için Başkanlık sisteminin yürürlüğe girmesinden önceki dönemin esas alındığını belirtmek gerekir. Alman federal devlet yapısı dünyanın en karmaşık federal yapı modellerinden birisidir. Eyaletler eğitim ve vergi gibi bazı önemli konularda bağımsızken ağırlıklı olarak merkezi yönetime bağlı olduğunu söylemek gerekir. Özellikle 2006'da yapılan reformlar sonrası Almanya'da daha çok merkeziyetçi bir federal yapı oluştuğunu söylenebilir. Öte yandan, Türkiye üniter devlet yapısını benimsemiş bir ülkedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası'nda yönetimi kolaylaştırmak için kullanılan vilayet yapısı sadece yönetsel birimler olduğu açıkça belirtilmiştir.

İkinci olarak, liderlerin karar almadaki yasal güçlerini sınırlandıran yasal bağlamlar açısından iki kavram karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Şansölye demokrasisi kavramı Almanya'da Adenauer döneminde ortaya çıkmış Şansölye'nin siyasal gücünün liderler kullanmayı tercih etmese de tüm konulardaki politika parametrelerini belirleyebileceğini ifade eder. Almanya'da Şansölye ile Cumhurbaşkanının gücü karşılaştırıldığında hiç şüphesiz Şansölye en güçlü karar alıcıdır. Türkiye'ye bakıldığında ise; 2017 referandumundaki değişiklik hariç bakıldığında 1982 Anayasasına göre Türkiye'de parlamenter sistem geçerlidir. Ancak, bu sistem yapısal olarak sorunlar içermektedir. Cumhurbaşkanı yetkilerinin genişliği nedeniyle Başbakan'dan fazla hakka sahiptir ve bu da aslında Türkiye'de yarı başkanlık gibi bir yapı yaratmaktadır. İki ülkede anayasal farklılıklara rağmen, liderlerin karar alma açısından güçlü aktörler olduğunu söylenebilir.

Son olarak, siyasal sistemlerin farklılığının tartışıldığı iki alt kategori aslında üçüncüyü oluşturmuştur. Bu bağlamda, Almanya'da koalisyon kültürü hem Anayasal düzenlemeler hem de tarihi faktörler nedeniyle zaman içerisinde etkili bir költ oluşturmuştur. Bunun tam tersi olarak Türkiye'de tarihsel etkiyle beraber uzun süre koalisyon hükümetlerinin başarısızlığı da göz önüne alınarak, güçlü liderler kültürü ortaya çıkmıştır. Aynı zamanda, Türklerin siyasal liderleriyle kendilerini özdeşleştirdikleri de önemli bir farktır. Tüm bu yapısal ve kültürel

farklılıklar, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in dış politika karar alma süreçlerinde yadsınamaz bir etkidir.

İki liderin seçilerek ilk göreve geldikleri 2000'lerin başı dünya, bölge, Türkiye ve Almanya için önemli dönüşümlerin yaşandığı bir dönemdir. 1990'lardan 2000'lere ülke, bölge ve küresel seviyedeki gelişmeler liderlik süreçlerini şekillendirici unsurlardan birisidir. 1990'ların başında dünyada özellikle SSCB ve Yugoslavya'nın çöküşü ile birlikte liberalizmin yükseliş dönemi başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda küresel pazar ve küreselleşme ön plandadır. Bu süreçlerin içerisinde; Avrupa bölgesel olarak daha fazla entegrasyon çağrısıyla Avrupa Birliği olmanın adımlarını atarken, SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla Balkanlar bölgesinde yeni ve bağımsız ülkeler ortaya çıkmıştır. Ancak bu ülkeler, 1990'ların ortasına gelindiğinde etnik kökenlerin gölgesinde tarihin en kanlı çatışmalarının yaşandığı bir sahneye dönüşmüştür. Türkiye ve Almanya'da bölgenin ve uluslararası sistemin bir parçası olarak bu genel resimden etkilenmiştir. Türkiye ve Almanya'nın bu 10 yıllık zaman dilimindeki atmosferi iç siyaset, ekonomi ve dış politika açısından üç boyutta incelenmiş; Erdoğan ve Merkel'in iktidara geliş döneminin arka planı bağlamsal olarak verilmiştir.

1990'ların başındaki Türkiye, iç siyasette dünyayla uyumlu olarak yeni aktörlerin ortaya çıkışına tanıklık etmiştir. Muhafazakarlar ve etnik kimlik siyaseti yapan partiler ön plana çıkmıştır. Muhafazakar parti olan Refah Partisi, 1994 Yerel Seçiminde Recep Tayyip Erdoğan öncülüğünde İstanbul Belediye Başkanlığı'nı kazanmış ardından 1995 Genel Seçimlerinde Erbakan liderliğinde hükümet kurma pozisyonuna gelmiştir. Önce ANAP ile koalisyon kuran Doğruiol Partisi, bir ay sonra Refah Partisi ile koalisyon kurmuştur. Ancak 28 Şubat Postmodern Darbesi'yle Erbakan görevinden istifa ettirilmiş ve asker bir kez daha sivil siyasete müdahil olmuştur. Muhafazakar ve laikler arasındaki yükselen tansiyonun yanı sıra bu dönemde terörle mücadele Türkiye'nin temel gündem maddelerinden birini oluşturmuştur. Bu genel durum, dönemin Kürt siyasetine de yansımıştır. 1999 Gölcük Depremi ve 1990'lar boyunca kronikleşen ekonomik krizler sarmalı eşliğinde 20.yy son seçimlerinde Türkiye DSP-MHP-ANAP koalisyonunu sandıktan çıkarmıştır. Ancak diğer tüm koalisyon hükümetleri gibi bu koalisyonda

da siyasi konulardaki ayrışmalar ve en önemlisi ekonomik krizler 2001’de zirve yapmış ve Türkiye tarihinin en büyük krizine sürüklenmiştir.

1990’larda adeta kronikleşen üç büyük ekonomik kriz Türkiye’nin siyasi anlamda da geleceğini etkilemiştir. Bu krizler halkın nezdinde eski dönem liderlerin ve koalisyon hükümetlerinin devrini de kapamıştır. Dış politika bağlamında ise dünya ve bölgede değişen konjonktürle Türkiye açısından tarihsel bağlarının olduğu bölgelerle ilgili yeni fırsatlar ve zorluklar ortaya çıkmıştır. Turgut Özal dönemi dış politika bu anlamda yenilikçi bir yaklaşımla geçse de sonrasında dış politika gündemi yine koalisyonların gölgesinde kalmıştır. Bu zaman diliminde, dış politikada öne çıkan başlıkların Erbakan tarafından D-8’in kurulması, Yunanistan ve Suriye’yle yaşanan kriz olduğu söylenebilir. Elbette bu dönemde, Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem’in dış politika yapım süreçlerinde en etkili aktör olduğu söylenebilir. 1999 sonrası iç krizlere rağmen Avrupa Birliği sürecinde ilerlemek isteyen ve Orta Asya’da daha etkili bir politika gösteren bir Türkiye vardır.

Diğer tarafından Almanya’ya baktığımızda 1990’ların başında Berlin Duvarı’nın yıkılmasından sonra başlayan birleşme sürecinin siyasi, ekonomik ve dış politika sancılarını görmek mümkündür. Temel sorunlar, Doğu Almanya’daki eyaletlerin Batıdaki sisteme nasıl adapte olacağı üzerine şekillenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, yeniden birleşen Almanya’da eyalet ve parti sisteminin revize edilmesi bu süreçte de ekonomik baskının azaltılması hedeflenmesine rağmen, 1990’larda sorunlar beklenmedik şekilde artmıştır. Birleşmede siyasi olarak parti, eyalet ve en önemlisi de heterojen toplumların zorlukları ortaya çıkarken ekonomik beklentilerde birleşme öncesi vaatler karşılanamamıştır. Birleşme sonrası işsizlik hızla yükselip; büyüme oranının da düşmesi ile hane halkı geliri de önemli bir şekilde etkilenmiştir. Tüm bu ekonomik sorunlara Schröder hükümeti, Hartz reform planını oluşturarak kısa ve orta vadede ekonomik bir rahatlama sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Öte yandan, Avrupa Birliği ve NATO nedeniyle Almanya’nın birleşmesi elbette bölgesel siyaset ve Alman dış politikasından bağımsız düşünülemez. Schröder hükümeti, birleşme sonrası geçişi AB ve NATO üyelikleri kapsamında da dış politika yapımı açısından da uyumlu geçirmiştir. Ayrıca, Balkanlar bölgesinde ortaya çıkan etnik

çatışmalar Alman dış politikasının tarihsel bir dönüşüm geçirmesine neden olmuş; ilk defa Alman ordusu tatbikat amaçlı sahaya inmiştir. Belirtildiği gibi; Almanya 2000'lerin başında birleşmenin getirdiği tüm ekonomik ve sosyal sonuçları, Alman halkının yeni bir arayışa yönelmesine neden olmuştur. Birleşmenin mimarı Helmut Kohl parti içi finans skandalıyla hem CDU hem de Almanya'nın kaderini değiştirmiştir.

İki ülkenin 2000'lere gelindiğinde siyasi, ekonomik ve bölgesel sorunların gölgesinde seçime girdiğini, Türk ve Alman halkının yeni bir siyasi yaklaşım ve lider arayışında olduğuna dikkat çekmek gerekir. Bu arayış da Türkiye'de İstanbul Belediye Başkanlığı'ndaki başarılarıyla öne çıkmış olan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AK Parti'yi kurarak 2002 seçimlerine girmiş kendisi siyasi yasaklı olmasına rağmen partisi tek başına iktidara gelmeyi başarmıştır. Buna karşılık, Almanya'da Angela Merkel Doğu Almanya kökenli ve kadın bir siyasetçi olarak Helmut Kohl skandalında ortaya koyduğu tavırla yeni ve temiz bir sayfa açacağına Alman halkını ikna ederek 2005 yılında Alman Şansölyesi olmayı başarmıştır.

SNA liderlik Modeli'nin ikinci boyutunu ise liderlerin geçmiş yaşantıları oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu tez çalışmasında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel'in çocukluktan günümüze siyasi yaşamlarının dönüm noktalarını da kapsayan yaşantıları ele alınmıştır.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 26 Şubat 1954 yılında Ahmet ve Tenzile Erdoğan'ın ilk çocukları olarak İstanbul'da dünyaya gelmiştir. Ahmet ve Tenzile Erdoğan'ın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'dan sonra bir erkek ve bir kız evlatları daha olmuştur. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aslen Rizelidir. Babası Ahmet Erdoğan 14 yaşlarında babasını kaybedince; daha 15 yaşlarında aile büyükleri tarafından evlendirilmiş; Rize'den ayrılarak; Zonguldak da olan yakınlarının yanına yerleşmiş; çalışarak geçirdiği 4 yılın ardından da İstanbul'a göçmüştür. Ahmet Erdoğan, Deniz İşletmeleri'nde kaptan olarak çalışan, namazında niyazında, dindar birisidir. Vefalı memleketli, güvenilir insan ve otoriter baba olarak bilinen bir denizcidir. Öte yandan annesi Tenzile Erdoğan'ın komşuları ve diğer akrabaları tarafından çok sevilen, sayılan ve fedakar bir hanım olduğu söylenmektedir. Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan'ın hayatının tüm bölümlerinde ailesinin rolünün büyük olduğunu söylenebilir. Daha sonrasında eğitim hayatını sürdürdüğü İmam Hatip okulu ise hem gençlik yıllarının hem de gelecekteki siyasi hayatını şekillenmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Burada sadece öğrenci olarak başarı göstermekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda okulun futbol ve basketbol takımında da yer alıyordu. Lise'nin son iki senesinde münazara kolu başkanlığı, sınıf başkanlıkları ve 2 yıl üst üste İstanbul liselerarası birincisi olmuştur.

Dönemin siyasi ve sosyolojik koşulları da hayatının şekillenmesinde de çok etkilidir. 1960'lı ve 1971'li yıllar bir askeri darbe ile başlayan; daha sonra bir başka askeri muhtıra-darbeyle biten bir dönemdir. Öncesi itibarıyla Türk Siyasi tarihinde 1950-60'lı yılların politik, ekonomik, askeri tüm sancılı olaylarını, bunların çok boyutlu izdüşümlerinin oluşturduğu bir toplumsal bağlamı ifade etmektedir. Aynı dönem de muhafazakar gençliğin sağ ve sol çatışmalarının dışında kalmayı başarıp; entelektüel alan da etkili olmayı benimsediğini ve Milli Görüş'ü merkeze alan siyasi bir anlayışın dışında kendi özgün dilini oluşturduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Erdoğan'ın siyasi kariyerini MSP çizgisinde sürdürmekle beraber zihinsel gelişimini bu entelektüel süreç üzerinden gerçekleştiren gençlerden biri olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Erdoğan'ın , Milli Türk Talebe Birliği'nde önce tesisler sonra kültür müdürü olarak görev yaptığı Birliğin “Milli Gençlik” kavramı üzerine ağırlıklı olarak yoğunlaştığı zaman dilimleridir. Kuşkusuz Erdoğan'ın MTTB'de bu dönemlerde bulunduğu yönetsel pozisyonların ve yaptığı çalışmaların daha sonraki yıllarda AK Parti'de Gençler ve Gençlik Kolları bağlamında yaptığı ve yaptırdığı çalışmalarda önemli etkileri olduğu düşünülebilir.

Erdoğan 1973 yılında İmam Hatip Okulundan mezun olur; Eyüp Lisesine kayıt olup; fark derslerini vererek aynı yıl girdiği üniversite sınavında Aksaray İktisadi Ticari İlimler Yüksek Okulunu kazanır. Daha sonra adı Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Bilimler Fakültesi olarak değişen bu okuldaki mezun olmuştur. Erdoğan için özellikle siyasi yaşamı için 1976 yılı önemli bir zaman dilimidir. 1976 yılında önce MSP Beyoğlu daha sonra da merkeze rağmen 22 yaşında İstanbul İl Gençlik Kolları başkanı seçilir. O dönem faaliyetlerini yürüten İdealist Kadınlar Derneği'nin ikinci başkanı Emine Gülbaran ile 4 Temmuz 1978

yılında evlenmişler ve çiftin Ahmet Burak, Necmeddin Bilal, Esra ve Sümeyye isimli dört çocukları oldu. Erdoğan MSP Beyoğlu ve İstanbul İl Gençlik Kolları başkanlığı görevlerini MSP’ de dahil olmak üzere siyasi partilerin kapatıldığı 12 Eylül 1980 yılına kadar sürdürmüştür.

Erdoğan, siyasi partilerin kapatıldığı, siyasi yasakların söz konusu olduğu 12 Eylül döneminde, özel sektörde müşavirlik ve üst düzey yöneticilik yapmıştır. Erdoğan 1982 askerliğini tamamlamıştır. Erdoğan 1983 yılında kurulan Refah Partisi ile fiilen siyasete geri dönmüştür. 1984’de Refah Partisi Beyoğlu İlçe Başkanı 1985’de İstanbul İl Başkanı ve MKYK üyesi olmuştur. Bu göreve seçildikten sonra diğer siyasi partiler için de model olan yeni bir örgütsel yapı geliştiren Erdoğan, bu dönemde özellikle kadınların ve gençlerin siyasete katılımını artırmaya yönelik çalışmalar yapmıştır. Benzer bir biçimde Erdoğan, 26 Mart 1989’da ise Beyoğlu Belediye Başkanı adayı olarak Refah Partisi’ne büyük bir başarı kazandırmasına rağmen seçilememiştir. Benimsenmesi için önemli adımlar atmıştır. Bu seçimde gösterdiği başarı, parti çalışmaları için “ İstanbul Modeli ” olarak ülke çapında çok önemli bir örnek teşkil etmiştir. 1993 yılında Cumhurbaşkanı Özal’ın vefatıyla Türk siyasetinde yeni bir döneme girilirken, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Refah Partisi’nin 1994 Yerel Seçimlerinde İstanbul adayı olarak 27 Mart 1994 yerel seçimlerinde % 25. 19 oy oranıyla İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı seçilmiştir.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, belediye başkanlığı döneminde; siyasi yeteneği, ekip çalışmasına verdiği önem, insan kaynakları ve mali konulardaki başarılı yönetimiyle dünyanın en önemli metropollerinden biri olan İstanbul’un su, imar planı, çöp, çevre kirliliği gibi kronikleşmiş sorunlarına yenilikçi çözümler üretmiştir. Aslında bütün de bakıldığında bu dönem Türkiye ve dünya için çok boyutlu yepyeni bir politik liderlik modelinin inşasında ustalıkla hazırlanmış bir zemin oluşturma süreci olarak tanımlanabilir.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın öne çıkan liderliğinde belki de en çok göze çarpan özelliği ise güçlü hitabetidir. İmam Hatip yıllarında fark ettiği bu özelliğini şiir sevgisiyle birleştirmiş olan Erdoğan dünya liderleri arasında da hitabet yeteneğiyle

öne çıktığı söylenebilir. İzleyenleri iletişiminde şiirler önemli bir yer tutmakta ve siyasi hayatında dönüm noktalarına eşlik etmektedir. 1997’de İstanbul Belediye Başkanlığı döneminde Siirt’te okuduğu Ziya Gökalp’ın Asker Duası şiiri nedeniyle hapis cezasına çarptırılmış ve siyasi yasaklı olmuştur. Erdoğan’ın bu göze çarpan retorik özelliği yabancı liderlerle toplantılarda da önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

Dört aylık hapis dönemi süresi boyunca Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ı 30 binden fazla kişi ziyaret etmiş ve binlerce mektup yazılmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz bu süreçte, Erdoğan ve izleyenleri arasındaki bağ güçlenerek devam etmiştir. Hapis cezası sonrasında Erdoğan ve yol arkadaşları AK Parti’yi kurma kararı almışlardır. Kendisi siyasi yasaklı olması nedeniyle 2002 seçimlerini kazanmalarına rağmen ancak yasağı kalktığı 2003 yılında Başbakan olarak göreve başlamıştır. O günden 2020 yılına gelindiğinde 18 yıldır aralıksız seçimle iktidarda olan bir partinin genel başkanı ve önce Başbakanlık sonra, Cumhurbaşkanlığı yapmış olan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye’nin dönüşüm hikayesinin en önemli aktörüdür. Bu tez çalışmasında biyografisinin bir parçası olarak AK Parti döneminde Erdoğan liderliğinde Türkiye’deki ekonomik, siyasi reformları ve dış politika değişimine değinilmiştir. Bu üç alanda da Erdoğan’ın liderliğinin öne çıktığını kendisinin karar alma süreçlerinde önemli rol üstlendiğini söylemek mümkündür. Ekonomik açıdan birçok reformu gerçekleştirmiş, gayrisafi milli hasıla, kişi başına düşen gelirden önemli iyileşmeler olmuştur. Ülke içi reformlarda, Erdoğan birçok siyasi reformu ve demokratikleşme adımlarını gerçekleştirmiş, askerinin siyaset üzerindeki etkisini azaltacak anayasal düzenlemeleri de sağlamıştır. Dış politika ekseninde bakıldığında ise hiç şüphesiz AK Parti döneminde önemli dönüşümler olmuştur. Çok yönlü ve dış politikayı 360 Derece dış politika yaklaşımını benimseyerek; Türkiye’nin uluslararası ilişkiler alanında temas etmediği ülke bırakmayacağı anlayışıyla yeniden inşa etmiştir. 18 yıllık iktidarı süresince Erdoğan, insanı dış politika anlamında önemli adımlar atmış; Türkiye’yi bu anlamda gayrisafi milli hasılasına göre dünyada en çok yardım yapan ülke konumuna getirmiştir. Erdoğan’ın Türk dış politikasına en önemli katkılarından biri “Dünya Beşten Büyüktür” yaklaşımıyla Birleşmiş Milletler ‘in daha adil bir düzende yeniden yapılanmaya davet etmesidir.



SNA Liderlik Modelinin üçüncü boyutundaki tutum ve davranışlara göre Erdoğan'ın hayatını analiz ettiğimizde ortaya önemli veriler çıkmaktadır. Erdoğan hem iç hem dış siyasette kaotik ortamın farkındalığı yüksek olan bir liderdir. Örneğin, seçim çalışmaları sırasında Kürt bölgeleri için özel Kürtçe seçim şarkısı hazırlatmış ve tüm Türkiye'yi kucaklayan politikalar geliştirmiştir. Öte yandan, Erdoğan Suriye'deki kaotik durumun farkındalığını anlatırken bu bölgedeki her politikanın birbirine bağlı olduğunu söylemiştir. Katalatik ve kaleydoskopik düşünen bir lider olarak Erdoğan siyasi hayatı boyunca kendini ve AK Parti'yi yenileyerek geliştirmek konusunda başarı göstermiştir. Bunun en önemli örneklerinden birisi partisinin çalışmalarında teknolojiyi yüksek düzeyde kullanması verilebilir. Glokal lider özellikleri de sergileyen Erdoğan ülkesinin "Made in Türkiye" markasını küresel pazarda öne çıkartmasının yanı sıra her sektörde rekabet edebilen; yerli ve milli üretimlere odaklanmıştır. İç ve dış siyasette her zaman insani değerleri merkeze alan politikalar belirleyen Erdoğan, bu yönüyle tüm dünya liderlerinden öne çıktığı söylenebilir. İktidara geldiği 2002 yılından sonra Türkiye'nin kronik sorunlarına çözüm bulurken sergilediği liderlik özellikleriyle dolanıklık bağlamında çözümler üreten bir lider olduğunu göstermiştir. Erdoğan iç ve dış siyasette birçok krizle yüz yüze kalmış bu noktada ülkesi ve toplumunun yönlendirmek açısından belirsizliklerin belirleyicisi olma açısından liderlik göstermiştir. Hiç şüphesiz bunun en kritik ve en önemli örneği 15 Temmuz'da Türkiye'nin kaderini değiştiren tutumudur. Ayrıca Erdoğan, bu karmaşık süreçleri izleyenlerine yalın şekilde anlatmayı başarmıştır. Son olarak, bir lider olarak en önemli davranışlarından birisi izleyenleriyle arasında her zaman dinamik tutmayı başardığı çekim alanına sahip olmasıdır.

Almanya'nın ilk kadın Şansölyesi Angela Merkel 17 Temmuz 1954' te Batı Almanya'nın Hamburg şehrinde doğmuştur. Doğumundan kısa bir süre sonra babasının işi gereği Doğu Almanya'da Quitzow adında küçük bir bölgeye taşındılar. Hayatının geri kalanında buradaki yaşantıları hiç şüphesiz önemli rol oynamıştır. Merkel'e göre Babası Polonya kökenli Protestan papazı olan Horst Kasner zamanının çoğunu işine ayıran disiplinli bir babaydı. Ona göre babası yüksek rasyonaliteye sahip, aşırı disiplinliydi ve mükemmeliyetçiydi. Sonraki yıllarda liderliği etkileyen babasıyla ilişkisini sevgi dolu ama mesafeli olarak

tanımlayan Merkel'in annesiyle daha özel bir ilişkiye sahip olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Annesi Herlind Kasner gibi Polonya kökenli bir İngilizce öğretmenidir. Eğitim hayatı boyunca hep çok başarılı olan Angela Merkel'in annesinin bu süreçte en büyük desteği olduğu söylenebilir. Bunu yanı sıra bir büyük erkek ve de küçük kız kardeşi bulunan Merkel'in ailesinin üniversite yıllarına kadar hayatındaki etkili kişiler olduğu söylenebilir.

Lise yıllarında Doğu Almanya Devleti'nin kurduğu öğrenci birlikleri olan Genç Öncüler ve Özgür Alman Gençliği 'ne katılan Merkel, bu arada aktif olarak sosyal faaliyetlere katılmıştır. Yıllar sonra bu deneyiminden bahsederken kendisini komünizme yakın olmakla suçlayanlara sadece katıldığı öğrenci birliklerinin bir öğrenci kulübü olduğunu ve sosyal faaliyetler yapıldığını söylemiştir. Okullarda gösterdiği başarının yanı sıra Rusçayı çok iyi konuşmasından dolayı Rusça Olimpiyatlarına katılmış ve birinci olmuştur. Tüm bunların yanı sıra aktif bir genç olarak seyahat etmeyi seven Merkel; Sofya, Prag ve daha bir çok şehre seyahat etme şansı bulmuştur. Doğu Almanya'daki komünist rejimin etkisinden dolayı olacaktır ki Merkel üniversitede fizik okumayı tercih etmiştir. Ancak bu seçimi onun sosyal ve politik olaylara yakın olmasını engellememiştir. Yıllar sonra bile Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılışının kendisinin o dönemki en büyük travması olduğunu söyleyen Merkel'in bu durum, siyasi görüşleri ve değerlerini etkilemiştir. 1973 yılında Leipzig Üniversitesi'nde fizik bölümüne başlayan Merkel, bir yıl sonra ilk eşi Ulrich Merkel'le tanışmıştır. 1977 yılında evlenen çift 1981 yılında ayrılmıştır.

Bu dönemde yazılan ve birçok tartışmaya sebep olan Rudolf Bahro'ya ait Doğu Almanya'yı eleştiren dergi makalesini okuyan Merkel için artık hiçbir şey eskisi gibi olmayacaktır. Yine bu dönemde Prag seyahati sırasında şu anki eşi Dr. Joachim Sauer ile tanışmıştır. Bu dönemin kendisinin siyasi görüşleri açısından bir uyanış olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. 1980'lerin sonuna gelindiğinde, Doğu ve Batı Almanya açısından değişen siyasal iklim Merkel'inde hayatını değiştirmiştir. Merkel, birleşen Almanya'nın geleceğinde rol oynamaya kararlıydı, bu amaçla ilk önce yeni kurulmuş olan Demokratik Uyanış Partisi'ne gitmiş, burada aradığını bulamamış; daha sonra Liberaller ve Sosyal Demokratlar Partisi'ne yönelmiştir. Ancak Merkel bu iki partinin de kendisine uymayacağını düşünerek Demokratik

Uyanış Partisi'nde görev almaya karar vermiştir. İlk görevi basın sözcülüğü olan Merkel burada sergilediği üstün performans ve seçim gecesi Maziere'lerin yardımıyla CDU'ya geçip; CDU üyesi olarak siyasi yaşamını bir adım öteye daha taşımıştır. Merkel, Helmut Kohl'le tanışmayı başarmış ve kabinede Kadın ve Gençlikten sorumlu bakan olmuştur. Merkel'in hem kadın hem de Doğu Almanya kökenli olması onun bu görevi almasında önemli rol oynamıştır. Bu bakanlığı önemli bir sıçrama tahtası olarak kullanmayı başaran Merkel, bir sonraki dönem çevre bakanı olarak kabinede yer almıştır. Bu dönemde hem parti içerisinde var olma mücadelesi veren Merkel, hem de BM Çevre Konferansını ağırlayarak Almanya tarihine geçmiştir. Bu dönem aslında sonradan kendisinin de anlattığı gibi, hem kadın hem de Doğu Almanya kökenli ve siyaset geçmişi olmayan biri olarak kendini kabul ettirmesi anlamında önemlidir. 1998 yılındaki seçimlerde CDU, SPD' ye yenilmiş Schröder, Almanya'nın yeni şansölyesi olmuştur. Aynı yıl Merkel'de CDU'da Genel Sekreterlik görevine gelmiştir. 1999 yılında CDU Kohl'un seçim zamanında yaptığı ortaya çıkan parti içi finans skandalıyla sarsılmıştır. Alman kamuoyunda yıllarca Kohl'ın kızı diye isim takılan Merkel siyasi kariyerinin en önemli hamlelerinden birini yaparak gazeteye genel sekreter olarak yazdığı makalede Kohl'un hatalı olduğunu ve bu süreçte partisinin artık kendi ayakları üstünde durması gerektiğini belirtmiştir. Bu hamleyle Angela Merkel hem kamuoyunda hem de partisinin içerisinde güvenilir bir lider adayı profili çizmiştir.

Bu skandaldan 1 yıl sonra parti tarihin de ilk kadın ve Katolik olmayan bir kişi olarak liderlik koltuğuna oturmayı başarmasına rağmen Merkel, 2002 seçimlerinde parti tarafından Şansölye adayı olarak gösterilmemiştir. Angela Merkel CDU lideri olarak elbette partisini birçok alanda dönüştürmüştür. Bunlar temel olarak ekonomik, aile ve cinsiyetle ilgili politikalardır. Öncelikle sert piyasa ekonomisi savunan partisini daha eşitlikçi ekonomik politikalar benimseyen noktaya taşımıştır. Ayrıca CDU tarihi boyunca; erkeğin çalıştığı kadının evde kalarak ev ve çocuk bakımını üstlendiği geleneksel aile tablosunu benimseyen bir parti olduğunu vurgulamak gerekir. Merkel sonrası bu anlamda da farklılaşan parti politikaları aile tanımını genişleterek ayrılan ebeveynleri ve daha bir çok kesimi içine katmıştır. Bu noktada en önemli değişiklik hiç şüphesiz kadına yaklaşım

konusundadır. Merkel döneminde parti içinde görev alan kadınların sayısı artmış ve CDU'nun oy oranlarında da kadınlar önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

2002 seçimlerinde kendisi yerine aday gösterilen Stoiber Schröder karşı seçimleri ufak bir farkla kaybettirmiştir. Ancak Hartz reformlarının olumsuz sonuçları nedeniyle 2005'te erken seçime gitmek zorunda kalınan Almanya'da 2005 seçim sonuçlarında CDU SPD'den sadece %1 fazla oy almıştır. Bu dağılıma göre Merkel liderliğinde CDU-SPD büyük koalisyonu oluşturulmuştur. Bundan sonraki dönemden bugüne gelindiğinde 15 yıldır Merkel önderliğinde CDU/CSU her seçimden zaferle çıkmış ve liderliğini pekiştirmiştir. Bu nokta da Merkel'in seçim politikalarında kişisel olarak önemini de vurgulamak gerekir. Uzun yıllardır Merkel'in seçim dönemlerinde partisinden ön plana çıktığı seçim kampanyaları dikkat çekmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle Merkel kişisel imajıyla seçim kazanmak konusunda önemli bir seçim yöntemi strateji geliştirmiş; etkili biçimde kullanmıştır.

Angela Merkel'in Şansölyelik dönemi de Erdoğan'ın iktidar dönemi gibi uzun yılları kapsaması nedeniyle tez içerisinde koalisyonlardaki önemli olaylar Merkel 1,2,3 ve 4 dönemi olarak incelenmiştir. Sırayla bakmak gerekirse, Merkel ilk dönemde dış politikaya yönelmeye çalışmış iç meseleleri koalisyon ortağı SPD'ye bırakmıştır. Merkel'in ikinci döneminde Avrupa'nın en büyük krizi olan Avrokriziyle yüzyüze kalmıştır. Merkel krizin ilk döneminde uzun süre karar alamamasıyla eleştirilmesine rağmen başta Yunanistan olmak üzere bu ülkelerin kurtarılması ve daha entegre olmuş bir Avrupa noktasında geliştirdiği politikalarla sadece Almanya'nın değil AB'ninde lideri olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Üçüncü Merkel koalisyon döneminde aslında Avro krizinin etkileri hissedilirken, Rusya'nın Ukrayna'da çatışmalara dahil olması ve sonrasında Kırım'ı ilhak etmesiyle çok ciddi bir bölgesel sorunla karşı karşıya kalınmıştır. Merkel bu krizde de Rusya ve Putin'le farklı olan ilişkisini avantaja çevirerek diyalog sürecinin her aşamasında öncülük etmiştir. Bu dönemki Almanya'nın ve AB'nin kaderini değiştiren Suriye Mülteci Krizi ise ayrıca ana örnek olay olarak tez içerisinde incelenmiştir. 2018'den bugüne Merkel'in 4. Dönemi ise halen sürmektedir.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın biyografisinde de olduğu gibi Angela Merkel'in geçmiş hayatı SNA Liderlik Modeli'nin üçüncü boyutundaki tutum ve davranışlarla analiz edilmiştir. İlk olarak Merkel, siyasete 30'lu yaşlarından sonra girmesine rağmen, Alman ve dünya siyasetinin kaotik yapısını ve en önemlisi bu yapının içinde aktörlerin ne kadar etkili olduğunu bilen bir liderdir. Örnek olarak, Merkel Almanya'da iş adamlarının sistem içindeki rolünü en iyi şekilde kullanarak birçok ekonomik reform sürecinde onları yanına çekmeyi başarmıştır. İkinci olarak, katalitik ve kaleidoskopik düşünme yeteneğine sahip olan Merkel, partisi CDU'yu modernize etmiş ve farklı seçim yöntemlerini etkili şekilde kullanmıştır. Üçüncü olarak, global politikalar sergileyen Merkel "Made in Germany" kültürünü sanayi ve teknoloji alanında dünyada öncü hale getirmeyi başarmıştır. Dördüncü olarak, Protestan bir papazın kızı olan Angela Merkel Doğu Almanya hayatının da etkisiyle; demokrasi, özgürlük gibi değerleri ön plana koymuş aynı zamanda mülteci krizindeki kararıyla da her alanda değerlerinin kararlarında merkezde olduğunu göstermiştir. Davranışlara gelindiğinde ise; Merkel bilim insanı yönüyle dolanıklık bağlamında çözümler üretmek konusunda başarılı bir liderdir. Örneğin Almanya'da önemli bir gündem oluşturan ev fiyatları konusunda çok sektörlü çözümler üretmeyi başarmıştır. Avro krizindeki liderliğiyle Merkel sadece Almanya'nın değil bölge açısından da belirsizliklerin belirleyicisi olduğunu kanıtlamıştır, kendisinin uzun süre karar alamamasının eleştirilmesinin arkasında da bu beklenti ve başarı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Karmaşıklıkta yalınlığı görmek ve buna yönelik politikalar üretmek konusunda görünür bir başarı sergileyen Merkel özellikle göreve başladığı ilk günden beri vergi sisteminin sadeleştirilmesine çalışmıştır. Ayrıca, bilim insanı arka planı sayesinde konuşma içerikleri sade ve kısadır. Son olarak, Angela Merkel siyasete girdiği ilk günden beri izleyenleriyle arasındaki etkileşimde hem kendi imajını inşa etmek hem de başarısını sürdürmek konusunda oldukça başarılıdır. 15 yılda yaşadığı tüm krizlere rağmen bu ilişkiyi dinamik zemine taşımıştır.

Tezin araştırma konusu kapsamında seçilen örnek olaydan ilki olan Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi hem iki liderin aktif rol oynadığı hem de bölgenin kaderini değiştiren bir olgudur. Bu kriz Türkiye ve Almanya için farklı zaman dilimlerini kapsamış olsa da sürecin yönetilmesi ve çözüme ulaştırılması noktasında

Erdoğan'ın ve Merkel'in liderliği önemli rol oynamıştır. Bu liderlik süreçleri de SNA Liderlik Modelinin dördüncü boyutuyla analiz edilmiştir. 2011 yılında başlayan Suriye iç savaşında ilk göç, komşu ülke olan Türkiye'ye küçük gruplar halinde başlamış sekiz yıl içerisinde toplam mülteci sayısı 4 milyona yaklaşmıştır. Erdoğan öncülüğünde Türkiye etnik ve dini farklılar gözetilmeksizin ilk günden beri açık kapı politikası izlemiştir. Açık kapı politikasının sürdürülmesinin arkasındaki en önemli unsurlardan birisi Ensar Kültürü'dür. Türk Halkı'nın toplumsal yaşantısında önemli yer tutan Ensar Kültürü, tarihsel geçmişle beraber izlenen politikanın sürdürülmesine önemli katkı sunmuştur. Yıllar içinde halkın Suriyeli mültecilere tutumu değişse de genel olarak açık kapı politikası destek bulmuştur.

Almanya Suriye Mülteci Krizi'yle Türkiye kadar erken dönemde de tanışmamış olsa da 2011 yılından itibaren bölgesel kalkınma planlarıyla bölgedeki mülteci ağırlayan ülkelere destek paketleri oluşturmuştur. Ayrıca AB çerçevesinde uygulanan Dublin Antlaşması'ndan bağımsız olarak eyaletler de özel sponsorluk programı başlatmış ülkede yaşayan bu etnik kökendeki vatandaşların akrabalarının geçimini karşılamaları koşulunda belirli sayıda mülteci kabul edilmiştir. Ancak 2015 yılının yaz aylarına gelindiğinde Suriye'de çatışmaların artmasıyla 1 milyondan fazla kişi sadece Türkiye'ye geçmiştir. Ancak BM'nin yardımları azaltmasıyla beraber göçmenler Avrupa'ya doğru göç yürüyüşüne başlamıştır. Kısa sürede Balkanları aşarak Avusturya ve Almanya sınırına ulaşan binlerce mülteci AB bölgesinde krize sebep olmuştur. Hiç şüphesiz birçok ülke sınırlarını kapatırken Merkel'in sınır kapılarını açması kendi iktidar döneminin en tartışmalı kararı olmuştur. O dönem bu kararın alınmasının yankıları hala sürmektedir. Sonraki süreçte, Merkel Alman halkına "Birlikte Başarabiliriz" ve "Hoş Geldin Kültürü" gibi çok kültürlülüğü anımsatan temalarla açık kapı politikasının belirli bir dönem başarılı bir şekilde sürdürülmesi sağlanmıştır.

Almanya'daki mülteci sayısının hızla ve kontrolsüz şekilde artışıyla beraber olumlu olan hava olumsuz dönmeye başlamış; AB nezdinde bir çözüm üretilmemiştir. Bu durumun da Angela Merkel'in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'la antlaşma yoluna gitmesine neden olduğu söylenebilir. Elbette iki lider, insanı kriz

çözümünde ortak payda da buluşmuş olsa da antlaşma içeriğinin oluşturulması ve kabul edilmesi zaman almış ve bir çok tartışmanın önünü açmıştır. Ancak 18 Mart 2016'da iki taraf mutabakata varmış; mülteci akını durdurulmuştur. Bu mutabakata göre hem geri kabul planlanmış hem de başta Türkiye'nin üyelik sürecindeki fasıllarının açılması, Gümrük Birliği Antlaşması ve Türkiye'nin vize serbestisi hızlandırılması planlanmıştır. Antlaşmanın üzerinden geçen üç yılda eleştiri ve tartışmaların hala sürdüğünü söylemek mümkündür.

Suriye Mülteci Krizi'nde Erdoğan ve Merkel'in izlediği politikalar SNA Liderlik Modelinin dördüncü boyuttaki altı maddesiyle analiz edilmiştir. İlk olarak iki lider de müzakereci yönlerini güçlü bir şekilde göstermişlerdir; hem birbirleriyle müzakere ederken hem de üçüncü aktörlerle etkili şekilde müzakere etmişlerdir. İkinci olarak kişisel diplomasi noktasında, sürecin etkili şekilde yürütülmesinde iki liderin de bireysel diyalogları yapıcı rol oynamıştır. İki lider bu krizin sadece bir mülteci krizi olmadığını ve diğer bölgesel olaylarla bağlantılılık açısından hayati rolü olduğunu bilerek; Suriye iç savaşına da çözüm üretmek noktasında ortak çalışmışlardır. Erdoğan ve Merkel mülteci akımını durdurmak adına kişisel olarak girişimci politikalar izlemiş; Suriye'de bölgelerin yeniden inşasından Dublin Uygulamasına alternatif oluşturmaya kadar birçok alanda inisiyatif almışlardır. Elbette iki lider çözüm odaklı davranmış; Erdoğan tampon bölge ve Merkel Avusturya sınırına geçici kamp kurmayı önermiştir. Son olarak, barış odaklı politikalar üreten iki lider uluslararası barış görüşmelerinde aktif rol oynamakla beraber kendilerinin başı çektiği Fransa ve İngiltere'nin olduğu dördüncü zirve başlatmışlardır.

Tez kapsamındaki ikinci örnek olay ise Batı Balkanlardır. Bu bölge iki ülke ve iki lider için çok önemli olup; Suriye Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra önemini daha da arttırmıştır. Tez kapsamı içerisinde Batı Balkanlar kavramı Bosna Hersek, Kuzey Makedonya, Sırbistan, Kosova ve Arnavutluk olmak üzere beş ülkeyi ifade etmektedir. Türkiye ve Almanya'nın bu beş ülke ile ilişkileri dört ana boyutta incelenmiştir; ticaret&yatırımlar, kalkınma, eğitim&kültür ve askeri&savunma. Türkiye 2002'den bu beş ülkeyle ticaret hacmini genişletmiş yatırımlarını arttırmıştır. Bu ülkelerde Türkiye'nin yabancı yatırım açısından önemli bir paya

sahip olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Kalkınma politikaları anlamında Türkiye bölgede özellikle TİKA aracılığıyla hem ülkelerin özelindeki sorunlarına hem de bölgenin kronik sorunları olan işsizlik, eğitim, altyapı gibi alanlarında çözüm üretecek faaliyetler sürdürülmektedir. Eğitim ve kültür alanındaki politikalar ise Türkiye, bölgedeki en önemli yumuşak güç unsuru olup; başta Bosna Hersek olmak üzere birçok ülkede her kademedede eğitim ve kültürel çalışma faaliyetlerini YTB, YEE ve Maarif Vakfı aracılığıyla sürdürmektedir. Son olarak, askeri ve savunma alanında Türkiye'nin bölge ülkeleriyle teçhizat, eğitim ve daha kapsamlı şekilde işbirlikleri üst düzeye çıkmıştır. Türkiye ayrıca bölgesel uluslararası oluşumlarda da aktif rol oynamaktadır. 2002'den bu güne bakıldığında; Erdoğan'ın izlediği politikalarla bölgeye her anlamda daha fazla önem verdiğini ve Türkiye'nin bölgedeki varlığını daha fazla hissettirdiğini söylemek gerekir.

Öte yandan Alman Şansölyeleri arasında Angela Merkel Batı Balkanlar özelinde en fazla politika üreten ve inisiyatif alan lider olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ticaret ve yatırımlar alanında AB bölgesinin en güçlü ekonomisi olarak Almanya ticaret ortaklığı ve yatırımlarda birinci sıradadır. Kalkınma işbirlikleri noktasında Eğitim ve kültür politikaları noktasında DAAD ve farklı vakıflar üzerinden projeler gerçekleştirirken özellikle mesleki eğitim alanında bölgeye destek olmaktadır. Askeri ve savunma alanında ise Almanya bölgedeki ülkelerle teçhizat, eğitim ve ortak tatbikat konusunda işbirliği yapmaktadır. Türkiye gibi Almanya'da bölgeyle ilgili uluslararası oluşumlarda önemli bir aktördür. Önemli bir başka nokta, Merkel 2014 yılında Berlin Süreci'ni başlatarak bölgenin AB'ye uyum sürecine desteğini açıkça ortaya koymuştur.

Hiç şüphesiz mülteci krizi, bölgenin mültecilerin göç yolu üzerinde bulunması nedeniyle önemini daha da arttırmıştır. Bu süreçte bölgedeki ülkeler, krizi yönetme noktasında, geçmişe dayalı etnik ve siyasi sorunlara rağmen işbirliklerin yüksek düzeyde sürdürmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, iki liderin bölge politikaları SNA Liderlik Modelinin dördüncü boyutuyla incelenmiştir. Erdoğan ve Merkel, bölgedeki NATO ve AB adayı ülkelere müzakere noktasında destek olmaktadır. İki lider bölgenin siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik açısından pek çok boyutta ülkeleriyle bağlantılığını bilerek birçok alanda işbirliğini geliştirmişlerdir. Kişisel



diplomasi noktasında iki lider de bu bölgede bireysel inisiyatif olarak anlık krizlerin çözümünde etkin rol oynamıştır. Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi her alanda yeni ve güncel politikalar izleyen Erdoğan ve Merkel bu bölgede girişimci dış politika sergilemişlerdir. Ekonomi, altyapı ve eğitim gibi sorunları içinde barındıran Batı Balkanlar'da iki lider bölgenin kronik sorunlarına farklı araçlarla çözüm üreterek çözüm odaklı dış politikada ön almışlardır. Son olarak; uzun süredir devam eden etnik ve siyasi sorunlara farklı araçlarla da olsa iki lider de barışı tesis etmek için bölge ülkeleri arasında uyumu artırmak konusunda önemli bir çaba sarf etmektedir.

Bu tez çalışması kapsam ve içeriği açısından alan yazına önemli bir katkı sunacağı söylenebilir. Tez içerisinde kullanılan SNA Liderlik Modeli iki lider ve iki örnek olay üzerinde analiz etmek amaçlı kullanılmıştır. Başta da belirtildiği gibi bu bir karşılaştırmalı çalışma değildir. Ülkeler ve liderlerin geçmişleri bağlamsal olarak verilmiştir. Bu bağlamda yazar SNA Liderlik Modelini kullanarak birçok farklı lider ve örnek olayı esas alan çalışmaları sürdürecektir. Bu tez sonucunda çok boyutlu ve holistik bakış açısıyla analiz elde edilen verilere bakıldığında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel hem Suriye Mülteci Krizinde hem de Batı Balkanlarda önemli ve kritik liderlik süreçleri ortaya koymuştur. Her iki liderinde geçmiş yaşantılarını, kendi vizyonlarını, ülkelerinin tarihsel ve kültürel özellikleriyle birleştirerek kendilerine özgü liderlik sergilediklerini söylemek mümkündür.

## D. TEZ İZİN FORMU/THESES PERMISSION FORM

### ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü/ Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü/ Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü/ Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü/ Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü/ Graduate School of Marine Sciences

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