

MECHANISMS OF UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL REALIST APPROACH TO THE SOCIO-POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION IN SYRIA AND LIBYA

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Prof. Dr. Yaşar Kondakçı
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür (METU,IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç (METU,IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen (Ankara Uni.,ULS) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur (METU,IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürsan Şenalp (Atılım Uni.,IKT) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Hikmet Mengüaslan

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Mengüaslan, Hikmet

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç

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This thesis discusses the phenomenon of development in the context of the mechanisms of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) entailed in the development of world economy. It employs the concept of U&CD instead of development, and brings in the concept of “emergentist development”. It utilizes a historical materialist and Critical Realist (CR) methodology in explaining the mechanisms of U&CD. Accordingly, it scrutinizes the Eurocentric and modernist conceptualizations of development. It argues that the Eurocentric and modernist conceptualizations of development – due to conflated ontological understandings and undertheorized causal mechanisms - provide merely a superficial view of the complex social relations of development.

The significance of this conceptual innovation is that it defies any reductionist, linear and mechanical conceptualization and explores the complex and the specific projections of development encountered by societies. Sensitized to the ontological depth and generative mechanisms, the emergentist development approach examines the emergent hybridities and amalgamations within socio-political transformation processes, and provides deeper structural explanation to uneven development processes. It emphasizes that the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification are nested in wider development processes.

As a case study, the thesis analyzes the socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya. The advantage of this conceptualization is that it brings together under the framework the global dynamics of development with contextual and local conditions providing a more totalistic and explanatory perspective.

Keywords: Critical Realism, Development, Arab Uprisings, Syria, Libya

ÖZ

EŞİTSİZ VE BİLEŞİK KALKINMANIN MEKANİZMALARI: SURİYE VE LİBYA'DAKİ SOSYO-POLİTİK DÖNÜŞÜME ELEŞTİREL GERÇEKÇİ BİR YAKLAŞIM

Mengüaslan, Hikmet

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez dünya ekonomisinde oluşan Eşitsiz ve Bileşik Kalkınma (EBK) mekanizmaları bağlamında kalkınma olgusunu tartışmaktadır. Kalkınma kavramı yerine EBK kavramı kullanılmıştır ve “ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma” kavramını geliştirmiştir. Tarihsel materyalist ve Eleştirel Gerçekçi metodolojiyi kullanarak EBK'nin mekanizmalarını açıklamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, tez Avrupa merkezci ve modernist kalkınma kavramsallaştırmalarını incelemektedir. Bu tez, düz ontolojik anlayış ve nedensel mekanizmaları eksik kavramsallaştıran Avrupa merkezci ve modernist kalkınma kavramsallaştırmalarının kalkınmanın kompleks toplumsal ilişkilerine yüzeysel bir yaklaşım sunduğunu tartışmaktadır.

Bu kavramsal yeniliğin önemli bir noktası indirgemeci, düzlemsel ve mekanik kavramsallaştırmaları reddetmesi, ve bu toplumlar tarafından karşılaşılan kompleks ve spesifik kalkınma uzamlarını araştırmasıdır. Ontolojik derinlik ve üretken

mekanizmaları içeren, ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma yaklaşımı sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerinde ortaya çıkan hibridite ve amalgamları incelemektedir ve eşitsiz kalkınma süreçlerine derinlemesine bir yapısal açıklama sunmaktadır. Toplumsal farklılaşma ve tabakalaşma mekanizmalarının daha geniş kalkınma süreçleri içinde yer aldığını vurgulamaktadır.

Vaka çalışması olarak, bu tez Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşümleri incelemektedir. Bu kavramsallaştırmanın avantajı daha bütünsel ve açıklayıcı bir bakış sunarak kalkınmanın küresel dinamikleri ve bağlamsal ve yerel koşullarını tek bir çerçeve altında bir araya getirmesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Gerçekçilik, Kalkınma, Arap Ayaklanmaları, Suriye, Libya

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFDB	African Development Bank
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GAFTA	Greater Arab Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GPC	General People's Congress
HDI	Human Development Index
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILSA	Iran and Libya Sanction Act
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SOE	State owned Enterprise
UAR	United Arab Republic
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

FROM DEVELOPMENT TO UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Introduction

“Development” is a complex phenomenon. Studies about development reflect a profound influence of the positivist social scientific understanding and methodology. The positivist scientific understanding has a conflated ontological perspective that cannot distinguish the events from their generative mechanisms; this is manifested in the studies on development in the form of attempts to “universalize Euro-centric experiences, views, and concepts.” It results in the idealization of Western development processes, which have turned into a model to be followed.

The existing conceptualizations and analyses of development have already been criticized in many aspects. Nevertheless, the challenges towards development tend to either strengthen the positivist social scientific understanding or rejecting it totally in an anti-foundationalist way. It is essential to underline that these challenges have undermined – rather than provide a scientific approach - the critical perspectives. This is due to conflating the rejection of positivist analysis of development with scientific analysis of development in its entirety.

This dissertation asserts that a radical perspective will have considerable benefits for the conceptualization and analysis of development processes. It argues that development processes are nested in various sectors of social reality, including political, economic, and cultural sectors. Through rigorous scrutiny, the dissertation aims to challenge first and foremost the current conceptualizations of development – *stagist, structural, and post-developmental*.

The framework that is developed in the dissertation argues for taking development processes as part of the broader socio-political transformations. It

problematizes the emergent features of development processes that nest in interactive capitalist social totality. In doing so, the methodological problems that emanate from the positivistic understanding of social sciences are inquired, and it is argued that Critical Realist (CR) methodological notions can help solve these problems.

The ontological distinction between the object and the knowledge acquired about it in CR methodology is essential for the scrutiny of the conception of development and its relevant perspectives. As development processes lead to complex forms of relations within various structures, the dissertation emphasizes the substantial benefits of using CR methodology, which argues for the priority of ontology, that is, the shift from empiricist epistemology to deep ontology and from events to generative mechanisms.

In this respect to what is underpinned by CR notions of *ontological stratification* and *emergence*, the dissertation discusses that the use of the Uneven and Combined Development perspective (U&CD) as opposed to development would be more appropriate to capture the complexity of development processes. That said, it becomes essential to emphasize the influence of positivist modernization analyses. They generate peculiar concepts, theories that applied to “developing” countries. Current perspectives on development processes are delineated with “stagist,” “political,” and “structural” approaches. While stagist and political approaches elaborate on divergent cases that are explained through their distinctive local features, the sweeping generalizations brush away the specificities of development; the structural approaches foreground the structural conditions of development processes and underline their asymmetrical implications for “developing” countries in a “determinist” manner.

It is important to emphasize that as the U&CD perspective sees development processes uneven and, more importantly, combined, it can offer an in-depth structural explanation to the implications of societal multiplicity. Examination of development processes through emphasizing the uneven and combined structural relations is promising to start towards the analyses of Syrian and Libyan socio-

political transformation processes. Such a perspective will help the analysis of the interaction between international and domestic in a totalistic and interactive manner.

It must be recognized that development can be an object of study without falling into the trap of subjectivist, relativist perspectives that reject any foundation for scientific analysis. The dissertation aims to build a framework for analyzing development processes building on Historical Materialism (HM). CR methodology will be used to contribute to HM philosophically and methodologically.

The framework constructed in the dissertation prioritizes the mechanisms of “Unevenness” and “Combination”. The development processes will be handled in-depth in a *non-reductionist* and *non-determinist* way. In this sense, the dissertation aims to challenge the neoliberal notion of capitalism as “there is no alternative” by eliciting the mechanisms of uneven and combined development and de-mystifying the ongoing development processes in a historical sociological manner.

For this purpose, this chapter starts with a brief introduction into CR methodological notions and underlines that development processes are embedded in wider socio-political transformation. The third section marks the significance of capturing the “interactive” nature of development processes. The conclusions for the IR and Middle East Studies are given along with the case selection criteria in the fourth section. The last section provides an outline of the following chapters.

1.2 Critical Realist Methodology for Emergentist Development

The methodological choices have significant implications for analyzing development processes. CR problematizes the ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations of positivist scientific understanding. It scrutinizes the models of theory building and testing, causal relations, the methodology for scientific analysis. With these features, CR is a comprehensive meta-theoretical perspective. The analysis draws on CR methodology and challenges the meta-theoretical foundations of positivist/post-positivist scientific understandings.

Unlike the positivist insistence on finding a succession of events or seeking of “putative laws for an explanation,” the CR focuses on the identification and eliciting of generative mechanisms of the phenomenon (Bhaskar, 2009: 71-72). CR

methodology seeks to identify the social structures and attempts to obtain information concerning the operation of mechanisms that generate events within the social structures. In this regard, it becomes essential to distinguish events from their empirical conceptualizations and to search for the generative mechanisms. The totality of the social phenomenon cannot be adequately handled with “lawfulness,” for once the various contingent possibilities along with the unintended consequences would be undertheorized (Ruggie, 1998, 135), and the result would be ontological conflation.

It is crucial, thus, to mark that the ontological stratification and differentiation denies a simplistic and parsimonious understanding of causality and theory. It becomes necessary to isolate certain aspects of the phenomenon in thought rather than manipulating events to obtain information about the generative powers, tendencies, and mechanisms in the real world (Danermark et al. 2002: 43). In this regard, Rutzou (2016: 334) says:

Realism is a theory of discovery which attempts to explain the social activity and social phenomena by reference to these structures. Against the shallow and surface analysis of empiricisms and the pursuit of events and constant conjunctions, realism searches for a means of moving beyond the surface and getting at the structures, and with the structures, the causal mechanisms, powers, capacities, and dispositions of social reality that account for the surface events.

The CR notions of ontological depth and emergence are complemented with the concept of generative mechanisms, which operate through social structures and play a decisive role in generating the actual events. Bunge (2004: 194) defines mechanism as “a process that brings about the desired changes or else prevents undesirable ones.” Morgan underlines the definition of the mechanism as “the way of acting of a thing,” resisting a description of events only. Thus, when generative mechanisms are taken at the center of analysis, it refers to focusing on causally operating relevant processes, tendencies, powers in the structures (Morgan, 2016: 286).

A distinct feature of CR methodology, which enables the analysis of social phenomena with its complexities, is the notion of “intransitivity” of reality. CR claims that social reality is concept dependent; however, it is independent of our

minds. The distinction between the object and the knowledge obtained about it allows critical engagement with different conceptualizations of development without reifying them. In addition to this, it proves that the development processes must be analyzed in a totalistic manner.

It is important to emphasize that, similar to natural sciences, the CR epistemic method for verification is the experience of the phenomenon. The method of choosing among alternative explanations and the “reality of the conjectured mechanisms” are verified through the empirical level and experience. As Wight argues:

What specific mechanisms govern a particular system is a matter for research, not theory, even if theory plays a necessary role in their identification and discovery. The only ontological limit on what might be a mechanism is that it possesses the powers and liabilities able to produce outcomes. (Wight, 2015: 54).

While positivist scientific understanding criticizes the conceptualization of complex explanation that results from acknowledging the “conjunctural, multi-causal and historically shifting” feature of causality as a toolbox approach, Steinmetz (1998: 182) contends that:

Accounting for the determination of complex objects in open systems necessarily involves an "eclectic" mix of theories relating to the relevant causal mechanisms. This is quite different from the empiricist "variablism" found in much multivariate statistical research, where variables are connected to theoretical mechanisms in a loose and ad hoc way.

Drawing on CR methodology, the framework for analyzing the socio-political transformation processes will identify mechanisms that generate and perpetuate the unevenness and differentiation in the structures of world development. Then, the combined processes of uneven development will be examined through problematizing the interaction of domestic and international, and the contradictions that emerge from the amalgamation of local and international, old and new.

1.3 “Development” embedded in Socio-political Transformation Processes

How do the development processes unfold? Is it a socially autonomous process? Does it have certain stages and phases? Does it reveal itself through

diffusion and emulation? By nature, an analysis of the implications of “multiplicity” requires an appropriate conceptualization of development.

The ontological understanding of the positivist approach seeks to simplify the complexities of social phenomena. As a consequence, the various and interconnected dimensions of a phenomenon are disintegrated. In the case of development processes, the complexities and interactivities are analyzed separately with reductionism, while the multi-causal, holistic perspectives are considered as unscientific. Nonetheless, since the mechanical and reductionist approaches to development processes read off particularities of localities from wider social totality, the isolated and abstract conceptualizations of development as cumulating processes without emergent features cannot produce an in-depth explanation.

Against the dichotomies of positivist conceptualizations of development, a holistic understanding of development processes does not merely separate the historical social formations such as state, civil society, institutions, and the capital because the separation of social formations from its interactive, broader structures prevent the analysis of their emergent features and results in misleading reductionism. The totalistic approach to development processes necessitates taking development processes historically as part of broader socio-political transformation. What can be useful as guiding principles for the analysis of historically specific social formations are: 1) recognizing a totalistic and interactive nature of the social; 2) searching for the underlying causal mechanisms that comprise of tendencies and counter-tendencies, actions, and reactions.

The analysis of the development processes with a historical-sociological approach that builds on historical materialism, in this regard, has substantial benefits. The static conception of international relations as a recurrent and repetitive system of states undermines critical perspectives. It pushes out the emancipatory views (Teschke, 2011: 1089). Compared to ahistorical and static conceptions of international relations, thus, a historical sociology approach that builds on historical materialist understanding helps denaturalization and historicization of the dynamism of societal multiplicity.

Secondly, adopting a Marxian view on society, the framework integrates the underlying structural logic of social interaction; “society does not consist of individuals but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand” (Marx, 1973: 265). As the structures operate and interconnect with each other through an underlying structuring logic, Budd (2013: 92) argues that this interrelatedness is not random, and social phenomena are aspects of a wider totality integrated by a complex, mediated yet discernable structuring logic.

It must be emphasized that the relation between the spheres of social totality is stratified and differentiated. As David Coates (2000: 226) puts it, “when evaluating the differences between the world’s major capitalisms, all this complexity and surface plurality has an underlying structuring logic of its own, tied to uneven development over time of capitalism as a world system.”

Thirdly, instead of linear and determining relations, Barker (1997: 28) argues that capitalism’s economic, political, and ideological relations are mutually entailing. These essential features invalidate static and abstract generalizations on development processes. Brohman (1995) underlines the untenable concepts on development as the most significant challenges concerning the current conceptualizations of development. The critical engagement of the current conceptualizations of development is conducted through the questions as follows:

- 1) How do the differential outcomes in developmental performance between social entities emerge?
- 2) What are the mechanisms that generate and perpetuate/inhibit the differential performance in development?
- 3) Which concepts are beneficial to grasp the totality of development phenomena?

The examination of development processes through embedding them into broader socio-political transformation constitutes an essential part of the framework. The framework takes development as processes of social change, reproduction, and transformation on a different level, all of which are motivated by the conflictual social relations. In this regard, such a development perspective attempts to elicit the mechanisms relevant to social differentiation and stratification.

Relevant to the Marxian views on the specificities of capitalism, Engels (2010: 162) directly challenges the mechanistic versions of Marxism because the

very process of subjecting the social forces to human will entails struggle; it denotes choosing between alternative models, and projects which themselves become a source of struggle (Budd, 2013: 90). Therefore, the wider social totality in which the development processes are embedded must be identified with its specificities. Similarly, the emerging institutional and organizational forms in the various social sectors defy separate and abstract examinations. The specificities of the given historical social formation must be discerned, and the implications of its relation must be identified according to the historical features of capitalist social totality that encompasses the development processes.

The framework prioritizes the unevenness and the combination as the essential mechanisms of the unfolding of the historically specific capitalist world system. Furthermore, the CR conceptualization of development, contrary to the Eurocentric, modernist conceptualizations of development, argues that development processes have historically unfolded in amalgamation, hybridities, and contradictory localities fed by the combinations of powers, tendencies, and mechanisms operating through within and without the “nation-states”.

It makes crucial the examination of the intersocietal interaction and its historical specificities through different localities and temporalities. The implications of the “international” have been dealt with various concepts. The concept of “globalization” has become the most prevalent and yet the most ambiguous concept about the implications of international. However, as the analytical lines between globalization as a cause and globalization as an object of analysis intertwine, the emergent features of societal multiplicity blur. For instance, on the issue of the relationship between inequality and globalization, Nicola Philips criticizes the understanding that inequality is understood as an effect or a consequence of globalization and emphasizes how globalization is itself intrinsically conditioned by inequality (Philips, 2005: 45).

Since the focus is on measuring the impact of globalization, the conceptualizations fail to be totalistic and explanatory. Rosenberg (2000) underlines there are those globalization theories and the theory of globalization, which must be distinguished. In this respect, the framework distinguishes the various

conceptualizations of the international that draw on empirical manifestations of intersocietal interaction; and it takes the uneven and combined development processes as an essential part of the broader socio-political transformation. In doing so, it focuses on the diffusion of intersocietal interaction.

As the intersocietal interaction diffused into the domestic structures of development, it affects the configuration of social forces and the management of socio-political transformation processes. Kiely (2010: 149) highlights that capitalist expansion and penetration processes have not appeared linearly. Therefore, the uneven tempo of development processes becomes quite a fascinating object of analysis not only for the “developing” countries but also for the “developed”.

As the socio-political transformations in Syria and Libya are embedded in uneven and combined development processes, the structural basis of the development processes cannot be thought of as separate from the intersocietal interaction. The consequences of interactivity are far-reaching for the societies and configuration of social forces. Within the hierarchical structural relations, the diffusion of developmental relations through the international division of labor creates specific patterns for the “late-developing” societies. Since these processes are multiply determined, there are various mechanisms at play.

Hettne (2009) draws attention to the uneven nature of globalized capitalist development processes and its impact over societies; arguing that the state/society complex is the theater to observe the implications because uneven and combined development indicate that “Inclusion, as well as exclusion, is inherent in the networking process implied in globalization, and benefits occurring somewhere are negatively balanced by misery and violence elsewhere.”

Besides that, the local specificities in the political structures and relations of production concatenate with structures of world development, and it is such a basis that the amalgam formations emerge. The mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification along with ethnic/tribal and sectarian identities in political and economic spheres, in this context, turns into quite an essential feature in the analysis of Syrian and Libyan socio-political transformations. Furthermore, the recent social movements known as the Arab Revolts provides a good test to appraise the

theoretical and conceptual analyses about the contradictions of socio-political transformation processes. As Bhaskar (2005: 52) argues:

It might be conjectured that in periods of transition or crisis generative structures, previously opaque, become more visible to agents. And that this, though it never yields quite the epistemic possibilities of a closure ... does provide a partial analogue to the role played by experimentation in natural science.

1.4 Development in Interactive Social Totality

Development processes defy homogenous and static conceptualizations. The developmental performances of social entities are historically differentiated and variegated. Even though the societies might experience similar processes, the specificities of intersocietal interaction entails rejecting mechanistic and static approaches. As the dissertation attempts to improve the historical materialist conception of development, the framework argues for examining the development processes in their interactive social totality that comprises of the various social structures and the processes of their transformation and reproduction.

It is beneficial to start with the delineation of the interpretations of development. Historical Materialism views historical processes through class struggles, which are conflictual. The capitalist social totality is conceptualized as a homogenizing totality; however, when Marx evaluated the world as a total unified market because of capitalist expansion (world after its image), his philosophy was under the influence of classical sociology, and it was methodologically nationalist. Not only had it failed to integrate interactivity of capitalist diffusion within intersocietal interaction with their particularities, but it has a sweeping and teleological conception.

The interpretations of classical Marxism have carried on linear and stagist features in their conceptualizations. As Marx writes shortly after the passage in the 1859 Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* that:

No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient to have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

As a consequence, the reductionism or blind eclecticism has continued to pose a severe threat to the analysis of development processes in their specificities. In this regard, the dissertation aims to bring in HM conceptualization of development and attempts to overcome the implications of methodological nationalism.

The dissertation brings in the concept of “emergentist development” to analyze uneven and combined development processes. It concentrates on the features of social totality that the development processes are embedded in. The concept of “emergentist” denotes that development:

1. is a dynamic process, as there is no teleological ending.
2. entails an ontological perspective integrating the differentiated and stratified tendencies, mechanisms, and powers (via generative mechanisms and the concept of emergence).
3. unfolds through structured forms of relations (types of state and world orders, regimes of accumulation, exploitation, and domination).

Firstly, the development of any society has historical specificities depending on its interactive milieu, which proves the impossibility of handling development in a unilinear way (Trotsky, 2007). An essential use of CR methodology is an in-depth analysis of the development and the distinction between the transitive-intransitive dimensions of reality as a ground for scrutinizing the perspectives that would naturalize the dominant theoretical approaches and for unveiling the real features of the social phenomenon (Wight and Joseph, 2010). For Bhaskar, these approaches are founded on “empirical realism” and entail “the destratification of being in the ontology and the dehistoricization of knowledge in epistemology” (Bhaskar, 2009: 64).

Moreover, the emergence of irreducible features within ontological strata becomes quite essential in CR methodology, which helps to overcome reductionism. CR methodology helps to examine a complex phenomenon with its diverse dimensions. The supremacy of the productive forces that search for the conditions and capacities of adoption and adaptation - regarding the other aspects of social formation - is essential (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015), this means that to argue developmental processes unfold in totalizing and equalizing manner would be misleading and counterfactual.

Secondly, it is argued that the nature of development entails a transcended, in-depth ontological perspective that can distinguish the transitive and intransitive dimensions of reality; in order to illustrate, the features of the object and the knowledge of it can show differences. The totality of capitalism reflects historical specificities. As Callinicos (1995: 134) pointed out, the abstract model of the capitalist mode of production and the concrete capitalist totalities have distinct features depending on the historical specific formations. On that point, Peter Gowan (2009: 151) argues that only systematic empirical research can establish which of the various contradictory trends within capitalisms predominate in a given place and time.

The historical unfolding of the capitalist world system has always created contradictions, which can be seen in various forms of institutions, modalities of production, and world orders. It renders that social relations, by nature, scale, and form, are inseparable from the social totality. As Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015: 9) remark, “treating capitalism in such terms - as a contradictory social totality -helps to trace how multiple relations of domination, subordination, and exploitation intersect with and reproduce each other.”

The relative primacy of the differentiated and stratified sectors of social reality, in this regard, has been a subject of debate. Budd (2013: 92) underlines that capitalism’s various aspects (economics, politics, geopolitics) have particular properties deriving from such factors as their different locations within the complex of social relations, the different tasks they are designed to fulfill, and their different institutional structures and modes of operation. As Achcar (2013: 10) puts it:

For capitalist development can be blocked by a distinct configuration of dominant social groups sustaining one particular modality of capitalism, rather than by the general relations of production between wage laborers and capitalists and the attendant property relations (private ownership of the social means of production).

With an in-depth ontological approach, CR methodology helps to build a framework that shifted from epistemology to ontology and from events to mechanisms. Rather than debating the relative weight of separated sectors of social reality (political, economic, and social), the emergentist development perspective

will give social relations of production an ontological primacy. With the help of the emergence concept, such an approach will abstain from conflating the remaining sectors of superstructure into a mechanistic, reductionist, linear understanding of development processes. In this respect, geopolitics, human territoriality, and intersocietal/international conflict, along with the very demarcation of the geopolitical as such, must be conceptualized as emergent properties of a wider interactive and uneven process of development (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 11).

The concretization of development processes in the emergentist development framework refers to adding a complex set of determinations without reductionism. Emergentist development deals with mechanisms that originate, perpetuate, and direct the development processes with its distinctive features. For this purpose, the framework focuses on mechanisms that generate unevenness and combination with their emergent features.

As development processes denote intersocietal interaction, the combinations in developmental interactions within and between nations are elicited via focusing on the formations, alliances, and struggles of social forces within the structures of development. Societal development processes defy any abstraction and isolation, as Gramsci puts it “how the international should be considered in its national aspect” (Gramsci, 1971: 240). This means that instead of separating the logic of capitalism and geopolitics, it would be better to integrate them.

Thirdly, the concrete analysis of historically specific social formations entails the examination of capitalist configurations of social relations and processes. Analyzing the mode of production, thus, makes sense of the domestic structures of development and the form of order in which they are embedded. The conception of uneven and combined development is, therefore, perceived through utilizing the concept of the “hegemonic model of development”.

The hegemonic model of development takes development processes as diffusing through the structures of development, while the structural basis of it emerges out of the relations of production, exploitation, appropriation, and dominance. As the social relations within structures interact with wider processes, it

would be reductionist to assume the relations between them are one-way. The combination, in this regard, means that as the interaction unfolds, it will acquire new forms; create amalgamation that leads to contradictions. Budd (2013: 101) argued that local social relations exercised their determinations, in such a way that socio-political transformation was not uniform but shaped by pre-existing social and political conditions. Trotsky's (1980: 890) uneven and combined development captures this sense of a differentiated whole:

The industrially more developed country shows the less developed only the image of its future. This statement of Marx, which takes its departure methodologically not from the world economy as a whole but from the single capitalist country as the type has become less applicable in proportion as capitalist evolution has embraced all countries regardless of their previous fate and industrial level. England, in her day, revealed the future of France, considerably less of Germany, but not the least of Russia and not of India.

In this way, the framework is sensitized to the patterns of interactions, which are conceptualized as “dependency, underdevelopment, interdependency, globalization, imperialism”; to illustrate, the interactive feature of social totality is an essential component of a holistic analysis of development processes. The historical specificities of domestic structures of development constitute the sources that generate amalgamation and differentiated developmental performances.

Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015) highlight that “uneven and combined development offers a cogent means of theoretically explaining the differentiated social forms and historically distinct agencies emerging from a single, unified process of socio-historical development, as well the geosocial effects of their interactive differences.” The why, how, and in what forms development is uneven and combined in different historical periods can only, by more concrete categories and determinations accompanying a mode of production-centered analysis.

Besides that, emergentist development that builds on the U&CD perspective can realize the interactive minded framework for exploring the implications of societal multiplicity and socio-political transformation processes. In other words, rather than attempting to reach sweeping generalizations at the expense of variegations and to rationalize the imposition of particular experiences on wider

localities, the U&CD perspective highlights the contributions of focusing on the historical formation of developmental specificities. Paying heed to structured, stratified reality, the U&CD perspective, underpinned by CR methodology, can account for the amalgamation and contradictions that emerge from the combined processes of uneven development.

Furthermore, as the U&CD sees development relations in a totalistic manner, it can provide a sociological and methodologically holistic analysis. Such a perspective will correct, revise, and reinforce the historical materialist conceptualization of development. As Rosenberg (2007: 479) states:

Introduced by Trotsky in *the History of Russian Revolution* (1930), Uneven and Combined Development offer the possibility of overcoming two symmetrical absences within the social and political sciences, that of “the international” from Historical Sociology and of “the historical” from International Relations.

The proper conceptualization of interactive features of societal multiplicity, therefore, becomes critical. While capitalism is a general feature of the world economy, it is mediated within nation-states (and localities and regions) by different institutional structures. The global spread of capitalism had transformed the political formations. As Kiely (2007: 162) argues, there are various capitalisms in the international order.

The underlying logic of varied capitalisms will be concretized via examination of the state-society complexes’ dynamics. As the hegemonic model of development diffuses into the local structures, the more apparent the concrete forms of uneven and combined development becomes. The developmental policies- such as the investment, finance-credit, and production- becomes crucial in that not only direct the socio-political shifts and transform the segments of society but also reflect the historically specific configuration of social forces and features of the hegemonic model. In this respect, Bruff (2016: 115) saw the state as an essential and necessary element in the developmental model, institutional form, and practical thinking.

The emergentist development framework, therefore, will critically engage with the accounts of socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya.

Secondly, the socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya will be elicited through the concretization of uneven and combined development processes.

1.5 Why Syria and Libya? The Implications for IR and the MENA

The various dimensions of the articulating social forces in the socio-political transformation processes constitute the essence of the intersocietal interaction. The basis of the argument for a more concrete analysis of the “international” is constituted with the hierarchical, in certain aspects, hegemonic nature of the intersocietal interaction. Such a conception conceives of the constitutive impact of the international and is argued to have significant implications for the theorization of international relations and approaches in the Middle Eastern studies.

The emergentist development builds on the Uneven and Combined Development perspective to conceptualize the interactive and complex nature of the international. Rosenberg (2013), elaborating on the philosophical premises of U&CD, argues that the “realist reification of the international” can be challenged with a “non-realist sociological definition of the international. Against the ahistorical and asocial theorization of the societal multiplicity, such a conception is significant in that it analyzes the articulation and interaction of social forces through different localities and temporalities. The intersocietal interaction, in this regard, goes beyond the reified, static, and ahistorical conceptions of the international; and provides a holistic perspective to the implications of societal multiplicity with a deep ontological understanding of structures and mechanisms. The interactive nature of societal multiplicity adds new causal mechanisms that are unconceivable with a methodologically nationalist perspective. The causal mechanisms of intersocietal interaction are *geopolitical pressure, mercantile penetration, ideological –cultural influences, and political substitutionism.*

From the insertion of modern political, economic, and cultural forms into backward societies, the combined forms of development emerge that cause mutations within world-historical development. This feature of societal multiplicity with its implications for development processes encompasses not only capitalist development but also the non-capitalist/socialist forms of development. As

Rosenberg (2007) discusses within capitalist social totality, the unevenness expands from being a descriptive fact to an “active causal structure of determinations and pressure,” and this makes the U&CD perspective “a concrete abstraction” for the analysis of development processes. Yalvaç (2013) argues that although U&CD might seem abstract and transhistorical, it overcomes the Euro-centric conception of international through its focus on the interactive formation of societies. It reformulates the basis of IR as intersocietal relations in order to capture its essence holistically.

The central focus of the thesis is the analysis of interactivity and holistic nature of socio-political transformation; accordingly, the cases are selected to examine the effects of societal multiplicity. Since CR methodology defines concretization as adding up multi-level determinations of an event, the cases are essential for the examination of various mechanisms operating together. The analysis of socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya, in this regard, becomes significant in three interrelated aspects: firstly, the development processes do not unfold linearly; the backward societies do not follow the same patterns of developed countries but skip certain stages. The unevenness of development creates not only the combined forms of development but also the hierarchical structural relations in various spheres of the social. The asymmetry of the structural positioning of social forces, therefore, has a dynamic nature and is continuously reproducing/transforming under the impact of societal multiplicity. In the context of such a competitive and uneven environment – the external whip of necessity – social forces skip certain stages of development processes. Syria and Libya are remarkable cases in that they could not manage to consolidate inclusive and progressive political regimes neither experience stable economic growth processes.

Second, related to the skipping stages of development, the social forces articulate within hegemonic structures of development in novel ways. The articulation of social forces is the basis on which socio-political transformation processes unfold. Since the articulation of social forces is realized under the influence of inter-societal interaction, the analysis of amalgamations and

specificities emerging within socio-political transformation processes entails the identification of the features of hegemonic structures of development, the incorporation of societies into structures of world development, and the configuration of social forces. The impact of the hegemonic model on the Syrian and Libyan state-society complexes brought in significant shifts in the configuration of social forces and created entrenched populist-authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, in the processes of capitalist development, the articulation of social forces within hegemonic structures brings out amalgam social formations through ideological-cultural influences and political substitutionism. It makes explicit the significance of the local structures in the mediation of development processes (Ashman, 2006: 90) because the relations of uneven and combined development are not limited to the boundaries of social entities, but refer to expansion and interaction between them. The specificities of the political formations have reproduced/transformed the particular domestic forms of capitalist development processes. The Arab socialist and pan-Arabist ideologies in Syria and Libya epitomize the historical formation of amalgamated ideological-cultural frameworks. The ruling complexes which are constituted by military-mercantile segments in Syria and military-tribal segments in Libya are essential for explaining the implications of development processes.

The third conclusion is relevant to the consequences of uneven and combined development processes. Under the leadership of social forces articulating within the skipping stages of development, as the amalgam formations emerge, the contradictions of development become more explicit and severe. In this regard, within these wider socio-political transformations, the social, political, economic contradictions emerge; and the struggles, alliances, and confrontations have unfolded through regional/international geopolitics embedded in the capitalist social totality; thus, any conceptualization of the interactivity of development processes should integrate not only the relations between North and South but also within North and South (Bogaert, 2013: 220). Syria and Libya are crucial to observe the contradictions of socio-political transformation processes. The development relations have unfolded as increasingly marginalizing and exclusive.

As the Syrian and Libyan social formations have undergone deep socio-political transformations under the influence of intersocietal interaction, they reflect, to a considerable extent, the implications of uneven and combined development processes. With the Syrian and Libyan cases, firstly, the wider socio-political transformation processes are examined with a historical sociology perspective that builds on a historical materialist understanding, and the shifts in the configuration of social forces are inquired into. Besides that, the transformation in hegemonic structures of development is reappraised. Secondly, the study of socio-political transformation processes through the lens of intersocietal interaction is significant. Such analysis not only provides essential insights into the wider development processes but also contributes to the study of the socio-political transformation that brought in the Arab Revolts, with its deep structural conception of the amalgam formations. Moreover, as the unfolding of revolts in Syria and Libya have involved the international, regional and local actors – creating a showcase for military, political, economic and social confrontation (Dalacoura 2012; Hinnebusch 2014; Ritter 2015; Ehteshami et, al. 2013), the analyses of these cases are essential in that they provide a good case for the interactivity of uneven and combined development processes.

In this regard, the main research questions are, “*what are the mechanisms of uneven (emergentist) development, and how have they directed the socio-political transformation in Libya and Syria?*” While the sub-questions are:

- a) How has been the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development into the domestic structures of development in Syria and Libya?
- b) How have the domestic structures of development transformed?
- c) What has been the amalgamation in these processes? What have been the contradictions?
- d) In which aspects the analysis of socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya can contribute to the study of societal multiplicity?

Emergentist development argues that the mechanisms of uneven and combined development are decisive in generating the underlying structures within which the socio-political transformation processes in societies have unfolded. In this context, the argument criticizes the deficiencies of conceptualizing development

with a methodologically nationalist perspective as “pathologies of deviancy, or aberration from the hegemonic model”. It explains the various and differentiated strategies of domestic development models with regards to structures of world development (Bilgin and Morton, 2004: 175-176).

Within the framework of emergentist development, the socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya provide significant insight into the development processes, which have three important conclusions for Middle Eastern Studies. The first one is related to the sociological part of the analysis. Seeing the implications of societal multiplicity through the lens of historical articulation of social forces constitutes a dynamic sociological analysis of the shifts and conjunctural changes. The second one is related to the structural context within which the development processes create combined formations – amalgamation. It forms an essential part of the in-depth structural explanation. Through the historical mechanisms of U&CD, the ideological frameworks (such as Arab socialism, Ba’thism) and practical consequences (such as authoritarian-populism) of uneven and combined development processes can be examined in a more informative and structural manner. Matin (2018), in this respect, emphasizes that the survival of local relations and structures should not be conceived of in an ahistorical manner. He argues that although the sectarian, tribal, and religious differences have a *longue duree* character, their meaning is obtained historically. Such a conceptualization, therefore, offers a way out of the cultural particularism and Euro-centric universalism.

The third conclusion indicates the contributions of analyzing the interactive nature of development processes holistically. Against the reductionist and essentialist accounts, which reify the empirical manifestation of development processes, it argues for the constitutive impact of international/intersocietal interaction. It discusses that the methodologically nationalist perspectives fail to capture the interactivity and complexity of socio-political transformation processes.

1.6 Outline of the Chapters

The following chapters elaborate on the conceptualization of the emergentist development and the hegemonic model of development. The second chapter, “Critique of Conceptualizations of Development,” constitutes a critical engagement with the current conceptualizations of development. Doing this, the current conceptualizations of development are categorized according to distinctive features, that is, stagist, structural, and post-developmental. In the first section of the chapter, it consists of CR social scientific understanding. The concept of “development” is problematized through the arguments on development thinking and theoretical conceptions. How development is defined and from which perspectives it is challenged are the points that are scrutinized. Development as *modernization* is discussed within “stagist” conceptualizations of development, while *Dependency* and *World-Systems Analysis* constitute the “structural” conceptualizations of development. The post-developmental conceptualization includes the conceptions of development as an idealized framework of development relations depending on the Euro-centric experiences.

In the remaining parts of the second chapter, the “emergentist development” is elaborated on within the CR methodological framework. The specificities of the relationship between state and states system and within the state-society complex are conceptualized. The distinctive features of the Hegemonic Model of Development are explored through the lens of CR notions of ontological depth and emergence. Against the structural-functionalist/voluntarist approaches to the relationship between agent and structure, the methodological advantages of the “Transformative Model of Social Action” are emphasized.

The third chapter, “Critique of Conceptions of Development in the MENA Region,” draws on the discussions related to the conceptualizations of development in the second chapter. Accordingly, the approaches to the analysis of development are classified as *stagist*, *political*, and *structural*. It is discussed that these theoretical approaches tend to analyze the development processes separately, which ends up incomplete conclusions. The stagist perspectives, reflecting a close relationship with the modernization approach, inquires into the domestic structures and local values

(such as political Islam and the patrimonial, lineage-based political, economic, and social relations) and their implications for the processes of transition to democracy (the relations between economic growth and democracy, between a robust civil society and democracy, between the durability of authoritarian structures and political transformation).

The interaction between social forces and production relations is also analyzed with the perspectives of “rentier state theory” (which conceives the rentier structures lagging development) and “developmental state” (which denotes the particular development relationship between the state and market forces, while the state is attributed a role of regulation, management, and planning of economic development). However, the findings are discussed as deficient due to missing conception of societal multiplicity (unevenness and combination).

The *structural* approaches, on the other hand, consist of dependency and world-systems analysis, the articulation of modes of production, and Neogramscian perspective on development. Although these approaches attempt to point out the structural implications on development processes and highlight the asymmetrical nature of relations between the “core” and “periphery” within the world-economy, their conclusions, in no small extent, fail to go beyond the linear conceptualization of development as in the modernization approach. The conception of structural relations tends to assume a highly decisive role over development processes.

As Dependency and World-Systems Analysis concentrate on the impact of structural relations upon development processes, the Post-colonialist approach to development foregrounds the ideational dimensions of development and dominance/subordinance relations. Similarly, Neo-Gramscian perspectives take the transnationalization of production processes at the center to analyze the formation of transnational class relations. In this section, the debate on the developmental state - is also included, for the state is quite relevant to the central analytical points, strategies, and policies in the development thinking.

Bearing the deficiencies of the stagist, structural, and post-developmental conceptualizations of development, these theoretical and conceptual arguments are contended as conflating the empirical manifestations of development with actual

development processes and undertheorizing the causal mechanisms. In this context, the remaining parts of the chapter are constituted with the framework for emergentist development. Following the scrutiny of the current conceptions of “international,” the generative mechanisms of Uneven and Combined Development operating through the capitalist social totality are identified. The historical specificities relevant to the mechanisms of unevenness and combination are examined. The historical features of the hegemonic model of development are identified, and its diffusion into the historically specific social formations through intersocietal interaction is conceptualized.

Through the lens of emergentist development, the fourth and fifth chapters analyze the Syrian and Libyan socio-political transformations, respectively. The articulations of uneven and combined development processes are discussed, as the making of modern Syrian and Libya social formations are elaborated on. The configuration of social forces in the Syrian and Libyan cases bear similar features; that is, there has been an authoritarian state presiding over a top-down revolution that concatenated to the existing social relations and structures of domination. The economy has rentier characteristics; the political structures are marginalizing and repressive.

The fourth chapter, “Socio-Political Transformation in Syria,” foregrounds the formation of the “state bourgeoisie” class, which was concatenated to the social forces in the Ottoman rule and French mandate. In the light of the Ba’thist revolution that was embedded in uneven and combined development processes; the configuration of social forces in Syrian social formation under Hafez Al-Assad rule is analyzed along with shifts in the developmental orientations and “structural consequences.” The section “Structural Consequences of Development” explores the acceleration and intensification of the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development in Syria. As the mechanisms of U&CD are discussed in the context of the transformation of the economic model of Syria into de-industrialized and consumptionist one, it is concluded that the military-mercantile complex in which the alliance of national/regional capital and the state bourgeoisie was embedded

acquired a more international/financial form via the “social market economy” model.

The fifth chapter, “Socio-Political Transformation in Libya,” examines the historical making of Libyan socio-political transformation with a framework sensitized to the interactive nature of capitalist structures. Although the Libyan case is mostly associated with the concept of rentierism and the Libyan society is approached with a static view of tribalism, this chapter evaluates the persistence of tribal relations under different forms of socio-political formations through the lens of amalgamation. It is argued that the military-tribal nature of Libyan social formation – especially under Qadhafi rule - can be understood after the analysis of amalgamated social formations that were carried on from the Ottoman and colonial legacies. In this way, the deficient and incomplete accounts of the static, unprogressive views on the Libyan social formation are criticized. In contrast, it is argued that the Libyan socio-political transformation must be considered within the interaction of international geopolitical and economic structures together, that is, the whip of sanctions regime and embargos on Libya through the 1980s and 1990s created specific outcomes for the Libyan social formation and its *infitahi* policies.

CHAPTER 2

CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Conceptualizations of Development

According to Sachs (2005), the 21st century started with the fading belief that “development is for all.” As the actual development processes have challenged the conceptions of the “stages of development” and “developmental formula,” it becomes essential to acknowledge that development is a complex term that has different connotations in different contexts for different perspectives.

In the Cambridge Dictionary, development is defined as the process in which someone or something grows or changes and becomes more advanced (Retrieved from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/development>). As a concept, on the other hand, it is clear that development has been historically specific, which is presiding over the material and ideational condition. It is best epitomized in the United Nations (UN) documentations, as they demonstrate how the term development has acquired different orientations for international relations. While it meant technical assistance and development aid in the 1950s, it included the human rights framework in the 1990s (Retrieved from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/dev/intro>). Similarly, the UN designed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a global project on development; however, the project ceased to promise an economic convergence between the “developing and developed” and transformed into drawing attention to the intensifying side effects of development processes. For contrary to the positive attitudes and beliefs in the globalization of free-market values and idealizations of Euro-centric conceptions of development, the development processes have unfolded quite heterogeneously, especially regarding the alleviation of poverty, culminated in

profound inequalities and marginalization in various localities (Piketty, 2014, Therborn, 2013).

As the modernist and Euro-centric conceptualizations of development de-socialize the development processes, the practical crises linked to developmental performances in the Third World are brought forward as “poverty and inequality, external debt and dependence, over-population, migration and brain-drain, the problem of urbanization, while these problems manifest themselves at the global level as international inequality, ethnic and racial conflicts, expansive world defense expenditure, environmental and ecological catastrophes, unequal and unjust world order” (Haque, 1999).

As it turns out that the positive connotations of development might not always realize, such outcomes of the development processes indicate that the choice between alternatives of development has serious implications. Against the stagist and modernist conceptions of development, the structural conceptualizations of development point out that the relations emerging from development processes may, at the same time, perpetuate the inequalities, the losers in the development processes might blame the development thinking or the instruments. Frank (1966) distinguishes “undeveloped” from “underdeveloped,” for the latter as a concept refers to “being fixed or unable to escape from a position of a disadvantage because of global inequalities.” Taking it further, Hobson (2012) asks a crucial question “whether the sources of developmental failures and ineffective domestic outcomes are emanating from the domestic wrongs or pervasion of neoimperial institutions.”

On the other hand, the incongruity between the actual development processes and the Euro-centric, modernist conceptions are viewed as part of the impossibility of universal, progressive development by Post-developmental thinking. Rejecting the scientific framework of development studies as serving to the purposes of constructed “development” understanding that keep “third-world” as backward, Post-developmentalism draws on a post-modernist conception of development processes.

This chapter explores the arguments and theoretical essence of existing conceptualizations of development and argues that it is essential to scrutinize the

methodological and conceptual origins of development in order to evaluate their conclusions on development. For, on the one hand, the reasons brought forward as obstacles before the “development” – be it economic growth or democratic progress – take their shape according to prevalent development thinking; on the other hand, the events in international relations, to a certain extent, play a decisive role in the orientations of development thinking and analyses.

The chapter finds out that the existing conceptions of development tend to take development with a methodologically nationalist, state-centric view. More importantly, the structural relations embedded in development processes are examined in linear and reductionist aspects (analyzed in detail in Chapter Three). While such conceptions culminate in the prevalence of studies focusing on the obstacles/facilitators of a specific understanding of development processes, the essential components of structural consequences of interactive development processes such as “globalization,” “imperialism,” and “neoliberalization” are either undertheorized or overlooked.

The conceptualization of the emergentist development, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to elaborate on development processes with their specificities and complexities. It acknowledges that conceptualization of development has reflected the various and complex social - the power, dominance, exploitation - relations. Nevertheless, it highlights that while development unfolds unevenly, it brings the impact of intersocietal interaction closer and more influential; thus, the framework sees that the conceptualization of development tightly knitted to social structures is essential.

The following sections, in this regard, are constituted by a critical review of the conceptualizations of development: *stagist, structural, and post-developmental*. The theoretical, conceptual, and methodological implications of the current conceptualizations of development are evaluated from a CR meta-theoretical perspective. In the remaining parts, uneven and combined development processes are conceptualized as the “emergentist development.” In a totalistic approach, the structural relations manifested in the developmental processes are concretized according to their underlying mechanisms and tendencies.

2.2. Critical Realist Conceptualization of Development

Developed by Roy Bhaskar, Critical Realism (CR) is a philosophy of science; it is a meta-theoretical perspective. CR argues that the methods used in the natural sciences can be applied for the social sciences as well (Chernoff, 2007: 399-400). Still, CR brings forward critical points relevant to the positivist/post-positivist scientific understandings (Yalvaç, 2010b:4).

The ontological position of CR differs from positivism/post-positivism. The reality is attributed to an independent reality in CR. Unlike positivism, the assumption that there is a real-world out there, waiting to be discovered by the observer is rejected in CR. Joseph sees the positivist understanding of reality as “empirically realist” (Joseph, 2007: 345-346). Similar to the positivist conceptualization of reality as composed of empirical experiences, the post-positivist model is founded on a conflated ontological position. The reality is defined in terms of language/discourse in post-positivist perspectives (Patomaki and Wight, 2000). The distinction between the object and the knowledge obtained about it enables CR ontological position to avoid the scientism of positivism while abstaining from the relativism of radical rejection of science in post-modernism (Sayer, 2000).

In CR, the primacy is given to ontology instead of epistemology. CR asks, “What the world should be for science to be possible.” Therefore, the ontological depth becomes a necessity to prevent the conflation of events with their generative causes. The reality is conceptualized in a stratified and differentiated form (Yalvaç, 1996: 146). CR rejects a reductionist and separate closure of reality as in the “modernist” kinds of social science, which underestimate the openness, contingency, and contextually variable character of social change (Sayer, 2000:3).

The ontological stratification of reality in the CR meta-theoretical perspective does not necessarily mean the impossibility of social scientific analysis. As in the natural sciences, the instrument of verification for the reality of the generative mechanisms in the real ontological level is the empirical level and experimentation. Such a position also keeps a solid foundation for choosing between alternative scientific accounts. In this regard, while CR methodology comes against pure

theoretical social scientific perspectives, the substantive ontology can be saved from conflation. Thanks to the notion of transitivity/intransitivity of the object in CR, Steinmetz (1998: 175) argues that things are saved from becoming “mere manifestation of thought, devoid of extra-discursive or empirical controls,” the transitive dimension saves thought from “becoming a mere expression.”

There are distinctive features of the objects of social scientific analysis compared to the natural sciences. These features lay in the ontological and epistemological notions. It is vital to emphasize that social reality is concept-dependent. It is an ontological difference, as Bhaskar argues the social structures – differing from the natural structures– “do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity” (Bhaskar, 2005).

Unlike the radical constructivist and hermeneutic perspectives, the CR notion of concept dependency does not mean the violation of the notion of realist science. It is at this point that the importance of the distinction of transitivity/intransitivity of reality appears once again, for it renders possible the social scientific analysis of the object. More importantly, while CR assumes there is an intimate relationship between the “social objects and the knowledge of them,” it does not naturalize the extant forms, relations, and structures (Steinmetz, 1998: 181).

The ontological position of CR allows social scientific analysis to adopt a reflexive position. As Rutzou (2016: 331) argues, social scientific understanding informed by CR holds the potential to become not only ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically reflexive, but also ethically and practically reflexive. Concerning the concept dependent nature of social sciences and their direct implications on the social, the reflexivity in the social scientific analysis is crucial for critical engagement of the existing reality. With reflexivity, CR meta-theory presents not only the in-depth explanatory methodology but also a potentially progressive path for social scientific analysis. In this regard, this dissertation underlines the vitality of starting with CR scrutiny of the current conceptualizations of development before presenting “emergentist development.”

2.3 Critique of Stagist Conceptualizations of Development

The study of development in the modern sense emerged following the Second World War. Nevertheless, preliminary development thinking can be found in the 18th century. According to Hettne (2009: 125), the development was associated with the notion of “progress” at that period. Concomitantly, the emerging social theories concentrated on identifying and examining the elements that inhibit/facilitate the progress states.

The studies on development, however, assumed a more academic form with the end of the Second World War. The decolonization processes in the following period deeply affected the development thinking. During this period, development thinking was closely associated with *raison d’être* of the state and catching up with the industrialized countries. In other words, the methodologically nationalist perspective became dominant; to illustrate, the development thinking was constituted with a strong belief in the link between economic growth and development, which was formulated according to experiences of the “developed” countries.

2.3.1 Modernization Theory

A crucial driver of progress in the 18th century was the industrial revolution in England. The industrialization processes and technological transformation of production rendered England the “workshop of the world”. Along with introducing new mechanisms for social differentiation and stratification within and among the societies, the industrial revolution brought evermore closer and powerful the intersocietal interaction.

A fundamental transformation in social thinking of the period was related to the market. The market was considered to be a natural phenomenon that had its law of motion- generally creating tension with political authority depending on the social and economic conditions. The development/progress was seen as natural and immanent. Thus, societies were believed to progress naturally.

Hettne (2005: 31) argues that those late-industrializers, challengers of English dominance, had only one option before them – to apply for protectionism to catch strong powers. Then, instead of utilizing comparative advantage in the international economic system, development thinking was constituted by an apparent trade-off between industrialization and perishing. Makki (2004: 153) argues that the model for accumulating power created tension between those advocating free trade and mercantilism.

The mechanisms of development, in this period, were the industrialization and building a strong economy, with a certain extent of protectionism – especially for the late-industrializing countries. Hobsbawm (1990: 29-30) describes the general thinking at that time as protectionist and stable national governments were advocated. While Alexander Hamilton pioneered the project in the USA, it affected Friedrich List in Germany. It acquired a new form in Germany, however, as the protectionist and state-interventionist model of the economy was not seen as a temporary policy goal. The aim was to strengthen Germany via industrialization and make it a part of the international system. It should be kept in mind that Makki argues (2004: 152) protectionist ideas could not hold the place until the interwar years when the *laissez-faire* economy collapsed.

The severe economic crisis, the Great Depression, resulted in a profound transformation in the international economy. The collapse of the world economy under the leadership of Britain – the “snapping of the golden thread” ushered in rising protectionist economic policies, which led to considerable decreases in international trade volumes (Polanyi, 1944: 29). The most important feature of economic deterioration was its impact on the relation between state and economy, which strengthened the hands of those who advocated the stable government against the market in ensuring economic growth. Strange (2014: 6) highlights that the main objective of the Listian economic model was to cope with the specificities of development processes, which for the late-developing/ industrializing countries created structural unevenness. To prevent late developer countries “subsumed within and subordinated to” international system based on the system of

comparative advantage, the Listian model advocated stable government and interventionist state in the economy.

To sum up, development was conceptualized as strengthening the material base of the state through industrialization in an anarchical system. Furthermore, the process of industrialization was thought to be similar from one country to another and seen as the main instrument for ensuring economic growth. Significantly, these models conceptualized the development processes oppositely regarding the effects. The Listian model acknowledged the structural dominance of industrialized against the latecomers and aimed to cope with structural unevenness while the British-led free trade model saw the same development processes as interdependency.

The post-World War II era staged rising concerns related to transformation in the international system of states after the decolonization process started, and there were the burning issues of the newly independent states. While how these new states would be incorporated into the international system concerned the Great powers, for those who gained their independence, it was ensuring the political independence. Development, in this context, meant to close the gap between the two groups. The obstacles before the convergence and the instruments in this process – strongly connoting the modernization thinking – were examined in political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. It was, thus, such a historical context that the modernization school derives its theoretical heritage from evolutionary and functionalist theories (So 1990: 17-19).

The unfolding of the development model in the international system corresponds to the rise of the Pax Americana. The terminology of decolonization and the approaches to institution-building express the preoccupation with development. It manifests itself in the historical and global conditions of the day. Following the end of the war, the Pax Americana was underpinned by the Bretton Woods order. “The commitment to the accommodation of national-level macroeconomic adjustment, economic reconstruction and industrial and state as well as market-driven capacity building” was the primary premises embodied in the Bretton Woods. Ruggie (1982) described this settlement embodying a form of embedded liberalism.

The theorization of development concentrated on studying comparative political culture, nation, and state-building processes (Haynes, 2005: 4). Development, dominated with concerns about modernization, was considered as economic transformation. The preconditions, consequences, and concomitants of transformation were social with its total character. More importantly, it was considered as a universal process (Bernstein, 1971: 141).

The analysis of social change/transformation has sociological, economic, and political aspects, each of which attempted to find out a particular dimension of developmental processes. As for the sociological approaches to modernization, social relations and individuals are taken as analytical foci. Examining the rise of capitalism with an individualist perspective, Max Weber underscored the rationality of all aspects of human life in order to account for the motor force behind social change (Weber, 2001). On the other hand, Durkheim (1965) linked the social change to shifts in the division of labor in society. For Durkheim, the transformation of static, agrarian-based, traditional communities into the modern, dynamic, and urban associations is motivated by the complex division of labor, which causes social relations to change.

The political perspectives analyzing the modernization processes focus on political culture and structures. Coleman (1968) saw political modernization as a process of differentiation of political structure, the secularization of the political culture that enhances the capacity of the political system of a society. The political approaches in the conceptualization of development in modernization perspective have compiled an extensive literature on democratization/authoritarianism arguments (Schlumberger, 2000; Anderson, 2006; Lijphart, 1989). Concerning the relationship between the regime type and developmental performances, the economic and political organization of a social formation becomes an object of analysis.

The modernization theory, in this regard, foregrounds the cultural and traditional institutions, values, organizations. The patrimonial relations and corruption come to the front as the main problems before modernization processes. The problems such as macroeconomic and political mismanagement are the

essential determinants of developmental performance, while political institutions primarily determine these factors.

The arguments about crony capitalism and corruption, in this respect, have become both a reflection of the extant structures of development and the effect of the generative mechanisms that emerge during the intersocietal interaction. Furthermore, the traditional and local are considered as backward, and “development,” which is conceptualized relational and evolutionary, means to shift from traditional in a linear understanding.

The literature on democratization/transition to democracy brings certain preconditions for ensuring democracy forward. The critical factors in democratization vary from an increase in income per capita to the level of education to industrialization. Regarding the MENA region, the analysis concentrated on the obstacles before the democratic transition, the dynamics of robust authoritarianism, and the exceptional situation of the Middle East against the waves of democratization.

Similarly, the economic perspectives of modernization theory such as Rostow’s (1960) adopted a progressive approach, Rostow identified certain phases for the economic development of a particular society which is 1) traditional society, 2) pre-conditions for take-off, 3) take-off, 4) the drive to maturity, 5) high consumption. The general characteristics of modernization perspective, in this regard, can be identified as revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenizing, irreversible, and progressive (Huntington, 1971: 288-290). However, the homogenizing and universalist understanding of modernization perspective is vital to account for the imposition of western experience into the “developing” countries. As to the homogenizing character, Levy (1967: 207) says:

As time goes on, they and we will increasingly resemble one another because the patterns of modernization are such that the more highly modernized societies become, the more they resemble one another.

The development thinking was concretized through the developmental model endorsed with the preponderant actors. The Bretton Woods order and the embedded liberalism became the instrumental framework, in which there was “an explicit

reference to Polanyian understandings of a stable or organic form of hegemony in orders, under which symbiotic relationships were fostered and constructed between states and their economies and societies” (Strange, 2014: 15). The Bretton Woods order aimed to rebuild economic internationalism and by stabilizing international money and trade cooperation, to strengthen interdependent relations. The dynamics of modernization consisted of mechanisms such as the introduction of a market economy, monetization, urbanization, industrialization, the spread of mass communications, and literacy.

Building on the historically specific experiences of capitalist progress, emerging theories of development idealized the capitalist developmental processes in the North. Since the economic dimensions of these processes are taken as analytical foci, these approaches are also named as theories of economic growth, which generally abstract economic models in neo-classical understanding, brush away the conjectural and context-specific factors, ignore the non-economic and impose “universalist” claims in all socio-economic and political contexts (Haque, 1999: 48).

The early 1950s, on the other hand, became a severe test for the development model of modernization thinking. The specific problems confronted by the “developing” countries demonstrated the significance of the issue. It was striking that the developmental path prescribed for those who attempted to catch up was quite different from the one experienced by the European countries. The World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were supposing a peculiar formula to the “developing” countries (Hettne, 1993).

It was a theoretical dilemma for the theories of modernization. In general, the theories of modernization specify relevant relations between the changes in different parts of the social structure in order to account for the developmental processes. To Bernstein (1971: 150), the limited applicability of empirical generalizations and concepts which are derived from the experiences of the industrially advanced countries has obtained the form of sweepingly general ideal-types. It formed a framework for analyzing the different types of social change / or obstacles before the change in the “underdeveloped/undeveloped” countries that do not fit.

The search for answers to why development occurs in some parts and not the others intrigued many. For instance, the faltering trade adjustment processes which the Bretton Woods institutions focused as a responsible mechanism for the ills of development attracted severe criticism by those who advocate the structural conditions inhibiting symmetrical trade relations (Strange, 2014: 16).

Categorizing the attempts to account for diverging cases, Bernstein puts it as:

Two simple ways of interpreting contradictory evidence have been mentioned briefly—one is to characterize it merely as 'pathological' in terms of the model, à la Rostow; the second is to view it as transitory. Another possibility is to explain 'disturbances' in terms of 'lags' in the operation of integrative mechanisms relative to those of differentiation (Bernstein, 1971: 151).

It is quite significant that differing from the mission of civilizing, “development/modernization” was embraced by the nation-building leaders of latecomers and post-colonial countries as an instrument that can be carried out only by a society that disposed of the colonial legacies (Makki, 2004: 155). It created a period of association of development with national feelings and the adoption of ISI strategies.

However, the integration of nationalist feelings into the development processes also paved the ground for those approaches challenging modernization. Strange (2014: 13) sees the rise of the neomercantilist model in the periphery as the prime cause behind the destabilization of the “liberal-Keynesian macro-economic and welfare settlement around the international political economy.” It epitomizes the specificities of uneven and combined nature of development processes. The incorporation and admission of post-colonial countries in a way reflected the subordinate structural position of them.

2.4 Critique of Structural Conceptualizations of Development

The economic performances and developmental problems faced by Latin American (LA) countries in the 1960s shook the confidence in the development formulae followed by Northern industrialized countries. It inevitably created a transformation within the modernization perspectives. David Harrison (1988: 56-59)

defines the new modernization approaches as (still) linear, nation-state centric, structural-functionalist, evolutionary, individualist, and heavily culturalist. The main difference between classical and new modernization approaches, on the other hand, is the analytical focus on several indices such as literacy, democracy, the spread of mass media, and urbanization. Nevertheless, the prescriptions for development did not cease to be questioned. In such a context, ECLA School (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) introduced a critical evaluation of economic relations between Northern industrialized countries and LA countries to account for the developmental problems in the LA region.

2.4.1 Dependency

The Dependency theory, building on a Marxist approach, underlined the impact of structural factors that emerged in international economic relations. The power of economic structural relations over the exchange of trade is discussed to be against the periphery countries which are specialized in the production of primary commodities. The unequal relationship is claimed to play a crucial role in the emergence of a dependent position for LA countries. In this regard, the volatility in the price of primary commodities is pointed out as worsening the dependency, which led to capital flight to industrial countries and deteriorated the already disadvantageous position of the periphery.

Capitalism, the underlying structure of the uneven system of states, determines the structural possibilities for a nation according to its role in the world division of labor (Haque, 1999). The theories of underdevelopment, therefore, examine whether development is compatible with a dependent position and whether the expansion of capitalism is necessary for overcoming the dependent position. Questioning the assumption that “underdevelopment” is an original universal situation, the concept of “dependency” critically examines the relationship between capitalism and modernity. In this regard, the “underdevelopment” is thought to refer to lacking development, like a stage that all developed countries experienced. It makes sense of the specificity of which societies relate to each other.

In classical Marxist thinking, the societies in which the pre-capitalist mode of production is dominant are argued to progress with the destructive forces of capitalist transformation. The pre-capitalist societies, in this regard, are considered as backward (Larrain, 1989: 52). The preliminary thoughts of backwardness and development can be seen in this argument.

For the dependency perspectives, on the other hand, the central mechanism is the surplus transfer through international trade, which is based on unequal exchange relations. The unequal exchange relations create a center and subordinate periphery, which determines the differential potentialities of development. It is contended that the relations between core and periphery are exploitative rather than being mutually beneficial. Greig et al. (2007: 89-90) claims that although both are having a dichotomous conceptualization of societies, the difference between dependency theory and modernization perspective relies upon the assumption that the developmental problems of peripheral countries stem from the dependency relations – the structural impact of the relations with modern colonial powers - rather than traditional domestic structures and cultural practices.

Frank (1969), conceptualizing the development of underdevelopment, argues that contrary to beliefs in the naturalness of underdevelopment, it “is an artifact,” which has emerged in the historical processes of domination and exploitation of the “Third World”. The domination to which the Third World countries are exposed to manifests itself in various forms of dependence, which Dos Santos identifies technological-industrial along with the colonial and financial-industrial (in So, 1990: 98). In this regard, the possibilities of having a developmental success via applying the same formulae of capitalist transformation are entirely rejected by Amin (1976) because of the very different contexts under which core and peripheral capitalist experience transition.

A sociological strand in the dependency perspective, on the other hand, focuses on the capitalist as a mode of production and underlines that it must be historically analyzed within social formations. Although acknowledging the conditioning impact of the capitalist economic system, the internal relations of production and conflictual class relations took precedence over the exploitative

nature of international trade relations. The situation was different for now “developing” countries, according to Frank (1966: 18), for now, “developed” countries were “at most undeveloped rather than underdeveloped.” Such an approach views the underdevelopment relevant to the process of Western capitalist expansion.

The development, then, becomes not incompatible with the dependent position. Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 159-161) recognize the role of both external and internal forces in the development in the periphery. For instance, instead of viewing dependency as an antithesis to development, they emphasize the possibility of dependent development characterized by an alliance between the indigenous state capital, national private capital, and international monopoly capital. Parallel to that, Cardoso (1977) focused on internal structures of dependency and has a more open-ended view of dependency. He argues that it is possible to have dependent-associated development where there can be development and dependency at the same time, and there exist more dynamic forms of dependency (Cardoso, 1977).

The differential performances experienced by those attempting to catch up, however, require a further explanation, which is still not possible with such conceptualization of capitalism and economic relations (Sanyal, 2007: 12). Differential temporalities and localities, with the mechanism of interaction, lead the transformation and reproduction of social – and intersocietal - relations.

The debates on the impact of international economic and political structures underpinned the theories of Imperialism and World Systems theory. Seeing imperialism as a progressive step for the development of periphery economies, classical imperialism theories, similar to classical Marxist understanding, have modernist and teleological arguments (Larrain, 1989: 71-72). However, there is not a uniform conceptualization of imperialist relations.

Hobson (1902) saw imperialism as a distortion of capitalism and emerging out of lacking domestic investment opportunities led by the export of capital. Rosa Luxemburg (2003: 434-435), giving analytical weight to the Third World, drew attention to the under-consumptionist tendencies in the industrialized countries and pointed that despite the relative slowing down of consumer markets, the increase of

productive capacity, without faltering, can be explained only with regards to the existence of non-capitalist regions, supplying raw materials and purchasing consumer goods. For her, imperialism and militarism are essential mechanisms for realizing surplus value.

Lenin (1937: 80), on the other hand, argued that when the characteristics of capitalist development started to change and turned into their opposites, the free competition turned into monopolies. For Lenin, imperialism is closely related to the fundamental properties of capitalism. As imperialism is a conception of a certain period of capitalist developmental relations, which contains in it the seed of transition to a higher social system, it can be called as the highest stage of capitalist development.

Baran, however, was against the progressive potential of capitalist development, and he saw the withdrawal from the capitalist system as the only rational solution (1973: 119). Unlike Lenin, Baran explains the "underdevelopment" emerging in the relations between societies with the interests of the capitalist core, which directs the structural backwardness (1973: 20). In this way, the necessary inputs for the Western economies such as raw materials are provided by this backward hinterland, while ensuring the continuity of the mechanisms of surplus transfer.

2.4.2 World-Systems Analysis

Examining global capitalism with a historical, sociological approach, the World-Systems Theory (WST) aimed to take account of the complicated relationship between the world system as a whole and individual experiences. Immanuel Wallerstein critiques the structural and economic view of the dependency approach and perceives social reality changing as we encapsulate it in order not to freeze the historical systems (Wallerstein, 1984: 27). Wallerstein (1977: 7) calls for the analysis of the holism of the socio-historical process over a long historical time and an ample space. The primacy of the "long-term economic, political, and social history" in the WST perspective is the adoption of the French Annales School (Radice, 2015: 141).

The unit of analysis in the World-System perspective is the world-system, and the analytical focus is on the historical dynamics of the world system through cyclical rhythms and secular trends. Hobson identifies three main aspects in WST: “a focus on dependency within the world-economy; a historical-sociological theory of the rise of the capitalist world-economy and inter-state system; and a historical-sociological theory of the rise and decline of hegemonies” (Hobson, 2000: 134). The structure of the capitalist world-economy is significant in determining state behavior. Wallerstein puts it as “the interstate system is merely a political organization of capitalist world-economy; in other words, “the political superstructure of capitalist world-economy is an inter-state system” (Wallerstein, 1984: 14). In this regard, Wallerstein explains the characteristic inequality of this system with the help of exploitative economic/exchange relations between core and periphery (Hobson, 2000: 136).

Criticizing the dichotomous view of modernization and dependency perspectives, he underscored the importance of mobility in the system and via trimodal conceptualization of his framework; he integrated the possible upward and downward mobility into his analysis. He underlined the capitalist mode of production, creating the international division of labor and added the concept of semi-peripheral (Wallerstein, 1982: 41-42). In WST, the division of the world into three core regions is essential for the system’s continuity (Skocpol, 1977: 1080). The uneven distribution of power becomes instrumental for the maintenance of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974: 355).

Compared to the structuralist perspective of Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn aimed to bring class relations back in and synthesize modes of production analysis with classical WST (Chase-Dunn, 1998: 13-69). Granting the state a degree of domestic agential power- institutional autonomy, Chase-Dunn treats the state, not as a product of mere economic relations. Rejecting the economically reductionist accounts of the interstate system, Chase-Dunn puts that “capitalist world-economy and inter-state system have no primacy on the other” (Chase-Dunn, 1998). Similar to Chase-Dunn’s critique of the primacy of the economic sphere, Arrighi (2009) contends that analytically separate two logics “the logic of territorialism” and “the logic of

capitalism” inform the behavior of state in the international system. While the logic of territorialism refers that rulers grow their territorial power in order to increase their power, the logic of capitalism means that rulers seek to amass capital for enhancing their power (Arrighi, 2009: 34).

The material bases of the hegemonic developmental model also had not been immune to the real-life development challenges. The variegated and differentiated developmental experiences in the international capitalist system emerged due to the conflictual strategies-policies embedded in the geopolitical rivalries, mechanisms of economic exploitation, and domination. In this regard, the wave of neomercantilist and protectionist developmental models, which continued through the 1970s and 1980 from the 1950s started to falter.

To Strange (2014: 17), the periphery based challenges to the hegemonic developmental models were led by the social forces that sought autonomy compared to the comparative advantage economic model. These challenges undermined the pro-capitalist hegemonic alliance embedded in development processes. While the international Fordism was abandoned as a regime of production, independent industrial development was seen as an instrument for political independence and industrialization acquired the form of import substitution that aimed to achieve independent development against the balance of payments problems emanating from the economic model imposed by comparative advantage (dependence on import of manufactured products while exporting primary products). The latter model was considered as responsible for the transfer of surplus from the national economy along with the limited income flow.

2.5 Critique of Post-Developmentalism

The 1970s were the years for the fading achievements of the post-war economic model. Neither modernization nor dependency paradigms were ready to cope with the profound transformation in the development processes along with identifying the new tendencies in the capitalist international economic system. While the industrialization and urbanization trends of the previous economic model

showed changes, the primary developmental focus shifted to the service sectors (Radice, 2015: 140).

The differentiated performance of the “developing” countries -successes, and the crises of the Asian Tigers, the model of the export-led growth- have become the new realities of the capitalist international economic system. The structural –also can be called as a pessimist – development paradigms failed to explain the variations via reductionist perspectives. The complexity of development processes showed up once more. While the modernization perspectives could attribute the developmental failures of the African and Latin American countries in 1980 to the domestic factors -politically corrupt governmental relations, restrictions on the property regimes, and poor education-, the dependency perspective could refer to the differential natural resources, land reforms-selective protections, and the Western security-related financial aids (Radice, 2015: 140).

The content of the new development model reflected the real-life challenges to developmental processes. The challenges to the competitiveness of the globalized manufacturing markets, the dollar crisis of 1971-1973 – underlining the instabilities of international Fordist production model - and the monetary instability accompanying the crisis of overproduction and increasing inflation severely undermined the reputation and desirability of the Bretton Woods order.

These developments also resulted in the transformation of accumulation structures that diffused into the national and regional political-economic structures, creating amalgamation and contradictions for social relations. The new model of “post-Fordist” global production processes emerged as neoliberalism.

The developmental model informed by the neoliberal thinking was not so different from the one by the classical economic liberalism. The neoliberal model advocates the free market saved from political obstacles and the regulation. It prescribes to install a new framework in which the political is market-friendly and serves to facilitate accumulation relations, structures, processes while concerns related to social justice, equality, and inclusiveness are ignored. Radice (2008: 1155) underlines the dualistic nature of the premises neoliberal model was founded;

for Radice, it reflects the antinomies between state and market, politics, and economics.

Similar to modernization theory, neoliberalism believes in the universalistic theoretical constructs. Brohman underlines that neoliberalism rooted in mono-economics of orthodox neoclassical theory, which asserts that there is only one body of economic theory with universally applicable concepts – deriving from natural sciences. This approach is a product of the rational-deductive method of positivist science; the behaviors of individuals are predisposed by the deductively posited universal rational rules (Brohman, 1995: 126). It removes much of the human agency as well as social relations from the development paradigm.

The key events prepared the road to the global hegemony of the neoliberal model; however, they lie firstly in the crisis of the welfare state and the Keynesian model in the “developed” countries. Secondly, the failures of the self-reliant developmental strategies and the success stories of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Southeast Asia epitomized the end of the previous –protectionist – models. Along with that, the debt crisis confronting the “developing” countries and conditional Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were the drivers of structural transformation, which all consumed the alternatives for a developmental path.

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the neoliberal model appeared as triumphant. The popular arguments such as “the end of history,” “the clash of civilizations,” opened a new space for the conceptualization of the global relations in economic-political and social spheres. The increasing speed of integration –financial, economic, production, etc.– started to be called “globalization.” As Neil Brenner puts it, “significant strands of contemporary globalization research have been permeated by geographical concepts such as glocalization, translocalities.” Furthermore, globalization researches tend to describe various emergent social processes that appear to operate below, above, beyond entrenched geopolitical boundaries with prefixes such as sub-, supra-, and trans- (Brenner, 1999, 39).

There are proponents and skeptics about globalization, along with those who define it as a process of strong financial integration (Pozo, 2006). Some important debates go around the impact of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the causes, effects, scope, and nature of economic integration, the advantages, and disadvantages of transnationalism, and, most importantly, epistemological and real decrease of state primacy. Weiss argues that between skeptics of globalization and those proponents, the differences became polarized (Weiss, 1999: 59).

A conceptualization of development handled in such perspective results with categorizations, and distinctions relied upon the features at surface level that are inherently related in categorizations and classifications of developmental performance. It is epitomized in the analyses of the WB. The WB assigns economies into four groups according to their income level, which is high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low (<https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-level-2018-2019>).

Between developed and developing or developed and undeveloped, there are certain thresholds – in the form of income, growth. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) categorizes the countries regarding their human development performance based on the Human Development Index as very high, high, medium, or low. The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes (UNDP HDI, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>).

Such a perspective, on the other hand, ends up with a teleological understanding. The position of already developed countries is the endpoint for all as if development is a one-way destination. These perspectives mostly attempt to account for the failures of transformation. The solutions are designed to eliminate the obstacles before a certain level of democracy and liberal context, building a strong and healthy private sector. In September of 2000, the United Nations (UN)

declared its “Millennium Development Goals¹,” and set a deadline of 2015 to achieve these goals which are:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development (<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>).

The attempts of convergence and models for neoliberal development in the so-called “globalization” context fail to offer a detailed perspective. Against this background, Rosenberg (2000) distinguishes between the conceptualizations of globalization. He criticizes the definition of globalization as the economic, political, and social change while pointing out the historical specificities of development processes of the post-1945 settlement.

Pieterse (2000) underlines that uneven development comes in hand with globalization processes; however, contrary to the arguments of decreasing state power, Marx’s critique of the state comes forward, as the state has the authority to embed the reproduction and accumulation of capital in social relations (Radice, 2008: 1161). At this point, the distinction between imperialism and globalization that Pieterse (2000: 132-133) made is insightful. While the former is state-centric, primarily political, and territorially clear-cut, the latter is multi-dimensional, non-territorial, and multiply acted.

Building on the failures of conceptualizations to naturalize the subordinate and deteriorating conditions of development, as the failures of SAPs became unbearable, the 1990 World Development Report epitomized the shift in

¹ The UN has started a new agenda for development called Sustainable Development Goals targeting 2030: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>.

development thinking. The suggestions of the report as the best way to fight against poverty were decided upon two-pronged strategy: the promotion of labor-intensive growth through economic openness and investment in infrastructure, and general provision of essential services such as essential health and education. Throughout the 1990s, on the other hand, the promises of the Washington Consensus did not turn out to as expected.

The criticisms against the developmental model suggested, on the other hand, took the form of questioning by large numbers of cultural critics starting from the 1980s. These critics saw the development concept as a Western-originated discourse and approached it as a powerful mechanism, quite influential in the social, economic, and cultural production of the Third World. The post-development perspective argues for going beyond the Western-centric “development” paradigm and contends that “development” is a discourse that is invented in the post-World War II period.

2.5.1 Post-development

Sachs (1992) argues that discourse means a particular way of viewing the world, an epistemological construction that closes off other ways of seeing the world. Development discourse conflates difference with backwardness. Escobar (2007) underscores that the critics, especially the post-structuralists- dealt with the developmental problem in the Third World, different from the others. Instead of asking the questions for ensuring better developmental performance, they foregrounded the invention of the Third World, through discourses and practices regarding development, as in need of development and help.

The perspectives in Post-development claim that development is a narrative, a mystification of dominant and exploitative nature of relations. Esteva (2010: 2) puts it as:

Underdevelopment began, then, on 20 January 1949. On that day, 2 billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality...a mirror that defines their identity...simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority.

Rist (2008: 54) similarly draws attention to the sources of the hegemonic position of development concept, calling them semantic and substantive illusions. The universalization of Western mode of production is presented as a reachable objective with the help of construction and dissemination of the concept of “underdevelopment and the term developing nations mystified the underdevelopment process.” The Third World is also exposed to the substantive illusion by narrating them provided that the resources are utilized, the development occurs. Rist underlines that with such an economic growth model, the promised developmental progress cannot be achieved, and to the contrary, it results in exclusive and marginalizing economic relations. Parallel to that, Esteva approaches to the existence of development with a skeptical perspective. Esteva argues that the underdevelopment itself is taken for granted, which makes it real, and explanations of underdevelopment start to appear (Esteva, 2010: 7). To Rist (2008: 23), “development resembles a belief. However, nothing of the kind happens in the field of ‘development’: promises are tirelessly repeated, and experiments consistently reproduced. So why is it that each failure leads to another reprieve?” Although making a good point in emphasizing the dominance of Eurocentric perspective on development, the criticisms of development in post-development thinking sound as if the social reality can be separated.

Rist (2008: 19-20) underlines that the development concept has always been defined according to the interests and objectives of a group. That reflects the subjectivity of the definition of development. Ziai (2007: 229) adds that the arbitrary definition of development is instrumentalized for a political campaign, and at the same time, it creates the very inferiority for the non-western. Hence, according to the current ‘post-development’ view, the less development is, the better. The post-development authors center their alternative developmental strategies on grassroots movements, informal sector, and local communities, both urban and rural.

Escobar (1995: 51) argues that the failure of development created reactions in the form of new social structures different from the economics, politics, and knowledge – resulted in the hybridized traditional and modern elements. In regards

to the alternatives to development perspective, Rist underlines that since development policies failed to provide material and cultural awareness, there is no logic in insisting. Therefore, for Rist, the achievement of political, economic, and social autonomous positions, especially for the subaltern, becomes crucial (Rist, 2008: 259).

The conception of development becomes a matter of inquiry, and its necessity is questioned. According to Corbridge (2007: 180), these narratives are significant parts of the particular governmentalities which must be understood and challenged. He is also against elevating one form critique (deconstructive) over another in order to include various forms.

Taking development from the perspective of the Third World, post-colonial thinking should also be mentioned. The modernization perspective is criticized as ethnocentric and having universalist claims as if there was no agency for the Third World, which is also directed to dependency perspectives due to being deterministic. Kapoor (2008: 9) says that “what brings dependency and postcolonial theory together is their shared commitment precisely to critique. In their fashion, both are counter-modernist and critical of Western liberalism”. The postcolonial perspective takes the colonial experiences of Third World countries at its center of analysis. It is highly attentive to the cultural and ideological dimensions of development narrative, which derives from the Eurocentric perspective of world issues.

The question of identity and culture is at the center of postcolonial studies; tends to ignore socioeconomic inequality. They examine interconnections and hybridities created by the world-historical experience of colonialism. In this regard, the concept of “development” was attributed to the status of a “neo-colonial project” serving for the necessities and desires of the colonial powers (Escobar, 1995).

The post-colonial writer Bhabha (1994) criticizes taking the nation-state centric political view in the analysis of political subjectivity in post-colonial countries. For Bhabha, the focus in the analysis should shift to the daily life of subalterns from the state or class centric perspectives.

The relation between development studies and postcolonial theory is defined by Christine Sylvester (1999: 703–704) as,

The two fields ignore each other's missions and writings; both are giant islands of analysis and enterprise that stake out a large part of the world and operate within it – or with respect to it – as if the other had a bad smell.

The problematic issues regarding the development relations between North and South for Pieterse (2000: 130) are the misuse of the Northern concepts out of their context and lacking historical depth. Besides, the post-development perspective seems to have a reductionist view of the Third World subjectivity – describing them as passively subsumed under the western discourse of “development” and subordinated to the necessities of the hegemonic development projects. In this regard, either they were denied any agential power as subalterns, or they were “romanticized” as resisting against the development project (Ziai, 2007). Similarly, McEwan (2003) underlines the criticisms relevant to postcolonial development, arguing that it failed to connect its critique of “discourse and representation to the realities of people's lives and its inability to define a specific political and ethical project to deal with material problems.”

A brief historical and analytical engagement in the transformation of development thinking proves vital to start the analysis with the conceptualization of development. The development concept has taken different meanings through historical periods and connoted various values, norms, strategies, and policies. Instead of inevitable, immanent views on development, it is crucial to take it as a historically contingent form of knowledge depending on the relations of conflictual social forces in the social structures.

“Development” has always been a contested concept. It had contextually and conjecturally various meanings and concomitant strategies, models reflecting the specific features: multiplicity, unevenness, and combination. However, conflating the problems of development with the existence of traditional structures, cultural codes, and crony capitalism today, thus, does not help to account for it, let alone finding solutions. Similarly, defending a complete rejection of the possibility of development – even the concept itself – would be misleading and counterfactual.

2.6 Conceptualization of Emergentist Development: Hegemonic Model of Development

A critical review of the current conceptualizations of development indicates that development processes are complex. The complexity and stratification of development processes manifest in the problematic issues in development relations, thinking, and models. The classifications according to the level of development as “developing,” and “least-developed” reflect the essence of development processes; to illustrate, international development aid and assistance, conditionality, international organizations have all been the historically specific outcomes of the particularities emerged in the development processes.

The current conceptualizations of development tend to concentrate on the empirical manifestations of complicated development processes, which results in inefficient solutions, models, and strategies for “development.” Because of Western-based social scientific understanding, Development Studies seek to find out similarities/differences between those “developing” and the idealized Western development model (Brohman, 1995: 121). Euro-centric and modernist perspectives fail to hear the subalterns of development processes and distort the local experiences of development. In this regard, Makki sees the 2008 global economic crisis as an excellent chance for “a new lease” of thinking on the concept of development. He puts that “there might be an alternative.” Therefore, as Haynes (2005: 6) rightly argues the alleviation of poverty and ensuring development by investing in more and more in infrastructural projects, physical capital would probably fail to achieve what is desired. To be blunt, the analysis of development processes first requires a restructured conceptualization to save it from conflating events with their generative mechanisms and causes.

The dissertation brings in the emergentist development concept for capturing the specificities and particularities of uneven and combined development processes. It underlines the necessity of a comprehensive framework to integrate various and extensive character of development relations. The objective of the dissertation is to provide a deeper explanatory framework, for it adopts a historically and socially-minded analysis, which is not abstracted from capitalist social totality.

Building on the historical materialist understanding, the dissertation attempts to fill the gaps relevant to the conceptualization of development. Such an analysis enables 1) to restructure conceptualization of a non-teleological and nonlinear development, 2) to understand profound structural impact over developmental processes 3) to examine the nature of development in an interactive and totalistic manner. Overall, a conceptualization of development via CR methodology sheds light on the operation of mechanisms generating unevenness and a combination in development processes.

CR methodology is concerned with the problematic ontological position in positivist scientific understanding. The empirical fallacy of conflating events with observable causes appears as one of the controversial issues. Unlike positivism, CR does not confine the scientific analysis to the empirical manifestation of social phenomena. The reality is attributed through experiencing empirically and causally in CR; to illustrate, with the notion of ontological depth, CR seeks to find underlying mechanisms of the events in a totalistic approach.

The conjunctural nature of the determination of most social phenomena reflects the involvement of different causes. This feature of social sciences renders reducing the complexities in social totalities into single, general factors impossible; still, the notion of ontological depth and stratification of reality brings the issue of settling the relative determining power. Porpora argues that it is essential to highlight that CR ontological stratification prevents any simplistic separation of material and social as if they were a different state of reality. The strata of reality have causal relations that are complex and irreducible. CR embraces the idea of “nonreductive materialism that gives primacy to the material without embracing determinism” (1998: 346).

CR underlines the close connection between the conceptualizations of the objects of social scientific analysis and the totalities in which the scientific analyses are embedded. It both results in the necessity of constant search for deeper structural information about the object and indicates the possibility of finding new totalities. The totalization process in CR epitomizes the attribution of reality according to the causal notion. For Bhaskar, although the totalization “is a process in thought,

totalities are real...Social science does not create the totalities it reveals, although it may itself be an aspect of them” (Bhaskar, 1998: 223).

Explanation of an event, therefore, depends on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions (Bhaskar, 2009: 71-72). The model for the explanation in open systems presented by Bhaskar, consist of four steps:

1. Resolution of the complex event into its components (causal analysis)
2. Redescription of component causes
3. Retrodiction to possible (antecedent) causes of components via independently validated normic statements
4. Elimination of possible alternative causes of components

The totality of capitalism requires incorporating the interactive nature of relations. Acknowledging the multi-causality and complexity of the social reality help to make a distinction between the real nature of the phenomenon/ object of analysis and the knowledge obtained about it through conceptualization, retrodiction, and concretization.

CR notion of concept dependency is relevant to the object of social scientific analysis; to illustrate, the mechanisms in the real ontological stratum operate and interact with each other, and as a consequence, the events are causally generated with emergent features in the actual ontological stratum. The conceptualizations of social sciences are located in the empirical ontological stratum. The historical specificities which are experienced in the empirical level are conceptualized through the extant theories, perspectives, and scientific methodology. This feature is defined as the concept dependency in CR. It has two implications; first, it renders possible the scientific analysis, and second, it entails the constant questioning of the accounts relevant to the object. The real test for the conceptualizations and theoretical perspectives, in this regard, becomes acquiring a deeper knowledge of the generative mechanisms. In the context of development processes, it means the critical review of the conceptualizations of development and their derivative concepts such as imperialism, dependency, and underdevelopment.

The conceptualization of development in historical materialism epitomizes the significance of methodological review. The core of materialist philosophy in Marx

emerges from the necessities of the reproduction of social life. In the Preface of *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx (1904) puts it as

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.

Historical materialism views historical developments through the lens of antagonistic class struggles. Through abstraction –getting beneath the concrete forms of actual events to explore underlying complex social relations constitutes the materialist essence of Marx’s method. Such perspective examines the narratives, imaginations, and discourses, yet do not start the analysis from that point (Marx and Engels, 1998). As mentioned above, CR methodology claims that although the generative mechanisms of the actual phenomena are unobservable, because of their being causally efficacious, they acquire a real character, and become part of realist social scientific analysis.

Methodologically, the Marxian approach to capitalist expansion relies on the assumption that the world becomes a total unified market after the image of England. However, it must be emphasized that the classical interpretations of Marxian philosophy seem to be under the influence of classical sociology and methodological nationalism.

Since it has a linear and, to some extent, stagist conceptualization of social development, the actual historic processes defy the imposition of any mechanistic interpretation of Marx’s social model. Although Marx had a materialist perspective that is fitting to realist understanding of social science, the reductionist approach to the higher-level phenomena in the sense of superstructure misleadingly ends up with teleological results. The incongruence between the theoretical model and actual events is because of the stratified and differentiated nature of social reality, which necessitates in-depth ontological conceptualization.

A similar problematic interpretation of Marx's model emanates from the mechanistic readings of Marx's arguments. In the 1859 Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," Marx (1904) argues that

No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient to have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

The premise of materialism in Marx's method is essential, he frequently emphasizes, in the German Ideology, that the conditions of existence affect the consciousness of men, and the men are the producers of their concepts – as in the CR notion "the concept dependency of social sciences." (Marx and Engels, 1998: 38) Regarding Marx's model and its various interpretations – structural, post-Marxist – CR claims a realist social scientific analysis of social phenomena is possible without being empirically realist or anti-foundationalist/relativist. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that reality is stratified and differentiated.

Drawing on Marx's materialist approach to elements- ideological, political, and cultural – in the superstructure, the interpretations of Marx's argument about the decisive effect of the economic basis of society over consciousness ended up with misleading conceptualizations:

The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousnesses (Marx, 1904).

The Marxist perspectives have to struggle for finding a way out from reductionism or blind eclecticism; to illustrate, neo-Marxist/structuralist research on development attempts to refine Marx's general framework of historical Materialism to capture the particularities in the form of "articulations of modes of production." The result is questioned whether underdevelopment or development necessarily flowed from the historical unfolding of capital, or could be "read off" the capitalist mode of production, or stemmed from the "needs" of developed capitalism and/or the capitalist world system.

Turning back to Marx's formula "material conditions the existence, rather than vice versa," it must be emphasized that the higher-level phenomena are irreducible to the lower level one. In other words, although the base has a causal primacy, the superstructural elements have their emergent features, powers, and tendencies. As Marx (1904) puts it:

The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformations of the economic conditions of production.

With such perspective, while the ideological, political elements are acknowledged as a part of a strategic-relational instrument of class struggles, collisions, and their preventive capacity of any social revolution in the form of illusionary ideological consciousness is noticed.

The second deficiency which can be overcome through CR methodology is the clarification of any teleological attribution to actual events. Marx (1904) conceptualized the emergent contradictions in the social structures in the form of conflicts between productive forces and relations of production:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or -- this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms -- with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then, begins an era of social revolution.

The CR understanding of social science proposes that social science aims to obtain deeper information regarding the structures in which social action is embedded. In this way, as the more in-depth knowledge is obtained, man gets further control over the structures, and it is the preliminary step for emancipation. In this sense, the CR notion of explanation is fitting to the concept of "alienation", for it aims to obtain information about the social structures within which the material processes of development are embedded along with ideational dimensions.

As the CR methodology emphasizes the significance of the structural approach to social events, it must be distinguished from the model of structural Marxism. Since the ontological conceptualization of the relationship between base

and superstructure in the classical Marxist interpretations is criticized as determinist, the structural Marxist perspective attempts to model this relation in a pluralist manner while keeping the determining primacy of the base. Structural Marxism argues that the base-superstructure model is problematic; the economy is only determinant “in the last instance”. Althusser (1977: 199) argues that “there is no longer any simple unity, only a structured, complex unity. There is no longer any original simple unity, but instead, the ever pre-givenness of a structural complex unity.”

The scientific version of Marxism, led by Althusser is severely criticized because of that Thompson (1978: 97) argues that “Althusser de-historicizes and de-socializes social relations because all these “instances” and “levels” are human activities, institutions, and ideas.” Therefore, with deep ontology, historical materialist development can be saved from dehistoricized conceptualization; Joseph (2006: 136) puts it as:

Society is seen as comprised of a multitude of strata with structures that inter-relate and co-determine one another. Within this economic structures may still be regarded as the most important or dominant ones, but they are not exclusively determinant and the different strata of the social formation each have their own emergent properties, laws, and powers.

A critical methodological approach to conceptualizations of development demonstrates that the ontological depth of social reality is vital to abstain from reductionism and to integrate emergent features into the analysis. Concerning the complex and interactive features of development processes, various generative mechanisms are involved. In order to build the causal model of emergentist development, the mechanisms must be identified and elicited.

The notion of causality in CR philosophy is complex. CR highlights the weaknesses and internal contradictions of the causal model in positivism. The Humean notion of causality in positivism takes the constant conjunction of events as necessary and sufficient condition for attributing causal relation between events. Bhaskar points out inadequacies in such a causal model, which carries a risk of the direct-shift from explanation to prediction. As the explanation of an event is projected to the level of prediction, such a causal model cannot help resulting in

misleading and reductionist accounts of social events that are realized in open systems under the influence of various social forces, mechanisms, and dynamics (Bhaskar, 2008: 55-56). In this regard, to cope with the complexity of the events, which are determined by variable configurations of causal factors, a conceptualization of contingency is necessary. Instead of a single causal factor or seeking for constancy, “contingency,” which pays attention to emergent features and ontological stratification, denotes that “the same types of events” might be caused by different mechanisms (Steinmetz, 1998: 172). Besides, in order for overcoming the misattribution of causality, Sayer (2000: 16) argues that one should ask a series of characteristically realist questions:

- What does the existence of this object/practice presuppose? What are its preconditions, viz? What does the use of money presuppose (trust, a state)?”
- “Can object A (capitalism) exist without B (patriarchy)? : This is another way of sorting out the conditions of existence of social phenomena”.
- “What is it about this object which enables it to do certain things (naturally, there may be several mechanisms at work simultaneously, and we may need to seek ways of distinguishing their respective effects.)

Before the concretization of emergentist development, it is beneficial to delineate distinctive features. A CR conceptualization of development, in this context, brushes away the mechanistic/stagist, universalistic connotations, concepts, theorizations. It sees development as processes embedded in social totality with complex, interactive, and emergent characteristics. Any notion of end-point, a teleological approach, is criticized as causing misleadingly empirical categorizations. Furthermore, it abstains from partial observations on development processes and rejects abstractions from social totality. CR development addresses the multiple dimensions -political, social, and cultural - impacting the development processes.



Figure 1: The Model of Emergentist Development

Figure 1 demonstrates the ontological stratification in social reality. Development processes are realized in the actual stratum and are generated by the specific mechanisms – unevenness and combination. The conceptualization of emergentist development essentially underpins the generative mechanisms in real stratum instead of a normative, subjective set of development thinking. The empirical level in the model sheds light on the current conceptualizations of development, while it epitomizes the risk of conflating specific outcomes of development processes with development itself. This dissertation underlines that without an ontological notion of depth, the social scientific analysis of development processes cannot abstain from falling into empirical fallacies.

The emergentist development examines the interactive nature of development processes and conceptualizes the intersocietal interaction with great care. The theoretical analysis of emergentist development relies upon the conceptualization of society in CR. Bhaskar (1998) asks, “What properties do societies possess that might make them possible objects of knowledge for us?”, and develops the “Transformational Model of Social Action” (TMSA). In this model, social structure is attributed to reality, thanks to its emergent and causally efficacious features (Lewis, 2000: 252). In TMSA, unlike individualist and structuralist models, the relational and positional dimensions of the society and individual are highlighted (Bhaskar, 1998: 39-41).

In CR, the structure is defined as “a set of internally related objects.” It refers to “the inner composition making each object what it is and not something else, which means it does not refer only to macro conditions” (Danermark et al., 2002: 47). Lewis (2000: 250) argues that “social structure and human agency are held to be recursively related; each is both a condition for and a consequence of the other.” Via their actions, individuals either transform or reproduce these structures. Gorski (2013: 543) underlines the conceptualization of a social structure/relation in a way that they afford different potentialities, possibilities, practices, and activities, requiring reflexivity as to what ends these should be directed. Lewis (2000: 259) draws a picture of society constituted by a nexus of social positions that are fulfilled by actors having a particular set of interests and actions. The positions in these

structures refer to the distribution of material and cultural resources that are required to carry out particular courses of action.

To illustrate, the distribution of endowments conditions the context of decisions made and is temporally before current activity, which points to the analysis of generative mechanisms that impact the relational process within actions in the social structures. Adopting such a position, one can account for the structural limits of society, social relations, and positions upon the individual, while the agential power of the individuals is preserved. Unlike the agent, it does not hold the power of action. The structure in the model, however, is argued to have constraining and enabling forces over the preferences of the agent. It is constituted by the social forces, inherited historically (Lewis, 2000: 251). When Wight (2006) refers to the structure agent problem in social sciences, he underlines the importance of the structural and historical explanation. Structure, in a way, enables/constrains the actions of the agent, which also has social predicates emerging out of the social dimension of reality (Wight, 2006: 288-289).

In emergentist development, development is realized within the social structures. While the agents hold power to transform/reproduce their structural conditions and position, the structures play a decisive role in the agential processes. Emergentist development in this regard unfolds through the agents bearing structural legacies.

Interconnected to causality and relation between agent and structure, the model for theory building-testing and theoretical explanation in CR seeks to abstain from reductionist tendencies. The definition and purpose of theory in positivist social scientific understanding derive from the positivist ontology – independent existence of reality, which is composed of linearly successive events creating cause and effect. CR critiques the positivist model because of conflating the empirical with actual stratum. More importantly, the succession of events is an elusive notion that can be possible in only closed, controlled systems. The possibility of closed systems in the real-world is questionable (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 20-23). It must be emphasized that the notion of holism in the CR model does not mean blind eclecticism or thick description without an explanatory causal relationship. While

the positivist critique sees explanatory complexity as a “toolbox approach”, CR explicitly acknowledges of conjunctural, multi-causal, and historically shifting causal relations. As Steinmetz (1998: 182) argues:

Accounting for the determination of complex objects in open systems necessarily involves an "eclectic" mix of theories relating to the relevant causal mechanisms. This is quite different from the empiricist "variablism" found in much multivariate statistical research, where variables are connected to theoretical mechanisms in a loose and ad hoc way.

In CR, the distinctive feature of a social scientific theory is its sensitivity to historical and social specificities. Historical refers to acknowledging the influence of the inherited structures and forces, while social refers to the interaction between structural and agential dynamics (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 25). At the same time, it should acknowledge the complex nature of causality and the diversity of social forces at play. It is crucial, thus, to reiterate once more that the ontological stratification and differentiation denies a simplistic and parsimonious understanding of causality and theory. In this regard, Rutzou (2016: 334) says:

Against the shallow and surface analysis of empiricisms and the pursuit of events and constant conjunctions, realism searches for a means of moving beyond the surface and getting at the structures, and with the structures, the causal mechanisms, powers, capacities, and dispositions of social reality that account for the surface events.

The dissertation builds its theorization of the socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya on a framework sensitized to the power and level of the generative mechanisms of development. In this context, an essential component of the theoretical framework is the macro-historical and social structures in which the intersocietal and intrasocietal interaction realizes. The theoretical framework of emergentist development is Uneven and Combined Development.

The U&CD perspective acquires a deep ontological form with CR methodology. It captures the multi-causal and multiply-determined nature of development processes. The U&CD perspective, when disposed of its “law-like” conceptualization, helps theorization of the “international.” It attempts to overcome essentialist, ahistorical, and asocial accounts of development. As Munck argues (2012: 85), it is sensitized to the specificities of the international, “globalization and

counter-globalization” along with combined causal relations of development processes via “intersocietal.”

CR is the methodology that can guide the Marxist core of the U&CD; to illustrate, U&CD in emergentist development acknowledges the historical specificities of the capitalist social totality. The emergentist development drawing on U&CD challenges the mechanical interpretations of historical materialism, which reduces historical development to stages in economic development. As Marx conceptualized the productive forces playing a decisive role in the specification of the relations of production, the contradictions emanating from the relations of production and shifts in productive forces become essential for social transformation. It prioritizes the mechanisms of unevenness and combination and seeks to capture development with its depth in a non-reductionist and non-determinist manner. It inquires the development phenomenon in a totalistic way to provide a sociologically and methodologically holistic account. The benefits of such an attempt are to integrate the partial accounts of specific outcomes of development and to build a solid ground to correct, revise, and reinforce HM conceptualization of development.

One of the main objectives of emergentist development analysis is to explain the varieties in a structured, stratified reality. It renders the inquiry of the formations, alliances, and struggles within social formations interactively. The interactivity of development processes is captured through the distinction between mechanisms at play. In CR, the ontological stratification also denotes the differentiation between mechanisms that operate at higher and lower levels. Moreover, the mechanisms emerge as plural in one level operating together – as political, economic, and social structures operate in the domain of social (Steinmetz, 1998).

The spheres of reality – economic, political, or ideological – become relevant to the generative mechanisms, institutions, and events (Collier, 1998: 271). A phenomenon is produced through the operation and interaction of different mechanisms. Focusing on relations, thus, undermines the analytical usefulness of

“level of analysis” (Yalvaç, 2010). Joseph (2010) argues that looking for explanations of the international at a lower domestic level is misleading.

The effects of the international were epitomized in the divergent case of the Russian revolution. Against the mechanical views of historical development in classical Marxist thought, Gramsci called it a “revolution against Marx’s Capital” (Joseph, 2006: 20). Along with being a divergent case for the mechanical interpretation of capitalist development, the Russian revolution reflects the essential features of the capitalist development processes: unevenness and combination-similarly, the Syrian and Libyan cases with their emergent features become interesting objects of analysis. The development processes in capitalist social totality cannot be thought separately from the consequences of international and amalgams of archaic and contemporary.

The emergentist development approach emphasizes that depending on the character of the day, interpretations of Marx’s social change assumed misleading methodologies. Contrary to Marx, the economic basis and productive forces of Russian society came after the revolution in the Russian case. In other words, the mechanistic materialism of Kautsky –lacking the ontological depth - seems to undertheorize the counter-tendencies in social strata. Although Marx (1904), in the appendix of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, mentions the “unassimilated” forms of previous modes of production, which emerge in amalgamated forms in the extant mode of production, the classical Marxist understanding adopted the evolutionary and naturalistic perspective of objective laws to explain actual events. Marx’s argument for the expansion of capitalism as creating similar tendencies and relations of production as in England, according to Trotsky (1980: 890), is less applicable in proportion. Trotsky argues that it “takes its departure methodologically not from the world economy as a whole but the single capitalist country as a type.”

Rosenberg (2006) argues that the undertheorized position of the “international” dimension in classical sociology resulted in lacking a “consistent” conceptualization of development in Marx’s writings (Makki, 2015). However, concerning the diffusion, amalgamation, and expansion of development processes, a

consistent theorization of the relational specificities of “development” entails integrating the international into the framework in a non-reductionist and non-deductive manner.

Trotsky compares this argument of Marx with his formula “No social formation disappears before all the productive forces have developed for which it has room,” and points out that this argument “takes its departure, not from a country but a sequence of universal social structures” (Trotsky, 1980: 890). It is neither taking domestic as the source where international is emerging from nor taking international in a deterministic way. The essence of “emergence” denotes that “national and international are both emergent relations out of underlying social structures.” The purpose of the social analysis becomes, thus, to identify these social relations and to examine their impact upon societal multiplicity. Regarding the ontological issue of international, Matin (2013) argues that the conceptualization of production in historical materialism has a methodologically nationalist understanding, which is abstracted from societal multiplicity. He continues that adding “international” later into the analysis would not be appropriate to the concretization process.

The emergentist development argues that development processes unfold through social structures, in which the social forces hold hegemonic positions. The formation of the hegemonic model of development in the social structures affects the domestic structures of development through intersocietal interaction. It turns into an essential feature of social relations that must be integrated into the framework, about which the U&CD perspective has a distinct position. Oliviera (2019) points out to the concepts of “combination and amalgamation” in Trotsky’s analysis of the transformation of Russian social structures – production, accumulation, exploitation – which were affected unevenly. The socio-political transformation in Russia resulted in the strengthened Russian absolutism against the external threats rather than a linear development and emergence of the bourgeoisie class.

The productive forces hold quite a vital place in Marx’s model of capitalist totality. As the productive forces expand, the division of labor is specified further,

and in a dialectical relation, the base and the superstructure impact one another. Trotsky (1980) argues that less developed nations are subjected to a peculiar combination of different states of the historical process. Under pressure from external, these countries develop modern capitalist features. U&CD takes the historical process with its specificities and amalgamation. It belies any stagist, mechanistic, and linear interpretation of social transformation. The Russian transformation epitomizes the significance of hegemonic social forces in the structures of development as mediators of development processes, to illustrate; the configuration of social forces within historically specific social formation not only provides the content of development but also directs the development processes.

The development of historically backward nations leads to a peculiar combination of different stages in the historical process; the character of their development assumes complexity and specificity. In this process, the mechanisms come to the fore. Bounded to the structures, they have causal effects over the relations of production. Trotsky (1980) underlines the extent to which this skipping of social development very much relevant to the economic and cultural capacities of the country while assuming its contradictions. He (Trotsky, 1980) puts it as:

Capitalism means, however, an overcoming of those conditions. It prepares and in a certain sense realizes the universality and permanence of man's development. By this a repetition of the forms of development by different nations is ruled out. Although compelled to follow after the advanced countries, a backward country does not take things in the same order.

The whip of external necessity should be conceptualized concerning the class struggles which are embedded in social structures governed by generative mechanisms emerging in the capitalist social totality. This necessity means that while the national configuration of social forces has to reproduce itself through hegemonic projects – at the same time colliding with rival hegemonic projects, the capitalist structures – geopolitical and economic – affect these processes. The hegemonic model of development conceptualizes this specific feature of intersocietal interaction as uneven and combined development.

The Syrian and Libyan cases, in this regard, present a rigorous object of analysis with their emergent features in development processes. It is argued that the

hegemonic model of development has diffused into the domestic structures of development. The content of the hegemonic model of development is determined in the social structures, as Harvey (2005) argues; the neoliberal project aims to restore the class power to the top elite. The emerging forms of political and social institutionalization take their shape according to underlying structural conditions.

The law of motion in the capitalist economic system can be presented as world capitalism with its uneven development and conflictual social forces. Neither the internationalization of capital and labor nor the undermining of the nation-state can capture the depth of the underlying structure of surface events. Radice (2015: 50-51) put forward that there is a unified political economy where the First, Second and Third Worlds are converging and where the uneven development unfolds, while the aim is to direct labor for the use of capital and to make it as easy as possible for capitals to restructure, relocate and rationalize. Adam Hanieh (2009: 79) views the current capitalist system as structured hierarchically and promoting internationalization tendencies of accumulation via dynamics of uneven development. On that account, the market is conceptualized as a social mechanism and institution, which defies an abstracted, asocial understanding. The “market society project” of the neoliberal hegemonic model of development reflects the broad and extensive implications of the model. Radice identifies the specificities in the market society project, which integrates the political and economic sectors via shifting from “absolutism” to “constitutional democracy” and “from feudal restrictions on property rights” to “the rule of money and commodification of all resources” (Radice, 2008: 1155). The agency of the state directs the market society project. Strange (2014: 14) approaches to the impact of “globalization” of the neoliberal model of development on the state with a different perspective. While acknowledging globalization transformed the functions of the state, Strange argues that the emergent state forms turn into a node as a locality embedded in the global circuits of accumulation and exploitation processes.

In *German Ideology*, Marx conceptualizes relations of production as encompassing the international relations, “The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive

forces, the division of labor and internal intercourse” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 38). “The structure of the industry, and the character of the class struggle in Russia, was determined to a decisive degree by international conditions,” this statement of Trotsky indicates the effects of combination in capitalist social totality in the form of international. The pedantic schematic interpretation of Marx’s model of capitalist development excludes the effects of international, which unfolds through the intersocietal interaction and realizes as the whip of external necessity. In *German Ideology*, Marx emphasizes that the division of labor also designates a position in the capitalist structures, which is valid for both national and international division of labor. He argues that “The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the way work is organized in agriculture, industry, and commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same conditions are to be seen (given more developed intercourse) in the relations of different nations to one another.”

The hegemonic model of development conceptualizes this intersocietal interaction as mediated by the state, which is the arena of class struggles that appear in the form of hegemonic projects colliding with each other. Rather than separating national from international, the capitalist structures are taken as being causally efficacious through mechanisms of unevenness and combination. As Trotsky puts it, “World development forced Russia out of her backwardness and her Asiaticness. Outside the web of this development, her further destiny cannot be understood.” In this context, Marx clarifies his conceptualization of the social revolution, which does not require reaching its limits in a particular country. Such view defies mechanistic and linear interpretations of social change, as Marx (Marx and Engels, 1998: 83-84) puts it:

To lead to collisions in a country, this contradiction need not necessarily have reached its extreme limit in that particular country. The competition with industrially more advanced countries, brought about by the expansion of international intercourse, is sufficient to produce a similar contradiction in countries with a less advanced industry (e.g., the latent proletariat in Germany brought into more prominence by the competition of English industry).

During the realization of uneven and combined development processes, the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification play a decisive role in the developmental outcomes. The unfolding of developmental outcomes is the test of verification for the reality of mechanisms relevant to uneven and combined development, as, through the diffusion of uneven development, the combined effects of development emerge.

The combined effects of uneven development extend beyond the social entities and encompass inside of them. This trait of development processes defies any abstraction from totality and distinction between and within national boundaries. An implication of combination can be seen in the misleading terms such as “lagged,” referring to the understanding that some parts of the world follow the temporal sequences from behind. In this regard, not to risk misunderstanding the particular experiences and dynamics of uneven development, Bogaert suggests that the conceptualization should integrate not only the relations between North and South but also within North and South (Bogaert, 2013: 220).

The neoclassical perspective seems to dominate the accounts on the persistence of poverty and marginalization in the global south. The delineation of the mechanisms that generate development processes indicates the problematic conceptualization of the persistence of poverty. Bush (2004) critiques that the neo-classical perspective focuses on the poor people’s differential incorporation in the political and economic processes, while undertheorizes the relations of exclusion and marginalization. It is vital to emphasize that the globalization of the neoliberal development model is the process in which the material, technological, and perceptual differences emerge (Pieterse, 2000). Nicola Philips criticizes the understanding that inequality is understood as an effect or a consequence of globalization and emphasizes the point of how globalization is itself intrinsically conditioned by inequality (Philips, 2005: 45).

The capitalist development processes are shaped by the distinct and historically specific formation of social forces in the state-society complex that has a “particular modality of capitalism”, rather than by the general relations of production between wage laborers and capitalists and the attendant property

relations (private ownership of the social means of production) (Achcar, 2013: 10). The state becomes an essential instrument for securing the interest of the classes and groups that struggle to present their interests as the general interest. It requires searching for the particular amalgamation in concrete historical formations. The diffusion of development processes reflects the specificities of structural conditions. An emergentist view of development requires the social relations that make a phenomenon possible (Bhaskar, 1998: 230). Yalvaç (2010a: 178) argues that “this also implies the transformational model of society since according to this model ‘to understand the essence of social phenomena ... such phenomena must be grasped as productions’; therefore, the relations referred to are relations of production.”

In the Libyan and Syrian cases, the world development designated the extent of their rentier economic models according to the hegemonic model of development, and their newly emerged productive forces specified their relations of production. However, the emergentist development, at this point, emphasizes that the residues of previous modes of production in both countries – due to colonial legacies and productive forces- amalgamated into the extant mode of production. As part of “peripheral capitalism,” which denotes the legacy of colonialism and subsumption under capitalism on the social forces and structures, although the mode of production in peripheral capitalism is amalgamated with the extant social forces, the emerging contradictions do not necessarily have to culminate in the social revolution. At this point, the emergent features of the complex level of determinations come to the fore. While the class struggle in a specific social formation makes sense of the projection of development, the mode of production and relations of production – in which the auxiliary classes and owner classes embedded – specify the context of development processes. Marx argues that the contradictory relations between productive forces and the forms of intercourse may take a different form other than social revolution when they could not manage to challenge the economic basis of society. These forms may create the illusion as they were the real causes of the collision between classes, ideas, political struggle.

However, to abstain from mechanistic readings of Marx’s materialism, Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony is significant in that it manages to

integrate the structure and agent without undertheorizing both. The strategic-relational conceptualization of the foundation and perpetuation of hegemonic historical blocs makes sense of the unfolding of relations of production and naturalization of contradictions. The hegemonic model of development, in this sense, concentrates on the material dimensions of production without overlooking the elements in the superstructure. It is distinct from the neo-Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony – a consensual form of hegemony. The emergentist development claims that the material conditions of relations of production can be examined through generative mechanisms. Concerning the development processes, they are identified as the mechanisms of differentiation and stratification.

Bunge (2004: 204) investigates the roots of social marginalization and polarization through mechanisms of exclusion and participation. Hettne (2009) draws attention to the uneven nature of globalization and its impact over the societies, arguing that the state/society complex demonstrates that:

The fundamental problem with globalization is the selectiveness of the process. The exclusivist implications lead to politics of identity, as loyalties are being transferred from civil society to primary groups competing for scarce resources in growing development crises.

It must be emphasized at this point that Marx acknowledged the impact of previous forms of relations of production in the extant one. The persistence of the material forms within the previous modes of production also appears in the superstructure. It denotes the argument of Trotsky as the amalgam of the archaic and contemporary instead of complete termination of the archaic with contemporary. It means that the amalgams and combined effects of development processes can emerge in the form of social and cultural, as much as economic.

The conceptualization of development processes as part of socio-political transformation allows the in-depth analysis of developmental specificities and differentiation. The cases of Syria and Libya present the amalgamation of tribal and sectarian identities with the modern institutions and mechanisms of social stratification. While these mechanisms operate under domestic structures of development upon which a particular state form presides, the state as a mediating actor directs the diffusion of hegemonic model of development according to

specificities emerging in the historical, social formation. Along with ethnic/tribal and sectarian identities in political and economic spheres, amalgamation, which impacted the outcomes of the development process, in this context, becomes an essential point that can provide explanatory information about the operation of developmental mechanisms. As Bhaskar (2005: 52) argues:

It might be conjectured that in periods of transition or generative crisis structures, previously opaque, become more visible to agents. Moreover, that this, though it never yields quite the epistemic possibilities of a closure ... does provide a partial analog to the role played by experimentation in natural science.

2.6.1 Concretization of “Emergentist Development”

The differentiation of the essence of the object from the knowledge obtained about it is the notion that scientific analysis is necessary, as Marx (1981, 956) puts it: “A science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence.” One of the substantial contributions of CR methodology is to provide a meta-theoretical framework to inform scientific analysis (Kurki, 2007: 368). CR attributes an essential position in the process of retrodiction in the analysis of social reality, and the concretization of the social phenomenon becomes a vital component in the processes of explanation. The benefits of such a meta-theoretical framework are to combine “realist ontology” and “relational sociology” (Bhaskar, 1998: 211). In *Grundrisse*, Marx (1973: 100-101) argues that:

The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result not as a point of departure, even though it is the real departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and conception.

The concretization of emergentist development, once sensitized to notions of ontological depth and generative mechanisms, includes acknowledging the socially and historically contingent outcomes. The concrete in this perspective refers to “not something reducible to empirical or to the factual” (Sayer, 1998: 123). Yalvaç (2010a: 180) states that “the feature making an object concrete is because it has

multiple determinations, not because it exists as a fact”. It means that, as Joseph (2010) puts it, “Those things existing at a higher layer will be governed by more than one law or mechanism.” Although the thing at a higher level is rooted in and emergent from the lower level, it is irreducible to it. It can be conceived of via viewing this process as a non-reductive social stratification where social layers mutually determine each other, yet still, there is a hierarchy. Certain relations, processes, and structures have a hiatus over the others in a complex and differentiated way. It also entails revealing these multiple sets of determinations, which otherwise remain as a partial view of the social phenomenon.

It makes the adding of multiple levels of determinations over a lower basis as appropriate to critical realist methodology. The introduction of multiple levels of determinations becomes meaningful. The structuring logic, underlying relation between the different sets of determinations, is the subject of analysis. As Bhaskar argued, the ontological depth provides the necessary analysis hiatus between spheres of reality. The analysis of mechanisms does not have to be necessarily determinist. Accordingly, the analytically higher, complex set of determinations become irreducible to lower levels; in other words, the lower level explanations do not become ontologically more meaningful. The contrary is the issue: a new set of determinations do have their emergent properties, which are not autonomous yet at the same time, not totality explicable with lower-level phenomena. As Engels (2010: 204-205) puts it:

The determining element in history is ultimately the production and reproduction of real life. It is not the only determining one, for the various elements of the superstructure also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases, preponderate in determining their form.

As Joseph (2010: 64) puts it, “this might mean, for example, looking at the underlying causal powers of something like the capitalist mode of production while also recognizing that it both influences and is contradicted by the actions of states or developments in IR.” Therefore, the evaluation of developmental performances first and foremost requires the underlying relations of development processes. Brohman (1995: 123) says, “development principles should not be formed via the direct

transplanting of preconceived approaches; instead, they should be reconsidered in terms of particular socio-cultural, political, economic and environmental conditions.” To illustrate, the confused and teleological connotations of the words attributed to development, such as “*progress, growth, and decline*,” do mislead the analytical focus. Callinicos emphasizes that the relations in capitalist social totality are distinctively conflictual and antagonistic – assuming differentiated forms and participants such as workers and capitalists, within capitals. For Callinicos, capitalist structures play a decisive role in unleashing economic crises and self-reinforce the uneven development processes (Callinicos, 2010: 25).

The advance of capitalism has affected the nature of interrelation within structures of development. The U&CD perspective takes as reality the “world economic structures,” which are interconnected with the international division of labor (Barker, 2006). According to Rosenberg (2010: 158), the U&CD perspective adds a “lateral field of causality over and above domestic determinations,” which demonstrates the capacity of its theoretical framework incorporating the sociological nature of intersocietal interaction.

Within intersocietal interaction, the mechanisms of development operate. The unevenness in capitalist social totality denotes differentiation and hierarchization in political, economic, and cultural sectors of social reality (Ashman, 2006: 93). It is vital to emphasize that the mechanism of unevenness cannot be thought separately from the capitalist social totality. While capitalism pushes for strengthening the interrelation between historical formations in a single productive system under the dominance of capital, the mechanisms of unevenness affect the tempo and content of the social forces. Besides, the unevenness of development is argued as “a banal fact of human development”, lacking a profound explanatory power.

Although Trotsky failed to spell out what are the relations and mechanisms of combination (Ashman, 2010), concerning the identification, clarification, and concretization of mechanisms of combination, a guiding principle in this complicated process can be looking at the moments of transformation in the logic and conditions of reproduction and accumulation. Along with that, the historical,

social formations become bound to each other, creating specificities and amalgamation through mechanisms of combination (Hardy, 2016: 2-3).

Evans (2016: 5), searching for the mechanisms of combination, suggests that mechanisms (a) “condition the integration of so-called backward social formations into global capitalist market relations” and (b) “directly affect the transformation of social class relations and property relations” should be paid attention. However, concerning the structured relations in capitalist social totality, the analyses seem to embrace separate views of political and economic, public, and private (Yalvaç, 2010a: 181). Evans (2016: 2) argues that the content of combination must be handled carefully not to cause “conceptual overstretching,” which denotes to unnecessary and misleading insistence on the technological transfers. The outcomes of these processes are not pre-determined and necessitate the examination of specificities of class and property relations. It turns into an essential part of the analyses of the capitalist mode of production (Wood, 2002).

Therefore, combination denotes the essence of the relation between different societies with different reproductive logic compelling each other to adopt the logic of the other (Allinson and Anievas, 2010, 207–213). For Anievas and Nişancıoğlu (2015), combination, in an abstract manner, refers to how the

internal relations of any given society are determined by their interactive relations with other developmentally differentiated societies, while the very interactivity of these relations produces amalgamated sociopolitical institutions, socio-economic systems, ideologies and material practices melding the native and foreign, the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward,’ within any given social formation.

In this way, Trotsky demonstrated that the spread of capitalism reproduced itself consistently anew (Davidson, 2009: 13–15). In this respect, the concept of combination, appropriate to the complexity of capitalist development processes, goes beyond the stagist, linear models of development. The emergent amalgamation and social contradictions demonstrate the effects of the interdependency of intersocietal interactive nature (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 49). Ashman (2010: 190) puts it that “as Trotsky argues, the pattern of the original transition can never

be repeated with exactitude. It is, henceforth, shaped by the outcome of earlier transitions. It is marked by the period when the transition is made.”

The relational aspect of social reality constitutes the core of the totality concept. As Marx (1971: 149) puts it: “Society is nothing more than the man himself in social relations.” A crucial distinction must be emphasized here; as Wight and Joseph (2010) argues, positivist approaches (mentioned in the third chapter especially), ends up with “naturalization of reified view of a social world and hiding deeper structures of the international system.” They focus on recurrent relations. According to Wight and Joseph (2010), it does not provide a detailed explanation pertinent to the specificities of relations between North and South. It entails searching for the underlying conditions that generate specific relations. The interactive and holist nature of capitalist social totality, therefore, requires to de-reify seemingly natural or supra historical structures of world politics (Anievas, 2010: 2). Emergentist development is conceptualized as multi-scalar and dialectically linking international structures and processes with regional-domestic ones. It is a process “down to local specificities of socio-economic development and human interaction” (Fabry, 2018: 42).

“The developmentally differentiated societies” interact with each other; from this interaction, the developmental effects spring and the “various forms of combined development” emerge (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 46). The capitalist social totality is comprised of specific social formations – the state-system with features such as drivers for change and reproduction, crisis tendencies, a contradiction. The point is to handle the emergence of the state as a transformation of social relations of production; it makes the political irreducible sphere to the lower ones. Lacher discusses that “the relevant historical totality to the conceptualization of the system of sovereign territorial states is capitalism” (Lacher, 2002: 162). As Yalvaç argues, the state-system becomes a “socio-historical category” that emerged in the historical unfolding of capitalist production relations (Yalvaç, 2010a). Underlining that CR sees the social world a combination of different structures and relations, Joseph points out to the specificity of state in a social formation (Joseph, 2010). At this point, the linkages between the relation

between state and state system and state and capital in capitalist social totality must be delineated in a manner that incorporates capitalist accumulation and geopolitical competition processes.

The notion of intersocietal interaction relies upon a holistic and totalistic understanding of international. The articulation of the social forces is essential to account for the implications of hegemonic structures of development. With intersocietal interaction, the emergentist development challenges the reified, static and ahistorical conceptions of international, As Rosenberg (2013) contended, the “non-realist sociological definition of the international” is against the “realist reification.”

The interactivity of societal multiplicity leads to the operation of new causal mechanisms that are unconceivable with a methodologically nationalist perspective. These causal mechanisms are *geopolitical pressure*, *mercantile penetration*, *ideological influences*, and *political substitutionism*.

Callinicos, for example, treats the states-system as “a set of determinations” with “specific properties that are irreducible to those of previously introduced determinations” (Callinicos, 2010). Teschke and Lacher (2010) conceived that interstate-ness of capitalism is structurally internalized into and thereby constitutive of, capitalist modernity, Anievas argues that with this notion, their approach differs from Callinicos’ in not subsuming the patterns of international relations under the intersection of two generic ideal-typified logics of anarchy and capital (Anievas, 2010).

With a holistic approach to the interaction between states-system and capitalism, Rosenberg points out to the influence of the unevenness within the capitalist social totality as a causal structure of determinations. He underlines the multilinearity and interactivity of development, which could be utilized to capture the essence of the dynamic of capitalist development processes (Rosenberg, 2007). The CR causal model, in this respect, claims that an emergentist approach to the relation between particular institutionalized forms within structures of development can offer a solution without reductionism. The historical specificities of the

configuration of social forces in particular social formation become crucial to explain emergentist development processes.

The insertion of modern political, economic, and cultural forms into the backward context creates a mutation for the historical development and changes the already made historical experience. This feature of societal multiplicity with its implications for development processes encompasses not only capitalist development but also the mutated forms of development. Yalvaç (2013) argues that although U&CD might seem abstract and transhistorical, it promises to overcome the Euro-centric conception of international through its focus on the interactive formation of societies. It reformulates the basis of IR as intersocietal relations in order to capture its essence holistically.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, the current conceptualizations of development are scrutinized. They are classified as stagist, structural, and post-developmental conceptualizations of development. It is easy to identify distinctive features of development as uneven, unequal, and competitive in capitalist social totality. The dominant development thinking, on the other hand, remains limited to dealing with surface taxonomies mostly in a dichotomous way. Such perspectives fall short of explaining the complex causal relationship within development processes. More importantly, the development thinking that misses critical elements continues to pose a massive danger of naturalizing the existing status quo. Thus, it is significant to underline that any satisfactory perspective on development must accommodate various modes of interpreting developmental issues and concerns. It must possess analytical rigor to encompass multiple dimensions of development and address cross-national diversity in societal contexts (Haque, 1999: 130).

The current conceptualizations of development, on the other hand, fail to capture the structural nature of development processes. While the stagist conceptualizations miss the structural because of the methodologically nationalist perspectives, the structural ones cannot theorize the multiply-determined nature of development processes due to the deterministic conception of structures.

Furthermore, although the post-developmental conceptualization of development comes close to provide a critical perspective to the hierarchical relations within development processes, it fails to carry these contributions into a proper social scientific analysis because of rejecting its possibility.

It is, therefore, necessary to provide a complex and interactive conceptualization for the analysis. Emergentist development employs the critical realist concept of emergence and manages to integrate emergent features of the various, stratified and differentiated ontological strata without conflation and reduction. The shift from events to mechanisms guides the emergentist conceptualization of development to seek out underlying structural relations of developmental processes. It argues that the development processes are generated by mechanisms. The explanation relies on obtaining information about the distinctive features of developmental structures embedded in capitalist social totality. In this way, the historical specificities of development relations in the capitalist social totality can be examined holistically.

Whether the development is possible for all or does it tend to realize at the expense of others (Fatton, 2016: 119), this specificity is what the conceptualization of the emergentist development tries to capture. It emphasizes that development processes unfold with underlying structural logic and reflect the specificities of particular historical formations. It claims that the concept of development gains its meaning in the process of bargaining social forces – overtly or covertly. The configuration of social forces in structures of world development, therefore, constitutes an essential part of the underlying structural logic of intersocietal interaction. The uneven nature of relations in capitalist developmental structures becomes the structural basis of socio-political transformations, which reflect the struggle between social forces that seek material reproduction. The totalistic and interactive framework of the emergentist development, in this respect, inquires the operation of mechanisms generating social polarization and inequalities that concatenate with the inherent tendencies of the capitalist social totality (Piketty, 2014).

Emergentist development conceptualizes the intersocietal interaction through a hegemonic model of development. It argues that the differentiated developmental outcomes and the various social formations are constituted by the mechanisms of societal multiplicity/international. The CR notion of emergence provides an ontological foundation with depth to integrate the emergent features of these complex and interactive processes without reductionism.

The intersocietal interaction, therefore, is perceived as the processes of diffusion and transformation of development structures. The historically specific features of the hegemonic model become decisive on these processes as the underlying structural logic – creating social structures that enable/constrain the unfolding of political, economic, and cultural relations. Moreover, whilst the historical configuration of social forces manages the socio-political transformation processes, the segments of societies transform and state-society complexes acquire their concrete forms.

Under the impact of intersocietal interaction, the amalgamated social formations emerge. While emergentist development captures the specificities of intersocietally constituted social formations, it also points out the mechanisms that are influential. In the face of geopolitical pressures and international division of labor, the skipping of the stages of development and the political substitutionism have become the main mechanisms that affect the combined implications of development processes.

CHAPTER 3

CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE MENA REGION

3.1 Critique of Approaches to Development in the MENA Region

This chapter inquires into the theoretical and conceptual perspectives of the stagist, and structural conceptualizations² of development, and accordingly, categorizes them as *stagist*, *political*, and *structural approaches*. Drawing on the conceptualization of emergentist development, it is utilized the framework of U&CD to analyze development processes with their specificities.

The conceptualization of development and the theoretical perspectives are not abstract to the conditions, problems, ideas, and values embedded in the social relations and structures. The material and ideational sources of development processes acquire their meaning within the social structures. These processes are embedded in socio-political transformation, which makes any methodologically individualist analysis misleading and deficient.

It is argued that the specificities of regional incorporation into the international capitalist structures reflect the regional peculiarities as much as the underlying structuring logic. However, the existing approaches to the region study the specific outcomes of development processes in a reductionist manner. Although these accounts seem to provide causal, theoretical rigor, the in-depth explanatory potential is lacking.

The theoretical framework of emergentist development emphasizes that development processes unfold in interactive capitalist social totality; therefore, they

² As the post-developmental conceptualization of development is mostly irrelevant regarding the approaches to development in the MENA, the conceptual and theoretical discussion of it will not be included in this chapter.

are relevant to various sectors of social reality. The interactive nature of developmental processes is epitomized in the history of the development of the Middle East. The Middle East has been a penetrated system. However, it has never become an entirely subordinated region, although there has been a large amount of external influence and intervention (Brown, 1984: 3–5, 16–18).

Halliday argues that the Middle East, among the other parts of the Third World, has the most extensive history of interaction – be it political, military, and economic – with the West. He continues that the studies onto the region both influenced by and affected the Western thinking on international relations – such as Clash of Civilizations, terrorism, democratization (Halliday, 2009: 1), which give an idea about the essence of relations between the region and the West.

Although the characteristics of the developmental models adopted in the region have not been quite different from those of the other “developing” regions, the peculiarities have been: the abundance of the oil resources, lacking enough arable lands and water for irrigation and the intricate patterns of discrimination and inequalities based on social class, ethnicity, gender, and other social relations. The dynamics of development processes tend to reflect the operation of mechanisms and generate differentiated performances.

The empirical manifestations of actual events extend from Islamist terrorism to the rentier economic model and authoritarian state structures. These features indicate the relevance of development processes to political, economic, and cultural sectors of social reality. In this sense, the emergentist development framework argues that an analysis of the development in the region must capture the specificities of colonial history.

Similarly, the geopolitical importance of the region resulted in the penetration of international actors in the region. Besides, as Brown (1984) underscores, domestic, and regional actors have benefitted from the manipulation of great power rivalries in the region. The asymmetrical relations between the region and international system have been essential for the development processes and underachievement.

The impact of international on the region has had substantial implications for the domestic structures. Ayubi takes the impact of international further and claims the impact of imperialism onto the region is as far as completing the formation of an Arab ruling class. He shows how the social forces are shaped with the changes in private ownership of land – according to urban notables and tribal chiefs turning formerly independent peasants into tenants. The traders in the region became intermediaries between the local economy and international markets, which created a mostly “undeveloped” society outside the big cities due to limited modernization, rudimentary industrialization (Ayubi, 1995: 86-99).

Halliday offers an analysis that is comprehensive enough to integrate a two-way relationship – both the impact of the international market and the local variables. According to Halliday (2005: 267), “the roots of the Middle Eastern economic impasses lay in the pattern of incorporation into the world market.” He phrased this process as “differential integration,” and links it with both economies of the region and the formation of the modern states. Hinnebusch (2003: 20), regarding the formation of state institutions in the region, points to the colonial implantation of state institutions, which resulted later in the extrapolation of political elites between cooperating with imperialist power and independence movements. The dividedness also reflected in the strategies designed for the ills of development in the region. Similarly, Cammett (2018) seeks to explain the sub-optimal economic performance of the MENA, and she calls attention to the colonial legacies in the region while emphasizing the particular manifestation of business-government relations in the region.

The experiences of colonization, the integration into the international economy, globalization of the capitalist economic system, and the articulation of capitalist mode of production with already existing modes of production manifested itself with the existing developmental outcomes. It would be extremely misleading, however, if this interaction were considered as a one-way relationship. Hinnebusch points out that equally as the imperialism fragments the region into rival states, the irredentist grievances against each other (Hinnebusch, 2003: 14). Concerning the transnational ideologies (pan-Arabism, political Islam), conflictual relations, and the

problematic issue of Palestine-Israel, a tentative base for tendencies of regionalization has always been on the agenda.

The developmental performances in the regional countries have reflected the unevenness and combination of both differentiated incorporation into the international capitalist system and the specificities of domestic structures. A historical snapshot of the MENA reveals that the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development for better or worse has determined the development processes in the region. In this sense, the essence of development from the 1950s onwards has transformed into a marginalizing and exclusive form, depending on the particular interaction with the hegemonic model of development (Kadri, 2014; Hinnebusch, 2009).

3.1.1 Critique of Stagist Approaches

Modernization refers to shift to rationality and to wash away of traditional values, institutions which are thought to be the obstacles before progress. The experiences of industrialization and following social transformation are idealized and prescribed as a solution to the developmental problems of the “developing” countries. Elmusa (1986: 253), in this regard, argued that the modernization perspective dominated the development studies in the MENA region.

Parallel to that, International Organizations such as the United Nations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as World Bank and IMF paid specific attention to the ills of the region and linked them with the developmental performance of states. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) employs the term developing country without qualification. It has generally been taken to mean a country eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA)³. Syria (lower–middle income) and Libya (upper-middle-income), appear in on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of ODA (2011)⁴. The UNDP had

³ For more information please visit: <http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-financestandards/historyofdaclistsofrecipientcountries.htm>).

⁴ For more information, please visit: (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC%20List%20used%20for%202011%20flows.pdf>).

embarked upon analyzing the obstacles before the development in the MENA region and published six reports (AHDR 2002 Opportunities, AHDR 2003 Knowledge, AHDR 2004 Freedom, AHDR 2005 Women, AHDR 2009 Human Security, and AHDR 2016 Youth and Human Development). These reports themed the development and why the developmental performance of the MENA countries is hindered.

Similarly, the stagist approaches in the conceptualization of development have compiled an extensive literature on democratization/authoritarianism arguments (Schlumberger, 2000; Anderson, 2006; Lijphart, 1989). Concerning the relationship between the regime type and developmental performances, the economic and political organization of a social formation becomes an object of analysis. The literature on democratization/transition to democracy brings certain preconditions for ensuring democracy forward. The critical factors in democratization vary from an increase in income per capita to the level of education to industrialization. The analyses on the MENA, in this respect, prioritized themes such as the obstacles before the consolidation of democratic governance, and the political-economic dynamics of durable authoritarian structures along with the local, cultural specificities that have made the MENA exceptional against the waves of democratization.

3.1.1.1 Modernization Theory

Yousef (2004) finds out that the 1990s demonstrated the disadvantages of the developmental model in the Arab states. The problem of high unemployment was prevalent and concomitant with high demographic growth, while the public sector was the largest employer – thanks to social bargain. Nevertheless, there was not a private sector to lead in employment. These were general trends with little differences plagued the last two decades in the region, and the main issues waiting to be addressed via political and economic reforms. In this regard, on the problems of the MENA region, Bernard Lewis (2002: 159) concludes his discussion of “What Went Wrong?” by saying:

It is precisely the lack of freedom – freedom of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question and inquire and speak; freedom of the economy from corrupt and pervasive mismanagement; freedom of women from male oppression; freedom of citizens from tyranny – that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim world.

The Islamic culture and the socio-political environment in the region are considered as the key responsible for the lagging of developmental performances and reforms. Islam was not conducive to democracy as it rejected the nation-state or the separation of state power and religion (Kedourie, 1992), which was an instance of the culturalist argument. Kuran (2009) warns against possible disappointments and failures upon the privatization and liberalization programs in the Arab states because of the lacking pre-conditions and institutional reform. Islam, Arab identity, or ancient rivalries between peoples are considered crucial in these processes (Huntington, 1996). Bernard Lewis, taking the famous motto of Islamist political movements, “Islam is the way”, argues that Islam has turned into the problem itself because of the failures in the secularization processes (Lewis, 2002: 106).

On the other hand, there are also authors not adopting such a totalistic approach. Examining the case of Iran, Zubaida (1988) points out to the heterogeneous nature of Islamic understanding and the diversity of state formation within the region. Timur Kuran (2004: 78), analyzing the underdevelopment of the Middle East, states that Islamic institutions played to some extent a determinant role and says that:

My explanations...will not presuppose that Islam retarded the Middle East's institutional evolution directly or intentionally. Rather, I shall argue that certain economic institutions of classical Islamic civilization interacted in unintended and unanticipated ways to block adaptations now recognized as critical to economic modernization.

Criticizing the culturalist and religious approaches, Maxime Rodinson, in *Islam and Capitalism*, argued that “it is not possible to see how a value system such as the Muslim religion can, in terms of autonomous ideological or textual impact, explain the history of economic behavior” (Rodinson, 1973). Similarly, Halliday puts it “the fads of the 1990s, ‘a clash of civilizations,’ and the epistemological

jungle of the debate on ‘Orientalism’ were but the latest in a long line of such aberrant idealist and unanchored lucubration.” (Halliday, 2005: 194).

Sayigh points to the state’s role in mediation for social relations. He argues that the reasons behind the resistant globalization experience of the MENA region lay not under the cultural, traditional values but due to the ability of rulers that can adapt to externally linked changes and direct them for their political power restoration internally (Sayigh, 1999: 232).

The modernist cultural and traditional approaches, in this context, examined the socio-political transformation processes with essentialist views. The arguments foreground sectarian identities, ancient hatred between tribes to account for the failures of modernization. It is discussed that the cultural essences of Islam, traditional values, local cultures have been the most significant elements in the unfolding of development processes in the region. Galal and Hoda (2013), accounting for the underdevelopment of the Arab countries, argue that lacking inclusive economic and political institutions are the primary causes. Concerning Syria and Libya, the state formation and institution-building processes –along with the political and economic inclusion mechanisms – the picture has not been bright (Anderson, 1987; Hinnebusch, 2001). The discouraging developmental performances, therefore, have been imputed to the survival of traditional and cultural relations. The impact of Islam and traditional relations can also be seen in political relations. The political Islamist oppositional movements have been the most influential ones in the MENA. In the Libyan case, Pargeter (2009: 1035) argues that historically, an essential source of the opposition emerged from the eastern parts, while the political inclusion had been so narrow that the political elites in Libya came mostly from the tribe of Qadhafi (the Qadhadhfa tribe). In the Syrian case, Hinnebusch (2001: 89) argues that between 1977 and 1982, the Assad regime gave a severe test against the Islamist rebellion. However, the result was massive repression and the political marginalization for those outside the regime opponents.

The modernist views on economic relations in the MENA countries deal mostly with corruption, the persistence of traditional relations such as patrimonialism, clientalism, and patronage. Khan (2003: 112-115) marks that these

economy-based reductionist views on corruption and inequalities -leaving out the political determinants- fail to be informative. Thus, Khan argues that the logic of capitalism and the logic of liberal democratic legal systems and norms are conflicting in developing countries; furthermore, there are also tribal and sectarian conflicts that are overlapping with the economic and political discrimination and inequalities (Pargeter, 2009; Van Dam, 2011).

The perspectives emerging from the modernization approach concentrate on cultural and traditional institutions, values, and organizations. The patrimonial relations and political-economic corruption come to the front as the main problems before modernization and economic growth. However, although macroeconomic and political mismanagement is the essential determinants of developmental performance, these factors are primarily determined by political institutions. In this respect, the crony capitalism accounts remain limited to both the empirical manifestations emanating from the concatenated structures of development and a reflection of the generative mechanisms of societal multiplicity. Furthermore, the conception of traditional and local as the most significant barrier before modernization processes and as the sign of backwardness is because of the understanding of development as relational and evolutionary processes, that is, a linear transition from traditional and local to modern and universal. Such a reductionist and abstract conceptualization is proved to be far from accounting for the complex social forces operated in development-induced processes.

3.1.1.2 Authoritarianism or Democratization

There is no consensus on the direction of causality concerning the relationship between democracy and development/economic growth. According to Lipset (1960), democratization is not a precondition of development, yet a result of it. Although it does not account for the causality, the democratization related studies mostly tend to associate democracy with national wealth and attempt to demonstrate the parallelism between economic liberalization and democratization (Mclean, 1994). Calvert (2005: 60) seeks to demonstrate the enhanced capacities of democratic states in achieving high levels of economic growth and living standards.

He identifies the distinct features of democratic states. For Calvert, these distinct features are “are judicial fairness, good governance; democratic accountability; and political stability.”

Similarly, Kamrava (2005: 73) argues that “at the broadest level, democratic transitions come about as a result of two developments: particular patterns and consequences of economic development; and the emergence of civil society.” However, the nature and direction of causality between the level of democracy/democratization and economic growth still necessitate further analysis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999). Kamrava (2005: 74) points to the difficulties concomitant to democratization movement, which put governments in economically dilemmatic situations – mostly resulting in “inimical” to the democratic openings.

Bellin (2002: 4) seems quite right in conceptualizing the relation between democratization and economic growth as a “developmental paradox.” The introduction of economic and political structures, values create amalgamation in social relations. The emergent social actors through the economic liberalization movements become the driving force behind the further democratization and liberalization. However, the specificities of the configuration of social forces led to a differentiated outcome; Schlumberger (2008) argues that the structural economic reforms in authoritarian contexts result in patrimonial capitalism differing from competition-based market systems. As Bellin (2002: 4) marks:

By sponsoring industrialization, the [authoritarian] state nurtures the development of social forces ultimately capable of amassing sufficient power to challenge it and impose a measure of policy responsiveness upon it.

Nabli (2016: 309-310) argues that there is not any “significant, stable, predictable, and causal” relationship between democratization and economic growth. The studies that focus on the relationship between economic liberalization and the push for democratization are ambiguous, for they consist of the fact that economic liberalization will encourage the stakeholders' interest in a democratic setting. It has turned out to be the opposite in MENA countries. Besides that, the nature of economic development and its diffusion into social structures and relations in the MENA catches close attention because the development of any independent

and robust private sector as in the advanced democratic countries has not been possible.

Diwan (2013) explores the insights of changing preferences of the middle class to understand the specificities of the democratic transformation. Concerned with modernization and its impact upon the distributional patterns, the middle class can be argued to defect from authoritarian order to democratic order. In contrast to this, in the MENA countries, the democratic transition was blocked by it; as Przeworski (Przeworski et al., 2000) argued: “there is no trade-off between democracy and development.” In other words, the economic development processes in the MENA region have turned into an inhibitor before the “transition” to democracy. The regime type is a significant determiner concerning the inclusion/exclusion relations, accountability, and transparency. The latter are among the characteristics that condition the relationship within the state-society complex. Timur Kuran (2004) focused on institutional quality in MENA countries and marked the impact of institutions over state functioning.

The primary conclusions of the democratization perspective bear similarities to the modernization perspective and can be summarized as; it assumes a staged process, linear progress, and irreversible nature of democratic movements; it considers the industrialized Northern examples of economic growth and development (Carothers, 2002). The literature on *Post-democratization*, on the other hand, offers to go beyond the democratization paradigm and to look for the dynamics perpetuating resilient authoritarian regimes. However, it can be argued that it is the reversed version of the transition paradigm (Valbjorn, 2014: 157). In this perspective, rather than democratization-democracy taking precedence, the resilience of authoritarianism is explored, and how the regimes managed to stay in power is evaluated with a specific focus on individual political instruments such as repression, co-optation, and economic instruments such as patrimonial relations.

Bellin proposes that some factors led to a continuation, the resilience of authoritarian regimes such as “rentier economy, international support network, low level of institutionalization of coercive apparatus, low level of popular mobilization” (Bellin, 2012: 128-129). To a similar point, according to Ehteshami,

ideology, patrimonial relations, and repressive power are the factors mostly brought forward in analyses concentrated on the robustness of authoritarianism in MENA (Ehteshami et al., 2013: 222-223). Elbadawi (2016: 239) suggests that the rentier revenues require an effective authoritarian bargain to be a functioning obstacle before the democratic transition, for they create employment opportunities.

In this regard, the hypothesis that democratization promotes economic growth and stability and reduces the distributive tensions at the national and international level seems quite relevant to Syrian and Libyan socio-political transformation processes. Concerning the nature of the state-society complex in Syria and Libya, Niblock (2005: 500) draws attention to the existence of civil society, organizations, and their position against the state. To Niblock, both states had had a harsh and repressive attitude against the civil formations, even functional, apolitical ones.

The dichotomous conceptualization of state and society as if the state presides separately over the social forces becomes problematic. Hanieh (2013) contends this assertion, which links the limited existence, and robustness of the civil formations in the authoritarian context to the weaknesses of capitalist development processes. Firstly, while Syrian and Libyan state-society complexes tend to carry on repressive and harsh attitudes against civil formations, typical in the period of the 1950s and 1970s, it does not necessarily mean that there has not been any. There had been “strong” and “inclusive” civil associations and organizations, yet mostly in a clientelistic and de-mobilizational manner (such as the Peasant and Trade Unions in Syria and Revolutionary Committees in Libya).

Secondly, by touching upon the meta-theoretical problems in authoritarianism/democratization perspectives, Valbjorn and Bank draw attention to the ontological and epistemological assumptions. They argue that democratization/authoritarianism perspectives suffer from two types of blindness; first, they are “blind to the actual continuity in the apparent changes” and second “to the actual changes in the apparent continuity” (Valbjorn and Bank, 2010: 187-188). McLean (1994: 38) articulates the misleading features of explanation through statistics, as the argument of linking democratization to economic liberalization, and the rise of income level to the democracy is significantly limited because the nature

of causality cannot be inferred from it, and second, the exceptional cases cannot be explained with a sweeping view. To a similar point, the ranking method for calculating the democracy level for Schlumberger is deficient. He criticizes “the Freedom House Index” as arbitrary variables that are decontextualized from their social, institutional, and cultural settings. Besides, it does not take into account the process and not capable of making a qualitative distinction between the “democratic and non-democratic or less democratic regimes” (Schlumberger, 2000: 124).

Instead of linear and reductionist conceptualization of development in modernization, therefore, Kamrawa (2005: 81) approaches to this relation as “paradoxical”. He rejects the uni-linear shift to democratization with industrial development and argues that the economic development processes turn into obstacles for democratic transitions. Furthermore, the causal relationship between the two is far more nuanced and context-specific. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 284), analyzing the relation between capitalist development and democracy in various regions, concludes as “factors such as dependent development, late and state-led development, international political constellations and events, and international learning, all conspired to create conditions in which the combination of causes and thus the paths to democracy (and dictatorship) were different in different historical contexts and different regions.”

Gerber (1987), drawing on a similar point, argued that patterns of political development in the Middle East must be linked to the specificities of class formation. Although the absence of civil society is recognized as the primary cause behind the failure of democratization in the MENA, it must be recognized that civil society does consist of progressive and retrogressive forces at the same time, defying a linear view on democratic transition. Furthermore, the impact of social forces (domestic and international) committed to neoliberal transformation on subverting the democratization struggles, then, requires close attention (Evans, 2002; Ayers, 2006).

The assumptions of both approaches (democratization/authoritarianism) crash with empirical reality when the real political developments did not unfold as the framework predicted. The problem emerges from the misconstrued causal

relationship development and democracy, arbitrarily separation of structural and agential attributes for simplicity and parsimony, and the blurred line between explanation and prediction due to the conflation of empirical and actual.

The two approaches fall in the same trap of imposing a deterministic paradigm. Such determinism can only be overcome by asking, “What is happening politically?” (Carothers, 2002: 18). Approaching the socio-political transformation processes with a broader framework will provide a broader perspective to understand the potential role played by different actors at different levels. Since the Arab Revolts pointed out the explosive configuration of social forces in the MENA region, as Valbjorn argues (Valbjorn, 2011: 31), the politicized Arab world can be argued to call for a change in perspective as considering the Arab Revolts as a transition to somewhere, highlighting a non-deterministic approach.

3.1.2 Critique of Political Approaches

The rentier state theory and the concept of the developmental state⁵ are two significant perspectives concerning the specificities of the development processes in developing countries. For the Syrian and Libyan socio-political transformation, they provide substantial insights. As both conceptions reflect the specific forms of state/society complex in capitalist social totality, their implications and conclusions on development processes must be included in the critique of political approaches to development in the MENA region.

While the conception of rentier state is associated with the development of productive forces in a social formation, it theorizes the relations between state and society and their specific processes emerging out of the rentier relations of production. The relative independence of the state from social forces is the central theme in the exploration of development processes in rentier states. The developmental state, on the other hand, denotes the particular development

⁵ While developmental state framework is associated with the relationship of the politically developmental orientation between the state and the market, the corresponding model in the MENA is closer to state-led capitalism. However, the corporatist relations characterize both models of social formation. For more information about corporatist relations between labor and state in developmental state conception, see Kohli, A. (2004). *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

relationship between the state and market forces, while the state is attributed to the role of regulation, management, and planning of economic development.

3.1.2.1 Rentier State Theory

The *Rentier State theory* analyzes the oil-producing states, and it aims to understand the puzzle of resilient underdevelopment despite huge revenues. The abundance of oil resources impacted the political and economic structures in the region, and consequently, the developmental model adopted (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987).

To define the rentier state, Beblawi (1987: 51-52) points to the dependence of the economy on substantial external rent and lacking a strong domestic productive sector. Mahdavy (1970) draws a picture of the rentier state: with a small portion of the population included in the oil industry, the economic sectors are not well connected, which causes inefficient use of the product by the rest of the economy.

The social formation of rentier states is argued to derive from controlling the oil sector. The oil revenues allow the rentier state to float over societal demands thanks to immunity emanating from no taxation. In such a context, the role of the rentier state is to distribute income, meaning not only providing the public services but also being the primary source of employment (Anderson, 1987; Luciani, 1987: 63). The specificity of the production relations - because of state control over the economic sectors- render the rentier states “omnipresent” in daily life (Altunışık, 2014: 78), while having adverse effects upon the institutionalization. It is because of the factors at play during the state formation, which in the case of a rentier state, turns out as lacking the complementary –legal, fiscal – institutional organization (Chaudhry, 1989: 103).

To fill the gap, Anderson argues that rentier states utilize the traditional sources –networks of kinship, patronage (Anderson, 1987: 10). In such a context, since the patronage system, and kinship relations plays a decisive role in the formation of social differentiation, it mostly ends up with marginalization of certain groups along with ethnic, sectarian, tribal identities. Another feature that strengthens the “solidarity” along with tribal, ethnic, sectarian identities, according to Skocpol (1982), is the reliance on imported labor, which undermines “the social organization

along with the class.” Furthermore, Chaudry argues that the class stratification patterns in rentier states are closely linked to the state expenditures. Calling it an “extreme form of corporatism,” Chaudry points to the high level of state intervention and control of the economic sectors (Chaudry, 1997: 26).

The case of Libya as a rentier state is essential. Libya, with its oil revenues and state-society formation, reflects the characteristics of the ideal type defined in the rentier state literature (Simons, 1993). The case of Syria, on the other hand, express the different characteristics of a rentier economy, with its high-level worker remittances and strategic rents, which depend on the conflictual relations in the region such as the Gulf wars and confrontation with Israel (Perthes, 2000). Libya and, to a certain extent, Syria can be defined as rentier economies, and they express the specific characteristics of the rentier state. Besides that, their social, political, and economic institutionalization have been built primarily along with the necessities of redistribution, which during the neoliberal transformation created severe tensions within society. However, the focus on similarities in rentier states ends up with ahistorical-reductionist conceptualization of social relations. In this regard, the rentier state theory seems to have a contradictory relationship with the modernization perspective, which accuses the insufficiency of capital for the lagging of development.

The rentier economic model is a significant element in the designation of economic, social, and political strategies. It also, to a substantial extent, determines the policy orientation. Hertog (2010a: 279) analyzes the content of economic populism in rentier economies and its particular relation to the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Hertog, examining the achievements of SOEs in rentier economies, attempts to explain the failure and inefficiencies resulting from the economic populism. The rentier nature of Syria and Libya affects the processes of budget formation and implementation of development projects.

However, the theoretical premises that rentier perspective founded on are simplistic and reductionist. Arguing that political motivations come in second place after the economic structural conditions, the rentier state perspective overestimates the effects of oil revenues while taking the formation of the rentier economic model

as separated from the historical processes of capitalist development. Okruhlik (1999) points out that the explanatory power of the rentier state model can be enhanced if the links between state expenditures and social forces can be constructed more explicitly.

The state-society complex through the lens of rentierism is dealt with a Weberian understanding. The political and economic is distinguished analytically. Since such a conception of state leads to incomplete accounts of socio-political specificities, it fails to capture the complex relationship between the configuration of social forces and the structures of development. Hanieh (2015) underlines that the form of state in the MENA is much more from the conception “an array of the weak capitalist class against the strong, independent state” – as the RST claims. The sociological hybridities express the complexity of the combined nature of the development relations. The dualistic and separate conceptualizations of state and society, or as Hanieh (2013) calls it “state vs. society,” result from the individualistic, atomized social understanding. Hanieh (2011: 15) puts it as:

To eschew the Marxian observation that the conditions of existence of specific institutions are the wider social structures that they mediate, rather than institutions being determinant relations unto themselves means to advance an explanation that is largely self-referential.

The specificities of incorporation into the international capitalist economic system, along with its emergent amalgamation in the domestic structures of development, must be integrated into the framework. Hertog (2010a) emphasizes the effective use of rentier revenues by the post-colonial rulers. They seek to carry out their revolutionary views while imposing mostly top-down social designations. The functional value of oil revenues appears in the public employment policies, which intensified and strengthened the clientelistic social structures while forming the new social classes, identities along with the extant structures of accumulation and exploitation.

While the impact of rentier revenues reflect the specificities of historical incorporation of rentier state into the international capitalist economic system, it also becomes vital in the transformation of the state-society complex. The configuration of social forces determines the political objectives, as Hertog (2010a:

267) puts it “in Libya and Algeria, technocratic and revolutionary factions squabble over efficiency versus distributional goals.”

In addition to that, the nature of political inclusion and exclusion processes acquires a particular form in the rentier context. Okruhlik marks that the assertion “no representation without taxation” is a weak one because the extraction capacities of state go far beyond the narrow processes of taxation; therefore, there is a close relationship between the emergence of oppositional movements and the mechanisms of distribution. Once these mechanisms falter, a social basis for the opposition is formed. For Okruhlik, the rentier economic structures involve the state officials dealing with businesses and becoming a state-affiliated bourgeoisie which creates monopolistic sectors in the economy (Okruhlik, 1999: 309)

3.1.2.2 Developmental State

The differentiated experiences of “developing” countries make room for the conceptualization of the specific social formations as a “developmental state.” The state in the developmental state perspective contradicts the “inimical state” in the modernization. Instead of free market-driven economic development, the state-controlled economic model is the key. The post-war developmental experiences of Japan epitomized the state-led development model.

Originated in Chalmers Johnson’s study of the post-war development of Japan (Johnson, 1982), the “developmental state” concept has been employed in the analysis of developmental performance in the Third World. Johnson (1982), examining the high growth in East Asian economies, grounded his model on the characteristics of institutional arrangements. Economic development is defined in terms of growth, productivity, and competitiveness, and it is the first and foremost priority of the developmental state. The framework of the developmental state is also essential for Chang (2002), who underlined the denial of development strategies to the developing countries by the developed ones. The strategy of the protection of infant industries was not allowed to developing countries, and Chang (2002) calls it “kicking away the ladder”.

Castells (1992: 55) identifies two essential components of the “developmental state” conceptualization; a structural and an ideological. The structural form of a developmental state is distinct in that it aims to achieve economic development through managing industrialization policies and intervening in the structures of accumulation. Besides, the sustainable development both provides legitimacy and organizational form to the developmental state whose ideological framework is constituted by developmental performance.

The concept of “developmental state” is argued to be an alternative to the neoliberal prescription of state rolling-out. It turns into a vigorous debate concerning the failure of the neoliberal policies. The developmental state framework can be a solution for the exclusive economic growth processes, which have severe social consequences. It argues for state intervention and takes providing an equitable, inclusive growth at the top of the policy agenda (Evans, 2014). A dualistic conceptualization of the state-society complex shows up in the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the “neoliberal capitalist model” compared to the “social market capitalism.” Radice (2008: 1160) distinguishes the two models regarding the role of the state in their framework. While the former puts the state above the social forces and structures; the latter conceptualize the state as integrator and representative of the society. Besides, the capacities of the state differ in two models. The neoliberal capitalist state abstains from the market relations as much as possible, while the social market capitalist state is diffused into the social structures for regulation and leveling off the ground.

The developmental state framework must be dealt with caution because; the advocates of developmental state deduce that policies such as “state intervention, protectionism, capital controls, and welfarism” form a better developmental framework in the hands of a “benign state”. In the case of failure, the “ideology, “vested interests,” and “lacking capacity” took the blame for (Selwyn, 2014).

The reflections of the developmental state debate are expressed in the forms of socialist, populist states in the MENA region. It is essential to acknowledge that, as Munck (2018: 56) argues, “The socialist regimes inherited the legacy of underdevelopment.” The structural and ideological components in the

conceptualization of the developmental state interact with the peculiar characteristics of the MENA region. As the instruments of developmental processes are utilized in the regulatory repertoires, they impacted upon post-war and post-independence state-building processes, the nature and scope of state intervention, and state-market relations. Vitalis and Heydemann put it as “European responses to the economic and administrative demands of World War II had profound implications for domestic processes of state formation and the organization of state-market relations in the Middle East” (Vitalis and Heydemann, 2000: 102).

Hinnebusch (2009) analytically periodized the Middle East, for him the 1950s, until the 1970s, is characterized by revolutionary, pan-Arabist Egyptian leadership. The defeats against Israel, the failure of the developmental model, and ISI strategy coincided with the oil boom and bust cycles, which created the order of oil money, or as Mohammed Heikal- Egyptian journalist –called it from Thawra to Tharwa meaning from revolution to resources and patrimonialism. The following period (the 1980s-present) has been associated with the conflictual, Hobbesian state-centric order. Similarly, Kadri divides the history of economic growth in the Arab World into three distinct periods, foregrounding the interaction of social forces: between the 1960s and 1980s was characterized by comparatively massive government intervention, which drove a high growth. Primarily due to the collapsing oil prices, free-market reforms and heralding structural adjustments, a period of low growth plagued the region until the 2000s; and the third period that extends today, it is a time with high oil prices but highly inequitable growth (Kadri, 2014: 83).

Firstly, the developmental state in the MENA context articulated not in a hostile manner to the commitment of private property and the market. The particularities of institutional evolution and the building of state-society complex, therefore, firmly circumscribed the capacities of state intervention. Secondly, interaction with international markets impacted the restructuring of developmental models and strategies. In other words, it depends on the difference between the conceptualization of the nature of the relation between state and market, economic growth strategies hinged upon state-led capitalism, or market socialism.

The economic relations of production structures in Syria and Libya have brought in amalgam formations when combined with the populist-authoritarian political structures. Although the socialist labeling of the regimes might have similar implications to the “developmental state,” the emergent social formations had been hybrid, reflecting the conjunctural and historical specificities of these societies. The structural and ideological components of the developmental state framework can be found in the specific form of social formations in Syria and Libya.

Although the development processes ostensibly created equalizing and inclusive outcomes, strengthened the basis of legitimacy for the ruling regimes, the conditions of the hegemonic model have necessitated to give up these policies and seriously undermined the capacity of MENA countries to implement developmentalist policies. For instance, as Stevens (2005) states, the oil revenues had adverse socio-political outcomes that facilitated the creation of predatory rather than developmental states. A solid example is Qadhafi’s Libya. The socialist and interventionist model was prevalent in Libya for nearly forty years, and it primarily relied on distributive functions (St. John, 2008a). Anderson (1986a) defines the institutional model of the Libyan state as emerging out of the concerns of distributive channels and security.

The state in the MENA, furthermore, has been an exception regarding the authority in the face of globalization. It is ironic that although the economic nationalist policies have been given up, the ruling regimes have managed to keep their grasp over the development processes. Sayigh (1999: 232) argues that globalization might undermine the power of elites and empower other social forces, yet it has not been the case in the MENA. The unfolding of globalization in the MENA is directed by the alliances between rising social forces and the ruling elites, which again consolidate the authority of the state.

Linda Matar (2013), in her article, twilight of state capitalism, argues that state-led capitalism failed to provide what it had promised. In the case of Syria, the liberalization efforts remained superficial because the state was still interventionist, which impacted the effectiveness of the market mechanism (Schmidt, 2009). Linda Weiss (2012) argues that the neoliberal state is a myth. It does not relate to state roll

out. It is selective rolling out of the state. It means state power becomes more relevant to particular sectors. It is, therefore, a transformation towards post-populist authoritarianism (Hinnebusch, 2001).

From theoretical aspects, critical scrutiny of the developmental state framework shows that it has a methodologically nationalist approach. Although it is seen as one of the alternatives to the neoliberal prescriptions of state rolling out, the developmental state framework fails to incorporate the interactive nature of capitalist development processes diffusing into the domestic structures of accumulation and exploitation (Pradella, 2014: 190). In this sense, Selwyn (2014: 39) rejects the possibility of a developmental state to be a “genuine human developmental alternative to the neoliberalism,” and claims that “it rests upon and requires the repression and exploitation of labor.” Similarly, Chibber (2005) emphasizes the “organizational enfeeblement of labor” as the most prominent result of this process.

3.1.3 Critique of Structural Approaches

The economic performances and developmental problems faced by Latin American (LA) countries in the 1960s shook the confidence in the development formula followed by Northern industrialized countries. In such a context, ECLA School (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) introduced a critical evaluation of economic relations between Northern industrialized countries and LA countries to account for the structural implications of the developmental problems in the LA region.

Differing in the conception of structural development, the Dependency perspective, WSA, and neo-Gramscian approaches have a common denominator, as they underline the specificities of capitalism and its consequences on development processes. Moreover, the concepts “core”, “periphery,” and “transnationalization of production” are essential to capture the actual development processes in capitalist social totality.

3.1.3.1 Dependency/ WSA/ Neo-Gramscian Approaches

Against the optimistic views of modernization school and the linear understanding of Euro-centric development, The Dependency perspective emphasizes the asymmetrical impact of structural conditions over development processes in “developing” countries. As Marx underlined the importance of productive forces of societies in the specification of the mode of production:

a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force". Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the "history of humanity" must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 42).

The theoretical perspectives within the dependency school, as mentioned before, see the relations in the international political-economic system unequal - through the exchange relations, the surplus-value is transferred to the core. From unequal relations, the nature of the relations between core –dominant- and periphery-subordinate – is determined.

One of the detailed analyses on the MENA belongs to Raymond Hinnebusch. He (Hinnebusch, 2003) approaches to the region with the core-periphery paradigm. Starting from the 19th century, the interaction between the region and core countries has shaped. It impacted the state formation processes, and after the independence, a penetrated regional system has been created. The economic features of the region, then, reflect the specificities of dependency relations; the regional countries have become mainly producers of primary products and mostly reliant on single export products, while technologic and manufactured products are imported. Concerning the impact of vast oil resources upon economies, Sayigh argues that oil revenues and the necessities of oil production intensified the technological dependency, enabling and promoting the import of technological and material products (Sayigh 1999). The socio-political reflections of dependency relations, on the other hand, created a convergence between the economically dominant classes and the core while forming a patrimonial and corporatist trade and investment patters (Hinnebusch, 2003: 35).

An inevitable consequence of oil production is the fluctuation of prices in the international market. The boom and bust cycles of international oil prices have significantly impacted the developmental performances and models. Alnasravi (1987: 366-367) argues that the October War opened myriad ways for the Arab economies to the international capitalist system and the nature of dependency. Although import-substitution industries - seen as a solution to problems of dependency were adopted, and developmental strategies were devised according to national independence and progress - resulting in diversification to some extent – still uneven, these strategies failed to establish a spillover effect, to promote other supporting industries. Concerning the economic structures of Arab countries, which were narrowly relied on agriculture and minerals, on the other hand, it created a reverse impact, raising the import of intermediaries.

Kadri (2014: 80) finds the main reasons behind de-developmental processes in the MENA laying in the “successive Arab military defeats, the collaborative (compradorial) ruling elites, and imperialist oil grab. He emphasizes the externally driven production and trade relations in the MENA, from import substitution and protectionism, the Arab world has swung to the opposite, outward-looking export-oriented industry. The shift has so far tangled the Arab economies even further in the web of the international economy (Elmusa, 1986).

The regional specificities manifested in the flow of finance, the point is for Alnasravi (1986), the dependency has not only shaped the relations between the Arab economies and the core but also created a “secondary dependency” for the others dependent on the worker remittances, funds derived from oil flows. On that account, Hanieh deals with the Arab capital – calling it Gulf capital – as quite an essential factor in the region (Hanieh, 2013). The Gulf capital became highly crucial in the legitimization of humanitarian intervention in Libya, and the transformation after the intervention. On the other hand, the protracted conflict in Syria, to some extent, emerged because of the reservations of Gulf countries.

Although the dependency analysts emphasized the subordination in the developmental relations (Greig et al., 2007: 89-90) – as above criticized modernization theorists who saw the developed and underdeveloped world in a

dichotomous manner- they are criticized for having a deterministic conception of structures. Along with that, focusing on exogenous factors and leaving no space for agential elements attracted significant criticism because the differentiated performances of development cannot be explicated with a structural perspective.

The concrete situations of development necessitate the expansion of mechanistic interpretations of the dependency framework. While the capitalist system specifies the concrete situations to a certain extent, the particularities of local context play their role in the unfolding of development. This feature makes intelligible the shift in conditions for industrialization in periphery capitalism, culminating in the “dependent development.” Palma (2009: 251) argues that the specificities of peripheral capitalism cannot be understood without making sense of the dialectical relationship between internal and external.

WSA, in this regard, attempts to combine structural approach with a historical perspective to provide an in-depth analysis of the international capitalist economy. The “semi-periphery” concept, getting beyond the dichotomous understanding of the core and periphery, is introduced. Concerning Libya and Syria, Dunaway and Clelland (2017) put Libya into non-western semi-periphery categorization, while Syria rests in the periphery. Still, such an explanation of the social change in the “underdeveloped” countries, in so far as it emphasizes the causal role of external factors, is extrinsicist and does not take sufficiently into account the role of internal forces. Alawi (1982a) argues that the actual experiences of peripheral capitalist societies belie the mechanistic interpretations of modernization and Marxism, He (1982a: 174) is critical of the Underdevelopment and WSA in respect to their conception of capitalism – the trade and exchange rather than social relations of production.

Against these criticisms, Ayubi (1995) uses the articulation of mode of production framework to explain the developmental relations in the region. The expansion and penetration of modern structures into local structures is the analytical premise of the articulation perspective. It is crucial for Ayubi (1995: 41), to add two modes of production in particular while dealing with the Middle East. These are the lineage (kin-ordered) mode of production and the bureaucratic mode of

production (also called etatist, Asiatic mode of production). He argues that the concept of articulation is also vital in explaining the process of incorporating the Arab World, mainly through colonialism, into the world capitalist system. The opposition to imperialism is essential in the exploration of the ideological frameworks of Nasserism and Ba’thism. Halliday (2013) argues that the opposition movements, however, ended up as class dictatorships through anti-bourgeois reforms. It is the embodiment of imperialism in the interests of ruling regimes, and the expansion of state through opportunities of employment.

Similarly, the “reformist nationalist movements” in the peripheral capitalisms are underlined in Hamza Alawi (1982a: 176). These movements reflect the class alliance between landowners and metropolitan capital. Alawi (1982a: 180) saw the structures in the peripheral capitalist as extending beyond national borders. The impact of international must be attentively conceptualized. While these developments in productive forces through incorporation into the capitalist system designated a prominent position for the state, the emergent contradictions between the productive forces and relations of production turned into far from progressive.

As these contradictions in the superstructure caught attention, the neo-Gramscian perspectives concentrated on the formation of hegemony through historic blocs. Sanyal (2007), in the analysis of India, emphasizes that the centrality of the economy on the capitalist underdevelopment must be rejected in favor of an analytical framework that recognizes the specificity of the non-economic instances and foregrounds the question of agency. Neo-Gramscian perspectives think in terms of fundamental structural changes by transnationalization of production and finance and the shift to neo-liberalism (Bieler and Morton 2006: 197). The focus is on the mechanisms of reproduction and expansion of the capitalist global political economy. Gill (2016) defines the current dominant model of capitalist development as “market civilization and has characteristics such as possessively individualistic, me-oriented, consumerist, exploitative of human beings and nature; it is unequal, energy-intensive, wasteful and ecologically myopic.” He defines development in this context as exclusive and marginalizing, which is the underlying source of resistance and struggle (Gill, 2016: 34).

Neo-Gramscian perspectives concentrate on the reproduction of hegemonic structures via consent. Gill and Law (1993: 94), argues that “a successful bloc was politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas, which give strategic direction and coherence to the constituent elements.” Neo-Gramscian perspectives, drawing on Gramscian conceptualizations of hegemony and the historic bloc, deny the possibility of separation of subject and object as in positivism. The empiricism is also considered inadequate in the examination of causality. On the contrary, as part of the critical theories, Neo-Gramscian perspectives delineate the current world order, taking social relations of production into the front (Bieler and Morton 2006: 196). They see social self-understanding to be central to politics and the possibility of progressive social change. For such, self-understanding, in part, defines the limits of possible social struggle and change (Jones, 2006: 43). Pass (2018) argues because of methodological dualism and ontological pluralism, the Coxian model is unable to theorize social change, the notion of a hierarchical; and the competitive nature of interstate relations effectively, which creates contradictions for the transnationalist arguments of the Coxian model (Budd, 2007). Sanyal (2007) argues that such a framework may be beyond the orthodox base-structure model, which cannot explain power, agency, and subjectivity (Sanyal, 2007).

With a neo-Gramscian approach, Hinnebusch (2009: 224) puts that:

At its very birth, the MENA regional system faced a gap between the material realities of state fragmentation and economic dependence and the transstate Arab and Islamic identities that dominated interhuman society. Ultimately the anarchy of the state system combined with the lack of regional economic interdependence deprived both pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam of a material infrastructure that could make identity the basis of effective and durable common action.

According to Jones (2006: 46-47), however, neo-Gramscian discussions often imply a simple opposition or dichotomy between material structure and ideas. It leads to the prioritization of the realm of ideas in the theorization of social ontology. Such a perspective ignores the non-ideational contradictions in the social relations of capital, the role of coercion and violence in the maintenance of hegemonic world orders. Pass (2018: 5) points out that although Cox and neo-Gramscian perspective draw on Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony since their model relies upon

Giddens' structuration theory to conceptualize the relationship between agent and structure, their model of hegemony ended up with ontological pluralism and overlook the effect of economic basis while concentrating on the intersubjective dimensions of the historic bloc in the superstructural sphere. This shift in the conceptualization of hegemony confines the analysis of hegemony to the surface level, undertheorizing the structural level (Joseph, 2002). Moreover, the agential dimensions of hegemony – as Gramsci saw it through the collisions of hegemonic projects- is excluded from the analysis.

3.2 The Mechanisms of Development: U&CD

As the Eurocentric conceptualizations of development have ontological and methodological deficiencies, the theoretical perspectives to the socio-political transformation processes in the MENA conflates the empirical manifestations of uneven and combined development with the underlying logic of intersocietal interaction. Such approaches are lacking theoretical and explanatory depth, and cannot go beyond thick description; as Gramsci puts it:

A common error in the historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. This leads to presenting causes as immediately operative, which in fact only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate causes are the only effective ones. (Gramsci, 1971: 178)

Against these methodological weaknesses, the emergentist development draws on CR and builds its framework through the Uneven and Combined Development perspective.

It is essential to test the theoretical premises of the U&CD according to the complexities of capitalist social totality and necessities of non-reductionist and non-deductive analysis. The scrutiny of U&CD consists of three main points: First is the abstention from the mechanistic views of U&CD. Second is related to an in-depth analysis of concrete historical formations with their specificities. The third is eliciting of the mechanisms of development and conceptualizing the empirical manifestations of structural relations – domination, subordination, and exploitation.

The “law-like” rendering of U&CD is a matter of critique. Questioning the explanatory potential of U&CD, Teschke (2014: 33) argues that it “is fundamentally barred from explaining not only social change but the development itself—not to mention non-development and de-development.” However, the distinctive feature of U&CD is the concept of combination. The uneven development lacks political implications, and by nature, it requires concretization (Davidson, 2018a; 2018b). As Teschke (2014) sees U&CD abstracted from the agency and far from having the capacity to explain “concrete historical formations,” the adding of the combination without reductionism becomes crucial.

Van der Pijl (2015) criticizes the thematization of international in U&CD and underlines that the neo-Weberian methodological and conceptual borrowings end up with “Marxism Lite.” For him, the substitution of international with merely “combining the uneven” is a move “emptied of the social content.” He puts it as:

The discipline of International Relations (IR), into which I argue the U&CD theorem, elevated to theory, was inserted as a sociologically enhanced version of the realist paradigm, never included such a social dimension.

The U&CD perspective is not confined to the limits of international relations, yet problematizes the intersocietal interaction and its diffusion into national boundaries. A U&CD approach drawing on CR methodology can provide a non-determinist and non-reductionist conceptualization of the relation between material and ideational while strengthening the structural analysis of development processes without relativist tendencies and anti-foundationalist perspectives.

In respect to the “emptied social content,” the conceptualization of development in U&CD has been seen as Eurocentric. It has become a part of the debate by the post-colonialism (Blaney and Tickner, 2017), and U&CD is criticized as not being able to go beyond the colonial encounters of developmental processes. However, Lawson (2015: 309) points out that the developmental processes have always had a “sociological” character on intersocietal interaction, which is argued to be constitutive to amalgamation and contradictions.

In a similar perspective, Van der Pijl (2010b; 2015; 2016) points out the banality of emphasizing the international character of the development. He puts it as

“Trotsky uses ‘combination’ to denote the compression of social development in the age of capitalist imperialism, but social development itself was always part of material foreign encounters.” Nevertheless, Munck (2012: 85) underlines that U&CD can revise the theorization of the “international” from a Marxist perspective. It provides an ontological depth into the unfolding of developmental processes. The incorporation of the political and economic spheres turns into one of the substantial benefits of U&CD.

At this point, a critical engagement with the specificities of developmental relations must be provided. The concepts of “underdevelopment” and “un-development” denote specific conditions emerging in the developmental processes, which can be addressed in-depth with “combination,” which allows going beyond the static views on the specificities of development. The emergence of hybridizations, amalgamation of new and old, domestic and international can provide a dynamic approach to contradictions and differentiation. De Oliveira (2019) puts it as

When uneven and combined development is brought to its full consequences, it becomes clear that there are no such things. The negation of absolute forms of development logically implies the negation of absolute forms of ‘non-development’.

As Achcar (2013: 136-137) argues, instead of concentrating on the underdevelopment, the combined development takes analytical focus upon the amalgamation emerging in the interactive nature of capitalist expansion and transformation – during which the pre-capitalist structures relatively and peculiarly endure or embed in new ones. The historical specificities of capitalist incorporation become intrinsic to development processes.

Although Teschke (2011: 1102) sees U&CD as reifying the categories of international and society, it must be emphasized that U&CD seeks to theorize international beyond capitalist social totality, the relevance of U&CD to a capitalist mode of production must be delineated to prevent any misunderstanding. The trans-historic character of U&CD and its applicability to different modes of production attracted significant criticisms (Ashman, 2010; Davidson, 2009; Kiely, 2012; Rioux, 2014).

The transhistorical general abstraction of U&CD as the basis of a transhistorical theory of international is critiqued by Ashman (2009), she argues that the role of historical social relations and political forms in the formation of the combined implications of uneven development must be acknowledged. Similarly, rather than chronological expansion, U&CD should be spatially extended, for it might not be possible to analyze uneven and combined development processes where the capitalism consolidated (Davidson, 2018a). The specificities of the social and historical relations within which the political and geographical economy of U&CD is immersed must be explored (Rioux, 2014; 2015). While the conceivability of international beyond any mode of production is questioned, the relative weight of social spheres – politics, economics, culture - in the creation of social formations and intersocietal interactions is inquired (Novack, 1976: 101).

Against this backdrop, Rosenberg attempts to develop U&CD as a general abstraction (Rosenberg, 2006). Taking U&CD not specific to capitalism (Davidson, 2018b:70) renders it transmodal. Ashman (2010) underlines that Rosenberg acknowledged that the transmodal U&CD could not produce a substantiated account of the concrete empirical events. The transmodal U&CD requires another “social theory such as Historical Materialism” (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2010: 157).

As U&CD becomes transmodal, it must be buttressed with the concept of totality. Yalvaç (2010a) points out that the concept of totality is different from the system and society. Totality can be captured with ontological depth and complex set determinants. Such a notion of concretization makes identification of generating mechanisms indispensable for emergentist development processes (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2010: 159-161).

Capitalism is a contradictory, stratified social totality. The inquiry of relations between the political entities cannot support a detailed explanation. In an open system, the mechanisms generating the events must be examined (Collier, 1998: 271), and there are distinct kinds of mechanisms - simultaneously applicable – operating in the emergence of an event (Bhaskar, 2008: 109). As Wight and Joseph argue, the specificity and impact of these features become only visible with historicization and empirical analysis (Wight and Joseph, 2010); therefore, since the

causal mechanisms emerging out of the interactivity adds causal mechanisms, which are inconceivable with a methodologically nationalist perspective, holistic and non-reductionist theory of states system can be constructed via U&CD perspective (Rolf, 2015). The causal mechanisms operating within uneven and combined development processes can be identified as geopolitical pressure, mercantile penetration, ideological influences, and political substitutionism.

It is crucial, however, to delineate on in which aspects these mechanisms merge into historical tendencies of capitalist development such as competitiveness and inequality and in which aspects they must be distinguished from each other because “the whip of external necessity, the privilege of historical backwardness and the contradictions of amalgam formations” are made more explicit within capitalism’s crisis tendencies (Rolf, 2015).

It is clear that development processes unleash tendencies for unification into a single form of capitalist development; however, this tendency does not ensure the existence of a “homogenous capitalist milieu” (Van der Linden, 2007: 151). The nature of relations in the capitalist structures hinges upon the drive for accumulation (Wood, 2002: 17). While the drive for accumulation results in contradictory forms of social forces, the imposition of “pre-determined” analytical concepts onto development processes becomes misleading and teleological.

U&CD perspective, therefore, is nested in the analytical framework of emergentist development and sees development processes as part of socio-political transformation. The analysis of socio-political transformation in a totalistic manner is conducted through the conceptualization of international. The competitive nature of capitalist social totality impacts the tendencies of struggle and conflict in the form of contestation of the hegemonic system by “rival hegemonic projects, subaltern resistance” (Hardy, 2016).

The conception of the hegemonic model of development draws on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Gramsci’s work is significant concerning economic determinist interpretations of the Classical Marxism. Gramsci’s hegemony means a shift from the narrow focus on the economic basis of society to the importance of superstructural factors – politics, culture, and ideology.

The formation of Historical Bloc is fitting to the emergence concept because it shows that the superstructure cannot be reduced to the economic base. However, the Coxian model of hegemony tends to focus on consensual elements and overlooking the processes of class struggles. The hegemonic model of development framework searches for the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development into the domestic structures of development with its historical particularities.

It must be recognized that these are emergent relations of the multiplicity of societies and constitutes the “sociological layer of anarchy” (Rosenberg, 2010). The equalization and differentiation become the specificities emerging out of these relations (Ashman, 2006). These relations, however, reflect and modify the struggles between social forces that are represented in the state. The state as political formation in capitalist social totality, thus, becomes an essential factor in ensuring the reproduction of economic and social relations. It operates at economic, political, and ideological levels simultaneously. Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015: 45) put it as:

Rather than simply describing two static conditions or dimensions of such development (multiplicity – difference), Trotsky instead sought to capture how their dialectical interaction (social multiplicity intersocietal interaction societal difference) formed the basic onto-relational texture of the historical process as a whole, wherein the shifting identity of any particular society accumulated and crystallized.

The hegemonic model of development claims that once the distinctive features of development relations –production, exchange, exploitation, appropriation, domination - are identified, the nesting mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification can be shed light upon in a non-reductionist and non-determinist manner with the CR notion of ontological depth.

3.2.1 The Conception of “International”⁶: Mechanisms of Combination

The conceptualization of international is essential for explaining the implications of societal multiplicity. The interactive nature of the international is variously conceptualized depending on the theoretical and methodological choices. Callinicos (2010) points out to “imperialism” and “globalization,” which concentrate on the relation between capitalist social totality and state/state system. These conceptualizations draw different pictures of the specific outcomes of intersocietal relations in capitalist structures. The state, diffusion of market values, structural exploitation and dominance, good governance, and democracy are just a few of the primary lenses the capitalist relations are seen through. However, these approaches indicate the persistence of conflationist ontological perspectives, which fail to distinguish the empirical manifestations with actual events and real generative mechanisms. The critical review of these conceptualizations can contribute to the precision of the “hegemonic model of development.”

The central argument in imperialism theories is relevant to the rules of reproduction of capitalist relations. The imperialism theories argue that these rules drive the political formations to involve in competitive relations for accumulation. In this way, the exploitation and domination relations determine the development processes for imperial and colonial entities.

As the nature of the configuration of states in the international system changed, the analytical focus of the theories of imperialism shifted from the inter-imperialist rivalries to the relations between North and South. The analysis became sensitized to the mechanisms of surplus appropriation and conceptions of “dependency” and “underdevelopment.” Still, Davidson (2018b) argues that there

⁶ It is essential to distinguish the conception of international in hegemonic model of development from Rosenberg’s attempt to account for the origins of multiplicity in international relations. Hegemonic model of development concentrates on the effects of international on development processes; and conceptualizes it through the lens of intersocietal interaction. In this regard, it is closer to Trotsky’s understanding of the international. For more information about Rosenberg’s conception of “international” as multiplicity, please see Rosenberg, (2006; 2010). For the critique of analytical overextension in Rosenberg’s use of U&CD, see Allinson, J. C. and Anievas, A. (2009). The uses and misuses of uneven and combined development: an anatomy of a concept, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22 (1), 47-67.

are two inter-related components to classical and more recent theories of imperialism: 1) rivalry and conflict among core capitalist powers; 2) exploitation by these powers of peripheral regions.

Lenin saw the “uneven and spasmodic development” built in the capitalist system (Lenin, 1964: 241). In this regard, the exploitative relations constitutive to uneven development are attributed to “imperialism,” which is operated through the capital using state instruments and various mechanisms – political, cultural, military (Robinson, 2010). Regarding the classical theories of imperialism, Westra (2010: 17) underlines the outward orientation in the conceptualization of international’s implications. Hilferding and Lenin concentrated on the imperialist rivalries of that day to explain the survival and strengthening of the capitalist model of production while accounting for the reasons of lagged socialist revolution. However, this effort was driven by the interest in capitalism’s perduring, not in questions relating to the development future (capitalist or otherwise) of the dominated states.

For Munck (2012: 79), the ideas of Lenin contributed to the conceptualization of the development of capitalism in both ways. While Munck argues that Lenin can be seen as a precursor of the dependency perspective, seeing the capitalism and imperialism as an obstacle before the development, Lenin (1937) acknowledged the progressive effect of capitalism on the “developing.” In this regard, both Cardoso (1972), with his “dependent development” concept, and Warren (1980) with “imperialism pioneer of capitalism,” was affected by Lenin-Kautsky debate on the nature of imperialism. Contrary to the determinist and pessimist views of Dependency perspectives, the progressive capabilities of imperialism upon the colonized were acknowledged.

The determining relationship between capitalism and the interstate system differs from classical imperialism and is rejected in recent theories of imperialism. The form and content of imperialism refer to a differentiated specificity between the societies since the inter-imperialist rivalries (Panitch and Gindin, 2003). Concerning the unipolar US supremacy and the solidarity between the EU and the US, a Kautskian perspective on the conceptualization of imperialism is offered by Hardt and Negri, and Robinson. For them, with transnationalized capitalism, “the capitalist

geopolitical” confrontations become history (Robinson, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2000). The analytical focus of the recent imperialism theories has turned into the collaborative relations within globalizing capitalist structures. Another perspective similarly, rejecting the deterministic view of Marxism, can be found in Harvey (2003) and Callinicos (2010). The “intersection of capitalist and territorial logics of power and economic and geopolitical competition” is constitutive of their conceptualization of imperialism. Harvey puts it as “the relation between these two logics should...be seen as problematic and often contradictory rather than functional or one-sided” (Harvey, 2003: 30). Although the attempts of Harvey and Callinicos are significant in that they seek to find a solution to the determinist conceptualization of the “base-structure” relationship, they fail to make sense of emergent and causal relationships between levels of determinations.

The conception of international is also implied in “globalization.” Although globalization denotes a wide range of relations and structures from the diffusion of market values into the different parts of the world, to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance, as a concept, “globalization” is overstretched. In this regard, it is a significant source of the literature on the problematization of international. The colonialism and the following tendency of “convergence” among the political entities of the international system – especially after the independence of colonial states – are also highly relevant to the development of the basis for globalization (Willis, 2010: 20). Pieterse (2000: 132-133) makes an insightful distinction between the analytical forms of imperialism and globalization: while the former is state-centric, primarily political, and territorially clear-cut, and the latter is multi-dimensional, non-territorial, and multiply acted.

There is a broad literature on globalization (Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2005). The proponents and opponents of the idea of globalization seem to line along according to its transformative implications on state and market (Giddens, 1999; McGrew, 2000). The shifts in the relative power of state and market depending on the transformation caused by globalization form the main subject, while the derivative approaches extend their arguments. The debates have been going around the nature of power and relevance of the state, whether decreasing (Ohmae, 1995) or

not (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). As a consequence, the studies on globalization focus on narrow political/economic concepts. These studies are interested in the change caused by globalization, which, as an approach, requires further explanatory effort on globalization itself.

The binary conceptualization of state and market in globalization/transnationalism debates are also relevant to the Marxist approaches. The expansion of capitalist relations and the historically concrete forms they assumed constituted an essential part of the Wallerstein's WSA and Cox's neo-Gramscianism.

A materialist perspective to the capitalist system, WSA focuses on systemic processes and emphasizes the uneven nature of relations of development along with growing inequality on a world scale (Bromley, 1999: 291). Its approach to structural positions and relations between nations is synchronic, while the world development is taken as exogenous to the nation-states, which are determined by the external. Although WSA has a historical perspective, its conceptualization of the international is close to structural determinism, which reflects itself in the exploitative relations between "core" and "periphery – parallel to the relationship between capital and labor. The undervalued political structures and conflated conception of a state within the economic base are the criticized aspects of WSA (Skocpol, 1977).

Concerning "international," although Chase-Dunn underlined the decisive role of the "single logic of mode of production" over the political-military issues along with the appropriation of economic surplus, Joseph criticizes WSA failing to develop an "emergent conception of IR," He (2010: 61-62) puts it as:

emergence should not be about how the international is emergent out of the national (or domestic) as many opponents of neorealism might argue, but that national (or domestic) and international are both emergent out of underlying social conditions.

The emergent conception of international denotes the irreducibility of any of these spheres to each other while acknowledging the decisive power of lower-level phenomena and mechanisms. It is essential to underline that the processes of globalization should be conceived as both the product and agent of intersocietal

interaction. Bromley (1999: 285-287) points out that the analysis of capitalism is not limited to the confines of national boundaries. Bromley argues that, according to Marx, the processes of differentiation in capitalist social totality are driven by the “emergence and consolidation” of the relations of production. Through globalization of these relations, the articulation and stratification of the social formations such as state, and market unfold.

Cox built his model of hegemony on relations production (Cox, 1987). The internationalization of state and internationalization of production led by Pax Americana from the 1940s undermined the model of state-centered hegemony culminating in a transnationalist capitalist age “enmeshed in single but complex transnational economic space” (Cox, 1993: 259-260). The domestic economies and, respectively, the forms of state have had to adjust to the demands of transnational capital and finance – the transformation of the Keynesian welfarist state, while Cox claimed that transnational managerial class and global economy were behind the wheel (Cox, 1981; 1987; 1992).

Robinson (2010) emphasizes the causal effects of transnationalized⁷ capital on the decreasing importance of the nation-state. For Robinson, nation-states are exposed to increasing incorporation into a unified system of production and finance. Overbeek and van der Pijl (1993: 5) argue the production relations in the accumulation of capital shape the structure of the social forces that attempts to control the economic processes and role of the state.

Concerning the complexity of international with its diverse dimensions, the debate on the state-market struggle in the literature concerning globalization and transnationalism is not wrong, yet it is deficient. The analytical concepts result in ignoring the struggle of social forces behind the formation of much reified analytical concepts. Similarly, the debate on withering away of state (transnationalism, globalization, empire) seems to miss the essence, the underlying structural logic of the empirical. The variegated relations of developmental encounters ended up with

⁷ For more information about the transnationalization of production and its impact on class relations, see Amsterdam School, and Overbeek, H. (2004). Transnational class formation and concepts of control: Towards a genealogy of the Amsterdam Project in international political economy, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7 (2), 113-141.

differentiated social structures and relations (Bernstein, 2000). The complexity of these transformative processes thus defies simplistic, stagist views of development. It makes concepts such as imperialism, dependency, inadequate, and narrow to grasp the totality of the relations (Pieterse, 2000: 131).

Among the critiques of transnationalism, Morton (2007a; 2007b) points to the “flattened ontology” that eliminates the state as a node in the circuits of capital, undertheorizes the geopolitics and class struggles of accumulation. Furthermore, Kiely (2010: 144) emphasizes the exaggerated independent status of “transnational” in the transnational capitalism argument, which led to missing the role of particular states in the deepening of expansion and diffusion of the neoliberal capitalist economic model, similar to Rosenberg’s argument on globalization theories (Rosenberg, 2005). It becomes essential considering the conceptualizations of “globalization,” which seem to underestimate the US-led encouragement of the neoliberal development model (Kiely, 2010: 144).

The analysis of the field of international in Marxist theories of the state seems inadequate. The classical imperialism theories by Lenin, Hilferding, for instance, the analytical foci is the expansion and universalization of capital, while the state system is left undertheorized (Yalvaç, 2010a: 181). Furthermore, the concepts such as inter-imperialist rivalry in Lenin and ultra-imperialism in Kautsky (1970) reflect the view of international as a derivative of capitalist relations. It also results in the problematic conceptualization of state, mostly seen in the arguments of globalization transnationalization of capital, as an abstracted reified institution rather than as a node in the social relations of capitalism. It creates the misleading legitimization of analytical focus on increasing or decreasing powers of the state against the market (Burnham, 2002: 124); instead of searching for the specific role played by the state in the reproduction process of capitalism.

Green (2014) notes that the hegemonic world order emanates from the national hegemony of a ruling class after a historic bloc is formed. Green asks how the change in the world order is explained with the Coxian framework, which lacks the combined aspect of development and its constitutive sociological impact. In Cox’s framework, the anarchy is maintained without accounting for how it is

formed through developmental relations. Pass (2018) argues that because of methodological dualism and ontological pluralism, the Coxian model is unable to adequately theorize social change – while powerfully describing the processes of transnationalized production – and conceptualizes hegemony through intersubjective consensus. For Green (2014), Cox takes for granted the diffusion of liberal world order under Pax Britannica, which excludes the historicization of development of these relations.

The “notion of a hierarchical and competitive interstate system, albeit one rooted in a global capitalist system, seems to sit uneasily with the neo-Gramscian” transnationalization argument (Pass, 2018) on the other hand, U&CD analysis with Hegemonic model of development conception can integrate the surface level with the structural level while integrating the hierarchical and competitive basis of international geopolitics. The states-system becomes a part of the complex set of determinations over the underlying structuring logic. It makes the states-system embedded in the capitalist mode of production, which renders the geopolitical relations between the states “capitalist geopolitical relations.” However, as part of a set of determinations, the states-system cannot be reduced to the underlying logic, it has distinct features (Callinicos, 2010) As Pozo-Martin emphasizes the state system cannot be extrapolated from the relations, mechanisms, and tendencies of the “capital.” On the contrary, he argues that “it exerts its own set of determinations” (Pozo-Martin, 2007: 556–57).

The point is the origins of the states-system might date back to the prevalence of capitalist mode of production; nevertheless, Ashman (2010: 193-194) argues that the states-system is “incorporated into and adapted to the capitalist mode, producing specifically capitalist geopolitics.” It epitomizes a form of combined development, for the latecomers attempt to improve their structural position through emulating the processes – sometimes skipping them –and “adopted the capitalist logic of geopolitics, which makes it crucial to integrate the mechanisms in the structures of accumulation, domination, and exploitation (Pozo-Martin, 2007: 556). The internationalization of production must be distinguished from the Hegemonic Model of Development. In *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, van der Pijl

(1998) sees the struggle between state/society complexes constitutive of the international relations; he puts it as “the internationalization of capital, then, historically does not evolve as an economic process in a fixed landscape of sovereign states. It is an aspect of a process of expansion of the state/society complex in which capital crystallized under what proved to be the most favorable conditions⁸.” Although his attempt to abstain from economic determinism in the formation of the state-society complex is significant, since his method of integrating the effects of “international” into his conceptualization is synchronic, he fails to account for the interactive nature of capitalist social totality and combined effects of the intersocietal interaction. Moreover, although his conception of state-society complexes and differentiation of the forms of states rest on the configuration of social forces and crystallization of capital, the exclusion of the intersocietal interaction – or seeing it merely in the form of geopolitics – end up with incomplete, and one-sided model of the complex nature of social relations.

The transnationalization of production had better seen as the effect of the shift in the Hegemonic Model of Development rather than as the cause. If it is seen as the cause of shift itself, then the transnationalization becomes reified. The hegemonic model of development sees it emerging from class struggle as a class project. U&CD analysis of the shifts in the Hegemonic model of development can account for the emergent features of this shift⁹, linking it to the class struggles – geopolitics, economic structures – together without reductionism and determinism.

Mielants (2016) argues that the intersocietal would not be a proper unit of analysis instead of capitalist world-economy as a whole because, the conception of intersocietal in U&CD does not capture the genuine exploration of mutual interactions in dialectic fashion, and the notion of uneven and combined

⁸ For further arguments on the formation of transnational class, see Van Der Pijl, K. (2010a). Western hegemony and transnational capital: a dialectical perspective. In Anievas, A. (Ed.) *Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism* (42-60). New York: Routledge; and (2012). *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*. London: Verso.

⁹ Sean Creaven (2007) argues that instead of mechanical interpretation of base/superstructure, material/ideational, and being/consciousness as the latter are determined by the former, the emergentist materialism attributes a causal priority in the explanation of social processes.

development is not consistent and too vague. Against this criticism, Mandel (1995: 1) characterized the law of uneven and combined development as a historical mechanism, and Van der Linden (2007) proposes to increase the explanatory power of the mechanism of uneven and combined development through identifying sub-mechanisms. Emergentist development identifies these mechanisms as geopolitical pressure, mercantile penetration, ideological influences, and political substitutionism.

The intersocietal, in this sense, is an essential part of the combination in development relations. Through geopolitical pressures, economic relations, and ideological-cultural influences, the socio-political, cultural, and material institutionalization processes unfold within social formations, which expand any national boundary. Rosenberg (2006) underlines that the state-society complexes are incorporated into the structures of development, that is, political orders, cultural frameworks, and division of labor. These relations are the sources of amalgam formations. Rolf (2015) points out that the structures and world hegemony is relevant to the forms of combined development, in this way, development is understood much more from the linear leveling out of development relations, yet as politically mediated through hegemonic projects contested from within and without. As the emergentist development underlines that the specificities of the development process can be identified looking at the diffusion of hegemonic structures of development, it acquires reality in the CR sense.

The state policies and its transformative impact upon the segments of capital and other strata in the configuration of social forces become quite essential to understand the implications and diffusion of the hegemonic model of development. Rolf (2015) is right in clarifying the shifts in developmental strategies can be understood with the international dimension and its mediation through state forms. The world structures of accumulation in which the state forms are embedded must be explored in order to account for the strategies of late developers – catch up development.

The unfolding of socio-political transformation in the post-colonial states has made the role of state more explicit. Since the colonial legacy on the modern state

formation processes is indispensable, the articulation of social forces has become intertwined with the institutionalization and penetration of state structures into social relations. Through these processes, the configuration of social forces in local structures of development is exposed to various mechanisms and historical conjunctures.

Concerning the articulation of social forces and ruling constituencies in uneven and combined development processes, the diversity within social relations of production plays a decisive role in the political-economic outlook of the world economy. Taylor (2014) argues that accumulation relations are constituted intersocietally, and the changes in these relations are driven by the political subjectivities and relations of power/dominance. It also has an impact on the scope of social property regimes, which are interrelated to the configuration of social forces and the incorporation of social formation into the world structures of development (Dufour, 2007). Thus, the implications of combination to a large extent rely on the economic and cultural capacities of a country, and contrary to the modernization perspective, it must not always have a progressive result yet might turn out to be modified backwardness (Van der Linden, 2007). The analyses of Syria and Libya marks the relevance of their incorporation into world structures of development that has affected the socio-political transformation in these countries and the consolidation of a de-industrializing, consumption-based economic model under the leadership of rising populist-authoritarian state which was seriously challenged with the neoliberalization processes.

3.2.2 Hegemonic Model of Development: Implications for the MENA

Emergentist development conceptualizes the intersocietal interaction without reifying the historical formations or conceptualizing them in an essentialist manner. It delineates the hierarchical relations within these structures and the mechanisms that generate combined effects of development. . In doing so, it prioritizes the concept of hegemony and hegemonic project within structures of world development (Harvey, 2005).

The broader implications of the emergentist development analyses for the socio-political transformation processes become: (1) the proper analysis of underlying structural logic, and (2) the apprehension of emerging historical specificities. As the various dimensions of social forces interact with the historically specific forms of hegemonic structures of development, it makes the shifts in the configuration of social forces closely related to the structures. The contradictions in the combination of political structures, production relations, and cultures, the impact of backwardness are the essential drivers of the intersocietal interaction over the socio-political transformation processes. It makes lacking the conception of international in the analyses of socio-political transformation processes quite problematic.

Developing a realist conception of hegemony, Joseph (2002) asks, “What the conditions are under which hegemony operates? Second, what makes hegemony a necessary social feature?” Emergentist development conceives of development as a process of structural interaction. The primary contribution of such conception is acknowledging the implications of intersocietal interaction from the very beginning rather than adding them as an addendum.

About the necessity of hegemony, Joseph (2002) asserts that “hegemony’s role is to forge a political and consensual unity and direction out of this differentiation.” Building on Gramscian conception of hegemony, Joseph examines the historical bloc. Connecting the structure and superstructure, it becomes more than building a ruling configuration of social forces. It includes the interaction between social structures to reproduce the material and ideational conditions for hegemony. The development processes, in this respect, become closely related to the interaction between social forces within structures of world development, while the main driver is becoming the dynamic process of material reproduction. Through interaction, specific social forces acquire hegemonic positions in the structures of world development. The features of hegemonic social forces are reflected in their compatibility with the emerging form of the developmental model and their capacity to subordinate other social forces under their ruling constituency.

The emergentist approach offers a solution to the relationship among particular institutionalized forms within structures of development without reductionism. It conceptualizes the complex intersocietal interaction processes via the hegemonic model of development. Rolf (2015: 142) argues that in the process of “exploring the social constitution of states pursuing catch up development, attention must be given to the world structures of accumulation in which they are embedded.” The hegemonic model of development conceives of intersocietal interaction as diffusion of hierarchical relations within structures of world development into the local structures and affecting the configuration of social forces. In this respect, the implications of state policies on transforming the particular segments of society (factions of capital, labor) constitute the main parts of concretization. The significance of such a perspective is that it allows the analysis of intersocietally constituted social formations. The varieties¹⁰ of capitalist historical social formations should be seen as the combined outcomes of intersocietal interaction. Within structures of world development, the intersocietal interaction manifests itself empirically in the form of hierarchical relations driven by material reproduction. The differentiated developmental performances of societies emanate from the uneven relations of societal multiplicity/international (Trotsky, 2007).

Emergentist development explores the multi-linearity and contradictory tendencies of the development processes together with the local political, economic, and cultural specificities. The hegemonic model of development highlights that the mechanisms, which generate unevenness, operate through the political, economic, and cultural relations that create constraining structures for social formations. The configuration of social forces is affected by historically specific social formations. The concept of “combined” denotes the amalgamated social formations through intersocietal interaction. The skipping of the stages of development and the political

¹⁰ In Marxist thought, the distinct types of capitalism are categorized according to periodization of capitalist orders; the liberal, monopoly, and state-monopoly forms of capitalism have been described (Jessop, 1982; Coates, 2005: 21-22). In WST, forms of capitalism have been appraised according to their position in the international division of labor (core, periphery, and semi-periphery); however, Albo marks that Marxian political economy perspective perceives the social formations in capitalism as a result of social relations rather than deducting from particular market exchanges or inducting from institutional and distributional particularities (Albo, 2005: 34).

substitutionism are the main drivers of combined implications of development processes in the face of geopolitical pressures and relations of production. The shape and essence of the particular state-society complexes in the MENA reflect, therefore, historical specificities of the hegemonic model of development's tendencies. The concrete forms of uneven and combined development in the Third World requires understanding the historical articulation of integration with capitalist structures of development, the configuration of social forces, and the intersocietal interaction.

As the MENA region has been an essential node in the structures of accumulation, it has always been a significant theater for the intersocietal interaction starting from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire to the Cold War and hitherto (Kamrawa, 2011: 34-47). The incorporation of the MENA region into the structures of world development has been designated by the geopolitical pressures, the international division of labor, and local specificities-relations of production (Owen, 2009). These factors primarily determined the articulation and configuration of social forces and created the combined implications of development processes in historical conjunctures –national independence movements, state-formation processes, and ideological-cultural formations. They shape the context of socio-political transformation processes by affecting the configuration of social forces.

The articulation of social forces does not happen in a vacuum; to illustrate, the formation of the bourgeoisie in the post-colonial states cannot be thought separately from the legacy of colonial structures. Evans (1982) questions the nature of the social forces in the Third World and emphasizes that the formation of social forces does not resemble that of industrialized capitalist countries. Any form of the progressive, national bourgeoisie, in this regard, cannot be found in the post-colonial states (Ayubi, 1995: 86-99). Instead, the formation of leading social forces concatenated with the hegemonic structures of development.

The historical social reactions to processes of adaptation to the structures of world development emerged in amalgam social formations such as Islamic fundamentalism, populist-authoritarianism, Arab socialism, and pan-Arabism. Emergentist analysis marks that the articulation of these social formations

constitutes the main source of amalgamation of local and international, old and new, modern, and archaic. The hegemonic model of development refers to the features of the structures of world development within which the social forces get into interaction and reproduce themselves materially. In such a context, the emergentist development framework identifies two significant hegemonic models of development starting from the end of World War II: The Keynesian-welfarist model and neoliberalization.

Although it can be argued that the Keynesian welfarist model of development diffused into the MENA after the Second World War, it was the colonial period under the Great Britain and France that marked the onset of necessary socio-political transformation processes (Issawi, 1982). The relations of production, surplus appropriation, and economic models had been exposed to colonial impact under the leadership of Great Britain and France – and for the Libyan case, Italy as well (Khoury, 2003; Vandewalle, 2012).

The colonial state formation processes according to the interests of the core were a manifestation of the hierarchical incorporation of state-society complexes into the structures of world development. With the national independence movements, the configuration of social forces articulated in a combined manner. The developmental amalgams emerged from these intersocietal interaction processes. The implications of the Keynesian-welfarist model on the societies were the skipping of the stages of development and political substitutionism. The amalgam political formations were realized through political substitutionism – the rise of the military (Seale, 1988: 145; Vandewalle, 2012). The configuration of social forces manifested itself in the form of populist-authoritarianism. The significance of this socio-political transformation was the controlled incorporation of specific segments of societies under the ruling constituencies.

The emergentist development framework delineates these socio-political transformation processes by exploring the shifts in the configuration of social forces and the structures of world development's historical features. The relations and interactions in structures of development reflect not only the features of the hegemonic model of development but also the specificities of the MENA: such as

the ideological frameworks of Arab socialism and Ba’thism, the military forces as the most organized social force capable of managing socio-political transformation, and the societal impacts of dependent development such as anti-modernization, political Islam, repressive and authoritarian political structures. Along with these, the processes, including land reforms, nationalization, and political-economic institutionalization, all shaped the state-society complexes in the MENA.

The shifts in the configuration of social forces, in this respect, drive the socio-political transformation processes. The impact of intersocietal interaction in the form of geopolitical pressures and economic penetration plays a decisive role in these processes. In the MENA context, as the national independence movements were mainly managed by the land-owners, and segments of capital (mostly the national market-oriented), the state-society complexes following the post-colonization periods were generally ruled by a mixture of these social forces (Burke III, 1991).

When the US replaced the hegemonic positions of England and France after the Second World War, the context of the intersocietal interaction became the Cold War between the US and the Soviets until the collapse of the Soviets in 1991. The intersocietal interaction had various dimensions, including the competing political-economic models, ideological-cultural frameworks. It was important that rather than a confrontation, both sides aimed to contain and decrease the influence of the other. Consequently, the geopolitical and economic pressures that emerged out of the confrontation between the Soviets and the US during the Cold War had been an effective driver of the intersocietal interaction. It was also significant in that it affected the formation of hybrid state-society complexes through concatenating with the local structures, forms of relations. The displacement of the European powers by the US and the strategy of containment were, in this respect, critical geopolitical strategies that directed the formation of alliances and support for the social forces in the MENA region.

Emergentist development conceives of a combination in development processes by looking at the articulation of social forces in the societies of the MENA. The formation of populist-authoritarian regimes, in this respect, cannot be

explained without referring to the shifts in ruling social forces and the processes brought in these shifts. Similarly, although the geopolitical competition and superpower penetration in the region has not been the immediate cause of the increasing role of the military, they played a decisive role in the rising power of the army over societies. The 1948 war against Israel and the failure of Arab states marked the onset of the rising influence of the military in the MENA societies (Watenpaugh, 2006: 299).

In the post-colonial period, the capitalist development processes increasingly penetrated the local structures of development and impacted the state-society complexes. The changing relations within structures of development became one of the drivers of socio-political transformation. The shifts in the configuration of social forces – from bourgeois segments to the military – were connected to the mechanisms of intersocietal interaction. Springborg (1993), regarding these shifts, argues that it is wrong to call Arab national bourgeoisie as reactionary or unprogressive. He marks that significant gains for the Syrian labor realized during the 1940s and 1950s with the industrialization movement under Syrian bourgeoisie – land-owners, notables. He contends that they aimed for autonomy, which was confronted with the socio-political transformation via military coups. Whether the ruling social force – comprising various segments of society – have progressive social project largely relies on its concatenation with the structures of development and the local specificities.

The dependent development processes, however, were crucial for this socio-political transformation. The military as an organized social force became critical in this transformation, which did not allow the unfolding of a proper European developmental example in the Middle East. It involved in the substitution of leading social forces in the MENA societies and adoption of the hegemonic model of development – the Keynesian Welfarism (the populist authoritarianism in the MENA context). The path for the increasing role of the military, furthermore, was closely related to the changing relations of production. The implications of the international division of labor were decisive over the articulation of working-classes in Syria and Libya. They constituted the social basis of the Arab socialist ideology.

While in the Syrian context, it was the working class pushing for increased salaries and better working conditions (Longuenesse, 1996); it was the oil workers in the Libyan context (Bini, 2019).

The mechanism of ideological-cultural influences was also crucial in the direction of socio-political transformation processes. Emergentist development examines Arab socialism and Ba’thism through the lens of intersocietal interaction and incorporation of local social forces into the structures of world development. The Arab socialist regimes, in this respect, become a significant source of amalgamation, and the Ba’thist ideology is conceived as an instrument of controlling and subordinating the social forces under ruling constituencies. Furthermore, it is also important to underline that the content of Arab socialism is designated according to the multiple mechanisms of uneven and combined development. The geopolitical pressures of the confrontation with Israel, the super-power penetration in the MENA, the position of the MENA societies in the international division of labor, and the local configurations of social forces all contributed to the designation of Arab-socialism.

The Soviet Union’s relationship to the MENA had specific implications for the Arab socialist political economy. As the leader of the anti-capitalist model, the Soviets managed the conditions for the “non-capitalist” path of socio-political transformation. The Soviets utilized the Communist Parties in the Third World and got in touch with the ruling elite without looking at their progressive capacities¹¹ (Bennett, 1985).

From the local perspective, on the other hand, although the intersocietal interaction was influential on the transformation of the political-economic structures, it did not mean the imposition of complete control over these processes. It was epitomized in the Arab socialist regimes’ harsh reactions against communist parties and activities, which did not harm the strategic alliance with the Soviets. Arab socialism was against the class struggle and materialism; however, it defended

¹¹ The MENA regimes’ reactions to the Soviets were mostly pragmatic. Similarly, the Soviets after Stalin rule improved relations with regional ideological frameworks such as Arab nationalism, and pan-Arabism in order to confront the US in the region (Munoz, 2019: 111).

the improving living standards, strong country, and modernization (no author, 1970: 4-5). This specificity makes the content and orientation of Arab socialist thought and its relation with the nationalist, anti-imperialist, and pan-Arabist ideologies essential to understand the socio-political transformation in Arab countries.

The historical conjunctures in the structures of world development were also decisive in the unfolding of intersocietal interaction. The impact of ideological-cultural influences through Arab-socialism in the form of nationalization of oil production was one of them. Similarly, the OPEC oil crises must be conceived of as an instrument within the geopolitical structures. As the incorporation of the MENA countries into the structures of world development realized in a dependent manner, the emergence of “oil consciousness” is argued to be one of the amalgamation in the uneven and combined development processes. The oil consciousness, along with the oil revenues, has had profound implications for the MENA societies via worker remittances, strategic aids, and direct investments. The emergentist development framework conceptualizes these historical conjunctures as crucial moments in the socio-political transformation processes. Although these events have had far-reaching implications for the MENA societies, the effects concerning the configuration of social forces are prioritized for the theoretical framework. These historical conjunctures are argued to contribute to the diffusion of Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model into the local structures of development, to consolidate the ruling constituencies and populist-authoritarian political economies, and to facilitate the adjustment of local regimes of accumulation into the structures of world development. There were also complementary local processes, such as the land reforms, to the socio-political transformation processes. The intended consequences of these formations were ostensibly to consolidate the non-capitalist path to socialism, yet in capitalist social totality, the historically specific configuration of social forces in hegemonic structures of development decisively managed the orientation of development processes.

While these processes of socio-political transformation consolidated the bond within state-society complexes, as Laqueur (1959) argues, the usefulness of the military exhausted when the older social order was dismantled. Yet it did not stop

there. The structures of world development pushed the local regimes of accumulation into a liberalization and privatization path. Springborg (1993) draws attention to the formation of the *infitahi* bourgeoisie different from the national bourgeoisie of Arab states. The first bourgeoisie was a class in itself with different factions; however, it was shouldered aside by the military. It was a process of containment for the bourgeois social forces.

The consequences of populist-authoritarian transformation might ostensibly seem as progressive and equalizing; however, it turned into a process of controlled inclusion of the social forces through distributive mechanisms. The emergent bourgeoisie is a Janus-faced, dualistic, for it is neither totally developmentalist nor completely pre-capitalist and pre-industrial. Moghadam (1991) uses the term *neopatriarchy* in relevance to the encounter between modernity and tradition in the context of dependent capitalism. The economic basis of this transformation, on the other hand, was de-industrialization, consumption-driven economic growth through unproductive economic activities and rentierism financed by oil revenues, strategic aid, and worker remittances. The political implications, furthermore, were the increased state dependence and hierarchical organization of society. Matin (2018) argues for the specific unfolding of capitalist relations and the concatenation with the existing social structures. The persistence of communitarian ideologies along with the modern structures and institutions, even imbrication of them, points to the amalgamation, rather than binary dichotomies of modern and traditional. It is essential to underline that the term combination captures the development processes as neither exceptional nor pathological. The empirical manifestation of uneven and combined development in this respect is in the form of dependent development.

Although the neoliberal transformation originated in the global economic recession of the 1980s, the MENA countries, both oil producers and non-oil producers have been exposed to structural shifts gradually through implementing measures in pursuit of sustainable macroeconomic policies led by IFIs. Any shift in the hegemonic structures of development, therefore, diffuses into the local structures and drives the transformation of the constituency of the social forces as in the neoliberal transformation. As the MENA countries have become incorporated into

the structures of world development, their political economies have reflected the structural features: firstly, oil or non-oil, they all became dependent upon external capital inflows; secondly, the political and economic outlook was threatening the ongoing of these flows. The debt crisis and decreasing amount of remittances left no choice but to move to transition in order to secure investment, and the loss of aid and concessional loans as the increasing convergence of superpower interests (accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union) no longer necessarily converted political alignment into financial reward.

The geopolitical and economic pressures constituted a firm basis for the neoliberal socio-political transformation in the MENA countries. Budd (2013: 125) argues that beneath the surface appearances, Pax-Americana's causal mechanisms were rooted in a new post-war structure of inter-imperialist rivalry in the form of "neoliberal restructuring," which has become crucial in the examination of the socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya. The deteriorating economic conditions were decisive in giving up populist tendencies. While the resources for financing the ISI model have been getting lesser, and the international markets have been more competitive, the state-led developmental policies have confronted the containment strategies of International Organizations in the period of financialization and competition (Desai, 2013; Kiely, 2012). The Keynesian policies cannot be adopted along with the neoliberal prevalence.

Nevertheless, it must be underlined that these transformations-reproductions have not been easy, smooth, and homogenous. Rolf (2015) distinguishes the developmental strategies from the irresistible expansion of neoliberalism, and he defines the transition processes as "socio-politically mediated development through hegemonic projects which have been contested from within and without the capitalist state." The contestation of development projects unfolds along with the transformation/reproduction of social actors in the structures. From these processes, the historically specific outcomes, amalgamation, and hybridities of development emerge (Bieler and Morton, 2013).

In this respect, while the authoritarian tendencies of the regimes have been preserved, the populist tendencies have been undermined. The societal

ramifications, on the other hand, have been exclusive and marginalizing. As social mobility has been blocked under repressive policies of neoliberal authoritarian regimes, and the developmental contradictions have been intensified, the political subjectivities in the MENA societies acquired a hybrid and radicalized form. Emergentist development argues that such transformations within the state-society complexes have reflected amalgamation of neoliberalism and repressive authoritarian political economies.

To analyze the implications of neoliberal hegemonic model of development, it is necessary to delineate the nature of neoliberal thinking, which is ambiguous because of the complexity of the relations relevant to it (Mudge, 2008: 703). Gamble points out that neoliberalism is a “form of political economy and ideology” (Gamble, 2001: 127). While good governance denotes establishing the rules that make markets work efficiently and that correct for market failure (World Bank, 1992: 1), an enabling state is that would allow markets to flourish (World Bank, 1997: 1). In other words, a restructured-state is required to carry out neoliberal policies (Kiely, 2007: 172-173).

Fraser (2015: 167) conceptualizes neoliberalism “as a mode of accumulation.” In these accumulation processes, the interactive nature of the rise of neoliberalism must be underlined; Germann (2014: 707) sees the essential developments springing from the unfolding of incorporation into international circuits of capital. Since there is no uniform model for the transition to neoliberalism, amalgamation are inevitable to emerge.

Kiely (2010: 178) examines the uneven developmental processes and argues that neither “under-development” nor convergence perspective of neoliberalism can address the differentiated outcomes with static approaches. The transformation of the state for Weiss (2012) is selective. Instead of rolling-out of state, there is selective rolling-out of state, especially for the particular sectors depending on the specificities of the social formation. Therefore, it requires the specification of the configuration in the social structures. How have been the structures relevant to development affected by this transformation must be identified to capture the complexity and depth of the change.

Fine (2012) emphasizes the “financialization” as a distinct feature of neoliberalization. Similarly, Arrighi (1994) saw the “financialization” as a qualitative change and “predominant feature of capitalism” since 1973. However, he argues that financialization is a “recurrent” feature of capitalism –against Hilferding, who saw the finance-capital marking a new phase of capitalism. In order to save these arguments from mutual exclusiveness, it is necessary to search for the sociological character of neoliberalization. The global neoliberal agenda is a class project, as Harvey argued. It is realized as a hegemonic project that prioritizes the financial over the productive sectors, intensified competition for global markets, and mediated by the selective rolling out of state authorities, which intensified the marginalizing and exclusive tendencies of capitalist development processes.

The relations of marginalization and exclusion have obtained new forms in the neoliberal restructuring; to give an example, the coercive instruments expanded into extra-market sectors, while the environmental exploitation reached its highest levels. As a consequence, the intensity of the unevenness of capitalist development processes and relations grew more substantial due to intersocietal interactions (Bond, 2010: 127). According to Hanieh (2014: 229), the transformation of economic and political structures has been realized through policies such as “the liberalization of ownership laws -particularly in the real estate, financial and telecommunication sectors; opening up to foreign investment flows; privatization of state-owned industries; restructuring of tax regimes; labor market deregulation; and the relaxation of trade barriers.” The objectives to increase the level of investment and shifts to export generating sectors remained limitedly useful.

The failures and underachievement of neoliberal reforms, however, become only relevant to the empirical level manifestations of neoliberal agenda. The historical sociological analysis of neoliberal reforms shows that the aim was not to encourage economic growth, stabilize inflation, and increase political liberties through good governance. Instead, neoliberalism has unfolded as a class project that is embedded in the accumulation and exploitation structures under the mediation of the state (Saad-Filho, 2010: 102). Although the content and strategies of the hegemonic models of post-war and neoliberal development have been different,

Saull (2012: 329) points out that the common point was to expand and ensure the capitalist essence of development processes. The policies of states and the configuration of social forces, in this respect, become essential in the analysis of the implications of uneven and combined development.

The general outlook of the neoliberal transformation in the Middle East can be delineated with its three prominent features, business taking precedence over government, FDI over trade, and rising Gulf capital (Hertog, 2007: 52). The neoliberalization processes have been intimately related to the internationalization of Gulf capital and the incorporation of national bourgeois segments into the regional/global accumulation circuits. The involvement of the Gulf finance capital has become through banks and financial institutions underlying the configuration of large business conglomerates. The nature of Gulf finance capital's expansion into the region has not been hostile and exclusionary to the capitalist classes; to the contrary, under the hegemony of the Gulf capital, regional class structures are entwined and provided benefits to both sides – while enabling the Gulf capital to carry out its model of expansion and internationalization (Hanieh, 2016: 17).

The most important implication of neoliberal transformation is developmental contradictions. As the ruling constituencies of the MENA societies have controlled and subordinated social forces under their rule through populist-authoritarian political economies, the more their populist nature has faded away, the more the severity and unevenness of development processes have been felt through vast segments of societies. Emergentist development argues that these processes are significant in that they are connected to the shifts in configuration of the social forces and diffusion of the developmental model through geopolitical pressures, relations of production, and cultural influences.

The consequent political substitutionism reflects the containment of counter-hegemonic social forces. Dahi (2011) argues that the revolts were against the neoliberal policies of authoritarian regimes. The contradictory tendencies of uneven development, therefore, become closely related to the accumulation of social tension/struggle, and it puts the analysis of Arab Revolts in a significant place regarding the exploration of the socio-political transformation processes.

The emergentist development framework inquires into the underlying structural logic of socio-political transformation processes and their relationship to the shifts in the configuration of social forces. In this respect, the next section examines the mechanisms of unevenness that affect the configuration of social forces through processes of social differentiation and stratification.

3.2.3 Mechanisms of Unevenness

The emergentist development argues that the analytical framework to examine the unevenness and combination of developmental processes must look at the historical formation of specificities in the state-society complex. These specificities are nested in the structures of development and generated by the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification.

The actual experiences of “peripheral” capitalist societies belie the mechanistic interpretations of modernization and Marxism (Alawi, 1982a). Alawi (1982b: 294-295) examines the state and social structures in peripheral capitalist societies and argues that the “structural imperative” in the capitalist system designates not the actions but the consequences. In the long run, the determining power of the economic basis in the last instance is conceptualized through the imposition of the logic of the capitalist economy on the state policy.

It is clear that development processes unleash tendencies for unification into a single form of capitalist development; however, this tendency does not ensure the existence of a “homogenous capitalist milieu” (Van der Linden, 2007: 151). The nature of relations in the capitalist structures hinges upon the drive for accumulation (Wood, 2002: 17). The drive for accumulation results in contradictory forms of social forces. The competitive nature of capitalist social totality impacts the tendencies of struggle and conflict in the form of contestation of the hegemonic system by “rival hegemonic projects, subaltern resistance” (Hardy, 2016). The outcomes of the developmental processes in capitalist social totality must be examined along with the domestic structures of development. This move includes looking at the configuration of social forces in domestic structures - class formations, struggles, and alliances. The equalization and differentiation become the

specificities emerging out of these relations (Ashman, 2006). The form and content of the historical specificities of social forces are generated by the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification.

Marx argues that any study of historical change should begin with the real, practical activities of man. Thus, he claims that production predominates distribution, exchange, and consumption, yet they are all members of one entity, different sides of one unit. With production, the process continually starts over again. He says: “a definite form of production thus determines the forms of consumption, distribution, exchange, and also the mutual relations between these various elements” (Marx, 1904: 291-292).

The essence of the relation between social forces, classes results in a society consistently in flux. It is this antagonistic nature of social forces that drives social change: conflictual relations between the relations of production and forces of production (Johnston and Dolowitz, 1999: 133). Cox argues that accumulated social power that determines the nature of production, the structure of authority as molded by the internal dynamics of the production process, and the distributive consequences are dialectically related in a single historical whole: the social relations of production (Cox, 1987: 12). The complexity of the various set of determinations and mechanisms result in the emergence of specific social formations, and state-society complex is one of these forms.

The form of state both reflects and contains the power to modify the realization of hegemonic projects and the class struggles. Thus those excluded from the hegemonic project turn into subaltern position and faces the contradictions of development. The international capitalist economy is the structural basis on which such conception of the state-society complex is grounded. Joseph (2006: 25) states that the source of the capitalist character of the state is as much related to its intrinsic relationship with the capitalist international system as the local configuration of social forces – the dominance of the bourgeois class. A point, however, must be delineated here. Although the state as a political entity has acquired a certain level of authority over development processes, as Pierson (1999: 177) pointed out, for Marx, it is still in the context of the capitalist social totality. It

means that it cannot undermine the capitalist logic and cannot act against the long-term interests of the capitalist class. Regardless of its political and economic specificities, it becomes a capitalist state.

The conceptualization of the state still becomes crucial in the exploration of the motion of capitalist processes. Against the determinist structuralist perspectives on state¹², the representation of class struggles must be incorporated along with the structural conditions. As Jessop modeled, “The power of the state is the power of the class forces which act in and through the state.” (Jessop, 1985: 337), and the state is the complex institutional ensemble that reflects and modifies the balance of class forces.

The nature of social forces and processes of class formation in the post-colonial states must be thought together with their colonial legacies, remnants of previous modes of production, and the impact of the capitalist system. As the post-colonial states –either under the banner of national independence/modernization or both– commenced a process of socio-political transformation, the social forces have undergone considerable changes.

The class-formation concerning ownership of means of production has been a matter of debate. First, the state actions have held a prominent position in the designation of social forces in the process of destruction of the conditions of reproduction. Second is that there emerged a mode of regulation depending on the mode of production in these societies, as Jessop (2002: 93) defines “an emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organizational forms, and patterns of conduct that can stabilize an accumulation regime.” While the role of the state assumes managing the complex relations between different interest groups along with popular mobilization, the crisis of the state turns into the legitimacy of the ruling constituency.

This transformation denotes the effects of capitalist relations on the formation of social forces, while sheds light upon the specificities of the configuration in

¹² For the Poulantzas-Miliband Debate, see Poulantzas, N. (1969). The Problem of the Capitalist State, *New Left Review*, 58, 67-78; Miliband, R. (1973). The Capitalist State – Reply to N. Poulantzas, *New Left Review*, 59.

historical social formations. In understanding the formation of the ruling regimes and the shifts in developmental orientations in Syria and Libya, in this regard, the distinction between the “class-in-itself” and “class-for-itself” is helpful. Marx (1963) puts it as:

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass.....is not a class for itself. In the struggle.....this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests.

Pröbsting (2016: 417) points out to the nature of capitalist social order as it “inherits, incorporates, and modifies” the local and international, old and new, modern and traditional. The amalgamation that emerges in the combination of development processes becomes essential in capturing the emergence of differentiated social forms (Davidson, 2010: 13), to illustrate; although unevenness emerges from the different tempo of development processes within and without the social formation, it does not unfold separately from the wider structures and relations (Davidson, 2018b).

Bieler and Morton (2014: 43) points out to the aim of Trotsky when he delineated the Russian socio-political transformation embedded in the uneven and combined development processes (Trotsky, 2007 [1929], p. 152). For Trotsky, The “structured” incorporation of Russia into the international order and the diffusion of it into the domestic structures are crucial for the uneven and combined nature of Russian development. The emergent institutions and activities – economic, political – are socially embedded, which renders impossible to maintain the extant mode of accumulation solely employing economic mechanisms (Jessop, 2002: 89). The amalgams of old and new, modern, and archaic in the form of politics and culture become essential for understanding the specificities of development processes. Most importantly, while the changes in the mode of development along with respective shifts in the formation of social classes are assumed to create contradictions in the peripheral capitalism, these contradictions did not create a progressive contradiction. The diffusion of the hegemonic model of development plays a

decisive role in the specification and modification of the winners and losers of development.

Concerning the “developing” countries, the developmental performances and operation of the market and state can be delineated via U&CD, in that their interaction with the hegemonic model of development realizes unevenly and in a combined manner. The specificities of neoliberal restructuring, in this regard, express the context of the combination processes, interacting with the domestic structures of production, exploitation, and domination. Hardy (2014: 153) argues that:

The importance of the concept is that it allows the exploration of systematic unevenness in spheres such as production, social reproduction and human domination along the lines of class, gender and ethnicity, which stresses the social damage associated with uneven capitalist development.

When it comes to identification and explanation of the tendencies of capitalist relations in the state-society complex and state system; thus, the crises unfold according to the particular configuration of social forces. Since the state emerges as having a crucial role in safeguarding the circuit of capital, the contradictions rooted in capitalist relations become more likely to turn to the state itself as crises of legitimacy and economic regulation (Hay, 1999: 158).

The examination of social relations of production requires the exploration of the relation between the economic basis of the society, its position in the international division of labor and geopolitics. The historical combination of these forces underlies the specificities of development processes in these societies.

Trotsky's analysis of the Russian revolution sheds light upon the examples of combined effects of development. An essential amalgam emerging from the condensation of development processes is the “substitution of the role of one class with another,” it has been the formation of the Revolutionary Council of Command in Libya and the military-mercantile complex in Syria. These formations have been quite influential in the mediation and control of the development processes. Moreover, these formations have both reflected and modified the mode of production in these societies. As Trotsky (1980) argues, the specificity of the Russian industry reflects another example of combination, for Russia did not repeat

the industrialization processes but adapted the latest achievements into its backwardness. In the cases of Syria and Libya, it is evident that the formation of rentier models epitomizes the combined effects of world development.

These arguments, *prima facie*, might evoke the conceptualization of world economy in Wallerstein's world-systems analysis – specifying the position of any country according to its position in the international division of labor. However, emergentist development sees developmental processes in societies such as Libya and Syria not in a reductionist manner, as if the world economy determines their relations of production. Alawi (1982a: 174) is critical of the Underdevelopment and WSA in respect to their conception of capitalism – the trade and exchange rather than social relations of production. On the contrary, emergentist development points out the forms of combinations in these societies along with their extant struggles within social forces – be it classes, ethnic, tribal communities.

The formations of alliances between fractions are conceptualized within these emergent consequences of the external whip of necessity – the hegemonic model of development. As Trotsky (1980: 8) emphasizes the combined effects of development in the formation of class alliances:

The confluence of industrial with bank capital was also accomplished in Russia with a completeness you might not find in any other country. But the subjection of the industries to the banks meant, for the same reasons, their subjection to the western European money market. Heavy industry (metal, coal, oil) was almost wholly under the control of foreign finance capital.

As the evolution and position of the industry designated the social character and political outlook of the bourgeois class in Russia for Trotsky, the uneven and combined development in the form of opposition to imperialism designated the projections of development in Syria and Libya (Halliday, 2013). The state as an institutionalized form of social forces came to the fore in the post-colonial period and turned into an influential node in the circuits of capitalist relations under the control of anti-bourgeois movements. The capacities of the state in generating employment and penetrating daily life increased as the capitalist relations diffuse.

Imperialism was embodied in the interests of the ruling regime, which meant the peripheral capitalist societies are partially independent. The social consequences

of the socio-political transformation, after all, turned into repressive and exclusive (Halliday, 2013). While Alawi (1982a: 176) argues that the “reformist nationalist movement” in the peripheral capitalisms reflected the alliance between landowners and metropolitan capital – emphasizing that the structures in these societies extend beyond national borders, with a more in-depth perspective Trotsky (1972: 248-249) points out the position of bureaucracy above society imposing its rule through the political institutions of the state. As the rule of state-affiliated bureaucracy relies on the defense of its privileged position – quite relevant to the Syrian and Libyan cases - it becomes distinct from a rule of class. For bureaucracy’s economic role and property rights are not independent of the state. Trotsky (1972: 249) puts it as: “the means of production belong to the state, but the state, so to speak, belongs to the bureaucracy.” Therefore, the formations of ruling regimes and the fractions within the ruling constituency require acknowledging the complex nature of alliances and the stratified essence of relations of production.

In this context, the transformation under neoliberalization turns into a crucial element for the analysis of socio-political changes in Syria and Libya. The specificities of a hegemonic project – state rolling out, deregulation, and privatization – determine the framework for the developmental outcomes.

The cases of this study, Syria, and Libya, express relatively similar features of incorporation into the international capitalist system. Hinnebusch (2001; 1984) classifies Syria - and similarly Libya - as formerly populist authoritarian regimes. The political and economic institutionalization processes relied upon a trade-off between political consent and economic privileges financed by a form of rentierism. More importantly, the socialist nature of these countries is questioned, as Ayubi (1992) distinguishes socialism in discourse from institutionalization. Anderson argues that both Syria and Libya had tended to use the term “socialism” for the political and domestic objectives, mostly in state-building processes (Anderson, 1987). Therefore, the state-society complex manifests in the struggles, negotiations, contestations, articulations of compromises, and marginalization along with social differentiation and unevenness embedded in structural relations (Joseph, 2000: 183-184). The competitive relations of accumulation are rooted in drive for the

appropriation of surplus-value and ensuring its perpetuation within social structures. It denotes particular structural relations such as *exploitation, opportunity hoarding, and distantiation-hierarchization*.

3.2.3.1 Exploitation/Appropriation of Surplus

The formation of societies is closely related to cooperation to generate the necessary subsistence. The relations emerging out of these processes reflect and modify the division of labor in any society. The essence of the emergent social forces in these processes is characterized by antagonism in historical materialist perspectives, as the exploitative relations are constitutive of the appropriation of surplus. It is crucial to underline the asymmetrical nature of these *prima facie* interdependent relations (Johnston and Dolowitz, 1999: 132-133). At this point, the views of Poulantzas based on class inequalities not only in terms of economic exploitation but also as a consequence of political and ideological domination become significant (Poulantzas, 1975: 224-225).

By taking the relations of production, the exploitation mechanism of Marx excludes the other forms of oppression generated via nationality, ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, age, health, and bodily disabilities, which is criticized by Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1993, 332-333). As Jones argued (Jones, 2006: 62-63), Marx's scientific practice respected the stratification of theoretical inquiry that is necessitated by the stratification of social reality. Besides, the exploitation mechanism is significant in that it helps to inquire about the articulation of the material conditions of inequalities.

Although the processes of exploitation and appropriation of surplus are examined through the relations of production and its relation to the class formation, they are overdetermined with the conflictual relations between ethnic, tribal, and sectarian interaction. Gramsci (1971: 143) argued that along with the economic sphere, the developments in ideological, religious, intellectual, and philosophical spheres are effective upon the concrete forms of inequalities. In the MENA context, Achcar (2013) examines the peculiarity of concrete forms that these relations assume, and he finds a hybrid form. The local patrimonial relations amalgamated

with the competitive capitalist relations and the modern forms of political-economic institutionalization are instrumentalized in the processes of appropriation. These amalgam formations become essential in the analysis of developmental contradictions.

The ruling bargain within the state-society complex, which gives legitimacy to the governance, is ensured by “the democracy of bread” in Sadiki’s words. It demonstrates that democracy demands in the sense of political participation are traded for material interests via the distributive function of the state (Sadiki, 2000: 79). The distributive functions, then, become the very source of exploitation and appropriation of surplus.

The specific economic structures and production relations in Syria and Libya have had implications upon the formation of social forces. The family, tribe, religious communities provided security and welfare, which undermined the class identity and solidarity. Concerning the cross-sectarian, tribal alliances that comprised the ruling regimes in Syria and Libya, the analysis of social differentiation and stratification must abstain from the reification of identities.

3.2.3.2 Opportunity Hoarding and Inclusion/Exclusion

The mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification are relevant to the appropriation of the generated social value through structural relations. In this sense, the term “social class” may not include the interclass differentiations or the specific sources that shape the configuration of social forces in a particular historical formation. The emergent features of ethnic, tribal, sectarian identities during intersocietal interaction – the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development – form the base of amalgamation. Then, those who share the same class position do not necessarily share the same status (Johnston and Dolowitz, 1999: 139-140).

The perpetuation of these relations in the social structures is realized by the agents holding relatively hegemonic positions. The “social closure” concept of Weber epitomizes particularity of exclusive structural relations (Weber, 1968: 43-46); Weber (1968, 1:43) puts it as:

A relationship is likely to be closed, in the following type of situation: a social relationship may provide the parties to it with opportunities for the satisfaction of spiritual or material interests...If...their expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is in a closed relationship.

Linklater studies the extension of inclusion/exclusion relations into the international community. Influenced by Habermas, Linklater (1990: 32-33) points out the problematic issue of exclusion in the international community. Zehfuss (2013: 148-149) argues that he envisages a framework for delineating the problems on power, order, and human emancipation “through the extension of the human community.

The relations of marginalization and exclusion have obtained new forms through neoliberalization. According to Hanieh (2014: 229), the transformation of economic and political structures has been realized via policies such as “the liberalization of ownership laws -particularly in the real estate, financial and telecommunication sectors; opening up to foreign investment flows; privatization of state-owned industries; restructuring of tax regimes; labor market deregulation; and the relaxation of trade barriers.” The coercive instruments expanded into extra-market sectors. As a consequence, the intensity of the unevenness of capitalist development processes and relations grew more substantial due to intersocietal interactions (Bond, 2010: 127).

The implications of inclusion/exclusion relations can be seen in both the state-society complexes and in the international community. Although the politics-oriented studies on the socio-political transformation processes, in this context, seem stuck with the reductionist and mostly methodologically nationalist accounts, they give hints about the essence of political structures in the region. Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004: 383) argue the loyal opposition parties as having no potential to mobilize the social and political opposition because they are for show only (for instance, the Syrian National Progressive Front in the Syrian case). Similarly, Lust-Okar (2004) underlines the managed political opposition in the region.

3.2.3.3 Distantiation/Hierarchization

In his work “Durable Inequality,” Tilly builds on Marxian exploitation mechanism and Weberian social closure concepts (Diewald and Faist, 2011: 13-14). Tilly points out the relational mechanisms and argues that they play a decisive role in the generation of social differentiation and stratification. Tilly (1999:58-59) emphasizes that exploitation relations follow the existing categorical inequalities, and argues that

Categorically differentiated experience in a given setting produces differences in individual capacities, propensities, and social relations that transfer into other settings and cause differential performances, hence unequal rewards, in new settings. Much of what observers and participants interpret as innate individual differences in capacity results from categorically organized experience.

The distantiation is the determination of the rules of competition, and hierarchization is the structure of institutionalized roles and positions with their respective rights and resources (Therborn, 2006). The political structures in Syria and Libya demonstrate distantiation/hierarchization relations. Niblock (2005: 500) examines the formation of civil society elements in Syria and Libya. Allergic to civil society, Syria and Libya controlled even the functional, apolitical civil society elements. In this regard, the emergent civil organizations in Syria and Libya have been the religious charity movements, and chambers of commerce. However, it does not necessarily mean that civil organizations have not been influential or representing social strata. On the contrary, these organizations have been strong and inclusive (mostly corporatist).

The political and economic transformation in both countries manifested in the social sector as well. Underscoring the shifting loyalties, Asef Bayat (2002: 3) concludes that in regards with the social activism, there has been a shift from class-based organizations to informal sectors, NGO’s, social Islam, from the expression of demands in the workplace to their expression in the community, and the increasing urban manifestation of conflicts. The shifts have also been reflected in the globalization of values such as human rights, democracy, and women. Schlumberger (2008, 634) shows how the arbitrary implementation of the legal

framework, marginalizing excluded groups, increased the inequality within the society, which can be argued to push the masses to the violent uprising as the only way of voicing their demands. Adam Hanieh, on the other hand, critiques the arguments that consider the revolts emanating from the crisis of regime legitimacy or political freedom. These analyses tend to overlook that revolts were, at their root, against confronting the outcomes of capitalist development itself (Hanieh, 2013).

A necessary implication of the mechanisms of social stratification, however, is its impact on the configuration of social forces. Achcar (2013: 136-137) rightly argues that the regime coalition had been buttressed by the particular alliances between social forces in Syria and Libya. These alliances cut across the sectarian, tribal identities most of the time, and resulted in hierarchical social relations. As a consequence, the privileged strata of the state-society complex prevented the emergence of a “general uprising.”

3.3 Conclusion

The conceptions of development in the MENA region are scrutinized in this chapter. According to the conceptualization of emergentist development, the stagist, political, and structural approaches to development processes are lacking a holistic framework to analyze the socio-political transformations interactively. The emergentist development perspective criticizes the tendency of separating the politics from economics in the stagist and political approaches to development processes. According to emergentist development, the development processes, as a complex social phenomenon, prevents approaching the relationship between social forces and structures of development in a methodologically nationalist and economically/politically reductionist manner. The emergentist development framework unequivocally demonstrates that the political and economic sectors of intersocietal interaction are interconnected. It renders a holistic approach to socio-political transformation processes essential. Besides that, lacking ontological depth, the approaches to the socio-political transformation processes in the MENA have a common denominator – misleadingly limited to the empirical level (Hanieh, 2013). A narrow focus on empirical manifestations of development processes is delimited

to the conditions of poverty, forms of inequality, short-term strategies of alleviation/improvement of the inequalities. The underlying structures and their effects are, however, undertheorized.

Although the structural approaches to development processes mark the significance and impact of structures on socio-political transformations, the conception of structures suffers from dualism and determinism. The social agency is not properly conceived of - especially in the Dependency perspective. Although this deficient conceptualization of social agency and deterministic view of development processes are subjected to revision in WSA and neo-Gramscian conceptions of capitalist social totality, WSA cannot go beyond providing at best an incomplete account of the interaction between internal and external. At the same time, neo-Gramscian emphasis on “transnationalization” fails to capture the causal relations between structural basis and surface-level features of hegemony.

Emergentist development concept approaches to intersocietal interaction with the notion of ontological depth. Emergentist development argues that in the processes of material reproduction, a hegemonic model emerges out of the interaction between social forces. Rather than taking the empirical manifestations of intersocietal interaction at the center, emergentist development prioritizes the generative mechanisms of uneven and combined development processes – geopolitical pressures, the international division of labor, ideological-cultural influences, and political substitutionism.

The hegemonic model of development denotes hierarchical relations within social structures; however, hegemony is not perceived as in the concept of hegemonic state or transnationalist managerial class. The hegemonic model should be conceived of as a level of abstraction. A structural form, once emerged, starts to have causal effects on intersocietal interaction and socio-political transformation processes. The historical features of the hegemonic model can be identified from its effects over the social forces because the configuration of social forces always reflects the characteristics of the hegemonic model. In this respect, while the Coxian model of hegemony tends to focus on consensual elements and overlooks the processes of class struggles, the hegemonic model inquires into the diffusion of

intersocietal interaction through the domestic structures of development and the shifts in the configuration of social forces.

For the analysis of socio-political transformation processes, the processes of integration into the hegemonic structures of development is as much significant as identification of the features of the hegemonic model and configuration of the social forces. Since the unfolding of the hegemonic model has a profoundly transformative impact on all segments of societies, it becomes a process of contestation and struggle within and without societies.

The emerging amalgamation, in this regard, becomes essential for the emergentist development framework because they not only provide insights about the processes of adaptation into the hegemonic structures under uneven and hierarchical conditions but also reflect the capacities and specificities of the societies to adopt the features of the hegemonic model. Emergentist development appraises the amalgamation as combined social formations of international and domestic, modern and archaic, traditional and new in the political, economic, and cultural spheres of society.

Emergentist development conceives of the historical, social formations such as populist-authoritarian regimes, the predominant role of militaries as the leading social forces, the survival of traditional identities, relations, and structures such as sectarianism, tribalism, patrimonialism, and clientalism through the lens of intersocietal interaction. It marks the role of the “international” in the constitution of these historical specificities and emphasizes that without identifying the underlying structural logic, the essence of these social formations cannot be properly understood.

The analysis of the socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya covers two significant hegemonic models of development: Keynesian-welfarism and Neoliberalization. The MENA societies, in the course adaptation to the implications of the Keynesian-welfarist model, deeply experienced the mechanisms of uneven and combined development. While they had to skip certain stages of development under the impact of geopolitical pressures and international division of labor, the configuration of social forces was transformed. The emerging state-society

complexes took shape under the institutionalization of populist-authoritarianism. The rising military as the leading social force was realized as political substitutionism. The significance of this socio-political transformation was the controlled incorporation of specific segments of societies under the ruling constituencies.

The local conditions, structures, and relations were also decisive in the constitution of amalgamation. The populist-authoritarian political formations integrated the masses through amalgam ideological-cultural frameworks such as Arab socialism and Ba’thism. The diffusion of the hegemonic model into the local structures of development, therefore, was managed through these amalgam socio-political formations.

The populist-authoritarian transformation of the MENA societies reinforced the controlled inclusion of social forces through distributive and repressive policies. From the economic aspects, similarly, the MENA societies became an inseparable part of the international division of labor. The rentier tendencies financed by the vast oil revenues, strategic aids, worker remittances got consolidated; the economic growth became increasingly dependent on unproductive, import-based, consumption-driven economic activities. The dynamics of state-society complexes, on the other hand, brought out certain tendencies such as entrenched state penetration into social spheres, increased state dependency, and hierarchical organization of society.

The diffusion of the neoliberal hegemonic model into the populist-authoritarian state-society complexes in the MENA, in this respect, started with the shifts in the structures of world development. The liberalization/infitahi movements throughout the 1980s and 1990s had deep implications for the socio-political transformation processes. The MENA societies had to gradually give up the populist tendencies, which gravely affected the vast segments of societies.

The following chapters inquire into these socio-political transformation processes in the context of the hegemonic model of development. After identifying the historical particularities of integration into the world structures of development, the shifts in the configuration of social forces are examined through the

development policies – including investment, credit-finance allocation, redistribution, social services.

CHAPTER 4

THE SYRIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

4.1 The Syrian Social Formation

The Syrian social formation has been an essential part of the MENA regional system. Its location and position in historical trade routes connect Syria into regional and global structures of development. The Ba’thist ideological framework and confrontation with Israel render Syria intimately related to the geopolitical structures. In the context of such interconnectedness, the constitutive impact of intersocietal interaction on the Syrian social formation makes a holistic and interactive perspective crucial because the complexity of interaction belies simplistic and reductionist approaches.

This chapter examines the Syrian socio-political transformation processes. With a framework sensitized to the interactive structures of world development, it points out the historical formation of amalgamation and their relationship to the uneven and combined development processes. The analysis focuses on the shifts in the configuration of social forces as the primary driver of socio-political transformation processes. Development, in this respect, becomes the articulation of social forces interactively. Therefore, the changing relations within structures of development are prioritized to elicit the unfolding of socio-political transformation.

As emergentist development argues for ontological depth, the structural changes are examined according to generative mechanisms, which are identified as geopolitical pressures, the international division of labor, ideological-cultural influences, and political substitutionism in the uneven and combined development context. The hegemonic model of development constitutes the structural context of the analysis; therefore, the aspects in which the hegemonic model diffuses and

combines with the extant structures of development are inquired through mechanisms.

The chapter analyzes the Syrian socio-political transformation with regards to the processes of political and economic institutionalization, formation/transformation of developmental structures, and articulation of social forces. In this respect, the chapter concentrates on, starting from the Ottoman rule, the colonial period, and post-independence. It identifies the configuration of social forces, relations of production, and societal specificities in the face of penetrating capitalist relations in the Ottoman rule. Then, following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial legacy on the state-formation processes, the articulation of social forces, and cultural-ideological amalgamation are inquired.

In the post-independence Syrian social formation, the processes of formation of state authority and ruling constituency are examined. In the course of diffusion of the hegemonic model of development- Keynesian welfarism- the shifts in the configuration of social forces become essential to account for the rising military. As the rise of the military against the bourgeois segments in Syria is crucial for socio-political transformation, it is inquired according to mechanisms of geopolitical pressures, relations of production, and political substitutionism.

The chapter points out that this shift was decisive not only in the containment and subordination of other social forces into the ruling constituency but also in creating the agent of socio-political transformation in the form of populist-authoritarian political economy in Syria. Furthermore, the analysis argues that the survival of local/traditional identities, relations, and structures in the face of intersocietal interaction has not realized linearly but in a combined way.

The emerging political subjectivities, political-economic model, cultural forms reflect the interactivity and complexity of uneven and combined development. The term “liminal agency” of Matin (2013) in his U&CD analysis of Iran epitomizes the combination of the pre-capitalist and capitalist “subjectivities” to conceptualize the relation between state and society. It indicates that the mediation of the state and the specificities of the state-society complex become a distinct set of determinations for development processes. The Arab socialist framework, with its political-economic

model and ideological influences, is a significant example of amalgamation. It had grave implications for the articulation of social forces.

The underlying structural logic of socio-political transformation, in this respect, is conceived according to the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development and Syria's position in the international division of labor. To account for the diverging and uneven effects of developmental policies upon the social strata, the geopolitical structures and economic processes must be considered together with the contradictory nature of the political and economic amalgamation. As the social forces reproduce/transform themselves, the development processes unfold. While these processes have rendered the state in Syria an essential node in development structures, they also designated the articulation of social forces; to illustrate, the selectiveness of the incorporation of capital strata into the ruling constituency unfolded according to the amalgamation of Keynesian-welfarist development model and the clientelistic, corporatist, sectarian features of Syrian social formation.

Ahcar (2013: 136-137) underlines that the content of the modernization processes has been nested in the political-economic interests of foreign or native agents of modernization. The specific forms of modernization have taken shape because of its instrumentalization for securing and consolidating power. The formation of state-affiliated bourgeoisie and incorporation of capital segments, in this regard, reflect the amalgamation of the strategical policies of ruling constituency and populist-authoritarianism. These processes have unfolded according to the mechanisms of uneven and combined development; therefore, the analysis of Syria explores the transformation of the populist-authoritarian regime into neoliberal one according to shifting hegemonic model, while inquiring its societal consequences.

The emergentist analysis embeds the developmental contradictions in wider socio-political transformation processes. The revolts in Syria, therefore, become much more than the demands for political inclusion and anti-corruption (Hanieh, 2013: 227). The revolts are perceived through the lens of the explosive configuration of social forces and become relevant to the specificities of socio-

political transformation. The primary contribution of emergentist analysis is the framework that can overcome Euro-centric and essentialist/reductionist accounts of Syrian socio-political transformation and developmental contradictions.

4.2 Making of Modern Syria

The international has been a decisive factor in the making of modern Syria. The Ottoman rule and French colonial mandate had significant legacies over the modern Syrian state-society complex. Hinnebusch calls this impact as the “peripheral incorporation,” referring to the structural conditions (Hinnebusch, 2003). The hegemonic model of development searches the specific conditions of the Syrian incorporation into the international capitalist system and –due to conception of international in an interactive manner, unlike WSA that has a more deterministic structural conception- examines the amalgamation in the historical configuration of social strata. In this regard, it looks at how the social forces articulated in the face of geopolitical pressures, and changing relations of production.

The Syrian socio-political transformation underwent a profound impact through the modernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Although the European capital and trade were introduced into Syria before these modernization efforts, they were still significant turning points. As the Ottomans had to cope with the implications of military defeats, the Ottoman rulers attempted to modernize the empire and transform it into a centralized entity against the “colonial” aims of the European powers and the early 19th century was the era of reforms in taxation, military, and governance (Hourani, 1991: 265). There had been essential implications for the Syrian social formation; the intersocietal interaction impacted the modalities of production/extraction and appropriation of the surplus-value.

The Land Code in 1858 was crucial among the reforms. First, it was crucial in that the motivations of the land law reflect “the external whip of necessity” (Burke III, 1991: 25-26). Second, the reforms led social classes to become distinctive. It transformed the land-owning patterns and mechanisms of social differentiation (Quataert, 1991: 39). As the changes in the land tenure and taxation were directly

relevant to the mechanisms of surplus appropriation, the configuration in the social structures underwent a profound adjustment (Hourani, 1994: 40-45). The “bourgeoisization of the Ottoman land law and the development of the capitalist notion of property” appear as the most significant changes (Aytekin, 2009). The social implications of these changes were differentiating, as the local notables held substantial gains (although they lost their tax-exemptions), the peasants met the taxes and the control of the centralized state (Quataert, 1991: 41-42).

The impact of the capitalist penetration of the European capital and the trade, on the other hand, was constitutive of the shift in the production and trade. The rising demand for agricultural products strengthened the position of urban notables in the cities, as they owned the land. In this sense, the orientation of production (internal and European markets) impacted the domestic structures of accumulation and social differentiation (Khoury, 2003: 18). The increasing demands for the Damascus textiles were another implication of the intersocietal for the relations of production. While the profit margins expanded and lured different segments of society into the business, it transformed the structure of production into an unequal and competitive model from full employment and controlled prices. Vatter (1994: 3) argues that it was a significant example of the exploitative relations between the local merchant, subcontractor, master weaver, and journeyman in the textiles sector.

Concerning the aims of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, the results of the social reform did not meet the expectations. The impact of centralization policies on Syrian social formation was limited (Ma’oz, 1968: 6-10). In this sense, while the Syrian capitalist incorporation was accelerated with the Ottoman reforms, the penetration of the European capital and trade determined the structural context. It is essential to state that although the relations in the structures of development were exploitative and unequal, it did not lead to the emergence of class consciousness among journeymen in a collective manner (Vatter, 1994: 8). Therefore, it becomes necessary to look at the amalgam formations in the political sphere to account for the containment and subordination of labor.

The colonial experience following World War I and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, deeply affected the making of the modern Syrian social formation.

From state institutionalization to the processes of social stratification and political inclusion, the French colonial rule had a profound impact on Syria. As the institutionalization of the Syrian state started under Ottoman rule, and the French mandate maintained some of the essential features. The French mandate formed clientelistic relations with rural notables—landowners, tribal chiefs, sympathetic religious patriarchs, and minorities while attempted to decrease the power of the urban bourgeoisie fearing from their nationalist opposition (Thompson, 2000: 63).

In French-mandated Syria, Khoury (1987a: 13) finds the origins of nationalist movements within relatively homogenous political culture among the Sunni upper class in towns. The concentration of Sunni-dominated urban classes leading the nationalist movements originated with the Ottoman policies of local intermediaries and land code, which threw the seeds of interconfessional conflicts, as the Ottomans favored the Sunnis economically (Devlin, 1983: 26). The continuation of the local intermediaries “in the form of violent political middleman” owed to the combination of a weak state, the oppressive agricultural system, and intense interconfessional rivalries in Syria (Burke III, 1991: 31). The Alawites, for instance, were exposed to discrimination by the Ottomans and exploited by Sunni and Christian notables, ending up with the consolidation of tribal solidarity (Van Dam, 2011: 7-8). Khoury compares the political cultures of Alawite and Druze, which were fractured along tribes – and points to instrumentalist policies of colonial French who encouraged the separatist movements as a balancing force against urban centers (Khoury, 1987a: 515).

The mandate era, as Sluglett (2005: 85) argues, affected the formation of the middle class– especially the salaried class, because the necessities of the colonial state were complex and required meritocratic employment processes; parallel to that, the “rudimentary” forms of political parties corresponded to that era which was relevant to the imposition of constitutional rule in the 1930s (Thompson, 2000). As the relationship between local notables and colonial metropole relied upon bargaining processes of interests and gains, the processes were political. Khoury (1987b: 25) underlines that the elite strategies played a decisive role in the struggles against colonial power and elites. In this sense, long before 1946 – the evacuation of

the French troops – the French rule had to allow relatively free elections since the 1930s and did not manage to establish a comprehensive clientelistic base (Sluglett, 2004). Therefore, the content of the social policies, along with the nationalist sentiments, had been the main subjects that mobilized the civic order in Syria. It resulted in the instrumentalization of distribution of the privileged welfare sources by the French mandate to confront the opposition and emergence of new mass movements in the form of organized political parties, labor unions, religious groups (Thompson, 2000. 59-65).

The formation of Syrian civic order under the French mandate had its specificities and implications for the post-independence; Van Dusen (1972) argues that after 1946 the existence of several political parties shaped the political commitments of the Syrian youth that had educated in the government high schools. It would later constitute the basis for the political ideologies that drove major socio-political transformation processes.

The formation of market and state, along with the relations between state and society, realized dependently during the French mandate. While the colonial interests (necessities of French industry) and domestic and external conditions (the Great Depression, short term investments of local capital) were the underlying factors of lacking proper industrialization and industrial bourgeoisie (Khoury, 1987b: 26). The conditions of World War II became prominent in shaping the particular form of state and market. Vitalis and Heydemann (2000) point out to the “Middle East Supply Center,” which was established in Cairo in 1941 by British authorities and became Anglo-American joint operation before dissolved in 1945. This center was so vital that it determined agricultural production, foreign trade, and taxation. However, it is essential to underline that these processes were not realized through imposition, but reflected the necessities and interests of social forces at that time. In this regard, the rudimentary forms of the ISI strategy and interventionist forms of state policies were introduced during the French mandate.

The emergentist development framework, while emphasizing the fact that institutionalization of the Syrian state reflected the French colonial interests, belies any reductionist view of the imposition of state formation. The Syrian example

demonstrates the specificities of the social configuration as determining the content of the state-building; therefore, the Syrian civic order and political mobilization – although colored with the nationalist independence movements on the surface – also involved the forms of conflictual class interests and the seeds of the bourgeoisie government were sown during the French rule.

In this regard, while the nationalist opposition movement drew together a wide range of social forces, the content of the social policies was on the political agenda during the 1930s. It resulted in the formation of National Bloc – that led by the “bourgeoisie” – which was depended on the urban, Sunni, and bourgeois constituency along with rural elites. It was against radical groups such as Communists and Islamists. As the aim of national independence diverted the struggles of class interests, the social implications of developmental orientation were downplayed. Thompson (2000: 92) argues that the state funds were mostly spent on the elites and their economic privileges while leaving the workers’ income taxed and declined. Lawson (2011: 80) points out to the mandate policies of industrialization and taxation, which put the burden on the wage-earners and favored the capitalist class. Still, the nationalist struggles and independence served the interests of National Bloc, as it kept the attention diverted from class struggles. The National Bloc, branches in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, led the independence movements and was constituted mainly by the urban classes: landowners and commercial bourgeoisie whose interests continued to prevail to the 1940s (Khoury, 1987a).

Sluglett (2004) points out to the fact that “representing a mild form of Syrian nationalism” the National Bloc had been in the government since 1936, and since it lacked an economic and social reform on the agenda, the content of policies had not been revolutionary (Burke III, 1991: 35). It is crucial, however, to understand the motion of social forces, as the struggle between the bourgeoisie and landed classes and rural forces were realized through the military coups, which had become a consistent factor in Syrian political life in late 1940.

As Sluglett (2005: 87) argues, the Syrian state imposed during the mandate era was not rooted in the social forces, which rendered it quite exposed to the shifts in

the rule. This specificity renders the structures of development amalgamated in the interaction between domestic and international. The cumulative impact of the social amalgamation has generated a hybrid sociality and ideological sensitivity in Syrian society. These distinctive features become essential in the analysis of traditional values nesting in modern institutions. The state, as in its institutionalized form, has relied on its repressive instruments while failing to ensure popular legitimacy. The marginalized groups, therefore, had to exploit their sub and supra identities.

In these processes, the amalgamation emerged from a form of anti-colonial and national movements; the archaic social struggles between the city and countryside acquired new forms. Tibi (1991: 148) emphasizes among the most critical amalgamation in the social forces as the unleashing of “unifying nationalism and divisive tribalism.” While the nationalist movement symbolizes the modernization processes, the tribalism relies upon the agrarian mode of production; however, these social forces are quite significant to elicit the emerging amalgamation and particularities. The specificities of these social forces can be found in the concentration of nationalist movements in town, while separatism in the tribal countryside.

The articulation of these social ideas and movements were firmly related to the structures of development. As a minor industrial base in Syria was founded under the control of large land-owners following the Second World War, an embryo of industrial labor, mainly in Damascus and Aleppo, started to form. Longuenesse (1996) looks at the sociological dimensions of social transformation and explores the dissolution of pre-capitalist structures and the formation of working-classes, the implications of industrial production, and trade unionism. It was after 1946; the industrial take-off started in the textile and food production sectors, which mark the emergence of exploitative capitalist relations and blocked social mobility are quite crucial for the radicalization.

The economic activities, on the other hand, acquired a relatively liberal form towards independence. The state was limited to non-profit and commercial sectors. The Sunni-Muslim and Orthodox Christian merchants commanded economic activities (Al-Ahsan, 1984: 301-302). In the agricultural sector, which was the

dominant sector in the Syrian economy, there were large landowners originated in the shift in the land code of the Ottomans.

When Syria became independent in 1946, it set a course of relatively capitalist transformation-modernization under “the national bourgeoisie.” Therefore, the context for Sunni-Muslim domination of political and economic spheres in Syria was formed. The struggles between social forces in Syria became considerably relevant to the regional developments, as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Great power intervention continued. Moreover, the developmental challenges within and without obtained specific forms thanks to the socio-economic conditions in Syria.

Parallel to that, these developments culminated in the opening to the socialist ideas and Syrian Communist Party (Munoz, 2019: 110), the geopolitical pressures and the failure against Israel in the 1948 war paved the way for the increasing military role in Syrian politics (Watenpugh, 2006: 299). As these factors underline the weaknesses of politics/economics centered perspectives (Tibi, 1991: 149), the emergentist development framework analyzes them with a totalistic perspective that incorporates the configuration of social forces and mechanisms of uneven and combined development.

The next section, in this regard, examines the causes and effects of the shifts in the configuration of social forces. It discusses that the rise of the military as the leading social force of socio-political transformation and the subordination of bourgeois-capital segments of society along with labor and rural population within a populist-authoritarian model of development is closely related to the Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model of development.

4.2.1 Formation of State Bourgeoisie

As the development policy is designed according to the configuration of social forces and the international, it is neither immune to the political coalitions nor separated from the hegemonic model of development. The model of development in Syria following independence took shape in a conflictual environment.

While the Great power intervention/involvement continued because of the Cold War conditions, the confrontation with Israel became quite crucial for the

legitimacy of the ruling regimes. The containment of the spread of communism in the MENA was the main driver behind the formation of Baghdad Pact, which was a tough call for the governments because any form of alliance with imperialist-colonial states would not gather public consensus easily.

It was in such a context that the Suez Crisis resulted in the increasing strategic importance of Syria and the Pan-Arabist/Arab socialist discourse (Hinnebusch, 2001). Emergentist development argues that the external whip of necessity in the form of geopolitical pressures contributed a lot to the undermining of post-independence governments, which had to face military coups. The military, as a social force, acquired an essential role also in the formation of a state-related bourgeois segment through state contracts, and privileges.

The reasons underlying the fall of the bourgeois government-led economic model in Syria were threefold. First, the domestic conditions for developmental performance bore the legacies of the mandate era. The economic activities of Syria were dominantly on the agricultural sector, and while the land ownership was concentrated in a small group of urban elites, the rural masses, to a large extent, had to accept the exclusive relations. Although the expansion of irrigated land resulted in economic growth, the end of it in 1957 was severe for Syrian agriculture, which exacerbated the already unequal distribution of economic surplus (Keilany, 1973: 62).

The second one is, as Hinnebusch (2001: 35) emphasizes, that the social implications of slowing economic growth were also related to the superstructure of Syrian social formation. The economic policies favored the upper strata, while the rural population was excluded. The unequal distribution of benefits and burdens fanned the conflictual class relations. The industrialization efforts did not benefit the working class (Keilany, 1973). More importantly, Hinnebusch argues that the “capitalist disruption of agrarian society” paved the way for radical mobilization of landless rural masses (Hinnebusch, 2001). The situation was the same for the middle-class as the opportunities for employment were limited and concentrated in the public sector; the exclusive nature of economic activities accumulated social tension.

The third factor was that the social tension in Syria was combined with the regional and domestic sources of political mobilization. The marginalizing political and economic structures, therefore, culminated in the formation of the “National Front” in 1956. It was a coalition government, which had “Pan-Arab¹³, anti-imperialist” orientations; however, the driving factor behind the “National Front” was the concerns of the ruling elite regarding the nationalist and leftist opposition.

The state-led development model and socialist arguments were getting prevalent in the face of the inequalities in the wealth distribution, the low living standards. Keilany discusses that the removal of the land-owning monopoly and the planned-economic system became central (Keilany, 1973: 63). The stability, nevertheless, was hard to achieve because of the radicalizing political and economic relations. These relations further undermined the state institutions, and political activism was realized through protests and strikes (Petran, 1972: 94-104).

The essence of uneven and combined development processes created the amalgam social formations, that is, while the hegemonic model of development diffused into the local structures of development, the international division of labor designated the survival of the heterogeneous and divided social forces. In other words, while the socio-political transformation structurally reflects the general characteristics of the hegemonic model of development, the specificities of the historically concrete forms of amalgams emerged thanks to the survival of traditional, local forms of social relations and structures. Hinnebusch (1991: 29) argues that after a century of capitalist penetration and modernization, Syria is no longer a simple segmental society but a complex one in which vertical units coexist with classes; it is an essential form of combination.

In this respect, the period between 1946 and 1958 was essential for the shifts in the configuration of social forces in Syrian society. While the alliance formed during the independence movement started fissure in this period, with the UAR, the control over worker movement increased. It caused increasing control over the labor as a social force because the impact of labor was blocked via forbidding of strikes

¹³ Between 1958 and 1961, Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR).

and consolidation of the corporatist relations through trade unions that turned into an instrument manipulation and control. Furthermore, according to Hottinger (1968), the break up with UAR and the elimination of civil government opened the way for the increased influence of the army and factions in it.

After the failed attempt of the United Arab Republic with Egypt between 1957 and 1961 and two years of successive coups between 1961 and 1963, the Ba’thist military coup took power in Syria. However, the political scene was far from the settlement, as the struggles between radical and pragmatic wings continued. Hinnebusch (1991) argues that the reasons for political conflicts cannot be separated from the accumulation and distribution of wealth, which is class-based conflict. The socio-political transformation was realized through the nationalization of economic assets, which consolidated the Ba’thist officers' rule and culminated in the fall of the bourgeoisie (Hottinger, 1968).

The local bourgeoisie was under the threat of international capital and local social forces such as the military; however, it is not a novel statement to argue that the state has become a central node in the processes of capital accumulation. What would be novel is to argue that the hegemonic structures of development processes pushed the state to become an essential agent in the capital accumulation processes in the Third World. Concatenated with the nationalist, anti-imperialist ideological appeal of Third World countries, the socio-political transformation processes cannot be understood without looking at the characteristics of the hegemonic model of development.

Joya (2007) argues that the resilience of non-capitalist social relations plays a decisive role in the unfolding of developmental processes. The imposition of colonial necessities in the state-building along with the “weak colonialist-bred bourgeoisie” affected the economic structures and formation of social forces, which brought in the state to intervene in the processes of accumulation. The post-independence nationalizations and confiscations caused the state to gain hand in the mode of production (Matar, 2013). The Ba’thist take over in Syria had severe ramifications for the model of development. It must be emphasized that the essence of developmental orientation, regarding the social implications, did not differ

radically from the hegemonic model at that time – Keynesian, welfarist model. Concerning the relationship between market and state, the Ba’thist model adopted ISI strategy and interventionist notion of state. Therefore, the developmental processes during Ba’thist rule started as part of a broader defensive modernization movement.

The determinants of the model had mostly been external such as climate conditions, external finance, and markets. The most important aspect of the Ba’thist model on development was relevant to land reform and agrarian production. The land reform in 1963 determined the limits of land ownership and redistribution; and aimed to create co-operatives (Gotthell, 1981: 833). The socialist transformation involved massive nationalization movements. As the big business enterprises and industrial plants were nationalized, the position of the public sector in economic activities transformed. The control on prices and foreign trade gave the state a strong base to manage economic sectors. The Ba’thist coup, in this regard, was a specific mix of nationalist and socialist ideas. Similarly, the industrialization movements were essential in the legitimacy of the post-independence Syria, and it was associated with the “nationalization and nationhood” (Issawi, 1982).

The state was in charge of the financial management of the development. The Second Five Year Plan (1966-1970) indicated that while the gap emanating from the private sector rolling-out was filled through the Soviets, the strategic sectors became the oil and public industrial sectors. The large infrastructural projects were the showcase of development. The Model argued that capitalist development run out of fuel, and private sector-led development could not be trusted. These features of the Ba’thist development saw the state as the most critical instrument that had the capacity of leading Syrian development.

The state-led developmental projects were geared towards redistribution of land, and industrialization for import substitution, which were financed with oil revenues (Yousef, 2004: 96). The Ba’thist coup continued the interventionist state and the redistribution policies introduced in the French mandate era. These shifts in the political and economic structures were part of state-building processes and rentier economic model (Richards and Waterbury, 1996). As the production,

marketing, and trade relations were taken under state monopoly, these moves had a severe impact on the merchant class. Moreover, the land reforms alienated the land-owning class. While the reforms resulted in serious opposition in the “old bourgeoisie,” they helped the regime expand its connections with pro-Nasser and leftists, which blew severe harm to the dominant position of the bourgeoisie (Rabinovich, 1972). This change meant a shift in the regime's constituency towards rural and middle-classes. Although the Ba’thist rule had to confront the domestic implications of the shift in developmental orientation, the worse was the regional geopolitical rivalries and ideological commitments that faltered the developmental capacities. The defeat in the 1967 War against Israel was effective in the fall of radical wings of the Ba’th party in Syria.

In such a context, until Hafez Al-Asad took over the power in 1970 with a coup, the rivalrous and fluid political coalitions were conjecturally formed in a cross-sectarian manner (Devlin, 1976). There were significant developments in this move that combined the geopolitical pressures of Israel and the relative incapability of the Syrian military with the attitudes of oil monarchies against radical ideologies like pan-Arabism (Hinnebusch, 2001: 54).

Seale (1988: 145) argues that the Al-Assad wing of the Ba’th represented a pragmatic and realistic side, which adopted a liberal approach against the radical development model. It was also significant concerning the confrontation with Israel, whose military capacities overshadowed the Arabs. The necessity of finance – closely related to the oil monarchies – along with the structural implications of the détente between the Cold War rivals created a favorable context for Syria to shift from radicalism to pragmatism under the leadership of Al-Assad, it meant that the developmental orientation of Syria shifted with the Al-Assad rule.

Although the radical movements such as land reforms and state co-operatives in agricultural production continued, the state policies between 1970 and 2000 indicated that Syria turned into a significant node in the regional/international capital circuits. As Farsoun (1988b) marks, although the emerging Keynesian welfarist state-society complex coincided with the struggle for political, economic,

and cultural independence, the inner logic of the state-capitalist model has unfolded in a counter-revolutionary way rather than a progressive direction.

In this sense, Ayubi questions to what extent the regime was socialist, underscoring the populist-corporatist regimes were never anti-capitalist (Ayubi, 1992: 102). The particular form of socialism, the “Arab Socialism” constituted the essence of Ba’thist political-economic model. Therefore, the formation of the state bourgeoisie can be accounted for with the amalgamation of Syrian specificities and the intersocietal interaction. The position of Syria in the regional and international division of labor and the anti-imperialist ideological framework concatenated and designated the specific articulation of social forces in Syrian social formation. It also included the selective incorporation of capital strata under the leadership of the ruling constituency without harming the regime of accumulation in the form of a consolidated populist authoritarian model of development.

The transformation affected the productive sectors in economies of Arab socialist countries. Via land reform, the structures of agricultural production changed, and the rural-urban migration increased; however, the employment opportunities could not meet the additional labor which was employed in service sectors. Farsoun (1988a: 164) underlines that these changes affected the transformation of social structures and consciousness and created additional contradictions of uneven and combined development. The increasing living standards and consumerism created embourgeoisment, which merged with the traditional identities and relations. These forms of social consciousness and social relations epitomize the amalgam developmental formations. The amalgam formations have been made more explicit within the uneven and combined development processes; that is, the inequalities are getting more severe and unbearable.

It must be emphasized that the development processes of Syria had been adjusted to the structural shifts – such as neoliberalization, the collapse of the Soviet model; thus, although the ISI strategy and industrialization were associated with the regime legitimacy, the military defeat (1967) against Israel and the fluctuating oil revenues deeply affected the capacities of state-led development of Syria. For

Beinin (2001: 143), these failures showed the limits of societal transformation envisioned within the Arab socialist and pan-Arab nationalist frameworks. Farsoun (1988a: 161) argues that the shifts in policies of Arab socialism culminated in the *infatih* policies, which meant a de-nationalization and de-industrialization. These shifts were financed with the oil boom money. A historical mechanism of geopolitical competition was at work there, the confrontation of communist influence led the oil money flow into the liberalization and privatization attempts, which marked the onset of the shift in the hegemonic model of development.

As emergentist development argues, the nature of the hegemonic model of development provides the structural content to the development processes. In the Syrian case, the emergent features of political and economic levels of determinations created the context for the alliance between state bourgeoisie and capital. The clientelistic relations and patronage networks facilitated the expansion and extension of this alliance. While the regime exploited the networks to increase its control and power, the capital benefitted from the privileged position in economic activities. In this sense, the way the hegemonic model of development diffuse becomes essential in the concrete historical results, the unevenness of development processes resulted in and perpetuated differentiation and stratification within the capitalist stratum benefitting from the state policies. This specific relation ensured the accumulation processes while allowing for the selective incorporation of the capital (Haddad, 2012a: 32). As Perthes (1991: 32) discusses, it was the merchant wing of capital that was benefitted most, compared to the industrial wing.

Once the alliance formed, it turned into a structural feature of Syrian social formation. As Ayubi (2000) found out, the nature of the political coalitions and the state-society complex was quite significant in accounting for the reluctant and cautious process of privatization. Furthermore, the regime-affiliated capitalist class became the force behind the liberalization movement (Matar, 2013). The accumulation processes came under the control of the class composed of the military bourgeoisie and national capitalists through public-private partnerships. As Matar (2016: 6) puts it, “this alliance gave rise to a new agent of investment, which made use of the market-friendly reforms to engage in profitable private-sector

investments. This new agent of investment consequently pushed for new patterns of investment activities that served private as opposed to social interests.” The increasing oil prices because of the oil embargos in 1967 and 1973 became quite essential for the finance of the developmental projects. The oil embargos also created vast employment opportunities for excess Syrian labor in the Gulf countries. The remittances of the workers, along with the Gulf finance, in this regard, contributed to the rentier transformation of the Syrian economy (Perthes 1995:135–36).

While the dependent position of the Syrian economic activities was not addressed, the adoption of the ISI strategy for industrialization rendered Syria more dependent on foreign technical and financial assistance (Issawi, 1982: 165-166). The competitive international markets and the fluctuations in the sources of finance culminated in faltering performance of industrialization (Sayigh, 1991). In this respect, the focus of the Third Five Year Plan (1971-1975) in the Syrian developmental model was on the agricultural sector. The “Euphrates Dam” project was viewed as vital to expand the irrigated areas, creating employment opportunities and energy (Petran, 1972: 205-217). It can be argued that the model was oriented to de-industrialization and consolidation of Syria’s dependent position in the international division of labor.

The socio-political implications of uneven and combined development processes created amalgamation for the Syrian social formation; especially the strength of state bourgeoisie and its vast networks demonstrate the increasing control over economic activities. These developments played a decisive role in the stabilization of the regime and controlled incorporation of the Syrian social strata as part of regime constituency. They also had two outstanding results for the Syrian socio-political transformation. The first one was the transformation of social formation through political and economic structures, and the second one was the formation of the state bourgeoisie, which allowed the regime to control the transformation processes. At this point, the advantage of the emergentist development framework comes forward, because the non-reductionist and non-

deductive examination of multiple sets of determinations are crucial to elicit the Syrian development processes.

Concerning the first point, the uneven and combined development unfolded with new asymmetric amalgamation. Although Waterbury (1991) acknowledges the role of state class, he imputes the liberalization movements to the economic crisis rather than shifts in the social forces. He puts it as “it was an economic crisis that derailed the project of the state bourgeoisie, and in the face of it, they failed to act as a class.” Emergentist development, on the other hand, argues that the imposition of the export-led growth strategy was a part of the hegemonic project that intensified the unevenness within the sectors of national economies. It was realized through the *infatih* movements that allowed the liberal transformation of Syrian development processes. Sadowski (1987: 449) argues that the shifts in the developmental model originated in the *infiraj* (relaxation) policies before *infatih* waves. After the October 1973 War, the collapsed economic infrastructure of Syria amounted to \$ 4.5 billion in capital goods. The Syrian regime, to recover from, led up the private sector as subcontractors. However, the industrial capital was “hit hardest and deprived of capital and leadership” (Perthes, 1991: 32).

The articulation of state bourgeoisie, to control socio-political transformation, required protecting the interventionist capacities of the state. Waldner (1999: 209) underlines the enactment of macro-economic reforms aiming to improve performance without eroding the intervention capacity of the state. It meant the formation of a new bourgeoisie, closely connected to regime-affiliated people, and entitled to produce import substitution products for consumption while being mostly apolitical (Perthes, 1991: 33). Furthermore, compared to the ISI model, which managed allocation of the external aid and financial flows to productive sectors in the 1960s, Hafez used them for military expenditures and enlarging the political patronage networks (Matar, 2016). Thus, “de-industrialization” would be a more fitting term to conceptualize the policies of *infatih* in Hafez Al-Assad’s rule in the 1970s.

The diffusion of developmental processes into the domestic structures, however, becomes quite essential to understand the consequences of socio-political

transformation as Seale (1988: 447) argues, the flows of oil revenues from the oil monarchies after the 1973 War were not used in effective industrialization. The military and political elites in Syria directed the utilization of these funds. While the construction sector and state-led development projects were financed, the industrialization was ignored. The traditional bourgeoisie, former large landowning class, withdrew to subaltern positions, and the regime affiliated capitalist class started to expand (Achcar, 2013: 175).

As part of the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification, the example of the military enterprises, which also entered the civilian market for commodities and construction, gave the military elite a stake in the statist economy (Drysdale 1979:372; Picard 1988), in which the military-housing establishment became an important one. Said (2018) delineates the specificities of the relation between the Syrian military's economic activities and its pro-regime stance. He argues that although the Syrian military should not be thought of as an independent economic entity, as in the Egyptian case, the opportunities of welfare and enrichment through their connections must be underlined. Similarly, the shift in the economic activities towards capitalist tendencies with the *infitahi* movements must be emphasized to understand the amalgamated forms of social strata. While the trade liberalization movements created a consumer *infitah* and resulted in Syria's embeddedness in regional and financial activities, a regime backed bourgeoisie class was developed among Alawi-Damascene connection, a kind of "military-mercantile complex" (Seale 1988:456). Those in the complex were the ones that benefitted most from the opportunities of *infitah*. Waldner (1999: 211) discusses that the political environment was ripe for the socio-political transformation of Syria in the 1980s. As the military-mercantile complex was getting consolidated, the *infitah* movement got under state control. As Haddad (2012a: 29) puts it:

..Notwithstanding variables such as rain seasons and oil production, the dominance of privileged rent-seeking networks has contributed immensely to the direction and type of economic and developmental outcomes obtained in Syria between 1986 and 2005.

The developmental performance of Syria through the 1980s, however, did not strengthen the industrial base of the country. Despite the priority given to

investment in the industrialization of production in the five-year plans between 1971 and 1980, and the effort spent on the consolidation of the earlier gains on industrialization in the plan of 1981-1985, the statist developmental model in Syria could not manage to secure diversified and self-sustaining industrialization of production. Moreover, as the capital intensive imports, such as turn-key plants, continued and the building a machinery industry failed, the ramifications of development model intensified rather than reducing the dependence and vulnerability (Perthes, 1995: 24-44). In this context, towards the mid-1980s, economic problems started to appear in the development model (Perthes, 1992a: 37). The combined impact of the declines in oil prices in the 1980s was the decrease in labor demand –that affected the migration and worker remittances – and more competitive markets.

More importantly, the dependence on external sources of credit started to be a heavy burden for the Syrian finance. The inflation rose, and the purchasing power of the large segments declined. Concerning the regime constituency, the supporters had to confront harsh economic conditions. With the drop in oil revenues and strategic rents, the balance of payments deficits became a severe problem.

Through the mid-1980s, The trade deficits emanating from the ISI model could be solved either by borrowing or using the reserves, and it resulted in the fiscal crisis of 1986 (Chaudry, 1997: 3-5). It was essential for two points; firstly it reflected the structural conditions of unevenness in the form of financial dependency for the MENA (Niblock and Wilson, 1999); secondly, the specificities of the domestic regulations shaped the nature and scope of the international integration (Yousef, 2004: 98).

The Syrian model of development had to adjust to the structural shifts towards the end of the 1980s. The fall of the Soviet project through the end of the 1980s and the increasing pressures for adopting a neoliberal paradigm becomes significant. As Beinin argues, the key events – the Gulf Wars, slowing European and Japanese economies – came hand in hand with the stagnated public sector and incapacitated private sector for economic growth (Beinin, 2001: 169). Comparing the 1970s with the 1980s and 1990s, Chaudry found out that while the former was characterized by

intense internationalization in capital flows but low internationalization in price convergence, the latter is featured with reverse (Chaudry, 1997: 21).

The complexity of the social strata in Syria had a profound impact on the nature, pace, and content of the socio-political transformation. The preferences and capacities of the regime more often than not adjusted to the combination of domestic and international. The selective incorporation strategy of the regime against capital and the corporatist attitude against labor was due to the pressing need of ally against the bourgeoisie and Muslim Brotherhood (Lawson, 1992). Hinnebusch conceptualizes the transformation in Syria in a linear perspective and argues that since the dynamics and pressures of the international system constantly push, the populist authoritarian regimes appear as only transitory forms. He puts it as “this transformation process is the reincorporation of underdeveloped countries into the world system.” (Hinnebusch, 2001: 132).

Similarly, the “selective liberalization” perspective of Heydemann approaches the transformation from a political aspect, which is not wrong but deficient in grasping the complexity. The specific unfolding of social formation - weak private capital, massive state intervention, and concentrated capital – resulted in an oligarchic context and determined the gradual integration of the MENA economies (Sayigh, 1999: 217). In other words, the result was “selective liberalization” (Heydemann and Leenders, 2013), according to the necessities and aims of the ruling coalition in Syria and Libya.

Notwithstanding the expanding private sector economic activity, the fiscal crisis confronted by the state was far from any sound solution. More importantly, the investments in the productive sectors of industry were by the private sector. Nevertheless, the dire straits were passed thanks to increasing oil revenues that helped amounting trade surpluses (Waldner, 1999). Although the results of the previous liberalization moves were not as bright as expected, the Syrian regime did not quit the centrally planned economic model entirely until 1990 (Joya, 2007: 179).

On the contrary, the crisis was addressed with the announcement of economic pluralism – freer environment and sectors for the private investment and liberalized prices, exchange rates, trade, and reduced subsidies (Dahi and Munif, 2012: 325).

For Perthes (1992a: 49-51), it would not be wrong that the “second infitah” aimed to allure private national capital along with foreign capital. The economic consequence of these policies was the transformation of the Syrian economic model towards “market-driven,” it was realized gradually through economic pluralism and implemented in non-strategic sectors - which can provide foreign currency. “Private and public partnership was started in tourism and agriculture (Matar, 2016: 2), making economic model turned towards capital-oriented (Perthes, 1992a: 43), while the social consequences of the economic turn were the deterioration of living conditions and enlarging gap of inequalities (Bromley, 1994: 173). The distribution of income in Syria epitomizes the growing gap, as real wages in manufacturing in the 1990s were at low or below the level of the 1970s (World Bank, 1995: 4).

The beginning of the 1990s saw an essential change in the constituencies of the Syrian economy. As the interests of the ruling elite shifted, they turned to the global economy, and reforms were aimed to form a market economy in Syria. The faltering situation of the public initiatives, on the other hand, facilitated the conditions for the private sector to exploit and grew (Joya, 2007: 180). With the end of the Cold War, feeling the intensity of dependence on external rents and competition for external flows, the states in the region had to confront new problems in economic and political sectors (Sayigh, 1999: 215).

In this sense, the Gulf War in 1991 was a watershed for the Syrian integration with the Gulf capital. Joined in the alliance against Iraq, the strategic rent flowing from Gulf helped Syria recover from the economic difficulties (Lawson, 1996). It was in such a context that Investment Law no. 10 was introduced, and this meant to a fundamental move for the Syrian economic model, shifting from import substitution to liberal investment and banking (Joya, 2007: 179). This law was significant in that the weight of the private sector for the Syrian economy was acknowledged, and the mistrust between regime and capital seemed to be overcome as the private sector was allowed to invest in previously reserved sectors. It becomes a distinct feature of the liberalization moves in 1990 from the previous ones, as they were realized through discreet transactions (Kienle, 1994: 1).

The complexity of the interaction and the policies of the state embedded in the social forces led to the formation of certain classes under the Ba'ath regime – “old, merchant, regime, infitah” (Perthes, 1991). Similarly, Bahout saw the “business community” in Syria as a “hybrid” group formed accordingly various political and economic changes of the past thirty years (Bahout, 1994). The essential point seems to be the formation of these social strata, and their impact upon the policy formation according to their interests – specific liberalization, public sector employees, and military wing of the Ba'ath stand against fearing of losing the gains (Sayigh, 2005). Sukkar notes that in the report prepared by the General Federation of Workers Syndicate, it was argued that the government should not leave its control over the economy, and the dependent nature of the economy was charged for the crisis, as lacking strong, productive sectors (Sukkar, 1994: 30). Lawson (1997: 10) argues that government policy in 1992 to shift to export-oriented agricultural policy led to discontent among Farm Laborers' Union.

The specificities of the ruling coalition, however, which Haddad (2012) conceptualizes as “networks) formed around the ruling elite and various components of the private capital, reflect the scope and content of the policies. Thus, it can be safely stated that the infitah policies, rather than undermining the position of the social strata that constituted regime coalition, strengthened them (Lawson, 1994: 51). Similarly, Achcar (2013: 175) points out that the Republican Guard has become a key player in the allocation of oil revenues. The military-industrial complex, which constituted the instrument of accumulation, along with the alliance between military officers and traditional bourgeoisie, which consolidated through neoliberalization, has become the leading social formations of socio-political transformation processes.

The infitah or liberalization policies denote the market-oriented reforms in Syrian social formation. These policies assumed a vital form in the 1990s as the interconnectedness of Syria within the capitalist development processes intensified. In the Syrian context, the unfolding of development had been primarily determined according to the interests of the state bourgeoisie, while the hegemonic model of development identified the structural context. The Emergentist Development sees

the shifts in the developmental model as relevant to the domestic as much as structural conditions. It discusses that the regional and international geopolitical rivalries turned into a significant level of determinations that had emergent features and amalgamation. The strategic position of Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its anti-imperialist stance, became essential elements of the structural conditions.

The emergentist development argues that the “selectiveness of liberalization” is the empirical manifestation of the interaction between the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development and the unfolding of internal development processes. As the content of the socio-political transformation in Syria was informed with neoliberalization at the end of the 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s, this transformation created its specific marginalized and excluded social strata through the mechanisms of differentiation and stratification; the framework sees the reactions of these groups as an essential part of the transformation; therefore, the rise of religious opposition and its amalgamation with the excluded wings of capital becomes quite essential. The next section, therefore, examines the specificities of the social implications of development over the marginalized and excluded segments of society.

4.2.2 Structural Consequences of Development

As argued above, the development processes are nested in the ruling strategies of instrumentalization of the corporative and clientelistic relations. The maintenance of accumulation processes – despite shifts in the forms and means – relied heavily on the instrumentalization of the Ottoman and French mandate legacies of confessionalism. In this sense, although the social differentiation and proletarianization of labor in Syria date back to the French Mandate, it acquired its historically specific form under Hafiz and Bashar Al-Assad regimes (Hanna, 1973: as cited in Matar, 2016: 81-82) according to the structures of world development. In this respect, there had been significant structural implications of development for the labor, specific segments of capital, and nature of the state-society complex.

The development processes of the Syrian state-society complex expresses the amalgamation of sectarian, tribal identities with social differentiation processes

based on income, occupation, and skills (Al-Ahsan, 1984: 320-321). Syrian labor had been a significant segment of the society that underwent a profound transformation. It, in the period following independence, was relatively robust and politically active. However, facing the colonial powers, it was directed into the nationalist mobilization, which consolidated the demand for political inclusion. It epitomizes the drivers of the inclusion of social strata into the political-economic processes, which must be considered together with structures of development. In the context of an interventionist and state-led developmentalist Syria, the institutions of state were provided with vast opportunities to control socio-political transformation. Especially after the Ba’thist coup and under Hafez Al-Assad leadership, it was consolidated and penetrated social structures. The mechanisms that operated in these processes were closely related to the state’s being the primary source of employment opportunities and accumulation. The regime, concerning the corporatist and clientelistic structures, managed to selectively incorporate specific segments of society and consolidate its social basis.

The institutionalization of the Arab Socialist Union, in this respect, turned into an instrument of mass de-mobilization, according to Hinnebusch (2005: 349). Since the regime-controlled the mobilization of the labor, it was a regime driven top-down project (Waldner, 1999: 28). It rendered the conceptualization of labor class in Syria as “class in-formation” by Longuenesse (1985: 17) due to its “segmented, isolated and rooted in other social strata.” The multiple mechanisms that kept the labor isolated and segmented indicate an amalgamation of modern capitalist relations of production with the local identities and relations.

The liberalization movements, similarly, must be considered within the processes of Syria’s incorporation into the international capitalist system. Concerning the socialist framework of the Ba’thist regime, the socio-political transformation, according to the diffusion of the hegemonic model, cannot be controlled without overseeing the political and economic demands. It made the agrarian production and its contribution to employment quite crucial for the incorporation of the rural segments. Land reforms and state co-operatives were instrumentalized.

The structural changes pushed the regime away from its populist constituency. Sadowski (1987: 445) puts it as “state investment in social services, infrastructure, and the public sector was distributed to promote the national economy rather than sectional interests. The agricultural investment was focused on the potentially fertile provinces of Euphrates and Jazira; industrial capital was channeled into the expanding municipalities of Hama and Homs.” Since the shifts in the orientation of development in Syria allowed the “embourgeoisment of the elite,” they had a stake in the protection and expansion of privileges (Picard 1979a, 1979b). Accordingly, the primary purpose of the party and other corporatist structures turned into the containment of the masses rather than mobilization.

The implications of development were also differentiating for the capital. Unlike the labor and rural population, there had been significant opposition from the capital after Ba’thist social reforms and economic politics. Moreover, the selective incorporation of the capital perpetuated the marginalizing nature of development processes. It was primarily a fitting term for the Aleppine capital. The situation of Aleppine bourgeoisie is a good case in point. Unlike the Damascene counterpart, the relations between Aleppine bourgeoisie and the regime was not in a rosary. The Aleppine bourgeoisie was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and they were excluded from the 1973 oil bonanza. Batatu (1988), analyzing the Muslim Brethren and its class roots in the Syrian society, identifies that the economic agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood is fitting to the interests of Sunni urban trading and manufacturing middle and lower classes. Compared to the Damascene bourgeoisie, which had collaborated with the regime since the 1970s, the Aleppine bourgeoisie represented not only a severe challenge to the model of accumulation but also an amalgam formation of opposition constituted by Sunni and capitalist segments of the Syrian society.

The economic self-sufficiency of religious stratum had significant ramifications. According to Batatu (1988: 119), some of the merchants increased their control upon small merchants, and the liberalization movements of Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s enhanced their capacities through army officers and Ba’th party apparatus. It is significant that during the 1980s, the import quotas for merchants

were increased because of the resistance of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a consequence, the case of the Islamist rebellion in 1982 epitomized the differences between rural and urban, Damascene, and Aleppine capital. Since Aleppo hosted the agrarian bourgeoisie, the Ba’thist reforms hit them hard. Seale (1988: 450) argues that it was not until the 1980s that the regime moved to incorporate Aleppo into its constituency. It was essential to acknowledge the role of social forces because this move of the regime shows the decisive role played by the configuration of social forces. The incorporation of the Aleppine capital into the ruling constituency implies the effect of local specificities along with the hegemonic model of development.

A significant argument related to the shift in the model of development is relevant to the survival of communal identities and relations. The end of the populist-authoritarian political-economy is conflated with the persistence of sectarian rivalries. Emergentist development, on the other hand, de-mystifies these arguments and points out that this shift must be delineated structurally. In this respect, the “twilight of state capitalism,” as Matar (2013) argues, started with the market-friendly reforms led by the state capitalist class and ushered in the shift from state to private capitalism. It meant that this shift while helping the capital-related strata marginalized the labor and the industrial working class (Al-Ahsan, 1984: 319). However, it had severe ramifications for many segments of the society and socio-political transformation processes. Before the examination of neoliberalization with its societal implications, the inquiry of sectarian rivalries is essential.

Perthes (1995: 95) utters that most of the workers in the 1970s and 1980s Syria was of rural roots. The consequences of the reforms were increasing rural-urban migration. The migrants had to work for low wages and became part of the informal sector; furthermore, the imported technology and export-led growth model rendered industrial labor excess and put more pressure on migrant and urban labor (Perthes, 1995: 96). Secondly, especially after the first half of the 1980s, since the regime prioritized the foreign and local private capital, the state-run enterprises in Syria billed significant losses (Lawson, 1997: 9), which led grievances to grow more. The impact of the reforms, on the other hand, becomes more encompassing

for both agricultural and industrial labor, increasing the penetration of dependency relations into daily life. The domination and exploitation relations acquired amalgamated forms with expanding capitalist relations. The share of the informal sector rose because of the low-income level, especially for the peasant-workers who had to rely on their rural background (Perthes, 1995: 96). Longuenesse (1996: 114) argues that it is because of these particular conditions that the communal ties survived.

Sadowski (1987: 444) underlines the link between social privilege and religion, which appeared most in the military wing of the Syrian state. It misleadingly resulted in the rise of the primacy of sectarian identities. The sectarian identities were always present, but as a means to end (Matar, 2016: 86). It was quite relevant to the increasing role of the state -due to providing services in health, education- and its penetration into daily life through regulatory activities. The corporatist and clientelistic networks, relations appeared influential in the accumulation and redistribution relations.

However, the incorporation and marginalization of regime constituency did not happen according to the clear cut sectarian or religious lines, as Droz-Vincent puts it: “although the regime benefits some Alawis close to the ruling family, it does not benefit all Alawis” (Droz-Vincent, 2014: 40). It makes the sectarian, religious and tribal accounts of socio-political developments in Syria – as it does in the case of reductionist political or economic perspectives – deficient because the specificities of the alliance-enmity patterns, patrimonial relations, and networks, the differentiation through accumulation and exploitation structures provide a more profound explanatory power regarding the complexity of Syrian social formation (Khatib, 2017: 6).

To discern the weight of sectarian identities and sectarianism in political life, first, it must be acknowledged that the account of ancient rivalries is deficient. Instead, the sectarianism has been built into the state-building processes and manipulated according to ruling elite strategies. Matin (2018) points out although the sectarian differences were *longue duree* features of the MENA societies, their meaning has been determined according to historical conjunctures. Because as

Allinson (2015: 306) argues, these relations – wage labor, rural-urban– acquire their meaning through the struggles of social forces that took a historically specific form behind an institutionalized state. Philips explicates the sectarianism in Syrian political life as “the Assads simultaneously promoted a multi-layered ambiguous Syrian national identity. Contrary to the ethno-symbolist view, politicized sect identities have not been ‘reawakened’ but were consciously developed alongside national identity as a consequence of how the modern Syrian state was formed” (Philips, 2015: 371). However, it must be distinguished that, according to Khatib (2017: 4), the sectarianist cleavages are not determining the political life of the region, yet authoritarianism is.

The sectarian rivalries in this respect can be considered as a historically specific empirical manifestation of developmental contradictions. It is closely related to the multiple mechanisms generating amalgam formations within development processes. In terms of development in the capitalist sense, with a modernist sense of argument, Longuenesse (1985: 21) saw any collective action or organized movement from labor as difficult. The sectarian identities came at this point in the analysis. For workers “resorted individual solutions” because of the very weakness of capitalism in Syria and the industrial production, capitalistic relations were not mature. Matar (2016: 84) opposes the argument of Longuenesse in that Syria is different not because of its weak capitalist mode of production and its feudal nature, but it has a more authoritarian capacity which can be deposited against the labor movement.

On the other hand, the authoritarian capacity of the Syrian regime should not be overestimated. Pierret and Selvik argue that the ruling elite had to draw on the help of different domestic components, from which sometimes it had to choose unwillingly (Pierret and Selvik, 2009: 609). It makes the depiction of the regime in Syria as so powerful that it can manipulate social actors and repress the others counterfactual.

Concerning the Syrian development processes, the emergentist development critiques the sectarian accounts as having limited explanatory capacities. Instead, the framework approaches to the configurations of social forces in state-society

complex and analyzes the impact of development interaction on the breaking of alliances between social strata –primarily the ruling constituency.

The neoliberalization of the Syrian development model, therefore, becomes an excellent case for eliciting the mechanisms of uneven and combined development. The selective liberalization movements of Syria were nested in the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development. It can be viewed through the lens of undermined capacities of a populist- authoritarian state.

4.3 Social Market Economy in the 2000s

This section analyzes the interaction between structural (geopolitics and economic) shifts through the 2000s and their manifestation in the Syrian development processes in the form of further neoliberalization. The socio-political transformation of Syria experienced a significant turning point with the Bashar Al-Assad taking power in 2000. He declared his enthusiasm for the modernization of Syrian political and economic structures. The reform program involved a transition to the “social market economy,” which denoted furthering the economic liberalization movements. Although the model of development in Syria is not associated with capitalism, the structural context must be delineated to capture its impact on Syria’s developmental performance. Saull (2012: 329) differentiates the models of post-war and neoliberal development and underlines that the common point was to expand and ensure the capitalist essence of development processes. Still, it is a must to distinguish the structural features of capitalism from the policies of states (Joseph, 2008).

The origins of the neoliberal transformation should be searched in the global economic recession of the 1980s, which forced most Middle East countries, both oil producers and non-oil producers, to implement new measures in pursuit of sustainable macroeconomic policies. Firstly, oil or non-oil, they all became dependent upon external capital inflows; secondly, the political and economic outlook was threatening the ongoing of these flows. The debt crisis and decreasing amount of remittances left no choice but to move to transition in order to secure investment, and the loss of aid and concessional loans as the increasing convergence

of superpower interests no longer necessarily converted political alignment into financial reward.

The global war against terrorism also created a context for the containment of the social forces. It increased the power of the state while consolidated the authoritarian tendencies in the MENA. It also blocked social mobility because the state as the leading employer turned into privatization.

A snapshot of the beginning of the 2000s shows that while the developmental model in Syria still failed to generate inclusive and progressive economic/political results, the configuration of social forces consolidated their position in Syrian social formation. In this sense, there was a facilitating structural context for further neoliberalization of the development model of Syria.

Although the uni-polar status of the US after the collapse of the Soviets allowed it to push for regional peace processes throughout the 1990s, and the political aims and instruments of the US took the form of economic sanctions – sticks and carrots – against Syria, the achievements were meager. The participation in “war against terrorism” and the Iraqi invasion was essential for the decreasing strategic rents and indicated a continuance of Great Power involvement into the region; however, the position of the regional actors started to become more significant and regional rivalries integrated into the geopolitics of the region (Philips, 2020). Concerning the impact of international/regional on the socio-political transformation in Syria, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a fundamental change in the regional geopolitics: these are “the breakdown of the post- 1991 order and the re-emergence of regional competition; the regional proliferation of sectarianism, Jihadism and Kurdish nationalism; and the weakening of the US” (Philips, 2016: 18).

Before delineating the domestic impacts of the transformation, the invasion of Iraq and the withdrawal from Lebanon must be discussed with their consequences to the Syrian economic relations. While the invasion of Iraq meant a strong US presence in the region and tipping the balance against Syria (Cleveland and Bunton, 2008: 557-559), the Syrian economy benefitted from the refugees coming from Iraq.

The increased consumption and money supply contributed to Syrian economic growth and boosted the Syrian economy (Arslanian, 2009: 67).

On the other hand, the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 had a deleterious impact on the Syrian economy and employment. As the Syrian economic growth to a certain extent relied upon the worker remittances - Hanieh underlines that the remittances of workers in Lebanon constituted 8% of GDP - Seifan argues that around 200-300,000 workers returned to Syria after withdrawal (Seifan, 2011); therefore, it contributed to overall poverty between 2005 and 2010, which mostly concentrated in the northeast region. The growing poverty was aggravated by the enormous amount of migration from the northeast region because of drought and economic crisis (Hanieh, 2013).

The unevenness of the international economic structures manifested in the economic relations between Syria and the EU. The content and scope of the relations, which must be considered within the “neoliberal recipe” and export-led growth strategy, have, to a large extent, shaped the mechanisms sprung from the political framework implemented by Syria. Similarly, as they had grave implications of the socio-political transformation, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) must be mentioned in the Syrian case. The conditions and frameworks within these models had de-industrializing and uneven consequences for the Syrian development processes; moreover, the attitudes of the WB and IMF in endorsing the maintenance of the authoritarian tendencies in Syria (Kadri, 2014: 82), while advocating the social market economy indicate the facilitating structural context for neoliberal socio-political transformation.

It is essential to delineate the nature of “free trade” relations, linked to the process of outward capitalist expansion. For Bieler and Morton (2014: 42), the free trade relations have a specific impact upon the unevenness and combination of developmental processes as perpetuating the structural inequalities. Concerning the expanded sectors for free trade negotiations (GATT and WTO), Kiely (2010: 188) argues that the expanded free trade agenda with its dynamics is a new phase of neoliberal free trade imperialism. It is crucial to delineate the nature of relations of

domination. Serfati (2016: 269), while studying the EU integration processes, found out that less developed member states have to adopt not only the advanced technologies but also the finance capital of core countries under the conditions that would work in favor of the core countries. For Serfati, it becomes a different and complex “whip of necessity” than Trotsky conceptualized. The erosion of independent decision-making for Syria can be given as an example for domination relations, for the neoliberalization moves led Syria to lose its resistance against the disadvantageous demands imposed via Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – such as deregulation and free trade policies (Abboud, 2010: 15). A part of these liberal trade policies is to remove the protection over domestic industries and to leave them exposed to competition; Said (2013: 33), examining the impact of liberal trade policies upon the textile and clothing industry, found that these industries will be particularly affected by increased competition.

In this regard, the trade policy in Syria based on the three-pronged framework: the expansion of the oil sector, the increase in the exports of finished products, and the strengthened role of the private sector (Abboud, 2010: 9). While the export-led strategy and free trade agreements resulted in shifts in the content, volume, and flow of trade, it also transformed the processes and relations of production. Furthermore, compared to the 1990s, the production of medium-high technology products almost stopped in the 2000s – although it was also because of the extinction of former communist markets, the policies of the regime and structural shifts were also influential. In consequence, Syrian producers turned into suppliers of low value-added products for the EU and Arab markets (Abboud, 2010: 12).

The juxtaposition of the contextual shifts is not enough to account for Syrian peculiarities, as it cannot answer the question such as “why did the Syrian rulers design such a model – possibly undermining the social contract that had ensured the regime legitimacy- and how has the implementation of the model unfolded?”

The underlying reasons for a policy change are a part of complex relations emerging in interconnected social structures. Concerning the Syrian policy change, there are economic arguments that once the internal accumulation processes fail, the rulers seek for external or private capital and pursue *infitah* (Richards and

Waterbury, 1996). Similarly, the Syrian infitah policies are accounted for by the deteriorating conditions due to economic crisis in the 1980s (Perthes, 1995: 15; Polling, 1994: 17; Sukkar, 1994; Hawwa, 1993: 84). The political accounts – geopolitics, military conflicts – similarly touch certain parts of the events, making sense of the time and scope of the political frameworks, actions. In the Syrian case, some accounts argue the economic considerations were subordinated to political rationality – regime security and stability. Heydemann (1992: 17-32) argues that when the stability of the regime is threatened due to economic problems, the state bourgeoisie attempts to protect it.

With a political Marxist perspective to delineate on the struggle between social forces in Syria, Viger (2018) attempts to explain the shifts in the ruling social forces through the concept of projects of state formation. He states that the class struggles are quite relevant to the competing projects of state formation, while the reproduction of the state-society complex relies upon the ruling class and their interconnection with the state to maintain the structures of accumulation. Similarly, Ismail (2009) points out to the components in the ruling constituency of the Syrian regime and discusses the importance of the shifts within the ruling constituency to elicit the political economy of the state-society complex. Nevertheless, it fails to provide insights on the specificities of the alliances.

Such perspectives are reductionist as much as they are incomplete; the Syrian regime did not rely exclusively on economic logic or regime security. Instead, political and economic considerations shaped the scope, content, and pace of transformation (Hinnebusch, 2001: 114; Heydemann, 2000). Nonetheless, the political-economic perspective must be enclosed with a historical sociologist content to make sense of the complexity and interactivity of developmental processes.

The whip of neoliberalism has peculiarly impacted the Syrian socio-political transformation. The relations between the Syrian national accumulation project and the global neoliberal agenda have taken certain forms, expressing the Syrian social formation. For Kadri (2012: 34-35), these processes are a part of imperialism, an inexpensive way of colonialism, which oversaw the transformations in Syria

according to the necessities of the core and imposed by it. The involvement of international dynamics is a crucial dimension that had deeply impacted both the formation of conditions and the direction of the socio-political transformation. However, such a perspective would fail to explain the specificities of Syrian social formation, taking it as a passive object of history, while emergent amalgamation and contradictory relations would be undertheorized. In other words, the interactivity of the combined nature of the developmental process would be marginalized in the analysis. As Hanieh (2013: 223) argues, although the neoliberalization of Syrian social formation consolidated the geopolitical pressures and exposed it to geopolitical rivalries,

It would be wrong to assess the struggle in Syria solely through the lens of geopolitics—this simply ignores the political economy of class and state formation in the country, reducing the Syrian people to a classless mass of rival “sects” and “tribes”.

In this regard, the state policies appear as the mechanisms of social differentiation, unevenness, and combination. The interaction of national accumulation project with the hegemonic project of development relies upon the historical specificities of the social formations. That is why the political and economic accounts, regime security accounts, ancient hatreds accounts cannot go beyond offering a partial view of totality. A historical sociologist account, to reflect the specificities of social formation, becomes essential.

The successor of Hafez, Bashar Al-Assad, announced modernization and underlined his reform-oriented worldview when he took power (Perthes, 2004a). The “social market economy” model is presented as a solution to the particular problems of Syria. The model oversaw a transformation, which mostly reflected the preferences of the ruling coalition — induced by shifts in geopolitical structures and economic relations, the Syrian model, while progressively turning the Syrian economy into a rent-based, commercial growth-led one, made it more connected and vulnerable to uneven effects of neoliberalization. Kadri describes the most critical features of this shift as to an uncertain environment, fluctuating cycles, economic shocks, all compounded by the liberalization of the financial market, a

freer trade regime, and a particular type of public sector, which became increasingly privately owned by the ruling autocracies (Kadri, 2014: 83).

The expansion of capitalist policies led by the state bourgeoisie made them own the means of production, becoming an “authentic” one (Perthes, 1991: 37). This shift must be underscored to account for the motivations and consequences of socio-political transformation. The Syrian accumulation model, embedded in the hegemonic project of neoliberalization, has meant that while more and more resources – both national and regional – were channeled into the low capital-output economic activities – real estate, finance, and insurance, lesser the rate of investment in plant and equipment was. As the productive capacities of the Syrian economy eroded, the neoliberalization process gained momentum under Bashar (Kadri, 2012: 28). In other words, while the contribution of the productive sectors in GDP growth¹⁴ in 2001-2010 changed, the weight shifted to trade and government services (Marzouq, 2019: 120).

While the Syrian transformation concentrated on economic sectors, excluding politics (Perthes, 2004a: 20), the WB and IMF were not called for help (Joya, 2007: 184). More importantly, the transformation consolidated the solidarity within the coalition of elites – political-military, economic, and religious – (Pierret, 2013: 160). The consequences of the developmental model, on the other hand, turned out to be neither egalitarian nor socially progressive, even though there had been GDP growth thanks to the oil boom in 2005-2008 (Matar, 2016: 14). The nature of the GDP growth was rent-based and driven by the domestic consumptionist trends and sales of imported goods, which cannot be expected to generate employment for productive sectors (Kadri, 2012: 29).

The “amalgamation of a pre-capitalist set of social relations and a modern, yet centralized state with hierarchically organized institutions” has been a dynamic source of contradictions (Joya, 2007: 193). The implications of the changes in the state-society complex, however, were far-reaching. The selective and controlled economic liberalization movements, outsourcing the social responsibilities of the

¹⁴ Look at Matar (2016: 9) for a detailed decomposition of GDP by economic sectors for the time period of 1963-2010.

state, gravely undermined the bond that kept the state-society complex intact. As a result, the throes of the shifts in the model of development mark the potential for particular segments of society to outburst (De Elvira and Zintl, 2014: 344).

As Joya (2010: 228) puts it: “the Syrian ruling elites have come to a crucial realization namely that the Ba’ath Party and its way of organizing the state and economy no longer represent the interests of the newly emerged factions of the ruling class.” In the process of the implementation of market-oriented reforms as a part of “modernization,” the Ba’ath party became an obstacle before further reforms. The restructured state meant not a reduced role for the state – as the neoliberal prescription claims – but re-orientation for serving primarily to the interests of the private sector through implementing liberalizing laws (in investment, trade, and finance) (Joya, 2007: 194).

The reasons underlying this transformation are handled by Perthes (2004b) through emphasizing the shift between the old guard and new Politically Relevant Elites. For Perthes, these shifts were neither change nor a breakdown. He argues that to implement the modernization program on the agenda entails the change of establishment of the elite. This view sees the shifts in the socio-political sphere emanating from the individual, institutional framework. On the same account, it is not wrong to argue that there is a shift in the model of development and class foundations of Syria, to concentrate on the micro-level class conflicts between newly rising bourgeoisie and the old guard is misleading and obscuring the wider level structural shifts. Although the specificities of Syrian social formation and the historical configuration of the social forces are included in this account of the shifts in the Syrian ruling constituency, the structural insight is missing. Besides, the configuration of social forces is not historicized. Such perspective entails looking at the transformation of different segments of society: military, fractions of capital, and labor.

Salam Said (2018) argues that the Syrian military cannot be thought of as an independent economic entity like the Egyptian one. The differentiating trait of military enterprises must be underlined, which, while renders the military-owned enterprises relatively powerless after neoliberal reforms, maintains the welfare and

business opportunities for the middle and lower rank officials. Still, the economic interests were not the only motivating factor behind the pro-regime stance of the military.

The concentration of wealth – those mainly exploited the privatization, liberalization of capital inflows – came with the advance of poverty. The concentration of capital requires a network, which is provided by the regime bourgeoisie and selective enforcement of laws (new investment and trade laws). A side effect is naturally the elimination of state social policies and marginalization of certain groups, which in the end exacerbates the weak position of state legitimacy. To Matar (2013), the neoliberal transformation conjured up the colonial developmental crisis, which ended up with the rise of the Arab version of “state capitalism” (balancing the concentration of accumulation and transforming the exclusionary development relations). However, with the neoliberalized social formation of Syria, the configuration of social forces turned into harming the very bases of regime constituency.

The nepotistic and crony capitalism came into being with the military mercantile complex. The development process, as Achcar (2013: 73) puts it, “acquired an increasingly Mafia-like character.” It is epitomized in the growth of stock markets and the financial immerse of the Syrian economy. This process not only created a dualistic economy but also facilitated the shift of value to the capital. The change in fixed capital formation in the public sector is an excellent example of this transformation. The lack of real productive activity, on the other hand, propelled the accumulation of capital in private hands. The accumulation of capital is strictly related to the implementation of the neoliberal prescriptions – trade liberalization with a biased distribution of licenses, privileging the private sector. Empirically, it resulted in the rolling-out of state from its liabilities such as social services, health, education, and employment expenditures, causing inequalities deepened and widened.

The socio-political transformation induced by the implementation of the Syrian developmental model entails an examination of the mechanisms generated the social differentiation –unevenness, and combination – through policies on

investment, trade, finance sectors, and social expenditures. The Syrian Investment Commission (Decree 9 of 2007) was founded, and the Law 10 of 1991 was replaced with the Law 8 of 2007, which brought down the taxes on investment and opened previously closed sectors of commodity and service to investment (Seifan, 2011: 17). However, the distinction and preciseness of the law was quite low¹⁵ and did far from meeting the expectations of generating growth and employment. Furthermore, the investment and economic liberalization seemed to concentrate on urban areas, where service-led economic activities took precedence and rendering urban areas magnet for migration. Nevertheless, when social policies¹⁶ did not address these demographic and social transformations, the poor segments of the society were seriously harmed (Abu-Ismaïl et al., 2011: 23).

Regarding the shifts in the character of the bourgeoisie after the 2000s, these processes have been quite influential. While the economic pluralism in the corrective movement of the 1970 coup created opportunities for the private sector, the mechanism of surplus appropriation became government procurement. The fiscal crisis of the mid-1980s intensified and consolidated the accumulation through government procurement created the networks state officials, party, and new riches. The rentier characteristic of the Syrian economic model was strengthened.

The contradictions emerging out of development processes, in this respect, not only created the amalgams but also made the inequalities more explicit. In the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development, the privatization and state rolling-out processes have been essential. Abboud and Lawson (2013) conceptualized the modes of privatization as displacement (deregulation, notably in finance-insurance, mostly benefitted the foreign capital) and delegation (included the activities and infrastructure rather than assets).

The newly privatized financial system in Syria is undoubtedly one of the largest sources of patronage. “Rather than financing SMEs, the banks and

¹⁵ Haddad (2012: 114) questions the effectiveness of reforms in investment, as there was no distinction between a cement factory and a nightclub.

¹⁶ The total government expenditures, both current and development, as a percentage of GDP fell from 33 per cent in 2003 to 22 per cent in 2008 (Central Bank, 2011: as cited in Matar, 2019: 99).

shareholders preferred to finance projects with large short-term profits – such as high-end tourism projects and residential compounds” (Shana, 2009: 109). Similarly, the fiscal policies appeared as one of the critical dynamics in the transition to the social market model. The government aimed to achieve fiscal consolidation through contractionary policies in the mid-2000s; as stated in the 2009 Article IV Consultation Report of the IMF, “the authorities’ medium-term fiscal strategy aims to contain the overall deficit below 5 percent of GDP. The key pillars of this strategy are the introduction of a VAT in 2011, a further deepening of subsidies reform, and expenditure restraint” (IMF 2009: 7).

As an encompassing developmental model, the effects of the Syrian transition must be analyzed together with industrial, agricultural, and labor dimensions. The trade-liberalizations negatively affected Syrian manufacturers who lost the protection and had to cope with cheap products coming from China and India. The elimination of tariffs between Arab trading partners exposed Syrian businesses to competition from Gulf-based enterprises (or exports from Asia – relabeled in the Gulf to avoid tariffs) (Shana, 2009: 111). Abboud (2010: 8) warns against the side effects of the trade agreements – GAFTA and EMP – and discusses that although EMP in the short and medium-term would create harmful effects, its most significant advantage would be political. Although with GAFTA and increasing Gulf investment combined with good harvests on agriculture, the economic situation was boosted after the 2000s (Arslanian, 2009: 65-67); these bright results did not turn into inclusive growth.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capital seemed to orient itself to the region; between 2003 and 2015, over 40% of the Greenfield FDI belonged to the GCC (Hanieh, 2016: 14). With the liberalization attempts, large Gulf-financed tourism ventures¹⁷ came to Syria (Hertog, 2007: 60). Gulf investors have also been the most prominent actors in the newly liberalizing Syrian financial sector (Hertog, 2007: 62).

¹⁷ With Emaar planning a \$4 billion project; The Aref Group of Kuwait has started a \$2 billion development to create a new finance and business district in Damascus (Hertog, 2007: 60).

Kadri (2014: 83) finds the primary sources of economic growth in the MENA coming from outside, which do not contribute to productive and efficient economic activities. Furthermore, the investments are oriented to short-term profiting that mostly concentrated in sectors such as finance, insurance, and real estate. It is evident that from such an economic model, the inclusionary and progressive developmental outcomes cannot be expected.

The labor side of the social market model did not promise bright days. A new labor law – to replace Law 91 (1958) – was drafted. The law brought labor market flexibility, which attracted sharp criticisms of the Labor Unions (Seifan, 2011: 22). Furthermore, the social consequences brought in by the social market model were not progressive and inclusionary. According to Dukhan (2014a: 75), the bedouin (agro-pastoral tribes) in Syria were displaced because of developmental projects, and they were marginalized and impoverished because of the government policies, which affected the broader popular base of the Syrian society and shed light upon the revolts of Bedouin origin people who migrated to find jobs in urban areas.

Looking at the results of the policies (1997-2004), while the growth was not pro-poor, the non-poor seemed to gain much more than the poor, which meant rising inequalities (Abu-Ismaïl et al., 2011: 22). The introduction of the health modernization program epitomized the sources of inequalities. Sen and Al-Faisal (2012) demonstrate that the program intensifies the gap between rich and poor in health expenditures, as the government adopted policies to streamline its social services expenditures and introduce more and more market-friendly reforms, public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP fell from 7 percent in 2005 to 5 percent in 2010 (World Bank WDI 2016).

The solution of the Syrian regime against the impoverishment was lifting off responsibilities to the private sector. Nonetheless, it was not like inviting the private sector following state rolling out, but like keeping the regulatory processes intact – primarily through the privatization of charities (De Elvira, 2012). Similarly, the problems in the housing sector due to the neoliberal policies were addressed via the promotion of the private sector, which became the driver of housing inequalities (Goulden, 2011).

The effects of privatization processes can be found on the transformation of civil society and the increasing number of NGOs. The rolled-out state entailed fostering developmental NGOs, which were still under the control of the state as a measure against Islamic civil society (Zintl, 2012). Pierret (2013b) argues that the regime supported the private movements and communities, seeking for domestic support.

The neoliberal socio-political transformation has been managed according to networks (Haddad, 2012) embedded in the social formation of Syria, which for Achcar (2013: 73) reflects the nature of the “post-socialist state capitalist model.” Taking this transformation with the perspective of amalgamation brings in the formation of the alliance between the ulama and merchants, which Salwa Ismail (2009) called “religio-mercantile complex.” The emerging Islamic finance – as a vector of capitalist globalization – sought to attract Gulf capital and private savings, which took the regime blessing until 2008 (Pierret, 2013a). There were measures, of course, to mitigate the destabilizing impact of the growing poverty. Pierret (2013a: 150) points to the strengthened links between the clergy and the private sector. Thriving relations between ulama and the capital, however, should not be seen separately from the regime control. The Syrian regime, liberalizing its policies towards the charities, lifted off its liabilities on the one hand and created a controlled civil society on the other.

The specificity of the components and nature of the ruling alliance, for Achcar (2013: 141) is crucial. He makes a distinction between the military-industrial complex as in Egypt and military-tribal complex as in Libya and Syria, which sheds light upon the unfolding of social formation. The amalgamation that emerged with the neoliberal developmental processes is described well by Bassam Haddad (2013: 175):

...The regime had consolidated its alliance with big business at the expense of smaller businesses as well as the Syrian majority, who depended on the state for services, subsidies, and welfare. It had perpetuated cronyism but dressed it in new garb. Families associated with the regime one way or another came to dominate the private sector, in addition to exercising considerable control over public economic assets.

Almeida (2016: 541) argues that the neoliberal development model has differentiated implications for social strata. While those in the financial sector, service sector, and export business have been favored by neoliberalization, the losers from various segments of the society have had a common cause for mobilization. Privatization policies that affect multiple social sectors such as healthcare, water, and electricity distribution have encouraged broad coalitions of multiple groups organizing anti-privatization protest campaigns (Silva 2009).

The neoliberal transformation has far-reaching implications for various segments of Syrian society. It is reflected in the variety of those who participated in the protests. The cross-sectarian, cross tribal mobilization becomes essential during the revolts (Dukhan, 2014b). Examining the social statuses of protesters, Abboud (2015) highlights that there were no clear cut classes, ethnic-sectarian-religious groups, but heterogeneous and porous groups instead. However, a crucial point that requires further explanation is the paradox that from the group of unemployed, marginalized, and urban subalterns, there were both pro and anti-regime protesters (Ismail, 2013).

The critical analysis of the revolts, on the other hand, have been marginalized by the dominant narratives (Lundgren-Jorum, 2012), which have taken the problems of housing, employment, political and economic cronyism as the efficient causes embedded in tribal, sectarian, geopolitical conflicts, and underestimated the social struggles generating them. The concretization of the implications of neoliberal transformation entails looking at the interactive processes of development and its consequences.

4.4 The Mechanisms of U&CD in Syria

This section discusses that the uneven development processes in Syria had a combined effect on the marginalization of the agricultural/rural population. The agrarian nature of Syrian development dates back to the Ottoman times, and its importance continued in the independence era. It was especially essential during the Ba'thist rule, not only because of its productive base but also the legitimacy it generates. In this sense, while in the beginning, the incorporation of rural population

and minorities into the political and economic structures has played a decisive role in the regime policies, later, it became an instrument to contain and de-mobilize them through repressive and clientelistic relations.

The transformation of the Syrian developmental model expresses the dominant feature of neoliberalization “financialization” as much as it introduced new mechanisms of transmitting the global crisis. The transformation originated in the global economic recession of the 1980s, which forced most of the Middle East states, both oil producers and non-oil producers, to implement new measures in pursuit of sustainable macroeconomic policies. Firstly, oil or non-oil, they all became dependent upon external capital inflows; secondly, the political and economic outlook¹⁸ was threatening the ongoing of these flows. Due to the shift to export-oriented production, Syria became more dependent on the EU for markets, needed investment, and worker remittances more than ever (Hanieh, 2013: 202). In this regard, the shift of focus through the neoliberalization of the Syrian development model deeply affected the agricultural sector and the rural population. Van Dam (1983: 137) argues that with Ba’thist Arab nationalism, the minorities are integrated into the regime. The support of the minorities helped the Alawite regime to free itself from a minority government position. Therefore, in a Sunni dominated urban environment, the Assad regime heavily depended on the rural areas. Nearly 90 % of Syrians - active in the agricultural sector –were a member of the peasant associations at the beginning of the 1990s, while the Peasant Union was mostly represented in the villages (Batatu, 1999: 251). The fostering of rural areas and public sector institutions were the areas of concentration during the Al-Assad senior period, along with increasing the living standards for peasant and workers. De Elvira and Zintl (2014: 344) emphasizes that it kept a delicate balance of management within regime constituency. Differing from the previous Ba’thist regimes in the 1969s, Hafez Al-Assad did not let the marginalization of the capital from the regime while promoting the interests of the populist base of the regime.

¹⁸ The debt crisis and decreasing amount of remittances left no choice but to move to transition in order to secure investment and the loss of aid and concessional loans as the increasing convergence of superpower interests’ no longer necessarily converted political alignment into financial reward.

It becomes crucial to make a distinction between the rules of Al-Assads. Although the legacy of controlling economic sectors through alliances between state bourgeoisie and national/foreign capital survived, the odds of the social configuration shifted towards a marginalizing and impoverishing model with the 10th Five-Year Plan (De Elvira and Zintl, 2014: 344). An urban-oriented and pro-private sector model was adopted. With this model, the selective nature of economic liberalization and neoliberal socio-political transformation intensified. The patrimonial and clientelistic networks got more privileges, benefitting the upper and middle-class segments. Furthermore, a new discourse complementary to the selective rolling out of state was embraced through concepts such as “social responsibility,” “participation,” and partnership.” The motivation of the regime was to create and foster a regime-controlled civil society, embedded in the accumulation and exploitation structures of Syrian social formation (de Elvira and Zintl, 2014: 344).

The agriculture was among the negatively impacted sectors of Syria. While the self-sufficiency in food production has been quite crucial for the Syrian economy from the very beginning of 1958 (agrarian reform), the neoliberal transformation created severe outcomes for the agricultural policies (Ababsa, 2019: 247). El-Hindi (2011: 26) argues that although the protectionist policies had been a distinct feature of Syrian agricultural policies, the increase in imports got far beyond the one in exports (El-Hindi, 2011: 45). The result was enlarging the agricultural trade deficit for Syria.

The contradictories of neoliberalization are an essential feature of the modernization; as Samir Amin discussed, modernization had a close relationship with the poverty¹⁹ in the region. For Amin, the implications of urbanization were not relevant to an industrial or agricultural revolution. It culminated in the transmission of rural misery and poverty to the urban areas, where the extant economic and social structures failed to incorporate the shifts (Amin, 2005: 12).

¹⁹ Abu-Ismaïl et al. (2011: 2-3) found that while only the seven percent of the total expenditure belonged to the twenty percent of the poorest, the 20 percent of the richest spent the 45 percent of total expenditure in 2003-2004; moreover, the thirty three percent had lived below the poverty line and thirty percent was just above the poverty level in 2007.

Concerning the social leveling and progress, however, it must be marked that neither the institutional framework nor the macroeconomic strategies of the regime were capable (Matar, 2019: 107).

The Syrian neoliberalization attempt, in this regard, should be seen through the contradictions of amalgamation, which intensified the tempo of the uneven nature of developmental processes. Hanieh (2014: 229) argues that its impact on agriculture has been severe. Exploring the extent of effects on the agricultural sector of the economy and the social hierarchies in the Jazira region of Syria, Ababsa compares the liberalization introduced in 1991 with the land reform. She claims that “to a higher degree than the liberalization process announced in 1991, the land reform has marked the end of the socialist ideology of the Ba’th Party” Ababsa (2011: 84). One highly significant consequence of these policies was a change in the characteristics of rural life - notably land ownership patterns and the nature of agricultural production (Hanieh, 2013). The transformation triggered by the neoliberal agenda appeared as changing land ownership and the content of the production. Relevant to the ownership and investment in agriculture, an essential point is that the rise of wealthy landowners dates back to the Hafez Al-Assad period (Sadowski, 1987: 448). The selective and superficial attempts on transformation, on that account, accelerated after the second part of the 2000s under the leadership Bashar al-Assad. An essential dimension of the transformation in this process was related to the agrarian sector. The land reform in Syria was one of the most important policies of the Syrian government through the 1970s. However, the rise of liberalization and privatization resulted in the emergence of large private farms which appropriated much of the underground water. On the other hand, the share of investments in the agricultural sector in total investments between 1970 and 1980 was quite low (Perthes, 1992a: 38-39). Gerges (2014: 13) argues that this was one of the factors behind the water crisis through the mid-2000s. It was a period in which 7.8 percent of agriculture’s share in GDP in 2005 decreased to 2.2 percent in 2010.

The global crisis of 2008, in this context, should not be considered as a sharp break of the development processes—the global crisis, to put it more explicitly, concatenated with the extant forms of social crises that had been prevalent in the

region. On the macroeconomic implications of the 2008 crisis, Neaime (2010) argues that MENA countries are affected via the trade and exchange rate channels through declines in the growth rates of GDP of the region's leading trading partner EU. Their debt servicing capabilities are weakened. Similarly, Adam Hanieh analyzes the ways that the impact of the global crisis is transmitted to the region. He underscores three main mechanisms in this process. First, the shift to export-oriented production, coupled with the heavy reliance on Eurozone markets for many countries, meant export levels hit low by the decline in global demand that followed the onset of the crisis. Between 2008 and 2009, Syria saw the value of its exports drop by 19 percent. The second transmission mechanism of the global crisis was the curtailment of worker remittances. Finally, as the economies opened up and integrated into international capitalist economic structures during the 2000s, the more they became subordinated to the effects of foreign capital inflows, the global crisis led to a decrease in the foreign capital inflows dramatically – especially in tourism revenues and FDI. Only Syria and Lebanon saw increases in FDI inflows, due in large part to their long-standing, large and relatively prosperous diaspora communities who moved the capital back home in the wake of crisis elsewhere (Hanieh, 2013).

With the 2008 global crisis, since the EU demand hit low, it affected the relations with Southern Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, it demonstrated the vitality of diversification, which Syria sought as well (Paciello, 2010: 62-63). The trade relations were changing in favor of China, Russia, Turkey, and India – rather than the US and the EU (Adam Hanieh, 2011: Appendix). The integration of the Syrian economy resulted in a high dependency on external demand, which made Syria vulnerable to adverse effects of the crises through declines in exports, level of FDI, and worker remittances. More importantly, the productive sectors of the Syrian economy hit hard by the decreasing demand. The shift to the export-led growth model caused the loss of jobs in the face of contracted demand for competitive products (Paciello, 2010: 54).

Concerning the trade-liberalization policies and international markets for the primary products, there have been several factors that aggravated the social tension.

Firstly, from 2007 to 2009, the food consumer price index rose 42 % (Hanieh, 2013). Secondly, Ababsa (2011: 83) argues that the climate conditions – three-year drought between 2008 and 2010 – intensified the already severe conditions for food security. As a result, Syria had to receive food aid, while the rural-urban migration assumed a new form. Almost tens of thousands of peasants²⁰ fled to central city suburbs in search of informal work. It is important to emphasize that the regime policies had a part in the diffusion of economic difficulties. Ababsa (2019: 248) claims that with the new agrarian Law 56 in 2004, landowners became the regime-favored social strata in a highly capitalist manner. The private sector represented around 60.5 percent of GDP by 2007, up from 52.3 percent in 2000. Two major holding companies dominated this private sector, both fed through state contracts and close links to the Assad regime (Hanieh, 2014: 230).

The EMP had a deteriorating impact on the productive sectors of Syria and labor. Since the textile and clothing and the olive oil industry provide employment and are linked to agro-industrial sectors, they are crucial for the Syrian economy (Said, 2010: 33). Zurayk and Gough (2014: 122-123) mentions the Syrian example as illustrating the effect of embracing neoliberal policies. They call this transformation as rural de-development after neoliberalization. The T&C industry plays a vital role in the Syrian economy and represents an essential pillar of the manufacturing industry. It employs almost 22% of the industrial labor force and makes up approximately 20% of the gross industrial output; it also represents 22% of the industrial Net Domestic Product (NDP). Over the past seven years, T&C exports constituted, on average, 32% of non-oil exports and around 9% of total exports. The comparative advantage of the Syrian T&C industry rests on two factors: (a) Syria's large scale production of cotton, which is a core raw material in the industry, (b) its relatively low labor cost. The contribution of the T&C industry is expected to grow further, especially with the gradual decline of oil exports as a result of deteriorating Syrian oil production (Said, 2010: 35).

²⁰ Its agricultural workforce may have dropped from 1.4 million to 800,000 workers in this period (Aita, 2010; as cited in Ababsa, 2011: 83).

It must be noted, however, that the disadvantageous policies have not been diffused equally into each component of the society, even those in the same status, ethnicity, or city. The divergence has come from the political sector that determined the social differentiation via credit mechanisms. As Ajl puts it: “it was in the context of hot capital flows and a burgeoning Gulf expatriate accumulation process that capitalism often re-entered the Syrian agricultural sector, with land, loans, and capital becoming massive mechanisms and indices of social differentiation” (Ajl, 2019: 236).

Aggravating the decline in investments was the commodification of land, which led to the concentration of agricultural areas in large agro-business companies. The neoliberal reform prepared the dismantling of existing systems of property, elimination of price ceilings upon tenancy. Furthermore, price caps on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and water were lifted, and production increasingly aimed at export markets. “These policies meant that it became increasingly difficult for farmers to survive on the land, and led to a growing concentration of land ownership as farmers sold their properties to richer landowners or agribusiness companies” (Ababsa, 2011: 106). The agro-industrial olive oil sector plays a vital role in the Syrian economy. In contrast to the T&C sector, the entire olive oil industry is managed by the Syrian private sector (Said, 2010: 47).

The agricultural sector was crowding out small and middle farmers. Zurayk and Gough (2014: 108) underline that cheap import since 2000 hardly hit the Syrian agricultural sector. They point out the “rurally disenfranchised” becoming the vast source of the resentment, and political disaffection. In Syria, the agricultural policies severely impacted internal migration, which created unemployed masses in urban centers. It cannot be understood without mentioning the changing state policies due to neoliberalization. As the broader segments of society are atomized, confined to poverty and unemployment, “the broken links between people-food-state” intensified the inequalities emanating from the surplus appropriation. The transformation of the food regime into a trade-based model, the disorientation of

agricultural policies –concentrated accumulation of land- contributed to the discontent with the rapid rural-urban transformation.

Joya (2007: 178) notes that the neoliberal transformation shifted the orientation of agricultural production towards external markets. Sukkar (1994: 34) argues that the outward-oriented economic model originated in the 1986 foreign exchange crisis. It played a decisive role in transformation into the export-led growth model, which provided a more prominent role in the “private sector.” Nevertheless, regarding the social dimension of the transformation, Sukkar draws a clear picture “The new strategy calls for exporting whatever can be exported, and the policy has been pursued even at the expense of fulfilling domestic needs” (Sukkar, 1994: 34).

Philips (2016: 46) argues that the rising cost of fuel, elimination of subsidies on fertilizers hit hardest the agricultural sector. Secondly, the orientation of the investments shifted from rural to urban, which harmed the capacities. Syria’s rural poverty rate in 2007 was 15 percent, but 62 percent of poor people in Syria live in rural areas. Of the poor in rural Syria, 77 percent are landless (International Fund for Agricultural Development, IFAD²¹). Not surprisingly, rural Syria, in particular the regime’s social base, has been the chief victim of burgeoning unemployment. It has sped up the rural exodus and the growth of the “informal sector,” swelling the ranks of the lumpenproletariat, among other groups such as the shabbiha (the criminal militias that the regime utilized against the uprising are recruited from this stratum (Achcar, 2013: 177). Saouli (2015: 327) discerns the comprehensive nature of the revolts, which included the Salafist rise in Dera to the confrontation with Alawite shabbiha in Latakia and underlines that the revolts were concentrated in the periphery where state services and control²² had weakened.

De Chatel (2014: 521-522) argues that the regime policies on water management and agriculture led to the severity of already harsh conditions of

²¹ Rural Poverty Portal: Syria, <http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/syria>).

²² Assad’s military strategy aimed to concentrate efforts on the main cities in order to preserve the strategic link between Damascus-Homs-Latakia (Saouli, 2015: 327).

drought. The worst-hit area was the Northeast (governorates of Aleppo, Deir Ez-Zor, Hassekeh, Idlib, and Raqqa), the breadbasket, and oil reserve of the country. The role played by the state policies in the management of water scarcity seemed to fail to recover the intensifying climate conditions (Barnes, 2009: 511). The key objectives of the agricultural policy of the regime were to enhance national security through fostering self-sufficient agricultural production in food staples and to ensure rising agricultural production via an extension of irrigated areas. The state farms are eliminated, and private land ownership increased, which ended up as the increase in the large landholders – appropriating the underground waters in no small degree. It propelled the social tension and urban migration after drought; however, the agricultural policies and the orientation of production should be considered together in the examination of the social consequences of development processes in Syria. As Fröhlich (2016: 42) puts it:

The Syrian uprising is explained by a prolonged drought period immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011. In this narrative, the marginalized ‘climate migrants’ are seen as a decisive factor for the onset of conflict. Bashar al-Assad’s applauded state reforms quickly faced resistance from the governing elite and other stakeholders, the so-called ‘crony capitalists’, who were unwilling to give up privileges.

In this regard, while it would be a baseless claim to argue that government aimed water scarcity, it must be emphasized that it was intensified directly through the state policies of food sufficiency and promotion of high water demanding product “cotton” for the export. Barnes puts it as “the paradox of the Syrian state is manifest: a nation-state with a narrowly defined nationalist agenda of security (in food and other respects) but at the same time an active participant in the world market (exporting cotton and other products)” (Barnes, 2009: 520).

Gerges (2014: 13) continues that the Syrian uprising began in Dara’a, a rural, agricultural area that used to be part of Assad’s social support base. A convergence of factors turned agricultural areas like Dara’a, Deir al-Zor, and al-Rastan from being supportive of the Assad regime to hostile. The neoliberal policies, on that account, opened the Syrian markets to cheaper agricultural imports and drought since 2005 that left rural agrarians dependent on foreign food aid as Damascus kept

withholding infrastructural investment because the areas were not seen as necessary to the central power structure. The transformation of the agricultural sector, in this respect, becomes one of the most apparent theaters to observe the implications of neoliberalization in Syria. While the Syrian administration aimed the corrective actions, it had to overcome the resistance of the extant configuration of social forces. Consequently, the reforms could not succeed, and the rural-urban balance deteriorated further, marginalizing and excluding the rural population.

In summary, rural Arabs become more impoverished and marginalized. Their economic contribution, although significant, is grossly unrecognized -the share of the agricultural budget in the Arab world is 2.4 percent. For Syria, it is 5.6 percent, down from 10 percent in 1995 (Zurayk and Gough, 2014: 117). The combined processes of uneven development promise to shed light upon the tempo and scope of the penetration and diffusion of inequalities in the socio-political transformation of Syria. In this regard, the government's policies on agriculture, which is an essential source of production in Syria, became crucial. The water-extensive agriculture, combined with the rural de-development and accumulation of land ownership, not only shifted the balance of the social contract in the state-society complex but also intensified the unevenness between rich and poor through government-directed social differentiation and domination relations.

4.5 Conclusion

The socio-political transformation processes in Syria have been complex and had various dimensions. The emergentist development framework conceives of these processes as the empirical manifestations of intersocietal interaction that unfolds through mechanisms of uneven and combined development.

The emergentist development examines the Syrian social formation in a totalistic and interactive perspective. The shifts in the configuration of social forces are understood as the essential drivers of socio-political transformation processes. Compared to the reductionist approaches such as regime security, geopolitics, the robustness of authoritarianism, selective liberalization, and networks of patronage, the emergentist analysis provides a more explanatory and totalistic account of the

Syrian socio-political transformation processes. Emergentist analysis demonstrates that these accounts undertheorize the constitutive impact of societal multiplicity. They cannot adequately grasp the complex causal relations between the social forces and structures of world development.

The Syrian socio-political transformation processes reflect the historical features of the hegemonic model of development. When conceived of as amalgamation, the emerging social formations are driven by mechanisms such as geopolitical pressures, the international division of labor, ideological-cultural influences, and political substitutionism. These mechanisms not only cause skipping of developmental steps but also designate the diffusion of the hegemonic model of development. The diffusion of the hegemonic model into the local structures of development affects the processes of social stratification and differentiation. The processes of adaptation into the hegemonic model and structures, in this respect, denote the controlled incorporation of social forces under the ruling regime. In this process, the Syrian social formation becomes an inseparable part of the international division of labor. In other words, while the development policies in Syria helped her to take part in international capitalist circuits, processes of selectively incorporating social forces become the empirical manifestation of intersocietal interaction.

The emergentist analysis of the Syrian socio-political transformation is, therefore, constituted by three steps: (1) identifying the historical features of hegemonic model of development; (2) exploring the processes of integration into the world structures of development; (3) examining the specificities of the configuration of social forces.

The modern Syrian social formation has been formed under the rule of the Ottomans and a colonial period. These periods have created profound effects on the configuration of social forces. The processes of integration into the capitalist structures of development were highly dependent. It started with the Ottoman centralization attempts; the ownership of means of production –land- was transformed, and taxation patterns had changed, which resulted in the emergence of strengthened urban – mostly Sunni - notable classes.

Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the French Mandate's strategies for ruling a multiconfessional country were to balance urban classes with sectarian and religious minorities. In a way, through intensifying the conflictual social relations, the French Mandate created certain amalgamation in the Syrian social formation. The colonial legacies on state formation can be seen in the instrumentalization of state institutionalization through distributive mechanisms and consolidation of local sectarian identities.

The penetration of capitalist relations designated the position of Syria in the international division of labor. The articulation of social forces in the mandate era, in this regard, was realized according to specificities of the French mandate. It culminated in the emergence of hybrid political subjectivities and ideological sensitivities.

One of the most significant consequences of this ideological-cultural amalgamation, however, was the subordination of class struggles under the mobilization for the nationalist independence movement led by the nationalist bourgeoisie. The post-independence Syria, therefore, expressed the features of the state that was formed during the mandate era. The political-economy was constituted by a national market ruled by a free-market model where the state was institutionalized according to the interventionist and welfarist model.

However, under the leadership of urban-notable class, the means of production - land- were mostly concentrated in private hands, large landowners, while trade was under the control of Mostly Sunni and Christian Orthodox merchants. The harsh living conditions for the peasantry in Syria and the national mobilization during the independence were facilitating conditions for Arab socialist ideas.

Under the influence of Soviet communism and geopolitical pressures, the bourgeois rule in Syria failed to adapt the structures of world development. The political-economic model of Syria failed to satisfy mobilization of the social forces – rising military, labor, and rural population. The geopolitical pressures emerging from the foundation of Israel and the diffusion of the Keynesian-welfarist

hegemonic model, on the other hand, paved the way for the rising influence of the military in Syria.

With the increasing influence of pan-Arabist, Arab-socialist ideology, the most compatible social force led the socio-political transformation processes in Syria through Ba’thist military coup and created a new ruling constituency relying upon the rural population, bureaucracy and middle classes. The Syrian social formation adapted to the necessities of the Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model of development through populist-authoritarianism. While the state acquired a hegemonic position in the development processes through the policies of land distribution and nationalization, it consolidated the support of previously marginalized and excluded strata of the society.

The Syrian socio-political transformation has been gradual. The emerging military-mercantile complex has directed the form, pace and the orientation of the development processes; however, it must be underlined that the Ba’thist socialist model and the specificities of the ruling constituency were decisive in the diffusion of Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model in the form of a populist-authoritarian developmental model. Consequently, while the Syrian social formation became integrated into the structures of world development, the articulation of social forces in Syria became consolidated with the formation of state bourgeoisie. The state bourgeoisie managed to contain and incorporate masses into the political-economic structures while maintaining the relations of accumulation and exploitation.

The emergentist development makes sense of the shifts in development policies according to changes in the structures of world development. The take-over of Hafez Al-Assad – representing the pragmatic and moderate wing of the Ba’th – in this respect, becomes more meaningful when considered together with the failure of radical pan-Arabist ideology against the confrontation with Israel. Besides that, following *infitahi* movements were intimately related to the deficiencies of the political-economy of populist-authoritarianism and changing structures of world development towards neoliberalization.

Similarly, the survival of traditional identities, the resilience of authoritarian political structures, and the unequal economic relations cannot be properly captured

with the reductionist approaches such as rentier state theory, and transition to democracy. The emergentist analysis emphasizes that the divergent developmental outcomes should not be perceived as pathological cases. Instead, the failure of liberalization movements to consolidate democratic political structures, to wash away the sectarian identities, and to bring in productive, inclusive economic growth must be considered in the context of intersocietal interaction's mechanisms. Moreover, the concrete forms of these processes cannot be thought separately from the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification.

In this regard, the mechanisms of intersocietal interaction created the basis on which the state-affiliated bourgeoisie and the national/international capitalist strata have strengthened their privileged partnership. The integration and adaptation of the Syrian developmental structures into the regional/global circuits of capitalist development was facilitated with the geopolitical pressures – the confrontation against Israel, the Gulf Wars and penetration of the US into the MENA, and the OPEC oil crises – and Syria's position in the international division of labor – the rentier and consumption-based economic growth financed by the worker remittances and strategic aids.

Through economic liberalization policies, the military-mercantile complex had been able to preserve its control over the private sector and to maintain its developmental model. The capital flows resulting from oil sales and transit fees into public-sector enterprises, and the economic ties with the former Soviet bloc, China, and North Korea had been essential sources of finance for Syrian development processes (Sayigh, 1999: 219). Within the Syrian state-society complex, the capitalist relations of accumulation and domination amalgamated with the clientelistic structures and patronage networks.

The neoliberal restructuring of the Syrian populist-authoritarian social formation was driven by the geopolitical pressures of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the global war against terrorism; and the implications of the international division of labor: internationalization of Gulf finance-capital and the trade agreements with the EU. While the increasing oil revenues culminated in the internationalization of Gulf capital, the Syrian economic

model had to adapt to the changing forms of financial structures. Furthermore, the trade agreements with the EU transformed the relations of production in Syria.

The basic features of neoliberalization in Syria, in this regard, were the rolling out of state, the financialized/speculative economic activities, intensified inequalities. While the state as the authority reflected the configuration of social forces constituting the ruling regime, the shifts in the hegemonic model of development – neoliberalization – have created nothing but favoring results for those who preside over the mechanisms of allocation, and appropriation.

Achcar (2013: 141) argues that the military-sectarian complex in Syria has played a decisive role in the Syrian socio-political transformation. As the military-mercantile complex in Syria has directed the *infitahi* movement, the Syrian military expenditure was annually \$ 4.843 Billion from 1990 to 2006. Wahid (2009: 124) argues that while the GNP per capita income in 2006 was as low as it was in the 1980s, the military spending between 2000 and 2006 was even higher than periods of confrontation with Israel.

The implications of neoliberal restructuring have been differentiated according to the segments of society. The grand and petty bourgeoisie in Syria have differed from each other regarding the collaboration with the state –grand bourgeoisie cooperated while petty bourgeoisie conflicted (Lawson, 1997: 13) because, in this process, the connection between Syrian and Gulf capital has intensified with the internationalization of Gulf capital (Hanieh, 2013). Besides that, the state penetration into the private sphere has been quite a useful instrument of neoliberalization in Syria. The state's accommodation of the Islamic sector at the social and political levels was an outgrowth of the need to reconfigure state-society relations in order to maintain the unity of the ruling coalition and to ensure the regime's survival well before these external challenges (Khatib, 2012: 35).

The societal consequences of the neoliberal transformation, on the other hand, have emerged in an exclusive, marginalizing, and repressive manner. The neoliberalization of development processes has consolidated the socio-economic form of Syria's rent-based, consumption-driven model. As the Syrian economic structures have become interconnected with the regional and global circuits of

capital, the rentier production model strengthened the distributive relations domestically. In the face of state rolling-out, however, the dependency of people on the state for income-subsidies and employment could not find a response. The most severe implications of neoliberalization have been on the agricultural sector and rural population that has had to migrate into urban areas.

As the populist essence of the Syrian development model faded away, so did the legitimacy and the credibility of the ruling regime. In such a context, the marginalized and excluded strata of society have become more sensitized against the sub-national identities. In contrast, the blocking of social mobility through repressive instruments of neoliberal authoritarianism has constituted the radicalized social basis against the regime.

The emergentist analysis argues that the main driver behind the eruption of social tension during the Arab Revolts was the de-industrializing, service sector based unproductive economic model, a transformation of which cannot be properly understood without identifying the position of Syria in the international division of labor. The mechanism of political substitutionism has been effective in the formation of an alliance between national/regional capital and the state bourgeoisie. Furthermore, this alliance acquired a more internationalized/financialized form via neoliberalization policies that have been introduced thoroughly with the “social market economy” model.

CHAPTER 5

THE LIBYAN SOCIO-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

5.1 The Libyan Social Formation

Libya is a significant country with its oil and natural gas resources. It has also been an important state in the MENA region thanks to foreign policy actions and particular socio-politic model. This chapter deals with the historical articulation of the Libyan social formation and its incorporation with the structures of world development.

The studies on Libya, as Bini (2018) points out, concentrate primarily on the transition of power from Italian colony, nationalization (Allan, 1981; Gurney, 1996); oil production/rentierism and its societal implications (Vandewalle, 1998; Altunışık, 1995, 1996; St. John, 2008a, 2008b); the resilient authoritarian political structures and tribal social relations (Anderson, 1986a; Pargeter, 2010; Lacher, 2011). In these studies, Libya is described as a stateless, tribal, and traditional social formation, while its political economy heavily relies on oil revenues.

The chapter criticizes the Eurocentric approaches to Libyan socio-political transformation processes. It, utilizing the emergentist development framework, attempts to demonstrate the weaknesses of reductionist and ahistorical perspectives. It is indicated in the legitimation of “humanitarian intervention” that these arguments are utilized in the discursive processes of democratization. They also constitute a significant part of the framework that shaped the strategies in the post-conflict transitory processes.

Emergentist analysis points out the underlying mechanisms of socio-political transformation processes in Libya. It examines the shifts in the configuration of social forces with a historical sociology perspective. The transformation of social forces within the structures of development is inquired. The historical making of the

Libyan socio-political formation has reflected the subordinate relations and articulated forms of structural dependency and unevenness under the rule of Ottomans, Italians, and the British. The incorporation of Libya into the international capitalist structures was realized in a peripheral manner (Hinnebusch, 2003). These processes accelerated under the Ottoman rule with social reforms and experienced a period of Italian colonization.

The post-independent societal specificities have unfolded regarding its particular position in the international division of labor due to the production of oil. The particularity of social formations is argued to emerge from the interaction between hegemonic structures of development and the domestic configuration of social forces. The skipping of the stages of development through the mechanisms of uneven and combined development created amalgamation. Achcar (2013: 136-137) points to that the modernization processes were primarily driven by the colonialists/national rulers who mostly utilized the archaic structures for consolidating the power. From these interactions, the “contemporaneousness” emerges as a combination of development. Similarly, the changing relations of production became another set of determination for the Libyan development processes.

The chapter emphasizes that the unfolding of socio-political transformation has been integrated with the specificities of the three peculiar regions of Libya: Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. These regions, each having peculiar socio-economic and political structures, have brought in their particularities and amalgamation (Ahmida, 2005: 6). The formation of ruling constituencies reflected the alliances between tribes which nested in the production-trade relations. It is underlined that the survival of traditional social formations such as tribalism has been an important source of amalgamation.

In the first section, the socio-political legacies of the Ottoman rule, then a brief period of Italian colonization (1911-1937) are discussed. The conceptions of the particularities in the Libyan society are inquired. In the following sub-sections, the amalgamation of the tribe and Jamahiriyya political-economies are examined for the periods before independence and monarchy rule (1951-1969) and the Qadhafi

era (1969-2011). The aspects of which the international sanctions affected the Libyan social-political transformation processes are delineated. The second section discusses the structural consequences of development and tries to demonstrate the contradictory consequences over society, while the third section concentrates on the mechanisms of uneven and combined development within socio-political transformation processes.

5.2 The Making of Modern Libya

It is clear that the foundation of oil was a critical development, and it affected the state-society complex of Libya. However, it did not happen as a linear modernization or washing away of traditional structures, relations, and institutions, but through combination and emergent amalgamation. It entails looking at how these developmental processes unfolded and underscoring its combined nature. The first step is a critical engagement with conceptualizations of the Libyan state-society complex. Secondly, the processes of intersocietal interaction embedded in uneven capitalist structural relations must be compared to the impact of oil production – rentierism - upon Libyan polity.

During the Ottoman rule, the large-scale industrial initiatives were quite a few. The production of traditional handicrafts and processing agricultural foods constituted the industrial activities (Abdussalam, 1983: 48). Ruth First (1974: 162-163) argues that the Ottoman land code did not start a transformation in land ownership, the emergence of large private estates. The feudal relations and classes (absentee landlords, agricultural workers, tenant relations) did not emerge. Since extensive irrigation networks were lacking, and the economic-political powers of the urban centers were weak, the investment in land was discouraged. Anderson (1984: 325) compares the Ottoman attempts of centralization and modernization with the Sanussi movement, finding their impact upon the tribal loyalties out as superseding. These attempts were significant events in changes of political power and economic wealth, as Ahmida (2009: 25) argues the domination of capitalist relations upon tributary ones transformed the Libyan state into “early modern” and

“less tributary.” The introduction of capitalist relations into Libya, however, happened under the Ottoman rule and European penetration through trade.

The new classes were formed under conditions of the Ottoman state-building attempts and European trade. The rise of salaried bureaucrats was linked to the land code; there was also the merchant class (esparto trade) linked to European capital. The social transformation was concomitant to the crisis in the Sahara trade, which severely affected Tripolitania and Fezzan while benefitted Cyrenaica with new trade routes – the increasing stakes for Cyrenaica prepared the rise of Sanussi movement and the monarchy.

Khadduri (1963: 9) describes the Ottoman rule in Libya as far from widespread, yet the 1908 revolution and establishment of the parliamentary regime were welcomed – Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were represented – as the secessionist elements were opposed. In this sense, nationalism in Libya was in harmony with the Ottoman authority, unlike in the Arab World.

The Italian colonization (1911-1937) of Libya, although a brief period, had a considerable impact on socio-political transformation. Wright (1969: 179-182) argues that from the 1920s and increasingly in the 1930s, the Italian rule turned into a fascist rule. It had territorial, military, mercantile expressions, along with the moral and spiritual one.

The Italian rule provided education, justice, the right to work, and religious toleration (Wright, 1969). Anderson (1984) underscored that the brief Italian period caused the transformation of the Ottoman legacy of reform (attempts of centralization and institutionalization). The Italian industrial investments in Libya were on agriculture, seafood, and mineral, which concentrated in Tripolitania (Abdussalam, 1983: 50). Similarly, the subsidies to the colonial budget were coming from the mother country, yet these subsidies were mostly directed to Italian colonizers in Libya (Wright, 1969). Fowler (1973) discusses that Italians held large areas of the better agricultural land in Libya in 1940 – it was not until 1964 that Libyans got their lands back. The appropriation of arable lands by the Italians led to a significant amount of rural-urban migration and emigration, which created demographic consequences.

Specificities of intersocietal interaction differentially impacted the three regions. While the nomadic nature of Libyans inhibited the formation of clear cut class relations, the interaction between the extant classes, and the social forces of Libya, when the Italian colonization began, expressed the Libyan social formation during the Ottoman rule. Ahmida describes the regional outlook when the Italian rule began as:

Tripolitania had a notable urban class, peasantry, and tribal confederations, while Fezzan was dominated by tribal confederations, land-owning clans, and sharecropping peasants. Cyrenaica had no peasantry and the formation of the Sanusi state-integrated tribal factions into one cohesive social force (Ahmida, 2005: 20).

The agro-pastoral tribes were prevalent, and trade was the primary source of wealth. The classes were formed along with landowners, small peasantry, and sharecroppers. The configuration of social forces determined the relations and reactions to colonization, and Ahmida argues that in urban areas of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (in parts where Sanussi dominance was limited), the notables preferred to collaborate with colonizers to protect their interests (Ahmida, 2005: 30). The Ottomans already gave Cyrenaica autonomy when the Italian colonization began - which let Sanusi movement develop a culture of resistance and build up experience of institutionalization - taking benefit of the trade structures and the tribal system in Cyrenaica into a de facto state in 1913 (Ahmida, 2009: 100).

The implications of colonization for Libyan socio-political transformation were significant regarding the survival of tribalism. In this respect, the conceptualization of the Libyan state-society complex from institutional and inclusionary aspects as in “strong society-weak state” conception of Migdal (Migdal, 1988) takes the state-building in late developers at the center of analysis. It conceptualizes the state and society in a dualistic manner. Similarly, Tibi points to the weak base of the nationhood, citizenship in the Middle East societies. Tibi finds the colonial rule significant in unleashing two opposite social forces: “a unifying nationalism and divisive tribalism” (Tibi, 1991: 147-148). These accounts are taking the colonial experience as the start of history and conceptualize the colonized as stateless, apolitical groups interacting limitedly with each other. Such perspective

underestimates as much as undertheorize the social formation of the colonized before and after colonization. The inability to account for the persistence of the tribal relations and structures epitomizes the weaknesses of Eurocentric perspectives. Thus, arguing as if there was no social differentiation in Libya before colonization and intervention in European capital would be misleading and would prevent understanding the amalgamation created afterward.

The combined nature of development denotes the amalgamation of “different social logics” within the extant political and economic sectors of society. The unfolding of developmental processes allows the archaic institutions, relations of domination combined with the modern, which becomes the source of contradictions where the social struggles, conflicts spring from (Achcar, 2013: 136-137). According to Ahmida (2005: 71), the Libyan state under Italian colonization was “rudimentary,” and the institutional form mirrored the colonial processes presiding over extant and emergent social forces. The colonial state of Libya, in this respect, can be described as an amalgam formation led by the social forces constituted by those attempting to protect their privileged position on the one hand and those struggling to “challenge” the existing modalities of the social formation on the other. For Ahmida, in these processes, the colonial Libyan state mediated the social forces, and peculiarities of Libyan social formation took shape. Ahmida (2005: 74) underlines that the Italian colonial transformation of Libyan society still needed the tribal-peasant confederations for the social rule. For the strong tribal and peasant alliances had been dominant through the Ottoman rule and centralization attempts. An essential amalgamation of archaic and modern was the necessity and continuation of the tribal-peasant confederations after 1951. The interaction of opposing social forces essentialized the amalgamation of traditional and modern relations in the monarchy. Ladjal (2016: 9-10) examines the *asabiyya* (solidarity) forming around the Sanussi order in Cyrenaica and found out that it helped the Sanussi movement both expand into Tripolitania and endorsed as the monarchy after independence.

The primary feature of the political and economic basis in independent Libya was a dependency. Thanks to its strategic location – close to the Suez Canal, which

was quite crucial for Britain at that time, Libya had strong relations with Britain in 1943 and managed to ensure financial aids from it in exchange for military bases (Worrall, 2007). On the other hand, the strategic location of Libya also played a decisive role in its independence. During the Suez Crisis, the ideological ramifications of Nasserism were quite influential over Libyan actions; however, the tendencies of the Libyans who had suspects regarding the benefits and stability of bureaucracy, institutionalization, and regulation did not culminate in the push for independence. Wright (1969: 191) argues that for four years following the end of the war, the issue of Libyan independence was put to the back burner, concerning the unreadiness of Libyans.

The peripheral position of Libya, in this respect, was effective in the processes bringing in independence. Baldinetti (2009: 141) describes the process as “accidental” and realized according to the interaction of interests of the Great Powers, which also had fears about the attitudes of local provinces. The general outlook for Libya in the wake of independence was a federal system. Anderson (1991b: 294) saw the process as a “compromise” between the demands of the international system for a state in Libya. Thus, the conjunctures of intersocietal interaction designated the path of independence for Libya.

While Libya acquired the form of national unity, the US and Britain prepared the framework of the “elaborate and expensive” government of Libya in exchange for military basing rights, and the local notables gained their privileged positions. The unification of the Kingdom, on the other hand, happened in 1963 through Libyanization efforts of the regime, which remained limited to the administrative and bureaucratic functions (Baldinetti, 2009: 145). The making of Libyan independence, in this regard, reflected the two distinct political legacies becoming interpenetrated –the republic and the Sanusi Emirate. Roumani (1983: 163) discusses that these two social formations managed significant processes. While the Emirate introduced the dynamics of administration and diplomacy into Libya, it was the republic that paved the way for movements of independence, endured the geopolitical pressures and colonial hardships, and, most importantly, the idea of national unity. In the Libyan social formation, the resistance of tribal relations also

comes forward. The washing away of the tribal identities with the institutionalized state did not realize.

On the contrary, tribal loyalty was strengthened. Though this was not an inevitable path for Libya, it became part of the Libyan reality due to the Monarchy and Qaddafi regime's strategy to maintain power. The political parties after WWII lost their appeal (Lewis and Gordon, 1954).

The combined nature of interactive development processes, in this respect, is only implied in the various approaches to Libyan social formation. Anderson (2014: 277-279), taking the state formation processes at the center of the analysis, distinguishes the North African example from the European example. While she seems to acknowledge combined structures of domination and mechanisms of appropriation creating unprecedented hybrid amalgamation, she argues that state institutionalization processes should be the analytical focus for analyzing late developers. In this regard, Anderson's analysis becomes as much right about the importance of state formation in late developers as she failed to go beyond the reification of state and institutionalization.

Djaziri underlines that "statelessness" in the form of weak institutionalization and relatively autonomous position of the regions was a legacy of the Sanussi Kingdom to the Qadhafi regime (1995: 180-181). The elite in Libya had been linked to a particular tribe. It was the Cyrenaican tribal Sanussi movement under the Monarchy, and Qadhafi with associated tribes under Qadhafi's rule, each having its own political and economic structures and marginalizing politics (Pargeter, 2006: 1035). The only change was the connotations of the tribal relations, which were interpreted as cohesion and exclusiveness of kinship under the rule of Monarchy, while equal participation and abhorrence of economic specialization under Jamahiriyya (Anderson, 1991: 288).

The primacy of tribal relations, in this respect, should not mislead an analysis of socio-political transformation in Libya. Achcar (2013: 136-137) argues that in the Arab region, the main archaic survivals influencing the political domination and the state are tribalism, sectarianism, and regionalism. Especially the independence movements of Libya were based on the "Sufi-Islam, tribal-peasant military

organizations, and oral traditions” (Ahmida, 2005: 74); however, as many studies, take tribal relations as given and reify the statelessness of Libya, they fail to provide an in-depth explanatory perspective. The examination of social forces – alliance, confrontation, and struggles – sheds light upon the persistence of tribal identities and specificities of Libyan social formation deeply. It gives clues about the scope and content of the Jamahiriya experience of Libya. Most importantly, it provides a totalistic and interactive account of the socio-political transformation of Libya with its historical sociological approach. Therefore, in the following sub-section, the processes of amalgamation between the tribal relations and the Jamahiriya political-economic model will be delineated with its emergent features.

5.2.1 Tribe and Jamahiriya

The economic relations of Libya underwent a profound transformation with the discovery and production of oil resources in 1959, and it created the most crucial specificity for Libyan incorporation into the international capitalist economic system. First (1974: 181) argues that the foundation of oil shaped Libyan position in the international division of labor as much as shaped its configuration of social forces domestically. The political-economic legacies of the Ottoman and colonial rules merged with the capitalist relations of production and resulted in the amalgamation. Through the international division of labor, the economic production in Libya transformed into a rentier model; furthermore, it created the conditions for the 1969 revolution.

In these processes, the national independence and nationalization of oil resources can be conceived as “oil consciousness”. While the financial-industrial bourgeoisie was lacking in Libya, there was only a dispersed and small commercial class within the national market. Nevertheless, with the oil revenues, the socio-political transformation processes in oil-producing countries became closely related to the structures of world development. It indicates the specificity of the state and the military as an organized social force in the Libyan socio-political transformation.

While in the domestic context, the nationalist mobilization against the colonial rule combined with the oil politics and the notion of “Arab solidarity” against Arab-Israeli conflict turned into quite a powerful instrument; within the international capitalist system, the oil revenues and the essence of interdependence between oil producers and industrialized consumers designated a particular form of international relations. Dietrich (2017: 124) puts it as:

At the moment when Radio Cairo charged the US and British aircraft with participating in the first Israeli attack of the June 1967 Arab–Israeli War, the oil consciousness developed during the previous two decades became more closely attuned to regional politics than ever before.

It, merging with the containment of communist ideology, became a crucial part of the geopolitical structures. The formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in this respect, must be seen as a significant effect regarding the MENA geopolitics. The impact of the Soviets, on the other hand, was essential in the OPEC petroleum crisis.

The social implications of oil consciousness combined with nationalist and Arabist sentiments culminated in the fissures within 1967 oil embargo, which King Idris said to the US ambassador “although the oil stoppage was regrettable, he needed to maintain it “for appearances” sake” (Dietrich, 2017: 146). Although the Libyan Kingdom, with the hope of increasing economic aid, welcomed the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 against communist influence (Wright, 1969: 238), the political and social feelings must be contained during the Oil embargos of 1967 and 1973.

The blocking of social forces, in this respect, was influential regarding the 1969 revolution, and the societal implications of oil production become far-reaching and crucial to examine Libyan socio-political transformation. The shift in the productive forces of Libya impacted its social division of labor, Bearman (1984) underlines that with the start of oil flow from 1961, the formation of the working class can be argued: “both in the drilling and construction industries and in the ancillary industries of transport, shipping, and docks.” Although the numbers of Libyan workers were never quite high, the implications of the introduction of new productive forces were quite visible, as F.C. Thomas (1961: 275) pointed out:

The impact of oil employment in Libya cannot be measured simply in terms of the numbers involved. Because of the nature of the operations and the high rate of labor turnover, probably twice the number currently employed [1961] have at some time worked in petroleum exploration. The experience has had an unsettling effect on the individuals involved as well as on the local communities from which they come.

The massive waves of migration to the cities were driven by the motivation to find jobs, which not only culminated in the increasing urbanization but also led to the weakening of the feudal basis of the Sanussi movement (Bearman, 1984). It dated back to the transformation under the effect of the Italian colonization, and it must be emphasized that these shifts in the demographic nature of Libya had profound implications for the Libyan social formation. The rural-urban migration implied the effects of the capitalist structures of development. The continuing migration patterns were part of the same cause, changing relations of production. During the Italian colonization, the migration started and continued as a response to the injection of foreign capital into the urban centers. After independence, the irregular growth patterns and distorted production relations intensified the distribution of income and wealth, which caused the continuance of migration. With the discovery and production of oil, the investments of multinational oil companies carried on the attraction of the urban centers (Abdussalam, 1983: 73).

In the face of increasing urbanization and income, the Libyan state focused on developmental projects. Wright (1969: 263) argues that the oil revenues provided a positive trade balance, and economic growth (per capita income) quadrupled between 1950 and 1962. The First Five Year Plan (1963) of Libya allocated significant amounts to the development projects including agriculture, industry, public works, education, and health thanks to oil revenues; however, the inflation in the cost of food, housing and necessities culminated in discontent with the effectiveness of government policies on oil and social policies.

Against the profound changes in the economic basis of the Libyan society, the changes in the superstructure in the form of institutionalization of political processes were not matching. Mabro (1970) argues that the oil industry culminated in the transformation of social forces – migration into towns, however, the capacities of skilled Libyan workers are limited, and the migrant labor is required. This move led

to the government multiplying public positions to maintain distributive functions. It causes decreases in rural population and agricultural production. The social transformation of Libya was mediated through weak political structures (Anderson, 2014: 275-276).

As the shifts in productive forces created tensions with the mode of production, the conditions of Qadhafi's coup were forming. Fathaly and Palmer (1980: 247) see the configuration of social relations as escalating in months before the 1969 revolution, for the Monarchy with its reliance upon the tribal structures, had found itself incapable before the social situation between tribal, religious elite and the new elite thrived with the oil wealth and composed of students, technocrats, young military officers. The inefficient distributive mechanisms of the oil revenues culminated in the disaffection in various segments of the Libyan society against the regime. More importantly, Collins (1974: 15) argues that the failure to create a "national bourgeoisie" class was a vital deficiency of the Libyan regime, for rather than investing in the Libyan economy to diversify economic activities and to generate employment, the Libyan regime depended on the foreign oil companies to exploit oil. In this context, while the petty bourgeoisie (public servants and military officers), impoverished peasants and unemployed urban migrants constituted the opposition, the main issues were the unequal distribution of oil revenues and incapable developmental model.

These features of the Libyan state-society complex indicate that the formation of a mass base for the revolution was closely related to the transformation driven by the changing relations of oil production and involvement of multinational oil corporations. As the interactive development processes affected the Libyan social formation, there was another implication – the emergence of labor and oil consciousness for political mobilization. However, the formation of labor and mobilization driven by oil consciousness must be considered together with the geopolitical structures of the Cold War. Bini (2019), examining the Libyan labor, underlines the close relationship between the workers in the multinational oil companies and the developments ushered in the 1969 revolution. The broader context of this relationship was embedded in the Cold War geopolitical structures

and the policy of suppressing the communist trade unions, which for the Libyan labor meant the erosion of worker rights.

Bini argues that the US policy was to improve the economy of Libya through its oil companies and secure Libyan membership in the western bloc, “by the mid-1960s, international oil companies in Libya employed approximately 10,000 people” (Bini, 2019: 6). However, the specificities of Libyan social formation – especially the political structures- were repressive against any political opposition and formation of any political organization and party. In this regard, the trade unions turned into a strong base, expanding into a political dimension.

Against a rise of possible confrontationist movement, the American oil companies tended to refrain from employing large amounts of local labor in the oil production sector (Bini, 2018: 315). The oppressive politics, nonetheless, could not manage to break the impact of labor – especially in the late 1960s – and the workers became a significant part of the formation of oil policies. It must be recalled that the pan-Arabist wave was on the rise at that time, and in the 1967 war, the workers “organized a three-week work stoppage in Tripoli and the Gulf of Sirte, while placing an embargo on oil exports.” (Bini, 2019: 7). The relation between the state and oil companies triggered the nationalist movements and paved the ground for Qadhafi’s revolutionary coup.

In post-independence Libya, the developmental model was based on state intervention and state-controlled income redistribution (Richards and Waterbury, 1996). The developmental model included the state-financed infrastructural projects, industrialization for import substitution (Yousef, 2004: 96). These movements resulted in domestic and structural changes: domestically, the amalgamation of tribal society with a centralized state and structurally the heavy dependence on external sources– material and technical. The consequences of a centralized state over tribal society intensified with the problems relevant to fast urbanization and demographic interaction (Issawi, 1982: 165-166).

Revolutionary Libya under Qadhafi attempted to gain control of these processes through socio-political reforms. The traditional tribal relations were despised and targeted through state policies. It indicates that the processes of

political substitutionism and configuration of social forces were intimately related in revolutionary Libya because Qadhafi, with a military coup, grasped the rule and endeavored to change the configuration of social forces through the elimination of tribal relations.

A mixture of rentier economic model and pan-Arabist, Arab-socialist political-ideological model constituted the framework for these reforms under Qadhafi. While the nationalization of oil production and subsequent transformation of state institutions around distributive mechanisms created a stable political-economy for Libya, the ideology of pan-Arabism and Arab-socialism provided the content and context for the socio-political transformation.

The radical socio-political transformation, however, did not start at the outset of the revolution. One of the very first actions of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in the early 1970s was to eliminate the established elite class, which was comprised mainly of tribal chiefs that the RCC viewed as the main threat to its revolution (Fathaly and Palmer, 1980). The effort to end the domination of the major tribes took the form of establishing administrative units involving sections of several tribes (Hweio, 2012). An essential shift was related to the regime constituency, on which the Qadhafi built its alliance. The center of power moved to Tripoli, Sirte, and Sebha from Benghazi, Tobruk, and Al-Bayda (Van Genugten, 2016: 83).

The ideological framework of the revolution, Deeb (1986: 447) argues, must be thought together with the ideals of Arab unity, which becomes crucial concerning the formation of Libyan identity. Since the formation of the Libyan national identity was confined to the limits of Turkish and Italian rules, and the social organization of the Libyan society was mainly tribal, the Arab unity was thought to have capacities to overcome these problems. In this sense, according to Bearman (1984), the Libyan revolution resembles the anti-colonial revolutions in the other parts of the Third World, such as China, Cuba, and Algeria. For Bearman, the role of middle-class in these societies was essential, while the role of working classes – because of the backwardness in the economic basis of these societies – was secondary.

Through the mechanisms of uneven and combined development, in this respect, the Libyan socio-political transformation processes were driven by the political substitutionism. In the face of skipping the stages of development processes, the military coup brought in the change in the ruling constituency. For as Deeb (1986: 457) argues that “unlike Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Libya did not have a robust indigenous bourgeoisie – which concerning the repressive consequences of Qadhafi’s revolution over the social differentiation through ownership of the means of production continued to remain subordinated and confined to commercial activities.

The diffusion of the hegemonic model of development the Keynesian-welfarism, however, amalgamated with the Libyan specificities. While the ideological framework might seem close to the Arab socialist path, its social content was different. Collins (1974: 21) argues that it was the Arab nationalist state-capitalist path before Qadhafi’s Libya project. It is important to emphasize that the formation of the national bourgeoisie or any class was prevented under Qadhafi. It was state capitalism, in which the economic activities related to oil were mediated by state-owned enterprises and contracted to foreign companies. The implications of the Keynesian-welfarist model of development are seen in the articulation of populist-authoritarianism and controlled formation of any social force.

Within the context of the populist authoritarian political economy, the rise of the state became quite decisive in the designation of social forces. The rise of bureaucracy with the institutionalization of state – although mainly around controlling the oil industry and focused on distributive functions and security - enhanced the penetration of state into the Libyan society. The state-led developmental projects were quite essential in generating employment and legitimacy – as a form of bonding material within the ruling constituency. Bearman (1984) conceptualizes the role of bureaucracy that had a privileged position concerning the state planning and economic administration, as having two central objectives “capital accumulation and its self-preservation”. In this context, the Libyan state-society complex should be seen not as an instrument of class, but as a

social formation relies upon an amalgam of pre-capitalist socio-economic structures with oil production.

The emergent socio-political and socio-cultural formations, on the other hand, reflect the Libyan specificities. Comparing Nasserism with Libyan model, Deeb (1986: 447) finds out that the latter was quite different in the sense that the agrarian reform could not be implemented in the Libyan context because the limited areas of agriculture cannot be utilized with underpopulation which was intensified after the oil boom's labor demands. Similarly, the nationalization of industry was only limited to the oil industries because of lacking industrial base in Libya. The lack of industrial and agricultural base prevented any inclusion of social forces through land reforms, and better rights for labor. It was a crucial structural context for the Libyan socio-political transformation, which pushed Qadhafi's revolutionary framework into the ideological sphere and distribution of oil revenues.

The main framework for the radical social transformation, in this regard, envisioned by the RCC, was "Islamic Arab Socialism." It resembled the amalgam of pan-Arabist, Arab-nationalist ideology combined with religion. The main objectives, on the other hand, reflected the diffusion of hegemonic model of development, as they included "economic diversification, sustainable exploitation of natural resources, agricultural self-sufficiency, industrial development, and nationalization of the workforce." These policies ensured the legitimacy of the Qadhafi regime through an increase in minimum wages, a decrease in rents, and free education (Van Genugten, 2016: 84). Bearman (1984) points out that the failure of the Qadhafi regime to secure corporatist relations through the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) might be relevant to the mild attitude of the revolution in the beginning to the private capital. As RCC did not want to antagonize the owners of capital in the country right at the outset of the revolution, it would not be wrong to argue that the main priority was to expand the control of the state over the oil industry. The RCC acknowledged that the extant classes in the Libyan social formation would not welcome the radical nature of social, political, and economic reforms of modernization. The content of the reforms was similar to the "socialist-oriented leaders" in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Algeria (Fathaly and Palmer, 1980: 248).

Simmons (1993: 214), approaching the socio-political transformation of Libya with a state-capitalist perspective, puts it as “the Libyan government was now acting as a state capitalist just as other states - Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria - had moved to support and expand industrial capitalism.”

In 1975, Qadhafi’s experiment with Libyan traditional social formation started. Oil revenues had provided the Libyan system grease to function smoothly with the non-Libyan labor force (Ahmida, 2005: 78). The nationalization of the oil industry appeared as essential. The main objective of the nationalization was ensuring the employment of “skilled Libyan workers” in the oil production sector, which controlled by foreign companies previously (Bini, 2018: 327). Abdussalem and Lawless (1988) argue that the processes of Libyanization would not be possible.

Instead, the requirements of the hegemonic model of development – the control of the social forces through a penetrated, consolidated state were fulfilled within the populist authoritarian state. An important part of the socio-political transformation was related to an increasing role for the state and containment of the social forces. In the late 1970s, according to Anderson (2014: 265), the attack on the private sector was a significant turnabout for the regime. Those who benefitted from the economic policies – non-exploitative capitalists, small-scale retailers, farmers, and entrepreneurs – were encouraged by the regime. This stratum profited particularly from the government policies in housing, education, and health care. Private investment accounted for 13% of the funds budgeted in the Five-Year Development Plan. However, in 1978 the policy changed, and the government abandoned this stratum.

The socio-economic and socio-political consequences of the reforms differentially impacted the social groups in the Libyan social formation. The upper and middle classes who were mostly employed in the bureaucracy were alienated against the regime. Furthermore, the productive sectors of the economy shifted to a more rentier, dependent, and non-competitive and inefficient form. The government subsidiary activities kept most of the economic sectors going. On the other hand, the regime managed to create its base of support and elites, which mostly came from lower and middle classes (Hinnebusch, 1984: 71).

Anderson (2014: 266) argues that another marginalized group was the once-favored religious organization, for the waqf properties were nationalized in the economic reforms. It left the military and domestic security services as the most influential, in as much as Qadhafi inhibits the autonomous and hierarchical development of any organization.

At first sight, the small and relatively domicile and fragmented population of Libya might be thought of as preventable from social differentiation with the help of oil revenues, as Roumani (1983) puts it “Oil riches and a small population permit (Libya) to avoid the need for a differentiated social structure to cope with the complexities of the modern age.” However, taking the oil-dependent production base of Libya for legitimizing the “rentier state” analysis would be misleading and too simplistic to capture multiple sets of determinations within development processes. Labels such as “hydrocarbon society,” “rentier state,” do create a framework for the complexity of the Libyan social formation as exploitable and manageable easily (Opondo, 2011: 664). Such an oversimplification of identity and power formations in Libya obscures the analysis. Instead of taking the concept “rentierism” as capable of transforming state-society complex entirely and as ahistorical perspective, rethinking it with the features of combination can provide more in-depth insight.

Hinnebusch (1984: 69) defines the social consequences of Libyan experience as crash modernization with high costs. With wasteful bureaucracy, foreign labor dependent production, and urbanization undermining the agricultural sector, state-controlled capitalist processes caused suppression of the private sector and creation of dependent state bourgeoisie. In this context, Libyan Jamahiriya is a modern populist state. Ahmida (2005:72) underlines that the political experiment of the Jamahiriya (“state of the masses”) in Libya, therefore, would make sense if one looked carefully at the historical and cultural bases of Libyan society. In this respect, the lack of political opposition or resiliency of authoritarianism cannot be imputed to rentierism. It must be examined within the operation of mechanisms generating marginalization and exclusion (Okruhlik, 1999: 308).

The processes of subordination and integration within which social forces interacted with the regime were essential in the articulation of social forces. The Libyan social formation under Qadhafi leadership reflected the problems of weak institutionalization along with strong coercive structures presiding over exclusive/marginalizing relations. In this respect, the articulation of social forces in the Libyan context became interwoven to the tribal identities. The processes of urbanization driven by the changing relations of production were another set of determination in the creation of amalgamation (Lacher, 2011: 146). Therefore, the Libyan socio-political transformation was not incompatible with tribal identities. At least until the end of the 1980s, the revolutionary regime followed economic policies that oriented to prevent social differentiation into classes would have posed a threat to tribal loyalties. The social differentiation and stratification were affected by the production relations, which took shape under the distribution and expenditure mechanisms and created clientelistic relations (Vandewalle, 1995). In Qadhafi's post-revolution Libya, the regime heavily relied upon clientelistic relations with tribes and the "Revolutionary Committee," which buttressed with dualistic security services (Joffe, 2011a: 14-15). Pargeter (2010: 16) underlines that the patronage mechanisms were frequently instrumentalized for ensuring the loyalty of regime constituency. The business deals, along with material privileges, and governmental positions were distributed to strengthen the roots of the regime. Besides, the formation of the independent bourgeoisie, in such a hostile context, was far from possible. Instead, there were patrimonial cronies of the regime network, which systematically alienated and marginalized the Cyrenaica tribes and ethnic minorities.

Such amalgamation of archaic and modern thanks to oil revenues prevented the elimination of tribal identities through modernization (Vandewalle, 1998); on the contrary, in politics, we saw a rise of tribal loyalties-nepotism (El- Kikhia, 1997: 103). In Qadhafi's rule, the political positions were distributed among the tribes in a meticulous and calculated way. The distribution of "political and administrative positions" turned into a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion in the Qadhafi era. The prevalence of the mechanism turned tribal relations into a solid base for the

reproduction of society (Hweio, 2012: 117). However, the evaluation of regime policies as separate and arbitrary would be missing the underlying motive behind the top-down reforms and the amalgamation emerging from the specificities of the Libyan social formation. The tribal social base of Libya affected the processes of representation, as the Qadhafi regime struggled to “disenfranchise any autonomous urban middle class” (Ahmida, 2012: 74). Concerning the socio-political transformation, Anderson (2014: 268) argues that the longevity of the Libyan experiment partially depends upon the regime's economic and administrative policies that kept the society fragmented and dependent on state distribution.

These processes can be conceived as attempts to control socio-political transformation processes through selective incorporation of social forces into the ruling constituency. However, these processes also resulted in the distorted institutionalization of structures in revolutionary Libya. El Fathaly and Palmer (1995) argue that the competing values of Qadhafi led to contradictory and overlapping institutions. Since Qadhafi aimed to mobilize the Libyan population under his control, he tried the Arab Socialist Union and Popular Committees, which were instrumentalized for containing masses. However, in 1979, the General People’s Congress (GPC) took the decision that would separate the formal authority from revolutionary authority. The bifurcation of power sources in Libyan Jamahiriya culminated in the endorsement of Revolutionary Committees’ power above the other institutions while ensuring Qadhafi’s “untouchable” status as the “Guide of the Revolution” (Vandewalle, 2012: 106).

Kikhia (1997) argues that the political bodies were subjected to the authority of Revolutionary Committees. The economic dimension of the revolution was also radical. The private sector was denounced and seen as parasites whose activities were seen unproductive. Pargeter (2006: 228) points out that the Revolutionary Committees had become an effective network of domination and accumulation in Libya. While the Committees had been provided with farms and perks – for instance, controlling the channels of distributing the state food/markets – in return for loyalty, the businesses had allowed providing vast opportunities for accumulation.

Although the domestic processes were under the control of Qadhafi, the transformation of Libya into a pariah state internationally was a watershed, which was determined through complex relations within uneven and combined development. Firstly, with the increasing impact of oil consciousness, the nationalization of oil production in Libya attracted the attention of oil companies. However, because of the geopolitical relations in the Cold War and the quality/proximity of Libyan oil to Europe, there could not be any harsh reaction possible.

Secondly, as the oil consciousness indicated the center shifted to producers from consumers, It was also significant that the new contracts indicated that the oil production was “meant to serve the national interest of the people of Libya which has a sovereign right to its national resources” (Dietrich, 2017: 164). However, since Qadhafi saw the Cold War camps as “the liberation camp and the imperialist one” (Qaddafi, 1987a: 47), he underlines that “colonialism maybe industrial colonialism now, but it will use military means to attain its industrial aims.” (Qaddafi, 1987b: 584). It indicated the Libyan efforts to increase its military capacities and supporting the terrorist activities, for which Libya had to endure the waves of sanctions throughout the 1980s and 1990s for supporting international terrorist networks and activities.

The sanctions were the structural instruments of the US policy and had severe implications for the Libyan socio-political processes. The geopolitical rivalry in the Cold War and the MENA as the theater for great power confrontation in the 1970s culminated in the rising importance of controlling the oil resources and containment of communism. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, however, brought the geopolitical pressures a new level with the OPEC crisis.

5.2.2 The Whip of Sanctions

The sanctions regime was quite destructive over Libyan development processes. Although it lasted through the 1980s and 1990s, it was not multi-lateral right at the beginning. For instance, the nationalization of oil production in 1971 did

not catch serious attention outside the oil companies, which were afraid of the Libyan example getting spread to other oil producers (Dietrich, 2017: 164); and the divergent interests of the Atlantic powers concerning Libya softened the hand of the US about the sanctions. It was energy security and the number of direct investments that provided Europe enough reasons to prefer accommodation rather than confrontation against Libya. In this respect, the analysis of the societal implications of the international sanctions becomes quite essential in the account of Libyan socio-political development processes under the rule of Qadhafi.

An in-depth structural analysis of the Libyan development would be deficient unless the contemporary political developments are considered. Especially the military defeat against Israel in 1967 expressed the extent of societal transformation in the framework of Arab socialism and Pan-Arabism (Beinin, 20012: 143). Besides, the exclusion of Libya from pan-Arabist circles contributed to the ideological radicalization of the regime. Although revolutionary Libya, as a particular form of Pan-Arabist, Arab-socialist regime, endeavored to adopt ISI strategy for industrialization – to no small extent remained limited to oil-related sectors – the sanctions regime put Libyan development at a halt. The intersocietal interaction through geopolitical pressures and international division of labor penetrated the Libyan structures of development and the hegemonic model of development diffused into Libya, merging with the local structures of tribalism, clientalism, patrimonialism. While the social forces articulated under the context of sanctions that affected the relations of production and trade, the cumulative impact of this sociological amalgamation was the production of a hybrid sociality and ideological sensitivity.

The sanctions pushed the regime to change the political-economic model. However, the domestic side of change was relevant to the implications of the sanctions. The regime legitimacy, which relied on the distributive mechanisms, later became the source of a dilemma between inefficient distributive model and the liberal market model. This dilemma was dependent on the specificities of the social forces and the interactive capitalist system. The ISI strategy started to be questioned towards the 1970s and 1980s (Sayigh, 1991).

Regarding the economic model in the region, however, Ayubi (1992: 102) clearly states that the issue was not whether socialism in the Arab states, but it is whether socialism, underscoring that the populist-corporatist regimes were never particularly anti-capitalist. It is, therefore, necessary to start with structural features of development processes. The features of the interactive capitalist system have become the uncertainty, fluctuations in oil and primary products, economic shocks, and increasing vulnerability with the liberalization attempts (Kadri, 2014: 83).

The drastic decline of the oil revenues at the beginning of the 1980s created a budgetary problem for Libya. Besides, the regime did not initially prefer to decrease military spending, which meant a grinding halt in the developmental projects and imports of Libya. With *infatih*, a profound transformation in the Libyan economy started (Vandewalle, 2012: 165).

Vandewalle emphasizes that the real damage happened because of the ban on investment in Libya, with the set of sanctions imposed by the Reagan administration in 1986 (Vandewalle, 2012: 165). The situation deteriorated when the Qadhafi regime started to unravel. The military failure in Chad – which demonstrated the ineffectiveness and lavishness of it – the rise of Islamist political groups with the return of Afghan jihadists into eastern Libya – especially Derna and Benghazi – were all aggravating the deteriorating outlook in Libya (Prashad, 2010: 111).

It is this historical specificity that after the consolidation of state power as a powerful social force, the liberalization movement became a decisive moment in the socio-political transformation of Libya and the creation of combined implications of development. As the agents managed the skipping of developmental phases were the military, the mechanism of political substitutionism was decisive in the unfolding of Libyan socio-political transformation. A snapshot of the Libyan society by the late 1980s would demonstrate that Qaddafi and the ruling elite were better educated compared to the military wing. Coming from urban middle-class backgrounds, they were crucial for the administrative functions of the regime and economic activities. Under these ruling elite, there were upper middle class – technocrats, administrators, and what had left from the wealthy commercial, entrepreneurial class. At the bottom were the small traders, teachers, farmers. These social components had been

restructured by the revolution and sought for the socio-political and economic transformation of the Libyan society (Metz, 1989).

Evaluating the Libyan revolution, St. John (1983) highlighted the transformative nature of the revolution for state-society relations. The state dependency and state penetration were among the most important ones. Contrary to the slogan of direct democracy, the penetration of state in daily lives became quite reasonable in Libya after the revolution. Anderson saw “the political contestation accompanying the mass mobilization” a side of the revolution (Anderson, 1986: 229). Buttressed by the demographics of Libya, the Qaddafi regime effectively utilized the support of politicized youth and urban poor.

Nevertheless, the capacity to manipulate mostly mirrored the distributive functions of the regime (Takeyh, 1998: 166). As the ambiguousness of the concept of rentier state emerges from the generalization of the features of oil boom periods (Okruhlik, 1999), it fails to account for oil contraction periods, not to mention the reification of the state and to separate it from social forces. Any decrease in oil revenues, thus, had a profound influence on the nature of relations between the Libyan regime and social forces (Vandewalle, 2012: 144).

The severe political crisis combined with the questioning of the regime legitimacy, thus, prepared the ground for reforms. The relative weight of domestic dynamics is underlined by Altunışık (1995: 218), who notes that “pressure from the social groups, therefore, played a decisive role in the initiation of the new policies.” Regarding the economic activities and the creation of employment, the Libyan regime, as El-Kikhia (1997: 58) notes, after 1978, was restricted to three categories: government employees, corporate employees, and self-employed workers. Since there was no apparent production, almost all of these corporations had to rely heavily on government subsidies for income.

The national accumulation project designed by the ruling elite cannot underestimate the domestic dynamics, as much as the external context. St. John (2008: 97) puts it as “recognizing internal discontent was approaching an explosive level, Qaddafi responded with a series of corrective measures aimed at moderating many of the ideologically driven policies implemented after 1969, called for reforms

in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, including a reversal of export substitution policies.” Among these corrections, the private sector was entitled to a new role and encouraged to commence self-management, which was planned as the creation of cooperatives in which partners could contribute either capital or labor. Thus, in the policies of 1987, Hamadouche and Zoubir (2007: 272) underline the limits of political reforms accompanying the broadened role of the private sector.

The first wave of *infatih* policies aimed to privatize retail trade and services and liberalize foreign trade. It is essential to note that remnants of the small business community before the radicalization of revolution shaped the content and scope of the reforms. Altunışık argues that “the nature of these demands showed how the underlying structural characteristics of Libyan society continue to determine the behavior of political actors” (Altunışık, 1995: 218).

The end of the 1980s, thus, saw the removal of state control over trade and state monopoly over import and export. The liberalized retail trade caused many small shops and souks to reopen (Vandewalle, 1991). However, the expansion of the private enterprise, according to Simmons (1993: 218), and the newly emerging business class was not operating in ways according to the political tenets of the Green Books. In this regard, the liberalization moves in Libya had its amalgamation. The heterogeneous production model of Libya renders it wholly dependent upon the price of primary markets – especially oil and natural gas. Vandewalle (1991) contrasts the patrimonial, clientelistic nature of domination and exploitation relations with the liberalization of the economy. It indicates that while the international sanctions had a transformative impact on the configuration of social forces in Libya since Libyan consumption was mostly reliant upon the import, the sanctions primarily affected the role of the state in import, distribution, and subsidization of the consumer products.

Emergentist development argues that while it makes the accounts of liberalization as a local demand incomplete, it also demonstrates in what ways the social amalgamation emerges through the mechanisms of uneven and combined development. Evaluating the general outlook of reforms, Vandewalle (2012: 166) discusses that the economic restructuring of the Libyan developmental model did

not confront severe challenges, as it was not directly undermining any constituency. Consumers and small entrepreneurs gained many benefits from the liberalized trade and import regulations. Similarly, those in the ruling elite – especially the technocratic elite in the Libyan National Oil Company, along with the managers in protected state institutions, military, and their clientelistic networks – strengthened their position. The opportunities provided to them, such as easy access to credit, involvement in import-export transactions, facilitated the operation of marginalizing accumulation processes.

The price liberalization, in this respect, helped the formation of a parasitic class and caused severe conditions for Libyan people (Chaudry, 2006: 47). Vandewalle puts it as (2012: 166):

Paradoxically, therefore, the lack of regulation that accompanied the first wave of reform brought about an even greater degree of economic stratification. Small retail merchants and entrepreneurs did not have equal access to capital and, as a result, restricted their operations to food, services that required little capital, and to consumer goods imported from neighboring countries.

Into the 1990s, the nature of intersocietal interaction underwent a deep transformation with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a foreign policy action, Qaddafi tried to improve relations with the Arab world and the West because of the collapse of the Soviets (Simmons, 1993: 288). Domestically, it had severe implications for Libyan socio-political transformation processes. The control of the articulation of social forces was the primary issue. The General People's Congress sought to shift the liberalization attempts and regain the political control on the economy in the March 17, 1990 session. The resolution stated the aim clearly “to transform society into one of production by destroying the consumer society and building a Jamahiriya production society” (Simmons, 1993: 219). Nevertheless, those in the commercial sector and profited from the liberalized trade and other transactions disliked the new agenda. Besides, there was growing opposition to Qaddafi's socialism. The merchants and middle classes have opposed the socialist programs in large part because they were directly affected by its economic policies. On the other hand, the attitude was not shared by working classes (El-Khawas,

1984: 40). The reforms were mainly motivated by the Qadhafi regime's plan to blame state institutions on policy failures.

The geopolitical pressures, on the other hand, were aggravating due to the Gulf War and the US intervention. The multilateral sanctions²³ on Libya after 1992 completely choked down the foreign investment (Niblock, 2001). Although not achieved because of European dependency on Libyan oil, the objective was to halt Libyan oil capacities (Simons 2003). The second wave of sanctions on Libya was to undermine the legitimacy of the Qadhafi regime and to break the bargain within state and society that ensured the political quiescence. Rose (1999: 143), however, evaluates the outcomes of sanctions as meager. Since the US could not convince Europe into the sanctions regime, the unilateral nature of the sanctions did harm mostly the US businesses, while the European oil companies took benefit. Vandewalle (2012: 171) argues that although the US policy of imposing a global oil embargo on Libya through the UN resolutions did not realize, Iran and Libyan Sanction Act (ILSA) in August 1996 was accepted (Vandewalle, 2012: 171).

Libya since the early 1980s had invested in down streaming mainly in European markets – as a network of gas stations and refineries. The sanctions regime culminated in severe difficulties. Aiming to circumvent the US ban on imports, these investments were expected to improve the dire conditions for the Libyan economy via finding markets for oil sales and strengthening the relations with Europe. When the sanctions on Libya were expanded to all exports, the difficulty of the situation for Libya grew bigger, for it could have a deleterious impact on the oil industry and high technology products²⁴ (Vandewalle, 2012: 165). The plummeting oil prices²⁵, however, changed the course of events for the Libyan

²³ UN Security Council adopted resolution SCR 883 in November 1993; this move had severe ramifications for the Libyan economy and included freezing Libyan assets abroad, intensification of the measures in SCR 748, and the ban on export of equipment crucial for Libyan oil industry.

²⁴ Vandewalle (2012: 165) argues that the US vetoed significant amount of civil aircraft export licenses to Libya in 1983 alone.

²⁵ It was caused by the OPEC overproduction and lasted for several months (Simmons, 1993: 219).

regime. The Libyan people became increasingly dependent on state subsidies. Niblock (2001) described the outlook of Libya as uncertain because of economic and political isolation.

The second wave of *infitahi* attempts of liberalization started in 1992 in such a context. The international economic sanctions, along with the decrease in the oil prices in the international markets at the beginning of the 1990s, were effective in this move. The reforms transformed the role of the private sector – still fledgling – and the state in economic processes. While the private sector assumed the control of the inefficiently state-operated system of distribution (state supermarkets), the state attempted to limit its functions to the provision of welfare. Although the system recovered from inefficiency and mismanagement in a short time, it was important that the local currency lost its reputation against the US Dollar, which became prevalent in most of the everyday purchases (AfDB, 2011: 5).

The course of socio-political transformation in Libya once again demonstrated its interactivity. The existing configuration of social forces was decisive in the diffusion of intersocietal interaction into structures of development in Libya. In the case of implementation of the second wave, the ramifications would be severe – but mainly for the one singled out above as the nucleus of the regime’s supporters. The liberalized banking system and real import regulations, as Vandewalle (2012: 166) argued, would lead to the end of privileged access to accumulation through obtaining licenses. (Vandewalle, 2012: 166). The reforms lacking popular support are rejected by GPC (Hamadouche and Zoubir, 2007: 272). According to Pargeter (2010: 15), the institutionalized impediment to reform was the “old guard”, who were opposing modernization movements. The old guard was constituted mostly by the Revolutionary Committees Movement.

The socio-economic consequences of the second wave of reforms were discouraging. The Libyan people had to cope with wage losses, and state subsidies, while the general outlook was getting worse because of the decreasing living standards. Vandewalle argues that the reforms were in no one’s interest in Libya. The average citizen, small entrepreneur, rural workers, and agricultural workers were against the cuts in government distribution of revenues (Vandewalle, 2012:

166). However, the political measures failed to protect the average Libyan from the adverse effects of inflation and liberalization processes, which was introduced with Law no.9 in 1992 (Hamadouche and Zoubir, 2007: 272).

The attempts of liberalization on trade and investment continued in the second part of the 1990s. Hamadouche and Zoubir (2007: 272) put that “in September 1997, Libya introduced Law No. 5 aimed at encouraging foreign capital investment in the country; under this law, investors were allowed to reexport the invested capital.” It was a significant indicator of Libya’s incorporation into the circuits of accumulation and appropriation.

As a consequence of liberalization on trade and investment, the domestic trade processes assumed a speculative form, including the growing black market, corrupt economic transactions, and land speculations (Takeyh, 1998: 164). Furthermore, the liberal reforms not only failed to resuscitate the private sector and productive economic activities but also resulted in intensified conditions of dependency for oil revenues.

Above all, the agricultural sector continued to lose its capacity to contribute to the economy. Ahmida (2005: 82) points out that in 1990, only 2% of the national budget came from the agricultural sector. It is vital that while the liberalization attempts meant to decrease state control and regulation over the economy, the result was increasing state control against relatively low regulatory activities.

The “deepening” liberalization wave after 1990 had brought in extending cuts in state spending, gradual withdrawal of subsidies, promotion of private sector initiatives in the industrial, trade, and agricultural sectors, removal of state import and export monopolies, further diversification of the economy (including the promotion of tourism), and creation of a viable banking system that would support these new initiatives Vandewalle (2012: 190).

Tim Niblock argues that sanctions could not seriously harm the oil and related sectors (Niblock, 2001: 64). However, purchasing power severely decreased because of the rising prices of imported products and inflation. The shortages of products and inability of the government to address problems consequently created a parallel economy, which at the same time inhibited social policies for equalization

and welfare (Niblock, 2001: 78), he underlines the steep decline in the wages and salaries because of the inflation during the 1990s and their impact upon the living standards (Niblock, 2001: 74).

To sum up, Libyan society and the economy quaked with the sanctions. The policies cannot be implemented, and economic structure rendered far weaker. After taking over (nationalization), the oil industry, billed significant losses, around %8 annually (Vandewalle, 2012: 157). Simmons (2003: 157) describes the impact of multilateral sanctions after the Lockerbie issue as a “deadly blow” to the economy. The Libyan economy had undergone a harsh period with the embargos by the US, and the crucial sectors such as health and social services, agriculture, transportation, and machinery import hit hardest in this period.

In the mid-1990s, Libya confronted with much domestic unrest, some driven by political Islamists, some by economic grievances (Joffe, 1996: 260). The contestation of the regime could not come from any civil society because there was not any. A significant base for the rise of opposition against Qadhafi could only come from the military institutions, which as Takeyh (1998: 169) argues, lacking a uniting ideological framework that could mobilize and motivate marginalized, excluded communities in the Libyan social formation. Joffe (1996: 263) links the domestic unrest, especially to marginalized Cyrenaican tribes and politically isolated youth.

The socio-political transformation processes, in this respect, were designated in the context of intersocietal interaction. While the sanctions regime undermined the stability of the populist-authoritarian political economy in Libyan Jamahiriya, the existing configuration of social forces created significant amalgamation through the diffusion of hegemonic model of development into the patrimonial, clientelistic structures. In the next section, the structural consequences of development in Libya will be delineated with a framework sensitized to the mechanisms of uneven and combined development.

5.3 Structural Consequences of Development in Libya

The examination of structural consequences of development in Libya entails looking at the changing attitude against Libya and the amalgamation that emerges in these processes. The dependent incorporation of Libya into the structures of world development culminated in skipping the stages of development and political substitutionism. The specificities of Libyan social formation are the corporatism and clientalism merging with the capitalist relations of production. Selvik and Stenslie (2011: 58) points out Libya as an example of how the state subordinates society through these amalgamated social formations.

The dependent incorporation of Libya into the structures of world development affected the socio-political transformation processes in which the weakness of private capitalism confronted with the energetic and assertive popular demands (Achcar, 2013: 172). The controlled and selective integration of social forces into regime constituency, in this respect, has become one of the most significant results of uneven and combined development processes in Libya. The intersocietal interaction -through mechanisms of international sanctions and rentier economic model -merged with the liberalization movements, the most severe contradictions of development processes manifested in the form of radicalized opposition that was repressed harshly (Joffe, 2011a: 14).

Van Genugten (2016: 85) states that the Keynesian-welfarist state financed by the oil revenues could not match the expected levels in ensuring self-sufficiency in industrial production; to the contrary, it increased the dependency of Libya in international relations. In such a dependent context, the neoliberalization of Libyan development processes started.

The seeds of neoliberal transformation should be searched in the global economic recession of the 1980s, which forced most Middle East countries, both oil producers and non-oil producers, to implement new measures in pursuit of sustainable macroeconomic policies. Firstly, oil or non-oil, they all became dependent upon external capital inflows; secondly, the political and economic outlook was threatening the ongoing of these flows. The Fordist production model was abandoned. Saull (2012: 329) argues that the two historical blocs – both post-

war and the neoliberal – have aimed to expand and ensure the capitalist development processes. Nevertheless, a careful distinction between the structural features of capitalism and the policies of states models political agendas is a must (Joseph, 2008).

The difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s for the Libyan social formation could not be expected to vanish at once and a smooth reincorporation of Libya into the international society – lifting of sanctions. The hegemonic neoliberalization movement affected the Libyan social formation with its peculiar features. However, contrary to the accounts take Qadhafi at the center, this chapter takes the specificities and emergent amalgamation in the unfolding developmental processes.

The attempts to recover relations with the West dates back to the 1990s when the Qaddafi regime showed its hand by demanding negotiations with the US upon its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program (Prados, 2005: 30). The “war against terrorism” and “oil security” were among the critical determinants for the change in seeing Libya as a pariah state towards “readmittance” and “rehabilitation” of the Libyan regime (Opondo, 2011: 664).

When the regime had gone far away from the high living standards of the oil boom years, and public services such as health, education were faltering, the Libyan regime had limited choices but to search for a fundamental shift. The domestic outlook was not promising, considering the Libyans getting more familiar with Arab critique of governments thanks to satellite and Al-Jazira of Qatar (Pargeter, 2000: 30).

At this point, The 2003 US intervention in Iraq should be mentioned, with its transformative impact over the region. The geopolitical quake in the region was because of Iraq’s invasion and the strong US presence, which tipped the balance (Cleveland and Bunton, 2008: 557-559); however, on the US side, the rapprochement was mainly driven by business interests, which felt marginalized because of the sanctions that mainly benefitted the European firms (Zoubir, 2006: 52). According to Goulter (2016: 47), from 2000 onwards, the UK government embarked on a concerted effort to normalize relations with Libya, and this is

considered to be one of the prime factors in convincing Gaddafi to renounce his support of terrorism and also cancel Libya's WMD and ballistic missile programs.

Libya got outstanding achievements in improving relations with the West. The advocating of "the global war on terrorism" ensured the exclusion of Libya out of the "axis of evil" in 2002 (Zoubir, 2006: 58). However, it should be marked that there is no direct relationship between the US invasion of Iraq and Libyan decision to disarm. Prados (2005: 31) argues that there were already talks to negotiate this process. There were also facilitating factors for the Libyan rapprochement. The "sanctions fatigue," as Zoubir (2006: 61) argues, turned into an essential element in the recovery of the Libyan image. However, the European insistence on rejecting the maintenance of harsh attitude against Libya pushed the US government (Clinton Administration) to shift to a "less stringent policy."

Joffe (2001: 88) puts it as "few of these changes came about, although the Libyan authorities went out of their way to attract European investment, with the hope that American investment would not be far behind." On the European side, the solution was prompted by the factors such as Libya's potential new oil resources which can be exploited, the increasing anti-sanctions attitude of African countries, and the British determination for Libyan reconstruction (considering the Middle East Peace process and ineffectiveness of ENP without Libya) (Joffe, 2001: 87). Lutterbeck (2009: 177) underlines the security of energy for recovering relations between Libya and the EU.

The signals of change in the orientation of Libyan economic policy, as argued above, date back to the 1990s. There were significant efforts to lure multinationals and oil companies into Libya. The neoliberal transformation of Libya accelerated with the rehabilitation of relations. However, the neoliberalization in Libya reflected the specific forms in the MENA. Regarding the mechanisms of combination in economic structures, the global neoliberal agenda acquired a specific form in the Middle East. According to Hertog (2007: 52), three main features in neoliberal transformation processes can be identified as 1) the business gained the upper hand against the government; 2) the investment flows – in the form of foreign direct investment took precedence over trade relations, and 3) The Gulf countries turned

into assertive regional actors. The Gulf countries are involved in many parts of the region through financial instruments and banks, which are underpinned by the business conglomerates (Hanieh, 2016: 12). Hanieh describes the basic features of this process as: “the Gulf’s centrality²⁶ to Arab financialization should not be viewed simply as a predatory, hostile takeover of other Arab capitalist classes. Instead, the cross-scalar knitting together of accumulation under the hegemony of Gulf finance capital is better seen as signifying a regional entwinement of class structures, with considerable benefits often extending to non-GCC Arab capitalists. Gulf capital’s involvement in many of the banks, for example, has enabled leading Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab capital groups to embark” on their processes of expansion and internationalization (Hanieh, 2016: 17).

Deeb (2000), in this regard, finds out two factors that explicate the international integration of Libya, one political the other is economic. Since Qaddafi managed to repress any opposition in Libya, he did not have to fear any domestic challenges and the deteriorating economic situation left no choice but to liberalize the economy in order to attract foreign capital and technology. The global war against terrorism created a context for the containment of the social forces and increased the power of the state while consolidated the authoritarian tendencies in the MENA. It also blocked social mobility because the state as the leading employer turned into privatization.

The difficulties confronted by the Libyan economy in 2002 was significant, the balance of payments problems, growing labor force, and inefficient resource use. Accommodating fiscal and credit policies are adopted (IMF, 2003). The previous policies were sharply criticized in order to rationalize shifts in the orientation. According to IMF staff, “Libya needs strong and sustained economic growth to meet demands of its rapidly growing labor force and efficient use of the country’s resources. It can only be achieved through the implementation of far-reaching market-oriented structural reforms” (IMF, 2006).

²⁶ According to Hanieh (2016: 14), from 2003 to 2015 the GCC was responsible for a remarkable 42.5% of total greenfield FDI.

The reforms started with the consultancy of IMF²⁷. In 2002, Libya unified its exchange rate and pegged its currency to the IMF's SDR in order to attract foreign capital. In reality, this meant the devaluation of Libyan Dinar at least %50. However, there was a cut of %50 on customs duty on most imports – which was thought to offset the negative impact of devaluation (AfDB, 2011). The recipe was clear “higher growth rates and diversification of the Libyan economy could only be achieved through deregulation, a significant scaling down of the dominant role of the public sector, and the development of the private sector” (IMF 2005: 4).

The market-oriented reforms included privatization and deregulation. More than 360 major economic units were planned for privatization. Libyan Airlines had been transformed into a %100 private company after being divided into three companies. Privatization had also penetrated the banking sector: the Unity Bank and the Sahari Bank have been privatized, in addition to the establishment of new banks such as the Development Bank (Masoud, 2013). The reforms continued as streamlining of the tariff schedule, the interest rates are partially liberalized. In 2006, import monopolies were mostly eliminated, and FDI in the non-oil sector was partially liberalized (IMF, 2007: 3).

The reforms in Libya brought forward a new figure, Saif Al-Islam. He, to conduct the neoliberalization moves, called diaspora Libyans and technocrats back. The prominent figures of the reforms were Shukri Ghanem, Mahmoud Jibril, and Tarek Ben Halim. “What they wanted was to build a Kuwait in the Mediterranean.” (Prashad, 2012: 136-137). According to Bond, the Bank and IMF were deeply involved in North African economic corruption, praising dictators' macroeconomic management (Bond, 2011a).

What happened after the neoliberal restructuring of the Libyan economy? First, the Libyan oil sector saw the return of US companies. In 2005, of the 15 EPSA concessions, 11 awarded to them- which was at the expense of the European companies and mainly French Total that did not spare its help during sanctions (AfDB, 2011: 7). During the second licensing round in Libya in 2005, the

²⁷ It was significant for Libyan economy, for it had not sought for consultancy before. The consultancy consisted the period of 29April - 15 May 2003 (IMF 2003; 2006).

companies from Europe and Asia obtained most of the licenses, including those from Japan, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, India, and China (Frynas and Paulo, 2007: 243).

After the multinational oil companies, Shukri Ghanem planned to create oil regimes similar to Gulf countries, and the public sector firm in the oil industry – Braiga Company – was aimed to replace it with private oil companies Al Sharaa and Al-Rahila (Prashad, 2012: 137-138). Similarly, in the tourism sector, there were several large-scale projects²⁸ (Hertog, 2007: 63). However, combined with these domestic developments were the changing geopolitical and economic conditions, the suspension of the sanctions imposed by the UN in 1999 was profoundly changed Libya's position in the international system. The European Commission showed a keen interest in improving relations with Libya. The EU policy over the Mediterranean was crucial in this move. The hegemonic aims and concerns over trade and energy directed the efforts as in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighborhood. Libya was indispensable for the border security and migration policies of the EU (Joffe, 2011c: 223). Look for trade between Libya and EU data in Joffe.

On the other hand, Libya's relations with non-Western powers and regional actors had also recovered from long-time isolation. In 2008 Putin became the first Russian president to visit Libya, and there were contracts – railroad and arms deals - given to Russia (Larssen, 2016: 76). As a consequence of this visit, contracts, including arms and infrastructure projects, were signed, and the debt issue between Libya and Russia was resolved (Joffe and Paoletti, 2011: 209).

Regarding China, Ding argues that although China aims to promote an image “responsible great power,” and Libya has not been a first-tier source for China's overseas energy demand, the relations showed progress and Libya became one of the fastest-growing overseas markets for Chinese FDI (Ding, 2016: 91-93). According to Ding (2016: 93), the unexplored energy resources because of the

²⁸ Hertog (2007: 63) marked that Sharjah-based Tameer would launch a project in Libya nearly worth of \$20 billion.

international economic sanctions were an important motivator for the rapidly improving relations between China and Libya.

The Qatari involvement in Libya is both through FDI and adopting a facilitator role between Libya and the West. The foreign policy aims of Qatar was expansive and to build leadership in regional affairs - considering the revolutions in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, Qatar used its close connections with many opposition leaders and vast amounts of money (Ulrichsen, 2016: 121).

Talani (2014: 219) points out the relevance of neoliberal transformation regarding the harsh conditions imposed on Libya in the period of sanctions and embargos. Talani argues that Qadhafi had to “bow” to the hegemonic structures embedded in the capitalist development processes; otherwise, it would face the collapse of the economy. In other words, the neoliberal transformation was, in essence, an attempt to cope with the difficulties on which the Libyan economy floated for the last decade (Vandewalle, 2012: 186). Considering the 30 % unemployment rate, the eruption of social, economic, and political problems was a matter of time (IMF, 2003).

In retrospect, the period between 2003 and 2011 was significant for Libya’s liberal restructuring. African Development Bank (2011: 6) evaluated Libyan reforms concerning the possibility of a fundamental transformation and saw it as an essential turn in the path. “On the one hand, it could pursue the type of state-led market reform that relied on cooperation between the state and several business coalitions. Alternatively, Libya could pursue economic liberalization and reform while moving away from what one could conclude as patronage driven and patrimonial system of the past.” However, it does not explicate the main motivations behind the waves of privatization and neoliberal restructuring. Bahgat (2005) argues that there had been a trade-off between Libya and the international community on the condition of quitting WMD and lifting sanctions.

The outcomes of the socio-political transformation in Libya by the 2000s, on the other hand, cannot be understood without looking at the amalgamation that emerged in the process. The confrontation between the internal processes of development and the global neoliberal agenda aggravated through the mass protests

and involvement of many regional, international actors. It entails, therefore, a more in-depth and historical analysis that can shed light upon the struggles of social forces combined with the external whip of necessity. The international embargo, the rising fear from the Islamist challenge – with worse of preventative war, according to Martinez (2006), were contributory factors to the sense of vulnerability and promotion of reforms. The Libyan neoliberalization-transition processes, on the other hand, cannot be evaluated without looking at the sanctions imposed on her. It both allowed Libya to expend lavishly and constrained it structurally. It also requires looking at the position and struggle of social forces.

The dependency of people on the regime continued into the 2000s. Vandewalle (2012: 190) cites from Prime Minister of the time Shukri Ghanem that “862,000 Libyans still depended on the state for their livelihood.” The AfDB (2011) statistics demonstrate that the oil sector employs 43,000, while public services 840,000. In terms of contribution to GDP, the energy sector’s share is %60 – employing %3 of the workforce; the public services, on the other hand, constitute the %9 of GDP, employing %51 of the workforce. According to the statistics, the share of informal economy in the constitution of GDP could be as much as %30, while inactive workers and massive over employment are not new in sectors such as banking, hotels, and utility companies. It means that while the government plans to use 70 percent of revenues for the developmental projects, the lion’s share goes to current disbursement, especially food subsidies, based on socio-political considerations (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 144-145).

The modality of Libyan social formation underwent a neoliberal transformation, which reflected the policy failures of past decades. Thus, the attempts of privatization and liberalization were oriented at addressing the dire situation in which the Libyan economy resided. In this regard, the privatization of strategic companies and the establishment of the Libyan Stock Market epitomized best the shifting state ideology towards neoliberalization.

The collaboration with the IMF was significant in the process of transformation. The Libyan government was proposed two conditions for the wage increase in the public sector: 1) the cut on subsidies; and 2) the decrease in public

employment – nearly one third. Besides, the IMF advised a gradual increase in the wages that would be implemented after decreasing public staff (IMF, 2007: 10). The thing is that although the Libyan economy was not in a fiscal crisis, the IMF prescription seemed to focus on relieving the state budget through shifting social expenditures towards other sectors of the economy.

An essential outcome of the reforms and neoliberal restructuring of Libya was the advantages it provided to the upper ruling elite. Chorin (2008: 163) underlines that the Libyan market is flooded with Asian investors, China (dominated the second round of EPSA), India. However, the “private sector” of Libya consisted of a small number in 2004. Most of them included the ex or current government officials and members patronage networks. The Qaddafi family took the most out reforms and developed lucrative businesses. Pargeter (2006: 232) points out that:

Mohamed Qadhafi, for example, owns both Libya’s mobile telephone companies, Libyanna and Al-Madar, as well as the General Post and Telecommunications Company. Saadi Qadhafi reportedly owns a construction company called al-Wathiqoun that has contracts for major construction projects across Libya. Hannibal Qadhafi has major interests in the marine transportation sector and according to the Libyan opposition owns the General National Maritime Transport Company.

Patrick Haimzadeh (as quoted in Achcar, 2013: 166-167) has provided an aperçu of the “private sector” in Gaddafi’s Libya and pointed out the clientelistic relations, especially around the children of Qadhafi:

Red tuna fishing and the Gaddafi Foundation for charitable associations (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi); the Adidas import license for Libya and the construction of a ring highway in Tripoli (Saadi Gaddafi); mobile telephones (Mohammad Gaddafi); maritime transport (Hannibal Gaddafi); the charitable association wa’tasimu (‘Aisha Gaddafi); pleasure-boat construction (Naval Staff); the great Benghazi River retention pond (Benghazi Security Force Battalion); import-export, construction and civil engineering (battalions of the security forces).

The form of Libyan economic restructuring and socio-political transformation, however, could not be in another but as it was. As the Libyan military-tribal society held power and resources, it is not surprising that they acquired a military-industrial dimension. The patrimonialism would not be washed away through liberalization moves. The property rights got so blurred that in 2006, Saif Al-Islam led a sovereign

wealth fund, managing tens of billions of petrodollars invested in various countries (Achcar, 2013: 166-167). Wehrey (2019) underlined that the 32nd Brigade became the source of profitable defense purchase contracts²⁹.

According to Zoubir (2009), the internal conditions (radical Islamism, sanctions and popular discontent) and external events (9/11, war on terrorism and EU demands on oil and gas, immigration) characterized the structural improvements for the shift in Libyan position, while allowing the regime to abstain from democratic reforms. Since the US accepted lifting the sanction on condition that Libya abandoned its WMD program and ensured its help against terrorism, the rehabilitation of Libya was endorsed. However, the political conditionality was off the agenda (Zoubir, 2011).

About external promotion of political liberalization, relations with the EU had always been essential. However, the global crisis in 2008 had eroded the motivations of the EU to promote real political change in Mediterranean countries – which actually could make worse by destabilizing the countries. The EU was preoccupied with its problems and concentrated on reducing dependency on Russian energy and the prevention of migration. The relations were also significant, for they did not have any political conditionality and outside the ENP or EMP (Paciello, 2008: 58). Similarly, Joffe (2008) argues that the political conditionality and normative values had been sacrificed to the combat against transnational terrorism, and also the handling of migration as a security concern.

The economic outlook of the country, on the other hand, was applauded by the global finance sector. According to the African Development Bank report (2009: 74), Libya is a middle-income country that registered an average annual growth rate of 5.1% in 2000-2008. More importantly, there were series of reforms in order to facilitate and promote trade, along with a healthy environment for thriving of the private sector and foreign investment – targeted mostly the sectors such as energy, construction, and tourism. The healthy environment for investment was accompanied by strong macro-economic indices of Libya, which was partially saved

²⁹ “The British subsidiary of General Dynamics signed an £85 million deal to revamp the brigade’s command and control systems” (Wehrey, 2019).

from the sharp rise in grain prices, and the global credit crunch that began in 2007 (Prashad, 2012: 93).

The 2008 global economic crisis, as Makki (2015) argued, created skeptical views on the effectiveness of the global neoliberal project and foreshadowed a change in the social-political conditions fostering it. The transmission of crises into Southern Mediterranean countries differed from each other. The global crisis in 2008 impacted Libya upon decreased growth rate - real economic growth decreased by 0.5% compared to 2007 in 2008 (Paciello, 2010: in for Libya, International Monetary Fund, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; For Syria, IMF, Syrian Arab Republic) – however it was the decline in oil prices that hurt much the Libyan economy (Paciello, 2010).

However, it must be reminded that the regional economic situation, including Libya, did not experience a breakthrough with the 2008 crisis. To illustrate, the extant forms of social conflicts amalgamated with the newly introduced mechanisms of exploitation and accumulation. The escalating cost of food was one of these precursors. Food prices had been on a general upward trend from the early part of the 2000s, but 2007 and the first half of 2008 saw a sharp increase in global prices (Hanieh, 2013). Overall, the neoliberal restructuring of the Libyan economy, recovering relations with the West, did not mean Libya was fully aligned with Western imperialism. It entails looking at the conditions that contradicted between the national project of accumulation and the global neoliberal agenda. For Western leaders, the neoliberal faction of the Libyan leadership was too weak, and Qaddafi an obstacle to the desired economic reforms (Pradella and Rad, 2017: 2416). Although one of the slogans of the 1969 revolution was equality, the new liberal reforms did not even claim so. Public sector workers were overwhelmed with the rising cost of living, while wages remained low (Vandewalle, 2012: 197). In 2007, however, there was a limited and conditioned rise in wages, which remained frozen for more than twenty years (IMF, 2003). The prescriptions for the Libyan economy did not allow for the government expenditures, and Qaddafi was convinced to halt the Wealth Distribution Programme, which was designed to distribute part of the oil revenues to the people and to reduce the size of the government (IMF, 2009: 4).

When the neoliberal restructuring of the economy resonated in the social sectors, serious challenges appeared from both people and the ruling elite that feared to lose beneficial ties to the economic activities. Thus, Shukri Ghanem was taken from the prime minister position to leading NOC – which has been quite crucial for the Libyan economy (Hamadouche and Zoubir, 2007: 274), and the pace of reforms slowed.

5.4 The Mechanisms of U&CD in Libya

The emergentist development argues that diffusion of the hegemonic model of development into the Libyan social formation has culminated in the persistence of the tribal relations that amalgamated into the modern state institutions and development processes. Although Libya is mostly a homogeneous Sunni Muslim Arab society, with only 5% Berbers, 3% other Africans, and 1% Tuareg (Najm 2008; as cited in Hweio, 2012: 113), the political and economic struggles have maintained an amalgamated tribal form. In this sense, Pack discusses that the revolts in Libya resulted from a cyclical process – periphery dislodging the center (Pack, 2013: 10). Such perspective denotes that those excluded and marginalized from the development processes provide the essential base of the opposition.

As the configuration of the social forces in Libya has taken shape around the specificities emanating from the neoliberal restructuring, the distributive nature of the social formation allowed the Libyan society not only to keep its tribal identities but also to strengthen them. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that tribes have been a significant power source, from which the ruling elites of the regime thrived. The institutionalization of dominance and exploitation had taken the form through the tribal structures, for tribes also provided informal control.

It became clear that social differentiation in economic activities had started to take place in the country. In the cities, certain groups among the military, the country's diplomatic elite, and other top bureaucrats visibly benefited in ways not available to the average citizen. The appearance of inequalities, which was once severely criticized by Qaddafi against the monarchy rule and of his rationale for

avoiding liberal economic policies, created an apparent contradiction with the neoliberal restructuring (Vandewalle, 2012: 145).

While the privileges ensured by the tribal networks endorsed the continuity of this amalgamation, the Qadhadhfa -the tribe of Colonel Qadhafi- turned into the most powerful tribe in the Libyan social formation. The Qadhadhfa tribe had had an informal political power and located around the coastline of the Gulf of Sirte. The base of the regime was constituted by the triple alliance of the Qadhadhfa, the Maghraha (from the Misrata region), and the Warfalla (from the Sirte region) (Joffe, 2009: 939).

The form of governance became a military-tribal complex within which the ruling elite controlled the structures of accumulation, exploitation, and domination; therefore, the essential features of the military-tribal complex in the Libyan social formation shed light profoundly on the structures of accumulation, exploitation, and domination. The development processes in Libya unfolded according to the political motivations of the regime constituency. It culminated in arbitrary activities of marginalizing and excluding certain regions. The differentiated developmental performances and relative exclusion from the top-down modernization processes impacted the form and content of the opposition movements. The political dimension of the development processes in Libya epitomized best in the deliberate impoverishment of the Eastern regions which especially after the Islamist uprisings in the 1980s and 1990s were kept in an underdeveloped position deliberately (Pargeter, 2009: 1036).

In this sense, the specificities of Libyan military-tribal complex were distinct from the military-industrial complex of Egypt, Achcar (2013:141) argues that the Libyan military-tribal complex had interests directly linked to the regime, which motivated the military to protect the regime at the expense of people. It was clear that the tribal nature of the Libyan state manifested in the organization of institutions and deeply affected its way of functioning. Joffe (2009: 939) argues that

tribal affiliations were imbricated in the administration, security services, and in command of the army³⁰.

The links between the military and the regime, however, had been far from homogenous. Libyan military had a bifurcated nature in many aspects. There were both regular military units and elite units. Taylor (2014: 144) argues that at the beginning of the revolts, the reaction of the military units was “fractured.” He puts it as: “While elite military units such as the Ninth and Thirty-Second Mechanized Brigades remained largely intact and supportive of Gaddafi’s regime, the regular military units dissolved, fractured into competing camps, or defected wholesale to the rebel movement.”

The dominant groups -military/security castes and state bourgeoisie- acquired an increasingly Mafia-like character. It was a development that went hand in hand with the expansion of the nepotistic capitalism fostered by the application throughout the region of neoliberal prescriptions: “trade liberalization, with the nepotistic distribution of import licenses; prioritization of the private sector, with the expansion of business circles that were less hampered by restrictions the higher the rung occupied in the state apparatus by their accomplices” (Achcar, 2013: 73).

The patrimonial and clientelistic networks, nevertheless, did not bring productive growth in Libya. Abdulla (2010) demonstrated the amounts of FDI between 2003 and 2008, %60 of which invested in the services sector. The internal factor inhibiting the efficient operation of investment in Libya was because of the contradictory liberalization movements. As St John argues, the minimum limit of capital requirement for foreign investment decreased to the 1.5 million \$ in order to overcome the investment bans (which was 50 million \$). While planning to attract foreign investment into the non-oil sectors, the Libyan regime also took some regulatory measures such as the requirement of “joint-stock companies with local partners.” St John argues that the regulatory moves negatively affected the interest in Libya (St John, 2008b: 143).

³⁰ The army command had been historically constituted by the Berbers; however, they were subjugated to the Sa’adi tribes of Cyrenaica (Joffe, 2009: 939).

The neoliberal restructuring of the economic model and social relations turned out to be quite far from meeting the expectations. Libyans continued to suffer from high levels of impoverishment, inefficient infrastructure, and bureaucracy (Pargeter, 2006: 219). Since the primary commodities were imported, considering the price fluctuations, the Libyans were affected by the enlarging gap between the rich and poor (Pargeter, 2010: 17). The social inequalities were intensified because of the skyrocketing food prices in 2008 in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, and Syria (Libya, IMF, and Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, for Syria IMF and the Syrian Arab Republic, 2009). Along with that the oil revenues had a fluctuating trend in the period of 2005-2009 (28 billion \$ in 2005; 57 billion \$ in 2008; and 30 billion \$ in 2009), a satisfactory solution for the social problems such as inadequate housing facilities, high level of unemployment, low public sector wages, and severe poverty, could not be adopted, which put most people in a dire situation to make a living. Instead, injection of money turned into a frequently used instrument in times of crisis – as in the 2006 riots in Benghazi, a marginalized and impoverished area on purpose by the regime.

Amin finds that modernization in the region has a close relationship with poverty. Urbanization is one of the critical points in this process, which does not have an industrial nor agricultural revolution. To the contrary, the urbanization resulted in the shift of rural misery into the urban areas where the extant industrial and social structures failed to incorporate (Amin, 2005: 12).

The reactions to the protests were determined by the strategic and economic value of the regions. Ronen (2002: 4) argues that “the country's economic backbone” the south of Ajdabiyya-Misurata Gulf on the Mediterranean was quite significant. The severe attacks against the Islamist threat by Qadhafi were because of not only the oppositional movements against the regime but also the logistics and oilfields. The Misrata region had become a vital hub for the political and military establishment of power. As a port city, the import and retail sectors of Libya relied upon the region. The Qadhafi era had ups and downs; however, the business elite and financial clout – dating back to the Ottoman era- had quite intimate relations with the regime (Lacher, 2016: 69). Although the coup attempt and nationalization

of the assets of upper classes in the 1970s hit the relations, the business deals and privileged partnerships appeared in the mid-2000s, primarily through the large-scale investments of the regime in the housing and infrastructure sector of which Misratan elite took primarily benefit.

There were also losers in the revolts. In other words, there were supporters of the regime, as in the case of Bani Walid. It is one of the largest tribes in Libya. Bani Walid lacks a stable economic base, and the elites, notables in the tribe, had always had clientelistic relations with the Qadhafi regime – such as the positions in the bureaucracy, security, and administrative organs of the state. Lacher (2016: 73) argues that the nature of the relation between Bani Walid and the regime had been strategic (but their role in tying the town to the state had been crucial), for instance, the coup plot in 1993 seriously undermined the trust between the regime and Bani Walid. However, the connection got recovered, and the regime control intensified (Cole, 2015).

Tobruk has been an oil port and populated by nearly 200,000; its close location to the border with Egypt allowed it to develop an economy resting on smuggling since the 1970s (Lacher, 2016: 77). Hüsken (2010) argues that in recent times, the management of the economic activities and controlling the distribution mechanisms along with land appropriation had become essential for the local elites. The elites of families ran Tobruk's economy and local politics. These families consisted of four large tribes that stretch into and keep control of the border. The tribal members participated in the administration. The nature of relations between tribes and the regime had ups and downs in the 1970s and 1980s; however, considering that the army of Tobruk was constituted by the local communities mostly, during the revolts, the army did not participate in repressing the protests and joined the protesters. In a short time, the city and its pragmatic tribal leaders had joined the revolution.

In Tripoli, according to Cole and Khan (2015: 55), the bedrock of revolutionary support came from poorer suburbs on the coastal outskirts which, with their poor roads and groundwater, were never historically settled, but where under Mu'ammār al-Qaddafi many of Tripoli's old merchant and landed families

relocated. These families were among those who suffered substantially from Qadhafi's 1970s Green Book redistributionism, losing property and business relationships to the government. Others could not afford the rising cost of living that the oil boom and urbanization brought (Cole and Khan, 2015: 55).

In addition to social differentiation via economic opportunities, the Islamist mobilization had a basis in the Libyan society. The Islamist opposition had severe implications, especially for the Cyrenaica region. Vandewalle (2012: 145) provided a rallying point for several Islamist groups, particularly in Cyrenaica, where resistance to the regime was, in part, linked to longstanding reservations about Qadhafi's political use of Islam. Throughout the early 1990s, a series of uprisings of Islamist groups were harshly put down. Their suppression relied in large part on the Revolutionary Committees - which were rejuvenated for the purpose - rather than the country's regular army. It provided an indication once more of the suspicion with which the regime - much like King Idris during the monarchy - regarded the regular army. Overall, Libyan Islamists had been effectively persecuted since the late 1970s.

As the economic grievances alone would fail to capture the complexity of the revolts, which were concentrated in the northeastern parts of Libya, the issue of radicalization must be integrated into the framework, for it had affected the opposition and revolt movements. Since the Libyan regime had ensured the political quiescence through distributive instruments, Barger (1999: 75-76) compares the Islamist in Libya with Algeria and underlines that Libyan Islamists had far fewer economic and social grievances on which to capitalize. In this sense, the explanation of populist reactions in the form of political Islam becomes much more than the economic grievances, political demands. As Colas (2006) approaches to political Islamist movements in the Maghreb with the U&CD perspective, he pointed out that their emergence is an amalgamated reaction to modernization processes and tribal discrimination.

The military units in the northeastern parts of Libya defected en masse. It epitomizes the instrumentalized relations with tribes that built their clientelistic networks. It was one of the reasons for the fractured reactions of the military units.

This distinct feature makes the revolts and regime fragmentation more than “merely a matter of units splitting into rival ethnic and regional camps, Taylor (2014: 158) argues that the differential level of repression imposed on the military units by Qadhafi regime culminated in the variation of interests to turn over the status quo.

The reactions of the southern regions of Libya turned into a significant instance, which economic grievances accounts fall short of an explanation. Although as poor as the northeast regions of Libya, the southern regions did not tend to show religious activism. In this regard, Lacher (2001: 145) emphasizes that Berber tribes in the Western Mountains played a decisive role during the revolts. Similarly, the Toubou minority in the south of Libya, which was discriminated politically and culturally under the Qadhafi regime, joined the protests from the very beginning.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the shifts in the configuration of social forces, starting from the pre-capitalist Libyan social formation, are examined. The historical specificities of integration into the structures of world development are explored. The implications of intersocietal interaction over the socio-political transformation are identified through the lens of mechanisms of uneven and combined development.

The tribal social base and the rentier economy can be identified among the most significant historical specificities of the Libyan social formation. However, according to Ahmida (2005: 70), the conceptualizations of these specificities suffer from two critical deficiencies cultural essentialism and lacking explanatory value:

First, the Eurocentric view of Maghribi society assumes all change flows from Europe or the West—the ‘rational,’ revolutionary, and detribalized region that produced a modern capitalist transformation. Fundamentally simplistic, it reduces North African social history to some changeless tribal structure-creating force that somehow emanates from the Muslim mind. The second inadequacy of the literature, especially modernization theory, is its inability to explain social transformation and the nature of politics in today’s North Africa.

The rentier state theory, in this respect, comes to the fore to analyze the Libyan social formation. It has provided significant insights into the Libyan state-

society complex; however, it epitomizes reductionist accounts on Libyan development processes. As the oil sector constitutes nearly all of the GDP and government revenues, the Libyan economic model can be considered as rentierism. It argues that segments of society would tend to be quietist thanks to the distributive functions of the state. Similarly, the state presiding over rentier production relations would be saved from social demands. The emergentist development, on the other hand, scrutinizes the reductionist perspectives on the state-society complex of Libya. Building on the rentier state theory, it discusses that the oil revenues enable the consolidation of distributive mechanisms; however, it is against the argument that oil revenues provided the regime a sphere of autonomy from the social forces and world structures of development. It sees the rentier production relations in Libya as a historical specificity.

The second point is the missing explanatory power in rentier state theory, especially regarding the survival of tribal structures. Emergentist development discusses that the traditional structures of tribalism managed to survive through combined implications of development. It is overdetermined with oil revenues and Libya's position in the international division of labor. The rentier relations of production, in this respect, are argued to be a significant source of amalgamation in the Libyan state-society complex.

In addition to rentierism, the studies on Libya mostly concentrate on accounting for the resilient authoritarian structures and repressive political relations in Libya with culturally essentialist arguments, charismatic individual figures, or lacking robust civil society formations. Although these accounts point out certain features of Libyan social formation, they fail to capture the constitutive impact of the international.

These accounts have a reified understanding of state-society relations. The analysis in the chapter, on the other hand, deals with these historical specificities in a sociological manner. It is argued that through the mechanisms of uneven and combined development, the socio-political transformation processes in Libya indicated the skipping of developmental steps.

The political substitutionism was effective in these processes. Under the impact of intersocietal interaction, the geopolitical relations, and the implications of the Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model pushed for a leading social force – which is the military in the Libyan case. The course of development processes underwent a profound transformation due to the dependent incorporation of Libya into the world structures of development.

It is marked that the emerging military-tribal complex has become an essential amalgamation in Libyan social formation. The ruling clan and its constituency directed the processes of social differentiation and stratification. During these processes, the rentier economic model and the distributive functions of the Libyan state have amalgamated with the tribal character of Libyan society, especially during the Qadhafi era. As a consequence, the clientelistic networks have turned into a base of regime support, and patronage networks have played a decisive role in maintaining the particular mode of accumulation and exploitation.

As the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification are nested in structures of development, the articulation of social forces in Libya turned into controlling the selective incorporation of social forces into the ruling constituency. The regime acquired a consolidated position in the state-society complex through its distributive functions.

For the Libyan social formation, the structural context of intersocietal interaction took shape with the geopolitical pressures of the international sanctions regime. Throughout the 1980 and 1990s, the sanctions regime was a crucial set of determination for the Libyan socio-political transformation processes. The ideological-cultural influence was another mechanism that affected the development processes in Libya. While Qadhafi managed to experience revolutionary processes for Libyan political and economic structures, the international position of Libya was determined according to Qadhafi's claiming himself as the main heir of Nasser (Owen, 2004: 54). Reflecting the embeddedness of geopolitics and economic structures in the international capitalist system, the pan-Arabist, anti-imperialist posture of Libya rendered a firm marginalized – even pariah – status in the international community.

The sanctions regime impacted the diffusion of the hegemonic model into the Libyan structures of development and affected the socio-political transformation processes. The critical implications of the international sanctions regime were two-fold. The first one was related to the undermining of state power through liberalization attempts. The second one was relevant to the articulation of social forces because the liberalization attempts created a regime-affiliated class that acquired wealth through import and trade activities. In this respect, while the rentier production relations, concerning the populist-authoritarian developmental model, provided the regime legitimacy and power to contain social forces, it also consolidated Libya's dependent position in the international division of labor. Under the sanctions regime, in 1987, 20 years after the revolution, the process was also known as the "green perestroika" was started as comprehensive reforms of economic liberalization along with limited political reforms. The social reactions to the reforms were not enthusiastic because of the decreasing living standards, which resulted directly from the liberalized import and trade transactions (law 9 of 1992). The hampered developmental/distributive performance of the Libyan regime, therefore, has become the most essential source for developmental contradictions³¹ (Vandewalle, 2012: 156).

The changing geopolitical structures created an opportunity to improve the position of Libya in the international division of labor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the invasion of Iraq were the significant drivers of rapprochement with the West. The accelerated neoliberalization attempts have also been relevant to these shifts; however, it had grave societal implications. The distributive functions, depending on the specificities of the ruling constituency, have been transformed according to the diffusion of the neoliberal model of development. Concerning the containment of social forces, the global war against terrorism became a decisive instrument in the hand of the regime, which as a consequence, has intensified the exclusive, marginalizing, and repressive nature of developmental contradictories.

³¹ St John (2008a) marks that the liberalization policies led to considerable accumulation of social tension, about a 30% increase in the fuel prices in 2005 resulted in increasing electricity prices – to almost double.

However, the most crucial outcome of neoliberalization was Libya's becoming a node in the international circuits of accumulation relations, which was closely related to the internationalization of Gulf capital. The neoliberal restructuring of Libya, therefore, can be defined as neoliberalism presiding over highly fragmented, depoliticized, and patrimonial structures. Neoliberal Libya nested in the energy security agenda of European states, and the financial involvement of especially the Gulf capital.

The emergentist analysis marks that the shifts in the orientation of ruling elites towards marginalizing and exclusive developmental models must be considered together with the shifts in the hegemonic development model. As the hegemonic model in the international capitalist structures transforms, the local developmental structures of accumulation, domination, and discourse change. Although these structural changes have not created deterministic implications, they have become the structural conditions within which Libyan socio-political transformation has been nested. In this sense, the Euro-centric studies on Libya are criticized as they approach the socio-political transformation processes reductionistly. The emergentist analysis indicates that exploring the socio-political transformation processes in the context of intersocietal interaction provides a more explanatory, structural, and sociological account.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Emergent Features of Development Processes

The dissertation emphasizes the contribution of utilizing critical realist methodology and a historical materialist understanding of the development in building a theoretical framework for the analysis of societal multiplicity's implications. It brings in an emergentist conceptualization of development and uses the concept of uneven and combined development instead of development. It develops a holistic perspective to grasp the constitutive impact of intersocietal interaction.

The use of CR methodology for the conceptualization of uneven and combined development is particularly relevant to the theorization of international relations. The international is undertheorized in the current stagist, structural, and post-developmental conceptualizations of development. The reasons lay with the ontological, epistemological, and methodological understandings of positivist social science. The conflation of epistemology with a flat ontological perspective leads to deficient attribution of causal relations, while methodological nationalism results in adding the international as an addendum. CR, in this respect, underlines the significance of a stratified ontology. It distinguishes the generative mechanisms from the events and their empirical manifestations (Bhaskar, 2005). It enables not only a holistic analysis of interactive and complex social relations but also a totalistic approach to the social events that multiply determined.

The emergentist conceptualization of the international as intersocietal interaction is against the ahistorical and asocial theorizations of international relations. CR methodology helps in providing a concrete sociological basis for the theorization of international and challenging “the realist reification of it”

(Rosenberg, 2013). I brought in the concept of emergentist development as a framework to analyze the emergent features of intersocietal interaction. It overcomes the deficiencies in the reductionist ontologies of stagist, structuralist, and post-developmental conceptualizations. It points out that the phenomenon of intersocietal interaction unfolds at the actual ontological level, and is observed in the empirical ontological level. At the same time, it is generated within the social structures of accumulation, domination, exploitation, and discourse through generative mechanisms of unevenness and combination. Emergentist development conceives of intersocietal interaction with its emergent features. In this way, emergentist analysis goes beyond the reductionist conceptualizations of the international. It appreciates the uneven and combined development processes as differentiated developmental forms rather than as “pathologies of deviancy, or aberration from the hegemonic model”.

Rosenberg (2007) discusses within capitalist social totality, the unevenness expands from being a descriptive fact to an “active causal structure of determinations and pressure,” and this makes the U&CD perspective “a concrete abstraction” for the analysis of development processes. Emergentist development explains the various and differentiated strategies of domestic development processes with regards to the structures of world development (Bilgin and Morton, 2004: 175-176). Emergentist development explores the structural diffusion of development processes within which the social forces reproduce/transform themselves. Such a conceptualization of intersocietal interaction acknowledges multiple sets of determinations. It identifies the causal mechanisms as geopolitical pressure, mercantile penetration, ideological –cultural influences, and political substitutionism, which are inconceivable under a methodologically nationalist perspective.

Emergentist approach to the implications of societal multiplicity, in this regard, captures not only the processes of capitalist development but also the forms of non-capitalist/socialist development processes. Such conception of U&CD is criticized as abstract and transhistorical (Ashman, 2010; Davidson, 2009); however, the emergentist analysis of intersocietal interaction appraises socio-political

transformation with a historical sociological view. While the sociological perspective explores the shifts in the configuration of social forces, the historical-structural perspective identifies the underlying structural logic of the development processes. The socio-political transformation processes, therefore, are perceived as neither an internal process nor a form of structural imposition. In this way, it overcomes the Euro-centric conceptions of the international, while reformulating the basis of IR as intersocietal interaction (Yalvaç, 2013).

The uneven and combined development processes encompass political, economic, and social dimensions of socio-political transformation. Through these dimensions, the emergent features of development acquire their historically specific form and content. Emergentist analysis perceives these emergent social formations as combined forms of development relations-amalgamation. The combined forms of development emerge from the insertion of modern political, economic, and cultural forms into backward societies that cause differentiated formations within world-historical development (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 46). Within these processes of development, the amalgamation and hybridities emerge within the interaction of antagonistic social forces and actors that reproduce/transform themselves.

The emergentist analysis of uneven and combined development processes is constituted by three steps: (1) the concretization of emergentist development; (2) the identification of world structures of development and their hegemonic features; (3) the historical-social analysis of the implications of intersocietal interaction through generative mechanisms.

6.2 Concretization of Emergentist Development

The emergent features of uneven and combined development processes can only be captured with a totalistic and interactive analysis. The concretization of totalistic analysis becomes possible with a deep ontological understanding of CR. The uneven and combined development processes are constituted by patterns about which we have various conceptions, theories, and perspectives. The ontological depth distinguishes the social phenomenon from the knowledge obtained about it because these conceptualizations do not cover the ontological tendencies, powers,

and structures of development processes in its entirety. CR methodology, while acknowledging the concept-dependent nature of the social phenomenon, is against the conflation of social phenomena with these conceptualizations (Steinmetz, 1998: 181); that is, the dependency, under-development, failure of modernization.

The dominant development thinking concentrates on creating taxonomies for development processes. These taxonomies, however, fail to explain the causal relations emerging out of uneven and combined development processes (Haque, 1999). Furthermore, the critical elements are missing in the Euro-centric, stagist development understanding. This leads to deficient and misleading conceptions about structures of development and socio-political transformation processes.

The structural conceptualizations suffer from similar problems. I argue that while stagist conceptualizations are lacking structural understanding due to methodological nationalism, the structural ones undertheorize the multiply-determined nature of uneven and combined development processes due to deterministic conceptions of developmental structures. Although the post-developmental understanding of development processes attempt to provide critical perspectives (Ziai, 2007; Escobar, 1995), they cannot manage to turn these contributions into a proper scientific framework.

The notion of ontological stratification allows for integrating the complex set of determinants of intersocietal interaction in the framework of emergentist development (Porpora, 1998). The capitalist social totality is, by nature, competitive, and uneven. It creates a context in which social forces interact, and as Pröbsting (2016: 417) underlines, it “inherits, incorporates, and modifies” the local and international, old and new, modern and traditional. In the course of material reproduction, the social forces are under the influence of structures and generative mechanisms that are within the social totality. The mechanisms of uneven and combined development processes, therefore, assume reality according to their causal effects even though the mechanisms cannot be observed empirically. The explanation and concretization of social phenomena, in this respect, becomes closely related to obtaining information about the mechanisms rather than searching

for causal laws, constant conjunctions between events, and nomothetic accounts (Bhaskar, 2009).

I prioritize the question of whether development is possible for all societies, or does it tend to realize at the expense of others (Fatton, 2016: 119). This specificity is the main point that emergentist analysis attempts to capture. Uneven and combined development processes should be conceived of as unfolding with underlying structural logic and reflecting the historical specificities of particular social formations. Within capitalist social totality, therefore, although unevenness is the basic feature of differentiated developmental tempo, the wider structures and relations of development designate the context of socio-political transformations (Davidson, 2018b).

Through the actions of conflictual social forces that are embedded into the intersocietal interaction, once a hegemonic developmental model is realized, it becomes an essential part of the development processes themselves on the empirical level. It reflects the interests and designs of the hegemonic actors, which are positioned in the structures of development. With this feature, the hegemonic developmental model turns into a structural element; in that, it determines the structural conditions of actors through enabling and constraining their actions.

The transformative impact of intersocietal interaction is determined according to the capacities of the societies (Trotsky, 1980: 890). When facing the intersocietal interaction in the form of geopolitical pressures and the international division of labor, the social forces that aim for material reproduction cannot follow the precise developmental steps of advanced societies.

The catch-up developmental actions lead to amalgamation and shifts in the configuration of social forces. These shifts, interconnected with the local struggles, render the most compatible social force the ruling one via political substitutionism. The unevenness of development processes, therefore, culminates in the skipping of developmental steps (Trotsky, 1980).

The diffusion of intersocietal interaction, therefore, becomes the motor force behind the socio-political transformations in societies. It makes the local processes of social differentiation and stratification intimately related to the structures of

world development. Depending on the historical specificities of the international division of labor and geopolitical pressures, the skipping of developmental phases creates amalgamation in the form of political, economic, and cultural formations. These formations contribute to the management, manipulation, explosion, and suppression of the developmental contradictions, which drive socio-political transformation processes.

The concretization of uneven and combined development, therefore, necessitates the identification of the hegemonic model of development in world structures of development. After the identification of the hegemonic model, the processes of incorporation into world structures of development must be explored; and the historical specificities regarding the configuration of social forces must be examined.

6.3 Hegemonic Model of Development and the MENA

The hegemonic model of development is against the reification of the historical social formations or conceptualizing them in an essentialist manner. It prioritizes the concept of hegemony within structures of world development. Through the lens of the hegemonic project, it appraises the relationship between socio-political transformation and configuration of social forces. It is important to note that the hegemonic model of development is more than a state that acquires a hegemonic position in structures of development. The international and sociological is conceived of as mutually constitutive; therefore, the realist reification of the state is given up in the U&CD perspective (Rosenberg, 2007; 2010).

It is also crucial to distinguish the hegemonic model of development from the institutionalized forms of preponderant actors in any social structure. The hegemonic model of development has distinctive features compared to the hegemonic state (Gilpin, 1988), the transnational ruling class (Cox, 1987), and constructivist perspectives. The hegemonic model enables the examination of the multi-causal and multi-linear paths of development with a non-reductionist and non-deductive approach. Firstly, it distinguishes the institutionalized, discursive, and material components of hegemony without reductionism. Secondly, unlike the

anarchy concept in geopolitical accounts (Waltz, 1979) or the hegemonic bloc in the Neogramscian approach (Burnham, 1991), it does not deduce from the certain empirical manifestation of uneven and combined development. It provides a holistic framework that can grasp the dynamism and complexity of intersocietal interaction. It is asserted that the socio-political transformation processes are driven by the mechanisms: geopolitical pressures, the international division of labor, ideological-cultural influences, and political substitutionism.

Conceptualization as a model is essential for two reasons. The first one is related to the material realization of development processes. The model oversees the formation of hegemonic development through structures of development in the actions and interactions of the social forces, which conditioned by the very structures themselves. In this regard, the emergentist development processes are realized through a class project (Harvey, 2005), which derives its content and form of the developmental model through the interaction of conflicting social forces in the structures of development. The hegemonic model can be identified within the structures of development: accumulation, exploitation, domination, and discourse. The point is getting beyond the Euro-centric binary oppositions between developed and developing (Matin, 2018), and to capture the peculiarities of development processes as part of social totality emanated from the mechanisms of unevenness and combination.

The second one is relevant to the formation of the hegemonic model of development and the alternative ones/challengers – the combinations. The model asserts that the struggle of social forces unfolds within structures of world development, and the drive of material reproduction affects the structural diffusion of developmental relations. In the context of societal multiplicity, the intersocietal interaction culminates in the shifts in articulation of the social forces. While the most compatible one takes the lead, the impact of this shift pushes the social forces in other societies to skip developmental steps (Trotsky, 2007). Thus, via political substitutionism, the change of ruling constituencies directs the socio-political transformation processes.

The unfolding of intersocietal interaction, therefore, is particularly relevant to the features of world structures and structural incorporation processes of societies. Emergentist development identifies two significant hegemonic models that underlie the socio-political transformation processes: Keynesian-welfarism and neoliberalization. These models have designated the particularities of intersocietal interaction for the MENA region.

The multi-linearity of intersocietal interaction amalgamates with the local political, economic, and cultural specificities. Emergentist analysis examines the legacies of colonial state institutionalization processes, the geopolitical pressures of superpower penetration and regional conflicts, as well as the implications of the international division of labor on the MENA. It examines the transformation of developmental structures under the impact of the hegemonic model. The development processes saw historical social reactions in the course of articulating social forces. The formation of populist-authoritarian regimes, in this respect, cannot be explained without referring to the shifts in ruling social forces and the structural processes brought in these shifts. The Islamic fundamentalist ideology, populist-authoritarian regime types, patrimonial, and clientel relations have been the most significant ones that characterize the state-society complexes in the MENA region. It is crucial to mark the constitutive impact of intersocietal interaction in the formation and unfolding of these specificities.

The state-society complexes in the MENA underwent deep transformations after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and colonial penetration of British and French forces into the region (Pamuk, 1987; Owen, 2009). The mechanisms of intersocietal interaction became prevalent and concatenated with the local structures of development. The articulation of social forces experienced a dependent diffusion of the hegemonic model (Halliday, 2005: 267). The leading social forces, in this respect, inherited the colonial state structures and production relations with the national independence movements (Ayubi, 1995: 86-99).

However, as the context of the Cold War and the competition between the US and the Soviets after the end of the Second World War led to significant changes in the structures of world development, these ruling social forces could not manage to

adapt the implications of Keynesian-Welfarist hegemonic model. While they had to skip stages of developmental steps, the developmental contradictions intensified as they failed to meet and contain the political-economic demands of mobilized masses (Issawi, 1982). Emergentist analysis asserts that the rise of the military as the leading social force was particularly relevant to the failures of the ruling constituency and its ability to instrumentalize the Arab socialist ideological framework to incorporate the previously marginalized social forces under its rule. The formation of populist-authoritarian ruling regimes, therefore, must be perceived in a way that the militaries in the MENA societies succeeded in containing and subordinate the social forces according to the necessities of Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model. The content and the form of populist-authoritarian regimes led by militaries, therefore, were closely related to the specificities of the MENA societies' position in the structures of world development. It was not only a form of ideological-cultural amalgamation but also an amalgam form of the hegemonic model. It was a reaction to the processes of "modernization" that originated in the political-economic and socio-cultural sphere. In this regard, I state that the Arab socialist and pan-Arabist ideologies emerged out of the processes of intersocietal interaction and assumed their historically particular forms according to the structures of world development.

Once the underlying structural logic of the social formations is perceived with their emergent features, it provides a totalistic and interactive account of socio-political transformation processes in the MENA societies. The processes of incorporation into the structures of world development, therefore, have had two essential implications for the MENA societies. First, the structures of production turned into consumption-driven and de-industrialization, and second, the state institutions became more penetrated the spheres of society through distributive and repressive policies (Owen, 2004).

The diffusion of the hegemonic model through structures of development affected the configuration of social forces and changed the ruling constituency. The articulation of social forces under the consolidation of populist-authoritarian regimes had relied upon the regime's capacities to build a ruling constituency

(Hinnebusch, 2003: 20). The struggle of social forces, in this regard, pushed the military as the leading social force, while undermining the old ruling constituency of the Arab bourgeoisie. The processes of intersocietal interaction amalgamated with the patrimonial-cliental relations, and the new ruling constituency was formed through military-mercantile/military-tribal complexes. Seen from an emergentist development perspective, the survival of communitarian, traditional relations such as sectarianism and tribalism have been decisive in the amalgamated formations such as Islamic fundamentalism, Arab-socialism, and Ba'thism. Emergentist development is against the essentialist accounts of these social formations; it argues that they assume their meaning through historical conjunctures. The concept of combination, therefore, does not see the formation of the amalgamation as exceptional or pathological cases. It captures their underlying structural logic and historical specificities according to the struggle of social forces.

Furthermore, the ruling constituencies have been articulated according to the necessities of the hegemonic model while becoming entrenched through patrimonial-cliental relations in these societies (Kadri, 2014). Oil revenues have become particularly significant in the emergence of socio-economic amalgamation for both oil and non-oil countries through distributive mechanisms. The finance provided by the oil revenues not only helped the subordination of social forces under the ruling constituencies but also strengthened the dependent position of the MENA societies in the international division of labor. While the state-led production relations became the primary source of accumulation (Richards and Waterbury, 1996), the emerging bourgeois segment took shape according to the international division of labor and local structures of development. The emergent bourgeoisie was a Janus-faced, dualistic, for it was neither totally developmentalist nor completely pre-capitalist and pre-industrial (Moghadam, 1991).

When the neoliberal hegemonic model was formed in the changing structures of world development, the MENA societies have already been an inseparable part of capitalist structures of development. Budd (2013: 125) argues that the neoliberal restructuring was the mechanism of inter-imperialist rivalry in the post-WWII structures. For MENA societies, the implications of the neoliberal hegemonic model

have been three-fold. First, the political-economies have been increasingly subjected to external financial flows. Second, the geopolitical pressures have become more and more decisive in securing financial aids, investments, and trade. Third, the collapse of the Soviets created a facilitating context for neoliberalization.

The political-economic deficiencies of production models and the difficulties in containing the social forces were among the domestic factors for the transition to the neoliberal model. Moreover, with the international markets becoming more competitive and resources getting increasingly difficult to find, the ISI model turned into a burden for the economies (Cammett and Diwan, 2016: 64). The welfarist-populist policies confronted the containment strategies of IOs (Desai, 2013), and the economic activities became financialized and more competitive. The irresistible expansion of neoliberalism, in this respect, intensified the developmental contradictions in the MENA societies. Emergentist analysis marks the significance of state policies in the transformation of social segments. The marginalized and excluded strata of societies have constituted the explosive social basis of neoliberalization processes (Rolf, 2015).

The neoliberalization has had significant outcomes for the socio-political transformation processes in the MENA; the most significant ones: business taking precedence over government, foreign direct investments over trade activities, and the increasing influence of Gulf finance (Hertog, 2007: 52). It has consolidated the entrenched ruling constituencies whilst intensifying the inequalities. The societal ramifications, on the other hand, have been exclusive and marginalizing. As social mobility has been blocked under repressive policies of neoliberal authoritarian regimes, the political subjectivities in the MENA societies acquired a hybrid and radicalized form. Emergentist development argues that such transformations within the state-society complexes have reflected amalgamation of neoliberalism and repressive authoritarian political economies.

The most important implication of neoliberal transformation is developmental contradictions. The economic models in the MENA societies have concentrated on unproductive, speculative activities through neoliberalization. While the sectors such as finance, investment, and real estate have become prominent, the surplus-

value has continued to be accumulated in ruling circles. As the ruling constituencies of the MENA societies have controlled and subordinated social forces under their rule through populist-authoritarian political economies, the more their populist nature has faded away, the more the severity and unevenness of development processes have been felt through vast segments of societies. Gerges (2014: 9) underlines the marginalizing and exclusive social developmental processes that have been intensified within the neoliberal model of development. He puts it as “the political entities have turned into a *fiefdom* of ruling clans and families.” As Prashad (2013: 9) puts it: “The South’s emergence was founded... on the contradictions of globalization that now favored states of the South even as they did not favor their population.”

The internationalization of Gulf finance has been one of the essential drivers of neoliberalization in the MENA. It has been effective in the incorporation of national bourgeois segments into the regional/global circuits of accumulation. Through banks and financial institutions, the Gulf finance involved in these processes; however, it has not been predatory and exclusionary. It has benefitted both sides: while it helped regional class structures to entwine, it enabled the Gulf capital to carry out its model of expansion and internationalization (Hanieh, 2016: 17).

6.4 Socio-Political Transformations in Syria and Libya

With the increasing exposure to the mechanisms of intersocietal interaction, the adaptation into the structures of world development incrementally affected the historical social formations and processes in the MENA (Hourani, 1994: 40-45). The socio-political transformation processes have political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions and the theoretical-conceptual accounts of these show great variety; however, when the experiences of these societies are appraised according to a reductionist and deductive framework- as of the modernization- the emergent features of development processes cannot be fully understood.

The Euro-centric perspectives perceive the processes of intersocietal interaction as modernization. According to these perspectives, once the societies

start to modernize –emulating the advanced ones, they are expected to experience linear and evolutionary socio-political transformation processes (Rostow, 1960; Huntington, 1971). Under the impact of modernization, the traditional and local relations in political, economic, and cultural spheres are supposed to be dismantled, while specific experiences of advanced capitalist social formations are awaited to universalize (Bernstein, 1971: 141). Although modernization processes are thought of as transformative (looking at the conceptualization as “developing countries”), the social formations emerging in these processes are conceived dichotomously: modern-traditional, developed-developing. Moreover, those who could not adopt the social formations of advanced societies are seen as aberrations and pathological cases. In this respect, as the societies fail to modernize, the analyses of socio-political transformation processes have concentrated on identifying the barriers before modernization.

The impact of uneven and combined development processes had already been prevalent under the Ottoman rule; however, the context of intersocietal interaction underwent profound changes with European colonial penetration into the MENA. The strategic location of the MENA for trade routes and energy resources rendered it as one of the most significant theaters of geopolitical and economic confrontation (Kamrawa, 2011: 37-47). The socio-political transformation in the MENA societies, therefore, was affected by the changing implications of the international division of labor and geopolitics.

Following the independence movements and gradual withdrawal of colonial powers, the state institutions that were formed during colonial rules were taken over by the newly formed ruling constituencies, mostly large landowners, merchants, state officials, and bourgeoisie (Burke III, 1991). It was a process constituted by taking the rule and managing the incorporation of contender social forces under ruling constituencies while confronting the domestic processes of defensive modernization, national independence movements, and the rising social forces as a result of changing relations of production (Bromley, 1994; Kadri, 2016). The emerging state-society complexes bore the historical specificities of the

configuration of social forces and the underlying structural logic of intersocietal interaction.

The mechanisms of uneven and combined development have, therefore, created similar tendencies for the socio-political transformation processes in Syria and Libya. Emergentist analysis distinguishes Syria and Libya regarding the production relations and social stratification. Looking at the relations of production and the formation of the ruling configuration in Syria and Libya, it can be seen that the relations of production had been more diversified in Syria (Khoury, 1987a; 2003). The segments of society were stratified according to the amalgamation of sectarian and production relations (Van Dam, 2011); the land-owners and the bureaucrats were formed by the state formation processes under the Ottoman Empire and the French colonial rule. In the Libyan context, however, the primary societal feature was tribalism, while the factors of production were mainly limited to trade relations (Pargeter, 2009). While the Sanussi religious order became influential in the Cyrenaica region, under the Italian colonial rule, a profound societal transformation was directed.

The Euro-centric analyses of these transformations prioritize the processes of state-building and institutionalization (Anderson, 1987; Hinnebusch, 2001); however, the social formations such as state, market, and civil society are theorized in ahistorical and de-socialized aspects. The implications of societal multiplicity are viewed reductionistly as anarchical and conflictual geopolitical relations or possibilities of collaboration in the interdependent states system. It resulted in the reification of robust authoritarian structures, patrimonial and cliental relations, religious and tribal identities – the Middle East exceptionalism (Lewis, 2002; Huntington, 1996). The cultural essentialism in these perspectives, therefore, carries the gravest danger for the analysis of socio-political transformation (Halliday, 2005: 194).

An informative analysis must perceive the formation and articulation of these socio-political transformations in an interactive and totalistic manner. The ontological depth enables the emergentist analysis to distinguish between the empirical manifestations of development processes and the generative mechanisms,

structural powers, and tendencies. The emergentist conceptualization of development explores the interaction between the hegemonic model and the historical articulation of social forces. The emergentist development framework, in this respect, has substantial benefits for the analysis of socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya: firstly, the constitutive impact of intersocietal interaction can be holistically captured; secondly, the socio-political transformation processes can be analyzed sociologically through the articulation of social forces; and thirdly, the underlying structural logic can be perceived with emergent features.

In the unfolding of development processes, there had been certain historical tendencies in the articulation of social forces. These tendencies can be identified when the underlying structural logic of the hegemonic model is elicited. The intersocietal interaction for the MENA societies had concrete implications with the Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model. While the geopolitical pressures and the international division of labor were determined according to control of strategic locations and resources for production, the ideological-cultural influences diffused through certain notions such as liberalism, democracy, consumption, and welfare under the leadership of state authority (Yousef, 2004). The mechanism of political substitutionism was influential in the processes of adaptation into the hegemonic model of development, and it was mostly driven by the military forces in the MENA.

The intersocietal interaction culminated in the skipping of developmental steps for Syria and Libya. In the face of the external whip of necessity, the configuration of social forces experienced shifts. Through the diffusion of the hegemonic model, the most compatible social forces in Syria and Libya were to become the ruling social force (Seale, 1988: 145; Vandewalle, 2012). The mechanism of political substitutionism was decisive on the shifting configuration of social forces and formation of state bourgeoisie segment (Sayigh, 1999: 218) (amalgamation in the form of the military-tribal complex in Libya, and military-mercantile complex in Syria). The features of the hegemonic model required the state to become the most crucial element in the development processes (Matar, 2013). The states in Syria and Libya acquired a form of a hegemonic instrument (St

John, 2008a; Hinnebusch, 2001), and the development processes turned into the incorporation of social forces in a controlled and manipulative way (Farsoun, 1988b). The state institutions assumed a crucial role in the relations of production, accumulation, and domination (Luciani, 1987: 63). While it was through the distribution of oil revenues, import privileges, and state-generated employment in Libya (Anderson, 1987; Simons, 1993), in the Syrian case, it was through the allocation of state contracts, trade privileges, and state-generated employment (Perthes, 2000). The basis of economic activities in both cases reflected rentier characteristics³² in which the state authority became vital (Chaudry, 1997: 26).

With the Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model acquiring a concrete form of populist-authoritarianism in Syria and Libya, the socio-political transformation processes unfolded accordingly. As the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification were decisive through the configuration of social forces, the articulation of social forces realized according to the implications of the hegemonic model. In the course adaptation, the amalgamation of international and domestic, old and new, modern, and traditional emerged in the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres.

The Euro-centric analyses of these historical social formations and processes have been conducted mostly through the stagist and political conceptions of development such as rentierism (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970), political-economy of regime security (Gause, 2017), and transition to democracy (Kuran, 2004; Galal and Hoda, 2013). It is true that the state-building processes have been influential in the socio-political transformations; nevertheless, these accounts miss an adequate conception of the intersocietal interaction, which was a dependency for these societies. In such a dependent context, the capacities of these societies to adapt to the hegemonic structures of development were considerably limited to mechanisms of rentierism and domination.

³² Although rentierism is mostly associated with the sale of natural resources, and the oil revenues have not constituted a large part of Syria's GDP, I argue that regarding the production relations, Syria has a rentier economy. The strategic aids, worker remittances and the state-contracts constitute a significant part of the GDP.

A discussion of the notion of rentierism, in this respect, would be informative. The rentier state theory argues that segments of society would tend to be quietist due to the distributive functions of the state. The state presiding over rentier production relations would, to a large extent, be saved from social demands (Chaudry, 1989: 103). Oil revenues obviously enable the consolidation of distributive mechanisms; however, emergentist development is against the argument that oil revenues provide the regimes a sphere of autonomy from the social forces and world structures of development. In contrast, emergentist analysis appraises the rentier production relations as a historical specificity – emerging out of the processes of adaptation to the hegemonic structures of development and necessity of controlled incorporation of social forces. Moreover, the rentier state theory misses explanatory power, especially regarding the survival of tribal and sectarian structures. Emergentist analysis argues that the traditional structures of tribalism and sectarianism manage to survive through combined implications of development. It is overdetermined with the oil revenues, strategic aids, worker remittances, and the countries' position in the international division of labor. The rentier relations of production, in this respect, are perceived as a significant amalgamation of capitalist and local social formations.

The Middle East exceptionalism against the waves of democratization has been explored through the democratization/authoritarianism perspectives. Although these accounts point out certain features of social formations, they fail to capture the constitutive impact of the international because they have a reified understanding of state-society relations (Valbjorn and Bank, 2010). Instead, certain features of these societies took the blame -charismatic individual figures, lacking robust civil society formations, political-economic corruption (Kamrawa, 2005; Ehteshami et al., 2013). Similarly, the political-economy of regime security perspective argues that the rulers are interested in protecting their privileged positions through repression and co-optation, and they are influential in the management of socio-political transformation processes with security organizations – military, intelligence, police forces. However, as they miss a dynamic conception of social relations, they cannot

account for the shifts in ruling constituencies and models of development sociologically (Hanieh, 2013).

In contrast to the conclusions of these perspectives, the socio-political transformation processes have not unfolded in the path of modernization and liberalization with inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The transition to democratization has not been realized. More importantly, the transformation in the political-economies and the base of ruling constituencies cannot be understood because such accounts lack an interactive framework and sociological content. Emergentist analysis, therefore, prioritizes the conflicting social forces as the motor force behind the shifts in the configuration and articulation of socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya. It argues that these processes have been affected by the underlying structural logic of hegemonic models and specificities of incorporation into the structures of development. The adaptation of MENA societies into the hegemonic model was financed through oil revenues for Libya, while it was mostly financed through worker remittances and strategic aids in Syria (Farsoun, 1988a: 161). The amalgamation that emerges in socio-political transformation processes has been crucial. While the ruling regimes were institutionalized in the form of populist-authoritarianism, they managed to subordinate mobilized social forces through these amalgamated forms. Especially, the socio-cultural and ideological amalgamation of socialism with the Arab local cultures and values in the form of Arab Socialism and Ba'thism has been influential in the legitimation of the ruling regime. Moreover, the selective incorporation of social forces has been one of the localized empirical manifestations of the hegemonic model of development. The result was the consolidation of populist-authoritarianism through the distributive and repressive capacities of the state institutions and amalgamation of the capitalist exploitation and domination relations with clientalism and patrimonialism (Joya, 2007). Emergentist analysis underlines that the implications of intersocietal interaction under Keynesian-welfarist hegemonic model were the rise of militaries as leading social forces, the increasing significance of state authority and institutions in processes of adaptation into the hegemonic structures, the amalgamation in the

form of ruling constituencies (military-mercantile and military-tribal complexes), the consolidation of dependent position in the international division of labor.

With the gradual transformation of world development structures, the hegemonic model of development started to change from the 1980s. Parallel to that, the national structures of development in Syria and Libya had undergone gradual liberalization processes, which meant the end of the ISI model and relatively populist, welfarist orientations (Ayubi, 2000). The neoliberal transformation, in this respect, did not happen at once. There have been geopolitical and economic conditions for the diffusion of neoliberalism. The external whip of necessity has been decisive for the MENA societies (Ehteshami, 2007: 37-39); the collapse of the Soviets in 1991 was quite significant for Syria and Libya to adopt liberalization policies. Furthermore, while the international sanctions regime that was imposed on Libya throughout the 1980s and 1990s became essential in this transformation, the faltering performance of the Syrian economic model and the pressures of IFIs pushed Syria for gradual liberalization movements (Bromley, 1994: 172-174). The need to attract the Gulf capital into the Syrian economy to finance public debt and infrastructure projects constituted the economic conditions for Syria (Perthes, 1992a: 49-51), while Libya was struggling to find ways to maintain imports of food and spare parts for the oil industry (St. John, 2008b).

The neoliberalization came out in such a context that the MENA societies were already incorporated into the structures of world development irrevocably. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the global war against terrorism were the geopolitical pressures, while the increasing oil revenues were the facilitating economic dimensions along with Gulf capital and the trade agreements with the EU (Ehteshami, 2007: 124-129). These processes have had profound ramifications for the Syrian and Libyan socio-political transformation. As a result, the authoritarian tendencies of the MENA societies consolidated; the populist tendencies were severely undermined according to the implications of the neoliberal hegemonic model.

The amalgam social formations – Ba’thism, military-mercantile, and military-tribal complexes, patrimonial and cliental relations – designated the implications of

socio-political transformation processes and acquired new features through neoliberalization. With Syria and Libya becoming inseparable parts of international circuits of accumulation, the relations of domination and exploitation have been transformed into international and financial forms (Matar, 2016: 6). The sectarian and tribal identities have become essentialized, the economic processes became unfairly privatized, and the political processes exclusively liberalized (Ehteshami, 2007: 130-143). The mechanisms of distribution have become increasingly significant in the face of the consolidated rentier and unproductive economic activities (Kamrawa, 2011: 271-273). More importantly, the socio-economic consequences of neoliberalization have been marginalizing and uneven for the vast segments of the Syrian and Libyan societies. With the state rolling out from social services, the intensified dependency of people on state subsidies has become a huge burden. As the populist essence of the Syrian and Libyan development model faded away, so did the legitimacy and the credibility of the ruling regime. In such a context, the marginalized and excluded strata of society have become more sensitized against the sub-national identities, while the blocking of social mobility through repressive instruments of neoliberal authoritarianism has consolidated the radicalized social basis against the regime. The diffusion of the neoliberal hegemonic model into the Syrian and Libyan domestic structures of development, in this regard, contributed significantly to the socio-political transformation's contradictions.

The interactivity of uneven and combined development, therefore, proves essential to understanding the implications of socio-political transformation. It is vital to clarify that the emergentist development framework does not attempt to relate empirical manifestations of capitalist development processes in Syria and Libya with the revolts. Instead, it discusses that these empirical manifestations are causal effects of the broader socio-political transformations nested in uneven and combined development processes. In this sense, the primary purpose of the analysis is to obtain more in-depth knowledge about the operation of generative mechanisms of uneven and combined development processes by bringing together domestic and

international, contextual, and conjunctural elements in order to evaluate the contradictions of intersocietal interaction.

I argue that the Arab Revolts have had severe ramifications for the articulation of social forces and the diffusion of the neoliberal hegemonic model in MENA societies. While a radical socio-political transformation seems far-fetched yet, the revolts have been a severe test of which the broader implications remain to be observed.

6.5 Research Programme of Emergentist Development

The social phenomenon is multiply determined. I argue that social scientific analysis has to prioritize the holistic and interactive features of social phenomena. CR methodology provides a strong foundation with ontological depth and the notion of complex causality to build a proper framework. I discuss that emergentist development can provide significant insights into the multiple sets of determinations that constitute the historical social formations in international relations.

Emergentist development is a complex and interactive framework that examines the emergent features of societal multiplicity. It inquires about the underlying structural logic, which generates the actual events that we have conceptualizations. I discuss that the intersocietal has a constitutive impact on the social formations, and I conceptualize the mechanisms of intersocietal interaction with the concept of hegemonic model of development. The hegemonic model argues that development processes assume their content according to historically specific configurations of social forces that are motivated by material reproduction. Out of these interactive development processes, once specific social forces acquire hegemonic positions in structures of world development, the features of the hegemonic model are designated. The diffusion of intersocietal interaction in the form of uneven and combined development processes impacts the relations of social differentiation and stratification. The hegemonic model then becomes a structural context of intersocietal interaction and affects the socio-political transformation processes.

The significance of emergentist development lies with the focus on obtaining information about the structures of development. For CR social scientific understanding, the oppression and domination of the uneven development relations render essential the knowledge of underlying structures and holistic approach to critique the empirical manifestations of inequality and overcome these structural constraints over human emancipation.

I assert that with the emergentist development analysis of socio-political transformation in Syria and Libya, there are three significant contributions to the study of intersocietal interaction. Firstly, the missing sociological perspective is appropriately integrated. Emergentist development prioritizes the articulation of social forces and its implications on the socio-political transformation in societies. Secondly, the underlying structural logic of world development is adequately examined. The constitutive impact of intersocietal on the historical social formations is conceptualized in a non-reductionist and non-determinist manner. Thirdly, the interactivity of societal multiplicity is conceived through the amalgamation. The impact of multiple sets of determinations is perceived in a non-linear and more informative manner. Such a conceptualization, therefore, offers a way out of cultural particularism and Euro-centric universalism. I argue that further studies on emergentist development through the spatial and temporal extension of the analysis would provide critical insights into the implications of the hegemonic model over societies.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Mengüaslan, Hikmet
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 9 June 1991, Mersin
Marital Status: Single
Phone: 0554 695 8921
email: hikmet.menguaslan@adu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	ADU International Relations	2015
BS	IEU International Relations	2012
High School	75. Yıl Teachers Training High School, Mersin	2008

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2016-present	METU International Relations Dept.	Research Assistant
2014-2016	ADU International Relations Dept.	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate Spanish

PUBLICATIONS

1. Arman, M, N. ve Menguaslan, H. “Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası Çerçevesinde Ukrayna Krizi”, Yıldız, U. B. (ed.) *Avrupa Birliğinin Dış İlişkileri: Bölgesel Politikalar, Bölgeler ve Uluslararası Aktörler ile İlişkiler* (59-82). Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık (2015)
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B. TÜRKÇE ÖZET /TURKISH SUMMARY

Giriş

Bu tez dünya ekonomisinde oluşan Eşitsiz ve Bileşik Kalkınma (EBK) mekanizmaları bağlamında kalkınma olgusunu tartışmaktadır. Kalkınma kavramı yerine EBK kavramı kullanılmıştır ve “ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma” kavramını geliştirmiştir. Tarihsel materyalist ve Eleştirel Gerçekçi yöntembilimi kullanarak EBK'nin mekanizmalarını açıklamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, tez Avrupa merkezci ve modernist kalkınma kavramsallaştırmalarını incelemektedir. Bu tez, düz ontolojik anlayış ve nedensel mekanizmaları eksik kavramsallaştıran Avrupa merkezci ve modernist kalkınma kavramsallaştırmalarının kalkınmanın karmaşık toplumsal ilişkilerine yüzeysel bir yaklaşım sunduğunu tartışmaktadır.

Bu kavramsal yeniliğin önemli bir noktası indirgemeci, düzlemsel ve mekanik kavramsallaştırmaları reddetmesi ve bu toplumlar tarafından karşılaşılan karmaşık ve özgül kalkınma uzamlarını araştırmasıdır. Ontolojik derinlik ve üretken mekanizmaları içeren, ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma yaklaşımı sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerinde ortaya çıkan hibridite ve amalgamları incelemektedir ve eşitsiz kalkınma süreçlerine derinlemesine bir yapısal açıklama sunmaktadır. Toplumsal farklılaşma ve tabakalaşma mekanizmalarının daha geniş kalkınma süreçleri içinde yer aldığını vurgulamaktadır.

Vaka çalışması olarak, bu tez Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşümleri incelemektedir. Bu kavramsallaştırmanın avantajı daha bütünsel ve açıklayıcı bir bakış sunarak kalkınmanın küresel dinamikleri ve bağlamsal ve yerel koşullarını tek bir çerçeve altında bir araya getirmesidir.

1. Kalkınma Süreçlerinin Ortaya Çıkan Özellikleri

Bu tez eleştirel gerçekçi yöntembilimi kullanmanın ve tarihsel materyalist bir kalkınma anlayışının toplumsal çoğulluktan doğan etkileşimli ilişkilerin incelenmesi için teorik bir çerçeve inşasına katkısını vurgulamaktadır. Kalkınma kavramı yerine eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma kavramsallaştırmasını (EBK) kullanmanın öneminin

altını çizmekte ve uluslararası oluşturuıcı etkisini anlamlandırabilmek adına bütünsel bir bakış açısı geliştirmektedir.

Bu bağlamda, eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınmanın eleştirel gerçekçi bir yöntem bilimle kavramsallaştırılması uluslararası ilişkilerin kuramsal incelemeleri açısından oldukça önemlidir. Mevcut olan aşamacı, yapısal ve kalkınma sonrası kavramsallaştırmalarında uluslararası etkisi yeterince kuramsallaştırılmamıştır. Bu durumun ortaya çıkmasında olgucu sosyal bilim anlayışının ontolojik, bilgi bilimsel ve yöntem bilimsel sorunları etkilidir. Bilgi bilimsel bakış açısının düz bir ontolojik yaklaşımla sığlaştırılması nedensel ilişkilerin atfında sorunlu durumlar yaratmakta ve yöntemsel ulusçuluğun da etkisiyle uluslararası etkisi sonradan ekleme yoluyla incelenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Eleştirel gerçekçiliğin katmanlı ontolojik anlayışı bu soruna kullanışlı bir çözüm sunmaktadır. Üretken mekanizmalar kavramı ortaya atılmakta ve bu mekanizmaların olaylardan ve olayların görgül tezahürlerinden ayrıştırılması gerektiği tartışılmaktadır. Böyle bir yaklaşım etkileşimli ve karmaşık olan toplumsal ilişkilerin bütünsel analizine imkân vermenin yanı sıra birden fazla nedensel etki sonucu meydana gelen toplumsal olaylara bütünselci bir yaklaşım da sunmaktadır.

Uluslararası toplumlar arası etkileşim şeklinde ortaya çıkarıcı kavramsallaştırması uluslararası ilişkilerin tarih dışı ve toplum dışı kuramlarına karşı çıkmaktadır. Eleştirel gerçekçi yöntem bilim uluslararası kuramsallaştırılması için somut bir toplum bilimsel temel hazırlamakla birlikte onun “gerçekçi somutlaştırılmasını” da reddetmektedir (Rosenberg, 2013). Bu çalışma ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma kavramını sunarak toplumlararası etkileşimin ortaya çıkan özelliklerini incelemek adına bir çerçeve oluşturmaktadır. Bu kavramsal çerçeve aşamacı, yapısal ve kalkınma sonrası kavramsallaştırmalarının indirgemeci ontolojik yaklaşımlarından doğan sorunları belirginleştirmektedir.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma kavramsallaştırması toplumlararası etkileşimin ontolojik katmanlarına değinmektedir. Bu bağlamda toplumlararası etkileşim eylemsel ontolojik düzlemde meydana gelirken, bunun tezahürleri görgül ontolojik düzlemde gözlenmektedir. Toplumlararası etkileşim bu sebeple toplumun belirli yapıları içinde meydana gelmektedir. Ortaya çıkarıcı kavramsallaştırma bu

yapılardan özellikle birikim, hâkimiyet, sömürü ve söylem yapılarının etkisine vurgu yapmaktadır.

Toplumlararası etkileşimin ortaya çıkan özelliklerine vurgu yapılarak incelenmesi uluslararası indirgemeci kavramsallaştırmalarından farklılaşmaktadır. Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçleri sapma, ayrıksılık, ya da anormallik olarak değerlendirilmek yerine farklılaşan kalkınma oluşumları olarak görülmektedir. Rosenberg (2007) kapitalist toplumsal bütünsellik içinde eşitsizliğin tanımlayıcı bir gerçeklik durumundan etkin nedensel belirlenim ve baskı yapılarına dönüştüğünü vurgular. Bu da EBK yaklaşımının kalkınma süreçlerinin incelenmesi için somut bir soyutlama haline gelmesini sağlar. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma çeşitli ve farklılaşmış yerel kalkınma süreçleri stratejilerini dünya kalkınmasının yapıları bağlamında ele almaktadır (Bilgin ve Morton, 2004: 175-176).

Toplumsal çoğulluğun bu özelliği ve bu özelliğin kalkınma süreçlerine yansımaları kapitalist toplumsal bütünsellik içinde sadece kapitalist kalkınma oluşumları için değil aynı zamanda kapitalist olmayan/sosyalist kalkınma oluşumları için de geçerlidir. Dolayısıyla, bu özellikler indirgemeciliği etkisiz kılarken tarihsel ve toplumsal bir incelemeyi de gerekli kılar.

Kalkınma süreçlerinin tarihsel ve toplumsal incelemesi kalkınma süreçleri meydana gelirken toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişindeki kaymalara karşı özel bir önem atfeder. Bu kaymalar sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçleri bağlamında oldukça önemli hale gelmektedir. Bu sebeple, salt yerel bir süreç olarak görülmeleri ya da yapısal bir belirlenim çerçevesinde anlaşılmaları imkânsızdır.

Bu durum EBK yaklaşımını soyut ve tarih ötesi bir görünüme büründürse de, Yalvaç (2013) bu şekilde uluslararası Avrupa-merkezci bir anlayıştan sıyrıldığını ve toplumların etkileşimli bir biçimde oluşmasını incelemeye odaklandığını tartışır. Böylelikle Uluslararası İlişkilerin temeli toplumlararası ilişkilerin özü bütünsel bir biçimde incelenecek şekilde yeniden oluşturulur. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınmanın odağı kalkınma süreçlerinin yapısal yayılımını araştırmaktır. Bu yayılım sürecinde sosyal güçler kendilerini yeniden üretir ya da değiştirirler. Böyle bir anlayış ile toplumlararası etkileşimin birden fazla belirlenim düzlemi ele alınabilmektedir. Bu bağlamda temel olarak nedensel mekanizmalar şu şekilde belirlenmiştir: jeopolitik

baskılar, ticari penetrasyon, ideolojik-kültürel etkiler ve siyasal ikamecilik. Bu mekanizmaların yöntem bilimsel ulusçulukla kavranamayışı ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma kavramsallaştırmasının önemini bir kez daha göstermektedir.

Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçleri siyasal, iktisadi ve toplumsal alanlara yayılmıştır. Bu alanlar içinde kalkınma süreçlerinin ortaya çıkan özellikleri şekillenmekte ve anlam kazanmaktadır. Bu şekil ve anlamlar ise kalkınmanın bileşik halleri olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Kalkınmanın bileşik halleri modern siyasal, iktisadi ve kültürel hallerin geri kalmış toplumlarla iç içe geçmesi ile ortaya çıkmaktadır ve dünya tarihsel kalkınmasında farklılaşmış oluşumları meydana getirmektedir. Bu kalkınma süreçleri içinde amalgam ve hibrit oluşumlar meydana gelmekteyken çatışan toplumsal güçler, aktörler kendilerini dönüştürmekte ya da yeniden üretmektedirler.

Bu sebeple, eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinin ele alınması ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma çerçevesinin somutlaştırılmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu işlem dünya kalkınma yapılarının hegemonik özelliklerinin belirlenmesini ve toplumlararası etkileşimin yansımalarının tarihsel ve sosyal açılardan ele alınmasını içerir.

2. Ortaya Çıkarıcı Kalkınmanın Somutlaştırılması

Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinin ortaya çıkan özellikleri bütünselci ve etkileşimli bir incelemeyi gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu gereksinim eleştirel gerçekçiliğin derin ontoloji anlayışı ile karşılanabilmektedir. Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçleri kendileri hakkında kavramsallaştırmalar, teoriler ve bakış açıları geliştirdiğimiz örgüler tarafından meydana gelir. Ontolojik derinlik toplumsal görüngülerin kendileri hakkında edindiğimiz bilgilerden ayrı tutulması anlamına gelmektedir. Çünkü bu kavramsallaştırmaların kalkınma süreçlerinin bütünü ele alabilmesi mümkün değildir. Eleştirel gerçekçi yöntem bilim toplumsal görüngülerin doğasının kavramlara bağımlı olduğunu kabul eder fakat toplumsal görüngülerin bu kavramsallaştırmalarla bir tutulmasına karşı çıkar. Kalkınma bağlamındaki kavramsallaştırmalarımızdan bazıları olan bağımlılık, az-gelişmişlik ve modernleşme başarısızlıkları bu duruma önemli örneklerdir.

Egemen kalkınma düşüncesi ise çoğunlukla kalkınma süreçleri için sınıflandırma yapmaya odaklanmaktadır. Bu sınıflandırmalar eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinden doğan nedensel ilişkileri açıklama konusunda başarısız olmaktadır. Dahası Avrupa-merkezci, aşamacı kalkınma anlayışı eleştirel öğelerden yoksundur ve bu durum kalkınma yapıları hakkında eksik ve yanıltıcı sonuçlar doğurmaktadır.

Benzer şekilde yapısal kavramsallaştırmalar da aynı sorunları doğurmaktadır. Her ne kadar aşamacı kavramsallaştırmalar yöntem bilimsel ulusçuluk dolayısıyla yapısal bir anlayıştan yoksun olsalar da, yapısal kavramsallaştırmalar da birden fazla belirlenimi olan eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerini yeterince kuramsallaştıramamaktadır. Bunun altında yatan en önemli neden ise kalkınma yapılarının deterministik biçimde kavranmasıdır. Bu bağlamda, kalkınma sonrası anlayış eleştirel bir bakış açısı sunmaya çalışsa da, bu katkıları sistemli bir bilimsel çerçeveye ekleme konusunda sıkıntılar yaşamaktadır.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma çerçevesi ontolojik katmanlı bir anlayışla kalkınma görüngüsünün karmaşık belirlenim setlerini bütünsel bir biçimde ele alabilmektedir. Doğası gereği kapitalist sosyal bütünsellik rekabetçi ve eşitsizdir. Toplumsal güçlerin etkileşime girdiği bu bağlam, Pröbsting'e göre (2016: 417) yerel ve uluslararası, eski ve yeni, modern ve gelenekseli miras alır, kendisine eklemeler ve değiştirir. Maddi yeniden üretim aşamasında, toplumsal güçler toplumsal bütünsellik içindeki yapılar ve üretken mekanizmaların etkisi altındadır. Bu yüzden eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinin mekanizmaları görgül olarak gözlemlenemese de nedensel etkileri dolayısıyla gerçeklik kazanmaktadır. Toplumsal görüngülerin açıklanması ve somutlaştırılması da nedensel kanunların ve olaylar arasında sürekli ardışıklığın aranmasından ziyade üretken mekanizmalar hakkında daha derin bilgiye erişme süreci ile yakında ilişkilidir.

Bu tezde kalkınmanın tüm toplumlar için mümkün olup olmadığı yoksa diğerleri pahasına mı gerçekleştiği temel sorudur. Kalkınmanın bu özelliği ortaya çıkarıcı çerçevenin anlamaya çalıştığı ana odaktır. Kalkınma süreçlerinin altta yatan yapısal bir mantık ile meydana geldiği ve belirli toplumsal oluşumların tarihsel özelliklerini yansıttığı tartışılmaktadır. Kapitalist toplumsal bütünsellik içinde

eşitsizlik her ne kadar farklılaşmış kalkınma tarzlarının temel özelliği olsa da, derin yapılar ve kalkınma ilişkileri sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin bağlamını belirleyen en önemli unsurlardandır (Davidson, 2018b).

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma toplumlararası etkileşimin yayılması sürecinde üretken mekanizmaların işleyişini ve toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişindeki kaymalara önem atfeder. Toplumlararası etkileşimin içinde var olan çatışmacı toplumsal güçlerin eylemleri yoluyla, hegemonik kalkınma modeli ortaya çıktığında, görgül düzlemde kalkınma süreçlerinin bir parçası olur. Kalkınma yapılarında konumlanmış hegemon aktörlerin çıkarlarını ve tasarımlarını yansıtır. Bu özelliğiyle hegemonik kalkınma modeli yapısal bir unsur haline gelir. Aktörlerin eylemlerini kısıtlama ve imkân verme yoluyla yapısal koşulları belirler.

Toplumlararası etkileşimin dönüştürücü etkisi toplumların kabiliyetlerine göre şekillenir. Jeopolitik baskılar halinde toplumlararası etkileşimle yüzleşen toplumsal güçler maddi yeniden üretim amaçlarında olduklarından ileri toplumların kalkınma adımlarını olduğu gibi izleyemezler. Bu süreçler amalgam oluşumları ortaya çıkarmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişinde kaymalara da sebep olurlar. Bu kaymalar, yerel çatışmalarla birleştiği için en uygun toplumsal gücü iktidara getirmede belirleyicidirler.

Bu sebeple toplumlararası etkileşimin yayılımı toplumdaki sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerinin motor gücü konumundadır. Aynı zamanda yerel toplumsal farklılaşma ve tabakalaşma süreçlerini dünya kalkınma yapılarıyla yakından ilişkili hale getirir. Uluslararası iş bölümü ve jeopolitik baskı mekanizmalarının tarihsel özelliklerine bağlı olarak, kalkınma aşamalarının atlanması siyasal, iktisadi ve kültürel oluşumlar halinde amalgamların ortaya çıkması ile sonuçlanır. Bu amalgam oluşumlar kalkınma çelişkilerine ve toplumsal gerilimin yükselmesine katkıda bulunurken sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerini de yönlendirir.

Bu bağlamda, eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinin somutlaştırılması dünya kalkınma yapılarının hegemonik özelliklerinin belirlenmesini, dünya kalkınma yapılarına eklenme süreçlerinin tarihsel incelemesini ve de bu yapılara bağlı olarak toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişinin değerlendirilmesini gerekli kılar.

3. Hegemonik Kalkınma Modeli bağlamında Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Bölgesi

Hegemonik kalkınma modeli toplumlararası etkileşimi tarihi toplumsal oluşumları şekleştirmeden ve onları özcü bir yaklaşımla kavramsallaştırmadan kavramaktadır. Dünya kalkınma yapıları içinde hegemonya kavramını önceleyerek bu ilişkileri hegemonik proje kapsamında değerlendirir. Sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin ele alınmasında jeopolitik baskılar, uluslararası iş bölümü, ideolojik-kültürel etkiler ve siyasal ikameciliği en önemli mekanizmalar olarak görür.

Hegemonik kalkınma modeli kalkınma yapılarında hegemonik konum elde eden bir devletten daha fazlasıdır. Uluslararası ve toplumsal arasındaki karşılıklı ilişki, eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinin devletin şekleştirilmiş şekilde kavranmasıyla yeterince incelenemeyeceğini göstermektedir (Rosenberg, 2007; 2010). Aynı şekilde hegemonik kalkınma modelinin herhangi toplumsal bir yapıda baskınlık kazanan aktörlerin kurumsallaşmış oluşumlarından da ayrılması elzemdir. Bu bağlamda, hegemonik kalkınma modeli ile hegemon devlet, ulus ötesi yönetici sınıf ve inşacı yaklaşımlar karşılaştırıldığında bazı ayırıcı özelliklerden bahsedilebilir. Hegemonik model hegemonyanın kurumsallaşmış, söylemsel ve maddi öğelerini birbirinden indirgemeci olmadan ayırmaktadır. Örneğin, jeopolitik yapılar ya da neogramşici yaklaşımdaki hegemonik blok gibi yaklaşımlar toplumsal gerçekliğin dinamik doğasını kavramada bütünsel bir anlayış geliştirmekte başarısızdırlar. Hegemonik model ise kalkınmanın çoklu nedensel ve çok uzamlı boyutlarının ele alırken indirgemeci ve tümünden gelimci olmayan bir çerçeve sunabilmektedir. Bunu kalkınma süreçlerindeki yerel değişimleri toplumsal bir bakış açısı çerçevesinde açıklayarak sağlamaktadır. Daha da önemlisi bu değişimleri açıklarken hegemonik kalkınma modelindeki değişimleri de göz önünde bulundurmaktadır.

Hegemonik modelin kalkınmanın toplumsal yapıları olan birikim, sömürü, baskınlık ve söylem yapılarında gerçekleştiğini vurguladığını belirtmek önemlidir. Hegemonik model kavramsallaştırması iki temel nedenden ötürü yararlıdır. Birincisi, kalkınma süreçlerinin maddi olarak gerçekleşmesi ile ilgilidir. Model hegemonik kalkınmanın oluşumunu kalkınma yapılarının etkisinde olan toplumsal

güçlerin eylemleri ve etkileşimi ile meydana gelen yapılar bağlamında ele alır. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma bir sınıf projesi olarak ortaya çıkmakta ve hegemonik yapılar içinde kalkınma modeline şekil ve anlamını vermektedir. Çünkü temel amaç gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan toplumlar şeklindeki ikicil karşılaştırmaların ötesine geçebilmek ve kalkınma süreçlerinin özelliklerini eşitsiz ve bileşik gelişmenin mekanizmalarından ortaya çıkan toplumsal bütünselliğin bir parçası olarak kavrayabilmektir.

İkincisi, hegemonik kalkınma modelinin ve alternatiflerinin-bileşik hallerin oluşumu ile ilgilidir. Model toplumsal güçlerin çatışmalarının dünya kalkınma yapılarında gerçekleştiğini ve maddi yeniden üretim güdüsünün kalkınma ilişkilerinin yapısal yayılımını etkilediğini belirtmektedir. Toplumsal çoğulluk çerçevesinde, toplumlararası etkileşim toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişindeki değişimleri meydana getirir. Hegemonik modelin özelliklerine en uygun olan toplumsal güç iktidarı elde ederken, bu kaymanın yansımaları diğer toplumlardaki toplumsal güçlerin kalkınma aşamalarını atlaması şeklinde ortaya çıkmakta ve siyasal ikamecilik yoluyla yönetici gruplar dönüşerek sosyo-politik değişim süreçlerini yönetmektedir.

Hegemonik modelin özellikleri dünya yapılarının özellikleri ve toplumların yapısal eklemlenme süreçleri ile doğrudan bağlantılıdır. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma ele alına tarihsel süreç içinde iki temel hegemonik model belirlemiştir: Keynezyen-refahçı model ve neoliberal model. Bu modeller Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika (ODKA) bölgesi için toplumlararası etkileşimin süreçleri üzerinde önemli rol oynamışlardır.

Toplumlararasıının çok uzamlılığı yerel siyasi, iktisadi ve kültürel özelliklerle amalgam oluşumlar meydana getirir. Kalkınma süreçlerinde toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişleri tarihi toplumsal tepkileri doğurur. İslamcı kökten ideoloji, popülist-otoriter rejim biçimleri, patrimonyal ve patronaj ilişkiler ODKA bölgesindeki devlet-toplum komplekslerinin en dikkat çeken özelliklerindedir. Bu özelliklerin oluşumu ve değişimi toplumlararasıının oluşturucu etkisinin önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma sömürgeci devlet kurumsallaşma süreçlerinin miraslarını, süper güçlerin bölgede yer alması ve bölgesel çatışmalardan doğan jeopolitik baskıları ve ODKA üzerinde uluslararası işbölümünün yansımalarını araştırır. Bölgedeki kalkınma yapılarının dönüşümünde hegemonik modelin etkisini ele alır. Bu bağlamda popülist-otoriter rejimlerin oluşumunun yönetici toplumsal güçlerdeki değişimler ve bu değişimleri meydana getiren yapısal dönüşümlere değinmeksizin açıklanamayacağını ileri sürer.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun parçalanması ve İngiliz-Fransız kuvvetlerinin sömürgeci girişimleri bölgedeki yerel kalkınma yapıları ile eklemlenmiş, bölgedeki devlet-toplum kompleksleri derin dönüşümlere uğramıştır. Toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişi toplumlararası etkisinin bağımlılığı dayatan bir şekilde yayılmasını tecrübe etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Lider toplumsal güçler daha sonra sömürgeci devlet yapıları ve üretim ilişkilerini miras almıştır. Ancak Soğuk Savaş ve ABD-Sovyetler rekabeti bağlamında İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dünya kalkınma yapıları önemli dönüşümler geçirmiş ve iktidardaki toplumsal güçler Keynezyen-refahçı hegemonik modelin gereksinimlerine uyum sağlama konusunda sıkıntılar yaşamışlardır. Kalkınmanın aşamalarını atlamak zorunda kalmışlar ve seferber olmuş kitlelerin siyasi-iktisadi taleplerini karşılamakta ve bastırmakta başarısız olarak kalkınma çelişkilerinin ağırlaşmasına sebep olmuşlardır.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma iktidardaki yönetimlerin başarısızlıklarının ve orduların Arap sosyalizmini araçsallaştırarak daha önce dışlanmış toplumsal güçleri kendi yönetimleri altında eklemlendirebilmelerine imkân verecek kabiliyetlere sahip olmalarının orduların lider toplumsal güç olarak yönetimi devralmalarında oldukça etkili olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu sebeple popülist-otoriter rejimlerin oluşumu ODKA toplumlarındaki orduların Keynezyen-refahçı hegemonik modelin gereksinimleri doğrultusunda toplumsal güçleri bastırabilmek ve kontrol edebilmeleriyle açıklanabilir.

Ordular tarafından yönlendirilen popülist-otoriter rejimlerin oluşumu ve şekli ODKA toplumlarının dünya kalkınma yapılarındaki konumlarından doğan özellikleriyle doğrudan bağlantılı olmuştur. Bu eklemlenme sadece ideolojik-kültürel bir amalgam olmakla kalmayıp aynı zamanda hegemonik modelin de bir

amalgam hali şeklinde ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu oluşum aslında siyasal-iktisadi ve sosyo-kültürel alanlarda meydana gelen modernleşme süreçlerine bir tepki olarak gelişmiştir. Kalkınma yapıları yoluyla hegemonik modelin yayılımı toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişini etkilemiş ve yönetici grubu değiştirmiştir. Bu çerçevede Arap sosyalist ve pan-Arapçı ideolojiler de toplumlararası etkileşim süreçlerinden doğmuş ve tarihi şekillerini dünya kalkınma yapılarına göre almışlardır.

Bu toplumsal oluşumların altta yatan yapısal mantığı ortaya çıkan özellikleri ile birlikte kavrandığında, ODKA toplumlarındaki sosyo-politik dönüşümün bütünselci ve etkileşimli açıklaması sunulabilir. Bununla birlikte popülist-otoriter rejimlerin sağlamlaşması sürecinde toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişini rejimlerin yönetici grupları inşa edebilme kabiliyetlerine bağlıdır. Petrol gelirleri hem petrol üreten hem de üretmeyen ülkeler için dağıtım mekanizmaları yoluyla sosyo-ekonomik amalgam oluşumların meydana gelmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Dahası iktidardaki toplumsal gruplar hegemonik modelin gereksinimleri doğrultusunda şekillenirken aynı zamanda bu toplumlardaki patrimonial ve patronaj ilişkileri yoluyla toplumun çeşitli alanlarında hâkimiyet elde etmişlerdir. Petrol gelirlerinin sağladığı finans kaynağı ile toplumsal güçlerin kontrolü sağlanmış ve aynı zamanda ODKA toplumlarının uluslararası iş bölümündeki bağımlı konumu ağırlaşmıştır.

Dünya kalkınma yapılarına eklenme süreçleri ODKA toplumları için iki temel sonuç doğurmuştur. Birincisi, üretim yapıları çoğunlukla tüketime dayalı ve endüstriyel üretimden uzaklaşan bir hal almıştır. İkincisi devlet kurumları dağıtım ve baskı mekanizmaları yoluyla toplumun çeşitli alanlarına giderek artan şekilde hâkim olmuştur. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma yaklaşımı çerçevesinde, mezhepçilik, kabilecilik gibi komüniter, gelenekselci ilişkilerin devamlılığı İslami köktencilik, Arap sosyalizmi, Baasçılık gibi amalgam oluşumların ortaya çıkmasında kilit rol oynamıştır. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma bu toplumsal oluşumların özcu bir şekilde kavranmasına karşı çıkar. Bu oluşumların tarihsel şartlar doğrultusunda anlam kazandığını belirtir. Kalkınmanın bileşik halleri kavramı bu amalgam oluşumların meydana gelişini istisna ya da sapma durumları olarak değerlendirmez. Bu oluşumların altında yatan yapısal mantığını ve toplumsal güçlerin çatışmasına göre belirlenen tarihi koşulları anlamaya çalışır.

Toplumsal güçlerin mücadelesi orduyu lider toplumsal güç olarak ortaya çıkarırken, Arap burjuvasının oluşturduğu eski iktidar grubunun altını oymuştur. Toplumlararası etkileşim süreçleri bu bağlamda patrimonyal-patronaj ilişkileri ile amalgam oluşumlar meydana getirmiş ve yeni iktidar grubunun askeri-ticari/askeri-kabileci şekillerde belirmesine yol açmıştır. Devlet tarafından yönetilen üretim ilişkileri en temel birikim kaynağı haline gelirken, ortaya çıkan burjuva tabakası uluslararası iş bölümünün ve yerel kalkınma yapılarının koşullarına göre şekillenmiştir. Ortaya çıkan burjuva tabakasının iki-yüzlü, ikicil olduğu tartışılabilir çünkü ne tamamen kalkıncı ne de tamamen kapitalist ve sanayi karşıtıdır (Moghadam, 1991).

Dünya kalkınma yapılarındaki değişiklikler ile birlikte neoliberal hegemonik model oluşmuştur. Neoliberal model İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında emperyalist güçler arasındaki rekabetin mekanizması olarak değerlendirilebilir (Budd, 2013: 125). ODKA bölgesi için neoliberal modelin yansımaları üç temel bağlamda gerçekleşmiştir. Birincisi, politik-ekonomiler artan oranda dış finansal akışlara boyun eğerek hale gelmiştir. İkincisi, jeopolitik baskılar finansal yardımlar, yatırımlar ve ticaret alanlarında giderek daha belirleyici olmaya başlamıştır. Üçüncüsü, Sovyetlerin çöküşü bölge için neoliberalleşme süreçlerini kolaylaştırıcı etki yaratmıştır.

Yerel düzlemde kolaylaştırıcı unsurlar ise üretim modellerinin siyasal ve iktisadi eksiklikleri ile toplumsal güçlerin bastırılmasındaki zorluklarla yakından bağlantılıdır. İthal ikameci sanayileşme modelinin finanse edilmesi için gerekli kaynaklar giderek azalırken ve uluslararası piyasalardaki rekabet giderek kızışırken, devlet yönetimindeki kalkınma politikalarının da uluslararası örgütlerin kontrolcü yaklaşımları bölge ülkelerinin finansallaşma ve rekabet ortamında uğraşması gereken en zorlu durumlar olmuştur (Desai, 2013; Kiely, 2012). Neoliberal modelin karşı konulamaz yayılması karşısında, kalkınma çelişkileri devlet politikaları yoluyla daha da ağırlaşmıştır. Bu bağlamda neoliberalleşme politikalarına en çok karşı çıkanlar dışlanan toplumsal güçler tarafından oluşmaktadır (Rolf, 2015).

Neoliberal dönüşümün üç belirgin özelliğinden bahsedilebilir: iş dünyasının hükümet üzerindeki etkisi, doğrudan yabancı yatırımın ticaret üzerindeki durumu,

Körfez sermayesinin yükselişi (Hertog, 2007: 52). Neoliberalleşme süreçleri Körfez sermayesinin uluslararasılaşmasıyla ve ulusal burjuva tabakalarının bölgesel/küresel birikim devrelerine eklemeleriyle doğrudan bağlantılıdır. Körfez finans-kapitalinin müdahil olması büyük holdingler halinde ortaya çıkmış ve bankalar ve finansal kurumlar yoluyla gerçekleşmiştir. Körfez finans-kapitalinin bölgeye yayılma süreçlerinin doğası ise kapitalist sınıflara düşmanca ve dışlayıcı biçimde olmamıştır. Aksine Körfez sermayesinin hegemonyası altında bölgesel sınıf yapıları bir bütün oluşturmuş ve Körfez sermayesi uluslararasılaşma sürecinde kendi yayılma modelini gerçekleştirirken her iki tarafa da önemli yararlar sağlamıştır (Hanieh, 2016: 17).

Neoliberal model bölgedeki sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerini de etkilemiştir. Hali hazırda iktidarda olan yönetimlerin yerini sağlamlaştırırken eşitsizliklerin artmasına yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda, terörizme karşı küresel savaş bölgedeki rakip toplumsal güçlerin bastırılması ve kontrol edilmesi sürecinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Sonuç olarak, bölgedeki rejimlerin otoriter eğilimleri korunurken, popülist eğilimlerin altı oyulmuştur. Toplumsal sonuçlar ise dışlayıcı şekilde ortaya çıkmıştır. Toplumsal hareketlilik süreçleri neoliberalleşen otoriter rejimlerin baskıcı politikaları altında kısıtlanırken, ODKA toplumlarındaki siyasal öznellik hibrid ve köktenci bir hale bürünmüştür. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma devlet-toplum komplekslerindeki bu dönüşümleri neoliberalleşme ve baskıcı otoriter siyasal-ekonomilerin doğurduğu amalgam oluşumlarla açıklamaktadır.

ODKA toplumlarındaki ekonomik modeller ise neoliberalleşme sonucunda üretken olmayan, spekülatif aktivitelere yoğunlaşmıştır. Finans, yatırım ve gayrimenkul gibi sektörler öne çıkarken, üretilen artı değer yönetimin etrafında kümelenen çevrelerde birikmeye devam etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Prashad'ın da (2013: 9) belirttiği şekilde “Güney ülkelerinin yükselişi devletlere yarasa da toplumlarına hiç de yaramayan küreselleşmenin çelişkilerinden doğmuştur.” Neoliberal dönüşümün en dikkat çekici yansımaları gerçekten de kalkınma çelişkileri olmaktadır. ODKA toplumlarındaki iktidarlar popülist-otoriter siyasal-ekonomiler yoluyla toplumsal güçleri kontrol edip bastırdıklarından, bu popülist özelliklerini kaybettikçe, kalkınma süreçlerinin şiddeti ve eşitsizliği giderek artan

oranda toplumun geniş kesimlerince hissedilmeye başlanmıştır. Gerges (2014: 9) neoliberal kalkınma modeli ile ağırlaşan dışlayıcı toplumsal kalkınma süreçlerinin altını çizer ve bu durumu “siyasal varlıklar iktidardaki klanlar ve ailelerin derebeyliği haline dönmüştür” şeklinde tanımlar. Bu sebeple, Arap İsyanları sürecindeki gelişmelerin otoriter rejimlerin neoliberalleşme politikalarına karşı meydana geldiği ciddi bir tartışma konusudur (Dahi, 2011). Eşitsiz kalkınmanın çelişkili eğilimleri de bölgede biriken toplumsal gerilim ve mücadele ile çok yakından ilişkidir.

4. Suriye ve Libya’daki Sosyo-politik Dönüşümler

Suriye ve Libya’daki sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin siyasal, iktisadi ve sosyo-kültürel boyutları bulunmaktadır. Kuramsal ve kavramsal açıklamaların çeşitliliği ise bu süreçlerin karmaşıklığının ve etkileşimliliğinin kanıtıdır. Bu çerçevede ODKA bölgesini ele alırken başvurulan kavramsallaştırmaları tartışmak önemlidir.

Avrupa-merkezci yaklaşımlar toplumlararası etkileşim süreçlerini modernleşme bağlamında değerlendirir. Modernleşme sürecine başladıkları zaman toplumların doğrusal ve evrimsel bir sosyo-politik dönüşüm geçirecekleri düşünülür. Siyasal, iktisadi ve kültürel düzlemde yer alan geleneksel ve yerel ilişkilerin modernleşme sürecinde ortadan kalkacağı belirtilir. Bu doğrultuda ileri düzey kapitalist toplumsal oluşumların tecrübelerinin ise evrensel bir hal alacağı düşünülür. İleri düzey kapitalist toplumsal oluşumları benimsemekte başarısız olanlar ise patolojik durumlar olarak görülür.

Gelişmekte olan toplumlar kavramından da anlaşılacağı üzere bu süreçler her ne kadar dönüştürücü olarak kavransa da, bu süreçlerde ortaya çıkan toplumsal oluşumlar ikicil bir şekilde algılanmaktadır. Devlet ve piyasa gibi oluşumlar ise tarih dışı ve toplum dışı biçimde kuramsallaştırılır. Benzer şekilde, toplumsal çoğulluğun sonuçları da indirgemeci bir şekilde anarşik jeopolitik ilişkiler olarak görülür.

Dahası ODKA bölgesindeki sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin incelemeleri modernleşmenin önünde duran engellerin belirlenmesine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Devlet inşası ve kurumsallaşma süreçleri de rejim güvenliği, rantiyeye gibi kavramların

öncelenmesi ile ele alınmıştır. Bu durum otoriter yapıların devamlılığının, patrimonial ve patronaj ilişkilerinin şeyleştirilmesiyle sonuçlanmaktadır.

Bu şekilde bir kültürel özcü bakış açısı çok büyük tehlikeler içermektedir. Açıklayıcı bir inceleme sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin oluşumu ve gelişmesini etkileşimli ve bütünselci bir bakış açısıyla ele almalıdır, aksi takdirde kalkınma süreçlerinin ortaya çıkan özelliklerinin tamamen anlaşılması mümkün olmayacaktır. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma yaklaşımı bu sebeple Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerinin incelenmesinde önemli avantajlara sahiptir. Birincisi, toplumlararası etkileşimin oluşturucu etkisi bütünselci bir yaklaşımla incelenebilmektedir. İkincisi, sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçleri toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişi üzerinden ele alınarak toplum bilimsel bir yaklaşım sunulabilmektedir. Üçüncüsü, altta yatan yapısal mantık ortaya çıkan özellikleri ile birlikte kavranabilmektedir.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınmanın en önemli noktası hegemonik model ve toplumsal güçlerin tarihi gelişimi arasındaki etkileşimi inceleyebilmesidir. Hegemonik modelin yayılımı Suriye ve Libya'nın kalkınma gidişatı hakkında fikir verirken, devlet-toplum kompleksinin tarihi düzenlenişi kalkınma süreçlerinin koşullarına ışık tutmaktadır.

Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınmanın mekanizmaları Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşümler için benzer eğilimler ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bunlardan en dikkat çeken siyasi ikamecilik yoluyla bazı kalkınma adımlarının atlanmasıdır. Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin incelenmesi devlet burjuvazisi sınıfının ortaya çıkmasında etkili olmuştur. Devlet burjuvazisi sınıfı Suriye'de askeri-ticari kompleks içinde belirirken, Libya'da askeri-kabileci bir kompleks içinde yer almaktadır. Bu oluşumlar kalkınma süreçlerinin yönetilmesinde kilit unsurlar olmuştur. Devlet otoritesi ise en temel araç haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda ideolojik-kültürel etki mekanizması da Arap sosyalizmi, Baasçılık ve pan-Arapçılık gibi çerçevelerin meydana gelmesinde etkilidir.

Hegemonik modelin gereksinimleri kalkınma süreçlerinde devlet unsurunun en önemli öge haline gelmesinde büyük rol oynamıştır. Suriye ve Libya'da devlet iktidar grubunun hegemonik aracı haline bürünmüştür. Kalkınma süreçleri ise

toplumsal güçlerin kontrollü ve baskıcı bir biçimde eklenmesiyle ilerlemiştir. Suriye ve Libya'daki sömürgecilik sonrası devlet-toplum kompleksleri toplumlararası etkileşimin mekanizmalarına maruz kaldığında ise sömürgecilik döneminde oluşturulan devlet kurumları yeni oluşan iktidar grubu tarafından ele geçirilmiştir. Devlet kurumları bu süreçler içinde her ne kadar sağlamlaştırılsa da devlet-toplum kompleksleri için bu süreçler bağımlılığı ağırlaştırmış ve toplumsal güçlerin iktidar gruplarının egemenliği altında eklenmesi için gerekli kapasitelerin ciddi biçimde altını oymuştur. Devlet-toplum komplekslerinin işleyişinde en temel mekanizmalar ise dağıtım ve baskı mekanizmaları olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Toplumlararası etkileşimin koşulları ODKA toplumlarındaki sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin izlediği seyirde oldukça belirleyicidir. Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki jeopolitik çatışmalar aynı zamanda ideolojik-kültürel çerçeveleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Savaşın her iki tarafı da karşı tarafı kontrol edebilmeyi ve kısıtlamayı amaçlamıştır. Toplumlararası etkileşimin ortaya çıkan özellikleri olarak bu durum ODKA bölgesindeki iktidarlar tarafından da kullanılan amalgam ideolojik-kültürel çerçevelerin oluşmasında etkilidir. Uluslararası iş bölümünde ve jeopolitik yapılarıdaki konumlarına bağlı olarak devlet-toplum kompleksleri toplumsal güçleri kendi iktidarları altında kontrol etmeye çalışırken, savunmacı modernleşme süreçleri, ulusal bağımsızlık hareketleri ve de değişen üretim ilişkileri sonucu yükselen toplumsal güçlerle karşı karşıya kalmışlardır.

Hegemonik modelin yayılması yoluyla, dış etkilerin baskıları Suriye ve Libya'da en örgütlü gücün iktidara gelmesinin yolunu açmıştır. Suriye'deki üretim ilişkileri bu bağlamda daha çeşitlidir. Üretim ilişkileri ve mezhepçiliğin amalgam bir halde birleşmesiyle toplumun tabakaları daha da katmanlı hale gelmiştir. Toprak sahipleri ve bürokratlar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Fransız mandası dönemindeki devlet oluşumu süreçlerinden etkilenmişlerdir. Libya bağlamında ise temel toplumsal özellik kabileciliktir ve üretim faktörleri ticaret ilişkileri ile sınırlı kalmıştır. İtalyan sömürgesi altında derin toplumsal bir dönüşüm yaşanmıştır. Senussiye tarikatı Sirenayka bölgesinde etkilidir. Her iki toplumda ortak olan unsur ise ordunun en örgütlü toplumsal güç olmasıdır.

Toplumlararası etkileşimin ideolojik-kültürel etkileri bu toplumlardaki yerel İslami, patrimonyal ve patronaj yapıları ile amalgam oluşum meydana getirmiştir. İktidar grupları bu amalgamlar yoluyla dünya kalkınma yapılarına uyum sağlamış ve toplumsal güçler üzerindeki iktidarlarını güçlendirmişlerdir. Bu amalgam oluşumlar hegemonik modelin altında yatan yapısal mantık ve toplumsal oluşumların yerel koşulları arasındaki etkileşime dikkat çeken etkileşimli bir bakış açısının da önemini vurgulamaktadır.

İktidardaki gruplar amalgam oluşumlar yoluyla seferber olan toplumsal güçleri bastırırken, aynı zamanda popülist-otoriter rejimler şeklinde kurumsallaşmışlardır. ODKA toplumlarının hegemonik modele uyum sağlama süreçleri ise Libya bağlamında petrol gelirleri ile gerçekleşirken, Suriye bağlamında işçi dövizleri ve stratejik yardımlar sayesinde olmuştur. Sonuç olarak devlet kurumlarının dağıtım ve baskı mekanizmalarının kabiliyetleri oranında popülist-otoriter rejimler güçlenmiştir.

Popülist-otoriter rejimlerin yeri pekişirken, toplumsal tabakalaşma ve farklılaşma mekanizmaları toplumsal güçlerin yerel düzenlenişini belirlemiştir. Devlet-toplum komplekslerinin siyasal-ekonomisi ise patronaj ve patrimonyal toplumsal ilişkilerle amalgam hallerde ortaya çıkmıştır.

Bu bağlamda ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma yaklaşımının eleştirileri anlam kazanmaktadır. Demokratikleşme, rantıye devlet kuramı gibi Avrupa-merkezci açıklamalar toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişindeki değişimleri, siyasal-ekonomilerin dönüşümleri ve devlet-toplum komplekslerinin tabanlarının özelliklerinin etkileşimli doğasını açıklamada yetersiz kalırken, ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma Suriye ve Libya'daki kalkınma süreçlerinin dünya kalkınma yapılarının etkisinde nasıl şekillendiğini ele alır. Hegemonik modelin yansımaları Suriye ve Libya'nın dünya yapılarına bağımlı şekillerde nasıl eklemlendiğinin altını çizer. Benzer şekilde, toplumsal güçlerin seçici eklemlenme süreçleri de eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınmanın görgül tezahürleri doğrultusunda ilerler. Bu yüzden, Avrupa-merkezci açıklamaların beklentilerinin aksine, Suriye ve Libya modernleşme ve liberalleşme yolunda ilerleyememiş, umulduğu gibi demokratik sonuçlar ortaya koyamamış, sürdürülebilir ve kapsayıcı bir ekonomik büyüme tecrübe edememiştir.

Kalkınma süreçlerinin gelişiminde toplumsal güçlerin belirmesi bazı tarihsel eğilimler doğrultusunda gerçekleşmiştir. Ekonomik aktivitelerde devletin konumu Suriye ve Libya bağlamında özel bir öneme sahiptir. Devlet kurumları üretim ilişkilerinin en kilit belirleyicileri olmuştur. Her iki ülke için de ortak özellik ekonomik aktivitelerin temelini rantiyeye özellikler göstermesidir. Rantiye tartışması bu bağlamda toplumsal güçlerin belirmesini ve amalgam oluşum meydana gelmesini açıklayacak önemli fikirler sunar.

Rantiye devlet teorisi toplum tabakalarının devletin dağıtım mekanizmaları yoluyla taleplerini kontrol edilebileceğini tartışır. Devlet rantiyeye üretim ilişkileri üzerinde konumlanarak toplumun isteklerinden kendini ayrı tutabilir. Ancak rantiyeye devlet kavramı indirgemeci bir yaklaşımdır. Her ne kadar petrol gelirleri dağıtım mekanizmalarının pekişmesini sağlasa da, ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma petrol gelirlerinin rejimlere toplumsal güçlerden ve dünya kalkınma yapılarından bağımsız bir alan yarattığı düşüncesine karşı çıkar. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma Suriye ve Libya'daki rantiyeye üretim ilişkilerini tarihsel bir koşul olarak değerlendirir.

Dahası rantiyeye devlet teorisi açıklayıcı güçten yoksundur. Özellikle de kabileci ve mezhepsel yapıların devamlılığı konusunu açıklayamaz. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma kabilecilik ve mezhepçilik gibi geleneksel yapıların kalkınmanın bileşik halleri sayesinde varlığını devam ettirdiğini tartışır. Bu yapıların devamlılığı petrol gelirleri, stratejik yardımlar, işçi dövizleri ve söz konusu ülkelerin uluslararası işbölümündeki konumu gibi unsurlarla belirlenir. Bu sebeple rantiyeye üretim ilişkileri kapitalist ve yerel toplumsal oluşumlardan meydana gelen amalgam haller kapsamında anlaşılmalıdır.

Rantiye kavramına ek olarak, Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik süreçlerin incelemeleri çoğunlukla kültürel özcü yaklaşımlar bağlamında karizmatik bireysel figürler ve sivil toplum eksikliği üzerinden otoriter yapıların devamlılığı ve baskıcı siyasi ilişkiler üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu açıklamalar her ne kadar toplumsal oluşumların belirli özelliklerine işaret etseler de devlet-toplum komplekslerini şeyleştirilen bir anlayışa sahiptirler. Bu sebeple de kalkınma modelleri ve iktidar gruplarında yaşanan değişimleri açıklamada yetersizdirler.

Ortaya çıkarıcı inceleme toplumlararası etkileşimin etkisi altında jeopolitik baskılar ve Keynezyen-refahçı kalkınma modelinin orduyu lider toplumsal güç olarak hazırladığını anlatır. Kalkınma süreçlerinin seyri bu toplumların dünya kalkınma yapılarına bağımlı şekilde eklemelenmesinden ötürü derin dönüşümlere maruz kalmıştır. Kalkınma süreçleri Suriye’de askeri-ticari kompleks tarafından yönetilmiş, Libya’da ise askeri-kabileci bir kompleks yönetimi ele almıştır. Bu kompleks oluşumların meydana gelmesi siyasal ikamecilik mekanizmasının hegemonik kalkınma modeli kapsamında ne derece önemli etkileri olduğunu kanıtlar.

1980li yıllardan itibaren dünya kalkınma yapılarında yaşanan değişimler hegemonik kalkınma modelinin de değişmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Buna bağlı olarak, Suriye ve Libya’daki ulusal kalkınma yapıları da kademeli liberalleşme süreçlerine girmiş bu da ithal ikameci sanayileşme modelinin sonlanmasına haliyle de popülist ve refahçı özelliklerin giderek azalmasına yol açmıştır.

Neoliberal hegemonik modelin ODKA toplumlarına yayılımında ise dış etkenler kilit rol oynamıştır. Libya’da uluslararası yaptırımlar rejimi bu konuda belirleyici olurken, Suriye’de ise ekonomik modelin başarısız performansı ve Uluslararası Finans Örgütlerinin baskıları kademeli liberalleşme politikalarının önünü açmıştır. Suriye ekonomisinin Körfez sermayesini cazip kılma çabaları bu dönüşümü hızlandırıcı unsurlardandır. Dahası 1991 yılında Sovyetler’in çöküşü ve Soğuk Savaş düzeninin sona ermesi Suriye ve Libya’nın liberalleşme politikalarını benimsemesinde etkili olmuştur. Bu süreçler Suriye ve Libya’nın devlet-toplum kompleksleri için derin etkileri beraberinde getirmiştir. Sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçleri iktidar gruplarının kontrolü altında gerçekleşmiştir. ODKA toplumlarının otoriter eğilimleri pekiştirilirken, popülist eğilimlerin ciddi ölçüde altı oyulmuştur.

2003 yılında Irak’ın ABD tarafından işgali ve terörizme karşı küresel savaş söylemi Suriye ve Libya’nın popülist-otoriter kalkınma modellerinin neoliberal modele doğru evrilmesinde belirleyici olan jeopolitik baskılardır. Neoliberalleşme sürecinin ekonomik boyutları ise Körfez sermayesi ve Avrupa Birliği ile imzalanan ticaret anlaşmaları doğrultusunda ilerlemiştir.

Neoliberalleşme süreçleri ODKA toplumlarının dünya kalkınma yapılarına geri dönülemez biçimde eklenmiş olduğu bir bağlamda gerçekleşmiştir. Suriye ve Libya'daki tarihsel hakimiyet ve sömürü yapılarının neoliberal dönüşümü yeni amalgam toplumsal oluşumlarla sonuçlanmıştır. Mezhepçi ve kabileci kimlikler özelleştirilmiş, siyasal süreçler dışlayıcı şekilde liberalleşmiştir. Sonuçta birikim ve sömürü süreçleri uluslararasılaşır ve finansallaşırken, sosyo-ekonomik yansımalar dışlayıcı ve eşitsiz olmuştur.

Suriye ve Libya'daki ekonomik yapılar bölgesel ve küresel sermaye devrelerine giderek artan şekilde dahil olurken, rantıye üretim modeli yerel olarak dağıtım ilişkilerini pekiştirmiştir. Devletin ekonomik rolünün azalmasıyla uzun yıllar boyunca gelir yardımları ve istihdam kapsamında devlete bağımlı hale getirilmiş olan kitlelerin talepleri ise cevapsız kalmıştır. Suriye ve Libya'daki kalkınma modelinin popülist özü azaldıkça iktidardaki grupların meşruiyetine duyulan güven ve saygı da zarar görmüştür. Böyle bir ortamda toplumun dışlanmış ve soyutlanmış tabakaları ulus altı kimliklere karşı daha hassas hale gelmiş ve toplumsal hareketlilik neoliberal otoriter politikalar yoluyla engellendiğinden rejimlere yönelik köktenci bir toplumsal tabanın unsurları oluşmuştur. Suriye ve Libya'nın yerel kalkınma yapılarına neoliberal kalkınma modelinin giderek artan derecede yayılması bu bağlamda Arap İsyanları sürecinde tecrübe edilen toplumsal gerilimlerin ve çatışmaların temelini atmış ve sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerini tetiklemiştir.

Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınmanın etkileşimliliği bu sebeple sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin yansımalarına özellikle dikkat çeker. Ancak ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma çerçevesi Arap İsyanları sürecinde yaşanan toplumsal gerilimlerin Suriye ve Libya'daki kapitalist kalkınma süreçlerinin görgül tezahürleri ile bir tutulmasına karşı çıkar. Bunun yerine bu görgül tezahürlerin kapitalist toplumsal bütünsellik içinde meydana gelen geniş sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin nedensel etkileri olarak görülmesini gerektiğini vurgular. Bu bağlamda incelemenin temel amacı eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma süreçlerinde işleyen mekanizmaların belirlenimleri hakkında yerel, uluslararası koşul ve durumları da göz önünde bulundurarak daha derin bilgiler edinmektir.

Suriye'deki isyanlar Suudi Arabistan, Türkiye ve Qatar'ın (yerel muhalif güçlerle etkileşime girerek) da müdahil olduğu jeopolitik bir mücadeleyi doğurmuştur (Saouli, 2015: 328). Aynı zamanda İran'ın direniş eksenini de pekiştirilmiştir. İran, Rusya ve Hizbullah gibi aktörler ise Suriye'deki rejimi desteklemiştir. Ancak bu gelişmeler Körfez ülkelerinin Suriye yerel kalkınma yapılarındaki finansal iç içe geçmişlik durumundan ayrı düşünülmemelidir.

Benzer şekilde Libya'daki insani müdahale kalkınma süreçlerinin karmaşıklığına güzel bir örnektir. Kaddafi sonrası Libya'da birçok aktör yer almaktadır. Bu durum Libya'nın dönüşümünün geniş kalkınma süreçlerinden ayrı ele alınmasını imkânsız kılmaktadır. Libya'da petrol bakanlığı ve merkez bankası yoluyla neoliberal dönüşüm ve birikim süreçleri neoliberal eğilimli gruplar tarafından yönetilmiştir (Prashad, 2012: 98). Ek olarak Hanieh (2013: 139) temeli Körfez sermayesine bağlı olan ulus ötesi burjuva gruplarının Libya'nın dönüşüm süreçlerinde giderek artan etkisine vurgu yapmıştır.

Arap İsyanları ODKA toplumlarında toplumsal güçlerin gelişimi ve hegemonik modelin yayılımı açısından çok önemli sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Her ne kadar kökten bir sosyo-politik dönüşümü yönlendirebilecek şekilde toplumsal güçlerin düzenlenişi değişmemiş olsa da isyanlar ve sonrasında yaşananlar iktidar gruplarının baş etmek zorunda kaldığı şiddetli bir test olarak tarihe geçmiştir.

5.Ortaya Çıkarıcı Kalkınma Yaklaşımının Araştırma Programı

Toplumsal görüngüler çoklu nedensel mekanizmalar doğrultusunda belirlenirler. Bu inceleme toplumsal bilimsel araştırmanın bütünsel ve etkileşimli bir yaklaşımla toplumsal görüngünün ortaya çıkan özelliklerinin öncelenmesi gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Eleştirel gerçekçi yöntem bilim ontolojik derinlik ve karmaşık nedensellik anlayışı ile uygun bir bilimsel çerçeve oluşturulabilmesi için güçlü bir temel sunmaktadır. Bu inceleme ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınmanın uluslararası ilişkilerde meydana gelen tarihi toplumsal oluşumları ortaya çıkaran çoklu belirlenim setlerine dikkat çekici bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır.

Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma toplumsal çoğulluğun ortaya çıkan özelliklerini inceleyen karmaşık ve etkileşimli bir çerçevedir. Haklarında kavramsallaştırmalar

geliştirdiğimiz fiili olayları üreten altta yatan yapısal mantık kapsamında incelemeler yapar. Toplumlararası toplumsal oluşumlar üzerinde oluşturucu bir etkiye sahiptir. Toplumlararası etkileşimin mekanizmaları hegemonik kalkınma modeli kavramı ile ele alınmıştır. Hegemonik model kalkınma süreçlerinin maddi yeniden üretim güdüsü ile hareket eden toplumsal güçlerin tarihi koşullar içindeki düzenlenişine göre anlam kazandığını belirtir. Bu etkileşimli kalkınma süreçlerinden doğan yapısal düzlemde toplumsal güçler kalkınma yapılarında hegemonik konumlar elde ettiklerinde, hegemonik modelin özellikleri ve koşulları da belirlenir. Eşitsiz ve bileşik kalkınma şeklinde meydana gelen toplumlararası etkileşimin yayılımı toplumsal farklılaşma ve tabakalaşma ilişkilerini de etkiler. Hegemonik model böylelikle toplumlararası etkileşimin yapısal bağlamını oluşturur ve sosyo-politik dönüşüm süreçlerini yönlendirir.

Hegemonik kalkınmanın önemi kalkınma yapıları hakkında bilgi toplamaya odaklanmış olmasıyla yakından ilgilidir. Eleştirel gerçekçi toplumsal bilimsel anlayışa göre, eşitsiz kalkınma ilişkilerinin baskı ve hâkimiyetle olan bağı altta yatan yapılar hakkında bilgi edinmeyi ve eşitsizliklerin görgül tezahürlerini eleştirmek için bütünsel bir yaklaşımı insanın özgürleşmesinin önünde duran yapısal kısıtlamaların üstesinden gelmek adına elzem kılmaktadır.

Suriye ve Libya'daki sosyo-politik dönüşümlerin ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma kapsamında incelenmesi toplumlararası etkileşimin çalışılmasına üç temel katkı sağlamaktadır. Birincisi, eksik olan toplum bilimsel yaklaşım uygun bir biçimde ele alınmaktadır. Ortaya çıkarıcı kalkınma toplumsal güçlerin gelişimini ve bunun toplumların tecrübe ettiği sosyo-politik dönüşümlere yansımalarını önceler. İkincisi, dünya kalkınma süreçlerinin altta yatan yapısal mantığı etkin bir biçimde incelenmektedir. Toplumlararası tarihi toplumsal oluşumlar üzerindeki oluşturucu etkisi indirgemeci ve determinist olmadan kavranabilmektedir. Üçüncüsü, toplumsal çoğulluğun etkileşimliliği amalgam oluşumlar yoluyla araştırılmaktadır. Çoklu belirlenim setlerinin etkileri doğrusal olmayan ve daha açıklayıcı bir yaklaşımla değerlendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda böyle bir yaklaşım kültürel tikelcilik ve Avrupa-merkezci evrenselciliğin ötesine geçebilecek bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Zamansal ve mekânsal olarak genişletilmek yoluyla ortaya

ıkarıcı kalkınma zerine yapılacak ileriki alıřmalar hegemonik modelin toplumlar zerindeki yansımalarına ok nemli katkılar saęlayacaktır.

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