

“APPLYING LEVEL OF ANALYSIS DISCUSSION TO THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN GERMANY AND TURKEY: 1999- 2014”

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **APPLYING LEVEL OF ANALYSIS DISCUSSION TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND TURKEY: 1999- 2014**

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Relations between Germany and Turkey include many different aspects. Therefore, applying the level of analysis to their relations is very useful to understand them. Three levels of analysis which are derived from Kenneth Waltz's three images are used for this discussion. These are system level, state level and individual level. System level refers to the power positions of both Germany and Turkey while the state level indicates the domestic features of these two countries that are effective on the relations. Individual level, on the other hand, shows how the leaders of Germany and Turkey are influential on the relations. This study investigates how relations between Germany and Turkey can be studied at all of these levels.

**Keywords:** Germany, Turkey, System Level, State Level, Individual Level.

## ÖZ

### ALMANYA TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİNİ ANALİZ DÜZEYİ TARTIŞMASI KAPSAMINDA İNCELEME: 1999- 2014

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Bu tezin amacı, birden fazla açıdan incelenebilir olan Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinde önemli bir yere sahip olan analiz düzeyleri tartışmasını kullanarak açıklamaktır. Kenneth Waltz tarafından ortaya atılan analiz düzeyleri olan uluslararası sistem, ulus devlet ve birey Almanya ve Türkiye ilişkilerini açıklayabilmek için ele alınmıştır. Sistem düzeyi, Almanya ve Türkiye'nin uluslararası sistemdeki güç konumlarının iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilere etkisini incelerken, ulus devlet düzeyi bu iki ülkenin içişlerindeki gelişmelerin ilişkileri nasıl etkilediğini inceler. İlişkileri birey düzeyinde incelemek istediğimizde ise Almanya ve Türkiye'nin liderlerinin ülke ilişkilerine olan etkisini tartışmış oluruz. Bu doğrultuda, bu tez Almanya- Türkiye ilişkilerinin üç analiz düzeyi kapsamında da ele alınabileceğini iddia etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Almanya, Türkiye, Sistem Düzeyi, Devlet Düzeyi, Birey Düzeyi

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DA	Democratic Awakening Party
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDR	German Democratic Republic
Jusos	Young Social Democrats
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party)
MSP	Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
WWII	World War II
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

One can see a masterpiece of German architecture on the Asian shoreline of the city of Istanbul. Haydarpaşa station stands not only as an example of architectural masterpiece but also indicates that relations between Germany and Turkey have a long history. Alkan describes that the relations between Ottoman Empire and Germany had been shaped by the interests, admiration and friendship during different times.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the relations can be traced back to earlier times. Ottoman armies march to Vienna first in 1529 and then in 1683 placed the image of Turks permanently in Western consciousness in particular for the German speaking people of Central Europe. In addition to that, German Ambassador to İstanbul had been appointed in 1554 to improve the relations.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, although Otto von Bismarck did not want to involve directly in the “Eastern Question” during his period of chancellorship and refrained from possible disagreements among European powers, Germany was part of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and military and civilian personnel from Germany were sent to Ottoman Empire starting from his period.<sup>3</sup> Congress of Berlin marked an important turning point for Ottoman Empire, since it was realized from that point on that interests of European powers were directed against the survival of the empire<sup>4</sup> which helps to explain the close relations between Germany and Ottoman Empire during the next period.

Haydarpaşa station was designed as a part of railway from Berlin to Baghdad. It was part of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s *Weltpolitik*.<sup>5</sup> He wanted to transform Germany into a world power and Abdulhamid II was there to assist him in his pursuit. For the

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<sup>1</sup> M. Nail Alkan, “Hayranlık, Dostluk ve Çıkar Üçgeninde Türk-Alman İlişkileri”, *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, No. 34 (2015), p.46

<sup>2</sup> Uğur İnan, *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Almanların Misyonerlik Faaliyetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,2015), p.18

<sup>3</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu*, (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018) p.77

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.46

<sup>5</sup> Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin - Baghdad Express*, (London: Penguin Books, 2011) p.2

Ottoman Sultan, as it was mentioned, it was clear that other European powers were trying for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Afterwards, with the enthusiasm of Enver Pasha, Ottoman Empire and Germany formed an alliance and in the end Ottoman Empire took part in the First World War on the Germany's side in 1914. At this point, Ottoman Empire had already been on postwar conditions after the long wars in the Balkans and Tripoli War against Italy both of which had exhausted resources of the empire.<sup>6</sup> Between 1914 to 1918, they fought together on several fronts. Military supplies as well as military personnel to help organize the Ottoman Army were sent from Germany.<sup>7</sup> This war not only increased the importance of Germany for Turkey in the historical context but also paved the way for the involvement of Germany in one of the main issues of Turkish foreign policy which is the controversy about the events of 1915 regarding the Armenian population of Ottoman Empire. As it is argued by Alkan, German military personnel who were at the high ranks of Ottoman army suggested the relocation of Armenian populations in certain regions.<sup>8</sup> This indicates the multifaceted nature of the relations between Germans and Turks. At the end of the war, alliance of Ottoman Empire and Wilhelm's Germany was defeated. Victorious powers signed Treaty of Versailles with Germany and Treaty of Sevres with Ottoman Empire. Germany was declared republic and in Anatolia, War of Liberation began in 1919 resulting in Republic of Turkey in 1923. Until the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, relations between Germany and Turkey were not very intense but it was friendly with the memories of Great War.<sup>9</sup> During the Second World War, relations between Turkey and Germany were mainly about Germany's efforts to persuade Turkey to join the war on its side or at least neutrality. Turkey was trying to stay out of war. In terms of domestic affairs, 80 renowned German scientists and artists who suffered the

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<sup>6</sup> Eric von Falkenhayn, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Almanya*, trans. Bursalı Mehmet Nihat, ed. Faruk Yılmaz (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2012) p.60

<sup>7</sup> Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl*, trans. Eşref Bengi Özbilen, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010)

<sup>8</sup> M. Nail Alkan, "1915 Ermeni Tehcir Kanunu ve Almanya'nın Etkisi", *Akademik Bakış*, Vol. 8, No. 15 (2014) p.98

<sup>9</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914 - 1995)*, (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019) p.267

persecution of the Nazi regime took refuge in Turkey.<sup>10</sup> German architects, artists and professors, which included Ernst Reuter who would later become the mayor of West Berlin<sup>11</sup>, have contributed greatly to the establishment of modern Turkey with their work. They have been very important for the improvement of academy in newly founded Turkish Republic. Fritz Neumark argues that the relative importance of refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany never been as great as anywhere in the Republic of Turkey.

After the World War II, relations between Germany and Turkey were generally shaped by the realities of Cold War and the competition between USA and USSR. Both of them became member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, Turkey's bid to membership to European Union (EU) also started during the Cold War and to this day it has continued to be an important aspect of relations between Germany and Turkey.

Today, relations between Germany and Turkey are shaped by wide-ranging issues. Three million people of Turkish descent live in Germany and almost half of them have German citizenship and they have an important effect on bilateral relations. Moreover, it can be argued that there is a broad coverage of Germany in Turkish media as well as world news in Germany includes Turkey more than any other country. Furthermore, Turkey is one of the main destinations for German tourists and their share in the tourism income of Turkey is very important. In addition, bilateral relations are intense and institutionalized between Germany and Turkey which includes "annual meetings between the two Foreign Ministers and the establishment of a number of working groups at the level of senior government officials to address issues such as bilateral relations, security policy, counter-terrorism, regional issues and Europe."<sup>12</sup> Thus, high level visits between two countries are held very frequently. Also, Germany is Turkey's most important trading partner and with total investments

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<sup>10</sup>Almanya'nın Türkiye'deki Dış Temsilcilikleri: Türkiye'ye Sığınan Almanlar, <https://tuerkei.diplo.de/tr-de/themen/kultur/-/1797648> (accessed June 1,2019)

<sup>11</sup> Ahmet Özgür Türen, *Atatürk Ülkesine Sığınanlar*, (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları, 2019) p.99

<sup>12</sup> Federal Foreign Office, "Turkey: Bilateral Relations", [https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/tuerkei-node/turkey/228290#content\\_1](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/tuerkei-node/turkey/228290#content_1)

of over 14 billion dollars since 1980, Germany is the second largest foreign investor in Turkey after the Netherlands.<sup>13</sup>

All of these different issues indicate that Germany is very important for Turkey and vice versa. Three million people of Turkish descent in Germany are affected by both Germany's perception of Turkey and Turkey's approach to Germany. Moreover, it can be argued that as one of the most important states of European Union, Germany's standing regarding the Turkish membership to EU is very significant for Turkey. Because of these facts it is very important to understand the relations between Germany and Turkey. Also, it can be clearly seen that relations between Germany and Turkey take place at different levels.

This study aims to understand the relations between Germany and Turkey between 1999 to 2014 by using the level of analysis discussion in International Relations. This period is chosen since it marks the beginning of Turkey's official status as a candidate state and ends with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's election as a President in August 2014 which marks the beginning of another period in Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) era. This study will also be helpful for understanding the next period of relations between Germany and Turkey in which the discussions move away from EU process. To do this, firstly, level of analysis debate in the discipline of International Relations is explained. Kenneth Waltz's three levels that he used for explaining the concept of war in international affairs are taken as three levels for this study. These levels are system level, state level and individual level. System level refers to the relative position of states (in this study Germany and Turkey). At this level, the actions of the states are explained by the circumstances in which all states exist. State level, on the other hand, looks at the domestic feature of nation states to understand their foreign policy. Finally, at the individual level, foreign policies are explained by looking at the leaders. It can be asserted that relations between Germany and Turkey can be found at all of these level.

After covering the levels of analysis, study continues with the German - Turkish relations at the system level. To do this, one should have an understanding of security realities of Cold War and how it evolved into its structure today. Using system level to understand the relations means also understanding the power positions of both

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.



Turkey and Germany. At the state level on the other hand, one should look at the internal realities of Germany and Turkey and how they influence the relations. For this level, firstly; regime, state structure and government changes in Germany and Turkey are analyzed. After that, democratization and human rights issues in Turkey, economic relations, public opinion and Turks in Germany are discussed for state level. Finally, this study is concluded with individual level in which understanding the leaders is very important and to do this personalities of Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel, Bülent Ecevit and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are analyzed.

## CHAPTER 2

### LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Kenneth Waltz has posed how to decline the incidence of war as his main question in his famous and influential book *Man, the State and War*.<sup>14</sup> According to him; to reach a conclusion, one must have an understanding of the causes of war. He has shown that these causes can be found by investigating what he has called three different images of international relations: men, the structure of separate states and international system.<sup>15</sup> Every solution to the problem of war must be related to one of these three images. Moreover, as Waltz argues, an accurate understanding of international relations may require combination of three images.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, J. David Singer asserts that an observer may choose to focus on the parts or on the the whole.<sup>17</sup> In the discipline of International Relations; this means that in order to understand a certain problem, a researcher might look at the international system or he or she might prefer parts of the system. This study takes Waltz's three images (although they are called "levels of analysis") as its starting point while it attempts to understand the nature of the relations between Germany and Turkey during the period of 1999 to 2014. Therefore, it is very important to have an understanding of levels of analysis problem in international relations.

Although J. David Singer was the one who brought up the problem of level of analysis in the discipline of International Relations, it is important to look at Waltz's description of them since the subsequent studies have been based on the three images of Waltz. First level that Waltz has explained is human behaviour. Proponents of this idea have seen the change in men necessary in order to achieve a more peaceful

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<sup>14</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p.2

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.14

<sup>17</sup> David Singer, "Level- of- Analysis Problem in International Relations" *World Politics*, Vol.14, No.1 (1961): p.77

world.<sup>18</sup> According to this understanding, human behavior is at the root of the political relations between states. Therefore, to comprehend the relations between states; this perspective argues, one must look at the individual behavior, in this case, behaviors of the policy makers. Internal organizations of the states is the second level that Waltz has addressed.<sup>19</sup> This means that the internal structure of a state determines its external behavior in general. For example, its type of government can explain a state's policies towards another state or towards a specific foreign policy issue. The third level can be argued as the most important level for Waltz since it led to theory of neorealism or structural realism with Waltz as its most prominent scholar. This level is the level of international system in which there is no supreme authority to regulate the relations among states. Therefore, the structure of international system is considered as anarchical. Because of this type of structure, each state has to rely on its own devices and sources and this has a significant effect on the external behaviour of states.

Singer, on the other hand, asserts that the issue of choosing a macro or micro level is the issue of methodological convenience and he employs the international system and the national sub-systems to examine. Furthermore, he argues for three requirements for an analytical model. First requirement is an accurate description of the phenomena which means that there should be a clear representation of the phenomena under consideration. Singer gives an example from cartography and difficulty of transferring the actual shape of planet earth to the two-dimensional surface of a map.<sup>20</sup> Here, it can be inferred that any meaningful use of any model in international relations needs to display the realities of world politics as accurate as possible. The second requirement is a capacity to explain the relationships among the chosen phenomena. Singer asserts the validity of explanation as the primary purpose of the theory. In addition to these two requirements, Singer argues that prediction is the final requirement for an analytical model. According to him, a researcher can demand a promise of prediction from the analytical model.

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<sup>18</sup> Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p.18

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81

<sup>20</sup> Singer, "Level- of- Analysis Problem in International Relations", p.78

Different IR scholars have displayed different preferences regarding the level of analysis. For example, it is well known that structural realism always emphasises the significance of the international system whereas democratic peace theory of liberal understanding highlights the domestic features of states. On the other hand, in some cases, it is necessary to understand the decision makers of foreign policy of states - men and women who have the responsibility. However, even though different IR scholars have had different approaches regarding the level of analysis and that they have declared preference for one of the levels over others, this study chooses to understand relations between Germany and Turkey in the light of the original three levels of Waltz while trying to take Singer's three requirements into account. It is important to have an understanding of different aspects to an issue since there might be more than one reason for a state to act in a particular way. Generally in social sciences, events have more than one cause and these causes can be found in various locations.<sup>21</sup> In international relations, for example, for a state to act in a particular way about a particular foreign policy issue can be caused by domestic reasons while it is also possible that other reasons may be related to policies of another state. As Yurdusev asserts the levels are interconnected and although an analysis of one of them without paying attention to others is not wrong, it is incomplete.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the relative importance of systemic, domestic and individual variables for a particular issue should be assessed.<sup>23</sup> Hence, for the purpose of this study, three levels of system, state and individual should be summarized.

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<sup>21</sup> Barry Buzan, "Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered" in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p.198

<sup>22</sup> A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (03 1993): p.83

<sup>23</sup> William B, Moul "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 03 (09 1973): p.496

## 2.1. System Level

System in international relations refers to the condition in which states exist in the world. It refers to the fact that there are many sovereign states in the world but there is no supreme authority to dictate the actions of the states. This condition enables states to act without being subject to a higher authority. The absence of the authority also means that a state should rely on its own devices to reach its desirable outcomes which leads to occasional use of force by a state to attain its goals. Thus, the actions of the states are decided by the circumstances in which all states exist. This is what is meant by system level in international relations.

To understand the system level, one should have an understanding of realist theory of International Relations. Roots of the realist theory can be traced back to Ancient Greece with Thucydides. Realism became a prominent theory of the discipline of International Relations at the end of the Second World War when interwar period idealism did not help to prevent the occurrence of another major war. Although there are different versions of realism, there are several points that are acknowledged by all of them.

First of all, there is an understanding that nature of international affairs is competitive. For instance, Hans Morgenthau argues that international politics is about struggle for power.<sup>24</sup> States are considered to be competing for power in the international area. The second point that is common and the most important one for this study is the absence of any centralized authority to possess power over states. According to realists, unlike domestic system, international system is not hierarchical and as a result of this, each state has to rely on its own power. This condition of states in international system is referred as self - help. Another assumption that is shared by realists is that main actors of international system is nation states. Although some realists do not deny the existence of other actors in international relations, they argue that their importance is not equal to that of nation states. The idea that survival is the main purpose of states in international arena is the fourth point that is common to all

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<sup>24</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, p.14

realists. According to realists, a state cannot be certain about the intentions of other states while trying to survive. Therefore, “security dilemma” arises in the relations between states where one side cannot trust to other. If a certain state wants to increase its military capabilities because it is not sure about the intention of another state, consequently it causes the other one to increase its own military capabilities. In the end, initial assumption of the former state is realized. Finally, concept of power should be mentioned to understand realism. It is an integral part of realism. Mearsheimer argues that states have to act according to balance of power if they want to survive.<sup>25</sup> Balance of power is the realist understanding that in the international system, states tend to balance each other. Although realism can be divided as classical realism, neorealism, and neo - classical realism, for the system level the focus should be on the neorealism since it’s mainly about the system level.

The understanding of neorealism, which is also known as structural realism, has its roots in the work of Kenneth Waltz. He asserts that theories to explain international relations can be divided to two as reductionist and systemic theories.<sup>26</sup> Reductionist theories are the ones that explain the international politics by looking at the individual or national level whereas the systemic theories try to understand the relations between states by looking at the structure of the international level. Instead of analyzing the parts of the system (which are nation states), international system itself is taken as the level of analysis. This understanding accepts that international system is anarchic and this anarchic structure of international system determines the relations between states.

Unlike domestic structures where there are hierarchy and centralization, in international structure of the relations among states there is no higher authority to dictate the behaviors of states. In such a system, there is the priority of survival for states. Since there is no one to help states in case of an emergency, they have to rely on their own power. Power and security are very important concepts for in the anarchic nature of the system of international relations since each unit (in this case

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<sup>25</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), p.3

<sup>26</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (Berkeley: Addison - Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.18

states) should be able to take care of itself. For neorealism, foreign policy behavior of a state depends on the power position of that state in the international system.<sup>27</sup> It means that power position among states is the deterministic feature in the international system.

The foreign policy of a state, according to neorealism, is decided by the relative power position the state has in the international system and its relative power position is decided by the capabilities. Neorealist view argues that a state's power is based on its political, military and economic capabilities which can be used in dealing with other states. Waltz names several different capabilities of states: "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence".<sup>28</sup> These capabilities are influential in determining the power position of states.

Power positions of states indicate the structure of the international system. Neorealists distinguish between bipolar and multipolar systems<sup>29</sup> although Nye and Welch add unipolar system as the third one.<sup>30</sup> Bipolar system means that there are two main poles that constitute the system. In bipolarity, a state with different capabilities but not a pole in the system itself, does not have a strong possibility of being completely independent. It has to rely on one of the great powers. In contrast to this, in the non-bipolar or multipolar system there is a higher chance of acting independently. In such a system, it can use its capabilities without being restricted by a super power. This approach can shed light on the changes of foreign policies of Germany and Turkey during and after the Cold War given their power positions.

Having described the system level to understand the relations between states, three requirements and advantages and disadvantages of the system level can be discussed. To begin with, for its description capability, it can be argued that by looking

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<sup>27</sup> Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy" in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p.37

<sup>28</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics*, p.131

<sup>29</sup> Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy", p.44

<sup>30</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A. Welch, *Küresel Çatışma ve İşbirliğini Anlamak*, trans. Renan Akman, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018), p.68

at the system as the cause of foreign policy behaviors of states gives us a very accurate picture. It describes the system as the determiner of the relations between states. This level reveals that security interests lead states to act in a particular way since survival is the main concern for states<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, when relations between states are studied at the system level, the states are considered as rational and there is a uniformity of each state.

As for the explanation capacity, it can be asserted that system level asserts that relations between states are shaped by the security concerns. It argues that these concerns lead to certain behaviors of states. For example, it can be stated that the relations between Turkey and Germany between 1945 to 1990 cannot be explained without taking security issues of Cold War into account.

Prediction capability of system level can be considered to be very adequate. By focusing on the system as a whole, we are enabled to comprehend the patterns of interaction which in turn gives us the ability to predict possible results.<sup>32</sup> For example, when a state increases its military capabilities, it can be expected that its neighboring states will act together due to their shared security concerns.

The most notable advantage of the system level is the fact that it is the most comprehensive level. This level allows us to study international relations as a whole. As Singer argues, “the necessary comprehensiveness is lost when the focus shifts to a lower level.”<sup>33</sup> It means that when internal issues of states are considered, it is difficult to reach a broader conclusion. Moreover, when states are regarded as sovereign and monolithic units, internal struggles and domestic structures of state are not taken into consideration. This monolithic perception and attributed rationality to states enables the researcher to study the behaviors of nation states in a standard way.<sup>34</sup> Thus, it becomes possible for him or her to study with comprehensive capacity.

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<sup>31</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994 - 1995) p.10

<sup>32</sup> Singer, “Level- of- Analysis Problem in International Relations”, p.75

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Atila Eralp “Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Oluşumu: İdealizm Realizm Tartışması “ in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016) p.79



For the disadvantages of system level, on the other hand, there is an obvious one that can be named. Although not including the domestic features of states into discussion can be an advantage for the comprehensiveness of the system level, it also prevents the system level from having a detailed explanations. For instance, important factors such as change of government in a country can be important to understand a certain foreign policy. Moreover, it prevents the researcher from seeing the differences among states. Different states might prefer different policies about same issue and it can be a result of a domestic preference.

## **2.2. State Level**

Taking nation state as explanation point to understand the international relations is the second level. For this understanding, it is important to look at the domestic features of a nation state to explain its foreign policy behavior. Constitution, political and economic structure, public opinion, or political parties of a nation state can be used to understand its foreign policy on a specific issue.

One of the most important International Relations theories that promotes this approach is idealism. Its appearance coincide with the emergence of the International Relations discipline itself. At the end of the World War I, or as it was called at the time “Great War” in 1919, people tried to understand why such a large-scale war had occurred and what could be done to avoid another war like that.<sup>35</sup> Idealism means reaching a more ideal situation than real conditions. Therefore, it is a normative understanding of international relations. These ideal situations for idealism includes progress and reform, expectation from people and trust to human nature, cooperation among states and improvement in international society. To reach these ideal situations, idealism has several means. For our discussion, education of people in nation states and democracy for the domestic structures are most important one of idealism’s instruments.

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<sup>35</sup> Ramazan Gözen, “*İdealizm*” in *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), p. 67.

Idealists envisage better education for people in nation states especially those who are responsible for policy making. They argue that state executives, decision-making bureaucrats and related actors should be educated to raise their awareness about the fact that wars are harmful and peace is beneficial. Moreover, think tanks, research institutes and international relations departments at universities are considered necessary.<sup>36</sup> Democracy and public opinion are other features that domestic structures of nation states should have according to idealism. From Kant to Woodrow Wilson, a lot of people in history have advocated the idea that regimes based on popular vote are more peaceful. In this context, ideas of self-determination, civil society, freedom, multi party system and direct participation in decision making process have been very significant for idealism.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, it can be argued that idealism has seen domestic features of states as significant part of international relations. For idealist, state level is one of the determinants for the explanation of relations among states.

Liberalism is another theory that sees domestic and international politics as highly related. Liberalism argues that there is a causal relationship between the political regime characteristic of domestic politics and foreign policy behaviors.<sup>38</sup> Relations that a nation state has with its own people also shape its relations with other nation states. A nation state's relations with its own people is the definition of its regime. Specifically, liberals believe that common principles of rule of law, individual rights and equality before the law and representative government in democracies make them less inclined to conflict with each other.<sup>39</sup> Liberalism also asserts that nation states might not adopt same foreign policies (which is a very different point from realist understanding of similar goals of nation states). Thus, liberalism does not perceive domestic politics and international politics as two separate realms.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 99

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 99

<sup>38</sup> Burak Bilgehan Özpek, “*Liberalizm*” in *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), p.121

<sup>39</sup> Scott Burchill, “Liberalism” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.60

Idea of the effects of regime on the international relations in liberalism is based on the argument made by German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. According to Kant, foreign policies of republics would be different from foreign policies of authoritarian regimes. He envisaged an eventual “perpetual peace” in relations among the states. To achieve this condition, it is necessary to adopt republican type of regime. In a republic, where there is a separation of powers, a leader has to be accountable to the public. To avoid public reaction and possibility of losing future elections, the leader would refrain from going to war with other states. Thus, in Kant’s argument, there is the tendency of republics to pursue peaceful foreign policies and adoption of this type of regime by more states leads to perpetual peace. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a causal link between the regime and foreign policy in Kant’s understanding.<sup>40</sup>

“Democratic peace theory” of liberalism is based on Kant’s ideas. It basically argues that liberal- democratic states do not resolve their differences with each other by force.<sup>41</sup> Like Kant, democratic peace theory offers a peaceful nature of relations among democratic states. Another assumption of democratic peace theory is that democracies do not refrain from using military power against non-democratic ones. However, Waltz criticizes this approach arguing that there might be a perpetual war for a perpetual peace, hence he asserts that “wars undertaken on a narrow calculation of state interest are almost certain to be less damaging than wars inspired by a supposedly selfless idealism.”<sup>42</sup> To conclude, this approach takes regime, a domestic future for nation states, as decisive attribution for relations among states.

Importance of regime on the foreign policy has been also addressed at the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Francis Fukuyama, in his famous article “The End of History?” has argued that with the universalization of Western liberal democracies, mankind has reached its ideological evolution.<sup>43</sup> In international relations, this end has meant fewer conflicts. In addition to the regime

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<sup>40</sup> Burak Bilgehan Özpek, “*Liberalizm*”, p.134

<sup>41</sup> Scott Burchill, “Liberalism”, p.60

<sup>42</sup> Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p.114

<sup>43</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): p.3

type, liberal understanding argues that domestic actors in a state and their goals play a decisive role in the foreign policy making. Thus, unlike realist theory, liberalism argues that actors other than nation states have influence on the foreign policy outcomes.<sup>44</sup> Also, it can be seen that by studying foreign policy at the state level, liberalism rejects the idea of unitary structures of nation states. It has been argued that foreign policies of nation states have emerged as a result of the relations among domestic actors such as multinational companies or lobby groups.

Another important approach that should be discussed is foreign policy analysis. As a subfield of International Relations discipline, it has internal characteristics of states as its main focus.<sup>45</sup> Foreign policy analysis understands that explanation for a certain policy can be found in the domestic features of the state as well as international. It argues against the realist understanding of state as a single, coherent actor pursuing clear interests since it accepts the fact that states vary in size, power and internal composition.<sup>46</sup> It asserts the influence of domestic structures on the external behavior, such as internal turmoils, levels of economic development. As Hill states that “foreign policy is about mediating the two-way flow between internal and external dynamics.”<sup>47</sup> Since foreign policy emerges from domestic structures of the state, it should be acknowledged that we cannot talk about foreign policy without the state. Although foreign policy analysis also emphasizes the importance of the decision making processes of leaders, for state level part of this study we will begin with the internal characteristics of nation states and how they affect the foreign policy.

First of all, it is important to take domestic structures into account. Constitutional structure is very important for foreign policy analysis. As Hill argues, “in foreign policy the elements of the constitutional structure which most affect outcomes are those dealing with executive- legislative relations”<sup>48</sup> There can be a federal or unitary states; pluralist democracy or centralism, parliamentary control or

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<sup>44</sup> Burak Bilgehan Özpek, “*Liberalizm*” , p.134

<sup>45</sup> M. Fatih Tayfur, “*Dış Politika*” in Devlet ve Ötesi, ed. Atilla Eralp (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p.74

<sup>46</sup> Christopher Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* (Palgrave, 2016), p.16

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.28

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.238

the division of powers all of which have influence on the foreign policies of states. In federal systems, such as Germany, although foreign policy is the area that falls immediately under the jurisdiction of central government, it can be asserted that constituent states still play a role.

Secondly, it can be argued that there are different pressure groups in states, even in non-democratic ones. Foreign policy analysis recognizes that the heads of states play two-level game since they have to formulate policies simultaneously for domestic and international purposes. This means that policies should be made by balancing two environment. There might be a foreign policy choice that have to be made to reach a certain goal internally. European Union can be given as an example here. States pursue the goal of joining EU not just for interests at international area, but also due to the fact that EU can improve domestic conditions, especially economic ones. Moreover, foreign and domestic politics can confront on the issue of resources. Although foreign policy is not the most expensive state activity, it can easily become one when there is a possibility of a serious conflict.<sup>49</sup>

Social forces in the domestic environment are also taken into consideration in foreign policy analysis. These forces can include nationalism, religion and social class.<sup>50</sup> Nationalist stands can be very effective for the conduct of foreign policy, particularly over the issue of the military conflict. Religion is another aspect that is influential on the state's foreign policy. For instance, effect of religion cannot be extracted from the foreign policies of the states like Israel, Iran or Italy. Class is also important for the foreign policy since it is commonly considered to be conducted by a particular class of elites.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the influence domestic culture of a state on the foreign policy which includes elections, military, media and public opinion, and ethnocultural groups. As a result of an election ruling party might change. Hence, change in foreign policy might occur. Elections are also significant indicators of public's reaction to foreign policy. Leaders might use a specific foreign policy issue to get better results in elections. Dominance of Germany's relations with Turkey in

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.233

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p.249

the debate between Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz during the 2017 elections in Germany can be given as an example.<sup>51</sup> Voters might want to punish the rulers for their mistakes in a specific foreign policy by voting for a new party or coalition.<sup>52</sup> Military is another important force to be reckoned with in terms of foreign policy. Particularly on issues concerning security, military can be an important part of the conduct of foreign policy. Also, depending on the domestic culture of a country, military can be an important other issues as well. For example, influence of military in history of Turkey cannot be denied. Coup d'états of 1960 and 1980 in Turkey are the most salient examples. Moreover, in 1971 Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel resigned under an ultimatum from the military and in 1997 military forces intervened in the politics which eventually ended with Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's resignation. Media and public opinion as parts of domestic culture can also be very effective in shaping foreign policy. Politicians can argue that their hands are tied by public opinion.<sup>53</sup> Also, they can take action concerning a specific policy due to pressures by public reaction and media. For example, Turkey's decision to participate in NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1990s was influenced by public's perception of Bosnia and Serbian attacks to Bosnians. Ethnocultural groups can be an important factor for the foreign policy. These groups have natural interests in their original homeland which most of the time affect the relations between their original homeland and the country they live in. Armenian and Greek lobbies in the United States can be given as examples.

After the definition of state level and several approaches that understand the importance of this level, discussion should continue with the assessment of state level. Firstly, description capacity of state level can be said to be very rich. Since it argues against the unity of nation states, it accepts the fact that each state can have its own different domestic qualities which consequently enables the state level to have more than adequate description capacity. Moreover, for the explanation capacity, state level has even more to offer. As it is seen, state level looks at the internal organization of

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<sup>51</sup> Melissa Eddy, "Angela Merkel Declared Winner of German Election Debate", *New York Times*, September 3, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/europe/angela-merkel-martin-schulz-debate-german-elections.html>, (accessed May 12, 2019).

<sup>52</sup> Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, p.267

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p.270

the states to understand the relations among states. Therefore, state level has more causes for its explanation since there is the acceptance of the fact that each state has its unique domestic organization. At the system level, explanation of relations among states is applicable to every state, whereas at the state level different states have different reasons for their foreign policy behaviors. For its prediction capability, according to Singer, power of state level is not greater than the systemic approach<sup>54</sup>. In fact, prediction capability can be defined as the weakest capability of state level since it is difficult to predict about state behavior when each state has its unique internal structure.

Including the assessment of the capabilities, there are advantages and disadvantages of studying at state level. First advantage is the fact that state level enables the researcher to differentiate among nation state which is something system level fails to do so. Because it does not need the attribution of great similarity to the nation states, “it encourages the observer to examine them in great detail.”<sup>55</sup> Secondly, with the influence of domestic features of nation states, a researcher might understand the reasons that system level alone may not be able to explain. For example, while system level might suggest that a certain policy can be result of a state’s power position, state level might indicate that the policy is a result of a domestic issue.

### **2.3. Individual Level**

Looking at individuals to understand the relations between states is another level that is analysed for this study. Individuals, most importantly leaders who are decision makers of their states need to be understood to comprehend the foreign policies of states. For instance, it is difficult to apprehend the events leading up to the World War II without paying attention to the personalities of Hitler, Stalin or Chamberlain. By same token, it is significant to look at the identity of Gorbachev to

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<sup>54</sup> Singer, “Level- of- Analysis Problem in International Relations”, p.89

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p.83

interpret the incidents at the end of the Cold War. Moreover, policy of United States concerning China during the Cold War cannot be fully understood without Henry Kissinger. More recently, some scholars argue that we should look beyond the system and state levels to understand the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and thus find the reasons in the personality of George W. Bush.<sup>56</sup>

As it is already discussed classical realism is one of the branches of realism and its focus is on the human nature. It borrows ideas from some historical philosophers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Thucydides, for example, argues that behaviors and decisions of statesmen are very influential for the beginning and continuation of wars.<sup>57</sup> Thus, according to him it is important to comprehend the motives of leaders. Moreover, Machiavelli asserts that for the sake of the state, the leader might act against the general norms of morality.<sup>58</sup> For classical realism ideas of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes about human nature are very important. In his influential book titled *Leviathan*, he envisages a pre-social state of nature of individuals.<sup>59</sup> According to Hobbes, men are driven by competition in the state of nature. Although classical realism takes this approach of Hobbes and applies it to condition of states in the international area, it still accepts the significance of human nature. In classical realism it is important to acknowledge the role of statesmanship which includes negotiating and mitigating.<sup>60</sup>

One of the most important contribution of foreign policy analysis to International Relations discipline is its analysis of the leaders. Some scholars argue that foreign policy analysis is characterized by its specific focus on the decision makers.<sup>61</sup> It is significant to have an understanding of how decision makers perceive

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<sup>56</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A. Welch, *Küresel Çatışma ve İşbirliğini Anlamak*, p.78.

<sup>57</sup> Eyüp Ersoy, "Realizm" in *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, ed. Ramazan Gözen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), p.167

<sup>58</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.59

<sup>59</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)

<sup>60</sup> Jack Donnely, "Realism" in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.31

<sup>61</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, no. 1 (2005): p.1



the world, how they are affected and shaped by their environment. To understand the individual foreign policy makers several points should be discussed.

First of all, it is important to know who holds the formal office that is responsible for foreign policy and how much power they are entitled to exercise. In most states, minister of foreign affairs is the nominal chief for foreign policy actions even though in today's globalized world their space is invaded by other ministers.<sup>62</sup> Ministers of economy, trade, defence and chief of staff of the military (especially on the issues concerning security) can be given as examples of individuals who are effective in the foreign policy making process. Officially, for outsiders, they are the first people to contact. However they are not assumed to have full power on foreign policy since heads of government have to spend majority of their time on foreign policy issues whether they intend to do so or not. Thus, it can be assumed that generally foreign policy is formed by the head of government and foreign minister. Therefore, their individual personalities take important part on the foreign policy making. As a result, relations between the foreign minister and head of the government is very important as well. Hill asserts three models for relations between the head of government and foreign minister: equality, subordinate foreign minister and assertive foreign minister as we can see from Table 1.<sup>63</sup>

**Table 1: Ministers and Head of States**

<b>Equality</b>	<b>Subordinate</b>	<b>Assertive</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Equal influence of foreign minister and head of the state</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● When head of the state is more influential and foreign minister is subordinate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● When foreign minister is assertive on certain issues</li> </ul>

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<sup>62</sup> Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, p.59

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.68

As it is mentioned, the psychological factor is very important to foreign policy making process. Psychological factor includes beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory or cultural heritage.<sup>64</sup> Thus, roots of the behavior can be understood by looking at the individual. Moreover, a leader's core political beliefs play an important role in the decision making. For example, heads of government from conservative parties tend to follow different policies than those from left-wing parties, as it is the case in domestic policies. Furthermore, psychological factor enables researcher to understand how under certain conditions since various individuals might act differently. "Where one person might feel trapped another could see room for choice."<sup>65</sup>

As part of the psychological factor, how decision makers perceive the world around them is also significant. Hill argues that "decision makers cannot avoid having images of others which will be as affected by their own cultural and political baggage as much as by the objective evidence."<sup>66</sup> Consequently, misperception is always a possibility with decision makers as it is with ordinary people. It can be of intentions since it is possible to perceive a higher or lower level of friendship or hostility. In addition, the leader's individual perception is also very beneficial to understand his or her decision making process. Leaders have an image of themselves and they include those images in the decision making processes.<sup>67</sup> Thus, self-image is also an influential element when a leader takes a decision.

In addition to these arguments, Hudson argues that there are several important conditions to examine a leader<sup>68</sup>. First one is the regime type which determines constraints on the leader's foreign policy choices. Naturally, one man dictatorships gives more room to preferences of a leader than a parliamentary democracy. Secondly, we should look at whether or not a leader is interested in foreign policy. If he or she

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<sup>64</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p.10

<sup>65</sup> Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013): p. 157

<sup>66</sup> Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, p.72

<sup>67</sup> Giampiero Giacomello, Federica Ferrari & Alessandro Amadori, "With Friends Like These: foreign policy as personal relationship", *Contemporary Politics* 15, 2.(2009): p.250

<sup>68</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis Classic and Contemporary Theory*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) p.38

is not, then there is strong possibility that, a large part of responsibility will be delegated to foreign ministry. Other condition is related to situations in which leaders have to take action. For example, in case of a crisis a leader does not have the choice of passing the responsibility to the his subordinates. Finally, whether or not a leader (head of government or a minister) has a diplomatic training. Most of the time, when there is not a former training, an individual is likely to be shaped by his or her personal characteristic.<sup>69</sup>

To assess the individual level, one should first have look at the first two levels. Individual level enables us to understand the influence of particular individuals on the foreign policy, for this study mainly the personalities of German chancellors and Turkish prime ministers. It shows that a particular foreign policy might be undertaken not just as a result of an external or a domestic issue but it can be the result of a leader's point of view. This is its main advantage. Moreover, as for its description capacity, it differentiates between the leaders. As it is the case with the state level, it cannot demonstrate the unity system level has since each individual has his or her own identity. However, as for its explanation and prediction capability it is difficult to say that individual level has the same ability of system or state level. An explanation of a specific policy cannot be based solely on the personality of the leader, even though it is an important aspect of it. Moreover, it is difficult to make predictions about foreign policies just by looking at the personality of the leaders. Therefore, it can be argued that although the individual level is an important level to take into consideration for foreign policy, it requires the system level and state level to be more accurate.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p.39

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **SYSTEM LEVEL: GERMANY AND TURKEY**

To understand the relations between Germany and Turkey, it is important to know about structure of international system which can be achieved by looking at them at the system level. System level underlines the significance of power position of states in the world. Foreign policy of a state is decided by its relative power position vis-a-vis other states. Power is what defines the structure of the system whether it is a bipolar structure or a multipolar one.

Thus, to comprehend the nature of relations between Germany and Turkey at the system level, one should be first familiar with how the system works and where Germany and Turkey are located at the system. Although this study focuses on the period between 1999 to 2014, it is necessary to begin with the Cold War period to understand how security realities of world changed and how the roles of Germany and Turkey evolved with new realities. Relations between Germany and Turkey is affected by the transformations in the international system, international crisis and changing foreign policy priorities of both countries.

#### **3.1.Cold War Period**

As it has been discussed, system level is used for understanding the relations among states by looking at how the structure of the system affects them. It is the most comprehensive level to grasp the relations between any two states. For Germany and Turkey, system level has crucial importance since both of them have been highly affected by the changes that have occurred in the system since the beginning of the Cold War.

“Cold War” as a term refers to the competition in the economy, ideology and propaganda between the United States of America (USA) and Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) without a direct military confrontation. During the Cold War, after Europe was in ruins as a result of World War II (WWII), two states rose to the status of superpower: United States and Soviet Union. Europe was at the center of the discussion. After the defeat of Nazi Germany at the end of the Second World War, there was a power vacuum to be filled in Europe which ended in the dismantling of wartime alliance between the United States and Soviet Union.<sup>70</sup> States like United Kingdom (UK) and France did not have their former power after the war, even though they ended up being on the victorious side. Germany, as one of the important powers in Europe; on the other hand, was defeated and divided between the Allied powers of UK, France, United States and Soviet Union. Two spheres of influence emerged: one under the leadership of Soviet Union and the other one under the US leadership. USSR took the Eastern Europe under its domain while the western occupation zones of Germany was united under the leadership of United States and former Axis states (including the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949) allied with the United States.<sup>71</sup> Consequently, a bipolar system emerged in the international system which would last until 1990s. Soviet Union would lead the side what is known as Eastern Bloc whereas the United States would be the leading Western Bloc. Directly or indirectly this bipolarity in world politics affected the every part of the globe.

Beginning of the Cold War can be traced back to failed results of the conferences that were held at the end of the WWII. Soviets and the United States did not agree on how to handle the problems concerning Germany, Poland and Eastern Europe.<sup>72</sup> In the West, there was the fear of the Soviet ideology. George Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, sent a document to Washington which is now known as “Long Telegram”. This document was later transformed to an article titled as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” for *Foreign Affairs* magazine.<sup>73</sup> In the telegram and

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<sup>70</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014) p.404

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. p.428

<sup>72</sup> Len Scott, “International History 1900-99”, in *The Globalization of World Politics An introduction to international relations*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.55

<sup>73</sup> George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” *Foreign Affairs*, 25, no.4 (July 1947)

article, Kennan argued that foreign policy of Soviet Union had its roots in its ideology of communism and that it aimed at expansionism. Therefore, according to Kennan, United States needed to contain the expansionist foreign policy of Soviet Union. In these lines, US President Harry Truman, on 12 March 1947 declared a doctrine which would be later named after him.<sup>74</sup> “Truman Doctrine” envisaged aid to Greece and Turkey and it indicated that United States was ready to help in case of a Soviet threat. Moreover, it included military and economic advisers to be sent to Turkey which shows that the United States was eager to provide security to Turkey.<sup>75</sup> In June 1947, Marshall Plan underpinned the idea of American economic aid which was necessary to rebuild the Europe. Thus it was clear from that point on that there were two poles in the world and that there was a competition between these two poles. This period had other important events that had an immense effect on relations between different states, however; for the purpose of this study the focus would be on the events during the Cold War that influenced Turkey and Germany and their power positions in the system.

### **3.1.1. Germany during Cold War**

To begin with, Germany was defeated in the Second World War and what to do with Germany had already become an important topic among Allied powers even before the end of the war. First occasion that Allied leaders discussed about Germany was at the Tehran Conference in Iran between November 28 and December 1 in 1943. During this conference three leaders decided on how to achieve victory against Axis powers. In addition to this, they discussed what to do with Germany during the postwar period. Possible partition of Germany was also brought up during this meeting. Another important gathering of the Allied leaders was at Yalta in Crimea in February 1945. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill came together once again to discuss what would happen after the war. During this conference, France was also included as one of the governing powers in Germany after the war. But the most important

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<sup>74</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, p.433

<sup>75</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikası'nda 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2007) p.7

conference regarding Germany was the one in Potsdam near Berlin from July 17 to August 2 in 1945. Germany had surrendered in May 8. Therefore, it was necessary for Allied leaders to agree on how to handle Germany. Churchill, Stalin and Truman decided that Germany should be demilitarized and disarmed under four zones of Allied occupation (Britain, France, the United States and Soviet Union). Moreover, they agreed on the arrest and trial of German war criminals. And finally, they officially acknowledged the German – Polish border at Oder-Neisse line.<sup>76</sup>

As it is already mentioned, Germany was surrendered on May 8, 1945. After its surrender, it was occupied by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union and was divided into four zones. Each of them were responsible for the administration of its zone. Also, the city of Berlin which was in the Soviet zone was under the control of the administration of four powers. At the end of 1946, first Britain and the United States merged their zones and then later France agreed to become part of this arrangement.

Marshall Plan was another important event for Germany and Transatlantic relations. US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall made a speech at Harvard University in Boston on June 5, 1947. In his speech, he said that US policy is not directed against any particular country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. His speech gave the signs for the primacy of economic aid. The United States would help them get on their feet.<sup>77</sup> In this spirit; with Marshall Plan, or officially known as European Recovery Program, 13 billion dollars were given by the United States to finance the economic recovery of Europe. Soviet Union, on the other hand, interpreted Marshall Plan as a US attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. Another significant event that paved the way to escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union which resulted in Cold War was Berlin Blockade. On April 1, Soviets halted the Western military trains to their own zones in Berlin which was inside the Soviet occupation zone. Because of this blockade, Western powers started an airlift which lasted almost a year to deliver basic needs to West Berliners. This event can be accepted as the first major clash of Cold War since

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<sup>76</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, p.396

<sup>77</sup> Gregory F. Treverton, *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.40

American side even considered a military challenge. On May 12, 1949, the Soviets reopened the borders after concluding that blockade had failed. However, it became clear for both sides that Germany and its former capital city Berlin would be divided.

American leaders had already started to think about a joint alliance with their European allies. After Soviet Union backed a coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and Berlin Blockade and subsequent US airlift, discussions about an alliance became more urgent. Berlin Blockade by Soviet Union on West Berlin and US airlift made the possibility of division between two occupation zones more apparent. Discussions ended with the signing of North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1949 by the countries of Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and of course the United States. <sup>78</sup>Article 5 of the treaty stated that a military attack against any of the signatories would be considered an attack against them all. Thus, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence.

Parliamentary Council met in Bonn under the chairing of Konrad Adenauer in the fall of 1948. After months of debating, on 8<sup>th</sup> of May 1949, Basic Law was accepted by the Parliamentary Council and on 23<sup>rd</sup> of May, Federal Republic of Germany which was unofficially known as West Germany was established. On the other hand, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, commonly known as East Germany) was created under the auspices of the Soviet Union on October 7, 1949. The United States did not recognize its legal validity and asserted that US would continue support West Germany's efforts to establish a true democratic Germany. Full diplomatic relations between Federal Republic of Germany and The United States of America was established on May 6, 1955.<sup>79</sup>

On 5<sup>th</sup> of May, 1955 three occupying powers of the western part announced that they officially ended their military occupation, thus; independence of the Federal Republic of Germany was recognized by Britain, the United States and France. On the same day, Federal Republic of Germany joined to NATO (Three years after the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952). Korean War, which had started in 1950,

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<sup>78</sup> NATO, *Founding treaty*, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_67656.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67656.htm)

<sup>79</sup> United States Department of State: Office of Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, <https://history.state.gov/countries/german-democratic-republic>



indicated that military confrontation between West and East was real and for Americans the battle lines in Europe formed along the division of Germany.<sup>80</sup> Konrad Adenauer recognized that the Western democracies did not have the chance of standing against Soviet Union without United States. As early as 1946, he said that Europe could only be saved with the help of USA.<sup>81</sup> East Germany, on the other hand, became part of an organization for the mutual defence of Eastern Bloc. Warsaw Pact was established in 1955 and German Democratic Republic was one its founding members. Thus, with West Germany's membership to NATO and East Germany's membership to Warsaw Pact, it became even more clear that new world order would be composed of two opposing blocs and two Germanys belonged to two different blocs.

With the construction of Berlin Wall, division became even clearer. On August 13, 1961, the Communist government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) started the construction of a barbed wire which would become a wall between East and West Berlin. The official purpose of this Berlin Wall was to prevent Western "fascists" from entering East Germany, but instead preventing people of East Germany from fleeing to West Germany became its primary objective. The wall made the division between East and West Berlin, East and West Germany and Eastern and Western Bloc visible. It was really the symbol of tyranny in the twentieth century. It was called "wall of shame" in Turkish language and this was a correct definition for such a wall. It stood between two parts of Berlin until November 9, 1989 as an example of disgrace for humanity. The speech given by US President John F. Kennedy in Berlin in 1963 indicated the significance of the wall and Berlin in the minds of Western Bloc "All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words: Ich bin ein Berliner."<sup>82</sup>

Willy Brandt became the chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany in September 1969. He is the first chancellor of SPD (Social Democrat Party of Federal Republic of Germany). Until he became the chancellor, West Germany did not

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<sup>80</sup> Treverton, *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe*, p.69

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p.61

<sup>82</sup> "John F Kennedy- Ich Bin Ein Berliner Speech" YouTube video, 2:32, posted by "thehistoricalarchive" April 8, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GK907TwM7q0>.

recognize GDR or any of the Soviet satellites. It was claimed that Federal Republic of Germany was the only legitimate German government. This was called Hallerstein Doctrine.<sup>83</sup> However, at the end of the 1960s and during the most of the 1970s a new period began. It was called détente. Détente period meant the rapprochement between two blocs. Strained relations between two superpowers started to thaw in doctrine. Willy Brandt seized the opportunity and as a part of Western Bloc West Germany followed similar policies. He initiated a policy called *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy). *Ostpolitik* indicated a break with the efforts to isolate East Germany and limit the relations with Soviet Union. As part of *Ostpolitik*, in 1970 Willy Brandt declared that the border along the Oder-Neisse line that was decided at the Potsdam Conference was the final eastern border of Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, as part of *Ostpolitik* status of Berlin was negotiated among occupying powers and West Berlin was recognized as free city in the East German soil. Furthermore, agreements were made with Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany in the spirit of friendship.

To sum up, it can be argued that starting from the beginning of the Cold War and until the end of it, Germany was at the center of attention for both superpowers. It was occupied and eventually divided into two parts. Consequently, it did not possess its former power and both Germanys had to be depended on the superpowers. Therefore, it can be asserted that Germany of Cold War particularly had to act according to necessities of the structure of the system. It was more true for Germany than any other country since its division and how to handle Germany can be accepted as reasons for the emergence of Cold War between two superpowers.

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<sup>83</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.714

<sup>84</sup> Neil MacGregor, *Germany: Memories of a Nation*, (UK: Penguin Books, 2016) p.483

### 3.1.2. Turkey during Cold War

After the Second World War, European powers lost their ability to be effective global powers and they became dependent on the United States for recovery. Therefore, United States became the leader of the West. When the confrontation with the Soviet Union became inevitable, United States started to protect certain states for the interest of the Western Bloc. Initially, United States did not consider Turkey as one of those states.<sup>85</sup> However, this changed after Soviet demands from Turkey about territory and Straits. Soviet demands first came to light when foreign minister of Soviet Union Molotov informed Turkish Ambassador Sarper about the conditions of a new agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey.<sup>86</sup> Moreover, Turkey needed foreign investment for its development and it was hoped by Turkish policy makers that close relations with the United States would solve its problems.<sup>87</sup> As a result, Turkey became closer to Western Bloc.

Acknowledgement of Soviet threats were realized by the United States by the declaration of Truman Doctrine. It emerged from a speech which was delivered by Harry Truman to US Congress on March 12, 1947. As US State Department explains:

“The immediate cause for the speech was a recent announcement by the British Government that, as of March 31, it would no longer provide military and economic assistance to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek Communist Party. Truman asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists. He also asked Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British aid.”<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (1985): p.807

<sup>86</sup> Erel Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980*, 21st ed., ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016) p.502

<sup>87</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikası’nda 1950’li Yıllar*, p.6

<sup>88</sup>United States Department of State: Office of Historian, The Truman Doctrine, 1947 <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>

On the other hand, Leffler argues that “Rather than expecting an imminent Soviet attack on Turkey, United States officials sought to take advantage of a favorable opportunity to enhance the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean”.<sup>89</sup> This means that even without immediate possibility of Soviet Attack, United States was willing to include Turkey in the Western Bloc. Moreover, according to Karpat, existence of Cold War not only led Turkish membership to NATO but it also provided Turkey with Western orientation in culture and its political regime.<sup>90</sup>

In July 12, 1947 Turkey signed an agreement with the United States agreeing to receive financial and military aid. This doctrine indicated that there were no longer wartime alliance between Soviet Union and United States and that United States was ready against the Soviet threat. In terms of Turkish foreign policy, initially it strengthened the relations between Turkey and US and it helped to refuse Soviet demands. In the long term, it signified the Turkish motivation to be included into Western Bloc. Erhan argues that with economic and military dependence on United States traditional foreign policy preferences of Turkey became compatible with American preferences like Turkey’s official recognition of Israel.<sup>91</sup> This indicates that in a bipolar system, states such as Turkey did not have the possibility of acting completely independent.

Although Truman Doctrine is very crucial for Turkey’s entry into Western Bloc, NATO was the most important institution in the West. Turkey made its first official application in May 1950 however this was not realized. In June 1950, military conflict broke out in between South and North Korea. The Turkish government decided to send forces to the Korean War under the auspices of the United Nations since it was seen as an opportunity to be acknowledged as part of Western Bloc. Turkish troops in Korea facilitated Turkey’s membership to NATO. In February 18, 1952 Turkey became an official member of NATO alongside Greece. According to

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<sup>89</sup> Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War” p.808

<sup>90</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012) p.162

<sup>91</sup> Çağrı Erhan, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980*, 21st ed., ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016) p.537

Bağcı, decision to send troops to Korea had important results and it remained significant in later decades.<sup>92</sup>

As strange as it sounds that an island in Caribbean and Turkey were brought together on the same subject, it was a Cold War reality. Cuban Missile Crisis was another important event for Turkey during the Cold War. Menderes government had agreed with United States that 15 Jupiter intermediate range missiles with nuclear warheads would be placed in Turkey and they were installed in 1962.<sup>93</sup> Missiles in Turkey became part of an important discussion when Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy in October 1962 to say that Soviet Union would withdraw their missiles from Cuba if United States were to lift the blockade against the island. One day later, he wrote another letter saying that removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would be in exchange for US withdrawal of missiles from Turkey. Kennedy chose to answer the first letter and avoided the bargain for Turkey. For Turkish foreign policy, it showed that in case of negotiations with Soviet Union, the United States could sacrifice security and interest of Turkey.<sup>94</sup>

Another important event during the Cold War for Turkey was “Johnson Letter” of 1964. When the conflict increased in Cyprus and decision of Greek Cypriots for armament Turkish government announced that it intended to intervene in the island and started to prepare for the action. Militaries were also mobilized in Greece and Cyprus too. In such an environment, American President Lyndon Johnson wrote a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, warning him that other members of NATO were not sure whether or not they have obligation to protect Turkey in case of a attack from Soviet Union if a possible Turkish intervention were to trigger an attack from Soviet Union.<sup>95</sup> Moreover, it was stated in the letter that Turkey could not use American weapons for intervention. This letter has been unique for Turkish diplomacy with its long-lasting effects as US Under Secretary of State George Ball stated it was

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<sup>92</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikası 'nda 1950'li Yıllar*, p.20

<sup>93</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013) p.98 – 99

<sup>94</sup> Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914- 1995)*, p.467

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p.107

a “diplomatic atomic bomb”.<sup>96</sup> Prime Minister İsmet İnönü responded to the letter by stating that “A new world will then be built and Turkey will take its place there.” which can be interpreted as his warning to the US.<sup>97</sup> The letter showed that even though Turkey had the military superiority there was a possibility that it would not be enough for its foreign policy goals without the superpower support. This was later confirmed when Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974 and this was followed by an arms sale embargo by the United States against Turkey. Although in the 1980s, when the tensions between superpowers rose again, with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian Revolution, Turkey’s importance was once again realized by the United States, “Johnson Letter” and embargo of 1975 left their mark on Turkish foreign policy.

In summary, Cold War policies of Turkey revolved around the policies of the United States. Turkey, as Germany, “was reconceptualized as a country at the center of where US interests lay”.<sup>98</sup> After Truman Doctrine, especially with the membership of NATO, Turkey was definitely part of Western Bloc.<sup>99</sup> This meant that Turkey’s foreign policy had to be in the same line as Western Bloc, in particular the United States and it signifies the connection Turkey has with the west in following decades.<sup>100</sup> Cuban missile crisis of 1962 demonstrated that at any point Turkey could become a subject of bargaining between two superpowers. Moreover, issues concerning Cyprus issue indicated a neo-realist point that bipolar structure of the system made very difficult for Turkey to have an independent foreign policy.

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<sup>96</sup> Haluk Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, (İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1987), p.28

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p.89

<sup>98</sup> Nathalie Tocci, “Let’s talk Turkey! US influence on EU-Turkey relations”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25, no. 3, (2012): p.400

<sup>99</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikası’nda 1950’li Yıllar*, p.130

<sup>100</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018) p.266

### 3.1.3 Relations Between Germany and Turkey during the Cold War

International system have always had an important effect on the relations between Germany and Turkey. Beginning with the Cold War Turkey and Germany belonged to same bloc. Both of them accepted the leadership of the United States and received economic and military aid from this country while perceived Soviet Union as the most important security threat. Cold War was a period in which geostrategic narrative in the international relations was dominant. Security issues were at the forefront. Therefore, their relations with each other were affected by their dependence on the United States and bipolar nature of the international system. Both Germany and Turkey became members of NATO during the Cold War. Membership to this organization influenced their security policies greatly as well as their bilateral relations concerning security. For instance, Federal Republic of Germany provided weapons and military supplies to Turkey in the framework of NATO.<sup>101</sup>

Another important institution that emerged in the Western bloc was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When the Second World War left Europe in devastation, political leaders in European countries realized that what they did not need was another major war in Europe. They also realized that cooperation was necessary in order to avoid war among themselves. Therefore, it can be argued that at the root of the European integration lied security concerns which according to Alkan it was also the reason for the success of European integration.<sup>102</sup> The leading politicians of the idea of European integration were Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman of France. They were the minds behind the famous Schuman Plan which is now regarded as the birth certificate of the European Union<sup>103</sup>.

Therefore, leaders of West Germany, France, Italy and Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) came together to create European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). On April 18, 1951 Treaty of Paris was signed by these six countries. By signing this treaty France and Germany wanted to avoid another war

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<sup>101</sup> Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, No. 28, (January 28, 1967): p.28

<sup>102</sup> M. Nail Alkan, *The Future of The European Union*, (Ankara: Barış Kitapevi, 2007) p.19

<sup>103</sup> European Union, *The history of European Union*, [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en) (accessed on June 1,2019)

with each other whereas Benelux countries participated since they depended heavily on French and German economies. However, it can be asserted that in addition to these reasons, common threat of Communism brought these six countries together. Especially for West Germany, threat was really significant with the existence of German Democratic Republic and West Berlin as an enclave in its territories. Therefore, it can be said that not to stand alone against Soviet Union was the common interest that “the Six” (as they were called) shared.

On March 25, 1957 “the Six” signed the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).<sup>104</sup> Together with ESCS, they constituted European Communities (EC). United Kingdom became member of ECC alongside with Denmark and Ireland. Thus, first enlargement of EEC took place in 1973 with memberships of Denmark, Ireland and UK. Second wave of enlargement (Mediterranean enlargement) materialized with membership of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Greece became a member in 1981. This decision was taken with the idea that membership would help Greece to strengthen its democracy and its commitment to Western block. Because they were ruled by dictators since the beginning of Cold War, similar way of thinking dominated both Spanish and Portuguese membership. It was believed that membership to EEC would help their transition to democracy. Hence, they became members in 1986. Enlargement continued with Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.

For Turkey, as for Germany, European integration has been very important. One of the principles of Turkey foreign policy is that Turkey is a status quo power. It means that Turkey tries to maintain the existing borders and balance. The second one is the fact that since its foundation Republic of Turkey has always followed the path to Westernization. According to Baskın Oran there are several reasons for Turkey’s proximity to the West.<sup>105</sup> First one is the fact that since the Ottoman period; Turks, especially the elite, have headed to the West therefore it can be said that there is a historical aspect. Secondly, ideologically Turkey has been trying to follow Western

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Baskın Oran, “Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği”, in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919- 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2016), p.50



ideas since the government of Committee of Union and Progress at the end of the Ottoman period. Moreover, culturally Turkey's society and state have been heavily affected by the West. In this case, it can be argued that Turkey's Western orientation and its bid to join EU are not surprising realities. As Bađcı argues, Turkey's western orientation is a deliberative act and since 1945 Turkey has been trying to integrate with the West.<sup>106</sup> Ođuzlu asserts that security concerns have very significant role in the relations between Europe and Turkey.<sup>107</sup> For its importance for the relations between Germany and Turkey as Kramer says, it can be argued that relations between Turkey and Germany is at the center of Turkey's bid for EU membership, given the importance of Germany in the EU.<sup>108</sup>

Turkey's EU process started with the signing of the Treaty of Ankara (Association Treaty) in 1963. Article 28 of the Treaty stated that after the articles of the agreement are fulfilled far enough, parties could examine the possibility of Turkish accession to the Community.<sup>109</sup> Thus, it can be said that the Treaty initiated the process of the possibility of Turkish membership. İsmet İnönü, the prime minister of Turkey at the time, said that the treaty constituted a permanent link between Turkey and Europe and that it would be a valuable heritage to future generations.<sup>110</sup> Hence, the Treaty provided Turkey with the expectation of membership.

During this period, Ludwig Erhard, who would later become the chancellor of Federal Germany, came to Turkey as minister of economy. After his visit on August 23, 1959, he argued that Germany was supporting Turkish objective of joining to

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<sup>106</sup> Hüseyin Bađcı, "Türkiye'ye Sođuk Savaşta Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir" *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası*, ed. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Mehmet Yegin (Ankara, 2011) p.2

<sup>107</sup> Tarık Ođuzlu, "The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey's Membership in the European Union," *International Journal*, vol.57, no. 4 (2002): p.579

<sup>108</sup> Heinz Kramer, *Deđişen Türkiye*, p.269

<sup>109</sup> Wendy Asbeek Brusse and Richard T. Griffiths, "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey-EU Relations in a Historical Perspective" in *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, ed. Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press,2004), p.18

<sup>110</sup> Seçkin Barış Gülmez, "The EU Policy of the Republican People's Party: An inquiry on the opposition party and Euro-skepticism in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 9, no. 3, (2008): p.423

European economic integration.<sup>111</sup> This indicates that German approach to Turkish membership was affirmative. Konrad Adenauer, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl also made official visits to Turkey during their periods as chancellor respectively in 1954, 1968, 1975 and 1985 whereas, Süleyman Demirel in 1967, Bülent Ecevit in 1978, Turgut Özal in 1984 and 1985 visited Federal Republic of Germany as prime ministers.<sup>112</sup> These visits and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's attendance to Konrad Adenauer's funeral in 1965<sup>113</sup> show the importance of these two states for each other.

In 1961, Labour Recruitment Agreement was signed between Turkey and Germany and as a result of this agreement many Turkish citizens immigrated to Germany. This agreement was the result of Germany's labor shortage in the late 1950s.<sup>114</sup> Consequently, Turkish workers became another important topic between Germany and Turkey during Cold War era and continued to be one later on. For instance, it was revealed that Chancellor Helmut Kohl was trying to decrease the number of Turkish workers in Germany by fifty percent and argued for their return.<sup>115</sup>

In 1970s and 1980s relations between Turkey and Europe had been heavily affected by the issue of Cyprus and the coup d'etat of 1980 in Turkey. Disagreements concerning the island were not solved and they had negative influence on membership prospect of Turkey. In addition to Cyprus conflict, military coup of September 12, 1980 led to what can be described as a very obscure period of relations between Turkey and EC. As a result of the coup d'etat, Turkey was excluded from Mediterranean enlargement of EC while Greece, Spain and Portugal were part of it.

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<sup>111</sup> Kaan Gaytancıoğlu, "Türkiye'nin Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'na Üyelik Başvurusu'nun Basına Yansımaları" *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, vol. 8, no.2 (2009): p.54

<sup>112</sup>Almanya'nın Türkiye'deki Dış Temsilcilikleri: Üst Düzey Resmi Ziyaretler, <https://tuerkei.diplo.de/tr-tr/themen/politik/0-hochrangige-besuche/1793980> (accessed September 1, 2019)

<sup>113</sup> Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, No. 28, (January 28, 1967): p.37

<sup>114</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Fransa ve Almanya'da Vatandaşlık ve Ulus Ruhu*, trans. Vahide Pekel (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009), p.212

<sup>115</sup> Claus Hecking, "Kohl Wanted Half of Turks Out of Germany" Spiegel Online, August 1, 2013 <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/secret-minutes-chancellor-kohl-wanted-half-of-turks-out-of-germany-a-914376.html>

Moreover, in Germany, aid pledged under the 1981 OECD aid consortium was blocked by Bundestag which was also the result of coup d'etat in Turkey.<sup>116</sup>

However, in 1980s Prime Minister Turgut Özal was determined that something must change. He decided that relations between EC and Turkey needed a “shock treatment” and in April 1987 Turkey officially applied for membership. Federal Republic of Germany was against the Turkish membership. Government in Bonn thought that Turkey applied for membership in order to strengthen its relations with EC.<sup>117</sup> In December 1989, European Commission announced that it would suspend Turkish application explaining that EC did not want to further expansion process before 1993. However, it can be asserted that there were underlying reasons for EC’s refusal to accept Turkish application. First of all, there were structural differences between Turkish economy and EC’s economy. Moreover, according to the Commission, political scene in Turkey did not seem adequate for membership. In particular, minority rights and human rights in Turkey were perceived as problematic. Also, disputes between Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus had negative influence on possibility of membership for European Commission. And finally, when there were regime changes in the Eastern Europe, this region became priority for EC.

To sum up, relations between Germany and Turkey during the Cold War were mostly shaped by the security framework of the time and position of both states in this framework. During the Cold War, system level is very useful to understand the relations between Germany and Turkey. Turkey’s bid for membership to European Community was the result of its understanding of the Cold War realities. Accordingly, Germany’s perception of Turkey was formed by Cold War realities as well. For instance, with this understanding, an agreement was made between two states for 50 million Deutsche Mark (DM) worth military aid from Federal Republic of Germany to Turkey.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, Germany was considered as an advocate for Turkey in European affairs during the Cold War as it was evident when German Foreign

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<sup>116</sup> İhsan Dağı, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1996): p 126.

<sup>117</sup> Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, “Avrupa Topluluklarıyla İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt II: 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), p.97

<sup>118</sup> Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, No. 28, (January 28, 1967): p.30

Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher argued for Turkey's return to European institutions after coup d'etat in September 1980.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, there was a "myth of fellowship" that was believed by many Turks which was the result of its alliance with Germany during the Great War although it was not a mutual understanding.<sup>120</sup>

### 3.2. End of Cold War

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. He started the reform process in Soviet Union. His reform program of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) brought significant changes in economics, domestic politics and international relations<sup>121</sup>. On the other hand, in the United States, Ronald Reagan was in power. He was aware of the reform policies of Gorbachev and supported the reform movements throughout the Eastern Bloc. He demanded that Berlin Wall should come down in 1987 and in 1989 his demand was realized. After the reforms of Gorbachev, borders were opened, Berlin Wall came down and there were free elections throughout the Eastern Bloc. In 1991, Soviet Union itself was dissolved and thus Cold War came to an end which has brought some significant changes in the international system.

First of all, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, dissolution of USSR and Warsaw Pact, United States emerged as the winning party of the Cold War since it was the leader of the Western Bloc. East and West Germany were reunited, former Eastern Bloc states of the Eastern Bloc became candidates for NATO and EU membership. There emerged a new system with a lot of uncertainties.

Secondly, it was no longer possible to address the structure of the international system from a military-strategic, political and economic perspective at a single level. Although it can be still asserted that United States is the most powerful state in the world from military-strategic perspective and still one of the biggest economies in the

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<sup>119</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler", in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, ed. by Atila Eralp, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997) p.298

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914- 1995)*, p.683

world, it is not alone. By looking at the economic-technological capabilities of the states one can argue that from this perspective there are multiple powers that have significant capabilities. Thus, it can be argued that, after the Cold War, there have been a structure in which multipolarity and hierarchy (in terms of power) can be observed at the same time.<sup>122</sup>

Finally, as a result of the newly discovered multipolarity, relations among states were no longer determined by the bipolarity between Soviet Union and the United States. Competition between the US and the USSR, key determinant of international affairs, was gone. With the removal of the ideological curtain that had been created by the Cold War, the understanding of balance of power based on interest became apparent, especially at the regional level.<sup>123</sup> Some scholars such as Samuel Huntington argued that there would be a “Clash of Civilizations” in which sources of conflict would be cultural, rather than ideological or economic.<sup>124</sup>

To sum up, it can be asserted that change in the structure of the international system brought new possibilities for the powers like Germany and Turkey, since there was no longer a Soviet threat and the international affairs could be decided by forces other than the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.

### **3.2.1. Germany and the end of Cold War**

On 12<sup>th</sup> of June 1987 Ronald Reagan gave a powerful speech in front of the Berlin Wall addressing Gorbachev and he said “Mr. Gorbachev tear down this wall!” His request would soon become true. On November 9, 1989, the spokesman for East Berlin’s Communist Party announced that citizens of the GDR were free to cross the country’s borders starting from midnight. People started to flood through the checkpoints, at midnight they were celebrating in front of the wall.

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<sup>122</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası 1991-2015*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2016) p.33

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p.34

<sup>124</sup> Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations” *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3(1993): p.22

Mikhail Gorbachev started the reforms that brought the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He wanted the East German government to accept the change when he was in East Berlin in October 1989, thus he paved the way for the first free elections in East Germany, which were held on March 18, 1990. Following his remarks, reunification negotiations began between the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany, which ended with a Unification Treaty on August 31, 1990. Negotiations between the GDR and FRG and the four occupying powers produced "Two Plus Four Treaty" which gave full independence to a unified German state. Treaty includes acceptance of Oder- Neisse as the final border between Poland and Germany, Germany's status as a non nuclear state and restriction on German military forces. On October 3, 1990 Germany was officially reunited. Moreover, Soviet Union also accepted the NATO membership of unified Germany. The US was the first to show a positive reaction when European partners started to react.<sup>125</sup> The United States and Reagan in particular played a mediating role between a unified Germany and its European allies since they (France and Great Britain) were worried about the strength of a unified Germany.

After the unification, there were concerns among Germany's neighbors about whether or not a unified Germany would bring back the old patterns of German power. This was a very understandable concern on these states' part since they were victims of German power before. Moreover, it was clear that unified Germany was bigger in terms of its population, territory and economy than both German states during the Cold War. Nevertheless, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wanted to assure Germany's European neighbors that only goal for Germany was to become "a normal country".<sup>126</sup> "Für ein Europäisches Deutschland gegen ein Deutsches Europa" (for a European Germany against a German Europe) became a slogan for German leaders to reassure European neighbors.<sup>127</sup> When Germany was an "economic giant and a

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<sup>125</sup> Reinhardt Rummel, "German – American Relations in the Setting of a New Atlanticism" *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol 4. (1993) p.19

<sup>126</sup> Dieter Dettke, *Germany Says "No" The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009) p.27

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p.51

political dwarf<sup>128</sup> during Cold War years there were not many concerns about German power, however with the unification there was a fear that this could change. However, there was also recognition that with the reunification “Germany was too big for an equal cooperation with the former partners, but still too small to exert hegemony.”<sup>129</sup> To appease concerns of its neighbors, Germany wanted to become a civilian power. It sought pacifism which means that for Germany military confrontation in a conflict would be last resort.

On the other hand, there were also expectations of Germany’s allies that Germany should assume more responsibilities in the formation of international politics. Now that the conditions of the Cold War politics did not exist anymore, it was expected from Germany to step up and take responsibility more frequently. Therefore, it can be argued that Germany was searching for a new role in the international politics after the reunification and this new role would come with new responsibilities.<sup>130</sup> Although Germany wanted to avoid taking part in military conflicts, there were some important events that cannot be ignored.

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p.54

<sup>129</sup> Bertel Heurlin, “International Position and the National Interest of Germany in the Nineties” in *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, ed. Bertel Heurlin, (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996) p.46

<sup>130</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, “Almanya: Yeni Bir Dünya Gücü”, *Dis Politika Enstitüsü Almanya Arastirmalari Çalışma Grubu Yayini*, No.1, (Mayis 1992), p.13

**Table 2: International Military Operations and Mission that Germany contributed after the Cold War<sup>131</sup>**

<b>Name of the mission</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Date</b>
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force)	Former Yugoslavia	1992
UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia)	Cambodia	1992
UNOSOM I(United Nations Operation in Somalia I)	Somalia	1992
NATO & WEU Sharp Guard Operations	Adriatic Sea	1992
UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)	Georgia	1993
SFOR (Stabilisation Force) & IFOR (Implementation Force)	Bosnia	1995
UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone)	Sierra Leone	1999
KFOR (Kosovo Force)	Kosovo	1999

Firstly, on August 2, 1990 Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded the neighboring state of Kuwait. UN Security Council adopted the resolution 678 which required Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait until January 15. When Saddam Hussein refused to carry out UN resolution a coalition led by United States started air operations. Initial German reaction was against to involve in a military conflict. However, when Turkey requested support from its NATO allies in case of an attack at the end of the 1990, Germany sent 18 Alpha Jets to Turkey fulfilling its obligation to help.<sup>132</sup> Thus, it can be concluded that although Germany contributed to the Gulf War financially, there was still avoidance from involving in a military conflict on Germany's part, since direct military assistance was not sent.

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<sup>131</sup> Table 2 is based on the information received from *United Nation Peacekeeping & NATO* and was formed for this study.

<sup>132</sup> Dieter Dettke, *Germany Says "No"*, p.74



Conflicts in Balkans at the end of the Cold War were more delicate matter for Germany since it was a very close region and a war in the region had serious repercussions for Germany. Collapse of the Eastern Bloc brought the end of socialist regimes in the region. For Yugoslavia, it also brought dissolution. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991. However, federal government of Milosevic responded with military offensive. Germany officially recognized Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, instead of waiting until January 1992 as it had been decided by EC states earlier. Moreover, after UN Security Council Resolution of 781 established no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, German aircraft and air force personnel participated in NATO's operation.<sup>133</sup> In addition to this, Germany participated in NATO-led IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the end of the conflict to monitor the compliance with the agreement. Similarly, Germany took part in KFOR (Kosovo Force) for peacekeeping in Kosovo after military intervention in 1999. Hence, it can be seen that Germany could not avoid involving in the conflicts in Balkans after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, as it can be deduced from Table 2, after the unification and end of Cold War which established Germany as an important regional and world power, Germany was ready to take more responsibility in regional and international affairs.

### **3.2.2. Turkey and the End of the Cold War**

With the end of superpower conflict, there was a new international system with new security challenges which were very influential in Turkey's environment. Initially, for Turkey as part of the Western Bloc, it was a positive development that the Soviet Union collapsed and the Soviet threat vanished. However, these positive feelings among Turkish policy makers were followed by the concern that with the end of Soviet threat the West would not need Turkey and Turkey's strategic importance

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<sup>133</sup> Rainer Baumann, "German security policy within NATO" in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p.170

for the United States and the West would decrease. However, when Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait, importance of Turkey, especially for the Middle East, was once again realized.

When the Cold War ended and Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were dissolved, a power vacuum and a lot of conflicts emerged in the regions of Caucasia, Balkans and Central Asia. Turkey with its western styled institutions and historical ties to all of these regions appeared as an important power in the region.<sup>134</sup> For the United States, Turkey was considered as a pivotal state since it had the potential to play an important role with its identity and historical significance to the states in these regions. Furthermore, Turkey could be the main obstacle to the influence of both Russia and Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, for the only superpower, Turkey seemed as a significant ally in the aforementioned regions. Turkey adapted the new realities of the time and agreed with the United States, the only superpower in the system, about the possible membership for former Eastern Bloc states to NATO.

Dissolution of Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union led to a debate about functioning and significance of NATO. Foreign policy makers of Turkey tried to be consistent with the membership in this organization. During this period, Turkey took part in different operations to help to establish peace and stability in the world and its region. Bağcı and Kardaş point out that Turkish perception that at the end of the Cold War, it was part of a large landscape from Central Asia to Europe was influential on the Turkish decision to participate in these operations.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Sönmezoğlu, *Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası 1991-2015*, p.92

<sup>135</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, "Exploring Turkey's Role in Peace Operations: Towards a Framework of Analysis" in *Contemporary Issues In International Politics, Essay in Honor of Seyfi Taşhan*, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), p.133

**Table 3: International Military Operations and Missions of Turkey after the Cold War<sup>136</sup>**

<b>Name of the mission</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Date</b>
UNIKOM ( <i>UN Iraq- Kuwait Observation Mission</i> )	Iraq-Kuwait	1991
UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia)	Somalia	1992
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force)	Former Yugoslavia	1992
NATO & WEU Sharp Guard Operations	Adriatic Sea	1992
UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)	Georgia	1993
SFOR (Stabilisation Force) & IFOR (Implementation Force)	Bosnia	1995
NATO Operation ALBA	Albania	1997
NATO AFOR (NATO's Albania Force)	Albania	1999
KFOR (Kosovo Force)	Kosovo	1999

Gulf War was the first important conflict during the period after the Cold War especially for Turkey and its status for the United States. When coalition forces led by the United States started air operations, Turkish parliament voted to permit for coalition forces to use İncirlik and other air bases in Turkey. Ground assault of coalition forces began in February 24, 1991. US asked Turkey to shift its troops to Iraq border in order to decrease military forces of Saddam at Kuwait front. Turkish respond to US demands were positive.

Events took a turn for the worse when Saddam Hussein started to suppress Kurdish rebellion in the northern region of Iraq brutally. 500.000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey to escape from Saddam's wrath. At the time, this was the highest number of

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<sup>136</sup>Table 3 is based on the information received from United Nation Peacekeeping & NATO and was formed for this study.

people that Turkey had had at its eastern border in its history.<sup>137</sup> President Özal decided that this issue should be solved under supervision of the United Nations. He suggested that UN should control the territory in northern Iraq in order for refugees to return a “safe haven” and his idea was adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 688 in April 1991.<sup>138</sup> Thus, with “Operation Provide Comfort” 20.000 troops of international force were placed in Turkey’s border with Iraq. Gulf War indicated that Turkey was willing to take more responsibilities and act as a regional power in the Middle East.

Balkans was another region that was significant for Turkey at the end of the Cold War. As it is shown, there were conflicts in the region as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Initially, Turkey considered the crisis as an internal problem of Yugoslavia. However, after EC states decided to officially recognize Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992; Turkey recognized these two states and also Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in February 1992.<sup>139</sup> After that, Turkey tried to convince international community for UN membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina since it avoided any unilateral operation in the region. Accordingly, Turkey contributed United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Moreover, Turkey took part in Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995.

Concerning the conflict in Kosovo, initial standing of Turkey was that solution of the problem was to act in accordance with 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia in which Kosovo had an autonomous status. However, when the parties did not agree on the solution and NATO began the airstrikes against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999; Turkey joined the operation with eleven F-16s. Moreover, after operations ended, Turkey participated in Kosovo Force (KFOR) for peacekeeping in Kosovo. In general, on the issue of conflict in Kosovo, although Turkey wanted to be an effective actor in the region, it mostly tried to act together with Western powers.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turkey and the Gulf War; 10 Years Later” in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.538

<sup>138</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, p.161

<sup>139</sup> Sönmezoglu, *Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası 1991-2015*, p.215

<sup>140</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, “Exploring Turkey’s Role in Peace Operations: Towards a Framework of Analysis”, p.133

To sum up, with the end of the Cold War, new opportunities emerged for the policy makers of Turkey. Former superpower and the most important power in the region surrounding Turkey did no longer exist. Bağcı argues that there would be new opportunities for Turkey and that Turkish foreign policy would have a wider scope.<sup>141</sup> On the other hand, power vacuum that emerged as a result of dissolution of Soviet Union led to other conflicts in Balkans and Middle East. However, Turkey did not possess the power to involve in and prevent these conflicts single handedly. Therefore, Turkey required the involvement of international community, mainly the United States as the only remaining superpower.

### **3.2.3 Relations Between Germany and Turkey after the Cold War**

After the end of the Cold War, there were important changes in the international system. There was no longer a Soviet threat. Structure of the international system changed. United States remained as the sole superpower. With the collapse of Eastern Bloc, reunification of Germany was the most important event that changed the power position of this country. Discussions were generally about this new power position of Germany especially in Europe. Turkey was one of the countries that supported the reunification of Germany.<sup>142</sup> While Germany increased its power position in the international system, Turkey had witnessed some important changes too. Dissolution of Soviet Union meant a power vacuum in Turkey's neighborhood and Central Asia which was a region Turkey had important cultural and historical ties with. Moreover, changes in the international system led European states, including Germany, to shift their focus on the former Eastern Bloc countries first with the conflict in the region, and after that with membership prospect for these states to European institutions. Furthermore, for European countries, with the disappearance of Soviet threat, strategic importance of Turkey was emphasized less.<sup>143</sup> However,

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<sup>141</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkische Außenpolitik nach dem Luxemburger EU-Gipfel vom Dezember 1997: Europäisch ohne Europa?" *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik*. (1999), p.603

<sup>142</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler", p.298

<sup>143</sup> Heinz Kramer, *Değişen Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2001), p.338

Turkey wanted to realize new opportunities of post-Cold War and tries to play an important role in the international system and in particular in its region. As Germany, Turkey participated in the international military operations concerning problematic regions. Consequently, it can be argued that end of the Cold War brought important changes for both Germany and Turkey. Soviet threat, which had been very influential on the power positions of both states, vanished. German and Turkish national interests were redefined. It is argued that Turkey and Germany demonstrated different interests after the Cold War, especially considering that their interests were common during the Cold War.<sup>144</sup> This was the result of the fact that Soviet threat did no longer existed. However, it can be asserted that although their interests were differentiated after the Cold War, cooperation between them about them were not impossible. Moreover, during Turkey's long journey of trying to become a member of EU, Germany has been at the center of Turkey's foreign policy concerning Europe whereas Turkey has been considered as an important partner for German foreign policy in the regions of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus.<sup>145</sup>

In terms of European integration, in 1992 in Maastricht, Netherlands; EC states signed a treaty to further European integration. With this treaty, there were some important changes. It established the European Union (EU) and its pillar structure. First pillar was European Community and the economic matters of the Union. Common Foreign and Security Policy was the second pillar and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs was the last one. Another important change Maastricht Treaty brought was the single European currency: Euro.

After the end of the Cold War, former Eastern Bloc states wanted to be part of European integration and started to apply. In June 1993, Copenhagen criteria, which was introduced by the Copenhagen European Council, became "the linchpin of the enlargement mode of governance".<sup>146</sup> It states that "would have to have institutions

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<sup>144</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkish -German Relations after the 1997 Luxembourg Decision of the EU" in *Parameters of Partnership: The U.S.- Turkey- Europe*, (Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p.89

<sup>145</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler", p.286

<sup>146</sup> A. Dimitrova, "Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement", *West European Politics*, 25:4. (2002): p.175

guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, minorities, existence of functioning market economy, the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including its aims of political, economic and monetary union.”<sup>147</sup> These states included Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and finally Croatia in 2013. Although Turkey has yet to become one of these countries, EU remained essential to Turkish foreign policy.

During the 1990s, there were improvements in the economic relations between the EU and Turkey beginning with the establishment of customs union. In 1992, Association Council, which was established by Treaty of Ankara in 1963, decided that to start the process of customs union which was later accepted by the Council in 1995. Hence, customs union between EC and Turkey was realized. Germany supported the customs union with Turkey, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel played an important role persuading Greece.<sup>148</sup> In addition to developing the economic participation of Turkey, customs union with EU also increased Turkey’s possibility to be included in EU legal framework considering economic and commercial law it featured. With the customs union, Turkey became the country to have most connections with EU even though it was not a member.<sup>149</sup> Thus, it can be argued that customs union was an important step for Turkey for its path to EU membership.

In 1997, at Luxembourg European Council, EU did not include Turkey as candidate country. Instead of including Turkey along with Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus as a candidate, EU created another category for Turkey which indicated that Turkey was evaluated differently. It led to disappointment on Turkish side and a period in which relations with EU were all time low. After Luxembourg Summit, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz accused German Chancellor Helmut Kohl of being against Turkish integration.<sup>150</sup> Thus, it can be said

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<sup>147</sup> European Council Council of the European Union, *European Council in Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf> (accessed on June 1, 2019)

<sup>148</sup> Bağcı, “Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler”, p.286

<sup>149</sup> Heinz Kramer, *Değişen Türkiye*, p.279

<sup>150</sup> “Yılmaz’dan Kohl’e ağır suçlama”, *Hürriyet*, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yilmaz-dan-kohl-e-agir-suclama-39279569> (accessed June 16, 2019)

that Luxembourg Summit led to a row between Germany and Turkey. In spite of this, in 1998, one important effort to fix the relations between EU and Turkey came from Germany. In October 1998, new coalition of SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and Green Party came to power in Germany. German government changed its attitude towards Turkey's EU membership and by disregarding the conditions that EU established agreed to Turkey's candidate status.<sup>151</sup> However, at Cologne Summit in June 1999 with the objections from Greece and Scandinavian countries, German plan was rejected.

In December 1999, however, great progress was made at Helsinki Summit. At this summit, Turkey was unanimously accepted as an official candidate for the EU. There were several reasons for the shift in the EU's position. First of all, there was a desire of EU to improve relations between Turkey and EU. Moreover, change in the German government which came with change in Germany's position about Turkish membership. Change in Greek government and US pressures were other contributing factors in EU's attitude change.<sup>152</sup> After Helsinki Summit, Turkey was included in new enlargement strategy of EU. First step was Accession Partnership Document by EU Commission and its adoption by Council of the European Union. This document have been prepared by EU for each candidate country individually and it included criteria to be met by the country.

Since Helsinki Summit explained the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey, Turkish government, began to restructure itself in the light of the EU criticism of the political regime and the human rights record. After 2001 economic crisis, Turkey started to take measures especially in the finance. In 2001 and 2002 Turkey prepared harmonization packages to bring constitution into line with EU requirements. In this framework, several amendments were made to the constitution abolishing death penalty, and use of native language in broadcasting and education. Also, in 2003, EU Harmonization Committee was established in the Turkish

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<sup>151</sup> Heinz Kramer, *Değişen Türkiye*, p.294

<sup>152</sup> F. Stephen Larreebe and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and Europe", *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (RAND Corporation, 2003), p.52



parliament<sup>153</sup> which indicated that Turkey was very enthusiastic about compliance with EU requirements.

In terms of economic and military cooperation, it can be claimed that relations between Germany and Turkey were generally on good terms. Germany maintained its status as Turkey's most important trade partner in Europe.<sup>154</sup> Moreover, Germany provided Turkey with military aid in the line with NATO requirements such as donation of former East German military equipments and assistance during the Gulf War.<sup>155</sup> Even though Germany suspended its military aids because of Kurdish issue in 1995, in 1999 Turkey was in first place in Germany's arms export list.<sup>156</sup> Thus, it demonstrates that in terms of military cooperation Germany and Turkey were important for each other.

In conclusion, although there were some disagreements between Germany and Turkey, they remained important for each other in the new international environment. Turkey recognized the significance of reunification of Germany and supported the idea. On the other hand, Germany was at the center of attention for Turkey for its policy towards European Union. Moreover, Germany's military aid to Turkey and trade between two states suggest that after the Cold War, Turkey and Germany maintained their partnership.

### 3.3. Germany and Turkey after 9/11

On September 11, 2001 nineteen members of an extremist Islamist group Al Qaeda hijacked four planes and carried out suicide attacks against the targets in the United States. These targets were the World Trade Center in New York City and the

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<sup>153</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Dönemlerle Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", in *Avrupa Birliğinin Uluslararası İlişkileri ve Türkiye*, ed. İlhan Sağsen and Mehmet Dalar, (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2018), p.23

<sup>154</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler", p.295

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p.296

<sup>156</sup> Gezal Acer, "5 soruda Almanya'nın Türkiye'ye silah satışı", *Deutsche Welle*, January 24, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/tr/5-soruda-almanyan%C4%B1n-t%C3%BCrkiyeye-silah-sat%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1/a-42294546> (accessed on September 1,2019)

Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C. It caused the death of 2977 people. The attacks caused a great shock worldwide, not just in the United States which did not face such an attack on its soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941. This event, commonly called as 9/11, had important repercussions in the world politics.<sup>157</sup>

To begin with, as a result of these attacks, a new threat was recognized. Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization was a global threat that would aim not only the United States but other states too, as it was indicated by the attacks in İstanbul, Madrid and London later. Moreover, the fact that World Trade Center was targeted showed that attacks were against Western institutions and Western domination on the global economy (consequently the inequality in the world).<sup>158</sup>

Secondly, 9/11 led to what many scholars called “revival of the state”<sup>159</sup> which emphasizes the importance of nation state in the world politics. With this new type of threat, security concerns once again became most prominent issues on the agenda. Therefore, nation states (especially the United States) took military action. Nation state and its military behaviors were seen as main solution to fight the terrorism. In October 2001 US President George W. Bush announced that U.S. and British troops began striking Afghanistan for harboring the al-Qaeda terrorists blamed for the 9/11 attacks. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by UN Security Council in December 2001 for maintenance of security. In August 2003, it was decided that NATO would lead the operation.

In addition to this new threat of global terrorism and revival of the state, unilateral decision making by the United States of America, Bush administration in particular, was marked as another result of 9/11. President Bush described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis of evil” in his State of Union address in January 2002 since they were seen as threats to peace in the world.<sup>160</sup> Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was accused of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Moreover, idea of “preemptive war” was introduced to prevent these states beforehand. In the line with these

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<sup>157</sup> Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), p.138

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Christopher Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, p.293

<sup>160</sup> Alex Wagner, “Bush Labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an 'Axis of Evil'” *Arms Control Today* Vol. 32, No. 2 (2002): p. 25

arguments, Bush administration tried to secure a UN Security Council resolution for an intervention in Iraq. Failing to secure this decision did not stop US action. In March 2003, United States began its military intervention in Iraq. Thus, it can be said that the United States followed a unilateral foreign policy in Iraq when it acted without the consent of international community.<sup>161</sup>

### 3.3.1. Germany and 9/11

Initial reaction of European allies was very supportive of the United States and at first, 9/11 attacks generated a huge sympathy around the world. However, ultimately it became a turning point in US – German relations.<sup>162</sup> An article named “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe” was published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in May 2003 by the two of the most eminent philosophers of our age, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. It was a call for a common foreign policy for European Union. It marked February 15, 2003 as the day mass demonstrations London, Rome, Madrid Barcelona, Paris and Berlin took place as a reaction to US intervention in Iraq.<sup>163</sup> In general, it was a reaction to US President George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” and US intervention to Iraq. The reason for a call for a common policy was the different responses of EU member states to intervention.

Initial German reaction to 9/11 was one of solidarity and Germany’s unrestricted political and military support was offered by Chancellor Schröder. Also, after 9/11 Germany and United States cooperated closely and more than 2000 German soldiers were deployed to Kabul and Kundus to be part of International Security Assistance in Afghanistan. However, after President Bush’s State of the Union

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<sup>161</sup> Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War” *Survival* Vol.59, No.4 (2017): p.22

<sup>162</sup> Jackson Janes, “Challenges and Choices in German – American Relations” *German Politics*, 17, no. 1 (2008), p.5

<sup>163</sup> Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe” *Constellations*, 10, no.3 (2003) p.291

address in January 2002, differences emerged in the two states' approaches to security challenges. US administration wanted military means to combat terrorism whereas Germany preferred civilian means like economic incentives and international cooperation even though the option of military steps was not rejected.<sup>164</sup>

During the election campaign in August 2002, Chancellor Schröder used the Iraq issue for domestic purposes. Foreign and security policy became a decisive issue in German elections. Schröder called the Iraq policy of the United States as adventurous and a mistake and rejected any German participation in military campaign against Saddam Hussein. French President Jacques Chirac also agreed with him and opposed to US intervention in Iraq. When Germany became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2003, Germany increased the volume of its opposition, with Schröder joining French President Jacques Chirac in challenging the US idea of war.<sup>165</sup> As a reaction to French and German opposition, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld said in an interview "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new members."<sup>166</sup> As it can be seen from his statement, United States and Germany differed in a major security issue of the age. It was the most significant difference of opinion between Germany and the United States since the end of the Second World War.

Another important event that took place during the period after the end of the Cold War was what is called Arab Spring. It began in December 2010 with the protests in Tunisia and soon turned into armed uprisings against governments in the Arab world. In Libya too, there were protests and eventually civil war erupted. After 17 March 2011 decision of UN Security Council, NATO under French initiatives started the intervention. At the end, this intervention was criticized by the argument that it was not a necessary action to protect civilians, that it contributed to escalation of the

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<sup>164</sup> Markus Kaim, "Friendship under Strain or Fundamental Alienation? Germany – US Relations After the Iraq War" *International Journal*, 59, no.1 (2003) p.132

<sup>165</sup> Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance" *Survival*, 45, no.1, (2003): p.99

<sup>166</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German – American Relations* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004) p.39

conflict in Libya and also that it was aimed at regime change rather than to protect civilians.<sup>167</sup> Germany did not want to take part in this operation and refused to vote for resolution at UN Security council. Once again, as in 2003, Germany as a member of NATO did not support its Western allies' decision to intervene.

As it is mentioned, after 9/11 there have been some important changes in the international system. Germany's ideal at the end of the Cold war that "military confrontation should be a last resort" was not realized as it was the case in Iraq in 2003 and again in Libya 8 years later. After September 11, 2001; global terrorism was recognized as the most important threat to peace in the international system as it was proven by Al Qaeda and later it would be proven again by the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq later. Germany's stand against this new threat was to rely on multilateral decision making rather than unilateral action. Moreover, "revival of state" was another reality of post-9/11. The most important consequence of this revival for Germany was felt its immediate neighborhood and most important aspect of its foreign policy; Europe. 9/11 led to division among EU states rather than unity since Europe was not able to formulate a united policy.<sup>168</sup>

### **3.3.2. Turkey and 9/11**

As a major event in the 21st century, 9/11 has had major repercussions not only in the United States but also around the world. Events on September 11 led to the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and isolation of Iran. United Nations Security Council established International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for security missions which were eventually led by NATO in Afghanistan. Thus, for the first time in its history, the article 5 of NATO's founding treaty was invoked and it was declared that United States was attacked and needed the help of its allies for the invasion of Afghanistan. After the 9/11 attacks, initially Turkey supported its ally United States since Turkey itself has long been victim of several terrorist organizations including

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<sup>167</sup> Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Intervention? Reassessing Nato's Libya Campaign" *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (SUMMER 2013), p. 134-135

<sup>168</sup> Inga Grote, "Donald Rumsfeld's Old and New Europe and the United States' Strategy to Destabilize the European Union" *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Vol.74, No.3 (2007): p. 348

“Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia” (ASALA) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).<sup>169</sup> International cooperation has been one of the strategies of Turkey to fight terrorism. While the Ecevit government advocated the invocation of Article 5, it also began to arrest some people for alleged membership of al-Qaeda and started to share intelligence with the US on al-Qaeda's financial sources<sup>170</sup>. Moreover, as part of ISAF Turkey played an important role. Unlike other NATO members, Turkey’s Muslim character and its historical ties with the region made it very significant in the mission. Therefore, as a country in the region who is also a member of Western institutions, Turkey’s importance in the international area was realized by its Western allies.<sup>171</sup>

When possibility of an intervention of Iraq was brought to the agenda, there had been a change in government in Turkey. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) won the November 2002 elections. Thus when Bush administration decided to intervene in Iraq, there was a new government in Turkey. For the invasion of Iraq, United States initially tried to secure a UN resolution. However, this failed when permanent members, especially France, were against to one. Nevertheless, on March 20, 2003 Bush administration started the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” with some supporters like United Kingdom, Spain and Italy.<sup>172</sup> For this operation, USA needed Turkey’s assistance. To launch a ground operation, American forces needed to use Turkish soil. In order for permission, the government needed Grand National Assembly to approve it majority. However, on March 1, 2003, after the vote at Turkish Parliament, such approval was not reached. This led to disappointment at the American side and it was another milestone at relations between Turkey and USA:

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<sup>169</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, and Şaban Kardaş, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited." *CEPS/IISS for the European Security Forum*, Brussels, Belgium. 2003.

<sup>170</sup> İlhan Uzgel, ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler, in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt III: 2001- 2012*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2016), p.258-259

<sup>171</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, “Effects of the End of the Cold War on Turkey’s International Position – Hüseyin Bağcı”, *Foreign Policy Institute*, November 28, 2016

<sup>172</sup> Baskın Oran, “Dönemin Bilançosu”, in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt III: 2001- 2012*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2016), p.21

“The defeat stunned American officials, who had been confident that Turkey's leaders would be able to persuade the members of their party to support the measure. American ships had already begun unloading heavy equipment at Turkish ports in anticipation of a victory, and two dozen vessels were idling off the coast.”<sup>173</sup>

Later, after Turkish Parliament failed to provide US with what they wanted, USA did not allow Turkish soldiers to Iraq whose purpose would be to prevent PKK actions and to protect Iraqi Turkmens. According to Deniz Bölükbaşı, who was the head of the committee that negotiated terms of March 1 Resolution, Turkey missed the opportunity to be effective player in the events following US intervention in the region when the Turkish Parliament voted “no”.<sup>174</sup>

As for Arab Spring and Libya, Turkey wanted to follow an active policy concerning the region by showing itself as a promoter of democracy. Libya was very important for Turkey due to its status as an important oil producer and number of Turkish companies in Libya. Initial Turkish reaction to intervention was a negative one. Prime Minister Erdoğan considered such intervention by NATO as “nonsense”.<sup>175</sup> However, after the intervention started in spite of opposition from some of the NATO members such as Germany, Turkish attitude towards the intervention changed and Turkey actually contributed with its naval forces.<sup>176</sup>

It can be argued that the period after 9/11 came important changes for Turkey too. Global threat of terrorism and subsequent involvement of the United States in Afghanistan and especially Iraq and its unilateral actions there heavily affected Turkey’s immediate region. This new situation increased the significance of Turkey in the eyes of its Western allies, in particular the United States. Bağcı and Kardaş

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<sup>173</sup> Dexter Filkins, “Threats And Responses: Ankara; Turkish Deputies Refuse To Accept American Troops”, *New York Times*, March 2, 2003, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/02/world/threats-and-responses-ankara-turkish-deputies-refuse-to-accept-american-troops.html>

<sup>174</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), p.178

<sup>175</sup> Ümit Çetin, “NATO’nun Libya’da ne işi var” *Hürriyet*, March 3, 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/nato-nun-libya-da-ne-isi-var-17150261>

<sup>176</sup> Bilgin Ayata, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor?” *Journal of European Integration*, Vol 37, No.1, (2015) p.101

argue that Turkey's value has increased not only for Americans but also for Europeans.<sup>177</sup> In spite of the economic crisis of 2001, Turkish economy recovered and developed during this period furthering the importance of Turkey. During this period, US involvement in Middle East and Arab Spring provided the opportunities for Turkey to play a role in the region.

### **3.2.3 Relations Between Germany and Turkey after 9/11**

Brussels Summit in 2004 was a milestone for Turkish membership. At this summit it was decided that accession talks with Turkey would begin in October 3, 2005. This development meant that Turkey as a candidate state that is conducting negotiation with EU was approaching its aim of Westernization. Moreover, Negotiation Framework Document was adopted by EU in which three fundamental principles were announced. First one is the fulfilling the political criteria of Copenhagen and accelerate political reforms. Second one is undertaking and applying the EU acquis. And finally, establishing and maintaining dialogue with civil society and developing a communication strategy aimed at both European and Turkish people. EU acquis refers to total body of EU law and it is categorized under 35 chapters:

- “1) Free Movement of Goods
- 2) Free Movement of Workers
- 3) Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services
- 4) Free Movement of Capital
- 5) Public Procurement
- 6) Company Law
- 7) Intellectual Property Law

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<sup>177</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, and Şaban Kardaş, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited."



- 8) Competition Policy
- 9) Financial Services
- 10) Information Society and Media
- 11) Agriculture and Rural Development
- 12) Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy
- 13) Fisheries
- 14) Transport Policy
- 15) Energy
- 16) Taxation
- 17) Economic and Monetary Policy
- 18) Statistics
- 19) Social Policy and Employment
- 20) Enterprise and Industrial Policy
- 21) Trans-European Networks
- 22) Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments
- 23) Judiciary and Fundamental Rights
- 24) Justice, Freedom and Security
- 25) Science and Research
- 26) Education and Culture
- 27) Environment
- 28) Consumer and Health Protection
- 29) Customs Union
- 30) External Relations
- 31) Foreign, Security and Defense Policy
- 32) Financial Control
- 33) Financial and Budgetary Provisions
- 34) Institutions
- 35) Other Issues<sup>178</sup>:

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<sup>178</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate For Eu Affairs, *Accession Negotiations*, [https://www.ab.gov.tr/37\\_en.html](https://www.ab.gov.tr/37_en.html)

The adoption of the Union's system; rights and responsibilities that are linked to the Union's institutional framework is required to be a membership of EU. Thus, as it can be seen from EU law is highly related to internal affairs of its member states as well as issues related to their foreign affairs. Therefore, it could have been expected that EU would be influential on the internal features of Turkey. Hence; Germany, as a member of EU who play a pivotal role in overall EU decisions, involved in the structure and functioning of domestic affairs in Turkey. In the line of this argument, when Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany in September 2005 and she announced that Germany would act according to principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are binding), it indicated that her government did not have a positive approach concerning Turkish membership.

In June 2006, Science and Research chapter was opened for negotiation and it was closed when EU Council decided that Turkey had met the necessary criteria. Thus, it was the first chapter that was opened for negotiation and closed. In December 2006, since Turkey rejected to include Cyprus into Additional Protocol, eighth chapters were suspended by EU. In 2007, Chapters 32, 18, 21 and 28 were also opened for negotiation during the EU Presidency of Germany. However, with election of Sarkozy as President in France, it became clear that France would block negotiations. Four additional chapters were opened in 2008 whereas two chapters were opened in 2009 and 2010. Moreover, 2010 adoption of amendment package also strengthened the democracy in Turkey in the line with EU necessities.<sup>179</sup>

It can be argued that although negotiation process began in 2005, not much progress has been achieved. This slow progress indicates that relations between Germany and Turkey in the context of European Union. It can be said that Germany's approach to Turkish membership is one of the reasons for the state of relations after 2005. Turkey's inability to adjust its domestic structure according to the necessary criteria can be argued as another reason. In this context, one of the important aspect of the German- Turkish relations in the for Turkey's EU membership has been the Kurdish issue. Starting from 1990s, Kurdish issue was brought to agenda by Germany

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<sup>179</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "The Prospects for the Future: Turkey- European Union relations" in *Die Türkei, der Deutsche Sprachraum und Europa*. ed. Reiner Arntz, and Michael Gehler, and Mehmet Tahir Öncü (Wien: 2014) p.414

very frequently as one of the conditions for Turkish membership to EU. In 1999, Bağcı argued that “Europeanization of Kurdish issue” was going to be used as a political instrument on Turkey in its relations with EU.<sup>180</sup> On the other hand, Germany did not completely abandon its support for Turkey, as Turkish-German Dialogue Mechanism was established in 2013 between foreign ministers of two countries.<sup>181</sup>

Events of September 2001, can also be asserted to cause changes in the international system. The period after 9/11 revealed global terrorism as new threat, revival of nation state and subsequent unilateral actions of United States which was realized by the intervention in Iraq in 2003.<sup>182</sup> This created a disagreement among NATO allies. Both Turkey and Germany had already supported US decision to go to Afghanistan, however when Iraq was brought to agenda without a UN Security Council resolution, they did not approve the unilateral action of US to intervene.

It can be argued that period between 1999 to 2014 power positions of both Germany and Turkey increased significantly. For Germany, economic crisis of 2008 gave the opportunity to prove this. When the crisis had tremendous repercussions for EU member states, especially Greece, Germany had to take the leadership role. Germany was the dominant country in the Eurozone who was contributing most to the bailout funds.<sup>183</sup> It was not the traditional co-hegemony of France and Germany in Europe. For Turkey, this period witnessed its status as rising power. With its dynamic economy and active foreign policy, Turkey became an important power in its region and in the world. These realities became more observable later with the refugee crisis when Germany tried to secure an agreement on behalf of EU with Turkey.

To conclude, it can be argued that international system have been very important for relations between Germany and Turkey. It decided the power position

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<sup>180</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turkish -German Relations after the 1997 Luxembourg Decision of the EU” p.93

<sup>181</sup> Ebru Turhan and Günter Seufert “German Interests And Turkey’s Eu Accession Process: A Holistic Perspective” *Istanbul Policy Center*, (November 2015): p.5

<sup>182</sup> Cerem I. Cenker and Tarık Oğuzlu, “Beyond Institutional Logics: International Level Systemic Analysis of EU-Turkish Relations” *Turkish Studies*, Vol 14, No.4 (2013), p.690

<sup>183</sup> Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, “Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints” *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.20 (2013) p.1395

of both countries and therefore affected the relations between them. NATO had been at the core of the security considerations of both countries although there had been different challenges Germany and Turkey had to face since the foundation of NATO. Thus, it can be argued that description capacity of the system level is very accurate for the relations between Germany and Turkey. It shows the power positions of both countries and its effect on their policies. Both states have been very important for each other in this respect. Turkey has been important for Germany as a model for a democratic Muslim country in the Middle East whereas Germany has been the most important European state for Turkey in terms of its bid to EU membership.<sup>184</sup> Explanation capacity of system level to understand the relations, on the other hand, can be considered as insufficient. Turkey's bid for EU membership could have been explained by the security concerns and the structure of the during the Cold War. And finally, for the prediction capability, by looking at the international system, it can be expected that when there are changes in the system, it is natural to assume that there will also be changes in the relations between Germany and Turkey as it was the case after the Cold War.

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<sup>184</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, "Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership" *The New Geopolitics Turkey Project Policy Paper*, No. 14 (March 2018): p.14

## CHAPTER 4

### STATE LEVEL: GERMANY and TURKEY

State level is very important to understand the relations between Germany and Turkey. As it is already discussed this level signifies the domestic features of states for foreign policy. Discussion starts with regime, state structure and government changes in both Germany and Turkey and their effects on the relations between two states. As it is already mentioned, pluralist democracy or centralism are important effects on the foreign policy, thus they are influential on the relations between Germany and Turkey. Moreover, government changes in both Germany and Turkey influenced the relations between them as it can be seen from the change in Germany's attitude towards Turkey's membership in EU after the coalition under Angela Merkel's leadership came to power.

Economy is another important aspect for the relations between Germany and Turkey. It is important for Turkey's relations with EU in general however, it is also specifically significant for Turkey and Germany considering the high volume of trade between the two countries and the fact that as of 2018 Germany ranked first in Turkey's exports.<sup>185</sup> Moreover, it should be added that impact of the German investments of companies in Turkey, the companies that have been established both by German citizens with Turkish origin and Turkish citizens in Germany is huge. Therefore, it can be said that economy should be covered to comprehend the relation between Germany and Turkey at the state level.

In addition to economy, regimes, public opinions in both countries and people with Turkish origin living in Germany are also important to discuss for the relations between Germany and Turkey at the state level. Both in Germany and Turkey what citizens think about possibility of Turkish membership affects the decisions and actions of governments. For instance, as of 2018 majority of Turkish people still

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<sup>185</sup>Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ticaret Bakanlığı, *Türkiye ile Ticaret*, <https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/yurtdisi-teskilati/avrupa/almanya/ulke-profil/turkiye-ile-ticaret> (accessed on June 1,2019)

support the EU membership.<sup>186</sup> Moreover, majority of people in Germany are against Turkey's EU membership.<sup>187</sup> Furthermore, there are more than 3 million people with Turkish origin living in Germany. They also constitute one of the important topics between Turkey and Germany. To sum up, to comprehend the relations between Germany and Turkey, one has to examine them on the state level elaborately. To to this, their domestic structure, economic relations between them, public opinions and Turks in Germany should be analyzed.

#### 4.1. Regime, State Structure and Government Changes

Regime and state structure is very important for foreign policy. Naturally, it has an important impact on relations between Germany and Turkey. To begin with, Germany and Turkey have very similar regimes. Both countries are democracies that follow the rule of separation of powers where executive, legislative and judicial branches are kept separate.<sup>188</sup> Nevertheless, there are some differences between two countries too. Germany is a federal parliamentary republic. It has sixteen states and two legislative assemblies (*Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*). Turkey, on the other hand, has a unitary structure and Grand National assembly of Turkey has the sole legislative power.

Foreign policy in Germany is carried out mainly by the government. Despite the principle of collectivity in the cabinet (*Kollegialprinzip*) and the authority of the German Chancellor to decide the main lines of foreign policy (*Richlinienkompetenz*), the government is far from being homogenous and occasionally there are disagreements.<sup>189</sup> According to Basic Law, which is the constitution of Germany,

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<sup>186</sup> "Turkish citizens' support for EU membership on the rise: Poll", *Hurriyet Daily News*, January 9, 2018, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-citizens-support-for-eu-membership-on-the-rise-poll-125402> (accessed on June 1,2019)

<sup>187</sup> Mehmet Dalar, "Avrupa Birliđi Kamuoyunun Türkiye'nin Üyeliđine Yaklařımı: Tarihsel ve Siyasal Perspektif" in *Avrupa Birliđinin Uluslararası İliřkileri ve Türkiye*, ed. İlhan Sađsen and Mehmet Dalar, (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2018), p.123

<sup>188</sup> This study does not include the period after 2017 referendum of constitutional changes in Turkey.

<sup>189</sup> Can Büyükbay, *Avrupa Birliđi, Almanya ve Türkiye*, p.52

foreign policy executive has the power to conduct foreign policy. Nevertheless, composition of the coalition governments might set limits on the Chancellor's actions. In addition to this, occasionally the legislative (the Bundestag and Bundesrat) and judicial branch (the Federal Constitutional Court) can be important players in the foreign policy.

In this system of Germany, in 1998 coalition of Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD) and Die Grüne/Bündnis 90 (The Greens/Alliance 90) came to power. This coalition, which is also known as Red-Green coalition, supported Turkey's membership to European Union and wanted to bring Turkey in line with European norms to achieve membership.<sup>190</sup> It is accepted by SPD that Turkey's membership to EU is also important for other Muslim nations to recognize that a Muslim nation with democratic government can be a bridge between Europe and Muslim world.<sup>191</sup> On the other hand, the Greens had first entered the Bundestag in 1982 and this party was born out of the concerns for the environment. The Greens have been supportive of Turkey's membership to EU and argued for fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria by Turkey.<sup>192</sup> Thus, the coalition government of SPD and the Greens under the leadership Gerhard Schröder presented very good relations between Germany and Turkey especially in the context of Turkey - EU context even though it was claimed that this coalition needed to appeal to Turkish voters especially in 2002 elections to win.<sup>193</sup>

In May 2005, when Red- Green Coalition lost at the state elections of North Rhine- Westphalia, Chancellor Schröder decided to go for early elections.<sup>194</sup> However, the federal elections of 2005 brought a new coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel. This new coalition was composed of Christlich Demokratische

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<sup>190</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, "Entrapped again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey" *International Politics*, vol.46, no.4, (2009): p.418

<sup>191</sup> İsmail Ermağan, "Avrupa Birliği Bağlamında Türkiye- Almanya İlişkileri", *Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol.9, No.20, (2012): p.83

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p.85

<sup>193</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Early Elections in Germany: What Does This Mean for Turkey?" in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.381

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, CDU) / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria, CSU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD). Majority of CDU/CSU group does not support Turkey's membership and they prioritize "deepening" of European integration over "enlargement".<sup>195</sup> Nevertheless, Merkel said in 2005 that her government's approach to Turkey's EU process will be according to *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are binding). According to Aktürk, SPD half of the government limited the excesses of CDU/CSU half which included negative approach to Turkey's EU membership.<sup>196</sup> Thus, the opening of chapters of Enterprise and Industrial Policy, Statistics, and Financial Control during the German Presidency of EU in 2007 can be understood in this context. However, after 2009 federal elections in Germany, coalition partner of CDU/CSU became Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP). Although FDP supported Turkey's EU bid, party members did not hesitate to criticize Turkey about the pace of the reforms.<sup>197</sup> This coalition coincided with the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France who also opposed to the Turkish membership. Therefore, Turkey's EU membership was still an open process but it was not supported by two important powers of EU: Germany and France.<sup>198</sup>

As in many other states, in Turkey, ministry of foreign affairs is the main institution that is responsible for foreign policy. However, in addition to foreign ministry, Turkish armed forces General Staff and National Security Council after the 1982 Constitution have been also effective, especially concerning the security issues.<sup>199</sup> Traditionally, there have not been major clashes between these institutions. Nevertheless, since the issues have become more diverse, institutions that involve in

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<sup>195</sup> İsmail Ermağan, "Avrupa Birliği Bağlamında Türkiye- Almanya İlişkileri", p.82

<sup>196</sup> Şener Aktürk, "The Turkish Minority in German Politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications" *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (2010): p.65

<sup>197</sup> İsmail Ermağan, "Avrupa Birliği Bağlamında Türkiye- Almanya İlişkileri", p.84

<sup>198</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, "Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership" p.3

<sup>199</sup> M. Fatih Tayfur and Korel Göymen, "Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.38, no.2, (2002): p.106



the foreign policy making also diversified too. For example, EU membership conditions its candidates to make major domestic changes. Thus, as a candidate country, different institutions in Turkey started to involve. These include the institutions such as the ministry of energy, environment, interior, and economy.<sup>200</sup>

After the national elections of April 1999, coalition government under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit came to power in Turkey. Bülent Ecevit's Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) received 22.3 percent of the votes and his coalition partners Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, MHP) and Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) received 18.1 and 13.3 percent respectively. This coalition witnessed the important period for relations with EU. Although all of them had nationalist tendencies, MHP was the one to persuade about the EU reforms.<sup>201</sup> This shows the effect that domestic politics can have on the foreign policy since the fulfillment of the reforms influenced the relations between Turkey and EU.

In 2002 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) came to power in Turkey. According to Baskın Oran, AKP had two main features.<sup>202</sup> First of all, unlike Bülent Ecevit's coalition before it, AKP did not have republican roots which helped with its reforms for joining the EU. Moreover, Oran argues that AKP politicians had what he called "town origin".<sup>203</sup> It reflects the fact that AKP adopted conservative approach which integrated conservative and nationalist approach that had been created after 1980 coup d'etat. This approach included respect for the leader which consequently can be one of the reasons for Erdoğan's leadership style. During AKP period, great progress was made to meet EU criteria. One of the most important reforms was the ones related to military- civilian relations.<sup>204</sup> In 2010 referendum in Turkey, AKP supported the yes vote to constitutional amendments.

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<sup>200</sup> Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey's neighbourhood policy and EU membership: Squaring the circle of Turkish foreign policy", *International Journal*, 67, no. 1, (2011-2012): p.68

<sup>201</sup> Gamze Avci, "Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euroskepticism?" *Turkish Studies*, 4:1,(2003) p.158

<sup>202</sup> Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu", in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt III: 2001- 2012*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2016), p.81

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Birol A. Yeşilada, "The future of Erdoğan and the AKP", *Turkish Studies*, 17:1 (2016), p.22

These amendments included trying of crimes committed by military personnel in civilian courts.<sup>205</sup>

Öniş and Yılmaz argued that AKP government constituted the golden age of relations between EU and Turkey, the period after 2005 witnessed “the loss of enthusiasm for the EU membership project”.<sup>206</sup> The impact of the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel’s understanding of “privileged partnership” for Turkey is important here. On the other hand, during the AKP period, Turkey started to show increasing interest in Turkish immigrant communities. In parallel with this interest, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities was established in 2010 which was very important for Turks in Germany since it they constituted the highest number in Western Europe.<sup>207</sup> To conclude, domestic structure of the state and changes in government have been important domestic determinants of relations between Germany and Turkey. For instance, relations were on very good terms during Red- Green coalition of Germany. The claim that Schröder’s need for Turkish votes in federal elections affected his approach to Turkey’s EU bid is a very prominent example of domestic structure’s influence on the relations between two states. Moreover, AKP’s reforms in Turkey is another example of domestic changes that have positive effect on international relations since the reforms helped its bid to join EU and good nature of relations between Germany and Turkey.

#### **4.2. Democratization and Human Rights**

Although in founding treaties there is little reference to human rights, starting from 1980s human rights and democracy have become important issues for European

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<sup>205</sup> Ergun Özbudun, “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.19, No.2 (2014): p.156

<sup>206</sup> Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (March 2009): p.13

<sup>207</sup> Ebru Turhan and Günter Seufert “German Interests And Turkey’s Eu Accession Process: A Holistic Perspective” p.20

Community.<sup>208</sup> With the Treaty of Maastricht, it was accepted that “strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States” and to “maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice” was included as objectives of the EU.<sup>209</sup> Moreover, as it is already stated, with Copenhagen Criteria; democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities became condition for EU membership. Therefore, it can be assumed that Turkey’s efforts to undertake initiatives concerning democracy and human rights can be related to its pursuit of EU membership.<sup>210</sup> Although Keyman and Düzgit argues that 2001 financial crisis is also influential on changes in Turkey since it was realized that economic stability can be achieved by democratic consolidation, deepening of the relations between Turkey and EU since Helsinki Summit of 1999 is the main reason.<sup>211</sup>

Consequently, Germany as a member state of European Union had been involved in the domestic conditions of democracy and human rights in Turkey. Even though Hale suggests that Angela Merkel’s rise to power in Germany in 2005 and her preference for “privileged partnership” for Turkey instead of a membership contributed to weakening of reforms in Turkey<sup>212</sup> and Wolff argues that Germany’s scepticism for Turkish membership contradicts with its aims to promote Turkish democracy,<sup>213</sup> German involvement in Turkey’s domestic affairs concerning human rights dates back to 1990s.

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<sup>208</sup> İhsan Dağı, “İnsan Hakları ve Demokratikleşme: Türkiye- Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Siyasal Boyut” in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, ed. by Atila Eralp, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), p.122

<sup>209</sup> Christos Kassimeris and Lina Tsoumpanou, “The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey’s EU Candidacy” *International Journal of Human Rights*, 12:3 (2008): p.331

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, p.335

<sup>211</sup> Keyman, E. Fuat, and Senem Aydın Düzgit. "Europeanization, democratization and human rights in Turkey." *Turkey and the European Union*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 70-71.

<sup>212</sup> William Hale, “Human Rights and Turkey’s EU Accession Process: Internal and External Dynamics, 2005–10” *South European Society and Politics*, 16:2 (2011): p.326

<sup>213</sup> Jonas Wolff, “Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power: The Example of Germany’s ‘Value-Oriented’ Foreign Policy”, *German Politics*, 22:4 (2013): p.486

Germany's approach to human rights in Turkey is mostly related to Kurdish issue in Turkey. Firstly, in 1992 claims that German arms were used against Kurds in Turkey resulted in resignation of Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg.<sup>214</sup> Furthermore, Turkey's military operation in Northern Iraq which started in March 20, 1995 was criticized by Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel and this led to very tense relations between Germany and Turkey which ended in suspension of military aid to Turkey.<sup>215</sup> These incidents indicate that Kurdish problem which first emerged as a domestic problem in Turkey became an issue with its relations with Germany. Moreover, in 1998 Gerhard Schröder declared that "Kurdish issue is a European problem."<sup>216</sup> This can be related to the fact that Germany has its own Kurdish population in addition to its Turkish population and Germany itself witnessed PKK actions in 1990s especially the protests in German autobahns which escalated into violence.<sup>217</sup> As a result, PKK was officially labelled as a terrorist organization in Germany. In spite of this official ban, Germany was criticized by Turkey about the claims that the PKK and its affiliates continued their activities in Germany.<sup>218</sup>

Another important domestic event in Turkey that caused reaction from Germany was Gezi Park protests that started in a park in Taksim district of İstanbul and in a short period of time spread to other parts of the country. The protests had a wide media coverage in German press. Also, Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle said that "Turkish government has to show that modernization in Turkey is taken seriously."<sup>219</sup> On the other hand, he also reminded that these protests should

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<sup>214</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk - Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler", p.288

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Is Kurdish Issue a Real European Problem?" in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.306

<sup>217</sup> Gezal Acer, "Alman uzman: Türk-Kürt çatışması istenmiyor", *Deutsche Welle*, March 3, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/tr/alman-uzman-t%C3%BCrk-k%C3%BCrt-%C3%A7at%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1-istenmiyor/a-42997097>, (accessed on October 23, 2019)

<sup>218</sup> Zafer Meşe, "Avrupa'nın PKK politikası değişiyor mu?", *Sabah*, November 25, 2017, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/zafer-mese/2017/11/25/avrupanin-pkk-politikasi-degisiyor-mu> (accessed on October 28, 2019)

<sup>219</sup> "Türkiye Modernleşmeyi Kanıtlamak Zorundadır", *Habertürk*, June 25, 2013, <https://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/850286-turkiye-modernlesmeyi-kanitlamak-zorundadir>

not be confused with Arab Spring since Turkey is a democracy with an elected government<sup>220</sup> Thus, Gezi Parkı protest became another issue concerning democracy and human rights in Turkey that had a reaction from Germany.

To sum up, democratization and human rights are on the agenda in Turkey mainly they are requirements for the EU membership and Germany has been reacting to the domestic conditions concerning the issues of human rights and democracy in Turkey since 1990s. Kurdish problem in Turkey is the most prominent example that can be given in this context. It was a domestic issue for Turkey at first, however, later it became an issue that affected the relations between Turkey and Germany. Moreover, Gezi Park protest in 2013 was another incident that demonstrated that a domestic problem in Turkey can become an international one when it was widely covered by German media. These incidents are the examples of how a domestic issue can become an international one and illustrates explanation at state level for foreign policy behavior.

### **4.3. Economy**

As a “trade state”, for Germany, relations with Turkey is very important. Germany is most important partner of Turkey in Europe, therefore; Germany tries to avoid any political act that might affect its trade with Turkey negatively. For Turkey, as Germany is its number one partner in trade, there are many people with Turkish origin and and the fact that Germany has been sending the highest number of tourists to Turkey, it is a very important country from an economic perspective.<sup>221</sup>

When the bilateral economic and commercial relations of Republic of Turkey with other states are taken into consideration, it can be seen that the most intense

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<sup>220</sup> “Almanya Başbakanı Merkel'den Gezi Parkı açıklaması”, *Hürriyet*, June 3, 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/almanya-basbakani-merkelden-gezi-parki-aciklamasi-23427254>

<sup>221</sup> Kemal İnat, “Economic Relations Between Germany and Turkey”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.18, NO.1 (2016): p.22

relations are with Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>222</sup> Therefore, economy has always been one of the most important aspects of the relations between Germany and Turkey. As in previous years, Germany ranked first in Turkey's exports in 2018, followed by the Russian Federation and China in terms of imports. Moreover, in Turkey, between the years 2002-2008, 3.2 billion dollars of the total foreign direct investment of 62.5 billion dollars came from Germany. In 2009, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow from Germany was 1.3 billion dollars whereas in 2010 and 2011 numbers were 592 million dollars and 605 million dollars respectively<sup>223</sup>

The fact that relations between Turkey and Germany are not limited to trade makes economic relations even more important. For example, investments of people of Turkish origin in Germany are very significant.<sup>224</sup> Moreover, number of German tourists that visited Turkey have always been high. For instance, in 2017 number was 3.5 millions.<sup>225</sup>

With this information, it can be said that to maintain this high level of economic relations, Germany and Turkey should also have close political relations. Economic aspect of relations between Germany and Turkey ensures that when making political decisions about the other one, one has to keep in mind that there will be also be an economic aspect.<sup>226</sup> Therefore, leaders would be inclined to cooperate politically to continue to have intense economic activity with the other country. Thus, it can be asserted that economic relations can have positive effect on political relations.

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<sup>222</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ticaret Bakanlığı, *Türkiye ile Ticaret*, <https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/yurtdisi-teskilati/avrupa/almanya/ulke-profil/turkiye-ile-ticaret> (accessed on June 1,2019)

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Bağcı, “Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler”, p.295

<sup>225</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate For Eu Affairs, *Commercial and Economic Relations between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commercial-and-economic-relations-between-turkey-and-the-federal-republic-of-germany.en.mfa>

<sup>226</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership” *The New Geopolitics Turkey Project Policy Paper*, No. 14 (March 2018): p.8

**Table 4: Trade between Germany and Turkey<sup>227</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Exports from Turkey to Germany (million dollars)</b>	<b>Share in Total Export (Percentage)</b>	<b>Turkey's imports from Germany (million dollars)</b>	<b>Share in Total Imports (Percentage)</b>
<b>2002</b>	5.869	16,3	7.041	13,7
<b>2003</b>	7.485	15,8	9.452	13,6
<b>2004</b>	8.745	13,8	12.515	12,8
<b>2005</b>	9.455	12,9	13.633	11,7
<b>2006</b>	9.686	11,3	14.768	10,6
<b>2007</b>	11.993	11,2	17.540	10,3
<b>2008</b>	12.951	9,8	18.687	9,3
<b>2009</b>	9.793	9,6	14.096	10,0
<b>2010</b>	11.479	10,1	17.549	9,5
<b>2011</b>	13.951	10,3	22.985	9,5
<b>2012</b>	13.124	8,6	21.400	9,1
<b>2013</b>	13.696,8	9,0	24.182	9,6
<b>2014</b>	15.147,4	9,6	22.369	9,2

<sup>227</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ticaret Bakanlığı, *Türkiye ile Ticaret*, <https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/yurtdisi-teskilati/avrupa/almanya/ulke-profil/turkiye-ile-ticaret> (accessed on June 1,2019)

#### 4.4. Public Opinion

Public opinion is another feature that affects the relations at state level and it is very important aspect of the relations between Germany and Turkey. Almost everyone in Germany have something to say about Turkey and vice versa. Since the relations between people of Germany and people of Turkey dates back to Ottoman periods and that of Roman German Empire, naturally peoples of these two countries have some established perceptions about each other. Ruth Mandel argues that the Ottoman army's march into Vienna still evokes idea of "what if" among German speakers.<sup>228</sup> Thus, it can be assumed that history does not help German people to improve their approach to Turkey. Turkish people's perception of Germany also derives heavily from history. When primary school student started to learn about the foundation of the republic, they also learn how Ottoman Empire and Germany fought together during the Great War.

Other than history, most important issue that public opinion of both countries influence the foreign policy is possibility of membership to EU for Turkey (It should be mentioned here that since this study focuses on the period between 1999 to 2014, it does not cover other issues that caused public reaction such as German Bundestag resolution about Armenia, refugee agreement or detention of German nationals in Turkey). In Germany, most of the time, the public has not been in favor of Turkish membership to European Union. Furthermore, public support continued to decline especially 2005 onwards. On the other hand, Turkish public have become less enthusiastic about EU membership too. This was related to rise of national sentiments in the public. According to a survey that was conducted by Center for Turkish Studies of Kadir Has University, 38.4 percent of the people were against Turkish membership to EU.<sup>229</sup> Moreover, according to the same study, Germany was behind Central Asian states, USA and Japan for international cooperation.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Ruth Mandel, "Fifty Years of Migration, Fifty Years of Waiting: Turkey- Germany and the European Union", *German Politics & Society*, Vol.31, No. 2 (2013), p.69

<sup>229</sup> "Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması Kantitatif Araştırma Raporu", Kadir Has Üniversitesi, December 4, 2013

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.



As it has already been stated public opinion as parts of domestic culture can be very influential in shaping foreign policy. Thus, when German public is not enthusiastic about Turkey's membership to EU, this, in turn, gives the government an opportunity to pressure Turkey into undertaking reforms more quickly or to oppose it altogether. On the other hand, Turkey might also justify its actions, or lack of actions, by demonstrating the results of its public opinion. Therefore, public opinion is a very significant part of both countries that can affect the foreign policy actions.

#### 4.5. Turks in Germany

Even though there are 77.000 Germans living in Turkey according to *Turkish Statistical Institute*<sup>231</sup> and they are surely important for contributing to cultural relations between Germany, more than 3 millions people with Turkish origin have had longer history in Germany. From 1960s onwards growing number of Muslim workers and immigrants particularly from Turkey have arrived in Germany. These *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) were invited to Federal Republic of Germany to fill the gap as a result of rapidly increasing industrial production and since then their number increased significantly. Turkish workers were usually running away from the lack of choice and unemployment at home and they saw the opportunity to find both. While there were seven thousand Turkish people were living in Germany, today their number is more than 3 millions. Moreover, especially in cities like Berlin, Cologne, Stuttgart, Turks continue to influence cultural and political life in Germany. As former Prime Minister and President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel once said, “there is a Turkey in Germany.”<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> “Türkiye'de 919 bin yabancı yaşıyor”, *Türkiye Gazetesi*, February 7, 2018, <https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yasam/541907.aspx>, (accessed on October 23, 2019)

<sup>232</sup> “Almanya'nın içinde bir Türkiye var”, *Hürriyet*, June 3, 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/avrupa/almanya-nin-icinde-bir-turkiye-var-29336157>, (accessed on October 23, 2019)

Turks living in Germany are seen both as part of Germany and Turkey. Although they live in Germany, they are up-to-date about what is going on in Turkey. For Turkey, immigration population can be a significant political instrument in its relations with Germany considering that some of them have German citizenship.<sup>233</sup> For Germany, they are now part of German culture. There are many important individuals who have Turkish origins that have contributed to German culture as politicians, football players, directors and more. They are the bridge between not only German and Turkish societies, but also between governments of Germany and Turkey since their existence creates an undeniable political and economic results for both Germany and Turkey.<sup>234</sup>

When Turks went to Germany and started to work, it was considered as a temporary situation. However, in time, as former German Ambassador to Ankara Dr. Eckart Cuntz argues, they have become the indicator of unprecedented close human ties that have evolved over the years.<sup>235</sup> Moreover, Turks in Germany also have the potential to deteriorate the relations between Germany and Turkey. For instance when Germany was reunited in 1990, unemployment in Germany mostly hit the Turks.<sup>236</sup> Although Turks were negatively affected by the economic consequences of the reunification, they were accused because of their increasing number.<sup>237</sup> Furthermore rise of xenophobia made Turks targets in Germany. Solingen arson attack in 1993 during which five members of a Turkish family was killed is one of most tragic example of Turks becoming targets.<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Yıldız Köremezli, "Immigrants' struggle for recognition: religion and politics" in *Religion, Identity and Politics*, ed. by Haldun Gülalp and Günter Seufert, (London: Routledge, 2013), p.65

<sup>234</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler" p.292

<sup>235</sup> Dr. Eckart Cuntz, "Bir başarı öyküsü" *Hürriyet*, March 15, 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/bir-basari-oykusu-17272079>

<sup>236</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkish- German Relations after the 1997 Luxembourg Decision of the EU", p.92

<sup>237</sup> Bağcı, "Alman Dış Politikası ve Türk- Alman İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Beklentiler" p.292

<sup>238</sup> "Germany remembers Solingen arson attack victims, 25 years on" *Deutsche Welle*, May 29, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-remembers-solingen-arson-attack-victims-25-years-on/a-43955577>, (accessed on June 21, 2019)

Thus, it can be argued that Turkish people in Germany is another important aspect of relations between Germany and Turkey. Turkish people in Germany give Turkey the opportunity to be effective in domestic life in Germany whereas Germany has to be more attentive to its relations with Turkey. In this respect, as Bađcı argues, Germany is the most important European country for Turkey and there is a special relationship that should be recognized by both states.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> Hüseyin Bađcı, “Venue of Common Sense: Improvement of Turkish German Relations”, in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.297

## CHAPTER 5

### INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: PEOPLE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY

Germany has had important leaders that shaped the course of its history. Bismarck is one of the important historical figures whose ideas are still cited. Moreover, other than him there have been other leaders who left their mark on history of Germany. One cannot forget Konrad Adenauer who was the first chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany. Also, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl whose terms and policies had influence not only in Germany but also Europe in general. From 1999 to 2014 two important chancellors shaped German foreign policy and Germany's approach to Turkey and its bid for EU membership. Both Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel have been important political figures for Turkey as well as they have been for Germany and Europe. Moreover, ministers of foreign affairs; Joschka Fischer, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Guido Westerwelle and Ahmet Davutoğlu in Turkey were also important names that affect the relations between Germany and Turkey.

For Turkey, similarly, leaders have been very important. Since the declaration of the republic in 1923 and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, different leaders during different periods have left their mark on foreign policy whether they were social democrats or conservatives. For instance, it can be argued that Turkey's Western orientation was consolidated under the leadership of Atatürk.<sup>240</sup> Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend Turkey of 1950s without looking at Adnan Menderes. Similarly, understanding Turgut Özal is very important for relations between EU and Turkey during 1980s as well as relations between US and Turkey. Moreover, it would be hard to understand Turkish foreign policy without Süleyman Demirel or Bülent Ecevit both of whom had served the country for long and difficult periods.

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<sup>240</sup> Mustafa Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: changing patterns and conjunctures during the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36:1 (2000) p. 105

**Table 5: People Who Are Responsible For Foreign Policy in Germany**

<b>Chancellor</b>	<b>Ministers for Foreign Affairs</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Gerhard Schröder: SPD (October 27, 1998 - October 22, 2002)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Joschka Fischer: Green (October 27, 1998 - October 22, 2002)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Gerhard Schröder: SPD (October 22, 2002 - October 18, 2005)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Joschka Fischer: Green (October 22, 2002 - 22 November 2005)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Angela Merkel: CDU (November 22, 2005 - October 28, 2009)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Frank-Walter Steinmeier: SPD (November 22, 2005 - October 28, 2009)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Angela Merkel: CDU (October 28, 2009 - December 17, 2013)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Guido Westerwelle: FDP (October 28, 2009 - December 17, 2013)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Angela Merkel: CDU (December 17, 2013 - March 14, 2018)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Frank-Walter Steinmeier: SPD (December 17, 2013 - January 27, 2017)</li> </ul>

**Table 6: People Who Are Responsible For Foreign Policy in Turkey**

<b>Prime Ministers</b>	<b>Ministers of Foreign Affairs</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Bülent Ecevit: DSP - MHP - ANAP coalition (May 28, 1999 - November 19, 2002)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● İsmail Cem ( April 18, 1999 - July 11, 2002)</li> <li>● Şükrü Sina Gürel (July 12, 2002 - November - 2002)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Abdullah Gül: AKP (November 19, 2002 - March 12, 2003)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Yaşar Yakış (November 19, 2002 - March 14, 2003)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: AKP (March 14, 2003 - August 29, 2007)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Abdullah Gül (March 14, 2003 - August 28, 2007)</li> <li>● Ali Babacan (August 29, 2007 - May 2, 2009)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: AKP (August 29, 2007 - July 6, 2011)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ahmet Davutoğlu (May 2, 2009 - July 6, 2011)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: AKP (July 6, 2011 - August 28, 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ahmet Davutoğlu (July 6, 2011 - August 28, 2014)</li> </ul>

### 5.1. Gerhard Schröder Period in Germany (1998- 2005)

Gerhard Schröder became the Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany in October 1998. He was a member of SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). His tenure was an important period for German politics both domestically and internationally. He was the chancellor during the 2003 Iraq crisis between Germany and the United States. Moreover, during Helsinki Summit in which Turkey became an official candidate for EU membership, Schröder was the leader of Germany. Therefore, Turkey was a significant issue on Schröder's agenda. To understand his approach to relations with Turkey, it is important know about life and personality of Gerhard Schröder.

He was born in Blomberg, North Rhine-Westphalia in 1944. His father was killed during World War II and his mother was a worker. Coming from a lower class family, he felt that he could find what he sought in politics at SPD.<sup>241</sup> Thus, he became member of SPD in 1963. He was the chairman of the Jusos (Young Social Democrats) from 1978 to 1980. From 1980 to 1986 he was a member of Bundestag. Also from 1976 to 1990, he was a lawyer in Hannover. SPD won the state elections in June 1990, Schröder became Minister-President of Lower Saxony as head of an SPD-Greens coalition. Thus, it was his previous experience of head of SPD- Greens coalition. Finally, in 1998, he took over the chancellorship from Helmut Kohl who is famously known as "the Chancellor of Unity", and became the chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany.

Before he became the chancellor, Schröder made it clear that as a chancellor he would not necessarily carry out the party's wishes. While such statements of acting independently from the party and an openness to ideas from all political quarters gained him many votes they also alienated party members.<sup>242</sup> This approach of Schröder to politics was also evident in his years as Minister- President of Lower

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<sup>241</sup> Gerhard Schröder, *Siyasi Hayatım*, trans. Çiğdem Canan Dikmen, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2007), p.19

<sup>242</sup> Gerard Braunthal, "The 1998 German Election: Gerhard Schröder and the Politics of the New Middle", *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (50) (Spring 1999), p.38

Saxony. He tried to impress both the employers and the workers. He would try to dress like business people and smoke Havana cigars like them, whereas when he was speaking to workers he would emphasize his family background.<sup>243</sup> This indicates that he was not fixated on a particular ideology and was willing to follow policies that were in the line with the situations. Moreover, he had great media support. Patzelt says that “Schröder is a personally pleasant man possessing quick-wittedness and a telegenic appearance, and has shrewdly established close and reliable relations with most top ranking journalists, which often operates on a first-name basis even in semi-public encounters.”<sup>244</sup>

Another important point that should be mentioned about Schröder is the fact that he brought a new generation of leadership with himself to power. He was less burdened by the past as he did not witness the war period of Germany. This gave him opportunity to be more assertive about foreign policy interests of Federal Republic.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, he was generally establishing personal relationships with leaders of other states his relationship with Russian leader Putin as the most prominent example. Furthermore, it can be argued that his interests in foreign policy had to increase especially after the crisis with United States over the intervention of Iraq.

In terms of Turkey’s membership to EU, Schröder put a great deal of importance on the issue. According to him, one of the most difficult issues in European politics during his chancellorship was the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.<sup>246</sup> He predicted that there would be domestic arguments in Germany because of the approach of CDU/CSU. In the opposition they were against the Turkish membership. However, Schröder was a supporter of efforts of Turkey in spite of the possibility of a domestic pressure. He argued that Germany had to be consistent in its European policy and since it was assured that negotiation process would start as soon

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid. p.35

<sup>244</sup> Werner J. Patzelt, “Chancellor Schröder's approach to political and legislative leadership” *German Politics*, Vol. 13, No.2 (2004), p.269

<sup>245</sup> William M. Chandler, “Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections” *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (Spring 2003), p.164

<sup>246</sup> Gerhard Schröder, *Siyasi Hayatım*, p.182

as Turkey complied with Copenhagen criteria, he decided to fully support Turkey.<sup>247</sup>

For him, Turkey's importance for Europe was clear. He argued that:

“In addition to the unique geopolitical position of Turkey where Europe meets Asia, its importance for the security of energy resources, and its political, military and economic weight would be other gains for European Union. Moreover, Turkey's strong links with European Union would play an important role in Europe's relations with Islamic world. Also, Turkish membership to EU would mean irreversibility of Turkey's transformation to a democratic society. On the other hand, interruption of the process and missing the opportunities would lead to identity crisis for Turkey”<sup>248</sup>

In terms of personal relations, although his relations with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was more close, it can be said that in the climate of increasing prospect for Turkish membership, he maintained good relations with Bülent Ecevit too. In the letters they wrote to each other in 1999 Ecevit emphasized that Turkey was aware of the Copenhagen criteria and ready for reforms whereas Schröder said that he would do his best to overcome problems in EU's relations with Turkey.<sup>249</sup> Therefore, it can be said that the relations between Schröder and Ecevit were in a positive nature.

As it is already mentioned, relations between Schröder and Erdoğan have been very good. Erdoğan can be argued as one of the leaders with whom the Chancellor has managed to establish personal relations. When Schröder was the chancellor, it was Erdoğan's first term as prime minister and his government was trying for Turkish membership to European Union. Therefore, it was natural that his relations with Schröder were on good terms. However, as Schröder later described him as “one of his companions”<sup>250</sup>, it can be argued that their relations were based on more than

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid. p.183

<sup>249</sup> “Tarihi mektuplar”, *Hürriyet*, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/tarihi-mektuplar-39083722> (accessed on June 21, 2019)

<sup>250</sup>“Erdoğan'ın dostu Schröder kaygılı” *Deutsche Welle*, September 23, 2015 <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-dostu-schr%C3%B6der-kayg%C4%B1%C4%B1/a-18736175> ,(accessed on June 21, 2019)



having common ground on Turkey's EU policy. Furthermore, their close relations can be argued because of the fact that after the end of Schröder's chancellery, two leaders continued to meet. For example, Erdoğan was invited to Schröder's birthday party in 2009<sup>251</sup> whereas Schröder represented Germany in oath taking ceremony of Erdoğan in Ankara after he was elected for president in 2018.<sup>252</sup>

Another important individual during Schröder's period in power was Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer. As Schröder, he was active in politics in 1960s and went on to become a founder of the Greens. He was the minister of the environment in Hesse and during the same period he fought the nuclear industry. When he became a Federal Foreign Minister, Fischer announced his intentions of putting more emphasis on human rights as a "condition for improving relations with other countries"<sup>253</sup>. Moreover, he had close personal relations with Chancellor Schröder and he was often described as Germany's most popular politician of the coalition.<sup>254</sup>

In terms of relations with Turkey, Fischer was supporter of Turkey's membership of European Union. Although he emphasized the importance of Turkish membership of EU for Germany, he also argued that in general for EU Turkish membership would have three significant benefits.<sup>255</sup> First one is the fact that possibility of membership to EU would foster Turkish reforms. Secondly, especially after 9/11 Turkey became very important for European security. And finally, he

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<sup>251</sup> "Erdoğan'dan Schröder'e doğum günü sürprizi", *Deutsche Welle*, April 18, 2009 <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fandan-schr%C3%B6dere-do%C4%9Fum-g%C3%BCn%C3%BC-s%C3%BCprizi/a-4188852-0>, (accessed on June 21, 2019)

<sup>252</sup> "Beştepe'deki törende Almanya'yı Schröder temsil etti", *Deutsche Welle*, July 9, 2018 <https://www.dw.com/tr/be%C5%9Ftepedeki-t%C3%B6rende-almanyay%C4%B1-schr%C3%B6der-temsil-etti/a-44586564>, (accessed on June 21, 2019)

<sup>253</sup> Gerard Braunthal, "The 1998 German Election: Gerhard Schröder and the Politics of the New Middle", p.50

<sup>254</sup> William M. Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections", p.171

<sup>255</sup> Joscka Fischer, "Turkey's European Perspective: The German View, Fall 2004," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/104/turkeys-european-perspective-the-german-view-fall-2004>. (accessed on June 22, 2019)

argued that Turkish membership to EU would be in EU's and Germany's economic interest.

## **5.2. Angela Merkel Period in Germany (2005- 2014)<sup>256</sup>**

Angela Merkel has been a very interesting chancellor for Germany not just as a woman but also as a former GDR citizen. Merkel was born in 1954 in Hamburg at a time when Germany was divided in East and West and Hamburg was part of Federal Republic. However, later his father moved his family to East Germany where Merkel would live until the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989. She studied physics at Karl Marx University in Leipzig and furthered her studies at Academy of Sciences at Berlin. During the final days of GDR she became part of Democratic Awakening Party (DA). She became the press officer of the party in 1990. In February of that year, before the first free elections were to be held in GDR, East German section CDU DA and German Social Union merged into the Alliance for Germany. As part of the party Angela Merkel three goals in mind; reunification of Germany, market economy and to sit in the Bundestag.<sup>257</sup> All of her goals were realized in very short amount of time.

After Germany was reunited, Merkel became the Minister for Women and Youth in Helmut Kohl government. Later, in 1994 she was appointed as Minister for the Environment which was a more suitable position for Merkel considering her background at physics. After CDU lost the elections in 1998, she distanced herself from Kohl and in 2000 she became the first female leader of a German party. After 2005 elections, she became the first female chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany.

Three aspects can be used to describe German Chancellor Angela Merkel: that she is a woman, she is a former GDR citizen and she has a background in natural

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<sup>256</sup> As of 2019, Angela Merkel remains the Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany, however this study does not include the period after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the President of Turkey in August 2014.

<sup>257</sup> Stefan Kornelius, *Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World*, (London: Alma Books, 2013) p.33

science. All three of them make her a unique case for Federal Republic of Germany. First of all, as a former GDR citizen and this has had a significant influence on her. She said that since she lived in a dictatorship for thirty five years that was not very different from the previous one, she is always sceptical about the possibility of history repeating itself.<sup>258</sup> Moreover, it can be assumed that the reason behind her frequent advocacy for freedom is her past in GDR. Also, it can be said that her former status as a GDR citizen gave her an opportunity to look at the European Union and the West in general from outside. Merkel herself accepted this when she was awarded with Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Obama in 2011 by saying that she grew up in a part of Germany that was not free and that she dreamed of freedom for many years.<sup>259</sup> Furthermore, Merkel's past as the daughter of a clergyman working on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain can also be expected to affect her foreign policy, in particular towards Russia and the United States.

Yoder argues that many studies focus on the less aggressive leadership style of women and assert that women prefers cooperation over combative behavior.<sup>260</sup> However, this point can be refuted by the examples of Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom who led the country during the military conflict over Falkland islands or Tansu Çiller of Turkey who was the prime minister during the country's intense military campaign against PKK. With these examples, it can be seen that women do not necessarily need be less competitive or more nurturing. On the other hand, it can be argued that less competitive nature of Angela Merkel is what makes her difficult to defeat for her opponents. As Ursula Von Der Leyen says:

“I've seen many situations at the very beginning where men try to humiliate her. They were very authoritarian towards her. They sat up strong and with a deep voice, and they were loud and they were very decisive. And I realised that she let them have their way, but she was very soft, answering in a low voice. This was a

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<sup>258</sup> Ibid. 81

<sup>259</sup> “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on receiving the Presidential Medal of Freedom at the State Dinner”, The Federal Government, <https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-en/hidden-hier-nur-knoten-verlinken-die-auch-publiziert-sind-fuer-preview-elemente-test-etc-nur-preview-hidden-node-verwenden/homepage/speech-by-federal-chancellor-angela-merkel-on-receiving-the-presidential-medal-of-freedom-at-the-state-dinner-478512>, (accessed on October 29, 2019).

<sup>260</sup> Jennifer A. Yoder, “An Intersectional Approach to Angela Merkel's Foreign Policy”, *German Politics*, 20:3. (2011) p.361

behaviour where men at the very beginning couldn't cope with at all, because that was not the typical behaviour”<sup>261</sup>

Although the fact that she is a female leader is usually emphasized, Merkel herself thinks that her background in natural science shaped her more than her sex.<sup>262</sup> Natural science was a non-ideological subject that gave her academic freedom and also provided a certain way of thinking that she applies not only in her studies but also in politics. Therefore, she is not impulsive as a politician and does not make decision based on personal feelings. This makes her opposite of Gerhard Schröder who used his personal relations with other leaders when he made foreign policy decisions.

For domestic policy, as a woman Merkel led to some changes in her part CDU and Germany in general. For example, she was not just the first female leader of CDU but also first female leader of Germany. As a former East German and divorced woman she was different from her predecessor and did not instantly seem like a natural fit to a conservative party.<sup>263</sup> Moreover, change in CDU’s approach to immigration also occurred during the leadership of Angela Merkel. She held annual meetings with migrant groups and federal and local officials which resulted in a plan facilitate integration of the immigrants.<sup>264</sup> With Merkel’s term as a Chancellor, CDU changed direction from rejecting the immigration to finding ways to integrate immigrants into society.

Foreign policy was one of the most important topics for Angela Merkel. In 2005 when she first became the Chancellor, 15 pages of her 18 page speech were about foreign policy.<sup>265</sup> In terms of foreign policy, European Union is very important for Chancellor Merkel. For her, Germany cannot solve its problems alone and the most

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<sup>261</sup> *The Making Of Merkel*. Directed by Mark Radice. Produced by Mark Radice. BBC Worldwide, 2013. [https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic\\_entity%7Cvideo\\_work%7C3366660](https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C3366660).

<sup>262</sup> Joyce Mushaben, “Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and the Triangulation of German Foreign Policy”, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2009) p.29

<sup>263</sup> Karl Vick and Simon Shuster, Person of The Year: Chancellor of the Free World”, *Time*, (2015)

<sup>264</sup> Clay Clemens, “Modernisation or Disorientation? Policy Change in Merkel's CDU”, *German Politics*, Vol. 18, No.2 (2009): p.133

<sup>265</sup> Kornelius, *Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World*, p.87

important principle of foreign policy is multilateralism. In this context, the most important organization for Germany is Europe. Relations between Germany and USA and transatlantic relations in general are also very important for Merkel's foreign policy. As a former GDR citizen, she has always been aware of the importance of United States and Western Alliance for Germany. Thus, it can be assumed that NATO is also significant for foreign policy understanding of Angela Merkel. It might be the explanation of why she has been seen as "last hope for the survival of liberal democracy" after recent developments.<sup>266</sup>

It can be said that for her term as a chancellor, Angela Merkel had to face important challenges both in Europe and the world. The economic crisis of 2008 began with bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In 2009, crisis spread to Europe. Germany and Merkel had to have the role of leadership during the Eurozone crisis for economic reasons. Stefan Kornelius argued in his interview with Şuay Nilhan Açıklan that during this crisis Merkel had the courage to use the crisis to transfer Europe into "new and strong Europe together"<sup>267</sup>. It was the largest state in terms of population, gross domestic product and gross national product. Another important event was the Arab Spring. Merkel had to lead Germany during the intervention into Libya. It should be noted that Merkel also had to solve problems with Russia during Ukrainian Crisis during 2013 and more recently refugee crisis as a result of Civil War in Syria.

In terms of Germany's relations between Turkey, it can be argued that this was another issue that has been very important for Germany. Even though accession negotiations began in 2005, there were also suggestions that non-membership alternatives should be offered to Turkey. Merkel has been one of them. She suggests that Turkey's attachment to the EU should be based on the formation of a "privileged partnership".<sup>268</sup> "Privileged partnership" refers to forms of non-membership relations

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<sup>266</sup> Klaus Larres, "Angela Merkel and Donald Trump – Values, Interests, and the Future of the West", *German Politics*, 27:2, (2018), p.197

<sup>267</sup> Şuay Nilhan Açıklan, "Leadership in Chaos: Angela Merkel and Eurozone Crisis", (Master's Thesis, The Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, May 2015), p.87

<sup>268</sup> Tarik Oğuzlu & Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who's to Blame?", *Turkish Studies*, 10:4 (2009), p.587

with the EU in which the economic and political relations will develop without prospect of membership. As a concept, it does not elaborate how this privileged partnership would be established or what it would contain. This concept was used by Angela Merkel on more than one occasion and it served to block progress in accession negotiations.<sup>269</sup> Therefore, it can be said that unlike Schröder, Angela Merkel has been against Turkey's EU membership and was enthusiastic about finding other ways to maintain relations with Turkey. On the other hand, opening of three chapters for negotiations during Germany's Presidency of EU in 2007 indicates that Merkel made an effort during her term for the improvement of Turkey's relations with EU.

Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on the other hand, was supportive of Turkish membership provided that Turkey would fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. He saw Turkey as a bridge between the cultures of Christian world and Islamic world.<sup>270</sup> He did not see the the problem as "privileged partnership" or "membership" for Turkey. According to him, whether Turkey would fulfill the criteria was the discussion. Guido Westerwelle, who was the Federal Foreign Minister from FDP, was also supportive of Turkish membership too. He wanted the progress in the relations between Turkey and EU when relations became standstill after 2005. Thus, it can be said that Germany's preference of "privileged partnership" over to membership for Turkey was mainly derived from Chancellor Merkel herself.

For Angela Merkel's relations with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it can be said that he is one of the leaders with whom she worked together for the longest time.<sup>271</sup> Since Merkel came to power, there have been three leader changes in the United States, four in France and five in the United Kingdom (as of July 2018). However, since the beginning of her term, in Germany's relations with Turkey, Merkel has always been meeting with the same person. However, it can be said that Merkel's relations with Erdoğan have not been problem-free. From their first meeting in 2004, there have

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<sup>269</sup>Senem Aydın-Düzgit, "No Crisis, No Change: The Third AKP Victory in the June 2011 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*, 17:2, (2012), p.344

<sup>270</sup>Ebru Turhan, "A new grand coalition? Possible implications" *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 11 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/a-new-grand-coalition-possible-implications-56044>

<sup>271</sup> When Merkel came to power in 2005 in Germany, Erdoğan was the Prime Minister of Turkey. As of 2019 Merkel is still the Chancellor of Germany whereas Erdoğan is the President of Turkey.

been tensions about Turkey's EU bid since two leaders differ on the issue. On the other hand, as Bađcı says "nobody expects her to change her political position yet the more she deals with Turkey the more Turkey and Germany would come to a common understanding on both on bilateral and EU level".<sup>272</sup> As Bađcı predicted, Merkel did not change her political position in time, however, her frequent meetings with Erdoğan and her dealings with Turkey led her to appreciate the significance of Turkey more.<sup>273</sup>

### **5.3. Bülent Ecevit Period in Turkey (1999- 2002)**

Bülent Ecevit has been one of the important faces of Turkish political life. He was born in İstanbul in 1925. His father was a professor at Ankara University and his mother was a painter. Ecevit went to Robert College in İstanbul. He was elected to Turkish Parliament for the first time in 1957. Before coming to power in 2002 for the fourth time, he already previously served as a prime minister in 1974, 1977, 1978. Until 1980 coup d'etat, Bülent Ecevit was the leader of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party). He was suspended from politics after the coup and when his ban was lifted in 1987, he came back to political scene as a leader of Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left Party).

In terms of foreign policy, it can be asserted that Ecevit's most influential action in foreign policy of Turkey was Cyprus Intervention in 1974. During the intervention, which would also become an important issue for Turkey's bid to EU membership, he was the prime minister of Turkey. In addition, Turkey's road to European Union was one of the most important issues of his last period as prime minister.

During the 1970s his understanding of EC was based primarily on economic terms however at the end of 1990s EU gained significant momentum in Turkey and

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<sup>272</sup> Hüseyin Bađcı, "Angie of Turks" in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.387

<sup>273</sup>"Merkel Erdoğan ile buluştu", Deutsche Welle, February 25, 2013, <https://www.dw.com/tr/merkel-erdo%C4%9Fan-ile-bulu%C5%9Ftu/a-16627740>, (accessed on November 2, 2019)

Ecevit supported the idea.<sup>274</sup> For Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria of liberal democracy it needed to improve human rights record. Ecevit played an important role in this respect. He wrote a personal letter to Gerhard Schröder to demonstrate his determination to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. He also persuaded his coalition partners, in particular the leader of nationalist MHP, to abolish death penalty.<sup>275</sup> Ecevit's statement after Helsinki Summit summarizes his approach to Turkey's road to EU:

“Through NATO has contributed to the security of Europe and the West as a whole throughout the decades of Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War Turkey became a pivotal country in the Eurasian process. Turkey, is the leader country in democracy and secularism among the countries having a majority of Muslim population. These are precisely why, Turkey's membership to the European Union is not just to the benefit of Turkey, but to the Union as well.”<sup>276</sup>

Foreign Minister İsmail Cem was another important person that was effective on foreign policy especially Turkey's EU policy. Between 1999 and 2002, he played an important role in recognition of the need to start a series of internal reforms in order to qualify for membership in the European Union (EU).<sup>277</sup> In particular, efforts were made by him to build confidence in Turkish- Greek relations. Cem saw a better future for Turkey in European Union and he worked for this ideal.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Lauren M. McLaren & Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkish Parliamentarians' Perspectives on Turkey's Relations with the European Union”, *Turkish Studies*, 4:1, (2003) p.199

<sup>275</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, “The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of European Union Reform”, *South European Society and Politics*, 16:2, (2011), p.337

<sup>276</sup> Republic of Turkey Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit In Helsinki On Turkey's Candidacy To The EU December 11, 1999”, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey\\_s-candidacy-to-the-eu\\_br\\_december-11\\_-1999-.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey_s-candidacy-to-the-eu_br_december-11_-1999-.en.mfa)

<sup>277</sup>Emel Parlar Dal, “A normative approach to contemporary Turkish foreign policy: The cosmopolitanism–communitarianism divide”, *International Journal*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2015), p. 426

<sup>278</sup> “Dışişleri Bakanı Cem: AB iki büyük hedeften biri”, *Hürriyet*, May 9, 2002, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/disisleri-bakani-cem-ab-iki-buyuk-hedeften-biri-70786>, (accessed on June 23, 2019)



To sum up, both Ecevit and Cem tried to establish good relations with European Union to achieve Turkish membership. During their period, significant progress was made for this purpose. Moreover, since German leadership was supporting Turkey's EU membership during this period, it can be said that both of them succeeded at establishing good relations with Germany.

#### **5.4. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Period in Turkey (2002- 2014)**

Although the importance of the leaders in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish culture in general cannot be denied, Erdoğan's case has been different from his predecessors. As Görener and Ucal argues that even in Turkey where dominant leadership underpinnes the political culture, Erdoğan's influence over the political process has reached a new level.<sup>279</sup> Trying to understand Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's perception of foreign policy and the outside world is important because he is a leader who determines almost every aspect of the political life of the country during his term. At the end of the period Erdoğan established an administration in which every action would be consulted to him.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in 1954 in Kasımpaşa district of İstanbul as the youngest of five children. His father immigrated from Rize and worked as a ferry captain and they had a rather modest life. Unlike most other Turkish leaders, "Erdoğan did not attend any prestigious schools, nor lived abroad at any point."<sup>280</sup> Instead, he studied at an Imam Hatip (prayer-leader and preacher) high school and during his education he had to work for his allowance by selling bottled water, and later he completed a bachelor's degree in business management.<sup>281</sup> His political career started

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<sup>279</sup> Aylin Ş. Görener and Meltem Ş. Ucal, "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.12, No.3 (2011): p.357

<sup>280</sup> Barış Kesgin, "Turkey's Erdoğan: leadership style and foreign policy audiences", *Turkish Studies* (2019): p.8

<sup>281</sup> Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), p.21

early as a successful organizer for the youth movements of the Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan and his Milli Görüş (National View) which was an Islamist movement. Later, Erdoğan became mayor of city of Istanbul from Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) in 1994 and from that point on he became more visible in national politics. RP was an Islamist party and having a religious background Erdoğan was an effective member of it. In February 28, 1997, the military-led National Security Council declared series of decisions which perceived Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey as dangerous as Kurdish separatism and argued that it should be fought by all available means.<sup>282</sup> After reading a poem with Islamist content at a 1998 rally, Erdoğan was imprisoned for using religion to foster disorder. During his imprisonment he had many visitors from all over Turkey indicating that Turkish politics gained a new leader.<sup>283</sup>

In 2001 he became one of the founders of Justice and Development Party (AKP). Before even coming to power, AKP leaders were clear that they did abandon their Islamist roots and European Union was a priority issue on the foreign policy agenda. When he became the prime minister in 2003, he resumed a very active role in foreign policy of Turkey.<sup>284</sup> Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, early AKP governments made important progress in the EU process which led to economic growth, increase in foreign investment, and securing agreements for energy pipelines. Also during his period, reforms significantly improved Turkey's democratic status and resulted in the opening of accession talks with the EU in 2005. Erdoğan was very important for reforms in Turkey, as he argued that the Copenhagen political criteria should be an objective to be reached whether Turkey would not be perspective of EU membership.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> Fulya Atacan, "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP" *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, (2005): p.192

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p.91

<sup>284</sup> Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (November 2006): 947

<sup>285</sup> İhsan Dağı, "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy" in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, ed. by Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 2006), p.93

Erdoğan's has been a very popular leader in Turkey. The fact that he has the large percentage of the popular vote made him very popular and almost unchallengeable domestically. His leadership role over the Muslim communities around the world helped to secure conservative votes at home.<sup>286</sup> One example of this was Davos in 2009 at the World Economic Forum. He had a dramatic exit from the panel after discussing about Palestine and Israel. When he came back to Turkey people mobilized at the airport to greet him.<sup>287</sup> Moreover, his victory speech after he was elected president in August 2014 in which he claimed the victory not only for himself but also for Islamabad, Arbil, Beirut, Sarajevo, Skopje, Hama, Homs, Ramallah, Gaza, Jerusalem indicates the importance of Muslim communities around the world for him and how it helps him to organize domestic support.<sup>288</sup>

Another important name that should be mentioned for Turkish foreign policy is Ahmet Davutoğlu. As it can be seen from Table 6, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey from 2009 to 2014. Before he became the minister, he was the chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Thus, he was a very important individual for shaping the foreign policy of Turkey.<sup>289</sup> Davutoğlu studied Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University and later became a professor in the same field. Thus, he had an academic training in the area that he became responsible for. In his book “Strategic Depth”, he defined the “Strategic Depth” of Turkish foreign policy and argued that it was based on geographical and historical depth.<sup>290</sup> Davutoğlu argued an important role and active foreign policy for Turkey based on its historical ties to the region it is located. Moreover, in terms of Turkey's relations with Germany, Davutoğlu asserted that relations between Turkey

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<sup>286</sup> Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Nebahat Tanriverdi Yaşar, “Populism and foreign policy in Turkey under the AKP rule”, *Turkish Studies*, 19:2, (2018), p.210

<sup>287</sup> Kemal Koprulu, “Paradigm Shift in Turkey's Foreign Policy” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall / Winter 2009), p.190

<sup>288</sup> “Erdoğan balkon konuşmasını yaptı” *Milliyet*, August 10, 2014, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/erdogan-balkon-konusmasini-yapti-1923760>, (accessed on October 21, 2019)

<sup>289</sup> Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy” p.946

<sup>290</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2010).

and Germany have been in crisis after the end of the Cold War, because of conflicting interests concerning European Union, NATO and Eastern Europe.<sup>291</sup> Furthermore, he urged both Germany and Turkey to take each other into consideration for regional and global politics.<sup>292</sup> In addition, he argued for an active foreign policy for Turkey in the regions of Middle East and Balkans as former Ottoman Empire territories. However, Bağcı argues that implementation of Davutoğlu's policies have been different since Turkey needed to act with the United States and European Union in these regions.<sup>293</sup>

For Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Germany has been a very important state in Europe. Not only Erdoğan realized the significance of Germany in terms of EU relations but he also said that he was aware of the issues in German.<sup>294</sup> Moreover, he argued that relations between Turkey and Germany should be close for Turkish people living in Germany. In the lines of these arguments, Erdoğan visited Germany 16 times during his term as a prime minister.<sup>295</sup> Furthermore, Erdoğan said that Germany is the main state that supports and guides Turkey and therefore it was necessary for Turkey to maintain good relations with Germany.<sup>296</sup>

In terms of personal relations, Erdoğan and Schröder had very close relations that they maintained after the Schröder's term as a chancellor. Gerhard Schröder was a very popular politician in Turkey thanks to his support for Turkey's EU bid. During his last visit to Turkey, Schröder was invited to *Iftar* dinner (special dinner during the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims.) which shows his closeness to Erdoğan and

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<sup>291</sup> Ibid., p.532

<sup>292</sup> Ibid., p.533

<sup>293</sup> Bağcı, "Türkiye'ye Soğuk Savaşta Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir", p.11

<sup>294</sup> "Erdoğan'dan Alman vatandaşlığına teşvik", *Hürriyet*, September 2, 2003, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogandan-alman-vatandasligina-tesvik-168971>, (accessed on October 21, 2019)

<sup>295</sup> Jülide Danışman, "Erdoğan'ın Almanya ziyaretleri", *Deutsche Welle*, September 29, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-almanya-ziyaretleri/a-45662176>, (accessed on October 21, 2019)

<sup>296</sup> "Erdoğan: AB ile 2005 yılı, normal bir yıl olmalı", *Hürriyet*, February 23, 2004, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-ab-ile-2005-yili-normal-bir-yil-olmali-204686>, (accessed on October 21, 2019)

Turkey.<sup>297</sup> Moreover, his last address on European policy before the Bundestag as the Chancellor, Schröder talked about Turkey and predicted that negotiations about EU membership will last 10 and 15 years.<sup>298</sup> Thus, it can be argued that Turkey was very important for Schröder and his focus on Turkey and his friendly relations with Erdoğan helped two countries to have closer relations.

On the other hand, Erdoğan's relations with Angela Merkel have been very different than his relations with Gerhard Schröder. When Merkel came to Turkey as the leader of main opposition party in 2004, the press conference was very tense. Merkel argued for "privileged partnership" for Turkey whereas Erdoğan said that membership to European Union was the only option.<sup>299</sup> Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel have had different opinions about Turkey's EU bid and Erdoğan has never shared the same close relations he had with Gerhard Schröder, Merkel was the one who visited Turkey the most, among all of the former chancellors.<sup>300</sup>

To conclude, individual level can be very helpful to understand the relations between Germany and Turkey. Firstly, as it was discussed Erdoğan's past and his political journey are important to comprehend his foreign policy. For example, his experience as youth organizer for Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), can be contributing factor in his later political life as a very successful and influential speaker.<sup>301</sup> Moreover, as it was apparent in his inclusion of other Muslim countries in

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<sup>297</sup> "Turkey Bids Schröder a Fond Farewell", *Deutsche Welle*, October 12, 2005, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-bids-schr%C3%B6der-a-fond-farewell/a-1739104>, (accessed on October 23, 2019)

<sup>298</sup> "German Parties Disagree on Turkey", *Deutsche Welle*, October 1, 2005, <https://www.dw.com/en/german-parties-disagree-on-turkey/a-1727326>, (accessed on October 21, 2019)

<sup>299</sup> "Ankara'dan imtiyazlı ortaklığa ret", *Deutsche Welle*, February 17, 2004, <https://www.dw.com/tr/ankaradan-imtiyazli%C4%B1-ortakli%C4%B1%C4%9Fa-ret/a-2527040>, (accessed on October 23, 2019)

<sup>300</sup> Almanya'nın Türkiye'deki Dış Temsilcilikleri: Üst Düzey Resmi Ziyaretler, <https://tuerkei.diplo.de/tr-tr/themen/politik/0-hochrangige-besuche/1793980> (accessed September 19, 2019)

<sup>301</sup> Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü*, p.18

his speeches show that his Islamic roots have been very influential in shaping his foreign policy understanding. On the other hand, for the relations between Germany and Turkey, Erdoğan's personal relations with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany have been very positive. Their close relations and good chemistry contributed to good nature of relations until 2005 whereas disagreements between Erdoğan and Merkel slowed the progress of relations.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

Kenneth Waltz asserted that causes of war can be found in three images of men, structure of states and the international system in his influential book *Man, the State and War* in 1959. This approach can be applied to relations between Turkey and Germany not only in 20th century but continuing intense relations between two states since the beginning of 21st century. Relations between Turkey and Germany have been very important for both of the states and affect the lives of both people of Germany and people of Turkey. As Szabo argues “Germany and Turkey have a special relationship as they are linked by 3 million people with Turkish heritage in Germany, extensive economic relations and strategic concerns.”<sup>302</sup> Therefore, to understand them this study looks at the relations on three levels of analysis. This study mainly focuses on the relations between 1999 to 2014. This period was chosen because it includes Turkey’s acceptance as an official candidate for European Union and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s term as a Prime Minister of Turkey.

Level of analysis discussion was brought up to International Relations discipline by J. David Singer who asserted that to understand international relations a researcher might look at the part or the whole. Thus, for understanding the relations between Germany and Turkey both the parts and the system as a whole are used for this study. These are the three levels of analysis which are also the original three images of Waltz. Therefore, this study begins by describing what three levels of analysis in the discipline of International Relations are and how different scholars have different approaches to these three levels.

First, system level is explained. It is the more comprehensive level to use for understanding international relations. This level is mainly used by realist theory of International Relations. Particularly, structural realism explains world affairs by looking at the system as a whole. Using system level means understanding the

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<sup>302</sup> Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany and Turkey: The Unavoidable Partnership” p.1

conditions of states in the system of international relations. For Germany and Turkey, to understanding the relations at the system level means looking at relative positions in both states in the international arena. To do this, structure of the international system beginning from the Cold War is explained. During the Cold War both Federal Republic of Germany and Republic of Turkey were heavily dependent on the Western Bloc and the United States for their security. Germany was divided as West and East Germany and West Germany (Federal Republic) belonged to Western Bloc and the security structure of NATO which it became the member in 1955. Turkey, likewise, was part of Western Bloc and Turkish security was provided by NATO which it joined in 1952. During that period relations between Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey were mostly shaped by these realities. Germany was part of European Community which was founded as a result of the security concerns of Western European states and Turkey's process for European integration began in 1963 with the signing of Ankara Agreement. On the other hand, German military and economic supply to Turkey this period and official visits by German chancellors during this periods indicates how system level is useful to understand the relations between Germany Turkey. Later, end of the Cold War brought important changes for both Germany and Turkey. Germany was reunited in 1990. For Turkey, collapse of the Soviet Union was the most important change in the international system since it marked a power vacuum in its neighborhood which includes Caucasias, Balkans and Central Asia. These are the regions Turkey had historical ties with. Moreover, when the Soviet threat disappeared from East and Central Europe this region became the main focus for European states including Germany. On the other hand, Gulf War in 1991 showed that the region surrounded Turkey is one of the most important security threats at the end of the Cold War. Moreover, customs union between European Community and Turkey was established in 1995 and Germany was supportive of this decision. During this period relations between remained very important as it was evident in Germany's continuing supply of military and economic aid to Turkey. Thus, although security challenges at the end of the Cold War changed, this did not decrease the significance of Germany and Turkey for each other. EU's decision to accept Turkey as an official candidate for European Union and Germany's support during this process also shows that Turkey continued to be an important country both



for Germany and Europe. Another important event that introduced new security challenges to international system was the 9/11 attacks on the United States. This event brought the threat of global terrorism to the world and US efforts to overcome the new threat which eventually brought US intervention Iraq. Germany opposed the US action in Iraq and this new environment increased the importance of Turkey not only as a NATO ally in times of crisis but also as a model of democratic Muslim country. Moreover, Germany continued to be the most important state in Europe for Turkey both as an economic power and for its bid for EU membership.

At the state level, domestic features of states are taken into consideration. How domestic realities of each state affects the relations between them is discussed. Their impact on the foreign policy making is analyzed. Domestic features of Germany and Turkey play an important role in the relations they have with each other. To begin with, both countries have similar regimes since they both are democracies that follow the rule of law. On the other hand, government changes in both states have been very influential on their relations. For instance, when the coalition of SPD and the Greens was in the power in Germany, relations with Turkey were on very good terms. This was because of the fact that both parties supported Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, DSP, ANAP and MHP coalition in Turkey witnessed the important period for relations with EU and consequently Germany. During their period Turkey's status as an official EU candidate was accepted. Furthermore, after AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002 its reforms in Turkey became another example of domestic changes that have positive effect on international relations since the reforms helped its bid to join EU and good nature of relations between Germany and Turkey. However, when the coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD under the leadership of Angela Merkel came to power in 2005 in Germany, it was announced that Germany would maintain its approach to Turkey's negotiations with EU according to *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are binding). In addition to the government changes, democracy and human rights in Turkey have been very important for its relations with Germany. Governments in Germany always argued that Turkey should fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria of democracy and human rights. On the other hand, starting from 1990s Kurdish problem in Turkey has been an important issue between Germany and Turkey which even led to resignation of Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in Germany.

In 2013, Gezi Park protests in Turkey became another issue of human rights between Germany and Turkey when Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle criticized Turkey. Democracy and human rights condition are domestic features of a state and since they affect the German- Turkish relations it shows that relations between Germany and Turkey can be explained at the state level. Moreover, economic relations between Germany and Turkey also confirms the significance of both countries for each other. Germany is the most important trade partner for Turkey. Also, German investments in Turkey and investments of people with Turkish origin in Germany are another aspect of economic relations between Germany and Turkey. Furthermore, public opinion in both countries are also effective on the relations. German public does not support the Turkey's membership to EU which can explain decreasing support by German governments for Turkey. Turkish people in Germany is another important aspect of relations between Germany and Turkey. They are important feature of domestic reality of Germany and at the same time have strong ties to Turkey which in turn make them an important topic between Germany and Turkey. Claims that Gerhard Schröder supported Turkey's EU bid because of Turkish votes at federal elections is one of the examples how they are effective on relations.

Finally, looking at individuals to understand the relations between states is another level that is analysed for this study. Decision makers of their states need to be understood to comprehend the foreign policies of states. For Germany and Turkey, leaders of both countries are very influential on the nature of the relations. Their personalities and approaches to foreign policy can decide the relations between the two states in different periods. Four of those influential leaders and their approaches to foreign policy are explained. Chancellor Schröder was a supporter of efforts of Turkey and he had very close relations with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey. The fact that Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer also supported the Turkish membership was a contributing factor in the good nature of relations during Schröder's term. On the other hand, Angela Merkel has not supported Turkey's EU bid and acknowledged a "privileged partnership" for Turkey instead. Both Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Guido Westerwelle did not agree with Angela Merkel about Turkey. However, as Germany acted according to *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are binding) for negotiations with Turkey concerning EU indicates that although

individual choices of decision makers are important at the end they might not always determine the final outcome. Moreover, it also shows that individual level does not completely explain the state of relations between Turkey and Germany during this period. For Turkey, both Bülent Ecevit and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were very enthusiastic about Turkey's membership to EU. Moreover, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem also supported Turkey's bid for EU membership and actively worked for this. On the other hand, Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted that relations between Turkey and Germany have been in crisis after the end of the Cold War, because of conflicting interests. Consequently, it can be argued that individuals have always been important for German- Turkish relations. Official visits were very frequent between two states and same issues occupied the minds of the leaders of both countries.

To sum up, this study shows that relations between Germany and Turkey can be studied at all three levels. However, it is difficult to argue that one of the level is more important than the other two. As it can be seen from the discussions above, all of the levels can be used for explaining the German- Turkish relations. However, it can be said with certainty that these two states are very important for each other and efforts should be made to maintain good relations. As Bağcı argues, "history does not repeat itself but mistakes do, the responsibility of the statesmen is to create an environment of common interest even if the situation is disappointing."<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and Germany: The Changing Parameters of Friendship" in *Zeitgeist: Global politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: Orion Publications, 2008), p.279

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Uluslararası İlişkiler'deki analiz düzeyi tartışmasını kullanarak, 1999-2014 yılları arasında Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu dönem Türkiye'nin AB adayı devlet olarak resmi statüsünün başlangıcına işaret ettiği ve Ağustos 2014'te Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olarak seçilmesi ile sona erdiği için seçilmiştir. Bunu yapmak için öncelikle Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplindeki analiz seviyesi tartışması açıklanmaktadır. Kenneth Waltz'un uluslararası ilişkilerde savaş kavramını açıklamak için kullandığı üç düzey ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışma, Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin bu üç düzeyde de ele alınabileceği iddiasıyla hazırlanmıştır. Bu düzeyler, uluslararası sistem, ulus devlet ve bireylerdir.

Uluslararası ilişkilerde sistem, devletlerin dünyada bulunduğu durumu ifade eder. Dünyada pek çok egemen devlet vardır, ancak devletlerin eylemlerini dikte etmek için daha yüksek bir otorite bulunmamaktadır. Bu durum devletlerin daha yüksek bir otoriteye tabi olmadan hareket etmelerini sağlar. Otoritenin yokluğu, bir devletin amaçlarına ulaşmak için zaman zaman güç kullanımına yol açar. Bu da, devletlerin eylemlerine, bütün devletlerin var olduğu koşullar tarafından karar verildiğini gösterir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde sistem düzeyinde kastedilen budur. Yapısal realizm olarak da bilinen neorealizm anlayışı sistem analizi için en önemli teori olup, köklerini Kenneth Waltz'un çalışmalarında barındırır. Waltz uluslararası ilişkileri açıklayan teorilerin, indirgemeci ve sistemik teoriler olarak ikiye bölünebileceğini iddia eder ve kendisi sistemik teorileri savunur. Bu teoriler, sistemin bölümlerini (ulus devlet) analiz etmek yerine, uluslararası sistemin kendisi analiz düzeyi olarak alınır. Bu anlayış uluslararası sistemin anarşik olduğunu ve uluslararası sistemin bu anarşik yapısının devletler arasındaki ilişkileri belirlediğini kabul eder. Neorealizme göre bir devletin dış politikasını, devletin uluslararası sistemde sahip olduğu göreceli güç pozisyonu belirler. Neorealist görüşü, bir devletin gücünün, diğer

devletlerle ilişkilerde kullanılacak siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik yeteneklerine dayandığını savunur.

Ulus devleti, uluslararası ilişkileri anlamak için bir açıklama noktası olarak kabul etmek ikinci analiz düzeyidir. Bu anlayış için, dış politika davranışını açıklamak için bir ulus devletinin ulusal özelliklerine bakmak önemlidir. Anayasa, siyasi ve ekonomik yapı, kamuoyu veya bir ulus devletinin siyasi partileri, dış politikasını belirli bir konuda anlamak için kullanılabilir. Liberalizm, iç politikanın politik rejim özelliği ile dış politika davranışları arasında nedensel bir ilişki olduğunu savunur. Bir ulus devletinin kendi insanlarıyla olan ilişkileri, diğer ulus devletlerle ilişkilerini de şekillendirir. Liberaller ortak hukuk devleti ilkeleri, bireysel haklar ve eşitlik ve demokrasilerdeki temsili hükümetin devletleri birbirleriyle çatışmaya daha az eğilimli hale getirdiğine inanmaktadır. Liberalizm, ulus devletlerin de aynı dış politikaları benimsediklerini kabul etmez. Dolayısıyla liberalizm, iç politika ve uluslararası politikaları iki ayrı bölge olarak algılamaz. Rejimin uluslararası ilişkiler üzerindeki etkileri fikri, Alman filozof Immanuel Kant tarafından 18. yüzyılda yapılan tartışmaya dayanmaktadır. Kant'a göre, cumhuriyetlerin dış politikaları otoriter rejimlerin dış politikalarından farklı olacaktır. Kant'a göre cumhuriyetlerin barışçıl dış politikaları takip etme eğilimi vardır ve bu tür bir rejimin daha fazla devlet tarafından benimsenmesi sürekli barışa yol açar. Dolayısıyla, Kant'ın anlayışında rejim ve dış politika arasında nedensel bir bağ olduğu söylenebilir. Liberalizmin “demokratik barış teorisi” Kant'ın fikirlerine dayanmaktadır. Temel olarak liberal-demokratik devletlerin birbirleriyle olan farklılıklarını güç kullanmadan çözdüklerini savunur. Kant gibi, demokratik barış teorisi de demokratik devletler arasındaki ilişkilerin barışçıl bir doğasını olduğunu söyler. Tartışılması gereken bir diğer önemli yaklaşım da dış politika analizidir. Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin bir alt alanı olarak, odak noktasını devletlerin iç özellikleri olarak kabul eder. Dış politika analizi, belirli bir politika için açıklamanın devletin iç ve dış özelliklerinde bulunabileceğini anlamaktadır. Devletin boyut, güç ve iç kompozisyon bakımından farklılık gösterdiği gerçeğini kabul ettiği için, devleti açık çıkarlar peşinde koşan tek, tutarlı bir aktör olarak ele alan realist anlayışa karşı çıkar.

Devletler arasındaki ilişkileri anlamak için bireylere bakmak, bu çalışma için analiz edilen başka bir düzeydir. Devletlerin dış politikalarını kavramak için

devletlerinin karar alıcısı olan bireyler anlaşılmalıdır. Öncelikle, dış politikadan sorumlu resmi ofisi hangisi olduğu ve ne kadar güç kullanma hakkına sahip olduklarını bilmek önemlidir. Çoğu devlette, dışişleri bakanı, bugünün küreselleşmiş dünyasında alanları diğer bakanlar tarafından işgal edilmiş olsa da dış politika eylemlerinin nominal şefidir. Ekonomi, ticaret ve savunma bakanları (özellikle güvenlikle ilgili konularda) dış politika yapım sürecinde etkili olan bireylere örnek olarak verilebilir. Bununla birlikte, hükümet başkanlarının zamanlarının çoğunu, isteseler de istemeseler de dış politika konularına harcamak zorunda olmaları bu bakanların dış politika üzerinde tam güce sahip olmalarını engellemektedir. Dolayısıyla, genel olarak dış politikanın hükümet başkanı ve dışişleri bakanı tarafından oluşturulduğu varsayılabilir. Bu nedenle, bu mevkilerde bulunan bireylerin kişilikleri dış politika yapımında önemli rol oynamaktadır. Psikolojik faktör dış politika yapım süreci için çok önemlidir. Psikolojik faktör; inançları, tutumları, değerleri, deneyimleri, duyguları, özellikleri, üslubu, hafızayı ve kültürel mirası içerir. Böylece, davranışın kökenleri bireye bakarak anlaşılabilir. Ayrıca, liderin temel politik inançları karar vermede önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.

Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri incelemek için sistem düzeyine baktığımızda, Soğuk Savaş döneminden başlamak gerekir. “Soğuk Savaş” bir terim olarak, doğrudan askeri bir çatışma olmadan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB veya Sovyetler Birliği) arasındaki ekonomi, ideoloji ve propaganda rekabetini ifade eder. Avrupa bu dönemde tartışmanın merkezindeydi.

Marshall Planı ile ABD tarafından 1947 yılında Avrupa'nın ekonomik toparlanmasını finanse etmek için 13 milyar dolar verildi. Öte yandan Sovyetler Birliği, Marshall Planını ABD'nin diğer devletlerin iç işlerine müdahale etme girişimi olarak yorumladı. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki gerilimi artırmanın yolunu açan bir başka önemli olay da Berlin Ablukası oldu. Sovyetler, 1 Nisan'da Batı askeri trenlerini Berlin'deki Sovyet işgal bölgesi içindeki kendi bölgelerine durdurdu. Bu abluka yüzünden Batılı güçler, Batı Berlinlilere temel ihtiyaçları karşılamak için neredeyse bir yıl süren bir hava ikmali başlattı. 12 Mayıs 1949'da Sovyetler, ablukanın başarısız olduğu sonucuna varduktan sonra sınırları yeniden açtı. Ancak, her iki taraf için de Almanya'nın ve eski başkenti Berlin'in

bölüneceği açıktı. Berlin Ablukası'ndan sonra, bir ittifak hakkında tartışmalar daha acil hale geldi. Tartışmalar 4 Nisan 1949'da İngiltere, Fransa, Kanada, Belçika, Lüksemburg, Hollanda, Norveç, Danimarka, İzlanda, Portekiz, İtalya ve ABD tarafından Washington D.C.'de Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla sona erdi. Anlaşmanın 5. maddesi, imzacıların herhangi birine karşı askeri bir saldırının hepsine karşı bir saldırı olarak kabul edileceğini belirtti. Böylece Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) ortaya çıktı. 5 Mayıs 1955'te, Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti NATO'ya katıldı. Doğu Almanya ise, Doğu Bloku'nun savunması için 1955'te Varşova Paketi'nin kurucu üyelerinden biriydi. Böylece, yeni dünya düzeninin iki karşıt bloktan oluşacağı ve iki Almanya'nın iki farklı bloka ait olacağı daha da belirginleşti.

Başlangıçta, Birleşik Devletler Türkiye'yi Batı Bloku'nun çıkarları için koruyacağı devletlerden biri olarak görmedi. Ancak bu, Sovyetlerin Türkiye'den toprak ve Boğazlar konusunda talepleri olmasıyla değişti. Dahası, Türkiye'nin gelişimi için dış yatırıma ihtiyacı vardı ve Türk politika yapıcılar ABD ile yakın ilişkilerin sorunlarını çözeceği umuyordu. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye ABD'ye ve Batı Bloku'na yakınlaştı. Türkiye, 12 Temmuz 1947'de, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nden mali ve askeri yardım almayı kabul eden bir anlaşma imzaladı. Truman Doktrini, Sovyetler Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasında artık savaş zamanı ittifakı olmadığını ve ABD'nin Sovyet tehdidine karşı hazır olduğunu göstermiştir. Öte yandan, NATO Batı Bloku'nun en önemli kurumuydu ve Kore Savaşı'na gönderilen Türk birlikleri, Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliğini kolaylaştırdı. 18 Şubat 1952'de Türkiye, Yunanistan'ın yanı sıra NATO'nun resmi üyesi oldu. Bağcı'ya göre, Kore'ye asker gönderme kararı önemli sonuçlar verdi ve sonraki yıllarda önemli olmaya devam etti.

Soğuk Savaş'ın başlaması ile birlikte Türkiye ve Almanya aynı bloka ait oldu. Her iki devlet de ABD'nin liderliğini kabul etti ve Sovyetler Birliği'ni en önemli güvenlik tehdidi olarak görürken ABD'den ekonomik ve askeri yardım aldı. Soğuk Savaş, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki jeostratejik anlatıların baskın olduğu bir dönemdi. Güvenlik sorunları ön plandaydı. Bu nedenle, bu iki ülkenin birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne bağımlılıkları ve uluslararası sistemin iki kutuplu doğasından etkilenmiştir. Soğuk Savaş sırasında hem Almanya hem de Türkiye NATO üyesi oldu. Bu kuruluşa üyelik, güvenlik politikalarını ve güvenlikle ilgili ikili

ilişkilerini büyük ölçüde etkiledi. Örneğin, Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti NATO çerçevesinde Türkiye'ye silah ve askeri malzeme sağlamıştır. Batı Blok'unda ortaya çıkan bir diğer önemli kurum da Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu idi. Batı Almanya, Fransa, İtalya ve Benelüks ülkelerinin (Belçika, Hollanda ve Lüksemburg) liderleri Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu'nu oluşturmak için bir araya geldi. 18 Nisan 1951'de Paris Antlaşması imzalandı. Kendi aralarında savaştan kaçınmaya ek olarak, komünizm tehdidi de Avrupa'da başlatılan bu entegrasyonun bir diğer nedenidir. Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti bu oluşumun başını çeken ülkelerden biri olurken, uzun yıllardır devam eden AB süreci Türkiye'nin bu oluşumun bir parçası olmayı amaçladığını gösterir. Türkiye'nin AB süreci 1963 yılında Ankara Antlaşması'nın (Ortaklık Antlaşması) imzalanmasıyla başlamıştır. Antlaşma'nın 28. maddesi, anlaşma maddelerinin yeterince yerine getirilmesinden sonra tarafların Türkiye'nin Topluluğa katılma olasılığını inceleyebileceğini ifade etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği Almanya- Türkiye ikili ilişkilerini önemli bir yönünü temsil etmektedir.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde ikili ilişkilerin önemi, üst düzey ziyaretlerden de gözlenebilir. Konrad Adenauer, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Helmut Schmidt ve Helmut Kohl, 1954, 1968, 1975 ve 1985 yıllarında şansölye olarak Türkiye'ye resmi ziyaretlerde bulunurken, 1967'de Süleyman Demirel, 1978'de Bülent Ecevit ve 1984'te Turgut Özal ve 1985 başbakan olarak Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti'ni ziyaret etti. Bu ziyaretler iki devletin birbiri için önemini gösterir. Bunların yanı sıra, 1961'de Türkiye ile Almanya arasında İşe Alım Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla çok sayıda Türk vatandaşı Almanya'ya göç etti. Bu anlaşma, Almanya'nın 1950'lerin sonlarındaki işgücü kıtlığının sonucuydu. Sonuç olarak, Türk işçileri Soğuk Savaş döneminde Almanya ile Türkiye arasında önemli bir konu haline geldi ve daha sonra da önemini korumaya devam etti.

Mikhail Gorbaçov 1985 yılında Sovyet Komünist Partisi Genel Sekreteri olarak göreve başladı. Sovyetler Birliği'nde reform sürecine başladı. İkili perestroika (yeniden yapılandırma) ve glasnost (açıklık) programı, ekonomi, iç politika ve uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli değişiklikler getirdi. Gorbaçov'un reformlarından sonra sınırlar açıldı, Berlin Duvarı yıkıldı ve Doğu Bloku boyunca serbest seçimler yapıldı. 1991'de Sovyetler Birliği'nin kendisi feshedildi ve böylece Soğuk Savaş sona erdi ve

bu da uluslararası sistemde bazı önemli değişiklikler getirdi. Uluslararası ilişkilerin belirleyicisi olan ABD ile SSCB arasındaki rekabet ortadan kalktı.

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinin Almanya açısından en önemli sonucu yeniden birleşme oldu. Doğu Almanya'da 18 Mart 1990'da gerçekleşen ilk serbest seçimler yapıldı. Alman Demokratik Cumhuriyeti ile Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti arasında yeniden birleşme müzakereleri başladı ve 31 Ağustos 1990'da Birleşme Anlaşması ile sonuçlandı. 3 Ekim 1990'da Almanya resmen yeniden bir araya geldi. Dahası, Sovyetler Birliği de birleşik Almanya'nın NATO üyeliğini kabul etti.

Süper güç çatışmasının sona ermesi ile birlikte, Türkiye'nin çevresinde etkili olan yeni güvenlik sorunları ile birlikte yeni bir uluslararası sistem vardı. Başlangıçta, Batı Bloku'nun bir parçası olarak Türkiye için, Sovyetler Birliği'nin çökmesi ve Sovyet tehdidinin ortadan kalkması olumlu bir gelişmeydi. Ancak Türk politika yapıcılar arasındaki bu olumlu duyguları, Sovyet tehdidinin sona ermesiyle Batı'nın Türkiye'ye ihtiyaç duymayacağı ve Türkiye'nin ABD ve Batı için stratejik öneminin azalacağı endişesi takip etti. Ancak Saddam Hüseyin'in Irak'ı Kuveyt'i işgal ettiğinde, Türkiye'nin, özellikle Ortadoğu için önemi bir kez daha fark edildi ve Türkiye'nin politika yapıcıları için yeni fırsatlar ortaya çıktı. Türkiye'yi çevreleyen bölgedeki eski süper güç ve en önemli güç artık yoktu.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile her iki devlet üzerinde de çok etkili olan Sovyet tehdidi ortadan kalktı. Alman ve Türk ulusal çıkarları yeniden tanımlandı. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş sırasında çıkarlarının ortak olduğu düşünüldüğünde, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Türkiye ve Almanya'nın farklı çıkarlar sergilediği öne sürülmektedir. Bu, Sovyet tehdidinin artık mevcut olmadığı gerçeğinin sonucuydu. Bununla birlikte, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında çıkarları farklılaşmasına rağmen, aralarındaki iş birliğinin imkânsız olmadığı söylenebilir. Almanya'nın, eski Doğu Alman askeri teçhizatının bağışlaması ve Körfez Savaşı sırasında yardım gibi NATO gerekleri doğrultusunda Türkiye'ye askeri yardım sağlaması bunu göstermiştir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'nin AB'ye üye olma yolunda yaptığı uzun yolculukta, Almanya Türkiye'nin Avrupa ile ilgili dış politikasının merkezinde yer alırken, Türkiye de Almanya'nın Orta Doğu, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya ile ilgili dış politikasının önemli bir ortağı olarak kabul edilmektedir. AB ilişkileri ise ikili ilişkilerin bir başka önemli ayağı oldu. Almanya Türkiye ile gümrük birliğini destekledi ve Dışişleri Bakanı Klaus Kinkel Yunanistan'ı ikna etmede önemli



bir rol oynadı. Ekim 1998'de Almanya'da SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) ve Yeşiller Partisi koalisyonu iktidara geldi. Alman hükümeti Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğine karşı tutumunu değiştirdi ve Türkiye'nin üyeliğini destekledi. Aralık 1999'da Helsinki Zirvesi'nde büyük ilerlemeler kaydedildi. Bu zirvede, Türkiye oybirliğiyle AB için resmi bir aday olarak kabul edildi. Sonuç olarak, Soğuk Savaş sonunda Almanya ile Türkiye arasında bazı çıkar farklılıkları olmasına rağmen, yeni uluslararası ortamda birbirleri için önemli kalmaya devam ettiler.

11 Eylül 2001'de aşırılık yanlısı İslamcı bir grup El Kaide'nin on dokuz üyesi dört uçağı kaçırdı ve ABD'deki hedeflere karşı intihar saldırıları gerçekleştirdi. 11 Eylül olarak adlandırılan bu olayın dünya politikasında önemli yansımaları oldu. Bu saldırılar sonucunda yeni bir tehdit türü kabul edildi. Bir terör örgütü olarak El Kaide, daha sonra İstanbul, Madrid ve Londra'daki saldırıların da gösterdiği gibi, yalnızca ABD'yi değil diğer devletleri de hedef alacak küresel bir tehditti. İkincisi, 11 Eylül ulus devletin önemini vurgulayan “devletin yeniden canlanması” na yol açtı. Bu yeni tehdit türü ile güvenlik endişeleri bir kez daha gündemdeki en önemli sorun haline geldi. Bu nedenle ulus devletler (özellikle ABD) askeri harekete geçti. Bu yeni küresel terörizm tehdidine ve devletin yeniden canlanmasına ek olarak, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, özellikle Bush yönetimi tarafından tek taraflı karar alınması, 11 Eylül'ün başka bir sonucu olarak belirlendi. Başkan Bush, dünyada barışa tehdit olarak görüldükleri için Ocak 2002'deki Birlik Devleti adresinde Irak, İran ve Kuzey Kore'yi “şer eksenini” olarak nitelendirdi. Saddam Hüseyin'in Irak'ı Kitle İmha Silahlarına sahip olmakla suçlandı. Ayrıca, bu devletleri önceden önlemek için “önleyici savaş” fikri getirildi. Bu iddialar doğrultusunda Bush yönetimi, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nden Irak'a müdahaleye ilişkin karar çıkarmaya çalıştı. Bu kararın alınmaması ABD'nin eylemini durdurmadı. Mart 2003'te ABD Irak'a askeri müdahalesine başladı.

11 Eylül'e ilk Alman tepkisi dayanışma oldu ve Şansölye Schröder Almanya'nın siyasi ve askeri desteğini sundu. Ayrıca, 11 Eylül'den sonra Almanya ve ABD yakın iş birliği içinde oldu ve 2000'den fazla Alman askeri, Afganistan'daki Uluslararası Güvenlik Yardımının bir parçası olarak Kabil ve Kundus'a konuşlandırıldı. Ancak, Başkan Bush'un Ocak 2002'deki konuşmasından sonra, iki devletin güvenlik sorunlarına yaklaşımında farklılıklar ortaya çıktı. ABD yönetimi terörizmle mücadele için askeri araçları kullanmak isterken, Almanya askeri adımlar

seçeneğini reddetmese de ekonomik teşvikler ve uluslararası iş birliği gibi sivil araçları tercih etti.

11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra Türkiye, uzun zamandır çeşitli terör örgütlerinin kurbanı olduğu için başlangıçta müttefik Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni destekledi. Uluslararası iş birliği, Türkiye'nin terörizmle mücadele stratejilerinden biri olmuştur. Ecevit hükümeti 5.Maddenin uygulanmasını savundu. Ayrıca Afganistan'da Türkiye önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Diğer NATO üyelerinden farklı olarak, Türkiye'nin Müslüman karakteri ve bölgeyle olan tarihsel bağları bu misyonda çok önemli oldu. Dolayısıyla bölgede Batılı kurumlara da üye olan bir ülke olarak Türkiye'nin uluslararası alanda önemi Batılı müttefikleri tarafından gerçekleştirildi. Irak'a müdahale olasılığı gündeme geldiğinde Irak'ın işgali için ABD başlangıçta BM kararını almaya çalıştı. Bu operasyon için ABD'nin Türkiye'nin yardımına ihtiyacı vardı. Bir kara operasyonu başlatmak için Amerikan kuvvetlerinin Türk toprağını kullanmaları gerekiyordu. İzin için hükümetin çoğunluğu onaylaması için Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin onayına vardı. Ancak, 1 Mart 2003 tarihinde, Türk Parlamentosu'ndaki seçimlerden sonra, böyle bir onay sağlanamamıştır. Bu, Amerikan tarafında hayal kırıklığına yol açtı ve Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkilerde bir başka dönüm noktası oldu.

1999-2014 yılları arasında Almanya ve Türkiye'nin güç konumlarının önemli ölçüde arttığı söylenebilir. Almanya için 2008 ekonomik krizi bunu kanıtlayıcı fırsatı verdi. Krizin AB üyesi ülkeler için yansımaları olduğunda, Almanya liderlik rolünü üstlenmek zorunda kaldı. Almanya, Euro Bölgesi'nde kurtarma fonlarına en çok katkıda bulunan baskın ülkeydi. Türkiye için bu dönem yükselen güç statüsüne tanık oldu. Dinamik ekonomisi ve aktif dış politikası ile Türkiye, bölgesinde ve dünyada önemli bir güç haline gelmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, uluslararası sistemin Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiler için çok önemli olduğu söylenebilir. NATO, Almanya'nın ve Türkiye'nin NATO'nun kuruluşundan bu yana her iki ülkenin güvenlik konularının merkezinde yer almıştı. Bunun yanı sıra Türkiye, Orta Doğu'da demokratik bir Müslüman ülke için bir model olarak Almanya için önemliyken, AB üyeliğine verdiği teklif açısından Almanya Türkiye için en önemli Avrupa devleti olmuştur. Sistem düzeyinin ilişkiyi açıklama kapasitesi ise yetersiz olarak değerlendirilebilir. Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği, Soğuk Savaş

sırasındaki güvenlik kaygıları ve yapısı ile açıklanabilirdi fakat sonrasında iki ülkenin politikalarını açıklamak için sistem düzeyinden fazlasına ihtiyaç duyulmuştur.

Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri anlamak için devlet seviyesi çok önemlidir. Daha önce tartışıldığı gibi, bu seviye devletlerin dış politika için ulusal özelliklerinin ele alınmasını ifade eder. Tartışma, Almanya ve Türkiye'deki rejim, devlet yapısı ve hükümet değişiklikleri ve bunların iki devlet arasındaki ilişkiler üzerindeki etkileri ile başlamaktadır. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, çoğulcu demokrasi veya merkezîyetçilik dış politika üzerinde önemli etkilerdir, bu nedenle Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinde etkilidir. Dahası, Almanya ve Türkiye'deki hükümet değişiklikleri, Angela Merkel'in liderliğindeki koalisyon iktidara geldikten sonra Almanya'nın Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğine yönelik tutumundaki değişiklikten de anlaşılacağı üzere aralarındaki ilişkileri etkilemiştir. Gerhard Schröder liderliğindeki SPD ve Yeşiller koalisyon hükümeti, özellikle Türkiye- AB bağlamında Almanya ve Türkiye arasında çok iyi ilişkiler kurdu. 2005 federal seçimleri Angela Merkel'in önderliğinde yeni bir koalisyon getirdi. Bu yeni koalisyon, Bayern'deki Almanya Hıristiyan Demokratik Birliği (CDU), Hıristiyan Sosyal Birliği (CSU) ve Sozialdemokratische Almanya Sosyal Demokrat Partisi (SPD) 'den oluşuyordu. CDU / CSU grubunun çoğunluğu Türkiye'nin üyeliğini desteklememektedir. Bununla birlikte, Merkel 2005 yılında hükümetinin Türkiye'nin AB sürecine yaklaşımının pacta sunt servanda (anlaşmalar bağlayıcıdır) anlayışına uygun olacağını söyledi. Türkiye'de ise Bülent Ecevit liderliğindeki DSP, MHP ve ANAP koalisyonu AB ile ilişkiler için önemli bir döneme tanık oldu. 2002 yılında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) Türkiye'de iktidara geldi. Öniş ve Yılmaz, AKP hükümetinin AB ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin altın çağını oluşturduğunu iddia eder.

Kurucu antlaşmalarında insan haklarına çok az atıfta bulunulmasına rağmen, 1980'lerden itibaren insan hakları ve demokrasi Avrupa Topluluğu için önemli konular haline gelmiştir. Ayrıca, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Kopenhag Kriterleri ile; demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları ve azınlıkların korunması AB üyeliği için şart haline geldi. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin demokrasi ve insan hakları ile ilgili girişimlerde bulunma çabalarının AB üyeliği arayışı ile ilgili olduğu varsayılabilir. Sonuç olarak, Avrupa Birliği'ne üye bir ülke olarak Almanya,

Türkiye'deki demokrasi ve insan haklarının koşullarına karışmıştı. Almanya'nın Türkiye'deki insan haklarına yaklaşımı çoğunlukla Türkiye'deki Kürt meselesiyle ilgilidir. İlk olarak, 1992'de Türkiye'de Kürtlere karşı Alman silahlarının kullanıldığı iddiası Savunma Bakanı Gerhard Stoltenberg'in istifasına yol açtı. Dahası, 1998'de Gerhard Schröder “Kürt meselesini bir Avrupa sorunu” ilan etti.

Ekonomi, Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin bir diğer önemli yönüdür. Türkiye'nin genel olarak AB ile ilişkileri için ekonomi önemlidir, ancak iki ülke arasındaki ticaret hacminin yüksek olması ve 2018 itibariyle Almanya'nın Türkiye ihracatında birinci sırada yer alması nedeniyle Türkiye ve Almanya için özellikle önemlidir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki şirketlerin Alman yatırımlarının hem Türk kökenli Alman vatandaşlarının hem de Almanya'daki Türk vatandaşlarının Almaya'da kurdukları şirketlerin büyük etkisi olduğu da vurgulanmalıdır. Dolayısıyla, Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiyi devlet düzeyinde kavramak için ekonominin ele alınması gerektiği söylenebilir.

Ekonomiye ek olarak, her iki ülkedeki rejimler, kamuoyu görüşleri ve Almanya'da yaşayan Türk kökenli insanlar da Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri devlet düzeyinde tartışmak için önemlidir. Hem Almanya'da hem de Türkiye'de vatandaşların Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği olasılığı hakkında ne düşündükleri hükümetlerin kararlarını ve eylemlerini etkiler. Mesela 2018'den itibaren Türk halkının çoğu hala AB üyeliğini destekliyor. Almanya'daki insanların çoğunluğu ise Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğine karşı. Ayrıca Almanya'da yaşayan 3 milyondan fazla Türk kökenli insanın varlığı Türkiye ile Almanya arasındaki önemli konulardan birini oluşturmaktadır. Özetle, Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri kavramak için, bunları devlet düzeyinde incelemek gerekir.

İkili ilişkileri anlamak için dış politikaya şekil veren bireylere bakmak da Almanya- Türkiye ilişkileri açısından önemlidir. Her iki ülke de tarihi boyunca önemli liderlere sahip olmuştur. Ele aldığımız dönem için ise Almanya için Gerhard Schröder ve Angela Merkel, Türkiye için ise Bülent Ecevit ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın dış politika anlayışlarını incelemek önemlidir.

Gerhard Schröder Ekim 1998'de Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti Şansölyesi oldu. Görev süresi, Alman siyaseti için hem yurtiçinde hem de yurtdışında önemli bir dönemdi. Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği için resmi aday olduğu Helsinki Zirvesi'nde

Schröder, Almanya'nın lideriydi. Dolayısıyla Türkiye, Schröder'in gündeminde önemli bir konuydu. Schröder, belirli bir ideolojiye bağlı değildi ve durumlara uygun politikaları izlemeye istekliydi. Ona göre, şansöyeliği sırasında Avrupa siyasetindeki en zor konulardan biri, Türkiye ile katılım müzakerelerinin başlamasıydı. Almanya'da CDU / CSU yaklaşımı nedeniyle tartışmalar olacağını öngördü. Ancak Schröder, ülkesindeki baskı olasılığına rağmen Türkiye'nin çabalarını destekledi. Almanya'nın Avrupa politikasında tutarlı olması gerektiğini ve Türkiye'nin Kopenhag kriterlerine uyduğu anda müzakere sürecinin başlayacağından emin olduğu için Türkiye'yi tam olarak desteklemeye karar verdi.

Kişisel ilişkiler açısından, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ile ilişkileri daha yakın olmasına rağmen, Türk üyeliği beklentisinin arttığı iklimde Gerhard Schröder'in Bülent Ecevit ile de iyi ilişkiler sürdürdüğü söylenebilir. 1999 yılında birbirlerine yazdıkları mektuplarda Ecevit, Türkiye'nin Kopenhag kriterlerinin farkında olduğunu ve reformlara hazır olduğunu vurgularken Schröder, AB'nin Türkiye ile ilişkilerindeki sorunların üstesinden gelmek için elinden geleni yapacağını söyledi. Dolayısıyla Schröder ve Ecevit arasındaki ilişkilerin olumlu bir yapıda olduğu söylenebilir. Schröder ve Erdoğan arasındaki ilişkiler ise çok daha iyi oldu. Erdoğan, Gerhard Schröder ile kişisel ilişkiler kurmayı başaran liderlerden biridir. Schröder şansölye iken, Erdoğan'ın başbakan olarak görev yaptığı ilk dönemdi ve hükümeti Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyeliğini istiyordu. Bu nedenle Schröder ile ilişkilerinin iyi şartlarda olması doğaldı. Ancak Schröder'in şansölyeliğinin sona ermesinden sonra iki liderin görüşmeye devam etmesi, ilişkilerinin Türkiye'nin AB politikasında ortak bir zemine sahip olmaktan çok daha fazlasına dayandığı söylenebilir.

Angela Merkel, Almanya için sadece ilk kadın şansölye olarak değil aynı zamanda eski bir Doğu Almanya vatandaşı ve Leipzig'de Karl Marx Üniversitesi'nde fizik eğitimi almış biri olarak da çok ilginç bir lider oldu. Sık sık özgürlük savunuculuğunun arkasındaki nedenin Doğu Almanya Cumhuriyeti'ndeki geçmişi olduğu varsayılabilir. Ayrıca, bir Doğu Almanya Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olarak eski statüsünün ona Avrupa Birliği ve Batı'ya genel olarak dışarıdan bakma fırsatı verdiği söylenebilir. Doğa bilimi, Merkel için akademik özgürlüğünü veren ideolojik olmayan bir konuydu ve aynı zamanda sadece çalışmalarında değil siyasette de geçerli olduğunu düşündüğü belirli bir düşünce biçimiydi. Bu nedenle, politikacı olarak

dürtüsel olmadı ve kişisel duygulara dayanarak karar vermedi. Dış politika kararları verirken diğer liderlerle kişisel ilişkilerini kullanan Gerhard Schröder'in tam tersi bir tutum sergiledi.

Merkel Türkiye'nin AB'ye bağlılığının “ımtiyazlı bir ortaklık” oluşturulmasına dayandırılmasını önerir. “İmtiyazlı ortaklık”, ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkilerin üyelik beklentisi olmadan gelişeceği AB ile üyelik dışı ilişkiler biçimlerini ifade eder. Bu kavram Angela Merkel tarafından birden fazla kez kullanıldı ve katılım müzakerelerindeki ilerlemeyi engellemeye hizmet etti. Bu nedenle, Schröder'in aksine Angela Merkel'in Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğine karşı olduğu ve Türkiye ile ilişkileri sürdürmenin başka yollarını bulma konusunda istekli olduğu söylenebilir.

Angela Merkel'in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ile ilişkileri için, onun en uzun süre birlikte çalıştığı liderlerden biri olsa da Merkel'in Erdoğan ile ilişkilerinin sorunsuz olmadığı söylenebilir. 2004'teki ilk toplantılarından itibaren, iki lider konuyla ilgili farklılık gösterdiğinden Türkiye'nin AB üyelik hedefiyle ilgili gerginlikler oldu. Öte yandan, Merkel siyasi konumunu zamanla değiştirmede, ancak Erdoğan'la sık sık yaptığı görüşmeler ve Türkiye ile olan ilişkileri, Türkiye'nin önemini daha fazla takdir etmesine neden oldu.

Bülent Ecevit, Türk siyasi yaşamının önemli yüzlerinden biri olmuştur. 2002'de dördüncü kez iktidara gelmeden önce, daha önce 1974, 1977, 1978'de başbakanlık yaptı. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne giden yolu, başbakan olarak geçirdiği son dönemin en önemli konularından biriydi. 1990'ların sonunda AB Türkiye'de önemli bir ivme kazandı ve Ecevit bu fikri destekledi. Türkiye'nin liberal demokrasinin Kopenhag Kriterlerini karşılaması için insan hakları sicilinin iyileştirilmesi gerekiyordu. Ecevit bu konuda önemli bir rol oynadı. Kopenhag Kriterlerini yerine getirme kararlılığını göstermek için Gerhard Schröder'e kişisel bir mektup yazdı. Ayrıca koalisyon ortaklarını, özellikle de milliyetçi MHP'nin liderini reformlar konusunda ikna etti.

Türk dış politikası ve genel olarak Türk kültüründeki liderlerin önemi yadsınamaz olsa da Erdoğan örneği öncekilerden farklı olmuştur. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın dış politika algısını anlamaya çalışmak çünkü o dönem boyunca ülkenin siyasi yaşamının neredeyse her yönünü belirleyen bir liderdir. 2001 yılında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) kurucularından biri oldu. AKP liderleri iktidara gelmeden

önce İslamcı kökenlerini terk ettiklerini ve Avrupa Birliği'nin dış politika gündeminde öncelikli bir konu olduğunu açıkça belirttiler.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan için Almanya Avrupa'da çok önemli bir ülke oldu. Ayrıca, Türkiye ile Almanya arasındaki ilişkilerin yakın olmasının Almanya'da yaşayan Türkler için de gerektiğini savundu. Bu tartışmalar doğrultusunda Erdoğan, başbakanlık döneminde 16 kez Almanya'yı ziyaret etti. Ayrıca Erdoğan, Almanya'nın AB'de Türkiye'yi destekleyen ve yönlendiren ana devlet olduğunu ve bu nedenle Türkiye'nin Almanya ile iyi ilişkiler sürdürmesinin gerekli olduğunu söyledi.

Kişisel ilişkiler açısından Erdoğan ve Schröder, Schröder'in şansölye olarak görev yaptıktan sonra da sürdürdükleri çok yakın ilişkilere sahiptiler. Gerhard Schröder, Türkiye'nin AB üyelik hedefine verdiği destek sayesinde Türkiye'de çok popüler bir politikacıydı. Türkiye'ye yaptığı son ziyarette Schröder, Erdoğan ve Türkiye'ye yakınlığını gösteren İftar yemeğine davet edildi. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Schröder için çok önemli olduğu ve Türkiye'ye odaklanmasının ve Erdoğan ile dostane ilişkilerinin iki ülkenin daha yakın ilişkilere sahip olmasına yardım ettiği söylenebilir. Öte yandan Erdoğan'ın Angela Merkel ile ilişkileri Gerhard Schröder ile olan ilişkilerinden çok farklıydı. 2004 yılında Merkel ana muhalefet partisinin lideri olarak Türkiye'ye geldiğinde basın toplantısı çok gergindi. Merkel, Türkiye için "imtiyazlı ortaklık" olduğunu savunurken Erdoğan, Avrupa Birliği üyeliğinin tek seçenek olduğunu söyledi. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Angela Merkel, Türkiye'nin AB üyelik hedefiyle ilgili farklı görüşlere sahip olsalar da Erdoğan, Gerhard Schröder ile yakın ilişkilerini hiç paylaşmamış olsa da, Alman şansölyeleri arasında Türkiye'yi en çok ziyaret eden Merkel oldu.

Analiz düzeyi tartışması, uluslararası ilişkileri anlamak için bir araştırmacının kısma veya bütüne bakabileceğini iddia eden J. David Singer tarafından Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini getirildi. Bu nedenle Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri anlamak için hem parçalar hem de bir bütün olarak sistem bu çalışma için kullanılmıştır. Bunlar aynı zamanda Waltz'un orijinal üç imgesi olan üç analiz düzeyidir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinde üç analiz düzeyinin ne olduğunu açıklayarak başlar.

İlk olarak sistem düzeyi açıklanmıştır. Uluslararası ilişkileri anlamak için en kapsamlı düzeydir. Almanya ve Türkiye için, sistem düzeyindeki ilişkileri anlamak,

uluslararası arenada her iki devlette de görelî konumlara bakmak demektir. Bunu yapmak için, Soğuk Savaş'tan başlayarak uluslararası sistemin yapısı açıklanmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sırasında hem Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti hem de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti güvenlikleri için Batı Bloku'na ve ABD'ye büyük ölçüde bağımlıydı. Almanya, Batı ve Doğu Almanya ve Batı Almanya olarak Batı Bloku'na aitti. Aynı şekilde Türkiye de Batı Bloku'nun bir parçasıydı ve Türk güvenliği de Almanya'nın olduğu gibi NATO tarafından sağlandı. Bu dönemde Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiler çoğunlukla bu gerçeklikler tarafından şekillendirildi. Almanya, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin güvenlik kaygılarının bir sonucu olarak kurulan Avrupa Topluluğunun bir parçasıydı ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa entegrasyonu süreci 1963 yılında Ankara Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla başladı. Daha sonra Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi hem Almanya hem de Türkiye için önemli değişiklikler getirdi. Almanya 1990 yılında yeniden bir araya geldi. Türkiye için, Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü, Kafkasya, Balkanlar ve Orta Asya'yı içeren mahallesinde bir elektrik boşluğu oluşturduğu için uluslararası sistemdeki en önemli değişiklikti. Dahası, Sovyet tehdidi Doğu ve Orta Avrupa'dan kaybolduğunda, bu bölge Almanya dahil Avrupa devletleri için ana odak noktası haline geldi. Öte yandan 1991'deki Körfez Savaşı, Türkiye'yi çevreleyen bölgenin Soğuk Savaş'ın sonunda en önemli güvenlik tehditlerinden biri olduğunu gösterdi. Ayrıca 1995 yılında Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye arasında gümrük birliği kurulmuş ve Almanya bu kararı desteklemiştir. Bu dönemde, Almanya'nın Türkiye'ye devam eden askeri ve ekonomik yardım arzında görüldüğü gibi, aralarındaki ilişkiler önemli kaldı. Dolayısıyla, Soğuk Savaş'ın sonunda güvenlik sorunları değişse de bu Almanya ve Türkiye'nin birbirleri için önemini azaltmadı. AB'nin Türkiye'yi Avrupa Birliği için resmi aday olarak kabul etme kararı ve Almanya'nın bu süreçte verdiği destek, Türkiye'nin hem Almanya hem de Avrupa için önemli bir ülke olmaya devam ettiğini gösteriyor. Uluslararası sisteme yeni güvenlik zorlukları getiren bir başka önemli olay da ABD'ye yapılan 11 Eylül saldırıları oldu. Almanya ABD'nin Irak'taki eylemine karşı çıktı ve bu yeni çevre Türkiye'nin kriz zamanlarında NATO müttefiki olarak değil, aynı zamanda demokratik bir Müslüman ülke modeli olarak önemini artırdı. Almanya hem ekonomik bir güç hem de AB üyeliği için Türkiye için Avrupa'nın en önemli devleti olmaya devam etti.



Devlet düzeyinde, devletlerin ulusal özellikleri dikkate alınır. Almanya ve Türkiye'nin ulusal özellikleri birbirleri ile olan ilişkilerinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Başlangıç olarak, her iki ülkenin de benzer rejimleri vardır, çünkü her ikisi de hukukun üstünlüğünü izleyen demokrasilerdir. Öte yandan, her iki devletteki hükümet değişiklikleri ilişkiler üzerinde çok etkili olmuştur. Örneğin, SPD ve Yeşiller koalisyonu Almanya'da iktidardayken, Türkiye ile ilişkiler çok iyi durumdaydı. Bunun nedeni, her iki tarafın da Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğini desteklemesiydi. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki DSP, ANAP ve MHP koalisyonu AB ve dolayısıyla Almanya ile ilişkiler açısından önemli bir döneme tanık oldu. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin resmi AB aday statüsü kabul edildi. Dahası, AKP 2002 yılında Türkiye'de iktidara geldikten sonra, Türkiye'deki reformları, dış ilişkiler üzerinde olumlu etkisi olan yerel değişikliklerin bir başka örneği haline geldi, çünkü reformlar AB adaylığı sürecine ve Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin iyi doğasına yardımcı oldu. Bununla birlikte, Angela Merkel'in önderliğinde CDU / CSU ve SPD koalisyonu 2005 yılında Almanya'da iktidara geldiğinde, Almanya'nın pacta sunt servanda (anlaşmalar bağlayıcıdır) anlayışına göre Türkiye'nin AB ile müzakerelerine yaklaşımını sürdüreceği açıklandı. Hükümet değişikliklerine ek olarak, Türkiye'deki demokrasi ve insan hakları Almanya ile ilişkileri açısından çok önemli olmuştur. Almanya'daki hükümetler her zaman Türkiye'nin Kopenhag demokrasi ve insan hakları kriterlerini yerine getirmesi gerektiğini savunuyorlardı. Öte yandan, 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren Türkiye'deki Kürt sorunu, Almanya ile Türkiye arasında, Almanya'da Savunma Bakanı Gerhard Stoltenberg'in istifasına bile yol açan önemli bir konu olmuştur. Demokrasi ve insan hakları durumu bir devletin iç politikasıyla ilgili özellikleridir ve Alman-Türk ilişkilerini etkilediği için Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin devlet düzeyinde açıklanabileceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ekonomik ilişkiler de her iki ülkenin birbirleri için önemini teyit etmektedir. Almanya, Türkiye'nin en önemli ticaret ortağıdır. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki Alman yatırımları ve Almanya'dan Türk kökenli insanların yatırımları, Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin bir başka yönüdür. Ayrıca her iki ülkedeki kamuoyu da ilişkiler üzerinde etkilidir. Alman halkının Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğini desteklemiyor olması, Alman hükümetlerinin Türkiye'ye azalan desteğini açıklayabilir. Almanya'daki Türkler, Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin bir diğer önemli yönüdür.

Almanya'nın iç gerçekliğinin önemli bir özelliğidir ve aynı zamanda Türkiye ile güçlü bağları vardır ve bu da onları Almanya ile Türkiye arasında önemli bir konu haline getirir. Gerhard Schröder'in Türk kökenli vatandaşlardan federal seçimlerde aldığı oylar nedeniyle Türkiye'nin AB üyelik hedefini desteklediği iddiası, ilişkilerde nasıl etkili olduklarının örneklerinden biridir.

Son olarak, devletler arasındaki ilişkileri anlamak için bireylere bakmak bu çalışma için analiz edilen başka bir düzeydir. Devletlerinin karar vericilerinin, devletlerin dış politikalarını kavramaları anlaşılmalıdır. Almanya ve Türkiye için her iki ülkenin liderleri ilişkilerin doğası üzerinde çok etkilidir. Kişilikleri ve dış politika yaklaşımları iki dönem arasındaki ilişkilere farklı dönemlerde karar verebilir. Bu etkili liderlerden dördü ve dış politika yaklaşımları açıklanmaktadır. Şansölye Schröder, Türkiye'nin çabalarını destekledi ve Türkiye'den Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ile çok yakın ilişkileri vardı. Öte yandan Angela Merkel, Türkiye'nin AB üyelik hedefini desteklemedi ve bunun yerine Türkiye için “imtiyazlı bir ortaklık” olduğunu kabul etti. Hem Frank-Walter Steinmeier hem de Guido Westerwelle, Angela Merkel ile Türkiye hakkında anlaşamadı. Ancak Almanya, AB ile ilgili Türkiye ile müzakereler için pacta sunt servanda'ya (anlaşmalar bağlayıcıdır) göre hareket ettiğinden, karar vericilerin bireysel seçimlerinin önemli olmasına rağmen sonuçta her zaman nihai sonucu belirleyemeyeceklerini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, bireysel düzeyin bu dönemde Türkiye ile Almanya arasındaki ilişkilerin durumunu tam olarak açıklamadığını da göstermektedir. Türkiye için hem Bülent Ecevit hem de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği konusunda çok hevesliydi. Sonuç olarak, bireylerin Alman-Türk ilişkileri için her zaman önemli olduğu söylenebilir. İki ülke arasında resmi ziyaretler çok sık gerçekleşti ve aynı meseleler her iki ülkenin liderlerinin zihnini işgal etti.

Özetle, bu çalışma, Almanya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin her üç düzeyde de incelenebileceğini göstermektedir. Ancak, seviyelerden birinin diğer ikisinden daha önemli olduğunu iddia etmek zordur. Yukarıdaki tartışmalardan görülebileceği gibi, tüm düzeyler Alman-Türk ilişkilerini açıklamak için kullanılabilir. Bununla birlikte, bu iki devletin birbirleri için çok önemli olduğu ve iyi ilişkilerin sürdürülmesi için çaba gösterilmesi gerektiği kesin olarak söylenebilir.

## APPENDIX B. THESIS PERMISSON FORM/TEZ İZİN FORMU

### TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master  Doktora / PhD

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