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JORDANIAN SECURITY: A SECURITIZATION PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

JORDANIAN SECURITY: A SECURITIZATION PERSPECTIVE

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The Middle East and its sub-region Levant have been ridden with political instabilities, wars, migrations and economic crises since the emergence of new Arab states. Jordan, on the other hand, has been able to enjoy a rather peaceful and secure environment in contrast to its neighbors. Despite this interesting quality, the case of Jordan has not been sufficiently investigated in the literature of security studies. What are the major securitization dynamics of Jordan? To address this question, this thesis will utilize Securitization Theory, which was developed within the framework of the Copenhagen School by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde. From this point of view, thesis will focus on three main security sectors which are military, political and economic and this study will demonstrate the dynamics of securitization in Jordan, in response to changing nature of threats. Within this qualitative case study, after providing brief review of literature and theoretical framework on security studies, Jordan's securitization dynamics of military, political, and economic sectors will be analyzed. Including regionalizing dynamics in regard of external threats and distinct types of internal security issues, thesis will touch upon far-reaching security dynamics by analyses of various cases from the time of King Hussein and King Abdullah II.

Keywords: The Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Copenhagen School, Securitization Theory

ÖZ

ÜRDÜN GÜVENLİĞİ: BİR GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRME BAKIŞI

Işık Hamutcu, Sema

Yüksek Lisans: Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç

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Orta Doğu ve alt-bölgesi Levant, Arap devletlerinin ilk inşasından itibaren siyasi iktidarsızlık, savaş, göç ve ekonomik krizler ile yüzleşmektedir. Ürdün ise komşularının aksine daha barışçıl ve güvenli bir atmosfere sahiptir. Bu dikkat çekici özelliğine rağmen Ürdün, güvenlik çalışmaları literatüründe yeterli şekilde incelenmemektedir. Ürdün'ün güvenlikleştirme politikasının ana dinamikleri nelerdir? Bu tez, söz konusu soruya cevap aramak amacıyla Barry Buzan, Ole Waever ve Jaap De Wilde tarafından Kopenhag Okulu bünyesinde geliştirilen Güvenlikleştirme Teorisinden yararlanacaktır. Ayrıca bu tez, Kopenhag Okulunun askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik olmak üzere üç temel güvenlik sektörüne odaklanacak, tehditlerin değişen doğasına cevaben Ürdün'deki güvenlikleştirme dinamiklerini ortaya koyacaktır. Nitel durum çalışması kapsamında, güvenlik çalışmalarına dair kısa bir literatür ve teorik çerçeve bakışı verilecek ve daha sonra Ürdün'ün askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik sektörlerinin güvenlikleştirme dinamikleri analiz edilecektir. Çalışma, bu dinamikleri dış tehditler ve çeşitli iç güvenlik meseleleri olmak üzere ayıracak, Kral Hüseyin ve

Kral II. Abdullah d6nemlerinde karřılařılan birbirinden farklı durumları 6z6mleyerek geniř kapsamlı g6venlik dinamiklerine deęinecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Doęu, 6rd6n Hařimi Krallıęı, Kopenhag Okulu, G6venlikleřtirme Teorisi

To my loving family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
FMA	Foreign Military Aid
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GID/Mukhabarat	Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate
IR	International Relations
IS (DAESH)	Islamic State
ISIL (DAESH)	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS (DAESH)	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAA	Jordan Arab Army
JAF	Jordanian Armed Forces
JOD	Jordanian Dinar
KADDB	King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau
LIEO	Liberal International Economic Order
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RSC	Regional Security Complexes
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a place that is partially destabilized and is ridden with multiple conflicts, political, economic, and humanitarian crises. This place is not far from the world people live in, the region is called ‘Middle East’ and has crucial imbalances and clash of interests among states that came into existence following the collapse of Ottoman Empire. From a security context, Middle East is identified as “one of the most conflict-prone regions” in a “conflict-ridden region”¹ in the world. Within this turbulent region, there are several sub-regions that have diverse characteristics. The Levant, as a sub-region, of the Middle East is a hot bed of conflicts, both, inter-state and intra-state. Geographically, Levant is at the center of diverse disputes, conflicts, and other sub-regional threats can directly affect it. This consequently causes an insecure environment within the Levant region. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as a member of the Levant region, has a distinct position in regards to providing stability and national security even when its neighboring countries are in a state of chaos.

This gives rise to the question that, how can Jordan preserve its security and stability in a region surrounded by instable and insecure countries. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan can be perceived as a ‘buffer zone’ and relatively safe country vis-a-vis its neighbors and the regional dynamics. The alarming position of Jordan has compelled it to manage its stability and preserve its security in the face of regional threats to the country. These threats include, but are not limited to, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Syrian civil war, regional turmoil since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the position on Saudi

¹ Mirjam E. Sorli, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Harvard Strand, "Why is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (2005): 141-142.

Arabia and conflicts in Iraq that directly threaten Jordan's security not only in terms of military security, but also political and economic security. Within these circumstances, some perceived threats have been securitized by King Hussein and King Abdullah II in order for consolidating the power of Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan. For this reason, this thesis will attempt to answer the question, what are the major securitization dynamics of Jordan in response to changing nature of threats in the region? In order to answer this question, this thesis will apply Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory with regards to military, political, and economic security and the regionalizing dynamics of Jordan.

Generally, analysis in security studies approaches cases like this within the framework of traditionalist state-centric and military approach, which is rooted in realism. However, in the case of Jordan, there is need for a broader and multi-directional approach to security analysis. In this situation, the Copenhagen School of security studies is more appropriate because it has yielded various multidimensional theories such as security sectors (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental), security complex theory, and securitization theory. This is why, this research will utilize securitization theory by examining Jordan's security sectors i.e., military, political, and economic sectors and their impact on the security of Jordan. In this study, securitization is used as a central concept around which the security of Jordan has been comprehended.

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute towards the gap in literature on the internal and external multi-directional security analysis of Jordan. By examining the limited literature on in-depth security analysis of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, this thesis aims to analyze the security of Jordan using the lens of Copenhagen school's securitization theory and applying it to Jordan using a military, political, and economic context. In order to do so, this thesis reviews existing literature on the Copenhagen

School's framework in the Middle East, and applies it to the Middle East in general² and Turkey³ (in its Israel relations⁴), Iraq⁵, Egypt⁶, Israel⁷, and Lebanon⁸ in specific. While there have been studies that look at the securitization of Jordan focusing on the issue of Palestinian-Jordanians⁹ and water¹⁰, there are very few studies that focus on analyzing a combination of military, political, and economic factors and their impact on securitization in Jordan. Therefore, this thesis is unique because of its comprehensive securitization analysis of Jordan that includes a focus on regional dynamics, using a multi-sectoral framework.

1.1. Research Objectives, Questions and Hypothesis

The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to literature on the security of Jordan using a broader perspective. Primarily, this study will provide a general overview of Jordan's security using military, political, and economic perspectives. More specifically, it will undertake a multilateral analysis on the diverse threats and regional

² Pinar Bilgin, "Security in the Arab world and Turkey: differently different," in *Thinking International Relations Differently*, ed. A. B. Tickner and D. L. Blaney (London: Routledge, 2012), 27-47.

³ Sarp Kurgan, "From Discourse to Action: An Analysis on Securitization Policies in Turkey," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 17 (2018): 299-326. And Pinar Bilgin, "The Politics of studying securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 4-5 (2011): 399-412.

⁴ Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş, "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey's Relations with Israel: An Analysis of 'Securitization,'" *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 2 (2012): 99-120.

⁵ Basar Baysal, "Coercion by Fear: Securitization of Iraq prior to the 2003 war," *International Journal* 74, no. 3 (2019): 363-386.

⁶ Muhsin Baran, "Multisectoral Securitizations in the Post-Revolutionary Middle East: The Case of Egypt," *Bilgesam*, n.d., <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-330-2014090919guvenlik2.pdf>

⁷ Ronnie Olesker, "National identity and securitization in Israel," *Ethnicities* 14, no. 3 (2014): 371-391.

⁸ Heavy Nala Estriani, "The Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Moving Towards Securitization," *Journal Hubunigan Internasional* 7, no. 2 (2019): 178-188.

⁹ Mohannad Al-Kasaji, "Evaluating the Jordanian National Strategy toward the Palestinian Jordanians (Palestinian Jordanians as a Securitization Case Study)," *FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations* (FI12041103), 2012, <https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/554>.

¹⁰ Philip Jan Schäfer, *Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan* (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013).

dynamics that have shaped Jordan's distinct approach to enhancing and preserving its security and stability. In addition to a multilateral analysis, this thesis also aims to provide an in-depth account of the current security situation of the volatile 'Levant' region in the Middle East, where Jordan is situated. This is vital in order to understand the impact that internal and external security issues in Middle East have on Jordan, in addition to its domestic dynamics and neighboring countries.

In order to achieve these objectives, this research will answer the following research question: *“In response to the changing nature of threats, what are the major securitization dynamics of Jordan?”*

To answer this research question, this thesis will apply Copenhagen School's 'Securitization Theory' to the case of Jordan. In its essence, the securitization theory focuses on understanding Jordan's security dynamics using three critical security lenses that are military, political, and economic. The securitization theory is applied to distinct cases dating from the early years of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan till present; particularly those cases occurring during the reign of King Hussein and his son King Abdullah II.

1.2. Research Design and Methodology

This research adopts a pragmatist methodology to answer the question of what the major securitization dynamics of Jordan are, in response to the changing nature of threats. As opposed to other traditional approaches to conducting research that have strict rules on how research should be done, pragmatist paradigm focuses on using any methods and techniques that can help in effectively answering the question. As such, researchers using pragmatist paradigm have more leniency to apply a combination of methods and approaches to their study.¹¹ In this research, mixed-methods are used as

¹¹ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (California: Sage Publications, 2014), 23.

part of a pragmatist epistemology, with an understanding that the use of mixed-methods is more likely to ensure an exhaustive answer to the research question.¹²

A mixed-methods approach includes a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. Primarily, this research is designed as a qualitative case study using a ‘bottom-up’ approach. For primary data collection, this research has utilized qualitative sources such as: researcher’s observations and interviews with Jordanians, official speeches and interviews of Jordanian premiers, and archival documents. Primary data is also collected through official websites that archive the speeches and interviews of Jordanian Kings, and also researcher’s own observations and interviews with Jordanians. Secondary data collection for this research includes sources such as: published articles, books, newspapers/news (both international and local ones), and the articles from newspapers. In addition to qualitative data, this research also uses quantitative data on Jordan’s military and economic performance, using sources such as governmental institutions, NGOs, and other statistical databases.

1.3. Structure of the Study

This thesis is structured into seven chapters. The first chapter includes the introduction which gives general information on the objectives, methodology, design, and structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 of this research is a topical literature review that is divided into: (i) literature on security of the Middle East and the Levant, and (ii) security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Within the review itself, the Levant region and Jordan’s neighbors are examined before an analysis of Jordan’s national security because the region’s security dynamics have a direct impact on the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The review of literature on Jordan’s national security incorporates a review of multi-dimensional security dynamics and analysis.

¹² Cresswell, *Research Design*, 23.

Chapter 3 of this research consists of the theoretical framework for this study. It includes a discussion on the various approaches used to study security in general and, more specifically, the tenets of Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Three theoretical principles of the Copenhagen School are discussed in this chapter. These theoretical concepts are (i) security sectors, (ii) security complex theory, and (iii) securitization theory. An examination of these concepts is critical to provide a platform for further analysis of Jordan's security in the following chapters.

Chapter 4 is the first thematic chapter of this research that focuses on the military security of Jordan using securitization theory. To do so, it presents a detailed analysis of three separate cases that are: Israel, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Terrorism throughout the reign of King Hussein and King Abdullah II. Additionally, this chapter presents an account of dynamic threats and regional security factors that play an important role in comprehending Jordan's military security.

Chapter 5, the second thematic chapter, examines Jordan's political security using securitization theory. More specifically, it analyses the case of Israel. In doing so, this chapter encapsulates internal and external political factors that have significantly impacted Jordan's national security in the past. It puts forth 'Israel's threat' as an external factor.

Chapter 6 is the third, and last, thematic chapter of this study that is based on an analysis of Jordan's economic security using securitization theory. More specifically, it looks at the case of Syrian refugees and corruption in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Both of these cases have received significant attention in local news and politics in the recent past – especially in reference to the threat they pose on Jordan's economic stability. The chapter also briefly discusses Jordan's economic security in reference to the changing regional dynamics.

Chapter 7 concludes this study by reinstating the aim of this research and summarizing on the cases discussed in previous chapters. This chapter also presents findings on the military, political, and economic securitization of Jordan, an analysis of primary

interviews conducted by the researcher, and the study's contribution to existing literature.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The Literature review of this thesis comprises two main sections analyzing the securitization of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. First, this literature review provides an examination of the security of the Middle East, as a region. There is a wide range of literature available on this subject, covering some remarkable conflicts and disputes on both regional (The Middle East) and sub-regional (The Levant) levels. Sub-regional analysis is applied to this study because the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is considered as a constituent state¹³ in the distinctive Levant region. A regional analysis is important for this study because any conflicts or threats occurring in the Middle East directly affect states in the region. Therefore, Jordan's security can be better understood by a regional analysis of Middle East as a whole. It is also relevant because, as Melanie Schmoll emphasizes, "the only thing stable about the Middle East is its instability. This has never been truer than today."¹⁴ For this study specifically, Schmoll's claim takes on a new meaning because in a chaotic Middle East, Jordan is commonly perceived as a safe heaven. To understand this peculiarity, this study will analyze the security of Jordan in three different sectors (military, political, and economic security).

¹³ Mustafa Aydın, ed., *The Levant: Search for a Regional Order* (Tunisia: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018), 6.

¹⁴ Melania C. Schmoll, "The Transformation of the Levant Region: Security-Related Changes in a Turbulent Region," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 16, no. 3 (2015): 10.

The second section of this literature review lays out the groundwork for the next chapters on military, political, and economic security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This section consists of literature on the main challenges, discussions, and the strategies that Jordan has experienced from the First World War to the present. From existing studies on the issue, both external and internal dynamics of the Jordanian security from military, political, and economic context are included in this section. However, even as there are plenty of sources on security from the reign of King Abdullah I, King Hussein, King Abdullah II (since 1999), and the Arab Spring, there is a lack of sources that provide an in-depth analysis of Jordan's military, political, and economic security. However, it should be noted that the literature review in this study is entirely based on sources in English and Turkish language. Arabic literature has not been included in this review because of the researcher's lack of competence in Arabic language.

2.2. Literature on Security of the Middle East

To begin the discussion on the security of Middle East, it is first important to understand the origins of the name Middle East. Clay F. Naff explains that the name Middle East is derived from “the label ‘Middle East’” that was first adopted by European leaders in the early twentieth century. This was a time when the colonial powers of the West were making incursions into what had been a largely unified Islamic empire.”¹⁵ Naff continues that this name demonstrates how the conqueror (West, including the USA) viewed the region, while the original inhabitants do not approve of this label “Middle East”.¹⁶ After the Second World War, the US secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, considered Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf sheikdoms as the Middle East.¹⁷ On the other hand, at the same

¹⁵ Clay F. Naff, *Conflict in the Middle East* (San Diego: ReferencePoint Press, 2008), 9.

¹⁶ Naff, *Conflict*, 9.

¹⁷ Pinar Bilgin, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2019), 47.

time, Britain had considered a distinct Middle East stretching “from Malta to Iran and from Syria to Ethiopia”, which Pınar Bilgin argues is the widest imagining of the Middle East.¹⁸ In addition to Bilgin’s argument, Bassam Tibi also argues that the boundaries of the Middle East range “from Iran in the East to Morocco in the West, from Turkey on the north to the Sudan in the South”. He also notes that the Middle East is also a political entity, so its geographical boundary is not the only variable that should be considered.¹⁹ Similarly, this study agrees with Tibi that there may be numerous geographical imaginings of the Middle East as a region but rather than analyzing the geography of Middle East, this study focuses on its security as a political entity.

Much like Naff, Tibi also argues that the Middle East is one of the most “war prone regions” in the world.²⁰ And it is worth investigating why this region is the most unstable and insecure in the world. According to Mehran Kamrava, the Inter-War period (from the end of WW1 to the beginning of the WW2 in 1939), shaped the fate of Middle East, and this region is still experiencing issues that have stemmed from the Inter-War era.²¹ Kamrava asserts that the contemporary Middle East was created in this time period with its wars, tension, extremism, and so on.²² Similarly, while studying conflicts and complex dynamics of the Middle East, Johan Schaar argues that five events have shaped the Middle East that are: “Arab order/ disorder, originating in the dysfunctional post-World War I state system, the Israeli-Arab conflict, Sunni-

¹⁸ Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 46.

¹⁹ Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 6.

²⁰ Tibi, *Conflict and War*, 6.

²¹ Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: a political history since the First World War*, 3rd ed. (California: University of California Press, 2013), 36.

²² *Ibid.*, 8-36.

Shiite tensions (specifically after 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), Sunni radicalization, and lastly the 2011 uprisings and aftermath”.²³

When analyzing causes for endless conflicts and the unstable environment in the Middle East, special attention is to be given to the period from the First World War to the end of the Cold War. There are turning points that took place in this period that have had a significant impact on the shaping of contemporary Middle East, beginning with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. According to Kamrava, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and its consequent collapse in early 20th century, led to a power vacuum in the Middle Eastern region, allowing Western powers (Britain and France) a chance to pursue their interests in the region.²⁴ Similarly, William L. Cleveland argues that the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 was orchestrated by the alliance between Sharif Hussain of Mecca and the British High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Henry McMahon.²⁵ The Hussain-McMahon Correspondence is also an evidence of British involvement in the region. It looked at the region as “the larger Middle East”, paving the way for the institution of a Western mandate system in accordance with a series of treaties and the drawing of maps for the new Arab territories.²⁶

On May 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement further cemented the new boundaries of newly independent Middle Eastern states²⁷. And lastly, with slight modifications to the Sykes-Picot agreement (in San Remo Conference), Britain gained mandates to the regions of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq while France gained mandates over

²³ Johan Schaar, “A Confluence of Crises: On Water, Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa,” *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security* 2019, no. 4 (2019): 6.

²⁴ Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 36.

²⁵ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, trans. Mehmet Harmançı (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 176-177.

²⁶ Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 177-179.

²⁷ James Barr, *A Line in the Sand* (UK: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2011), 31.

Lebanon and Syria.²⁸ According to Pinar Bilgin, “Sykes-Picot order has become a trope for seemingly unending wars and conflict in the Middle East as an outcome of ostensibly ‘artificial’ boundaries of post-colonial states”.²⁹ Bilgin also argues that Sykes-Picot Agreement and the artificial boundaries that it imposed was a proof of “a top-down, outwards-oriented, military focused, and statist approach to security”.³⁰

Mehran Kamrava puts forth the Balfour Declaration (issued in 1917) as another turning point for the security of the Middle East because the Balfour Declaration changed the fate of not just Palestinians but the Middle East as a whole.³¹ It is a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild - the pioneer of Zionism, discussing the establishment of a ‘Jewish State’ as a ‘Jewish Homeland’ on the territories of Palestine.³² Balfour Declaration thus paved the way for the initiation of the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) conflicts and tensions in the Middle East. More specifically, Palestinian-Israeli conflicts initiated at the declaration of a Jewish state on Palestinian territories in 1948, and was followed by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Days War) that led to “devastating military defeat and humiliation” for Arabs.³³ As a result of these events, Bassam Tibi emphasizes that 1967 War not only changed the map of the region but also affected and revolutionized the structure of the Middle East (political and ideological alteration).³⁴

Furthermore, as Pinar Bilgin states, between mid-1940s and mid-1960s relations between the newly independent Arab States further soured due to conflicting claims

²⁸Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 44.

²⁹ Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 62.

³⁰ Ibid., 64.

³¹ Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 42.

³² Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 270-271.

³³ Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 84-108.

³⁴ Tibi, *Conflict and War*, 9.

on territories such as Iraq's claim on the territories of Kuwait in 1961.³⁵ In the same period, a rise in Arab nationalism (led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt)³⁶ followed by the Arab Cold War (tensions in the region between 'radical' republics and 'conservative' monarchies under the influence of bi-polar superpowers)³⁷ shaped the fate of how modern security is comprehended in the Middle East. According to Naff, Iran, being the distinct non-Arab state in the region also actively engaged in several regional conflicts after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.³⁸ The Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Sunni-Shiite division, followed by the Iran-Iraq Eight Years War³⁹, and a rise of non-state actors (Islamist extremist groups such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda)⁴⁰ caused further chaos and instability in the security landscape of the Middle East. From the end of the Cold War to the present day, security in the Middle East has continued to be a cause of concern, stemming from the chaotic turning points discussed above. In consideration of this fact, the literature review below discusses the consequences of conflicts on the region and the security dynamics of Jordan's neighbors by focusing on the regional and the sub-regional (the Levant) level.

Bassam Tibi argues that after the Cold War Middle East, which belongs to the Third World, has experienced continuous wars even as superpower rivalry has minimized in the region.⁴¹ Similar to Tibi's view, Bilgin describes the post-Cold War Middle East as having a military-focused and statist view of security that relies on both interstate and intrastate conflicts with a variety of insecurity dynamics such as US-led war on

³⁵ Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 75-82.

³⁶ Turgay Murat, "Mısırda Nasır Dönemi Arap Milliyetçiliğinin bölge Yönetimlerine Etkisi," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, no. 200 (2012): 58.

³⁷ Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 360-369.

³⁸ Naff, *Conflict*, 24.

³⁹ Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 460-464.

⁴⁰ Christopher P. Dallas-Feeney, "Violent-Non-state Actors in the Middle East: Origins and Goals," *E-International Relations*, 2019, <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/05/28/violent-non-state-actors-in-the-middle-east-origins-and-goals/>.

⁴¹ Tibi, *Conflict and War*, 3.

Iraq, a rise in the number of non-state actors, terrorism and so on.⁴² Tibi also gives an example of the 1990-1992 Gulf war, which was not only a war between two states but also a consequential conflict for the region. It also depicted the changing ways in which major superpowers continue to influence the region.⁴³ After the 1990-91 Gulf War and 9/11 attack on the US by Al-Qaeda, US's intervention in the Middle East increased.⁴⁴ Johan Schaar argues that US's invasion of Iraq in 2003 further triggered tensions in the region, and the result of this conflict was catastrophic due to the casualties of thousands of people and displacement of millions within the region.⁴⁵

Yet, the impacts of the US invasion in 2003 are not limited to civilian casualties and internal displacement, it opened the doors for newer types of conflicts and wars in the Middle East. According to Bettina Koch and Yannis A. Stivachtis, the new regional movement began in 2010 when a desperate and unemployed Tunisian set himself alight, sparking the 'Arab Spring' throughout the region.⁴⁶ According to Amr Youssef, in the Arab Spring, the masses were protesting high levels of corruption, poverty, lack of services, and authoritarian Arab regimes.⁴⁷ However, according to Mustafa Aydin, the outcomes of the Arab Spring were not uniform through the region. While some countries undertook severe political reforms such as Tunisia, others experienced civil unrest/war like in Syria.⁴⁸ He also asserts that the Arab Spring had critical influence

⁴² Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 97, 7.

⁴³ Tibi, *Conflict and War*, 17-18.

⁴⁴ Raymond Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences," *Perceptions*, 12 (2007): 10-14.

⁴⁵ Schaar, "Confluence of Crises", 6.

⁴⁶ Bettina Koch and Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds. *Regional Security in the Middle East: Sectors, Variables and Issues* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2019), 204.

⁴⁷ Amr Yosef and Joseph R. Cerami. *The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East: Emerging Security Threats and Revolutionary Change* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1.

⁴⁸ Aydin, *The Levant*, 128.

on the aggravation of ethnic and sectarian divides in the region, leading to civil and proxy wars backed by superpowers and regional powers in the Middle East.⁴⁹

2.2.1. *Security Dynamics of the Neighbors of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*

This section analyzes specific countries that have had a direct effect on Jordan since the post-Cold War era in order to shed light on conflicts and threats that they can pose towards Jordan. One of the more conflict-ridden countries in the region, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are two specific countries that have a large influence on the security and politics of Middle Eastern states, including Jordan. In terms of Iraq's influence, Koch and Stivachtis argue that the consequences of the Gulf War primarily influenced the exacerbation of a sectarian schism in the region i.e. the Sunni-Shiite divisions. Furthermore, Kurdish tension throughout the country and the brutal oppression of Kurds by Iraqi government resulted in many deaths and increased refugee flows within the region.⁵⁰ For Naff, the civil war under the leadership of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein belligerently opened the door for the US to invade Iraq in 2003.⁵¹ As a consequence of events taking place in Iraq, Kamrava argues that "Institutional decay and atrophy, despotism, cross-border conflicts, ethnic and sectarian tensions, foreign invasions - all relics of the past - continue to haunt much of the Middle East to this day".⁵² In addition to Iraq, Bilgin argues that Saudi Arabia - a neighbor of Jordan - has also depicted characteristics of interventionism within the region such as Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen's Civil War (1962-1970)⁵³, and its continued military presence in Yemen that has resulted in tragical outcomes for Yemen and the region.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Aydın, *The Levant*, 128.

⁵⁰ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 33.

⁵¹ Naff, *Conflict*, 12-13.

⁵² Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 209.

⁵³ Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 150.

⁵⁴ Aydın, *The Levant*, 17.

2.2.2. *Security Dynamics of a Sub-Region of the Middle East; “the Levant”*

After the Cold War, as Melanie Carina Schmoll discusses the importance of security structure to analyzing the regional intensity of interdependency of the states in terms of security.⁵⁵ She refers to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s argument on “Regional Security Complexes (RSC)” (will be discussed on Chapter 3). One such sub-region is at the center of Middle East⁵⁶ called the ‘Levant’. For Mustafa Aydın, since the Cold War years Levant has comprised of the following states: Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Cyprus, and partial areas of Egypt and Turkey.⁵⁷ This sub-region has its own vulnerabilities from external interventions, and inter/intrastate conflicts⁵⁸. Moreover, Koch and Stivachtis argue that the Levant is also at the center of a “triangular rivalry among Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arab States led by Saudi Arabia”.⁵⁹

To begin with a discussion on Palestine-Israel (within the Levant), the central dispute between the two has been briefly discussed above. Mehran Kamrava summarizes the dispute by stating that the emergence of Zionism, which promoted the formation of a Jewish state and nation in 1948 on Palestinian territories, led to the expulsion and displacement of 150,000 Palestinian refugees to Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. Combined with the devastation of the Six Days War in 1967 plus the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948, the total number of Palestinian refugees in the region reached over 500,000 (including Palestinians, Egyptians, and Syrians). This chaotic environment induced the birth of ‘the Fedayeen’ - Palestinian militant movement. It was soon followed by the Palestinian refugees joining Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (from 1967 to 1987) in order to gain victory over Israel.⁶⁰ For

⁵⁵ Schmoll, “The Transformation of the Levant”, 10.

⁵⁶ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 11.

⁵⁷ Aydın, *The Levant*, 6.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁵⁹ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 11.

⁶⁰ Kamrava, *Modern Middle East*, 73-123.

Clay Farris Naff, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an unending mutual conflict that has impacts on the entire region.⁶¹

In Lebanon, Mustafa Aydın argues that the political and social structure is very complex and vibrant consisting of eighteen distinct religious and ethnic communities.⁶² For Aydın, the existence of Hezbollah, which is a Shia sectarian militia operating in the Lebanon, is an evidence of a “state within state” that has survived with the support of Iran.⁶³ More recently, when the Syrian Civil War broke out, Lebanon hosted a considerable number of Syrian refugees (approximately 1.5 million Syrians). This destabilized country and then the region⁶⁴ and resulted in the rise in extremism amongst Sunni populations against Hezbollah resulting in incidences of mutual violence between Sunni populations and Hezbollah.⁶⁵

In a different section of the region, Amr Youssef argues that Egypt has had a bad reputation because of its crime rates, violence, and an insecure environment caused by the deterioration of its economy.⁶⁶ In addition to worsening economic conditions, Koch and Stivachtis indicate that the political turmoil in Egypt since the Arab Spring (2011) - specifically with the ousting of Mohammed Morsi by the Defence Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s in 2012 - has become more visible, more violent, and more authoritarian.⁶⁷

Lastly, Syria is perhaps the most notable threat that has had direct effects on the region since 2011. According to James Black et al., the Arab Spring in Syria turned the masses against Bashar Al-Asad’s authoritarian regime. As a consequence of the

⁶¹ Naff, *Conflict*, 17.

⁶² Aydın, *The Levant*, 77.

⁶³ Ibid., 78.

⁶⁴ Schmoll, “The Transformation of the Levant”, 14.

⁶⁵ Aydın, *The Levant*, 78.

⁶⁶ Yosef and Cerami, *The Arab Spring*, 34-35.

⁶⁷ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 35-36.

ensuing Syrian Civil War, there are millions of displaced Syrians and thousands of citizens have died till date.⁶⁸ Furthermore, for James Black et al., the terrorist threat of Islamic State in the Levant/Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIL/ISIS) or Daesh (from the root of al-Qaeda) has appeared within Syrian territories and spread through the Middle East easily, affecting the region and the world dramatically.⁶⁹ As a result, Koch and Stivachtis stress that the Syrian case demonstrates how a civil war can destruct regional and international balances, leading to instability and insecurity of the entire region.⁷⁰

2.3. Literature on Security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The second part of the literature review seeks to focus on the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from the end of WWI till current day. While there are plenty of sources on the security of the Middle East and countries in the Levant, the literature on Jordan (especially regarding security) is limited. Malcom Yapp states that “Jordan (except for its foreign policy) [is] one of the least studied states of the Near East”.⁷¹ For Lawrence Tal, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has encountered many national security threats, both, externally and internally.⁷² Yet, Curtis R. Ryan argues that although Jordan is a very small country with limited power (political and economic) and resources, it has strong foreign policy capabilities in the Middle East region.⁷³ He also adds that King Hussein and his son King Abdullah II have experienced many regional crises and security threats such as Arab Israeli Wars, and the US invasion to

⁶⁸ James Black et al., *Troubled Waters: A Snapshot of Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region* (California: RAND Corporation, 2017), 5.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁷⁰ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 23.

⁷¹ Tariq M. Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3.

⁷² Lawrence Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955- 1967* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1.

⁷³ Curtis R. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 61.

Iraq. Yet, Jordan remains a key player in the region due to its successful foreign policy that has allowed it to overcome turbulent crises more than once.⁷⁴

According to Hatem Shareef Abu Lebdeh, the origins of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan can be traced back to the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. He continues that after WWI, under the British mandate Transjordan emerged as a result of the division of Syria between Britain and France.⁷⁵ Geographically, Transjordan was very important for Britain in order to secure its road from the Red Sea to Iraq and Persian Gulf. At this point, Abu-Lebdeh mentions the San Remo meeting (1920), where the artificial boundaries for new Arab countries (including Transjordan area) were decided upon.⁷⁶ Transjordan gained its independence in 1946⁷⁷ but Tariq M. Tell argues that until 1948 Transjordan was regarded as “an artificial entity” for the accommodation of an “itinerant warrior” (Abdullah I - the first king of Transjordan). However, this conception also served the British imperialist objectives in the region.⁷⁸ Tell further argues that the 1948 War with Israel changed the profile of Transjordan. This is because after the 1948 war, demographic movements (migrations) from the coastal cities of Palestine to the territories of Transjordan led to the settlement of cities including Amman, Al-Salt, and Irbid.⁷⁹

W. Andrew Terrill states that it was after the 1948 War that King Abdullah I declared the name of his country as ‘the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’ after annexing the West Bank and Jerusalem in 1949.⁸⁰ Terrill also finds that in 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman when he was in Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem

⁷⁴ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 61.

⁷⁵ Hatem S. Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perceptions and United States- Jordan Relations* (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 63-64.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 241.

⁷⁸ Tell, *Social and Economic Origins*, 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 22.

⁸⁰ W. Andrew Terrill, *Global Security Watch - Jordan* (California: Praeger, 2010), 7.

because of his decision to secretly negotiate a peace treaty with Israel. He was succeeded by his grandson, King Hussein, who rules Jordan from 1953 until his death in 1999.⁸¹ According to the Selahattin E. Çiftçi, with the annexation of the West Bank and Jerusalem Jordanian society became very heterogenous.⁸² Bartosz Wroblewski adds to Çiftçi's argument by claiming that the annexation of these territories and assassination of King Abdullah I can be interpreted as Palestine's rejection of the Hashemite rule over Palestinian populations.⁸³ From this point on, Jordanian national security gained added importance in terms of both, internal and external dynamics, in the Middle East.

2.3.1. *Security Dynamics of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*

Lawrence Tall classifies three challenges to the national security of Jordan: "external dependence, a hostile regional environment, and internal fragility".⁸⁴ Amongst these challenges, a very significant security threat for Jordan is its economic independence. Jordan is highly dependent to external financial aid due to a lack of natural resources, water, combined with a large refugee population living in Jordan.⁸⁵ According to Curtis R. Ryan, because of its dependency on external financial and military aid from Western powers, Jordan is a pro-Western ally that has good ties with states in the West.⁸⁶ This has not always been a favorable trait for Jordan. For instance, in the early rule of King Hussein (1950s), a rise in Arab nationalism in the region,⁸⁷ a rise in Pan-Arabism led by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and secular Arab radicalism

⁸¹ Terril, *Global Security*, 7.

⁸² Selahattin E. Çiftçi, "Ortadoğu'da Rejim Güvenliğinden İnsan Güvenliğine: Ürdün Örneği," *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2016): 116.

⁸³ Bartozs Wroblewski, "The Mystery of Political Stability in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Monarchy and the Crisis of State Governance in the Arab World," *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 25, no. 4 (2016): 21.

⁸⁴ Tal, *Politics*, 2.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁶ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 62-63.

⁸⁷ Tal, *Politics*, 6.

were crucial threats to the ‘monarchy’ of Hashemite Jordan.⁸⁸ This situation is best described by Malcolm Kerr as the ‘Arab Cold War’ where the Arab world was divided into two: one defined as pro-Soviet ‘revolutionary, radical (secular) such as Syria and Egypt and second regarded as pro-Western ‘reactionary’ conservative (monarchies) such as the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. There was also a third group that included neutral states such as Saudi Arabia.⁸⁹ At the same time, during the Arab Cold War (concurrent with the Cold War), US favored the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan and King Hussain going so far as to guarantee US support for the country by stating that “Jordan had become the only barrier against communism” in the region. Thus, in order to preserve Jordan’s stability and security, US provided additional economic aid (approximately 56.1m US Dollar) to Jordan in 1959.⁹⁰

In addition to the Arab Cold War, the response to the 1967 Six Days War also had a huge impact on Jordanian security. For one, territories that Jordan has annexed from Palestine - the West Bank and Jerusalem - were captured by Israel. For W. Andrew Terrill, these territories were the main economic resource of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.⁹¹ According to Selahattin E. Çiftçi, in the days following the 1967 War, Jordanian population consisted of approximately 60% Palestinians and 40% Jordanians. The failure of the 1967 war led to an increase in Palestinian population in Jordan bringing with it the rise of PLO, which became Palestinian national active force in Jordan.⁹² In 1970, PLO had adopted diverse means of fighting for the liberation of Palestine including ‘guerilla forces’.⁹³ Because of several intense violent conflicts in Jordan, PLO and Jordanian army had frequent confrontations.⁹⁴ Consequently,

⁸⁸ Tell, *The Social*, 3.

⁸⁹ Tal, *Politics*, 54.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 66.

⁹¹ Terril, *Global Security*, 14.

⁹² Çiftçi, “Ortadoğu’da Rejim Güvenliğinden İnsan”, 117.

⁹³ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 63-64.

⁹⁴ Terril, *Global Security*, 16.

Palestinian political and military movement was completely abolished within the territories of Jordan.⁹⁵ However, even as PLO preserved its existence and popularity within the region, Bartosz Wroblewski states that Jordan did not permit the creation of ‘a state within state’.⁹⁶ William Cleveland finds that the bloody internal conflicts launched by PLO are, till date, remembered by Palestinians as the ‘Black September’.⁹⁷

In addition to the rise and fall of PLO in Jordan, Curtis Ryan argues that the significance of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (known as Gulf War) in 1991 triggered a turbulent political period in the Middle East that directly threatened the national security of Jordan. This threat pushed the Hashemite monarchy to further secure its presence.⁹⁸ To do so, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty that promoted ‘an official end to the state of war’.⁹⁹ Terrill argues that this treaty strengthened the ties between the US and Jordan more.¹⁰⁰ However, Ryan interprets this treaty as a mere agreement between the state of Israel and the Hashemite monarchy, not between their peoples, which is why the gap between Jordanian regime and its citizens is still existent.¹⁰¹ At the time of the death of King Hussein in 1999 and the succession of the King Abdullah II, the regional atmosphere was very fragile due to the conflicts in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Afghanistan that posed a security threat for Jordan.¹⁰²

⁹⁵ Wroblewski, “The Mystery of Political Stability”, 24.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 23.

⁹⁷ Cleveland, *History of Middle East*, 400-401.

⁹⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 145.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Terril, *Global Security*, 19.

¹⁰¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 162.

¹⁰² Ibid., 169.

In the decades following the succession of King Abdullah II, Nur Köprülü comments on the wave of Arab Spring that arrived in Jordan in 2011 in the form of protests against economic dismay (including high rate of unemployment, poverty and corruption) by Jordanians. These protests demanded regime change, which was expected to bring economic relief in Jordan.¹⁰³ As a response to this demand, as Köprülü finds, the reaction of the regime was different than other countries. For instance, a government politician stated in his speech that “There is no comparison between Egypt and Jordan. The people there demand a regime change, but we ask for political reforms and an elected government. We recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of Hashemites.”¹⁰⁴ Mustafa Aydın also supports Köprülü’s argument by adding that Arab Spring protests were not as intense in Jordan as they were in Egypt and Syria mainly because the regime had taken many precautions, especially on the topic of political reforms.¹⁰⁵ Yet, Aydın finds that the outcomes of Arab Spring have indirectly affected Jordan. This is due to the Syrian Civil War and the huge refugee flow from Syria to Jordan that has negatively impacted Jordanian resources and economy.¹⁰⁶

2.3.2. *Security Analysis of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*

Bettina Koch and Yannis A. Stivachtis argue that military threats are seen as the primary security concern for governments in the Middle East because of the constant wars and conflicts taking place in the region.¹⁰⁷ Lawrence Tal finds this to be true for Jordan because since 1948 Jordan has experienced several external and internal wars and conflicts. Therefore, Jordan grants great importance to its military and security

¹⁰³ Nur Köprülü, “Consolidated Monarchies on the Post- ‘Arab Spring’ Era: The Case of Jordan,” *Israel Affairs* 20, no. 3 (2014): 319.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 319.

¹⁰⁵ Aydın, *The Levant*, 81-82.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 3.

forces.¹⁰⁸ He further states that “by 1965, Jordan had the largest number of security forces in the Arab world. About 23 of every 1000 Jordanians served in the military, while only 14 were employed in manufacturing.” Which is why he finds it peculiar that only a limited number of studies look at the military security of Jordan (most of them based on outdated data).¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Andrew Terrill provides a history of Jordanian military power finding that the “Arab Legion” is actually the military forces of the Transjordan region. After the succession of King Hussein, Arab Legion was Arabized (British soldiers were replaced by Jordanians) resulting in the shaping of the Jordanian Army.¹¹⁰ Terrill also states that in spite of the size and the position of Jordan in the region, the Jordanian intelligence service is very powerful in the region.¹¹¹ Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was established in 1964 in order to undertake domestic and international intelligence operations. Yet, there is a lack of public sources on information pertaining to GID.¹¹²

In terms of political security, protecting the regime in Jordan is the primary political objective. Selahattin Çiftçi argues that the democratization of Jordan in 1989 was not the response of citizens demand, it was all about preserving the security of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.¹¹³ Andrew Terrill agrees with Çiftçi, finding that the highly debated democratization of Jordan after 1999 was done with similar motives (in King Abdullah’s Jordan).¹¹⁴ According to Curtis R. Ryan, the regime security approach posits that a country’s ruling elite have a propensity to maintain its survival by forging regional and international alliances that address external threats and

¹⁰⁸ Tal, *Politics*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Terrill, *Global Security*, 8.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 43.

¹¹² Ibid., 44.

¹¹³ Çiftçi, “Ortadoğu’da Rejim Güvenliğinden İnsan”, 119.

¹¹⁴ Terrill, *Global Security*, 27.

internal conflicts.¹¹⁵ Since 1990s, Jordan is a good example of this, evident from its alliances within the region and outside of the region in order to secure the state and Hashemite rule.¹¹⁶

In terms of economic security, Koch and Stivachits argue that economic threats can have severe consequences for any country. Therefore, economic security is a matter of national security. This is because during an economic crisis, states often become weak, unstable, and insecure.¹¹⁷ In the case of Jordan, Terrill argues that Jordan's economic environment and its lack of oil resources makes it dependent on foreign aid from oil rich Arab countries and Western powers.¹¹⁸ For Terrill, Jordan receives external aid because of its geostrategic position in the region.¹¹⁹ According to Selahattin Çiftçi, this dependence affects Jordan's foreign and domestic policy, and limits it from making independent decisions.¹²⁰ Domestically, Wa'ed Alshoubaki argues that the refugee crisis in the region also has direct effects on Jordan, specifically on the country's economic development.¹²¹ For example, Terrill finds that even as Jordan has a large number of educated people, employment opportunities are few and the unemployment rate is very high.¹²² Alshoubaki links the lack of job opportunities and limited economic resources to the large refugees population in Jordan.¹²³ He also adds that Jordan has hosted refugees from Palestine since 1948, Iraq since 1999, and

¹¹⁵ Ryan, *Inter-Arab alliances*, 13-14.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹¹⁷ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 5.

¹¹⁸ Terril, *Global Security*, 34-35.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Çiftçi, "Ortadoğu'da Rejim Güvenliğinden İnsan", 122.

¹²¹ Wa'ed Alshoubaki and Michael Harris, "The impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan: A Framework for analysis," *Journal of International Studies* 11, no. 2 (2018): 158.

¹²² Terril, *Global Security*, 35.

¹²³ Alshoubaki and Harris, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan", 158.

Syria since 2011, and the economic costs of hosting refugees has slowed down the economic growth of Jordan.¹²⁴

In addition to the impact of refugees on the Jordanian economy, the scarcity of water in Jordan is also an economic burden according to Lawrence Tal.¹²⁵ Philip J. Schafer adds to Tal's argument by findings that limited sources of water is an urgent economic issue for Jordan because it has faced regional tensions with Israel since the 1950s on the issue of sharing water.¹²⁶

Lastly, conceptual notions of nation and religion have played a crucial role in Jordan. Threats to nation and religion are generally regarded as a part of military and political threats.¹²⁷ Soh, You, and Yu further point out that the refugee policy of Jordan is based on the adaptation of refugees into Jordanian society through integration, guaranteeing them the same rights as Jordanians.¹²⁸ Bartosz Wroblewski also argues that in terms of religious sensibility, the Hashemite monarchy is rooted in the lineage of Prophet Muhammad and this is used by the royal dynasty to preserve its security (legitimacy) in Jordanian society.¹²⁹ However, Wroblewski finds that since the Arab Spring, the idea of Islamism propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood has gained significant popularity in Jordan, which can prove to be a security threat for the Hashemite monarchy.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Alshoubaki and Harris, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan", 159.

¹²⁵ Tal, *Politics*, 4-5.

¹²⁶ Schafer, *Human and Water Security*, 110.

¹²⁷ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 4-5.

¹²⁸ Changrok Soh, Yoonjeong You, and Youngdoo Yu. "Once Resolved, Stay Resolved? The Refugee Policy of Jordan toward Palestinian Refugees," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 23, no. 1 (2016): 1-2.

¹²⁹ Wroblewski, "The Mystery of Political Stability", 10-11.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter of the thesis, security of the Middle East and its sub-region, the Levant, was examined in order to understand main regional factors that have an impact on the security of Jordan. As a part of the review, the security dynamics of Jordan's neighbors from the Levant i.e. Palestine-Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria and its neighbors in the region i.e. Iraq and Saudi Arabia were evaluated for their impact on Jordanian security. A chronological review of literature pertaining to the security of Jordan was presented in this chapter beginning with the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (formerly Transjordan). The review of Jordan's security dynamics was also divided into three security sectors i.e. military, political, and economic.

The immediate conclusion of the literature review is that while the literature on the history and foreign policy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is ample, the literature on a modern understanding of Jordan's security with regards to its military, political, and economic security is rather limited. Wroblewski agrees with this, finding that Jordan's security approach is heavily reliant on a traditional monarchical perspective which focuses on regime security in the country, thus positioning its secret services, police forces, and the national army as the most important institutions in Jordan.¹³¹ Tal also agrees with Wroblewski's argument that Jordan's priority is to preserve the monarchy and maintaining territorial integrity.¹³² At the same time, Tariq M. Tell finds that "the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is at once the most accessible and least understood of the countries of the Arab East".¹³³ The underlying objective of this study is to analyze Jordan's security using a modern framework based on three security sectors analyzing regional security dynamics on interstate and intrastate level. In this study, a modern security framework refers to non-military level of analysis the impact

¹³¹ Wroblewski, "The Mystery of Political Stability", 28.

¹³² Tal, *Politics*, 125.

¹³³ Tell, *Social and Economic Origins*, 3.

of the regional variables (both the Middle East and the Levant) on security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

The following chapter comprises of the theoretical framework adopted for this research. This chapter focuses on comprehending the concept of security by first analyzing what security is and then examining different approaches used to study security. After exploring the conceptual tenets of security, this chapter looks at the post-Cold War era in order to understand security in post-bipolar world order, and especially in the Third World. This is followed by an analysis of constructivist theories on the topic of security, particularly the Copenhagen School of security studies. The Copenhagen School's theoretical approaches are used as the theoretical framework for the following chapters. Therefore, this chapter first examines the theory and then looks at particular sub-theories including the security complex theory, security sectors, and securitization theory in detail. The thesis aims to analyze the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan using Copenhagen School's three security sectors, military, political, and economic. This multi-sectoral approach is underpinned by the securitization theory as the main framework that is applied to Jordanian policy making process with an aim to preserve its security against domestic and regional threats and vulnerabilities.

3.2. Security Studies

Stephen Walt defines security studies as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”¹³⁴ He argues that an ideal comprehension of security studies should consider “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war”.¹³⁵ This neorealist approach (also known as a traditionalist view) on security studies posit war as the main problem and states as the key actors and central concern.¹³⁶

It is after the Cold War that the field of security studies extended its frame of analysis to include not just military security of states but also issues related to political, environmental, societal, and economic security.¹³⁷ This broad conception of security first came out of Europe and the Copenhagen School, whose major interest was to understand “how security ‘works’ in world politics.”¹³⁸ However within the academic discipline of IR, there is a division between “traditionalist conception” and “more broadly constructed conception” of security. Yet, both the approaches seek to perceive and define security in general including threats, actors, concerns and so on.¹³⁹ The main difference is that while traditionalists focus on state-centric security system, non-traditionalists focus on other sectors in addition to states.

As a subfield of IR, security studies focus on a diverse range of issues from everyday life. Thus, it is one of the most crucial concepts in academic research. At the same

¹³⁴ Stephen M. Walt. “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 2 (1991): 212-213.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies: an Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2010), 31.

¹³⁷ Lai Yew Meng and Christopher W. Hughes, *Security Studies: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2011), 26-80.

¹³⁸ Paul Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2008), 67-68.

¹³⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 14.

time, Paul Williams states that security studies are not just for the academic understanding of subjects, it also aims to achieve tangible solutions to real life problems faced by individuals and entities.¹⁴⁰ This thesis tries to do so by analyzing factors pertaining to security in the Middle East and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

3.2.1. *What is Security?*

In the field of IR, there is no universal definition of security. This is because security has been defined in varied ways by different scholars. Some scholars go as far as to argue that the concept of security is similar to the concept of “beauty” that is highly subjective and its perception can easily change depending on different perspectives and contexts.¹⁴¹ For W. B. Gallie’s, security is an “essentially contested concept” much like concepts such as freedom, equality, power, love, and so on that are hard to define.¹⁴² Therefore, it is not surprising that the definitions of security cannot be limited to one common understanding of the concept.

Yet, like the traditionalists (military-political understanding), Barry Buzan claims that security is about “survival”.¹⁴³ Penelope Hartland-Thunberg describes national security as successful preservation of the national interest by a nation in the world. In a similar vein, Giacomo Luciani emphasizes that security of the nation “may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad”.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, John E. Mroz also describes security as the “*relative freedom* from harmful threats.” In contrast, Arnold Wolfers presents a comprehensible definition of security by dividing the concept into two: (i) objectively, security is the “absence of threats to acquired values”,

¹⁴⁰ Williams, *Security Studies*, 1.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Buzan, *Peoples*, 7.

¹⁴³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

¹⁴⁴ Buzan, *Peoples*, 16-17.

and (ii) subjectively, it is “the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”.¹⁴⁵ This definition widely explains what security is by taking into consideration the objective and subjective understanding of the concept.

Much like Wolfers’s perspective, the Canadian National Defence College provides a multilayered definition of national security that ‘it is about preserving quality of life which includes “freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values”.’¹⁴⁶ This explanation of the national security shows more broad understanding of security that goes beyond a traditionalist understanding to include dimensions such as economic, political and societal security. Ole Waever goes one step further to define security (within a language theory) as a speech act. In other words, for Waever security is when a “state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area, claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development.”¹⁴⁷ This approach lays the foundations of Copenhagen School’s securitization theory which is the main theoretical framework adopted for this thesis.

3.2.2. *Paradigms of Security*

From the Second World War to the end of Cold War, realism was the core school of thought in academic IR. Within the realist paradigm, classical realists and neorealists have differing positions on analyzing security, yet both of them agree on the significance of power and state-centrism in security studies.¹⁴⁸ After the Cold War, the changes from bipolar to unipolar world order reshaped regional and local security concerns. This shift paved the way for widening of the ways in which security is

¹⁴⁵ Buzan, *Peoples*, 16-17.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ John Baylis, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 5, no. 18 (2008): 70.

defined i.e. not only military concerns, but other concerns as well such as economy, environment, society, and politics.¹⁴⁹

Coming back to the realist approach, realists try to ‘explain security’ in line with what they see in the world¹⁵⁰ and the core focus of this approach is on states and power.¹⁵¹ In other words, realists believe that security is a “derivative power”, thus, if an actor (generally referred to states and leaders) has adequate power that guarantees its survival, it is assumed that this actor has security and/or is secure.¹⁵² As a result, it may be argued that realist approach establishes a cause and effect relation between power and security, while states play a central role in this association. In this regard, Kenneth N. Waltz goes beyond classical realism to focus on the bipolar world structure during the Cold War. He believes that the ‘balance of power’ in a bipolar world translates into an ease of predicting threats, so stability (security) can either be preserved or attained accordingly.¹⁵³ Therefore, as opposed to classical realism, neorealists assume that ‘international cooperation’ can be achieved to some degree and it is not necessary to perceive security as a negative concept.¹⁵⁴ Neorealists also believe that the international system is anarchic in nature in which security should be the central concern for states by arguing that “In anarchy, security is the highest end... The goal of the system encourages them [states] to seek security”.¹⁵⁵ Despite diversity of views within the realist school on the concept of security, both classical realists and neorealists arrive at a consensus on the idea of power maximization that enables states

¹⁴⁹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 177.

¹⁵⁰ Baylis, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı”, 73.

¹⁵¹ Övgü Kalkan Küçüksolak, “Güvenlik Kavramının Realizm, Neorealizm ve Kopenhagen Okulu Çerçevesinde Tartışılması,” *Turan-Sam* 4, no. 14 (2012): 203.

¹⁵² Buzan, *Peoples*, 2.

¹⁵³ Küçüksolak, “Güvenlik Kavramının”, 204.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Buzan, *Peoples*, 12.

to survive in an international system. This is the military state-centric approach that is synonymous with realism.

Towards the end of the Cold War in 1990s, realism lost its popularity as the central school of thought in IR to “alternative approaches”.¹⁵⁶ After Cold War, the need of broaden the concept of security emerged due to a rise in the number of intra-state (regional) and interstate conflicts.¹⁵⁷ In response to this need, security studies developed a broadened understanding of security by including issues such as human, society, politics, environment, economy, and so on.¹⁵⁸ Barry Buzan argues that from this point onwards, newer intellectual developments were adopted in order to examine security as a concept including “historical, philosophical and politico-linguistic approaches”.¹⁵⁹

In addition to inter and intra-state conflicts, regional and local security problems also gained importance in the post-Cold War era, leading to an increased focus on regional security.¹⁶⁰ For instance, after the Cold War, most of the conflicts have taken place in Third World and the underlying cause of these conflicts is mostly intrastate threats such as revolt against regimes, tribal or sectarian conflicts, civil wars, and so on.¹⁶¹ From these conflicts, along with military threats, nonmilitary threats also came to the fore. For instance, a lack of water, food, or housing are not traditionally considered to be national security threats, but in the Third World threats have led to internal conflicts at interstate and intrastate levels.¹⁶² Consequently the Third World experience of security shows the need for going beyond a military understanding of security threats

¹⁵⁶ Williams, *Security Studies*, 20.

¹⁵⁷ Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution*, 187.

¹⁵⁸ Meng and Hughes, *Security Studies*, 64.

¹⁵⁹ Buzan, *Peoples*, 13.

¹⁶⁰ Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution*, 177.

¹⁶¹ Meng and Hughes, *Security Studies*, 53.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 54.

to also focusing on economic, environmental or societal challenges that may also result in regional conflicts¹⁶³ that may have a domino effect on the international world order.

This broader conception of security, according to Barry Buzan, has taken the focus away from classical paradigms into more constructive paradigms.¹⁶⁴ For instance, constructivism in IR argues that all of norms, interests, behaviors, relationships, and even systems are “socially constructed” and open to change.¹⁶⁵ Constructivist paradigm, with its assumptions of ‘change’, challenges the materialistic theories of IR such as realism.¹⁶⁶ Constructivism argues that “the system is not a deterministic, rather it is socially constructed” and therefore “the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material”.¹⁶⁷ In constructivist theory, rather than giving the abstract and general definitions on security, the focus is on the existence of identical, cultural, social, and historical norms that compose the meaning of security in different contexts.¹⁶⁸ Constructivists believe that it is possible to ascribe diverse meanings to security in different situations, and threat perception differs in each case. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is an example where constructivists argue that the possibility of nuclear armament of Saddam Hussain led US to invade Iraq because US’s threat perception was very high as compared to states such as Russia, China, Israel, or India, which the US did not perceive as critical threats at the time.¹⁶⁹

In addition to the subjective perception of threat, the logic of ‘security dilemma’ is also a cause for concern for states in an international system. In the process of

¹⁶³ Meng and Hughes, *Security Studies*, 57.

¹⁶⁴ Buzan, *Peoples*, 2.

¹⁶⁵ Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” *International Studies Perspectives*, no. 2 (2001): 247.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 247.

¹⁶⁸ Williams, *Security Studies*, 61.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

preserving national/territorial security, states tend to invest in their armament capabilities such as land, air, and naval forces. However, while such capabilities can be used for self-protection, they can also be used for offensive military campaigns – becoming a security concern for states.¹⁷⁰ Wendt accepts this neorealist idea of ‘security dilemma’ but he perceives this notion in a different way. He argues that the physical military capacity of a state is less important than if the state is perceived as a threat or not.¹⁷¹ Wendt states that “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons” because the US’s perception of friends and foes is based on its previous experiences; although this perception can change in time.¹⁷² Hence, in this anarchical world order, Alexander Wendt alleges that “Anarchy is what states make of it”.¹⁷³

As a result, in constructivism, the focus on military state-centric attitude is preserved but norms, identities, cultures, human rights, the lessons from past experiences also gained considerable prominence. Thus, these given issues are also critical to security studies.¹⁷⁴ In fact, the Copenhagen School rooted in constructivist theory, attempts to come up with a more coherent understanding of security studies by looking at “how security ‘works’ in world politics”.¹⁷⁵ In the Copenhagen School’s Security Studies, the main concepts are classified under three titles: ‘sectors’, ‘regional security complexes’, and ‘securitization’. Securitization is accepted as the core element of the security analysis, while sectors and regional security complexes have a crucial contribution in diversifying and broadening the analysis.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 18.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, “Sosyal Konstrüktivizm ve Kopenhag Okulu Bağlamında Lübnan’daki Siyasal Yapının Değerlendirilmesi,” *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 9, no. 35 (2013): 119.

¹⁷⁵ Williams, *Security Studies*, 67-68.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

3.3. Copenhagen School Security Studies

The main theoretical framework adopted for analyzing the security of Jordan in this study is the Copenhagen School security studies. Buzan's theoretical arguments in his book *People, States and Fear*, published in 1991 as part of the Copenhagen School, expanded the conception of security from being a purely militaristic to also being political, economic, environmental, and societal.¹⁷⁷ In 1995, the concept of securitization was developed by Ole Waever, which is used as a central proponent by Copenhagen School theorists.¹⁷⁸ Copenhagen School also devised its security sectors and security complex theory under the securitization theory and they are often used together in answer the question "how security works?" in world politics.¹⁷⁹ That is to say, in securitization theory, researcher does not engage in what cases are classified as a security issue, rather, the important point is to evaluate how issues are securitized by actors and their power consolidation within that case.

In contrast, Stephen Walt (a traditionalist thinker) argues that broadening security studies from military to nonmilitary sectors will make it difficult to find solutions for specific security problems because of the intellectual incoherence brought forth by the inclusion of a wide range of issues.¹⁸⁰ On the contrary, Buzan et al. claims that the traditionalist position of the 'only military focus' in security studies is the real reason for intellectual incoherence and that broadening the scope of approach to include non-military aspects may be the best method to reach an understanding of security.¹⁸¹ However, while Buzan et al. argue for the inclusion of nonmilitary sectors in security analysis, they also continue to maintain the "state-centric thinking" in securitization

¹⁷⁷ Küçüksolak, "Güvenlik Kavramının", 205.

¹⁷⁸ Başar Baysal and Çağla Lülecı, "Kopenhag Okulu ve Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi," *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, no. 22 (2011): 63.

¹⁷⁹ Baysal and Lülecı, "Kopenhag Okulu", 63.

¹⁸⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 4.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

process.¹⁸² Thus, Copenhagen School is positioned between classical state-centric theories and constructivist security studies.¹⁸³ Therefore, Copenhagen School theorists centralize state-centric thinking and add other sectors to the framework of security, in order to evaluate it with a broader lens.

3.3.1. *Security Complex Theory*

Regional security complex theory was developed by the Copenhagen School after the Cold War period. The aim of this theory is to understand post-Cold War regions in the world order rather than bipolar world system because in the new regional structure, the complex dynamics of power relations and security can be easily understood and analyzed.¹⁸⁴ According to the security complex theory, security dynamics are more autonomous amongst regional actors.¹⁸⁵ In other words, while all states are interconnected with each other, yet this should not have a negative connotation such as threats and distrust among them (threats are interlinked to other regional actors¹⁸⁶). Rather, the aims should be to focus on physical closeness of states (within regions) because being closer brings more interdependence between states. That is why, an anarchical world order and security threats create regional security complexes that are quite diverse in comparison to the classical perception of security threats.¹⁸⁷ However, Buzan et al. also point out the shortage of literature on these threats.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, regional security complex theory broadens security analysis within the securitization theory, particularly on the study of specific regions.¹⁸⁹ This thesis applies this theory

¹⁸² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 7.

¹⁸³ Baysal and Lüleci, “Kopenhag Okulu”, 65.

¹⁸⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 43.

¹⁸⁵ Baysal and Lüleci, “Kopenhag Okulu”, 73.

¹⁸⁶ Williams, *Security Studies*, 70.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁸⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 44.

¹⁸⁹ Williams, *Security Studies*, 69.

to Jordan in the Middle East, because this region is suitable for combining regional security complex approach with securitization theory.

3.3.2. *Security Sectors*

In his book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan et al. aims to conduct a broad examination of the character and dynamics of security in three security sectors: “military, political, economic, environmental, and societal”.¹⁹⁰ The purpose of differentiating between these sectors is to prevent complexity in the securitization process. It is also because each sector has its own specific dynamics. However, this does not mean that these sectors are not inter-related. For Buzan et al., these sectors are inseparable parts of the whole picture.¹⁹¹

The military sector remains the oldest sector derived from classical theories on security. The military sector aims to maintain national security¹⁹² of the state by focusing on its armed defensive and offensive capabilities. Buzan et al. accept the traditional militaristic paradigm of security by asserting that “security is about survival”.¹⁹³ In this sector, analysts focus more on how states perceive each other’s intentions and evaluate each other’s coercive capabilities.¹⁹⁴ In the political sector, the aim is to preserve sovereignty, legitimize ideology, states’ stability, authority, and governing structure itself.¹⁹⁵ It can be said that the political sector is more related to intrastate security concerns, where the main purpose is to protect and maintain the political structure of states. When looking at the economic sector, it can be said that it focuses on states’ development, access to resources, markets, and finance in order to

¹⁹⁰ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 97.

¹⁹¹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 8.

¹⁹² Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 97.

¹⁹³ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 7-21.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

ensure its welfare and to become an efficient power.¹⁹⁶ Societal sector comprises of a states' traditional culture, custom, language, religion, and national (collective) identity, which are important for keeping a state unified.¹⁹⁷ Lastly, environmental sector is related to preserving "local and planetary biosphere", which is the main source of all human life and civilization accordingly.¹⁹⁸

All these sectors are interlinked with each other and they cannot be isolated from each other.¹⁹⁹ They are separate entities, but constitute a whole and depending on the topic or issue, the priorities of these sectors can change depending on the context in which they are analyzed.²⁰⁰ Hence, it can be claimed that security sectors are crucial to examine and understand security. By avoiding complex definitions, sectoral distribution of analysis makes it easier to analyze the security of a state.

3.3.3. *Securitization Theory*

Securitization theory is the critical underlying theory for this thesis. Therefore, it is critical to understand the main tenets of this theory. Securitization is a "discursive conception of security"²⁰¹ or "discursive construction of threat"²⁰² developed by Ole Waever in 1995. At the root of securitization theory is Barry Buzan's definition of security, which "is about constituting something that needs to be secured: the nation, the state, the individual, the ethnic group, the environment, or the planet itself".²⁰³ For Buzan et al., securitization is socially constructed²⁰⁴ (is based upon constructivist

¹⁹⁶ Buzan, *Peoples*, 19.

¹⁹⁷ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 7-8.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Buzan, *Peoples*, 20.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution*, 213.

²⁰² Williams, *Security Studies*, 69.

²⁰³ Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution*, 11.

²⁰⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 30.

theory) and it is consequently a speech act²⁰⁵. That is why, in defining securitization theory the main focus is on discourses, followed by socially constructed norms and ideas related to security and threat. Securitization was first formulated by Waever as a “theory of language” within the “speech act theory.”²⁰⁶ That is ‘security’²⁰⁷ is when an actor (often a political leader) undertakes an act and claims special right to take all initiative and speaks on behalf of the state, nation, or specific group in order to dominate and affect public attention and take immediate measures.²⁰⁸ From this point of view, the very general description of the securitization is:

... threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.²⁰⁹

In the process of securitization, the first step is to establish an “existential threat” by speech acts, which threatens the security of a state (sovereignty), nation, or group and the target (‘referent object’) ‘has to survive’ this threat.²¹⁰ These existential threats are established and propagated by securitizing actors, that are influential persons or people within the threatened group, such as politicians, leaders, and respected people.²¹¹ The second step is interaction between securitizing actors and the audience as part of an intersubjective process. Thirdly, the speech act should be accepted by the audience. And lastly, successful securitization occurs when the audience legitimizes emergency

²⁰⁵ Meng and Hughes, *Security Studies*, 95.

²⁰⁶ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 95.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Williams, *Security Studies*, 69.

²⁰⁹ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 95.

²¹⁰ Küçüksolak, “Güvenlik Kavramının”, 206.

²¹¹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 35.

measures.²¹² By breaking the normal procedure in order to deal with problems urgently, securitizing move is based on an application of extraordinary measures and actions by demanding priority on existential threat.

Successful securitization is a significant factor in the securitization theory. In the securitization process, it is not important if the threat is real or not, the important thing is if the speech act of the actors is accepted by audience (generally public) or not.²¹³ For Buzan et al., successful speech act can be prepared using a combination of language in internal and external conditions.²¹⁴ The internal conditions include the way in which the actor uses language and grammar to state security concerns and the way he expresses concerns about the existential threat to the target audience. External conditions include credible securitizing actors from government, authority, bureaucrats, lobbies etc.²¹⁵ and the provision of “facilitating conditions” which are defined as “conditions that increase the likelihood of successful securitization”.²¹⁶ According to Copenhagen School theorists, securitization is an intersubjective process because successful securitization demonstrates the role of securitizing actors, the audience (whether they accept or not), and how this interaction established the credibility of threats faced by a state.²¹⁷

Furthermore, according to Buzan et al. securitization can be perceived as an extreme version of politicization ranging from “nonpoliticized” (meaning that states are not taking an issue on board to move public debate), “through politicized” (refers to the formation of an issue into public policy requiring government decision), to “securitized” (that is when actors take needed emergency measures by justifying

²¹² Baysal and Lüleci, “Kopenhag Okulu”, 82.

²¹³ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 94.

²¹⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 32.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

²¹⁶ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 96.

²¹⁷ Baysal and Lüleci, “Kopenhag Okulu”, 82.

actions as in response to an existential threat, which are against national or international rules and norms for the sake of preserving security).²¹⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde do not perceive securitization as a positive act because when actors take emergency actions as part of their unconditional consolidation of power, it is not conducive to peace and international cooperation in the modern world order. To circumvent this, desecuritization is also included in this theoretical framework. According to Waever, desecuritization occurs when (securitized) issues are phased back from being emergency threats to normal political discourse. This means that securitized issues are converted to being normal political issues.²¹⁹

Lastly, existential threats in the securitization theory are better understood as part of the security sectors framework. Therefore, Buzan et al. analyzed five sectors with their referent objects.²²⁰ For the military sector, the referent object is generally 'state' and sometimes, but rarely, 'political entities'. In order to preserve and protect states, military capability has to exist.²²¹ In the political sector, any threats to the sovereignty and ideology of the state is existential. In the economic sector, referent objects are difficult to detect, but generally national economies should survive for sustainability. Therefore, the referent object of economic sector is the national economy.²²² The referent object of societal sector is collective identities including norms, identity, culture, custom, religion. Lastly, in the environmental sector, the referent object is very broad including, but not limited to, survival of endangered species, habitats, climate protection, biosphere preservation, and so on.²²³

²¹⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 23-24.

²¹⁹ Peoples and Vaughan-William, *Critical Security Studies*, 101-102.

²²⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 21-22.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid., 23.

3.4. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, security studies is a crucial topic in International Relations (IR) because throughout history, security issues have always garnered attention at regional and international level. For this reason, scholars have tried to define security as a concept using distinct perspectives. However, even as there is no consensus on a common definition for security, each definition has its own meaning in specific circumstances. Theoretically, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, realist approach to security was dominant in defining and analyzing security around the world. However, in the post-Cold War period the current approaches to studying security gained attention under the constructivist theory, which paved the way for broadening the concept of security.

In the 1990s, the Copenhagen School security studies was established as an alternative to the classical military-centric approach of analyzing security. The Copenhagen School developed the idea of security sectors (military, political, societal, economic, and environmental), regional complex theory (especially after realizing the importance of regions facing various interstate and intrastate security issues), and lastly but most importantly, the securitization theory. The Copenhagen School puts securitization theory at the center of its approach to examine security as a concept and process. It then incorporates a study of sectors and regional security complexes as part of the securitization theory. This research applies the Copenhagen School securitization theory as a whole (including military, political, and economic sectors and excluding societal and environmental sectors) to analyze the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY SECURITY OF HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

4.1. Introduction

Taking into consideration of the fragile environment that Jordan posits in the Middle East region, Jordan has faced numerous security threats and regional conflicts until today. In other words, because of the creation of ‘artificial’ boundaries in the Middle East²²⁴ after the WWI, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as a buffer zone in terms of its security and stability, has been found itself in the line of fire inescapably. Hence, from the very beginning of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, official speeches (speech acts) regarding security issues have always existed in its agenda, and to this respect, this thesis aims to analyze security of Jordan from a different viewpoint; Copenhagen School securitization theory. In the case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the theory of securitization can be applied specifically in military, political and economic sectors. From this point, the thesis aims to focus on Jordanian securitization in these three sectors regarding the era of King Hussein and his son, King Abdullah II. On the securitization of Jordan, as Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert state, all of these sectors have made up the securitization whole²²⁵ and reduce the complexity of the securitization analysis²²⁶.

²²⁴ Bilgin, *Regional Security*, 62.

²²⁵ Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, “Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 416.

²²⁶ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 8.

This chapter focuses on the securitization of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the basis of military sector. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate military rooted threats that are securitized by Jordan, and to analyze three securitized cases (Israel, PLO, and Terrorism) within Jordanian military security. This chapter also gives the nature of threats, vulnerabilities, and regionalizing dynamics which are helpful for the examination of Jordanian securitization process through changing conditions that Jordan faces.

4.2. Jordanian Securitization in Military Sector

The sub-region Levant within the Middle East is geographically situated in the middle of conflicts and disputes since the WWI. Within this region, Nigel Ashton describes Jordan as a ‘classic buffer state’ that is surrounded by Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia²²⁷. These neighboring states of Jordan have always been in internal and external struggles and Curtis Ryan pointed the crucial role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in both war and peace situation in the Levant.²²⁸ Within this scope, Jordanian securitization in the military sector gives more clear understanding of state’s security. Military sector in the securitization process can be considered as the most institutionalized one and focuses on internal and external military threats and states’ military defense capabilities against other states, governments, or nonmilitary menace such as rival ideologies which threaten the existence of the government or the regime.²²⁹

Considering the internal threats in the military security as Buzan et al. mentions, it mostly focuses on preserving the existence of the ruling elite, regime or government,

²²⁷ Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright, eds., *Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the End of the Cold War 1968-91* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 98.

²²⁸ Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan First: Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy under King Abdullah II,” *ASQ* 26, no. 3 (2004): 43.

²²⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 49-50.

civil peace, and territorial integrity of the state.²³⁰ These are generally classified as “militant separatist, revolutionary, terrorist or criminal organizations or movements” which threaten the state security directly.²³¹ In Jordanian military securitization, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or (*fedayeen*) and the Salafist jihadi movement/ terrorism; Al-Qaeda and ISIS/DAESH have a crucial position from the 1960s until today. On the other hand, external threats in the military sector are defined as firstly states’ armed offensive and defensive capabilities and secondly, states’ calculation on each other’s potential power and intentions.²³² In external threats, Jordan securitizes Israel from 1948 War to the beginning of 1970s in the time of King Hussein. Thus, military security can be perceived as the use of (armed) force in order to secure territorial integrity, the position of the ruling elite from external and internal threats. On both situations, Buzan et al. assert that desecuritization (the process which contains the reversing steps of the securitization/ issues are in political sphere rather than security) is possible.²³³ In Jordanian case, King Hussein desecuritizes both Israel and PLO and turns them back to the normal politics.

4.2.1. *Referent Objects and Securitizing Actors*

In military sector, securitization starts with declaring of existential threats by speech acts of securitizing actors on the referent object. For Buzan et al., in the traditional point of view, the referent object of the military sector is ‘state’ and in respect of dynastic and national states, both of them consider sovereignty as a broader concept that consists of the maintenance of the government and territory.²³⁴ Furthermore, regarding monarchical state, regime (monarchy) and royal families are also perceived

²³⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 49-50.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 51.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

as referent objects of the military sector.²³⁵ The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a good case because in its military securitization, primarily regime and royal Hashemite family and then state, Arab nation (in the time of King Hussein) are presented as referent objects in both internal and external security dynamics of Jordan.

Securitizing actors in the military sector, for Buzan et al., are state representatives who give speeches on the behalf of their states and have a legitimate impact on their people.²³⁶ State representatives in the military sector are comprised of governments, ruling elites and political leaders.²³⁷ While analyzing the securitizing actors of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the military sector, it is very easy to assert that the securitizing actor is the King even if the government and political leaders speak on the behalf of Jordan. In other words, in Jordan as an (powerful monarchy) undemocratic state, the only actor of securitizing move is the King because other actors only support (also have an impact to some extend toward King's decision) the arguments of the King for both maintenance of territorial integrity and regime security in the military sector. All of the existential threats can be labeled voice in the state by the King and the other actors cannot freely start the securitizing move without the control of the monarchy.

4.2.2. *Functional Actors*

According the Buzan et al., functional actors of the military sector are varied that it can include many actors who have a direct influence without existing securitizing actors or referent objects.²³⁸ The Jordanian government and political leaders can be classified as functional actors in the military security. In the situations of the lack of King's speeches on the securitizing move, government members, spokesmen or military officials (on high) can speak on the behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of

²³⁵ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 52-53.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

²³⁷ Baysal and Lüleci, "Kopenhag Okulu", 78.

²³⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 56.

Jordan's military security and they have a crucial effect in securitization move because the audience is always aware that these actors cannot move further without monarchy's control.

In addition to these functional actors, arms industry and armed services have a strong pressure on the military security strategy and even in procurement.²³⁹ As for Jordanian military security, national arms industry is encouraged by the King Abdullah II and by this way, the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) was established for enhancing national military industry of Jordan in 1999.²⁴⁰ Considering the armed services of Jordan, navy, air force, and army, even including intelligence service- General Intelligence Directorate (GID) (as a branch of Royal Jordanian Armed Forces) have respected power on both the external and internal security issues.²⁴¹ Furthermore, three of ministries; Defense, Finance, and Foreign²⁴² are effective actors in generating the military security policies in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian Defense Ministry is in a very important position and it is proven that the Prime Minister is Defense Minister as well and it has an important role in decision making process of the military security of the state.

²³⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 57.

²⁴⁰ Shana Marshall, "Jordan's Military-Industrial Complex and the Middle East's New Model Arm," *Middle East Report* 267, (2013): 42.

²⁴¹ Joshua Sinai, "Assessing Trend in the Terrorist Threats against Jordan and Its Counterterrorism Measures," *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 24, no. 2 (2016): 19.

²⁴² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 57.

Table 1: Illustration of Referent Objects, Securitizing Actors, and Functional Actors in the Military Sector

Referent Objects	Securitizing Actors	Functional Actors
State	King Hussein	Government
Arab Nation	King Abdullah II	Political Leaders
Regime (Hashemite monarchy)		Arms Industry Armed Services
Royal Hashemite Family		Defense (prime minister too), finance, foreign ministers

Source: Author's own Assessment of the Literature

4.3. The Analysis of Jordanian Securitization in the Military Sector

Concerning the securitization in the military sector analysis of thesis follows the chronological order that begins with the securitization of Israel in the time of King Hussein and accordingly, the analysis of the securitization of PLO/ *fedayeen* (again in King Hussein's era). Both of these two cases were later included in the desecuritization process under the leadership of King Hussein and thus, thesis includes desecuritization of Israel and PLO into military security analysis. Besides King Hussein, his son King Abdullah II has also securitized terrorism (Salafist jihadi movement) including Al-Qaeda and Daesh within the military sector. From this point, thesis examines the construction of policies in order to preserve military security and stability of Jordan through speeches and actions by King Hussein and King Abdullah II and their government, and effectiveness of these securitizing moves, and lastly, how significant these securitizations in military sector are.

4.3.1. *Securitization of Israel*

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dispute over the territories of the Middle East can be considered as the much known security issue in the region. Jordan has involved in this crisis from the very beginning of its modern history that is from the establishment of Jordan in 1947. Jordan's first king, Abdullah I, had objected the 1947 UN decision of partition plan over Palestinian territories, and he proposed to send its army (Arab Legion) to defend 'Arabs of Palestine' and other Arab states including Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon sent their troops to join the Arab Legion.²⁴³ 1948 Arab-Israeli War started with this move, and it can be said that Jordan was the leading power in this conflict. This war also shed light on further conflicts between Arabs and Israelis, and for Jordan, the outcome of the 1948 War was to gain West Bank and East Jerusalem²⁴⁴ which meant that Jordan would be very passionate on its security and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

Another significant war between Arabs and Israelis was 1967 'Six Day War' and this war had a huge impact on today's Middle East order. In other words, the 1967 War by the alliance of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria resulted in loss of territories and 300,000 influx of refugees from Palestine to these allied Arab countries.²⁴⁵ Specifically as for Jordan, it lost the West Bank which was the most cultivable and industrial land for Jordanian economy and to make matters worse, there was a huge refugee flow from the West Bank to the East Bank (Jordan).²⁴⁶ After the 1967 War, Jordan faced social and political problems²⁴⁷ and this troubled situation went from bad to worse. That is

²⁴³ "History: The Tragedy of Palestine," The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, accessed November 20, 2019, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_palestine.html.

²⁴⁴ Hassan Barari, *Jordan and Israel: A Troubled Relationship in a Volatile Region* (Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq, 2014), 53-81.

²⁴⁵ Casey and Wright, *Mental Maps*, 100-101.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 102.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

why, from the end of 1967 War, Jordan has further increased its voice to preservation of its security and stability.

When explaining Jordanian securitization of Israel, it should firstly be considered whether Israel is presented as an existential threat to Jordanian security or not. At this point, in 1956, King Hussein stated that

...the two peoples have integrated; Palestine has become Jordan, and Jordan Palestine.....those organizations which seek to differentiate between Palestinians and Jordanians are traitors who help Zionism in its aim of splitting the Arab camp.....We have only one army, one political organization, and one popular recruiting system in this country.²⁴⁸

In this speech, King Hussein stated the importance of Palestine for Jordan, that is Jordan and Palestine are accepted as the same country because after gaining West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1948, King Hussein started the securitizing move against Israel (Zionism) as an existential threat for the referent object: Palestine (is Jordan).

Following this, in 1963, King Hussein expressed his fear of Israeli military intervention by saying “I have often referred to the danger that Israel might seek to benefit from the [present situation] and pursue a policy that would result not only in a loss to Jordan but to the entire Arab nation...”²⁴⁹ From this statement of King Hussein, while existential threat is clearly Israel, the referent objects are Jordan (state) and Arab nation. In 1965, following the 1963 crisis between Jordan and Israel, all of the Jordan Arab Army (JAA) commanders were relocated against Israeli sabotage to the territories of Jordan and the JAA stated that “maximum effort must be made to safeguard the border through strictest vigilance by rounding up the saboteurs...”²⁵⁰ Here, functional actors are the JAA and emergency actions are actions within JAA as part of this securitizing move. Emergency actions prove that this securitizing move

²⁴⁸ Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, “Is Jordan Palestine?,” *Commentary*, (1988): 40.

²⁴⁹ Shemesh Moshe, “The IDF Raid on Samu: The Turning-Point in Jordan’s Relations with Israel and the West Bank Palestinians,” *Israel Studies* 7, no. 1 (2002), 145.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 150.

was successful and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan took precaution and action against Israeli military threat (audience-Jordanians accepted the securitizing move of King Hussein).

After the 1967 'Six Day War', King Hussein mentioned that Israelis recaptured territories from Jordan (West Bank) and this event, with the loss of land and lives, created very big shock, despair and frustration and thus, the rejection of the existence of Israel among his people.²⁵¹ On this case, King Hussein gave another record after the United Nations Security Council resolution 242 passing in 1967²⁵² and he highlighted that

...at the recent failure of the Security Council to condemn immediately the Israeli aggression and to demand that they give up the territory they occupy at once.....Israel has stated that what is peace and security, which has always been the cry of the successful aggressor....What Jordan and Arabs want is peace and justice.... It provides no justification for armed aggression, the occupation of thousands of square miles of territory, the death of thousands of human beings and the destruction of their cities and home.²⁵³

King Hussein falls in repetition on the aggression of Israel and he emphasizes the occupation of Jordanian-Palestinian territories with heavy losses. Therefore, it can be said that King Hussein tried to emphasize Israeli behavior that can justify his further actions toward Israel. Following these statements, he also addresses that

We stand today as the victims of that aggression. An attack against one of us is an attack against us all.... Israeli Army's behavior as any barbarian invader..... destroying other Jordanian and other Arab towns and villages.... by acts of vandalism, terror, and confusion... The whole of the West Bank of Jordan, my country, is still occupied. This

²⁵¹ King Hussein, "The Jordanian-Palestinian Peace Initiative: Mutual Recognition and Territory for Peace," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 14, no. 4 (1985), 20.

²⁵² Casey and Wright, *Mental Maps*, 103.

²⁵³ King Hussein, "Hussein ben Talal, King of Jordan," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 33, no. 20 (1967): 610-611.

is a completely unacceptable and intolerable situation. Jordan will survive...we will rise again. And with us will arise the Arab nations.²⁵⁴

This record from King Hussein clearly pictures Israel as barbarian, terrorist and vandal and again as the existential threat to Jordanian state and the Arab nation. In this securitization move, it cannot be easily asserted that King Hussein is successful because even if the audience (Jordanians and Palestinians) accepted his words ‘unacceptable and intolerable situation’ and were ready to take position against Israel (it will be discussed in the PLO section), emergency actions were not be taken by the King and his government.

4.3.1.2. Desecuritization of Israel

With King Hussein’s desire of peace and stability in Jordan, he had pursued normalization with Israel and the Israeli- Jordanian Peace Treaty in 1994 was signed²⁵⁵. This treaty aims firstly to end the war and then emphasizes of regional cooperation, mutual understanding and trust regarding security and stability in the Middle East.²⁵⁶ Till as the beginning of 1990s, the official record about peace with Israel had been the unusual move for Palestinians and Jordanians, Israel had always been on security agenda of the country and with this treaty, the issue of Israel had been moved from security arena to politics, that is the Israeli issue had been desecuritized by King Hussein. Within this process, King Hussein gave numbers of speeches and interviews to express himself and his aim concerning this peace treaty. For him, peace is the urgent stage for security and stability of his country and he addresses that “I was not just thinking on myself but, above all, of the dangers that Jordan would be facing

²⁵⁴ Hussein, “Hussein ben Talal”, *Vital Speeches*, 610-611.

²⁵⁵ Helena Lindholm-Schulz, and Michael Schulz. “Israel, Palestine and Jordan: Triangle of Peace or Conflict?,” in *The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development*, ed. B. Hettne, A. Inotai, and O. Sunkel (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 168-169.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

if peace were delayed even further.”²⁵⁷ He also justifies his move (because for his citizens, peace cannot be easily accepted) by addressing that

There were only two possibilities. Either continue in the old way—which would have meant more and more despair with an uncertain outcome, or daring to make the big leap and open a new page in the history book. This meant: Moving directly toward peace with Israel.²⁵⁸

King Hussein gave speech in the Jordanian National Congress in 1991 about the necessity of making peace with Israel by stating “because just peace would touch every aspect of our lives.... Thus, we must be involved in the drive for peace because it concerns our present and future and has an impact on our continuity.”²⁵⁹ King Hussein emphasized Jordanian well-being and future (for everyone) and he also took attention of the changing world order after the end of Cold-War that “the end of Cold War period and the beginning of a new phase in which all indications show that competition will essentially be economic and scientific, but not military, as was the case in the past”²⁶⁰. This statement is a good illustration of desecuritization in military sector because the meaning of desecuritization in this case is having peace (ending war) and disputes are moved into the domain of politics between Jordan and Israel. King Hussein also proved this idea by stating that “we always insisted that negotiations must lead to peace, rather than making peace first and negotiating all points later”²⁶¹ and moreover, he strengthens his statement that “we can say that the territories must be returned in full and Arab sovereignty over them, including Jerusalem, must be secured”²⁶². That is to say, for preserving security and stability in military sector,

²⁵⁷ King Hussein, “Interview with King Hussein,” interview by Volkhard Windfhur. *Der Spiegel Newspaper*, August 22, 1994.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ “Address to the Jordanian National Congress,” *King Hussein*, October 12, 1991, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/91_oct12.html.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ King Hussein, “Interview with King Hussein,” interview by Ibrahim Nafi. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*, February 19, 1995.

²⁶² Ibid.

rather than securitization, desecuritization of Israel can be asserted as the better choice for Jordan, and ongoing disputes between two parties dealt with diplomacy rather than coercive power.

4.3.2. *Securitization of PLO/ Fedayeen*

While securitization of Israel was rooted in external military threats for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, securitization of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)/ *Fedayeen militia* was based on internal threats that had been there against regime legitimacy and survival against PLO guerilla forces from the late 1960s to early 1970s. At the very beginning, after the 1967 War, the troubled situation for Arab side directly affected the situation of Palestinians and thus, PLO started to challenge the regime of Jordan- the Hashemite Kingdom in order to liberate Palestinians from Jordan.²⁶³

According to Adnan Abu-Odeh, former advisor of King Hussein and King Abdullah II, “after the devastating war (1967), Jordanian authorities were in no position to prevent the landless Palestinians from organizing and carrying weapons in order to resist the Israeli occupation”.²⁶⁴ In addition to this statement, he also shed light on the backstage of securitization of PLO by asserting that PLO’s rejection of Jordan over West Bank and that attacks of *fedayeen* militia under the PLO had been intensified on Jordan and Hashemite regime between 1967 and 1970 had pushed King Hussein to control the PLO in Jordan accordingly.²⁶⁵ For him, although King Hussein had tried to coordinate with PLO/ *fedayeen*, it was rejected couple of times and this situation

²⁶³ Barari, *Jordan and Israel*, 82-84.

²⁶⁴ Hassan A. Barari, “Four Decades after Black September: A Jordanian Perspective,” *Civil Wars* 10, no. 3 (2008), 233.

²⁶⁵ Adnan Abu Odeh, “Interview with Adnan Abu-Odeh”, interview by Jean Krasno. *Yale-UN Oral History*, March 14, 1998.

had compelled the King to intervene in this organization which is posited 'state within state'²⁶⁶ and securitization of PLO continued since then.²⁶⁷

On the eve of civil war in Jordan called as 'Black September' among Palestinians, *fedayeen* had declared Hashemite monarchy as a 'puppet of Western imperialism', 'a Zionist tool', 'illegitimate' that should be overthrown and that is why its militia had attacked Jordanian state.²⁶⁸ As part of "survival strategy"²⁶⁹ of the Hashemite monarchy, King Hussein had securitized PLO and its *fedayeen* organization regarding their attacks on Jordan by saying "the shame of the Arab world", "they would suffer the consequences", "everyday Jordan sinks a little more. There must be peace or war."²⁷⁰ In the teleprinter conference with UK Embassy in 1970, King Hussein emphasized the conflict between Jordan and PLO which could not be prevented in these circumstances and he added that "a cancer operation had to be performed to save Jordan's life."²⁷¹

In this securitization process, the referent object is understood as firstly Jordanian sovereignty and then the Hashemite regime/ monarchy. The emergency actions that King Hussein has started a military campaign against PLO on September 1970 and July 1971 and a series of clashes between *fedayeen* and the army of Jordan has resulted in many of casualties²⁷². Just before these clashes, King Hussein also utilized Jordanian Army and Air Force and he stated that "We'll kick out the civilian

²⁶⁶ Barbara Gallets, "Black September and Identity Construction in Jordan," *Journal of Middle East Studies Students Association* 12 (2015): 1.

²⁶⁷ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Interview*, 9-12.

²⁶⁸ Michael Makara, "From Concessions to Repression: Explaining Regime Survival Strategies in Jordan during Black September," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7, no. 4 (2016): 393-394.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 387.

²⁷⁰ "1970: Civil War Breaks out in Jordan", *BBC On This Day*, accessed November 20, 2019, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/17/newsid_4575000/4575159.stm.

²⁷¹ Nigel J. Ashton, "Pulling the Strings: King Hussein's Role during the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan," *The International History Review* 28, no. 1, (2006): 118.

²⁷² Makara, *From Concessions*, 387-394.

government and put in a temporary military government”²⁷³. Considering these attempts in the securitization process of the PLO, it should be analyzed that this securitizing move had achieved its aim and audience- Jordanians and the West were persuaded to take emergency actions after King Hussein’s alarms. Jordanian Army and some officials on this process had played role as functional actors and Jordanian military capability (Army and Air Force) and its foreign military assistance from Britain and the US²⁷⁴ can be accepted as facilitating conditions.

4.3.2.2. Desecuritization of PLO

After providing regime security of Jordan, King Hussein could not run the risk of continuing the dispute with PLO/ Palestinians and desecuritization process had begun accordingly. In 1974 Arab Summit Conference (Rabat), Arab leaders including King Hussein agreed the recognition of the PLO as “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”²⁷⁵ and in the following years, PLO had been accepted as a voice of Palestinians in all negotiations. In 1982, King Hussein stated that “I recognize, and which I hope the world recognizes. Jordan and PLO..... PLO is a liberation organization; it is a process toward the achievement of peace”.²⁷⁶ Finally, in 1985 Arab summit (Fez), King Hussein officially approved the legitimacy of PLO over Palestinians²⁷⁷ and eventually desecuritization of PLO had been done and moved to the politics of Jordan rather than the alarming security issue.

²⁷³ “Jordan’s Black September, 1970,” *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*, July 8, 2016, <https://adst.org/2015/07/jordans-black-september-1970/>.

²⁷⁴ “Jordan asked Nixon to Attack Syria, declassified papers show,” *CNN*, November 28, 2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/28/nixon.papers/>.

²⁷⁵ “Jordan in the 1970s: Heading towards a Healthy Economy,” *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, accessed November 20, 2019, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods6.html.

²⁷⁶ “Transcript of a BBC Interview with King Hussein of Jordan of Reagan Plan”, *New York Times*, September 15, 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/15/world/transcript-of-a-bbc-interview-with-king-hussein-of-jordan-of-reagan-plan.html>.

²⁷⁷ King Hussein, “The Jordanian-Palestinian Peace Initiative: Mutual Recognition and Territory for Peace,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 14, no. 4 (1985): 17-18.

4.3.3. *Securitization of Terrorism/ Salafist Jihadi Movement*

Not only Jordan, but the whole world has faced the threat of terrorism and the Salafist jihadi movement ideas can easily be converted to terrorist ideologies in the Middle East region where the chaos intensely exists. As Jordan is positing the heart of the Middle East, has been directly affected this type of terrorism and this situation poses a challenge for its internal security consequently. According to the interview with King Abdullah II,

...the impact of such prolonged crisis on the region and the world, particularly rising extremism and terrorism... the longer the conflict in Syria continues, the further extremism is entrenched... the tremendous pressure they place on the capabilities and resources of Jordan and other neighbors of Syria.²⁷⁸

He emphasizes in his statement that the ongoing conflict in Syria has threaten the regional and the world peace and he adds priority of controlling the borders of Jordan and preserving the security of his citizens' safety and security.²⁷⁹ For him, "Jordan's security is a cornerstone for the region's security"²⁸⁰ and the reason why King Abdullah strongly and clearly states terrorism as a threat for Jordan is approximately 85 per cent Jordanian Salafist jihadis sympathize with some terrorist groups such as DAESH.²⁸¹ The Salafist jihadi movement has spread all over the Jordan including al-Rusayfa, al-Zarqa (East), al-Salt (West), Irbid (North), and Ma'an (South).²⁸² While King Abdullah II securitized terrorism, he applied emergency actions by arresting nearly 300 suspected Salafist Jihadis.²⁸³

²⁷⁸ King Abdullah II, "Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II," interview with Ghassan Sharbel. *Al Hayat*, March 22, 2014.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Oded Eran and Eddie Grove, "Threats to Stability in Jordan," *Strategic Assessment* 18, no. 2 (2015): 61.

²⁸² Joas Wagemakers, "Jihadi-Salafism in Jordan and the Syrian Conflict: Division Overcome Unity," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41, no. 3 (2018): 195.

²⁸³ Eran and Grove, "Threats to Stability", 60.

In this securitization process, the King gave a speech in Germany against terror by saying,

It is time for a new level of global action focusing our resources, coordinating our responsibilities and synchronizing our military and security efforts. Our countries, our international institutions, must work collectively, as a truly global alliance.²⁸⁴

With this statement, securitization of terrorism had targeted not just Jordanians, also the world as audience and King Abdullah draws the attention on taking steps against Salafist jihadis movement collectively. To strengthen this argument, in New York, the King also addresses the threat of terrorism is “not a single country’s problem, it is not a local or regional problem; it is our collective problem”.²⁸⁵ While the scope of audience is very broad, King Abdullah II successfully securitizes extremism on the Jordanian basis: “I assure all Jordanians that we are ready to deal with all possibilities, and the brave armed forces and security institutions are exerting heroic and historical efforts in protecting Jordan.”²⁸⁶

Regarding the success of securitization of terrorism in Jordanian military sector, the emergency actions which Jordan has taken like in Ma’an domestic military operation in 2002 can be highlighted²⁸⁷. Moreover, researcher’s own interviews with Jordanians may also support this securitization because 6 interviewees, clearly perceive terrorism

²⁸⁴ “Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II during the 52nd Munich Security Conference”, *Embassy of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in US*, February 12, 2016, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/news/remarks-his-majesty-king-abdullah-ii-52nd-munich-security-conference>

²⁸⁵ “Remarks by his Majesty King Abdullah II at the Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and violent Extremism,” *King Abdullah II*, September 29, 2015, <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/leaders%E2%80%99-summit-countering-isil-and-violent-extremism>

²⁸⁶ King Abdullah II, “Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II with Al Ghad,” interview by Jumana Ghneimat. *Al Ghad*, August 10, 2014.

²⁸⁷ Ryan, “Jordan First”, 56.

as an existential threat for Jordan, and they support emergency actions by the country.²⁸⁸

4.3.4. *Securitization of Al-Qaeda and DAESH*

This section specifically and briefly shows the securitization of Al-Qaeda and DAESH which are frightening terrorist groups not only for Jordan but for the whole world. From 2001 to today, Al-Qaeda and DAESH have had an impact on people throughout the world and both targeted the non-Muslim communities and states, and had a claim on erasing moderate Islamic entities and countries.²⁸⁹ Within these moderate states, Jordan is in the forefront, and is directly exposed to the threat of terrorism.²⁹⁰ For this reason, Jordan securitized both Al-Qaeda and DAESH immediately and has taken emergency actions on the basis of the military security.

In the case of Al-Qaeda, Jordan did securitization after 9/11 in the US, terrorist attacks in 2002 targeting foreign diplomats in Jordan, and in 2005, attacks on 3 hotels in Jordan resulted 57 death, 115 injured citizens in which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.²⁹¹ In 2005, King Abdullah II stated that “let it be clear to everyone that we will pursue these terrorists and those who aide them. We will reach them wherever they are, pull them from their liars and submit them to justice”, and he continues, “Jordan does not bow coercion.... Our confidence in the security services and their ability to protect the security of this country and its stability remains unwavering”.²⁹² What he meant by security services is Jordanian General Intelligence Department

²⁸⁸ Interviews with Jordanians, January, 2019.

²⁸⁹ Adel Hawatmeh, “Jordan’s Role in Resisting Extremist Groups: The Case Study of Daesh,” *Democratic German Center, MENA Studies and Training*, May 27, 2017, <http://german.democraticac.de/index.php/category-article/jordan-s-role-in-resisting-extremist-groups-the-case-study-of-daesh/37>.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 10.

²⁹² “Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II to the Nation in Response to the 9 November Terror Attacks,” *King Abdullah II*, November 10, 2005, <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/nation-response-9-november-terror-attacks>.

(GID) that prevented a bomb attack of Al-Qaeda in 2004.²⁹³ In this securitization process, GID is considered as in facilitating conditions within the process of emergency actions.

The threat of DAESH (ISIS/ISIL/IS) which is the latest terrorist group in connection with Al-Qaeda from 2006²⁹⁴ regarding its roots, is the biggest existential threat on Jordanian terrorism agenda. Just after the burning of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh alive by DAESH in 2015, King Abdullah II securitized DAESH by promising of fighting back against DAESH and said that “death of a Jordanian pilot at the militants’ hand will not be in vain”, and followingly the government spokesman Mohamed al-Momani underlines Jordanian membership of the US-led coalition and states “undermine, degrade and eventually finish [Islamic State] This evil can and should be defeated... Jordan was more determined than ever to fight the militant group”.²⁹⁵

The US-led coalition membership indicates that Jordan has taken an action with foreign allies against war on terrorism, and it does not hesitate to fight as Jordan alone against DAESH as well. On this evaluation, researcher’s interviews also support Jordanian securitization of DAESH that the Interviewee 3 states that “terrorism, DAESH affects security, sustainability in the Middle East”²⁹⁶ and Interviewee 4 strongly emphasizes “the biggest problem of it is the ideology of DAESH. Even if we defeat them militarily in Syria and Iraq, they will have sympathizers.”²⁹⁷ Therefore, they are as members of audiences in this securitization process (because interviewees

²⁹³ Hawatmeh, “Jordan’s Role”, 10.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 3.

²⁹⁵ “Islamic State: Jordan’s King Abdullah Vows ‘Severe Response’ to IS”, *BBC News*, February 4, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31125835>.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Interviewee 3, January 21, 2019.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Interviewee 4, January 19, 2019.

are Jordanians), both accepted DAESH as a security threat and one of them also emphasizes Jordanian military power to defeat DAESH within the borders of Jordan.

Regarding the general evaluation of the military securitization of terrorism including Al-Qaeda and DAESH, existential threats are Salafist jihadi terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda and DAESH. Referent objects on the other hand, can be classified as Jordanian sovereignty, Hashemite monarchy (regime), and the whole world.

4.4. The Nature of Threats and Vulnerabilities in Military Security of Jordan

On the basis of the three mentioned cases in Jordanian securitization- i.e. Israel, PLO, Terrorism- the threats and vulnerabilities are considered as effective conditions that ease the completing of the securitization process. At the beginning of comprehension of threats and vulnerabilities, it should be kept in sight that securitization is defined as an intersubjective process which the alleged threats and security issues are socially constructed and while some conditions make to build these threat perceptions easy and some of them complicate.²⁹⁸ Threats and vulnerabilities in military security has been considered as primacy that directly challenges national security and affects other sectors such as economy, politics, society, and so on.²⁹⁹

Taking into consideration of military sector, military capabilities and amity& enmity degree of states determine the direction of de/securitization process.³⁰⁰ These can be classified as facilitating conditions of securitization in military sector. In terms of state's military capabilities, both Jordanian and its neighbors' capability have shaped their securitization and desecuritization decisions. Securitization of Israel firstly shows that Arabs, and specifically Jordan until 1967, had a belief of superiority of their military capabilities (material and human power) over Israel, that is why, they had

²⁹⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 57.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 57-58.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

easily securitized Israel in military means. The Arab Legion (Jordanian military forces) proved the strength of capabilities until 1948 War even to the beginning of 1967 ‘Six Days War’.³⁰¹ However, after 1967 War, Jordan started to desecuritize Israel because it had realized that the military strength of Israel should not be underestimated³⁰² and desecuritization would be good for Jordan’s security and survival rather than securitization. In the securitization case of terrorism, the role of military capabilities, the US-led coalition membership³⁰³ for war on terrorism and Jordanian Intelligence Department (GID)³⁰⁴ has made easy for Jordan to clearly securitize Salafi jihadis such as Al-Qaeda and DAESH.

Examining Jordan’s military capabilities apart from these cases, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) was designed to defend border security and to provide an armored response to diverse security threats of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.³⁰⁵ Jordan’s defense budget was 1.16bn (JOD), its Foreign Military Aid (FMA) was 350m (US\$) in 2018.³⁰⁶ Jordan has a close relations with the US army and it is the major non-NATO ally of the US, and Jordanian military personnel are very well trained (86,000 army personnel), they also give training their allied countries specifically in the Middle East region.³⁰⁷ King Abdullah Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) also is accepted as Jordanian state-owned, national defense industry venture although it had very little export rate until 2018.³⁰⁸

³⁰¹ Terril, *Global Security*, 40.

³⁰² King Hussein, *Hussein ben Talal*, 610.

³⁰³ “Islamic State: Jordan’s King Abdullah Vows ‘Severe Response’ to IS.”

³⁰⁴ Hawatmeh, “Jordan’s Role”, 10.

³⁰⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2019* (London: IISS, 2019), 349.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 349-350.

Apart from the JAF, Jordanian Intelligence Directorate (GID)/*Mukhabarat* works for Jordan's security, stability and safety since 1964.³⁰⁹ It has the responsibility of arranging operations of 'domestic and international intelligence'.³¹⁰ When researcher asked interviewees about the most important security unit of Jordan, the most popular answer is *Mukhabarat*/GID and in Interview 1³¹¹ and 16, interviewees state that Jordan's *Mukhabarat* is the most powerful intelligence agency in the region and the Interviewee 16 also states that this experience stems from Jordan's cooperation with powerful states.³¹² In Interview 19, interviewee also points that *Mukhabarat* provides Jordanian security and safety by preventing organized attacks in many places both inside and outside Jordan.³¹³ To this respect, Jordan has given importance to its military strength despite its limited resources and man power, and this shows that considering the regions instability, Jordan tries to preserve its stability and security regarding its existing and potential military threats. As a result, GID and JAF may be included as the facilitating conditions in the military securitization of Jordan.

For Buzan et al., apart from military capability, geography, history and politics also have a crucial role in generating and preserving de/securitization process in the military sector.³¹⁴ On geography, Jordan is an appropriate example of its openness to direct threats from its neighbors because almost all of its neighbors (are in chaos) pose security threat to Jordan. In both securitization and desecuritization of Israel, between two countries, there is no physical barriers such as mountains, open water, and thus, Jordan needed to securitize and then desecuritize Israel. In addition to Israel, securitization of terrorism is also much related to Buzan et al.'s geographical

³⁰⁹ Terril, *Global Security*, 43.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 43.

³¹¹ Interview with Interviewee 1, January 18, 2019.

³¹² Interview with Interviewee 16, January 19, 2019.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 59.

understanding because of Syria's civil war and Iraqi conflicts³¹⁵, extremism and then terrorism have appeared on these lands and have expanded throughout the region. This situation has threatened the region directly, including Jordan.

History is also the suitable condition that affects the establishment of de/securitization process against military threats and hence, historical enmity or wars directly shapes the perceptions of parties towards each other.³¹⁶ The military securitization and then desecuritization of Israel is an illustration for Jordan considering their disputes over Palestinians and Israeli occupation on Palestine. Lastly, the impact of political conditions on military securitization is considered as recognition of the parties or actors on the basis of their ideologies.³¹⁷ The securitization of PLO is discussed in relation to the political factors because PLO had not recognized the Hashemite monarchy and its ideology³¹⁸ and King Hussein perceived PLO's stance as an existential threat to his regime accordingly.

4.4.1. Regionalizing Dynamics in the Military Securitization

By the end of the Cold War, existing security perceptions went through changes from global-level to the regional and local levels.³¹⁹ Third World including the Middle East has been affected from this new world order in terms of military security.³²⁰ Thus, the regional security dynamics have become more apparent especially in the Middle East, that is, the region as one unit is interconnected with each other and one conflict can easily be transformed to a regional conflict.³²¹ From bipolar to multipolar world order, regional logic of security has become the most significant concern for military

³¹⁵ Hawatmeh, "Jordan's Role", 2.

³¹⁶ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 59.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 60.

³¹⁸ Pipes and Garfinkle, "Is Jordan Palestine?", 40.

³¹⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 61.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Baysal and Lüleci, "Kopenhag Okulu", 74.

de/securitization that gives more freedom to countries to establish securitization or desecuritization by themselves.³²²

For Jordan, after the Cold-War, desecuritization of Israel was officially done in terms of having stability and security with its neighbor within the region. Buzan et al.'s cooperative security/ desecuritization³²³ is compatible with Jordan's move on Israel because this desecuritization further relieved the economic and political security of two parties apart from military security. In addition to that, securitization of terrorism can also be analyzed under the regionalizing dynamics of the Middle East because Syrian and Iraqi instability create the regional threat and the rise of extremism and terrorism influences both internal and external security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

4.5. Conclusion

As a conclusion, when Jordan has been accepted as a buffer zone in the Middle East regarding its neighbors' instability, it can be asserted that military securitization of Jordan is not inevitable from the very beginning of the establishment. When looking through the internal and external military threats under securitization by Jordan, PLO and terrorism (Al-Qaeda and DAESH) can be classified as internal threats and Israel is regarded as an external threat to Jordanian security. These are also named as existential threats in military securitization process. Moreover, desecuritization of Israel and PLO demonstrate that Jordanian threat perception had changed over these securitized threats and thus, Jordan has moved them into the domain of normal politics.

Analyzing Jordanian military securitization in detail, Israel had firstly been securitized from 1948 to the end of 1967 War and in this securitization case, referent objects were Palestine (is Jordan), Jordanian state, and Arab nation. Functional actor was Jordanian Arab Army (JAA). At the same time emergency actions had been taken by JAA. After

³²² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 65.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 66.

the 1967 War's devastating result, Jordan changed its position one step at a time over Israel and in 1994, Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty was signed. This treaty officially shows Jordan's military desecuritization of Israel and it has comprised of ending war and promoting cooperation between two parties. In this desecuritization move, it can be alleged that the security perception of Jordan on the issue of Israel had changed and the desecuritization of Israel is the better option for preserving Jordan's military security and stability in the region. Thus, in comparison to securitization of Israel, within the changing conditions, its desecuritization gives more assurance of maintaining security of Jordan and moving continuing disputes regarding Israeli issue to the domain of politics, and Jordanian diplomacy can be considered as ensuring Jordanian military security against its neighbor, Israel.

In respect to securitization of PLO/*fedayeen* in the 1960s and early 1970s, the referent objects were Jordanian sovereignty and Hashemite monarchy (regime), and the functional actors were Jordanian Army (including officials) and Air Force which can be also considered as facilitating conditions on securitization of PLO. While analyzing the emergency actions in this case, Jordanian military campaign against PLO and defeat on September 1970-July 1971 ('Black September' for Palestinians) are the most apparent moves that Jordan took for their security. Going further one more step in this case, just after guaranteeing Jordanian sovereignty and regime security, King Hussein desecuritized the PLO from 1974 and the official desecuritization of PLO by King Hussein was done in 1985 Arab Summit (Fez) by recognizing PLO as a legitimate organization which represents Palestinians.

In the last case of Jordanian securitization in military sector is terrorism (Salafist jihadi extremism). Existential threats can be regarded as Salafist jihadi groups specifically Al-Qaeda and DAESH and referent objects are the sovereignty of Jordan and Hashemite monarchy (regime). Here, the audience is not just Jordanians but the world as well, and emergency actions are considered as arresting suspicious Salafists, Ma'an military operation in 2002 and gathering intelligence and preventing some terrorist

attacks by GID. While these emergency actions are taken, Jordan has collaborated with other states including inside and outside the region, and lastly, the facilitating conditions of Jordanian securitization of terrorism can be perceived as GID and JAF.

Taking into consideration of these three cases, the threats and vulnerabilities that Jordan has faced, have pushed Jordan to generate its military securitization. From this point, military capabilities- as it was mentioned on JAF and GID, geography- is prioritized as the cases of Israel, Terrorism, and history- as taken by the Israeli issue from 1948, have a crucial role in shaping the military de/securitization by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Lastly, the regional dynamics (is still dominant in the military sector) of the Middle East and the Levant (as sub-region) after the Cold War, pave the way for establishing securitization and desecuritization by Jordan more freely with an eye towards regional threats primarily. As a result, Jordan has securitized more than one threat in order to preserve its security and stability both in the time of King Hussein and his son King Abdullah II, and while the case of Israel and the PLO have afterwards been desecuritized, securitization of terrorism lasts till today.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL SECURITY OF HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

5.1. Introduction

This chapter primarily focuses on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's political security under the Copenhagen School securitization theory. Taking into consideration of Jordan's stance against its domestic and foreign challenges after the end of Cold-War, Jordan had done little changes in its strategy by coping with these burdens more politically rather than militarily. That is why, even if military security of Jordan preserves its necessity in some situations, political sector has become more of an issue in analysis of the Jordanian security. The main aim of this chapter is to indicate a securitized threat that is politically defined against Jordan and consequently, is to analyze this securitization process under the political sector in a deeper sense. In this way, chapter starts with examining Buzan et al.'s political sector in general and then continues with an understanding of threats that are securitized by Jordan and Jordan's securitization process. While Jordan securitizes an existential threat- Israel- for Jordan's security and stability, mentioning the nature of threats and vulnerabilities and regionalizing dynamics give more clear view of Jordanian security under the umbrella of the political sector. Unlike previous chapter, this chapter only focuses on King Abdullah II's era including today and examines the much-known security threats since the beginning of 2000s in Jordanian politics.

5.2. Jordanian Securitization in Political Sector

Political sector in the Copenhagen School securitization theory mainly concentrates on threats which are nonmilitary to state's national sovereignty.³²⁴ This sector is supposed as the widest sector within Buzan et al.'s five sectors and it can be seen that security issues have political meaning and facing all threats and then responses are politically shaped and defined.³²⁵ Political sector is separated off from other sectors by composing political threats which are not applying the means of other four sectors such as economic, military, environmental, and so on.³²⁶ This widest scope of this sector for Buzan et al., poses a problem and is less coherent than other four sectors.³²⁷

When comprehending this sector deeply, it should be focused on two levels of analysis that are internal and external threats to states. While internal political threats are about 'legitimacy' of state's political unit³²⁸ which is the political struggle on state's ideology such as authoritarianism, secularism, Islamism, or pan-Arabism, and so on.³²⁹, external threats are on the 'recognition' of the state in regard of state's external legitimacy³³⁰ and its organizational stability within the region.³³¹ In other words, the internal threats of political security is classified as the threat to state's regime and the external one is the threat to "the recognition of state as a state".³³²

Jordanian security and stability regarding political sector are threatened both internally and externally from the very beginning of its establishment. Within the scope of

³²⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 141.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid., 142.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid., 144

³²⁹ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 3-4.

³³⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 144.

³³¹ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 3-4.

³³² Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 144.

internal threats to Jordanian political security are briefly understood that are against state's regime, in a sense, the Hashemite monarchy. Some threats (can be very influential on public opinion) against Jordan's regime and ruling elite (royal family) is considered as an existential threat for state's security and accordingly, securitization move can start.

On the other hand, external threats targeting the Jordanian security in political sector can be analyzed on the basis of Jordan's external recognition specifically in the Middle East. It is surely beyond doubt that Jordan is recognized as a state externally, however, its securitization case on Israel in political sector demonstrates the recognition ("denial of sovereign equality"³³³) of Jordan under the threat of its existence. This is all to say, Jordanian assertion specifically of its custodianship (over the holy sites of Islam and Christianity³³⁴) on Jerusalem and Israel's respond can be assumed as a threat to Jordanian internal and external recognition in political sector, thus, King Abdullah II securitizes Israel regarding the concern on Palestinian issue consequently.

5.2.1. *Referent Objects and Securitizing Actors*

At the beginning of the securitization move in political sector, firstly, the threat should be determined and analyzing the referent objects comes then. In the general sense, the major referent object is the 'territorial state' and in some cases, various statelike or state-paralleling political organizations are accepted as unit-level referent objects and these are at first, quasi-superstates like European Union (EU), secondly, stateless-societal groups (self-organized) such as tribes, minorities, and lastly, transnational movements like Muslims, the Catholic Church.³³⁵ In the case of Jordan, the referent objects in securitization of Israel (as an existential threat) sets the pace of unit-level referent objects- stateless-societal groups and again the sovereignty of state. In other

³³³ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 150.

³³⁴ Oded Eran, "Concerns for Jordan's Stability," *INSS Insight*, no. 1169 (2019): 3.

³³⁵ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 145.

words, Israel existentially threatens, existence of Palestinians on their territories, and thus, the Arab identity of Jerusalem, that means, the external legitimacy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is under threat because of its unrecognized duty of custodianship on holy sites of Islam and Christianity within Jerusalem. In addition to external threats, within the case of Israel, internal threats are targeting the Hashemite royal family, the regime because of Palestinian struggle in Jordan (Palestinian population is very high in Jordan).

The securitizing actors in the securitization process of political sector are the authoritative leaders that define existential threats to their state³³⁶ by speech acts. In addition to the authoritative leaders, in weak states (extensive challenging ideologies and basic institutions), the government is usually defined as securitizing actor as a legitimate voice of the state when the government, itself is existentially threatened.³³⁷ Considering Jordan as a Third World state in the Middle East region, it can also be identified as a weak state in terms of its challenging ideology and institutions. From this point of view, regarding Jordan's securitization move on Israel, the securitizing actor is King Abdullah II that are strongly describing existential threats against Jordanian state, sovereignty, nation, Hashemite monarchy and the royal family.

5.2.2. *Functional Actors*

The actors who have an impact on securitization process apart from securitizing actors are defined as the functional actors.³³⁸ In Jordanian political security, functional actors have also influence on securitization dynamics in each case. The functional actors are the government officials that express their position on supporting the King Abdullah II's stances on the security of Jordan and Palestinians.

³³⁶ Buzan, Waeber, and Wilde, *Security*, 146.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Buzan, Waeber, and Wilde, *Security*, 35-36.

Table 2: Illustration of Referent Objects, Securitizing Actors, and Functional Actors in the Political Sector

Referent Objects	Securitizing Actors	Functional Actors
State sovereignty and nation	King Abdullah II	Government officials
Arab Identity of Jerusalem		
Palestinians		
Regime (Hashemite monarchy & royal family)		

Source: Author's own Assessment of the Literature

5.3. The Analysis of Jordanian Securitization in the Political Sector

The analysis of Jordanian political securitization comprises of one distinct case that shows Jordanian stance on both internal and external threats and actions in order for preserving its political security and stability. This part, therefore, consists of securitization of Israel from the time of King Abdullah II including today. Securitization of Israel is about the external security and partially internal security of Jordan in political sector. This clearly demonstrates the current security problems that Jordan faces and immediately prevents and controls this security threats for its internal legitimacy and external recognition- power within the Middle East. During the analysis of these mentioned securitization case, King Abdullah II and his government's speeches about these threats are taken as the basis and these securitization cases are evaluated in terms of their significance to Jordanian political security.

5.3.1. *Securitization of Israel*

The threat perception concerning Israel by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has existed from the very beginning of their establishment in 1947-8. Until 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty, the threat of Israel had been evaluated as in military security issue and that is why, King Hussein securitized Israel- as an existential threat to Jordan in military sector. However, after the Peace Treaty, despite the disputes between two parties have lasted, the threat of Israel had been moved from military (by desecuritization) to political security agenda in the late 1990s. The question ‘on what grounds has Israel been perceived as an existential threat to Jordanian political security?’ is necessary for this thesis in order to comprehend the position of Israel in Jordanian political security.

Going back to the time of Sharif Hussein in 1924, the special position of Hashemites over Holy sites in Jerusalem began with the proposal of Jerusalemites to Sharif Hussein for restoring Al-Aqsa Mosque and from this point, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under the rule of King Abdullah I, King Hussein and now, King Abdullah II has identified their duty to protect Jerusalemite Christians and Muslims including their holy churches and mosques in Jerusalem.³³⁹ This description of Hashemite duty (on protection of these lands and people) has been named as Hashemite Custodianship over the holy city of Jerusalem and Jordan emphasizes its custodianship on behalf of Islamic nations and Arabs, will continue till the Palestinians gain their independent state and their legitimate rights on these territories.³⁴⁰ Regarding the allegation of Hashemite custodianship, this obligation has been amplified by Jordanian law which

³³⁹ Mustafa Abu-Sway, “A Noble Hashemite Custodianship Undermined,” *Palestine- Israel Journal* 22, no. 4 (2017).

³⁴⁰ “Tarawneh says Jordan Resolute on Hashemite Custodianship,” *Jordan Times*, March 20, 2019, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/tarawneh-says-jordan-resolute-hashemite-custodianship>.

the Islamic *Awqaf* has a power on managing and protecting the holy city (Jerusalem) and hence, Palestinians officially recognize the Hashemite Custodianship in 2013.³⁴¹

Furthermore, after 1967 War, withdrawal of Jordan from East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Jordan has maintained their claim of sovereignty over these territories.³⁴² To this respect, when regarding King Abdullah II's speeches on behalf of Palestinians and Jerusalemites, he accordingly assumes that Israel has violated the right of Jordan on the holy Al-Aqsa by its occupation on East Jerusalem and even Palestinian territories, hence, for him, this situation is breach of international law and peace agreement between two parties.³⁴³ In 1994 Peace Treaty, although Israel approves special role of Jordan on Jerusalem, it has never recognized the Hashemite custodianship and for Israel, this special role is not referring to custodianship of East Jerusalem.³⁴⁴

From this point, securitization of Israel by Jordan begins and lasts until today. The former key adviser of King Hussein and King Abdullah II, Adnan Abu Odeh describes the current situation between Jordan and Israel by saying that "Israel has never treated either Jordanians or the Palestinians in a similar way" and "This is the top of the naivete of the Arabs".³⁴⁵ King Abdullah II states that,

Jordan - within the Hashemite custodianship over Muslim and Christian Holy sites in Jerusalem - will continue to stand firm against Israel's unilateral policies and measures and will work to end repeated violations of Al Aqsa Mosque's sanctity and attacks against worshippers.³⁴⁶

³⁴¹ Abu-Sway, "Noble Hashemite Custodianship".

³⁴² Ali Younes, "Jordan Reclaims Borderlands as Israel Ties under Strain," *Al-Jazeera*, November 10, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/jordan-reclaims-border-lands-israel-ties-strain-191109165310967.html>.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ King Abdullah II, *Interview by Jumana Ghneimet*.

He also expresses his precision on his duty of custodianship by saying, “I will never change my position toward Jerusalem in my life”.³⁴⁷ By supporting King Abdullah II’s securitization move, former Jordanian Prime Minister Taher Al Masri states the threat of transformation of Muslim- Arab Jerusalem to Judaize the city and he has a concern on Al Aqsa mosque to become gradually Jewish temple.³⁴⁸ He, therefore, insisted that “Amman will take strong diplomatic steps against Israel..” and accordingly King Abdullah II states that “Any more provocations in Jerusalem will affect the relationship between Jordan and Israel, and Jordan will have no choice but to take action”.³⁴⁹ Lastly, King Abdullah II shows his stance on the Israeli threat against Arab identity of Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalemites, and his highlights insistence on defending the rights of Palestinian people.³⁵⁰

In addition to the Hashemite custodianship, King Abdullah II also securitizes Israel because of its violence against Palestinians; “we have been working diligently to end the Israeli offensive...Palestine remains our central cause, and this is our historical and national duty towards our brothers.”³⁵¹ Moreover, he stresses the Israeli occupation that “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the longest-lived in the region, and so ensuing injustice continues” and

Over the years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and even in years following Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has been committed to positions and policies supportive of the Palestinian people and their

³⁴⁷ “Jordanian King Vows to Protect Jerusalem Holy Sites,” *AP News*, March 21, 2019, <https://apnews.com/54b3ec34e4c14c2ba257bcac4b797509>.

³⁴⁸ Osama Al Sharif, “Al-Aqsa Incursions Strain Jordan-Israel Ties,” *Al Monitor*, September 18, 2015, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2015/09/jordan-israel-relations-ties-temple-mount-violence.html>.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ “King Warns Continued Absence of Prospects to Resolve Palestinian Issue Threatens Global Stability,” *King Abdullah II*, November 28, 2019, <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/news/king-warns-continued-absence-prospects-resolve-palestinian-issue-threatens-global-stability>.

³⁵¹ King Abdullah II, *Interview by Jumana Ghneimet*.

continued existence on their lands in freedom and dignity and the right to establish their independent state.³⁵²

While Jordan feels responsible for the rights of Palestinians against Israeli occupation, the decision of moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the US recognition of Israel's capital as Jerusalem³⁵³ in 2017 has exacerbated the Jordanian apprehension of Israeli threat to its security. For this reason, Jordanian Minister of state for Media Affairs Mohammad Momani (Government Spokesperson as well) warns the US that moving US Embassy to Jerusalem would be a "red line for Jordan"³⁵⁴ and he continued by saying "it will have catastrophic implications on several levels, including the regional situation", "it will definitely affect the bilateral relationship between countries in the region, including Jordan, and the parties that will be related to such a decision".³⁵⁵ In this case, Jordan has perceived Israel as a threat of its recognition and sovereignty over the Jerusalem and has securitized both because of its existence and the right of Palestinians.

The securitization move of Jordan against Israel has an aim of gaining recognition and the Jordanian presence in Jerusalem (the Hashemite Custodianship) and over Palestinians. Even if this recognition does not perfectly fit in the definition of Buzan et al., it can be understood with the uniqueness of Jordan's regional dynamics. Moreover, in this securitization process, Jordan also perceives Israel as an existential threat in accordance with its of security and legitimacy internally because Jordan has a considerable Palestinian population and very long borderline with Israel. Considering all of these in analyzing the securitization move, referent objects are sovereignty of Jordan, Arab and Muslim identity of Jerusalem, presence of

³⁵² King Abdullah II, *Interview with Ghassan Sharbel*.

³⁵³ Azzam Tamimi, "Jerusalem's Deal of the Century," *Insight Turkey* 20, no. 1 (2018): 71.

³⁵⁴ "Relocating US Embassy to Jerusalem a Red Line- Jordan," *Jordan Times*, January 5, 2017, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/relocating-us-embassy-jerusalem-red-line-%E2%80%94-jordan>.

³⁵⁵ "Jordan Says Moving US Embassy to Jerusalem is Red line," *Associated Press (AP)*, January 5, 2017, <https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-jordan-says-moving-us-embassy-to-jerusalem-is-red-line-2017-1>.

Palestinians in their own territories and then, securitizing actor is King Abdullah II. In this move, functional actors can also be the Jordanian government officials that they support their King by their statements in this securitization process.

Finally, it can be seen that Jordan has taken emergency actions against Israel such as recalling its ambassador to Israel temporarily in October 2019 because of the Israeli detention of two Jordanians without any trial.³⁵⁶ In parallel to this, because of Jordanian disappointment of the peace with Israel, in 2019, King Abdullah II reclaimed the Jordanian border lands (Baqura and Al Ghamr) which Israel had a permission to access and use under the Peace Treaty with Jordan in 1994.³⁵⁷ This moves are accepted as an emergency condition that King Abdullah II has taken against Israel and he states Jordanian position of “full sovereignty over every inch of those lands”.³⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it is hard to say either this securitizing move is successful or not because this issue still preserves itself as a ‘hot topic’ on Jordanian security agenda and thus, taking crucial steps may worsen the security dynamics between Jordan and Israel.

5.4. The Nature of Threats and Vulnerabilities in Political Security of Jordan

The securitization process makes benefit of state’s vulnerabilities that ease to start the securitization move and to complete it. In the political sector, threats are generally in the form of challenging the legitimacy of the state and its denial of recognition.³⁵⁹ These threats mainly target to challenge sovereignty of the state, that is, the survival

³⁵⁶ Younes, “Jordan Reclaims Borderlands”.

³⁵⁷ Rana F. Sweis and Isabel Kershner, “Jordan Reclaims Land Israelis Used Under ’94 Peace Accord,” *The New York Times*, November 10, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/world/middleeast/jordan-israel-lease-land.html>.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 151.

of the state and if state's domestic legitimacy is weakened, the tendency of making securitization rises considerably.³⁶⁰

Considering securitization of Israel, Jordan's threat perception on Israel is not new and the security issue in political sector has gained importance after the Cold-War. Within this scope, Jordan defines Israel as an existential threat to its recognition (Buzan et al.'s denial of sovereign equality³⁶¹) and Jordan perceives Israel as a challenge to preserve the rights of Palestinians, and its duty of custodianship over East Jerusalem. These threats are not limited to mentioned cases, moving the US Embassy of Israel to Jerusalem in 2017 and US President Donald Trump's 'Deal of the Century' poses great threat to sovereignty and recognition in both internal and regional security of Jordan. Even if The Deal of the Century has not been officially announced yet, it is considered as a plan for solving Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jordan comprehends that rather than its proposal of two-state solution (a Palestinian state with capital city of East Jerusalem), this plan aims to weaken Palestinian situation and strengthen the Israeli position in the region.³⁶² For Jordan, if this scenario comes true, Jordanian stability and security will be affected directly (in terms of its borders and Palestinian population internally) and the former Prime Minister Taher Masri describes this situation as "a grave threat to Jordan".³⁶³

The threat of Israel regarding mentioned cases naturally eases Jordan to securitize Israel directly within the political sector. Researcher's interviews also support this argument, Interviewee 7, 11, 12 agree the biggest security threat is Israel and without finding a solution on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both Jordanian and the regional

³⁶⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 151-153.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 151.

³⁶² Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordanians worry that the 'deal of the century' will come at their expense," *Washington Post*, May 28, 2019, <https://outline.com/APX3uV>.

³⁶³ Ibid.

stability cannot be preserved.³⁶⁴ Furthermore, interviewee 1 asserts that despite the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, dispute has continued over decades because the Palestinian issue is an existential vulnerability of Jordan³⁶⁵ and interviewee 2 perceives Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a political vulnerability of Jordanian security and he urges the threat of rising Jewism of Jerusalem that may be further vulnerable point for Jordanian security as well³⁶⁶. In parallel to these interviews, interviewee 3 finally highlights the threat of Israeli occupation on Palestinian territories. It is also identified as a challenge for Jordanian security.³⁶⁷ As a result, given threats and vulnerabilities to political security of Jordan legitimize its securitization process and ease to take emergency steps for preserving its security and stability.

5.4.1. Regionalizing Dynamics in the Political Securitization

The regional dynamics of the political sector is not much obvious as in military sector.³⁶⁸ Threats and security issues are shaped firstly as in bilateral level and then, is transformed to the regional level.³⁶⁹ In the case of Israel, Jordan's securitization in political sector begins with bilateral- between Palestinians (Jordan) and Israelis, however, it becomes the regional and even global security issue. The US involvement in this conflict via the moving US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and its plan of 'the Deal of the Century', and moreover, Jordan's regional allies within the region such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' stance against Jordanian position have threatened Jordan's political and economic security and stability.³⁷⁰ On political stance, Jordan has been in dilemma to preserve its legitimacy over Palestinian issue

³⁶⁴ Interview with Interviewees 7, 11, and 12, January 20, 29, and 21, 2019.

³⁶⁵ Interview with Interviewee 1, January 18, 2019.

³⁶⁶ Interview with Interviewee 2, January 20, 2019.

³⁶⁷ Interview with Interviewee 3, January 21, 2019.

³⁶⁸ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 154.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 161.

³⁷⁰ Ryan, "Jordanians Worry".

both internally and externally and it has faced the threat of losing its allies in both regional and global levels. In economic sense, Jordanian economy hinges upon the foreign aid that come from its strong allies such as the US, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, thus, Jordan again is in dilemma on where it should posit in order to preserve its fragile security in the region.³⁷¹ Finally, the pressure of Jordan's global and regional allies- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates- to Jordan to recognize Israeli's capital state as Jerusalem³⁷² poses a great political security threat (means of abandoning Hashemite Custodianship and rising criticism from its own Jordanian-Palestinian population) for Jordan that may cause isolation of Jordan in the Middle East and loss of its internal and regional legitimacy consequently.

5.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, Jordanian security analysis in the political sector shows that changing the political environment after the Cold-War in the world had affected Jordan's position on its security strategy. Rather than the dominance of military security agenda, Jordan's political security has gained importance from 1990s to today. Therefore, this chapter starts with comprehending the existential threats and the analysis of Jordanian securitization in political sector including the examination of the nature of threats and vulnerabilities, and evaluating the regionalizing dynamics that ease Jordan to proceed its securitization moves for its security and stability. Regarding Jordan's securitization in political sector, there is one case; securitization of Israel till now, and this case is under the era of King Abdullah II. That means, this chapter follows the very current security issues of Jordanian politics.

Taking into consideration of two pillar security analysis of political sector which are internal and external, Jordan follows them in its securitization move while Israel externally (to some extend internally) threatens the recognition of Jordanian

³⁷¹ Suha Maayeh, *The Deal of the Century and Jordan's Dilemma* (Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2019).

³⁷² Tamimi, "Jerusalem's Deal of the Century", 76-77.

legitimacy. In this way, Israel as an existential threat for the sovereignty and recognition of Jordan over Jerusalem (its custodianship) and Palestinian issue, the referent objects are sovereignty of Jordan, Hashemite Monarchy and royal family because of Palestinian existence in their territories, Arab and Muslim identity of Jerusalem, and the securitizing actor is King Abdullah II. In this case, functional actors consist of the government officials of Jordan and emergency actions are Jordanian recalling its Ambassador to Israel in 2019 and reclaiming border lands, Baqura and Al Ghamr in 2019 for the first time after the peace with Israel in 1994. This case demonstrates that taking the emergency actions proves the success of completing securitization moves by Jordan, however, the securitization of Israel still in question because it lasts till today, and Jordan has faced new kind of threat from Israel as days pass. Hence, it is difficult to assert the complete success of Jordan's securitization of Israel today in political sector.

The nature of threats and vulnerabilities as a condition that concentrate Jordan to take precautions for its security and stability in political sector. Regarding the threat of Israel, securitization move starts however, Israeli issue is more complicated because the threat of Israel has been confronted in a different way in Jordan, that is, Israeli threat renews itself in diverse forms such as US decision of moving its embassy of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and recognizing Israel's capital as Jerusalem, and US& Israel plan on "the Deal of the Century" pose an unpredictable existential threat to Jordan both internally and externally. As a result, Jordan is more prone to securitize Israel in political sector. Additionally, the regionalizing dynamics of Jordan have a crucial effect on shaping Jordan's securitization. In the securitization of Israel, Jordan's both regional and global allies stand in the opposite direction of Jordan (that means their position on Israeli side) and they force Jordan to change its stance toward Israel. This causes a huge dilemma for Jordan in terms of its political and economic conditions with its internal and external challenges on the same issue.

Last but not the least, the reason why Jordan needs securitization in political sector is primarily its internal concern of regime legitimacy because of its weak institutions and governing system, that is why, the high portion of Palestinian population poses threat for Jordan's regime and ruling family and thus, Jordan tries to limit and prevent this condition. On the other hand, Jordan needs securitization because of its open wound, the existence of Israel, despite the external pressures to Jordan from its allies, the Jordanian history (Hashemite Custodianship) and its demographic structure (Palestinian origin population comprise nearly the half of the Jordanian total population) also drives Jordan to posit as a defender of Palestinians and their occupied territories. As a conclusion, the political security of Jordan can be regarded as relatively fragile and this situation encourages Jordan to securitize its threats in order to preserve internal and external security and stability.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC SECURITY OF HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

6.1. Introduction

This chapter is about the economic security of Jordan and aims to analyze how Jordan reacts in facing its heavy economic crisis since 2008³⁷³. When looking at Jordanian current security challenges, it can be noticed that the most of the concerns on security is about economic problems. From this perspective, this chapter firstly examines the economic security under the Copenhagen School securitization theory and then it evaluates the current economic position of Jordan. Following the general view, chapter continues with determining the economic threats and the analysis of the securitization by Jordan in terms of economic sector. The nature of threats and vulnerabilities including regionalizing dynamics are also mentioned in this chapter in order to comprehend Jordan's economic security, stability and its securitization cases better. Hence, chapter contains two cases which are securitization of Syrian refugees and securitization of corruption, on the economic security of Jordan. Chapter focuses on the reign of King Abdullah II and aforementioned cases have crucial significance in the agenda of Jordanian economic security.

6.2. Jordanian Securitization in Economic Sector

Economic security is defined as a very controversial and politicized concept since identification of the economic threats is highly difficult.³⁷⁴ Briefly, economic security

³⁷³ Mohammad Ahid and Ayuba Augustine, "The Impact of Global Financial Crisis in Jordan," *International Journal of Business and Management* 7, no. 16 (2012): 80.

³⁷⁴ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 95.

is about “access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power”³⁷⁵ and it can work with political and military spheres in regard of the national security issues³⁷⁶. In this sector, the central focus is changing based on the actors (having mercantilist/neo-mercantilist, liberal, socialist view), for example, while mercantilists/neo-mercantilists prioritize politics, liberals perceive economy as the first, and these actors define economic security in a different way.³⁷⁷ In the securitization analysis, various cases and states prove that economic security can go in different directions and therefore, the object of securitization can show an alteration by securitizing discourse and the referent objects in economic sector, and referent objects are classified into three levels; unit level, subsystem level, and system level.³⁷⁸ Regarding these all three levels, referent object can be sometimes individuals, classes, firms, states or international economy-Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO).³⁷⁹ Thesis mainly focuses on the unit level referent object, that is state (focused as the main referent object with LIEO)³⁸⁰ and this means any threat on national economy and welfare of its society can be securitized in this analysis.

Considering the economic security of Jordan, its current economic situation it should firstly be understood. Jordanian economy is small, resource limited, service sector based (not industrial)³⁸¹ and dependent foreign aid from West (especially US) and the Gulf countries within the region³⁸². Its economy mostly hinges upon the tourism, export of phosphates and potash, and agriculture (very limited again because of the

³⁷⁵ Buzan, *Peoples*, 19.

³⁷⁶ Koch and Stivachtis, *Regional Security*, 5.

³⁷⁷ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 95.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 96-103.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 100.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 101.

³⁸¹ Harun Öztürk, “Ürdün Ekonomisinin Genel Özellikleri,” *Ortadoğu Analiz* 4, no. 46 (2012): 74.

³⁸² Terril, *Global Security*, 35.

limited water resources).³⁸³ Especially after the global economic crisis in 2008, Jordanian economy was affected badly, and it has faced serious economic problems such as high level of unemployment, poverty, and budget deficit.³⁸⁴ These problems have been deteriorated by the overpopulation³⁸⁵ (influx of Syrian refugees specifically) and corruption problem³⁸⁶ that directly threaten the welfare of the national economy of Jordan, welfare of its society. From this point of view, this chapter focuses on analyzing two cases of securitization regarding Jordanian economic security and the first one is the securitization of Syrian refugees, and the second case is the securitization of corruption in Jordan.

6.2.1. Referent Objects and Securitizing Actors

In economic sector, referent objects are rich in sources and it is ranging from individuals to states, from classes to the system of global market, and at the unit level, the state is the most significant referent object in economic security.³⁸⁷ Regarding the state as a referent object, the state interests and its national economy have a primary right to claim of survival such as in the existence of threat which can be a national bankruptcy or being not able to meet its population needs or the worst-case scenario, war.³⁸⁸ In the case of Syrian refugees, the referent object is the national economy of Jordan which is directly threatened by the influx of refugees from Syria, and Jordanian state cannot maintain its economic stability in the face the threat of overpopulation especially after the beginning of Syrian civil war in 2011 to today. The securitization of corruption case has also the same referent object- Jordanian national economy because the presence of corruption at a high level in Jordan deteriorates the current

³⁸³ Terril, *Global Security*, 34.

³⁸⁴ Öztürk, “Ürdün Ekonomisinin Genel Özellikleri”, 74.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Terril, *Global Security*, 36.

³⁸⁷ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 100-101.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 22.

economic problems and it is agreed that corruption is an existential threat to the survival of strong national economy of Jordan.

Analyzing the securitizing actors, they can also be at all levels in economic sector, and state representatives are the main securitizing actors in economic securitization.³⁸⁹ From this point, both in the case on the securitization of Syrian refugees and corruption in Jordan, securitizing actor is King Abdullah II and he directly securitizes these two threats as an existential threat to Jordanian national economy. Apart from the King, his son crown prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II and his government officials are also classified as functional actors who have a direct impact on the securitization process but they are not the initiators of this securitization moves. That is why, while King Abdullah II is a securitizing actor both in the issue of Syrian refugees and corruption, the crown prince and government officials of Jordan are identified as functional actors who have a strong support to the securitizing actor and crucial impact on the securitization process.

Table 3: Illustration of Referent Objects, Securitizing Actors, and Functional Actors in the Economic Sector

Referent Objects	Securitizing Actors	Functional Actors
The welfare national economy of Jordan	King Abdullah II	Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II Government officials

Source: Author's own Assessment of the Literature

³⁸⁹ Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*, 103.

6.3. The Analysis of Jordanian Securitization in the Economic Sector

Securitization analysis in economic sector based upon the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, primarily follows two cases which are securitized by King Abdullah II in the current economic circumstances of Jordan. These cases are firstly the securitization of influx of Syrian refugees and the high rates of corruption in Jordanian economic security. While King Abdullah II securitizes these threats by his given speeches and statements, his son Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II and his government also supports him in this process and takes more attention on the severity of these threats. On this analysis, this part also shows the significance of these securitization cases on the economic security and stability of Jordan and it analyzes the process of these cases from the beginning to the end, and their success by referencing to the emergency actions against these threats.

6.3.1. Securitization of Syrian Refugees

Influx of Syrian refugees since the beginning of Syrian civil war in 2011 to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has deteriorated the existing economic problems (especially after 2008 Global Economic Crisis) of Jordan.³⁹⁰ Syrian refugees are not just outrunning from the fear of death, they are also taking refuge in Jordan for their future (stable and secure life in all sectors), however, including unemployment, extensive inequality and corruption in Jordanian economy, and Jordanians suffer from these realities, Syrian refugee influx has worsened these economic vulnerabilities in Jordan.³⁹¹ Looking back to the refugee flow from Syria to Jordan from 2011 in general, the crisis of refugees has broken out from the early months in 2012, and from 2018's data on the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are approximately 670,000 registered Syrians living in Jordan and the estimated total number of Syrian refugees

³⁹⁰ Alexandra Francis, *Jordan's Refugee Crisis* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2015), 11.

³⁹¹ Eran and Grove, "Threats to Stability in Jordan", 63.

in Jordan are 1.265 million in 2015.³⁹² Regarding these data on the influx of Syrian refugees, Jordanian population growth between 2012 and 2016 is 32 per cent.³⁹³ This can be counted as a heavy burden on Jordan especially in the economic sector, and thus, Syrian refugees represent an existential threat to Jordanian economy.

Syrian civil war by itself and unstable situation of Iraq have affected Jordan by collapsing its trade route (now only the Aqaba port city has served as Jordanian trade route), and this burden has deeply impacted the national economy of Jordan.³⁹⁴ Under these circumstances, Jordan as a main host country has a high number of Syrian refugees, reaching the alarming number- nearly 1.2 million³⁹⁵ and the international financial assistance cannot meet the needs of its people, it is not enough for economic recovery³⁹⁶ drive Jordan to do securitization of Syrian refugees within the economic sector. In 2014, King Abdullah II gave an interview, and securitized Syrian refugees by saying that “in the increasing waves of refugees, which create unprecedented financial pressures, depleting infrastructure and basic services offered to Jordanians, with the international community failing to keep up with the rapid ramifications of increased influx”.³⁹⁷

In addition to this speech, King Abdullah II also emphasizes that Syrian refugee crisis cannot be sustainable for Jordanian economy and he continues by saying;

³⁹² Salem Ajluni, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Jordanian Labour Market* (Amman: WANA Institute, 2019), 2.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ James Arnold and Christopher N. Cox, “Unchecked Corruption Puts Jordan and Middle East, at Risk,” *The Hill*, January 3, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/431490-unchecked-corruption-puts-jordan-and-middle-east-at-risk>.

³⁹⁵ Alshoubaki and Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees”, 154.

³⁹⁶ Ala’ Alrababa and Scott Williamson, “Jordan shut out 60,000 Syrian refugees - and then saw a backlash. This is why,” *Washington Post*, July 20, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/20/when-jordan-closed-its-border-to-refugees-the-public-protested-heres-why/>.

³⁹⁷ King Abdullah II, *Interview by Jumana Ghneimet*.

Jordan is shouldering a huge burden, with mounting pressure on infrastructure and natural resources, especially water and energy and, more importantly, the shocks caused by the refugee influx to the national economy, including distortions in the labor market, where the refugees are competing for jobs with Jordanians, not to mention the impact on education and healthcare.³⁹⁸

From this statement, King Abdullah II briefly securitizes Syrian refugee crisis as a threat to the stability of Jordanian national economy, and he emphasizes his country's limited resources and problem of unemployment. On this securitization process, his son crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II also highlights Jordan's economic weaknesses on the issue of Syrian refugees; "The direct cost of the Syria crisis now consumes more than a quarter of our budget... Housing, food, energy, healthcare, education, jobs: all are under pressure".³⁹⁹

Furthermore, King Abdullah II mentions the impact of Syrian refugees (according to him, they consist 20 per cent of the Jordanian population⁴⁰⁰) on Jordanian economy that their costs is 25 per cent of the national budget.⁴⁰¹ In the same speech, King Abdullah II also expresses his concern on his country's economic security and stability that "...we understand this is a Syrian refugee issue, but if you don't mention the future of the Jordanians, then we are failing ourselves at the London conference".⁴⁰² On this point, King Abdullah II securitizes Syrian refugees on the basis of prioritizing and preserving economic stability and Jordan's future. In his mentioned conference, he

³⁹⁸ King Abdullah II, "Interview with his Majesty King Abdullah II," interview by Adel Tarifi. *Asharq Al Awsat*, June 26, 2013.

³⁹⁹ "Remarks by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II at the 72th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *General Assembly Debates*, September 21, 2017, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/jo_en.pdf.

⁴⁰⁰ King Abdullah II, "Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II," interview by Mikhail Gusman. *ITAR TASS News Agency*, February 13, 2018.

⁴⁰¹ King Abdullah II, "Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II," interview by Lyse Doucet. *BBC*, February 2, 2016.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*

also strengthened his arguments by giving an example which aims to demonstrate how difficult situation Jordan posits in;

It is as if the UK had to absorb the entire population of Belgium.... The US and EU, whose combined economies are almost a thousand times bigger than Jordan's, are struggling to handle about one million refugees: our small country, alone, has taken in almost 1.3 million already.⁴⁰³

Taking into consideration of this securitizing move, because Jordan has faced heavy economic crisis, the influx of Syrian refugees deteriorates this economic burden and poses a threat to its economic security and stability of Jordan. The reason why, King Abdullah II (as a securitizing actor) needs to securitize this threat and he believes that despite Jordan's efforts to host Syrians, the national economy and the future of Jordanians are under threat. Something must be done to prevent this security issue. On this case, functional actor is the crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II because he moves this threat to another channel in order to draw attention on the economic threat of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Therefore, in analyzing this securitization move, the last step is examining its success or not. Jordan has taken emergency actions against the influx of Syrian refugees such as limiting health services of Syrian Refugees⁴⁰⁴, deporting 2,361 refugees including children⁴⁰⁵, and restricting and shutting down borders to pass Syrian refugees from 2015 to today.⁴⁰⁶ On the issue of shutting down Jordanian borders, government spokesperson Jumana Ghneimat states that

⁴⁰³ "Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II during the "Supporting Syria and the Region Conference," *King Abdullah II*, February 4, 2016, <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/during-%E2%80%9Csupporting-syria-and-region-conference%E2%80%9D>.

⁴⁰⁴ "Jordan: Syrian refugees blocked from accessing critical health services," *Amnesty International*, March 23, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/jordan-syrian-refugees-blocked-from-accessing-critical-health-services/>.

⁴⁰⁵ Jordan INGO Forum, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Protection Overview* (Amman: Jordan INGO Forum, 2018).

⁴⁰⁶ UNHCR, *Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Jordan* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2018), 1.

Jordan has dealt with seven years of refugees and we've always supported Syrians, which has cost us a lot...But, we currently don't have the capacity for it...It is better for Syrians to stay in their homes while we try to provide them with aid they need.⁴⁰⁷

Considering this claim and the other emergency actions that have been taken by Jordan, it can be said that the securitization of Syrian refugees has reached success, and Jordan has taken precautions for preserving its national economy and stability. It should be noted that although Jordan cannot cope with this vulnerability completely regarding its economic security, this securitization proves that Syrian refugees are identified as a security issue and with the success of securitization move, taken emergency actions aim to minimize its effects on Jordanian national security.

6.3.2. *Securitization of Corruption*

With regard to mentioned economic burdens in Jordan such as unemployment, poverty, limited resources of citizens, Syrian crisis and so on, economic securitization is more likely to become an issue in its security agenda. Apart from the existence of Syrian refugees as a threat, corruption is another popular case on economic security in Jordan. In 2018, while unemployment preserves its high rate- 18 per cent and debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 95 per cent, the government decided to increase taxes from 3 to 10 per cent⁴⁰⁸ led people to go out and protest tax changes, economic crisis (deteriorating living conditions) and corruption in Jordan⁴⁰⁹. With these protests, the topic of corruption has gained importance and become a hot topic again. However, the high rate of corruption in Jordan exists even before these protests and the securitizing move against corruption began before 2018. The significance of these protests is that the emergency actions have been taken after the call to fight against corruption which

⁴⁰⁷ Arwa Ibrahim, "Syria's War: Why Jordan Keeps its Borders Shut to Deraa Refugees," *Al-Jazeera*, July 7, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/syria-war-jordan-borders-shut-deraa-refugees-180707110721627.html>.

⁴⁰⁸ Arnold and Cox, "Unchecked Corruption Puts Jordan".

⁴⁰⁹ Ryan, "Jordanians worry that the 'deal of the century'".

causes deteriorating economic conditions for Jordanians⁴¹⁰. In regard to researcher's field interview 14, interviewee stresses the reality of poverty in Jordan and she states a huge gap between rich and poor that is all related to corruption in the country.⁴¹¹

Before analyzing the securitization of corruption, the meaning/ what refers corruption should be understood in Jordan. Although the corruption index 2018 shows that Jordanian corruption is not that bad (rank is out of 180 countries, Jordan: 58, and score is 49/100- 0 is highly corrupt, 100 is very clean)⁴¹², it is securitized and emergency actions have been taken in order to preserve Jordanian economic security. The Arabic word, *Wasta* is referring to corruption in Jordan and means that a system among 'middlemen' that is seen as very common in the country including doing business, blocking competitiveness, and making non-transparent work.⁴¹³ In other words, *Wasta* is referring to the pulling strings and it is about not exchange of money but of favors.⁴¹⁴ *Wasta* prevents the equality (in terms of unequal treatment and access) of citizens and regarded as corruption when it reaches excessive and unfair favoritism.⁴¹⁵ This version of corruption in Jordan is highly popular especially among politicians and they are very busy with generating and disturbing these favors under the name of *Wasta*.⁴¹⁶ This type of corruption poses a further threat to Jordanian deteriorated economy and securitization becomes unavoidable.

⁴¹⁰ Shehab Al Makahleh, "Jordan between Regional Threats and International Pressures: The Economic Key," *Washington Institute*, April 11, 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/jordan-between-regional-threats-and-internal-pressures-the-economic-key>.

⁴¹¹ Interview with Interviewee 14, January 20, 2019.

⁴¹² "Jordan," *Transparency International*, 2018, <https://www.transparency.org/country/JOR#>.

⁴¹³ Hani Hazaimah, "Jordan seeks to break backbone of corruption," *Arab News*, August 14, 2018, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1355991/middle-east>.

⁴¹⁴ David Jackson, Sarah Tobin, and Jennifer Philippa Eggert, "Capacity Building for Politicians in Contexts of Systemic Corruption: Countering 'Wasta' in Jordan," *CMI* 9 (2019): 3.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

In 2017, King Abdullah II gives an interview on corruption and he states that

I would like to stress that combating corruption requires the cooperation of all state institutions and components, and- most importantly- citizens themselves. *Wasta*, in particular, cannot be rooted out without first being categorically rejected and spurned by citizens.⁴¹⁷

In this speech, he emphasizes that the *Wasta* refers to corruption and every Jordanian should fight against this reality because powerful individuals/citizens (who have strong network with politicians in Jordan) apply it frequently. By this way, King Abdullah II also underlines the threat of corruption that “we are diligently to curb corruption...”⁴¹⁸, “We again need to fight corruption...”⁴¹⁹. Moreover, King Abdullah II also urges his government and he declares that; “we want to break the back of corruption.”⁴²⁰

King Abdullah II’s waging war on corruption, former Jordanian diplomat Fouad al-Batayneh supports the position of his King and determined that Jordan is facing the threat of economic collapse because of the rampant corruption system.⁴²¹ Even if the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ was established in 2006 and renewed under the name of ‘Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission’ in 2016⁴²² in order to fight corruption, government needed to pass new anti-corruption law (2019) to prevent threat effectively. This new law has aimed to protect and improve economy of Jordan and

⁴¹⁷ King Abdullah II, “Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II,” interview by Faisal Shboul. *Jordan News Agency (Petra)*, September 13, 2017.

⁴¹⁸ King Abdullah II, *Interview with Ghassan Sharbel*.

⁴¹⁹ King Abdullah II, “Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II,” interview by Jay Solomon. *The Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 2011.

⁴²⁰ “Jordan Authorities Arrest Former Minister in Corruption Case,” *The National*, January 24, 2019, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/jordan-authorities-arrest-former-minister-in-corruption-case-1.817254>.

⁴²¹ Ali Younes, “Jordan: Anti-Corruption Law praised but Questions Remain,” *Al-Jazeera*, September 5, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/jordan-anti-corruption-law-praised-questions-remain-190905171205639.html>.

⁴²² Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission of Jordan, “About Us,” n.d., <http://www.jiacc.gov.jo/en/content/1/about-us>.

according Article 44 decision, it “bans ministers, officials, and parliamentarians with business from involvement in government contracts while in office”.⁴²³ In accordance with issuing this law, the president of Jordan’s 65-member Senate emphasizes its importance by saying; “this law reinforces the independence and neutrality of the cabinet and parliament members in the eyes of the public”.⁴²⁴ Considering this statement, King Abdullah II’s securitizing move is supported by his officials and the crucial step of securitizing move by their speeches has been done.

Including statements and speeches of King Abdullah II and his officials against the economic threat of widespread corruption in Jordan and considering their precautions by anti-corruption law, it is still hard to assert this securitizing move is successful. Therefore, by examining this move, arresting high profile politicians including the former Water and Irrigation Minister and former Director of Customs and charging them to illegal tobacco production, bribery, and smuggling⁴²⁵ and this scandal is called as “highest-profile corruption arrests”⁴²⁶ which Jordan has taken emergency action and this is necessary to reach success of the securitization move of corruption. In this securitization, securitizing actor is King Abdullah II and functional actors are his government officials including a former diplomat, president of 65-member senate. As a result, the securitization of corruption for stabilizing national economy of Jordan has been succeeded by taking emergency actions and while some politicians- as functional actors against corruption, the target is also the same group.

⁴²³ Younes, “Jordan: Anti-Corruption Law”, 2019.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ “Top Jordanian politicians arrested on corruption charges,” *AP News*, January 23, 2019, <https://apnews.com/f5d566479574431daa3e3a59c1144cd2>.

⁴²⁶ “Jordan Authorities Arrest Former Minister in Corruption Case.”

6.4. The Nature of Threats and Vulnerabilities in Economic Security of Jordan

In 2019, Omar Razzaz, the Prime Minister of Jordan stated the biggest security threat of Jordan is economic and he asserted that even if regional crises and security threats have been defeated in both political and social sense, they have affected the direction of economic security and stability which is very negative in terms of economic growth, employment, and standards of living.⁴²⁷ From the point of Jordanian Prime Minister, before examining the threats to economic security, general information on Jordan should be given which directly affects the economic stability as well. Jordan is characterized as a ‘lower middle-income country’ and its total population is 9.5 million, and from this 9.5 million, non-citizens comprise of 2.9 million and these are mostly refugees.⁴²⁸ Moreover, Jordan is regarded as resource-poor, water and food deficit country with limited cultivable land, water resources and energy resources, and thus, more than 14 per cent of Jordanian population lives under poverty line which proves that Jordan is a poor country.⁴²⁹ In addition to difficult economic circumstances, Syrian refugee influx and the high corruption rate deteriorate existing economic conditions, that is, they do not lead non-existed unemployment issue, at first time, and they exacerbate preexisting ones.⁴³⁰

Regarding the flow of Syrian refugees and facing high rate of corruption/*Wasta* in Jordan, therefore, there are two main points (central threats) that help on initiating existential threats for Jordanian self-contained economic system⁴³¹ and accordingly

⁴²⁷ “Jordan Maintained Stability throughout Crises, but Economy Took Hit- Razzaz,” *Jordan Times*, January 24, 2019, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-maintained-stability-throughout-crises-economy-took-hit-%E2%80%94-razzaz>.

⁴²⁸ World Food Programme, “WFP Jordan Country Brief, May 2018,” May 31, 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/wfp-jordan-country-brief-may-2018>.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Francis, *Jordan’s Refugee Crisis*.

⁴³¹ Buzan, Waever and Wilde, *Security*, 105.

they are securitized. The first one is poverty; Jordan has faced threat of poverty for many years and in 2019, Jordanian government announced that the current national poverty rate is 15.7 per cent (15% of the Jordanian population lives under poverty line)⁴³². Here, poverty is originally meaning that the inability to have/gain minimum required and desired living standard which comprises low consumption of food, water, limited benefitting from services such as health, education, housing, and living under insecure conditions such as unemployment, handicap, serious illnesses, disasters/crises and so on.⁴³³ The reality of poverty in Jordan, accordingly opens the new door; the second; unemployment. Unemployment is crucial threat to Jordanian economic security and at the end of 2019, the unemployment rate of Jordan is 19.10 per cent⁴³⁴ while in 2018, it was 18.7 per cent⁴³⁵ and it should be noted that among unemployed citizens, they are mostly either young or female⁴³⁶, and the highest group is the holders of bachelor's degrees or higher qualification⁴³⁷. Thus, the unemployment rate is considered as very high especially among young population, and it poses great threat to the development of Jordanian economy.

Taking into account of the influx of Syrian refugees in regard to the economy of Jordan, it can be analyzed that they have a direct influence on labor force because there is already a scarcity of job opportunities and refugees are joining informal work networks like farming, and construction (with a lower wages in comparison to

⁴³² Matthew Wai-Poi, *Poverty & Equity Brief: Jordan* (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2019).

⁴³³ Maha Dawas, "Poverty in Jordan," *SSRN Electronic Journal* (2017): 1.

⁴³⁴ CEIC, "Jordan Unemployment Rate: 2000-2019 Quarterly," *Department of Statistics*, December 5, 2019, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/jordan/unemployment-rate>.

⁴³⁵ World Bank, "Jordan Overview," *The World Bank*, October 1, 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview#1>.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ "Unemployment Continues to Rise in 2019, Hitting 19%," *Jordan Times*, June 4, 2019, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unemployment-continues-rise-2019-hitting-19>.

Jordanians⁴³⁸)⁴³⁹ and Jordan is not able to control food, housing prices and subsidies and the economy Jordan is also in under pressure to provide public services especially for education and health⁴⁴⁰. In addition to poverty and unemployment, in 2018, government's tax reform because of the hikes in fuel and electricity, limiting subsidies, was announced and led people to go out and protest this reform and government.⁴⁴¹ These protests had reached masses in Jordan and the demand was not only abandonment of price increases and tax reform, high rate of corruption was also the agenda of the protestors.⁴⁴² The outcome of these protests was to backing away of the government and the corruption issue has been taken as urgent to convince the citizens. As a result, Jordan has securitized Syrian refugees and corruption that have a direct and crucial impact on existing economic problems in order to preserve the national economy from further bad effects.

6.4.1. Regionalizing Dynamics

Regionalizing dynamics is very significant on evaluating threats and securitization of Syrian refugees. From this perspective, the crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II underlines the regional impact on Jordanian national economy by saying

We are currently bordered by a number of conflicts... All this has affected us in very real and felt ways. Our largest market, Iraq, was completely shut off. Trade with Syria came to halt, and we lost critical trade routes from Europe and Turkey. Despite our best efforts, regional instability has undermined tourism and investment.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ Ajluni, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis*.

⁴³⁹ Associated Press, "Jordan instability fears as growth slows, unemployment rises," *Fox News*, August 14, 2016, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/jordan-instability-fears-as-growth-slows-unemployment-rises>.

⁴⁴⁰ Alshoubaki and Harris, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan", 159.

⁴⁴¹ Ronja Schiffer, *Protest as the Last Straw - A Report on Jordan's Tax Reform in 2018* (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2018).

⁴⁴² Ryan, "Jordanians worry that the 'deal of the century'".

⁴⁴³ "Remarks by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II".

Regarding crown prince's concerns, the regional impact on economy can be said is very critical in Jordan. The regional instability has directly influenced the national economy and the securitized threat, Syrian refugees thus, has been rooted in breaking out of the Syrian civil war in 2011.⁴⁴⁴ This kind of instability poses a threat to economic security in Jordan especially in terms of its economic growth, increasing military expenditure as vital for survival, increasing unemployment, and intensifying the budget deficit.⁴⁴⁵ As a consequence, strong regional dependence in the form of instability means that being not able to meet basic needs of its citizens and a security issue on the survival of national economy legitimizes Jordan to securitize itself in order to minimize the effects of regional threats in its economy.

6.5. Conclusion

As a result of this chapter, within the analysis of economic sector under the Copenhagen School securitization theory, the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan proves that the ongoing economic problems in domestic, regional and global level have compelled Jordan to apply securitization in order to secure its national economy. From this perspective, Jordan is small, independent and resource poor country and its fragile economy can be directly affected from any threats unlike its military and political sectors. That is why, after the global economic crisis in 2008 and the regional turmoil since Arab Spring, 2011, Jordan has faced existential threats to its self-contained economic system⁴⁴⁶. These threats can be varied within the very problematic economy of Jordan, however, under the securitization theory, the most popular ones have been brought forward by the speech acts and identified as a security issue that emergency actions should be taken for the economic security of Jordan.

⁴⁴⁴ Alshoubaki and Harris, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan", 154.

⁴⁴⁵ Sakher Moh'd Nour Al Shriedeh, "The Impact of Regional Instability on Jordan's Economy," *Jordan Times*, April 9, 2019, <https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/sakher-mohd-nour-al-shriedeh/impact-regional-instability-jordans-economy>.

⁴⁴⁶ Buzan, Waever and Wilde, *Security*, 105.

These are firstly the influx of Syrian refugees after the breaking out of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and the other issue is the high level of corruption/ *Wasta* within the economy of Jordan. These two cases are securitized by King Abdullah II with his speech acts from his speeches and interviews which are open to the public.

Within the analysis of two securitization cases, the common referent object is the national economy of Jordan and both of these threats are accepted as existential to Jordanian national economy. When looking deeply to the first case, Syrian refugees, it has a direct impact on deteriorating existing problems of Jordanian economy such as poverty, unemployment, and limited resources. That is why, even if this issue represents the human duty for all states, Jordan has no other choice to securitize refugees in order to guarantee its national economic welfare and security accordingly. In this securitization, King Abdullah II as the only securitizing actor uses some words ‘burden’, ‘Jordan’s future’, ‘economic stability’ which are the key words of securitization move in economic sector of Jordan. While King Abdullah II securitizes this issue, his son the Crown Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II supports his father’s reasons on this refugee problem and is regarded as functional actor in this securitization process. In evaluating the success of this process, emergency actions; shutting down the borders, limiting healthcare services, and deporting issue of Syrian refugees demonstrate that Jordan tries to secure its economy by minimizing the effects of Syrian refugees. An interview which is done by researcher in Jordan- the interviewee 4 perceives Syrian refugees as a burden on Jordanian economy by saying “they drove prices drastically... Jordanians now cannot afford to have rent apartments. Rent prices went up. And our city has become more expensive than the past.”⁴⁴⁷ Here, it should be indicated that Jordan has tried its best by opening borders and giving secure environment to refugees, however, because of its own national security and

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Interviewee 4, January 19, 2019.

welfare of its own people in economic sector, refugee issue poses alarming challenges, its securitization has become unavoidable.

Another popular issue, corruption is also taken as the case of securitization in economic sector. Despite the presence of war on corruption from the beginning of the 2000s, the success of securitization move is very current. After the protests against the tax reform and increasing prices in 2018, under the deteriorating economic conditions, the demand of ending corruption/ *Wasta* has been clearly put into words by Jordanians. Following this event, the King Abdullah II has continued to securitize the threat of corruption by emphasizing ‘rampant corruption’, ‘fight corruption’, ‘curb corruption’, and thus, anti-corruption law was issued by aiming to prevent *Wasta* (middlemen) especially among politicians and officials in Jordan. In this securitization process, the securitizing actor is King Abdullah II and functional actors are the government officials of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 2019, arresting senior officials including former minister because of a corruption scandal is also perceived as emergency actions against corruption and with this move, the securitization process is accepted as successful in order to control the welfare of Jordanian economy. As a last point on the securitization of corruption, this issue is still on the agenda of economic sector, and like in Syrian refugee case, it is very current as a threat to Jordanian national security.

Considering the regional dynamics in economic sector, the mentioned global and regional instability led Jordan to suffer from more economic problems. In other words, after global economic crisis in 2008 and regional turmoil especially after the Syrian civil war in 2011, because of the dependence and geographical conditions, Jordan has faced crucial economic instability and more economic burdens. This regional reality has caused poverty and unemployment issues to become points of economic vulnerability of Jordan. Thus, with the rising unemployment and poverty, it can be seen as factors that are facilitating conditions on securitization in economic sector. These conditions (most important economic problems) have a crucial role in initiating

securitizing move in economic sector and consequently, Syrian refugees and the issue of corruption/*Wasta* have been securitized in order to secure the national economy of Jordan. When considering researcher's interviews with Jordanians, with regard to the impact of regional dynamics on the economic security of Jordan, interviewee 2 emphasizes that because of the crises in Syria and Iraq, Jordanian economy has been deeply affected and he says that Jordan is very poor in terms of water and energy (they are mostly imported) resources, poses a threat to the economic security.⁴⁴⁸

As a base of these interviews, on the question regarding the most significant vulnerable point for the security of Jordan, the most common answer is the economy and interviews 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 assert that the actual security problem is rooted in economic vulnerabilities of Jordan.⁴⁴⁹ From these interviews, the issues of poverty, low wages with rising prices, corruption, unemployment, and huge gap between rich and poor pose real threat to the economic security.⁴⁵⁰ Taking into consideration of these vulnerable points, regional turmoil, and Jordan's small and limited economic power, the rising threats of Syrian refugees and corruption issue have been securitized in order to preserve the national economy and welfare of Jordan. It should be emphasized that these securitization cases are considered as exacerbating threats on pre-existing problems (poverty, unemployment, limited public services, and so on.) and that is why, they are securitized to minimize the impacts of these existing challenges to Jordanian national economy. To conclude, overpopulation by Syrian refugees and the corruption issue are the deteriorating threats to the existing and rampant economic problems and these are consequently regarded as existential threats to the national economy of Jordan which is securitized under the securitization theory within economic sector.

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Interviewee 2, January 20, 2019.

⁴⁴⁹ General assessment based on interviews about the security of Jordan.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Interviewee 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 16, January 18 to 28, 2019.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is perceived as a safe zone in the most ‘war prone region’⁴⁵¹ in the world, i.e. the Middle East. The security of Jordan is a significant issue in the Middle East because being safe in an insecure region comes at a price. In other words, while Jordan tries to preserve its security and stability, it faces extra challenges and threats to its security. Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syrian refugee crisis, terrorism, and chaos in Iraq are some instances of threats to the security of Jordan. At the same time, Jordan’s security is also rooted in regional or domestic turmoil, which has a huge impact on shaping new security dilemmas such as a military security issue that may also affect Jordan’s economic security dynamics. The Levant region is rife with examples of such multidimensional security dilemmas.

Taking into consideration the insecure atmosphere and chaos in the Middle East and its sub-region of Levant, this research seeks to study one of the lesser studied countries in the region. Security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not been studied thoroughly in comparison to other countries in the region such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. To make up for this lack of attention, this thesis evaluated the security dynamics of Jordan by not just analyzing its military, but also focusing on political and economic dynamics that can impact the security of Jordan. In Jordan, external threats are compounded by internal threats and new challenges stemming from regional politics affect the security and stability of the country. Regardless of regional crises in Levant and the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continues to

⁴⁵¹ Tibi, *Conflict and War*, 6.

maintain a semblance of security and stability, which is why it is worth analyzing the security dynamics of Jordan.

From the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, the field of security studies was dominated by a realist approach based on a traditionalist military-centric view of security. However, after the Cold War the changing dynamics of the world order led the field of security studies towards broadening the scope of analysis to non-military sectors. In the post-bipolar world order, a modern perspective to security studies emerged that replaced the traditional military-centric consensus with a multilateral approach to studying security using political, societal, economic, and environmental dimensions within the security analysis. This change in approach was championed by the constructivist school of thought. In 1990s, the Copenhagen School security studies was established by Barry Buzan, that focused on a multilayered study of security. Even as this approach was intended to be applied to the European security structure, it has been applied to many other regions including Middle East⁴⁵². Copenhagen School imagines five distinctive but overlapping security sectors: military, political, environmental, economic, and societal. It also developed the regional complex theory, and most importantly the securitization theory.

In securitization theory, the significant point is not to analyze the security issues, rather to evaluate and examine how issues are securitized by actors. Speech acts are evaluated to determine which issue is classified as a security issue. This makes securitization an intersubjective process because, on one hand, cases are established as security issues by an actor. On the other hand, such cases can only be accepted and legitimized by the target audience. After issues are determined as security threats, emergency measures are taken in order to prevent and/or minimize them for the sake of a group, nation or state. The efforts following the securitization of an issue often

⁴⁵² Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

involves actors to abandon routine processes and come up with problems immediately, often in the form of extraordinary measures that seek to prioritize response to an existential threat. Hence, securitization is perceived as an extreme version of politicization. For Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, securitization is not a positive act because extreme politicization of an issue and emergency measures that grants actors with limitless power are not ideal for states and groups in the modern world order. This is why, desecuritization is also a part of their theoretical framework – referring to the attempts at reversing securitized issues back to normal political issues. As a result, securitization analysis refers to the examination of how an issue is established as a security problem. Within this context, securitization theory was used as the central theoretical framework for this thesis.

In the literature, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not been evaluated using this perspective in the past. Therefore, this thesis intended to apply this theory to analyze Jordanian security in military, political, and economic contexts. Using the securitization theory, it was relatively less complicated to analyze the security dynamics and examine Jordan's internal and regional security circumstances. Therefore, the objective of the study was to contribute to the literature on the issue of security analysis of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan using the lens of Copenhagen School securitization theory. In order to do so, this thesis sought to answer the question: "In response to changing nature of threats, what are the major securitization dynamics of Jordan?" In order to respond to this question, this research analyzed the securitization dynamics of Jordan for three security sectors (military, political, and economic) and regionalizing dynamics under the reign of King Hussein and King Abdullah II.

To summarize the findings of this research, three securitization cases were analyzed in context of the military sector, dating from the reign of King Hussein and his son King Abdullah II. In the first case of military securitization, the state of Israel was identified as an external threat during the reign of King Hussein (from the

establishment of Jordan till the Jordan-Israel peace treaty in 1994). In the second and third cases of military securitization, the rise of PLO in Jordan and Terrorism were identified as internal threats to Jordan's security. While the securitization of PLO began in the era of King Hussein (1960s to early 1970s), the securitization of terrorism took place during the reign of King Abdullah II (since the early 2000s). Each of these cases depict unique dynamics that represent different threats to Jordan's military security. While Israel presents an urgent and direct military threat to Jordan's territories, PLO is a threat to Jordan's sovereignty and the ruling regime of Jordan. At the same time, terrorism is a very distinctive threat to Jordan's sovereignty and regime security posed by Jihadists from extremist Salafist groups such as Al-Qaeda and DAESH. Yet, each of these cases threaten the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's military security, and that is why they have been securitized.

King Hussein, since the early years of his reign in 1950s, actively securitized Israel as a threat. Following the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel, Israeli establishment posed military threats to Jordan's territorial integrity including areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Thus, the securitization of Israel resulted in legitimizing emergency actions and military operations against Israel by the Jordan Arab Army (JAA) before the 'Six Days War' in 1967. However, it should be noted that even after the devastating 1967 war, King Hussein continued to securitize Israel by blaming Israel for occupying Jordanian territories and threatening Israel that Jordan would take back Israel's territories in response. At the same time, King Hussein realized that Israeli's military capabilities and organized forces are not to be underestimated because the Arabs could not afford to respond to Israel through military means. That is why, Jordan moved to change its strategy towards Israel and desecuritized it as a military threat. Desecuritization was the better choice for Jordan in order to preserve its territorial integrity and stability within the region. Jordan desecuritized relations with Israel into normal politics with the peace treaty in 1994. Although, ongoing disputes between two parties are still existent, Jordanian diplomacy towards Israel can has ensured Jordan's military security until today. As a result, it can be concluded that

the securitization of Israel by King Hussein after 1967 was not successful. As a consequence, the existential threat of Israel had to be desecuritized by Jordan in the following years.

In regards to the internal threat posed by PLO, Jordan securitized PLO and Palestinian fedayeen for a brief time period between the 1960s and 70s as a threat to Jordan's internal security. PLO became an internal threat for Jordan following the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the region after the First World War. Jordan terminated this threat by conducting a military campaign against PLO in September 1970 (what Palestinians call the 'Black September'). This military campaign was carried out even though Palestinians made up for nearly half of the Jordanian population. It was also undertaken after Jordan had clearly prioritized the issue of Palestine against Israel in the past. Yet, when it came to Jordan's security and stability, PLO's internal threat to Jordan's sovereignty and monarchy had to be adequately countered. Thus, the securitization of PLO was justified and successfully acted upon.

After the threat of PLO had wiped out from Jordan, and Jordan had guaranteed its own security, desecuritization of PLO emerged as the organic option. Hence, Jordan desecuritized PLO (from 1974 to 1985) by officially recognizing PLO as the legitimate organization representative of Palestinians and their resistance against Israel. This specific case proves that Jordanian sovereignty and security are the most significant priorities against any threats in military sector - even if this threat comes from Jordan's most vulnerable point i.e. the Palestinians issue.

The last case of the securitization in military sector is terrorism in Jordan. Salafist Jihadi groups have threatened Jordan because its modest ruling family, the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan. Jordan has suffered with terrorism by Al-Qaeda and DAESH since the early 2000s. This issue alarmed Jordan because of its threat to the regime and sovereignty of Jordan. Notably, the securitization of terrorism and terrorist groups was easily accepted by audiences within the country and outside of it. Jordan's securitization against terrorism has gained internal and external support and

emergency actions have been taken collectively (such as sharing intelligence with the US). Even if the securitization of terrorism is classified as internal military threat because of Salafist radical citizens within the territories of Jordan, it should also be noted that terrorism is rooted in regional turmoil - especially from the civil war in Syria and Iraq. This is why, this case can be evaluated as an internal military security problem which is rooted in the regional dynamics of the Middle East. Nevertheless, external (Israel) and internal (PLO and Terrorism) existential threats originated due to a vacuum in the region, which directly affects the security dynamics of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The second sector, political security of Jordan, is very significant for understanding Jordan's security and stability in modern times. This thesis tried to examine Jordan's security strategy in a changing political atmosphere after the Cold War in the Middle East. In order to do so, the political security of Jordan has experienced one legible threat i.e. Israel both internally and externally. More specifically, this threat is posed by Jordanian-Palestinians and Jordan's existing issue over the custodianship of East-Jerusalem.

The securitization of Israel in the political sector is completely different from military sector securitization. Israel's political threat to Jordan threatens its sovereignty and its recognition at domestic and regional levels. The sovereignty and recognition of Jordan's role as the custodian of Jerusalem is not recognized by Israel. This has resulted in growing tensions between Israel and Jordan, that has also isolated Jordan from its allies in the Middle East and the world. On a domestic level, Jordan's position on Israeli occupation has garnered criticism by its own citizens because nearly half of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin. This has created a need for Jordan to securitize Israel politically. It should be noted, that even as Jordan desecuritized Israel militarily, its political securitization of Israel has continued. For instance, as part of the political securitization process against Israeli threat and occupation, Jordan took emergency actions by reclaiming border lands from the peace treaty in 1994 and

recalling the Jordanian ambassador from Israel. However, it is hard to determine if these securitization moves were successful mainly because political conflicts between the two states continue to emerge even today. For instance, new threats and vulnerabilities such as moving US Embassy of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and ‘the Deal of the Century’ continues to dominate Jordan’s political sphere at present. As a result, it cannot be concluded whether Jordan’s political securitization of Israel was completely successful. In fact, the regional dynamics and Jordan’s isolation from its regional and international allies may cause Jordan’s ruling elite to change their position on Israel. Nevertheless, Jordan’s securitization of Israel in the political sector is essential given the fragile security of the country.

The last section of this research was on economic securitization. This sector is highly important for understanding the current economic vulnerabilities and threats faced by Jordan. As in the cases of military and political securitization, Jordan’s economic securitization is critical in determining Jordan’s security including threats, vulnerabilities, regional dynamics, and existing security vacuum. Economically, there are two important cases of securitization that took place in the reign of King Abdullah II. These cases are currently ongoing. The first case of securitization is the influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The second case is of high-level corruption/*Wasta* within the country. Although the common referent object is the same, i.e. the national economy of Jordan, the threat of Syrian refugees is regarded as a regional/external issue and corruption is referred to as an internal/domestic threat for the Jordanian economy. The economy of Jordan is already very fragile, especially since the global economic crisis of 2008. Jordan faces economic issues in the form of poverty, unemployment, and limited public services for citizens. Given this context, it is relatively easy for Jordanian elite to securitize economic threats.

The Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011. It has resulted in a large number of refugees pouring into Jordan. Regional dynamics are very influential in shaping this threat to the economy of Jordan. Syrian civil war has directly paved the way for newer threats

to emerge such as the overwhelming flow of refugees from Syria into Jordan. Syrian refugees in Jordan are evaluated within economic sector because they considered only as threats to the economic stability of Jordan, not military or political. The flow of Syrian refugees into Jordan exacerbated existing economic problems including, but not limited to poverty, unemployment, and limited resources and services since 2011. For this reason, Syrian refugees have been securitized by King Abdullah II in order to control and maintain his country's economic stability. The actions that Jordan has taken against this existential threat has limited further refugee flows into Jordan by ensuring that refugees do not cross borders, deporting some of them, and limiting health services for Syrians in order to ensure the stability of the economy of Jordan. It should be noted that hosting refugees is a humanitarian duty. Jordan believes that humanitarian duties are performed to the best of its capabilities. However, when the national economy of Jordan and welfare of its citizens is under threat, certain precautions (such as securitization) need to be taken and the issue is no longer just a humanitarian issue.

Corruption/*Wasta* is also another threat for Jordan's economy because it aggravates existing vulnerabilities and challenges to the economy. Corruption in Jordan has caused an extensive wealth gap between the rich and the poor. Economic disparity has further affected the economic conditions of the country. Therefore, the threat of corruption (middlemen) became a hot topic after 2018 tax reform protests in Jordan. These protestors demanded the end of corruption, which pushed the government to act immediately. One of these acts was to securitize *Wasta* by King Abdullah II, who described it as an existential threat to Jordanian economy. As part of the securitization efforts, Jordan passed an anti-corruption law and arrested some senior officials including former minister for corruption. These actions intended to prevent, or at least limit, the high level of corruption in the country. In his speeches, King Abdullah II also stressed that not just the politicians and government officials, but the citizens of Jordan also must be aware of not applying *Wasta* in their daily lives. In Jordan, *Wasta*

system is deeply embedded into the structure of state and tradition of the country, which makes it an internal threat worth securitizing.

Considering the overall evaluation of these securitization cases, it can be concluded that the political and economic securitization are just as significant as military securitization in Jordan. All three of these sectors are critical to preserve and maintain the security and stability of Jordan. Each of these selected cases were chosen for their importance in shaping the fate of how security issues are approached in Jordan or because they were (or are) current 'hot topics' worthy of securitization in the country. Both internal and external/regional dynamics are influential in shaping the threats and vulnerabilities faced by Jordan, and thus, securitization acts are undertaken considering these circumstances. Nevertheless, desecuritization has taken place only in the military sector because military securitization is more dangerous than other sectors because the outcomes of military securitization can be catastrophic. Extreme military securitization can lead to major losses for Jordan, which is already experiencing a fragile and unpredictable regional environment. It may also result in securitizing actors losing their consolidated power. On the other hand, political and economic sectors' securitization cases are based on long-term dynamics and many such cases were securitized by King Abdullah II in contemporary times.

In addition to the findings of the literature review, researcher's primary interviews also shed light on how the analysis of Jordan's security can be comprehended. The researcher conducted a series of interviews with Jordanians in Jordan and asked several questions about the security of Jordan in order to evaluate general security perceptions of Jordanians. These interviews can pose as subsidiary sources for determining securitization dynamics of Jordan and shed light on the general security agenda of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. These primary interviews are valuable for this study because the interviewees are chosen from different age groups, gender, and socio-economic background - that would give a generalizable opinion on Jordan's security in different sectors and dynamics. The recurring answers in the interviews

also shaped this thesis's theoretical framework in addition to the Copenhagen School security studies. Generally, from all three security sectors, interviewees cited current issues as the most significant threat for Jordan's security and stability such as DAESH, corruption, Syrian refugees, Israel, and so on. This also guided the research is further exploring these issues.

In conclusion, this research sought to answer the question: 'in response to changing nature of threats, what are the major securitization dynamics of Jordan?' by applying Copenhagen School's securitization theory to three main sectors (military, political, and economic). Each of these sectors has its own unique security issues, diverse threats, vulnerabilities, and regional dynamics. Combining the findings of these cases with the researcher's primary interviews with Jordanians and the overall evaluation of Jordan's security framework, this study fills the gap in literature arising from the fact that this significant 'safe' and 'buffer zone' country in the Middle East region has not been analyzed using Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory before.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
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ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

11 ARALIK 2018

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (IAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu


Sayın Doç.Dr. Tuba Ünlü BİLGİÇ

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız Sema IŞIK'ın "Ürdün Güvenliği" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2018-SOS-198 protokol numarası ile araştırma yapması onaylanmıştır.


Saygılarımla bilgilerinize sunarım.


Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ


Başkan


Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL
Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR
Üye


Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI (4.)
Üye


Prof. Dr. Ali Emre TURGUT
Üye


Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK
Üye


Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye

B. DATES AND LOCATIONS FOR PRIMARY INTERVIEWS

Interviewee Number	Date of Interview - Location	Occupation
Interviewee 1	18.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Diplomatic Personnel
Interviewee 2	20.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Civil Servant
Interviewee 3	21.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Senior Academic
Interviewee 4	19.01.2019 – Amman, Jordan	Journalist
Interviewee 5	24.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Academician
Interviewee 6	28.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Merchant
Interviewee 7	20.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Translator
Interviewee 8	20.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Secretary in Private Sector
Interviewee 9	21.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Academic
Interviewee 10	28.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	PhD Student
Interviewee 11	29.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Doctor
Interviewee 12	21.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Retired Individual from Private Sector
Interviewee 13	18.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Teacher
Interviewee 14	20.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Retired Teacher
Interviewee 15	21.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Student
Interviewee 16	19.01.2019 - Amman, Jordan	Teacher

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKEÖZET

Bu çalıřma, dünyada en çok savařa ve güvensizlięe tanık olmuş bölgede, Orta Doęu'da, Ürdün Hařimi Krallığı'nın güvenli bölge olarak adlandırılması noktasından yola çıkarak Ürdün'ün güvenlik analizini amaçlamaktadır. Orta Doęu bölgesinin alt bölgesi olarak bilinen 'Levant' incelendięinde bölge atmosferinin askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik açılardan ne kadar kaotik, istikrarsız ve tehlikeli olduęu anlaşılmaktadır. Ürdün de bu bölgeye ait bir ülke olarak bölgenin istikrarsızlıęından ve güvensizlięinden direkt etkilenmektedir. Buna raęmen, komřu ülkeleri göz önüne alındıęında Ürdün'ün istikrarlı ve yaşanabilir olduęu inkâr edilemez. 1948'den beri süre gelen İsrail- Filistin meselesi, özellikle 2000'den sonra bölgede ortaya çıkan terör tehdidi, aynı zaman diliminden bugüne kadar Irak'ta dinmeyen kargařa, Suriye'deki sivil savař ve bunun sonucunda karşılaşılan mülteci konusu hem bölgenin hem de Ürdün'ün maruz kaldıęı güvenlik tehditleri arasındadır. Bahsedilen bölgesel tehditlerin yanı sıra Ürdün'ün kendi içerisinde karşılařtıęı çeřitli güvenlik tehditleri de yeni ve karmařık olarak tasvir edilebilecek güvenlik problemlerine ve ikilemlerine yol açmaktadır. Bu çalıřma dolayısıyla ilk olarak çok boyutlu güvenlik ikilemlerini ve krizlerini anlamak, daha sonra ise Ürdün'ün karşılařtıęı iç ve dış güvenlik problemlerini ve bunlara karşı aldıęı önlemleri Kopenhag Okulu Güvenikleřtirme Teorisi bakıřından incelemeyi hedeflemektedir.

Orta Doęu bölgesinin, özellikle Levant'ın istikrardan ve güvenden yoksun ortamı dikkate alındıęında, bölgenin güvenlik konusunda en az çalıřılmış ülkesi bu çalıřmanın ana konusu olarak ele alınmıřtır. Bu bağlamda Ürdün Hařimi Krallığı Irak, Suriye, Lübnan, İsrail ve Türkiye'ye kıyasla güvenlięi en az çalıřılmış Orta Doęu ülkesidir. Ürdün'de dış tehditlerin iç tehditler ile bir bütün olarak güvenlik sorunu haline gelmesi ve bölgeden kaynaklı yeni ve hatta benzeri olmayan çatıřma ortamlarına tanıklık etmesi Ürdün'ün hali hazırda korumaya çalıřtıęı istikrarı ve

güvenliđi daha zor bir hale getirmektedir. Bölgedeki bunca karışıklığa rağmen, Ürdün yine de istikrarını ve güvenliđini diđer bölge ülkelerine kıyasla korumayı başarmıştı. Bu yüzden, geniş kapsamlı bir güvenlik analizi Ürdün üzerinde yapılmaya deđer görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak, bu tez Ürdün'ün güvenlik dinamiklerini sadece askeri açıdan deđer, siyasi ve ekonomik açıdan da incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Güvenlik çalışmaları İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Soğuk Savaş bitimine kadar popülaritesini realizm çerçevesinden oldukça sıcak tutmuş, bu fikir geleneksel askeri merkezli güvenlik anlayışını öne sürerek, en baskın yaklaşım olarak uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe yerini bulmuştur. Soğuk Savaş'ın hemen akabinde ise bu anlayış deđerşen dünya dinamikleri nedeniyle daha geniş ve derin bir analiz ihtiyacını doğurmuştur. Diđer bir deyişle, çift kutuplu dünya sisteminin neredeyse tamamen zarar görmesi sonucunda geleneksel askeri merkezli güvenlik anlayışı daha modern ve geniş kapsama sahip siyasi, ekonomik, toplumsal ve çevreci dinamiklerin de güvenlik analizine dâhil edildiđi bir bakış açısına yerini bırakmıştır. Realizme karşı gelişen bu yeni kritik yaklaşım, yani konstrüktivizm, yenedünya düzeninde ortaya çıkan farklı dinamiklere sahip güvenlik meselelerinin daha derin bir şekilde incelenmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. Konstrüktivizm temeline dayanan Kopenhag Okulu güvenlik çalışmalarının ortaya çıkması ise yine aynı dönemde yani Soğuk Savaş bitimi, 1990'ların başlarına rastlamaktadır ve ilk defa Barry Buzan önderliğinde çok boyutlu, geniş kapsamlı ve derinlemesine yapılacak bir güvenlik analizini dünyaya tanıtmaktadır. İlk olarak okul Avrupa temelinde bu analizin gerçekleşmesini planlasa da Orta Dođu bölgesi dâhil dünyanın hemen hemen tüm bölgelerini içerecek şekilde yapılan güvenlik analizleri Kopenhag Okulu bakış açısıyla literatürde yerini almıştır. Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenlik analizinde ortaya koyduđu üç ana fikir vardır, bunlar beş ana başlık altında deđerlendirilen güvenlik sektörleri (askeri, siyasi, ekonomik, toplumsal ve çevresel), bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi ve en önemlisi güvenlikleştirme teorisidir.

Güvenlikleştirme teorisi ele alınan olayların bir güvenlik sorunu olup olmadığıyla ilgilenmek yerine bu olayların güvenlikleştirici aktörler tarafından nasıl güvenlikleştirildiğini inceler. Bu bağlamda güvenlik algısı bir söz-edim olarak kabul edilir ve konuların gerçek bir güvenlik sorunu olup olmaması değil, ne şekilde güvenlik meselesi haline getirildiğinin analizi amaçlanır. Bu noktada güvenlikleştirme özneler arası bir süreç olarak görülür çünkü konular bir aktör tarafından güvenlik meselesi olarak dile getirilir ve ilgili dinleyiciler (hedef kitle) de bu güvenlikleştirme hamlesine karşı olumlu veya olumsuz bir tutum sergiler. Dinleyiciler güvenlikleştirilmeye çalışılan konuyu kabul eder ise güvenlikleştirici aktörlerin önerdiği acil tedbirler hedef kitlenin (referans nesnesi yani hedef alınan kitle; devlet, millet gibi) güvenliği ve varoluşunun devamı için güvenlikleştirilmiş tehdide karşı alınır. Olağanüstü tedbirlerin alınması ile hâlihazırdaki kuralların yani normal politik tedbirler dışına çıkma, güvenlikleştirmeyi politize de bir adım ötesine taşımaktadır. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever ve Jaap De Wilde güvenlikleştirme adımının pozitif bir hareket olmadığını savunur çünkü alınacak olağanüstü tedbirler normal işleyişin dışına çıkma manası taşımakta ve güvenlikleştirici aktörün/ aktörlerin kazandığı sınırsız güç modern anlayışa sahip bir dünya düzenine ile uyuşmamaktadır. Bu yüzden, güvenlikdışlaştırma yani güvenlikleştirilmiş konuların güvenlik alanından çıkarılıp normal politik alana geri döndürülmesi de güvenlikleştirme teorisi çatısı altına eklenmiştir. Sonuç olarak Kopenhag Okulu güvenlikleştirme teorisi bir konunun/problemin güvenlik meselesi haline getirilmesi sürecini geniş ve derin bir şekilde inceleme hedefine odaklanır.

Güvenlikleştirme teorisi bu çalışmanın ana teorik çerçevesine oturtulmuş ve bu çerçevede dâhilinde üç ayrı güvenlik sektörü (askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik) ve bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi Ürdün örneği üzerinden analiz edilmiştir. Literatüre bakıldığında, Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı'nın henüz Kopenhag Okulu güvenlikleştirme teorisi temelinde askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik güvenlik dinamiklerinin analiz edilmediği görülmüş, bu nedenle bu çalışma literatürde var olan boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamıştır. Güvenlikleştirme teorisi ile birlikte, Ürdün'ün çeşitli güvenlik dinamikleri ve

akabinde hem iç hem de bölgesel tehditlere karşı duruşu belirli olaylar dâhilinde incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma dolayısıyla Kral Hüseyin ve Kral II. Abdullah dönemi içerisinde tanımlanan tehditlerin değişen doğasına cevaben Ürdün'deki güvenlikleştirme dinamiklerinin ortaya konmasını amaçlamaktadır.

Bu çalışma nitel bir durum çalışması olarak ele alınmakta ve bu kapsamda Ürdün'ün ilk olarak askeri sektördeki güvenlikleştirme dinamikleri incelenmektedir. Askeri sektör içerisindeki inceleme tezin en önemli kısmını oluşturmaktadır çünkü Kopenhag Okulu geleneksel askeri merkezli güvenlik anlayışına karşı çıkmaz, yetersiz bulur ve bu yüzden askeri sektördeki güvenlikleştirme analizi okulun en çok önem parçalarından biridir. Bu analizdeki askeri güvenlikleştirme ilk olarak Ürdün'ün dış tehdit olarak algıladığı İsrail'dir ve Kral Hüseyin'in ilk yıllarından 1994 yılı İsrail ile Ürdün arasında imzalanan barış anlaşmasına kadar sürdüğü gözlemlenmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, iç güvenlik tehdidi olarak ortaya konan Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü (FKÖ)'nün askeri sektörde güvenlikleştirilmesi yine Kral Hüseyin zamanına denk gelmektedir ve 1960'lardan 1970'lerin başına kadar gündemi meşgul ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. Aynı zamanda terör konusu da iç güvenlik problemi olarak görülmekte ve 2000'lerin başında Kral II. Abdullah tarafından güvenlikleştirilmektedir. Ele alınan bu üç konu askeri sektör içerisinde karşılaştırıldığında her birinin kendine has dinamiklerinin olduğu ve çeşitli tehditleri Ürdün güvenliğine karşı barındırdığı ortaya konmuştur. Bu bağlamda İsrail çok acil ve direkt bir askeri tehdit olarak Ürdün'ün ve Filistin'in toprak bütünlüğüne karşı betimlenmektedir. FKÖ ise Ürdün'ün egemenliği ve rejim güvenliğine karşı bir tehdittir ve bu yüzden askeri olarak güvenlikleştirilmiştir. Bunun aksine terör konusu ayrı olarak ele alınmalıdır çünkü tehdit edilen şey ülkenin ılımlı İslami bir yol izleyen kraliyet ailesi ve rejimdir. Terörizm bu çalışmada, Selefi Cihat Hareketi ve bu fikirden doğan El-Kaide ve DAESH'i kastetmektedir.

İsrail'in askeri sektörde güvenlikleştirilmesi Kral Hüseyin'in ilk yıllarına, hatta onun da öncesi, dedesi Kral I. Abdullah (1948) zamanına rastlamaktadır. 1948 yılında İsrail

devletinin kurulması ve hemen akabinde gerçekleşen Arap-İsrail Savaşı, Ürdün'ün toprak bütünlüğüne (Doğu Kudüs ve Batı Şeria da dâhil) direkt bir tehdit olarak algılanmıştır. Bundan dolayıdır ki, Kral Hüseyin İsrail'i başarılı bir şekilde güvenlikleştirmiş ve akabinde olağanüstü tedbir alma yoluna gitmiştir. Buna kanıt olarak 'Altı Gün Savaşları' 1967 yılında vuku bulmuş, Ürdün önderliğindeki Arap Ordusu İsrail'e karşı savaşmıştır. 1967 savaşı sonucunda Arapların uğradığı ağır yenilgi, Ürdün'ün Filistin topraklarında 1948 savaşından sonra elde ettiği Doğu Kudüs'ü ve Batı Şeria'yı İsrail'in eline bırakması ve günümüze kadar devam eden Filistin- İsrail çatışmasına ve bölgenin istikrarsızlığına neden olmuştur. Bundan dolayıdır ki Kral Hüseyin 1967 savaşı sonrası İsrail'in küçümsenmemesi gereken bölgesel bir askeri güç olduğunu kabul etmiş ve 1994 yılına kadar İsrail'in güvenlikdışılaştırılmasına ortam sağlayacak hamlelerde bulunmuştur. Güvenlikdışılaştırma Kral Hüseyin'in ve Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı'nın bekası için daha iyi bir seçenek olduğuna karar verildiği görülmektedir ve bu yüzden 1994 yılında Ürdün, İsrail ile imzalanan barış anlaşması bölgedeki güvenliğin ve istikrarın korunması ve ikili ilişkilerin normal politika alanında ilerlemesini hedeflemektedir.

Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü'nün güvenlikleştirilmesine bakıldığında ise, olayın bir iç tehdit olduğu ve kısa bir zaman dilimi sürecinde güvenlikleştirmeye başvurulduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Bunun nedeni ise Kral Hüseyin'in ve rejimin FKÖ tarafından tehdit edilmesi, hemen ardından kralın güvenlikleştirmeye başvurması ve başarılı olması 1960'lardan 1970'lerin başına kadar uzanan kısa bir zaman dilimini kapsamaktadır. FKÖ'nün Ürdün güvenliğinin tehdidi bir iç güvenlik problemi olarak görülse de aslında dış etkenlerden (İsrail- Filistin meselesi ve 1967 savaşındaki ağır yenilgi) ortaya çıkmıştır ve ortada Ürdün rejimine karşı çoğunluğunun Filistin kökenli vatandaşlarının oluşturduğu, FKÖ önderliğinde ciddi bir sorgulama vardır. Kral Hüseyin bu yüzden FKÖ'nün Ürdün'ün toprak bütünlüğüne ve egemenliğine bir tehdit olarak algılanması için güvenlikleştirme yoluna başvurur ve 1970'de Ürdün Kraliyet Ordusu'nun yönettiği bir askeri müdahale ile (Filistinliler tarafından 'Kara Eylül' olarak da bilinmektedir) FKÖ'nün varlığını Ürdün topraklarında bitirir. Burada

olağanüstü tedbirlere rejimi ve ülke güvenliğini korumak amacıyla güvenlikleştirici aktör- Kral Hüseyin tarafından başvurulduğu gözlemlenmekte, bu yüzden de güvenlikleştirme adımı başarılı olarak kabul edilmektedir. Filistin direnişi ve FKÖ'nün Ürdün için bir tehdit olmaktan çıkması ile FKÖ Kral Hüseyin tarafından askeri sektörde güvenlikdışlaştırılmıştır çünkü bu durumun devam etmesi kraliyet ailesinin ve rejiminin güvenliği açısından uzun vadede daha büyük bir tehdit olacağı öngörülmüştür. Bunun nedeni ise Ürdün'de yaşayan ve neredeyse halkın yarısını oluşturan Filistin kökenli halkın haklarını arayacağı ve daha ciddi iç güvenlik meselelerinin ortaya çıkacağına Kral Hüseyin tarafından anlaşılmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, 1974 ile 1985 yılları arasında yoğunluklu olarak, Kral Hüseyin FKÖ'yü Filistin topraklarındaki İsrail varlığına karşı Filistin direnişinin meşru temsilcisi olarak gördüğünü resmi olarak ilan etmiştir.

Bu çalışmaya, askeri sektördeki güvenlikleştirme için son olarak Ürdün'ün 2000'lerden itibaren sık sık gündeme getirdiği terör konusu dâhil edilmiştir. Radikal İslam hareketinden doğan Selefi Cihat Hareketi bir terör konusu olarak 2000'lerin başından itibaren diğer ülkeler gibi Ürdün'ün de sıcak gündemindedir. Bu terör tehdidi, Ürdün'ün Müslüman bir ülke olmamasından ötürü değil, Kral II. Abdullah ve Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı'nın ılımlı İslam'ı temsil etmesinden ötürü ülke içerisinde varlığını ciddi anlamda sürdürmektedir. Bu yüzden, Ürdün 2000'lerin başından itibaren ilk olarak El-Kaide daha sonrasında da DAEŞ yüzünden ciddi güvenlik tehditlerine maruz kalmıştır ve akabinde Kral II. Abdullah terör konusunu güvenlikleştirme yoluna başvurmuştur. Güvenlikleştirme hareketi başlatıldığında Kral II. Abdullah'ın pozisyonu sadece ülke içerisinde kabul görmemiş, kral uluslararası seviyeden de destek alarak olağanüstü tedbirlerini uygulamaya sokmuştur. Burada terör konusunun bölgesel bir tehdit olarak ortaya çıkması (özellikle Irak ve Suriye krizlerinden sonra) ve tüm dünyayı tehdit edecek boyuta gelmesi Ürdün'ün hem iç hem de dış destek bulmasını kolaylaştırmıştır. Ürdün terör konusu üzerinden güvenlikleştirmeyi askeri müdahaleler ile başarılı bir noktaya getirmiş, tehdidin ülkenin varlığına ve rejimin bekasına karşı önemsiz bir seviyeye indirildiği

görülmüştür. Son olarak, askeri sektöre bağlı güvenlikleştirme adımları çalışmada bahsedilen olaylar üzerinden farklı dinamikler barındırdığı hem iç hem de bölgesel karışıklıklardan kaynaklanabildikleri ve Ürdün'ün güvenliğine karşı direkt bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak algılanmasından ötürü güvenlikleştirildiği, daha sonra da İsrail ve FKÖ özelinde güvenlikdışılaştırılması yoluna gidildiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Çalışmada ele alınan ikinci sektör siyasi sektördür ve bu çatı altında Ürdün'ün siyasi güvenlikleştirme dinamikleri incelenmiştir. Siyasi sektörün güvenlikleştirme teorisinde kullanımı klasik güvenlik çalışmalarının aksine, ülkelerin güvenlik analizlerinin sadece askeri dinamiklere bağlı olarak değerlendirilmesinin yeterli olmadığını göstermektedir. Dolayısı ile tezin bu kısmı Soğuk Savaş sonrası Orta Doğu'daki hızlı değişen güvenlik stratejilerini ve dinamiklerini göz önüne alarak, Ürdün'ün siyasi alanda yaptığı güvenlikleştirme örneğine odaklanmıştır. Bu örnekte güvenlikleştirilen tehdit Ürdün'ün hem iç hem de dış güvenlik meselelerini kapsayan İsrail'dir.

İsrail askeri alanda güvenlikdışılaştırılmış olmasına rağmen siyasi bir tehdit olarak Ürdün'ün egemenliğine ve bölgedeki varlığına karşı varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır ve özellikle Kral II. Abdullah döneminin başından itibaren siyasi sektör dâhilinde güvenlikleştirilmektedir. İsrail'in bir iç tehdit olarak algılanmasındaki en önemli husus özellikle günümüzde Ürdün rejiminin İsrail'e karşı benimsediği ılımlı tutumuna karşı Ürdün'de yaşayan Filistin asıllı halkın Haşimi monarşisine takındığı eleştirel duruştur. Ürdün'ün İsrail'i dış tehdit olarak algılaması ise biraz daha karmaşıktır. Ürdün'ün Arap devletlerinin ilk oluşumundan itibaren Kudüs'teki Müslüman ve Hristiyanların kutsal merkezlerini koruma hizmeti üstlenmesi ve Filistinlilerin kendi ülkelerini kurana kadar onların korunması ve haklarının savunulması görevini yüklenmesi, günümüze kadar Ürdün'ün Filistin topraklarında İsrail'e karşı direk bir muhatap alınması talebini doğurmuştur. Buna rağmen, İsrail'in Ürdün'ün varlığını tanımaması ve ülke içerisinde yükselen rejim eleştirileri Ürdün'ün İsrail'i siyasi anlamda güvenlikleştirmesine neden olmaktadır. Bundan dolayı, İsrail'in

Filistin topraklarındaki işgali ve Ürdün'ün oradaki varlığını tanımaması gerekçeleri Kral II. Abdullah tarafından dile getirilmesiyle İsrail'in siyasi alanda güvenlikleştirilme süreci başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda Ürdün 1994 yılında İsrail'in kullanımına verdiği sınır bölgelerinin iadesini istemiş ve Tel Aviv Büyükelçisini geçici olarak geri çağırmıştır. Ürdün'ün aldığı olağanüstü tedbirler yaptığı güvenlikleştirmenin başarılı olduğunu gösterse de bu sürecin neticelendiğini iddia etmek sürecin doğru analizi açısından uygun görülmemektedir. Kral II. Abdullah hala söylemlerine devam etmekte ve her yeni gün bölgede değişen politik iklim (ABD'nin Büyükelçiliğini Tel Aviv'den Kudüs'e taşıması ve Yüzyıl Anlaşmasının açıklanması) sebebiyle bir sonraki adımın kaderi değişebilmektedir. Bu ortam içerisinde diğer bölgesel güçlerin Ürdün'ün müttefikleri arasında yer almasına rağmen, İsrail konusunda Ürdün'e karşı farklı bir tutum sergilemeleri ülkenin ciddi bir ikilime sürüklenmesine neden olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, çalışmada verilen kırılmalı ve öngörülemez istikrarsız bölge göz önüne alındığında, politik sektörde yapılan güvenlikleştirme Ürdün için henüz neticelenmemiş, kısa süre içerisinde de neticeleneceği düşünülmemektedir.

Son olarak bu çalışma, Ürdün'ün ekonomik sektörde yaptığı güvenlikleştirme sürecini değişen dinamikler çerçevesinde Kral II. Abdullah dönemi dâhilinde incelemektedir. Ekonomik sektördeki güvenlikleştirme analizi Ürdün'ün askeri ve siyasi güvenlikleştirme analizi kadar önemli olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Ürdün ekonomisi özellikle 2008 küresel ekonomik krizden sonra kötü yönde etkilenmiş, ardından 2011 Arap Baharı süreci, Irak ve Suriye'deki tehlikeli ve istikrarsız ortam ekonominin neredeyse tamamen dışa bağımlı hale gelmesine neden olmuştur. Hem bölgesel istikrarsızlık hem de karşılaşılan iç tehditler ülkenin ekonomik güvenliğinin tehlike altına girmesine ve dolayısıyla Haşimi meşruiyetine karşı seslerin çok hızlı bir şekilde yükselmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Ürdün'ün başvurduğu ekonomik güvenlikleştirme iki ayrı durum üzerinden analiz edilmektedir, bunlar; Suriyeli mülteci akını ve ülkedeki yüksek oranlarda karşılaşılan yolsuzluk (aracı/ vasıta) meselesidir. Burada her iki olay için de referans nesnesi milli ekonomi olsa da tehdidin

şekli ve ayrışan dinamikler ekonomik güvenlikleştirmenin farklı şekillerde yapılmasına ortam sağlamaktadır. Örneğin, Suriyeli mülteci konusuna bakıldığında tehdit dış/ bölgesel olarak görülmekte ve mültecilerin maliyetinin Ürdün ekonomisi üzerinde ciddi bir payı olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Yolsuzluk konusu ise Ürdün'ün tamamıyla iç güvenlik meselesi olarak algılanmakta hatta bu durumun bir gelenek haline dönüşmesinden ötürü tüm halka vasıtaya/ aracıya başvurmamaları için çağrı yapılmaktadır.

Suriyeli mülteci akını 2011 Arap Baharı sonrası Suriye'de çıkan iç savaş neticesinde bölgedeki birkaç ülke gibi Ürdün'de de vuku bulmuştur. Mültecilerin maliyeti Ürdün'ün içerisinde bulunduğu ekonomik kriz göz önüne alındığında bir hayli yüksektir ve bu durum Kral II. Abdullah tarafından bir güvenlik meselesi haline getirilmiştir. Hali hazırda Ürdün'ün yüzleştiği yüksek oranlara sahip işsizlik ve yoksulluk, sınırlı öz kaynaklar ve hizmetler (sağlık, eğitim gibi) mülteci probleminin daha da kötü bir hal almasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum ülkenin ekonomisine ve akabinde yönetim şekline varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak tasvir edilmektedir ve bu yüzden Kral II. Abdullah ülkesinin ekonomik dengesini korumak ve gücünü meşrulaştırmak amacıyla Suriyeli mültecileri ekonomik olarak güvenlikleştirmiştir. Daha fazla mülteci kabul etmemek için sınırların kapatılması, bazılarının sınır dışı edilmesi ve mültecilere verilen sağlık hizmetinin sınırlandırılması alınan olağanüstü tedbirler arasında gösterilebilir. Bu olağanüstü tedbirler insan haklarına aykırı gözükmemektedir, fakat yine de Kral II. Abdullah bu durumun ülkesinin istikrarı ve ekonomik güvenliği için alınması zorunlu olan acil tedbirlerden biri olduğunu verdiği tüm röportajlarda belirtmektedir.

Yolsuzluk konusu ise kötüye giden Ürdün ekonomisine karşı ayrı bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. Yolsuzluk genel anlamda siyasilerin veya hükümete yakın kişilerin aracılığı olmaksızın iş bulamama veya var olan işleri yönetememe (aracı/ adam kayırma/ torpil olarak da tasvir edilir) durumudur. Bu durum Ürdün'de aynı zamanda zengin ile fakir halkın arasındaki uçurumu daha belirgin bir hale getirmektedir ve

ekonomik adaletsizlik halkın daha hızlı bir şekilde reaksiyon vermesine neden olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 2018 Haziran ayında halk sokaklara dökülmüş, yaklaşık bir ay boyunca yükselen vergiler ve ekonomik adaletsizlik üzerine protestolarına devam etmiştir. Aslında 2018'den önce de gündemde yerini koruyan yolsuzluk konusu, protestoların ciddiyeti ve Haşimi yönetiminin varlığının sorgulanması durumundan sonra Kral II. Abdullah tarafında güvenlikleştirilmiştir. Bu güvenlikleştirme sürecinde kral hem halka hem de devlet görevlilerine çağrıda bulunmuş, bu gelenekselleşen adaletsizliğe karşı savaş açtığını belirtmiştir. Bunun akabinde, aralarında eski bir bakanın da olduğu üst düzey görevlilerin yolsuzluk skandalı adı altında tutuklanmaları güvenlikleştirmenin alınan olağanüstü tedbiri olarak açıklanmaktadır. Özetle, ekonomik sektördeki güvenlikleştirme dinamikleri Ürdün hem iç hem de bölgesel dinamiklerine bağlı olarak gelişmektedir ve bu çalışmada ele alınan ekonomik problemler ülkenin içinde bulunduğu ekonomik krizi daha da kötüleştirdiği görüşü nedeniyle başarılı bir şekilde güvenlikleştirilmiştir.

Kopenhag Okulu güvenlikleştirme teorisinin Ürdün örneği üzerinde ele alındığı bu çalışmada okulun askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik dinamikleri incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda etraflı bir değerlendirme yapılacak olursa çalışmada ele alınan güvenlik analizinde siyasi ve ekonomik sektörlerin askeri sektör kadar önemli olduğu ve her sektörün hatta sektörlerin içerisindeki her durumun kendine has dinamiklerinin olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu da tezin amacına hizmet etmekte olup, daha derin ve kapsamlı bir güvenlik analizinin Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı için yapılmasını mümkün kılmıştır. Seçilen her vaka Ürdün'ün güvenliği üzerinde ya iz bırakmış ya da güncelliğini koruyup Ürdün halkının hafızasında yer etmiştir ve hepsinin güvenlikleştirilme süreci başarılı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Hem iç hem de dış/bölgesel dinamikler bu sürecin şekillenmesine direkt olarak katkıda bulunmuştur. Güvenlikdışlaştırma ise Ürdün'de sadece askeri sektörde gözlemlenmektedir çünkü bazı durumlarda güvenlikleştirilen konunun daha sonra güvenlikdışlaştırılması istikrarsız bir bölgede ülkenin güvenliği ve güvenlikleştirici aktörün gücünün garantiye alınması açısından gerekli görülebilmektedir. Bu çalışma, dolayısıyla Kopenhag Okulu güvenlikleştirme teorisi

bakış açısıyla Ürdün'ün askeri, ekonomik ve siyasi sektörlerdeki güvenlik dinamiklerini belirli olaylar dâhilinde derinlemesine incelemiş ve literatürdeki boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamıştır.

Yukarıda bahsedilen bulguların yanı sıra, araştırmacı bu çalışmanın daha güçlü olabilmesi adına Ürdün'de ülkenin güvenliğine dair çeşitli mülakatlar gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu mülakatlar sorulan araştırma sorusuna cevap verme aşamasına ışık tutması ve yapılan analizin daha iyi anlaşılması bakımından önemli bir role sahiptir. Mülakatlar Ürdün/Amman'da Ürdünlülere ülke güvenliği hakkında sorulan bir dizi soruyu içermektedir ve Ürdünlülerin ülke güvenliğine bakış açıları hakkında genel bir görüşe sahip olunması amaçlanmıştır. Bu çalışma, tezin amacı olan güvenlik dinamiklerinin bulunması, incelenmesi ve anlaşılması açısından yardımcı bir bileşen olarak kabul edilebilir. Araştırmacı mülakatlardaki cevaplar doğrultusunda takip edeceği yolu ve tezde yer vereceği vakaları hedef kitlenin (Ürdün halkı) yönlendirmesiyle belirleyip incelemiştir. Mülakat yapılan kişiler farklı yaş, cinsiyet, sosyo-ekonomik durum temel alınarak seçilmiş, bulguların daha geniş kapsamlı olması amaçlanmıştır. Mülakatlarda elde edilen popüler cevaplar bu çalışmanın omurgasını oluşturmaktadır ve araştırmacı güvenikleştirme analizini buradan yola çıkarak inşa etmiştir. Ayrıca, mülakatlar İngilizce, Arapça ve Türkçe olmak üzere katılımcıların kendilerini en iyi şekilde ifade etmesi açısından üç ayrı dilde yapılmıştır. Son olarak, mülakatlardaki katılımcılar Ürdün için belirttikleri güvenlik tehditlerini ve istikrarsızlığa yol açan problemlerinden bahsederken DAES, yolsuzluk, Suriyeli mülteci konusu ve İsrail'den bahsetmişlerdir. Bu da Kral Hüseyin ve Kral II. Abdullah tarafından üç ayrı sektörde (askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik) yapılan güvenikleştirmenin ve alınan olağanüstü tedbirlerin katılımcılar tarafından kabul gördüğünün kanıtıdır.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma tehditlerin değişen doğasına karşın, Ürdün'ün güvenikleştirme politikasının ana dinamikleri nelerdir sorusuna cevap aramaktadır ve bu cevap aranırken Kopenhag Okulu güvenikleştirme teorisi okulun üç ana sektörü (ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri) ile temel alınmıştır. Her bir sektör kendisine has güvenlik

dinamiklerine sahiptir ve bu dinamiklerin Ürdün'ün karşılaştığı iç problemlere veya bölgesel tehditlere göre şekillendiği görülmektedir. Ele alınan konuların bulguları, yapılan mülakatlar ve tezin genel değerlendirmesi ele alındığında, bu çalışma, Kopenhag Okulu güvenlik çalışmaları kapsamında Orta Doğu Bölgesinde 'tampon bölge' veya 'güvenli bölge' olarak anılan Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı güvenliğinin daha önce geniş kapsamlı çalışılmamış olduğunu ortaya koymuş, buradaki açığı kapatmayı hedeflemiştir.

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