

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES IN ASIA:
JAPAN, CHINA, AND INDIA COMPARED

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ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES IN ASIA: JAPAN, CHINA, AND INDIA COMPARED

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This thesis attempts to analyze the development of IR studies in three major Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and India. The main research question is whether the Asian study of IR is capable of challenging the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Western study of IR. Regarding this research question; influential philosophers, key concepts, and major think tanks of these three countries are examined. In this thesis, it is observed that the fundamental concepts and esteemed philosophers of these countries are capable of extending the sources and limits of the IR literature. However, as the answer of the research question, contrary to the argument of some scholars who claim that the Asian study of IR presents an indigenous alternative to the Western study of IR, this thesis argues that although studies of IR in Asian countries highlight the contributions of Asian thinkers and specific nature of Asian problems, the Asian study of IR still reflects the Western epistemological and ontological assumptions about IR.

Keywords: The Asian study of IR, theories of IR.

ÖZ

ASYA'DAKİ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ÇALIŞMALARI: JAPONYA, ÇİN VE HİNDİSTAN ÖRNEKLERİ

Okan Yücel

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Asya'daki gelişimini, Japonya, Çin ve Hindistan üzerinden inceleyerek analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Tezin ana araştırma sorusu, Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının Batı'dakilere göre epistemolojik ve ontolojik olarak somut bir farklılık getirip getirmediğidir. Bu soruya yanıt aramak için, çalışılan üç ülkenin siyasî düşünce tarihini etkileyen filozofları, geliştirdikleri önemli kavramları ve düşünce kuruluşları incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, önemli düşünürlerin ve kavramların katkılarının mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünün kaynaklarını ve sınırlarını genişletebilecek nitelikte olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Ancak ana araştırma sorusuna cevaben, her ne kadar Asya'daki filozofların katkılarını ve Asya özelindeki problemleri içerse de, bu tez, Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının Batı'daki epistemolojik ve ontolojik kabulleri yansıttığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmaları, uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CPC	The Communist Party of China
CPIFA	Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
ICWA	Indian Council of World Affairs
IDSA	Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis
IR	International Relations
ISIS	The Indian School of International Studies
JIIA	Japan Institute of International Affairs
JNU	Jawaharlal Nehru University
JPRI	Japan Policy Research Institute
PRD	Peaceful Rise / Development of China
PRC	People's Republic of China
UK	The United Kingdom
US	The United States
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Objective

This thesis aims to assess the scope and the development of the Asian study of IR and its implications in three major Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and India. The thesis also focuses on contributions of Western scholars to the existing literature of Asian IR and seeks answer to the main research question: Whether the Asian study of IR is capable of challenging the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Western study of IR?

Regarding this research question, I argue that the Asian study of IR is a substantial component of the discipline of IR. For this reason, this thesis agrees that sources of the Asian study of IR are capable of extending the existing boundaries of the IR literature, however, although some scholars argue that the Asian study of IR poses a strong alternative to the Western study of IR, this thesis argues that the Asian study of IR still reflects the ontological and epistemological assumptions of Western IR theories. In this regard, this thesis explores the historical development of the field of IR in Asia through case studies of Japan, China and India.

1.2. Review of Literature

The literature on the development of Asian IR studies is dominated by sharp opposition to Westphalian form of inter-state relations. The basic argument of almost all scholars who are interested in Asian studies of IR is that the Westphalian way of seeing world politics constrain and hinder contributions of the Non-Western world in general and the Asian World in particular. Correspondingly, this understanding has entailed dominance of Western IR studies over the Non-Western and thus, the voices of Asian thinkers and their contributions to the IR literature are ignored to a great extent.

Questioning of the Westphalian based IR system ultimately leads us to the discussion of the ontology of IR theories. The ontological assumptions of mainstream IR theories prescribe a world in which sovereign nation-states are surviving in an anarchical international system.¹ For Scott Burchil and Andrew Linklater, “this ontology equates nation with state and to define the field as limited to the interactions among states”.²

These fixed ontological claims are questioned by other Western IR theories such as critical theory, constructivism and the English School of thought. For example, Alexander Wendt argues that the anarchical structure of the international system was constructed by states. In this sense, by complaining about the lack of identity definitions of mainstream theories, he writes as follows, “Constructivists bring to this lack of resolution a systematic communitarian ontology in which intersubjective knowledge constitutes identities and interests.”³ Robert Cox has similarly argued that structural conditions are socially constructed.⁴

The English School has sought to shake these mainstream ontological orientations as well. For Richard Little, the English School of thought “subscribes to an ontology which extends beyond a states-system” and “generates an ontology which diverges dramatically from the ... image of states interacting in an anarchic arena.”⁵ Nevertheless Barry Buzan argues that main scholars of the English School, namely

¹ Jacqui True, “Feminism” in *Theories of International Relations (Third Edition)*, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Peterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.222.

² Scott Burchil and Andrew Linklater, “Introduction” in *Theories of International Relations (Third Edition)* p.20.

³ Alexander Wendt, ”Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): p.425.

⁴ Richard Devetak, in *Theories of International Relations (Third Edition)*, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Peterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.150.

⁵ Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p.192.

Martin Wright and Hedley Bull did not question the supremacy of the state or “power politics”.⁶

In this sense, Hartmut Behr argues that the idea of an “international society” is juxtaposed with the international system as an ontological foundation and conceptualisation of the international society is not adequately deep.⁷ Behr also contends that in the international politics, key elements of ontological foundations were shifted from universalistic to particularistic thinking. As a result of this shift, the primary unit of analysis had been changed from ‘humanity’ to the ‘nation-state’.⁸ As nation-states are regarded as the highest political entity, and the main concern has become the strength and national interests of states, inventing an alternative ontology has become more difficult than it was.⁹

Asian IR studies thus aim to break the dominance of the mainstream IR theories and make the contributions of Asian thinkers more visible. In this sense, the first influential study was carried out by André Gunder Frank in 1998. It is followed by studies of Peter J. Katzenstein, Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver.¹⁰ For Fierke and Jabri, researches of Chan, Mandaville and Bleiker also provided great in-depth insights to “the limited geographic and cultural space” which was established by

⁶ Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996, p.49.

⁷ Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*, p.192

⁸ *Ibid*, p.238.

⁹ *Ibid*, p.2.

¹⁰ Alexei D. Voskressenki, *Non-Western Theories of IR, Conceptualizing World Regional Studies*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p.20.

dominant actors of the IR literature wherein ‘Asian characteristics’ have been neglected widely.¹¹

Above all of these studies, the study of Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan has spared the biggest impetus to Non-Western and Asian IR studies. In their article which was published in 2007 and has been cited in almost all of the articles about Asian IR studies, Acharya and Buzan underscore the urgent need for Non-Western IR studies by stressing “...we think Western IRT is both too narrow in its sources and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of the wider project to understand the social world in which we live”.¹²

Acharya and Buzan explicitly declared that their primary goal when carrying out this study was inspiring Non-Western scholars to question the dominance of the Western World over IR studies as well as introducing new aspects of IR theories. According to Acharya and Buzan, while studying Asian IR, it is fundamental to make the IR studies of the Non-Western countries more visible instead of creating antagonism to the West; and thereby promoting conventional IR studies to become more inclusive in their sources and more pluralistic in their world vision.¹³

Since then, pluralism in IR literature has become a significant topic for Asian scholars. Those who study Asian IR claim that their western counterparts are neglecting philosophers, cultures, and indigenous contributions of Asian scholars. For example, according to Navnita Behera, Kautilya (Chanakya), who was a very influential strategist and politician of Indian political thought history, is excluded from conventional IR textbooks and is reduced to becoming an ‘Indian Machiavelli’. Indeed, Behera argues that just like Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Hobbes

¹¹ Karin Marie Fierke and Vivienne Jabri, “Global Conversations, Relationality, Embodiment and Power in the Move Towards a Global IR” *Global Constitutionalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2019. p.2.

¹² Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Introduction” in *Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge, 2010, p.2.

¹³ Ibid.

and Niccolo Machiavelli; Kautilya is a prominent representative of the realist school of thought.¹⁴

The same can be claimed for Nishida Kitaro and ‘the philosophy of Kyoto School’ in the Japanese context. In this regard, Takashi Inoguchi argues that Nishida Kitaro can be perceived as ‘an innate constructivist’, and “Eastern culture produced a constructivist thought before Western scholars invented it”.¹⁵ While in the Chinese case, the system of ‘Tianxia’ is proposed by Zhao Tingyang in order to illustrate how an alternative and peaceful inter-state system can be built upon the Sino-centric regional order which is based on the principles of Confucianism.¹⁶

When we scrutinize the existing literature of the Asian study of IR, it can be observed that scholars who engage in these studies tend to extend the existing boundaries of the IR literature by referring to cultural and historical figures of Asian political history. In that respect, instead of replacing Western IR theories, they aim to diversify the IR literature by adding contributions of Asian philosophers, scholars, and indigenous concepts. In this regard, the two themes are fundamentally essential. First is the discussion of pluralism in IR literature and the second is building a dialogue between Western and Asian studies of IR. For this reason, the first chapter of the thesis particularly focuses on these two debates and introduces considerable studies that tackle pluralism and dialogue. Then a broad picture of the Asian study of IR will be provided in the last part of the first chapter and the main argument of the thesis will be defended against the claims that the Asian way of understanding and interpreting world politics pose a radical ontological and epistemological alternative to the Western study of IR.

¹⁴ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-Imagining IR In India”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no.3 (2007): p.353.

¹⁵ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no.3 (2007): p.379.

¹⁶ Tingyang, Zhao. “Can this ancient Chinese philosophy save us from global chaos?” Washingtonpost.com
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/07/tianxia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ca540ffdf4d0, (accessed on 19 November 2018)

As illustrated above, the foremost methodology for reaching to a more diverse IR discipline is creating a dialogue site between Asian and Western studies of IR. In order to reach this goal, Yong- Soo Eun provides a remarkable methodology by using the term of ‘conversation’ instead of dialogue. According to him, analyzing the relationship among Asian states through one of the mainstream IR theories will entail a healthy conversation. In this context, due to the cultural rivalry between South Korea and Japan, constructivism should be utilized as an inspiring instrument in order to attract attention of Western IR theories and ultimately enlarge the scope of IR studies.¹⁷

Steve Smith argues that pluralism is very crucial for any social science and Asian IR has achieved a lot to make the epistemological assumptions of IR more plural. Steve Smith contends that similarities of neo-liberalism and neo-realism due to their positivist epistemological assumptions have narrowed the vision of the rationalist IR field.¹⁸ In parallel with this, J. Ann Tickner has argued that methodological and epistemological standpoints of Western-centric IR visions have prevented the discipline from developing more comprehensive approaches.¹⁹

In order to assess the development of IR studies in Asia, three major cultures and states of the Asian world are determined as case studies of the thesis. These countries are Japan, China, and India. Historical background of IR studies in these countries, influential philosophers for their political thoughts, reports, and policy recommendations of major think tanks of each country are analyzed in order to comprehend the evolution of the discipline of IR in Asia.

IR studies in India, Japan, and China assign huge significance to the historical backgrounds of their states and cultures. Besides their national cultural heritage,

¹⁷ Yong-Soo Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR: How to Ensure Dialogue as Mutual Learning”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume.0, No.0 (2018): p.10.

¹⁸ Steve Smith, “The discipline of international relations: still an American social science?” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2, no. 3 (2000): p.382-383.

¹⁹ J. Ann Tickner, “Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2011): p.611.

they also analyze the regional political structures and inter-state relations. Kautilya's (Chanakya) 'Arthashastra' occupies the biggest place in Indian IR studies. It is observed that Kautilya is widely perceived as the most influential philosopher and politician in Indian history. His studies are generally classified under the realist school of IR theories. Additionally, Amitav Acharya avers that Kautilya as a figure, demonstrates the dominant narrative of Western IR, because he is generally known as "Indian Machiavelli" within the Western IR community. However, due to chronology, labelling Machiavelli as "Euro-Mediterranean Kautilya" would be more appropriate.²⁰ Besides Kautilya, the founder of the Indian nation-state, Jawaharlal Nehru and his policy of non-alignment are widely accepted as important intellectual sources as well. While think tanks in India are particularly attracted by the recent developments in the international system and India's responses to them.

In Japan, IR studies began towards the end of the 20th century. It is possible to argue that Takashi Inoguchi is regarded as the most prominent scholar who pondered about IR studies in Japan. He has contributed to numerous studies that deal with the Asian study of IR. According to him, there are four approaches that matter greatly in framing the IR studies in Japan both theoretically and methodologically. These are, 'Staatslehre', 'Marxism', 'American-style approach', and 'Historicism'.²¹

Takashi Inoguchi also emphasized the role of Nishida Kitaro and the Kyoto School in the development of the Japanese political thought. He regards Nishida as "an innate constructivist" due to his studies on culture.²² Again with his cultural studies and being an esteemed member of the Kyoto School, Tetsuro Watsuji is another influential philosopher of modern Japanese history.

²⁰ Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no.3 (2011): p.628.

²¹ Takashi Inoguchi, "Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?". *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, (2007): p.370.

²² *Ibid*, p.379.

Kosuke Shimizu underlines the impact of the intellectual domain of Western IR studies on the Japanese study of IR. He contends that Japanese IR studies have been developed within the conceptual framework of Western IR studies. According to him, “Western IR was, and still is, the unchangeable reference point for Japanese IR”.²³ In the same line with Shimizu, Takashi Inoguchi contends that IR theories in Japan are of “middle-range type”.²⁴

IR studies in China have shown great ramification in the last 40 years and the opening-up policy of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s remarks a fundamental benchmark in this context.²⁵ IR studies have flourished within the Chinese IR community and lots of remarkable debates have been operated within academic circles. Government officials actively participate in IR teachings in universities and institutions. Consequently, Renmin University, Peking University and Fudan University have become essential institutions alongside think tanks that raised considerable academic awareness with respect to China’s foreign policy studies.²⁶

In China, it is possible to argue that IR studies and their theoretical frameworks have been developed hand in hand with China’s economic and political ascent. In this regard, it can be argued that IR studies in China have been operated around two related poles. The first is China’s political history and its compatibility with the Confucian principles. The second is important themes and concepts within IR studies which allegedly make China’s foreign policy choices more understandable.

²³ Kosuke Shimizu, “The Genealogy of Culturalist International Relations in Japan and Its Implications for Post-Western Discourse”, *All Azimuth* 0, no. 0 (2017): p.5.

²⁴ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?”. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, (2007): p.370.

²⁵ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing, “International Relations Theory in China”, *Global Society* 15, no. 3 (2001): p.254.

²⁶ Qin Yaqing, “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge, 2010. p.28.

In this thesis, Confucius is determined as the most influential philosopher in Chinese political thought. Even though Confucianism is mainly an ethical philosophy, it influences the political system of China as well. It can be argued that relevant concepts in the Chinese academic literature such as “harmonious world” and “peaceful co-existence” are premised on the Confucian principles. Although the impact of Confucius on Chinese society dates back to thousands of years ago, his political wisdom entered to the Chinese academic agenda in the late 1970s.²⁷

The application of Confucian wisdom to Chinese foreign policy throughout Chinese political history has long been questioned by Chinese scholars. Premises of Confucianism are generally examined within the scope of traditional Sino-centric architecture of East Asia which is labelled as the “tributary system”. In this context, two opposite perceptions should be assessed. For Yuan Kang, China pursued the strategy of “balance of power” among her tributes and Confucianism never shaped China’s policy preferences.²⁸ On the contrary, Shogo Suzuki puts forward “the diplomacy tradition of China was derived from Confucian principles”.²⁹

In today’s China, IR studies have been performed through key concepts. Concepts such as “harmonious world”, “peaceful coexistence” and “peaceful development” are respected as important parts of China’s foreign policy agenda. Officially, Chinese political leaders claim that they are determined to shape their foreign policy in accordance with these themes. “Peaceful coexistence” is mentioned in all of the white papers that are published regularly by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China since 1995. In these writings, ‘five principles of peaceful co-existence’ are determined as follows:

²⁷ Ed. John Makeham, *New Confucianism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p.83.

²⁸ Yuan Kang Wang, *Harmony and War, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Contemporary Asia in the World)*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.181.

²⁹ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.38.

Strengthen unity and cooperation with developing countries and actively develop good-neighbourly relations with bordering nations; stands for the proposition that all nations, big or small, are equal and opposes hegemonism and power politics in any form; advocates the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means; and opposes the threat or use of force in international relations.³⁰

Peaceful rise/development (PRD) of China is another concept which is widely discussed among IR scholars. In this regard, both Chinese and Western scholars have elaborated their arguments by explaining the political rise of China. Therefore, PRD of China can be seen as a concept which creates a linkage between China's past and future under the discussions of global governance and hegemony. Besides Chinese scholars, Western scholars have dealt with this concept as well. From neo-liberal lenses, scholars such as Joseph Nye and John Ikenberry argue that the existing international order is capable of accommodating China's rise and China's ascent would bring more cooperation and prosperity to global politics.³¹ Both scholars agree that China benefits from the existing system and rather than challenging the U.S. as a peer competitor, China is willing to ensure the sustainability of the existing world order.³²

Contrary to neoliberal arguments, John Mearsheimer argues that China cannot rise peacefully. Because of the architecture of the international system, China will certainly challenge the hegemony of the U.S. and try to become the most powerful state in the world. Thus, the U.S. will probably approach to China in a way that they approached to the USSR throughout the cold war.³³ Another esteemed proponent of neo-realism, Randall Schweller has similarly argued that just like all

³⁰ White Book (Paper) of the Chinese Ministry of Defence, November 1995, available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-2.htm> (accessed on 10 December 2018)

³¹ Joseph Nye, "The Cooperative Rivalry of US China Relations", project-syndictae.com. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-america-relationship-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s-nye-2018-11>, (accessed on 2 December 2018)

³² G. John Ikenberry, "The rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February. 2008, p.1

³³ John J. Mearsheimer "China's Unpeaceful Rise", *Current History* 105, (2006): p.161.

rising powers in history, China will certainly try to spread her influence in the Asia-Pacific region and other parts of the world. This policy might trigger a conflict between the U.S. and China.³⁴

With respect to Chinese IR studies via concepts, “tianxia” which literally means ‘all under heaven’ is another important theme. It also represents one of the most fundamental concepts of this thesis due to its relatively different ontological assumptions. Redefining and reinventing this particular concept has become one of the most cited research fields of Chinese IR studies. The biggest proponent and supporter of the ‘tianxia’ system is Zhao Tingyuan. Zhao’s proposal is propounded by some scholars with the claim of it challenges the established ontological and epistemological foundations of Western IR theories. This thesis argues that tianxia model offers relatively different ontological foundations, however it reproduces the hegemonic worldview of the West and do not reach beyond the limits of the state-centrism.

1.3. Argument

This thesis explores the development of IR studies in three major Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and India. In this context, the evolution of their IR communities is also compared in the conclusion chapter. Whether the Asian study of IR is capable of challenging ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Western study of IR is determined as the main research question of this thesis. Contrary to the argument of some scholars who argue that Asian studies of IR present indigenous alternative to the Western studies of IR, this thesis argues that although the study of IR in Asian countries highlight the contributions of the Asian thinkers and specific nature of Asian problems, the Asian study of IR still reflects the Western epistemological and ontological assumptions about IR.

This thesis illustrates that the main opposition point of Asian scholars is the rejection of the Westphalian anarchical inter-state order as the main structural determinant of global affairs. In this sense, in particular Chinese and Indian IR

³⁴ Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 00, no.0 (2018): p.14.

studies bring the Westphalian wisdom into question. With respect to external affairs, scholars from three countries assign a huge importance to their cultural and moral values. In this regard, some Indian thinkers argue that Jawaharlal Nehru's non-alignment policy is a reflection of Indian moral culture; some Japanese scholars have argued that Nishida Kitaro's and the Kyoto School's arguments are based on Japan's cultural values; similarly, some Chinese scholars interpret the rise of China through lenses of the Confucian wisdom.

Alongside calling a more plural and inclusive discipline, Asian scholars also put forward that the Westphalian anarchical inter-state order is not relevant to the history of Asian nations and is not regarded as a superior model. Here, criticisms toward the Westphalian straightjacket of the conventional comprehension of IR are also oriented by the English School of thought, social constructivism, and post-positivist Western approaches of IR. Significance of cultural and moral values as well as identities is vigorously emphasized by constructivism as Alexander Wendt explicitly declares that "identities" shapes the "interests".³⁵ When it comes to offering alternative international systems, Indian scholars underline the Mandala state system which was prevalent during the era of Kautilya; while Chinese scholars stress the importance of the tributary system which lasted approximately five centuries in East Asia and ended up in the 19th century.³⁶

In this sense, these alternatives can be regarded as remarkable contributions and endeavours to widen the scope of IR and force it to embrace histories and philosophers of the Asian world as well. I also argue that Asian sources are capable of playing an important role in pluralizing the field of IR. In that respect, evaluating Kautilya as one of the most influential figures of realism and Nishida as the prominent representative of social constructivism would generate healthy debates in IR studies and ultimately open a considerable space for Asian scholars wherein they

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics" p.398.

³⁶ David C. Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900", *Asian Security* 1, no.1 (2005) p.55

might be able to display their intellectual capital as well. Nevertheless, in this thesis, I argue that no concrete alternative to the Western study of IR is offered by the Asian study of IR. Kautilya's 'mandala' system is still based upon the traditional state-centrist ontology of Western IR and no comprehensive and explanatory theory has been developed upon this view, while Zhao's 'tianxia' proposal replaces the hegemon of the world order and do not radically alter the core epistemological and ontological foundations of state-centric theories. In this regard, Ching-Chang Chen brilliantly points out that rather than offering a powerful alternative to the Western study of IR, Asian IR studies have become local informants for the Western center due to the lack of a feasible alternative.³⁷ In this context, despite their valuable endeavours for reinforcing Asian IR studies and although they highlight the contributions of Asian thinkers and specific nature of Asian problems, this thesis argues that the Asian study of IR still reflects the Western epistemological and ontological assumptions about IR.

1.4. Methodology

As illustrated by the literature reviewed above, in this research, the question of "How the field of IR is studied in Asia?" will be explained. In order to analyze IR studies in Asia through case studies of China, Japan, and India; the historical background of IR studies in each country should be examined.

In this sense, besides historical backgrounds, influential philosophers and scholars are assessed as well. National characteristics and current priorities of each country as well as the relationship between academic studies and government policies are analyzed too. In that respect, library resources, official statements, articles, academic studies, and journals as well as reports and policy recommendations of various think tanks are used for research.

³⁷ Ching-Chang Chen, "The absence of non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.1 (2011): p.18.

1.5. Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of six main chapters. The first chapter illustrates scope and objectives, review of literature, main argument and the methodology of the study. Following the introduction chapter, the second chapter depicts the broad picture of IR studies in Asia with their reflections on the existing IR literature within the debate of generating a dialogue between Asian and Western IR studies. The same chapter also deals with the contributions of Asian IR studies to make the discipline of IR more plural in its sources and methodology.

The third chapter focuses on IR studies in Japan. In this regard, historical background of Japanese IR studies, influential philosophers and important think tanks are analyzed to comprehend both the debates of Japanese IR throughout its development process and current practices regarding Japan's foremost foreign policy concerns.

The subsequent chapter deals with IR studies in China. Besides providing insights to China's IR debates through its historical background, whether philosophy of Confucius has affected China's foreign policy choices are analyzed by providing opposite visions. Most essential and debated themes are also examined as an important part of the Chinese study of IR. Lastly, features of the Chinese think tanks are examined in order to highlight the current issues in China's foreign policy.

The fifth chapter sheds light on IR studies in India. How Kautilya's opinions are evaluated among Indian scholars is explained through providing a brief historical background of Indian IR studies. Reasons of lack of theoretical frameworks and lack of interest to the field of IR are examined as well. Furthermore the impact of Jawaharlal Nehru and the policy of non-alignment on the Indian study of IR are assessed too. Alongside contributions of important historical figures such as Kautilya and Jawaharlal Nehru to Indian IR studies, characteristics of Indian IR regarding recent developments in India's foreign policy are also analyzed through policy recommendations and short papers of various major think tanks.

The sixth and the last chapter have concluding remarks. In the conclusion chapter, development of IR studies in these three countries will be compared. Also it will be argued that despite its reference to indigenous Asian political thoughts, the Asian study of IR is not capable of challenging the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Western study of IR.

CHAPTER 2

IR STUDIES IN ASIA

2.1. Introduction

This chapter depicts the broad picture of the Asian study of IR. Since this thesis focuses on the development of IR studies in Asia, this chapter seeks to analyze the position of Asian IR studies within the IR literature. In this sense, two main topics are particularly notable. Firstly, a vast amount of literature deals with promoting pluralism to the IR literature. It can be argued making the existing IR literature more plural and inclusive have become the leading motive. Secondly, calling for a more plural and diverse field of IR is based on a dialogue between Western and Asian studies of IR. Since whether the Asian study of IR is capable of challenging the Western study of IR ontologically and epistemologically is the main research question of this thesis, development of Asian IR studies is determined as an important framework.

2.2. Historical Background and Emergence of the Asian Study of IR

Most of the scholars who engage in the Asian study of IR begin their evaluations with harsh criticisms towards Western IR theories. In this context, the biggest complaint is about generalizing the Westphalian model of international relations. Westphalian international order is perhaps one of the most cited and studied narrative of the IR literature. According to Adam Watson, its historical essentiality stems from the fact that the “Westphalian settlement legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states”.³⁸ From the standpoint of mainstream IR theories, the modern international system is almost completely formed in parallel with the Westphalian

³⁸ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992. p.186.

state system.³⁹ It reflects the desire of nation-states to have a total control within their borders and building alliances independently to secure their sovereignty.⁴⁰ In this regard, the contemporary understanding of IR gained its meaning in the 15th and 16th centuries with the emergence of nation-states.⁴¹ English school also “treats Westphalia as marking the emergence of an international society that removed the problem of religious conflict and affirmed a commitment to peaceful coexistence among sovereign states”.⁴² In this regard, “Westphalian narrative naturalizes the Eurocentric conception of international society”.⁴³ If we take the Westphalian wisdom as our point of departure, then it is coherent to argue that power politics is the key of the international system; because the distribution of power among sovereign states within the international system designates the international setting and generate a so called “self-help environment” in which each state can only count upon its own strength to guarantee its survival.⁴⁴

After the Treaty of Westphalia, especially starting with the 19th century, European state model continued to have allegedly superior position over other parts of the world. According to Adam Watson, the biggest reason for this is: “During the nineteenth century the Europeans brought the whole world for the first time into a

³⁹ Barry Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?”, *International Studies Review* 0, (2016): p.1.

⁴⁰ Luís Moita, “A Critical Review on the Consensus Around the “Westphalian System”, *e-journal of International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2012): p.19.

⁴¹ Nuri Yurdusev, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Öncesi”, in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013. P.19.

⁴² Ching-Chang Chen, “The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations” *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 3 (2012): p.465.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, p.32.

single net of economic and strategic relations”.⁴⁵ For L.H.M. Ling, the Treaty of Westphalia established two basic components of the modern state system: “Inter-state commerce and territorial sovereignty”. The second component was guaranteed by the first one and with the help of nation-states. Simultaneously, nation-states were struggling for their survival within a self-help environment that resembles a “Hobbesian state of nature”.⁴⁶

In this context, locating coercive and material power to the central point of state relations is the reflex of the imperial past of the Western states. In this sense, this view serves the interests of the powerful Western countries for maintaining their political and economic superiority over the East and the South. The primary outcome of this understanding was to shape an oligarchic sub-system in an anarchical international system and thus provide an intellectual opportunity for Western countries to sustain their economic and political control over the East and the South.⁴⁷

Steve Smith argued that modern narratives of IR, especially starting with the Second World War, are intertwined with American way of making politics. This fact has led to parochial Western definition of IR and a shallow understanding of world politics.⁴⁸ Therefore, “pluralism in IR literature” has emerged as an important debate. In order to make the field of IR more inclusive and plural, Amitav Acharya’s study of “global IR” which prescribes both culturally and historically broader IR discipline worth mentioning. Global IR will serve as an instrument

⁴⁵ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis*, p.265.

⁴⁶ L.H.M. Ling, *The Dao Of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations*, London & New York: Routledge, 2014, p.11.

⁴⁷ Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *North Over South: A Non-Western Perspective of International Relations*, Harvester Press, 1982, p.26.

⁴⁸ Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline””, *International Studies Association*, Blackwell Publishing, 2002. p.68.

which will enrich the sources of the discipline without overthrowing the hitherto development of the IR literature.⁴⁹

Since the Global IR project entered into the agenda of IR studies, it has received enormous attention among scholars who engage in Non-Western IR studies. It could be regarded as the most concrete consequence of endeavours for creating a dialogue basis for Asian and Western studies of IR. Peter J. Katzenstein contends that the global IR project, with its emphasis on dialogue between Western IR theories and the non-western world will enrich the IR scholarship if it ensures a “methodological cross-fertilization”.⁵⁰

In order to underline the narrow scope of the discipline, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan emphasize the urgent need for Non-Western IR studies by stressing, “...we think Western IRT is both too narrow in its sources and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of the wider project to understand the social world in which we live”.⁵¹

Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya explicitly declared that their goal when carrying out this study is inspiring Non-Western scholars to question the Western dominance over IR studies as well as introducing new aspects of IR theories that are neglected by conventional theories. While doing this research, it is fundamental to make the IR studies of the Non-Western countries more visible instead of creating antagonism for the West; and thereby promoting conventional IR studies to become more inclusive in its sources and more pluralistic in its world vision.⁵²

⁴⁹ Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): p. 647 – 648.

⁵⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein, “Diversity and Empathy”, *International Studies Review*, 0, (2016): 1–2.

⁵¹ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Introduction” in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge, 2010, p.2.

⁵² Ibid.

The best way to ensure this interaction is generating a healthy dialogue between the ‘West’ and the ‘Non-West’ and in particular, Asia. Since opinion of generating a dialogue has received huge amount of attention, most of the scholars who are interested in IR studies in Asia felt compelled to contribute to this debate. Applicable and appropriate methodology and potential obstacles regarding these endeavours have been analyzed broadly.

2.3. Pluralism in IR Literature

Most of the scholars, in particular Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, aim to broaden the scope of the discipline of IR with the help of a healthy conversation which is based on mutual learning and respect principles between the West and the Non-West. Nevertheless, whether pluralism makes the field of IR more comprehensive is also a controversial issue among scholars.

Discussion of pluralism in IR studies operates around two debates. The first is ‘American IR vs the rest’ and the second is ‘Western IR vs the rest’.⁵³ In this sense, these rivalries also compared with each other on the ground of being more plural. For example, Steve Smith contends, “The UK is far more open to new ideas and to a variety of methods and epistemological positions than is the US IR community”.⁵⁴

Brian Schmidt opposes Smith’s arguments by stressing that the difference of intellectual and theoretical pluralism between IR in the UK and IR in the U.S. is not as huge as Steve Smith assumes.⁵⁵ In parallel with this argument, William Wohlforth and Randall Schweller entered the same debate by evaluating the linkage between rationalist ontology of American IR and realist school of thought. As Steve Smith argues that most of the American theories are ontologically rationalist and

⁵³ Pinar Bilgin, “Looking for ‘the International’ beyond the West”, *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 5 (2010): p.818.

⁵⁴ Steve Smith, “The discipline of international relations: still an American social science?”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2, No. 3 (2000): p.397.

⁵⁵ Brian Schmidt, “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism?”, *Journal of International Studies* 36, no.2 (2008): p.302.

epistemologically positivist⁵⁶; contrary to the widely accepted assumption, William C. Wohlforth and Randall Schweller contend that there is not a direct bound between realism and rationalism.⁵⁷ Schweller also states, “Neorealism is not a rationalist theory of state behaviour”.⁵⁸ Lastly, contention of realism’s hegemony on the discipline until the post-positivist theories had shown up is controversial too. When the articles which were published from 1970 to 1995 are examined by Jeffrey Morton and Thomas Walker, it is argued that liberalism was ahead of realism as an analytical tool. Therefore, it would be too assertive to argue that post-positivist approaches have broken the monopoly of realism.⁵⁹

J. Ann Tickner thinks that IR as a discipline is too Western and has long been focused on questions that concern Eurocentric wisdom. For Tickner, outside Europe and the U.S, there exists a methodologically more plural IR scholarship which is capable of directing our thoughts to less Eurocentric world visions.⁶⁰ In a similar vein, Andrew Hurrell also emphasized the importance of pluralizing the field by mentioning, “We certainly need to continue to pluralize, to relativize, and to historicize”.⁶¹ And Non-Western studies have provided satisfying insights for

⁵⁶ Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline”, *International Studies Association*, Blackwell Publishing, 2002. p.72.

⁵⁷ Brian Schmidt, “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism?”, *Journal of International Studies* 36, no.2 (2008): p.303.

⁵⁸ Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth. “Power test: Evaluating realism in response to the end of the cold war,” *Security Studies* 9, no. 3 (2000): p.70.

⁵⁹ Brian Schmidt, “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism?”, *Journal of International Studies* 36, no.2 (2008): p.304.

⁶⁰ J. Ann Tickner, “Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no.3 (2011): p.612.

⁶¹ Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR”, *International Studies Review* 0, (2016): 1-3.

reaching this goal.⁶² Hellman has similarly opted, "...pluralism is not the second best alternative but actually the most promising strategy for furthering research and the production of knowledge".⁶³ Colin Wight, Tim Dunne and Lene Hansen also contend that IR studies should open up itself not only for pluralism of different traditions but also for competing theoretical paradigms.⁶⁴

Contrary to Tickner and Hurrell, John Mearsheimer argues that there is nothing wrong with the prevailing of American and Western theories as long as they are largely applicable to other parts of the world. He opines that pluralism can move us to a 'divided discipline' which might result in the questioning of the discipline itself. Consequently, epistemological fragmentations in IR theories might prevent progression and knowledge accumulation in the field.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the American hegemony over IR theories might fade within decades due to the academic enthusiasm of other parts of the world for "developing new theories and refining the existing ones".⁶⁶ Regarding questioning the Eurocentric characteristics of social sciences, Richard Little also thinks that trying to escape from limits of Eurocentrism in social sciences inevitably brings about a more indefinite and breached discipline.⁶⁷

⁶² Ibid, p.1.

⁶³ Gunther Hellmann, "Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?", *International Studies Review* 5, (2003): p.126.

⁶⁴ Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, "The end of International Relations theory?" *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no.3 (2013): p.406.

⁶⁵ John Mearsheimer, "Benign Hegemony", *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): p.147.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.148.

⁶⁷ Ed. Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang and Joel Quirk, *International Orders in the Early Modern World Before the rise of the West*, New York: Routledge, 2014, p.159.

2.4. Dialogue Between Asian and Western IR Studies

Building a dialogue between the Asian world and traditional IR schools is generally respected as the prerequisite of making the agenda of the IR literature more inclusive. Pluralism of the discipline of IR, ways to build a dialogue and potential obstacles for these endeavours are thereby discussed by almost all scholars who are interested in Non-Western and Asian IR studies. Dialogue and pluralism are originated from the same problem and are oriented to the same goal which can be summarized as widening the IR literature by adding narratives, historical backgrounds, philosophers and concepts of the Asian world.

In Amitav Acharya's view, generating a dialogue between Western theories and the Asian world should be the priority of those who aim to develop an Asian IR theory. Creating a dialogue site will eventually lead to two major goals: Firstly, cultures, histories and thinkers of Asia will become more visible and secondly, building a dialogue will eliminate the risks of insoluble conflicts that are likely to emerge out of these debates.

According to Pinar Bilgin, both Western and Non-Western ways of building world politics have been affected by each other. It means that the Asian study of IR cannot be totally different from the Western way of perceiving world politics. In this context, she argues, "What we think of as 'non-Western' approaches to world politics may be suffused with 'Western' concepts and theories".⁶⁸ Pinar Bilgin also points out that most of the concepts in the Asian study of IR such as 'security', 'development' and 'sovereignty' had been exported to Asian countries by the Western world during the cold war. Therefore, these concepts were developed under the domination of the U.S on political thoughts and were examined under the domestic conditions of the Asian world.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Pinar Bilgin, "Thinking past 'Western' IR?", *Third World Quarterly* 29, no.1 (2008): p.6.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Correspondingly, evaluations of American scholars were also influenced by their interaction with the non-western world. Ultimately, it can be argued that from Pinar Bilgin's point of view, expectations from Non-Western or Asian world to develop radically different IR theories than Western ones are not consistent due to constant interaction between these two parts of the world. In this sense, Bilgin writes as follows,

The broader argument here is that 'non-Western' insecurities did not evolve in a vacuum. They evolved through interaction with the USA—its ways of thinking about and doing world politics. These relationships made their mark on American IR as well.⁷⁰

In this context, travelling of these studies to Asia via Asian scholars who study in Western countries eventually reproduced the ontological and epistemological domination of Western IRT in Asian studies.⁷¹ According to Ching-Chang Chen, if it wants to portray itself as a strong alternative, Asian IR studies should stop taking the Western way of IR theorizing as its primary reference point.⁷² Westphalian interpretation of IR sets the tone of the modern international system which does not cover even the most obvious and essential historical experiences of the East and the South.⁷³ Accordingly, regarding the epistemology of Asian IR studies, Asian IR theorists should seek to change the ontology of the 'agency',⁷⁴ because, "Various IR theories have denied the agency claims of the non-Western societies".⁷⁵ Fierke

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.10.

⁷¹ Jacqueline de Matos-Ala, "Making the invisible, visible: challenging the knowledge structures inherent in International Relations Theory in order to create knowledge plural curricula", *Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.*, Volume. 60. No.1 (2017): p.8-9.

⁷² Ching-Chang Chen, "The absence of non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered", P.13.

⁷³ Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery", p.628.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.629.

⁷⁵ Acharya Amitav, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): p.649.

and Jabri also contend that, the ‘individualistic ontology’ must be transformed to ‘relational ontology’ in order to ensure a global conversation.⁷⁶ In this sense, Asian countries have to deny the construction of the “inferior other” by the “superior self”.⁷⁷

In a similar vein, Fabio Petito also calls for a smooth discussion to create a dialogue environment. However, as opposed to Amitav Acharya, Petito argues that underlining the so called ‘Asian values’, such as ‘Hinduism’, might entail a more aggressive response from the Western counterparts which will consequently push Asian scholars to behave more conservatively. The same efforts will certainly be regarded as a “cultural revolt” against the West in the Western academic circles as well.⁷⁸ Moreover, it carries a risk of creating solid fragmentations within the discipline and even “build more tight walls between two”.⁷⁹

Here the main issue is finding the right methodology that prevents reproducing the self-other dichotomy. Eun Yong-Soo argues that it is possible to find this methodology if proponents of the Global IR project manage to focus mainly on combining the existing Western IR theories with Asian politics at the initial stage. He complains about the lack of methodological studies which will lead to a dialogue. Soo thinks that responds to ‘how-to related questions’ are not satisfying

⁷⁶ Karin Marie Fierke and Vivienne Jabri, “Global Conversations, Relationality, Embodiment and Power in the Move Towards a Global IR” *Global Constitutionalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2019. p.4.

⁷⁷ Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (Ed.) *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of “Civilizations” in International Relations*, Palgrave, 2007. p. 21.

⁷⁸ Fabio Petito, “Dialogue of Civilizations in a Multipolar World: Toward a Multicivilizational-Multiplex World Order”, *International Studies Review*, (2016): p.5.

⁷⁹ Yong-Soo Eun, “Opening-Up the Debate Over ‘non-western’ International Relations”, *Political Studies Association*, Volume.00. No.0. (2018): p.5.

within the Non-Western and Asian IR literature except few scholars such as Pinar Bilgin and Kimberly Hutchings.⁸⁰

Soo prefers to use the term of ‘conversation’ instead of dialogue. For him, there are two kinds of conversations that are very extensive in academic literature. However, neither ‘Socratic dialogue’ nor ‘Habermasian dialogue’ is applicable to this context. Socratic dialogue prescribes a ‘scripted’ dialogue, hence the potential outcomes of this dialogue can be foreseen prior to the process. This kind of a dialogue would translate the Global IR to an insincere project and might reproduce the domination of conventional theories.⁸¹ For Yong-Soo, both creating indigenous Non-Western theories that turn a deaf ear to Western centric approaches, and applying the Eurocentric discourses directly to Asian context without questioning their epistemologies serve to the same mistake.⁸² In response, Yong-Soo Eun states, “Habermasian dialogue operates within a particular epistemological framework, namely rationalism, and thereby excludes other forms of knowledge production and approaches to dialogue, such as those based on intuition or emotion”.⁸³

From Yong-Soo Eun’s point of view, we can argue that in order to develop a healthy conversation, the shrewdest thing to do is applying one mainstream theory to the Asian context. It will attract the attention of mainstream IR theories and arise a feeling that the Asian World has something in common with traditional IR theories. He elaborates his ideas by applying constructivist theory to the rivalry between South Korea and Japan; because Yong-Soo Eun thinks that with its emphasis on concepts such as national values, norms, cultures and identities, constructivism constitutes the most applicable mainstream IR theory in the East

⁸⁰ Yong-Soo Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR: How to Ensure Dialogue as Mutual Learning”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume.0 No.0. (2018): p.2.

⁸¹ Ibid, p.4.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid, p.5.

Asian context.⁸⁴ The primary source of rivalries between Korea and Japan, and Japan and China is their mutual comprehension of historical and cultural values of each other. For example, despite a harsh confront between North Korea and South Korea, the so called ‘Korean identity’ engenders solidarity among them; while in the case of Sino-Japan rivalry, both countries contend that their traditional values are superior to the other one.⁸⁵

In this regard, it is crucial to mention that Yong-Soo Eun’s aim is not testing the main tenets of constructivism or trying to directly fit it to foreign relations of Asian states. He thinks that seeing the picture of Asia through the lenses of the Western theories might raise the interest of both sides and accelerate initial conversation among them. It is capable of ensuring a mutually learning process which will certainly support the endeavours of making the discipline of IR more inclusive and even democratic.⁸⁶ Apart from the other two conversation models which he does not consider as suitable methods for Asian IR studies, Soo labels his method of conversation as “instrumentalist” approach.⁸⁷ As a consequence, it is possible to argue that the above-mentioned methodology also reflects the epistemological and ontological approaches of the Western study of IR.

In a similar vein, Kimberly Hutchings opposes creating a Socratic or Habermasian dialogue between the West and the East. Similar to Yong-Soo, Hutchings has argued that Socratic dialogue will not effectively work due to its pre-determined nature. Habermasian dialogue on the other hand seems closer to generate a conversation. However, this model requires more common grounds between two

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.11.

⁸⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell US About International Relations Theory?”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, (2012): p.62.

⁸⁶ Yong-Soo Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR: How to Ensure Dialogue as Mutual Learning”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 0, no.0 (2018): p.10.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.12.

participants.⁸⁸ Furthermore, it indicates rationality in which a conversation must operate and only the modern Western thought can meet the ontological and epistemological foundations of this methodology.⁸⁹

2.5. The Asian Study of IR

As the above mentioned analysis has explained, IR studies in Asia have a remarkable capacity for contributing to the discipline and face an immense challenge as a ‘late comer’. In order to underline the urgent need of IR studies in Asia, Amitav Acharya writes,

A central challenge facing global order today is the seeming contradiction between the desire of Asia’s leading states to be recognized and treated as global powers on the one hand, and their limited and hesitant contribution to global governance on the other.⁹⁰

Alastair Iain Johnston similarly emphasizes the importance of Asian studies of IR by stressing, “It seems clear from the data that East Asian cases are excluded from much of the analyses in the U.S and European IR, and IR scholars seem to acknowledge this”.⁹¹ The common objection point of IR Studies in Asia is mainstream IR’s approach to East Asia’s institutions and historical background.

In this context, the domination of Westphalian inter-state order in the IR literature and claims of mainstream IR theories regarding relations of Asian countries are vigorously contested. It is regarded as the main motivation behind Asia’s exclusion from the existing IR literature. With Acharya’s words:

⁸⁸ Kimberly Hutchings, “Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/ Non-West Distinction in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no.3 (2015): p.640.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 641.

⁹⁰ Amitav Acharya, “Can Asia Lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century” *International Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2011): p.854.

⁹¹ Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell US About International Relations Theory?”, p.54.

In IR, ethnocentrism creates the basis for exclusion and ignorance. All forms of centrism require the creation of the notion of the outside. As a social practice, ethnocentrism starts with the marking off of others as non-members. It is produced and reproduced by the denial of the identity of others.⁹²

Contributions of Asian IR are noteworthy in this context and we can observe various criticisms towards the hegemony of the Westphalian inter-state system. For example, L. H. M. Ling argues that the concept of “Chinese threat” is the result of the Westphalian logic because this logic inherently favours the West/U.S. Therefore, the political ascent of China is perceived as an existential threat to the current international order which leads to wrong and exaggerated assumptions regarding China’s rise.⁹³ However, not only the U.S. but also other two major Asian countries, Japan and India also consider China’s rise as a threat to their national interests as policy recommendations of influential think tanks in these countries brilliantly demonstrate this understanding.

Preliminary studies of Asian IR tend to reflect similar criticisms toward Westphalian sovereignty which is assumed to be the basis of the conventional Western IR theories. Many scholars have addressed this problem and argued that due to epistemological and ontological domination of Western IR studies, voices of Asian thinkers are not taken into account. Here the leading argument underlines historical differences of two regions: Europe and East Asia, and contends that East Asian hierarchical inter-state order still influences state behaviours and this situation has not been tackled properly in Western IR studies. Thus, introducing contemporary and traditional Asian inter-state relations is respected as a step forward to move beyond the limits of Westphalian based mainstream IR theories. In this sense, the Westphalian anarchical international system is challenged by the hierarchical Sino-centric tributary system in East Asia. Aim of this stance is to

⁹²Amitav Acharya, “Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory”, in *Displacing Security*, ed. Samantha Arnold and J. Marshall Bier, Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 2000. p.3.

⁹³ L. H. M. Ling, “Worlds beyond Westphalia: Daoist dialectics and the ‘China threat’” p.8.

illustrate that Westphalian order is not accepted or regarded as a superior model to other parts of the world, especially to Asian countries.⁹⁴

In historical narratives of Asia, it is a widely accepted vision that the international architecture of East Asia was distorted due to imperialist Western intervention in the region. It is argued that China's tributary system functioned properly and maintained peace and stability until the Western intervention in the 19th century. Eventually, in order to protect themselves from external interferences, China, Japan and other major Asian countries adapted modern nation-states.⁹⁵ Likewise, India built a secular nation-state in order to gain its independence from the UK.⁹⁶ In this context, Pinar Bilgin has argued that Asian countries have regarded their modernization and westernization process as an important part of their recognition by the Western world as the "equal members of the international society". In this sense, Bilgin points out that Asian countries have long sought to integrate themselves into the existing world order through westernization.⁹⁷

Japan's westernization endeavours are regarded as the leitmotif of the Asian modernization. Particularly, under the Meiji administration, Japan carried out structural reforms to reshape its political organisation model and national identity in accordance with the "Western values".⁹⁸ After the Second World War, Japan's integration into the liberal world accelerated. As a result, modernity with "Asian

⁹⁴ Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2011): p.632.

⁹⁵ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?", *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.756.

⁹⁶ Chih-yu Shih, "China Rise Syndromes? Drafting National Schools of International Relations in Asia", *Intercultural Communication Studies* XXII: 1 (2013), p.11.

⁹⁷ Pinar Bilgin, "Thinking past 'Western' IR?" p.17.

⁹⁸ Shinichi Kitaoka, "The Significance of the Meiji Restoration", *Asia-Pacific Review* 25, no.1 (2018): p.5.

values” emerged in the late 1980s when Japan was growing rapidly.⁹⁹ In this context, Gilbert Rozman writes as follows:

Asia’s rise was already conspicuous in the 1980s, contributing to discussion of values distinct from those of the West. This did not bode well for universal values, and it left an opening for other ways of thinking about East vs. West. China’s potential weight in Asia made a synthesis more likely.¹⁰⁰

See Seng Tan argues that the Asian study of IR is mimicking Western making of politics as an outcome of the modernization process.¹⁰¹ In the same sense, Rosa Vasilaski argues, “Pluralism operates more or less like the idea of ‘multiple modernitys’”.¹⁰² The economic development of East Asia was another additional momentum for Western intellectuals to import IR theories to these countries. Realism, idealism and constructivism were given particular attention by Asian thinkers. In this respect, Timothy Mitchell argued that modernity is the result of the interaction between the West and the Non-West.¹⁰³ For See Seng Tan, methodologically rationalist approach has resulted in “emulation and hence the uncritical transplantation of some of the theoretical problems associated with the positivism of mainstream IR theory into ‘Southeast Asian International Relations’”.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Gilbert Rozman, *Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. p.80.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.81.

¹⁰¹ See Seng Tan, “Southeast Asia: theory and praxis in International Relations” in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Weaver, New York: Routledge, 2009. p.120.

¹⁰² Rosa Vasilaski, “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-Western IR Theory,” *International Studies* 41, no.1 (2012): p.7.

¹⁰³ Cited in: Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?”, p.7.

¹⁰⁴ See Seng Tan, “Southeast Asia: theory and praxis in International Relations” in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. Arlene B Tickner and Ole Weaver, New York: Routledge, 2009. p.126.

The historical background of Asian countries thereby emerged as a significant aspect of the Asian study of IR. East Asia's history seems very different when compared to Europe's inter-state relations until the 1900s. In particular, the pre-modern East Asian order was durable and rarely generated conflicts thanks to its hierarchical inter-state order in which China was the dominant actor and was regarded as the head of the East Asian family.¹⁰⁵ The tributary system was based on the principles of Confucianism instead of the principles of "national interest" and "sovereign equality".¹⁰⁶ Confucian cultural and social hierarchies are assumed to entail social harmony and peace. For these reasons, this type of a hierarchical system is believed to ensure the "moral purpose of the state" within the "East Asian international society".¹⁰⁷

Nonetheless, for Yuan Kang Wang, Confucian tradition had never constrained or mitigated the Chinese violence. China's foreign policy was oriented to maintain the distribution of power among other states and to intervene and configure it whenever needed. In this context, Chinese leaders perceive the strategy of 'balance of power' as a tool which will sustain their hegemony. Hence, the positions of other states within the system were determined by the preferences of China and China did not refrain from using force when shaping the structure of the tributary system.¹⁰⁸

In contrast to Yuan Kang Wang, David C. Kang argues that the tributary system was based on the values of Confucianism, which provided a shared identity to East Asian countries and demonstrated that even a hierarchical system can be relatively peaceful. This power configuration and hierarchical relationship of East Asia

¹⁰⁵ Masaru Kohno, "East Asia and International Relations Theory", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14, no.1 (2014): p.181.

¹⁰⁶ Alastair Iain Johnston, "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell US About International Relations Theory?", p.61.

¹⁰⁷ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.34.

¹⁰⁸ Yuan Kang Wang, *Harmony and War, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Contemporary Asia in the World)*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.181.

proved to be more stable than Europe throughout the same centuries.¹⁰⁹ In parallel with this, Kang argues that the richer and stronger China could be more beneficial for other East Asian countries because the chaos in East Asia has been often provoked by the weakness and poverty of China.¹¹⁰

In parallel with East Asia's historical background and the hierarchical relationship between China and the tribute states, T.V. Paul also emphasizes that dominant IR theories are not suffice to explain the peaceful changes in the international system.¹¹¹ Today in East Asia, smaller states neither bandwagon nor balance in classical manners. Besides, the rise of China has not given birth to a counter-balance behaviour or economic progression in East Asia as a result of inter-dependence.¹¹² According to Paul,

The relative success of smaller South Asian states to extract trading concessions and infrastructure development funds from both China and India point to this direction. Thus, state behaviour does not follow through established patterns of balancing and bandwagoning.¹¹³

Amitav Acharya also underlines the hierarchical inter-state order in ancient East Asia and its implications for today: He argues that bandwagoning rather than balancing is more relevant in the East Asian context due to hierarchical Confucian culture.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ David C. Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900", *Asian Security* 1, no.1 (2005): p.55.

¹¹⁰ David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong, The Need For New Analytical Frameworks", *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): P.66.

¹¹¹ T.V.Paul, *Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p.9.

¹¹² T.V. Paul, "When balance of power meets globalization: China, India and the small states of South Asia", *Political Studies Association, Special Issue Article*, 2018, p.11.

¹¹³ Ibid, P.10

¹¹⁴ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Introduction" in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge, 2010. p.5.

However, analyzes of major think tanks of Japan, China and India contradict with Amitav Acharya's assumption. As their policy recommendations will be elaborated later, think tanks in these three countries underline the importance of the balance of power configurations in East Asia and both Indian and Japanese thinkers call their governments to actively participate in policies of Western countries that aim to countervail ambitious and aggressive foreign policies of China.

2.6. IR Studies in Japan, China, and India

Building "national schools of IR" in Asian countries is another important topic worth mentioning. For Peter J. Katzenstein, many history books, including 'The Rise of the West' which was written by William McNeill, equalize world history with the evolution of the western community.¹¹⁵ To overcome this equality, contributions of the national schools such as "Copenhagen School" and "Chinese School of IR" might be useful, because according to him, "Both schools focus on the intersection between history and theory".¹¹⁶

On the contrary, Ching-Chang Chen argues that new trajectories in Asian IR should not aim to build their own national schools such as "Chinese School of IR" or "Japanese School of IR". For Chen, "It would be no more than constructing a 'derivative discourse' of Western modernist social science".¹¹⁷ In parallel with this, Chen also contends, "...one may speak of IR studies around Asia, but the scholarly discussions there remain essentially an intellectual monologue within the Western mainstream, reflecting a peculiar version of Eurocentrism".¹¹⁸ It will also become an insuperable obstacle which might lead to mimicking existing IR theories and

¹¹⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Second Coming? Reflections on a Global Theory of International Relations", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 0, no.0 (2018): p.6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p.6.

¹¹⁷ Ching-Chang Chen, "The absence of non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered", p.1.

¹¹⁸ Ching-Chang Chen, "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations", p.482.

ultimately pave the way for a dialogue of the like-minded theories which neither pluralizes nor democratizes the IR literature. Similarly, Rosa Vasilaski also criticizes those who believe that creating national schools would enrich the IR literature and break the dominance of the Western study of IR. In this context, Vasilaski writes as follows,

These regional IR schools are often the mirror-image of the logic underpinning Western dominance: based on the idea of uniqueness of a 'special' civilisation, culture or nation, its 'special' place in the world and its 'special' mission, they often produce their own versions of hegemony and imperialism.¹¹⁹

In this sense, Chih-yu Shih contends that if the Asian study of IR reflects its historical characteristics, it might backfire. For instance, if they introduce the anarchical, tributary system of East Asia as an alternative to Westphalian order, it will create an image that Asian history is repetitive. This alternative would be an important ontological difference, however it might rule out Asia from the 'modernist narrative' of which Asian countries have long been struggled to become part of. Asian countries might also read the existing and imported IR theories in accordance with their own cultures but it might indicate an indefinite change in Asia's social science culture.¹²⁰

Qin Yaqing refers to Yan Xuetong while stating that Yan Xuetong might contribute to establishing a 'Chinese School of IR' with his interpretation of neo-realism with 'moral aspects'. He argues that Xuetong acknowledges the core principles of neo-realism such as the distribution of power and anarchical international system but assigns more significance to the moral values of states.¹²¹ Nevertheless, it can be argued that no alternative claim regarding the ontology of the Western study of IR is provided in this example.

¹¹⁹ Rosa Vasilaski, "Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-Western IR Theory", p.7.

¹²⁰ Chih-yu Shih, "China Rise Syndromes? Drafting National Schools of International Relations in Asia", *Intercultural Communication Studies XXII*: 1. 2013. p.10.

¹²¹ Qin Yaqing, "A Multiverse of Knowledge: Cultures and IR Theories", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics 14*, no.1 (2018): p.425.

Through proceeding from Chen's arguments, it is possible to argue that Asian studies of IR aimed to reflect their local vantage points, and thus failed to provide alternative epistemological and ontological foundations. In this sense, efforts of building national schools of IR have failed to surpass the 'Hegelian trap' and eventually have reproduced the domination of Western IR narratives. Chen argues that these are "'derivative discourses' of the Western IR that reproduce colonial modernity rather than disrupting it".¹²² For example, according to him, the tianxia system which is discussed fervidly within the Chinese IR community can be perceived as "a Chinese 'mimicry' of the Western imperial system".¹²³ They still use the Western study of IR and its concepts as the primary reference points. If Asian studies of IR are willing to increase their impact, it is clear that they need a radical epistemological change because with their present situation, as Chen brilliantly explains, Asian IR "were effectively turned into the 'local informants' for the Western center".¹²⁴

While on the other side, there are scholars who are optimistic about the developments in the Asian study of IR. For instance, Muthiah Alagappa puts forward that Asian IR theorists are developing national responses to international issues and they have already contributed remarkably to existing IR studies. Meanwhile their studies are not based upon the positivist methodologies and unlike the predominant ideas in the West, Asian scholars are determined to complement their opinions with ethical and cultural dimensions.¹²⁵ For Alagappa, emulating and copying of Western intellectual products in Asian countries has been transformed to creating alternative knowledge sites and alongside enriching the IR literature with adding new dimensions to widespread concepts, Asian countries are able to provide new theoretical milieus as well. In this regard, Alagappa states,

¹²² Ching-Chang Chen, "The absence of non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered", p.4.

¹²³ Ibid, p.13.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.18.

¹²⁵ Muthiah Alagappa, "International Relations studies in Asia: distinctive trajectories", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2. (2011): p.194.

Shaped by differing domestic political circumstances, national objectives, international positions, and international circumstances, IR in China, India, and Japan have developed along trajectories that differ not only among themselves but also from trajectories in the West. Declining state domination of the public sphere in all three countries, their rising international positions, and changing international circumstances have contributed to some convergence in master narratives, epistemology, and methodological features among them and with the West.¹²⁶

On the other hand, it is also notable that after Acharya and Buzan wrote “Neither China nor Japan fit comfortably into Realism or Liberalism”,¹²⁷ in 2007, they admitted that both countries have become akin to depicts of realism and liberalism in their foreign policy preferences after ten years. China exceedingly increased its military spending, while Japan has been regulated under a nationalist administration which has lots of things in common with its nationalist Western counterparts.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, Acharya and Buzan still think that Asian IR studies are capable of posing serious challenges to mainstream IR. Their endeavours might lead to a more ‘international’ discipline. They count upon traditional values of the Asian countries and their unique inter-state systems in the history of East Asia. In this context, Acharya and Buzan write as follows,

East Asia provides the clearest historical counterfactual, because its international history has been mainly dominated by hierarchical practices and political theories. There is no shortage of observers of East Asian societies and international relations who think that hierarchy remains a powerful factor in all levels of political relations in these societies.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.225.

¹²⁷ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Introduction” in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge. 2010. p.3.

¹²⁸ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 0*, (2017): p.22.

¹²⁹ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 0*, (2017): p.22.

Alagappa also argues that building national schools will hinder the aim of producing universal knowledge. The Asian study of IR is capable of contributing to the existing IR literature, yet challenging ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of Western IR requires more time and comprehensive theoretical frameworks.¹³⁰

Asia in many ways constitutes a strong alternative site of knowledge construction. Therefore, IR studies in Asia are widely respected as a strong challenge to Western IR theories and allegedly have the potential for breaking the dominance of the conventional IR theories. In particular, critiques of the Westphalian vision of world politics might at least reflect the desire of a more plural and inclusive IR understanding. However, it is observed that despite the emphasis on cultural and historical values, Asian IR studies do not offer different epistemology and still operate within the ontological perceptions of Western IR studies.

For instance, methodologically, positivist enterprise as an epistemological inquiry is still the foremost approach both in the Chinese and American IR communities.¹³¹ Steve Smith observes that the chief epistemological assumptions of the IR discipline are depicted through positivism.¹³² While ontological boundaries of the discipline are drawn by rationalism.¹³³ In the same line, Qin Yaqing also stresses that Chinese IR studies are carried out with strong references to mainstream American IR theories.¹³⁴ In that respect, he opines, “A Chinese IRT school is yet to

¹³⁰ Muthiah Alagappa, “International Relations studies in Asia: distinctive trajectories”, p.222.

¹³¹ Yong-Soo Eun, “To what extent is post-positivism ‘practised’ in International Relations? Evidence from China and the USA”. *International Political Science Review*, 2016, p.4.

¹³² Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline”, p.71.

¹³³ Ibid, p.72.

¹³⁴ Qin Yaqing, ”Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2 (2011): p.234.

emerge”.¹³⁵ Navnita Chadha Behera contends that epistemological domination of IR discipline has determined the boundaries of IR studies in India. In this sense, she writes as follows, “A positivist enterprise precluded a debate about what issues of inquiry could be included in IR and how its key concepts of nation-state, nationalism, sovereignty, and territoriality could acquire different meanings”.¹³⁶ In a similar vein, Behera goes on to say, “There has been no systematic questioning of the positivist logic underlying the realist paradigm... “So, to do ‘theory’ remains essentially a positivist enterprise”.¹³⁷

Western IR literature continues to be the main reference point in Japan, China, and India. Key concepts in Chinese IR studies reproduce the Western way of doing politics; while Japan’s and India’s theoretical contributions are neither adequate nor deep to offer alternative methodologies. In this context, it won’t be an exaggeration to argue, “Western scholarship dominates both the ontology and epistemology of IR theory”.¹³⁸ Due to these reasons, it will be a huge mistake to reject the hitherto development of the IR literature even if it is still dominantly Eurocentric. Rather, it will be smarter to underscore the overlapping points of Asian IR studies with the Western study of IR. This might facilitate the democratisation process of Western IR studies and ultimately lead to a broader discipline.

2.7. Conclusion

As stated, this chapter explored the contributions of the Asian study of IR to the existing IR literature. In this sense, ignoring the opinions of ancient philosophers and the historical background of Asia are observed to be the two strong opposing points of those who argue that the existing IR literature falls short when explaining political developments in Asia. In this sense, sticking with the Westphalian wisdom

¹³⁵ Ibid, p.251.

¹³⁶ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-Imagining IR in India”, p.349-350.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.348.

¹³⁸ Jacqueline de Matos-Ala, “Making the invisible, visible: challenging the knowledge structures inherent in International Relations Theory in order to create knowledge plural curricula” *Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.*, Volume. 60. No.1 (2017): p.7.

is identified as the biggest obstacle for Western thinkers. Even though above-mentioned alternatives of Asian IR scholars regarding the dominance of Western way of performing IR can be perceived as valuable contributions, I argue that none of these approaches is capable of offering a strong ontological and epistemological alternative to Western IR studies. Although many of these arguments find their roots in the history of East Asia, questions of how these historical developments have affected Asian IR thinking and how they influenced behaviours of East Asian states are not sufficiently explained. Therefore, I agree that Asian contributions are not given the credit they deserve in the IR literature, however, they are still far from offering alternative theoretical and epistemological assumptions to the Western study of IR.

The next chapters will examine indigenous contributions of three major Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and India through analyzing their influential philosophers, key concepts, and sizable think tanks.

CHAPTER 3

IR STUDIES IN JAPAN

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, IR studies in Japan will be evaluated. This chapter will examine how social sciences and different theoretical approaches within the Japanese academic community emerged and what were their vantage points. Then, contributions of Kyoto School's prominent figures such as Nishida Kitaro and Tetsuro Watsuji will be examined. Lastly, this chapter deals with the research fields of think tanks and seeks an answer to the question of how the recent developments in the global affairs affect Japan and how these policies are tackled by the influential Japanese think tanks.

3.2. Historical Background of IR Studies in Japan

Japan's modernization process under the Meiji administration has greatly shaped the social science studies. With launching of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan entered into a rapid modernization process. In this respect, according to Yoko Arisaka,

It is not an exaggeration to say that the history of post-Meiji Japan is shaped by the cultural understanding of a difference between 'Japanese vs. Western', or more commonly, 'East and West', where the East represented what is traditional, spiritual, indigenous, cultural, backwards, particular (to Japan or Asia), and the West represented its contrast, namely what is modern, materialistic, foreign, scientific, advanced, universal (as science and technology, the chief markers of modernity, were said to be based on the principles of universal truth).¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Yoko Arisaka, "Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications". *The Royal Institute of Philosophy*. (2014): p.4.

Meiji had two options when he faced the expansionism of the Western world: Being the victim of it or protecting itself by pursuing a modernization program.¹⁴⁰ Thus, Meiji followed the modernization path but he did not ignore Japan's cultural background.¹⁴¹ In this sense, elites such as Ito - Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and Okuma Shigenobu contributed hugely to the modernization process with their deep enthusiasm for "Westernization".¹⁴²

After the modernization process of the Japanese politics took place, "China's centrality" in Japanese narratives and discourses gradually disappeared. Until that time, "'China' helped Japanese self-definition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries".¹⁴³ Since then, Japanese intellectuals began to tackle with the consequences of Japan's interaction with the western world.¹⁴⁴ In this sense, the prevailing tendency in scholarly discussions assumes that if Japan aspired to become a modern capitalist country, it had to free itself from the "Chinese hegemony".¹⁴⁵ On the other aspect of the Japanese modernization, it is important to note that from the early 17th century until the mid 19th century, Japan was largely outside of the Western civilization's sphere of influence.¹⁴⁶ And even today, Japan can be defined as "in many respects still a feudal society with little modern Western

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.4.

¹⁴¹ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.117.

¹⁴² Ibid, p.118.

¹⁴³ Akira Iriye, *The Chinese and the Japanese Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980. p.4.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p.6.

¹⁴⁶ Erin McCarthy, *Ethics Embodied Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*, UK: Lexington Books, 2010. P.xii.

technology”.¹⁴⁷ In this respect, Japan’s rapid modernization in the late 19th century was materialized hand in hand with the growth of the militant nationalist discourse under the influence of the “Westernization” process.¹⁴⁸

Shinichi Kitaoka argues that Meiji embarked on fundamental reforms that radically altered the Japanese social science studies.¹⁴⁹ For Nakano, from the Meiji period until the introduction of Marxism to the Japanese social science, Japanese social science studies were dominated by “moral values” and “humanism”.¹⁵⁰ As modern political science studies had come to the fore, the preliminary social science studies in Japan were heavily dominated by state analyses in scholarly discussions.¹⁵¹

For, Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, the field of IR in Japan emerged in the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, systematic studies regarding this field were not observable until the aftermath of the Second World War.¹⁵² According to Kawata and Ninomiya, two approaches had framed IR studies in Japan until the 1970s. The first approach was developed by the group of “international political science” and the “power politician group” and the second approach is labelled as the “Marxist group”.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Shinichi Kitaoka, “The Significance of the Meiji Restoration”, *Asia-Pacific Review* 25, no.1 (2018): p.5.

¹⁵⁰ Ryoko Nakano, “‘Pre-History’ of International Relations in Japan: Yanaihara Tadao’s Dual Perspective of Empire”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no.2, (2007): p.307.

¹⁵¹ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*, p.38.

¹⁵² Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, “The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan,” *The Developing Economies* 2, no. 2 (1964): p.195.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.199.

Power politicians aim to analyze the relations of nation-states through assessing relative power of one state on another. This approach is respected as the “orthodoxy” in the Japanese literature and the pioneers of this view such as, Tanaka, Rōyama, and Uchiyama are widely accepted as followers of Kamikawa. Concepts such as “imperialism”, “power”, “balance of power”, and “nationalism” are among the themes that these scholars had focused on. They examined Japan’s new role in the international system after the Second World War as well as the ways that Japan might build its political institutions in collaboration with the Western World. In this context, they accepted the Western based IR ontology, and in order to benefit from the existing international order, they tried to locate Japan into the established global system.¹⁵⁴

Marxist scholars such as Maeshiba and Okakura preferred to determine “class interests” and “hegemony of capitalism” as their unit of analysis. Rather than focusing on economic and political bounds among sovereign states, these two scholars tend to view the international system as a whole and argued that the driving force of the international relations is the international community and the cardinal factor of this community is conflicts between different economic and social classes. However, from their point of view, conventional IR studies confined themselves to the limits of policy-oriented analyses. In Marxist scholars’ view, the priority should be attached to examining the role of expanding international organizations and regional alliances.¹⁵⁵

Kazuya Yamamoto argues that Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR), which was founded in 1956, played an important role in the development of institutional IR studies in Japan. Especially throughout the 1960s, diplomatic historians undertook an immense mission to conduct policy relevant researches in

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p.200.

¹⁵⁵ Kazuya Yamamoto, “International Relations studies and theories in Japan: a trajectory shaped by war, pacifism, and globalization”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2 (2011): p.201.

JAIR. By the late 1960s, the focal point was shifted from IR to International Political Economy (IPE) studies.¹⁵⁶

According to Kazuya Yamamoto, development of IR studies in Japan, in particular after the Second World War, has been shaped by pacifism and historical practices of Japan. For Yamamoto, “Methodologically, Japan’s IR studies have been characterized by their historical approaches”.¹⁵⁷ Introducing thinkers such as Nishida, Tanaka and Hirano is a concrete outcome of these efforts. Even though Japan’s relations with other countries were ardently discussed among Japanese scholars, there was no discernible theoretical framework, and hence these debates cannot be respected as indicators of the emergence of the field of IR as an academic discipline.¹⁵⁸

3.3. Fundamental Approaches in IR Studies in Japan

Takashi Inoguchi is the most esteemed and influential Japanese scholar who study Japanese IR in particular and the Asian study of IR in general. In his view, since the late 1890s, there have been four traditions in Japanese IR studies that matter greatly in shaping the framework of IR trajectories within the Japanese academic community. These are: i) “Staatslehre”, ii) “Marxism”, iii) “Historicism”, and iv) “the American-style approach”.¹⁵⁹ Each methodology will be introduced respectively

3.3.1. Staatslehre

Staatslehre tradition is considered as the most pervasive political thinking in Japan between 1868 and 1945. Throughout this period, policy-oriented analyses were

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.266.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.260.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p.260.

¹⁵⁹ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no.3. (2007): p.372.

carried out via government-backed institutions. Nevertheless, transnational studies were also relevant in Japanese political studies. In this regard, rather than defending the supremacy of the authority and the sovereignty of the Japanese state, transnational trade and economic activities of the “Imperial Japan” were scrutinized as well. Economic interactions of Japan were examined through lenses of Japan’s national interests and national identity.¹⁶⁰

Kuji Murata contends that until the end of the Second World War, Japanese IR studies had evolved around two main research subjects, namely international law and diplomatic history. The latter also covers economic agreements of Japan with other states as well as Japan’s domestic economic development.¹⁶¹ Kawata and Ninomiya have similarly argued that until the mid-1940s, thanks to the *Staatslehre* tradition, domestic politics of Japan, and Japan’s national sovereignty had become the two main components of the Japanese political thinking. In this sense, they think that “foreign policy” was regarded as “at best as an extension of domestic politics”.¹⁶² Economics and law were two essential components of the *Staatslehre* methodology, because under the Meiji administration, Japan entered overseas activities and tried to represent itself as a civilized and modern empire to the Western world.¹⁶³ *Staatslehre* tradition was seeking to legitimize policy actions of incumbent administrations and in order to attain this particular goal, the Japanese Association of International Law was established in 1897 thanks to the intense efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Tetsuya Sakai, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868–1945”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Volume: 9, Issue: 2, August (2008): p.237.

¹⁶¹ Koji Murata, “The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science 11*, Special Issue: 03, (2010): p. 356.

¹⁶² Tadahsi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, “The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan,” *The Developing Economies*, p.190.

¹⁶³ Tetsuya Sakai, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868–1945”, p.234.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.235.

The most explicit methodology of the Staatslehre tradition was analyzing historical events and personalities through positivist epistemology. Staatslehre tradition also had a huge amount of impact on military and colonial studies in the pre-Second World War era. Since 1945, most of the area studies have continued to follow this approach.¹⁶⁵ In particular, today's think tanks in Japan are following a similar path.

3.3.2. Marxism

The second strongest school of thought of the same period was Marxism. Marxism was believed to be the anti-thesis of the Staatslehre tradition. Analyses of Marxist scholars and thinkers were highly inspirational within Japanese social sciences from the 1920s to the 1960s.¹⁶⁶ Attractiveness of Marxism began to emerge when the word “social science” (shakai kagaku) entered into the Japanese academic literature. Takashi Inoguchi thinks that, “Japanese social science had been literally ‘Marxised’ by 1930s”.¹⁶⁷

Ohara Institute for Social Research, which was founded in 1919, had served to educate Marxist academicians for a long time. Even though Marxism began to be heard in the late 1890s within the Japanese intellectual circles, thanks to strenuous efforts of the Ohara Institute, it had flourished rapidly. Despite a militarist turn in the Japanese domestic politics in the 1930s and increased suppression on Marxist scholars especially after Japan's joining to the anti-Comintern pact in 1936, Marxists managed to sustain their impact within the Japanese academia.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?” p.372.

¹⁶⁶ Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “The Study of IR in Japan: towards a more international discipline”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1*, (2001): p.11.

¹⁶⁷ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?” p.372.

¹⁶⁸ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*, Berkeley. Los Angeles & London, University of California Press, 2004. p.53.

After the Second World War, Marxism became increasingly popular school of thought in Japan.¹⁶⁹ In particular, the ‘article 9’ of Japan’s new constitution was heavily criticized by Marxist thinkers on the ground that it was an indication of Japan’s dependence on the U.S. in its security affairs which was then embodied in 1951 with signing of the “Security Treaty Between the U.S. and Japan”.¹⁷⁰

Marxist theorists also criticized the former imperial system of Japan and this attitude also contributed to evolving of a “civil society”.¹⁷¹ For Andrew E. Barshay, Uchida Yoshihiko was a prominent Marxist thinker and from his point of view, civil society had its Marxist aspects in two frames. The first is their rejection to Japan’s subordinate position to the U.S., and the second stems from their status of “future-oriented but immanent critique of Japan’s capitalism”.¹⁷²

According to Japanese Marxists such as Uchida Yoshihiko and Hirata Kiyooki, the “Japanese style of capitalism” was developed because of the weakness of civil society.¹⁷³ It is also notable that some of Marxist thinkers in Japan such as Arisawa Hiromi, defined themselves as “non-communist Marxists” in a sense that they were in favour of a planned and state-governed economy which will decrease the poor-rich gap and blur the class distinction; but did not promote actions which will lead to overthrowing the existing administration on behalf of a socialist revolution.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Thiago Corrêa Malafaia, “Japanese International Relations: an assessment of the 1971-2011 period”, *Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association*, 2016. P.6.

¹⁷⁰ Koji Murata, “The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations”, p.357.

¹⁷¹ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*, p.175.

¹⁷² Ibid, p.164.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.69.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p.59.

Starting with the 1980s, the narrative of “varieties of capitalism” entered into the Japanese academic agenda through the “international political economy” (IPE) studies. “Developmental state theory” constituted the framework of these academic studies. Chalmers Johnson is the person who used this term at first. He argued that Japan’s capitalism path was very different than the Western experience because the central role in capitalist model of Japan was played by the Japanese state. In this sense, the state elite forced markets to acknowledge their subordinate status to the government, and private sector played its role in industrializing the country under the guidance of the Japanese government.¹⁷⁵

After the cold war came to an end, Marxism lost its attractiveness among the Japanese academics mainly due to the collapse of the USSR. As a result, many of the Marxists changed their position and defined themselves as proponents of different traditions such as Post-Marxism, post-modernism or radical feminism.¹⁷⁶ Despite protectionist economic policy of the U.S. towards the Japanese products in the 1990s, criticisms of Marxists were not observable. Nonetheless, Inoguchi contends that footprint of Marxism is still traceable in Japanese IR studies today.¹⁷⁷

3.3.3. Historicism

The historicism tradition has been perceived as a “branch of humanity” rather than social sciences at the initial stage. Until 1945, focus of the historicist approach was on events and personalities rather than politics itself. This approach is related to Hirano’s “theory of inter-cultural relations” and Hamashita’s regional integration discourse. Hirano was one of the most esteemed Marxist scholars of the pre-second world war period. During the war, he radically changed his political ideas and became supporter of “Greater Asianism” or “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity

¹⁷⁵ Walden Bello, “Reading Hobbes in Beijing: Great Power Politics and the Challenge of the Peaceful Ascent”, in *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE)*, Ed. Mark Blyth, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.181.

¹⁷⁶ Koji Murata, “The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations” p.373.

¹⁷⁷ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?” p. 378.

Area”. He labelled the Meiji administration as a classical colonial empire with absolute monarchy. In this sense, he also studied international law and argued that the hierarchical Japanese administration and society should be replaced with an equal communal organisation based on material conditions.¹⁷⁸

After the Second World War, he changed his opinions and became a supporter of “Asianism” based on economic aspects. He abandoned his anti-governmental stance and stopped opposing the supremacy of the state sovereignty. He argued that each state had their own missions to develop economically within their international peripheries.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Hirano argued that Western forms of economic rising should not penetrate to East Asian region because “they undermine smallholder communitarianism by bourgeois individualism”.¹⁸⁰

Hamashita’s studies were more about the historical background of Japan, in particular its position within the Sino-centric tributary system. Hamashihta argues that even though China had a clear upper hand on the military power compared to its tributaries, some countries within the system were able to pose serious challenges to the Chinese supremacy.¹⁸¹

Starting with the 19th century, tributaries of the Sino-centric tributary system demanded to become equal trade partners and began to challenge the hegemony of China within the system thanks to interventions of the Western countries.¹⁸² After Japan’s trade with the Western World grew in the late 19th century, Japan attempted

¹⁷⁸ Tetsuya Sakai “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868– 1945.” p.243.

¹⁷⁹ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?” p.381.

¹⁸⁰ Andrew E. Barshley, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*, p.181.

¹⁸¹ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009.p.44.

¹⁸² Takeshi Hamashita, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and historical perspectives*, Edited by Linda Grove and Mark Selden, USA & Canada: Routledge, 2008, p.21.

to re-construct the tributary system in East Asia. However, Japan had gotten stuck between the Western influence on East Asia and military power of the Sino-centric tributary system.¹⁸³

Hamashita is among the leading scholars who studied the tributary system earlier. Despite studies on the tributary system has been launched recently thanks to the ramification of the field of IR in Asian countries, Hamashita studied the tributary system in the 1980s. He studied regional history of East Asia with particular focus on the tributary system. Hamashita's regional history studies reveal the fact that the mindset of the Japanese academic community is strictly biased with the "Westphalian principles" which prevent them from analyzing their own regional and historical background.¹⁸⁴

What makes his studies unique is that Hamasihta preferred to study the peripheral countries within the tributary system rather than the core ones. Thus, Japan and China were merely referred in his writings on the tributary system.¹⁸⁵ In this respect, he was particularly attracted by the example of the Ryukyu Kingdom which was under the control of two different states at the same time from the 17th century until the 19th century. For Shimizu, the importance of this study emanates from its questioning of the non-interventionism and state sovereignty principles of the Westphalian wisdom. In this sense, Shimizu argues:

What is remarkable here is that the system of blurred state boundaries made it possible in practice for a state to come under the control of two different jurisdictions. In other words, the Ryukyu Kingdom exploited the system of blurred boundaries to maintain its relative independence from both big powers.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Ibid, p.26.

¹⁸⁴ Kosuke Shimizu, "The Genealogy of Culturalist International Relations in Japan and Its Implications for Post-Western Discourse". p.13.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, p.12.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p.12.

Despite its emphasis on the state sovereignty and questioning of the superiority of the Westphalian system through its analysis on historical background of East Asian inter-state system, it is observed that the historicist approach does not have promising insights for future trajectories of Japan's IR studies.

3.3.4. American-style Approach

The last tradition is the American-style approach: According to Takashi Inoguchi, after 1945, American social sciences gained momentum within the Japanese academic circles. The American-style approach has two very characteristic components. These are the "formulation of theories" and empirical testing of them. This intellectual tradition became stronger from the 1970s until the 2000s.¹⁸⁷ American-style methodology in Japan's IR studies claims that the security and cooperation of Japan have to be tackled frontally.¹⁸⁸

In this sense, issues of Japan's soft power and the position of Japan in East Asia are analyzed from Western IR's point of view. In this context, Japan's alliance with the U.S. is taken for granted and Japan's foreign policy behaviours are evaluated under the given regional and global conditions.¹⁸⁹ The most notable examples of this approach are observed in the studies of the Japanese think tanks.

Despite common perception within the Japanese academic community that *Staatslehre* and Marxism represent two opposite stances, Yanaihara managed to apply both traditions to his analyses. He acknowledged moral elements of state on the one hand and oriented his analyses to concepts such as imperialism and class

¹⁸⁷ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009. p.54.

¹⁸⁸ Graham Gerard Ong, "Building an IR Theory with 'Japanese Characteristics': Nishida Kitaro and 'Emptiness'", *Journal of International Studies* 33, no.1, (2004): p.42.

¹⁸⁹ Sakai Tetsuya, "The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868– 1945." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9, no.2 (2008): p.245.

struggle on the other.¹⁹⁰ He argued that all nations within the territories of an empire should live together based on the moral principles of the empire however, he also added material aspects of political life to his analyses and contend that empires create overseas colonies and expand economically whenever they see necessary.¹⁹¹

He criticized capitalism but did not completely embrace Marxism as a communist. Instead, he regarded socialism as a way of ensuring harmony within society with less economic inequality among each person. In a similar vein, Suzuki introduces Kawakami Hajime who combined the elements of Confucianism with Marxist historical materialism:

The socialist economist Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946) stood as an example of those who oscillated between Marxist historical materialism and traditional Japanese thought. His work, *Binbo Monogatari* [A Tale of Poverty], published in 1916, depicted the poverty of the underdeveloped world from a Marxist viewpoint, and yet his solution was identical with the Confucian moral principles of restraint and frugality.¹⁹²

Takashi Inoguchi contends that despite their waning influence, these four approaches still linger on Japan's IR theory making studies today.¹⁹³ According to him, each of these approaches has its own characteristics and disadvantages. However, researchers from other countries in the Asia-Pacific focus on their similarities with the Western narratives. For instance, according to Thiago Malafaia, all of these traditions lack epistemological and methodological

¹⁹⁰ Ryoko Nakano, "'Pre-History' of International Relations in Japan: Yanaihara Tadao's Dual Perspective of Empire", *International Studies* 35, no.2 (2007): p.303.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Morris-Suzuki, *A History of Japanese Economic Thought*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989. P.78-79.

¹⁹³ Takashi Inoguchi, "Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?" p.378.

frameworks, thus, they can be considered as “descriptive studies” rather than theories.¹⁹⁴

In a similar vein, Ching-Chang Chen, argues that while the four traditions of Inoguchi seem to be based on different assumptions and theoretical compositions at first glance, none of them pays sufficient attention to the narratives that were developed in other countries of Asia. In this sense, Chen writes, “Japanese IR academics believe they can learn little from the concepts and experiences of other Asian countries, because Asia lacks Westphalia”.¹⁹⁵ In fact, it is possible to argue that all of the four traditions that Inoguchi introduces have their origins in the Western political experiences and were imported to Japan during the period modernization.

3.4. Influential Thinkers in Japanese Political Thought

As illustrated above, Nishida Kitaro is respected as the most influential philosopher of the modern Japanese political thought. For this reason, the concepts of Nishida Kitaro as well as criticism of him will be provided in this part of the thesis. Besides Nishida Kitaro, studies of Tetsuro Watsuji, who was Nishida’s colleague at the Kyoto University, will be explored as well.

3.4.1. Nishida Kitaro

Among the modern Japanese philosophers and thinkers, Nishida Kitaro is respected as the most famous and unique one. Nishida Kitaro is known as the father of the “modern Japanese philosophy” and the leader of the “Kyoto School of Philosophy”. Nishida was a professor at Kyoto University from 1914–1929. In 1911, with the publication of his first work, “The Study of Good, Zenno Kenkyu”, Nishida began

¹⁹⁴ Thiago Corrêa Malafaia, “Japanese International Relations: an assessment of the 1971-2011 period”, *A Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association* 10, no.1. (2016): p.9.

¹⁹⁵ Ching-Chang Chen and Young Chul Cho, “Theory “ in *Critical Imaginations In International Relations*, ed. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.254.

to develop his fundamental concept, namely “experiential ontology”, which is a form of philosophical foundation based on “experience”.¹⁹⁶

The preliminary theoretical study of Nishida was to ground in what he calls “pure experience”. “Pure experience” was defined as “prior to subject and object”, nevertheless including the elements of both. Yoko Arisaka clarifies the bottom line of this philosophy by stating, “According to Nishida, ‘it is not that the individual has experience, but in experience emerges the individual’. The individual experience is only a small part of Experience”.¹⁹⁷

Nishida did not find the Cartesian logic appealing and he preferred to adapt dialectic. In his dialectic model, a thesis and an antithesis coexist without forming a synthesis.¹⁹⁸ On the epistemological ground, Nishida’s primary goal was to show that the traditional subject-object dualism of the Western philosophy, which reached its peak via Kantian philosophy, was not deep adequate to understand the modern relationship between subject and object. In this regard, Nishida argues, “Assumption of the opposition between knower and known is not an ‘inherent necessity’”.¹⁹⁹ Nishida goes on to say,

In their absolute opposition, subject and object can never be synthesized, and yet they are inseparable in their mutual reference... In their mutual implacement in the world, their opposition remains as the world’s own dialectical self-determination.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ Yoko Arisaka, Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications”. *The Royal Institute of Philosophy*. 2014. p.7-8.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.8.

¹⁹⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?”, p.379.

¹⁹⁹ Nishida Kitaro, *Place and Dialectic*, Translated by John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo as “Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic”, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. p.12.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.38.

In this respect, Nishida develops two fundamental concepts: *Basho* (place) and “self-negation”. For Nishida, ‘*basho*’ signifies an element that exists in-between the relationship of subject and object. In this regard, he writes, “There must be a *basho* wherein they are related”.²⁰¹ He also evaluates *basho* within the scope of the relationship between content and knowledge. In this sense, Nishida argues “A form of knowledge requires content. Even if we can conceive a single whole unifying the two together, there must be a *basho* wherein it can be mirrored”.²⁰² In Nishida’s *basho*, the system is comprised of concrete universals. In the same logic, identities, political structures and organizing models of societies are located in the “pure experience”.²⁰³ In his view, this “pure experience” is conceived as, “an immediate state prior to the differentiation between the experiencing subject and the experienced object”.²⁰⁴

Another important and supplementary concept of Nishida is called “self-negation”. Self-negation is described as “the temporal-[human]-historical self comes into being in relation to its simultaneous negation in space, and vice versa”.²⁰⁵ Thus, Nishida’s dialectic can be best understood with his concept of “self-negation”: “In contrast to dialectic that would subsume opposites under a sublating concept (i.e.,

²⁰¹ Ibid, p.51.

²⁰² Ibid, p.50.

²⁰³ Satofumi Kawamura, “Introduction to the “Nishida Problem””: Nishida Kitaro’s Political Philosophy and Governmentality”, *Afrasian Research Center*, Phase 2, Ryukoku University, 2013, p.8.

²⁰⁴ Nishida Kitaro, *Place and Dialectic*, Translated by John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo as “Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic”, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. p.8.

²⁰⁵ Alan Tansman, *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009. p.334.

Hegel), this dialectic unfolds the interrelations of opposites and independents via mutual self-negation”.²⁰⁶ Regarding self-negation, Yoko Arisaka writes,

An individual negates himself in his identification of himself with the whole (society, community), and simultaneously negates the whole in order to determine itself as the individual. The individual ‘empties itself’ in the whole, yet the whole gives particular characteristics to the individual.²⁰⁷

In Nishida’s philosophy, contradictions are manifested in concrete and universal forms rather than privileging a characteristic of any nation. If every determiner of both society and the global system consists of universal forms, it would signify a greater reality and this greater reality is inherently universal.²⁰⁸ In this sense, for Nishida, “discursive reinterpretation is the basis of transcendence of boundaries”.²⁰⁹ Nishida’s self-negation also assumes, “The temporal-[human]-historical self comes into being in relation to its simultaneous negation in space, and vice versa”.²¹⁰ By the same token, the past can be emerged out of the present and future. In this context, Nishida adapt this understanding to Japanese history. Nishida puts it forward by stating,

The return of the past in our nation has always been the character of a renewal. It has never been a mere return to the past but always a step forward as the self-determination of the eternal present. . . . In this history of our country, there was always a return to the Imperial Throne, a return to the past. This has never meant a return to the systems and culture of

²⁰⁶ Nishida Kitaro, *Place and Dialectic*, Translated by John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo as “Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic”, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. p.38.

²⁰⁷ Yoko Arisaka, “Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications”. P.13.

²⁰⁸ Satofumi Kawamura, “Introduction to the “Nishida Problem”: Nishida Kitaro’s Political Philosophy and Governmentality”, *Afrasian Research Center*, Phase 2, Ryukoku University, 2013, p.8.

²⁰⁹ Shih Chih-yu, “China Rise Syndromes? Drafting National Schools of International Relations in Asia”. *Intercultural Communication Studies XXII*: 1 2013. P.11.

²¹⁰ Alan Tansman, *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009. p.334.

antiquity but has involved taking a step ahead in the direction of a new world.²¹¹

Proceeding from self-negation, Nishida reflects this understanding to universal by combining his self-negation dialectic with *basho*: “In negating itself, the world affirms the individuals implaced in it. And in turn the individuals through mutual self-negation contribute to the world’s creativity”.²¹²

3.4.2. Criticism of Nishida Kitaro

In his book titled “The Problem of Japanese Culture” (*Nihon-bunka no mondai*), which was published in 1940, Nishida seems to regard the Japanese Emperor as the cultural authority of the Japanese imperial-nation state, and this has entailed the suspicion that Nishida might have contributed to the “total mobilisation of individuals as imperial subjects who must be undisputedly loyal to the Emperor and the National Polity”.²¹³ On this ground, Nishida was densely criticized by left-wing politicians and thinkers particularly for his alleged support to extreme nationalist rhetoric of the Japanese government. He was also accused of being the “academic brain of the fascist government”.²¹⁴

Alongside these criticisms, Marxist thinkers argue that his assessments lack historical points, material aspects of production relations, and a consistent theoretical framework.²¹⁵ For instance, Tosaka Jun, a Marxist student of Nishida,

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Nishida Kitaro, *Place and Dialectic*, Translated by John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo as “Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic”, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. p.38.

²¹³ Satofumi Kawamura, “Introduction to the “Nishida Problem”: Nishida Kitaro’s Political Philosophy and Governmentality”, p.1.

²¹⁴ Yoko Arisaka, “The Nishida Enigma: ‘The Principle of the New World Order’.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 51, no. 1 (1996): P.85.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

labelled Nishida's philosophy as "an academic, bourgeois philosophy of idealism that was trans- historical, formalistic, romantic, and phenomenological".²¹⁶

Nishida's writings were pretty much popular among Japanese society during the 1930s, and his ideas were seen as compliments on the nationalist sentiment of the militarist government of Japan that justify wars and invasions on behalf of a "greater Japan". For Feenberg, after Nishida had seen that the defeat of Japan in the Second World War was inevitable, he changed his militaristic tone and turned to a strictly non-militaristic and cultural nationalist discourse.²¹⁷ Even though Nishida was targeted for being a fan of the militarist government, Yoko Arisaka argues that Nishida was not sympathetic to the fascist Japanese administration. Nevertheless, he met with government officials in order to provide his vision for Japan's better administration.²¹⁸

Although Kyoto School and Nishida Kitaro lost their popularity mainly because of the disastrous defeat of Japan in the Second World War,²¹⁹ Nishida continues to be an important figure and his opinions are still being discussed today. For Arisaka, the privilege of Nishida Kitaro stems from his endeavour to create a "philosophical model that exists neither in European nor in American philosophies".²²⁰ Kawamura thinks that the idea of "a world-oriented nationalist political philosophy respecting freedom and rationality" is offered by Nishida.²²¹ Nishida was the most influential

²¹⁶ Ibid. p.85.

²¹⁷ Yoko Arisaka, "The Nishida Enigma: 'The Principle of the New World Order'. P.96.

²¹⁸ Ibid, p.86.

²¹⁹ Gerard Graham Ong, "Building an IR Theory with 'Japanese Characteristics': Nishida Kitaro and 'Emptiness'", *Journal of International Studies*, Vol.33, No.1, (2004) pp: 35-58. p.39.

²²⁰ Yoko Arisaka, "Beyond "East and West": Nishida's Universalism and Postcolonial Critique", *The Review of Politics* 59, no.3 (1997): p.7.

²²¹ Satofumi Kawamura, "Introduction to the "Nishida Problem": Nishida Kitaro's Political Philosophy and Governmentality", p.4.

thinker of Japan during the 1930s, however, it is possible to argue that despite his emphasis on identity and studies regarding dialectic which might animate IR studies in Asia, Nishida Kitaro's contribution to academic IR studies in Japan do not matter greatly within the Japanese IR community.

For Takashi Inoguchi, tradition of Kyoto School resembles constructivist school of thought and he respects Nishida as "an innate constructivist". Inoguchi goes further and contends, "Before Americans 'invented' constructivism, many Japanese historians of international relations felt they had been constructivists all the way through".²²² He argues, "Indeed, Japanese scholars feel that they have been practising reflectivist scholarship long before their American counterparts".²²³

Ching-Chang Chen criticizes the way Inoguchi defines and depicts the contributions of Nishida Kitaro, and the Kyoto School to Japanese political and intellectual history. Chen puts forward that by analogizing Nishida's dialectic with Hegel, Inoguchi reproduces the established "self-other dichotomy". In this sense, Chen argues, "Inoguchi thus reinforces the West's assumed cultural superiority that he seeks to problematize".²²⁴ Chen contends that Nishida's emphasis on the Japanese identity is vital and his argument of coexistence of two theses without forming a synthesis would be a remarkable contribution for escaping from the self-other dichotomy and making the methodological approaches of IR theorising more plural. However, Inoguchi made a mistake by comparing Nishida's perception of world politics with Hegel's. In this respect, according to Chen,

Nishida's dialectic is reduced to something 'more Hegelian'[than Hegelian]'. In doing so Inoguchi ends up reinforcing the West's assumed cultural superiority that he seeks to problematise. It is self-defeating for a

²²² Takashi Inoguchi, "Why are there no non-Western theories of International Relations? The case of Japan" in *Non-Western international relations theory: (Perspectives on and beyond Asia.)* ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge. 2010. p. 53.

²²³ Graham Gerard Ong, "Building an IR Theory with 'Japanese Characteristics': Nishida Kitaro and 'Emptiness'", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.33, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-58, p.41.

²²⁴ Ching-Chang Chen "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations" p.470.

non-Western IR project to look for a investiture from a questionable Western authority such as Hegel (who had famously equated Asia with the land of Oriental despotism to be absorbed by the law-based, civilised West/Europe, while ignoring other potentially valuable sources.²²⁵

Besides Nishida Kitaro, Tetsuro Watsuji was another esteemed thinker for the theoretical inquiry of Japan's political history.²²⁶ Tetsuro Watsuji was colleague of Nishida's at the Kyoto University. He served for twenty five years at the same institution. He is well known for his analyzes on Western philosophers as well as his studies about culture.²²⁷ Although Watsuji was colleague of Nishida and a member of the Kyoto School, his ideas are not rooted at the core of the same philosophy.²²⁸ Nevertheless, especially his ethical understanding, reflects the mainstream traditions of his period such as "Buddhism" and "Confucianism".²²⁹

For Watsuji, society cannot be examined apart from the environment shapes them, so their studies are part of the domain that they conceive. As opposed to examining subject and object apart from each other, Watsuji argues that human beings are constantly interacting with culture, education and aesthetic. Opinions of individuals reflect the features of the objects they engage with.²³⁰

In terms of theoretical perspective, much of the literature about him compares his vision with Heidegger. In this sense, Arisaka writes as follows,

²²⁵ Ching-Chang Chen and Young Chul Cho, "Theory" in *Critical Imaginations In International Relations*, ed. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.254.

²²⁶ Yoko Arisaka, "Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications". p.3.

²²⁷ Ibid, p.10.

²²⁸ Erin McCarthy, *Ethics Embodied Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*, UK: Lexington Books, 2010. P.11.

²²⁹ Ibid, p.xii.

²³⁰ Yoko Arisaka, "Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications". p.11

Watsuji engages Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-World yet criticizes Heidegger's emphasis on temporality and individuality; human existence is just as spatial as temporal, and the place and space of existence must equally be a fundamentally constitutive part of a human self.²³¹

Tetsuro Watsuji finds a strong linkage between environment and national identity.²³² According to him, emotions of Japanese people are the primary determiner of their social behaviours and reactions. In this sense, he argued that Japan is ethnically homogenous country and this characteristic demonstrates Japan's cultural uniqueness.²³³ Watsuji's analysis also reflected the "patriarchal aspects of Japan".²³⁴ After the Second World War, Japan lost almost all of its colonies and entered a radically different position within a bipolar international system. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the new Japanese nation was built under the narrative of the cultural uniqueness of Japan and Watsuji had contributed extremely to this discourse through his studies. In this regard, he excluded "time" from his analyses and adapted "unchanging cultural essence".²³⁵

Watsuji thinks that the state-society relationship determines the social behaviour of each person.²³⁶ In parallel with this, William Lafleur explains Watsuji's approach by stating,

According to Watsuji, both sides of human existence, man's existence as an individual and his existence as society, are coequal and thought of as

²³¹ Ibid, p.11.

²³² Alan Tansman (Ed. by), *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009, p.240.

²³³ Eika Tai, "Rethinking Culture, National Culture, and Japanese Culture", *Japanese Language and Literature, Vol. 37, No. 1, Special Issue: Sociocultural Issues in Teaching Japanese: Critical Approaches* (2003): p.12.

²³⁴ Erin McCarthy, *Ethics Embodied Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*, UK: Lexington Books, 2010. P.5.

²³⁵ Alan Tansman, *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, p.99.

²³⁶ Yoko Arisaka, "Modern Japanese Philosophy: Historical Contexts and Implications". p.12.

such. The important point is that the notion of being in relationship is not secondary or an afterthought but, along with the individuated aspect, constitutive of man from the outset.²³⁷

This understanding presupposes, “all members of a society are living inside mental and physical boundaries that were determined by cultural essences”.²³⁸ Contrary to conventional approach to individualism of the mainstream Western philosophy, Watsuji puts forward that a self identity emerges only through interaction with other human beings. In this respect, Erin Mccarthy writes, “Watsuji’s concept of human being as *ningen* is at odds with the Western concept of self as purely individual, where relationships with others are only contingent”.²³⁹

3.5. Think Tanks in Japan

According to data of “Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”, which is announced by the “Thinks Tanks and Civil Societies Project” annually, 128 think tanks are actively operating in Japan.²⁴⁰ Japan is lagging behind India and China which are ranked behind the U.S. on the second and the third seats respectively. In the same report, Japan is ranked on the ninth seat in the list of countries with the largest number of think tanks. In parallel with the number of think tanks, Robert Eldridge contends that think tanks in Japan have been far from providing considerable impact on Japanese politics.²⁴¹

²³⁷ Cited in, Erin Mccarthy, *Ethics Embodied Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*, p.14.

²³⁸ Ibid, p.13.

²³⁹ Erin Mccarthy, *Ethics Embodied Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*, p.13.

²⁴⁰ James G. McGann, 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2019).TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports". p.36.

²⁴¹ Robert D. Eldridge, “Support Smaller Think Tanks in Japan” <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/12/09/commentary/japan-commentary/support-smaller-think-tanks-japan/#.XfOSDGQzBIU>, (accessed on 8 December 2019.)

Think tanks in Japan generally organize international events, provide policy recommendations to government bodies, publish articles and journals regarding numerous foreign policy issues. IR studies in Japanese think tanks cover wide range issues such as; impacts of the nuclear weapons or potential denuclearisation process of North Korea, the military presence of the U.S. in Pacific countries, China's political rise and its growing status in the international system, economic cooperation in East Asia and Japan's security treaty with the U.S.

Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) is regarded as the most influential and productive think tank in Japan. In 2008, JIIA was ranked at the second seat among Asian think tanks after the Korea Development Institute, and was ranked at the fourteenth seat globally in "Global Go-To Think Tank Rankings".²⁴² JIIA was formed in 1959. Publications and researches of the institute aim to explain the recent foreign policy and security issues of Japan. In September 1960, JIIA was authorized as an incorporated foundation that works in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Thus, the chief mission of the institute is recommending policy proposals to the Japanese government.²⁴³

The first chairman of JIIA was Shigeru Yoshida. He served here until 1967. Yoshida was the prime minister of Japan from 1948 to 1954.²⁴⁴ In the recent issues of this journal and other publications of JIIA, the security treaty between the U.S. and Japan is discussed elaborately. In this sense, nuclear weapons of North Korea, China's political rise and its assertive foreign policy are identified as vital security concerns for Japan.

In particular, the influence of the U.S. on East Asia since the end of the Second World War is contested and new recommendations regarding Japan's security

²⁴² The Japan Institute of International Affairs. <http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/aboutUS.php>, (accessed on 7 December 2019.)

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Yoshida Shigeru", britannica.com, available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yoshida-Shigeru>, (accessed on 10 January 2020.)

policy are propelled.²⁴⁵ In this regard, their recommendations to policy-makers include various pieces of advices. They think that the technological power of Japan should play a more important role in Japan's national security. The government of Japan should respond to attacks of China and Russia when they declare that the Japanese democracy is under threat. In response, the Japanese government has to find more efficient tools to disseminate widespread disinformation among Japanese society. To neutralize China's and Russia's offensive policies, Japan must actively participate in endeavours for maintaining the liberal international order of which Japan is a key actor. In order to defend its national interests in East Asia against China's ambitious maritime policies, Japan should intensify its bilateral ties with the U.S. and to facilitate this step, the number of Japanese studies in the American thinks tanks should be enhanced through the financial aids of the Japanese government.²⁴⁶

Japan Policy Research Institute (JPRI) is another notable think tank that carries out researches regarding issues such as regional security, economic integrity, and global justice system. Having established in 1994, JPRI aims to promote public education. It is also worthwhile to mention that all of the members of the board of advisors who live in the U.S., received their M.S or PhD degrees from American universities. Kozy K. Amemiya and Sumi Adachi are the only two members of the board who were born in Japan.²⁴⁷

As a unique subject, JPRI examines the impact of water conflicts on Japan's bilateral relations with other Asian countries. Within this framework, Tatsushi Arai and Zheng Wang wrote an article about the Sino-Japan relationship and growing

²⁴⁵ The Japan Institute of International Affairs, "A New Security Strategy for Addressing the Challenges in the Turbulent International Order 11 Recommendations for the Defense of Japan" November 2018. Available at : http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/recommendations/A_New_Security_Strategy_for_Addressing_the_Challenges_in_the_Turbulent_International_Order.pdf

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p.16-17.

²⁴⁷ Japan Policy Research Institute, available at: <http://www.jpri.org/about/board.html>, (accessed on 10 January 2020.)

interest disparities between these two countries. It is argued that disagreements among two countries ensue from the impacts of the nuclear weapons or potential denuclearisation process of North Korea and the military presence of the U.S. in Pacific countries. In order to solve Japan's foreign policy problems, most of the papers offer similar recommendations such as improving bilateral economic relations in a mutually beneficial sense and reviving regional cooperation among East Asian countries.²⁴⁸

Regarding security issues and Japan's national defence strategies, National Institute For Defense Studies (NIDS) occupies a sizable place. NIDS was established in August 1952 with the name of National Safety College.²⁴⁹ NIDS is regarded as the main research body and the partner institute of the Japan Ministry of Defense. The institute particularly focuses on military and security studies.²⁵⁰

Alongside supporting policy makers through policy-oriented analyses, NIDS also serves as the only military history research think that provides education for civilian officials of the Ministry of Defense (MOD).²⁵¹ The most relevant subjects in their researches include Japan-U.S. security partnership, the rise in China's power and its effects on Japanese foreign policy and new regional prospects for East Asia. Since 2011, NIDS has been issuing a journal which is called "NIDS Journal of Defense" at the end of each year. When they analyze "National Defense Program Guidelines" (NDPG), they notice that Japan's biggest security concern is its security alliance with the U.S. in the era of China's political and economic ascent. For them, Japan needs to engage in "a more multi-layered security zone" by strengthening the regional cooperation regarding security issues without severing its security

²⁴⁸ See Strait Talk Berkeley Consensus Document, available at: http://www.jpri.org/projects/2014_strait_talk_consensUS_doc.pdf

²⁴⁹ National Institute for Defense Studies, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/about_US/index.html, (accessed on 8 December 2019.)

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ National Institute for Defense Studies. <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/research/index.html>, (accessed on 8 December 2019.)

partnership with the U.S. In this sense, Japan also has to improve its ties with other East Asian countries and should take more responsibility rather than relying solely on the security umbrella of the U.S. In that respect, they write as follows,

...to build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air.²⁵²

In this regard, article 9 of the Japanese constitution which prescribes denial of using the Japanese military power outside its national territories has been discussed. Improving relations with India and the centrality of ASEAN are pointed out as important foreign policy goals as well. Lastly, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) is essential for illustrating the contributions of political actors, business people, and academicians. JFIR was established on 12 March 1987. Besides conducting researches and publications, JFIR organizes symposiums and workshops.²⁵³

JFIR has four regular research fields. These are; China's status within the current international order, Japan's Eurasia diplomacy, Japan's economic diplomacy, and maritime strategy of Japan. JFIR also carries out special group researches. They examine issues such as the Japan-U.S. security relationship and the politic-economy of East Asia. They have both regional and country-specific type of researches like the Chechnya study group which became effective in 1996 and the Russian Study Group which has been conducting researches since 2001.²⁵⁴

JFIR has published 37 policy recommendations and most of them are about the national security of Japan. In their latest policy recommendation, which was published in 2014, they assessed Japan's positive pacifist strategy in its security since the end of the Second World War. In this sense, they concluded with various

²⁵² Japan's New National Defense Program Guidelines, p.227.

²⁵³ The Japan Forum on International Relations, available at: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study.htm, (accessed on 9 December 2019)

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

policy suggestions that will reinforce Japan's national security. From their point of view, Japan should actively participate in the UN's military trainings and should contribute to forming a global collective security structure. Japan should be wary of China's assertive foreign policy. To mitigate China's ambitious regional policies, Japan should advance its relation with other major Asian countries such as India, and Australia. Developing more comprehensive economic cooperation with the U.S. in order to prevent China from dominating East Asia is highlighted as another considerable option.²⁵⁵

3.5. Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter illustrated the development of IR studies in Japan. It is found that the interest to the discipline of IR has enhanced after the Second World War. According to Takashi Inoguchi, there are four important approaches regarding the methodological development of the Japanese study of IR. It is observed that these traditions have lost their influence on Japanese IR studies. Nishida Kitaro is respected as an inspirational thinker of the modern Japanese thought. Nevertheless, it would be too assertive to argue that Nishida's philosophy has a profound effect on Japan's IR studies today. As Kosuke Shimizu argued, Western IR theories are still the dominant way of thinking in Japanese IR literature.²⁵⁶ In today's think tanks, IR studies are generally carried out in accordance with the recent developments in global politics and Japan's foreign policy preferences. In light of the above-mentioned analysis, this thesis argues that Japanese IR studies might extend the existing boundaries of the IR literature, but these studies are far from offering an ontological and epistemological alternative to the Western study of IR. The next chapter will examine the evolution of IR studies in China.

²⁵⁵ The Policy Council The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc., *Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action*. August 2014, p.10.

²⁵⁶ Kosuke Shimizu, "The Genealogy of Culturalist International Relations in Japan and Its Implications for Post-Western Discourse", *All Azimuth 0*, no. 0 (2017): p.5.

CHAPTER 4

IR STUDIES IN CHINA

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, IR studies in China will be analyzed. At first, the development of IR studies in China will be explored briefly. Then it is pointed out that IR debates in the Chinese IR community are being operated within the scope of several concepts that aim to explain China's historical mission, current position in global affairs and China's vision for the future of global politics. Confucius is determined as the most influential thinker of China in the thesis and in this sense, how his teachings are evaluated by Chinese scholars and how his opinions are related to different concepts that help us to scrutinize both traditional and current Chinese political thought will be examined. Lastly, the most debated topics of major think tanks as well as their policy recommendations and reports will be assessed.

4.2. Development of IR Studies in China

Institutional IR studies in China began in the early 1950s according to Qin Yaqing.²⁵⁷ Although there are institutions and universities that undertook a mission of studying China's foreign policy more professionally, academic attention was given in the late 1980s, when China launched new economic reforms under the Deng Xiaoping administration.²⁵⁸ Jianwei Wang argues that up to the 1980s, the scope of the field of IR in China was firmly limited and IR itself could be barely accepted as a substantial academic discipline. In this regard, the study of IR was not

²⁵⁷ Qin Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan. New York, Routledge, 2010. p.28.

²⁵⁸ Wayne M. Morrison, "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States". *CRS Report for Congressional Research Service*, 2013. p.2.

respected as a legitimate social science.²⁵⁹ Since IR and building of foreign policy were highly interrelated, IR was not echoed widely among scholars. This field was widely considered as a concern of governments.²⁶⁰ In a similar vein, Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing have underlined that no systemic IR theory building occurred within the Chinese academy until 1980.²⁶¹ Qin Yaqing contends that IR studies in China have evolved within three stages starting with 1953. At the initial stage, the People's Republic in China (PRC) set up its first IR-related department-level program under the Renmin University of China in 1953 and it can be accepted as a monumental step forward to launch an academic program. The primary mission of the program was educating and training Chinese diplomats and doing researches regarding the significant political developments at the global stage.²⁶²

Three institutions were the most essential and influential ones regarding IR studies from 1953 to the 1980s. Alongside Renmin University, Peking University and Fudan University were other weighty institutions. These three universities have their own focal points. Studies in Peking University attached considerable value to national liberation movements in the third world; Renmin University focused on communist movements all around the world, while Fudan University interested in IR studies in the West.²⁶³ However, in the 1970s, studies of international politics at Fudan University began to underscore the importance of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist theories of imperialism, world communism, and national liberation

²⁵⁹ Jianwei Wang, "International Relations Studies in China", *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2, no.1 (2002): p.70.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing, "International Relations Theory in China", *Global Society* 15, no.3 (2001): p.254.

²⁶² Qin Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in *Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge, 2010. p.28.

²⁶³ Ibid, p.28.

movements. The development of IR institutions and branching of different subjects were the most prominent characteristics of this stage.²⁶⁴

The second stage is from 1964 to 1979. During this period, the above-mentioned universities were dealing with classical revolutionary studies of influential socialist figures such as Mao, Lenin and Marx. The final stage is from 1979 up to the present. This period has witnessed the greatest progress in Chinese IR studies.²⁶⁵ This dramatic increase in IR studies is immensely related to the opening-up policy of China after Deng Xiaoping's arrival. The rising interest of the new government in China animated IR studies academically. Jianwei Wang summarizes this situation by stating "Research on 'world politics', together with that on political science and legal science, had to make up for the lost time of the Cultural Revolution".²⁶⁶ In this sense, it can be argued that the development of IR studies in China was accelerated thanks in great part to the demands of the incumbent Chinese government in the early 1980s. Most of the universities and institutions were under the observation of "The Communist Party of China" (CPC).²⁶⁷ In this context, the foundation of the "Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs" (CPIFA) can be regarded as a concrete outcome of these governmental efforts.

According to Qin Yaqing, the most momentous debate of the 1980s was performed between two Marxist schools. One Marxist school of thought argued that China should continue to be a proletarian revolutionary state and shape its foreign policy accordingly.²⁶⁸ They believe that the international system still consisted of wars and revolutions which resemble Lenin's analysis of imperialism. According to this

²⁶⁴ Jianwei Wang, "International Relations Studies in China", p.73.

²⁶⁵ Qin Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?", p.28

²⁶⁶ Jianwei Wang, "International Relations Studies in China", p.72.

²⁶⁷ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing, "International Relations Theory in China", *Global Society* 15, no.3 (2001): p.254.

²⁶⁸ Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2. (2011): p. 235.

argument, imperialism is a war itself and the proletarian revolution is the mere solution.

The other side urges the Chinese government to behave like a regular nation-state and to launch the integration of China into the world economy in order to ensure the sustainability of its economic development. They contended that Marxism should adapt itself to economic and political changes in the international system so that it could make itself a more viable ideology. One view continued to see the class struggle and continuation of socialist revolutions as the center of their perception, while the other side thinks that China has to stop centring class struggle in their foreign policy and should contribute to the consensual international endeavours to create a more favourable international environment for China's economic ascent.²⁶⁹

Through CCP's (Communist Party of China) released documents, endeavours within the Chinese IR community were intensified. During this period, the problem of "shortage of textbooks regarding IR studies" was solved to a great extent.²⁷⁰ Starting with the 1980s, mainstream IR theories have been gradually entered into the curriculum of Chinese universities. Nevertheless, Maoist and Marxist classics continued to be the leading guide in the textbooks, while "western sources were placed within textbooks as supplementary sources".²⁷¹

The first wave of translation of Western classics was also carried out in the early 1990s. In this period, the most cited IR studies including Hans Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations", Kenneth Waltz's "Man, the State, and War" and "Theory of International Politics" and Robert Gilpin's "War and Change in World

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p.239.

²⁷⁰ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing, "International Relations Theory in China", *Global Society* 15, no.3 (2001): p.255.

²⁷¹ Ibid, p.255.

Politics” were translated to Chinese. Those works attracted significant attention and accelerated the development of IR studies in China.²⁷²

Thanks to raising academic interests, the opening-up and reform policies of Deng Xiaoping appealed to many scholars. In particular, some western concepts such as, “balance of power” and “interdependence” received particular attention.²⁷³ Wang explains this transformation by stating “China's own theory of IR, hence, should not stick to the outdated concepts of Marxism and Maoism, but incorporate the so-called ‘rational elements of Western IR theory’”.²⁷⁴

Since the early 1990s, Chinese scholars have begun to interpret the world through new concepts that find their roots in China’s rich history. Rather than explaining China’s foreign policy vision by counting solely on western conventional understandings, Chinese scholars eagerly worked for finding new sources and creating alternative knowledge sites in order to enrich the IR literature. Zhang Feng calls this enterprise and this period as “the indigenization of China’s international studies”.²⁷⁵

The debate of “International Relations Theory (IRT) with Chinese characteristics” has occupied a noticeable place in the ongoing process of Chinese IR studies. The idea of “IRT with Chinese characteristics” entered into China’s academic agenda after Deng Xiaoping’s announcement of “a need for ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’”.²⁷⁶ By refusing the Western model of capitalist development and

²⁷² Qin Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates”, p.238.

²⁷³ Jianwei Wang, “International Relations Studies in China”, p.80.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, p.80.

²⁷⁵ Zheng Fang, “The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5, (2012): p.76.

²⁷⁶ Song Xinning “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, *Journal of Contemporary Chin* 10, no. 26 (2001): p.66

growth, socialism provides an opportunity for China to develop through a fundamentally different methodology. Thus, it marks a radical disparity from the Western way of interpreting political events.²⁷⁷

In the 1987 Shanghai meeting, where the core principles of International Relations were discussed by Chinese and American scholars, the necessity of the same topic was emphasized too. Wang Daohan, who was the mayor of Shanghai at that time, and Huan Xiang, who was the Assistant Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China between April 1964 and August 1978, assigned incalculable importance to “Chinese characteristics” during this conference. Nevertheless, they fail to fully define what these characteristics are.²⁷⁸ Zhang Mingqian, director of the Research Department of the Center for International Studies of the State Council tried to explain what is meant by the “Chinese Characteristics”,

It is not the Soviet theory, nor the American theory, nor even the theory that could be easily accepted by the whole world. It must be Chinese opinions of international affairs and the culmination of Chinese understandings of the laws of the international community development.²⁷⁹

Most of the Chinese scholars who had an opportunity to study IR in the West claimed against the possibility of an “IRT with Chinese Characteristics”. Their basic arguments can be mentioned as follows: I) The term is “neither scientific nor academic”. II) This term is highly controversial because rather than developing a comprehensive and consistent IR approach, this conceptualization aims to justify China’s foreign policy ambitions. III) They also concerned that the studies about “general theory” will be ignored and the “policy-oriented” approaches will gain

²⁷⁷ Ed. by Lion König and Bidisha Chaudhuri, *Politics of the ‘Other’ in India and China: Western Concepts in non-Western Contexts*, New York: Routledge, 2016, p.142.

²⁷⁸ Song Xinning “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 26 (2001): p.66.

²⁷⁹ Cited in. Song Xinning “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 26 (2001): p.67.

impetus.²⁸⁰ Song Xinning has similarly argued that “those who advocate Chinese IR characteristics cannot define what these ‘unique characteristics’ are”.²⁸¹

Peter Kristensen and Ras T. Nielsen assert that the interest of the Chinese IR community to build a unique IR theory stems from China’s political and economic rise. According to them, the need for developing “IRT with Chinese Characteristics” is twofold:

First, a rising political power has expanding foreign policy interests and thus demands advice from scholars. Second, a rising economic power has more money, some of which go to universities, less to IR research, and even less to theorizing—a material explanation.²⁸²

In light of these examinations, it is possible to argue that as long as China continues to rise politically and becomes a more decisive actor in the international system, the Chinese IR community will definitely seek to pursue an IR theory that reflects the so called “Chinese characteristics”.

According to Thuy T. Do, endeavour for creating an “IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics” began in 1987.²⁸³ While according to Wang, in the early 1990s, Chinese scholars began to discuss the construction of a Chinese School of IR.²⁸⁴ Both Hung – Jen Wang and Thuy T. Do stress the role of exportation of Western IR Theories as well as translation of Western IR classics in the same process. Another

²⁸⁰ S Song Xinning “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, *Journal of Contemporary Chin* 10, no. 26 (2001): p.69.

²⁸¹ Ibid, p.69.

²⁸² Kristensen, Peter M. and Ras T. Nielsen, “Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory: A Sociological Approach to Intellectual Innovation”, *International Political Sociology*, (2013): p.30.

²⁸³ Thuy T. Do “China's rise and the ‘Chinese dream’ in international relations theory”, *Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 27, no.1 (2015): p.21.

²⁸⁴ Hung – Jen Wang, *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship*, Lexington Books, United Kingdom, 2013, p.3.

momentum for Chinese scholars for developing a Chinese IRT is about their perception of the Chinese state. In this sense, Wang thinks “Chinese scholars highly adhere to their state and party”.²⁸⁵ Wang also argues,

Most of the Chinese scholars think that China was victimized a century ago and its status was semi-colonial during the ‘century of humiliation’ and thereby they contend that theories should support a rigid statecraft... The relationship between Chinese scholars and the characteristics of ‘their China’ is inseparable. They do not treat China as an object ‘out there’ to be discovered or studied.²⁸⁶

Even though the momentum of creating a Chinese IR School lost its popularity in the 2000s, “Chinese characteristics” has still considerable footprint in today’s theoretical debates.²⁸⁷

As an epistemological inquiry, Yong-Soo contends that positivist methodology dominates IR studies in China. Yong-Soo writes that between 1994 and 2014, no study was conducted through post-positivist epistemology in the articles of China’s four leading journals.²⁸⁸ In this sense, he argues “In sum, the investigation of the teachings of Chinese IR further elucidates the earlier findings that post-positivist research remains at the margin of the Chinese IR community in terms of practice”.²⁸⁹

It can be deduced that Chinese IR scholars follow a similar path with their American counterparts as the American IR community also highly adheres to

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p.2.

²⁸⁶ Ibid, p.5.

²⁸⁷ Thuy T. Do “China's rise and the ‘Chinese dream’ in international relations theory”, *Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 27, no.1 (2015): p.22.

²⁸⁸ Yong-Soo Eun, “To what extent is post-positivism ‘practised’ in International Relations? Evidence from China and the USA”. *International Political Science Review*, (2016): p.4.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, p.7.

positivism in their researches.²⁹⁰ Qin Yaqing similarly underlines that Chinese IR studies are being performed within the “intellectual domain of mainstream American IR studies”.²⁹¹ In this sense, according to him, “A Chinese IRT school is yet to emerge”.²⁹²

4.3. Influential Thinkers in Chinese Political Thought

The opening-up policy of China has brought about another major consequence: Introducing Confucius and his principles to academic studies of the Chinese IR community. Confucianism entered the agenda of China’s foreign policy making in the late 1970s.²⁹³ The opening-up policy of Deng Xiaoping raised awareness in the Chinese intellectual circles that the gap of cultural studies in China was too big. Therefore, this field required specific attention, and Confucianism seemed to be the most inspirational philosophy of Chinese history.²⁹⁴

Even though Confucianism is mainly an ethical philosophy, it influences the political system of China as well. Besides shaping the relationship between individuals and family members, Confucianism also organizes the empire-society relationship.²⁹⁵ Although the range of this influence is debatable, it cannot be denied. The former President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Hu Jintao also underlined the role of Confucius in Chinese political thought by stressing

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p.3.

²⁹¹ Qin Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2 (2011) p. 234.

²⁹² Ibid, p.251.

²⁹³ John Makeham (Ed. By), *New Confucianism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.83.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, p.81.

²⁹⁵ Richard E. Nisbett, *The Geography of Thought, How Asian and Westerners Think Differently and Why*, New York: The Free Press, 2003, p.6.

“Confucius said, ‘Harmony is something to be cherished’”.²⁹⁶ Hu Jintao emphasizes the role of the Confucian concept of “harmony with difference” in Chinese political rhetoric officially.²⁹⁷

Contrary to claims that Maoist revolutionary state undermined the footprints of the Confucian tradition in Chinese society and in the Chinese state culture, Daniel A. Bell argues that Mao’s call for the moral transformation of the Chinese society in order to become a prosperous country has to do “a lot with Confucius tradition more than it has with Marxist materialism”.²⁹⁸ While there are other claims that academic traces of Confucian principles can only be observed starting with the 1990s.²⁹⁹ Relevant concepts in the Chinese academic literature such as “harmonious world” and “peaceful co-existence” are premised on the Confucian wisdom. In this context, Martin Jacques claims that the Chinese society regards the Chinese state as “head of a family”.³⁰⁰ As Shogo Suzuki summarizes,

In the Confucian order, those who stood at the apex of the order were charged with the role of maintaining the social hierarchy, a prerogative of the virtuous that carried substantial prestige. Member states of the Society thus competed to place themselves in the highest social position possible. This was also reflected in the hierarchical ‘organizing principle of sovereignty’ of the order.³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ Daniel K. Gardner, “What Confucius says is useful to China’s rulers” available at: <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-oct-01-la-oe-gardner-confucius-20101001-story.html>. (accessed on 9 December 2019)

²⁹⁷ Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, London: Penguin books, 2009, p.295.

²⁹⁸ Daniel A. Bell, *China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*, Princeton University Press, 2008. P.24.

²⁹⁹ Feng Zhang, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8, no.2 (2015): p.199.

³⁰⁰ Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, London: Penguin books, 2009, p.207.

³⁰¹ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.34-35.

Whether China had applied this Confucian wisdom to its foreign policy throughout history is an extremely controversial issue among Chinese scholars. For Yuan Kang, when China's political history is assessed properly, it can easily be argued that foreign policy preferences of Chinese leaders were motivated by the "balance of power configuration" within the "tributary system" rather than Confucian principles.³⁰²

Contrary to the claims that the Confucian political culture represents a strategic pacifism in foreign policy, Yuan Kang asserts, "The popular belief that Confucian pacifism has guided China's security policy is therefore a myth".³⁰³ Kang also argues that Chinese leaders did not refrain from expanding its territories through violence whenever needed and Confucian tradition did not constraint the expansionist behaviours and violent foreign policies of China.³⁰⁴ According to Kang,

At the height of its power during the period from 1368 to 1449, the Ming Dynasty initiated twenty-nine military attacks against the Mongols, invaded and annexed the state of Vietnam, and dispatched seven large-scale maritime expeditions to project power to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.³⁰⁵

In a similar vein, Fang Zhang thinks that Confucianism does not posit a pacifist approach. According to him, this argument denies China's assertive and sometimes violent strategies in its external relations. Fang Zhang argues,

History shows that Confucian pacifism is not a valid description of imperial Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Recent IR scholarship has exposed the enormous discrepancy between this alleged Confucian

³⁰² Yuan Kang Wang, *Harmony and War, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Contemporary Asia in the World)*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.181.

³⁰³ Ibid, p.182.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

foreign policy tradition and the frequency and scale of state violence throughout Chinese history.³⁰⁶

Contrary to these analyses, Shogo Suzuki argues that the diplomacy tradition of China was derived from Confucian principles.³⁰⁷ David Kang has similarly argued that both King and Ming dynasties adapted Confucianism to their external relationships with other states.³⁰⁸ They used coercive forces in order to defend themselves against the expansionist policies of Mongols in the 13th century, and Japan in the 16th century.³⁰⁹ Jiang also assumes that shaping the political behaviour in accordance with the core values of Confucianism is appropriate for China to carry out now and in the future.³¹⁰

4.4. Key Concepts in Chinese IR Studies

Debates within the Chinese IR community are being operated through key concepts. These concepts are derived from the Confucian wisdom and have a profound effect on the development of Chinese IR studies. In this sense, concepts of “the system of ‘tianxia’” and “the peaceful rise/development” of China will be examined respectively.

4.4.1. The System of “Tianxia”

The system of “tianxia”, which literally means “all under heaven”, prescribes a global architecture in which China has an undeniable political superiority over its

³⁰⁶ Zhang Feng, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8, no.2 (2015): p.202.

³⁰⁷ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter With European International Society*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.38.

³⁰⁸ David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.41.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, p.40.

³¹⁰ Cited in: Daniel A. Bell, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*. P.23.

neighbours. Throughout the period of the “tributary system” in East Asia, political positions of East Asian countries were subordinate to the Chinese state and the sole country which was able to object to China’s uncontested leadership was Japan. Proceeding from this understanding, Fairbank argues that the tributary system shows China’s world vision.³¹¹

For Benjamin Schwartz, this ancient system can be observed in all hegemonic inter-state systems. However, what makes the China-centred tributary system unique is its Confucian criteria of higher culture. In particular, during the Chou period, Confucian morality was determined to be one of the constituent elements of the Chinese state.³¹² On the other hand, it is controversial whether the ancient tributary system indicates a perfect example of harmony and peaceful co-existence, because according to Fairbank, only Koreans seemed to wholeheartedly accept China’s hegemony.³¹³

Kung-Chuan Hsiao argues that China had changed its political behaviour, in particular its foreign policy approach, from “legalism” to “Confucianism”. The chief factor of this radical swing was the change of Chinese leaders’ mindsets. After they had understood that they cannot force other countries to behave in concert with China’s national interests by coercive power, they adapted Confucian political principles as a political strategy in order to maintain the Sino-centric state system and prevent potential rebellions against the Chinese hegemony.³¹⁴ Kung-Chuan Hsiao also contends,

³¹¹ John King Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’, in *The Chinese World Order*, John King Fairbank, Harvard University Press. 1968. p.4.

³¹² Ed. by John King Fairbank, *The Chinese Perception of World Order: Past and Present*, Harvard University Press, p.278.

³¹³ *Ibid*, p.276.

³¹⁴ Kung-Chuan Halao, “Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China”, *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, February 1964, p.119.

In the periods during which China was officially a Confucian state, Confucianism did not exert an exclusive influence on the imperial administration but served largely as a useful supplement to autocratic practices that were in reality inspired by Legalism.³¹⁵

For Fairbank, the structure of the Chinese system and the state-society relationship were shaped by the Confucian wisdom. In this sense, foreign relations of the Chinese state were the extension of its relationship with Chinese society:

The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society. China's foreign relations were accordingly hierarchic and non-egalitarian, like Chinese society itself.³¹⁶

Fairbank thinks that this is a highly radical difference between the foreign relations of East Asian countries and Europe. He goes further and argues that neither the term "international" nor the term "interstate" appropriately defines the traditional relationships of East Asian countries throughout their history until the Western invasion. Rather, Fairbank defines this order as "the Chinese world order".³¹⁷

This traditional foreign relations system had sustained until the First Opium War which broke out in 1839.³¹⁸ The Chinese academic studies have long been attracted by reinventing and redefining the ancient tianxia system. In this context, numerous studies have been published which analyze the structure of the tianxia state system and offer it as an alternative international order to the Westphalian inter-state system. The most ardent proponent of the tianxia model is a Chinese scholar, Zhao Tingyuan, who is a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and a Professor at Renmin University.

³¹⁵ Ibid, p.119.

³¹⁶ John King Fairbank, 'A Preliminary Framework', in Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, Harvard University Press. 1968. p. 4.

³¹⁷ Ibid, p.3.

³¹⁸ Nele Noesselt, "Is There a "Chinese School" of IR?", p.18.

Zhao Tingyang thinks that Chinese scholars fall short when it comes to develop a global vision for China. Zhao contends that even if China becomes the biggest economic and political power of the world, it means nothing unless it produces its own knowledge. China has to become a knowledge producing power if it wants to take advantage of the economic strength. To achieve this goal, Zhao insists that China should assert its traditional way of understanding and interpreting world politics. For him, the biggest display of the ancient Chinese worldview was embodied through the system of tianxia.³¹⁹

Tianxia contains some Confucian principles. Zhao thinks that Confucius was the first person who comprehended the importance of communication among individuals by stating, “Being is only defined in relation to others, not by individual existence”.³²⁰ According to Confucian philosophy, a person cannot exist apart from society, because all actions are results of the relationship between individual and society.³²¹ That’s why Zhao says that the tianxia system could be labelled as “Confucian optimum”.³²²

For Zhao, the biggest difference with the system of tianxia and today’s world is that today’s world is highly interdependent and heterogeneous, while cultural relations under the tianxia were much more homogenous. Zhao argues that the tianxia will ultimately bring world peace, because it entails a universal agreement. He defines the system of tianxia with these words:

³¹⁹ Tingyang Zhao, “Can this ancient Chinese philosophy save us from global chaos?” Washingtonpost.com
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/07/tianxia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ca540ffdf4d0, (accessed on 19 November 2018)

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Richard E. Nisbett “The Geography of Thought, How Asian and Westerners Think Differently and Why”, New York: The Free Press, 2003. p.50.

³²² Tingyang Zhao. “Can this ancient Chinese philosophy save us from global chaos?” Washingtonpost.com
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/07/tianxia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ca540ffdf4d0, (accessed on 19 November 2018)

The concept of All-under-Heaven, consisting of many ‘sub-states’, independent in their economies, military powers and cultures, but politically and ethically dependent on the empire’s institutional centre. There was a tributary system between the suzerain centre and the sub-states. And the suzerain centre enjoyed its authority in recognizing the legitimacy of the sub-states, but never interfered unless a sub-state declared war on another member of the family of All-under-Heaven.³²³

On the contrary, the current international system, which is based on the principles of the treaty of Westphalia, established a world in which national interest became the basic component and thus brings about inextricable conflicts among states. Zhao argues that the supreme reason for these conflicts is the lack of a higher authority above states. In response, there is a need for a sound and harmonious world. In other words, for him, there is no real “worldism” or “worldness” but only “internationality”. Whereas, once the tianxia system put into practice, no country or culture will be regarded as “foreign”.³²⁴

Because, a potential renewed tianxia system might be capable of eliminating all sorts of conflicts.³²⁵ In Zhao’s view, four conditions are necessary to reactivate the Tianxia system. These are: i) Internalization of the world, ii) relational rationality, iii) Confucian improvement, and iv) compatible universalism.³²⁶ Through materializing these conditions, every state would attach priority to develop a comprehensive relationship based on not mutual beneficiary but on happiness of every individual.³²⁷

³²³ Tingyang Zhao, *Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance*, Beijing: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p.34.

³²⁴ Ibid,p.39.

³²⁵ Tingyang Zhao, *Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance*, Beijing: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p.47.

³²⁶ Ibid, p.58.

³²⁷ Ibid, p.54.

Thuy T. Do, gives a credit to Zhao for calling Chinese scholars to embrace their own traditions, and regard these efforts as progressive guides to develop theories and understand the existing international system from the standpoint of China's historical and traditional values. On the other hand, Thuy T. Do thinks that rather than a theory, Zhao's ideas can be regarded as a philosophy.³²⁸

Ching-Chang Chen contends that reinventing and redefining the tianxia system only result in deepening of miscommunication between Western and Asian IR studies. For Chen, Zhao's superiority claim of the ancient Sino-centric inter-state order to Westphalian sovereignty, only underscores the self-other dichotomy between the East and the West; because in Zhao's opinions, the main motivation is not dismantling the hegemonic international system, rather he aspires to change the roles of the actors within the international system and locate China as the new top ruler of both intellectual projects and world governance. In this context, he goes on to say,

By emphasising China's purported cultural uniqueness, Zhao not only contradicts his concern about the world, but also reveals a competitive and nationalistic mood to demonstrate the superiority of traditional Chinese political thoughts over the Western ones. Instead of proposing an alternative that transcends the limits and deficiencies of the Westphalian world order, the tianxia system actually reproduces the same confrontational logic of the states system therefore.³²⁹

The sharpest opposition to Zhao's alternative world view is oriented to him by William Callahan. For Callahan, despite Zhao's claim that the system of tianxia is all-inclusive, indeed it excludes three groups, namely "the West, the people, and other nations along China's frontier."³³⁰ Zhao justifies his ideas by referring to China's tributary system which was allegedly more stable and peaceful than the

³²⁸ Thuy T. Do, "China's rise and the 'Chinese dream' in international relations theory", p.24.

³²⁹ Ching-Chang Chen and Young Chul Cho, "Theory" in *Critical Imaginations In International Relations*, ed. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.252.

³³⁰ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?", *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.754.

Westphalian order. In this sense, Callahan also argues that this Sino-centric regional order created violence and conflicts as well when China was politically dominating East Asia. According to Callahan, Zhao's alternative world depiction is predicated on misleading assumptions. In this sense, the tianxia order will only reproduce the international system that operates under a strong hegemon. Callahan contends that Zhao is trapped with his own criticism towards the Western study of IR. Zhao opposes the Western view that favours the European state system over the East and universalizes it. However, by offering the system of 'tianxia' as an alternative to the existing international system, Zhao universalizes a very specific notion of China, and attempts to apply it to the practical issues of world politics. In this sense, Callahan avers, "Tianxia is not a post-hegemonic ideal, so much as a proposal for a new hegemony".³³¹

The importance of the tianxia model stems from its relatively different ontological elements. Ontologically Zhao's tianxia model is based on "co-existence" rather than "self-existence" and epistemologically it treats the whole world within the conceptual framework of the world-society relationship as its unit of analysis;³³² whereas, the Western study of IR regards the nation-states as the highest political entity.³³³ Furthermore, Western political thought organizes its political community with three reference points; "individual, community and nation-state", whereas, Chinese political thought is built upon "Tianxia, state, and family".³³⁴

Nevertheless, in Zhao's model, the hegemonic country is the main determinant of the whole system and this model still cannot reach beyond the limits of state-

³³¹ Ibid, p.759.

³³² Qin Yaqing, "A Multiverse of Knowledge: Cultures and IR Theories", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11, no.4 (2018): p.427.

³³³ Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven'", *Social Identities* 12, no. 1 (2006): p.31.

³³⁴ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?", *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.753.

centrism, while ontologically it reproduces another hegemonic inter-state system. In this sense, Ching-Chang Chen argues that Zhao's assertion of the tianxia model is not a strong alternative for the Western way of making politics, and instead it is mimicking Western IR because it still takes the West as the sole reference point. In this regard, according to Chen,

Yet, Zhao's logic, which is exactly the same as that of Acharya and Buzan's embedded in the modernization and development problematique, cannot produce a genuine alternative because he continues to take the West as his reference point. In this sense, Zhao's Tianxia can be conceived as a Chinese 'mimicry' of the Western imperial system (Bhaba, 1994).³³⁵

Chen's referring to Homi K. Bhabha is notable in this context. Bhabha argues that mimicry should be understood as "a colonial practice aimed not only altering the colonized country's conduct but also at reconstituting its identity".³³⁶ Here we see a mutual construction of a national identity through an inter-subjective process. Even though this mutual interaction occurs under a hierarchical relationship, neither actor has an absolute control over this process.³³⁷

In that respect, Hartmut Behr argues that there are two kinds of ontological perceptions in the broadest sense. The first is "universalistic" and the second is "particularistic".³³⁸ While the Westphalian inter-state architecture ontologically reflects the particularistic view of European history, Zhao singles out a very specific notion which belongs to China's history and contends that this model is superior to the Westphalian order. Thus, it is possible to argue that Zhao's

³³⁵ Ching-Chang Chen, "The absence of non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered", p.13.

³³⁶ Michal Frenkel, "The Multinational Corporation As A Third Space: Rethinking International Management Discourse On Knowledge Transfer Through Homi Bhabha", *Academy of Management Review* 33, no. 4 (2008): p.926.

³³⁷ Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse", *Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis* 28, (1984): p.126.

³³⁸ Hartmut Behr, "A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International", p.246.

alternative also reflects a particularistic ontology. Moreover, it deals with China's position in the international system and the system of tianxia can also be understood as a proposal for China's national interests. In this sense, Ching-Chang Chen puts forward, "The problem is that Zhao himself does not rise above state-centrism, for his analysis is still motivated by how China can become a true world power..."³³⁹ As Callahan rightly points out: "Indeed, while the Westphalian system is rightly criticized for being state-centric, the Tianxia example shows how non-Western alternatives can be even more state-centric."³⁴⁰

In light of these arguments, it is possible to contend that Zhao's argument creates a structurally different but logically similar binary between the West and East Asia by asserting that the tianxia model should be the prevailing inter-state structure. In this sense, it can be argued that Zhao's alternative of "tianxia" still operates within the state-centric ontological foundations.

4.4.2. Peaceful Rise / Development of China

China's peaceful rise/development has received enormous attention within the academic literature. The most popular ideas stand exactly opposite to each other. One idea is that China uses this discourse as a tool which justifies its ambitious foreign policies. On the other hand, some scholars argue that China's peaceful rise is not a mere discourse. It is compatible with the historical background and cultural values of China.

The notion of the "rise of China" first appeared in the late 1990s when China was consistently growing.³⁴¹ Sujian Guo argues that the concept of the "rise of China"

³³⁹ Ching-Chang Chen, "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations" *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 3 (2012): p.477

³⁴⁰ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?", p.759

³⁴¹ Jianyong Yue, "Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?" *International Politics* 45, (2008): p.441.

was first used by Yan Xuetong in his book which is called “International Environment of China’s Rise”.³⁴² Right after the 16th National Congress of CCP which was held in November 2002, a new concept of “peaceful rise” was reintroduced by Zheng Bijian first on 9 December 2002, while giving a talk in Washington.³⁴³

Since 2000, debates within the Chinese IR community has been dominated by the narrative of the “Chinese school of IR”, and the most notable outcome of this enterprise is the invention of “China’s peaceful rise/development” (PRD).³⁴⁴ For Barry Buzan, PRD is an effective program and it designates a “radical shift in China’s status from ‘middle-range power to a grand power’”. He contends that PRD is not just an abstract idea, “but one that has had well-rooted standing in China’s policy and rhetoric for nearly two decades”.³⁴⁵ Meanwhile, Buzan also puts forward that China has changed this rhetoric from “peaceful rise” to “peaceful development”, because “rise” sounds too provocative and it instigates the concerns about China’s rise in the West and feeds the perception of the “Chinese threat”.³⁴⁶

For Buzan, regardless of the consequences of this peaceful development strategy, the application of this discourse officially marks a crucial turning point in China’s political history and foreign policy. Due to the Maoist revolution in China which was occurred in 1949, and partly thanks to the bipolar structure of the international system, China intentionally preferred to abandon itself from the western bloc and stayed away from the western economic and political institutions until the late

³⁴² Cited in: Xin Li & Verner Worm, “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise”, *Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies* 16, (2010): p.70.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Thuy T. Do, “China's rise and the ‘Chinese dream’ in international relations theory”, p.24.

³⁴⁵ Barry Buzan, “The logic and contradictions of ‘peaceful rise/development’ as China's grand strategy” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7, no.4 (2014): p.5.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, p.5

1970s. Nevertheless, they were capable of building economic ties with the West through bilateral agreements.³⁴⁷

According to Jianyong Yue, the bottom line of China's peaceful rise rhetoric is whether that discourse prescribes a "revisionist power" or a "status quo power". Yue argues that the structure of the international system can provide challenges for China depending on the content of this concept. Yue contends that the peaceful rise concept and its transformation into a practical foreign policy strategy are highly beneficial factors for the Western World as well; because, it underlines the dependency of China on the Western economic institutions and norms of the international trade which were compromised mainly among the advanced Western economies.³⁴⁸

Yue's approach stands between neo-realist and neo-liberal perceptions of mainstream IR theories. He argues that China owes its economic ascent to the existing economic institutions of the international system to a great extent, and thereby there is no reason for China to demand a radical change.³⁴⁹ Nevertheless, regardless of China's attitude, the U.S. might feel that its political dominance will be undermined due to China's growing influence, and eventually try to hinder China's economic rise. He thinks that even though China is willing to cooperate with the U.S. as part of its official "peaceful development" and "peaceful coexistence" agendas, the U.S. will not refrain from taking hard measures.³⁵⁰

Ikenberry also respects China's integration into the global economic system as a key factor of China's peaceful development policy. According to him, China's

³⁴⁷ Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise Possible?'" , *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, (2010): p.12. .

³⁴⁸ Jianyong Yue, "Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?" *International Politics* 45, (2008): p.439.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p.440.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p.451.

access to the WTO in 2001 brought about radical and positive changes in China's foreign affairs. China is well aware that the existing order facilitates and accelerates China's rise. According to Ikenberry, "Western centered system is open, integrated and rule-based with wide and deep foundations, it is hard to overturn and easy to join".³⁵¹

From Ikenberry's point of view, the complexities and challenges of China's rise mainly stem from the existing architecture of the international order. He argues that the situation of China's position in the world order as a rising power is much different than other rising powers in the past. Even if China wants to overthrow the existing world order through a hegemonic war against the U.S, its mission would be much difficult than former revisionist powers, because the current order is strictly institutionalized and multilayered.³⁵²

Another esteemed scholar, Giovanni Arrighi contends that China's official discourses such as "peaceful rise" and "peaceful co-existence" are compatible with China's and East Asia's historical background and traditions. Arrighi argues that due to its Eurocentric reference points, neo-realism cannot capture the political situations in East Asia.³⁵³

The biggest difference is that European countries had been engaged in wars against each other for a long time, while in East Asia the same situation cannot be observed. Western powers were seeking for colonizing weaker countries and they aimed to establish overseas empires. However, East Asian countries did not have this tendency and hence, did not compete with each other.³⁵⁴ Arrighi thinks that it

³⁵¹ Ikenberry G. John, "The rise of China and the Future of the West: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008, p.1.

³⁵² G. John Ikenberry and Darren L. Jim, "China's Emerging Institutional Statecraft, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the prospects for counter-hegemony, Project on International Order and Strategy" at *Brookings*, Issued on April 2017, p.5.

³⁵³ Giovanni Arrighi, "Reading Hobbes in Beijing: Great Power Politics and the Challenge of the Peaceful Ascent", in *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE)*, Ed. Mark Blyth, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.166

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.167-168.

was the balanced power structure of the European system which caused European states to wage wars against each other. Arrighi argues,

These different dynamics of the European and East Asian systems can be traced to two other differences — a difference in the distribution of power among the systems’ units, and a difference in the degree to which the primary source of power was internal or external to the system... political, economic, and cultural power in East Asia was far more concentrated in its center (China) than in Europe, where a center proper was hard to identify.³⁵⁵

The mainstream American school of IR is divided substantially with respect to the effects of the rise in China’s power. Neo-liberals assert that China will not try to dethrone the U.S. or overthrow the existing world order. For example, Joseph Nye thinks that China will not become a new hegemon, because its “soft power”, which generally stems from think tanks and universities, is not as efficient as the U.S’. Secondly, China is exposed to several territorial conflicts. Therefore, China cannot replace a declining U.S. due to domestic and external constraints. Moreover, China is not willing to overthrow the existing system. In fact, China highly benefits from the existing global order and rather than trying to force the U.S. as a rival, it wants to compete with the U.S. in order to reinforce its capabilities and continue to enhance its economic growth without enduring the responsibilities of being a hegemon.³⁵⁶

By neo-liberal scholars, it is also argued that the current liberal international order is capable of accommodating China’s peaceful rise.³⁵⁷ There is a widely accepted view by neo-liberals that the economic inter-dependence will undermine China’s ambitious foreign policy behaviours. Although a newly powerful China wants to reinforce its influence and advance its interests, it also has a robust aspiration to

³⁵⁵ Ibid, p.169.

³⁵⁶ *The future of America*, instruction by Joseph Nye at the “Second Annual Betty Lou Hummel Memoria”1 Lecture on, 3 March 2017.

³⁵⁷ Jinghan Zeng, “Is China committed to peaceful rise? Debating how to secure core interests in China”, *International Politics* 54, issue 5 (2017): p.3.

maintain international stability and to deepen cooperative relations in order to keep its strong position in global affairs.³⁵⁸ Alongside these factors, from the standpoint of an existing albeit declining hegemon, it is more rational to peacefully accommodate a rising power rather than to cause conflicts and occlude the engagement of the rising power to the established international order.³⁵⁹

Contrary to neo-liberal assumptions, as a structural realist (neo-realist), John Mearsheimer argues that China cannot rise peacefully.³⁶⁰ His main argument is built upon the assumption that the international system is anarchic which means that there is no higher authority above states. From the view of neo-realists, the international system is all about competition for more power. All states want to be as powerful as possible because it is the best way to survive in a self-help environment. Realists contend that, due to the uncertain, chaotic and hazardous architecture of the international system, states expand when they find the appropriate environment.³⁶¹

It means that the U.S. is a declining power and declining powers often prefer political, military and economic retrenchment due to balancing of commitment and resources. It will certainly create a power vacuum of which China is willing to exploit. Therefore, in contrast to Joseph Nye, Mearsheimer argues that as long as China continues its rise, it will definitely try to dominate its own region by pushing the U.S. out of East Asia.³⁶²

³⁵⁸ Hiroko Okuda, “China’s “peaceful rise/peaceful development “: A case study of media frames of the rise of China”, *Global Media China*, Volume.0, no.0 (2016): p.1.

³⁵⁹ T.V.Paul, *Accommodating Rising Powers*, p.21.

³⁶⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, *Current History* 105, (2006): p.160.

³⁶¹ Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume. 00. No.0 (2018): p.8.

³⁶² John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, p.162.

From Mearsheimer's statements, it can be deduced that the architecture of the international system would not allow China's peaceful rise and it brings about a conflict of interests between China and the U.S. which might precipitate unsettling conflicts between them. In his view, the distribution of power in Asia, as is in any part of the world, is vital for the U.S., and the U.S. will definitely try to stop the Chinese expansion of the sphere of influence. Thus, for Mearsheimer, "America is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the cold war".³⁶³

Another esteemed neo-realist scholar Randall Schweller argues that the changing shape of the international system from unipolar to multipolar can be observed in the nationalist discourses of both countries. As opposed to John Mearsheimer, Randall Schweller argues "There is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate, in Xi's opinion, as long as they treat each other as equals".³⁶⁴ Nevertheless, just like all rising powers in history, China will certainly try to spread its influence in the Asia-Pacific region as well as other parts of the world. The vital situation here is the potential response of the U.S.³⁶⁵

In light of these examinations, it is found that the concept of "peaceful development" might open up new phases in Western IR discussions regarding the perception of the "Chinese threat" and feed the available sources to create a domain wherein a healthy conversation both between Chinese scholars and American scholars, and among American scholars might take place. However, this substantial debate is still performed under the structural constraints and the conceptual framework of the ontological foundations of the Western study of IR, and epistemologically does not reach beyond the limits of Western IR studies.

³⁶³ Ibid, p. 161.

³⁶⁴ Randall Schweller, "Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume. 00 no.0 (2018): p.4.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, p.4.

4.5. Think Tanks in China

According to the 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, with 507 think tanks, China is the third biggest country in the world with the largest number of think tanks.³⁶⁶ The main research fields of Chinese think tanks include a wide range of subjects such as: Global governance, the rise of China, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Project, the relationship between the U.S. and China, the economic situation of East Asia as well as global security concerns. Think tanks in China examine the current challenges of China's foreign policy in accordance with China's national interests. In this sense, China's external problems are tackled by policy-oriented approaches with the aid of fundamental concepts such as harmonious world, and peaceful development.

Many of the well-rooted and influential think tanks were established with the encouragement of the Chinese government. Besides incumbent politicians, retired political actors also actively participated in the establishment process of major think tanks. China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a very monumental example of a government-related think tank. CIIS was founded in 1956 and is serving as the think tank of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁶⁷ CIIS is ranked as the 8th best government-affiliated think tank in the world.³⁶⁸

Researches and policy recommendations of CIIS concern recent developments and relations between great powers in the international system. OBOR Project is among the most studied topics of CIIS. Regarding the U.S.- China relations, it is analyzed that as long as China continues rising, disagreements between the U.S. and China is

³⁶⁶ McGann, James G., "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2019).TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports.16. p.36. (available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/16).

³⁶⁷ China Institute of International Studies,
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2019-01/10/content_40639859.html, (accessed on 28 January 2020)

³⁶⁸ McGann, James G., "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2019).TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports.16. p.176. (available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/16).

likely to be intensified. In this sense, Obama's strategy of "rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific" which was launched in 2011, aimed to control the rise of China.³⁶⁹ If the strategic mistrust between these two countries enhances, it would entail an overall mutual antagonism. Nevertheless, the cooperation of China and the U.S. will continue to grow because, both countries regard their relationship as mutually beneficial for improving their countries' economic situation.³⁷⁰

Alongside the relationship between the U.S. and China, the influence of the U.S. on East Asia is also examined. It is argued that the U.S. has been seeking to control East Asia via its military leverage on Japan since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. However, the U.S. did not actively take part in the peaceful negotiations among East Asian countries. The most recent example of this is the timid approach of the U.S. to political tensions between South Korea and Japan. In parallel with this, it is stated that the U.S. is pursuing its own interests in the region. Therefore, counting upon the foreign policy choices of the U.S. with the desire of maintaining prosperity and peace in East Asia, is not compatible with historical realities. In this context, Shi Yongming argues, "It is clear that U.S. policy, which focuses on maintaining its hegemony in the region, is the root cause of the current turmoil in Asia, and it may continue".³⁷¹

As a solution, it is suggested that East Asian countries have to break the narratives and interferences of imperial countries. East Asia might become the center of the world economy and prosperity through healthy communication and political connections which are based on mutual trust among East Asian countries. Thus,

³⁶⁹ CIIS Report: Managing Sino-US Disagreements in Political, Economic and Security Fields, No: 10. June 2016, p.65.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p.66.

³⁷¹ Shi Yongming, "Breaking Imperial Designs: East Asian countries must resolve historical issues for common growth" available at: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2019-07/25/content_40842636.html, (accessed on 17 December 2019)

promoting economic cooperation and political collaboration among East Asian countries would play a pivotal role in East Asia's regional development.³⁷²

With respect to the current situation of Sino-U.S relations, the president of the institute, Qi Zhenhongs stresses that China's economic development and political attitude are regarded as if China is willing to become a peer competitor of the U.S. and has replaced its cooperation policy with competition. Whereas, the Chinese believe that the recent foreign policy behaviour of the U.S. toward China demonstrates that the U.S. is planning to contain China's development. These perceptions signify a crucial historical juncture in the relationship between these two countries. For Qi Zhenhongs, in order to successfully deal with this crucial moment, both countries have important missions. According to him, China does not intend to replace the U.S. as the new leader of the international system. Endeavours of the U.S. to impede China's growth would be futile, therefore the U.S. should stop perceiving this mutual relationship as a zero-sum game. Zhenhongs argues, "The two historical propositions -- "Make America Great Again" and "Achieve the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" -- are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing and fulfilling".³⁷³

In order to prevent conflicts and deepen cooperation, Qi Zhenhongs suggests that China and the U.S. must engage in a healthy dialogue and try to find out new ways which will promote a stronger relationship. Through this path, the world's largest and the second largest economies will not only bring stability to their bilateral relations, but also to other countries that are embedded to the global industry chain.³⁷⁴

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Qi Zhenhong, "Correct Mutual Understanding and Adapt to the Times: Jointly Advance a China-US Relationship Featuring Coordination, Cooperation and Stability", available at: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2019-08/06/content_40855285.html, (accessed on 20 December 2019)

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

Another deep-seated institution is Chinese People's Institute Of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). CPIFA was established in 1949, with the initiative of the first Premier of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai.³⁷⁵ CPIFA organizes forums regarding recent developments in Chinese foreign policy. It conducts researches and publishes articles on issues such as security, economic relations of China, and global politics. CPIFA provides policy recommendations to the Chinese bureaucracy as well. The current president of CPIFA is Wang Chao, who was the Assistant Minister of Ministry of Commerce from 2006 to 2010. From 2010 to 2014, he served as the Vice-Minister of Ministry of Commerce.³⁷⁶

Chinese officials periodically write articles for the institute. For example in 2018, Vice President of China, Wang Qishan, wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs Journey* which is the journal of CPIFA and has been regularly published three times in a year since 1985. In his article, Qishan questions China's position within the international system in the era of globalisation. According to him, until 1840, the China-centred tributary system functioned properly even though there were obvious defects. After the century of humiliation, China began to grow with its nation through "socialism with Chinese characteristics", and now China's future seems very bright and promising.³⁷⁷ For Qishan, in order to address the structural problems of today's international system such as underdevelopment and security; multilateralism and joint efforts must be promoted.³⁷⁸

China's Vice Foreign Minister, Le Yucheng writes that confrontations and crises within the international system cannot be solved via protectionism and unilateralism as order of Versailles System demonstrated perfectly. He thinks that

³⁷⁵ The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.cpifa.org/en/class/view?id=7>, (accessed on 15 December 2019)

³⁷⁶ China Vitae, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Wang_Chao, (accessed on 15 December 2019)

³⁷⁷ Wang Qishan, "Upholding Peace and Cooperation and Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind". at the Opening Ceremony of the 8th World Peace Forum. In *Foreign Affairs Journal* Autumn 2019, 8 July 2019, p.3.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p.6.

the OBOR initiative is capable of providing multilateralism and cooperation among the states that take part in the project. In this sense, Belt and Road project is seen as a valuable catalyst for China's economic growth. Yucheng also suggests a 'revised' international order by proposing, "We need to uphold the international system with the United Nations at the core and governed by international law, and uphold the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its center".³⁷⁹

Assistant Foreign Minister, Zhang Jun also points out that the OBOR Project fosters the economic development of the less developed countries. In this sense, OBOR initiative reflects China's desire of peaceful development in a harmonious world.³⁸⁰ China's rise will not be detrimental to the global economic growth; on the contrary, it will create new domains for shared benefits, and enhance the cooperation among all participant countries. The OBOR initiative finds its roots in history of China, and can be regarded as the "contemporary Silk Road".³⁸¹

In terms of China's relationship with the U.S, within the scope of the OBOR project, Chen Dongxiao argues that the relationship between China and the U.S. is the most swinging bilateral relationship in the twenty-first century. In the last months, this relationship has been witnessed a growing distrust by both countries.³⁸²

The prevailing tendency among American IR pundits assumes that China is preparing to challenge the U.S. as the new hegemon. Whereas, strategists in China think that China needs a new strategy to counter these opinions. In this regard, among Chinese strategists, two opposite standpoints are prevalent. The first

³⁷⁹ Ibid, p.9.

³⁸⁰ Zhang Jun, "High-quality Belt and Road Cooperation at a New Starting Point" Journal 2019. No: 132. Available at: <http://www.cpifa.org/en/cms/item/view?table=book&id=279>. (accessed on 17 December 2019)

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Chen Dongxiao, "Three Promising Fronts For Sino-US Policy Coordination" Chinausfocus.com <http://www.siiis.org.cn/Research/EnInfo/4779>, (accessed on 17 December 2019)

assumes that the U.S. is deliberately exaggerating the perception of the “Chinese threat” in order to conceal its declining internal economy. The second group contends that the U.S. reads the rise in China’s power as a real threat to their global leadership especially in the era of a declining U.S. hegemony.³⁸³

For Chen Dongxiao, seeing this bilateral relationship as a hegemonic contest is not accurate. Even though their rivalry will not result in a hot conflict, it is obvious that these two countries need to improve their ties to increase global economic growth and prevent any confrontation. In this sense, mitigating the impact of the ongoing trade war and reinforcing the cooperation on fields like science and technology are two fundamental issues.³⁸⁴

4.6. Conclusion

To conclude, in this chapter, the development of IR studies in China via influential thinkers and fundamental concepts has been demonstrated. As mentioned, the early stages of IR debates were revolving around discussion of capitalism and China’s political identity which was accepted as a “revolutionary state”. Promotion of IR studies gained momentum with the encouragement of Chinese politicians. The translation of classical IR texts helped theoretical IR studies to advance.

Afterward, China’s traditional and historical values entered the agenda of the Chinese study of IR. The ancient tributary system and the core principles of Confucian philosophy occupy a considerable place in the conceptual development of Chinese IR studies. Key concepts such as the tianxia, and the peaceful development opened another stage in Chinese IR studies. Today, topics such as, China’s current position in the existing international system, its initiatives in order to expand its influence such as the OBOR Project, and its bilateral relationship with the U.S. have become top priorities of Chinese IR studies. The next chapter will shed light on IR studies in India and explore how their philosophers and institutions have shaped the discipline of IR.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

IR STUDIES IN INDIA

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the evolution of IR studies in India will be examined. This chapter will firstly seek to outline the academic development of IR in India and its relationship with the Indian state. Secondly, opinions of the two influential figures that provided the biggest theoretical and practical impetus to the Indian IR studies, namely Kautilya and Jawaharlal Nehru will be assessed, and their impact on the Indian study of IR will be demonstrated. Lastly, this chapter deals with the research fields of think tanks in India by focusing on their published articles and policy recommendations.

5.2. Development of IR Studies in India

International relations as a discipline have not received the attention it deserves in Indian politics and in the Indian academic community. Even though India's interests in global affairs and its assertiveness in foreign policy have been continuously growing, theoretical structure and perspectives toward their global strategy are not adequate and deep. Lack of conceptual studies regarding international relations in general, and IR theories in particular, have a sheer number of reasons.

According to Navnita Behera, it is possible to categorize these reasons as external and internal ones. Not attributing importance to teaching IR in universities, seeing IR as a discipline which is inferior to Area Studies and Political Science and therefore undermining its essentiality as well as the lack of funding for academic researches can be pointed out as the most notable domestic reasons.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁵ Navnita Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no.3 (2007): P.345.

On another aspect, it is worth mentioning that social sciences in India were given a particular mission to support the nation-building process after the secular Indian-nation state was formed. Due to the above-mentioned reasons, critical thinking is not “rooted in Indian social sciences”.³⁸⁶

Lack of theoretical studies in India hinders the theoretical social science studies as well. As T.V. Paul argues, “In Indian context, the “theory” is assumed to be unpractical and it is neither policy relevant nor policy-oriented”.³⁸⁷ Indian IR and social sciences struggle to define theory and study into it because many scholars believe that India is not familiar with the word “theory”. In this context, the colonial background of India remains a serious problem for IR studies. For Mallavarapu, another reason regarding poor studies on theory is that the “theory itself was seen as an imperial project” partly due to their historical background of being a colonized state.³⁸⁸

For Behera, the most alarming external problem regarding the development of IR in India is the traditional boundaries of Western IR and its “persisting desire of staying as a Eurocentric discipline”.³⁸⁹ She contends that especially epistemological domination of the IR discipline determined the boundaries of IR studies in India. In this sense, Behera writes as follows, “A positivist enterprise precluded a debate about what issues of inquiry could be included in IR and how its key concepts of

³⁸⁶ Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): P.168.

³⁸⁷ T.V. Paul, “Integrating International Relations Studies in India to Global Scholarship”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.130.

³⁸⁸ Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories”, p.166-67.

³⁸⁹ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-Imagining IR in India”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no.3 (2007): p.347.

nation-state, nationalism, sovereignty, and territoriality could acquire different meanings”.³⁹⁰

Behera argues that this problem stems from the idealization of the nation-state model. During the post-colonization period, Indian academia continued to ignore the cultural, civilizational and historical background of pre-colonial India. This factor results in the assimilation of the positivist logic of mainstream IR theories that are not able to develop comprehensive and explanatory theories with respect to non-Western World. It provided opportunities for Western IR to legitimize and justify their model which is considered as the general truth of world politics and shape the other parts of the world accordingly.³⁹¹

India’s economic integration with the global system since its independence has paved the way for several Western IR concepts to be examined by IR scholars. For example, the concept of “good governance” had been studied in concert with other western concepts such as “development”, and “underdevelopment”. In this context, Lion König and Bidisha Chaudhuri assert that “the concept of development has never been objected or challenged”.³⁹² According to them,

Governance studies, much like studies of democracy and other equally popular political concepts, has been dominated by various political science approaches for which Western/European polity was always a point of reference and a benchmark to evaluate political systems in other parts of the world.³⁹³

In this sense, it is possible to argue that state-centric views of IR are prevalent in Indian IR debates, as evaluations of Nehru and Kautilya explicitly illustrate this tendency. Despite India’s interest in mainstream IR, Behera argues that the Western study of IR has ignored the contributions of Indian politicians and thinkers. For

³⁹⁰ Ibid, p.349-350.

³⁹¹ Ibid, p.347.

³⁹² Ed. by Lion König and Bidisha Chaudhuri, *Politics of the ‘Other’ in India and China: Western Concepts in non-Western Contexts*, New York: Routledge, 2016. P.87.

³⁹³ Ibid, p.86.

instance, despite their deep and comprehensive insights, none of the definitions of Indian thinkers and politicians regarding the concept of “nationalism” have found a notable place in the Western literature.³⁹⁴ Another example is undermining the opinions of Katuliya. His ideas have never been searched properly by the West and he has only been labelled as the “Indian Machiavelli” who lived in the past.³⁹⁵ Amitav Acharya has similarly argued that regarding Kautilya as ‘Indian Machiavelli’ instead of seeing Machiavelli as a ”Euro-Mediterranean Kautilya” is a strong implication of the Eurocentric aspect of the existing IR literature.³⁹⁶

It can be argued that Indian IR studies have been operated within certain boundaries which was designed and established by the Eurocentric narratives. Moreover, within the Indian academia, this problem has not been discussed with details. Political realism has exerted considerable influence on IR studies and lead to a state-centric ontological comprehension of world politics with its positivist epistemology.³⁹⁷ In this context, according to Behera, “There has been no systematic questioning of the positivist logic underlying the realist paradigm... “So, to do ‘theory’ remains essentially a positivist enterprise”.³⁹⁸

Despite all of these deficits, according to Kanti Bajpai, from 1947 to the late 1980s, India was the leading country among Asian states in terms of IR researches and studies. Since the end of the cold war, India has been lagging behind countries such as Japan, China, and South Korea.³⁹⁹ Most of the universities in India regard IR as

³⁹⁴ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-imagining IR in India”, p.351-352.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, p.351.

³⁹⁶ Amitav Acharya, “Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2011): p.628.

³⁹⁷ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-Imagining IR In India”, p.347.

³⁹⁸ Ibid, p.348.

³⁹⁹ Kanti Bajpai, “Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.189.

the subfield of political science. Three universities, Jadavpur in Kolkata, Mahatma Gandhi in Kottayam, and Pondicherry, should be cited as the pioneers of academic IR studies in India.⁴⁰⁰ Jadavpur University (JU) in West Bengal and Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi are among the universities which are best known for their special studies on IR. However, most of these universities are not capable of responding to radical changes in the international system.⁴⁰¹

Institutional IR studies in India began in 1943 with the establishment of the “Indian Council of World Affairs” (ICWA). ICWA was founded by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in 1943 through encouragement of Jawaharlal Nehru. Afterward, The Indian School of International Studies (ISIS) was found under the roof of ICWA.⁴⁰² ISIS was established in 1955 as part of the Jawaharlal Nehru University.⁴⁰³ ISIS is regarded as the pioneer of IR studies academically. Since its establishment, the primary goal of this institution has been training diplomats and IR experts.⁴⁰⁴

Early research agenda of ISIS was guided by the Indian government and it became the fundamental institute which will determine the scope of the field of IR in India as a discipline. In this sense, for Kanti Bajpai, the primary mission of researchers of ISIS was defining and legitimizing the policy of “non-alignment”.⁴⁰⁵ Behera has

⁴⁰⁰ Rajan M.S., “Golden Jubilee of the School of International Studies: An Assessment”, *International Studies* 42, 3&4. (2005): p.201.

⁴⁰¹ Devika Sharma, “Mapping International Relations Teaching and Research in Indian Universities”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.75.

⁴⁰² Amitabh Mattoo, “The State of International Studies in India”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.38.

⁴⁰³ Varun Sahni, “The Fallacies and Flaws of Area Studies in India”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.50.

⁴⁰⁴ Rajan M.S., “Golden Jubilee of the School of International Studies: An Assessment”, p.195.

⁴⁰⁵ Devika Sharma, “Mapping International Relations Teaching and Research in Indian Universities”, p.73.

similarly argued, “Indian scholars had little choice but to write books on non-alignment distributed by Indian publishers”.⁴⁰⁶ On the contrary, non-alignment was largely despised as a variant of “neutralism” and was not scrutinized by Western IR intellectuals.⁴⁰⁷

For Kanti Bajpai, despite the existence of studies about non-alignment, almost none of them scrutinized whether non-alignment was applicable or not. The primary goal of articles regarding the policy of non-alignment was legitimizing the foreign policy preferences of the Jawaharlal Nehru administration. What’s more, they had never questioned its validity and discussed whether there were alternative policy approaches.⁴⁰⁸ This tendency of the Indian IR community caused a drastic decrease in the quality of IR studies in India. In a similar vein, Muthiah Alagappa puts forward that Nehru’s presence as a strong political figure strengthened the state domination in intellectual circles and fed the state-centric IR analyses in India.⁴⁰⁹ For this reason, he argues that Nehru’s domination of foreign policy studies in India hampered the development of IR research programs.⁴¹⁰

5.2.1. The Relationship between Academic Studies and the Government

The influence of the government in any country on studies and researches in universities has been discussed deeply since the linkage between the knowledge production and the political authorities became more visible. Even though the information does not come to light solely through social sciences, social sciences itself is inherently more questionable with respect to being sceptical about its

⁴⁰⁶ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-Imagining IR In India”, p.346.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Kanti Bajpai, “Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations”, p.116.

⁴⁰⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, “International Relations Studies in Asia: distinctive trajectories”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no.2 (2011): p.217-218.

⁴¹⁰ Muthiah Alagappa, “Strengthening International Studies in India: Vision and Recommendations”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.11.

outcomes. The discipline of IR is not free from that reality. Mainstream IR theories are generally regarded as theories that justify the foreign policy ambitions of Western countries.⁴¹¹ This doubt entails a search for IR theory with national characteristics. As the debate of ‘national characteristics’ entered into the literature of IR, its relationship with the governments began to be underlined more cogently. In India, the relationship between the institutional social science studies and the government is apparent as well.

Accountability and autonomy are the most basic concerns regarding the freedom of universities and institutions. When this issue is raised in India, the responses of university scholars and institute academicians vary greatly. University teachers do not ponder intensively on that issue as they are accountable to their students on a daily basis.⁴¹² While research institutions take that subject into consideration and feel compelled to justify their researches.⁴¹³ In essence, due to the nature of politics and the monopoly of politicians in policy makings, academic studies regarding fields of political science and IR have been neglected largely by politicians, and thereby earned little respect.⁴¹⁴

Many of the science institutions were constituted under the administration of Jawaharlal Nehru, nevertheless, government funding for scientific researches has never been adequate.⁴¹⁵ The approach of the government bodies to academic IR has not been positive and they think that academic studies do not have a lot to say about foreign policy practices. According to T.V. Paul, academic studies in India require

⁴¹¹ Giorgio Shani, “Toward a Post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory”, *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.723.

⁴¹² Partha Chatterjee, “Social Science Research Capacity in South Asia”, *Social Science Research Council* 6, (2002): p.94.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, p.94.

⁴¹⁴ Kanti Bajpai, “Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations”, p.126.

⁴¹⁵ T.V. Paul, “Integrating International Relations Studies in India to Global Scholarship”, *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.132.

and deserve more attention from policy-makers, especially from diplomats. In this respect, Paul writes as follows,

To diplomats, IR scholarship has little value in their day-to-day operations. To them, Indian IR scholarship is not valuable because Indian scholars often regurgitate what the diplomats themselves say. Very few Indian IR scholars are sought by diplomats for consultation, or to solicit opinions on crucial issues.⁴¹⁶

Besides problems regarding accountability, lack of attention on academic studies pose another serious challenge for the scientific development the Indian study of IR. The other two major problems are very similar to the problems in other parts of the non-western world. The first is the western hegemony over non-western in terms of academic researches and developing theories, and the second is the problem about producing alternative sites of knowledge that facilitate theoretical developments and accelerate contributions to the existing IR literature.

5.3. Influential Thinkers in Indian Political Thought

India has produced numerous philosophers and thinkers throughout its unique political thought history. Regarding IR studies of India, two names are highly inspirational. These are: Kautilya, (Chanakya) and Jawaharlal Nehru. Owing to the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru also developed the concept of non-alignment, his ideas will be elaborated in the subsequent part of the thesis. Throughout the literature review process, I observed that Kautilya is the most cited philosopher and politician of ancient Indian history. Kautilya was the minister in the Kingdom of Chandragupta Maurya during 317 – 293 B.C, and the advisor of the king Chandragupta Maurya of the Maurya dynasty.⁴¹⁷

5.3.1. Kautilya and IR Studies in India

Kautilya (Chanakya) is widely known for his study of “Arthashastra”. Since the discovery of this writing by R. Shamashastry in 1905, the authorship of these

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, p.136.

⁴¹⁷ Deepshikha Shahi, *Kautilya and Non-Western IR Theory*, Delhi: Palgrave, 2018, p.16.

writings has still been questionable today.⁴¹⁸ Some researchers contend that the original text was written by Kautilya but afterward, some other writings were added to the original text by unknown writers; while remaining researchers put forth that all of the writings and chapters in the book were compiled from different writings which belong to ancient Indian thinkers including Kautilya.⁴¹⁹ Even though the authorship of this treatise is still debatable today among Indologists, the common opinion is that this work of art belongs to Kautilya. Having accepted that the author of Arthashastra is Kautilya, this is believed to be written around 300 B.C.⁴²⁰ For Deepshikha Shahi, Arthashastra has been received attention among the Western Academic thinkers after its translation to English in the early 1900s.⁴²¹

According to Kautilya, the “king” is the sole decisive individual in both foreign and internal policies of any state. For Kautilya, a king must be at the center of the state and must become the uncontested leader of the “*mandala* system”.⁴²² The main responsibility of a king is to provide happiness for his citizens by strengthening the material and military capabilities of the state as much as possible. These factors designate the status of the king in the global system.

In order to grasp the world vision of Kautilya, one should focus on the concept which is called “*sadhgunya*” (the “six-fold policy”). Kautilya argues that there are six types of performing a foreign policy. These policies can be listed as:

- i) A well-prepared army for conquering.
- ii) Eliminating an enemy

⁴¹⁸ Liebig Michael, “Kautilya’s Relevance For India Today”, *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 69, no.2 (2013): p.101.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, p.101.

⁴²⁰ George Modelski, “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World”, *The American Political Science Review* 58, no.3 (1964): p.549.

⁴²¹ Deepshikha Shahi, *Kautilya and Non-Western IR Theory*, Delhi: Palgrave, 2018, p.1.

⁴²² Benoy Kumar Sarkar, “Hindu Theory of International Relations”, *The American Political Science Review* 13, no. 3 (1919): p.401.

- iii) Assisting both friends and enemies of an enemy
- iv) Cautious and prudent approach to conflicts.
- v) Favouring peace over war.
- vi) King's fair treat to his citizens.⁴²³

Kautilya underlines the importance of these attitudes by stating, "The king who understands the interdependence of the six methods of foreign policy plays, as he pleases, with other rulers bound to him by the chains of his intellect".⁴²⁴ Kautilya also identified seven elements as the constitutive forms of state. These are stated as: "a) *swamin*, (the ruler); b) *amatya*, (the minister); c) *janapada*, (the people); d) *durga*, (the fortress); e) *kosa*, (the treasury); f) *danda*, (executive power); g) *mitra*, (allied state)".⁴²⁵

Western conceptualization of state also rises from several principles. One of the most inspirational thinkers of the modern state theory is Max Weber. For Weber, the state itself is the main actor of politics and the datum point is the state's monopoly on using material force.⁴²⁶ Weber argues, "Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force".⁴²⁷ He thinks that the key determiner mean of politics is violence.⁴²⁸ He goes further to say,

⁴²³ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, Translated by L.N. Rangarajan, India: Penguin Books, 1992. p.371-72.

⁴²⁴ Ibid, p.541.

⁴²⁵ Liebig Michael, "Kautilya's Relevance For India Today", *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 69, no.2 (2013): p.101.

⁴²⁶ Nuri Yurdusev, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Öncesi", in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013. p.21.

⁴²⁷ Weber, Max. *Politics as a Vocation*, Published as "Politik als Beruf," *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Muenchen, 1921), pp. 396-450. Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich. From H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited), *From Max Weber: New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.*

⁴²⁸ Ibid, p.25.

If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,' in the specific sense of this word... Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state.⁴²⁹

Emphasis on the territory is fundamental because the secular western nationalist model of nation-state rests on this idealized conceptual model. This ideal model designates clearly defined territories of each state. For nationalists, this ideal model helps to constitute a normative ideal as well. This conceptual model of the nation-state was ramified during the 19th and 20th centuries.⁴³⁰ Many of the countries that could be labelled as nation-states have claimed that “citizenship meant adherence to single country via single national identity”.⁴³¹

National identity brings a nation together and creates new forms and institutions in the country, new power relations within the society, and new bonds within the population. Correspondingly, it became very vital for the rulers of nation states to clearly define their territories and control their borders, because it is the most powerful determiner of legitimate public policy within the process of nation building.⁴³² Therefore, pillars of constitutive elements of state rest upon internal constituents. For Michael Liebig, what differs Kautilya’s definition of state from its modern depictions is that Kautilya’s ideal state system is based upon his understanding of internal constituents of a state. According to him, “*mitra*”, (allied

⁴²⁹ Ibid, p.1.

⁴³⁰ Rogers Brubaker, “Migration, Membership, and The Modern Nation State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging”; *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xli:1 (2010): p.62.

⁴³¹ Gerhard Casper, “The Concept of National Citizenship in the Contemporary World: Identity or Volition?”; *Bucerius Law School*, Hamburg, 26 September 2008. P.4.

⁴³² A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (eds.). “State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches”, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 9, (2005): p.586.

states) is among the seven constitutive elements of the state and it is an unusual approach compared to traditional conceptualizations of statecraft.⁴³³ Nevertheless, Indian IR scholars did not develop a comprehensive theory based on these aspects. In this regard, it can be argued that without a theory, there would be “no specification of ontology.”⁴³⁴

5.3.2. Kautilya and Realism

Realism is regarded as one of the oldest theories of IR. Core assumptions of classical realism still prevail today, while some of its assumptions have been regenerated. Structural realism has been evolved out of the realist school of thought. Rather than specifically focusing on the power of an individual state, structural realists have preferred to focus on the distribution of power in the international system.⁴³⁵ According to John Mearsheimer, who is an esteemed proponent of structural-realism, the key determiner of the international system is its feature of being anarchical. By anarchy he means that “there is no higher authority above states”, so the primary concern of each state is surviving within a so-called “self-help environment”. In that sense, all countries are constantly pursuing more power and trying to become as powerful as possible.⁴³⁶ Therefore, it is possible to argue that Kautilya’s interpretation of the king’s duties is in parallel with the core assumptions of the realist school of thought.

Likewise, the emphasis on the military capabilities occupies a huge part in Kautilya’s “mandala system” as well. According to Kautilya, having a significant

⁴³³ Michael Liebig, “Kautilya’s Relevance for India Today”, p.101.

⁴³⁴ Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, “The end of International Relations theory?” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no.3 (2013): p.415.

⁴³⁵ Faruk Yalvaç, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Yapısalcı Yaklaşımlar”, in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013. p.150.

⁴³⁶ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. P.32.

military power leads to economic strength which facilitates king's pursuit of dominance. Correspondingly, a smart foreign policy must prioritize how to expand country's territories. That brought us to another important concept of realism, namely defending national interests. In parallel with that, Hans Morgenthau's definition of the "national interest", can be matched with the "king's interest" in Kautilya's understanding.⁴³⁷

Just like realist scholars, Kautilya also thinks that being the most dominant and powerful actor should be the ultimate goal of a king. He contends that the king has to strive to become the leader of the 'mandala system'.⁴³⁸ Kautilya is often compared with Niccolo Machiavelli, who is widely accepted and classified as the most important representative of the realist school of thought. To make Kautilya's world vision more concrete, he is often portrayed as "Indian Machiavelli".⁴³⁹

In fact, the famous works of these two thinkers, "The Prince" and "The Arthashastra" have a lot in common. Raising questions such as, "How to conduct power over other countries? How should a ruler ensure his/her legitimacy? How can a state expand its power and defend its territories?" has led to the inquiry of the same subject in both studies. Moreover, responses to these questions are very similar. They both accept the existing systems as if they exogenously exist, and comprehend the existing inter-state orders as taken for granted.⁴⁴⁰ Therefore, they can be treated as problem-solving theories rather than critical theories and inevitably they reflect positivist epistemology, and a similar ontology. Both studies assign a huge amount of value to the similar instruments of maintaining the existing

⁴³⁷ Deepshikha Shahi, *Kautilya and Non-Western IR Theory*, New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p.40.

⁴³⁸ Benoy Kumar Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relation"s, *The American Political Science Review* 13, no. 3 (1919): p.402.

⁴³⁹ Amitav Acharya. "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no.3 (2011): p.628.

⁴⁴⁰ George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World" p.550.

system and taking advantage of it. By the same token, “Kautilya’s study of Arthashastra reflects India’s aspiration of being a great power”.⁴⁴¹

However, there are pretty remarkable differences as well. George Modelski argues that Machiavelli grounds his analyses on events from historical experiences. He provides concrete examples regarding global issues, and examines the foreign policy behaviour of any state by referring to past experiences. On the other hand, Kautilya does not focus on past and concrete events. Rather, he tries to find the best way for a king to govern its citizens, and build his foreign policy without any reference to the past.⁴⁴²

Furthermore, Kautilya’s treatise does not deal with only material aspects of life. His analyses cannot be confined to politics since it covers a wide range of issues from juridical systems to religion, from culture to architecture. It can be argued that Kautilya’s study reflects a more holistic understanding of the dynamics of society. Jawaharlal Nehru also compared Kautilya with Machiavelli and declared that this comparison can be seen fair. But Nehru states that Kautilya was a bigger intellectual and politician than Machiavelli.⁴⁴³ As an important point of comparison regarding these two historical figures, and as a magnificent summary of Kautilya’s methodology, Nehru argues, “There was hardly anything Chanakya (Kautilya) would have refrained from doing to achieve his purpose”.⁴⁴⁴

In light of these examinations, it is possible to argue that analyses of Kautilya by Indian scholars do not offer fundamentally different ontological and epistemological foundations to the Western study of IR. In this context, his ideas are generally seen as state-centric, and classified under the realist school of thought.

⁴⁴¹ Ed. by David Scott, *Handbook of India’s International Relations*, UK: Routledge, 2011, p.4.

⁴⁴² George Modelski, “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World”, p.551.

⁴⁴³ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1946. P.123.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

In this regard, examinations of Kautilya might serve as an influential philosophy that is capable of extending the sources of the existing IR literature, however, it still reflects the core ontological assumptions of the Western study of IR.

5.4. Key Concepts in Indian IR Studies

As illustrated by the review of literature, the policy of non-alignment is regarded as the most cited foreign policy tradition of India. For this reason, the policy of non-alignment is determined as the most influential concept in Indian IR studies. Owing to the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru is accepted as the founder of this policy, his ideas will be elaborated in this part of the thesis as well.

5.4.1. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Policy of Non-Alignment

Jawaharlal Nehru is India's first foreign minister, and is respected as the founder of the modern Indian nation-state.⁴⁴⁵ He is also accepted as one of the most thoughtful leaders that India has ever produced. Nehru's political wisdom is based on three core elements. These are: "self-sufficient economy, non-aligned foreign policy, and building a secular nation state".⁴⁴⁶ The crux of his argument lays on his interpretation of the cold war and his conceptualisation of the policy of non-alignment.

Nehru's vision for foreign policy making dominated India from 1947 until his death in 1964.⁴⁴⁷ Even after Nehru's demise, foreign policy making in India was shaped through individual initiatives of successor Indian prime ministers. In this sense, Shivshankar Menon writes as follows, "In foreign policy, policymaking has always been almost entirely within the individual domain of the prime minister, a practice begun by Nehru and carried on by all his successors".⁴⁴⁸ Non-alignment policy

⁴⁴⁵ Jivanta Schöttli, *Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2012, p.21.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, p.2.

⁴⁴⁷ Ed by David Scott, *Handbook of India's International Relations*, UK: Routledge, 2011, p.5.

⁴⁴⁸ Shivshankar Menon, *Choices Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016, p.128.

created a domain in which India can perform its foreign policy without being dependent on any superpower. The policy of non-alignment has both external and internal sources. It can be argued that all of these sources have practical motivations. One important domestic root of non-alignment lies beneath the class distinction in India and affiliations of different social classes with two blocs of the cold war. In this sense, Nehru also identified several internal conflicts:

Essentially the internal conflict in India, apart from the nationalist struggle against foreign domination, is between the remnants of the feudal order and modernist ideas and institutions. That conflict exists on the national plane as well as within each major group, Hindu, Moslem, and others.⁴⁴⁹

The sharpest class distinction was between the upper middle class and the working class. Even though the upper-middle class in India was the chief force of the independence movement, other social classes in the country such as feudal lords, nascent bourgeoisie class, and unorganised working class supported them. Therefore, entering into a close relationship with the USSR would cause strong opposition from the middle class, while aligning with the U.S. would receive a similar reaction from the working class. Non-alignment policy was also reasonable under these domestic conditions.⁴⁵⁰

Another internal determinant factor of India's non-alignment policy was India's colonial legacy. Negative traces of the colonialist rule were still being felt within Indian society, thereby anti-imperialist sentiments were widespread. Entering into a close relationship either with the USSR or with the U.S. would have also revived fears of a new colonial rule.⁴⁵¹ In this regard, Nehru stated, "We would rather delay our development [...] than submit to any kind of economic domination to any

⁴⁴⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1946. p.351.

⁴⁵⁰ PC Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy The Nehru Years (1947-64)*, New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing Pvt, 2012. P.85.

⁴⁵¹ Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 46, no. 2 (2008): p.198.

country”.⁴⁵² This concern also shaped the moral dimension of the non-alignment policy so that the non-alignment strategy was seen as the most significant and direct outcome of the independence aspiration of India.⁴⁵³ In 1936, Nehru wrote, "No nation and no people, are going to tolerate domination and exploitation by another, even though this is given some pleasant name".⁴⁵⁴

In 1936, Nehru also wrote that the Congress of India eliminated political and economic imperialism and developed a foreign policy which would ensure cooperation among free nations.⁴⁵⁵ It was the sign of India's desire for independence. Because, according to him, old fashion of national independence was not valid at that moment and it was inevitable for a newly independent state to cooperate with other nations in order to survive in the international system.⁴⁵⁶ He also approved the Congress' decision of not engaging in an armed combat throughout the First World War.⁴⁵⁷

By the same token, Nehru considered the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR as a sort of traditional power politics which would ultimately reproduce the expansionist mindset of modern empires.⁴⁵⁸ Thus, according to Nehru, the traditional conceptualisation of power politics was doomed to failure. Moreover,

⁴⁵² Ed by David Scott, *Handbook of India's International Relations*, UK: Routledge, 2011, p.6.

⁴⁵³ Benjamin Zachariah, *Nehru*, London: Routledge, 2004, p.260.

⁴⁵⁴ Cited in A. P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (1969): p.306.

⁴⁵⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1946, p.416.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.421.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.418.

⁴⁵⁸ A. P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (1969): p.307.

the classical way of pursuing material power cannot maximise national interests.⁴⁵⁹ Even though he did not seek to meliorate the pitfalls of the Westphalian inter-state system, he underscored the need for an international society which does not support the either side of the cold war. However, in the psychological atmosphere of the cold war, it was not completely attainable. Thus, the policy of non-alignment emerged as the most feasible foreign policy that might provide insights to all countries that will push them to seek new ways in creating a more peaceful international environment.⁴⁶⁰ In this vein, Nehru wrote as follows, “We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale”.⁴⁶¹

For Nehru, in such an environment, engaging in a robust alliance in the cold was strategically unwise as well.⁴⁶² As Nehru puts it in the course of his long speech in the session on world peace:

If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place in reducing that area of the world which may be called the ‘unaligned area’ is a dangerous step and leads to war.⁴⁶³

It is understood that from Nehru’s point of view, non-alignment was the sole strategy which is capable of framing a field for India wherein they can analyze each case specifically and decide the most beneficial choice in concert with India’s national interests. In this sense, India was not compelled to accept any policy of

⁴⁵⁹ Jivanta Schöttli, *Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2012, p.64.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, p.65.

⁴⁶¹ Cited in K.P. Misra, “Towards Understanding Non-alignment” *International Studies* 20, issue.1-2 (1981): p.36.

⁴⁶² Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65”, p.209.

⁴⁶³ Ibid, p.209-10.

either superpower and react accordingly. The policy of non-alignment enabled Nehru to evaluate all possible reactions in any global issue and this strategic autonomy emerged as the leitmotif of India's foreign policy.⁴⁶⁴

Besides maintaining India's independent status, Nehru saw the policy of non-alignment as the extension of India's economic development model. Despite his sympathy for socialism, he was eager to promote mixed and planned economic development for India.⁴⁶⁵ He planned to receive aids from both the Soviet Union and the U.S. Therefore, the policy of non-alignment was strategically wise and it worked effectively.⁴⁶⁶ Economic prospects of Western countries were more promising than the eastern bloc, and Nehru wanted to take advantage of it.⁴⁶⁷ In this regard, it can be argued that Nehru's foreign policy path sought to accelerate the integration of the Indian economy into the global economy.

Nehru also attempted to exploit the cracks between the Soviet Union and the U.S. through receiving economic aids from both sides. Second five year plan of the USSR was a great opportunity for India to bring some of the Soviet technocrats to India. During this period, the impact of the Soviet presence on India's heavy industry was immense. At the same time, Nehru also kept green light to economic cooperation with Western countries such as West Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S.⁴⁶⁸ As the external determiner of Nehru's strategy, the policy of non-alignment was based on the "peaceful co-existence" of India with communist and capitalist parties. Creating a peaceful environment was essential for India for its

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ A. P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment", p.304.

⁴⁶⁶ A. K. Damodaran, "Jawaharlal Nehru And Non-alignment", *India Quarterly* 39, issue: 1, (1983): p.47.

⁴⁶⁷ PC Jain, PC Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy The Nehru Years (1947-64)*, New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing Pvt, 2012, p.vi.

⁴⁶⁸ Rajen Harshe, "India's Foreign Policy under Nehru and its Contemporary Relevance", *Contemporary Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (2007): p.43.

economic development as well as for the survival of their newly independent nation-state.⁴⁶⁹ In this sense, Nehru once remarked:

Even in accepting economic help or getting help, it is not wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket. Nor should we get help at the cost of our self-respect. The diversification of the sources of economic aid can alone enable India to minimize the pressure (l)at could be exerted by any state or bloc and also to balance the inevitable pressure from one side by the pressure from the other.⁴⁷⁰

When the cold war had entered to the period of détente, the non-alignment movement focused on promoting economic development in newly established states.⁴⁷¹ However, starting with the 1980s, the policy of non-alignment began to lose its appeal.⁴⁷² After the cold war, staying as a non-aligned country was not valid, because the bipolar structure of the international system was changed.⁴⁷³ Starting with the 1990s, China's rise became the top priority of India's foreign policy agenda, and India aligned itself with the U.S. in order to prevent China from dominating South Asia.⁴⁷⁴

Moreover, starting in 1991, India carried out policies to liberalize the Indian economy. Finance Minister of this period, Manmohan Singh (who was then the prime minister of India) argues that these liberal policies resulted in unprecedented

⁴⁶⁹ PC Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy The Nehru Years (1947-64)*, p.34.

⁴⁷⁰ Cited in PC Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy The Nehru Years (1947-64)*, p.35.

⁴⁷¹ K.P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment", p.25.

⁴⁷² Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories", p.169.

⁴⁷³ Shivshankar Menon, *Choices Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016, p.18.

⁴⁷⁴ Hussein Solomon, "Critical reflections of Indian foreign policy: Between Kautilya and Ashoka", *South African Journal of International Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2012): p.69.

productivity growth in the Indian industry.⁴⁷⁵ Nevertheless, after the end of the cold war, India continued to support the multipolar international order.⁴⁷⁶

Sometimes, Nehru's foreign policy took certain directions in vital issues of foreign policy. Therefore, the policy of non-alignment should not be perceived as an extension of neutralism. The most concrete example of this tendency was India's attitude to Israel-Palestine conflicts. Despite its non-aligned position, India preferred to act in cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁴⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Kanti Bajpai contends that the policy of non-alignment was a variant of neutralism.⁴⁷⁸

Although Nehru perceived the balance of power strategy as a concomitant of the imperial mindset,⁴⁷⁹ A.P. Rana has argued that non-alignment is a variant of balance of power policy and Nehru's non-alignment perspective is very similar to England's balancing and non-intervention strategy in Europe throughout the 19th century.⁴⁸⁰ Chih-yu Shih has similarly argued that the policy of non-alignment was not neutralism itself but aimed to neutralize the confrontations of superpowers in order to create a relatively safe domain in which non-aligned countries can manoeuvre. Contrary to Mao's three world theory, non-alignment preferred to

⁴⁷⁵ Aseema Sinha & Jon P. Dorschner. "India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?", *Polity* 42, no. 1 (2010): p.93.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.86.

⁴⁷⁷ Pant Harsh V. *Contemporary Debates In Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates its Rise in the International System*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. P.132.

⁴⁷⁸ Kanti Bajpai, "Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations", p.16.

⁴⁷⁹ Pratap Bhanu Mehta. "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India", *India Review* 8, no. 3 (2009): p.220.

⁴⁸⁰ A. P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (1969): p.302.

exploit the cracks between two blocs rather than overthrowing the existing global order.⁴⁸¹

According to Verma, Nehru combined the elements of both idealism and realism.⁴⁸² He recognized the importance of power and security, as well as their effects on India's national interests. At the same time, he also tried to ease the tensions emanating from the cold war.⁴⁸³ In this sense, Nehru's contribution to international law via "Panchsheel" is remarkable as well. Panchsheel Agreement, which was signed on 29 April 1954 between India and China, prescribed five principles which then stated as a benchmark in later territorial disputes and bilateral confrontations: "(i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; ii) Mutual non-aggression; (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; (v) Peaceful coexistence".⁴⁸⁴ For Nehru, these principles were successfully embodied and maintained thanks to the Bandung Declaration and persistent endeavours of the non-aligned countries.⁴⁸⁵

Non-alignment movement of Nehru was based on these principles in the Bandung Declaration and it was institutionalized at the Belgrade summit in 1961.⁴⁸⁶ According to Verma, the doctrine of Panchsheel was the greatest contribution of

⁴⁸¹ Chih-yu Shih, "China Rise Syndromes? Drafting National Schools of International Relations in Asia", *Intercultural Communication Studies* XXII: 1 (2013): p.12.

⁴⁸² Verma, D.P. "Jawaharlal Nehru: "Panchsheel and India's Constitutional Vision of International Order", *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 45, issue: 4, (1989): p.308.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ HuffPost staff, "Was Jawarharlal Nehru The Architect of Panchsheel? The Fascinating Story Behind The 1954 Treaty" Huffingtonpost.com available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/09/05/was-jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-panchsheel-the-fascinating-story-behind-the-1954-treaty_a_23197081/. (accessed on 3 January 2020)

⁴⁸⁵ Verma, D.P. Jawaharlal Nehru: "Panchsheel and India's Constitutional Vision of International Order", p.312.

⁴⁸⁶ Rajen Harshe, "India's Foreign Policy under Nehru and its Contemporary Relevance", *Contemporary Perspectives* 1, no. 1, (2007): p.43.

Nehru.⁴⁸⁷ It can be argued that these five principles and non-alignment were operating hand in hand. For Nehru, principles of Panchsheel were the guarantor of international peace.⁴⁸⁸ Non-alignment thus contributed to creating a peaceful environment through Indian culture, because according to Nehru, non-alignment was an indigenous product.⁴⁸⁹ Thanks to this agreement, Nehru managed to preserve India's national interests and reflect it to the existent international order.⁴⁹⁰ The Panchsheel Agreement radically changed the foreign policy formation of both Jawaharlal Nehru and India. Although Nehru was not in favour of establishing an unchanging and institutionalized foreign policy strategy, this agreement has materialized a particular understanding of foreign policy view for India.⁴⁹¹

From Rohan Mukherjee's point of view, India's foreign policy at that time had demonstrated that weak countries were also capable of carrying out their political agenda, if they had achieved to free themselves from superpowers. Correspondingly, Mukherjee argues, "India's case shows that even weak countries, if they are skilful in their use of diplomacy and the instruments of moral suasion, can secure a larger degree of autonomy in world affairs than their material capabilities might allow".⁴⁹² After Nehru's death, philosophy of him became dogma and foreign-policy makers could not adapt the right policies to revise this foreign

⁴⁸⁷ Verma, D.P, Jawaharlal Nehru: "Panchsheel and India's Constitutional Vision of International Order", p.316.

⁴⁸⁸ Jivanta Schöttli, *Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2012, p.142.

⁴⁸⁹ P.V. Narasimha Rao, "Nehru and Non-Alignment", available at: <https://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1399.html>, (accessed on 27 December 2019)

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Jivanta Schöttli, *Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2012. p.152.

⁴⁹² Rohan Mukherjee, "Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy" in *Globalization, Development And Security In Asia* ed. The Benny Cheng Guan, 2014. P.86.

policy strategy. Thus, it eventually created isolationism of India from the international system.⁴⁹³

Contrary to arguments that the policy of non-alignment helped the marginalized third world countries to establish their movement and pursue their own interests; Hussein Solomon claims that India's alliance with the U.S. in 1962, and with the Soviet Union in 1971 contradicts with these arguments.⁴⁹⁴ In this sense, non-alignment means aligning with the either superpower on specific issues according to their positions in different contexts. Hussein Solomon also contends that rather than representing an alternative international system which prescribes a non-hegemonic world under radically different moral conditions, non-alignment attempted to make India an area of great power agreement. In parallel with this, Hussein Solomon argues, "Far from normative considerations, Indian policy on non-alignment could be explained by the national interest considerations of realism".⁴⁹⁵ Furthermore, India's behaviours are very much related to geostrategic perceptions of realism, and India had never engaged in institutionalized resistance of the Southern countries against the hegemony of the North and the West.⁴⁹⁶

Nehru's individual effort and determination to non-alignment policy kept this strategy alive.⁴⁹⁷ Nevertheless in the last two years of his administration, the policy of non-alignment had already lost its earlier excitement and dynamism mainly due to India's heavy defeat against China in 1962. This defeat was morally

⁴⁹³ Ed by David Scott, *Handbook of India's International Relations*, UK: Routledge, 2011, p.16.

⁴⁹⁴ Hussein Solomon, "Critical reflections of Indian foreign policy: Between Kautilya and Ashoka", p.68.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid, p.68.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid, p.67.

⁴⁹⁷ A. K. Damodaran, "Jawaharlal Nehru And Non-alignment", *India Quarterly* 39, issue: 1, (1983): p.46.

disappointing for Indian society and it hampered the economic development of India as well.⁴⁹⁸

In light of the above mentioned examinations, it can be argued that that Nehru's non-alignment policy was shaped by the distribution of power in the cold war. Despite its emphasis on moral values and claims that his contributions should be seen as philosophical rather than practical; the structure of the international system was the main determiner of Nehru's foreign policy, and in this sense, he sought to stay on the sides without strictly aligning with the either bloc, and tried to receive foreign aids from both sides of the cold in order to achieve India's primary goal of economic development as a newly independent country. In this context, it is possible to argue that Nehru's non-alignment policy was developed and operated within the scope of the ontological and epistemological visions of the Western study of IR.

5.5. Think Tanks in India

According to the "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report", 509 think tanks are actively operating in India. With this number, India is the second country with the largest number of think tanks after the U.S.⁴⁹⁹ However, the impact of think tanks is not proportional to their number. Rahul Singh, N.N. Sharma and Uday Jha argue that Indian think tanks have very little influence on shaping policy making.⁵⁰⁰ According to them, the linkage between the public sphere and think tanks is completely blurred, and think tanks are used by the government as a tool which will justify their foreign policy preferences. In this sense, think tanks in India serve as counsellors to the Indian government, but their connection is not concrete. The lack of transparency prevents us from comprehending the extent of think tanks' impact. In this regard, Singh, Sharma, and Uday Jha contend:

⁴⁹⁸ PC Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy The Nehru Years (1947-64)*, p.235.

⁴⁹⁹ McGann, James G., "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2019).TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports.16. p.36. (available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/16).

⁵⁰⁰ Rahul Singh, N. N. Sharma, Uday Jha, "Think Tanks, Research Influence and Public Policy in India", *Washington* 18(4) 2014. p.294.

Indian think tanks by design and structure are small ideology institutions as against the western concept which acts as large foundations. The leadership of the Indian think tanks is limited to the authority and credibility of the founding person or selected leader. This model fails to provide credibility to institution in long run or in absence of the leader for any reason. The governance of Indian think tanks is considered weak and trailing.⁵⁰¹

There are three categories of think tanks in India in terms of funding sources. For instance, Institute For Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) is funded by the state albeit enjoys a legal autonomous status; Centre For Civil Society (CCS) is supported by both international and national companies, while The Centre For Policy Research (CPR) is funded and guided by international agencies.⁵⁰²

Indian think tanks predominantly analyze India's national defence and potential challenges for India in the current international system. They also cover issues such as economic policies, urbanisation, environmental law, international relations and security. For this aim, they carry out policy-oriented researches and publish journals and agendas. Prominent think tanks such as IDSA and CPR also provide training programs to civilian and military officers of the Indian government and promote high-quality academic studies. In this context, policy recommendations are documented either with comprehensive reports, or with short papers. In this regard, studies of IDSA occupy a significant place among Indian think tanks. IDSA was established in New Delhi on 11 November 1965, and is funded by the Indian Ministry of Defence, while it functions autonomously.⁵⁰³ IDSA was also ranked as the 7th best government-affiliated think tank in Asia.⁵⁰⁴

Indian think tanks study both theoretical and practical challenges. In this sense, the policy of non-alignment, India's civilizational character, and the problem of

⁵⁰¹ Ibid, p.296.

⁵⁰² Ibid, p.291.

⁵⁰³ Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses, available at: <https://idsa.in/aboutidsa>, (accessed on 10 January 2020)

⁵⁰⁴ McGann, James G. , "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report", p.176.

terrorism are studied from theoretical perspectives. China's political ascent, India's growing economic capacity and its potential contributions to the world economy as well as India's bilateral relationship with the U.S. are displayed as the underlying issues. For example, research fellow at IDSA, Dr. S. Kalyanaraman evaluates whether India and the U.S. will engage in a formal alliance in the near future. He criticizes those who argue that India would never form a bilateral alliance with any country due to the non-alignment foreign policy which was the main strategy of the Indian foreign policy vision throughout the cold war. In contrast with this perception, Kalyanaraman argues that even in the cold war, India aligned itself with the Soviet Union in 1971, and it lasted until the late 1970s. Therefore, non-alignment would not prevent India from forming an alliance with the U.S. There are other major factors worth mentioning in this context.⁵⁰⁵

The first is the so-called "Chinese threat". The rise in China's power instigates concerns over China's potential economic domination in East Asia. The second factor is military cooperation between India and the U.S. A bilateral cooperation might result in India's military dependence on the U.S which will undermine India's national defence strategy. Since China's region encapsulates a sheer number of territorial disputes, it is unlikely that India will need a direct military assistant to counterbalance China's military presence. Thus, it will be more favourable for India to receive support from organisms like the United Nations Security Council rather than forming a bilateral alliance with the U.S.⁵⁰⁶

Another important issue, namely international security, is tackled within the scope of debates on terrorism. Muhammad Feyyaz has attempted to theorize Pakistani-specific terrorism and its implications on both Indian politics and international security. According to Feyyaz, terrorism has been studied from the standpoint of communication theory which brings about a vast gap regarding the socio-political

⁵⁰⁵ S. Kalyanaraman, "Will India Ally with America?" <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/will-india-ally-with-america-skalyanaraman-200819>. (accessed on 17 December 2019)

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

grounds of terrorist organisations. In this sense, he urges Pakistani academics to draw a certain framework by assessing the former definitions of terrorism in order to influence policy-makers and international society.⁵⁰⁷

In Indian think tanks, foreign policy preferences of the Trump administration with respect to East Asia, India's status in the global order, future prospects and trajectories in 2020 are studied in parallel with one another. Former Foreign Secretary of the Indian state, and currently a senior fellow of CPR, Shyam Saran contends that the influence of China on Asian geography will remain as the biggest concern for India in 2020. China's military and economic capacities are too heavy for India to handle by itself. Thus, India might seek to intensify its relations with the U.S, Japan, and Australia in order to countervail China's influence in the sub-continent. However, the inconsistent foreign policy behaviours of the Trump administration might complicate this objective.⁵⁰⁸

Saran also argues that the "neighbourhood first" policy will continue to be the pathfinder in India's foreign policy. According to him, India should foreground its high-quality economic growth and take advantage of its democracy culture which represents one of the oldest and impressive one in Asia.⁵⁰⁹

Professor of strategic studies at CPR, Brahma Chellaney puts forward that the key actor the of India-U.S relations is China. According to him, neither throughout the era of the Obama administration, nor within the era of the Trump administration, the U.S. managed to carry out its verbal commitments towards East Asia. The vision of a "free and open" Indo-Pacific has not been realized up to until now and

⁵⁰⁷ Muhammad Feyyaz, "Terrorism Can and Should be Defined. But How?", *Strategic Analysis*, (2019): p.13.

⁵⁰⁸ Shyam Saran, "HTLS 2019: Foreign policy opportunities India must seize in 2020" (available at): <https://www.hindustantimes.com/htls/htls-2019-foreign-policy-opportunities-india-mUST-seize-in-2020/story-weXzLPhzzwkUGNQMkzViJN.html>. (accessed on 17 December 2019)

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

moreover, the U.S turned a blind eye to China's territorial expansions.⁵¹⁰ For Chellaney, the U.S should develop a clear, comprehensive and inclusive strategy to “change the status-quo in Indo-Pacific region and appease the ambitious and aggressive regional policies of China.”⁵¹¹

Zorawar Daulet Singh is a fellow at the CPR. In the article that he wrote for CPR, he seeks to outline how India's civilizational character helps India to position itself into the declining neo-liberal world order. He argues that India's diverse identities provide both challenges and advantages to India. India embraces identities of “liberal democracy, colonial past, post-colonial political thought, aspiration for regional leadership and Westphalian values of sovereignty and non-interference”.⁵¹² Saran similarly argues that India's domestic politics decided its foreign policy choices throughout the year of 2019, and in this sense, India's civilizational identity and its cultural values will continue to play a crucial role in the making of foreign policy. In this regard, India's constitution should be an inspiring factor. With its emphasis on plural and diverse society and democratic federalism, India's constitution creates a field in which India should operate successfully.⁵¹³

According to Zorawar Daulet Singh, the biggest difference in the political thought of India and the West ensues from each other's percept on civilization, culture and nationalism. Contrary to Western perception, culture and civilizational identity are respected as fundamental moral values that have had a profound impact on Indian politics. Even the non-alignment policy was shaped by India's cultural and historical background. However, today, it is obvious that the existing neo-liberal institutions fall short when they need to address the needs of rising powers in the

⁵¹⁰ Brahma Chellaney, “Trump's weak Indo-Pacific plan will embolden China” available at: <https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/opinion-trump-s-weak-indo-pacific-plan-will-embolden-china-11574099522985.html>. (accessed on 18 December 2019)

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Zorawar Daulet Singh, “India's Civilisational Identity and the World Order”, *EPW Economic & Political Weekly*, vol IIV no.39 (September 28, 2019): p.10.

⁵¹³ Shyam Saran, “HTLS 2019: Foreign policy opportunities India must seize in 2020”.

Non-Western World.⁵¹⁴ According to Singh, India is accustomed to co-exist in a system which is composed of culturally diverse countries. BRICS is the contemporary implication of this characteristic. In today's world, rising powers like India and China demand rule-based, pluralistic and inclusive institutions, while established Western powers seek to preclude rising of these countries. Despite contradicted efforts of the rising and the established powers, India will pursue to call for a more diverse international system that is capable of accommodating rising powers in the Asian world.⁵¹⁵

5.6. Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter sheds light on the development of IR studies in India. It is stated that IR studies in India lack a theoretical framework that prevents the Indian IR community from explaining India's rising power status in a comprehensive manner. It is indicated that two intellectuals and politicians have the biggest impact on Indian IR studies. First is Kautilya and his treasury of 'Arthashastra', and the second is Jawaharlal Nehru and his invention of the policy of non-alignment. These two important figures still find their place within different contexts in Indian academic studies. The rising power status of India is analyzed in think tanks and these institutions are oriented to explain India's bilateral relationship with the U.S., and China through policy-oriented methodology. They also study India's regional aspirations and its civilizational identity that matter greatly both in regional and global affairs. The next chapter will provide a conclusion on evaluation of each country, respectively Japan, China, and India. Historical background of IR studies, influential thinkers, and priorities of think tanks will be compared in order to demonstrate the common grounds of IR studies in these three countries. Besides concluding remarks, the conclusion chapter also outlines the different stages that these three countries have currently been in the discipline of IR.

⁵¹⁴ Zorawar Daulet Singh, "India's Civilisational Identity and the World Order", p.11.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid, p.11.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis seeks to analyze the development of IR studies in three major Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and India. In this sense, the evolution of the field of IR through important institutions, influential thinkers, key concepts, and historical background of each country were assessed.

In this respect, debates regarding the dominant ontological assumptions of mainstream IR theories, other Western IR studies and the Asian study of IR are explained at first. In this regard, the West and the East are not treated as if they are two separate and fundamentally different political entities. Rather, the Western study of IR is used to elaborate the IR studies in Western countries, while the Asian study of IR discusses the contributions of Asian countries to the IR literature and explores the development of the discipline of IR in Asian countries. Asian countries have produced influential philosophers and politicians throughout their history. Moreover, they have extremely rich cultures and historical backgrounds. These facts have led to the main research question of the thesis: Whether the Asian study of IR capable of challenging the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Western study of IR?

When three case studies have been scrutinized, it is demonstrated that there are two alternatives that have relatively different assumptions. The first is the ‘mandala system’ of Kautilya. Opposing the domestic politics and the foreign policy dichotomy of the established system, it also encompasses the allied states as part of the internal constituent of a state. Nevertheless, no systemic theory was developed over these assumptions due to several problems with respect to theory building within the Indian IR community. Thus, no ontological foundation has emerged out of Indian IR academia.

A similar but stronger alternative is offered by Zhao Tingyang through the concept of tianxia. Tianxia offers a relatively different ontology by taking the whole system as its unit of analysis instead of regarding the nation-states as the highest political entity. Nevertheless, it still has an individualistic ontology by applying a very specific Chinese notion to the world. It is found that this concept deals with China's position in the international system and the system of tianxia can also be understood as a proposal for China's national interests. Therefore, it does not shake the boundaries of the state-centric view and also reproduces the hegemonic world order which operates under a strong hegemon. Despite its relatively different ontological assumptions regarding the structure of the international system, it would be too assertive to argue that the system of tianxia is capable of challenging the key ontological foundations of the Western study of IR.

Regarding the development of the field of IR in Japan, China, and India, the most notable similarity between these three countries is the promotion of IR studies by governments. In particular, Deng Xiaoping's call for academic studies regarding the subject of 'IR Theory with Chinese characteristics' and Jawaharlal Nehru's urge to Indian scholars for debating the policy of non-alignment theoretically in Indian academic journals are important implications of governmental efforts. Also in Japan, between 1868 and 1945, when the tradition of Staatslehre was the dominant approach, policy-oriented researches were conducted by government-backed think tanks.⁵¹⁶

In this context, it can be argued that debates in the Chinese IR community have long been operated around concepts which aim to explain global affairs as well as China's status within the international system. Debates of "IR Theory with Chinese characteristics" and "Chinese school of IR" occupy considerable places within Chinese IR studies. Recently, these debates have been replaced by the "peaceful rise of China" which is also embraced officially by the Chinese government.

Peaceful rise concept indicates a theoretical framework which is an indigenous product. American IR scholarship also entered this debate from two fundamentally

⁵¹⁶ Tetsuya Sakai, "The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868–1945", *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9, Issue: 02, (2008): p.237.

different standpoints. For instance, neo-liberals assume that China highly benefits from the existing world order and thereby will not aspire to overthrow the existing system and replace the U.S. as a hegemon; on the other hand, structural realists argue that China will certainly try to become as powerful as possible and eventually try to become the dominant power of the world.

Development of IR in Japan followed a different path. In fact, Japanese IR studies date back earlier. While the Chinese IR community accepted that there was a huge gap in the Chinese study of IR until the 1980s. Japanese IR studies were performed even in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first approach was developed by the group of 'international political science' and it can also be divided to two sub groups as "power politician group", and "Marxist group".⁵¹⁷ Alongside these approaches, Inoguchi points out four traditions as well. These traditions are derived from Japan's historical, political, and cultural history. Inoguchi contends that they have still footprints in today's IR studies in Japan.⁵¹⁸ After the Second World War, new institutions were formed in Japan and the number of articles that deal with fundamental IR concepts, and Japan's foreign affairs were increased dramatically.⁵¹⁹

In this context, India presents a special case. International relations as a discipline has not received the attention it deserves in Indian politics due to various reasons. Lack of institutionalizing of the field of IR, absence of funding for researches and theoretical studies, and fairly limited career opportunities are the most noteworthy reasons. However, according to Kanti Bajpai, from 1947 to the late 1980s, India was the leading country among Asian states in terms of IR researches and studies.

⁵¹⁷ Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, "The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan", p.199.

⁵¹⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, "Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?", p.385.

⁵¹⁹ Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, "The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan" p.197.

Since the end of the cold war, India has been lagging behind countries such as Japan, China, and South Korea.⁵²⁰

Despite Inoguchi's depiction of Nishida Kitaro as an innate constructivist, the impact of both the Kyoto School of Philosophy and Nishida on today's IR discussions in Japan is highly questionable. In this context, philosophers of India and China have more influence on their countries' IR perceptions. Figures such as Kautilya and Jawaharlal Nehru in the Indian context, and Confucius and Zhao Tingyang in the Chinese context should be mentioned.

Kautilya is also referred by Western scholars in their studies and he is generally known as "Indian Machiavelli". In this sense, his writings are classified under the realist school of thought in IR. While his depiction of 'mandala state system' raises other debates regarding the structure of the international system. Jawaharlal Nehru is the founder of the Indian nation-state and the significance of Nehru's ideas emanates from the presumption that they are shaped by India's civilizational identity.

In this regard, the policy of non-alignment is the most cited and inspiring foreign policy approach of the contemporary Indian political history. Two fundamentally different stances aim to explain Nehru's non-alignment policy. The first approach argues that the primary goal of Nehru's non-alignment policy was to receive foreign aids from both sides of the cold war in order to ensure economic development. In this sense, it is argued that the policy of non-alignment was based on the balance of power calculations. Whereas, the other stance underlines the cultural identity of India and argues that the policy of non-alignment is the product of India's experience of "coexisting in diversity" which is also guaranteed by India's constitution.

The footprint of the non-alignment strategy in Indian foreign policy is still traceable today. Some scholars still argue that despite China's political rise, India's reluctance to engaging in a formal alliance with the U.S. emanates from India's

⁵²⁰ Kanti Bajpai, "Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations", *International Studies* 46, 1&2 (2009): p.109.

non-alignment foreign policy tradition. Furthermore, their contribution to BRICS and promotion for more diverse and plural international institutions are also related to India's non-alignment principles. Nevertheless, in the light of studies on non-alignment policy, it can be argued that Nehru's non-alignment policy reflects the rationalist state tendencies due to its practical and cyclical motivations.

In the Chinese context, Confucius is determined as the most influential philosopher in Chinese political thought for this study. Not only his impact on Chinese society and politics, but also his influence on the East Asian region is pretty remarkable. Despite the late entrance of Confucian principles to the Chinese academic agenda, Confucianism has received an inordinate amount of attention within the Chinese IR community.

Besides key concepts, the principles of Confucius are often evaluated alongside the tributary system. The tributary system is portrayed as a harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures and nations within an international system. Therefore, it signifies a radically different inter-state structure than of the European world which was based on the principles of Westphalia.

For Qin Yaqing, IR debates in China have deeper ontological aspects. In this respect it can be argued that China is capable of forming and analyzing unique concepts. Nevertheless, major debates in IR studies have still been operated around three mainstream Western IR theories, namely constructivism, liberalism and realism.⁵²¹ In this sense, global governance and world order topics are the most promising subjects for Chinese scholars to come up with deeper theoretical frameworks. These debates can enrich the Western IR theories rather than replacing it. In this sense, these dense endeavours will likely result in remarkable contributions to both Chinese and mainstream IR studies.⁵²²

As the most notable common ground, it is observed that three countries have analyzed their historical backgrounds by sharp opposition to the prevailing

⁵²¹ Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", p.249.

⁵²² Ibid, p.252.

Westphalian narrative. Hamashita studied the tributary system from the standpoint of the countries that are located in the periphery. Through the example of the Ryukyu Kingdom, he has demonstrated that in contrast to Westphalian sovereignty, one country can be under the juridical patronage of two different states. 'Mandala system' of Kautilya showed that different countries within the inter-state system can also be regarded as an internal constituent of a state. Historical figures such as Confucius, Kautilya, and Jawaharlal Nehru have still been taken as essential references in Indian and Chinese IR studies; whereas, in today's academic IR studies, the impact of historical figures is not traceable in Japan.

Three countries have emphasized their regional and national backgrounds as well as their philosophical and cultural traditions regarding IR studies. However, IR debates in these countries are instigated by different factors. Debates in India are shaped by characteristics of its leaders and based on foreign policy preferences of India throughout history. IR studies in Japan are motivated by policy-oriented researches, while in China, IR studies are operating around key concepts that aim to explain China's position within the current international system. With respect to think tanks in these countries, it should be noted that most of the influential think tanks are working in collaboration with the government bodies and are funded by ministries. As a global issue, think tanks in three countries ascribe a huge importance to their bilateral relations with the U.S. as well as China's political and economic ascent.

The main difference can be highlighted by underlining the conceptual development of IR studies. In this regard, it is observed that there is a growing theoretical literature in China, and the Chinese study of IR is more progressive and dynamic than IR studies in Japan and India. Despite lacking deep theoretical explanations, Indian scholars still debate the policy of non-alignment and its potential explanatory power in India's recent foreign policy behaviours. In contrast to India and China, Japan's IR studies do not discuss the development of the discipline through fundamental concepts.

To illustrate another important difference among three countries, it is found that China's rising power status has also generated new debates regarding global

governance, and in this context, China's historical background and its decisive power in global affairs are not only discussed within the Chinese IR community but also discussed in the Western intellectual circles. In terms of theoretical debates and literature on IR concepts, it is possible to argue that Chinese IR studies are more comprehensive and explanatory than Japanese and Indian IR studies. In this sense, IR studies in China can be regarded as the locomotive of the Asian study of IR.

In India, it is highly discernible that the lack of theoretical and institutionalized IR studies hampered the development of the discipline. IR studies in India are still being performed with reference to past of the Indian political thought and in contrast to China, no recent concept or debate has been emerged to animate scholarly discussions. Similarly in Japan, the lack of theoretical frameworks impeded the development of IR studies. In recent years, the Japanese study of IR is dominated by policy-oriented approaches due to Japan's security concerns over nuclear threat of North Korea, China's assertive regional policy, and the future of Japan's bilateral relations with the U.S. under the Donald Trump administration.

Similarly, in the Chinese context, Zhao Tingyang's depiction of the system of 'tianxia' is similar to hegemonic worldview of the U.S, and rather than challenging it, Zhao reproduces the same narrative with his proposal.⁵²³ William Callahan has similarly argued that Zhao's model is a proposal of a new hegemony.⁵²⁴ Despite its emphasis on seemingly distinctive ontology, it still reflects the natural balance of power theory as well as state-centric view in terms of its comprehension of the hegemonic relationship between China and the tributary states which are located in the periphery of the Sino-centric world order.

In parallel with these arguments, most of the Asian IR studies are being operated within the positivist epistemological and ontological boundaries of IR. It is

⁵²³ Ching-Chang Chen and Young Chul Cho, "Theory" in *Critical Imaginations In International Relations*, ed. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.252.

⁵²⁴ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?", *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.759.

observed that Western IR has still been the foremost reference point for IR studies in Asian countries.

In light of these assessments, it is argued that the development of IR studies in Asia has been evolved within the scope of Western IR theories. Asian studies are regarded as the late comers to IR studies and thus, most of the fundamental concepts and policies are being defined inside the established boundaries of the existing IR literature. Many of the concepts have long been introduced by Western thinkers, and in this sense, it would not be too assertive to put forward that the intellectual domain of the Western study of IR still dominates the Asian study of IR.

In conclusion, this study explored the development of IR studies in Japan, China and India. From the assessments above, it is found that among these three countries, IR studies in China have the biggest potential for contributing to the IR literature. Despite theoretical defects in each country, with their rich cultural values and unique historical and philosophical experiences, IR studies in these three countries are capable of contributing to the existing IR literature by broadening its limits and sources. However, as the answer of the main research question, it is argued that, at least at this stage, the Asian study of IR still reflects the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the Western study of IR.

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APPENDIECES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tezin amacı, Asya ülkelerindeki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarını değerlendirerek Batı'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarına kıyasla ontolojik ve epistemolojik farklılıklar getirip getirmediği sorusuna yanıt aramaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda politik yapı, siyasî tarih ve kültür açısından oldukça zengin olan üç Asya ülkesi; Japonya, Çin ve Hindistan örnek ülkeler olarak seçilmiştir. Bu üç ülkede hem akademik bir alan olarak uluslararası ilişkilerin hem de yine aynı disiplinin literatürünün gelişimi değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, sonuç bölümünde elde edilen veriler Çin, Japonya ve Hindistan'ın kendi arasında kıyaslanmasına da olanak sağlamıştır. Bu tezde uluslararası ilişkiler tek bir disiplin olarak ele alınmış ve disiplinin Asya'da nasıl çalışıldığı değerlendirilmiştir.

Asya ülkelerinin hem siyasî hem de ekonomik açıdan güçlenmesiyle birlikte uluslararası sistemde nasıl bir yere sahip oldukları ve olacakları Asya'daki ülkeler tarafından giderek daha da fazla tartışılmaya başlamıştır. Aynı zamanda tarih ve kültür açısından oldukça zengin olan ve çok sayıda düşünür yetiştirmiş bu ülkelerde disiplinin nasıl çalışıldığı ve ontolojik ve epistemolojik farklılıklara sahip olup olmadığı tezin ana araştırma sorusunu ve esas motivasyonunu oluşturmuştur. Tez aynı zamanda özellikle Türkiye'de çok zengin olmayan Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmaları literatürüne katkı sunmayı amaçlamıştır.

Bu konu kapsamında Asya'da farklı tarihsel geçmişlere ve mevcut siyasî güçlere sahip Japonya, Çin ve Hindistan'da uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin gelişmesinde rol oynayan önemli tarihî figürler ve filozofların düşünceleri değerlendirilmiş, disiplinin ortaya çıkışı ve hangi akımlardan etkilendiği ele alınmış ve düşünce kuruluşlarında hangi konuların çalışıldığı araştırılmıştır. Yapılan analizler sonucunda üç ülkedeki akademik çalışmaların bir kısmının mevcut ve Batı merkezli

uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünü genişletecek potansiyelde olmasına rağmen ontolojik ve epistemolojik açıdan farklı alternatifler ortaya koymadığı savunulmuştur.

Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarına katkıda bulunan ve bu çalışmaların kavramsal çerçevesini çizen akademisyenler öncelikli olarak "Vestfalya düzeni" olarak adlandırılan devletler arası ilişkilerin Batı tarafından ele alınma şekline karşı çıkmışlardır. Dolayısıyla tezin başlangıç bölümünde disiplin içindeki egemen ontolojik yaklaşımlar ve buna karşı yine Batı'da geliştirilen alternatif ontolojik kabuller değerlendirilmiştir.

Buna göre egemen Vestfalya anlatısı üzerinden şekillenen ana akım uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri uluslararası sistemi devletlerin üzerinde hiçbir üst otoritenin bulunmadığı anarşik bir yapı olarak görmüşlerdir. Devletlerin davranışlarının öncelikli nedeninin uluslararası sistemin anarşik yapısı olduğu varsayımı üzerinden şekillenen bu ontolojik kabule göre yapı kendiliğinden oluşmuştur ve devletler kendi aralarında işlevsel olarak farklılaşmamaktadır.⁵²⁵ Ancak bu ontolojik yapıya ilişkin eleştiriler Batı'daki çalışmalardan da yöneltilmiş ve analiz birimleri olarak ulus-devletler aşılımaya çalışılmıştır. Örneğin Alexander Wendt, mevcut yapının inşa edildiğini ifade etmiştir.⁵²⁶ Bu noktada Asya'da ortaya çıkan ve kendini devlet merkezli yaklaşımlara ve ulusal çıkar gibi kavramlara eleştirel olarak konumlandıran en önemli çalışma Zhao Tingyang'ın "tianxia" sistemini yeniden tanımlaması ve kavramsallaştırması olmuştur. Bu örnek de tezin ilerleyen kısımlarında detaylı olarak incelenmiştir.

Batı'daki uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin Avrupa merkezli olması ve Batı dünyası dışındaki ülkelerin siyasî geçmişlerini ve düşünce tarihlerini analizlerinin dışında bırakması Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarını ele alan akademisyenler

⁵²⁵ Faruk Yalvaç, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Yapısalcı Yaklaşımlar", in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013. p.153.

⁵²⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of power politics", *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): p.425

tarafından önemli bir sorun olarak belirlenmiştir. Tam da bu yüzden tezin ikinci bölümünde Batı merkezli tarih anlayışının değişmesini ve uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünün yöntem ve kaynak bakımından daha kapsayıcı hale gelmesini savunan akademisyenlerin çalışmaları değerlendirilmiştir. Tezin ilk kısmında da belirtildiği gibi bu çalışmalar içinde en çok konuşulan ve atıfta bulunanlardan biri Amitav Acharya ve Barry Buzan'ın birlikte kaleme aldığı "Non-Western International Relations Theory, Perspectives on and Beyond Asia" isimli çalışmadır.

Bu çalışmayla birlikte Asya ülkelerindeki uluslararası ilişkiler disipliniyle ilgilenen akademisyenler de bu konu üzerinde daha sık eser üretmeye başlamıştır. Bu çalışmaların kayda değer bölümü mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünün tamamen yıkılmaması ama kapsamının farklı coğrafyaları da kapsayacak biçimde şekillendirilmesini savunmuştur. Özellikle uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Batı harici dünyadaki gelişimiyle ilgilenen yazarlar arasında disiplinin ve literatürün daha kapsayıcı ve çoğulcu hale getirilmesi için iki farklı coğrafya ve akım arasında diyalog kurulması gerektiği fikri yaygın kanı haline gelmiştir. Bu noktada farklı metotlar geliştirilmiştir ve bu metotların ilerleyen süreçte "Küresel uluslararası ilişkiler" (Global IR) gibi bir aşamaya ulaşabileceği ve disiplinin hem tarih hem de kültür açısından daha katılımcı bir noktaya taşınabileceği savunulmuştur.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Japonya'daki akademik gelişimi, önemli akımlar ve filozoflar üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Japonya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarına en yoğun katkıda bulunan isimlerin başında gelen Takashi Inoguchi'nin tanımladığı dört yaklaşım ayrı ayrı ele alınmıştır. Yapılan analizler sonucunda bu yaklaşımların açıklayıcı akımlar olduğu, epistemolojik ve ontolojik açıdan Batı'dakilere kıyasla farklı varsayımlar getirmediği vurgulanmıştır.

Japonya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin nasıl geliştiğinin anlatıldığı bu bölümde Nishida Kitaro en önemli filozof ve tarihî figür olarak seçilmiştir. Hem Kyoto Okulu'nun hem de modern Japonya felsefesinin kurucusu olarak kabul edilen Nishida Kitaro'nun düşüncelerinin Asya'daki ve Japonya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmaları üzerinde bir etkisi olup olmadığı değerlendirilmiştir. Zira Takashi Inoguchi, Nishida Kitaro'yu inşacı yaklaşımın öncülerinden biri olarak

sunarken ABD’li akademisyenler bu düşünceyi üretmeden önce Japonya’da bu görüşün yaygın olduğunu savunmuştur.⁵²⁷

Aynı bölümde Nishida’nın özellikle özne ve nesne arasındaki ilişki hakkındaki düşüncelerine de yer verilmiştir. Nishida’nın düşüncelerinin Japonya’nın özellikle 2. Dünya Savaşı dönemindeki siyasetine yön verdiği görüşleri mevcut olsa da teorik açıdan Japonya’daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarına ciddi bir katkı sunmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Japonya’da görev yapan düşünce kuruluşlarının ise ağırlıklı olarak Kuzey Kore’nin nükleer silah tehdidi, ABD ile Japonya arasındaki ikili antlaşmalar ve Çin’in yükselişi hakkında raporlar ve tavsiyeler hazırladıkları görülmüştür.

Genel olarak Japonya’daki çalışmaların özellikle kaynak açısından mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünü genişletebilecek boyutta olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Yine de, özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan itibaren disipline yönelik akademik ilginin arttığı Japonya’daki çalışmalarda hâlâ Batı literatürünün etkisi hâkimdir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Çin’deki gelişimi anlatılmış ve Çin’de disiplinin nasıl çalışıldığının yanıtı aranmıştır. Çin’de 1980’lerin başında Deng Xiaoping’in reform politikalarıyla birlikte disiplinin gelişimi hız kazanmış ve 1990’ların başında Batı’daki çalışmaların Çinceye tercüme edilmesiyle uluslararası ilişkiler alanındaki araştırmalar da yoğunluk kazanmıştır. Çin’deki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının teorik temeli kavramlar aracılığıyla oluşturulmuştur. Konfüçyüs ise önemli düşünürler arasında en çok öne çıkartılan isimdir.

Çin’deki çalışmalar birkaç farklı açıdan önem taşımaktadır. Öncelikli olarak Vestfalya düzenine karşı çıkılmasının temel dayanaklarından biri Doğu Asya’da Çin’in hiyerarşik üstünlüğü ile oluşturulan ve on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ortalarına kadar süren bölgesel düzendir. Zira bu düzende egemen eşitlik ilkesinden söz edilmemektedir ve uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin Asya’daki gelişimini çalışan

⁵²⁷ Takashi Inoguchi, “Why are there no non-Western theories of International Relations? The case of Japan” in *Non-Western international relations theory: (Perspectives on and beyond Asia.)* ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, New York: Routledge. 2010. p. 53.

akademisyenlerin çoğu Batı literatürünün yeterince kapsayıcı olmadığı konusundaki görüşünü dile getirirken atıfta buldukları faktörlerden biri de bu düzene akademik araştırmalarda yeterince yer verilmemesidir.

Bu açıdan bakıldığında tezde incelenen üç ülke arasında filozofların uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin gelişmesine en çok etki ettiği ülke olarak Çin göze çarpmaktadır. Bu noktada iki isim öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki Çin toplumu üzerinde büyük bir etkiye sahip olan ve M.Ö 500'lü yıllarda yaşamış Konfüçyüs, diğeri ise günümüzde hâlâ aktif olan ve düşünceleriyle Çin akademik dünyasında önemli bir yer edinmeyi başaran Zhao Tingyang'dır.

Zhao Tingyang, geleneksel bir kavram olan “tianxia”nın yeniden tanımlanmasının gerekli olduğunu belirterek bu konsepti uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne kazandırmaya çalışmıştır. Bu anlatı tezin temel kavramlarından birini oluşturur; çünkü mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımlarına karşı hem ontolojik hem de epistemolojik açıdan anti tez oluşturma iddiasına sahiptir.

Zhao'ya göre mevcut literatür Vestfalya temelinde şekillenirken ontolojik olarak her devletin kendisinden sorumlu olduğu öngörülür. Ancak “tianxia” modeli devletlerin bir arada bulunmasını baz alır ve sistemi daha bütüncül yorumlar. Zhao'ya göre bu sistemin geliştirilmesi elzemdir. Çinli akademisyenler kendi kavramlarını kendi tarihlerinden almalıdırlar, aksi halde Batı tarafından tanımlanmaya devam eden Çin, ekonomik ve siyasî açıdan ne kadar yükselirse yükselsin, kendi bilgisini oluşturamadığı müddetçe asla bir süper güç haline gelemez.⁵²⁸

İkinci olarak Zhao, mevcut uluslararası sistemin yapısal sorunlarına “tianxia” modelinin çözüm üreteceğini düşünür. Mevcut sistemde her ülke kendi çıkarlarını

⁵²⁸ Tingyang, Zhao. “Can this ancient Chinese philosophy save us from global chaos?” Washingtonpost.com
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/07/tianxia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ca540ffdf4d0, (accessed on 19 November 2018)

savunduğu için devletlerin üzerinde herhangi bir otorite olmayan böyle bir ortamda çözümü imkânsız çatışmalar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ancak “tianxia” sisteminde bütün devletler gönüllü olarak kendileri üzerinde bir güç kabul edeceği ve o güç de bütün devletleri savunacağı için bu tip çatışmalar çıkmayacak, belki de Immanuel Kantı’nın “ebedi barış” düzenine bu sayede ulaşılacaktır. Hatta Kant’ın modeli sadece Avrupa ülkelerine çekici gelirken bu model çok daha kapsayıcı olacak ve bütün dünya devletlerine hitap edecektir. Sistem oturduğu takdirde hiçbir kişi ya da devlet kendini dışlanmış bir yabancı gibi hissetmeyecektir.⁵²⁹

Bu noktada Zhao’ya yöneltilen çok sayıda eleştiri vardır. Örneğin Ching-Chang Chen bu konseptin Batı hegemonyasından üretilen bir kavram olduğunu ve kavramın Batı merkezli sistemi tekrar etmekten öteye gitmediğini savunur.⁵³⁰ William Callahan ise mevcut uluslararası sistemin sorunlarını gidermeyen bu modelin yalnızca egemen ülkeyi değiştirdiğini ve bu yüzden kapsayıcılıktan uzak olduğunu ifade eder.⁵³¹

Tianxia kavramı nispeten farklı bir ontolojik model ve uluslararası sistem yapısı önerdiği için tezin en temel kavramlarından biri olmuştur. Bu noktada şunu belirtmekte fayda var ki ulus-devletleri değil ama sistemin bütünü analiz birimi olarak kabul etme düşüncesi Batı’daki teoriler tarafından da ortaya konmuştur. Immanuel Wallerstein tarafından geliştirilen “Dünya Sistemi Perspektifi” buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Bu örnekte de ontolojik açıdan sistemin bütünü devletlerden önce gelir.⁵³²

⁵²⁹ Tingyang Zhao, *Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance*, Beijing: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p.39.

⁵³⁰ Ching-Chang Chen and Young Chul Cho, “Theory“ in *Critical Imaginations In International Relations*, ed. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.252.

⁵³¹William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?”, *International Studies Review* 10, (2008): p.759.

⁵³² Faruk Yalvaç, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Yapısalcı Yaklaşımlar”, in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013. p.171.

Tianxia modelinin aynı zamanda ne kadar evrensel bir önerme olduğu da şüphelidir. Örneğin Hartmut Behr'e göre evrensel ve "partikülarist" olmak üzere iki ana ontolojik yapı vardır.⁵³³ Bu noktadan yola çıkarsak, nasıl ki mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini Avrupa'da hüküm süren Vestfalya düzeni üzerinden geliştirse tianxia modelinde de yine bölgesel yani "partikülarist" bir ontolojik yapı önerildiğini düşünebiliriz.

Hatta Çin'e ait bir nosyonu alıp bütün dünyaya bir model olarak sunmak, Doğu Asya'daki tarihî bir sistemin Avrupa'dan üstün olduğunu iddia etmek anlamına gelir ki bu da Batı ve Doğu arasındaki ikiliğin yeniden üretilmesine yol açar. Aynı zamanda ilk bölümde bahsedilen Asya ve Batı arasında diyalog kurulması çabalarına da olumsuz yansır.

Diğer bir faktör ise "tianxia" modelinin devlet merkezli olmasıdır. Zhao'nun özellikle Çinli akademisyenlere bu çağrışı yapması ve Çin'e ait bir model olarak bu kavramı literatüre sunması Çin'in uluslararası sistemde nasıl bir pozisyon alması ve nasıl büyümesi gerektiğini gösterir ki bu da "ulusal çıkar" penceresinden bakıldığında mevcut disiplinin devlet merkezli değerlendirmelerine benzemektedir. Bu noktada Zhao'nun devlet merkezliliğini aşamadığını ve Çin'in nasıl bir gerçek süper güç haline gelebileceğini değerlendirdiği göze çarpmaktadır. Ching-Chang Chen'in bakış açısıyla yorumladığımızda da bahsedilen sınırları aşmadığı için Batı'daki anlatıları yeniden üretme hatasına düşen "tianxia" modeli Batı'daki hegemonik yaklaşımla aynı noktada durmaktadır.⁵³⁴

Bu açılardan bakıldığında "tianxia" modeli farklı bir önerme olarak ve başka bir tarihin varlığına işaret ederek literatürü zenginleştirebilir ve Asya'daki ülkelerin tarihsel arka planlarının daha derin incelenmesine katkı sunabilir. Ancak tezde

⁵³³ Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p.246.

⁵³⁴ Ching-Chang Chen, "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations" *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 3 (2012): p.477.

detaylıca açıklanan nedenlerden dolayı bu modelin Batı'daki mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinine ontolojik ve epistemolojik açıdan radikal bir farklılık getirmediği savunulmuştur.

Zhao'nun modeli hem Çin'in bir hegemonya arayışının somutlaşmış hali hem de Çin'e ve Doğu Asya'ya ait bir modeli küresel çapta önerdiği için Batı ve Doğu arasında aşılacak istenen ikiliğin yeniden üretilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Özellikle diyalog temelli bir genişleme olarak hangi sistemin diğerinden üstün olduğundan ziyade neden farklı ilişki ağlarının ve sistemlerin doğduğu ve bunlara neden ihtiyaç duyulduğu mevcut literatüre daha kapsamlı bir katkı ve genişleme imkânı sunacaktır. Ancak bu ikiliğin aşılması halinde tianxia sisteminin literatürde daha geniş bir yer edineceği öngörülebilir.

Çin özelinde incelenen ikinci kavram ise “barışçıl kalkınma” olmuştur. Bu kavram Çin'in tarihsel ve kültürel özelliklerini barındırır. Çin yönetiminin 1995'ten bu yana yayımladığı bütün Beyaz Kitap'larda kendisine yer bulan “barışçıl kalkınma” kavramı Çin'in yükselişinin bütün dünya için faydalı olacağı görüşünü savunur. Bu noktada kavram pratik ile ilişkili bir tartışmaya da yol açar. O da Çin'in yükselişinin gerçekten barışçıl olup olmayacağıdır.

Bunun yanı sıra Batı merkezli küresel sistemin geleceğine bir tehdit olarak görülen Çin'in yükselişi ve “Çin tehdidi” algılamaları da bu kavram etrafındaki tartışmalarda kendine yer bulmuştur. Bu açıdan Asya ülkelerinde ortaya çıkan diğer kavramlardan ayrılan barışçıl kalkınma kavramı özellikle ABD'deki tartışmalarda da konu olmuştur.

Burada iki zıt görüş ortaya çıkar. Neo-liberal görüş Çin'in mevcut sistem sayesinde güçlendiğini ve uluslararası sistemde ortaya çıkan gelişmelerin sorumluluğuna katlanmadan büyümeye devam ettiğini, dolayısıyla ekonomik açıdan gelişmeyi sürdürdüğü müddetçe kural temelli ve Batı merkezli küresel sistemden de kopmak istemeyeceğini savunur.⁵³⁵ Neo-realist görüş ise Çin'in yükselmeye devam ettikçe

⁵³⁵ Joseph Nye, “The Cooperative Rivalry of US China Relations”, project-syndictae.com. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-america-relationship-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-11>, (accessed on 2 December 2018)

politik nüfuz açısından mümkün olduğunca genişlemeye çalışacağını ve bunu yaparken de kaçınılmaz olarak ABD ile karşı karşıya geleceğini, bu yüzden de barışçıl bir yükseliş yaşamasının mümkün olmadığını savunur.⁵³⁶

Kavram şu aşamada güç dengesi konsepti çerçevesinde değerlendirilmektedir. Her ne kadar literatürü genişletecek ve yeni kaynaklar ekleyecek bir kavram olsa da ontolojik ve epistemolojik açıdan Batı'daki çalışmalara alternatif bir model sunmamaktadır.

Tezin beşinci bölümünde disiplinin Hindistan'daki gelişimi ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda disiplinin yeterli ilgili görmediğinden yakınan Hint akademisyenler özgün bir teori geliştirmek için Hindistan'ın önünde ciddi sorunlar bulunduğunu savunur. Disiplinin devlet merkezli yorumlanması, teori üretmenin bir sömürgeci pratiği olarak algılanması, ortaya konan epistemolojik açıklamaların pozitivizmi aşamaması ve Batı'daki akımların etkisinde devam etmesi bunlardan en önemlileri olarak göze çarpmaktadır.

Hindistan'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında en çok atıfta bulunulan ve disiplini en çok etkilediği gözlemlenen iki isim vardır. İlki Hint düşünürü ve siyasetçi, genellikle "Hint Machiavelli" olarak tanınan, Kautilya'dır (Çanakya). İkinci isim ise Hindistan'ın ilk Başbakanı Cevahirlal Nehru'dur.

Kautilya'nın "Hint Machiavelli" olarak tanımlanması, disiplinin Asya'daki gelişimini inceleyen akademisyenler açısından mevcut literatürün ne kadar Avrupa merkezli olduğunun göstergesi olarak yorumlanmıştır. Gerçekten de Kautilya'nın düşünceleri ile Machiavelli'nin düşünceleri arasında büyük benzerlikler vardır. İki ismin düşünceleri arasındaki paralelliği araştıran George Modelski'ye göre iki düşünür arasındaki en önemli fark ise Machiavelli'nin düşüncelerini ifade ederken

⁵³⁶ John J. Mearsheimer "China's Unpeaceful Rise", *Current History* 105, (2006): p.161.

geçmişte yaşanan olaylara atıfta bulunmasıdır. Kautilya ise meydana gelen olaylar üzerinden analiz yapmaz ve olması gerekenleri söyler.⁵³⁷

Kautilya'nın meşhur 'Arthashastra' eserinde geçen "Mandala Sistemi"nin de tıpkı tianxia'da olduğu gibi farklı bir yaklaşım benimsediği savunulabilir. Bu yaklaşım aynı zamanda disiplinin temelinde yer alan dış politika ve iç politika ayrımından da uzaktır. Ancak bu kavram da hegemonik bir ilişki yapısı öngörmektedir. Ayrıca bu kavram üzerinde yapılan teorik çalışmaların da yetersiz olduğu gözlemlenmiştir.

Cevahirlal Nehru ise Hindistan'da en çok atıfta bulunulan ve en çok tartışılan düşünürlerin ve siyasetçilerin başında gelir. Nehru iki açıdan oldukça önemlidir. İlk olarak, kendi döneminde pek çok düşünce kuruluşunun açılmasına destek olmuş ve akademik çalışmaların gerçekleştirilmesi için çaba göstermiştir. İkinci olarak ise bağlantısızlık (non-alignment) politikasını geliştirerek önemli bir kavramsal çerçeve çizilmesine olanak sağlamıştır.

Bağlantısızlık politikası bugün bile Hindistan'daki akademisyenlerin en çok analiz ettiği konulardan biridir. Zira bazı akademisyenler Hindistan'ın gelecekte ABD ya da başka bir ülke ile resmî bir ittifak ilişkisine girmeyeceğini, bunun nedeninin ise bağlantısızlık politikanın içselleştirilmesi olduğunu söylerler.

Her ne kadar Nehru'nun düşüncelerinin bazı Hint geleneklerinin ahlakî değerlerinden kaynaklandığı savunulsa da aslında Nehru'nun bağlantısızlık siyasetinin pratik kaynakları daha fazladır. Tezde detaylıca anlatıldığı üzere güncel siyaset ile ilişkilendirilebilecek pek çok faktör bu politikanın ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlamıştır. Hatta bağlantısızlık politikası soğuk savaş dönemindeki güç dengesi stratejisine uygun olarak ilerlemiştir. Hindistan'ın ekonomik kalkınmasını önceleyen Nehru bu politika sayesinde soğuk savaştaki iki süper güç tarafından da maddi yardım elde etmeyi başarmıştır. Bunun ötesinde Nehru iki kutbun olduğu bir dünyada stratejik olarak taraf seçmenin yanlış olacağını savunmuştur. Bu açıardan bakıldığında bu kavramın da Batı literatüründeki epistemolojik ve ontolojik

⁵³⁷ George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World", *The American Political Science Review* 58, no.3 (1964): p.551.

kabulleri yansıttığı savunulabilir. Yine de tianxia veya barışçıl kalkınma gibi bağlantısızlık kavramı da uluslararası ilişkiler literatürün zenginleşmesine katkı sağlamıştır.

Tezin sonuç bölümünde ise hem uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin üç ülkedeki gelişimi kıyaslanmış hem de tezin ana argümanı savunulmuştur. Disiplinin bu üç ülkedeki gelişimi açısından en büyük benzerlik üç ülkede de uluslararası ilişkiler alanının akademik bir disiplin haline gelmesinde ve çalışmaların nitelik açısından artmasında hükümetlerin önemli rol oynamış olmasıdır. Batı'nın disiplini domine etmesine karşı çıkan düşünüler kendi ülkelerinin ve bölgelerinin tarihsel geçmişlerini de literatüre eklemek için çaba harcamışlardır.

Yine üç ülkede de önemli düşünce kuruluşlarının hükümetler ile işbirliği halinde çalıştıkları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda Çin ve Hindistan'daki düşünce kuruluşlarında bu ülkelerin yükselen güç olma özellikleri vurgulanmıştır. Hindistan'da ülkenin ulusal güvenlik sorunları düşünce kuruluşlarındaki çalışmaların önemli bir kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Çin'de Kuşak-Yol projesi kapsamında çok sayıda analiz bulunmaktadır ve yine ABD ile olan ikili ilişkilere değinilmiştir. Japonya'daki düşünce kuruluşları ise Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer silah tehdidine, ABD ile ikili ilişkilere ve Çin'in yükselişine odaklanmıştır.

Çin'in yükselişi Batı ülkelerinde de yankı uyandırmaktadır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında Çin ile diğer iki ülke arasındaki önemli bir fark Çin'deki tartışmaların ve kavramların Batı dünyasında da ses getirmesi olarak gösterilebilir. Yine önemli bir farklılık olarak Çin'deki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının daha çok kavramlar üzerinden gerçekleştirildiği vurgulanması gereken bir husustur. Genel olarak bakıldığında Çin'in yükselen güç olma özelliği ve uluslararası sistemdeki ağırlığının her geçen gün artması, akademik çalışmalara da hız kazandırmış ve literatür açısından tartışmaların zenginleşmesini sağlamıştır. Dolayısıyla Çin'deki çalışmaların, hem teorik hem de kavramsal tartışma açısından Hindistan ve Japonya'daki çalışmalardan daha önde olduğunun altı çizilmelidir. Bu nedenlerden dolayı mevcut uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne en büyük katkıyı yapan Asya ülkesi

olarak Çin'i öne çıkarmak ve Çin'deki tartışmaları Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının lokomotifi olarak tanımlamak abartılı olmayacaktır.

Toparlamak gerekirse, bu tez literatürde büyük yer kaplayamayan, Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının gelişimini konu edinmiştir. Bu bağlamda Asya'daki çalışmaların Batı'dakilere kıyasla ontolojik ve epistemolojik açıdan bir farklılık getirip getirmediğini araştırılmıştır. Asya'daki çalışmalar her ne kadar Batı'daki ana akım teorilere kıyasla bir takım farklılıklar barındırsa da yöneltilecek eleştiriler ve bulunan alternatifler Batı'daki diğer çalışmaların belirlediği sınırları aşmamıştır.

Ontolojik açıdan Kautilya'nın eserinde geçen "Mandala" sistemini ve Zhao Tingyang'ın tianxia önermesini bir farklılık olarak ortaya koyabiliriz. Ancak benzer eğilimleri Batı'daki başka düşünce akımlarında da gözlemleyebiliriz. Bu açılarından bakıldığında Asya'daki çalışmaların Asya'ya özgü koşullara ve sorunlara öncelik verse de, mevcut çalışmaların uluslararası sistemin hegemonik yapısı ve devlet merkeziliği gibi bir takım öğeleri yeniden ürettiğini iddia edebiliriz.

Asya ülkeleri pek çok açıdan küresel düzende daha aktif roller üstlenmeye başlamıştır ve bu noktada hem Batı'daki uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin bu ülkelere bakışı hem de Asya'nın en çok öne çıkan ülkelerinde bu disiplinin nasıl gelişmekte olduğu bu tezde önemli bir konu olarak ele alınmıştır. Literatüre katkı olması amacıyla yazılan bu tez, ana araştırma sorusuna cevaben Asya'daki uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının en azından mevcut aşamada Batı'daki çalışmalarla aynı ontolojik ve epistemolojik kabulleri yansıttığını savunmuştur.

APPENDIX B: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

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