

DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A CASE OF  
FAILED STATE?

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A CASE OF FAILED STATE?**

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This thesis focuses on accelerating drug-related violence in Mexico since the early 2000s which has pushed Mexico into arguments around the concept of “failed state” which does not provide a sufficient basis for explaining the violence and security issues in Mexico. In this thesis, the term “failed state” has been described in order to reveal its origin, present critics on it and understand why Mexico has become a subject of this discourse by briefing Latin America history from colonial period to today in the context of path dependence in order to explain the historical bonds of institutional development. It has been tried to focus on the critical junctures which created the path dependence on institutional development in Mexico to explain the causes of enduring violence. Therefore, the colonial period, independence process, Mexican revolution, state corporatism and authoritarian approaches, neoliberal implications and democratization processes which created an unconstrained space to drug cartels have been introduced. Moreover, drug-related violence in Guerrero as the local state which has been exposed to violence for a long period of time due to the marginalization of rural poor and indigenous people, production and trafficking of narcotics has

been tried to be analyzed within the dynamics of state and society in historical perspective.

**Keywords:** Drug-related violence, Mexico, Guerrero, failed state.

## ÖZ

### MEKSİKA’DA UYUŞTURUCU BAĞLANTILI ŞİDDET: “BİR BAŞARISIZ DEVLET” ÖRNEĞİ Mİ?

Dursun, Ayşegül

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tez, 2000lerin başından beri Meksika’da uyuşturucuya bağlı artan şiddete ve güvenlik problemlerini açıklamak için yeterli bir temel sağlamayan başarısız devlet kavramı etrafındaki tartışmalara odaklanmaktadır. Başarısız devlet kavramının çıkış noktasını, kavrama ilişkin eleştirileri ve Meksika’nın neden bu kavrama konu olduğunu ortaya koymak adına başarısız devlet kavramı tanımlanmış, sömürgeci dönemden günümüze Latin Amerika tarihi özetlenerek kurumsal gelişimin tarihsel bağlarını açıklamak için izlek bağımlılığı kavramından yararlanılmıştır. Sürekli şiddetin nedenlerini açıklamak için Meksika’da kurumsal gelişime izlek bağımlılığı yaratan kritik dönemeçlere odaklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu nedenle, sömürge dönemi, bağımsızlık süreci, Meksika Devrimi, devlet korporatizmi ve otoriter yaklaşımlar, neoliberal uygulamalar ve uyuşturucu kartelleri için kısıtlanmamış bir alan yaratan demokratikleşme süreçleri ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca, kırsal kesimde yoksul ve yerli halkın marjinalleşmesi, uyuşturucu ile bağlantılı şiddet, uyuşturucu madde üretimi ve ticareti nedeniyle uzun süredir şiddete maruz kalan yerel devlet

Guerrero'da, devlet ve toplum dinamikleri tarihsel perspektif gözetilerek analiz edilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Uyuşturucu bağlantılı şiddet, Meksika, Guerrero, başarısız devlet.

*To my family and friends*

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION .....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE CONCEPT OF FAILED STATE AND ITS CRITICISMS .....	6
2.1. Origins of the Concept of “Failed State”: Praetorianism à la Huntington .....	7
2.2. Failed State in Historical Institutionalism.....	11
2.2.1. Embedded Autonomy of the Developmentalist State .....	12
2.3. Defining Failed State.....	16
2.3.1. Failed State: A New Challenge for Post-Cold War Era.....	16
2.3.2. The Failed State as a Security Threat in the Aftermath of 9/11 .....	22
2.3.3. The Rise of Failed State Literature in Political Science and International Relations .....	26
2.4. Critiques of the Failed State Concept.....	33
3. DISCUSSING MEXICO: FAILED OR NOT.....	38
3.1. Looking into the History of Latin America.....	40
3.2. The US Foreign Policy from The Monroe Doctrine to the Cold War.....	43
3.3. Post-Cold War Era and the New Discourse: Drug Trafficking.....	49
3.4. From Colonialism to Neoliberalism: Critical Junctures in History of Mexico.....	50
3.5. Different Colonial Practices: Which Path to be Dependent? .....	54

3.5.1. Mexico in the Post-Colonial Period .....	60
3.5.2. Passive Revolution Process in Mexico (1910-1920) .....	63
3.5.3. Authoritarian Government and Corporatist Social Reconstruction ...	67
3.5.4. The Effects of Neoliberalism on Mexico .....	69
3.5.5. Major Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico .....	73
3.5.5.1. The Gulf Cartel .....	74
3.5.5.2. Los Zetas .....	75
3.5.5.3. La Familia .....	75
3.5.5.4. The Sinaloa Cartel .....	76
3.5.5.5. Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel) .....	77
3.5.5.6. Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel) .....	78
3.5.5.7. The Beltrán Leyva Organization .....	78
3.6. Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Trafficking Organizations' Existence .....	79
4. GUERRERO: A LOCAL STATE IN ENDURING VIOLENCE .....	83
4.1. An Overview of Guerrero .....	85
4.2. Early Times of Guerrero .....	89
4.3. Peasant Movements and Political Violence: Dirty War (Guerra Sucia) in Guerrero .....	93
4.4. The Outcome of Neoliberalism in Guerrero: Drug Related Violence .....	98
4.4.1. Guerrero in Calderón Era .....	103
4.4.2. Soaring Violence: The Deadliest Years (2011-2020) .....	107
5. CONCLUSION .....	109
REFERENCES .....	113
APPENDICES	
A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY .....	127
B. TEZ İZİN FORMU/THESIS PERMISSION FORM .....	139

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Registered homicide rates in Mexico (2005-2018).....	2
Figure 2 Map of Guerrero .....	86

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In today's Mexico, violence associated with "Drug Wars" has escalated to an unrelenting level. Two recent events illustrate the current situation very well: In October 2019, The Sinaloa Cartel practically seized the city of Culiacan, one of Mexico's largest cities. The Sinaloa Cartel flexed its muscles against the law enforcement forces after the capture of Ovidio Guzmán López, the son of convicted drug lord Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán during a patrol (BBC, 2019a). In November 2019, 9 US citizens were murdered in a conflict between two rival gangs of Juárez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel (BBC, 2019b). The drug-related violence that Mexico has been fighting for years was brought to the scrutiny of the international media by these events.

Apart from these incidents, in 2014, in the municipality of Iguala in the state of Guerrero 43 protesting teacher trainees from Ayotzinapa Raul Isidro Burgos Teachers' College disappeared. A drug cartel called as Guerreros Unidos was known to be responsible for taking the 43 Mexican teacher trainees, who were handed to them by local authorities; they brutally murdered the students and burned their bodies. For a long time, the disappearance of the students remained at the top of the news and numerous mass protests for 43 missing students were organized across the country and also around the world (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015). Although drug-related violence has been prevalent all across Mexico as of 2014; violence in Guerrero in particular, due to this unresolved world-shaking incident, has become more visible and a kind of sore point for the latest administrations during the last six years.

Evidently, violence and security issues in Mexico were not limited to those events mentioned above. For many years, drug-related violence has taken tens of thousands of lives in Mexico (Atuesta and Paredes, 2016). Ironically enough, since the “War on Drugs” initiated by the President Felipe Calderón against drug cartels in 2006, crime rates have started to increase significantly (Coronado and Saucedo, 2019) (see also Figure.1). During the tenure of the President Calderón (2006-2012), the official number of people who died as result of drug-related violence was reported to be 60,000. It is also stated that these numbers might be much higher in reality (BBC, 2019c). Even with the \$1.4 billion financial support US provided in order to fight against drug-related crime called “Mérida Initiative” (Morton, 2012; Mercille, 2011), it is stated that the acceleration of violence has been steeper, especially in locales where the conflict with the government is intense (Atuesta and Paredes, 2016). The war against drug-related crime initiated by the Calderón administration was conceived in response to the serious violence problem across the country- as drug cartels were constantly struggling to control their areas of influence and consequently harming the regional economies; yet this initiative itself further escalated the violence (Coronado and Saucedo, 2019).




Figure 1 Registered homicide rates in Mexico (2005-2018)

(Source: BBC [2019c])

In 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected as president and he seemed to ignore the violence and the security problems in the country; instead, he began to implement his policies on other issues. The Nieto administration has focused on the economic reforms even though the issues including security and human rights violations were equally pressing. In addition, the political elite of the time was allegedly involved in overt corruption (Magaloni and Razu, 2016).

Nonetheless, Nieto's biggest achievement on violence and security issues was the capture of "El Chapo" in 2016. However, the Sinaloa Cartel remained in power even after the extradition of "El Chapo" to the US. The release of El Chapo's son after his arrest, owing to the cartel-instigated violent incidents can be cited as an indication of this power (BBC, 2019c).

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) became the president of Mexico on December 1, 2018, with his rhetoric about eliminating the military pressure on drug cartels while launching a fight against corruption and inequality. The Obrador administration instituted a new civilian National Guard with a new approach to combat violence with "*Hugs, not bullets*" which was in fact one of his election campaign slogans. Furthermore, he promised to solve the disappearance case of 43 teacher trainees in Guerrero. However, during Obrador's first year in office, the rate of violent incidents increased to historical levels. As an indication of this, on December 1, 2019- the first anniversary of Obrador administration, the Mexican Secretariat of Public Security reported a total of 127 killings in single day (Al Jazeera, 2019). Moreover, there is no significant progress on the resolution of Missing 43 case so far.

The Mexican state officials are continually emphasizing the necessity for major reforms to ensure public order and peace; yet, it is not certain whether carrying out the suggested reforms would be sufficient to achieve these goals (Ağkaya and Genç Yılmaz, 2017). As Morton (2017) notes, qualitatively and quantitatively increased violence has led scholars to scrutinize the Mexican

statehood around the concept of “failed state”. To put it simply, the violence that became more prevalent -directly affecting the lives of the Mexican people- has pushed Mexico into a discussion around failed state concept.

However, the concept of failed state appears to fail in providing a solid conceptual framework for explaining the violence and security issues in Mexico. While corruption is widespread and drug cartels cause extreme violence in some parts of the country, Mexico is the 14<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world. Thus, in the same institutional paradigm, this connotes strong institutional mechanisms in Mexican state; for instance, Mexico can provide almost complete security of oil pipelines (Ağkaya and Genç Yılmaz, 2016).

Hence, this thesis argues that it is necessary to discuss the underlying social structure that gives rise to violence and security problems in Mexico. This discussion then would be juxtaposed with the notion of failed state to examine to what extent this concept would explain Mexico's socio-political characteristics. Following Morton (2017), this thesis argues that Mexico cannot be understood without underlying historical patterns of development, political economy and the social relations constituting Mexican state and society. Therefore, focusing on important historical events and geopolitical conditions which shape the infrastructure of the state would help avoiding the deployment of failed state status in Mexico and elsewhere in postcolonial contexts (Morton, 2017). The main aim of this thesis is to explain violence seen in Mexico, focusing on historical processes the country has gone through, with references to historical institutionalism and to put forward why it is not appropriate to categorize Mexico as a failed state in light of historical perspectives.

In particular, this text will focus on the state of Guerrero, located in the Southwest of Mexico. Guerrero has been exposed to violence almost since its establishment and more recently, it was turned into a battlefield of drug trafficking organizations, self-defense groups and the Mexican army. Guerrero is

one of the poorest, marginalized and an indigenously diversified state of Mexico and it has come to the forefront of international media due to accelerating drug-related violence and existence of unfavorable institutions. These events will be introduced in the manuscript with references to critical junctures and state-society relations.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides the purpose and the structure of this thesis. In the second chapter, the concept of failed state was examined with its origins, weaknesses and strengths. This chapter also lays out the arguments as to why Mexico has become a subject of this concept and focuses on historical institutionalism which will be the framework to analyze Mexico. The tools utilized by historical institutionalists will be introduced briefly. The third chapter presents a very short history of Latin America from the colonial period to present time to reveal possible path dependencies, explaining the historical social relations that shape the institutional development. This chapter also focuses on the critical junctures in which strategies, alliances and struggles of the social actors would make turning points in institutional development in Mexico. Therefore, the fourth chapter is divided into sections tracing the relevant historical periods that explain the rise of drug cartels and booming drug-related violence. The fourth chapter focuses on the state Guerrero as the unfortunate laboratory of violence for a long period of time, due to marginalization of rural poor and exclusion of indigenous communities from agricultural production. The dynamics of state-society relations in Guerrero are discussed to demonstrate how narcotic networks and self-defense groups filled the vacuum left by the state institutions in light of the discussions in the previous chapters. The concluding chapter aims to hint at a policy alternative that could be pursued for the wellbeing of the citizens and for reduction in violence in the so-called failed states of Mexico and Guerrero.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE CONCEPT OF FAILED STATE AND ITS CRITICISMS**

Before analyzing Mexico, which is currently associated with failed state concept in terms of drug-related violence, it would be crucial to explain what the “failed state” term means. It is also necessary to understand how this concept evolved. Therefore, this chapter will introduce the concept first and will elaborate on the criticisms of different scholars from different perspectives. In light of this chapter, Mexico will be analyzed in relation to historical institutionalism.

The concept of the failed state was created as a result of the emergence of new types of threats international peace and security face with the end of the Cold War (Brooks, 2005). With the self-determination movements that started after the Second World War (WWII), the decolonization process has entered a period of rapid progress. This progress has reached the phase of evolution after the 1960s and the number of states present on the world stage has increased. However, the problems faced by new types of states have started to endanger the protection of international peace and security, which is one of the main objectives of the UN Treaty. The emerging problems pushed politicians and bureaucrats to focus on the concept of state failure, and security organizations came to the conclusion that many problems affecting international peace and security are of paramount importance, from refugee movements to drug trafficking.

When looking at the political and legal criticism of the concept of the failed state today, the lack of uniform practice related to the concept and the arbitrary practices of the international community and the states with great power are the most striking issues. Therefore, it is important to understand the concept of failed

state and how it was criticized, in order to understand the discussions on drug-related violence in Mexico and the current discourse about Mexico and its status in terms of failure.

### **2.1. Origins of the Concept of “Failed State”: Praetorianism à la Huntington**

Huntington examines states with regards to the degree of government. Therefore, he puts “Communist totalitarian states” and “Western liberal states” into two groups, which have effective political systems. He gives the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union as examples of governments who govern via strong, adaptable and coherent political institutions and states that have superiority over the others in Asia, Africa and Latin America in terms of efficiency in governing. According to Huntington, political institutions of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America do not have as much power as the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. For this reason, the governments do not govern properly at basic level. By referring to Gunnar Myrdal, Huntington also underscores the increasing economic inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries that bring about a political gap. However, countries which have underdeveloped economies may have developed and well-organized political system vice versa. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the main focus of political underdevelopment, such as economic underdevelopment, tends to be the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Huntington, 1973:1-3). Huntington explains the situation of these countries after WWII with their political development which evolved around frequent military coups, continuously reiterative uprisings, ethnic and class conflicts, violence, hegemony of inefficient leaderships, catastrophic economic and social policies, pervasive corruption at government level, controversies on violations of rights, decreasing efficient bureaucracy, authority loss in judicial power, disintegration seen in political parties, widespread indifference in urban politics (Huntington, 1973:3). According to Huntington, in two decades after the WWII, between the 1950s and the 1960s, political order was in decline which was macerating effectiveness,

authority and legitimacy of governments in Asian, African and Latin American countries. Due to the lack of the public morale and the lack of political institutions based on public interest, political decay prevailed instead of political development. Huntington explains these determinants such as violence and instability that causes political decay: "...rapid social change and the mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions." (Huntington, 1973:4).

Multiplied political demands, extended political consciousness and participation due to the social and economic change debilitated efficiency and supremacy of traditional institutions and made the adaptation of new institutions difficult. In these circumstances, while political participation was increasing, political institutionalization remained low, leading to political instability and disorder. Therefore, political institutionalization is not regarded as the most significant criterion when countries face social and economic change. In the US foreign policy, political development was underestimated, and economic development became the focal point for two decades after WWII. It was believed that the political development and stability would follow the economic development. Hence, aid programs were planned, and loans were given to underdeveloped countries, just aiming to terminate poverty and problems related to social policy along with contributions to development of economy. At this point, Huntington criticizes the policy followed by the US and claims that economic development and political stability may not go hand in hand as seen in Argentina and Venezuela where there was significant growth rate, but political stability could not be provided (Huntington, 1973:5-6).

Huntington puts forward "praetorian society" concept to define politicized society which have multiplied social forces apart from the military in political sphere. These forces are the labor unions, universities, religious organizations, businessmen etc. and they become major actors in societies where effective political institutions are absent or weakened. In this system, there is no political

institution as the legitimate intermediary actor between conflicting groups. This shows that the power is not unified, occurs in different forms and sizes, and authority can be achieved or lost easily due to the weakness of political institutions. Because of diversified social forces in a praetorian society, tension could not be diminished, whereas it could be achieved in societies which institutionalized properly. In addition, the participation of new groups worsens rather than relieves tensions; methods and resources applied in political action are multiplied and causes fragmentation of the polity (Huntington, 1973:195-196).

In sum, he asserts that the praetorian societies are in a vicious circle which lacks community which makes developing political institutions difficult. The lack or absence of effective political institutions even affects the community, creating a barrier in front of the development of the community in complicated forms of praetorian societies. In these circumstances, this trend in society endures and repeats. The culture of society absorbs praetorian politics in it (Huntington, 1973: 237-238).

Furthermore, Huntington divides praetorianism into three categories: oligarchical, radical and mass praetorianism. In oligarchical praetorianism, political actors are rather homogenous, and community consists of social ties and political action. But as political participation expands, the actors in politics increase in number and the methods of political action become more diversified. As a result, conflict occurs in an oligarchical praetorian society, in the middle-class radical praetorian society it is seen intensely, and in mass praetorian society it becomes even more intense. In these three phases of praetorianism, the direct interaction among social forces is not effective or less effective to bring public good from their private interests. Huntington further explains the three praetorianism categories: The struggle occurs between personal and familial groups in praetorian oligarchy which may last for a long time, even centuries, as seen in Latin America in the 19th century. The major social forces in oligarchical

praetorianism were the owners of vast lands, the church and the ruling class which held the power. On the other hand, social institutions did not have clear-cut features and political, military, religious, social and economic leadership roles were usually merged by the ruling class. In rural spheres families, cliques, and tribes were active in politics and a continuous struggle was seen among them to capture power, wealth and status in the politics and the society. In this atmosphere, there was no consensus on the resolution of conflicts, or few institutions were interested in such a resolution (Huntington,1973:199).

When ‘conquistadors’ of Spain and Portugal came to the continent, they did not allow the indigenous people of Latin America to develop their own local political institutions. After the independence of nation states, creoles strived to establish institutions and constitutional changes the same way the US and France applied. However, this led to the establishment of weak and ineffective political institutions for a modernizing state and society, as well as a vacuum of legitimacy. The society stayed in highly oligarchical and feudal form. Republican form of institutions was not fully appropriate for the societies in Latin America. Therefore, “political authority decayed and the institutions withered...” and “Latin American constitutions became piece of paper” (Huntington,1973:200).

Apart from the oligarchical praetorianism, in the radical praetorian society, struggle was seen in the institutional and occupational groups together with personal and family groups for decades; in the mass praetorianism, certain social classes and social movements are in spotlight and these circumstances commonly endure for a couple of years (Huntington,1973:198).

To conclude, he claims that the absence of effective political institutions and the inability to develop them create political turmoil in a society (Huntington, 1973:197-198).

## **2.2. Failed State in Historical Institutionalism**

The theoretical premises of the historical-institutionalist approach, which deals with the role of states in the development process from a comparative perspective, are based on the book titled "Bringing the State Back In" in 1985 edited by Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. In this book, Skocpol emphasizes that previous state theories only focus on the question of how the state was shaped by society and neglected the question of how state transforms society with its organizational power.

According to Skocpol et.al. (1985), the own interests and powers of state administrators have been ignored. This negligence is due to the wrong emphasis in the pluralist approach on competition among interest groups. She claims that structural functionalist approaches assumed that state activities derive from the functions that must be met in society hence explaining the institutional structure of the state with reference to society., Skocpol also names the Marxist approaches as "society centered" as she claims this approach takes the state as shaped by the class relations. Skocpol, by criticizing the notion of the relative autonomy of the state, especially emphasized by Marxist approaches, as being society-centered, stated that the historical situations in which the state acted completely autonomously from society were neglected in Marxist analyzes.

Skocpol was drawing on Weber who defined the state as "the human community that monopolized the legitimate use of physical power in a particular territorial area," and claimed that the state consisted of the "management, police and army" organizations, and that the power of the state came from its institutions, not from society. Based on this, Skocpol explained the power of states to guide societies around a specific target (e.g. development or prosperity) with reference to two basic concepts: "state autonomy" and "state capacity." The autonomy of the State is related to the extent to which the State is isolated from social groups and to what extent they can act towards goals that are not a simple extension of their

demands. State capacity, on the other hand, relates to the extent to which states have strong organizational opportunities to achieve these goals. In this context, "strong and weak" states can be mentioned. Strong states are states that are relatively isolated from social groups, can act in line with their own goals instead of the demands of society, and have strong institutions (with a rational bureaucracy in the Weberian sense) to achieve these goals. Therefore, the higher the autonomy of a state from the society and the stronger its institutional capacity, the greater the ability to shape society in line with development or other goals (Skocpol, et.al., 1985).

In the late capitalizing countries, the main factor that determines the success or failure of capitalist development seems to be the autonomy and effectiveness of the state. However, the factor actually is the country's original position in the world system. While the contradictions of the developmental state are actually class contradictions stemming from late capitalization, it is presented to be the product of the political choices made by the state / political elites.

### **2.2.1. Embedded Autonomy of the Developmentalist State**

In his book entitled "Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation" published in 1995, Peter Evans sought to answer the question of why the state was "failed" in countries such as India and Brazil and "successful" in Korea in the development process. While Evans searches for the answer to this question, he first redefines the concept of "developmentalist state" based on an original synthesis of Weber, Gerschenkron and Hirschman.

According to Evans (1995), in developmental states, there is a rational bureaucracy isolated from social demands in the sense which Weber (Constas, 1958) defined. Being elected through the merit system provides bureaucracy with some form of consistency and internal integrity, which gives autonomy to the state apparatus. However, the existence of a bureaucracy isolated from social

demands is a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the markets. Yet, it is insufficient for the implementation of industrial policies in the countries that adopted the capitalist economic structure rather late. Because in the countries that become capitalist later, the state sometimes should invest by putting itself in the place of entrepreneurs and sometimes it has to direct investors with incentives. At this point, Evans focuses to the studies of Gerschenkron on late developing countries (European countries such as Germany, Japan, Russia, which were industrialized later than England in the nineteenth century) and studies of Hirschman on later developing countries (Third World countries which became industrialized after the World War II). According to Gerschenkron (1962), late industrialized countries have to use production technologies that require a much larger scale of capital than their own entrepreneurs have in order to compete with the early industrialized countries, and therefore the state plays the role of entrepreneurs in these countries. Hirschman (1958) states that the main problem in later industrialized countries is not the lack of capital, but the indecision of the capitalist in which areas to invest, and that the state should direct the entrepreneurs with incentives to solve this problem.

According to Evans (1995: 32), Gerschenkron's and Hirschman's approaches point to a state embedded in society, a state that is a capital accumulation project and that can implement it rather than a state isolated from society in the sense of Weber. At this point, Evans (1995: 33) uses the concept of "embedded autonomy" to describe a state that is both autonomous from society in the sense of Weber, and a state embedded in society in the sense of Gerschenkron and Hirschman. Embedded autonomy, based on contradictory synthesis between the bureaucracy's internal integrity and its outward linkages, allows the state to successfully intervene in industrial transformation, and thus is the main feature of developmentalist states.

Evans (1995: 59) adds that embedded autonomy in this sense is different from the concept of "relative autonomy" used by Marxists. Because while the concept of relative autonomy only indicates that state autonomy is restricted by the requirements of capital accumulation, embedded autonomy means that it has institutional channels through which the state can constantly negotiate the policies it pursues, thanks to its ties with society. Hence, state rationality and market rationality resonated owing to the nodal institutional structure of the state. Evans (1995: 65) indicates that the most typical examples of the developmental states are the newly industrialized East Asian countries, especially Korea. On the other hand, when the state lacks such nodal agencies to reach to society, the result would be unfavorable (Evans, 1995).

Evans (1995) constructs "predatory states" as another ideal type in the Weberian sense, as a mirror image opposite of developmentalist states. The pre-bureaucratic, patrimonial character of the predatory state is contrasted to extraordinary administrative capacities of bureaucracy in the developmental state. Bureaucrats seek to maximize their own interests. Individual interests come before collective interests. The ties with the society go only through personal relationships, not corporate. The predatory states do not take any steps for the development of capital accumulation in the country, but also seize existing social resources. Evans notes that the most typical example of these states is Zaire. He describes the states between these two extremes as "intermediate states" and puts countries such as India and Brazil into this group (Evans, 1995: 12)

Peter Evans (1995) uses the term 'ideal type' to falsely identify Zaire and Korea. It should be noted that in Weberian methodology the ideal types by definition do not exist in reality. Ideal types in Weberian conception are mental constructions, a collected defining characteristic from a family of similar cases. Therefore, an ideal type is an abstraction. While Evans claims to adhere to the Weberian theory

and adopting the term 'ideal type', his usage of the term appears to be problematic.

According to institutionalist scholars, the developmental state continues its salience through the neoliberal globalization conditions, whilst with different role and functions. While in the 1960s and 70s, the developmental state served to ensure the transition of importers from import substitution industrialization to export-oriented industrialization, since the 1980s, it has been ensuring to orchestrate a new industrial policy incompatible with the rules of the global competition. Policies to integrate with the international accumulation process through high-tech sectors are possible only with the establishment of new control mechanisms on labor. In this case, it is expected to create new channels of legitimacy from the developmental state outside the production process. As a result, the developmental state, as an institutionalist fiction and a fetishistic concept (Oğuz, 2013: 126), continues to reproduce unequal and contradictory character of capitalist transformation. In order to understand these inequalities and contradictions, it is necessary to bring back not only capital but also social production relations as a whole.

Historical institutionalist approach and Weberian understanding of the "state" shows how state failure of success was understood. The studies conducted in this way contributed the legitimization of channels of existing capitalist system. Thus, it should not be difficult to understand how the failed state discussions occurred after reviewing the literature created with such insights.

In addition, it should be better to know when and how Mexico is mentioned with failed state concept. Therefore, the discussion on Mexico will be given in following chapter. After that, it will be tried to be explained with considering historical process behind the current status of Mexico.

### **2.3. Defining Failed State**

This section aims to introduce the concept of failed state. Failed state is both well-defined within a clear-cut frame and a malleable concept. The term will be examined in parallel with the evolution of the literature on this concept. This section also explores its utilization as a foreign policy tool, in which the state is theorized on the concept of failed state. Finally, the section will delve into the criticisms of the failed state in order to comprehend the causes and consequences of defining a state as a threat to international security.

#### **2.3.1. Failed State: A New Challenge for Post-Cold War Era**

Political institutions have always been central explanatory factor in political science. Since Weber, several scholars have written about how the institutions would change the political system and social structure. Although these studies may be called as old institutionalism, it would be fair to claim that the institutions became a major explanatory variable in political science literature only after the Second World war. The focus on the political institutions has indeed dominated the mainstream approach to social change.

‘Failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘collapsed’, ‘failing’ and similar adjectives are commonly applied for defining states that have been categorized -or demonized- while considering them as security threats for the liberal world order. They are relatively new concepts in the theory of state, international security and development fields.

Which states can be considered as failed or what makes a state strong? With regards to the point of bearing of the failed state literature, one can narrow down the list of failed states under the main category of non-western countries including the states in the Balkan region and Central Asia aftermath of the dissolution of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), decolonized states

in Africa and South Asia, and states in South America which have been in neoliberal and democratic transition since the 1980s. When the category of the Third World became irrelevant at the end of the Cold War era, there was a necessity to define the wreckage of the USSR, young nation states on decolonized spaces which existed during the Cold War as a new battlefield for liberal order. The failed state concept was born as an unsettling new phenomenon under these circumstances.

Although this concept has been included in the international relations literature and security studies in the early 1990s, this kind of classification was first mentioned as “soft states” in the 1960s by Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal defines the post-colonial African and Asian countries as soft states that were new states established following decolonization. In the scope of development studies field, for Myrdal, soft states have deficiencies in legislation, and particularly in law observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels to rules and directives handed down to them and he emphasizes the corruption and bribery in these underdeveloped countries (Myrdal, 1970).

Subsequently, in the 1980s, several studies were particularly focused on development dimension in the field of economics, instead of security. While Médard (Médard, 1982) defined the African states as neopatrimonial, Migdal (Migdal, 1988) indicates the weakness of the states and the strength of the societies in relation to Egypt, Israel and Mexico. In Sandbrook’s study (1985), African states were the focal points to comprehend what went wrong in Africa after decolonization.

Other than the studies mentioned above, the term “failed” was firstly and precisely propounded in the 1990s to describe the states which are not as same as “advanced” states. “*Saving Failed States*” published in 1992 is recorded as one of the early articles on this concept. This article points out “failed nation state as utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international

community” (Helman and Ratner (1992:12) and describes the failed states as causes of violence and anarchy; posing threats for their neighborhoods because of political instability and migration. In this article, saving failed states has been regarded as a new challenge for many fields related to politics. They emphasize the necessity for the developed states to rescue the failing states through direct involvement in their internal affairs to preserve international peace and security. The cases mentioned in this study includes Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, and Somali as failed and Ethiopia, Georgia, Zaire as failing. The newly emerged states after the collapse of the Yugoslavia and the USSR were also mentioned within this failure framework without a clear category of their own (Helman and Ratner, 1992:13).

Bueger and Bethke divide the evolution of the literature into four phases: Phase 1-the late 1980s where the concept was just mentioned in general; it was extended in the 1990s in Phase 2; in Phase 3 it was globalized and securitized in the early 2000s; and a double trend of homogenization through quantification and heterogenization through criticism in Phase 4 (Actor Networking the Failed State, 2014).

An extensive literature has evolved around this concept since its emergence on the foreign policy agenda as well as in academia. Its diffusion in foreign policy and security and development studies has been conveniently well-received. The concept has been popularized in areas related to foreign policy, national security and development; consequently, the literature focused on these announced policies concentrating on case studies.

First, failed state concept started to be accentuated in policy agendas of the United States of America (USA) as the United Kingdom (UK), while the international institutions were also on board. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have commissioned reports on the

failed states (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014). For instance, Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay note that the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) organized its first research-preparatory workshop on this topic in April 1993, while the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) organized a program on “Linking Rehabilitation to Development: Management Revitalization of War-torn Societies”. In addition, the concept had a particular mention by the former US Ambassador to the UN and former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright with regards to the Somalian situation (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014:199). Albright’s article published in New York Times in 1993 calls Somalia as a "failed state." Albright calls for the international community to help disarm all its warlords and praises. She aims to justify the activities of the UN in Somalia, as there were criticisms of departure from its humanitarian purpose by conducting military operations against the renegade warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid (Allbright, 1993).

The Somalia case was used to open a new interventionist era in the US Foreign Policy. Madeleine Albright included the concept of “state failure” in a National Security Strategy Report “*A National Security Strategy for a New Century*” which was later submitted to the Congress by the President Bill Clinton in 1997 (Jones, 2008). Similarly, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, described the failed state as ‘a feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted’ (Grieco and Ndulo, 2010: ix). In his June 1992 Report, *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of "post-conflict peace-building" was considered as a new priority of the United Nations. Thus, this concept has gained acceptance as one of the main tools of foreign policy strategies- particularly- of the US and the UK, assuming the role of a strong states.

In the US, The State Failure Task Force (SFTF) which was established in 1994<sup>1</sup> and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started to work in order to identify factors associated with state failure and determined four separate kinds of state failure and accompanying political crises: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, mass killings (genocide or politicides in which large numbers of people are killed for their political views or activities), and adverse or disruptive regime changes like events in which democratic regimes are terminated or authoritarian regimes are disrupted, causing an extended period of disorder but excluding coup d'états in authoritarian states and abrupt regime changes to stable democracy, neither of which the task force considers significant failures. The Task Force found that three clusters of variables had significant correlation with subsequent state failures: (1) quality of life; (2) openness to international trade (3) the level of democracy (Working Papers State Failure Task Force Report,1995). The SFTF aimed at guiding the formulation of policies to prevent a state failure. The report is based on an empirical research. Based on the empirical research that was carried out in selected “failed” states in 1995, the scholars conclude that there would be an imminent increase in the rate of state failures in the newborn democracies in the aftermath of the Cold War. The authors also warn the US and other “leader” countries to be positioned diplomatically and strategically to minimize the impact of the failures that could emerge in the future (Working Papers State Failure Task Force Report,1995).

In the UK, the Department for International Development (DFID) was founded in 1997, it paid special attention to the impact of internal crises in developing countries on the UK. Poverty reduction, human security and the recognition of the role of the state within developing countries, supporting economic arrangements and providing laws and regulations to protect human rights were particularly emphasized.

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<sup>1</sup> In 1999, the State Failure Task Force also published an upgraded report with applying additional variables to analyze the state failure.

Alongside these attempts of the international institutions to design roadmaps and programs to avoid state failure, a substantial literature has developed around this new concept while several scholars have carried out case studies in order to exemplify and analyze the failed state concept. Among them, Zartman's edited work "*Collapsed States*" has been regarded as a pioneering book that scrutinizes the concept of state failure and collapsed state. Zartman considers state failure taking place when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed in the situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart (Zartman, 1995:3). He emphasizes the role of authoritarian state leaders and their regimes in state failure which tends to collapse in time. He explains the process with five factors: 1- leaders' repression to keep their powers, 2- refrainment from decision making in crucial issues, 3- lack of support of the population, 4- loss of control in the state's territory due to the problems of the central government inside, 5- which creates illegal armed forces and groups in local sphere and lack of law and order alongside the country. He states that when these phases are completed, the inevitable ending is a state collapse (Zartman, 1995:10).

Another scholar working on the concept of failed state is Jean-Germain Gros. He argues that the failed state concept was poorly defined. He tries to develop a global taxonomy of failed states and identify the factors that are associated with their failure, examining Haiti and Somalia. He also explores the pitfalls of external intervention in failed states. While defining it, Gros points out that the states labeled as failed are not at the same level of failure. Hence, he constructs a kind of taxonomy that includes five types of states: anarchic state (Somalia and Liberia), phantom or mirage state (Zaire- former Democratic Republic of the Congo), anemic state (Haiti and Cambodia), captured state (Rwanda), failed in vitro or aborted state (Bosnia) by referring to five factors as such economic mal-performance, lack of social synergy, authoritarianism, militarism and environmental degradation caused by rampant population growth. He claims that the various efforts (such as peace operations, aid and the like) of the external

actors to heave the failed states up would be temporarily effective. Therefore, Gros suggests that the failed states should strive for an internal change which requires years even centuries with considering their specific situation with distinctive internal institutional characteristics and social structures (Gros, 1996). As mentioned above, since the 1990s, failed state literature started to get enriched by the scholars who embrace the state in terms of neo-Weberian and neoliberal institutionalist approaches. The think tanks and international organizations/institutions contributed to the accumulation of literature conforming with the foreign policy concerns of the developed states. This literature has been inspired by the Weberian ideal types. Since the 2000s, it has been deeply entrenched in security studies due to the changing definition of security as one of the results of 9/11.

As seen in the evolution of failed state concept, the concept has been welcomed especially in the Post-Cold War era. Throughout this period, Mexico was not included in this concept. The African states after decolonization and the Balkan states who were constructed from the heritage of the USSR were the main cases in which scholars focused on. However, after 9/11 it has been noted that the concept started to be widely utilized by the US in foreign policy. The section of this chapter below will attempt to chronologically present the second phase of failed state concept in political science and international relations in brief; how it has gained prominence especially in the US side and how it has become a widely referred tool while highlighting particularly the “national security” and the “international security”.

### **2.3.2. The Failed State as a Security Threat in the Aftermath of 9/11**

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon by the militants of Al-Qaeda in 2001, the failed states have been regarded as the most crucial and priority threats to the national security of Western countries. A tremendous attention was paid to fixing the foreseen

problems for international order and the concept has been frequently applied. Therefore, the US National Security Strategy has been mostly shaped around failed state threats as major security concerns in the George W. Bush administration.

In 2004, the US Congress focused again on the mandate of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to put emphasis on supporting poor countries; it also established the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent agency, to assist countries selected on the basis of their policy-performance and institutional capacities. This internalization of the principle of selectivity within the organizational design of the US bilateral assistance scheme created conditions that allowed the initiation of a policy discussion on state fragility and development. In 2005, USAID drew up specific policy objectives for intervention in fragile states (described either as ‘vulnerable states’ or ‘states in crisis’), depending on the degree of weakness of the political authority over the territory, the capacity of the state to deliver basic services to the population and the legitimacy of the government.

On a parallel axis, The World Bank indicated Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) which have very weak policies, institutions, and governance. Since the countries have no capacity for effective mechanisms in financing to curb poverty, these countries cannot utilize the aid properly (Di John, 2008).

The British Department for International Development (DFID) used the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) methodology to draw up a list of ‘fragile states’, defined in a very similar way to the way ‘failed states’ are defined in other studies. It identified 46 countries that fell under the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Group which identifies roughly thirty extremely impoverished countries “characterized by weak policies, institutions, and governance” as LICUS. However, the LICUS designation is based largely on economic components of governance, with less

weight given to security, political, and social considerations. Under DFID's definition, fragile states are those countries that lack the capacity or the will to fulfill functions that are indispensable to their populations, including ensuring security, economic management and the delivery of basic services (DFID, 2005).

In addition to DFID's aid policy, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's Strategy Unit published a report within the new 'Countries at Risk of Instability' (CRI) program for the definition of policy making about 'fragile states' which emphasized demolishing political, economic and social institutions, civil strife, lack of control on territory etc. in states such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. This report's aim was to battle with the instability that leads to extremism and violence and to initiate state building process for the sake of peace and prosperity (Morton, 2005).

Furthermore, a redesigned and redefined security strategy of the EU was declared in 2003 with new security priorities. Major security challenges were indicated as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, and organized crime, which could weaken the regional stability. In particular, state failure has been stated as an alarming phenomenon that worsens regional instabilities and undermines global governance (EU Security Strategy, 2003).

Within this new strategy, the EU has started to aim at focusing on security in the neighborhood especially on stabilizing the EU's Eastern periphery, which has been regarded as old problematic area due to the legacy of the Cold War era. Starting with the enlargement policy, the EU was involved in the Eastern Europe as a major actor for international security and strengthening international order while suggesting a "comprehensive security toolbox". Within this framework, the EU's external policy has been widened and the objectives have targeted to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and reform (Gerrard, 2004).

The enlargement towards the Eastern Europe would not only strengthen the single market, but also provide security for the EU's eastern borders (Doğan, 2018: 48-9). It should also be noted that during the enlargement process most of the Central and Eastern European countries became NATO members, as a sign indicating that EU's security policy was indeed in line with the US national security strategy.

Besides these political approaches and declared policy agendas for failed states, some measurement tools were also designed to assess countries in terms of their fragility with regard to several indicators. One of these tools was developed by the Fund for Peace (FFP): Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)<sup>2</sup> for policy makers and field practitioners to analyze and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments and assess the vulnerability of states to collapse in the 1990s within both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Another one of these measurement tools is Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) which was formed by a group of scholars from Carleton University. With the support of the Canadian state, the CIEP aimed to provide a framework that could enable policymakers and practitioners to engage in fragile environments. The CIFP has three core parameters -represented by the acronym ALC- for understanding the fragility: Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity. It consists of several wide-ranging tools that encompass, among other things, the monitoring, forecasting, and evaluation of failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the development, security, and economic challenges they represent. It has a methodology for evaluating individual country performance with regards to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (See: <https://carleton.ca/cifp/about-cifp/>).

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<sup>2</sup> CAST was redesigned as Fragile State Index in 2004 and began to be applied in case studies based on the concept of failed state.

### **2.3.3. The Rise of Failed State Literature in Political Science and International Relations**

With these kinds of measurement tools for analyzing the states in terms of fragility, the concept of failed state has gained traction in political science and international relations disciplines- specifically along the international security and development studies areas in the early 2000s. One of the prominent scholars who worked on failed states is Robert Rotberg who explains the tendency of some states to fail by considering various factors. Another scholar David Carment advocates the failed state concept, but he mentions drawbacks of this approach in terms of linking the theoretical analysis to policy options. He emphasizes the effective early warning practices for the prevention of state failure and argues that “understanding and responding to state failure requires a multifaceted, multilayered and multi-actor methodology” (Carment, 2003:421).

Rotberg defines the nation state as the provider of political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders) through a decentralized method of delivery (Rotberg, 2004:2). In this framework, Rotberg focuses on the provision of political goods to its citizens, as state’s crucial role. He highlights the prominence of security as the most significant political good which aims to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory. With regards to eliminating domestic threats to the national order and social structure, states should prevent crime or any related dangers to domestic security while enabling citizens to resolve their differences with the state as well as among their fellow inhabitants without resorting to arms or other forms of physical coercion (Rotberg, 2004). He also emphasizes the rule of law, participation of the citizens in political processes, provision of healthcare, education, infrastructure, communication, and banking system as *sine qua non* of a state. Hence the failure indicators are defined with reference to how good a state performs these roles. Moreover, while categorizing states, he applies several other indicators such as GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency

International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom of the World Report.

According to Rotberg (2004), various parameters can cause the state to transform into the failed category. These parameters can be conflicts (ethnic, religious, linguistic etc. or/and urban crime), inadequate infrastructure, lack of quality in education and health services, economic failure, corruption, issues in legitimacy, *et cetera*. The states which are struggling with these kinds of issues can be judged as being "failed" easily: according to measurement tools, criteria and indexes which are created by today's "successful" states' policies and the academic domain. Rotberg (2004) also mentions that:

Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops, battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. (Rotberg, 2004: 5).

In his study, Rotberg (2004) assessed the states that show the general signs of being failed such as Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan. The signs that point to state failure are presented as:

- lasting violence,
- civil strife,
- dissension of the society,
- loss of control on the territory of the state,
- increase in criminal violence,
- dependent judicial system,
- politicized army,
- destroyed infrastructure,
- decrease in literacy

- increase in infant mortality,
- existence of endemic illnesses (with high percentage among citizens),
- very-high class inequality (with corruption in institutions like army)
- insecurity of citizens
- existence of local and independent security forces (under warlords, strong people)
- major economic issues like devaluation (Rotberg, 2004: 17).

Rotberg defines the worsened version of the failed state as the ‘collapsed state’ (2004). Democratic states can protect human rights while overcoming the dissatisfaction of the people and political difficulties brought by the criticism of the opposition. Stating that the failings of the failed states occur at this point, Rotberg (2004: 22) elaborates that the failed states cannot respond or adapt to these situations effectively. The bourgeoisie tries to exploit these adverse conditions by making use of institutional weaknesses for corruption.

Rotberg further explains that the ex-colonial territories which have turned into nation-states strengthened the antidemocratic hierarchy, such as neopatrimonialism over time; naturally pushing these states into failure and collapse. Corruption, escalating levels of which are one of the indicators of state failure, accompanies neopatrimonialism and helps to bring the states to failure. Bad governance is an inescapable corollary, and it has often preceded the insurgencies within states (Rotberg, 2004: 27).

In this analysis, Rotberg provides the states in turmoil and disaster with a prescription to regain their institutional capacities and to transform each threat or/and potential conflict into a “stable and safe unit” for the international system. On the other hand, Carment emphasizes another aspect in this literature: how to write prescriptions for the states in crises by developing methodologies of risk assessment and early warning for the purposes of analyzing and predicting state failure. Therefore, he recommends an approach for anticipating state failure; this

approach is process-based and it requires sound analysis as well as an explicit connection to policy options for preventive measures. According to Carment, the activities based especially on the long-term structural transformations should have a “built-in evaluative process” or “impact assessment capability” that provide self-monitoring and policy guidance (Carment, 2003:422).

By referring to previously mentioned CIFP’s fragility index, another study carried out by Carment and Samy (2014-3) indicates the legitimacy problem in analyzing state failure, and it defines fragile states that have typically fallen into collapse brought on by “manmade” calamity, such as civil war or a mismanaged economy, sometimes exacerbated by environmental degradation or natural disasters. They describe the state fragility as a relative term that could be evaluated in comparison with the peer states. Thus, they analyze the state fragility in respect to three core structural parameters: authority, legitimacy, and capacity (ALC). The parameter of authority encompasses the extent of abilities of a state which can be listed as enacting binding legislation over a population, exercising coercive force over its sovereign territory, providing core public goods and a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. In assessing the condition of state fragility, the first parameter is an authority problem which can be briefly defined as an inability to control both the people and the territory. Deterioration in the central authority is accepted as the starting point of state fragility that leads to politically motivated civil conflict, fractionalized society, fear of criminal and drug-related violence, shifting loyalties of the public from the state to the traditional communities such as *de facto* authorities of rebel militias or criminal groups; thus hindering the rule of law, and finally the weaknesses in border control which enables illicit flows of people and goods.

The second parameter, the lack of legitimacy which occurs due to the lack of authority refers to the extent of public loyalty and support to the governing regime, its legislation and policy. Such states that have legitimacy problems face

a lack of public support, making them inherently vulnerable to internal upheaval and as a result, denomination as a fragile state. The third parameter is the capacity problem, which refers to the development or economic capacity that is unable to meet the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); including GDP per capita, education, human development, infant and maternal mortality, literacy, disaster risks, arable land, and energy consumption (Carment and Samy, 2014:3-27).

In addition, Gros explains the failed state with regards to taxonomy, micro level and macro level risk factors and phases of imperialism which points out the external origins of state failure in his elaborate study on Haiti. He gives the definition of the state in accordance with that of Max Weber, as a compulsory organization whose decisions are injunctions not subject to negotiations and exceptions. The state has a territorial basis, it monopolizes the force and proscribes the use of force without its approval. He also refers to Durkheim's definition of state where it is described as a special organ whose responsibility is to ensure the good of the collectivity and its status is higher than those of other institutions since it looks after the collective good (Giddens, 1971). Gros conveys how Weber and Durkheim see the state: as a protector. Within this perspective, he defines the failed state as one that does not protect against such risks.

Gros mentions four types of failed states (Type I, II, III and IV). He defines the Type I as a state which does not keep law and order among its citizens (the risks of internal disorder- RID) nor does it protect its territory from external predators (the risks of external aggression- REA) of whatever origin (e.g., other states, foreign terrorists, narco-traffickers etc.). In sum, he points out a critical loss of control and gives Somalia as a proper example for Type I. While explaining Type II, he describes the states included in this type as such: The state which has a strong military that does not protect against internal violence- RID but protects against REA, such as the former USSR (1980s- December 1991) that formed

Eastern European satellites and Ethiopia under Mengitsu Haile Mariam's presidency. For Type III, the state does not protect against REA but protects against RID such as Haiti (pre-1986) and Uganda (under Idi Amin presidency). Lastly, he defines Type IV which ebbs and flows in terms of characteristics of a failed state in Gros's view. This kind of state does not protect against RID and REA but these defects are neither complete nor permanent. For Gros, states in Type IV compose the vast majority of failed ones and they are the mildest form of state failure. They can provide certain services of a state, but they have lost control in some regions especially in the countryside or the periphery of its territory. He exemplifies this category with Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Haiti (post Duvalier period) (Gros, 2012).

With all these definitions for state weaknesses or failures which are looking at the several cases, after the 90s and particularly 2000s, state-building processes has also come to the fore. In another study, we confront the major role of failed state in insecurity. While giving examples such as terrorist attacks in the West which have Eastern ties with the states that have been accounted as failed, Siegle emphasizes the capacity to lethality and the role in destabilizing their regions in terms of security. With considering state building activities of Western states, he lists number of so-called "relative success" in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Croatia, Kosovo, East Timor, El Salvador and Colombia which were gained by the international stabilization efforts. He considers stabilizing fragile states as a collective challenge of the contemporary international security era. He lists reason behind state fragility as poverty, lack of legitimacy, lack of public goods, inequalities and corruption due to patronage networks of authoritarian regimes that create civil conflict and distrust of government and the inherent inequalities cause perpetuity of illegitimacy and instability. To avoid fragility, using a professional and effective security force to maintain social cohesion which prevents ethnic or geographical disunity and also for being a legitimate state, states should able to provide social services. Military intervention is necessary but not enough solely. A fragile state

needs to be fixed by the integrated political, security and developmental efforts of international institutions (Siegle, 2011).

Besides Siegle's approach to failed states in terms of international security, Fukuyama also highlights the prominence of state-building processes in addition to military intervention in war-torn or unstable countries which are called as failed or weak states for preserving international order and security. To protect the international system in a permanent way, he offers not only military power but also state building mission as soft power tool in these failed states which will entrench the democratic values to eliminate the threat to international order (Fukuyama, 2004).

In sum, failed state concept has emerged as one of security challenges in the post-Cold War period and flourished inside of both the international development and security studies in parallel with neoliberal policies which have been started to be followed. At first, it has been staged in foreign policy arena and then the concept has been studied by many scholars of international security or/and development, international relations, several think tanks and agencies. They defined the failed state concept in accordance with state definition of Weber and the lacks and shortcomings of a state have been determined within the borders of ideal statehood approach. This kind of states have been recognized as little Bart Simpsons of the international system.<sup>3</sup> Through the 2000s, its prominence in terms of international security has been highlighted and it has been moved the top of the threats lists of the Western countries and international organizations such as the UN, the EU etc. In general, the studies on failed state have problematized with considering the three core terms: legitimacy, authority and capability with relying on empirical data that obtained by some kind of indexes or/and measurement tools which were developed by the think tanks

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<sup>3</sup> This analogy is mentioned in Jean-Germain Gros's study to describe failed state as chronic unsuccessful one (Gros,1996).

or/and international institutions. Currently, this concept has still been easily referred to define less democratic, stable and capable ones than the developed states or/and any country where there has been civil strife, violence and crime instead welfare, stability and order.

#### **2.4. Critiques of the Failed State Concept**

In previous section, it has been tried to present a brief literature review on failed state concept and to put forward how has evolved. While this concept has started to be commonly stated in official documents, reports, articles and researches studies etc., studies have been carried out on criticisms of failed state concept. At this point, it has been significant to point out how this concept criticized to utilize while analyzing Mexico and Guerrero at particular level.

Today, although the concept of failed state is a concept that is widely dealt with in the academic field, many criticisms have been brought to this concept. For example, failure debate was criticized in different aspects like empirical, analytical, normative and practical ways. In these criticisms, it is generally possible to state that the idea that the concept of failed state involves an effort to mold states. As a matter of fact, it is stated that the concept of failed state is a stereotypical concept and it is not correct to distinguish it as successful and failed with sharp lines (Hagman and Hoehne, 2009). In addition, it is one of the criticisms that the western states' efforts to evaluate the problems arising in many different parts of the world according to the same criteria in terms of state capacity (e.g. neoliberal institutionalists and neo-Weberian institutionalists) are an exclusion and marginalization effort (Lambach, et.al. 2015; Nuruzzaman, 2009; Eriksen, 2011). An example of this is the study stating that the concept of failed state is a deviant proclamation of West for some countries in Africa (Hill, 2005). One of the other criticisms on the concept that is being all about current failing status in terms of state capacity and ignoring the political interventions from outside and historical reconstruction of state structure as in the study of

Hameiri (2007). In next paragraphs, these views are presented respectively in order to understand the aspects of criticisms on the concept.

In their study which evaluates Somali as a failed state, Hagman and Hoehne (2009) indicates that the failed state debate is a useless distinction between “successful” and “failed” states and it is guided by a teleological belief in the rapprochement of all nation-states, ignoring the variegated empirical state types existing on the ground, limiting the absence of a central government to anarchy.

In his study, Hill (2005) criticizes the use of the concept of failed state created by Western Europe and North America for the othering and deviant proclamation of African societies. In the article with insights from post-colonial studies, it is argued that the African states defined as failed state in the literature are handled only according to European traditions, practices, organizations and institutional structures, and this false situation leads to a static and ahistorical definition of the state concept. At this point, while failing state analysts interpret the unique characteristics of African societies according to the West, Hill (2005) rejects the concept of failed state and tries to understand societies that are marginalized by the West, declared guilty, seen as deviant, and defined as imperfect.

In the study of Lambach et al. (2015), it is stated that the concepts of fragile, failed and collapsed state are dealt with in a problematic and methodological way in terms of normative, and it is pointed out that the studies conducted on this issue should be carried out more systematically. Although the study of Lambach et al. (2015) is focused on defining state capacity from a Weberian perspective and setting standards for state failure, it is possible to state that this study also criticized it for addressing the systematic shortcomings of current failed state debates.

In his study, Call (2008) states that the concepts of "failed" and "failing" state are used in many divergent and problematic ways today and this situation has lost

the utility of the concepts. It is stated that the use of concepts such as “state failure”, “fragile” and “troubled” should be avoided in the academic field and such definitions should be tried to be explained by alternative concepts.

In his study, Nuruzzaman (2009) states that the concept of failed state was formed by guiding politically and ideologically, but it is far from critical approach in the context of international relations. It is criticized that the West's political, economic and military policies and the impact of military interventions on states defined as "failed" are focused only on the fragility and failure of such states. A criticism is also made regarding the mistakes in state-building strategies following the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, efforts to establish state according to the Weberian state definition, and that the liberal worldview of the West is incompatible with institutional structures in fragile and failed states (Nuruzzaman, 2009).

Hameiri (2007) states that a wide variety of literature studies were conducted on the failed state in the post-Cold War period, and the concept of failed state was generally defined in terms of state capacity (especially by neoliberal institutionalists and neo-Weberian institutionalists), although there is theoretical diversity in this literature. At this point, Hameiri (2007) states that due to the technical and objective nature of the concept of capacity, its political nature in the process of state building and reconstruction of states is hidden. While addressing the deficiency of failed state debates isolated from political and social institutions in terms of resolving conflicts, attention is also drawn to determining who is involved in these debates and the interests involved in political processes. While criticizing the failed state discourse and outlining an alternative approach. In his study, Eriksen (2011) states that evaluating all states over the definition of modern state according to the criteria established by this definition does not benefit from understanding these states, analyzing the processes of being failing or fragile. Instead of this kind of categorization and marginalization, it is stated that it will be more beneficial to focus on the relationship between the formation

of the state after the colonialism and the idea of the state and the real state practices, the way states connect with their societies and their international relations.

The classical sociological definition of the state is made by Machiavelli with reference and emphasis on violence and the use of violence. Weber then sought to define the state on the basis of its means, not on its aims, and described the state with reference to its monopoly of legitimate violence. According to this, the state is the human community that holds the monopoly of using physical force legitimately on a certain piece of land. (Frazer and Hutchings, 2011). In summary, it is the monopoly of violence and the legitimate character of the monopoly of violence that makes the state dominant over the territory and population it occupies. In this definition, an important detail underlying the formation of the modern state is hidden. Accordingly, once the state seizes the monopoly of violence, the practice of violence by non-state actors becomes subject to the permission of the state. Violence used by non-state actors without the permission of the state is considered illegitimate (O'Neill, 1986).

If the state is defined through the monopoly of legitimate violence based on its sociological definition, it becomes possible to use the failed state in the Weberian sense for states that cannot function. Failed state conceptualization can be explained in various ways depending on how the state is defined. For example, Ignatieff (2002), starting from a Weberian definition of the state, defines the concept of failed state on the basis of the state's loss of monopoly of violence. Zartman (1995), on the other hand, defines the failed state as a type of state in which the state does not fulfill its basic functions, based on a Hobbesian definition of a social contractual state. Although a common definition of the failed state conceptualization is not available in the literature, in general, such states are conceptualized with reference to the failed state in its struggle against the ongoing political violence during the times of civil war, terrorism and uprising.

As it has been examined by the scholars mentioned above, failed state concept was constructed on the manner of othering the developing states which have not had the same development process as the developed ones. As a Western-centric, politically and ideologically developed concept is not enough to explain the states facing violence, political instability, conflict and poverty. With simplistic calculations categorizing states via indexes, do not accounted as enough explanation method. On the other hand, this concept was created with considering only concerns of developed states and for the sake of their security at particular, in the name of international security and peace. In addition, as there is no consensus on defining a failed state, there is also no study which comprehensively scrutinize on a case study by considering all the factors such as state-society relations, the condition and relations with other states and international organizations, its economy, institutions and historical patterns behind the current status etc.

With regarding these critiques, it cannot be said that Mexico is a failed state. By looking enduring and accelerating violence for many years due to not only the drug trafficking and organized crime activities but also guerrilla movements in Guerrero in particular is just a single parameter but not enough to classify Mexico in group of failed state, due to the reasons that have been mentioned above. However, it can be claimed that Mexico has conflictual issues in political, economic and societal sphere because of drug-related violence and also it should be worthy to note that drug-related violence is not only single reason of current discontent, but also it is the output of unfavorable institutionalism comes from the colonial period. It should be more appropriate to explain the current status of Mexico via looking into its history from colonial period to our age. Due to the way of institutional development in years which is the result of path dependence from colonial period to our time, a kind of unfavorable institutionalism has been witnessed in Mexico and Guerrero in particular at local sphere. Therefore, to comprehend the Mexican state and the current violence seen in Mexico it is essential to present historical institutionalism.

## CHAPTER 3

### DISCUSSING MEXICO: FAILED OR NOT

The concepts of fragile, failed or collapsed states are usually applied to countries where the principles of territorial unity, legitimate monopoly over the use of force and constitutional law do not apply – among them many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and Afghanistan. Latin America, however, is only rarely included in these analyses of fragility. But it is useful to consider whether extending such concepts to the recent experience of countries like Bolivia and Venezuela, and even Argentina and Brazil, might illuminate some of the problems and dynamics of the changing politics of the continent. It is striking that the list of "fragile states" drawn up by the World Bank Group Work on Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report, includes mainly African states, and in the region of Latin America (a category used here to include central America and the Caribbean) it mentions only Haiti. A more controversial list of sixty unstable states (designated according to several variables) compiled by The Fund for Peace in Washington, places Haiti in tenth place, Colombia in fourteenth, and Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Honduras, Ecuador and Cuba in the lower half of the list (Aguirre, 2006).

However, the case of Mexico needs further examination to come to terms with the concept of a failed state. Mexican state appears to provide a strong basis for explaining the problem of political violence. To begin with, corruption is all encompassing (Andreas, 1998) while the drug cartels are responsible for extreme violence in some parts of the country (Molzahn et al., 2012). Despite these facts, Mexico is the 14<sup>th</sup> largest economic power in the world, with strong institutional mechanisms, which can provide almost complete security of oil pipelines (Paul et al., 2014).

One of the most important problems of Mexico in recent years is the violence and insecurity in the country and citizens' loss of trust towards a state that cannot prevent this violence (Morton, 2012). The degree of violence in Mexico is comparable to the violence experienced in war-torn countries, and drug cartels are the main actors in accelerating violence in recent decades (Ríos, 2013). However, surging violence in Mexico cannot be understood through the activities of drug-oriented criminal organizations alone.

In general, in order to understand the violence, it is necessary to focus the analysis on the state. In this respect, the political economy approach provides a useful background for understanding the causes of violence in the country. The loss of the monopoly of legitimate violence of the Mexican state and the collapse of political and security institutions should be considered within its social and material context.

It is important to understand how the bureaucracy, that has an extensive organization and functioning in Mexico, has become a subject of debates through failed state terminology. In Mexico, the public's confrontation with a fragmented bureaucracy, which has lost its monopoly of oppression, poses a serious threat to the reproduction of violence. In what way do the institutions of the state and the security-centered ones (i.e. police and army) that exist and function in the interest of drug-oriented criminal organizations instead of representing the public interest? What kinds of relations have eroded the Mexican state's monopoly of legitimate violence?

In this context, this study raises the idea that Mexico's current violence problem cannot be caused solely by the internal dynamics within the state. In parallel with this main idea, Morton (2012) argues that the strategic thoughts on the concept of failed state spreading through policy-making and academic fields - especially in the US but also beyond, and the state crisis in Mexico cannot be understood by abstraction from the underlying historical patterns of development. Thus,

isolating this issue from the political economy and social relations constituting the Mexican society is unfeasible.

In light of Morton's ideas, this study will examine violence in Mexico within the postcolonial context, by addressing historical, regional and geopolitical conditions shaping the restructuring of the state in Mexico. Within the given conditions, it would not be right to think of Mexico's status, independent of the general context of Latin America. Hence, the next section briefly explores historical background of Latin America.

### **3.1. Looking into the History of Latin America**

Although there are certain differences due to its social and geographical features of the country, Mexico generally shares the same fate with the other neighboring Latin American. Therefore, it is apt to begin the analysis with an historical insight to the regional context. It is, of course, impossible to do justice to the complex history of a region as vast as Latin America in few pages. The focus, therefore, will be on the developments that took place after the nineteenth century which are more directly significant to the case of Mexico.

After Christopher Columbus landed in the Caribbean in 1492, the new-found continent became the field of colonialism of European states. While Hernan Cortes conquered Aztecs in 1519-21, Francisco Pizarro conquest the Inca Empire in 1532. The Spaniards established a total colonial order in Central and South America including the southern states of the United States of California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and Florida, while Portugal established a colonial order in present Brazil. However, Spain came under the occupation of Napoleon during the wars of the revolution weakening the grip in the colonies which paved the way for the independence wars during the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the support of England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The intention of the other

European states was to gain control over the colonies of Spain. When Spain was weakened during this period, the colonies on the American continent rebelled.

President Monroe sent a message to the American Congress on December 2, 1823, announcing his doctrine on two issues. In line with this doctrine, the statements that “the United States does not interfere with European affairs, Europe should not interfere with American affairs, and if a European state enters the American continent and attempts to colonize it, the US will regard this movement as hostile and opposes it” have prevented the European states to dare to come to the American continent with colonial purposes. Between 1820 and 1830, the Spanish colonies gained their independence (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002).

The state building of the Latin American countries thus should be traced back the independence period. At the end of the eighteenth century, social tensions characterized by the racial mixing (*mestizo*) had increased. The caste lines of hierarchy had become blurred challenging the established system of social strata. The Spanish-American Creoles (American born with a Spanish descent) were discriminated without any lawful foundation causing increasing tension between them and peninsulars (Iberian Peninsula born). Peninsulars would be controlling the administrative and commercial activities, conducting tax collection each time heavier burden both on the indigenous and creoles. Creoles had strong influence at the local municipal level that gave them the military leadership during the independence (Halperin Donghi, 1993).

The son of a creole family, Simon Bolivar declared Venezuela's independence in 1816 by fighting against the loyal peninsular colonialists. Bolivar, who became the elected President in 1819, entered Bogota and established the Colombian state and united it with present Venezuela. In 1822, he incorporated present day Ecuador into this union of Gran Colombia. Argentina in 1816, Chile in 1818, Brazil in 1822 and Uruguay in 1828 declared independence. In November 1821,

Panama became independent. Peru, which had declared its independence in 1821, became independent from the Spaniards in 1824 with the help of Bolivar. In 1821, five Central American states declared their independence and joined the Mexican Empire. When the Mexican Empire collapsed in 1823, the states left Mexico to form the Central United States. But, in 1838, these states, which suffered constant conflicts among them, became five independent states, as they are now called Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Efforts to unite these republics have failed (Lynch, 1983).

It is the independence wars that took place in a large part of the continent in 1810-1825 which gave the word "nation" a different meaning in Latin America. As independence approached, Simon Bolivar put it in this way in 1815:

We are not Europeans; we are not Indians; we are but a mixed species of aborigines and Spaniards. Americans by birth and Europeans by law, we find ourselves engaged in a dual conflict: we are disputing with the natives for titles of ownership, and at the same time we are struggling to maintain ourselves in the country that gave us birth against the opposition of the invaders. Thus, our position is most extraordinary and complicated (Page and Sonnenburg, 2003: 1123).

It was necessary to build the unique identity of Latin America. Despite all the divisions, there was a sense of cultural unity with the "great homeland" that encompassed the old colonies. The first unified proposal of the unification was designed by Bolivar. In June 1826, Bolivar called for a Congress of Deputies in Panama for the institutional basis of this union. There were participants from Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and Guatemala. However, they lacked authority and did not have the internal stability to carry out Bolivar's proposals (Mix, 1991).

As Galeano indicates, type of production and class structure in countries of Latin America were externally moulded at every turn with referring to chaining up universal wheel of capitalism. Dependencies which consecutively occurred has created an endless chain (Galeano, 2006:14). In the eye of people who regard the

history as a competition, belatedness and poverty of Latin America are the result of failure (Galeano, 2006:15). The double tragedy of developing countries is due to the fact that they are victims of this international monopolization mechanism, as well as their subsequent compensation for industrial delays, that is, the accumulation of industrial capital in a world filled with the manufacturing products of the developed Western industry (Galeano, 2006:49). Even today, it can be claimed that the existence of the rich centers of capitalism can only be explained by the existence of poor and enslaved periphery countries, and these rich centers and poor circles are in front of us as an integral part of the same system (Galeano, 2006:51).

### **3.2. The US Foreign Policy from The Monroe Doctrine to the Cold War**

The Monroe Doctrine was articulated in President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The European powers, according to Monroe, were obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States' sphere of interest. President James Monroe's 1823 annual message to Congress contained the Monroe Doctrine, which warned European powers not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere (Murphy, 2005).

The name "Latin America" became popular in the 1860s as part of the movement of Pan-Latinism during the reign of Napoleon III. The fact that Latin American countries are in the same hemisphere as the US has had important consequences for their political history. Towards the end of the 19th century, the idea of Pan-Americanism, which foresees the unification of the American continent under the hegemony of the United States, was based on the establishment of a colonial empire by the United States and developed in particular by Jefferson.

Understandably, the United States has always taken a particular interest in its closest neighbors – the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Equally understandably, expressions of this concern have not always been favorably

regarded by other American nations. The Monroe Doctrine is a well-known the US policy toward the Western Hemisphere. Buried in a routine annual message delivered to Congress by President James Monroe in December 1823, the doctrine warns European nations that the United States would not tolerate further colonization or puppet monarchs. The doctrine was conceived to meet major concerns of the moment, but it soon became a watchword of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was invoked in 1865 when the U.S. government exerted diplomatic and military pressure in support of the Mexican President Benito Juárez. This support enabled Juárez to lead a successful revolt against the Emperor Maximilian, who had been placed on the throne by the French government (Renehan, 2007).

The lack of land distribution to the landless indigenous due to resilient power of the landed aristocracy, the lack of development of trade with Europe, and the damage to local industry due to production of cheap goods in Europe caused many Latin American countries to experience violence, dictatorship, political and economic instability between 1820 and 1870. From the 1870s onwards, the capital movement from Europe created changes in the economy and increased the debts of these countries. On the other hand, the interventions of the powerful states in Latin America (US to Mexico in 1845-1848 and Nicaragua in 1855-1860, France to Mexico in 1861-1867) for trade concessions and raw materials also developed a sense of solidarity against the aggressors. In the 1880s, US Secretary of State James G. Blaine created the "Big Brother" policy, and Latin American countries were forced to open markets to the United States (Van Zoonen and Aslama, 2006).

After gaining independence, during the civil wars as well as the wars between the newly established countries, the sense of continental solidarity soon weakened. Western powers continued to intervene in the region to keep their trade paths open by preventing internal cohesion. Brazil and Argentina came to the brink of war many times over the 19<sup>th</sup> century to seize Uruguay and

Paraguay. Brazil, the first country to recognize the independence of Paraguay in 1811, made three political and military interventions in Uruguay in 1851, 1855 and 1864. Between 1843-1852, Uruguay had gone through a nine-year civil war in the capital city of Montevideo, where France was involved. Of these wars, the most grievous was Chile's Pacific War against Peru and Bolivia between 1879-1883, and the Chaco War of 1865-1870, which posed the tripartite alliance of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil against Paraguay. In the Spanish-Peruvian War of 1864-1866, former Spanish colonies such as Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia stood by Peru in the name of Spanish American solidarity (Quijano, 2000).

Almost 40 years later, in 1904, European creditors of a number of Latin American countries threatened armed intervention to collect debts. President Theodore Roosevelt promptly proclaimed the right of the United States to exercise an "international police power" to curb such "chronic wrongdoing." As a result, the US Marines Corps were sent to Santo Domingo in 1904, Nicaragua in 1911, and Haiti in 1915, ostensibly to keep the Europeans out. Other Latin American nations viewed these interventions with misgiving, and relations between the "great Colossus of the North" and its southern neighbors remained strained for many years (Valdés-Ugalde, 1999).

During the nineteenth century, the US administration often resorted to the Monroe Doctrine and intervened in Latin American countries. Many countries have been repeatedly subjected to occupation, coups, dictatorships and civil wars. The influence of the US on the American continent has emerged as a special relationship. From the 1880s onwards, an attempt was made to promote the idea of Pan-Americanism and the unity of Americans. However, this effect diminished after the Second World War (Tulchin, 2016).

From the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the United States became more intrusive in the internal affairs of the Latin American republics. US President Theodore Roosevelt's administration expanded the scope of the Monroe Doctrine and

announced that if any state in Central and South America could not gain US confidence in its social and political structure, the US would intervene. Roosevelt imposed an agreement for the opening of the Panama Canal in 1901 to the Colombian government, which was then in the territory of Panama. When the Colombian Senate did not ratify the treaty, there was a revolt by manipulation, and in 1903 Panama was given independence. This civil war killed 26,000 people. Channel rights from Panama were purchased for \$10 million. Roosevelt's gain from the Monroe Doctrine is called as "*Roosevelt Corollary*", and the form of hegemony that is linked to this policy is called as "*Big Stick*". The presence of the US in the region is reinforced by the Big Stick policy. American intervention in the continent continued with examples of Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1914, and Dominican Republic in 1916. These interventions were later referred to as Banana Wars, and the Latin American geography began to be described as the "*backyard*" of the United States (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005).

Latin American countries remained neutral during the WWI and offended the United States. Only 8 of the 20 countries declared war on Germany, and only Cuba and Brazil actively supported the Allies. During the war, Latin American countries developed their economies by selling raw materials. However, the economic crisis in the mid and late 1920s showed the problems associated with privatizing the food sector. During this period, while farmers desperately tried to destroy their crops to raise prices, riots for bread and protest marches of hungry people became usual cases (Benjamin, 1987).

On the other hand, the banana empire of the United Fruit Company, a US company, sold vegetables such as carrots, potatoes, peas, and especially tropical fruits such as bananas and pineapples, which they bought from farms in third world countries to the US and European markets. The company's influence in Guatemala was so great that in 1901, the government gave the United Fruit Company the authority to manage the country's postal services. By the 1920s, the United Fruit Company of Guatemala was called "El Pulpo", meaning octopus.

Because of the organization of the company, which evokes colonial practices, its intensive working conditions and its interventions to political structure of the countries in which its farms were operating, the term “Banana Republic” has emerged. The first real “Banana Republic” in history was Guatemala (Moberg, 1996). The term in today’s world indicates an inefficient and dependent state and used pejoratively to connote certain countries of the South.

The American government adopted a policy that supported the emergence of pro-US movements instead of direct intervention in the southern countries after Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a 'good neighbor policy' with Latin American countries in 1934. The policy of low-intensity conflict implemented by the United States during the 20th century aimed to keep the power people of their choice in Asia, Africa and Latin America in power to exploit the natural resources of these countries. Although this type of war has caused many massacres of civilians and human rights violations, it has not been successful anywhere, and the hatred towards the US has not ended (Jones, 2000).

During World War II, Washington received support from all other governments, except Uruguay, to become allies. Uruguay remained neutral till the end of the war. During these years, the Germans in Latin America were sent to the United States (Cole et.al, 2005).

After World War II, the Cold War between the US and the USSR started. During this period, the fear of the US was the spread of communism, and so even if they came to power by democratic means, it led to the overthrow of governments that were left-leaning in the political line or not in the interests of the US. The US wanted to reorganize Latin America, which it saw as its backyard after the Second World War. For this purpose, in 1947, a mutual defense agreement was signed with the Rio Pact. A year later, the Organization of American States (OAS12) was established (Shaw, 2003).

These arrangements, in fact, represented a return to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 during the Cold War. The aim was to prevent the entry of communism into these countries through military partnerships. Several countries, particularly Uruguay and Brazil, refused to deploy American troops in their countries. In 1947, the US nuclear bombers flexed their muscles on Uruguay. Finally, in exchange for military assistance, the countries were forced to sign the 1947 Rio Treaty, which envisaged a US multilateral intervention (Shaw, 2003).

During the Cold War, the US's policies towards the region, which was shaped by security and the struggle against communism, also brought rigid interventions. During the Cold War period, the US tried to intervene in the administrations of Latin American states to defeat the US interests. This led to extreme violence and political instability in many countries, while paving the way for leftist governments. After Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara overthrew the US-supported Batista dictatorship in 1959, many Latin American countries suffered direct interference from the US administration, which did not want another Cuba in the region. The US first tried military coups to overthrow the leftist governments, and when the coups failed, they resorted to terrorist methods, torture, mass executions, death squads and other coercion. In Bolivia alone, there were 190 military coups since its independence in 1825 (Darnton, 2012).

In 1962, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked symbolically when the USSR began to build missile-launching sites in Cuba. With the support of the Organization of American States, President John F. Kennedy threw a naval and air quarantine around the island. After several tense days, the USSR agreed to withdraw the missiles and dismantle the sites. Subsequently, the United States dismantled several of its obsolete air and missile bases in Turkey (Gilderhus, 2006).

In sum, there has been continuous intervention in the regions by the Europe and the US in different time periods which would have serious implications with regards to political development of the institutions. Tracing the history of the

regions from colonialism till the Cold War, it is evident that Latin American states cannot be evaluated only by considering their internal dynamics. What appears as institutional failure has been part and parcel of the international dynamics. The domestic power relations in these countries have since the colonial era been shaped, and reshaped in relations to external power relations. Therefore, while analyzing Latin American countries, the negative the external role of European powers and especially the US should not be underestimated.

### **3.3. Post-Cold War Era and the New Discourse: Drug Trafficking**

Following the collapse of the USSR, the US has seen itself as the sole ruler of the world and has continued to pursue policies similar to those of the Cold War period. Factors of "national security" continued to serve as a cover for US aggressive policy. The rulers who oppose America's security (interests) are overthrown by coups in the past and manipulated masses today. And those who resist such American intervention are declared war criminals. In fact, the resources of the countries are exploited, new markets are created for this exploitation and the resources of the country are seized through privatization. With the discourse of democracy, the internal parameters of the countries are kept by the people who support the US. Unless the Latin American countries make an important breakthrough in economic, political and military terms, it does not seem easy to change their situation in the short term. As long as other states are involved in their home affairs, peace and a better life in Latin America cannot go beyond being a distant hope (Diamint, 2004).

In the 1990s, during the post-Cold War era, while US policy of active involvement in Latin America continued mutual relations drifted towards a more complex structure. The US foreign policy, which had just abandoned the anti-Communist security perspective, developed a new perception of national security through the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. Hence, the policy towards the countries of the region was shaped within this framework. This

policy was first initiated in Panama and the drug-fighting strategy was put into practice in Colombia after President Noriega was taken from his country and imprisoned (Ortiz, 2002).

While the contingent geographical and social factors might have caused the emergence of drug trafficking, its persistence and reproduction could be related with the very dynamics of the capitalist system. Hence, the emergence of drug cartels could be viewed from a broader perspective. The problems created by the drug trafficking were left unresolved by the consecutive governments. The United States also used the concept of “Drug Wars” as a means of renewing its regional sovereignty in Latin America. However, instead of solving this problem, it led other forms to continue (Villa et.al, 2016).

In Latin America, without addressing the legacy inherited from colonialism and the whole political system based on it, it does not seem possible to develop solutions to the problems posed by drugs and violence. Therefore, the section, to understand the current condition of Mexico due to drug trafficking and violence, will turn to a brief history of Mexico to draw attention to violence related to foreign interventions by means of neoliberalism and critical junctures.

### **3.4. From Colonialism to Neoliberalism: Critical Junctures in History of Mexico**

Despite the efforts of heavily armored Mexican security forces and supported intelligence units thanks to Mérida Initiative; soaring violence and civil strife related to the drug trafficking and counter narcotics program has continued to be a crucial problem in the country and brought about a question: “Is Mexico a failed state?” in the last decade.

The discussions started on Mexican state’s role and its deficiencies in drug policy and in this spreading war throughout Calderón era. Increasing violence

and discontent among Mexican society, escalating rate of drug trade, revealing linkages between drug traffickers and statesmen reflected on inferring Mexican state as a failed one. It can be asserted that this ascription was mold in terms of the US foreign and security policy and the US centered political approaches. Mexico's status as failed started to be observed in several reports which were carried out not only by official departments of the US governments but also think tanks and prominent names of foreign policy, military and government. For instance, in Freedom House 2007 report, Mexico was included in country group-Hungary, Taiwan, South Africa, Argentina, the Philippines, Brazil and Kenya-which has unformed or fragile democratic institutions although these were in better position in terms of democratic stability before (Freedom House, 2007). Mexico was firstly and bluntly mentioned with Pakistan as one of the states on the edge of collapse in the United States Joint Forces Command's 2008 report-The Joint Operating Environment:

... In particular, the growing assault by the drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican government over the past several years reminds one that an unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States. ...In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. ... The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone... (Joint Operating Environment, 2008: 34).

George Friedman's analysis highlights the expanded corruption in Mexico and non-functionalized state organs which have become under the control of drug trafficking organizations on the way to state failure of Mexico. Looking back to previous Mexican governments, Friedman states that a tradition of state failure has been developed throughout its history. He sees Mexico's way to failure is a crucial signal for the US due to Mexico's considerable population and economy, border with the US, which has been accepted as great power who controls North

America. Friedman warns that possible state failure would create geopolitical reflections and extension of competence between drug trafficking organizations and related to this competence, violence into the US, Friedman warns (Friedman, 2008).

In 2009, regarding increasing violence in Mexico, an analogy between Mexico and Iraq, Iran was made by Director of Central Intelligence, General Michael Hayden. He pointed out that this was the greatest potential threat to national security of the US in the upcoming years compared to Iraq and Iran (Nava, 2011).

In addition, as it has been mentioned in James D. Cockcroft's article, the US Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair's statement indicates being a failed state as the main reason behind violence in Mexico and Central America by referring to insecurity, instability, corruption and ungovernability (Cockcroft, 2010). The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine ranked Mexico as 98<sup>th</sup> on the Failed States Index, 2009 and almost it remained in its place in top 100 states of FSI for years.

Moreover, in 2010, Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton's comparison between Mexico and Colombia in terms of drug trafficking and violence caused questioning Mexican state's condition more with the failed state concept. In her words;

It's looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago. And Colombia — it got to the point where more than a third of the country, nearly 40 percent of the country at one time or another was controlled by the insurgents, by FARC. But it's going to take a combination of improved institutional capacity and better law enforcement and, where appropriate, military support for that law enforcement married to political will to be able to prevent this from spreading and to try to beat it back... We need to figure out what are the equivalents for Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

In parallel with FSI, in the annual report of Freedom House for 2011, Mexico was also mentioned with Ukraine as the “partly free” countries with referring drug-related violence and inefficiency of Mexican government (Freedom in the World 2011, 2011).

With 2000s, along with these analyses and statements, drug related violence has started to head towards to journalists, officials, staff of law enforcement etc. Tortured dead bodies of common people who were not in drug trafficking increased the visibility of violence. Fractionalized drug trafficking organizations began to realize a variety of criminal activities such as kidnapping, torture, extortion etc. targeting ordinary people. Finally, news on drug related violence had wide media coverage at both national and international levels.

In riposte to all the arguments on failed Mexican state, Calderón’s totally rejected them:

To say that Mexico is a failed state is absolutely false. I have not lost any part, any single part, of Mexican territory. Colombia lost [territory] during several decades . . . and even today huge parts of its territory [are] in the hands of the criminals, or the guerrillas, or some combination of drug traffickers and guerrillas. But in Mexico, all the territory is in the hands of the Mexican authorities (BBC, 2009).

Following Calderón’s statements, counter arguments flourished which referred to Mexican state’s superiorities; Phil Williams asses Mexico as a rising economy and applause the government of Mexico for its struggle for defying drug trafficking organizations and corruption. Refusing to compare it to Nigeria or Somalia, Williams finds failed state rhetoric for Mexico faulty and simplistic without underestimating the macabre level of violence (Williams, 2009). In line with Williams, Gros sees violence as just one parameter in state failure. Giving some regions in Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil as example, violence does not mean that there is a state failure, however it in itself does not show that the state achieved an acceptable status to preserve internal order (Gros, 2012).

To sum up, in the debate on Mexican state's so-called state failure which flourished in the last decade, the concept of failed state was utilized by some scholars to serve the US-centric approach to Mexico. They just look at the accelerating violence and consider Mexico as a threat to national security of the US. Without regarding negative external role of the US in expansion of drug trafficking and the growth of narco-economy and drug-related violence, Mexican state is placed in the category of failed states. As an alternative, the next section of the present study will focus on critical junctures and path dependence.

### **3.5. Different Colonial Practices: Which Path to be Dependent?**

In this subsection of the thesis, the facts that have pushed Mexico into the failed state debates are discussed in the historical context. Therefore, firstly, path dependence phenomenon caused by different colonization processes in North and South America is presented. Then, starting with the declaration of independence of Mexico, policies and institutional change processes implemented until today are discussed chronologically.

To clarify how Mexico has become a subject of failed state discourse is the main problem of this thesis. At this point, historical processes are important in terms of providing the necessary information. When examining historical processes, one can observe that the existence of Mexico's current problems is not surprising. The reason for this is the direction of institutional changes that have been developing since the colonial period. It is possible to explain this process of change with the concept of path dependence. In defining path dependence, many scholars employ a broad conceptualization that essentially entails the argument that past events influence future events. For example, according to Sewell's influential definition, path dependence means "that what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time" (Sewell, 1996: 262-263). Definitions such as this one have led many scholars to characterize their arguments as path-

dependent simply because earlier events affect later events. For example, in her excellent study of oil-producing nations, Karl (1999) characterizes her argument as path-dependent because it shows that the impact of decisions made in the past persists into the present and defines the alternatives for the future. Nooteboom (1997) adopts a similar approach when he argues that organizational evolution is path-dependent in the usual sense that directions for future development are foreclosed or inhibited by directions taken in past development.

Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) discuss the institutional transformation processes between Mexico and the US, which were colonized in the same period. Despite the similar conditions faced by the Spanish and British colonists, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) reveal the reasons behind the economic and political differences as the formation of exclusive and inclusive institutions. The institutional change processes of these two countries, which have great differences in economic and political terms, and the path dependence strengthened in these processes can explain why Mexico is the subject of a failed state debate.

In addition to the phenomenon of path dependence, which is influential in Mexico's institutional transformation processes and has an undeniable role in bringing it to its present state, changing economic policies under the influence of the bourgeoisie, which emerged on the basis of capitalist means of production and endeavored to establish hegemony over Mexican society which had high agricultural production levels and population density are also important. It is clear that these economic policies have changed in line with the goal of maximizing profit. The mechanisms that provide the balance between power and the consent of the people have been effective in ensuring stability in these processes of economic change. The mechanisms of power-consent created with the Mexican revolution and structured in a manner similar to Gramsci's passive revolution (Morton, 2007), have long been preserved in the country which was ruled by one-party rule. Keynesian economic models imposed on the market by

the global crisis of 1929 began to be implemented in this period. With the rise of social opposition in the 1960s and the deterioration of economic balances, the system faced a new crisis in the 1970s (Topal, 2010). The neoliberal policies developed in this direction began to be implemented in Mexico in the 1980s and led to the dissolution of the consent mechanisms between PRI administration and the public. It is not surprising that drug cartels, one of the major factors driving Mexico into the failed state debate, have emerged, especially during the neoliberal period. The neoliberal policies that led to the detachment of the people, most of whom are tied to the land, raised the problem of migration and the masses that were concentrated in the cities were then pushed into poverty. As a result, many young people had to be included in the system of drug cartels, hoping to survive misery.

Differences in development levels across countries around the world have been the subject of debate from past to present. Adam Smith first addressed this issue in his book *The Wealth of Nations*, which is considered as the beginning of modern economics. When Adam Smith wrote his book, the welfare level difference between nations was 5 times at most, but now this difference is over 40 times (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012). Today, the reason for the differences in welfare level between nations is discussed from many different perspectives. These include geographical factors (source-nature, science), cultural factors (Weber) and “enlightened leadership” (macroeconomic literature). But the main issue in this thesis (perhaps the most important factor) is the policies that condemn nations to poverty and infiltrate institutional structures.

Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) discuss “inclusive economic institutions” and “exclusionary economic institutions”. Inclusive economic institutions are those that provide an environment conducive to investment and innovation and which can provide equal conditions for a nation to present its existing capabilities in the most efficient way. On the other hand, institutional structures that cannot protect the property rights of nations, cannot provide public order are ineffective in

conflict resolution, do not reward innovation and hinder sustainable economic growth are expressed as exclusive economic institutions. The most important point mentioned here is that the exclusive institutions are designed consciously. These exclusive institutions, designed by those who hold power, ensure continuation of inequality and exploitation.

The American continent is an important example to understand how different institutional structures are shaped, how they find support in different political circles, and in turn lead to a huge economic difference. The economic and political institutions in the Americas have been largely shaped by the experiences of colonialism that began in the early 16th century. It is necessary to evaluate this process as North and South and to identify the differences.

As Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) state, the colonists who came to South America set foot on this continent for the purpose of finding precious metals such as gold and silver and capturing and enslaving the indigenous people to be forced to work. However, the indigenous population known as Charrúas and Querandí in the region could not be systematically enslaved by the Spaniards for reasons such as that they did not have an established order, did not have a hierarchy within themselves, and were difficult to capture. As a result of this failure, the colonists moved to the region known as Paraguay, northward, and met similar indigenous groups. The biggest difference of the locals (Guaraní) was that they had a hierarchy within themselves. The colonists took over this hierarchy and enslaved society. During the enslavement process, a system of exploitation was established in the form of forced labor and land allocation to the elite Spaniards. In addition to being obliged to accept the wages they receive, the incomes of the locals and the necessity of receiving the products that the elite tries to sell caused major problems in terms of property rights. In such an order, there can be no such thing as economic growth and sustainable development.

The colonization process of the North America has similar characteristics to the South America. The Virginia Company model, consisting of the elite captains and aristocrats sent to North America in the early 17th century, pursued similar objectives to the Spanish invaders. The Virginia Company pursued precious metals, such as gold, in the hope that they could enslave the natives and force them into labor. The colonists who came to North America faced similar conditions as those in the South and failed to achieve their goals. At this point, unlike the South, they decided to bring their own imported lower class (proletariat). It is important to note that the incoming groups were restricted by strict laws. The strategies adopted by subclass settlers on the continent under strict laws (escaping, illegal trade, etc.) have led to the need to develop new strategies for injecting the subclass into the settler community in colonies such as the Jamestown colony, which the Virginia Company is allowed to establish. In this direction, the system was established in 1618 and known as headright. It was based on the protection of the land's right to property in exchange for the cultivation of land by giving a legal share of land to the imported sub-classes. Nevertheless, the security of property rights could not be mentioned under circumstances where the slightest crime was punished with death. Political rights have also been granted over time to secure the economic incentives offered to settler subclasses. This, in fact, enabled them, through more inclusive political institutions, to move to a position higher than the lower layer of society from which they could make their own decisions.

The main reason for the difference between South and North America colonized in the same period is the differences in economic and political institutions formed in these regions. The long-term economic development of their empires was largely hampered as the Spaniards managed to establish exclusionary institutions to enrich themselves and their kings. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the United States was a better place to take advantage of new technologies and economic opportunities (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012).

Galeano also emphasizes the difference between the North and the South of American continent by indicating the colonization systems. As he claims, two different colonization methods existed for two different Americas: The United States and Latin America. The migrants who arrived at the North America aimed to settle with their families and establish colonial settlements. They did not become a kind of colonial tool to enhance European capitalist accumulation. But in the South, plantation economy was established, leading Spain and Portugal to depend on slave labor. After enslaving indigenous people, they also imported slave labor from African continent. Cheap workforce was there just to feed and flourish the Europe (Galeano, 2006:174-176).

Colonial institutions have long since disappeared. In this part of the thesis, the main stress is on the connection of institutional change processes with the steps taken in the past. This bond, which is called path dependence, is able to explain the extent to which the renewed institutions resemble the institutional structures formed in the past. In other words, even though colonial institutions do not exist anymore, it cannot be denied that the remnants of exclusionary institutional structures continue to expose Mexico and other South American countries to various problems. With the disappearance of the colonial order, this path dependence has become evident. The deep differences in the US and Mexico's stories of independence explain this fact. While the institutional transformation processes in the US independence process took the form of the development of inclusive institutions formed during the colonial period, the independence process in Mexico came to the agenda as a tool used by the colonial elites to consolidate the exclusionary institutions. The differences between the institutional structures established after independence also support this. Mexico, for example, has been struggling with civil wars and instability for decades after independence. The type of business and investments established by those who set up and invested businesses is also quite different between the United States and Mexico. In the United States, for example, it was possible to freely enter many of the promising areas in the 19th century, as evidenced by the different

backgrounds of the leading businessmen of that period. In Mexico, in the second half of the nineteenth century, businesses that emerged with relative stability were established and managed by elites who cooperated with the government, protected by legal regulations and monopolized the banking system. The end result was that it was the United States rather than Mexico, which grew rapidly in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. And this is the period in which the gap between these two countries is most likely to open between North America and South America.

It is the economic institutions that determine economic incentives and the allocation of resources, investments and innovation as a result. But it is the political institutions that determine how economic institutions work and how they evolve. In many societies suffering from exclusionary economic institutions, the reason for the disappearance of colonial institutions is that political power is concentrated in the hands of elites ruling with exclusionary political institutions.

### **3.5.1. Mexico in the Post-Colonial Period**

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the expansion of production tools and capital in the center formed by developed capitalist countries led to the dissolution of traditional economies in the peripheral countries, and then to the start of the dependent primitive capitalist accumulation process. Accordingly, the place of Latin America in the international division of labor and its role in the formation of global capitalism cannot be understood only with reference to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when Latin America began to be colonized, and especially the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it has been an important center providing valuable mineral, raw materials and food products to commercial capitalism sprouting in Europe. In the primitive accumulation process in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, while the classical economic and social relations based on the land gradually resolved, foreign capital turned towards public borrowing, infrastructure investments such

as railways, raw material production and export, agricultural products for the foreign market and manufactured production for domestic consumption. The expansion of capitalism from the center to the near periphery has led to the formation of a dependent socioeconomic form in which the capitalist and non-capitalist forms coexist, conditioned by the process that Trotsky defined as “uneven and combined development” (Ashman, 2009).

Mexico, which gained its independence in 1820, witnessed the development of economic activities especially in the fields of mining and agricultural products for international markets. While the conversion of the local economy with British and French consumer goods took place in the beginning of the century, it lost nearly half of its territory (Texas, California, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado and New Mexico) with the physical intervention of the United States. Against these losses, liberals who wanted to eliminate the influence of the great landowners and aristocracy, to maintain the modernization of Mexico and continue their colonial privileges, revolted for reform in 1855 and declared the constitution in 1857. After this date, liberals started a massive struggle against the great landowners and the church, one of the most important landowners in Mexico. Between 1859 and 1861, with the laws were referred to as Reform Laws, the state was secularized, all the property of the church was nationalized, and all its privileges before the law were abolished. Although the liberals won the civil war, the church and the conservative land-owner conservatives asked for help from Spain, England and France. After this request, Napoleon III, France invaded Mexico and led to the establishment of the second empire, where they brought the Maximiliano of the Habsburg dynasty to power This occupation and the anti-constitutional government ended in 1867 when the liberals defeated the conservatives and re-established the republic (Wenzel, 2010).

It is important to note that the most important dynamic underlying the struggles which mentioned above is the struggle of bourgeoisie to establish hegemony in a society where agricultural production and population were intense. In this

respect, the issue of private property on land is an inevitable part of the problematic of the establishment of a bourgeois domination that has survived to the present day. In Mexico, where the articulation to the international capitalist markets was largely through mineral products and agricultural products, the biggest obstacle to capitalist development for liberals was that land ownership could not be transformed into a free-floating market because it was concentrated in the hands of churches and latifundia (big landholdings) or for self-consumption by indigenous communities. At the same time, the church was the most important credit source in the country, thanks to its privileges on land ownership and diezmo (giving ten percent of the revenues to the church) revenues. With the Juárez Law (Ley Juárez -1855) and the Lerdo Law (Ley Lerdo -1856), all lands that are not based on individual property, including lands called ejido, that the Indigenous people have been using for centuries, have been put up for sale. Although the liberals oppose the monopolization of the land, the lands of small landowners who cannot fight with landowners larger than them due to 5 percent internal customs have been gradually gathered in the hands of large farms (hacienda) (Cypher, 2007).

During this period, migration and geographical location constituted the basis of organized crime in Mexico. Poppy was first brought in by the Chinese immigrants to the province of Sinaloa, West Mexico, the most important heroin supplier of North America, in the 1880s. As a result of the closeness of Sinaloa to the state of California, the state of Sinaloa has become one of the main suppliers of legal opium and its derivatives, heroin and morphine, until the US's Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 subjecting the sale of opium to strict regulations. With the increase in the need for medical morphine, an opium extract, due to the WWII, legal opium production increased. At that time, Japan produced most of the opium in the world, and because of the war, the US started to supply legal morphine from Mexico, especially from the province of Sinaloa, instead of Japan. Although the production of morphine provided a great benefit in military medicine, the legal trade of opium has caused widespread illegal

cultivation and distribution. As a result, poppy production, mainly brought by Chinese immigrants and legally provided to the US military for several years, underlies the strength of today's Sinaloa Cartel (Lauderdale, 2013: 188).

### **3.5.2. Passive Revolution Process in Mexico (1910-1920)**

The incorporation of Mexico in the 19th century to the global capitalist system in an uneven and combined manner has been the main socioeconomic factor that also conditioned the passive revolution that the bourgeoisie enacted by cooperating with the peasants and the emerging working class. In 1910, 800 large landowners, many of them foreign, owned almost all the land of the country. These landowners lived in the capital or in Europe. When they visited their lands, they were sheltered in their mansions surrounded by high stone walls. On the other side of the walls, the workers lived one after the other in mud brick sheds. 12 million of the population of 15 million worked on the *latifundiums*. The workers were spending all of their wages in *tienda de raya*, in shops, to buy beans, flour and drinks which were selling at astronomical prices. Dealing with the 'innate imperfections' of the locals were the duties of prisons, military barracks and churches. A member of one of the noble families of the time said that the natives were born "lazy, drunkard and thief". The situation was the same in tobacco plantations in Valle Nacional, forest businesses and orchards in Chiapas and Tabasco, and rubber, coffee, sugar cane, tobacco and fruit plantations in Veracruz, Oaxaca and Morelos. Galeano refers to John Kenneth Turner's travel notes which recorded that the US made the President Porfirio Diaz completely politically dependent on the US, thus turning Mexico into a colonial land in a slave status. North American capital made direct and indirect gains from its partnership with the dictatorship (Galeano, 2006:161-163).

At this point, it should be noted that the concept of passive revolution corresponds to an important historical development that resulted in the consolidation of capitalist production relations in state-society relations. Briefly,

in the definition of Gramsci, the passive revolution is revolution-restoration, in other words, “revolution without revolution” concluded by the established alliance, which opens the clogged dialectic, between lower classes and bourgeoisie which had no capacity to establish new hegemony (Morton, 2007). Thus, the developing bourgeoisie in Mexico has set out to reorganize and organize capitalist production relations by establishing a different and more sustainable form of power-consent. While the old regime, which had lost its capacity to ensure the continuation and expansion of the developing capitalist production relations and capitalist accumulation, was being liquidated by the alliance of the bourgeoisie, which had completed its development process, capitalist relations of production were consolidated on the basis of consent mechanisms that would satisfy the working masses in the short term and control or paralyze in the medium term.

In 1909, the enactment of a law envisaging the seizure of part of the land further triggered the already long-standing social contradictions (Galeano, 2006:162). Emiliano Zapata, who became famous as the best horse trainer in the country and gained everyone's respect with his honesty and courage, became the guerrilla leader. Southerners formed an army of liberation under the leadership of Zapata (Galeano, 2006: 162-163). The Mexicans were armed and revolted against President Porfirio Diaz. Zapata was an advocator of land reform, a leader who targeted social liberation, stood by the poor. Francisco Madero was declared as the President by toppling down Diaz. While the armies of the main actors of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) Álvaro Obregón, Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata were constituted from the peasants, in the post-revolution period, the deep-rooted land reform and autonomy demands of the peasants were evaluated only within the limits of capitalist relations of production. Land reform promises were soon forgotten. Zapata, who used to be a hero, suddenly turned into a bandit who had to be eliminated. Zapata then announced the Plan de Ayala in November 1911. In this plan, it was stated that the most of Mexican villagers did not have rights on the land where they lived and worked and it was

demanded to take back the land which were expropriated or plundered (Galeano, 2006: 163). With the announcement of Plan de Ayala, so many villagers participated in Zapata's movement which targeted not only to topple down the administration but also bring about the revolution in real. The war between these two sides proceeded approximately for ten years. Meanwhile, the US executed two landing operations and numerous bombardments, political conspiracies by means of diplomatic agents, and assassinate Madero and vice president. So many military troops were send to the rural areas to suppress the Zapata's movement. However, in the south of Mexico, in the mountainous region people were trying to strengthen themselves. In 1914, Zapata and Pancho Villa seized the power in Mexico City, followed by land redistribution. Technical schools were founded, factories which produced agricultural tools and agricultural bank were established. Refineries and distilleries were expropriated and transformed into public enterprises. The political, economic and social texture were tried to be redesigned in line with people's demands and rights (Galeano, 2006:161-169).

In this respect, the 1917 Constitution, which came into force, included both liberal elements and those that accepted the common property of the land. In this context, with its revolution, the national bourgeoisie took over the state apparatus and institutionalized stable change of political power, while keeping the organized and agitated peasant and workers groups under control by making them inactive. The existing workers' organizations were united in two large confederations (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers -CROM) and Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers -CTM)) that were newly established and were under the control of political power, and the workers' movement and struggle were taken under the auspices of the state. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 deals with the land reform that constitutes the main demand of the peasants who actually provided the greatest support to the revolution and accepted that all the land belonged to the people of Mexico. Despite this, there was no extensive land reform after the revolution, and even

though much land was taken into joint ownership with the *ejidos* that took millions of hectares at different times, these distributions were generally cyclical (Dell, 2012).

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mexico's border cities have become centers for the US to provide products and services that they cannot legally obtain in their home country. As a result of the prohibition of soft drink alcohol during the alcohol prohibition period, illegal alcohol trade, drug trafficking was provided in the US until 1933 through gangs directed by notorious characters such as Al Capone, Bugs Moran and Lucky Luciano. As a result of the prohibition of alcohol in the US, alcohol trafficking emerged as a business with high profit rate just like drug traffic in cities close to the American border. Alcohol trafficking became widespread and developed during this period in major border cities such as Matamoros, Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Piedras Negras, Juarez and Tijuana. In addition to the illegal transfer of alcohol, drugs, including cannabis and opium, and the proliferation of prostitution and gambling have caused these cities to become "la Zona Rosa", "red-light district", or in other words: "tolerant zone" where brothels and bars were clustered. In this process, which started in the 1910s and continued until the 2000s, municipal, state and federal governments cooperated with these criminal organizations in Mexico. The PRI government kept all the stages of organized crime under control, and bribed politicians were able to ensure the continuity of these crimes with their bribes. (Lauderdale, 2013: 189). There were families in every border city who managed organized crime. If there were various conflicts between these families, state intervention came. While organized crime, which was directed by the families, was necessarily included some violence, this violence was never directed against the Americans (gringos), who are considered as the most important customers. The most important locations for conducting the affairs of organized crime organizations (families / cartels) were the regions close to the gates of America's border with Mexico. The Mexicans called these areas the "plaza", and if a criminal organization could get government assurance, they could earn a lot of money.

With the increase in the American population and welfare level over time, the gain of organized crime organizations at the municipal level has also increased and the ground has been prepared to move illicit trafficking out of the plazas, across the border, to the US. In this smuggling business that crosses the US border, contrary to the plaza business, the amount of products was much higher, while it was necessary to deliver the products to the people who would sell to the customers in the US.

### **3.5.3. Authoritarian Government and Corporatist Social Reconstruction**

The crisis of global capitalism in 1929 gave a different direction to the corporatist institutionalization of the Mexican revolution. With the global crisis of capitalism, which corresponded to the period of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1928-1932), the Mexican economy declined greatly in the export of agricultural products to international markets and faced great difficulties in terms of foreign trade balance. Under these structural conditions, Cárdenas accelerated land distribution, nationalized Mexican oil and railways, expanded infrastructural work and increased public spending. This statist approach in the economy not only provided the support of workers and peasants to Cárdenas, but also laid the foundations of the import substitution form of capitalist accumulation in Mexico (as seen in many other peripheral countries in the same period) (Knight, 1994).

The need for a new unification process arose due to the fragmentation of social integrity during revolutionary processes, and this integrity was attempted to be restructured in the form of a single party regime with an authoritarian state approach. After Obregón, Plutarco Elías Calles was elected president as one of the revolutionary generals. Although Obregón was re-elected, as a result of Obregón's assassination, he took office with the influence of Calles himself and civilian and military politicians close to Calles, the National Revolutionary Party (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario - PNR*) was established and the name was changed in 1946 to Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario*

*Institucional - PRI*) (Topal, 2010). As Topal (2010) states, although PRI, which held power in the local elections until 1989, in the senate and representative assembly elections until the 1990s and in the presidential elections until 2000, did not attempt to prevent opposition parties at the local and national level, it organized the elections to ensure the continuity of its own regime, did not change the election results despite many claims by the opposition, and severely restricted democratic rights and freedoms and demonstrated its authoritative character.

Besides the authoritarian nature of PRI, the success of a corporatist social construction, especially in the 40s and 50s, is also worth mentioning. Corporatism is a social integration strategy in which the institutions providing the organization of social interests and the representation of the society are also used as the regulatory instrument of the state in the economic field (Topal, 2010). The development of all civil society institutions, such as trade unions within the PRI and the state acting in accordance with the economic policies is an indication that the corporatist structure serves capital in the labor-capital conflict. In addition, after WWII, the relation between PRI and drug trafficking organizations became stronger and closer. A kind of patron-client relation was established between the government and drug trafficking organizations. This relation covered the illegal activities and it controlled the level of violence and also personnel from Mexican military and police force were involved in narco-trafficking activities thanks to corporatist arrangement between criminals and the state (O'Neil, 2009).

It is stated that the Mexican economy grew by an average of 6.5 percent annually from 1950 to 1981. The migration from rural to urban areas and the increase in the ratio of the manufacturing sector to the gross national product are remarkable developments in these years. Although the figures indicate a steady growth, especially between 1950-1965, it cannot be said that positive developments were experienced in terms of social justice. Monopolization in various production

sectors and the domination of foreign companies forced the small producers, peasants and workers to migrate and caused various tensions among the large landowners and peasants (Topal, 2010).

The social opposition, which started with student movements in the late 1960s, had the power to cover different social segments throughout the 1970s and led to the crisis of the entire political system. Foreign debt, which has increased as a result of financing and balance of payments deficits and aggravated by the transformation in agricultural foreign trade relations caused a deep crisis on August 1982. In order to overcome this hegemonic crisis, which emerged as a result of the overlapping crisis of the political system and the economic crisis, both the relationship established by the state with the social classes and the way the Mexican economy joined international markets was radically restructured. This crisis was a turning point for the neoliberal restructuring process for Mexico (Topal, 2010).

#### **3.5.4. The Effects of Neoliberalism on Mexico**

It is possible to state that the neoliberal restructuring process of the economy gained momentum during President Miguel de la Madrid's period (1982-1988). Throughout this sexenio, economic restructuring activities were carried out for overcoming the 1982 debt crisis. In addition, with the aim of terminating corruption, a campaign named as "*La Renovacion Moral*" was commenced when Miguel de la Madrid was elected as the President of Mexico. Although he some officials who were involved in corruption or/and fraud, it was not implemented efficiently. Institutional corruption remained as same and drug trafficking played a key role in entrenching PRI hegemony and provided easiness for the implementation of neoliberal policies which started right after the debt crisis (Watt and Zepeda, 2012:63). by not only international enterprisers and Mexican businessmen but also corrupt officials and drug trafficking organizations benefited from free market activities thanks to neoliberal policies (Watt and

Zepeda, 2012:68). In the early 1980s, as a result of eradication operations, poppy fields were divided into smaller scale fields and widely expanded, so it became difficult to and eradicate them and accordingly drug trafficking organizations were scattered on Mexican land (Watt and Zepeda, 20012:64).

Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), successor of Miguel de la Madrid rapidly privatized 800 state-owned enterprises. The role of the state in the economy and public spending was significantly restricted, the "*National Plan for Rural Modernization*" (*Plan Nacional de Modernización del Campo*) based on an export-based economic organization oame to an end, barriers to the opening of activities and land operation to investment of national and international capital were removed (Peters, 1996).

It is possible to summarize the reforms that restructured the Mexican economy from the import substitution model to the export-based industrialization model as follows (Erol, 2016: 152):

- the privatization of the public sector, including important natural resources such as oil;
- flexible labor market to improve export-based production;
- changing the land ownership regime for export-based agriculture and raw material production and opening it to foreign capital;
- liberalization of financial markets by opening out to finance the balance of payments.

With the priority of export-based production, both the assembly and non-assembly manufacturing sectors grew, and total exports increased by 13 percent annually between 1989-1997. However, this situation did not solve the economic crisis of Mexico but made it more chronic by deepening it. Imports of machinery and intermediate goods, which increased due to increased exports, caused a

significant deficit in the balance of foreign trade and payments, and rapidly liberalizing financial markets made the financial markets unbalanced.

With the financing of the foreign trade deficit with short term debt of up to 68.5 billion dollars, in 1994, while opening the way to the peso crisis and devaluation, the Mexican economy entered the cycle of growth-increasing the value of national currency-increasing import-devaluation as one of the most open economies to international trade and capital flows (Díaz 2001). A bailout package of \$50 billion dollars under the condition that promised the continuation of neoliberal policies in complied with NAFTA. In line with these circumstances, agriculture was adversely affected. The peasants did not have power to share the pie with agribusiness which was supported by the US capital. Mexico's agriculture sector thus turned to import agricultural commodities. These developments paved the way for the expansion of poppy production instead of food products (Laurell, 2015:250-252). In addition to this, the share of industrial investments in total foreign investments dropped rapidly, and these investments shifted towards more profitable financial investments. Government bonds in dollars called Tesobono can be shown as examples of these foreign investments (Peters, 1996).

The Mexican economy, which has become more dependent on foreign capital and more sensitive to international financial movements, has been integrated with NAFTA and North American capital. NAFTA caused the assembly industry called maquiladora, which is based on 'flexible and cheap workforce' rather than R&D and technology-intensive industrial production, to expand and expand to the southern provinces, where labor was much cheaper. The maquiladora model, which was 75 percent of the total businesses owned by North American capital, was concentrated in the production textile, electronic equipment, white goods and automobile industry (Bair, 2002). Neoliberal restructuring, institutionalized with NAFTA, expanded the labor-intensive production produced with flexible workforce in the Mexican economy, while positioning it at the periphery of

technology and capital-intensive North American industrial production. Thus, while Mexico adopted export-based capitalist accumulation, it also adopted the paradigm that the workforce should be as flexible as possible and kept cheaper, and that natural and environmental standards that prevent the capital investments should be reduced and included in production in the most effective way (Morton, 2000).

It can be said that, the state apparatus, the whole mechanism of the political society formed by the institutionalization of the bourgeois hegemony with the consent of civil society and consolidated with the Mexican revolution had its first crisis in 1960s with the failure to reproduce consent. This crisis spread to rural areas from 1970 onwards. Comparative advantage pressure, which is aimed to increase or maintain the labor market even more flexibly by neoliberal restructuring, intensified the contradictions on a rural scale by opening up land and above-ground resources to the intervention of global capital, and privatization of public services and investments are the elements that expand these contradictions.

An illegal source of income with such a high profit rate in the Mexican economy caused organized crime and the growth of cartels.

Organized crime activities, which started in the 1920s extended to the 2000s, were carried out under the control of the PRI government with the participation of local, state and federal government officials. However, with the increase in drug consumption in the US in the late 1990s, production increased in Mexico, and agricultural workers started to learn that they could earn much more (more than their ten-year income) by completing only one single drug smuggling process.

The amount of profit from drug trafficking is much higher than in all other lines of trade both in Mexico and around the world. Therefore, one of the biggest

problems of criminal organizations has been how to protect so much cash without being sanctioned by the law. According to a story published in the New York Times dated June 15, 2012, the value of one kilo of cocaine supplied by Sinaloa Cartel from the mountainous regions of Colombia and Peru to approximately \$2,000 can reach up to \$10,000 in Mexico, \$30,000 after passing the US borders, and \$100,000 when sold in grams. The fortune of El Chapo Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, is estimated to reach billion dollars. The amount of money earned in the drug trade is so great that the highest amount of cash seized at a time was recorded as \$206 million which was found in the home of Zhenli Ye Gon, a Chinese Mexican businessman accused of providing raw materials related to meth. The proceeds of the drug trade are used to pay individuals, politicians and law officers in the drug network. For example, Noe Ramirez, one of the police officers of the Calderón period, who was considered successful in the fight against drugs, faced accusations that in 2008 he received a monthly bribe of \$450,000 from the cartels (Ellingwood, 2008).

Bribery, one of the most important trump cards of drug cartels, targets legal areas such as the US Customs Agencies, Border Patrol Officers, elected prosecutors and the judiciary in line with their own benefits. As a result of the abundance of cash, which is one of the most important problems of drug cartels, they distribute the bribes in cash.

### **3.5.5. Major Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico**

The drug trafficking organizations that run drug trafficking in Mexico have grown tremendously in the last decades and have turned the Mexican land into battlefields of military forces and drug trafficking organizations. Although Calderón, who started his presidency in 2006, fought against cartels, it is possible to mention that Mexico continues to have some major cartels that benefit from a corruption problem that can reach even the highest authorities in the law enforcement bureaucracy (Chalk, 2012: 5).

There are some basic features that describe the cartel world mentioned above in the development process. First, there is constant conflict, and alignments and personalities are constantly changing. Secondly, as one of the most important features of the cartel world, the profit rate is extremely high and, which allows the use of a large amount of cash to bribe politicians, military personnel, police force and law officers. The third is the high unemployment rate and poverty in Mexico, which provides a wide manpower pool for the cartels (Lauderdale, 2013: 190).

In this subsection, brief background information on the main actors of the drug trade in Mexico is provided. These cartels/DTOs are the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, La Familia, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Organization, the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel), and the Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel).

#### **3.5.5.1. The Gulf Cartel**

The Gulf Cartel was established in the Matamoros region of Tamaulipas State, which borders Texas's Brownsville city. Although the group's history dates back to the 1970s, its activities increased with the increase of cocaine traffic in the 1980s and 90s. For a long time, Gulf Cartel was recognized as the strongest gang among drug trafficker groups in Mexico and increased its control power through a notorious paramilitary arm called Los Zetas. However, in the period since 2007, the cartel has lost its strength and importance as a result of the elimination of cartel's long-term leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen (imprisoned in U.S.) and his brother Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (died), and Los Zetas' independence in 2009. The current leader of the cartel, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, "*El Coss*" tries to prevent Los Zetas from entering the Tamaulipas smuggling corridor, which lies between Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo on the Texas border (Grayson, 2017a). As a result of this desperate effort, Gulf Cartel has developed "narco-tanks" to ensure their own safety on smuggling routes. Four of these

trucks, equipped with air conditioning and steel plates, were seized by security forces in a garage in Camargo in June 2011 (Bunker and Ramirez, 2013).

### **3.5.5.2. Los Zetas**

Los Zetas was founded between 1996 and 2000 by ex-members of Gruper Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), an elite special-forces unit of the Mexican army. This gang, which served as the paramilitary arm of Gulf Cartel for a while, started to act independently in 2009 and became a more important DTO. Today, it is in conflict with Gulf Cartel on human trafficking routes in Tamaulipas State. In addition to these conflicts, Cartel was able to expand its power to Zacatecas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, the capital region, Quintana Roo and Chiapas. Cartel collaborated with the Beltrán Leyva Organization to improve its influence in the Culidad Juarez region, one of the main human trafficking routes to the US. Although known as one of Mexico's most violent DTOs, Los Zetas has lost its former strength in the northern border states of Mexico as a result of the arrest of several top leaders since 2008. Prominent in this regard are Mateo Lopez (“Comandante Mateo”), Efrain Teodoro Torres (“Z-14”), Daniel Perez (“El Cachetes”), Manuel Perez Izquierdo (“El Siete Latas”), Marco Garza de Leon Quiroga (“El Chabelo”) and Jaime Gonzalez Duran (“El Hummer”). While the first five of these names were known as top members in the general leadership hierarchy of the cartel, the sixth was responsible for the management of cocaine imports from America. Heriberto Lazcano (“El Lazca”), one of the founding members and still leader of the cartel, and Trevino Morales (“Z-40”), the number two of the cartel, still hold power as a major element of violence (Correa-Gabrera, 2017).

### **3.5.5.3. La Familia**

The Gulf Cartel was established in the Matamoros region of Tamaulipas State, which borders Texas's Brownsville city. Although the group's history dates back

to the 1970s, its activities increased with the increase of cocaine traffic in the 1980s and 90s. For a long time, Gulf Cartel was recognized as the strongest gang among drug trafficker groups in Mexico and increased its control power through a notorious paramilitary arm called Los Zetas. However, in the period since 2007, the cartel has lost its strength and importance as a result of the elimination of cartel's long-term leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen (imprisoned in U.S.) and his brother Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (died), and Los Zetas' independence in 2009. The current leader of the cartel, Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, "*El Coss*" tries to prevent Los Zetas from entering the Tamaulipas smuggling corridor, which lies between Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo on the Texas border (Grayson, 2017a). As a result of this desperate effort, Gulf Cartel has developed "narco-tanks" to ensure their own safety on smuggling routes. Four of these trucks, equipped with air conditioning and steel plates, were seized by security forces in a garage in Camargo in June 2011 (Bunker and Ramirez, 2013).

#### **3.5.5.4. The Sinaloa Cartel**

Sinaloa Cartel was founded in the mid-1990s under the name of La Alizana de Sangre. After founder Hector Luis Palmar Salazar ("El Guero") went to jail in 1995, Juaqin Guzman ("El Chapo" or "Shorty") took the lead and still continues. It is known that El Chapo, the most wanted drug lord in Mexico before his capture, once exceeded several billion dollars in personal wealth (Flores and Flores, 2017). The Sinaloa Cartel keeps most of the state of the same name under control and holds important bases in Baja California, Durango, Sonora, Jalisco and Chihuahua. The cartel is known to transfer cocaine using tunnels dug below the U.S. border and establish distribution cells across the U.S. In addition, it is thought to have installed additional Andean hubs to facilitate the transfer of cocaine from Peru and Colombia to Europe via West Africa (Hull, 2018). Sinaloa Cartel can be described as the strongest and most effective DTO in Mexico despite the fact that many high ranking members including leader El Chapo, Teodoro Garcia Simenta ("El Teo") who was responsible for many of the

violence in the border areas in 2008-2009, and Ovidio Limon Sanchez who led cartel's American market have been captured by security forces. The cartel is currently struggling to control two major trafficking routes to New Mexico and California. For one of these routes, the cartel clashes with Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate, Beltrán Levya Organization (both former allies) and Los Zetas. The other route is Tijuana, where it is in conflict with Arellano Felix Organization (Grayson, 2017b).

#### **3.5.5.5. Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel)**

Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate, also known as the Juarez Cartel, was established in the city of Ciudad Juarez in the province of Chihuahua. The cartel is now under the direction of Vincente Carrillo Fuentes (El Viceroy). This crime organization, which has a strong alliance with Beltrán Levya Organization in various aspects, fights Sinaloa Cartel to take control of the city of Juarez. It is known that the organization used a group that was recruited among corrupt police officers as law enforcement, called La Linea. Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez ("El Diego"), who has been a long-time leader of the Cartel, was caught by security forces in August 2011 (Smith and Williams, 2015). He admitted that he gave about 1500 murder orders. It is known that the Juarez Cartel used Barrio Azteca, a street gang, to execute sales, distribution and murder orders when they deem necessary, and controls almost half of the drugs that travel from Mexico to the US (especially towards the cities of Austin, Dallas and El Paso). It is stated that the weekly earnings of the cartel are around 200 million dollars. Although it faced obstacles in the control of human trafficking routes in the city of Chihuahua as a result of its struggle with Sinaloa Cartel, the cartel remains an important organization among DTOs in Mexico. It is reported that Juarez Cartel, who does not lag behind other crime organizations about violence, has roles in the Ciudad-Juarez serial murder site, which is known as the "house of death" and reported for the first time in 2004 (Beittel, 2015).

#### **3.5.5.6. Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel)**

Having a significant influence on Zacatecas and Sinaloa, with its headquarters in the state of Baja California, the Tijuana Cartel was one of the largest DTOs in Mexico in the past. Inherited the management of the organization in 1989, it was organized by five brothers and four sisters who took over from the Angel Angel Felix Gallardo, who was arrested after the murder of a US DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) official. The cartel, which experienced great losses as a result of the arrest or killing of four of the founding brothers and some of the senior executives over time, lost its control and access area by losing its control and some of the smuggling routes. However, it continues to operate in the state of Baja California as a criminal organization that still has significant power. In addition, it continues to exist in 15 states, albeit at a reduced level, and is said to have control over street-level gangs and cells across the border (in the U.S.) (Beittel, 2019).

#### **3.5.5.7. The Beltrán Leyva Organization**

The Beltrán Leyva Organization was founded by four brothers (Marcus Arturo - "El Barbas", Carlos - "El jefe de jefes", Alfredo - "El Mochomo", and Hector - "El Ingeniero", born in the 1960s. Conflict between the Beltrán Leyva and Los Zetas on making profit on drug trafficking and other products started in 2004 and this conflict caused severe problems in Guerrero. As it has been mentioned in International Crisis Group's recent report on Guerrero, controlling mining areas especially for illegal logging was also the one of the main reasons of the conflict between in these two drug trafficking organizations (International Crisis Group, 2020:7). Particularly, Acapulco which is famous tourism destination turned into a battlefield. Residents of the city often faced firearm attacks in the streets, kidnappings, extortion, etc.

Although these four brothers were initially close allies of the Sinaloa Cartel, the cooperation of the two cartels ended after Alfredo was arrested in 2008 result of a betrayal. Following this event, the organization proved to have the power to compete with Sinaloa, sneak into narcotic troops, and assassinate some high-ranking officers. But the power of Cartel began to diminish after losing some of the most important members. The first major loss was the death of leader Arturo in the conflict in December 2009. This was regarded as victory of President Calderón in drug war. Then, in January 2010, Carlos Beltrán, Gerardo Alvarez-Vasquez ("El Indio") in April, Edgar Valdez Villareal ("La Barbie") in August and Sergio Villareal Barragan ("El Grande") in September were the names that the organization lost. Another senior member, Oscar Osvaldo Garcia Montoya ("El Compayito"), was detained in April 2011. Even though Montoya's capture was defined as "last Beltrán Levya link of any importance", this was an exaggerated claim, proved by the group's continuing activities. As a matter of fact, Cartel formed various alliances with Carillo Fuentes Syndicate and Los Zetas and entered a competition over the control of the Sinaloa Cartel in Ciudad Juarez. In addition, a residual leadership structure around Hector, one of the four founding brothers, can still be observed (Beittel, 2019).

The satellite of Beltrán Levya, Los Rojos (The Red Ones) and splinter organizations of Los Ardillos and Guerreros Unidos have been among the main drug trafficking organizations in Guerrero.

### **3.6. Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Trafficking Organizations' Existence**

One can argue that Mexico's indigenous people are in a cultural war with American-based elites today, just as they fought with European colonists in the colonial period. This can be explained by the significant influence of the foreign capital on the institutions and enterprises in Mexico. It is possible to observe that the cartels create such an intense environment of violence, the institutions of the state are inadequate in the face of this violence, and all these negative factors

push Mexico into the middle of a failed state debate. But how accurate is it to adhere to a failed state label only in the context of today's conditions without considering the history, sociology and geography of the country?

As it has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, it will be possible to argue that one of the most important reasons for Mexico to reach its current state is a chain of links, expressed as path dependence, which can be explained by the historical institutionalist approach. As a matter of fact, considering this approach, the economic and institutional differences between today's North and South America confirm the phenomenon of path dependence. In the past, colonists were able to establish the exclusionary institutions they had planned in the south and maximized exploitation. However, since the colonists in the north brought their own class of workers from their own countries (a kind of working-class importation), they were not able to implement fully the exclusionary and persecution-oriented policies they did to the indigenous people. Therefore, in the North, despite ups and downs and setbacks, the institutional structuring process has been realized in a more democratic and inclusive ways. However, in the south, the authority gap that emerged after the colonial withdrawal was filled by the indigenous elites, who were also under the control of the colonists. At this point, it is possible to state that the destructive effects of the persistence of the colonial institutional system constitute the basis of various problems that exist in Mexico and in most of the Latin American countries.

Although Mexico, where the devastating traces of the past had a significant impact on the institutional level, has such a great potential (both in terms of population with 115 million people and resources like crude oil) today, one of the reasons that it became a subject of failed state debates is the problems with the constitution of the middle class. As a result of the path dependence, educational institutions as well as other institutions were affected, and the educational system has remained well below world standards. The average education level is less than 12 years in Mexico today (World Bank, 2020).

This deficiency of the middle class and the low level of education of the young population has led to young people struggling with economic problems, who have begun to fall into the trap of cartels in search of future prospects. One of the reasons why cartels are so strong today is that they can recruit staff from the young population continuously.

The current situation in the country, of course, affects the people negatively. Intensive violence among other factors forces people to leave their lands and live as refugees or immigrants in the US. The colonialists of the past and the elite of today (one of the biggest partners of these are the US), which is the driving force behind the inability of Mexico to form a middle class, tries to treat Mexico as a failed state and does not take responsibility for its own crime, so to speak. Similar to the practices of colonialists in the past, the US has established a hegemony over Mexico and directed state policies in line with its own interests, and benefited from both human resources (as cheap labor) and other natural resources of the country in order to favor its own bourgeoisie.

The US, which develops a new security discourse every period, has tried to justify its interventionist approach by putting forward the concept of failed state in the direction of its own interests after Cold-War. This situation, unfortunately, has been accepted by some sections of the academic community, and various failed states have been defined and categorized.

In today's world, in order to understand the violence in Mexico, it is necessary to consider Mexico in a historical institutionalist context, rather than labeling it as failed. For this reason, in this thesis, Mexico has been examined in a historical perspective and cartels, which constitute the main source of violence, have been discussed in rather detail. In the next part of the thesis, the state of Guerrero, one of the most violent states in Mexico, will be discussed in historical, sociological and geographical terms. The thesis will criticize the concept of failed state and

try to show that calling Mexico a failed state to will not provide any valuable basis for fruitful discussions.

## CHAPTER 4

### GUERRERO: A LOCAL STATE IN ENDURING VIOLENCE

The war on drugs have resulted in different outcomes in different Mexican states. None was the same as Guerrero, which is a hot spot for violence due to discontent dating back to the early times to drug trafficking activities in our age. This thesis has focused on Guerrero as the case to study since this state has been constantly in struggle with violence more than the other states as a result of militarization and criminalization since counter-insurgent movement started in the late 1960s. Therefore, Guerrero will be analyzed in order to comprehend how an unfavorable institutional development took place and how this historical process brought about continuous violence.

Violence, crime, unrest, drug cartels, homicide, tortured dead bodies, kidnappings, disappearances and lingering fear... These are the words often used to define Guerrero. A southwestern state of Mexico, Guerrero territory is divided into areas controlled by the drug trafficking organizations along the Pacific Ocean. Although it is also famous for its attractive tourism destinations such as Acapulco, Taxco and Ixtapa which are known as the *Triángulo del Sol* (Sun Triangle), Guerrero has been associated with violence and crime for a very long time. It is also placed in the U.S.'s list of unsafe states in Mexico for travel (Los Angeles Times, 2018). In addition to drug trafficking organizations' activities affecting in every sphere of life, Guerrero has also been home to guerrilla movements from 1960s and activities of security organizations which have been managed by local people to provide their own security in some areas against the cartels.

One significant incident of this enduring violence is known as “Missing 43” incident, which occurred on September 26, 2014; this could be regarded as the tipping point in the history of violence in In the municipality of Iguala in Guerrero protester student teachers (*normalistas*) from Ayotzinapa<sup>4</sup> Raul Isidro Burgos Teachers’ College were intercepted and attacked by police while they were going to Mexico City to attend to a demonstration held to commemorate the students killed during the protests in 1968 43 *normalistas* were taken custody and they disappeared. Following the investigation of forensic teams, it was found that the missing students’ bodies were cremated. For a long time, disappeared students remained on the top of the news. Numerous mass protests for 43 missing students were organized across the country and also around the world (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015). There is not a consensus on whether the police or the members of drug trafficking organization ‘Guerreros Unidos’, or both are guilty of kidnapping or/and killing them. The case could not be closed judicially because there have still been problems on locating the missing students or their dead bodies.

During the President Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency, this incident was considered as a most notorious crime and this impunity was often protested. Moreover, 43 missing students led the people to question the Mexican state’s role in this violence/ war on drugs more. The voices of masses have been raised to protest the impunity and accelerating violence which touch the *normalistas*/civilians who were neither guerrillas nor drug traffickers. The President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has promised to establish a truth commission to re-examine one of the country’s most notorious unsolved crimes (Argen, 2018). Recently, a presidential commission was established by Obrador

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<sup>4</sup> This is a small village which has a teacher training school dates back to 1926 and it was established in order to educate and engrain social justice and values of the revolution in rural people aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Not only literacy and education, but also politics has been included in the curriculum of the college. Therefore, student teachers in this college have always been interested in politics (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015, x).

in order to coordinate works on this case which could not be resolved since 2014 (CRS Report, 2019).

Guerrero has faced violence and instability for a long period of time due to the marginalization of rural, poor, and indigenous people; production and trafficking of narcotics and this has led to a situation where narcotic networks and indigenous self-defense organizations filled the vacuum left by the state institutions especially in the economy and security spheres.

Before delving into the violence in Guerrero, it should be better to look at Guerrero in terms of its geography, demography, societal structure and its history in order to be familiar with this region in Latin America to comprehend the dynamics of state and society on this land.

#### **4.1. An Overview of Guerrero**

As one of Mexico's poorest states whose growth rate was estimated as 1% in 2014, the State of Guerrero (territorial surface: 64,586 km<sup>2</sup>) is located along the Pacific Ocean on the south; and bordered on the north by Michoacán, México City, and Morelos; on the east by Puebla and Oaxaca. Guerrero is a mountainous state whose mountainous area starts from the Sierra Madre del Sur to the Sierras del Norte (the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía-INEGI, 2020). Through the south-north line, it has a narrow coast and mountainous land spread on a large area as a single ridge - called as Balsas Depression- from east to west. Due to large mountainous terrain, transportation infrastructure has not been well-developed (Kyle, 2015).



Figure 2 Map of Guerrero (INEGI,2020)

It has seven administrative regions- Acapulco, Tierra Caliente, Costa Grande, Costa Chica, el Centro (Central Zone- the capital of the state is Chilpancingo (Chilpancingo de los Bravo) located in this region), el Norte and la Montana; and 81 municipalities.

Guerrero has an indigenously diverse society. 3,542,204 people live in Guerrero (INEGI, 2015) and there are 7.452 indigenous communities and 481.098 people (the total population of which approximately 16 per cent) speak indigenous languages (Topal, 2012). Among this population, according to the results of 2010 survey of INEGI, 170.672 people speak Nahuatl language, 139.387 people speak Mixteco language, 119.291 people speak Tlapaneco language, 45.799 people speak Amuzgo de Guerrero language (INEGI, 2010). It has been known that there are 52 indigenous languages spoken by the people of Guerrero. However, only four of them are more common than the others among the people of Guerrero.

From these indigenous groups, the Nahuas live in 22 municipalities in La Montaña, Norte and el Centro and some members of groups are seen in Costa Chica, Costa Grande, and Tierra Caliente. The population of Nahuas have been scattered in several regions in Guerrero. Therefore, it is difficult to say that they have very common characteristics as an indigenous group. Except the isolated

areas, they do not speak their own language. Their main economic activities are artisan work production and agriculture. Due to low productivity and high demographic growth, many Nahuas migrate to the cities to work or to sell artisan work and they settle where they migrated. As the majority indigenous group, the Nahuas are active in politics since they live in the central cities and have connections in the government.

The second group, Mixtecos mainly live in Alcozauca, Metlatónoc, part of Tlapa, Xalpatláhuac and Copanatoyac. They also live in other states of Mexico: Oaxaca and Puebla and are known as the “men and women of rain”. They have tried to protect their indigenous language by establishing a center called as “the Academia de la Lengua Ñu Savi”. Due to the insufficiency of agricultural production -even for self-consumption- and deteriorated ecology of their region, Mixtecos have chosen to migrate to the other states or abroad. There have been social and political discontent where Mixteco population live. Therefore, there are more than 40 cases of socially divided communities. Each community has their own authorities, school, music band, teachers, and sports facilities. In Mixteco region, in order to protect indigenous rights, political organizations have been established and a guerrilla group (Ejército Popular Revolucionario/ The Popular Revolutionary Army, EPR) was founded in 1996. In 1998, Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente/ Insurgent People's Revolutionary Army (EPRI) was founded by some members of EPR (Paulson, 2007).

Another indigenous group, the Tlapaneco or Mè'phàà densely live in la Montaña, el Centro, and Costa Chica regions (in the municipalities of Acatepec, Atlixac, Malinaltepec, Tlacoapa, San Luis Acatlán, and Zapotitlán Tlabbas). The Mè'phàà are the third largest indigenous population in Guerrero after the Nahuas and the Mixtecos. The name Tlapaneco means “one that is painted” and “dirty.” For this reason, aftermath of the event of the 500 Year anniversary of the arrival of Europeans in America, the Mè'phàà started a movement for changing the word “Tlapaneco” with Mè'phàà and gained acceptance as Mè'phàà. The

Mè'phàà only recently have written their language (a tonal language) and very few have literacy in their own language. Approximately 31 percent of the population is monolingual. The Mè'phàà region is a poor region and has faced environmental deterioration. As in the Mixteco region, agricultural production is very low and migration rate is high. The Mè'phàà migrate to the other major cities such as Acapulco, Chilpancingo etc. where the economic activities are intense and diversified or Mexico City and to other states mostly as agricultural workers in Morelos, Sinaloa, and Yayarit and they have not preferred to migrate abroad. In their region, basic public services cannot be provided properly and mortality and illiteracy rates of this group are higher than the rest of the state.

Another group, the Amuzgos are densely located in the municipalities of Xochistlahuaca, Tlacoachistlahuaca, and Ometepec. The Amuzgo population is also seen in Oaxaca. The population of Amuzgos had decreased due to the epidemics during the Spaniard colonization, falling from an estimated 59,615 in 1520 to 1,100 in 1582. Over the centuries, the Amuzgos lost vast majority of their land and pressured authorities for restitution, which was finally granted in the 1930s. Since this group has not been studied extensively, their language is not known very well. The main social conflicts in this area stem from conflicts over land, local politics, and rivalry among individuals. Violence, particularly vengeance killing has been widespread. The young population of the Amuzgos migrate, due to lack of land, employment, economic resources. They particularly work in construction, cleaning services, domestic help or work as gardeners, laborers, service industry employees in Acapulco, Ometepec, Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, and Mexico City.<sup>5</sup>

As it can be inferred from this brief information about the indigenous people of Guerrero that poverty, marginalization, migration and illiteracy can be

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<sup>5</sup> Information about these indigenous groups have been cited from the web site of Partido Comunista de Madrid. See:

[http://www.profesionalespcm.org/\\_php/MuestraArticulo2.php?id=3531](http://www.profesionalespcm.org/_php/MuestraArticulo2.php?id=3531).

considered as the main problems commonly faced by these groups. After this general picture of the society, the history of the state Guerrero will be discussed in order to provide a background to the current degree of violence and instability.

#### **4.2. Early Times of Guerrero**

Standish, in his book *“The States of Mexico”*, mentions that the first human presence dates back to 22,000 years ago in Guerrero and in 7000-5000 BC the first villages were founded near the rivers and lakes and early settlements were seen in Puerto Marqués near to Acapulco. But the identity of first human presence is controversial: Olmecas or Mezcalas. Others Purépechas, Mixtecs, Mayas and Zapotecs came later to Guerrero which led to cultural exchange and the Toltecs were included in this mixture in the 8<sup>th</sup> century. Following the Toltecs decline in this region, the Chichimes became the part of Aztec Empire. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century, different groups occupied the lands of Guerrero: The Purépechas, the Cuitlatecas, the Ocuitecas and the Matlatzincas in the hot areas; the Chontales, Mazatlecos and Tlahuicas in the northern part; the Coixcas and the Tepoztecos in the valleys; the Tlapanecos and Mixtecs in the mountainous area; and the Yopis, Mixtecs, Amuzgos, Tolimecas, Chubias, Pantecas, and Cuitlecas along the coastal region and during the 15<sup>th</sup> century the Mexicas (Aztecs) started to take control of the region before the Spaniard occupation. During the occupation, Southern part of Mexico was an attraction point for Spaniards in search of new lands and gold. According to Standish, they did not face strong resistance in the southern part of Mexico, since the indigenous groups were not able establish a unified force to resist the Spaniards due to the scattered structure of these groups. The conquistadors explored the region from the coast to the mountainous area (Standish, 2009). Afterwards, *encomienda* system which provides the Crown’s grant to conquistador, members of army, and officials land where indigenous people lived was established. The *encomendero* who received the grant got to opportunity to exact tribute from the indigenous people for their security in the name of Christianity (Meade, 2010:73-74).

During the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a decrease in the population of indigenous people was seen due to the diseases and inappropriate and inefficient treatments. Therefore, African slaves were brought to the region to support the workforce in *encomiendas* (Standish, 2009). Thus, Afro mestizo<sup>6</sup> (Afro Mexican) identity has existed in the region since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Since they were exposed to racist abuse to a great extent, the Afro-mestizos had a leading role in resistance against the colonists and indigenous groups later joined this resistance. Due to the crucial position of Afro mestizos in the resistance, the phrase ‘Guerrero bronco’ - which was defined as “wild and uncontrollable mustang” by historian Bartra- has been used while referring to the resistance movements in the region (Topal, 2012). By the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, due to the economic reasons, unrest among the Afro mestizos and indigenous people with the claim to the right to land. For the independence, at first, Jose Maria Izazaga started the movement in Valladolid and then on September 16, 1810, Roman Catholic priest Miguel Hidalgo announced the revolution against Spain at Dolores, in Guanajuato. Hidalgo’s announcement took effect in Guerrero immediately. In southern Mexico, Jose Maria Morelos commanded the movement. After his death, the eponym of Guerrero, Vicente Guerrero as a commander in chief proceeded on the way of independence. Agustin de Iturbide was announced as emperor in 1822 and Vicente Guerrero was assigned to one of the five military regions of Mexico which was established in Tixtla where the borders of Guerrero shaped (Standish, 2009). However, the borders of the states remained controversial for a while. After the fall of Iturbide, Vicente Guerrero was elected as the first black Indian president of Mexico in 1829, abolished the slavery and supported the autonomy of village councils, ‘declaring that the interests of people were best served by the closest political body that represented them’ (Vincent, 2001). At the same year

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<sup>6</sup> The 2015 population survey marked the first time since the 19th century that the Mexican government included a distinct category for people of Afro-Mexican descent. As of 2015, the INEGI found that 1,973,555 persons or 1.7% of the population self-identified as Afro-Mexican or partially Afro-Mexican (1.2% of the population excluding people who self-identified as only partially Afro-Mexican).

See: <https://blog.diegovalle.net/2016/01/afro-mexicans.html>.

Vicente Guerrero was ousted by General Antonio López de Santa Anna, who replaced him in the presidency with Anastasio Bustamante; Vicente Guerrero was captured and executed. Southern Mexico became the theatre of internal conflict between liberals and conservatives and protests were seen in the Southern part for the territorial division. Eventually, the president of the day José Joaquín de Herrera announced the state of Guerrero by a decree in 1849 (Standish, 2009).

Throughout the term of President Porfirio Díaz (Porfiriato period-1876-1911), Guerrero had nine governors who were loyal to the authoritarian regime. During this period, land was sold, foreign mining and textile concerns arrived in the state, first banks were set up, railroad reached Guerrero and peasants worked as hired workers on their land. A small group of landowners and businessmen enjoyed all the advantages of industrialization and improvement of technology (Standish, 2009). Moreover, the economic program of Porfiriato has turned the rancher families into the “new village elite” called as *caciques*, as Jacobs refers, a new rural middle started to exist in Guerrero (Jacobs, 2014). At this point, it should be better to briefly explain *caciquismo* system which has had a historically crucial role in societal, economic and political structure of Guerrero. Caciques are defined in Middlebrook’s study as local bosses who have informal political and coercive power to dominate patronage linkages and administrative relations in local sphere, they also could easily be active in local politics in formal extent, even in some cases they could be influential at national level in politics and *caciquismo* refers to the system which was shaped around these people (Middlebrook, 2009). This system was rooted in Spaniard occupation period when the colonial power needed to provide control of indigenous people by establishing relation with their leaders. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, *caciquismo* played a vital role to entrench the dominance of PRI in rural sphere by utilizing patronage resources and coercive power, even applying violence against the rural movements, any opposition group, and this dominance persisted till the 2000s. Yet the influence of *caciquismo* has not faded away easily in each

region such as Guerrero. The networks of these families and their relations with the Díaz regime have substantially moulded local government institutions of Guerrero (Topal 2012:93). Yet, rapidly developing caciques in the North were at the target of Díaz regime to strengthen close ties and it was disruptive for the caciques of the South- particularly Guerrero where the resistance against centered.

The Mexican Revolution (1910) could not bring about change in *caciquismo* system of Guerrero. The revolutionary groups aimed at abolishing *caciquismo*, but the caciques in Guerrero were already ready for the new system and found their place in it. For instance, the Figueroa family enhanced its position in the administration of the state. As a result, Francisco Figueroa became the governor of Guerrero. After the Revolution, during the 1920s and the 1930s, conflictual issues such as land distribution, social and economic inequalities, land distribution and ethnic discrimination became prominent. Under these circumstances, especially teachers and peasant groups were positioned in the opposition. The members of teachers' union actively participated in The Workers' Party of Acapulco (*Partido Obrero de Acapulco – POA*), which was founded in 1919 and gained support in elections in the 1920s. According to this political party, Guerrero was living in bourgeois revolution conditions and time was ripe for a socialist revolution. This approach brought about the teachers' movement in the 1920s and militant peasants' mobilization in the 1930s for the socialist revolution. In the early 1930s, many members of the teachers' union and the peasants' organizations enrolled in the Mexican Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Mexicana- PCM*), in which they formed a significant bloc between 1936 and 1939. Afterwards, the Socialist Party of Guerrero (*Partido Socialista de Guerrero –PSG*) was established and teachers and peasant movement joined the party (Topal 2012:93).

### **4.3. Peasant Movements and Political Violence: Dirty War (Guerra Sucia) in Guerrero**

Throughout the 1940s, the political authoritarianism of the PRI became more visible and the economic projects of the Party which focused on rapid industrialization and urbanization accelerated, development policies started to be followed and import substitution became the main orientation of the Mexican economy. This allowed the empowerment of the cacique families in the political sphere while ruling out the rural parts of the state and their people who became the poor masses. Especially, import substitution caused a significant decline in the economic and social production systems, resulting a high degree of marginality and poverty among the indigenous communities. Therefore, the vast majority of the indigenous people- who were mostly illiterate and lived in the conditions of social and economic hardship such as Amuzgos Mixtecos, Nahuas - were compelled to migrate to the northern agroindustry plantations to work and maintain their lives or one member of a family had to migrate seasonally or permanently to earn income for the family. Another option to earn livelihood was cultivating poppies which had comparative advantage over growing other agricultural products. It was learned from Sinaloans by the 1970s and became a significant part of economy in rural Guerrero especially in the mountainous region where the climate is appropriate to cultivate poppy and produce poppy gum.

Eventually, the political and social exclusion of the countryside from the center resulted in the protests of the masses. In the 1950s and 1960s the protests against inequalities, poverty and political dominance of caciques and landowners continued. Discontent in Guerrero prominently expanded and two armed movements were organized by two school teachers: one under the leadership of Genaro Vásquez, National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR- Asociación Cívica Nacional Revolucionaria) and the other the Party of the Poor (PDLP- Partido de los Pobres) led by Lucio Cabañas (Paulson, 2007). At first, these were

part of rural movements. Frequent and intense violent attacks caused the struggle to move to the mountains. For instance, as Guzman refers to Cabañas's experience, massacre of rural people in Atoyac de Alvarez on May 1967 by the state police caused him to commence the armed movement (Calderón and Cedillo, 2012). Against these movements and many others, the PRI employed two tactics: massacre of protestors in public spaces and the selective assassination of dissident movement leaders such as Lucio Cabañas. As Aviña indicates, state violence against resistance and reform avoidance in social, political and economic sphere stimulated radicalization in the form of guerilla warfare (Aviña, 2017). Government propaganda for hiding the essence and objective of guerrilla movement emphasized that these were directly associated with drug trafficking and criminal activities and this also affected the public opinion about the resistance movements (Watt and Zepeda, 2012:39). In 1971, a mass movement started in Guerrero and the government tried to quell it by army battalions and 10.000 police with air support. The operation for suppressing the movement mostly focused on some 32 communities in the Sierra de Atoyac where approximately 650 people disappeared in the hands of the military and Lucio Cabañas was killed at the end of 1974. Following his death, the government intended to justify the military operations in Guerrero by a report of the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA – Department of National Defence) claiming that Cabañas was 'afforded protection' by 'swindlers' and 'drug traffickers'. But the reasons behind these movements and what real happened during the operations were not recorded in official documents or in media. The goal of central government was to show the illegitimacy of guerrilla movements by stressing criminality, drug trafficking on all occasions, although it was known that Guerrero was in trouble with poverty and political crisis or/and political exclusion rather than with drugs. In parallel, by referring to Operation CONDOR, a high ranking federal police agent's statement could be regarded as a confirmation of the fact that the role of Guerrero in drug production was not major: "We're really attacking the poppy fields in Oaxaca, Guerrero and other states; and when we finish wiping them out we're going to launch an all-out

drive against the critical triangle<sup>7</sup>, because that's where it's at". (Craig, 1980:349). So, Guerrero was regarded as a source of insurgency and instability due to the existence of the peasant movements. Again, statements mentioned in Craig's study shows that how the central government undermined Guerrero agriculture by using herbicide<sup>8</sup> to eradicate poppy plantations for experimentation: Defense Secretary General Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz response to a reporter's questions in 1976, "... herbicides were being used 'experimentally' in the states of Sinaloa and Guerrero." (Craig, 1980:347).

To put it bluntly, the official discourse on dissidents highlighting the relations between guerrillas and drug traffickers was very influential to disqualify the political opposition in the 1960s and 1970s; these were the times when the fear of Communism was spread out all over the world (Watt and Zepeda, 2012:40). Although Guerrero had small scale opium and marijuana production, this was enough to form a target to the PRI during the 1960s. Moreover, suppression of peasant movements with violence in Guerrero, as Watt indicates, caused militarization of the region which led to the cooperation between the officers and drug traffickers who could not continue to run their business without close ties with the military (Watt and Zepeda, 2012:54). It may be concluded that drug eradication activities of the military could not achieve to terminate the production, but they permanently strengthened the drug trafficking organizations' position in Guerrero. Therefore, Aviña describes the regime in Guerrero as a kind of "militarized rural governance" which pursues both counter insurgency and counter narcotics practices in order to hinder the peasant

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<sup>7</sup> Critical triangle refers to "Golden Triangle" which includes the three states of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua where the rate of marijuana and opium production has always been high.

<sup>8</sup> According to a report published by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (2015), "the herbicide glyphosate and the insecticides malathion and diazinon were classified as probably carcinogenic to humans".  
(See: <https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MonographVolume112-1.pdf>)

movements in armed form or/and their participation in narco economy by using force at macabre level (Aviña, 2016:144).

Operations for counter- insurgency in Guerrero succeeded to an extent in suppressing the armed opposition but did not dissolve the political and social discontent and (Hamnett, 1999:276). Against these protests and unified communities; soldiers, police and gangs of landowners violently attacked Guerrero's marginalized groups- and these attacks were made under the title of Dirty War (Guerra Sucia) while all these actions have still been remained with impunity. The central government actively supported, relied on and closely monitored the local policy makers in Guerrero to ensure the suppression of the resistance movements, which would have otherwise spread out to the neighboring states. State repression was chosen as the strategy of the caciques for countering the opposition. At this point, as Watt highlights, "*guerreuses* had little or no political representation by what they saw as corrupt and inept Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) state and national governments..." (Watt, 2010). Topal explains role of the local regime in Guerrero as a "force-based domination" which created two ways of central government for controlling the state: First, top-down control which could be considered as the influence of central government on governor and governor's tight control over mayors; second, bottom-up control which was led by caciques. She adds that "the PRI rule in Guerrero created a centrifugal force marginalizing dissidents" (Topal, 2012: 94-95). Until the 1980s, social relations of Guerrero were shaped by this bottom-up control of caciquismo. Approximately for 40 years, Figueroa family was very influential on political, economic and social life in the state. Close ties of cacique families like Figueroa family with authorities of the local state enabled a mechanism to determine who will be in municipal administration and city councils. Furthermore, this power provided advantages in the economic sphere. Like informal agricultural bankers, such families held the monopoly in fertilizer market of agriculture sector, and this ensured capital accumulation which transformed the smallholder cacique families of the 1920s into agro-

industry bourgeoisie of Guerrero in the 1940s. These families even had armed private security staff called white guards (*guardia blanca*) who were utilized as apparatuses to use the threat of or actual violence during the social and political tensions and throughout the 1970s. The name Figueroa thus came to be intimately linked with the state of Guerrero as well as the authoritarianism and violence that ruled over the state. As it has been mentioned above, thanks to their relations with central government and power in politics and economy, embedded agro- industry bourgeoisie in local state brought about the weakness of local state. Therefore, the leaders and the institutions of the local state who were adhered to the agro- industry bourgeoisie of Guerrero became corrupt and coercive, leading to the acceleration of inequality, political exclusion and violence (Topal, 2012:95-96). Although some opposition leaders continued to struggle within electoral politics outside the PRI, a result of the persistent forceful action that the local policymakers undertook, peasants' resistance movements have lost confidence in the rules of the "democratic game." For this reason, the repeated PRI victories between the 1940s and 1990s should be read as the exclusion of the opposition by marginalizing dissidents from the decision-making.

In sum, since the early times of the local state of Guerrero, instability dominated every sphere of life in an endless circulation; historian Armando Bartra sums the history of Guerrero with this phrase: "bites its own tail" which is called as Ouroboros (Paulson, 2007). The violence in Guerrero has continued under the name of counterinsurgency in parallel with combating drug trafficking. By the 1980s this had become more brutal and led to the emergence of alternative organizations for providing security and income in Guerrero where the local state could not provide security for its citizens, include indigenous groups in local politics and avoid economic disparities in rural areas. At this point, it is significant to note that apart from the role of state, caciquismo was determinant in shaping the political, social and economic spheres. Corruption, coercion and exclusion of indigenous in local politics and economy became the inevitable

features at local state level which shaped today's Guerrero. In addition, the fear of communism due to the guerrilla movements started in Guerrero paved the way for the deployment of military troops which would be permanently deployed.

#### **4.4. The Outcome of Neoliberalism in Guerrero: Drug Related Violence**

At the beginning of the 1980s, the demands of peasants were not met by the government due to the economic conditions and policies of the era. As a result of the neoliberal shift in economic policies, state subsidies were pulled out from rural regions. However, decentralization policies that started with President de la Madrid followed by the governor of Guerrero, Cervantes Delgado (1981-87) facilitated political participation in local state. He even included people from the opposition who have leftist backgrounds and were significant participants of student movements in 1968 as senior advisors in his team. In the context of decentralization process, revising 50 articles of the Constitution of Guerrero, some amendments were made in Law of Citizen Participation and Development Planning Committee of Guerrero (Comité de Planeación para el Desarrollo del Estado de Guerrero- COPLADEG). Besides, the Socio-Economic Plan of the State of Guerrero (Plan de Desarrollo Socioeconómica del Estado Guerrero) which was mostly called as Plan Guerrero was launched by Delgado. The main aim was to provide development in several fields such as education, public health, infrastructure, construction and industry. On the other hand, this program also implicitly targeted the dominance of the caciquismo. For instance, for this purpose, Municipal Strengthening (Fortalecimiento Municipal) was commenced. The program was designed to diminish the effects of caciques at municipal administration level by giving right to self-manage economic resources and to make resolution for the conflicts that occurred in their municipality. For the efficient implementation of this plan, the state government initiated negotiations for development agreements in order to discuss the development projects with the state government. In addition to this, an audit system was designed for avoiding corruption and fraud at the municipal level. Thanks to this control

mechanisms, corruptions were revealed and became visible by publishing them on newspapers which caused protest against local authorities. Another action was about the credit mechanisms. Since the caciques were the only group who had power to provide credit to the peasants and enable them to reach the world market, creating a new credit system was another aim of the Plan Guerrero. Credit on Your Word (*Credito a la Palabra*) program was initiated to protect small producers with cheap credit from the Union of Ejidos and provide network for selling their products to the world market. Furthermore, the government by enacting a new law obliged the abolition of the armed guards (*guardia blanca*) of the caciques for the sake of public security (Topal, 2012:100-102). In sum, it can be concluded that both decentralization and efforts of the governor Delgado target to restrict caciquismo and the peasant movements which dated back to the 1960s were influential in the inclusion of peasants to a certain extent to the development process. Nevertheless, the caciquismo breath down peasants' neck could not be cut as easily as planned with implementation of such policies and projects in terms of decentralization.

On the other hand, in the late 1980s, tourism substantially increased its share as a significant part of local economy. Aftermath of Delgado term, the governor José Francisco Ruiz Massieu was in office between 1987-1993. In Ruiz Massieu period, instead of supporting agriculture, development projects focused on urban areas- especially in touristic regions like Acapulco, Ixtapa for bringing foreign capital to the tourism sector of Guerrero. The arrival of international hotel chains like Holiday Inn, Hilton International, Marriott etc. was witnessed and their owners and managers became effective actors in local politics meanwhile cacique families started to lose their prominence and dominance in tourism regions, since it was considered that the uncontrollable power of cacique families eroded the attractiveness of the region in terms of foreign tourism investments. To curb the power of caciques, the strategy of the local state was to privatize 17 of 36 economic enterprises. In the meantime, tourism entrepreneurs were directly included in local development programs by establishing consulate organs such as

Consultative Tourism Boards (Topal, 2012:103-104). As a result, tourism capital became an inseparable part of the local politics in Guerrero.

Meanwhile, discontent increased among peasant groups due to the development programs which focused on urban space and tourism industry while ruling out agricultural areas. These groups saw the PRD as the political organization to express their socio-economic and political demands. In this sense, the PRD enhanced the organizational power of indigenous peasant groups. Thus, peasants had a chance to be more visible in political sphere. On the other hand, as one of the results of decentralization policies, demands for autonomy increased. With the wind of the Zapatista movement which started in 1994 which had an armed wing called as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional- ELZN), peasant groups in Guerrero who demanded to completely abolish the caciquismo system and to gain right to participate in politics and self-determination and autonomy on their land, founded Popular EPR; this resulted in militarization of the region again after the Dirty War in the 1970s (Topal, 2012:106). Yet, this time the armed movement could not find significant support from the indigenous movement and a security organization called as Coordinating Committee of Community Authorities- Community Police (Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades Comunitarias- Policia Comunitaria, CRAC-PC) was established for providing security and justice to communities in which local state was not able to provide security. Especially, the organization as an alternative to local state's police force had members of the Me'phaa, Na Savi ethnic group and mestizo communities who live in the Mountain region and Pacific side. This policing organization have been established as an institution based on communal structure of the indigenous groups. This system's principal is re-education with regard to the gravity of crime and since this method was seen as a successful tool to maintain harmony in society, the right to autonomy to CRAC-PC as an institution was legalized in the State Congress of Guerrero (Sierra, 2017).

During the 1990s, there was a constant controversy in the context of various social interests in Guerrero, including the local regime, the local state apparatuses and the local units of political parties. But, in this period, political sphere in Guerrero can be regarded a relatively legitimate battlefield for the marginalized and suppressed masses. Between 1990 and 2000, there was an increase in indigenous movements in Guerrero in parallel with political and economic reforms in Mexico. For instance, in 1994, the Tlachinollan Center was founded in the town of Tlapa de Comonfort by Abel Barrera Hernandez to give voice to members of the many indigenous communities in Guerrero whose rights are often overlooked. Another significant organization, Consejo Guerrerense 500 Años de Resistencia Indi'gena (the Consejo) was formed and it consisted of ethnic groups of Amuzgo, Mixteco, Nahuatl, and Tlapaneco who wanted to transmit economic and political demands to the government by means of this organization which was based on indigenismo and which later unified with the PRD in 1999 with the aim of representing indigenous groups (Overmyer-Velázquez, 2007), (Topal, 2012:107).

Another significant incident occurred in 1995 which caused the resignation of Ruben Figueroa Alcocer (1993-1996): 17 unarmed peasants were killed by the police at Aguas Blancas. Those were the members of the South Mountain Range Farmer Organization who participated in a protest with the aim of demanding the release of Gilberto Romero Vázquez, a peasant activist who had been arrested a couple of months ago (and who has never appeared since) and also they demanded amendments for the restriction of local logging operations, increase in farmworkers' wages and teachers' salaries, reduction in police violence and prevention of arbitrary detentions. Although Figueroa claimed that the peasants had opened fire first and putting forward a video as proof, but the unedited version of the state video turned up, showing just the opposite. Figueroa stepped down after the Supreme Court began an investigation over the June 95 killing of peasants (McMahon, 1996).

The 1990s was a period of time when tourism investments in Guerrero- which became a part of the world market due to the tourism that intensified in Acapulco region in partnership with foreign tourism bourgeoisie and local capital groups and the local bourgeoisie. Foreign and local bourgeoisie regarded getting involved in rural movement in Guerrero as a way out of the PRI domination in this promising zone for tourism industry. Meanwhile, the PRD came up as a political party where both the peasants and tourism industrialists got involved in local politics. Therefore, local capital groups considered their alliance with the PRD as an opportunity for breaking the PRI supremacy although it has been known that tourism industrialists had kept in silence since the birth of the PRD as an alternative and peasant groups were supported by the PRD in several ways within the civil society sphere (Topal, 2012:107). Moreover, it can be stated that in order to observe an increase in the competitiveness of the local economy for investments and tourist circulation, there should have been an alliance between local and global tourism industries and the peasants. They both became major components of the PRD in Guerrero and supported the party in politics. Yet, the PRD could not achieve a notable success in the elections till 2005. In the early 2000s, during René Juárez Cisneros period (1999-2005), the role of business in development gained significance which particularly focused on tourism with the aim of enhancing economy and peasants were not considered a focal point while planning development programs. Peasant groups' political demands and their inclusion in politics tried to be met by establishing citizen councils at municipal level in Chilpancingo and Acapulco at first, then it expanded to the other regions (Topal, 2012:108). These councils paved the way for founding different organizations such as Secretary of Indigenous Matters which aims to preserve culture and language of the indigenous groups, Community Development Committees were initiated the State Council of Indigenous Communities which includes several actors such as social agencies, producer organizations. These all were established in order to provide development in social, economic and political life of indigenous groups in Guerrero. However, they were not very efficient to bring about positive changes in the livelihood of peasants and

indigenous groups of Guerrero. Especially, poverty remained as the main problematic issue in Guerrero which led to existence of drug trafficking as a lucrative economic activity in this state which has the most appropriate location, topography and climate to produce marijuana and poppy. For a farmer one kilo of marijuana equaled one ton of corn in terms of revenue. Therefore, the highest increase in marijuana cultivation was seen in Guerrero in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

While there was a struggle in local politics among the major agents in Guerrero, drug trafficking was also in transformation. Today's drug trafficking network was firstly established by the Beltrán Leyva brothers in the midst of 1990s. While in the mountain region, poppy production was planned to be enhanced, in urban region retail narcotics market began to operate. In addition, cartels established relations with the major political and economic elites for money laundering activities and providing security. In the meantime, they drew the first cocaine smuggling routes from Acapulco and Zihuatanejo to Costa Grande (Kyle, 2015).

In the 1990s, political violence became a problem for Guerrero; after the 90s, due to the violence caused by drug trafficking organizations, the security problem increased exponentially.

#### **4.4.1. Guerrero in Calderón Era**

The victory of Zerefino Torreblanca as the first PRD governor of Guerrero in 2005 elections was welcomed by the indigenous groups and Zerefino started to work on enhancement of decision making process and providing public services. In 2006 he revised the COPLADEG for improving its efficiency by including professionals, business organizations whereby he intended to minimize the diversified organizations for efficient representation of peasant groups. Zerefino's minimization of representation of peasants had an adverse effect

among peasants at PRD level. In 2006, under the title of “Towards a Democratic and Transparent Guerrero” more than 140 representatives from 34 indigenous, peasant, environmental and human rights organizations, as well as 12 public institutions gathered in the state congress’ library. This organization included diverse people such as social movement leaders— including the indigenous Community Police of the Costa Chica-Montaña region and the Community Coordinating Committee against the “La Parota” Dam which was a 900 MW dam on the Papagayo River that would have flooded close to 17,000 hectares of land and displaced more than 25,000 people (International Rivers, 2012). Their main demand from the local state was to –particularly based on right to know- establish a true “culture of transparency and accountability” in all spheres of public authority and active participation of society (Fundar, 2006).

Besides, the tradition of local state of labelling any kind of activists as drug traffickers continued in the 2000s, for instance, environmental activists Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera who organized a campaign against logging and deforestation by multinational corporations in Guerrero. They were blamed as drug traffickers by the local caciques and were arrested and tortured by the military until they confessed that they had been caught in possession of drugs and guns. They were imprisoned although it was revealed that the crime factors had been created by the officers (Mercille, 2011:1648). As it can be seen in this incident, drug war was utilized as a tool for repressing opposition groups.

In the mid- 2000s, in parallel to the political violence, drug related violence became more visible. In Kyle’s report, the year of 2005 has been considered as the beginning of conflict and violence among the drug trafficking organizations when Los Zetas -on behalf of the Gulf Cartel- and Los Pelones for Beltrán Leyva Brothers started to contest to dominate smuggling routes and heroin production in Guerrero where the Beltrán Leyva Cartel had monopoly over drug production and trafficking from the mid-1990s until 2008 (Kyle, 2015).

Right after Calderón's declaration of drug war and the deployment of military units to conflict zones in 2006, violence has moved to a new phase. After the first major operation in Michoacán, 7,600 troops were sent to Guerrero by Calderón. These operations were not effective in eradicating violence. Arresting leaders of cartels was the main strategy of the government in order to decrease their power. But this kingpin strategy just inflamed the conflict and multiplied violence (Janowitz, 2016). Five main drug trafficking organizations got divided into smaller groups and this led to diversification of their activities such as extortion, human trafficking, preying on natural resources, capturing public resources in local regions for the continuation of money flow and they have also started to commence war in rural sphere. Moreover, most of victims of drug war had been members of drug trafficking organizations from 1990s to 2006. In order to not only take control on drug trafficking routes but also gain power on local administrations, since 2006 these organizations have started to get involved in crimes which targeted civilians and members of local government, (Ley, Sandra, et al., 2019: 181).

Meanwhile, in the early 2000s, violence in Acapulco where Beltrán Leyva Brothers had been long active caused by the defense of Beltrán Leyva Brothers against the Los Zetas cartel led to a series of government collapses. In addition, tensions erupted again in 2008, when Beltrán Leyvas continued with a distant relative of a long alliance called "El Chapo", Joaquín Guzman and a total war erupted among the former allies. Moreover, the death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, the leader of the cartel in firefight with armed forces in 2009 increased the level of violence in Acapulco (Janowitz, 2016).

Therefore, people of Guerrero have been increasingly exposed to both state and cartel violence. Some institutions of the state, even the police, have mingled with organized crime. In line with this, powerful families preserved their power on institutions which have neglected impoverished indigenous and rural populations

who have been employed in drug market and lived in under narco rule rather than engaging in formal economic activities (Open Society Foundation, 2015:7). Divisions began in the Beltrán Leyva organization after Arturo's death. Hence, Acapulco became a battlefield for these new drug trafficking organizations. Inter-cartel war reached the tipping point in 2011 when the pieces of the Beltrán Leyva cartel divided into a series of new organizations. While the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, the Barredora (mechanical street sweeper), and the Devil's Commando were fighting each other, Acapulco became the prized zone for other organizations (Janowitz, 2016).

Currently the main active cartels are Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos which had originated from Beltrán Leyva Organization. Drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion are their main activities. The Guerreros Unidos actively operates in Guerrero- especially in the center and Pacific coast-, Mexico and Morelos and it trades cocaine to Chicago in the US. Major inter-cartel wars and competition in Guerrero were seen due to the absence of a dominant drug trafficking organization. As a result, the number of crimes such as homicide, extortion, kidnappings etc. skyrocketed in 2013 and Guerrero followed the state of Mexico as the second most violent state in 2014 (CRS Report, 2019).

To conclude, the immense war on drugs with kingpin strategy started in 2006 has not been effective on decreasing violence as it was planned by the federal state. It also adversely affected the volume of violence in Guerrero since the apparatuses of state have weakened and closely engaged in drug trafficking organizations. Competition between fragmented drug trafficking organizations has become fiercer and this led to self-defense groups gain significance in providing security instead of army and police force. Due to pervasive poverty, narco economy has gained importance as a sector. With the support of the US via Mérida Initiative, the security crisis was militarized by sending troops to the rural areas and the crisis became chronic.

#### **4.4.2. Soaring Violence: The Deadliest Years (2011-2020)**

After Zerefino regime, in the 2011 elections, Angel Aguirre Rivero (2011-2017) from the PRD who had been the interim governor between 1996-1999 under the PRI authoritarianism was elected as the new governor of Guerrero. Although he was elected as the candidate of the PRD; in his first period (1996-1999), the peasant groups were underestimated and politically repressed whilst tourism industrialist were supported to participate in politics (Topal, 2012:110). His notoriety continued in his second period. A protest was held by between 300 and 500 students from Ayotzintapa Raul Isidro Burgos Rural Teacher Training School and activists who demand improvements and funding for their college in Ayotzinapa on December 12, 2011. They blocked Cuernavaca- Acapulco highway and by the command of the governor Rivero, the State Police used force to disperse the crowd by firing tear gas and shooting fire into the protestors. Many students were arrested and injured by the police. Two students- Gabriel Echeverria and Jorge Herrera died (Los Angeles Times, 2011). Cortes and fellow police officer Ismael Matadama Salinas were arrested in 2012, since they were accused of being in connection with the deaths of two students, but they were released from custody in 2013 due to lack of evidence (Latin American Herald Tribune, 2019)

On the other hand, while Rivero restrained political rights of indigenous people, he encouraged tourism industrialists to participate in decision making process of the local state more. Similar to his predecessors, Rivero also followed development policies based on brightening up the tourism sector. For this purpose, in February 2012, with the support of Mexican businessman Carlos Slim who was ranked as the richest person in the world on the list of Forbes in 2010, “the Consulting Board for the Restoration of Traditional Acapulco” was founded consisting of representatives of the local state, civil society and Acapulco municipality (Topal, 2012:110).

During Rivero era, very similar to student protest in 2011 -but much brutal than it- another incident occurred which has been mentioned above: “Missing 43” which caused the resignation of Rivero later. Following his resignation, Rogelio Ortega Martinez was assigned as an interim governor until Hectór Astudillo Flores from the PRI became the governor with 40.94 per cent of vote (Illades, 2017:148).

The former president, Enrique Peña Nieto, mainly followed through on Calderón’s policy. But different from Calderón, he emphasized improvement of coordination and law enforcement. He claimed that the falling murder rate between 2012 and 2014 was thanks to his policy. Particularly, the rearrest of El Chapo in January 2016 was regarded as an achievement. Despite this so-called success, neither drug-related violence nor flow of drugs stalled. Disappointed with the security strategy of the state, citizens have been forced to seek justice on their own for a long time when the processes did not work (Janowitz, 2016).

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The discovery of the American continent is one of the most important turning points in world history. As a matter of fact, this geographical discovery not only affected the people who lived on the continent, but also changed the economic and social structures on other continents. During the systematic settlement of colonialism, numerous people living on the continent were murdered, enslaved, and all their property, including their basic human rights, was seized. Over time, the practice and concept of slavery disappeared, the colonies gained their independence one by one, and different states emerged. However, it is possible to observe the deep scars left by the colonial period even today.

This thesis explores the origins of drug-related violence in Mexico. In this context, by criticizing the judgment of failed state directed to Mexico, it is emphasized that path dependence is more important than the failure of the state in terms of violence.

There are myriad of news, articles, academic studies and reports showing that violence in Mexico is at a gruesome level today. It is in this context that Mexico has been considered as a failed state in the last decade. For a state to become a failed state, even in conventional accounts, violence alone is not enough.

Therefore, even when evaluated according to Weberian state capacity criteria, state failure which is has different dimensions, does not constitute a framework to discuss Mexico's current violence problem and as such, cannot go beyond a simple label.

This thesis has argued that the debate centered around the concept of failed state, which were carried out to explain the violence problem in Mexico, is both methodologically problematic and failed to produce academically valid knowledge. As a matter of fact, various criticisms have been brought to the concept of failed state in many studies conducted in the academic field. Considering these criticisms, this study has preferred historical the institutionalist approach instead of the Weberian state capacity criteria in the failed state literature in order to critically analyze drug-related violence in Mexico. Historical institutionalism, one of the new institutionalist approaches, focuses on how time, sequence and path dependence affect the institutional structure when evaluating a case. The phenomenon of path dependence, which has the power to shape social, political, economic structures and social change has effective in the processes Mexico has undergone since the colonial period.

As violence has not emerged recently in Mexico, looking at the past is of great importance when evaluating the current factors underlying violence. The colonial process covers a significant part of the Mexican past. This is because Mexico has undergone different colonization processes resulting in different waves of institutionalization many of which have to do with its relationship with the US. As it has been mentioned earlier, the colonists of North America necessarily imported immigrants and created their own working class. Consequently, institutions were formed in a more inclusive way and the foundations of today's democracy were laid. While this makes the colonists unsuccessful at one point, on the other hand, it is one of the most important factors that make up the economically and militarily strong position of the US today. On the other hand, in the colonization process of Latin America, institutions were formed in a more exclusive way. as the main purpose of the colonists was to achieve their goals such as immediate profits by any means, including slaughtering or local people. Accordingly, exclusionary institutionalization has been observed in Latin America. As a result of the

exclusive institutional structure, it has been inevitable for the Mexican state to face the "capacity" problem expressed today.

Although the developments after the colonial period seemed to be towards liberalization, , the bourgeoisie instead of lower classes was the main beneficiary in the events such as institutional restructuring and the change of power. The processes that started as a revolution turned into one of production of consent after a point in time and this resulted in the failure of the first social liberation attempts after the colonial period.

In states established after the revolutions, authoritarian administrations within the scope of nation-state also served the bourgeoisie. These nation-state structures, which enabled the bourgeoisie to be empowered by the state, at some point left its place to the neoliberal order in order to increase the criteria of profits of the bourgeoisie. At this point, in Mexico drug trafficking organizations filled the gap by creating a lucrative market for poor masses who have become poorer after neoliberal adjustments.

After discussing Mexico in general, this thesis has moved to Guerrero, one of the most problematic states in the federal structure. It has a quite distinctive historical background and indigenously diversified society and is one of the poorest states of Mexico. Since its establishment as a state, turmoil in politics, economics and social life have continued. For many decades, guerrilla movements and drug trade in have been on the top of the agenda of both state and society. The fear created by cacique families who were the major actors in every sphere of life and their power on local people, counter-insurgent operations went in hand in hand with counter narcotics program for curbing social movements and guerilla movements started in 1960s and flourishing role of drug trafficking organizations in economy especially after 1980s created a kind of unfavorable environment seriously damaging institutional development. The vacuum left by the state have been filled by self-defense group in terms of

security and drug trafficking organizations in terms of employment. Turf wars between the drug trafficking organizations and federal state's drug war strategy have increased the level of violence. Approximately hundreds of thousands of people were killed thousands of people disappeared, most of these losses were observed in recent times due to the drug-related violence. It is worth noting another significant outcome of violence in Guerrero, which is the displacement of people. Due to the 'activities of drug trafficking organizations, especially indigenous people have been fleeing their villages both to live and earn money. In addition to the effects of the violence on society, in local politics, drug trafficking organizations have become determinant actors which have aimed to control politics and economy at local sphere. They have become effective on local elections with assassination of municipal party candidates who would not cooperate with the cartels on drug trade and criminal activities (Villegas and Semple, 2018).

While assessing the current external and internal causes of drug-related violence, historical patterns should be carefully analyzed. If the goal is to terminate violence and drug trafficking, instead of establishing new institutions such as National Guard which was recently established by the President AMLO as a solution to violence, it would be worthy and meaningful to draw a roadmap to empower the core institutions of state and create trust among the society in order to terminate poverty.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY

Gelişmekte olan ülkeler kategorisinde değerlendirilen ve dünyanın ilk yirmi ekonomisi arasında yer alan Meksika, 2000'lerin ikinci yarısından itibaren katlanarak artan uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddet nedeniyle sıklıkla “başarısız devlet” kavramıyla birlikte anılır olmuştur. Özellikle 2006-2012 yılları arasında görevde olan devlet başkanı Felipe Calderón döneminde, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin Mérida Girişimi başlığı altında sağladığı kaynak, silah, mühimmat, araç, teçhizat ve istihbarat desteği ile başlatılan “Uyuşturucu ile Savaş”’a rağmen şiddetin ilerleyişi durdurulamamıştır. Altı yıllık Calderón döneminde, resmi rakamlarla 60.000 kişinin uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddet nedeniyle yaşamını yitirdiği kayıtlara geçmiştir. Calderón’un halefi Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) döneminde de şiddet döngüsü kırılmamıştır. Ve hatta Nieto’nun uyguladığı “elebaşı stratejisi” (kingpin strategy), kartellerin daha küçük gruplar haline bölünerek yer değiştirmesine, şiddetin karteller arası savaş nedeniyle daha da artmasına neden olmuştur. Başkanlığı Meksika’da şiddeti sonlandırma vaadiyle Başkan Nieto’dan devralan Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) son iki yılda şiddetin yukarı doğru artan seyrini bir nebze olsun aşağıya çekmekte muvaffak olamamıştır. Ne acıdır ki, seçim zaferinin yıl dönümünde bir günde 127 Meksikalı uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddet nedeniyle yaşamını yitirmiştir. Meksika’nın güneybatısında yer alan Guerrero uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddetin adeta merkezi olmuş, şiddet denildiğinde ilk akla gelen bölge olarak gerek Meksika gerekse dünya gündeminde geniş yer bulur hale gelmiştir. Özellikle, 2014 yılında Guerrero’da 43 protestocu öğretmen adayının polis müdahalesi esnasında kaybedilmesi ve söz konusu olayda faillerin polis mi Guerreros Unidos adlı uyuşturucu çetesi mi olduğu konusunda uzun süren soruşturmalar ve davalar Guerrero’nun bir yerel devlet olarak ortaya

çıkışından beri görülen ve günümüzde de süren şiddeti görünür hale getirmiştir. Meksika devletinin olağan gündemi haline gelen ve olağanüstü boyutlara ulaşan şiddet, yalnızca “Uyuşturucu ile Savaş”ın taraflarından olan ordu, polis ve uyuşturucu kartellerinin dâhil olduğu bir çatışma olmaktan çıkmış; Meksika halkının doğrudan etkilendiği, hayatın olağan akışını önemli ölçüde etkileyen nedeni, bugün ortaya çıkan ve yoğun bir şekilde hissedilen şiddetin ötesinde, Meksika devletini ve toplumunu bugüne getiren tarihsel arka planda yatan ve aşılamayan gündelik bir sorun haline gelmiştir. Yolsuzluk yaygınlaşıp, şiddet-özellikle uyuşturucu üretimi ve/veya ticaretinin yoğun olduğu bölgelerde-korkunç boyutlarda yüksek bir ivme kazanırken Meksika ekonomisi dünya sıralamasındaki yerini korumaktadır. Şiddet söz konusu olduğunda etkisiz kalan kurumlar ekonomi alanında güçlü bir tablo çizmeye devam etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu tezde Meksika’da görülen uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddet ve güvenlik problemlerini açıklamak için yeterli bir temel sağlamayan başarısız devlet kavramı etrafında yürütülen tartışmaya odaklanılmıştır. Meksika’yı özelde de son dönemde sıklıkla şiddetle gündeme gelen Guerrero’yu bu tanımlama üzerinde araştırmaya çağırmıştır. Bu kapsamda; beş temel bölüme ayrılan bu teze ilk bölümde tezin amacı ve kapsamı açıklanmış; Meksika’ya atfedilen başarısız devlet tanımlamasının öncesinde ikinci olarak bu teze başarısız devlet kavramının akademik çalışmalarda nasıl yer aldığı araştırması ile başlanmıştır.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra başlayan self determinasyon hareketleriyle, sömürgecilik hızlı bir çözülme sürecine girmiştir. Bu çözülme ile 1960'lardan sonra dünya sahnesindeki mevcut devletlerin sayısı artmıştır. Bununla birlikte, yeni tür devletlerin ortaya çıkışının uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunmasına tehlike oluşturmaya başladığı savından hareketle ortaya çıkan sorunlar politikacıları, dış politikada rol oynayan devlet ve devlet dışı aktörleri, bürokratları başarısız devlet kavramına odaklanmaya itmiştir. Bahse konu tanımlamanın bazı düşünce kuruluşları tarafından öne sürülen ülkeleri kategorize eden endeksler ve veri setleri ile desteklenerek başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri olmak üzere uluslararası sistemde “başarılı” olarak nitelendirilen devletler ve

uluslararası platformda söz sahibi olan Dünya Bankası, Avrupa Birliği (AB), Ekonomik Kalkınma ve İşbirliği Örgütü (OECD) ve benzeri uluslararası örgütlerce dış politika aracı olarak faydalanıldığı ortaya koyulmuştur. Başarısız devlet kavramı Ira William Zartman, Robert Rotberg, Jean-Germain Gros ve David Carment gibi araştırmacılara atıfta bulunularak açıklanmış, müteakiben söz konusu kavrama getirilen eleştiriler, Charles T. Call, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, Tobias Hagmann ve Markus V. Hoehne, Shahar Hameiri, M. Nuruzzaman, Johanthan Hill'in çalışmaları ile ortaya koyulmuştur. Başarısız devlet tartışması ampirik, analitik, normatif ve pratik yollar gibi farklı açılardan eleştirilmiştir. Bu eleştirilerde, başarısız devlet kavramının devletleri biçimlendirme çabası içerdiğini söylemek genellikle mümkündür. Nitekim, başarısız devlet kavramının basmakalıp bir kavram olduğu ve onu başarılı ve başarısız olarak keskin çizgilerle ayırmanın doğru olmadığı ifade edilmektedir. Buna ek olarak, batı devletlerinin dünyanın birçok farklı bölgesinde ortaya çıkan sorunları devlet kapasitesi açısından aynı ölçütlere göre değerlendirme çabalarının (ör. neoliberal kurumsalcılar ve neo-Weberci kurumsalcılar) bir dışlama ve marjinalleştirme olduğu getirilen eleştirilerden biridir. Bugün başarısız devlet kavramının politik ve hukuki eleştirisine bakıldığında, uluslararası toplumun ve büyük güce sahip devletlerin kavramı ve keyfi uygulamalarıyla ilgili tek tip uygulama eksikliği en dikkat çeken konulardır. Bu nedenle, Meksika'da uyuşturucu-bağlantılı şiddet ve Meksika hakkındaki mevcut söylem ve başarısızlık durumu konusundaki mevcut tartışmaları anlamak için başarısız devlet kavramını ve nasıl eleştirildiğini anlamak önemlidir. Başarısız devlet tanımlamasının özellikle dış politikadaki fonksiyonel kullanımı daha sonra akademik çalışmalarda da, araştırma nesnelarının açıklanmasında kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Akademik çalışmalarda bir ülkeyi ele alırken tarihsel oluşumdan bağımsız, bir anomali olarak gözlemlenen durumun sonuçlarının olabildiğinde kısa süre içerisinde anlaşılmasının amaçlandığı bir araştırma içerisinde büyük imkân sağlayan bu tanımlama, devletlerin nerede eksik/yanlış/zayıf/rüşvetçi/baskıcı vb. olduklarının anlaşılacak bir yandan da olması gereken asıl devletin tüm bu anormallikleri zıttı, yani en iyisi olduğu

doğrulanmaktadır. Konu Meksika olunca hem ekonomik olarak Kuzey Amerika Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmasının taraflarından biri ve teritoryal olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile son savaşında büyük ölçüde toprak vermiş ve doğal sınırlarına çekildiği varsayılan bir ülkenin de bu sınıfta sayılmasını incelenerek bu tanımlama etrafında Meksika'nın nasıl tanımlandığı ele alınmıştır.

Bu tezde gösterilmeye çalışıldığı gibi başarısız olarak tanımlanan bir durum, uyuşturucu kartellerinin devletin meşru şiddet kullanımını askıya alarak infazlarda bulunması, devletin kurumlarının olayları yargılayamaması, önleyememesi ve büyük ölçüde suça dâhil olması durumunda, Meksika devletinin asgari sorumluluğu olan yurttaşına yaşam imkânı sağlayamamasıdır. Bu sonu gelmek bilmeyen şiddet kendi kurumsallaşmasını sağlayarak ve istisna olmaktan çıkarak kural haline dönüşerek bugün gözlenen durumun yani istenmeyen kurumsallaşma diyebileceğimiz kurumsallaşma biçiminin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum Meksika'da toplumsal kesimler üzerinde belirleyici rol üstlenirken siyasal gücün uyuşturucu kartelleri karşısında boyun eğmesi olarak yorumlanmaktadır.

Bu düşünce biçimine karşın, Meksika örneğinin tarihsel oluşumda geçirmiş olduğu dönüşümlere, bugün başta komşusu Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile olan ilişkisinde ve uluslararası düzendeki konumuna dikkat çekilmiştir. Tarımsal üretim ve petrol rezervlerine sahip olan Meksika'nın, komşusu Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinden çok farklı bir kolonyal süreçten geçmesi nedeniyle sanayi ve sonrası dönemde daha çok tarımsal üretim biçimlerine ve siyasal oluşum sürecine sahip olmasının iki devleti karşılaştırarak bir diğerini başarısız ilan etmenin tarihsel bir skordan fazlası olamayacağı, tarihsel bir izleğin sonucu olarak duruma bakılması ve bunun bir sebep gibi göstererek yeni bir şiddet döngüsüne itilmenin doğru olmayacağı savunulmuştur. Bu maksatla, Latin Amerika tarihine kısaca değinilmiş kurumsal gelişimin tarihsel bağlarını açıklamak için izlek bağımlılığını kavramından yararlanılmıştır.

Ciddi kazanç sağlayan ve gelişmiş devletlerin açık pazarlarında alıcı bulabilen bir ekonomik meta olan uyuşturucunun, meta olarak ekonomik değeri dışındaki tüm anlamlarının arındırılması sonunda ki günümüz ekonomi tanımı buna cevaz vermektedir, -her şeyden bağımsız sadece kendi kuralları olan ekonomi gibi- genel anlamıyla tarımsal ürün olduğu kabul edilmelidir. Alıcısının olduğu, talebin yıllar içinde varlığını koruduğu ve arz sahibine sağladığı kar düşünüldüğünde tarımsal bir ürün olan uyuşturucunun yasaklanması ancak ekonomi dışı zorla mümkündür. Tarımsal üretim üzerine inşa edilen ve uzun sürmüş, her alanda derin izler bırakmış bir kolonyal tarihe sahip ve sonrasında bu bağımlılığını ekonomik zorlarla takip eden bir ülkenin tarımsal bir üründen fayda sağlamasından vazgeçmesini beklemek tüm bir oluşumu tersine çevirmek olacaktır ki, bu kavramı kullananların böyle bir arzularının olduğunu düşünmek büyük iyimserlik olacaktır. Bu yönlü karlı bir girişimin değerlendirilmemesi serbest piyasa mantığına açıkça aykırı olacaktır, haliyle Meksikalı kartel üyelerinin de bu tehlikeyi göze alabilmeleri şaşırtmamalıdır. Ekonomik bir meta olarak uyuşturucunun pazarın dışına itilmesi ancak ulusal ve uluslararası hukuk marifetiyle sağlanabilmektedir. Meksika toplumunun ekonomik durumunda kartellerin sağladığı ekonomik güç ve işgücü kendilerini bir sektör olarak var edebilmektedir.

Kurumsal reformlar ve yahut güçlü siyasi bir otorite gibi hazır reçeteler dışında ortaya somut bir çözüm önerisi getirilmeden yapılan ve metodolojik olarak problemlili olan bu başarısız devlet tanımlaması meselenin üstünün örtülmesine, Meksika'nın kalıcı sorunları sonucunda ortaya çıkan tikel bir durumun aslında kabul edilerek devam ettirilmesi dışında başka bir şeye hizmet edememektedir. Hayırsız ve uğursuz bir komşu olarak, kendisinden her şeyin beklenebileceği, her türlü suçlamada ilk akla gelen diğeri olarak sürekli elimizin altında bulunan kötülüğün en yakın temsilcisi olarak Meksika'nın sonu gelmeyen bir şiddet girdabına çekilmesi de kendi tarihselliği içerisinde düşünüldüğünde kana susamışlıklarının bir başka örneği olarak anlaşılabilir.

Ortaya çıkanın, ekonomik sistemin mecburi arızaları olarak tanımlanabilen somut durumların tüm bir politikayı sorgulamaya ihtiyaç bırakılmayacak şekilde kapatılarak rafa kaldırılması için uygun kavram setlerinden biri olarak karşımıza çıkan başarısız devlet tanımlaması böylece sonu gelmeyen şiddeti, uyuşturucu kartellerinin hukukunu sineye çekilebilecek bir mazeret olarak çalıştırılmaktadır. Bu tezde, Meksika örneğini Weberci devlet kapasitesi dikkate alınarak geliştirilen başarısız devlet tanımlaması içerisinde anlamak yerine tarihsel kurumsalcı perspektif doğrultusunda izlek bağımlılığı kavramından hareketle, Meksika'nın kolonyal tarihinden itibaren takip ettiği çeşitli temel uğrakları üzerinden anlamaya ve tarihsel olarak gelinen noktanın hangi patikaların zorunlu sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmış olabileceği araştırılmıştır. Kuzey Amerika'daki diğer ülke örnekleri olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Kanada'nın aksine yerli nüfusun İspanyol fatihlerce sömürüye açılması, Afrikalı kölelerce takviye edilen ucuz iş gücü yığınağı olarak kurgulanan tarımsal üretim modelinin devamı niteliğindeki ekonomisinin yaratmış olduğu etkiler üzerinde durulmuştur. Büyük toprak sahiplerinin yanında zor şartlar altında yaşamlarını sürdüren nüfusun kademeli olarak toprak elde etmesinin ekonomik sebeplerden ötürü başarıya ulaşamaması, kente göç ile başlayan sürecin neoliberal politikalarla emekçi kesimin sınıfsal baskılanmasının ve orta sınıfın güçlü bir şekilde taleplerini dile getiremeyecek konumda olmasının Meksika'nın izlek bağımlılığını oluşturan temel uğraklar olduğu savunulmuştur.

Elbette başarısız devlet tanımlaması ile gündeme gelen devletlerin uluslararası düzen içerisinde kapitalist gelişim sürecinde geri kalmışlığı ile içinden geçtiği kalıtsal hale gelen krizlerle sürekli uğraşmalarından ötürü bir taraftan yöneltilen başarısızlık yaftası, bu ülkelerin karşılaştığı sorunlar konusunda bir duyarlılık geliştirse de gerek kendi yurttaşlarına sağlamadıkları güvenlik, refah ve önüne geçemedikleri yozlaşma konusunda kayıtsız kalınmasına neden olmamalıdır.

Meksika'nın tarihsel süreci içerisinde incelendiğinde, kolonyal dönemle başlayan süreçte, yurttaşlarına sağlayamadığı güvenlik ve refah ihtiyacı tarihsel

bir gerçeklik olarak karşımızda durmaktadır. İspanyol, Fransız müdahaleleri ile şekillenen Meksika'nın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile girilen mücadele ve bağımlılık ilişkisinde Meksikalıların hayatları maalesef pek ucuz olmuş, halkın mücadelesinin bastırılmasında da şiddete başvurmak hep ilk seçenek olarak akla gelmiştir.

Haliyle uluslararası düzen içerisinde Meksika'nın konumu tarıma dayalı, sömürüye açık ve ülke refahının düzen içerisinde başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri olmak üzere gelişmiş ülke pazarlarına taşınması üzerine kurulmuş olması olarak kurgulanmış olduğundan, Meksika'nın giderek artan şiddet ile sarsılması ya da uluslararası suç örgütlerine ev sahipliği yapması şaşırtıcı bir durum olarak değerlendirilmemelidir. Buradaki amaç şiddet açmazından ve uluslararası suç örgütlerinin tasfiyesi olacaksa eğer, Meksika'nın mevcut yönetim kapasitesinin kısa vadeli reçeteler ile tedavi edilmesinde aranmamalıdır.

Bu tez kapsamında ortaya koyulmaya çalışılan temel sav, Meksika'nın gerçekten önemli bir şiddet ve suç döngüsü içerisine sürüklendiği, halkın organize suç örgütleri tarafından temel yaşam haklarının yok sayıldığı ve hükümetin bu suç örgütleri ile işbirliği içerisinde olmasına rağmen Meksika'nın bu durumu giderek kanıksamasındaki temel sebeplerin ortaya çıkarılmasının ancak sorunu çözmeye yönelik gerçekçi bir adım atılmasına hizmet edeceğidir. Öteki türlü, Meksika devletinin mevcut kriz halini aşmaya yönelik kapasitesinin olmadığı ilan ve bu konuda reformların yapılması yahut uluslararası camiadan destek alınması yönündeki kısa ve faydasız çözüm önerilerinin sorunu çözemeyeceği aşikârdır.

Bu bakımdan, bir kavram setinin ve tanımlamanın ancak mevcut durumu açık ve ayırt edecek şekilde açıklayabilecek, sorunlu olarak tanımlanmış ise kalıcı bir çözüm önerisi sunabilecek şekilde yönlendirmeye imkân sağlayabilmesi gerekmektedir. Haliyle, başarısız devlet tanımlamasının özellikle tezde incelenen Meksika örneğinde, örneğin mevcut durumu içerisinde açık bir şekilde ortaya koyamadığını, ayırt edici özelliklerini sunarak Meksika ve Guerrero özelinde

yeterince aydınlatamadığını ve en önemlisi de somut olarak incelenen örnek hakkında, durumun aşılması için gerekli araçları sunmaya elverişli olmadığı düşünülmektedir.

Meksika'nın kapitalist gelişimi ve uluslararası düzen içerisinde konumlanışına baktığımızda, kolonyal dönem sonrası süreçte büyük toprak sahiplerinin üretim ve siyasal gücün yoğunlaşmasında etkili olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Büyük toprak sahipleri ve topraksız köylüler arasındaki ilişkide devletin konumlanması büyük çoğunlukla toprak sahiplerinden yana olurken, topraksız köylülerin yaşam şartları ve ücretleri ise sefaletin sınırlarında olmuştur. Topraksız köylülere verilen değer ve kırsal nüfusun yaşamının değersizliği düşünüldüğünde Meksika'da günümüzde yaşanan şiddetin ve karteller arasındaki savaşlarda ortaya çıkan olaylara rağmen hala yeterince işgücü ve gönüllünün olabilmesinde bu tarihsel mirasın etkili olabileceği düşünülmektedir.

Komşu Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile olan tarihsel süreçte sanayi ve sonrası dönemde ekonomik gelişmelerin tarımsal üretimle sınırlı kalması ve endüstriyel üretimin yeterince oluşmaması da Meksika'nın uluslararası kapitalist dünya düzeninde konumlandığı yerde sabitlenmesine yol açmaktadır. Tarımsal üretimin makineler yardımıyla ihtiyaç duyulan kas gücüne eskiye nazaran daha az ihtiyaç duyması sonucunda topraksız ve mesleksiz kalan geniş halk nüfusunun yarattığı sonuçlar başka biçimlerde kendini göstermektedir.

Ulusal bütünlüğün sağlanması ve nihayetinde yapılan reformlar sonucunda tüm nüfusu kapsayacak şekilde yeniden tasarlanmaya çalışılan Meksika coğrafyasında büyük toprak sahiplerinin reform sonrası siyasal düzene en hızlı adapte olan sınıf olması nedeniyle başta toprak reformu olmak üzere diğer reformlar da kalıcı ve köklü birer kurumsal dönüşüme yol açmamıştır. Toprak sahiplerinin sisteme en iyi adapte olduğu ve mevcut imtiyazlarını koruyabildiği yerler bugün uyuşturucu ticaretinin en yoğun biçimde gözlemlendiği yerlerle aynıdır.

Yirminci yüzyılın başından itibaren başlayan bu ulusal ekonomi modelinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası süreçte ithal ikameci ekonomi modeline geçmesiyle başlayan süreçte reformlar devam ettirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu süreçte geniş kitlelerin istihdamına ve ekonomik durumlarının iyileştirilmesine çalışılırken geleneksel ekonomik sorunlarla bir parça yüzleşilmeye çalışılmıştır. Fakat yukarıda da değinildiği gibi toplumsal yapının temel aktörlerinden olan büyük toprak sahiplerinin bu süreçte yeni ekonomi modeline adapte olmaları ve mevcut imtiyazlarını koruyarak arttırabilme kapasitelerinin fazlalığı kendilerine avantaj sağlamıştır.

1980'lerde başlayan ve neoliberal ekonomi modelinde emek sermaye denkleminde, devletin sermayeden yana tavır alarak emekçi sınıfları sermayenin eline bırakmasıyla birlikte, tarihsel olarak zayıf olan emekçi pozisyonunun artarak yoksullaşmasına ve güvencesizliğe sürüklenmesine Meksika gibi ülkelerde daha fazla hissedilmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu süreçte geniş kesimlerin işsizliğe sürüklenmesi, güvencesizlikle birlikte suça eğilimli hale gelmeleri gözlemlenmiştir. Uyuşturucu trafiğinin ve üretiminin artmaya başladığı dönem ise yaklaşık olarak bu sürece denk gelmektedir.

Bu çalışmada ortaya konan tez, Meksika'da ve Guerrero özelinde somut bir şekilde gözlemlenmektedir. Meksika'nın güneybatısında yer alan Guerrero federal yapı içinde en çok şiddetle anılan yerel devletlerden biridir. Şiddet yoğun tarihsel geçmişi ve çok farklı yerli etnik grubu içinde barındıran toplum yapısı ile gayri safi yurt içi hasıla içinde payı en düşük olan Guerrero'nun nüfusu önemli ölçüde yoksuldur. Özellikle 1960'lı ve 1970'li yıllarda muhalif hareketlerin en çok görüldüğü bölgelerden biri olan Guerrero 1980'lere gelindiğinde uyuşturucu trafiğinin en yoğun olduğu, uyuşturucu çetelerinin şiddete en sık ve yoğun bir şekilde başvurduğu bölgelerden biri haline gelmiştir. Bu dönemden itibaren, devletin kurumsal olarak bıraktığı boşluğu ekonomide uyuşturucu çeteleri, uyuşturucu savaşı nedeniyle de ortaya çıkan güvenlik açığını yerel halktan örgütlenerek kurulan meşru müdafaa grupları doldurmuştur. Protestocu öğretmen

adaylarının işkence ile öldürülmesinin gündeme geldiği, faillerinin bulunmasının seçim vaadi olarak dile getirildiği bu bölgede uyuşturucu çetelerinin gücü kolluk ve yargı gücünü ele geçirmiş durumdadır. Guerrero uyuşturucu trafiğine uygun coğrafyasının yanı sıra, yalnızca büyük toprak sahiplerinin zamanla sahip oldukları politik gücün belirlediği, işsizlik ve yoksulluğun yoğun olarak gözleendiği bir bölgedir. Yakın tarihinde turizm sektörü için bir cazibe merkezi olarak gündeme geldi ise de bölgedeki güvenlik sorunları Guerrero'yu turizm cennetinden ziyade uyuşturucu savaşının ortasında kalmış bir cehenneme dönüştürmüştür. Büyük toprak sahibi ailelerin köklü bir geleneğinin olduğu Guerrero'da, yoksulluktan kaçısın tek imkânı haline gelen uyuşturucu ekonomisi bu bölgede çok kolay kas gücüne ulaşabilmekte ve böylece uyuşturucu tacirlerinin tutuklanması yahut ölümleri caydırıcı olamamaktadır.

Bölgenin tarihine baktığımızda politik olarak kırdan gelerek tarımsal arazilerde çalışan emekçi kesimin yoğun bir örgütlenme tarihi olduğu, toprak sahiplerinin kazanmış oldukları imtiyazlara karşı mücadelelere giriştikleri gözükmektedir. Ayrıca, bu mücadelelerde kırsaldan gelen yerlilerin silahlı mücadeleler başlattığı ve politik mücadelelerin öğretmenler ve öğretmen okulu öğrencilerinin önderliğinde gerçekleştiği de gözlemlenmektedir. 43 öğretmen adayının kaybolması olayından sonra, uyuşturucu kartellerinin politik bir cinayete tetikçilik yaptığı argümanı düşünüldüğünde uyuşturucu çetelerinin zaman zaman iş tanımlarının çok kolay bir biçimde genişleyebildiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Haliyle, uyuşturucu ticaretinin gerçekleştirilmesi için yalnızca rüşvet vermenin dışında, mevcut güç odaklarının aleyhinde gerçekleşen tüm sivil politik mücadelelerde de aktif rol oynayarak varlıklarını devam ettirdiği iddiaları güçlenmektedir. Uyuşturucu tacirleri ile politik gücün her türlü maddi fırsat doğrultusunda ortaklaşabilmesi Meksika'nın meşruluğunu bir kez daha sorgulamaktadır. Üstelik bu denli kanlı şiddet olaylarının faillerinin bulunmamasına rağmen kartellerin imzası şeklindeki işkence yöntemleri ile mafyalaşan yönetim halkın gözünde meşruiyetini yitirmeye başlamıştır.

Büyük toprak sahipleri tarafından ele geçirilen politik güç zamanla uyuşturucu çeteleri ve bu ailelerin elinde halkın aleyhine kullanılacak hale dönüştürülmüştür. Uyuşturucu çeteleri ile federal güçler arasındaki mücadele giderek şiddetin tırmanmasına ve çetelerin şiddetin dozunu arttırmasına sebep olmuştur. Bu şiddet olaylarında binlerce insan ölmüş, kaybolmuş ve yerlerinden edilmiştir. Köylerinde barınamayan insanlar hem korkularından hem de yoksulluktan şehirlere göç etmek zorunda kalmışlar bu da kent yoksulluğunun daha da dramatikleşmesine sebep olmuştur.

Şiddetin yerel halk üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerine ek olarak, uyuşturucu ticaretinden elde edilen gelirler ile siyaset, polis ve yargı mensuplarının elde edilmeye başlanmış ve halkın bu çetelerden koruyabilecek tüm kurumlar halkı korumasız bırakmıştır. Uyuşturucu ticareti ile savaşmak isteyen belediye başkanları ve adayları suikastlara uğramış böylece seçimlerde kartellerin destekledikleri adayların kazanması sağlanmıştır.

Haliyle, bir yandan siyasal gücün tarımsal emekçileri dışlayacak şekilde yoğunlaşması sonunda ortaya çıkan boşlukta uyuşturucu çetelerinin ve toprak sahiplerinin doldurduğu, şiddetin meşruiyet sınırının altüst olduğu bir toplumsal yapıda bölgenin almış olduğu hal içerisinde elbette devletin varlığının sorguya açılması gayet normaldir. Fakat meselenin yalnızca bozulmuş siyasetçiler ve kamu çalışanları ile açıklanmaya çalışılması siyasi kurumların oluşumu ve tarihsel izleklerin sorgulanmaması meselenin tam olarak çözülmesine hizmet edemeyecektir. Ancak iyi bir tahlil ve teşhis sonucunda ortaya konabilecek bir reçete ile çözülebilecek bu sorunlar geçiştirilerek gayrimeşru oluşumların giderek normalleşmesine sebebiyet verecektir.

Uyuşturucu trafiğinde hep uyuşturucunun üretiminde ve taşınmasında etkili olan ülkeler üzerine yoğunlaşılırken arz boyutuna pek değinilmemesi de bu sorunun bir diğer önemli kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Artan talebin kendi arzını oluşturduğu düşüncesine rağmen, uyuşturucu gibi yüksek fiyatlarla satılabilen bir ürünün

alıcısının sürekli artıyor oluşu ise arz tarafında bir kesimin böyle bir ürüne sağlayabileceği paranın da arttığını göstermektedir. Bir yandan bu ürünün lüks mallardan da oluştuğu düşünüldüğünde, özellikle kokain gibi, bir kesimin çok kolay harcama yapabildiğini göstermektedir. Bu da yine gelişmiş ülkelerde bir kesimin çok kolay gelir elde edip piyasada harcayabildiğini göstermektedir ki bu da yine neoliberal süreçte birilerinin çok kolay gelir sahibi olup bu geliri harcayabildiğini göstermektedir. Elbette bu ürünlerin kullanımı bu süreçten önce de varsa da daha çok kişi tarafından talep edilmesinin bu süreçle ilgili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Ancak bu konu bir başka çalışmanın konusu olabilir.

Geniş halk kesimlerinin yaşadığı bu yoksulluk durumu ve orta sınıf olarak adlandırılan ve haklarını daha fazla aramaları beklenen kesimlerin nicel olarak azlığı ve siyasal hak arayışlarının şiddet ile bastırılmasının bu süreci durdurmaya yönelik adımların atılmasına engel olmuştur. Haliyle uyuşturucu ticareti ve artan şiddetin Meksika'nın içerisinde olduğu ekonomi modelinin zorunlu bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını, ekonomik modelin temel unsurlarının sürdürülmesine rağmen sitemde yapılacak tali yamaların bu sonucu değiştirmeye yetemeyeceği ve başarısız bir devlet olarak kabul edilmeye çalışılan Meksika'nın bu başarısızlığı kabul ederek neoliberal politikalarından vazgeçmeye çalıştığı anda yine kabul görmeyeceğini tahmin etmek pek de zor değildir.

Ekonomik modelin kaçınılmaz sonuçlarının bizzat bu ekonomik model ile ilişkilendirmeyecek her türlü argümanın gerçek soruna işaret etmemesi şartıyla kabul görebildiği bir düşünce biçiminde başarısız devlet tanımının modasının geçtiği yerde yeni kavram setleri ile asli tartışmanın bastırılması için yeni araç ve gereçlerin ortaya çıkması ve asli olan soruna işaret edilmesi, tarihsel arka planda yer alan örüntülerin göz ardı edilmeden iyi okunması gerektiği düşünülmektedir.

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