

RECONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY IN TURKEY:
NEOCONSERVATISM AND IMAM HATIP SCHOOLS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ALARA ATAÇ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
GENDER AND WOMEN STUDIES

JUNE 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı (Hacettepe Uni., SBKY) _____

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata (METU, ADM) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe İdil Aybars (METU, SOC) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Alara Ataç

Signature :

ABSTRACT

RECONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY IN TURKEY: NEOCONSERVATISM AND IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS

Ataç, Alara

M.S. Department of Gender and Women Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata

June 2019, 134 pages

From feminist perspective, this thesis attempts to analyze how female subjectivity has been reconstructed through education of Imam-Hatip schools under the impacts of neoconservative ideology since 2002. It is critical to understand rising power of neoconservatism and its impacts on Turkish women, especially after the AKP came into power. The party has developed neoconservatism as new political ideology as counter to secular-Republican ideology, and launched the Islamization project. In this case, the party's gender ideology forms the core of aimed transformation. They realized women's importance in Islamization and conservatization of socio-political domains. Hence, the AKP started to form new ideal female subjectivity who would serve their ideological transformation with their religious-conservative culture, and reconstruct the constructed ideal women of Turkish Republic. These new ideal women are to be constructed through education of Imam-Hatip schools which are one of the most important ideological state apparatuses producing ideal religious citizens of the AKP. To understand this frame, this study employs feminist methodology and feminist standpoint. Besides secondary

analysis, women's experiences and thoughts are put at the center of research and accepted as indicators of social reality. To reach women's experiences, in-depth interviews have been conducted with 22 women who were graduated from Imam-Hatip schools during the AKP rule. Their social and educational experiences and personal thoughts on womanhood are analyzed. In this context, this study reveals the nature and consequences of ideological reconstruction of female subjectivity through education of Imam-Hatip schools in accordance with the AKP's Islamic-conservative priorities and interests.

Keywords: The AKP, Islamization, Imam-Hatip Schools, Female Subjectivity, Patriarchal Construction

ÖZ

KADIN ÖZNELİĞİNİN TÜRKİYE’DE YENİDEN YAPILANDIRILMASI: YENİ MUHAFAZAKÂRLIK VE İMAM-HATİP OKULLARI

Ataç, Alara

Yüksek Lisans, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kadın Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata

Haziran 2019, 134 sayfa

Feminist bakış açısıyla, bu tez kadın özneliğinin 2002 yılından bu yana İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitimi boyunca yeni muhafazakâr ideolojinin etkisi altında nasıl yeniden yapılandırıldığını analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Özellikle AKP iktidara geldikten sonra, yeni muhafazakârlığın yükselen gücünü ve Türk kadınları üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak çok önemlidir. Parti yeni muhafazakârlığı laik-Cumhuriyetçi ideolojinin karşıtı olan yeni siyasi ideoloji olarak geliştirmiş ve İslamlaşma projesini başlatmıştır. Bu durumda, partinin cinsiyet ideolojisi hedeflenen dönüşümün çekirdeğini oluşturmaktadır. Sosyo-politik alanların İslamlaştırılmasında ve muhafazakârlaşmasında kadınların önemi fark edilmiştir. Bu nedenle, AKP, dini muhafazakâr kültürleriyle ideolojik dönüşümlerine hizmet edecek yeni bir ideal kadın özneliği oluşturmaya ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yapılandırılmış ideal kadınlarını yeniden yapılandırmaya başlamıştır. Bu yeni ideal kadınlar da AKP'nin ideal dini vatandaşlarını üreten en önemli ideolojik aygıtlardan olan İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitimi yolu ile yeniden yapılandırılmaktadırlar. Bu çerçeveyi anlamak için, çalışma feminist yöntem ve feminist bakış açısını kullanmaktadır. İkincil analizlerin yanı sıra, kadınların deneyimleri ve düşünceleri araştırmanın merkezine

konulmuş ve sosyal gerçekliđin belirleyicisi olarak kabul edilmiştir. Kadınların deneyimlerine ulaşmak için, AKP yönetimi boyunca İmam-Hatip okullarından mezun olan 22 kadınla derinlemesine mülakat yapılmıştır. Bu kadınların toplumsal ve eğitimsel deneyimleri ile kadınlığa ilişkin kişisel düşünceleri analiz edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma AKP'nin İslami-muhafazakâr öncelikleri ve çıkarlarına uygun olarak İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitimi yoluyla kadın öznelliđin ideolojik olarak yeniden yapılandırılmasının doğasını ve sonuçlarını ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AKP, İslamlaşma, İmam-Hatip Okulları, Kadın Öznelliđi, Ataerkil Yapılandırma

To all women who resist and reject all impositions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata for her continuous support and immense knowledge. It has been an invaluable experience to write this thesis under her guidance. I also would like to thank Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe İdil Aybars for their participation in the thesis examining committee, and for their valuable and critical comments.

I am thankful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen and Dr. Asuman Özgür Keysan. When I was in pessimistic and stressful times, they always supported me with their valuable academic and motivational support.

I am forever indebted to my precious family for their continuous and unconditional love, support and encouragement throughout my whole educational life and this thesis process. They are the first persons who teach me the meaning of being a strong woman and being just myself. They were always the first persons who stood by me and helped me stand up to fight when I fell down. Words cannot express my love and gratitude to my lovely father, Erdoğan and my superwoman, Süheyla. I am also grateful to my second mother, my lovely aunt, Hatice, for her all supports throughout my educational life.

I would like to thank my loved ones, who have supported me throughout entire process. First, I am really thankful to Dr. Günce Yılmaz who is my super hero in invisible cape. Without her emotional support, especially during last periods of my thesis process, I could not complete this journey. Second, I thank my all friends who helped me to reach my interviewees and all women who are the part of this study. Last but not least, to my dears; Erim, Yonca, Laika, Kaan and Gizem, I feel so lucky to have you. I thank all of you for being here and listening to my all endless complaints.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Objective of the Study and Research Problem Statement.....	1
1.2. Methodology of the Study.....	4
1.3. Significance of the Study	10
1.4. Structure of the Study.....	12
2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:	14
FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY AT THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EDUCATION AND THE STATE.....	14
2.1. Introduction	14
2.2. Education and An Ideology of the State.....	15
2.3. The Construction of Gendered Subjectivity.....	18
2.4. Patriarchal Senses in the Interplay between Education System and the State	20
2.4.1. Schooling and Gender Inequality.....	23
2.5. Conclusion.....	25
3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY IN EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA	27
3.1. Introduction	27

3.2.	A New Independent Republican State and Republican Women.....	28
3.3.	Education and Republican Women.....	32
3.3.1.	The Girls' Institutes	35
3.4.	Conclusion	37
4.	NEW HEGEMONIC POWER IN TURKISH POLITICS: THE AKP.....	39
4.1.	Introduction.....	39
4.2.	Composition of the AKP's Ideological Stance	40
4.3.	AKP's Neoconservatism and Women.....	44
4.3.1.	The Familization of Women.....	46
4.3.2.	Islamic Symbolization of Women	49
4.3.3.	A Venue for Neoconservative Gender Politics: KADEM	51
4.4.	Conclusion	53
5.	IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS	55
5.1.	Introduction.....	55
5.2.	The Foundations of Imam-Hatip Schools	55
5.3.	Politicization of Imam-Hatip Schools.....	57
5.4.	The AKP and Imam-Hatip Schools	59
5.5.	Conclusion	62
6.	THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY AT IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS	64
6.1.	Introduction.....	64
6.2.	Why Imam-Hatip Schools: Their Distinctive Features or Characteristics.....	65
6.3.	Being an Imam-Hatipli	69
6.4.	Education of Imam-Hatip Schools.....	71
6.4.1.	Formal Education.....	72
6.4.2.	Informal Education	74
6.4.2.1.	A Dominant Discourse of ' <i>Fıtrat</i> '.....	75
6.4.2.2.	Segregated Social Interactions and Contacts	76
6.4.2.3.	Segregated Practices of Courses	79
6.4.2.4.	Extra-Curricular Activities.....	81

6.5.	Being a Woman from the Eyes of Female Members of Imam-Hatip Schools.....	82
6.5.1.	Ideas on Women’s Position in the Private and Public Sphere	84
6.5.1.1.	Ideas on Marriage and Motherhood	84
6.5.1.2.	Ideas on Employment and Housekeeping	89
6.5.1.3.	Ideas on Dress and Behavior Codes	93
6.6.	Ideas on Women’s Question in Turkey	94
6.7.	Conclusion.....	96
7.	DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	98
	REFERENCES.....	108
	APPENDICES	
	Appendix A: In-Depth Interview Questions	118
	Appendix B: METU Human Research Ethics Committee Approval Page	121
	Appendix C: Türkçe Özet/ Turkish Summary	122
	Appendix E: Tez İzin Formu/ Thesis Permission Form.....	134

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.4.1. Graduation Years of Samples.....	7
Table 1.4.2. Undergraduate Programmes of Samples.....	8
Table 5.4.1. Number of Imam-Hatip Schools and Total Number of Pupils, 2002-2018.....	49

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi- Motherland Party
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- Republican People Party
DP	Demokrat Parti- Democrat Party
Eğitim-Sen	Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası- Education and Science Workers' Union
FP	Fazilet Partisi- Virtue Party
KADEM	Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği- Women and Democracy Association
MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi-National Order Party
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party
RP	Refah Partisi-Welfare Party
TEOG	Temel Eğitimden Ortaöğretime Geçiş- Transition from Primary Education to Secondary Education

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Objective of the Study and Research Problem Statement

This study analyses the construction of certain female subjectivity from the feminist perspective with a special focus on the patriarchal interplay between education and state politics. In the feminist literature, patriarchy is acknowledged as a central concept which explains the institutionalization of stratified power relations in which men dominate and control women. While studying unequal, dominated, invisible and excluded positions and status of women, feminist scholars provide many conceptualizations on several variations and different nature of patriarchy (e.g., Millet, 1970; Eisenstein, 1979; French, 1985; Pateman, 1988; Hartmann, 1981)¹. However, in the contemporary world with various development and transformation in all aspects of life, to understand and to bring women's oppression into light, it becomes more essential to focus on the manifestation of patriarchy "at the different level of abstraction" (Walby, 1990: 20).

It is the fact that we live in the world of specific norms and practices which put women into inferior positions and make men have a right to exercise power over them. With the power of these norms and practices, patriarchy operates and forms its exploitative

¹ For instance, Kate Millet (1970), Carol Pateman (1988) and Marilyn French (1985) see gender and sexual system as fundamental cause of patriarchy. By supporting radical feminism, they assert that biological differences make men dominant and women subordinated. For them, sex is political and male-female relations is the paradigm for all power relations in the public and private sphere. On other respects, while supporting socialist feminism, Zillah Eisenstein (1979) and Heidi Hartmann (1981) accept men's power and economic privilege as a source of patriarchy. They underline the interrelationship between capitalism and patriarchy in oppressing women in both public and private domain.

systems in all spaces. In her valuable study, Sylvia Walby (1990) provides a new way of theorizing patriarchy. She describes patriarchy as “a system of structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (1990: 20), and associates such system with different abstractions in both public and private sphere. She (1990) explains six different dimensions of patriarchy which are (1) paid employment, (2) household production, (3) cultural institutions such as schools, (4) sexuality, (5) violence and (6) the state. She points out the interconnectedness of gender inequalities through different structures and their causal impacts on women’s oppression. In this study, it is also significantly focused on women’s oppression by putting a particular importance on the interconnection between different dimensions of patriarchy through the education and state politics.

In this regard, the main objective of the study is to understand how women and their lives are used and controlled through an androcentric interplay between the education and state politic. To shed light on this issue in a more effective and obvious way, more specifically this study emphasizes contemporary situation in Turkey. It analyzes the reconstruction of female subjectivity through the education of Imam-Hatip schools under the impacts of neoconservative ideology of the government since 2002. It attempts to reveal how female subjectivity is constructed as a political product of patriarchal construction through ideological education in the case of Imam-Hatip schools.

In analyzing this framework, I aim to underline that it is the fact that through the history of the Turkish Republic, women have been formed accordingly the prevalent ideology of the state. During the initial periods of the Republic, women have been seen as having a symbolic and instrumental role in the reforms of modernization and the reinforcement of the state ideology. In this case, the first appearance of constructed female subjectivity has become apparent. The Turkish Republic has created Republican female subjectivity that symbolizes the state ideology and the identity of the nation and then, reinforces ideological consciousness. By doing that, reformers of the Republic paid a special attention to education because they believed that education is “a pivotal institution which would pave Turkey’s way to becoming a member of contemporary civilization”

(Akpınar, 2007: 161). Republican women have been created by breaking up their ties with traditional way of life, and encouraging them to be productive in both public and private sphere with their modern and Westernized appearances. As a result, Republican female subjectivity was constructed as a modern and active woman in the public sphere, and a good wife and mother in the private sphere as proper for the Republican ideology of the state.

When it is turned to contemporary time, it can be explicitly seen that the Turkish Republic has entered into new political age since 2002 when the AKP came into power. Through all political, economic and societal areas of the country, transformations have been felt. Neoconservatism as a counter-political ideology to the Republican ideology has rapidly developed and started to exist in all control and decision mechanisms. Through harsh turning in dominant ideology of the state, female subjectivity sharply began to be reconstructed as similar as during the initial periods of the Republic.

Based on this framework, in this study, I shall argue that the states establish an education system in which educational institutions are used as a social and cultural agent. In this system, schools have an effective ideological function in spreading and legitimizing hegemonic ideology of the state through the construction of idealized citizens. However, women are positioned and constructed in such system differently from men. Based on essentialist and gendered assumptions, women's primary responsibilities/obligations are acknowledged as mothering and housekeeping. It is accepted that they reproduce and raise future generations, and they become the first socializer/educator of children at the home (Ortner, 1974: 81). For this reason, their education is crucial for the states. Through the education, the states create required ideal women who would produce future citizens on the basis of their dominant ideology, and who would be profound signifiers of such ideological system. In the case of the Imam-Hatip schools, female subjectivity is reconstructed by depending on such reason as well. To provide conservatization of Turkish society accordingly Islamic values and traditions, the education of female pupils is used as a key tool.

In analyzing the reconstruction process of the certain type of women who serves the state ideology, I also aim to point out that this new female subjectivity reflects new patriarchal nature of Turkey which worsens women's position in all spheres of life and increases the gap between women and men in Turkish society. To put it briefly, the central objective of the thesis is to understand and criticize patriarchal reconstruction of female subjectivity at the intersection of education and state ideology in general, and the impacts of education of Imam-Hatip Schools on subjectivity construction in particular from feminist perspective. Other special objectives are to demonstrate a new nature of patriarchy relying on conservative and Islamic ideology of the state and to make explicit increasing gender hierarchy in contemporary Turkey.

1.2. Methodology of the Study

In this study, I am using feminist conceptual framework and methodology. The feminist methodology has emerged and developed as a critical reaction to gender-blind analyses of mainstream social and political science. In the mainstream thought, knowledge is produced through partial and distorted analysis of the social world. It is overwhelmingly based on the perspectives of men and the overgeneralization of their experiences in every aspect of life to experiences of all people (Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2006: 30). As pointed out by Harding, problematics of social life are generated from social experiences of Western, white, heterosexual and bourgeois men (1987: 6). Women are only considered as "abstract deviation of humanity" or "convenient object of men's need" (Westcott, 1990: 59). By putting women into a secondary position, traditional social science has caused invisibility of women's unequal status, their oppressions and exclusion from social science as an object of knowledge.

With the resurgence of feminism through women's liberation movement in the 1970s and 1980s, many feminist scholars started to criticize the relations between "production of knowledge" and "practices of power" in traditional social and political science (Harding, 2004: 1). Through women's liberation movement, feminists have aimed "a holistic transformation of society which would do away with male dominance in every

sphere -in private as well as public- and would challenge all the older gender patterns” (Gordon, 2014: 53). They needed to develop a new methodological approach to bring women’s controlled and dominated positions to light and to demonstrate gender inequality embedded in all structures of the society.

In this context, the feminist methodology has a significant role in consciousness-raising about women’s visibility in social life and gender-blindness in social science, especially with feminist standpoint methodological approach.

The feminist standpoint is an achievement – it is the portrayal of social life from the viewpoint of the activity which produces women’s social experiences, not from the partial and perverse perspective available from the ‘ruling gender’ experiences of men (Abbott, Tyler & Wallace, 2005: 374).

In contrast to the traditional social enquiry, feminist standpoint focuses on women’s experiences and locates them at the center of scientific enquiry to empower oppressed groups, to value their experiences and to develop an oppositional consciousness (Harding, 2004: 2). In this respect, knowledge is analyzed and produced by resorting “the perspective of not only privileged (men) but also the oppressed women” (Smith, 1987: 99, as cited in Abbott, Wallace & Tyler, 2005: 374). By taking woman as a source of knowledge, with the feminist standpoint approach, women’s experiences become a significant indicator of social reality and the ways in which they are controlled and used start to be significantly revealed.

Revealing the experiences of women, feminists pursue qualitative research method as the most suitable data-collection technique. They believe that positivist research methods and quantitative analysis can be inaccurate in describing women’s experiences. As Abbott, Wallace and Tyler highlighted, feminists insist that “they must adopt a qualitative methodology, so that women (and men) who are the subjects of research can be ‘heard’ and so that it becomes possible to see and understand the world from the position of the research subjects” (2005: 368).

In this regard, they also reject the methodological principles of “being value-free, neutral, uninvolved approach and of non-reciprocal relations between researcher and researched” (Mies, 1993: 67). First, they insist on the importance of being involved in the research process and interactive relations between researchers and researched because they believe that this enables them to understand the world of researched more obviously, and to produce more accurate knowledge in illustrating women’s oppressive positions. Second, through that involvement and interactions, feminist researchers pay a particular attention to equal and non-exploitative relations between researchers and researched. They support that it is essential to approach participants by taking “the right of researched as a people”, rather than “as an object of knowledge” into consideration (Henn, Weinstein& Foard, 2006: 37). This leads to the eradication of power relations in the research process, and enables researched to express themselves more clearly.

At that point, interviews, that are unstructured and semi-structured, have a significant place in feminist research. According to Reinharz,

Unstructured and semi-structured interviews include a free interaction between the researcher and the participant. Such interviewing offers researchers access to people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words rather than in the words of the researcher. This asset is particularly important for the study of women because in this way learning from women is an antidote to centuries of ignoring women’s ideas altogether or having men speak for women (1992: 18-19).

It is obvious that in-depth interviews provide a chance to obtain perceptions, ideas and feelings of researched through their words and interactions with researchers.

In line with the feminist research, this study uses qualitative analysis as a research method, and employs semi-structured in-depth interview as a principal data-collection technique. As the overt aim of the study is to analyze patriarchal reconstruction of certain female subjectivity through the lens of the Imam-Hatip Schools’ education, it is essentially important to understand female pupils’ educational and social experiences and their personal thoughts on womanhood. In this case, I have conducted interviews

with 22 female graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools. For the practical purpose, I have decided to make interviews with only graduates, not with active students.

It should be pointed out that it was not easy to reach the interviewees. Firstly, I did not know the members of Imam-Hatip Schools. I needed to develop a network to contact them. In this case, I used the snowball sampling technique² to reach women. Having accessed them, before the interviews, I explained who I am, what I am doing, where I am studying and what the purpose of the study is. At that stage, I started to run into difficulties. When I stated that I am a student at Gender and Women Studies master programme at the Middle East Technical University, many women refused to be part of the study. Because I am affiliated with a graduate programme which supports feminism and the university which reflects oppositional ideology for them, I was considered as an antagonist towards their world, beliefs and the way of living. Thus, many graduates rejected the interviews since it did not reflect their political interests. Hereby, being a woman, or 'not being an opposite sex', is only positive factor that made my access to them easy.

Therefore, I have conducted 22 interviews. However, 19 of them did not accept face-to-face interview. Some of them, particularly aged between 18 and 20 women, stated that their family did not approve the meeting, or it would not 'appropriate' for them to meet with me as they wanted to be anonymous. In addition, a few of them told that they did not have free time in the day time and interviews will be possible at the night. In this case, I have conducted interviews via telephone with these 19 graduates. On the other side, other 3 persons accepted face-to-face interviews.

It was planned to use a tape recorder during all interviews but none of them allowed a tape recorder. All dialogues and answers have been transcribed in the electronic environment at the same time with interviews. Moreover, graduates generally paid a

² For the literature on snowball sampling technique: Bailey, K.D. (1994). *Methods of Social Research*. The USA: The Free Press, p. 96; Yang, S. & Knoke, D. (2008). *Social Network Analysis*. The USA: SAGE, p. 18; Bernand, H. R. (2006). *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. The UK: Altamira Press, p. 193.

particular attention to protect their anonymity during the interviews. Most of them are reluctant to share their personal information; who they are, where they live or where they have studied at Imam-Hatip schools. Indeed, although they expressed their thoughts and experiences openly throughout the interviews, they did not want their participation in the study to be known, especially by their own communities. For this reason, I did not ask any questions about these points. Throughout the interviews, I mainly asked and analyzed female graduates' social and educational experiences and their personal thoughts on womanhood to understand (1) the nature of education in Imam-Hatip schools, (2) their definition of ideal women's positions in both public and private sphere, and (3) the nature of new patriarchal ideology. At the end, this study has been complicated by the contributions of 22 female graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools.

Since the study focuses on the connection between rising neoconservative ideology since 2002 and the education of Imam-Hatip Schools, interviewees were selected from those who have graduated at the period between 2002 and the present. With regards to their graduation years, interviewees are defined as a group between the ages of 18 and 31.

Table 1.4.1. Graduation Years of Samples

Graduation Year	Number of Female Graduates
2004	1
2009	3
2011	4
2012	1
2013	3
2014	3
2015	1
2016	5

Table 1.4.1. (continued)

2017	2
------	---

Although majority of interviewees appears to be graduated in 2016 or in 2011, there is no important intensification on a specific group based on their ages or graduation years. It can be said that although it was difficult to reach samples, I paid particular attention not to select them from a same age group or from those who were graduated in a same year. Each group may have diverse educational experiences in the parallel with rising conservative authoritarianism of ruling government, its changes in governmental politics and its educational regulations since 2002. In this sense, it is crucial to avoid emphasizing same group of graduates.

Other important dimensions of interviewees which contribute to analyze their life aspirations based on their understanding of womanhood in the further chapters are related to their educational levels, field of study in higher education, employment positions and marital status. When their educational levels, field of study in higher education and employment positions are analyzed, it is seen that 19 female graduates of the Imam-Hatip Schools preferred to continue their higher education. 2 of them are currently active workers and they are working as a teacher of Culture of Religion and Knowledge of Ethics. Remaining 17 women continue to study in higher education as shown at *Table 1.4.2*, and 3 graduates preferred to stay at home. In addition, their marital statuses demonstrate that of the samples, 17 women are bachelor, 3 of them are married and remaining 2 women are engaged.

Table 1.4.2. Undergraduate Programmes of Samples

Undergraduate Programme	Number of Female Graduates
The Divinity Faculty	8
Sociology	1

Table 1.4.2. (continued)

Philosophy	1
Islamic Philosophy	1
Arabic Philosophy	1
Turkish Language Teaching	1
Faculty of Islamic Sciences	2
Physics Engineering	1
Both The Divinity Faculty and Sociology	1

As their demographic information show that even though there is some intensification on those who are students, bachelor or majoring at the Divinity Faculty, samples provides critical frame that enables analysis of subjectivity construction by focusing different dimensions. In addition to interviews, I have also benefited from reviewing secondary sources. In general, I have emphasized studies and research which examine patriarchal structure of the state and the education system. And in particular, I have read studies and research on the AKP party politics, its gender ideology and Imam-Hatip Schools' education to constitute a framework for comprehensive analysis of the research problem of the study.

1.3. Significance of the Study

The subject matter of the study is crucial in itself. Analyzing the construction process of certain type of female subjectivity at Imam-Hatip Schools based on feminist standpoint, this study critically sheds light on some significant points regarding women's status and position in contemporary time. First of all, it showcases the broad framework including analysis from macro-level to micro-level. It analyzes existing government's politics at macro-level and their impacts on female subjectivity construction at micro-level. As a

result of this, it enlightens micro-level consequences of macro-level state ideological politics in women's lives. It profoundly reveals how changes in the dominant ideology of the state provide control mechanism over women's agency.

Secondly, this study probes into this regarding framework by focusing on one of the most important political controversial educational institutions in Turkey; Imam-Hatip schools. Imam-Hatip schools were founded by the state as vocational schools for the purpose of training young men to be prayer leaders and preachers. However, over the years, with their proliferation and the existence of their graduates in other professions instead of working as religious functionaries, the status and the function of Imam-Hatip schools has become the center of a political debate, especially between conservative-religious and secular groups of Turkish society. For the secularist group, Imam-Hatip schools are the threat to Turkish secular system and they are used as an instrument to reinforce Islamic consciousness in the society by raising pious generation. In this respect, Imam-Hatip schools are widely criticized for being educational institutions which produce subjects that are supportive of certain community rather than being particular vocational schools (Özgür, 2012: 178). This criticism can be evidenced by the admission of female pupils who cannot be prayer leaders or preachers and then, by their majority in the schools. In this study, by supporting the idea that Imam-Hatip schools train individuals based on particular consciousness, it is attempted to give a point which cannot be ignored. Like in many areas of social life, female pupils experience this training process differently from male pupils. This study illustrates different position of female pupils from that of men by relying on feminist standpoint.

Thirdly, it is the fact that there is a strong movement for more egalitarian political, economic and social environment for women in our contemporary world. However, while it is expected to decline the power of patriarchy, its existence persists in Turkey. In this case, patriarchy gains new nature which is more related to conservative-religious understanding of the existing ruling class. Through the education of Imam-Hatip Schools, female pupils internalize ideological consciousness of the state and then, patriarchal understanding. When making observation by putting female graduates' own

thoughts and experiences at the center, this study also reveals that female graduates become functional part of this new patriarchal system. In this context, it is considered that this study would contribute to the understanding of contemporary womanhood and women's position in gender hierarchy of Turkey at the scope of education and the state.

1.4. Structure of the Study

In the context of the study, the reconstruction of female subjectivity is analyzed and examined within seven main chapters. In Chapter 1, which is an introduction of the study, objectives, research problem, significance of the study and methodological approach are demonstrated and clarified. After the introduction, I provided required historical and theoretical background for the better understanding of the research problem. In this respect, the following part of the study, Chapter 2, provides a theoretical and conceptual framework. The interplay between education and state politics are examined and its patriarchal side is critically revealed at the theoretical level. Having provided theoretical and conceptual framework, Chapter 3 begins to give a brief historical background because to understand the nature of reconstruction process and its new patriarchal mentality, it is essential to understand first construction process and its patriarchal understanding. Hence, this chapter clarifies first female subjectivity construction and what ideal Republic women were. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 turn to contemporary situation in Turkey. At the first step, Chapter 4 introduces new hegemonic power of Turkish politics; the AKP and its mindset idealizing new women. It significantly explains new religious-conservative ruling ideology and women's dominated position in it. After that, Chapter 5 critically analyzes the politicization of Imam-Hatip schools and how they are primarily improved and employed as an ideological agent through national education by Islamists and thus, by the AKP to Islamize society. After examining new religious-conservative ideology of Turkey and its primary political tools in education system, Chapter 6 begins enlightening the interplay between education of Imam-Hatip schools and the AKP politics in the reconstruction process of female subjectivity. It illustrates experiences and thoughts of Imam-Hatip schools graduates, and reveals the nature of reconstruction process and new ideal

women. It provides overall analysis of data obtained through interviews. Finally, Chapter 7, the discussion and conclusion of the study, overviews and discusses all previous explanations to shed light on research problem of the study.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY AT THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EDUCATION AND THE STATE

2.1.Introduction

This chapter aims to analyze the ideological function of the schools and patriarchal senses embedded in the relationship between the schools and state politics at the theoretical level to provide a required conceptual background for further discussions. In this context, the chapter starts with explaining how the philosophy of education is organized in accordance with the ideological interests of the state. Based on theoretical explanations, how “education and politics are inextricably interwoven with each other” (Kelly, 2004: 161) is demonstrated. The critical point here is to understand that with massive inculcation of ideology, particular subjectivity is produced in the schools for the purpose of disseminating and reinforcing the power of the state.

Having explained that point, the chapter goes on with emphasizing the construction of gender subjectivity. Before analyzing patriarchal organization in the interplay, it is essentially important to comprehend and examine the mentality and perspectives which characterize patriarchal culture and contribute to the formation of gender and gender roles. Then, based on the fact that gender is constructed socially and politically, the chapter continues with analyzing and explaining patriarchal senses in the relationship between the education and the state by appealing to feminist theorizations.

It is pointed out that patriarchal ideology is the part of the state’s official political ideology. It is embedded in all structures and institutions of the state and promoted by

governmental mechanisms. In this case, it is obvious that schools are the most important institutions of the state which contribute to spread patriarchal ideology and construct a certain type of subjectivity based on the state's ideological interests and gendered patterns. Within this framework, the chapter turns to explain the ways in which schooling constructs a gender subjectivity. Finally, the chapter ends with the conclusion which summarizes patriarchal subjectivity construction through schooling under the control of the state.

2.2. Education and An Ideology of the State

The fundamental function of education in the schools is acknowledged as the transmission of factual knowledge and practical skills which prepares children or teenagers for the adult life. However, taking into consideration theoretical approaches which are particularly based on the variants of Orthodox Marxism and Neo-Marxism in traditional political and social science, it is safe to say that education in the schools also has an effective role in social change and ideological control in the parallel of ruling class' priorities and values.

Firstly, in the traditional political and social science, the positive aspects of education and schooling are pointed out in the theoretical conceptualizations of functionalism. According to functionalism, education in the schools is seen as a crucial part of the society's system which helps it to work and keep it functioning. In this theoretical approach, Émile Durkheim, as one of the most influential sociologists of education, defines education as

The influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined (1956: 28).

He believes that education transmit required values for proper functioning and survival of the society and points out that

Society can survive only if there exists amongst its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which collective life demands (1956: 70).

It is obvious that functionalist approach focuses on positive impacts of education and schooling on the society. However, as Giroux stated, it left unexamined questions about the connection between schooling and the issue of power and ideological control (1981: 91). Some sociologists of education and scholars began to raise questions and then, to provide critical alternative theoretical approaches to analysis conceptualized by functionalists in order to shed light on political nature of schooling. In this case, unequal sides hidden in the organization of education in the schools start to be clarified and illustrated. It is shown that while schools transmit knowledge and train pupils, they also transmit the dominant culture and ideology which serves only for the interests of ruling class, not for the society as a whole (Giroux, 1981; Bourdieu& Passeron, 1977; Apple, 1979).

At that point, it is worth to mention Louis Althusser's analysis of educational institutions as the ideological state apparatuses. According to Althusser, educational institutions are one of the most important state apparatuses as education "massively" and "predominantly" functions by depending on ruling ideology which is "the ideology of ruling class" (1971: 145). Based on the fact that ruling class is the group of people who hold power, their ideology forms a dominant culture in the education. In this regard, each school introduces prevalent ideology of the ruling class into pupils and imposes it on them. As Althusser stated,

It [the school] takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most 'vulnerable', squeezed between the Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into them, whether it

uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (1971: 155).

In this situation, the schools endeavor to instill a dominant ideology and to create certain consciousness to make pupils uphold and advocate required values, beliefs and practices inherent to ideology for the reinforcement and maintenance of existing political system.

Through those values, beliefs, and practices, a sense of subjectivity is socially, culturally and institutionally produced and constructed. Althusser underlines that “all ideology hails and interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (1971: 173). By this, he means that ideology transforms individuals into the certain subject who naturalizes and internalizes a specific value system and then, takes up the subjectivity identified with the meanings of the ideology. Most of them accept their ideological self-construction as a reality or nature. Althusser put it,

What thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology [...] That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, "I am ideological"(1971: 175).

And he added that individuals are interpellated as a free subject who freely submits the commandments of being subject of ideology (1971: 183). In this regard, they unwittingly become the part of a certain ideological system and serve the interests of a certain class.

Consequently, schools, which function under the control of the state, are significantly characterized by dominant ideology of the ruling class. As Young stated that both every day and school knowledge is always politically and socially constructed as a creation of a hegemonic group in “a particular type of society” at “a particular point in time” to serve the continuity of them in power (as cited in Porter, 1986: 8). It is explicit that pupils obtain certain kind of opinions, attitudes, dressing and behavioral patterns by

becoming accustomed to hegemonic ideology in the school culture and educational process. Such learning and socialization process transmits on a large number of values and beliefs of the dominant culture and as a result, constructs the subjectivity which has important political consequences (Dekker, 1991: 34). Through the educational system, generations who contribute to the survival of existing political regime dominated by privileged class are trained.

2.3. The Construction of Gendered Subjectivity

In order to comprehend patriarchal nature of the organizations and structures, it is prominent to understand the construction of gendered subjectivity. It is well-known that patriarchy is founded and spread through the concept of gender, the attribution of gender roles and thus, the construction of subjectivity. The societies are built on two types of people; men and women, and their organizations are formed based on the distinctive behavioral patterns of men and women. Here, a corollary explanation for this situation comes from the theorization of biological determinism.

According to biological determinism, men and women are biologically different and as a result of innate biological differences between sexes, they have distinctive behavioral patterns (Oakley, 1972: 49; Hawkesworth, 2013: 34; O'Brien, 2009: 67; Ryle, 2012: 96; Shepard, 2010: 273). As understood from this point, "biological determinism reduces some kind of behavioral patterns to unchangeable biological roots" (Ryle, 2012: 96). Different expectations and behaviors for men and women are formed on the basis of the sex categorization within the society (Shepard, 2010: 273). For biological determinist group, biological factors are "sole determinant of gender" (Ryle, 2012: 96).

In this case, reproductive physiology has an important role in stereotypical differentiation since it is believed that it determines individual character and capacity (Hawkesworth, 2013: 33). Firstly, some characteristics are differently attributed to men and women. As Oakley indicated in her research, according to biological determinism,

Men are more aggressive and independent than women. They are braver, more outgoing and extroverted, confident in their own ability to control and manipulate the external environment. Women are more sensitive and perceptive in their relationships with other people, they are more dependent on these relationships. They are intervened and domesticated and emotionally labile (1972: 49).

Taking different physiological structure of men and women into consideration, their characteristic features are classified and their nature are accepted differently from each other.

Secondly, individual capacity of men and women is evaluated with regard to these types of characteristics attributed to them. Thus, masculine and feminine gender are identified and both male and female subjectivity is constructed. In this case, men are assumed to be naturally more aggressive and independent than women and to be built for providing and protecting. On the other side, women are believed to be designed for domestic responsibilities since they are thought as being naturally more passive and sensitive (Shepard, 2010: 273). Women with their femininity are accepted as incapable for the affairs of the public sphere. Because of their reproductive physiology and biological characteristics, their primary responsibilities of which they are capable are accepted as motherhood and housewifery. Whereas men take their places into public sphere to seek professional satisfaction, women are expected to play their domestic roles in the private sphere of the family since childbearing and childrearing has been conceived as naturally and biologically determined (Jaggar, 1983: 113).

In this regard, proper place for women is accepted as home and their social roles are identified as fulfilling need of all members of household and motherhood by taking women's physiological structures and characteristics into account. Therefore, biological determinist group believes and supports that "disparate male and female anatomies carried natural mandates for social roles" (Hawkesworth, 2013: 34). This traditionalistic theorization has strong impacts in shaping particular type of femininity and masculinity. It is culturally believed that women and men are different because of their nature and

thus, they have different subjectivities and social roles which are “complementary” with each other (Lerner, 1986: 18).

At that point, this essentialist and reductive theorization and cultural perception are criticized by feminist and gender studies scholars. According to them, gender and gender roles are not inevitable and natural (Francis, 2006: 8). West and Zimmerman significantly point out that “gender is not a set of traits, nor a variable, nor a role but the product of social doing of some sort” (1978: 129). Similarly, Anselmi and Law states that gender reflects “socially and culturally defined prescriptions and beliefs about the behavior and emotions of men and women” (1998: 195). It is obvious that gender and social roles which are seen as appropriate behavioral patterns for men and women are a social attribution and cultural product. Because of essentialist and reductionist approach, “patterned subjectivity that bears to some relations to cultural conceptions of femininity and masculinity” are constructed and produced (Hawkesworth, 2013: 40). They are socially, culturally and politically constructed, and become the cornerstone of patriarchal ideology. Thus, the different positioning of women and men in terms of their social roles does not result in the complementary situation, but in asymmetrical power relations in which women are inferior to men and restricted. However, it is still common that the society uses the concept of gender as organizing principles. Through important institutions, patriarchal ideology and its product; a gendered subjectivity composed of traditional gender roles continue to be disseminated and reinforced, as in the interplay between the education system and the state.

2.4. Patriarchal Senses in the Interplay between Education System and the State

While traditional social and political science diagnoses the reproductive role and the control mechanism of state-education in perpetuating inequalities, feminist scholars are also aware of the reproduction of inequality in the interplay between education system and the state. They have documented and offered criticism of schools because of “their reproductive ideological function of gender inequality” and revealed “patriarchal dimensions in state-education” (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 90; Porter, 1986: 5; Walby, 1990:

93; Stromquist, 2006: 148; Francis, 2006: 10; Dillabough, 2003: 376). For feminist scholars, one of the most significant issues in the education system, organized and standardized by the state, is that male and female pupils are unequally positioned and constructed as gendered subjects (Stromquist, 2006: 146). While the state instills its dominant ideology into pupils and thus, constructs the subjects belonging to this ideology, patriarchal senses take their place in this process. In other words, patriarchal ideology which prevails in many systems and structures throughout the history has been an important part of the official state ideology.

In many studies and research, feminist scholars point out that although patriarchy varies in degree from the state to the state throughout the history, the state is patriarchal in its nature (Walby, 1990: 50; Stromquist, 1995: 424) because “it is not autonomous of gender” (MacKinnon, 1989: 238 as cited in Marinetto, 2007: 80). Systematically, it is organized and structured as appropriate to serve the interests of the patriarchal ideology. It is directly engaged with gendered political forces and its actions have gender-differentiated results (Walby, 1990: 150). It approaches men and women in a gendered way and thus, it redefines and recreates ideology which promotes secondary and inferior status of women (Stromquist, 2006: 145). In this regard, as Wearing indicated, the most salient part of dominant ideology perpetuated by hegemonic ruling class is the gendered organization of relations and procreation which accepts women’s naturally inevitable status in the family as a mother (as cited in Porter, 1986: 11). Thus, the state pursues traditional patriarchal views and makes it ideological part of its function.

To put it more explicitly, from the beginning of theorization on the state and its nature in traditional social and political science, the perception of the subject has been constituted in a gendered way. In traditional theory, the ideal subject of the state is described as “a rational individual engaged in abstract moral reasoning with strong ego boundaries” (Amstrong & Squires, 2002: 263). This subject is essentially associated with male citizens because of their naturally accepted capacities (Amstrong & Squires, 2002: 264; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989: 8). It is assumed that women are incapable of having such rationality and they are biologically created for domesticity, not for the affairs of

the public sphere. The active subject of the state is accepted as a male citizen, who is independent from the private sphere of domesticity and free to be active in the public sphere (Amstrong & Squires, 2002: 264; Thornton, 1991: 449).

For the state, women as the subject are important for its maintenance. As Yuval-Davis and Anthias put in their study, women are primarily included in the state actions in line with their biological and cultural reproduction of future generations (1989: 7). They indicate that the state sees women as essentially important as “reproducers of the members of the society”, “central participants of ideological reproduction”, “transmitters of dominant culture” and “the signifier of ideology” (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989: 7-9). In this regard, women with their naturally determined roles; being a mother and a spouse, are seen as the hearth of the society (Esposito, 1991: 205). They reproduce required citizens of the state by giving birth. They become early socializer of children in the family (Ortner, 1974: 81). And then, they raise and educate the future generations of the citizens accordingly ideals of the state. Consequently, they becomes primary social servant of the state for its continuity in power.

At that point, it is seen that the state supports the notion of gendered subjectivity and the existence of certain social roles for men and women which serve it to legitimize its power. While male citizens are accepted as active subject of the state, women are seen essential for the state in the domestic sphere because of their reproductive roles. The role and status of women with respect to family and domesticity is crucial for strategical and practical interests of the state. Pragmatically and politically, the state requires women into private sphere since it sees women as primary individuals who would instill and transfer its prevalent ideology to future generations.

In this case, gender-specific spheres and the private-public dichotomy is deployed by the state (Thornton, 1991: 448). Ideologically, it promotes gendered division of labor (Thornton, 1991: 450). Whereas men are actively positioned in the public sphere, women are idealized with their social roles in the private sphere. The subjectivity construction based on essentialist and patriarchal understanding becomes the important

part of the state actions and policies promoted through its institutions. The state justifies and reinforces patriarchal culture along with its dominant ideology through governmental machineries and various institutions under its control (Stromquist, 1995: 423). In this regard, as Bourdieu significantly stated, education system plays a central role in ideological reproduction of patriarchy (as cited in Dillabough, 2003: 376).

Based on these theoretical approaches, it is explicit that while pupils are educated and trained in accordance with prevalent ideology of the state, they learn values and beliefs of the patriarchal system. They internalize certain roles and positions belonging to masculinity and femininity, and their subjectivity is constructed according to their gender. Therefore, the state and schools, as the apparatus of the state, are patriarchal and they collaboratively produce gender disparities with the construction of gendered subjectivity.

2.4.1. Schooling and Gender Inequality

Having understood the state control over the education and patriarchal construction of the subjectivity in line with ideological interests of the state, it is crucial to emphasize how schools construct and produce idealized subjectivities for female and male pupils in a gendered way. As LeCompte notes that schools transmit skills, norms, aspirations, and behavior patterns which reproduce the assumption of specific roles overtly and covertly (1978: 22). In other words, the formal and informal structure of education system in the schools function as critical forces in reproducing the dominant culture (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 91).

The formal structure of the education system reflects formal curriculum which is organized, standardized and approved by the state. On the other side, the informal structure of the education system denotes hidden curriculum. In comparison to formal curriculum, hidden curriculum is not written, planned and does not have apparent visibility in the schools (Özgür, 2012: 67). Çobanoğlu and Engin-Demir state that hidden curriculum can be seen as invisible agenda through which students are educated

into particular type of value and behavior system apart from manifest operation of the schools (2014: 777). Likewise, Skelton defines hidden curriculum as “a set of implicit messages relating to knowledge, values, norms of behavior and attitudes that learners experience in and through education process” (as cited in Özgür, 2012: 67). Therefore, while schools formally train and educate pupils through their planned and determined subjects of formal curriculum, they also informally impose values, norms and practices of dominant ideology on pupils through hidden curriculum. In this structure, pupils experience formal and informal instillation of the consciousness belonging to dominant culture through “a wide array of mechanisms and relations” including textbook/course content, authority allocation structure in schools, organization of classrooms and school environments, social conducts/relations, codes of dress and manners, and extracurricular activities (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 90).

However, male and female pupils experience this overt and covert process of schooling differently. As aforementioned, since women are seen as essential with their reproductive roles by depending on essentialist patriarchal understanding of world and social relations, male and female pupils are subjected to gendered education in and through both formal and informal structure of education system (Walby, 1990: 93; Stromquist, 2006: 148; Acar& Ayata, 2002: 90). Schooling reflects effective social and socio-psychological process through which gender-differentiated forms of subjectivity is constructed and produced (Walby, 1990: 93). Many gender codes in the schools serve to contextualize what are appropriate gender behaviors for male and female pupils in the family and the society, and then, translate them into appropriate gender academic and social practices in the education environment (Stromquist, 2006: 148). At schools and classrooms, female and male pupils learn appropriate behavioral patterns and experiences for boys and girls (Liu, 2006: 428). As a result, girls and boys acquire a gendered subjectivity forming cultural notions of masculinities and femininities (Walby, 1990: 93). They conform to proper definitions of ways of walking, talking, dressing, and life aspirations for their sexes and thus, learn how to behave as ideologically expected (Shepard, 2010: 276).

In this regard, the formal and informal structure of education system in the schools are organized so as to transmit the appropriate ideology which would position male and female pupils into their so-called distinctive gender roles. And thus, gendered subjectivity is constructed through schools with “the representation of women within a patriarchal gaze” (Walby, 1990: 21). Through schooling, the ideological attachment of women into the private sphere and of men into the public sphere is underlined. As a political aim of education, gendered division of labor between women and men is supported. The education system is organized to transmit patriarchal culture which fit female students into female labour and traditional wifeness and motherhood roles within the family through formal and informal schooling (Porter, 1986: 18). Based on biological understanding, it is accepted that women and men have different nature and thus, the status and position in the society. Since it is assumed that division of labor between men and women is necessary for proper function of the society, gender roles are identified and imposed on pupils. Female pupils learn what the idealized womanhood is with regard to their traditional social roles under the impacts of their educational and lived experiences in the school environment.

It is obvious that through schooling, stereotypical social roles and segregated organizations and relations are instilled into pupils. They become accustomed to persuasive patriarchal culture by learning their traditional social roles, gender stereotypes, and gendered division of labor based on the separation between the public and private sphere. Distinctive gender subjectivities for male and female pupils are constructed and entrenched in the schools. Differently from male pupils, female pupils are identified with certain kind of subjectivity which is the part of patriarchy.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter shows that the education system is used by the state as one of its primary ideological apparatus. Through schooling under the control of the state, the ideal subjects who would serve for the dissemination, reinforcement and continuity of dominant ideology are constructed and produced. It also demonstrates that in such

system, female and male pupils have different experiences since ingrained patriarchal culture engages with all political and social structures. In this case, patriarchal bias toward women is embedded in the official state ideology. While the state idealizes its citizens in accordance with its dominant ideology, it approaches women and men differently and idealizes them in a gendered way. In the process of constructing ideal subjectivity for the state through schooling, women have different educational experiences and socializations. They are transformed into the subjects with their particular subjectivity who accept and internalize a male-dominated culture, its legality and their secondary position in it. As Arnot stated, “they become colonized within a male-defined world through a wide variety of educational experiences” (2002: 103).

Within this framework, (1) ideology as a political rationality, (2) school as an ideological apparatus of the state and (3) gendered subjectivity as a political product of patriarchal construction are adopted as theoretical and conceptual tool of the study. These theoretical and conceptual tools are used to address strategical and practical interests of the state in constructing female subjectivity with pursuing the gendered notions of femininity. And, they are utilized along with Feminist Standpoint to analyze women’s different educational and social experiences in patriarchal culture.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY IN EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA

3.1. Introduction

After examining women's position through the interplay between state ideology and education at the theoretical level, this chapter attempts to give a brief historical account of the construction process of certain female subjectivity in Turkey. It is a well-known fact that the close relationship between state ideology, education and constructed female subjectivity has been visible since the beginning of the formation of the Turkish Republic. After the proclamation of the republic, a new state with a new political regime has been established. Newly established Turkey underwent transformation into political, cultural, scientific, religious and economic spaces. In this circumstance, women became the most essential part of the transformation and the dissemination of new cultural and political values. Female subjectivity has been designed and constructed by the state based on its prevalent ideological value system through the education.

This chapter clarifies female subjectivity construction in Republican era for the purpose of better understanding the contemporary situation. It is essential to focus on the constructed subjectivity for an accurate analysis of the current reconstruction process in Turkey. The historical focus in this chapter provides required background for the understanding of changing nature of patriarchy and increasing gender inequality around the reconstructed womanhood which are explained in Chapter 7.

Within this framework, this chapter firstly examines why and how women had a unique importance for the Republican government. Then, it continues with analyzing the importance of education among the reforms and how education created a space for the state to benefit from women for their ideological interests. To illustrate this situation in a more obvious and effective way, the Girls' Institutes as an example are briefly analyzed. Here, the aim is not to provide any comparison between the Girls' Institutes and Imam-Hatip schools. The Girls' Institutes are merely selected as an example since they were vocational high schools like Imam-Hatip schools. Although these two types of schools have different school culture and educational program, both schools' education serve the formation of ideal femininity by underlining certain norms and beliefs of patriarchal culture from the point of their own hegemonic ideology. In this case, when female subjectivity construction through these schools' vocational and general educations is analyzed, the changing nature of patriarchy from the Republican era to the AKP era can be more explicitly seen at the further chapters. Hence, how the Girls' Institutes constructed idealized Republican women is briefly explicated. After that, the chapter ends with conclusion which critically shows patriarchal system appearing early Republican Turkey and its manifestation in female subjectivity construction.

3.2. A New Independent Republican State and Republican Women

The Turkish Republic has been officially declared on 29 October, 1923. The Ottoman Empire collapsed and it was transformed into the Turkish Republic as a nation state. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, and ruling political cadres aimed “the radical break with Ottoman Islam and its institutions” (Kandiyoti, 1991: 22; Coşar, 2007: 118, Durakbaşa, 1999: 139) and “the radical implementation of westernizing and secularizing reforms” (Azak, 2010: 9). A range of reforms and regulations were launched to build an independent Turkish state and to make it a modern and secular republic. Republican ruling elites considered that although there were some attempts for reforming traditional basic institutions during the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, none of them could be effective in preventing its collapse. For them, the main problem

in the implementation of reforms was “the compatibility of modernization with Islam” (Coşar, 2007: 115).

Because of that fact, Republican ruling cadres devoted themselves to achieve the complete transformation with extensive modernizing and secularizing reforms for the total break with Ottoman past and for the shift from Islamic culture to the original culture of Turks before they did not accept Islam. They asserted that pre-Islam Turks had a more egalitarian society in contrast to the Ottoman Empire and they worked to bring modernity to Turkish nation by reviving the pre-Islamic tenets (Keskin, 2002: 246; Soydan, 2002: 296). In this regard, the concept of *ummah*³ was replaced with the nation, and a traditional theocratic Islamic empire was replaced with a secular and modern Republic.

Accordingly, as the first sign of elimination of Islamic sources of power and the legitimacy of secular structure, the Caliphate was abolished in 1924. The same laws led to the abolition of Sheik ul-Islam⁴, the Ministries of Religion Affairs (*Şeriye*) and Pious Foundations (*Evkâf*). Instead of them, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was established and charged with the administration of religious activities (Azak, 2010: 10). Furthermore, with the Law of the Unification of Education, the education was made “a monopoly of state” and it was secularized in accordance with state ideology (Kandiyoti, 1991: 22). Another important reform made by the Republican government was that Sufi orders were banned in 1925. With that, all locals and central dervish lodges were dissolved (Azak, 2010: 10). After one year, the legal system was secularized with the adoption of the Turkish Civil Code which was inspired by the Swiss Civil Code (Azak, 2010: 11). Polygamy was outlawed and civil marriage was made legal as the only valid form of marriage. Women were granted with equal rights in inheritance law, applying

³ Islamic community bounded by religion. For a more comprehensive definition of Ummah, see Kim, D. W. (2018). *Religious Encounters in Transcultural Society*. The UK: Lexington Books, pp.69-83.

⁴ Islam’s legal authority of ummah. For the definition of Sheik ul-Islam, see Hzkowitz, N. (1971). *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*. The USA: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 57-58.

divorce, and having child custody (Kandiyoti, 1991: 22). In addition, in 1934, they gained the right to vote and to stand for both municipal and national elections.

Beside these progressive reforms, there were also important changes in the daily life of the people to adopt Western modernization and to secularize the society. In 1925, the dress code was applied. It imposed the compulsory use of the western brimmed hat and outlawed the *fez*⁵. Veils were discouraged in public spaces such as schools and civil service offices (Azak, 2010: 11). This was followed by the replacement of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin one in 1928, the adoption of European clock and calendar in 1926, of European numerals in 1928, and of European measures and weights in 1931 (Azak, 2010: 12). Therefore, reforms and regulations of the Republican government reflect modernizing efforts for the radical break with the Ottoman past, even in the everyday life of the people.

Through the socio-political transformation of the country, it is explicitly visible that women's lives have been influenced differently from those of men. While Muslim society underwent secularization and modernization process with a series of reforms, women began to possess the rights and status that they did not possess before. In comparison to their inferior position within the Ottoman Empire, their status started to be improved dramatically by granting unprecedented rights. Although all reforms opened up new doors for women in political, cultural, scientific and economic spheres, there is one more important reality.

The improvement of women's status in the Republican era is considered as a consequence of the state-feminism (White, 2003: 147; Tekeli, 1986: 193; Kandiyoti, 1991: 42; Durakbaşa, 1999: 141). As White stated, "a male-dominated state made women's equality in the public sphere a national policy" (2003: 145). At that point, the motivation behind the progressive reforms related to women's improvement was not the

⁵ The traditional headgear for men. White (2003: 149) defines that "headgear had been a sign of status and distinction during Ottoman times, the different types demonstrating rank, profession, and sex. It also was a sign of Islamic affiliation."

complete emancipation of Turkish women for its own sake, but was the requirement for the strong and representable symbol of modernization and secularization of a newly independent Republic. Lots of reforms pointed out to “the new positioning of the state vis-a-vis women” (Toktas& Cindoglu, 2006: 738). Republican ruling cadres, who wanted to acquire a civilized outlook and present modern state to Western states, realized the importance of women in the transformation process.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, each state has its own political ideology but this ideology is patriarchal in its nature. In such case, the positions and status of women are evaluated based on essentialist culture. They are primarily seen essential and important as a mother, a spouse and a housekeeper. As a result, they are idealized by depending on patriarchal culture into prevalent ideology of the state. During the Republican era, although the state created more egalitarian environment in contrast to Ottoman period, women’s traditional social roles were ideologically underlined in the state action as indicated in Chapter 2 as well.

Firstly, they were important because they were an explicit symbol of a new state (Kandiyoti, 1991: 41; White, 2003: 147; Tekeli, 1986: 193; Durakbaşa, 1999: 143). Equality of citizens, particularly gender-equality was promoted as the marker of new modern and secular ideology (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 91). In this case, Republican women reflected “the signifier of the break with the Ottoman past” with their westernized, modern, and secular appearances and their visibility in the public sphere (Keskin, 2002: 247). Secondly, based on their motherhood, women were seen as the primary persons who instill the ideological consciousness of the Republic into younger generations. They were “a necessary corollary of the Westernization efforts” because they were “a political expedient means of inducing cultural transformation” since they play significant role in the family for transmitting the dominant cultural beliefs and values to future generations (Toprak, 1990: 43).

In this regard, a new Republican woman was conceptualized and her subjectivity was constructed accordingly the prevalent ideology of the Turkish Republic. As Atasü described, a Republican woman was idealized as

a citizen free from the darkness of illiteracy, able-minded, patriotic, responsible, away from racist-religious fanaticism; productive not only domestically but also undomestically; aware of her rights of education, working and earning money, gaining property; confident of herself to be able to get through the social function men undertake, advocating monogamy, grateful to the Republic and strong with the desire of serving it (1998: 132 as cited in Özdemir, 2010: 102).

As well-understood from this description, the state demanded the proper type of women who were completely different from those in the Ottoman Empire and who would counteract their backwardness. And yet, a new Republican woman was constructed as educated, socially active in the public sphere, a trained homemaker and mother in the private sphere, and a modernly dressed woman. The state shaped women's roles in the compatibility with their values and principles, and accepted them as a main symbol and instrument of their ideology.

3.3. Education and Republican Women

As pointed out in Chapter 2, education is an important ideological state apparatus in which dominant ideology of the state is transmitted and instilled into pupils for the interests of ruling class and for their continuity in power. In this regard, as schools serve to reinforce existing ideology of the state and to protect its system of power through the transmission of culture as an apparatus, education was considered as crucial for required national transformation. Ruling leaders acknowledged education as the most effective way of transforming Ottoman values and culture into Republican ones with modern and secular understanding (Arat, 1999: 154). Thus, they established education system which would help the country to reach civilization of western world and also to legitimize political ideology of the state in the society.

In this case, when the education system was secularized with the Law of the Unification of Education, modern education depending upon scientific knowledge, rationality, positivist methodology and a secular world-view was founded (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 91). Schools became the important places in which citizens who were consistent with modern, secular and westernized self-image of the newly Republican established state were trained (Arat, 1999: 154; Soydan, 2000: 269). Ayata and Acar indicate that they successfully operated to produce

... independent-minded, free-spirited, intellectually accomplished, emotionally mature generations of young Turks whose self-definitions would reflect liberation from the control of religious and traditional sources of loyalty and an unchallenged commitment to such underlying features of modernism as science, the nation-state and the ideal of progress (2002: 91).

Thus, schools with their new education system and westernized curriculum took on the function of creating and constructing proper citizens as the state aimed. It is obvious that the government established an education system in which schools functioned as a cultural and social agent in spreading and reinforcing secular ideals of the Republican state and creating idealized citizens.

Within this kind of ideological system of education, as Republican women were considered having a significant symbolic and instrumental role for the legitimization of state ideology, their education became quite important for ruling cadres. Since the initial period of the reforms, the government supported the principle of male-female equality and women's equal participation in education with men (Arat, 1997: 99). For political cadres, unless women were educated, the society would not make a break with the Ottoman past and would not provide any development towards modernization. Thus, women were considerably included in the education system and their subjectivity was formed by considering their symbolic and instrumental importance for new Republican state.

In the case of their symbolic function, it is obvious that the Republican government radically supported Turkish women to take place into the public sphere with their westernized, modern and secular appearance, dressing and way of living. For this reason, they put particular importance on women's intellectual and scientific development. In this case, free and equal education was adopted and primary school education for both girls and boys became mandatory in 1924 (Kabasakal-Arat, 2003: 57). Then, co-education was instituted and women were strongly encouraged to take place into all levels of schooling (Gök, 2007: 96). By the 1931-1932 academic year, the total enrollment in secondary education increased 400%, and significantly, female enrollment increased six times in comparison to the number in 1923 (Kabasakal-Arat, 2003: 57). Republican women were promoted to work in the professions in which they had not been involved before that time. By 1938, they constituted 10% of all university graduates (White, 2003: 151). Remarkably, they began to have careers in the fields of medicine, law, engineering, civil service and other areas of social and natural sciences (White, 2003: 151). For instance, Atatürk's adopted daughter, Sabiha Gökçen studied aviation alongside with her male counterparts and became the first female combat pilot of the world. Through education, the state ensured women's intellectual/scientific development and their modernization. Thus, these women illustrated the level of civilization and modernization of the country to other Western states and symbolized new Republican state.

On the other side, in the case of their instrumental function, it is seen that women were educated to be future modern and secular mothers and homemakers who were the cornerstone of families. While the state promoted their public participation by the way of education and work, it continued to underline women's motherhood and housekeeping since they would reproduce and raise the future generations of the state accordingly the values and ideas that they learned through their education. In this regard, traditional gender roles were reinforced in the curriculum (Kabasakal-Arat, 2003: 58-7) and female pupils learnt "latest modern childrearing and household techniques from the

West” (White, 2003: 146). Thus, modern mothers of the new state was to be constituted by the education.

Obviously, from the point of view of ruling cadres, it was expected from Turkish women to break up their ties with their traditional lifestyle by being productive in both public and private sphere. Durakbaşa points out that the Republican government defected that Republican women should participate in social life and take social responsibilities as professional women alongside with their traditional gender roles of being a mother and wife (1999: 143). Schools in new education system was used to form this ideal type of women.

3.3.1. The Girls’ Institutes

There is a little intellectual and academic attention on education of schools in early Republican era and thus, the Girls’ Institutes. Few scholars make an attempt to examine the education system and the formation of ideal Republican women. However, it is the fact that the schools in general and the Girls’ Institutes in particular had a considerable role in constructing proper female subjectivity especially during the early Republican periods. In this regard, the Girls’ Institutes as vocational high schools were set up at the beginning of the Turkish Republic. In the late of 19th century, a number of industrial schools were established within the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of educating orphan girls to obtain a dowry for their marriage or to prepare military uniforms (Toktaş& Cindoğlu, 2006: 739). After the establishment of the Republic, they were converted into the Girls’ Institutes which provided certain type of education for Turkish women based on new ideals and principles of the newly established state. (Toktaş& Cindoğlu, 2006: 739). In this case, the first institute, the Ismet Pasa Girls’ Institute, was established in 1928 in Ankara. Gradually, this was followed by others in large cities and even in smaller cities. Over the years, the number of the Girl’s Institutes and total number of female pupils enrolled in these schools rapidly multiplied (Toktaş& Cindoğlu, 2006: 739; Arat, 1999: 163).

The primary aim of the Girls' Institutes was to train and create Republican Turkish women who would symbolize the state's westernized and modern ideology and who would raise the future generations in accordance with the ideological consciousness of the state. To construct Republican female subjectivity, the curriculum which aimed at instilling most essential values and skills for training the exemplary women of the new state was designed and adopted in the institutes (Gök, 2007: 97). Their curriculum was composed of both vocational courses and general high school courses. The regular high school programme was carried out through general courses which were Turkish, civics, geography, history, mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology, French, physical education and music (Gök, 2007: 97; Toktas& Cindoğlu, 2006: 739; Arat, 1999: 162). On the other side, sewing, tailoring, embroidery for white fabric, embroidery for coloured fabric, fashion-design, hat making, flower making, underwear making, clothing repair, ironing and starching, cooking, household management, child care and hygiene as vocational courses were taught in the Girls Institutes (Gök, 2007: 97; Toktas& Cindoğlu, 2006: 739; Arat, 1999: 162). General courses helped young women to learn skills and scientific knowledge. On the vocational course side, they learned "how to provide scientific and rational house management, how to look fashionable, how to dance, how to cook healthy meals, how to make a smart hat, how to entertain guest over the weekend and so on" (Ayata& Tütüncü, 2008: 379).

As a result of received education in the institutes, women became the ideal Republican woman who was socially progressive, active in the public sphere but also dutiful modern mother and wife at home (White, 2003: 146). On the one side, after the graduation, women started devotedly taking their place into the public sphere as teachers, high state officials, or civil servants to symbolize and spread Republican modern and civilized values (Toktas& Cindoğlu, 2006: 743). On the other side, as stated in Gök's study, they became

...modern women who were competent to prepare French-style dinner table settings and make fancy cakes, not *baklava*⁶ or

⁶ Turkish traditional dessert.

*tarhana*⁷, traditional Turkish foods which they thought their mother would make. Because they were going to become perfect women and housewives, they were envied and esteemed in the community in which they lived (2007: 100).

Therefore, new Republican women constructed as transformed from traditional Ottoman women who were merely confined into the private sphere to women who can be active in both spheres when they wanted.

It is clear that while the Turkish Republic was working to form the new ideal type of Westernized Republican women, schools were the instruments to construct ideal female subjectivity. The education inculcated the proper language, values, attitudes and way of dressing into young female pupils. Young Turkish women and their cultural roles became deeply engaged in the socio-political transformation. Republican female subjectivity was constructed on features symbolizing a newly established modern Turkish Republic and supporting its ideological existence by teaching primary values and beliefs to the younger generations.

3.4. Conclusion

All explanations show the ideological importance of women for a newly established independent state and how their subjectivity was constructed through schooling. From a brief historical analysis, it is understood that the first constructed femininity ideal has been created at the formation periods of the Turkish Republic. Based on their symbolic and instrumental importance, ideal women were formed and constructed by the state through the education. At the first glance, a constructed Republican woman is seen as the product of women's emancipation in the early Republican era. When granting equal rights to women in family, employment and education, and reforms in the way of dressing and behaviors are taken into account, it is considered that republican femininity ideal was the product of women's emancipation. However, in reality, it was only an

⁷ Turkish traditional soup made from dehydrated mixture of grain and yogurt.

important part of the socio-political transformation. At that point, the patriarchal interplay between education and state ideology becomes more visible and apparent. As Turkish women were put into defined frame of certain features and styles, they experienced patriarchal culture. In other words, although their emancipation led them to have different status and positions from those in the Ottoman Empire, their subjectivity was constructed under the impacts of certain traditional patriarchal beliefs.

Depending on gendered and essentialist understanding, the private sphere was accepted as women's sphere and being a mother and a housemaker is attributed to women as gender roles. Owing to the importance of their instrumental role, traditional gender roles of women were redefined during the Republican era. Whereas Republican women gained opportunities to participate in the public sphere equally with men, their domestic functions were ideologically underlined. Women became mothers who would reproduce and raise the citizens for the state according to the Republican principles, and became homemakers who would establish modernity in the private sphere. This means that new Republican femininity ideal reflects only public emancipation of women and the continuousness of gender hierarchy in the private sphere. The state promoted patriarchal structure of family. Similarly, education made women internalize this patriarchal operation. Through the interplay between the state ideology and education, gender roles were defined and imposed on Republican young women. They actively participate in the subjectivity construction and then, their gender roles.

Therefore, as Kandiyoti highlighted, Republican female subjectivity shows "emancipated, but not liberated" women (1987: 317). In the Turkish Republic, while women began to take their places into the public sphere, family and women's domestic functions in it remained as the authentic side of Turkish society (Parmaksız, 2016: 46). That is, Turkish women are not liberated from the private sphere and their domestic responsibilities.

CHAPTER 4

NEW HEGEMONIC POWER IN TURKISH POLITICS: THE AKP

4.1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the 1980's military coup d'état, the Kemalist regime started to confront strong challenges of religious groups under the proliferation of Islamism (Kaya, 2015: 52; Ayata& Tütüncü, 2008: 367). Especially by the late 1980s, political scene has experienced the relocation of Islamic identity in the public domains and thus, Islam and Islamic traditional codes of conducts have gained new momentum (Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 562). Such apparent visibility of Islam has particularly manifested its impacts on women as well. An ideal woman which was conceptualized by the Republican state has been also confronted with criticisms and challenges. For Islamists, those women were degenerate and immoral accordingly the Islamic codes and etiquettes (Acar, 1999: 287). While Republican ideology constructed women with a visible public participation, and modern and secular lifestyle, dressing and attitudes, religious-conservative ideology idealizes Turkish women in a different way. For this reason, the image of Republican women had been periodically challenged since 1980 (Keskin, 2002: 247). However, the major challenge and change have come to exist with the triumph of new political power; the AKP.

With this new hegemonic political power, Turkey has experienced another important socio-political transformation in its history. Political regime has been changed in the direction of the AKP's ideological stance as counter to Republican ideology. Through turning in dominant ideology of the state, women have begun to be sharply re-idealized and reconstructed accordingly ideological priorities of the AKP's leading cadres. Like the Republican state, the AKP and its government have realized the importance of

women in the transformation and they have started to work for new ideal woman which would fit into their beliefs and values.

Within this framework, this chapter aims to clarify ideological mindset behind the reconstruction process of female subjectivity. The chapter, firstly, provides a brief clarification of the AKP's ideological stance. Then, the chapter continues to specifically analyze existing gender ideology in the political culture. At that point, why and how women have become the instrument and symbol of another historical transformation is specifically analyzed. Finally, the chapter ends with the conclusion which demonstrates ever-growing power of patriarchy.

4.2. Composition of the AKP's Ideological Stance

In 2001, the group who called themselves as 'innovationists' established a new political party: the AKP under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Özbudun, 2006: 546). A year after its establishment, The AKP won a historic victory as one of pro-Islamic political parties in Turkish politics. On 3 November 2002, it won the parliamentary election with 34.3 percent of vote and almost two-thirds of seats in the parliamentary (Özbudun, 2006: 543). For the first time of Turkish political history, a political party with Islamic roots formed "the single-party majority government" (Şen, 2010: 60). From then on, Turkey has been witnessing the rise of a new political party inspired by religious values in its political structure.

Although it is a known fact that the AKP and its leading ruling cadres have a closer relation with the RP and *Milli Görüş Hareketi*⁸, the AKP portrays and displays different ideological stance from those of previous pro-Islamic political parties. That is, the party differentiated itself from other traditional Islamic parties and Islamist movement, *Milli*

⁸ National Outlook Movement is the Turkey's Islamist Movement began in 1970s under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan who was the former prime minister of Turkey (1996-97). For more on *Milli Görüş Hareketi* see Yang, C. & Guo, C. (2015) National Outlook Movement in Turkey: A Study on the Rise and Development of Islamic Political Parties, *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 9(3): 1-28

Görüş Hareketi, since it no longer pursued anti-Western attitudes and radically supported Islamic ideology as others did (Çavdar, 2010: 343-4). Since its inception, the AKP has adopted “conservative democracy”, not *Milli Görüş*, as a new political ideology with particular focus on the respect for secularism, democracy, social peace, social justice, pluralism, neoliberal economy alongside religious-moral values and norms (Çavdar, 2010: 344; Kaya, 2015: 53). Thus, from the outset, the party and its ruling cadres tried not to act as a descendant of previous Islamic parties and constituted “a new understanding of conservatism”.

However, as Çakmak pointed out, an Islamic party founded by liberal Islamists did not mean that “the party would not Islamize the secular regime, especially when the AKP’s intention to broaden its support base without alienating the traditional constituency of the Islamist movement was taken into account” (2009: 836). Therefore, the constitution of new conservative understanding is considered, especially by secularist groups, as a tactic to dispel doubts about the party’s religious rationality and to hide its religious intentions.

In the political history of Turkey, pro-Islamic political parties have been closed down by the military intervention and the Constitutional Court. The MNP, established in 1970, was outlawed by the Constitutional Court following the military intervention in 1971. Similarly, the MSP, founded in 1972, was closed down after the military coup d’état in 1980. After that, the RP was founded in 1983. It came to power in the coalition government in 1996 and also became the first most powerful Islamic party in Turkish political history. However, the government policies and party’s actions created serious frictions with the military and secular structure of the state (Özbudun, 2006: 545). In 1997, this resulted in 28 February Process in which military strongly criticized the government and took strict measures about their religious activities (Özbudun, 2006: 545). Eventually, the RP was banned in 1998 by the Constitutional Court since it violated secular principles. Lastly, the FP, established in 1997, was closed down in 2001 due to same reasons. This history of pro-Islamic parties and especially 28 February Process obviously helped the AKP understand how the military tutelage closed down its

predecessors that radically worked to establish Islamic political order in the preceding years. As Özbudun underlined,

The Turkish constitution is strongly committed to secularism, and parties that are found to violating these secularist principles run the risk of being closed down. As a result of the closure of the RP and FP, a group of former Islamist politicians seems to have reached the conclusion that challenging the secular state in Turkey is a dead-end. The AKP represents the transformation of political Islam into a moderate conservative democratic party (2006: 547).

For this reason, the AKP exhibited its differences from its predecessors with its new understanding of conservatism by identifying itself as conservative democrat.

This ideological stance of the party is clarified in the handbook entitled *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*⁹. In the handbook, firstly, it is stated that the AKP's understanding of conservatism is against both "the radicalism and the elitism of political projects of social engineering" (Kaya, 2015: 34). The party criticized "political communities which radicalize politics" and presented a more moderate image of the center-right than previous Islamic parties (Özbudun, 2006: 548). Secondly, it is explained that the party's conservatism is not against "the new" and advocated the change in comparison to traditional conservatism which rejects the change (Özbudun, 2006: 549; Kaya, 2015: 54). In this regard, the party "shifted to democracy and free-market economy and developed a sociality recognizing individual freedoms" (Ertuğrul, 2012: 162). And thus, while the party became attractive to different segments of the society by portraying itself as different from radical Islamic political communities, it became able to legitimize its ideology and to cover its religious intentions.

⁹AK Party and Conservative Democracy was written by Yalçın Akdoğan in 2003 in order to inform Turkish society on the party's official political identity and purposes. The handbook can be obtained from the official website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, available at: <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/handle/11543/2633?locale-attribute=en>, lastly accessed in January, 2019.

Indeed, the AKP's conservative democracy is argued to be American neoconservatism, and religion still has a central place in this ideology (Ertuğrul, 2012: 163). In his study, Ertuğrul states that "... the AKP adopts neo, not traditional conservatism because neoconservatism does not reject change for the sake of preserving the old... And, the basic catalyst of this change is religion. Therefore, the AKP turns back to the Ottoman Empire in projecting its vision of Turkey's future in terms of its identity and interests" (2012: 164-7). He sheds light on the actual ideological position of the AKP. In this regard, from the religious perspective, Turkey and its society are idealized with the socio-political structure of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the history of Turkey, Islamic groups have desired to traditionalize the society by creating ideal Ottoman society (Yılmaz& Bashirov, 2018: 1822). Therefore, although the AKP displayed a more moderate and affirmative ideological portrait, its idealization of socio-cultural and political spheres is not very different from previous Islamic parties.

In this regard, during its first term (2002-7), the party often focused on its strong commitment to Western democratic values and liberal economic principles, contributing to Turkey's aim to join in European Union. However, since the beginning of its second term (2007-11), the situation has begun to change. Moral notions and religious values have increasingly become dominant in the party's rhetoric and actions concerning the regulation of social, cultural and political spheres (Acar& Altunok, 2012: 14). Indeed, although the AKP has achieved to take over executive power through successful elections, it was unable to consolidate its power until 2007 (Kaya, 2015: 50). During his presidential years, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a secular President, had an active role in remarking and restricting the AKP's certain activities which would lead to threats towards secular regime with his power and veto legislation. With the ending of his presidential term, the new President became Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan's ally and an important members of the AKP. Therefore, the impacts of any challenges that presidential vetoes would create have been eliminated to some extent.

Subsequently, the AKP took the steps to criminalize military intervention in the politics through a number of court cases, and achieved to reduce military influences (Esen&

Gümüşçü, 2016: 1584). Moreover, in 2010, its government passed a constitutional referendum regarding the higher courts and Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Esen& Gümüşçü, 2016: 1585). By the end of 2010, especially with the politicization of judiciary, veto players in the political system has been suppressed. The party has become able to dominate political institutions and governmental mechanisms in the direction with its ideological values and interests. From then on, political regime and dominant ideology of Turkey has begun to shift from the Republican and secular one to neoconservative one. And thus, the AKP has begun to work for concretizing religious-conservative society by presenting its neoconservative ideological identity¹⁰ more radically than before.

4.3. AKP's Neoconservatism and Women

Based on neoconservatism, the AKP has launched a comprehensive and visible project to increase the domination of religion and social morality to transform socio-political spheres into their idealized religious structures and organizations (Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 557). The conservatization and Islamization of the Turkish society have come to foreground. Within this ideological project, the AKP has discerned the importance of women for aimed transformation and situated them at the center of its religious-conservative agenda. They have positioned women as the cultural essence and attached moral values and religious sentiments to them by taking their attributed social positions and roles into consideration (Ayata& Tütüncü, 2008: 384). Thus, the party's gender ideology forms the core of its aimed gradual transformation.

¹⁰ Reducing the AKP's identity of governmentality to only neoconservatism can be found as insufficient since neoconservatism is one part of its political agenda. However, this study merely focuses on religious project of the party to provide the Islamization and conservatization of Turkey, and addresses the research problem in the frame of neoconservative ideology. For this reason, neoliberal identity of the party is briefly mentioned as one part of its neoconservatism which differentiated its conservative stance from traditional conservatism.

During its first term (2002-7), while presenting the strong commitments to democratization because of the impetus of European Union process, the AKP and its government promoted women's rights and gender equality with progressive legal regulations (Koyuncu& Özman, 2018; Ayata& Doğangün, 2017; Ayata& Aybars, 2019; Ayata& Tütüncü; 2008). Nevertheless, as aforementioned, this term only reflects the AKP's efforts to present itself as more moderate and affirmative and to gain supports of various segments of the society. During these periods, the party and its government only strategically and pragmatically supported equality of women with men. However, by the second term (2007-11) and the suppression of veto players in the system, the AKP changed its political atmosphere, especially about gender equality and their ideological approaches to women (Koyuncu& Özman, 2018: 1). In this case, their so-called focus on gender equality began to shift towards focus on women's ideal positions with their traditional gender roles (Ayata& Aybars, 2019: 61).

In reality, in its religious-conservative mindset, The AKP approaches women based on biological determinist understanding derived from the Islamic notion of *fitrat*, which literally means "original disposition", "God-given characteristics" or "the nature, prescribed by Islam" (Göktürk, 2018: 661; Acar& Ayata, 2002: 96). As aforesaid in Chapter 2, biological determinism reduces behavioral patterns to different characteristics and capacities on the basis of the inevitable biological nature of men and women. Relying on this understanding, it is believed that women and men have biologically different capacities and liabilities which create complementary division of labor in the society.

In the similar vein, the AKP adheres such approach with its political mindset by underlining the significance of considering *fitrat*. In a meeting in 2010, Erdoğan, the leader of the party, devoutly stated that he does not believe in equality between men and women. He prefers to say equality of opportunity because for him, women and men are

different and complementary with each other¹¹. Obviously, the notion of *fitrat* claims that women and men have their peculiar existences and they are equipped with unique capabilities and liabilities which are different from and complementary with one another (Ünal, 2015: 14). Therefore, the AKP differentiates women's nature from that of men and asserts that women have different individual liabilities which fit them into their so-called gender roles and positions.

In this regard, the AKP's neoconservative ideology primarily relates the constitution of social morality/religiosity with women's modest and chaste way of living, behaviors and physical appearance. First and foremost, they conceive of women as a main source of social morality and religious order within the familial domain through their uncontested gender roles (Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Ayata& Tütüncü, 2008; Çavdar, 2010; Ayata& Doğangün, 2017; Acar& Altunok, 2012; Ünal, 2015; Cindoğlu& Ünal, 2017). In the context of neoconservative ideology, being a woman is primarily defined through their familization, exclusively their care-giving roles. Second, although the party's conservatism centers women on the political and cultural importance of mothering, ruling cadres also underline the significance of their veiling in line with Islamic values and beliefs. Veiled women, in this regard, are acknowledged as the significant marker of social morality and religious order with their chaste, modest and decent appearances (Cindoğlu& Ünal, 2017: 50). Therefore, the AKP, as a religious-conservative political party, sees women's familization and veiling as vital for the sake of conservatization and Islamization of Turkish society.

4.3.1. The Familization of Women

While the AKP and its government work for the constitution of morality in the society and the conservatization of socio-political domains accordingly Islamic values and norms, they have firstly put a particular importance on family which is accepted as “a

¹¹ For his full statement, see <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz---318006-siyaset/>, lastly accessed in February, 2019.

primary moral pillar of the society” and on women’s leading position in it (Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 561). As Acar underlined,

Islam is particularly careful and elaborate on the issues of family and relations between sexes as forces that are crucial in the maintenance of order and assume central roles in the process of societal regeneration. In this context, women in their capacity as wives, mothers and home-makers are viewed as social agents responsible for creating and maintaining harmony in family life and socializing the young in the line with Islamic principles. This attributes paramount importance to women in the ideology of Islam (1999: 282).

Adopting this perspective in its neoconservative ideology, being a woman is firstly defined through their familization.

To put it more explicitly, the AKP, in its mindset, rejects non-familial lifestyle, especially for women in the name of protecting moral order. In the Islamic doctrines, it is expected from women to be devoted to their husbands and families. They should not show themselves to stranger men and should not keep in close contact with them. Pre-marital courtship and intercourse are forbidden for them. Their main responsibility is assumed to establish a family and being a loyal wife and an affectionate mother (Acar, 1999: 285). Depending on this perspective, the AKP disapproves of any contacts/relations before marriage and underlines the establishment of family as a crucial requirement for moral and religious order.

In the familial domain, ideologically main emphasis is put on women’s motherhood. They are conceptualized as “sacred mothers who is the keystone of the family” and “the guardians of social morality” (Acar& Altunok, 2012: 17-8). Women have been primarily idealized with their maternal functions, most crucially as a mother within the private sphere since they are accepted as primary individuals who would instill their moral-religious consciousness into future generations. According to Erdoğan, women who refrains themselves from motherhood and prefer to have a work life are “deficient” and

“incomplete”. They only reject their femininity.¹² Obviously, the party reduces womanhood primarily to motherhood and works to confine women within the private sphere due to their so-called natural capacities and liabilities.

In this case, since neoconservatism “identifies the state with the task of setting the moral-religious compass for the society” (Brown, 2006: 697 as cited in Acar& Altunok, 2012: 15), the AKP and its government displayed interventionist attitudes towards the familization of women in the authoritarian way. For the purpose of separating women from the public sphere and confining them into private sphere, they have implemented some incentive policies. Examples abound. Working mothers’ salaries and right to retire early are made dependent on the number of children that they have. Severance pay began to be provided to women who leave their jobs one year after they are married (Nazlıaka, 2017: 51). It is clear that the AKP government works to encourage the familization of women.

While idealizing women as a mother in the private sphere, the party attempts to control their bodies and reproduction since the reproduction means the production of ideological subjects. Erdoğan defined ideal number of children by stating that “at least 3 children are necessary in each family”¹³. Further to such defining, the AKP and its government have taken initiatives to control women’s reproduction accordingly their ideological priorities and interests. In a public meeting in 2012, Erdoğan made another statement that abortion is murder¹⁴. Upon his statement, the amendment of legislation proposing the ban on abortion appeared on the political agenda of the party. However, it failed and the

¹² For his full statement, see <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkeys-president-erdogan-says-childless-women-are-deficient-and-incomplet-a7067126.html>, lastly accessed in February, 2019.

¹³ For his full statement, see <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-neden-3-cocuk-istedigini-acikladi--siyaset-1650260/>, lastly accessed in February 2019

¹⁴ For his full statement, see <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18297760> , lastly accessed in February 2019

government claimed the control over women's reproduction with laws passed through statutory decrees (Kaya, 2015: 61). Following that, Erdoğan stated that he is against C-sections for "the protection of the Turkish family and national power" because it leads women to have fewer children (Ayata& Doğangün, 2017: 619). In this vein, legal changes have been made, which restrict C-sections to medical emergencies (Ünal, 2015: 13). Moreover, Erdoğan warned doctors about being insistent on natural childbirth and not making abortion (Kaya, 2015: 61). In recent times, especially in state hospitals, there are no abortion services or abortions are made without anesthesia as a punishment (Kaya, 2015: 61). Thus, women's bodies become the side of their familization and neoconservative politics. The party and its government reduce women's sexuality to procreation and perceive women's bodies/wombs as a factory which produces required religious subjects.

It is obvious that the AKP accepts the importance of family and women's position in it for sake of new cultural transformation of Turkey. They idealize women as their political and social instrument of neoconservative ideology. As a mother, women are accepted playing a central role in the family for transmitting religious beliefs and values to future generations. Thus, womanhood essentially defines through women's familization within the private sphere due to their so-called natural capacities.

4.3.2. Islamic Symbolization of Women

For the Islamization and conservatization of Turkish society, another important point is women's public chastity and modesty. In non-familial areas, women are expected to behave and dress modestly and chastely in the name of the protection and maintenance of social morality and religious order. In this regard, women's modes of conducts, behaviors and physical appearance in accordance with Islamic conception of morality become the focal point of religious identification of the society.

In the Islamic doctrines, women's chastity and morality are religious requirements. It is believed that women are the source of temptation and seduction to men due to their

nature. To maintain morality in the society, it is needed to avoid attention of strange men. Since women are accepted as inherently having precious, sensitive and weak human nature, they should be protected and covered when entering into non-familial areas (Stromquist, 2013: 117-6). In this case, moral attitudes and veil become a religious necessity to protect women from being sexually attractive to men and thus, threatening the social order of the society (Acar, 1999: 290). However, while women's decent behavior and dress code is religiously required to provide moral order in the society, women's veiling has another significant role.

As Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu pointed out, physical appearance and dress code of women have always been an important symbol of political ideology in Turkey. Hence, covering head symbolizes Islamic ideology and assumes “a special position for challenging self-image of secular and Republican order of Turkish state and society” (2008: 520). In this regard, veiling is a signifier which labels one as Islamic (Stromquist, 2013: 121-2). The visible majority of veiled women justifies the society which has a religious characteristics. Central to this justification, the status of women's morality and chastity becomes the marker of the Islamic-conservative ideology. Veiling, in turn, symbolizes both “fundamentalist vision of female chastity and public decorum” (Özyeğin, 2009: 107).

Depending on this perspective, the AKP emphasizes on the importance of veiling accordingly its Islamic priorities and ideological purposes. According to Çavdar, while the party mentions women within the context of family, they also emphasize them with regard to the veiling issue (2010: 344). Although the party worked to lift ban on veiling in the name of respect for freedom of religious expression, it is obvious that they promoted veiling due to its symbolic and practical importance compatible with their conservative ideology. As aforementioned in Chapter 3, during state formation period, women's dressing and appearance was the central for the secular image of the state. Veiling was depicted as the backwardness of the Ottoman past. Although it was not banned, it was strongly discouraged through the promotion of Western, modern and secular appearance of women. Subsequently, dress code in the university was introduced

and veiling was officially banned in 1982. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the ban began to be applied in the civil services (Saktanber& Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 519). In 2008, the AKP, however, passed two constitutional amendments and lifted the ban in universities. Following this regulation, the AKP government lifted ban in the civil services as well in 2013.

It is clear that while the party has provided the turn in dominant ideology of the state having gradually suppressed secular actors in the system since 2007, it has strengthened the status of women who cover their heads. With the legal changes regarding veiling issue, veiled women become highly visible as counter to women who were constructed in the line with secular principles of the Republic and symbolize religious-conservative ideology of the AKP.

4.3.3. A Venue for Neoconservative Gender Politics: KADEM

The AKP's neoconservative gender politics are circulated in the statements of the party's leader and members, legal regulations and social policies. However, one of the most effective venues that the party uses to spread and reinforce its neoconservative gender politics is civil society. With the supportive initiatives of the AKP in 2013, KADEM was established by Sümeyye Erdoğan, the daughter of the president Erdoğan, and a group of women who are relatives of the party's members. It is obvious that the association is not independent from the state and it functions based on the state agenda. As Koyuncu and Özman stated, the AKP and its government established "their own civil societal actors, instrumentalizing women's rights and legitimizing its rule" (2018: 3). That is, KADEM constitutes a visible institutionalization of the state's gender politics compatible with its religious values and beliefs.

In the literature, such type of civil society organizations are labelled as Government Organized Non-governmental Organizations (GONGOs). GONGOs are "the creations by the state of seemingly civic organizations to influence the realm of civil society in a way that directly supports state power" (Doyle, 2017: 252). In the similar vein, KADEM

is, as a GONGO, exclusively created to disseminate and spread the AKP's ideology of gender relations and women's positions. Its declared official objective is to "to cultivate a consciousness of traditional values and their practice in real life among the Turkish women" (Diner, 2018: 104).

Significantly, while KADEM works to disseminate and reinforce conservative gender ideology, it points out traditional gender roles and the concept of gender justice. In other words, the association actively and strongly supports the AKP's understanding of *fitrat* and gender ideology as the main axis of its ideological stance (Koyuncu& Özman, 2018: 8). Sare Aydın-Yılmaz, the former and founding president of KADEM, states that

Women and men must be regarded as two equivalent entities with the same essence, complementing each other... Thus, within this scope, "gender justice" is a term [...] highlighting the different features and characteristics of men and women by nature, and acknowledging different liabilities between men and women attributed by society and culture (2015: 112-13).

Through the concept of gender justice, it is attempted to internalize gendered division of labor between men and women and women's leading social roles; being mothers and homemakers.

Since its foundation, the association organizes Gender Justice Congress every year and hosts government officials (Diner, 2018: 105). In addition, they organize summit conferences and panel discussions at both international and national level. Through all of these organizations, the association underlines traditional gender roles and gender hierarchy. The problems of women are reduced to the problems of domestic spheres and familial issues. Empowerment of women is only discussed in the context of private sphere and veiling issue. It is explicit that KADEM works to disseminate and reinforce collective consciousness for the conservatism of women and thus, society. Accordingly the AKP's neoconservative gender politics, it uses every opportunity to remind the importance of women as mothers, homemakers and chaste individuals of Muslim society.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter shows that with the triumph of the AKP, Turkey has witnessed the transition in dominant political ideology; from secularism to neoconservatism which is new counterpart of political Islamism, and thus, experienced another historical transformation. The AKP puts religion at the center of changes after decades of secularism. In seeking to establish a new Islamic state and society, like in the state formation period, it realizes women's role for the transition. Women have become the core part of gradual Islamization and conservatization. The state, in its new political regime, embarks on idealizing and conceptualizing women who would serve their ideological transformation with their religious-conservative culture.

In this regard, the AKP demands the type of women who are different from Republican women with their morality and chastity. They profoundly relate social morality and religious order with the status and roles of women. They conceive of women as main source, constituter, protector and symbol of new Islamic Turkey. Owing to the integration of patriarchal senses in Islamic doctrines, women's way of living, attitudes, dressing and bodies have been idealized, theologized and politicized as compatible with prevalent conservative ideology.

In the AKP's gender ideology, women are primarily confined within the private sphere. Since family is accepted crucial to functioning of neoconservatism and as the natural locus of women, they are placed within the private sphere. Their main obligations are idealized to establish a family, devote themselves to their homes and thus, constitute social morality and reproduce moral-religious subjects. To promote this situation, their bodies and sexualities are idealized and controlled as well. Moreover, while the state supports the confinement of women into private sphere, it ironically utilizes the visibility of veiled women in the public sphere based on their political interests. Veiled women is seen as an important protector and symbol of religious-moral order of the society. In this way, Turkish women are once again put into defined frame of particular features and styles. Thus, while whole modern world is fighting for a more egalitarian and non-

hierarchal environment for women, patriarchy continues to be embedded in all socio-political structures and organizations in contemporary Turkey.

CHAPTER 5

IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS

5.1. Introduction

During the state formation period, Imam-Hatip schools were established as vocational schools which educate young men for religious services. However, they have begun functioning much more than training religious functionaries over time. Their structural/systematical changes and proliferation throughout the country have been always closely related with the development and mobility of the Islamic movement in Turkish politics. In recent time, Imam-Hatip schools are in the most powerful period of their history. With the rising power of the AKP, they have unequivocally become one of the most effective ideological state apparatus.

Through their education, they inculcate religious consciousness and value system into pupils and thus, contribute to Islamization of society. They produce pious and devout generations that are highly required to consolidate the AKP's ideology in every aspects of life. While producing religious subjects, it also transmits patriarchal culture and produces gendered subjectivities idealized by the state. In this context, before accurately analyzing ideological reconstruction of female subjectivity in the following chapter, this chapter tries to demonstrate politicization and ideological function of these schools. In this regard, it respectively explains the origin of Imam-Hatip schools, their politicization and their unprecedented empowerment under the rule of AKP.

5.2. The Foundations of Imam-Hatip Schools

As aforementioned in Chapter 3, newly established Republican state paid a particular attention to education system. Through the enactment and implementation of the Law on

the Unification of education, education system was secularized and unified, and state-control over education was established under the authority of the Ministry of National Education. At the same time, in the line with law, *madrasas*¹⁵ were closed down and religion was eradicated from the schools' curriculum (Sarfati, 2016: 153). In this regard, with the thought that there was no remained place for correct religious education, the Law on the Unification of Education stipulated with Article 4 that vocational schools which would train religious functionaries required to be established under the Ministry of Education (Sarfati, 2016: 153; Özgür, 2012: 33; Acar& Ayata, 2002: 91). Subsequently, the state established and opened Imam-Hatip schools for the purpose of “the cultivation of enlightened “*imams*”¹⁶ and “*hatips*”¹⁷ who preached loyalty to a secular nation-state” in 1924 (Çoşkun& Şentürk, 2012: 166). Therefore, Imam-Hatip schools were founded as vocational schools with a four-year education as other middle schools had (Sarfati, 2016: 153). However, at the end of 1929-1930 academic year, these schools were closed down due to the lack of demand (Sarfati, 2016: 153).

One year after the transition to multiparty system in 1947, some reforms concerning religious education were made. Imam-Hatip schools were reopened in the form of Imam-Hatip Programs to overcome criticisms of secularism by Islamic-conservative segment of the society (Sarfati, 2016: 153; Çakmak, 2009: 830). These new programs gave ten months education and a certificate to graduates who desired to work as an *imam* or *hatip* (Sarfati, 2016: 153). In 1950, the CHP, which formed the government as a single-party of Kemalist regime since 1923, lost the general election and the DP, the supporter of conservative values, formed the new government. The DP transformed Imam-Hatip programs into “full-fledged vocational high schools which provided a seven-year education” (Sarfati, 2016: 153). In this regard, Imam-Hatip schools were founded as vocational schools as similar as during the initial periods of the Republic.

¹⁵ Religious schools or seminaries in the Ottoman Empire

¹⁶ Prayer leaders

¹⁷ Preachers

However, in that time, they began to grow in a different way with a huge demand and interest of conservative circles.

5.3. Politicization of Imam-Hatip Schools

From their foundations, Imam-Hatip schools are “the site of contestation between two competing political ideologies” (Sarfati, 2016: 146). They have been always a significant part of Turkish politics. However, the participation of the MSP in a coalition government in the 1970s led to an important turning point for them. During the MSP’s period in the government, their status and number significantly changed and they began to be visibly politicized (Sarfati, 2016:155). The MSP followed the path of the MNP which was by most account the first visible expression of political Islam in Turkish politics, and sought to disseminate Islamic values. While the party worked to spread and reinforce traditional religious values, it realized the prominent role of Imam-Hatip schools. Imam-Hatip schools were considered as primary places where a new moral and religious generation who would transform Turkey could be trained. Therefore, in the party’s first ten months in the coalition government, new 29 schools were opened. Due to the MSP’s key position in the government, the opening of new schools was accelerated (Sarfati, 2016: 155).

At the same time, in 1973, the MSP’s government enacted the Fundamental Law of National Education. With this law, Imam-Hatip schools began to function with a mandate not only to train pupils to perform as religious functionaries but also to prepare them for higher education as other high schools did (Acar& Ayata, 2002: 92). As a result of this structural change, graduates of the schools have become able to study in other majors such as law, political science or economics. Thus, Imam-Hatip schools began to have functions more than training religious functionaries.

Beside such a critical development, another significant change was that in 1975, female pupils were officially accepted into Imam-Hatip schools (Çakmak, 2009: 832). With the acceptance of girls who could not be prayers or preachers according to Islamic rules, Imam-Hatip schools have become strongly an alternative to secular high schools. As a

consequence of all these changes, the MSP achieved to improve Imam-Hatip schools' prosperity and influence (Özgür, 2012: 47). As Sarfati pointed out, "the MSP never hid its interest in Imam-Hatip schools and saw them as a tool, through which it could realize its self-declared goal of spiritual development for Turkey" (2016: 155). Obviously, the MSP politicized these schools in the line with its ideological interests and purposes.

In the 1980s, the ANAP was in the government which was another conservative party. During its period, due to the military control, the number of Imam-Hatip schools did not change remarkably. However, despite this situation, some efforts were made to improve their capacities and qualities. Firstly, instead of opening new schools, new buildings as additional campuses were established and opened (Sarfati, 2016: 155). Secondly, the ANAP founded Anatolian Imam-Hatip schools which provided "more elite education" in comparison to its counterparts with its instruction of a foreign language besides Arabic (Özgür, 2012: 49; Sarfati, 2016: 156). The main intention of establishing such schools was claimed as to train prayers and preachers serving outside the country. According to Çakmak, Islamist groups aimed to make their gains permanent and realized the significance of conducting strong relations with external circles to protect their gains (2009: 834). In this regard, foreign language education in these schools had a politically pragmatic importance. At that period, most of graduates also went to foreign countries for their higher education. Therefore, although the ANAP did not lead to quantitative changes, they achieved to improve the status of the schools.

However, in the 1990s, the situation began to change. For the first time of Republic, Islamic political party, the RP, was the largest party in the parliament. With the RP's rise, Islamic discourses expanded and competed with secular ideology. Political Islam peaked and began to be considered as a main threat to existing political regime (Çoşkun& Şentürk, 2012: 167). In the line with these thoughts, Imam-Hatip schools were seen as "the Islamist political backyard" or even "the Trojan Horse within Turkish state" (Sarfati, 2016: 157). In this case, when the National Security Council took a series of decisions to suppress rising power of political Islam through 28 February Process in 1997, there were some decisions regarding education system of Imam-Hatip schools.

The first decision was that the duration of compulsory education was increased to 8 year and thus, middle-sections of Imam-Hatip schools were closed (Çakmak, 2009: 836; Özgür, 2012: 54; Kaya, 2015: 57). The second decision was that scoring system of the university entrance exam was changed and coefficient factor was instituted (Çoşkun& Şentürk, 2012: 167). It became nearly impossible to study at any majors other than the divinity for graduates. In an obvious way, graduates were prevented from working in some important state institutions such as army, judiciary or police force. Thus, schools' functions was restricted to produce only religious functionaries and political effectiveness of their functions decreased. However, this restriction and state-control over the schools continued until the power of the AKP.

5.4. The AKP and Imam-Hatip Schools

The AKP has a visible Islamic priority in the education system on the basis of its neoconservative ideology. For the party and its government, education is a crucial sphere to indoctrinate the masses with utilizing their prevalent ideology (Kaya, 2015: 55). As explained in Chapter 2, schools are accepted as prominent social and political agents of the state since they disseminate and reinforce its dominant ideology and legitimize its ideological power through the transmission of hegemonic culture and the construction of idealized subjects. In this sense, Imam-Hatip schools as a primary state apparatus of Islamic movement are remarkably on the agenda of the party. For the permanent Islamization and conservatization of the society, the promotion of Imam-Hatip schools is put at the center of educational system. The AKP and its government work to improve both quantity and quality of these schools with their incentive policies and outstanding mobilization of its facilities.

In this regard, the AKP has firstly aimed to eliminate the restrictions of 28 February Process on Imam-Hatip schools and to equate religious and secular degrees (Sarfati, 2016: 157; Kaya, 2015: 55). They believe that coefficient factor put Imam-Hatip schools' pupils at disadvantaged position in accessing higher education and thus, important professional positions. For this reason, in 2004, the AKP proposed a new draft

law on granting Imam-Hatip schools equal opportunities with secular schools in university entrance exam (Sarfati, 2016: 157). However, although the parliament accepted the draft, Sezer vetoed and returned the draft to the parliament. Since the AKP and its government did not want to present any anti-secular image, they shelved the law (Sarfati, 2016: 157). After the gradual weakening of secularist actors in the system, the AKP passed the law which removed the coefficient factor in 2009. They have shifted the status of Imam-Hatip schools from vocational schools to “Religious Education Intensive Regular High Schools” (Çoşkun& Şentürk, 2012: 168). Thus, their graduates regained the opportunity to pursue any field of study. Subsequently, in 2010, the AKP government has made possible to convert general high schools into Imam-Hatip schools to increase their number all around the country (Elveren, 2018: 120).

In 2012, it passed another new law concerning education system. The new law, popularly known as 4+4+4, lengthened compulsory education from eight to twelve years. With the extension in compulsory education time, a new educational system was introduced where pupils have to study four years in the primary school, plus four years in the middle school and then four years in the high school education (Kaya, 2015: 57; Sarfati, 2016: 158; Elveren, 2018: 120). As a result, the middle school sections of Imam-Hatip schools were reopened which were closed with 28 February Process, and pupils gained opportunity to study in Imam-Hatip middle schools from fifth grade. Thus, children graduated from primary schools became able to receive religious education, and they are steered into the instillation of religious consciousness at earlier age than before. In the meantime, Imam-Hatip schools have become more mainstream educational institutions that produce conservative and religious youths for idealized Muslim society (Pak, 2004: 333).

Moreover, in 2017-2018 academic year, the AKP government decided to change the exam system for high school admission. They abolished TEOG¹⁸ and established the new system. In the new system, pupils are to be placed in high schools based on their

¹⁸ Entrance Examination for the High School, applied between 2014 and 2018

home addresses. It is expected from them to fill out their selection form by choosing high schools closest to their residence places. In this case, many pupils can be automatically registered in any schools because of address-based registration system. When increasing number of Imam-Hatip schools and their proliferation in the neighborhood are considered, it is clearly understood that the AKP government works to encourage the mandatory placement into these schools and thus, aims to make them more prevalent in the education system.

In this regard, the AKP has achieved, as a result of all these changes, to align the education with its religious-conservative ideology. Since it came into power in 2002, the status and position of Imam-Hatip schools has been improved and their number has been dramatically increased. According to the annual report of Eđitim-Sen, the number of schools and pupils has been considerably increased during the rule of the AKP as demonstrated at *Table 5.4.1*. Although their numbers increased moderately between 2002 and 2011, the number of newly opened Imam-Hatip schools and their pupils has been significantly increasing since 2011 (2018: 6-7).

Table 5.4.1. Number of Imam-Hatip Schools and Total Number of Pupils, 2002-2018

Academic Year	Number of Schools	Number of Pupils
2002/'03	450	71.100
2003/'04	452	90.606
2004/'05	452	96.851
2005/'06	453	108.064
2006/'07	455	120.668
2007/'08	456	129.274
2008/'09	458	143.637
2009/'10	465	198.581
2010/'11	493	235.639
2011/'12	537	268.245

Table 5.4.1. (continued)

2012/'13	708	380.771
2013/'14	854	474.096
2014/'15	1.017	546.443
2015/'16	1.149	555.870
2016/'17	1.452	506.516
2017/'18	1.604	514.806

Source: Eđitim- Sen Report: The Status of Education at the Beginning of 2018-2019 Academic Year

Furthermore, for the Eđitim-Sen, beside incentive policies and regulations, financial investment of the state to Imam-Hatip schools is another important contribution to the improvement of the schools. According to the report, the Ministry of National Education does not allocate any funds to public schools, and receives financial supports from the parents. However, it mobilizes all monetary resources for Imam-Hatip schools when the subject is their improvement (Eđitim-Sen, 2018: 6). These schools are supported in terms of all respects, and their all expenses are paid by the state. Obviously, the AKP sees them as its social and political agents and works to strength its position in the national education system.

5.5.Conclusion

It is explicit that whereas Imam-Hatip schools were initially established to further secular aim of the state, providing state-control over religion, these schools have undergone transformation, and become ideological state apparatuses of the Islamists. As akmak highlighted, “they are schools where the Islamist movement is reproduced” (2009: 837). In this regard, they have inevitably become one of the major components of the AKP’s aimed transformation in the national education system. Ruling cadres acknowledge Imam-Hatip schools’ education as the most effective tool in national education to transform secular and Western value system into Islamic-conservative

culture. These schools form the places where the new conservative understanding is placed and internalized. Within such ideological system of these schools, required citizens who would consolidate the AKP's aimed Islamic structure of society and culture with their religious-conservative ideology are trained and produced.

CHAPTER 6

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY AT IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS

6.1. Introduction

Chapter 4 explains the AKP's religious-conservative ideology and the subordinated status of women in it, and Chapter 5 demonstrates how Islamist groups and thus, the AKP have used Imam-Hatip schools as an ideological apparatus. Having previously clarified these points, this chapter turns to delineate the patriarchal interplay between the AKP's religious ideology and education of Imam-Hatip schools by analyzing the reconstruction of female subjectivity. While elaborating this, it takes female graduates' educational and social experiences and personal thoughts on womanhood as a source of knowledge.

Within this framework, the chapter firstly clarifies that for pupils/graduates, Imam-Hatip schools are not ordinary schools that provide a standardized-education due to its religious-conservative characteristics. Thus, the chapter highlights their uniqueness from viewpoint of graduates. Secondly, it explores the way in which education and school culture in Imam-Hatip schools integrate pupils into patriarchy and construct gendered female subjectivity. Thirdly, the chapter moves on to analyze the definition of being a woman in graduates' mindsets. Finally, it examines female graduates' ideas on women's questions in Turkey to analyze their perspectives about current political system and patriarchal structure.

6.2. Why Imam-Hatip Schools: Their Distinctive Features or Characteristics

Findings of the research demonstrate that at the first step, the preferences of young women to study at Imam-Hatip schools depend on either desires of their families or their personal desires. Most of graduates state that their families wanted them to study at Imam-Hatip schools. However, in the line with findings, it can be said that the parental expectations and female pupils' own expectations from Imam-Hatip schools reflect the same frame. In this frame, the motives why young women prefer to attend Imam-Hatip schools are characterized with certain features of their educations and institutional structures.

According to findings, the one of most important motives is that Imam-Hatip schools provide a qualified education for youths. In this sense, the significance and dominance of religion in educational training has an attractive factor for both families and pupils. As pointed out by Özgür in her study, Imam-Hatip schools aim “to cultivate religious sensibilities in their students, to heighten their awareness of faith and to promote the notion that religion should play a substantial role in the life of individuals and society” (2012: 64). At that point, graduates underline that Imam-Hatip schools differ from other secondary high schools with its extra religious education. For them, the mixture of religious and humanistic sciences produce more qualified education, and train their pupils both intellectually and spiritually.

If I had to study in the high school again, I would again choose to study at Imam-Hatip school. Our scores were enough for studying at any other secondary high school, but despite our high scores, we preferred to attend Imam-Hatip schools. At Imam-Hatip schools, we were able to receive both religious education and humanistic, scientific education (Interview 8, 2019).

Studying at Imam-Hatip Schools is a privilege. As a result of your education, you have come to a certain degree of privilege in terms of religion. And, at the same time, you have come at the same level with your peers in terms of your scientific education (Interview 17, 2019).

In addition, graduates point out that Imam-Hatip Schools are only venue for learning correct Islam and producing proper moral and pious Muslims.

Imam-Hatip schools teach Islam in the most correct way and train a conscious, pious Muslim. In other words, in my opinion, it is an important feature that Imam-Hatip schools produce those who know their faith, their religious sensitivities and those who are right Muslims. Every schools provide a certain form of education, but Imam-Hatip schools seriously educate people who know meaning of humanity. They not only teach mathematic or geography, but also being a person who know the meaning of humanity. At Imam-Hatip Schools, it is a matter of bringing you closer to humanity instead of moving away from humanity (Interview 22, 2019).

I think that Imam-Hatip schools are the most suitable schools for a Muslim country. We learn religion and other scientific knowledge together. In this sense, the most important point is that we learn our religion in the most precise and correct way (Interview 21, 2019).

For them, Imam-Hatip schools are only secondary educational institutions that serve proper values for Muslim Turkey. In this respect, graduates highlight religious education of Imam-Hatip schools which prevents pupils from being filled with wrong beliefs.

With the dominance of religious education in Imam-Hatip schools, other distinctive characteristics of schools, and thus, motives behind preferences of Imam-Hatip schools are formed. In this regard, another important motive is that graduates dissatisfied with other schools' environment. Most of graduates insist that Imam-Hatip schools have different environment from other secondary high schools. For them, whereas there are "immoral" relations, and students have "detrimental habits" at other high schools, as Özgür indicated in her study, Imam-Hatip schools have a moral and sound environment that it is impossible to find at any other school (2012: 109).

The environment in this world, especially the environment at the present time, directed me to Imam-Hatip schools. The environment of Imam-Hatip schools is nowhere to be found. I studied at secular middle school and I was learning immoral

attitudes or courses. Most of my teachers or my friends disliked Islam and I was discriminated. Then, I started to study at Imam-Hatip High schools. Definitely, the environment, the behavior of the teachers are different from that of other school. At Imam-Hatip schools, jokes are made without overstepping the limits. For example, the principal warned us about our clothes in a more comfortable way because he knew that we would meet his warning with respect. Or they were warning my friends who put on makeup. Everyone paid attention to warnings because everyone had great respect towards their teachers or principals who were elder. Students in other schools did not have such respect (Interview 3, 2019).

The potential of students is very different ... I do not know how I can describe this now. But, there is a consciousness at Imam-Hatip schools. More conscient people... Those who know what to do, when, where should do and how to behave people. Teachers are teachers, students are students. Everybody knows their positions and limits (Interview 5, 2019).

I grew up in Kazan province in Ankara. There were few high schools in the province. We [she and her family] first considered Anatolian High school since my score was enough...The atmosphere in Anatolian High school was not good. I heard from my acquaintances that there were students who used drugs. I was afraid of that environment. I am the first child of my family and they did a lot of things to bring me up in a right way. My father directed me to the very best, so I went to Imam-Hatip school (Interview 20, 2019).

This finding supports Sarfati's study (2016: 163) in which it is explained that atmosphere of Imam-Hatip schools instills spiritual principles in pupils. As a result, pupils avoid improper behaviors such as violence, using drugs, drinking alcohol and criminal activities. However, some of graduates whom I have interviewed also argue that some pupils, who prefer Imam-Hatip schools because of their low scores in high schools entrance exam, affect the environment adversely and damage the image of Imam-Hatip schools. As Ayata and Acar (2002: 94) indicated, some families sent their naughty children to Imam-Hatip schools for discipline.

Firstly, I can say that there are no any distinctive features of Imam-Hatip schools. At the past, we received both theological

and scientific education. We learnt both of them. Environment was distinctively good. Social circle was good and it was composed of people who know themselves. However, nowadays, families sent their children who received low scores [in exam for high school admission] to Imam-Hatip schools. Indeed, members of Imam-Hatip schools should be veiling, pious, virtuous and polite people. Now, they are not like that (Interview 10, 2019).

The current environment of Imam-Hatip schools is not like that of our parents. It is really not good. Scores for the entrance of Imam-Hatip Schools should be higher! All persons who are free, alcoholic, and use drugs are at Imam-Hatip schools. However, being the members of Imam-Hatip schools has a religious aim. We are virtuous and pious Muslims (Interview 11, 2019).

Moreover, according to Özgür (2012: 94), female pupils are veiled due to their faiths based religious consciousness and Imam-Hatip schools are only schools allowing and encouraging veiling. Findings support her study and show that together with other motives, being the only secondary school which condone veils has an important effect in decision made by female pupils and their parents.

I was a student after 2002, but before the removal of the coefficient factor. I graduated from my middle school. Then, I took high school entrance exam. I preferred to study at Imam-Hatip schools because of my veil. It is my choice. I have veiled and had to go to Imam-Hatip schools. Otherwise, I would have experienced difficulties at any other high school (Interview 15, 2019).

Besides these, the separation between male and female pupils and the discouragement of any social interaction among them are motives that lead female graduates to attend Imam-Hatip schools. According to Sarfati, conservative families are more likely to send their girls to these schools because of their more acceptable gender relations (2016: 165). Thus, religion-based justification and patriarchal values integrated in it shape the preferences of female pupils and their family for Imam-Hatip schools.

In the light of these information, it is safe to say that although there are different motives that encourage students to attend Imam-Hatip schools, the primary motive that shapes all

other motives is Islamic education and Islamic understanding of life embedded in social and structural organization of the schools that other general high schools do not have.

6.3. Being an Imam-Hatipli ¹⁹

While being aware of distinctive characteristics of Imam-Hatip schools, female graduates are proud of distinctive identity that these schools inculcate into them. During the interviews, most of female graduates point out that being an *Imam-Hatipli* is a “privilege”. Unsurprisingly, they believe that dominance of religious education and its combination with general scientific education make them advantageous and superior in comparison to others who are studying or were graduated from other ordinary high schools. One of graduates whom I have interviewed highlights that

I am much more well-educated than other youths. I am advantageous in terms of religious education compared to other people who are graduates of general high schools. Similarly, I am advantageous at the point that I could learn my religion in the most correct way. The notion of being a pious Muslim makes me superior to others (Interview 13, 2019).

As pupils learn a certain belief and value system based on Islamic traditions, norms and practices, they accept themselves as “distinct”. They significantly highlight that they have the distinct honor of being members of Imam-Hatip schools. One graduate states that “we are distinct from our peers and other people with our moral and virtuous consciousness” (Interview 17, 2019). And other adds that “being a member of Imam-Hatip schools is a distinction. We learn our religion from our education not from fictitious assumptions. I develop my identity through my education based on correct norms and practices” (Interview 2, 2019).

In the similar vein, some of them who were students or were graduates before the removal of coefficient factor and the ban on veiling associate this privilege or distinction with being a missionary youths. It is a fact that the coefficient factor handicapped

¹⁹ Being a member of Imam-Hatip schools.

pupils of Imam-Hatip schools. Their grade point average was multiplied by a coefficient of 0.3 whereas that of other high schools' students was multiplied by 0.8 (Özgür, 2012: 56). As Özgür highlighted, this situation positioned graduates of Imam-Hatip schools at an immense disadvantaged position (2012: 56). However, female pupils experienced this situation differently from male ones. Because of veiling, Imam-Hatip schools were only secondary educational institution in which they could wear their veils. In this case, despite handicaps of the coefficient factor, they insisted on the education in these schools. Thus, they interpret being an *Imam-Hatipli* as being a missonaristic youth who paid a price for being a part of Imam-Hatip schools.

The privilege... We are individuals who know responsibilities of Muslim generation. We are persons who learn our religion in the correct way. We are strong. Now, there is no the coefficient factor, but in our time, there was. We took a risk to be a member of Imam-Hatip schools (Interview 22, 2019).

In our time, there was the coefficient factor. Even if I could receive 100 score from YGS²⁰, I could not study in any field that I want in higher education. I paid a price for that. I had become a student of Imam-Hatip school while knowing this reality. People saw us as dangerous religious people who support Sharia. We have a mission through this marginalization towards us. So... I do not know what means being a member of Imam-Hatip schools for current students, but for me and my peers, it means having a mission (Interview 12, 2019).

Findings of research also show that graduates believe that being an *Imam-Hatipli* is also equalized with being a role model for the society. This finding supports Akpınar's study which clarifies how Imam-Hatip schools' pupils see them as role model of "exemplary Islamic moral society" (2007: 166). It is obvious that through their education, pupils learn religious norms and conduct all relations by taking Islamic values into consideration. They become the symbol of Islamic way of living, or in their words, rightest way of living. One graduates indicates that

²⁰ The Higher Education Entrance Exam in Turkey, applied between 2010-2017

Being member of Imam-Hatip schools means being a role model. Our stance, moral values, spirituality... Any member of Imam-Hatip schools symbolizes faithfulness and sincerity towards corrupt relations embedded in the society (Interview 21, 2019).

In sum, for graduates, members of Imam-Hatip schools reflect those who share the privilege of knowing Islam in the most correct way, who are distinct with their morality, who take a risk to have this identity and who are the role model for the rightest generation of Turkey.

6.4. Education of Imam-Hatip Schools

In the line with findings of research, graduates explain that in the context of its religious education, Imam-Hatip schools teach (1) main principles of Islam, (2) moral, religious and national values, (3) traditions and customs, (4) social roles attributed to a woman and a man, and (5) how acceptable and exemplary social relations should be in Turkish society. In this case, it is obvious that education of Imam-Hatip schools reinforces students' attachment to Islamic values and beliefs, and shapes the process of their identity construction.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, through their formal and informal education, Imam-Hatip schools attach importance to religious values and heighten Islamic consciousness of their students. While the schools formally inculcate Islamic knowledge through their religious courses of the curriculum, they also informally instill Islamic way of living and acting. In her study, Özgür (2012: 66-67) underlines such educational structure by stating that

Education at Imam-Hatip schools is an amalgam of two elements: formal curriculum and experiences. Formal curriculum denotes the subjects which teachers intentionally plan and teach to their students in organized and structured ways. Formal curriculum refers to what students learn or are exposed to in classrooms, assemblies, and planned school activities. Experience refers to what students learn by simple being in school. The experience side of education includes everything that student learn and internalize informally or passively through

their interaction with peers, teachers and the powerful aesthetic and normative environment that surrounds them.

Therefore, it is crucial to examine their informal educational activities besides formal curriculum to understand main values and characteristics for desired citizens. As a matter of fact that education in Imam-Hatip schools is different in each schools. The formal side of education reflects same system since official curriculum and textbooks are standardized by the state. However, the informal side of education varies from the school to the school because of different approaches of principals and teachers. For instance, one of graduate states that

Social relations vary from the school to the school based on their principals' attitudes and conservatism. For example, my cousin is also a graduate of Imam-Hatip Schools. In her school, even giving their girlfriends hug was accepted as a wrong manner. It was thought that when she hugs her friends, boys around also want to hug them. Hugging was seen as a shame! I have never experienced such a situation. Actually, my principals were not as crazy as their principals (Interview 12, 2019)

In this regard, considering differences in their educational activities and the school cultures, educational experiences of graduates in both formal and informal side of Imam-Hatip schools' education are significantly analyzed in the following parts of the chapters.

6.4.1. Formal Education

The formal curriculum of Imam-Hatip schools is designed by the state to instill most essential values and skills to train exemplary Muslim citizens in general and modest women in particular with the Islamic syllabus. As graduates stated, it is a mixture of vocational courses and general high school courses. General high school courses, called as secular-scientific courses, are same courses that other high schools teach. They are Turkish language and Literature, History, Geography, Psychology, Sociology, Mathematics, Biology, Physics, Chemistry, Foreign Language, History of Principles and Reforms of Kemalism, Physical Education, Music, and Virtual Arts. On the other side,

vocational courses are religious courses, and they are Qur'anic Exegesis (*Tefsir*), Hadith (*Hadis*), Islamic Jurisprudence (*Fıkıh*), Islamic Theology (*Kelam*), Creeds (*Akaid*), Religion, Culture and Civilization, Preaching and Vocational Training, and Arabic language.

Current curriculum is made up approximately 55 percent of general high school courses and 45 percent of vocational courses.²¹The ratio of vocational-religious courses to general courses in the formal curriculum has shown alternations at some periods, especially in line with ideological priorities of the state. When the coefficient factor was in the practice, as Akpınar (2007: 162) said, more than half of classes were religious ones. However, with the removal of coefficient factor, the percentage of general courses has strategically increased. One graduate states that

We had courses such as biology, philosophy, sociology, history and mathematics...On the other side, we had religious vocational courses such as Hadith, Qur'anic Exegesis, Qur'an, and Islamic Theology. Until the coefficient factor was removed, we had more vocational courses. However, after the removal of coefficient factor, we began to take more secular scientific courses (Interview 7, 2019)

Similarly, Özgür explains that when the schools became the institutions which not only educate pupils for religious functions but also for other professional areas, more general courses into the curriculum were introduced and their percentage outweighed that of vocational-religious courses (2012: 69). In this regard, higher percentage of general courses in current curriculum is only used as a tool to prepare pupils for different field of study in higher education and to increase the number of graduates in different professions.

²¹ The weekly curriculum of Imam-Hatip schools can be obtained from the official website of the Directorate General of Religious Education, available at: https://dogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2018_04/10184800_01123902_20180014_02_AYH_L_Haftalik_Ders_Cizelgesi_2018-2019.pdf and at: https://dogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2018_04/10185043_27143646_104_AYHL_Fen_So_syal_Bilimler_Haftalik_Ders_Cizelgesi_.pdf, lastly accessed in March 2019.

Pupils are still significantly engaged in religious education, especially in comparison to other high schools. Differently from other pupils, they considerably learn main principles, tenets and rituals of Islam and adopt Islamic culture as the way of life. In this case, while learning Islamic culture, they also internalize patriarchal culture. For instance, according to Anwar, Qur'an and hadiths justify gender hierarchy and different constituters of femininity and masculinity. The embodiment of religious beliefs and values stated in Qur'an and hadiths form different identities for men and women on the theological basis that they are naturally created different (2006: 94).

Therefore, it is obvious that through their formal education, Imam-Hatip schools distinctively transmit Islam as basic philosophy of knowledge and thus, its counterpart; patriarchy to pupils. This formally instilled knowledge has important reflections in the school culture and pupils' experiences.

6.4.2. Informal Education

While formal education teaches Islam as the basic philosophy of education in government-directed curriculum, informal education inculcate the faith traditions through extra-curricular elements of education at Imam-Hatip schools. The extra-curricular elements reinforce religious consciousness and construct Imam-Hatip school experiences. Through experiences, religious pervades the all sphere of socialization and forms the characteristic of pupils. In this regard, the most important point is that through extra-curricular elements based on Islamic religious consciousness, Imam-Hatip schools reinforces certain type of subjectivity that the pupils' identities have, and counters gender inequality. By depending on this context, extra-curricular elements embedded in discourses, manners, contacts and activities in Imam-Hatip schools are critically analyzed.

6.4.2.1. A Dominant Discourse of ‘*Fitrat*’

In the culture of Imam-Hatip schools, gender differences between males and females pertains to *fitrat*. In this respect, it is accepted that women and men have different *fitrat* and thus, different social positions and roles. The notion of *fitrat* constitutes different gender identities attributed to females and males. Based on this notion, pupils are trained at Imam-Hatip schools. As stated by one of graduate that “the meaning of *fitrat* are explained and taught at the Imam-Hatip schools and pupils support this notion” (Interview 1, 2019). And other adds that

Fitrat is important...For the development of the society, for knowing appropriate positions for women and men. In the recent times, people are trying to construct relations based on this [fitrat]. Everybody should accept this [fitrat] (Interview 21, 2019).

For them, *fitrat* is an important concept in determining what sort of behavior and roles in the society and social order are appropriate for them. Most of graduates believe that there is a fair distribution of social roles between female and male due to their different natures, and this values every aspects of social life. In other words, they support the notion of gender justice or equal opportunity.

I do not think that women and men are equal creations. We are different because of our nature. We can be a mother. We have a more fragile nature [than that of men]. We are more emotional [than men]. We have less psychical power [than men have]. Are they like us? No. They are strong. They have a logical intelligence. In the present times, there is a trend supporting that women and men are equal and women can do everything that men can do. [Come on!] Women have their own characteristics and beauties. We are different. I do not support equality. I support justice which takes human nature coming from the creation into consideration. It provides balance between women and men. Everybody has responsibilities in accordance with her/his own natural differences and characteristics, and contributes to the course of life by sharing them [responsibilities]. This is right for me, but also for Islamic values (Interview 22, 2019).

Therefore, female pupils adopt the notion of *fitrat*. Most of pupils or graduates believe that women and men are not equal. They are naturally created different to complete each other and to help the society keep functioning. They internalize their gender roles and positions within themselves. And thus, this understanding of *fitrat* form other dimensions of their lives. They determine their ideals and life aspirations by taking their so-called natural capabilities and liabilities into consideration.

6.4.2.2. Segregated Social Interactions and Contacts

Many studies in the literature (Acar& Ayata, 2002; Akpınar, 2007; Özgür, 2012; Pak, 2004) explain that Imam-Hatip Schools are profound secondary institutions in Turkey which maintain gender segregation in the practice. As aforementioned, since practical experiences can be vary from the school to school, the level of segregation is also various. In this context, findings of the research show that some schools assign different classrooms for female and male pupils in the shared buildings to prevent any interaction between two sexes. At some schools, they occupy different buildings in the shared campus. One graduate whom I interviewed points out that

During my first two years, my classroom is coeducational. After two years, one building has been constructed and we [female and male students] were separated. Our social interaction was good [among female students]. Our principals or teachers did not allow us to interact with male students. That's why, separate building is constructed (Interview 11, 2019).

On the other side, as also understood from her explanation, at some schools, there is co-educational classrooms for certain years. For example, female and male students are educated in same classrooms for the first or second years, and then, they are separated in their second or third years. Furthermore, in the case that they share same classroom, they share desks only with members of same sex students. One of graduates critically underlines that

We had a coeducational classroom. But, in our classroom, female students sat at the desks on the one side and male

students sat at the desks on the other side [of the classroom]. Even this demonstrates explicit example of borders between female and male students (Interview 18, 2019).

In the similar vein, even students share same classroom or same building, there is a minimal interaction and communication between them, or sometimes there is no. A few of students assert that they have a good communications with male students. However, most of them underlines that when it is required to interact with opposite sex, conversations are held in most modest and defined way.

According to findings, at the schools, female pupils spend their times with their same sex friends. When the question; is there any social interactions between students such as doing a homework, studying or having a lunch together is asked, it is observed that most of them say 'yes', but without taking opposite sex groups into consideration. They all have social interactions with female students, not male ones. When it is wanted them to answer that question by considering male students as well, they once again highlight that there is no social interaction, even friendly, among different sex groups.

This situation is explained based on religious norms embedded in schools' culture and on the fear of disciplinary penalty. According to Acar and Ayata, the fundamental nature of school culture is formed by the importance given to the discipline (2002: 97). Similarly, one graduate says that "even if I communicated with any male relatives, I was punished by the discipline" (Interview 11, 2019).

Our social environment was quite different. In our school, we had more moral and better environment [than that of other secondary high schools]. We did not have coeducational classrooms. There was no interaction between female and male students. [Otherwise] We received a warning (Interview 22, 2019).

Our school was coeducational. At my first year, I have many male friends since I did not lose myself in the atmosphere of the school yet. 'Elder sisters' [who are senior] frequently warned me [because of this situation]. Once, I met with my male friend outside the school. I do not know how our principal learn this

meeting, [but] (s)he invited me to her/his office and gave an advice. I tried to defend myself. What I experienced! Then, I lost myself in the environment of the school in my second year. I started not to interact with boys. I did not meet with my old friends. Even I started not to greet them. I became just the model of Imam-Hatip schools that my elder sisters and teachers wanted (Interview 9, 2019).

If you are a member of Imam-Hatip school, you have to be part of framed identity. You have to be virtuous and pious. You have to know your borders. Even if when you make any mistakes as you are teenager, you are punished (Interview 6, 2019).

However, to ensure segregated environment, schools authorities strictly control female pupils. One graduate explains that “there were segregation between male and female pupils [in my school]. Boys were always free. They were acting how they want” (Interview 10, 2019). That is, girls’ behaviors and relations are restricted and significantly controlled. In this environment, pupils uphold social norms that their schools inculcate and start to construct their identity in accordance with this frame.

Findings also show that such emphasis on certain segregation among pupils does not have same visible influences in the interaction between the students and teachers as in the relations among them. When the issue concerning the relations between the students and teachers, particularly opposite sex teachers, is addressed, many graduates state that they have good relations with their all teachers regardless of their sexes. For them, as Imam-Hatip schools have a different moral and social environment, corrupt relations cannot exist. In this case, the interaction between the pupils and the teachers are defined as quite moral, virtuous and sound. Even, some of them describe their relations like father-daughter or brother-sister relations. One of graduates highlights that “the relations between the students and the teachers are like the relations between father and daughter or sister and brother. When it was required, all students could interact with their teacher conveniently” (Interview 14, 2019). Another says that,

There is no any discrimination as we are students of Imam-Hatip schools. No differences in terms of social interactions... We are different only in terms of physical contact. For example, for us

there is a threat to break our wudus. Except physical contact, there is no difference in our social relations... I could interact with whoever I want. It did not matter they were male or female teachers (Interview 8, 2019).

It is explicit that gender segregation visibly takes its place through the interactions among pupils. On the other side, the relations between teachers and students seem not to have any apparent segregation among the sexes. However, the borders and restricted positions of both parts are underlined. Therefore, in the culture of Imam-Hatip schools, social interactions are segregated and contacted based on Islamic beliefs which set invisible but perceivable barriers between two sexes in the public life.

6.4.2.3.Segregated Practices of Courses

Formal curriculum that is standardized and approved by the state are same in all Imam-Hatip schools. However, their practices can be varied and thus, different in each school. According to Özgür, the manner of teaching can change based on teachers' personal style of teaching (2012: 69). In this vein, findings also reveal that although male and female pupils share same classrooms, gender segregation can be experienced through the practices of courses in some cases.

Although approximately all of graduates state that there is no specific courses for female pupils, some of them explain this situation with the word 'officially'. In other words, they indicate that there is no 'officially' different type of courses for girls. At that point, when it is considered on unofficial side of courses, one of graduates enlightens this situation with her words,

Female students could not participate in the course of Physical Education. This course is [seen as] break-time for the girls. [However] Boys immediately wore their sweat-suits and went to exercise. In my senior year, to change this situation, Religious Music courses started to be given to female students. While male students were at the course of Psychical Education, female students were taking Religious Music. So, we were hymning. (Interview 9, 2019).

While this explanation is minute, it is remarkable. In Acar and Ayata's study, one female teacher indicate that everything can be considered as a sin in these schools, even psychical education (2002:97). It shows that while religion and its patriarchal senses are reference point in setting school culture, female pupils may experience segregation through the practices of courses. It is explicit that the practices of courses can be segregated in accordance with essentialist gender roles attributed to women and men.

Graduates also argue that when sensitive issues are discussed in the courses, lectures are separately given to female and male pupils.

There was no specific course for female students, but there were some sensitive issues. In this case, in order to provide correct understanding, the issues were explained to female and male students separately such as the issues about menstruation period or washing bodies for funeral (Interview 17, 2019).

In addition, in their period of menstruation, female pupils do not participate in some courses.

When female students were menstruating, they were too embarrassed. In such times, we wrote the names of the girls who were at menstruation period on the paper and then put it on the desk of teacher to be exempt from the courses in which we recited Qur'an. Teacher did not bother these female students. Other male students understood the situation and female student felt embarrassed (Interview 9, 2019).

That is, religious doctrines in the school culture segregate female and male pupils. The control of sexuality and the protection of morality are important in the Islamic doctrines. When the issues about their bodies or biology are discussed, the courses are given separately to boys and girls in accordance with the ethnics of Islam to protect the morality. In this regard, segregated nature of the schools' culture can continue to exist in the practices of some courses. Male and female pupils can experience the practices of courses in a different way although it is not officially standardized.

6.4.2.4. Extra-Curricular Activities

According to findings, after school hours, female pupil preferred to go to their home because they were either tired due to long hours of courses or not allowed to spend their time outside by their parents. In addition, some of them went to private teaching institution for the University Entrance Exam, and a few of them went to Qur'an courses in their free time.

In this regard, if their schools organized any activities, they preferred to go to these extra-curricular activities. They convened after school hours and organized debates on specific religious issues or competition for hadith memorization. They attended in conferences that were organized in their schools. Similarly, they preached sermons among female students.

Except the courses, there were conferences. We emphasized the issues such as religion, current position of Islam in Turkey, its [Islam's] significance, its [Islam's] empowerment, how we can contribute to this [Islam's empowerment]. In addition, we have organized debates on certain issues (Interview 21, 2019).

Except official courses, some students voluntarily preached during the lunchtime at the part of the school's mosque which was separated for female students. I have done this [preaching sermons] twice. Who wanted to listen, attended [sermons]. Or as teachers would be there, they were there as well... Additionally if school organized any program, I always participated in it. Hadith memorization, sermons, Friday prayers... (Interview 9, 2019).

It is seen that students continue to be engaged in activities which focuses on Islam and its traditions. In this respect, it is safe to say that through both formal and informal side of education at Imam-Hatip schools, despite differences in each schools system and structures, all students are trained mainly based on religion and the Imam-Hatip schools produces young generation which has a strong religious consciousness.

Female pupils experience this system differently from male pupils. Through all –formal or informal- educational activities, gender segregation and patriarchal understanding are

rooted in all spheres of social environment at the Imam-Hatip schools. Thus, women are not only trained on the basis of Islamic norms, values and practices, but also they learn and accept segregated structure which make them inferior to men as a natural characteristics of social order. In this case, new type of female subjectivity start to be reconstructed at Imam-Hatip schools.

6.5. Being a Woman from the Eyes of Female Members of Imam-Hatip Schools

According to findings, in general, female graduates describe being a woman as being “privileged”, being “strong” and being “superior”. Although these words have different meanings in the dictionary, the main idea behind them for the graduates are the same. They repeatedly identify being a woman with having particular biological and social characteristics.

At first, some of them emphasize that women are the unique creation in comparison to men. They have feminine features in their identities and these features make them unique. In this case, graduates whom I have interviewed associate female identity with being emotional, fragile, sensitive and virtuous. For them, thanks to their unique characteristical features, being a woman means “privilege”.

I see being a woman as being the most beautiful human who has privileged characteristics. However, I think that women who value themselves can live this privilege. By valuing, I mean that I am against the competition between men and women. I am against feminism. Allah creates a woman with some features. Why do women compete with men? I am a woman and I am like a woman. Allah creates men differently. Why I consider myself as equal to them? If I know my femininity, I value myself with my feminine features. I live this privilege. Women should also know their femininities and identities to be a woman (Interview 2, 2019).

Being a woman in popular feminist understanding is nothing. I am, as a woman who gave birth, so different from men. Women are different in terms of many things... [They are] More fragile... the symbol of elegance, the symbol of emotional

power. Popular feminists are more sexist. Equality as a notion corrupts features which make women a woman. Woman is created by Allah differently from men (Interview 12, 2019).

I would not want to be a man. I like to get dolled up. I like dresses as clothes. Additionally, I am an emotional person. Men should be stronger [than women] because of an exhausting routine of the life. I am not like that. I am not angry. I have features attributed to females (Interview 15, 2019).

Second, they assert that women are “strong” because they are mothers and they have many responsibilities.

I think being a woman means staying strong because the woman has many responsibilities. Before anything else, she has many responsibilities since she raises a child. A mother is an important factor in raising healthy individuals. That’s why, being a woman means staying strong. She shoulders responsibilities for her child (Interview 5, 2019).

Being strongest... Women have power. I associate this power with being a mother. If I define this power by depending on a man, I would say that it is protecting life. But, for women, it is a responsibility. For instance, my future goal... It is claimed that woman cannot handle working and being a mother together. I will do because I am strong and I am a woman (Interview 7, 2019).

By being a woman, they mean being strong and powerful to struggle against all difficulties and responsibilities of motherhood.

In contrast to these graduates, a few of them describe being woman as a difficulty in current societal structure. For them, current society is degenerated and women are seen as a sexual object since religious doctrines are less effective in the recent times.

For me, being a woman is a good thing. [But] It is not a good thing in our society. [Women are] People who are depreciated, and who are seen as a sexual object... Women are mentioned with their bodies. In the Ottoman Empire or Islamic periods, being a woman was a good thing. The respect towards women was high at those periods. In recent time, women appear with

their bodies. At the same time, being a woman is dangerous in the present time. Even if women wear *the çarşaf*²², men look abusively at women. They are continuously under the pressure (Interview 11, 2019). □

Therefore, it is seen that they have diverse ideas on being a women. However, they mutually identify female subjectivity with their biological nature and social characteristics. They evaluate being a woman by relying on gendered conceptualization of sexes and their gender roles in the social life.

6.5.1. Ideas on Women’s Position in the Private and Public Sphere

6.5.1.1. Ideas on Marriage and Motherhood

When ideas on marriage and motherhood are analyzed, it seems that the majority of graduates are in the same opinion. While defining being a women with regard to so-called social roles and positions, it is not surprising that for most of them, marriage and family are important life goals. As Akpınar indicated, Imam-Hatip schools pupils believe that women are naturally created to be a mother and wife (2007: 174). In this vein, getting married and being a mother is accepted as their primary responsibility coming from their *fitrat*. Marriage and motherhood complete their womanhood with their *fitrat* and provide their self-actualization. Thus, according to graduates, every young women who came of their ages must be married and a mother.

In this respect, the findings of research show that most of them disapprove of women who continue their lives without getting married or being a mother. While some of them describe this situation as “deficiency” or “misfortune”, some underline societal dimensions of the situation. In the former case, one of graduates states that “living without being a mother is deficiency. Every woman wants to be a mother” (Interview 3, 2019). Similarly, another explains that

²² Full body garment that only expose women’s eyes.

Think that you have a dress and you will go to the party. Your dress is really good. It looks good on you, but your look is incomplete. There is a lack of pieces which would complete your look such as shoes, clutches, or jewelries. So, living without getting married or being a mother is like that... This life will be completed with having a child (Interview 6, 2019). □

On the other side, in the latter case, they emphasize that being bachelor is not welcomed by the society and women are labelled as “spinster”. In other words, being bachelor or not being a mother is seen as an abnormal situation in the societal perspective. For them, not to be stigmatized by people, women should be married and a mother.

Women can continue their lives without getting married and thus being a mother. But, it would be difficult. If they are not married when they enter in any social environment, they are called as ‘spinster’. People underestimate them. It is impossible to be a mother without getting married. But also, if they are married and not a mother, they are again underestimated. People think that they have health problems (Interview 13, 2019).

I think it is a bad thing... There are many women who are ‘spinster’ and all of them have some psychological problems. They do not know how to behave in the society. They have behavioral disorders since they do not talk to anyone, or are not busy. They want to attract attention. People do not have to take cares of anybody every minute (Interview 11, 2019).

In contrast to these ideas, a few of them state that they are planning to continue their lives without marrying or having children, and see this situation as normal in compared to other graduates. For instance, one of them state that

I want to continue my life without getting married and not being a mother. Women do not need these [marriage and motherhood] to be accepted by the society. They can do somethings more than these [marriage and motherhood]. Everyone can be married and have a child. There is no points that need to respect. If one woman produce, do science, change someone’s life, respect and love herself, I respect to her. (Interview 9, 2019).

Nevertheless, despite diverse approaches to marriage and motherhood, graduates mostly find both of them important and serious for women's lives.

Findings show that graduates are in agreement that marriage is a serious commitment. For this reason, pre-marital period has a distinctive importance. Approximately all of them assert that pre-marital sexual experiences are socially and Islamically unacceptable. Without marriage, women and men should not live together and women should not be a mother. Women should wait to marry and be loyal to their future husbands. Their personal religious conviction leads them to avoid involving in any pre-marital relations and thus, sexual experiences. When the question: could a woman live with a man without marriage is asked, they directly relate this type of relationships with sexuality. Thus, they evaluate the situation by focusing on pre-marital sexual experiences and disapproving of it. Despite this, they are not against the pre-marital dating between prospective couples. However, they point out that it should not be long-lasting and should be circumscribed to protect women's virtue and reputation without any physical contact.

It is about the respect that woman show herself. I think in terms of religion and the society. In terms of both religion and the society, it [living together without marriage] is not appropriate to defend women's rights. In such situation [living together without marriage], every liabilities are attached on woman. Men do not share these liabilities. It is not seen as appropriate for the woman not for the man. If they [women] do not find themselves in such situation, it would be better for them (Interview 2, 2019).

Living together without marriage is the worst. When you asked the question, how my eyes opened! I am shocked. So, flirt is OK, but even it should be stopped at the certain point. They should be serious. They should live their relationship morally (Interview 3, 2019).

I find living together with a man at the same house as immoral. If the issue is flirt, I think, it is normal to like someone. People should be acquainted with each other in certain borders. At the end of the day, there is a possibility to marry. They should chat

with each other to know their identities. But, there should not be joking, cuddling or hugging (Interview 4, 2019).

I have to consider this situation [living together without marriage] from my Muslim understanding. When we look at Qur'an, it is not proper for Allah. So, it [living together without marriage] is a haram. Quran shows which situation is haram or halal. I cannot break the religious laws. It is impossible for me. When we talk about the flirt, I am engaged. I have flirted but it should be between the borders. Still, I do not hold his hands or kiss him. There should be the border between us until we get married (Interview 7, 2019).

I am not against the love. People can love. Allah agrees with it, too. However, it should be in certain limits. It [love] should not be about sexuality. Everything should have some limits. So, living together is not good (Interview 11, 2019).

Another important point for them is the issue of divorce. Again, all of them are in the agreement that women can get divorced from their husbands. Some of them significantly highlight that divorce is the most hated of permissible things for Allah. However, they tolerate divorce and the separation between husbands and wives under specific conditions. For instance, they state that women and men can be divorced because of domestic violence, cheating or irreconcilable differences in marriage. Except these conditions, women should not prefer to divorce.

Divorce is of course not a good situation. But, if you experience certain situations such as violence, you can get divorced. Except this, it is not proper to get divorce as a result of minor issues. Because it is not easy to live with your children alone. You have to care them. You have to earn money. You have to live alone as a widow. It is really difficult. Who knows terrible and unexpected things can happen? (Interview 21, 2019).

Woman can get divorced and continue her life alone. Even it is better if there is domestic violence. Or irreconcilable differences... Lack of respect... Nobody depends on anyone. Respect in family is really important... If couples frequently struggle to each other and fight, this marriage is psychological damage for children. Divorce is better (Interview 7, 2019).

In this respect, they believe that these conditions can influence psychological development of their children. Therefore, since they put a particular importance on their children as a mother, they prefer to divorce not for themselves but for their children.

Moreover, through the interviews, many graduates indicate that rearing children is the primary responsibility of women. In their essentialist and patriarchal understanding, they support that being a woman become meaningful with being a mother. Although women who are mothers have serious responsibilities and workloads, they have a vital role. Since the family is accepted as the building block of the society and the natural place of women, women are primarily important individuals who contribute to its function and development. They raise children who will form other strong blocks of the society by becoming a role model with their perceptions, consciousness and habits.

In this case, it is essential to understand what are taught by mothers to their children. It is inevitable that all graduates rear their children under the impacts of social experiences and consciousness of Imam-Hatip schools. At the first step, most of them point out to the importance of Islam and Allah. They say that in general they will (or do) teach Islam, its requisites, the existence of Allah, being virtuous, pious, and respectful individuals regardless of sexes of their children. At that point, for them, it is important that their children should know their religion and this makes them a rightest person and rightest Muslim. After that, they emphasize certain points.

Firstly, [I will teach my children] to be honest, to be yourself, to be pious...And they should know existence and fear of Allah. They should contact their relations with Allah. (Interview, 7, 2019).

Firstly, love should be taught... Then, everybody knows their limits [in social life]. They [children] should form their relations with their limits. They should know themselves. When they know themselves, everything will be good... Knowing yourself is parallel with knowing Allah. It is important to know why they are created by Allah. They approach to other people with this consciousness. So, a mother should teach love, knowing limits

and why Allah exists to her children regardless of their sexes (Interview 8, 2019).

In this case, it is not surprising that as one of graduates also stated, they also teach gender roles which they learned through their education at Imam-Hatip schools.

In general, [I will teach my children] to be a good person, to be pious Muslim. There is no differences between girls and boys. Maybe, social roles will be taught. Social and biological roles... This does not mean that I will differently approach to my children according to their sexes. I will just teach how to be a good person, good boy and good girl (Interview 7, 2019).

That is, it is important for graduates to provide certain background by imparting their religious beliefs their children. In the family, they aim to teach how to live and conduct relations according to Islamic value system to their children. Therefore, for the most of graduates, getting married, establishing their own family and having children are important. They believe that they are naturally created to be a mother and to raise children. And thus, they mostly accept marriage and motherhood as their primary responsibility in their social life.

6.5.1.2. Ideas on Employment and Housekeeping

According to findings, all graduates point out that women can work and take their places in the labor market. It is permissible for women in the context of Islam. Although their families are accepted as their primary responsibility, working outside home is tolerated. However, they also indicate that women's employment at labor market is subject to certain conditions. As emphasized by them, a woman can work in the labor market if she does not transgress the limits of Islam. In this case, firstly, most of them put a particular importance on the relation between Islam and *fitrat*. For them, women should work in the professions which are proper to their natural capabilities and liabilities.

If a woman does not harm her private life, personality and character, she does every job. But, as women are naturally emotional, it is open to be discussed whether they can be the

director of any company or the chair of any political party or not. I am not sure whether they could do their jobs well or not. Actually, men are more logical [than women] and they are more appropriate for these types of works. Nursing and teaching are for us (Interview 2, 2019).

I think women should pay particular attention to the issue of capability. As women are more emotional creations [than men], they can become confused. They are not professional as men are. Now, I do not know how I can explain... Women have menstruation periods. In these periods, their feelings are frequently changing. They are already more emotional and fragile than men. They cannot do jobs which require power. So, as I said, capability is important. Women should do jobs that they are able to do (Interview 6, 2019).

There are differences between psychical power of men and women. Management is a work-field which requires time and logical thinking. So, in my opinion, this type of work-fields are not suitable for women. When I think of teaching, I can answer based on my experiences. Indeed, it is not an easy job, but it is proper for women. [When you are a teacher] You care children, and teaches something to them. In our nature, we already have this [training children]. So, of course, everybody can do every job, but we should not ignore differences [between men and women' nature]. Why do people put themselves in harsh condition? (Interview 8, 2019).

Besides the issue of *fitrat*, social interactions in workplace is another crucial issue for graduates. For them, a woman should maintain her chastity and modesty. As they should not transgress their religious limits, they should be careful in their social interactions in the workplace. Thus, women should work in sex-based segregated professions by being careful to protect the borders between them and stranger men. As one of the graduates told that

Everything is suitable for women if they are done in accordance with Islamic manners. Women can do every work without transgressing the limits of Islam and without contacting close relations. They set the borders between themselves and men. Men also behave towards them without trying to move away the limits. (Interview 3, 2019).

Therefore, while many graduates see family, caring husbands and children as a significant female role, ironically they are also not against the participation of women into labor force. In this regard, ideas on being a housewife and housekeeping should be analyzed. In the line with their ideas on women's employment, most of them indicate that being a housewife can be normal for women, but as they are productive in the home, they can be productive in the public space. On the other side, a few of them state that women should not be a housewife, they should work outside the home.

Findings demonstrate that despite different ideas, graduates are not against women's employment in the labor market because of two factors. The first factor is that they believe that in the capitalist system of the present time, every individuals compete to have capital. In such system, women also should not stay into the home. They also should work to have capital.

Being a housewife was very good in the past. But, in the recent times, it is only luxury. Our time is the period in which everybody needs to participate in the labor market. That's why, it would be luxury. Staying at home and only looking after children... Current society is not suitable for this. Everybody is outside home. Even housewives... They attend some personal courses (Interview 15, 2019).

Being a housewife has been divided into two groups; housewives in traditional time and modern time. In the traditional time, it is not like being a housewife. At that period, socialization [social activities in the private sphere] was high. Consider crowded social environment... Sister-in-law, mother-in-law, neighbors... Women could not be getting bored. While looking after their houses, they were also socialized. They were happy women. However, in the modern time, being a housewife means loneliness. Especially, in the capitalist world... (Interview 12, 2019).

The second factor is about economic dependence. One of graduates says that "being a housewife is difficult. When they go shopping and buy somethings, they have to explain the amount of money that they spent her husband" (Interview 13, 2019). That is, financial need is the reason behind their preferences for working in the labor market.

In the similar vein, graduates examine the division of labor for houseworks. When it is asked to them, most of them argue that the division of labor is required at home. Women should not be responsible for caring of all members of household. For them, the assistance among members of household is important. However, most of them explain the nature of this assistance by referring gender roles attributed to males and females. In other words, their perception of division of labor depends on the notion of *fitrat* and different social roles of men and women. For instance, one graduate say that “there should be division of labor. If people share same space, they should share responsibilities and duties in this space as well. It is not nice to put all responsibilities on a person. This division of labor should be organized in accordance with things that people are capable of doing” (Interview 14, 2019). Even though they attach the importance to the assistance in their Islamic sense, they divide responsibilities and duties in accordance with their appropriateness for female and male nature instead of thinking equal division. In the name of assistance, they share responsibilities among female and male members of the household, and shared responsibilities of women are identified with responsibilities of private sphere.

Division of labor should depends on assistive relations [among the members of family]. Generally, it is illustrated in textbooks. Mother and her daughter set a table for dinner and cook. Father buy bread and son helps to him. It [the division of labor] should be rest on the assistance (Interview 1, 2019).

Therefore, in the general sense, graduates support employment of women under current economic circumstances. However, they continue to point to the significance of natural differences between males and females in both public and private sphere. While tolerating women’s employment in the labor market, they underline their responsibilities in the private sphere. And further, they seem to support sex-based segregated structures in the social life.

6.5.1.3. Ideas on Dress and Behavior Codes

In the line with findings of the research, it is explicitly seen that being modesty, virtue and chastity is essentially crucial for respondents. They conduct their lives with modesty, dignity and respect by depending on Islamic beliefs and practices. In this case, dress and behavior codes is one of the most essential conditions (obligation) of Islam for them.

Within this context, findings show that most of graduates point out that women should observe modesty and chastity in their physical appearances when they appear in the public sphere. At that point, a few of them state that although they do not have to wear veils, they should dress in public life without drawing too much attention on their bodies by showing their femininity. On the other side, some of them claim that women should fulfill the condition of the dress code of Islam. The requirement for the code emphasizes covering all attractive parts of the body, except face and hands. For them, all women should practice Islamic doctrines.

In the case of Islamic doctrines, it is not only required to dress modestly but also to behave in a way that promotes moral and respectful order. Most of graduates focus on this point and further explain that women also should behave in the society in accordance with moral values of being a good Muslim.

I am veiling, and I accept this as a doctrine. At that point, I think that women should dress without drawing attention and revealing the outline of their bodies. Some appearances can change the focus point. Appearance is important. It is the mirror of personality. To draw attention with appearance is not logical. Attitudes and personalities should draw any attention on individuals (Interview 8, 2019).

Women should not draw any attention. In the recent times, even women attract women's attention. Even, we [women] look at a woman who does not cover certain parts of her body. There are many so beautiful women at who I sometimes cannot stop look. In recent time, men are not self-command. To product

themselves, women should dress in more covering way. Even if they are not veiling, they should not prefer dresses that reveal the outline of their bodies. Also, women should be aware of their behaviors. Women who are freer are not welcomed. Women should be more modesty. The tone of their voices should be softer. They should not speak loudly. They should not draw attention (Interview 11, 2019).

Women should dress modestly and should veil. They should not behave attractively. They should not have attitudes to attract attention. They should not be in any psychical contact with men. They should not communicate with men that they do not know (Interview 1, 2019).

For me, the woman determines her own value. Women are fragile creations. Women should be protected as how fragile item is protected. In the same way, they should be protective. They should not be one who attempts to drawn attention to herself by her clothes and behaviors. They should dress and behave in accordance with their modest femininity to feel in safe (Interview 2, 2019).

In contrast to these ideas, a few of them says that women should wear how they please. They should not be restricted in certain frames. They should dress and behave how they feel free. Despite these views, most of them agree that women should wear outfits that would refrain from drawing too much attention and their behaviors and attitudes should avoid attracting attention with an excess of extravagance. Women should live modestly and virtuously in accordance with Islamic value and belief system.

6.6. Ideas on Women's Question in Turkey

Findings reveal that many of graduates believe that there is no systematical oppression of or discrimination against women in current Turkish society. For some of them, women have experienced discrimination as a social problem in Turkey before the removal of official ban on wearing veils in the public spaces. One graduate states that “the biggest women's problem in Turkey was veiling issue. It has been removed. I think that there is no issue creating problem for women now (Interview 15, 2019). Another agrees with this explanation, and adds that,

There was a veiling issue. Thanks God! Now, there is none. Our president solved that issue. Now, we can take our places in the schools, universities, and any other public spaces freely. There is no any other problem in which women experience difficulties in recent Turkey (Interview 1, 2019).

Therefore, for them, women are not confronted any societal problems in recent Turkey.

However, some of them indicate that Turkish women do not experience systematical problems. If they experience any kind of problem, it would be about their personal relations with men in their lives such as brothers, fathers or husbands. For instance, according to them, if a woman experiences domestic violence, it is only about problematic relations between this woman and her husband or father in their own families. This problem cannot be generalized as the problem of whole Turkish society.

I do not want to say there is no problem for women. They really face some difficulties, including me. But, these difficulties depend on personal experiences. I cannot say that all men systematically suppress all women. It varies from the person to the person. When a woman experiences domestic violence, it is only a problem for herself (Interview 12, 2019).

Indeed, women's problem differs accordingly personal experiences of individuals. Some women have husbands who depreciate them whereas some have husbands who appreciate them. The problems that women experienced are changing in accordance with men's perceptions and approaches (Interview 3, 2019).

Furthermore, some of them explain that in Turkish society, women face some difficulties and problems. For some, the most significant problem in Turkish society is violence against women, sexual abuse and rape. On the other side, for some, women's issues in the employment can be problems in Turkey. However, while describing these as women's problems, graduates believe that women are rooted in the source of these problems. One graduate critically explain that

Women's problems can be in career choices. I do not believe that every woman can work in every work-field. For instance, one of

the girls went to the construction yard which is located at the mountain to work as an engineer. It is not fit to her character! As a result, she was unsuccessful in her work. She could not do duties which require men's power and then, she became only responsible for desk jobs. Everyone must know their positions. The preferences of women cause inequality in the employment. They believe that there is a social pressure on them. While attempting to remove pressure, they locate themselves into difficult situations. They cause chaos, inequality... (Interview 6, 2019).

She believes that while women struggle against culturally constructed structure of Turkey, they cause inequality because they try to position themselves into inappropriate places for their natural capabilities and liabilities. Similarly, another graduate highlights that

In the present time, women's problems are the issues of rape and sexual abuse. In this case, women have many responsibilities. Some of them wear outfits which attract too much attention. They are laughing in the streets. They drink alcohols in the public areas. They spend time during all night long. The society is degenerated. This situation encourages men (Interview 22, 2019).

As understood from these expressions, vast majority of graduates are not aware of existing women's problems and patriarchal structure in Turkey because of their ideological consciousness. Even some of graduates are aware of some women's problems in Turkey, they see women's attitudes as main source of these problems. In contrast to these expressions, a few of them mention patriarchal structure and women secondary, segregated and dominated position in Turkey. Although they are not aware of seriousness in women's problems, they see unequal structure.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter firstly reveals the nature of education and environment in Imam-Hatip schools based on graduates' experiences and thoughts. It is explained that these schools

have considerably religious-patriarchal culture, and train pupils overtly and covertly as compatible with priorities and ideals of hegemonic ideology. Through the education in the schools, the government creates its ideal citizens who share and support its ideological consciousness. Within this kind of ideological function of the schools, female pupils' lives are affected differently from those of male ones because religious-patriarchal culture idealizes them with their gender roles alongside their religious obligations.

At that point, the chapter specifically demonstrates how female subjectivity, which is the counter to Republican image of women is to be constructed in Imam-Hatip schools. In the school culture and educational process, female pupils learn and internalize certain social roles, codes of conducts and way of living. As a result of their education, religious-conservative type of women who are crucial reproducers and markers of new ideology are created. Findings of the research explicitly shows this process. Although a few of graduates criticize certain points in their educational process and reject some religious-patriarchal understandings, even their criticisms clearly reveal ideological aims in Imam-Hatip schools' education. In this regard, findings provide a closer look at ideological construction in the schools. The discussions in the following chapter delineate this construction more obviously by blending all historical and theoretical explanations of the study.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study seeks to analyze how women and their lives are used and controlled by emphasizing different manifestations of patriarchy at the interplay between education and state politics. To shed light on this problematic issue, it specifically focuses on contemporary Turkey and examines the reconstruction of female subjectivity in accordance with new hegemonic political ideology through the education offered by Imam-Hatip schools.

As it is clarified in the study, the first ideal femininity of the Turkish Republic was idealized concurrently with its establishment in 1923. The Republican state realized the importance of women exceptionally for, first, a radical break from the Ottoman Empire, and second, the legitimization of new state. Women's emancipation and equality with men constituted the core of the modernization and democratization process. In this regard, the new ideal femininity for the consolidation of the new regime was defined as convenient to ideological priorities. Firstly, the ideal women were constructed as well-educated women with modern and secular knowledge and skills to be active and productive in the public sphere. Secondly, their role in cultural transmission was strongly emphasized as women who were to reproduce and raise secular future generations. And thus, they were constructed as a perfect mother and wife acquiring modern lifestyle in the private sphere. In this way, newly established state idealized and constructed the first ideal female subjectivity as a symbol of the new nation and transmitter of its hegemonic ideology.

However, when the AKP came into power in 2002, secular structure of society and governmentality of the Republic began to be strongly challenged and changed. Undoubtedly that the AKP is the first hegemonic Islamic power in Turkish politics. With

its rising power over the years, Turkey has undergone significant transformation towards “new” society and political system in which Islamic values and codes of conducts are dominant determinants like at the Ottoman Empire. Neoconservatism has developed as a dominant political ideology and its impacts began to spread in all important socio-cultural and political landscapes. Alongside with harsh turning in dominant ideology and political regime, the AKP has begun to reconstruct ideal image of women of the Turkish Republic who symbolize and reproduce secular consciousness, and they have created their own ideal female subjectivity in line with hegemonic religious-conservative mindset.

This new ideal religious-conservative female subjectivity are to be constructed through the education of Imam-Hatip schools which are only religious schools at secondary level in “secular” education system. As it is demonstrated in the study, from the outset, Imam-Hatip schools are an integral part of the Islamist movement. Like all other political actors in the movement, the AKP also utilizes their education accordingly its political interests and priorities. From the viewpoint of the AKP’s ruling cadres, Imam-Hatip schools are crucial state apparatuses since their education system massively and predominantly serves for ruling ideology which is their neoconservatism. These schools are accepted and used as the institutions where the AKP’s religious-conservative ideology and subjects belonging to such ideology are produced.

In this regard, to analyze the reconstruction process in these schools, 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with women who were graduated from Imam-Hatip schools since 2002. Qualitative research technique enables to understand their self-construction in the school culture and educational process. Interviewees have different experiences and thoughts since they were graduated from different schools in generally different years. However, all of them, whether they approve or disapprove of patriarchy, provide general overview of gendered education system and schools culture in Imam-Hatip schools. They ascertain a detailed examination of how female subjectivity is reconstructed in these schools.

First, from their foundation, Imam-Hatip schools train pupils, particularly with religious education. Their main aim is to cultivate religious consciousness and culture. Findings of the research reveal that Imam-Hatip schools achieve to instill prevalent religious-conservative ideology into pupils through their formal curriculum and extra-curricular activities. It is seen that the vast majority of graduates gain Islamic consciousness and start to uphold religious values and practices. Their explanations expose how they internalize a specific belief and value system and take up subjectivity identified with dominant ideology. Most of them see their schools and their identities that these schools attributed to them as unique. In their viewpoints, Imam-Hatip schools are not ordinary schools like other high schools. Their unprecedented education, combining religious and non-religious courses, and their moral characteristics form the true model of Muslim citizens. In this regard, as Althusser underlined, pupils are inserted into practices governed by their schools and they recognize hegemonic culture as the reality (1971:181). And, they become constructed subjects of religious-conservative ideology. Hence, findings reveal that Imam-Hatip schools achieve to produce youths with religious consciousness to a great extent.

Second, educational experiences of graduates clearly show how Imam-Hatip schools, in its own religious culture, approach and educate female pupils based on essentialist and patriarchal understanding. As it is discussed in theoretical part of the study, through their formal and informal educational mechanisms, ranging from textbook/course content to disciplinary control, to the organization of classroom and school environment, to codes of relations, social conducts, and dresses, to extracurricular activities, these schools teach Islam and its gendered principles. Obviously, the formal curriculum transmits Islam and Islamic rituals as a basic philosophy of knowledge via schools program, textbooks, and courses. In this case, since Islam is patriarchal in itself, while acquiring religious consciousness, female pupils learn gendered worldview of Islam. On the other side, hidden curriculum, distinctively, provides religious sociability and gender segregation. As Acar and Ayata stated, gender segregation, the seclusion of girls and strict disciplinary control are the most salient characteristics of Imam-Hatip schools

culture, and they are the primary items on the hidden curriculum (2002:95-97). At that point, when we look at the educational experiences of graduates, it is understood that Imam-Hatip schools effectively constitute patriarchal school culture engaged in religious conviction and conceptualize female pupils' subjectivity in a gendered way.

In the school culture, stereotypes between sexes are obviously recognizable. Relying on biological determinist approach, it is believed that men and women possess distinct and dissimilar *fitrat* and thus, behavioral patterns. They are differentiated in every aspect of life, from their capabilities to their professions, morality and social roles. In this regard, women are situated in secondary and inferior positions in line with patriarchal principles. It is assumed that since their *fitrat* is more fragile, emotional, affectionate and passive, they are naturally created for being a wife and mother. As Elveren indicated, Imam-Hatip schools reinforces women's position as a mother and wife in the family unit (2018:120). That is, marriage, establishing a family and mothering become their life goals.

While instilling this segregationist understanding, Imam-Hatip schools also practically apply gender segregation. They locate male and female pupils in different areas and set perceivable borders between them. In the school culture, pre-marital close contacts, even friendly relations, between opposite sexes are negatively valued and strictly controlled. Co-education is not supported. As graduates' experiences underline that although the level of segregation varies in each school, male and female pupils visibly separated in every school. Even the relations between female pupils and male teachers are in the borders and restricted positions. In the Islamic doctrines, the morality of the society is profoundly related with women's loyalty to their families and husbands. For this reason, gender segregation and the seclusion of female pupils are essentially practiced in Imam-Hatip schools.

To protect women's virtue and chastity and thus, to provide social morality, such segregation in the school culture is ensured by disciplinary controlling. Educational experiences of graduates demonstrate that teachers and principals of the schools

primarily generate strong disciplinary control over behaviors and relations of female pupils rather than those of male pupils. Graduates state that they are warned or punished in case they communicate with the opposite sex. In this case, female pupils are segregated and positioned into the control mechanism. Their behaviors and relations and thus, freedoms are restricted through certain ‘informal’ rules without considering their personal desires. Therefore, Imam-Hatip schools have the patriarchal culture in its moral environment and provide gendered socialization to shape “sex-based segregation in all public sphere activities” (Acar& Ayata, 2002:95). In this schools culture, female pupils experience patriarchy and their subjectivity is constructed accordingly its main principles.

Third, graduates’ social experiences and personal thoughts on womanhood reveal that the vast majority of them internalize their patriarchal self-construction and become a functional part of patriarchal ideology. They exhibit what a new woman and ideal femininity of the AKP are. Among diverse viewpoints, graduates, who have already internalized this gendered system and become an ‘ideological subject’, exemplify re-idealized women of the AKP. Undoubtedly, while launching ideological transformation, the AKP conceptualizes ideal citizens with reference to gender roles (Acar& Altunok, 2012: 20). In this respect, its ideological apparatuses, Imam-Hatip schools, have become one of the most effective venues and producers of this system through their gendered education. New women who are reflectively part of the AKP’s ideology, who adopt religious consciousness and who have a certainly gendered subjectivity, are reconstructed through their education.

As understood from graduates’ explanations, these new ideal women of Turkey are primarily defined with their biological nature and functions. Relying on the notion of *fitrat*, it is accepted that women and men are different creations and their positions/roles are different in both public and private spheres. First and foremost, new women are identified with their motherhood. For most of the graduates, being a woman is essentially equivalent to being a mother. This is the privilege and sacred duty that Allah assigns them. That’s why, their primary role is to be mothers in social life. Moreover, for

them, new ideal women are moral, chaste and virtuous. They do not communicate with stranger men before marriage and protect their loyalty to their future husbands. When they come of their ages, they must marry to establish their families and fulfill their primary duty; mothering. Although most of the graduates whom I interviewed are still a bachelor, they underline the importance of marriage and being a mother to complete their nature²³. Hence, new ideal women are firstly constructed with being a wife and a mother.

While particular importance is put on marriage, establishing a family and being a mother, women are constitutively idealized in the private sphere. The private domain is accepted as their indispensable place. Women continue to be a subject, in this sphere, with their gender roles. Most of the graduates highlight the gendered division of labor among members of family. In this regard, women are primary persons who meet all needs of household members. Responsibilities of the private sphere are attributed as main social roles to women on the basis of the gendered division of labor. Therefore, new ideal women of Turkey cannot be considered separate from the private sphere. They are women who provides all required cares for their families in every respect.

On the other side, new women's position in the public sphere is re-idealized and reconstructed as well. Although women are primarily idealized within the private sphere, as Acar stated, women's working in the public sphere is also tolerated in cases of financial need (1990: 288). Similarly, for most of graduates, new ideal women can participate in the labor market, but they exist in this domain by considering moral and religious boundaries. Their working is subjected to certain conditions. First of all, ideal women do professions which are proper to their *fitrat*. It is against their nature that they do professions which require physical power or logical intelligence such as engineering and politics. As a matter of fact, when we look at Table 1.4.2, it is seen that one graduate only studies engineering. Although professional ideals of graduates who criticize

²³They are still studying in higher education. 2 of them are engaged and other remaining, who accept and internalize their patriarchal self-construction, wait to marry after their graduations.

patriarchal system of the schools are not shaped by the notion of *fitrat*, graduates who adopt this system state that they prefer to be academicians or teachers which are accepted as ‘female occupations’. Secondly, when taking place within the public sphere, ideal women pay particular attention to provide and protect gender segregation that Imam-Hatip schools instill. They work in the proper workplaces that is sex-based segregated areas.

In non-familial areas, ideal women behave and dress modestly and chastely. They do not get attention of stranger men and thus, not harm desired moral order. They observe modesty in their dresses and behaviors. They cover attractive parts of their body and veil. Even they do not prefer to veil, they pay attention not to wear dresses that reveal the outline of their bodies. They are aware of their behaviors and do not draw attention in the public areas. They act as a symbol of Islamic culture and ideology in the society. In this regard, it is safe to say that the AKP utilizes the education of Imam-Hatip schools to create its aimed female subjectivity. Women who are primarily a good mother and wife, who accept their marriage and family is the most important thing in their lives, who live accordingly moral values and who have religious-conservative consciousness, are reconceptualized and reconstructed as ‘the new ideal women of Turkey’ in Imam-Hatip schools.

Last but not least, graduates’ all experiences, and personal thoughts, especially on women’s questions in Turkey, reveal that these newly reconstructed women are both products of new patriarchy and its functional part. Since the establishment of the Republic, women experience patriarchal structures and organizations in every aspect of their lives. During state-formation periods, they were used as a political tool and their subjectivity was constructed to legitimize Republican ideals. This Republican femininity was constructed based on their public emancipation and unfortunately, their social roles in the private sphere. Through their education, Republican women internalized patriarchal subjectivity construction and then, their gender roles. In our contemporary time, with harsh turning in the dominant ideology of the state, new society is tried to be established accordingly religious values. Women are once again used as a political tool

and their subjectivity is to be reconstructed as a counter to women of Republican ideology.

Through all this transformation and the creation process of new ideal femininity, the nature of patriarchy has changed. As Ayata and Doğangün stated, “under the rule of the AKP, the state-led ideology of egalitarianism is replaced by state-support and protection of motherhood which fit perfectly into conservatism” (2017: 616). Thus, “the state hosts a new mode of patriarchal configuration, certainly with a considerable dose of conservative morals, built on the sanctity of tradition, faith and family values” (Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 561). In this regard, women are idealized differently by the new dominant ideology.

Still, their motherhood has ideological importance in reinforcing the government since they reproduce and raise required religious youths. They are primarily positioned in the private sphere and continue to experience gendered structure of the family. However, in contrast to Republican women, their participation in the public sphere is either not supported or restricted by Islamic rules. The morality of society is reduced to their morality. Their behaviors, relations, and dresses in the public areas are controlled to provide moral order. Whereas men are free to work in professions that they want, to contact relations with whom they want, to wear what they please, women are controlled and restricted on the theological and patriarchal basis of ruling culture. Even their freedom to practice personal religious beliefs is politicized for the priorities of the state. They become only apparent with their ideological significance. Their empowerment is only considered in the context of family and veiling issue. They are seen crucial since they raise religious generations, constitute religiosity and protect moral order, and symbolize religious ideology of the state with their veils. Hence, they are reconstructed as products of new religious-conservative patriarchy.

Also, they internalize and become a functional part of this new system. As understood from their explanations on women’s questions in Turkey, they accept the androcentric system and hierarchal relations which put them into inferior and secondary status. They

see women who do not adopt Islamic way of life are the main source of women's problems, and ignore existing unequal social order. Thus, patriarchy persists its existence in its new nature by increasing gender hierarchy in the society in the name of conservatization and Islamization.

To sum up, this study enlightens how the AKP reconstructs ideal female subjectivity in the frame of its religious gender ideology through education of Imam-Hatip schools. Women's experiences and thoughts demonstrate the nature of Imam-Hatip schools and the subjectivity construction. When we evaluate these primary data by considering other historical and theoretical discussions in the study, it is safe to say that the AKP uses education system as its social and cultural agent. It is seen that for its ideal religious society and nation, its idealized citizens are constructed through all educational channels in Imam-Hatip schools. Within this kind of ideological function of these schools, female pupils have different positions and status from male pupils. They experience not only religious-conservative identity formation but also patriarchal one at the interplay between education and state politics. Imam-Hatip schools transmit different behavioral patterns and certain gender codes for girls and boys. They segregate both sexes and put women into strict control mechanism. And thus, female pupils' subjectivity is formed "within the patriarchal gaze" (Walby, 1990: 2).

In this circumstance, as indicated in both studies of Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) and Armstrong and Squires (2002), women become apparent as a subject at the state actions with their ideological importance through their traditional gender roles. The state does not approach women as autonomous individuals and accepts them as their primary servant for its cultural transformation and legitimization. Ideologically and pragmatically, the AKP re-conceptualizes ideal type of women as counter the Republican image of women, and primarily benefits from their so-called gender roles, especially motherhood on the behalf of its political interests. In Imam-Hatip schools, women are predominantly educated with religious consciousness and lifestyle rather than modern and secular knowledge. And thus, the AKP shapes and constructs its own

femininity which serves for cultural and biological reproduction of religious consciousness, and which is signifier of its religious-conservative ideology.

In this circumstance, the party and its government constitute new patriarchal structure of Turkey in which women are controlled and not seen as individual as men in almost every aspects of life. Therefore, new ideal women are the products of new religious-conservative patriarchy and their subjectivity is merely reconstructed as the embodiment of the AKP's political priorities and purposes in and through a highly gendered educational process and school culture of Imam-Hatip schools.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, P., C. Wallace, C., Tyler, M. (2005). *An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Acar, F. & Ayata, A. (2001). 'Disciplines, Success and Stability: The Reproduction of Gender and Class in Turkish Secondary Education', in D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber (Eds.) *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press
- Acar, F. (1991). 'Women in the Ideology of Islamic Revivalism: Three Islamic Women's Journals' in R. Tapper (ed.) *Islam in Modern Turkey, Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Acar, F., & Altunok, G. (2013). The 'politics of intimate' at the intersection of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in contemporary Turkey. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41, 14-23.
- Akpınar, A. (2007). The Making of a Good Citizen and Conscious Muslim through Public Education: The Case of Imam Hatip Schools, *Swedish Research Institute*, 18(1), 161-178
- Althusser, L. (1971). *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
- Anselmi, D. L., & Law, A. L. (1998). 'Defining Sex and Gender', in D. L. Anselmi, and A. L. Law (Eds.), *Questions Of Gender: Perspectives and Paradoxes*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Apple, M. W. (1979). *Ideology and Curriculum*. London: Routledge.
- Arat, Y. (1997). 'The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey', in S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (Eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

- Arat, Z. (1999). 'Educating the Daughters of the Republic', in *Deconstructing Images of Turkish Women*. England: St. Martin Press.
- Armstrong, C., & Judith, S. (2002) 'Beyond the Public/Private Dichotomy: Relational Space and Sexual Inequalities,' *Contemporary Political Theory*, 1,261–283.
- Arnot, M. (2002). *Reproducing Gender Critical Essays on Educational Theory and Feminist Politics*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Ayata, A. & Aybars, İ. A. (2019). The State and Women's Organizations in Turkey: An Irreversible Distance or Total Embeddedness. *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology*, 56(1), 55-86
- Ayata, A. & Doğangün, G. (2017). Gender Politics of the AKP: Restoration of a Religio-conservative Gender Climate. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 19(6), 610-627
- Ayata, A. & Tütüncü, F. (2008). Party Politics of the AKP (2002–2007) and the Predicaments of Women at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(3), 380–382.
- Aydın-Yılmaz, S. (2015). A New Momentum: Gender Justice in the Women's Movement. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 13(4), 107-115
- Azak, U. (2010). *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. C. (1977) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Çakmak, D. (2009). Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: The Imam Hatip Schools, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(5), 439-454.

- Çavdar, G. (2010). Islamist Moderation and the Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 11(3–4), 341–357.
- Cindođlu, D. & Ünal, D. (2017). Gender and sexuality in the authoritarian discursive strategies of 'New Turkey', *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 24(1), 39–54
- Çobanođlu, R. & Engin-Demir C. (2014). The Visible Side of the Hidden Curriculum in Schools. *Elementary Education Online*, 13(3), 776-786.
- Coşar, S. (2007). Women in Turkish Political Thought: Between Tradition and Modernity. *Feminist Review*, 86:113-131.
- Coşar, S., & Yeğenođlu, M. (2011). New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the Age of AKP. *South European Society and Politics*, 16(4), 555-573.
- Çoşkun, M. K. & Şentürk, B. (2012). 'The Growth of Islamic Education in Turkey: The AKP's Policies toward Imam-Hatip Schools' in K. İnal and G. Akkaymak (Eds.) *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dekker, H. (1991). 'Political Socialization Theory and Research', in H. Dekker and R. Meyenberg (Eds.) *Politics and the European Younger Generation; Political Socialization in Eastern, Central and Western Europe*. Oldenberg, FRG: BIS.
- Dillabough, J. A. (2003). Gender, Education, and Society: The Limits and Possibilities of Feminist Reproduction Theory. *Sociology of Education*, 76,376-379.
- Diner, Ç. (2018). Gender Politics and GONGOs in Turkey. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 16(4), 101-108

- Doyle, J. D. (2017). State Control of Civil Society Organizations: The Case of Turkey. *Democratization*, 24(2), 244-264
- Durakbaşı, A. (1999). 'Kemalism as Identity Politics in Turkey', in Z. Arat (ed.) *Deconstructing Images of Turkish Women*. England: St. Martin Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1956). *Education and Sociology*. New York: The Free Press.
- Eğitim-Sen, (2018). 2018-2019 Eğitim Öğretim Yılı Başında Eğitimin Durumu. Retrieved from: <http://egitimsen.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/E%C4%9Fitimin-Durumu-Raporu-Eyl%C3%BCI-2018.docx> , lastly accessed in April, 2019.
- Eisenstein, Z. R. (1979). *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*. New York: Monthly Review.
- Elveren, A. Y. (2018). "The Transformation of Regime and Gender Inequality in Turkey" in *Brain Drain and Gender Inequality in Turkey*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ertuğrul, K. (2012). AKP's Neo-conservatism and Politics of Otherness in Europe-Turkey Relations. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, (46), 157-186
- Esen, B. & Gümüşçü, S. (2016). Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1581-1606
- Esposito, J. (1991). *Islam, the Straight Path*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Francis, B. (2009). 'The Nature of Gender', in C. Skelton, B. Francis & L. Smulya (Eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Gender and Education*. California: SAGE Publications.

French, M. (1985). *Beyond Power: On Women, Men, and Morals*. New York: Summit.

Giroux, H. A. (1981). *Ideology, Culture and the Process Of Schooling*. London: Falmer.

Gök, F. (2007). 'The Girls' Institutes in the Early Period of the Turkish Republic', in M. Carlson, A. Rabo and F. Gök (Eds.) *Education in 'Multicultural' Societies': Turkish and Swedish Perspectives*. Stockholm: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

Göktürk, D. (2018). Ethnographic Account of a Pedagogical Project: Sisterhood Institution in the Hizmet Movement. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 39(5), 654-668

Gordon, L. (2014). 'The Women's Liberation Movement' in D.S. Cobble et al. (Eds.), *Feminism Unfinished: A short, Surprising History of American Women's Movements*. London: W.W. Norton.

Harding, S. (1987). *Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Harding, S. (2004). *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies*. New York: Routledge.

Hartmann, H. (1981). 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union', in L. Sargent (Ed.), *Women in Culture and Revolution*. Montreal: Black Rose.

Hawkesworth, M. (2013). 'Sex, Sexuality and Gender: From Naturalized Presumption to an Analytical Category.' in G. Waylen, K. Celis, J. Kantola and Louren Waldon (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Henn, M., Foard, N., & Weinstein, M. (2006). *A Short Introduction to Social Research*. London: SAGE.

- Jaggar, A. M. (1983). *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Kabasakal-Arat, Z. (2003). Where to look for the truth: Memory and Interpretation in Assessing the Impact of Turkish Women's Education. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26 (1), 57-68.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1991). *Women, Islam, and the State*. London: Macmillan.
- Kaya, A. (2015). Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity, *South European Society and Politics*, 20(1), 47-69
- Kelly, A. V. (2004). *The Curriculum Theory and Practice*. California: SAGE Publications.
- Keskin, B. (2002). 'Confronting Double Patriarchy: Islamist Women in Turkey', in P. Bacchetta and M. Power (Eds.), *Right-Wing Women: From Conservatives to Extremists around the World*. New York: Routledge.
- Koyuncu, B. & Özman, A. (2018). Women's Rights Organizations and Turkish State in The Post-2011 Era: Ideological Disengagement versus Conservative Alignment, *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 1-26
- LeCompte, M. (1978). Learning to Work: The Hidden Curriculum of the Classroom. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 9(1), 22-37.
- Lerner, G. (1986). *The Creation of Patriarchy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Liu, F. (2006). 'School Culture and Gender', in C. Skelton, B. Francis & L. Smulya (Eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Gender and Education*. California: SAGE Publications.

- Marinetto, M. (2007). *Social Theory, The State and Modern Society: The State in Contemporary Social Thought*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Mies, M. (1993). 'Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research' in M. Hammersley (Ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: SAGE.
- Millett, K. (1970). *Sexual Politics*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Nazlıka, A. (2017). Advancing Women's Equality in Turkey. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 16(2), 49-56
- O'Brien, J. (2009). Biological Determinism. In *Encyclopedia of Gender and Society*. (66-68). California: SAGE Publications.
- Oakley, A. (1972). *Sex, Gender and Society*. London: Temple Smith.
- Ortner, Sherry B. (1974). 'Is female to male as nature is to culture?' in M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (Eds.), *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Özbudun, E. (2006). From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3), 543-557
- Özdemir, E. (2010).Kemalist Tradition and Kemalist Women's Movement in Turkey After 1980, *Turkish Journal of Politics*, 1(1), 99-113
- Özgür, I. (2012). *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Özyeğin, G. (2009). Virginal Facades: Sexual Freedom and Guilt among Young Turkish Women. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 16(2), 103-123.

- Pak, S.Y. (2004). "Articulating the Boundary between Secularism and Islamism: The Imam Hatip Schools of Turkey", *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 35(3), 324-344.
- Parmaksız, P. M. (2016). Paternalism, Modernization, and the Gender Regime in Turkey. *Aspasia*, 10(1), 40-62.
- Pateman, C. (1988). *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Porter, P. (1986). *Gender and Education: Sociology of School*. Australia: Deakin University Press.
- Reinharz, S. (1992). *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Ryle, R. (2012). *Questioning Gender: A Sociological Exploration*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- Saktanber, A. & Çorbacıoğlu, G. (2008). Veiling and Headscarf-Skepticism in Turkey, *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 15(4), 514–538
- Sarfati, Y. (2016). 'The Politics of Religious Education in Turkey', in S. F. Krishna-Hensel (ed.) *Religion, Education and Governance in the Middle East: Between Tradition and Modernity*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Şen, M. (2010). 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party', *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 59-84
- Shepard, J. M. (2010). *Cengage Advantage Books: Sociology*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
- Soydan, E. A. (2002). Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşması Çerçevesinde Mesleki Teknik Eğitim (Cumhuriyet İdeolojisinin Kuruluş Sürecinde Kız Enstitüleri 1923-1940), *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, 1(1), 269-287

- Stromquist, N. P. (1995). Romancing the State: Gender and Power in Education. *Comparative Education Review*, 39(4), 423-454.
- Stromquist, N. P. (2006). Gender, Education and the Possibility of Transformative Knowledge. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 36(2), 145-161
- Stromquist, N. P. (2013). *Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues*. New York: Routledge.
- Tekeli, Ş. (1986). 'Emergence of the feminist movement in Turkey,' in D. Dahlerup (ed.) *The New Women's Movement*. London: Sage Publication.
- Thornton, M. (1991). The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered and Discriminatory. *Journal of Law and Society*, 18(4), 448-463.
- Toktas, S. & Cindoglu, D. (2006). Modernization and Gender: a history of girls' technical education in Turkey since 1927, *Women's History Review*, 15(5), 737-749
- Toprak, B. (1990). 'Emancipated but Unliberated Women in Turkey: The impact of Islam' in F. Özbay (ed.) *Women, Family and Social Change in Turkey*. Bangkok: UNESCO.
- Ünal, D. (2015). Vulnerable identities: Pious women columnists' narratives on Islamic feminism and feminist self-identification in contemporary Turkey, *Women's Studies International Forum*, 53, 12-21
- Walby, S. (1990). *Theorizing Patriarchy*. Oxford: Blackwell
- West, C. & Zimmerman, D. (1987). Doing Gender. *Gender and Society*, 1(2), 125-151.

Westkott, M. (1990). 'Feminist Criticism of the Social Sciences' in J.M. Nielsen (Ed.) *Feminist Research Methods*. Boulder: Westview Press

White, J. B. (2003). State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman. *NWSA Journal*, 15(3), 145-159.

Yılmaz, I. & Bashirov, G. (2018). The AKP after 15 years: emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey, *Third World Quarterly*, 39(9), 1812-1830

Yuval-Davis, N. & Anthias, F. (1989). *Women-Nation-State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: In-Depth Interview Questions

- Kendinizi tanıtabilir misiniz?
 - Kaç yaşındasınız?
 - İmam Hatip Lisesi'nden kaç yılında mezun oldunuz?
 - Medeni durumunuz?
 - Mesleğiniz? Öğrenci iseniz, eğitiminizi sürdürdüğünüz dal?
 - İleriye dönük hayatınız ile ilgili –kariyer veya aile kurmak vs.- planlarınız nelerdir?/Kendinizi ileride nasıl bir hayat içerisinde görüyorsunuz?
- İmam Hatip okullarına sizi yönelten sebepler nelerdir?
- Size göre, İmam Hatip okullarını diğer okullardan farklı ve özel kılan özellikleri nelerdir?
- Eğitiminiz boyunca size öğretilen temel ilkeler nelerdir?
- İmam Hatipli olmayı nasıl tanımlarsınız?
- Okul içerisinde verilen dersler nelerdir? Kız öğrenciler için verilen özel bir alanda ders var mı?
- Okul içerisindeki sosyal ilişkileriniz nasıldı? Okulunuz kız-erkek karma mıydı?
 - Öğretmen- öğrenci ilişkisi nasıldır? Öğrencilerin rahatlıkla öğretmenleri ile iletişime geçmeleri mümkün mü?

- Öğrenciler arasında paylaşım var mıdır? Ödevleri ortak yapma, projelerde beraber çalışma, öğlenleri yemek yeme vb.
- Ders- dışı faaliyetler hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Okuldan kalan boş zamanlarınızda neler yapıyordunuz?
- Kadın olmayı nasıl tanımlarsınız?
 - Size göre, bir kadının önceliği ne olmalıdır?
 - Çalışma alanında bulunan kadınlar için ne düşünüyorsunuz? Mesela, bir kadın şirket yöneticisi olabilir mi? Bir siyasi partinin başkanı olabilir mi? Şantiye de çalışan bir mühendis olabilir mi? Okul öncesi öğretmeni olabilir mi? Ya da hemşire olarak çalışabilir mi?
 - Ev hanımı olmayı nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
 - Size göre, ev içindeki bireyler arasında iş bölümü olmalı mıdır?
 - Bir kadının evlenmeden ve anne olmadan yaşamını sürdürmesini nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?
 - Evlenmeden, erkeklerle görüşmesini, flört etmesini veya beraber yaşamasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
 - Evlenmeden, bir kadın size göre anne olabilir mi? Ya da bir kadın eşinden boşanarak çocuğuyla hayatına devam edebilir mi? (Evet/Hayır ise neden?).
 - Size göre, kadınlar nasıl giyinmeli ve toplumsal alanda nasıl davranışlar sergilemelidir?
- Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitliği ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Adaleti kavramlarını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz ve destekliyor musunuz?
- Sizce, bir annenin aile içerisinde çocuklarına öğretmesi gereken temel değerler nelerdir? (Kız çocuğu ve erkek çocuğu)

- Sizce, gnmzde Trk kadnn deneyimlediđi toplumsal sorunlar ya da kadnlar iin eđitsizlik yaratan konular nelerdir?

**APPENDIX B: METU HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
APPROVAL PAGE**

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

DÜMLÜPINAR BULVARI 06800
ÇANKAYA ANKARA/TÜRKİYE
T: +90 312 210 22 91
F: +90 312 210 79 59
Sayı: 28620816 / 709
www.ueam.metu.edu.tr

03 OCAK 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlişi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof.Dr. Ayşe Güneş AYATA

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız Alara ATAÇ'ın "Kadın Öznelliğinin Türkiye'de Yeniden Yapılandırılması: Yeni Muhafazakarlık ve İmam Hatip Okulları" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2018-SOS-244 protokol numarası ile araştırma yapması onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımla bilgilerinize sunarım.


Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ

Başkan


Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR

Üye


Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI (4.)

Üye


Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK

Üye


Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN

Üye


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT

Üye

APPENDIX C: TÜRKÇE ÖZET/ TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma kadın öznelliğinin, 2002 yılından bu yana İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitimi boyunca yeni muhafazakâr ideolojinin etkisi altında nasıl yeniden yapılandırıldığı analiz etmektedir. Feminist literatürde ataerki (patriarşi) kavramı erkeğin egemen kadının tabii olarak yer aldığı güç ilişkilerini anlatan temel kavram olarak kabul edilmiştir. Kadınların görünmez olduğu ve dışlandığı tüm pozisyon ve durumları açıklarken, feminist bilimciler ataerki kavramının doğasını birçok farklı açıdan değerlendirip farklı açıklamalar sunmuşlardır. Ancak günümüz dünyasında, kadının ikincil durumunu açıklığa kavuşturmak için ataerki sistemi farklı düzeylerde incelemek daha gerekli hale gelmiştir.

Sylvia Walby (1990: 20), çalışmasında buna dikkat çekerek, ataerkiyi “erkeklerin kadınlara hükmettiği, onları baskı altına aldığı, sömürdüğü yapıların ve uygulamaların oluşturduğu bir sistem” olarak tanımlar. Böylelikle, ataerki sistemin bir genelden oluşmadığını, özel alan ile kamu alanındaki farklı uygulamalar ve yapılar altında meydana geldiğini belirtir. Ve Walby (1990), (1) ücretli istihdam, (2) ev içi emek, (3) okullar gibi kültürel kurumlar, (4) cinsellik, (5) şiddet ve (6) devlet olmak üzere ataerki sistemi 6 farklı soyutlama seviyesinde açıklar. Arkasından, kadınların ezildiği ve kontrol altında tutulduğu durumları anlamak için bu farklı yapıları ve bu yapılar arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşimi anlamının önemini vurgular. Bu çalışma da ataerkinin, devlet politikaları ile eğitimin karşılıklı etkileşimi boyunca meydana gelen farklı boyutlanmalarına önem vererek kadınların tahakküm altındaki durumuna odaklanır.

Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın temel amacı, kadınların ve yaşamlarının eğitim ve devlet politikaları arasındaki androsantrik (erkek egemen) etkileşim boyunca nasıl kullanıldığını ve kontrol edildiğini anlamaktır. Bu konuya daha etkili ve açık bir şekilde ışık tutmak için, çalışmada günümüz Türkiye’ye odaklanılmıştır. Bu durumda, ana araştırma sorunsalı; kadın öznelliğinin 2002 yılından bu yana İmam-Hatip okullarının

eđitimi boyunca yeni muhafazakârlığın etkisi altında nasıl yeniden yapılandırıldıđıdır. Bu konuya odaklanırken, çalışma ayrıca Türkiye'deki yeni ataerkil sistemi ve artan cinsiyet hiyerarşisini göstermeyi de amaçlamaktadır.

Aslında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilanıyla birlikte ilk kadın öznelliđi idealize edilmiş ve oluşturulmuştur. 1923'de, yıllar boyunca süren yıkıcı ve yorucu savaşlar sonrasında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulmuştur. Dönemin siyasi yöneticileri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na ait geleneksel ve dini toplumsal ve siyasi yapıyı laik ve modern bir yapı ile deđiştirmiştir. Birçok önemli yenilik ve yasal düzenleme ile laikleşme, demokratikleşme ve modernleşme süreci ülke genelinde desteklenmiştir. Bütün bu devrimsel deđişim sürecinde ise kadınların hayatları gözle görülür şekilde erkeklerinkinden farklı olarak etkilenmiştir. Daha önce sahip olmadıkları haklara ve dolayısıyla, pozisyon ve statülere sahip olmuşlardır. Yapılan yasal düzenlemeler ve yenilikler kadınların eğitimsel, toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik alanlarda erkeklerle eşit olmalarını sağlamıştır. Geçmişten farklı olarak kamusal alanda görünürlükleri artmıştır. Ancak bütün bu iyileşmeler yapılırken, asıl amaç devletin kadınlara özgürlük sağlaması deđil, yeni güçlü, laik, modern ve Cumhuriyetçi devletin sembolü olan ideal kadını yaratmaktır. Bu dönemde devlet feminizmi ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk kadın öznelliđi yapılandırılmıştır.

İlk olarak, devlet kadınları yeni ideolojinin ve milletin temel sembolü ve simgesi olarak kabul etmiştir (White, 2003; Tekeli, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991; Durakbaşı, 1999). Vatandaşların eşitliđi, özellikle kadın-erkek eşitliđi, yeni laik ve modern ideolojinin en önemli belirleyicisi olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, batılı, modern ve laik görünüşleri ve kamu alanındaki aktif varlıklarıyla kadınlar öncelikli olarak yeni devletin sembolü olarak idealize edilmiştir. İkinci olarak, annelikleri üzerinden, kadınlar Cumhuriyetçi ideolojinin gelecek nesillere birincil aktarıcısı olarak kabul edilmişler ve annelikleriyle idealize edilmişlerdir (Toprak, 1990; White, 2003; Durakbaşı, 1999). Bu idealize edilen kadınlar, yeni devletin modernleşme sürecini en etkili şekilde destekleyen kurumlar; okullar aracılıđıyla yapılandırılmışlardır. Böylelikle, iyi eğitim almış, hem kamu hem özel alanda aktif ve üretken olan laik ve Cumhuriyetçi kadın öznelliđi

oluşturulmuştur. Yani, Cumhuriyetçi devlet kendi ideolojik çerçevesinde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk kadın öznelliğini yapılandırmıştır.

Ancak, 1980 darbesi sonrası Cumhuriyetçi Kemalist rejim dini gruplar tarafından eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Buna paralel olarak, bu rejimin ve rejimin egemen ideolojisinin ürünü olan; Cumhuriyet kadını da bu dönemde aynı şekilde eleştirilere maruz kalmıştır. 1980 itibarıyla, dönem dönem güçlü eleştiriler ile ideal kadın imajının egemenliği zorlansa da, asıl değişim AKP'nin 2002 yılında iktidara gelmesiyle olmuştur.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti siyasi tarihinde ilk kez İslamcı bir parti tek başına iktidara gelmiş ve tek başına hükümet kurmuştur. Böylelikle, Türkiye'de yeni bir çağ başlamıştır. Onlarca yıllık laiklikten sonra, AKP yeni muhafazakârlığı egemen ideoloji olarak tanıtmıştır. Bu yeni ideoloji çerçevesinde, sosyo-kültürel ve siyasi alanlarda İslamlaşma ve muhafazakârlaşma üzerine başka bir devrimsel değişime gidilmiştir. Bu noktada, AKP toplumu İslami değer ve etiklere göre muhafazakârlaştırmaya çalışırken, kadınların önemini algılamıştır. Tıpkı Cumhuriyetçi devlet gibi, kendi ideolojik çıkarlarına servis eden kendi ideal kadını yaratmak istemiştir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin hâlihazırda yapılandığı ideal kadın profilini kendi dini-muhafazakâr ideolojik önceliklerine göre yeniden yapılandırmak için çalışma başlamıştır. Bunun için çalışırken de, yine devletin oluşum dönemindeki gibi eğitimi etkili bir yol olarak kullanmayı tercih etmişlerdir. Laik-Cumhuriyetçi devletin kurduğu eğitim sistemindeki tek İslami bilinci aşıl原因an İmam-Hatip okullarını birincil ideolojik aygıtları olarak kullanmışlardır. Böylelikle, AKP'nin ideal kadın özneliği İmam-Hatip okulları eğitimi yoluyla yapılandırılmaya başlanmıştır.

Bu çalışma tam olarak bu sürece odaklanmış ve İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitiminin doğasını ve oluşturulan yeni dini-muhafazakâr kadın özneliğini açıklamıştır. Bu konu üzerinde araştırma yapılırken, çalışmada temel olarak feminist metodoloji kullanılmış ve feminist bakış açısı üzerinden olaylar değerlendirilmiştir. Ana akım siyasi ve sosyal bilimde, durumlar ve olaylar incelenirken erkeklerin deneyimlerine bağlı kalarak analiz sunulur (Henn, Weinstein& Foard, 2006; Harding, 2004) . Böylelikle,

kadınların farklı deneyimleri ve de onları ikincil kılan durumlar meydana çıkarılmaz. Feminist araştırma yöntemi ve feminist bakış açısı buna tepki olarak kadınların deneyimlerini araştırmanın merkezine koyarak, olayları ve durumları onların duygu ve düşünceleri çerçevesinde değerlendirip, onları ikincil kılan ve kontrol eden unsurları gösterir (Harding, 2004; Abbott, Tyler & Wallace, 2005). Dolayısıyla, gerçekliğin belirleyicisi kadın deneyimleri olarak kabul edilir.

Bu bağlamda, ikincil veri analizinin yanı sıra, bu çalışma da kadınların düşüncelerini ve deneyimlerini merkeze koyarak araştırma sorunsalını analiz etmiştir. Kadınların deneyimleri ve düşüncelerine ulaşmak için, bilgi toplama yöntemi olarak derinlemesine mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın temel amacı çerçevesinde, 22 tane AKP iktidarı boyunca İmam-Hatip okullarından mezun olmuş kadın ile derinlemesine mülakat yapılmıştır. Mülakatlar esnasında, mezun kadınların toplumsal ve eğitimsel deneyimleri ile kadınlığa ilişkin kişisel düşünceleri sorgulanmış ve analiz edilmiştir. 22 tane kadının desteği ile çalışma tamamlanmıştır. Böylelikle, İmam-Hatip okullarında kadın öznelliğinin yeniden yapılandırılması ve yeni ideal kadınlık anlayışı tanımlanmış ve açıklanmıştır.

Çalışma 7 bölümden oluşmaktadır. 1. Bölüm giriş bölümüdür. Çalışmanın amaçları, araştırma sorunsalı, argümanı, önemi ve metodolojisi gösterilmiştir. 2. Bölüm çalışmanın teorik ve kavramsal çerçevesini okuyucuya sunmaktadır. Bu bölümde, devlet kontrollündeki okulların ideolojik işlevleri ve bu ideolojik işlevin ataerkil yanı anlatılmıştır. İlk olarak, Louis Althusser'in (1971) teorisine dayanarak, eğitim ve siyasetin birbiriyle ayrılmaz bir şekilde nasıl iç içe geçtiği gösterilmiştir. Althusser'e göre, okullar devletin en önemli ideolojik aygıtlarından biridir. Okulların eğitimleri devletin yönetici sınıfının egemen ideolojisine göre düzenlenir. Öğrenciler eğitimleri boyunca devletin egemen kültürünü öğrenir ve bu kültürün değer ve inanç sistemini benimser. Bunun sonucu olarak da, öğrenciler somut bireylerden belli bir ideolojinin somut öznelere dönüşür ve ideolojik bir öznellik kazanır (Althusser, 1971).

Dolayısıyla, okullar devletin egemen ideolojisine bağlı kalarak bu ideolojiye ait öznelliklere sahip bireyler üretirler. Ancak bu döngü içerisinde, kadınlar erkeklerden farklı şekilde etkilenir. Bu noktada, farklı feminist teorik eleştirilere dayanarak, kadınların bu süreçte ataerkil yapıyı nasıl deneyimlediği açıklanmıştır. Ataerkil kültür, maalesef ki devletin resmi siyasi ideolojisinin bir parçasıdır. Devlet kendi doğasında ataerkildir çünkü cinsiyetçi yaklaşımlara ve politikalara sahiptir (Walby, 1990; Stromquist, 1995). Biyolojik determinist anlayışı benimseyerek, devlet kendi ideal öznelerini açıklarken erkek ve kadını doğaları gereği farklılaştırmıştır. Ve sonrasında, onları farklı pozisyonlarda idealize etmiş ve konumlandırmıştır. Devlet için erkekler kamu alanının aktif öznesi iken kadınlar özel alanın öznesidir. Kadınlar devlet için, gelecek nesillerin/vatandaşların üreticisi, devletin egemen ideolojisinin gelecek nesillere aktarıcısı ve devlet ideolojisinin sembolü olarak önemlidir (Yuval-Davis& Anthias, 1989; Amstrong& Squires, 2002). Böylelikle, devlet kadın ve erkeğe farklı sosyal statüler ve roller biçer ve onların ideolojik öznelliklerini cinsiyetçi bir yaklaşımla şekillendirir.

Devlet bu yaklaşımını tüm kurumları ve hükümet mekanizmaları ile destekler. Bu bağlamda, okullar devletin ataerkil ideolojisinin yayılmasındaki en etkili kurumlardan biridir (Acar& Ayata, 2002; Porter, 1986; Walby, 1990; Stromquist, 2006; Francis, 2006; Dillabough, 2003). Resmi ve gayri resmi eğitim kanalları boyunca okullar etkili bir şekilde devletin ideolojik çıkarlarına ve cinsiyetçi kalıplarına uygun belirli bir kadın ya da erkek özneliği oluşturur (Walby, 1990; Stromquist, 2006; Acar& Ayata, 2002). Böylelikle, devletin siyasi öncelikleri doğrultusunda ataerkil bir yapılandırmanın sonucu olarak cinsiyetçi öznellikler şekillendirilir. Ve kadın öğrenciler, erkek öğrencilerden farklı olarak ataerkil düşünce sisteminin bir parçası olarak yapılandırılmış bir öznellikle tanımlanırlar. Bütün bu teorik açıklamalara bağlı kalınarak, bu bölümde son olarak, çalışmanın teorik ve kavramsal araçları belirlenmiştir. Çalışma içerisinde, (1) ideoloji siyasi rasyonelite, (2) okul devletin ideolojik aygıtı ve (3) cinsiyetçi öznellik ataerkil bir yapılandırmanın siyasi ürünü olarak kabul edilmiş ve kullanılmıştır.

Teorik açıklamaları sunduktan sonra, 3. Bölüm tarihsel arka planı okuyucuya sunmaktadır. Bu bölümde, daha önce bahsi geçen Cumhuriyet'in kuruluş dönemindeki ilk kadın öznelliği yapılandırılması incelenmiştir. Yeniden yapılandırma sürecini ve bu sürecin yeni dini-muhafazakâr ataerkil kültürünü anlamak için ilk yapılandırma dönemini anlamak önemlidir. Bu sebepten, bu bölüm, yeni kurulan bağımsız Cumhuriyeti ve onun kadına yaklaşımını anlatarak eğitim yoluyla Cumhuriyet kadınının nasıl yaratıldığını açıklamıştır. Cumhuriyet döneminde, tüm eğitim sistemi boyunca laik ideoloji çerçevesinde kadınlar erkeklerle eşit şekilde eğitime katılmışlardır. Ancak çalışma eğitim kurumu olarak Kız Enstitülerini örnek almış ve eğitim sistemi içerisinde kadınların nasıl idealize edilmiş modele göre yapılandırıldıklarını açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Kız Enstitülerinin örnek olarak seçilmesinin nedeni ise bu okulların da tıpkı İmam-Hatip okulları gibi mesleki liseler olmasıdır. Bu iki tip okulun eğitim kültürü farklı olsa bile, mesleki ve genel eğitimleri boyunca kendi egemen kültürleri içerisindeki ataerkil anlayış çerçevesinde belli bir kadın kimliği yaratma konusunda ikisi de etkili rollere sahiptir. Burada iki okulu karşılaştırma amacı gütmeyen, ana konunun daha iyi anlaşılması için gerekli tarihi zemin hazırlanmaya çalışılmıştır.

4. ve 5. Bölümler ise günümüz Türkiye'ye dönmektedir. İlk önce, 4. Bölüm AKP'nin yeni muhafazakâr anlayışını ve kadın ideolojisini tanıtmıştır. Bölüm temel olarak, AKP'nin daha önceki İslamcı siyasi partilerden niyet olarak çok farklı olmadığını ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni İslamlaştırma ve muhafazakârlaştırma üzerine çalıştığını anlatmaktadır. Daha sonrasında, partinin kadın ideolojisine odaklanıp, kadınların hedeflenen devrimsel değişimdeki önemli pozisyonlarını açıklamıştır. AKP toplumsal ahlakı direk olarak kadınların erdemli ve iffetli yaşama şekillerine, davranışlarına ve fiziksel görünüşlerine bağlı kalarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu sebepten dolayı, ilk olarak kadınları aile içerisindeki sosyal rolleri ile toplumsal ahlakın ve dinseliliğin temel kaynağı olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Yeni muhafazakâr ideolojiye bağlı kalarak kadınları öncelikle annelik rolleriyle tanımlamışlardır(Coşar& Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Ayata& Tütüncü, 2008; Çavdar, 2010; Ayata& Doğançün, 2017; Acar& Altunok, 2012; Ünal, 2015; Cindoğlu& Ünal, 2017). Daha sonra, başörtüsünün sembolik önemine vurgu

yaparak, kadınlar için başörtüsü idealize edilmiştir. Başörtülü kadınlar egemen dini ideolojinin simgesi olarak kabul edilmiş ve kullanılmıştır (Cindoğlu& Ünal, 2017; Saktanber& Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). Böylelikle, AKP kadınları geleneksel sosyal rolleri boyunca yeni İslami Türkiye'nin ana kaynağı, koruyucusu ve sembolü olarak idealize etmiştir. Egemen ideolojiye uygun şekilde, kadınların yaşamlarını, davranışlarını, kıyafetlerini ve bedenlerini dini bakımdan ele almış ve siyasileştirmiştir. Çalışmanın 4. Bölümü de bu konuya açıklık getirmektedir.

5. Bölüm ise İmam-Hatip okullarının nasıl siyasileştirildiğini, eğitim kurumundan ziyade nasıl ideolojik bir araç olarak kullanıldıklarını açıklamaktadır. Bölüm içerisinde, İmam-Hatip okullarının kuruluş zamanından bu yana İslamcı hareketin nasıl önemli bir parçası olduğu gösterilmiştir. Önemli olarak da, bölümün son kısmında, günümüzde AKP tarafından milli eğitim sistemi içerisinde tek ve en önemli ideolojik aygıt olarak nasıl kullanıldıkları vurgulanmıştır. Böylelikle, 5. Bölüm İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitimini incelemeyi önce siyasi önemlerini anlatmıştır.

Açıkça görülmektedir ki, 4. Bölüm Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yeni egemen dini-muhafazakâr siyasi ideolojisini ve bu ideolojinin içerisindeki kadın konumunu anlatmıştır. 5. Bölüm ise İslamcı grupların ve dolayısıyla AKP'nin İmam-Hatip okullarını nasıl ideolojik bir araç olarak kullandıklarını açıklamıştır. Bu bilgiler ışığında, 6. Bölüm AKP'nin devlet siyaseti ile İmam-Hatip okullarının eğitiminin karşılıklı etkileşimine odaklanarak, nasıl belli bir ideal kadın özneliği yaratıldığını analiz etmiştir. Bu noktada, mülakat bulgularından faydalanılmış ve kadın deneyimleri ile kişisel düşünceleri bilginin ana kaynağı olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bölüm ilk önce kadın mezunların İmam-Hatip okullarına yaklaşımını ve İmam-Hatipli olmayı nasıl tanımladıklarını analiz etmiştir. Mezunlar için, İmam-Hatip okullarının dini karakteristiklerinden dolayı diğer okullar gibi sıradan okullar olmadığı anlaşılmıştır. Hemen sonrasında, bu okulların eğitim yapıları analiz edilmiştir. Resmi ve gayri resmi eğitimleri boyunca nasıl dini ve ataerkil bir eğitim sundukları gözlemlenmiştir. Eğitim süreçleri incelendikten sonra, mezunların zihniyetine göre kadın olmanın anlamı sorgulanmıştır. İdeal ve doğru kadının kamu ve özel alanlardaki pozisyon ve statülerini ne şekilde yorumladıkları

analiz edilmiştir. Son olarak da, mezun kadınların Türkiye’deki kadın sorunlarıyla ilgili düşünceleri sorgulanmış ve gösterilmiştir. Böylelikle, 6. Bölüm direk olarak saha çalışmasına bağlı kalarak, araştırmanın bulgularını analiz etmiştir. Bu analizlerin sonucu olarak İmam-Hatip okullarındaki ideolojik yapılandırma süreci ve bu sürecin kadınlar üzerindeki etkileri ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Çalışmanın son bölümü olan 7. Bölüm ise bu yapılandırma sürecini çalışma genelindeki tüm tarihsel ve teorik bilgiler ışığında derinlemesine ortaya çıkarmıştır. Birincisi, araştırmanın bulguları, İmam-Hatip okullarının resmi müfredat ve müfredat dışı etkinlikleriyle egemen dini-muhafazakâr ideolojiyi öğrencilere aşılama başarısını ortaya koymaktadır. Mezunların büyük çoğunluğunun İslami bilinç kazandığı ve dini değerleri ve inanışları benimsediği görülmektedir. Mezunların açıklamaları, belirli bir inanç ve değer sistemini nasıl içselleştirdiklerini ve egemen ideoloji ile özdeşleştirilen öznelliği nasıl benimsediklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Birçoğu okullarını ve kimliklerini eşsiz/benzersiz olarak nitelendirmektedir. Mezunlara göre, İmam-Hatip okulları diğer liseler gibi sıradan okullar değildir. Dini ve dini olmayan, bilimsel konuları bir araya getiren müfredatı ile benzeri görülmemiş bir eğitim sistemine sahiptirler. Aynı zamanda okulun ahlaki özellikleri Müslüman vatandaşların gerçek modelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle, bulgular İmam-Hatip okullarının büyük ölçüde dini bilinçli gençleri üretmeyi başardığını ortaya koymaktadır.

İkincisi, mezunların eğitim deneyimleri İmam-Hatip okullarının dini bilinci öğrencilere aşılarken, kız öğrencilerin bu süreçte nasıl farklı etkilendiğini göstermektedir. Öğrencilerin açıklamalarına göre, İmam Hatip okulları kız öğrencilere ataerkil anlayışı temel alarak yaklaşmakta ve onları dini-ataerkil kültüre bağlı kalarak eğitmektedirler. Çalışmanın teorik bölümünde tartışıldığı gibi, ders kitabı/ders içeriğinden disiplin kontrolüne, sınıf ve okul ortamının düzenlenmesine, etik kurallara, sosyal davranışlara ve kıyafetlere kadar resmi ve gayri resmi eğitim mekanizmalarıyla bu okullar İslam’ı ve cinsiyetçi ilkelerini öğretmektedirler. Resmi müfredat İslam ve onun kadın-erkeği birbirinden ayıran cinsiyetçi düşüncesini direk olarak öğrencilere

aktarmaktadır. Öte yandan, gizli müfredat, belirgin bir şekilde, okul kültüründe dini sosyalleşmeyi ve cinsiyet ayrımcılığını sağlamaktadır.

Bu durumda, okul kültüründe fitrat anlayışına bağlı kalınarak kadın ve erkek ayrımı yapılmaktadır. Biyolojik determinist yaklaşıma dayanarak, kadın ve erkeklerin ayrı ve farklı fitrat ve dolayısıyla davranış modellerine sahip olduğuna inanılmaktadır. Yeteneklerinden mesleklerine, ahlaki rollerine ve sosyal pozisyonlarına kadar yaşamın her alanında kadın ve erkek farklılaştırılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, kadınlar ataerkil ilkelere uygun olarak ikincil ve alt pozisyonlarda yer almaktadır. Fıtratlarının daha kırılğan, duygusal, şefkatli ve pasif olarak kabul edilmesinden dolayı, eş ve anne olmaları için yaratıldıkları varsayılmaktadır. Bu nedenden dolayı, İmam-Hatip okulları kız öğrencileri öncelikli olarak iyi bir eş ve anne olmak için eğitmektedirler.

Bu ayrımcılık anlayışı okul içerisinde pratik olarak da uygulanmaktadır. Kız ve erkek öğrenciler farklı alanlara yerleştirilmekte ve aralarına algılanabilir sınırlar konulmaktadır. Okul kültüründe evlilik öncesi yakın temaslar, hatta karşı cinsler arasındaki dostça ilişkiler bile negatif olarak değerlendirilmekte ve sıkı bir şekilde kontrol edilmektedir. Karma eğitim okul sisteminde desteklenmemektedir. Mezunların deneyimleri, cinsiyet ayrımının düzeyinin her okulda değişmesine rağmen, erkek ve kız öğrencilerin her okulda gözle görülür bir şekilde ayrıldığını vurgulamaktadır. Kız öğrenciler ve erkek öğretmenler arasındaki ilişkiler bile sınırlı ve kısıtlı konumdadırlar. İslami öğretilerde, toplumun ahlakı, kadınların ailelerine ve kocalarına olan bağlılığı ile derinden ilişkilendirmektedir. Bu nedenle, kadınların erdemini ve iffetini korumak ve böylece sosyal ahlakı sağlamak amacıyla cinsiyet ayrımı İmam-Hatip okullarında uygulanmaktadır.

Öğrencilerin açıklamalarına göre okul kültüründe bu ayrımcılık disiplin kontrolü ile sağlanmaktadır. Mezunların eğitim deneyimleri, öğretmenlerin ve okul müdürlerinin öncelikle erkek öğrencilerin davranışlarından ziyade kız öğrencilerin davranışları ve ilişkileri üzerinde güçlü bir disiplin kontrolü oluşturduğunu göstermektedir. Mezunlar, karşı cinsle iletişim halinde olmaları halinde uyarıldıklarını veya cezalandırıldıklarını

belirtirmişlerdir. Bu durumda, kız öğrenciler farklı olarak kontrol mekanizmasına yerleştirilmektedirler. Davranışları, ilişkileri ve dolayısıyla özgürlükleri belirli “gayri resmi” kurallarla sınırlandırılmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle, İmam-Hatip okulları kendi ahlaki ortamında ataerkil bir kültüre sahiptir ve cinsiyetlendirilmiş sosyalleşme sağlamaktadır. Bu okul kültürü ve eğitimi içerisinde, kız öğrenciler ataerkil yapıyı deneyimler ve öznellikleri bu ataerkil yapının ana ilkelerine göre yapılandırılır.

Üçüncüsü, mezunların toplumsal deneyimleri ve kadınlık hakkındaki kişisel düşünceleri, büyük çoğunluğunun ataerkil öz yapılarını içselleştirdiğini ve ataerkil ideolojinin işlevsel bir parçası haline geldiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Farklı bakış açıları arasında, hâlihazırda bu cinsiyetçi sistemi içselleştirmiş ve “ideolojik bir özne” haline gelmiş mezunlar, AKP'nin yeniden idealize edilmiş kadınlarını örneklemektedirler. Bu mezunların açıklamalarından da anlaşıldığı gibi, Türkiye'nin bu yeni ideal kadınları öncelikle biyolojik yapı ve işlevleri ile tanımlanmaktadır. Fıtrat kavramına dayanarak, kadın ve erkeklerin farklı varlıklar olduğu ve onların kamusal ile özel alanlarda konumlarının/rollerinin farklı olduğu kabul edilmektedir.

Her şeyden önce, yeni kadınlar annelikleriyle özdeşleştirilmektedir. Mezunların çoğu için, kadın olmak esasen anne olmakla eşdeğerdir. Bu, Allah'ın onlara verdiği kutsal görevdir. Bu yüzden onların sosyal yaşamdaki birincil rolleri anne olmak şeklinde tanımlanmaktadır. Dahası, onlar için yeni ideal kadınlar ahlaki, iffetli ve erdemlidir. Evlenmeden önce yabancı erkeklerle iletişim kurmazlar ve gelecekteki kocalarına bağlılıklarını korurlar. Gerekli yaşa geldiklerinde, ailelerini kurmak ve birincil görevleri olan anneliği yerine getirmek için evlenirler. Ayrıca, cinsiyet rollerinin gereği olarak, yeni ideal kadınlar ev halkının ihtiyaçlarını karşılayan birincil kişilerdir. Özel alanın sorumlulukları, cinsiyetçi işbölümüne dayanarak kadınlar için temel sosyal roller olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin yeni ideal kadınları özel alandan ayrı olarak değerlendirilemez. Yani, yeni ideal kadınlar öncelikle bir eş ve bir anne olarak özel alanda aileleşmeleri ile yapılandırılmışlardır.

Diğer taraftan, yeni kadınların kamusal alandaki konumu da yeniden idealize edilmiş ve yapılandırılmıştır. Her ne kadar kadınlar öncelikli olarak özel alan içinde idealize edilmiş olsalar da, kadınların kamu alanında yer alması maddi ihtiyaç durumlarında tolere edilmektedir. Benzer şekilde, mezunların çoğu için, yeni ideal kadınlar işgücü piyasasına katılabilir, ancak ahlaki ve dini sınırları göz önünde bulundurarak bu alanda yerlerini almaktadırlar. Çalışmaları belirli koşullara tabidir. Her şeyden önce, ideal kadınlar kendilerine uygun meslekler yaparlar. Mühendislik gibi fiziksel güç ya da politika gibi mantıksal zekâ gerektiren meslekleri yapmaları doğalarına aykırıdır. Daha sonra, kamusal alan içerisinde yer alırken, ideal kadınlar İmam-Hatip okullarının aşıladığı cinsiyet ayrımını korumak için özen gösterir. Cinsiyete göre ayrılmış alanları olan uygun işyerlerinde çalışırlar. Yabancı erkeklerle yakın ilişki kurmamaya ve ahlaki sınırları aşmamaya özen gösterirler. Ayrıca, ailevi olmayan alanlarda, ideal kadınlar erdemli ve ahlaklı davranır ve giyinir. Yabancı erkeklerin dikkatini çekmezler ve böylece istenen toplumsal ahlaki düzene zarar vermezler. Toplumda İslam kültürü ve ideolojisinin sembolü olarak hareket ederler. Açıkça görülmektedir ki, öncelikle iyi bir anne ve eş olan, evlilikleri ve ailelerini yaşamlarının en önemli görevi olarak kabul eden, ahlaki değerlere göre yaşayan ve dini-muhafazakâr bilinci olan kadınlar idealize edilmiş ve 'Türkiye'nin yeni ideal kadınları' olarak yeniden yapılandırılmışlardır.

Son olarak, mezunların tüm deneyimleri ve özellikle Türkiye'deki kadın sorularına ilişkin kişisel düşünceleri, yeni yapılanmış bu kadınların yeni ataerkilliğin hem ürünü hem de işlevsel parçası olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Açıkça anlaşılmaktadır ki, Cumhuriyetçi devletin eşitlikçi anlayışından farklı olarak AKP kadını dini-muhafazakâr bir ataerkil kültür ile idealize etmiş ve yapılandırmıştır. Dini bilince sahip gelecek nesilleri yetiştirdikleri için, kadınların anneliği hala devlet için ideolojik öneme sahiptir. Bu sebepten, birincil olarak özel alanda konumlandırılmışlardır ve hala ailenin cinsiyetçi yapısını deneyimlemeye devam etmektedirler. Ancak Cumhuriyet kadınlarının aksine, kamusal alandaki katılımları ya desteklenmemekte ya da İslami kurallar doğrultusunda kısıtlanmaktadır. Toplum ahlakı kadınların ahlakına indirgenmektedir.

Kadınların kamusal alanlardaki davranışları, ilişkileri ve görünüşleri ahlaki düzeni sağlamak adına kontrol edilmektedir. Erkekler istedikleri mesleklerde çalışırken, istedikleri kişilerle iletişim kurarken ve istedikleri gibi giyinirken, kadınlar egemen kültürün teolojik ve ataerkil temelinde kontrol edilmekte ve sınırlandırılmaktadırlar. Kişisel dini inançlarını uygulama özgürlükleri bile devletin öncelikleri için siyasetleştirilmektedir. Kadınların güçlendirilmesi sadece aile ve başörtü sorunları bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Böylelikle, dini nesiller yetiştirdikleri, dindarlığı sağladıkları, ahlaki düzeni korudukları ve devletin dini ideolojisini başörtüleriyle sembolize ettiklerinden dolayı devlet için önemlidirler. Devletin gözünde geleneksel cinsiyet rolleriyle var olmaktadır.

Öte yandan, mezunların Türkiye'deki kadın sorunları konusundaki açıklamalarından anlaşıldığı üzere, ataerkil sistemi ve onları ikincil konuma koyan hiyerarşik yapıyı neredeyse büyük çoğunluğu benimsemiştir. Mevcut eşitsiz toplumsal düzeni görmezden gelerek, İslami yaşam tarzını benimsemeyen kadınları, kadınların problemlerinin ana kaynağı olarak görmektedirler. Böylece, Türkiye'de ataerkillik muhafazakârlaşma ve İslamlaşma adına yeni dini doğasında varlığını sürdürmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, AKP'nin İmam Hatip okullarının eğitimi yoluyla dini cinsiyet ideolojisi çerçevesinde ideal kadın öznelliğini nasıl yeniden yapılandırıldığını aydınlatmaktadır. AKP İmam-Hatip okullarını gerekli olan dini vatandaşlarını yetiştirmekte ideolojik bir araç olarak kullanmıştır. Ancak bu süreçte, kız öğrenciler erkeklerden daha farklı şekilde etkilenmiştir çünkü onların özellikleri dini-ataerkil kültürün bir ürünü olarak yapılandırılmıştır. Açık ki, kadın özneliği İmam-Hatip okullarının dini ve cinsiyetçi resmi ve gayri resmi eğitimleri boyunca AKP'nin yeni muhafazakâr ideolojisinin vücut bulmuş hali olarak yeniden yapılandırılmıştır.

APPENDIX E: TEZ İZİN FORMU/ THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Ataç
Adı / Name : Alara
Bölümü / Department : Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kadın Çalışmaları

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : Reconstruction of Female Subjectivity in Turkey: Neoconservatism and Imam-Hatip Schools

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE:

Yüksek Lisans / Master

Doktora/ Phd

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.**
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two year. ***
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. ***

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu Kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.
A copy of the Decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date 17.06.2019