

Dynamics behind the europeanization in crisis management under the EU's security and defence policy

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Abstract

This article argues that a regulative norm to act in unity and make the Security and Defence Policy work through crisis management missions is operative within the European Union. EU crisis management missions analysed here demonstrate that this normative concern has influenced the national preferences of even the larger member states, Britain and France. However, Europeanization of foreign and security policies of these two member states appears to take place easier if it does not collide with pre-existing norms and interests at the domestic and international levels. Norms and interests influential at other institutional contexts determine the scope conditions of Europeanization.

Key words: Europeanization, constructivism, EU crisis management missions.

1. Introduction¹

Whether the European Union has influenced traditional ways of conducting foreign and security policies in the member states through its institutionalization, namely, the processes of Europeanization have attracted increasing attention in the literature (Tonra, 2001; Rieker, 2006; Dover, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011b; De Flers, 2012). This article aims at contributing to this literature by analysing Europeanization within the framework of the EU's security and defence policy. The EU's security and defence policy can be traced back to the Saint-Malo Declaration

¹ This article is from unpublished PhD thesis of Zerrin Torun, Constructivist Approach to Europeanization under the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Framework, submitted to the University of Sussex, 2009.

of Britain and France in 1998, where these two countries announced that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by military forces. Six months later, in the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the EU declared its intention to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (Keukeleire, 2010: 56). The policy became operational in 2003 by the deployment of first military operation Operation Concordia to Macedonia. This was followed by Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003. As of 2016, 18 operations have been completed and 15 operations are ongoing (European External Action Service, 2016). Military and civilian crisis management missions form the backbone of this policy.

Pessimist analyses of the policy argue that the political and strategic goals of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now Common Security and Defence Policy - CSDP) on why the Union should intervene beyond its borders, where it should do so, and according to what criteria are poorly articulated (Kaldor et al., 2007: 282). Others, such as Catriona Gourlay, point out that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis depending on institutional capabilities and other geopolitical factors (Gourlay, 2004: 412, 419). Frédéric Charillon on the other hand, draws on different elements in a more theoretically conscious analysis. Benefits involved may induce Europeanization since a member state can improve its power and visibility, appear as a normal and legitimate security actor in the international arena or have a say in international issues through Europeanization. Alternatively, group dynamics within the EU may play a role, for instance, if one's security conception is not shared by a majority of the partners, the risk of being perceived as ineffective by the Union may induce Europeanization (Charillon, 2005: 525-527). Finally, Eva Gross relies on Europeanization, alliance politics and governmental politics as the analytical lenses to explain European crisis management and argues that existing theories of both International Relations and European Integration are ill-equipped to explain the nature of the impact and influence on the national level and *vice versa* (Gross, 2009: 7). This divergence in the literature as well as the ever widening activities of the EU in the realm of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with numerous missions comprising both civilian and military components only serve to exacerbate the need for analyzing the interaction between the European and national levels and conceptualizing this dimension.

Initially, scholars used 'Europeanization' to refer to the growing competence and authority of EU actors and institutions, in a way that is largely synonymous with conceptions of European integration. Lately, the concept has been used to refer to the impact of the EU on domestic policies, emphasising the adaptational pressures emanating from the EU. A definition of Europeanization in this vein that incorporates both the tangible and less tangible aspects of the issue, was developed by Claudio Radaelli (2003: 30):

Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.

This definition is particularly useful because it draws attention to two essential steps in top-down Europeanization: adoption at the EU level and incorporation at the domestic level. Moreover, Europeanization also comprises bottom-up mechanisms as the outcomes of it can feed back into the process of EU policy reformulation as well (Börzel, 2001: 193). In downloading (top-down Europeanization), the changes in national foreign policies caused by participation in foreign policymaking at the European level is called Europeanization. In uploading (bottom-up Europeanization), Europeanization refers to the projection of national preferences, ideas and policy models onto the level of the European Union (Wong and Hill, 2011a: 4). Thus, focus must be on the interaction between the national and the EU levels, and how each level feeds into the other, in order to differentiate between processes of European integration itself and Europeanization.

In this context, the interaction between the national and the EU levels in larger member states, especially the UK and France, with regard to these decisions deserves special attention, as these two members have been the driving forces behind ESDP since their joint summit in Saint Malo in December 1998. The leading role of these two countries' in the incorporation of a military dimension to the ESDP may lead to the characterization of Europeanization of these two member states' foreign and security policies as a bottom-up process or uploading (Giegerich, 2006: 193, 200). Given their capabilities and status as former 'great powers', it is obvious that not only the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but also ESDP (CSDP) very often remain as one option among many for these countries.

However, an area for the Europeanization of member states' foreign and security policies where top-down mechanisms play a role may be the choices of missions. In this light, whether decisions of these larger member states on deploying (Europeanizing) missions have been influenced by the formal and informal norms or inter-subjective understandings developed within the EU appears to be a crucial question. This is a question, answer of which would lay forth the impact of the European integration process on the national level and therefore contribute to the literature on the EU security policy by taking a step beyond simply drawing attention to the institution- or capacity- building or convergence around existing values or points of agreement.

When the issue is about the influence of the EU on the national level, constructivist approach becomes highly relevant with its emphasis on the role of social and ideational factors (the EU norms and rules, as well as the concern over credibility and political standing within the EU) in the definition of member states' preferences.² Norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. Regulative norms order and constrain behaviour whereas constitutive norms create new actors, interests or categories of action. Constructivists focus on the routinized practices and the unintended and intended consequences of institution-building by analyzing the impact of socialization (internalisation of norms³) or social learning. These are also the mechanisms of Europeanization according to the constructivist perspective. Based on these concepts and assumptions, constructivists believe that there are possibilities for institutions to have transformative effects on basic actor properties. Identities can multiply or become nested into more complex configurations, and this does not rule out the possibility for role tension or conflict between identifications. Put another way, constructivists argue that interaction within institutional environments can lead to redefined, transformed, or expanded conceptions of the self through acquiring new interests and/or preferences (Lewis, 2003: 108).

In this light, this article aims to contribute to the literature on Europeanization by analyzing the nature and scope conditions of the process of Europeanization of crisis management missions with a focus on the interaction between the national and European levels in the British and French cases, two larger member states of the EU. In order to better explore the the impact of interaction within the EU framework, the missions analysed here are those that either one or both of these two countries' policy-makers were reluctant to launch. Furthermore, these missions are the first of their kind deployed to Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caucasus under ESDP. The following section analyses the factors behind the deployment of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Artemis marked the successful uploading of French national preferences to the European level, whereas the British preferences have been shaped mostly by the circumstances of the period and dynamics of European integration. Subsequent sections explore the processes of deployment of ESDP crisis management missions in Aceh, Indonesia and Georgia. Both the UK and France were initially against the deployment of a mission to Aceh, and they held opposing views in the case of Georgia. As the analysis based on a series of interviews with relevant actors demonstrates norms and inter-subjective understandings within the EU had an impact in changing the preferences

² Social and ideational factors comprise norms, rules, identities and inter-subjective understandings (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

³ Norm-guided behaviour and constitutive rules does not mean that actors never violate norms. See Thomas Risse (2004).

on launching these missions. Therefore, the article concludes that a normative concern to act in unity and make ESDP work through crisis management missions is operative within the EU and this normative concern influences larger member states as well.

Thus, security cultures and national preferences of the UK and France have been influenced by incorporation of this new interest to improve ESDP by launching these missions. However, in all three of the missions explored, conditions were permissive in terms of the expectations of outside actors and the parties to the conflicts. Among these, the low-profile engagement of the EU in Georgia as a security actor in particular suggests that the role of external factors is more significant for these EU member states. Therefore, Europeanization of foreign and security policies of these two larger member states is easier if this does not collide with pre-existing norms and interests at the domestic and international level. To sum up, not only the EU norms and inter-subjective understandings, but also those emanating from other contexts have to be taken into account in order to fully explore the dynamics behind Europeanization in this area, since these determine the scope conditions of Europeanization including, the nature and timing of EU crisis management missions.

2. ESDP in the democratic republic of Congo (DRC)

The grave situation in Bunia, to where the EU force was sent, was a result of the ongoing war in the DRC since 1998. A UN peacekeeping mission was sent to the country in 1999, but it was not strong enough in terms of the mandate and the forces. A strong EU action going beyond aid and cooperation programmes and support to the mediation efforts did not come forth until after the UN was humiliated on the ground in Bunia in May 2003. 700 Uruguayan soldiers in the area were not strong enough to avoid violence, and their UN Mandate was limited to protect UN staff and installations, excluding the protection of civilian lives (Walsh, 2003: 2-3).

The sending of an EU military force to oversee the situation until reinforcement by a UN mission was possible at this stage for a number of reasons. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called President Chirac and Javier Solana in order to ask for support for the UN Mission (Solana, 2005: 39). The French volunteered as they were interested in the stability of the DRC. They had the experience of intervention in the DRC, and spoke the same language, so they seemed like the natural candidate to lead. However, special attention had to be paid to the Rwandans who were against a French presence in the region because of the perceived French role in the 1994 genocide. Rwanda's consent was achieved, thanks to the efforts of the EU Special Representative, who secured the British efforts to convince the Rwandans. The mandate of the operation had to be short and limited to Bunia in Ituri, partly because of the guarantees given to Rwanda, to

convince them that there was no ulterior French motive. France was keen to have the UK on board and to intervene on the basis of a UN Chapter VII mandate to alleviate concerns (Interview 14 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006). In addition, France welcomed the opportunity to Europeanize this mission, as focusing EU member states' attention on this region had been a declared French objective as early as 2001 (France's African Policy, 2001).

The UK eventually agreed to contribute to an EU mission by sending 88 troops in total, the majority of which were Royal Engineers who upgraded Bunia's airfield. The remainder were staff officers and support personnel (Ingram, 2003: Column 698W). Despite this, the UK position on Artemis seemed quite surprising as it had neither historical nor economic links to the DRC. However, a number of factors led to the UK consent to this mission. Since the first EU operation in cooperation with NATO was already launched in the Balkans and the British agreed to EU interventions without NATO assets at Saint Malo in 1998, opposition to an autonomous EU force could not be put forward (Gegout, 2005: 438). Besides, as NATO was involved in Afghanistan, and was considering a potential involvement in Iraq, Africa was not on its agenda (Gegout, 2005: 438; Faria, 2004: 47). Thus, the British involvement was also facilitated by tacit US approval. The US did not oppose the idea of an EU operation without NATO assets as it was not only willing to ease transatlantic tensions over the Iraq war but also reluctant to get entangled in Africa due to the lingering memory of the peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM II in Somalia, where 18 US soldiers died in 1993 (Rothchild, 2001: 190-192). Not only did the US give its consent to the EU at the UN Security Council, reportedly, it even spent efforts to convince the conflict parties, Uganda and Rwanda to accept the EU interim mission (Astill, 2003: 16). In addition to these factors which facilitated the UK decision, the idea that Europeanizing this mission would result in far less political baggage was shared by the UK as well. This was also seen as a positive step for the EU to establish itself a security actor, and to defy arguments that it is too weak to react in areas where it is the major donor (Evans-Pritchard, 2003: 16; Castle, 2003: 14). British diplomats shared an additional concern with France, the necessity to do something, especially as the credibility of the UN on the ground was at stake (Interview 8 with Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006). As permanent members of the UN Security Council, both the UK and France had an interest in having a relevant and important UN (Ulriksen, et al., 2004: 513).

For both the EU member states and the US, then, the decision was a gesture to mend the transatlantic link (Smith, 2003; Interview 12 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006). As the US, the UK, and France were in serious clash over the war in Iraq, Operation Artemis seemed as a good way to preserve some modicum of cooperation for the future (Bayart, 2004: 455). It seemed also functional in order to prove that the EU could act autonomously from NATO,

especially for France, as the first ESDP mission Operation Concordia to Macedonia had been carried out with NATO planning and logistical support. Thus, the operation became symbolically and functionally important to demonstrate that the EU functions despite the grave disagreements between its member states (Black, 2003: 20). Despite this, the risks involved in the operation (Castle, 2003) were a source of concern for many member states, whereas the grave humanitarian situation pointed to the need to take action. However, even for these countries, such as Germany, this operation was significant in terms of ESDP's future, since it brought closer the UK and France representing respectively Atlanticism and Europeanism (Fischer, 2003). Furthermore, the EU High Representative Solana's role in actively pushing the process forward was important. By publicly citing his contacts with the UN Secretary General, and evoking the latter's demand for an EU-led mission, he made a refusal politically difficult for reluctant member states (Jönsson and Strömvik, 2005: 25).

To sum up, concerns of proving that EU member states can act collectively through missions, and that the EU is a credible security actor able to assist the UN have been influential. However, this has been possible under permissive conditions, since the change in the UK preference did not conflict with other norms and interests, which guides the UK not to take actions that would undermine NATO or the Anglo-American relationship. Hence, after the UNSC Resolution 1484, which authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia, Ituri, on 12 June 2003 the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to launch its first fully autonomous crisis management military mission outside Europe for which France acted as the Framework Nation and provided the operation headquarters (UNSC Resolution 1484, S/RES/1484, 2003; Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP, June 2003; EU-led Military Operation in the DRC, July 2003).

Operation Artemis has been the starting point for a number of other EU actions towards stability and security in Africa. It focused the attention of Javier Solana, the EU High Representative on the area, who advocated further investment by the EU for police assistance, judicial expertise, and help in the electoral process down the line (Solana, 2003). Thus, subsequent deployment of EU civilian crisis management missions to the area, and increasing financial assistance in a more structured manner became possible. However, since this does not mean that unilateral actions or action in other organizations stopped being an option for these two states, it seems more plausible to analyse the wider context in which these operations took place, in order to understand which operations are Europeanized. The EU is valuable as a magnifier as it involves legitimacy and effectiveness by being acceptable to third countries (Interview 4 with an official at the Council of the EU, 8 March 2006). Europeanized operations have the full backing of the

Council and the potential to bring more benefits to the host country than a unilateral operation could, such as less financial burden and less concerns about hidden agendas (Ulriksen et al., 2004: 521). Besides, these operations, even if they cannot end crises, are seen as a sign of the EU's ability to take action in regional crises of concern and as a corollary of the Union's global influence and role in other issue areas (Richard, 2001). Although one may cite the financial benefit of multilateralizing or Europeanizing military crisis management missions as the motivation, the EU missions are small in terms of size and short in duration, and could supposedly have been borne by these two larger member states. Therefore, political benefits or symbolism of EU missions appear to be more important as factors (Interview 6 with a senior official at the Council of the EU, 13 March 2006), leading the UK and France towards Europeanization in this area, at least at the initial stage.

To conclude, France has successfully uploaded its preference for conducting a crisis management operation in the DRC under ESDP to the EU level, whereas the UK preference was shaped under the influence of the EU decision-making process. Proving that EU member states can act in unity through missions, and that the EU is a credible security actor that can assist the UN have been influential on both French and British preferences. Therefore, the decision and the preferences on deploying this mission have been influenced by the EU norms or inter-subjective understandings. However, this has been possible under permissive conditions. The analysis of a context wider than one which focuses on the developments within the EU *per se*, shows that the EU action on this issue became possible thanks to the indifference (NATO and the USA) and weakness of other international actors (the UN), as well as the unwillingness of regional actors to see individual actions of former colonial powers. Therefore, this case also draws attention to the importance of tacit approval of, or external recognition by, actors in the international arena for the EU to improve itself as an actor in the realm of peace and security. Thus, it can be concluded that in order to reach a full account of the dynamics of Europeanization of crisis management missions, norms and interests emanating from settings other than the EU have to be taken into consideration as well.

3. ESDP in Aceh, Indonesia

Aceh, a province in northern Sumatra, has been part of Indonesia since the country's independence. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement (GAM), an explicitly secessionist movement, appeared as a reaction to the authoritarian regime (New Order) of President Suharto in the early 1990s (Jemadu, 2004: 320-21). However only in 2005 the mediation efforts to bring peace to Aceh by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties (International

Crisis Group, 2005: 2, 6). The involvement of the EU and its member states in the conflict resolution was confined to acting through the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral programmes with Indonesia on good governance. The European Commission financed a programme under its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to support the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA) in Aceh, Indonesia since 2002 (European Commission, D(2002) D/129335, 2002). Since the establishment of a robust mechanism for resolving disputes over violations, which was lacking in a previous initiative had proved to be a fatal flaw, the EU involvement was needed and sought for after this agreement although the EU and its member states were not directly involved in this mediation effort (International Crisis Group, 2005: 11).

Indonesia would not have accepted the UN, since the UN was perceived to be responsible for the loss of East Timor. Although the US, Japan, the UK, ASEAN and Australia preferred the settlement of the issue in Indonesia's favour, and never debated the situation in East Timor in the Security Council between 1976 and 1999 (Philpott, 2006: 143). Indonesia's incorporation of the territory was never formally recognized by the UN General Assembly. Moreover, since East Timor's independence referendum in 1999, the UN had been involved in the monitoring process in the area, and continued its involvement by the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UMAMET). Japan could have been another candidate acceptable as a monitor for Indonesia. However, the Japanese Administration turned inwards in 2005 in order to deal with domestic reform issues and elections (Er, 2006: 156). An explicit role by the US, Australia or China was unlikely both because these countries were not interested (Interview 7 with a Member State Diplomat, 17 March 2006), and their role as a partner at peace talks was not acceptable to Indonesia. The US was seen by many as anti-Islam and pro-Israel, whereas Australia's image was compromised by the fact that it was seen as a junior partner to the US and it took a leading peacekeeping role in East Timor. A Chinese role in Aceh was unacceptable due to the perception that it had interfered in Indonesian domestic politics by aiding communist insurgency in the past. ASEAN could not take a major role as Indonesia regarded itself as a first among equals within this organization, and would consider its involvement as neighbourly interference in its domestic politics (Er, 2004: 358). Besides, ASEAN did not have sufficient operational capabilities or expertise to manage such an operation on its own (Pirozzi and Helly, 2005: 1). Therefore, at this stage the EU's role became essential as the actor acceptable to both sides as an international monitor of the peace agreement.

Although Ahtisaari and CMI had already started to explore the possibilities for an EU monitoring mission in April 2005 (European Commission, RELEX/A4 REG PA (05) D/508248, 2005), and Council representatives had collaborated closely with CMI in planning and drafting concepts and modalities for the

monitoring mission, it did not prove easy to agree on an EU role (Lahdensuo, 2006: 18). Most EU member states, including the UK and France, had little interest in the resolution of the conflict in Aceh. The UK and France were eventually convinced of the need to take a more active role through an ESDP mission as a result of the efforts of Ahtisaari, the neutral members of the EU plus the Netherlands.

The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) agreed that the EU was prepared in principle to send observers to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between GAM leaders and Indonesia, and asked the competent bodies (Political and Security Committee/ PSC) to continue planning for a possible mission in July 2005 (Grevi, 2005: 21). However, within the PSC, there were members who did not even know where Aceh is, therefore, it was hardly a priority (Interview 10 with a Member State diplomat, 24 April 2006). Except for the Dutch (former colonial power), it was a region most Europeans did not know very well. Pretty much everybody thought that the EU should concentrate its efforts on stabilization in the Balkans and bringing order to sub-Saharan Africa, rather than risking their soldiers' lives in a small piece of Indonesia (Interview 7 with a Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006). It was Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands who enthusiastically promoted the mission (Schulze, 2007: 5). Finland had supported Ahtisaari and CMI's mediation from the outset (European Commission, 15 April 2005). Sweden's commitment could be seen as part of its post-tsunami efforts to support Indonesia. As for the Netherlands, it was a natural outcome of the country's continuing post-colonial interest in the area (Interview with an EU expert, London, 12 May 2006).

Despite the fact that the first instinct in France, especially within the Strategic Defence Department was not favourable (Interview 12 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006) the CFSP unit and the Asia Directorate were willing to add political clout to relations with Asia, as it was only the European Commission that was visible in Asia (Interview 9 with a Member State diplomat, 24 March 2006; Interview 13 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006). The British, who at the time were holding the Presidency, were not keen on the mission (Interview 7 with a Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006). Within the PSC, arguments in favour centred on the development of ESDP and answering a demand in an area where an EU effort was needed. At a time of stagnation after the rejection of the Constitution and the budgetary stalemate, the envisaged mission would demonstrate that ESDP was strong and functioning (Grevi, 2005: 21). A mission in Asia would prove that ESDP has a global dimension as the European Security Strategy argued (Interview 10 with a Member State diplomat, 24 April 2006). It was also a good opportunity to step up cooperation with Asian partners (Interview 3 with a senior Member State diplomat, 15 February 2006). and to test the ESDP machinery for CCM, especially the newly established Civil Military Cell (Grevi, 2005: 21), as the mission would

have to draw both on civilian and military experience (Feith, 2007: 4). Both British and French practitioners regarded the enthusiasm of Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands to conduct an operation as a positive sign for ESDP (Interview 13 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006; Interview 11 with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006; Interview 7 with a Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006). Moreover, Ahtisaari's efforts to construct a position in favour of the mission and his intellectual influence on people were effective in convincing ministers at an individual level, especially in the British case (Interview 7 with a Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006). Last, but not least, there were requests both from Acehnese in exile – who sent a letter to the Presidency – and the Indonesian government. This was extraordinary in the sense that the EU usually asks for invitation letters from the parties concerned after there is an initial agreement within the EU on conducting a mission (Interview 10 with a Member State diplomat, 24 April 2006). Given the above mentioned sensitivities of the Indonesian government in particular to other actors as monitors, the need for EU action on the ground became clearer to the EU member states. Thus, on 9 September 2005, the Council adopted a Joint Action to establish a European Union Monitoring Mission (Aceh Monitoring Mission- AMM) to assist Indonesia in the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP, 2005). After this mission, the EU's role continued by the Commission aid for the reintegration of former GAM fighters into civil society, capacity building in local governance and police training, in addition to a joint election observation mission by the European Parliament and the Commission (Feith, 2007: 3).

The case of the Aceh monitoring mission once more illustrates that larger member states' foreign and security policies are not immune to the impact of European integration in this policy area. EU member states see efforts towards conducting missions as one of the mechanisms that bring about convergence in terms of areas of interest and mentalities. The argument that the mission aimed to improve ESDP capabilities or 'learning by doing' and the visibility of the EU helped overcome the reluctance of the practitioners of the larger member states. As successful completion of the missions has a powerful effect on people by showing them that they can work together and produce an outcome that is greater than the sum of its parts, 'learning by doing' is an influential argument over actors (Interview 1 with a senior former diplomat, 20 January 2006). Thus, both the British and French preferences on the deployment of an EU crisis management mission to Aceh changed in interaction with the arguments at the EU level. However, the analysis also suggests that the change in the preferences of the UK and France were possible under permissive conditions, similar to those identified before. These are the presence of member states willing to undertake the mission, the lack of international opposition and the absence of member state preferences requiring the

EU's non-involvement. The requests by the parties to the conflict and the obvious absence of any other international actor to do the job also seem to have influenced the British and French decisions. Therefore, it appears that the most influential factors that led to the Aceh decision was the presence of actors within the EU promoting the decision and the absence of conflicting preferences. Thus, dynamics external to the EU have to be taken into account as well in order to fully understand the preference or interest formation with regard to Europeanization of crisis management missions.

4. ESDP in Georgia

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia became independent but suffered seriously from conflicts in the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition to these conflict-areas, Georgia suffered from a shadow and war-economy, widespread corruption and high levels of organized crime. Despite these serious problems, the EU was primarily an aid provider (both humanitarian and non-humanitarian) rather than a political actor during the 1990s (International Crisis Group, 2006: 5). It was only when the prospects for the Eastern enlargement of 2004 increased that the EU acknowledged the need for a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the South Caucasus as a future neighbouring region in its Security Strategy (European Security Strategy, 2003, 8). Following this, Georgia became part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in June 2004, which aimed to develop greater political, economic and cultural cooperation with non-EU member neighbouring countries (Popescu, 2007: 9).⁴ However, the EU contribution to the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus focused on the ground-level implementation of economic rehabilitation, humanitarian aid and confidence building programs in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its political engagement was minimal compared with the US, Russia, the UN and the OSCE (International Crisis Group, 2006: 16).

While the UN took the lead in Abkhazia, the OSCE was at the forefront of conflict resolution activities in South Ossetia as Russia preferred the involvement of institutions in which it is a member. In other words, Russia regarded Georgia to be within its exclusive sphere of influence and tried to resist interference by actors in which it is not a member in the region. However, in 2004, Russia vetoed the extension of the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission in South Ossetia, stating that the militants could easily pass through the northern border of Georgia. Moscow declared that replacing this mission with another one would not be productive and

⁴ See also European Union Neighbourhood Policy, European Union-Georgia Action Plan (2006).

put pressure on Tbilisi to accept bilateral arrangements to monitor the shared border and to engage in joint anti-terrorist activities (Lynch, 2006: 47-48).

Georgia invited the EU to conduct an unarmed border monitoring mission, which would serve primarily as a political deterrent *vis-à-vis* any Russian moves to cross into Georgian territory along the Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestani border sectors, when the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation was terminated (Socor, 2005; Popescu, 2007: 10; International Crisis Group, 2006: 24). In response, the EU discussed four possible options which included taking over the OSCE Mission entirely under an EU flag, supporting a coalition of the willing mission outside the EU framework, launching an EU training mission for Georgian border guards, and finally, sending three EU border experts to advise Georgia on border reform (Socor, 2005; Popescu, 2007: 6, 11). However, its involvement was compromised since Russia and the leadership of the secessionist entities of Abkhazia and especially South Ossetia opposed an EU role. Even after a few months of discussion, member states could not agree on a follow-up mission and chose to send a three-person assessment mission to find out Georgia's needs and capacities. The lack of political consensus owed much to the reluctance of some member states, including France, Greece, Italy, Belgium and Spain, to take steps which Russia might consider antagonistic. The new Baltic members of the EU, supported by the UK, on the other hand were willing to launch a substantial mission, even as a coalition of the willing, outside the ESDP framework (International Crisis Group, 2006: 24). The dependency of many EU member states on Russian energy resources, the growing strategic significance of the South Caucasus as an oil and gas transit route as well as the risk of spill-over of illegal immigration and terrorism from the region required a fine-balancing act from the EU.

The EU finally agreed to extend the mandate of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in late July 2005 to include reporting on the border situation, facilitating confidence building between Georgia and Russia and assisting the Georgian government to prepare a comprehensive reform strategy for its border guards. A EUSR support team of 20 officials was deployed in Tbilisi in September 2005 and began to work closely with Regional Border Guard Centres throughout the country. However, conflict areas were excluded from its mandate (International Crisis Group, 2006: 24; EUSR Border Support Team (BST) to Georgia, 2007). Thus, starting by three officials under a low-profile mission, the EU aimed to respond to Georgia's security concerns and play a role in improving Georgian-Russian relations without being seen as defending Georgia against Russia. At this size, the EUSR border support team became comparable in personnel and involvement to other ESDP missions, such as EUJUST Themis or EU COPS PATT in Palestine. However, the EU kept the profile of the EUSR border support mission as low as possible in order to avoid any substantial reactions from Russia (Popescu,

2007: 11-12). The significance of the Russian reaction, which brought about a low-profile mission, becomes clearer when compared with the 2005 EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EU BAM), which had a stronger mandate and 200 personnel (EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine Pamphlet, 2008: 4). Whereas EU BAM had five field offices along the Ukraine-Moldova border, the border team for Georgia was seated in Tbilisi, far from the border (Tangiashvili and Kobaladze, 2006: 55; Lobjakas, 2007). Partly in order to compensate, in July 2004 the EU launched a rule of law mission (EUJUST THEMIS) with the aim to assist the new government in its efforts to bring local rule of law standards closer to international and EU standards in July 2004, before making improvements to the border support mission. By launching this mission, the EU wanted to demonstrate its full support for Georgian reforms and commitment to democratic values, despite the fact that it could not provide practical help on border management at the time (Gularidze, 2004). The mission was also seen as a test for EU-Russia relations by virtue of being the first ESDP mission deployed in the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, it was also regarded as a good opportunity to test the EU's Civilian Crisis Management capabilities in the field of rule of law (Popescu, 2007: 10). Therefore, it appears that this mission also resulted from the influence of the widely shared view within the EU that ESDP should evolve incrementally by 'learning by doing'.

The missions, whether civilian or military, serve the purposes of both the UK and France. For the UK, they stimulate calls for increased capabilities, while also proving that the EU can do things. For France, on the other hand, the missions increase the visibility of the EU and strengthen ESDP (Interview with Prof. Richard Whitman, 17 October 2005). Examples such as the deployment of observers to Aceh, Indonesia or the Georgian rule of law missions help people realize that the EU is able to put together policies and can actually implement these, which eventually change attitudes significantly (Interview 1 with a senior former diplomat, 20 January 2006). In addition, the expanding number and geographical scope of the civilian and military missions result in mainstreaming of the EU related issues in the Foreign Ministries of member states, as various desks and directorates become more aware of the EU activities (Interview 2 with a Member State diplomat, 24 January 2006; Interview 5 with an official at the Council of the EU, 9 March 2006). As this survey shows, although member states' interests in not risking their relations with Russia limited the EU response, EU activities under the framework of ESDP were still motivated by enhancing its visibility (through other actions) and capabilities through missions (despite the low profile in the border management), in a way similar to the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

Thus, expectations of EU member states from one another to prove that the EU can act as a security actor are influential on the decisions to deploy ESDP

missions. However, while the UK and Baltic member states were in favour of an EU border monitoring mission, France and others were not willing to do anything that would impair their relations with Russia. Therefore, Russian opposition to an EU presence in its near abroad resulted in a low profile EU initiative to help the Georgian government to protect its borders. In addition to keeping a low profile in terms of border-management, the EU decided to focus on rule of law reforms within Georgia, so as to enhance its own capabilities and visibility in the realm of security without impairing relations with Russia. Therefore, it can be concluded that the norms or inter-subjective understandings developed within the EU are more influential on member states provided that the actions in conformity with these do not conflict with norms and interests influential at other levels. This supports the previous conclusion that permissive conditions are important and that the inter-subjective understandings of EU member states and institutions actually matter less in the Europeanization of crisis-management operations. The fact that pre-existing norms and interests at the domestic and international level have influenced the nature and timing of the crisis management mission means that in order for a full understanding of the scope conditions regarding Europeanization in this area, it is necessary to go beyond the concerns of EU member states to prove that the EU can act in unity as a security actor, or the EU norms and inter-subjective understandings.

5. Conclusion

It has been demonstrated that a regulative norm to act in unity and make ESDP work through missions is operative within the EU and it influences larger member states, such as the UK and France. For the EU member states crisis management missions are about projecting an EU identity and proving that the EU can act in unity as an actor in the realm of security. These operations, in other words, are deployed to put the flesh on the bones of the EU claim to be recognized as a security actor. This appears to be the argument that makes the EU action possible by convincing those member states which are reluctant to take action under ESDP. Thus, these missions have been results of this norm of developing the EU as a security actor and making ESDP work by taking incremental steps.

Although British and French security cultures and national preferences have not drastically changed, these have been influenced by the incorporation of this new interest or preference. While the case of Operation Artemis in the DRC demonstrates that crisis management missions may be results of bottom-up processes of Europeanization, cases on the missions in Aceh, Indonesia and Georgia prove that Europeanization of these two member states' foreign and security policies is also marked by top-down mechanisms. Thus, it may safely be concluded that larger member states are not immune to the impact of European integration in this policy area. The arguments in favour of launching these missions draw attention

to the emergence and the influence of a norm that requires member states to act in a way that strengthens ESDP by deploying missions.

Case studies on the missions deployed to Aceh, Indonesia and Georgia also demonstrate that policy makers in the UK and France are willing to act in line with the expectations of their fellow EU member states, provided that these expectations do not collide with pre-existing norms and interests influential within other institutional contexts. The fact that the rules, norms, or ways of doing things within the EU provide frames of reference for ESDP actions and influence the national preferences of the UK and France more if these do not collide with existing ones also explains why marginal Europeanization has taken place in this area. However, one should keep in mind that the missions analysed here are from an early stage of ESDP/CSDP, the results could be different if missions from the later stage of this policy are analysed.

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Özet

Avrupa Birliđi'nin güvenlik ve savunma politikasında avrupalılařmanın dinamikleri

Bu makale birlikte hareket etme ve Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasını kriz yönetimi operasyonları yoluyla çalıştırmaktan ibaret bir düzenleyici normun Avrupa Birliđi içerisinde işlerlik kazandığını iddia etmektedir. Burada incelenen AB kriz yönetimi operasyonları bu normatif endişenin İngiltere ve Fransa gibi büyük üye devletlerin ulusal tercihlerini bile etkilediđini göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu iki üye devletin dış ve güvenlik politikalarının Avrupalılařmasının, eđer bu, iç ve dış düzeylerde daha önceden varolan normlar ve çıkarlarla çatıřmazsa daha kolay meydana geldiđi görülmektedir. Bařka kurumsal ortamlardaki normlar ve çıkarlar Avrupalılařmanın kapsama şartlarını belirlemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupalılařma, inřacılık, AB kriz yönetimi operasyonları.