THE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the evolution of the Russian military doctrines starting with the Soviet period until the most recent doctrine of the Russian Federation in 2014. Through this analysis, I aim to examine the transformation of political and military security perceptions of the Russian state and analyze how security issues are reflected in the official military doctrines. Along with the evolution of the Russian military doctrines, which were subsequently restructured in 1993, 2000, 2010 and 2014, I will discuss the general security perception of the Russian Federation.

Keywords: The Russian Federation, Security, Military Doctrines, Security Understanding, Threat Perception
ÖZ

RUSYA FEDERASYONU ASKERİ DOKTRİNLERİNİN GÜVENLİK PERSPEKTİFİ ÜZERİNDEN ANALİZİ

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To the loved ones
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM..................................................................................iii
ABSTRACT.......................................................................................iv
ÖZ.................................................................................................v
DEDICATION...................................................................................vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................viii
ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................x

CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................1
2. UNDERSTANDING MILITARY DOCTRINES: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE............................................................................4
   2.1. Security.................................................................................4
   2.2. Military Doctrines...............................................................7
3. RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY PERCEPTION...................................10
   3.1. Security Perception............................................................10
       3.1.1. Security Perception of the USSR......................................11
   3.2. Perception of War...............................................................17
       3.2.1. Perception of War during the USSR...............................17
       3.2.2. Perception of War during the Russian Federation...............19
4. MILITARY SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND MILITARY DOCTRINES IN THE USSR.........................................................22
   4.1. A Short Outline.................................................................22
4.2. Military Doctrines of the Soviet Union ......................................................... 23
4.3. Evolution of the Soviet Military Doctrines ................................................. 25
4.4. The Gorbachev's Period ............................................................................. 36
5. MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
SECURITY TRANSFORMATION ......................................................................... 40
5.1. An Introduction ............................................................................................ 40
5.2. 1993 Military Doctrine ............................................................................... 42
5.3. 2000 Military Doctrine ............................................................................... 44
5.4. 2010 Military Doctrine ............................................................................... 51
5.5. 2014 Military Doctrine ............................................................................... 58
6. A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: BASED ON THREAT AND THREAT
REACTION ............................................................................................................. 66
6.1. Evolution of the Threat Perception ............................................................. 66
6.2. Evolution of the Threat Reactions ............................................................... 68
7. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 71
REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 75
APPENDICES
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ....................................................... 80
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU ..................................... 90
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Military doctrines are generally defined as the systems that are unique to every state; the system that defines how a state will wage a war during the war times. The reason for this uniqueness is the fact that every military doctrine is formed depending on that very state’s threat perception, economic conditions, military technology and other political, economic and technological variables.

Military doctrine is highly relevant with the national security understanding. In this respect, examination of national security concerns and perceptions is crucial in the evaluation of military doctrines. My intention is to analyze and to try to find answers to the following questions: ‘How has the security perception of the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union evolved in time?’ and ‘how has this transformation been reflected in the military doctrines?’ In other words, the main purpose of this study is to examine this evolution closely.

The analysis of the security understanding will be focused on enemy perception, means of counteracting military threats in the lights of military security and military doctrines. In this context, epistemology will be used as the mean of methodology. The way of conducting this study is based on comparison. I will compare the subsequent military doctrines of the Russian Federation. I will also combine this method with the analysis of the military doctrines and military documents during the Soviet Union. The main sources for this study will be the official military doctrines of the mentioned two periods.

The analysis of the Russian Federation’s military doctrines are important as they do not only reflect where the Russian Federation is in the international arena but also reflects the international situation where the Russian Federation wants to see itself.
The evaluation of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation will help us to better understand country’s future acts or at least intensions of the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, there are not many recent studies about the evolution of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation. Most of the studies were gathered around studies analyzing only certain military doctrines of the Russian Federation; like Polina and Bettina’s study ‘Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and Beyond’. In this respect, I sincerely hope that this study will contribute to the literature.

In the literature, there are some fundamental resources which I’ve benefit much. One such work is written by Bert Chapman in 2009 and titled ‘Military Doctrine: A Reference handbook’. Another such work is ‘The Roots of Military Doctrine’ (2013), where the Aaron Jackson discusses military doctrines extensively. Kaufman’s work (1994) titled “Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy” is an important contribution where the issue is discussed within a security perspective.

Since there are not many studies directly related to the evolution of the military doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, I mostly benefited from specific studies on particular doctrines or security studies. Regarding the security studies in Russia, Allison and Christoph’s joint work (1998) “Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia” and Fatayev’s (2004) “Military security of the Russian Federation and Legal Regimes for Its Maintenance (Voyennaya Bezopasnost’ Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Pravovyye Rezhimy Yeye Obespecheniya) are the main studies in the respect. Regarding the Soviet military doctrines, the best contribution is made by William Rose (1991) with his ‘Soviet Doctrine: Blueprint for the future or an indictment of the past, Military Intelligence’ and William Odom with ‘Soviet Military Doctrine’ published in the Foreign Affairs Journal.

The literature in Turkish language on military securities and military doctrines of the Russian Federation is rather limited. One of the most relevant works is Ahmet Sapmaz’s dissertation (2018) “Transformation in Military Security Reflex of Russian Federation“. Hopefully, this thesis will contribute to the Turkish language literature on the issue as well.
In the second chapter of my study, I will try to explain what military doctrines are, why military doctrines are important for states and what they mean in the international relations. In the third chapter, I will briefly discuss the national security understanding in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. This chapter will provide a background to better analyze the military doctrines. In the fourth chapter, I will analyze the military doctrines and security policies of the Soviet Union. Later on, in the fifth chapter, I will examine the military doctrines of the Russian Federation by focusing on various articles with a focus on threat perception. In addition to that, I will highlight the similarities and differences of these doctrines. Before coming to the conclusion, I will make a comparison of military doctrines of these two periods and discuss the evolution through years.
CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING MILITARY DOCTRINE: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Military doctrines’ starting point has always been the security understanding. Military doctrines are formed so as to ensure security for states during war times. In this respect, I will not only discuss security but also military security in this chapter. Later on, I will focus on the definition of military doctrines and will examine why military doctrines are important and how one should understand the content of military doctrines.

2.1. Security

Before directly delving into the issue of military doctrines, I will provide a general definition and understanding of security. There are two philosophical ideas regarding the emergence of the concept of ‘security’. One of the ideas views security as the sum of power. According to this understanding, to have security, you must have money – financial capabilities - weapons, army and other similar material means. In this context, power forms the way towards security. Actors can possess security in the ratio of their possession of power. According to the second understanding, security is based on emancipation. In this context, security is described as the relation between different actors. This relation can exist in two ways - the condition of non-existence of threats or the existence of desired conditions. (Williams, P.D., Mcdonald, M. 2018)

As most of the scholars would accept, mainstream security understanding is generally shaped through the realist and neorealist theories. While Liberal and neo-Marxist approaches started to penetrate security studies especially after the détente
period during the Cold War, realism keeps its importance and continued its hegemony for security studies.

Realism defines ‘security’ based on two mainstream perceptions of the international environment. These are ‘an environment with a constant insecurity’ and ‘the condition of being insecure’

One of the most prominent scholars of the realist stream, Stephen Walt, defines security with the help of threat and use of military force. In this context, he claims military power as the main point of the security field. Moreover, Walt states that security consists of the definite policies, which states resort so as to get ready, prevent or wage a war (Stephen, W. 1991).

As realist theory considers the international environment as ‘anarchic’, this anarchic condition defines the understanding of security. This leads states to take care of their own security trusting on their own capabilities. So as to provide their own security in this anarchic environment all states must acquire military capabilities (Michael, S. 2005).

If one makes a conceptual study of security, realism will play a vital role in this case. In this respect, evaluating security from a realist perspective puts a great deal of emphasis upon ‘states’, since states are the main actor in international relations in the eyes of realists.

Security of a state generally is defined in a way where the territorial integrity of a state is preserved and physical safety of its citizens is provided (Walt, 1991). From a realist perspective, the main problem of international relations lies in the insecurity of states. In this respect, ‘self-help’ is the sole way of providing security. If states do not ensure their own security, there are not any other actors out there to help a state and provide security (Walt, 2010).

Security is the most important aim of the states and thus, survival. Unless security and survival are provided definitely, states cannot try to reach other aims (Waltz, K. 1979, p.126).
Even though security definition provided by Kenneth Waltz tells us the core of security, it is so broad to be utilized and make distinctions in terms of policy goals. This questioning leads us to the question of ‘survival of which values?’ which was tackled by Baldwin (Baldwin, D. 1997). This question widens the argument of security and scholars also start to be divided among themselves.

Security understanding during the Cold War and its general understanding will be of high use while examining military security and military doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. In this respect, during the Cold War security studies concerned itself with the question of ‘how to keep the state secure from external military threats’. Main approach to military threats at those times was clearly to keep the state secure from the threat of nuclear weapons. Starting with the end of the Cold War, nature of security threat has started to change. As for the Russian Federation after the Cold War, security understanding started to witness a change by including non-military issues.

The reason of change in the understanding of security after the Cold War is the fact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could not be explained or predicted by realism’s focus on military power.

Delving further into the concept of security, the need to describe military security arises. The birth of the ‘military security’ notion is directly related with the awareness so as to create practical counteractions specifically against military threats to society, state and individual. In this respect, the origin of military security has its core reasons for the aspiration to protect the citizens of a state from a military danger. Military security goes back to the period of the first formation of an army. The very aspiration for military security is an inherent feeling of all states and societies throughout the history. (Il‘ich, L. V. 2015)

Military methods are conceived as the use of weapons and military equipment in order to solve tasks related with military security. The problem regarding the definition of military methods for solving the tasks related with military security stems from the fact that military methods are not clearly defined. So, military methods need to be defined clearly and which methods will be accepted as ‘military’ methods need to be obvious. So, those methods should be defined during the
peacetime by the authorized organizations. The same theoretical problem persists in the Russian Federation as well. The military doctrine of the Russian Federation did not define military methods for solving military security problems. Nevertheless, it identified the main forms of use of troops as methods: operations (strategic, joint, counter-terrorism) and hostilities. (Fateyev, 2004)

2.2. Military Doctrines

Military doctrines are described differently from state to state. The main reason for this difference stems from the following: the security threats that countries face, technological developments, priorities in national security, the budget for military forces and civil-military relations. Military doctrines guarantees security either by reducing the security of other states, or by providing stability against corresponding national security threats, or through contributing to national security by increasing the perceptions of other states regarding their own security (Chapman, B.2009)

Military doctrines are the simplifying processes which come into being following an academic study which was conducted in a way of implementation of military power (Chapman, B.2009)

Raymond L. Garthoff provides one of the best descriptions of military doctrine in his book “The Soviet Military Doctrine”. He provides the following definition:

‘Military doctrine may be defined as that body of assumptions and beliefs about military science and art, strategy, and tactics which is accepted in any armed force as being the basic guide for its conduct of military affairs. Soviet military doctrine, like Soviet policy and strategy in general, is the product of a dynamic conjunction of ideological and pragmatic motivations’” (Garthoff, R.L. 1953, p.25).

Dr. Aaron P. Jackson defines military doctrine in a different way. Military doctrine is defined as a ‘belief system’. However, this belief system is not yet well recognized because it changes depending on the understanding and its evaluation. This understanding and evaluation bear an important meaning. The reason for this is obvious. This understanding and evaluation is related to the above-mentioned
concept of ‘belief system’. This belief system is capable of setting the way an army wages a war, the relationship between a state and society, which this belief system is built on, and its institutional culture. As a result of the accurate interpretation of this belief system, states face consequences. For example, if a state interprets this belief system in the correct way, it means triumph, good strategy, steady military-civil relations and wellbeing of organizations. On the contrary, if a state interprets this belief system in the wrong way, it means unstable military-civil relations, dysfunctioning of organizations, bad operational outcomes and even defeat. So, starting with this point of view, states including military personnel, politicians and military strategists should have a well-developed and detailed military doctrines (Jackson, A.P, 2013)

J. Dziak (1981) provides another definition of military doctrine in his book “Soviet Perceptions Military Doctrine and Power”. As Dziak indicates, this definition is quoted from the Soviet military dictionary and is quoted here as follows: ‘’Military doctrine is a nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war”’. (William, R. 1991)

In short, military doctrines can be defined as a plan, which shows how a military organization intends to fight in combat. To make it more accurate, military doctrines are the set of documents produced by military organizations so as to help military forces command their actions in a war (Gallo, A.A. 2018)

Regarding the importance of military doctrines, one can highlight two different points. First is the fact that military doctrines shape the relations between states in the international arena. Depending on the character of these doctrines, possibility of arms races and even wars can be calculated. So, military doctrines shape international political context. Second, military doctrines are directly related with security of states and they need to comply with the political goals of states. If a military doctrine fails to respond to the political necessities of the state, it won’t be able to contribute to the security chains of the state, further it may even harm it (Posen, B. 1984, p. 15-16)
Military doctrines show the changes in the understanding of a state in terms of national security. What national security means here is the prevention of external and internal threats. National security is always in a form of transformation due to the necessities of time and international environment. Moreover, sometimes preventing internal and external threats are done without taking into consideration of various national interests of a country but only one; survival.
CHAPTER 3

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter, my main intention is to provide a general understanding of Russian National Security understanding and its mentality. This is important as all the official documents that I will analyze are formed around this mentality. While explaining the national security understanding of the Russian Federation, I will use two different categories as the following; security perception and war perception.

Security perception is vital due to the fact that security has always taken an indispensable place during Russian history. Regarding the importance of war perception, I may state that war is highly related with continuation of politics in Russian history especially during the times of the Soviet Union. It was part of state ideology. Almost all the political mentality was based on war perception.

3.1. Security Perception

Understanding Russia’s military doctrines, security perception and strategies is not an easy task. Even Winston Churchill refused to estimate the Soviet attitude by saying that the USSR is a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ (Ross, W.A 1991). However, up until the Gorbachev period, it is obvious to see that the development of Russian Military doctrines was based on technological innovation. This principle was collapsed with Gorbachev. He was the first one that changed the military doctrine understanding depending on not technological but political changes in the world.
3.1.1. Security Perception of the USSR

The Soviet Union strategy was based on the traditional understanding of security, which represents the embowering of the state sovereignty and protection of state’s territorial integrity with the help and utilization of military means (Herd, G. 2010).

The main mentality of security during the Soviet period was to strengthen the current political system and make sure the Communist party continues to exist. The reflection of this main aim was to protect the Warsaw Pact1 against its enemies, expand the Soviet sphere of influence in the world while reducing the influence of NATO and the US and support the independence wars of third world countries (Sapmaz, A. 2018). The meaning of a victory for the Soviet Union was the devastation of the USA and NATO. Soviet military doctrine was shaped around offensive steps. In this context, war was just a tool for ideology and politics of the Soviet Union (Department of Defense, USA, 1988, p.10). So, it is obvious that ideology in the Soviet Union was almost everything and it integrated and penetrated in every aspect of life and military and security strategies. This means, in their perceptions, the existing threats of those times were not only directed to the Soviet Union, instead, they were aimed to socialism. In this context, every Western anti-communist country was perceived as opponents.

Graeme Herd in 2010 extensively discusses these issues in his article. As he states, security policies, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, was based on deterrence and strategies of containment. With this perspective, both sides, the USSR and the US, were trying to hinder the efforts of each side to be superior over the other side. Therefore, Cold War security understanding was formed upon the survival of states against external threats. Here what is meant by external threats is the territorial integrity, state sovereignty and military power. Classical security understanding outweighed in the Soviet strategy. In this understanding, one may

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1 Warsaw Pact was a collective mutual defense treaty established by the Soviet Union in 1955 and seven other Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe. This treaty placed the Soviet Union as the commander of the armed forces of all the other member states: Albania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The pact is dissolved in 1991.
claim that state sovereignty and territorial integrity were the key elements in state’s security perception (Herd, G. 2010).

3.1.2. Security Perception of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation’s national security is formed and evolved as a result of the changes that Russian society and the state have been going through. These changes are shaped by the impact of internal and external threats. This period includes the times starting from the independence of the Russian Federation until the current time.

When one examines the security perception of the Russian Federation and its transformation in the Russian Federation, international and domestic political, military and economic developments becomes highly important. In this respect, without taking these developments into consideration, it is almost impossible to understand how the security perception of the Russian Federation is formed.

With the independence of the Russian Federation, the political ideas formed on the basis of Communist ideology lost its power and a new era was starting for the Russian Federation, which was filled with a lot of unknowns and uncertainties.

In this respect, the analysis of the security understanding based on the military security of the Russian Federation will make more sense for the content of this study. In the next parts, the military security of the Russian Federation and the developments affecting this process will be analyzed.

Following the Soviet Collapse the new state Russia was looking for strong basis to establish its security policy. During the initial period after the Soviet disintegration, the Russian Federation was not the influencer but the influenced one, especially during the times of Yeltsin.

There were particular developments, which were influential in shaping this policy at the time. First of all, Russia was unable to sustain a large military force due to its economic decline as well as the decreased military threat perception from the West during the initial phase after the Soviet collapse. The particular developments were;
Military intervention to Chechnya; considering the expansion possibility of separatist idea to other Federations. According to the Russians, North Caucasus had never been a real place with civil virtues and economic freedom even though since 1991 the laissez-faire policy was implemented. It was a place where ethnic groups fought for their own supremacy. So, Chechnya was always seen as a place where ethnic conflicts were abundant and extremist separatist movements existed (Markedonov, S. 2001, p.265). As for the war campaigns that the Russian government conducted, they were totally based on the declarations calling for ‘victory over terrorists’ and ‘defeat the haven’ Chechnya provided for terrorism (Trenin, D. V. 2003, p.2).

Acceptance of NATO’s new out-of-area policy with the bombings of Yugoslavia and thus increasing the threat perception from the west. This act of NATO affected the Russian Federation not only because it was an out-of-area operation but also this bombing took place without the authorization of UN Security Council.

Increasing the strategic convergence with China at the second half of the 90’s due to NATO’s intervention to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, expansion of NATO and the accelerating effect of Eurasians. Evaluating this convergence from the view of security perception, one may claim that this convergence was probably all about to counter the effects of NATO and especially USA in the region. The official declaration of strategic partnership took place in 1994 by Yeltsin and continued. The interventions of NATO urged both countries – the Russian Federation and China – to announce the need not for a unipolar world but multipolar world.

Under the lights of these developments, in the beginning of the 1990s, military security of the Russian Federation was based on neutrality. The Russian Federation would not use military force without the right of self-defense. Main policy was to realize intervention to local conflicts so as to ensure security and sustain territorial integrity (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.37) Even being unable to react to the bombings of NATO and its out-of-area operations was showing the fact that the Russian Federation was no the influencer but the influenced one.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin took the power and ruled the country. However, his management destabilized the country. The shock therapy for moving to the market economy was not helping the country and also the ideas of democracy and free market were hindered (Müllerson, R. 2013). The reason for that was the fact that media and economic power were gathering around the same circle of people which later on would be called as oligarchs.

When the Berlin wall was falling, Yeltsin continued ruling the country in 1989. Putin was a KGB officer and served in Dresden in East Germany. Putin was not well known until he was appointed as the director of KGB in 1998. This appointment was taken place with Yeltsin’s decision and this got two leaders closer. Just four months after this appointment, Boris Yeltsin resigned, leaving Vladimir Putin as his successor.

With the inauguration of Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation was on its very way to ensure territorial integrity by military power and strengthen its domestic security. In this respect, there was a huge dilemma in the relationship with the US in terms of military security. The main core of this dilemma had two aspects. First, the Russian Federation was against the unilateral dominance of the USA in world politics. On the other hand, the Russian Federation had to have a coherent relationship with the US. This would give the Russian Federation the possibility to be considered as one of the leading powers in the world. In this respect, 9/11 attacks were solid events which clearly showed this dilemma. Russia resorted its policy against unilateral acts of USA in the international arena and condemned it but at the same time it had become an opportunity to reveal the common enemy act more freely in internal conflicts which the Russian Federation was operating against terrorist within the country.

Munich Security Conference of 2007 is one of the important milestones in the security policy of the Russian Federation. The main criticism by the Russian Federation against the US was its unipolar activities and struggle. Even it was a tough stance by the V. Putin, the Russian Federation was cautious in its relations with the USA due to Russia’s domestic economic context.

In this context, Sino-Russian relations were in the process of convergence towards the same goal, which underlined an understanding against a unipolar world led by the
US. In this respect, the Russian Federation and China showed a common attitude against Iraq and Afghanistan intervention and Iran’s nuclear program.

Besides the relationship with the USA, in the domestic policy there was a harsh stance especially against the separatist movements within the Federation. Chechnya’s taken under control with the help of solid determination increased Putin’s popularity and contributed to him strengthening his place in the Russian domestic politics.

In 2008, the Russian Federation has executed its first military operation abroad in Georgia. One of the most determinant factor in this action was Georgia’s insistence to be a member of NATO. It was a definite victory for the Russian Federation which lasted only for five days. The main goal of this offensive act was to take control of two regions; Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would directly give two positive outcomes to the Russian Federation. First, a better strategic position in the Caucasus. Secondly, an international prestige showing that the Russian Federation is capable of conducting off the border military operations. This was a proof of the Russian Federation’s determination for the near-abroad policy.

Later on, in relation with the Arab Spring, importance of regime security has arisen and the gap between domestic and international security threats got narrower. Arab Spring was indicating how a domestic issue – a state’s regime – transformed into an international problem. With this regard, the Russian Federation paid more importance to its regime security, even restricted the rights of protests in the country.

The Russian Federation’s second military intervention has taken place in Ukraine and ended with the independence of Crimea. This crisis stems from a series of events. First sign took place when the pro-Russian president Yanukovych was removed from power. Then the Russian Federation claimed the need to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea from the far-right extremists; because their lives were under danger. This way the Russian Federation tried to legitimize her acts in Crimea.

This was not the only act of the Russian Federation in the Ukraine. The events which may be called as uprisings against the Ukrainian government were supported by the Russian Federation financially and militarily. These interferences by the Russian Federation are the signs of increasing military power of the Russian Federation.
Besides that, these must be considered as the efforts by the Russian Federation to prove herself as one of the most important actors in the international arena.

The final military action of the Russian Federation is to be a part of the Syrian crises not only on the table but also in the area.

Under the lights of these political and military developments, the Russian Federation military security and the military power are the first priority principles. Thus, the Russian Federation has started pursuing the goal of being a prominent actor in international politics with the strength of its military power. Economic power is also important as it is an important mean to improve the country’s military power and thus to increase political capability while acting on the international stage. In this respect, it is obvious that when the economic power of the Russian Federation is strong, the Russian Federation’s statements and arguments are also strong in the international arena. However, economic power is mainly important for the Russian Federation because it is one of the biggest contributors to military power and military power helps the Russian Federation to operate more effectively for the international deeds.

In order to understand the security perception of Russia in the later decades under Putin’s leadership, it is important to focus on the Eurasianist perspective that was dominant in the national security circles. While historically Eurasianist ideology goes back to 18th century, contemporary Eurasianist perspective was developed by Aleksander Dugin and Valery Korovin. Aleksander Dugin is a Russian political analyst and the supporter of far-right ideas in the Russian Federation. He is known as the founder of ‘fourth political theory’ where he tries to rediscover premodern non-western values rather than fascism, communism and liberalism. He believes that these ideologies are the product of the western world and defends the idea of a multipolar world. Alexander Dugin is considered to have an influence in the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

In Korovin’s book ‘Blow to Russia’ (Udar Po Rossii) written in 2015, national security is explained in a more traditional way. The preface of book carries the signature of Dugin. It is clearly noted that monopolar world and ignoring Russia’s equal existence as a global power are the main threat Russia faces. In this context,
this scenario constitutes the main security threat for the Russian Federation. Main question is whether this world will be a monopolar world or not. Moreover, this approach is detailed by the help of geopolitics and gaining more territory. Under this light, the main question is shaped as follows: “will there be only one empire or a few of them?” (Valeriy, K. 2015)

Related with the mentioned passions of the Russian Federation, military security is shaped in the same direction. Regarding military security, Russia is aiming and depending on deterrence. Kremlin politicians are actually defining military security on the basis of deterrence. For Kremlin, military security is to deter and to prevent other states from weakening the importance of Russian Federation in terms of international relations (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011).

3.2. Perception of War

3.2.1. Perception of War during the USSR

In order to understand military doctrines, one needs to understand the essence of war in the Soviet Union. Nature of war in the Soviet Union was mainly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to this thinking, war and politics were strongly connected to each other. Marxist-Leninist thinking claims that wars exist just because exploiting societies exist. If it starts with the demise of exploiting societies and capitalist ideology, at the end war will disappear as well along with the capitalist ideology (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990).

According to analyzes of Lenin, there are two types of wars: just and unjust. Just wars were waged so as to obtain freedom and realize social progress in every part of the world. Even if just wars do not have the mentioned aims, they are waged against an attack. The rest was seen as unjust wars. Those are the ones waged for expanding territory or increasing the influence of a state in the sphere of policy and economy. Besides just war and unjust war, there was another more sophisticated categorization of wars in Soviet mentality as international and civil war. As it is obvious from its name, the opposition group fights civil war as a power struggle within a country in order to obtain power. Civil war has its own sub-categories. These are democratic and revolutionary civil wars. This concept deserves attention. It is one of the main cornerstones of the Soviet mentality. It refers to the wars where the opposition group
is working class. Such wars refer to a new concept that had emerged with the application of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war. This thinking proposes the possibility of establishing communism in states where certain classes are exploited by that period’s reactionary policies by capitalist administrations. (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.17)

As for international wars, there are three different types. According to Soviet theories, in the first type the warring parties are capitalist and communist systems. This war is about death and life which in the end will lead to the demise of capitalism. In this first type, it was always believed that the war-starting side is capital world and their eternal demands. The second type of international war is almost the same with the first one. In this type, the warring parties are colonial powers and indigenous people fighting to gain national freedom. So, if a group is waging a war in order to gain its own national freedom, socialist wing considers the very group as an ally. Thus, the socialist group members believe that they have the right to support the first group. All in all, the reason of this type of war is the actions of imperialist powers. The third type of international war is seen as the war between two imperialist states. However, even though both states are imperialists, in this case, one of the imperialist states wants to expand its own sphere of influence while the other one wants to defend its own national freedom and sovereignty. Even this third type of war exists in the literature, scholars did not consider a huge possibility of a war between two imperialist states since 1970s. (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p18)

During the Cold War era, according to Raymond Garthoff, there were two different types of warfare as the political (nonmilitary) warfare and limited military violence. Soviets had become a master for combining two types of warfare at the same. They were also executing the political, economic and psychological types of warfare at the same time (Garthoff, R.L, 1953, p.20).

Until the end of the Stalin era, the war between two blocs- capitalism and communism- were seen as the inevitable end. This possible outcome prediction was being done by the Soviet Union due to the aggressive acts of the Western bloc. Western bloc was defined as the definite aggressor in order to defend and promote its own place in international relations. However, from the point of communist world,
especially from the Soviet perspective, the outcome of the war was already predetermined. It would end with the triumph of the Communist world, which would lead to the demise of capitalism. The reason was obvious, socialism was superior to capitalism (Kubalková, V.-Cruickshank, A 1980)

There is another approach to the analysis of war rather than the aggressive acts of the Western bloc. This approach belongs to William Odom. He suggested in 1988 saying that according to Marxist-Leninist rule of thought, war is just the result of having private property, in other words capitalism. The source of this idea is the fact that it divides people in different classes. So, if capitalism does exist and has military aims, accordingly peace environment is not ready and war is inevitable. Thus leads us the deduction that according to Marxist-Leninist thought peace is only possible with the destruction of capitalism (William, O. 1988, p.116).

### 3.2.2. Perception of War during the Russian Federation

In order to comprehend the essence of security in the Russian Federation, one should try to view the world from Russia’s own point of view. In this context, Russia considers itself as having a strong position influencing the developments in the world. Russia clearly states that it is against the forcefully imposed ‘universal’ values. Along with the imposition of these ‘universal’ values, Russia states that it is against the change of regimes in the world. Also Russia rejects the traditional political arrangement in the world and complains about the loss of sovereignty (Belozorov, V.K. 2015).

Among the conditions that dominate today’s political stand of Russian Federation, one may state some points. Russian Federation’s strive to preserve its identification and actions as one of the equally valued actor of world politics is at the beginning of these conditions. One may add ‘political stability’ in the country and ‘rejection of liberal model of development’ to these conditions (Belozorov, V.K. 2015).

As for the war perception in the Russian Federation, the main difference from the Soviet era is the ideological difference. As explained in the previous section, war is totally connected with ideology in Soviet Union and it is seen as a means of policy. War is generally seen an inevitable end and a destination to be reached. However, in
the Russian Federation, war perception is not related with the ideology since the Cold War is over. Besides its relation with the ideology, war in the Soviet era involved a global war where two poles would be fighting. In the Russian Federation, this understanding is not accepted and even the West is seen as a partner.

The Russian Federation is not aiming a global war. The active participations in the regional conflicts are seen as wars during the Russian Federation such as the first Chechen War between 1994-1996 and the second Chechen War between 1999-2009. The war in Georgia followed these two in 2008. Involvement in the Syrian crisis in 2015. The claims of these wars were never related with the ideology but with the nationalistic interests.

To detail the ideological difference, one may take Afghanistan as an example. This war during the Soviet era was interpreted within the ideological framework of Marxist-Leninist perception. So, the expectation was the triumph of communism over capitalism. However, as for the Chechen war, the Russian Federation was not dreaming about a revolution (Herpen, M. H. 2014, p.160)

Another significant difference in the perception of war is in terms of geopolitical approach. During the Soviet era, the wars were planning to take place as an expansive war in order to expand the influence of ideology. However, during the Russian Federation, all wars are shaped as a defensive war where the war was being fought against separatism (Herpen, M. H. 2014, p.161)

The war perception of the Russian Federation can be evaluated from a military tactical level as well. The Russian Federation’s tactics are evaluated as a new form by the name of ‘hybrid warfare’.

Hybrid warfare is defined as a fact where non-state actors are fighting against a state by being supported by a state. As for the Russian Federation, hybrid warfare has four different means which are irregular, conventional, terrorist and criminal. In addition to these, cyber, economic, diplomatic and social means are mentioned as the acts of the Russian Federation especially in Ukraine. In this respect, some scholars such as Mark Galeotti (2015), Matthew Rojansky and Michale Kofman (2013) claim that Russia’s means of war has not yet entered to the terminology of defense studies. So,
Tad A. Schnaufer from New York University claims that this method should be considered as Non-Linear Warfare which showed itself in the mid of 1990s. This method is generally defined when the certain line between war and peace is lost. This method relies on unknowns and aims to weaken the will of the enemy forces to fight (Schnaufer, T. A. 2017, p. 20-21).

With the mentioned changes in the perception of war during the Russian Federation, military doctrines and security perceptions are also changed in significant ways.
CHAPTER 4

MILITARY SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND MILITARY DOCTRINES in the USSR

The military doctrines of the Soviet Union are crucial in order to understand the evolution of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation not only as a historical background but also for the comprehension of the general military mentality.

In this chapter, firstly I will try to give a general view before discussing in detail the military doctrines of the Soviet Union. This will make the comprehension of the military doctrines of the Soviet Union easier. Later on, I will discuss the military doctrines of the Soviet Union and their evolution. In order to make this analysis clearer, I will make some categorizations and create a time line. Finally, I will finish this chapter with a particular focus on the Gorbachev period since his time is highly separated from the other leaders of the Soviet Union in terms of ideological and political transformation of the Soviet Union.

4.1. Short Outline

Neither in the Russian Empire nor in the USSR, there were no published military doctrines except from one document which was signed in 1987 titled ‘About the Military Doctrine of member states of Warsaw Pact’. In this document, there is a statement as follows: ‘nuclear war cannot be a means to reach a political goal’ (Voyennaya Doktrina RF, 2014). This is important in order to highlight the defensive nature of the document. In addition to this, one needs to bear in mind that Russia, especially under President Putin, continuously asserts that Russia always pursues a defensive policy. I will try to go deeper in this concept in the coming pages.

The general worldview of the Soviet administration was always based on the continuation of war. Wars were always a part of the Soviet mindset even in peace
times. This was due to the main core of the Soviet worldview. This world-view was seeing the war as the continuation of politics. It was an approach generally based on Clausewitz’s ideas. Lenin was totally behind this idea from the beginning, even before the Bolsheviks revolution (Garthoff, R.L, 1953, p.10-11). However, one needs to keep in mind that war was not the main goal of the Soviets, it was the continuation of politics. Thus, the Soviet main strategy was focused on oppression and enforcement by hard power so as to reach political goals firstly.

In Soviet strategy, one must admit that there was not an obvious distinction between peace and war. Also there was not a clear variation between military strategy and military doctrine. In this perspective, while evaluating two notions on their own, one needs to see these nomenclatures as a whole (Garthoff, R.L, 1953, p.12).

As indicated in the article of William Odom in 1988, in the Soviet Army, all officers were well educated despite what was written and thought at those times by Western scholars. More than 75 percent of those officers had a specialized education at one of the military schools. During the time of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, it was always considered that there was a lack of trained officers and soldiers. However, this was only partly true at those times. Moreover, if one looks at the number of Soviet troops, it will be obvious that the Soviet troops outnumbered the combined forces of Western countries. (William, O. 1988, p.115).

Besides that, cultural and technical knowledge of the Soviet society was increasing and this fact was helping to strengthen the Soviet Union’s military and economic condition. This was vital for the Soviet Union because it was helping to strengthen economy and thus helping the transformation of the budget for the expenses of war. This also helped bringing more competent military personnel to the army (Sokolovski, 1963, p.229).

4.2. The Military Doctrines of the Soviet Union

Military Doctrines of the Soviet Union have two aspects. Those aspects are social-political and military-technical. These two aspects are considered as unique for each and every state. The reason for this approach stems from the fact that no states’ economic, geographical, political and social features are totally the same. In Soviet
military doctrines, there is a combination of political- economic and military approaches, which stems from the historical and ideological understanding of the state. Karl Marx thought that the revolution would take place in an industrialized state where there was an abundance of workers. However, the Communist revolution did not take place in an environment as Marx foreseen, instead it took place in a backward country. There were doubts whether socialism had the power to expand and spill over from such a country. When this question was asked to Stalin, his answer was ‘Socialism is one country built upon peaceful coexistence’. This period was designed for breathtaking. This period also consisted of development of relations with the West so as to increase the economic progress and create a more industrialized environment within the Soviet Union. Finally moving the class struggle to the Third World countries. This was what first Five-Year plan was based on; speed up the industrialization. By this act, the aim was to create a sufficient military strength and by the increased military capability to help the continuation of the contestation between two worlds - socialism and capitalism at the international level (William, O. 1988, p.117).

Indeed military strategy and military doctrine are intertwined. In addition to this both are bound by politics and thus both are looking at politics to be formed and shaped. Under this light, strategy and doctrine are dependent on political leaders, as for the Soviet Union, it was dependent on Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is obvious that Soviet military thinkers considered that strategy and doctrines must be integrated according to a bigger political desire and structure. This integration is not momentary; it has its own process. This process of integration is not always successful or smooth (Sokolovski, 1963, p.6).

Coming back to the two aspects of military doctrines, which are socio-political and military-technical, these two are not two separate things in the logic of the Soviet Union. Military sector has a big dependence on economy and society as a whole. So, while considering upon military potential, the Soviet elite had considered state’s social and economic resources in order to build a new doctrine (William, O. 1988, p.127).
4.3. The Evolution of the Soviet Military Doctrines

Starting with the Khrushchev era, the political elite in the Soviet Union was claiming that all the military doctrines of Soviet were characterized by a defensive attitude. However, when one looks at the distribution of armed forces and their education principles in the Soviet Union, it is obvious that in line with the Russian military traditions, the Soviet Union’s main mentality was always built on offensive strategies. On the other side, I believe that there is a fine line between the defensive and offensive attitude if one takes deterrence into consideration. At the time of Khrushchev, nuclear position of the two superpowers was completely transformed. The Soviet Union could only manage to invent the hydrogen bomb in 1953; one and a half year later than the USA. During this period of time, Communist Party elite was assuming that a mutual war would definitely start by nuclear attacks. Depending on these assumptions, Strategic Missile Forces was launched in Soviet Union in 1959. In this context, the importance devoted to nuclear missiles was increased in times of Khrushchev whereas the importance of conventional forces was reduced (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.23).

In his article written in 1988, William Odom detects three cycles in the development of the Soviet military doctrine. The first cycle starts in the early 1920s. In this cycle, three developments were decisive. These developments in chemical weapons, aviation and motorization were crucial in terms of their ability to change the assessment of possible future wars. Regarding the changes in the possible future wars, there were four different assessment. The first was the blur between rear and front due to the developments in the sphere of airpower. The second is the ability of motorization. It was thought that motorization would provide an easiness for deeper offensive attacks. The third one is about logistics as producing all the necessary weapons in peacetime could not be done. Military industry had to be ready to mobilize itself and keep supplying during the times of war. The fourth one is about the number of military personnel during the times of a war. Military manpower in the Soviet Union would have to outnumber the number of military personnel in the Western countries (William, O. p.120).
The second cycle of William Odom’s analysis starts with the end of the Second World War. Soviet military leaders were aware that they were in a dire condition like the one in 1920s. The army had gone through a war and arms industry was worsened. The number of militarily educated manpower was so low. Moreover, Soviets were witnessing three new technologies which would change the whole environment fundamentally. These developments were nuclear weapons, early computers - cybernetics and missile systems. Soviet elite called this period as the revolution in military affairs.

Coming to the late 1950s and the beginning of 1960s, the Soviet military thinkers aimed army readiness in order to attack Europe first, later on Far East and Southwest Asia. This attack plan was created in any circumstances, nuclear or non-nuclear. Actually, this is one of the points that shows that the Soviet Union’s military doctrines were totally based on defense, as this plan was scheduled to be executed under the terms of a war. For this plan, Soviets needed three abilities.

Firstly, there had to be built a strong rear side at a sufficient level. This is why there were good numbers of interceptor aircraft, missiles that were able to fire from surface to air. Moreover, the ABM systems in Moscow and in underground areas to provide non-stop communication could be explained with this perspective. Secondly, there were specially trained military ground forces. The tasks of this force was to penetrate the defense forces of the enemy and reach to the depths. Thus, they were opening ways for their own troops. Moreover, the Soviet infantry forces were placed on armored vehicles so as to be deployed fast and safely. The third ability was to be able to attack enemy’s rear so as to destroy its economy, command and control. Plus, hindering enemy’s forces to be deployed in Eurasia was among the needed abilities. The means in order to obtain this ability was to create strategic rocket forces (William, O. p.122-124). This type of military and strategic understanding required large forces. So one can deduct that these abilities were not planned to be gained at once for a short period of war.

William Odom claims that the third cycle of his analysis started at the end of 1970s and continued until 1988. There were undoubtedly changes in the military doctrine understanding parallel to the policy changes throughout Gorbachev times. In the
third cycle, there was an assessment regarding the length of the first phase of a war. The first phase was thought to linger longer. The main goal of this phase was to destroy the NATO nuclear weapons not with a nuclear attack from the Soviet side but by conventional attacks. If this could be realized during the first phase, this would lead to a positive inclination on the Soviet side. The reason was obvious; NATO would lose its incentive to resort to nuclear weapons because Soviet weapons would get an edge over NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This change of balance would be decisive for the continuation of the war (William, O. p.126-127)

I argue that the above-mentioned third cycle should not actually be considered as a change in the doctrine. It should be assumed as a change in the sphere of planning and economy. A change of the doctrine based on only military planning is really hard, because it is related with military technology and developments. The above-mentioned change is not about a change in doctrine but a change in the military planning.

In mid 1980s, while the belief on the fact that nuclear weapons would be decisive in any conflict persisted, it is assessed that every conflict would not end up with a nuclear war. So, while the process of developing nuclear weapons continued in this period, conventional forces was strengthened at the same time. As a result, the Soviet Union got an edge over the USA in terms of number of soldiers, fighter aircraft and artillery (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.24).

The formation of Soviet military doctrines was influenced by many factors. These doctrines were always in permanent transformation. This transformation was mainly based on the ideological approach of Soviet Union – Communism which was also related with foreign policy, military capabilities and economic strength of opponents, the history, geography and definitely technological developments in the Soviet Union. The Soviet military doctrines have a highly hierarchical system, which goes from up to down going through the every steps of decision making level. The contexts have a good volume and include every related point in the military. These points are wide enough and includes every possible important point from tactics of platoons to national defense policy. (William, R. 1991)
According to Marshal Sokolovskiy who was a Soviet General in World War Two and served on the Eastern Front, the Soviet military understanding has a set of laws of war. One of them is still valid in today’s world. This law underlines the importance of public support and says that modern wars cannot be fought unless there is public support.

The fact of being ready for a war was a big source of relief for Soviet soldiers. This feeling is ‘war is inevitable’. Through this thinking, the Soviet Army had always been kept ready in peace times. While this does not prove that the Soviets were always eager for war, it shows that they are always getting ready for one (William Rose, 1991). The previously mentioned feeling about the inevitability of war started to change and was rejected starting with the period of Malenkov and during the final years of the Khrushchev period. Besides that, in his final years of rule, Stalin came up with the analysis that although an upcoming war between the capitalist and the communist states were inevitable, a war between capitalism and communism was not exact (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.20)

According to William Rose (1991), the Soviet doctrines were alive and never stopped developing. These doctrines have different periods in development especially after the Second World War. First stage is between 1945 and 1953. This stage came to an end with the death of Joseph Stalin. After this development, there was a power struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev. However, Malenkov was a step ahead of his rival and became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Later on Malenkov could not keep the support of the Soviet elites and had to retire from his post. The main debate between the two was based on the management of economy and military resources. Malenkov was planning to make cuts in resources spent in defense industry. His main motivation was to move from heavy industry to light industry and developing agriculture. The supportive idea behind his plan was his thinking upon the Soviet military capability. He believed that the Soviet Union had reached to the level of reasonable sufficiency. So making cuts and moving resources to a different area would not create any threats for the Soviet Union. On the other side, Khrushchev was not motivated to do cuts in the defense industry although he was aiming some agricultural reforms. He emerged with an idea by the name of Virgin Lands. What he could not evaluate at the time
was the weakness of the current agricultural abilities of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Khrushchev got the necessary support from the Soviet elite and became the next General Secretary of the CPSU. Actually Khrushchev did not only get the support from Soviet elites but also armed forces’ leaders. (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.20). This stage is seen as a period of massive technological progress.

The second stage starts in 1953 and lasts until 1959. This is the period when nuclear weapons are introduced to the world and when the international environment started to radically change in terms of the security perception. (William Rose, 1991) This period can also be mentioned as a transitional period since there was a change from a simple Stalinist understanding of military doctrine to a more modern and sophisticated new one. Even though main actors were generally the same, among the military and political leaders, new discussions were started upon military doctrines and feature of future wars. The support of intelligence units were strong contributors to these discussions.

The period starting with Malenkov’s term was unique in that there was a hidden ban after the Second World War to discuss military strategies in the Soviet Union. In addition to that it was a time when political leaders were seeking a great deal of support from the military leadership. For the first time, Stalinist views and military doctrines were reevaluated and updated according to the needs of time, in other words the nuclear weapons (Jukes G, 1972, p.16).

Under the rule of Malenkov, there was a change in the main concept of war understanding in the Soviet Union. Malenkov was against the coercive understanding of ‘inevitable war’. He saw that it was possible to avoid a war and supported the relaxation of international tensions. He was supportive of the consolidation of peace. According to his understanding, war meant the destruction of not only one system but also the whole civilization. When Malenkov’s speeches are examined carefully, they are quiet revealing in this respect. By ‘aggressors’ he does not mean all the capitalist states of the West. He meant a small group of states in the capitalist world. This brings us to the point that Malenkov rejects viewing all capitalist states as aggressors. Moreover, Malenkov’s understanding was to reject one of the main features of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He was against the instrumentality of war.
A war would be fatal in his view and even after a won war there would be a highly damaged state. (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.21).

Khrushchev on the other hand at first he was in favor of classical Marxist-Leninist mindset where the war was inevitable between two systems. According to him, the Soviet Union was under siege and would be attacked by the Capitalist world, which was led by USA. He was considering that aggressor would be the West because western system was getting weaker. In order to save the weakening system, the West would resort to war. So, in order to stop and prevent further deterioration, capitalist world needed to be aggressors. In those times, armed forces were seen and evaluated as the guarantor of security. In this context, the main aim and expectation was to develop armed forces and nuclear capabilities as much as possible (Olli-Pekka Jalonen, 1990, p.21). At this point, it may sound more realistic to say that Khrushchev’s policy was more based on the international context of the period. In the middle of 1950’s, the nuclear capabilities of Soviet Union were very restricted in terms of number of warheads and possible vehicles to deliver those warheads. In other words, in case of a nuclear war the Soviet Union would have lacked the necessary equipment to cause a serious damage on the US soil. In comparison with Khrushchev's time, Malenkov’s strategy was seen as minimalist. Besides that, they were times where radical changes seemed very unlikely to happen. That is why Malenkov had to retire from his post and left it to Khrushchev.

Over the time, we see a change of Khrushchev's ideas on war between the capitalist and communist world. In his 20th CPSU speech, he was stating that a war between two systems were not inevitable. He correlated this reasoning with the weakening of capitalist world. He did not reject the idea of ‘Westerners as aggressors’, but instead referred that the Soviet Union was much stronger than it was with its nuclear capabilities and its allies in the Eastern Europe. Besides the third world was getting stronger as well. All these arguments were leading to the idea that these developments could prevent the West start a war over Communism. Khrushchev also started to reject the main feature of the Leninist ideology which was ‘war is inevitable.’ In other words, both systems could live in peace at the same time. (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.21). It could be possible to suggest that behind this change of ideas there lies the reassessment of the significance of nuclear weapons.
This reassessment was not only taking place in the heads of political elite but also within the military elite. The then Major General Nikolay Talenskiy was also criticizing the length of wars. He was not the supporter of long wars. Besides that he did not consider a war to last for long times because massive usage of nuclear weapons would end all the wars at a short time. Khrushchev made his own inferences from these developments and foresaw a not long but intense nuclear war. In his view of war, conventional methods would be useless due to their old nature and war being short. These visions were not negating his ideas of peaceful coexistence of two systems at the same time. These visions were developed in case of political failure to prevent a possible war. In other words, war was not instrumental in the eyes of socialism. War was still on the table but seen as possible only in case of aggressive politics (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.21).

As noted in the previous paragraph, the changes in the second part of the 1950’s were not only taking place within the political elite but also within the Soviet military leadership. There were two different groups, which can be named as modernists and traditionalists. Modernists were visioning a shorter war in terms of length. In this context, they wanted military capabilities to be focused and dependent on nuclear weapons. On the other hand, traditionalists foresaw a longer war where conventional methods and nuclear capabilities had to be developed with the same level. The reason for this understanding was that wars did not have to be as short as in the minds of modernists. According to modernists, preventing a war was possible and only probable by being dependent on nuclear wars. However, traditionalists were not on the same page. They were thinking that war is likely to happen where the Soviet Union had to be prepared by nuclear and conventional means (Wolfe, T. 1964)

According to the report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US in 1964, the debate over Soviet Strategy started with the Red Star article. In this report, the Red Star was representing modernists while traditionalists were identified as ‘military strategy’. Under the visions of military strategy, the report was saying that the initial period of a likely war would have a huge effect on the outcome of the war. However, first attacks might not be able to convert the war into a final war and determine the outcome of it. On the other hand, military visions of Red Star
mentioned the opposite. The report was saying that the initial period of war had vital importance where stock nuclear weapons would be used. This resort to use of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war might be decisive on the outcome of the war. The tasks which would normally last months to be realized in a traditional war, might be executed within seconds in a nuclear war (CIA, Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Propaganda, 1953)

The difference in ideas was stemming from the different understanding and evaluation of war. Modernists saw war as could be avoided by deterrence. So the vital mission of the army was to prevent a war from happening. On the other hand, traditionalists were so sure that war was going to happen. Modernists were ready to allocate the defense budget in order to develop country’s economy. Strong economy had to be used to increase nuclear capabilities and to reach the point where Soviets would have primary striking capability. Due to these divisions, there was serious disintegration among the military elites. So military unity deteriorated and collapsed (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.23).

Towards the end of 1950’s, Khrushchev declared a new Soviet military doctrine in his 1960 speech. He mentioned about two phases. In this doctrine, the first phase was given a great deal of importance. The first phrase consisted of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. This would not only give superiority to the Soviets in terms of the destruction of enemy’s crucial military points but also would protect Soviet territory from a nuclear catastrophe. War was again a probably phenomenon in this doctrine which was almost impossible to avoid. However, this would be the final war which would started by the capitalist world. The reason was not the idea that capitalist world would lose it. The main reason was that the Western society would not want to bear with the serious consequences of a system which was bringing only suffering (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.23).

With regard to the 1959 military doctrine, according to Holloway, the Soviet Union was just trying to form an image in order to cover its own nuclear weakness. He argues that the Soviet Union fell for its nuclear developments which were realized at the beginning of 1950’s. However, after that there were not much progress. So the Soviet Union was just following a policy called as deterrence through concealment.
At that time, the Soviet Union did not have enough capacity and capability for pre-emptive nuclear attacks (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.24). However, this strategy had negative effects for the Soviet Union. Since Soviets could persuade the US that the Soviet Union had the capability to resort to pre-emptive strike, it urged the US to speed up armament and work nuclear capabilities more.

Looking at the doctrine from a more militaristic perspective it was not aiming and selecting some exact targets to attack in case of a war but instead attacks were planned to destroy large areas (Olli-Pekka, J. 1990, p.24). If one makes a general assessment regarding the 1959 military doctrine of the Soviet Union, it is possible to claim that it had preserved itself a defensive nature. It was obvious that Khrushchev implied all wars were unwanted and undesirable.

Later on, a new stage (1960-1987) started, which introduced the readiness of all Soviet people in the country against an opponent in times of a nuclear war. Within this last stage Soviets had inspired a belief that nuclear wars are possible to fight and even win. This belief was disturbing for the US policy makers (William, R. 1991). The debate between the modernists and traditionalists military elites continued in this phase too.

There were also important new developments in the US especially between 1964 and 1966. Under the administration of President Kennedy, the US was speeding up in developing new nuclear projects. Moreover, the US adopted a new strategy, which was the counterforce version of the flexible response. These changes were interpreted by the Soviets, as the US was getting ready for the first strike and the US had the desire to keep a nuclear war limited only in the territory of Europe. These interpretations were given place in the 1960 doctrine however in the mid 1960’s, there were serious criticisms against these interpretations. The starting point of these criticisms were the fact that Soviet Union had realized the divergence among NATO members. Due to this divergence, NATO would not jeopardize its allies. So as to have more independency, France wanted to 1990, p.24).

These policies irritated France up to a point where France wanted to pull off from NATO’s active unified military operations. Definitely these above mentioned changes were not the only reason, but it had contributed much to this result. Besides,
France was thinking that NATO was completely dominated by the US and Britain. So as to have more independency, France wanted to pull off. However, this change of ideas did not lead to a point where France would have left NATO completely, although it left NATO’s military integrated command (Klein, J. 1977).

Until this time, the Soviet Union had not been in a position to change and affect the Western policies. However, now the Soviet Union was getting more confident seeing that it could make a change. Moreover, this attitude of the US was showing that even in a very tense environment, the US would not be willing to move this tension into a war in order to keep itself away from the massive destruction.

Under Brezhnev, the most significant development was the restoration of the doctrine which itself bore the name Brezhnev. Brezhnev doctrine was suggesting a totally different approach at those times and it was totally contradictory with the UN Charter in its time. The restoration of this doctrine dates back to 12th of November 1968 during Brezhnev’s speech. The doctrine addressed not only the external enemies of socialism but at the same time addressed domestic enemies. Brezhnev clearly stated that when a domestic or external threat would arise to create a capitalist order in a socialist state or tries to stop the development of the very social state, then this threat would not be evaluated as only a threat against to that particular socialist state but against all the socialist states. In other words, Brezhnev doctrine clearly points to a common problem that not all the Communist states were totally supporting each other (Glazer S, 1971). Brezhnev doctrine is very important as it was a call to the socialist world to come together and merge again on the very common goal and motivation of socialism. Brezhnev declared that the SU would intervene in the Warsaw Pact countries, if communism is seen to be under threat by this doctrine. You should make this point clear.

While explaining the legitimacy of his doctrine, Brezhnev stated that aiding to fraternal states was only a step, which would be taken by necessity. The aid here should be understood as military aid to a socialist state. Brezhnev claimed that none of the laws shall be formulated without taking into consideration of class laws as in the mentality of Marxist-Leninist approach. This legitimation attempt mostly referred to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. (Glazer, S. 1971).
Throughout much of the Brezhnev period, there was willingness to keep a possible war as a conventional one. The plan of the Soviet Union was already decided. It was to utilize huge conventional ground forces, supported by the air forces. While this was the plan adopted by the military and political elite of the Soviet Union, the military strategy was not suggesting the same. Military strategy was to lead and push NATO to resort to nuclear weapons. It was like a self-destructive strategy (Kaufman, J.S. 1994).

In 1967, the Soviet Union started to develop a new plan, which was applicable in a non-nuclear war. The driver for this planning was the announcement of the flexible response strategy of NATO. In 1974, a new mission for the Soviet Union armed forces was declared. It was a change made by Marshal Grechko. He was saying that Soviet soldiers’ mission was not limited to only defending the Motherland and other socialist states but also to the use of military power where it would be needed in accordance with the interests of Soviet Union (William, R. 1991).

The above-mentioned change did not occur only due to the change of NATO’s policy of flexible response but also due to the Soviet thinking of nuclear equality between the two superpowers. Accordingly, a possible war, which is not nuclear but conventional, was the possibility. This change in policy had reflections in the trainings of military forces as well. This change also had massive cost for the Soviets. The Soviet Union was now getting ready for both types of war (Department of Defense, USA, 1988, p.12). In the light of these developments, it is reasonable to claim that the Soviet Union was predicting the possibility of a nuclear war as very low. This led the Soviet Union to get prepared for a possible conventional war. Indeed, during this time there was a stronger fear among the Soviet elites that a war could outbreak all of a sudden not intentionally but accidentally (Jackson, D.W. 1981).

The treaty between United States and Soviet Union on Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems is another milestone regarding the Soviet Military strategy, which created a debate within the Soviet elite. The debate was due to the fact that during 1960s, Soviet Union’s military elites suggested to have good quality of ABM system in case of a nuclear war in their nuclear-war strategy. However, when it comes to 1972, the
Soviet political elite made a different move independently from military elite’s strategy and signed the ABM treaty (Kaufman, J.S. 1994).

Indeed the Soviet Union developed a new, two-layered military doctrine. The first layer was based on the prediction that nuclear war and even nuclear escalation could be avoidable. The second layer would be in action in case the first was run over. The possibility of avoiding a nuclear war was predicted by the abrupt use of conventional means of weapons (Olli-Pekka Jalonen, 1990, p.24). These policies clearly imply that Soviet Union’s military doctrine had defense attitude up to a point.

During the 70s, there was no doubt that the Soviet Union was a superpower. However, during the 80s, some scholars started to consider that Soviet Union had only one component of a superpower, which was the military power. These claims were not unfounded. For so long, the Soviet executives had always claimed that one day Soviet Union would get ahead of the USA and socialism would be in better position than capitalism. However, in 1980s KGB was reporting the fact that Japan ranked number two in world economy, and if Soviets kept this pace, the West Germany would rank in the third place (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.22).

Besides these military doctrines and strategies, there were a series of military activities taking place. Soviet armed forces aimed to fight in a war against NATO particularly in Eastern Europe. Ironically, the Soviet armed forces were mobilized against other communist states such as in 1953 in Eastern Germany, in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. The main goal of the Soviet Union was to protect the communist regimes in these countries against societal reactions. Moreover, the Soviet Union was on the edge of a war with another communist state at the time, with China (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.23). The Soviet intervention in these communist states indicates that communism was going through difficult times in the region as the support of its own citizens were vital in the survival of these states.

4.4. The Gorbachev Period

Gorbachev era differentiates from other Soviet leaders’ era in terms of not only political approach to the world developments but also transformation of security
perception. Under Gorbachev, Russian military doctrine has gone through a fundamental shift, from offensive to defensive one (William, R. 1991).

Mikhail Gorbachev served as the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He was inaugurated in 1985 for this position and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, he is the last president of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speeches in the 27th Party Congress in 1986 and in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World in 1987 - underlined the concept of reasonable sufficiency. This term meant that Soviets would maintain sufficient nuclear forces so as to be able to defend itself against a NATO attack. Later on, in a meeting of Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, these speeches were turned into a doctrine in as the new Soviet Military Doctrine. According to the Soviet spokesmen, the Soviet military doctrine had actually not changed at all in that it always had a defensive nature. A possible NATO attack was seen as a reality that Soviets had to be prepared and adopt a defensive posture. But in reality Soviets adopted a more defensive military doctrine only with ‘reasonable sufficiency’. Gorbachev also continued to modernize armed forces for either a conventional or a nuclear war. Reasonable Sufficiency Concept had also carried the same objectives as with the Soviet’s previous goals as dividing NATO. Despite the seemingly softened international context, the Union’s defense spending did not decrease but increased. (Department of Defense, USA, 1988, p.13).

Moreover, in the Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine, which was accepted in 1987, there was a statement saying that Warsaw Pact member states will not resort to armed forces unless they are attacked by a state or by a coalition. During the Gorbachev period Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - was signed. Considering all the developments, by the end of 1990, the Soviet Union was on a totally defensive position (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.25). These steps were taken so as to further deescalate the international tension.

Also a change in the understanding of war and revolution started to form under the Gorbachev era. This change was seen as a conceptual alteration from the previous ones. War was always evaluated in a positive way in the Soviet Union. This consideration was highly ideological because war was perceived as means, which
leads to revolutions and it was revolutions that would lead to ideological changes. However, this assessment needed to change in order to save humankind from a total destruction due to nuclear weapons. So, during Gorbachev era the Soviet leadership considered the interest of humankind above class struggle. The Soviet Union at this point, not to risk the security of all people, was on the same page with the Western states in their unwillingness for a nuclear war. Accordingly, Gorbachev created the new military doctrine based on their defense system and introduced the concept of ‘reasonable sufficiency’. This introduction opened the door slightly to discuss the previous views saying that ‘Were Soviet military requirements highly based on the possibility of an attack on the Soviet Union? Amid these developments, according to Gorbachev’s friend from Politburo Yegov Ligachev, the consideration regarding the fact that humankind’s interest is above the class struggle was irritating for other communist states abroad (William, O. p.130)

Gorbachev rejected the classical understanding of Leninism, which explicitly indicated war as the continuation of politics. Gorbachev was not only opposed to nuclear wars, which could lead to huge devastations but also against the conventional wars. He did not make any distinctions between these two. In other words, he was against armament, which was always seen as a means to provide security. He was in favor of solving problems by political way without resorting to war.

According to the Russian scholar Belozerov, during Gorbachev era, the military doctrine completely became a defensive one. It was formulated to prevent wars, to provide solutions for interstate conflicts via peaceful means and to put the universal values as the priority. This change in the times of Gorbachev had longer consequences and even continued at the beginning of the Russian Federation and had negative effects on the military cadres of the Russian Federation. However, partners of the Soviet Union did not make concessions on their own interests. So, only the Russian Federation tried to make a change. Thus, this change did not come out positively for Russia because the Soviet Union was getting alone since other socialist states were not supporting (Belozorov, V.K, 2015).

Gorbachev’s aim can be assessed from an ideological point of view as well. He was trying to get rid of the political utility of nuclear weapons in order to underline that
the US nuclear deterrence is against the interests of mankind (William, O. p.131).

During the 70s, there was no doubt that the

Under the Gorbachev period, the cornerstone understanding of the Soviet Union, which saw the international conflicts as normal and to provide new opportunities to benefit from, thus reducing the sphere of influence of Western world, remained the same. However, the Soviet type of socialism and communism started to be seen as a failure in third world states due to persisting economic problems (Department of Defense, USA, 1988, p.18).
CHAPTER 5

The MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

In this chapter, I will analyze the military doctrines of the Russian Federation in detail. In addition to that, I aim to highlight the differences and similarities of all military doctrines that the Russian Federation adopted. I will analyze the original military doctrines in Russian language in order to avoid problems that may occur in translation.

This chapter will be the backbone of this study and will highlight the evolution of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation. Thus, one will be able to see which factors has been explaining the evolution of military doctrines, why these factors were important and what kind of implications they meant for the future acts or intentions of the Russian Federation.

5.1. An Introduction

When one looks at the Russian military doctrines, he/she will observe that the Russian military doctrines differ from the Western ones in the context of content. While Western military doctrines perceptibly focus on military operations, Russian military doctrines are more abstract and include more political discussion. As a consequence, Russian military doctrines are more in relevance with political-strategic level. (Haas. 2011, p. 19)

In 1991, the world order has changed dramatically. The Soviet Union collapsed and, the Russian Federation inherited the ruin. Following the disintegration process, international politics has massively changed with the demise of one of the poles. These times deeply affected the Russian Federation. First of all, in this period, the Russian Federation had to get familiar with new terms and institutions of the new
world. Besides that, Russia has interpreted these terms and institutions in her own way. These military documents and doctrines are indeed a reflection of Russia’s interpretation of world politics (Öztürk, O. M. 2001).

While Russia was no longer considered a super-power, Russia strove to gain its strong position back in international politics and prove itself as an important regional and international actor at times. The main factor is probably the military power of the Russian Federation and especially its nuclear capabilities.

The Russian Federation has published four military doctrines after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These doctrines are adopted in the following dates: 2nd of November 1993, 21st of April 2000, 5th of February 2010 and 25th of December 2014.

Military Doctrines play a vital role in the political opinion of the Russian Federation. In this context, military doctrines are open declarations of the Russian Federation to the world and to its own people regarding Russia’s aims, reasonable limits and use of military force. These doctrines also highlight Russia's national values and interests as well as the ways for achieving these interests (Belozorov V.K. 2015).

One may make a list of different views explaining the reasons for the alteration of military doctrines. The change of leadership, the change of international environment, the developments in the sphere of military and defense technology may be listed as some of these reasons for this change.

However, to be able to comprehend and make analysis based on the real reasons of change, one needs to see the difference from the Russian Federation’s point of view. These changes are generally stemming from the reactions of the Russian Federation to the political developments abroad as well as the developments in the domestic arena (Belozorov V.K. 2015).

Russian experts and political leadership argues that Western analysts evaluating the military doctrines of the Russian Federation are wrong. The political elites of the Russian Federation also claim that Russia is misunderstood and misinterpreted by other international actors (Baluyevskiy, YU. 2014).
One of the most important military capabilities is the power of conventional warfare. In this respect, the Russian Federation is generally considered as a weak state especially in the first decade of following Soviet collapse, until the election of Putin as the president in 1999. This weakness was mostly related to the economic situation of the state. For example, towards the end of the Cold War, the defense budget of Russia was like 300 billion dollars. On the other hand, in 1998 it was 20.8 billion dollars. This situation also affected the conditions of army and its popularity. Russia’s transformation in this respect started with the election of Putin, as he increased the defense budget and combined military matters with more political meanings (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015).

5.2. 1993 Military Doctrine

The Russian Federation’s first military doctrine was approved in the 2nd of November 1993 and it was turned into a law. However, it was not published officially. (Sapmaz, A. 2018, p.34)

The 1993 Doctrine underlines that ideological divisions are over and cooperation and convergence has become more of an issue. None of the states are seen by the Russian Federation as an enemy and all the states who are not in a conflict with Russia are partners of the Russian Federation (Öztürk, O. M. 2001, p.35)

According to the 1993 doctrine, preventing military conflict is the main goal. Armed forces would never be resorted unless there is an attack against Russia or to any of its allies. In case of an attack, resorting to armed forces would be evaluated as a self-defense right (Öztürk, O. M. 2001, p.35).

The 1993 Doctrine gives priority to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the sphere of defense cooperation. In this context, existing and future regional military conflicts within the borders of the CIS member states are among the most important military threats. This aspect clearly highlights that the Russian Federation is more focused on its near neighborhood (Öztürk, O. M. 2001, p.36). The mission to deal with regional armed conflict are given under the responsibilities of the Russian armed forces. Nationalists and separatist movements are seen as probable threats (Pietkiewicz M. 2018).
In the doctrine it is stated that every country whose interests do not collide with Russia is a partner of the Russian Federation. Reading this statement in the reverse order, one may make a deduction that every country whose interests collide with Russia is a rival of the Russian Federation. In this context, we can claim that other actors’ interest on the former Soviet republics irritate the Russian Federation.

Another point that deserves attention in this doctrine is about Russia’s inclination towards the United Nations. In the doctrine, Russia consistently highlights the necessity of reforming the UN in accordance with the new international order after the end of the bipolar system. Russia has two main worries reflected in this doctrine regarding the new international order. First is the fear of possible interference into the domestic affairs of the Russian Federation such as separatist movements in the region. Second fear is the probability that Russia would be ignored in resolving the global problems. These worries are clearly defined in the doctrine (Öztürk, O. M. 2001, p.37).

One of the most important points regarding the military doctrines of the Russian Federation is the use of nuclear weapons. In the 1993 doctrine there is a dramatic change in terms of resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. In this doctrine, the first use of nuclear weapons was allowed. However, up until that time, nuclear weapons were only thought as weapons to be used against a nuclear attack as determined in the doctrines of 1970s and 1982 (Sokov, N. 1999).

The main reason of keeping nuclear weapons is considered as the removal of nuclear war danger. To be able reach that goal, Russia should deter other states from resorting to an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. Nuclear weapons are allowed to be used without waiting for a nuclear attack from another state. Russia could resort to nuclear weapons if a large-scale war, in other words, a global war had started. Such wars could put Russia’s sovereignty and existence under threat. Within the doctrine, there is a constant reminder that even a small conflict could lead to a global war where resorting to nuclear weapons was possible. Actually this was showing Russian military doctrine’s defensive side; the effort to remove the possibility of any military conflict. (Sokov, N. 1999). However, the option of resorting to nuclear weapons without waiting for a nuclear war is
worrisome. Besides that, if one tries to read this permit to resorting to nuclear weapons in an adverse way, one may claim that nuclear capabilities were the only means of battle under the bad economic conditions of those times for the Russian Federation. That is why nuclear capabilities are highlighted in the 1993 doctrine.

However, according to some scholars such as Arbatov (1997), interpretation of Russia’s inclination towards nuclear wars is pointless. Arbatov claims that there must be some criteria to be met. In order to resort nuclear weapons. He claims these criteria as; first, there must be a need for reinforcement against a possible opponent in terms of conventional warfare. Arbatov argues that none of the neighbor states has the capability of conducting a successful conventional warfare against the Russian Federation. In this context, he claims this criterion to be met in order to resort to nuclear weapons. Secondly, he thinks that there must be a strong justification in order to resort to nuclear weapons. In addition to this, Russia at least could show to the people of the Russian Federation that starting a nuclear war was not a suicidal mission. Hence, the initiator should have an apparent advantage upon its rival in terms of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the damage on its own country is inevitable (Arbatov, A. 1997). Even though the latter explanation has its own place in discussion, the first argument is clearly not sufficient. The expectation of a conventional attack only from a neighbor state is quite groundless.

The idea of being the first one in resorting to nuclear weapons can be explained with a series of reasons. Some of the reasons are as follows: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reordering of the international politics, the failure in modernizing and reforming Russian army between 1991 and 1993, and the economic crisis Russia experienced especially during the first years of the Russian Federation. As these have negatively affected Russia’s use of conventional forces, Russia’s preference for resorting to nuclear weapons first can be better explained. (Arbatov, A. 1997).

5.3. 2000 Military Doctrine

The Russian Federation published its second military doctrine on the 21st of April, 2000 with V. Putin’s signature as the President. At the beginning of the official version, the definition of military doctrine is underlined as such: Military doctrine is the compilation of official views which determine the military- political, military-
strategic and military-economic foundations so as to provide the military security of the Russian Federation (*Ukaz Prezidenta Rossyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000*).

Actually there are many differences between the original doctrine and the earlier draft which was prepared in 1999. There is an obvious explanation for this as the change in the political leadership. When the first draft was prepared in 1999, the president of the Russian Federation was Yeltsin. However in 2000, Putin was the president (Main, S.J. 2000). Regarding the difference between the draft and the original document, one of the first point that deserves to be mentioned is the notion of ‘world war’. In the draft there are articles saying that an aggression may lead to a world war whereas in the original doctrine in 2000, there is not a mention of ‘world war’. Instead of it a ‘large-scale’ war is used.

Another difference between the two documents is the mention of some provisions of the UN Charter. To illustrate, in the draft it is written that the Russian Federation will abide by the provisions of not only the UN charter but also Helsinki agreements, which were signed in 1975 and 1992. In addition to these 1990 Paris Charter is mentioned. On the other hand, in the original documents, none of these additional provisions are taking place (Main, S.J. 2000).

The military doctrine of 2000 is the document, which reflects Russia’s political and economic transition in addition to the reformation of state’s military organizations and dynamic transformation of the international system (*Ukaz Prezidenta Rossyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000*).

Indeed this transitional period was similar to the period of 1920s and 30s when the Soviet Union adopted socialism. The reason for this similarity stems from the fact that the system was changing and it was a painful process (Main, S.J. 2000).

The 2000 Military doctrine is a document which is a product of a long-time study. There were serious studies on this doctrine and numerous revisions. Besides that, this doctrine was to be published before 1997 however it ended up being completed in 2000 (Sokov, N. 1999).

There are various explanations for Russia’s adopting a new military doctrine. One of the prominent one seems to be the changes in the North Caucasus region where
increasing terrorist attacks and separatist movements affected the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. One may call these developments as the increase of traditional threats against a state (Pietkiewicz, M. 2018).

In the doctrine, it is mentioned that direct traditional threats against the Russian Federation are reduced. Russia does not feel a serious threat from other states due to the peace-loving policies of the Russian Federation and keeping Russia’s military abilities on a sufficient level. Besides that, the positive attitude of other states and positive changes in the international arena is also mentioned in the official document (Pietkiewicz, M. 2018). I suggest adding Russia’s weak economic position. The Russian Federation’s mindset seemingly does not only suggest to claim what exists but also claims what to expect from international environment. So, reading the doctrine from another angle, the reasons of the decreased expectation of aggressiveness can be explained as the less powerful the Russian Federation as the heir of Soviet Union.

The 2000 military doctrine has defensive characteristic with a firm determination to protect national interests and to guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000) The doctrine has 3 chapters under the following titles: military-political foundations, military-strategic foundation and military-economic foundations.

In the document, it is explicitly noted which factors determine the military-political situation. These factors are as follows: the risk of large-scale war, including nuclear war; the formation and strengthening of regional centers of power; strengthening national, ethnic and religious extremism; activation of separatism; the expansion of local wars and armed conflicts; reinforcement of regional arms race; proliferation of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons and other means of achieving them; intensification of informational confrontation (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000).

The destabilizing effects on the military-political aspect are explained under 6 points. These are:
- Attempts to weaken (or to ignore) the existing mechanisms of provision of international security (the UN and OSCE are meant);
- The use of military force in the form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ without the resolution of the UN which contradicts with the common principles of international law and its norms;
- Violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament;
- The use of informational and other (including non-traditional) means and technologies of international relations’ subjects for aggressive (expansionist) goals;
- The activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, terrorist movements, organizations and structures;
- The expansion of organized crime, terrorism, illegal arms and drug trafficking, the transnational character of these activities (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000).

Regarding the United Nations, the 1993 doctrine only underlined the UN reform needs. However, in the 2000 one, attempts to weaken the role of the UN in international relations is defined as destabilizing.

One of the main points that we need to examine is the threat that the Russian Federation perceives to its military security. In the related part of the military doctrine of 2000, before making a list of threats, it is indicated that in today’s circumstances direct military aggressions against the Russian Federation and its allies in traditional forms have diminished thanks to the positive changes in international context, peace-loving foreign policy of the Russian Federation, and maintenance of Russian military potential especially in nuclear terms (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000).

The 2000 doctrine defines the main international threats against the Russian Federation as such: territorial claims against the Russian Federation and intervention in the domestic affairs of the Russian Federation. Another threat perception is the attempts to ignore the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving the problems of international security and attempts to prevent strengthening of its position as one of
the influential centers of the multipolar world (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000). At this point, it should be mentioned that the Russian Federation gives particular importance to its prestige. One should feel the desire of the Russian Federation to be taken into consideration as one of the power centers of the world. In addition to ‘desire’, one should add the word ‘fear’ also. Throughout the history, one may claim that Russia seemingly and mostly cares about its prestige rather than the welfare of its own people.

Another external threat that is underlined in the document is armed conflicts; primarily armed conflicts which are close to Russia’s and its allies’ borders (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000). Border security has always been important in the history of Russia. One may claim that border security is important for every state; however, when it comes to the Russian Federation geopolitics plays a vital role. Russia does not have many natural borders, thus Russia always felt itself under threat and felt the obligation to expand until it finds a natural border.

Besides the armed conflicts, the creation of group of forces which may hamper the balance of power in the region is among the external threats. This threat is noted especially if these group of forces are near to the border of the Russian Federation and its allies and also close to the seas adjoining the Russian Federation’s and its allies’ territories (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000).

Regarding military blocs, NATO is not explicitly noted. Instead a general description as ‘military blocs’ whose expansion is detrimental with regard to the Russian Federation’s military security, is used (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000)

Informational security occupies an important place for Russian military security, and this is underlined in the doctrine under the title of operation of hostile information. The importance of informational security comes from the need for strategic early warning systems. These systems carry a huge importance for highly efficient command and control of the whole army units.

In the external threat section of the doctrine, the citizens of the Russian Federation who are living abroad are also mentioned. Discrimination of citizens of the Russian
Federation in foreign states and the suppression of their rights are seen as an external threat by Russia (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000). This article may be seen as the starting point for the 2014 intervention in Crimea.

Regarding the Russian citizens abroad, there are differences between the 1999 draft and 2000 version. In the draft, there was no a mention of ‘protecting them (citizens of the Russian Federation) from military threats’. This shows us the importance that Putin gives to the Russian Federation’s citizens abroad. Moreover, one may also argue that the Russian Federation’s citizens abroad have a political value for Russia. It shows the strong bond between military support and political activities of the Russian Federation (Main, S.J. 2000).

As emphasized in the doctrine, Russian armed forces have a responsibility in domestic conflict solving. It is noted that the armed forces have a role in operations when it comes to ‘counter-terrorist operations’ and ‘Internal Armed Conflicts’ (Main, S.J. 2000).

Under the Chapter “Safeguarding Military Security”, it is obvious to see that Russia is eager to maintain the status of ownership of nuclear power. In the article it is stated that Russia wants to have this position so as to maintain deterrence against any aggression towards Russia or its allies (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000). In addition to this, the Russian Federation states its readiness to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis directly naming the US as well as other countries having nuclear weapons. However, this article states that Russia is only ready to reduce nuclear weapons to a minimal point where it can still have the strategic stability. So, it is not true to articulate that Russia is ready to eliminate all the nuclear weapons. One needs to bear this fact in mind so as to totally grab the security understanding on the Russian Federation. The reason for not eliminating all the nuclear weapons is noted in the following article. It says that Russia wants to have the capability to guarantee to exert damage to any aggressor. In this context, Russia wants to deter any aggression to her or to any allies of the Russian Federation and maintain international peace and stability. Russia supports the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. According to the Russian
Federation, one way to prevent the expansion of nuclear weapons is to ban the testing of nuclear systems (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000).

The 2000 Military doctrine categorizes warfare into four. These are as the following: armed conflict, local war, regional war and global war. Armed conflict is defined as the conflicts within the state originating from ethnic or religious problems. Local wars involve at least one state. The aim of the war is limited here. Regional war is defined as an attack of a state or a coalition with clear political goals. Speaking of global war, the attack must be executed by a series of states (coalition). The important point here is the fact that the existence and sovereignty of the Russian Federation is under serious threat. After explaining these types, let’s have a look how they are different from each other in terms of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the 1993 military doctrine global wars are defined as the only reason for resorting to nuclear weapons. However in the 2000 military doctrine, we see a difference. The usage of nuclear weapons is associated with both regional and global wars. This difference shows a change in Russia’s military mindset. Russia started to consider that it is unable to win a large-scale war unless it uses nuclear weapons. The reason for this change seems to be associated with the Kosovo case, which Russia could not deter (Sokov, N. 1999).

According to the 2000 doctrine, Russia keeps its right to resort to nuclear weapons as a response to the use of nuclear and mass destruction of weapons against Russia or Russia’s allies. Resorting to nuclear weapons is not limited only as a response to nuclear weapons’ attack but also as a response to large aggressions of conventional weapons at a critical level to threaten the national security of the Russian Federation.

Regarding the nuclear weapons, there are some subtle points that one should pinpoint. There are three major differences. The first point that deserves attention is the fact that deterrence is not limited to and may include military security. In addition to military security, international peace and stability are also mentioned. Even though it is not exactly what Russia might imply but it seems that the scope and role of nuclear weapons had a wider political meaning. Secondly, for the first time resorting to nuclear weapons against a conventional attack is clearly written. Third is
the use of nuclear weapons against the use of other weapons of mass destruction is permitted (Sokov, N. 1999).

While timing of resorting to nuclear weapons is mentioned, the wording seems to be a bit vague. The reason seems to be the fact that Russia is trying to increase its deterrence against any attack. By this way, probably the Russian Federation is trying to stall time (Main, S.J. 2000).

Actually until this doctrine, there were different documents approved by Russia showing that nuclear weapons can only be used as a mean of deterrence. To exemplify, we may mention the decrees which were approved by Yeltsin in 1997 and 1998. These decrees suggested a huge decrease in Russia’s nuclear arsenal (Sokov, N. 1999).

Only one country’s name is explicitly written in this document as an ally: the Republic of Belarus. This is Russian Federation is conducting joint defense policy with Belarus which is a Union State in order to safeguard its military security (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000)

It is once more noted in this chapter that the Russian Federation views all states as partners whose policies do not clash with Russia’s national interests and do not conflict with the UN Charter (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.04.2000) The notion ‘all states’ should be highlighted as a proof that the Russian Federation wants to show its defensive attitude. Moreover, it is a sign which shows Russia wants to approach to the transitional period.

5.4. 2010 Military Doctrine

The third Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved on the 5th of February 2010. 2010 Military doctrine is signed and published after 10 years of waiting. There are some general reasons for change in the military doctrines of the Russian Federation. Firstly, due to high prices of raw materials, the Russian Federation had an improvement in the sphere of economy and thus started to increase its influence in the international arena. In other words, Russia’s global authority started to increase. Accordingly, the threat perception was changed due to these developments (Pietkiewicz, M. 2018)
This doctrine, as the previous ones, is one of the most fundamental documents, which includes defense planning of the Russian Federation as well as the steps for getting prepared for the defense. In other words, this document shows us Russian Federation’s defense policy mentality from a military point of view. Overall, one may label this doctrine as having a defensive attitude. However, the doctrine is not only dominated with defensive aspects. In different points Russia’s defensive attitude is moved to an attack in the cause of defense (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011).

This military doctrine consists of four chapters with the following headlines: general provisions, military dangers and military threats against the Russian Federation, military policy of the Russian Federation and military-economic support for defense.

In the 2010 doctrine, there is not a statement, which makes a note regarding the time, or importance of this doctrine as indicated in the 2000 Doctrine as ‘transitional period’. However, the first change can be observed in the definition of some international terms such as military threat, military conflict, local, regional, large-scale war.

This doctrine’s main points are circled around the NATO threat against the Russian Federation and Russia’s strategic plans in terms of nuclear weapons use. In this context, there are two main reference points that affected the content of the doctrine. First is the consolidated domestic potential of Russia. Second is Russia’s main aim which is to consolidate its authority and existence in the international arena (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011). This shows us Russia is not using whip of nuclear weapons as a means of backup plan but benefits from nuclear weapons as a mean of pressure against the Western policies.

At the beginning of the second chapter, there is a general overview of world’s current state. It says that in contemporary world and at the present stage, there is an extenuation of ideological confrontation, a decline regarding the political, economic and military influence of certain states but an increase in the number of other states who have ambitions for a multipolar world and globalization of diverse processes (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).
The general overview of the doctrine continues by noting that many regional conflicts still remain unsettled. There is a continuing tendency towards their resolution based on force including regions along the borders of the Russian Federation. In the later section of this paragraph, rather than an analysis, there is a criticism, which states that the existing mechanism of international security including the legal international mechanisms does not provide equal security for all states (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

According to this doctrine, even though the possibility of a large-scale war including conventional weapons or nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation is declined, military threats in a number of areas are becoming stronger (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

The Eighth article of the doctrine where the main external military dangers are explained, starts with a major difference from the 2000 doctrine. At this article the name of NATO is explicitly written whereas it was just ‘military blocs’ in the 2000 doctrine. So, the first external threat is the desire of NATO to move its infrastructure closer to the borders of the Russian Federation and also expanding NATO (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010). However the ‘United States of America’ is not mentioned explicitly in any areas in the 2014 Doctrine, which implies that the Russian Federation does not directly refer to any state. This fact may mean that Russia wants to show the world that it is open to dialogue with any states on an equal basis. Russia wants other states to respect Russia’s national interests no matter which individual state this is.

Besides moving its infrastructure near the border with Russia, NATO’s other actions are seen as a threat against the Russian Federation such as those which Russia claims violates the laws and norms of International law. While this is the first time NATO is mentioned explicitly in a doctrine, according to Pugaciauskas (2011), it was always kept in mind in the previous doctrines. It was obvious that Russia was meant ‘NATO’ when the 2000 doctrine said ‘military blocs’. However, it could be expected NATO to take place in 2000 military doctrine because of the enlargement of NATO in 1997 when Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic was accepted to the alliance. The same logic is valid for the 1993 military doctrine that even NATO was not
explicitly noted there were hints for NATO. (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011). In other words, one may claim that when Russia feels more powerful, it starts to speak louder and sharper.

As noted in this doctrine, Russia is eager to improve its relationship with partner states and improve its cooperation with them. While the Russian Federation is trying to realize improving relations, what Russia wants is to realize these improvements based on common security interests in order to make international security stronger. Besides common interest, another expectation is to improve the relations in accordance with international law (Pietkiewicz, M. 2018). It is obvious that these statements in a way implied new cooperation formats with the SCO and BRICS.

These indicate the Russian Federation’s efforts to create a more balanced security system including all the powerful and developing states. Also another focus was related to the development of relations with the CIS states.

Russia wants to increase its cooperation with all the key players in the game and also wants to do it in a consistent way where other states interests are not clashed with Russia’s. So, it shows us that Russia wanted to develop a permanent presence of itself as an effective player where its own interests cannot be denied in the international politics.

The second external threat in the doctrine is the attempts to destabilize the existing situation of individual states and regions and respectively disrupt the strategic stability (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010) Another external threat related with that day’s world developments which does not have a place at the 2000 doctrine is the deploying and building of strategic missile defense systems, as well as the militarization of outer space, the deployment of non-nuclear high-precision weapon systems.

Regarding the territorial claims and interference in domestic affairs, these are still seen as external threats against the Russian Federation but in the 2010 doctrine, not only the Russian Federation but also its allies are mentioned.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies and an increase in the number of states who have nuclear weapons are not mentioned
in the previous doctrine while it is mentioned in the 2010 military doctrine (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

International armed radical groups’ activities on the border of the Russian Federation and its allies are also considered as an external threat. International terrorism, violation of international laws and deployment of military forces on the borders of the Russian Federation remains the same (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

When it comes to domestic military threats, there are three points. First is the efforts in order to change the constitutional order of the Russian Federation. Second is the interference with its sovereignty, violation of the country’s unity and territorial integrity. Third is disruption of the functioning important organs of the state such as military facilities, public authorities and informational structure.

The main military threats in the international realm are also explained in the doctrine. First threat is defined as the deterioration of military-political situation between states and the possible conditions where military forces will be used. Another threat is the hindering of some systems of the Russian Federation’s governance, derogation of nuclear forces and missile warning systems, space monitoring systems, nuclear energy and storage facilities. A third threat is the formation of illegal armed forces not only within the borders of the Russian Federation but also in the territories of the Russian Federation’s allies. In addition to that, military activities and demonstrations in the neighboring states are also considered as threats. An increase in the activities of armed forces of individual states or a group of states would be considered as threats where neighboring states move to a war time conditions (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

In the third chapter discussing the military policy of the Russian Federation starts with the ultimate goal of this policy. It says that Russian military policy is set for the avoidance of arms race, coercion and preventing military conflicts, enhancement of military organizations, forms and means of military forces as well as other forces. It is defined as a means of destruction for the defense and security of the Russian Federation, as well as the interests of its allies.
The main goal of the Russian Federation in this respect can be defined as the prevention of any nuclear conflict. Besides that, there are some other possible acts of the Russian Federation to prevent military conflicts. First is the situation analysis. This analysis includes military-political situations, developments and predictions around the world at the global level and also at the regional level. The means to be used in this analysis are the contemporary technical means and information technologies. Another act is the neutralization of possible military dangers and military threats by means of policy, diplomacy and other non-military means (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii o 05.02.2010) However non-military means are not explicitly or implicitly explained.

Owning nuclear weapons is viewed as a must and thus, as a deterrence for the Russian Federation at a sufficient level. Russia once more shows its willingness to meet the requirements of international law regarding the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

When it comes to the international organizations, the importance of cooperation with CIS, OSCE, SCO and CSTO is highlighted in the framework of international security. In addition to that developing relations with other interstate organizations such as NATO and the EU is noted as a necessity. Moreover, it is important to state that the EU is mentioned for the first time in Russia’s military doctrine.

The doctrine puts a great deal of emphasis on the CSTO. CSTO entered in a Russian military doctrine in 2000 for the first time and continued to preserve its importance. According to some, the CSTO was trying to be formulated as an alternative or even a rival to NATO in the sphere of security. In other words, the Russian version of NATO. This security organization provides Russia the opportunity to indicate its own dominance and sphere of interest in the region. Moreover, it gives Russia the possibility to deploy armies beyond borders (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011). Even though the CSTO has similar articles such as NATO’s Article 5, it is not much active as NATO is. The reason may stem from the fact that members are not strong in comparison with NATO’s member states.

As noted in previous military doctrines, cooperation with partner states in order to strengthen international security is mentioned but on the basis of shared national
interests. For the first time in a military doctrine, Russia proposes to sign an international treaty so as to prevent and prohibit the deployment of weapons in the airspace. Russia once more states its readiness to take part in any peacekeeping activity under the aegis of the United Nations (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

In wartime, Russia states that it is legitimate to resort to armed forces in order to protect its citizens. In addition to that mobilizing military troops are considered as legitimate for repulsing of an aggression against the Russian Federation or/and its allies and for restoration of peace (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

Russia as noted in the previous doctrine keeps its right to resort to nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure against a nuclear attack to Russia or its allies as well as against a conventional attack (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.02.2010).

Interesting point which I want to mention is the fact that nuclear weapons and their necessity to be standing by are not only articulated by the political leaders. They are stated publicly in the religious environments as well. Nuclear weapons are seen as the means which strengthen Russian sovereignty as Patriarch Cyril stated in 2010 (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015).

In comparison with the previous doctrine, the 2010 one has another point that deserves attention. At the end of the 2000 military doctrine there is a strong commitment to the doctrine. It says that Russia commits for the exact execution of the military doctrine. However, in the 2010 military doctrine, Russia does not make a strong commitment to execute the doctrine as it was that day. It says that execution may differ from the document depending on the new emerging military dangers. This article tells a lot about the document. This shows us how it is easy for the Russian President to act and interpret the document unilaterally. In other words, this article gives president wider opportunities in terms of military policy (Pugaciauskas, V. 2011).
5.5. 2014 Military Doctrine

The most recent doctrine of the Russian Federation is approved on 25th of December, 2014 by President Putin. In this document, one of the important missions of armed forces is defined as to protect national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. In order to realize that mission Russia created a strategic command beyond the Arctic Circle. The command called ‘North’ was based on the Northern Fleet. (Pavloviç A.K. 2015). The importance of Arctic region has increased much as opposed to previous times. Its importance is not only reflected in the military doctrine but also mentioned in the marine doctrine of the Russian Federation. Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020 is also published. So, as noted in the military doctrine, a new mission for the Russian armed forces in the peace times is noted to secure the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region (Belozorov, V.K. 2015).

Another goal that is set for the armed forces of the Russian Federation is to counteract attempts of other states to gain military advantage by developing a strategic missile defense system, deploying weapons to the airspace and deploying non-nuclear, high-quality strategic weapon systems (Pavloviç, A.K. 2015).

As noted in the former doctrines, this doctrine also contains two different but very close notions ‘military threat’ and ‘military dangers’. Military threats constitute the sub group of military dangers. Military threats are external events or factors that may lead to the use of armed forces. So, military threats are the ones which have the potential to develop into military dangers (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015).

Another feature of the new doctrine is the close link between foreign and domestic threats. Two different scenarios are drawn. The first one is the possibility of increasing numbers of ethnic and religious conflicts. Such threats are generally expected in the North Caucasus and in the whole country. The extreme Islamism flows are expected as threats in the North Caucasus and extreme Russian nationalism in the whole country. Second scenario is the fear of forceful change of the constitutional system of Russia. This fear stems from the stability of domestic authority in the country. The success of Putin is due improved economy and welfare.
of the society. However this may be ruined by the Western economic sanctions and low oil prices. So, in this context, Russia focuses on information that may affect its citizens especially the young ones. Russian elite thinks that these young citizens may be alluded to the misinformation coming from social media (Klein, M. 2015).

In this doctrine some points are articulated more clearly than in the previous ones. For example, the removal of military threats in information security, interethnic and inter-religion tensions, activities of private of military companies, increase in separatism and extremism, the use of information and communication technologies for military-political goals, subversive acts of secret services and organizations of foreign countries against the Russian Federation, activities in the sphere of information targeting especially the youth to disrupt historical, spiritual and patriotic feelings (Belozorov V.K. 2015).

The 2014 Military doctrine of the Russian Federation, for the first time mentions a concept called as ‘prompt global strike’. It is a threat against the Russian Federation. USA’s system which ensures the ability to be able to deliver a rocket in the world just within an hour. This concept is mentioned as a military danger in the doctrine. Russia plans to counter this threat with the help of high-precision conventional weapons. High-precision conventional weapons are already mentioned in the previous doctrines, however, it is obvious that in this doctrine more importance is given (Sinovets P, Renz B. 2015). Two other concepts, cyberwarfare and subversive activities of special services are new as well (Klein, M. 2015). Joining of cyberwarfare, subversive activities and prompt global strike concepts to the doctrine is definitely related with Russia’s increasing power, economically and financially. In the previous doctrine, it was not much mentioned especially in 1993 and 2000 doctrine. The reason is the starting change in Russia’s military capabilities especially under Putin. Nuclear weapons were always on the table due to their super deterrence capability. On the other hand, they were the only high quality deterrence means that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Regarding when to resort to nuclear weapons, the process stays the same that it can only be used as a retaliatory means.

Underlining patriotic feelings and relating it to the informational sphere shows Russia’s anxiety for the problems within its society and social stability. Russia refers
to Western secret service works (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015). Besides Russia still continues to securitize domestic problems following Colored Revolutions and the Arab Spring. Russia argues that these events started with the help of external forces and Russia is the next target for change of regime. This is an excuse for the Russian leadership to cover its failures in the sphere of economy and policy (Klein, M. 2015).

The 2014 Military doctrine has 4 chapters similar to the previous doctrine. These chapters are; General provisions, military dangers and military threats against the Russian Federation, military policy of Russian Federation and military-economic security.

In this doctrine, it is noteworthy that for the first time in a military doctrine of the Russian Federation there is emphasis that Russia will resort to military means for the protection of its interests and its allies, only after exhaustion of political, diplomatic, economic, informational and other nonviolent means (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014).

This point is considered as the main difference between the military doctrines of the USA and the Russian Federation. Russia views the US military doctrine as the document that allows them to resort military power to any part of the world whereas Russia is committed not to use power unless there is not any peaceful solution for the crisis (Pavloviç, A.K. 2015).

It is important to see the use of a new term ‘system of non-nuclear deterrence’ for the first time in a military doctrine of the Russian Federation (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014). This shows us that Russia no longer counts only on its nuclear deterrence. Actually ‘prompt global strike’ which I mentioned before is launched with the same logic. Moreover, one may interpret that this new concept is developed for the countries that do not have nuclear weapons but possess high conventional military capabilities.

In the first article of the Chapter on ‘Military Dangers and Military Threats against the Russian Federation’, there is a general evaluation of world politics. It is stated that in contemporary world affairs, there is intensification of global rivalry, tension in inter-state and inter-regional relations, rivalry of values and developmental
models. The description does not end here and continues with the instability of the political and economic development processes not only at the global level but also at regional levels with the complication of international relations in the background. At the end of this article, it stated that gradually the power centers which influence the world politics are moving towards the new centers of economic growth and political attraction (*Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014*). Russia claims here that in today’s world the ultimate power is moving away from the West and world is becoming multipolar.

As remarked in the previous doctrine there is a repetition of the inadequacy of international system in providing equal security to all states. In the previous doctrines, the importance of information field was mentioned partially. However, in the 2014 Doctrine, it is explicitly remarked that information space is becoming a new area of military threats (*Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014*).

The first external threat that is underlined as the expansion of NATO, which provides NATO global capabilities which violates international law. Due to the violations of international law, Russia always claims that current international system does not provide equal security to all states. Whereas providing security to all countries are considered by the Russian Federation as the duty of the existing international system (*Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014*). Russia probably refers here to out-of-area NATO operations such as Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 (Klein, M. 2015). NATO’s Military drills which are exercised in large-scale throughout the border of Russia are considered as threats as well (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015). So, starting with the 2010 Doctrine, ‘NATO’ continues to be stated in the Russian military doctrines clearly as an external threat.

This doctrine devotes important space to transnational threats in addition to NATO and the US. Such threats are global terrorism and drug and arms smuggling. Russia is probably more afraid of a spillover effect. Drug smuggling from Afghanistan is particularly worrisome for Russia. Moreover, Russia is really concerned that these smuggling cases will increase after the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan. Russia is not only concerned about smuggling but also concerned about religious extremist groups fleeing into the Russian Federation (Klein, M. 2015).
In the military doctrine, it is clearly noted that probability of a large-scale war against Russia has decreased. However, NATO’s military infrastructure getting close to Russia’s border and deployment of American Missile defense systems to Europe are noted among the threats mentioned in the doctrine. Besides that, the current doctrine does not exclude the creation of joint defense missile systems with other states. The only condition of this joint system is to make it on the equal level with the attendants (Pavlović, A.K. 2015). Depending on the wording of the doctrine, one may suggest that Russia does not consider NATO as an enemy whereas it considers its expansion as hostile. In this context, one may argue that the Russian Federation is not waging Cold War with the US despite the intense international environment. Territorial claims and destabilizing situations in single states are mentioned as external threat as mentioned in the previous doctrines.

The focus on airspace and deployment of weapons on space is evaluated as a possible external threat. The placement of strategic missile defense systems is regarded so powerful that it can change global stability (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014). This can be interpreted as such: according to Russia global stability is provided by the strongest weapons, which means, nuclear missiles.

Other external threats are the violation of international agreements in the sphere of arms banning and restriction, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its technologies, resorting to military forces and use of armed forces along the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies as well as violating the international law, global terrorism, interethnic tensions.

In the 2014 doctrine, there is more emphasis on terrorism as an external threat. In the previous doctrines, terrorism was mentioned not in so much detail. In the 2014 Doctrine, insufficient cooperation in combatting terrorism is mentioned. The use of toxic chemicals and radioactive substance by terrorists are perceived particularly threatening.

There is the first time mentioning of ‘military companies’ in the 2014 Doctrine. Activities of private military companies and radical armed groups along the borders
of the Russian Federation or its allies are mentioned as the external military risks in the doctrine.

In the 2014 doctrine, the statement ‘combining efforts of the state, public and individuals for the protection of the Russian Federation’ is particularly important. In this context, ‘mobilization readiness’ understanding is underlined. This shows the capability of the Russian Federation to combine military power with other forces and organs, economy of the state and local governmental organizations to realize the mobilization plans (Belozorov V.K. 2015).

According to Klein (2015), Russia mostly focuses here on the mobilization of society and economy in preparation for an event like ‘Maidan’. Also, there are some new arrangements done in the sphere of financial sector. The aim here is to be able to step in when an economic crisis hits. The mobilization of society refers to two different categories. First is the patriotic and military education of society. Second is the providing of security in informational area (Klein, M. 2015). In such cases, one may expect limitations on the freedom of expression.

Regarding the information technologies, there are more differences in comparison with the previous doctrine. The first point that deserves attention is the use of information technologies for the goals in the sphere of military-political activities which aim for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014). The important point here is the lack of definition of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the sphere of information technologies. Actually this is not only a problem relevant to the Russian Federation, in today’s world there are not any commonly accepted definition of these terms in technological sphere. So, this article is open to discussion and can be evaluated openly.

Even though none of the states’ names are clearly stated in the doctrine, Russia feels its concern throughout its borders, views “foreign acts” in Russia’s sphere of influence as policies that threaten Russia’s interests in the region. While it is Ukraine that initially comes to mind, Russia perhaps refers to all states in its near abroad. This ‘acts’ not only should be considered as military threats, because in the chapter of military threats Russia also states its concerns over informational technologies’
usage against independence and territorial integrity of ‘certain states’. So, one should not only take military exercises which are being conducted at Russia’s borders but also use of information technologies against the Russian Federation’s policies as threats (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015).

When it comes to domestic threats, there is only one article, which is different from the previous doctrine. This article tells us about the attempts to prompt extremism related with ethnic and social tensions and increase the hatred for religious matters (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014). Main military threats that are in the 2014 doctrine are the same with the threats mentioned in the 2010 Doctrine.

In the third Chapter, the military policy of the Russian Federation is explained. The main military policy is almost the same with the 2010 doctrine with just a difference. The difference stems from the point that although ‘arms race’ is mentioned in the 2010 doctrine, 2014 doctrine does not mention arms race as one of the military policy. In 2010 military doctrine, possibility of an arms race is seen as a threat. As noted in the previous doctrine, the prevention of nuclear conflicts forms the main basis of the Russian Federation’s military policy.

There are particular duties defined for Russia to deter military conflicts. Most of these tasks consist of the same articles as the 2010 doctrine. The only difference is the mentioning of the ‘BRICS’2 which did not exist in the 2010 one. Creating and expanding relations with BRICS countries is defined as one of the tasks of Russia to prevent military conflicts (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014).

There is an interesting difference between the 2010 and 2014 doctrines regarding international organizations to prevent military conflicts. In the 2010 doctrine, there was an emphasis on the development (razvitiye) of relations with NATO and the European Union. However, in the 2014 doctrine, instead of development, there is an emphasis on maintaining (podderzhaniye) of equal relations with NATO and the European Union in European security realm. In addition to that difference,

2 BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. These states are considered as the fast growing economies which have huge impacts on regional affairs.
concerning the defacto change in Georgia after 2008 war, there is an article related with Abkhazia and South Ossetia which states that cooperation with the Republic of South Ossetia and The Republic of Abkhazia is among the priorities so as to prevent military conflict (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014). There is an emphasis on the dialogue between the West and Russia on equal basis. When it comes to cooperation, mainly Belarus, the CSTO and SCO are mentioned. In addition to these, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are stated to increase cooperation. Although the West is not mentioned for improving cooperation, fighting against terrorism and extremism are defined as common areas of cooperation between the West and the Russian Federation (Klein, M. 2015).

The changes in the notions – from development to maintaining show us that NATO is not considered as a partner to provide collective security for the world. Instead, it is regarded as a potential partner with whom Russia may maintain ‘equal dialogue’. In other words, one may interpret this as Russia no longer hopes for more cooperation with NATO. Instead of NATO, Russia mostly focuses on the CSTO and SCO (Sinovets, P. Renz, B. 2015).

Some other priorities that Russia aims to execute in order to prevent military conflicts are concluding agreements for arms control, preventing states from deployment of weapons to outer space, preventing some states to become superior in terms of military by the help of deployment of strategic missile systems, participating peacekeeping activities and fighting against international terrorism (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 26.12.2014).
In this chapter, I will compare the military doctrines of the Russian Federation from a military security perception combined with the analysis of the doctrines conducted in the previous chapter. By this comparison, one will be able to see the evolution of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation better. In this chapter, there will be two different themes so as to provide a basis to the comparative study. These two themes are ‘threat’ and ‘threat reaction’ which are the main complements of military security. Thus, one may be able to see how the evolution of the security perception in the Russian Federation has been reflected in the military doctrines.

6.1. Evolution of the Threat Perception

Threats have always been one of the main indicators for states, which help them to take necessary actions and political measurements in the international arena. Threat is a controversial notion. However, as Christian Krause and Michel Vale state in their article, the verb ‘to threaten’ needs two different parties. First is the threatening party and the second is threatened party. First party definitely demands or requires some certain things whereas the second party accepts this demand or tries to resist it. (Krause, C. Vale, M. 1983). In this part, I will be discussing the threatening parties and the evolution of these for the Russian Federation.

In the 1993 military doctrine, no state is defined as an enemy. All states who were not acting against the interest of the Russian Federation were partners. Local military conflicts are considered as one of the most dangerous military threats starting with the 1993 Military Doctrine. Territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its domestic stability is really important and acts, which attempt to harm, are listed
among major threats. In the 2000 military doctrine, once again it is repeated that all states are considered as partners whose policies are not contrary to the security of the Russian Federation.

In the 2000 military doctrine, it is clearly mentioned that the Russian Federation does not seriously consider a traditional military threat from other states. However, possible armed conflicts, which would be close to the territory of the Russian Federation are defined as possible military threats. The decrease of threat perception in terms of conventional or traditional threat against the Russian Federation continued in the later military doctrines of the Russian Federation.

In the first place of military threats, territorial claims against the Russian Federation is mentioned. This tells us about the historical background of the Russian Federation due the collapse of the Soviet Union. Besides that territorial claims and ethnic conflicts were always considered as military threats against the Russian Federation in 1993, 2000 and 2010 military doctrines. In the 2014 military doctrine, inter-religion tension is added to this group as a military threat.

With dynamic changes of the international environment, the Russian Federation explicitly started to consider the attempts, which aim to ignore the interests of the Russian Federation in international security as a threat in 2000 Military Doctrine. This is a reaction to the understanding of a unipolar world. The emphasis of this approach grew over every military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

In the final part of the military threats, discrimination of the Russian Federation’s citizens in foreign countries is considered as a military threat whereas in the 1993 military doctrine, only ‘Russian speaking’ people were underlined instead of citizens of the Russian Federation. In the 2000 military doctrine NATO was not explicitly noted, but the expansion of military blocs is considered as a military security issue whereas in the 1993 military doctrine, there was no such emphasis.

The 2010 military doctrine has a fundamental change in terms of threat perception. This fundamental change is based on the articulation of NATO explicitly in the doctrine. For the first time, NATO and its expansion is noted in the doctrine as a threat to the Russian Federation. In the 1993 and 2000 military doctrines, NATO was
not even clearly mentioned it was only implied as ‘military blocs’. NATO’s perception as a threat and its expansion along the borders of the Russian Federation continued in the 2014 military doctrine as well. In the same context, due to Arab spring, regime security gathered more attention in comparison with the previous military doctrines rather than the 2014 military doctrine. This is associated with the external powers, especially with the Western powers. So, the acts of foreign states’ secret services as to destabilize the security of the Russian Federation are mentioned in the 2014 military doctrine as one of the main threats.

As can be seen, throughout the years, the threat perception of the Russian Federation constantly changed. At least the way the Russian Federation was interpreting them was changing due to the international and economic stance of the Russian Federation.

Information sphere is started to take its place in the military doctrines first time with the 2010 military doctrine. However, during those times, information threat was not described in detail. When it comes to the 2014 military doctrine, information threat was considered as a stronger threat than before and it was related with the propaganda acts of foreign states. In this context, communicational technologies were highlighted even going forward to claim that information space was going to be the new arena of military threats.

There is a change in the technological realm in the 2010 military doctrine, which was not mentioned in the previous ones. Militarization of space is evaluated as an external threat whereas this issue does not exist in the previous military doctrines. Further in the 2014 military doctrine, militarization of space is kept being defined as one of the military threats in the military doctrines of the Russian Federation.

While there are differences in the threat perception of the Russian Federation, international terrorism and the inability of international organizations to provide equal security is still the same in 2010 military doctrine. This inability and inadequacy of international organizations are stated in the 2014 military doctrine as well.
In terms of threat perception, destabilizing attempts which are aimed for single states and respective regions are among the leading threats listed in the 2010 military doctrine. With the increasing military technological abilities of states all around the world, a new threat perception entered the radar of the Russian Federation, which was not valid in the previous military doctrines. It is the increase in the amount of states with access to nuclear weapons.

Evolution of military threats mentioned in the military doctrines of the Russian Federation has taken place in a gradual way. In each of the military doctrines, it is obvious that threat perception is widened. This expansion is not only about the number of threats but the impact of such threats is stronger globally.

The increasing economic power and growing self-esteem of Russia over the years are the main factors that contributed to the process of the evolution of the military threats. As the economic power of the Russian Federation improves, the military threats are started to be explicitly and directly stated.

6.2. Evolution of the Threat Reactions

In the 1993 military doctrine, the Russia’s condition to resort to armed forces is defined when there is an attack against the state or any of its allies. All these reactions to threats will be regarded as a self-defense right for the Russian Federation. Intervention in the domestic politics of the CIS countries can only happen if there are violations of human rights for the Russian speaking people.

Nuclear weapons are listed among the means for counteracting a global war. In this respect, the Russian Federation did not have to wait for the use of nuclear weapons from an external force.

In the 2000 military doctrine, nuclear weapons are allowed to be used in not only a global war but also in a regional war different from the 1993 military doctrine. The reason of this change seems to be the Kosovo intervention. In the 2010 military doctrine, nuclear weapons still keep its central place as a reaction to military threats. It would be a retaliatory measure against nuclear attacks to the Russian Federation or against a conventional attack which would be aimed against to the core existence of the Russian Federation.
Besides the nuclear weapons, in the 2010 military doctrine, resorting to armed forces is defined as legitimate so as to protect Russian citizens abroad. In addition to that, mobilization of military forces is a legitimate right to restore the peace in the Russian Federation or its allies.

All in all, it is obvious that nuclear weapons were always considered as the main means against the threats towards the Russian Federation. There is no difference in all of the military doctrines in this context. However, there is a new threat against the Russian Federation developed by the USA as the ‘prompt global strike’, which involves the use of high-precision conventional weapons. This notion is used for the first time in the 2010 military doctrine and more importance was given to this in the 2014 military doctrine. One can argue that the Russian Federations started to expand the means of reactions to military threats. This change can be interpreted as follows: the Russian Federation does not only rely on its nuclear deterrence but also wants to deter its opponents by other military means rather than the nuclear weapons.

Over the years and in response to developments in international politics, the 2010 military doctrine has a different aspect from the previous ones in terms of threat reaction. The main difference is the commitment to the military doctrines. While there was a strong commitment to the military doctrine so as to be implemented exactly as planned in the 2000 military doctrine, this commitment is not included in the 2010 military doctrine. The 2010 military doctrine explicitly states that execution of the military doctrine may indicate some differences when it comes to the practical implementation of it due to changing military threats all around the world.

Except from the unilateral threat reactions to the military threats, in the 2014 military doctrine, the Russian Federation started to mention about BRICS as a mean to counteract against military threats. In this respect, the creation of relations within the BRICS is one of the duties of the Russian Federation to be able to prevent military conflicts.
Military doctrines are considered as one of the essential documents that a state publishes in order to put forward its own methods of waging a war in times of a military conflict. While this is generally the case for most states, the Russian military doctrines too, reflects the country’s major perspective on domestic and international security, as well as defining the main threats to security and its enemy perception.

Considering the Soviet Union’s and the Russian Federation’s military doctrines, one may easily notice the process of change. First differentiation at this point seems to be the fact that all the military doctrines of the Soviet Union, up to the Gorbachev era, underwent a change due to the technological changes in the sphere of military technology. The first differentiation started with Gorbachev. The reformulation of military doctrine in Gorbachev’s period was done according to the political changes in the then international context; not according to the changes realized in the sphere of military technology.

Looking at the discourses of Soviet executives, one will realize that beginning with the Khrushchev’s inauguration, military doctrines were claimed as defensive while Western analysts and scholars argued that it was offensive. The ‘offensive’ claims derive from the distribution of forces and the training of military personnel. However, the reason for considering the Soviet Union’s military doctrines as offensive is due to the fact that in a situation like nuclear war, defensive attitude is not possible due to the nature of such weapons, which also explains the motivation for a deterrence policy.
The analysis of the evolution of the Soviet military doctrines reveals different approaches and categorizations. According to William Odom (1988), there are three different cycles of development name them for the Soviet Union. All the cycles are related with the technological developments in their times.

As for the categorization of the Soviet Union’s military doctrine evolution process, William Rose (1991) indicates two different phases. The first period was about different ideas regarding the management of military resources. This debate mainly took place between Malenkov and Khrushchev. The second phase according to Rose (1991) started as of 1953 and included the introduction of nuclear weapons. This was the transitional process from the Stalinist military doctrine to a more complicated and difficult-to-form-strategies doctrine.

Brezhnev period brought new understandings due to the military doctrines and security understanding of the Soviet Union at the time. His doctrine was generally based on ideology and social world. The new doctrine was named after him, following his 1968 historical speech. Brezhnev was trying to emerge as the leader of the Communist world and sending messages of togetherness.

During the Gorbachev era, the military doctrine and understanding of security had changed. This time, generally, the change was not due to the technological changes taking place in the military sphere but rather due to the international political context.

The military doctrines prepared following the Soviet collapse are highly affected by the domestic military-technological developments, domestic political developments and the developments that took place in the international arena.

Russian military doctrines generally differ from each other in terms of the enemy, threat and threat reaction perception. These changes have mostly been influenced by the economic and military power of the Russian Federation. We see a gradual evolution of the enemy and threat perception. In the first military doctrine in 1993, no specific threat coming from other states, organizations and groups were defined. One can observe that once Russia becomes economically stronger and self-sufficient, the threats defined become more specific with clear definitions of probable enemies.
Thus one can see the influence of country’s economy and the relevant political power in Russia’s reformulation of its military doctrines in the post-Soviet period. In other words, the Russian Federation did not directly set a state or a military organization as a threat, if its economic and political power is not sufficient to counterbalance the threat. The best example of this, while the Russian Federation always wanted to define NATO as one of the key threats after its military intervention in Kosovo, this did not take place until the 2010 military doctrine. One can reach this deduction by the help of Klein Margarete (2015) who is specialized in the Russian Federation and defense security. When he mentions about ‘providing equal security to all states’, he claims that international law does not provide equal security to all states. This claim of Russian Federation comes after the Kosovo intervention by NATO (Klein, M. 2015). However, the Russian Federation waited until its economic power is sufficient to challenge NATO.

However, even before the economic and political power of the Russian Federation, international prestige has always taken the first place in the military doctrines of the Russian Federation. This is highly related with the fact of being a former superpower in addition to Putin’s inauguration. Even in the 2000 military doctrine, ‘ignorance of the interests of the Russian Federation in the security issues’ took place in the military doctrine as a military threat. This was all about the prestige of the Russian Federation. Besides the prestige, the Russian Federation was setting its own place where she wants to see itself in the coming years. This is a highly important feature of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation.

As noted before, the military doctrines of the Russian Federation are not only about military strategies but also it is about the political stance and international threat perception. We perceive this fact, with the latest doctrines of 2010 and 2014. For the first time, we see the threat perception is clearer with the mentioning of international actors influential in the Arab Spring and the threat of regime change. Besides that BRICS started to take place in the military doctrines where the collaboration is aimed to be strengthened. The militarization of space is defined a new emerging threat. These considerations show us the fact that the military doctrines of the Russian Federation are not only about how to wage a war but they also help to understand country’s political stance in the international stage.
The evolution of the military doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation has been influenced by various factors from ideology and technology to economic and political power. The importance of ideology and military technology was vital in the military doctrines of the Soviet Union until the Gorbachev era. As for the Russian Federation, military threats and how to counter these threats have been very crucial. In addition to these international and domestic political factors have been considered as very important. Thus, the military doctrines of the Russian Federation not only reflects the military issues but also reflects the country’s international political stance, its future goals and the perceived threats to the state. In this respect, the military doctrines of the Russian Federation are unique and deserves a careful analysis in comparison with the military doctrines of other states.
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78


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Rus askeri doktrinlerine bakıldığında, Rus askeri doktrinlerinin içerik bağlamında batılı askeri doktrinlerinden farklı olduğu görülecektir. Batı askeri doktrinleri çokça askeri operasyonlara ve stratejilere odaklanırken, Rus askeri doktrinleri daha soyut ve aynı zamanda politik meseleler içeriyor. Bunun doğal bir sonucu olarak, Rus askeri doktrinleri batılı muadillerine oranla daha politik-stratjik düzeyde yer almaktadır (Haas.2011, s.19)

Askeri doktrinlerin yıllar içinde değişiklik göstermesine ilişkin, bu değişimleri açıklayan farklı yorumlar var. Lider değişikliği, uluslararası çevrenin değişimi, askeri ve savunma teknolojisi alanındaki gelişmeler bu değişikliğin bazı nedenleri olarak sıralanabilir.

Bununla birlikte, Rusya Federasyonu’nun askeri doktrinlerinin değişimindeki gerçek nedenleri kavrayabilmek ve bu nedenlere dayanarak analiz yapabilmek için Rusya Federasyonu’nun bakış açısından olayları ve değişimleri değerlendirilmek gerekir. Bu
bağlamda, askeri doktrinlerindeki değişimler genellikle Rusya Federasyonu'nun yurtdışındaki siyasi gelişmelere ve iç arenadaki toplumsal gelişmelere verdiği tepkilerden kaynaklanmaktadır.


sıra, Rusya bu terim ve kurumları kendi tarzında tanımlama arayışına girdi ve aynı zamanda da tanımladı. Dolayısıyla, aynı zamanda bu askeri belgeler ve doktrinler, Rusya’nın bu kurumları ve terimleri nasıl tanımladığını gösteren belgeler olarak da görülmelidir.

Bu gelişmelerin ışığı altında, 1990'ların başında, Rusya Federasyonu'nun askeri güvencesi tarafsızlığa dayanıyordu. Rusya Federasyonu, meşru mütareke hakkı dışında askeri güç kullanmayacağını taahhüdünü veriyordu. Temel askeri güvenlik politikası, ülkenin güvenliğini sağlamak ve toprak bütünlüğüne karşı olabilecek yerel çatışmaları müdahale etmekte (Sapmaz, A. 2018, s.37) NATO'nun alanı dış operaşyonlarına Rusya Federasyonu'nun tepki vermemesi dahi Rusya Federasyonu'nun etkileyen değil, etkilenen ülke olduğunu göstergesidir.


2007'deki Münih Güvenlik Konferansı, Rusya Federasyonu'nun güvence politikasındaki önemli kilometre taşlarını işaret eder. ABD'ye getirilen ana eleştiri tek tarafta faaliyetleriydı. V. Putin tarafından ortaya konulan çetin bir tutum olsa bile, Rusya Federasyonu, o an var olan finansal durumu nedeniyle ABD ile ilişkilerinde temkinli ilerliyordu.

Bu bağlamda, Çin-Rus ilişkileri, ABD’nin liderliğini üstlendiği tek kutuplu dünya yaklaşımına beraber karşı durduklarından ötürü yakınlaşma sürecindeydi. Bu
doğrultuda, Rusya Federasyonu ve Çin aynı çizgideydi. Irak ve Afganistan müdahale sine ve İran’ın nükleer programına karşı aynı tutumu gösterdi.


Sovyetler Birliği ve Rusya Federasyonu askeri doktrinleri düşünüldüğünde, değişim sürecinin çeşitli belirleyici noktaları olduğu göre çarpıyor. Bu noktada ilk farklılaşma, Gorbaçov dönemine kadar Sovyetler Birliği’nin tüm askeri doktrinlerinin, askeri teknoloji alanındaki gelişmelerden dolayı bir dönüşüm
geçirdiği gerçeği gibi görünüyor. İlk farklılık Gorbaçov dönemi ile başladı. Gorbaçov zamanlarında askeri doktrinin yeniden düzenlenmesi, o günün uluslararası durumundaki siyasi değişikliklere bağlı olarak gerçekleştilirdi; askeri teknoloji alanında gerçekleşken değişimlere değil.


Gorbaçov döneminde, askeri doktrin ve güvenlik anlayışı çeşitli değişimlere maruz kaldı. Bu kez Sovyet askeri doktrinlerinde değişim, askeri teknoloji alanında
meydana gelen gelişmelere değil, uluslararası alanda meydana gelen politik gelişmelere dayanyordu.

Rusya Federasyonu'nun askeri doktrinleri, doktrinin içeriğinde yalnızca askeri stratejileri ve gelişmeleri değil, aynı zamanda ulusal ve uluslararası ortamda gerçekleşen politik gelişmeleri de ortaya koyması açısından diğer ülkelerin askeri doktrinlerine göre farklılık göstermektedir.

Rusya Federasyonu askeri doktrinleri genellikle düşman, tehdit ve tehdit reaksiyonu bakımından birbirinden farklıdır. Bu farklılıkların temel kaynağı her zaman Rusya Federasyonu'nun ekonomik ve askeri gücü olmuştur. Rusya Federasyonu'nun Sovyetler Birliği'nin mirasını devraldığı ilk yıllarda, diğer devletlerden, örgütlerden veya gruplardan belirli bir tehdit algısı askeri doktrinlere yansımiyordu. Ancak, Rusya Federasyonu'nun ekonomisi geliştikçe, tehdit algısı daha belirgin hale geldi ve askeri doktrinlere net bir şekilde yansımayla başladı.


2000 askeri doktrininde, Rusya Federasyonu'nun diğer devletlerden ciddi bir şekilde konvansiyonel (geleneksel) bir askeri tehdit hissetmediği açıkça belirtilmektedir. Yalnız, Rusya Federasyonu'nun resmi sınırlarına yakın olabilecek olması silahlı çatışmalar askeri tehditler arasında yer almaktadır. Rusya Federasyonu'nun yönelik geleneksel saldırı bağlamında tehdit algısı takip eden askeri doktrinlerde de düşüş göstermeye devam etmiştir.


Nükleer silahlardan sonraki 2010 yılı askeri doktrininde, farklı devletlerde yaşayan Rus vatandaşlarının korunması için silahlı kuvvetlere başvurmak meşru bir hak olarak belirtmiştir. Buna ek olarak, askeri kuvvetlerin Rusya Federasyonu veya müttefik devletlerde barışı yeniden tesis etmek üzere harekete geçirilmesi meşru bir hak olarak ifade edilmiştir.

Genel olarak değerlendirildiğimizde, nükleer silahlardan her zaman Rusya Federasyonu'nda tehdit reaksiyonunun temel aracı olarak kabul edildiği açıktr. Bu bağlamda askeri doktrinlerin hiçbirinde farklılık meydana gelmemiştir. Ancak, Rusya Federasyonu tarafından ‘prompt global strike’ (çabuk küresel saldırı) adıyla


Artan ekonomik güç, devlet özgüveninin yükselmesi ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun yıllar içinde devlet olarak yeniden olgunlaşması, askeri tehditlerin evrim sürecine katkıda bulunan ana faktörler olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır.


Bu açıklamaların ışığı altında, Sovyetler Birliği ve Rusya Federasyonu askeri doktrinlerinin evrimi ideoloji ve teknolojiden başlayıp ekonomik ve siyasi güçle biten çok farklı faktörlerle başlaymıştı. Ancak, Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki ideolojinin ve askeri teknolojinin Gorbaçov dönemine kadar ana belirleyiciler olduğu açıktr. Rusya Federasyonu'na gelince, askeri tehditler ve bu tehditlere nasıl karşı çıkılacağını hayati öneme sahiptir. Bunlara ek olarak, uluslararası ve uluslararası politik faktörler çok önemlidir. Bu nedenle, Rusya Federasyonu askeri doktrinleri sadece askeri meseleleri yansıtmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda uluslararası siyasi duruşu, Rusya Federasyonu'nun gelecekteki hedeflerini ve devlete yönelik gerçek tehditleri de
dikkate alır. Bu bağlamda, Rusya Federasyonu askeri doktrinleri diğer devletlerin askeri doktrinlerine kıyasla daha dikkatli bir şekilde düşünülmemeyi hak ediyor.
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