

AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL FAIR REPRESENTATION IN ANKARA
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

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ABSTRACT

AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL FAIR REPRESENTATION IN ANKARA METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

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In representative democracies, representation in the councils formed as a result of elections is one of the indispensable elements. In municipal councils, which are the closest administrative units to the public, different opinions should be represented in parallel with the election results as much as possible. Therefore, political fair representation is an important issue in representation. This thesis examines the degree of political fair representation in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council by analyzing several local elections that took place between 1963-2019. As a result of this examination, historically, how proportional this council's political representation is; what affects the degree of political fair representation, and how it can be improved are evaluated. In this context, the study also analyzes the legal developments related to local governments in Ankara and their effects on the election results. Furthermore, the elections of the Ankara Provincial General Council from 1963 to 1984 are also examined in terms of over / under-representation. In addition, comparisons are made with the political fair representation in the local councils in London, Paris, and Berlin. It was concluded

that Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council had deficiencies in terms of political fair representation, and recommendations were made.

Keywords: Political Fair Representation, Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, Local Governments, Local Elections, Local Democracy

ÖZ

ANKARA BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYE MECLİSİ'NDE TEMSİLDE SİYASİ ADALET DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

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Temsili demokrasilerde, seçimler sonucunda oluşan meclislerde temsil en önemli hususlardan birisidir. Özellikle halka en yakın idari birimler olan belediye meclislerinde farklı düşünceler olabildiğince seçim sonuçlarıyla paralel temsil edilmelidir. Bundan dolayı temsilde siyasi adalet önemli bir noktadır. Bu tez, 1963-2019 yılları arasında yapılan yerel seçimleri analiz ederek Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'ndeki temsilde siyasi adaleti incelemektedir. Çalışma kapsamında, tarihsel olarak bu meclisteki temsilde siyasi adaletin ne kadar orantılı olduğu, bu seviyeyi nelerin etkilediği ve temsilde siyasi adaletin nasıl geliştirilebileceği değerlendirilmektedir. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi ile ilgili yasal gelişmeler ve bunların seçim sonuçlarına etkisi de bu bağlamda analiz edilmektedir. Bunun yanında Ankara İl Genel Meclisi'nin 1963'ten 1984'e kadar olan seçimleri de eksik / aşkın temsil açısından incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, Londra, Paris ve Berlin'deki yerel meclislerdeki temsilde siyasi adalet ile karşılaştırmalar yapılmaktadır. Tüm bu incelemeler sonucunda Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye

Meclisi'nin temsilde siyasi adalet bakımından eksiklerinin olduđu sonucuna ulařılmış ve geliştirilmesi üzerine önerilerde bulunulmuřtur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Temsilde Adalet, Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi, Yerel Yönetimler, Yerel Seçim, Yerel Demokrasi

To my family

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Aims of the Study

In our era, it is infeasible for public to directly participate in law making without a political representative. Therefore, elections are held, and with these elections, the public determines the representatives who will reflect their thoughts on the decision-making process. Free, honest, and regular elections are an essential part of representative democracies. (Doherty, & Mecellem, 2012, Huntington, 1991, Linz, & Stepan, 1978).

Elections should not only be seen as "electing representatives", because many variables such as rules, systems, methods, restrictions, and calculations that are applied in elections affect the results of this process. Therefore, the effect of a single vote in different electoral systems is not the same. One of the most important factors affecting this is the election systems, such as plurality/majority systems and proportional systems. These systems follow different ways of transforming/converting the votes cast into representatives. These differences become evident in the distribution of the elected representatives, such that in some election systems, the disproportionality is higher than the others.

Thus, while the representation of voters in parliament and local councils is a vital point in democracies, it is not always proportionate in these councils. In other words, although the voter will is reflected in the ballot as a vote rate, it is not reflected in the assemblies as a representative rate. If the percentage of the vote for each party is equal to the percentage of seats for each party, it is a perfectly proportional election. Disproportionality refers to the degree of deviation of the

result in the elections from the perfectly proportional election (Renwick, 2015). If the percentage of the representative of the parties is higher than the percentage of the votes they have received, they have gained over-representation. If the percentage of representation of the parties is lower than the percentage of their vote, they have under-representation.

Political fair representation is a term that emerged along with election systems, and proportionality and disproportionality in elections. With the simplest explanation, the lower the disproportionality, over-representation and under-representation values, the more political fair representation is achieved in the elections. There are many other methods for calculating disproportionality. The most basic method is to find the difference between the percentage of votes received, and the percentage of seats won.

Political fair representation also relates to the elections that are held in local government councils, which are the organs of local governments and one of the places where the public's wishes and thoughts should be represented. Today, local governments are seen as one of the leading democratic institutions in almost all countries. The main reason for this is that local administrations are institutions that enable the self-governing of the people, which is an indispensable feature of democracy. Citizens do this through the organs they have chosen (Keleş, 2016: 61). In the local elections with low political fair representation, the will of the people is less reflected in the elections. In other words, while some parties are represented less than the votes they receive, some parties are represented much more.

Representation in municipal councils to be more meaningful depends on the efficiency of the representatives in the decision-making mechanism. If the power of the assembly is less than that of the president, no matter how fair the distribution of representatives, different opinions cannot be fully represented in the council. Therefore, the parameters of a strong council or a strong mayor are also different aspect in terms of the political fair representation.

Low political fair representation in these councils may mean ignoring the primary demands of citizens. Because when a certain group is underrepresented in the council, it has less power than it should. In this case, the demands of the people cannot be fully reflected in the council decisions.

In the light of these, the aim of this study is to investigate the degree of political fair representation in the Metropolitan Municipal Council of Ankara by examining several local elections that took place between 1963-2019. As a result of this examination, how proportional this council's political representation is; what affects the degree of political fair representation, and how it can be improved will be evaluated. The study will also examine the changes in the structure of the local governments and related laws in Turkey with respect to local elections. In addition, different local government practices and election systems that are observed in countries and capitals whose systems are exemplary will be reviewed in the study to reveal how these countries deal with political fair representation issue. For this purpose, the electoral structure and local elections in London Assembly, Conseil de Paris, and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin will also be analysed and compared with Ankara case.

While analysing political fair representation, evaluations can be made from structural, conjunctural, and social aspects. This study will evaluate the structural aspects. In other words, research will be conducted on the effects of changing laws and decisions. In this sense, changes, which are elements of politics and conjunctural structure, such as changing political party structures and new political movements will not be included in the research. At the same time, the effects of local and international movements, changes in social, economic, and interest groups will not be included in the research and evaluation parts of the study. Evaluations will be made on the laws, and their effects and results will be investigated.

1.2 Significance of the Study

In the literature, local councils have been less researched in terms of political fair representation. Indexes and calculation methods are mostly applied to the parliamentary election results. When comparing local governments between countries, there are very few investigations in terms of fairness of representation. In comparisons, election systems are not explained in detail. In addition, in the literature, the examination of the political representativeness of metropolitan municipal councils in Turkey has not been done by utilizing Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index. Ankara councils were not historically analysed on this issue. It is hoped that this study will be a tool for closing this gap in the literature and provide an example of conducting such studies. As the study aims to shed light on how to improve political fair representation in municipal councils and metropolitan municipal councils, it is also hoped that this study will contribute to local governments in terms of new election system proposals that can be used in local elections.

1.3 Methods of the Study

Within this framework, the examination of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council in terms of political fair representation will be considered as a case study. As part of the case study, a mixed-method will be used to collect qualitative and quantitative data and then analyse and interpret these data. In qualitative research, decisions of Supreme Election Council (YSK), election information, and election laws are collected from the Official Gazette for evaluations of their effects. Besides, the laws concerning municipalities and the literature about those periods are also examined. Inferences about these are made to understand the factors affecting political fair representation and the reason for these differences.

In the Quantitative method, election results data sets are used in the study. Numerical findings about the research questions will be explained by using tables and figures. Quantitative analysis will be carried out on different election results for the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, which are 1984, 1989, 1994,

1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 local elections using three different Indexes and calculation methods to evaluate the degree of political fair representation. Local elections results for the years 1963, 1968, 1973, 1977, when Ankara was not a metropolitan municipality, will also be included in some analyses for comparison. In addition, other councils that implement different election systems will be compared.

There are four steps to follow in order to do this analysis in detail.

The first step is to determine the methods to be used to calculate the political fair representation. In this study, three different calculation methods were used to ensure that the values are not misleading, and the results are consistent. These are Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index. These Indexes and calculation methods are the most widely accepted.

The second step is to examine the historical and structural development of local governments in Turkey and local election laws. Examination of a municipal council alone does not create interpretable data. Along with the laws, the process of Ankara and the changes in the political fair representation will be examined. There is no Ankara assessment in the literature using these Indexes and calculation methods. Therefore, calculations of the elections to be discussed will also be made. The data obtained will show how the current situation of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council is in terms of political fair representation. While examining the local elections, not only municipal council elections but also the provincial general council elections will be also examined until the 1984 local elections. This examination will be made due to the coexistence of two different electoral systems simultaneously. Therefore, differences between election systems and applications will be seen clearly in terms of political fair representation.

The third step is the evaluation of different examples. In order to make a more detailed examination and analysis, samples from different countries should be examined. The purpose of this is to see how different practices affect political fair representation. These data will enable a more comprehensive evaluation for

Ankara. In this respect, cities that have common characteristics with Ankara but have differences in the electoral system were selected. The cities of London, Paris and Berlin, which have common features with Ankara, such as being metropolitan and being capital, and which have their own characteristics such as being in a special status, and having strong local government structures, were selected. Also, the local election systems applied here differ.

The fourth step is the comparison of the data. A detailed comparison of the data found as a result of the analyses will show the status of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council in terms of political fair representation. As a result of these findings, positive or negative aspects will be shown. Suggestions on the parts that can be improved will be provided.

While doing quantitative research, numerical data of Ankara's and Turkey's local elections, which are used as samples, were collected from TÜİK, DİE, YSK, Official Gazette, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, and literature. Data on elections from TÜİK and YSK, information about the elections and population from the publications of DİE and information about the council structures from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality were collected. While examining London, Paris, and Berlin, which are used as samples, publications and websites of public institutions were used, and news sites were also scanned. Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index were used to analyse the collected numerical data.

1.4 Organization of The Study

In the next chapter, literature review is presented. Here, the main concepts and issues related to the research questions of the present study will be reviewed, and the importance of political fair representation and its measurement will be discussed in relation to the literature.

In the third chapter, the local governments in Turkey will be examined in detail in a historical perspective. This section includes a review of the histories, related

laws, and electoral systems in the local governments of Turkey. These will prepare the ground for the analyses to be made in the later sections.

In the fourth chapter, the election results of Ankara municipal councils will be analysed historically with regard to political fair representation. In addition, the election results of the provincial general council up to the 1984 local elections will be included to compare the effects of two different election systems. The results of the two council elections will be evaluated and the differences between them will be revealed.

In the fifth chapter, London, Paris, and Berlin cases will be examined, and compared with Ankara case. First, the local government and local election structures of these will be shortly reviewed, followed by an analysis of their local election results for political fair representation. Data that can be compared from samples will be collected by using indexes and calculation methods. As a result of these data, comparisons will be made with Ankara case in terms of political fair representation. The findings will be presented.

In the last chapter, findings and recommendations will be discussed as a result of analyses and comparisons. Index values, differences of laws and electoral systems, their effects on political fair representation, and aspects to be improved will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

To examine the status of political fair representation in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, this chapter aims to provide a framework that elaborates on the key issues of political representation. Representation is directly linked to democracy; therefore, first, the concept of democracy and local democracy will be briefly explained, and the significance of elections in a democracy will be stated. Representation in councils can be calculated in different ways. Electoral systems as an important point for representation is also presented in this part because different types of electoral systems and their calculation methods affect representation. After presenting the main electoral systems, the chapter discusses the concept of political fair representation, its calculation, and its implications.

2.1 Democracy

The word democracy comes from Greek as its origin. "Demos" (people), and "kratos" (governing) have been combined to find the term democracy or "democratia". The first to use this expression are Greeks (Dahl, 2001: 11). Thus far, democracy has been expressed in different ways.

Democracy does not have a straightforward definition in the literature; different users may consider or describe it in different ways, and it has no agreed meaning (Arblaster, 2002: 3, Collier et al., 2006: 216). Democracy found its expression in 1863 by US President Abraham Lincoln in words "government of the people, by the people, for the people" and reorganized with very simplified and realistic principles (Schmidt, 2000: 19-20). Democracy cannot be considered independent from people, according to Lincoln's statement.

According to a commonly accepted definition, democracy is a political system in which all people make positive or negative decisions about the significant problems related to public policy. The public is empowered to make these decisions (Holden, 1988). The democratic method is the institutional order in which individuals are involved in the political process through elected representatives and try to establish a common public interest by saying the final word on the results. (Schumpeter, 2008: 250-269). Democracy is a political lifestyle that gives the greatest number of individuals the greatest freedom, recognizes and protects the greatest possible diversity (Touraine, 2002).

While scholars define democracy, they often argue that they refer to the structural aspects of a political system. These scholars realize some combination of procedural structures such as fair, free and periodic elections, access to alternative sources of information, freedom of expression as the crucial elements of democracy (Doherty, & Mecellem, 2012). Therefore, democracy can also be defined as the freedom of free, honest, and regular elections and freedom of political parties that can participate in these elections. Any productive political office cannot be excluded from direct or indirect electoral liability (Linz, & Stepan, 1978; 5). The democratic regime includes the fact that most powerful collective decision-makers are selected with fair, honest, and periodic elections by all the adult populations eligible for voting. These elections are indispensable for democracy. Candidates clearly compete to win an election (Bulut, 2010: 2, Huntington, 1991). Honest, free, and regular elections have an essential place for democracy. Different election systems have been developed and used around the world, which are explained in the following sections.

2.2 Local Democracy

Local democracy is an essential tool for developing fair representation in local governments.

Local authorities are both political institutions and contributing to the progress of democracy, conceived as the primary schools of democracy by John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, and also administrative

agencies that are in charge of providing local public services to local communities. In addition to the professionalization of administration of local government as service delivery bodies; constitutionalism, as understood in the sense of formal electoral representation at all levels of local government, is one of the fundamental characteristics of local democracy (Keleş, 2014: 15-16).

As a democratic potential, local governments are superior to other administrative units. The most suitable environment for the individual to participate in self-management is at the local level (Ulusoy, & Akdemir, 2010: 30).

Moreover, municipal councils, one of the local level administration units, are the decision-making body of the municipality and consist of members elected by the local people. Therefore, it is the "legitimacy producer" body of the municipalities (Arikboğa, 2012: 125). So, municipal councils are an important part of local democracy and fair representation in local. In the literature, many researchers think that democracy is easier to apply in small administration units such as local governments.

Local governments and representatives mirror the moral values and thoughts of the local people. Collectivism and cooperating with local people are the principles of local government works. Historically, reflecting community desires is the true role of local representatives/councillors. (Newnham, & Winston, 1997: 105-108). Local councillors have a key role because of communication between the citizens and the local authority (Bains, 1972: 137).

2.3 Election and Election Systems

Many scholars tried to define the concept of democracy, and most of them referred to terms of "election" or "representation". According to Dahl (1971); "right to vote", "free and fair elections" and "institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference" are three of the requirements (out of eight) for a democracy among the large number of people to exist. These are essential for establishing two dimensions: participation (representation, the right of virtually every adult to vote and contest for office) and opposition (organized contestation through regular, free, and fair elections), which creates

democracy. Elections, which are free, and fair, cannot be held without a specific degree of political liberalization and guarantee of civil rights. Elections are a significant place in democracy because of representation. Constitutive democratic capacities and practices are helped by representation (Plotke, 1997: 30).

Electoral law, the ballot structure, the electoral threshold, the electoral formula, and the district magnitude are the main aspects of the elections. Different types of election systems affect representation in some ways. Two types of election systems (electoral formulas) are used widely in the world. These are proportional and plurality/majority systems. Moreover, mixed systems which are combined these two systems can be used. Considering different electoral systems and their outcomes can provide insights about the fairness of elections.

In democracies, effective political authorities are determined by elections. The determination in question takes place only with certain technical procedures. The answer to the question of which of these procedures, called the electoral system, is better depends on political preferences. Because electoral systems directly affect election results. Therefore, it is at the center of political discussions (Bulut, 2010: 2,15).

The most crucial characteristics of elections are the method of election and the process of allocating the representatives (seats). Countries generally use proportional and plurality/majority systems for allocating the seats. One hundred fifty-five nation-states (out of 191) use proportional or plurality/majority system in the world. Furthermore, 29 of them use mixed (combined) type (Norris, 2004: 40-41).

These systems differ from each other with some characteristics. According to Gallagher (1992; 469), proportionality or types of political systems, which are two parties or multi-party systems, stable government, and so on, are some criteria for comparing election systems. Moreover, Duverger (1954) claims that plurality/majority systems are suitable for two-party systems, although proportional representation systems cause multi-party systems. These two types

have been used in Turkey's municipal council elections. While the plurality/majority election system was applied until the 1963 local election, the proportional representation system started to be used with the 1963 local election.

These two systems are explained in detail in the following section.

2.3.1 Plurality/Majority System

The plurality/majority systems are simply systems that enable the party with the most votes to win the election. The plurality system is explained in the Britannica Dictionary as follows:

The plurality system is the simplest means of determining the outcome of an election. To win, a candidate need only poll more votes than any other single opponent; he need not, as required by the majority formula, poll more votes than the combined opposition. The more candidates contesting a constituency seat, the greater the probability that the winning candidate will receive only a minority of the votes cast (Gibbins, Eulau, & Webb, 2015).

The majority system is explained in the Britannica Dictionary as follows:

Under the majority system, the party or candidate winning more than 50 percent of the vote in a constituency is awarded the contested seat. A difficulty in systems with the absolute-majority criterion is that it may not be satisfied in contests in which there are more than two candidates (Gibbins, Eulau, & Webb, 2015).

The plurality/majority system is suitable for the two-party system (Duverger, 1954). The large parties are advantageous in plurality/majority electoral systems (Rae, 1967: 74). Major parties gain more advantages than others (minorities, small groups) in a majoritarian system since it gives the least proportional results (Norris, 2005). Legislative elections using the plurality (first-past-the-post, FPTP) system have disproportional (the least proportional) election results because of three main reasons. Firstly, one party that does not have the majority of the votes can gain the majority of representatives. That is "manufactured majorities". Secondly, the party may not reach the largest of the representatives even if it takes the largest number of votes. Finally, small changes in votes may create great change in the distribution of seats (Lijphart, 1994, 1999: 15; Rae, 1967: 74-75;

Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). In the FPTP, whoever wins the simple majority of votes is the winner. The majoritarian system has a slight difference. In this system, the winner should take %50+1 of the votes. The plurality/majority system has an imperfect representation because half or more of voters may not represent (Morrill, 2004: 89). The plurality/majority system can create negative situations in terms of representation, and this system complicates the representation of some groups.

2.3.2 Proportional Representation System

The proportional representation system is based on the proportion of votes. The Proportional Representation system is explained in the Britannica Dictionary as follows:

Proportional representation requires that the distribution of seats broadly be proportional to the distribution of the popular vote among competing political parties. It seeks to overcome the disproportionalities that result from majority and plurality formulas and to create a representative body that reflects the distribution of opinion within the electorate. Because of the use of multimember constituencies in proportional representation, parties with neither a majority nor a plurality of the popular vote can still win legislative representation (Gibbins, Eulau, & Webb, 2015).

The main purpose of this system is that, unlike the plurality/majority election system, the distribution of representatives can be correlated proportionally with the distribution of votes. Therefore, proportional representation gives more chances to small groups and minorities. The proportional representation system is known as PR in literature.

PR focus on the inclusion of all voices (unlike plurality/majority systems that emphasize governability). Minorities, small groups, or pressure groups can be represented in parliament, policymaking process. This issue is maximizing representativeness in the political process (Ishiyama, 2012: 159, Lijphart, 1984: 429, Norris, 1997: 303, 2004: 50). Small parties are disadvantaged in plurality/majority systems. In the PR system, more people, groups represent, and fewer voters are wasted (Norris, 1997: 305-306). PR is popular among the most democratic countries, perhaps because of fair share among candidates (Blais, &

Massicotte, 1997: 113). The PR system is considered fairer due to its structure and principles.

The main principle of PR is that seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes thrown for each party (Norris, 2004; 50). PR is rarely challenged; however, "nonproportional systems" (the plurality/majority system) reduce the disproportionality between votes won on elections and representatives, so these systems are more challenged than PR. PR is more supportable than the plurality/majority system in terms of representation and voter turnout (Lijphart, 1984, 428-429, 1999; Powell, 1982). The PR system has been adopted more by voters, and this situation has an impact on participation. Increasing participation is vital for democracy awareness.

As in every system, PR has various calculation methods. These methods give different results for seat allocation. In Turkey's municipal council elections, the d'Hondt method has been used since 1963 local elections.

In the PR, allocation of seat method is based on division according to the number of votes and representatives. However, there are some variations and systems for how votes transform into seats. Party lists may be open or close; may be national or regional. The electoral formulas, which differ among systems, also have different types. Votes can be allocated to seats based on the highest averages method or the largest remainder method. In the highest averages methods, the number of votes for every political party to be divided by a series of divisors. D'Hondt formula, Sainte-Laguë method, "modified" Sainte-Laguë method are the highest average methods. An alternative of the highest average method is the largest remainder method. This method uses a minimum quota. Hare quota and Droop quota are the largest remainder methods (Norris, 1997: 303). D'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, and largest-remainder formulas are the most frequently used methods. Furthermore, these methods may result in slightly differing allocations of seats (Lijphart, 1984: 435).

The most common highest averages method is the d'Hondt formula in the World and Europe (Norris, 2004: 51; Gallagher, 1991: 34). D'Hondt can allocate more seats to parties larger than their electoral share. This method aims to ensure that a party with the majority of voters receives at least half the seats in the legislature (Gallagher, 1991: 34). The d'Hondt formula is the least proportional and supports the larger parties (Lijphart, 1990: 484). The d'Hondt formula uses divisors (which are 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) (Norris, 1997: 303). It applies as follows. Let v_i is the votes received, and s_i the seats won (so far), by the i th party. The formula then compares the related values $\frac{v_i}{(s_i + 1)}$ for each political party and awards the next seat to whichever political party can present the highest value. It uses the divisor sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. (Gallagher, 1991: 34). This formula is used in Turkey's municipal council and provincial council elections since 1963. However, the d'Hondt formula is used with "the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system" (in Turkish: *onda birlik baraj uygulaması nispi temsil sistemi*) since 1984. Therefore, the parties, which win the majority of votes, had more advantages. This situation will be analysed in further chapter detail.

The Sainte-Laguë method is one of the highest averages methods. Odd numbers (which are 1,3,5,7, etc.) are used to division in the Sainte- Laguë method (Norris, 1997: 303). Sainte- Laguë method uses the divisors 1,3,5,7, etc.; the n th divisor equals $2n - 1$. The next seat calculates that Party A wins the next seat instead of party B if the result of $\frac{v_A}{(2s_A + 1)}$ is greater than the result of $\frac{v_B}{(2s_B + 1)}$ (Gallagher, 1991: 35). The Sainte-Laguë formula is more objective than D'Hondt. Proportionality is very close between large and small parties. In practice, the Sainte-Laguë method is more often used in a modified form that uses 1.4 instead of 1 as the first divisor (Lijphart, 1990: 484).

The largest remainder (LR) method uses a minimum quota. Hare quota and the Droop quota are ways of the LR method (Norris, 1997: 303). Hare quota calculation is by dividing the total number of votes by the number of seats

(Gallagher, 1991: 37). The Droop quota divides the votes by the number of seats available in the district + 1 instead of the number of seats (Lijphart, 1990: 484).

Each method contains a certain degree of injustice and gives different results due to methodological differences. These electoral systems affect to a certain extent the principles of fair representation and stability of government. While fair representation may come to the fore in some management systems, the principle of stability of government comes to the fore in others. These two principles can also be put forward by synthesizing (Göksel et al., 2018: 105, Güneş, 2017: 50, 51).

2.4 Representation, Principle of Fair Representation and Stability of Government

Democracy, representation, and election systems are directly linked to fair representation. In its ideal sense, democracy, which is defined as the self-government of the people, shifted in time within the liberal system. Democracy has turned into a method of administration in which rulers are elected by the voters through honest and free elections (Bulut, 2010: 3). After these elections to be held in accordance with the proxy theory in the administration, it should be essential to reflect the will of all voters to the decision-making bodies to be formed fully and fairly. Therefore, it is seen that two principles are taken into account in meeting this expectation in all elections involving democratic competition. The first of these is fair representation, which aims to ensure the participation of the people in the administration and the reflection of different views in the people to the power (Bulut, 2010: 3, Güneş, 2017: 50). The principle of fair representation is a very important principle, as it is suitable for multi-party political life and therefore polyphony. Because of these characteristics, it can be said that the principle of fair representation is indispensable for an electoral system (Ustabulut, 2018: 351).

Two principles are important in determining electoral systems. The first of these is the aforementioned principle of fair representation, and the other is the principle of stability of government. The first principle is mentioned together with the principle of "justice" or "democratic representation" in electoral law, and its main function

is to ensure the reflection of different views in the public to the parliament. The second one is handled within the framework of the principle of "stability" and its main function is to ensure the formation of a majority in the parliament as a result of the elections and as a result, to enable the determination of the government. It is used with the meaning of "government stability" (Barın, 2019: 8, Bulut, 2010: 3, Tuncer, 2006: 167, Ustabulut, 2018: 351). Political stability includes a wide spectrum from culture to economy, from education to freedoms, and of course, the electoral system and the government system (Barın, 2019: 8).

Electoral laws give priority to one of these two principles, or take care to strike a balance between these two principles. The targets foreseen in terms of these two principles during the regulation of election laws are not always realized in practice (Güneş, 2017: 50, Tuncer, 2006: 167). When priority is given to one of the principles of fair representation and stability of government, which are essentially opposite to each other and work in the opposite direction, the other suffers. This situation has led to the emergence of different electoral systems. Discussions on which of these principles should be given weight have emerged (Bulut, 2010: 4). These two principles create a contrast to each other in local and national elections (Güneş, 2017, 50,51).

The most important problem in modern democracies is the question of which of these two principles will be given weight, in other words, which one of the democratic representation or stability facts will be preferred. Given fair representation, stable governments can be difficult to form. In this case, the rates of over/under-representation are seen at low levels. On the basis of stability of governments, fair representation can be harmed. In this case, the rates of over/under-representation increase (Bulut, 2010: 3, Tuncer, 2006: 168).

These two principles are stated in paragraph 6 of Article 67 of the Turkish Constitution as follows: "The electoral laws shall be drawn up so as to reconcile the principles of fair representation and stability of government."

In Turkey, these two principles are extremely important and indispensable principles, as in all countries. Fair representation comes to the fore for the system to be suitable for multi-party. In the words of the Constitutional Court, the reflection of the votes cast by the voters to the legislative body and the executive body to be strong explains the stability of government (Bulut, 2010: 3, Ustabulut, 2018: 351). In the Turkish Constitutional Law literature during the September 12, 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution period, the word "stability" refers to government stability; instability is synonymous with coalition governments (Barın, 2019: 8).

In Turkey, "government stability" principle has been more adopted. 10% threshold system is used for this. It would be more correct to implement the zero-threshold system in order to bring justice to the fore more in representation. Since this will create a more fragmented parliament, it means that the effect of the principle of stability of government will decrease (Barın, 2019: 28, Ustabulut, 2018: 341,353).

Fair representation is not only about fairness of districts (fairly represent equal blocks of the population) but also the fair distribution of seats (Balinski, & Young, 1982). Disproportionality is key to ideas of electoral fairness (Grofman, & Taagepera, 2003: 660). Electoral systems do not reflect the same percentage of votes cast for political parties or independents to legislatures. Fair representation is the proportionality of the votes of the parties with the number of seats they have won. Some of the political parties have representation ratios above the voting rates they obtain in the elections, and some of them below the voting rates. In fact, it is observed that one of the two parties with almost the same voting ratio won a considerable number of deputies, but the other did not even enter the parliament. The voting rates of the parties that cannot be represented are also an important point in the fair representation. When the ratio of seats in legislatures is higher than the rate of votes, there is overrepresentation, and when it is low, underrepresentation (Çirkin, 2019: 445,446, Göksel et al., 2018: 110, Güneş, 2017: 53, Tuncer, 2006: 168). Proportionality is not the only criterion of fair representation. However, proportionality can normally be examined significantly.

Even if proportionality may not measure the degree to which each voters' total political worries are equally efficient over legislative conclusions; at least, proportionality measures the degree to which each voters' electoral aims are equally effective over the electoral results (Baker, 1996: 734). Examination of fair representation was generally done in terms of gender, race, age, geographical, and political.

According to Lijphart (1981: 900-902), there are sixteen criteria of fair representation, some of which are widely accepted, and some of which are controversial in the literature. These criteria contain effects of the district system, and electoral district, electoral systems, the proportionality between the share of the votes and share of the seats (representatives) won, equal power among citizens to affect the outcome of elections and so on. Thus, fair representation provides distribution proportionally for parties and fair distribution for each electoral district. Representatives reflect voters' opinions as much as possible.

Moreover, Lijphart (1981: 910-911) argues that proportional representation (PR) with an effective district method is the most suitable system for fair representation. PR with large districts is compatible with 14 of 16 criteria. These criteria are related to "maximizes the four dimensions of voter equality", "parties and ethnic minorities representation", "neutrality and proportional results for parties and other groups", "responsiveness" and "using vote".

Analyses of fair representation have some problems such as district systems, vote plans, gerrymandering (defined as the manipulation of the boundaries of the districts (which are not necessarily of the unequal population) for partisan advantage; to recount the boundaries of the districts in favor of a party in order to prevent the "wasted" votes (Erikson, 1972: 1234-1237, Martis, 2008: 835)), political subdivision and districting, hearing from the minority, how "equal" is "equal" (Dixon Jr, 1965: 321-324).

The problem of proportionality has great importance in terms of fair representation. Therefore, many researchers found different formulas for

calculating and measuring proportionality or disproportionality. These indices are reviewed in the next section.

2.5 Indices to Measure Proportionality of Election and Fairness of Representation

Some proportional electoral formulas were designed to minimize the difference between the vote rates and seat share rates of each party but, exact proportionality cannot be reached (Pennisi, 1998: 3, Puyenbroeck, 2008: 498). Therefore, the proportionality of electoral systems is often discussed (Fry, & McLean, 1991: 52). Different measures have been proposed to calculate fairness of representation and proportionality of election, and the result of this, different methods create a different distribution of representatives with the same vote rates. It shows that some methods are more proportional than others. As a result, proportionality method discussions for correct measurement have become even more important (Grofman, & Taagepera, 2003: 660, Pennisi, 1998: 3, Puyenbroeck, 2008: 498). Disproportionality indices or measures of proportionality methods emerged as a result of these discussions. Disproportionality indices or measure of proportionality methods are based on the comparison between the quota of votes and quota of seats each political party obtains. Some indexes exist such as the Loosemore and Hanby Index¹ (Loosemore and Hanby, 1971), Rae Index² (Rae, 1971), Gallagher Index³ (the Least Squares Index) (Gallagher, 1991), Gini Index⁴, Rose's Proportionality Index⁵ (Rose, 1984) and so on. The most commonly used method is Loosemore and Hanby Index, but some researchers suggested Gallagher Index because this index has more acceptable than Loosemore and Hanby Index

¹ Loosemore, J. and V. Hanby (1971) 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytical Expressions for Electoral Systems', *British Journal of Political Science* 1: 467-77.

² Rae, D. (1971) *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, New Haven, Yale University Press

³ Gallagher, M. (1991) 'Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems', *Electoral Studies*, 10 (1), 33-51.

⁴ Fry, V., & McLean, I. (1991). A note on Rose's proportionality index. *Electoral Studies*, 10(1), 52-59. & Puyenbroeck, V. T. (2008). Proportional representation, Gini coefficients, and the principle of transfers. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 20(4), 498-526.

⁵ R. Rose, 'Electoral systems: a question of degree or of principle?' in A. Lijphart and B. Grofman (editors), *Choosing an Electoral System: issues and alternatives*, (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp.73-81.

(Aleskerov, & Platanov, 2005: 24, Fry, & McLean, 1991: 52, Gallagher, 1991: 38; Grofman, & Taagepera, 2003: 659-660, Lijphart, 1990: 483, Pennisi, 1998: 3). Duverger (1972: 23) used the differences between the voting rate of each party and the representative rate of each party to calculate the over/under-representation and disproportionality (Duverger's calculation method). This calculation is similar to the Loosemore and Hanby Index.

In accordance with the sample of the study, Loosemore and Hanby Index, Gallagher Index (the Least Squares Index), and Duverger's calculation Method are decided to be used in this study to calculate proportionality of Ankara's councils and other proportionality calculations. The political fair representation decreases as the value of these indexes increases.

In Duverger's calculation, $v_x - s_x$ (v_x refers to the rate of the vote received, and s_x refers to the rate of seats won) shows over/under-representation. This calculation is applied to each party. When the result of this calculation equals to zero, there is no over/under-representation. If v_x is greater than s_x , under-representation occurs; otherwise, over-representation occurs. The more differences between zero and result are there, the more over/under-representation occurs. This calculation will be used in the following sections.

Loosemore and Hanby Index is based on a rate of vote-seat differences. In order to calculate Loosemore and Hanby, the absolute values of the rate of vote-seat differences for each party are added and then divided by 2 (as the same voters are calculated twice). The formula of this index is as follows

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |v_i - s_i|$$

(consider an election with n parties participating. Let (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n) be the rates of votes and (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n) be the rates of seats each party receives.) (Aleskerov, & Platanov, 2005: 29-30, Gallagher, 1991: 38-39, Lijphart, 1990: 483, Loosemore, & Hanby 1971: 468-469). This index also will be used in the other sections.

Michael Gallagher founded the Gallagher Index (the Least Squares Index – Lsq) since 1991. Gallagher (1991) criticized the Loosemore and Hanby Index, and the Rae Index moreover introduced a new index. In the Least Squares Index, differences between the voting rates and seat rates of each party are squared, and then all of these results summed. After that, these summed results are divided into 2 and taking its square root (38-41). The formula of this index is as follows

$$\text{Lsq} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i - s_i)^2}$$

(consider an election with n parties participating. Let (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n) be the rates of votes and (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n) be the rates of seats each party receives.) (Aleskerov, & Platanov, 2005: 29, Karpov, 2008: 1424). This index also will be applied in the other parts.

There are many other indexes, such as the Rae Index, the Gini Index, the Rose's Proportionality Index. The Rae Index is similar to the Loosemore and Hanby Index. Calculate the Rae Index, sum |votes rate – seat rate| for parties that win more than 0.5 percent of the total votes. Furthermore, the result divides the "included" party number (Gallagher, 1991: 39-40). The Gini Index is based on the Gini coefficient of inequalities in distribution. This index is calculated using the Lorenz curve (Karpov, 2008: 1427). The definition of Rose's Index of Proportionality is as follows; the sum of the differences between the share of votes – seats for each party, divided by two and subtracted from 100 (Fry, & McLean, 1991: 52). In the literature, there are many indices such as the Maximum Deviation Index, the Grofman Index, the Equal Proportion Index, the d'Hondt Index, the Sainte-Laguë Index, the Lijphart Index, the Monroe Index, the Gatev Index, the Ryabtsev Index, the Szlai Index, the Aleskerov and Platanov Index, the Atkinson Index (Aleskerov, & Platanov, 2005, Karpov, 2008, Martínez-Panero et al., 2019: 26).

2.6 Summary and Conclusion

In the literature, fair representation is directly linked to representative democracies. This is because representative democracies are directly compatible with elections and representatives. Electoral systems and representative distributions affect both principle of the fair representation and the principle of stability of government. Generally, when one of these two opposite principles is given importance, the other principle is ignored. These principles and concepts are important not only in general assemblies, but also in local councils. Justice in representation is of great importance in the formation of local democracy.

Fair representation is not a concept that changes only with electoral systems. It is possible to examine fair representation from different aspects. Fair representation can be examined in terms of political, geographical, socio-cultural aspects. In these examinations, election systems are generally discussed. However, the effects of changes such as conjunctural and social changes cannot be denied in these studies.

Generally, election systems are divided into Plurality / majority systems and Proportional Representation systems. Proportional Representation systems are seen as fairer. Up to the 1963 local election, the local elections in Turkey, plurality system is used, with the 1963 local election, d'Hondt system which is one of the Proportional Representation systems has started to be used.

Different indices and calculation methods are used in political fair representation and proportionality measurements. There are many different methods, but the Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index, which are the most accepted methods in the world, will be used in this study.

CHAPTER 3

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY WITH RESPECT TO RELATED LAWS AND LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS

Local governments are an essential element for the democratic government (Mill, 1910: 2357). In democracies, citizens have a critical role, because rulers, who represent the public, implement the policies, and assign bureaucrats for applying these policies, are elected by citizens (Jones, 1995, Schmitter, & Karl, 1991: 77). Representatives, elected officers take some decisions to represent citizens. Requests of citizens are voiced by these representatives. Collective decisions are one of the key elements of democracies (Dixon, 1968, Pitkin, 1967, Sartori, 1987). These collective decisions enable the effectiveness of local authorities. Local political institutions give an opportunity for political participation and democratic behaviours. Moreover, local knowledge and interest can provide effective and efficient service. (Mill, 1910: 2357). Also, the principle of subsidiarity says that problems should be solved by the most immediate level of the current authority. According to Article A, in the Treaty on European Union (1992: 7), decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizens.

Given the importance of local governments, concepts such as democracy and representation, and evaluating fair representation and their calculation methods can be particularly relevant for local governments, although they are mostly addressed for central governments in the literature. In this chapter, the historical development of local government system of Turkey is analysed, with an overview of the related laws, and their effects on the local election system and results in Turkey.

3.1 Background on Local Governments and Local Elections in Turkey

In Turkey, there are three types of local governments: special provincial administrations, municipalities (including metropolitan municipalities), and villages. Article 127 of the 1982 Constitution titled "Local Administrations" contains the article regulating the place of local governments and the basic features of the local administration system within the Turkish administration structure. According to this article,

Local administrative bodies are public corporate entities established to meet the common local needs of the inhabitants of provinces municipal districts and villages, whose decision-making organs are elected by the electorate described in law, and whose principles of structure are also determined by law. The formation, duties and powers of the local administrations shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principle of local administration (The Constitution of the Turkish Republic, 1982).

The 1982 constitution also regulates the scope and rationale of the administrative tutelage authority of the central government over local governments.

Turkey has 51 special provincial administrations, 1397 municipalities, and 18.336 villages.

Table 1: Number of local governments in Turkey

Types Year	Special Provincial Administrations	Villages	Metropolitan Municipalities	Provincial Municipalities	All types of Municipalities
2017	51	18.336	30	51	1397

Source: T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı On Birinci Kalkınma Planı (2019-2023) Yerel Yönetimler ve Hizmet Kalitesi Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu, 2018: 25

Metropolitan cities do not have special provincial administrations. The general provincial council is the decision-making body of the other provincial municipalities.

Each district is an electoral zone. In the elections for the provincial council memberships, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system (onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi) is applied (Law on Elections of

Local Administrations and Neighborhood Mukhtars and Board of Elderman, 1984). The number of representatives varies according to the population.

Table 2: Distribution of provincial council memberships by districts

District Population	Number of councillors
Up to 25,000	2
25,001 to 50,000	3
50,001 to 75,000	4
75,001 to 100,000	5
100,000 +	One member is added for every additional 100,000 population. In the division of the population by 100,000, if the remaining number is less than 50,000, no longer member is added; if it is more than 50,000 (included), a member is added.

Source: edited from Law on Elections of Local Administrations and Neighborhood Mukhtars and Board of Elderman, 1984

There are municipalities in towns, districts, provinces, and metropolitans. Metropolitans do not have any towns. Forms of metropolitan municipality councils are different from other municipality councils.

Table 3: Distribution of municipal council members by the population of areas

Population	Number of members
Up to 10,000	9
10,001 to 20,000	11
20,001 to 50,000	15
50,001 to 100,000	25
100,001 to 250,000	31
250,001 to 500,000	37
500,001 to 1,000,000	45
1,000,000 +	55

Source: edited from Law on Elections of Local Administrations and Neighborhood Mukhtars and Board Of Elderman, 1984

The number of metropolitan municipal council memberships is determined in the sixth article:

Metropolitan municipal councils are composed of members equal to the number that will be calculated by taking one fifth of each district of the municipal councils member numbers determined for district electoral zones within the borders of metropolitan municipality. Remaining numbers are not taken into account during this calculation.

The determination of those elected for provincial council and municipal council memberships is stated in Article 23:

Number equal to one tenth of the valid votes in an electoral zone, is separately extracted from votes of political parties and independent candidates. After this transaction, political parties and independent candidates which do not have votes remaining, are not included in calculation of allocating of member process.

After the first stage, the calculation is continued with the d'Hondt system. Another important point in this section is the quota memberships for municipal councils. In electoral zones, where quota candidates are shown according to Article 10, electoral zones where quota candidates are nominated, quota candidates of political parties who take the highest amount of votes, become the members of municipal councils (Law on Elections of Local Administrations and Neighborhood Mukhtars and Board of Elderman, 1984).

Many laws regarding municipalities were made in the Republican era, and the latest law (Law No. 6360) brought new regulations to metropolitan municipalities. This law also changed the structure of the metropolitan municipal councils. In the last elections, there were cases where the metropolitan mayor and the majority of metropolitan municipality council were from different parties (Table 4). It is also noticed that in some metropolitan municipalities, disproportionality is high.

Table 4: Different parties in metropolitan municipality mayors and a majority of council in 2019 Local Elections

	Mayors' Party	Major Party* in Council Members
İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	JDP
Ankara Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	JDP
Antalya Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	JDP
Adana Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	NAP
Hatay Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	JDP
Manisa Metropolitan Municipality	NAP	JDP
Mersin Metropolitan Municipality	RPP	NAP

Source: YSK; TÜİK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, NAP: National Action Party

In Manisa Metropolitan Municipality, NAP won the metropolitan mayor, and JDP won the majority of the metropolitan municipal council. These two parties are the parties that have made an election alliance. So, this situation is different from other metropolitan cities. In the remaining six metropolitan municipalities, parties from different alliances won the mayor and the majority of the council members. One of the most remarkable in terms of disproportionality in metropolitans is the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council.

Table 5: Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council according to 2019 Local Elections results

Party*	Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JDP	41.0	88	59.86
RPP	37.9	29	19.73
NAP	7.1	19	12.93
GP	7.2	11	7.48
GUP	2.1	0	0
FP	2.0	0	0
PsDP	1.1	0	0
Total		147	
PsA	50.2	107	72.79
NA	47.5	40	27.21
Total		147	

Source: YSK; TÜİK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GP: Good Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, PsA: People's Alliance consist of JDP, NAP and GUP, NA: Nation Alliance consist of RPP, GP, FP and DP

Looking at the votes of the parties and the percentages of the seats won, it is seen that this election is not a perfectly proportional election. So, this case is disproportional. The following section reviews the history of local governments and related laws to shed light on the developments affecting political fair representation in local government councils in Turkey. In the later chapters, more detailed data is presented by examining the local election results through some indices.

3.2 Historical and Structural Changes in Local Governments in Turkey and Reflections on Local Elections

In order to see and understand the current codes in Turkey which are related to local governments, how municipalities act according to these codes and how these municipalities are affected by the current codes, what will be examined is a historical process of metropolitan municipalities and the specific codes that had an impact on Ankara. Besides, the evaluation of the local election in the process and changing election systems will be taken into account, and their influences will be debated. The evaluation will be based on the characteristics of over and under-representation.

In a modern sense, Turkish local government history does not have a long past (Keleş, 1998: 122). In a historical sense, the regulations on the local governments begun with the rescript of Gülhane and continued its progress until the present era. It underwent many changes within the Republican era. In this part, it is vital to examine the republican era and the changes that municipalities experienced, so that the process of their present formations could be understood in a broad sense. In that context, how the municipalities changed in the process, and their effect on political fair representation will be examined. The historical development will be studied under the sub-headings of:

- Single Party Era Until 1946
- 1946-1960- Multi-Party Years
- 1960-1980: In between Two Coup D'états
- 1980-1984: Post Coup D'état era
- 1984-2012: Rise of the Local
- 2012 to present: Emergence of Law No. 6360

3.2.1 Single Party Era Until 1946

World War I caused severe damages to the Ottoman Empire. In the post-war era, while on the one hand national struggle was ensued against imperial forces; on the other hand, the National Assembly that was constituted in Ankara in 1920 continued its activities. In this process, a new constitution was prepared in 1921.

Unlike the 1876 Constitution, the 1921 Constitution, prepared under war conditions, based local governments on an administration. According to the 1921 Constitution, the provincial local administrations would be autonomous administrative units with legal institutional status. Instead of provincial general councils, there would be provincial councils, and these councils would elect their chairmen. The elected chairman and executive committee assumed the executive function of provincial local administrations (Gözübüyük, 1967). In the Republican era Turkey, the most distinct development on local governments was the fact that the 1921 Constitution identified local governments as legal entities which possessed their own democratic and autonomous identity. The fact that constitution gave the right to local governments to elect their local president and distributed the role of execution to the local council president and the local council administrative council shows the democratic identity of the local governments (Aydın, 2011: 16).

In this era, the understanding of municipal work was constituted based on the aim to create a modern, contemporary style city together with the goal to realize the current regime of the time and to protect it (Alada, 2004: 22). 1924 Constitution narrowed down the area of activity of local governments, the situation which continued throughout the single-party era. The intense centrality of the single-party regime was also reflected in the local governments; therefore, it was not possible to separate the central government and local governments from each other (Aydın, 2011: 16). On 16 February 1924, Ankara Şehremaneti Law was introduced. This law resulted in the formation of Ankara in a similar way to that of İstanbul. According to the law, the municipality was to be ruled by the mayor who was appointed by the central government (Alada, 2004: 22; Ersoy, 1989: 47).

According to the 4th article of Ankara Şehremaneti Law (1924: 1), 24 members of the municipality council were popularly elected. In 1924, therefore, the first step of the settlement of Ankara municipality within republican era was observed. In this step, however, it is not observed any significantly separate structure from central government. Although 24 members of the municipal council were popularly elected, the mayor was appointed by the central government which shows the influence of the central government. According to this law, the right to elect and to be elected is much narrower than the present time (25 October 1877 4th article-19th article).

In 1930, with the introduction of Law No. 1580, Municipality Law, it was accepted to establish municipalities in settlements whose population was higher than 2000 (Tortop, et al. 2006: 38). According to the Municipality Law dated 15 April 1930 and numbered 1580, the Vilâyet Municipal Law, Dersaadet Municipal Administration Law, and Ankara Şehremaneti Law were repealed as of 1 September 1930 (Tekeli, 2009). The most significant contribution of the Municipality Law No. 1580 to our democracy was that it enabled women to participate in political life with its decisions that without any discrimination based on gender, every citizen of the republic who is above age 18 has right to vote in the election and above age 25 to get elected in political competition. Another contribution was that the law enabled the municipal council to elect a mayor among its members or a non-member person who satisfies the requirements rather than direct appointment of the mayor by the central government, with some exceptions that were mentioned above. These people's election as mayor was confirmed by the signature of the ministry of interior and approval of president in provinces, and by approval of the governor in other municipalities (Eryılmaz, 2002: 8). The new law brought equality among all municipalities except İstanbul and Ankara municipalities. In Ankara and İstanbul mayoralty and governorship were joined together so that absolute check and action of the central authority was ensured. For other municipalities, although the principle of universal direct suffrage was adopted, the central government had established a powerful checking mechanism on the decisions and decision organs of the municipalities (Tekeli,

1978, 53). According to the 20th article of Municipality Law No.1580 which was indicated in Official Gazette, April 14, 1930, No. 1471 (1930: 8826), members of municipality council were directly popularly elected. Municipal elections were one of the significant steps in the sense of representation. Although the single-party regime and the checking mechanism of the central government were at the highest level, the praxis of direct popular election of the municipal council members and the election of the mayor by these members rather than direct appointment by the central government shows that the preferences of the citizens had come to the forefront. In general, these characteristics shape the main framework of the single-party era. In 1946, a transition to the multi-party regime was achieved.

3.2.2 1946-1960: Multiparty Years

In 1946 opposition parties to Republican People's Party (RPP) were established. The first of the multi-party elections was realized in the same year with local elections. This election, which was an early election, was organized on 26 May 1946. In the analysis of this election, however, it is not possible to collect satisfactory data.

According to Cumhuriyet Gazetesi (1946, 1) National Development Party (NDP) participated in this election together with RPP. Democrat Party (DP) had announced that the party would not participate in the elections as a protest to a certain extent. In this situation, two parties participated in the election. DP invited people to boycott the elections as a result of its protest.

When the election results are examined, it is observed that RPP won all the municipalities as a result of NDP's withdrawal from the elections, which was caused by the irregularities in the election. In that context, it is not possible to provide a strong analysis in the sense of representation, according to the announcement of the minister of interior which was published in Minutes of the *TGNA Debates* (TGNA, 1946, 240) the participation rate in the election was calculated as %64, together with the observation that in 44 of the total 61 provinces, the participation rate was recorded in above %50. When the official

state archives are examined, it is seen that the participation rate in Ankara is estimated as %49.

In the post-war period in which the transition to the multi-party system was ensured, there were no significant changes other than terminating the privileged situation of Ankara and İstanbul. Anti-democratic measures such as the approval of mayors by the ministry of interior and governorship and directly central appointment of the mayors whenever it is seen necessary remained in force. In other words, the transition to multi-party politics was not reflected in the relationship between central and local government; therefore, the tendency to see the municipalities as the rural organization of the central government continued to exist (Keleş, 1988, 292). The adaptation of the political process into a pluralistic democracy based on universal suffrage brought about crucial changes in issues such as the decision-making style of local governments and the extent to which the political influence of the citizens was realized; especially that of social groups which were relatively had weak influence in the previous period in the political sense. It was no longer possible for the central government to retain its control over the local governments and utilize them as tools for creating a specific “lifestyle”. Local government was to adopt popular interests rather than manipulating them. The demands of the masses, if not attempting to abolish main institutions of the system, they nevertheless were inclined to get out of the legal boundaries. This tendency to ‘spontaneously’ getting out of the legal limits was able to be embedded within society as they were easily consented (Tekeli, 2009).

In 1950 general elections DP gained the majority of the seats and took control over the government. The party was mainly in favor of liberal economy, democracy and decentralization together with opposition to statist policies.

There was no legal change within the functions of municipalities in the aftermath of DP’s control over the government. However, in practice, DP increased the role and activity of craft and petit-bourgeoisie within the municipal work. In a sense, there emerged a certain division of labor between the central government and municipalities. On the central level, interests of the developing bourgeoisie were

defended. The interests of the petit bourgeoisie were realized in municipalities (Tekeli, 1992, 10). Therefore, the interests of big capital were being protected at the central level while the interests of local notables and small entrepreneurs were being protected at the local level (Şengül, 2001). With the change of power, changes within implemented policies occurred as well differentiations between interest groups were observed.

With the transition to the multi-party regime, municipal organs and party programs became much more sensitive to the people's expectations. In this period, the roles of the municipalities were shifted to the center through newly established institutions. It is possible to see a relative increase in the revenues of the local governments in 1955 as a positive step. Another positive influence of the multi-party politics on the municipalities was the increase in the number of municipalities. While in the single-party era the number of newly established municipalities is estimated as 91, in the period between 1945 and 1960, 412 new municipalities were established. In this increase, there had been the influence of the increase of urbanization, together with the influence of political power owners' effort to transform municipal works to concrete political profit (Keleş, 1988, 293).

3.2.3 1960-1980: In Between Two Coup D'états

In the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention, municipalities were ruled by governors and district governors (Köseçik, & Özgür, 2009: 160). The process of reform and democratization of the local governments was made possible with the establishment 1961 constitution (Aydın, 2011, 16). Through the acceptance of the 1961 Constitution in post-1960 coup era, the democratic rights and liberties were extended together with adaptation of the principle of monitoring the executive through autonomous institutions (Tekeli, 1978, 191). One-stage election system with plurality method was brought into the municipal elections so that, it was thought, mayors could have much more legitimacy as a result of deriving direct power from the people. Local assemblies were given more power in relation to mayors and monitoring role of the municipal council was extended so that it would be possible to prevent the mayor from abusing his/her power (Aydın, 2011, 16;

Tekeli, 1978,191). 1961 constitution left the decision on the gain and loses of organic attribution of elective municipal organs and their supervision to an independent judiciary. With the Law No. 307, which came into force in 1963, the authority to abolish municipal councils, which belonged to council of ministers before, was shifted to the council of state (Ersoy, 1989, 47, Kösecik, & Özgür, 2009: 160).

1961 Constitution attempted to realize the adaptation of the understanding that mayors possess responsibilities towards people. With the transition to the one-stage election system, mayors began to be elected directly by the people. As a result, the main responsibility of the mayors shifted to the people who directly elect them and not the members of the municipal council. On the other hand, the supervisory mechanisms of municipal councils on mayors were increased.

The election legislation, which was applied to 1963 local elections, contained many innovations, compared with the pre-1960 era. For the first time, instead of plurality/majority system, the d'Hondt method was implemented in the elections of the municipal council and provincial council. Besides, the mayor elections were also held for the first time with a direct election system. Lastly, for the first time in 1963 elections, the regulation of the local elections was realized under the surveillance and supervision of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), which possessed the legal characteristic that is labelled as 'constitutional institution' (Akbulut, 2001, 41).

Law No. 306 and 307 with acceptance date of 19.07.1963 contain decrees related to local elections as well. Law No. 306 indicated that there are to be implemented certain changes and abolishment of certain codes in the application of İdarei Umumiyei Vilâyat Law, which describes how the number of members to be calculated. Here, although the d'Hondt method is not mentioned directly, its way of application is expressed clearly. One of the changes in the General Province Administration Law is the calculation of the number of provincial council members with relation to population census. In the 2nd article of Law No. 306, the changes and the new numbers are given. Accordingly, the number of members that could be elected are:

1 in districts whose population census is equal to or lower than 25.000.

2 in districts whose population census is between 25.001 and 40.000.

3 in districts whose population census is between 40.001 and 55.000.

4 in districts whose population census is between 55.001 and 70.000.

And, plus one member for every 25.000 people added to the population census from that point on.

Table 6: Numerical relation between population and municipal council members

Population	Number of Municipal Council Members	Increase
<3000	12	-
3000-5000	$12 + (\text{Population} - 3000) / 500$	1 in each 500
5000-10.000	$16 + (\text{Population} - 5000) / 1000$	1 in each 1000
10.000-25.000	$21 + (\text{Population} - 10.000) / 3000$	1 in each 3000
25.000-50.000	$26 + (\text{Population} - 25.000) / 5000$	1 in each 5000
50.000-100.000	$31 + (\text{Population} - 50.000) / 10.000$	1 in each 10.000
100.000>	$36 + (\text{Population} - 100.000) / 25.000$	1 in each 25.000

Source: Formulated by the author on the basis of Municipality Law No. 1580

In Law No. 307, it is indicated that the proportional representation system in municipal council elections and the majority procedure in the mayor elections would be implemented. In this law, the arrangement of the municipal council members is put forward in accordance with Law No. 306. It is understood from the 2nd article that the distribution of the municipal council members according to the population remained the same in line with Municipality Law. Accordingly;

In town municipality councils whose general population is up to 3.000 there would be 12; in municipality councils whose general populations are between 3.000 and 5.000 additional 1 member for each 100 extra people in population the part of above 3.000; in municipality councils whose general populations are between 5.000 and 10.000 additional 1 member for each 1.000 people in general populations in the part of above 5.000; in municipality councils whose general populations are between 10.000 and 25.000 additional 1 member for each 3.000 people in population in the part of above 10.000; in municipality councils whose general populations are between 25.000 and 50.000 additional 1 member for each 5.000 people in the population in the part of above 25.000; in municipality councils whose general populations are in between 50.000 and 100.000 additional 1 member for each 10.000 people in the population in the part of above 50.000; in municipality councils whose general population is higher than 100.000 additional one member for each 25.000 people in the part of above 100.000

is elected. In both of these calculations, residue numbers (fractions) are ignored.

For the first time, applications such as the d'Hondt method and the direct election of the mayors by the public were realized with the election of local administrations in 1963. The results of this election all over Turkey are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: 1963 Local Elections results

Party*	Mayoral Election		Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JP	44.61	505	46.75	7469	47.30	45.36	803	50.95
RPP	34.69	335	35.77	6485	41.07	36.21	573	36.36
RPNP	1.54	9	2.17	340	2.15	2.98	17	1.08
NP	2.54	8	2.73	266	1.68	3.15	26	1.65
TLP	0.56	-	0.63	6	0.04	0.36	1	0.06
NTP	3.57	58	4.22	1047	6.63	6.54	108	6.85
Inds	10	113	1.33	182	1.15	5.4	53	3.36
Total		1028		15791			1576	

Source: Official Gazette, 1964, January 17, p. 3.

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents

According to the election results, JP ranked first, and RPP ranked second. RPP has a 5.3 over-representation rate in of Municipal Council resulted from Turkey general election results and became the party with the highest representation rate. However, in the Provincial General Council, JP has a 5.59 over-representation rate, and it is the party with the highest over-representation rate. Other parties do not stand out in terms of over/under-representation.

The local elections after these elections were supposed to be held 4 years later, in September 1967 according to the laws numbered 306 and 307. However, the election date was postponed to 1968, 2nd June (Akbulut, 2000). The results of the 1968 Local Elections are shown in Table 8 below.

Table 8: 1968 Local Elections results

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Member Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JP	49.58	9957	52.15	49.06	1052	60.95
RPP	34.8	6575	34.44	27.88	458	26.54
RP	4.44	979	5.13	6.64	65	3.77
RPNP	1.49	254	1.33	1.00	5	0.29
NP	3.46	638	3.34	3.50	30	1.74
UP	1.19	61	0.32	1.64	19	1.1
TLP	1.95	117	0.61	2.74	15	0.87
NTP	0.76	186	0.97	0.71	10	0.58
Inds	2.33	326	1.71	6.82	72	4.17
Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election					
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)			
JP	46.54	693	55.98			
RPP	30.71	292	23.59			
RP	3.22	23	1.86			
RPNP	0.99	7	0.57			
NP	1.87	12	0.97			
UP	0.96	0	0			
TLP	1.69	0	0			
NTP	0.49	9	0.73			
Inds	13.53	202	16.32			

Source: Number of 13013 Official Gazette, 1968, September 28, p.4

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RP: Reliance Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, UP: Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents

Also in the 1968 elections, JP became the first, and the RPP became the second party. The most striking point in that election is JP has over-representation with more than 10 rate in Turkey General Provincial General Council. This situation led to the under-representation of other parties, albeit in small amounts.

First local elections after 1968 were held in 1973. The importance of this election was that it was the first local election in the aftermath of 12 March 1972 military memorandum. The election was supposed to be held on 4 June 1972; however, it was delayed in accordance with Law No. 1569 labeled as "Re-Organization of Local Administrative Elections that are to be Held Sunday" which indicates that

“In line with the Laws No. 904-905 and 906 decree dated 13.7.1967 it is decided that local elections are delayed to 1973.” (Official Gazette, 1972: 45). The date of elections was determined as 9.12.1973 according to the Supreme Electoral Council’s decree no. 1619. In the period until 1973 local elections, no significant change in the application of representation and election system is observed.

In the post-1960 era, the rapid urbanization movements crossed with capitalizing and industrialize process within the country, which resulted in significant differentiation and polarization within social and political demands. 1963 and 1968 elections stand out as the elections in which centre-right wing parties gained success on the local level. However, this table was changed from 1973 onwards with the success of centre-left wing party RPP in its country-wide superiority, especially in metropolitan cities. At the same time, in contrast to 1968 elections the vote rate of strongest centre-right wing party, Justice Party, remarkably declined.

Table 9: 1973 Local Elections results

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JP	35.31	10007	40.23	32.17	709	37.02
RPP	41.49	9280	37.31	37.36	848	44.28
RRP	2.63	801	3.22	2.76	34	1.78
DP	8.99	2622	10.54	10.8	147	7.68
NP	0.21	37	0.15	0.09	0	0
NAP	1.59	358	1.44	1.25	7	0.36
NSP	5.42	1211	4.87	6.33	64	3.34
TUP	0.51	42	0.17	0.4	3	0.16
Inds.	3.85	515	2.07	8.34	103	5.38
Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election					
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors		Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)		
JP	33.91	643		39.69		
RPP	39.59	554		34.2		
RRP	1.39	37		2.28		
DP	6.78	104		6.42		
NP	0.09	0		0		
NAP	0.81	5		0.31		
NSP	3.86	31		1.91		
TUP	0.04	0		0		
Inds.	13.53	246		15.19		

Source: Number of 14831 Official Gazette, 1974, March 18, p.4-5

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People’s Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, Inds: Independents

The era that began with 1973 elections stands out as the period in which “a new understanding of municipal work was born”. These structural changes forced the change in the quality and sources of political power as well (Yayman, 2000a).

The Table 9 shows 1973 local election results.

In 1973 local elections, RPP ranked first, and JP ranked second for all types of elections which are Mayoral, Provincial General Council, and Municipal Council. Although RPP received more votes in Municipal Council, it has 4.18 under-representation rate. So it has not been able to send as many representatives as it should have. However, JP is the party that has the highest number of representatives to send Municipal Council with 4.94 over-representation rate in 1973. In Provincial General Council, JP and RPP have over-representation.

These elections were concluded as the representation of the new Turkey, which was the result of rapid urbanization and industrialization, and in nearly all industrial cities, RPP gained strong superiority over its closest rival, JP. From 1973 elections onwards, “new” understanding of municipalism had become dominant and took the place of the conventional understanding of municipal work, which resulted in the emergence of the new perspective of municipalism which was not written in the party programs at the beginning but evolved in time through the applications of local governments. The first clues of this understanding can be observed in RPP-NSP (National Salvation Party) coalition program, which was formed on 26 January 1974. In summary, the program aimed to prevent corrupted urbanization and environmental problems, building satellite towns, legalize slums, rationalize city planning through developmental plans etc. (Yayman, 2000a).

New municipalism movement that begun with 1973 local elections was not debated and underlined much in the pre-11 December elections process. In this era, the movement was rather combined under the scope of “necessity of system change”, which was heavily emphasized, and was continued to be seen as the main condition of the democratization project of the country through its applications by

mayors, majority of whom were from RPP, under the label of “New understanding of municipalism” (Yayman, 2000b).

Following this “new” period of 1973-1977, the time came for 1977 elections. The date of elections was determined as 11 December 1977 by Law No. 2033. There were no changes in “representation and election content” in the laws regarding elections.

In the 1977 local elections, election results and the votes won by the parties are shown in the table below.

Table 10: 1977 Local Elections results

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JP	37.83	11602	42.92	37.08	865	40.98
RPP	46.89	11534	42.67	41.81	999	47.32
RRP	0.72	217	0.8	0.6	5	0.24
DP	0.91	244	0.9	1.01	4	0.19
NAP	5.33	1451	5.37	6.66	93	4.4
NSP	5.56	1443	5.34	6.85	73	3.46
SRP	0.06	0	0	0.03	0	0
TUP	0.41	38	0.14	0.23	0	0
TLP	0.28	28	0.1	0.53	0	0
TSLP	0.11	8	0.03	0.24	0	0
Inds.	1.9	466	1.73	4.96	72	3.41
Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election					
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors		Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)		
JP	37.84	708		41.4		
RPP	45.68	707		41.25		
RRP	0.4	9		0.53		
DP	0.63	4		0.23		
NAP	4.07	55		3.22		
NSP	4.76	51		2.98		
SRP	0.1	0		0		
TUP	0.07	1		0.06		
TLP	0.21	0		0		
TSLP	0.14	0		0		
Inds.	6.1	175		10.23		

Source: Number of 16240 Official Gazette, 1978, March 26, p.46-48

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People’s Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, SRP: Socialist Reform Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, TSLP: Turkish Socialist Labour Party, Inds: Independents

The results of this election are similar to those of the election held in 1973; RPP ranked first, and JP ranked second. Similarly, because JP has over-representation and RPP has under-representation in Municipal Council, JP ranked first in both numbers of seats and rate of seats. However, in Provincial General Council Elections, JP has 3.9 and RPP has 5.51 over-representation rate.

In the aftermath of these elections, for the first time ‘Ministry of Local Governments’ was established in 1978 with the aim of solving the problems among the municipalities. This ministry functioned as the institution which contributes helps to the solution the conflicts that occur between municipalities, especially fiscal ones.

In the 22 months-long period in which the Ministry of Local Governments provided the service, the surveillance and supervision over the local governments were attempted to be reduced and some attempts to increase the revenues of the municipalities were made (Keleş, 2000: 419).

3.2.4 1980-1984: Post-Coup D’état Era

It is observed that approaching the metropolises and metropolitan municipalities as a problem area begun in the 1960s. The fact that especially cities such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir took many migrants from rural areas and experienced disproportional demographic growth resulted in administrative problems which brought the search for new governance models into the main picture. Since 1961 constitution did not provide the necessary structure for the regulation of a new metropolitan governance model, in 1970s Ministry of Interior and Public Works developed some drafts that are labelled as “unity model”. Accordingly, the aim was to establish a unity among municipalities in metropolitan areas which took the role of realizing public services in the metropolitan area. However, the political condition of the era did not make such arrangements possible (Arikboğa, 2013: 52-53). Besides, instead of bringing a solution to municipalities problems, the ministry of local governments was constituted at the end of 1970s which was closed in less than two years.

In the post-1980-coup era, it is observed that the military government also searched for solutions to the social and administrative problems that emerged in metropolitan municipalities. Especially the fact that violent events and social conflicts, which were claimed to be the main reason for military intervention, were seen wider and more effective in metropolises; the fact was combined with the problem of coordination problems resulted from the fragmented administrative structure and this combination prompted the military government to underline the necessity of adopting a new model in metropolises. The first solution was to unify municipalities and villages. The first step towards unification was made by the National Security Council with the Legal Decision No. 34, Decree date 1980. With this decision, in metropolitan municipalities, the small municipalities in surrounding the main municipality were legally attached to the main municipality. For the reasoning behind the decision, the insufficiency of services that occur in the small municipalities in the sense of drain, water and lightening which emerged as a result of the rapid increase of population and rural-urban migration was shown. Because of the disharmony that emerged in the application of the mentioned law, Law No. 2561 was legislated in 1981. In the law, the main aim is indicated as providing planning in which the basic municipal services such as energy, drinking and utilization water, drain, mass transportation and public improvements could be coordinated with each other and unified so that planning could be realized effectively and efficiently (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 45-49). In this era, within the provinces whose population were above 300.000, namely; İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Konya and Eskişehir, while on the one hand, some small municipalities that are resided in province center were unified, on the other hand, the legal entities of some villages were abolished. As a result of these changes, the number of municipalities was decreased from 1700 to 1580. According to the 127th article of newly accepted 1982 constitution, which aimed to solve the problems related to the metropolitan space administration, the principle that “For metropolitan settlements, it could be brought special governance models” which opened the way for establishing a new metropolitan city governance model (Keleş, 2016: 322-325). Besides, as a sign of the

Metropolitan Law No. 3030, with the *Statutory Decree* on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities No. 195 that was enacted on 23 March 1984, double-staged metropolitan municipality governments were constituted in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir.

In addition, another law that was enacted within 1984 was the law concerning the local administration elections. In the Law on elections of local administrations and neighbourhood mukhtars and board of elderman, Law No. 2972 contains provisions on the emergence of the mayor and most importantly of municipal councils.

3.2.5 1984-2012: Rise of the Local

From 1984 onwards, the regulations on the local governments gained pace. Most of the regulations that were not observed previously were implemented in the aftermath of 1984. In other words, most of the regulations that were implemented until the present was mainly put into practice in the post-1984 era. In that sense, 1984 can be seen as a cornerstone for the evolution of the local governments.

First of all, at the beginning of 1984 law concerning the election of local administration, Law No. 2972 was enacted on 18 January 1984. The first local election after the 1980 coup d'état, 1984 election, was arranged in accordance with this law. Moreover, in this election, the notion of “Metropolitan municipality” is used for the first time and the elections in these municipalities (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir) were held with a different method in contrast to province municipalities.

Besides, Law No. 2972 contains many differentiations. In the law, it was indicated that elections would be held every five years rather than four years. Another divergence is that in the general provincial council and municipal council elections, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system was implemented. The threshold system means that the parties with lower votes than a certain rate would not get any political representation at all. It creates an undesirable situation in the sense of just character of the representation. The

system results in the over-representation of the parties which were able to pass the threshold, thanks to the lack of representation of the parties under the threshold. Besides, in that context d'Hondt system causes the counting of the votes of parties with a diminishing rate.

Another change is the election of the mayors of metropolitan municipalities by the constituents within the districts of the metropolises. In Law No. 3030 it was also indicated that mayors of the municipalities that are posited in the immediate environment of the metropolitan municipality are the natural members of the metropolitan municipal council. A new type of calculation on the number of members of the general provincial council and municipal council was also made according to the population. With such calculation, the members of the metropolitan municipal council gained “double identity” (Keleş, 2000). Therefore, the members of the council became the representative of both his/her district from which s/he was elected and of the metropolitan. According to the articles of the law that are related to the municipal council and general provincial council:

In the elections undertaken by provincial council and memberships of municipal councils, proportional diplomatic mission with one tenth threshold system, in the mayor elections majority system is applied.

Number equal to one tenth of the valid votes in an electoral zone, is separately extracted from votes of political parties and independent candidates. After this transaction, political parties and independent candidates which do not have votes remaining, are not included in calculation of allocating of member process. Names of the political parties and independent candidates which have votes remaining, are written top and bottom with the numbers of remaining votes. These numbers are divided into one, two, then three.... Until reaching to the number of original members. The shares obtained are lined without any discrimination of political parties, from the biggest to smallest. Memberships equal to numbers of provincial and municipal councils are allocated to political parties and independent candidates due to their superiority.

For membership of provincial councils, according to the recent census:

In districts of which population is up to 25 000	2
In districts of which population is up to 50 000	3
In districts of which population is up to 50 001-75 000	4

In districts of which population is up to 75 001-100 000 5

Original membership and equal amount of reserve memberships are calculated.

In districts of which population is up to 100 000, for each additional 100 000 population, one original and one reserve members are added. In calculating dividing the population to 100 000, in case the remaining number is less then 50 000 then it will not included into counting, in case it exceeds 50 000, one original and reserve member are added.

For elections of memberships of municipal councils due to general census:

In tows of which population is up to 10 000	9
In tows of which population is up to 10 001-20 000	11
In tows of which population is up to 20 001-50 000	15
In tows of which population is up to 50 001-100 000	25
In tows of which population is up to 100 001-250 000	31
In tows of which population is up to 250 001-500 000	37
In tows of which population is up to 500 001-1 000 000	45
In tows of which population is up more than 1 000 000	55

Numbers of original and reserve members are calculated.

Metropolitan municipal councils are composed of members equal to the number that will be calculated by taking one fifth of each district of the municipal councils member numbers determined for district electoral zones within the borders of metropolitan municipality.

In contrast to the previous election law, changes within the rate of population/representative and some electoral districts are observed. The most significant change is the application of % 10 threshold.

Moreover, *Statutory Decree* on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities *No. 195*, which also laid the foundation of the Law No. 3030 in the mentioned year, was enacted with reference to 127th article's 3rd paragraph in 1982 constitution which indicates that "For metropolitan centers of populations, special governance model could be brought". From the words of Alaattin Firat, who was the spokesman of the committee on planning and budget then, it is understood that

mentioned decree was prepared in order to satisfy the necessities of the metropolitan cities such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. The factors such as population increase and the problems that are born from that, rapid urbanization, unhealthy growth of the cities, insufficiency of the services, constant and irregular migration from rural areas to cities as a result of skew industrialization, lack of coordination among different services continued to the present; he pointed out. Besides, he also indicated that the measures that had been taken for these problems until then were sufficient solutions either. Therefore, the mentioned statutory decree is claimed to be enacted to solve these problems. The main aims of the mentioned decree can be sorted out through 6 steps:

- 1- Bringing a solution to the unplanned and uncontrolled extension of the municipal borders,
- 2- Grasping the problems such as unplanned and uncontrolled reconstruction, housing, transportation and environment issues as a whole,
- 3- Dealing with infrastructure services on the basis of a rational and proper attitude and ensuring adaptation,
- 4- Solving local necessities through locally elected administrators without getting too much into metropolitan problems, so that fast response with local service to the problems could be ensured,
- 5- Preventing the possible conflicts between metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities through giving clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities of each institution,
- 6- Ensuring adaptation and organization on the issues that are related to the whole metropolis and realizing effective, disciplined, efficient and constant services, in addition, providing solid resources for the realization of these services (TGNA, 1984: 546-547).

As it can be seen, the main aim in this statutory decree which was mainly related to the metropolitan municipalities was to provide solutions to the political, functional and administrative problems of three major provinces of Turkey and ensuring more organized coordination in them through increasing local

governments' public services. This decree had a considerable impact on the emergence of Law No. 3030.

Similar to its Western counterparts, the formation of metropolitan municipalities in Turkey begun with the aim of establishing coordination as a solution to the series of economic, social and administrative problems that occurred in the 1980s within metropolises. The most concrete step was taken by enacting the Law No. 3030 which formed the metropolitan municipalities in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir in 1984.

The Law No. 3030 foresaw a central metropolis structure based on two main administrative institutions; namely, metropolitan municipality and district municipality. In the context of the relationship between administrative organs, the metropolitan municipal council and the metropolitan mayor had been given tutelage for ensuring the coordination. Municipal organs consist of the municipal council, committee, and mayor. The Law No. 3030 foresaw that adaptation of the provincial municipalities which contain more than one district municipality within their municipal border to metropolitan municipalities. However, the tendency to gain metropolitan status in many developing cities occurred as a result of Law No. 3030's providing additional financial sources. Therefore, the municipalities which do not possess this characterization are also transformed into metropolitan municipalities with the statutory decrees and laws that were enacted later. With the Law No. 3030 two-staged municipalities in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir were established (Keleş, 2012, Eryılmaz, 2011; Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 38-40). Accordingly, for a metropolitan municipality to be constituted in a certain space, it was foreseen to be multiple district municipalities within the borders of the metropolitan municipality or constitution of at least two district municipality by central administration. In Law No. 3030, there is no indication of criteria related to the population. The authorities that were given to the metropolitan mayor in this law resulted in the labelling the metropolitan administration as "powerful mayor-limited council" mode (TOBB, 1996: 124).

The constituents in these elections voted in 6 different elections. These are 1. Metropolitan mayor, 2. District municipality mayor, 3. District municipal council, 4. General provincial council, 5. Neighbourhood mukhtar, 6. Board of an alderman (Cumhuriyet, 25.3.1984).

Along with these regulations, local elections were held in 1984. In these local elections, the parties that were closed after the 1980 Military Coup were replaced by new ones. In these elections, the distribution of votes and seats was as follows.

Table 11: 1984 Local Elections results

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
MP	43.5	8485	47.35	41.48	1420	61.58
TPP	12.05	2776	15.49	13.25	188	8.15
PP	8.14	1114	6.22	8.75	58	2.52
NDP	5.68	1160	6.47	7.09	99	4.29
WP	3.89	215	1.2	4.4	14	0.61
SDP	25.54	4084	22.79	23.4	506	21.94
Inds.	1.2	87	0.48	1.63	21	0.91
Party*	Municipal Mayor Elections			Metropolitan Municipal Mayor Elections		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
MP	43.17	883	51.91	50.18	3	100
TPP	11.85	238	13.99	4.5	-	-
PP	7.79	94	5.53	7.92	-	-
NDP	5.44	106	6.23	4.31	-	-
WP	3.75	16	0.94	3.72	-	-
SDP	24.81	284	16.7	28.99	-	-
Inds.	3.19	80	4.7	0.38	-	-

Source: Number of 18412 Official Gazette, 1984, May 26, p. 13-14

*MP: Motherland Party, TPP: True Path Party, PP: Populist Party, NDP: Nationalist Democracy Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDP: Social Democracy Party, Inds.: Independents

When the table which is prepared according to the results of the first local elections after the 1980 Military Coup is examined, it is clear that MP and TPP have over-representation with the rate of 3.85 and 3.44 respectively in Municipality Council. However, SDP, PP, and WP have under-representation. If it is compared with the Provincial General Council, it is clear that the unbalanced

distribution of seats is striking. Over/under-representation rates are higher in Provincial General Council compared to Municipal Council. In Provincial General Council Elections, MP received 41.48% of the total votes and ranked 1, however, its representative rate is 61.58. It means that MP has 20.1 over-representation rate, which is quite high. On the other hand, other parties have under-representation. The major reason for that is the 10% threshold. Those parties which could not exceed the threshold cannot send their representatives to the Provincial General Council. This situation caused that the parties that could not pass the threshold are not represented, and the parties that pass the threshold are more represented in Provincial General Council, which creates more distinct differences in municipalities with more populations, in other words, municipalities with more representatives. Another reason for unbalanced representation rates is that the d'Hondt method is calculated after 10% of the votes of all parties have been removed. This situation causes the parties with more votes to have more representatives due to the d'Hondt method, which is based on the division method.

With the law numbered 3030, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir are the first metropolitan cities. Later, the number of metropolitan municipalities increased. Later, other five cities became metropolitan with different laws such as Adana in 1986, Bursa, Gaziantep, and Konya in 1987, and Kayseri in 1988.

The law no. 3030 decree date 1984 has the feature of first metropolitan municipality law in the sense that it emphasizes that “special administrative arrangements may be introduced by law for larger urban centres”. After 20 years-long period, it was replaced by the Law on Metropolitan Municipalities, Law No. 5216 in 2004.

1989 local elections appear as the second local elections in the aftermath of 1980 coup. Some changes within election statute and municipal statute had occurred between 1984 and 1989 elections. Most important ones of these changes, which influenced the elections, were the increase of the number of metropolitan

municipalities from 3 to 8 and bringing the notion of quota candidate to municipal assemblies. In Law No. 3507 it was indicated that

Political parties, nominate one in towns which have 9 and 11 municipal council members, two in towns which have 15, three in towns which have 25 and 31, four in towns which have 37, five in towns which have 45, six in towns which have 55 quota candidates.

Quota candidates are not included into the candidate for nomination sequence and written in candidate lists additionally as quota candidates. The quota candidates are the most voted political party's members who are sent to the municipal council as the member. They are not included in the d'Hondt system. In other words, in the municipalities which contain nine members, political parties show eight municipal council candidate and one quota candidate. The quota candidates could be elected as the member in the case that their political party pulls the most votes in the election. With this implementation, the most voted parties were strengthened. Besides, the first member who is to be sent to the metropolitan municipalities is the quota candidate.

Along with these changes, 1989 local elections were held in which 7 parties competed. The results of the elections in which the quota candidates are used for the first time and where there are 8 metropolitan municipalities are in the table 12.

According to election results, MP has more than 7, and TPP has more than 4 over-representation rate in Municipal Council. Although SDPP has more votes than others, it has 1.39 under-representation rate. In these elections, all parties, except TPP and MP, appear to have under-representation in Municipal Council. It is clear that MP, TPP, and SDPP, which are the three parties with the highest votes have over-representation in the Provincial General Council. TPP has over-representation with more than 5 rate, and SDPP has around 4.5 over-representation rate. All parties that could not pass 10% threshold are under-represented in all Turkey.

Table 12: 1989 Local Elections results

Party*	Municipal Councils			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
MP	23.50	6493	30.67	21.80	617	23.40
DLP	6.72	537	2.54	9.03	79	3.00
TPP	23.70	5894	27.84	25.13	863	32.73
RDP	0.52	62	0.29	0.94	2	0.08
NWP	3.30	332	1.57	4.14	34	1.29
WP	8.93	1094	5.17	9.80	155	5.88
SDPP	33.16	6727	31.77	28.69	877	33.26
Inds.	0.16	27	0.13	0.47	10	0.38
Party*	Municipal Mayoral Elections			Metropolitan Municipal Mayoral Elections		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
MP	23.66	565	28.59	23.62	-	-
DLP	6.48	38	1.92	8.74	-	-
TPP	23.49	552	27.94	17.84	1	12.50
RDP	0.50	6	0.30	0.41	-	-
NWP	3.02	24	1.22	1.92	-	-
WP	8.75	74	3.75	9.04	1	12.50
SDPP	32.78	650	32.90	38.37	6	75.00
Inds.	1.31	63	3.19	0.05	-	-

Source: Number of 20178 Official Gazette, 1989, May 28

*MP: Motherland Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, RDP: Reformist Democracy Party, NWP: Nationalist Work Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, Inds.: Independents

The new metropolitan municipalities were constituted in accordance with Laws No. 3306, 3391, 3398, 3399, 3508 following Law No. 3030. In these processes, some malfunctions in the constitution of metropolitan municipalities were observed and in the forthcoming era application of constituting metropolitan municipalities on the basis of district municipalities and the law was terminated, with giving the reason of economic realities. Therefore, provincial municipalities began to be transformed into metropolitan municipalities through statutory decrees. Statutory Decree No. 504 could be seen as a result of it (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 50-52).

In Law No. 3030 the definition of metropolitan municipalities was based on the existence of multiple district municipalities within the border of metropolitan municipality. In the statutory decree no. 504 that was enacted in 1993 for the constitution of the metropolitan municipality the establishment of the first-stage municipality was seen sufficient instead of district municipality condition. Thus, in 1993 within 7 provinces, new metropolitan municipalities were constituted.

Table 13: Municipalities gained metropolitan status before legislation of Law No. 6360

Provinces	Year of Constitution	Base of Constitution	Provinces	Year of Constitution	Base of Constitution
Ankara	1984	Law No. 3030	Antalya	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
İstanbul	1984	Law No. 3030	Diyarbakır	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
İzmir	1984	Law No. 3030	Erzurum	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
Adana	1986	Law No. 3306	Eskişehir	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
Bursa	1987	Law No. 3391	İzmit	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
Gaziantep	1987	Law No. 3398	Mersin	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
Konya	1987	Law No. 3399	Samsun	1993	Statutory Decree No. 504
Kayseri	1988	Law No. 3508	Adapazarı	2000	Statutory Decree No. 593

Source: Regulated by author according to the related laws

The metropolitan municipalities of Antalya, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, İzmit, Mersin and Samsun which were constituted with the Statutory Decree No. 504, that was enacted in 1993, were labelled as “third-generation” and were posited in a different status. According to the mentioned statutory decree, without the condition of establishing district municipalities within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality, the constitution of sub-provincial municipalities which would perform the functions of district municipalities was foreseen (1993: Statutory Decree no. 504).

In the local elections held on 27 March 1994, 15 metropolitan municipalities were elected differently from the previous elections. These elections were held with the participation of 13 political parties and independent parties. These are the elections with the largest number of parties to date. These elections are subject to the same election legislation. There is no change in this regard between the 1989 elections. The voting rates in these elections are as follows.

Table 14: 1994 Local Elections Results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
MP	22.71	8180	28.51	21.00	744	24.65
GUP	1.07	129	0.45	1.26	6	0.2
RPP	4.31	803	2.80	4.63	39	1.30
DP	0.33	83	0.29	0.54	5	0.17
DLP	8.36	502	1.75	8.77	72	2.39
TPP	18.89	8538	29.76	21.44	1085	35.95
WoP	0.17	1	0.003	0.28	-	-
NP	0.17	9	0.03	0.45	-	-
NAP	7.65	1488	5.19	7.97	130	4.31
WP	19.14	4288	14.93	19.09	686	22.73
SDPP	16.81	4647	16.20	13.57	241	7.99
SUP	0.11	-	-	0.29	-	-
RbP	0.18	2	0.007	0.37	1	0.03
Inds.	0.11	27	0.09	0.34	9	0.30

Source: Number of 21927 Official Gazette, 1994, May 7, p. 16-18

*MP: Motherland Party, GUP: Great Union Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DP: Democrat Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, WoP: Worker Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, SUP: Social Union Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, Inds.: Independents

In 1994 local elections, MP became the first party with the 22.71% vote rate in Municipal Council. Also, WP became the second with 19.14%, and the TPP became the third party with 18.89% vote rate. However, in terms of representation, TPP became the first party with 28.71%, which means that it has over-representation with more than 10 rate. Also, MP has 5.80 over-representation rate. However, other parties have under-representation. Although WP has the second

party in vote rate, it has under-representation with 4.21 rate, and it ranks 4 in representation. The highest rate in under-representation belongs to DLP with 6.61.

In Provincial General Council, the votes that TPP, MP, and WP received are very close to each other; 21.44%, 21%, and 19.09%, respectively. However, TPP has 14.51 over-representation rate. It has 11.3% more the representation rate than MP, which is the closest to TPP in terms of representation rate. MP and WP have around 3.5 and 4 over-representation rate. All parties except TPP, MP, and WP have under-representation. In 1994 local elections, the party with the most under-representation rate in these elections is DLP with 6.38 under-representation rate.

Table 15: 1994 Local Elections Results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Municipal Mayoral Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
MP	22.76	789	29.31	21.79	3	20.00
GUP	0.95	11	0.41	0.38	-	-
RPP	4.37	63	2.34	2.93	1	6.67
DP	0.32	6	0.22	0.08	-	-
DLP	7.95	23	0.85	11.23	-	-
TPP	18.97	882	32.76	15.88	3	20.00
WoP	0.16	-	-	0.18	-	-
NP	0.17	-	-	0.35	-	-
NAP	7.54	118	4.38	4.53	-	-
WP	18.95	324	12.04	22.40	6	40.00
SDPP	16.83	432	16.05	19.68	2	13.33
SUP	0.09	-	-	0.19	-	-
RbP	0.17	-	-	0.24	-	-
Inds.	0.78	44	1.63	0.15	-	-

Source: Number of 21927 Official Gazette, 1994, May 7, p. 16-18

*MP: Motherland Party, GUP: Great Union Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DP: Democrat Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, WoP: Worker Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, SUP: Social Union Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, Inds.: Independents

The 1999 local elections were held on the same date as the general elections. In these elections, there was no regulation that would affect the political fair representation in local elections.

Table 16: 1999 Local Elections Results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
MP	17.08	7854	23.06	15.06	431	13.81
RPP	13.27	4012	11.78	11.08	190	6.09
DLP	16.21	2881	8.46	18.67	611	19.57
TPP	12.51	7181	21.09	13.22	484	15.50
NAP	15.70	5470	16.06	17.15	730	23.38
VP	18.24	5448	16.00	16.48	526	16.85
PDP	3.46	677	1.99	3.48	128	4.10
FSP	0.66	26	0.08	0.84	0	0
WoP	0.09	0	0	0.21	0	0
DPP	0.01	5	0.01	0.02	0	0
CTP	0.01	1	0.00	0.01	0	0
LP	0.10	5	0.01	0.09	0	0
DTP	0.69	136	0.40	0.93	7	0.22
RbP	0.06	6	0.02	0.06	1	0.03
GUP	1.31	261	0.77	1.72	9	0.29
DPsP	0	0	0	0	0	0
DP	0.14	45	0.13	0.15	3	0.10
LDP	0.09	0	0	0.09	0	0
PeP	0.17	40	0.12	0.22	1	0.03
NP	0.14	1	0.00	0.27	0	0
SRP	0.00	0	0	0.07	0	0
Inds.	0.07	8	0.02	0.18	1	0.03

Source: Number of 23706 Official Gazette, 1999, May 26

*MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, VP: Virtue Party, PDP: People's Democracy Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, WoP: Worker Party, DPP: Democracy and Peace Party, CTP: Changing Turkey Party, LP: Labor Party, DTP: Democratic Turkey Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, GUP: Great Union Party, DPsP: Democratic People's Party, Democrat Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, PeP: Peace Party, NP: Nation Party, SRP: Socialist Rule Party, Inds.: Independents

When the results of the local elections held in 1999 are calculated according to the Duverger's calculation method, the following findings emerged. In Municipal Council, TPP is the party with the highest over-representation rate, which is 8.58. In this way, although it is the sixth in the rate of votes, it is in second place in the rate of representation. MP, which has the highest number of votes, is the second party with the highest over-representation rate. NAP has 0.3 over-representation

rate. Other parties have under-representation in Municipal Council. DLP is the party with the highest under-representation with 7.75 rate. Other parties also have under-representation, although at a lower rate than DLP.

Table 17: 1999 Local Elections Results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Municipal Mayor Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
MP	17.43	778	24.40	16.87	2	13.33
RPP	13.81	366	11.48	16.52	3	20.00
DLP	15.20	184	5.77	19.28	4	26.67
TPP	12.78	737	23.12	7.38	0	0
NAP	15.15	499	15.65	10.35	1	6.67
VP	18.42	484	15.18	23.37	4	26.67
PDP	3.37	36	1.13	3.82	1	6.67
FSP	0.49	2	0.06	0.49	0	0
WoP	0.09	0	0	0.12	0	0
DPP	0.02	1	0.03	0.02	0	0
CTP	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
LP	0.09	0	0	0.01	0	0
DTP	0.70	14	0.44	0.30	0	0
RbP	0.06	0	0	0.06	0	0
GUP	1.22	25	0.78	0.57	0	0
DPsP	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
DP	0.13	4	0.13	0.04	0	0
LDP	0.09	0	0	0.20	0	0
PeP	0.16	6	0.19	0.16	0	0
NP	0.13	0	0	0.14	0	0
SRP	0.01	0	0	0.07	0	0
Inds.	0.64	52	1.63	0.13	0	0

Source: Number of 23706 Official Gazette, 1999, May 26

*MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, VP: Virtue Party, PDP: People's Democracy Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, WoP: Worker Party, DPP: Democracy and Peace Party, CTP: Changing Turkey Party, LP: Labor Party, DTP: Democratic Turkey Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, GUP: Great Union Party, DPsP: Democratic People's Party, Democrat Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, PeP: Peace Party, NP: Nation Party, SRP: Socialist Rule Party, Inds.: Independents

The same method is also applied in the results of the Provincial General Council. NAP is the party with the highest rate of over-representation with 6.23. Although the NAP is the second party with the highest number of votes in these elections, it is the party with the highest number of representatives. DLP, TPP, and PDP also have over-representation, although they have fewer vote rates. Other parties have; however, under-representation. RPP is the party with the highest rate of under-representation, which is 4.99.

Adapazarı also gained metropolitan status with the Statutory Decree-Law No. 593 issued in 2000 before the law numbered 5216. Thus, the number of metropolitan municipalities increased to 16.

With the law numbered 5216 (compass law), which was enacted in 2004, it was desired to combine the city centre and its settlements, thus providing administrative unity and convenience. A law similar to this law (Law No. 5019) was enacted in 2003 but was vetoed by the president for reasons of elections. Law No. 5216 came into force approximately four months after the 28 March 2004 elections, which was the reason for its veto. It is seen that there is no regulation about the political fair representation when regulations about previous elections are considered. The results of these elections are as follows.

Table 18: 2004 Local Elections Results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JDP	40.33	16637	48.26	41.67	2276	70.95
MP	2.86	1105	3.21	2.50	26	0.81
RPP	20.56	5631	16.33	18.23	392	12.22
DLP	2.03	385	1.12	2.12	9	0.28
TPP	9.57	4747	13.77	9.97	156	4.86
NAP	10.47	3401	9.87	10.45	178	5.55
SDPP	5.04	1067	3.10	5.15	129	4.02
GUP	0.75	215	0.62	1.16	7	0.22
FP	4.65	961	2.79	4.02	19	0.59
YP	2.54	183	0.53	2.60	4	0.13

NTP	0.24	48	0.14	0.25	0	0
LP	0.12	13	0.04	0.06	1	0.03
ITP	0.28	23	0.07	0.48	0	0
WoP	0.14	5	0.15	0.25	0	0
FSP	0.12	21	0.06	0.04	0	0
LDP	0.00	4	0.01	0	0	0
TCP	0.05	0	0	0.26	0	0
LTP	0.03	0	0	0.01	0	0
NP	0.05	3	0.01	0.03	0	0
DP	0.02	11	0.03	0.2	2	0.06
Inds.	0.17	17	0.05	0.73	9	0.28

Source: Number of 25460 Official Gazette, 2004. May 12

JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, YP: Young Party, NTP: New Turkey Party, LP: Labour Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, WOP: Worker Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LTP: Light Turkey Party, NP: Nation Party, DP: Democrat Party, Inds.: Independents

When the results of the local elections held in 2004 are calculated according to the Duverger's calculation method, JDP, MP, TPP, WP, and DP have over-representation in Municipal Council. JDP has the highest rate of over-representation with a rate of 7.93. It is the first party in terms of both vote rate that it received and the number of representatives. Also, TPP and MP have over-representation with the rates of 4.2 and 0.35, respectively. However, other parties have under-representation. RPP is the party with the highest rate of under-representation rate with 4.23. Total under-representation rate of other parties is 12.03 in Municipal Council elections.

Provincial General Council results show that only JDP has over-representation in 2004 Local Elections. Its over-representation rate is 29.28. However, other parties have under-representation. RPP has 6.01, TPP has 5.11, NAP has 4.9, and FP has 3.43 under-representation rate, and their rate of under-representation is striking. Other parties also have under-representation, but their rate is less than RPP, TPP, NAP and FP.

Table 19: 2004 Local Elections results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Mayoral Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
JDP	40.19	1750	54.81	46.07	12	75
MP	2.96	100	3.13	0.78	0	0
RPP	20.72	467	14.63	24.46	2	12.50
DLP	1.95	30	0.94	2.27	1	6.25
TPP	9.42	388	12.15	5.40	0	0
NAP	10.14	247	7.74	5.11	0	0
SDPP	4.69	64	2.00	7.35	1	6.25
GUP	0.63	10	0.31	0.44	0	0
FP	4.77	63	1.97	4.04	0	0
YP	2.42	13	0.41	3.03	0	0
NTP	0.23	5	0.16	0.10	0	0
LP	0.11	0	0	0.01	0	0
ITP	0.32	1	0.03	0.27	0	0
WOP	0.11	0	0	0.18	0	0
FSP	0.10	2	0.06	0	0	0
LDP	0.00	0	0	0	0	0
TCP	0.10	0	0	0.17	0	0
LTP	0.05	0	0	0.11	0	0
NP	0.05	0	0	0.06	0	0
DP	0.02	1	0.03	0	0	0
Inds.	1.04	52	1.63	0.16	0	0

Source: Number of 25460 Official Gazette, 2004, May 12

JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, YP: Young Party, NTP: New Turkey Party, LP: Labour Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, WOP: Worker Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LTP: Light Turkey Party, NP: Nation Party, DP: Democrat Party, Inds.: Independents

In law no. 5216, which was legislated after the elections, the conditions for a settlement to become metropolitan municipality were indicated as: Being a provincial city centre, containing at least three districts or three first-stage municipalities, having its population censused as more than 750.000 within municipality borders including the settlements at most 10 km distance in the last population census. Under these conditions, it was emphasized in the law that a metropolitan municipality could be constituted through code legislation (Law no. 5216, 2004).

With the Law No. 5216, the term ‘metropolitan sub-province municipality’ was defined. However, it was described as “district municipality that is included within the borders of metropolitan municipality” without taking civilian administration into account. It is noted that based on this description, legal loopholes may arise in the issues such as whether the authority belongs to the civilian administration or to local governments in public services, determination of the boundaries of local electoral district etc. (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 50-52).

This law, considering the circumstances of then, made the constitution of metropolitan municipality harder. Previously, including three municipalities within the borders was sufficient condition. In this law, it was seen that in addition to the necessity of 750.000 population, economic development level, and the physical reality of the settlement were also crucial factors in the constitution of the metropolitan municipality.

Again, with the Law No. 5216, the boundaries of 16 metropolitan municipalities were extended. Accordingly, the municipalities and the villages that are within the borders of the metropolitan municipality and province could join the centre as it was declared by the municipality law decrees. Such demand by relevant district or first-stage municipal council would be taken into account by the metropolitan municipal council (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 54-89). In the case of İstanbul, which had a high level of population density, and İzmit, the extension of the metropolitan municipality was based on the equalizing provincial administrative boundaries as metropolitan municipal boundaries. In other metropolitan boundaries, the extension was grounded on geographical distance together with population growth. With the assumption that is taking governorship building at the centre, which is also included within the provincial administrative boundaries, the formulations of 50 km radius for settlements with 2 million population census or more, 30 km for those between 1 and 2 million, 20 km for those under 1 million are used to determine the borders. With such formulation, the borders are thought and aimed to be more realistic.

Table 20: Metropolitan municipality borders according to Law No. 5216

Provinces	20 km Radius Metropolitan Municipality	30 km Radius Metropolitan Municipality	50 km Radius Metropolitan Municipality	Metropolitan Municipality that Contains All Provincial Boundaries
Adana		X		
Adapazarı	X			
Ankara			X	
Antalya		X		
Bursa	X			
Diyarbakır	X			
Erzurum	X			
Eskişehir	X			
Gaziantep	X			
İstanbul				X
İzmir			X	
Kayseri	X			
Kocaeli				X
Konya	X			
Mersin	X			
Samsun	X			

Source: Tuzcuoğlu, 2007

As it can be seen in the table, the formulations that are used are respectively; in İstanbul and Kocaeli equalizing to the whole provincial area, in Ankara and İzmir 50 km radius, in Adana and Antalya 30 km radius and for the rest ten municipalities to 20 km radius.

In 2005 with the legislation of the law no. 5390, some changes were implemented on the law no. 5216. With the extra regulation that was made with this law, the boundaries that are acquired through the formulation of 20 km, 30 km and 50 km radius in 16 metropolitan municipalities became much more realistic and applicable. Thus, the law enabled the towns and villages, whose district municipalities are within the borders, but they were outside of the metropolitan boundaries, to participate in the metropolitan municipality as well. For the contrary case, it is also possible to put the villages and towns, whose district municipalities are outside of the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality but are themselves

within the borders, to put themselves out of the metropolitan borders with their old status (Özgür, Yavuzçehre, & Ciğeroğlu, 2017:14).

The law no. 5393, which was legislated in 2005, regulated with detail the boundary, role, authority and privileges of the municipalities, and brought new regulations on the sources of municipal revenues, on the town and village relationships and even on citizenship law. Municipality Law no. 5393 was accepted in 3.07.2005 and was published in Official Gazette no. 25814 in 13.07.2005 which means that it was legislated one year after the Municipality Law no. 5216.

In order to prevent misunderstandings, it is necessary to indicate that the municipalities which are not legally considered as the metropolitan municipalities are subject to law no. 5393 and perform their functions accordingly. Metropolitan municipalities and metropolitan sub-province municipalities together with the first-stage municipalities, on the other hand, are both subject to the law no. 5216 and law no. 5393. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the law no. 5393 is special to the municipalities which are not in the category of metropolitan municipalities.

Although the Law No. 5393 brought the necessary population for the establishment of municipality up to 5000, the municipalities whose population census are between 2000-5000 continue their existence. In Law No. 5393 it is indicated that

Municipality can be established in the settlement areas where the population is 5,000 and above. It is mandatory to establish Municipal Corporation in the provinces and districts.

It is not allowed to establish municipality in the drinking and utility water basins and other places under environmental protection and settlement areas at less than 5,000 meters distance from the municipal boundaries.

In order for the villagers to establish municipalities through incorporating various quarters of villages, the inhabited area shall be at most 5,000 meters away from the central administrative unit and the total population should be 5,000 or above.

Where it is decided by the board of aldermen of one or more than one village or an application is made in writing to the territorial government by

at least one half of the electors plus one, or where it is deemed necessary by the governor; upon notification of the governor, the local election committees shall collect the votes of the electors registered in the villages or quarters within fifteen days and report the results to the governor's office with an official report.

The file proceeded shall be sent to the Ministry of Interior together with the remarks of the governor. The municipality shall be established in that place upon receipt of approval of the State Council under a joint decree.

Upon proposal of the Ministry of Interior, a municipal corporation can be established in a new settlement area with a population 5,000 or above, under a joint decree (Article 4).

According to this law, the municipalities whose population declines to lower than 2.000 must be transformed into the village by joint enactment of the ministry of interior's suggestion based on the council of state's opinion (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 117). Besides, for the transformation of the current villages to the municipalities, 2.000 population census is not sufficient, and their population should go up to equal to or higher than 5.000. To put differently, the criteria of not falling under 2.000 population census is applicable for the current municipalities, while the non-municipal settlements need to rise to at least 5.000 population census. These criteria related to the population can also be seen in Law No. 5747.

Law No. 5747 was legalized on 6 March 2008 and put into practice in the aftermath of 29 March 2009 local elections. With this law, significant regulations for the unification of local governments are brought into the main picture. Law mainly terminated the first-stage municipality application in the context of the metropolitan municipality, grounded the metropolitan municipality system on the functioning of only district municipality system, opened the road for the constitution of new districts and foresaw the transformation of municipalities to villages whose population censuses were under 2.000. The aim is to the adaptation of a much plainer structure for metropolitan municipality system. In the course of this goal, some districts were divided, and some small towns were unified, and thus new districts were constituted. Also, many small-town municipalities were closed down and contained under district municipalities. With this law, the first-stage municipality status that functions within metropolitan municipality was

abolished. These municipalities were included in district municipalities, and the number of municipalities was increased.

The Law no. 5747, which was approved in 2008 and put into practice in 2009, is significant for the restructuring of the metropolitan municipal governance in the sense that it included the regulations on the issues such as new district municipalities within metropolitan municipalities and the status of first-stage municipalities. With the enactment of the law the transformation of 862 town municipalities to villages was foreseen, transformations of 240 of 283 first-staged municipalities to the neighbourhood, 34 of them to district municipality and 1 of them to the village were implemented, together with the protection of legal entity of 8 of them with bordering them out of the metropolitan municipality (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 114). In total 43 new districts within 12 provinces were constituted in Turkey; 1 in Ankara, 2 in Adana, Erzurum, Eskişehir and İzmir, 3 in Samsun, 4 in Diyarbakır, Mersin, Sakarya, 5 in Antalya, 6 in Kocaeli and 8 in İstanbul. The table below shows which districts were constituted with the mentioned law.

Table 21: 43 New districts that were constituted in 12 provinces with Law No. 5747

Provinces	New Districts	Provinces	New Districts
Adana	Sarıçam Çukurova	İzmir	Bayraklı Karabağlar
Ankara	Pursaklar	Kocaeli	Başiskele, Çayırova, Darıca, Dilovası, İzmit, Kartepe
Antalya	Aksu, Döşemealtı, Kepez, Konyaaltı, Muratpaşa		
Diyarbakır	Bağlar Kayapınar Sur Yenişehir	Mersin	Akdeniz Mezitli Toroslar Yenişehir
Erzurum	Palandöken Yakutiye	Sakarya	Adapazarı, Arifiye, Erenler, Serdivan
Eskişehir	Odunpazarı Tepebaşı	Samsun	Atakum, Canik, İlkadım

Source: Prepared by author based on Law No. 5747

Besides, there are settlements that are put out of the scope of the metropolitan municipality according to the 2nd article of the law (Law no. 5747 2nd article 7th party).

Table 22: Settlements that were put out of the scope of metropolitan municipality according to the 2nd Article 7th Party of the Law No. 5747

Provinces	Settlements That Were Put Out of the Scope of Metropolitan Municipality
Bursa	Zeytinbağı Municipality Göynükbelen Municipality Karıncalı Municipality
Eskişehir	Sakarılıca Municipality - (By transforming to Village) -
İzmir	Mordoğan Municipality
Samsun	Çınarlık Municipality
Mersin	Gözne Municipality and Soğucak Municipality – (By including into Toroslar District) – Değirmençay Municipality – (By including into Yenişehir District) -

Source: Prepared by author based on Law No. 5747

Township and township governance were abolished as an administrative organization which existed for a long time. The abolished township centres and dependent villages are included within the provinces and districts that are underlined in the law. The way in which the services would be provided within the settlements that were transformed into village and neighbourhood and which institutions would be responsible for providing these services was indicated adding one party to the 11th article of the Municipality law no. 5393 (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009: 122).

After these changes which were implemented in the aftermath of 2004 elections, 2009 local elections arrived. With these changes, the number of municipalities in some provinces changed as well. In some metropolitan municipalities, the number of districts was increased while in others the number decreased, which naturally influenced the number of members in metropolitan municipality council and their space of representation. According to the 24th article of Law No. 2972

Members of metropolitan municipal councils determined in article 6 of this Law, are considered due to the sequence of election of original members for each district and first stage municipality from beginning to the sufficient numbers (Law no. 2972).

According to Law No. 5216, metropolitan municipal councils are composed of members equal to the number that will be calculated by taking one fifth of each district and one-tenth of each first stage municipality of the municipal councils member numbers determined for electoral zones within the borders of the metropolitan municipality (Law no. 5216). The mayors of the municipalities which are within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality are the natural members of the metropolitan municipal council.

Along with these changes, the 2009 local elections were held.

Table 23: 2009 Local Elections results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JDP	38.16	14732	45.48	38.39	1889	57.57
MP	0.63	240	0.74	0.76	4	0.12
RPP	24.84	6125	18.91	23.08	612	18.65
DLP	2.95	774	2.39	2.85	26	0.79
DSP	5.26	1169	3.61	5.70	235	7.16
NAP	16.64	6005	18.54	15.97	414	12.62
GUP	1.58	294	0.91	2.36	18	0.55
FP	5.64	1081	3.34	5.20	29	0.88
NP	0.02	2	0.01	0.10	0	0
LDP	0.01	1	0.00	0.01	0	0
ITP	0.26	45	0.14	0.42	1	0.03
FSP	0.08	35	0.11	0.17	0	0
TCP	0.01	2	0.01	0.21	0	0
LP	0.07	23	0.07	0.12	1	0.03
WoP	0.01	3	0.01	0.29	0	0
DP	3.68	1843	5.69	3.84	45	1.37
RLP	0.01	0	0	0.07	0	0
PDP**	0	0	0	0	0	0
PAP	0.02	4	0.01	0.02	0	0
Inds.	0.14	14	0.04	0.43	7	0.21

Source: YSK; Number of 27225 Official Gazette, 2009, May 11, Mükerrer

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, DSP: Democratic Society Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LP: Labour Party, WoP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PAP: People's Ascent Party, Inds.: Independents

**PDP's vote rate is written as 0 in the table since it received less than 0.01% votes.

Table 24: 2009 Local Elections results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Municipal Mayoral Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
JDP	38.64	1442	49.67	42.19	10	62.50
MP	0.61	16	0.55	0.27	0	0
RPP	24.70	503	17.33	32.43	3	18.75
DLP	2.87	60	2.07	2.10	1	6.25
DSP	5.16	96	3.31	4.29	1	6.25
NAP	16.50	483	16.64	12.37	1	6.25
GUP	1.19	30	0.69	0.64	0	0
FP	5.37	80	2.76	3.79	0	0
NP	0.02	0	0	0.06	0	0
LDP	0.03	0	0	0.05	0	0
ITP	0.31	4	0.14	0.27	0	0
FSP	0.07	4	0.14	0.01	0	0
TCP	0.09	0	0	0.14	0	0
LP	0.05	2	0.07	0	0	0
WoP	0	0	0	0	0	0
DP	3.62	148	5.10	0.99	0	0
RLP	0.02	0	0	0.07	0	0
PDP**	0	0	0	0	0	0
PAP	0.03	0	0	0.04	0	0
Inds.	0.74	45	1.55	0.30	0	0

Source: YSK; Number of 27225 Official Gazette, 2009, May 11, Mükerrer

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, DSP: Democratic Society Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LP: Labour Party, WoP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PAP: People's Ascent Party, Inds.: Independents

**PDP's vote rate is written as 0 in the table since it received less than 0.01% votes.

The results of 2009 Local Elections which are calculated according to Duverger's calculation method are as follows. JDP has the highest over-representation rate with the rate of 7.32 in Municipal Council. MP and NAP are the other parties that have over-representation. TCP, LP, and WP are the parties that have neither over-representation nor under-representation, which means that they have as many representatives as they receive votes. PDP's vote rate is written as 0 in the table

since it received less than 0.01% votes. Other parties have under-representation. RPP and FP are the parties with the highest under-representation rate. Their under-representation rates are 5.93 and 2.3, respectively. Other parties also have underrepresentation, albeit to a lesser extent in Municipal Council.

JDP and DSP have over-representation in Provincial General Council. JDP has 19.18 and DSP has 1.46 over-representation rate. However, other parties have under-representation. The most striking ones are MP which has 4.43 under-representation rate and FP, which has 4.32 under-representation rate.

3.2.6 2012 to present: Emergence of Law No. 6360

Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-laws is the last of the regulations regarding municipalities from past to present (In 2013, Ordu was made a metropolitan with the law numbered 6447). A detailed review of this law helps to understand better the situation in the 2019 local elections, which will be compared in later chapters. With the understanding of the changes brought by the law, the current importance of the metropolitan city councils will be seen.

This law was accepted on November 12, 2012 and published on December 6, 2012. With this law, fourteen provinces became metropolitan municipalities, the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities were extended to the provincial administrative boundaries of the city, and special provincial administrations were abolished in metropolitan municipalities. So, 77% of Turkey population became urban.

These regulations caused essential changes in the administrative structures, organisation, and service provision of metropolitan municipalities. The implementation of this law started with the 2014 local elections.

Table 25: Legal regulations regarding metropolitan municipalities

Acceptance Year	The Law
1984	Law No. 3030 on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities
1993	Statutory Decree-Law No. 504 on Establishment of Metropolitan Municipalities in Seven Cities
2004	Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities
2005	Law No. 5393 on Municipality
2008	Law No. 5747 on Establishing Districts within Boundaries of Metropolitan Municipalities and Amending Various Laws
2012	Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-Laws
2013	*Law No. 6447 on Making Amendments on the Establishment of Thirteen Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-Laws

*With Law No. 6447, 'Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-laws' is changed and named as 'Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Fourteen Metropolitan Municipalities and Twenty-seven Districts and Amendments at Certain Law and Decree Laws'.

Along with "Law No. 6360", 14 metropolitan municipalities and 358 metropolitan district municipalities have been added to the current situation. However, there has been a decrease of 1582 in the number of town municipalities, 1558 in the total number of municipalities, 30 in the number of special provincial administrations and 16563 in the number of village administrations. Together with all, the last situation is demonstrated in the table below.

Table 26: Number of municipalities before and after Law No. 6360

Local Governments	Before Law No. 6360	After Law No. 6360
Metropolitan Municipalities	16	30
Metropolitan District Municipalities	143	501
Provincial Municipalities	65	51
District Municipalities	749	416
Town Municipalities	1977	395
Total Municipalities	2950	1392
Special Provincial Administrations	81	51
Village Administration	34283	17720

Source: Çelikyay, 2014: 16

As seen in the table, the total number of municipalities has decreased to less than half. The major reason is closing the town municipalities in the metropolitan area

with the Law No. 6360. So, the legal entity of the town municipalities of the remaining 51 provinces, whose population remained below 2000, was terminated.

Provincial administrative boundaries which are addressed in Law No. 6360 have been exposed to some changes and took their current forms which are the same with metropolitan boundaries. This situation was started in İstanbul and Kocaeli in 2004, later it was revised in 2008, and finally took its current form with the changes made 2012 and 2013. Current situation of 30 metropolitan municipalities' boundaries is extended and covered all provincial administrative boundaries.




Figure 1: Metropolitan boundaries for before and after Law No. 6360

Source: Çelikyay, 2014: 10-15

As can be seen in the figure, there was a more limited metropolitan municipality boundary before Law No. 6360, and after the Law No. 6360 metropolitan municipality borders expanded and included provincial administrative boundary. Also, all districts became metropolitan districts.

Special provincial administrations in metropolitan municipalities were abolished along with Law No. 6360. Those that remain in 51 provinces continue to have their legal entities.

The duty, authority, and the sources (movable and immovable estates) of provincial special administrations are distributed. In the provinces where the metropolitan municipalities were constituted, the authority of the special provincial administration, which was abolished, was given to the ministries,

dependent and related institutions, field service, governorships, state treasury, metropolitan municipalities and their dependent/related institutions and lastly district municipalities. Moreover, with the law, the council structure of the special provincial administrations was changed as well. Accordingly, “Provincial council consists of the presidency of the governor, general secretary and three members who are elected each year from the provincial assembly and two members who are elected by the governor among unit chiefs”. Thus, the number of the representatives of provincial assembly declined from 5 to 3 for council representatives, and from 5 to 2 for unit chiefs. General secretary became a member of the council, the obligation of the existence of the chief of financial units among unit chief representatives was abolished (İzci, & Turan, 2013: 128).

With Law No. 6360, legal entities of not only the special provincial administrations but also the village municipalities were removed in metropolitan municipalities. In metropolitan cities, villages turned into neighbourhoods. With the relevant law, 16,544 villages’ legal entities are eliminated, and they became neighbourhoods. Different from villages, neighbourhoods neither have legal entity nor decision-making and implementation mechanism. “Village administrations are local government units that have different rights and privileges due to their legal entity, have their assets, and have the right to use forests and pastures” (Güler, 2012a). When the villages turned into neighbourhoods, they lost some rights they had because they were villages.

Also, along with the villages turned into neighbourhoods, many villages suddenly became urban. As a result, a large part of the population started to be described as urban population.

In the provinces, which have been transformed into a metropolitan municipality model at the provincial boundary, local administrations have started to be executed from a single source. Village administrations and special provincial administrations were abolished with the new regulation. As a result, metropolitan municipalities became the only local government unit in 30 cities (Bingöl et al., 2013: 48).

One of the things that Law No. 6360 brought is Investment Monitoring and Coordination Department (in Turkish: Yatırım İzleme ve Koordinasyon Başkanlığı, YİKKB). The purpose of the newly constituted department is to ensure effectively realizing investments and services of public agency and institutes in the metropolitan cities, following these activities, and ensuring coordination (Karasu, 2014: 185).

With the Law No. 6360, the metropolitan municipalities were given authority to implement the upper-scale plan from one hand, and in a sense brought an integrative planning approach in contrast to the “compass law”. Within the provincial administrative boundaries, the most comprehensive authority in the sense of service and planning was left to the metropolitan municipalities as one administration. The main point in the sense of planning principles is that, like other local services, the lower scale regulations such as implementary development plan or subdivision are prepared by the units which are closes to the people. However, with Law No. 6360 in the level of provinces, only district municipalities are left, and the authority of planning is left to the metropolitan municipalities even in the smallest areas.

In this law, there two main factors that influenced elections in metropolitan municipalities. First is the abolishment of the provincial assembly, second is the extension of metropolitan municipality boundaries to the provincial administration boundaries. The abolishment of the provincial assembly means that the only council that would be responsible for the whole province is the metropolitan municipality council. The extension of the boundaries from central districts to the provincial administration boundaries changed the formation of metropolitan municipality councils. Previously, the metropolitan municipality councils used to consist of the representatives of central district municipalities; in the new political order, all district municipalities send their representatives to the council. That means the right to speak is given to the settlements which have a certain distance to the city centre. Since the metropolitan municipal councils are determined through indirect representation system, the more district that sends representatives

to the council means more number of members of a metropolitan municipal council.

The most crucial political effect of the Law No. 6360 on the metropolitan municipalities is the unfair representation on the formation of metropolitan municipalities. In the new model, provincial assemblies are abolished. Metropolitan municipal councils consist of district mayors and 1/5 rate of representation of the number of members in district municipalities. In the sense of this reformulation, negative outcomes such as regional differentiation in the council, the tendency of representatives, who come from districts, to act primarily on the benefit of their district rather than whole city are possible (Yıldırım, Gül, & Akın, 2015).

Table 27: Total number of members who goes to the metropolitan municipality and representation rate

District Municipality Population Zones	District Municipality Council Member	1/5 of the Number of Members of the Council	Total Number of Members Who Goes to the Metropolitan Municipality (Mayor + Council Member)	Representation Rate (Representative / Population)
0-10.000	9	1	2	1/5000
10.001-20.000	11	2	3	1/6666
20.001-50.000	15	3	4	1/12.500
50.001-100.000	25	5	6	1/16.666
100.001-250.000	31	6	7	1/35.714
250.001-500.000	37	7	8	1/62.500
500.001-1.000.000	45	9	10	1/100.000

Source: Arıkboğa, 2014

As can be seen in the table above, in the current model, the representation rate of districts with lower population census is higher than those with more population census in the metropolitan municipal council. For instance, a district whose population census is up to 10.000 is represented by two members whereas eight

members represent a district whose population census is between 250.001 and 500.000. In this example, while the second district is 25 times larger than the former, its representation is four times higher, which shows that the representation rate of lower populated districts is higher than the others. This unfair representation rate makes the districts with lower population census in a higher position in the metropolitan municipal council, compared with the central districts whose population census is much higher. This situation negatively affects the fairness of representation in the geographical context. However, not only in the sense of geography but also in a political context, it harms fairness of representation. According to Arikboğa (2014: 42), the fact that representation rate of districts with lower population census is higher in the metropolitan municipal councils does not refer only to geographically unjust representation but also the corruptive effects of the representation fairness in a political context. What is meant is that the representatives who are sent from the settlements with less population census and who also gain more representation rate in comparison with more populated district representatives, gain their right to represent with much fewer votes. At the same time, since the quota membership and mayor go to the metropolitan municipal council, if the first ranked party which won the mayoralty and municipal council is the same in the districts whose population census is up to 20.000 –which is generally the case in Turkey- these municipalities send the people from the same party as the members of the municipal council to the metropolitan municipal council. This situation results in the one-party representation in some metropolitan municipal councils. Also, it influences the political representation rate in the metropolitan municipal council.

Another troubled point in the context of the fairness of representation is that independent of the Law No. 6360, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system which continues for many years. This system does not only limit the representation of the parties under %10 threshold but also deducts %10 of other parties votes and result in changes within the calculation. Arikboğa (2014: 41) explains this situation as:

Because the subtractive calculation method in the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system changes the vote rates of the parties. In d'Hondt method, it results in changes in electing to order of the candidates of districts municipality council. This point also influences the situation of a member of district municipal council to be (or not to be) sent to the metropolitan municipal council, since one of the factors in the determination of the members of the metropolitan municipal council is the electing order for membership of district municipal council (2972/24). The members other than mayor and quota member, gain or do not gain the right to be a member of the metropolitan municipal council according to the order that is determined according to the d'Hondt method. In summary, subtractive one-tenth threshold method is one of another factor that results in the differentiation among vote distribution and member distribution in the metropolitan municipal councils (2014: 41).

The first local elections after the Law No. 6360 are the 2014 local elections. Election results are shown in the table below.

Table 28: 2014 Local Elections results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JDP	42.87	10530	51.37	45.43	779	62.27
RPP	26.34	4131	20.30	16.87	159	12.71
DLP	0.35	66	0.32	0.35	0	0
NAP	17.82	3501	17.08	20.71	174	13.91
GUP	1.51	165	0.80	2.28	4	0.32
FP	2.84	411	2.00	3.31	5	0.40
NP	0.04	6	0.03	0.04	0	0
LDP	0.02	12	0.06	0.10	0	0
ITP	0.20	8	0.04	0.35	0	0
TCP	0.15	6	0.03	0.08	1	0.08
WOP	0.24	4	0.02	0.23	0	0
DP	0.69	164	0.80	1.03	0	0
RLP	0.08	6	0.03	0.11	0	0
PDP	4.16	1432	6.99	7.73	128	10.23
PsDP	2.12	9	0.04	0.38	1	0.08
TPP	0.03	0	0	0.04	0	0
REP	0.08	0	0	0.03	0	0
FCP	0.21	6	0.03	0.37	0	0
SRRDP	0	0	0	0	0	0
CP	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
PLP	0	0	0	0	0	0

LP	0	2	0.1	0	0	0
FSP	0.11	4	0.02	0.17	0	0
Inds.	0.12	5	0.02	0.40	0	0

Source: Number of 28992 Official Gazette, 2014, May 6; Mükerrer of Number of 29000 Official Gazette, 2014, 14th May, YSK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, WOP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, TPP: True Path Party, REP: Rights and Equality Party, FCP: Free Cause Party, SRRDP: Social Reconciliation, Reform and Development Party, CP: Country Party, PLP: People's Liberation Party, LP: Labour Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, Inds.: Independents

Some vote rates are written as 0 in the table since they received less than 0.01% votes.

23 political parties and individuals participated in the 2014 Local Elections. As a result of examining the distribution of the Provincial General Council according to the Duverger's calculation method, the following data were obtained. JDP has 16.84 over-representation rate, and PDP has 2.5 over-representation rate in 2014 Local Elections. TCP has neither over-representation nor under-representation, which means that it has as many representatives as they receive votes. Other parties have under-representation. NAP is the party that has the highest rate of under-representation with the rate of 6.80. Second highest rate of under-representation is 4.16 taken by RPP. SRRDP, CP, PLP, and LP received very few votes.

In Municipal Council, JDP and PDP have over-representation with the rate of 8.5 and 2.83, respectively. Also, DP and LP have over-representation. Over-representation rate of DP is 0.11, and over-representation rate of LP is 0.1. Rest of the parties have under-representation. RPP has the highest rate of under-representation in Municipal Council with the rate of 6.04. SRRDP, PLP, and LP received very few votes.

JDP and PDP have over-representation in the elections of Municipal Council and Provincial General Council. DP and LP have over-representation in the election of Municipal Council, and other parties have under-representation in the both elections.

Table 29: 2014 Local Elections results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Municipal Mayoral Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors (%)
JDP	43.13	800	59.22	45.54	18	60.00
RPP	26.45	226	16.73	31.04	6	20.00
DLP	0.39	5	0.37	0.14	0	0
NAP	17.76	166	12.29	13.65	3	10.00
GUP	1.42	6	0.44	0.71	0	0
FP	2.84	27	2.00	1.66	0	0
NP	0.04	1	0.07	0.06	0	0
LDP	0.04	1	0.07	0.02	0	0
ITP	0.23	0	0	0.18	0	0
TCP	0.02	1	0.07	0.03	0	0
WOP	0.15	0	0	0.12	0	0
DP	0.75	14	1.04	0.21	0	0
RLP	0.02	1	0.07	0.09	0	0
PDP	4.18	97	7.18	3.09	2	6.67
PsDP	2.01	0	0	2.34	0	0
TPP	0.03	0	0	0.09	0	0
REP	0.04	0	0	0.12	0	0
FCP	0.20	0	0	0.15	0	0
SRRDP	0.01	0	0	0.02	0	0
CP	0.02	0	0	0.08	0	0
PLP	0	0	0	0.08	0	0
LP	0	0	0	0	0	0
FSP	0.01	1	0.07	0	0	0
Inds.	0.25	5	0.37	0.59	1	3.33

Source: YSK; Number of 28992 Official Gazette, 2014, May 6; Mükerrer of Number of 29000 Official Gazette, 2014, May 14

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, WOP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, TPP: True Path Party, REP: Rights and Equality Party, FCP: Free Cause Party, SRRDP: Social Reconciliation, Reform and Development Party, CP: Country Party, PLP: People's Liberation Party, LP: Labour Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, Inds.: Independents

Some vote rates are written as 0 in the table since they received less than 0.01% votes.

Law No. 7102 come into force in 2018. With this Law, parties were allowed to form alliances in general elections. This alliance model does not have a legal

infrastructure in local governments. But even if the parties did not ally on the legal basis, they declared that they supported each other municipal by municipal and some parties did not nominate in some municipalities.

There have been no changes (except Law No. 7102) affecting local elections which were held in 2019. The results in these elections are formed as follows.

Table 30: 2019 Local Elections results for municipal and provincial general council

Party*	Municipal Council			Provincial General Council		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
JDP	42.56	10173	49.04	41.61	757	59.51
RPP	29.36	4613	22.24	17.46	184	14.47
DLP	0.88	98	0.47	0.20	0	0
NAP	7.46	2819	13.59	18.82	188	14.78
GP	7.31	1092	5.26	8.12	23	1.81
GUP	1.90	2	0.01	1.82	6	0.47
FP	3.00	295	1.42	2.47	3	0.24
ITP	0.27	0	0	0.26	0	0
TCP	0.29	11	0.05	0.09	3	0.24
DP	0.88	135	0.65	0.65	1	0.08
PsDP	5.60	1230	5.93	7.93	101	7.94
PatP	0.19	2	0.01	0.14	0	0
Inds.	0.28	8	0.04	0.44	6	0.47
PsA	51.92	12994	62.64	62.25	951	74.76
NA	40.55	6135	29.57	28.7	211	16.6

Source: YSK, TÜİK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GP: Good Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, DP: Democrat Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, PatP: Patriotic Party, Inds.: Independents PsA: People's Alliance consist of JDP, NAP and GUP, NA: Nation Alliance consist of RPP, GP, FP and DP

When the alliances are ignored, the results of 2019 Local Elections which are calculated according to Duverger's calculation method are as follows. JDP, NAP, and PsDP have over-representation in Municipal Council. JDP has 6.48, NAP has 6.13, and PsDP has 0.33 over-representation rate. Other parties have under-representation. RPP has the highest under-representation rate in Municipal Council with the rate of 7.1. However, when the alliances are considered, the results are striking. PsA has 10.72 over-representation rate in Municipal Council, but NA has 10.98 under-representation rate.

Table 31: 2019 Local Elections results for mayoral and metropolitan municipal mayoral election

Party*	Municipal Mayoral Election			Metropolitan Municipal Mayoral Election		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Municipal Mayors	Rate of Municipal Mayors (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors	Rate of Metropolitan Municipal Mayors
JDP	42.55	742	54.76	44.06	15	51.72
RPP	29.81	240	17.71	29.14	10	34.48
DLP	0.97	6	0.44	1.47	0	0
NAP	7.44	233	17.20	5.18	1	3.45
GP	7.76	24	1.77	9.52	0	0
GUP	1.59	10	0.74	0	0	0
FP	2.91	21	1.55	3.27	0	0
ITP	0.32	0	0	0.41	0	0
TCP	0.11	1	0.07	0.20	0	0
DP	0.96	8	0.59	0.89	0	0
PsDP	4.52	57	4.21	4.15	3	10.34
PatP	0.16	0	0	0.28	0	0
Inds.	0.89	13	0.96	1.43	0	0
PsA	51.58	985	72.7	49.24	16	55.17
NA	41.44	293	21.62	42.82	10	34.48

Source: YSK, TÜİK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GP: Good Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, DP: Democrat Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, PatP: Patriotic Party, Inds.: Independents PsA: People's Alliance consist of JDP, NAP and GUP, NA: Nation Alliance consist of RPP, GP, FP and DP

JDP, TCP, and PsDP have over-representation in the Provincial General Council when the alliances are ignored. JDP has the highest rate of over-representation with the rate of 17.9. However, the rests of the parties have under-representation. GP has 6.31 and NAP has 4.04 under-representation rate, and they are two parties with the highest rate of under-representation. When alliances are considered, PsA has 12.51 over-representation rate, and NA has 12.1 under-representation rate.

3.2.7 Summary and Conclusion

According to the results of the local elections in Turkey throughout its history, disproportionality can be observed both in the municipal council elections and provincial general council elections. This disproportionality creates situations in which the party with the highest votes in the country in some elections does not have the most representatives. Moreover, some parties have more representative

rates than vote rates and some parties less. This is because of the over/under-representation.

In the municipal council elections, the highest rate of over-representation is 16.84 in 2014 local elections. In under-representation rates, the highest rate is in the 2019 local election with alliance. In the provincial council elections, the highest over-representation rate was in the 2004 local elections. The highest under-representation rates are seen in the 2019 local election with alliance.

Based on the data, it can be said that the disproportion has increased in the last elections. The election threshold application is one of the reasons for these increases. There are also many laws that affect municipal councils. Quota membership and natural members of the councils (mayors) appear as the most important factors. The next section focuses on the case of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council and examines political fair representation issue throughout 1963-2019 local elections.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF ANKARA MUNICIPAL / METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS BETWEEN 1963-2019 WITH REGARD TO POLITICAL FAIR REPRESENTATION

In the previous section, major turning points about local governments and local elections, as well as their effects were reviewed. In this chapter, local election results of Ankara will be examined in detail in order to assess the degree of political fair representation. From the 1984 local elections to the 2019 local elections, the metropolitan mayor election and the metropolitan city council election results will be investigated. From 1963 local elections until 1984, when Ankara was not declared to be a metropolitan municipality, the results of the election for Mayor of Ankara Municipality, Ankara Provincial General Council, and Ankara Municipality Council will also be included in the analyses for comparison. The provincial general council structure, which is not found in metropolitan municipalities according to the current law (Law No. 6360), has not been examined for periods after 1984 when Ankara became the metropolitan municipality.

Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index were used to analyse political fair representation. Calculations were made without taking into account the Metropolitan Mayors.

While analysing the elections of Ankara, Duverger's calculation method for the calculations of the provincial council; furthermore, Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index were used for Ankara Municipality Council and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality calculations.

4.1 Analyses of Local Elections in Ankara Regarding Political Fair Representation

In this section, Ankara's local election results and representative numbers are examined. Although Ankara gained metropolitan status in 1984, the local elections held prior to this status are also included in the analyses for comparison purposes.

From the 1963 Local Elections to the 1984 Local Elections, the Ankara Municipality Mayoral elections, Ankara Provincial General Council elections and Ankara Municipal Council elections are examined. These reviews are based on vote rates, the number of elected representatives and rates of representatives in councils. In addition, over/under-representation rates are calculated according to the Duverger's calculation method. When examining provincial general councils, only the Duverger's calculation method is used. In the city council reviews, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index are used in addition to the Duverger's calculation method. With these methods, the values of each election are presented for comparison. In addition, comparisons between provincial general councils and municipal councils are made during these years.

In the period of 1984 Local Elections and after, Ankara Municipality became Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. In this period, the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral elections and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council elections are discussed. According to Law No. 6360, there is no provincial council review in the periods after Ankara has received metropolitan status since there are no special provincial administrations in metropolitan municipalities. As there is no provincial general council, which is one of the organs of the special provincial administration in Ankara, there is no data that can be compared as of 2014. Therefore, there is no examination of the periods after Ankara became a metropolitan municipality.

In 1963, elections for both Ankara Mayoral Election and Membership of Municipal Council cover Central District (Province Centre), Altındağ, Çankaya, and Yenimahalle districts. Administrative boundaries of Ankara Municipality was

constituted of the area that is included in Ankara Municipality boundary inside of Central District that involves Ulus, Altındağ, Çankaya, and Yenimahalle (Figure 2) in 1960 (Özçağlar, 2014: 179-180). The election result of the Provincial General Council, on the other hand, covers all of Ankara.




Figure 2: Administrative division of Ankara in 1960

Source: Özçağlar, 2014: 180

According to the calculations made in the light of these data, the total number of general council members in Ankara is 83. In this calculation, all districts are calculated separately. In addition, according to the information received from the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, the number of municipal council members is 57, and it is 58 together with the mayor.

Depend on Ankara election results and the information explained in Table 32 which demonstrates the Ankara local elections and the distribution of votes in 1963 is created.

Table 32: 1963 Local Elections in Ankara

Party*	Mayor of Ankara Municipality	Provincial General Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes
	Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method
JP	36.26	34.81	29	42.03	7.22
RPP	40.14	36.11	28	40.58	4.47
RPNP	3.67	6.47	2	2.9	-3.57
NP	13.65	11.06	5	7.25	-3.81
TLP	2.97	2.09	0	0	-2.09
NTP	2.39	8.27	4	5.8	-2.47
Inds	0.92	1.19	1	1.45	0.26
Total			66		

Source: 306 sayılı İdareî Umumiyeî Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; Mahalli Seçimler Sonuçları; DİE, 1965; Documents taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2020

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents

Table 33: 1963 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JP	37.44	22	38.6	1.16	1.16	1.35
RPP	40.27	24	42.11	1.84	1.84	3.39
RPNP	4.03	2	3.51	-0.52	0.52	0.27
NP	12.84	7	12.28	-0.56	0.56	0.31
TLP	2.63	1	1.75	-0.88	0.88	0.77
NTP	2.71	1	1.75	-0.96	0.96	0.92
Inds	0.09	0	0	-0.09	0.09	0.01
Total		57			6.01	7.02
Value of Index					3.005	1.87

Source: 306 sayılı İdareî Umumiyeî Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; Mahalli Seçimler Sonuçları; DİE, 1965; Documents taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2020

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents

Calculation of votes of Ankara Provincial General Council is the result of the sum of the election results of all districts. The members are formed by calculating the number of members won in each district, as seen in Annex 1. For also that

election, JP and RPP have over-representation. Indeed, JP has 7.22 over-representation rate, and it sent more members despite having fewer votes than RPP. Other parties have around 2 and 3 under-representation rate in Ankara Provincial General Council, in 1963.




Figure 3: Over/under-representation rate in 1963 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

RPP ranks first in Ankara Mayoral Elections with respect to election results in 1963. Also, RPP has got the most votes in Membership of Municipal Council and became the winning party with a little gap. In terms of political fair representation, JP and RPP have over-representation while others have under-representation in Membership of Municipal Council. Over/under-representation rates are very low, so it can be said that the political fair representation is provided with a very high level.

In 1963, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 3.005 and value of the Gallagher Index is 1.87 in Ankara Municipal Council Election.

The local elections after these elections are held four years later, in 1967 according to the laws numbered 306 and 307.

Ankara results and evaluations are made with the results obtained according to Ankara's population information. According to the population information of 1965, the total population of Ankara municipalities is 902,216 (DİE, 1966: 28). Also, according to the information provided by the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, there are 68 members except for Mayor Ekrem Barlas. In order to determine the number of provincial council members, 1965 population data are used (DİE, 1969a: 8). The borders which are valid in the 1963 local elections and the districts which are counted in the vote calculations are the same. Together with all this information, the tables below are made.

Table 34: 1968 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Mayor of Ankara Municipality	Provincial General Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes
	Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method
JP	39.88	48.3	51	61.45	13.15
RPP	38.78	29.6	24	28.92	-0.68
RP	2.79	4.5	0	0	-4.5
RPNP	1.63	1.7	1	1.2	-0.5
NP	5.16	7.5	3	3.61	-3.89
UP	7.4	3.2	2	2.41	-0.79
TLP	3.03	3.5	1	1.2	-2.3
NTP	0.55	0.1	0	0	-0.1
Inds	0.78	1.6	1	1.2	-0.4
Total			83		

Source: 306 sayılı İdareî Umumiyeî Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; DİE, 1969a; DİE, 1969b; DİE, 1965: 28; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RP: Reliance Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, UP: Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents

In Ankara Provincial General Council, over-representation rate of JP which is 13.15 is noticeable. So, other parties have under-representation. For instance, although the vote rate of RP is 4.5%, it could not be able to send any representative because it could not get a representative by getting enough votes in any district. Moreover, NP has 3.89 under-representation rate in 1968 Provincial General Council Election. According to calculations depend on related law; the

number of provincial council members is 83. The calculations are presented in Annex 2 with distributions for each district.

Table 35: 1968 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JP	39.78	28	41.18	1.4	1.4	1.96
RPP	38.49	27	39.71	1.22	1.22	1.49
RP	2.59	1	1.47	-1.12	1.12	1.25
RPNP	1.68	1	1.47	-0.21	0.21	0.04
NP	5.96	4	5.88	-0.08	0.08	0.01
UP	7.2	5	7.35	0.15	0.15	0.02
TLP	3.54	2	2.94	-0.60	0.60	0.36
NTP	0.47	0	0	-0.47	0.47	0.22
Inds	0.28	0	0	-0.28	0.28	0.08
Total		68			5.53	5.44
Value of Index					2.765	1.65

Source: 306 sayılı İdarei Umumiyei Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; DİE, 1969a; DİE, 1969b; DİE, 1965: 28; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RP: Reliance Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, UP: Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents




Figure 4: Over/under-representation rate in 1968 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

JP won Ankara Mayoral Elections in 1968 elections. Also, JP and RPP, which are the parties with most of the votes in Membership of Municipal Council Elections, made up the majority in the Ankara Council. JP, RPP and UP are parties which have over-representation. Other parties have under-representation. Their over/under-representation rates are around 1.

In 1968, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 2.765 and value of the Gallagher Index is 1.65 in Ankara Municipal Council Election.

According to the information received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, the Ankara Municipal Council consisted of 81 members except for the mayor. As in previous elections, the same processes are valid for Ankara in these elections. The tables below are prepared depend on 1973 local election results.

Table 36: 1973 Local Elections in Ankara

Party*	Mayor of Ankara Municipality	Provincial General Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes
	Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method
JP	24.39	30.8	35	36.08	5.28
RPP	65.52	47.9	54	55.67	7.77
RRP	0	1.3	0	0	-1.3
DP	0	8.6	5	5.15	-3.45
NP	0	1	0	0	-1
NAP	0	2.1	0	0	-2.1
NSP	4.23	5.1	2	2.06	-3.04
TUP	0	1.3	0	0	-1.3
Inds	5.86	1.8	1	1.03	-0.77
Total			97		0

Source: 306 sayılı İdareî Umumiyeî Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; DİE, 1972; DİE, 1973; DİE, 1974; Documents that are received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, Inds: Independents

As a result of the calculations of the 1973 local elections according to the Duverger calculation method, the following findings emerged. In the Provincial General Council, there is much more over/under- representations in the same year compared to the municipal council. For example, JP and RPP are parties with over-representation at the rate of 5.28 and 7.77 in turn. Other parties have under-representation, and DP has 3.45 under-representation rate which is the highest one.

Table 37: 1973 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JP	21.80	18*1-2	22.22	0.42	0.42	0.18
		19*3-4-5	23.46	1.66	1.66	2.76
RPP	60.08	51*1	62.96	2.88	2.88	8.29
		52*2-3-4	64.20	4.12	4.12	16.97
		53*5	65.43	5.35	5.35	28.62
RRP	1.59	1	1.23	-0.36	0.36	0.13
DP	2.66	2	2.47	-0.19	0.19	0.04
NP	0.58	0	0.00	-0.58	0.58	0.34
NAP	1.60	1	1.23	-0.37	0.37	0.14
NSP	3.92	3	3.70	-0.22	0.22	0.05
TUP	2.28	1*1-2-3	1.23	-1.05	1.05	1.10
		2*4-5	2.47	0.19	0.19	0.04
Inds.	5.49	4*1	4.94	-0.55	0.55	0.30
		3*2	3.70	-1.79	1.79	3.20
		2*3	2.47	-3.02	3.02	9.12
		1*4	1.23	-4.26	4.26	18.15
		0*5	0.00	-5.49	5.49	30.14
Total*1		81			6.62	10.56
Value of Index*1					3.31	2.30
Total*2		81			9.1	22.14
Value of Index*2					4.55	3.33
Total*3		81			11.57	30.64
Value of Index*3					5.785	3.91
Total*4		81			11.95	38.60
Value of Index*4					5.975	4.39
Total*5		81			14.41	62.24
Value of Index*5					7.205	5.58

Source: 306 sayılı İdarei Umumiyei Vilâyat Kanununda deęişiklikler yapılmasına ve ilgili bazı kanunların kaldırılmasına dair Kanun; 307 sayılı Belediye Kanunu'nda deęişiklik yapılmasına dair Kanun; 1580 sayılı Belediye Kanunu; DİE, 1972; DİE, 1973; DİE, 1974; Documents that are received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*There is no information about the number of independent candidates and how many entered the council while calculating vote distribution with respect to d'Hondt method. For this reason, all scenarios have been considered, and the table has been prepared to cover all scenarios. The maximum number of electable independent candidates is 4. (*¹) is the situation when the number of elected independent candidates is 4, (*²) is the situation when it is 3, (*³) is the situation when it is 2, (*⁴) is the situation when it is 1, and (*⁵) is the situation when there is no elected independent candidate. All of these situations are going to be considered and explained accordingly.

**JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, Inds: Independents

In Municipal Council Elections, JP and RPP have over-representation for every situation, and TUP has over-representation for *⁴ and *⁵ situations. Other parties have under-representation. If TUP gave 1 representative, it has 1.05 under-representative rate, which is the highest rate. Obviously, there are many over/under- representations in these elections in terms of political fair representation. As can be seen from the examples, over/under-representation rates are higher in Provincial General Council, and Municipal Council is fairer than Provincial General Council in terms of the political fair representation.




Figure 5: Over/under-representation rate in 1973 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 1973, value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 3.31 in *¹, 4.55 in *², 5.785 in *³, 5.975 in *⁴, and 7.205 in *⁵ and value of Gallagher Index is 2.30 in *¹, 3.33 in *², 3.91 in *³, 4.39 in *⁴, and 5.58 in *⁵ 7 in Ankara Municipal Council Election.

While calculating the elections of Ankara, 1975 census data and 1977 election results are used. Documents that are received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality are also considered during calculations. Depend on all information, the number of Ankara Municipal Council members is 103, with the exception of

Ali Dinçer elected from the mayor RPP, the number of Ankara Provincial General Council members is 119. Ali Dinçer, who was a candidate of RPP, won the mayor in these elections. Since Ankara administrative area covers the same area as previous years, in these elections, the Central District (Province Centre), Altındağ, Çankaya and Yenimahalle districts choose Ankara Municipal Council and Ankara Mayor. The 1977 local elections were held under the same laws as the 1973 local elections. The tables below are prepared depending on the 1977 local election results.

Table 38:1977 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Mayor of Ankara Municipality	Provincial General Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes
	Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method
JP	21.5	28.7	38	31.93	3.23
RPP	58.1	49.5	69	57.98	8.48
RRP	0.9	0.7	0	0	-0.7
DP	0.7	1.1	0	0	-1.1
NSP	4.5	5.4	3	2.52	-2.88
NAP	11.2	10.9	9	7.56	-3.34
SRP	0.2	0	0	0	0
TUP	0.8	0.8	0	0	-0.8
TLP	1.3	1.3	0	0	-1.3
TSLP	0.4	0.4	0	0	-0.4
Inds.	0.1	1.2	0	0	1.2
Total			119		

Source: DiE, 1979; DiE, 1977; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, SRP: Socialist Reform Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, TSLP: Turkish Socialist Labour Party, Inds: Independents

According to the Duverger Calculation Method, the situation of the 1977 local elections in Ankara is examined, and the results are as follows. JP and RPP, have over-representation in Provincial General Council Election. Their rates of over-representation are 3.23 and 8.48, respectively. On the other hand, other parties have under-representation. The most striking party is NAP which has 3.34 under-representation rate. According to this calculation, it is seen that the political fair representation is less in the Provincial General Council.

Table 39: 1977 Local Elections in Ankara

Party	Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JP	21.3	23	22.33	1.03	1.03	1.06
RPP	59.5	64	62.14	2.64	2.64	6.97
RRP	0.8	0	0	-0.8	0.8	0.64
DP	0.8	0	0	-0.8	0.8	0.64
NSP	4.5	4	3.88	-0.62	0.62	0.38
NAP	10.2	10	9.71	-0.49	0.49	0.24
SRP	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
TUP	1.3	1	0.97	-0.33	0.33	0.11
TLP	1.4	1	0.97	-0.43	0.43	0.18
TSLP	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Inds.	0.2	0	0	-0.2	0.2	0.04
Total		103		0	7.34	10.27
Value of Index					3.67	2.27

Source: DİE, 1979; DİE, 1977; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, DP: Democrat Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, SRP: Socialist Reform Party, TUP: Turkish Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, TSLP: Turkish Socialist Labour Party, Inds: Independents




Figure 6: Over/under-representation rate in 1977 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

JP and RPP have over-representation with 1.03 and 2.64 rate respectively in Municipal Council. However, other parties have under-representation, and the highest rate in under-representation belong to RPP and DP with 0.8 rate.

In 1977, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 3.57 and value of the Gallagher Index is 2.26 in Ankara Municipal Council Election.

For the first time in Ankara, the Metropolitan Municipality Election was held in 1984. With the Law No. 2963 dated 30 November 1983, Province Centre (Central District) was connected to Altındağ district. In addition, Mamak and Gölbaşı districts are divided from Çankaya. Sincan district has become a new district by dividing it from Yenimahalle. The district of Keçiören is formed by dividing Altındağ district. In these elections, the districts covered by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality were Altındağ, Çankaya, Keçiören, Mamak and Yenimahalle (Özçağlar, 2014: 181). After the Ankara Municipality gained metropolitan status, analysis for Provincial General Council is not going to be conducted in this study.

In this new system, Altındağ, Keçiören, Mamak and Yenimahalle districts will each send seven representatives, and Çankaya district will send nine representatives to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council. In the information received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, it is seen that there are 37 councillors except for Mehmet Altınsoy, the mayor.

As a result of this election, only two parties took part in the Metropolitan Municipality Council. The biggest reason for this situation is the new threshold system that started to be used. MP is the only party that have over-representation with the rate of 19.40 according to Duverger's calculation method. Other parties have under-representation. Also, four parties are not represented in the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality.

In 1984, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 19,415 and value of the Gallagher Index is 15,12 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

Table 40: 1984 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes			
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
MP		53.2	52.02	30	71.42	19.4	19.4	376.36
TPP		4.1	4.52	0	0	-4.52	4.52	20.43
PP		4.4	4.62	0	0	-4.62	4.62	21.34
NDP		2.5	2.50	0	0	-2.50	2.50	6.25
WP		2.7	2.69	0	0	-2.69	2.69	7.24
SDP		33.0	33.63	12	28.57	-5.06	5.06	25.60
Inds.		0.1	0.04	0	0	-0.04	0.04	0.00
Total				42		0	38.83	457.23
Value of Index							19.415	15.12

Source: DİE, 1983; DİE, 1984; DİE, 1988; 2972 sayılı Mahalli İdareler ile Mahalle Muhtarlıkları ve İhtiyar Heyetleri Seçimi Hakkında Kanun, 3030 sayılı Büyükşehir Belediye Kanunu; 195 sayılı KHK; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*MP: Motherland Party, TPP: True Path Party, PP: Populist Party, NDP: Nationalist Democracy Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDP: Social Democracy Party, Inds.: Independents




Figure 7: Over/under-representation rate in 1984 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 1989 local election, according to YSK Adjudgment No.312 dated January 16, 1989, Altındağ, Çankaya, Keçiören, Mamak, Yenimahalle, and Sincan are the districts that are located within the borders of Ankara Metropolitan. In the additional adjudgment, Pursaklar Municipality was also decided to participate in the metropolitan elections. With the new regulations and the 1989 elections, Ankara was shaped as follows.

Table 41: 1989 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes			
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
MP		20.20	19.84	7	14.00	-5.84	5.84	34.11
DLP		5.00	5.32	0	0.00	-5.32	5.32	28.30
TPP		20.40	21.07	7	14.00	-7.07	7.07	49.98
RDP		0.50	0.54	0	0.00	-0.54	0.54	0.29
NWP		3.90	4.52	1	2.00	-2.52	2.52	6.35
WP		5.90	5.97	0	0.00	-5.97	5.97	35.64
SDPP		44.10	42.73	35	70.00	27.27	27.27	743.65
Inds.		0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0	0	0.00
Total				50			54.53	898.33
Value of Index							27.265	21.19

Source: Supreme Electoral Council's Adjudgement No.312 dated January 16, 1989; DİE, 1988; DİE, 1989; 2972 sayılı Mahalli İdareler ile Mahalle Muhtarlıkları ve İhtiyar Heyetleri Seçimi Hakkında Kanun; 3030 sayılı Büyükşehir Belediye Kanunu; 195 sayılı KHK; Documents that are taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*MP: Motherland Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, RDP: Reformist Democracy Party, NWP: Nationalist Work Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, Inds.: Independents

The election of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council is analysed according to the Duverger's calculation method, and the results are as follows. All parties have under-representation except SDPP. SDPP has a major over-representation with 27.27 rate. However, MP, DLP, TPP, and WP are the most remarkable parties which have under-representation with 5.84, 5.32, 7.07, and 5.97 rates, respectively.

NWP is the only party that has representative, although it has fewer votes than 10%. In the following years, Etimesgut and Gölbaşı were also included in the boundaries of the Metropolitan Municipality.




Figure 8: Over/under-representation rate in 1989 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 1989, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 27.265 and value of the Gallagher Index is 21.19 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

In 1994 local elections, Gölbaşı and Etimesgut are also added the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. Etimesgut was declared as a district with the Law No. 3644 on May 20, 1990 and joined the administrative boundary of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. Gölbaşı, which was a district in 1983, joined the administrative boundary of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 1991 (Özçağlar, 2014: 183). Thus, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has eight district municipalities. Pursaklar Municipality also participated in the elections of the Metropolitan Mayor according to the decision of the Supreme Election Board No. 171 (4 January 1994, Official Gazette No. 21808). In this case, the voting situation and the distributions are as follows.

Table 42: 1994 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index
MP	18.7	19.76	8	13.33	-6.43	6.43	41.34
GUP	0.6	1.21	0	0	-1.21	1.21	1.46
RPP	2.1	2.99	0	0	-2.99	2.99	8.94
DP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
DLP	7.8	8.88	0	0	-8.88	8.88	78.85
TPP	8.3	9.2	1	1.67	-7.53	7.53	56.70
WoP	0.2	0.27	0	0	-0.27	0.27	0.07
NP	0.4	0.21	0	0	-0.21	0.21	0.04
NAP	7.2	11.2	7	11.67	0.47	0.47	0.22
WP	27.3	20.42	22	36.67	16.25	16.25	264.06
SDPP	26.9	25.26	22	36.67	11.41	11.41	130.19
SUP	0.2	0.31	0	0	-0.31	0.31	0.10
RbP	0.2	0.24	0	0	-0.24	0.24	0.06
Inds.	0.1	0.06	0	0	-0.06	0.06	0.00
Total			60			56.26	582.05
Value of Index						28.13	17.06

Source: Documents that are taken from TÜİK, YSK, and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*MP: Motherland Party, GUP: Great Union Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DP: Democrat Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, LP: Labour Party, NP: Nation Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, WP: Welfare Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, SUP: Social Union Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, Inds.: Independents

These results are achieved for the 1994 local elections with Duverger's calculation method. WP, SDPP, and NAP have over-representation. WP has 16.25 over-representation rate, and it is the party with the highest over-representation rate. Also, SDPP is the second party with the highest over-representation rate with 11.41 over-representation rate. All parties except WP, SDPP, and NAP have under-representation. DLP has 8.88, TPP has 7.53, and MP has 6.43 under-representation rate in 1994 Ankara Local Elections.




Figure 9: Over/under-representation rate in 1994 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 1994, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 28.13 and value of the Gallagher Index is 17.06 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

In 1999 local elections, there was no regulation that would affect the political fair representation in Ankara local elections.

The situation for Ankara is as follows.

Table 43: 1999 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
		Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
MP	6.6	8.57	0	0	-8.57	8.57	73.44
RPP	32	24.02	16	25.81	1.79	1.79	3.20
DLP	10.6	15.38	6	9.68	-5.70	5.70	32.49
TPP	2.6	3.53	0	0	-3.53	3.53	12.46

NAP	11.8	19.92	15	24.19	4.27	4.27	18.23
VP	33.8	24.09	25	40.32	16.23	16.23	263.41
PDP	0.6	0.69	0	0	-0.69	0.69	0.48
FSP	0.4	1.17	0	0	-1.17	1.17	1.37
WoP	0.1	0.16	0	0	-0.16	0.16	0.03
DPP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
CTP	0	0.03	0	0	-0.03	0.03	0.00
LP	0.1	0.14	0	0	-0.14	0.14	0.02
DTP	0.2	0.39	0	0	-0.39	0.39	0.15
RbP	0.1	0.08	0	0	-0.08	0.08	0.01
GUP	0.6	1.12	0	0	-1.12	1.12	1.25
DPsP	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
DP	0	0.07	0	0	-0.07	0.07	0.00
LDP	0.2	0.15	0	0	-0.15	0.15	0.02
PeP	0.1	0.17	0	0	-0.17	0.17	0.03
NP	0.1	0.21	0	0	-0.21	0.21	0.04
SRP	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Inds.	0	0.12	0	0	-0.12	0.12	0.01
Total			62			44.59	406.66
Value of Index						22.295	14.26

Source: Documents that are taken from TÜİK, YSK, and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, VP: Virtue Party, PDP: People's Democracy Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, WoP: Worker Party, DPP: Democracy and Peace Party, CTP: Changing Turkey Party, LP: Labor Party, DTP: Democratic Turkey Party, RbP: Rebirth Party, GUP: Great Union Party, DPsP: Democratic People's Party, Democrat Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, PeP: Peace Party, NP: Nation Party, SRP: Socialist Rule Party, Inds.: Independents

The following data were obtained as a result of the calculations of Ankara Local Elections which is held in 1999 according to Duverger's calculation method. RPP, NAP, and VP have over-representation. VP has the highest over-representation rate with 16.23. However, other parties have under-representation. In this sense, MP and DLP are the most striking parties in these elections.

In 1999, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 22.295 and value of the Gallagher Index is 14.26 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.




Figure 10: Over/under-representation rate in 1999 Local Elections of Ankara
Municipal Council

In 2004 Local Elections, it is seen that there is no regulation about the political fair representation when regulations about previous elections are considered for Ankara. The results of 2004 Ankara Local Elections are as follows.

Table 44: 2004 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes			
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JDP		55.1	49.15	105	80.15	31.00	31.00	961.00
MP		0.4	0.55	0	0	-0.55	0.55	0.30
RPP		12.6	25.57	21	16.03	-9.54	9.54	91.01
DLP		0.9	1.07	0	0	-1.07	1.07	1.14
TPP		2	3.08	1	0.76	-2.32	2.32	5.38
NAP		4.6	8.72	4	3.05	-5.67	5.67	32.15
SDPP		20.8	6.76	0	0	-6.76	6.76	45.70
GUP		0.5	0.82	0	0	-0.82	0.82	0.67
FP		0.7	1.09	0	0	-1.09	1.09	1.19
YP		1.6	2.07	0	0	-2.07	2.07	4.28
NTP		0	0.12	0	0	-0.12	0.12	0.01
LP		0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
ITP		0.2	0.28	0	0	-0.28	0.28	0.08

WoP	0.3	0.30	0	0	-0.30	0.30	0.09
FSP	0	0.09	0	0	-0.09	0.09	0.01
LDP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
TCP	0.2	0.21	0	0	-0.21	0.21	0.04
LTP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
NP	0.1	0.11	0	0	-0.11	0.11	0.01
DP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Inds.	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total			131			62	1143.08
Value of Index						31	23.91

Source: Documents that are taken from TÜİK, YSK, and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, TPP: True Path Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, YP: Young Party, NTP: New Turkey Party, LP: Labour Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, WoP: Worker Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LTP: Light Turkey Party, NP: Nation Party, DP: Democrat Party, Inds.: Independents

When these results of the elections are examined with Duverger's calculation method, it is seen that only JPD has over-representation. Its over-representation rate is 31. Other parties have under-representation. RPP is the party that has the highest under-representation rate, which is 9.54.




Figure 11: Over/under-representation rate in 2004 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 2004, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 31, and the value of the Gallagher Index is 23.91 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

In 2009 Local Election, with the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor has started to be elected by the votes of Altındağ, Çankaya, Keçiören, Mamak, Sincan, Yenimahalle, Pursaklar, Ayaş, Bala, Çubuk, Elmadağ, Güdül, Kalecik, Kızılcahamam, Gölbaşı (not all district boundaries included), Kazan, Akyurt, and Etimesgut districts. While calculating the votes of the parties in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election, the votes of these districts were taken as basis.

Altındağ, Çankaya, Keçiören, Mamak, Sincan, Yenimahalle, Pursaklar, Ayaş, Bala, Çubuk, Elmadağ, Kalecik, Gölbaşı, Kazan, Akyurt, and Etimesgut districts sent representatives to the metropolitan municipal council (Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı 2011 Mali Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, 2012). Vote rates of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council are result of a calculation through summation of votes that these districts voted for municipal council.

Table 45: 2009 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes			
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JDP		38.5	37.82	60	58.82	21.00	21.00	441.00
MP		0.3	0.26	0	0	-0.26	0.26	0.07
RPP		31.3	31.8	25	24.51	-7.29	7.29	53.14
DLP		0	0.69	0	0	-0.69	0.69	0.48
DSP		0.5	0.52	0	0	-0.52	0.52	0.27
NAP		27.4	24.22	17	16.67	-7.55	7.55	57.00
GUP		0	2.05	0	0	-2.05	2.05	4.20
FP		1.2	1.64	0	0	-1.64	1.64	2.69
NP		0.1	0.08	0	0	-0.08	0.08	0.01
LDP		0.1	0.02	0	0	-0.02	0.02	0.00
ITP		0.2	0.24	0	0	-0.24	0.24	0.06
FSP		0	0.04	0	0	-0.04	0.04	0.00

TCP	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
LP	0	0.03	0	0	-0.03	0.03	0.00
WoP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
DP	0.3	0.58	0	0	-0.58	0.58	0.34
RLP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
PDP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
PAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Inds.	0	0.01	0	0	-0.01	0.01	0.00
Total			102			42	559.26
Value of Index						21	16.72

Source: Documents that are taken from TÜİK, YSK, and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

JDP: Justice and Development Party, MP: Motherland Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, DSP: Democratic Society Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, LP: Labour Party, WoP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PAP: People's Ascent Party, Inds.: Independents

As a result of calculating the 2009 election according to the Duverger's calculation method, it is seen that JDP has 21 over-representation rate. It is the only party that has over-representation in this election. Other parties have under-representation. For instance, RPP and NAP have over-representation rate, which is more than 7.




Figure 12: Over/under-representation rate in 2009 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 2009, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 21, and the value of the Gallagher Index is 16.72 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

The first local elections after the Law No. 6360 are hold 2014. In these elections, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor has started to be elected by the votes of all districts of Ankara. Election results are shown in the table.

Table 46: 2014 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes		
		Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JDP		44.8	98	70.50	28.10	28.10	789.61
RPP		43.8	23	16.55	-15.35	15.35	235.62
DLP		0.1	0	0	-0.20	0.20	0.04
NAP		7.8	15	10.79	-6.51	6.51	42.38
GUP		1.3	1	0.72	-4.18	4.18	17.47
FP		0.5	0	0	-0.80	0.80	0.64
NP		0	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
LDP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
ITP		0.1	0	0	-0.20	0.20	0.04
TCP		0	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
WoP		0	0	0	-0.30	0.30	0.09
DP		0.1	2	1.44	1.04	1.04	1.08
RLP		0.1	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
PDP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
PsDP		0.9	0	0	-1.10	1.10	1.21
TPP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
REP		0.1	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
FCP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
SRRDP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
CP		0.2	0	0	0	0	0.00
PLP		0.1	0	0	0	0	0.00
LP		0	0	0	0	0	0.00
FSP		0	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
Inds.		0.6	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
Total			139			58.38	1088.25
Value of Index						29.19	23.33

Source: YSK; TÜİK

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, NP: Nation Party, LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, WOP: Worker Party, DP: Democrat Party, RLP: Right and Liberties Party, PDP: Peace and Democracy Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, TPP: True Path Party, REP: Rights and Equality Party, FCP: Free Cause Party, SRRDP: Social Reconciliation, Reform and Development Party, CP: Country Party, PLP: People's Liberation Party, LP: Labour Party, FSP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, Inds.: Independents

As a result of examining 2014 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality according to the Duverger's calculation method, the following findings emerge in terms of political fair representation. JDP and DP have over-representation with the rate of 28.1 and 1.04, respectively. Other parties have under-representation. RPP is the party with the highest rate of under-representation with 15.35.




Figure 13: Over/under-representation rate in 2014 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 2014, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 29.19 and value of the Gallagher Index is 23.33 in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council Election.

In the general elections held before these elections, the alliance system was applied. However, this system is not available in local elections. Therefore, the parties allied differently.

NAP and GUP announced that they supported JDP in the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality mayoral election. GP supported RPP. Alliances emerged in parallel with the alliances held in the general elections. In addition, it is seen that some parties do not nominate candidates from some districts in the elections of district council members. Parties that do not nominate any candidates have decided to

support the party they are in the same alliance with. There is no legal mechanism for alliance formation in local elections. So, parties have found an alternative way to become an alliance. In the light of these, the 2019 local elections were shaped as follows in Ankara.

Table 47: 2019 Local Elections in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Party*	Mayor of the Municipality	Metropolitan Municipal Council			Calculation Methods/Indexes			
		Vote Rate (%)	Vote Rate (%)	Number of Seats	Rate of Seats (%)	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
JDP		47.1	41.0	88	59.86	18.86	18.86	355.70
RPP		50.9	37.9	29	19.73	-18.17	18.17	330.15
DLP		0.3	0.2	0	0	-0.20	0.20	0.04
NAP		0	7.1	19	12.93	5.83	5.83	33.99
GP		0	7.2	11	7.48	0.28	0.28	0.08
GUP		0	2.1	0	0	-2.1	2.1	4.41
FP		1	2.0	0	0	-2.00	2.00	4.00
ITP		0.2	0.2	0	0	-0.20	0.20	0.04
TCP		0.1	0.3	0	0	-0.30	0.30	0.09
DP		0	0.4	0	0	-0.40	0.40	0.16
PsDP		0	1.1	0	0	-1.10	1.10	1.21
PatP		0.2	0.2	0	0	-0.20	0.20	0.04
Inds.		0.1	0.1	0	0	-0.10	0.10	0.01
Total				147			49.74	729.92
Value of Index							24.87	19.10
PsA			50.2	107	72.79	22.59	22.59	510.31
NA			47.5	40	27.21	-20.29	20.29	411.68
DLP		0.3	0.2	0	0	-0.2	0.2	0.04
ITP		0.2	0.2	0	0	-0.2	0.2	0.04
TCP		0.1	0.3	0	0	-0.3	0.3	0.09
PsDP		0	1.1	0	0	-1.1	1.1	1.21
PatP		0.2	0.2	0	0	-0.2	0.2	0.04
Inds.		0.1	0.1	0	0	-0.1	0.1	0.01
Total				147			44.98	923.42
Value of Index							22.49	21.49

Source: Documents that are taken from TÜİK, YSK, and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

*JDP: Justice and Development Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, DLP: Democratic Left Party, NAP: Nationalist Action Party, GP: Good Party, GUP: Great Union Party, FP: Felicity Party, ITP: Independent Turkey Party, TCP: Turkey Communist Party, DP: Democrat Party, PsDP: People's Democratic Party, PatP: Patriotic Party, Inds.: Independents PsA: People's Alliance consist of JDP, NAP and GUP, NA: Nation Alliance consist of RPP, GP, FP and DP

When the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is examined in the 2019 local elections, it is seen that the council consists of 4 parties and 2 alliances to which they are affiliated. RPP won Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election, and it is represented in the council with 20.41%. RPP is a member of NA, and NA is represented with 27.89% in the council. When the results of the election are evaluated with respect to Duverger’s calculation method, the following outcomes emerge. JDP and NAP that are members of PsA have over-representation with the rate of 18.86 and 5.83, respectively. Also, GP that is a member of NA has over-representation with 0.28 rate. PsA has 22.59 over-representation rate when the alliances are considered. Other parties and NA have under-representation. NA has under-representation with the rate of 19.61, and RPP, which is the member of NA have under-representation with the rate of 18.86.




Figure 14: Over/under-representation Rate in 2019 Local Elections of Ankara Municipal Council

In 2019, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 24.87 and value of the Gallagher Index is 19,10 for all parties in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council

Election. Value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 22.49 and value of the Gallagher Index is 21.49 for parties and alliance system.

4.1.1 Comparing Political Fair Representation in Municipal Councils of Ankara by Different Elections

The purpose of this section is to compare municipal councils in Ankara (1963-1984: Ankara Municipality Council, 1984-2019 Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council) on the basis of elections in terms of political fair representation. These comparisons are based on the calculation methods and indexes used in the previous section. These calculation methods and indexes show whether the distribution of representatives is balanced in terms of over / under-representation rates and political fair representation values.

In the Table 48, comparisons of local selections were made using three different Index and calculation methods.

Table 48: Comparison of Ankara by elections

Local Election	Value of Loosemore and Hanby Index	Value of Gallagher Index	Duverger Calculation Method	
			The Most Over-representation	The Most Under-representation
1963	3.005	1.87	1.84	-0.96
1968	2.765	1.65	1.40	-1.12
1973* ¹	3.31	2.30	2.88	-1.05
1973* ²	4.55	3.33	4.12	-1.79
1973* ³	5.785	3.91	4.12	-3.02
1973* ⁴	5.975	4.39	4.12	-4.26
1973* ⁵	7.205	5.58	5.35	-5.49
1977	3.67	2.27	2.64	-0.80
1984	19.415	15.12	19.4	-5.06
1989	27.265	21.19	27.27	-5.97
1994	28.13	17.06	16.25	-8.88
1999	22.295	14.26	16.23	-8.57
2004	31.00	23.91	31.00	-9.54
2009	21.00	16.72	21.00	-7.55
2014	29.19	23.33	28.10	-15.35
2019 (Parties)	24.87	19.10	18.86	-18.17
2019 (Alliance)	22.49	21.49	22.59	-20.29

Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index show the fairness of the elections. Elections that have less value according to these indexes are fairer. Duverger Calculation Method shows the values of the most over-representation and the most under-representation in the elections. These rates are also important in terms of seeing the imbalance in the elections.




Figure 15: Loosemore and Hanby Index calculations of Ankara election results

When local elections are compared according to the Loosemore and Hanby Index, the political fair representation is seen more in the elections between 1963-1977. The lowest value of all time with the value of 2.765 is seen in the 1968 elections. This means that there is the fairest local election. During these periods, Loosemore and Hanby Index values (although the exact value of 1973 is unknown) is between 2.765 and 7.205. Since the 1984 local elections, values have been increasing according to this Index. This means that fairness decreases. The value of 31.00 in the 2004 local elections is the highest. According to this value, 2004 Local Elections in Ankara is the most unfair local elections in Ankara. The lowest value between 1984-2019 is 19.415. This value is much higher compared to previous periods.




Figure 16: Gallagher Index calculations of Ankara election results

When local elections are compared according to Gallagher Index, it is seen that it is progressing in parallel with Loosemore and Hanby Index. Political fair representation is higher in this Index between 1963-1977 than in other periods. The 1968 local elections have the lowest value with 1.65. In other words, the fairest local election. Political fair representation declined with the 1984 elections. Values between 1984-2019 are between 14.26 and 23.91. There is a big increase compared to previous periods. The 23.91 value in 2004 is the highest. So, this election is the least political fair representation.

According to Duverger's calculation method, when the highest over/under-representation values are compared, a stable graph is seen until 1977. Until the 1980s, there was not much difference between the highest over-representation and the highest under-representation values. In other words, a more balanced distribution is observed. However, since the 1984 local elections, the difference started to increase and a more disproportional situations started to emerge from the previous periods. Over-representation values, which increased with the 1984 elections, became the highest in the 2004 elections with a value of 31.00. The under-representation values, which also increased with the same elections, received the highest value in the last elections.




Figure 17: Duverger Calculation Method of Ankara election results

In all three calculations, it is seen that the 1984 local elections are a breaking point. It did not fall below the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index 19, and Gallagher Index did not fall below 14 after this local election. However, in the pre-1984 elections, the Loosemore and Hanby Index value was at most 7.205. The highest value of Gallagher Index value is 5.58. In Duverger's calculation method, disproportionality started to increase. The 1984 local elections are those where the political fair representation begins to decline. Value changes are less in the next period.

4.1.2. Discussion of the Results with Respect to Related Laws

In this section, a detailed discussion of the index values of the Ankara Municipal Council between 1963 and 1977, and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council between 1984 and 2019 will be made. During this examination, the connections between the values that have been calculated with Loosemore and Hanby Index, Gallagher Index, and Duverger's calculation method in previous sections and the several laws will be established. While examining the features of these laws, how they affect will be investigated.

Table 49: Laws and elections

Local Election	Laws in Force That Affect Elections	Value of Loosemore and Hanby Index	Value of the Gallagher Index	Duverger's Calculation Method	
				The Highest Rate of Over-representation	The Highest Rate of Under-representation
1963	- Law No. 1580	3.005	1.87	1.84	-0.96
1968	- Law No. 306	2.765	1.65	1.40	-1.12
1973* ¹	- Law No. 307	3.31	2.30	2.88	-1.05
1973* ²		4.55	3.33	4.12	-1.79
1973* ³		5.785	3.91	4.12	-3.02
1973* ⁴		5.975	4.39	4.12	-4.26
1973* ⁵		7.205	5.58	5.35	-5.49
1977		3.67	2.27	2.64	-0.80
1984	- Law No. 2972 - Law No. 3030 - Statutory Decree- Law No. 195	19.415	15.12	19.40	-5.06
1989	- Law No. 2972	27.265	21.19	27.27	-5.97
1994	- Law No. 3030	28.13	17.06	16.25	-8.88
1999	- Statutory Decree- Law No. 195	22.295	14.26	16.23	-8.57
2004	- Law No. 3507	31.00	23.91	31.00	-9.54
2009	- Law No. 2972 - Law No. 5216 - Law No. 5393 - Law No. 5747	21.00	16.72	21.00	-7.55
2014	- Law No. 2972	29.19	23.33	28.10	-15.35
2019 (with Parties)	- Law No. 6360	24.87	19.10	18.86	-18.17
2019 (with Alliance)		22.49	21.49	22.59	-20.29

Law No. 1580:1580 on Municipal Law; Law No. 306: Law No. 306 on the amendments to the Law on İdarei Umumiyei Vilâyat and the abolition of certain related laws; Law No. 307: Law Amending the Municipal Law No. 307; Law No. 2972: Law on Elections of Local Administrations and Neighbourhood Mukhtars and Board of Elderman; Law No. 3030 on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities; Law No 3507: Law No. 3507 on Making Amendments Law on Elections of Local Administrations and Neighbourhood Mukhtars and Board of Elderman; Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities; Law No. 5393 on Municipality Law; Law No. 5747 on Establishing Districts within Boundaries of Metropolitan Municipalities and Amending Various Laws; Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Fourteen Metropolitan Municipalities and Twenty-seven Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-Laws

Different municipal laws and metropolitan municipal laws are promulgated up to this time in Turkey. Since these laws can change municipal boundaries, the number of representatives, the number of representatives pertaining to the electoral

district and the methods used in the election, council memberships and membership distributions have changed over years. So, these changes affect representation rates and proportionality. Their effects on political fair representation are significant. Therefore, while examining political fair representation in Ankara Municipal Council and Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, examining the laws affecting Ankara at the same time will show the effects of the laws more clearly.

The index values of Ankara in the period that covers from 1963 Local Elections to 1984 Local Elections is lower than previous years' values. The laws that were in force at that time and considered the structure of the city council are Law No. 1580, Law No. 306, and Law No. 307. According to these laws, the d'Hondt system is applied. Since the population of Ankara is more than 100.000, one member is added for each 25,000 population to 36 representatives. The highest political fair representation is provided in the elections which are held between 1963 and 1984 when these laws were in force. However, the reason for the situation which is occurred 1977 local election is independent candidates who are already under-represented get higher under-representation rates in any case. In this situation, the under-representation rate of independent candidates is increasing, and the over-representation rate of parties with an increasing number of representatives is rising. If the opposite situation, that is, the independents had over-representation in the first step, and the over-representation rate is decreased for each decreasing number of representative, and other parties that send representatives to council had under-representation, and their under-representation rates are decreasing, then the value in these indexes would fall, in other words, political fair representation would have increased.

Ankara has gained metropolitan status during 1984 Local Elections. So, the municipality council has become the metropolitan municipality council, and its structure is changed. As a result of these changes, the metropolitan municipality council has become consist of district council representatives. These district councils were not all districts councils in Ankara, but the district councils that are

located inside of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality boundary. Altındağ, Çankaya, Keçiören, Mamak, and Yenimahalle district municipalities are within the boundary. One-fifth of the council members of these district municipalities have become members of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, in order of being elected in the d'Hondt method. In other words, the members of the metropolitan municipality council were chosen indirectly, not directly. In addition, the mayors of these municipalities took part in the council as a reserve member of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council.

The other important change is that the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is started to be applied. With this system, 10% of the total votes taken by parties is eliminated in municipal council elections. For instance, if 1,000,000 votes are cast in the election, 100,000 votes will be deducted from each party. In this way, parties with less than 10% of votes could not send representatives to district municipal councils. Also, parties with a bit more than 10% of votes have become disadvantaged. So, parties with a high rate of votes have become advantaged in terms of sending a representative to district municipal councils.

Another change is the difference in the number of members elected to district municipal councils. These changes are one of the reasons leading a differentiation in the number of representatives for metropolitan municipality council which have the one-fifth representative of each district.

There is a huge difference between index values of the elections before 1984 Local Elections and both 1984 Local Elections and the following elections. Before this election, Loosemore and Hanby Index values were between 2.765 and 7.205; however, they have become 19.415.

Also, the Gallagher Index value of previous elections which are held before 1984 was between 1.56 and 5.58, but the value has risen to 15.12 in 1984 Local Election. According to Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index, political fair representation has diminished.

Together with these changes, differentiation of the index values demonstrates the following results.

- Parties that received less than 10% of the total votes in the elections before the 1984 elections could send a representative(s) to the Ankara Municipal Council. However, these parties were not able to send representatives to Ankara Metropolitan Council in 1984 Local Elections due to the changes discoursed above.
- Parties that could not send representatives to the Metropolitan Municipality Council could not pass the 10% threshold in the district municipal council election in any district that constitutes the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council. It means that they could not have representatives in these district municipal councils.
- In the districts within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality, the constituency is districts. Any party can send representatives to the metropolitan municipality council by getting a high vote in one of these constituencies. In other words, the total voting rate of that party within the borders of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality does not need to be over 10%.
- The parties that received 14.37% of the total votes in these elections were not represented due to the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system. Only two parties could send representatives to the metropolitan municipality council. With this system, parties received more votes have become advantageous in the implementation of the d'Hondt method.
- Indirect election of representatives in the metropolitan municipality council caused disproportionality.
- The fact that district mayors are members of the city council causes disproportionality.
- The values of Loosemore and Hanby Index, Gallagher Index, and Duverger's calculation method show that the laws that were enforced in

these elections lead to decrease in political fair representation and increase in disproportionality.

In local elections which were held in 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004, implementation “quota membership” actualised, different from 1984 local elections. It is implemented with Law No. 3507. Quota members are the representatives that the party that won the district municipality council election automatically send to the metropolitan city council. Their number differs depending on the number of representatives in the district municipal council. The seat distribution is made by d'Hondt method after subtracting the number of determined quota members from the number of district municipality council members which are determined in Law No. 3030. This situation also affects metropolitan municipality councils. The first among the quota members elected in the district municipal councils becomes the member of the metropolitan municipal council. The first member who is sent to the metropolitan municipal council is the quota member. So, the party, which won the district municipality council election, has the opportunity to send more representatives to the metropolitan municipality council.

During this period, there were also changes specific to Ankara. For example, Pursaklar Municipality has participated in the elections related with Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 1989 Local Elections. As another example, Gölbaşı and Etimesgut districts were declared as central districts of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality before 1994 local elections.

Two inferences can be made depending on index values of 1984 Local Elections and local elections that are held between 1989 and 2004. The first inference is that political fair representation is decreasing when the election results of the 1984 elections between 1989 and 2004 are analysed. This inference is made with respect to Loosemore and Hanby Index values. While Loosemore and Hanby Index value is 19.415 in 1984 Local Elections, index values are between 22.295 and 31.00 in the local elections held between 1989 and 2004. Since the index value of the 1984 local elections was lower than those of the elections held between 1989 and 2004, this inference emerged. The second inference is that, according to the Gallagher

Index, there is no huge difference between these elections in terms of political fair representation. Gallagher Index value of 1984 Local Elections is 15.12. This value is higher than the value of one of the four elections between 1989 and 2004, which is 1999 Local Elections, and lower than the value of three elections. So, it can be said that the political fair representation has increased on average. However, it cannot be said that the laws in force which are in the 1984 local elections and in local elections between 1989 and 2004 have an effect on political fair representation since Gallagher Index value of 1999 Local Election is 14,26. So, this situation shows that the 1999 Local Election is fairer than 1984 Local Election.

Quota membership implication which is put into practice in 1988 decreased political fair representation according to the results of Loosemore and Hanby Index values. The first reason for this is that the party, which ranked first in district municipal council elections, becomes more advantageous in sending representatives to Metropolitan Municipal Council. Another reason is that due to the quota membership of the parties that do not rank first in the district municipal council election and can also send representatives, the chance of sending representatives to the metropolitan municipality has decreased.

Law No. 2972 continued to be implemented in 2009 local elections; however, Law No. 5216, Law No. 5393, and Law No. 5747 also started to be implemented. The biggest difference of these laws for Ankara is the increase in the number of districts covered by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. The boundary of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has changed with these laws. Except changing boundary, there were no changes have been made.

When comparing between 2009 local elections and local elections between 1989 and 2004 in terms of political fair representation, the Loosemore and Hanby Index value of 1999 Local Election is less than the previous elections, but the difference is not considerable. When the values are analysed according to Gallagher Index, 2009 local elections are less fair than the 1999 local elections, but it is fairer than 1989, 1994 and 2004 local elections. In other words, according to the Gallagher

Index, a certain judgment cannot be reached in terms of political fair representation.

When the 1999 Local Elections and 1984 Local Elections are compared, 1999 Local Elections have a higher value in both Index types. In other words, the 2009 elections are less fair than the 1984 elections.

Law No. 6360 came into force with the 2014 local elections. Due to this law, many changes have occurred regarding metropolitan municipalities. But the change which is most affected Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is the expansion of the metropolitan boundary to the provincial administrative boundary. For this reason, the metropolitan municipality council structure has changed. The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system, which is one of the most problematic implications continues.

The Index values for the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council in the 2014 local elections are analysed, and higher values are seen than the values in 2009.

Loosemore and Hanby Index value increased by 8.19, and Gallagher Index value increased by 6.61 from 2009 to 2014. It means that the 2014 local elections have less political fair representation than the 2009 local elections. The reasons for that are both new boundaries owing to Law No. 6360 and demographic structures of newly added districts to Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. Due to Law No. 6360, all districts in Ankara became able to send a representative to the Metropolitan Municipal Council. The population of newly added districts to the boundary of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is less than the population of the districts within the borders of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. But it has more representation in the metropolitan city council than its population. For instance, newly added districts comprised 5.98% of the population in 2014; however, they comprise 22.44% of the Metropolitan Municipal Council in Ankara. So, the demographic structures of districts are important in terms of the index value.

When 2014 local elections are compared with other elections according to Loosemore and Hanby Index, 2014 local elections are less fair than local elections held before 1984, 1984 local elections, and 1999 local elections. However, according to Gallagher Index, 2014 local election is fairer than only 2004 local elections in terms of political fair representation.

The 2019 Local Elections are considered both as parties and as alliances in this study. The reason for this is that the election alliances applied in the 2018 general elections were implemented without legal basis in these elections. Some parties in order for the other party/parties in the alliance to get more votes, they did not nominate candidates in some election districts. This condition is also seen in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayoral Election in 2019 elections. Alliance member parties that have representatives in the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council are still members of their alliance. Therefore, calculations that consider alliances were also made in this study. As there is no legal regulation on local elections, membership of municipal council elections was made according to the same procedures and principles.

When the two versions, which are the situations that alliances are considered and not considered, of the 2019 local elections are compared with each other, the alliance version is fairer according to the Loosemore and Hanby Index. However, according to the Gallagher Index, the alliance version is less fair in terms of political fair representation for the same election. Since the election alliance system is not placed on a legal basis for local elections; no definitive judgment can be made. If legal arrangements on the alliance system are made, the functioning of the system will change the number of representatives and Index values.

When 2019 local elections are compared with 2014 local elections for Ankara, political fair representation is higher in 2019 local elections for both versions which are alliance-based and party-based. This situation is seen in both index values in the same way. The 2019 local elections, also, are fairer than the local elections held in 1989, 1994, and 2004 according to Loosemore and Hanby Index for party-based and alliance-based versions. Moreover, according to Gallagher

Index, 2019 local elections fairer than local elections held 1989, 2004, and 2014 in terms of political fair representation for party-based version, and fairer than 2004 and 2014 local elections for alliance-based version.

As a result of the calculation of municipal council elections for Ankara according to Indexes, it is seen that the most critical change is in 1984 local elections. In 1984, Ankara has undergone major changes in its structure since it became a metropolitan municipality. But the political fair representation in the municipal council was negatively affected. After that, different laws and practices were made, but the political fair representation values in the elections before 1984 could not be reached. The current situation of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council has an average value in terms of political fair representation when local elections held in and after 1984 are considered. The last law, which is called Law No. 6360 caused great changes in these elections in terms of political fair representation.

4.2 Summary and Conclusion

When the local elections of Ankara are examined, it is seen that the political fair representation is at lower levels in the last 8 elections. Considering the reasons for these, the reasons can be listed as follows.

- The difference between elections of Ankara General Council and Ankara Municipal Council (between 1963 and 1977) proves that instead of being elected indirectly in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, the direct election is an implication that will increase political fair representation. Therefore, indirect elections affects the political fair representation negatively.
- The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system affects the representation. This effect is clearly seen when municipality council elections until the 1984 local elections and the local elections held in 1984 and after are compared.
- The fact that district municipality mayors are members of the metropolitan municipality council affects the political fair representation negatively.

This was first applied in the 1984 local elections, and the difference between these elections and elections before is clearly seen.

- Quota membership affects the political fair representation. This can be seen by comparing local elections before and after 1988.

According to Indexes, it is seen that the most critical changes are in 1984 and 1988 local elections as a result of the calculation of municipal council elections for Ankara. In 1984, Ankara has undergone major changes such as electoral districts changes, participation of districts and their mayors on metropolitan council in its structure since it became a metropolitan municipality. But the political fair representation in the municipal council was negatively affected. After that, different laws and practices were made, but the political fair representation values in the elections before 1984 could not be reached. Moreover, in 1989 local elections, values increased with the quota membership application. The current situation of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council has an average value in terms of political fair representation when local elections held in and after 1984 are considered. The last law, which is called Law No. 6360 did not cause great changes in these elections in terms of political fair representation.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARISON OF ANKARA METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS WITH LOCAL ELECTIONS IN LONDON ASSEMBLY, CONSEIL DE PARIS, AND ABGEORDNETENHAUS OF BERLIN IN TERMS OF FAIR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

It is essential to compare the Ankara Municipal Council and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council with the local councils functioning within different local government and election systems in order to evaluate them more consistently in terms of political fair representation. Therefore, the capitals of England, France and Germany; London Metropolitan Council, Council of Paris, and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin are chosen to compare. One reason for these choices is that they have rooted history in local governments, and their systems are very powerful. Another reason for choosing these capitals is that they have special statuses and different electoral systems in their own countries.

In this chapter, first, the structures of local governments and the election systems for these capitals will be presented. Each will be followed by an analysis of political fair representation by using the Loosemore and Hanby Index, Gallagher Index and Duverger's calculation methods. Finally, they will be compared with Ankara municipal councils.

5.1. Overview of Local Governments in England

Within the administrative structure of England, local administrations have been seen since 1215 Magna Carta. In this sense, England is one of the countries with the most extended local government experience. In the Anglo-Saxon section of England, the local administration system started with the organization of big cities

and even small villages by the local representatives of Monarchy. England has had the local administration system for centuries, albeit in different forms (Koçak, 2008: 143, Oakland, 2002: 65).

In history, London is one of the places where the first steps were taken in terms of metropolitan government. The secular use of the metropolis occurred in the 17th century when London emerged as the political, cultural, central and capital of England. London's position strengthened throughout the 18th century; it has become the largest city in Europe in terms of its political, social, cultural importance and population (Rodger, 2012: 85-87). According to Rao (2008: 14), the administration of London, which has exceeded 1 million in the early 19th century and has exceeded 8 million today, is no longer an issue that will be evaluated only on the scale of London. In other words, how London is governed sheds light on important issues both globally and an England scale.

England has improved and rooted structure of local governments. It is essential to look at the metropolitan area government of London, the capital of England, and examine how its local representation is in terms of the political fair in representation in local governments. A review of the Greater London council and its composition will contribute in terms of political fair representation.

The current structure of local governments in the UK was created by the Local Governments Act, which was legislated in 1972 and promulgated since April 1, 1974. It took its final form with the arrangements made in 1986. With the Local Authorities Law, which was enacted since 1974, local governments were rearranged according to population density, and socioeconomic status and the number of local government units was reduced, and a three-class system was created (Stanyer, 1980: 46-47). With the Local Authorities Law, which was enacted since 1974, local governments were rearranged according to population density and socioeconomic status, while the number of the existing local governments was decreased, and the three-tier system is created (Stanyer, 1980:46-47).

Local governments in England are subordinate organizations created by parliament to provide a set of services. They have elected local councils and have powers that represent general interests in a particular private area (Chandler, 1991: 1).

Table 50: Number of local governments in England

Local Governments with Numbers	
The total county with and without Metropolitan	83
District	236
Parish	10.449
Great London	1

Source: http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/File/Country_profiles/United_Kingdom.pdf: 209, "England - Office for National Statistics", <https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/geography/ukgeographies/administrativegeography/england>

Local governments in London consist of the county, district, parish, and Great London Administration that has a special status (Varney, 2013: 332).

Table 51: Provision of urban services in England

	Governmental Areas			Metropolitan Areas
	Unitaries	County Councils	District Councils	Metropolitan Districts
Highways	X	X		X
Transport Planning	X	X		X
Passenger Transport	X	X		X
Environmental Health	X		X	X
Leisure and recreation	X		X	X
Waste Collection	X			X
Waste Disposal	X	X		X
Local taxation collection	X		X	X

Source: Local Government Group, 2010 local-government-structur-634.pdf, , <https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/local-government-structur-634.pdf>

The county, which is the first level and the widest of the local government units in the UK, does not refer to a county with specific limits in the geographical area, but to the administrative province in terms of local government. The county councils, which have the status of the decision-making body of the counties local government units, are formed by the vote of the voters. (İnaç, & Ünal, 2006: 127, Kocaoğlu, & Usta, 2015: 546). These councils serve the entire county and provide

about 80 percent of services such as schools, social services, public transport, highways, waste disposal and trade standards in these areas (Local Government Group, 2010).

Districts are sub-level local government units in County, which are formed by dividing according to certain measures (İnaç, & Ünal, 2006: 127). Each district council covers a smaller area than the county and provides more local services, including recycling and refuse collection, local planning, and leisure facilities.

Parish units are located within the districts and are the smallest administrative units of the local government in small residential areas with more than 200 voters. According to the regulation made in 1972, Parish councils are mandatory in places with at least 200 voters. However, places with a lower population do not have to form the Parish Assembly. People in such parishes can come together and make decisions about themselves. In these places, the people come together at least once a year in meetings called Parish Meetings. There is no upper limit for the number of members where the council is located, but there must be at least five council members and must meet at least four times a year. Parishes have rural characteristics and are located in districts that do not have metropolitan features. In non-metropolitan areas, they form the third level of the local government system (Yıldırım, 1990: 175-176, Kavruk, 2002: 113-114, Padfield, & Byrne, 1987: 339, Varney, 2013: 332).

The duties of the parish administrations are limited due to their limited decision-making power. The duties of Fulford and Hebden Royd parish governments are as follows: Arrangement of open spaces, issues related to cemeteries, prevention of crime, police services, traffic decisions and sending these decisions to the higher authorities. (Hebden Royd Town Council, n.d., The Role of Parish Councils, n.d.)

With the year 2000, London was once again switched to the metropolitan system. In this system, while the mayor comes to the fore as the chairman of the metropolitan administration, the role of the metropolitan council is defined as

controlling the decisions of the chairman and making administrative appointments within the metropolitan area (Köseçik, 2000: 69).

In light of the powers and duties of the London Metropolitan Government and the mayor, it appears that the Mayor of London has not been given any authority to enforce the mayor’s decisions directly. In other words, it seems impossible for the mayor to take a decision alone since the assembly retains the power to oversee the mayor and mayor’s policies. This situation has emerged as a result of a strong assembly structure. It is clear that the purpose of establishing such a structure is to prevent the mayor from being directly influential in the provision of local public services and to ensure that critical services under the responsibility of the metropolitan government are managed by these administrations organized on a functional basis in London.

5.1.1. The Electoral Structures of Local Governments in England

Elections for local councils in the UK are held every four years. There are also local governments that renew half of the members every two years or elect one-third of the representatives every year for three years. The dates of these elections are not the same throughout the UK. Local council members, elected representatives of the people in the UK, are selected according to the First Past the Post (FPTP) system (Allum, 1995, Government Digital Service, 2016)

Table 52: Types of local authority and their election cycle

Type of Authority	Number of Authority	Cycle
County councils	26	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).
London Boroughs	32	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).
Metropolitan Districts	33	Councillors elected for a four-year term by thirds (at each election a third of the council is elected). Elections are held every year except the county council year.

Table 52 (cont'd)		
Metropolitan District	3	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).
Districts	131	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).
Districts	54	Councillors elected for a four-year term by thirds (at each election a third of the council is elected). Elections are held every year except the county council year.
Districts	7	Councillors elected for a four-year term biennially (at each election half of the council is elected). Elections held every two years.
Unitary authorities	38	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).
Unitary authorities	17	Councillors elected for a four-year term by thirds (at each election a third of the council is elected). Elections are held every year except the county council year.
Isles of Scilly and the City of London	2	All councillors elected once every four years (whole council elections).

Source: Government Digital Service, 2016

5.1.2 Electoral Structure and Local Elections of London Assembly

The purpose of this section is to examine the Greater London Council in terms of political fair representation. For this, the Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index will be used. The data will be compared with Ankara, along with other capitals in the next chapter. In order to analyse these comparisons better, the election system of London, the capital of England, will also be examined because the Greater London Council uses a different election system than other local governments in England.

When the council structure of London Metropolitan Government is examined, it is going to give information about the structure of the metropolitan council in London and the representation of the voting rates in the representation, and it is going to provide data for comparison.

The London Metropolitan Council has an essential role in decision making. The mayor has duties such as auditing the decisions and policies and approving the budget prepared by the mayor. At this point, it becomes an important issue to examine the structure of such an essential administrative unit in detail. Returning to the London Metropolitan Council, this structure consists of 25 members in total, and they become representative after a form of choice that can be defined as two-stage. In the first stage of the elections, a total of 14 members are determined, and then the remaining 11 members are determined according to the system applied across London. In other words, each of these 14 members, called Constituency London Assembly Members, represent different parts of London. The remaining 11 members are determined by applying the d'Hondt method to represent London in general (Londonelects.org.uk, n.d.).

One of the essential points at this point is the election threshold. The 5% election threshold applied across England is also applied in the structuring of the London Metropolitan Council, and the candidates of the parties under this threshold are considered to be eliminated according to this system (Londonelects.org.uk, n.d.).

London, where Modified d'Hondt method is applied, makes a two-stage election. The first stage is called Constituency London Assembly Members, while the second stage is called London-wide. In other words, Londoners vote two times to elect the London Metropolitan Council members, consisting of a total of 25 members. The first is "Constituency London Assembly Members" election which is used to select 14 members to be sent to the council from each electoral district; the second is the election of 11 representatives named London-wide, and in this election, all London borders are the only electoral district. The details of the system can be examined by looking at how the first stage took place. In the first phase, Constituency London Assembly Members, one member from each of the 14 regions enters the assembly. In other words, the person who has the highest number of votes in that region is entitled to be in the council as the representative of that region. Because each party nominates candidates for each constituency, the person who has the highest number of votes represents the specific party.

Accordingly, in the 2016 elections, the Labour Party sent nine representatives, while the Conservative Party sent five representatives out of 14 regions.

Table 53: London Metropolitan Council Election results in 2016 (First Stage)

Name of the Party	Number of Votes	Percentage (%)	Number of Seats
Labour	1.138.576	43.5	9
Conservative	812.415	31.1	5
Green	236.839	9.1	0
UKIP	199.448	7.6	0
Liberal Democrat	195.820	7.5	0

Source: BBC, 2016

The d'Hondt method is not implemented in the first stage. This method was not required because each region sent one representative who had the highest number of votes. Labour and Conservative parties achieved to contain all the representatives in the first stage. However, Green, UKIP and Liberal Democrat parties could not win any seats in the London Metropolitan Council although they passed the 5% threshold. The reason for this situation is that the first stage of this election in which 14 members are determined is not the results of London in general, but the results of each region of London, which is divided into 14 regions. If this election had been made in London as general, according to the d'Hondt method, Labour Party could win seven representatives, Conservative Party could win four representatives, and Green, UKIP and Liberal Democrat could win one representative for each.

The table formed as a result of the first stage local elections is formed as follows.

Table 54: First stage winners

Constituency	Party/Description
Barnet and Camden	Labour Party
Bexley and Bromley	The Conservative Party Candidate
Brent and Harrow	Labour Party
City and East (City of London, Barking & Dagenham, Newham, Tower Hamlets)	Labour Party
Croydon and Sutton	The Conservative Party Candidate
Ealing and Hillingdon	Labour Party
Enfield and Haringey	Labour Party
Greenwich and Lewisham	Labour Party

Table 54 (cont'd)	
Havering and Redbridge	The Conservative Party Candidate
Lambeth and Southwark	Labour Party
Merton and Wandsworth	Labour Party
North East (Hackney, Islington, Waltham Forest)	Labour Party
South West (Hounslow, Kingston upon Thames, Richmond upon Thames)	The Conservative Party Candidate
West Central (Hammersmith & Fulham, Kensington & Chelsea, Westminster)	The Conservative Party Candidate

Source: londonelects.org.uk

Labour Party won 9 seats in 2016 local elections by getting the highest number of votes in regions of North East, Merton & Wandsworth, City & East, Barnet & Camden, Greenwich & Lewisham, Lambeth & Southwark, Enfield & Haringey, Ealing & Hillingdon, and Brent & Harrow. On the other hand, the Conservative Party won 5 seats by getting the highest number of votes in regions of South West, Bexley & Bromley, West Central, Croydon & Sutton, and Havering & Redbridge. In this way, the first stage of the London Metropolitan Council was completed.

The second stage is London-wide. Both political parties' candidates and individual (independent) candidates can compete in London-wide Council Member elections. In 2016, however, only parties attended the elections. The 11 London-wide Council Member seats were allocated by applying the additional member system.

All parties send a "party list" before the elections. The party positioned the candidates while delivering their list. For example, if the party won two seats, the first and second candidates on its list would occupy the party's two London seats in the Council.

To assign the seats, firstly, votes were gathered from across London in the London-wide election. Parties that could not get more than 5% of the total number of votes were eliminated (londonelects.org.uk). Parties that have received less than 5% of votes that could not issue a representative at this stage mean that they could not be represented in parliament because they did not participate in the second

stage. If parties with few votes are strong in a constituency, they can send a representative even though they cannot enter the second election.

Before, each party proposed 11 candidates for London-wide elections, and total London-wide representatives are designated by using the “Modified d’Hondt” method. According to the table that explains the electoral system done by londonelects.org.uk(n.d.), at first, the votes of each party for the London-wide are based on. The most distinctive point here is that the votes of each party are not distributed directly using the d’Hondt method, but Modified d’Hondt through calculation by dividing the second stage votes into “the number of seats they won in the Constituency election + 1”.

Table 55: London-wide Election results

Party/Description	London-wide Assembly Member Votes	Percentage
Labour Party	1,054,801	40.3%
Conservative Party	764,230	29.2%
Green Party – "vote Green on orange"	207,959	8.0%
UK Independence Party (UKIP)	171,069	6.5%
Caroline Pidgeon's London Liberal Democrats	165,580	6.3%
Women's Equality Party	91,772	3.5%
Respect (George Galloway)	41,324	1.6%
Britain First – Putting British people first	39,071	1.5%
Christian Peoples Alliance	27,172	1.0%
Animal Welfare Party	25,810	1.0%
British National Party	15,833	0.6%
The House Party - Homes for Londoners	11,055	0.4%
Total good votes	2,615,676	

Source: BBC, 2016, londonelects.org.uk

The table above demonstrates the votes of parties in London-wide elections. It is obvious that the first five parties in the table pass the 5% threshold. The formula which can be demonstrated as

$$\frac{\text{Votes for the Party}}{\text{Constituency Council Member representations won} + \text{London wide Council Member representations won} + 1}$$

is applied to these parties that pass the threshold, and 11 seats are distributed accordingly. The calculations of seat distribution for the first five parties are made by using the formula which is shown above and using the “Modified d’Hondt” method is in the table.

The d’Hondt method was explained broadly in Chapter 2. While calculating with this method, the number of votes is divided into 1, 2, 3..., respectively. According to the results afterwards, the seat is distributed. In the Modified d’Hondt method, unlike the d’Hondt method, the number of votes received for each party does not start by dividing by 1.

Table 56: Application of modified d’Hondt method

	Conservative Party	Green Party	Labour Party	Liberal Democrats	UKIP
Constituency seats won	5	0	9	0	0
+0 London-wide seat	^{4.} 764,230 / (5+0+1) = 127,372	^{1.} 207,959 / (0+0+1) = 207,959	^{6.} 1,054,801 / (9+0+1) = 105,480	^{3.} 165,580 / (0+0+1) = 165,580	^{2.} 171,069 / (0+0+1) = 171,069
+1 London-wide seat	^{5.} 764,230 / (5+1+1) = 109,176	^{7.} 207,959 / (0+1+1) = 103,980	^{8.} 1,054,801 / (9+1+1) = 95,891	165,580 / (0+1+1) = 82,790	^{11.} 171,069 / (0+1+1) = 85,535
+2 London-wide seat	^{9.} 764,230 / (5+2+1) = 95,529	207,959 / (0+2+1) = 69,320	^{10.} 1,054,801 / (9+2+1) = 87,900	165,580 / (0+2+1) = 55,193	171,069 / (0+2+1) = 57,023
+3 London-wide seat	764,230 / (5+3+1) = 84,914	207,959 / (0+3+1) = 51,990	1,054,801 / (9+3+1) = 81,139	165,580 / (0+3+1) = 41,395	171,069 / (0+3+1) = 42,767
London-wide seats	3	2	3	1	2
Total seats	8	2	12	1	2

As shown in the formula, the number of seats taken in the Constituency is also added to the section. In this case, the calculation is started as follows. The votes that Conservative Party received are divided by six which are equals to the sum of 5 and 1, and the votes that Labour Party received are divided by ten which are equals to the sum of 9 and 1. This approach is used in order to ensure justice in representation in the London Metropolitan Council. Due to London-wide election,

which is also called as Additional Member System, Labour and Conservative Parties could not achieve an essential dominance as they achieved in the first stage. While Labour and Conservative Parties both won 3 seats, Green Party and UKIP both won 2 seats, and Liberal Democrat Party won 1 seat.

Ultimately, the following table is created as a result of the analysis of the London elections data.

Table 57: Analysis of London Local Election

Party	Vote Rate of the First Stage (%)	Number of Seats in the First Stage	Vote Rate of the Second Stage (%)	Number of Seats in the Second Stage	Number of Total Seats	Rate of Seats (%)
Labour	43.5	9	40.3	3	12	%48
Conservative	31.1	5	29.2	3	8	%32
Green	9.1	0	8.0	2	2	%8
UKIP	7.6	0	6.5	2	2	%8
Liberal Democrat	7.5	0	6.3	1	1	%4
Others	1.1	0	9.6	0	0	%0

Each party that participated in the London Metropolitan Council elections in 2016 and exceeded the 5% threshold was able to achieve representation in the council at a level which is close to the votes they received. However, it can be said that the parties with the higher vote are more advantageous than other parties. For instance, in 2016 elections, Labour Party which has the highest number of votes has 4.5 over-representation rate in the first stage, and 7.7 over-representation rate in the second stage, according to the Duverger's calculation method. However, the Liberal Democrat Party, which has the lowest number of votes, has 3.5 under-representation rate in the first stage, and 2.3 under-representation rate in the second stage. It can be said that for parties other than Labour and Liberal Democrat, political fair representation has been achieved at close levels. The most important factors that make this happen are the second stage, namely the system

called London-wide is implemented and the use of the "Modified d'Hondt" method.

Table 58: Political fair representation values in London

Party	Calculation Methods/Indexes					
	For Constituency Election			For Final Version		
	Duverger's Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
Labour	4.5	4.5	20.25	7.7	7.7	59.29
Conservative	0.9	0.9	0.81	2.80	2.8	7.84
Green	-1.1	1.1	1.21	0	0	0.00
UKIP	0.4	0.4	0.16	1.5	1.5	2.25
Liberal Democrat	-3.5	3.5	12.25	-2.3	2.3	5.29
Women's Equality Party	0	0	0	-3.5	3.5	12.25
Respect	-0.6	0.6	0.36	-1.6	1.6	2.56
Britain First	0	0	0	-1.5	1.5	2.25
Christian Peoples Alliance	0	0	0	-1	1	1.00
Animal Welfare Party	0	0	0	-1	1	1.00
British National Party	0	0	0	-0.6	0.6	0.36
The House Party	0	0	0	-0.4	0.4	0.16
All People's Party	-0.3	0.3	0.09	0	0	0.00
Socialist	-0.1	0.1	0.01	0	0	0.00
Take Back the City	-0.1	0.1	0.01	0	0	0.00
Thamilini Kulendran	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Communist League	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total		11.5	35.15		23.9	94.25
Value of Index		5.75	4.19		11.95	6.86

The value of the first stage of the London 2016 local election according to the Loosemore and Hanby Index is 5.75. The value of the same stage, according to Gallagher Index, is 4.19. The value of the second stage of this selection according to Loosemore and Hanby Index is 11.95, while it is 6.86, according to Gallagher Index. In the second stage, the most crucial reason for the political fair representation to be less is the total rate of the parties that could not exceed the 5% threshold and was 9.6%.

According to the data of the London council, the most disadvantageous part of this election system is that a city with a population of approximately 9 million is represented by 25 people. In other words, there is one representative per 360,000 people. This situation indicates that London, where political fair representation rate is high, has low representation. It means that representation of London with more people than 25 could be more useful for representation.

As a result, there are some similarities between the two capitals, Ankara and London, in terms of the election system. In London's two-round election system, some of the representatives are elected to the parliament via the FPTP system, while the other is elected in the modified version of d'Hondt. In this respect, it is similar to mayors and quota members sent to the Metropolitan Municipality council from every district in Ankara. However, there is no system in Ankara where the whole city is taken as a single election district. As a result of the elections held in the districts, some of the representatives elected to the district councils become representatives in the Metropolitan Assembly. There are differences in terms of not being chosen directly and in terms of the application of d'Hondt.

5.2. Overview of Local Governments in France

There are three types of local governments in France. These are communes (municipalities), departments (provincial administrations), and regions. Regions have the same status as provinces and municipalities and have no sovereignty over provinces and municipalities (Couzigou, 2013: 73, Kuhlmann, 2011: 315). Local

governments with special status are located under regional and municipal management forms.

The high number of municipalities in France is related to the lack of small local government units in the local government system. Municipalities were established in small rural areas due to the absence of village administrations (Keleş, 1994:4).

The numbers of local governments in 2016 in France are as shown in the table below.

Table 59: Number of France local governments

Types of Local Governments	Numbers
Municipalities (<i>Communes</i>)	36.681
Metropolitan France (<i>France métropolitaine or la Métropole</i>)	36.552
Overseas France (<i>France d'outre-mer</i>)	129
Departments	101
Metropolitan France (<i>France métropolitaine or la Métropole</i>)	96
Overseas France (<i>France d'outre-mer</i>)	5
Regions	18
Metropolitan France (<i>France métropolitaine or la Métropole</i>)	12
Overseas France (<i>France d'outre-mer</i>)	6

Source: Insee - National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, n.d., <https://www.insee.fr/en/accueil>, Venir vivre en France, 2016: 55-60

There are municipal organisations not only in urban areas but also in small or rural areas in the local administrations of France. According to the data of 2006 in France, where the number of municipalities is more than 30,000, the number of municipalities in places with a population of less than 1,000 is around 27,000. As it can be understood from the high numbers of municipalities in France, the regions with low population or settlements that are not so far away from city centres have their own municipalities. Even in places where the population is not 100 people, municipal organisations are existing (Toksöz et al., 2009: 58).

Table 60: Population distribution of municipalities in France (2006)

Population	Number of Municipalities
<1,000	27.189
1,000 – 4,999	7.764
5,000 – 9,999	1.071
10,000- 49,999	849
50,000- 99,999	97
100,000 <	47

Source: Toksöz et al., 2009: 58

The local government system in France has a history of separating homogenous tiers of power to each type of authority in the local political area. These blocks all share powers at a triple-level such as economic planning, transporting, social welfare, town planning, infrastructure services, arts, and sports activities, urbanization, and social assistance services. (Allum, 1995, Koçak, & Tek, 2010: 366). At the same time, the autonomous status of the departmental, communal, and regional local government agencies protects these organizations against each other and the central administration. In France, the activities of these three types of local government organizations show a complementary distribution (Koçak, & Tek, 2010: 366).

In France, communes have different importance from other French place management institutions due to their proximity to the local people. Except for the special status of Paris, all communes have similar authority and administrative autonomy. Elected councils take charge of the administration of the communes. Within the French local government system, communes have a general mandate for their own areas (Cole, 2012: 335-337, Şinik, 2009: 250). Council of communes has the decision-making powers, and its political formation is significant in determining the ideological direction of the commune. Councillors generally do not actively participate in the decision-making process, but they follow their leaders and do not share administrative details. After the legislative elections, the mayor is elected by the new council. The mayor became the representative and agent of a nation-state (Hunt, & Chandler, 1993).

In this regard, local responsibilities such as public transportation, construction, and maintenance of primary schools, water, fire-fighters, construction permits, street lighting, libraries, sewage, waste disposal, some social assistance services, cultural and economic development are mostly in communes (Cole, 2017: 117-118, 135-139, Cole, 2012: 336, Couzigou, 2013: 80). The primary responsibilities of the departments include sewerage, health, cleaning jobs, intercity transport, social services, and rural works (Allum, 1995, Couzigou, 2013: 80). Communes, the smallest local government units, and the departments, which are larger local government units, undertake some of the services that are directly needed and required by the public.

The regions, which are a more extensive local government unit, have primary responsibilities such as economic development, vocational education, and apprenticeship relationships, urban and country planning, (Allum, 1995, Couzigou, 2013: 80). As can be seen, the regions have responsibilities on issues that are larger and effective at the country level.

Article 72 of the French Constitution allows the establishment of a special-status metropolitan area in the country in line with the provision that allows local governments to differentiate (Kayıkçı, 2003: 29-30). Law no 82-1169 of December 31, 1982, relating to the administrative organisation of Paris, Marseille, Lyon and public establishments for inter-municipal cooperation (*Loi n° 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 relative à l'organisation administrative de Paris, Marseille, Lyon et des établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*) sets the particular case of the three largest cities in France.

In France, metropolitan administrations are, in principle, the unity of many communes. Metropolitan administrations have goals such as executing projects in areas such as zoning, economy, environment, ecology, education, culture, and social development. (Eliçin, 2017: 46).

Paris is a capital and local government unit with a special statue. Also, Lyon and Marseille are local units with special statuses; moreover, these three units are

divided into arrondissements (districts). Paris has 20, Lyon has 16, and Marseille has nine arrondissements. Arrondissements in these local government units do not have a municipal legal entity, unlike other local units, but arrondissements have their own elected assemblies. These twenty arrondissements of Paris are managed like the administrative units of Paris. Their roles are mostly consulting. Some of its members are elected to the council of Paris (*Conceil de Paris*) and participate in the main decision-making power here (Toksöz et al., 2009: 58, Turan, 2013: 263).

Paris has always had a special status administration for France in the historical process. Paris has both provincial and commune status within this special status (Toksöz et al. 2009: 58).

It is observed that the management model applied for Paris in France has a slightly tricky target, such as reconciling local interests and global interests because the Paris region has the most qualified and executive functions in subjects such as research and development, financial logistics, etc. In a sense, Paris takes on the task of providing the country's connection with the global economy. On the other hand, it is also suggested that the model adopted stands on the compassionate ground because it brings together different actors with different interests (local, regional, and national), so it will be difficult to reach consensus (Bourdeau-Lepage, 2013: 407-420, Lefèvre, 2003: 289).

For political as well as economic and social reasons, the Île-de-France region has been treated differently from other regional tiers. Because Paris is the capital of France, the state was reluctant to transfer as many powers to the Île-de-France as to other standard regions. Consequently, decentralisation has not been implemented in Paris in the same way it has in the other parts of France. Several significant policy sectors such as transport and regional policy have remained under the tight control of the central governments (Lefèvre, 2003: 291).

As Lefevre explains, Paris has an important place both for the world and France.

Paris, as a capital government with special status, has the features of the department council and communal council. One of the most critical factors that ensure that Paris has special status is that the Law Enforcement-Police Governor is a representative of the state in the Paris Assembly (Toksöz et al., 2009: 58).

5.2.1 The Electoral Structures of Local Governments in France

In the communes, the council and council of the regions are elected every six years. Moreover, half of the departmental council representatives are elected every three years (Allum, 1995; Hunt, & Chandler, 2013).

An elected council governs communes. The size of the council of communes varies from 9 to 69 councillors depending on the population of the commune. Communes of under 100 population have nine members. The number of councillors increases in proportion to the population. Communes, which have more than a population of 300.000 people, have 69 councillors. Paris, Lyon, and Marseille have different council members because of their special status. Paris has 163, Lyon has 73, and Marseille has 101 seats on their councils (Hunt, & Chandler, 2013, Stevens, 2017: 150-151).

In 1982, a new electoral system was introduced for the assembly of communes with a population of more than 3500 (except for Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles, which have special status). Each French commune with more than 3,500 inhabitants is a single electoral district. The list of candidates is determined with respect to the number of seats. Voters have one vote in these elections. If there is a party (list) with more than 50 per cent of the vote, that party/list wins half of the councillors. The other half of the councillors are distributed among the parties/lists that receive more than 5 per cent of the vote according to the d'Hondt system. The party that receives 50 per cent of the votes also participates in this distribution. If no party/list secures 50 per cent of the vote, the second round is held. Parties/lists that get at least 10 per cent of the votes can participate in the second round. At this stage, the party/list with the highest number of votes receives half the seats in the electoral district. The other half of the seats are distributed among the parties that received at least 5 per cent of the vote in this round by the d'Hondt method. The party/list with the highest vote also participates in the d'Hondt method. In the second round, candidate lists of two parties can be combined depending on some conditions. This election system allows for an alliance between the parties. In the second round of elections, list combinations are shaped by election results in the

first round. In this way, weak parties can conclude an agreement with strong parties to be represented. In these elections, residents who are citizens of the European Union can vote (Stevens, 2017: 150-151, Massicotte, & Blais, 1999: 352).

5.2.2 Electoral Structure and Local Elections of Conseil de Paris

The purpose of this section is to examine the Council of Paris, which has a special status due to being both the capital and the metropolitan among the local governments of France, in terms of political fair representation. As a result of this examination, collecting data that can be compared with Ankara is also aimed.

Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, like the cities which have a special status, are divided into electoral districts. Paris, Lyon, and Marseille are divided into arrondissements. There are 20 arrondissements in Paris, 9 in Lyon and 16 in Marseille. Each arrondissement has its own council and mayor. One-third of the members elected to each arrondissement council are also members of the metropolitan city council to which the arrondissement is affiliated. The two councils are elected simultaneously, and the number of seats determines the candidates in the lists. Paris acts simultaneously as both the *conceil municipal* and the *conceil général* (Stevens, 2017: 150-151, Massicotte & Blais, 1999: 352).

This election system (*fusion*) is implemented in communes with a population of more than 3500. In communes with less than 3500 inhabitants, the majority voting system is used (Stevens, 2017: 150-151, Massicotte & Blais, 1999: 352). This system is applied in electoral districts within Paris. In other words, since Paris is divided into election districts where there is no single electoral district, this system called '*fusion*' (Massicotte & Blais, 1999: 347) is applied in the arrondissements, and a certain number of councillors are sent to the Paris council.

The election system specified is applied in the arrondissements. In the two-stage election system, a mixed system which is combined plurality/majority systems, and the proportional system is applied. In the first stage, the majority system and the d'Hondt system are used together. In the second stage, the plurality system and

the d'Hondt system are used together. This election system, which is similar to the establishment of the alliance system in Turkey in the last local election, allows for an alliance between the parties in Paris.

In 2014 local election Paris was divided into 20 electoral districts. Each election district was an arrondissement. The distribution of the councillors according to the arrondissements to the Paris council in the 2014 elections is as follows.

Table 61: Distribution of the councillors

Arrondissement	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	
Number of councillors to be sent to the Paris council	1	2	3	2	4	3	4	3	4	7	
Arrondissement	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	Total
Number of councillors to be sent to the Paris council	11	10	13	10	18	13	12	15	14	14	163

Source: Edited at Résultats des élections municipales et communautaires 2014, (2020)
[https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/\(path\)/MN2014/075/075056.html](https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/(path)/MN2014/075/075056.html)

The election was concluded in the first round, in the first, sixth, sixteenth and seventeenth arrondissements. It resulted in the second round in other arrondissements. According to the 2014 election results, the Paris council formed as follows. Firstly, the alliance of PS (*Parti socialiste*), PCF (*Parti communiste français*), PRG (*Parti radical de gauche*), GU (*Gauche unitaire*), R&S (*République solidaire*), and EÉLV (*Europe Écologie Les Verts*) had 91 councillors. Secondly, the alliance of UMP (*Union pour un mouvement populaire*), UDI (*Union des démocrates et indépendants*), and MoDem (*Mouvement démocrate*) had 71 councillors. Thirdly, the alliance of PG (*Parti de gauche*), Ensemble ! (*mouvement pour une alternative de gauche, écologiste et solidaire*), PCOF (*Parti communiste des ouvriers de France*) alliance had one councillor (Résultats des élections municipales et communautaires 2014, 2020). It is understood that many parties allied with each other. The votes received in the both rounds and the percentage of representation in the council were in the Table 62.

Table 62: Results from the first and second rounds and councillor data of the 2014 Paris Local Elections

Parties (Lists)	The result from the first round in only 4 arrondissements (%)	Councillor in the first round		A result from the first round in all arrondissements (%)	The result from the second round (%)	Number of Councillor in the second round	Rate of councillor in the second round (%)
		Number	Rate (%)				
PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S	21.04	3	10.34	34.40	53.33	88	65.67
EÉLV	5.31	-	-	8.86			
UMP, UDI, MoDem	58.40	26	89.66	35.91	44.06	45	33.58
RN, RBM	6.12	-	-	6.26	-	-	-
PG, Ensemble, PCOF	2.19	-	-	4.94	1.35	1	0.74
Paris libéré	6.16	-	-	3.36	0.51	-	-
DVD – UMP diss.- UDI diss	0.46	-	-	2.84	0.75	-	-
SE	0	-	-	1.31	-	-	-
MRC-MUP	0	-	-	1.01	-	-	-
LO	0.31	-	-	0.55	-	-	-
NPA	0	-	-	0.55	-	-	-

Source: Edited at Résultats des élections municipales et communautaires 2014, (2020)

[https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/\(path\)/MN2014/075/075056.html](https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/(path)/MN2014/075/075056.html)

(PS: Parti socialiste, PCF: Parti communiste français, PRG: Parti radical de gauche, GU: Gauche unitaire, R&S: République solidaire, EÉLV: Europe Écologie Les Verts UMP: Union pour un mouvement populaire, UDI: Union des démocrates et indépendants, MoDem: Mouvement démocrate, RN: Rassemblement national, RBM: Rassemblement bleu Marine, PG: Parti de gauche, Ensemble !: mouvement pour une alternative de gauche, écologiste et solidaire, PCOF: Parti communiste des ouvriers de France)

The results of the 2014 Paris local elections shows that there are significant differences between the votes received and the distribution of representatives in the first round. According to the Duverger's calculation method, The UMP, UDI, MoDem alliance has 31.26 over-representation rate, while the alliance of PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S has 10.70 under-representation rate. Other parties also have under-representation. According to the first round, these parties do not have councillors in the Council of Paris.

Considering the results of the second round and the number of representatives won in this round, the following results are obtained. While the PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S and EÉLV alliance has 12.34 over-representation rate, the UMP, UDI, MoDem alliance has 10.48 under-representation, and the PG, Ensemble, PCOF alliance has 0.61 under-representation.

The evaluation of the first two rounds independently is as above. The second round seems fairer than the first round. However, in order to be able to make an accurate assessment in terms of the political fair representation, the total votes won, and the total councillors won must be calculated. In this respect, the number of the first-round votes in 4 arrondissements that resulted in the first round, and the number of the second-round votes in the other 16 arrondissements that resulted in the second round were summed. Total voting rates were obtained. Likewise, the total number of representative numbers was found. In this case, the table below has emerged.

Table 63: Total vote rates and representative numbers resulting from the calculations made in the 2014 Paris Local Elections

Parties (Lists)	Total vote rate (%)	Total number of Councillors	The total rate of Councillors (%)
PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S	48.79	91	55.83
EÉLV			
UMP, UDI, MoDem	46.47	71	43.56
RN, RBM	1.03	0	0
PG, Ensemble, PCOF	1.49	1	0.61
Paris libéré	1.47	0	0
DVD	0.70	0	0
LO	0.05	0	0

Source : Edited at Résultats des élections municipales et communautaires 2014, (2020)
[https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/\(path\)/MN2014/075/075056.html](https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Municipales/elecresult__MN2014/(path)/MN2014/075/075056.html)

As a result of the calculation of total voting rates and the total number of councillors, the PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S, and EÉLV alliance that received the highest number of votes in the arrondissements with 48.79%, along with this vote rate, it has obtained a representation rate of 55.83%. The UMP, UDI, MoDem alliance received 46.47% of the votes and has a representation rate of 43.56%. The other alliance, which owns the councillor in the council, received 1.49% of votes and had a 0.61% representation rate.

According to the Duverger's calculation method, while the PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S and EÉLV alliance has 7.04 over-representation rate, the UMP, UDI, MoDem alliance has 2.91 under-representation rate, and the PG, Ensemble, PCOF alliance has 0.88 under-representation rate.

The distribution of representatives, which was much more unfair in both rounds, became fairer with the combination of the two. Especially the more unfair results in the first round were fixed with the second round.

Table 64: Political fair representation values in Paris

Party	Calculation Methods/Indexes		
	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
PS, PCF, PRG, GU, R&S	7.04	7.04	49.5616
EÉLV			
UMP, UDI, MoDem	-2.91	2.91	8.4681
RN, RBM	-1.03	1.03	1.0609
PG, Ensemble, PCOF	-0.88	0.88	0.7744
Paris libéré	-1.47	1.47	2.1609
DVD	-0.70	0.70	0.4900
LO	-0.05	0.05	0.0025
Total		14.08	62.52
Value of Index		7.04	5.59

When this selection is calculated according to the Loosemore and Hanby Index, it has a value of 7.04. According to the Gallagher Index, the value of 5.59 is reached.

Since there is a 5% threshold in this election system, some lists are not able to win representatives. Parties with less than 10% voting rate cannot enter the second round on their own. These situations are harmful in terms of the political fair representation. Besides, this system causes the winning parties in the districts to gain over-representation.

It is possible to form an alliance both before the election and between the two rounds, which is a bit positive for small parties. However, parties with less than 5% of votes in the first round cannot enter alliances before the second round.

There are 163 representatives in Paris, which has a population of approximately 2 million. This means that a representative is assigned to approximately 12 thousand people. This rate is reasonable in terms of representation power.

As a result, these findings will be compared with those of Ankara to see the effects of the electoral system in terms of political fair representation, political fair representation with alliance, and structure of the metropolitan municipal council. These two cities, which have similarities in terms of the alliance, will be evaluated through different methods of calculation over the political fair representation. Moreover, since there are alliances in both cities' electoral system, political fair representation with alliance comparisons can also be made. The council members of these two cities are not directly elected. There are councils formed by representatives from their electoral districts. However, the system of recruiting members from these electoral districts is different. It can also be compared to how these differences affect political fair representation.

5.3 Overview of Local Governments in Germany

The most basic features of local government systems in Germany are the federal system, the autonomy of local governments, and the principles of separation of powers. The autonomy of local governments also means that local governments

are one of Germany's main complementary elements and one of the most important actors of daily life (Yalçındağ, 1989: 33).

In Germany, local government units are, as a rule, municipalities (*Gemeinden*), and self-dependent rural districts - counties (*Kreise* or *Landkreis*). Nevertheless, unions, provinces, urban districts (*kreisfreie Stadt*), depending on the county cities (*kreisangehörige Gemeinde*), and city-states (*Stadtstaaten*) (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen) can also be counted among the local government units (Frenzel, 2013: 98, Mengi, 1997: 96).

It is possible to group German local governments into two main groups. The first group includes local governments in rural areas, and this group exhibits a two-step structure. Municipalities are located in the first step of this building, and districts are located in the second step. The second group includes municipalities that are separate from the district and are independent from the district organisation. These are generally city municipalities with a population of over 100,000. However, there are differences in implementation from state to state, and municipalities in less populated settlements are also excluded from the district organisation, depending on the city's economic and social importance (Mengi, 1997: 94).

Each state has a general election council (*Landtag*), a government, and a judicial system. There are two assemblies at the federal level. One of them is the Bundesrat, which consists of representatives of state governments, and the other is the Bundestag, which is made up of representatives of the entire public (Bağlı, 2011: 45).

In Article 28 of the Basic Law, the general competence of local self-government or "self-administration" (*kommunale Selbstverwaltung*) is guaranteed, and the relationship between local and state authorities is determined in the constitution. Municipalities, counties, and lands with constitutional guarantees have general authority to perform the services in their areas of duty. In accordance with the principle of "subsidiarity", the authority to make regulations regarding local governments in Germany belongs to the states (Banner, 2006: 125-126, Uzun, 2003: 605).

The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany consists of three levels of government. Outside the federation, there are 16 states (*Länder*), which are Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia, and more than 10,000 local government units. Local government consists of two types of units: municipalities (*Gemeinden*) and counties (*Kreise*). Districts usually consist of a number of municipalities and perform functions that smaller municipalities cannot fulfil. However, larger cities generally do not belong to a county, but they perform the functions of both municipalities and counties. Three of the 16 states (i.e., city-states of Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen) are both states and municipalities simultaneously and perform both state and local government functions (Erkul et al., 2016: 44, Reissert, 2006: 160).

The table below gives the numbers of states, municipalities, and other local administrations in Germany.

Table 65: Local governments numbers of Germany

Types of Local Governments	Numbers
States (<i>Länder</i>)	16
Counties (<i>Kreis - Landkreis</i>)	323
Municipalities Do Not Belong to a District (<i>Kreisfreistaedte</i>)	116
Municipalities (<i>Gemeinden</i>)	12.629

Source: Erkul et al., 2016: 47, Frenzel, 2013: 100

As can be seen, the number of municipalities is high in Germany. The closest local government units are municipalities.

German local authorities are primarily servicing organisations. The task of delivering public services, which are compulsory, and voluntary - optional (two types of responsibilities), in Germany, is mainly shared between the federal state, states, and local governments. The first type is managed by federal and *Länd* laws, and it carried out by the counties. Examples of local administrations' compulsory services are zoning, housing, transportation, construction works, waste collection, drinking water and energy supply. The second type is derived from a competence that allows a commune to act in the interests of its citizens. As an example of local

administrations' voluntary duties, we can show the establishment and operation of a museum, establishment of sports fields and swimming pools (Allum, 1995, Banner, 2006: 125, Ulusoy, 2005: 109, Uzun, 2003: 608).

Municipalities are part of the state. In the state and administrative structure, they are called the lowest level below the Federation and Länder. Each of these levels is represented and legitimized by parliaments. When looking at the relations between local authorities to the higher levels, a distinction must be made between the relations of towns, municipalities, and districts to the Federation on the one hand and the respective Land on the other. In principle, the Federation is only the guarantor of local government agencies, but - with few exceptions - it has no direct relationship with individual municipalities or districts (Haschke, 1998).

Although they vary slightly from state to state, the main tasks of municipalities can be summarised as local traffic and road construction, providing water, light, gas, and electricity for the residences, ensuring food safety, urban planning, construction and supervision of houses, local police and fire services, supporting the local culture, providing adult education as well as a primary and vocational school, local health services, marriage and mother guidance, school hygiene and children's physical development, funeral services, and local monuments and historical buildings (Frenzel, 2013: 112).

Local governments have another area called as a district. Districts have two roles. It is chosen to manage tasks that small communes cannot do, and it is also the lowest level of state government in Germany (Allum, 1995). Districts (*kreise*) with complementary services to municipalities mediate the equal distribution of local services at the country level (Uzun, 2003: 612). The main services carried out by the district local administrations are can be summarised as vocational education, cultural services, social and youth assistance services, construction and repair of inter-municipal roads, environmental protection services, traffic control, and transport services for students (Ulusoy, 2005: 109).

Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen have a special status. They have both state and local government functions. The constitutions of these cities include provisions on municipal administration. The Senate, the state council, is also the metropolitan city council. Under the metropolitan municipality (*Hauptverwaltung*), district municipalities (*Bezirksverwaltungen*) are located. In these city-states, district municipalities do not have legal personality. The district municipal council (*Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*) is created by citizens in the district municipality boundaries, by the method of proportional representation (Mengi, 1997: 98).

5.3.1. The Electoral Structures of Local Governments in Germany

One of the main units of the government is the municipality. They are established to fulfil the role of political and administrative restructuring and often offer a wide range of services. They also have great discretion in the implementation of their responsibilities. Works of the municipality are carried out by an elected council, which is *Ländtag*. These are determined by the constitutional laws of the state (Peters, 1993).

The size of the council usually depends on the size of the society. The mayor, who is the chairman of the council, is elected in the assembly for a certain period. The executive and administrative powers in large areas are in the hands of a different officer than the mayor appointed by the council (Allum, 1995).

State elections (*Landtagswahl*) take place every five years in each of the 16 states. Bremen is the only state where elections take place every four years. The name of the state councils is not the same in every city: "*Bürgerschaft*" in Hamburg and Bremen, "*Abgeordnetenhaus*" or "House of Representatives" in Berlin. It is called "Landtag" in all the remaining federal states. Council meetings (*Ländtag*) are not frequent, so majority parties choose members with administrative skills for the council (Bağlı, 2011, Voting in Germany, n.d.)

In *Ländtag* electoral systems in Germany, in states allocated to the different number of electoral districts, mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems

(*personalisierte Verhältniswahl*), which is the combination of principles of proportional representation and plurality system, namely the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, is applied. These systems can be categorized as At-large MMP systems, Regionalised MMP systems, Two-level MMP systems (The President of the State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, 2019: 12-13, Weinmann, & Grotz, 2020).

Individual candidates win seats based on the number of votes cast directly in their electoral district (first-past-the-post system). The number of representations won by political parties in *Ländtag* is based on the proportional distribution (proportional representation) of the votes of the parties. (The President of the State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, 2019: 12-13).

These systems are implied for two votes, which are candidate vote (*Erststimme*) and party vote (*Zweitstimme*), for each voter in all constituencies (Linhart et al., 2010: 244).

Constituency seat is selected by candidate vote (*Erststimme*). One representative from each electoral district (*Direktmandat*) is selected to *Ländtag* by applying the FPTP system. One Constituency seat - district candidate is elected from each electoral district (Linhart et al., 2010: 244, The President of the State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, 2019: 12-13).

In party vote (*Zweitstimme*), PR systems are applied instead of plurality rule. In party vote, the entire state is a constituency, and a 5% election threshold is generally applied. Variant forms of the proportional representation system are used in all German federal states. Representatives are distributed by applying the Largest Remainder Method (Hare- Niemeyer Method or LR Hare), Sainte-Laguë Method, and d'Hondt Method. Party vote allows the number of seats in the parliament to appear. Each state has a minimum number of representatives, but there is no definite number of representatives. The reason for this is the levelling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*). All overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) that arise during the allocation of mandates

will be compensated (Linhart, et al., 2010: 244, Potrafke et al., 2020: 6, Seils, 2013, Weinmann & Grotz, 2020).

All in all, the number and distribution of representatives in the Landtag is determined. Seats are distributed in three steps. The first step is that all successful constituency candidates in the electoral districts are elected with the *Erststimme*. In a second step, the party votes (*Zweitstimme*) become essential; the proportional representation systems (Weinmann & Grotz, 2020) are used to calculate the number of representatives for each party. Those with a higher voting rate of more than five per cent are taken into calculation. At the last step, leveling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) appear. These were created to compensate for overrepresentation. The party can win more direct seats (in the *Erststimme*) than it is entitled to by proportional representation (in the *Zweitstimme*). When the party wins so many constituency seats in the candidate – direct vote (*Erststimme*) that the number of seats across the State (Land) that it has going to be higher than its percentage of the party votes (*Zweitstimme*), then the number of seats in the parliament (*Ländtag*) increases overall. Because the party maintains the extra overhang seats hence the other parties gain extra seats, according to the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). These extra seats are named leveling seats or “equalisation” seats (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) (Lewis, & Zitzlsperger, 2016: 208-209, Linhart et al., 2010: 244, Turner, 2011: 172, Weinmann & Grotz, 2020).

Each federation may have a different system. Some do not apply a 5% threshold; some make only one choice. Party votes calculation methods also differ.

5.3.2 Electoral Structure and Local Elections of Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin

The purpose of this section is to examine the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin - House of Representatives in terms of political fair representation. Berlin, as the capital city of Germany, has a different status as a city-state and a different electoral system. In this respect, Ankara, the capital of Turkey, can be compared in terms of political fair representation, formation, and structure. The Duverger’s calculation

method, Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index will be used in order to determine the value of political fair representation.

The Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin has a minimum of 130 representatives; however, more representatives can be elected.

Berlin's constitution allows parties to nominate for a party list or district list. Everyone who votes in the elections of the House of Representatives has two votes. The first one is the *Erststimme* constituency vote, and it is elected according to the FPTP system. The second votes (*Zweitstimme*) are calculated by the LR Hare system, which is one of the proportional representation ways. This voting determines the size of the various assembly groups in the House of Representatives. In Berlin, five percent votes or minimum one single-member districts' seat (first votes) as an alternative hurdle. Approximately three-fifths of the seats in Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin are determined by candidate vote (*Erststimme*) (*Direktmandat*), while the remaining two-fifths are distributed based on the proportional power of political parties in the party vote (*Zweitstimme*) (*Ausgleichsmandat*). Two votes can be used for different parties or candidates ("vote-splitting"). There are at least 130 seats in Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin; however, more representatives are usually elected. The reason for this is the leveling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*). Seventy-eight of these seats is selected in the candidate vote (*Erststimme*) because Berlin is divided into 78 election districts. Other seats are formed by the party vote (*Zweitstimme*) and the implementation of leveling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, 2015: 4-5, Landeswahlgesetz, 1987, Plischke, 2012: 37, Weinmann & Grotz, 2020).

The 2016 Berlin local elections were held according to this election system. The table below which shows the vote rates of parties in *Erststimme* and *Zweitstimme*, number of seats in *Erststimme* and totally, and percentage of total seats, has been prepared according to these election results.

Table 66: First election (*Erststimme*), and second election (*Zweitstimme*) results and representative numbers of Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin elections in 2016

Party	Vote Rates in <i>Erststimme</i> (%)	Number of Seats in the <i>Erststimme</i>	Vote Rates in <i>Zweitstimme</i> (%)	Total Number of Seats	Percentage of seats (%)
SPD	24.79	28	21.55	38	23.75
CDU	19.82	21	17.61	31	19.38
GRÜNE	15.76	12	15.19	27	16.88
DIE LINKE	15.43	12	15.64	27	16.88
FDP	5.56	0	6.70	12	7.50
AfD	14.12	5	14.16	25	15.63
Others	4.51	0	9.16	0	0
Total		78		160	

Source: Edited from ARD1 (n.d.), Die Landeswahlleiterin für Berlin (2016), and The Federal Returning Officer (n.d.)

SPD: *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party of Germany), CDU: *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), GRÜNE: *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (Alliance 90/The Greens), DIE LINKE: *Die Linke* (The Left), FDP: *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party), AfD: *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany)

SPD is the party with the highest number of votes in the first (*Erststimme*), and the second election (*Zweitstimme*) elections. It is also the party with the highest number of representatives. Six parties have passed the threshold. FDP, which did not come first from any election region in the *Erststimme*, had 12 seats thanks to the *Zweitstimme* results and the leveling seat. The parties of SPD, CDU, GRÜNE, DIE LINKE, FDP, and AfD were able to overcome the threshold, while others could not exceed the threshold and therefore could not send representatives to parliament.

In the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin elections in 2016, the results of the first (*Erststimme*), and the second election (*Zweitstimme*) and the distributions of the representatives are in table 66. With respect to this information, when calculated in terms of political fair representation according to the calculation method of Duverger, over/under-representation occurred as follows.

First, SPD has 1.04 under-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has 2.20 over-representation rate according to *Zweitstimme*. Second, CDU has 0.44 under-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has a 1.77 over-representation rate

according to *Zweitstimme*. Third, GRÜNE has 1.12 over-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has 1.69 over-representation rate according to *Zweitstimme*. Fourth, DIE LiNKE has 1.45 over-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has 1.24 overrepresentation according to *Zweitstimme*. Fifth, FDP has 1.94 over-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has 0.80 overrepresentation according to *Zweitstimme*. Moreover, lastly, AfD has 1.51 over-representation rate according to *Erststimme* and has 1.47 over-representation according to *Zweitstimme*.

According to *Erststimme*, the SPD has the highest under-representation (1.04), and FDP has the highest overrepresentation (1.94). According to *Zweitstimme*, there are no parties with underrepresentation. The reason for this situation is that the total number of votes of the parties that have not exceeded the threshold is 9.1% and the *Ausgleichsmandate* application. This voting rate is equal to the over-representation rate of six parties passing the threshold. The highest over-representation is in SPD (2.20).

Calculations based on the Duverger calculation method show that the over/under-representation rates are very low, based on both selections. This situation can be interpreted that the levelling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) applications were successful.

Table 67: Political fair representation values in Berlin

Party	Calculation Methods/Indexes					
	For Erststimme			For Final Result		
	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index	Duverger Calculation Method	Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index
SPD	-1.04	1.04	1.08	2.20	2.20	4.83
CDU	-0.44	0.44	0.20	1.77	1.77	3.12
GRÜNE	1.12	1.12	1.26	1.69	1.69	2.87
DIE LiNKE	1.45	1.45	2.09	1.24	1.24	1.54
FDP	1.14	1.14	1.30	0.00	0.00	0.00
AfD	1.51	1.51	2.28	1.47	1.47	2.17

Table 67 (cont'd)						
piraten	-1.98	1.98	3.93	-1.73	1.73	-1.98
NPD	-0.32	0.32	0.10	-0.58	0.58	-0.32
pro Deutschland	-0.42	0.42	0.18	-0.45	0.45	-0.42
Die PARTEI	-1.22	1.22	1.48	-1.95	1.95	-1.22
BIG	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
DKP	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.21	0.21	-0.01
ödp	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
PSG	-0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.13	0.13	-0.04
BüSo	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.08	0.08	0.00
B	-0.05	0.05	0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.05
DL	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ALFA	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.41	0.41	-0.01
Tierschutzallianz	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-1.87	1.87	-0.02
Graue Panther	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.11	1.11	0.00
DIE EINHEIT	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
DIE VIOLETTEN	-0.06	0.06	0.00	-0.05	0.05	-0.06
MENSCHLICHE WELT	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.05	0.05	-0.02
MIETERPARTEI	-0.06	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.06
Gesundheitsforschung	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.48	0.48	0.00
Total		11.21	13.97		17.53	27.09
Value of Index		5.60	2.64		8.77	3.68

SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany), CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), GRÜNE: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens), DIE LINKE: Die Linke (The Left), FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party), AfD: Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)

According to the Loosemore and Hanby Index, the value of these choices is 5.60 for *Erststimme* and 8.77 for the final result. The biggest reason for this difference is that other parties that received 9.16 votes in *Zweitstimme* could not send representatives to the parliament. When calculated according to Gallagher Index, *Erststimme* has a value of 2.64, while the final result has a value of 3.68. If non-representative parties are excluded from calculations, these values are drawn much lower.

The 5% threshold is a disadvantage for the representation of smaller parties. Having more than 3.5 million inhabitants, Berlin has 160 representatives and

shows that it is strong in terms of representation power. Because there is approximately one representative per 22,000 people.

As a result, the main difference between Berlin and Ankara's election system is that the election systems are different. These findings will be compared with those of Ankara to see the effects of the electoral system and levelling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) applications in terms of political fair representation, and structure of the council. These two cities, which are similar in terms of being the capital, implement the election threshold, albeit at different rates. In the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, mayors from each district can directly participate in the council, while all those elected in the Berlin council are directly elected.

The other differences is that voters in Ankara use one vote, while those in Berlin use two votes. While the d'Hondt method is used in Ankara, both the first past the post voting (FPTP) method and the LR Hare method are used in Berlin.

Another difference is that levelling seats and overhang seats are seen in Berlin. However, in Ankara, there is not any type of balancing systems. The political fair representation will be examined by evaluating all of these.

5.4 Comparison of Ankara with London, Paris, and Berlin in terms of Local Governments and Political Fair Representation

London Metropolitan Council election held in 2016, Council of Paris election held in 2014, and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin election held in 2016 were discussed in the previous chapters. In this section, these elections and Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council election held in 2019 will be compared. First, the electoral systems of these metropolitan cities will be discussed, and then the comparison will be made according to the Indexes and calculation methods. After these comparisons are made, the differences between them will be examined. The reasons and advantages and disadvantages of these differences will be found out.

London Metropolitan Council election has two stages as clarified in detail in section 5.1. The first stage is the constituency elections. In these elections, a representative is elected from each electoral district. First Past the Post (FPTP) system is applied while selecting representatives. The second stage is London-wide elections. In this stage, the Modified d'Hondt method is applied.

In Paris, the election system called “*fusion*” is used. This selection system also has two stages. Plurality/majority system and proportional system are used together in 20 electoral districts. In the first stage, if no party can receive 50% of the total votes in an *arrondissement*, the second stage of the election is carried out in this *arrondissement*. Also, alliance formation in Paris is similar to those in Turkey.

There is also a two-stage election system in Berlin. The first stage is the *Erststimme*, constituency vote. With the FPTP system, representatives in election districts are elected. In the second stage, *Zweitstimme*, LR Hare System is applied. However, the election of representatives does not end with these two stages. Systems called levelling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) are engaged in order to make the distribution of representatives more proportional.

The election system used in Ankara has one step. Every district in Ankara is a constituency. The mayor and the quota members from each district take part in the metropolitan city council. In this respect, it is similar to *Erststimme*. Besides, metropolitan municipality council members are composed of representatives of district municipalities. This situation shows that Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council does not comprise of only one election.

Thanks to the results of the calculations made in previous chapters, the political fair representation values of these four cities were created.

The table below shows the values resulting from the calculations made in the previous chapters. Comparisons will be made according to these values.

Table 68: Comparison of council elections

Value of the Indexes & Methods Councils		Loosemore and Hanby Index	Gallagher Index	Duverger's calculation method	
				The Highest Rate of Over-representation	The Highest Rate of Under-representation
Ankara	Parties	24.87	19.10	18.86	-18.17
	Alliance	22.49	21.49	22.59	-20.29
London	Constituency Election	5.75	4.19	4.5	-3.5
	Final Result	11.95	6.86	7.7	-3.5
Paris	Final Result	7.04	5.59	7.04	-2.91
Berlin	Erststimme	5.60	2.64	1.51	-1.22
	Final Result	8.77	3.68	2.20	-1.95

When the councils which are examined according to the Loosemore and Hanby Index are considered, the results are as follows. First, the *Erststimme* election, which is held in Berlin ranks first in terms of political fair representation with the value of 5.6, according to Loosemore and Hanby Index. Second, Constituency election held in London has the second highest value of political fair representation with 5.75. Loosemore and Hanby value of Final Result is 7.04 in Paris, 8.77 in Berlin, 11.95 in London. In Ankara, the value of Loosemore and Hanby Index is 22.49 in alliance-based version and 24.87 in party-based version. The lowest political fair representation belongs to Ankara. If the elections are sorted with respect to Loosemore and Hanby Index, the list is as follows: Berlin-*Erststimme*, London-Constituency, Paris-Final Result, Berlin-Final Result, London-Final Result, Ankara with Alliance, and Ankara with Parties. The sequence starts from the highest political fair representation to the lowest political fair representation.




Figure 18: Loosemore and Hanby Index values of four capitals' elections

The *Erststimme* election, which is held in Berlin ranks first in terms of political fair representation according to Gallagher Index results, as it is Loosemore and Hanby Index results. After *Erststimme*, which has 2.64 value according to Gallagher Index, Final Result value of Berlin is 3.68, which means that it ranks second in political fair representation. London – Constituency election result' value is 4.19, according to Gallagher Index. Also, the value of the Final Result is 5.59 in Paris and is 6.86 in London. Gallagher Index Value of Ankara is 19.10 in party-based version and is 21.49 in alliance-based version. Ankara ranks last in terms of political fair representation among these capitals, according to Gallagher Index values. Together with all, if the elections are sorted depend on Gallagher Index, the list is as follows: Berlin-*Erststimme*, Berlin- Final Result, London- Constituency, Paris- Final Result, London- Final Result, Ankara-Alliance, Ankara-Parties. The sequence starts from the highest political fair representation to the lowest political fair representation.




Figure 19: Gallagher Index values of four capitals' elections

In this section, the election results are calculated according to Duverger's calculation method. Then, the results of the calculations were classified as over-representation or under-representation, and the highest over/under-representation rates that any party has in the specified election were determined. As seen in the figure, the lowest over-representation and under-representation rates are in the Berlin-*Erststimme* elections. The political fair representation in the elections is parallel with fewness of these rates. The second lowest rate of over and under-representation is in Berlin-Final Result. These rates show that Berlin has an election system which is very closer to be fair compare to other capitals' electoral systems, according to Duverger's calculation method. The highest rate of both over-representation and under-representation belong to Ankara for both versions. Ankara's disproportionality is higher than that of other capital cities, according to Duverger's calculation method. It can be an inference that Ankara has the lowest political fair representation.




Figure 20: The highest over/under-representation rates of four capitals' elections in terms of Duverger's calculation method

It is observed that Ankara has higher values and rate in these calculation methods and indexes (Loosemore and Hanby Index, the Gallagher Index, and Duverger's calculation method). These values and rate are inversely proportional to political fair representation, so local elections which held in Ankara has lower political fair representation than others have. In order to better determine the cause of this situation, it is necessary to compare the values and rate of Ankara local elections results with the other capitals' values and rate in elections, one by one.




Figure 21: Comparison of Ankara and London local elections results

The factors that make a difference in political fair representation between London and Ankara are as follows:

- There is a two-stage election system in London, and Modified d'Hondt method is implemented in the second stage. Because of this implementation, parties that could send representatives to the council in the first stage were tried to be limited in the second stage. This situation has benefited parties that received a low rate of the vote. However, there is a one-stage election system in Ankara, and district municipality mayors and quota members are also members of the metropolitan municipality council. However, there is no difference in implementation of the d'Hondt method in the Ankara local elections, as there is in London local elections.
- The first stage of the London local elections takes place in 14 electoral districts, but in the second stage, London is considered a single electoral district. However, in the Ankara local elections, Ankara is considered a single electoral district to elect only metropolitan municipality mayor. Members of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council were elected not directly but indirectly, from 25 districts. Each of these districts is an electoral district.
- In Ankara, members of Metropolitan Municipality Council are elected indirectly, that is, the votes are cast for the district municipality council, but one-fifth of the district municipality council members, for each district, are sent to Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council. However, in London, representatives are elected directly.
- The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is implemented in Ankara. However, the threshold is 5% in London. The difference in threshold systems makes a change in terms of the representation of parties with a low rate of the vote.
- Therefore, there are different types of election system implications, which crates differences in terms of representation of small parties in councils.




Figure 22: Comparison of Ankara and Paris local elections results

The factors that make a difference in political fair representation between Paris and Ankara are:

- Alliance formation in Paris is provided by a legal basis, but in the local elections in Turkey, a legal arrangement has not been made regarding the formation of an alliance. As a result of that, electoral alliances in Ankara are held in the election of the Metropolitan Municipal Mayor and the membership of district municipal councils. This situation is in the form of withdrawal of the parties in favour of other parties. There has been no change on alliances in elections of district municipal councils' membership. After the elections, these alliances continued to exist in both district municipal council and metropolitan municipality council. However, this situation has no legal basis.
- Alliance formation brought advantages for parties with a low rate of the vote. Parties that received few votes in the first stage of the election can participate in the second stage of the elections together with alliances depending on certain conditions.
- Election threshold is 5% in Paris during application of d'Hondt. However, in Turkey, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system, disadvantageous for parties with few rates of votes, is applied.




Figure 23: Comparison of Ankara and Berlin local elections results

The factors that make a difference in political fair representation between Berlin and Ankara are:

- The electoral system held in Berlin is two-stage. In the first stage, *Erststimme*, 78 representatives are elected in each 78 electoral districts. These elections are held according to the FTPT system. In the second stage, the LR Hare System is implemented. Leveling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) implementations are used to prevent unfairness caused by these two systems.
- Leveling seat and overhang seat are applications that increase the number of representatives. The Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin has at least 130 representatives after the elections. However, thanks to the Leveling seat (*die Ausgleichsmandate*) and overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) applications, extra representatives can be sent to the Abgeordnetenhaus, in order to ensure balance. Since these applications are not in the form of rearranging 130 representatives, ensuring the balance is easier, which causes the political fair representation to rise. In Turkey, the number of representatives that each district municipality will send to the metropolitan

municipal council is certain, and no other action is taken in the number of representatives to ensure political fair representation.

- Representatives in the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin are elected directly. However, in Ankara, representatives are elected indirectly.
- In Berlin, there is a requirement to have a 5% vote in the transition from the first stage to the second stage of the elections or to have a representative which is sent in the first stage of the elections. However, in Ankara, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is applied. The system that is used in Berlin has advantageous for the parties that received few rates of votes.
- The second stage of the elections in Berlin, Berlin is the single electoral district. This situation is only present in the metropolitan municipality mayor elections in Ankara.

According to analysis and calculations for election systems, Ankara is less successful than the three metropolitan cities, which are London, Paris, and Berlin, in terms of political fair representation. When the local election system of Ankara is compared with the other three capitals' election systems, it is observed that the local election system of Ankara has some disadvantageous features. These features can be listed as follows:

- The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is applied,
- The members of metropolitan municipality council are elected indirectly,
- Ankara is not a single electoral district; indeed, there are 25 electoral districts in Ankara,
- There is no system to prevent disproportional conditions to ensure balance.

It can be argued that these features are the major reasons for the low political fair representation in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council.

5.5 Summary and Conclusion

According to analysis and calculations for election systems, Ankara is less successful than the three metropolitan cities, which are London, Paris, and Berlin, in terms of political fair representation. When the local election system of Ankara is compared with the other three capitals' election systems, it is observed that the local election system of Ankara has some disadvantageous features. These features can be listed as follows:

- The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is applied in Ankara. This effect is noticeable when 2019 local elections are compared with the data of London, Paris and Berlin.
- The members of metropolitan municipality council are elected indirectly, the London and Berlin examples show that direct election is more effective.
- Ankara is not a single electoral district; indeed, there are 25 electoral districts in Ankara. London and Berlin have a single district in at least one stage.
- There is no system to prevent disproportional conditions to ensure balance. It can be argued that these features are the major reasons for the low political fair representation in Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council. These types of implementation are available in London and Berlin and used to raise the political fair representation.
- The alliance system does not exist in Turkish local election system. In the Council of Paris elections, it is observed that the parties with few votes gained representation by applying the alliance system.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary and Discussion

Local governments are the administrative units that are closest to the public and are considered the most accessible to the public since these units are where people get the services, they need most in their daily life. Although the understanding of local government which is dating back many years may emerge differently in different countries, its common purpose is to meet the demands and needs of the public.

One of the most important local government units is municipalities. Municipalities, which have great importance in our country, have been shaped in different ways in different countries. However, the most important feature of municipalities is the local councils, which have an important place in the decision-making mechanism. These units exist as municipal councils and metropolitan municipal councils in our country.

In democratic countries, local council representatives are elected through elections. These elections can be made by applying different election systems. In these elections, where the people are most closely involved in politics, voters elect representatives to represent themselves in local councils. Thanks to these representatives, the public desires to influence the environmental decisions they live in.

Free, regular, fair, and honest elections are directly linked to democracy and have an essential place in a democracy. The proportional representation (PR) system and plurality/majority election systems are widely used in countries governed by

democracy. There are some points where these two systems have advantages. PR system seems more advantageous than plurality/majority in terms of political fair representation.

There are different ways of applying these systems. In plurality/majority system, which is considered more suitable for the two-party system, there are application forms in which the party that get the majority of votes are elected (first-past-the-post, FPTP) and where more than 50% of the votes are selected.

In the proportional representation system, representative numbers can be determined by using the highest averages methods or the largest remainder methods. The d'Hondt formula which is applied in Turkey since the 1960s and Sainte-Laguë method highest averages are examples of methods that are applied in proportional representation systems. Also, Hare quota and Droop quota are examples of the largest remainder method. These methods create changes in the conversion of the votes to the number of representatives, which affects political fair representation.

There are many studies on fair representation in the literature. These studies examined fair representation in terms of gender equality, geography, and minorities, as well as in terms of politics. In political fair representation term, which is emphasized in this study, analysis is made on the parties. However, studies of political fair representation in the literature were mostly at the level of the central government. There are very few studies at the local level.

The simplest definition of political fair representation is a reflection of voter will to the representative number proportionally. There are different methods to measure this situation and to measure proportionality - disproportionality. Duverger's calculation method is one of them. When Duverger explained the over/under-representation, he used a very simple calculation method in 1972. This calculation method is based on subtraction. It is used to calculate disproportionality on the basis of parties. Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index are used for disproportionality and political fair representation

analysis based on elections results. These three methods and indexes (Duverger's calculation method, Loosemore and Hanby Index, and Gallagher Index), which are applied in this study are the most common ones.

Along with the principle of political fair representation, the principle of stability in government are two principles that negatively affect each other. Therefore, giving importance to one principle causes the other principle to be lower. Some applications are observed in the elections where one of these principles was adopted. These applications are seen in both parliamentary elections and local council elections. For instance, the threshold applied in elections is an application that puts the principle of stability in the foreground, and it can be seen in both types of elections. In addition, the electoral systems affect these principles. While plurality/majority election systems are closer to the principle of stability in government, on the other hand, Proportional Representation election systems are closer to the principle of political fair representation. Different electoral systems and practices are used together to strike a balance between these two opposite principles.

In this study, the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council has been evaluated in terms of political fair representation. In this context, firstly, elections, which are a requirement of democracy, are mentioned, and then the effects of election methods on political fair representation are covered. As a result, it was found that different election systems affect political fair representation differently, so the necessity of finding ways to measure political fair representation has emerged. All of the indexes and calculation methods are reviewed in the calculation of proportionality, disproportionality, and political fair representation. Some of the indexes and calculation are chosen, and their importance is indicated. Since examining Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council with only one election cannot give comparable findings, other councils and elections that can be compared had to be found. As a result, it was decided to examine both the previous council elections and other council election examples from different countries. The effects of different systems are clearly revealed by investigating the systems in all sample elections.

As a result of all these, Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council has been evaluated comparatively in terms of political fair representation.

As a result of this study, according to Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index, the elections with the highest proportionality and political fair representation are the elections in 1968, in Ankara. 2.765 and 1.65 index values, which are the lowest values, belong to these elections. According to these indexes, the most disproportional elections were 2004 local elections. Also, the elections with the least political fair representation are the 2004 local elections. These elections have 31.00 and 23.91 index values, and these values are the highest values. According to the Loosemore and Hanby Index, the order of the elections that queue from the highest political fair representation to lowest political fair representation is 1968, 1963, 1973*¹ (the first situation), 1977, 1973*^{2,3,4,5} (the other situations), 1984, 2009, 1999, 2019 (alliance-based), 2019 (party-based), 1989, 1994, 2014, and 2004. When these elections are ordered in the same way, according to Gallagher Index, the sequence of the elections is 1968, 1963, 1977, 1973*^{1,2,3,4,5} (every situations), 1999, 1984, 2009, 1994, 2019 (party-based), 1989, 2019 (alliance-based), 2014, and 2004.

According to Duverger's calculation method, the highest over-representation rate is in the 2004 local election in Ankara. In this election, JDP has 31.00 over-representation rate. The election with the highest under-representation rate is in the Ankara 2019 local election. In this election, RPP has 18.17 under-representation rate, and Nation Alliance has 20.29 under-representation rate, which is the highest rate in under-representation in Ankara local elections. There are minor differences between the ranking of the values of Loosemore and Hanby Index and Gallagher Index; nevertheless, the election in which the index values increase most is the 1984 local elections, according to the analysis made in this study. Impacts of the Law No. 3030 on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities which is legislated before 1984 local elections are considerable.

The system that Law No. 3030 brought causes the metropolitan municipality council to be elected indirectly. Also, the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

boundary is not a single electoral district. While the metropolitan municipality mayor is elected, the metropolitan borders are a single electoral district. However, there is no such situation for the election of metropolitan municipality council members. Since the elections which are held since 1984 are regulated in the same way, there is no increase in the political fair representation. In the period between 1963 local elections and 1984 local elections, the differences in terms of disproportionality between members of the provincial general council and municipality council are evident. As seen in Chapter 4, although the votes rates are close to each other in the provincial general council and municipal council elections, there are large differences in the rates of representatives elected in these elections. This situation is an example that shows the difference between divided electoral districts and a single electoral district. This kind of election system creates a handicap in terms of political fair representation.

Another reason for the decrease in the political fair representation is the use of the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system. The impacts of the electoral district and the threshold system are also evident in the vote rates of the parties that could not send representatives to the metropolitan municipality council. In local elections before the 1984 local elections, the number of parties that could not send representatives was very low. The parties that have 0.09% vote rate in 1963 (only independent candidates), 0.75% vote rate in 1967, 0.58% vote rate in 1973 (if the independent candidates are elected), 6.07% vote rate in 1973 (if the independent candidates are not elected), and 1.80% vote rate in 1977 could not send representatives to metropolitan municipality council. According to this situation, it is seen that the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system and change in electoral district boundary caused a remarkable increase in vote rates that unrepresented parties have. This system and change are used in local elections which are held in 1984 and after. Because of this system and change, parties which received 14.37% vote rate in 1984, 11.79% vote rate in 1989, 14.17% vote rate in 1994, 16.60% vote rate in 1999, 13.47% vote rate in 2004, 6.16% vote rate in 2009, 3.60% vote rate in 2014, and 6.60% vote rate in 2019 in local elections are not represented in the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal

Council. So, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system and changes in electoral district boundary can be seen as an obstacle to fair representation.

In the 1984 local elections, the mayors of the districts' municipalities within the boundaries of the metropolitan city became members of the metropolitan municipality council. In Ankara, the winner parties that win district municipality council member election and district municipality mayor election are the same in general. In this case, the party that rank first in both elections are represented more. So, this situation leads to a decrease in political fair representation. However, there is no regulation or application that balances this situation.

The quota membership implementation, which is brought with 1989 local election is critical for political fair representation. In response to this application, disproportionality has increased in general since no other application that can balance proportionality has been introduced. So, political fair representation increased in general. The quota membership implications, which started to be implemented in 1989, has created disadvantageous for the parties that cannot rank first in municipal council elections in terms of proportionality.

Within the scope of the study, detailed examinations have been made about London Metropolitan Council, Council of Paris, and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin. As a result of these examinations, Data were provided on the duties of the councils, their special status condition, council structures, election systems and election results.

The political fair representation of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 2019 local elections is lower than the political fair representation of London Metropolitan Council in 2016 local elections, Conseil de Paris in 2014 local elections, and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin in 2016 local elections.

According to Loosemore and Hanby and Gallagher Indexes, index values of Ankara in 2019, local elections are higher than other capitals' index values.

According to Duverger's calculation method, proportionality and political fair representation are low.

When Ankara is compared with London, it is seen that London's political fair representation is in a much better condition than Ankara. One of the reasons for this situation is the application of the modified d'Hondt method, which is a mechanism to balance the number of representatives in London, which is a system different from the elections of other local government units in England. This method has different functioning process than the d'Hondt method implemented in Ankara. Another reason is that London has a two-stage election system, and London is considered as a single electoral district in the second stage which is also called London-wide elections. Ankara is not considered as a single electoral district, which leads to low political fair representation. Another reason is that representatives of London Metropolitan Council are elected directly. However, representatives of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council are elected indirectly. The last reason is that London has a 5% threshold system, although Ankara has the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system.

The reasons for the situation in Paris, whose political fair representation is more than Ankara, can be summarized as follows. First of all, the alliance system in Paris, which has a special status in France, aims to ensure that the parties with few votes are also represented. However, the electoral alliance system in Turkey was organized for the general election. There is no legal regulation for local elections. The other significant reason is that 5% threshold system is applied in Paris, different from Ankara. In Ankara, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is applied in local elections.

When Ankara and Berlin are compared, political fair representation of Berlin which has a special status is higher. One of the reasons for that is that Berlin has a two-stage election system. In the first stage, representatives are sent as representatives from 78 electoral districts, while in the second stage, Berlin is a single electoral district; however, for Ankara local elections, each of 25 districts is electoral districts. The other reason is that different from Ankara; representatives

are elected directly in Berlin local elections. Another reason is that in the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin elections, the parties must have received 5% of the vote or they must have taken a representative from the first elections. However, the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system is applied in Ankara. The last reason is the leveling seat (die Ausgleichsmandate) and overhang seats (Überhangmandate) implications in Berlin. These implications contribute to increase in political fair representation, and to the change in the number of representatives in the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin. However, in Ankara, there is no such balancing implication.

As a result of these findings, it is seen that the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council is far from political fair representation. The main reasons of the low the political fair representation of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council are as follows.

- The first reason is electing all members of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council (except for the metropolitan municipality mayor) indirectly. One-fifth of the number of members from each district municipality council is sent to the metropolitan municipality council. This creates a disadvantageous situation for parties with low vote rate in districts.
- The second reason is that, depending on the previous situation, 'elections for metropolitan municipality council members' do not exist. In other words, voters can choose candidates to go to the metropolitan municipality council limitedly.
- In Ankara local elections, Ankara does not consider as a single electoral district, but 25 districts in Ankara are electoral districts. This affects political fair representation negatively. As expressed in the previous reason, there is no election system in the form of "metropolitan municipal council member elections". This prevents the metropolitan municipality from being a single electoral district.
- The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system leads the parties that received few votes are not represented in councils.

- Quota members and district municipality mayors are members of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council, which affects political fair representation negatively.
- There is no system to balance the disproportionality caused by the situations which are clarified above.

6.2 Recommendations

Considering these factors, some solutions and recommendations can be developed to make Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council closer to political fair representation. These solutions and recommendations are as follows.

- Implementing direct election.
 - In order to implement direct election, “Metropolitan Municipal Council Elections” can be conducted.
 - This election does not have to be one-stage elections. A two-stage election system can be created, as in London, Berlin and Paris. As in London and Berlin, one of the stages can cover all Ankara, and regard Ankara as a single electoral district. The other stage may be the election in which representatives from the districts will be elected.
- Changing or abolishing in the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system.
 - The proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system can be converted to only a threshold system. In other words, extraction of one-tenth of the votes from votes that parties and independent candidates received can be eliminated.
 - The percentage in the proportional diplomatic mission with one-tenth threshold system can be reduced.
 - Threshold percentage can be reduced through the implication of only threshold system
 - Threshold system can be removed.
- Abolishing in participation of district municipalities’ mayors.
- Abolishing in participation of the quota members.

- Implementing balance system.
 - The first stage of local elections can be kept the same, and the second stage can be added to these local elections. In the second stage, the whole boundary of the metropolitan city can become the electoral district. If so, a method suchlike the modified d'Hondt method can be implemented. This implementation can be performed by integrating the total numbers of municipality mayors, quota members, and representatives from district councils into the d'Hondt method. Or some of these can be integrated to the d'Hondt method.
 - In the same way, a two-stage selection system can be created. After two steps, leveling seat and overhang seat can be implemented similar to the system in Berlin.
- Applying the alliance system.
 - In municipal council elections, an electoral system can be created, as in general elections.
 - A new election system which has two-stage can be created. PR system can be implemented at least in one stage of the new election system, and the electoral district of this stage may be all metropolitan municipal boundaries. In this stage of the elections, an election alliance can be made by law.
 - An alliance can be made in both stages in the new election system.
- Uncertain number of members.
 - The minimum limit of the number of representatives in the metropolitan municipality council can be determined. A system similar to the system implemented in the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin can be introduced to increase the number of members.
 - In the current implementation, it may be allowed to increase the number of representatives in the metropolitan city council. Extra representatives can join the council in order to sustain political fair representation. Various methods can be used to determine these representatives.

- Giving different or special status to Ankara.
 - Based on the analyses of Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council only, it is not necessary to change the system in all metropolitan cities, because variables such as different population and number of districts also affect metropolitan municipal councils. However, as seen in London, Paris and Berlin, capitals can be given different statuses. Different election systems can be applied in places with different status. Therefore, if it is desired to change the existing system as a result of the evaluations made for Ankara, it will be sufficient to give Ankara a different status or election system.

6.3 Conclusion

This study presented the situation of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council in terms of political fair representation. Values are calculated using Loosemore and Hanby Index, Gallagher Index and Duverger's calculation method. There is not much in the literature on local council evaluation using these indexes and calculation method. This study examined the structure of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council and presented calculation methods that can be applied for other local councils. All of the metropolitan municipality councils in Turkey can be examined by this index and calculation methods, and comparisons can be made between them. By examining the causes of the differences between them, a fairer election system can be created. Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council is one of 30 samples in Turkey. Political fair representation condition in Turkey's metropolitan municipality councils can be revealed by analysing all metropolitan municipality councils. Therefore, some recommendations and solutions can be proposed for metropolitan municipality councils in Turkey.

As a result of all these examinations, Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council is less fair and more disproportional than local councils of other capitals that are analysed in this study, in terms of political fair representation. The reasons that may cause this situation are clarified in the study. Also, in order to reduce the impact of these reasons and to make Ankara Metropolitan Municipal Council

fairer, some recommendations and solutions have been presented. It is aimed the fact that the practical correspond of this study is to create a more suitable election system for political fair representation. All metropolitan cities can be examined, and then arrangements can be made that will concern all metropolitans or only the capital Ankara. From this point on, it is the discretion of the legislators. The solutions and recommendations cause both for the election of metropolitan municipality council to converge perfectly proportional elections and for metropolitan municipality councils to converge political fair representation.

6.4 Limitations of the Study

In the scope of the study, Ankara's local elections since 1963 were examined. While the examination of these elections, the distribution of the metropolitan municipal council members, municipal council members and provincial council members in the 1994 local elections and previous elections could not be reached. As a result of the application made to the YSK, the application request could not be met since it required a “special study”. Also, as a result of the face-to-face meeting held with TÜİK, except for the information on the website, more information could not be found. So, the first limitation is lack of information. This limitation was partially coped with the information received from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality.

Lists of the council members from 1963-1989 (including 1989) were taken from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. Moreover, Metropolitan Municipality representative lists of the following periods and the information of the parties they belonged to were obtained. However, there was no party information on the 1963-1989 lists. Since it is thought that not knowing the membership of the council between these years will damage the purpose of the study, the data between these years were calculated manually based on election laws and decisions. This is the second limitation because when errors exist, although the calculations are made with care, the results will be affected.

The third limitation is that, accordingly, the number of independent candidates and how many votes are received by these candidates are not known. In the publications in which the election results are announced, a single column is reserved for independent candidates. This column is referred to as "independents", and votes received by all independent candidates are shown as a total. This situation caused problems only in the 1973 local elections, not in other local elections. The reason is that independent candidates or candidates could not get enough votes to be elected in these elections. Differently, in the 1973 local elections, the number of votes received by independent is enough to select four candidates in Ankara. Since the number of independent candidates, the number of votes they received and their rates, and how many independent candidates were elected are unknown, and five possibilities emerged in the 1973 local elections. In order to overcome these limitations, all possibilities are calculated manually.

The fourth limitation is that no data is available about the Provincial General Council members. Therefore, calculations were made manually based on the votes, populations, and laws of the relevant years. The number of representatives in the provincial council and the number of representatives won by the parties in these councils has been reached with some calculations. In these calculations, the results for each district were calculated manually depending on the population in some elections. Accessing these data from official institutions will enable the study to be done more clearly.

While examining fair representation, it can be examined from different aspects. In this study, evaluations will be made on the electoral system and parties. Political fair representation analysis will be made. However, in terms of geographical (particularly in this respect, examinations metropolitan municipalities in Turkey is an important consideration because of the differences between districts), population, economic, socio-economic, the class point of view and make many other aspects of examinations are also possible. Another limitation is that not all of these examinations can be made.

The last limitation appears in the Council of Paris and Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin elections. In the Paris section, as the way of calculating the total votes will give misleading results in the study, a different method was used. These calculations are made manually. Also, in the researches for the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin elections, the percentage of all parties could not be reached. Therefore, the voting rates are calculated by calculating the total votes received. It is beneficial to find official data when conducting this kind of studies. Also, in cases where data is not available, it is essential to calculate meticulously for missing data in terms of the accuracy of the values to be taken in such studies.

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APPENDICES

A. RESULTS OF 1963 ANKARA PROVINCIAL GENERAL COUNCIL ELECTION

Annex 1: Results of 1963 Ankara Provincial General Council Election

Location	Number of Members						
	JP	RPP	RPNP	NP	TLP	NTP	Inds
Ankara - Total	29	28	2	5	0	4	1
Ankara City, Towns and Villages	3	2	0	1	0	0	0
Altındağ City, Towns and Villages	3	3	0	1	0	0	0
Çankaya City, Towns and Villages	5	7	0	2	0	0	0
Yenimahalle City, Towns and Villages	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
Ayaş City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balâ City, Towns and Villages	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Beypazarı City, Towns and Villages	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Çamlıdere City, Towns and Villages	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Çubuk City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Delice City, Towns and Villages	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Elmadağ City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Güdül City, Towns and Villages	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Haymana City, Towns and Villages	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Kalecik City, Towns and Villages	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Keskin City, Towns and Villages	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Kırıkkale City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Kızılcahamam City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Nallıhan City, Towns and Villages	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Polatlı City, Towns and Villages	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
Sulakyurt City, Towns and Villages	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Şereflikoçhisar City, Towns and Villages	2	2	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Prepared by author based on Law No. 306 and information in DIE, 1965

(JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents)

B. RESULTS OF 1968 ANKARA PROVINCIAL GENERAL COUNCIL ELECTION

Annex 2: Results of 1968 Ankara Provincial General Council Election

Location	Number of Members								
	JP	RPP	RP	RPNP	NP	UP	TLP	NTP	Inds
Ankara - Total	51	24	0	1	3	2	1	0	1
Ankara City, Towns and Villages	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altındağ City, Towns and Villages	6	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Çankaya City, Towns and Villages	9	9	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Yenimahalle City, Towns and Villages	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ayaş City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balâ City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beypazarı City, Towns and Villages	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Çamlıdere City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Çubuk City, Towns and Villages	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Delice City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elmadağ City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Güdül City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haymana City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kalecik City, Towns and Villages	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keskin City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kırıkkale City, Towns and Villages	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Kızılcahamam City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nallıhan City, Towns and Villages	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polatlı City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Sulakyurt City, Towns and Villages	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Şereflikoçhisar City, Towns and Villages	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

Source: Prepared by author based on; Law No. 306, DİE, 1969a, DİE, 1969b

(JP: Justice Party, RPP: Republican People's Party, RP: Reliance Party, RPNP: Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party, NP: Nation Party, UP: Union Party, TLP: Turkish Labour Party, NTP: New Turkish Party, Inds: Independents)

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'ndeki temsilde siyasi adaleti ele almaktadır. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nin 2019 Yerel Seçimleri sonucunda oluşan durumu üzerinden değerlendirmeler yapılmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırmalar yapılırken, Ankara'da daha önce yapılmış olan yerel seçimler ve Londra, Paris ve Berlin'in son seçimleri incelenmektedir. Bu incelemeler hem seçim sonuçları üzerinden hem de yasal farklılıklar üzerinden yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca temsilde siyasi adaletin en büyük ayırıştırıcısı olan seçim sistemlerinin farklılıkları da ele alınmaktadır. Seçim sonuçlarının hesaplanmasında 3 farklı yöntem kullanılmaktadır. Bu incelemeler sonucunda Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nin siyasi temsil açısından ne derece adaletsiz olduğu görülmektedir. Temsilde siyasi adaletin derecesini nelerin etkilediği de değerlendirilmektedir. Yapılan karşılaştırmalar sonucunda bulunan bulgular ile bu adaletsizliğin nedenleri ve de bu olumsuzluğun giderilmesi için çözüm önerileri, tavsiyeler verilmektedir.

Yerel yönetimler ile ilgili bu türde bir çalışma literatürde çok yer almamaktadır. Genel meclislerin temsilde adalet araştırması yerel meclislere göre çok daha fazladır. Genel seçimler düzeyinde bu çalışmada kullanılan metotlar ve daha fazlası kullanılarak birçok çalışma yapılmış, karşılaştırma yapılmıştır. Fakat yerel düzeyde yapılmış çalışmalar çok daha az görülmektedir. Bu çalışma yerel düzeydeki meclislerin araştırılması ve karşılaştırılması bakımından önemlidir. Türkiye'deki yerel meclisler için daha önce kullanılmamış hesaplama yöntemlerinin kullanılması başka araştırmaların da önünü açacaktır. Bu çalışmada YSK Kararları, seçim bilgileri, yasalar, sayısal veriler ve hesaplamalara ağırlıklı olarak yer verilmektedir.

Temsili demokrasilerde adil, dürüst ve düzenli seçimler ve de seçim ile yönetimde bulunan yöneticiler önemli yere sahiptir. Bu seçimler ile başa gelen yöneticilerin

halkın iradesini doğru yansıtması önemlidir. Bunun için yöneticilere düşen bir sorumluluk vardır fakat bu durum sadece yöneticiler ile ilgili değildir. Aynı zamanda seçmenin verdiği oyların orantılı olarak meclislere yansıtması da önemli noktalardan biridir. Temsilde adaletin sağlanması ve seçim sonuçlarının meclislere orantılı yansıtması demokrasilerin daha olumlu işlemesine yardımcı olan etmenlerdir.

Temsilde adaleti sadece genel meclislerde ele almak büyük bir yanılsamadır. Yerel anlamda demokrasi, demokrasi deneyiminin en küçük yapı taşıdır. Halka en yakın temas halinde bulunan ve de halkın en ulaşılabilir olarak gördüğü yönetim birimleri yerel yönetim birimleridir. Bu açıdan demokrasi tecrübesinin en net görüldüğü ve halkın en fazla etkilendiği noktalar da yerel yönetim seçimleridir. Yerel yöneticiler, yerel halkın çıkarlarını gözetmek için seçilirler. Yerel yöneticiler, halk ile yerel yönetimler arasında köprü görevi görürler ve de halkın ihtiyaçlarını, isteklerini, sorunlarını yerel otoritelere sunarlar.

Temsil adaletini sağlamak amacıyla farklı seçim sistemleri ve uygulamaları görülmektedir. Seçim yasaları, oy pusulalarının yapıları, baraj sistemleri, seçim bölgesi uygulamaları gibi birçok değişken temsilde adaleti etkilemektedir. Temsilde adaleti en çok etkileyen değişken ise seçim sistemleridir. Çoğunluk sistemleri ve nispi temsil sistemleri en yaygın kullanılan seçim sistemleridir. Çoğunluk sistemleri seçim bölgesindeki oyların çoğunu alan tarafın o seçim bölgesinde temsilciliği kazanmasını temel alır. Bu sistemde %50'den fazla oy alma şartı da bulunabilir. Yani basit çoğunluk ya da salt çoğunluk aranan sistemler mevcuttur. Nispi temsil sistemleri ise seçimlerde alınan oy oranları ile seçilen temsilci sayılarının orantılı olmasını öngören sistemlerdir. Orantılılık prensibine dayalı olduğundan dolayı çoğunluk sistemlerinden daha adil sistemlerdir. D'Hondt sistemi, Sainte-Lague formülü, en büyük artık yöntemi gibi farklı biçimleri vardır. Türkiye, 1963 Yerel Seçimleri ve sonrasındaki yerel seçimlerde, il genel meclisi ve belediye meclisi seçimlerinde d'Hondt sistemini kullanmıştır.

Seçim sistemleri ve uygulamaları temsilde adalet ve yönetimde istikrar ilkelerine hizmet edecek şekilde düzenlenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Fakat bu iki prensip birbirine

zıt olarak çalışmakta olduğundan dolayı, bir prensibe önem verildiğinde diğer prensip daha geri planda kalabilmektedir. Temsilde adalet ilkesi seçmenlerin tercihlerinin adil ve orantılı şekilde meclislere yansıtılmasını temel almaktadır. Yönetimde istikrar ilkesi ise istikrarlı ve güçlü otoritelerin kurulmasının önünü açar.

Temelde temsilde adalet, oy oranları ile temsilci oranlarının birbirine örtüşmesidir. Fakat temsilde adaletin farklı yönleri de vardır. Partilerin oy oranları ile temsilci sayılarının orantılılığı temsilde siyasi adalet veya siyasi temsil adaleti olarak adlandırılır. Coğrafi, kültürel, ekonomik temsil adaletleri gibi başka yönleri de bulunmaktadır. Dünya'daki bazı meclislerde görülebileceği gibi Türkiye'deki yerel yönetim meclislerinin bazılarında da siyasi temsil adaleti bakımından adil olmayan durumlar görülebilmektedir.

Adil olmayan durumların ölçülebilmesi açısından bazı endeksler, hesaplama yöntemleri geliştirilmiştir. Eksik ve aşkın temsil, orantısızlık ve temsil adaleti ölçümleri bu yöntemlere göre hesaplanabilmektedir. Bugüne kadar uygulanmış birçok farklı yöntem bulunmaktadır. Bu yöntemlerden Duverger'nin hesaplama yöntemi, Loosemore ve Hanby Endeksi ve Gallagher (Lsq) Endeksi ise en yaygın ve doğru kabul edilen üç yöntemdir.

Türkiye'de bu hesaplamalar yapılmadan önce yerel yönetim sisteminin ve belediye sisteminin anlaşılması gerekmektedir. Türkiye'de 2017 yılı itibariyle toplam belediye sayısı 1397'dir. Bunların 30 tanesi ise büyükşehir belediyesidir. Belediyelerin karar alma mekanizmaları meclisleridir. Bu meclisler ise bazı kanunlar çerçevesinde oluşmaktadır. Belediyelerin türüne ve nüfusuna göre belediye meclislerinin yapısı değişmektedir. Büyükşehir belediye meclis üyeleri hariç diğer belediye meclis üyeleri doğrudan seçilmektedir. Fakat büyükşehir belediye meclisleri, büyükşehir belediyesi sınırlarının içerisinde bulunan ilçelerin (6360 sayılı Kanun ile büyükşehir belediye sınırları il mülki sınırları ile aynı olduğundan dolayı tüm ilçelerin) belediye meclislerinde bulunan temsilcilerden beşte birinin katılımıyla oluşmaktadır. Ayrıca ilçe belediye başkanları da büyükşehir belediye meclisinin doğal üyeleridir. Yani, büyükşehir belediye

meclisleri hariç diğer belediye meclislerinin sayısı nüfusa göre sabitken; büyükşehir belediye meclislerinin temsilci sayıları ilçe belediye meclislerinin temsilci sayılarına göre değişkendir. Bu durum büyükşehir belediye meclislerinde temsilde adalet açısından sorunlara yol açabilmektedir. Kanun'un belirlediği nüfus kriterleri açısından büyükşehir belediye meclislerinde coğrafi temsil adaletinin sıkıntılı olduğu görülürken; ilçelerin temsilcilerinden oluştuklarından dolayı siyasi temsil adaletsizliğine de neden olmaktadır. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde de bu olumsuzluklar görülmektedir. Özellikle siyasi temsil adaletsizliği göze çarpan netliktedir. Bu durumun nedenlerini anlamak için Türkiye'nin yerel yönetim tarihini ve de Ankara'nın bu tarihsel süreçteki durumunu görmek gereklidir. Hangi değişikliklerin bu süreçte siyasi temsil adaletine katkı sağladığını ve hangilerinin olumsuz etkilediğini görmek açısından neden-sonuç ilişkisi bağlamında tarihsel inceleme yarar sağlayacaktır.

Türkiye'nin çok köklü bir yerel yönetim geçmişi bulunmamaktadır. Cumhuriyet'in ilanı ile birlikte şehirlerin modernleşmesine de önem verilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu dönemi izleyen dönemlerde de Türkiye'de yerel yönetimler ve belediyecilik önemli değişikliklere uğramıştır. Bu değişiklikler 2012 yılında yürürlüğe giren ve 2014 yılında uygulanmaya başlanan 6360 sayılı Kanun ile şu anki halini almıştır. Ayrıca, bu süreçte YSK kararları ve de seçim yasaları da temsilde adaleti etkilemiştir. Bu değişiklikler ile beraber 1963 Yerel Seçimlerinden 2019 Yerel Seçimlerine kadar olan belediye meclis seçimleri ve il genel meclisi seçimlerini ülke genelinde Duverger'nin hesaplama yöntemine göre ele aldığımızda, en yüksek aşkın-eksik temsil oranlarının son zamanlardaki seçimlerde olduğunu görmekteyiz. Bu durumdan anlaşılmaktadır ki, yapılan bazı/bütün değişiklikler temsilde siyasi adaleti olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir.

Belediyeleri ilgilendiren yasalardan birçoğu Ankara'yı da etkilemiştir. Ayrıca seçim yasaları ve YSK'nın Ankara özelinde aldığı kararlar da Ankara'da temsil adaletini etkilemiştir. Ankara 1984 yılında büyükşehir statüsü kazanmış ve belediye meclisi yapısı değişmiştir. Siyasi temsil adaletinin değişmesindeki en büyük etkilerden biri bu olmuştur. Ardından gelen büyükşehir yasaları ile

büyükşehir belediyesi kapsamındaki ilçelerde değişiklikler görülmüştür. Son olarak 6360 sayılı Kanun ile tüm ilçeler Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nin kapsamına girmiştir. Sadece belediye sınırları kapsamında değişiklikler değil, ayrıca; seçim yasaları üzerinde de değişiklikler olmuştur. Bu değişiklikler Ankara'daki temsilde siyasi adaleti etkilemiştir. 1963 yılından günümüze kadar yapılan yerel seçimler incelendiğinde; son 8 seçiminde temsilde siyasi adaletsizliğin daha fazla olduğu görülmektedir. 1963'ten 1984'e kadar yapılan seçimler çok daha adil sonuçlar göstermektedir. 1984 ve sonrasında yapılan seçimler ise daha az adil olarak görülmektedir. Ayrıca 1984 seçimlerinde Loosemore ve Hanby Endeksi, Gallagher Endeksi ve Duverger'nin hesaplama yöntemine göre elde edilen değerlerde büyük bir değişim görülmektedir. 1989 seçimlerinde de o kadar büyük olmasa da değerlerde yeniden bir kırılma görülmektedir. Bunların nedenlerine baktığımızda 1984 yılında Ankara'nın büyükşehir belediyesi olması en etkili nedenlerden birisi olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi bu seçimlerden itibaren ilçe belediye meclislerinden gelen üyelere başlamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, bu büyükşehir belediye meclisinin temsilcileri doğrudan seçilmemektedir. Büyükşehir belediye meclisi üyeleri, ilçe belediye meclislerinden seçilme sıralarına göre büyükşehir belediye meclisine katılmaktadır. Ayrıca ilçe belediye başkanları da büyükşehir belediye meclisinin doğal üyesidirler. Bunun ile beraber 1984 yılında yapılan yerel seçimlerde onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi uygulanmaya başlamıştır. Yeni getirilen bu baraj sistemi ile beraber az oy alan partilerin temsil edilme olasılığı azalmıştır. Bu durumlar 1984 yılında yaşanan kırılmanın başlıca nedenleridir. Ayrıca 1984 ve sonrasında yapılan seçimlerde de daha önceki değerlere neden ulaşamadığının da başlıca göstergeleridir. 1988 yılında yürürlüğe giren kontenjan üyeliği uygulaması da 1989 yılında yapılan yerel seçimlerde değişime neden olan faktörlerdendir. Kontenjan üyeliği ilçe belediye meclis üyeliğinin kazanan partinin yönetiminde istikrar ilkesini güçlendirmek amacıyla fazladan üye çıkarmasını sağlayan bir sistemdir. Ayrıca bu üyelerin ilk sırada olanı büyükşehir belediye meclisinde de temsilci olmaktadır. Bu durum, herhangi bir ilçede en fazla oyu alan partinin hem ilçe meclisinde hem de

büyükşehir belediye meclisinde daha fazla temsilciye sahip olması ve daha güçlü olması anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca 6360 sayılı Kanun yürürlüğe girene kadar büyükşehir belediyeleri ile ilgili yasalar görülmüş ve bu yasalar sonucunda Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'ni oluşturan ilçeler değişiklik göstermiştir. En sonunda da tüm ilçelerin temsilcilerinden oluşan bir meclis yapısı meydana gelmiştir. Tüm bunların etkisiyle Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde siyasi temsil adaleti, 1984 ve sonrasında adil olmaktan uzak bir görüntü çizmektedir.

Ankara'nın belediye ve büyükşehir belediye meclisi deneyimlerinin tarihsel olarak incelenmesinin yanında, farklı seçim sistemi uygulayan örneklerin de incelenmesi karşılaştırma ve yargıda bulunmak için önemli bir noktadır. Bu açıdan İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya'nın yerel yönetim yapılarını ve yerel seçim sistemlerini incelemek önemlidir. Bu bağlamda köklü yerel yönetim sistemleri olan bu ülkelerin başkentlerinin incelenmesinin yapılması; karşılaştırma yapabilecek verilerin toplanması açısından zaruridir. Bu açıdan buldukları ülkelerde özel statüleri bulunan Londra, Paris ve Berlin'in yerel meclislerinin incelenmesi yapıldığında bu yerel meclislerin son seçimlerde oluşan meclis yapılarının temsilde siyasi adalet açısından Ankara'ya göre çok daha adil oldukları görülmektedir. Bu durumun birçok nedeni bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'de uygulanan onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nin siyasi temsil adaletinin düşük çıkmasındaki nedenlerden birisidir. Diğer örneklerde baraj uygulamaları daha düşük oranlarda görülmektedir. Ayrıca Türkiye'de uygulanan sistemde toplam oyun %10'u partilerden düşürülmektedir. Bu durum diğer ülkelerde görülmemektedir. Bir diğer neden ise Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde bulunan temsilcilerin dolaylı yoldan seçilmesidir. Londra ve Berlin örneklerinde doğrudan seçimin temsilde siyasi adalet açısından dolaylı seçimlere göre daha etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, Londra ve Berlin'de iki ayaklı seçimin en az bir ayağında tüm şehir tek seçim bölgesidir. Ankara'da ise tek ayaklı bir seçim vardır ve de burada da Ankara'nın 25 ilçesi ayrı ayrı seçim bölgesidir. Bu durum da siyasi temsil adaletini etkilemektedir. Bir başka neden ise Ankara'da temsilde siyasi adaletsizliğini dengeleyecek bir sistemin bulunmamasıdır. Londra ve Berlin'de ise seçimlerden

sonra oluşabilecek dengesiz ve orantısız durumları dengeleyecek sistemler geliştirilmiştir. Bu sistemler siyasi temsil adaletini ve eksik/aşkın oyların daha az seviyede olmasını sağlamakta yardımcı olmaktadır. Son neden ise Türkiye’de yerel yönetim seçimlerinde yasal olarak ittifak sistemi geliştirilmemiştir. Paris’te yerel yönetimlerin ittifak yapabilme olanağı mevcuttur. Bu sayede düşük oy oranına sahip partiler de temsilci sahibi olabilmektedirler. Fakat Türkiye’de sadece genel seçimlerde ittifak sistemi yasal olarak oluşturulmuştur; yerel yönetimlerde ise partilerin başka partiler lehine seçimden çekilmesi şeklinde bir ittifak yöntemi partiler tarafından geliştirilmiştir.

Tüm bulunan bulgular sonucunda Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi hakkında ve daha önceki hali Ankara Belediye Meclisi hakkında hem tarihsel olarak hem de başka örnekler ile karşılaştırmalı olarak bazı sonuçlara varmak mümkündür. Tarihsel olarak baktığımız zaman Loosemore ve Hanby Endeksine göre Ankara’da en yüksek siyasi temsil adaleti bulunan seçim 1968 Yerel Seçimleri, en düşük siyasi temsil adaleti bulunan seçim ise 2004 Yerel Seçimleri olmuştur. En yüksek siyasi temsil adalet bulunan seçimden en düşüğe doğru sıralama ise şu şekildedir: 1968, 1963, 1973*1 (ilk durum), 1977, 1973*2,3,4,5(diğer durumlar), 1984, 2009, 1999, 2019 (ittifaklı hesaplama), 2019 (partiler üzerinden hesaplama), 1989, 1994, 2014, ve 2004. (1973 yılındaki yerel seçimlerde, Ankara’daki kaç tane bağımsız temsilcinin seçildiği bilgisi bulunamadığından dolayı 5 farklı senaryo ayrı ayrı hesaplanmıştır.) (2019 yılındaki yerel seçimlerde yasal olarak olmasa da ittifaklar, birbirlerinin lehine çekişmeler görülmektedir. Bu yüzden hem partiler hem de ittifaklar açısından 2 farklı hesaplama yapılmıştır.)

Gallagher Endeksine göre Ankara’daki en fazla siyasi temsil adaletinin olduğu seçimler önceki hesaplamada olduğu gibi 1968 yılındaki yerel seçimlerdedir. Diğer endeks ile bir diğer benzerlik ise en düşük siyasi temsil adaletinin bulunduğu yerel seçimlerdir. Gallagher Endeksine göre de en düşük siyasi temsil adaleti 2004 yılındaki yerel seçimlerden sonra oluşan durumda görülmektedir. Gallagher Endeksine göre, en yüksek siyasi temsil adaleti bulunan seçimlerden en düşüğe sıralanışı şu şekildedir: 1968, 1963, 1977, 1973*1,2,3,4,5(her durum),

1999, 1984, 2009, 1994, 2019 (partiler üzerinden hesaplama), 1989, 2019 (ittifaklı hesaplama), 2014, ve 2004.

Bu iki endekse göre de 1984 öncesi ve sonrası ayrımı görülmektedir. Gallagher Endeksine bakıldığında sadece 1999 yılındaki yerel seçimler 1984 yılında yapılan yerel seçimlerin önüne geçebilmiştir. Fakat 2 endekste de 1984 ve sonrasında yapılan yerel seçimler 1963-1977 yıllarında yapılan yerel seçimlerin değerlerine ulaşamamıştır. Yani, meclis içerisindeki dağılım asla o dönemlerdeki kadar adil olamamıştır.

Duverger'nin hesaplama yöntemine göre baktığımızda, en yüksek aşkın temsil 2004 yerel seçimlerinde 31.00 aşkın temsil oranı ile olmuştur. En yüksek eksik temsil ise 2019 yerel seçimlerinde 18.17 eksik temsil oranı ve ittifaklar düzeyinde 20.29 eksik temsil oranı ile olmuştur. Bu durum yine son seçimlerde orantısızlığın daha fazla olduğunu göstermektedir.

Tarihsel süreçte Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde temsilcisi bulunmayan partilerin toplam oy oranlarına bakıldığında ise yine 1984 yılında bir kırılma görülmektedir. 1984 yılından itibaren bu oranlarda da artış görülmektedir. Yıllara göre Ankara Belediye Meclisi'nde temsilci bulundurmayan partilerin oy oranları şu şekildedir: 1963 yerel seçimlerinde %0.09 toplam oy oranı (sadece bağımsız adaylar), 1967 yerel seçimlerinde %0.75 toplam oy oranı, 1973 yerel seçimlerinde eğer tüm bağımsız adaylar seçilmiş ise %0.58 toplam oy oranı, 1973 yerel seçimlerinde hiçbir bağımsız aday seçilemediyse %6.07% toplam oy oranı ve 1977 yerel seçimlerinde %1.80 toplam oy oranı olan partiler Ankara Belediye Meclisi'nde temsilci bulunduramamıştır. 1984 yılı ve sonrasında itibaren Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi seçimlerinde mecliste temsilci bulundurmayan partilerin oy oranları ise şu şekildedir: 1984 yerel seçimlerinde %14.37 toplam oy oranı, 1989 yerel seçimlerinde %11.79 toplam oy oranı, 1994 yerel seçimlerinde %14.17 toplam oy oranı, 1999 yerel seçimlerinde %16.60 toplam oy oranı, 2004 yerel seçimlerinde %13.47 toplam oy oranı, 2009 yerel seçimlerinde %6.16 toplam oy oranı, 2014 yerel seçimlerinde %3.60 toplam oy oranı ve 2019 yerel seçimlerinde %6.60 toplam oy oranı alan partiler Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye

Meclisi'nde temsilci bulunduramamıştır. Bu farklılığın en büyük nedenlerinden birisi onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemidir. Bir diğer neden ise büyükşehir yasaları ile değişen seçim bölgeleridir.

Diğer üç yerel meclis ile Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi karşılaştırıldığında da Ankara'nın değerlerinin Loosemore ve Hanby Endeksi ve Gallagher Endeksinde daha yüksek olduğu görülmektedir. Yani, Ankara'da temsilde siyasi adalet daha düşüktür. Duverger'nin hesaplama yöntemine göre de oy dağılımı ve sandalye dağılımındaki orantılılık ve temsilde siyasi adalet, 2019 Ankara yerel seçimlerinde karşılaştırılan diğer örneklere göre daha düşüktür.

Tüm elde edilen veriler, karşılaştırmalar ve incelenen sonuçlar ışığında Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde siyasi temsil adaletinin düşük olmasının nedenleri şu şekilde sıralanabilir.

Öncelikle, Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nde belediye başkanı hariç hiçbir üye doğrudan seçilmemektedir. Ankara'nın sınırları içerisinde bulunan ilçelerin (6360 sayılı Kanun ile beraber bu ilçeler Ankara'daki tüm ilçeleri kapsamaktadır) belediye meclislerindeki üyelerin beşte biri büyükşehir belediye meclisine gönderilmektedir. Bu durum ilçelerde düşük oy alan partiler için dezavantajlı durumlar oluşturmaktadır. Az oy alan partiler ilk sıralardaki temsilcilikleri alamadıklarından dolayı ilçe belediye meclislerinde temsilci sahibi olsalar bile büyükşehir belediye meclisinde kendilerine yer bulamamaktadırlar.

Bir diğer neden doğrudan olmayan seçimler ile bağlantılı bir nedendir. Seçmenler büyükşehir belediye meclisine gidecek temsilcileri limitli sayıda seçebilmektedir. Yani seçmenler ilçe belediye meclisinde bulunmasını istedikleri partileri seçebilmektedirler lakin; büyükşehir belediye meclisinde bulunmasını istedikleri partileri seçme şansları bulunmamaktadır. Bu yüzden, ilçe belediye meclislerine seçtikleri temsilcilerin ilk sıralardan seçilmesinin gerçekleşmesini beklemek zorundadırlar.

Ankara'da belediye meclis üyelerinin seçimleri yapılırken 25 seçim bölgesi bulunmaktadır. Büyükşehir belediye meclisi seçimlerinde tek seçim bölgesi bulunmamaktadır. Tek seçim bölgesi olması büyükşehir belediye meclisine doğrudan seçim anlamına da gelmektedir. Fakat tek seçim bölgesi bulunmamasından dolayı seçmenler dolaylı yoldan temsilci seçmek zorundadırlar.

Onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi az oy alan partilerin temsil edilebilirliğini zorlaştıran başka bir durumdur. Az oy alan partilerin temsil edilememesi, meclislerde orantısızlığa ve de temsilde siyasi adaletin zayıflamasına neden olmaktadır.

Kontenjan üyeliği ve ilçe belediye başkanlarının Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'ne doğrudan katılımları güçlü olan siyasi partilere daha fazla avantaj sağlamaktadır. Bu durum güçlü partilerin aşkın temsil almasına neden olmaktadır. Bu durum da temsilde siyasi adaletin düşük olmasına neden olmaktadır.

Londra'da ve Berlin'de görülen dengeleyici sistemlerin hiçbiri Türkiye'de uygulanmamaktadır. Bu durum temsilde siyasi adaletin ve orantısızlığın olduğu durumlarda herhangi bir düzenleme yapmama anlamına gelmektedir. Bu durum da temsilde siyasi adaletin düşük olmasının bir başka nedenidir.

Bu nedenler sonucunda ve de diğer meclis örnekleri ele aldığı anda aşağıda verilen önerilerin uygulanması, Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nde siyasi temsil adaletinin artmasını sağlayacaktır.

1963-1977 arasında Ankara İl Genel Meclisi ve Ankara Belediye Meclisi karşılaştırdığında ve Londra ve Berlin örnekleri ele aldığı anda doğrudan seçimin daha etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Temsilde siyasi adaleti daha iyi sağlamak için "Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi Seçimi" adında bir seçim yapılabilir. Bu seçim tek ayaklı bir seçim sistemi şeklide değil; Londra, Paris ve Berlin örneklerinde olduğu gibi iki ayaklı bir seçim sistemi şeklinde yapılabilir. Londra ve Berlin'deki gibi bir ayağı tüm seçim bölgelerinde, bir ayağı tek seçim bölgesinde yapılabilir.

Onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi uygulaması temsili etkilemektedir. 1984 öncesi ve sonrası seçimlerde bu açıkça görülmektedir. Daha düşük baraj yüzdesi uygulayan şehirler ile Ankara karşılaştırıldığında da bu fark ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu sistemin getirdiği olumsuzlukları aşmak için bu sistem sadece baraj uygulamasına çevrilebilir. Yani partilerden toplam oyun onda birinin çıkarılma durumu ortadan kaldırılabilir, şu anki sistemdeki %10 oranı daha makul seviyelere indirilebilir, sadece baraj sistemi getirilerek daha düşük bir yüzde ile uygulanabilir veya onda birlik baraj uygulamalı nispi temsil sistemi tamamen kaldırılabilir ve baraj uygulaması hiç uygulanmayabilir.

1984 yılından itibaren uygulanan ilçe belediye başkanlarının, büyükşehir belediye meclisinin doğal üyesi olması kaldırılabilir.

Kontenjan üyeliği durumu temsilde adaleti negatif etkileyen bir durumdur. Bu durum 1988 öncesi ve sonrası seçimlerindeki fark ile görülmektedir. Kontenjan üyeliğinin kaldırılması temsilde adalet için olumlu bir adım olacaktır.

Herhangi bir dengeleyici sistemin bulunmaması temsilde adaletin sağlanması açısından olumsuz bir durumdur. Dengeleyici sistemler temsilde adalettaki ciddi farklılıkları en düşük seviyeye çekmektedir. Londra ve Berlin örneklerindeki sistemler bunun göstergesidir. Dengeleyici sistemler farklı şekilde uygulanabilir. İki ayaklı bir seçim sistemi oluşturulup, ilk adımında şimdiki sistem aynı şekilde uygulanıp, ikinci ayağında ise tek seçim bölgesi oluşturulabilir. İkinci adımda Londra'daki "*modified*" d'Hondt sistemine benzer bir sistem oluşturulabilir. Bu sistem içerisine kontenjan üyeliği, ilçe belediye başkanlıkları ve ilçe belediye meclis üyeleri dahil edilebilir ya da sadece bir kısmı eklenerek de yapılabilir. Bir başka yöntem ise Belin örnek alınarak oluşturulabilir. İki ayaklı seçim sistemi oluşturulabilir ve de bu iki ayaktan sonra Berlin'de uygulanan "*die Ausgleichsmandate*" ve "*Überhangmandate*" sistemleri veya benzeri sistemler uygulanabilir. Dengeleyici sistemlerin bulunması temsilde siyasi temsilin artmasını sağlayacak uygulamalardır.

Genel seçimlerde kullanılan ittifak sistemi yerel meclis seçimlerinde de uygulanabilir. Bu sistem sayesinde az oy alan partilerin meclise grime şansları artırılabilir. Paris'te yapılan ittifaklar sayesinde az oy alan partiler de meclise girebilmektedir. Bu yüzden Türkiye'deki genel seçimlerdeki gibi bir sistem yerel seçimlerde de uygulanabilir, iki ayaklı bir seçim sistemi oluşturulup nispi temsil sistemi en az bir ayağında uygulanabilir ve bu ayakta tek seçim bölgesi kullanılabilir; bu ayakta seçim ittifakı yapılabilir veya Paris örneğindeki gibi iki ayakta da seçim ittifakı yapılabilir.

Büyükşehir belediye meclisindeki üye sayısı ilçe belediye meclislerinin üye sayılarına bağlıdır. Fakat Berlin'de minimum üye sayısı bellidir. Bu sayı "*die Ausgleichsmandate*" ve "*Überhangmandate*" yöntemleri ile artabilmektedir. Berlin'de uygulanan sistemin bir benzeri uygulanarak sadece minimum temsilci sayısı belirlenip, artış yapılacak şekilde ayarlanabilir veya temsilde siyasi adaleti sağlamak için farklı dengeleme yöntemleri kullanılarak, eksik temsile sahip olan partiler için fazladan temsilci meclise kazandırılabilir.

Bu sistemler her büyükşehir belediye meclisine uygulanır ise farklı sonuçlar verebilir. Bu çalışmada sadece Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi'nin analizi yapılmıştır. Diğer büyükşehir belediye meclislerinin analizi eksiktir. Bu yüzden, sadece Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi analizlerine dayanarak tüm yerel meclisler için sistem değişikliği yapılması zorunlu değildir. Çünkü; büyükşehir belediyeleri farklı nüfus yapılarına ve farklı ilçe yapılarına, sayılarına sahiptir. Fakat Londra, Paris ve Berlin'de ülkelerinde uygulanan seçim sisteminden farklı sistemler kullanılabilir. Ankara'ya da farklı statü verilerek ya da farklı seçim sistemi yöntemi uygulanarak Ankara'daki temsilde siyasi adalet yükseltilebilir.

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