

UNDERSTANDING POPULIST PARTY ELECTORATE IN EUROPE: A STUDY
OF LEFT-WING POPULIST AND RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES AFTER
THE CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to explain the behaviour behind voting for radical populist parties. Previous studies have found often conflicting results regarding the characteristics of populist party voters, some suggesting modern populist party voter do not fit the traditional norms of populist party voters. This study argues after the economic crisis, populist parties have returned to their traditional electorate. By focusing on populist parties based on their classification in PopuList dataset and using data from Round 8 of European Social Survey for voters; their characteristics have been analysed for both left and right wing populist parties. This study focuses on the political views and socio-economic status of populist party voters. Results indicate “losers of globalization” hypothesis is no longer viable to explain voting for populist parties. They are different from their predecessors and same logic cannot be applied to these groups. Even though both are voting for populist parties, politically right-wing and left-wing voters are not the same. They are divided by ideological lines.

Keywords: Populism, Populist Party Electorate, Right-wing Populism, Left-wing Populism

ÖZ

AVRUPA'DA POPÜLİST PARTİ SEÇMENİNİ ANLAMAK: KRİZ SONRASI SAĞ POPÜLİST VE SOL POPÜLİST PARTİLER ÜSTÜNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Bu tez sağ ve sol populist partilere oy vermenin arkasındaki davranışı açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Önceden yapılan çalışmalar küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri hipotezini ortaya koymuş ancak bu tipolojinin modern populist parti seçmenleri açıklamakta yetersiz olduğunu öne sürmüştür. Bu çalışma ise, populist partilerin ekonomik kriz sonrasında geleneksel seçmenlerine dönüş yaptığını ve populist parti seçmenlerinin yeniden kürselleşmenin kaybedenleri olarak tanımlanabileceğini öne sürmektedir. PopuList veri setinde yapılan sınıflandırmalar üstünden sağ ve sol populist partilere odaklanarak, ve European Social Survey verisinin 8. turundan populist parti seçmenlerinin özellikleri incelenerek, sağ populist ve sol populist parti seçmeninin karakteristikleri ortaya koymayı amaçlamıştır. Bunu yapmak için populist parti seçmenlerinin siyasi görüşlerine ve sosyo-ekonomik durumlarına odaklanılmıştır. Sonuçlar küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri hipotezinin modern populist parti seçmenini açıklamak için kullanılabilir olmadığını göstermiştir. Aynı zamanda her ne kadar populist partilere oy verseler bile sağ parti ve sol parti seçmenleri birbirlerinden ideolojik olarak ayrılmaktadırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, Popülist Parti Seçmeni, Sağ Popülizm, Sol Popülizm

To My Parents

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, there have been two crisis that transformed the political climate in Europe. First, the 2008-2009 financial crisis that started in the United States has severely affected many countries in Europe, which at time were running high budget deficits and had high levels of debt. Following this economic downturn, many European countries have implemented austerity measures to cut back on their debt and have a healthy fiscal balance. These measures included increase in taxes and social spending cuts. Effects of the crisis, however, were not limited to economic spectrum. They also caused political turmoil throughout Europe. As a result of the worsening conditions, people across Europe felt they are not being truly represented by the incumbent governments, whose policies aiming to reduce debt made already aggravated living conditions worse. Cuts on welfare spending have hit the most vulnerable groups on the society, who already suffered the negative consequences of the economic crisis.

Mainstream political actors were deemed as unhelpful to solve these problems, many people have turned to populist parties (Hobolt and Vries, 2016). Populist parties on both left and right flanks of the political spectrum, generally being outsiders to political establishment, managed to turn these crises to profit. They were able to garner support among the electorate by signalling the failures of governments and political establishment. They have blamed the incumbent political actors both for worsening economic conditions and the austerity measures. These criticisms by populist actors have met with support from the public. As a result, European party politics experienced a significant change in the last decade. Nearly in every European country, new populist parties have emerged and the ones existing already gained favour among the electorate. These parties, whose presence were previously regarded on most occasions negligible by the political establishment posed a threat to existing political

structure. They managed to enter national parliaments, become the main opposition party or entered government either as a single party or via coalitions. Their unprecedented success was seen as a threat not only to political establishment but liberal democracy itself.

Success of populist parties was not limited to their national context. European Union has been pushing towards more economic and political integration for the past decade. Since the crisis resulted in problems on European level many people turned to EU institutions for solutions along with their national governments. Lack of an adequate solution by these institutions combined with populist accusation that European integration has caused the crisis to be more severe have sparked Eurosceptic ideas among voters of populist parties.

Brexit is shown as the primary example of how populism together with Euroscepticism can be detrimental to political stability. Many consider these challenges faced by Europe as the most serious since the inception of European Union. EU project, which have been fairly successful in uniting European people under common laws is now facing an unprecedented threat from within. Following the successful Brexit referendum, populist politicians across Europe have called referendum in their own countries. Rise of populism not only had its impact on the national political level but on European level too, even threatening the future and existence of EU.

Brexit referendum and success of populist parties in national elections show why understanding the underlying conditions behind popularity of populist parties is important. Populist parties have posed a significant challenge to mostly stable electoral systems in Western Europe. In Western Europe, the electoral arena has been fairly stable with centre-right and centre-left parties controlling the parliaments and forming governments occasionally. Populist parties, on the other hand, were mostly dormant in national contexts. From time to time, they were able to enter parliaments and even challenge the status-quo but these challenges were rare and many have resulted in failures. However, after the crisis, populist parties have been fairly successful. Most particularly in the 2014 European Parliament elections, they ranked first in many countries and were able to form governments with their successes in national elections. These changes have shown political arena is changing and it is

important to understand these changes. If these actors are able to have huge impact at national and regional levels, the reasons behind their success is worth attention.

In this context, populism have sparked interests among scholars and there have been many studies examining the reasons behind their popularity. There have been two approaches to the study of populism: demand side and supply side. Demand side explanations of populism focus on the populist party electorate. It aims to understand the characteristics that make people more likely to vote for a populist party and examine commonalities between voters of these parties both across countries and ideological contexts. Supply side, on the other hand, have focused on environmental factors that worked for the benefit of these political parties. Apart from the demand from the voters, the context in which these political parties operate in also have an impact on their success. Number of political parties, electoral system and existence of threshold have been factors examined by scholars of supply side. Taken together, these two have been the building blocks of the study on populist actors.

Scope of this study will be on the demand side explanations of populist party voting. It is important to understand the characteristics of people voting for populist parties. Political parties are actors that represent the people. Without ideological demand from the people, there is no incentive for political actors to emerge and spend resources on issues that would not find popularity among the public. So, in order to understand why populist parties are emerging, reasons behind why people vote for populists should be understood and this can be done by examining the characteristics of populist party electorate. Main questions regarding the populist party electorate and electorate in general have mostly revolved around same issues: their socio-economic status, views towards politics and stances on various political issues. These should be understood thoroughly; only then, focusing on the electoral context that these parties are competing in and environmental incentives that serve populist parties would be beneficial.

This study will focus on the electorate of both populist left and populist right parties separately to understand their characteristics and see what individual characteristics make people more likely to vote for populist parties. It has previously been hypothesized that populist party voters are members of the group called “losers of globalization”, which is a group that consists of people working in low-skilled jobs

(Mosimman et.al, 2018; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Van der Brug et al., 2000), have low-income (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Algan et.al, 2017; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2000), not highly educated (Ennser-Jedenastik et.al, 2019; Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2013; Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Lubbers et al., 2002) and distrustful towards politics and political institutions (Li, 2018; Kehrberg, 2015; Kriesi et.al, 2008; Kriesi et.al, 2006; Betz, 1994). This idea, however, has been challenged by scholars who suggested these groups are no longer the core electorate of populist parties and modern populist parties in Europe have a more heterogenous electorate and are not limited to narrower group. This study argues that, even though the heterogeneity of voter bases may be true for pre-crisis era, post-crisis era should show these voters becoming core voter group of these parties again. As mentioned earlier, many voters who have been negatively affected by the economic deemed the incumbent political actors as unhelpful for solving their problems (Hobolt and Vries, 2016). Since there have been increase in the unemployment and cuts on the social spending; “losers of globalization” who are the main beneficiary of these programmes are likely to turn against the incumbent political actors and support populist parties. Consequently, it can be argued that, these voter groups are returning back to voting for populist parties and form the majority of the party base electorate. Thus, it is necessary to observe this phenomenon in light of the contemporary developments. This research aims to find whether populist party voter typology of “losers of globalization” is a viable tool to study the populist party electorate in contemporary European politics. This is most particularly important for the post Great Recession political climate as the populist parties have increased their vote share after the global financial crisis. Thus, it is important to examine the idiosyncrasy of these voters. This will be helpful not only in understanding the populist party electorate but can provide insight for studying populist parties themselves.

In order to observe characteristics of voters, this study will employ data from Wave 8 of European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2016. ESS is a widely used dataset in the study of people’s political preferences. It measures demographic and socio-economic status of people as well as political preferences, all of which are frequently used in these studies. Similarly, this data-set allows for cross-country analysis of voters with same questions being asked to respondents living in different

countries. Since same questions are asked, underlying conditions for populism in different countries can be understood better as well. This will help examining supply side factors in cross-national context and also likely to help understand populist party voter phenomenon on a global scale. Use of a recent dataset also allows this study to focus on the post-crisis electorate in Europe. In the ESS Round 7 conducted in 2014, some of the elections throughout Europe took place either before the economic crisis or before the austerity measures. Since political impacts of the crisis mainly stems from the poor economic conditions and austerity policies, it is likely that political effects were peripheral at the time. Since these parties have surged in the polls after 2009-2010 period, analysing the electoral behaviour for those years will be more helpful in understanding characteristics of the populist party electorate.

In order to analyse the electorate of populist parties, it is necessary to determine which political parties will be used in the analysis. This requires classification of political parties both in terms of their ideological positions and either as populist or not-populist. Definition of populism and populist actors that is going to be used in this study is based on Mudde's populism as a thin ideology (2007, 2004). Mudde (2007, 2004) and Hawkins et.al (2018) argue that populist actors emphasize a struggle between the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" and they argue that politics should represent the general will of the people. Their criticism is generally directed towards the mainstream political parties, who they believe are parts of the political elite. They argue that the political elite is disconnected from the people and their voters. Their interests are different and they often clash with the interests of voters. Populist actors suggest that as the political elite pursue their own interests and unsympathetic to the problems of people, they are unable to solve the issues that concern the common people. This disconnection between the people and elite has become more apparent in wake of the economic crisis where policy measures implemented by the incumbent political elite failed in helping the people and people deemed the elite as futile for the economic crisis (Hobolt and Vries, 2016). Since in Western Europe these parties have been outsiders of the political arena, they were able to use anti-mainstream and anti-establishment rhetoric to garner support among the electorate. In this case populist political actors used this rhetoric and criticized national governments and international organizations for disregarding the interests of the people during and in the aftermath

of the economic crisis. This definition of populism has also been employed by the comparative datasets that have classified populist political parties such as Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) by Polk et al. (2017) and by the PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) dataset is going to be used in the analysis. PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019), classifies European political parties either as populist or not-populist based on Mudde's definition. PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) also classifies political parties based on their position along the ideological left-right spectrum and place them as radical-left, radical-right or neither. Based on their classification in the dataset radical-left political parties and radical-right political parties will be chosen and their electorates will be analysed. It should be noted that not all populist parties in Europe are classified as radical in either of the ends. Even though populism is generally accompanied by radicalism, this is not the case for all parties. There are populist parties in which no single ideological position triumphs over others. Since it is hard to pinpoint the precise political positions and ideas that drive voting for these parties, they have not been included in the analysis.

Outline of this study will be as follows. In the second chapter, literature regarding concept of populism, populist parties, reasons behind rise of populist parties and characteristics of populist party voters will be discussed. This will help to create the theoretical assumptions and hypotheses that will be used to test in the study. The following chapter will introduce the dataset that is going to be used to test these hypotheses and discuss selection of cases, the variables that have been identified as important and the model that will be employed for the analysis. In the fourth chapter, results of the analyses of two models on populist-right and populist-left voters will be given and their relative importance will be discussed briefly. Fifth chapter will present a more in-depth discussion of these results in light of the previous findings in the literature to identify how this study helped on the understanding of populist party voters. All these chapters aim to contribute to the understanding of the reasons behind vote for populist parties. Next chapter will introduce and discuss the previous literature regarding populism, populist parties and populist party electorate.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will introduce the concepts that will be used in this study and will discuss their relevance and importance based on the existing studies from the literature. By doing so, it aims to provide an insight to these concepts, show the gaps that have not been touched by previous studies and point out to conflicts on concepts, definitions and issues that are yet to be resolved. This way, hypotheses and model for the analysis can be understood better. First, we will discuss the concept of populism in general and emphasize various perspectives on the definition of populism. Secondly, concept of populist party, common characteristics of populist parties on both left and right will be discussed. Along with this discussion, current popularity of these populist parties and their policies defining both their populist and ideological characteristic will be discussed. Third part of discussion will be on the main topic of interest in this study: populist party voter. Conceptualizations of populist party voter will be discussed in light of the left-wing and right-wing populism. Through a review of these concepts and definitions, this study aims to build a framework within which the hypotheses will be tested.

2.1. Populism

With the current rise in populist parties around the world, use of concept of populism has become popular among media sources and scholars. It has been used to define many politicians or political parties around the world who are challenging the political establishment. The usage has a wide coverage in terms of ideological scope not being limited an ideological position. Categorization of political actors as populists ranges from Greek party SYRIZA on the left to Italian Centrist party M5S and to right-wing FN in France. As a result of the rise of populism, it has become a corner stone

in political party research. Even though in the European context, populism may seem like a novel instrument in politics; it has emerged in multiple countries and regions under different contexts across time.

Currently, most studies on populism are conducted by scholars of European politics; analysing the rise in populist parties in European continent. Scholars of Latin American politics, on the other hand, have been examining the populism and populist political actors in the region during 20th century. As a result, literature on populism was mostly built on Latin American politics. Kaltwasser et.al (2017) shows the term have been used to define various political movements across the globe each with their own characteristics. This distinction across time, regions and contexts have brought complexity on the study of populism and populist political actors. Despite its frequent use across the literature there is no consensus on the definition and ambiguity surrounding the term continues. Moffit and Tormey (2014) argue, it is one of the most contentious concepts in the political science.

There have been multiple definitions of populism, each aiming to explain populism in light of the events across the globe. These have been used to describe common factors behind and among populist political movements. Even though, there are differences between the terms, somewhat of a consensus has been reached on some characteristics with scholars from different sects of populist study acknowledging a common core (Kessel, 2014; Zaslove, 2008). Each of the definitions have both their benefits and shortcomings; explaining the populism phenomenon partially. On the other hand, Blokker et.al (2005) suggest populism is hard to capture with one single definition and cannot be reduced to a particular flank of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, there is still enough understanding of populism, making study of populist parties and electorate possible. The definitions of populism that will be discussed in this section are: populism as a strategy, populism as a sociocultural phenomenon, populism as an ideology and populism as a discourse.

Currently, the most prominent approach in populism studies is to treat populism as an ideology, a method that has been dominant among scholars over the past decade particularly in the European political context (Moffit and Tormey, 2014). The definition has been coined by Mudde (2004) who defines populism as an ideology which divides the society between two distinct groups: the corrupt elite and the pure

people. Populists argue that politics should represent general will of the pure people and not the corrupt elites (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017 & Mudde, 2004). Populist political actors argue that contemporary politics do not represent the people since the political elite is detached from the needs and interests of the people (Pinelli, 2011). Their conception of people is that the pure people are homogenous (Akkerman et.al, 2013; March, 2012; Stanley, 2008), virtuous (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Taggart, 2000), inherently good (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) and they believe that people are in the heart of democratic system (Akkerman et.al, 2013) and are the basis of a functioning society (Zaslove, 2008 & Mudde, 2004). On the other hand, elite in populist conception can take many forms such as financial elite or political elite, but currently most common criticism by the populist actors is directed towards the political elite. Political elite should not be limited only to the incumbent or establishment politicians nationally; populist actors are also critical of the European political institutions. Populist actors view the political elite as evil (Hawkins, 2009), corrupt (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008), self-serving (Rico and Anduzia, 2019; Rooduijn, 2013) and as a force that threatens both the unity and purity of the citizens (Akkerman et.al, 2013). So, populists believe that unresponsiveness by the elite to the people should not be what the political system is and the political system should be total representation of the general will of people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017 & Mudde, 2004). This view of populism have been used to explain the backlash from populist actors and the people against the political establishment amid the economic crisis. Pinelli (2011) and Rico & Anduzia (2019) suggest that the unresponsiveness by the political elite to the crisis enhanced those views among the people that elite does not bother itself with the problems faced by the people. Populists were able to frame the economic crisis and the aftermath as a crisis of political establishment in helping the citizens. Poli (2019) suggests that contemporary populist political actors in Europe have exploited public perception of the economic crisis and blamed the EU for worsening conditions. They have sustained their criticism of the political elite both on national and international level with tonnes related to the economic crisis.

Populism, however, is not an ideology similar to others such as liberalism or socialism. Instead, it is a thin-centred ideology with no ideological sophistication (Mudde, 2004). This thin centredness of populism allows it to attach thicker or full

ideologies (Bakkat et.al 2015; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde and Klatwasser, 2013), create a more sophisticated ideological platform and define set of political principles based on them. Thus, populism is able to attach itself to values across the political spectrum and can take form of left-wing populism or right-wing populism by adopting the values held by these ideological groups. This way populists are able to convey their message of people vs. elite through using the elements from the ideology that they attach their rhetoric to.

A benefit of defining populism as an ideology is its ability to open room for further research, particularly for comparative studies. First, as Mudde (2017) suggests, approaching populism as an ideology makes it measurable in political actors and allows researchers to distinguish between populist and non-populist actors. As mentioned earlier, many political actors or movements across time and countries have been classified as populist. These classifications have not entirely been accurate since the conceptualization of populism was vague. By reducing the vagueness on these issues; populism as an ideology is able to measure whether a political actor has populist tendencies by separating the actor from its thicker ideology and observing it directly on the bases of pure people vs. corrupt elite rhetoric. Secondly, as Mudde (2017) suggests it also allows comparability across time, regions, countries and even ideological positions. Literature on populism have developed separately in Latin America and Europe, each defining the populism in the region with certain set of characteristics. Same can also be applied to the study of populist- left and populist-right, where characteristics of populism have been mixed with ideas of thicker ideologies. These have made comparison between regions and party groups difficult. By emphasizing the populism as an ideology, a more universal understanding of populism has been built which is reflected in the modern studies focusing on populist parties in Europe.

Second perspective of populism is put forward by Weyland (2017) who offers an organizational and strategic approach to understand populism. He criticizes the ideological conceptualization of populism and suggests that organizational characteristics of the party and supporters are more important. In his idea, populist parties are based on personalistic leadership style that relies on non-organized support from masses with no strong party organization in the base. Consequently, the populist

parties rely on the personal opportunity seeking by the party leader. Weyland (2017) argues that this conception goes against the ideological approach to populism since personal leadership and unorganized bases of support result in manoeuvrability in party positions and leaders avoid sticking with an ideology. If they aim to capture a larger share of the electorate, they should be able to abandon their previous positions easily. This cannot be done in parties whose populism is attached to thicker ideologies. They want the flexibility to change their discourse based on the circumstances they are in and in order to have that flexibility, they eschew strong ideological positions. So, the political positions of the populist parties are not well defined and is subject to changes based on the personal views of the leader based on the opportunities they see.

Weyland (2017) also criticizes ideological approach by suggesting that the ideological views puts too much emphasis on “the people” which is mostly used by the right-wing populist parties. This ideological positioning on the radical ends, however, hinders the ability of populist parties to win over moderate electorate and build a broad coalition of the people. An aspect of organizational view is the hierarchical structural relation between the leader of the party and supporters. This organizational dynamic of populist party is hidden in the term “the people”, when these people delegate their political sovereignty to the populist leader. Due to nature of the top-down leadership seen in the populist parties, lack of political organization among the supporters and high reliance on the idiosyncratic aspects of populist leaders, the connection between leaders and supporters lack intermediary organizations. The lack of intermediary organizations is helpful to explain how populist parties are able to change their positions. As Weyland (2001) suggests, this approach also captures the volatility of the populist parties and the way they change their political discourse.

One criticism of the organizational approach is put forward by Mudde (2017), a proponent advocate of ideological approach. He suggests that the merits of organizational movements are evident but populism in history has come in many different forms. The contemporary Tea Party movement for instance, lacks a leader or French populist right-wing National Front (FN) is well structured. Still, Mudde (2017), accepts many contemporary populist actors consist of strong charismatic leaders with weak formal organizations. Particularly, European populist right-wing

parties are formed around charismatic leadership skills. Geert Wilders, leader of Dutch populist right-wing party, Party for Freedom (PVV) and Marine Le-Pen, leader of French populist right-wing party FN are prominent examples of charismatic leadership. However, Mudde (2017) suggests, even though populism has an affinity to this type of structure; it should not be regarded as the core or defining aspects of populist movements or populism. Mudde (2017) also criticize organizational approach based on the “pure people” vs. “corrupt elite” dichotomy of the ideational approach. He suggests, populist party voters are sceptical of both strong party leaders and strong party organizations since these types of political actors are more prone to either corrupt the system or become corrupted.

Third view of populism that will be discussed in this section is Ostiguy’s (2017) socio-cultural approach to populism. This approach assumes a new dimension of high and low in politics. It focuses on how politicians appeal to public, i.e. ways of doing politics. In high dimension, politicians are more restrained both in terms of their characteristics and organizational structures. From their attitude towards political rivals to the language they use, they seem to have a more professional approach. Low dimension, on the other hand, is much more personalistic and direct in both the politician’s characteristics and organizational structure (Ostiguy, 2017). In low dimension, politicians use less sophisticated terminology and associate themselves with the ordinary people. Ostiguy (2017) suggests, populism is the admiration of “the low”.

This high and low dimension supported by the classical left-right axis of politics creates a new two-dimensional approach to understanding populism with four quadrants. Ostiguy (2017) argues that this is helpful to compare populist parties across different regions by their left-right placement. Regardless of their ideological placement, populist parties seem to use more layman terms to appear more folksy in the eyes of the public. This essentially means that what divides populist from non-populist is whether a party puts effort in appearing more folksy or more professional. An advantage of this method is its usability along with ideological and organizational approaches to populism. It emphasizes that populist actors and non-populist actors have different organizational structures, thus they can be studied based on the structure. Secondly, it does not rule out the importance of thicker political ideology

along the left-right scale. Political actors can be placed on anywhere in the left-right scale, independent of their position in the populism scale. Thus, populism still cuts across different ideological positions and can be emphasized by different political actors from left to right.

Last view of populism that will be discussed is the discursive approach. It has been influential among scholars of populism and has been put forward by Laclau (2005). He uses the same definition of populism as in the ideological form – “pure people” vs “corrupt elite”— but reaches a different conclusion by suggesting that populism is a strategy used by the political elite to have more precise definition on the term “the people”, in order to maximize their political power. Through using this rhetoric, populists are able to redefine what they mean by “the people” and making people subject to their political discourse. So, instead of being an ideology, populism becomes a political tool for all political actors, regardless of their thin or thick ideology. Even the political actors that are in the government or a core part of the political system are able to use populist rhetoric in this idea. Whereas in the ideational approach of Mudde, populism is generally described as a political tool that is used by non-mainstream political actors, Laclau’s (2005) definition implies a wider usage of populist rhetoric.

In light of the discussions above, this study will acknowledge the merits of Mudde’s (2007, 2004) argument of populism as an ideology for several reasons. First, it allows to capture the essential differences between right-wing and left-wing populist parties. Acknowledging the common populist core and disjoining it from the thicker ideology that it attaches itself to will be helpful to examine the idiosyncrasies of the thicker ideology. Since this study aims to understand populist parties on both left and right, ideational approach offers greater opportunities to understand how left-wing and right-wing populism use populist ideas to promote their ideas. Secondly, methodological benefits of treating populism as an ideology allows performing cross-sectional analysis not only between regions or countries but also between different ideological groups. Populist political parties from various countries and even opposite ends of the political spectrum can be brought under the populism as a thin ideology umbrella and differences between them can be investigated. Even though European populist parties have the people vs. elite struggle as the common idea; parties on left

and right flanks of the political spectrum differ on various issues. These commonalities and differences between parties show that populist ideas attach themselves to thicker ideologies. By understanding the populism's ability to travel across ideological boundaries, it will become possible to observe what makes these political parties different and why would a certain individual would vote for that party. The next section will discuss, essence of populist political parties, left-right dichotomy and reasons behind the contemporary rise in populist party popularity across Europe.

2.2. Populist Political Parties

Previous section has demonstrated that defining populism is not straightforward. Multiple definitions have been employed, each having their own merits. Empirical studies having used these sometimes-opposing definitions have created an ambiguity in the literature dealing with populism. As a result of the ambiguity over defining populism, definition of populist actors and populist parties has also been contested. In order to understand what really constitutes a populist party, studies based on Mudde's (2007, 2004) definition of populist actors are helpful. Populist parties should be seen as political actors who believe there is a Manichean struggle between people and the elite (Hawkins et al., 2018, Moffit, 2015) and support their argument by supplementing ideas from thicker ideologies in which they articulate themselves to. Since this study focuses on the electorate of populist parties on left and right this definition of populism is helpful to distinguish the two and examine the reasons behind their differences. Before discussing the findings from previous studies about these similarities, differences and how they emerged, it will be helpful to mention common problems and mistakes in the study of populism that have been identified in the literature on European party politics.

One frequent problem that has been observed in many current studies is due to focusing solely on the right-wing populism. Even though there are left-wing populist parties in Europe, some being successful, their existence has been neglected by the much of the scholarly works (Bernhard and Kriesi, 2019; Roodujin, 2017). In the second half of 20th century in both Latin America and Europe, populist left had been

the focus of scholars as their presence was much larger in both regions. These parties, however, in time have deradicalized and left populist arena to right-wing parties (Akkerman et.al, 2016; March, 2007). As a result of these changes and due to popularity of right-wing populism, contemporary studies on European populist parties, have to the most extent focused on right-wing populist parties. The exclusive focus on right-wing, however, has come with its disadvantages. First, Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) suggest many equate populism with the right-wing ideology, think its exclusively a right-wing phenomenon and focus on their nationalist attitudes exclusively. Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) suggest populism and nationalism should be distinguished from each other. Ignoring the presence of left-wing populists hinders the ability to understand populist parties and other reactionary forces that has been shaping the continent's political structure since Eurozone crisis. Populist left may not have been as successful as their right-wing counterparts in general but with successes of SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain, their presence in European party system is growing. As a result, along with right-wing, left-wing populists should also be studied to get a clearer look to the European politics.

Another common problem in the scholarly literature is to treat every extremist party as populist. Bernhard and Kriesi (2019) warn against equating radicalness with populism as there are mainstream parties which have higher levels of populism than some radical parties. This mistake is particularly apparent in the case of extreme right and populist right parties (Geurking et.al, 2020). Although it is common for these two elements to co-exist, it's not a necessary condition. Just as not every populist party is extremist, not every extremist party is populist. A political party such as the Italian M5S, sits on the centre of political spectrum but carries populist attitudes. M5S is known for using a populist rhetoric but also emphasizing issues put forward by both left and right. Pirro and Kessel (2018) show, while M5S had a socioeconomic framing of the economic conditions after the Eurozone crisis similar to left parties around Europe, during the migrant crisis it embraced sociocultural and nativist attitudes often found in the right parties. A similar point is put forward by Drake (2018) argues, M5S; despite having left-wing origins resembles many aspects of the contemporary right-wing populist movements. So, even though they have a populist and a radical tone, their radicalism brings together ideas from opposite ends of the spectrum, making

them a party that cannot be placed at either of the radical ends. On the other hand, French radical left-wing Communist Party is not assumed to have a populist tone (PopuList, 2019). Even though it clearly champions radical-left policies it lacks populist elements. Literature on contemporary European populism to a large extent suffers from the latter issue. Existence of centrist political parties have been accepted but there are still some studies classifying non-radical political parties as if they are populist.

Georgiadou et.al (2018) apply this distinction between populist and radical in their research and focus on the European right-wing parties. Their findings indicate, populist right and radical right can be distinguished from each other by grievances that support their popularity. They argue that, whereas extreme right vote is mostly associated with economic problems, support for populist right is associated with cultural issues. Although they share some similar characteristics, there are differences between the grievances or problems they rely on. Furthermore, Halikiopoulou (2019) suggests that a reason behind the success of populist right parties is their ability to distance themselves from radical-right and racism by presenting immigration as a value problem. This distancing from previous fascist background to become more people centric (Schwander and Manow, 2017) is not exclusive to parties on the right. Roodujin and Akkerman (2015) argue both radical left and radical right have replaced their attacks on the liberal democratic system with a more moderate criticism of the political establishment. So even when there is similarity between the grievances, populist right parties are able to use a different rhetoric to build broader coalition. Rydgren & Betz (2018) further suggests that power of populism originates from different sources than traditional radical right. Instead of targeting groups independently, populist right actors are both targeting these groups such as migrants and blaming the political establishment for ignoring the interests of the “pure people” regarding them. Nevertheless, since the factors that help these parties and their rhetoric are different, they should not be regarded as members of same party family.

A possible explanation for the confusion is the way political parties which previously held radical view have transformed themselves into populist. An example has been put forward by Ivaldi (2018, 2015) who shows that French political party FN; which was previously extremist but in time by adjusting their political positions

they have transformed into a populist party. Even though, this has been the experience for FN and some other political parties in Europe, this is necessarily not the case for all. Some still hold on to extremist values without emphasizing a populist rhetoric. It would be a mistake to assume the same for all political parties. Consequently, there needs to be a distinction between populist political parties and extremist political parties. Even though these terms are not mutually exclusive, they do not necessarily co-exist. Dataset that will be used in this study –PopuList— (2019) takes into account the differences between extremist political parties and populist political parties, giving a clearer look into the European political party system.

A criticism towards classifying radical right-wing political parties as populist has been put forward by Rydgren (2017) who suggests that even though many radical right parties are now referred to as populist, not all these parties share populism as their main defining value. He argues the ethnic nationalism of these parties is more of a defining factor than their populism for their ideological profile. Similarly, Stavrakakis et.al (2017) suggest that, populism is not the main theme of these parties but opposition to certain ethnic groups, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes are. They argue even though populism is still an element defining these political parties it is not at the core of their ideological positioning and they should not be labelled as populist primarily. They are a radical party first and then a populist party. This applies to populist parties of both right and left. This, however, does not mean that populism cannot be used as to classify these parties. Populist ideas are still there but they are there to complement the policies of thicker ideologies.

Although these arguments are correct in suggesting that populism is of secondary importance, this should not mean that their populist ideas can be disregarded. Instead of disregarding populist ideology because it is not the most common feature; a better alternative would be to distinguish between populist left parties and populist right parties. Secondly, even if the populism is not the common theme in these parties, this corroborates Mudde's (2007, 2004) argument of populism as a thin ideology. Being a thin ideology, populism attaches itself to ethno-nationalist ideology of the right and left-wing economic ideas of the left. This way, these parties are able to appeal to voters with their extreme positions, blended with populist ideas. It may be overshadowed by the ideological rhetoric but their populism is still there

and it is shaping how they convey the message. Similarly, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) suggest populism and radicalism may in some cases act together and often do. However, just as a radical right party does not need to be populist, a populist party does not need to embrace radical values.

To understand populism to its full extent, instead of classifying them under one giant family, they should be grouped under two distinct categories that happens to share set of ideas. Werts et.al (2012) show the current discussion of populist parties in Europe defines populist parties based on their position on the political spectrum. Left-wing populist parties bring together populist set of ideas from the thicker socialist ideology and right-wing populist parties borrow ideas from the thicker conservative ideology. PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) uses its own classification method of European political parties based on the previous arguments in the literature. Their definition of populist parties is based on Mudde's (2007, 2004) argument who suggests populist parties adhere to the idea that there are two homogenous and antagonistic groups in the society: pure people and elite. Mudde (2007, 2004) suggests populist parties believe society is separated between these two groups and the politics should represent general will of the pure people, not the elite. Their classification of far-right parties relies on Mudde (2007) who characterizes far-right as nativist and authoritarian and classification of far left-parties relies on March's (2012) study who suggests that these parties reject the existing socio-economic structure and call for redistribution of resources.

Thicker ideologies mentioned here are important for populist parties and it shows, even though they primarily use a populist rhetoric to convey their messages, their populism cannot be properly observed independently from the host ideology. (Huber and Schimpf, 2017), Otjes and Louwse (2015) and Mudde (2007) suggest that using the term populist radical right rather than radical right populism since these parties are primarily right-wing but use populist attitudes to gain favour among the electorate and exercise their ideology. Secondly, although populism is used as an umbrella term to define these parties on both left and right; we cannot expect right-wing populist party and left-wing populist party to share many values (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). They may all emphasize the struggle between people vs. the elite (Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015) but their perception of "people" and

the reasons behind this perceived struggle are likely to be different and reflective of their host ideology. In this study, two classifications of the populism will be used: far-right populism and far-left populism.

Apart from their populist rhetoric and opposition to elite in favour of “people”, there are some aspects that brings right-wing populist parties and left-wing populist parties together. Normally, one would assume these political parties to be totally opposite of each other. In the most general understanding of political scale, right-wing parties sit in the opposite end of left-wing parties with liberal or social democratic parties in the middle. Their differences would not only be limited to economic factors but cultural factors as well. Traditionally, far-right has advocated for neo-liberal economic reforms at least on the national levels, whereas far-left has been the exponent of welfare redistribution. Similarly, on the issue of multiculturalism, far-right political parties are known to be nationalist or nativist, while far-left parties are more internationalist. These strict differences, however, does not necessarily apply to the case of populist parties.

Taggart (2017) suggests that there are multiple issues that can be mobilized by the parties on both left and right but their mobilization style is what separates them. These parties are assumed to have similar policy positions, particularly policies concerning welfare, European Union and more generally European integration (Halikipoulou et.al, 2012; Harmsen, 2010). Pirro & Kessel (2018) and Meijers & Zaslove (2020) suggest that the common denominator for the populist left and populist right, despite their differences on various issues is their Euroscepticism. Podobnik et.al (2019) go further in the argument and argue that previously there has been left-wing and right-wing populists but now this distinction seems to have come to an end and even a cooperation seems to exist between the two on issues relating to European Union. The common Euroscepticism has been on the rise most particularly since the Eurozone Crisis. Ivaldi (2017) suggests that populist parties have been converging against a common enemy of elite: global financial elite and European Union.

As Eurosceptic parties on both left and right have been on the rise since the European debt crisis, Euroscepticism have been one of the most debated political issues along with populism. Following their success in the 2014 European Parliament elections, Eurosceptic populist parties were able to convey their message to wider

groups. Pinnacle of Euroscepticism was the Brexit Referendum of 2016, where the result favoured United Kingdom leaving the European Union. Although Euroscepticism has been an influential idea in the last decade, it's a not a novel idea in politics. In fact, it has been a tool used by the radical left-parties in the 70s and 80s as an opposition to the globalization of the financial markets, financialization and expansion of the neoliberal economic ideas through the reforms made in the European Community (March, 2007). As for the far-right parties, such ideas have been more recent starting with the Maastricht Treaty and politicization of the European Union (Elsas and Brug, 2015; Werts et.al, 2012).

Modern form of Euroscepticism, however, is more complicated and existing differences between left populists and right populists seems to be less important. Kneuer (2019) suggest that Euroscepticism has cut through ideologies and borders and can be seen in nearly all populist political parties. Pirro et.al (2018) corroborate this argument and show that, after Eurozone crisis, right-wing populist parties were able to use the same economic framework for their Eurosceptic discourse that had been employed by radical left many years ago. Populist parties have benefited from negligent response by European level institutions to the crisis and criticism of these problems has brought the two-party families together. Not only their criticisms have become similar but their issue saliency also changed. Otjes and Van der Veer (2016) suggest that pro-anti EU line has become more important than the left-right divide in the European Parliament. Eurosceptic left and Eurosceptic right parties have opposed many economic moves by the European Union in unity. Pirro and Kessel (2018) show that populist political parties have been able to push their populist rhetoric by emphasizing the lack of public support towards the European Union decision making and democratic deficiency, which has been the primary criticism of populists against the European Union. This has been the electoral strategy of the populist parties regardless of their political position.

There are, however, criticisms and arguments against common core of Euroscepticism. Even though both groups have employed Eurosceptic ideas in their manifestos, attacked European Union simultaneously and benefited from the crisis, there are several differences between Euroscepticism of these groups (Podobnik et.al, 2019). Pirro & Kessel (2018) and Pirro et.al (2018) show that pre-existing differences

between the parties have largely been preserved an even though parties on both ends of ideological spectrum have championed legitimacy and sovereignty, cultural frames have been mostly used by the right-wing parties and left-wing populists have continued their criticism through socioeconomic lens. Similar to populism, Euroscepticism has been employed to convey the ideological message not independent from the host ideology. So, it can be regarded as the symptom of their populist discourse and connected to their ideological profile.

Secondly, it has also been argued that their level of Euroscepticism is not the same. Mavrozacharakis et.al (2017) focus on the Eurosceptic characteristic of the SYRIZA and suggest that even though the party has criticized EU institutions, they wanted to remain a member of the EU, unlike many of the right-wing populist parties. Similarly, Elsas (2016) and Pirro &Kessel (2018) suggest that even though these two groups can unify under Eurosceptic ideas; Euroscepticism of right and left has distinct roots. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current situation in the EU but are not opposed to further integration, while right-wing Eurosceptics either oppose further political integration or are against the idea of membership (Pinelli, 2011). This shows that variety and degrees of Euroscepticism exist and one should not confuse being anti-EU with being critical of the EU.

Second issue on which populist parties of left and right are assumed to agree is their support for welfare policies. Hausermann and Kriesi (2011) argue that the boundaries between economic and cultural dimensions of politics have been blurred since populist right parties have started to emphasize welfare issues. Left-wing political parties have always supported redistributionary policies. They have wanted an extensive welfare state that can take care the needs of unemployed, people in low income and other groups that require financial assistance. However, priorities of left-wing political parties changed from economic issues to cultural issues (Koster et.al, 2018) and populist right parties were able to fill this void by emphasizing problems related to economy.

French party National Front for instance, has undergone one of the most significant transformations in terms of economic policy. Ivaldi (2018) suggests that with the changes in voter base of the FN –transforming into a party for younger working-class citizens since the late 1980s—the party wants to protect economic

interests of their voters who supported FN for their positioning on the cultural issues. These changes have been most evident after the Eurozone crisis. With many vulnerable groups getting unemployed and losing some of the social benefits due to austerity, FN has transformed itself into the economic vanguard of these voters. This transformation was predicted by Betz (1993) who suggested that right-wing populist parties would appeal to losers of globalization, blue-collar workers who had been marginalized, younger people with no education and the unemployed. It has been argued that the radical right might abandon their traditional connection to economic liberalism and focus more on the centre-left economic policies (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995; Betz 1993). This prediction has been proven to be correct and amid the events of global financial crisis, some populist right-wing parties, most prominently FN have turned to more social-democratic economic policies with support for welfare (Ivaldi, 2018, 2015).

Changes in issue saliency is not exclusive to the populist right. Following the global financial crash, left-wing populists have turned back to prioritizing economic problems and inequality in the society along with the cultural issues. Voss (2018) suggests that contemporary populism is a symptom of inability of social democratic parties to mobilize working-class voters in times of crisis. Some of these voters have switched to the left populist parties and some switched to the populist right (Bale et.al, 2010). A case for this has been shown by Kestila-Kekkonen and Soderlund (2013) who suggest that many voters from left and right have switched to populist right wing True Finns after seeing inability of mainstream parties in responding to the crisis. Not all voters, however, have shifted to the populist right and in some countries populist-left parties have been successful in mobilizing the same voters. Voss (2018) argues that if number of these voters are not enough to be electorally relevant, the populist right party captures them by framing the economic issues alongside their framing of cultural problems. If, however, they are electorally relevant and mobilize attention from the supply side then left-wing populist party will capture them by emphasizing socio-economic issues directly. These experiences of the right-wing populist parties suggest that the ideological boundaries of these parties may not be so strict as some have believed to be and they are flexible in terms of their response based on the national context and voter profile in their countries.

The argument about convergence on welfare policies, however, has been criticized for ignoring thicker ideological profile of these parties. The critics suggest, that although right-wing populist parties have shifted their welfare policies towards left, their understanding of welfare system is different than the left's and the reasons behind the change of this position are also different from the left. Otjes et. al (2018) for instance show that the economic response of the right-wing populist parties does not reflect an economic understanding of the issue and rather it is the reflection of their nativist attitude. These parties are not advocating for better welfare programmes because they oppose current economic system. Similarly, Margalit (2019) argues that when the populist right politicians emphasize issues regarding the economy of immigration or welfare, they are not concerned with the socioeconomic aspects of it but with the cultural aspects. Traditionally their voters come from conservative and nationalist background, but as a results of new incoming working-class electorate they have transformed their economic position (Goodwin, 2011) in order to market themselves as party of working-class (Goodwin, 2014). These incoming working-class voters, however, are not attracted to the populist-right due to their emphasis on socio-economic problems but for their opposition to immigration which threatens the employment of the working class. So, embrace of right-wing populists of welfare values is just a reflection of their nativist attitudes and to hold on to voters they have gained as a result of their opposition to immigration policies, not due to a change in their economic rhetoric.

Apart from these presumed similarities which are shown to be mere reflections of their ideological profiles, much divides these two groups of parties. One difference between these party groups is the source of their resentment. Taggart (2017) and Salmela & Scheve (2018) show that there are differences between the target of left-wing populist and right-wing populist resentment. While the left focuses on the political and economic establishment by blaming them for the implementation of austerity politics, the right argues that the establishment has been favouring the out-groups in favour of the natives and ignoring the importance of national identities to push cosmopolitan ideas. Ivaldi (2017) shows that populism as thin ideology is helpful to explain issue perspective of these parties. Even though they believe there is a common enemy against the people, the left and the right differ on their conception of

the people. Although both blame the elite and focus on the dichotomous struggle between pure people and corrupt elite, their thicker ideology shapes the boundaries and target of these criticisms (Kriesi, 2013).

It has been shown earlier in this section that their perceived similarities regarding welfare policies were shaped by their ideological profile. As a consequence of different origins, the right-wing populist parties have an additional component of welfare that left-wing parties lack: welfare chauvinism (Koster et.al, 2012). Even though as Ivaldi (2018, 2015) shows, the right-wing populist FN has shifted its focus on the welfare policies, the support for welfare is not inclusionary. Welfare chauvinists are not opposed to the welfare state but they support limiting the distribution of resources with the native population only. Reflecting the origins of their support for welfare, welfare chauvinism also does not derive from socio-economic concerns but stems from cultural conflict (Hausermann and Kriesi, 2011). Even though the origins of welfare chauvinism is not entirely socio-economic this aspect has been more salient amid economic crisis. Ennsner-Jedenastik (2018) argues that especially after the financial crisis and a large influx of immigrants, the populist right-wing parties embraced welfare chauvinism as a means to protect the native population and this has been evident in many countries in Europe such as Denmark (Siim and Meret, 2016), Netherlands (De Koster et.al, 2016) and Germany (Decker, 2016). Similar to variety of Euroscepticism among the parties, welfare chauvinism is not unified too with some supporting much stricter limitations (Fenger, 2018).

Another important difference between these two party groups is related to the issues regarding immigration and multiculturalism. The populist right parties have always benefited from the sociocultural clashes in the society. These clashes mostly taking in the form of natives vs. immigrants, have provided breeding grounds for populist right parties. With the recent surge in immigration to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, the populist right parties have been able to use these issues in their own favour. They have not only framed immigration as a cultural problem but also as a socio-economic trouble (Pirro and Kessel, 2018). Following the economic collapse in 2009, they were able to use this rhetoric more to push their manifesto further by emphasizing interaction between cultural and economic concerns. Ivarsflaten (2008) has shown that even though the right-wing populists are known for

their active role in using anti-elitist sentiments and grievances over economy, these factors play a less consistent role in voting for far-right populist parties in Europe. Immigration, on the other hand, has been a successful common theme for them. This finding shows the importance of immigration with regards to right-wing political parties.

Immigration and multiculturalism are also what divides the right-wing populists from their left-wing counterparts. Nationalism, xenophobia and opposition to immigration differentiate the right-wing populist parties from the more inclusionary forms of left-wing populism in Europe (March, 2017, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Their emphasis of people also differs as a result of their conceptualization of the “pure people”. Whereas the right-wing populists are able to merge their populist narrative with the nationalist narrative to speak in the name of the “people”, by defining people as the natives of the country (Halikiopoulou, 2019, Cohen, 2019); Sanders et.al (2017) suggest that PODEMOS, for instance, includes the immigrants among the people that have been excluded from the political system by the elite.

2.3. Economic Crisis and Populist Parties

After observing some similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing populist parties, before moving on to analyse what motivates people to vote for them, it is important to understand the reasons behind how these parties benefited from the crisis. This will help to observe the environmental circumstances in which people supported populist parties. It has been mentioned earlier that the economic crisis had a significant political impact throughout Europe with populist parties benefiting from the political turmoil the most. Voss (2018) corroborates this and argues that simultaneous emergence of left-wing and right-wing populism indicates the importance of the socio-political context in which the populist parties act. Following the Great Recession, many European countries had to implement austerity measures and cut back social spending. The unemployed, low-income citizens and low-skilled labour were severely affected by these budget cuts since they were the main

beneficiary of the welfare programmes. Failure of the European Union institutions and national governments to respond properly to the economic problems (Berman, 2019; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2016) have generated lack of trust towards them and gave rise to the populist parties on both left and right (Luo, 2017; Kriesi, 2014). People who were fed up with the bad policymaking turned towards alternatives who promised them a more inclusionary politics. Bartels (2014) and Kriesi (2014) show incumbent political actors have been punished by the electorate as a result of their failures in dealing with the crisis and the electoral loss is more severe in countries more severely affected by the crisis.

Impacts of the economic crisis on populist party voting has been observed by several scholars, focusing on individual and national levels. On the national level, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) have shown that populist political parties in Europe have increased their vote share 4.1 percent and they are continuing to do so. They suggest that this increase has been more substantial in Southern Europe where the economies were hit hardest by the Global Recession. Most particularly in the case of Europe, not only the impact of the crisis was acute but also in the aftermath they had to implement severe austerity measures. Populist political actors in those countries took the opportunity and used the cuts on welfare spending to blame mainstream politicians and the political establishment (Aslanidis, 2017; Poli, 2016) most particularly in Greece and Spain (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Vasilopoulou et.al, 2014).

On the individual level, Hernandez and Kriesi (2016) suggest that economic downturn can be associated with electoral loss for incumbent political actors in Western Europe and among individuals most severely affected by the economic crisis (Hoblot & Vries, 2016). People who have been severely affected by the crisis have turned to populist political actors as their saviours. An example for this is put forward by Guriev (2018) who has shown that apart from the austerity measures increased levels of unemployment is also related with voting for populist parties. So, even in countries that has been fairly better-off in the crisis, individuals who are most likely to belong in “losers of globalization” group have experienced adverse effects of the crisis. Populist political actors have used the populist rhetoric of “pure people” ve “corrupt elite” in criticizing the governments and political actors in their response to the economic crisis (Pirro&Kessel, 2018 & Pirro et.al, 2018; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016;

Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). They blamed the incumbent political actors for the worsening economic conditions (Elchardus & Spryut, 2016) and for their unresponsiveness to the economic downturn (Rico & Anduzia, 2019). They played on the dissatisfaction among citizens to criticize the political elite and since many people also blamed the establishment politicians for the crisis they turned to populism. As a result, both populist left and populist right were the main beneficiaries from the Great Recession across Europe (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

It is important to note that there is not one common ideological response given to these crises by the populist parties. Pirro and Kessel (2018) by focusing on the Dutch and Italian populist political parties on left and right suggest that the response to the crisis depends on the ideological profile of the country and the degree to which the countries are affected by the crisis. Even though, the right-wing populism have been more salient amid economic crisis, Doležalová (2015) and Alonso and Kaltasser (2015) suggest that in countries which experienced a significant decline in GDP and increase in unemployment such as Greece and Spain the primary beneficiary has been left-wing parties SYRIZA and PODEMOS. Similarly, in these countries the main problem had been the severe austerity measures. These measures have resulted in cuts in social spending, unemployment benefits and pensions directed towards disadvantaged groups in society. People who were already struggling with the worsening economic conditions or unemployment were severely affected by these new economic measures. Populist political actors blamed the political establishment for disregarding the interests of citizens (Elchardus & Spryut, 2016) and these criticisms directed towards the incumbent political actors have met with support from the public. Schwander and Manow (2017) make a similar argument and suggest that the success of AfD, a far-right populist party in Germany, a country where economy has been fairly stable in the post crisis period, is not related to the economic grievances but to cultural issues, most prominently high number of immigrants and refugees in the country.

Populist parties do not diverge from their ideological profiles when responding to economic crisis. This is not unexpected considering populism as a thin centred ideology. Despite some exceptions, the right wing populist parties have emphasized the migrant crisis as their top priority issue and the left-wing political parties have

emphasized economic crisis and austerity measures as their focus. This, however, does not indicate that the rise of populist right parties had nothing to do with poor economic conditions. Georgiadou et.al (2018) argue that unemployment had positive impact on both populist right and populist left. Even though populist right had mostly a cultural breeding ground, there are economic grievances still in place.

This, however, can also mean that previously existed cultural problems are being reflected in the socio-economic arena due to labour market competition. Dehdari (2018) puts forward a case for the argument above and shows that the increase in the unemployment of low-skilled workers in Sweden is related to the increase in vote share of the Swedish far-right party. This increase in vote is higher in places where there are more low-skilled immigrants. As a result of labour market competition many low-skilled workers who blamed their current unemployment on immigrants or feared unemployment due to potential future immigration have voted for populist right parties. So, the immigration should not be examined separately from the economic crisis, at least while analyzing contemporary Europe. This is in line with Mudde's (2012) argument, who suggests that the economic crisis has hindered growth potential of the right-wing populist parties. Since they were not able to saliently use the immigration rhetoric, they have used the opportunities arisen from the economic crisis to frame normally socio-economic problems as socio-cultural problems.

Vieten and Poynting (2016) discuss why the right-wing populist parties have been successful in some countries and not others, building their argument around the political culture and political history. They suggest that left-wing populism has been present in political movement across South America and Central America. In Europe, only two cases of such populism can be regarded as successful: SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain. Thus, majority of the populist movements in Europe are right-wing. Loch and Norocel (2015) shows that there are various arguments regarding the regional differences associated with the existence of these movements: previous political movements, political culture and past experience with populism. These are believed to be important socio-political factors that play a role in how contemporary populist parties emerge around Europe.

In light of the discussions above, the findings suggest Eurozone crisis can be used as a milestone to study populism, populist political parties and the populist party

electorate. Amid the crisis, around Europe in some countries many already existing populist political parties have gained popularity and in other countries new populist parties have been formed. Furthermore, as discussed in this section they garnered support among the electorate that have been adversely affected by the crisis (Hernandez and Kriesi; 2016). Thus, there is a link between the economic crisis and voting for populist parties. This link shows the importance of analysing the characteristics of the populist party electorate in the post economic-crisis era. In the next section, characteristics and previous hypotheses that have been used to conceptualize the populist party voter will be discussed.

2.4. Populist Party Electorate

Now that the populist political parties have been put into context and some processes behind the rise of populist parties has been discussed we shall move on to discussing the populist party electorate. Whatever the issues these parties argue for or against, there needs to be a demand for those issues. Political parties respond to the macroeconomic or political environment in their countries. Klapsis (2014) and Vieten & Poynting (2016) suggest that when the economic conditions remain bad for a significant period of time, people are attracted to populist parties. So, the populist parties are able to take advantage of a crisis and turn it into profit by emphasizing the issues that distress voters. Even if a country collapsed economically or had immense number of immigration; if there is no reaction from the electorate to these events it is unlikely that a political party will emerge to emphasize them.

Consequently, it is important to understand the populist party electorate. Their demographic or socio-economic characteristics, issues that they find more important as compared to the rest of the electorate are essential questions to understand populism in Europe. This section will discuss previous studies trying to understand the populist party electorate of both left-wing and right-wing populist parties. First, the commonalities between populist party voters, and then the differences between the two voter groups will be discussed based on their socio-economic and demographic backgrounds, and their preferences on political matters.

There have been attempts to build a common typology for populist party voters. These studies aimed to find out what makes people more likely to vote for these challenger populist parties regardless of their ideological positions. This approach seems logical considering Voss' (2018) argument who shows that, after the crisis the emergence of left-wing populism of both right-wing populism dependent on the number of people hurt by the economic problems. So, this common ground underlying the emergence of the two voter groups draws attention to see whether they share core ideas or characteristics. The presumed similarities between the two voter groups are related to their socio-economic background, populist belief that politics do not care for the general will of the "pure people" and Euroscepticism.

Previous studies have suggested populist party voters and more specifically populist right voters to be "losers of globalization" (Merezin, 2009; Minkenberg, 2000). This theory assumes that due to the globalization of world economy, manufacturing industry in Western countries and most prominently in Europe has shifted to the developing nations where cost of production is lower because of low cost of labour. Similarly, increasing number of low-skilled immigrants most particularly from less prosperous nations to Western Europe created a labour market competition between natives and immigrants and drew down the wages in these industries. Hence, people whose jobs have been affected by the changing circumstances are considered as the losers of globalization. These people are mostly low-skilled blue-collar workers (Mosimman et.al, 2018; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Van der Brug et al., 2000), not highly educated (Ennsner-Jedenastik et.al, 2019; Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2013; Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Lubbers et al., 2002), low on income or unemployed (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Algan et.al, 2017; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2000), older (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and male (Schwander and Manow, 2017; Hartevelde et.al, 2015). Apart from their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, they have also been argued to be dissatisfied with both national and EU-level politics and politicians (Li, 2018; Kehrberg, 2015; Kriesi et.al, 2008; Kriesi et.al, 2006; Betz, 1994), dissatisfied with society (Spruyt et.al, 2016), economically insecure (Algan et.al 2017), have more pessimistic view of future (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Klapsis, 2014) and Eurosceptic (Werts et.al, 2013; Taggart, 2004; Taggart, 1998). These groups have

been the primary voters of populist right political parties (Oesch, 2008) most prominently FPÖ in Austria (Heinisch and Werner, 2019; Halla et.al, 2017; Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013) and FN in France (Ivaldi, 2018, 2015) (Otjes et.al, 2018).

Even though, primarily used to describe populist-right, similar voter profiles have been developed concerning left-wing populist party voters too (Ramiro, 2016; Visser et al., 2014; Knutsen, 2006). Particularly after the economic crisis and austerity measures being implemented, the welfare supporting low-income, lower-class voters have shifted towards the radical left-wing populist parties (Burgoon et al., 2019). Tsatsanis et.al (2018) corroborates this argument by suggesting that the strongest indicators of populist attitudes are low household income and education. Ramiro (2016) and Ramiro and Gomez (2017) show that after these people started to feel the effects of the economic crisis, they have become dissatisfied with both ruling politicians and political establishment and this dissatisfaction has led them to vote for populist parties. As the left-wing populist parties offered an anti-austerity solution to solve economic problems, low-income voters in those countries were attracted to that message. These similarities between left-wing and right-wing populist party voters have put forward the idea of a general populist party voter.

Critiques of this idea such as Roodujin (2018) argues that there is no single populist right party voter profile. They are not always losers of globalization, i.e. unemployed, with lower income, from lower classes, or have lower education, Eurosceptic attitudes and low levels of political trust. Similarly, Mudde (2016) suggests that although at first, this conceptualization may seem correct considering white, low-education blue-collar workers are regarded as typical right-wing populist party voter, these groups do not form the majority of right-wing populist parties' electorate in cases where they have been electorally successful. So, the right-wing parties have a heterogeneous voter profile (Mudde, 2007). This finding aligns with those of Inglehart & Norris (2017) and Betz (1993, 1994) who put forward the idea of blue-collar workers being only one part of the populist-right coalition. Right-wing populist parties also appeal to "new professionals" (Betz, 1994), younger and more educated citizens (Rama and Cordero, 2018), who would not be considered among classical losers of globalization. These latter groups are not likely to be affected by market competition due to immigration and they are not likely to compete for welfare

benefits but they can still vote for the populist right. Imerzeel and Pickup (2015) go further and reject the idea of losers of globalization altogether. They argue that “losers of globalization” are not likely to be mobilized by successful populist right parties and these voters are likely to be electoral abstainers. Their voters, however, are the ones who previously participated in elections and voted for the mainstream political parties. As populist parties became available in the political arena, they switched their vote abandoning their previous allegiances.

Similar arguments have also been made regarding the electorate of the populist-left parties. Santana and Rama (2018) suggest that the sociodemographic profile of populist left-wing populist party voters is a contested issue with ongoing debates on education and income levels of the voters. Knutsen (2006) suggests that the populist left voters are working class who vote due to these parties for the issues they support. Since the left-wing parties have traditionally supported income redistribution and stronger welfare state, it should not be surprising for working-class or low-income electorate to support them. On the contrary, however, Santana & Rama (2018) and Ramiro & Gomez (2017) show that the populist-left voters in Spanish case are urban and highly educated males. This categorization of left-wing populist supporters not only contradicts the traditional left-wing voter profile; it also does not fit the losers of globalization narrative; in fact, it is the opposite. Similar to what Betz (1993) found regarding the new professionals, the left-wing populist parties also seem to appeal educated groups along with citizens with low socioeconomic status. These findings suggest that the losers of globalization hypotheses is not relevant for either populist left or populist right voting alone. On the contrary, even though the findings suggest being a member off “losers of globalization” does not have an impact on voting for the populist left, people who said they do not have enough money to pay their bills are more likely to vote for populist left parties (Santana and Rama, 2018). Santana and Rama (2018) argue that this may be a result of the mobilization by the right-wing populists in the country, or the losers of globalization in case of the left-wing parties might be different from the right-wing. They may be affected by the economic crisis but not from the immigrants entering their country for work.

Thus, this study will test the “losers of globalization” hypotheses with the socio-economic status indicators that have been previously mentioned in the literature.

It has been previously argued that losers of globalization are people without university education (Ennsner-Jedenastik et.al, 2019; Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Lubbers et al., 2002), blue-collar worker in a low-skilled job (Mosimman et.al, 2018; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Van der Brug et al., 2000) and low on income or unemployed (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Algan et.al, 2017; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2000). These four indicators of socio-economic status is important to understand whether a person belongs to “losers of globalization” group or not. Similarly, apart from their indicators; it has been shown that these people are also more likely to feel they do not have enough income to pay their bills (Santana and Rama, 2018). Independent from their socio-economic indicators, if a person believes their income is not enough for sustaining their life, that person is suggested to be more likely to become a populist party voter. So, in addition to the socio-economic indicators, feeling of present income along with the four previous indicators of socio-economic status will also be used to examine whether a person is more likely to vote for populist party or not. These indicators will be helpful to see whether populist party voters can be associated with losers of globalization or nor. More detailed description of the variables that are going to be used for socio-economic status will be given in the next chapter.

Second issue that has been assumed to unite electorate of populist right and populist left is populist attitudes towards political insitutions. Hawkins et.al (2017) show that populist parties are able to convey failures of government as failures of political establishment in serving the citizens. In this way, they are able to attack the political institutions and political actors representing them together and present themselves as the true representative of the people. Voters who believe that a struggle exists between people and elites are more likely to vote for populist parties. The belief in this struggle and lack of trust towards political institutions are defined as core the of populist attitudes. Hauwert and Kessel (2018) argue that regardless of ideology and positions on policies, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party voting. As expected, the electorate of both the left and right have higher populist attitudes as compared to the electorate in general. Both party groups criticize the political establishment and system arguing in favour of the common people. These findings suggests that populist attitudes should be regarded as a common theme among

both parties. With regards to Mudde's (2004, 2007) arguments, populism as a thin ideology, populism attaches itself to left-wing or right-wing ideas. Although as shown earlier, conception of the people and the elite varies across the two groups, opposition to an elite is still in the core of their ideas.

Critiques of populism as common theme among the left-wing and the right-wing parties, on the other hand, use Mudde's (2004, 2007) definition of populism as a thin ideology to argue that the perceived common core is not a cardinal issue for populist party voters. Even though it is true that populist attitudes are good predictors for populist voting regardless of the ideological position of voter and party (Hamerleers and Vresse, 2020; Marcos-Marne et.al, 2020; Akkerman et.al, 2017; Akkerman et.al, 2014), populist attitudes of the voters should not be observed completely independent of thicker ideology (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020; Stanley, 2008). They may oppose to same political institutions and blame these for not representing the interests of people. The difference, however, is their perception of people and source of the criticisms. As shown in the previous section the populist parties of left and right have different conceptions of people and attack national and supranational institutions for different reasons. This is likely to be the case for their electorate too. People voting for populist parties are likely to perceive elite and people from the perspective of their political ideology. Even if there are similarities between the two groups in their opposition to the elite, this seemingly similar opposition is just a reflection of their political ideology (Tsatsanis et.al, 2018; Akkerman et.al, 2014).

A criticism against global financial elite has been used most prominently by the left-wing populists long before the crisis. March (2007) shows that even in the 1970s and 1980s, radical-left has emphasized problems regarding financialization and globalization of markets. People, most particularly low-income and unemployed individuals, were attracted to these messages as their problems were being represented in politics. Such criticisms have remained fairly stable over the years but gained popularity amid Eurozone crisis. With the collapse of many national economies and austerity measures implemented which put burden of the crisis on people, citizens who blamed global financial system and elite for those problems have supported the populist-left, who make similar criticisms.

On the other hand, critique from the radical-right voter has had a different source. Populist-right electorate since 80s and 90s reflect their parties' opposition to political unification of Europe and opening of borders to other European countries. So, their opposition to the elite is particularly to supranational European and national political elite, who, they believe, want to undermine their country's national sovereignty by creating supranational institutions. These findings correspond to Mudde's (2004, 2007) suggestion that populism attaches itself to thicker ideologies. While both groups carry populist attitudes and believe there is a struggle between corrupt elite and pure people, the elite in left-wing discourse is understood from the perspective of left-wing ideology while the elite in right-wing discourse is described from the perspective of nativist aspect of right-wing ideas. Hauwert and Kessel (2018) substantiate these findings and show that populist attitudes start to matter less when the voter moves to a more extreme on the issues concerning EU, immigration on welfare. Voters care mostly about the message and receiver, not how populism is used to convey it. So, populist attitudes should not be understood as independent from their host ideology. They are used to reflect the ideas from thicker ideologies.

As an extension of their cynical view towards the political institutions, populist party electorate is also skeptical of the government and they are less likely to be satisfied with it. This is not unprecedented considering that the populist party electorate are assumed to be protest voters (Voss, 2018; Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008). Since these people are not trusting towards the political elite and vote for populist political parties hoping for a change, it can be expected them to be less satisfied with the incumbent political actors. Norris (2005) in a study on populist right parties in Europe have tested this argument and contrary to expectations has found populist party voters to be satisfied with their governments. Even though this might have been the case for pre-crisis European politics, it is likely to be different in the post-crisis era. With the Eurozone crisis many protest voters resulting from the economic crisis shifted their support to populist parties. These parties have been criticizing governments as failing in their duty to protect citizens and following the economic decline these views have become more salient (Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Many populist parties have used the crisis as an opportunity to

attack the incumbent political actors and attracted support from the electorate with their criticisms (Aslanidis, 2017; Poli, 2016).

This study will focus on the trust towards political institutions and satisfaction with the government in order to examine the relation between voting for populist political parties and attitudes towards politics and political institutions. Norris (2005) previously measured institutional trust to understand voting for populist right-wing parties and have found that populist right voters have lower levels of institutional trust. Following it, this study will focus on trust towards political institutions and examine whether the same applies for modern populist party voters. Previous studies have shown that populist party voters are not satisfied with politics and politicians (Li, 2018; Kehrberg, 2015; Kriesi et.al, 2008; Kriesi et.al, 2006; Betz, 1994) and it is likely to be the case for modern populist party voter in Europe. Since both European level and country level institutions have failed to prevent harmful effects of the economic crisis and even implemented austerity measures which hurt people more, it is logical to expect populist party voters to be distrustful towards politics and less satisfied with their governments. By examining their trust towards political institutions and level of satisfaction with the government, this study expects to understand impact of populist political attitudes in voting for populist political parties. These two variables will be discussed further in detail in the next section.

Populist attitudes are evident in dissatisfaction with national governments and the European Union. The European Union here requires a special emphasis over dissatisfaction with political institutions. Since Euroscepticism has been a highly salient issue in the last decade, it should be observed as a unique phenomenon. As shown in the previous section, populist parties have risen in the countries that are most severely affected by the economic crisis and with problems of mass immigration. Inability of both national governments and supra-national EU to deal with these problems has resulted in populist backlash from voters. This has resulted in increasing Eurosceptic attitudes on the part of the voters. Euroscepticism is assumed to be the unifying force among the right-wing and left-wing populist party electorate (Rama & Santana, 2019; Tsatsanis et.al, 2018; Ramiro & Gomez, 2017; Ramiro, 2016; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Visser et.al, 2014; Werts et.al, 2013; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007)

who feel threatened by the economic and political developments in the EU (Kriesi et al, 2008, 2006; Swank and Betz, 2003).

This unified understanding of Euroscepticism, however, has been criticized for disregarding the ideological background of these voters. One criticism of unified Euroscepticism suggests that left-wing and right-wing voters do not oppose European Union for the same reasons (Roodujin, 2017). Whereas right-wing voters are dissatisfied with the immigration and integration, left-wing voters disagree with the economic policy (Taggart, 2017). There may be similarities in the way they reflect these problems, but in essence, these two groups differ from each other. This is reflected in historical background of Euroscepticism. Elsas and Brug (2015) show that previously with the economic expansion of EU, opposition to integration was put forward by the left-wing parties. After Maastricht, however, the right-wing populists used nationalistic framing to criticize further unification. These two voter and party groups have been different on their criticisms on EU even before the crisis and same argument can be applied to post-crisis period.

Economic shortcomings of the European Union have become more visible among populist-right amid the Eurozone crisis. Serricchio et.al (2013), on the other hand, suggest that even though the Euroscepticism has been most salient in the countries hit hardest by the economic crisis, right-wing populist parties did not reframe their Euroscepticism with economic criticism. National identity and trust in political institutions continued to play an important role in their criticism of the EU. So, even though it has been argued that right-wing populist party electorate also adapted an economic criticism of the EU, that criticism seems to be overshadowed by the classical ethnocentric opposition to the EU and its institutions. Left-wing Eurosceptics, on the other hand, have been more consistent with their version of Euroscepticism: by criticizing economic aspects and failures of the European Union. They stick with their previous criticisms of non-people centric economy in EU, but due to the crisis they were able to form this criticisms more saliently.

Second argument against a common view of Euroscepticism focuses on the degree of Euroscepticism among voters. Krause and Wagner (2019) and Roodujin (2018) suggest that lack of trust towards political institutions do not have the same effect for all populist parties. Just as political parties have different levels of

Euroscepticism (Pirro & van Kessel, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2011), the same principle applies to voters. Elsas (2016) suggests that while the left-wing citizens might reject the current situation in the EU, they may not oppose further integration and can be in favour of a better Europe. Their opposition is not essentially to the nature of political and economic unions between countries and nations but to the current policies that disregard their problems. Right wing populists, on the other hand, oppose the idea of European unification as a result of their nativist and ethnocentric world view.

These differences between two party groups are assumed to narrow down in recent years. With the economic crisis left-wing populist party electorate has become more similar with right-wing citizens opposing the EU politics, and they have also become more pessimistic regarding the future of the European Union (Hobolt and Vries, 2016). During the course of crisis, negative opinions of EU have increased significantly across countries and both populist groups (Beaudonnet & Gomez, 2017). Even when voters of radical left parties have positive views of the European unification, they are still extremely dissatisfied with the economy and with austerity measures being implemented their positive view of future has diminished. This allowed right-wing populist parties to reach dissatisfied left-wing electorate. Under normal conditions, left-wing electorate would not vote for populist-right due to vast differences between their ideologies. However, with increasing discontent among left-wing supporters, right wing parties were able to build a larger and heterogeneous coalition rather than sticking with their pool of Eurosceptic and even Europhobic supporters. Similarly, some populist-left parties have also expressed harsher criticisms of the European Union from an economic perspective, and they have also emphasized discontent with EU-level institutions more than they used to (Beaudonnet & Gomez, 2017). Consequently, there have been differences behind reasons and in the level of Euroscepticism across two ideological groups. With the crisis, however, these differences have diminished and even if they are still not the same; their resemblance is higher than ever.

The similarities between the groups are shown to be reflections of the thicker ideologies. Even if both groups are highly populist and Eurosceptic, their conceptualizations of these terms rely heavily on the main ideology. When considering the differences between these voter groups two issues are mentioned most

prominently: welfare and immigration. Hauwert and Kessel (2018) show that socioeconomic issue positions are important predictors for voting for a left-wing party while immigration issue positions are important for right-wing parties. These two issues have been the central in the ideological profile of these voters regardless whether they support a populist party or not. In studying populist party electorate, immigration and welfare carry great importance as their attachment to populist ideals shape the ideological profile of those voters. Akkerman et.al (2017) provide an empirical example for this case and show that in Netherlands where both left-wing and right-wing populist parties are strong, right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) attracts voters with anti-immigration sentiments and left-wing Socialist Party (SP) attracts voters who are in favour of income equality.

Consequently, it is necessary to include Euroscepticism as a measure of characteristic of populist party electorate. Euroscepticism will be taken independently from the trust towards political institutions since its meaning to the voters go well beyond the trust towards EU political institutions. It also has a history that extends well beyond the Eurozone crisis, as March (2007) suggests left-wing populists have opposed neo-liberal economic expansion and integration of the European community and as Elsas & Brug (2015) and Werts et.al (2012) suggests right-wing populist actors have directed their criticisms starting with the Maastricht Treaty and politicization of the EU. This has become more apparent amid the economic crisis with many people questioning the policy-making in the European level and blaming not only their national governments but also the policy directed by the EU (Pirro et.al, 2018). Therefore, it is likely that Eurosceptic attitudes have increased among the populist party electorate. Examining the Eurosceptic attitudes among the party electorate will be helpful to understand whether the citizens are allured to populist parties by this discourse. Measurement of Eurosceptic attitudes will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Immigration has been a central issue for populist-right electorate. All right-wing populist parties around Europe share ideas regarding opposition to immigration. Kehrberg (2015) and Zhirkov (2014) show that radical right party support mainly depends on immigration with populism playing a minor but important role. It has been previously argued that right-wing's opposition to immigration is related to economic

grievances. This was Betz's (1993, 1994) suggestion who argues that since lower income groups do not want to compete for resources and jobs with immigrants, they are more in favour of limiting immigration thus voting for populist right party.

These arguments have been criticized and critics suggest that opposition to immigration is not related to economic problems but stems solely from ethnocentric and nativist ideas of right-wing ideology. Ivarsflaten (2005, 2008), Oesch (2008) and Mudde (2007) show that radical right-wing parties do not mobilize electorate based on economic grievances, or even immigration issues related to economic grievances, but their focus is solely on identity concerns, with economic ideas being peripheral to it. Bornschieer and Kriesi (2013) corroborate these claims and suggest cultural, not economic modernization –socially conservative voters– losers support the extreme right. Similarly, voters of far-right perceive ethno-cultural threats to be greater than economic threats (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). So even when losers of globalization theory does not hold, right wing populist party electorate will still oppose to immigration not for the reasons related to labour market competition but because of their ethnocentric world view and belief that immigration poses a threat to their national identity (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). Their perceived threat from immigration is also reflected in their Eurosceptic attitudes. Podobnik et.al (2017) suggest that populist right voters are concerned with the number of immigrants in the other EU countries since problems faced in these countries can quickly become a problem of their own. Therefore, they are more sceptical of European integration as they do not want to carry the burden of immigration problems of the other countries.

This study will focus on the attitudes towards immigration in order to understand the thicker ideological aspect of populist party voters. Immigration has been a central issue in the study of populist-right wing parties. Since many of the current populist right-wing parties either have an extreme right background or share the nativist worldview of the right-wing parties, we can expect voters of these parties to have nativist views too. These views are most commonly reflected in the attitudes towards immigration. As the previous studies suggest populist right party voters share anti-immigrant sentiment (Kehrberg, 2015; Zhirkov, 2014). This forms the thicker ideological aspect of what the thin ideology of populism attaches itself to. Thus, in order to identify reasons that people vote for populist parties and populist right parties

in particular, that is independent from their socio-economic status of view of the political realm; immigration is a good identifier. Measuring the relation between immigration attitudes and voting for populist parties is not only important to understand the impact of thicker ideology but also good for differentiating voters of populist left and populist right. Anti-immigration sentiments are suggested to be exclusive to right-wing populist party voters. Measurement and indicators of immigrant attitudes variable will be discussed further in detail in the next chapter.

Just as right-wing parties are defined by opposition to immigration, the central idea for left-wing parties have been support for welfare. Left-wing electorate and parties have always pointed out income inequality and have been in favour economic egalitarianism. Even before the economic crisis, left-wing electorate have pointed out to the problems related to income inequality and welfare spending. Eurozone crisis has increased saliency of these issues in political arena and among the left-wing electorate. Gidron & Mijs (2019) and Burgoon et.al (2019) show that loss of income during the crisis has increased support for the left populist parties. Voters who have especially been uncomfortable with budget cuts following the economic crisis seem to be more supportive of populist left parties (Masseti, 2018). Considering the long-standing alliance between left-wing electorate and left-wing parties regarding welfare issues, the shift towards populist-left is expected.

With recent crisis, however, welfare has also been an issue for the populist right electorate but in a different form. One difference between voters regarding welfare is their welfare chauvinism. Unlike left-wing voters who believe in universal welfare system in their countries regardless of ethnic background and migrant status, right-wing voters are supportive of limiting welfare benefits to the natives exclusively. Eger and Breznau (2017) suggest that in the regions where number of immigrants is higher, welfare chauvinistic attitudes among people are also high. Regardless of their support for welfare, right-wing populists oppose distributing resources to immigrants. Gidron and Mijs (2019) and Hameleers and Vreese (2020) argue that people who vote for populist-right parties are generally not supportive income equality. This may suggest welfare chauvinism is more related to anti-immigrant and foreigner sentiments rather than economic attitudes. Even if individuals are not hurt by economic crisis or austerity measures, they may still be supportive of welfare chauvinism.

This, however, does not mean economic grievances have nothing to do with right-wing's welfare chauvinist ideas. Gidron and Mijs (2019) suggest that in times of economic downturn there is incentive for populist-right parties to use nativist tones because citizens would be more inclined to accept anti-immigrant rhetoric (Cohrane and Neviite, 2014). In this case, economy can be regarded as an activator for welfare chauvinist ideas. Particularly for populist-right a combination of those two can have a huge impact and form the winning formula (Harteveld, 2016; Van Der Brug & Spanje, 2009; Lachat & Dolezal, 2008). This has been an effective tool used by populist right. Kitschelt (2004) and Hartveld (2016) suggest that since voters will have more fears over economic collapse, right-wing populists will be able to push the ideas further more easily. So, even though there seems to be support for welfare among both electorates, their approach to welfare policies is different. First, whereas income loss is a good predictor for left-wing vote it is not associated with voting for radical-right. This finding is compatible with the body of research suggesting that there are different drivers behind the support for populist left and populist right (Gidron and Mijs, 2019; Hauwert and Kessel, 2018; Akkerman et. al, 2017). Both party groups may be supportive of the same idea but their reasons are very different. Just as in case of Euroscepticism, attitudes towards welfare are also divided along the lines of left-right ideology.

Thus, this study will use welfare attitudes and welfare chauvinism among voters in order to examine the relation between them and voting for populist political parties. Support for welfare policies has been central in left-wing party voting and same can be expected for voting for populist left parties. Most particularly, in Greece and Spain populist left political parties blamed the mainstream political parties and the incumbent governments for their cuts of welfare spending amid the crisis. As Gidron & Mijs (2019) and Burgoon et.al (2019) show, loss of income during the crisis has increased support for the left populist parties. Burgoon et.al (2019) have shown that as the centre-left political parties advocated neo-liberal economic policies and austerity measures, people who supported welfare policies have shifted to populist-left parties as in Greece and Spain (Tsatsanis et.al, 2018; Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Ramiro, 2016). People who needed the social spending were not able to get them and it drifted the electorate towards populist left parties (Masseti, 2018). Even though,

traditional right-wing electorate is not defined by their support for welfare policies, there have been indicators suggesting the modern populist right voters are. Ivaldi (2017) shows, some populist right-wing parties have shifted their economic platform to the left. So, there is reasonable argument in suggesting it has done in order to accommodate the incoming populist-right voters who were dissatisfied with their economic situation and the welfare cuts implemented.

Despite their possible support for welfare policies, welfare chauvinism is also shown to be related with voting for populist right (Mosimann et.al; Eger and Breznau, 2017; Loch & Norocel, 2015). Due to being more nativist and ethnocentric, they are likely to share the anti-immigrant attitudes in the state's welfare spending. Examining the relation between welfare chauvinism and populist party voting will be helpful to see how the two party voter groups distinguish from each other. In order to examine the two relations, this study will use measures of welfare attitudes and welfare chauvinism. These two variables and their measurement will be discussed further in the next chapter.

This literature review has examined populism, populist parties and populist party electorate. It has shown that previous studies had variety of approaches regarding what populism is. Most prominent of those ideas is put forward by Mudde (2004, 2007) who treats populism as a thin ideology that can be attached to other thicker or full ideologies. A benefit of treating populism as a thin ideology is its allowance for cross-national and cross-ideological research. Therefore, this study will be using premises of that argument.

Secondly, there have been attempts to establish common properties for populist parties and populist party voters. These studies focused on perceived common characteristics of parties and electorates. Findings here provide contesting arguments. While some show that there is indeed a common category of populist party or common characteristics among populist party voters, others argue there are differences between two groups that are shaped by the ideological profile and they should not be considered the same. This seems to be the main idea from previous studies. They show that populist parties and voters have only very little in common. Roodujin (2018) suggests that one should be careful to draw inferences from analysis of voters. Even if the aim is to build a common framework for both groups, this analysis should take into account

characteristics peculiar to populist left and populist right parties. The same applies to voters and even though there seems to be common elements; these are assumed to be a reflection of their general ideological profile. There does not seem to be an agreement regarding populist party electorate among scholars.

These issues require attention for several reasons. First, many of the populism studies such as Fieschi & Heywood (2004) and Norris (2005) are based on an understanding of populism, populist parties and most importantly populist party electorate from the pre-crisis period. Even though these parties have been contenders in political arena through the 1990s to 2000s, their period of success has started after the crisis. There have been individual cases where they surged in a country such as National Front in 2002 presidential election in France. Rise in nearly all countries, on the other hand, have been unprecedented. Today, there is a strong populist party nearly in every European country. This literature also shows that European economic crisis has been a milestone for populism. Therefore, post-crisis political dynamics should be considered when studying populist party electorate. Next chapter will introduce and discuss the hypotheses that are necessary to test with data. These hypotheses have been drawn from contested points in the literature and are either issues that there is no consensus on or issues that have not been touched upon.

2.5. Hypotheses

This section will introduce hypotheses that this study will be based on. As shown in the review, there are many contentious points about populist party electorate that are far from being settled. Consequently, these issues require special attention to understand modern populist right and populist left party voter. This study assumes previous argument that “losers of globalization” no longer being the core voter profile of populist political parties are not likely to hold for post-crisis populist parties. Even though, the voter profile of populist parties might have changed over time and shifted away from losers of globalization; economic crisis might have brought the voter profile back to those political parties. It has been shown that in countries where severe austerity measures were implemented populist parties on both left and right have

gained popularity among the electorate (Luo, 2017; Kriesi, 2014). Since people who were affected by the cuts on social spending are more likely to fit the description of “losers of globalization”, the crisis might have changed the trend in voter shift. As, Ivaldi (2018, 2015) shows a far-right party such as FN has transformed itself into social democratic on economic terms in the post-crisis period. Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris (2016) have used economic left-right classification of populist parties and have found that many populist-right parties in Europe are indeed sit on the economic left. These findings corroborate importance of considering crisis dynamics for populist party electorate. These parties have not transformed themselves out of nothing. Without environmental incentives they are unlikely to change their positions on important issues. When discussing populist-right or populist-left electorate these changes should be taken into consideration.

In this section hypotheses that are going to be tested in this study will be introduced and their relevance will be discussed based on the previous literature and assumptions that can be drawn from this study’s approach. Through examining them, populist party electorate of both right-wing and left-wing parties will be better understood. Mainly, these hypotheses fall under five categories: attitudes towards politics, Euroscepticism, socio-economic status, attitude towards immigration and attitude towards welfare. As shown and discussed in the previous section these issues seem to be cornerstones of populist party electorate research and can show different aspects of populist party voters.

Welfare has been one of the most discussed issues regarding populist left and populist right voters. Particularly for populist right voters there has not been a consensus on their attitude towards welfare. While some have argued they are not in favour of income redistribution or state supporting society for economic reasons (Hameleers and Vreese, 2020; Gidron and Mijs, 2019), others have suggested that due to their working-class background they would be supportive of these policies (Burgoon et al.,2019; Tsatsanis et.al, 2018). Latter point also seems to be corroborated by the studies regarding political parties which suggest that there have been a shift towards economic-left (Ivaldi, 2017). Thus, there is an empirical background assuming populist right supporters to have positive attitudes towards welfare. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: Populist-right voters have positive attitudes towards welfare as compared to general electorate.

Similarly, it has been shown that populist-left supporters are more in favour of welfare policies to protect vulnerable groups in the society (Masseti, 2018). Left-wing party voters have always been supportive of welfare and populist parties are no exception. With recent competition from left-populism to centre-left who started to advocate a degree of neo-liberal policies; people who support extensive welfare may drift to left populism (Burgoon et al., 2019) as it happened in countries such as Greece (Tsatsanis et al., 2018) and Spain (Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Ramiro, 2016) in post economic crisis period.

H1.2: Populist-left voters have positive attitudes towards welfare as compared to other voters.

As an extension for the first hypothesis, right-wing populist party voters are also assumed to have a unique view of welfare policies. Apart from the discussions regarding their support for welfare, it has been agreed that populist right supporters favour welfare chauvinism (Mosimann et al.; Eger and Breznau, 2017; Loch and Norocel, 2015). They are shown to be nationalistic and have ethnocentric views, so it is likely that they will carry these views into their view of national economy. This would mean limiting social spending with the natives only and excluding immigrants. Particularly after the Eurozone crisis, worsening economic conditions and austerity measures they would be supportive of such limitations.

H1.3: Populist right voters are also more likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes as compared to other voters.

Immigration has been a central issue in the study of populist-right wing parties. Since many of these parties have an extreme-right background, it is expected that their voters to share common values for far-right political parties. Populist right voters are assumed to share nativist view of their far-right party family. Furthermore, as suggested by the loser of globalization hypothesis, these voters are likely to oppose immigration purely for economic reasons. Independent from their reasons of opposition, the common idea is that populist-right voters are anti-immigrant.

H2: Populist-right voters have negative view towards immigrants.

Trust has been a central issue for both populist left and populist right political parties. These people are assumed to be cynical regarding political issues thus have lower trust towards political institutions on both national and international level. This study expects, economic crisis and austerity measures to intensify these attitudes. Since both European level and country level institutions have failed to prevent harmful effects of the economic crisis and even implemented austerity measures which hurt people more, it is logical to expect populist party voters to be distrustful. They are likely to blame political elite for their conditions getting worse. Previous sections have demonstrated populist-left voters are sceptical of global financial elite and their relation to national political institutions. Even though their reasons are different, both voter groups are assumed to have lower trust towards political institutions.

H3: Voters of populist-right have lower levels of political trust.

H3.2: Voters of populist-left have lower levels of political trust.

Euroscepticism has also been a central issue for populist parties. Although it is similar to political trust, it has taken its own form due how widespread it has been across the political spectrum. It also goes beyond from being purely institutional to cover economic and cultural views of voters. Particularly after the economic crisis many people in Europe have started to question legitimacy of European Union and the future of European integration. Both-left wing and right-wing electorate have criticized European Union on their own merits. Radical party electorate have always had Eurosceptic views. Left-wing tend to view European Union as a capitalist organization whereas right-wing views it as a political organization undermining their national sovereignty. Even though, there is a varying degree of Euroscepticism across the political spectrum, this study expects Eurosceptic attitudes to be common among populist party electorate due to failures from the crisis.

H4: Populist right voters are likely to have negative a view towards the European Union.

H4.2: Populist left voters are likely to have negative a view towards the European Union.

Populist party electorate are assumed to be protest voters (Voss, 2018; Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008) or at least people who vote for these parties because they are not satisfied with the performance of their governments. Since they

are distrustful towards political establishment, they vote for populist parties hoping for a change in politics. Even though Norris (2005) had a conflicting finding regarding satisfaction with government of populist-right electorate this study assumes it has changed since the Eurozone crisis with protest voters of the economic crisis voting for the populist parties. Populist parties have been criticizing governments as failing in their duty to protect citizens and following the economic decline these views should be more salient (Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). So, this study assumes populist party voters to be dissatisfied with their current government.

H5: Populist right voters have lower satisfaction with the government.

H5.2: Populist left voters have lower level of satisfaction with the government.

Populist party voters have previously been assumed to belong to the “losers of globalization” group in the society. These people with low-income, low education and a low-skilled job have been negatively affected by the economic globalization process have turned to populist parties to support their interests. Even though some studies have shown that populist party electoral base is not homogenous and there are multiple social groups voting for these parties (Santana & Rama, 2018; Mudde, 2007, 2004), it may have changed with the economic crisis. With the inability of mainstream political parties responding to the crisis, populist parties on both left and right have seized this opportunity to turn the crisis in to their favours (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Ramiro, 2016). Thus, is it likely that populist parties amid the economic crisis will have an electoral base consisting of “losers of globalization”, —people who have been negatively affected by the economic crisis. So, this study expects populist party voters to belong to the classical “losers of globalization” group in the society.

H6: Populist right voters come from “losers of globalization” background.

H6.2: Populist left voters come from “losers of globalization” background

This section has demonstrated hypotheses that will be used in this study to test arguments. These are formed based on the previous discussion on the literature and in light of contemporary developments in the political arena. Next chapter will delineate data and variables that will be used to measure these concepts and analytical methods of analysis that will be employed to test these hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

Previous chapters have discussed the concept of populism, contemporary surge in popularity of populist parties in both national and European context, and populist party electorate in European countries. Based on the analysis of previous literature, we have shown that there are gaps in the knowledge of populist party electorate and there are issues where studies have yet to reach a conclusive argument. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are contradicting arguments regarding the populist party electorate and this shows further research is necessary. This chapter will introduce dataset, variables and methods used in this study for the analysis and will discuss their merits both based on the previous findings and hypotheses of this study. Results from these analyses aim to make a contribution to the efforts to understand the nature of populist party voter phenomenon, which have been widely discussed in the literature for the past decade. Since the demand side analysis of populism focuses on voters, their preferences and typology of populist party electorate, it is generally studied by employing survey level data to analyse the voters. Both national and cross-national surveys are used and they include questions regarding the socio-demographic information and political information of the voters, both of which have been used extensively in study of voters. Since the interest lies within the European-level politics, cross-sectional surveys offer a better compatibility across the nations and will be used for this study. All data, variables and methods for the analysis will be discussed further.

3.1. Data

There are various datasets on political parties, each having its own methods to classify them. Populist political parties included in this analysis have been selected based on the classification by PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019), a dataset that is used in

the analysis of populist political parties in Europe (Schwörer & Romero-Vidal, 2020; Berlingozzi & Piccolino, 2019; Zulianello, 2019). The project examines populist parties in 31 European countries, starting from 1989 which made a certain impact in the elections --either won a seat or won at least 2% in the national election. Similar to the methods used by Norris and Inglehart (2016) who worked on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data to classify populist parties either populist-left or populist-right, this dataset also measures the level of populism of these parties and classify them as: populist, Euroskeptic, far left and far right, where only far-left and far-right are mutually exclusive categories. Their conceptualization of populism is based on the definition by Mudde (2007, 2004) who suggests that populist parties believe, in society there is a struggle between people and the elite. However, whereas Norris and Inglehart (2016) classify populist parties as either left or right by focusing on their score in economic dimension, PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) employs a wider definition of these ideological groups. They use Mudde's (2007) definition of far-right as nativist and authoritarian and use March's (2012) definition of far-left as parties that reject the current structure of contemporary capitalism and call for redistribution of resources to achieve a more egalitarian society. Since this study focuses on voting for populist left and populist right, PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) is helpful to determine which political parties will be the focus in this study.

A merit of using this data set is acknowledging the existence of non-populist radical political parties such as far-left French Communist Party and centrist populist political parties such as Five Star Movement. Solely focusing on the populist characteristic of parties could have resulted in misclassifying centrist populist parties, so this dataset is helpful to achieve this study's goals. Using data from PopuList, political parties have been classified under two groups: populist far-right and populist far-left. An advantage of using PopuList data as an alternative to CHES is its acknowledgment of non-economic left-right dimension. Whereas studies using CHES data classifies parties as left-right based on their economic policy position, PopuList dataset goes beyond and includes other factors when talking about left and right. Therefore, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the populist party phenomenon. Full list of political parties and their countries is given in the Appendix.

For the demand side of issues, this study employs data from Round 8 (2016) of European Social Survey (ESS) to examine what characteristics or views make people more likely to vote for a political party. ESS has been used by various scholars to observe voting preferences across Europe and to understand support for the radical right (Akkerman et.al., 2016; Norris, 2005). It not only provides information on political issues such as the party preference of an individual, their support for certain policies and their view of politics and society in general, but also provides extensive information on socio-economic backgrounds and demographic characteristics as-well. Previous studies have emphasized importance of including demographic characteristics in building an image of populist party voter. It has been suggested that apart from their political views, people with certain socio-economic status or demographic backgrounds are attracted to populist parties more. Round 8 of ESS normally covers 23 countries but the cases where PopuList data did not have any matching information for the party have been dropped, leaving 19 countries for the analysis. The remaining countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia. The sample used in this study are people who have voted in the last election in countries where at least one political party which has been classified as either populist right or populist left was competing.

3.2. Variables

For the analysis of demand side of populism, there are two dependent variables: voting for a populist right party and voting for populist left party. It is created by matching data from ESS on responses to the question: “Party voted in the last national election?” with data from PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) dataset classifying political parties as populist left or populist right. Responses have been recoded into two variables: taking value of 1 if an individual voted for a party belongs to left-wing populist or right-wing populist party group and 0 if not; based on the classification in the PopuList dataset. There is at least one right-wing populist party in each of the cases except two: Ireland and Spain. Left-wing political parties, on the

other hand were available in 5 countries: Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, Slovenia and Germany.

Independent variables fall under several categories: demographic variables, socio-economic status variables, general political attitudes, attitude towards immigration and attitude towards welfare. Demographic variables are widely used in examining populist party voter. Previous studies have described the populist right wing voter as older males (Schwander & Manow, 2017; Vieten & Poynting, 2016). Consequently, age and gender are included in the analysis. Gender is a dummy variables taking a value of 1 if the respondent is male.

Second group of variables, which are the socio-economic status variables include university education, previous status of long-term unemployment, income level and type of occupation. Socio-economic status is tricky in understanding political party voting. Whereas Roodujin (2018) argues that there is no consistent finding suggesting the socio-economic status of an individual is a predictor of far-right voting, other studies have put forward a typology of populist party voter based on the socio-economic factors. As a result, these variables are part of the model to see whether they are good at explaining populist party vote when taken together with others. Education is created as a dichotomous variable: having a university education or not. Previous studies have suggested people with no university education are more likely to vote for a populist and populist right party in particular. Since university education is seen as the dividing line between the voters, its absence will be measured. University education is derived from ES-ISCED index to have more consistency among the electorate. It is possible for different countries to have different education systems and various years of education. ES-ISCED uses numbering method to classify levels of education in different countries. Using a common factor such as ES-ISCED is more sensible than years of full education completed to overcome this possible bias. Participants are given a value of 1 if their ES-ISCED score is 6 or 7, meaning they have completed their education on at least the bachelor level and 0 otherwise. Previous long-term unemployment is used as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the responded answered yes on the question regarding whether they were unemployed for more than 3 months in the past and 0 if not. In ESS, income levels are given in the form of decile standing in the country. Based on the recommendation from Eurostat

(Inequality of income distribution, 2020), people in the bottom quintile –two deciles— are taken as the low-income groups and given a value of 1 if they belong there 0 if not. Type of occupation is also coded as a dummy variable and it takes value of 1 if the individual works in a low-skilled job. Job classification is based on the ISCO08 standard, where occupations are categorized based on the required skill set. ISCO08 suggests, jobs on the 9th category are classified as low skill work. Last variable that is used is the feeling towards current income to capture whether individuals are satisfied with the living conditions they are currently in and to see how this satisfaction has an impact on voting for populist parties. The variable has been recoded to make higher numbered responses to represent a more positive attitude of their income.

Third group of variables used in this study are general attitudes towards politics. Previous studies have suggested lack of institutional trust is a driver of populist-right voting (Norris, 2005). Norris et.al (2005) uses trust towards political institutions as a grouping variable. This study, however, will only focus on the trust towards political institutions that has a direct impact on the lives of Europeans and not the trust towards non-political institutions. Consequently, trust in political parties, politicians, national parliament and European parliament are used to create a new variable of political institutional trust using CFA. Results from the analysis confirm these four variables can be used as predictors of political trust. Third variable is the satisfaction with government. Since many of the populist parties are newly emerging, they are likely to pull individuals many of whom are already voting for existing political parties. Individuals who are not satisfied with the government or economy are known to look for alternatives and it has been theorized they are more likely to vote for a populist party (Voss, 2018; Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008). In this study, answers to satisfaction with economy and satisfaction with the government will be used to measure how satisfied an individual is with the government. Confirming with CFA that these two variables are related, they have been combined to create new variable about satisfaction with the government.

Measuring Euroscepticism have many different approaches. Even though, Euroscepticism is often understood as a single term, it should be regarded in a broader perspective and even as an umbrella term. There are many levels and approaches to Euroscepticism and depending on the interpretation of the term there are significant

differences between them. Some focus on the country's membership in the European Union while others use the attitude towards EU or European integration. Nevertheless, in this study, whether an individual believes the European integration has gone too far or thinks it should go even further will be used to measure Eurosceptic attitudes among the electorate. PopuList data shows that although it is a common stance among the populist parties, not all of them share Eurosceptic ideas. Even when they share a Eurosceptic attitude there are varying degrees of Euroscepticism, ranging from soft-Euroscepticism to Europhobia. Thus, it is important to see how related is Euroscepticism to populist party voting.

Immigration has been at the centre of populist-right research. Consequently, it is vital to see how attitudes towards immigration impact voting for these parties. Attitudes towards immigrants are measured by combining three questions regarding effects of immigrants in the country: Effects of immigrants on economy, on cultural life, and whether they made the country a better or worse place to live. By employing these two variables, this study aims to capture populist party electorates position on both new and existing immigrants in the country.

Welfare is also one of the most interesting subjects when it comes to populist party voting. Betz (1993) suggests that modern radical right-wing parties are no longer sharing economic dimension with centre-right parties and have changed their economic agenda. Taggart (2017) corroborates this and shows that some populist right parties have adopted a social democratic agenda. It can be seen in Ingehart and Norris' (2016) classification of populist parties in left and right, where many Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant populist-right parties fall under left category in the economic dimension. Consequently, measuring welfare attitudes is helpful in understanding not only the populist-left parties but populist-right too. There are four questions measuring possible negative welfare attitudes: welfare places great strain on economy, costs businesses too much, makes people lazy, and makes people less willing care for one another. Using CFA, these four variables have been combined into one to create attitudes towards welfare variable. These variables will indicate how voters approach welfare policies on both economical and societal level. If indeed populist right-wing parties have changed their rhetoric on economic issues, this should tell whether this change happened or not at least on the voter level. A similar yet different welfare related

variable measures welfare chauvinistic attitudes in individuals by asking “When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services.” As shown previously and hypothesised, populist right wing parties are not only supportive of some welfare schemes but they are strongly in support of limiting access to welfare services by limiting the service to native people in the country. Since welfare chauvinism is shown to be an effective tool for the populist right (Fenger, 2018; Koster et.al, 2012), its effects on the voting behaviour should be investigated.

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis has been employed to estimate latent variables that are used in the study. Model has been estimated by using design weights as given by the ESS and robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Figure.1 in the Appendix C shows to the scheme used to create the model in STATA. Results indicate that the observed variables are predictors of the latent variables that has been defined. Looking at the goodness of fit statistic for the whole model SRMR, size of residuals has a value of 0.033 and since it is close to zero and below commonly used value of 0.08 as shown in Stata Manuel (StataCorp, 2013), it can be concluded that the model has a good fit. Factor loadings are given in the Figure.1 in the Appendix C. These newly created variables have been standardized to fit in [0,1] range. Figure for the model will be given in the appendix. The next section will discuss methods used in testing our hypotheses.

3.3. Methods

For the analysis, multivariate binary weighted logistic regression model will be estimated using Stata. Weights are the design weights for all individuals as given by the ESS. This allows to correct for unequal probability of being selected to survey in a given country. Secondly, since nature of logistic regression is heteroskedastic, Huber-White (robust) standard errors will be applied, helping to get more precise estimates of the standard errors. Even though homoskedasticity is not one of the assumptions of logistic regressions and robust standard errors will not fix the heteroskedasticity, it will help model to have better estimates of standard errors.

European Social Survey data is hierarchically structured, with people being nested in countries. In order to control for country-level heterogeneity, country-level

fixed effects will be applied –a method applied in studies using ESS data (Akkerman et.al, 2016). One reason behind using a fixed-effects model is the limited number of upper-level units exist in the dataset. This study only has 19 countries and as Hauwaert and Kessel (2018) suggest, multi-level models are not effective and should not be applied when dealing with small number of units. They suggest fixed effects models do not suffer from such disadvantage. Consequently, fixed effects models are useful in the analysis of cross-sectional surveys with low country units compared to multi-level models (Mohring 2016). Secondly, Hox (2010) shows that country error terms in multi-level models are assumed to be independent of both individual error terms and other variables in the model. In fixed effect models, on the other hand, country error term is estimated in the model as fixed parameters rather than random (Bryan and Jenkins, 2013); thus, there is no need for independence between other variables and country error term (Allison, 2009). Fixed effects model also helps to reduce chances of an omitted variable bias by controlling for heterogeneity that exists on the country level (Mohring, 2016; Wowles and Xezonakis, 2016; Benedictis and Salvatici, 2011) whereas multilevel models would have resulted in biased estimates when relevant between group measures were left out (Hauwaert and Kessel 2018; Hartmann, 2014). As a result of these advantages, fixed effects model will be used by estimating dummy variable for k-1 units in the model. Odds Ratios for both of the models will also be reported alongside the main logistic model. Since the logistic regression coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, odds ratios provide a better solution.

So, the equation for the model to estimate demand side of populism for both groups of parties is given as follows:

$$\log \left[\frac{P(\text{PartyVoted} = 0)}{1 - P(\text{PartyVoted} = 0)} \right] = \alpha_i + \beta_1(\text{Gender}) + \beta_2(\text{Age}) + \beta_3(\text{Unemployment}) + \beta_4(\text{Low income}) + \beta_5(\text{Low Skilled Job}) + \beta_6(\text{University Education}) + \beta_7(\text{EU Attitude}) + \beta_8(\text{Feeling of Income}) + \beta_9(\text{Welfare Chauvinism}) + \beta_{10}(\text{Political Trust}) + \beta_{11}(\text{Positive View of immigrants}) + \beta_{12}(\text{Government Satisfaction}) + \beta_{13}(\text{Welfare Support}) + \beta_{14}Z_i + v_j \quad (1)$$

Regarding the assumptions of a logistic regression model, multicollinearity, outliers in the dataset and the residuals of the independent variables have been checked before running the analysis. Multicollinearity has been checked using the Variance

Inflation Factors (VIF) method. Table of results from the VIF test is given in Appendix D. The results indicate model does not suffer from multicollinearity. Results show that all VIF values for the model are below the standard value of 10 (Hair, 2006) and even below the more conservative estimates such as 5 and 4. This result indicates explanatory variables can predict the dependent variable reliably and stable. Since the multicollinearity diagnostic results turned to be low, there is no need to exclude any of the variables mentioned earlier. Wald Test has been performed to see whether the independent variables included in the model are good indicators of the dependent variable compared to the null model. The results show that null hypotheses for both models can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level, indicating that for both models including the variables creates an improvement in the fit of the model. Residual plots have also been used and plots for both models are also given in the Appendix. Furthermore, “*Performance*” package (Lüdecke et.al, 2020) in R from “*easystats*” has been used to check for any outliers and the results indicated there are no outliers detected for both models. Since the assumptions of the logistic regression have been met, the analysis will be conducted. The next chapter will introduce and discuss results of the analyses.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The first model in this study measures the characteristics of a populist right wing party voter. Table.1 shows the results of binomial multivariate weighted logistic regression with country level fixed effects. Fixed effects have been omitted from presentation. Huber-White standard errors are shown in the parentheses. Odds Ratios are also shown alongside the model coefficients.

Table 1. Populist Right Party Voting

Variable Name	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Odds Ratio
Gender	0.303*** (0.057)	1.35
Age	-0.008*** (0.001)	0.99
University Education	-0.510*** (0.081)	0.60
Unemployed	0.158* (0.066)	1.17
Low Skill job	0.070 (0.113)	1.07
Low Income	0.102 (0.086)	1.11
EU Attitude	-0.099*** (0.012)	0.90

Table 1 Cont'd

Positive View of Immigrants	-0.415*** (0.022)	0.66
Satisfaction with Government	0.235*** (0.030)	1.27
Political Trust	-0.155*** (0.029)	0.86
Welfare Support	-0.096 (0.068)	0.91
Welfare Chauvinism	0.157*** (0.033)	1.17
Feeling About Income	-0.123** (0.047)	0.88
Constant	-1.622*** (0.264)	
<i>N</i>	19,940	
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

First, starting with demographic variables, null hypotheses for gender and age can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Coefficient for age is negative and odds ratio is below 1, indicating as people get older odds of voting for a populist right party also decreases. On the other hand, coefficient for gender is positive and odds ratio is above 1, indicating odds of man voting for a populist right wing party is higher compared to women –a result that is consistent with the previous findings. These findings provide an insight to the demographic characteristics of populist right-voters as observed in some of the previous studies: younger males.

Moving on to the socio-economic variables, lack of university education is also believed to be common among populist right voters and findings here substantiate those claims. As implied by the negative coefficient, odds of voting for a populist right wing party is higher among people who do not have university education. As expected, previous experience with long-term unemployment makes the odds to vote for a populist right party higher. Null hypotheses can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. On the other hand, we fail to reject the null hypothesis on people living on low income. With the data available, people who are living on low levels of income in their countries are not found to higher odds for voting for a populist right party. A similar argument following losers of globalisation hypothesis is that people who work in a low-skilled job would be more likely to vote for a populist right-wing party. Contrary to our expectations, this null hypotheses cannot be rejected. Results indicate there is not enough evidence to fully support our hypotheses H6 suggesting populist-right voters can be described as “losers of globalization”. On the other hand, odds of voting for a populist right party is higher among individuals who believe their income is not enough. These implications will be discussed further in the next chapter.

As mentioned earlier, many populist parties on both left and right have Eurosceptic attitudes. Euroscepticism employed in the study measures people’s attitude towards the European integration. As expected, the null hypotheses for Euroscepticism can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Negative coefficient imply, the odds of the people who support European integration voting for a populist right party is lower than the individuals who oppose it. This finding supports hypothesis H4, suggesting Euroscepticism can be used to explain populist right voting in Europe.

Satisfaction with the government is another tool that has been employed to study populism and populist right. Since there has been a major crisis with no adequate response from the national government, people who feel they suffered from the government policies are more likely to be dissatisfied with government. Results indicate the opposite of the expectations and substantiate Norris’ (2005) findings. Null hypotheses that there is no relation between government satisfaction and populist right voting can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level but the direction of the relation is opposite of what we have expected. Consequently, we are not able to support H5 and even find

the opposite argument for it. This result is worthy of further discussion in light of the discussion earlier and will be examined further in detail in the next chapter.

Political trust is assumed to be determinant of populist party voting. Results indicate that the null hypothesis on political trust can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Since the coefficient is negative, lower political trust means higher odds of voting for populist right. This result supports hypotheses H3. This finding creates an interesting dilemma where people have no trust in either national or European level organizations but are still satisfied with the government, a result can be found in Norris' (2001) analysis too. It is worthy of discussion and will be discussed further in detail in the next chapter.

As mentioned earlier in the study, immigration and welfare are believed to be two important and definitive explanations for the populist political parties in Europe. Particularly with the recent saliency of immigration crisis, populist right parties are likely to thrive on negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. As expected, people with negative attitudes towards immigrants have higher odds to vote for populist right parties. Null hypotheses can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Positive view of immigrants has a negative relation with populist right voting as evidenced by negative coefficient and odds ratio below 1. The two results support hypothesis H2.

There is a view in populist right voting which argues welfare is an important factor since some studies point out that populist. We fail to reject the null hypotheses for welfare support among the populist right voters. Results indicate higher support for welfare does not necessarily mean vote for the populist party meaning the data do not support hypothesis H1. Support for welfare chauvinism, on the other hands, yields to higher odds to vote for populist right parties. We are able to reject the null hypothesis; coefficient is positive and odds ratio is over 1. It means that hypotheses H1.3 is supported by the data and as theorised earlier, populist party voters have welfare chauvinistic tendencies. This finding is congruent with previous studies and indicate that higher support for limiting social spending towards immigrants increases the odds to vote for populist right parties. However, since no relation is established between welfare support and populist right voting, welfare chauvinistic attitudes of voters may not be economy related, but rather have cultural origins. These results will be discussed further in detail in the next section.

Second model measures dynamics behind voting for a populist left-wing party. Table.2 shows the results of binomial, multivariate, weighted logistic regression with country level fixed effects. Fixed effects have been omitted from presentation. Huber-White standard errors are shown in the parentheses and odds ratio are presented alongside the model coefficients.

Table 2. Populist Left Party Voting

Variable Name	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Odds Ratio
Gender	0.342** (0.103)	1.41
Age	-0.014*** (0.003)	0.99
University Education	0.036 (0.117)	1.04
Unemployed	0.299** (0.110)	1.35
Low Skill job	0.189 (0.188)	1.21
Low Income	0.274 (0.153)	1.31
EU Attitude	-0.006 (0.023)	0.99
Positive View of Immigrants	0.100** (0.036)	1.10
Satisfaction with Government	-0.421*** (0.057)	0.66
Political Trust	0.050 (0.054)	1.05

Table 2 Cont'd

Welfare Support	0.773*** (0.117)	2.17
Welfare Chauvinism	-0.031 (0.056)	0.97
Feeling About Income	-0.156* (0.073)	0.86
Constant	-1.670*** (0.507)	
<i>N</i>	19,940	
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Results from the second logistic regression provide an insight to the characteristics of the populist left voter. We are able to reject the null hypothesis for gender and age at $\alpha = 0.05$. Coefficient is positive and odds ratio is above 1 for gender and this indicates that the odds of voting for a populist left party is higher for males. This result matches the findings in the previous studies which suggested males are more likely to vote for a left-wing populist party. Age also has a negative relation with populist voting, increase in age decreases odds of voting for a populist left-wing party.

There is a debate on the socio-economic status of populist-left voters. While some argue that populist left voter is the same as populist right voter with lower education and lower income (Ramiro, 2016; Visser et al., 2014; Knutsen, 2006), others have suggested that left-populists parties have a younger and educated background (Santana & Rama, 2018; Ramiro & Gomez, 2017). Results of our analysis fail to find support for most of these claims and we fail to reject the null hypotheses for having university education, being on low income and working in low-skilled job at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Only history of unemployment turned out to have a relation with voting for populist left parties. In light of these findings no conclusive argument have been made

about the dilemma regarding modern populist left voters as discussed in the previous studies (Santana and Rama, 2018). Despite not belonging to groups that are defined as “losers of globalization” odds of voting for a populist-left wing party is higher among individuals who believe they do not have enough income. Our study corroborates these arguments regarding populist-left voters and these findings will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Satisfaction with the government turned out to be an inverse effect in the previous analysis, but we expect populist-left voters to be less satisfied with the government. Results indicate, null hypotheses can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$, and by looking at the negative coefficient and odds ratio under 1, the relation is shown to be negative. Therefore, the hypothesis H5.2 has been shown to be supported. The odds of being a populist left voter increases when that person is more dissatisfied with the government. Secondly, despite their differences on key issues such as immigration and welfare, both left-wing and right-wing populism are believed to share a common trait: Euroscepticism (Kneuer, 2019). Even though it has been previously argued that source and degree of Euroscepticism among the two groups is not the same (Rooduijn, 2017; Taggart, 2017), we expected this to change amid the economic crisis. The results indicate null hypothesis cannot be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ and there is not enough evidence to support the hypotheses H4.2. We expected left-wing Euroscepticism to resurface following the Eurozone crisis and economic downturn. This model, however, did not find any evidence in favour of Euroscepticism among left-wing voters.

Similar to Euroscepticism, lack of political trust is assumed to be related with the populist left vote and populist party vote in general. Results from the model indicate the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Therefore, with the data available we are unable to construct a relation between lack of political trust and populist left voting and cannot confirm hypothesis H3.2.

Adhering to welfare policies can be thought as a common property for left-wing political parties, and this study expects left-wing populist party voters also to share these positive attitudes towards such policies. As expected, odds of being a left populist party voter increase with more support for welfare policies. The null hypothesis can be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level, supporting the hypotheses H1.2. Even though the results showed no evidence of lower-income citizens, low-skilled workers

and people who experienced long-term unemployment having higher odds to vote for the left, being supportive of welfare policies still seems to be increasing the odds of voting for populist left parties. This is worth further discussion in the next chapter. Populist-left's support for welfare does not come with an exclusionist attitude unlike the welfare chauvinistic approach of the populist right. The null hypothesis for welfare chauvinism cannot be rejected at $\alpha = 0.05$ level.

Results from both models indicate, populist right parties are mostly driven by their opposition to immigration and support welfare chauvinism which they adapted in the last two or three decades, abandoning their previous allegiance to neo-liberal programmes. Since they are not shown to be supporter of welfare policies, whether their support for welfare chauvinism is economic-born or cultural-born is not evident. Just as expected, left-wing populists share a more economic element. Even though the findings did not find any support for their base to be low-income, positive welfare attitudes are shared amongst them possibly due to ideological reasons. Euroscepticism and lack of political trust are the usual suspects in the case of populist voting. This study, however, finds no evidence these two components are shared across the edges of political spectrum. While being a right-wing populist party voter is significantly associated with lower trust towards political institutions and having higher Eurosceptic attitudes, the same cannot be argued for populist left voter. In light of these results, this study has found mixed evidence concerning commonalities between two populist party voter groups and theories regarding the groups themselves. Implications of these results on the phenomenon of common populist party voter and populism as an ideology will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Discussion

Findings provided in the previous chapter give further insight into contested points regarding nature and characteristics of populist party voters and they allow opportunities for further research too. This chapter further elaborate on the findings and discuss their relevance to the literature to see how these findings improve the understanding of the topic.

First, regarding socio-economic status and demographic background of populist-right party voters one of the most contested issues is whether they are “losers of globalization”. Previously it was argued that people with low-skill job, lower income, low education or people who are unemployed, i.e. people who are hurt by the economic globalization process would be more likely to vote for a populist right-wing party (Krause and Giebler, 2019; Oesch, 2008; Betz 1994, 1993). On the contrary it has also been argued that right-wing populist party voters are not just losers of globalization and party electorate is formed by a heterogenous group (Roodujin, 2018). Not only “losers of globalization” but other groups such as new professionals vote for populist right too. Results from analysis of populist-party voters provide support on the latter argument. Findings indicate that populist right voters are not more likely to be either low-skilled worker or unemployed. The only aspect that has been shown to be likely is their lower education level compared to other voters. Even though not having university education is one of the components of populist right voting, this may not be a reflection of the economic grievances. It is possible that people with higher education have a more cosmopolitan and progressive world view and are less likely to be drawn to nativist rhetoric of populist right. Thus, education

can be considered separately from losers of globalization. Nevertheless, losers of globalization hypothesis does not seem to explain voting for populist right.

There are multiple implications that can be drawn from these arguments. First, people may not be drawn to populist right due to economic resentment, and even though it may play a factor in voting for populist right, it should not be taken as sole indicator. These parties have risen in the polls following the Eurozone crisis. Hardest hit groups from the crisis were people who are either low on income or unemployed. It would be logical to assume these people as economic resentment voters. Results, however, show fragile groups are not necessarily voters of populist right.

Secondly, this finding is important in the light of discussions surrounding economic positions of right-wing populist parties. As shown earlier many populist-right parties in Europe currently have left-wing economic positions (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). They seem to be more supportive of welfare and income redistribution, resembling modern social democratic parties. Ivaldi (2018) suggests that this transformation was to accommodate incoming low socio-economic status (SES) voters. Since this study fails to find argument in favour of populist right voters having low SES, an interesting dilemma worth of attention emerges. If populist right voters are not more likely to be from groups who are more dependent on welfare policies, why would these parties take the risk and change their economic positions? There are potential downsides of such change such as losing current voters. Rovny (2013) points to this argument and suggests that populist-right parties have more precise placement on cultural issues or immigration but they do not seem to openly place themselves along the economic dimension. This may be on purpose in order to accommodate both classical right-wing voter and the new-comers. Results create potential for further research. Blurring of economic positions could be examined alongside shift to economic-left. Considering Betz's (1993, 1994) argument that both "losers of globalization" and "new professionals" are potential voters of populist right parties, these parties may want to appeal to both of these groups. In order to accommodate them alongside the new comers who are dissatisfied with the current state of the economy blurring of economic positions with hints of centre left economic positions may provide a winning strategy.

Similar arguments regarding left-wing electorate have been made. These voters are also assumed to protest against political establishment and economic crisis, because they are losers of globalization too. Radical-left parties have traditionally supported strong welfare state and redistribution of income. Voters who would like to benefit from these are more likely to be globalization losers and vote for the populist left. Even though literature examined in this study does not suggest left-wing populists to be losers of globalization in classical sense, they have argued these voters are a different kind of losers of globalization from those that are mobilized by populist right. (Santana and Rama, 2018).

This study has expected the traditional losers of globalization to be voter base of left-wing populist parties in the current context. After the crisis, many social democratic parties around Europe have failed in their duty to protect interests of their left-wing voters. The ones in government have implemented austerity measures which mostly affected economically vulnerable groups. Consequently, voters who felt betrayed by social democrats and needed a political actor that will guard their welfare interests, shifted their support to the populist-left. This is evident in the populist-left party research and populist political actors in the most severely affected countries sized the opportunity of budget cuts and blamed the incumbent mainstream politicians and the political establishment in general (Aslanidis, 2017; Poli, 2016). These criticisms were more salient in hardly hit countries such as Greece and Spain (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Vasilopoulou et.al, 2014). Since, these political parties have gained electoral popularity amid the austerity measures, we expected people who were hardly hit to support populist left. Failure of social democrat parties has been the essence of criticism by the left-wing populists too, most particularly by SYRIZA in Greece. Results, however, do not lend support for these arguments. Similar to results concerning populist-right, findings here do not indicate globalization losers to be populist-left voters. These findings corroborate findings by Santana and Rama (2018) who suggest that modern populist left voters do not fit the typology of globalization losers. These findings lend support to ideas suggesting populist party voters – regardless of their left-right positions—are not a homogenous group. The appeal of these parties is not limited to smaller parts of the society, but they are able to appeal to a wide group of voters.

These changes to voter basis can have implications for niche status of populist parties. Wagner & Meyer (2016) and Abou-Chadi (2016) have emphasized radical right parties to be niche competitors both in terms of issue positions and issue saliency. Niche parties, instead of focusing on wide range of issues, emphasize smaller number of issues and be extremely salient about it. This issue is immigration for right-wing and welfare for left-wing populist parties. If, however, they continue to appeal to a wide range of voters, their niche status may start to include more mainstream elements. There have been signs towards such change where populist-right have adapted some mainstream elements (Mudde, 2012) and if they continue to appeal to a larger number of groups, this process may include other issues. It could be an interesting area for further research since through electoral successes, populist-left's or populist-right's will partake in the political establishment and this will have consequences for populism. Mudde (2016) suggests that when in power populist actors will have to choose between what their voters want and what the reality dictates. This has been the case for Greek SYRIZA, which chose the latter. Populists who chose the latter might lose their status as a political outsider that once provided them the electoral success.

Another hypothesis that has been tested in this study is the lack of trust in populist party voters towards political institutions. It has been well established in previous studies that populist party voters are distrustful towards national and international political institutions. This is expected considering criticism by populist actors towards the corrupt elite. This study has found that while populist right electorate indeed lacks trust towards political institutions, the same cannot be argued for populist-left. For populist right lack of political trust is not unprecedented. The parties they are supporting have been attacking the political establishment (Taggart, 2018) for a long time, long before the economic crisis. It is expected them to be distrustful towards political elite, considering the problems associated with economy after 2009. On the other hand, for populist left no evidence has been found showing them to be more distrustful as compared to the general electorate. This is a confusing finding considering how populist left parties used Eurozone crisis to attack incumbent governments that adapted austerity measures. These criticisms have been the main rhetoric of populist left parties and this study expected these views to be shared by their voters.

One reason behind this may be varying degrees of political distrust among voters. Krause & Wagner (2019) and Roodujin (2018) show that lack of trust towards political institutions does not have the same affect among the electorate of all populist parties. While it may play a huge role in supporting some parties, it can have a negligible effect in case of some others. Findings in this study are supportive of that argument along the lines of left-right division. Populist party electorate research has mainly focused on populist-right voters, but some of the indicators describing populist right voters may not explain the voters of populist left parties. Future research can focus on why left-wing electorate are more trusting towards political institutions. One reason may be they trust the intuitions but would like to change actors governing them. They may still believe in the efficacy of the political system and their ability to remedy it. This can also be the difference between people voting for populist parties and people who abstain from voting all together at least in case of left-wing populists. Populist-right may have captured abstainers with its anti-political rhetoric that has been in use for many years. Left-wing populists, at least in this study, are mostly newcomers to political arena and may need more time to convince left-wing distrustful abstainers that they are a viable alternative to other parties in the system.

Level of satisfaction with government among populist party voters has also been investigated in this study. Findings indicate that even though populist right electorate lack trust towards political institutions, they seem to be more satisfied with their government. This seems one of the most conflicting finding with the general understanding of populist party voter. Populist party voters have been assumed to be protest voters who are in discontent with the way politicians run their country. Their discontent can be seen in lack of trust towards political institutions but does not seem to show itself with satisfaction with government. Previously Norris (2005) has also found the same result in her study on populist right parties. This study, however, has expected that to change after the economic crisis. Eurozone crisis has driven many voters to populist parties as a result of economic grievances and bad policymaking by the incumbent governments. As new voters joined the electoral base of these parties, post-crisis stand of supporters of these parties would be different from the pre-crisis period. Failures of governments have been much more salient in public eye during this period, so the logical explanation would be these voters to be dissatisfied.

The finding contrary to expectation brings up multiple questions that can be answered with further research. Populist actors criticize the government on immigration policies, austerity measures and suggest that political elites do not care for the needs of people. Their voters are drawn to these messages but at the same time are satisfied with how government is run. If these people are satisfied with their governments why are they attracted to political actors that criticize how government runs the country? Secondly, most of these voters are also opposition voters since there are few countries in Europe ruled by populist-right but they still seem to be satisfied. Not many opposition supporters would be satisfied with government but populist-right voters show an exception for this case too. These two dilemmas provide interesting direction for further research.

Left-wing populists, on the other hand, are less satisfied with their government. Following the previous argument on impacts of the Eurozone crisis, this is not an unprecedented finding. Austerity measures implemented by mainstream political parties have hurt the welfare-supporting electorate the most. Some of these voters are those who previously voted for social democratic parties, which are among the parties that implemented austerity. As seen in the case of Greece, many left-wing voters have showed support for populist-left SYRIZA, whose opposition to austerity measures and critique of governments implementing such policies have remarked the party in electoral market. Consequently, as expected by the crisis hypothesis, left-wing electorate being dissatisfied with governments is in line with arguments regarding austerity measures.

In terms of level of Euroscepticism, this study provides two different results for populist left and populist right. Whereas populist-right is shown to be Eurosceptic, no evidence has been found to support Euroscepticism of populist-left electorate. One reason behind this may be the way Euroscepticism is conceptualized in this study. As mentioned in the literature review, there are varying degrees of Euroscepticism; some oppose democratic deficiency of European Union, some oppose liberal economic unification and some are against political unification. In European Social Survey, the question regarding Euroscepticism asks respondents whether they think European integration has gone too far or it should go on further. Even though this question captures some aspects of Euroscepticism, it leaves out other views about it.

Considering how Eurosceptic ideas are formed and shared by multiple ideologies across the political spectrum, there cannot be one question to capture all aspects.

With the concept of Euroscepticism used, findings here are on par with the previous studies. Elsas (2016) and Pirro & Kessel (2018) have shown that while left-wing electorate is not satisfied with current situation in the EU, they would not oppose further integration; right wing electorate, on the other hand, are opposed to deeper integration. Since the question in ESS asks the respondents their views on the future of integration, left-wing populist party electorate do not seem Eurosceptic. We have hypothesized that especially after the Eurozone crisis, populist-left wing voters would also become sceptical about the future of EU and European integration. Since voters become economically deprived due to poor policy making on the European level, their belief in further integration could also decline. Pirro et.al (2018) have suggested Euroscepticism to become more salient with the crisis. Results, however, indicate that even if Euroscepticism has risen among left-wing voters, it has not affected the way they see the future of European integration. Elsas (2016) and Pirro & Kessel (2018) are shown to be correct regarding conceptualizations of Euroscepticism across the two ideological groups. Future studies should take varying levels of Euroscepticism into account. Since left-wing and right-wing electorate have different understandings of Euroscepticism, these differences should be considered when measuring their attitudes.

Welfare has been an issue for both ideological profiles. Previous studies focusing on right-wing populist parties have argued that in order to accommodate for the needs of the working-class voters better, some populist right parties have shifted their position on economic affairs to the left. This way they have wanted to become representative of working-class not only on cultural issues but also in economic terms. These results, however, failed to find support for this argument. There may have been some cases where populist right electorate had left-wing economic views but this does not apply to all populist-right parties across Europe. On the other hand, left-wing electorate are in support for welfare regimes, as expected. Rama and Santana (2018) have shown that populist-left electorate support stronger welfare state even though they are not among the losers of globalization. These findings support these claims

and show that even though left-wing voters are not necessarily members of needy groups, they still support welfare regimes ideologically.

Welfare chauvinism, on the other hand, is assumed to be an idea shared by right-wing electorate (Fenger, 2018; Koster et.al, 2012) but we have not found any evidence of welfare chauvinistic attitudes among left-wing voters. This indicates that right-wing voters are more willing to limit social spending for immigrants. An implication of this result is about the nature of grievance among the populist-right. It has been argued that populist right electorate also have economic grievances and are hurt by the liberal economic developments throughout Europe. These results, however suggest that this is not the case. These people support right-wing parties out of their opposition to immigration and support for nativist policies and not because they have been hurt economically due to immigrants getting their share from the welfare system. As expected, right-wing supporters have been found to be more in favour of limiting number of immigrants and have negative views towards immigrants whereas no such evidence have been found in case of left-wing. Thus, this finding indicates that support for welfare chauvinism among right-wing voters is culturally oriented and not an economic decision.

These two results substantiate the claims that right-wing populism can be defined by its nativism and anti-immigrant beliefs whereas left-wing populism can be defined by support for welfare. Their difference concerning welfare attitudes further supports Mudde's (2007, 2004) views of populism as a thin ideology. Classical extreme-right and extreme-left in Europe had always carried these values and recently they attached themselves to populist ideas and marketed in a different way (Rydgren & Betz, 2018; Taggart, 1995) but essentially, they are still left-wing and right-wing. Mudde (2002) suggests that one of the issues that has been reframed is their view towards immigrants. He suggests populist right-wing parties were able to combine xenophobic ideas with anti-establishment rhetoric. Rydgren & Betz (2018) further suggests that these radical right-wing parties previously had xenophobic tones in their opposition to immigrants. With the adoption of populist rhetoric, they directed their criticism against the political establishment and on its failure to protect the national interests. An example of this change is shown by Rydgren & Betz (2018) who argues that National Front in France was able to break ties with its extreme right past and

restructure itself as a modern and presentable populist party, a process called “dédiabolisation”. Betz & Johnson (2004) shows that by referring to common sense of the ordinary people, right-wing populist parties are able to counter accusations of racism and convey their anti-foreigner ideas as common sense. Populist right-wing political parties are also less extreme in the way they want to achieve their goals. While, extremist parties want a radical change in the political system, populists accept the rules and aim to change some minor elements (Von Beyme, 2015; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Pedahzur & Weinberg, 2001; Griffin, 2000). Even though these parties have transformed the way they convey political messages, ideological positions still define how their voters view political and economic world via populist eyes. Their choice of enemy or the elite, definition of Euroscepticism and points on which they put emphasis are all shaped by their core and thicker ideology.

5.2. Conclusion

This study has focused on the characteristics of populist party voters. Populist parties have been the centre of attention in European politics for the past decade due to their popularity among the electorate and it is important to understand underlying conditions for why people vote for them. In order to accomplish this, data from Round 8 of European Social Survey have been analysed to see what makes voters more likely to vote for a populist party. Populist parties in Europe on both left-wing and right-wing ideologies have been examined in this study. Populist parties have been selected based on their classification in PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) dataset. Aim of this study was to show characteristics of populist party voters. Analyses have focused on commonly used variables regarding populist party voting such as their socio-economic status, political positions on important issues and views towards politics in general. These have been shown to be effective in understanding not only populist party voters but electorate in general. Consequently, they have been employed in this study.

Through the analysis of these predictors, this study aimed to show the indicators of populist party voting on the individual level. These findings have added to the growing body of literature regarding populism and populist party electorate.

Findings have shown that modern populist party voter cannot be characterized with the understanding of populist party electorate before. Previous studies have suggested populist party voters to be “losers of globalization” most particularly in the 90’s but more modern findings have suggested that populist party voters are not necessarily from these groups. Acknowledging the changing patterns in the voter bases of populist parties, this study has expected this to change amid the economic crisis. With the economic crisis many people in Europe were either hurt by the economic crisis and unemployment or have been adversely affected by the austerity measures implemented by many governments as a response to the economic crisis. It has been theorized in the previous literature that individuals who were affected by the crisis or in countries in which the effects of the crisis are more severe, populist parties have gained significant shares among the electorate. Following that logic, this study assumed “losers of globalization” –people who are more likely to feel the deleterious effects of the economic crisis—to be core voters of the populist political parties. Previous studies on populist parties show that these parties have championed more people-centric economy policies and blamed the political institutions both on national and European level either for disregarding the interests of the people or advocating policies that harm the fragile groups. Findings here, however, do not lend support for those arguments and populist party voters are not found to be members of “losers of globalization”. For the populist-right, voters are shown to lack university education and had experienced long-term unemployment in the past but since they are not working in low-skilled job or low on income; we cannot necessarily say “losers of globalization” is a good description of the populist right party voter. As for the populist left only evidence in favour of “losers of globalization” is found to be the experience of long-term unemployment in the past. Even though, long-term unemployment can be taken as an indicator; alone it cannot provide enough evidence to classify voters. Consequently, this study did not find any evidence in support of shifting voter bases for populist left and populist right parties. Their voter bases may include “losers of globalization”, but these voters are not alone in voting for these parties and are joined by other groups as hypothesized in the previous works (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Mudde, 2007).

Secondly, the results have shown that there is no single populist party voter as it was hypothesized by some scholars before. Left-wing populist party electorate and right-wing populist party electorate, although being mobilized by the political parties blaming the incumbent political actors, political establishment and more generally political institutions, these voters are not similar to each other in terms of the ideological division and separated by the ideological lines. Findings here show that whereas, populist right voters can be identified by their opposition to immigration and support for welfare chauvinistic policies; populist left voters can be identified by their support for extensive welfare policies and are not found to have negative views of immigrants. This can be regarded as a support for populism as a thin ideology by Mudde (2007, 2004). Even if both voter groups are attracted to populist rhetoric, they may not be swayed away by any ideological group using populist discourse. Populist party voters are attached to their thicker ideologies and are attracted to populist political parties that are exponents of those elements. Even if they view the political world through the lenses of populist ideas, populist party voters are devoted to the elements of thicker ideologies. A left-wing political party can embellish left-wing ideas with a populist discourse but this may not be enough to sway away right-wing populist party voter in the case that there is a populist right party competing. Populist right-wing party might be more compelling with the anti-immigrant rhetoric along with the populist discourse. This, however, does not mean that populism of these parties or populist attitudes among voters is not important. Those views are attached to thicker ideologies and create populist-right and populist-left party groups. Framing of the thicker ideology issues in a populist way is the tool that distinguishes both populist parties and populist party electorate from their radical counterparts. Mudde's (2007, 2004) conceptualization of populism suggested that the thin ideology of populism is able to attach itself to thicker ideologies. In this research, we examined parties where populism is attached to the right-wing nativist and left-wing economic ideologies. This study has benefited from the ideological definition of populism and the findings suggest corroborate the argument.

A contribution of this study to literature regarding populist party electorate is the focus on post-crisis electorate. Populist political parties, although competing for elections were not the frontrunners during the first decade of 21st century. After the

crisis, however, their fortune has changed and they competed for office with large mainstream parties. This indicates, populist parties were able to attract a broader coalition of voters compared to previous elections. Many studies analysing populist party electorate has focused on the pre-crisis electoral period. The conceptualizations of populist party electorate were based on the pre-crisis understanding of populist parties. However, as Ivaldi (2018, 2015) shows, populist parties such as FN have transformed their policies. This study argued, populist party voters to experience a similar change. Therefore, focusing on the pre-crisis electoral period is futile to explain contemporary populist party voters. Even when analysing more recent survey data such as the ESS Round 7 which was conducted in 2014, in many countries there were no election held after 2010 –the year crisis is assumed to begin. Thus, even at that time the modern populist party voters cannot be truly examined. Since this study uses ESS Round 8 data which was conducted in 2016, it is able to capture more recent elections, at the time when populist parties were on rise. Consequently, this study by focusing truly on the post-crisis elections and post-crisis voters is able to analyse the characteristics of populist party voters in modern setting.

Secondly, this study has also took non-economic aspects of the left-right political dimension into consideration when classifying populist parties. Whereas some studies have based their left-right classification solely on the economic positions of the populist parties, this study uses PopuList (Rooduijn et.al, 2019) dataset which goes beyond the economic classification of parties. It is helpful to understand the non-economic aspects of populist parties including cultural lines of conflict among the parties. Inglehart and Norris (2016) have used economic positions of populist parties to classify them as left and right and have found that many of the right-wing populists in Europe support left-wing economic positions. Whereas they are right-wing Eurosceptic and have anti-immigrant rhetoric, their manifestos indicate economic-left world view. Using a classification based on the merits above would have resulted in incorrectly assessing left-wing populist party electorate and left-wing populism which is shown to be different from the right-wing populism. By taking into account problems associated with economic categorization and using the dataset appropriate for more comprehensive classifications, this study is able to capture a broader picture of populist party electorate and populist parties in Europe. Otherwise, anti-immigrant

protectionist political parties would have classified as left-wing, whereas their general ideological profile is the opposite.

One limitation of this study is the lack of countries where populism has been strong such as Greece and Denmark. Whereas in Greece populist-left SYRIZA were able to form government, in Denmark right-wing populist Danish People's Party has been a strong competitor in the electoral arena. Since, however, electorate of these countries were not interviewed in the Round 8 of ESS, there is no data available from them. Another limitation of this study is a result of the fixed-effects model. Even though fixed effects model is helpful to reduce heterogeneity across entities, in this case countries, it reduces the external validity of the results (Hill et.al, 2019; Allison, 2009). Results from these models only apply to the subgroup of countries used in the analysis (Treiman, 2009). Therefore, based on these results we cannot infer the characteristics of populist party voters in other European countries. Despite these limitations, this study is able to examine the populist party voters in the selected countries.

In conclusion, populism is a complex phenomenon. From its definition to conceptualization of populist actors and populist party electorate there are many issues that are yet to be settled. Discrepancies regarding these concepts manifests itself in the empirical studies. Thus, in order to understand populist actors or populist party electorate better there needs to be a more refined and well-structured understanding of what populism is and how it shows itself in different ideological groups and countries. By doing so, a better understanding of the above concepts can be reached and empirical studies will be more consistent in their findings. This way it may be possible to reach consensus on characteristics of populist party voters.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Table 1. List of countries and political parties

Country	Party	Ideological Position
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	Right
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Right
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	Right
Belgium	People's Party	Right
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	Right
Finland	True Finns	Right
France	National Front	Right
Germany	The Left	Left
Germany	Alternative Germany	for Right
Hungary	Fidesz	Right
Hungary	Jobbik	Right
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Left
Italy	Northern League	Right
Italy	Brothers of Italy	Right

Table 1 Cont'd

Lithuania	Coalition of S. Buškevičius and the Nationalists	Right
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Left
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Right
Norway	Progress Party	Right
Poland	Law and Justice	Right
Slovenia	United Left	Left
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	Right
Spain	Podemos	Left
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Right
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	Right
Switzerland	Ticino League	Right
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	Right

APPENDIX B. MULTICOLLINEARITY STATISTICS

Table 1.VIF Values for the model

Variable Name	VIF Value
Gender	1.01
Age	1.06
University Education	1.16
Unemployment	1.09
Low-skilled Job	1.05
Low income	1.16
Euroscepticism	1.20
Immigrant Attitudes	1.76
Government Satisfaction	3.48
Political Trust	3.43
Welfare	1.15
Welfare Chauvinism	1.27
Feeling About Income	1.32

APPENDIX C. CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS DIAGRAM




Figure.1 Diagram for Confirmatory Factor Analysis

APPENDIX D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table.1. Descriptive Statistics of the variables

Variable Name	Minimum	Mean	Standard Deviation	Maximum
Age	18	52.95	16.93	100
Gender	0	0.48	0.5	1
Previous Unemployment	0	0.27	0.44	1
Low-skilled Job	0	0.07	0.26	1
University Education	0	0.27	0.44	1
Low Income	0	0.15	0.36	1
Political Trust	0	0.42	0.21	1
Government Satisfaction	0	0.47	0.19	1
Immigrant Attitudes	0	0.53	0.20	1
Welfare Support	0	0.49	0.20	1
Euroskepticism	0	4.90	2.67	10
Welfare Chauvinism	1	3.20	1	5
Feeling Towards Income	0	3.17	0.8	4
Voted Populist Left	0	0.03	0.16	1
Voted Populist Right	0	0.10	0.31	1

**APPENDIX E. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL
LOGISTIC REGRESSION**

Table.1 Voting for Populist Right

Variable Name	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Gender	0.215*** (0.051)
Age	-0.009*** (0.002)
University Education	-0.507*** (0.073)
Unemployed	0.094 (0.060)
Low Skill job	-0.030 (0.096)
Low Income	0.126 (0.076)
EU Attitude	-0.084*** (0.010)
Positive View of Immigrants	-0.199*** (0.024)
Satisfaction with Government	0.248*** (0.027)
Political Trust	-0.116*** (0.025)
Welfare Support	-0.157** (0.056)

Table 1 Cont'd

Welfare Chauvinism	0.200*** (0.029)
Feeling About Income	-0.080* (0.037)
Constant	-2.076*** (0.186)
<i>N</i>	20560

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table.2. Voting for Populist Left

Variable Name	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Gender	0.325*** (0.098)
Age	-0.010** (0.003)
University Education	-0.056 (0.109)
Unemployed	0.405*** (0.102)
Low Skill job	0.398* (0.170)
Low Income	0.424** (0.132)

Table 2 Cont'd

EU Attitude	0.024 (0.020)
Positive View of Immigrants	0.131** (0.048)
Satisfaction with Government	-0.329*** (0.052)
Political Trust	-0.052 (0.049)
Welfare Support	0.523*** (0.102)
Welfare Chauvinism	-0.059 (0.049)
Feeling About Income	-0.075 (0.068)
Constant	-3.600*** (0.349)
<i>N</i>	20560

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

APPENDIX F. RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR THE MODELS




Figure 1. Residual Plots for Populist Right Voting




Figure 2. Residual Plots for Populist Left Voting

APPENDIX G. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

AVRUPA'DA RADİKAL POPÜLİST PARTİ SEÇMENİNİ ANLAMAK: KRİZ SONRASI SAĞ POPÜLİST VE SOL POPÜLİST PARTİLER ÜSTÜNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

Bu çalışma Avrupa ülkelerinde son yıllarda yükselişte olan popülist partilerin seçmenlerini inceleyerek, insanları popülist partilere oy vermeye iten faktörleri ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Özellikle 2009 yılında başlayan ekonomik kriz ile beraber Avrupa ülkelerinde hem sağ hem de sol populist partiler yükselişe geçti. Birçok Avrupa ülkesinde bu partiler uzun zamandır dengeli seyreden siyasi sahneyi sarstı ve ülke siyasetinde önemli roller oynadılar. Bu partiler sadece kendi ülke siyasetlerini etkilemekle kalmayıp, Avrupa genelinde de ciddi siyasi sarsıntılar yarattılar. Birçoğunun sahip olduğu Avrupa Birliği hatta Avrupa birleşmesi karşıtı duruşları, uzun zamandır Avrupa Birliğinin üstüne kurulduğu temelli sarstı. Bazı ülkelerde muhalefet bazılarında koalisyon ortağı ve bazılarındaysa iktidar olarak modern Avrupa siyasetini şekillendiren aktörlerden oldular. Bu başarılarından oturu hem medyada hem de akademik çevrelerde en çok odaklanılan konu oldular. Bu yükseliş de akademik alanda bir çok kişinin popülizmi, populist partileri ve populist parti seçmenlerini tartışmasına yol açtı.

Ancak konuya bu kadar odaklanılmasına ve tartışılmasına rağmen henüz popülizmin tanımından, populist siyasal aktörlerlere, populist hareketlere ve populist seçmene uzanan geniş bir konu grubunda tanımlar üstüne tam bir anlaşma sağlanabilmiş değil. Bu çalışma ise popülizm literatürünün hala üstüne tartışılan ve önemli önemli parçalarından birisi olan populist parti seçmenlerinin kürselleşmenin kaybedenleri grubuna ait olup olmadığı konusuna odaklanmaktadır. Populist parti seçmenlerinin kim olduğu, sosyo-ekonomik durumları ve siyasi konulara dair görüşlerini inceleyerek, populist partilere oy veren vatandaşların genel seçmenlere göre farkını incelemektedir. Seçmen gruplarının görüşlerinin anlaşılmasıyla beraber, populist partiler daha iyi tanımlanabilir ve geride biriktiğimiz 10 yıl içinde populist partilerin yükselmelerine sebep olan faktörler seçmenler zemininde de incelenmiş olacaktır. Bunun anlaşılmasıyla beraber popülist partilerin başarılı olmak için

uyguladıkları politikalar ve seçmenlerle iletişimlerinde seçtikleri yolların anlaşılması kolaylaşacaktır.

Popülizmin tanımlanması:

Popülizm sadece bir donee, bir ülkeye be bir bölgeye özgü bir kavram olmadığı için tanımlanmasına da bu zamansal ve mekansal farklılıklar yansımıştır (Kaltwasser vd, 2017). Her ne kadar popülizm üstüne yapılan çalışmalar son yıllarda Avrupa ve özellikle Batı Avrupa ülkelerine ve bu ülkelerde bulunan popülist partilere odaklanmış olsa da, popülizmin geçmişî farklı dönemlere ve farklı bölgelere yayılmıştır. Bu farklı vakaları ve dönemleri inceleyen araştırmacılar popülizm üstüne farklı tanımlamalar yapmış ve bu tanımların ışığında popülist siyasi aktörleri incelemişlerdir. Günümüzde yapılan popülizm araştırmalarını incelediğimiz zaman dört yaklaşımın öne çıktığını söyleyebiliriz: ideoloji olarak popülizm yaklaşımı, örgütsel yaklaşım, sosyokültürel olgu olarak popülizm ve söylem olarak popülizm.

Bu dört yaklaşımın içinde en ön plana çıkan ve günümüz Avrupa popülist partileri çalışmalarına yön veren yaklaşım Mudde (2007, 2004) tarafından ortaya konan popülizmi bir ideoloji olarak gören yaklaşımdır (Moffit ve Tormey, 2014). Bu yaklaşıma göre popülizm toplumu “masum insanlar” ve “yozlaşmış elitler” olarak iki homojen gruba böler ve siyasetin toplumun genel iradesini temsil etmesi gerektiğini söyler. Ancak Mudde’ye göre bu sosyalizm veya liberalizm gibi katı merkezli bir ideoloji değil, zayıf merkezli bir ideolojidir. Böylece popülizm kendini katı merkezli ideolojilere ilişitirerek o ideolojinin savlarını destekleyen bir yapıya dönüşür (Bakkat vd 2015; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde ve Klatwasser, 2013). Dünya üstünde aşırı sağ ve aşırı sol partiler içinde de popülist fikirlerin olabilmesinin de sebebi budur. Kendi başına katı bir ideolojik değer taşımadığı için, birbirleri ile ters olan iki farklı ideoloji grubunda da görünebilir.

Bu yaklaşımın diğerlerine göre daha ön planda olmasının ve siyasi aktörleri analiz ederken yaygın şekilde kullanılmasının en önemli sebebi karşılaştırmalı analizlere olanak tanımasıdır. Mudde’ye (2017) göre bu yaklaşım araştırmacıları popülist aktörleri ve hareketleri daha önceden tanımlamada önemli bir engel oluşturan zaman ve mekandan belirli ölçüde kopartıp hem farklı dönemleri hem de farklı

bölgeleri incelemeye olanak tanımaktadır. Benzer şekilde popülizm zayıf merkezli bir ideoloji olarak ele alındığı zaman, sağ ve sol ideolojilere olan bağından ayrılabilir ve böylece geniş ideolojik anlamlara bağlı kalmadan kendi başına siyasi aktörleri etkileyen bir düşünce olarak incelenebilir. Bu çalışmada da popülizm Mudde'nin (2007, 2004) yaklaşımı olan zayıf merkezli bir ideoloji olarak ele alınacak; sağ ve solun sahip olduğu daha katı merkezli ideolojiler ile etkileşime nasıl girdiği ve bu etkileşimin partilerin seçmeninin görüşleri ile nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğu incelenmektedir.

Popülist siyasi partiler:

Popülist siyasi partiler ise popülizmin “masum insanlar” ve “yozlaşmış elitler” grupları arasında bir çekişmeye işaret ettiğinden yola çıkan siyasi partiler bu düşünceyi benimseyerek siyasete karşı eleştiri geliştiren siyasi aktörlerdir (Hawkins vd, 2018). Popülizmin zayıf merkezli bir ideolojisi olması sebebi ile sağ, sol veya merkez düşüncelerden bağımsız olarak siyasi partiler popülist fikirleri benimseyebilir ve bunları kullanarak siyaset arenasında aktif olabilirler. Hem sağ hem de sol popülist partilerin benzerliklerini ve farklılıklarını incelemeden önce bu partileri tanımlamada, sınıflandırmada ve incelemede yapılan önemli hataları tartışmak konunun daha kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılması için önemli olacaktır.

Popülist partiler ile ilgili yapılan en önemli hatalardan birisi sadece aşırı-sağ popülist partilere odaklanıp, solda ve merkezde olan popülist partileri görmezden gelmektir (Bernhard ve Kriesi, 2019; Roodujin, 2017). Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden birisi özellikle son zamanlarda Avrupa’da popülist sağ partilerin ön planda olması. Akkerman vd. (2016) ve March (2007) zamanında ülkelerinde özellikle Latin Amerika’da ve Avrupa’da güçlü olan popülist sol partilerin zaman içinde hem popülist yanlarını hem de radikal yanlarını kaybettiklerini ve bunun bir sonucu olarak popülist sağın, bu tarz eleştiriler ile ön plana çıktığını göstermiştir.

Popülizme ve popülist partilere sadece sağ popülistleri inceleyerek bakılmasının önemli bir sıkıntısı Cleen ve Stavrakakis’in (2017) de gösterdiği üzere popülizm sadece sağa özgü olduğunun sanılması ve sadece milliyetçi yaklaşımlara odaklanmasıdır. Popülizmi milliyetçilik ile özdeşleştirmenin bir sonucu olarak da, popülist tavır göstermeyen milliyetçi partiler ve bu partilere oy veren seçmenlerin

hatalı bir şekilde popülist olarak sınıflandırılması ortaya çıkmaktadır. Böylece popülizm kendisini farklı ideolojilere iliştiren zayıf merkezli bir ideoloji olarak değil de, milliyetçi sağın düşüncelerinin bir uzantısı gibi algılanmaktadır. Bu durumun getirdiği bir başka sorun ise popülist sol partilerin büyük ölçüde gözardı edilmesidir. Her ne kadar özellikle kriz sonrasında Yunanistan'da Radikal Sol Koalisyon (SYRIZA) ve İspanya'da Yapabiliriz (Podemos) ile popülist sol partiler ülkelerinde güçlü bir konuma gelmiş olsalar bile, popülizm üstüne yapılan çalışmalar bu partiler ne kadar başarılı olmuş olursa olsun sadece popülist sağ aktörlere odaklanmaktadır. Böylece popülizmi tümüyle anlamak mümkün olmamakta ve popülist seçmenlerin neden bu partilere oy verdiğini anlamak için yapılan çalışmalar popülist sağ değerleri küresel olarak popülizmde kabul görmüş değerlermiş gibi davranarak, olguyu tümüyle inceleyememektedir.

Önceden yapılmış çalışmalarda sıkça rastlanan bir diğer sorun ise radikallik ve popülizm birbirlerinden ayrılmaz kavramlarmış gibi görmektir. Popülist olarak tanımlanan partiler büyük ölçüde sağ veya sol ideolojinin radikal düşüncelerini de benimsediği için bu iki kavram birbirinden ayrılmaz gibi gözükebilir ancak Bernhard ve Kriesi'nin (2019) gösterdiği üzere merkezde bulunan ve hatta ana akım olan bazı siyasi partiler uçlarda bulunan partilere göre daha yüksek popülist düşünce seviyesine sahip olabilir. Böylece normalde popülist olarak tanımlanacak merkez partiler gözden kaçarken, popülist olarak tanımlanmaması gereken partiler bu kategoriye dahil edilmektedir. Böylece ne popülizm, ne popülist partiler ne de popülist seçmenler tam olarak anlaşılabilirlerdir.

Bu şekilde karşılaşılan sorunlar dikkate alındığı zaman popülist partiler ve ideolojileri anlaşılabilir ve karşılaştırılabilir. Bu çalışmada odaklanılan sol popülist ve sağ popülist partiler her ne kadar ters uçlarda gözükseler ve katı merkezli ideolojileri birbirlerinden uzakta olsa bile popülist yapılarının da bir etkisi ile bir araya geldikleri ve seçmeni harekete geçirdikleri konular vardır. Ortaklık gösterdikleri düşünülen konular: Avrupa Birliği ve Avrupa bütünleşmesine olan yaklaşımları ve refah politikalarına olan bakışlarıdır. Taggart'a (2017) göre ise her ne kadar partiler bu konularda uzlaşıyor olsalar bile seçmenleri harekete geçirme şekilleri bakımından birbirlerinden ayrılmaktadırlar.

Partilerin uzlaştığı söylenen konulardan ilki özellikle ekonomik kriz sonrasında popülist partiler arasında ciddi bir artış gösteren Euroskeptiklik (Halikipoulou vd, 2012; Harmsen, 2010). Ivaldi'ye (2017) göre 2008 yılında yaşanan ekonomik krizden küresel finansal elit ve Avrupa Birliği'nin bürokrasisini sorumlu tutan popülist partiler bu siyasal ve ekonomik eliti ortak düşman olarak görüp, bu elite karşı tutumlarında uzaşmaya başlamıştır. Önceki yıllarda ve özellikle Avrupa ekonomik bütünleşmesinin gündemde ön sıralarda olduğu dönemlerde radikal sol partiler tarafından kullanılan (March, 2007), 1990'lı yıllarda ise Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun siyasal bütünleşme yönünde seyretmesi ile radikal sağ partiler tarafından öne sürülen eleştiriler (Elsas ve Brug, 2015; Werts vd, 2012) böylece tekrardan ön plana çıkmış oldu. Ancak Kneuer (2019) tarafından gösterildiği üzere geçtiğimiz yıllarda farklı dönemlerde farklı nedenlerden dolayı getirilen eleştiriler, kriz ile beraber sağ ve soldan bağımsız olarak neredeyse bütün popülist partiler tarafından kullanılmaya başlandı. Otjes ve Van der Veer'e (2016) göre ise, Euroskeptik fikirler Avrupa Parlamentosunda sağ ve sol ayrımının önüne geçerek iki farklı popülist parti grubunu ortak bir zeminde buluşturdu.

Her ne kadar Euroskeptik fikirler iki grup tarafından kullanılmış olsa da bu düşünceleri iki parti grubu için ortak nokta olarak almaya yönelik eleştiriler de vardır. Pirro ve Kessel (2018) and Pirro vd (2018) tarafından gösterildiği üzere her ne kadar iki parti grubu da Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik eleştirilerde bulunmuş olsa da, getirdikleri eleştiriler açısından aralarındaki ideolojik farklılıklar devam etmiştir. Sol popülist partiler ekonomik eleştirileri kullanırken, sağ popülist partiler ise kültürel ve milli egemenlik temelli eleştiriler kullanmıştır. Benzer şekilde Avrupa Birliğine olan karşıtlıklarının da aynı seviyede olmadığı ve bütünleşmeyi farklı düzeylerde eleştirmektedirler. Elsas (2016) ile Pirro ve Kessel (2018) tarafından gösterildiği üzere sol popülist partiler Avrupa Birliği'nin günümüzde bulunduğu durumundan memnun olmamasına rağmen gelecek entegrasyonlara karşı bir tutum sergilemezken; sağ popülist partiler Avrupa bütünleşmesine ve Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine temelden karşı bir tutum sergilemişlerdir.

Popülistlerin ortaklaştığı düşünülen diğer bir konu ise refah politikalarına olan yaklaşımlarıdır. 20.yüzyıl içinde sol partilerin temelini oluşturan refah politikalarına destek, bu partilerin bazılarının merkeze kayması bazılarının ise ekonomik konular

yerine kültürel konuları ön plana çıkarmasından dolayı (Koster vd, 2018) popülist sağ tarafından bir konu olarak görülmüş ve popülist sağ partiler bu konuda oluşturdukları politikalar ile seçmenleri kazanmaya çalışmıştır. Bu şekile bir değişimin en belirgin örneği ise Fransız Milli Cephe(Front National) partisidir (Ivaldi, 2018, 2015). Bu değişimler özellikle 2008 krizi sonrasında yaşanmıştır (Ivaldi, 2018). İşsiz kalan ve kemer sıkma politikalarından dolayı sosyal yardımları kesilen seçmen gruplarından oy almak isteyen popülist sağ, ekonomi politikalarını sola yaklaştırarak bunu başarmak istemiştir. Her ne kadar bu değişimin 2008 krizi ile beraber yaşanmış olsa da, Betz (1993) popülist sağ partilerin “küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri” olan mavi-yaka seçmene odaklanıp, ekonomik liberalizm ile bağlarını kopartacağını ve daha merkez sol ekonomik politikalar izleyeceğini söylemiştir. Böylece Ivaldi'nin (2018, 2015) kriz sonrasında bahsettiği dönemin bu süreci başlatan değil de hızlandıran bir olay olduğu söylenebilir.

Her ne kadar popülist sağ partiler ekonomik konularda ve özellikle refah politikaları konusunda sola kaymış olsa da, refah politikalarına olan desteği iki grup arasında ortak bir politika olarak almaya da yönelik eleştiriler getirilmiştir. Bunun temel sebebi ise sağ partilerin refah devleti anlayışlarının sol partilerden farklı olmasıdır. Otjes vd (2018) tarafından gösterildiği üzere popülist sağ refah devletine milliyetçi bir yaklaşıma sahiptir ve refah devletinin faydalarından sadece ülkenin yerlilerinin yararlanmasını savunurlar. Göçmenleri refah devletinin kapsamından dışlayan bu refah şovenistik yaklaşım sağ partilere özel bir durumdur (Koster vd, 2012). Katı merkezli ideolojilerinin temelini oluşturan milliyetçi tutumlar kendisini burada da göstermektedir. Ennsler-Jedenastik'e (2018) göre, kriz sonrasında artan göç dalgasının da etkisi ile popülist sağ partiler kırılgan durumda olan seçmenleri korumak için refah şovenistik yaklaşımları daha çok benimsemişlerdir. Böylece Euroskeptik konularda olduğu gibi partilerin sağ ve sol katı ideolojik yapıları ortak noktaları olarak gözüken refah devletini de ayırmıştır (Fenger, 2018).

Öne sürülen bu benzerlikleri ve ayrıştıkları noktaların yanısıra bu partilerin birbirlerine ters düştüğü konular da vardır: göçmenler ve çokkültürlülük. Geçmiş yıllarda yerliler ve göçmenler arasında yaşanan siyasi çekişmelerden dolayı destek kazanan ve siyasi sahneye çıkan popülist radikal sağ partiler krizin de etkisi ve devamında yaşanan göç dalgası ile beraber göçmen karşıtı politikalarını sadece

kültürel olarak değil aynı zamanda sosyo ekonomik bir eleştirisi ile dile getirmiştir (Pirro ve Kessel, 2018). Bu tarzda getirdikleri eleştiriler aynı zamanda popülist retoriği kullanma şekillerine de yansımıştır. Popülist sağ partiler insanlar ve elitler arasındaki mücadelede insanları ülkenin yerlileri olarak tanımlarken (Halikiopoulou, 2019, Cohen, 2019); İspanyol popülist sol partisi Yapabiliriz, göçmenleri de dahil ettiği bir insanlar ve elit çekişmesini ön plana çıkarır (Sanders vd, 2017).

Popülist parti seçmenleri:

Partileri ortak bir popülist grup çatısında toplama amacıyla olduğu gibi, bazı çalışmalar seçmenleri de ortak bir popülist çatıda toplamaya çalışmış ve sağ-sol ayrımından bağımsız olarak “popülist parti seçmeni” kavramını incelemiştir. Bu tarz bir yaklaşım Voss’un (2018) popülist partilerin aynı dönemde ekonomik krizden olumsuz etkilenen insanların oyları için yarıştığı düşünüldüğü zaman mantıksız değildir. Partiler arasında olduğu gibi popülist parti seçmenlerinin birbirlerine benzediği ve ayrıştıkları söylenen konular vardır. Benzer oldukları söylenen konular: sosyo-ekonomik durumları, popülist davranışları ve Euroskeptik düşüncelerdir.

Sosyo-ekonomik durumlara bakılacak olunursa “küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri” grubuna dahil edilen insanların popülist parti seçmeni olmaya daha yatkın olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Her ne kadar asıl olarak popülist sağ seçmenini incelemiş olsa bile benzer bir yaklaşım popülist sol seçmenler için de kullanılmıştır (Merezin, 2009; Minkenberg, 2000). Bu yaklaşıma göre ekonomik globalleşmenin etkisi ile önceden üretim işleri ülkelerindeyken hem üretim sürecinin başka ülkelere kayması hem de dışarıdan gelen göçmenlerin bu işlere alınması ile ekonomik olarak kayıp yaşayan mavi yaka seçmenler (Mosimman vd, 2018; Arzheimer ve Carter, 2006; Van der Brug vd, 2000), bu sorunları dile getiren popülist partilere yakınlaşmışlardır. Bu seçmenler genellikle düşük eğitim seviyesine sahip (Ennsner-Jedenastik vd, 2019; Bornschier ve Kriesi, 2013; Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers ve Scheepers, 2007; Lubbers vd, 2002) ve sosyal yardımlara muhtaç olan işsiz veya düşük gelir grubundandır (Gidron ve Hall, 2017; Algan vd, 2017; Lubbers vd, 2002; Van der Brug vd, 2000).

Bu seçmen tipi asıl olarak popülist sağ partilere oy verenleri tanımlamak için kullanılmış olsa bile, özellikle ekonomik kriz sonrasında aynı seçmen grubu popülist sol partilerin seçmenlerini anlamak için de kullanılmıştır (Ramiro, 2016; Visser vd, 2014). Popülist parti seçmenlerinin genel bir göstergesi olan hükümetten ve siyasi düzenden memnun olmama özellikle kriz sonrasında sos popülist seçmenler arasında artmıştır. Bunun önemli bir sebebi hükümetlerin ekonomik krize tam olarak cevap verememesi ve verilen cevapların da kemer sıkma politikaları olarak ekonomik olarak zor durumda olan halkı daha da zorlamasıdır (Ramiro ve Gomez, 2017; Ramiro, 2016).

Her ne kadar “küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri” hem popülist parti seçmenini genel hem de ayrı ayrı ideolojik grupları açıklamak için kullanılmış olsa da, popülist parti seçmenini bu şekilde tanımlamaya karşı olanlar da vardır. Mudde’ye (2016) göre her ne kadar popülist parti seçmeni denildiği zaman akla ilk olarak bu özellikler gelse bile popülist sağ partilerin çoğunluk seçmen grubunu bu gruplar oluşturmaz. Betz (1994), “küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri” argümanını popülist sağ seçmeni tanımlamak için ortaya atmış olsa bile, bu seçmen gruplarının daha genç ve eğitilmiş olan “yeni profesyoneller” ile beraber partinin tabanını oluşturduğunu söyler. Benzer eleştiriler popülist sol parti seçmeni için de öne sürülmüştür. Santana & Rama (2018) ve Ramiro & Gomez (2017) İspanya’da popülist sol seçmenlerin sanılanın aksine şehirli ve eğitilmiş olduğunu göstermiştir. Bundan dolayı popülist partilerin ortak bir seçmeni olarak gösterilen “küreselleşmenin kaybedenleri” grubunun popülist partilere verilen desteği açıklayıcı olmadığı ve bu partilerin tabanlarının homojen olmadığı öne sürülmüştür.

Popülist parti seçmenlerini birleştirdiği düşünülen bir diğer konu ise popülist davranışlardır. Hauwert ve Kessel’e (2018) göre sağ ve sol ideolojilerinden bağımsız olarak popülist seçmenleri bir araya getiren nokta popülist düşünceleri benimsemeleridir. Bu düşünceler, Mudde’nin (2007, 2004) popülizm tanımından yola çıkarak insanlar ve elitler arasında bir çekişme olduğunu öne sürer. Önceden popülist seçmenler üstüne yapılan çalışmalar bu seçmenlerin siyasi olarak memnuniyetsiz olduğunu öne sürmüştür Li, 2018; Kehrberg, 2015; Kriesi vd, 2008; Kriesi vd, 2006; Betz, 1994). Böylece popülist düşüncelere olan inanç popülist parti seçmenlerinin ortak bir düşüncesi gibi görülmüştür.

Bu tarz bir gruplandırmaya karşı çıkanlar, popülist düşünceleri tanımlayan Mudde'ye (2007, 2004) atıf yaparak, popülizmin seçmenler için de zayıf merkezli bir birleştirici olduğunu ve bu seçmen gruplarını tanımlamak için ana çıkış noktası olarak kullanılamayacağını söylerler. Popülist düşünceler hem ikincil öneme sahiptir hem de kendilerini iliştiirdikleri ideolojilerden bağımsız olarak incelenemezler (Meijers ve Zaslove, 2020; Stanley, 2008). Her ne kadar iki grubun seçmenleri de hem ülke hem de Avrupa seviyesinde siyasal kurumları eleştirirler ve bu kurumların insanları temsil etmediğini söyleseler de, kurumlara olan eleştirilerinin sebebi de, çekişme içinde bulunan "masum insan" tanımları da birbirlerinden farklıdır ve katı merkezli ideolojilerinden beslenir (Tsatsanis vd, 2018; Akkerman vd, 2014).

Popülist davranışların bir yansıması olan Euroskeptiklik de iki seçmen grubunu bir araya getiren bir unsur olarak geçmiş çalışmalarda tartışılmıştır (Rama & Santana, 2019; Tsatsanis et.al, 2018; Ramiro & Gomez, 2017; Ramiro, 2016; Otjes & Louwense, 2015; Visser et.al, 2014; Werts et.al, 2013; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). Özellikle kriz sonrasında Avrupa Birliği düzeyinde krizle verilen mücadeleyi yeterli görmeyen seçmenler Avrupa Birliğinin uygulamak istediği para politikalarını ve kemer sıkma politikalarını destekleyen ana akım siyasi partileri terkedip, Avrupa Birliği ve kemer sıkma karşıtı söylemleri ile ön plana çıkan popülist partilere yönelmişlerdir. Böylece hem sağ hem de sol partilerin seçmenlerin de Euroskeptik düşüncelerin önemli bir yeri olduğu düşünülmüştür.

Ancak, popülist davranışlarda olduğu gibi Euroskeptik düşünceler de seçmenlerin popülizmden bağımsız olan ideolojilerini görmezden geldiği için ortak bir payda yaratamayacağı noktasında eleştirilmiştir. Rooduijn'e (2017) göre sağ ve sol popülistlerin Avrupa Birliği karşıtlığı farklı sebeplere dayanmaktadır. Sağ popülist parti seçmeni göçmenler ve milli egemenlik konularından dolayı eleştiri sunarken, sol popülist parti seçmenleri ekonomi politikasını eleştirir (Taggart, 2017). Böylece aynen partilerin Euroskeptik davranışların da olduğu gibi seçmenlerin de bu tarz düşüncelere sahip olma sebebi farklıdır. Benzer bir şekilde iki seçmen grubunun Avrupa Birliği karşıtlığının aynı derecede olmadığı da öne sürülmüştür (Krause ve Wagner, 2019; Rooduijn, 2018). Her ne kadar sol popülist seçmenler Avrupa Birliği'ni eleştirse de bu eleştirileri genellikle günümüzde uyguladıkları ekonomi politikalarına yöneliktir ve ileride yaşanacak siyasal bütünleşmeye karşı değillerdir. Sağ popülist seçmen ise

partilerinde olduğu gibi bir politik kurum olarak Avrupa Birliğine karşıdır ve gelecekte yaşanabilecek bütünleşmeye de karşıdırlar (Elsas, 2016).

Seçmen gruplarının benzerliklerini ve bu benzerlikleri içindeki farklılıkları inceledikten sonra odaklanılması gereken önemli bir nokta ise bu iki seçmen grubunu ayıran düşüncelerdir. Geçmiş çalışmalar bu ayırmda iki önemli nokta olduğunu öne sürmüştür: göç ve refah politikası. Bunun bir örneği Akkerman vd (2017) tarafından Hollanda üstünde verilmiştir. Hem popülist solun hem de popülist sağın güçlü olduğu ülkede sağ parti göçmen karşıtı bir politika, sol parti ise gelir adaletsizliğine odaklanan bir politika izlemiştir. Bu iki konunun, siyasi partilerin katı merkezleri ideolojileri hesaba katıldığı zaman seçmenler tarafından destekleniyor olması beklenecek bir durumdur.

Her ne kadar refah politikalarına olan destek kriz sonrasında sağ siyasi parti seçmeni için de önemli bir konuma gelmiş olsa da, sağ ve sol siyasi seçmenler de refah politikalarına olan bakış açılarında birbirlerinden ayrışırlar. Parti seviyesinde olduğu gibi sol seçmenler daha kapsayıcı refah politikalarını desteklerken sağ seçmenler göçmenleri dışlayıcı ve ülkenin yerlilerini merkeze alan bir refah devlet isterler. Bunun bir örneğini veren Eger ve Breznau (2017), göçmenlerin sayısının fazla olduğu bölgelerde yaşayan insanların refah şovenist davranışları daha fazla sergilediğini göstermiştir. Böylece evrensel refah devletini savunan ve göçmenlerin de bu sistemden faydalanmasını destekleyen popülist sol partilerin aksine, daha sınırlayıcı bir anlayışın görüldüğü söylenebilir.

Bu tartışmaların ışığında bu araştırma popülist sol ve popülist sağ seçmenine odaklanmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu çalışmanın geçmiş araştırmalara göre iki farklı noktası vardır. İlki, popülist sağ seçmenlerini tanımlamak için kullanılan terimler doğrudan alınıp tüm Avrupa popülist seçmenlerini ve partilerine genelleme yapmak için kullanılmamıştır. Popülist sağ ve popülist seçmen birbirlerinden bağımsız olarak incelenmiştir. Böylece popülist sağ ve popülist solu birbirlerinden bağımsız olarak tanımlamak mümkün olacaktır. İkinci olarak, önceki çalışmalar büyük ölçüde kriz öncesinde yapılan seçimleri analiz etmiş ve popülist parti seçmenini kriz öncesi dönemin ölçütleri ile tanımlamıştır. Ancak ekonomik krizin bu partileri ortaya çıkartan ana etken olduğu düşünüldüğü zaman kriz sonrası popülist seçmeni anlamak önemli olacaktır. Böylece kriz öncesi tanımlara göre olan değişimler saptanabilir. Bu

araştırma parti seçmenlerinin, demografik ve sosyo-ekonomik durumları, göç ve refah devleti hakkında görüşleri ve dünyasına olan genel görüşleri —popülist davranışları— üstüne odaklanmıştır. Bu kavramlara odaklanarak popülist parti seçmenlerinin diğer seçmenlerden nasıl ayrıştığını görmek mümkün olacak ve popülist seçmenin tanımı daha doğru bir şekilde yapılabilecektir.

Metot ve Sonuçlar:

Bu araştırma popülist seçmenleri analiz etmek için iki farklı veri setinden yararlanacaktır. Seçmenlerine odaklanılacak partiler PopuList (Rooduijn vd, 2019) veri setinden, seçmenlerin ölçümü ise European Social Survey (2016) verisinden alınmıştır. Araştırmada PopuList (Rooduijn vd, 2019) veri setinde en az bir popülist partiye sahip olan ülkeler kullanılmıştır ve böylece 19 ülkenin siyasi partilerine odaklanılmıştır. Aynı zamanda araştırmada sadece bir önceki seçimde oy veren seçmenler incelenmiş olup oy verdikleri partilerin sınıflandırmasına göre popülist sağ seçmen veya popülist sol seçmen olarak iki gruba ayrılmışlardır.

Araştırmada, demografik ve sosyo-ekonomik değişkenler, siyasi güven, toplumsal güven, partizanlık, kişisel sol-sağ endeksine yerleşim, AB'ye karşı tutum, refah şovenistliği, refah devletine destek, bireysel gelir hakkında düşünce, göçmenlere karşı olan tutum ve hükümetten memnuniyet bir kişinin popülist sağ partiye oy verip vermediğini tahmin etmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu değişkenlerden demografik ve sosyo-ekonomik değişkenler, AB'ye karşı tutum, refah şovenistliği, partizanlık, kişisel sol-sağ endeksine yerleşim ve bireysel gelir hakkında düşünce doğrudan European Social Survey (ESS) veri setinden alınırken diğerleri veri setinde bulunan birden fazla soruya verilen cevabın Doğrulayıcı Faktör Analizi ile tek bir değişkende birleştirilmesiyle oluşturulmuştur. Analiz için ise iki farklı model oluşturulmuştur: popülist sağ partiye oy verme ve popülist sol partiye oy verme. Bu iki değişken iki farklı analizde bağımlı değişken olarak alınmış ve çok değişkenli, ikili ve ağırlıklı lojistik regresyon ile analiz edilmiştir. Modelde aynı zamanda ülke seviyesinde gözlemlenmemiş farklıtüreelliği kontrol etmek için ülke seviyesinde sabit etkiler uygulanmıştır.

Sonuçlara göre önceden kurulmuş olan “kürselleşmenin kaybedenleri” grubu kriz sonrası seçmen için geçerli değildir. Her ne kadar krizden etkilenen seçmenler popülist partilere yakınlaşmış olsalar da, en azından buldukları sosyo-ekonomik gruplar açısından “kürselleşmenin kaybedenleri” hipotezinin geçerli olmadığı söylenebilir. Beklendiği üzere popülist sağ partilerin seçmenleri göçmenlere karşı bir tavır sergilerken aynı popülist sol seçmenlerde bu konya dair bir kanıt bulunamadı. Böylece popülist fikirlerin kendilerini sağ partiler durumunda milliyetçi fikirlere iliştiirdiğini söylemek mümkün. Benzer şekilde refah devletine destek popülist sol seçmende gözüdürken popülist sağ seçmende aynı destek için bir kanıt bulunamadı. Her ne kadar kriz sonrasında olumsuz etkilenen seçmenlerin bazı durumlarda popülist sağ ve bazı durumlarda popülist sol partilere oy verdiđi söylene de (Voss, 2018), bu araştırma bunu destekleyen bir kanıt bulamadı. Ancak beklendiđi üzere popülist sağ seçmenler refah şovenistik politikaları desteklerken, popülist sol seçmenler için bunu destekleyen bir kanıt bulunamadı. Böylece popülist sağ ve solun birbirlerinden temel olarak çokkültürlülük ve göçmenler noktasında ayrıştıđı desteklenmiş oldu. Ancak iki partinin seçmenlerinin de diđer partilerin seçmenlerine göre daha radikal görüşlere sahip olduđu ve daha partizan tavırlar sergilediđi bulundu.

Bu araştırma sonuçları itibariyle literatürde bazı noktalara katkı yapmış, bazı tartışmalı noktalarda tartışmaya uygun sonuçlar bulmuştur. Bakıldıđı zaman literatürde uzun zamandır tartışmalı olan ancak son dönemlerde geçerli olmadığı söylenen “kürselleşmenin kaybedenleri” konusunda son dönem literatürüne uygun ancak çalışmanın kriz sonrası seçmenden beklediđinin aksine bu durumun geçerli olmadığını bulmuştur. Böylece sonuçlar popülist partilerin heterojen seçmen gruplarından olduđuna dair görüşü destekler niteliktedir. Ayrıca Avrupa çapında kriz sonrasında seçmenlere dair geniş bir şekilde yapılan ve popülist seçmeni kriz sonrası inceleyen bir çalışmadır. Böylece popülist partilerin görece zayıf olduđu 2010 öncesi seçimlerini inceleyerek daha kısıtlı bir seçmen grubunu anlamak yerine oylarını yükselttikleri döneme odaklanarak popülist partilerin yeni kazandıkları seçmen gruplarını incelemiştir. Burada ortaya çıkan bulgular, 2010 ve sonrası dönemdeki popülist parti seçmenine ışık tutarak, son dönemde çok konuşulan popülist dönemi daha iyi anlamaya çalışmıştır. Bunun için ise önceki dönemlerde popülist seçmeni tanımlayan kavramların yanısıra, kriz sonrası dönemi anlamak için işe yarayabilecek

kavramlara odaklanmıştır. Sonuçlar aynı zamanda Mudde'nin (2007, 2004) popülizmi zayıf merkezli bir ideoloji olarak tanımlamasını destekler niteliktedir. Popülist sol partilerin seçmenleri için refah devleti konuları önemliyken, popülist sağ parti seçmenleri için göçmenler ve milli egemenlik gibi konular daha ön plandadır. Bu görüşler ise popülizmin kendisini geleneksel sağ ve geleneksel sol ideolojilere iliştiirdiğini göstermektedir.

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TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master **Doktora** / PhD

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