THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN CONDUCTING A RESPONSIBILITY

TO PROTECT MISSION:

THE CASE OF UKRAINE

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ABSTRACT

The question of sovereignty in conducting a responsibility to protect mission: the case of Ukraine

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The purpose of this research study is to examine how an illegal humanitarian intervention can be justified, how historical mythologies affects perceptions of sovereignty and what are the effects of abusing an R2P humanitarian mission. The attempt is to determine whether this mission can constitute a breach of sovereignty and if is being used as a tool for other interests. This research study aims to analyze the transforming character of sovereignty by focusing on its main contradiction between non-interference and human rights. Considering that the justification of the mission is the understandings of responsible sovereignty, this study will intend to prove that the interdependent character of sovereignty may prevent the state from having a minimum control of the external influences. Thus, without that minimum control, apparent "irresponsibility" may follow and an international mission can be justified. The study will further try to prove that the Russian view of limited sovereignty fits the concept of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, and that the R2P mission may fit the framework of sovereignty as lack of control, rather than lack of responsibility. This thesis is an attempt for a step further in understanding the contradictions of sovereignty and the consequences of justifying the breach of it under the abusing of a humanitarian mission. A case study research will be conducted, by looking at the Russian R2P intervention in Ukraine in 2014. The qualitative approach will help in the examination of the intervention`s methods and results and it will determine whether R2P was used for other interests.

Keywords: Sovereignty, Humanitarian Interventions, R2P, Ukraine, Russia.

ÖZ

Egemenlik hakkında idare sorumluluğunu koruma görevi: Ukrayna

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Bu araştımanın amacı, yasadışı bir insani müdahalenin nasıl gerekçelendirilebileciğini incelemek, tarihsel mitolojilerin egemenlik algılarını nasıl etkilediğini ve R2P'nin insani misyonunu kötüye kullanmasının ne gibi etkileri olduğunu göstermektir. Bu görevin, misyonun bir egemenlik ihlali teşkil edip edemeyeceğini ve diğer çıkarlar için bir araç olarak kullanılıp kullanılamayacağını tespit etmektir. Bu araştırma içişlerine müdahale etme ve insan hakları arasındaki temel çelişkiye odaklanarak egemenliğin dönüşen karakterini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Misyonun gerekçelerinin sorumlu egemenlik anlayışları olduğunu düşünerek, bu çalışma egemenliğin birbirine bağlı olan karakterinin devletin dış etkiler tarafından asgari kontrolüne sahip olmasını engelleyebileceğini kanıtlayacaktır. Nitekim, bu asgari kontrol olmadan, görünürde "sorumsuzluk" gibi algılanabilir ve uluslararası bir misyon haklı çıkabilir. Çalışma Rusya' nın sınırlı egemenlik görüşünün örgütlenilmiş riyakarlık olarak egemenlik kavramına uyduğunu kanıtlamaya ve R2P' nin misyonunu sorumluluk yoksunluğu yerine egemenlik çerçevesinde kontrol eksikliği olarak takip edeceğini kanıtlamaya çalışacaktır. Bu tez, egemenliğin çelişkilerini ve insani bir misyonun kötüye kullanılmasıyla ihlal edilmesini ortaya çıkaran sonuçların anlaşılmasında bir adım daha atmaya yönelik bir girişimdir. 2014 yılında Ukrayna'daki Rus R2P müdahalesine bakılarak bir örnek olay incelemesi yapılacaktır. Nitelikli bir yaklaşım, müdahalenin yöntem ve sonuçlarının incelenmesinde yardımcı olacaktır ve R2P'nin diğer çıkarlar için kullanılıp kullanılmadığını belirleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Egemenlik, İnsani Müdahaleler, R2P, Ukrayna, Rusya.

DEDICATION

To my parents

CALARETU Neculai

and

CALARETU Veta

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. Introduction

The central argument of this research is that the view of "limited sovereignty" expressed by Russia when referring to the ex-Soviet space, fits the concept of "organized hypocrisy", which is related to the prevailing norms such as non-intervention, that are being disregarded because of other higher principles, an issue that is tolerated by the international community (Goble, 2014; Krasner, 1999). As part of this argument, I will also claim that R2P may fit the potential idea of sovereignty as organized lack of control. In this respect, it will be argued that control is an important dimension of sovereignty and that without control of what's happening within the borders, arguing about responsibility might not be the best starting point (ibid). Should a stronger state prevail in conducting or applying an organized lack of control on top of sovereignty, than the lack of responsibility follows and R2P can be justified. Additionally, this paper will argue that R2P evolved in a two sided coin. Thus, one side could represent the curtain of human rights which might help legitimizing an intervention, and the other side representing the national interests which could determine an interference, even illegally (Jaber, 2016; Campbell, n.d.). Furthermore, it will be maintained that Russia, while employing R2P, acted in what has been defined as a logic of consequences that are expected, meaning that states act according to their own interests (March and Olsen, as cited in Krasner, 1999). Thus, this will come as against the appropriateness logic, the appropriate behavior, which assumes that states generally act according to their roles and established rules (ibid).

The failures of the international community to do more regarding the genocide in Rwanda, and the latter "illegal but legitimate" Western intervention in Kosovo, based on human rights claims, has influenced the United Nations (UN) to adopt the R2P mission as a form of preventing grave human rights violations in the states which are unwilling or un-capable of fulfilling the responsibility of protecting its population (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000; UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005). However, a contradiction arose between human rights protection and non-interference. Thus the question of which one should come first became almost impossible

to answer, but at the same time the answer to this question becomes crucial in understanding the meaning of sovereignty. As a consequence, it has been argued that the Westphalia understanding of sovereignty, based on its most important principle of non-interference persists even today, representing the bedrock of peaceful coexistence between states (Bartelson, 2006). However, authors like Beaulac (2000) and Osiander (2001) have claimed that Westphalia sovereignty is a myth, because nowhere in the treaties were ever mentioned concepts such as non-interference, independence or sovereignty and that its meaning was gravely manipulated and served as a false propaganda. Furthermore, Simpson (2004) has gone as far as to claim that through the Congress of Vienna and later through the League of Nations, the hegemony of the Great Powers has been legalized and only they can be called truly sovereigns. Today it can be argued that the United Nations` Security Council Five Permanent Member States (UNSC5P) constitutes a legitimized hegemony, which enjoys an "un-commanded commander" type of sovereignty (Hilla, 2008, p.91). This is because there is no higher authority beyond the UNSC and thus it cannot be held accountable, and that the traditional understanding of sovereign equality applies only to a certain degree to all the rest (ibid).

Holding a state accountable for its actions is what brings me to the question of illegal intervention within the internal affairs of other states and how this is changing the understanding of sovereignty. Thus, under what conditions and under the name of what higher principles an intervention can be justified without being considered a breach of sovereignty? One of the justifications refers to the prevention or to the ending of ethnic cleansing, genocide war crimes and human rights violations, which have been embedded within the R2P mission (UN GAR 60/1, 2005). In this respect, responsibility to protect becomes more important than previous human rights interventions. This is because unlike the latter one, which focused on the use of force, the former focuses primary on preventive and non-coercive actions, before taking into consideration the use of force. In this respect, it has been argued that sovereignty should start being understood as a responsibility, in the sense that the state has the responsibility to protect its citizens and that it has to fulfill both its internal and external obligations (Deng et al., 1996). Thus, according to Deng`s (1996) ideas, should the state fail or become unable to protect its population, an intervention of other states could be justified.

Although, R2P and "sovereignty as responsibility" (Deng et al., 1996) proponents may have had good intentions in justifying an intervention for the purpose of protecting human rights, however critics imply that R2P may not be that altruistic as it may seem. The notion of "humanitarian" which characterizes interferences in a state for the purpose of protecting the people who are in grave danger, makes the intervention appear as charitable and altruistic, thus free from any other interests that states might have (Krieg, 2013). However, several critical theories of R2P maintained that the mission opens a door for abuse, that it can be used as a tool for serving other interests, that it enables coercive unilateral action and legitimizes unwanted state intervention (Breakey, 2011; Genser& Cotler, 2012). It was further pointed out that R2P might suffer from a "complementarity trap" (Stahn, 2001, p. 116) due to the selective application issues. This would mean that while some states may warrant an intervention, others may not follow the same path until there would be strong proofs of human rights abuses (ibid). Authors like Genser and Cotler (2012, p. 175) also underlined the selectivity issues in which countries might interfere when their national interests are threatened even if unwarranted, a situation identified in Russia`s intervention in Georgia, where national interests were important enough to overlook the absence of humanitarian disasters in South Ossetia. It was also argued that R2P may suffer from double standards issues, because the US appeared to denounce humanitarian abuses in certain states not important for it like Iraq and Libya, but it did not follow the same course of actions in countries of political and economic importance like Saudi Arabia (Aryeh Neier as cited in Chandler, 2006, p. 85). Hence, by taking into consideration the critical theories of R2P, one can ask whether the Kosovo intervention fits the double standards problem, since several authors have argued that beyond human rights violations, there were security, power and influence related interests (Krieg, 2013; Belzil, 2013). Rwanda is another case of clear humanitarian disaster which actually did not see an intervention because apparently there were no state interests (Ayoob, 2002). Thus, one can also ask whether the refusal to do more in the case of Rwanda genocide fits the selectivity problem, in the sense that the states had no interests to intervene and thus, nothing to gain. The list of such situations does not end here. Cases of interventions such as in Iraq, Libya, and Syria have raised questions regarding the altruistic nature of R2P and its place in the debate of sovereignty.

The problem regarding the mission of R2P is that, as some critics point out, it can open the path to abuse. However, the purpose of this research is not to look at the cases of Kosovo, Rwanda, Libya, Iraq or Syria to see how the R2P was justified. But if we look at Kosovo and Ukraine humanitarian interventions, a question arises. Thus, why such interventions based on similar humanitarian motives had different results, with Kosovo independence but Crimean annexation? It is not the purpose here to compare and contrast Kosovo with Crimea, because this would mean comparing two different states with highly different historical and political backgrounds, which would require an extensive research that would be beyond the limits of this study. But instead I will focus on the case study of Russian intervention in Ukraine as the first case in which an R2P mission resulted in a territorial annexation, and to analyze how this mission has been abused, this time by Russia. In this respect, the R2P language was increasing in Russian statements, by repeatedly adding that Russia`s interest is to protect its people in Crimea, claiming that this will constitute a humanitarian mission (Justice in Conflict, Russia`s Responsibility to Protect in Ukraine, 2014). Furthermore, the president of Russia has also publically invoked the human rights protection under R2P, declaring that this norm constitutes at least half of Russia`s justification for its intervention in Crimea (Brown Political Review, Justifying Crimea: President Putin Invokes R2P, 2014). However, the connection between R2P and the case of Crimea has been generally dismissed as a way of conducting aggressive actions under the umbrella of humanitarian interference (ibid).

These analyses are conducted in order to answer the question of: What are the implications of these results for the debate of sovereignty and what other reasons, besides human rights abuses, enabled R2P? Additionally, I will employ a historical and political analysis to see how Ukraine`s relations with Russia evolved, how its sovereignty was affected and transformed, if Russia`s actions were based on a logic of consequences, or of appropriateness (Krasner, 1999), and determine whether control has become equally important as responsibility in defining sovereignty. In analyzing R2P in relation to different interests and in relation to the debate on responsible sovereignty, I will look at the mission through the R2P critical theories, as doubles standards and as a challenges to sovereignty, which will shed some light on the advantages and disadvantages of such interventions. Consequently, these critical theories of R2P together with the vast literature

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on sovereignty, and more importantly Deng`s (et. Al., 1996) "sovereignty as responsibility" and Krasner`s (1999) "sovereignty as organized hypocrisy", will be central in this research. Based on these theories, I will attempt to find out if R2P is enough altruistic and if is developing into a fully-fledged, legitimate norm, acceptable enough to breach sovereignty, or if its level of significance is downgraded with each intervention and abuse. I will further use Krasner (1999) understandings of interdependent sovereignty, where he refers to the states` lack of control in an interdependent world, which will be applied mainly in this case study. This will help me see if responsibility is really more important than control and if Russia, while justifying Ukraine intervention based on R2P acted in what Krasner (1999) mentioned as a logic of consequences or in logic of appropriateness.

Central to my analysis will be Deng`s (et. Al., 1996) claim of "sovereignty as responsibility", the critical theories of R2P, and Krasner`s (1999) book on "Sovereignty as Organized Hypocrisy". The first theory will provide an explanation of how the mission of R2P became an acceptable reason for intervention and a strong justification of sovereignty breach, while the critical approaches to R2P will be used as tools in bringing to surface the methods in which R2P can be abused (e.g.: Hehir, 2008; Genser& Cotler, 2012; Chandler, 2006; Krasner, 1999; Reinold, 2013). Finally, Krasner`s (1999) critical theory on sovereignty will be adopted to underline the importance of interdependent sovereignty related to the state`s lack of control, where he is emphasizing it as a dimension of hypocrisy in the sovereignty debate. Krasner`s (1999) view is very important for this paper, as the logic of interdependent sovereignty leads me to assume that a state which is unable to control what's happening within its borders may result in a determination of other more powerful states to control what others cannot. These theories will be used not because the others are not as important, but because Deng (etc. Al., 1996) is the first to relate human rights responsibilities with sovereignty in a norm, which would legitimate an intervention in case a state fails in its obligations, and because Krasner (1999) is the first to relate sovereignty with an organized hypocrisy due to the overlooking of this principle in the name of other higher principles. Therefore, both concepts of responsibility and control will be considered in this paper as equally important dimensions of sovereignty. By further looking at Krasner`s (1999) analysis, I will also apply his view

on states actions, whether they act in a logic of consequences or appropriateness. These two logics will be considered in determining what were Russia`s motivations for Ukraine intervention, whether human rights, national interests or historical roots.

1.2.Thesis Argument

First, I am arguing that, when talking about human rights interventions, sovereignty should not be understood solely as responsibility but also as control, as equally important dimension of sovereignty. In this respect, I will argue that powerful states acting in logic of consequences may create the conditions for disorder in other weak states which are unable to control the flow of information, people, weapons etc., for the purpose of justifying an intervention under R2P. This leads me to the idea that even if human rights are not being violated, even if a state proves both its internal and external obligations and responsibilities, the absence of minimum control to a level that would guarantee the security and stability of a country, can lead to the dismissal of sovereignty. Failing to maintain a minimum control, the state can become a victim of other powerful states which have the necessary tools to turn the tables in their own advantage. Thus, one state`s weakness can become another state`s strength. In this respect, if a stronger state can successfully manage to conduct an organized lack of control within a different state, then the lack of responsibility of the targeted state might follow, and R2P might be justified.

By looking at the critical theories of R2P regarding its double standards, selectivity issues and potential for abuse, in relation with the claims of sovereignty as responsibility and interdependent sovereignty, it will be argued that R2P is being downgraded and transformed in a tool at the hands of the powerful states, while sovereignty may not be understood solely as responsibility when addressing human rights. Additionally, I will argue that R2P mission is not altruistic in nature and it evolved in a two sided coin: one side is the curtain of human rights violations which legitimizes a potential intervention, while the other side is a set of different interests which determines the states to decisively, unilaterally and illegally act. By applying the logic of consequences of the powerful states and the inability of the weaker states to control, I

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argue that R2P transformed in a Responsibility to Control (R2C) and that Russia`s motives may involve historical or security interests or both. Should the R2P of the powerful become an R2C of the ones that cannot control their borders, this will constitute a grave breach of sovereignty. However, the first central argument of this research is that the view of limited sovereignty of the states of traditional importance for Russia fits the concept of "organized hypocrisy", coined by Krasner (1999). This concept is mainly related to the fact that prevailing norms such as non-intervention, are being disregarded because of other higher principles, and that the international community tolerates most of the times such violations (ibid). The second central argument which is connected with the first is that the R2P mission in Ukraine fits the notion of sovereignty as an organized lack of control.Finally, I also claim that human rights violations as a threat to Westphalia and responsible sovereignty has been exaggerated in the case of Ukraine. Thus, I claim that traditional historical ties and/or security interests between Ukraine and Russia, constituted an important factor in Russia`s acting in a logic of consequences, organizing the lack of control within Ukraine which led to a lack of responsibility, and justified an R2P resulting in a territorial annexation.

Primary Questions:
Why Russia breached Ukraine`s sovereignty annexing Crimea, and how a humanitarian mission helped justifying it?
Secondary Questions:
Under what conditions a humanitarian mission can be abused, used as a tool, and still be justified when breaching sovereignty?
How historical mythologies may influence a state`s perceptions about others countries` sovereignty?

1.3.Primary and secondary research questions

Considering the fact that humanitarian missions have been created for the good intentions, but at the same time taking into account the contradiction between human rights and non-interference in the sovereignty debate, and the room for abuse and unilateralism within the R2P, several questions arise. Therefore, how a humanitarian intervention can be used as a tool and still be justified in breaching sovereignty, and how the historical ties may influence a state`s perceptions regarding sovereignty, will be central questions in this research. Answering these questions will help providing an answer to the main question of: Why Russia breached Ukraine`s sovereignty, and how the R2P mission helped justifying it?

However, for the purpose of answering these questions, several others need to be addressed. First, it has to be determined how the aspect of non-interference, as crucial in understanding sovereignty, was replaced by responsibility and how this replacement fits the altruistic character of Responsibility to Protect Human Rights. Secondly, it has to be determined under what conditions and under the name of what higher principles an intervention can be justified without being considered a breach of sovereignty? Thirdly, it has to be established what are the potential methods through which an R2P can be abused, used as a tool, and still provide the basis for justification of sovereignty breach?

After these questions have been answered, the case of Russian intervention in Ukraine will be considered, in an attempt to find out whether there were other interests besides human rights which may have enabled the Russian intervention, and what are the implications of these results for the debate of sovereignty? Finally, it will be addressed whether the dimension of control is equally important as responsibility when debating sovereignty. This last aspect I believe it to be important for this research, because by taking into account that state irresponsibility to protect human rights fits the altruistic character of R2P, I will intend to find out whether the lack of control of external influences fits the framework of the abusing character of R2P. If the latter becomes true, then sovereignty might also be understood as an organized lack of control which fits the term of organized hypocrisy.

I intend to answer these questions by looking at the vast literature on the concept of sovereignty to see how and why it transformed in what is called today as responsibility. Although, I will look at the internal dimension on sovereignty for the purpose of determining what are the minimum conditions for a state to be considered sovereign, however the main focus will be on the external dimension of it, to see if the external sovereignty is understood in terms of non-interference, responsibilities, obligations, rules, interdependence and control, or others. Then, I am looking at the R2P proponents to determine its purpose, mission, principles that it defends, to explain how and when the mission can be justified and how it fits the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility". Additionally, by using the critical theories of R2P, I will determine which their weaknesses are and how it provides the states with an option for abusing and using it as a tool.

Having established these aspects, I am employing a historical and political analysis of Ukraine`s relations with Russia, to find out if historical ties or national interests had any influence on Russia`s decision to intervene in Ukraine. Additionally, I will employ a realist approach which can provide a better explanation of why states chose to intervene in the internal affairs of others and I will apply Krasner`s view on whether states act in a logic of appropriateness or in a logic of consequences. Furthermore, Krasner`s view of sovereignty as a form of hypocritical organization will be central, because it will help explaining the argument that the interdependent character of sovereignty results in a lack of states` control, which can be used in the advantage of other states for justifying an intervention. Finally, by gathering data from news and articles, I will attempt to determine what were Russia`s methods for intervention, and I will analyze them in the context of sovereignty as hypocritical organization. The next attempt would then be to find out if the R2P mission fits the lack of responsibility claim, or if the lack of Ukraine`s control was used by Russia and transformed in irresponsibility with the aim of justifying sovereignty breach.

1.4.Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Approach

Firstly, the theoretical orientation will be based on two theories: realism, and critical theories of humanitarian interventions and Responsibility to Protect. The realist theory has been used to find out if there are other motives and interests states might have when conducting a humanitarian mission (e.g.: Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 2006). Additionally, realism has also been used to explain why sovereignty remains a strong factor in international relations despite the fact that it can be challenged by its interdependent dimension (Biersteker& Weber, 1996, p. 7) or by a centralized framework of international law which does not really exist (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 4). On the other hand, the critical theories on humanitarian missions have been used to explain whether or not these missions have been successful, legally implemented and free from other state interests (e.g: Gensen & Cotler, 2012; Deyermond, 2016; Krasner, 1999). Although, this research study can be approached through other theories as well, however I consider that Realism and critical approaches to R2P are better suited for the purpose of this thesis. Thus, they appear to be free from the domination or influence of liberal, constructivist or institutionalist arguments, and they generally counter types of hegemonic inclinations (e.g. liberal wars, fulfilment of accepted norms, or through the responsibility of institutions) and showing a commitment to liberation from self-imposed and accepted norms (e.g.: Morgenthau, 2006; Waltz, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001). Additionally, the key concepts of my research and central to my thesis are the concepts of sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect. In this respect, the concept of sovereignty is used in its standard form to refer in general to a state`s right to independently conduct both its internal and external affairs, while respecting the internationally binding treaties that have been agreed upon (Krasner, 1999). Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as a form of responsibility is also used to refer to the fact that states have the responsibility to protect its citizens which in turn guarantees their sovereignty, as elaborated by Deng (1996). This later concept forms the basis of the R2P mission which is utilized to denote a humanitarian mission which may or may not include military means, but takes place only when clear proofs of humanitarian disasters exists as defined in the R2P Reports (2005; 2009).

Methodology: while the theoretical approach will provide an explanation about the different reasons why states intervene in other states, how interferences can be justified

in relation to sovereignty and under what conditions a state may lose its sovereignty, I will then seek to interpret these theories in relation to the study case of Russian intervention in Ukraine. This will help me see if the factors that contributed to the problems in Ukraine were strong enough to justify an intervention, identify the potential reasons why Russia intervened, whether or not the methods used are justifiable in relation to sovereignty, and what were the results. Therefore, my methodology will be based on a case study research. Moreover, since I will have more an interpretative analysis, I will employ a qualitative research that will rely on the following methods for gathering information: from primary and secondary sources. Therefore, I will use primary data such as news, legal documents, government documents and reports, newspaper articles, surveys, speeches, declarations, treaties, and books. As regarding the secondary sources, I will use: analyses of political and legal documents, academic journals, theories, government studies and case studies, work of criticism and interpretations, history and other scholarly books, literature reviews, book reviews and encyclopedias.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY

This chapter has the main purpose of presenting several theories of sovereignty in order to clarify the concept, find out what are its weaknesses, identify what changed in states practices, and which model remained unmodified over time. Therefore, I will begin with the modern views of sovereignty explained by Bodin (1992), Hobbes (1999), and Grotius (2005), which were considered among the key authors to analyze internal and external dimensions of it, followed by de Vattel`s (1844) contributions to this concept. Additionally, I will present the reasons why Beaulac (2000) and Osiander (2001) contradicted the ideas that sovereignty was born with the Westphalia treaties. In this respect, I will also look at the reasons why Westphalia sovereignty was not even considered in the case of the former colonized states, following Anghie`s (2004) analysis of the relation between international law and imperialism. Furthermore, I will continue with Gerry Simpson`s (2004) analysis of the relations between unequal sovereignties and the legally established hegemony. It will then become important to see how this concept under investigation was perceived during the Cold War by the two main powers, following the contributions of Deyermond (2008; 2016) and Krasner (1999). Having determined these aspects, I will then analyze what changed after the Cold War, why sovereignty principles downgraded in favor of humanitarian interventions, why Russia is perceived as following an old Soviet model of sovereignty, and why this concept is seen as hypocrisy. In addition, I will also look at the Military Strategies of USSR and post USSR, to find out if there are any connections between them, and I will explain whether or not Russia is influenced by an Eurasian Empire like external policy, by focusing on Aleksander Dugin1s ideas, who is considered the father of the Eurasianist strategy, and Primakov Doctrine`s influences on Russian foreign politics. Furthermore, I will specifically focus on Krasner`s (1999) explanation of interdependent sovereignty related to state`s control of internal and external influences, which appears to challenge all other forms of the concept. Finally, I will explain what Deng (1996) meant by the concept of responsible sovereignty, and how these ideas shaped the 21st century understandings of it. Last but not least, I will end the review by looking at the challenges to this concept posed mainly by human rights, humanitarian interventions, and non-interference (e.g.: Krasner, 1999; Chandler, 2006, Doyle, 2015; Deyermond, 2016; Genser& Cotler, 2012).

However, this literature review will be reflected in the present thesis mainly through the analyses put forward by Krasner (1999), Deyermond (2008; 2016), and Deng (1996). First of all, the reason why I am not going to use modern ideas of sovereignty (Bodin, 1992; Hobbes, 1999; and Grotius, 2005) is because they proposed absolute models of the concept which, in light of the strong interconnections between states, does not hold today anymore. On the other hand, de Vattel (1844) focused on the rules governing the peaceful relations between states, while this thesis will focus more on the concept of sovereignty. Considering that Westphalia is argued to be a taken for granted concept, I will assume that it marked the beginning only of a symbolic sovereignty (Beaulac, 2000; Osiander, 2001). This leaves me with three main analyses which will be used in my thesis. Thus, first I will use Deyermond`s (2008; 2016) analysis where he claims that an old Soviet model of sovereignty continues to influence the relations between, in my case study, Ukraine and Russia. This can help me determine whether or not Ukraine`s sovereignty is dependent on Russia, and if there is any connection between Ukraine`s decision to independently follow certain political paths, and Russia`s decision to deny its sovereignty through intervention. Secondly, I will use Krasner`s (1999) views on sovereignty as organizational hypocrisy to see if it fits the Soviet limited model of the concept. Additionally, I will use the interdependent model related to control (ibid). This is being pursued in order to see whether or not Ukraine`s loss of Crimea was due to a loss of control of its own borders. Finally, I will use the concept proposed by Deng (1996), identified as responsible sovereignty because it is the main basis of the Responsibility to Protect Mission, which I will investigate in relation to Russia`s application or misapplication of it in the case of Ukraine. However, before the literature review, I will provide an explanation of several concepts in a standard way, since a more detailed analysis would be beyond the limits of this thesis.

2.1. Conceptual Framework

First of all, in order to understand state sovereignty, it should be mentioned how the state alone is defined. Unfortunately there is no universally agreed definition of it and pursuing such analysis would go beyond the limits and purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the state will be defined here only through the basic characteristics of it, to include a

territorial delimitation, a population, a government, and a level of control over the political body which must be accompanied by authority and legitimacy in exercising the governmental competencies (Jasentuliyana, as cited in Nagan& Haddad, 2012).

On the other hand, state authority will refer here to a claim made by a state over its citizens, a claim to bind them together, to regulate their interests and to coordinate all the frameworks of social control, but for which legitimacy is needed for the purpose of increasing the state`s stability (Green, 1988, p. 1). The standard understanding of authority refers to the fact that the claims made are generally recognized, and since there is recognition it also becomes legitimate, which together becomes legitimate authority (ibid, p. 60). However, if people are forced to respect the law, then the institutions do not have authority, but power (Hehir, 2010, p. 132). In this respect, Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2013) proposed three types of power, one soft referring to the capability of an actor to persuade others to follow a specific course of actions, hard power which is generally referring to the use of force for the same purpose and smart power which involves a combination of both. However, I will use in this research the standard understanding of power, which refers to the capability (coercive or non-coercive) to influence certain actions and behavior (Green, 1988, p. 62).

Having mentioned legitimacy, this concept is generally defined by Coicaud, Curtis and Ebrary (2002) as admitting one`s right to govern, an action which must involve consent in resolving a potential problem, which includes simultaneously a justification for political power, political obligation and obedience. Legitimacy, in international relations, is generally related to the belief that actors should respect and obey the rules internationally established, or different institutions (Hurd, 1999, p. 381). Additionally, it should be mentioned that when states agree with international laws or accept an organization as legitimate, both the rules and organizations become forms of authority (ibid, p. 381).

The aspect of internal and external social control is also important, because it suggests an attempt to establish order by imposing certain values over others, which can constitute a great source of conflict (ibid, p. 383). The idea that control is maintained

through legitimacy is the main perspective utilized in this thesis. Finally, since legitimacy refers to the compliance with a rule, it means that compliance is not influenced by coercion, fear, or self-interest, but by a moral obligation (ibid, p. 387). Hence, the dimension of control is legitimate as long it was agreed upon (Dahl and Lindblom, as cited in Hurd, 1999, p. 387).

Having explained the previous concepts, state sovereignty would now refer to a form of authority relations, where authority can be based on power and coercion seen as illegitimate, thus a true authority must include legitimacy obtained through consent and an obligation of all parties in question (Lake, 2003, p. 304). It becomes clear that legitimate authority includes a non-coercive command and finally it is never absolute (Lake, 2003, pp. 304-305). As a form of authority relationship, sovereignty includes a domestic and external dimension, where domestically it refers to the highest form of authority within the territory, suggests a hierarchical relationship between the sovereign and its subjects, and it includes control over the territory (ibid, p. 305). Externally, it refers to the mutual recognition between sovereign states and suggests a relationship of states` equality (ibid, p. 305). The importance of these two types of authority relations in defining internal and external sovereignties refers to the fact that their existence is strongly dependent on one another (ibid, p. 305).

Finally, a state`s autonomy is generally identified with independence. Autonomy in a standard understanding, denotes a state`s capability to govern itself independently, free from external forces (Christman, 2015). Furthermore, autonomy basically means that one actor is not under the control of another, thus control is a fundamental point of autonomy (Foldvary, 2011). Therefore, political autonomy denotes a group of people and a territory which is governing itself without being under the control of other higher dimensions of government (ibid). From this idea it follows that complete autonomy would refer to an independent state (ibid).

2.2.   Models of Sovereignty, Westphalia and The Vienna Congress

One of the most important figures to contribute to the understandings of sovereignty as the starting point of the modern idea of it in the 16th century France, was

Jean Bodin (1992) in his famous "Six Livres de la Republique". The concept of sovereignty has been related most of the time with the internal dimension of it, and Bodin (1992) identified it with an absolute power and authority, established within one individual. From his perspective, it could be drawn that domestic sovereignty is identified with absolutism, since "perpetual power" would mean for him as having power until the end of the sovereign`s life, who responds only to God (Bodin, 1992, pp. 1-4). Additionally, power and legitimacy are identified with sovereignty, and he who can have the power to create law is truly sovereign (Bodin, 1992, pp. 6-15). However, the fact that Bodin (1992, pp. 4, 15) argues that the sovereign can be bound by a contract with its citizens, but he is ultimately responsible to God, and that he has unlimited rights, leads to a contradiction. Because of this contradiction, it is considered that a stronger version of absolutism identified with the concept of "un-commanded commander" type of sovereignty, begins actually in the 17th century with Hobbes and Grotius (Hilla, 2008, p. 92).

As such, Grotius (2005, pp. 259-260) mentions that one can be considered supreme if his actions do not depend on someone else`s power and this ultimately represents the sovereign power, which can be identified with a state. However, at the internal level, subjects may have a right of resistance, but if an injury was caused by the sovereign`s will, then the subjects should bear it and serve an absolute king (Grotius, 2005, pp. 338-369). On the other hand, when it comes to non-intervention, Grotius (2005, p. 136-148) argued that in looking at what are the rights of a war, one has to understand the right as something just and moral based, which can justify it. Additionally, the author believes that the rights of nations deduct their authority from the will of states majority, and that the right reason forbids only the violence that is against society and violates one`s own right (2005, pp. 162-184). In short, Grotius argues for a balance between what is just and what is legal, both being required for enabling an intervention.

On the other hand, the real reason why Hobbes (1999) was considered to propose a stronger type of absolute sovereignty is because the sovereign does not respond to its people or to any Gods, as Bodin (1992) and Grotius (2005) argued. Thus, as Hilla (2008, p. 92) claims, the idea of "un-commanded commander" was completely developed by

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Hobbes in Leviathan. Hobbes (1999) begins the analysis starting from the understandings of the human nature. This is seen as negative and selfish, and although men can differ in body strength, they are nonetheless equal (Hobbes, 1999, pp. 86-87). Because they are equal, they might want the same thing which cannot be obtained by both, and as such they will become enemies ready to destroy (ibid, p. 87). Because of this condition, people cannot protect themselves and since there is no power to maintain them in check, they find themselves in a situation of war of all people against one another, and thus the solution to peace is the fear of punishments and death (ibid, pp. 87-117). Hobbes (1999, p. 124) claims that the actions of the sovereign cannot be accused by its people, nor attacked, nor punished, because a person who already chose him and later complains about sovereign`s injustice, is like complaining of something that he himself accepted and became the author of it. Additionally, the entire power to make rules, the indivisible rights to conduct war and peace with other states it entirely belongs to the sovereign (ibid, pp. 125-129). Moreover, no protests are ever allowed, and the population owes to the sovereign a type of obedience which is in line with God`s laws (ibid, pp. 158, 245). Although it may look like the author agrees with the sovereign`s obedience to God however, Hobbes (1999, pp. 417-419) argues that spiritualism is characterized by darkness which is shown through some peoples` ignorance, and others` potential for abusing the meaning of Scripture, or misinterpreting it. This might represent Hobbes` fear that people could misunderstand the purposes of God`s law and thus, by thinking that they act in accordance to that law, they might act against the sovereign himself. Therefore, the form of sovereignty explained by Hobbes becomes absolute.

On the other hand, De Vattel (1844, p. 1) argued that once there is a design including many people who have common goals, it is required to create a Public Authority which coordinates the relations in that society and constitutes the sovereignty, while the persons who are invested with this authority represents the sovereign. As long as this sovereign does not depend on any external power, he is a sovereign state (ibid, p. 2). Additionally, it is argued that sovereignty once established cannot be divided and a state should stay united in front of a mutual enemy (ibid, p. 93, 96). Furthermore, sovereignty can be protected through mutual assistance, respect for treaties, and aid in their pursuit of universal justice, but independently through mutual love and ensuring that one`s action

does not affect negatively the progress of others, nor contributes to disorder (ibid, pp. 133-142). Therefore, Vattel`s sovereignty is not absolute, but dependent on mutually agreed treaties, which separates him from other authors. Finally, when it comes to interference, De Vattel (1844, p. 11) is clear about the fact that no external state has the right to intervene in the affairs of another, except if it is asked to do so, or is determined by different exceptional reasons. States have a right to security, and intervening only if the actions of a leader became unbearable for the population and they beg for aid (ibid, p. 152-155). More importantly, is the fact that De Vattel (1844, pp. 233-244) already pointed out the problem of interpreting treaties, which can lead to contradictions, and can be used in self-interest by duplicating the meaning of words. For these reasons, is forbidden to interpret something which is already clear (ibid, pp. 244- 248).

However, more important for the analysis of sovereignty is the Westphalian Peace which has always been considered the beginning of the modern state system. In this respect, Brahm (2004, p. 1) believes that the international arena was not composed of sovereign countries until Westphalia, but rather of feudal agreements. Thus, the beginning of a sovereignty based system started in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia, underlining the characteristics of domestic sovereignty related to complete authority within a specific territory, and external sovereignty as a recognition of each other`s equal powers in conducting such an authority (ibid, p.1). The optimism related to sovereignty identified with the Westphalian Peace is seen in different arguments (e.g.: Simpson, 2004, p. 30; Qian, 1995, p. 1). However, these views have been contested by authors who argued that Westphalia might be just a myth, or a false propaganda.

In this respect, Beaulac (2000, p. 151) argued that independence was not achieved with the Westphalia peace, but long time after it. It is claimed that in the 11th century, the Emperor and the Pope were fighting for the throne of a spiritual community, the Christendom (ibid, p. 152-153). In short, this following period was characterized by a battle in two directions: one was horizontal between the Emperor and the Pope, while the other one was vertical, between the German Empire and Papacy on one side, and the many subjected European entities on the other side (ibid, p. 155). The revolt which started against the Empire and the Catholic domination in 1618 led to the Thirty Years War based

on religious contradictions, which was then characterized by power politics, ending with Westphalia Treaty (ibid, pp. 160-161). Beaulac (2000, p. 162) argued that the peace was not about independence, because the central objects of the two treaties concerned religious toleration of Protestantism and Catholicism, as well as territorial settlements to the satisfaction of mainly France and Sweden (ibid, p. 165). Furthermore, the Empire in fact remained a central actor even after Westphalia and it ceased to exist when Germany was conquered by Napoleon in 1806 (ibid, pp. 168- 173).

Osiander (2001, p. 251) on the other hand, argues that Westphalia is a taken for granted picture based on an imaginary past. The author believes that the Thirty Years Crisis did not start because the Empire wanted to increase its role, but rather because other actors were trying to decrease it (Osiander, 2001, p. 260). In fact, the war began because of the aggression of expansionist actors such as Sweden and France (ibid, p. 260). Although, they could have used military means, however they wanted legitimacy, a just cause to justify a war, which shows the importance of painting the Empire as the evil who abuses its powers (ibid, p. 263). Therefore, Osiander (2001, p. 263) claims that France and Sweden warned the princes of Germany about the Empire`s desire of absolute domination, which was a propaganda. Consequently, the Westphalia Peace reflects a false idea regarding the intentions of the Empire, and the treaties do not include anything related to sovereignty, independence, and non-interference (ibid, p. 266).

A myth or not, it should also be stated that the European states colonized the rest of the countries from the 15th to 19th centuries, and thus the so called sovereign authority through Westphalia was not even considered in the cases of non-European states (Brahm, 2004, p.1). In this respect, Anghie (2004, p. 3) considers that the international law`s contribution to sovereignty is strongly connected with imperialism, because colonialism was justified through a legal "civilizing mission". However, with the establishment of the UN, all states were admitted as sovereign, but problems connected with the colonial past persisted (ibid, pp. 205-208).

These aspects, brings me to the next question, of whether or not there was equality between sovereigns? Gerry Simpson (2004) was the author who examined the problems

of unequal sovereignty, coining the terms of anti-pluralism and legalized hegemony. In his analysis, he claimed that the following Congress of Vienna's purpose was to implement the idea of sovereign equality in a legalized hegemony framework (Simpson, 2004). The author argues that there are two types of legalized hierarchies: anti pluralism through which states are labeled based on their ideology, and legalized hegemony based on states` superiority and position of dominance (ibid, p. 67). The Major Powers separated themselves from the rest of nations starting with 1815 at the Vienna Congress, continuing with Hague (which was a failure), Versailles, and San Francisco (ibid, p. 67). This legalized hegemony includes four parts: first, the Great Powers` domination was legally established; only the major powers were equal sovereigns; they acted in concert to obtain different ends in the global order; and finally, this legally established hegemony was enforced from the top and agreed from the bottom by states (ibid, pp. 67-73). On the other side, anti-pluralism is liberal in nature. The problem is that liberalism has produced two interpretations of states: the internal political design of states can determine how a state is seen at the international level, which represents liberal pluralism; since liberalism underlines the importance of diversity, acceptance, and equality, a liberal pluralism would mean to tolerate illiberal states, therefore by not tolerating them leads us to a form of liberal anti-pluralism (ibid, pp.77-80).

Furthermore, the meetings held in 1899 and 1907 at Hague to create extreme equality failed because of competing views, but in 1919 at Versailles with the League of Nations` creation, hegemony and sovereign equality were combined, by giving equal representation to all but security responsibilities to few (ibid, pp. 132-161). However, the Major Powers targets were achieved with the establishment of UN at San Francisco in 1945, where their hegemony was completely realized through the Security Council, permanent representation of the main powers (P5), and veto rights, while all the rest were subjected to the policies of interference (Simpson, 2004, p. 165-188).

2.3. Cold War and Post-Cold War Sovereignty

Having seen that sovereignty was more of a formal one within the United Nations, it is important now to look at what changed during the Cold War. It is argued that the

non-interference rule was strongly underlined, and although non-intervention was central in the international community, however interferences did take place, especially from the main super powers at the time (Bolt, 2013, p.4). Both USSR and US influenced the authority structures in their areas of influence (Krasner, 1999, p. 184). Europe was specifically important from a security point of view for both powers, and thus USSR was seeking to impose Communist rule, whereas US was trying to encourage the expansion of democratic capitalist regimes (ibid, p. 185). Both major powers had different and strong material interests, as well as ideological concerns, which resulted in constant violations of the Westphalia principles (ibid, p. 202). As the Cold War was growing, US were encouraging democracy, private property and free market through the Marshall Plan, an aid to counter the advancement of communism (ibid, p. 204). In Eastern Europe, the policies, personnel, and constitutional structures, were established by the USSR (ibid, pp. 212, 216). Thus, both US and USSR violated the independence of other European states and affirmed the right of intervention through Brezhnev and Truman doctrine (ibid, p. 218). However, more important here is to understand the Soviet model of sovereignty.

In the Western side, there are multiple and competing views of sovereignty literatures, which are uniformly applied in both the internal and external dimensions, meaning that the character of these two dimensions is the same for all states (Deyermond, 2008, p. 26). In contrast, the Soviet theory appears to have generally only one main perspective, thus although there were many different analyses, the perspective was the same (ibid, p. 26). The Soviet theory then, was based on a uniform perception of different multiple relations of sovereignty where the Soviet government had supremacy in its relations to all (ibid, p. 26). It is safe to mention that the different approaches to sovereignty derived from the fundamental difference between the capitalist and the socialist societies (ibid, p. 27). In the Soviet theory therefore, one result was the understanding of sovereignty as the reflection of Marxism, in terms of class conflict, and thus the model would be dependent on the state structure (ibid, p. 27). Therefore, as a Soviet analyst observed: the bourgeois state with its claim of peoples` sovereignty is hiding the bourgeois class dictatorship, and the basis of sovereignty is the supremacy of the state which is the ruling class` political organization (ibid, p. 28). Additionally, this sovereignty model differentiation identifies the Soviet center`s sovereignty with the duty

and need to defend it, because the socialist movement elsewhere depends on making the center stronger in its authority and resistant to external influences (ibid, p. 28). Therefore, this reflects the fight between democratic progressive sides against the capitalist imperialistic side (ibid, p. 28).

Additionally, in the Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977, there was a problematic attempt to unite the ideas of sovereignty of the center, its units, and the autonomous republics, while arguing that the sovereignty of states is indivisible (ibid, p. 29). Furthermore, two more important aspects stand central and are stipulated in the Constitution: the units` competencies depended on the USSR; and the Soviet Union had authority and final decision over all aspects considered by it as important (ibid, p. 31). Another important aspect refers to the affirmation that the sovereignty of the republics and the union is not being canceled by one another, but rather the republics` sovereignty creates the Union itself (ibid, pp. 31-32). This apparent contradiction has two dimensions: the power of the center strengthens the powers of the republics, thus it becomes the guarantee of the units` sovereignty; and the units` decision to become part of the USSR was voluntary, thus their sovereignty was not limited (ibid, pp. 32-33). Therefore, this model argues that two sovereignty claims can exist over the same area (ibid, pp. 33-34). Additionally, in the broader socialist bloc, their external sovereignty was explicitly characterized as limited (ibid, p. 35). This was informed by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which argues that if a socialist state is under threat, the USSR has both the right and the responsibility to interfere in order to protect it (ibid, p. 35). It was further claimed that in a case of counter revolution, a soviet intervention would reinforce its sovereignty, not break it (ibid, p. 36). Apparently, these aspects continue even in the post-Soviet times, between Russia and its "near abroad", because the Brezhnev Doctrine practices were noticed in different security disputes (ibid, p. 36). In this respect, it should be mentioned that Lenin`s concept of self-determination revealed that the right of states to self-determine means that they have a right to an independence in a political sense (Lenin Theses, 1916). This political democratic demand suggests a freedom to bring the question of secession through a referendum on the part of the nation that would like to secede (ibid). However, for him, this demand was not to say that is identical with the demand for the creation of small states, but an actual expression of the battle against a form of national

oppression (ibid). However, in short, he basically advocated the idea that each subject state should have the freedom to either separate or remain part of the Great Russian People, thus Lenin`s doctrine of self-determination implied a democratic choice which appears to come as against the Brezhnev Doctrine (Page, 1950).

After the USSR`s disintegration, the model of shared sovereignty, as well as the legally established relations between the former Soviet units, vanished (Deyermond, 2008, p. 36). However, the Soviet model had significant influences regarding the establishment of the units as independent states (ibid, p. 37). It was suggested that the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991 (CIS) was a way of reproducing the centralization of the Soviet center, and that the old model of sovereignty survived in the relations between Russia and its former units (ibid, p. 37). In the CIS founding treaty, sovereignty, non-interference, and self-determination, were clearly stipulated, however, it was also affirmed that the CIS members will cooperate in different internal policy issues, economic, social, military and foreign, which became dubious (ibid, pp. 40-41). These aspects echoed the Soviet Constitution, in which security and external policies were decided by the center, and a centralized coordination was implied (ibid, p. 41). Secondly, states were moving towards independence which was in opposition to the agreement which appeared to strengthen the ties between them through a coordinated external policy (ibid, p. 41).

On the other hand, the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST) which set the security policies of the CIS, was not clear because it underlined the sovereignty principles, but prevented states to join alliances and committed them to coordination in all international security aspects (ibid, pp. 42-43). Additionally, in the case of a threat, the members were supposed to consult each other and eliminate it, but the unclear meaning of the terms concerned states about their capability to control their security and thus, Ukraine, for example, did not sign it (ibid, p. 43). Moreover, it was underlined cooperation and mutual defense of external borders which meant a high level of interdependence, common vulnerability, and undermined the principle of non-interference (ibid, p. 45).

However, on the other side, Russia was not the only one to modify or breach sovereignty principles, thus at the beginning of the 1990, the number of state interventions in the internal affairs of others, would actually increase. In this respect, the Secretary General of UN declared that absolute sovereignty is no longer valid and its theory was never in line with reality (Hogan, 2012, p.3) Furthermore, the UN adopted resolutions which underlined the significance and the acceptance of intervening in the name of human rights (ibid, p.3). Thus, interferences took place in Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti, to name a few, which were justified in human rights logics (Bolt, 2013, p.5). Moreover, in 1993, Deng became a UN representative of matters related to internally displaced persons (IDP`s) which enforced the new understandings of responsible sovereignty (ibid, p.5). This new concept is strongly related to IDP`s related issues, because as IDPs, civilians had no extra defense and the international community could not reach them because of the non-interference (ibid, p. 5). The point of adopting a responsible sovereignty understandings was to avoid non-interference barriers and assist the IDP`s (ibid, p. 6).

These changes determined Stephen Krasner (1999) to argue that sovereignty is a form of hypocritical organization, because of the constant violations of it in the name of more important principles, such as human rights. Krasner (1999, p. 3) argues that there have been generally four different types of sovereignty used by states: Westphalia, international legal, domestic, and interdependent. As it is already clear, the first three types refer to non-interference, mutual recognition and domestic political authority, but the interdependent model is based on the capabilities of public authorities to effectively control the movement of people, capital, and information across the states` borders as results of globalization or state interconnections (ibid, p. 4). The most important aspect here is that by losing the interdependent dimension, the control across borders` movements, it might immediately lead towards losing the domestic sovereignty related to internal control, but it does not automatically mean a loss of authority (ibid, p. 10). It is argued that sovereignty related to control is weakened by globalization, thus James Rosenau (as cited in Krasner, 1999, p. 12) claims that this weakening is a result of issues such as terrorism, economic crises, or drug trafficking which constitutes an outcome of interdependence. Although, losing the interdependent model of sovereignty is not necessarily related with internal authority, it is however a problem for the control

dimension, thus if a country is unable to control what crosses its borders, then it will be unable to control what is happening inside of them (ibid, p. 13). In addition, the author argues that the modalities chosen by states to deviate from international norms depend on matters of interests and power (ibid, p. 27). The major problematic aspect is that, although states take in their calculations the appropriateness logic (acting according to their roles) related with Westphalia rule, there have been however alternatives such as human rights coupled with opposite material interests and power, which made the logic of consequences (acting in self-interest) to prevail (ibid, p. 41).

In this respect it should be mentioned that the problems of logic consequences, self-interest, and control, were widely seen in the Military Doctrines of the USSR and post USSR, as well as in the Russia`s foreign policy. Thus, the Soviet Military Strategy reflected ideas that were against Western ones. In this respect, the Soviets expressed their unhappiness with the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) type of strategic balance (Currie, 1983). Therefore, the strategic balance through which status quo of both states assures mutual security, was not the favourable Soviet strategy, but rather the one in which the military superiority guarantees the USSR security and freedom of action while curbing the one of the West (ibid). It was also raised the question of deterrence which for the West was through punishment, an act that was not acceptable among the Soviets (ibid). The refusal of it was because the Soviet Union took into consideration the possibility of failure of such a policy, and thus the Russian perspective was that USSR had to be prepared to conduct a successful war in case of a deterrence failure (ibid). The Soviet Union Military Strategy was therefore strongly based on counter action, being capable of denying US ability to cause damage, and would guarantee Soviet supreme military power that could paralyse the US political system (ibid). Furthermore, this strategy would ultimately assure USSR`s desire to pursue it global aims without being concerned about US reprisals (ibid). In fact, the doctrine was the main basis of the Soviet Union to obtain its global objectives, because it was predicated upon strong and superior weapons, high capabilities, centralized military command, economic strength, maintenance of superior nuclear force and capability to employ offensive and defensive war in order to maintain *control* (ibid).

Considering these aspects, the Soviet Military Strategy appeared to focus on constant development of military forces and underlines the potential future wars or Western actions that might damage the Soviet political system. In this respect, it might not be a surprise that the post-Soviet Military Doctrines continue to reflect Soviet ideas. Since the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian view of modern warfare perceives wars as generally undeclared, and views conflicts as destructive, short and decisive, a topic on which has been written very much since 1920`s by the Russian Military leaders (Defence Intelligence Agency, 2017). In short, the 1993 Military Doctrine reflected the Soviet Doctrine, by referring to the military dangers as persistent, the 2000 one reflected the fears of external military threats as in the 1993 doctrine, whereas the 2010 doctrine clearly pointed out the actions that are seen as threats to Russian security, most of them referring to US actions and interventions, international law violations and NATO expansion (FAS, The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, n.d.; Carnegie Endowment, Text of Newly Approved Military Doctrine, 2010; Just Security, Russia`s 2010 Military Doctrine, 2014). Moscow also appears to be concerned with the non-nuclear weapons capabilities to obtain strategic advantages, being one of the main reasons of why Russia, since 1993 and even recently in 2014 Military Doctrine, has reserved its right to respond with nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear attack (Defence Intelligence Agency, 2017). Furthermore, although traditional wars are considered less likely, Russia appears to focus more and more on pre-emption which underlines the fears of future attacks (ibid). Specifically, the 2014 Military Strategy reminds of the Soviet times due to the fact that the non-nuclear deterrence was underlined, emphasized different threats to the Russian political system which requires stronger military capabilities to cause damage on any potential enemies, and focuses on active restraint (ibid). Consequently, these aspects raises questions on wheatear Russia is really attempting to return to the Soviet times and recover the perceived lost glory. Finally, the similarity between its military strategies and Gherasimov Doctrine appears to be strong. This is because, Russia acknowledged the elements of modern conflict and thus, it attempted to include them in its deterrence policies and strategies, such as psychological warfare, propaganda, and indirect actions (ibid). In short, the General Valery Gherasimov, the Russian Chief of the

General Staff published a paper in 2013, in the Military Industrial Kurier, laying down the military strategy on war, underlining a new type of modern warfare (Politico, The Gherasimov Doctrine, 2017). In this article he briefly pointed out that non-military warfare became more important than weapons in achieving a state`s goal (ibid). The approach basically points out the importance of guerrilla warfare, including hackers, fake news, propaganda and chaos (ibid). Therefore, it is argued that this doctrine appears to be included within the Russian military strategy, since the strategy has been noticed in Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia and now in Ukraine (ibid).

Furthermore, it is also considered that Russia follows a Eurasian Empire like type of foreign policy (Vice, Aleksander Dugin Wants to See a Return to Russian Imperialism, 2014). In this respect, Aleksander Dugin, who is a key member of the United Russia party of Putin, was considered to be the brain behind the plan of Crimean annexation (ibid). Moreover, even before the Georgian war in 2008, Dugin declared its wish to see Georgia completely conquered by Russia, along with Ukraine and Crimea (ibid). This is because, being a strong supporter of Eurasianism and the founder of Russia`s Eurasia Party, his vision and therefore political outlook is based on anti-Western ideas, against liberalism and pro Russia imperialism (ibid). In short, Eurasianism developed during 1920`s within the Russian community, and attempts to seek stronger cooperation with Asia, more than with any other parts of the world (ibid). Therefore, Dugin`s vision is to create an Eurasian Empire covering all the former USSR and expanding in other Asian states as well (ibid). The idea is that by following this path, Russia would be brought back again as a strong superpower which would match the America`s influence (ibid). Moreover, Dugin believes that Russia already started this path under Putin`s rule, considering that his ideas started to be taken seriously since 2000 by the people close to Putin (ibid). Unsurprisingly, Dugin was declared persona non-grata in 2006, in Ukraine, due to his Pro Russian Imperialism stance, anti-Western ideas, and due to his Eurasian Youth Movement that has a branch in Ukraine (Kyiv Post, Vitrenko`s Flirtation with Russian "Neo-Eurasianism", 2007).

Moreover, Yevgeni Primakov, who was the foreign minister of Russia in 1996, had a foreign policy that was also based on anti-Western approaches, on "near abroad"

Russian domination, criticizing the US led unipolar international scene that threatens the democratic multipolar order (Waller, 1997). He also repeatedly argued for the CIS recognition as equal to the states of NATO, believing in the continuation of the bipolar rather than the multipolar world (ibid). Furthermore, his foreign policy was clearly denouncing the negative intentions and dangers that NATO entails (ibid). In addition, the Primakov Doctrine that envisaged ideas of returning Russia to the centre of the international arena, appeared as welll to have influenced the Russian politics, considering the Russian military campaigns in Abkhazia in 1998, Chechnya in 1999, South Osetia in 2008, and recently in Ukraine and Crimea (Daily Times, The Primakov Doctrine, 2018). This is because, in many ways, the Primakov`s clear opposition to American hegemony closely coincided with Putin`s anti-Western politics, as it was observed through their mutual disagreements with US in the cases of Iraq, Libya and Syria (Huffington Post, Yevgeny Primakov, 2016). Consequently, due to the Primakov`s strong opposition to US, and his foreign policy that coincided with Putin`s beliefs, it was considered that Primakov constituted the ideological father of Putin (ibid).

2.4. 21st Century Sovereignty and Human Rights. Hypocrisy or Responsibility?

In order to avoid these problems related with interferences, it was argued that the states should become responsible. In this respect, Francis Deng (et al, 1996, p. 1) claims that sovereignty includes a set of responsibilities, which if they are not fulfilled by states then they should be held accountable. In the case of domestic conflict, the challenge is to first create a conflict prevention framework nationally and internationally, and second is to protect the civilians whose basic human rights have been denied (ibid, p. 1). The problem is that in both sets of challenges, the state is central, but it does not always have the capacity or willingness to resolve the problems, especially when the state in question might actually be part of the conflict (ibid, p. 1). If is part of the conflict, the state becomes a barrier against the international assistance which is generally justified through state`s sovereignty (ibid). However, Deng (et al, p. 15-16) believes that the best way to guarantee a state`s sovereignty is by fulfilling its humanitarian responsibilities otherwise it will be

subjected to intervention. Finally, his ideas would contribute to what is called today "Responsibility to Protect" mission which enforces the model of responsible sovereignty.

However, challenges to sovereignty increased, especially given by the 2002 Bush Doctrine (Dresner, 2009) which reserves the right for unilateral intervention. On the other hand, Russia appears to have as well a double approach to sovereignty: a post-soviet approach in the ex-Soviet space related to limited sovereignty, and a completely Westphalian approach, based on non-interference, outside of it (Deyermond, 2016). Thus, it becomes clear that sovereignty has been challenged in many ways, but mostly by humanitarian interventions which are contradictory to non-interference rules.

2.5. The Contradictions between Sovereignty and Interventions

John Stuart Mill (as cited in Doyle, 2015, p. 26) argued that the legitimacy of an interference, along with the sovereignty principles, depend on the approval of those subjected to intervention. Additionally, an interference occurring for the purpose of self-determination, for people`s own decision of their faith, is not authentic (J.S.Mill, as cited in Doyle, 2015, p. 26-27). This is because, the act in itself cannot be true if, for example, democracy is imposed by force thus, an imposed political framework or regime does not really reflect peoples` desires (Doyle, 2015, p. 26-27). On the other hand, there are several arguments for intervention as well, such as for self-defense, humanitarian defense or countering a previous intervention (ibid, pp. 51, 96). More controversial is the case of secession as a form of national liberation when two groups contest the same territory, because is difficult to identify which and if a people is truly a different nation (ibid, p. 77).

However, until the end of the Cold War, interferences were based generally on security concerns, but at the end of it, interventions became explicitly humanitarian. Hehir (2010, p. 2) considers that the effects of globalization, of growing interconnectivity between states, created more awareness of human rights abuses all over the world (Hehir, 2010, pp. 5-6). The problem is that the term "humanitarian" has no accepted definitions. For example, Hehir, (2010, p. 12) argues that a state which defines its intervention as humanitarian, is in fact attempting to suggest that the action is legitimate, moral, justified

and not self-interested. "Humanitarian" generally refers to an altruistic act, and in this respect, the president of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) argued at UN in 1992 that humanitarian and political acts must have separate paths for the purpose of not threatening the neutrality of the first (Hehir, 2010, pp. 12-13). Later, in 2001, the ICISS did not use the concept of "humanitarian intervention" in its documents, because there was a strong opposition from different organizations regarding the potential militarization of the term "humanitarian" (Hehir, 2010, p. 13).

Humanitarian intervention has been generally described (Teson, as cited in Hehir, 2010, p. 17) as the help given by one state to the population of another one whose basic human rights are being abused. On the other hand, the Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2005) mentions that the doctrine of humanitarian interference refers to the fact that states, or international groups, can use force or threats to defend the population of a specific state from human rights deprivations, including genocide, a doctrine which is internationally disputed. However, it is mostly agreed at the international level, that this doctrine should be used in extreme humanitarian disasters, because the importance of preventing such disasters should be more important than the international rules (ibid). Finally, the ICISS (2001, p. 8) described this intervention as an action against a country or leaders, for humanitarian, or protective aims without states` approval, acting preventively and using coercion as a last resort. However, for the purpose of this thesis, humanitarian intervention will be understood as the use of force only when non-coercive means have been employed already and failed, and when strong proofs of humanitarian disaster exist (as defined within the R2P Report).

2.6. Legality and Legitimacy Debates of Sovereignty Violations

First of all, it is important to understand how low it is being created. In this respect, at the end of the First World War, many lawyers and diplomats gathered together to draft the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Meijers, 2009). Ever since that time, the international community has become more and more complex, speeding up the need for international rules between the states, which now constitute the primary creators of the law (ibid). Furthermore, within the UN Charter, there are also objectives

set related to the creation of the conditions through which justice, treaties and different agreements can be maintained, and thus the development of international law has represented a key focus within the UN (United Nations, Uphold International Law, n.d.). Nonetheless, international law is still generally created by states through their mutual consent, but it does not have a defined governing body and rather it refers to the multiple and different laws which are governing the interactions between states (HG, International Law, n.d.). Thus, without a clear governing and enforcing body, international law appears as a voluntary act and hence the power of enforcing these laws, exists only in cases in which the states agree to abide by the rules set in a specific agreement (ibid). However, the UN along with the International Court of Justice are widely recognized as the most influential organizations in overseeing international law (ibid).

Arriving at the issue of law and human rights, Hehir (2010, p. 19) argues that one of the biggest problems of humanitarian interventions is its legal status and that although there is some disagreement over it, a great number of legal scholars however see this as illegal. This illegal form does not have automatically implications for the problem related to the legitimacy of an act, as it was the case of Kosovo intervention in 1999 (Hehir, 2010, p. 19). Taking into account that the definitions include force and non-consent, and considering that non-consent violates sovereignty which is legally prohibited, then it follows that no matter what the definitions says, the act is illegal except if it is in self-defense (ibid, pp. 19-20).

The problem was that the industrial revolution gave states the capacity to destroy in higher levels, leading to arms race before WWI (ibid, p. 84). However, things would begin to change when states realized they needed some form of international institution to have its basis on globally agreed legal codes (ibid, p. 84). Such attempts were the creation of the League of Nations (1919), the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922), the International Court of Justice (1946), and finally the creation of UN which limited the use of force and outlaw war except in self-defense, or international peace threats (ibid, pp. 84-88). However, it is widely agreed that neither before, nor after the UN Charter, was there any customary international law regarding humanitarian interventions (Hehir, 2010, p. 93). In this respect, the US unilateral intervention in

Kosovo was criticized as breaching the law, and both Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions suggested that sovereignty is either redistributed or that inequality between sovereigns is being accepted (Chandler, 2006, pp. 121-122). However, the International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) agreed that there is a gap between law and intervention, and that there is a need to address the weaknesses between legitimacy and legality (ibid, p. 134). But instead of expanding the international law, the Commission was trying to find justifications for a new type of legitimacy (ibid, p. 134). Therefore, they argued that human rights interventions are located in a gray area of uncertainty between law`s expansion and moral consensus, further claiming that this gray area extends above exact laws to include flexible ideas of legitimacy (ibid, p. 134). Hence, the attempt to find a solution regarding the opposition between Western demands and international law, would mean that the proponents of law expansion would have to agree on the need of legal uncertainty (ibid, p. 135). However, if western states adopt international rules without UN resolutions and without equal application, it suggests that law can no longer curb the use of force, while interventions are legitimized based on justice (ibid, p. 154).

The problems begin once law is extended to be based on morality and that morality becomes questionable when determining whether the act was legitimate or not, as it was the case of Iraq interference in 2003 (Hehir, 2010, p. 96). However, it is also agreed by several authors that illegal humanitarian intervention which proved its ethical merits should not be punished (ibid, p. 97). Apart from these, an additional issue refers to who has the authority to interfere, and although UN is seen as having international authority, the Council however, is not widely seen as having entire legitimacy (Hehir, 2010, pp. 128-129). Nonetheless, the fact that many states are seeking the authorization of UNSC means that the Council is seen as a highly important and legitimate institution (ibid, p. 133). However, it is further claimed that the record of humanitarian interferences show two aspects: when such intervention occurs, there is a large amount of state interests; but when national interests are absent, there is a high unwillingness to act (Hehir, 2010, p. 177). Therefore, the huge amount of criticism against humanitarian interventions, and the legal weaknesses in enabling them, shows that a reform of the legal system is necessary otherwise the interferences will continue to be perceived as breaches of sovereignty.

3. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will first provide the theoretical orientation which will be based on two theories: realism, and critical theories of humanitarian interventions in general, and Responsibility to protect in particular. Additionally, the key concepts of my research and central to my thesis are the concepts of sovereignty, responsible sovereignty, and Responsibility to Protect. In this respect, I will first provide a short background of humanitarian interventions, I will then attempt to explain why they have increased at the end of the Cold War and how they contributed to the development of responsible sovereignty concept, and what was their impact on R2P development. Thus, this chapter will explain how the concept of non-interference was more or less replaced with the notion of responsibility and how this replacement fits the altruistic nature of R2P. Additionally, it will also lay out the conditions and higher principles than non-interference under which an intervention can be justified without being seen as a sovereignty breach.

I will then focus on the critical theories related to humanitarian interventions and Responsibility to Protect (R2P), in order to establish the weaknesses of this mission and the methods through which it can be used as a tool for strategic interests. Although, I believe that several humanitarian actions did serve their altruistic purposes, however a special attention will be given to how it can serve the national interests. Secondly, I will continue with several theoretical contributions to the understandings of sovereignty and morality, and explain why Realism might be better suited for the purposes of this thesis. These two types of theories will then be used in the study case that I will follow regarding the Russian intervention in Ukraine and Crimean annexation, to find out what the challenges to sovereignty were, and whether the weaknesses of R2P have been used in a realist manner. It should be mentioned that this chapter is not about placing such missions under a dark umbrella, nor about disagreeing with the true purposes on which R2P was founded, but rather is about pointing out the potential open doors for abuse which can be used in a selfish manner. By doing this, it would become easier to establish whether the study case under investigation matched an altruistic intention or not. Additionally, the purposes of this debate and contradictions that would follow are not about discouraging

the existence of this mission, but they are rather about establishing how the mission is being downgraded, and thus serving the purpose of higher development of it.

3.1. Background of Humanitarian Interventions and R2P Development.

First of all, Human rights have long been considered as extremely important and thus efforts to assert individual rights were set in many documents, such as Magna Carta in 1215, the US Bill of Rights in 1791, and the English Bill of Rights which constituted strong bases for the many agreements of today (HR Library, A Short History of Human Rights, 1993). However, these documents, when translated into policy, were actually excluding people of colour, women, and members of different ethnic, religious or political groups (ibid). These aspects in turn, also determined the oppressed people to further develop these rights in supporting the right of self-determination as well (ibid). However, due to slave trade and horrors of war, the focus was more on human rights, and with the UN establishment, these aspects started to become more important and the human rights ideas stronger (ibid). Nonetheless, the self-determination principle was also seen as an important part of human rights, however is considered that millions of people around the world are being denied this right on deciding their fate (UNGA, SHC, 2013). In this respect, it appears that states might have different interests at stake, and thus the rights of self-determination is weaker compared with human rights issues, due to either state interests, states led occupation actions, aggression, military interferences, or exploitation by foreign powers (ibid). In a similar line of words, when the Human Rights Conference took place in Vienna in 1993, many states argued that human rights constitutes a universal right, applicable in the entire world, however other nations disagreed with these statements, claiming that the human rights concept depends from one region to another (Takayuki, n.d.). Based on these aspects, it might be argued that in fact both concepts might depend from one state to another, or unfortunately according to states` interests. However, it might also be argued that human rights might entail less misunderstandings, since the focus would be explicitly on human beings. Whereas, the case of self-determination concept might lead to more confusing situations, involving human rights, but also territorial contests, and stronger external interests. Therefore, the concept appears to be unclear, especially since several debates are being held within the UNGA where it

is arguing that that the concept apparently became something of an orphan, because the people, once they have obtained their independence, self-determination appeared to have become obsolete (UNGA, SHC/3651, 2001).

However, human rights started to acquire more and more attention and thus, human rights interventions begun to constitute the legitimate break of the sovereignty principle, which became truly universal in the 20th century (Brown, 2002, p. 138). At the end of the WWII, the rule of self-determination was also encouraged within the UN (ibid, p. 142). It is interesting to note that the Cold War international system was based on a strong rule of non-interference, and that UN references to human rights were weak compared with the legitimacy of sovereignty (ibid, p. 143). Thus, it was clear that in order to witness the development of a strong human rights rule, the East-West struggles had to come to an end, and once it did, dramatic conflicts emerged, as well as stronger humanitarian norms (Brown, 2002, p. 145).

First of all, the 1990-1991 Gulf War between Iraq and US coalition ended once Iraq stepped back from Kuwait (Brown, 2002, p. 146). On the other hand, in Somalia 1991-1992, the dictator lost control over the country which led to clan warfare, famine and humanitarian tragedies (Brown, 2002, p. 147). The UN sent a humanitarian mission without the consent of the government, along with US forces, which both suffered many human losses determining a withdrawal of forces in 1994 and a return to the Somalian chaos (ibid, p. 148). Rwanda was tormented by ethnic conflict between two main groups Hutu and Tutsi, and although there was a UN monitoring force, the general who led the force and warned UN about an upcoming genocide remained with no actions, and approximately one million people were killed in the genocide in 1994 (ibid, pp. 148-149). Another tragic situation emerged after the Yugoslav Federation broke up in the 1990s which caused as well a humanitarian disaster, determining several interventions (ibid, p. 149). However, probably the most controversial case was in Serbia`s autonomous region of Kosovo, with Milosevic conducting ethnic cleansing actions (ibid, p. 150). In 1999, the NATO armed attack took place without a UN authorization which would later cause many legal versus legitimacy disputes (ibid, p. 151). Soon after Kosovo, a new humanitarian crisis would start in East Timor which was annexed by Indonesia (Hehir,

2008, pp. 53-54). East Timor represented the scene of enormous conflicts, however, long time after the conflicts begun, in 1999 Indonesia finally accepted an Australian UN-led force, which brought order (Brown, 2002, p. 151). Later, in 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, US intervened in Afghanistan on October 2001 (Hehir, 2008, p. 57). The interference was displayed in liberating and self-defense terms, along with the UN resolutions which offered some form of legitimacy (ibid, pp. 57, 59). On the other side, Russia followed a similar path in justifying its intervention in Georgia based on the terrorist threats, which was criticized by US as an excuse for interference (Reinold, 2013, p. 110-111).

Later in 2003, US with the "coalition of the willing" intervened in Iraq under the motives of nuclear weapons possession (which proved to be wrong), Al Qaeda connections and humanitarian rationale (Hehir, 2008, pp. 59-60). Another crisis which started in 2003 was the one in Sudan, where it was confirmed that the government was conducting an ethnic cleansing mission (Hehir, 2008, p. 65). It was not until 2006 that the UNSC finally authorized a strong mission, but asking for government`s approval, which constituted a step back for the newly agreed R2P for which approval is not necessary (ibid, p. 67).

3.1.1. The Interventions` Impact and the ICISS 2001 R2P Report

In the light of so many interferences, in which most of them had their basis on moral principles, the human rights started to be regarded by many scholars as being very powerful because it includes in itself three interconnected ideas: universality (universal justice), empowerment (protection of oppressed people), and human center approaches (moral values and human rights above sovereignty) (Chandler, 2006, p. 3-10). Following the tragedies in Rwanda and in the Balkans in 1990s, the former Secretary General of UN, Kofi Annan, recalled in his "Millennium Report", in 2000, the failures of the UNSC (UN, Background Information on R2P, n.d.). He further asked that if humanitarian intervention is strongly against sovereignty principles and thus, unacceptable, then how should the international community respond (ibid). Therefore, the 2001 Report on R2P, released by the ICISS, was formed in response to United Nations former Secretary General, Kofi Annan`s question (ibid).

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published a document called "The Responsibility to Protect" which had its roots from Francis Deng (1996) analysis of "sovereignty as responsibility". The ICISS (2001, p. xi) report opened with the acknowledgement of sovereignty as responsibility, embracing three types of duties: responsibility to prevent internal conflicts; duty to react in response to human rights abuses; and responsibility to rebuild the society after interference, especially if it was a military one. It was also affirmed that the failures to react in Rwanda genocide in 1994, to prevent the humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia 1995, to do more in the case of Somalia 1992-1993, along with the later "illegal but legitimate" intervention in Kosovo 1999, all contributed to the development of the R2P concept (ICISS, 2001, p. 1).

Additionally, the question is not whether there is a duty or a right to intervene, but it should solely be understood as a responsibility to protect human rights (ibid, p. 17). Thus, if a particular state is not willing or not able to respond, or is itself guilty for human rights violations, then the international community has the responsibility to take action (ibid, p. 17). Moreover, military interference should be exceptional and in cases where it was clearly proved that human rights tragedies occurred or are imminent (ibid, p. 32). Additionally, it was proposed that the veto power of the UNSC5P should not be used in cases of serious humanitarian catastrophes and when the states` national and vital interests are not affected, thus they should base their decisions on a "code of conduct" regarding these aspects (ibid, p. 51). Although, few states would say anything against the idea that sovereignty comes hand in hand with responsibility, however many states withdrew from R2P because there was a need for clarifying the concept, thus the original form was modified (Reinold, 2013, pp. 86-87).

3.1.2. The 2005 UN World Summit, 2009 R2P, and its Legal Status

The 2001 ICISS led to a UN meeting, where several of the initial requests from the original 2001 document would be either completely abandoned or modified. Several debates regarding R2P and how to best implement the norm took place within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) starting from 2005 on-words. Almost each year, a

report of the Secretary General of the UN is being released in which the importance of R2P is being acknowledged, identifying the strengths and gaps of the mission, underlining the low levels of information sharing, asking to for more cooperation, and stronger early warning mechanisms (ICRtoP, n.d.).

Thus, all states representatives attended the World Summit in New York in 2005, negotiating the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), all being suspicious regarding the US intervention in Iraq (Hehir, 2008, p. 70). Bellamy, (as cited in Hehir, 2008, p. 71) suggested that there were three important concessions made: the SC did not agree with giving up their veto rights, and legitimate interference without UN authorization was dropped; the terms for intervention was restricted to just cause (ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity); and finally, the idea that R2P would be conducted when states are unwilling or irresponsible, was changed to: states which are clearly failing, limiting the action for sovereignty breach. The importance of this mission is that it differs from humanitarian interventions which focused mainly on the use of force, while R2P underlines the urgency of diplomacy, negotiation, preventive and non-coercive actions, before any other considerations (force being the last resort), and thus emphasizes that this is not a right to intervene but a clear responsibility to protect (Adams, 2012).

In 2009, the UNGA published a report of the Secretary General, where the R2P commitments were reaffirmed and the three main pillars were clearly established (UNGA, A/63/677, 12 January, 2009, p. 1). In the first pillar was explicitly mentioned that the state has a responsibility to protect its own populations from the four main crimes: ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (ibid, p. 8). The second pillar of the report argues that the international community has a commitment to help the states which need assistance in fulfilling those responsibilities, thus international aid and capacity building are central (ibid, p. 9). Finally, the third pillar, clearly establishes that the member states of the UN have a responsibility to provide a collective answer in a situation in which a state fails to protect its population (ibid, p. 9).

It should be mentioned that the intention is not to provide a justification and legitimation of the use of military interference, but the basis of the R2P doctrine is

prevention (Global Centre for the R2P, 2015, p. 4). In addition, when it comes to the R2P legal status, it does not constitute yet a rule of customary international law however, it can definitely be seen as an international norm (ibid, p. 7). In this respect, a norm represents a standard of behavior, whereas an international norm based on conduct of states is the one which has been accepted internationally by a majority of states (ibid, p. 7). Therefore, considering that R2P has been accepted and unanimously adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit by all states constitutes a demonstration of a legitimate international norm (ibid, p. 7). Once a norm has been internationally accepted and has started to be used, it then becomes part of the broader customary international law (ibid). Although, R2P spread fast in the international community, it has just recently started to be invoked in different cases and it does not have yet the complete acceptance in a manner that would make R2P become law, thus R2P continues to develop (ibid).

3.1.3. Enabling Responsibility to Protect

In 2008-2009, a conflict would begin between Georgia and Russia, where it was alleged that the Georgian state was conducting genocidal actions against the people living in South Ossetia (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, [ICRtoP], 2008). In this respect, Russia which did not agree with the R2P (see Reinold, 2013), was now prepared to be the first to utilize it in the case of Georgia. As such, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Russia invoked the right to use R2P, justifying a military intervention in Georgia under the claim that Russian citizens must be protected (ICRtoP, 2008). However, this intervention was considered to be misapplied and R2P misrepresented, because it was not clear whether the Russians in Georgia were facing high scale threats as the ones described in the R2P document, nor was it clear whether the military response was appropriate (ibid). Furthermore, Russia was also criticized because the R2P norm was clear in stating that states have a responsibility to defend the citizens of their own territory (ibid). However, if there is a case in which a humanitarian disaster is happening outside of a specific country, then it becomes the responsibility of the entire international community to intervene in a collective mission under the United Nations (ibid). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the outcome of R2P misapplication in the Russian interference in Georgia was the 2008 Russian recognition of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia as independent states, which attracted international condemnations (CNN, 26 March, 2017).

Another crisis would take place in Libya in 2011 as a result of protests which became violent because the Gaddafi regime had a brutal response against the opposition, and thus it transformed in a civil war with the purpose of removing Gaddafi from power (Norooz, 2015, p. 26). Because the situation was becoming worse in terms of human rights violations, the UN argued that the case of Libya was a clear match for R2P, and the international community condemned Gaddafi with enormous crimes against humanity (ibid, p. 27). Consequently, the UN passed a resolution in favor of intervention, which at the beginning it was a Western states` coalition, turning into a mission under NATO (ibid, p. 28). In this case, it was considered that the mission met the legal and political backgrounds because firstly, the humanitarian disaster was recognized as a result of Gaddafi`s attacks against protestors, secondly the Arab League asked for the interference of the international community, and thirdly the UNSC gave its approval for the intervention (Isaac, 2012, p. 121). However, criticism has been raised, because it was believed that NATO expanded its UN mission for the purpose of obtaining a regime change (ibid, p. 122).

This particular example has been compared with the problems in Syria which started since 2011, a country which constitutes the ground for high levels of humanitarian atrocities. The Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is also fighting its opposition and protestors in the most brutal way, but in this case the critics are asking why a humanitarian interference occurred in the rich-oil Libya, but it was not enabled in the case of Syria (ibid, p. 122). In this respect, it is claimed that the conditions which enabled a mission in Libya are not the same with the ones in Syria (ibid, p. 122). Thus, except the fact that it is internationally acknowledged that Syria constitutes a humanitarian disaster, there was no UNSC approval of such a mission nor an Arab League call (ibid, p. 122). Although, there is no R2P approval in this case, there is however Russian backed army. Thus, it should be mentioned that Syria has a strong army that is supported by Russia, and that the Syrian president has actually expressed his wish to see the Russian troops continuing

their presence on their territory until a global power shift takes place (Neewsweek, Syria wants Russian Military to Stay until Global Power Shifts, 2018).

Finally, another R2P mission was the Russian one in Ukraine which resulted in Crimea annexation. In this case it was argued that Russia should intervene for the purpose of protecting Russian minorities` rights in Ukraine, because the country was facing protests and internal conflict, and thus a Russian unilateral intervention was justified (De Geest, 2015). The president of Russia, Putin, further provided legitimacy of the action under the claim that the former president of Ukraine, Yanukovych together with the prime-minister of Crimea asked Russia for intervening, while the latter invasion and ultimate annexation of Crimea was justified under the approval of the parliament (ibid). However, this act has been criticized as well, because it was unilateral rather than a UN collective response, and because it misrepresented and used the mission in the interest of maintaining a sphere of influence in the region (ibid).

3.2. Critical Theories of Humanitarian Interventions and R2P

3.2.1. Ethical Foreign Policy and Legitimacy without Accountability

First of all, Chandler (2006, p. 35) considers that the spheres of human rights aid through NGOs during the Cold War, set the path for more direct humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, and it helped legitimizing a foreign policy based on ethics (ibid, p. 35). Thus, it is argued that when internal issues may divide different parties, human rights encouragements have the power to keep the society united (Chandler, 2006, p. 63). Ethical policy can be a very powerful framework, because it constituted a significant resource of authority for Western leaders, being capable to project values as unifying the people (ibid, p. 63). In this respect, Mick Hume (as cited in Chandler, 2006, pp. 64-65) argued in The Times that the UK intervention in Kosovo was a way to project an image of Tony Blair based on ethical values. The same applied in the case of US`s former president Bush after 9/11, who argued that he will defend US`s ethical principles in the war against terrorism (pp. 63-64). Chandler (2006, p. 65), further claims that is easier to encourage moral values externally than internally because there are three advantages: the one who is being criticized is an external actor; powers such as US and

UK cannot really be held accountable for their external actions; and the positive results can be claimed by the states, while the negative ones can be blamed on the state who was being criticized (ibid, p. 65).

On the other hand, the success of humanitarianism is not really because of NGOs activities during the Cold War, but the success lies more in the discourses which are strong enough to offer "legitimacy without accountability" (ibid, p. 69). UN along with NGOs and state governments` responsibilities are vague, matching more of an aspirational and not an explicit responsibility of any institution which can be held accountable (ibid, p. 71). Another problem refers to the fact that accountability cannot really be accepted because there is no exact framework of guidelines which can be applied in all cases (ibid, p. 84). This aspect, of course, would lead to a generalization problem and constitutes a good thing of not having guidelines because a solution cannot be applied in all cases and expect the same results. This is why it is suggested that humanitarian decisions should be taken on a case by case framework because for some states, a military interference may be the good option, while in other cases a simple negotiation may be the best course of action (ibid, p. 84).

3.2.2. Illegal but legitimate Kosovo

First of all, the Kosovo crisis underlined the dramatic opposition between international law, UN rules, and humanitarian movements, which opened the path for the contribution in 2001 of the ICISS`s report on "Responsibility to Protect" (Hehir, 2008, p. 48). This report, although it underlined the non-interference norm, it mentioned the exceptional cases of genocide, human massacre and ethnic cleansing where action is necessary (ibid, p. 49). Having seen the Kosovo Commission adopting a pro humanitarian stance and describing the Kosovo intervention as "illegal but legitimate", along with the proposal of R2P, is important to see if optimism related to humanitarian missions prevailed afterwards (Hehir, 2008, p. 52).

Firstly, in the case of the East Timor humanitarian crisis, it was claimed that the response of the Australia led UN intervention came only after the disaster took place and was already coming to an end (Bellamy, as cited in Hehir, 2008, p. 55).On the other hand,

in the case of Afghanistan, a supplement to the legality of US interference was given by humanitarian claims to a case which was clearly connected to security concerns, and thus it signaled the beginning of abuse (Hehir, 2008, p. 59). In the case of Iraq, when no nuclear weapons were found, the humanitarian rationale was underlined which signaled the beginning of abuse (Ibid, p. 62-65). In addition, the Darfur crisis reminded about Rwanda and of the so much invoked "never again", but it also reminded the Kosovo optimism (Hehir, 2008, p. 68). However, the Western states apparently were not interested to intervene because it was not a priority, nor a national interest at stake (ibid, p. 69). In addition, as it was already mentioned, Libya intervention was criticized for serving other interests (Norooz, 2015). And lastly the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine based on humanitarian grounds were perceived as unjustified and thus, illegal (De Geest, 2015& ICRtoP, n.d.). Therefore, these criticisms suggest that optimism related to the illegality of Kosovo, but legitimate intervention, along with the ICISS Report on R2P, did not prevail but they opened a door to abuse.

3.2.3. The R2P Dependence on UNSC`s (un) Willingness

Having seen the criticism raised related to humanitarian interventions, and pessimism connected to the legitimacy of Kosovo and ICISS`s Report on R2P in 2001, it becomes important to see what changed in the new report in 2005 and what is the criticism related to the new adopted R2P. Hehir (2008, p. 73), notes that the R2P Report agreed by UN in 2005, went back to UNSC authorization, which means that at least the unilateral interference has been rejected. He further continues using Wheeler (as cited in Hehir, 2008, p. 73) affirmations that the R2P document does not respond to the question of what it can be done should UNSC cannot or is not willing to interfere for preventing a disaster, and that it also did not provide an answer for the problem of political will. In addition, UN has been severely criticized its failures, specifically for Rwanda and Darfur cited as a result not of law`s limits, but as of lack of willingness (ibid, p. 101). In addition, the suggestion of interference outside UN being legitimate made in 2001 by the ICISS and in 2005 at UN, proved to be wrong, because the Iraq 2003 case and others proved that R2P principles can be abused (ibid, p. 103). Furthermore, it appears that even the ICISS found

out that in ten interference cases, the human rights arguments have been used the most in cases where these abuses claims were the weakest (ICISS, as cited in Hehir, 2008, p. 108).

The problem is not that law restricts states` actions, but rather that states found ways of acting outside of it, because law lacks the capability of excluding interests (ibid, p. 120). However, attempting to find a legal solution does not resolve the problem in either way, because moral values entail a basic human responsibility and obligation, not a legal one. Adopting a law on humanitarianism could actually create a justification for abuse and use of force (Falk& Stromseth, as cited in Hehir, 2008, p. 135). This is why the ICISS did not approach it in legal terms, but it made an appeal to UNSC`s readiness, good will, and an agreement on a "code of conduct" (ibid, p. 121). But even this aspect is problematic because it does not prevent interests and power in the states` calculations and the code of conduct depends on states` subjective views of their own interests (ibid, p. 122).

3.2.4. Double standards, Morality of Immorality, and R2P Subjectivism

Several authors are arguing that R2P has double standards, that less powerful states are subjected to other standards than those powerful ones, or that it can even give the impression that some states are worth the trouble of protecting, more than others (Genser& Cotler, 2012). Double standards are interconnected with the selectivity problem, meaning that, as Aryeh Neier (as cited in Chandler, 2006, p. 85) argued, the Clinton administration condemned human rights abuses in states which were not economically or politically important, but refused to do the same in cases of outmost importance for US. These views are underlined by the fact that US denounced Iraq, Iran, Cuba, Serbia, Libya and North Korea, but it did not denounce similar or worse human rights violations in states of great economic and political importance such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, India, Russia, or China (ibid, p. 85).

Thus, some countries are arguing that the idea of humanitarian missions such as R2P is open to misinterpretation and abuse, with others claiming that R2P is yet another good rational justification for unwanted intervention and that the interferences of US in Iraq, and Russia in Georgia, are proofs of unwanted intervention (Genser& Cotler, 2012).

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Furthermore, Stahn (2007, p. 116) addresses the selective application issue, by claiming that the terms enabling an intervention are not clearly defined, which results in a "complementarity trap" meaning that while some states warrant the intervention, other states may not do so until there are strong humanitarian abuses proofs. It was further argued that the most alarming dimension of selectivity problem is not that countries would interfere when their national interests are threatened, but that they will interfere when those interests are threatened even if unwarranted, proved through Russia`s intervention in Georgia, where it focused on its national interests enough to overlook the fact that there were no humanitarian disasters in South Ossetia (Genser& Cotler, 2012, p. 175).

Another critique related to the double standards, claims that ethics and morality in external policy are not opposing realpolitik practices, but they rather constitute a way of acting on them (Chandler, 2006, p. 86). These strong critics believe that the states are condemned of human rights abuses because they either resist to the international economic market, or have different resources which can be exploited, or they are geo strategically important and have to be controlled (ibid, p. 87). Other authors have also argued that human rights are themselves limited, because moral values depend on the states` interests, underlining the paradox of "morality of immorality" (Allot, as cited in Chandler, 2006, p. 90).

However, the humanitarian mission of R2P is also seen by some authors to be dependent on subjective interpretations of different states. The Russian representative for example, did not even consider that R2P should be discussed in UNSC because is premature to promote this concept, whereas China claimed that R2P should be conducted in line with non-intervention principles and states` approval (Reinold, 2013, p. 59). On the other hand, US impeded R2P because it wanted it to be an option not an obligation (Reinold, 2013, p. 61-63).

Finally, the 2009 R2P Report on the three pillars and justifications for interference in the case of large scale humanitarian disasters is also criticized. Thus, it is argued that the three pillars are too restrictive, the "code of conduct" is not clear, the final decision of UNSC is problematic, and that R2P is a western idea used in its interest (ibid, pp. 120-

123). However, as several cases of interventions based on R2P received strong criticism, it becomes clear that the relevance and significance of the missions is being downgraded.

3.3. Realism on Sovereignty and Moral Values.

3.3.1. Different Theoretical Approaches to Sovereignty

First of all, the general liberal argument is that governments which are based on the respect for people`s freedom are exercising restraint and peaceful actions, an idea that was drawn from Immanuel Kant`s "Perpetual Peace" (Doyle, 1986, p. 1151). It is further maintained that the liberal states which are created on the basis of freedom, equality, human rights, private property and elected representatives, are always against wars, and that those wars which are liberal in nature are conducted only for popular reasons (Doyle, 1986, p. 1151-1160). Furthermore, liberal sovereignty may mean a country`s *capability to control* internal and external influences, and the focus is on how sovereignty is being eroded (Seay, 2007). In addition, liberalism generally connects human rights interventions with legal and moral principles, and relates sovereignty as being dependent on these aspects (Seay, 2007, p. 1-3). Thus, in a case of intervention, as long as it is happening for liberal values, is considered a legitimate breach of sovereignty. However, the problem is that liberalists are underestimating the possibility of liberal wars fought for materialist or national interests and they do not focus enough on what sovereignty is, but rather on how sovereignty may be eroded. For these reasons, I believe that liberalism cannot explain how and why a liberal war may be motivated by hidden agendas. Consequently, the theory is not suited to find out whether sovereignty has been legitimately or illegitimately breached, because for liberalists, the motives do not appear to be of crucial importance as long as an intervention has a liberal intention.

On the other hand, constructivism would argue that interests have a social constructed meaning, which derives from common ideas and norms (Wendt, 1992). From this it could be argued that states having common interests and adhering to the same norms and regulations, they are constrained in acting independently and selfishly, and thus sovereignty can be understood through the importance of norms, which may prevent states to interfere. Additionally, constructivists claim that sovereignty represents an

institution, existing under different expectations, leading to a community of mutual recognition and reciprocal permissions, to conduct their political authority of a specific territory (Wendt, 1992, p. 412). If states do not act on the basis of sovereignty norms, the sovereign identity disappears, thus the concept is based on a continuous practice accomplishment, not a fixed norm separated by practice (Wendt, 1992). Moreover, if states agree on the sovereignty norms, they will respect the others` territorial rights, and this restrain happens because part of being sovereign is that no one intervenes without "just cause" (Wendt, 1992, p. 414-415). However, constructivists are also underestimating the potential of turning norms in tools in the states` hands to obtain other interests. If states are acting on sovereignty norms that are unclear, leaving room for corruption, then sovereignty can be easily breached through the very norms that have been agreed upon.

This is where institutionalism would praise the importance of international institutions in sharing information and enabling cooperation by settling conflicts (Keohane& Martin, 1995). Thus, this would mean that states can cooperate together for a stronger capability to control internal and external activities, while the institutions would try to prevent conflict and ensure peaceful relations. Although, the institutions may be important, they may not always work according to states` expectations, and thus different organizations might be influenced by the more powerful states.

Apart from these analyses, there are also interdependence and dependence perspectives on sovereignty, which also suggests that the states are not the only important actors, that they coexist with other transnational actors, and thus sovereignty is being eroded by different phenomena which are transnational (Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 6). However, Biersteker and Weber (1996, p. 7) criticize these theories for failing to present a comprehensive model of sovereignty, and rather they make a description of how this concept is being eroded. Furthermore, Thomson (1995, p. 216) argues that interdependence theory`s major problem is that it measures sovereignty in terms of control over different types of trans-border influences. However, sovereignty is not really about control but is rather about authority, therefore the question would follow of whether or not states` authority in the decision making eroded, if political authority moved from

the states level, to institutions or non-state actors (ibid). Additionally, they are not clear about the connection between interdependence and sovereignty therefore, is one affecting the other or vice versa (ibid)? However, because of these weaknesses, Thomson (1995, p. 213) argues that a better understanding of sovereignty is in realist terms, referring to the states` capability to exercise authority in the decision making, and even in matters of war.

3.3.2. State Interests and Morality Connections with Sovereignty.

Because of contradictions between morality and domination, political thought has been split mainly between two different schools with completely opposing views regarding human nature. Thus, it becomes clear that one school believes in a moral political order, while the second school focuses on a historical precedent, where moral principles can be approximated through a balance of interests (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 3). Morgenthau (2006) considered that international politics can be analyzed by looking at interests, which does not mean that moral principles are excluded, but that there should be a difference between motives and intentions. His theory keeps the political sphere`s autonomy, but this is not to say that his theory ignores all the other standards, but rather that it subordinates them to the political field (Morgenthau, 2006). Morgenthau (2006) is arguing that states are interested in maintaining a balance of power through different policies that will stabilize the world of sovereign states. However, most realists, when analyzing sovereignty, they propose more a *responsibility* rather than *capability* or *ability* to control internal and external influences (Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001; Carr, 1946). Additionally, Morgenthau (as cited in Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 4) understood sovereignty in a legal basis, defining it as the existence of a centralized power which is exercising its authority to create and enforce laws within a specific territory. Biersteker and Weber (1996, p. 4) argue that the challenge for Morgenthau was to respond to the question of whether the international law was affecting sovereignty through legal constraints. The answer to this challenge was that the only thing which is incompatible with sovereignty is the existence of a centralized and strong framework of international law, which in fact does not exist (ibid, p. 4). Therefore, Morgenthau (ibid) claimed that state sovereignty constitutes in fact the main reason of why the international law is decentralized, ineffective and weak.

On the other hand, Carr did not really share Morgenthau`s view, arguing instead that it would be naive to believe that power over territory is permanent, and that in the end it represents no more than a useful label claimed by different states to set themselves as independent authorities (Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 5). Additionally, for the reasons enumerated in the other theories, Carr may offer a better understanding of the contradictions between morality and domination. As such, Carr (1946, p.64-68) argued that justice constitutes a right which belongs to the stronger, and that ethical standards do not exactly constitute a way of expressing absolute principles, but that they are rather "historically conditioned", the results of different interests. The existence of theories that morally discredit a state are types of purposeful thinking, establishing the interests within the vocabulary of global justice (Carr, 1946, pp. 71-73). Therefore, morality is a product of the dominating states and is understood as having a double meaning process, discrediting one state and justifying other state`s actions, applying it in the world under the cover of a universal interest (Carr, 1946, p. 73-79). These aspects reflect what is known as "the doctrine of the harmony of interests", a moral tool used by the dominating group for the purpose of justifying and maintaining their dominant status (Carr, 1946, pp. 80-82). This ultimately may result in a situation in which one state is trying to force its way into the privileged group, by appealing to nationalism and strongly opposing internationalism of the dominating powers (Carr, 1946, p. 86). Furthermore, Carr (1946, pp. 93-94) argued that once an ideal policy becomes part of an institution, it stops being an ideal and becomes a form of interest that should be terminated and replaced with a new ideal. Finally, Carr (1946, pp. 166-168) believes that actors such as US and the former British Empire identifying their interests with those of the entire world, are fatal in the analysis of international morality, because this shows the existence of a hegemonic power challenging the states who may not share the same views.

3.3.3. Sovereignty as a Result of Anarchy

Finally, contemporary neorealists, who are more or less identified as being similar with the realist tradition of Carr and Morgenthau, generally do not focus on details regarding the problematic features of sovereignty, but they are rather uniting the existence of a territory, recognition, authority, and population, into an actor, namely the sovereign

country (Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 5). Since they are concerned with the anarchic character of the international system, they become preoccupied with sovereignty generally when it sets itself as a potential institution which can manage anarchy (ibid, p. 5). Thus, Biersteker and Weber (1996, p. 5) explain the realist sovereignty in anarchical features of the international arena meaning that states are sovereign because there is no other authority above them. Therefore, for realists the state is the only actor responsible to control and exercise authority within its territory. Additionally, Waltz (1979) does not propose the idea that sovereigns can do what they want, but he rather understands sovereignty as a state which can take decisions for itself when addressing internal and external influences (Waltz, 1979). Additionally, Waltz (1979) considers that states, in an attempt to maintain the balance of power, they will form alliances to enhance the security of their own national sovereignty.

On the other hand, when looking at the problems related to humanitarian interferences, the difference between realism and liberalism more broadly, rests within their primary focus, the first on the interests of the major powers (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), whereas the second focuses on the legal principles and moral values. The problem is that realists are generally pessimistic in relation to humanitarian interferences because of potential or clear abuse, whereas the liberals consider that interventions could determine the major powers to help the people under ruthless regimes (Seay, 2007, p. 1).

However, the problems related to the general realist analyses is that the authors do not address, they ignore, or simply are not paying enough attention, to other important factors of sovereignty related to recognition, non-interference and justifications for the states` actions, or they are focusing on one dimension while ignoring the other. Additionally, as it already became clear, the interdependence linkages constitutes indeed a challenge for sovereignty in terms of control, to which realists reply that those linkages are happening exactly because of sovereign states that agreed and accepted them (Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 7). In addition, Thompson (1995) also replied that sovereignty is not about control but about authority. Although, I agree with Thompson`s perspective, I believe however that although authority comes first, control comes after,

meaning that sovereignty is not *exclusively* about control, but it does constitute an important aspect of the concept under investigation. In this respect, I suggest that all dimensions of sovereignty are important, because they are in fact dependent on one another. Thus, one author who managed to provide a more comprehensive analysis in this debate is Krasner (1999) who approached four dimensions of sovereignty, suggesting that they all depend on one another.

3.3.4. Sovereignty Still Strong or an Organized Hypocrisy?

Considering that the general liberal argument is that states` sovereignty is slowly being eroded, Krasner (1999) argues that although sovereignty is an organized hypocrisy giving the constant violations of it in the name of moral values, is still however strong and important because is the bedrock in defining the state. Thus, a striking feature of his analysis can be seen from the very beginning when he acknowledges the importance of domestic and interdependent sovereignties, as well as the challenges given by globalization, but offers far more importance to the international legal and Westphalia sovereignties in order to prove the realist point that sovereignty still holds strong.

In short, Stephen Krasner (1999, p. 4), argues that international legal sovereignty (recognition of territorial delimitations) together with the Westphalian sovereignty (non-interference) are related to legitimacy and authority, and constitute the strongest and most important dimensions of the concept. Additionally, interdependent sovereignty (which refers to control of the internal and external movements) and domestic sovereignty which includes both authority and control (the authority structures recognized in a state and the success of control) are related mainly to control (ibid, p. 10). Thus, all these four types of sovereignty together mean an "organized hypocrisy" because they have been breached in the name of higher principles (ibid). Moreover, the author acknowledges that losing the interdependent model can lead to a loss of the domestic sovereignty of control, but not the internal sovereignty of authority (Krasner, p. 10). Krasner (1999, p.12) claims that the domestic dimension is the most important question in a political analysis, asking for attention to the fact that domestic authority and control are not really related to international-legal and/or Westphalian sovereignty. If a state cannot regulate the

movements across its borders, then it cannot be claimed to have any control of what is happening within the borders (Krasner, 1999, p.13). In his opinion, if a state losses control over a certain period of time, it could cause a weakening of authority and ultimately the loss of it (ibid, p. 10). Additionally, if the exercise of control is being done effectively, or there has been an agreement on a new rule for clear instrumental motives, then this could lead to the establishment of new mechanisms of authority (ibid, p. 10).

However, realist scholars generally argue against the idea that transnational effects are eroding the sovereignty of a state, and claim instead that transnational relations are increasing because of sovereignty in the first place, since transnational actors expanded under the rule of an independent country which had an interest in accepting them (Biersteker and Weber, 1996, p. 7). Finally, considering that states have acquired new roles in the international system, they might behave according to those specific roles (in a logic of appropriateness, e.g. respecting Westphalia sovereignty), but Nils Brunsson (as cited in Krasner, 1999, p. 5) argued that states adopt in most cases, the instrumental behavior which is influenced by a "logic of expected consequences" summarized as the "organization of hypocrisy".

3.3.5. Why Realism?

Considering the contributions of these theories, I believe that they are better suited to explain how a humanitarian intervention, although illegally implemented, can still be justified in the breach of sovereignty, why it does not bring the expected results, and how norms and institutions can be turned in tools. Additionally, I believe that the question of order and control should receive more attention in the sovereignty debate. This is not only because disorder in one state can enable an intervention which may not necessarily have a humanitarian motive, but also because a powerful state that has a reason to intervene in a weaker state can create disorder and lack of control, and *then* it can justify by itself an intervention. Furthermore, I suggest that by putting all ideas together, a better realist understanding of sovereignty would be in terms of survival in a world of self-interested states (acting in a logic of foreseen consequences), defined more or less as the only authority in the international system (giving the system`s anarchical characteristic) who

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has the *responsibility* (in contrast to liberals` *ability*) to control internal and external influences and decide for itself, whereas the interdependence linkages does not constitute a threat but a manifestation of the sovereign who agreed with them in the first place.

On the other hand, the theory which morally discredits one state and justifies another state`s actions, explained by Carr (1946) appears to match to some extent the understandings of humanitarian missions. The fact that illegal humanitarian missions were enacted by both US and Russia, which are two of the main dominating powers, also matched the view of Carr (1946) that morality is held by the dominating group. If morality is being used as a tool by the dominating powers, this may also fit Carr`s "harmony of interests doctrine" (1946, p. 81). If Carr (1946) is right in arguing that states may force their way into the dominating group, by opposing internationalism and adopting nationalism, this may reflect Russia`s opposing statements against Western democratic and humanitarian interventionism, condemning the unilateral and illegitimate interventions as breach of sovereignty (2007, The Washington Post). Additionally, by intervening illegally in the case of Ukraine, under the banner of R2P, may constitute the way in which Russia is forcing its way in the dominating group (as Carr warned would happen), using a Western mission which was further transformed in a tool for territorial annexation. These ideas consequently may provide an explanation of why humanitarian missions do not necessarily reflect states` desire to self-sacrifice in the name of protecting other states` populations.

Additionally, I believe that moral principles (e.g. human rights) should not be ignored or excluded, but as Morgenthau (2006) argued they should be subordinated under the political sphere, while focusing on the analysis of states` interests. This is because as Carr (1946) claimed, an ideal (e.g. R2P) that became part of an institution is not an ideal anymore but an interest which has to be replaced by a new ideal. By also taking into consideration Waltz (1987) structuralism, his theory can further provide an understanding of how the perception of a self-help system may influence the way in which states interact with each other, and whether or not, a change in the system is what determined a stronger abuse of a humanitarian mission (e.g. Kosovo precedent). Considering that Morgenthau (2006) underlined the importance of the historical precedent, in this analysis, Kosovo may

be considered as the precedent which opened the door for abuse. However, in this thesis I will look at how a humanitarian mission can be abused, from a Russian perspective. Moreover, taking into account that this is the first time when an R2P resulted in a territorial annexation, it may be assumed that this intervention is in fact a new precedent.

Furthermore, by looking at the sovereignty analysis of Krasner (1999), where he argues that a state who does not have a minimum control of internal and external movements cannot be seen as having the domestic sovereignty of control, becomes specifically important in the analysis of Russia`s intervention in Ukraine. This is because it is important to determine whether the intervention occurred, and has been justified, because of the lack of Ukraine`s responsibility or because of its lack of control. If the loss of control can lead to a loss of authority, then this may offer an explanation for why Ukraine lost Crimea. Finally, by looking at the two ways in which states act, mentioned by Krasner (1999), it can be determined the way in which Russia took actions, in a logic of appropriateness according to its role, or in a logic of expected consequences.

4. HISTORICAL MYTHS OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE AND ASSETS OWNERSHIP

In this chapter I am going to look at how the historical myths of the Rus Land and the Cossacks are strongly connected to the statehood and national identity of both Russia and Ukraine and how they contributed to territorial contested issues, specifically regarding the beginning of the modern state of Ukraine. I will then continue by looking at how the Ukrainian state changed before and during the Cold War, but more importantly after the USSR dissolution. The end of the Cold War, since it led to the Ukrainian independence, is important for the purpose of identifying how Russia regarded Ukraine`s sovereignty. This later aspect can be explained by further underlining how the assets of the former Soviet Union were divided between Russia and Ukraine, especially the nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet division, and what were their connections with sovereignty matters. Finally, I will look at what was the importance of Crimea and how it remained a contested territorial issue based on historical national myths.

This chapter becomes strongly connected to the sovereignty debate because it will lay out the reasons why Ukraine`s sovereignty is perceived as limited and not in a standard way as the sole legitimate authority capable of governing and controlling itself without outside interference. Additionally, this investigation becomes relevant for this thesis because it might provide some explanation of the potential reasons and interests of why Russia might have been determined to deny the sovereignty of Ukraine and intervene in the internal affairs of the state, resulting in territorial annexation. Therefore, it could provide an answer to my primary and secondary questions of how historical mythologies may have influenced Russia`s perceptions about Ukraine`s sovereignty and whether or not the reasons of the later interference is related to such mythologies. Finally, if Ukraine`s sovereignty was seen as limited and if it has been denied its right to control itself, then this chapter will become strongly connected to the understandings of responsible sovereignty debate. This is because, if control is being denied or prevented, then it might mean that some other more powerful state might control it and this aspect in turn will point out a weakness in the understandings of both sovereignty as

responsibility and the mission R2P whose purpose can be abused, a matter which will be approached in the next following chapter.

4.1.   The Rus Land Historical Mythology

Several contested territorial issues exist as well as national myths about the identity of Ukraine and Russia. One of it refers to Kievan Rus, however that part of history is shared between Belarusian, Russians and Ukrainians (Wilson, 2015, p. xii). On the other hand, Ukrainian Cossacks appeared to have created a sovereign Hetmanate in 1648, but this part is contested as well and it could not provide the basis of the modern state creation (ibid). Between 1917-1920 and after the ending era of Habsburgs and Romanovs, there were several Ukrainian governments created, however they were generally supporting the rival USSR model (ibid). Thus, it appears that Ukraine`s identity had to be based and created in other people`s countries until 1991, a time considered as the beginning of statehood construction (ibid). In spite of these aspects, the state of Ukraine is still seen as weak and the statehood construction as very low established (ibid).

First of all, national origins have always been contested, starting with the Rus Land which Ihor tried to protect it in 1185 as the Kievan Rus Kingdom, a strong power in the east of Europe between the 9th and 13th centuries (Wilson, 2015, p. 1). This territorial setting covered most of today`s Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (ibid). The "Lay of Ihor`s Host" is a poem which described the fights in those times, and which disappeared until 1790s when a certain Pushkin found it (ibid, p. 1). This poem was however destroyed with Pushkin`s house during a tragedy known as the Moscow fire at the beginning of the 19th century (ibid, pp. 1-2). However, the originality of those writings was contested because apparently it did not describe but it rather evoked the tsarist ideology of the time (ibid, p. 2). In addition, there were many translations of the poem, which rendered the Rus land as the Russian land (ibid, p. 2). Several Tsarist, Soviet and even Western interpretations abused the meaning of the Rus land for the purpose of denying both the Belarusian and Ukrainians an identity (ibid, p. 2).

On the other hand, the Ukrainian interpretations claimed that Ukrainians and Russian have always followed separate historical roads (ibid). But there are two different

Ukrainian perspectives: one is that Rus constituted a land of agglomeration of peoples; the other one was that the land was simply the beginning of Ukrainian state creation called as Rus Ukraine and from where Russia emerged later (ibid). It can also be argued that all states in question are results of the Rus, a united group of people from which great differences among them begun at the end of Prince Ihor`s time (ibid). However, saying that a common identity was present at the time is not to say that all states of today are Russian, because Rus emerged before those three states, and during a period when collective identities were weak and modern states did not even exist (ibid).

Finally, the origins of these disputed interpretations refer to several factors. First factor is about the theories of unity in which case the Ihor`s poem appeared to support the ideas that Rus was a single entity because it was described as such: united against common enemies, having common system of law, common language, names and culture, which means there was an ethnic unity (ibid, pp. 4-7). Secondly, there were theories of differences, thus unity was contested by both Ukrainians and Belarusians (ibid, p. 8). In this respect, Ukrainians identified around six highly different groups of peoples arguing that the land was a federal entity of different ethnicities (ibid, pp. 8-9). Belarusians, on the other side, claimed that Rus was nothing more than a union composed of many other unions with a leader who had only limited authority, given the existent power of other assemblies and groups of militias (ibid, p. 9).

What is important is that by claiming the Rus Land as Ukrainian, provided a myth of their state`s emergence, but Wilson (2015, p. 19) argues that because of the already existing differences in 1240 within the Rus area, which grew more after the Rus fall, the creation of a real and separate Ukrainian identity in fact started to form by the 17th century. In this respect, Wilson (2015, p. 43) claims that by the end of the 14th century, the Rus land was divided among different actors, and in time the South Rus started to separate itself from the North, with the South now being identified with the name of Ruthenia, suggesting a different and separate community (ibid, p. 43). However, the Belarusians in the North, with the Ukrainians in the South, started to be collectively named as Ruthenians (ibid, p. 46). Later, in the 16th and 17th centuries, cultural revolutions begun, religious modernization programs were set, which enhanced the differences between the

North and South (ibid, p. 47). However, different actors claimed that the 1648 events (which will be discussed later) set the real differences between the beginning of Ukraine and Belarusian states (ibid, p. 47). Others argued that the Lublin Union of 1569 decisively separated the North from the South however no clear distinction was truly made until the late 19th century (ibid, pp. 47-48).

As regarding the Russians, since Ivan III (1462-1505), they have always argued to be the only sovereigns over all lands of Rus, which was many times contested as an invented tradition (ibid, p. 52). Furthermore, the idea that the land represents the mother of all cities of Russia is highly central in the historical analysis of its state origins (ibid, p. 20). Therefore, from the Russian point of view, it is believed that the Kievan Rus is the first Russian state which had a Russian population (Kohut, 1994, p. 124). Furthermore, they claim that although there was a Mongol invasion, the state survived by being centred in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as part of the Russian Empire (ibid, p. 124). In addition, even if the Southern lands of Rus (Belarus and Ukraine) were lost in the favour of external actors, the Old Russian unity should be reconstructed to include all Russian territories, even Belarus and Ukraine (ibid, p. 124). Finally, they also believed, in imperial model logic, that the Mongol invasion is the reason why Russian unity was broke and allowed later developments of separate people of Ukraine and Belarus, thus denying their claims to the Rus lands origins (ibid, p. 127).

Although, it is not the purpose here of outlining a detailed historical analysis, however this historical part is important because both Russian and Ukrainians contest the land as their own. Thus, Russians deny the Ukrainian identity and the idea of a separate state, while Ukrainians deny Russian origins from the Rus, and these problems are all results of highly different and conflicted interpretations of the past (Wilson, 2015, pp. 3-4). Therefore, it appears that these opposite views of the historical past might have influenced the way Russia perceived Ukraine`s sovereignty even after its independence. This could mean that Ukrainian sovereignty was not completely recognized by Russia. Thus, it could provide an explanation of why Russia felt it was not only a necessity but a responsibility as well to intervene in the internal affairs of the state in question in order to defend the land which historically belongs to Russia. Hence, this might constitute an

answer to my research questions of how historical mythologies influenced the way Russia perceived Ukraine`s sovereignty, apparently as limited. Finally, it could also answer the question of why Russia decided to conduct an interference apparently in order to protect what rightfully belongs to Moscow.

4.2.   The Cossacks Historical Myth

Another major stage in the conflicting politics of identity was represented by the Cossacks (Wilson, 2015, p. 58). For the Ukrainians, this stage represented the key moment of Ukrainian national revolution, which opened the path towards the Cossack Ukrainian country establishment in 1648 (ibid, p. 58). The Cossacks were known as the free people, who targeted a wield area known as nobody`s land, and established autonomy in the region from the other surrounding powers of the time (Polish, Muscovy, Ottomans, and Crimean Tatars) (ibid, p. 58). These Cossacks were people coming from both Ruthenia and Muscovy and thus it was difficult to establish what separated the North Russian Cossacks from those of the South (ibid, p. 58). Sometimes, they were in conflict with each other, while other times they were together fighting against mutual outside enemies (ibid, pp. 58-59).

Nonetheless, a great uprising was to take place in 1648 led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who was hailed as the God given gift (ibid, pp. 60-61). By 1649 he took control of large territories, set them as independent Hetmanate, and established himself as Hetman (ibid, p. 61). In spite of these aspects, the idea of Cossack statehood was unclear, because although Ukrainians like to identify the 1648 as the creation of a Cossack Ukrainian state, others argue that after 1648 there were actually three different political entities, none of which being a state with clear boundaries (ibid, p. 62).

Regardless of these facts, in terms of geopolitics the Hetman was continuously looking at both east and west potential threats, and chose an alliance with all neighbours, including with traditional enemies (ibid, pp. 63-64). One of the alliances was formed through the Pereiaslav Treaty with the Tsarist Russia in 1654 (ibid, p. 64). This treaty was described by Soviets and Russians as a reunion and not as a foreign political action (ibid, p. 64). Ukrainians on the other side saw it as a choice, a contract, and as an alliance against

mutual external threats (ibid, p. 64). Hence, this contract was considered to have been breached by the Tsarist Russia, and exposed in a 1990 cartoon with one image showing two sovereignties of the 1654 depicting Russia and Ukraine as equals, whereas the second image of the two sovereignties of 1990s shows Ukraine skinny, thus weakened by the Tsar`s destruction of the Hetmanate`s autonomy (ibid, p. 64). Considering these aspects, it is clear that the Cossacks myth worked in opposite directions, thus for Russia was about defending the integrity of the empire, while for Ukraine was about celebrating their national consciousness and protect the integrity of their territory (Kohut, 1994, p. 132).

In addition, it is also clear that although Ukrainian 17th century revolution was incomplete, never becoming fully independent, this century still set the foundations of Ukraine`s identity, maybe not on religion or ethnicity alone, but on the idea of freedom against Tsarist control, therefore a truly local culture clearly emerged at that time (Wilson, 2015, pp. 69-71). In this respect, starting from 1654 onwards, Ukrainian territories were absorbed within two different empires, the Habsburgs and the Romanovs (ibid, p. 72). The two Ukrainian territories appeared to be convergent at the beginning of the 20th century, but they still constituted different types of national identity (ibid, p. 118). Small changes begun by the end of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, which allowed a populist movement identified with the Ukrainians revolution (ibid, p. 122).

However, the attempt to create a Ukrainian state between 1917 and 1920 was seen more as a result of the national revival of the 19th century, and generally remembered as a lost revolution (ibid, p. 122). Some authors were arguing that the idea of Ukraine creation collapsed in the fights during 1917-1920, but the attempts still continued (ibid, p. 138). This is because Ukrainians were trying to modernize themselves through leadership and religion (among others) along with an Ukrainisation campaign, which took place between 1920 and 1930 (ibid, pp. 138-140).

It appears that the strongest form of national revival and modernization took place between 1917 and 1930 and that there were no any other attempts like this again. This is mainly because, once Stalin strengthened its powers in Moscow, a rapid end was brought to the Ukrainisation and modernization of Ukraine`s campaigns, with the Soviet Union

model of modernization dominating until Stalin`s death (ibid, p. 140). The Cossack`s myth as a national unifying factor which increased in 1917, appeared to slowly re-emerge after Stalin died, but was then immediately and completely banned in 1972 and apparently no other re-emergence took place until the end of the Cold War (Plokhy, 1994, pp. 157-158). Thus, despite these bans and sovietised reinterpretations of the myth, the Ukrainian historical consciousness based on this mythology emerged once again with the glasnost and perestroika, which ultimately resulted in independence in 1991 (ibid).

It is not the purpose here to pursue historical details regarding the way in which Ukraine`s campaigns of modernization and Ukrainisation took place based on the Cossack`s myth and how they were being stopped, because this would mean to go beyond the limits of this thesis. However, this investigation is made to shortly point out the central moments in which Ukraine`s national unification efforts took place and to underline the fact that these efforts were always being stopped by Russia, which negatively affected the Russian-Ukrainian relations. Therefore, in the light of these historical aspects, it becomes clear why Ukraine regards Russia with suspicion, given the experiences and interpretations of the Cossacks, the Kievan Rus, the 1917-1920 battles for independence, and Stalin`s rapid end of Ukraine`s campaigns of modernization and Ukrainisation (Kohut, 1994, p. 137). Basically, Ukraine appears to have been blocked in any attempts that could have offered the state, not necessarily independence or autonomy, but any form of separation from Russia through a distinct identity and local culture that could have differentiated the former from the later. In this respect, it becomes clear that Russian-Ukrainian relations have been greatly affected by their different perceptions and interpretations of the historical myths. This in turn, could constitute another explanation of why Russia may not perceive Ukraine`s sovereignty as completely rightful since its very identity has been contested in many occasions. Hence, this subchapter, like the previous one, could provide insights into the reasons of why Russia may have decided to intervene in Ukraine in 2014, which is part of the main research question raised in this thesis. Additionally, it could also set a potential answer to another question of how the historical mythologies influenced Russia`s perception about Ukraine`s sovereignty. In this respect, if this investigation bears any truth it might mean that the answers to the research questions are highly connected with each other. Therefore, this might mean that

the partial reasons of why Russia interfered in the internal affairs in Ukraine are based on the historical mythologies claimed by Ukraine and denied by Russia, which resulted in Russia perceiving Ukraine as having a limited form of sovereignty. However, this limited form of sovereignty might be seen as hypocritical and it does not match the understandings of responsible sovereignty and thus, an interference based on R2P may not necessarily be applicable. Finally, the reasons why I have stated "partial reasons" of Russian interference, refers to the fact that other potential interests in realist terms might have determined such actions which will be approached in the next chapters.

4.3. Post-Soviet Union Denuclearization and Sovereignty Relations

The political conditions between Russia and Ukraine started to change once the Soviet Union came to an end. Thus, it was obvious that the first set of problems in post-Soviet states` road to independence was related with the Western understandings of sovereignty, while for the centre, now Russia there was a Soviet model of a limited form of sovereignty, as it was already mentioned previously (Deyermond, 2008, p. 56). These tensions between the different understandings led to a new problem related to the assets division of the former USSR (ibid). The problem of what assets belong to which states was open for debate because in the immediate post-Soviet Union environment there was no clear successor state and thus all states had different demands with the most sensitive issue being connected to the armed forces and the nuclear arsenal (ibid, p. 57). The conflicting debates on assets represented the consequences of different sovereignty understandings in the first place (ibid, p. 56).

The discussions involved many different aspects such as legal, economical and security related issues. However, there were three central debates over the assets ownership, which are being investigated here, mainly because they were the most important and the most connected with sovereignty claims. In short, these battles over the assets ownership involved the question of nuclear weapons and the former Soviet Union Armed Forces, The Black Sea Fleet, and the statuses of Crimea and Sevastopol (ibid). Firstly, the discussions related to who would have control over the nuclear weapons and which state or states would control which parts of the Soviet Union Armed Forces were

very important points, since it was considered that having such a power would guarantee a state`s sovereignty (ibid). The second central conflicting debate over the Black Sea Fleet, which seemed irrational since it lost its importance in terms of defence at the end of the Cold War, was also significantly important for both Ukraine and Russia because it was connected to strong national identity claims (ibid). And finally, the third assets debate which became the most important of all was related to the statuses of both Crimea and Sevastopol where the Black Sea Fleet had its primary basis (ibid). The conflicting claims over who controls Crimea and Sevastopol constituted probably the strongest challenges to Ukraine`s sovereignty, mainly because Russia did not recognize the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 as being legal (ibid).

First of all, after the Soviet Union dissolution, there were suddenly four nuclear states instead of one nuclear power, thus besides the Russian Federation, another three states possessed nuclear weapons as well: Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine (ibid, p. 63). Although, the weapons have been removed from the later three states by 1996, the impact on relations between them lasted much more (ibid, p. 63). The significance of nuclear weapons served as a bargaining card, and it was clear that such a power would ensure sovereignty of the states involved (ibid, p. 64). There is a strong connection between sovereignty and nuclear weapons because it reminds the idea that a state cannot be seen as completely sovereign if it cannot defend itself against a nuclear attack, thus these weapons were seen as a marker and guarantor of independence (Deyermond, 2008, pp. 64-65).

In this respect, there were several obstacles to the denuclearization problem, one being the fact that both US and Russia (which set itself as the inheritor of the USSR) wanted to keep the bilateral agreements related to arms control treaties (such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/ START), but Ukraine was not ready to accept that (ibid, p. 66). Another problem was related to the CIS Joint Armed Forces command which was not ready to recognize the three states in question as nuclear holders (ibid).

A more confusing problem was the question of who had the authority to decide on these matters (ibid). Thus, above the existing US-Russia negotiating mechanism, there

were also bilateral and trilateral meetings between US and the other three states, resulting in the agreement on the Lisbon Protocol as an addition to the START I, and an agreement between Russia, Ukraine and US in 1994, while also placing the three states` denuclearization problems within the CIS framework (ibid, p. 67). Two additional problems were further posed regarding the economic costs of denuclearization and who had control of what forces of the disintegrated Soviet Armed Forces (ibid). Finally, these nuclear negotiations were connected to security concerns as well, thus Ukraine-Russia relations were in strong conflict over the Black Sea Fleet and Crimean peninsula ownership (ibid, p. 68).

For Ukraine, although it did not want to remain a nuclear state, it saw it as an important card in the question of sovereignty, non-interference, assets ownership on its territory, and control of the internal events (ibid). However, there were internal political divisions in Ukraine with some asking for denuclearization and others against it, because it ensured security against Russian threats with regards to the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea (ibid, p. 69). Although, Ukraine declared its decision to denuclearize, things changed in 1992 when Russia and CIS unilaterally decided to determine the future of the weapons which undermined Ukraine`s authority, cancelling the weapons` transfer until it was guaranteed that they would be destroyed (Deyermond, 2008, p. 71). This Ukrainian suspension of the transfer proved its authority and sovereignty of deciding on the weapons on its territory (ibid, p. 72). However, the transfer resumed later when it coincided with the negotiation of the three states` status in relation to START I Treaty, which again reflected opposed sovereignty models (ibid).

Thus, Russia wanted START to remain bilateral between herself and USA, but Ukraine rejected this view and asked to be treated as party to the treaty (ibid). This aspect was very challenging for the international community because it would imply that by adding three more states to the treaty, their status becomes one of a nuclear state, challenging even the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) (ibid). This issue was resolved by adding the Lisbon Protocol to START I, signed in 1992, which recognized the three countries in question as USSR successors and asking all of them to

ratify it, thus admitting their sovereignty over the nuclear weapons (ibid, pp. 72-73). In exchange for this, the three states had to ratify NPT as non-nuclear countries (ibid, p. 73).

However, the agreements did not achieve much, and thus a new issue would deteriorate the Russia-Ukraine relations. The new problem was related to the Crimean status in 1992, when Russia declared that the transfer of Crimean territory to Ukraine in 1954 was not legal, and when a year later, Russia passed a resolution setting Russian status of Sevastopol (ibid). However, tensions would downgrade once the Trilateral Agreement between Russian, USA, and Ukraine was signed in 1994 which acknowledged Ukraine`s sovereignty, guaranteed the refrain of using force, and committed the US to financially assist with the denuclearization process, which finally led to Ukraine's accession to NPT (ibid, p. 74). Ukraine`s struggles for these aspects (assets ownership) were in fact related to its demands for financial support, security guarantees and compensations, thus once these were given through the 1994 Trilateral Agreement, START I was finally ratified by Ukraine (ibid, pp. 78-79).

4.4. The Black Sea Fleet Ownership and Sovereignty Relations

The problems with ownership of the arsenal were not related only with the aspects mentioned, but also with the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. Although, the conflicting claims over the apparently uninteresting and expensive fleet appeared irrational, it has to be seen as a battle for controlling the "symbol of national identity" and for sovereignty (Deyermond, 2008, p. 101). The Black Sea Fleet which had the basis in Crimea, USSR, and Bulgaria, was a significant port of Soviet defence, but with the Cold War end, its strategic importance fell (ibid, p. 102).

However, there were three main reasons for dispute over the fleet: selling a part of it would have brought some more revenue; despite the end of the Cold War, both Ukraine and Russia saw the fleet as having geopolitical importance, thus controlling especially the fleet in Crimea was seen as a strategic asset in balancing others` powers or balancing NATO`s expansion; and finally, it had an economic importance, by serving a regional economic cooperation and representing a way of creating energy pipelines (ibid, p. 103).

Additionally, it was also seen as a symbol of national identity and reflected once again sovereignty disputes, a sovereignty which was used as commodity traded by Ukraine (and Georgia) in exchange for domestic stability or energy supplies (ibid, p. 104). Moreover, the issues related to ownership of the fleet, became strongly connected to the problems of Ukraine`s sovereignty over the territory of Crimea (ibid, p. 105). This aspect was specifically related to Crimea and Sevastopol`s statuses (ibid, p. 122). The idea of having both Russia and Ukraine using the bases in Sevastopol was rejected by Russia, and in several occasions, both states expressed their desire to see completely removed each other`s naval forces from Crimea (ibid, p. 122). Moreover, Russia argued that its fleet in Sevastopol was Russian, that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was not legal, and that Sevastopol will always be the primary base of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, which strongly challenged Ukraine`s sovereignty (ibid, p. 123).

During the entire process of conflict over the fleet, there were competing claims related to legal, financial, or historical aspects (ibid, p. 111). The problem was that from a legal point of view, different treaties were agreed and laws passed, which gave separately a legal claim to all actors involved: Russia, Ukraine, and CIS (ibid, p.112). From a financial point of view, Russia and Ukraine made several claims to have strongly financed the fleet, both arguing to be the only actors to do so which meant that both had to take back a part of the fleet in terms of financing (ibid, p. 115). Finally, as it was mentioned before, there were also historical and national identity claims, with Ukraine connecting the fleet`s formation with the Kievan Rus times predating the statehood of Ukraine as a country, while Russia connecting it with the Soviet Union, as well as with the Russian Empire times (ibid, pp. 116-117).

However, it was not until 1997 that Ukraine and Russia agreed on the Black Sea Fleet giving Ukraine 50% of it, but with 38% giving it back to Russia in the form of paying the energy debt (ibid, p. 108). Furthermore, a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the two countries which acknowledged the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other (ibid, p. 108). The situation was stable, but because of economic and corruption issues in Ukraine, the state tightened relations with Russia (ibid, p. 109).

4.5.   The Importance of Crimea

First of all, The Crimean Khanate represented one of the several remnants of the Golden Horde, a division of the Mongol Empire (All Empires, The Tatar Khanate of Crimea, 2004). Crimea constituted a part of the Golden Horde, beginning with its establishment during the 13th century (ibid). However, it rapidly transformed in a separate administrative unit, while those who ruled it obtained considerable significance in the Golden Horde political mechanisms during the fifteenth century (ibid). The Crimean Tatars continued to live in the Crimean Khanate despite many attempt to force their exile (Daily Sabah, History of Tatars in Crimean Peninsula, 2014). The Khans ruled the territory until 1478, when its integration with the Ottoman Empire begun (ibid). Nonetheless, the Crimean Khanate remained with its initial structure, as the rulers of those times continued as the autonomous leaders of their homeland (ibid). Furthermore, they were not demanded any loyalty payments to the Ottoman Empire, unlike other Ottoman lands, but were in fact rewarded for their strong cavalry, which was an integral part of the Ottomans` war mechanisms (ibid). However, their existence eroded once the Russo-Turkish agreement in 1774 took place, and Russia annexed Crimea in 1783 (ibid). Therefore, the darkest part of the Crimean Tatars` history would follow, peaking in 1944 when Stalin gave the order of a mass forced deportation from the Crimean land, known as "Surgunlik" (ibid). This exile led to approximately 240000 deaths, because of starvation and different diseases, as they were moving to the South of the Balkans where they continued to be mistreated, and to Turkey and Central Asia (Ibid). However, it is believed that this dark part of their history ended in 1989 with the disintegration of the USSR, which allowed the Crimean Tatar community to return to their homes (ibid).

After the USSR disintegration, a referendum in Ukraine had the result of 90% of the voters to support independence, and thus Russia would focus only on Crimea which had a majority of ethnic Russian population, and where the vote results were the lowest, with 54% in favour (Plokhy, 1994, p. 148). Known as the resort of the entire Union and central base of the Black Sea Fleet, Crimea is seen as Russian territory (ibid, p. 148). In fact, many Russians claim that Crimea`s transfer to Ukraine in 1954 was illegal, bringing different arguments for returning Crimea to Russia (ibid, p. 148).

In addition, Russian presence on the territory of Crimea is related to the fleet, but also to the central base of Sevastopol, known as the city of glory for Russians, which is the main justification for territorial claims of it (ibid, p. 149). This is seen as a myth which has its basis on the Crimean War (1853-1856) where it is underlined the heroism of Russian soldiers (ibid, p. 149). Furthermore, it was claimed to have defended the aggrandizements of the Empire starting from the 18th century onwards (ibid, p. 149). At the end of USSR, the myth continued to survive and be invoked to protect the interests of Russia (ibid, p. 149).

Because Sevastopol was exploited for the territorial claim, Ukraine fought back with historical arguments, claiming that history started way back, thus justifying Ukraine`s integrity with the Cossack mythology, already mentioned above (ibid, pp. 149-150). Nonetheless, it is generally argued by Russia that Khrushchev gave Crimea in 1954 as a gift to Ukraine while he was certainly drunk (Wilson, 2014, p. 99). However, the idea that Crimea is forever Russian, is argued by Wilson (2014, p. 99) as being a non-sense. Putin, in his speech of victory in March 2014 (after the territorial annexation), argued that Crimea was always part of Russia, as the basis of culture and civilization, that unifies Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, the place which keeps the graves of Russia`s soldiers who brought the land back to the Empire, which hold the Sevastopol fortress, and constituted the birthplace and basis of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia (Wilson, 2014, p. 99).

However, Wilson (2014, p. 100) argues that the strongest claim to the land is held by the Crimean Tatars. This is because the empire of Russia annexed Crimea in 1783, but it became Russian territory only from the times of the Crimean war (1853-1856) until 1917, and again between 1945 and 1954 (between 1921 and 1945 it represented a separated Soviet Republic), thus the Russian claims are false (ibid). Wilson (2014, p. 100) argues that Crimea was part of Russia for 73 years, becoming then Ukrainian for 60 years from 1954 to 2014, and thus the numbers of years are not that different. However, before all of this, the land belonged for 400 years to the Crimean Tatars (ibid).

After 1991 however, it should be mentioned that ethnic Russians in Crimea constituted a majority, and that the land became a republic at the end of a held referendum,

mentioning that they wish to be a subject of the USSR (ibid, p. 105). This wish became irrelevant when the Soviet Union disintegrated, although Crimea supported the preservation of the Union with around 87% of the votes in the 1991 referendum (ibid, p. 105). However, the Crimean Autonomous Republic continued to be part of Ukraine, and once Ukraine became independent Crimea joined it through a referendum held in all Ukraine, with the positive vote in Crimea of 54% (ibid).

In the 1990s, Crimea was well known for its strong hold of local mafia and related wars, but in 1995 the mafia groups were switching towards political affairs, trying to obtain money from privatization of local land businesses (ibid). The main enthusiastic group of people who wanted the Kiev rule, were the Crimean Tatars who in 1999 agreed on the establishment of a Tatar Council of Representatives to be attached to Ukraine`s president for the purpose of improving the Crimean Tatars` lives, although this representative authority in a parallel manner did not appear to be normal from a sovereignty related aspect (ibid, p. 106-106).

However, the later president of Ukraine, Yushchenko neglected the Crimean Tatars problems, and because of that, local gangsters re-emerged, and businesses were connected to mafia and politics (ibid, pp. 106-107). With all the corruption in place and ethnic division, Crimea was always the worst governed place of Ukraine, and although many predicted troubles, few would expect such a Russian land annexation, but with this being said, anyone who desired to cause problems had enough material to do so (ibid, p. 107).

These last three subchapters referring to the assets division, mainly between Russia and Ukraine were not just simply connected to sovereignty claims, but it appeared that the conflicting debates over assets ownership started because of different understandings of sovereignty in the first place. Considering that Russia was already denying Ukraine`s national identity and sovereignty based on historical mythologies, it became clear why Russia considered itself as the sole and true sovereign successor state of the former USSR. Therefore, it was only natural for Russia to claim ownership over the all assets involved in the discussions, such as nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet

and the status of Crimea. In short, the nuclear debate was won by Russia, the Crimean question was won by Ukraine, and the Black Sea Fleet constituted a common ground for a mutual understanding on a fair split. But although, Russia lost the Crimean debate, it did not mean that the complete recognition of Crimea as part of Ukraine was acquired in Moscow`s perception. That is mainly because Russia brought strong arguments, both historical and legal, with which it hoped to regain Crimea which was strategically important for Moscow. In this respect, the question of Crimea appeared to be a very sensitive issue for Russia that constituted a reason of why Russia continued to perceive Ukraine as having a limited type of sovereignty.

Furthermore, the entire chapter becomes relevant for the understandings of sovereignty. First, it appears that Ukraine has fought to establish its sovereignty based on historical mythologies. Secondly, it has fought in the question of assets ownership for the same reasons, but more importantly for the wish of controlling the internal matters without outside interference. As it was explained previously, Ukraine did not really want to remain a nuclear state, but it saw it as an important card in establishing its authority, sovereignty and right to control its internal affairs in relation to Russia. Thus, this chapter suggests that Ukraine was struggling for obtaining control over its territory however, by denying all its rights, Russia perceived it as having a limited form of sovereignty, hence not as having complete control over its internal affairs. Although, the dimension of responsibility is extremely important in the sovereignty debate, the aspect of control becomes also very relevant, because without control, a state cannot take full responsibility of what is happening within its borders.

It is important to note the significance of these events in the analysis of Russia and Ukraine relations and the perception of Ukraine`s sovereignty according to Russia`s claims. This investigation becomes very important in connection with the main research question of this thesis of why Russia decided to intervene in Ukraine and annex exactly the territory which has been the most debatable and contested issue by Moscow. The answer might be related with the fact that Russia appeared to have contested all of the Ukrainian historical myths, denied its separate identity, claimed to be the only true successor independent state of the former USSR, and declined in all occasions the right

of Ukraine to any of the assets involved in the ownership debate. Therefore, by perceiving Ukraine as having a limited type of sovereignty, and by denying its historical, political and legal rights, Russia might have considered as having a responsibility to intervene in a country that was historically part of USSR, which would in turn offer a legal excuse for the interference and annex the territory of such importance for Russia. Finally, this aspect would suggest that one of the central claims of this thesis might be true, that is the fact that the limited form of sovereignty is hypocritical if the control over internal affairs is denied and the non-interference rule is broken in the name of other higher principles such as human rights. It should be mentioned here that humanitarian missions are not considered as negative actions, however if such interferences are manifested due to other hidden agendas that states might have, then this would suggest that humanitarian missions suffer from a weakness which is used by states to fulfil they own potential interests which would be in line with the realist claims. Therefore, this chapter and the following one become relevant in relation to the theoretical and conceptual framework in which I intent to find out if the responsibility dimension of sovereignty is more important than the control dimension of it, if there is any connection between moral values and state interests and if humanitarian missions are used to disguise the true intentions and interests of states under the legitimate human rights curtains in the name of responsible sovereignty.

5.   UKRAINE`S POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

In this following chapter I am going to focus on the political developments of Ukraine since its independence, in an attempt to identify what changed and what were the factors which contributed to the Colour Revolution of 2004. I will then continue by looking at how the politics of the Ukrainian state changed over time, whether or not Russia influenced its political environment and decision making, and what were the causes that led to the Maidan Protests in 2013. Finally, I will close the chapter by presenting the background of the Russian interference in Ukraine, the reasons why it decided to follow this path and how the Crimean territory was annexed to Russia.

This chapter will become very relevant in relation to the concept of sovereignty, the consequences of perceiving Ukraine`s sovereignty as limited, and how this limitation becomes hypocritical. Moreover, this investigation will help establish if the concept of responsible sovereignty is more significant than the control dimension of it. This is important because if a state`s right to control is not recognized and respected, then a stronger actor could interfere, create the conditions for a humanitarian abuse, and prevent the targeted state from controlling the internal affairs and take responsibility for the situation. Moreover, if a targeted country is considered as having a limited type of sovereignty, then the state which created the conditions for a humanitarian abuse might claim to have the responsibility to intervene under the R2P mission. Therefore, the idea of responsible sovereignty and R2P become weak in the case of less powerful states. Additionally, the concept of limited sovereignty might become a form of hypocrisy because the non-interference rule might be placed before other higher principles such as human rights.

More importantly it becomes to find out if such interventions in the internal affairs of other countries are altruistic, or they are being abused and used to hide other national interests. Thus, in the next chapter I intent to find out if a humanitarian missions such as R2P could be used to legitimize an interference and hide other national interests which trigger the intervention in the first place. By pursuing this path, I intent to also find out if

there is any connection between state interests and moral values according to the realist theories, and if R2P mission suffers from a weakness which is used to abuse its real intentions, as per the critical theories of R2P and humanitarian interventions.

5.1. Political background of Ukraine Since its Independence

Many Ukrainians saw their independence with their first elected president Kravchuk as their sole rescue from the Soviet Russia (Bilinsky, 1994, p. 171). However, many economic and diplomatic problems brought the country to its limits, but not only Ukraine was to be blamed for it, because Russia`s aggressive economic and political acts as well as diplomatic isolation pushed Ukraine to those limits (ibid, p. 171).

On the other hand, Kuchma who took office in 1994 brought some form of economic stabilization (Wilson, 2015, p. 311). But in 1999, Ukraine was economically blocked and Kuchma was forced to assign Viktor Yushchenko as a prime minister (Wilson, 2014, p. 43). His second term between 1999-2004 marked high corruption given several scandals such as the Gongadze journalist`s death with claims of Kuchma being involved, or being responsible for it (Wilson, 2015, p. 311).

These factors were very damaging, isolating Ukraine from the West, but on the other side, Russia`s Putin became the best friend of Kuchma, exploiting Ukraine`s damage to exert influence (ibid, p. 312). These aspects led to a protest called "Ukraine without Kuchma" between 2000 and 2001, but with no strong effects (ibid, p. 312). It should be mentioned that the protestors at the time in 2000 were disappointed with the reformist government in place and the prime-minister Viktor Yushchenko for the lack of support and who were focusing on economic reforms rather than political ones (ibid). Thus, Yushchenko decided to assign Yulia Timoshenko as Deputy Prime Minister, and together they focused on the economic and energy sector reforms which brought an economic recovery (ibid, pp. 312-313).

5.2. The Color Revolution of 2004

Although, Kuchma survived, he could not change the constitution in his benefit of running for a third term in 2004 (Wilson, 2014, p. 43). In this respect, the strongest

clan of Donbas in Ukraine imposed Yanukovych as prime minister in 2002, and as a candidate for presidential elections in 2004, whereas the opposition was uniting along Yushchenko (ibid). Yanukovych was considered to fight dirty, with economic support from Russia and so-called political technologists known as being involved in arranging elections, distracting the attention from corruption issues, hacking in the voting counts, paying demonstrators against opposition, and pitching Eastern Ukraine against Western Ukraine, but nonetheless the opposition was prepared for the fraud (Wilson, 2014, p. 44).

Thus, in November 2004, the Orange Revolution begun after some news showed that the presidential victory of Yanukovych was a result of vote rigging the elections (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). These protests were led by the opposition candidate Yushchenko, which had great results considering that the Supreme Court cancelled the presidential results (ibid). Things started to change at the beginning of the 21st century, with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine seen as the starting point of distancing from Russia and coming closer to NATO and EU (Deyermond, 2008, p. 109).

In short, it should be stated that Colour or Orange Revolutions are generally known as the democratic uprisings and protests in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, which created a feeling of threat and panic among Russians relating these revolutions with foreign interventions (Wilson, 2014, p. 34). In addition, Colour Revolutions have been identified by Russia as regime change externally sponsored acts, specifically by the West, and defined them as threats and non-military warfare (Bouchet, 2016, pp. 1-2).

In the light of these political conditions, one month later, in a rerun of the election, Yushchenko wins and Yanukovych resigns as prime-minister (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). On the other hand, Russia was supporting Viktor Yanukovych for presidential campaign of 2004, because he was more Russia oriented, but when the opposition leader Yushchenko won, the problems started again because the first thing Ukraine did was to reject the Russian fleet presence on the territory of Ukraine, further arguing that the agreement set on this matter will not be renewed after its expiration in 2017 (Deyermond, 2008, p. 109).

This dispute escalated in 2006 when first, Ukraine took over the Light House of Yalta claimed initially by both Ukraine and Russia as agreed in 1997, and second when protests begun in Crimea when US was preparing its ships towards Crimea for mutual military drills (ibid, p. 110). These aspects triggered the Ukrainian decision to expel those people, foreigners, and generally Russian, who were being involved in the Crimean protests (ibid).

In addition to these issues, in 2006 Putin declared that the Russian Fleet in Crimea could be good for maintaining stability in the region, and protect Ukraine from external interventions, to which Ukraine replied that it has the capacity to defend itself alone (ibid, p. 111), thus reaffirming its sovereignty. These disputes along with Russia`s desire to maintain a military presence in what it calls as "near abroad" have started to be seen as a response to NATO expansion, increased US military presence in the former USSR area, and the pro-Western political orientation of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia following the path of Colour Revolutions (ibid, p. 147).

However, regardless of the strong stance of Ukraine, Yushchenko had political mistakes and the people started to look at Timoshenko who really wanted a change (Wilson, 2014, pp. 45-46). But considering that she was a prime minister during the 2008 economic crisis, having no clear exit strategy, and that Yushchenko exploited these aspects, her voters were discouraged (Wilson, 2014, pp. 48-49). Two years later, in 2010, the streets of Kiev were filled with Yanukovych supporters who were apparently paid, thus the message was clear that he was not about to accept defeat again, as in 2004 (ibid, p. 49). However, he finally won the presidential elections, while his rival Timoshenko was jailed for abuse of power (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014).

5.3.   The Maidan protests of 2013

The problems reappeared when in 2013, Yanukovych and his team decided to abandon an agreement with the EU regarding strengthening their trading ties, and sought instead to follow stronger cooperation with Russia which led to new protests (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). The protests which begun in November 2013, as a result to a governmental decision to cancel the Association Agreement with EU, are known as the

Euromaidan (Wilson, 2014, p. 66). However, it was also reported that the Maidan protests that took place in Ukraine could have been part of a larger US coup d`etat (Modern Diplomacy, The 2015 Coup D`etat and the Ukrainian Crisis, 2016). This is because it was argued that US might have used its sponsored NGOs for the purpose of starting and supporting protests on the streets, once Ukraine refused the offer of strengthening its ties with EU (ibid). Nonetheless, the manifestations that took place in Kiev Square in 2004 are known as the Original Maidan, but apparently in 2013 when the protestors gathered in frustration regarding the governmental decision, had actually no plan for a Maidan two (Wilson, 2014, p. 66). Wilson (2014, pp. 73-74) saw based on the results of several research surveys that the protestors were more male, from small cities and regions, that the number of people from Kiev dropped (from 50, to 19, to 12%), while the number of outsiders increased (from 50, to 81, to 88%), and that the Maidan meeting was becoming the Maidan fortress.

Later, Putin offers a deal to Yanukovych, accepting to buy $15 billion from the debt of Ukraine and lower the gas supplies prices from Russia by a third (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). Right after this financial aid, one of the former political technologists of Russia, Gelman, joked about Maidan through a tweet on social networks, claiming that the installation of Maidan was successfully sold for $15 billion as the most valuable piece of art (Wilson, 2014, p. 74).

However, the protestors did not stop and thus, they used information related strategies to make public all crimes of the regime, exposing their wealth, their guilt and violence, patrolling the streets and setting cars in flames, which infuriated Yanukovych (ibid, p. 75). By 2014, the protests would become a revolution, increasing because of anti-protests laws (which were later cancelled), the regime`s increasing brutality and violence, and because of no negotiation results, which made the protestors become more militant, whereas the regime more violent (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014; Wilson, 2014, p. 86).

5.4. Russian Intervention in Ukraine and Crimean Operation

At that time, some authors believed that the Crimean operation was well planned before the initial takeover given the fact that the 2008 Georgia intervention was pre planned in a similar manner (Wilson, 2014, p. 108). It is further argued that it took only 60 man armed to take power in Crimea on 27th of February, with the government changing under gun point, a resolution to secede at gunpoint, plus a referendum (ibid, p. 105). It was reported that masked man, volunteers, Russian political technologists to recruit protestors, Secret Service Russian Units, special forces, and Russian ships with a thousand men landing on Crimea, were all involved in the Crimean coup (ibid, pp. 110-111).

What followed was that Yanukovych fled the country on 22nd of February, with an arrest warrant issued on him, pro Russia armed men took control of Crimea capital`s buildings, and unidentified men wearing combat suits were present at Crimea`s airports (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). Later, on 1st of March, the Parliament of Russia authorized Putin`s decision to utilize force in Ukraine for the purpose of defending Russian interest (ibid).

Throughout the months, the secession referendum of Crimea to join Russia was apparently supported by 97% of the votes, condemned by the West as fraud however Putin signs a decision to annex Crimea, and pro-Russian separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk affirm their independence, although the referendums were not recognized (ibid). After the held referendum, Putin declared that within the total population of Crimea of approximately two million people, the Crimean Tatars which make about 290.000-300.000 people, appear to also agree with joining Russia, as the referendum held has proved (BBC News, Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin Speech Annotated, 2014). Although, Putin admitted that the Crimean Tatars have been treated unfairly during the USSR times, he also reminded that in fact all the people suffered greatly, mainly Russians (ibid). Additionally, he also declared that it is necessary to pursue all the political and legislative paths in order to reinforce the Crimean Tatars` rights (ibid). However, recent reports stated that the Russian authorities that are present in Crimea have actually

strengthened the persecution of the Tatar population with the apparent goal of silencing their reported disagreements with the annexation (Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 2017). Apparently, the Crimean Tatars who constitutes a Muslim ethnic minority, are openly opposing the Russian annexation of Crimea (ibid). Although, the Russian majority ethnic group in Crimea may have agreed with the intervention, the Crimean Tatars have clearly not (Al Jazeera, How Crimean Tatars Deft Moscow`s Pressures, 2018). The reason of their disagreement appears to be related with their collective memories related to the Russian rule (Al Jazeera, How Crimean Tatars Deft Moscow`s Pressures, 2018). Thus, as it was mentioned, there are two bitter memories, one related to the Khanate of Crimea being conquered by the Russian Empire in 1783, and the other one related to their deportation in 1944 based on claims of their connection with the Nazis (ibid). And although, they were allowed to return to their homeland after the USSR dissolution, they did not really recover their property, and they still continued to be discriminated (ibid). Then, the Russian annexation took place, and as a Crimean Solidarity Group activist argued, they were seen as "traitors" in 1944 and as "terrorists" today (ibid). Thus, as a consequence, they are apparently described as extremists, and under these pretexts they are being subjected to intimidation, threats and physical attacks (Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 2017). Therefore, the Russian president`s statements related to the protection of the Tatar community, does not really match the current conditions.

However, later in May, Ukraine elects a new president, Petro Poroshenko, followed by a reduction in the use of force by Russia, Western sanctions against Russia, an agreement between Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels in Minsk to cease fire, and a withdrawal of Russian military troops from the East of Ukraine (Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC News, 2014). But nonethelss, the situation in Ukraine is still precarious, with Crimea remaining annexed to the Russian state.

Finally, it should be stated that Russia has been accused of conducting what is called a "hybrid warfare" strategy in Ukraine, which is primarily based on non-military means (Chivvis, 2017, p. 1). The main characteristic of this strategy is that is population-focused, having the objectives to conquer territory without resorting to military force, but

creating later a reason for military action, and influence the politics and policies of targeted countries (ibid, pp. 2-3). In short, it generally includes a combination of propaganda, psychological operations, intimidation, deceptive campaigns and terror, among others, while if the military force is used, this is done in secret (Jagello, 2015, p. 8). In this respect, Jagello (2015, p. 11) found out that all the actions that took place in Ukraine until Crimea`s annexation constituted a clear cut strategy of hybrid warfare, whereas the actions since then are not very clear.

5.5.   Pre-Planned Operation of Crimea

Throughout the situation in Ukraine, it should be mentioned that initially Ukraine accused Russia of sending troops to Crimea and attempting to provoke Ukraine in a military conflict (BBC News, 2014). Furthermore, it was argued that several helicopters and armed vehicles were seen in Crimea, as well as armed people wearing unidentified army uniforms suspected of working with Russia, who started to invade the parliament of Crimea, several telecommunications centres and state television centre (ibid). These acts were further seen by Ukraine as military aggressions and invasion of Crimea (Saul, 2014).

Regardless of these accusations, Russia denied having any involvement in the situation, attempting to seize Crimea, or spreading a separatist feeling in the region (Reuters, 2014). Putin also declared that it had no intention to pursue a military intervention in Ukraine and no plans for a special intervention in the region (The Washington Post, Putin Denies Russian Troops are in Ukraine, 2015). In addition, it was claimed that the local forces are for self-defence purposes and they have the responsibility to take control of the official buildings (Reuters, 2014). Furthermore, Putin claimed that anything Russia did was part of a humanitarian mission, having the purpose to defend the Russian ethnic minorities in Crimea and that there is no intention of annexing Crimea (Chappell& Memmott, 2014). Moreover, Putin argued that the troops in Crimea constitute local militia groups (Sputnik, 2014).

What is more important is the fact that the Black Sea Fleet of Russia has its bases in Crimea through a bilateral agreement which authorises the deployment of around 25,000 troops of Russia at the bases of the fleet, however Russia denied any involvement

of these troops in the Crimean conflict (ibid). Finally, when asked more about the possible Crimea annexation, Putin argued that the population of Crimea will decide on this matter and therefore a referendum on the status of Crimea was announced (ibid).

However, later Putin admitted that Russian military specialists were present in East of Ukraine, but insisted that they were not the same with the general Russian troops (Walker, 2015). Moreover, although the unidentified men called as "little green men" were denied by Russia during the Crimean annexation as having any connections with Moscow, it was later admitted that they were Russian soldiers (ibid).

What is more surprising is the fact that Putin even admitted to have planned and ordered the Crimean annexation several weeks before the scheduled referendum regarding Crimea`s self-determination (BBC, 2015). The decision to absorbed Crimea within Russia that took place on 18[th] of March 2014, was apparently taken after a secret opinion pools results which shown that around 80% of Crimea`s population were supporting the idea of joining Russia (ibid). Thus, on 16th of March when apparently 97% of Crimea`s voters accepted to join Russia, two days later Putin signs a legal document to annex Crimea to Russia (ibid). More surprisingly was that a prominent Russian politician, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, has actually made the proposition to divide Ukraine altogether, and suggested to other countries (such as Romania, Poland, and Hungary) to also hold referendums on absorbing western territorial parts of Ukraine (Reuters, Russian Politician Proposes New Divisions of Ukraine, 2014). Zhirinovsky, who constitutes the deputy speaker within the Duma and whose nationalist Liberal Democratic party maintains a minority within the parliament, strongly supports president Putin in the Russian Parliament (ibid). Although, his party represents only a minority, however his ideas and nationalistic language started to resonate with a considerable high part of the population of Russia and with the Kremlin`s increasing pro-nationalistic ideas (ibid). Therefore, it should not come as a surprise the fact that Zhirinovsky, like Putin, refers to the Soviet past. Thus, Zhirinovsky has actually argued that it is never too late to modify and correct the errors of history, and attempt a new division of Ukraine in the lines of the Soviet-Nazi Germany agreement (ibid).

Regardless of these affirmations, Russia claimed that its intervention in Crimea was based on human rights protection, and not on other historical past errors related interests, however other authors beg to differ. In this respect, Treisman (2016) argued that there are three different potential reasons for this decision: one refers to the fact that the Crimean operation constituted a response to the threats given by Western expansion through NATO, which might have led to Ukraine joining NATO and evict the Black Sea Fleet of Russia from Sevastopol. The second one described Putin as an imperialist, trying to regain former Soviet Union territories by expanding the borders of Russia, because Putin never accepted losing the Russian prestige at the end of the Cold War (ibid). Finally, the third interpretation argues that the operation was an improvisation because it has not been expected for the pro Russia Ukrainian president Yanukovych to fall, and thus the Crimean occupation was an impulsive act (ibid). However, it is difficult to argue which motives played more in the decision of Russia to intervene in Ukraine, but nonetheless the idea that the interference was based on humanitarian reasons remains strongly disputed.

5.6.   Russia`s Legal Justifications

First of all, it has been added by the Russian president that the precedent of Kosovo has been accepted as legitimate, thus Crimea should be accepted as legitimate as well (BBC News, Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin Speech Annotated, 2014). Although, these statements with regards to Kosovo might be valid, they are also pointing out towards the double standards of Russia. This is because, Russia (along China) vetoed the Kosovo intervention in 1999, considering it as an aggression (The New York Times, Russia's Veto Diplomacy, 2012). However, now Russia appears to use this very precedent in order to create an excuse for its own interference. Finally, it can also be observed the Russia stance on Ukraine`s attempt of joining a Western type of organization. This is because Putin made it very clear that it would not accept a NATO base within Crimea, in Sevastopol, in the very city of military glory of Russia, as Putin described it (ibid).

As regarding the legality of acts, Russia claimed that it had a legal right under the international law to defend its people abroad (Marxsen, 2014, p. 372). This justification

was further explained as protecting the ethnic Russian minorities in Ukraine, followed by the Russian Council`s claims that the lives of Russian citizens are under great danger, as well as the military at the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, thus authorizing Russia`s use of force in Ukraine (ibid).

However, Marxsen (2014, p. 372) found out that this argument is part of a larger one based on self-defence, under UN Charter, which needs proofs of armed conflict between states. Therefore, in international law it is not clear if this argument holds for Russia`s explanation as well, in which self-defence can be enabled when the nationals of one country on the territory of another are under armed attack (ibid).

On the other hand, in order for this exception to be legal enabled it has to be proved that the citizens of one country are in real danger, that the state in question (Ukraine) is unwilling or not capable to protect them, and that no other options are left (ibid, p. 374). However, Russia never provided any strong proofs that these violations occurred, nor had a justification for protecting the Russian minority, because an R2P measure needed the approval of SC, but in the absence of strong humanitarian disasters, there was no legal room for intervention in these bases (ibid).

Finally, a more important legal argument, in Russia`s favour was brought by the idea of interference through invitation (ibid). It was argued that after Yanukovych fled Ukraine he signed a letter inviting Russia to interfere as a countermeasure against the nationalists Maidan protesters` takeover (ibid). Russia argued that although Yanukovych was removed from office, this act was not in line with Ukraine's constitution, and thus he was to be seen as the legitimate president, although Yanukovych regretted later his letter (ibid, p. 375).

However, Marxsen (2014, p. 379) claims that when Yanukovych fled Ukraine, he already lost control of internal support and of police and military forces. Secondly, his legitimacy was weak considering the parliament spoke against him (ibid, p. 379). Thirdly, Russian interference did not really have the purpose of re-establishing Yanukovych government, but it rather followed other interests directed at setting the environment for future secession (ibid).

Therefore, the Russian legal claims based on the former president`s invitation does not hold either, thus the Russian acts represent violations of Ukraine's sovereignty (ibid). It further represents a violation of the legal agreements between Russia and Ukraine regarding sovereignty and non-use of force, such as the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership (ibid, pp. 370-371).

In addition, as regarding the legality of Crimea`s secession from Ukraine, the very holding of referendum on Crimea was illegal according to Ukraine's constitution which affirms Ukraine as a "unitary state" and renders Ukraine`s territory as 'indivisible and inviolable" (ibid, p. 380). Furthermore, Crimea is set as part of Ukraine, and although it has the autonomous status and rights for referendum, these are however limited to local issues, thus a territorial change needs a referendum being hold in all Ukraine (ibid, pp. 380-381). In addition, the referendum`s freedom needs to be guaranteed and requires the absence of military forces which have not been guaranteed (ibid, p. 381).

More controversial was the fact that a referendum needs to have one question with two options of answering, either yes or no (ibid, pp. 381-382). However, Crimea was given two questions with the option of choosing one of them, but none of them included a version of maintaining Crimea`s status quo, but rather both of them were about restoring Crimea`s status as part of Ukraine or joining Russia (ibid, p. 382). Considering that the referendum was considered illegal and relied on Russian illegal interference, the later declaration of independence becomes illegal as well (ibid, p. 384).

What is interesting is that Russia justified the Crimea secession by referring to the case of Kosovo, which underlined the consequences of using exceptions in accepted international norms (ibid, p. 387). Furthermore, Putin made sure to send the message that Western states are using double standards in analysing states` actions (ibid, p. 388). The problem is that the Western states used exceptions which at least served their interests, and hence Russia attempted to do the same (ibid, p. 389).

Although, the Crimean operation does not hold a detailed legal analysis, Putin used prior legal practice through the Kosovo precedent, for which the Western states hold some

responsibility (ibid). Therefore, after the Crimean annexation, Putin in his remarks mentioned the global domination of a single power, suggesting the existence of abuses (Myers& Barry, 2014). Here it should also be reminded that before Russia intervened in Georgia 2008, Putin made a similar speech during the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, expressing its condemnations of uncontrolled use of force and military means, downgrading international norms (Washington Post, 2017).

6.   CONCLUSIONS

6.1.   Was Ukraine`s sovereignty challenged by its interdependent dimension?

First of all, considering that we currently live in an interdependent world, where states` actions depend on one another, the absolute version of sovereignty does not hold in todays` international relations. However, this is not to say that sovereignty lost its meaning, since the fact that the states agree with certain international treaties, rules, laws, and join different international organizations, constitute an expression of states` sovereignty in the first place. Therefore, the states are not coerced to pursue different courses of actions, which are against their own interests, although there might have been cases in which states might be pressured by different circumstances to take decisions which do not always work in their benefit. In addition, the fact that the main five powers of the UNSC have certain privileges certainly challenges the sovereignty of the others, but then again if all states would have veto rights, then we might turn towards a world of absolute sovereigns.

In this respect, it becomes difficult to explain what type of sovereignty Ukraine holds. However, it can be argued that Ukraine had both the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, because the authority and legitimacy to govern the state internally and externally in relations with others, was recognized internationally since its independence in 1991, including by Russia. However, the exception of the interdependent dimension clearly marked the country`s capability to defend itself from, and control, internal and external pressures, since it has not been able to control, stop, or prevent the intrusion of Russian "little green men". But this is not to say that Ukraine has never been

independent due to Russia`s influence. That independence could have been remained intact should Ukraine have known its weaknesses and strengths.

But on the other hand, the fact that the state wanted to take a certain foreign policy decision (e.g.: strengthening its ties with the EU) represents a declaration of sovereignty which Russia had to respect. Therefore, in order not to specifically and publically deny Ukraine`s sovereignty, what Russia apparently did was to use the interdependent character of sovereignty as a weakness against the Ukrainian state. The loss control of internal and external influences made the country appear as "irresponsible", and it appears that Russia might have been behind the irresponsibility that followed, which in turn gave Russia a green card to intervene. Thus, the intervention was *justified* under the banner of human rights abuses and not under the practice of limited sovereignty.

6.2.   How historical mythologies influenced sovereignty perceptions?

Based on the analysis of Russia-Ukraine historical mythologies and territorial contested issues since the Rus Land, the Cossacks, and up until the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, it became clear that the main country which does not fully recognized Ukraine`s identity, and hence independence, has been Russia, which although it officially recognised it, there were certain events that made Russia reconsider its statements.

In this respect, the fact that Russia expressed its condemnation of NATO`s expansion, and Colour Revolutions as foreign supported regime changes and described them as non-military warfare threats, it became clear that Russia was deciding on not to regard Ukraine as the state with whom it traditionally agreed on international legal treaties. This is because the Colour Revolution in Ukraine was leading to a Western model of state which is not recognized by Russia.

In this context, the historical mythologies and political developments served the purposes of further underlining the fact that Ukraine does not have a clear identity, that it has always been part of Russia, and that Crimea has been illegally given to Ukraine, thus arguing against Ukraine`s sovereignty. In addition, the mythologies which denied Ukraine`s identity and sovereignty might have further served as an excuse to potentially

subject the country to an interference. In this respect, historical justifications were challenges against Ukraine on top of the already existing interdependent character of sovereignty which was exploited by Russia to further justify an intervention. Therefore, both dimensions counted in Russia`s calculations.

6.3.   Is limited sovereignty a hypocritical organization?

These historical statements should have mattered more in Ukraine`s calculations, especially since Russia appears to view Ukraine`s sovereignty as limited, based on the Brezhnev Doctrine, which subjects the country to potential interference, under the form of support against what Russia considers external threats. Additionally, considering that some authors already pointed out that Russia is adopting an old model of Soviet sovereignty based on the Brezhnev Doctrine, and that Soviet practices continue even today between Russia and the former USSR space, it can be argued even more that Ukraine had limited sovereignty in the eyes of Moscow.

Hence, by interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine and by annexing a part of its contested territory, namely Crimea, it can be concluded that the limited sovereignty model fits the concept of sovereignty as a hypocritical organization. This is because, according to Russia, the intervention took place under humanitarian motives, meaning that sovereignty was breached under the name of higher values such as human rights. However, considering that Russia later admitted that the interference was pre planned, and taking into account that no strong humanitarian proofs existed to justify the intervention under the R2P rationale, which made the action illegitimate and illegal, points towards the idea that Ukraine`s sovereignty as a hypocritical organization went to higher levels.

Hence, the sense in the case of Ukraine is that its sovereignty has been breached in the name of what Russia considered as higher values, its own national interests as far more important than Ukrainian ones. It is true that the Russian intervention was based on humanitarian reasons, but strong proofs were missing. Therefore, if Russia believe it important to interfere for the purpose of countering a Colour Revolution, or blocking Ukraine to strengthen its ties with EU, or preventing NATO expansion in the states which

are traditionally important for Russia, then these aspects might appear as far more important for Moscow than sovereignty itself, which makes the entire scenario a hypocritical organization.

6.4. Why and How Russia breached Ukraine`s sovereignty?

As it became clear from the chapters on humanitarian interventions, the purposes of these missions have been severely criticized as either taking place when states interests are at play, or not being enabled given the lack of those interests but where strong proofs of humanitarian disasters exist as it was the case of Rwanda. In this case, Kosovo served as a precedent in which an international intervention based on human rights (but also on security concerns) took place without the explicit authorization of UNSC. This intervention was criticized by some, but supported by many as illegal but necessary and thus legitimate, given the proofs of human rights violations.

These contradictions between sovereignty and human rights have constituted one of the biggest challenges of international law. Given this contradiction, the weaknesses of law, the opened doors for abuse, the Rwanda failure and the illegal but necessary intervention in Kosovo, the international community agreed on adopting the Responsibility to Protect mission. This mission was supposed to be enabled when clear proofs of humanitarian disasters exist and when the UNSC gives explicit authorization to do so. In addition, the mission was based on the new understanding of responsible type of sovereignty, meaning that states which do not or cannot protect its own citizens, an international action must take place to legally defend them. However, R2P has also been criticized for not being clear enough under what circumstances can be enabled, and for depending on the willingness of the UNSC which may have interests in either intervening when there are no clear proofs of human rights violations, or blocking the intervention when it can jeopardize their interests, and such cases did occur as it was already shown.

In this context, Russia was one of the states to disagree even with the adoption of such a mission which was considered as premature, and in general it disagreed with western type of humanitarian interferences. However, Russia was now one of the states to follow this action in Ukraine, justifying its intervention based on Russian ethnic

minorities' protection and Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, the breach of Ukraine`s sovereignty was justified on the basis that strong human rights violations exist and that Russia has a responsibility to intervene and defend its nationals.

First of all, based on the political developments in Ukraine, it is suggested that the pro Russia oriented leader Yanukovych was influenced by Russia to cancel the Ukraine-EU Trade Deal which might have strengthened the relations between the two and lead to a potential EU membership. This scenario might have been against what Russia perceives as countries traditionally important to it, but also against its main interest to keep maintaining its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea`s Sevastopol Base (considering that the leader before Yanukovych, the first things he did when he became president was to announce its intention of cancelling the renewing of the treaty on maintaining Russian troops for protection purposes).

It should be mentioned that the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea appears to be of extreme importance for Russia either for economic and geopolitical reasons, however it is not the purpose here to explain in details the importance of it as it was already mentioned in previous chapters. What is important is to remind that Russia could not have given up on the Black Sea Fleet not only because of the geopolitical and economic reasons, but also because by holding the fleet at Sevastopol`s bases might represent an indirect statement of denying sovereignty to Ukraine and thus this indicates the potential reasons why Russia later annexed Crimea. However, this also suggests that it might have been the main reason why Ukraine wanted initially to renounce on renewing the treaty concerning the fleet, in order to restate its sovereignty in relation to Russia.

However, considering the decision to cancel the Trade Deal, the protests in Ukraine started as against this action, thus expressing their desire to follow a European path. However, based on the analyses and news gathered, it appears that these protests transformed in an all-revolution, but those involved were not only Ukrainian citizens but also Russian political technologists which were responsible with spreading misinformation, propaganda, and chaos. What followed were unidentified men wearing

army suits being present in Crimea`s airports and military bases which Russia initially denied having any connections with them.

The situation that followed was described by some authors as a hybrid warfare strategy, a combination of non-military means such as spreading misinformation, chaos and intimidation with the purpose of changing or influencing the decision making in the targeted country. In this respect Crimea was identified as a clear cut hybrid strategy, and all the problems on the ground in fact helped Russia justify a humanitarian intervention based on R2P terms.

But was this intervention legal? The information gathered clearly shows both sides of the intervention`s story. On one hand, Russia had two main legal justifications: one based on defending ethnic Russian minorities living in the territory of another country, and the second one based on the principle of intervention through invitation from the former Ukrainian president Yanukovych.

As it was already shown, the first one did not hold for three main reasons: one refers to the fact that there were no clear proofs of humanitarian disasters which could have enabled an international response; the second one is based on the legal idea that a state can defend its citizens within its own territory but it is not clear if this holds for defending the citizens placed in a different country; and finally the third one refers to the fact that such a response could not have been enabled just by one actor alone, but with the approval of UNSC for a coalition of states to intervene.

On the other hand, the second legal justification based on intervention through invitation did not appear to hold either because at the time of invitation, the Ukrainian president lost control of its country and fled, lost support from its people and from the Parliament, and therefore it is suggested that he did not have the legitimacy nor the authority to make such an invitation. In this respect, these legal justifications are not strong enough to make the intervention truly legal, but it certainly helped making it appear like it is.

Probably, the most important legal justification that Russia indirectly used, was the threatening conditions on the ground in Ukraine, protests which transformed in revolution and escalated in a dangerous conflict. In this respect, it is important to mention that humanitarian interventions were in some cases criticized for causing more harm than good (such as the Libyan case), and Russia was certainly one of the critics of such interventions. Whether or not previous interventions had stronger legal arguments it is not the concern of this thesis.

However, it is important to remind the fact that Russia criticized such Western led interventions based on legal exceptions, because what Russia appeared to have been doing in Ukraine was to create a similar excuse based on a legal exception, namely the fact that it is not clear whether or not a country can act in self-defence to protect its citizens, not on its territory (which is legal), but within the territory of another country (which is unclear from a legal point of view, and becomes a small legal exception).

Whether this exception is legal or illegal is not the purpose here, thus this aspect requires legal research which is beyond the purposes of this thesis. However, what it becomes now important is to understand what exactly caused the conflicted situation on the ground in Ukraine, in order to understand how this served the purposes of Russia and whether or not Russia was the state responsible for the situation in the first place.

6.5. Ukraine: An Organized Dis-control Scenario?

First of all, it should be reminded that the new understanding of sovereignty in today`s international relations are based on what other authors claimed as responsibility. Therefore, the state is the only actor responsible for the protecting its citizens and preventing their rights to be seriously violated. However, should the state be unwilling or it simply does not have the necessary capabilities to defend its population, then an international intervention based on humanitarian reasons can be enabled.

These understandings of responsible sovereignty constituted the main basis for the adoption of Responsibility to Protect mission which can be enabled if its fits the agreed conditions, mainly to provide clear proofs of humanitarian disasters such as

genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, and to obtain the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, in order to obtain a justification for interference in Ukraine, the basic condition of providing proofs of strong human rights violations must be met.

However, the second condition of obtaining the authorization of UNSC might not have been extremely important in Russia`s calculations considering that other such interventions occurred already without such approvals, thus providing already the precedent. Hence, the most important condition remains the one related with humanitarian needs. In this respect, based on the information gathered, it appears that Russia calculated every step that it needed to take in order to create the perfect conditions on the ground in Ukraine for the purpose of justifying later a potential interference.

First of all, Russia has been accused in many occasions of conducting a hybrid warfare strategy in Ukraine, meaning that its intention was to spread misinformation, create panic and intimidate the population and the politicians with the purpose of influencing their decision making, and thus preventing them from taking clear actions to defend their country. Secondly, the 'little green men", the unidentified military men which initially Russia denied having any connection with them, were send by Moscow as it admitted so later. These armed men contributed to the escalation of the conflict by further spreading panic among the population.

The reasons why Russia did not initially admit having any connection with the armed men was that by admitting it would have become clear that a state is illegally intervening within another state, thus breaching its sovereignty which could have triggered a stronger Ukrainian response to defend itself. However, by not admitting the Russian connections, basically the armed men were identified as non-state actors and thus Ukraine could not defend itself as it "did not know" against whom it had to defend, nor the international community could have taken any actions against a non-state actor. Although, both Ukraine and the international community suspected Russia of being involved, they were left with no options of doing anything about it, because whatever

actions they would have taken against Russia it would have been considered as illegal since there was no strong proof of Russian involvement.

This is also the reason for why Russia opted for a hybrid warfare strategy because it is not the same with a normal war, the military style involving two or more states which can be held accountable for their actions. Therefore, the most important point of hybrid strategy type of warfare is that it includes a combination of actions (propaganda, targeting the population by spreading panic and intimidation etc.) which are not considered illegal from an international law point of view, and the actor of this strategy is generally unknown, thus no one can be held accountable.

Furthermore, what weakened Ukraine was the fact that its interdependent dimension of sovereignty truly marked its capabilities to defend itself. This is because it could not fully control the internal and external influences, because should Ukraine had more power to control especially what was crossing its borders, then the "little green men" should never had been present in Crimea, and probably the internal conflict would not had escalated in such a manner.

Moreover, the armed men creating havoc in Crimea, along with the psychological warfare targeting the population and spreading panic, got out of control and Ukraine proved once again that it did not have the necessary means to calm and deescalate the situation. Thus, the situation on the ground suggests that Russia conducted a successful organized dis-control scenario. However, this is not to say that Ukraine`s sovereignty did not matter, because if it did not, then Russia would have intervened straightforward without resorting to such warfare strategies.

But nonetheless, the exception of interdependent sovereignty truly marked Ukraine`s capabilities to control and defend itself. Although, this idea suggests that control might become more important than responsibility, however, this does not mean that states should move towards a sovereignty based on stronger control, but it certainly might suggest that states should increase their security capabilities, especially the ones concerning the borders protection in order to avoid external actors entering the state and creating havoc.

6.6. Does R2P fit the framework of Organized Dis-control?

What this Russian strategy proved was that although responsibility is important in a state preserving its sovereignty, control might become an equally important dimension in states` calculations. This is because, if the states do not have strong security mechanisms, and they cannot control what crosses their borders, then other states could create the perfect conditions to create internal conflict, contributing with the necessary means to escalate it, leading to human rights violations, panicking and intimidating the state, preventing it to take strong actions to defend itself, following state "irresponsibility".

However, the Ukrainian lack of responsibility was not due to its unwillingness or to its absence of capabilities per se, because as it was shown, Russia appeared to have prevented Ukraine to take the necessary measures to defend itself and its citizens. This is because a small state like Ukraine which has within its sovereignty imbedded the interdependent character, could not compete with one of the five main powers of the UNSC which in the end remains a legally established form of hegemony as it was previously shown. This also suggests that although sovereignty is still important in today`s international relations, the rules simply does not apply equally for all and some states are simply stronger than others and ready to use their power in order to fulfil their national interests.

Therefore, what this Ukrainian scenario proves is that a state which does not have enough capabilities to control the internal and external influences across its borders, another more powerful state could create the necessary conditions on the ground which can lead to apparent "irresponsibility" of the state to protect its citizens, and later provide the perfect justifications for an interference based on the conditions set through the Responsibility to Protect.

In addition, it further proves that R2P has many weaknesses which can be used as tools by other states. This is because R2P can fit the scenario of organized dis-control as it appears to be shown through the case of Ukraine and the actions employed by Russia. Therefore, if this scenario is set in place carefully by other actors which have a hidden

agenda to intervene, then an R2P can be justified since it meets the conditions set, regardless of how those conditions came to be and whether or not the entire scenario holds a thorough legal analysis.

Furthermore, these ideas also suggest that the Responsibility to Protect Mission turned in a two sided coin. Hence, one side appears to represent the curtain of human rights which helps legitimizing an intervention, whereas the other side represents the national interests which make the intervention to happen, making the state to decisively intervene even illegally. Therefore, considering that there is room for corruption within the R2P, a humanitarian crisis scenario was created in Ukraine and this creation appears to have been motivated by national interests. However, considering that it is difficult to prove that Russia clearly had national interests at stake, another door is open which can legitimize the entire R2P intervention, leaving the international community with no options for holding Russia accountable for its actions.

Moreover, considering that Kosovo was used as a precedent for such actions, it can be assumed that Crimea annexation was a result of such illegal but at the same time legitimate interference. However, taking into account that a humanitarian mission in Kosovo resulted in independence, whereas the Responsibility to Protect in Ukraine resulted for the first time in a territorial annexation, suggests that Crimea is in fact a new precedent which opened a new door for further abuse of R2P. This in turn, further downgraded the purposes and values on which R2P was based upon.

6.7. Did Russia acted in logic of foreseen consequences?

Considering that several multilateral and bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia related to territorial integrity, sovereignty, recognition, and non-interference, have been violated by Russia suggests that it did not act according to its role, its commitments, and legal obligations, but it rather acted in logic of foreseen consequences, meaning that it pursued its self-interested objectives.

Giving the analyses of the political developments and the background information regarding the Russian invasion of Crimea, it appears that the main reason has been to

divide the country in order to prevent the most debated territory of Crimea to become part of a Western type of organization. By dividing Ukraine, thus separating Crimea from it, it has lost a part of its sovereignty, and by losing it, it has also lost partially its potential chances to join EU and/or NATO. This loss of chance of joining an international Western type of organization is not only because of Ukraine`s loss, but also because through the Crimean annexation, Russia made a clear political statement, that it strongly disagrees with Ukraine`s path towards Western organizations which would probably want to avoid any future armed conflicts.

Taking into account that Russia denounced Colour Revolutions as threats, declaring that it will take actions to defend its Russian ethnic minorities, might suggest that a logic of appropriateness might have prevailed, thus acting according to its role as a defender of its own citizens. However, the lack of strong evidence of humanitarian disasters in Ukraine coupled with the decisions to overlook Ukraine`s intention of strengthening its trading ties with EU suggests the opposite that Russia acted in a logic of expected consequences, especially since Russia has denounced in many occasions its disagreement with Western led organizations.

In this respect, it is not the first time when Russia made such statements, as it was mentioned, in 2007 Moscow already expressed its condemnations of Western states` decisions to intervene either directly or indirectly in the politics of different countries without their explicit consent, nor with Russia`s acceptance, which would lead to the downgrading of international law. These Russian political statements served as potential warnings against such practices. However, the fact that Russia decided to take on the same path might suggest that it did not do so only to fulfil its own interests of preventing former Soviet Union territories from joining international organizations, but also to underline the fact that other states can follow the same practices which could create chaos in law.

6.8. Was Responsibility to Protect transformed in a Responsibility to Control?

However, considering that the interdependent dimension of sovereignty is related to states` lack of capability to control internal and external influences, and taking into

account that this weakness can be exploited by powerful states to create the conditions which increase this lack of control of the targeted state, setting the state`s irresponsibility in motion and serving as clear justifications for an Responsibility to Protect, it can be argued that this mission in the case of Russia was applied in the form of Responsibility to Control, rather than protect. This is because in the case of Ukraine, the problem was not about unwillingness to protect, nor about its inability to take responsibility, but it was about its inability to control the situation on the ground, and therefore, the organized dis-control induced by Russia and the lack of Ukrainian control fit the framework of a rather different mission which does not yet exist but it being practiced, namely a mission based on Responsibility to Control.

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