

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE:
TIME OR THOUGHT AND THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF
BEING IN HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY

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
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
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ABSTRACT

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The subject matter of this thesis is to analyse how the classical conception of identity, Parmenides' dictum asserting the identity of being and thought, has been changed into the union of being and time in hermeneutic ontology. Throughout the thesis we have discussed the problem of transcendence and the question of the unity of being both in Greek and in hermeneutic philosophy. We have argued that Kant's transcendental philosophy has an essential significance for the question of the unity of being and also for the turn in the understanding of the principle of identity.

Keywords: Being, Thought, Time, Unity of Being, Transcendence

ÖZ

AŞKINLIK PROBLEMİ:
ZAMAN YA DA DÜŞÜNCE VE HERMENEUTİK ONTOLOJİDE
VARLIĞIN BİRLİĞİ SORUNU

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Bu çalışmada klasik metafiziğin temel önermesi olan Parmenidesin varlık ve düşüncenin özdeşliği ilkesinin hermeneutik ontolojide nasıl varlık ve zamanın birliğine dönüştüğünü araştırdık. Tezimizde, aşkınlık ve varlığın birliği problemini klasik ve hermeutik ontojide inceledik. Kant'ın transcendental felsefesinin, varlığın birliği kavramı ve klasik özdeşlik ilkesinin değişmesinde önemli bir yer tuttuğunu tartıştık.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık, Düşünce, Zaman, Varlığın Birliği, Aşkınlık

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Parmenides said 'one cannot think of what is not'; - we are the other extreme and say 'what can be thought of must certainly be a fiction'.

Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, section 539.

Parmenides' dictum that being and thought are the same is the basic ground of Western metaphysical thinking. The other dictum that determines the nature of Western metaphysics comes from Parmenides as well; being is the one and a unity. For him, being is timeless, unchangeable and indivisible.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, argues that his aim is to 'understand' the meaning of being in terms of time "as the possible horizon for any understanding of whatsoever of being."¹ Ever since Parmenides, identity of being and thought, that is, the principle of identity, is the basic ground of metaphysics, but Heidegger replaces thought by time so as to understand

being. He no longer uses being and thought together, but being and time, since he asserts that we can understand the meaning of being in terms of time. In other words, for the understanding of being, 'thought' has been replaced by 'time' to the contrary of classical thinking. Therefore, our main problematic is to elucidate how such a radical and profound change in Western metaphysics has taken place.

We will try to answer the above question in terms of the other declaration of Parmenides, i.e., the unity of being. This will lead us to ask how the unity of the being in hermeneutic ontology is seized within the conception of being grounded on temporality. To put in differently, we will clarify the main opposition between classic ontology and hermeneutic ontology through the question of the unity of being. We will focus on the problem of transcendence and its relation to the principle of identity, i.e.; the basic principle of thinking which is the ground of metaphysics since Parmenides.² In short, first, we will ask how the essential relation of being and thought have been transformed into the relation of being and time, in spite of the fact that, for Greeks, being is beyond temporality and is to be understood in terms of thought. And then, we will analyse this question in terms of the question of the unity of being and its relation to the problem of transcendence.

In classical thinking, it is supposed that there is a naïve correlation between thinking and being, that is, *nous*, the apparatus of thinking has the

mental vision of those real beings. Contemplation, *theoria*, from this point of view has no relation to the practical world. Therefore, the spheres of *theoria* and *praxis* are incommensurable in their very nature and man in terms of contemplative thinking is to be seen as receptive of the eternal being, that is, the being beyond temporal and practical world.

Both in Greek and Medieval philosophy being is understood as transcendent and the unity of being has been viewed in the thing itself, i.e., without depending on human consciousness and human being. But, in Kant's philosophy, being is understood as a subjective-logical predicate. The identity of thought and being, in classical thinking, was taken in absolute sense. We will argue that since Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and his transcendental philosophy such an absolute identity between being and thinking has been redefined on the ground of subject and relative to subjective sphere, Kant argues that;

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely a positing of a thing, of a certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement.³

For Kant, the unity of being is to be found just in the unity of the transcendental synthesis of the subject, in other words, in the unity of the synthetic apperception. The unity of the subject as the original unity of the synthetic apperception is the ground of being.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that according to Aristotle, although being is a unity and the oneness of being has a transcendental character, he is not able to explain the unity of being, since, for Aristotle, being can also be expressed in manifold ways.⁴ Heidegger criticises Kant's view of being as well as studied in *Critique of Pure Reason*, because the question of being must be studied in the widest sense of the concept of being. The fundamental task of ontology is not to study some or definite areas of being, but being in general. Kant's study is restricted only to the concept of being pertaining to nature, Heidegger argues that "his transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject matter of that area of Being called 'Nature'".⁵

We will argue that, according to Heidegger, the unity of the being is to be searched in phenomenological-hermeneutical analysis of Dasein. What he calls fundamental ontology is a first philosophy, where one finds the meaning of being in terms of Dasein's disclosure of being; phenomenological truth, disclosing of being, is essentially *veritas transcendentalis*.⁶ Besides, Dasein has a temporal being; the meaning of being is inherently temporal.

For Heidegger, the meaning of the Dasein's being is time, which makes possible the metaphysical continuity of the self. Temporality is itself the self-unifying ecstatic unity, hence the unity of being is to be found only in the unity of care-structure (the ontological constituents of the unity) and in the ecstatic unity of temporality (the temporal constituents of the unity) based on

Dasein's being. Therefore, according to Heidegger's interpretation, transcendence has a temporal meaning as well as an ontological one.

In his analysis of the transcendental character of Dasein, Heidegger asserts that Dasein, as the being-in-the-world, constitutes the worldhood of the world, which is the meaning of the being of the Dasein and of the transcendence. For Heidegger, human being is in the essence a transcendental subject in ontological sense; that is, man is a being whose essence is transcendence toward world and toward whatever is in this world. Therefore, the meaning of transcendence is constituted in the factual and temporal world, thus, in the world of experience and the conception of transcendence in phenomenological hermeneutics is understood in terms of the finitude and the temporality of human being.

According to Heidegger, time is the meaning of being of Dasein as ecstatic unity and the unity of being is to be found in the temporal unity of Dasein. In other words, being is neither a real predicate, as in the case of Aristotle, nor a logical copula, as in the case of Kant. However, being as a unity has a temporal meaning, the origin of which is the unity of the care-structure and the ecstatic unity of the temporality that is essentially transcendental.

We will maintain that in hermeneutic ontology, following Kant, the unity of being is supposed to be in the subjective realm. For Early Heidegger,

the unity of being is to be seized in the unity of care-structure and consequently in the ecstatic unity of temporality. For Later Heidegger, i.e., after *Kehre*, it is understood through the language where the presencing of being gathered in a unified harmony. Heidegger interprets Greek *logos* as *Versammlung*, as harmonised unity of being and language, i.e., being and thinking belong to each other. Following Heidegger, Gadamer interprets the unity of being in the speculative unity of the language.

We will argue that both Husserl and Heidegger have followed Kant in the transcendental conception of being. Husserl, who projects phenomenology as first philosophy, through the transcendental analysis of ego criticises Platonic conception of essences and the traditional-naïve supposition of the relation between subject and object, i.e., the relation between being and thought.⁷ To Husserl's mind, phenomenology aims to study the encounters between consciousness and the world. For phenomenology, the world only ever is encountered as already constituted by and within consciousness. Therefore, consciousness, -intentionality-, has a priority in constituting the world, in this sense, the subject is transcendental by giving to the world its meaning and validity. Although, for Kant and Husserl, transcendental philosophy has an epistemological meaning, Heidegger provides a new insight for the concept of transcendental and transforms its meaning into the ontological realm in *Being and Time*.

Levinas, who also comes from phenomenological–hermeneutical tradition, reconceptualises the problem of transcendence in terms of freedom as an ethical question, for him transcendence means going beyond being and essence, and the problem of transcendence precedes ontology. Because, metaphysics means passing over to being's other and to go to otherwise than being.

We understand Kant's philosophy as the beginning of transcendental philosophy; that is, he places man and human reason into the centre of metaphysical problems through the Copernican Revolution thereby giving the problem of transcendence a new direction. For Kant, the question of being and unity of being must be searched within the problem of transcendentality. He defines metaphysics as a mistress, to whom after quarrel we go back again and again, in his famous words;

...human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is not also able to answer.⁸

The battlefield of these endless controversies is metaphysics. In this line, he criticises the notion of pure reason, i.e., the classical uncriticised concept of reason, and the being-thought relation born out of the very nature of it. Kant calls his transcendental philosophy as Copernican Revolution. Since he believes that human being, that is, the transcendental subject, bestows to the objects their unity in terms of the transcendental synthesis. If we are to say it

metaphorically, Kant replaces Plato's sun, -which transcends the worldly entities and in terms of which those entities are and being known, - by the human being as the transcendental being. As Fell argues, "the attitude of post-Kantian German thought to Kant is much the like the attitude of post-Parmenidean thought to Parmenides."⁹ Heidegger speaks of the *lichtung* of being, Gadamer as well argues that the theory of hermeneutics is based on the metaphysics of light. Therefore, we will argue that after Kant's Copernican Revolution, the metaphysical light no longer comes from the sun of Plato, but from the transcendental human being.

Western philosophy has most often been an ontology, says Levinas, that is, we can consider the whole history of philosophy as an attempt for the comprehension of being.¹⁰ In early Greek, Aristotle has defined metaphysics as the quest for being qua being. Since that time metaphysics has been understood as the branch of philosophical reflection which deals with what there really is, specifically with the categories of being and reality. For Aristotle, metaphysics is essentially theoretical.¹¹ Philosophical wisdom, *sophia*, is the contemplation, *theoria*, and the knowledge, *episteme*, of the being as being.¹² One's knowledge of something could be qualified as *episteme* only when one could give an account of the thing which traced back to certain principles, *archai*, or causes, *aitiai*. Likewise, for Plato, *episteme* is the knowledge of the true being, i.e., *eidos*, beyond temporal and phenomenal

world. True being is something permanent, unchangeable and eternal, in order to have genuine knowledge one must know the permanent and the unchangeable essence of things.

Both for Aristotle and Plato, the knowledge of being is essentially theoretical, thus beyond experience and temporality. The true being is eternal, which transcends the world of experience and time, and being is a real predicate or a property. To the contrary of the classical thinking, in hermeneutical-phenomenological ontology the notion of transcendence is towards the temporal and practical world.

In this context, the main opposition between classical ontology and phenomenological - hermeneutical ontology is to be considered in their understanding of being. In phenomenological hermeneutics, metaphysics is based on the temporal and practical world, that is, on the finitude of human being, therefore the paradigm of thinking is not *theoria* but *phronesis*, practical reasoning. On the other hand, the classical thinking understood as *theoria* is nonhumanistic and nonanthropocentric, since man himself is subjected to the cosmic harmony and man finds its true nature, i.e., *eudaimonia*, by contemplating eternal beings, which are beyond temporal and phenomenal world.

We can summarise the main assumptions of classical thinking as the following:

- 1) Being is a real predicate and the unity of being consists in the entity itself and there is an absolute identity between thought and being, i.e., principle of identity, which is the ground of thinking.
- 2) Philosophical wisdom, *sophia*, consists in contemplation, i.e., *theoria*, of eternal beings in terms of the vision of the *nous*.
- 3) Since ideas or essences are beyond temporal world, contemplation bears no relation to temporal and practical world.
- 4) Human beings do not take any constitutive part in the very being of the beings, hence in ontology.
- 5) Metaphysics is essentially theoretical; practical and theoretical worlds are incommensurable.

Furthermore, we have to take into account Descartes' philosophy as a radical departure from the classical route of philosophy. We will argue that hermeneutic ontology actually has a Cartesian notion of ground. Since, firstly, Kant's transcendental subject stems from Cartesian doctrine of subject; secondly, Husserl understands his transcendental phenomenology in terms of Cartesian subjective ground, accordingly Heideggerian notion of ground based on Dasein's clearing of being has Cartesian-subjective remnants as it depends on the notion of ground based on subjectivity.¹³

Clearly, the study of being in phenomenological hermeneutics is carried out in terms of phronetical analysis of human being - for Heidegger, in

terms of Dasein, for Gadamer, in terms of language and tradition. But, for Aristotle, the study of being, that is, first philosophy, must be grounded on *theoria*, since man is not the best thing in the world. He discusses the question of *sophia*, philosophical wisdom, by comparing *theoria* with *phronesis*, in the book VI of *Nichomean Ethics* and asserts that;

Wisdom must plainly be the most finished state of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be comprehension with knowledge - knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

For it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.¹⁴

Contemporary philosophy tries to rethink many problems of the traditional philosophy, such as the concepts of truth, reason, ethics and being. The main characteristics of these new approaches are that they try to refrain from classical foundationalist and the essentialist views. We call these thoughts either postmodern or postmetaphysical philosophy in general. We speak about the end of philosophy, overcoming metaphysics, after philosophy and we are asking what comes after philosophy, or who comes after subject and the like. It is said that nowadays thinking is groundless. We do try to philosophise on the ungroundedness of the ground, about which Nietzsche arguing that "since Copernicus man has been rolling from the centre to towards X"¹⁵ sends a message to us from years ago:

My friends, it was hard for us when we were young: we suffered youth itself like a serious sickness. That is due to the time into which we have been thrown – a time of extensive inner decay and disintegration, a time that with all its weakness, and even its best strength, opposes the spirit of youth.

Disintegration characterises this time and thus uncertainty: nothings stand firmly on its feet or on a hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow is dubious. Everything on our way is slippery and dangerous, and the ice that still supports us has become thin: all of us feel the warm, uncanny breath of the thawing wind, where we still walk, soon no one will be able to walk.¹⁶

Postmetaphysical thinking goes hand in hand with philosophical nihilism, Vattimo interprets it as the weakness of Being.¹⁷ Caputo states that postmodern situation can be characterised as ‘suffering’ in the play of life and we do not know who we are, since we have become problematic to ourselves, and we are no longer the man of humanism.¹⁸ Derrida refers to the same point in the end of his essay *Ends of Man* and asks that “but, who we are”.¹⁹ Truly, this is one of the prophecies of Nietzsche, he said a century ago that “nihilism stands at the door”.²⁰

Basic problematic of postmetaphysical thinking is that the signs that are interpreted no longer signify anything other than themselves, there is not any transcending ground on which we can base the meaning of the signs. Since, once the value of the classical conception of truth depending upon eternal concepts is called into question everything becomes a mere interpretation. The world itself becomes nothing more than a sign-world, a semiological construct, in which the signifier signifies only itself. In the same line, the

meaning of the play refers to nothing other than itself; hence the substantial content of the play is enclosed in the play itself.

We will interpret the ground on which man 'walks' – Nietzsche's metaphor- as the ground in the classical philosophy on which man bases his thinking. Therefore, we will take 'death of God' as the following; philosophical thinking has lost the grandiose metaphysical connection in the case of classical thinking, such as, search for truth, being, knowledge or in general search for the true account of things and reality. For Heidegger, Western metaphysics is governed by the underlying conviction that there must be some being or beings, which are fundamental or truly real. Those being or beings which makes philosophical thinking possible are the justificatory and explanatory base of that thinking, such as, Platonic ideas, Aristotelian truths of beings and the unmoved mover, Hegelian spirit or the God of medieval philosophy. Thus, the main problem in contemporary philosophy is the question of ground; that is, the loss of ground as Nietzsche has pointed out 'philosophical nihilism'.²¹ Vattimo argues the same point as follows;

The reference to Nietzsche's announcement draws us closer to theme of nihilism. If hermeneutics, as the philosophical theory of every experience of truth, is lucid about itself as no more than interpretation, will it not find itself inevitably caught up in the nihilistic logic of Nietzsche's hermeneutics? This 'logic' may be encapsulated in the statement there can be no recognition of the essentially interpretive character of the experience of the true without death of God and without fabling of the world or, which amounts to the same thing, of Being. In short, it seems impossible to prove the truth of hermeneutics other than by presenting it as the

response to a history of Being interpreted as the occurrence of nihilism.²²

We will argue that the question of being and the problem of transcendence, since Kant's Copernican Revolution, has been based on the human being and restricted within the subjective sphere. Philosophical thinking now becomes a narrative among others and views itself more modestly leaving us in the mere interpretations of the signs. When the world loses its connection to the world of essences, which signifies Nietzsche's 'death of God', the world can only be meaningful either as the interpretation of the signs or as a hermeneutics of the play of life, yet the meaning has no ground other than human being.

For Hegel, philosophy begins when a split occurs between self and the world, which is the origin of the problems of philosophy and these problems touch the deepest layers of human existence, they are the perennial questions of mankind. Philosophy in this sense, is perennial philosophy, *philosophia perennis*. As Jasper states "philosophy is always with us" and "man cannot avoid philosophy, it is always present... there is no escape from philosophy."²³ Philosophy "is the principle of concentration through which man becomes himself, by partaking of reality."²⁴ This is the one and the eternal philosophy which contains in itself all varieties of philosophical thoughts, all claims of truth and all disagreements about the nature of being; shortly, the entire attempt of mankind to understand the very existence of

himself and the being in general. Considering the problems of philosophy as *philosophia perennis* we can say that philosophy itself is an inexhaustible endeavour in its own nature. It is a generous attempt through which we can not attain any final resolution, in other words, every answer given hides or holds a new problem in it and every solution creates a new question, which is the very essence of philosophy.

Postmodernism though has very different meanings and implications in different areas, in philosophy it has a connotation asserting that philosophy has ended.²⁵ For instance, Heidegger talks about the end of philosophy and the end of the task of thinking, Derrida declares the ends of man, Lyotard asserts, in his *Postmodern Condition*, end of metanarratives and the deconstructing of them. Foucault says that man is an invention of recent date and one perhaps nearing its end. It is widespread to discuss the proclamation about the end of philosophy in two respects. These are, in the first instance, about modernity and the modern philosophy; i.e., philosophy of subjectivism; metaphysics based on the subject-object dichotomy issuing from Cartesian doubt. In the second instance, it is about philosophy itself in general; that is, philosophy in Platonic sense. It is clear that since the philosophy of Descartes subjectivity has guided philosophy and for the last centuries there have arisen attacks against the concept of subject-centred reason arguing that reason is situated. Furthermore, we see a quarrel about the very nature of philosophy itself; it is

especially about Greek concept of logos, reason and the like. The reason for such critiques is that after post-Socratic thought, philosophy has been considered to be rational human endeavour having universal claims.

The concept of ground is situated in the very centre of these debates, whether it is the subjectivistic meaning of reason or the Greek concept of philosophy depending on logos. For instance, Heidegger's critique of Cartesian subjectivism and the subjectivist conception of reason traces back to Greek concept *nous* as the fate of being. In the same line, Nietzsche blesses pre-Socratic philosophy because of its tragic nature, but he radically criticises Western tradition, with its beliefs in truth, morality and metaphysics depending on Platonic-Christian conceptions of world. To him, there is just one true world, the world of experience, Heraclitian world of flux.

In general, since Nietzsche's, Later Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's views, it is common to argue that philosophy has ended whether it is primarily an epistemological or a metaphysical-ontological issue. This assertion could be interpreted as the following; Platonic philosophy has played itself out and has accomplished its all ontological and epistemological predetermined possibilities, namely, the thinking defining itself in foundationalist terms as a search for finding out the ultimate context or the very ground of knowledge, being, language and so on.²⁶

We can summarise our study as follows. Firstly, the main problematic in our study, is to track back how the basic ground of metaphysics, that is, how the principle of identity - the identity of being and thought - has been converted into the union of being and time, in spite of the fact that for Greeks the question of being must be contemplated beyond time and temporality. Since, in Greek philosophy, being is a real predicate and unity of being, that is, the transcendental character of being, is to be found in the entity itself and the question of being is to be studied without depending on human being, without depending on human consciousness and human finitude.

The change from thought to time entails the change from *theoria* to *phronesis*; this transformation correspondingly embodies the fact that the question of being must be understood in terms of *phronesis*. *Phronesis* depends on human being²⁷ and it is the *noein* used in the realm of being that can be otherwise and in each case is new and is ruled by the either-or.²⁸ Besides, both for Heidegger and Gadamer freedom is the main relation between man and being instead of truth, which is a further consequence of this change.

For Greeks, being is eternal and must be studied in terms of *theoria*, however it is interpreted within temporal world in terms of *phronesis* in hermeneutic ontology. For Aristotle, human being and practical reason cannot be the ground for philosophical wisdom, i.e., for *sophia*, since man and

practical reason are 'not the best thing in the world'. Therefore, we will ask what is the relation between 'end of philosophy' and the grounding of the question of being on man and practical reason.

We will interpret these questions by analysing the problem of transcendence and its relation to the question of the unity of being and the principle of identity. Before Kant, transcendental character of being, i.e., the unity of being, is supposed to be in the entity itself. But, after Kant's dictum 'being is not a real predicate', the unity of being is determined to be in the transcendental subject. Transcendental concept of identity basically asserts that there is no such absolute identity between thought and being but instead there is a relative and partial identity issuing from transcendental character of subject. As parallel to Kant, Husserl criticises classical naïve belief for subject and object correlation, his phenomenological investigation attempts to clarify this relation in terms of consciousness, furthermore the world as a meaningful totality is a result of the acts of consciousness. For Heidegger, the unity of being is comprehended in terms of Dasein, i.e., the unity of being stems from the unity of care-structure and the ecstatic unity of temporality. Because Dasein is the being whose basic nature is transcendental, Dasein transcends towards world, thus delivers light -being (*Sein*)- to the beings in the world. Moreover, Dasein has a temporal being, the unity of which is the ecstatic unity of temporality; accordingly being (*Sein*) is temporal and historical.

For such an aim, we will especially follow the below lines of thought of metaphysics; being and thought are the same, and being is a unity (Parmenides), the study of being as being (Aristotle). Being is not a real predicate but a logical copula (Kant), time is the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being (Heidegger). Being that can be understood is language (Gadamer) and metaphysics precedes ontology (Levinas).

In other words, we will track down the history of being, i.e., 'isness', by referring to these cornerstones of the history of metaphysics. Distinctively, we will try to elucidate Kant's view of being and his transcendental philosophy as a turning point in the understanding of being, especially for the question of the unity and the locus of the being. We will interpret Kant's Copernican revolution as a radical departure from the Greek and the classical route of thought, in the sense that after and by Kant the unity and the locus of being have been redefined in subjective realm.

In the second chapter, we will give a short description of the notion of the transcendence and the unity of being in Greek thought and its critique made by Kant and Husserl. Then, we will analyse how Heidegger criticises Aristotelian notion of the unity of being and Kantian doctrine of being. For Heidegger, the unity of the being is constituted by means of the conception of transcendence based on Dasein's clearing of being and the ecstatic unity of temporality.

The third chapter is confined to the comparison of Aristotle's conception of first philosophy as *theoria* with the critique of it made by transcendental conception of philosophy. We will clarify why according to Aristotle the study of being qua being is substantial ontology, subsequently why *theoria* is the way to the question of being and to *sophia*, i.e., to philosophical wisdom. Then, we will analyse classical notion of thinking as vision of mind, i.e., *nous*, and Greek conception of metaphysics as *theoria* beyond time and temporality, therefore the reason that why, for Aristotle, practical reason, *phronesis*, could not be basis for philosophical wisdom.

In the fourth chapter, we will analyse how classical conception of identity of being and thought was criticised by Kant and Husserl, hence beginning of transcendental philosophy and its Cartesian origin; both as birth of the subject and as the origin of external world problem. Therefore, we will analyse the differences between Greek cosmos, Cartesian and Kantian worlds and Husserl's phenomenological *Welt*. These serve us as preliminary steps for Heidegger's conception of Dasein as the being-in-the-world and the problem of transcendence in phenomenological hermeneutics. Finally, we will touch upon Nietzsche's critique of classical conception of being, for him being is an illusion that is interpreted, and Kierkegaard's critique of Greek notion of *theoria*, hence subjective philosophy based on temporality and its relation to hermeneutics.

Chapter five is confined to phenomenological hermeneutics. Here, firstly we will analyse Heidegger's recapitalising of transcendental philosophy in ontological sense, that is, his reviewing the unity of being based on transcendental character of Dasein. We will reflect on how Heidegger reviews the problem of transcendence in terms of self-transcendence, transcending world and transcendence-temporality relation. Then, we will take into account Heidegger's conception of freedom as the ground of transcendence and metaphysics and the relation between Plato and Heidegger.²⁹

We will analyse Gadamer's hermeneutic ontology, i.e., being-language relation, as a phronetical-historical analysis of concept of being issuing from Heideggerian understanding of transcendentalty. Lastly, we will evaluate Levinas' critique of the concept of transcendence in phenomenological-ontological sense. We will consider Levinas' reconstruction of Platonic concept of transcendence in ethical sense, transcendence beyond being and beyond essence; therefore we will take into account why, according to Levinas, ethics must be first philosophy.

In the conclusion, we will give a general outcome of the study and discuss how after Kant's critique of classical conception of pure reason and his doctrine of being, philosophical thinking was redefined by means of the conception of transcendence grounded on transcendental subjectivity and how this turn gave philosophy a new direction. For Aristotle and for the Greeks, the

question of being and philosophical wisdom, *sophia*, must be grasped in terms of *theoria*; and practical wisdom, *phronesis*, could not be ground of metaphysics. In phenomenological hermeneutics, the concept of being following Kant has been determined within the subjective sphere, and thus the identity of being and thought has been replaced by the being and time unity based on interpretation, namely, the phenomenal and the phronetical analysis of being in terms of the temporality of human being. Finally, we will ask whether we could say that philosophy has ended since it depends on human finitude and human being in general, and what is the relation between hermeneutic ontology and Cartesian subjectivism. Hermeneutic ethics and reconstruction of transcendence in Platonic sense is a return to the Greeks and to Plato for a new beginning in philosophy. And we will try to find the answer for whether hermeneutic ontology could be understood as a discussion of the notion of transcendence between Aristotle and Plato through Kant's transcendental philosophy.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

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- ¹ Heidegger; *Being and Time*, p., 19.
- ² We have to distinguish that by *transcendental philosophy* we mean the kind of thinking beginning with Kant's transcendental philosophy. We use *the problem of transcendentals* as understood in medieval philosophy and in the Greek philosophy as *hyperousia*. We take in the *problem of transcendence* to indicate a general problem both in Kantian sense and in classical sense and the problems arising from them.
- ³ Kant; *Critique of Pure Reason*, par., A598 B626.
- ⁴ Heidegger; *Being and Time*, p. 22-23
- ⁵ Ibid, p. 31
- ⁶ Ibid, p. 62.
- ⁷ Cf., Husserl, Edmund; *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, p. 88.
- ⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction to the first edition, p. 7.
- ⁹ Fell, J. P.; *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place*, p. 8.
- ¹⁰ Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 43.
- ¹¹ Aristotle has never used metaphysics as a philosophical term, since this term has been coined for his writings coming after *Physics*. Aristotle has used first philosophy for now what we call metaphysics; Descartes has titled one of his main studies *Meditations on First Philosophy*. For Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* actually has meant first philosophy, Husserl never used the term metaphysics and viewed phenomenology as first philosophy, to Heidegger, *Being and Time* is fundamental ontology in the sense of first philosophy. And, for Levinas, ethics is the first philosophy, for him, 'metaphysics precedes ontology' and transcendence has essentially an ethical meaning.
- ¹² For Aristotle, human being is a union of desire and intellect (*Nichomean Ethics*, par., 1139b 5-7) and the end of human being is *eudaimonia*. (*Nichomean Ethics*, par. 1098a 12-20.) The highest form of *eudaimonia* is the exercise of highest virtue, *sophia*. *Noein* is the best activity for human being and the telos of human life (Aristotle; *Nichomean Ethics*, par. 1177a 13-22.) Because, *nous*, reason in theoretical realm, is directed towards the universal and the eternal.
- ¹³ We use the term subjectivity here in the sense of human being, hence not in the sense of subject-object dichotomy as used in Cartesian philosophy.
- ¹⁴ Aristotle; *Nichomean Ethics*, par., 1141a 15-25.
- ¹⁵ Nietzsche; *The Will to Power*, p.8.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, p.41.
- ¹⁷ Cf. Vattimo, Gianni; *The End of Modernity, Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture*
- ¹⁸ John, D. Caputo; *Radical Hermeneutics*. p. 287-290.
- ¹⁹ Derrida, *The Ends of Man*, in *Margins of Philosophy*, p.136
- ²⁰ Nietzsche; *The Will to Power*, p.7
- ²¹ Ibid, p.41

²² Vattimo, Gianni; *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, p.7-8.

²³ Jaspers, Karl; *Way to Wisdom*, pages 7-13.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Our concern with postmodern philosophy is not to analyse the postmodern philosophy itself, but to understand why 'philosophy has ended', hence, to interpret the reasons for the beginning of *postmetaphysical* thinking.

²⁶ We can site some of the studies performed for such a purpose. Firstly, Bernstein beginning with Cartesian anxiety, that is, to find out an ultimate basis for *episteme*, interprets the postmodern thinking as a task for *praxis*, namely as a dialogue between communities which takes us beyond the *Cartesian* anxiety, hence, to fall the relativism or the fear of being non objective. (Bernstein, Richard J.; *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, 1988.) In his *Radical Hermeneutics*, Caputo views the same problem in terms of returning the original difficulty of life, that is, from the opposite course of metaphysics and from restoring the factual existence to its original difficulty, to openness to the mystery and to the mystery of the person. (Caputo, John D.; *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and The Hermeneutic Project*, 1987.) Vattimo takes the same problem in another point of view, for him, end of modernity signifies not only the death of subject but also death of the dichotomies of the classic metaphysics, such as, essence and appearance, other world and this world. (Vattimo, Gianni; *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture*, 1988.) He interprets this situation in philosophy as the weakness of Being or as nihilism. For Vattimo, hermeneutics has a nihilistic vocation. (Vattimo, Gianni; *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, 1997). Roochnik examines postmodern philosophy in defends of Greek logos, that is, life-affirming and aware of the tragic limits of our very being, which, he interprets as the Platonic conception of logos. (Roochnik, David; *The Tragedy of Reason: Toward a Platonic Conception of Logos*, 1990.) Rorty takes the same problem, that is, the end of philosophy or the philosophy in the post-philosophical age, in terms of Greek ocular metaphor and foundationalist claims of classical metaphysics. (Rorty, Richard; *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 1980.) For him we can divide the Western philosophy mainly into two camps, these are systematic and edifying streams. The former is more scientific, the latter emphasises practical wisdom, the actualisation of man himself in the temporal world by coping with the change and flux, hence, more poetical. We can mention also Habermas' study, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*. Finally, for Philipse, who after pointing out the subjectivism and the problem of the external world and the epistemological issue, concludes that we can see postmodern philosophy and the discussion on the end of philosophy as a meta-ontology, i.e., relations between ontologies. (Philipse, Herman; *Towards a Postmodern Conception of Metaphysics: On the Genealogy and Successor Disciplines of Modern Philosophy*, *Metaphilosophy*, January 1994, Vol. 25, No. 1.)

²⁷ Cf, Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p.115.

²⁸ Cf, Ibid. p. 34-40.

²⁹ Those who have interpreted Heidegger actually ignored the point how Heidegger's philosophy depends on Plato's conception of transcendence. They generally see just how Heidegger criticises Plato, i.e., after Plato, truth has been changed just into a mere 'unconcealment' ignoring the 'concealment' feature of the being.



CHAPTER 2

A PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTION OF THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF BEING

2.1. EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE

Our aim in this chapter is to understand how the change from the problem of transcendentals to transcendental philosophy has taken place and how the question of the unity of being is re-defined through subjective realm. To comprehend phenomenological-hermeneutical conception of being based on temporality, we have to distinguish the conception of being between before Kant and after Kant, that is, the classical conception of being as the transcendent and the transcendental conception of being. We will argue that in Kant's transcendental philosophy both the locus of the concept of being and the transcendental character of being, that is, the unity of being, have been determined within the subjective sphere. In classical understanding, however, being and the unity of being has been defined objectively and the subject-object relation (thought-being connection) is viewed as a correspondent dependence relation. In other words, in classical thought *nous* is understood as a receptive of being, not a regulative reason as in the philosophy of Kant. On this basis, we will

discuss that phenomenological-hermeneutical concept of being based on temporality is parallel to Kantian transcendental notion of being. Particularly, the unity of being is viewed in the subjective sphere; that is, it is upheld that the unity of being originates from human being itself.

This chapter is a preliminary one, in other words, to look over the classical conception of being and its transcendental character in Greek philosophy and to understand Kant's critique of the classical idea of being. Kant argues that being is not a real predicate and being is a logical copula. Husserl and Heidegger follow Kant's this doctrine of being. Heidegger's recapitalising concept of being arises especially from Kantian doctrine of being in the sense that the transcendental character of being is captured in terms of subject, i.e., in terms of Dasein. Following both Kant's transcendental conception of being and Husserlian phenomenological-intentional notion of being, Heidegger understands unity of being in terms of Dasein based on temporal and phronetical analysis of transcendence, i.e., in terms of the unity of care-structure and the ecstatic unity of temporality, which are the a priori conditions of clearing of being. Therefore, the unity of being in phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy is seen in the subjective realm contrary to the classical one in which the unity of being is seen in the objective realm.

The term transcendental is intended to be in a sharp contrast with two other terms, namely, immanent and transcendent. Something is immanent with respect to certain bounds and limits if it lies within them. Something

is transcendent if it lies beyond those bound and limits. Something is transcendental; however, if it lies neither within nor without those limits, but is, rather, a matter of the essential nature of those very limits themselves. In this sense, Kant is concerned with establishing the essential, the a priori limits of human knowledge.

For Kant, transcendental philosophy means the analysis of the human knowledge that precedes all experience and that makes knowledge of experience possible. In other words, we can say that transcendental philosophy is the conception of philosophy that criticises the concepts of pure understanding and analyses the a priori concepts of knowledge in general. Kant defines transcendental philosophy as the following;

I entitle all knowledge which is occupied, not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts might be called transcendental philosophy. ¹

For him, transcendental philosophy is “a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason”², in the sense that, “the critique of pure reason will contain all that is essential in transcendental philosophy” and “it carries the analysis only so far as requisite for the complete examination of knowledge which is *a priori* and synthetic.”³

Transcendental philosophy means nearly a Kantian conception of thinking, i.e., a philosophy begins with Kant and radically differs from classical thinking and Greek philosophy. Certainly, this is the reason why Kant calls his philosophy a Copernican Revolution. He sharply distinguishes between the transcendental and the transcendent, since then

the words transcendent and transcendental are usually differentiated in philosophy. In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* the transcendental is that which pertains to the necessary, a priori conditions of knowledge. Transcendental philosophy is, for Kant, an inquiry into the necessary presuppositions of knowledge. In other words, to Kant, the knowledge of the transcendent is not possible, but the transcendental is.

In medieval philosophy the idea of transcendentals comes from Aristotelian doctrine of the being, since being is the one; it has a transcendental character. Namely, being is a unity; hence it is essentially transcendental. It was generally accepted that what one conceives first is the most evident and to which one can reduce all other concepts is the concept of being. Thus all other concepts of our understanding can be described as additions to the concept of being. Christian theology has developed the meaning of the transcendental into the understanding of trinity, namely the good, the one and the true. Later on, this doctrine has been elaborated systematically into a philosophical concept. In medieval philosophy, the transcendentals are those entities that transcend the boundary between any two categories in Aristotelian sense, thus they are coextensive with being (*ens*). They were usually held to be one (*unum*), true (*verum*), something (*aliquid*), good (*bonum*) and thing (*res*) and beautiful (*pulchrum*).

The notion of transcendence begins in Greek thought with Parmenides' positing of an existent and then proceeding to deprive it of all

characteristics save oneness.⁴ For Parmenides, this is ‘the way of truth’, that is, if being is, then it is the one, unique and indivisible. Parmenides argues that being is a name for just a special sort of entity and that entity is and ‘only being is, and not-being is not and cannot be thought’. Thought is not different from being, because it is only the thought of being.

Plato discusses the question of the unity of being and the one, in *Parmenides* (paragraph 141d and 142a); he argues the relation between the one and time, and says that “the one has nothing to do with time and does not occupy any stretch of time.”⁵

According to Plato, “there is no way in which the one has being” and “the one is in no sense *is*”.⁶ Therefore, the one, for Plato, is beyond temporality and it has no being, he argues that;

Consequently, it cannot *have* a name or be spoken of, nor can there be any knowledge of or perception or opinion of it. It is not named or spoken of, not an object of opinion or of knowledge, nor perceived by any creature.⁷

Plato brings an end to the long discussion (paragraph 166d) about the one saying that; “thus, in sum, we may conclude, if there is no one, there is nothing at all”⁸. Related to Plato’s understanding of the one, Aristotle states that Plato identified the one with the good (*Metaphysics*, par. 1091a-b). As Moravcsik discusses about this long and complicated dialogue of Plato, “the second reading brings out more clearly what is in any case the moral of this part of the *Parmenides*; namely that without the One and the other Forms, nothing can be.”⁹

For Plato, 'the good' is the one and the supreme principle, the *arche* of all *eide* and on which all other *eide* are grounded. The one is the *summa genera* of which all the *eide* are species. Plato uses *hyperousia*¹⁰ in *Republic* (509b) in the sense of 'the good', the supreme and the ethical principle beyond being and *ousia*, comparing it to the sun he says that;

You are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself not essence but still *transcends* in dignity and surpassing power.¹¹

Hence, for Plato, only 'the good' is the transcendent in the sense that 'the good' is beyond being and beyond essence and presents to the beings their being, the good both in the ethical and the ontological sense is the ground of philosophy. Heidegger while discussing the notion of transcendence and the problem of ground in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* closes the discussion referring to this phrase of Plato and he translates and re-interprets Plato's words (*Republic*, 509b) as follows;

And you must say that knowing is not only present for and with known beings, present namely on the basis of the good (the good establishes for beings not only knownness and thereby world-entry) but also being and being-a-what is assigned to beings from that (namely the good). The for-the-sake-of, however, (transcendence) is not being itself, but surpasses being, and does so inasmuch as it outstrips beings in dignity and power.¹²

As we shall see, in chapter five, Levinas, criticising the phenomenological-hermeneutical conception of transcendence, i.e., the ontological conception of transcendence, tries to base his philosophy on

the ethical ground in Platonic sense and argues that not being but the ethical must be first philosophy, the ground for philosophical thinking.

2.2. UNITY AND THE NATURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTELIAN ONTOLOGY: BEING AS A REAL PREDICATE

Both Plato and Aristotle follow Parmenides in what an entity is, but they criticise Parmenides, since in his theory of being there is something confusing, the distinction between the properties and the entities that possess these properties must be clarified. For Plato, the concept of being is to be understood in terms of universals, that is, universal ideas. But, to Aristotle, the particular, the entity itself, i.e., substance, *ousia*, is the primary type of being. Aristotle held that those entities which are in the primary sense are the substances and the properties which they have are accidents. For him, the question of being, i.e., the question of being qua being, must be studied in the sense of substance. Aristotle comparing being with health argues that;

There are many senses in which a thing may be said 'to be', but they are related to one central point, a definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it.¹³

Therefore, to Aristotle being has not a definite and a unique sense. Being can have many senses but it is primarily a substance, he argues that;

So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substances, or destructions or privations or qualities of substances, or productive or generative of substances, or of things which are relative to substances, or negations of some these things or of substance itself.¹⁴

Accordingly, Aristotelian ontology is a substantial ontology; that is, all things are 'being' in reference to substance, to a particular entity. Aristotle analyses the ontological problem in terms of the ten categories the substance of which is the primary one. In other words, the other categories could be added to substance as properties, i.e., to subject as predicates, as he argues;

That which is primarily and *is* simply must be substance.¹⁵
Substance is primary in every sense - in formula, in order of knowledge, in time. For of the other categories none exists independently, but only substance.¹⁶

The categories are the fundamental and indivisible concepts of thought; they are at the same time basic features of the real. In other words, reality and human thought are identical, which is one of the main critiques of Heidegger's classical notion of logic. For Heidegger there must be a more fundamental ground in which such a coincidence between subject and object takes place and that ground is the transcendence. He calls this ground primordial transcendence.¹⁷

To Aristotle, the category of substance is the all-important one and the others exist only in so far as they can be predicated of substance. The essence, or the true nature of a particular concrete being is constituted by

its form, *morhpe*, by the essential qualities of the class to which it belongs; so that after all, the idea of form is the most essential element. Clearly, it can be said that, for Aristotle, the question of being is a study of being as being in the sense of substance, *ousia*. *Ousia* has two connotations: the ultimate subject of predication, which cannot be predicated of anything further in turn; and which can be distinguished as an identifiable thing in its own shape, *morhpe*, and form, *eidos*.¹⁸

2.3. THE PROBLEM WITH ARISTOTELIAN ONTOLOGY: THE ONE AS THE TRANSCENDENT AND THE MANIFOLD EXPRESSING OF BEING

For Aristotle, the question of being is primarily a question of substance. The problem with Aristotelian ontology, which is one of the main critiques of Heidegger, is that while Aristotle says that being and the one are the same and they have a transcendental-universal character, he also argues that being could be said in many diverse ways. For Heidegger, Aristotle could not explain how such a manifold expressibility of being could be gathered in the unity of being.

According to Aristotle, being could be expressed mainly in four ways, which are;

- a) being *per se* or *per accidents*, that is, by essence or accidents,
- b) according to categories,
- c) being as truth and as false,

d) according to potential and the actual meaning of being.

Substance is the basic meaning of being, in other words, the unity of being is that of substance. Hence, we can utter such propositions, like 'something is a man, or is green, or that objects are there, or a picture is counterfeit' and in each case being has different meanings. But they all refer to a substance, that is, to a being. Aristotle argues that being can be said in many diverse ways;

The unqualified term 'being' has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true (non-being, being the false), while besides these are the figures of predication, e.g., the 'what', quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings, which 'being' may have; and again besides all these there is that which is potentiality and actuality: - since 'being' has many meanings.¹⁹

And "while being has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing"²⁰

In *Metaphysics* Aristotle says that the 'one' and the 'being' are the same and they are transcendent,²¹ he argues that;

If then no universal can be a substance, as has been said in our discussions of substance and being, and if being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of a one apart from the many (for it is common to many), but is only a predicate, clearly the one cannot be also a substance; for being and the one the most universal of all predicates. Therefore, on the one hand, classes are not certain entities and substances separable from other things; and on the one hand the one cannot be a class, for the same reason for which being and substances cannot be classes.²²

Like being, the unity also follows the categories in many diverse ways;

And that in a sense unity means the same as being is clear from the fact that it follows the categories in as many ways, and is

not comprised within any category, e.g., neither in substance nor in quality, but is related to them just as being is.²³

In Aristotle's ontology being and the one is not a genus, since they are universal, he discusses that;

It is not possible that either unity or being should be a genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and the one, but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the differentiae taken apart from the species.²⁴

Hence, we can say that, firstly, being is the most universal predicate, secondly, being and the one are the same,²⁵ consequently they are transcendent, thirdly being is not a class. Finally, being and the one are predicated in many diverse ways.

We can sum up Aristotle's conception of being as the following; firstly, being is the most universal and a real predicate, that is, a predicate that the entities possess in themselves. Secondly, being is not a genus. Being and the one are the same and they are transcendent and the most universal. Thirdly, being is an unqualified term, since on the one hand we say that substance is the primary type of being, - being must be understood firstly and for the most part in the sense of substance, that is, entity as the one -. On the other hand, there is a problem that we could not give a reasonable explanation as to how to apply the other meanings, such as predicates, categories and the actual-potential meanings to the unity of being. In other words, where and how the unity of being, the transcendental character of being gathers in itself those multiplicity of meanings.

In the following sections, we shall try to capture the meaning of being in Kant's, Husserl's and Heidegger's transcendental philosophy. The main difference between Aristotle's conception of being and their transcendental conception of being is that according to transcendental philosophy, whether in Kantian, Husserlian or Heideggerian sense, being is not a real predicate, it is only a predicate which finds its origin and locus not in the thing itself but in the subjective realm. Therefore, the unity of being is based on the transcendental subject. Firstly, we will analyse Kant's conception of being as a logical copula stemming from human being. Then, we will discuss Husserl's phenomenological notion of being based on Kant's view of being. Finally, we will consider how Heidegger criticises both Kant and Husserl, and also Aristotle's conception of being recapitalising unity of being in terms of transcendental structure of Dasein and redefines it on a temporal base, that is, on the base of the ecstatic unity of temporality.

Consequently, we will argue that the meaning of the concept of being after Kant's transcendental philosophy, i.e., after the Copernican Revolution, exposes a very essential difference regarding the classical conception of being. If all philosophy is a thinking of being, it can be said that after Kant, the classical identity principle has been transformed from absolute sense into the relative ground of transcendental philosophy.

2.4. FROM PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTALS TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY: BEING AS A LOGICAL COPULA

Kant asserts that the 'is' in any proposition is not a real predicate, like Aristotle and the classical thinkers have thought it to be. For Kant, being is not a property; that is, existence is neither a predicate nor a determination of a thing, but rather a positing of a thing and just a logical copula.²⁶ Kant argues in *Critique of Pure Reason* that;

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely a positing of a thing, of a certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement.²⁷

To Kant, "by whatever and how many predicates we may think a thing- even if we completely determine it- we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing *is*"²⁸. Since, he argues that "the small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject."²⁹

The main reason for Kant's asserting that 'being is not a real predicate' issues from his critique of the classical notion of *nous* as receptive of being, since, for him, reason is a regulative foundation for all a priori synthetic knowledge and all concepts. Therefore when discussing the classical problem of transcendentals in ancient sense, he claims that;

In the transcendental philosophy of ancients there is included yet another chapter containing pure concept of the understanding which, though not enumerated among the categories, must, on their view, be ranked as *a priori* concepts of objects. This, however, would amount to an increase in the number of categories, and is therefore not feasible. They are propounded, so famous among the Schoolmen, *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum...*

These supposedly transcendental predicates of *things* are, in fact, nothing but logical requirements and criteria of all *knowledge* of things in general.³⁰

Heidegger explains these words of Kant as the following;

Kant knows only one alternative: to trace these determinations and relationship back to formal logic. However, if Kant, is not understood in the way of Kantians understand him, and if one bears in mind that for Kant the original unity of transcendental apperception was the pinnacle of logic, and if this unity is not left simply hanging in the air but is questioned as to its own roots, then it can be indeed shown that how Kant for the first time since Aristotle was once again starting to broach the real question about being.³¹

Thus, for Kant, there is a connection between his transcendental philosophy and the ancient doctrine concerning the transcendentals, that is, classical ontology.³² Kant argues that all that we use these concepts just for the agreement of knowledge with itself and under the general logical rules.³³ Consequently, being is a transcendental concept, that is, it is not something, which the thing has, but just a logical copula the transcendental subject asserts. But being is an *unum*, a unity. In Aristotle, the categories were modes or inflections of being to which the *nous* adapted itself. In Kant, conversely, the reason already contains the categories, that is, why Kant calls his philosophy as Copernican Revolution. The categories are in our understanding and not directly in the entities themselves. The main

problematic with Aristotle's doctrine of being, as we have said, is how to apply the manifold meanings of being and the categories to the unity of being, for Kant, categories belong to subject's understanding.³⁴

Hence, the unity of being as a logical copula does not belong to the thing itself, but rather it depends on the transcendental subject and on the transcendental unity of apperception.³⁵ Apperception is a form of consciousness that involves self-consciousness and the unity of apperception is transcendental because it is a priori condition for the possibility of knowledge.

According to Kant's interpretation of being, the unity of the being as the unity of experience lies in the transcendental synthesis of the subject; that is, the unity of the subject as the original unity of the synthetic apperception is the ground of being. Hence the question of the ground in thinking and being identity is relative to subject, i.e.; it is not absolute in the classical sense. Thilly argues the same point as the following;

The transcendental unity of apperception accordingly occupies a position in Kant's system analogous to that of substance in system which define substance as the ultimate subject of predication (Aristotle and Leibniz), or as the independent and self-sufficient (Descartes and Spinoza); it is the ultimate a priori, the last term in transcendental regress.³⁶

For Kant, transcendental unity of apperception is the highest point where his transcendental philosophy reaches its conclusive end, that is, the ground of his logic. Kant argues that;

The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably

therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.³⁷

Heidegger interprets Kant's view of being as studied in *Critique of Pure Reason* and argues that;

This is the pure synthesis of transcendental apperception; and this synthesis is the primal act of cognitive thought. Because being is not a *real* predicate, but is nevertheless a predicate and therefore is attributed to object, and yet cannot be elicited from the substantial content of the object, the ontological predicates of modality cannot stem from the object, but rather must, as modes of positing, have their origin in subjectivity. Positing and its modalities of existence are determined from the side of thought.³⁸

Thus, Heidegger argues that "there hovers unexpressed over Kant's thesis about being the heading: Being and Thought."³⁹

2.5. TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

Phenomenology in its general sense is a critique of classical naïve understanding of the relation between subject and object. The central theme of phenomenology is intentionality. Intentionality, originally coming from Husserl's teacher Brentano, means that every conscious act of the subject is always an act of something. In other words, our thoughts are always thoughts of something and they are directed to something. Phenomenology is an investigation of phenomena; that is, items displayed or found in experience, as Thilly argues, "Husserl conceived pure

phenomenology as a necessary preparatory science much as Aristotle considered logic as a propaedeutic science.”⁴⁰

For Husserl, transcendental philosophy must be understood in a Cartesian manner, that is, the transcendental philosophy of Husserl has a Cartesian origin rather than Kantian transcendental philosophy. In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl argues that;

Descartes, in fact, inaugurates an entirely new kind of philosophy. Changing its total style, philosophy takes a radical turn: from naïve Objectivism to transcendental subjectivism.⁴¹ Following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if made in the right manner leads to the transcendental subjectivity: the turn to the *ego cogito* as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgements, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded.⁴²

Although Descartes has made a radical turn and has grounded philosophy on *ego cogito*, Husserl argues that, he failed to turn transcendental subjectivity. Husserl maintains for Descartes's turn that;

He stands on the threshold of the greatest of all discoveries- in a certain manner, has already made it – yet he does not grasp its proper sense, the sense namely of transcendental subjectivity, and so he does not pass thorough the gateway that leads into genuine transcendental philosophy.⁴³

For Husserl, phenomenology is the analysis of transcendental experience in terms of phenomenological epoché, both as the analysis of the realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience and as the analysis of the objective world constituted by transcendental subject.⁴⁴

Tapper argues the same point as the following;

The difference between Descartes and Husserl lies not in the conception of self-reflection of the ego, nor in the means of establishing the validity of belief in the world, but in Husserl's conception of the transcendental ego as constituting the world

and hence not being a worldly entity. What makes Husserl's phenomenology a transcendental philosophy is this theory of constitution, and ... the idea that it is consciousness which constitutes the world.⁴⁵

Both Husserl's and Heidegger's transcendental philosophy finds their origin in Kant's Copernican Revolution, since, as Rosen discusses;

The world is not encountered but actualised by the specific act of perceptual cognition through which we think an object. To think an object, that is, to posit, the world of experience as the context of object. This is the ancestor of the Husserlian and Heideggerian doctrine of the horizon.⁴⁶

Although, Husserl especially follows Descartes rather than Kant in grounding philosophy on transcendental subjectivity, he is more akin to Kant and his doctrine of being for the understanding of being. To analyse the concept of being, in *Logical Investigations*, (paragraph 40), Husserl takes the following example: I see white paper and say 'white paper'. I see that paper is white and I express this by saying 'this paper is white'. The word 'white' means the something attached to the paper, but the meaning only coincides with the partial percept that relates to the white aspect of paper. The same applies to the name 'paper', i.e., only the quality meanings are contained in its concept terminate in perception. The assertions 'this white paper' and 'this paper is white' are both fulfilled on the same perceptual basis. But there is nothing given to us in the percept which presents the paper's being or existence and nothing that presents its being white.

In other words, Husserl argues that although in this percept we perceive just the white paper, or the paper and the white colour it has, but

never we perceive the being of the white paper, that is, the word being has no objective correlate. Hence when we assert the proposition ‘this paper is white’, being is not a real predicate. For Kant ‘being’ is a logical copula, for Husserl ‘being’ is neither a real predicate nor a logical copula. Related to the nature of being, Husserl in *Philosophical Investigations* (paragraph 43) giving reference to Kant’s notion of being argues that;

The form-giving flexion *Being*, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember Kant’s dictum: *being is not a real predicate*. This dictum refers to being *qua* existence, or to what Herbart called the being of ‘absolute position’, but it can be taken to be no less applicable to predicative and attributive being. In any case it precisely refers to what we are here trying to make clear. I can see colour, but not *being*-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not *being*-smooth. I can hear a sound but not that something *is* sounding. Being is not *in* the object, nor part of it.... But being is also nothing attaching *to* an object: as it is no real internal feature, so it is also no real external feature, and therefore not, in the *real* sense, a ‘feature’ at all.⁴⁷

So, what is the origin of the concept of being, Husserl discusses this question (paragraph 44) and asks if ‘being’ like logical categories would be a mental act and if it could be a judgement, he argues that;

The thought of judgement fulfils itself in the inner intuition of an actual judgement, but the thought of an “is” does not fulfil itself in this manner. Being is not a judgement nor a constituent of a judgement.⁴⁸

For Husserl, ‘the concept of being can arise only when some being, actual or imaginary, is set before eyes’.⁴⁹ To paraphrase it, being is neither a real nor a logical predicate, nor is it a judgement, but only an abstraction from actual giving of objects or state of affairs, only in such cases it can arise, although it is not given in the sense-perception. Although, Husserl

never gives a final answer to the origin of the concept of being, like Kant for him it is certain that being is not a real predicate, since the origin and the locus of the being can be found only in the transcendental ego.

2.6. TRANSCENDENCE IN HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY: UNITY OF BEING ON TEMPORAL BASE

We will assert that Heidegger's notion of being based on temporal-phronetical unity stems from Kantian view of being, in the sense that the unity of being is supposed to be in the subjective realm, i.e., it is understood in terms of human being. Heidegger bases his theory of being on the distinction between being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiendes*), he argues that such distinction has been forgotten since Plato's philosophy.

For Aristotle, being is not a genus or a class; it is a most universal and a real predicate. Following Aristotle in medieval ontology 'being' is designated as a 'transcendent', since the universality of being 'transcends' any universality of genus. Heidegger argues that;

Aristotle himself knew the unity of this transcendental 'universal' as a *unity of analogy* in contrast to the multiplicity of highest generic concepts applicable to things. With this discover, in spite of his dependence on the way in which the ontological question formulated by Plato, he put the problem of being on what was, in principle, a new basis. To be sure, even Aristotle failed to clear away the darkness of these categorical interconnections.⁵⁰

To Heidegger's mind, there remains a problem with the Aristotle's notion of being, which is how to apply the multiplicity of the categories to

the thing, which is a unity. Since, in his famous phrase, Aristotle says that a being becomes manifest (that is, with regard to its being) in many ways or a being can be spoken in many ways. Regarding the problem of being Heidegger claims that “so if it is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It is rather the darkest of all.”⁵¹

In other words Heidegger asks how or where the unity of being is possible. Thus he argues that “whence does Being as such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination.”⁵² The origin of the thought that being is one comes from Parmenides’ doctrine of being. For Parmenides, being and the one are the same.⁵³ The oneness of being in Aristotelian ontology originates from Parmenides’ doctrine of being, as Heidegger argues, “it is evident why Aristotle substitutes *to on*, beings, for *einai*, being, about which he is inquiring: namely, because it stands for *to on he on*, being. And being is one, *hen*.”⁵⁴

In Aristotle’s ontology “*on* and *hen* are different conceptually, but in their essence they are the same, that is, they belong together.”⁵⁵ It is clear that for Heidegger when we assert that being is a unity in Aristotelian sense, there remains a problem, which is how to understand the manifold sense of being, since the concept of being has multiple meanings for Aristotle.⁵⁶ Because, for Aristotle being in the first instance has a fourfold meaning and furthermore it has ten meanings, i.e., ten categories. Heidegger argues that this problem has determined the way of his thought.

According to him, as a result of Aristotle's statement, there has appeared a decisive turning point in the history of philosophy, because the question of 'Being' turns into the question of 'being', namely, the problem of the ontological difference and the oblivion of the meaning of being. With regarding that phrase of Aristotle, Heidegger asks that;

Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: What is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One needs but runs over the names assigned to them in the language of the philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem, at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as potentiality and actuality, Being as truth, Being as scheme of categories. What sense of being comes to expression in these four headings? How they can be brought into comprehensible accord? ⁵⁷

The resolution of this problem, which Heidegger sees, is that we can find the unity of such manifoldness of being in the analysis of the existential - transcendental structure of Dasein, for him, "every disclosure of being as transcending is *transcendental* knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is *veritas transcendentalis*." ⁵⁸
(Emphasis Heidegger's)

The meaning of transcendental, for Husserl, must be outside the world, whereas, for Heidegger, Dasein is always within-the-world. For Kant and Husserl transcendental has an epistemological meaning. For Heidegger it has an ontological meaning, as Vattimo argues;

Philosophy arrives at a recognition of the interpretive 'essence' of truth by way of a generalisation, above all in contemporary thinking, of the Kantian thematic of the transcendental function of reason, with the vital additional ingredient of the existentialist 'discovery' of the finitude of Dasein.⁵⁹

Heidegger interprets the meaning of being by means of the temporality of Dasein. He argues that "we shall point temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call 'Dasein'"⁶⁰ Heidegger suggests that "the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if it is rightly seen and rightly explained."⁶¹ Dasein is the only being which understands being and the being of Dasein is the temporality, hence, for Heidegger, time is the possible horizon for the understanding of being in general.⁶² The unity of being for Heidegger lies in the unity of care-structure and in the ecstatic unity of temporality, he argues that;

This ecstatic unity of the horizon of temporality is nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of *world* and world's essential belonging to *transcendence*. For transcendence has its possibility in the unity of ecstatic momentum.⁶³ (Emphasis Heidegger's)

To conclude, for the Greeks, being is a real predicate and the unity of being consists in the entity, substance itself, whereas the locus of being has been considered in the subjective realm as a logical copula by the transcendental philosophy of Kant. For the Greeks, being is the transcendent, the universal, i.e., something beyond any category. Kant through the Copernican Revolution redefines the way of metaphysics as transcendental philosophy and argues that being is not a real predicate, but

just a logical copula stemming from the transcendental unity of the apperception. Husserl in phenomenology and Heidegger in hermeneutic ontology follow Kant for the transcendental conception of philosophy, however, for Heidegger meaning of the being should be considered in terms of the transcendence of Dasein and the unity of being consists just in the ecstatic unity of temporality.



END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

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- ¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, par., B25.
- ² Ibid, par., B29.
- ³ Ibid, par., B28.
- ⁴ For a detailed discussion of transcendentals in Greek thought, look, F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon*, items *hyperousia* (beyond being, transcendence) and *hen* (the one, one), p. 91 and 78 and ff.
- ⁵ Plato, *Parmenides*, par. 141d.
- ⁶ Ibid, par. 141e.
- ⁷ Ibid, par. 142a.
- ⁸ Ibid, par. 160b.
- ⁹ Moravcsik, J., *Plato and Platonism, Plato's Conception of Appearance and Reality in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics, and its Modern Echoes*, p. 159.
- ¹⁰ Transcendence or transcendentals is a Latin concept; the matching concept in Greek philosophical vocabulary is *hyperousia* meaning beyond being or beyond essence.
- ¹¹ Plato, *Republic*, par. 509b.
- ¹² Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p.219.
- ¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par., 1003a35.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, par., 1003b1.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, par., 1028a1.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, par., 1028a1.
- ¹⁷ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p.135.
- ¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par., 1017b25.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, par., 1026b1.
- ²⁰ Ibid, par., 1028a1.
- ²¹ Ibid, par., 1052a15-1059a15, especially 1054a15.
- ²² Ibid, par. 1053b 20.
- ²³ Ibid, par. 1054a 15.
- ²⁴ Ibid, par. 9988b1 20.
- ²⁵ Look, for a detailed discussion of universality of being and the one, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par. 1001a1 5-30.
- ²⁶ Kant discusses concept of being related to ontological proof of the existence of God, since according to this argument the existence of God can be derived from the analysis of the concepts. But, he argues that the existence of something cannot be inferred from the concepts employed within that argument, since being cannot be derived from the reality and nothings add to it, since it just a logical copula.
- ²⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, par., A598 B626.
- ²⁸ Ibid, par., A600, B628.
- ²⁹ Ibid, par., A598, B626.
- ³⁰ Ibid, par., B114.
- ³¹ Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics, On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, p.27.
- ³² Kockelmans J. Joseph, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*, p. 202.

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- ³³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, par., B115-B116.
- ³⁴ In Kant's philosophy, there are twelve categories and the first of which is unity, and the possibility of meaningful experience is based on the idea of unity. If the reason had no a priori category of unity, it could never recognise anything as one thing.
- ³⁵ Rosen, Stanley; *The Question of Being, A Reversal of Heidegger*, p.38.
- ³⁶ Thilly, Frank; *A History of Philosophy*, p. 427.
- ³⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, par., B134, footnote.
- ³⁸ Heidegger, *Kant's Thesis about Being*, in *Pathmarks*, p. 354-355
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Thilly, Frank; *A History of Philosophy*, p. 621.
- ⁴¹ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 4.
- ⁴² Ibid, p.18.
- ⁴³ Ibid, p.25.
- ⁴⁴ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p.25-26.
- ⁴⁵ Tapper, Marion; *The Priority of Being or Consciousness for Phenomenology: Heidegger and Husserl*, *Metaphilosophy*, Vol, 17, No: 2-3, April-July. p.159
- ⁴⁶ Rosen, Stanley; *The Question of Being, A Reversal of Heidegger*, p.199.
- ⁴⁷ *The Essential Husserl, Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology*, Ed, Welton, D. p. 125.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 127.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 22.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, p.23
- ⁵² Heidegger, *Letter to Father Richardson*, p. X
- ⁵³ Cf., Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics, On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, p. 14-21.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 21.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 24.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 28
- ⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Letter to Father Richardson*, p. X.
- ⁵⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.62.
- ⁵⁹ Vattimo, Gianni; *Beyond Interpretation: The meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, p.9.
- ⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.38.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, p. 40.
- ⁶² Ibid, p.39.
- ⁶³ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 208.

CHAPTER 3

THE ORIGIN AND THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF METAPHYSICS IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

3.1. TWOFOLD ESSENCE OF METAPHYSICS AND THE INCOMMENSURABILITY OF THEORIA AND PRAXIS

Aristotle makes a distinction between practical and theoretical realms of philosophy. For him, *phronesis* and *techne* are two modes of knowledge related to the practical realm of philosophy and *episteme* is the theoretical realm of philosophy. Actually, since its beginning there has existed two ways of philosophy; one is what we call metaphysics of logic, which sees the primary issue in philosophy as *theoria*, that is, contemplation in the sense of the knowledge of being as such. The other conception of philosophy is what we call metaphysics of experience of which main concern is *phronesis*, an understanding of philosophy that suggests the main target of philosophical thinking to be in the course of life and in the practical issues. The main difference or the discord between them is time or temporality. With respect to their object of philosophy we can differentiate between them, *theoria* orients itself to the being itself, which

is beyond time and change, but *phronesis* remains in the sphere of time, within temporality and especially within human affairs. In the same line, philosophy since its birth has two meanings, which are closely related to each other, these are philosophy as a way of life and philosophy as knowledge. Therefore, the word philosopher has two meanings, either the man who lives and acts in a particular way, or the man who possesses a certain knowledge. Therefore, two particular tasks have been assigned to philosophy, theoretical and practical wisdom, that is, *bios theoretikos* and *bios praktikos*. The first is the contemplation of rational and eternal truth and the second is a kind of living according to a certain knowledge.

In discussing the relation between doing and thinking, Hannah Arendt argues that thinking, *theoria*, born in Greek mind, firstly means the withdrawal from the being involved in world and doing, hence in Greeks to theorise means to contemplate. The word theory comes from the Greek word *theatai*, which has the meaning spectators. For Greeks the condition of truth is the withdrawal from the play of life, Arendt argues that;

...as a spectator you may understand the 'truth' of what the spectacle is about; but the price you have to pay is the withdrawal from participating it.

The first datum underlying this estimate is that only the spectator occupies a position that enable him to see the whole play – as the philosopher is able to see the *kosmos* as a harmonious ordered whole. The actor, being part of the whole, must *enact* his part; not only is he a 'part' by definition, he is bound to the particular that finds its ultimate meaning and the justification of its existence solely as a constituent of a whole.¹

In the same line, Arendt discusses that there is a price, or cost, the philosopher must pay between the two ways. Since, in philosophy, one of

the ways necessarily excludes the other. If the philosopher wants to see the whole play and the whole cosmos, it is necessary for him to withdraw from the game itself, she claims that;

Withdrawal from the direct involvement to a standpoint outside the game (the festival of life) is not only a condition for judging, for being the final arbiter in the on going competition, but also a condition for understanding the meaning of the play.²

Therefore, what the actor is concerned with is *doxa*,³ opinion. In other words, for Greeks, theory and praxis are incommensurable, that is, through praxis we do not acquire the knowledge of theoretical objects and the vice versa. Heidegger discussing the same point arguing, that is, the main difficulty in choosing the way of metaphysics between *sophia* (*theoria*) and *phronesis* he argues that;

Phronesis specifically concerns man himself, but because it is dependent on the being of man as *agathos*, it is not autonomous.

On the other hand, *sophia* is indeed autonomous, insofar as it is purely concerned with the *archai*, but because it is concerned precisely with *aei*, it does not settle anything as regards human Dasein.⁴

In this classical sense, Greeks find their own true place in the cosmos through contemplation of the eternal order beyond the practical and the temporal world. We can site the main differences between *sophia* and *phronesis* as follows; *sophia* is in its essence *episteme*, that is, it is always related to beings that are. In other words, the world that we try to know is eternal and what is temporal is not within *episteme*; *sophia* is the knowledge of something that is eternal and unchangeable.⁵ *Sophia*

ultimately aims at the final principles of beings.⁶ On the other hand, the object of *phronesis* is the deliberator himself, hence the being can be otherwise, *phronesis* is in each case new and ruled by the either-or.⁷ Thus, *phronesis* remains always within time.

Therefore, we can ask that which one is the way or the nature of philosophy that the philosopher must primarily and essentially follow, is it *sophia* or *phronesis* he is to choose? In other words, what is the highest possibility of metaphysics? With regard to that question, to the way of philosophical wisdom, Aristotle claims that *theoria* is the highest possibility of human being, therefore, the highest way of metaphysics, since it is the perfect form of *episteme*. He discusses the question of *sophia* versus *phronesis* in the book VI of *Nichomean Ethics* and says that;

Wisdom must plainly be the most finished state of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be comprehension with knowledge- knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion. For it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.⁸

According to Aristotle, philosophical wisdom, *theoria*, is a higher form of knowledge than practical wisdom, *theoria* is the kind of knowledge accomplished simply for its own sake and *theorein* is the way through which *sophia* is carried out. Aristotle argues that “the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong to the contemplative activity, ...

the wise man, even by himself, can contemplate truth ... he is the most self-sufficient.”⁹

Accordingly, the wise man, man who has *sophia*, is the ideal of Greek philosophy; it can be argued that three things are particularly definitive of Greek philosophy; *nous*, *bios theoretikos* and *bios praktikos*. *Sophia* is pure seeing carried out through *bios theoretikos*, one who theorises looks on the festival of life as a spectator. On the other hand, the aim of the *phronesis* is the struggle of man to cover up himself; that is, in *phronesis* man himself is in the play or in the festival of the life.

3.2. METAPHYSICS FOR ARISTOTLE: THE QUESTION OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND THE RANK BETWEEN THEORIA AND PHRONESIS

Aristotle has classified the sciences as follows; logic, as the method of inquiry employed in all other sciences, which he calls *Analytiks*. Theoretical sciences, which are concerned with the pure and abstract knowledge; these are mathematics, physics, biology, psychology and first philosophy, later to be called metaphysics. Ethics and politics are practical sciences; these are related to conducting the life. Finally, poetics, which is related to the nature of beauty and the beautiful and in a sense similar to what we call now aesthetics. Especially, what Aristotle calls first philosophy, that is, *prote philosophia* or metaphysics, determines our idea of philosophy. First philosophy investigates beings as beings, it is not

related to a particular field of beings like mathematics or physics, but it tries to analyse the beings as beings, their origins, *arche*, and their causes, *aitia* is the aim of first philosophy.

According to Aristotle, philosophy in its essence is a rigorous science; the science of things as they are, consequently, the first and the prime task of philosophy is theoretical wisdom. In *Metaphysics* Aristotle discusses the scope and the aim of philosophy and remarks that there is a science which investigates being as being, and defines it in the following way; “there is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belonging to this in virtue of its own nature.”¹⁰ He differentiates it from other sciences in respect to their related substances and claims that;

If there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, the natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this being *qua* being-both what is and the attributes which belong it *qua* being.¹¹

Although being may be expressed in many diverse senses, there is a central point, all these senses refer to that point, every being is a substance. And “it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.”¹² In *Categories*, Aristotle distinguishes two senses of substance, in the first instance “a substance - that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily and most of all - is that which is neither said of a subject nor in subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse.”¹³ In its second sense, substance is the species and the generals, for

instance, man belongs to the species and animal is a genus of the species, these are the secondary substances. He says that whether philosopher investigates the substance itself or certain properties belonging to being as such, it is about these that the philosopher has to investigate. The most important mark of the substance in its primary sense is that it is a subject, other categories such as, quality, quantity, relation, space and so on can only be predicates, but primary substance as a subject exists in terms of itself and by itself. In this line, Aristotle argues that “all the things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any other things to exist.”¹⁴ Truth, according to Aristotle, is another sense of being, however it is not in the entity itself but it is in the subject’s mind, who investigates the senses of being. In his famous definition, Aristotle defines truth in the following way, “to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”¹⁵

For Aristotle, “being and unity are the same”¹⁶, since substance signifies unity and individuality which means that all properties of a substance belong to a one definite thing. Being has also the sense of potentiality and actuality.¹⁷ But, as it can be seen from the above considerations that the question about being as being is essentially a question of substance. Related to this point Allan argues that “the contemplation of being, which is directed to a discovery of its first causes,

will be par excellence, but not exclusively a contemplation of the substantial.”¹⁸ As Aristotle himself argues “there are several senses in which a thing may be said to be... while ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is the ‘what’ which indicates the substance of the thing.”¹⁹

Aristotle distinguishes substance and the attributes, the properties belonging to it; the latter ones are the predicates of the substance, i.e., of the subject. The essence of a thing is that which makes that thing what it is, he argues that “denoting the substance of a thing means the essence of the thing is nothing else.”²⁰ In this line, as S. M. Cohen argues “essentialism, then, is part and parcel of Aristotle’s conception of substance, as the basic individuals.”²¹ Essentialism poses a sharp division between essential and accidental properties hence we can consider Aristotle’s theory of being in terms of substantialism and essentialism.

However, on the one hand, for Aristotle, first philosophy poses the question of essences and the nature of beings, the nature of to be in general insofar as it is a being. On the other hand, it investigates beings as a whole, in inquiring back to the supreme and to the ultimate, the most original being, that is, divine being, therefore first philosophy has an intrinsic or essential connection with theology.²²

As it is well known, the term metaphysics has been coined to indicate the position of Aristotle’s some writings and by the title it is supposed to refer to the works coming after *Physics*. The content of those writings,

Aristotle himself calls *prote philosophia*. Throughout the history of philosophy the term metaphysics, proper to its grammatical meaning has achieved the idea that it is a science that deals with the being itself. In other words, metaphysics no longer means that which comes after the doctrines on physics, but that which deals with whatever turns away from physics and turns toward beings in general. Therefore, metaphysics remained such a technical title for a long time and then it has gained a meaning as the science of suprasensuous with respect to its content, a meaning which asks the question of what is over the physical realm, that is, being qua being. First philosophy or metaphysics is the science of being itself as being, as Heidegger interprets meta-physics;

Ta meta ta physica, now no longer means that which comes after the doctrines on physics, but that which deals with whatever *turns away* from the physica and *turns toward* other beings, toward beings in general and toward that being which properly is. This *turnaround* happens in philosophy proper. The *prote philosophia* is metaphysics in this sense. This turning away of philosophy proper from nature as one particular domain, from any such domain at all, is *going over beyond* individual beings, *over* to this other.²³ (Italics Heidegger's)

For Heidegger, in our understanding of the term metaphysics we are stuck to this conception of metaphysics, that is, to the tradition which sees *prote philosophia* as metaphysics interpreted in the above way and as a philosophising proper.²⁴

The traditional concept of metaphysics has either the meaning of the science studying on the suprasensuous world or it has a similar meaning with theology. Actually, it depends on Aristotle's understanding of *prote*

philosophia, accordingly, the issue in the first philosophy is the knowledge of being as such, that which pertains to every being as a being and to every being as far as it is a being. Consequently, first philosophy has two senses, in the first instance it poses the question of the essence or the nature of the beings; in the second instance it poses the question concerning beings as a whole, namely the questions related to theology. Therefore, Aristotle names also first philosophy *theologike*. Thus it is prefigured in Aristotle's thought that *prote philosophia* and theology has a peculiar connection. This is why Descartes in his major work *Meditations on First Philosophy* explicitly says that first philosophy has as its objective the proof of the existence of god and the immortality of the soul. This explains that why in the medieval age, metaphysics under the very influence of Christianity has been connected with theology and why Christian philosophy reinterpreted Aristotle's conception of first philosophy as suprasensuous world or God himself.²⁵

3.3. CLASSICAL METAPHOR OF THINKING: ESSENCE VISIBLE TO MIND

It is held by the most that Plato in the doctrine of the ideas has given a rational and an intelligible system pervading all things, and by reason alone one captures the world. The essence of the Plato's philosophy can be said to behold the ideas and to withdraw from the pseudo-images of the actual living world. Accordingly, the theory of knowledge occupies the

heart of Plato's philosophy and the acts of knowing is the primary issue as the highest possibility of philosophy, if it is, so we can understand why Descartes accuses the preceding philosophers of a failure to find the true way of knowledge.

Both in postmodern area and in traditional metaphysics the philosophy of Plato generally has been viewed in rational terms. Namely, the understanding that the true world is present to reason rather than to experience, and the term Platonism has been used not only for the adherents of the above view but also for philosophy itself. Accordingly, the understanding that truth or being is reached by circumventing ordinary experience and thought is the universal constant refers to both philosophy and Platonism in general. If this is true, we understand by philosophy to know an abstract truth once and for all, hence, the primary task of philosophy is of a theoretical issue having no direct sign regarding the phenomenal world but only a secondary one in a roundabout way. We can summarise this view as the following;

For Plato, the intellect (*nous*) is the highest part of human soul. Through it man can gain wisdom, which consists in contemplating the Ideas. The Ideas are eternal, immutable, incorporeal entities on which all other things depend for their being.²⁶

In the Greek world, philosophy has begun with Parmenides' dictum that being and thought are the same, as Hannah Arendt argues "philosophy begins with an awareness of the invisible harmonious order of *kosmos*"²⁷. She claims that;

Since Parmenides the key word for this invisible, imperceptible whole implicitly manifest in all that appears has been *Being*, seemingly the most empty and general, the least meaningful word in our vocabulary.²⁸

What corresponds to being is the *nous* in man²⁹, something that which is the quintessence of *animal rationale*, as Hoffman argues the same point;

The Greek tradition conceived the notion of the universe as a cosmos, a beautiful harmonious and a beneficent sphere. Human personality was viewed, in potentially, as the microcosm the universe. Man's function was to mirror the macrocosm as perfectly as possible in his self, *Nous*, his task was to recognise, identify with, and represent the perfect order.³⁰

This understanding of man and world inaugurates the philosophy historically, namely the affinity between mind and reality. Roochnik argues that "Thales was the first thinker in the West to believe that the *arche* was intelligible... that there is a continuity between the mind and the world out there that the mind thinks."³¹

According to Heidegger, the formulation of Parmenides' being and thinking are the same "becomes the basic theme of all Western-European thinking and the history of that thinking is at bottom a sequence of variations on this theme, even where Parmenides's saying is not specifically cited."³² In other words, the words of Parmenides, which indicates the fundamental problem of relation between man and being has become the basic issue for philosophy since the beginning of it. With Parmenides, the duration of what-is replaced with the mythological gods

and the essence of man has been defined in the identity of thinking and being. Habermas, underlying this point, states that;

...the identity of the individual ego as a stable entity can only be developed through identification with abstract laws of cosmic order. Consciousness, emancipated from archaic powers, now anchors itself in the unity of a stable cosmos and the identity of immutable Being.³³

Therefore, it can be suggested that being becomes the basic idea of the metaphysical thinking and every idea is related to being, that whatever is is comprehended in a such way that it is a being. Furthermore, the essential relation between man and being is that of an intelligibility and the truth is the name of such a relation, that is why in the traditional ontology truth is defined as the conformity of thing and intellect or the intelligibility of being is called truth. Shortly, being and the true are convertible and, as Aristotle says, truth is another name for being.

First philosophy as the contemplation of the truth of being, or as the question of the being as being, formulated by Aristotle, up to the contemporary age has determined the main characteristics of philosophical thinking. *Theoria* has been viewed as the main target of philosophical thinking. *Theorein*, contemplation, has been understood as the way through which *sophia* carried out and the role of the disinterested *nous* in this task is to contemplate being, as Levinas argues;

The correlation between *knowledge*, understood as the disinterested contemplation, and, *being*, is, according to our philosophical tradition, the very site of intelligibility, the

occurrence of meaning. The comprehension of being – the semantics of this verb – would thus be the very possibility of or the occasion for wisdom and the wise and, as such, is *first philosophy*. The intellectual, even the spiritual life, of the West, through the priority it gives to knowledge identified with Spirit, demonstrates its fidelity to the first philosophy of Aristotle, ... by being *qua* being.³⁴

If we consider the same problem from the point of representation, the main concern of philosophy is to present what is outside of human mind to the human reason. As Rorty argues, in the Greek world, philosophical contemplation of the knowledge of the universal concepts makes the eye of mind the inescapable model for the better sort of knowledge³⁵, that is, the eye of the mind, *nous*- thought, intellect, insight- has the capability of knowing eternal truths. Man's essence has been considered to discover the essences;

The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy essence, the universe around us is the complement of the notion, common to Democritus and Descartes, that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly knowable things, knowledge of whose essence provides the master-vocabulary which permits commensuration of all discourses.³⁶

If we follow Heidegger in discussing the question of representation, the Greeks have had no word in their language that has the meaning of representation.³⁷ Since, for them, knowledge of something was the apprehension of what-is. However, representation is indeed a modern kind of thinking, namely, Cartesian thinking that bases itself on subject's ontologically distinction from the object. Yet representative thinking has

been destined as a fate in the Greek world. While interpreting Heidegger's concept of *Weltbild* Derrida argues that;

The determination of the being of what is as *eidōs* is not yet its determination as *Bild*, but the *eidōs* (aspect, look, visible figure) would be a distant condition, the presupposition, the secret mediation which would one day permit the world to become representation.³⁸

Indeed, representation theory is a Cartesian conception based on the metaphor of visually thinking and it means literally both to exhibit the image and to present earnestly to the mind a visual or a mental image of something. However, as Buber argues the visual understanding of thinking in the history of human spirit occurs firstly in the Greek world;

The hegemony of the visual sense over other senses, which appears among the Greeks for the first time, as a tremendous new factor in the history of the human spirit, the very hegemony which enabled them to live a life derived from images and to base a culture on the forming of ideas, holds good in their philosophy as well. A visual image of the universe (*weltbild*) arises which is formed from sense impressions and objectified as only the visual sense is able to objectify, and the experiences of the other senses are as it were retrospectively recorded in this picture. Even Plato's world of ideas is a visual world, a world of forms that are seen.³⁹

Rorty calls such an understanding of visual thinking Greek ocular metaphor.⁴⁰ Pöggeler, following Heidegger, argues that the conception of truth through the philosophy of Plato turns into *idea*, therefore it is related to making visible of something and its showing itself.⁴¹ As parallel to it, in the philosophy of Aristotle *theoria* means looking at, viewing something, it is the way to the truth. Philipse claims that "if one models universal

knowledge on the paradigm of vision, one will think that there have to be universal objects which are perceived by the spiritual eyes.”⁴²

However, it is different from the Greek thinking, Cartesian way of philosophy, repeats the ocular metaphor in its own way. Since, for Descartes, subjective representation involves having true mental images of the objects, but, for Aristotle and for the Greek thinking, in acquiring knowledge the mind becomes formally identical with the known object, that is, knowledge is something the identity of the subject with the object. As Gadamer argues for Aristotle's *De Anima*, (book III paragraph 4), “Aristotle is setting forth the truly speculative identity of subjective and objective as the culmination of his metaphysics.”⁴³ Philipse discusses the same point as follows, “for Aristotle in acquiring knowledge the mind becomes identical with the known object, knowledge on Cartesian conception involves true mental representations.”⁴⁴

Furthermore, Descartes' philosophy makes subjective epistemology central to metaphysics, in the Cartesian dictum *cogito ergo sum*, the basis of which lies in the Cartesian search for an indubitable ground, subject's reason has come to mean self-consciousness with no essential bounds to other than anything itself.

Properly, in the Greek thinking man is comprehended in the world and such a view of man's nature lies in the visual understanding of kosmos. The tendency of Greeks to understand the world as a self-

contained space in which man has a too fixed place, was perfected in Aristotle's geocentric spherical system, as Buber claims;

It was not before Aristotle that the visual image of the universe is realised in unsurpassable clarity as a universe of things, and now man is a thing among these things of the universe, an objectively comprehensible species beside other things – no longer a sojourner in a foreign land like the Platonic man.⁴⁵

In the Greek world, thought-being relation is the definitive of who we are. The world of ideas in the philosophy of Plato is in the static presence, which could be grasped only through perceiving the ideas, and truth is the correctness of such a mental perception as the agreement between perceiving and the thing perceived. Therefore, what we call Platonism is the understanding that the true world is present to intellect rather than to experience; true world, that is, truth or being is reached by circumventing ordinary experience and thought is the universal constant on which we base the question that who we are. Man's self-constitution is primarily seen in the representation of what-is through *nous*, which provides the metaphysical conception of self-identity issuing from Parmenides' dictum. However, in the Cartesian substantial dualistic ontology, the ego or the subject is considered to be the absolute ground for representing the true world and the being is grasped by thought in the mathematical form. To sum up, philosophical wisdom, *sophia*, in Greek world has been carried out in terms of *theoria* as first philosophy and the principle of identity was later transformed into the identity of the subject as self-consciousness in the form of representative thinking. As we shall see

in the following chapters, in hermeneutic ontology the conception of philosophy arisen from *sophia, theoria* or representative thinking has been criticised by Heidegger, Gadamer, Levinas asserting that understanding, history, interpretation and ethics are more fundamental categories than theoretical conception of first philosophy or subjective metaphysics.



END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

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- ¹ Arendt, Hannah, *The Life of the Mind: Thinking and Willing*, p., 93.
- ² Ibid, p. 94.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Heidegger, Martin, *Plato's Sophist*, p.115.
- ⁵ Cf., Ibid, p.23, 24.
- ⁶ Ibid, p. 40.
- ⁷ Ibid, p.34-40.
- ⁸ Aristotle, *Nichomean Ethics*, par., 1114a 15-25.
- ⁹ Ibid, par. 1177a 25-35.
- ¹⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par., 1003a 15-25.
- ¹¹ Ibid, par., 1026a 30.
- ¹² Ibid, par. 1003b 15.
- ¹³ Aristotle, *Categories*, par. 1b 15.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, par. 2b 5.
- ¹⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par. 1001b 25.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, par. 1003b 20-25.
- ¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book IX.
- ¹⁸ Allan, *Aristotle*, p.75
- ¹⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, par. 10208a 10-15.
- ²⁰ Ibid, par. 1007a 25-30.
- ²¹ Cohen, *Essentialism in Aristotle*, The review of *Metaphysics*, Vol. XXXI, No 3, Issue No 123, March 1978, p.405
- ²² Ibid, p. 43.
- ²³ Heidegger, Martin, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, p.39
- ²⁴ Ibid, p. 40.
- ²⁵ Cf., Ibid, p.40-46.
- ²⁶ Marenbon, J., *Later Medieval Philosophy 1150-1350 An Introduction*, p., 94.
- ²⁷ Arendt, Hannah, *The Life of the Mind: Thinking and Willing*, p., 143.
- ²⁸ Ibid, p., 144.
- ²⁹ Ibid, p., 136.
- ³⁰ Hoffman, Hans, *Order and Chaos: A Plea for Flexibility*; in *The Concept of Order*, p., 408.
- ³¹ Roochnik, David, *The Tragedy of Reason: Toward a Platonic Conception of Reason*, p., 138.
- ³² Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*, p., 242.
- ³³ Habermas, Jurgen, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p., 307.
- ³⁴ Levinas, *Ethics as First Philosophy*, p., 76.
- ³⁵ Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p.,39.
- ³⁶ Ibid, p., 357.
- ³⁷ Cf. M. Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture*, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*.
- ³⁸ Derrida, *On Representations*; p. 119.
- ³⁹ Buber, M., *Between Man and Man*, p., 127.
- ⁴⁰ Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p., 11.
- ⁴¹ Pöggeler, Otto, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 80.

⁴² Philipse, Herman, *Towards a Postmodern Conception on Metaphysics: On the Genealogy and Successor Disciplines of Metaphysics*, *Metaphilosophy*, January 1994, Vol. 25, No. 1., p., 5.

⁴³ Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, p., 27.

⁴⁴ Philipse, Herman, *Towards a Postmodern Conception of Metaphysics: On the Genealogy and Successor Disciplines of Modern Philosophy*, *Metaphilosophy*, January 1994, Vol. 25, No. 1., p.5

⁴⁵ Buber, Martin, *Between Man and Man*, p., 127.



CHAPTER 4

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF GREEK CONCEPT OF THEORIA

The main target of this chapter is to compare the classical notion of philosophy with the transcendental understanding of philosophy and to understand the meaning of Kant's Copernican Revolution as an inversion of the logic of subject-object relation. Greeks has defined the main way of metaphysics in terms of *theoria*; firstly and for most of the part the fundamental question of metaphysics has been delimited as the task for the inquiry for being as being. Hence, we will analyse how the Greek concept of cosmos has been criticised both from epistemological and ontological points of view and the task for philosophy has been redefined in the phenomenal world. Particularly, our aim is to view how Greek conceptions of *theoria* and *sophia* has been exposed to such radical critiques and the main way of philosophy has been redefined especially in the sphere of experience. With the philosophies of Kant, Husserl, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the classical way of metaphysics has begun to change gradually from theoretical realm to practical realm, whereby praxis and the interpretation of praxis become the essential way of metaphysics. Kant's transcendental subjectivism and Husserl's transcendental ego find their

origin in Descartes's philosophy of subjectivism and metaphysics of self-consciousness, therefore, we will interpret that the origin of transcendental philosophy is subjectivism. In other words, the ground of metaphysics is the consciousness of the subject where philosophy begins and returns to it. We will shortly analyse Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's critique of traditional conception of metaphysics, that is, Nietzsche's view of being as interpretation and Kierkegaard's notion of temporality and truth without objectivity and theory in Greek sense.

For Greeks, metaphysics is the contemplation of the being or the truth of being, but phenomenology replaces the talk about being with the talk about the phenomenon of being. Therefore, the absolute harmony between thinking and being has been replaced with the relative harmony between 'subject's thinking' and 'the being subject thought'. In other words, in phenomenological ontology, Cartesian thinking is still the model for grasping the world. Gadamer argues that Husserl has viewed transcendental reduction for arriving at the *ego cogito* –transcendental ego- as the ultimate foundation on which we base the all legitimate derivation of the ontic validity of everything.

Just as Descartes, by means of universal doubt, suspend everting held as valid in order to reach the certainty in *fundamentum inconcussum* of the *ego cogito*, so the suspension of the general thesis of reality and the movement of transcendental reduction leads in the same way to transcendental-primal ego as the source of every bestowal of meaning and being.¹

But, the main problematic which Cartesian thinking produces is the relation between subject and the objective world, likewise which is the main problematic for phenomenology. As we shall see, for Kant, existing of the external world still depends on a belief. According to him, we have the knowledge of the phenomenal world and we are not able to know the nature of the things in themselves, the noumenal world. Furthermore, the knowledge of the phenomenal world is possible only on the basis of subject's transcendental characteristics; like, transcendental aesthetics, (intuitions and sensations), the transcendental logic and transcendental analytics (categories). Therefore, these properties of the subject are transcendental, in that they are what make possible our experience of the objective world and prior to the experience.

Both in Kantian and Husserlian phenomenological way of thinking, the main emphasis of the transcendental philosophy is on the critique of the Greek notion of *theoria*. On Kant's account, all metaphysical problems and the debate issuing from them is a consequence of the uncriticised concept of theoretical reason. To him, our knowledge is restricted to the realm of experience, the condition of which is the a priori concepts and the relations of those concepts. On Husserl's account, the notion of intentionality and the consciousness are the conditions of the knowledge.

Hence, both Kant's and Husserl's transcendental conception of philosophy and transcendental epistemology is a critique of the classical pure or naïve conception of logic, that is, the thought-being logic

understood as *theoria*. Transcendental philosophy rejects the direct vision of the objects by the pure or naïve knowledge of the subject, in other words, when subject transcends to the object, it determines the conditions the objectivity the object. Therefore, the object is object only in so far as a transcendental subject or ego transcends it. Gadamer while evaluating the main characteristics of the contemporary philosophy argues that contemporary philosophy has three distinctive peculiarities, they are the critiques of “1) the naïvete of the assertion 2) the naïvete of the reflection 3) the naïvete of the concept.”² The first critique is directed to the conception of logic, i.e., to the apophantical conception of judgement. Second critique is related to the intentionality, in that, there is always an intention between subject and the object and the reflection between subject and object is not naïve. The objective of the third critique is language, for instance, Heidegger views language as a mode of interpreting world and all thinking is confined to the language as a limit and as well as a possibility.

4.1. THE QUESTION OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY IN CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE SELF-GROUNDING SUBJECT

The point by which Descartes begins his philosophy and which determines the basic traits of the Cartesian world conception and by which philosophical tradition orients itself to epistemological issues as its main problems is the Cartesian doubt. In the Cartesian world conception the

main argument is that man is seen as self-enclosed to himself or as a wordless and an isolated subject. It is not an accident that Descartes is called as the father of modern philosophy, in fact, according to Descartes, in order to do philosophy we need clear and distinct knowledge upon which we base all philosophy. Descartes in *Meditations* clarifies his aim in philosophy as the following;

Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.³

He means by clear and distinct knowledge the kind of knowledge about which we cannot doubt, it is thus indubitable and certain, as Bernstein argues;

Descartes's *Meditations* is the *locus classicus* in modern philosophy for the metaphor of the 'foundation' and for the conviction that the philosopher's quest is to search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge.⁴

The Archimedean point for Descartes is the *ego cogito* which could serve for such a purpose and which is indubitable as firm and permanent foundation. For Heidegger, with this change metaphysics becomes essentially an epistemological search, as Blahchette argues;

When doubting was brought to stand at the begging of philosophy, Heidegger writes, 'a theory of knowledge had to be erected before a theory of world. From then on epistemology is the foundation of philosophy, and that distinguishes modern from the medieval'.⁵

This development culminates in Kantian philosophy with a new twist, because metaphysics becomes the science of philosophy by the transcendental philosophy of Kant. In the first *Critique* Kant asks, as the main problem of metaphysics, how knowledge is possible, more exactly how metaphysics is possible as a science. In the Cartesian philosophy there are three things that make up the world, these are, *res cogitans* and *res extensa* and *res divina*. Descartes maintains this division, but we see that these three kinds of things as nature, the soul and God are also a division of metaphysics to which Kant strictly adheres in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.⁶ When we accept the *ego cogito* as a foundation, the world in Cartesian view becomes something specifically external. The *ego cogito* is a self-grounding ground, that is, something defined in terms of itself and then becomes the spectator of others, as Guignon argues;

The crucial decision made by Descartes is to determine the ground of understanding as lying in the *self-certainty* of the knowing subject. With this shift in the conception of the source of true understanding, the anthropocentrism and the subjectivism of the modern age begins.⁷

Res cogitans is the thinking subject. It is as such the subject grounding itself. *Res extensa* is the substance having extension and is the object of the subjects. When these two substances are sharply separated from each other, the subject as self-enclosed to itself becomes the wordless and the world is considered especially to be the world of *res extensa* which is external to the subject. Heidegger thus argues on the basis of his interpretation of the Cartesian conception of the world that “Descartes

narrowed down the question of the world to that of things of nature (*Naturdinglichkeit*) as those entities within-the-world which are proximally accessible.”⁸ For Descartes, we are merely minds with certain ideas and representations; knowledge is the way through which subject gets out itself and knows the world and “the only genuine access to them lies in knowing *intellectio*, in the sense of the kind of knowledge we get in mathematics and physics.”⁹ In this relationship what comes the fore is that the subject, i.e., the *ego cogito* that has consciousness and it represents the objective world, as Guignon argues, “the subject becomes the centre around which all other entities revolve as the object of experience: the self is the ‘subjectum’ that which is ‘thrown-under’ and underlines beings.”¹⁰

In Cartesian philosophy, the unity of being and thinking was asserted first and for the most in the subjective sphere, within the ‘I’ itself, through *cogito ergo sum*. Such an understanding of identity signifies beginning of modern philosophy and modern thinking, something differs from the Greek mind. Descartes views the moment of self-consciousness as the absolute beginning point of philosophy in the sense that we eliminate all presuppositions and self-consciousness is regarded as the essential constituent of the self.

Actually, with the modern age or with the philosophy of Descartes, the fundamental character of metaphysics has become the absolute certainty, not as an epistemological problem, but as the very content and the problem of metaphysics itself. Epistemology, in this sense, has been

considered to be a tool for such an absolute certainty and that the Cartesian 'I' has become the starting point for such an aim.

In Cartesian thought, man is seen as self-enclosed to itself without any bound the world, while on the other hand, Kant's philosophy is a critique of Cartesian subject in a positive sense. Kantian transcendental subject is a revaluation of Cartesian subject in terms of possibility of experience. Whether we think of Cartesian subjectivity or Kant's transcendental subjectivity man is considered to be a rational, autonomous self. Self-consciousness, that is, the relationship of the knowing subject to himself, is the inner and the absolutely certain sphere which relates man to objects in terms of representations. Related to Cartesian self-consciousness and the Cartesian dictum *cogito ergo sum* Levinas argues that;

The passage from *cogito* to the *sum* leads to that point where the free activity of knowledge, an activity of alien to external goal, will also find itself on the side of what is known. This free activity of knowledge will also come to constitute the mystery of being *qua* being, whatever is known by knowledge. The *Wisdom of first philosophy* is reduced to self-consciousness.¹¹ (Italics Levinas')

To sum up, Descartes' philosophy renders epistemology central to metaphysics and Kant remains within this tradition. The substantial character of Cartesian subject comes from itself as the self-grounding ground, which has given rise epistemology a primarily metaphysical character and it has caused a sharp detachment between the subjective and the objective worlds.

4.2. ORIGIN OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY: THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EXTERNAL WORLD

The fundamental idea laid down in *Critique of Pure Reason* is that reality can only be known in terms of spatio-temporal intuitions, which are a priori conditions of empirical sensations and rationally apprehending and interpreting of such intuitions. The former is what Kant calls transcendental aesthetic and the latter is transcendental logic. For Kant, the aim of transcendental philosophy is to settle down the way of philosophy in its correct route, as Bernstein states;

He claims that his critical inquiry at once reveals and justifies the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge. Kant identifies *the transcendental turn* with the proper way of philosophy.¹² (My emphasises)

Kant, in the beginning of the Critique states that “there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience”¹³. However, he argues that the existing of the things outside of us is the scandal of philosophy, since we are not able to prove their existing. His transcendental subjectivism in its essence remains within the Cartesian problematic, as Philipse argues, “Kant remained within the Cartesian frame of reference, which induces us to ask how we could get from the inner space of representations to outer reality.”¹⁴

Kant follows Descartes’ theory of separable mind and his distinction of the subject and the object, that is, the two different conceptions of

substance and the question of the correspondence of subjective and objective worlds. His transcendental theory can be considered to be an attempt to answer the problem of the constitutions of correspondence between mind and objective reality. Therefore, Kant's main question, how synthetic a priori judgements possible, is an effort for explaining the relation between the two worlds. On the one hand there exists an outer world, while on the other hand, mind standing out sensible-phenomenal world constructs the knowledge of the outer world in terms of the spatio-temporal forms of sensations and the categories of mind, as Deleuze states,

The first thing that the Copernican Revolution teaches us is that it is we who are giving the orders. There is here an inversion of the ancient conception of wisdom. The sage was defined partly by his submission, partly his final accord with Nature. Kant sets up the critical image in opposition to wisdom. We are the legislators of Nature.¹⁵

In other words, as Smith argues "Kant placed all emphasis on the unity bestowed on the object in virtue of its thought by the subject." ¹⁶

According to Kant, the noumenal world, the world of things in themselves, is unknowable for us and he develops his theory of critique as transcendental subjectivism which is the unity of subjective mind and objective world, i.e., phenomenal world. For our aim, we could regard Kant's philosophy from three points, these are, firstly, his critique of theoretical reason, secondly, the unknowable nature of noumenal world and finally viewing metaphysics in practical-ethical world, hence, which is not a theoretical task as Greeks thinks. We take Kant's distinction between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* as having a crucial point, since his Critique of Pure

Reason is a challenge against the classical metaphysics, against seeking the fundamental principles of being or reality in terms of reason, as Louis argues, “he believed that he had discovered in practical reason the means to get at the domain of noumenon, which had been irremediably closed to speculative philosophy.”¹⁷

According to Hannah Arendt, for Kant, truth is limited to the realm of understanding and meaning to the realm of reason, that is; “the need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest of meaning. And truth and the meaning are not the same.”¹⁸ In other words, thinking (meaning) is what reason does and knowing (truth) is what understanding does. Yet, Kant closes the meaning question to reason itself arguing that human reason when surpasses experience goes to antinomies. For Kant, the classical assertion about the unity of being and thinking is only and partly possible in the sphere of experience in terms of the unity of the self-consciousness, i.e., the synthetic unity of apperception. The connection between subjective and objective worlds is the ‘I think’ that accompanies every representation which Kant calls pure apperception through which the transcendental ‘I’ unifies perceptions given in the manifold. Therefore, the ‘I think’ is the ultimate precondition for having an object of experience and has its function in the phenomenal world, that is; “for Kant the unity of all possible objects experience depends in the last analysis on the unity of the I in its synthesising categorical sets of thinking.”¹⁹ Since, the noumenal world, the world of things in themselves, is unknowable to us and he

develops his theory of critique as transcendental subjectivism, which, in its essence is the unity of the subjective mind and the objective world, that is, phenomenal world. The unity of the two worlds is the fundamental idea of what Kant calls the Copernican Revolution.

As Hegel criticises Kant, the identity of being and thinking is relative in Kant's philosophy. Hegel takes the issue of philosophy from this problematic, for him, they are originally and absolutely identical. As Hincman argues; "being as it is in itself for Kant originally different from thinking, the only possible knowledge open to us is relative, that is, to the mind's capacity to 'legislate' for nature by means of the categories."²⁰ For Kant, the existing of the external-objective world is based on the faith, i.e., a supposition that we could not confirm, which he calls the scandal of philosophy. In the preface of the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* he states that;

It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside of us (from which we derive the whole material knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted on *faith*, and if anyone thinks doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.²¹

According to Kant, there cannot be given any rational solution to this problematic, but, for Heidegger, this is a pseudo problem, he argues that "the scandal of philosophy is that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected again and again."²² Heidegger argues that Cartesian metaphysics of knowledge is the origin of the problem of external world;

Descartes's interpretation of what it is to be of truth first creates the presupposition underlying the possibility of a theory of knowledge or a metaphysics of knowledge. Through Descartes's realism is first put in the position of having to prove the reality of the outer world.²³

Gadamer at this point argues that Heidegger radicalised the criticism of the consciousness by transforming it into an ontological critique of the understanding of being. For Heidegger such an understanding of consciousness creates the problem of external world, as Gadamer argues, Heidegger's critique of consciousness found its watchword in the assertion that Dasein is 'being-in-the-world.' Since that time many have come to regard that it is absurd and wholly obsolete to ask how the subject arrives at the knowledge of the so-called 'external world.' Heidegger has called the persistence of this question the real 'scandal' of philosophy.²⁴

4.3. PRACTICAL FINALITY OF METAPHYSICS

The self in the first *Critique* of Kant is the transcendental I as the legislative for nature defined in an instrumental epistemology, transcendental apperception is the 'I' that observes or introspects, not the 'I' that is fixated as object. Hence the former is noumenal, the latter phenomenal. Noumenal I is to be taken in the moral law as the subject of choice, which is out of the chain of causality. The man in noumenon sense is the man in himself and the choice takes place on the noumenal level of human existence. In the philosophy of Kant, the problem of the relation of the subject and the object tends to be internalised having two fundamental

parts, receptive sensibility and active understanding. Therefore, representation is both limited to the phenomenal world and redefined in the active sense. Dogmatism, i.e., classical understanding of theory, affirms a harmony between subject and object, to Kant's mind, this harmony remains incomplete in the speculative faculty, from which Kant passes into moral world, where the final harmony between subject and world occurs in terms of freedom, that is, as Lovejoy argues, Kant did not stop in theoretical reason; "...for his so-called 'practical reason' which he had the last word in his philosophy, gave forth metaphysical as well as ethical deliverances." ²⁵

Freedom is the realisation of the final and the fundamental task of human being; it is the supreme end for man on the terrestrial-temporal conditions. Therefore, the highest interest of reason is of practical in terms of free will. This is what Kant calls legislation by the concept of freedom, which he contrasts with legislation by natural concepts. The former legislates in the faculty of desire, the latter in the faculty of knowledge. The concept of freedom cannot represent a phenomenon, but when reason legislates in the practical interests it fulfils the rational ends of human being, which is the final realisation of the self. Hence, practical reason is seen as the realisation of man's inmost nature in Kant's philosophy, as Kant argues in the *Critique of Practical Reason*; "... every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use." ²⁶

In this sense, Kant claims that we can divide metaphysics into two parts, these are speculative and practical employment of pure reason and he finally retains the term metaphysics for its practical employment. Since, for him, reason, in its speculative employment could not find complete satisfaction and in the end brought us back to experience. According to him, human reason has two objects, nature and freedom, that which is and that which ought to be; the philosophy of nature deals with the former and the philosophy deals with the latter. The philosophy of morals in the last term is the final target of philosophy, and this is why “the ancients in their use of the term the ‘philosopher’ always meant, more especially, the moralist”.²⁷ To conclude, the highest object of metaphysics, for Kant, is the man himself; clearly practical philosophy is that which constitutes metaphysics and the moral subject is the culmination of the metaphysics, that is, for Kant, the determining ground of philosophy or the ultimate end of pure reason as the canon of philosophy is the ideal of the highest good, shortly practical philosophy.

4.4. PHENOMENOLOGY AS TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF NAÏVE CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

Phenomenology aims at studying the encounters between consciousness and the world. For us, the main point is that the world is only ever encountered as already constituted by and within consciousness,

that is, by transcendental subject. Since, transcendental subject never meets something alien to it, unfamiliar to its consciousness, hence, external world is an activity and the product of consciousness. Therefore, phenomenology tries to show the conditions of the re-presentation of the object in the subject's mind, that is, there is no naïve presentation or naturalistic presentation of the object to the knowing subject, as Davis argues;

The object is never re-presented to the subject because it can never be fully and neutrally encountered as it is. The mode of access to the object forms the part of the object itself; it is always an intentional object and so always belongs to the world given meaning by the intentionality of the consciousness. Even the division between subject and object can be regarded as one of the ways in which consciousness makes the world intelligible to itself, rather than being an opposition with objective validity outside consciousness.²⁸

In the same line, Levinas argues that phenomenology is a counter movement against the naïve view that it is possible to represent the object in terms of theoretical contemplation, he claims that;

Phenomenology is a destruction of the representation of the theoretical object. It denounces the contemplation of the object - (which, however, it seems to have encouraged) - as an abstraction, as a partial vision of Being, as a forgetting, one may say in modern times, of its truth.²⁹
To do phenomenology is to do denounce naïve the direct vision of object.³⁰

Therefore, in phenomenological ontology, we cannot say that the subject relates itself directly to the objects in terms of contemplation or through any theoretical way, but on the contrary the transcendental world-forming ego in terms of consciousness and intentionality constitutes the object and the objective world. Hence, the objective world is a product of

the transcendental subject as a unity of meaning. For instance, related to the spatio-temporal world Husserl argues in *Ideas* that;

The whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning mere intentional Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness. It is a Being which consciousness in its own experiences (*Erfahrungen*) posits, and is, in principle, intuitable and determinable only as the element common to the harmoniously motivated appearance-manifolds, but over and beyond this, is just nothing at all.³¹

Husserl, in *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, discusses that, naturalistic epistemology supposes that nature is before the consciousness as it is and as a unity of spatio-temporal being.³² In other words, the empirical sciences of nature, such as physics and psychology, presuppose that nature exists in itself and that may be known on the basis of experience. However, for Husserl, the object given in experience never could be encountered as it is and his transcendental idealism in this sense is a reversal of the natural ontology and an analysis of the possibility of objective experience in terms of the transcendental subject.³³

Husserl stresses on the consciousness of the subject and the intentionality in the relation of subject and object. For him, subject epistemologically has more priority than the object. To Husserl, consciousness and the intentionality are primary and absolute, therefore transcendental ego constitutes the knowable world through his intentional acts. The epoche reveals the transcendental ego, from which all others must be derived. Husserl argues in *Cartesian Meditations* that;

The objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me – this world, with its all Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its all existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only in the transcendental-phenomenological epoche.³⁴

In Husserl, transcendental philosophy means to put philosophy in its proper way, like it is in Kant. Bernstein clarifies this point as follows;

Transcendentalism, as portrayed by Husserl, supposedly represents the 'most radical transformation' and the fulfilment of the 'whole movement of philosophical history in the modern period'. Transcendentalism promises 'apodictic certainty' a genuine 'beginning', a new foundation and Archimedean point for philosophy. ... Transcendental phenomenology is supposed to be the 'final form' of philosophy itself.³⁵

However, Husserl criticises Kant's transcendental subjectivity and the unity of apperception, - since, Kant still holds the question of knowledge within the naturalistic and scientific world, i.e., Newtonian world, - as West points out;

All knowledge is founded on the achievements of an 'object-constituting subjectivity' (leistende Subjectivität). Husserl cites St. Augustine's dictum that 'The truth is not to be found in the external world; it resides in the interiority of man'.³⁶

According to Husserl, the transcendental philosophy of Kant still holds the objectivism. For Husserl Kant was not radical enough in pursuing the questions that he raised. Bernstein argues that Husserl thought himself as pursuing the *telos* of transcendental philosophy in a more thoroughgoing way than any previous philosopher and he understood himself as battling against all forms of objectivism in modern philosophy.³⁷

4.5. TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF LIFE-WORLD

In the beginning of his phenomenological project, Husserl believed that in terms of phenomenological *epoche* one could arrive at 'the things themselves'. In his early writings Husserl tried to make secure path of philosophy 'as a strict science'. As we know, in his later writings, especially in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, we see a new tendency in his thinking. He gives more importance in his philosophical analysis to the concept of *Lebenswelt*, i.e., life-world. He believes that scientific thought ignores the human historical context in their origins and there is a discontinuity between them, i.e., between scientific thought and the life-world, as West argues Husserl maintains that;

It is the genuine task of philosophy to supply such a rigorous understanding, bridging the gulf between science and the life-world. Husserl believed that he could apply the phenomenological method to this task, providing a phenomenological analysis of the essence of 'life-world'.³⁸

Husserl has begun to see that life-world is the foundation of the thought and science, as Fell argues;

In radical contrast to Descartes and Kant, who regard transcendental thought as establishing the world of knowledge and science (of *episteme*) as the real world, phenomenology rehabilitates 'the disparaged *doxa*, which now suddenly claims the dignity of a foundation of science, *episteme*.'³⁹

Therefore, the life-world could be seen as the very foundation of the sciences, in other words, sciences are to be grounded in transcendental subjectivity the ground of which lies in the life-world. Gadamer argues the same point as following;

Husserl came to the characterisation of the life-world that still functions as valid, that is, as the pregiven word. Its constitution is the task the transcendental ego that remained unrecognised before this time.⁴⁰

In this sense, for Husserl the work of phenomenology is a study of unfolding, explicating, laying out the implicit fore-structures and horizons that make explicit experience possible, i.e., the fore-structures that bear ontological implications on consciousness and transcendental ego. The life-world, there exists in advance for us as the ground of all praxis and theory.

4.6. SUBJECTIVITY AND TEMPORALITY

The idea that Kierkegaard rejects is the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, hence Greek conception of *theoria* cannot be ground for the metaphysical question of man's being. Therefore, the stress in his thought falls on the anxiety of the groundless decision rather than the rational constitution of man's choice. Meaning lies in subject's experience; man is the arbiter of meaning. The subject is not a universal one but an existing individual with no access to self-evident or divinely guaranteed criteria of judgement. Neither existence nor essence, nor being and thinking makes a coherent union. The legitimate ground or any rational way is missing. The

existing individual finds himself in the abyss, in the absence of ground, as Caputo argues;

The Platonic conception of return the ideas, and the identity of being and thinking is something that which is what impossible man's essential nature- the Greek recollective theory-, since, for Kierkegaard only possible action to man is the movement forward, namely repetition. Only Aristotle in the Greeks has given an important issue to the concept of movement. Kinesis, for Aristotle, is the movement from potentiality to actuality, which, according to Kierkegaard is to be understood in terms of freedom, not of a logical possibility. Therefore, kinesis properly posits movement.⁴¹

To Kierkegaard's mind, the metaphysics of presence has always either denied or subverted the concept of time and motion, hence freedom; time is not something passing away against which man is to persist, but authentic time lies in the future.. The Greek understanding of man and being is of a logical one based on necessity, but Kierkegaard, as a Christian thinker, develops his conception of time in terms of freedom, since the world has been created by the free act of divine will. In other words, Kierkegaard bases his concept of subjectivity on Christian therapy. Therefore, repetition has an ethico-religious meaning in Kierkegaard's thought;

Repetition means the task set for the individual to preserve in time, to stay with the flux, to provide his identity as an effect. And this ultimately is the religious task. The highest expression of repetition is the religious movement in which the individual passes from sin to atonement.⁴²

Transcendence, for Kierkegaard, means the actualising of the self himself; therefore it has a temporal meaning. It is to move, is to create an identity in the face of chaos, to repeat oneself in new actual matters. In this

line, freedom is the essence of movement and man's essential being, which is a counter argument for the Greek conception of man's essentially belonging to truth. The self is the one who presses forward in the element of actuality, rather than one who seeks some way around and becoming a spectator, looking *eidōs* by a disinterested *nous*. In Kierkegaard's words;

...repetition is a crucial expression of what 'recollection' was to the Greeks. Just as they thought that all knowing is a recollection, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition.... Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward.⁴³

Recollection reminds us that we are the products of our past, in other words, we can know who we are by recalling who we have been. However, repetition affirms that our present self is also determined by the future and our existence is yet open; "thus selfhood is a mode of being which sustains both the backward orientation of recollection and forward orientation of hope in the dialectical relation which is repetition."⁴⁴ In the movement from past to future self actualises himself in terms of freedom. In this context, truth is to be understood, for Kierkegaard, in terms of selfhood, subjectivity. The highest truth that is attainable for an existing individual is subjectivity. Properly, an objective understanding of truth can only be uttered at the expense of losing the subject. These two ways of questioning human nature, namely, subjectivity and objectivity are fundamentally opposite to each other and only one of them is proper to human's being. As a result, for Kierkegaard, selfhood lies in the

subjectivity, he argues that the existing individual is in the truth even if he is related to what is not true objectively.⁴⁵

4.7. PERSPECTIVISM AND INTERPRETATION OF BEING

If truth, for Kierkegaard, signifies temporality and the metaphysics without theory based on a theological view in positive sense; for Nietzsche, all truth is an interpretation and the foundation of all interpretation signifies a negative theology, since God is dead. Death of the God symbolises the lack of absolute foundation of the truth from a philosophical point of view; in other words, it symbolises that there is no longer any absolute foundation for thought in Platonic sense, the meaning of which could be more meaningful if we remember that the veracious God of Descartes is the guarantor of the truth. Truth, for Nietzsche, is an illusion that is in a constant state of becoming, since the value of the world lies in our interpretation without a final ground. Nietzsche in *The Will to Power* argues that;

The value of the world lies in our interpretation... The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fable and an approximation on the bases of a meager sum of observations; it is in 'flux' as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for – there is no 'truth'.⁴⁶

Foucault argues that in Nietzsche's view there is no truth and a transcendental signifies in classical sense;

There is no original signified for Nietzsche. Words themselves are nothing other than interpretations; throughout their history, they interpret before being signs, and in the long run they signify only because they are only essential interpretations.⁴⁷

The interest in interpretation is an interpretation of being. Blondel discusses the meaning of the interpretation in Nietzsche as the following;

Being is as interpreted, it is constituted in and through interpretation. ... It is then play more than truth, evolving and practical rather theoretical. But this conception implies that being has no foundation, since the interpretation which compasses being is always the interpretation of an interpretation, unless one could come to an end or represent (trace it back to) a pure, ultimate being, a founder.⁴⁸

Being is a sign that is to be interpreted; hence interpretation has an ontological order rather than an epistemological order and the world is a text and interpretation is a philological metaphor of philosophical-metaphysical scope.⁴⁹ For Nietzsche, being is an imaginary concept “being- we have no idea of it apart from the idea of ‘living’. – How can anything dead ‘be’?”⁵⁰ Since the philosopher, who asserts being is a man, he has just the imaginary view of the world which is not the real;

If one is a philosopher as men have always been philosophers one cannot see what has been and becomes- one see only what *is*. But since nothing *is*, all that was left to the philosopher as his ‘world’ was the imaginary.⁵¹

The object of the interpretation is being, yet being remains enigmatic and unthinkable, except the interpretations of the signs. What man interprets does not depend on a real fact but only on a fiction and they are just our opinions that correspond to our desires, interpretation is a psychological trick and the world itself is a fiction.⁵²

'Interpretation', the introduction of meaning – not 'explanation' (in most cases a new interpretation over an old interpretation that has become incomprehensible, that is now itself a sign). There are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively most enduring is – our opinions.⁵³

All our knowledge is perspectivism, according to Nietzsche, we cannot extricate ourselves from the play of perspectives and interpretations, he argues that "there are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes- and consequently there are many kind of 'truths', and consequently there is no truth."⁵⁴ The classical notions of a timeless knowing subject, pure reason, absolute spirituality, knowledge in itself, substance and the logic of subject-object relation are pure fictions on which rests the need for the security of understanding;

The fictitious world of subject, substance, 'reason' etc., is needed -: there is in us the power of order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. 'Truth' is the will to master over the multiplicity of sensations: - to classify phenomena into definite categories. In this we start from a belief in the 'in-itself' of things (we take phenomena as *real*).

The character of the world in a state of becoming is incapable of formulation, as 'false', as 'self-contradictory'. Knowledge and becoming exclude another.⁵⁵

There is no truth, since there is not a stable world existing independently of our perspectival interpretations. Being is not the presence of that which is to be clarified or explained; it is just the presence of a horizon or the perspective of interpretation.

4.8. OVERVIEW OF THE CRITIQUE OF GREEK CONCEPT OF THEORIA

If we consider the philosophy of Aristotle, we see that he views world as a teleologically ordered universe in terms of cause and change. In Greek cosmos there exists an ordered and fixed totality of things, the order and the structure of which owe nothing to human consciousness and God is viewed as the first cause. In Greek world man himself is subjected to the universal harmony. Every being in this world has been considered in substantial terms, and thinking, the contemplation of the being, which is directed to a discovery of the first causes, is *par excellence*, but not exclusively, a contemplation of the substantial.⁵⁶ However, in the Cartesian world conception, we see that monistic substantial view of the Greek cosmos has disappeared. Descartes viewed universe in terms of two different substances, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. In Cartesian world, the subject has been defined as the thinking substance and the other beings, that is, objects, have been defined as the substance having extension. Descartes has interpreted the world of objects in terms of mechanically ordered universe instead of Aristotelian teleological world conception.

Classical Aristotelian ontology is a substantial one and the substance exists independently of whatsoever and first philosophy investigates beings as beings. In that classical sense ontology poses, the question of the *Ursprung der Welt* in cosmological and causal categories, it attempts to

explain the origin of the world, as an ontic and mundane reality, as a cosmos that would be the foundation and the ultimate locus of all categories.⁵⁷ Kant's philosophy has reduced the legitimate limits of reason to the world of experience, to the world of phenomenon and it has limited the question of being to the phenomenal world; that is, the thing in itself remains for us to be an untouchable thing. Husserl, whose aim is to arrive at 'essences' by phenomenological reduction, remained within Descartes's notion of subject and also maintained Kant's philosophy, that is, the ultimate reference is relative to subject's experience, as Fell argues;

Husserl in this notion confirms Descartes's notion of ego as absolute centre and arbiter of its world and Kant's notion of the transcendental unity of apperception- all expressions of the modern notion of the ego as ground of its world.⁵⁸

In this sense phenomenology talks about the phenomenon of being instead of being itself. Related to Greek concept of cosmos, phenomenology poses the question of the *Ursprung der Welt* in a more and absolute manner. It asks the question of how the world arises as the world of human consciousness beginning from the absolute and presuppositionless standpoint of actual experience.⁵⁹

In short, we can say that the phenomenological ontology puts the problem of world of experience and the transcendental subjectivity, whether in Kantian or Husserlian sense, before the problem of Greek cosmos, and the Greek question of *sophia*, even if it omits the latter on behalf of the former. In other words, on the one hand world is no longer have a connection to the Platonic upper world and on the other hand, the

analysis of that phenomenological being is carried out in terms of experience of the transcendental subject. In the following chapter, we will interpret how Heidegger uses Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* in his philosophy as the factual analysis of Dasein as well as Husserl's phenomenology and how he transforms Kant's transcendental subjectivism into transcendental analysis of Dasein in ontological and temporal sense. We will maintain that Heidegger's doctrine of transcendental philosophy is an ontologised version of transcendental philosophy on temporal base as a hermeneutics of facticity. Although Heidegger always criticises Cartesian philosophy, we will argue that hermeneutical ontology still inheres in its essence Cartesian metaphysics and subjectivism; because of the fact that hermeneutical notion of transcendence comes from Kantian understanding, it has Cartesian remnants within it. Indeed, in such a way we can understand why Heidegger leaves the project of *Being and Time* incomplete, since after *Kehre* he gradually leaves the systematic language of philosophy and begins to use a more poetic language. But on the other hand, there is another meaning of transcendence in hermeneutical ontology; that is, Platonic meaning of transcendence based on freedom. We will discuss this argument in the following chapter in detail.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

- ¹ Gadamer, H. G., *The Phenomenological Movement*, in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 153.
- ² Cf., Gadamer, H. G., *Philosophical Foundations*, in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 119-129.
- ³ Descartes; *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*, p. 63.
- ⁴ Bernstein, Richard, *Beyond Objectivism and relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, p. 16.
- ⁵ Blahchette, Olivia, *Are There two Questions of Being*, The Review of Metaphysics, XLV: 2 (1991), p., 274.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Guignon, Charles. B., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, p. 23
- ⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 133.
- ⁹ Ibid, p., 128.
- ¹⁰ Guignon, Charles. B., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, p. 17.
- ¹¹ Levinas, *Ethics as First philosophy*, p. 78.
- ¹² Bernstein. R. J., *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science Hermeneutics and Praxis*, p. 10.
- ¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. par., B1.
- ¹⁴ Philipse, Herman; *Towards a Postmodern Conception on Metaphysics: On the Genealogy and Successor Disciplines of Metaphysics*, p., 8.
- ¹⁵ Deleuze, Gilles, *Kant's Critical Philosophy, The Doctrine of Faculties*, p. 14.
- ¹⁶ Smith, John, E, *Hegel's Critique of Kant*, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXII, No. 3 Issue No 103, p. 450.
- ¹⁷ Louis, De Raeymaeker; *The Philosophy of Being: A Synthesis of Metaphysics*, p. 5-6.
- ¹⁸ Arendt, Hannah; *The Life of the Mind: Thinking and Willing*, p.15.
- ¹⁹ Cerf, W. and Harris, H. S., Introduction, In, *G. W. F. Hegel's Faith and Knowledge*; p. XXVIII.
- ²⁰ Hincman, L., *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, p. 22-23.
- ²¹ Kant; *Critique of Pure Reason*, footnote, p. 34.
- ²² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 249.
- ²³ Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p.139.
- ²⁴ Gadamer, H. G., *Philosophical Foundations*, in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 110-119.
- ²⁵ Lovejoy, A. O., *The Reason, the Understanding and Time*, p.13.
- ²⁶ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*; p.128.
- ²⁷ Ibid. p. 658
- ²⁸ Davis, Colin; *Levinas an Introduction*, p.20.
- ²⁹ Levinas, E., *En decouvrant l' existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, (quoted from; Davis, Colin. *Levinas an Introduction*, p. 20.)
- ³⁰ Ibid, p. 20.
- ³¹ Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction the Pure Phenomenology*, p. 153.
- ³² Husserl, *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science in Phenomenology and the Crisis of the Philosophy*, p.79.
- ³³ Cf, for a detailed discussion of this problem, Philipse, Herman, *Transcendental Idealism*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, p. 247 ff.

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- ³⁴ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations; An Introduction the Phenomenology*, p. 26
- ³⁵ Bernstein. R. J., *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science Hermeneutics and Praxis*, p. 234. (Notes for Part One)
- ³⁶ West, David, *An introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 90.
- ³⁷ Bernstein. R. J., *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science Hermeneutics and Praxis*, p. 10.
- ³⁸ West, David; *An Introduction the Continental Philosophy*, p.96.
- ³⁹ Fell, J. P., *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place*, p. 22
- ⁴⁰ Gadamer, H. G., *The Phenomenological Movement*, in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 155.
- ⁴¹ Caputo, J. D., *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*, p.16.
- ⁴² *Ibid*, p. 20.
- ⁴³ Kierkegaard, *Repetition*, p. 131.
- ⁴⁴ Cole, J. P., *The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud*, p.154.
- ⁴⁵ Cf., *Ibid*, p.150-151.
- ⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, section 616, p.330.
- ⁴⁷ Foucault, Michel, *Nietzsche, Freud and Marx*, in, *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context from Nietzsche to Nancy*, p. 65.
- ⁴⁸ Blondel, Eric, *Interpreting Texts*, in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context from Nietzsche to Nancy*, p. 80.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid*. 82.
- ⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, section 582, page, 312.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid*, section 570, p., 307.
- ⁵² *Ibid*, section 585, p. 317.
- ⁵³ *Ibid*, section 604, p. 327.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid*, section 540, p. 291.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid*, section 517, p. 280.
- ⁵⁶ Allan, D. J., *Aristotle*, p. 75.
- ⁵⁷ Edie, J., *Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Ontology without Metaphysics*, in *The Future of Metaphysics*, p., 8.
- ⁵⁸ Fell, Joseph; *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place*, p.18.
- ⁵⁹ Edie, J., *Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Ontology without Metaphysics*, in *The Future of Metaphysics*, p.80.

CHAPTER 5

BEING - TIME UNITY AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE IN HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY

5.1. HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER ON THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE

For Husserl, phenomenology means above all the demand to go to the things themselves. The phenomena are to be brought into clear view and described without any metaphysical presuppositions. In Husserlian sense phenomenology is a descriptive science of things themselves. According to the Husserl's transcendental philosophy the logic between subject and object is intentional and it is the basic concept in phenomenological analysis, in the analysis of the subject-object relation, however, for Heidegger, problem of intentionality remains just in the secondary level related to the problem of transcendence.

The problem of transcendence as such is not identical with the problem of intentionality. As ontic transcendence, the latter itself only possible on the basis of original transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world.¹

According to Heidegger, the phenomenon of transcendence is not identical with the problem of subject-object relation, but it is more

primordial in the dimension and the kind as a problem, i.e., it is directly connected with the problem of being as such. For Heidegger, phenomenology is universal ontology, but his conception of phenomenology differs from his teacher's understanding, in that, Heidegger replaces transcendental I with the factual Dasein, which understands itself historically, and interpretation or hermeneutics is the articulation of the phenomena that has been understood. In other words, Heidegger bases phenomenology on the understanding of factual life and on the interpretation of the facticity and Dasein is the basic being as a fundamental for all ontology.

For Heidegger, the phenomena must be so described that we have to let it show itself as it is, it must be so discovered that we can see it as it is, which is the basic meaning of phenomenology. By phenomenological description Heidegger understands interpretation. Phenomenology thus becomes hermeneutical phenomenology, as Pöggeler argues "it is concerned with the bringing news about the Being of beings, but in a such way that Being itself appears."² Heidegger in this way claims that he establishes phenomenology on basis of the factual life, on the hermeneutics of facticity. The method applied in *Being and Time* is phenomenology and the meaning of phenomenology, for Heidegger, is as follows;

Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. *Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.* In the phenomenological conception of 'phenomenon' what one has

in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.³ (Emphasis Heidegger's)

Consequently, hermeneutical phenomenology is ontology in the sense of exhibition of the being of the beings and the meaning of being in general. Accordingly, for Heidegger, phenomenological ontology is a hermeneutical-existential analysis of Dasein;

Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guideline for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*.⁴ (Emphasis Heidegger's)

Heidegger determines the sense of being of Husserl's transcendental I as a factual existence, that is, intrinsically hermeneutical and as Pöggeler argues Husserl's transcendental phenomenology becomes for Heidegger hermeneutical phenomenology. The hermeneutical understood 'transcendental knowledge' is both the question about the sense of Dasein's Being and about the sense of Being; it is therefore 'ontological', a disclosure of Being. The transcendence of Dasein is certainly distinctive, insofar as Being is at issue for Dasein in transcendence, in going beyond beings to Being, and to the extent that in Dasein's transcendence there lies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individualization.⁵

5.2. KANT AND HEIDEGGER ON THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE

According to Kant, the noumenal world, the world of things in themselves, is unknowable to us and the possible knowledge is just within the phenomenal world. Hence, he develops his theory of critique on the basis of a transcendental subjectivism as a unity of the subjective mind and the objective world. Yet he argues that we cannot prove the existing of the external world, for him, which is the scandal of philosophy. Since, existing of the external world is based on faith. However, Heidegger holds that to think of man without the world is impossible. Because, to Heidegger, the being of Dasein is to be understood in terms of transcendence that essentially transcends toward the world, for Dasein is the being-in-the-world. In other words, the analysis of existence is the analysis of Dasein as the being of which basic nature is to transcend toward the world and to bestow the being of beings in the world. Hence, the world is only in so far as Dasein is and the world must be understood in terms of Dasein, as he claims “that toward which Dasein transcends we call the world, and now define transcendence as Being-in-the-world.”⁶

To Heidegger’s mind, Kant calls transcendental philosophy as the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience but he argues that;

Transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being themselves, but rather the possibility of the precedent understanding of Being, which means at the same time the ontological constitution of beings. It concerns the going-beyond (transcendence) of pure reason toward beings so that experience can now first of all take the measure of them as possible objects.⁷

For Heidegger, Kant's transcendental philosophy is on the one hand an analysis of the possibility of the experience, but from another point of view and actually Kant's philosophy is an ontology and the logic of the ground of the subject-object relation.

Kant gives the name transcendental philosophy to the ontology that, as a result of the transformation effected by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, considers the being of beings as the objectivity of the object of experience. Transcendental philosophy has its ground in logic. The logic, however, is no longer formal logic, but the logic determined by the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. In such logic ontology is grounded.⁸

For Kant, problem of transcendence is of an epistemological issue, however, for Heidegger, transcendence in its essence is an ontological problem and its epistemological side is a derivative and a secondary outcome of the problem, he claims that "if the essence of transcendence is construed more radically and universally it is then necessary to work out the idea of ontology and so of metaphysics more primordially."⁹ In other words, Heidegger transforms Kant's philosophy of transcendental subjectivity into Dasein's clearing of being. The Kantian expression of the problem of transcendence focuses on the subject and the conditions of experience; but Heideggerian explanation is an ontological surpassing, as Dahlstram states;

... the problem of transcendence is for Heidegger not the difficulty by Kant in the refutation of idealism (or as Kant also puts it, the problematic idealism of Descartes), namely 'How a subject comes out to an object', but rather, 'what makes it possible ontologically that a particular being (Seiendes) can be encountered within the world, and being encountered, can be objectified?'¹⁰

To Heidegger, Kant's theory of transcendence remained within the possibility of knowledge, i.e., the relation between subject and object, which does not go beyond experience. In this sense, Kant has restricted the concept of being just within the nature as objectified by transcendental subject. However, according to Heidegger, 'Dasein's transcendence' means that the essence of its being is such that it forms the world in the sense that it lets world happen and the world is the realm wherein the being of the beings comes to relation with Dasein as the being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is an a priori and constantly whole for the possibility of an ontology. Heidegger argues that;

The idea of a 'pure I' and of a consciousness in general are so far from including the *a priori* character of 'actual' subjectivity that the ontological characters of Dasein's facticity and its state of being are either passed over or not seen at all. Rejection of a 'consciousness in general' does not signify that the *a priori* is negated, any more than the positing of an idealized subject guarantees that Dasein has an *a priori* character grounded upon fact.¹¹

Hence, Heidegger defines transcendence as being-in-the-world as a phenomenological-ontological a priori constitution of Dasein, contrary to the epistemological meaning of transcendence defined in terms of subjectivity and a priori conditions of knowledge. In his analysis of the transcendental character of Dasein, Heidegger argues that Dasein, as the

being-in-the-world, constitutes the worldhood of the world, which is essentially the meaning of the being of the Dasein and the transcendence.

He argues that;

We name *world* that *toward which* Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as *being-in-the-world*. World co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence; as belonging to this structure, the concept of world may be called *transcendental*.¹² (Italics Heidegger's)

For Heidegger, man essentially is a transcendental subject in ontological sense; that is, man is a being whose essence is transcendence toward world and toward whatever is in this world. For he says that;

If one chooses the title of 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein', then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity. The subject never exists beforehand as a 'subject', in order then, *if* subjects there are objects at hand, *also* to transcend. Rather to *be* a subject means to be a being in and transcendence.¹³

Hence, he argues that "the problem of transcendence can never be worked out by seeking a decision as to whether or not transcendence might pertain to a subject; rather an understanding of transcendence is already a decision about whether we are able to conceptualise such a thing as 'subjectivity' at all, or merely a truncated subject, as it were."¹⁴

5.3. FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY AS TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

According to Heidegger's conception of hermeneutic ontology, the task of the working out the question of being is twofold. In the first place, fundamental ontology must be developed on basis of the principle of ontological difference. Secondly, it necessitates the destruction of the history of ontology, which means having in the view Dasein's temporality and historicity and given the intimacy between Dasein and being, the destruction aims at the roots of traditional ontology.

According to Heidegger, since the time of Plato and Aristotle the question of being has been forgotten, which he calls 'the oblivion of being'. For Heidegger "oblivion of being means: the self-concealing of the origin of Being divided into whatness and thatness in favour of Being which opens out beings as beings and remains unquestioned as Being."¹⁵ Since that time a dogma has dominated the traditional ontology; any attempt to understand the being is futile, because this dogma firmly stated that being is something which is self-evident, most universal - transcends everything -, and finally it is indefinable.¹⁶

Because metaphysics, the philosophical manner of asking which begins by Plato and Aristotle, does not comprehend the profound difference between beings (*Seiendes*) and being (*Sein*), Heidegger establishes a new principle for ontology; this principle for Heidegger is

'ontological difference'. This new ontology is called in *Being and Time* fundamental ontology. For Heidegger, the term being in classical sense has the following basic problems:

- 1) the ontological difference
- 2) the basic articulation of being (that is, *existentia* and *essentia*)
- 3) the veridical character of being
- 4) the regionality of being and the unity of the idea of being.¹⁷

According to Heidegger, the problem of transcendence must be posed as universally and radically that we can gather all these meanings of being in one point. Fundamental ontology, in this sense, is that which can give us the basic ground of all these multiple meanings of being in terms of transcendence. Heidegger explains the relation between the fundamental ontology and the problem of transcendence as follows;

Transcendence is being-in-the-world. Because it pertains to transcendence as such, world is a transcendental concept in the strict sense of the term. In Kant 'transcendental' has a meaning equivalent to ontological but pertaining to ontology of 'nature' in the broadest sense. For us the term has an equivalent to 'fundamental-ontology'.¹⁸

The meaning of transcendence cannot be localised for Heidegger in a particular activity, such as theoretical, practical or aesthetic. All these must be grounded on transcendence and they are all possible only on the basis of transcendence.¹⁹ To Heidegger, considering that beforehand we don't know what being is there must be a means of access for us to do this task. This entrance, for Heidegger, is *Dasein*, the human being itself. Since, *Dasein* is distinguished from other beings as it has alone a transcendental

relationship to being and has also an understanding of being, there is, *es gibt*, being for the sake of Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein's priority among other beings is threefold. Otto Pöggeler cites these as;

Dasein has an ontical priority, it is distinguished from all other beings in that it is defined by its relationship to being, i.e., by existence.

On the basis of being defined by existence Dasein is intrinsically ontological, it understands being and thus has ontological priority.

On the basis of understanding of being, it understands its own being which lack the character of Dasein; thus it has onto-ontological priority.²⁰

Transcendence is the basic constitution of Dasein and transcendence is conceived by way of temporality.²¹ The way to fundamental ontology is Dasein, i.e., to the question of the meaning of being and the difference between being and beings. Fundamental ontology is placed before all ontology, considering classical ontology fails to discuss the meaning of being as such. Clearly, for Heidegger, ontology in classical sense is just the questioning of being as being and not being (*Sein*) itself. To illustrate, Heidegger argues that Kantian transcendental ontology asks the question of being, but indeed it is a productive logic for the possibility of any natural science. He thus states that;

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.²²

According to Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the being of Dasein, the essence of Dasein, must be understood in terms of existence;

“that kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call ‘existence’ ”.²³ Existence cannot be cited by a ‘what’, but in terms of ‘who’; for Dasein always understand itself in terms of its existence, i.e., the particular Dasein can decide its existence. Because it is the possibility of itself, to be itself or not itself, that is, “Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already.”²⁴ The structures of existence are existentialia and the structures of beings of which being is other than Dasein are categories and the kind of being belongs to them are called ‘presence-at-hand’ (*Vorhandenheit*). Heidegger understands existentialia in terms of two different groups as extentiell and existential. The former as related to the ontical level does not require a theoretical transparency of formal structures and remains in concrete possibilities, the latter, however, as related to the ontological level requires an analysis of the contexts of such structures. Thus, Heidegger concludes, “fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought of in the existential analytic of Dasein.”²⁵ But, in turn, “the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical.”²⁶

5.4. SELF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE UNITY OF THE CARE-STRUCTURE

Being-in as such is related to 'Da' of Dasein, namely that the existential constitution of 'there', which signifies Dasein's being disclosed. For Heidegger, "Dasein is its disclosedness"²⁷, which means to be illuminated, to be cleared and Dasein as the being-in-the-world gets cleared in such a way that it is itself the clearing. To be cleared, for Heidegger, means transcending of Dasein both for itself and for the being of the beings other than Dasein, he argues that;

The beings surpassed in transcendence are not, however, only, those which are not Dasein. In transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as a being; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like itself. In first surpassing itself, the abyss [*Abgrund*] is opened up which Dasein, in each case, is for itself. This abyss can be covered over and obscured, only by because the abyss of being-a-self is opened up by and in transcendence.²⁸

Heidegger, in the essay *What is Metaphysics*, argues that the prefix 'meta' in the concept metaphysics means the go over, - trans -, beings as such. Therefore, transcendence essentially means meta-physics, i.e., trans-physics, in the sense that "in the question concerning the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings as a whole, takes place".²⁹ Hence, Dasein means the being held out into the nothing and the being of Dasein is essentially metaphysical and transcendental:

Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond being as a whole. Such being beyond beings we call transcendence. If in the ground Dasein were not

transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never adopt a stance toward beings nor even toward itself. Without the original manifestness of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom.³⁰

By its very nature, Dasein brings the 'there' along with itself.³¹ The basic structure or make-up of disclosedness is threefold; they are state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*), understanding (*Verstehen*) and discourse or talk (*Rede*). In the state-of-mind Dasein finds itself in its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and in the midst of being as a whole Dasein is always disclosed as a being delivered over in its being, i.e., facticity of Dasein. Dasein is factual in its thrownness, Heidegger explains facticity of Dasein as follows;

Facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being – one which has been taken up into existence, even it has been thrust aside. The 'that-it-is' of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it.³²

In the state-of-mind a mood assails Dasein, it arises out of very being of Dasein and in such a state-of-mind Dasein discloses world, "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind."³³ And the moods effect all our looking to the world theoretically; "yet even the purest *theoria* has not left all moods behind it, even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks."³⁴ In the state-of-mind with its mood there is always an understanding. But in this state of existence, even understanding is also suppressed. Understanding belonging to the state-of-mind is the

primordial understanding; explaining, intuition, thinking and ordinary understanding are derivatives of it. Understanding essentially is transcendental, Heidegger claims that “understanding-of-being is transcendence; all understanding of being, whether unthematically pre-ontological, or thematic or conceptually is transcendental.”³⁵

The being of Dasein has its possibility both for the world and for the others in terms of concern and solicitude and in all these the being-possible pertains to Dasein’s potentiality-for-being. Heidegger claims that “understanding is the existential being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.”³⁶ Understanding is the being of such potentiality-for-being, but that being is not present-at-hand, rather it lies in the existence and the existential structures, which is designated by Heidegger as projection (*Entwurf*). Interpretation is the process of what has been understood, i.e., it is the course to get develop of what has been understood, which is the working-out of the possibilities projected; hence interpretation is an articulation and interpretation, which depends on the totality of involvements. Discourse or talk, as the existential-ontological foundation of language is the articulation of intelligibility, an articulation of totality of meanings. Everyday Dasein, as the inauthentic self, is lost in the ‘they’, falling (*Verfallen*) of Dasein, by means of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. The inauthentic Dasein individualises or becomes authentic self in anxiety (*Angst*) which is the basic state-of-mind. Through anxiety

that is anxious, “the world collapses into itself, the world has the character of completely lacking significance”³⁷ and Dasein finds itself not-at-home. Therefore anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its being-free, to the freedom of choosing itself and to its authenticity.

Being-with and being-one’s-self are the constitutives of the being-in-the-world related to the ‘who’ of Dasein which is analysed in the ‘they’ sphere (*das Man*). For Heidegger, the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is not just the ‘I myself’, since the self of everyday Dasein is the they-self as an inauthentic existence. The being-with of Dasein’s being means being-with-others, however, others cannot be thought of everyone else who stands against one, “they are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom is one too.”³⁸ Being-with is based on the care-for-others, i.e., solicitude (*Fürsorge*). Like concern (*Besorgen*) for ready-to-hand, solicitude, too, is interpreted in terms of phenomenon of care (*Sorge*). Being-in-the-world is a whole and care is what unifies and harmonises the constitutives of being-in-the-world. Care, as the being of Dasein, is existentially a priori and the ground for all understanding of being whether theoretical or practical, as Heidegger explains;

Care, as primordial structural totality lies before every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a *priori*; this means that it always lies in them so this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the ‘practical’ attitude over the theoretical. When we assert something as present-at-hand by merely looking it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a ‘political action’ or taking rest and enjoying oneself. ‘Theory’ and ‘practice’ are

possibilities of being for an entity whose being must be defined as 'care'.³⁹

According to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's disclosedness, understanding, as the projection of Dasein's potentiality-for-being, is primarily futural; however, state-of-mind temporalizes itself primarily in the past and finally the fallingness of the Dasein is the present situation. When these three constitutives of the 'there' are completely disclosed, they are articulated by discourse that is in itself temporal. All these temporal states are grounded as a whole in the unity of the care-structure. As Heidegger argues, in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of the existence, facticity, and falling – that is, the unity of the care-structure.⁴⁰

5.5. TRANSCENDING WORLD AND THE TEMPORAL UNITY OF BEING

Being-in-the-world presented in *Being and Time* is the fundamental structure of Dasein. Care is the existential meaning of the fundamental structure as a unity of the constitutives of the being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is something a priori and constantly whole but it can be analysed in various ways, which are; firstly, the world in its worldhood; secondly,

being-in-the-world as being-with and being-one's-self, finally, being-in as such.

For Heidegger, the world is neither a particular being, nor the totality of things, i.e., the entire sum of what is. The worldhood of the world essentially belongs to Dasein's being. Therefore, the world is a common context both for Dasein and for what-is on the whole. Hence, for Heidegger to speak about the external world is a pseudo problem, that is, an attempt to prove the existing of external world is a problem that is originated by an improper understanding of the concept of world. The being-in as such, in the being-in-the-world, signifies Dasein's 'Da', namely the existential-temporal constitution of the 'there'. By its very nature Dasein brings its 'there' along with it, therefore where Dasein 'exists', the world 'is'. Furthermore, any 'external thing' in Heideggerian world is not something that lies in the external-objective world as a separate substance for Dasein, but it is an equipment, something ready-to-hand in the referentially structured world disclosed by Dasein.

In comparison to the Cartesian-Kantian world conception, Heidegger's theory of world differs basically in the concept self, since, for him, to consider man as a worldless subject is not credible, i.e., man whose being is the being-in-the-world is already in the world. In other words, man and world cannot be represented on the basis of subject-object dichotomy as maintained in the Cartesian world conception. Heidegger does not

thinks of the being of anything in its objectness, but in its usage as the readiness-to-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) and as an equipment.

For Heidegger, man and world go together with each other and the worldhood of the world essentially belongs to Dasein's being as the being-in-the-world. World, as a common context in which everything becomes meaningful by a referential totality cannot be thought of Dasein's transcending, i.e., Dasein's disclosing the world and encountering the beings. Anything is in the world only and for the sake of Dasein's being. In this sense, Heidegger's world conception is a counter argument for Cartesian subject-object dichotomy and the technological understanding of being, as Dreyfus argues;

In so far as, then, as the analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world offers a phenomenological critique of the subject/object relation, Being and Time would seem to stand in direct opposition to the technological understanding of Being.⁴¹

Being-in-the-world does not have any meaning that Dasein lives in the midst of the totality of beings, which together forms the world. Even the beings, which are present-at-hand within the world, are worldless. Yet they occur in the world in that Dasein has concern (*Besorgen*) for them, such as having to do with something, attending to something, interrogating and neglecting. Concern is possible only on the basis of facticity of Dasein;

The concept of facticity implies that an entity within-the-world has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.⁴²

'Being-in' in the being-in-the-world signifies Dasein's 'dwelling alongside', 'residing' and 'being familiar with' the world.⁴³ World is the abode of Dasein and Dasein gives to entities worldly character by handling them. Handling and using for Heidegger is no way restricted to the realm of praxis, it includes every way of concern, like theoretical issues. Pöggeler argues that this is the way of Dasein's being in the world, "Heidegger does not grasp the world in which Dasein exists as the totality of things, but rather as the manner (*das wie*) in which beings as whole can show themselves."⁴⁴

The environment (*Umwelt*) is the closest world to the everyday Dasein. Those beings with which everyday Dasein deals and encounters are ready-to-hand, namely 'a piece of equipment' and equipment is a general name. "Taken strictly there is no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to' ".⁴⁵ In this totality, a piece of equipment has its definite involvement, one piece of equipment refers to another, and so it has a meaning, it is something in-order-to. Hence, for Heidegger, the question of being must be analysed firstly and for the most part in terms of concept of the equipment, conversely of the classical conception of being in which it is understated especially in terms of substance and substantial ontology.

Heidegger defines the sum of the contexts of reference and significance as the world that is environment.⁴⁶ Nature is therefore not present-at-hand, just “as the environment is discovered, the nature thus discovered is encountered too.”⁴⁷ Whenever we encounter anything in the world, the world has already been discovered, since “the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is earlier than any single item.”⁴⁸ Therefore, the worldhood of the world and the being of any item in the world are grounded on the existential character of Dasein and Dasein’s assigning itself to the world.

For Heidegger, the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time as primordial temporality.⁴⁹ Time is that what constitutes the metaphysical continuity of Dasein, hence the continuity of the being of Dasein is not self-awareness, and neither mind nor the unity of body and soul. Time is not intelligible if we try to grasp its meaning through a theoretical way, i.e., temporality only possible on the basis of the factual existence of Dasein.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Heidegger argues that the following points are significant to understand the nature of time;

- 1) The essence of time has an ecstatic character
- 2) Together with this ecstatic structure, there is a horizontal character which belongs to time
- 3) Time neither passes nor remains but it temporalizes itself.⁵¹

Heidegger means past, present and future, i.e.; retention, making-present and expectancy are the ecstatic moments of time. Expectancy is the primordial and genuine sense of the time. These three phenomena are the

basic ecstases of temporality and “temporality is itself the self-unifying ecstatic unity in ecstatic temporalization”.⁵² Time temporalizes itself means, for Heidegger, that time must be understood as the unity of the retention, making-present and expectancy, hence not in terms of ‘is’⁵³ and he argues that “this ecstatic unity of the horizon of temporality is nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of world and world’s essential belonging to transcendence.”⁵⁴ Horizon is a field of vision and an enclosure of the world.

Temporality is the meaning of the being of care. According to phenomenological-existential analysis of being of Dasein, being-towards-death and being-guilty are what makes up Dasein’s being, that is, the care. Dasein discloses to itself on the basis of the call of conscience, to free for itself and for the authentic resoluteness. The resolute Dasein takes itself out of resoluteness of the ‘they’ and thus becomes the conscience of others. The resolute Dasein lets itself come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, which is the primordial phenomenon of the future as the basic source of temporality. Therefore, time stems from the future, as Heidegger argues;

Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. *The primary phenomenon and authentic temporality is the future.*⁵⁵
(Emphasis Heidegger’s)

Since Dasein has been thrown into the world and it is this existential state reveals another moment of time, i.e., the past, Dasein finds itself as

what it is in the present situation and existential state which reveals the moment of temporality called present. Furthermore, the future oriented/originated conception of time reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care and that 'authentic temporality' is the primordial time. Heidegger by primordial time means the understanding of temporality, i.e., human conceptions of time upon which all other temporal concepts are founded.

Both the disclosedness of the 'there' and Dasein's basic existential possibilities, authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded upon temporality. For Heidegger, the possibility of the world lies in the ecstatic unity of the temporality; "the existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon." ⁵⁶

The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, present and the past is grounded on the ecstatical unity of temporality. The world and the entities are disclosed on the basis of the horizontal constitution of the ecstatical unity of the temporality, Heidegger argues that;

The horizontal unity of the schemata of these ecstases makes possible the primordial way in which the relationship of the 'in-order-to' are connected with the 'for-the-sake-of'. This implies that on the basis of the horizontal constitution of the ecstatical unity of temporality, there belongs to that entity which in each case its own 'there', something like a world that has been disclosed.⁵⁷

The historicity of the world is based on the temporal character of the Dasein. In other words, the temporality of the disclosedness is what

makes Dasein and the historicity of the world. Dasein is primarily historical and what is encountered within-the-world is secondarily historical.⁵⁸ Clearly, the historicity of the world is rooted in the 'there' and in the temporality of Dasein. Consequently, "with the existence of the being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world."⁵⁹

We can summarise Heidegger's view of transcendence as the following; being-in-the-world means the world entry of Dasein and the understanding of being. It is the transcendence itself and the occurring of truth in ontological sense based on the ecstatic unity of temporality. As Heidegger argues, understanding-of-being is transcendence; all understanding of being, whether unthematically pre-ontological, or thematic and conceptually ontological, is transcendental. This understanding-of-being and its basic modes is the disclosure of that resides in the ecstatic unity of temporality, in the temporalizing breaking-open of horizons. This disclosure is the metaphysically primordial being-true, the truth, which is the transcendence itself, *veritas transcendentalis*.⁶⁰

5.6. TRUTH AS VERITAS TRANSCENDENTALIS

Heidegger calls every disclosure of being as transcendental knowledge. Therefore, phenomenological truth, i.e., the disclosedness of

being, is *veritas transcendentalis*.⁶¹ For Heidegger the essence of truth as a whole is only to be clarified as a problem of transcendence. He argues that;

Truth resides in the essence of transcendence; it is primordially transcendental truth. But, if the basic theme of logic is truth, then logic itself is metaphysics if the problem of transcendence presents in another way the fundamental theme of metaphysics.⁶²

Problem of truth in classical philosophy has generally been viewed as an epistemological problem, that is, as the correspondence of any assertion with the reality. In other words, as formulated in the medieval age *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*, truth is the agreement of thought or mind with reality. According to Heidegger, since Plato's theory of ideas, *eidos* (seeing, appearance), truth has been understood as the correspondence between the thing perceived and the man's perceiving. In this view, then, things, as the objects of truths, are in constant presence. Therefore, truth is supratemporal.

Heidegger considers truth from two perspectives. Firstly, the truth of being is an ontological truth as the clearing of being, which is a historical and a dynamic process. Secondly, propositional truth is a derivative of the clearing of being. In other words, the process of truth, for Heidegger, is a transcendental-ontological achievement of Dasein as the clearing of being, which he calls *aletheia*, the meaning of truth for Greeks.

Since truth must be analysed in the 'there' constitution of the Dasein, i.e., in the existential-ontological structure of Dasein, truth is an ontological, therefore, a transcendental problem. Accordingly, truth has a

temporal and historical character. For this reason, Heidegger resolutely tries to point to the temporality of truth, as connected with the problem of being, in the following manner;

Being does indeed 'go together' with truth.⁶³
Being (not entities) is something which 'there is' only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and only as long as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially.⁶⁴

The main difference between the correspondence theory of truth and the Heideggerian conception of truth lies in the 'as' structures, that is, the apophantic 'as' and the hermeneutic 'as'. The former is the derivative of the latter, in other words the apophantic 'as' is the as of the assertion, but the hermeneutic 'as' is of Dasein's concerned dealings with beings. Dasein is open to being by its very nature of the existential-ontological constitution, through its concerned dealings Dasein encounters the beings opened up in their being and only after the disclosing of Dasein any assertion is possible.

To Heidegger's mind, the change in the essence of truth begins with Plato. Before Plato, in the pre-Socratic world, truth has been understood as the unity of the appearance and the *physis*. By the philosophy of Plato, appearance and the essences have been divided into different worlds. Heidegger argues this point as follows; "it was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be a mere appearance and thus degraded. At the same time Being, as idea, was exalted to a suprasensory world."⁶⁵

In other words, with the philosophy of Plato truth has become only what is unconcealed from idea to appearance and since then, truth has been

understood as just the unconcealment, that is, it has lost the characteristic of the event of coming from concealment to unconcealment. As Pöggeler points out that “the idea, which is nonetheless the idea only on the basis of unconcealment, refers no longer to any concealment.”⁶⁶ Therefore, truth no longer means the unconcealment of being, but it is a correctness of what is showed itself in the sense of the idea. In this manner, correctness as the correspondence of knowing with a state of affairs is secured in knowledge. The separating of appearance and *physis* (being) is the point, for Heidegger, where philosophy as Platonism, i.e., just the ontology of beings, arises. Thus, in that way *ti estin* as a philosophical question has given rise, *ti estin* is a question of *essentia*, of whatness, which at the same time has caused another question, that is, *hoti estin*, the question of *existentia*, of thatness. As Heidegger argues “the thought of Being, has, ever since Plato’s day, been conceived as ‘philosophy’, later acquiring the title of ‘metaphysics’.”⁶⁷

According to Heidegger, philosophical manner of asking about being has become the ‘isness’ of any entity, i.e., the essence or the *ousia* of the thing. Aristotle is the one who has developed the question of being as *ti to on* (*was ist Seiende*) and, to him, the question *ti to on* must be answered in the form of *on he on* (*ens qua ens, Seiende als Seiende*), which means that the question of being (*Sein*) turns into the question of beings (*Seiendes*). However, Heidegger argues that, in the thought of pre-Socratics, like Parmenides and Heraclitus, the main convention is that there is a harmony

between the logos and being. Among the early Greeks, being essentially and primarily has been *physis*, which means for them coming into out open, self-disclosing; or something which appears and comes to presence; clearly, something which discloses itself from unconcealment to concealment. And for early Greeks, that which is said and that which is unconcealed are the same, which means, for Heidegger, why “*Das Sein ist die Versammlung – Logos*”⁶⁸. Therefore, for early Greeks “the logos as the gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving to it.”⁶⁹ It was Aristotle’s conviction that *logos* in the sense of propositional determination, *logos* in the sense of judgement, manifestly presents itself as the basic phenomenon of logic.

For, in the first place, *logos* is an original unity. Though it can be resolved individual concepts, these dissociated elements do not, nevertheless, constitute the whole. They lack precisely their essential unity. Logos is not the sum or aggregate of two notions. But what provides the unity is the ultimately just what is essential in thinking, *noein* and *dianoein*.⁷⁰

Heidegger interprets Parmenides’ conclusion that ‘being and thinking are the same’ as the following; *noein* is the apprehension of what is appeared, stood in the light, hence entered into unconcealment, that is, *physis*, which means *einai*, being, and these two are the same, in other words they belong to each other, “where Being prevails, apprehension prevails and happens with it, the two belong together.”⁷¹ According to Heidegger, *logos* has lost its original meaning of gathering, i.e., collecting of the truth of being and it has come to mean only statement as the locus of

truth and “it was Aristotle who first gave a clearer metaphysical interpretation of logos in the sense of statement.”⁷²

The main characteristics of the classical conception of truth are; firstly, the locus of the truth is assertion, or judgement, secondly, the essence of truth is the agreement of the judgement with the reality.⁷³ For Heidegger, the above notion of truth is actually an Aristotelian view of truth and since Aristotle this notion of truth has determined the idea of truth up to contemporary age. For instance, the Copernican Revolution of Kant still adheres this conception of truth.⁷⁴ Heidegger’s main critique of the classical notion of truth is that the assertion or judgment is only possible on the basis of the Dasein’s disclosing – transcending the being of the beings, namely, just by means of Dasein’s uncovering of the truth of beings.

Accordingly, phenomenological conception of truth is only possible on the basis of the Dasein’s transcendently uncovering of the being of the entities. For Heidegger, the expression that ‘an assertion is true’ means the agreement of the assertion with reality beforehand accomplished by Dasein’s clearing of being. In other words, the epistemological part of the truth, the apophantic truth, is just possible on the basis of the ontologically uncovering of the being. Heidegger calls the disclosedness of truth as the primordial phenomenon of truth;

Being-true as being-uncovering is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called ‘true’ in still a more primordial sense. The most

primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential- ontological foundations of uncovering.⁷⁵

Consequently, Dasein is in always truth, which includes the following points as the main traits of transcendental truth in Heideggerian sense. Firstly, disclosedness is possible in general through the phenomenon of care, secondly, thrownness of Dasein in a definite world, i.e., facticity of Dasein, thirdly, projection, Dasein's potentiality-for-being including authenticity of Dasein which is the own most possibility of potentiality-for-being. Finally, fallingness, namely, Dasein's being lost in the 'they'; the beings uncovered are at the same time disguised in the world of the 'they'. For this reason, "because Dasein is essentially falling, its state-of-being is such that it is in untruth."⁷⁶ In other words, since man essentially has a finitude being, he could not really let what-is be just what it is, hence every revelation of what-is is at the same time a concealing, that is, untruth.

Hence, Dasein is both in the truth and in the un-truth. This explains why Heidegger prefers the Greek word *aletheia* to explain transcendental conception of truth. Since, *aletheia* means the being uncovered of something, or something be made free from the concealedness. Truth, therefore, is essentially an uncovering through the 'there' of the Dasein. Consequently, it is transcendental on the basis of the a priori structures of the Dasein's existential-ontological constitutions, i.e., on the unity of the care-structure. Furthermore, it has a temporal character on the basis of the ecstatic unity of temporality.

5.7. THE GROUND OF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE HIGHEST POSSIBILITY OF PHILOSOPHY: FREEDOM

For Heidegger, the goal of philosophy is not a system of interesting information, nor a sentimental edification for faltering souls, he argues that;

Only he can philosophise who is already resolved to grant free dignity to Dasein in its radical and universal-essential possibilities, which alone makes it suitable for withstanding the remaining uncertainty and gaping discord, while at the same time remaining untouched by all the idle talk of the day.⁷⁷

The dignity in Dasein is the freedom, which precedes all the scientific, ethical and the practical recipe for life. To be free is the highest possibility of the transcendental-universal Dasein's being, as he claims;

To be sure, philosophising – and it especially – must always proceed through a serious conceptual knowledge and must remain in the medium of that knowledge, but this knowledge is grasped in its genuine content only when in such knowledge the whole of the existence is seized by the root after which philosophy searches – in and by *freedom*.⁷⁸ (Italics Heidegger's)

Accordingly, the main fundamental of philosophical logic is not the principle of non-contradiction, or the principle of excluded middle and the principle of identity understood in classical logic, Heidegger criticising Kant argues that;

If the unity of identity means the compatible harmony of what belongs together, then it is clear that both characterisation of the essence of truth, true as being the same and true as being adequately perceived, surely go together and mean the same thing.

For Kant, both concepts, that of identity and of truth, are linked together in the primordial unity of synthesis of transcendental apperception. [In Kant] identity is traced back, with the help of truth of judgement, to the condition of possibility of the execution of every cognitive act. The 'I' is that subject whose predicates consist in all representations, everything in any way contributing to knowledge.⁷⁹

In other words, for Heidegger there must be a more fundamental way than the classical conception of identity and logic that determines the *Gründ-Saetze* of all thinking and that makes thinking possible.⁸⁰ Freedom is that which makes possible the ground of thinking as the basic relation between man and being. For Heidegger, the basic principles of classical logic are the ground of all thinking just issuing from Dasein's being free;

These basic principles (*Gründ-Saetze*) are not rules alongside a thinking that would be determined from elsewhere, but they are the grounds (*Gründe*) for statements (*Saetze*) in general, grounds which make thinking possible. And they are this, furthermore, only because they are the bases (*Gründe*) for understanding, existence, the understanding of being, Dasein and the primordial transcendence.⁸¹

Thus Heidegger's attempt to uncover the grounds of logic leads to a more fundamental conception of transcendence and to the question of unity of being. Heidegger argues that transcendence, the possibility of experience of beings, must be understood on the basis of freedom. Freedom, therefore, is the most primary way of relation between man and being as the metaphysical ground of logic.

Hence, we can summarise how Heidegger understands the very meaning and the possibility of philosophy which he calls the philosophical logic. Firstly, philosophy is the rigorous conceptual knowledge of being,

secondly, that philosophical grasp of conceptual knowledge is just to be understood in the sense of being free of Dasein, as he puts it;

Only what exists as a free being could be at all bound by an obligatory lawfulness. Freedom alone can be the source of obligation. *A basic problem of logic, the law governedness of thinking, reveals itself to be a problem of human existence in its ground, the problem of freedom.*⁸² (Italics Heidegger's)

When Heidegger discussing the problem of being and the question of ground in the sense of transcendence and freedom he believes that the essential connection between them is apparent in Plato, where he reflects on *Republic* (517 b, 509 b) and argues that;

The intrinsic connection between the problem of being and the problem of preference is especially apparent in Plato where in the *Republic* he teaches that 'beyond being' that, 1) The last thing in realm of the knowable is the idea of the good.... 2) The idea of good is the basic determination of all order, all that belongs together... 3) The idea of the good brings the light, in the realm of the visible, and the master of this light, ie, the sun... 4) The idea of good dominates in the realm of reason. It is directly dominant what is graspable by human reason, so that it provides truth and reason... 6) The idea of good is even beyond being, transcending even beings and their being.⁸³

For Heidegger, transcendence, in Platonic sense, emerges as the most fundamental problem regarding to ideas, because the whole is organised on the basis of the idea of the good that transcends all other ideas and determines them. The meaning of the whole is the world, or the basic characteristic of the world, in Heideggerian language.⁸⁴ Dasein transcends world in terms of purposiveness, for-the-sake-of-which, accordingly by means of freedom. Heidegger explains this relation as follows;

But a for-the-sake-of-which, a purposiveness (*Umwillen*), is only possible where there is willing (*Willen*). Now insofar as transcendence, being-in-the-world, constitutes the basic structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world must also be primordially bound up with or derived from the basic feature of Dasein's existence, namely, *freedom*. Only where there is freedom is there a purposive for-the-sake-of, and only here there is world. To put it briefly, Dasein's transcendence and freedom are identical. Freedom provides itself with intrinsic possibility; a being is, as free, necessarily in itself transcending.
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The notion of for-the-sake-of should not be understood in an egoistic purpose, because it is the basic metaphysical structure of Dasein and intrinsic possibility of willing and freedom. Dasein as free is the world-projection; that is, it is the entry into world. Accordingly, "one must take transcendence back into freedom, one must seek the basic essence of transcendence in freedom"⁸⁶ and one "must take transcendence more intelligible by briefly characterising the entry into world."⁸⁷

For Heidegger, the inner possibility of truth, *aletheia*, the clearing of being is a 'behaviour' belongs to very nature of the 'there' of Dasein, which Heidegger calls the 'overtness' (*Offenheit*) of man. He discusses that "all behaviour is 'overt' to what-is and all 'overt' relationship is behaviour."⁸⁸ And only Dasein might have such a behaviour that sustains itself in the open thorough which the being of what-is occurs. This means, that man frees what-is concealed out of concealment into the unconcealment, which makes understandable that why Heidegger argues "the essence of truth is freedom."⁸⁹

In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger discusses the same point as well, where he calls the basic relation between man and being as 'nearness'. The 'nearness' means that being and man reach each other and this attainment of the two is called 'event of appropriation'; in the event of appropriation "man and Being are appropriated to each other" and "they belong to each other".⁹⁰ Because man's distinctive feature lies in his openness to being, i.e., listening to being, man replies to being in words, "it is in words and language that things come into Being and are".⁹¹ In this reciprocal relation man names the being, renders the being to its house, to the language. Thinking, in Heideggerian language, is man's attunement himself to the being's voice, in which being presences its truth, and "that in all of this Being appropriates its own truth previously and always primarily and that is the appropriating wherein Being presences".⁹² In other words, as Heidegger argues, "thinking is of Being inasmuch as thinking, coming to pass from Being, belongs to Being. At the same time thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being."⁹³

The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' as it is.⁹⁴ Clearly, for Heidegger, freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such and these are all grounded on the 'there' of Dasein as being-there that clears, makes open and overt the being. However, the freedom of man is not to be understood in the absolute sense, since freedom is man's opening himself to the summons addressed to him and the way on which he is already being sent and that sending is destined by

the being itself. For Heidegger, there is a mutual relationship with being's destiny and man's freedom. They are the two grounds of the occurrence of truth.⁹⁵

5.8. PLATONIC RECONSTRUCTION OF TRANSCENDENCE AND HERMENEUTICAL ETHICS

At the beginning of his magnum opus *Being and Time*, Heidegger, quoting from Plato's *Sophist*, argues that we no longer understand what being means. Plato says that "for manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression being"⁹⁶. Heidegger argues that "do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word being"⁹⁷. For Heidegger, we are nowadays perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'being'. He argues that;

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.⁹⁸

Following Heidegger, Gadamer, in *Truth and Method*, asserts that "being that can be understood is language"⁹⁹. For Gadamer, language is the universal medium through which the unity of what is spoken of and the what-is takes place, he argues that "to come to language does not mean that a second being is acquired. Rather, what something *presents* itself as belongs to the its own being. Thus everything that is language has a speculative unity."¹⁰⁰

According to Gadamer, the speculative mode of being of language has a universal ontological significance. Since, for Gadamer “what comes into language is something different from the spoken word itself. But the word is a word only because of what comes into language in it.”¹⁰¹ Gadamer understands the unity in the speculative unity of the language and argues that “everything that is language has a speculative unity: it contains a distinction, that between its being and its presentations of itself, but this is a distinction that is really not a distinction at all.”¹⁰²

As Heidegger understands the meaning of being in terms of Dasein’s clearing, Gadamer approaches the problem of being in terms of the aesthetic experience, for him, there is no something like the being-in-itself in the work of art. Similarly, when we consider being in general, he argues that, there is no object in itself. But, there is just historical consciousness through which tradition understands being that comes to presence in terms of language. For him, language is the universal medium of the mediation between past and the present based on the finitude of historical experiences. As Heidegger claims language is the house of being, Gadamer understands hermeneutics as a universal basis of philosophy and being in general. Both for Gadamer and Heidegger, language is the locus of being where being presences and is interpreted. Consequently, being is temporal and being is to be understood-interpreted on the ground of language wherein tradition, culture, history have an effective consciousness and language determines the understanding of being in terms of pre-

interpretations. To illustrate, for hermeneutics, the being of scientific object does not depend on theory - as the vision of nontemporal world projection -, but it depends just on the interpretation of being in general of which origin is the practical-temporal world. The question that guides Gadamer in *Truth and Method* "how understanding is possible?"¹⁰³ is a Kantian question. Therefore, it is basically a transcendental problem. Gadamer is not attempting to provide a method that will allow us to verify correct understanding, but rather an explanation of the very possibility of understanding in general. If we can put in Kantian terms, we could ask what are the a priori conditions of understanding that makes it possible.

Gadamer's main argument that "the being that can be understood is language" ¹⁰⁴ is actually a development of Heideggerian conception of thinking into a language based understanding of being. For Gadamer, language is the locus of the total mediation of every experience of the world and the every occurrence of being. Likewise, language is the medium where our historical experience of the world has been transmitted from past to future. Gadamer considers logos in terms of time and he qualifies his understanding of language with Heideggerian conception of historical finitude. Like Heidegger, Gadamer takes *phronesis* as the basic articulation of being in terms of human facticity. In this sense, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics develops directly from the philosophy of Heidegger. To be-in-the-world is to be in a linguistically constituted world

and language, rather than being a tool for understanding the world, is the framework of meaning in which we live.

For Gadamer, understanding is the primary mode of human being and reason is always dependent on tradition, which is not a deficiency of reason but rather the essence of it. Understanding is ontological as the fundamental mode of human being and we are always interpreting insofar as we are, as Ricoeur argues “Gadamer bases the hermeneutic task on an ontology of the dialogue which we are”.¹⁰⁵ For Gadamer, understanding has a meaning based on Platonic conception of dialogue, that is, it is a participation and a course through which man partakes the truth of being.

Like Heidegger, Gadamer distinguishes hermeneutics from epistemology and we participate in language as interpretive beings. In this regard, there is never a question of stepping outside of language for getting a better view of the world, for there is no world outside language. Language has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it, as Gadamer argues “whoever has language ‘has’ the world”¹⁰⁶ and this is the reason why language is the horizon for hermeneutic ontology and for the world in general. According to Gadamer, understanding is the basic way in which self-consciousness, historically existing beings are related to the world and understanding has an ontological significance. History is not simply an object to be known, but rather history is what has made us into particular subjects who attempt to understand it.

Hermeneutics is not restricted to the problem of method in *Geisteswissenschaften*; it moves to the very centre of philosophy and is captured as an ontological problem. Understanding is a primordial mode of being in the world, as Gadamer argues;

Being that can be understood is language. The hermeneutical phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its own relation to beings as interpretation.¹⁰⁷

According to Gadamer, reason is not faculty or capacity that can free from itself its historical context and horizons. Reason is historical and gains its distinctive power always within a living tradition. For Gadamer, this is not a limitation or a deficiency of reason, but rather the essence of reason is rooted in human finitude. In other words, we can base the issues of traditional philosophy on the human finitude, hence on the limits of human consciousness. As Bubner argues, for Gadamer, hermeneutics has a meaning equivalent to first philosophy;

Hermeneutics, as a philosophical theory of understanding is as it were the new *prima philosophia*. It opens eyes to 'a universal ontological structure, that is, the fundamental condition of everything to which understanding can in general direct itself.'¹⁰⁸

For Gadamer, language and thought depends on each other.¹⁰⁹ Thinking finds itself already within language and immersed in it. Thinking is always already in language and language is always already in thought. They cannot be separated, since they always find themselves together. Language is not, therefore, merely a handy tool for exhibiting

concepts that have been pre-formed and stored away by thought.¹¹⁰ Thus, for Gadamer, thinking can never get behind language. Thinking does not precede language; neither does language precede thought. They both occur together, the hermeneutic circle describes the togetherness of thinking and language and the impossibility of separating them. All possible forms of interpretation and understanding are linguistic in nature and occur in language. Gadamer's philosophy of language suggests that every language has a form which transcends any particular languages. This transcendental form of language would make possible the translation from one given language into another, and it would also be the means whereby reason escapes from the boundaries of any particular language and which makes the universality of hermeneutics. As Gadamer argues, "precisely through our finite, the particularity of our being, which is evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite dialogue is opened in the direction of truth we are."¹¹¹ Clearly, the language is itself has a transcendental form and at this Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical standpoint, language becomes the locus where the articulation of the structure of being is carried out.

Ethics is the subject, which Heidegger leaves the least elaborated subject of hermeneutics although we can argue there is a tacit notion of ethics in his philosophy. But he never clarified it, or he deliberately leaved this subject untouched. Followers of him, like Gadamer and Levinas, studied ethics in detail. We will analyse Gadamer's conception of

hermeneutics both as a Kantian notion of transcendence related to being, in that the unity of being and the question of being in general are understood in terms of a linguistically formed world, and also as a Platonic notion of transcendence which inheres both ontological and ethical consequences. For Levinas, the problem of transcendence is only an ethical question surpassing the problem of being, in other words, the good transcends the being, hence ethics is the first philosophy.

Gadamer argues that the final aim of philosophy is to understand universe. For him, this task of philosophy could be accomplished in terms of the question of being, but as well in terms of ethics, since for him, ethics is the second best of philosophical endeavour in addition to ontology. In other words, he tries to combine ontology with moral theory, even though for Aristotle *theoria* and *praxis* are separate realms of philosophical striving, Gadamer argues that 'the good' is also the final target of philosophy as a Socratic task. Gadamer discusses the question of the priority of *theoria* and *praxis* related to the question of Aristotle's conception of first philosophy. Although Aristotle separates the theoretical and practical world and announces that first philosophy must be theoretical contemplation, for Gadamer, in the end, the universe is also understood in terms of moral experience. In other words, Gadamer interprets Aristotle's conception of the good, as follows; the good is another fundamental in addition to *theoria* for understanding the world, hence practical reason is

another best of reason accompanying theoretical reason, as Gadamer argues;

Practical reasonableness, phronesis, as well as theoretical reasonableness are 'best-nesses' (*aretai*). That which is highest in the human being – which Aristotle likes to call 'nous' or the divine – is actualised in both of them.¹¹²

Like Heidegger, Gadamer bases his conception of truth and being on the Platonic good, for Heidegger, freedom is the highest possibility of transcendence and he bases his theory of transcendence on Plato's conception of the good in *Republic*. Likewise Gadamer, referring to the same place in *Republic*, argues that;

True being – the noumena (objects of intellection), the *ontos onta* (things that really are), the eide (forms) – appears in thinking in the same way that light connects the visible with seeing: the good makes thinking what it is.¹¹³

For that reason, the good lights up the being and the truth and allows thinking to be thinking, in other words, Gadamer claims "with this formulation it seems clear that the whole realm of *noeta* (things thought of) has been opened up."¹¹⁴ As Gadamer interprets Plato, the beautiful is another aspect of the good, to put in other words, the good appears as the beautiful¹¹⁵ and "it is the dynamis of the good, which holds everything together every-where and gathers everything together into a unity."¹¹⁶

Gadamer bases his theory of hermeneutic ethics on Platonic conception of the good that transcends every being, Levinas argues that the main concern of philosophy must be the ethical, in the sense that the good, instead of being, is the final idea of philosophy. Levinas claims that

philosophy has been understood as ontologism up to the contemporary age, although the good is what beyond being and essence. But what differentiates Levinas' approaching to the question of the good is that for Levinas the problem of transcendence is restricted within the ethical realm, yet for Heidegger the question of transcendence bears only an ontological meaning. However, for Gadamer, it has both ethical and ontological meaning, hence the problem of transcendence has a Kantian meaning, in the sense that language has a transcendental character in constituting the world and making interpretation and understanding possible, i.e., an ontological meaning related to being and truth. But also as Gadamer bases his theory of understanding on the conception of Platonic dialogue including Platonic good and as the good transcends every being, it has an ethico-ontological meaning, which is implicit in Heidegger's conception of transcendence.

However, according to Levinas transcendence has only an ethical meaning surpassing the problem of being, he argues that "metaphysics precedes ontology".¹¹⁷ Levinas asks, "if transcendence has meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event of being, the *esse*, the essence, passes over to what is the other than being. But what is Being's other?"¹¹⁸ For Levinas, transcendence is passing over to being's other and which is the ethical, i.e., the good, as he argues, "the beyond being, being's other or the otherwise than being, here situated in diachrony, here expressed as infinity, has been recognised as the Good by Plato."¹¹⁹ Clearly, "transcendence is

the well coming of the other by the same, of the Other by me.”¹²⁰ He argues that “to think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence not to think an object.”¹²¹ Consequently, Levinas argues that transcendence is an idea of infinity, like Plato’s the good.¹²² Levinas bases his theory of transcendence on Plato’s understanding of *hyperousia*. Heidegger as well argues that the ground of transcendence is freedom, where he argues also from the same point, i.e., from the Platonic conception of *hyperousia*, yet for him the discussion of freedom and transcendence is an ontological problem. The question par excellence for philosophy, Levinas claims, is not the question of being, but how being justifies itself?¹²³ In other words, for Levinas, since the good transcends essence in dignity and the surpassing power, it must be the main question of philosophy.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

- ¹ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 135.
- ² Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 54.
- ³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 60.
- ⁴ Ibid, p. 62.
- ⁵ Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p. 55.
- ⁶ Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, p.41.
- ⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by James S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana university press, 1968, p., 24. (Otto Pöggeler's quotation, Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 64)
- ⁸ Heidegger, *Kant's Thesis about Being*, in *Pathmarks*, p.350.
- ⁹ Ibid, p.,41.
- ¹⁰ Dahlstrom, Daniel, *Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes on his Commentary on the 'Critique der Reinen Vernunft'*, *The Review of Metaphysics*, XLV, 2 (1991), p., 341.
- ¹¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.,272.
- ¹² Heidegger; *On the Essence of Ground*, in *Pathmarks*, p. 109.
- ¹³ Ibid, p. 108.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Heidegger, *Metaphysics as History of Being*, in *Basic Writings*, p. 4.
- ¹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.,19.
- ¹⁷ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 153.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, p. 170.
- ¹⁹ Cf, ibid, p.184.
- ²⁰ Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p. 36.
- ²¹ Cf, Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 165-167.
- ²² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 31.
- ²³ Ibid, p., 32.
- ²⁴ Ibid, p., 33.
- ²⁵ Ibid, p., 34.
- ²⁶ Ibid, p., 34.
- ²⁷ Ibid, p., 171.
- ²⁸ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p., 182.
- ²⁹ Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics*, in *Pathmarks* p., 93.
- ³⁰ Ibid, p., 91.
- ³¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 171.
- ³² Ibid, p., 174.
- ³³ Ibid, p., 176.
- ³⁴ Ibid, p., 177.
- ³⁵ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 217.
- ³⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 184.
- ³⁷ Ibid, p., 231.
- ³⁸ Ibid, p., 154.
- ³⁹ Ibid, 238.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, p., 401.

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- ⁴¹ Dreyfus, Hubert, *Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment*, in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, p.,173.
- ⁴² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 82.
- ⁴³ Cf., *Ibid*, p., 80 and ff.
- ⁴⁴ Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 39.
- ⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 97.
- ⁴⁶ Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 39.
- ⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 100.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p., 116.
- ⁴⁹ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 195.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 198.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 198.
- ⁵² *Ibid*, p. 205.
- ⁵³ Cf, *ibid.*, p. 208 ff.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 208.
- ⁵⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 378.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p., 416.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 416-417.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p., 433.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p., 440.
- ⁶⁰ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 217.
- ⁶¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 62.
- ⁶² Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 217.
- ⁶³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 256.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 272.
- ⁶⁵ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 106.
- ⁶⁶ Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p., 80.
- ⁶⁷ Heidegger, *On the Essence of Truth*, in *Existence and Being*, p., 319-320.
- ⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Was ist das, die Philosophie*, p. 22.
- ⁶⁹ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 186.
- ⁷⁰ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 24.
- ⁷¹ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 139.
- ⁷² *Ibid*, p., 58.
- ⁷³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 257.
- ⁷⁴ Cf, *Ibid*, p., 257-258.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p., 263.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p., 264.
- ⁷⁷ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p.17-18.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p., 18.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p., 69.
- ⁸⁰ Kant, when arguing the original synthetic unity of apperception, claims that "it must possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and this is the equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible." *Critique of Pure Reason*, B131-132.
- ⁸¹ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* p., 19.
- ⁸² *Ibid*, p., 20.
- ⁸³ *Ibid*, p., 116.
- ⁸⁴ Cf., *Ibid*, p., 184-185.

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- ⁸⁵ Ibid, p., 185.
⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 192
⁸⁷ Ibid, p.193.
⁸⁸ Heidegger, *On the Essence of Truth*, in *Existence and Being*, p.301.
⁸⁹ Ibid, p., 303.
⁹⁰ Cf, Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, p. 31-32.
⁹¹ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 13.
⁹² Heidegger, *Recollection in Metaphysics in Basic Writings*, p.78.
⁹³ Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, p. 195-196.
⁹⁴ Heidegger, *On the Essence of Truth*, in *Existence and Being* 305.
⁹⁵ Ibid, p., 323-324.
⁹⁶ Cf., Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 19.
⁹⁷ Ibid.
⁹⁸ Cf., Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p., 19.
⁹⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p., 474.
¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p., 474-476.
¹⁰¹ Ibid, p., 474-476.
¹⁰² Ibid, p., 475.
¹⁰³ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. xxx (Forward to second edition)
¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 474.
¹⁰⁵ Ricouer, Poul, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 78.
¹⁰⁶ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 453.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p., 475.
¹⁰⁸ Rudiger, Bubner, *Modern German Philosophy*, p. 57.
¹⁰⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p.401, 407.
¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 406
¹¹¹ Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p.16.
¹¹² Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 175.
¹¹³ Ibid, p., 87.
¹¹⁴ Ibid, p., 87.
¹¹⁵ Ibid, p., 117-125.
¹¹⁶ Ibid, p., 125.
¹¹⁷ Cf, Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p., 42-48.
¹¹⁸ Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence*, p. 3.
¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 19.
¹²⁰ Cf., Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p., 43.
¹²¹ Ibid, p., 49.
¹²² Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p., 19.
¹²³ Levinas, *Ethics as First Philosophy, The Levinas Reader*, p., 86.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of our study we have posed the following question as our main problematic; although for Greeks being is to be contemplated beyond the world of experience, how the classical conception of the identity of being and thought has been converted into the union of being and time in hermeneutic ontology.

In Greek philosophy, contemplation has no relation to the practical world. Therefore, the spheres of *theoria* and *praxis* are incommensurable in their very nature. In terms of contemplative thinking man is to be seen as receptive of eternal being. Philosophical wisdom is the contemplation and the knowledge of the being. Both for Aristotle and Plato the knowledge of being is essentially theoretical, because the true being is eternal and beyond the world of experience.

As opposed to the classical thinking, the question of being in hermeneutic ontology is determined within the temporal and practical world, on which metaphysics is based, therefore the paradigm of thinking is not *theoria*, but *phronesis* as hermeneutics of being.

Our first aim, therefore, has been to analyse this turn from thought to time in order to understand being and to review its consequences in

philosophical thinking. We have scrutinised into how we can understand the question of the unity of being in hermeneutic ontology and its relation to the problem of transcendence. Furthermore, we have analysed the relation of this substitution to the postmodern dicta 'philosophy has ended' and 'overcoming metaphysics'.

With regard to the three questions above, we have suggested the question of the unity of being has an essential significance. We have reflected the transcendental philosophy of Kant as a turning point in the history of metaphysics. Since, in classical thought *nous* is understood as a receptive of being, which is not a regulative reason as in the philosophy of Kant, we have argued that Kant's Copernican Revolution is a radical break from the traditional idea of the unity of being, therefore from the classical conception of ground, i.e., the principle of identity. Both the locus of the concept of being and the unity of being have been redefined on the subjective sphere by Kant's transcendental philosophy. In classical understanding, however, the unity of being is defined objectively and the subject-object relation (thought-being connection) is understood to be a correspondent dependence relation.

At this point, our main statement is that in classical metaphysics being is considered to be a real predicate; moreover the unity of being is understood in the entity itself, which is called as the transcendental character of being. Kant's Copernican revolution redefines the unity of being in terms of the transcendental unity of apperception and furthermore

transforms the notion of being from a real predicate into that of a logical copula. Apperception is a form of consciousness that involves self-consciousness and the unity of apperception is transcendental because it is a priori condition for the possibility of knowledge and for the being of any object. For him, transcendental unity of apperception is the highest point where his transcendental philosophy reaches its conclusive end, that is, the ground of transcendental logic. Consequently, we have asserted that, for Kant, being is a transcendental concept, that is, it is not something which the thing has, but just a logical copula that the transcendental subject asserts. Therefore, we have argued that Kant's critique of classical metaphysics should be understood as a transition from classical notion of transcendence to transcendental philosophy.

We have asserted that the origin of both Husserl's and Heidegger's transcendental philosophy is Kant's Copernican Revolution. We have determined that Heidegger's conception of being (*Sein*) is actually a Kantian notion in the sense that the unity of being is to be understood in terms of human being. But, what differentiates between Kantian conception of being and that of Heidegger is that Heidegger reconceptualizes the unity of being on practical and temporal basis. Heidegger strictly follows Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy but differs from him in the existential basis of the notion of transcendence. The unity of being for Heidegger lies in the unity of care-structure and in the ecstatic unity of temporality. However, both for Kant and Husserl

transcendental philosophy has an epistemological meaning, Heidegger gives a new insight to the concept of transcendental and transforms its meaning into ontological-temporal realm.

On this basis, we have discussed that phenomenological-hermeneutical concept of being based on temporality, contrary to Parmenidian one, is parallel to Kantian transcendental notion of being. Particularly, the unity of being is viewed in the subjective sphere; that is, it is upheld that the unity of being originates from human being itself.

There is another consequence of Kant's Copernican revolution related to Plato's conception of transcendence, which is not restricted only the problem of transcendence arising from the Aristotelian conception of being as a real predicate and its transformation into the terms of Kantian transcendental philosophy. As we have indicated before, according to Plato, the good is the one; it transcends every entity and gives them their being. Accordingly, we have interpreted the Copernican revolution of Kant also as the replacement of Plato's sun, i.e., the good - the one, by the human being. Plato claims that the good transcends the worldly entities and those entities are and being known in terms of the good. But, for Kant, the human being as the transcendental being bestows to the beings their being and makes possible the logic of subject-object relation.

Therefore, the problem of transcendence in hermeneutic ontology is twofold. Firstly, it is related to Kant and Aristotle as indicated above in terms of the question of unity of being. Secondly, it has an essential

connection to the Plato's doctrine of transcendence. Actually, Heidegger's notion of transcendence, on the one hand, stems from Kantian notion of transcendental philosophy, on the other hand, it directly bears a Platonic content, since Heidegger bases his conception of freedom, therefore the problem of transcendence, on Plato's doctrine of the good.

Consequently, we have argued that the problem of transcendence in hermeneutic ontology bears a problematic between Aristotle's and Plato's notion of transcendence through Kant's transcendental philosophy. If we consider the phenomenological tradition after Heidegger, Gadamer understands the question of the unity of being as a unity in the speculative unity of language, originating from both Kantian and Heideggerian notion of unity. According to Gadamer, language has a transcendental character for the articulation of being; that is, language determines the a priori conditions of language for the interpretation of being. Moreover, for Gadamer, the question of ethics is interpreted in terms of Plato's conception of the good, and he argues that ethics, as well as the question of being is another way for understanding the cosmos.

Levinas, who also comes from phenomenological tradition, reconceptualises the problem of transcendence in terms of freedom as an ethical question, for him, transcendence means going beyond being and essence; hence the problem of transcendence precedes ontology. Levinas bases his theory of transcendence on Plato's understanding of transcendence. Heidegger, as well, argues that the ground of transcendence

is freedom, where he argues also from the same point, but we should add that, for Heidegger, the discussion of freedom and transcendence is an ontological problem.

Lastly, for Aristotle human being and practical reason cannot be ground of philosophical wisdom, *sophia*, since man and practical reason are not the best thing in the world. On this basis, we have interpreted the turn in the meaning of the unity of being has a fundamental consequence for the question of philosophical ground. Postmetaphysical thinking goes hand in hand with philosophical nihilism; we have argued that the change in the understanding of the classical notion of the principle of identity is the source for such a nihilism. Therefore we can explain the postmodern dictum that philosophy has ended on the account that the question of being has been interpreted in terms of human being. Furthermore, hermeneutic ontology has a problematic related to the task of overcoming Cartesian subjective philosophy, on the one hand it tries to overcome Cartesian subjectivism but on the other hand it remains within Cartesian conception of ground in that human being is still the arbiter of meaning and being in general. Finally, we have concluded that hermeneutic conception of freedom, for Heidegger, as the basic ground of transcendence, is a return to Plato in ontological sense. And, for Gadamer and Levinas, ethics and reconstruction of transcendence in Platonic sense is a going back to the Greeks and to Plato for a new beginning philosophy in postmetaphysical age.

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APPENDIX

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

AŞKINLIK PROBLEMİ:

ZAMAN YA DA DÜŞÜNCE VE HERMENEUTİK ONTOLOJİDE

VARLIĞIN BİRLİĞİ SORUNU

Bu çalışmadaki temel problematik klasik metafiziğin temel önermesi olan Parmenides'in varlık ve düşüncenin özdeşliği ilkesinin hermeneutik ontolojide nasıl varlık ve zamanın birliğine dönüştüğünü araştırmaktır.

Heidegger *Varlık ve Zaman* isimli eserine varlığın anlamını zaman ile anlamaya çalışacağını belirterek başlar, fakat klasik ontolijide varlık tecrübe ve değişim dünyasının, yani zamana ait olan dünyanın dışında, ve sadece teori – saf düşünce- yoluyla anlaşılabilir bulunmuştur. Dolayısıyla varlığın bilgisi için saf düşünceden zamana geçişe ait dönüşümü metafizik tarihinde radikal bir değişim olarak ele aldık ve analiz etmeye çalıştık.

Bu deęiřimi analiz etmek iin Parmenides'in varlıkla ilgili bir bařka nermesine bařvurduk; yani varlık birdir ve birliktir nermesi, ve hermemeutik ontolojide varlıęın birlięi nasıl mmkndr sorusunu sorduk.

Eęer klasik ontolojiye bakarsak varlık probleminin temel argmanları olarak řunları grrz.

- 1) Varlık gerek bir yklemdir ve varlıęın birlięi her hangi bir varolanın kendisinden kaynaklanır, yani hem varlık hem de varlıęın birlięi objektiftir ve herhangi bir znellięe dayanmaz. Varlık ve dřnce zdeřtir, ve bu zdeřlik metafizięin temelidir.
- 2) Felsefi bilgi zamana ait olmayan, ebedi varlıęın saf dřnce yoluyla elde edilmesinden kaynaklanır ve temelde akli gryle ilgilidir.
- 3) Plato'nun ideaları ya da Aristoteles'in zleri zamana ait dnyanın tesinde olduklarından teorik akıl pratik dnyayla bir zdeřleřim iinde deęildir.
- 4) İnsan varlıęı herhangi bir varolanın varlıęına mdahil deęildir ve ontolojide herhangi bir zel yer tutmaz.
- 5) Metafizik z itibarıyla teoriktir; pratik ve teorik dnyalar birbirleriyle eř lmezdir.

Tezimizde takip ettiğimiz temel metafizik dönüşüm çizgisi ise aşağıdaki gibidir:

- 1) Varlık ve düşünce aynıdır, varlık birdir – Parmenides
- 2) Varlığın varlık olarak çalışılması – Aristoteles
- 3) Varlık gerçek bir yüklem değildir fakat sadece mantıksal bir bağıdır – Kant
- 4) Zaman, varlığın anlamı için bir ortamdır – Heidegger
- 5) Anlaşılabilen varlık dildir – Gadamer
- 6) Metafizik ontolojiyi önceler – Levinas

Kant kendi kritik felsefesini, metafizikte Kopernik devrimine benzetir. Hermeneutik ontolojinin de Kant'ın Kopernik devrimini takip ederek varlık problemini ve varlığın birliği sorusunu öznel alanda tartıştığını ale aldık.

Bu nokta da Kant'ın transendental felsefesini metafizik tarihinde önemli bir dönüşüm noktası olarak gördük, zira Kant *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* adlı eserinde varlığın gerçek bir yüklem değil, fakat sadece mantıksal - öznel bir bağ olduğunu söyler. Kant için varlığın birliği transendental öznenin birliğinden kaynaklanır. Dolayısıyla hem varlık hem de varlığın birliği öznel bir temele sahiptir. Bu anlamda Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesi metafizik tarihinde klasik transendence probleminden transendental - aşkınlık felsefesine keskin bir dönüşümdür.

Heidegger'in Dasein analizi ve varlık problemine yaklaşımını ve Husserl'in fenomenolojik felsefesini Kant'ın transcendental felsefesinin bir devamı olarak ele aldık, şu farkla ki Husserl için yönelmişlik problemi ve özne – nesne mantığı hala epistemolojik bir problem iken, Heidegger için özne – nesne ilişkisinin olabilmesi için daha derin bir olanak zemini gerekir, Heidegger bunu 'ilk aşkınlık' olarak adlandırır.

Heidegger için Kant'ın varlık anlayışı nesnelleştirilmiş doğa ile sınırlıdır, Aristoteles'in varlık anlayışındaki temel sorun ise şudur: Aristoteles bir taraftan varlığın çok anlamlılığını ve değişik biçimlerde söylenebilirliğini ifade eder, bir diğer taraftan varlığın bir olduğunu ve bir'le aynı anlama geldiğini söyler. Fakat Heidegger'e göre Aristoteles varlığın birliğinin nasıl olduğunu ve bu çok anlamlılıkla nasıl bağdaştırılabileceğini tam olarak ortaya koyamaz.

Heidegger'in hermeneutik ontolojisinde varlık probleminin pratik dünya ve zamansallık düzleminde Dasein'in ekzistensial analiziyle çözümlendiğini biliyoruz. Bunu biz Kantçı transendental felsefenin ontolojik ve zamana ait bir boyuta taşınması (teorik – epistemolojik düzlemden pratik – zamansal bir düzleme kaydırılması) olarak ele aldık.

Heidegger varlık problemini Dasein'in özü olan 'kaygı' ya indirger ve kaygının birliğini oluşturan üç temel eleman vardır, bunlar varlığın ontolojik birliğini oluşturur. Ve bunlara paralel olarak üç temel ekstatik- zamansal uzanım bulunur, bunlar da zamansal birliği oluşturur.

Biz bu ontolojik – zamansal birliğin, hermeneutik ontolojide varlığın birliğine tekabül ettiğini tartıştık.

Bir başka deyişle varlık probleminin hermeneutik ontolojide Kant felsefesini takiben nasıl öznel – transendental alana nasıl kaydığını araştırdık. Aslında bu çizgi, yani Kant , Aristoteles ve Heidegger çizgisi, bu problemin bir kısmını oluşturur.

Bu problemin bir diğer uzantısı ise Plato felsefesi ile yakından ilgilidir. Plato için tek transendental varlık ‘iyi ideasıdır’ ve diğer bütün idealar varlığını ondan alır. İyi ideası aslında tek bir olandır ve bütün diğer varlıkların da birliklerinin kaynağıdır.

Biz bu noktadan bakarak Kant felsefesinin sadece Aristotelesçi bir varlık anlayışının ve varlığın birliği anlayışının metafizik açıdan radikal bir dönüşüme uğramadığını, fakat Platoncu bir varlık anlayışının da ciddi bir değişime uğradığını tartıştık. Zira Kant’ın transendental öznesi Plato felsefesindeki iyi ideasının da yerini almıştır.

Heidegger aşkınlık problemini tartışırken Plato’nun iyi ideasına atıfta bulunur. Çünkü Heidegger için metafiziğin temeli özne – nesne mantığı ya da özdeşlik ilkesi değildir, fakat özgürlüktür. Yani ilk aşkınlık probleminin özünde Dasein’in özgürlüğü vardır ve burdan kalkarak Heidegger Plato’nun iyi ideasındaki ahlaki seçme ve irade boyutunun aslında etik bir sorundan çok ontolojik bir seçme özgürlüğü olduğunu söylemeye çalışır. Eğer Heidegger’in etik konusunda suskun kaldığını ve

onun ontolojisinin her zaman gizli bir ahlaki içerik taşıdığını hatırlarsak bu yorum kendini haklı çıkarırır.

Heidegger'in bir takipçisi olarak yorumladığımız Gadamer de varlığın birliği problemini dilsel (linguistik) birlikte görür. Yani nasıl Kant için transendental özne varlığın a priori koşullarını kendinde taşırsa Gadamer için de dil benzer bir şekilde, Heidegger'i takip ederek, varlığın a priori koşullarını tarihsel ve pratik dünyanın içinde taşır. Gadamer için etik problemi daha çok Plato'nun iyi ideasına dayanır. Gadamer etiğin Aristotelsçi teorik akıl kavramı kadar evreni anlamız da birincil bir yere sahip olduğunu tartışır.

Levinas ise aşkınlık problemini, yine Plato'nun iyi ideasına dayandırarak, ontolojik bir problemden çok etik bir sorun olarak ele alır. Ve aşkınlık problemini hem Kant'ın transendental – epistemolojik hem de Heidegger'in ontolojik boyutundan alıp etik bir alana taşımak ister.

Tezimizde ulaştığımız sonuçları ise şöyle özetleyebiliriz: Klasik metafiziğin temel önermesi olan varlık ve düşüncenin özdeşliği ilkesinin varlık ve zamanın birliğine dönüşmesindeki temel etkenin Kant felsefesiyle birlikte varlığın öznel alana aktarılması olarak değerlendirebiliriz. Bu aynı zamanda varlığın birliğinin de, yani varlığın aşkın boyutunun da öznel-transendental bir alana aktarılmasıdır.

Hem Husserl hem de Heidegger bu temel transendental dönüşümü takip etmişlerdir. Heidegger için aşkınlık problemi ontolojik ve zamana ait bir boyut içerir. Bu aynı zaman da varlık sorusunun neden

teorik akıldan - *theoria* - pratik akla - *phronesis* - indirgendini de açıklar.

Postmodern bir diktum olan 'felsefenin bittiği' iddiasını da bu açıdan değerlendirdik, yani Kant sonrası felsefede varlık sorununun özne temelli bir alanda ele alınması olarak ve bunun temelinde de Kartezyen felsefenin olduğunu ele aldık.

Bu bağlam da her ne kadar hermeneutik felsefe Dekart'ın öznelci metafiziğini aşmaya çalışsa da, neden hala hem Kant hem Dekart felsefesinin sınırları içinde kaldığını ele aldık, çünkü varlık sorunu öznelci bir alana indirgenmiş olarak kalmıştır.

Diğer taraftan, Heidegger'in Plato'nun iyi ideasına vurgusu ve aşkınlık sorununu özgürlük problemine indirgemesi, ve de Gadamer'in ve Levinas'ın etik problemine aynı noktadan yaklaşması, postmetafizik çağda felsefenin yeniden Grek orjinine yönelmesi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Son olarak şöyle diyebiliriz ki, hermeneutik felsefede aşkınlık problemi hem Platoncu hem de Aristotelesçi anlamında Kant felsefesi boyunca ve ondan ele alınarak yeniden tartışılmaktadır.

VITA

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