

GENERATIVE MECHANISMS OF TURKISH - AMERICAN DEFENSE
RELATIONS: 1973-1980, A CRITICAL REALIST APPROACH

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RELATIONS: 1973-1980, A CRITICAL REALIST APPROACH**

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ABSTRACT

GENERATIVE MECHANISMS OF TURKISH - AMERICAN DEFENSE RELATIONS: 1973-1980 A CRITICAL REALIST ANALYSIS

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The Turkish-American relations hit a hard bottom in 1974 and then enjoyed a high level of cooperation with the DECA of 1980. This thesis explores how bilateral relations evolved from a conflictual level to a high level of cooperation in just six years and the causal mechanisms that induced change in bilateral relations. In doing so, it targets to find out causal mechanisms of the Turkish-American defense relations during one of the most turbulent periods of this relationship. In order to solve this puzzle, a causation theory based on Aristotelian four causes typology was applied. Accordingly, structural, agential, material and ideational causes that produce the major milestones of the said relations in the studied period were analyzed in the light of the scientific realist philosophy. Hence, the study reviews the arms embargo imposed upon Turkey in 1975, the removal of that embargo in 1978, and the signature of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980 based on the declassified official US foreign policy documents.

Keywords: Embargo, DECA, Turkish-American Relations, Defense Industrial Cooperation

ÖZ

TÜRK-AMERİKAN SAVUNMA İLİŞKİLERİNİ ÜRETEN MEKANİZMALAR: 1973-1980, BİLİMSEL GERÇEKÇİ BİR YAKLAŞIM

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Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri 1974'te sert bir dibe vuruş yaşadıktan sonra, 1980 yılına gelindiğinde Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması ile yüksek düzeyde bir işbirliğine sahip olmuştur. Dolayısıyla bu tez, ikili ilişkilerin sadece altı yıl içinde çatışma düzeyinden yüksek düzeyde bir işbirliğine nasıl dönüştüğünü incelemeyi ve ikili ilişkilerde değişimi üreten mekanizmaları ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla, Aristo'nun dört neden öğretisine dayalı olarak geliştirilmiş olan bir nedensellik teorisi uygulanmış; incelenen dönemde söz konusu ilişkilerin temel kilometre taşlarını oluşturan olaylar, 1975 yılında uygulanan ambargo, 1978 yılında ambargonun kaldırılması ve 1980 yılında Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması'nın imzalanması, yapısal, amil, maddi ve fikirselle nedenler bağlamında incelenmiştir. Araştırma, temel olarak ABD'nin gizliliği kaldırılmış diplomatik yazışma ve resmi dış politika belgelerine dayanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ambargo, SEIA, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Savunma Sanayii İşbirliği

To my wife Asude Başat.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	: The Central Treaty Organization
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CRA	: Congressional Review Act
DCA	: Defence Cooperation Agreement
DCI	: Director Central Intelligence
DECA	: Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DoD	: Department of Defense
DPC	: Defence Planning Committee
FMS	: Foreign Military Sales
FRUS	: Foreign Relations of United States
GAO	: Government Accountability Office
GNP	: Gross National Product
GOG	: Government of Greece
GOT	: Government of Turkey
ICBM	: Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
IMET	: International Military Education and Training
IMF	: International Money Fund
JP	: Justice Party
JUSMMAT	: Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
MAP	: Military Assistance Program

MBFR : Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSA : National Security Agency

NSC : National Security Council

NSSM : National Security Study Memoranda

OECD : Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PRC : Policy Review Committee

RPP : Republic Peoples Party

SALT : The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

TGS : Turkish General Staff

UN : United Nations

USG : Unites States Government

USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Question

With its patterns of cooperation and discord, Turkish-American defense relations endured many turbulent times, beginning with President Johnson's infamous letter in 1964 that impolitely warns Turkey not to use American equipment in a likely Cyprus intervention. Since the Truman Doctrine, a swinging pendulum between good and bad days of this relationship has been the source of many conflicting accounts and even of conspiracy theories that claim to explain and understand major problems between the two countries. So much so that this relationship was usually called by adjective prefixes such as "troubled" or "strategic." Sometimes these problems were explained by the choices of governing leaders or parties; other times, the international system or the interferences of third parties, i.e., special interest groups and lobbies, were the culprit. However, these two countries' asymmetric structures make it impossible to rely on a single factor explanation. Indeed, a comprehensive look at the relationship, which considers material, ideational, agential, or structural factors, is required.

Towards the end of 1974, Congress imposed a ban on the sales and transfers of defense equipment to Turkey as a response to Turkey's peace operation in Cyprus. Subsequently, Turkey closed American military bases in her territory in 1975. However, five years later, the two countries signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which aimed to help Turkey establish its indigenous defense industry. This short period was embraced many transitions. The international system went from *détente* to the escalated Cold War and arms race; there were three presidents in the US; there were short-term coalitions in Turkey accompanied by domestic violence and increased financial problems in Turkey.

It is the contention of this dissertation that the Turkish-American relations hit a hard bottom in 1974 and then enjoyed a high level of cooperation with the DECA of 1980. It aims to account for this puzzle. This dissertation asks how bilateral relations evolved

from a conflictual level to a high level of cooperation in just six years and what were the causal mechanisms that induced change in bilateral relations. In doing so, it targets to find out causal mechanisms of the Turkish-American defense relations during one of the most turbulent periods of this relationship, which swung from embargo in 1974 to the finalization of the most comprehensive defense and economic cooperation agreement in 1980.

Full of events, at both bilateral and international levels, this relatively short period is very promising to embark on a study to find out causal mechanisms of the relationship between Turkey and the United States of America (USA). The opium crisis, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, the embargo decision, negotiations for a new defense cooperation agreement, the struggle between the US Congress and the administration, the political and economic turmoil in Turkish domestic politics are key highlights of this term, which was coincided with a time from détente to increased superpower competition. Thus, the aim of this study as a contribution to the literature is twofold: first, to trace the empirical aspects of this relationship by studying the official US documents between 1973 and 1980 and second, to develop a comprehensive theoretical understanding of the causal mechanisms of Turkish-American relations by applying the causation theory based on the critical realist philosophy.

1.2. Methodology

This dissertation is a case study, and it utilizes qualitative analysis. In doing so, it overwhelmingly relies on primary resources. The research is fundamentally based on the declassified official US foreign policy documents. The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series is the official historical record of significant diplomatic activities. The series is produced by the Department of State. The volumes comprised of declassified documents of US foreign affairs agencies. All the FRUS documents¹

¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, eds. Lauries Van Hook, Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing

that cover US relations with Turkey between 1969 and 1980 were reviewed for this study.

Some congressional documents, documents released to the public from other US agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or Government Accountability Office, were also examined. These documents shed light on many historical developments that are sometimes very analogous to current events and problems concerning Turkish-American relations. Existing literature that deals with the Turkish-American relations lack these official documents since most of the available work was written before these documents were declassified and published.

In addition to the official documents, the available literature about this period were also used as secondary sources. The secondary sources were especially helpful to contextualize the information derived from the primary sources. By using mainly primary sources, this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of the Turkish-American relations empirically. However, its contribution is not limited to the empirical domain.

The dissertation also aims to contribute to the theoretical domain by applying the causation theory to the Turkish-American relations to reveal generative mechanisms of this relationship. The causation theory provides a comprehensive tool to assess the dynamics of the Turkish-American relations from structural, agential, ideational, and material perspectives as well as their interactions with each other.

In the existing literature, the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US was analyzed by employing different international relations theories. However, most of these theories take into account a limited aspect of the international phenomena. Most

Office, 2010); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXI, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece; 1977–1980, eds. Lauries Van Hook, Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010)

of these theories accuse each other of being reductionist. For instance, a realist analysis focuses on the international system and the behaviors of individual states with ignoring to elaborate inside the states as “black boxes”. However, a constructivist would argue the role of the construction of the ideas and societies. A critical theorist, who may focus on class interest, gender, or environment, would accuse realists of justifying inequalities by ignoring the sub-state level agents. Indeed, the discipline divisions, as known as grand debates, are centered on what to study and how to study international relations.² This ontological and epistemological strife among the different theoretical schools can be observed in the first debate between realist and idealist, in the second debate between traditionalists behavioralists, in the third debate among realists, pluralists, and Marxists, and finally in the latest debate between positivists and post-positivists. The implication of these debates and divisions in the discipline makes it difficult to develop a consistent and comprehensive analysis of the matter at hand. Therefore, it is argued in this study that a comprehensive approach is needed in the discipline of international relations to avoid reductionist tendencies, and this comprehensive approach should take into account both structure and agency as well as ideational and material aspects. Furthermore, considering that these dimensions affect each other, the interrelationship between them should also be captured.

The scientific realist philosophy and the causation theory, used together, allow to employ a positivist epistemology (with its belief that the existence of a world outside which can be discoverable) and postpositivist ontology (since it accepts observable and unobservable causes). This feature of scientific realism also enriches the methodology by allowing harmonistic methods.

² For great debates in international relations, see: Steve Smith, “Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory”, in Tim Dunne et al eds, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.16-26

Reviewing official documents also shows how four causes work together and influence each other to constitute, construct, and shape the events. For instance, the ambassador's role as an agency is visible in the formulation of foreign policy towards Turkey. Views of ambassadors and other state officials, who visit Turkey, are informed by all four causes (material, structural/formal, ideational/final, and agential/efficient) analyzed in this study. During the Cold War, the superpower competition, ideas concerning the role and position of Turkey, the military material necessities of NATO, and Turkish economic problems were all different angles of the relationship that acted together. Consequently, in this research, the thematic analysis technics is widely used in order to discover broad themes and patterns by applying the theory of causation.

Therefore, this dissertation is both a theoretical and an empirical attempt to answer the research question how Turkish-American relations got from a very low point to a high level of cooperation in a relatively short period, and what were the causal mechanisms that produced change in this relationship.

1.3. Organization of the Dissertation:

The next chapter sets the theoretical framework of this study. The philosophical approach adopted here is scientific realism since it suits best ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically to this study's aim. According to scientific realism, the reality is stratified, and the generative mechanism of empiric level reality is produced in deep level generative mechanisms.³ To develop a comprehensive approach to find out these generative mechanisms, Milja Kurki's work on causational analysis⁴ inspired this study to work on complexes of causes. Following her example, the focus of the theoretical framework is centered on the Aristotelian notion of causes; formal (structural), material, ideational (final), and agential (efficient) causes. The

³ Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, Routledge, London, 2008, p.2

⁴ Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations, Reclaiming Causal Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, 2008

layered approach of scientific realism would facilitate a holistic understanding of the international phenomena accompanied by the theory of causation advanced by Kurki. By employing a causal approach, it would be possible to deal with the different layers of reality as complexes of causes, which operate together. Therefore, this study's main theoretical argument is that these four causes work in tandem with each other in forming complexes of causes as generating mechanisms of acts and decisions shaping and shoving the Turkish-American defense relations.

The third chapter provides a quick background and a brief timeline of events that took place during the period of the study. The US Congress was already upset with Turkey's decision to resume opium production even before the Cyprus intervention. This intervention quickly provided an alibi for punishing Turkey with the embargo. Instead of endless discussions over the "real" reason for the embargo and the worsening relations between the two countries, a comprehensive look at the history by applying the four causes model would be more useful. How structural, agential, ideational, and material causes interact together in producing the events and outcomes is the central perspective in reviewing documents after this chapter.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters review the road to the embargo, negotiations for a new defense cooperation agreement, removal of the embargo, and finally, the new agreement's signature mainly relying on the official American Foreign Policy documents. The fourth chapter starts from deteriorating relations between two countries under the shadow of the opium crisis and the Cyprus intervention. Immediately after the Cyprus intervention, the relationship's central theme is centered on the Congress' embargo decision. During the period from embargo decision to the lift of the ban, while the Cold War rivalry set the international stage, bureaucratic politics and the struggle between administrative and legislative branches in the US, domestic political turmoil and economic crisis in Turkey were crucial elements that shaped the relationship.

The fifth chapter focuses on the bilateral discussions between the US and Turkey to go back to normal by removing the embargo. However, it was a stringent process. Turkey had to close US airbases. The US had to rediscover the importance of its bases in Turkey and keep Turkey in NATO against the background of intensification of the Cold War. Those were years of turbulent domestic politics and economic difficulties for Turkey. Even though the society polarized, both rightist and leftist politicians were trying to show their supporters that they were defending Turkey's national interest against the US while, on the other hand, trying to keep the Turkish-American relations from further damage.

Towards the end of the period, as covered in the sixth chapter, a new climate emerged in the relationship between Turkey and the USA. A much more positive mood, including Americans' effort to help Turkish economic stability, concluded a comprehensive economic and defense cooperation agreement.

The seventh chapter analyses the relationship based on the official documents reviewed in the previous chapters. The aim here is to show how complexes of causes, structural, material, agential, and ideational causal forces shape and constrain major acts and decisions in working together as complexes of causes. The main structural forces dealt with here are the Cold War rivalry, the Cyprus issue, the revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As material causes, the US military bases in Turkey, Turkey's military capabilities and deficiencies as a NATO member, and the Turkish economy's fragile state were mentioned as they were frequently prompted in the review of official documents in the previous chapter. Agential, or in Aristotelian terms efficient causes, include the primary domestic sources of the foreign policy formulation such as Congress and the administration, bureaucratic politics and diplomacy, special interest groups and lobbies, Turkish politicians, and military. Ideational forces (final cause in the Aristotelian sense) include both sides' perceptions and beliefs towards each other. While Americans had the firm belief that Turkey has no alternative to American weapons to protect itself, the Turkish military and

politicians were developing a strong sense of urgency to establish a local and independent defense industry.

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CHAPTER 2

APPLYING THE THEORY OF CAUSATION TO TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

This study aims to discover the generative mechanisms of Turkish-American relations during the period between 1974 and 1980. While the Cyprus intervention of 1974 and the subsequent American arms embargo imposed on Turkey represent the worst point in this relationship, just six years later, two countries signed the most comprehensive cooperation agreement to date, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980.

In search of mechanisms that affect Turkish-American relations during the late seventies, a period in which two countries' relations went from the worst to the best point in a relatively short time, a comprehensive approach is needed to be able to advance empirical, ideational, and critical perspectives all at the same time. Therefore, this dissertation has adopted scientific realism as the philosophical approach since it suits best ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically for the dissertation's purposes.

After showing why scientific realist philosophy is relevant for this study, I will focus on the most crucial aspect of scientific realism, suggesting that the observable or unobservable mechanisms generate reality. How reality generated is particularly important for this study's aim is to find out the mechanisms, generative forces that "shape and shove" Turkish-American relations. For this, Milja Kurki's theory of causation based on the Aristotelian four causes model's interpretation will be applied to show how material, ideational, structural, and agential causes are working together

in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions.⁵ As it will be further explained, this approach permits one to go beyond the boundaries of narrow theoretical frameworks and reductionist tendencies in the discipline.

This dissertation will focus on setting a theoretical framework rather than elaborating a more detailed meta-theoretical debate on applying scientific realism to the discipline of international relations (IR). For this study, the main pillars of scientific realism are 1- the reality is stratified, 2-it adopts a plural ontology, and 3-observable or unobservable deep generative mechanisms exist.

2.1. Scientific Realism:

Scientific realism is not a theory, but a philosophy of science developed by Roy Bhaskar. In his paper, that concisely covers critical realism as a post-positivist phase in international relations, Faruk Yalvaç⁶ writes that social scientists including Andrew Sayer⁷, Andrew Collier⁸, Margaret Archer⁹ and Peter Manicas¹⁰ contributed to the development of this realist philosophy of science. Yalvaç argues that critical realism, as he calls as the applied version of scientific realism to social sciences, is a candidate

⁵ Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations, Reclaiming Causal Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, 2008

⁶ Faruk Yalvaç, “Eleştirel Gerçekçilik: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Post-Pozitivizm Sonrası Aşama”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol 6, Issue 24 (Winter 2010), p. 3-32.

⁷ Andrew Sayer, *Method in Science: A Realist Approach*, Londra, Routledge, 1992; *Realist Social Science*, Londra, Sage, 1999

⁸ Andrew Collier, *Critical Realism*, Londra, Verso, 1994; Kathryn Dean et al. (der), *Realism, Philosophy and Social Science*, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

⁹ Margaret S. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Margaret Archer et.al. (der), *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, Routledge, Londra, 1998

¹⁰ Peter T. Manicas, *A Realist Philosophy of Social Science: Explanation and Understanding*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

philosophy of science to overcome the fragmented nature of the discipline divided between positivists and post-positivists.¹¹ Yalvaç also mentions scholars of international relations such as Alexander Wendt,¹² Colin Wight,¹³ Heikki Patomäki,¹⁴ Jonathan Joseph,¹⁵ and Milja Kurki¹⁶ who try to develop the discipline by applying scientific realist philosophy. Indeed, this study attempts to apply Kurki's work on theory of causation in order to develop a comprehensive approach to understand causal mechanisms of Turkish-American relations.

Jonathan Joseph underlines the importance of transcending empirical level to grasp reality based on "unobservable and underlying structures, processes, generative mechanisms and causal relations."¹⁷ He summarizes main pillars of scientific realism in a concise paragraph which is worth to quote here:

¹¹ Yalvaç, (2010), p.5

¹² Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wright, "After Post Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism", *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 44, No 2, 2000, s. 213-237; Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories About World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, V 2, No 1, 1996, pp. 105-33;

¹³ Colin Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work!", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, V. 35, No 2, 2007, pp.379-398.

¹⁴ Heikki Patomäki, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics*, Londra, Routledge, 2000;

¹⁵ Jonathan Joseph, "A Realist Theory of Hegemony", *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, V. 30, No 2, 2000, s. 179-202; "Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Approach", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 35, No 2, 2007, pp. 345-359;

¹⁶ Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; Milja Kurki, "Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations: Causes All the Way Down", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Cilt 35, No 2, 2007, pp. 361-378;

¹⁷ Jonathan Joseph, "Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution", *Review of International Studies*, Vol 31, No 1, 2008, pp. 109-128; p.115

scientific realism is a philosophical position that argues that reality exists independently of the conceptions we have of it. This puts it at odds with post-structuralist, hermeneutic, constructivist and various intersubjective positions. Against those positions influenced by the positivist tradition, scientific realism argues that we must move beyond empirical realism to look at the reality of unobservable and underlying structures, processes, generative mechanisms and causal relations. Bhaskar argues for this stratified depth ontology through a set of transcendental arguments along the lines that given that human knowledge, social practices (including science), events and occurrences are intelligible, this presupposes that the world itself (including the social world) is structured and ordered in a certain way that is relatively enduring over time and open to investigation. From here we can move to an investigation of the nature of the social world, how it is ordered and how it is reproduced, what its most important structures and mechanisms are, and how they exert their causal influence.¹⁸

The overarching feature of scientific realism is it gives ontological status to ideational, material, agential and structural causes. This feature of scientific realism makes it possible to develop a comprehensive approach to study international relations. Joseph puts it this way:

Given all this, perhaps the answer to the question of the ontological status of objects, ideas, relations and structures is to say that they are all real. Both the material and ideational should be conceived in the context of real entities that exist independently of our conceptualization and have real powers, liabilities and causal effects. Thus, ideational things as much as material things can be said to have a real existence independent of particular conceptions and understandings we may have of them.¹⁹

The reality is stratified:

Yalvaç contends that one of the prominent features of the scientific realism is that it argues the existence of a stratified reality independent from human mind and the aim of the science is to discover this reality.²⁰ Indeed, Roy Bhashkar, the eminent scholar

¹⁸ Jonathan Joseph, "Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution", *Review of International Studies*, Vol 31, No 1, 2008, pp. 109-128; p.115

¹⁹ Jonathan Joseph, "Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Approach", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 35, No 2, 2007, p.354

²⁰ Yalvaç, (2010), p.5

of scientific realism, argues that, “the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical are distinct”.²¹ “Bhaskar distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical: the first refers to what entities and mechanisms make up the world, the second to events, and the third to that which we experience”. The layered conception of reality is a significant part of scientific realism. They argue that “the real is not identical with the empirical, i.e. only with what is experienced. Rather, reality consists of both observable phenomena and the unobservable structures, underlying relations and generative mechanisms that govern them”.²²

For Colin Wight the agency role of the state is not clear since “the state, as a constructed social form, can only act in and through individual action. State activity is always the activity of particular individuals acting within particular social forms.”²³ Indeed, Wight suggests “a multi-layered account of agency at least, although not only, three levels of agency. A sense of balance to the agent structure relationship requires a multi layered view of agency because agency refers to both individual and social predicates.”²⁴

Accordingly, the theoretical framework of this study is based on the argument that every layer of reality has its own dynamics and hegemonic structure. This approach makes it possible to employ a pluralist ontology. Indeed, referring Cox, Yalvaç argues that “the concept of hegemonic depth is important in that it facilitates the development

²¹ Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, Routledge, London, 2008, p.2

²² Faruk Yalvaç, Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System, *International Relations*, 26(2), p.169.

²³ Colin Wight, They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They?, *European Journal of International Relations*, p.128

²⁴ Colin Wight, p.129

of a theory of foreign policy that connects domestic social developments to the historical interaction between social orders and world orders”.²⁵

Similarly, Colin Wight underlines the importance of the empirical reality doesn't provide the full picture of the reality:

A commitment to depth realism presupposes that there are things, entities, structures and/or mechanisms that operate and exist independently of our ability to know or manipulate them. It also presupposes that appearances do not exhaust reality, that there are things going on, as it were, beyond and behind the appearances that are not immediately accessible to our senses. The laws of nature, the entities, structures or mechanisms which are often not empirically 'observable', are what Bhaskar terms the 'intransitive objects of knowledge' and exist independently of (wo)man and independently of his/her ability to know them.²⁶

This approach of stratified reality fits the aims of this study, which is to find out the main dynamics and generative mechanisms of Turkish-American relations that might be still valuable in explaining the “troubled relationship”²⁷ between the two countries. In analyzing Turkish-American relations, approaching from international system, regional and domestic levels provide different explanations. Moreover, the formulation of a foreign policy both for Turkey and the USA implies a wide spectrum of domestic inputs ranging from special interest groups to bureaucratic politics. However, understanding the reality in a stratified manner helps us solving the puzzle. The aim of this study is to find out causal mechanisms occurred in deeper levels of reality instead of only looking at the empiric level. Indeed, positivist approaches, such as neorealism or neoliberalism, explain interstate relations if we accept states as billiard balls or black boxes and we do not bother with their internal decision-making

²⁵ Ibid, p.171.

²⁶ Colin Wight, agents, structures and international relations, P.29

²⁷Larrabee, F.Stephen, (2010) Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change, RAND Corporation

processes.²⁸ Yet, at the deeper levels of the reality lie the mechanisms that gives impetus to the events taking place upper layers.

On the other hand, explaining the empiric layer with reductionist theories is potentially misleading as Kenneth Waltz contends “reductionist theories miss out set of causes operate at the systemic level and which cannot be unearthed by looking at the attributes and interaction of parts”.²⁹

As Hollis and Smith defended,

At each level of analysis there is a framework of rules which enable and constrain what may be done, thus letting the inquirer identify the action by finding the intention in the behavior and by locating the legitimating reasons for it.³⁰

Similarly, Kurki and Wight argued that “for scientific realists, scientific knowledge goes beyond appearances and constructs explanations that often run counter to, and even contradict, observed outcomes”.³¹

Wight also defends the fact that reality is stratified and looking at only one level of reality would be misleading:

Importantly, in order to maintain the intelligibility of science, it is not only a matter of these domains of reality being distinct, but that we recognise that they are, or can be, unsynchronised or out of phase with one another. Experience, the domain of the empirical, for example, may well not coincide – be in phase – with the actual; events can happen without anyone to experience them. Likewise, events may typically be out of phase with the mechanisms that govern them: the conditions of possibility for a war, for example, may be present (armies, and a potential

²⁸Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1990), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

²⁹Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *The theory of International Politics*,

³⁰Hollis and Smith, p.184

³¹Kurki, Milja and Colin Wight (2013) *International Relations and Social Science in International Relations Theories* ed by Dunne et.al. Oxford University Press, Oxford.p.25.

area of dispute), yet perhaps no war emerges owing to action of a countervailing mechanism (diplomacy, for example). Reality is stratified and the realm of appearance or the empirical is (1) distinct from, (2) often, and even normally, out of phase with (that is to say, disjoint from) and (3) perhaps in opposition to the phenomena (or phenomenal forms) they generate.³²

However, the approach of stratified realities adopted by scientific realist scholars is different from Singer's³³ level of analysis problem that suggests systemic and unit levels. Indeed, Steve Smith argues that the level of analysis debate is a methodological not an ontological debate: it refers to how best to explain and not to how the world really is.³⁴ Taking into account of Waltz's three levels, international system, states and bureaucracies, we can argue that both Singer and Waltz have focused on the "explaining side" in Hollis and Smith's term.

I argue that this layered approach will facilitate a holistic understanding of the international phenomena accompanied with the theory of causation furthered by Kurki. For instance, the deep levels of reality, in following Bashkar's categorization, includes a specific distribution of power in terms of not only material wealth, but also a cultural hegemonic structure in the Gramscian sense. This deepest level's structure consists of forces who aim to construct a world image suitable to improve its already dominant position. Exaggerating the Soviet's military build-up, for instance, justifies enormous defense spending and unleashes the powers who create the climate for McCarthyism at empirical level. As an underlying theme of Edward H. Carr's seminal work, *Twenty*

³² Wight, p.35

³³ Singer, J.D. (1961) "The level of analysis problem in international relations" in Knorr and Verba (eds), *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 77-92.

³⁴ Hollis and Smith, p.203

Years Crisis, the conflict of “haves” and “have nots” are lying at the essence of international power struggle.³⁵

Two important aspects should be taken into account in this layered approach; the hegemonic structure of each level (empirical, actual and real) and the interaction between those three layers. Once depicted as a picture by the deepest level where priorities set and the rules of dominance determined reflecting the hegemonic structure of that deepest level, the construction process of that reality commences in accordance with the depicted world image. While it is produced by deeper levels of reality, the empiric level is also part of the reality. Once created, its rules are binding, binary oppositions constrain behaviors of the actors at the deepest level even it may redefine their interests. Therefore, it is not to say that the empirical reality is in perfect compatibility with the layers beneath. Root causes construct a world, which in turn shapes and constrains itself. In other words, power relations of each layer create a hegemonic structure that constructs the upper layer, all the while it constrains the layer below. It is perhaps similar to the Tilly’s famous line “war made the state and the state made war”.³⁶

Therefore, as Joseph put it, hegemony is a crucial element of reproducing social structures and it has both agential and structural aspects:

The central argument outlined here is that hegemony is not only about praxis issues like projects, alliances, leadership and consent. Hegemony is also necessarily related to the reproduction of social structures. The intersubjective view that sees hegemony as the relation between groups only makes sense when located within a structural context that shows us what is at stake and what it is that these groups are responding to. We can say that hegemony therefore has both agential and structural aspects. It is agential in terms of the relations between groups as expressed in the conscious projects and activities of social agents; it is structural in the sense of

³⁵Edward Hallett Carr, “Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939”, Reissued With a new Preface from Michael Cox, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2016

³⁶ Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell.

relating to the issue of the reproduction, conservation or transformation of social conditions.³⁷

Generative Mechanisms:

The distribution of the material capabilities both in international system and in societal levels reveals a distinction between “haves” and “have nots” as Carr puts it in, *20 Years Crisis*³⁸. In any point of history, the existing structure that reflects the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” gives hints about the mechanism that generates events which we experience at the empiric level. Therefore, uncovering this mechanism may be a starting point. There are some approaches from the perspective of political economy that can be instrumental in this endeavor. Polanyi’s³⁹ analysis of the capitalist economic system, Arrighi’s⁴⁰ thoughts about the development of the capitalism are important sources that helps us to understand the deep levels of reality. Moreover, the construction of the global capitalism and neoliberal age can be viewed by the teachings of Gindin and Panitch⁴¹ who argue that the USA constructed the global capitalist class while Peter Gowan’s⁴² perspective with regard to financialization of the capitalism starting from Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard support the arguments of this study.

³⁷ Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol 31, No 1, 2008, pp. 109-128; p.120

³⁸ Carr, (1939)

³⁹ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1944.

⁴⁰ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, Verso, London, New York, 1994.

⁴¹ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, Verso, London and New York, 2012

⁴² Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble, Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*, Verso, London, 1999.

Polanyi's famous book *The Great Transformation* provides us with two concepts which seem relevant and useful for discovering the deepest level reality: "Fictive commodities" and "double movement". To sum up briefly, according to Polanyi, the free-market system turns the environment (land), the people (labor) and money into goods in markets as they are being sold in their markets. This is in fact against their very nature and eventually creates resistance by these fictive goods against the roles enforced upon them. Just as the environmental crises are the results of turning land into commodity, societal crises are too the result of turning people into commodity in labor markets. This resistance is the essence of the second concept, the double movement. While the free market tries to expand and settle into societies, the society tries to resist. This resistance is manifest in different ways depending on the historical and sociological context. It happens as social democracy in northern Europe, or socialism in Russia or the new deal in the USA. Therefore, I argue that particularly the concept of double movement is closely relevant in studying international phenomena due to its potential of revealing social mechanisms that produce both domestic and international reality. As this study analyzes the beginning of the neoliberal period which implies establishment and expansion of global free trade and neoliberal principles with respect to its impacts on the Turkish-American relations, Polanyi's concepts have potential in discovering mechanisms that lie at the deepest reality level.⁴³

For defining the deepest level mechanisms that trigger the events we experience, it is also necessary to conceptualize the development of global capitalism. According to Giovanni Arrighi, in the last five centuries there have been four hegemonic powers with increasingly expanding spheres of influences. Starting with the Italian city state of Genoa, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and finally the United States are global hegemonic powers.

⁴³ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1944.

The hegemonic status of the USA has become the subject of discussions particularly after Vietnam War. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the end of the Cold War, the world order constructed by the Western block became undisputed. The liberal global order's ultimate victory, "The end of the History" discourse was widely accepted. However, following scholars such as Hardt and Negry⁴⁴ or Gindin and Panitch, apart from the realist notion of unipolar moment or undisputed American hegemony, it is possible to discern the reality of the construction of global capitalism in transnational class formation.

Empiric Layer

It is tempting to discuss international phenomena at empiric level because it would be simpler to base theories on the assumption of states as black boxes or billiard balls, as this renders observing their behaviors and measuring their material capabilities relatively easier. It is quite easy to make a phrase commencing, for instance, with "The United States wants..." by attributing belief or desire to the states as units or agents. Even though elaborating on deeper level realities show the complexity of a decision-making or policy formulation process, it is comforting to observe the regularities of international system based on these units' behaviors. Ahead of all the discussions of the explanatory power of empirical analysis of realism, this study aims at drawing the attention at the interaction between layers.

2.2. The Theory of Causation

Hence, this study aims at giving ontological status to structures, agents, material and ideational causes. Acknowledging stratified reality in accordance with scientific realist stance, permits us to use a comprehensive tool to analyze international reality by employing Aristotelian four causes approach developed by Kurki. By employing

⁴⁴Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000

causal approach, it is possible to deal with the different layers of reality as complexes of causes, which operate together.

This approach is also closely related with the agent-structure problem in international relations theory. Scientific realist philosophy offers an alternative for transcending agent-structure problem by giving both the ontological status. In his seminal article, while debating about the agent-structure problem, Alexander Wendt argues that “There are two basic ways to approach this question: by making one unit of analysis ontologically primitive, or by giving them equal and therefore irreducible ontological status”.⁴⁵ By giving ontological status to both agents and structures, Wendt adopts a structurationist approach.

The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status. Far from being a mindless synthesis of the "best of both worlds," however, the structuration project requires a very particular conceptualization of the agent-structure relationship. This conceptualization forces us to rethink the fundamental properties of (state)agents and system structures. In turn, it permits us to use agents and structures to explain some of the key properties of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as "codetermined" or "mutually constituted" entities.⁴⁶

According to Yalvaç, since agents and structures have different features, they should be left analytically separate instead of thinking them as a single conception of society.⁴⁷

Jonathan Joseph draws attention to peculiar features of structures and agents. While structures provide an enduring context with enabling and constraining powers, among the distinct feature of agents are having self-consciousness and intentionality as well as cognition and emotions:

⁴⁵ Alexander E. Wendt, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, *International Organization*, Vol 41, No.3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 335-370, The MIY Press

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.339

⁴⁷ Yalvaç (2010), p. 21

Structures and agents possess distinct properties. As Carter and New⁴⁸ neatly summarize, among the unique properties of structures are anteriority – such things as legal systems and linguistic systems are pre-existing features of the world we engage with. Secondly, structures are relatively enduring. And thirdly, they possess powers of enablement and constraint – for example, existing allocations of wealth enable some and constrain others. Meanwhile, among the sui generis properties of agents are self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, cognition and emotionality. Such properties of agency, and the properties of structure, are irreducible to one another.⁴⁹

In the discipline of IR, there are attempts to go beyond the positivism and post-positivism debate. As Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight suggest “that critical realism can incorporate many of the recent epistemological developments and at the same time move the debate forward due to its focus on ontological matters. Critical realism highlights the conditions of possibility for a resolution of many of the theoretical, methodological, and praxiological cul-de-sacs international relations theory currently finds itself in.”⁵⁰ In their article, Patomäki and Wight problematize the Humean-Kantian origins of conventional IR thinking, and propose critical realism as an alternative. In doing so, they “try to revive causal theorizing by redefining causality in realist terms and by arguing that both meaningful reasons and social structures are causally efficacious.”⁵¹ They argue that critical realism makes it possible since it “embeds the social within the material”:

Critical realism, we argue, is suggestive of potential solutions to these problems, because of its radical break with both Humean skepticism and Kantian transcendental idealism. Critical realism provides an alternative “problem-field” which embeds the social within the material without reducing one to the other.⁵²

⁴⁸ B.Carter and C.New, *Making Realism Work*, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, p.5

⁴⁹ Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol 31, No 1, 2008, pp. 109-128; p.117

⁵⁰ Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 2000, 44, p.215

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.216

⁵² *Ibid*, p.223.

In advancing a pluralist ontology, scientific realist philosophy allows us to develop a comprehensive understanding of the international phenomena. As Patomaki and Wight put it:

according to critical realism the world is composed not only of events, states of affairs, experiences, impressions, and discourses, but also of underlying structures, powers, and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse. For critical realists this underlying reality provides the conditions of possibility for actual events and perceived and/or experienced phenomena.⁵³

Patomaki and Wight underline the necessity of an approach based on causal explanations taking different layers into account:

In order to provide causal explanation, we need theories about what it is that brings about changes in the world outside of the texts we are writing ourselves; that is, an account of causal powers of different structured mechanisms or complexes at different layers of the world.⁵⁴

Indeed, they defend the scientific realist conception of different layers of world:

According to critical realism, there are different layers of world, each being able to influence each other causally. These layers include ecological, biological, and social worlds. Now, it is a central critical realist argument that, at the social layer, reasons for actions by social beings are among the causally powerful elements of the real world.⁵⁵

Patomaki and Wight conclude:

Critical realism sees society as an emergent entity with material and ideational aspects and hence makes any attempt at an easy separation problematic. Critical realism suggests that the material and ideational have to be viewed as a whole. A whole that it is necessary to investigate as an integral system with all its necessary interconnections, not as isolated fragments torn out of context. Things, even social things, have to be seen in their movement and interconnections.⁵⁶

⁵³ Ibid, p.223.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.229.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.230.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.235.

Hollis and Smith concede the causal role of societal, cultural, historical and economic elements as well as the structure of international system in shaping perceptions and therefore actions of the agency by saying that:

Why do actors see the world in certain ways? It is not explanatory just to say that this is how they see the world, if there are good grounds for thinking that their perceptions are caused by societal, cultural, historical, or economic factors.

the structure of the international system might be one major cause of decision makers' perceptions of which issues are most important and which choices are most appropriate.⁵⁷

In a widely cited definition, Onuf describes structure as rules, institutions, and unintended consequences.⁵⁸ Jonathan Joseph, as a scientific realist, attributes causal powers to structure. Joseph argues:

Scientific realists try to get past this material–ideational question by insisting instead that structures – as underlying processes – are real and have real causal effects. They would agree that the ideational aspect of structures is important but would also point to the significance of the material aspect⁵⁹

In the same vein, Faruk Yalvaç argues that the discussion between positivists and post-positivist is in fact another form of the previous big debate between behavioralists and traditionalists in the discipline of IR. In the current debate, positivists defend causal explanations whereas post-positivists prefer constitutive explanations. As Yalvaç reminds, the causal explanations preferred by positivists are, in essence, Humean type of causation.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Hollis and Smith, p.145

⁵⁸ Nicholas Onuf, 'Constructivism: A User's Manual' in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp.58–78, 61,

⁵⁹ Jonathan Joseph, "Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Approach", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 35, No 2, 2007, p.351

⁶⁰ Yalvaç, (2010), p.7

The very basic characteristic of the Humean approach is it is based on observing regularities. Moreover, As Kurki contends, “Hume reduces causal relation to a relation between observables: since all we can know is what we observe.”⁶¹ According to Humean causation system, if we observe a regularity of event A followed by event B then we say if A then B. This is in fact very essence of positivist theorizing in the IR.

Therefore, some scientific realists, in an attempt to transcend this divide, reject Humean causation notion and replace it with an Aristotelian causation approach. As an important attempt to go beyond the causation and constitution divide between rationalist and reflectivist, or in other words positivist and post-positivist approaches, Kurki developed and proposed an Aristotelian causal approach instead of the dominant Humean approach in the discipline of IR.⁶²

In her “theory of causation” Kurki demonstrates the flaws of Humean approach and argues that the tendency to depend on Humean causation notion results in causation and constitution divide as well as reductionist tendencies in the discipline of IR. She basically argues that treating causal forces, structure, agents, ideas and material capabilities as independent sources is misleading. Therefore, she proposes to use Aristotelian causation notion instead of Humean one, thus it would be possible to employ multi causal ontology, methodologic plurality and relativist epistemology for IR.⁶³ As Aristotelian four causes model allows us using material, ideational, structural, and agential causes as ontologic elements, this approach, in turn, paves the way for transcending the boundaries of positivism by employing postpositivist epistemology. In other words, positivist ontological elements i.e. material or agential accompanied by unobservable ideational and structural causes.

⁶¹ Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations, Reclaiming Causal Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.36-38

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ *ibid*, p. 288

Bhaskar also argues in the preface of his seminal book *A Realist Theory of Science* that sociologists are increasingly using Aristotelian typology of causes.⁶⁴ However, Bhaskar applies this typology to his own work, a little differently than Kurki:

The material cause is antecedently established knowledge, facts and theories; the efficient cause is the methodological paradigm or generative theory at work in the theoretical and experimental activity of men; the formal cause new knowledge, facts and theories; and the final cause knowledge of the enduring and transfactually active mechanisms of nature.⁶⁵

According to Kurki, “Aristo categorized causes into four basic types of constituents: material, formal, efficient and final causes.”⁶⁶ Kurki adds that, “in the Aristotelian four causes model material and formal causes, as the basic constituents of being, are the intrinsic causes and efficient and final causes, as movers, are the extrinsic causes.”⁶⁷ Kurki’s model gives additional ontological statuses to material and ideational causes along with agential (final) and structural (formal) causes. Indeed, Kurki contends that, “the social ontology advocated here accepts that causes can be structural and agential, material or ideational”⁶⁸

Aristotle’s material causes “have ontological primacy in the world in the sense that nothing in the world can exist without materiality. This means that all explanations of the state of the world will have to inquire into the material basis from which things arise.”⁶⁹ Formal causes are in effect the structural causes which the discipline of IR is quite familiar. “A formal cause is the ‘according to which’ something is made or

⁶⁴ Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, London and New York, Routledge, 2008, p.

⁶⁵ Roy Bhaskar, *ibid*, p.185

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.220.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.220.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.280.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.221.

constructed.⁷⁰ While the “structure” can be defined as the formal causes, Aristotle’s efficient causes are in fact agential causes. Kurki writes that, “the Aristotelian notion of efficient cause refers to the primary movers, or sources of change.”⁷¹ The fourth category of the causes in Aristotle’s system is the final causes and that can be translated into ideational causes, since they are “the purposive goals that direct ‘mechanistic’ processes.”⁷²

It is important that these four causes always work together as a complex of causes. As Manicas observes “in our world, most events – birth, growth, rain, fires, earthquakes, depressions, revolutions – are the products of a complex nexus of causes of many different kinds, conjunctively at work.”⁷³

As Kurki maintained, “although these four causes were separable as types of causes, Aristotle conceived of them as always working in relation to each other, not in isolation.”⁷⁴ This conception of ontologically different causes that are working together is the essential element of theoretical approach of this study. As Kurki argued, “the Aristotelian conceptual system allows us to conceptualize the ontological parameters of social inquiry in a useful way: it directs us towards a multifaceted understanding of causal powers in the social world.”⁷⁵

In applying the Aristotelian causation system to the IR, Kurki explains this system's principal merits based on four causes; material, formal, efficient, and final. For her, "if we accept the Aristotelian understanding of material causes, we can recognize that

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.221.

⁷¹ *ibid*, p.222.

⁷² Kurki, p. 222.

⁷³ Peter T. Manicas, *A Realist Philosophy of Social Science: Explanation and Understanding*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.3

⁷⁴ Kurki, p.222.

⁷⁵ Kurki, p.223

material causes are fundamental in any explanation." Naturally, "Materiality is a basic ontological condition of all existence."⁷⁶

Accepting the Aristotelian notion of formal causes "provides us with a useful way of framing the causal role of ideas, rules, norms, and discourses in the social world."⁷⁷ The stark similarity of formal causes to the notion of the structure permits us to employ it in the IR. Efficient causes, on the other hand, imply agency. Therefore, she contends, "if the Aristotelian conception of efficient causes is accepted, efficient causes, and hence agency, must always be linked to the material form of causality in the sense that agents' movements and actions are taken within a material environment and are based on the material base of human mind and body."⁷⁸ The critical distinction here is the difference between agents and their actions. To place agent's intentionality in this theory of causation, the Aristotelian notion perfectly fits. As Kurki said "the actions also take place drawing on the formal environment around the agents, and the agents' intentionality is formed in relation to that environment."⁷⁹ Therefore, "accepting the notion of final cause, and distinguishing it from the notion of efficient cause"⁸⁰ allows us to put motivations and intentions into the comprehensive framework in our quest to understand and explain the matter at hand. Besides, she contends, intentions "is not reducible to efficient causality."⁸¹ Indeed as she put it, "intentions, and reasons, are 'active' causes; yet they are not physical 'powerful particulars' in the efficient cause sense."⁸²

⁷⁶ Kurki, p.226

⁷⁷ Kurki, p.226

⁷⁸ Kurki, p.226

⁷⁹ Kurki, p.226

⁸⁰ Kurki, p.226

⁸¹ Kurki, p.226

⁸² Kurki, p.226

Kurki points out that, formal and material causes provide a framework for understanding and explaining the roles of agents and ideas. She contends that “conditions can be understood through the material and formal cause notions: they refer to causal powers that ‘condition’ or ‘constrain and enable’ the context of social agency.”⁸³

Therefore, she argues that Aristotle notion of causation is quite compatible with the critical realist thought:

The Aristotelian schema allows us to avoid these conceptual problems. We can follow the philosophical realists in arguing that mechanisms are rooted ontologically, they do not refer to mere ‘intervening variables’ conceived of as regularities (as for many positivists). However, instead of seeking to define mechanisms in a fixed way, or shying away from defining them, we gain a better understanding of the rather vague metaphor ‘**mechanism**’, **if we define it, quite simply, as ‘complexes of causes’**. In the light of the Aristotelian plural conception of ontology and causal powers, it could be argued that mechanisms are usefully thought of as the particular kinds of, often relatively stable, interactions that take place between certain types of causal forces. Mechanism explanations, then, can be seen as accounts of the processes of interaction between different elements that bring about given events or processes.⁸⁴

For Kurki, this notion of multiple causes allows the IR discipline to deal causal-constitutive divide and to tackle theoretical reductionism:

The pluralistic conception of causal powers advanced here has some important implications for clarifying problems of causation in IR. It provides us with (1) a better way of dealing with the causal–constitutive divide as well as (2) a way of tackling the problems of theoretical reductionism in IR.⁸⁵

Kurki asserts that this notion of causal analysis promises pluralist methodology and a holistic ontology that would permit developing a comprehensive approach as aimed in this study:

⁸³ Kurki, p.233.

⁸⁴ Kurki, p.233.

⁸⁵ Kurki, p.234.

It will be argued here that if causal analysis is developed in the directions indicated by the revised conception of causal analysis advocated here, specifically the ‘deeper’ conception of causation, certain potentially productive, methodologically pluralist, historical, self-reflective and ontologically holistic avenues can be explored⁸⁶

One of the crucial aspects of Kurki’s theory of causation is the fact that these four causes work together in shaping and constraining foreign policy decisions and actions:

The social ontology advocated here accepts that causes can be structural and agential, material or ideational, but argues, further, that causes in all those senses are both ‘contingent’ (in that many causes always come together in complex ‘non-predetermined’ ways) as well as determining (causes are real and have real causal powers).⁸⁷

She emphasizes that we “must always relate different kinds of causes to others.” In order to answer “why the factors are, interlinked.”⁸⁸ She also insists on the importance of approaching the international phenomena in a holistic way:

Instead of seeking ‘a fundamental cause’, IR theorists should seek to understand the historical causal process in a holistic way, that is, concentrate on accounting for the complex interactions of various causes in specific historical contexts.⁸⁹

The Turkish-American relations at the final years of the Cold War were affected by a wide range of major international events such as the Iranian revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the renewed arms race between superpowers. The major events that we observe at the empiric level constitute the structural or formal causes. On the other hand, the agents, such as administrations, politicians, Congress, special interest groups etc. act on this structural background. They act with the knowledge provided by the structure empirically. Moreover, they act not only based of this empiric knowledge buy also with the aim of changing or affecting this structure with different

⁸⁶ Kurki, p.262.

⁸⁷ Kurki, p.280.

⁸⁸ Kurki, p.280.

⁸⁹ Kurki, p.286.

motivations stemming from their ideas and/or material necessities. Indeed, giving all four causes ontological status, makes it possible to see and understand how these causes act and work together as complexes of causes. Therefore, this study aims to use and build on the conceptual framework advanced by Kurki and apply this framework to develop a comprehensive approach to study Turkish-American relations by showing how and why major causal forces are linked together to create particular results.

2.3. Conclusions

This chapter provided the theoretical framework of the study. In light of the scientific realist philosophy, this dissertation attempts to apply the causation theory developed by Milja Kurki. According to scientific realism, reality is stratified, that includes both observable and unobservable elements. Since the research question of this dissertation is to find out causal mechanisms of main events in Turkish-American defense relations between 1973 and 1980, developing a comprehensive approach based on the theory of causation fits this study's aim. The theory of causation adopts the Aristotelian conception of causation and rejects the dominant Humean approach in international relations. As developed by Kurki, these four causes are adapted as material, structural, ideational, and agential causes. In this study, material causes include material bases of national interest such as US military bases, defense equipment, the overall economic conditions. Structural causes incorporate the international system, such as the détente, the cold war, regional or national level structural determinants that affect the matter at hand. While material and structural causes are constitutive or intrinsic causes, ideational (final in Aristotelian typology) and agential (efficient) causes are active or extrinsic causes.⁹⁰ Ideational causes include perceptions and motivations such as Turkey's seeking autarky in defense production or the Congress' distrust of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy conduct. Agential causes contain all the actors such as presidents, political and bureaucratic leaders, lobby groups. The critical aspect of the

⁹⁰ Kurki, *ibid*, p.220

theory of causation is that these causes are not act stand-alone; instead, they work together at different reality levels.

CHAPTER 3

A CONCISE SUMMARY OF TURKISH-AMERICAN DEFENCE COOPERATION (1973-1980):

Before examining the events from the embargo to the DECA it would be useful to provide a brief account of the period between 1973 and 1980 in terms of the Turkish and American political developments.

3.1. Nixon, Ford and Kissinger

At the beginning of the 1970s, the relations between the US administration and the Congress were tense. Against the background of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, the contested roles and responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches culminated in the War Powers Resolution on November 1973. The Congress passed the Public Law also known as the War Powers resolution that curbed the powers of the president in conducting military operations without formally declaring a war.⁹¹

After President Nixon's resignation in the face of an imminent impeachment, Vice President Gerald Ford replaced him as president on August 9, 1974. One of the most important achievements of the Ford Presidency was détente in relations with the Soviets. With the signature of Helsinki Accords in 1975, "the United States recognized the legitimacy of Soviet rule and communist borders in Europe in exchange for a

⁹¹ Joyce P. Kaufman, *A Concise History of US Foreign Policy*, Second Edition, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc, Plymouth, UK, 2010.

Soviet promise to respect human right within the borders of the USSR and its European satellites.”⁹²

Many scholars would agree that during Nixon and Ford presidencies, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had a disproportionate impact in shaping administration’s foreign policy choices. Indeed, during the Ford Presidency, Henry Kissinger’s role in conducting American foreign policy continued and strengthened. It is evident in documents reviewed in this study with regard to the negotiations between Turkey and the US on Cyprus, embargo and defence cooperation issues.

Kissinger was a tutor of an “international seminar at Harvard, assisted by funding from Ford and Rockefeller foundations as well as CIA”⁹³ Until 1969 approximately six hundred foreign students participated in the seminar. Participants included Valéry Giscard d’Estaing from France and Bülent Ecevit from Turkey.

3.2. Carter, Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski

Jimmy Carter, a Georgia businessperson, defeated Gerald Ford in November 1976 and was elected 39th President of the US. Ambrose and Brinkley contrast Carter’s foreign policy with realpolitik of Kissinger era and claim that he “was the least experienced President of the post-World War era.”⁹⁴ However, Carter was distinguished with his consistent emphasis on human rights and international disarmament efforts. As Joyce Kaufman observed, “Carter brought back to foreign policy the idealist perspective

⁹² Jeffrey A Engel, Mark Atwood, Lawrence, and Andrew Preston eds, “America in the World, A History in Documents from the War With Spain to the War on Terror”, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2014, p.302

⁹³ David Milne, “Worldmaking, The art and Science of American Diplomacy”, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2015, p.759/1264

⁹⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Ninth Revised Edition, Penguin Books, New York, 2011, p. 610/1266

advocated by Woodrow Wilson, and he vowed to make the fight for human rights the centrepiece of his foreign policy agenda.”⁹⁵

Kaufman and other scholars⁹⁶ agree that Carter had dramatic success and failures during his presidency. His facilitating role in the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel brought him the Nobel Peace Prize. His handling of SALT II negotiations with the Soviets and ensuring a permanent right for US to defend the neutrality of the Panama Canals were also other success of his tenure. On the other hand, his conduct during the Iran revolution in 1979 and particularly the subsequent hostage crisis where American diplomats were trapped in the US Embassy in Tehran after the revolution greatly undermined his presidency. Another setback from the US perspective was the revolution in Nicaragua where Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ousted the dictatorship.⁹⁷

President Carter answered the Soviets’ invasion to Afghanistan by saying that the United States would use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf in his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980. This statement is widely known as the Carter doctrine:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital ⁹⁸interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Milne, Ibid, p.109.

⁹⁶ See for example: George C Herring, Stephen E. Ambrose,

⁹⁷ Steven W. Hook, ed, US Foreign Policy, The Paradox of World Power, Third Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2011, p.53

⁹⁸ Ambrose and Brinkley, p.626

⁹⁹ Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address 1980, January 23 1980, <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml>

Carter, continuing on Ford-Kissinger era's already softened relations with the Soviets in the détente atmosphere, had started with the emphasis of human rights and further easing relations with the Soviets. However, these idealistic aims were not easy to achieve. On the contrary, his idealistic stance annoyed Soviets and they became more aggressive as they showed by invading Afghanistan. Ambrose and Brinkley argue that "when Carter left office, relations with the Soviet Union were worse than they had been when he was inaugurated." Therefore, Herring argues, "Carter had the misfortune to serve in a complex and confusing time of transitions – in foreign affairs from Cold War to détente and back again, at home from the liberal consensus to a more conservative outlook."¹⁰⁰

As with the Nixon-Kissinger and Ford Kissinger teams in the formulation of the US foreign policy, President Carter also had powerful bureaucrats in his entourage, national security adviser Brzezinski and secretary of State Cyrus Vance. However, these two dominant figures of Carter era US foreign policy were of different traditions and constantly in competition to influence the President. While Cyrus Vance was a supporter of détente and against the containment of the Soviets, Zbigniew Brzezinski was more like Kissinger, and did not trust the Soviets at all.¹⁰¹ Therefore, Carter era was marked by inter-agency rivalries.

3.3. A Summary of US-Turkey Relations Between 1973-1980

During Ford and Carter presidencies, the Turkish-American relations had very turbulent years even though both Administrations were openly supporting Turkey as a NATO ally. However, a number of structural, agential, ideational and material factors resulted in the embargo. In the following chapters, these factors are analyzed through

¹⁰⁰ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower, US Foreign Relations Since 1776*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2008, p.860

¹⁰¹ Ambrose, P:618

official US documents within the framework of the causation theory as outlined in the previous chapter.

Before proceeding to reviewing the documents, it would be useful for setting the stage by briefly touching upon some important events and dates in the Turkish-American relations of that period.

After the military coup in Turkey on March 12, 1971 Prime Minister Demirel had to resign. Between 1971 and 1973 Turkey was governed by technocrats chosen by the military. In that period there had been more than fifty constitutional amendments¹⁰² that was restricting liberties brought by the constitution of 1961, eventually paving the way for a security state. This tension between security needs of the state and demand for individual liberties of the society would be felt in economic, social and political developments in the 1970s in Turkey.

After October 14, 1973 general elections, Bülent Ecevit became Prime Minister in Turkey in January 1974, through a coalition government formed by his social democratic Republican People's Party (RPP), and Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist oriented National Salvation Party (NSP). One of the first steps of this new government that triggered upsetting relations with Americans was to decision to resume opium poppy production.

The opium issue between Turkey and the US dates back to the foundation years of the Republic of Turkey. A very short article published in the New York Times on March 19, 1933 underlines the American Ambassador Charles Sherrill's effort and positive response of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on this issue. The Ambassador thanks Atatürk for Turkey's adherence into the Hague and Geneva conventions on narcotic traffic.¹⁰³ As

¹⁰² Bestami S. Bilgiç, Domestic and Foreign Policy in Turkey: 1971-1983 in Turkey's History of Democracy with Domestic and Foreign Developments, Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç and Cihat Göktepe (eds), Ufuk Publications, İstanbul, 2014, p.225

¹⁰³ "Our Envoy Thanks Mustafa Kemal", The New York Times, 19 March 1933

Çağrı Erhan explained in detail, after the Second World War, illicit use of narcotics became a grave problem for the US. So much so that, in Richard Nixon's presidential campaign in 1968, solving the drug addiction was the second theme after promising to end Vietnam War.¹⁰⁴ After Nixon's resignation this issue was still at the heart of the American politics. As David Campbell noted in his seminal work, "President Ford declared drugs a national security threat in 1974".¹⁰⁵ Therefore, it was a very sensitive issue with domestic politics aspect for the US.

Turkey had unilaterally banned opium production in July 1971 during a military backed government after the March 12, 1971 military coup. In response to Turkey's ban on opium production, the US had sent financial assistance to compensate Turkey's losses caused by this ban. Since Turkey had not officially replied this memorandum, there were no written agreement between two countries on this issue. On July 1, 1974, however, Turkey allowed the resumption of opium production in seven provinces of Turkey as newly elected Premier Minister Ecevit had promised during his election campaign.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, this was a very sensitive issue for the US since they regarded Turkey as one of the principal sources of heroin. According to their estimates, in 1972, eighty percent of illicit heroin entering to the country was coming from Turkey.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, this issue prepared the quick deterioration of relations between Turkey and the US.

¹⁰⁴ Erhan, Çağrı, "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006, Fact and Analyses with Documents, Ed. Baskın Oran, The University of Utah Press, 2010, p.422.

¹⁰⁵ David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992. p.198

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rescission of the Opium Poppy Growing Ban by Turkey, B-173123: Published: Sep 9, 1974. Publicly Released: Sep 9, 1974

¹⁰⁷ Turkish Opium Ban negotiations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety Third Congress, July 16, 1974

While the US Congress had already been discussing measures against Turkey's opium decision, on July 20, 1974 Turkey intervened in Cyprus following a military coup d'état that took place five days earlier.

The immediate reaction of the Congress, which was already discussing sanctions to Turkey due to the opium issue, was to impose ban on military assistance to Turkey. The decisions for arms embargo to Turkey were taken by the Senate on September 19, 1974 and by the House on September 29. However, President Ford vetoed these decisions on October 15. Even though the President Ford and Secretary Kissinger initially resisted to the earlier embargo initiatives of the Congress, finally a new decision was taken in the Senate (on December 17) and in the House (on December 16 1974) that required the President to start embargo until February 5, 1975. President Ford had to endorse these resolutions on December 30, 1974.

Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit had resigned as Prime Minister upon disagreements with his coalition partner on September 18, 1974. After long deliberations between parties during the interim Sadi Irmak government, Süleyman Demirel became Prime Minister in Turkey in March 1975 by forming a four-party coalition, called National Front. In a somewhat delayed response to the American arms embargo, new Demirel Government in Turkey, cancelled the Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and suspended the use of military bases in Turkey on July 25, 1975.

Ford administration negotiated a new Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey in order to bypass the embargo and restore relations with Turkey. The agreement was sent to the Congress as a last act of President Ford in the office. However, the new administration wanted to persuade the Congress before pushing it to be endorsed.

When President Carter started office, Turkish Prime Minister was Süleyman Demirel. In June 1977, Bülent Ecevit replaced Demirel upon winning the general elections held on June 5. This was an historic election for RPP since it received 41% of votes. Yet, this percentage was not enough to form a government in the parliament. After Ecevit's

one month tenure and unsuccessful attempt to form a government, Demirel managed to form his fifth government through the Second Nationalist Front coalition. However, his tenure lasted until 5 January 1978 when Bülent Ecevit overthrew the government by interpellation. Ecevit replaced Demirel again with the coalition backed by some independent members of parliament until he resigned after October 1979 Senate elections. Demirel became prime minister again until the military coup of September 12, 1980. This turbulent period of Turkish domestic politics was further complicated by economic and domestic security problems. President Carter negotiated with Demirel and Ecevit for the new Defence Cooperation Agreement while trying to remove embargo by gaining the necessary support in the Congress.

Finally, the arms embargo that had been imposed on Turkey was removed on September 26, 1978 through the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, signed by President Carter.¹⁰⁸ The renegotiated defence cooperation agreement obtained an economic element and became Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement and was signed on March 29, 1980, by the two countries.

¹⁰⁸ Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1978 Statement on Signing S. 3075 Into Law. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243414>

Table 1- Government Leaders and Foreign Ministers in Turkey and the US between 1973 and 1980.

Years	US President	Turkish Government/ Prime Minister	US Secretary of State	Turkish Foreign Minister
1974	Gerald R. Ford Republican Party (Aug 1974 – Jan 1977)	Bülent Ecevit (coalition between PRP and NSP) (Jan 1974 – Nov 1974)	Henry Kissinger (Sep 1973 – Jan 1977)	Turan Güneş (Jan 1974 – Nov 1974)
1975		Sadi İrmak (Nov 1974 - March 1975)		Melih Esenbel (Nov 1974- March 1975)
1976		Süleyman Demirel (JP led Four party coalition-National Front 1) March 1975- June 1977		İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (March 1975- June 1977)
1977	Jimmy Carter Democratic Party (Jan 1977 - Jan 1981)	Bülent Ecevit (June 1977 – July 1977)	Cyrus Roberts Vance (Jan 1977 – April 1980)	Gündüz Ökçin (June 1977 – July 1977)
1978		Süleyman Demirel (JP lead 3 party coalition- National Front 2) (July 1977 – Jan 1978)		İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (July 1977 – January 1978)
1979		Bülent Ecevit (PRP lead 3 party coalition) (Jan 1978 - Nov 1979)		Gündüz Ökçin (January 1978 – November 1979)
1980		Süleyman Demirel (Nov 1979 - Sep 1980)		Hayrettin Erkmen (November 1979 – September 1980)

3.4. Conclusions

The 1970s were years of transition for both the US and Turkey. From the point of the structure of the international system, that period covered fading away of détente and intensification of the Cold War.

There were transitions in the agential level too. In the US, President Nixon had to resign after the Watergate scandal; after a short period of Ford's presidency, the presidency changed hands from republicans to democrats; Carter became a president with an agenda of human rights and disarmament. In Turkey, those were the years of short-term coalitions and political and economic instability.

At the center of the Turkish-American relations lay some material aspects too. Among them were the US military facilities in Turkey, Turkey's decreasing military capability, and the need for urgent modernization.

The 1970s started with the opium crisis when Turkey decided to lift the production ban. Without settling this issue, the relations were clouded by the Cyprus intervention and the subsequent embargo, Turkey's closure of the US bases in her land. In this turbulent period of transitions; intentions (as ideational causes) also changed commensurate with the changes of structural, material, and agential causes.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROAD TOWARDS THE EMBARGO

The US interest in the Turkish domestic politics was evident in a memorandum prepared by the Department of State Secretary bureaucracy regarding the election results of 1973 according to which the Republican Peoples Party¹⁰⁹, won majority of the seats and it was likely to form the new coalition government. The final paragraph of the memorandum reflects the significance of Turkish domestic politics for the US. It is clear that the Department of State Secretary bureaucrats were not very happy with the prospect of working with a leftist party instead of Süleyman Demirel's moderate rightist Justice Party. As understood from the memorandum, the State Department was expecting problems in Turkish-American relations particularly in the security cooperation:

we expect that the USG will be able to continue close and friendly relations with whatever government comes to power. However, the possibility of instability and resultant loss of effectiveness in government might make these relations somewhat more difficult. Moreover, the RPP rank and file and particularly its left wing, has not always been as friendly towards the US as has the JP, and the RPP might therefore be inclined to give a hard look at some aspects of US-Turkish relations, especially in the security field.¹¹⁰

Therefore, it is possible to spot a clear disdain of American diplomats towards a leftist government in Turkey as one of the ideational causes which would be important in shaping Turkish-American relations to be unfolded by events in subsequent years. It is not only the ideational cause that play the sole role here, this paragraph also shows

¹⁰⁹ Turkish centre left political party CHP with Turkish initials.

¹¹⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, eds. Lauries Van Hook, Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 197

the importance of the role of agency too, in the formulation of foreign policies of both countries towards each other.

In 1973, there were prior signals of deteriorating relations between two countries. One is the Soviet overflights towards the Middle East. Since Turkey allowed the USSR aircraft to use its airspace, there was a growing dissent on the US side. After the Johnson letter of 1964, Turkish - American relations were already in decline. According to William Hale, deterioration of relations with the US, led Turkey to establish closer ties with the Soviets. Explaining how this relationship translated into economic cooperation, Hale emphasizes that “by the end of the 1970s, Turkey was reported to have received more Soviet economic assistance than any other Third World state.”¹¹¹ Indeed, Gu Guan-Fu shows that Turkey received 3,198 billion US dollars aid of total 7 billion US dollars disbursed by the Soviets between 1965 and 1979 for the non-socialist countries in the Middle East.¹¹² It is in this environment that the Soviets had requested military transport permission through Turkey’s airspace during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 in order to help its Arab allies logistically. According to an intelligence memorandum of the CIA, “the Soviets notified Turkey on 15 October that there would be 30 overflights of Turkish territory beginning on 17 October for carrying technical equipment”.¹¹³

A telegram from the US Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State summarizes Ambassador Macomber’s meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Bayülken with regard to the use of İncirlik base and Turkey’s permission to Soviets to use its airspace during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Ambassador Macomber emphasized how Americans were clearly upset about Turkey’s attitude during the war. Their particular

¹¹¹ Hale, p.108

¹¹² Gu, Guan-Fu, Soviet Aid to the Third World an Analysis of Its Strategy, Soviet Studies , Jan., 1983, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 71-89

¹¹³ CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, Middle East, Situation Report Number 63, 21 October 1973, pp.3-4

concern was Turkey's establishing a precedent vis-à-vis Soviet overflights in the situation:

I specifically contrasted GOT unwillingness for Incirlik to be used in connection with crisis while at same time permitting Soviet overflights. I added that USG was concerned by failure on part of allies fully to comprehend the danger to NATO itself of divisive shift in strategic balance in Middle East and that we were therefore surprised by Turkish actions in facilitating these Soviet shipments.

The US Ambassador underlined the fact that, Turkish Foreign Minister Bayülken's response showed how regional and international systemic concerns were intertwined and produced awkward results for allies with different perspectives.

Bayulken was clearly uncomfortable during the presentation. He first attempted to say that if Turkey had understood it was NATO problem they would have taken different attitude, but that they had considered matter simply domestic Middle East struggle in which Soviets were helping their friends and U.S. were helping their friends, and Turkey thought it best to stay out of dispute.

I pointed out that in beginning our discussions I had noted that problem was larger than simple Middle East dispute and that if power balance in this area changed as result of Soviet intervention this would clearly have adverse consequences elsewhere. (I reminded him that, in our earlier conversations, he had agreed with this point.) I also referred to the concerns Ambassador Rumsfeld had expressed in NATO councils. Finally, I said that, of all NATO partners, Turkey instinctively should be in best position to recognize threat to shift of power balance in its own back yard.¹¹⁴

This problem was a clear example of how both international system and regional levels structurally affected the Turkish-American relations at a time of the Cold War rivalry and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

Meliha Altunışık also underlines the impact of the interaction between international and regional developments on Turkish-American relations. She concisely summarizes this point in her article:

Towards the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s Turkey became less eager to support the US policies in the Middle East. For instance, during both the 1967 and 1973 Arab – Israeli wars Turkey refused to allow the USA to use the bases and other

¹¹⁴ Ibid, Document 198.

facilities in Turkey to help Israel. In fact, from then on Turkey tried to separate its relations with the USA from that of the Middle East as Turkish officials continued to declare the US and NATO facilities in Turkey not to be available for non-NATO military actions in the Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East without prior Turkish approval.¹¹⁵

Another problematic area is the Turkish opium production. So much so that, some scholars like Turkmen, argue that the real reason of the embargo is Turkey's removal of the opium ban.¹¹⁶ Newly elected Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had promised to remove the ban during his election campaigns. There are also allegations that some pharmaceutical companies lobbied in the government for the resume of opium poppy production.¹¹⁷ Upon the new government's plan to remove the ban on opium production in Turkey, in a memorandum from Harold Saunders and Henry Applebaum of the National Security Council Staff to the Secretary of State Kissinger dated February 15, 1974, this issue is described as "the one that carries the greatest danger of seriously hurting our overall relations with an important ally".¹¹⁸ American Ambassador Macomber met Ecevit to discuss this issue on July 1, 1974 and he sent the meeting report by a telegram to the Department of State. In his report the Ambassador underlined the fact that Ecevit had already decided to go on with his decision to remove the ban, assured Americans that Turkey would act responsibly, taking necessary precautions and even seek international technical assistance through the UN with regard to control of the opium production.

I said that I must ask, on behalf of my government, that he re-consider this decision. It carried the gravest risks of setting back our battle against heroin and of doing enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. I then emphasized that as result of tonight's announcement we were already in crisis relationship, and that

¹¹⁵ Meliha B. Altunışık, *The Middle East in Turkey–USA Relations: Managing the Alliance*, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2013, Vol. 15, No. 2, p.159

¹¹⁶ Turkmen, Fusun, "Kırılğan İttifaktan Model Ortaklığa Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri" Timaş, İstanbul 2012, p. 137.

¹¹⁷ Turkish Opium Ban negotiations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety Third Congress, July 16, 1974, p.68

¹¹⁸ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 199.

his government's proposed action would, in my judgement, bring the US-Turkish relationship to its lowest point since World War II. I also said that while I hoped very much I was wrong, the odds tonight were very strong that US military assistance to Turkey was finished. The US Executive branch, while deeply dismayed, would not, I thought, initiate such a cut off. The Congress, however, would take decision into its own hands.¹¹⁹

The US considered the policy options against Turkey's decision to resume opium production. These options included to pressure Turkey by using its main vulnerability, its dependence on the US military aid. According to the memorandum from Harold E. Horan of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) dated July 10, 1974 these policy options included:

(a) denying a recent GOT request of transfer to Turkey of two excess US naval vessels," and "(b) informing the GOT that we will not for the present grant Turkey any military assistance under our current continuing resolution authority and will not make any disbursements under FY 1975 Foreign Assistance until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan to prevent smuggling."¹²⁰

However, the dilemma for Americans was that linking the opium issue to the military aid would jeopardize the security cooperation between two countries, which was also an undesired outcome. A paper dated July 16, 1974, prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Europe on Turkish opium poppy ban mentioned negative sentiments in the Congress arose:

The Problem: Turkey has revoked its June 1971 opium ban. This threatens a resumption of smuggling of illicit opium from Turkey and a resultant worsening of the heroin problem in the U.S. There is also a danger of serious damage to our interests in Turkey as sentiment develops in the Congress to take punitive measures against Turkey.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Ibid, Document 204.

¹²⁰ Ibid, Document 205.

¹²¹ Ibid, Document 206.

The paper drew attention to the risks that security cooperation with Turkey faced. At the same time, this paper can be considered as having recognized the agential roles within Turkey, i.e., those who supported or who were against cooperation with Americans:

There are many within and without the Turkish Government who are genuinely concerned at the possible impact of the poppy decision on Turkish-American relationships, and particularly its impact on the security relationship. (The opposite side of this coin is that there are some who welcome the decision as an opportunity to weaken or destroy that relationship)¹²²

The paper shows that, in applying pressure on Turkey by using security relationship as a chip, there was also a tremendous risk of losing the support of Turkish military that attached importance to the Turkish-American security cooperation. Therefore, for the policy makers of the US, there should be a delicate balance between exerting pressure on the Turkish government and totally alienating military and losing it as a leverage. This is summed up in the document as:

The Turkish military tend to be nationalistic and suspicious of foreigners. They have until now, however, appreciated the value of American military assistance to Turkey. A complete suspension of this assistance (more than \$150 million per year) would cause a serious reaction in Turkey which could lead to a significant and probably rapid deterioration in our security relations.¹²³

A Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford dated August 21, 1974 claimed that the opium produced in Turkey was the major source of heroin smuggled into the US. Kissinger maintained in his memorandum that, the repeal of ban on production of opium created a negative sentiment against Turkey particularly in the public opinion and the Congress. This lengthy memorandum included the observations that, since the imposition of opium production ban in 1971 in Turkey there had been a decline in drug addiction in the US, however the ban was very unpopular Turkey despite the US aids amount to \$35,7

¹²² Ibid, Document 206.

¹²³ Ibid, Document 206.

million to offset affected farmers in Turkey. Kissinger added that even though the US officials urged Turkish counterparts about the very negative consequences of lifting opium production ban, Turkey seemed firm on this decision. After Turkey's declaration of its decision, it caused adverse Congressional reaction.¹²⁴ Kissinger aimed to inform the president about the course of events and policy options to solve this crisis between the US and Turkey. He reminded President Ford that both the House and the Senate took actions, while on July 11 the Senate passed an amendment that requires suspension of military and economic aids, the legislation passed by the House on August 5 was demanding similar sanctions. Kissinger also explained that:

The existing legislation—Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act—requires that you suspend all US assistance to a country if you determine that its government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotics produced there from illegally entering the US. US military assistance to Turkey has been running at \$150–200 million annually in recent years. Economic aid has been much smaller; our request to Congress for fiscal 1975 economic aid to Turkey is for \$23 million, and the final figure is expected to be much lower.¹²⁵

Against Turkey's opium decision, Kissinger underlined the existence of three policy options; the soft-line, the middle ground and the hardline approaches adopted by different circles in the US bureaucracy and recommended adopting the middle ground option. The “soft-line approach” was proposing to engage Turkey in order to help her establishing an efficient control system for the opium production while the “middle ground approach” was advocating both technical cooperation and the threatening Turkey to suspend military and economic aids if it fails to prevent opium smuggling to the US. “The harder line approach” included both two previous options and applying pressure on critical areas of cooperation.¹²⁶

He reminded that the US policy towards Turkey on opium issue should achieve;

¹²⁴ Ibid, Document 208.

¹²⁵ Ibid, Document 208.

¹²⁶ Ibid, Document 208.

- a) minimizing the adverse impact of the Turkish decision on domestic battle against heroin addiction in the US;
- b) to make clear to the Congress, the American people, and foreign governments that the US Government has commitment to combatting international narcotics trafficking;
- c) accomplish these two with the least possible damage to security relationship between the US and Turkey.¹²⁷

As one could observe during the Cyprus crisis, the US administration would try to keep security relations with Turkey intact. Here in this case too, structural (formal), material, ideational (final) and agential (efficient) causes work together in producing outcomes. While, domestic sources of American foreign policy making, the public opinion, requests a strong commitment in fighting narcotics, the foreign policy decision makers, the administration and the Congress want at the same time to keep security relationships intact with an important NATO partner under the Cold War circumstances.

4.1. Cyprus Intervention and the Arms Embargo:

The decisions for arms embargo to Turkey were taken by the Senate on September 19, 1974 and by the House on September 29. However, President Ford vetoed these decisions on October 15.

Meanwhile, the Library of the Congress published its research on the legitimacy of Turkey's use of American weapons in Cyprus. According to this report, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 were requiring the US to stop all military aids if these weapons were not used for internal security or self-defense purposes. The Military Sales Act of 1968 had this paragraph which would

¹²⁷ Ibid, Document 208.

serve as a main formal cause for those who supported the imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey:

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold ... solely for international security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations¹²⁸

Upon the publication of the Library of Congress' report, the House of Representatives passed a new bill (H.J. Res. 1163) on October 16, 1974 to stop arms transfers to Turkey if American weapons were used in Cyprus. President Ford vetoed this one again on 17 October.¹²⁹

President Ford's remarks are significant in terms of underlying the starkly different approaches between the legislative and executive branches of the USA.

President Ford stated "instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute," the embargo would "imperil our relationships with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean."¹³⁰

In his veto letter addressed to the o the House of Representatives, President Ford stated that:

While the language of this new bill is different, its effect is similar to the earlier Continuing Resolution which required my veto on October 14. I need not reiterate the extensive comments which I made at that time and which again compel a veto. The provisions of this bill as they would apply to Turkey would do nothing to bring an end to the suffering of the Cypriot people, would do nothing to encourage the

¹²⁸ Public Law, 90-629, HR 15681, 22 October 1968, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-82/pdf/STATUTE-82-Pg1320-2.pdf#page=1> (accessed on May 18, 2020)

¹²⁹ Erhan, Çağrı, "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006, Fact and Analyses with Documents, Ed. Baskin Oran, The University of Utah Press, 2010, p.425

¹³⁰ The Turkish Arms Embargo Part 1, The Byrd Center Blog, accessed on October 9, 2019, <https://www.byrdcenter.org/byrd-center-blog/the-turkish-arms-embargo-part-i#>

two sides to resolve the dispute peacefully, and would bring a further deterioration of the posture of the NATO alliance in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It is for these reasons and those previously stated that I must reluctantly veto the bill before me.¹³¹

Even though the President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were resisting to these decisions, finally a new decision was taken in the Senate on December 17 (49 against 43) and in the House on December 16 (209 against 189) which required the President to start embargo until February 5, 1975. President Ford finally endorsed these decisions on December 30.

President Ford made a statement on reluctantly signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. He emphasized Turkey's importance for the US and NATO's security interests:

I appreciate the spirit of compromise which motivated the Congress to extend to February 5, 1975, the period during which military assistance to Turkey may continue under specified circumstances. I regret, however, that the restriction was imposed at all. Turkey remains a key element of U.S. security and political interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The threat of cutoff of aid, even if unfulfilled, cannot fail to have a damaging effect on our relations with one of our staunch NATO allies whose geographic position is of great strategic importance. This, in turn, could have a detrimental effect on our efforts to help achieve a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.¹³²

This new law enacted in the Congress was adding a clause to the law of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act) which required the stop of all kinds of military aids and sales to Turkey until the President decided that Turkey complies with this law and there was improvement in the Cyprus issue.¹³³

¹³¹ The American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/veto-second-continuing-appropriations-resolution-providing-for-suspension-military-aid>, accessed on July 10, 2020.

¹³² Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256300>

¹³³ Armaoğlu, Fahir. 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Volume 1 :1914-1980, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Tisamat, 1991, Ankara, p.811.

Therefore, the arms sales and military assistance to Turkey, which included 200.000 US Dollars of military aid, was suspended with the embargo on Turkish military aid took effect on February 5, in accordance with the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, which the Senate passed on December 4 and the House on December 11, 1974.¹³⁴

Erhan argues that the turbulence in Turkish domestic politics prevented Turkey to effectively resist the embargo decision. Still, Turkish diplomats communicated the following points to the U.S. authorities with regard to the embargo:

1. Turkish intervention to Cyprus is legitimate and based on international agreements. Therefore, the embargo is not just.
2. The embargo decision encourages Greek Cypriot's uncompromising attitude and prevents the peace negotiations to start.
3. The Cyprus issue and Turkish - American relations are separate issues.
4. US arms transfers to Turkey is based on alliance agreements. They are not gifts.
5. The embargo harms NATO's southern flank against the USSR.¹³⁵

In response to the Embargo, Demirel Government in Turkey, cancelled the Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and suspended the use of military bases in Turkey on July 25, 1975. At that time there were 21 U.S. military bases in Turkey with 5000 military personnel.¹³⁶

According to the Congress, Turkey had violated these agreements:¹³⁷

¹³⁴ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 216.

¹³⁵ Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO ile İlişkiler", in "Türk Dış Politikası", Ed. Baskın Oran, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p.707, (Nasuh Uslu, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Ankara 21. Yüzyıl, 2000, p.200-201)

¹³⁶ Ibid. p.708.

¹³⁷ Congress and Foreign Policy:1974, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs Division, USG Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp.63-64

1- American Foreign Assistance Law of 1961

2- Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

3- Bilateral Agreements between Turkey and USA 1947 and 1959

As Mehmet Gönlübol noted, the embargo was seen as a hostile act by the Turkish public opinion and negatively affected the relations between Turkey and the US¹³⁸ with an ever-lasting shadow on the relationship since then.

4.2. The Divide between the US Administration and the Congress regarding Turkey

Glen P. Hastedt discerns four patterns in the relationship between Congress and the president: competitive (active and assertive), disengaged, supportive and strategic (capable of challenging).¹³⁹ As it would be seen from the documents reviewed in the following paragraphs, the period from arms embargo to the signature of DECA, President Ford and President Carter definitely faced a competitive congress.

It is a recurrent theme through Turkish-American relations that Congress and the US administration was in a visible clash over the policy options towards Turkey. After the Cyprus operation, this fact is clearly seen in many correspondence between US officials. For instance, in a message dated December 5, 1974 the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) requested Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Haig) who was visiting Ankara to convey the administration's efforts to overcome Congressional pressures:

While recognizing that your visit to Turkey will come at a time of uncertainty and sensitivity regarding status of caretaker Turkish Government, I would nevertheless

¹³⁸ Mehmet Gönlübol, Uluslararası Politika , İlkeler-Kavramlar-Kurumlar, 3rd press, AÜ SBF ve BYYO Yayinevi, Ankara, 1985, p.152

¹³⁹ Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, Edition no 9, Pearson, Boston, New York, 2011, p.161-162.

appreciate your making following points to senior Turkish military leaders with whom you have discussions:

A. U.S. administration, including President, engaged its full efforts in October to resist congressional pressures to end military sales and assistance to Turkey and was successful in preventing totally restrictive legislation¹⁴⁰

A Memorandum from A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger dated January 20, 1975 clearly shows that despite the embargo it was imperative for the US to continue military assistance to Turkey. The memorandum reminded the President that according to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 he was required to certify to Congress if there had been a progress in the Cyprus issue towards an agreement so as to continue normal military cooperation with Turkey after February 5, 1976. The paper underlined the political necessity of continuing military aids to Turkey:

If Turkey makes the necessary gestures before the cut-off date, the President can so certify. However, even without the necessary gestures, it remains of fundamental importance to U.S. interests to continue military assistance to Turkey, and the administration's approach to the Congress should be tailored accordingly.¹⁴¹

According to the document, there were five main arguments for continuing military assistance to Turkey. First, providing military assistance to Turkey was necessary for NATO and the US security, weakening Turkey militarily was detrimental for both. Second, military embargo to Turkey would do more harm for Cyprus issue, since the US would lose its leverage with Turkey, Turkey stance would be hardened, they would seek military aid other than the US. Third, the ongoing negotiations between parties in Cyprus would be negatively affected after the cut off of military assistance to Turkey. Fourth, Turkey needed political stability, the US had to wait until a new government formed for effective negotiations. Fifth, the negotiation involving Greece, Turkey and

¹⁴⁰ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 214.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, Document 216.

two Cyprus communities was by nature very complex and lengthy process. Imposing deadlines were not wise for reaching a solution.¹⁴²

These arguments of the administration for the continuing security relationship with Turkey was based on the rationale that Greek-Turkish disputes should be separated from Turkish-American relations. Not only was it counterproductive in resolving Cyprus issue, it was also harming US's own security interests since Turkey was a NATO member situated in a critical geography. Therefore, the administration was in constant need of developing a coherent strategy towards Turkey against the pressure of the Congress.

The official documents reveal that there are many other examples of the divide between the Congress and the executive branch regarding policies towards Turkey. A memorandum by the Foreign Secretary Kissinger to President Ford regarding his visit to Turkey to discuss the effects of the arms embargo in March 1975 reflected this divide between the executive and legislative branches in the USA. The memorandum shows that Kissinger was an open critic of the arms embargo as he emphasized:

It is really tragic to see what this aid cutoff is doing to a very close and loyal ally of the United States. I feel even stronger than when I arrived that we have no alternative but to continue to make an all-out effort to get the cutoff repealed. The Turks have no real interest in a waiver on spare parts, and this is understandable since they want no link whatsoever between our relations, aid, and the Cyprus problem.¹⁴³

Kissinger was of the opinion that the arms embargo to Turkey is counterproductive with regard to the Cyprus issue. According to him, if the US wanted Turkey's cooperation in Cyprus, it should have ended the embargo:

obviously if we could achieve the actual or potential repeal of the aid cut-off it would not only be a stimulus in starting the process of the negotiation (on Cyprus) but it would help carry it through to a successful conclusion. But the reversal of the

¹⁴² Ibid, Document 216.

¹⁴³ Ibid, Document 220.

cut-off cannot wait for the negotiations. We have, at most, till the end of April to get it changed before reprisals will occur.¹⁴⁴

Another document that clearly shows the disagreement between the Congress and the Ford administration is a memorandum of conversation dated March 21, 1975 between the President and three members of the Congress.¹⁴⁵ According to the document, Congressman John Brademas was clearly in conflict with Kissinger:

We only put the legislation in when the United States didn't condemn the occupation. We think it is a fundamental principle that arms shouldn't be used against the purposes of the Act. We think Kissinger has focused more attention to turning Congress around than to turning Turkey around.¹⁴⁶

While the Congress demanded to push Turkey towards a solution for the Cyprus problem, the administration wanted to keep its relations with Turkey intact as it was an invaluable asset against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the administration presented the Congress with three options.¹⁴⁷ First was passing the Mansfield–Scott Bill which would restore some military aid allow commercial sales of military articles to Turkey on the condition that Turkey would observe the ceasefire in Cyprus. The second option was a passing a waiver to allow necessary assistance while the third option was altogether lifting the embargo.¹⁴⁸ The Senate eventually passed the bill S.846 with a one vote margin and allowed continuation of most of the military aid.¹⁴⁹

Kissinger, who attended a CENTO meeting in Ankara on March 22, 1975 sent a message to the President Ford to share his impressions on Turkish political climate regarding the Turkish-American relations. He observed that Turkish side was very

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, Document 220.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, Document 221.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, Document 221.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, Document 223.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, Document 223.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, Document 224.

pessimistic about the future of the Turkish-American relationship because of the very narrow margin (41-40) in the Senate in passing the bill that allows military assistance to Turkey.¹⁵⁰

...and the Turks are pessimistic regarding the possibilities in the House. I assured them that we would continue our efforts to get the House to take action similar to the Senate; they are going to send a delegation to bring their case to the Congress.¹⁵¹

Kissinger underlined the fact that Demirel's attitude meant a support and tolerance to the US, however Demirel himself was politically in difficult position because of the American embargo to his country.

Demirel did speak feelingly and with a good deal of understanding and support for America as he reviewed the difficult situation he is in as a result of the continued embargo. He wants to give us a little more time. He expressed the strong hope that we will do everything possible to get the House to take the same action as the Senate and I assured him of our determination in this regard. Demirel is continuing to keep a lid on anti-Americanism, but he left me with a distinct impression that the time is running out. He may very well give you some indication of the kind of retaliatory measures he will feel impelled to take if the embargo is not lifted.¹⁵²

In his message to the President, Kissinger also mentioned CENTO's increased importance after the détente period since this organization was instrumental in engaging regional countries through Turkey:

As détente has supplanted cold war, the work of the organization has shifted to economic activities, although this past year an important joint military exercise was successfully undertaken. CENTO's principal utility is that it provides us with an instrumentality for close consultations with Iran and Turkey.¹⁵³

On May 29, 1975 President Ford and Prime Minister Demirel met in the margin of the NATO Summit. During the meeting, President Ford clearly expressed the divide

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, Document 225.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, Document 225.

¹⁵² Ibid, Document 226.

¹⁵³ Ibid, Document 225.

between his administration and the Congress on policy choices over Turkey. After acknowledging the difficult Vietnam period's effect on the relationship of the Congress and the White House, he even cited the Congress' embargo decision as unwise. President Ford also assured Demirel that as his administration they were totally in opposition to that action and he was personally dedicated to lifting the arms embargo imposed on Turkey.¹⁵⁴

In response to the President Ford, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel reflected the mood of frustration in Turkey vis-à-vis the embargo. He reminded that Turkey, as an ardent supporter of the Free World, was carrying the burden of opposing Soviets and Communism while championing democracy in its region. He articulated unfair situation and the paradoxes of the relationship by giving stark examples such as paying the storage fee of the military equipment, which were not to be delivered.

Demirel started his letter by reminding traditional lines of the mutual good relations and benefits as well as Turkey's choice was to be a democratic country within the ranks of the free world against communism:

As far as Turkey is concerned we appreciate your efforts. We have been a friend of the United States for thirty years and we believe that this mutual friendship is based on great understanding and on the basis that there are mutual benefits in our relations. Turkey has chosen the democratic way in the Free World. Turkey is also trying to Show that development is possible in a democracy. There are two systems struggling in this world—the Free Democracies against Communism. Communism has made lots of progress over the years and we feel we are in the front line in opposing Communism. We are a loyal friend of the United States. Many of our people died for freedom in Korea.¹⁵⁵

By choosing without hesitation to be a defender of the free world as a neighbor of the Soviets, Turkey took a great risk. This was recurrent theme used by Turkey against the US as it was reminded in Demirel's letter. Also unlinking the Cyprus issue from the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, Document 227.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, Document 227.

US-Turkey bilateral relationship was also a persistent position defended by Turkish Governments:

We believe in defending freedom. In the meantime we have a direct neighbor to the north—the Soviet Union. We cut our relations with them by taking certain actions which made us the target for the Soviets. We have never hesitated in this policy. I was six years as Prime Minister and I always defended the value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. If there were a conflict between Turkey and the United States I would be better able to explain to my people what the problem is but we have no conflict. Cyprus is not our conflict. U.S.-Turkish relations would be easier to handle if we could talk about a specific problem between us.¹⁵⁶

Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel needed to emphasize his personal position against communism. Having an anti-communist and pro NATO stance makes it difficult for himself to explain his voters the double standards and arms embargo imposed on Turkey by Americans:

We appreciate what the Administration has done. But the arms embargo puts us in a difficult position. It puts U.S.-Turkish relations in a difficult position. What harm have we done to the United States? My countrymen will ask this question. Did we violate some understanding or commitment? No. I can't complain about the United States Congress because that is not a body of my government. The United States sells arms to 90 countries but not to Turkey—loyal friend. We took risks. We became a prime target of Soviet arms because we made available missile bases for your Atlas missile. We also allowed intelligence facilities and thus continue to be a prime target. How can I explain to my people what harm we have done to the United States? Even Yugoslavia receives arms from the United States but not Turkey. We are anti-Communist, we believe in NATO and we are a democracy. How can we be treated this way?

Demirel provided some blatant examples of these double standards including the ban of delivery of already purchased military equipment such as F-4 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft from the US:¹⁵⁷

We bought 40 F-4's. Sixteen have been delivered and the rest were due to be delivered by August 1975 but they have not been. We are paying instalments, we are paying interest and we are asked to pay storage fees. But these have not been delivered. We have 100,000 tons of military materiel in New York and Houston.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, Document 227.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, Document 227.

We are asked to pay warehouse charges for these goods that have not been shipped. How can I explain these things? They are small matters but they could easily spoil our friendship. Once spoiled it will be hard to rebuild.¹⁵⁸

The issue with the C-130 transport aircraft was a dramatic example cited by the Prime Minister Demirel as it was clearly showing how the embargo bizarrely hampering security cooperation between two allies. Turkey had to send aircraft to the US for maintenance but in that case the planes would not be able to ship back to Turkey under the current arms embargo:

Let me add a couple of more things. We have some C-130 planes that need repair. We have a contract with Lockheed to repair these planes in the United States but if we send them there they will not send them back because of the embargo. If we don't send them we have to pay a penalty to Lockheed.¹⁵⁹

President Ford's reply once again underlined the fact that his administration was at odds with the Congress. He did not hesitate to acknowledge that there was no excuse to the Congressional action which caused to harm bilateral relations. He also blamed the enormous effect of the Greek lobby over the Congress. President Ford reiterated his commitment to restore Turkish-American relations and his highest priority was to remove the embargo:

It is incomprehensible to me why Congress does not see this. The consequences of their action will not be to make a solution to Cyprus easier. That can only come when the aid cut-off is removed. We must re-establish good U.S.-Turk relations. Nothing will have a higher priority with me than to remove the embargo.¹⁶⁰

It is clear that both the President Ford and the State Secretary Kissinger understood Turkish position regarding the embargo and its linkage to the Cyprus problem. As a response to the Turkish threats to close American bases in Turkey the US administration intensified its efforts to find a solution to lift the embargo. In a meeting with some key Congress members, considering the difficulties of removing the

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, Document 227.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, Document 227.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, Document 227.

embargo imposed on Turkey, the President Ford contemplated on the idea of a partial lifting of bans in order to allow Turkey to get the arms and other defense articles already paid for. To convince the members of the Congress he cited the importance of the US intelligence installations in Turkey.¹⁶¹

In the same meeting, Kissinger underlined the importance of lifting the arms embargo on Turkey by saying that, “Lifting the embargo won’t guarantee a settlement, but without it there won’t be a settlement”.¹⁶²

Meanwhile the Senate passed a bill to soothe the concerns of the Turkish military stemmed from damages done by the embargo. They allowed shipments based on deals made prior to embargo, and future NATO related sales.

During the discussions in the House of the Bill S.846 by the Senate, two rival arguments were visible. Those who wanted to endorse the bill and repeal the embargo imposed on Turkey argues that the embargo was counter-effective, it did not bring Turkey to any concessions on the Cyprus issue, while an increased sense of national pride precluded Turkish Government to act in a desired direction for Americans. For instance, Representative Whalen (from Ohio) who had previously voted in favor of the embargo said that he had earlier voted for the embargo for two reasons, first he believed that it was wrongdoing of a nation who used American equipment to invade another, second reason was his hope of compelling Turkey to a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. However, he said that he was mistaken in his both assumptions. First Greece too sent troops equipped with American rifles illegally and on the other hand the embargo was not helping Turks to bend, he admitted that he misjudged human nature and “national pride would preclude Turkey’s caving in to congressional dictation.”¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Ibid, Document 230.

¹⁶² Ibid, Document 230.

¹⁶³ Congressional Record-House, July 24, 1975, CIA Documents, Approved for Release 2005, 11, 21, CIA-RPD77M00144R000500070085-0

This one member's reversal of decision with regard to the embargo imposed upon Turkey had clues for the slight change in the mood in the Congress: It was now more widely accepted that the embargo is both a useless tool for solving the Cyprus problem and was in effect against the interest of NATO and the US.

Against this, those who supported the continuation of the embargo blamed Kissinger and the administration for the inefficiency of the embargo since their acts favoring Turkey boldened and encouraged the country. Representative Edgar argued against the repeal of the embargo by saying:

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have done nothing to compel the Turks to make peace. Since the arms embargo was imposed, the administration has continually assured the Turkish Government that the arms embargo would soon be lifted. Only 11 days after the ban became effective the administration proposed the repeal of the ban. Knowing this, why should the Turkish Government have felt compelled to make any concessions. The administration never gave the arms embargo a chance to succeed in forcing the Turkish Government negotiate. The President is responsible, therefore, for Turkey's intransigent attitude toward the peace settlement. The President's appeasement of the Turks may lead to still more fighting.¹⁶⁴

Consequently, this bill to repeal arms embargo to Turkey was vetoed by the House of Representatives. It was one of the rupture points in Turkish-American relations as Demirel government stopped all US military bases' operations in Turkey as of July 25, 1975.

On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject the amended version of S.846 despite intensive lobbying by the White House. The following day Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory, including 4 intelligence-gathering facilities.¹⁶⁵

Upon the defeat of the White House in the Congress, the CIA prepared a memorandum on the same day, on July 25, 1975 in order to assess potential Turkish reaction to the

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p.H7438

¹⁶⁵ Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867

failure of the American administration to lift arms embargo.¹⁶⁶ The memorandum envisaged that, Turks would avoid “rash overreaction” and “excessive retaliation” as Turkish leaders would face several constraints. According to the CIA memorandum, one of these constraints was the absence of a credible alternative for the armament. Moreover, Turkish economic situation was not permissive for a major allotment of scarce resources for purchasing arms from elsewhere. The memo also claims that there was not enough public support in Turkey for seriously damaging relations with Americans. However, not responding to the continuation of the embargo was not a political option either:

On the other hand, Turkish leaders have the important matter on face to consider; they are likely to feel obliged to do something tangible -probably some action against US installations in Turkey- to show their displeasure. US intelligence facilities may be the first target.¹⁶⁷

Another indication of the divide between the Carter administration and the Congress was evident, according to Turkmen, in reading Carter's diary published years after-Carter articulated that "we won narrowly in the vote for removing the embargo." In his style it is possible to see how Carter affiliated himself with the cause. Turkmen further argues that the pro-Turkish stance in the White House could be attributed to personal efforts of the National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Madeline Albright, who was working as his liaison to the Congress, (and who would be the future State Secretary).¹⁶⁸

Nasuh Uslu attributes the main reasons of those in the Congress who voted against the administration's proposal to lift the embargo to the “the uneasy relationship between

¹⁶⁶ CIA Memorandum, Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo, 25 July 1975, Approved for release 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3

¹⁶⁷ CIA Memorandum, Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo, 25 July 1975, Approved for release 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3

¹⁶⁸ Turkmen, p.142

the legislative and executive branches.”¹⁶⁹ According to Uslu, Nixon Kissinger era foreign policy followed in Vietnam and other places grow suspicion for the motives of the policies of the White House in the Congress. Uslu claims that “the Watergate scandal resulted in an almost complete breakdown of Congressional trust in the Presidency.”¹⁷⁰ For Uslu, the Congress was waiting an opportunity to punish the executive branch and the “Cyprus issue simply provided this opportunity.”¹⁷¹

According to Kissinger, Brademas and other Congressmen who visited him to criticize their soft attitudes against Turkey were just lobbying for the Greek cause. For him, their guidance was not relevant, since the foreign policy was the responsibility of the administration. Moreover, they were the same congressmen who took enormous role in the impeachment of President Nixon.¹⁷²

Nasuh Uslu argues that, during the late 1974 and early 1975, the Congress was fully against any offer or explanation from the administration. It was now the mission of the Congress to prove that the US attached utmost importance to the rule of law and justice.¹⁷³

Regarding the embargo and Cyprus issues, even Kissinger admitted that, they were not in a position to use threats or promises as diplomatic tools against Turkey and

¹⁶⁹ Uslu, Nasuh (1994) Turkey's relationship with the United States 1960-1975., Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1453/> p.260-261

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, pp.260-261

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p.261

¹⁷² Uslu (2016), p.316

¹⁷³ Laipson, Ellen B. Congressional Executive Relations and Turkish Embargo, Foreign Affairs Committee Print, Washington, 1981, p.30.

Greece, since they were in the last three weeks of Nixon administration which was struggling with the Watergate scandal.¹⁷⁴

After the resignation of Nixon, Kissinger was continuing as State Secretary and he was seen as a remnant of the Nixon administration towards which the Congress had strong dislike.¹⁷⁵

Nasuh Uslu also mentions also an anecdote regarding how members of Congress were motivated against Turkey. An official from the State Secretariat visited Senator Eagleton, a member of Foreign Relations Committee, and informed him about the conclusions of the report regarding Turkey's use of American weapons in the intervention to Cyprus. According to the report, it was unlawful to continue arms trade with Turkey. From then on Senator Eagleton decided to struggle against the administration on this issue.¹⁷⁶

Kissinger very openly indicated this clash between the administrative and legislative branches of the US. In an interview published in Chicago Tribune dated July 31, 1983, Kissinger replied a question about the struggle between the Congress and the administration:

... I can mention one from the period I was in office – just to take discussion away from immediate controversies. We were attempting to negotiate an agreement between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. The Congress, in the middle of the negotiations, voted an embargo on arms to Turkey. The end result was that the negotiations stopped entirely, and to this day the Cyprus situation is totally stalemated. Now I can't prove that those negotiations in 1974 would have succeeded, but with every passing month the position of those who occupied the territory became more firmly established.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1191.

¹⁷⁵ Laipson p.29.

¹⁷⁶ Uslu (2016) p.317

¹⁷⁷ Robert Bendier, *Kissinger on Foreign Policy*, Chicago Tribune, 31 July 1983.

Another document hinted that the US administration was seen pro-Turkish by the Congress in a memorandum of conversation dated September 23, 1975, between Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and US Secretary of State Kissinger. Kissinger jokingly admitted that he was not popular in Greece.¹⁷⁸

After all, Kissinger's own analysis remarkably showed the extent of this divide between the administration and the Congress. He claimed that because of the embargo the US lost the power over the course of events after Turkey's intervention to the island.

...during the weekend following Nixon's resignation the crisis erupted again, culminating in a second Turkish invasion of the island. While Ford struggled to restore executive authority over the next months, a freewheeling Congress destroyed the equilibrium between the parties we had precariously maintained; it legislated a heavy-handed arms embargo against Turkey that destroyed all possibility of American mediation — at a cost from which we have not recovered to this day.¹⁷⁹

The divide between the US administration and Congress on the decision to impose embargo widely cited by scholars. Dankwart A. Rustow, in his article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1979 writes that the US “Administrations repeatedly tried to have the embargo lifted, but ran into strong resistance from Greek-American sentiment, ably represented in Congress by such eminent figures as Senator Paul S. Sarbanes and Representative John Brademas, the Democratic whip in the House.”¹⁸⁰

Çağrı Erhan too, points out the divide between the Congress and the administration. He contends that during the sessions in the Congress the representatives were raising these three major arguments.¹⁸¹ The first argument was that the Turkey's second

¹⁷⁸ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 236.

¹⁷⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982 p.1192

¹⁸⁰ Dankwart A. Rustow, *Foreign Affairs*, “Turkey's Travails”, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Fall, 1979), p.95

¹⁸¹ Erhan (2010), p.438.

operation in the island had lacked legal justification. The second argument of pro-veto congress members was the fact that Turkey's use of American arms in Cyprus was against the agreements between two countries. And the third argument was that the veto was the only way to compel Turkey to abandon its operation in Cyprus. They also argue that without a veto "Turkey would have been rewarded for this unlawful behavior."¹⁸²

Erhan argues that the Congress took steps towards the embargo decision without waiting the administration to act because just after the Watergate, the legislative body's confidence on the administration eroded. Besides, the Congress was accused of the lack of oversight over the administration during the Vietnam War, bombing of Cambodia and over the policies on Chile. Therefore, now it was the time for the Congress to act and determine the policy.

According to Erhan, the U.S. administration was finding the Congress' attitude too extreme and harsh. Their main arguments were usually centered on Turkey's being an ally and NATO member, weakening her would counterproductive, the US military installations were at stake. Erhan also point outs two other arguments, one is the Congress action was against the US constitution and the other is the embargo would negatively affect Israel who uses American weapons in its wars with Arab nations:

3. For Congress to take on the responsibility of the executive and impose an embargo on Turkey was an open violation of the principle of the separation of powers embodied in the US Constitution. The intemperate actions of the Congress would limit the administration's freedom of action in its efforts to uphold US interests.

4. An arms embargo imposed on Turkey could have harmful effects on US relations with Israel, which had used US supplied weapons in its wars against the Arabs in 1967 and 1973.¹⁸³

¹⁸² Erhan (2010), p.438.

¹⁸³ *ibid*, p.425

As Mustafa Aydın argued, the divide between the Congress and the US administration is an important aspect of Turkish-American relations. He contends that “the arms embargo was imposed by Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department and the American Military. This difference of opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States, such as they were, and still save face.”¹⁸⁴

Therefore, for Turkish-American relations, the (final) agential causes were under the influence of domestic, strategic and material considerations. Motives and priorities of the Congress and the administration were different for the formulation of a foreign policy with regard to Turkey. The role of Greek lobbies, the image of Turkey with reference to recent opium issue in American public opinion, images of Nixon and Kissinger particularly with reference to their handling of foreign policy were ideational (final) causes while the strategic considerations, need to keep a NATO member strong against the Soviets were structural (formal) causes that shape and constrain agents acts and decisions.

4.3. US Security Policy Toward Turkey

A National Security Memorandum dated July 16, 1975 and signed by Brent Scowcroft, indicated that the President Ford requested a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy vis-à-vis Turkey particularly weighing the US military presence, priorities of the US bases and US nuclear presence in Turkey as well as Turkey’s material capabilities.¹⁸⁵ In response to this request, an NSC interagency group chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs prepared a report titled “U.S. Security Policy Toward Turkey”.¹⁸⁶ The report highlighted the main dynamics of Turkish-

¹⁸⁴ Aydın, Mustafa; *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.36, No.1, January 2000, pp.103-139 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON, p.129

¹⁸⁵ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 231.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, Document 234.

American security cooperation, maintaining the ideas that the relations were mutually beneficial, Turkey's Western oriented governing elites including the military, attached utmost importance to the partnership with the US, however the relationship was also subject to change, and in Turkey, there was a visible erosion to the trust to the US, particularly after the embargo. The NSC report started with the observation that the security relationship between two countries were mutually beneficial. The report claimed that the US had provided Turkey defense articles worth more than \$3 billion dollars, therefore, almost entire Turkish Armed Forces was dependent on the US defense equipment. Since Turkey was planning a major defense modernization, The US assistance become even more important for Turkey. On the other hand, the report continued, the US had obtained approximately two dozen military facilities in Turkey among which the most important one was the Incirlik airbase.¹⁸⁷ The report continued with the remark that this beneficial security cooperation hampered by the recent Cyprus issues and the subsequent arms embargo imposed on Turkey.¹⁸⁸

The report highlighted Demirel Government's prudent and cautious attitude after the embargo while acknowledging that even his government would face internal pressures soon for a retaliatory action. The report also draw attention to the Turkish military and maintained that they were too generally trying to maintain security cooperation with the US.¹⁸⁹

The report observed that Turkey's ties to the NATO was strong both politically and militarily with underlining that "Turkey attaches great importance to its NATO role, both in terms of Turkey's defense and of its political identity as a western European country. The Turkish military has a strong interest in continuing full participation in NATO's military activities." Therefore, the report claims that Turkey would not

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, Document 234.

question its membership to NATO after the embargo imposed by the US. Rather the report suggests “will push other allies hard to fill the gap in its arms and equipment inventories.”¹⁹⁰ According to report, Turkey would request from NATO and other allies for its priority items in defense such as communications infrastructure and procurement of air-defense systems.¹⁹¹

The report also underlined the importance of keeping the US military bases and facilities in Turkey:

US objectives in the forthcoming negotiations with the Turks are to retain our basic facilities and preserve the fundamentals of the multilateral security relationship. These aims are intrinsically conservative. We want to preserve those things we now have which we consider desirable, and relinquish only what we must. Within these goals, opportunities may arise to realign the US presence in ways which could make it more efficient while decreasing its size, visibility, and overall cost.¹⁹²

One of the striking observations that the report made was that the Turkish-American relations was in a transformation after Turkey had lost confidence in the US due to the embargo:

One of the basic assumptions underlying what we consider to be the optional approaches to negotiations available to the US is that the US-Turkish relationship is undergoing some permanent change. Turkey will no longer trust the US to the same extent as heretofore, no matter what is done to lift the embargo in the weeks and months ahead. On the other hand, Turkish leaders will be reluctant to see US-Turkish bilateral security ties disappear entirely.¹⁹³

The paper concluded by proposing four options ranging from reducing dependence to Turkey to accepting Turkey’s demands in negotiating with Turkey to preserve the US installations in Turkey. The first option was to accept Turkey’s offer to negotiate a new defense cooperation agreement even though that had a very slim chance of success

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁹² Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁹³ Ibid, Document 234.

given the mood in the Congress. The second option proposed by the policy paper was to engage Turks through NATO and other allies so as to satisfy Turkish military needs as well as keeping essential US military bases in Turkey. The third option was to wait for the improvements in the situation in Cyprus in order for attempting the embargo. And finally, the fourth option was to reduce the US presence in Turkey as much as possible before starting negotiations for a new defense cooperation agreement.¹⁹⁴

The response of CIA to the above mentioned interagency policy paper was very interesting. The memorandum dated August 27, 1975 and signed by Vernon A. Walters indicated that the CIA found the policy paper “passive and fatalistic” and drew attention the fact that the embargo decision was prone to change due to existence of waverers in the Congress who decided at the last minute against Turkey and they could be persuaded to follow an opposite direction.¹⁹⁵

Indeed, it is clear that the administration decided to continue pressing for the removal of the embargo as understood from a memorandum of conversation dated September 25, 1975, between the President Ford, the Vice President Rockefeller, the Secretary of State Kissinger and some congressional representatives. During the conversation, the vice president said that:

The Turkish election is between the man who put the troops on Cyprus in the first place and the moderate who’s seeking a reasonable solution. If the Congress fails to vote to lift the embargo, they will in fact be helping the radicals in Turkey.¹⁹⁶

The prominent argument against the embargo was its effect on NATO. According to the memorandum, Congressman Anderson reminds that the Secretary General of NATO had conveyed European allies’ concern over the embargo imposed on Turkey

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, Document 234.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, Document 235.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, Document 237.

the week before in his visit to the Capitol Hill. Andersen concluded that “I don’t see a stronger argument than the impact on NATO of the U.S. embargo.”¹⁹⁷

After this meeting in the White House, the House agreed to partially lift the embargo, with an amendment “requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on ways to counter the illicit diversion of opium. The Senate concurred with the amendment on October 3. Ford signed S.2230 on October 6.”¹⁹⁸

In a telegram dated November 5, 1975 sent by Macomber, the US ambassador in Ankara, to the Department of State shared the somewhat pessimistic view for the future of Turkish-American security relations. Macomber envisaged a military intervention in Turkey citing the economic conditions:

Reserves are declining; inflation is rampant; unemployment is staggering. Student violence continues to paralyze major sections of the university community. And under such circumstances of a deteriorating Turkish internal and international position, the question that always lurks in the background is just how much more will the Turk military take before intervening.¹⁹⁹

Highlighting the transition period of Turkish-American relations, he also reminded advantages and challenges of restoring this relationship as well as appraising Turkish people. He maintained the idea that this new relationship would be based on less confidence compared to pre-embargo era:

Down the road we should be able to reconstruct a new and viable relationship, but in today’s circumstances it seems almost inevitable that it will be a relationship based on less mutual sacrifice, and less mutual confidence and commitment, than that which existed prior to February 5, 1975.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, Document 237.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, Document 237.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, Document 238.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, Document 238.

In this context, an interagency intelligence memorandum dated February 21, 1975 evaluated foreign policy options towards Turkey after the embargo.²⁰¹ According to the document, Turkey was, for the first time, seriously contemplating on how to meet its defense equipment needs without American defense equipment. The document's scope was to find out to what extent Turkey depended on the US arms and equipment as well as the likelihood of viable alternatives sources for Turkey on that matter. The paper argued that most important elements for Turkey's calculations to choose the way forward after the embargo were the level of military dependence to the US, availability of viable alternatives for armament, and "the durability of Turkey's present orientation toward the West."²⁰²

The memorandum's principal conclusions included the claim that Turkey had no serious alternative to the US military supply for the short term. Here again it was mentioned that the embargo would potentially harm NATO capabilities due to the fact that Turkey has been located in a very strategic location bordering the Soviet Union. The memorandum observed that after the embargo Turkey had not hastily retaliated to the US but it was likely that eventually US military bases there would be questioned. Turkey's commitment to NATO and its orientation to the West, according to the memorandum, would very much depend on the help they would provide for Turkey to replace American military assistance.

In these circumstances, Turkey is likely to explore alternative sources of support abroad—from Arab states, for example—but will probably not be able to satisfy its needs in this way. The results might be an inward-turning isolation and a reversion to domestic conservatism which could spell trouble for Turkey's economic health and its role in southern Europe.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Ibid, Document 217.

²⁰² Ibid, Document 217.

²⁰³ Ibid, Document 217.

The memorandum predicted that in the wake military embargo Turkey would rely on domestic production as well as getting help of West Germany and Italy along with some Middle East countries such as Libya and Iran. The paper, in effect, analyzed the reasons that would lead Turkey to decide to establish its own defense industrial base:

10. Until early this month, the Turks felt that some way would be found to avoid a cutoff of US arms. Hence, they have just begun to make a serious effort to identify other sources of supply. Ankara is now weighing the prospects for:

—greater reliance on domestic production.

—purchasing arms from other NATO countries, especially West Germany and Italy.

—getting help from wealthy Middle Eastern states, such as Iran and Libya.

There seems to be a general consensus already among the Turks that there are no sources, or combinations of sources, that can be tapped in the near future to enable the Turkish armed forces to maintain their current capability.

11. Turkey has long spent a higher percentage of its GNP on defense than most other NATO members and is taking steps to increase its defense spending still more in the light of the US aid cutoff. The Turks would like to devote additional funds to domestic arms production and to buying weapons abroad. They are handicapped, however, by a high rate of inflation, a large trade deficit, and a sharp drop recently in foreign exchange reserves. These problems do not altogether prevent Ankara from attempting to use its own resources to help compensate for the loss of US aid, but the Turks realize that such efforts could hamper their economic development.

In evaluating Turkish defense industrial capabilities, the paper concluded that the road for Turkey to have its own defense industry was very steep since its lacked basic industrial infrastructure, necessary funding and skilled work force:

Turkey now produces small arms, ammunition, and some naval vessels. In addition, the Turks have the capability to modernize some of their more important military equipment. They would still be dependent, however, on outside suppliers for major subassemblies. The Turks are completely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft, tanks, submarines, and other more complex systems, and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicate an awareness that Turkey will remain so for a long time to come.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Ibid, Document 217.

Regarding the supply of arms from other NATO members, the paper underlined the fact that most of this equipment required their permission since they were made in the USA. On the other hand, Libya was mentioned as a possible source of arms supply since it was Libya who financed the purchase of Italian F-104s, and relations between Turkey and Libya were developed significantly after the Cyprus intervention:

The Libyans apparently provided spare parts or other material assistance for the Turkish forces at that time. Since then, ties between the two countries have continued to improve, with the Turks trying—with some success—to tap Libyan financial resources for military assistance. Tripoli apparently financed the purchase of Italian F-104s, for example, and a new Turkish-Libyan agreement provides for some unspecified form of cooperation in the production of military equipment.²⁰⁵

According to the memorandum, even though it would be possible for Turkey to find support for its armament efforts in its region, for instance Iran, it would still need spare parts for the maintenance of US built equipment in its inventory. The finance was not sufficient, it was also important to access for Western industrial sources for maintaining Turkish Armed Forces which was heavily dependent on the US made arsenal:

Even if Middle Eastern countries were willing to spend as much as the US was spending for military assistance to Turkey, the Turks could not obtain all the spare parts needed to maintain their current inventory of US-built equipment. Nor are they likely to get sophisticated items like the F-4s and electronic warfare equipment which they were counting on to upgrade their forces.²⁰⁶

The memorandum stressed the fact that for a total break with the dependence to US, Turkey would, in theory, resort to France or Germany for a complete renewal of its armed forces. However, even without financial problems, this kind of modernization and rearmament program would take several years to be completed:

Substantial financial assistance from wealthy benefactors would make it theoretically possible for the Turks eventually to reequip their forces with non-US equipment, such as French Mirage aircraft, West German Leopard tanks, and

²⁰⁵ Ibid, Document 217.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, Document 217.

British naval vessels, if the producer countries were willing to sell them to Ankara. (The French, West Germans, and British would have to weigh carefully, inter alia, the repercussions of such sales on their respective relations with Greece²⁰⁷

The paper also claimed that a direct transfer of defense equipment from other potential friendly Middle Eastern countries such as Libya were less likely while a new war with Israel was always highly probable. With these considerations, the paper argued that in the short-term Turkey was not unable to replace the US or western sources for its armament modernization. The paper correctly envisaged that even after the relations with the US restored Turkey would try to decrease its single source dependency for her military needs.²⁰⁸

The paper saw the USSR as the least possible option for Turkey to apply for its armament programs since it would not likely for her to switch to the Soviet bloc noting however the possibility that Turkey might use its relationship as a leverage.²⁰⁹

As such, the policy paper weighed Turkey's policy options against the US embargo and predicted that a shift toward the USSR and Arab countries seems implausible.

Consequently, in the formulation of the US foreign policy with regard to Turkey, it is discernible that four causes worked together in determining the output. As a chief material cause, the US bases in Turkey were at the center of the discussion. Turkey's orientation, and its search for alternate sources for armament had both material and ideational dimensions. The views of both country's military and political leaderships were also important as agential forces. In the background chief structural cause was the Cold War and both countries' security needs in this environment.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, Document 217.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, Document 217.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, Document 217.

4.4. Turkey Approaches the Soviets

While Americans weighing policy options towards Turkey, it is evident that they had to keep a delicate balance between pressuring Turkey and not losing it to Russians. In a high-level meeting held on September 26, 1974, with the participation of the US administration and Congressional leaders to discuss Foreign Assistance Bill and Turkish aid, views of Senators Fulbright and Mansfields were remarkable in this respect. While contemplating options on leaving the Cyprus issue to the UN, Kissinger argued that leaving the matter to the UN means supporting Turkey because there would be no solution through the UN mechanisms and that would help to preserve the current status quo in Cyprus. He further argued that they should do so in order to support Turkey, otherwise Turkey would drift away from the US and may approach to the Soviets. At this point Senator Fulbright rejected the idea of Turkey's move to the Soviets since he believed Turkey always feared of the Soviets. Other Congressional leader at the mentioned meeting claimed the contrary, and stated that he believed Turkey would move to Soviets and Arab nations.²¹⁰ The importance of this conversation is the fact that Turkey's policy options were being discussed at the highest level of the US foreign policy formulation circles without an agreement.

Indeed, against deteriorating relations with the US, Turkey tried to establish some ties with the Soviets. A report prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research dated January 14, 1976 evaluated Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Turkey in particular and Turkey-USSR relations in general. The report emphasized Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Turkey between 26-29 December in order to attend the inauguration of a steel plant in İskenderun.²¹¹ That plant was financed by the USSR.²¹²

²¹⁰ Ibid, Document 211.

²¹¹ Ibid, Document 239.

²¹² A steel plant in İskenderun, Hatay were financed by a Soviet Credit based on an agreement dated December 24, 1972. (Turkish Official Gazette, October 22, 1977, Number: 16092)

However, the report saw this visit as a pressure tactic on the US and highlights the fact that Turkey was pursuing a Western oriented policy even though it might improve its relations with Soviets in some areas including basic military technologies with the help of détente climate. The report stated that neither the Soviet Union nor its Arab neighbors were not carrying the potential of being reliable allies for Turkey. Turkish-Soviet cooperation would be very limited to areas such as procurement of some unsophisticated military equipment, credit agreements for industrial development and civil aviation.²¹³

4.5. A New Defense Cooperation Agreement

When the US arms embargo imposed on Turkey went into effect, Turkey had unilaterally declared that the cancellation of the DCA of 1969, which was an umbrella agreement for the regulation of the US military facilities in Turkey. Even though the US side claimed that the agreement was still valid, they have accepted to renegotiate the agreement in order to restore relations with Turkey so as to save the future of its military bases in Turkey.²¹⁴

With the cancellation of the 1969 DCA, two countries tried to reach an agreement for a new DCA against the background of deteriorated security relations in the shadow of the Cyprus problem and the embargo. Turkish Foreign Minister visited the US to discuss the new agreement. In a high-level meeting convened on March 24, 1976, for the new DCA, Kissinger said that the negotiations were very well affected by the Cyprus problem. According to the memorandum of the meeting, Kissinger outlined the main issues that should be dealt with to achieve a new DCA. Along with the amount and the content of the American assistance, defining the status of the US

²¹³ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 239.

²¹⁴ Ibid, Document 235.

military facilities in Turkey, especially within the NATO context, were among the significant areas to be addressed in this new agreement.²¹⁵

Kissinger and Çağlayangil had a lengthy discussion over the annexes, the duration and renewal procedures of the new defense cooperation agreement as well as technical language that would create problems both for Turkish public opinion and for the Congress. Kissinger often reminded the strength of the Greek lobby in the Congress to persuade his counterpart to arrive an agreed text that get the approval of the Congress.²¹⁶

Furthermore, the discussions were centered on Turkish request of modernizing its force. Turkey wanted to swap its aging F-100s in inventory with used F-4Cs which were newer aircraft. Turkey insisted that that kind of a swap was made between Spain and the US. However, US was reluctant on that offer since F-100s were now out of inventory of Americans. Turkey on the other hand wanted to modernize its air force with newer aircraft such as F-4Cs.²¹⁷

During these negotiations for the new DCA, President Ford also accepted Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil in the White House. According to the memorandum of this conversation dated March 24, 1976, Kissinger and Çağlayangil summarized the negotiations to the President Ford and raised the unresolved issues, the amount of the military aid and equipment. President Ford endorsed the agreement while leaving out unresolved issues as discussion details. The mood in the administration was always cooperative vis-à-vis Turkey.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Ibid, Document 240.

²¹⁶ Ibid, Document 240.

²¹⁷ Ibid, Document 240.

²¹⁸ Ibid, Document 241.

Kissinger and Çağlayangil signed the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 26.²¹⁹ However, the agreement could not be approved in the Congress during the last months of President Ford's tenure.

During the final months of his presidency, Ford also met Bulent Ecevit, former prime minister and the leader of the main opposition party on July 29, 1976. At the meeting, Ecevit emphasized how he valued the relationship with America and complained his domestic political rival Süleyman Demirel's populist rhetoric including leaving the NATO. He states that:

Demirel makes sour statements which may sound a little dangerous—like leaving NATO or warning of the consequences. I never say anything like that. I say that whatever happens, that is no reason to leave NATO because it is important for many reasons. I have kept my party in line on this issue. I don't think the Eastern Europeans would be happy if we left NATO. They can't say it, but we feel it²²⁰

Meanwhile, Kissinger and Çağlayangil continued to discuss another problem that escalated between Turkey and Greece: the continental shelf. On August 25, 1976, UN Security Council Resolution 395 was passed by consensus, which advised Greece and Turkey to exercise restraint, urges a reduction in tensions, called for direct negotiations, and prompted appropriate judicial means, particularly the International Court of Justice.²²¹ Turkey requested American help for this resolution through these bilateral meetings between foreign ministers. On September 29, 1976, in one of these meetings between Çağlayangil and Kissinger, the new defense cooperation agreement's slow progress was also covered. Upon the Turkish Foreign Minister's question about whether the process of DAC is being delayed, the US Secretary of State

²¹⁹ Department of State Bulletin, April 19, 1976, pp. 503–504

²²⁰ FRUS, 1973-76, Document 243.

²²¹ Ibid, Document 246, (via Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, p. 321)

answered affirmative and said that "immediately after Congress returns we will put great pressure on the legislature to get the agreement through".²²²

Upon the failure of the endorsement of the DCA, the US Ambassador Macomber in Ankara sent his comments to the Department of State with a very important telegram dated November 8, 1976. His telegram's subject was "Future Course of US/Turkish Security Relationship." Macomber's started his observations by predicting that the failure of the Congress to approve the DCA with Turkey before the elections would have substantial results on Turkish-American relations. The US Ambassador in Ankara envisaged a rough period in Turkish-American relations after the failure of endorsement of the DCA. He thought that it was already a lost opportunity for putting the relationship back on track since a new President and a new government would reexamine the agreement and it would further delay the normalization of relations.²²³

Presumably, any new administration would wish to reexamine the DCA before deciding the stance it would take respecting it. After weighing current circumstances—and our basic interests—in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, I would very much hope that the new administration will decide to endorse this agreement as it is presently written and seek early congressional approval.²²⁴

Macomber also drew attention to the fact that there were also negotiations with Greece on a DCA and these two DCAs were closely affecting each other and would potentially cause more delay during the new administration.²²⁵

According to Macomber, due to domestic factors, elections in both countries, the future of the DCA was not very bright. He also underlined the fact that failure to implement the newly signed DCA would also jeopardize Demirel Government in Turkey as the political opposition would be increased. The delay of normalization of

²²² Ibid, Document 246.

²²³ Ibid, Document 247.

²²⁴ Ibid, Document 247.

²²⁵ Ibid, Document 247.

relations would also increase the risk of confrontations between Turkey and Greece.

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For the longer the Congress delays action on the DCA the more likely it is that the political opposition to the Demirel government (and increasing segments of the Turkish public) will become committed to the defeat or renegotiation of the DCA, and/or that the Demirel government itself may collapse or be defeated, thus leaving the DCA with no sponsor.²²⁷

Another important factor reminded by Macomber was the US military bases in Turkey. During the negotiations of the agreement both parties agreed on immediate reopening of the facilities upon the endorsement of the DCA. In order to avoid negative consequences Macomber suggested to provide Turkey significant military assistance in the interim period. Macomber suggested that the existed US Government should convince the next government of the necessity of implementing the DCA as soon as possible.²²⁸

Given the importance of this partnership to the world strategic balance and to US security interests, it therefore seems to me that it is essential that the present administration make a major effort to convince the new administration of the need to move the DCA through the Congress in the early weeks of the next congressional session.²²⁹

Macomber highlighted the fact that the failure to restore relations with Turkey would be too costly for the US. He insisted that the US could not afford to lose military partnership with Turkey since it will harm NATO and most importantly cause “a

²²⁶ Ibid, Document 247.

²²⁷ Ibid, Document 247.

²²⁸ Ibid, Document 247.

²²⁹ Ibid, Document 247.

serious diminution of the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.”²³⁰ This would not only cause damage to NATO capabilities but also Israel’s security was at stake.²³¹

This new DCA, unlike the 1969 agreement, was precisely indicating the volume of the military aid from the U.S. to Turkey. This was, Erhan argues, one of the reasons the Congress was reluctant to endorse the new DCA. Because, he went on, “the budget was annually approved by the Congress. Therefore, a pre-determined commitment was curbing the Congress’ ability to act and oversight.”²³² This new DCA was envisaging a total of 1 billion U.S. dollars aid to Turkey. However, U.S. was offering in a similar agreement to Greece and giving them 200.000.000 U.S. Dollars. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, upon learning the U.S. offer to Turkey was 1 billion, withdrew from the negotiations of the DCA. Karamanlis compared all U.S. military aids to both countries since 1947 and found out the ratio of 7/10. Consequently, he requested 700.000.000 U.S. Dollars of aid from the U.S. as a pre-condition to renegotiate the DCA²³³

In his last week at the office, President Ford resent the United States-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement to the Congress attached to a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Retransmitting on January 18, 1977.²³⁴ In this letter President Ford emphasized that this agreement was based on the Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which “the Parties, separately and jointly, by

²³⁰ Ibid, Document 247.

²³¹ Ibid, Document 247.

²³² Erhan, p.426

²³³ Ibid, p.426

²³⁴ Gerald R. Ford, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Retransmitting the United States-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256762>, Accessed 10.08.2020

means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”²³⁵

I am transmitting herewith draft legislation, "To authorize the President to implement an Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Turkey relative to Defense Cooperation pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to resist armed attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area.

In this letter President Ford acknowledged Turkey’s ample need for military modernization and assisting Turkey was an American strategic interest:

Turkey needs substantial amounts of outside assistance to continue essential modernization of its armed forces to meet increased Warsaw Pact armed forces capabilities. It clearly continues to be in the U.S. interest to provide such assistance. This Agreement restores U.S. assistance to levels comparable in real dollar terms to what we have been providing Turkey over the past 30 years.

Close security ties with Turkey are in the interest of the United States. Such ties strengthen Turkey's contribution to NATO and to the stability of the eastern Mediterranean area.²³⁶

4.6. Conclusions

Turkey's decision to remove the opium ban caused a visible decline in Turkish-American relations; since combatting heroin addiction was a sensitive issue for the American public, Congress was already seeking ways to retaliate against Turkey. Another problem between the two countries was the Soviet overflights towards the Middle East during and after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Turkey allowed the USSR aircraft to use its airspace, causing a growing dissent on the US side. Finally, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 was followed by the Congress decision to impose an embargo on Turkey in December 1974.

²³⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

²³⁶ Gerald R. Ford, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Retransmitting the United States-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256762>

Facing these events and the Congress' embargo, The US administration tried to develop policy options towards Turkey and found that the relations were mutually beneficial. Turkey's Western-oriented governing elites, including the military, attached utmost importance to the US's partnership. However, the relationship was also subject to change, and in Turkey, there was a visible erosion of the US's trust, particularly after the embargo.

The divide between the administration and the Congress was a recurrent theme during the entire course of events concerning Turkey. However, this divide also had its root in American Foreign Policymaking stemming from the competition in foreign policymaking in general, and Nixon and Kissinger's conduct during the Vietnam War.

To analyze in the light of the proposed theory of causation, it would be useful to see the leading causes in four categories. Among the chief structural reasons that led to the embargo was the détente's permissive mood on international relations between superpowers. Due to the détente, it was easier to punish an ally located on the border of the Soviets. Among material causes that played a significant role in the embargo included Turkey's dependence on American equipment for its armed forces. Ideational/final causes were also visible: to discipline the US administration. Congress had a new history of struggle during the Vietnam War and to punish Turkey for its intervention in Cyprus. Agential/Efficient causes that were observable in the process of the embargo were the Congress and the Greek lobby in the US. Other essential agents, the White House, State Department, the Pentagon, as well as the Turkish Government could not obstruct the embargo decision. As the argument is that these causes act together, this period is a good case of showing how these four categories of reasons worked together in imposing an embargo on Turkey. The Congress (as the agential cause) decided (based on the ideational cause) that Turkey should be punished for its intervention in Cyprus. This punishment would work because Turkey had depended on American equipment (material cause). It seemed harmless to punish a

NATO ally since there was a rapprochement between two superpowers (structural cause) in the years of détente.

It is evident that during the imposition of the embargo, the White House fared weaker compared to Congress in terms of being agential causes. Throughout the last days of the Ford Administration, the negative mood against the executive branch was at its apex. The Carter administration, too, even though it had more credits than the previous one, faced enormous difficulties in Congress on this matter. However, the changing structure (i.e., intensification of the Cold War, Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan) made material causes (US bases in Turkey) more important, and this was used as leverage in the new administration's effort to remove embargo as it would be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

REMOVAL OF THE EMBARGO

When President Carter started his tenure, the first issue on his agenda about Turkey was the defense cooperation agreement which had been signed by the previous administration. The DCA between Turkey and the USA was signed in 1976 and sent to the Congress as a last-minute action by the Ford administration on January 18. However, when Carter became president, his new administration asked Congress to withhold immediate consideration of the agreement.²³⁷ This decision sparked an immediate controversy in the Turkish-American relations, which were already very tense following Turkey's intervention to Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent arms embargo held by the Congress.

Turkish Ambassador Esenbel met new State Secretary Cyrus Vance to discuss the reasons for calling back the Congress' agreement. Turkey's main expectations from the agreement were to repair the damage done by the 1974 embargo, unlink defense cooperation from the Cyprus issue and modernize its armed forces, which had been in poor condition. The Turkish side was surprised by the last-minute action of the Ford administration, and they knew that an immediate approval from the Congress was unrealistic, but the new administration's statement to call the Congress not to take action about the agreement was somewhat alarming and disappointing for them.²³⁸ On the other hand, the Turkish Government was also disturbed by this statement, for it was contributing to the anti-American rhetoric that the opposition was using against the ruling Justice Party. According to the memorandum of the visit, Ambassador

²³⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXI, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece; 1977–1980, eds. Adam M. Howard, David Zierler. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 84.

²³⁸ Ibid, Document 84.

Esenbel's made a comprehensive presentation to the State Secretary Cyrus concerning the DCA, which was waiting for approval in the Congress.²³⁹ Esenbel pointed out that the new DCA would correct the damage done to the bilateral relations by the embargo imposed on Turkey. Esenbel also reminded the State Secretary that Turkey reacted patiently so far since there was an election in the US, however without any steps taken for the restoration of political and military relations, this patience would not last forever. He also stated that an election in Turkey was approaching, and the inaction of the US to remove the embargo and restore relations would support anti-American sentiments in Turkey. He told State Secretary that "failure of the US Congress to approve the DCA would feed this opposition and strengthen those in Turkey who believed the US was no longer a credible or reliable ally."²⁴⁰ His other argument included the signature of the new DCA would benefit both countries, Turkey would be able to buy US arms, Turkey's contribution to NATO would be strengthened, the US bases would function again. Finally, he reiterated the necessity of unlinking the DCA and defense cooperation from the Cyprus issue.²⁴¹

Esenbel said he did not understand why the Ford Administration decided to send the US-Turkish Agreement to Congress at the last moment. At the same time, it was unclear to him why the new Administration felt so apprehensive about having this step taken. Turkey never expected immediate Congressional approval of the DCA, and it fully understood that the new Administration would want initially to review its policies in the area. For this reason, the statement issued on Wednesday seemed so unnecessary. What was most worrisome was the extent to which the statement reflected the new Administration's felt need to placate the Greek lobby in Congress.²⁴²

The discussion between Ambassador Esenbel and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance shows that the Turkish side had difficulty understanding both the Ford and the Carter

²³⁹ Ibid, Document 84.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, Document 84.

²⁴¹ Ibid, Document 84.

²⁴² Ibid, Document 84.

administrations' behaviors regarding the DCA, while the former sent the agreement at the last minute and the latter wanted to withdraw it. In both cases, Turks saw an element of reluctance regarding repairing the damage done by the embargo. It was merely a transition time for the administration for the American side, and they were evaluating all foreign policy issues and options, and they had not started to work with Congress on these issues. Secretary Vance replied to Ambassador Esenbel that the US administration too wanted to repair damaged relations with Turkey. He stated that they needed some time for the transition. Besides, the prospect in the Congress was not very bright concerning the approval of the agreement:

The new Administration also believes that if the Turkish-US Agreement is to get through Congress, considerable spadework on the Hill will be required. There are many in Congress who feel strongly about Cyprus and who have translated that concern into a deep interest in all issues involving Greece and Turkey. The new Administration has not yet had a chance to do the Congressional missionary work which it feels must be done, and for this reason asked Dr. Kissinger to withhold transmitting the DCA to the Congress.²⁴³

In a letter congratulating President Carter on assuming office, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel repeated that bilateral security and defense relations with the US and the membership to NATO were the main pillars of the Turkish foreign policy.²⁴⁴ Hence, deteriorated relations with the USA was also a source of domestic difficulties for the ruling Justice Party-led coalition. Turkey strongly felt the need to restore confidence with the US in volatile geography compounded with growing opposition and hostility towards Americans. In his letter, Demirel urged Carter that both countries "have a common and vital interest in having the Agreement to be put into effect without further and unnecessary delay."²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Ibid, Document 84.

²⁴⁴ Ibid, Document 85.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, Document 85.

Carter replied to Demirel by stating that he was committed to restoring Turkish-American relations. To this end, he was sending former Defense Secretary Clifford to Ankara and Athens to meet government officials and opposition leaders in February 1977:

I have asked one of my most trusted advisers, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, to undertake a special mission on my behalf to the area. Mr. Clifford is a man of broad experience and sound judgment. I hope you will speak frankly with Mr. Clifford about your concerns and that you will also discuss with him how together we might work to restore the closest possible Turkish-American relationship. I will look forward to receiving recommendations from Mr. Clifford on his return.²⁴⁶

On February 22, 1977, Carter's special representative Clifford met the opposition leader and the former Prime Minister Ecevit. He told him that the main obstacle in front of the approval of the DCA in Congress was the Cyprus issue. According to the memorandum of conversation of Ecevit and Clifford, the Turkish side again underlined the necessity of dissociating the defense matters from the Cyprus issue. Ecevit reminded Clifford of Turkey's geopolitical importance as a member of NATO and neighbor of troubled Middle East countries and the Cold War rival Soviets, and such a country like Turkey could not suspend its security relationship for a long time. For Ecevit, it was inadmissible that the security cooperation between the US and Turkey to be decided by domestic politics.²⁴⁷ Clifford responded that the US policies were not centered on Greece; they appreciated Turkey's devotion to NATO; however, it was a fact that the Cyprus issue affected this relationship negatively.²⁴⁸

An Intelligence Information Cable prepared by the CIA on March 3, 1977, suggests that there were negative sentiments among the Turkish Military ranks regarding the

²⁴⁶ Ibid, Document 87.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, Document 88.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, Document 88.

American attitude that became apparent during the Clifford mission concerning the DCA.

Following the Turkish General Staff (TGS) briefing of U.S. Special Envoy Clark Clifford and his delegation at the TGS on 22 February, TGS Chief General, Semih Sancar and other senior TGS officers met to discuss the results and impressions of the meeting. The thrust of their remarks was that although Clifford claimed he came to hear the Turkish point of view and learn the facts of the situation in the area, instead he presented an “ultimatum” that Turkey must choose between Cyprus and the Turkish American Defense Coordination Agreement (DCA). A few days after this meeting, TGS Chief General Sancar ordered the TGS to prepare a draft plan of what steps the TGS should take if, as a result of the Clifford Mission, the U.S. announces that the DCA is to be abandoned or if no agreement on Cyprus is possible. The TGS report has to be completed by 4 March, and serve as the basis for discussion of options by the National Security Council (NSC).²⁴⁹

However, as footnoted in the Document 89, National Security Council Staff Member Paul Henze commented that there were indications that Turkish government saw the visit positively. He contended that although there were sensitivities in the Turkish military circles, they would eventually “accept the views and initiative of their political leaders on these questions during the foreseeable future.”²⁵⁰ He also mentioned CIA cables that reported Clifford’s visit to Turkey was “basically positive in outcome”. He argued this positive reaction the result of the new US administration’s better understanding of the issues.²⁵¹

Amid controversy over Clifford’s visits’ success, President Carter sent a letter to Prime Minister Demirel to thank personally for accepting Clifford. It seems that Clifford’s visits helped new presidents’ understanding and grasp of the issues on the table. He underlined that after Clifford’s visit, he better understood the necessity of keeping and fostering Turkish-American relations:

²⁴⁹ Ibid, Document 89.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, Document 89.

²⁵¹ Ibid, Document 89.

Secretary Clifford spoke out of the wealth of his own personal experience of the abiding importance of NATO, he was expressing my views as well as his own. The American people place great value on Turkey's friendship and the alliance relationship we have developed and maintained together for almost thirty years. In conveying to me the impressions he gained from his visit to Ankara, Secretary Clifford has deepened my understanding of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and of the importance that must be attached to safeguarding and strengthening U.S.-Turkish relations.²⁵²

According to Nasuh Uslu, Clifford's conclusion from the visit to Ankara and Athens was to handle all issues together: Aegean disputes, Cyprus issue, and the new defense cooperation agreement contrary to Turkey's expectations of unlinking Cyprus issue from bilateral relations with the U.S.²⁵³

Meanwhile, Turkish Ambassador Esenbel continued to press State Secretary in Washington D.C. for the new DCA signed in March 1976. In a meeting held on April 8, 1977, he underlined the importance of the DCA concerning the Turkish domestic politics and also for problems of the Turkish military, which "faced increasing problems since its access to supplies had been interrupted."²⁵⁴ He repeated his previous argument that the failure of implementing the DCA would help anti-American sentiments in Turkey, and it would be harmful to the current government in the approaching elections. He also noted that "NATO Secretary-General Luns took the position that the DCA should be approved by the Congress without conditions because of its importance to Turkey's position in NATO."²⁵⁵

It is understood that the Turkish side expected at least a strong endorsement in favor of the agreement to satisfy the various parties in the Turkish domestic politics while waiting for crafting a policy about it. Americans saw this agreement as a tool for

²⁵² Ibid, Document 90.

²⁵³ Uslu (2016), p. 324

²⁵⁴ FRUS, 1977-1980, Document 91.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, Document 91.

pushing Turkey in the desired direction regarding the Cyprus problem. It is evident in a memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter sent on April 15, 1977.²⁵⁶ Cyrus Vance, based on Clifford's assessments, recommended policy options, including the endorsement of the DCA. However, he underlined that while they needed to demonstrate the importance attached to alliance relationship with Turkey and they recognized the need to give Turkey a sufficient level of military assistance, they also wanted to signal their dissatisfaction with the minimal performance regarding the Cyprus problem.²⁵⁷

5.1. Turkey's Financial Problems

Those were also times of financial difficulties for Turkey, which constituted one of the primary material causes that shaped the Turkish-American defense relations. Findings regarding Turkey's economic and financial problems were detailed in Brzezinski's memorandum for Vice President Mondale.²⁵⁸ This memorandum described the worsening economic situation and declining foreign exchange reserves in Turkey and underlining that it meant "an awkward time" for Prime Minister Demirel because the elections were approaching. The document was also suggesting that Turkey would need to apply "domestic austerity measures" to get foreign credits from NATO countries. Therefore, Turkey needed to have a strong government for these measures could be taken. The memorandum concluded that Turkey had no alternative but the West for help with its financial problems and envisaged that the Turkish economy would further deteriorate without political stability. The document's importance is that it was urging the US Government against using Turkey's financial problems as leverage for the Cyprus issue. Thus, it was revealing the US administration's approach

²⁵⁶ Ibid, Document 92.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, Document 92.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, Document 93.

and priorities vis-à-vis Turkey by highlighting that it even contemplated to benefit from Turkey's weaknesses in order to have progress in the Cyprus issue:

There is no way the present financial problems of Turkey could be exploited to make the Turks more forthcoming on Cyprus. Any hint that we were trying to do so would, in this tense election period, unleash a wave of nationalist protesting that would rile up the political situation and make the outcome of the elections even more uncertain than it is. After the elections, Turkey's need for friends who can help her sort out her indebtedness and get her financial affairs in order for the long haul will in all likelihood encourage her leaders to move to settle current political problems such as Cyprus and relations with Greece.²⁵⁹

A memorandum of conversation dated May 10, 1977, summarizes a meeting between President Carter and Turkish Premier Minister Demirel.²⁶⁰ They were in London for a NATO summit. The memorandum shows that Demirel repeated Turkey's arguments against the embargo and requested amelioration of relations with the US. Demirel emphasized that Turkey was a representative of democracy in the region. Moreover, as a neighbor of the Soviets, accepting US nuclear weapons in its territory, Turkey was risking its security for the alliance's sake. Nevertheless, the US imposed an embargo on Turkey, and it was not fair at all. Demirel insisted that it was very difficult for the Turkish people to understand the reasons for the embargo. In every opportunity, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel reminded Americans that even though Turkey had risked its security for the sake of the free and democratic world, it was treated unfairly. Demirel always used stark contrasts to underline his arguments as he did in this conversation by telling President Carter that the US was selling arms to almost all countries in the world except Turkey and Cuba:

The Prime Minister said that they had even allowed U.S. missiles, which were then taken out after the Cuban Missile Crisis. So much risk had been taken for the common cause. Then two years ago—with no direct conflict with the U.S. and no Turkish harm to the U.S.—there was a U.S. embargo on arms. The U.S. sells arms to 92 countries, but not to Turkey and not to (Cuba?).

²⁵⁹ Ibid, Document 93.

²⁶⁰ Ibid, Document 94.

The Prime Minister said that the embargo was imposed although there was no direct conflict with the United States. Then they had closed common installations. In March 1976, the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed—this was more than 13 months ago. He had expected that Congress should lift the embargo, and repair U.S. relations with Turkey. This had not happened yet. There is deep concern about the rest of it (?). Turkey is a strong fortress of democracy, and is anti-Communist. It shouldn't be paralyzed; and relations shouldn't be endangered for nothing.²⁶¹

In response to Demirel, President Carter argued that even though he was very new in the office, there was already good progress in the amelioration of relations. President Carter acknowledged that the main problem was lying with the Congress, with which the administration had already difficult relations after the Vietnam War, and resentment to Turkey due to the Cyprus issue was not helping to ease those relations. Carter also repeated his commitment to pressing Congress to pass the DCA and told Demirel that he was optimistic. He claimed there was also very good progress towards restoring relations, evidencing that they had increased the authority to sell arms to Turkey from \$125 to \$175 million.²⁶²

Here it is also evident from Demirel's struggling diplomacy that causal forces shaped the relationship between the two countries. The Cold War conditions were the leading structural (formal) cause, Turkey's military needs, economic and geographical conditions were constituting material causes, Demirel, the Turkish Military, the US administration, and the Congress were influential agential (efficient) causes. Turkey's role as a Western democracy in a troubled region was an ideational (final) cause.

5.2. Turkey's Alternative Sources for Armament

One of the main themes of this era is Turkey's search for alternate sources after the embargo. In this context it is not surprising that Turkey had to find ways to meet its armed forces' needs. According to an intelligence memorandum prepared by the

²⁶¹ Ibid, Document 94.

²⁶² Ibid, Document 94.

CIA²⁶³, dated June 3, 1977, after the February 1975 embargo, Turkey has been attempting to reduce its dependence on the US military equipment. The report stated that Turkish efforts to develop alternate sources of arms took four basic forms:

- 1) acquire arms from other NATO members either through purchase or in the form of foreign aid
- 2) increasing domestic arms production
- 3) investigating the possibilities of cooperation with other Muslim states and of direct purchase from non-NATO countries, and
- 4) exploring the possibility of obtaining arms from the Soviet Union.

The report asserts that Turkey would have difficulty in finding a satisfactory alternative for its armament needs:

even though Turks have had some success in locating non-US sources, the overall result of the effort has probably convinced them that there is no source or combination of sources which can satisfactorily replace the US for some time to come.²⁶⁴

Another important observation of the report was that the military balance between Turkey and Greece was changing in favor of Greeks as a result of the embargo. During the embargo Greece managed to buy some new French and US equipment:

the embargo has caused serious difficulties for the Turkish forces, particularly the air force, at a time when Greece is significantly improving the quality of its forces through the introduction of new US and French equipment. Turkey's acquisition of F-4s since the partial lifting of the embargo has only partly alleviated the situation.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Ibid, Document 95.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, Document 95.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, Document 95.

Turkey's intention to find other sources of armament might have led the US side to intensify their efforts to persuade Turkey for the restoration of relations. In a memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance clearly shows such efforts from the US side. Nimetz, upon returning from a trip to Turkey reported that the new Demirel Government in Turkey had "both a desire and the strength to deal substantively with difficult issues" and they have told Turkey that they were trying to restore relations:²⁶⁶

We presented a basic message: the U.S. was a friend of Turkey, not an antagonist. We had common goals: restoration of good bilateral relations; strengthening of NATO; passage of the DCA; and a solution to the Cyprus problem by establishing a bizonal, federal state. Since we both wanted the same results, we should work together on a scenario of actions to be taken during the next few months so that our goals could be accomplished. We would try to take account of their political situation; they in turn must understand our political needs.²⁶⁷

According to Nimetz, there was a risk of further deterioration of relations with Turkey unless the Carter administration would take necessary steps. He also pointed out the risk of "adverse implications for NATO, and also no real chance for movement on Cyprus any time in the near future." He admitted that the US side used the DCA as a leverage to get concessions on Cyprus. However, given the very little chance of resolving the Cyprus issue any time soon, it would be better to secure the relationship with Turkey.²⁶⁸

Nimetz's opinion written in this memorandum reflects the mood of the Carter administration and heralds the changing policy towards Turkey in a positive direction. Another argument raised in Nimetz's memo is the worsening of Turkish military capabilities as a result of the embargo. He was urging that the deterioration of Turkish military capabilities was at the critical levels, and Turkey needed at least a decade to

²⁶⁶ Ibid, Document 98.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, Document 98.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, Document 98.

reach NATO standards. He also underlined, since Greece was benefiting from this situation, that would mean that a DCA with Turkey should not pose them a risk anymore:

The deterioration of Turkey's military establishment caused by the embargo has reached critical levels. Most experts believe it will take up to a decade to bring the Turkish armed forces up to NATO standards. Our Military Attaches in both Athens and Ankara believe that Greece has now overtaken Turkey militarily, at least in the air and sea. This has the Turks worried. It also means that the Turkish DCA is no threat to Greece.²⁶⁹

5.3. Turkey Presses for DCA Approval: Congress vs Administration

On September 27, 1977, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil visited the USA to meet Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. According to the memorandum of conversation, Çağlayangil underlined the fact that "Turkey needed to know when the DCA would be ratified. It needed to know how the U.S. planned to reorder U.S.-Turkish relations."²⁷⁰ He repeated Turkey's arguments such as unlinking the DCA from the Cyprus issue. He complained that the slow progress on the Cyprus issue was mostly the Greek Government's failure. Therefore, Turkey needed help of the US administration to convince Congress to pass the agreement as soon as possible.

Çağlayangil concluded by insisting that the draft action paper had made abundantly clear what the U.S. expected from Turkey; and that what was far less clear was what Turkey could expect from the U.S. Turkey needed to know when the DCA would be ratified. It needed to know how the U.S. planned to reorder U.S.-Turkish relations. What help would we provide in the economic sphere?²⁷¹

In response to Çağlayangil, Secretary Vance reasserted that his government wanted to improve relations with Turkey however so as to be the new DCA to be successful they needed enough support in the Congress and it was still not the case. He repeated his argument that the administration was in agreement with Turkey on the principle of

²⁶⁹ Ibid, Document 98.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, Document 99.

²⁷¹ Ibid, Document 99.

unlinking the Cyprus issue and defense cooperation, however this was not the case with the members of Congress:

The Secretary said he wished to be frank on this point. If the U.S. Government were to put the DCA forward before there was clear-cut support for the document, and the DCA were defeated by the Congress, this could set back U.S.-Turkish relations for a long time. Thus, the administration had to be careful before embarking on the important step of urging Congress to vote on the DCA. The Secretary said he knew that it was a matter of principle to the Turkish government that there could be no linkage between Cyprus and the U.S.-Turkish security relationship. Unfortunately, such a linkage existed in the minds of many members of Congress. Therefore, it was our judgment that progress on Cyprus was needed to get the DCA passed. It is this progress that we have been trying to achieve.²⁷²

The follow-up meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and Secretary of State Vance took place on October 5, 1977. This time, the US State Secretary and the Turkish Foreign Minister discussed the DCA and the Cyprus issue in a more relaxed and positive mood.

With reference to the question of the timing, Secretary Vance asked if it would not be better to delay certain actions until after the Greek election in November. Çağlayangil at once quickly and firmly agreed. He said that in the meantime both sides could be going about their business—the United States could proceed with the FMS program. Turkey could initiate some of its planning and making certain statements, so that the time between now and November 20 would not be wasted. Thereafter both parties would proceed with appropriate haste to get the job done.²⁷³

The memorandum of the conversation, itself, reflects the better mood between two administrations as it would be seen from the comment section in the document. The comment included the observation that, restoring Turkish-American relations and bolstering NATO was now more important than the Cyprus issue due to the Soviet arms build-up.²⁷⁴ Reescalation of the Cold War, as a structural cause, was now decreasing the importance of other considerations such as the Cyprus problem.

²⁷² Ibid, Document 99.

²⁷³ Ibid, Document 100.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, Document 100.

Besides, as the memorandum highlighted, President Carter was also under the influence of other urgent issues including the Panama Canal and Middle East conflicts:

COMMENT: The tone of the meeting was excellent. Caglayangil spoke with commendable candor. Secretary Vance was equally frank. There was considerable discussion of the fact that the Cyprus problem was one small and minor element in an entire mosaic. The men agreed that the future of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey was of great importance and the continued maintenance and strengthening of the NATO Alliance was a matter of prime concern, particularly in the light of recent Soviet arms build ups.²⁷⁵

As seen from the above-mentioned discussion, the external factors, i.e., structural and material causes, such as increases in Soviet armament and Turkey's declining military capability were forcing the US administration to adopt a more conciliatory approach with regard to Turkey's demands. Turkish Foreign Minister's efforts as an agential cause is also visibly reflected in the above quoted US documents.

After two meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister in September and October 1977, US State Secretary Cyrus Vance submitted a memorandum to President Carter on October 23, 1977 to summarize the progress on Turkish-American relations. He informed the President that Turkey was now accepting that the restoration of the relations was depended on the improvement in the Cyprus issue:²⁷⁶

The Turkish Foreign Minister convinced me in New York that his government wants to re-establish the closest possible bilateral defense relationship with the U.S. He said Turkey was prepared to do whatever was necessary to resolve the Cyprus question and accepted that this was a necessary step to putting Turkish-U.S. relations back on the right track. Turkey could not act, however, so long as it was seen to be responding to direct U.S. pressure. A series of positive steps could be initiated, some time after the Greek elections of November 20, to bring about real progress—not just the appearance of progress—with respect to Cyprus.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ Ibid, Document 100.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, Document 101.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, Document 101.

Secretary of State Vance added that Turkey was ready to take some steps with regard to the Cyprus issue and they expected, in return, the US government to proceed FMS credits totaling 175 million dollars and to schedule Congressional hearings on the DCA in January 1978 with an expectation of full approval in April 1978. Vance indicated that the matter was urgent.

I believe it is a matter which cannot be put to one side much longer. The Turks have felt themselves disadvantaged and humiliated by the Congressionally imposed “embargo” which has been in effect for more than two years. They view enactment of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in March 1976, as the vehicle to restore our bilateral and NATO relationship. Our choice, therefore, is to test them now or to accept a continuing stalemate, or worse, in the eastern Mediterranean. Clark Clifford and I believe working with the Turks in the manner discussed in New York gives us the best chance to make progress on Cyprus—and the opportunity to restore the U.S.-Turkish security relationship, resume our operations at Turkish intelligence facilities and strengthen Turkey’s NATO capability. If we do not move ahead in this manner, I can foresee only continued stalemate in the Cyprus negotiations and a deteriorating security relationship with Turkey, with serious consequences for NATO and the entire region.²⁷⁸

Vance advised the President to take a positive approach with regard to Turkey based on three arguments; this is the only way to persuade Turks to take action in resolving Cyprus issue, security relationship with Turkey faced further deterioration, and the continuation of the deadlock might have led severe problems for NATO and the region. He concluded his memorandum with two propositions:

- 1) taking minimal interim steps and
- 2) inform Turks that the DCA will be pushed next year.

According to the FRUS documents, President Carter approved this memorandum.²⁷⁹ It is also interesting that the Carter administration seems to have a genuine interest in mending relations with Turkey. Vance reminded Carter that in the Congress the

²⁷⁸ Ibid, Document 101.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, Document 101.

opposition of John Brademas, Paul Sarbanes, Tom Eagleton, Ben Rosenthal and their supporters would continue to press against Turkey “since they believe that all existing military arms restrictions on Turkey should be maintained until a settlement of the Cyprus problem is in place”.²⁸⁰ Therefore, Vance noted that they would continue discussions with this group and foreign relations committees of both Senate and House of Representatives.²⁸¹

Following this memorandum of October 23, Carter signed Presidential Determination No. 78–1 on November 5, authorizing the financing of \$93.7 million for 40 F4E aircraft to be sold to Turkey.

(President’s adviser) “Brzezinski noted that this move would help to “demonstrate to the Turks that we are doing everything our legislation permits to maintain their military strength—in return we expect them to develop and maintain momentum toward settlement of their problems with Greece and Cyprus.”²⁸²

In this climate, both sides reiterated their positions as occasions arose. For instance, during a NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels on December 7, 1977, Turkish Minister of National Defence Turan Kapanlı and American Secretary of Defense Brown hold a side meeting to discuss defense relationship between two states. Defense Secretary Brown reiterated his support for the improving Turkish military capabilities and to he would do all he could do for the passage of the DCA in Congress. Turkish Minister Kapanlı drew attention to the lessening of public support in Turkey towards NATO due to strained relations with the US and pressured Americans to push the DCA:²⁸³

Kapanli continued that he was grateful for Dr. Brown’s words about his efforts to do everything he could within the constraints imposed by the U.S. Congress and

²⁸⁰ Ibid, Document 101.

²⁸¹ Ibid, Document 101.

²⁸² Ibid, Document 102.

²⁸³ Ibid, Document 103.

said that he wanted to support and align himself with the statements made about the Belgian government in the Plenary Session the day before and the need for a strong commitment to the Alliance. He emphasized that each and every member of NATO is duty bound to commit itself. He said he was speaking to Dr. Brown in a similar spirit and attitude. He remarked that Turkey, in spite of dedicating 17% of its budget to defense last year, is increasing this percentage to 20% this year, a fact which proves Turkey's dedication to the Alliance.²⁸⁴

The next day, on December 8, 1977, Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and US State Secretary Vance meets to discuss the Cyprus issue and bilateral relations. Çağlayangil repeated Turkey's expectations vis-à-vis the DCA, American help for Turkish economic difficulties and Greek's meddling to the DCA:

Çağlayangil also recalled that the Secretary had promised US support in helping Turkey with its economic difficulties in the international financial institutions. Çağlayangil said that thus far such US efforts had not been effective with the IMF or other financial institutions. He said that he wanted to bring these matters to the Secretary's attention quietly and calmly and not in the negative way that the Greek side usually approaches such questions. He also mentioned that the Greeks had asked to participate in NATO's Long Term Defense Program but tried to block approval of the Turkish DCA or even a meaningful reference to it in the NAC communique.²⁸⁵

5.4. Turkey's Domestic Politics in Turmoil

During the period under study, from the early 1970s to 1980, Turkey's domestic politics was in constant turmoil with coalition governments led by either Demirel's Justice Party or Ecevit's People's Republican Party. This situation is particularly influential on the agential (efficient) causes with regard to continuities and changes in Turkish politics depending on the government and leaders. While both Demirel and Ecevit, as seen from the official documents reviewed here, were supporters of the close Turkish-American relationship, there were important nuances and different perceptions that were effective in shaping relations.

²⁸⁴ Ibid, Document 103.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, Document 104.

A new Ecevit Government was in charge in January 1978. However, it is obvious that there is not a fundamental change towards relationship with the USA. A Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance dated January 11, 1978, shows that Ecevit reaffirmed Turkey's western orientation and its desire to resume close relations with the US. The memorandum was based on US Ambassador Spier's cable from Ankara to Washington DC:

In this connection he said Turkey's defense cannot be separated from the global problem of East-West relations. He needed to know what had happened in this area since the DCA was signed. He did not feel well-informed about the basic approach of the Carter administration and felt that Turkey, as a participant in the alliance, must have broader information on the US perspective. Accordingly, he would welcome a short visit from an authoritative member of the administration. It should not, however, be anyone below the level of the Secretary of State, Defense or Brzezinski. He felt that a Brzezinski visit would be easier to handle since he had invited him to Ankara after the Bilderberg Conference two years ago. Since Brzezinski is a Sovietologist with a broad view of US objectives, a visit by him would be particularly appropriate, whereas a visit by the Secretary, although it would be welcome, would have more of an official cast.²⁸⁶

The memorandum shows that Ecevit also wanted to ameliorate relations between the US and Turkey and he requested a high-level official from the US administration, preferably Brzezinski, to visit Ankara.²⁸⁷

In this environment, Pentagon was also pressing for the progress in the DCA. A Memorandum dated January 18 from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter regarding the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement shows the importance of the agential causes in determining relations between Turkey and the US as Pentagon's bureaucrats were also recommending the President to take action for the approval:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are persuaded that Congressional approval of the proposed Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey is becoming more and more important. The military situation on the Southern Flank of NATO is one which offers little comfort. In the case of Turkey, however, the matter is one which we have some power to affect positively or negatively through our handling of the

²⁸⁶ Ibid, Document 105.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, Document 105.

DCA. We are running a substantial risk that the longer the DCA is delayed the more likely become Turkish actions which as a practical matter will nullify their participation in the Alliance.²⁸⁸

In this memorandum, Defense Secretary Brown also underlined the fact that Greece was trying to use their own DCA as a leverage to prevent the realization of the Turkish-American agreement. He added that during the last NATO meeting he attended, his counterparts in NATO, particularly German Defense Minister openly criticized Americans for acting in favor of Greece:

As to the Greeks, it is plain to me that they are holding off signing their DCA for the purpose of preventing us, they hope, from moving forward on the Turkish DCA. We cannot force them to sign. But we should not let them control our relations with Turkey in so crude a manner. If you decide to ask the Congress to approve the DCA, I will strongly support favorable action. The Joint Chiefs assure me that they too will actively back the DCA in the Congress. I know that General Haig will also lend his support.²⁸⁹

From this important memorandum, one can deduce that Germany and Pentagon were aware of two distinct issues: first, it was important to strengthen the Turkish military's capacity, since its weakness directly affected the Alliance, and second, Greece was trying and expecting to prevent a Turkish-American DCA by slowing their own DCA with the US.

5.5. Adding Economics to the DCA

Upon Ecevit's invitation, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Ankara on January 20, 1978. Prime Minister Ecevit and Secretary Vance had two meetings during this visit. The report of this visit was sent as a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara to the Department of State. According to Ambassador Spiers, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit constantly repeated his desire to improve Turkish-American relations during

²⁸⁸ Ibid, Document 106.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, Document 106.

the meetings. Ecevit was also cautious in his remarks about the Soviets, as he underlined that he was not aware of any increase of threat from them.²⁹⁰

According to Ambassador Spiers, Ecevit said while it appeared that the primary reason for the broken relationship was stemming from internal political factors of the U.S. However, he wondered, "if there were not some other deeper reason for the U.S. attitude."²⁹¹ Ecevit openly stated that Turkey was forced to accept the bilateral problems stemming from Americans' internal politics. However, he pointed out, and it was also a problem for Turkish politicians to explain the American behavior towards Turkey to the Turkish public.

Ecevit also complained about the rapid increase of armament in the countries neighboring Turkey and underlined that most of these arms' source was the U.S.²⁹² Like his predecessor Demirel, Ecevit also emphasized that Turkish democracy was more important than its military capacity for the Western Alliance. This conversation between Cyrus Vance and Ecevit can be considered a sign of Turkey's bipartisan foreign policy during those years.²⁹³

Secretary of State responded to Ecevit by acknowledging that domestic sources played a significant role in determining the U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. He said that, even though the Carter administration wanted to get the DCA through Congress, they did not have enough votes to accomplish that goal at that time. He added, "he thought this situation was changing, however. He expected that the DCA would come up for

²⁹⁰ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹¹ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹² Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹³ Ibid, Document 107.

discussion in the Congress in March of this year, and he was hopeful that it would be passed."²⁹⁴

Cyrus Vance asked Ecevit what he considered as the most critical problems between Turkey and the U.S. According to Ecevit, the top two issues which deteriorated relations were problems with Greece and military cooperation. Ecevit underlined the importance of military cooperation and the increasing economic burden of armament due to the intensification of the Cold War and speeding up of the armament race. He also underlined that the current draft of the DCA "as it stands calls for an immeasurably larger contribution from Turkey than from the United States."²⁹⁵

A significant aspect of the meeting is that it is the first time Turkey stated its intention to have a broader agreement including economic support rather than a mere military one:

14. Ecevit said that in contrast with the previous government, his government intended to accord priority to the development of Turkey's economy. That economy, he said, was in particularly bad shape as a result of the United States arms embargo, the need for oil imports, and the mistakes of the previous government. The DCA, as it is now written, increases those burdens without providing any "compensating vitalism", he said. Ecevit acknowledged that it would be a difficult task to rewrite the DCA but he thought perhaps it could be supplemented by elements of economic cooperation. He suggested that such cooperation could be in the fields of arms industries or in other fields. Regardless the purpose would be to compensate for the burdens imposed on the Turkish economy by the DCA.²⁹⁶

Ecevit also wanted Turkey to have acknowledgment in terms of its democracy and its service to Western civilization vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. He stated that "Turkey should be evaluated not for her military contribution but for her political development,

²⁹⁴ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, Document 107.

i.e., her success in democracy. He said he wanted Turkey to be considered something more than a collection of brave soldiers."²⁹⁷

In responding to Ecevit's request to incorporate economic elements to DCA, State Secretary seemed to be reluctant to accept such a possibility arguing that would raise "a number of complex and difficult issues which he needed to reflect on before giving him an answer." Instead, State Secretary Cyrus voiced his concern about the DCA, saying that the four-year agreement would face the Congress's resistance.²⁹⁸

On the second day of Ecevit-Vance negotiations, the main topic was still the DCA. Ecevit pressured for the amendment of the agreement in order to add economic elements. Indeed, these negotiations were the first steps of the transformation of DCA to DECA.²⁹⁹ As understood from these discussions, Ecevit's primary concern was Turkey's economic situation. He asked "whether the United States would be able to help Turkey deal with its immediate economic problems, both by bilateral assistance and advice and by using its good offices with the International Monetary Fund." State Secretary Cyrus answered that the US was willing to help on this issue and "he would talk to Secretary Blumenthal after returning to Washington and would be back in touch with Ecevit."³⁰⁰

Ecevit – Vance meetings were historic in terms of openly discussing many aspects of the Turkish-American relationship. Ecevit even openly asked the question of Kurdish separatism and if the United States backed the Kurdish national movement:

42. Returning to his idea that the embargo and the DCA should be dissociated, the Prime Minister asked the Secretary whether he believed the embargo should be lifted first. The Secretary said it was a difficult political question and he would

²⁹⁷ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹⁸ Ibid, Document 107.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, Document 107.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, Document 107.

prefer to go through the congressional hearings on the DCA in March. Prime Minister said that lifting the embargo would ease his political problems; however, he was not pressing it.

43. Ecevit then brought up the question of Kurdish separatism. He said Turks have the impression that the United States backs the Kurdish national movement. The Secretary assured him that the United States was not supporting the Kurdish national movement.³⁰¹

Another interesting point from this meeting is that Ecevit asked Secretary if it was true that the Soviets and Americans divided the world into spheres of influence, and the Middle East was left to the US, and the Secretary denied the existence of any kind of gentlemen's agreement between the two superpowers.³⁰²

Also, during the meeting, Ecevit showed signs of hesitation regarding relations with the Soviets. Saying that the Soviets were particularly concerned about observation installations in Turkey, Ecevit asked the Secretary if the US would consider trying to incorporate these installations into a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union.³⁰³

Therefore, it is understood from this telegram of the Embassy that the Ecevit government broadly followed a similar foreign policy pattern concerning relations with Americans. However, he wanted to add an economic dimension to military cooperation, and he was visibly hesitant to provoke the Soviets.

After State and Defense department officials visited Turkey in January 1978, a Memorandum sent from National Security Council Staff to the National Security Adviser Brzezinski shows that Americans were trying to decide whether to proceed with the DCA or not.³⁰⁴ Memorandum stated that Ecevit might not attend to the NATO summit in May if the DCA question was not resolved by then:

³⁰¹ Ibid, Document 107.

³⁰² Ibid, Document 107.

³⁰³ Ibid, Document 107.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, Document 108.

As you know, a small State/Defense/Treasury team has been in Ankara this week examining all aspects of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, at the behest of Ecevit—part of our general strategy of encouraging the Turks to take initiatives on Cyprus which would in turn permit us to move forward with the DCA. First reports from that group are mixed. As usual, the Turks hoped our people would come checkbook in hand. They did indicate that the Ecevit-Caramanlis Summit is now set for March 9–10, but fleshed-out Turkish proposals on Cyprus are not yet ready. Ecevit’s subordinates hinted that the Prime Minister might not come to the May NATO Summit—it is Turkey’s turn to be honorary Council president—if the DCA question is not resolved by then.³⁰⁵

5.6. Ambassador Underlines the Importance of Turkey

In the meantime, American Embassy in Ankara sent a telegram to the State Department after this high-level visit.³⁰⁶ In this telegram, Ambassador Spiers strongly recommended an early congressional endorsement of the Turkish DCA in March 1978. Otherwise, Ambassador believed that the Turkish-American relations would be irreversibly damaged and he maintained that Turkey was more important to the US than either Greece or Cyprus:

“1. Although I have had a good opportunity to discuss the subject with Matt Nimetz over the past two days, I believe it is my responsibility to convey to you directly my strong recommendation that you and the President decide to move firmly in support of early congressional endorsement of the Turkish DCA in the hearings during the next month.

2. The reasons for and against this have been rehearsed at length, but I want to summarize my own views in the light of the meetings we have had over the past two days.

3. Fundamentally, I believe that our relations with Turkey will be irreversibly damaged if we do not make this move. This country is more important to us than either Greece or Cyprus, although I do not think that we should let it become an either/or choice.

4. In his polite, matter-of-fact, way Ecevit has given us a time limit. I have no doubt that he means it. If we do not move on the DCA by the time of the NATO summit, Turkey will make a major assessment of its interests and alignments in this world. The conventional wisdom is that Turkey has no options. I do not believe that this is the case over the long run. Certainly Turkey does not.”

³⁰⁵ Ibid, Document 108.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, Document 109.

Ambassador Spiers urged its capital that if the endorsement of the DCA failed, the relations would be affected very negatively. He estimated that that Turkey's primary responses would be closing down the US facilities in Turkey in the short term. He reminded that relocating these military and intelligence facilities would be very costly for the US. In the longer terms it would also harm Turkey-NATO relations:

“I do not know what, if anything, the Turkish Government would do with respect to its position in NATO. However, I believe that Turkey will set itself on a path that gradually but inexorably will diverge from that of its NATO partners. One practical factor is that as long as our NATO-related forces remain here under the restrictions and burdens imposed by “provisional status,” which can only be relieved by passage of the DCA, tensions and difficulties will increase in our [garble—military-to]-military relations to a point where we will probably both want our forces and our weapons removed. The consequence will be a progressive severing of Alliance ties when preservation of an acceptable East-West balance is a sine qua non for our efforts to build a stable detente and extend the arms control process.”

Therefore, the US Ambassador in Ankara warned Washington that since Turkey was already suffering economic problems, drifting away from the US and Western alliances would destroy this country's political stability. Here we see how structural, ideational (importance of keeping Turkey in the Western alliance), material (Turkey's economic troubles and the US military bases in Turkey) and agential (the interpretation of events by the ambassador in Turkey) causes were working together:

8. Turkey is in deep economic trouble, primarily because of the impact of oil prices and the attempts of previous governments to continue an unsustainably high growth rate. Ecevit is like an archaeologist presiding over a dig, the dimensions of which are only gradually becoming clear and the precise extent of which is not yet known. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the political and social stability and the democratic institutions of this country could, perhaps quite rapidly, be put in jeopardy. To judge from our contacts with Turkish officials in the past few days, the Turkish Government itself is deeply worried about the social consequences of the present economic crisis and of the austerity measures necessary to correct it. Although it is an irrational view, the fact of the embargo leaves us holding some of the bag for this situation in Turkish opinion. More importantly, I am convinced that as long as the embargo exists, we will be hampered in our ability to be helpful in this country's struggle to maintain the

political institutions basic to the freedom of 42 million people. Its removal seems to be a first step to anything else.³⁰⁷

One of the strongest arguments against the embargo was that it was not helping to resolve the Cyprus issue, on the contrary it was making it worse. In his letter to Washington DC, Ambassador Spiers also defended this view saying that Ecevit was already committed a for a solution in the Cyprus problem. He contended that “continuation of the embargo will only do more damage to our relationship and to the Alliance as a whole. It will not push Ecevit into doing more to settle Cyprus than he would do without it.”³⁰⁸ On the other hand, he argued that Greeks’ primary concern was to keep the embargo on Turkey. He wisely predicted that a solution in Cyprus was very far away.³⁰⁹

According to Spiers, two immediate steps that Turkey would take was to close down five US facilities in Turkey and not to attend to the next NATO Summit in Washington D.C. to be held in May 1978. Both steps would be a major blow for the Alliance in time when it was necessary to show solidarity against the Soviets. Other negative results of not signing the DCA, according to Spiers, were economic difficulties of Turkey, which might lead the collapse of democratic institutions of the country. He also drew attention to another important factor that he was firmly convinced that the embargo was not providing any leverage concerning the Cyprus issue and three years of embargo showed that it was an impediment rather than a stimulus to progress.³¹⁰ Ambassador Spiers repeated his arguments publicly in an interview with the Turkish news agency ANKA, conducted in English on January 24 and widely disseminated to the media. Spiers had asserted many of the same arguments he presented in his telegram sent to the Washington DC (Document 109). On an earlier date he had stated,

³⁰⁷ Ibid, Document 109.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, Document 109.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, Document 109.

³¹⁰ Ibid, Document 109.

“the embargo has not made a solution easier, on the contrary it has made it more difficult.”³¹¹

As seen from the above-mentioned telegram of Ambassador Spiers, his role as an agential (efficient) cause is quite distinctive. Moreover, his role as an agency works in tandem with the structural, material and ideational causes, as the Ambassador himself used these causes as his arguments, in drawing attention to Turkey’s role as a NATO member, Turkey’s economic situation and the danger of collapse that Turkey’s democratic institutions might face. He was effective in shaping the US policy towards Turkey as an agency, while his ideas were shaped by the structural, material and ideational causes as well.

5.7. Carter Administration Presses for DCA Approval in the Congress

Ambassador Spier’s opinions aside, the US officials’ visits to Turkey, and high-level bilateral meetings between Turkish and American leaders visibly had an impact on the US administration that moved to persuade the Congress for removal of the embargo and approval of the new defense cooperation agreement. A memorandum dated March 1, 1978 and prepared by Nimetz addressing the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, summarized Congressional views regarding approval of the Turkish DCA. According to memorandum, Nimetz met Congressional leaders Brademas, Sarbanes and Hamilton and told them that the administration was attaching importance to a Cyprus settlement, and was also trying to restore relations with Turkey and avoiding “of a complete break with Turkey.”³¹² Brademas and Sarbanes were critical of Ambassador Spiers public comments and they were urging the administration that “there was a sense of outrage in the Greek-American community; the President’s popularity and

³¹¹ Telegram 747 from Ankara, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7800480673

³¹² FRUS, 1977-81, Document 110.

credibility had been clearly damaged.”³¹³ Nimetz told them however, if the administration could not restore relations with Turkey, they would be the target of “a congressional investigation into “who lost Turkey” in the event Turkey cuts or limits its links with NATO or the U.S.”³¹⁴

This memorandum shows that there was a better mood in the Congress. They cooperated with the administration on the Turkish DCA even though the Cyprus issue was still linked to the improvement of relations between the US and Turkey. However, administration’s serious pressure and their threat to put the responsibility of losing Turkey on the Congress seemed to be a crucial factor for events to unfold. Here we can see the impact of the structural, ideational, and material causes over the interaction of agential causes.

In a memorandum prepared by President’s Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Moore), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Beckel), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) for President Carter dated March 4, 1978, a legislative strategy for the Turkish DCA was proposed.³¹⁵ It is envisaged that if the administration moved ahead with the DCA, an approval would probably be obtainable. The strategy was designed to propose steps to be taken by the administration so as not to disturb the Greek lobby:

If we decide to move ahead with the Turkish DCA, the votes will be hard to come by but probably obtainable. The critical question is how to minimize the damage to our credibility with Brademas, Sarbanes, and the Greek community, who will feel that we have backed down on campaign and personal commitments to them. If the issues are handled properly, we can probably avoid serious damage to this and other legislative priorities. The requirements are (i) a clear, compelling

³¹³ Ibid, Document 110.

³¹⁴ Ibid, Document 110.

³¹⁵ Ibid, Document 111.

rationale for our position and (ii) at least a week's prior notice to Brademas and Sarbanes before any leaks or public announcements from us.³¹⁶

Meanwhile, Turkish and Greek leaders, Ecevit and Karamanlis, meet in Montreux to discuss starting a new dialogue between two countries. On the other hand, Turkey reached an agreement with the IMF. Upon these developments, President Carter sent a letter to Ecevit and dispatched deputy State Secretary Warren Christopher to Ankara. In his letter, Carter told Ecevit that they had taken some decisions and in order to explain them personally he was sending Warren Christopher.³¹⁷ He also expressed his pleasure to learn that Ecevit—Caramanlis meeting in Montreux was a success for starting the dialogue between Turkey and Greece. Mentioning the IMF agreement, Carter he said that he believed Turkey would have long-term economic benefit by winning the confidence of international financial organizations.³¹⁸

A telegram dated March 29, 1978 sent by the US Embassy highlighted important aspects of the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Ankara. Deputy Secretary Christopher informed Ecevit about President Carter's decisions regarding the improvement of the Turkish-American relations. He noted that these decisions were taken upon consultation with his senior advisors including Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, Mr. Brzezinski and Vice President Mondaleat in a meeting held on March 27. Christopher told that the new program for restoring Turkish-American relations would be presented in Congress on April 6.³¹⁹

According to the telegram, Cristopher acknowledged that there was a presidential decision to go ahead with a program that would be presented in the Congress. The program consisted of four basic elements;

³¹⁶ Ibid, Document 111.

³¹⁷ Ibid, Document 112.

³¹⁸ Ibid, Document 112.

³¹⁹ Ibid, Document 113.

- 1) the immediate removal of the embargo,
- 2) a security support assistance of 50 million dollars as an economic loan,
- 3) 175 million dollars FMS will be continued at the same level as the previous year,
- 4) Defense Cooperation Agreement should be renegotiated to reflect 1978 realities.³²⁰

Deputy Secretary implied that now the path was clear for improving American-Turkish relations even though it was now necessary to alter the current draft of the DCA:

Through this approach President Carter could put his own stamp on U.S. military relations with Turkey. The most important reason for renegotiation, however, was our belief that the current DCA would not succeed in the Congress. This was primarily because of the four-year term and the billion dollar commitment. The agreement could be improved and modernized. There was a new mood in Congress and a desire to evaluate matters on a shorter term basis. Events elsewhere in the world, e.g. negotiations with the Philippines, had shown the great difficulty with a long term U.S. commitment.³²¹

Upon hearing these comments, Ecevit responded that if the president would not ask for the DCA's approval, this would be contrary to the previous talks with Americans and he was expecting steps towards the approval of the agreement. Secretary Vance replied that "President had reached a different conclusion. He believed that a billion-dollar, four-year DCA could not succeed in the Congress".³²² For Ecevit "two-year agreement would be all right, if Turkey were compensated economically". Another concern for Ecevit was the Greek DCA. Given their inaction to sign their own agreement with Americans Ecevit deduced that Greeks might be aiming at blocking the Turkish DCA by this strategy and he asked American assurance that there was no link between the two agreements.³²³ He asked "if President would say openly that he

³²⁰ Ibid, Document 113.

³²¹ Ibid, Document 113.

³²² Ibid, Document 113.

³²³ Ibid, Document 113.

would go ahead with a new Turkish DCA on its own legs regardless of what Greek attitude is.” Deputy Secretary Vance affirmed that the President would go ahead with the Turkish DCA regardless of their position vis-à-vis the Greece.³²⁴

5.8. Turkey plays NATO Card, Discovers Lobbying in America

However, Carter administration’s attempt to lift the embargo was defeated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 11, 1978 voting session. Following this attempt of the US administration, there was a letter from Ecevit to Carter regarding the NATO Summit to be held in Washington DC. In this letter dated May 15, 1978, Ecevit raised his objection to the tone of the draft declaration proposed for the NATO summit, arguing that the alliance should not provoke the Soviets to harden their position. Here one can see how formal causes, ideational causes, and agential causes work together. Ecevit, as a leftist-inclined leader of a NATO member country presses to keep the détente climate, a position, at the same time, could be read as a reaction to the US administration who recently failed to remove the embargo in the Congress.³²⁵ Ecevit raised his objection to draft declaration on the grounds that such a “strong and challenging” would be against the spirit of détente and would speed up the armament race between the two blocs. Ecevit declared that “Turkey cannot afford to be provocative towards her neighbors.”³²⁶ Turkey was supporting the détente and he asserted that Turkey “cannot therefore, subscribe to a declaration ... impairs détente.”³²⁷

Even though Ecevit threatened Americans by not attending the NATO Summit unless the DCA was approved in the Congress, he eventually went to Washington D.C. for

³²⁴ Ibid, Document 113.

³²⁵ Ibid, Document 114.

³²⁶ Ibid, Document 114.

³²⁷ Ibid, Document 114.

the summit. Before the summit, he met with President Carter on May 31, 1978. According to the memorandum of the conversation, both leaders brought their defense and foreign affairs ministers with themselves.³²⁸ In welcoming address to Ecevit, Carter also gave hints about dealing with the Congress on the Cyprus issue. According to Carter, even though Turks wanted to delink two issues, the reality in the Congress was different and Turkey should advertise itself on the achievements and opening on the Cyprus issue.³²⁹ In response to Carter, Ecevit complained about the unfair treatment of Turkey as repeatedly maintained by the Turkish leaders. He also cited Israel's arms transfers from the US as an example of this unfair treatment:

He said it seemed to Turkey that Israel had violated U.S. arms-use laws more than Turkey had, but Turkey was treated differently. He said he had been frustrated in his efforts at Montreux to get PM Karamanlis to join him in a serious effort to settle Cyprus and other issues between Greece and Turkey and Kyprianou had refused to meet with Denktas, or join a four-way meeting with Karamanlis.³³⁰

Ecevit continued to emphasize his resentment by saying that "Turkey does not rate high enough in the list of priorities of the administration; it comes after Panama and Saudi Arabia."³³¹

Ecevit also drew attention to how embargo affected NATO's military capacity negatively and how Turkey's special position, with its attachment to Western ideals, was not appreciated at all. Here it can be argued that material causes are also visible, as Ecevit repeatedly drew attention to the dangerous effects of the embargo on the Turkish military which had crucial importance in defending NATO on the Soviet borders:

³²⁸ Ibid, Document 116.

³²⁹ Ibid, Document 116.

³³⁰ Ibid, Document 116.

³³¹ Ibid, Document 116.

The Prime Minister complained that NATO had also been too passive on the embargo issue. The equipment of the Turkish army is now close to 50% ineffective, he said, and General Haig's estimates were that by 1980 it would be 80% obsolete. This was an intolerable situation for NATO itself when other countries were being heavily armed in the Middle East, which is full of explosive problems.³³²

Ecevit, concluded his remarks on the negative effects of the arms embargo by saying that "Turkey is at the limits of its patience and I am at the limits of my possibilities."³³³

In response to Ecevit, President Carter tried to appease by saying that he was busy with trying to persuade Congressional leaders in order to get them in line with the executive branch with regard to policies towards Turkey. The President also cited the power of the Greek lobby as an obstacle:

The President stressed that we do not underestimate the seriousness of Turkish concern and emphasized that the Administration is marshalling all its influence in the Congress to ensure the removal of the arms embargo. He said that he had recently had the leaders of the House and the Senate around the same table to discuss these matters and recalled that he had already dealt with two major foreign policy challenges this year—the Panama treaties and the Middle East arms sales issue. Both proposals had originally been regarded as doomed to defeat and the Panama issue was the most difficult with which he had ever dealt. No domestic lobbies were available to help the Panamanians or Saudis and there were strong domestic forces ranged against them, like the Greek groups who want to continue the arms embargo.³³⁴

The role of agential cause is again visible in this document, as President Carter encouraged Ecevit to use the lobbying mechanism in the Congress as Greeks did. He advised "Ecevit to make maximum use of opportunities such as the National Press Club speech on June 1 and interviews with major publications to underscore the facts and the constructive character of Turkey's position."³³⁵

³³² Ibid, Document 116.

³³³ Ibid, Document 116.

³³⁴ Ibid, Document 116.

³³⁵ Ibid, Document 116.

We can, in turn, do our part by focusing American public opinion on the positive side of these issues, the President pointed out. The President then observed that our position would be easier if Turkey could see fit to make further reductions in its troop strength in Cyprus, for it was important, the President said, for Congressional leaders to get the accurate impression that Turkey genuinely wants to settle the Cyprus issue.³³⁶

Indeed, following Carter's advice, Ecevit met with some congressional leaders from the Democratic Party, such as Senator Sarbanes, Congressmen Brademas and Rosenthal who were among supporters of the embargo. According to a memorandum of the conversation of Ecevit's meeting with the sponsors of embargo, discussions were not "hostile" and Ecevit was pleased too:

Ambassador Leonard accompanied the Washington group to a restaurant and discussed briefly with them what might be done next. He underlined that it seemed to him that the supporters of the embargo faced what he recognized was a difficult dilemma—if they maintained the embargo it was not likely these negotiations would go forward and the Greek-Cypriot refugees would gain nothing for years or perhaps forever. On the other hand, if they lifted the embargo, it was likely that they could regain Varosha for the Greek-Cypriots, but they would simply have to take their chances on Turkish flexibility toward remaining territorial questions and the constitution. It would of course be difficult to reimpose an embargo after it had been lifted. Brademas and Rosenthal seemed much more receptive to this analysis than Sarbanes, whose attention seemed concentrated on the "errors of the past" rather than where we go from here.

The following morning in a conversation with Ambassador Turkmen, Leonard was told that the Prime Minister had been quite pleased by the whole conversation and had not at all been angered by the strong and frank tone taken by the three Americans.³³⁷

While Turkey also was finding out importance of using the lobbies, as argued by Christos Kassimeris, influence of the Greek lobby during the Carter administration was weakened. Kassimeris contended that "Carter was successful in lifting the embargo, both by playing the Soviet card and exploiting the Democrats' majority in

³³⁶ Ibid, Document 116.

³³⁷ Ibid, Document 117.

Congress.”³³⁸ He claimed that, “the Greek lobby found its influence diminished, given its lack of response ever since Carter announced his intention to lift the embargo in the spring of 1977.”³³⁹

5.9. Turkey Wants a Defense Industrial Cooperation Chapter in the new DCA

On June 5, 1978, Ecevit and his delegation met with Defense Secretary Brown to discuss the embargo in the Turkish Embassy in D.C. Secretary Brown stated that “everyone in the administration will do all he can to persuade Congress of the importance of removing the embargo” and “the President will more than likely make a substantive statement at his next press conference”.³⁴⁰ Indeed, according to the memorandum, President Carter opened his June 14 press conference with a statement about the embargo.³⁴¹ Ecevit responded that he appreciated both Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense’s stances regarding the embargo and he underlined that even after the removal of the embargo a new concept for security cooperation:

The balance of detente must be maintained on the Southeastern flank in order to counter the Soviet threat. Serious consequences will result from the formation of a vacuum in the Turkish area. But stability must be based on deterrence, not on lofty words. Even if the embargo is lifted, however, we must consider a new concept and structure. It must be based upon new political conditions, the new feeling in NATO, and changes in the international situation and in military considerations. The military must be streamlined and made more efficient and not constitute a burden on the economy, but act as a spur to the economy.³⁴²

This remark of Ecevit is very important in terms of reflecting the mood in Turkey regarding its plans of establishing a self-sufficient defense industrial base. One of the

³³⁸ Christos Kassimeris, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 26, Number 1, May 2008, p.106

³³⁹ *Ibid*, p.106

³⁴⁰ FRUS, 1977-80, Document 118.

³⁴¹ *Ibid*, Document 118.

³⁴² *Ibid*, Document 118.

real and enduring consequences of the embargo was to stimulate Turkey to create its own defense industrial base. In order to create a robust defense industry, Turkey needed a stronger economy. To set up a link between defense cooperation and economic cooperation meant construction of a new setting of Turkish-American relations in the years to come during the neoliberal age. Indeed, according to the memorandum, Ecevit proposed a multilateral defense industrial cooperation with European countries. This was perhaps the vision that heralded many years later Turkey would indeed become a member of such multinational armament projects. Apart from technology transfer and industrial benefits, Ecevit underlined the political importance of such international projects by suggesting that “such a scheme of interdependence would allay concerns of the people of other allied countries as to which direction Turkey would go.”³⁴³ He meant that if Western alliance gave more role to Turkey as an industrial partner, there would be no need to worry about in which direction Turkey would go politically.

This conversation, and particularly statements and demands of Ecevit, had the basic elements of Turkey’s new defense industry policy, which started to have a shape: an indigenous defense industry with the export potential to lessen the burden of military to the fragile economy. Ecevit highlighted the necessity of the joint action in order to establish a self-sufficient defense industry in Turkey. He pointed out the dangers of depending on the single source in defense procurement and proposed launching joint production projects in Europe. This would facilitate technology transfer between allies and promote export of defense products which would offset the burden of the defense expenditures on weak economies. Ecevit also proposed that Turkey would specialize in certain fields of armament such as rockets, electronics, munitions etc. Ecevit underlined the necessity of establishing a local defense industry in Turkey required

³⁴³ Ibid, Document 118.

bilateral and NATO wide cooperation.³⁴⁴ These significant comments worth a lengthy quoting:

There are joint measures that the US and Turkey can take to improve the situation. Turkey has been handicapped by restricted outside supply sources and too much dependence on a single source. The Prime Minister stated that he would like to see that dependence eased by Turkey's being included in co-production schemes as with European nations. Such arrangements would involve technology transfers, foreign payment supports and formation of new industries. However, such a scheme of interdependence would allay concerns of the people of other allied countries as to which direction Turkey would go. There is obviously a close relationship between industry and defense; that is, a heavy defense structure cannot be built on a weak economy. Turkey would like the US to be more aware of that relationship in the future. Ecevit pointed out that in certain areas Turkey can export military equipment to the Allies, as well as supply some of her own needs. He mentioned that he had suggested to President Carter that this offshore purchasing system could give new economic impetus. It would be possible to enlarge several industries in Turkey in order both to meet Turkish needs and to supply other Allies. Examples are the manufacture of rockets, anti-tank munitions, and communications and electronic equipment, including co-production. Additionally, Turkish shipyards could build submarines for Allies and other friendlies. Repair and modernization facilities in Turkey could be enlarged, but financial assistance would be required, under appropriate provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.³⁴⁵

Ecevit underlined the fact that Turkey was ready to cooperate concerning the military bases after having resolved the problems created by the embargo. He acknowledged that "the joint US-Turkish facilities, particularly the identification, control and communications facilities, are important for security purposes, as well as SALT, MBFR, etc".³⁴⁶

At this point, Secretary Brown had an interesting response by emphasizing the role of private investment in defense industries. This also can be considered as the first sign of the future defense industry policy of Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish Law 3238 of 1985

³⁴⁴ Ibid, Document 118.

³⁴⁵ Document 118, *ibid*.

³⁴⁶ Document 118, *ibid*.

frames a defense industrial policy with a central aim of encouraging private investment in the defense sector.

Secretary Brown said that once the embargo is lifted a joint planning study should be the first step. The State Counselor raised this point last February, as well as the question of Turkey's defense industry capability for meeting its own and Allied requirements. He told Ecevit that he had asked members of the Defense Department to look at these points. He pointed out to Ecevit the importance of private investment, although that is not the only way out. The tank repair and modernization facilities, etc., would be part of it. DoD experts will visit and look at those facilities at the appropriate time. This will not solve the balance of payments problem; it will be a long time before Turkey will be able to manufacture modern aircraft, for example.³⁴⁷

Scholars maintain that the long-term effect of the embargo was the establishment of a Turkish defense industrial base. Erhan argues that the embargo was aiming to make Turkey to step back in Cyprus, however, Turkey did not take a step back in Cyprus. On the contrary, he argues, a Turkish Cypriot state was founded on February 13, 1975. U.S. initiatives to affect Turkey's Cyprus policy were not successful.³⁴⁸ The Greek lobbies wanted to punish Turkey, and this happened partially. Three years of cut in military aids to Turkey was harmful. However, the embargo caused increased anti-American sentiment in Turkey. The Armed Forces started to look for an indigenous defense industry in Turkey.³⁴⁹ Similarly, Turkmen argues that some reactions on the Turkish side against the arms embargo included increased Turkish distrust towards the US, and this fact positively affected the development of the Turkish Defense Industry.³⁵⁰ George Harris also underlines the fact that Turkey was resolved to create its own defense industrial base due to the lack of confidence to the Alliance:

For the Turkish government, uncertainties in relations with the US created a determination to manufacture its own weapons. Washington resisted this desire for

³⁴⁷ Ibid, Document 118.

³⁴⁸ Erhan, p.428

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p.711.

³⁵⁰ Turkmen, p.144

extensive technology transfer as liable to be beyond the financial and manufacturing capabilities of Turkish industry. In the end, however, Turkish demands for help in establishing a defense industry became codified in the Defense and Economic Cooperation agreement of 1980.³⁵¹

Ecevit's June 5 meeting with US Defense Secretary Brown is crucial since it shows that Turkey has already devised a plan to establish a local defense industry. In the literature, Turkey's effort to reach autarky in military capabilities mostly attributed to the lessons learned after the embargo following the intervention in Cyprus. However, this is only a part of the bigger picture. Turkey's needed the help and guidance of the other allies in order to establish an indigenous defense industry. This help, started with the removal of the embargo and the signature of a new defense cooperation agreement, underlies structural causes such as intensification of the Cold War; agential causes such as the Ecevit government's efforts and ideational cause as its new defense concept.

Therefore, in the establishment of the Turkish defense industry, this period seems to have a crucial importance. All four causal forces are, to some extent, observable in the process. Turkey's security needs were dictated by international and regional factors, the Cold War, and the Cyprus problem as structural (formal) causes. The material needs for the arms and economic difficulties which limited the import options were the material forces that persuaded agential forces, the Turkish government, the military, and the public opinion, for the necessity to invest in the local arms industry. It is under these conditions that the Turkish side pressured Americans for a more robust defense cooperation agreement that included an armament cooperation dimension.

5.10. Arguments against the Embargo

While the US administration increased its efforts to remove the embargo, arguments against it were gaining influence. The strongest of these arguments was that the US and NATO could not tolerate losing Turkey which was a neighbor of their main Cold

³⁵¹ Harris, p.73.

War rival. Besides, it was seen that the embargo did not achieve desired concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus issue. Keith R. Legg summarizes these arguments against embargo in his article.³⁵² He contends that the DCA became the highest foreign policy priority for the Carter administration who argued; “NATO and the United States could not afford to lose Turkey as an ally”.³⁵³ Moreover, Turkey's military needed a major overhaul which was only possible by American equipment, and the embargo did not create the effect Congress hoped concerning the Cyprus issue.³⁵⁴

Legg argues that embargo as a mechanism was ineffective, because when applied to Greece it did not help them towards democracy, when applied against Turkey it did not prevent arms exports to that country. Therefore, it would be wiser to remove the embargo which was already proved ineffective. Legg argues that Turkey depended other sources for its defense procurement such as Italy, Germany, and NATO's Maintenance and Supply agency (which was providing American origin equipment and spare parts). He also contends that Turkish military budget augmented after the embargo.³⁵⁵

Indeed, the SIPRI data shows that between 1973 and 1980 Turkey purchased military items from Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain, Switzerland, Libya and Norway. (See: Table below). The table also shows that the embargo only impacted arms exports to Turkey for only three years. Even though the total exports to Turkey were decreased from 1,279 to 299, even at this lowest level half of the purchases made from the US. As it would be seen in a SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Turkey procured frigates, fighters, various aircraft, radars, anti-ship missiles, submarines, support ships,

³⁵² Keith R. Legg, "Congress as Trojan Horse? The Turkish Embargo Problem, 1974-1978", Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy, in John Spaniger and Joseph Noguee (eds.), New York: Pergamon Press, 1981, p.129.

³⁵³ Ibid, p.129.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p.129.

³⁵⁵ Legg, p.123; 124

helicopters from Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway Switzerland and United States during the embargo years.

Table 2- Arms Exports to Turkey, 1973-1980

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Canada	9							
France	14				1			
Germany	3	25	184	184	97	216	153	234
Italy	42	22	22	8	21	3	3	3
Libya			22					
Netherlands					6	6	6	64
Norway			8	8	8			
Spain		2						
Switzerland					3	3	3	3
United States	722	1230	403	165	165	765	755	185
Total	789	1279	639	365	299	992	919	488

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database³⁵⁶ (Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions.)

Alongside the above mentioned formal and material causes, Legg also helps us identify agential and ideational causes including the Congress-Administration divide, hostility to Kissinger’s policies, antagonism to Turkey stemming from the opioid issue. He writes that the Greek lobby alone could not enough for the passing and continuing an embargo four years. He points out the factors such as hostility to Nixon-Kissinger policies and resentment to Turkey from its decision to allow opium production.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁶ <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods/> Generated: 12 December 2020

³⁵⁷ Legg, p.123

Nasuh Uslu also compiles arguments of the US administration against the embargo in similar lines. He adds Israel's security as an interesting factor among the arguments. According to Uslu, these arguments were:

1- Pressuring on one side is counterproductive in this complex situation. Punishing and sanctioning Turkey would backfire since Turks are proud and independent people.

2- The arms embargo to Turkey would jeopardize US interests since Turkey would drift away from the NATO.

3- Turkish military bases were very important for collecting intelligence on the Soviet's activities.

4- The embargo would negatively affect the southern flank of the NATO as it was degrading Turkish military capacity.

5- The congressional effort on foreign policy is against the principle of division of powers. The Congress is not suitable for pursuing the high interests of US since members could easily vote under the influence of lobbies and narrow interests.

6- The embargo would harm Israel's security indirectly as it would constitute an example for punishing countries who are using American weapons.³⁵⁸

On the other hand, Uslu also lists Turkish side's arguments against the embargo which were used in bilateral discussions between two governments. These arguments included that the embargo was weakening NATO and would not help solving Cyprus issue; on the contrary, Greece would be encouraged to act in an uncompromising way. Moreover, Uslu points out, the US military assistance was not a favor or grant but was a necessity of the alliance.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Uslu (2016) pp 331-333

³⁵⁹ Ibid, pp 336-338

5.11. Embargo Lifted

Carter administration was trying to lift the embargo but the mood in the Congress was still not in very much favor of Turkey. A memorandum dated July 18, 1978, prepared by Acting Secretary of State Christopher for the President, aimed at proving the military advantages of lifting the embargo.³⁶⁰ The memorandum emphasized the deterioration of the Turkish armed forces and described military benefits of repealing the embargo. Apart from the \$70 million equipment grant program, the US would be able to give permission to European allies, such as the Germans and the Dutch, to sell the US origin equipment to Turkey. More importantly after the removal of the embargo, the US and Turkish militaries would continue their joint planning in order to plan modernization of Turkish Armed Forces.³⁶¹ Christopher concluded the memorandum by arguing that the lift of the embargo would not harm their relations with Greeks while Turkey would be able to fulfil its role in the alliance.³⁶²

After intensive efforts of the Carter administration Congress finally agreed to lift the ban on arms sale to Turkey on July 25, 1978. It was a comfortable win for the White House, as the Senate was lifting the embargo with a 57 to 42 vote. Besides removing the embargo, the bill was also approving military equipment sales to Turkey amounted \$2.8 billion. However, with the proposals added in the Senate, the bill included a clause that the US arms would be used solely for defensive purposes.³⁶³ According to statement issued by the Department of State:

The lifting of the embargo will allow the United States to proceed in an atmosphere of renewed trust to work toward the strengthening of our relations with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Administration will continue to exert every effort to help bring about a just and lasting Cyprus solution, and to help

³⁶⁰ Ibid, Document 120.

³⁶¹ Ibid, Document 120.

³⁶² FRUS, 1977-80, Document 120.

³⁶³ Ibid, Document 121.

achieve peaceful solutions to problems in that region. The lifting of the embargo will help promote the achievement of these important policy goals.³⁶⁴

On August 1, The House of Representatives also voted to lift the embargo but with a narrower margin of 208–205. After “the House–Senate conference committee reached agreement on August 14, President Carter’s signed the legislation into law on September 26, 1978 (Presidential Determination No. 78–18).³⁶⁵

President Carter’s official statement on signing International Security Assistance Act of 1978 Statement on Signing S. 3075 Into Law on September 26, 1978, highlighted the removal of embargo would improve relations with Turkey as well as helping strengthen NATO in the region. While he added that this was starting a new chapter in the Turkish-American relations, he also stressed the shared commitment to democracy which was reflecting the mood of the Carter presidency.³⁶⁶

It is evident that, the US administration was relieved by the lift of the embargo. Now priorities for bilateral relations were to fix Turkey’s economic problems, reopening the US military facilities in Turkey and the Cyprus issue and the signature of the new defense cooperation agreement. In a note prepared by Paul B. Henze (the National Security Council Staff) for Brzezinski (the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs) these priorities were visible.³⁶⁷

With the overturn of the embargo, two sides continued to discuss subjects such as Turkey’s worsening economic situation and defense cooperation together with Cyprus issue to improve bilateral relations.

³⁶⁴ Ibid, Document 121.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, Document 121.

³⁶⁶ Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1978 Statement on Signing S. 3075 Into Law. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243414> Accessed 10.08.2020

³⁶⁷ FRUS, 1977-80, Document 122.

On September 27, 1978, Turkish Foreign Minister Gunduz Okcun met the US State Secretary Vance to discuss Turkish economic situation, the Cyprus issue and defense cooperation. Vance stated his pleasure of hearing Ecevit declared the US bases in Turkey were to reopen. And he was also pleased that “Turkey and the IMF had reached an agreement on the second drawing under the Standby Agreement.”³⁶⁸ At the same meeting, Turkish Ambassador Sukru Elekdag reminded that according the DCA of 1976 had a supplementary list of equipment that US would provide Turkey at the lowest price.³⁶⁹ In response to Ambassador Elekdağ, Nimetz stated that some of the equipment listed in the 1976 agreement were no longer available. However, he said, the Pentagon was ready to host a Turkish delegation in order to discuss these issues and review Turkey’s needs.³⁷⁰

Nimetz also informed the Turkish side that in the coming weeks an American delegation would visit Turkey to see what could be done in defense cooperation area.³⁷¹

Another topic in this meeting was the financial difficulties of Turkey. The Turkish delegation asked the American administration’s help in their search for credit either through private banks or through allies, including OECD countries and even Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Turkish Foreign Minister also reminded his American counterpart that Ecevit was taking a political risk by reopening the US facilities in Turkey so soon.³⁷²

5.12. Conclusions

³⁶⁸ Ibid, Document 123.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, Document 123.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, Document 123.

³⁷¹ Ibid, Document 123.

³⁷² Ibid, Document 123.

The arms embargo, which was imposed on Turkey in February 1975, was finally revoked on September 26, 1978, during the Carter presidency. Throughout the imposition to the removal of the embargo, both the US administration and the Turkish government tried to restore the relationship.

Ecevit's remarks during his meeting with Defense Secretary Brown is significant in the sense that it laid out the main principles of the future defense industry of Turkey. Ecevit proposed a jointly establishing a defense industrial base which was specialized, export oriented and open to multilateral cooperation.

It is possible to say that, among formal causes that affect the removal of the embargo, the structure of the international system is the major one. The administration's main arguments to press on Congressional members for the removal of the embargo include the urgent need to support Turkey's aging military (a material cause). The embargo was deteriorating the Turkish military, and Turkey was just too important to ignore as a NATO member and neighbor of the Soviets. Being allies in NATO provided the main formal framework for the necessity of removing the ban on military aids and exports to Turkey. Nasuh Uslu underlines the fact that the decision coincides with Iran's worsening situation, which would result in the loss of important military bases in the Middle East.³⁷³

Similarly, the chief material cause is the US bases. The geographical situation of Turkey, as mentioned above, was making the US military bases in this country extremely important. Since Turkey had closed its facilities to the US military, except NATO approved operations, it was now an absolute necessity to reopen and operate these bases in Turkey.

³⁷³ Uslu (2016), p. 323

The principal agential or efficient causes of the removal of the embargo involved the Carter administration and the US Ambassador in Turkey, who repeatedly underlined the importance of not losing Turkey against Greece, as shown in the previous chapter.

It should be sufficient to analyze US Ambassador Spiers' telegrams to show how these causal forces operate together to affect the outcome. The ambassador (as an efficient cause) pressed on the US administration with his ideas (final cause) that had been shaped under the material necessities and his structural perceptions.

CHAPTER 6

A NEW ERA OF DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Now that the embargo was lifted and normalization steps were taken, the main expectation of the US side in the resumption of the military cooperation was the reopening of the military bases, which were unilaterally closed by Turkey, following the embargo in July 1975. In an Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom) dated November 3, 1978, we understand that the US side aimed at focusing on military bases during the new negotiations of the DCA and not linking broad defense cooperation issues with this specific end.

The memorandum's subject was a request for authorization to negotiate for a new agreement which would cover the US military bases in Turkey.³⁷⁴ The removal of the embargo imposed on Turkey had created a positive mood in relations, and according to this memorandum the US side was eager to start to negotiate in order to benefit from this cooperative atmosphere. After Carter's signature to lift the embargo on September 26, Turkey declared that the U.S. military facilities would be open for a year, giving time for negotiating a new agreement. The negotiations would start in November, and the memorandum argues that an early start would be advantageous to benefit from the cooperative mood in the relations. According to the memorandum, the US negotiators' mandate would cover these positions:³⁷⁵

- The new agreement should be limited to cover the US military operations in Turkey avoiding commitments in military and economic cooperation and assistance.

³⁷⁴ FRUS, 1977-80, Document 124.

³⁷⁵ Ibid, Document 124.

- The new agreement should be as broad as possible instead of complex arrangements

At this point, positions were quite clear: the number one priority for the US side was the status of military bases, and their being operational again, while Turkey wanted to have substantial economic and technical assistance to create an indigenous defense industrial base of its own so as to repair damaged military capabilities because of the embargo.

Indeed, in a message from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Haig) to Secretary of State Vance it was indicated that Turkey was very concerned with its deteriorated economic situation and NATO Secretary General Luns, upon returning from a recent visit to Turkey, shared this impression.³⁷⁶

Another important agenda item during Luns' visit to Turkey was to discuss and to prepare Turks to Greeks' re-entry to NATO. According to the message, Prime Minister Ecevit rejected the Secretary General's proposals regarding this issue.³⁷⁷ Perhaps the most important part of the message sent by Haig to State Secretary was NATO Secretary General's very interesting remarks regarding the situation in Turkey. Apparently, he mentioned that Turkey's worsening economy, a possible rapprochement with the Soviets and growing domestic security problems might lead to a military coup:

He noted that it is evident that Turkey has become increasingly reliant on economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union which appears to be more willing than NATO nations to meet Turkey's needs. He noted that Ecevit described the current situation as the gravest ever faced by a democratic Turkey. Although there were absolutely no hints of a Turkish realignment or withdrawal from NATO, in private discussions this was hinted at to the Secretary General by responsible Turkish officials. Luns stated that in his view it was ludicrous that Western nations provide such vast resources to third world nations of far less importance to Western security and dramatized his own fears that recent internal difficulties in Turkey, with a

³⁷⁶ Ibid, Document 125.

³⁷⁷ Ibid, Document 125.

growing terrorist threat and near economic collapse, could result in a military takeover with the ultimate loss of Turkey to the West.³⁷⁸

6.1. Domestic Problems Worsen in Turkey

In December 1978, the domestic situation in Turkey was further deteriorated, the martial law was imposed on December 26 as a result of the intensified street fights between leftist and rightist groups. A memorandum dated December 27, 1978 and prepared by the CIA summarized the recent developments in Turkey and underlined that it was the third time a martial law was imposing in Turkey after the Second World War. The memorandum stated that Ecevit was trying to combat violence and keep liberties at the same time, but he failed on both.³⁷⁹

The memorandum attributed Ecevit's initial distance to impose a martial law to his ideology reminding that "he had strongly criticized earlier martial law periods for their excesses, particularly against members of the left wing of his party who suffered most." Ecevit having a personal commitment to democracy and being against all kinds of authoritarian rules, persuaded by his own cabinet and the military.³⁸⁰

CIA's memorandum reflected their perception on the causes of Turkish domestic discontent. It underlined that the sharp opposition between modernizers and traditionalist created extremist groups in both sides. Unemployment and lack of proper education helped these groups recruit young generations among their ranks. While another source of domestic conflict was the sectarian disputes between Alevis and Sunni Muslims; Kurdish separatism in the eastern provinces was also adding up to insurgencies.³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ Ibid, Document 125.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, Document 126.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, Document 126.

³⁸¹ Ibid, Document 126.

On December 28, 1978 a Policy Review Committee Meeting was held with the participation of all high-level bodies of the US administration in order to evaluate the situation in Turkey.³⁸² The agenda of the meeting included short term economic crisis, long term economic problem, and other assistance and confidence building measures.³⁸³ Concerning the short-term economic crisis, it was decided to keep the IMF and Germans in picture rather than providing direct financial aid to Turkey. The summary document of the meeting shows that “in addition to European and American participation, possibilities for Saudi, Kuwaiti and Gulf involvement will be explored.”³⁸⁴ Assistant Secretary Cooper stated that the in the long run Turkey had a good prospect in economics however it was depending on the responses to the short-term problems.³⁸⁵

It is interesting that during the meeting NSA Dr. Brzezinski envisaged a military coup if Ecevit Government failed. According to the document the economic problems in Turkey were turning into a political crisis.³⁸⁶ However, the Director of Central Intelligence did not share this idea saying that they saw no tendency at all for a military coup. “The DCI said that the intelligence community saw no inclination on the part of the military to assume power themselves”.³⁸⁷

The main purpose of the meeting, as understood from the document, was to repair the damage in the Turkish-American relations caused by the embargo. While its director maintained that there was no inclination for a military coup, another note prepared by

³⁸² Ibid, Document 127.

³⁸³ Ibid, Document 127.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, Document 127.

³⁸⁵ Ibid, Document 127.

³⁸⁶ Ibid, Document 127.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, Document 127.

the CIA and dated January 3, 1979, pointed out the risk of military involvement was getting higher in Turkey as quoted below:

Ecevit was compelled to declare martial law in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces to curb the social unrest which originates in political, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries that are aggravated by the faltering economy. This has cost him much in political capital in his own party, given new opportunities to the opposition, and limited further his ability and probably his willingness to risk the hard decisions the economy requires. It has also reopened the possibility of a larger political role for the military... The result may be active involvement by the military in the political process, and in the last resort, perhaps another temporary experiment in direct military rule³⁸⁸

American intelligence communities were now expecting a military intervention in Turkey. Indeed, in another CIA memorandum dated February 5, 1979, titled *The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics*, it was envisaged that “the political and economic crisis in Turkey could hasten greater militarization of the Turkish polity, which was a move that both political and military leaders would reluctantly take if they considered it necessary”.³⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Ecevit sent a letter to President Carter in appreciation of Warren's visit to Ankara. In his letter, dated January 19, 1979 Ecevit underlined the economic problems and highlighted the importance of keeping democracy in Turkey while emphasizing human rights which was the main legacy of the Carter administration. He said that the democracy was “the basic bond between Turkey and our allies and friends in the West.”³⁹⁰ Ecevit also thanked President Carter for his commitment to find solutions to Turkey's economic problems.³⁹¹

³⁸⁸ Ibid, Document 128.

³⁸⁹ Ibid, Document 128.

³⁹⁰ Ibid, Document 129.

³⁹¹ Ibid, Document 129.

6.2. US rediscovers Turkey's value as a Strategic Asset

While the situation further deteriorated in Turkey both economically and politically, along with the increased domestic insurgency, an elaborate memorandum dated February 22, 1979, from Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) described the main issues regarding the Turkish-American relations.³⁹² Apart from domestic problems of Turkey, regional issues such as the fall of the Iranian regime, Egypt-USA rapprochement, and the Cyprus problem continued to play an important role. This document itself shows how four causal forces work together with regard to the Turkish-American relationship. As the international political development as structural (formal) was setting the frame, material causes such as Turkey's worsening economic and military structure, ideational (final) causes such as the importance of keeping Turkey in the Western camp, and naturally agential (efficient) causes which include the politicians, military, and other domestic sources of foreign policy formulation processes are all acting in tandem for constituting and determining the direction of the relationship. Indeed, Henze, in this memorandum, dealt with these forces and urged Americans about the danger of frustration and an eventual loss of an ally in case "increased economic and military aid continue always to be over the horizon, promised but not delivered."³⁹³

On Iranian revolution's potential effect on Turkey, Henze drew attention to the ideologic potential of Iranian revolution on Turkey. He pointed out that two primary effects of the revolution for Turkey was the America's ability to intervene and the

³⁹² Ibid, Document 130.

³⁹³ Ibid, Document 130.

possibility of an Iranian collapse that would trigger separatist movements in Turkey. For Henze, the religious influence was not a source of concern for Turkey.³⁹⁴

Henze underlined the importance of repairing relations with Turkey and condemns the embargo strongly by saying that if the US wants to keep Turkey as an ally it has to “be ready to pay a higher price.”³⁹⁵ For Henze, this high price would be meeting Turkey’s demands during the negotiation of the new agreement. He advised that the US should use the new agreement to be signed with Turkey as a tool to keep them in the alliance.³⁹⁶

Henze contrasted the recently developing Egypt-USA relations with the Turkish-American relations and emphasized how badly it would be perceived by Turks. He said that while Turkey was with the US and the western alliance in the last 30 years, in the most part of these 30 years Egypt was with the Soviets. However, Egypt was getting more arms and more sympathy from Americans compared to Turkey:

Talk about a multi-billion arms commitment to Egypt galls Turks. They have stayed in the western alliance consistently for 30 years and we tell them we can provide only \$200 million in FMS for 1980 and no MAP! Egypt, which has worked against American purposes for the better part of the past 30 years, gets sympathy because its Soviet-supplied arsenal needs modernization. Loyalty seems to Turks not to produce dividends. Turks see the tactical value of keeping Egypt on our side now, but they think they are at least as important to basic U.S. strategic purposes. Turks are determined not to be taken for granted. They want credit for their commitment to democracy and feel they don’t get it. No Turkish political leader who ignores these deeply felt attitudes can gain or stay in office, nor will the Turkish military go on tolerating political leadership that does not ensure the bare minimum the military leadership feels it must have to maintain respectable armed forces.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁴ Ibid, Document 130.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, Document 130.

³⁹⁶ Ibid, Document 130.

³⁹⁷ Ibid, Document 130.

After describing the situation and psychology from Turkish perspectives, he turned on to his policy proposals which included, increasing military and economic assistance to Turkey and publicly showing American support for Turkey. Henze proposed that the administration should provide Turkey “\$300 million for economic purposes and \$200 for military modernization.”³⁹⁸ Henze argued this would also encourage other NATO allies to provide more assistance to Turkey while international financial institutions would see that Turkey has American’s commitment. He claimed that was “the only way Turkey can overcome her present short-term debt repayment and balance-of-payments crisis.”³⁹⁹

Henze ended his memorandum by also mentioning advantages of keeping Turkey as an ally. He argued, Turkey had a good economic potential and with a good governance would perform like Brazil or Korea. Turkey also was a democracy and “a military partner well worth having.”⁴⁰⁰ Therefore, he advised the US administration “should restore MAP for Turkey immediately. The symbolism of this act would be of enormous importance to the Turkish military and the cost would be small.”⁴⁰¹

The developments of 1979, both in regional and international levels, seem to bring Americans to recognize the strategic value of Turkey. In a high-level Policy Review Committee meeting convened on March 7, 1979, there was a unanimous decision to take further steps for immediate short-term economic assistance and long-term military cooperation including major co-production possibilities.⁴⁰² It was also decided in this meeting to establish a working group to coordinate additional economic

³⁹⁸ Ibid, Document 130.

³⁹⁹ Ibid, Document 130.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid, Document 130.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, Document 130.

⁴⁰² Ibid, Document 131.

and military assistance to Turkey.⁴⁰³ The working group prepared a report and sent to Brzezinski on March 15, concluded that Turkey needed more aid than initial calculations of the United States.⁴⁰⁴ It is understood by the executive branch that, in order to restore relations with Turkey and more importantly, to repair the damage done to the NATO by imposing embargo, the US had to commit economic assistance to Turkey.

6.3. Negotiations for a New Defense Cooperation Agreement

In this atmosphere, negotiations for a new Defense Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and the USA restarted with the inclusion of an economic cooperation dimension. In a telegram, dated 13 April 1979, sent by the US Embassy in Turkey to the State Department, Ambassador Spiers shared his observations about the ongoing negotiations and requested the review of instructions from the capital so as to respond Turkey's demands.⁴⁰⁵

Turkish military are not willing to accept what we can offer now: a year-by-year consideration of Turkish military requirements in a context in which they believe our judgment is largely influenced by extraneous political issues. The Turkish 5-year "modernization" plan, which we initially priced at between \$10 and \$15 billion, has been subject to detailed review and JUSMMAT estimates it to be in the \$3 to \$4 billion range (apparently including O&M costs). From Turkish standpoint, this plan is fairly moderate (omitting such high-cost items as F16's, for example) and justifiable if Turkey is to continue to make a creditable contribution to NATO defense. The Turks argue that they are not asking for money, as in the past, but are seeking specific items of military equipment made necessary by their NATO role. The Turks will certainly hold out for some portion of equipment transfers at reduced cost.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ Ibid, Document 131.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, Document 131.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid, Document 133.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, Document 133.

As understood from this telegram, Turkey wanted to establish a stable defense cooperation with the US while developing its own defense industrial base. Ambassador Spiers had other significant observations in his telegram. He pointed out the Turkish perception against recent American aids in the Middle East including \$400 million of equipment to Yemen and multi-billion assistance to Egypt or Israel. He said that Turks was a NATO member and a neighbor of the Soviets, perceived this contrast as an open injustice. Therefore, the ambassador urged, “the general reaction in military circles is that our overall response is minimal and ad hoc as measured by their needs.”⁴⁰⁷

Then he continued to alert the US administration that Turkey might review its relations with NATO and the West, saying that in Turkey there were also some groups “who feel Turkey’s best interests would be served if the country opted out of NATO.”⁴⁰⁸ He stressed that Turkey would also pursue Norwegian or French models in its relationships with NATO which meant removing the US troops and staying in NATO.⁴⁰⁹

Ambassador Spiers concluded by requesting a new mandate where the US side would be more willing to cooperate. He said that the Turkish side was not sure of the prospect of Turkish-American relations, they were expecting a five-year agreement so as to be able to see the future more confidently. Therefore, he proposed the below quoted clause to the agreement that would allow long term cooperation:

Pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in recognition that cooperative efforts of both governments as well as the assistance of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is needed to assist Turkey to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the Alliance, and with a view toward strengthening the mutual security cooperation between the two governments, representatives of the United States and Turkish armed forces will develop and keep current an

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, Document 133.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid, Document 133.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, Document 133.

equipment requirements list, arranged in order of priority, representing a 5-year Turkish armed forces modernization program. The Government of the United States shall exercise its best efforts consistent with United States laws, to provide the Government of the Republic of Turkey defense equipment, services and training, or the financing thereof, in accordance with the priorities established in this list.⁴¹⁰

This was also a time when the SALT 2 Agreements were negotiated between the USA and the USSR. President Carter sent a letter to Ecevit on April 14, 1979 to request permission for high altitude intelligence flights over the Turkish aerospace. He emphasized that, this request was different from the past practices that caused disturbances in the relations.⁴¹¹ In response to Carter, Ecevit expressed his concern vis-à-vis the Soviet reactions and he requested that this matter should be clearly discussed between Americans and Soviets during the SALT 2 talks.⁴¹²

Like his predecessor Demirel, Ecevit too, reminded Turkey's risky geographic position (structural cause) and its being a democratic county which aimed to contribute to the East-West relations (ideational cause) in his letter to President Carter:

I am sure you would appreciate, Mr. President, that Turkey, being situated in a most sensitive part of the world and faced with immense problems, would not wish to risk her own security and endanger her own relations with the Soviet Union and other neighboring countries, while trying to contribute to improved East-West relations and to world peace.⁴¹³

6.4. Turkish Economy Deteriorates Further

From the Memorandum from Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter dated April 23, 1979, it is clearly understood that the US was trying to mobilize other Western capitalist states to provide economic assistance to Turkey.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid, Document 133.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, Document 134.

⁴¹² Ibid, Document 135.

⁴¹³ Ibid, Document 135.

Owen pointed out that increasing the US contribution to Turkey would push Germany to increase its assistance to Turkey “to fulfill its leadership role by offering a matching amount. It also has helped to convince the Turks that the international aid effort is serious.”⁴¹⁴ Owen also stated that along with Germany, France, UK and Japan were also increasing their economic aid to Turkey in response to Carter’s letters to these countries’ leaders, according to the memorandum.⁴¹⁵

During his visit to Turkey on May 8, 1979, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher and Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit agreed on a draft oral note from the US to the Soviets regarding overflights over Turkey for SALT verification purposes.⁴¹⁶ According to the telegram, which reported the meeting held during that visit, Christopher also said that he would recommend to the President and Secretary Vance to take necessary steps regarding the economic assistance and defense cooperation agreement with Turkey. However, notes about the meeting showed that American’s impressions of those meetings were not particularly good since Ecevit indicated that he had the impression of Americans were acting slowly on economic and military aids as well as on the new defense agreement.⁴¹⁷

In an intelligence assessment report prepared by the CIA on May 24, 1979, it was observed that internal security and economic difficulties were worsening in Turkey and this situation weakened Ecevit government. The report which was titled “Turkey: Ecevit Government is in Crisis” suggested that Turkey needed structural adjustments. According to the report, the chance of Bülent Ecevit to tackle the country’s problems was dimming while the financial crisis was deepening, and the domestic security problems were intensifying. The report claims that the domestic insurgency level was

⁴¹⁴ Ibid, Document 136.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, Document 136.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, Document 138.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, Document 138.

coming back to the level before the martial law imposed; Kurdish separatist movements were heartened by the developments in Iran, and the economic crisis was so profound that the IMF agreement “would be no more than palliative if not accompanied by structural changes.”⁴¹⁸

The report also claimed that Ecevit had lost the support of the business circles and the military leaders. According to the report, even the labor force and ordinary citizens were tired of a weak government and a military intervention was seemed preferable by many Turks. The most remarkable assessment of the report was that if Turkey was to be an authoritarian state it would certainly be a rightist one:

Moreover, whatever Ecevit’s individual fate, growing numbers of Turks are fed up with weak governments and politics-as-usual. Support for an “above-parties” government is on the increase and some Turks even talk about a more basic “reform” of the political system itself, which might lead to military involvement. A weak government in Ankara will continue to make for strains in Turkey’s relations with its allies, and in the longer term so too would an authoritarian one. If Turkey does move toward authoritarianism, it will almost certainly be of the right and not of the left.⁴¹⁹

6.5. Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (1980)

Meanwhile, the discussions for the new DCA started to take shape. An American delegation visited Turkey to investigate the possible co-production schemes in defense industry area between the two countries. In a telegram dated June 1, 1979, Secretary of State Vance summarized his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun.⁴²⁰ It is clearly understood that this time Turkey wanted a different agreement from the previous DCA of 1969 with solid contents for achieving defense industrial and economic cooperation. According to the memorandum of conversation, Turkish Foreign Minister told that “Turkey now looks forward to concrete results and projects

⁴¹⁸ Ibid, Document 140.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, Document 140.

⁴²⁰ Ibid, Document 141.

in order to sell U.S./Turkish cooperation to the Turkish public.”⁴²¹ He also mentioned the visit of an American delegation to Turkey to explore and discuss co-production possibilities in defense industry and emphasized that “Turkey wants a concrete, politically justifiable and feasible relationship with the U.S.”⁴²²

The Turkish side had a new “umbrella” concept for the agreement under negotiations. While the previous DCA of 1969 was based on the NATO Charter’s third article, this new one would be based on article two and three, to reflect the expectation of economic collaboration along with defense cooperation. Foreign Minister Okcun stated that the umbrella concept meant that the new defense cooperation would comprise four categories; “defense procurement, economic cooperation, coproduction and installations.” The main feature of the 1980 DECA was now gaining its full shape: four supplemental agreements under an umbrella agreement.⁴²³

Another important aspect of the meeting, as understood from the telegram was the fact that Turkey requested the US support for multilateral platforms and help of other allied countries such as Japan:

Secretary Vance continued with regard to the World Bank, that he had already talked to Bank President McNamara and urged latter’s cooperation on the Turkish problem. McNamara had said he would personally pursue the matter. Secretary added that he was prepared to keep in touch with McNamara on this issue if Turks wanted; if they did not think it would be helpful he would desist. Okcun indicated that further such efforts by Secretary would be appreciated.⁴²⁴

In retrospect, from the increasing weight of economic interests on the bilateral agenda, it is possible to see hints of the context in which the future events would take shape: a neoliberal agenda was on the way to reshape the Turkish-American relations in the

⁴²¹ Ibid, Document 141.

⁴²² Ibid, Document 141.

⁴²³ Ibid, Document 141.

⁴²⁴ Ibid, Document 141.

years to come. Clearly, it is hard to trace direct evidence of this neoliberal agenda from the official documents of late seventies. However, the increasing mobilization of international financial institutions such as World Bank and IMF for finding remedies for Turkey's economic problems. Indeed, Çağlar Kurç argues that Turkey's inclusion to the neoliberal agenda starts with the standby agreements signed with IMF in the late 70s.⁴²⁵

Another interesting note from the telegram that Minister Okcun conveyed was Prime Minister Ecevit's satisfaction regarding the U.S. efforts for continuation of military assistance and efforts in the OECD context. "This shows that the U.S. has stopped following the policy of linkage".⁴²⁶ It seemed that finally the US separated the military cooperation with Turkey from the Cyprus issue.

On July 19, 1979, Ambassador Spiers sent a telegram to Washington DC to urge the administration that a new military coup was possible in Turkey however not immediately. He based his argument on his observation that the failure of politicians to address country's problems caused discontent among military leaders. He reminded that the military saw itself "as the ultimate defender of Ataturk's Westernizing and modernizing reforms and has intervened in the political process twice since 1960."⁴²⁷ He also cited the increase of external security threat after the revolution in Iran, and claimed that "there is evidence that senior military officers have discussed the possibility of a third political intervention among themselves and with elements of the Turkish political elite."⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ Çağlar Kurç, "Critical Approach to Turkey's Defense Procurement Behavior: 1923-2013", PhD Dissertation, METU, September 2013, pp.215-216

⁴²⁶ FRUS, 1977-80, Document 141.

⁴²⁷ Ibid, Document 142.

⁴²⁸ Ibid, Document 142.

Even though he did not see a military intervention imminent he argued that the political stalemate, deep economic crisis or mishandling a major event might provide sufficient reason to the Turkish military to intervene:

6. In sum, while it is our judgment that military intervention is not likely in the short run, we cannot be as confident about the medium term. Turkey's prolonged economic and political crisis has, according to our Consulates in Izmir and Adana, begun to have an adverse effect on the traditional stoicism of the Turkish public. The Consulates sense a growing inclination among some elements of the Turkish elite to want the military to intervene to "set things right." As our earlier analysis indicated, we doubt the current military leadership is inclined toward intervention, but a failure of the political system in dealing with Turkey's political/economic crisis may alter this attitude.⁴²⁹

Another memorandum dated October 12, 1979 and prepared by the CIA, evaluated the upcoming 14 October elections in Turkey and concluded that whoever wins the elections the resulting new government in Turkey would be a weak one to tackle deep economic and social problems, and the Turkish military would watch the developments. According to the memorandum CIA assessed that, "If civilian leaders seem unwilling to curtail political ambitions for the sake of national unity, military leaders might feel compelled to exert greater pressure in behalf of a government willing and able to do the job."⁴³⁰

Süleyman Demirel won the October elections and replaced Ecevit as prime minister on November 12, 1979. In this new setting of the Turkish political scene, the US Ambassador Spiers summarized his dinner with Turkish General Chief of Staff Kenan Evren in a telegram sent to Pentagon and State Department on November 24, 1979. It would not be an excess to say that Ambassador Spiers found a reasonable leader in General Evren's personality:

TGS's message was clear: in the absence of a clearer US commitment to Turkish security and a greater US willingness to address Turkey's defense requirements, Turkey would have no option but to adjust itself to the world which surrounds it.

⁴²⁹ Ibid, Document 142.

⁴³⁰ Ibid, Document 144.

Evren did not threaten. He has no illusions about the paucity of Turkey's options. He understands his country's plight and knows that first priority must be given to its economic woes. He fully appreciates the amount and generosity of our economic aid and he will not ask his political masters to divert to defense money needed to repair the economy. Furthermore, he knows that his country is politically isolated from its Balkan and Arab neighbors and the wider third world.⁴³¹

From the memorandum of the dinner with Evren, it seemed that Spiers was quite impressed. After mentioning that Evren expected a multi-year defense agreement, Spiers approvingly said that "the trend of events in this strategic corner of the world requires a fresh display of US determination."⁴³² He repeated his previous argument and urged Washington to prepare "more tangible assurances that Turkey will have access to US defense equipment and on the best possible terms."⁴³³ Ambassador Spiers ended his telegram by pressing for urgent and efficient action from the US administration by saying that "something concrete and specific is needed—and quickly—if we want to deal with this crucial country's growing fear for its security."⁴³⁴

In the meantime, newly elected Demirel Government's Foreign Minister met his American counterpart in the margins of the NATO Summit in Brussels on December 14, 1979.⁴³⁵ According to a telegram from the US mission there, Turkish Foreign Minister continued the previous government's position regarding the DCA and stated his government's expectation "that the agreements could be signed before the January 9."⁴³⁶ Erkmén also declared Turkey's intention to sign the umbrella agreement and the

⁴³¹ Ibid, Document 145.

⁴³² Ibid, Document 145.

⁴³³ Ibid, Document 145.

⁴³⁴ Ibid, Document 145.

⁴³⁵ Ibid, Document 146.

⁴³⁶ Ibid, Document 146.

annexes at the same time with resolving all the issues together.⁴³⁷ However, the new supplements and had the major potential for complicating the signature process.⁴³⁸

In an Action Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance dated January 2, 1980, it is understood that Nimetz was going to visit Turkey on January 6, to finalize defense cooperation agreement. Nimetz underlined the fact that there were two controversial issues regarding the negotiations of the agreement, Turks were aiming to sign the agreement as a whole together with all annexes and the restriction of the use of facilities to NATO purposes only.⁴³⁹

My goal in the January 6–9 talks is to initial a foundation agreement and, if possible, three supplemental agreements (defense support, defense industrial cooperation, and installations). These agreements would then be referred back to governments for early review, so that the Turks could feel that a signing ceremony might take place within a reasonable period.⁴⁴⁰

According to a footnote in the document 147, State Secretary Vance checked the “Approve” option and January 3 was stamped below. The negotiations to finalize the Defense Cooperation Agreement began when Nimetz met Erkmen in Ankara on January 5, 1980.

Finally, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) between two countries was initialed in Ankara on January 10, 1980. The most important features of the DECA were;

- all military bases in Turkey were considered Turkish facilities that would be managed by the Turkish commanders;

⁴³⁷ Ibid, Document 146.

⁴³⁸ Ibid, Document 146.

⁴³⁹ Ibid, Document 147.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid, Document 147.

- utilization of the bases required final authorization by the Turkish authorities;
- and the agreement was valid for five years and renewable on an annual basis thereafter.⁴⁴¹

The final step for the new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was the letter from US President to the Turkish Prime Minister. With his letter dated February 21, 1980, President Carter completed this formality. The letter, which emphasized the end of a turbulent period in the Turkish-American relations and the beginning of a new era between two countries, was submitted to Demirel by the new US Ambassador in Turkey, James W. Spain. In Carter's letter it is possible to discern traces of all four causes argued throughout in this dissertation. Carter emphasized that Turkish-American relations was older than the NATO itself and that this relationship was "based on common democratic values, peaceful ideals, and strong cultural and humanitarian ties."⁴⁴² Sharing the same alliance always constituted in the relationship as one of the ideational (final) causes.

Carter stressed the importance of the new agreement as it was "commitment on the part of the United States to assist in strengthening the armed forces as well as the economy of the Turkish Republic."⁴⁴³ These were chief material causes which affected Turkish-American relations. Economic and military capabilities and deficiencies of Turkey as a NATO member were becoming more or less urgent elements depending on the structural and ideational causes. In 1980, under the heightened moments of the Cold War it became a pressing issue to rescue Turkish economy, modernize Turkish military. Indeed, Carter said in his letter that, "the agreement recognized Turkey's

⁴⁴¹ Ibid, Document 147.

⁴⁴² Ibid, Document 148.

⁴⁴³ Ibid, Document 148.

crucial contribution to the Alliance, and addresses critical questions of defense and economic cooperation.”⁴⁴⁴

Demirel responded to Carter’s letter on March 7, 1980. His letter was also emphasizing a new era and the importance of economic and military strength of Turkey to fulfil its role in this new era to unfold. Demirel reminded in his letter that the level of new American aid should also take into account the damage done by the embargo. He also referred recent international developments and underlined the importance of cooperation for enabling Turkey for carrying out its NATO duties in response to changing circumstances.⁴⁴⁵

After the exchange of letters between the US and Turkish leaders, the agreement was finally signed on March 29. According to the DECA, the US was to provide military and economic support to Turkey. However, the agreement did not specify levels of aid for either the economic or military domains. The important and still alive mechanism created by the agreement was a joint U.S.-Turkey military commission. The High Level Defense Group meeting was held annually to review the agenda items and projects to foster military cooperation, “and contained pledges that both countries would work together in commercial, scientific, and technological pursuits”.⁴⁴⁶

According to Çağrı Erhan, during the negotiations for the new DECA there were some issues which led to a lengthy negotiation process:⁴⁴⁷ The first issue was related to the duration of the military aid, while Turkey requesting that the assistance should cover multi years, it was a technical problem for Americans since Congress had to endorse those assistance annually through budget approvals. The compromise was the “best

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid, Document 148.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, Document 149.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, Document 149.

⁴⁴⁷ Erhan, p.429.

effort” clause to satisfy Turkey’s need to embark on a multi-year modernization program. The second issue that Erhan pointed out was the level of signature. Americans proposed that the agreement would be signed between Turkish Prime Minister and the US Ambassador to Ankara. Turkey desired the agreement to be signed by the president. The compromise was found on exchanging letters. The third issue, was Turkey’s request of inclusion of a military equipment list to be transferred to Turkey in the Agreement. This was solved by the decision to determine the list by joint expert group before the signature of the agreement. Final problem was related to the types of aircrafts that the U.S. could deploy in the military bases in Turkey. Turkey wanted that the aircraft could not be used for the purposes other than NATO aims. The U.S. side had to accept this clause.

Upon resolving these issues, the agreement was signed on 29 March 1980. However, the Turkish parliament could not approve it due to the deadlock in the election of the new president upon the retirement of Fahri Korutürk. Therefore, the DECA was approved after the military coup of 12 September by a cabinet decision on November 18, 1980.⁴⁴⁸

The DECA was presented by the US State Department to the public as an agreement with a valued and strategically located ally. The State Department’s bulletin underlined the geopolitical importance of Turkey, by describing that “Turkey, forms part of NATO’s southern flank, helps guard access to the Mediterranean from the black Sea, and faces the Soviet Union across the longest common land border of any NATO nation.” The bulletin also highlighted the recent international development that elevated importance of Turkey by referring “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the unsettled conditions in the Middle East.”⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ Armaoğlu, p.300.

⁴⁴⁹ Department of State Bulletin, July 1980. The outline was based on a statement by Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary for Security Assistance Science, and Technology, before the

The preamble of the DECA, emphasized the link to North Atlantic Treaty's second and third articles which cover economic and technologic cooperation among Allies:

Taking into account the principle that the maintenance of an adequate defense posture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and stability,

Expressing their faith in the acceleration of disarmament efforts and their mutual desire to contribute to this process,

Acting on the basis of their continuing friendship and in recognition of their obligations to the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area and pursuant to Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty,

Have entered into the following Agreement⁴⁵⁰

6.6. DECA's Main Features

The US and Turkey signed the DECA on March 29, 1980. With this agreement the US was committed to use its best efforts to provide economic and defense support and strengthen Turkish defense industrial capabilities. In return, the U.S. had access to airbase, intelligence installations, a long-range navigation station, elements of a defense communication system, and other support and logistics facilities.

Hence, with its official name "Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy Between the Governments of The United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey in Accordance with Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty" the DECA is a bilateral executive agreement falling under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. It consists of a basic agreement, three supplementary agreements, and eight annexes. Basic or foundation agreement has a preamble and nine articles providing for the US "best efforts" in supplying economic as well as military assistance, joint production of defense material, and base access/operating rights for NATO purposes for the US forces in Turkey.

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on May 7, 1980.

⁴⁵⁰ U.S. Treaties on LEXIS, 32 U.S.T. 3323; 1980 U.S.T. LEXIS 39

The DECA contains no specific pledge of economic or assistance. The agreement recognizes the interrelationship between a strong economy and a strong defense and is consistent with ongoing efforts by the U.S. and the NATO nations to help stabilize the troubled Turkish economy and straighten the armed forces in furtherance of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The DECA includes a foundation agreement aimed at fostering economic and social developments, supplemented by agreements on 1) defense support, 2) defense industrial cooperation, and 3) installations.

Under defense support, the U.S. was committed to use its best efforts to provide the Government of Turkey with defense equipment, training and assistance in order to modernize and maintain the Turkish armed forces. To this end, a Joint United States-Turkish Defense Support Commission (Joint Commission) was established in Turkey to ensure the most effective use of U.S. resources provided to Turkey. The Joint Commission complements the existing relationship between the Turkish General Staff and the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group- the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT). The U.S. representative on the Joint Commission is the JUSMMAT Chief. The Joint Commission assists in developing a procurement plan designed to meet Turkish military needs. To aid in implementing the plan, the U.S. Government makes a best effort to provide military assistance to Turkey annually through the security assistance program. The State Department summarizes US security assistance provided by the DECA:

The agreement recognizes the interrelationship between a strong economy and a strong defense, and it is consistent with ongoing efforts by the United States and other nations to help the Government of Turkey stabilize its troubled economy.

Under the agreement, the United States pledges to exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey. The agreement specifies that military assistance to Turkey shall be subject to the annual authorization and appropriations contained in U.S. security assistance legislation.

A joint Turkish-U.S. commission established by the agreement, will complement the existing relationship between the Turkish General Staff and our Military Assistance Advisory Group in Ankara and will assist in determining how to

maintain the usefulness of our military assistance to Turkey. Each year the Government of Turkey, based on its assigned NATO missions, will develop a 5-year projection of its force goals. Using estimates of contributions that will be forthcoming from Turkey's own resources and other sources, the commission will make recommendations on how best to realize these goals.⁴⁵¹

The defense industrial cooperation section emphasizes enhanced U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the production, maintenance, repair and modernization of defense material and equipment. In addition, the two countries will seek ways to promote and facilitate the co-production of defense equipment and cooperation in defense research and development.

It is a long-term U.S. policy to encourage our NATO allies to develop and maintain the industrial and technological capability critical to a nation's security. The agreement emphasizes enhanced U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the production of defense material. To facilitate cooperation in Defense procurement, the United States and Turkey waive those "buy national" regulations not covered by law, as is the case with other NATO allies.⁴⁵²

Under the supplementary agreement on installations, the Turkey authorizes the U.S. to resume military activities at the specified Turkish facilities. All the U.S. activities at these installations arise out of and are limited to obligations contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. Any additional activities, outside of the NATO framework would require the permission of Turkey. Supplementary Agreement 3 specifies access to bases and associated operating rights for the US forces; seven annexes deal with Incirlik air base, the Sinop SIGINT and Pirinlik spacetrack installations, nodal communications sites, logistical and administrative facilities, the Belbaşı seismic station, and the Kargaburun LORAN site:

The agreement authorizes the United States to maintain forces and carry out military activities at specified installations in Turkey. These facilities. Include a major air force base regularly hosting NATO-committed U.S. aircraft, three

⁴⁵¹ Department of State Bulletin, July 1980. The outline was based on a statement by Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary for Security Assistance Science, and Technology, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on May 7, 1980.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

intelligence-gathering installations, a long-range navigation station, elements of the U.S. defense communications system, and other important support and logistic units. The following are key provisions of this part of the agreement.

The installations are designated as Turkish, with a Turkish commander, although the U.S. commander at each installation has full command and control over all U.S. personnel, equipment, and missions.

The U.S. flag will be flown at the headquarters of the U.S. commander.

Arrangements for joint use and joint technical operations are specified.

Each nation pays for the salaries of its personnel and for the maintenance of those facilities provided for their exclusive use.

The NATO status of forces agreement is applied to all U.S. personnel.

All ongoing U.S. military activities and missions in Turkey are authorized by the Government of Turkey to continue.

The extent of defense cooperation under the agreement is limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴⁵³

In addition to military cooperation, the DECA underlines the necessity of fostered economic cooperation between two countries.⁴⁵⁴ This was reflected well with the defense industrial cooperation addressed by the Second Supplementary Agreement with seven defense industry projects for collaboration.

Actual aid flows to Turkey (millions \$US) in DECA context is summarized in table below. As seen in the table, the total amount of economic and military aid to Turkey reached from USD 406,4 million to USD 864,3 million just in six years.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Murphy, Sean D, (1991) "Role of Bilateral Defense Agreements in Maintaining the European Security Equilibrium", *Cornekk International Law Journal*: Vol.24:Iss.3, Article 2.

⁴⁵⁵ CIA, Renegotiating the DECA, 13 September 1985, Approved for Release: 2010/01/28, CIA-RDP85T01058R00030340001-3

Table 3 US Military Aid to Turkey in DECA context

YEAR	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	TOTAL
1980	198,1	208,3	406,4
1981	201	252,8	453,8
1982	300	403	703
1983	285	402,8	687,8
1984	138,5	718,1	856,6
1985	175	700	875
1986	150	714,2	864,2

6.7. General Account Office’s Report on the DECA

The Comptroller General of the US evaluates the DECA signed with Turkey and provided assessment on its implementation upon the request of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.⁴⁵⁶ Main interest of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was, as mentioned in the report, “the impact of U.S. security assistance in meeting Turkey’s needs, 2) U.S. use of military facilities, and 3) proposed military construction”.⁴⁵⁷ Therefore the General Account Office’s (GAO) evaluation focuses on the validity of supporting Turkey and whether the US attained its goals with this agreement.

The report first gives a brief history of the US military assistance to Turkey citing some important figures:

From 1950 to 1975, until the embargo, the U.S. provided about 4,3 billion Dollars in security assistance, consisting of 3,2 billion Dollars in military assistance program (MAP) grant aid, 895 million in excess defense articles, and 185 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loans.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁶ The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement-US Interests and Turkish Needs, GAO, ID-82 31, May 7, 1982

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, p1.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid, p.2.

GAO affirms Turkey's increasing strategic importance for the US by using the same wording of the State Department:

Turkey is a most valued NATO ally. It occupies NATO's southern flank, helps guard access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and faces the Soviet Union across the longest common land border of any NATO nation. The importance of Turkey's strategic location has been highlighted by the recent instability in Iran and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁴⁵⁹

The report adds that the primary objectives of the US in signing DECA with Turkey was to maintain defense cooperation with Turkey and keeping US military facilities there to regain "access to intelligence and communication installations."⁴⁶⁰ In this respect, the GAO declared that the objectives were attained.⁴⁶¹

In describing Turkey's military needs, the report states that even though the US had provided a large sum of military assistance to Turkey since its membership to NATO in 1952, Turkey was still "significantly behind the military forces of the other allies" in terms of military equipment. According to the report, the embargo could only partially explain this inadequacy since it lasted only 3,5 years. Other important reasons for Turkish military's lack of modern equipment and capabilities included Turkey's economic problems and poor logistic planning:

Large amounts of military assistance have been provided to Turkey since it became a member of NATO in 1952. Yet, Turkey is still significantly behind the military forces of the other allies and is continually troubled by inadequate and outmoded military equipment. The U.S. arms embargo is partly to blame for Turkey's present condition; however, the partial embargo which lasted 3-1/2 years was not the only cause and other causes with far greater impact were 1) already obsolete equipment, 2) inflation in weapons cost, 3) the lack of usable U.S. excess defence articles, 4) Turkey's domestic economic problems, and 5) poor Turkish logistics planning for many years....Additionally, maintaining approximately a 566,000 man armed forces has always been a burden on the Turkish economy...However as a result of its relatively lower gross national product and weak economic condition, Turkey

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, p.3.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, p.5.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid, p.5.

spends on its armed forces about what Belgium spends on its 87,000-man force. Although Turkey has the largest standing army in NATO after the United States, it ranks ninth in NATO for annual defense expenditures.⁴⁶²

After describing Turkey's weak economic conditions, insufficient resources for defense modernization, and seven defense industrial projects that the U.S. would provide assistance as a part of DECA, the report concludes that, "both Turkey and the United States realize that the current capacity of the Turkish defense industry makes accomplishment of self-sufficiency not feasible in the near future."⁴⁶³

There is also a noteworthy observation made by the report regarding Turkey's attempt to develop its own defense industry: Turkey's absent project management skills and resource management notion. The report states that Turkey "did not have basic project planning information. Therefore, the United States suggested a format that would explain the technical and financial aspects of the projects".⁴⁶⁴

The report emphasized that Turkey lacked necessary financial resources for its defense modernization programs and "must rely on FMS credits." The report underlined that FMS credits were "the only source of funds presently available under U.S. law."⁴⁶⁵

This part of the report is like a recipe for the upcoming defense industry policy and institutions to be set up in 1985 with the establishment of Defense Industry Development Administration (later Undersecretariat for Defense Industries) which was organized as a modern project management agency with special defense industry support fund.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶² Ibid, pp.15-16.

⁴⁶³ Ibid, pp.26-27.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid, p.27

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid, p.28.

⁴⁶⁶ Law on the Establishment of Defense Industry Support and Development Administration, Law Number 3238, 13 November 1985. <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/18927.pdf>

However, report also draws attention to the fact that European allies' economic assistance to Turkey tends to decrease due to the concerns of the military government in Turkey after the 1980 coup.

In summary, the GAO's report affirmed that Turkey was an important ally, the U.S. should regain and maintain its presence in Turkey, the agreement already served these aims however, the U.S. commitment, which was defined as "best effort" was not sufficient to enhance Turkey's defense capabilities.⁴⁶⁷ Further funding either through other NATO allies or by the U.S. resources was necessary in order for Turkey to acquire necessary capacity to perform its NATO duties against the increasing Soviet threat and uncertainties in the region after the revolution in Iran. The report also underlined the fact that even though assisting Turkey was important for the U.S. it was also a NATO problem and other allies should increase their contribution."⁴⁶⁸ The report highlighted the strategic links of the military assistance between those made to Turkey and to other allies in the region, like Greece or Egypt:

Turkey will require substantial economic and military assistance for at least several more years. The questions are how much, on what terms, and who will provide the assistance. Turkey is a NATO problem but unless the allies are willing to increase their contributions, the United States may have to increase its security assistance program if Turkey is considered vital to U.S. interests. However, in doing so, the United States must consider the impact an increased program will have on the balance of power in the Aegean and U.S. interest in Southwest Asia.⁴⁶⁹

6.8. Renegotiating the DECA

The DECA was to be renewed after 5 years in yearly basis. A CIA report dated September 13, 1985 summarizes important aspects of the DECA's first five-year

⁴⁶⁷ GAO Report (1982), p.42.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid, p.39.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid, p.40.

implementation. The report asserts that Turkey was dissatisfied with the current DECA chiefly on three points.⁴⁷⁰

First, the US did not fulfill its pledge to exert its “best efforts” to assist Turkish force modernization. Levels of assistance were too low because of adherence to a 7:10 Greek-Turkish assistance ratio, and too much of it was consisted of non-concessional Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits rather than FMS credits on concessional terms (which were offered on lower interest rates) or Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants. The second complaint of the Turkish side, according to the CIA report, was inadequate level of defense industrial cooperation despite nine co-production projects that were underway and planned technology transfers linked to Turkey’s F-16 purchase. The third, the US contributed less than expected to the Turkish economy, largely due to meager US procurement of local goods, and services, such as construction materials and contract employees, and stingy contributions for operations and maintenance at shared installations.

Regarding the Turkish side’s disappointment of defense industrial cooperation, the report defended the US position underlining that the “original list of seven projects has grown to nine, the most extensive US coproduction program in the world. Moreover, the F-16 program, though not formally a part of defense industrial cooperation, will involve transfers of technology directly relevant to overall Turkish military production capabilities.”

The report emphasized that the US-Turkish defense cooperation would continue to be based on shared security interest. Just as Turkey had no realistic alternative to the United States as a military supplier and ally, there were few if any substitutes for Turkey’s geostrategic advantages to the United States either vis-à-vis the Soviet Union

⁴⁷⁰ CIA, Renegotiating the DECA, 13 September 1985, Approved for Release: 2010/01/28, CIA-RDP85T01058R00030340001-3

or as a potential support area for operations in the South West Asia and the Middle East. Despite points of friction, operational military cooperation was generally good.

6.9. Conclusions

Unlike previous DCAs, the DECA of 1980 had an economics dimension and a special supplement that envisaged helping Turkey founding its defense industrial base. This reflects the changing dynamics of Turkish-American relations under the influence of structural causes. Scholars cite the Cold War rivalry, Iranian revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as significant factors affecting US foreign policy's changing direction. An essential new structural force is the neoliberal policies, which gained momentum in Turkey after the military coup of 1980.

Material causes that shaped the new defense cooperation agreement involves Turkish economic problems. As shown in the previous chapter, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit repeatedly pressed for including economic assistance element to the new DCA.⁴⁷¹ The aging Turkish military equipment and the necessity to support NATO missions, and the urgent need of Americans for military bases in Turkey, are among the major material causes that fastened the new DECA's finalization.

Based on the official documents reviewed in this study, among the Efficient (agential) causes Ecevit's pressure to add an economic dimension to the new agreement and Turkish military's pressure for a new defense agreement with the defense industry dimension is quite discernible.

Final or ideational causes include ideas shared by both sides about the necessity of restoring Turkish-American relations. This idea was shared by both administrations. In Turkey, both Ecevit and Demirel governments pursued the same agenda concerning

⁴⁷¹ FRUS 1977-80, Document 107

mending ties with the USA. In the process of signing this new agreement, all four causes operated together, shaping each other simultaneously.

CHAPTER 7

CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Scholars, who work on the Turkish-American relations, try to show the importance of multiple casual elements and aspects affecting the relationship. For instance, according to Füsün Türkmen, two main elements stamped the Turkish American relations during the period of 1964 -1980: the Cyprus issue and the rise of Turkish leftist movements.⁴⁷² Türkmen also briefly argues that, bilateral relations between the two countries during the 1970s were affected by the Cyprus issue, the struggle between the Congress and the White House, role of lobbies, public opinion as well as by the Cold War realities.⁴⁷³ For Uslu, the embargo was a sign of weakness in case of the Cyprus issue. In order to support this argument, he maintains that the détente climate of 1974, in other words, superpower relations was also an explanatory factor for Turkey's intervention to Cyprus. Unlike the 1964 crisis, which ended up with the Johnson letter, Turkey this time could act independently.⁴⁷⁴ The failure of the US to prevent Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus was a stark example of the US impotency to affect Turkey's actions in a desired direction.⁴⁷⁵ However, there were still some limits for independent decision making. As Uslu also underlines, Turkey had to accept the armistice in Cyprus as a result of the US pressure.⁴⁷⁶ These kinds of explanations are very widely

⁴⁷² Turkmen, p.96

⁴⁷³ Ibid, p.144

⁴⁷⁴ Uslu, (2016) p. 306.

⁴⁷⁵ Uslu (2016) p. 307.

⁴⁷⁶ Uslu (2016), p.310

used in the literature on many subjects. This study aims to show that it is possible to demonstrate the interrelationship of the causes in a more systematic manner.

As explained in Chapter II, Aristotelian causation system has been used for the analysis of the Turkish-American defense relations in this study. According to Aristo, the causal forces were divided into four elements: formal, material, efficient and final causes. Following Kurki's work, these causal categories translate into structural, material, agential and ideational categories of causes.⁴⁷⁷

This dissertation uses the theory of causation under the scientific realist approach. According to scientific realism, reality is stratified, and this stratification includes three primary levels of reality; empirical, actual, and real. The four causes of the causation theory are based on the Aristotelian typology and consist of structural, agential, material, and ideational causes. Connecting these causes with scientific realist levels helps us to reach a comprehensive understanding. Therefore, while structural and material causes are discernible at the empiric level, agential causes are mostly responsible for the actual level of scientific realism. Finally, the Ideational level (which is the final cause in Aristotelian typology) is usually unobservable and constitutes the real level of scientific realism.

Kurki's uses her theory of causation in explaining the end of Cold War. She underlines the importance of positioning agents within complex structures shaped by formal, material and ideational causes.⁴⁷⁸ She also points out that "the study of concrete causal connections would also have to involve interpretive and historical analysis."⁴⁷⁹ These

⁴⁷⁷ Kurki, p.280, (Kurki argues that "the social ontology advocated here accepts that causes can be structural and agential, material or ideational")

⁴⁷⁸ Kurki, p. 285

⁴⁷⁹ Kurki, p. 285

interpretative and historical analysis constitute layers of reality, moreover they provide context for the agential, ideational and material causes.⁴⁸⁰

Therefore, in the following paragraphs, causal factors during the period between the embargo of 1974 and the signature of the DECA in 1980 will be analyzed using four causal categories. However, this chapter aims to show that causal forces work together, that they are not independent of other observable or unobservable causal forces. Hence, following the Scientific Realist philosophy and Kurki's understanding on the causation problematic, my argument is that revealing the complexes of causes and their interrelationship will lead to a comprehensive understanding of the generative mechanisms of the Turkish-American cooperation.

7.1. Structural (Formal) causes

Structural, or in Aristo's terms, formal causes, are discernible mostly at the empirical level. Indeed, the international system is accepted as a structural force in the discussions of agent-structure problem of the IR. Therefore, the neo-realist analysis of the Turkish-American relations will shed light onto some structural causes.

Primary issues that can be classified as structural causes that shaped the Turkish-American relations during the period between 1974 and 1980 were the Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR, the Cyprus Issue, Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Middle East politics of the super powers and particularly the US policy to protect Israel can also be considered as a structural causal factor that affected the Turkish-American relations. Also important is neoliberalism, which is difficult to separate as a sole structural force since it was also starting to be an ideational force at that time, to reshape the world in the years to come.

⁴⁸⁰ Kurki, p. 285

7.1.1. The Cold War Rivalry

The Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR was among the casual factors, which profoundly affected the Turkish-American relations. As a NATO member and neighbor of the Soviet Union, Turkey's strategic importance was at the highest point during the Cold War years. The military bases in Turkey were always at the center of the discussions regarding the Defense Cooperation Agreements. During the US Administrations' efforts to remove the embargo, the strategic importance of Turkey as a NATO member and the importance of Turkish military bases for collecting intelligence on the Soviet activities were among the chief arguments of the administration as shown in the previous chapter.

After the embargo, some Turkish attempts to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union, for instance, inauguration of a Soviet financed steel plant in Turkey⁴⁸¹ were seen by the US as pressure tactics.⁴⁸² This, in effect, shows that international system in general and the Cold War rivalry in particular had an important causal power over the relations between Turkey and the US.

As shown in the previous chapter, the US Government Accountability Office's report on the DECA summarizes the importance of Turkey for the US in a nutshell:

Turkey is a most valued NATO ally. It occupies NATO's southern flank, helps guard access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and faces the Soviet Union across the longest common land border of any NATO nation. The importance of Turkey's strategic location has been highlighted by the recent instability in Iran and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸¹ A steel plant in İskenderun, Hatay were financed by a Soviet Credit based on ana agreement dated December 24, 1972. (Turkish Official Gazette, October 22, 1977, Number: 16092)

⁴⁸² FRUS; 1973-76, Document 239.

⁴⁸³ The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement-US Interests and Turkish Needs, GAO, ID-82 31, May 7, 1982, P:3

This official evaluation of the GAO, which aimed to justify an economic agreement and military aids to Turkey, reflects the causal role of the Cold War rivalry on bilateral relations.

This geopolitical importance of Turkey is evident in the literature too. For instance, Ambrose and Brinkley mention Turkey's importance while explaining the US interest in the alliances with Middle East countries. They contend that "the Turks have little oil, but they do have a strategic location because they block Russia's only warm-water port, and of course they have one of the world's oldest civilizations"⁴⁸⁴

Another example of the effect of the international system and agencies on bilateral relations is reflected in a recent study by Timothy Naftali on the role of presidency. He argues that during the last days of Nixon-Kissinger administration, Greece and Turkey acted in a way to benefit from the power vacuum.⁴⁸⁵

Indeed, many scholars prefer to explain the end of the US embargo imposed on Turkey with the help of the changing international politics, i.e. structural (formal) causes. For instance, Kemal Kirisci argues that, "the sanctions were lifted in 1978 against a backdrop of fast receding détente, when the Cold War was making a second come back."⁴⁸⁶

7.1.2. The Cyprus Issue

It goes beyond saying that the one of the leading causal forces which shaped the relations with Turkey is the Cyprus problem. Both sides of the embargo debate in the

⁴⁸⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose & Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Penguin Books, 1997, p.255

⁴⁸⁵ Naftali, Timothy, *The Wounded Presidency, Part I*, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/impeachment_nixon_wounded_presidency_part_one

⁴⁸⁶ Kemal Kirişçi, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October-December 2000), pp. 37-63
Published by: SET VAKFI İktisadi İşletmesi, SETA VAKFI

US based their arguments on the situation created by the Turkish intervention to the island. The Cyprus intervention clearly functioned as a formal cause for the proponents of the embargo whose judgement on foreign military assistance act was affected by the Cyprus issue. The law that banned arms transfers to Turkey referred to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which required to stop of all kinds of military aid and sales to Turkey until the President decided that Turkey complied with this law and there was improvement in the Cyprus issue. “The linkage” of the Cyprus issue to the subsequent deals for improving the relationship between Turkey and the US was a recurrent theme during the term analyzed in this study.

7.1.3. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

The Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are formal causal powers affecting the course of the Turkish-American relations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in an elaborate memorandum dated February 22, 1979, from Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) the regime change in Iran was described among the main issues affecting Turkish-American relations.⁴⁸⁷ Henze claimed that there were two primary factors concerning Iran revolution. First, it would lead Turks to question the reliability of the US in the region as a protector against regime change. Second, the fragmentation of Iran would trigger Kurdish separatism and would cause trouble for Turkey as well. Henze observed that the religious character of the revolution was not worrying Turks.⁴⁸⁸

Similarly, the State Department bulletin announcing the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Turkey was clearly mentioning the role of structural

⁴⁸⁷ FRUS, 1977-1980, Document 130.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid, Document 130.

elements such as Soviet invasion of Afghanistan along with the disturbances in the Middle East.⁴⁸⁹

Spiers, the US Ambassador in Turkey during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, summarized how international structures affected Turkey in the region. He contended that “our defensive links to the Gulf via Iran have been cut and the Turks see themselves as geographically interposed between the Soviet Union and the oil it will need to overcome projected deficits in the 1980s.”⁴⁹⁰

Many scholars argue that the Iranian revolution had a visible impact on the Turkish-American relations. For instance, Feroz Ahmed claims that Turkey’s economic problems started to be eased after the Iranian revolution. He argues that Turkey’s “financial situation began to improve as a result of increased American support following the revolution in Iran.”⁴⁹¹

Therefore, the Iranian revolution was not only one of the important structural causes that affect the Turkish-American relations, but also it has indirect effects on other material causes, (increasing the importance of military bases and improving economic prospect of Turkey) good example of how complexes of causes work in tandem. Indeed, an article appeared in the Washington Post on May 9, 1970 concisely comments in the same manner:

The loss of Iranian bases has increased the strategic value of U.S. installations in Turkey. By far the most important of these are the ones at Pirinlik 180 miles from the Soviet border, where radar antennas pick up Soviet missiles on test flights, and

⁴⁸⁹ Department of State Bulletin, July 1980.

⁴⁹⁰ FRUS 1977-80, Document 145.

⁴⁹¹ Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, pp.177-178

at Sinop on the Black Sea, where listening devices monitor Soviet military communications missile test data.⁴⁹²

7.2. Material Causes

As Colin Wight argued, “all social life has a material aspect, but there is no reason to suppose that this will always be with objects that are natural. Many material objects are socially constructed – weapons, buildings and technology”.⁴⁹³ Therefore the material aspect of the Turkish-American relations, as shown in the previous chapter, affected many decisions and events. For instance, Turkey’s declining military capability and increases in Soviet armament were forcing the US administration to adopt a conciliatory approach with regard to Turkey’s demands.⁴⁹⁴ In many other cases, when the US Ambassador in Turkey, or other US officials corresponded about or making policy proposals with regard to Turkey, among their chief arguments one can see the concerns about these material aspects being either the necessity of the US bases or the deteriorating Turkish military capabilities. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge and classify material causes to have a complete picture of the generative mechanism of the relations between two countries. Among these material causes, the US bases in Turkey, Turkey’s deteriorated and aged military capacity, and worsened economic situation are easily discernible upon investigating official documents covering the period under study.

⁴⁹² John Lawton, “Turkey Demands More U.S. Aid for Use of Bases”, *The Washington Post*, 9 May 1979

⁴⁹³ Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations, Politics as Ontology*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p.296

⁴⁹⁴ FRUS 1977-80, Document 100.

7.2.1. US Bases in Turkey

As shown in the previous chapter, both during the embargo discussions and negotiations of the new defense cooperation agreement, the U.S. military bases in Turkey were at the center of considerations for both sides. While the U.S. was evaluating the impact of any decision regarding Turkey in terms of keeping the bases open and functional, Turkey consistently played the bases card to bargain a suitable decision for herself.

With the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980, the U.S. bases were regulated by the Supplementary Agreement 3, which specified access to bases and associated operating rights for the US forces. Seven annexes deal with Incirlik air base, the Sinop SIGINT and Pirinçlik spacetrack installations, nodal communications sites, logistical and administrative facilities, the Belbaşı seismic station, and the Kargaburun LORAN site.

Michael Gunter elaborates on the role of the military bases in the Turkish-American relations in his article. He emphasized that, the US military facilities in Turkey were “were used to monitor the Soviet Union with signals intelligence (sigint), communications intelligence (comint), and electronic intelligence (elint)” capabilities.⁴⁹⁵ He argued that “Turkey was a U.S. ally that offered an almost perfect location for the necessary eavesdropping and intelligence monitoring stations.”⁴⁹⁶

Gunter, concisely describes the importance of US military bases in Turkey. Karamürsel, Samsun, Sinop and Trabzon bases were all very critical bases that supplied invaluable information during the Cold War, including the historic moments such as the first manned space travel. For instance, Karamürsel base, which was under

⁴⁹⁵ Michael M.Gunter, *The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray*, World Affairs, Vol.167, No.3, Winter 2005, p.115-116

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p.115-116

the command of Naval Security Group, had huge rhombic antennas with very sophisticated technology aimed at voice and Morse communication of the Soviets. Gunter underlines the importance of Karamürsel base by saying that “Intercept operators monitored Yuri Gagarin’s liftoff and flight moment by moment despite the Soviets’ attempt at complete secrecy for this first man being sent into space.”⁴⁹⁷

Kirişçi too, briefly draws attention to the role of the US military bases in Turkey on Turkish-American relations. He contends that while these facilities provided strategic advantage for the NATO and the US throughout the Cold War, during time of embargo and opium crisis, they quickly became center of attention for the public opinion in Turkey.⁴⁹⁸

7.2.2. Turkish Military’s Efficiency as a NATO Member

The significance of supporting Turkish military capabilities is evident in many US documents reviewed in this study. As an example, in a letter dated July 16, 1973, then acting Secretary of State Ken Rush addressed Secretary of Defense Schlesinger regarding problems in providing Turkey with an electronic warfare capability.⁴⁹⁹ He underlined that the failure to provide Turkey the necessary capabilities it would harm directly the US intelligence facilities there and free access to use Turkish airspace.⁵⁰⁰ He contended that bases and privileges obtained from Turkey were crucial for the US security by saying that “our intelligence facilities in Turkey, as well as the other security-related privileges we enjoy there, are of such value that we should attempt to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Turks on this issue.”⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid, p.115

⁴⁹⁸ Kirişçi, ibid, p39.

⁴⁹⁹ Document 195, FRUS (1973-76)

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid, Document 195.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid, Document 195.

This letter reflected the nature of the Turkish-American defense relations with both changing elements and enduring features. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) was about to change the nature of the relationship which was based on conventional equipment aids. Turkey or any other significant ally had to be elevated to higher standards technologically so as to be able provide the requested assistance as an ally. In this case, major importance of Turkey which provided military bases as a neighbor of the Soviets, was increasingly challenged because of its technologic weakness caused by insufficient aging equipment.

7.2.3. Turkish Economy

The deteriorated Turkish economy during the period under study, can be considered among chief material causal forces in terms of affecting decisions and actions of both Turkey and the US. While economic problems constrained Turkey's options vis-à-vis foreign policy decisions, the effect of the economic crisis can be seen in Turkey's attempt to include economic assistance to the new DCA to be signed with the US. For the US, saving Turkish economy was a liability that should be shared with other Western countries as NATO members.

On the other hand, its weak economy sometimes considered as a vulnerability for Turkey by Americans so as to be used as a leverage for political aims, by giving or denying aid. However, as this cause is also strictly tied to other causes, Turkish economy sometimes was a subject of concern for Americans, (i.e., as a NATO ally it was necessary to support its economy) while other times it was used as a weapon (by denying help) as in the case of the Cyprus issue. Structural (formal) causes and agential (efficient) causes influence the overall effect of the Turkish economy as a material cause.

7.3. Agential (Efficient) causes

In Aristotelian causes system, agential (efficient) causes are one of the two extrinsic causes together with ideational (final) causes. When applying her theory of causation to the analysis of the end of the Cold War, Kurki argues that agents should be positioned within structures that pre-exists them. Agents “did not make their decisions and calculations in a vacuum but in a complex structural context.”⁵⁰² Therefore, agential (efficient) causes act in relation to material needs and constraints, ideational motivations or limitations, under the structural framework.

The importance of agency is covered in many IR theories as part of agent-structure problem. Based on the findings of the previous section main agencies which have discernible causal forces over Turkish-American relations can be summarized as the Congress, the administration, bureaucrats including diplomats and military, special interest groups and politicians. Naturally, agents are not limited to these actors however showing their causal effects on the major decisions and actions affecting the Turkish-American relations would serve this thesis’ purpose.

From the macro perspective, states are also considered as agents that operate within the international system. However, for this dissertation focus on the causal analysis of the two countries’ foreign policy formulation and implementation processes, states were left out as agential forces. After all, as Campbell argued, national states are “unavoidably paradoxical entities.”⁵⁰³

⁵⁰² Kurki, p.285

⁵⁰³ David Campbell. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992. p.11

7.3.1. The Congress and the President

The Congress as a whole as or with its individual members and groups have important agential roles as causal forces. Bearing in mind that agential causes work in tandem with all other causal forces, agent specific effects are important to be shown.

The Congress can be considered as the most important agent because all major decisions affected the Turkish-American relationship during the period covered by this study were taken in the House and the Senate. Lobby groups' work that pressured for the embargo and the administration's effort to either secure the removal of the embargo or to endorse the new DECA took place in the Congress. The decisions taken were under the influence of other causal forces described in this study as shown in the previous section.

Füsun Türkmen argues that the 1975 arms embargo is a tangible indicator of the increased efficiency of the U.S. Congress after the Vietnam War.⁵⁰⁴ As this view is shared widely by many scholars who write on American foreign policy, the Vietnam War's effect on administration-Congress relations shows that structural (formal), agential (Efficient) and ideational causes work together. Anti-war campaigns and its effect on developing strong ideational causes are also closely related. The debate on the military industrial complex also intensified in this period and this phenomenon itself strongly reflects the roles of agential, ideational and material forces.

7.3.2. Bureaucratic Politics and Diplomacy

The role of the bureaucracy as an agential cause is evident. There is of course a great body of knowledge dealing with the role of the bureaucratic politics on foreign policy analysis. For our study, the opinions and decisions of high-level officials, diplomats and advisors are evident in many cases.

⁵⁰⁴ Turkmen, p. 138.

For instance, the US ambassadors in Turkey sent lengthy reports to underline the importance of Turkey for the US. Their efforts had visible effects on the US administration's decisions regarding the removal of the embargo and accelerating the signature of a new defense cooperation agreement.

For instance, Ambassador Spiers' telegrams to Washington DC suggested that he almost acted as a volunteer to advocate the Turkish theses as seen his many telegrams.⁵⁰⁵

The pentagon also played important role during the removal of the embargo and the successful completion of the DECA. Obviously, as understood from the Defense Secretary Brown's meetings with Ecevit, intensification of the Cold War, and increased role of security in Turkey's region, moved Pentagon to play more actively in favor of the restoration of ties and increased cooperation with Turkey.

7.3.3. Special Interest Groups and Lobbies

After the Cyprus operation on July 20, 1974, Greek lobbies in the U.S. pressured up in the Congress for the sanctions against Turkey.⁵⁰⁶ Amongst them, the largest one was the American Greeks Orthodox Church, which had 502 branches all over the U.S. as of 1974. They had a very effective communication system which was informing Greek families about the recent events in Cyprus. They managed to raise funds above 1 million U.S. Dollars. They facilitated adopting children who lost their families during the war.⁵⁰⁷

Another effective Greek lobby group was American Hellenic Educational Progress Association (HEPA) which had 50.000 members in 430 branches all over the U.S.

⁵⁰⁵ FRUS 1977-81, Document 145.

⁵⁰⁶ Erhan, p.424.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid, p.424

Erhan argues that these lobbies' influence on the U.S. administration was higher than anticipated. So much so that, Gerald Ford, who replaced Nixon after his resignation over Watergate scandal, had to invite Archbishop Iakovos, the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church to the White House to appease American Greeks.⁵⁰⁸ It was also just before the November 1974 elections for the Congress that increased the efficiency of the Greek lobby according to Erhan.⁵⁰⁹

7.3.4. Turkish Politicians

During the period under study, Turkish domestic politics was mostly in turmoil, with constantly changing coalition governments led by the leftist RPP or conservative Justice Party. Therefore, both these parties and their leaders, Ecevit and Demirel, have significant causal roles as agencies in affecting important events, which took place during the embargo process and towards signing a new DCA. It is observed that while these two leaders and their parties significantly differ in their political agendas and choices, they follow the same outline with regard to relations with the US. However, their differences also affect the US-Turkey relationship. While Ecevit was more inclined to have good neighborly relations with the Soviets, Demirel emphasized Turkey's sense of victimhood due to being placed at the border of NATO's Cold War rival. While Ecevit underlined the importance of Turkey's democracy and its shared values with the West, for Demirel Turkey was the ardent supporter of free market ideology in this corner of the world. These differences were reflected in evaluations of American policy makers as shown in the documents mentioned in the previous chapter.

There are many evidences of these two Turkish leaders' differences of attitude and style. For instance, in his meeting with President Ford, Demirel emphasized his

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid, p.424

⁵⁰⁹ The Turkish Arms Embargo Part 1, The Byrd Center Blog, accessed on October 9, 2019, <https://www.byrdcenter.org/byrd-center-blog/the-turkish-arms-embargo-part-i#>

personal stance concerning the Soviets by saying that “I also have strongly opposed Communism.”⁵¹⁰

While Ecevit, in his meeting with Cyrus Vance, repeatedly underlined Turkey’s strength as a political force and its commitment to democracy and peace, rather than being a military asset. He was also very sensitive vis-à-vis the relations with the Soviets to the extent that he empathetically saw policies from the Soviet’s perspective. He said that “Turkey had been used as a tool by the allies, forcing the Soviet Union to concentrate forces in the Caucasus and thereby reducing the burden on Western Europe.”⁵¹¹

7.3.5. Turkish Military

The documents reviewed in this dissertation shows that Americans considered the Turkish military as crucial agent in terms of its impact on the bilateral relationship. For instance, a memorandum prepared by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, dated 12 July 1971, submitted latest developments and prospects regarding Turkey at a time when a military coup took place and Nihat Erim became prime minister replacing Suleyman Demirel who was forced by generals to resign. The memorandum summarized the political, economic and social situation in Turkey. The Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 was signed by the civilian Demirel government. However, implementing accords were not concluded and negotiations were continued by the military backed Erim Government. However, the most interesting part of the memorandum with regard to this study is a striking remark about the Turkish military. According to the document, which said “the generals want an orderly society in which public service is set as the highest good, with its rewards in wealth and power. Private

⁵¹⁰ FRUS 1973-74, Document 227

⁵¹¹ FRUS, 1977-80, Document 107.

enterprise and the accumulation of wealth through trade or industry rank at the bottom of their value system.”⁵¹²

This observation of Americans that the Turkish military did not value a capitalist society, might be considered as a hint for understanding the pre-neoliberalism era attitude of the Turkish Military. Just ten years later, Turkish government and army would be pressing to include defense industry and economic cooperation into the new defense cooperation agreement.

In their agential role the Turkish military’s importance is also evident in a number of correspondence between the US administration and the US Embassy in Ankara. In another example, as already reviewed in the previous chapter, Spiers’ memorandums on policy proposals had a great deal of remarks about Turkish military leaders. In many telegrams there were assessments and predictions about the approaching military coup in Turkey before 1980. Indeed, Mehmet Akif Okur elaborates on the relationship between the 1980 military coup and the US administration and concludes that there was ample evidence that the US authorities knew that the coup was coming.⁵¹³

7.4. Ideational (Final) Causes

In Aristotle’s four causes typology, final causes imply intentionality⁵¹⁴ and in essence they are purposive goals.⁵¹⁵ For this reason, ideational (final) causes are closely associated with agential (efficient) causes. Conceiving intentionality as a causal force

⁵¹² Office of National Estimates, CIA, 12 July 1971, Memorandum, Turkey in Trouble, Approved for Release 2006/03/10, p5.

⁵¹³ Mehmet Akif Okur, The American Geopolitical Interest and Turkey on the Eve of the September 12, 1980 Coup, *Cumhuriyet Tarihi ve Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Year 11, Issue 21, Spring 2015, p.215

⁵¹⁴ Kurki, p. 225

⁵¹⁵ Ibid, p. 222.

distinct from agents is a striking feature of the theory of causation advanced by Kurki. As she puts it, final (ideational) causes “refer to an irreducible type of cause”.

Therefore, finding out ideas that shape the events is also an important part of developing a comprehensive understanding of the Turkish-American relationship in that particular era. After reviewing official US documents between 1973 and 1980 most visible ideational causes are perceptions of two sides with regard to each other. For instance, the image of Turk and Turkey in the minds of American policy makers are as important as Turkish politicians’ own perception and desires with regard to Turkey’s image.

7.4.1. US Perceptions, Beliefs about Turkey

In documents reviewed in this study, a close look to agents’ behavior reveals that perceptions were influential. While at the aftermath of the embargo decision, the dominant faith in the US policy circles was that Turkey had no alternative to American military equipment. However, towards the end of the decade this perception replaced by a need to bolster Turkey’s military industrial infrastructure. The result was a closer armaments cooperation alongside with the removal of the embargo.

As a matter of fact, the perceptions of each side about one another have always been a determinant. Harris also touches this issue by saying that “membership in NATO brought a central and enduring problem: how to define the scope of cooperation with the U.S., an issue that has bedeviled the relationship ever since”.⁵¹⁶ He observes that “it seems likely that excessive expectations of the commonalities of interests between

⁵¹⁶ Harris, George. (2004) “Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine” in Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future, Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds, Routledge, New York, p.69.

the U.S. and Turkey helped intensify the disappointment when the realities revealed differences in objectives on significant matters.”⁵¹⁷

7.4.2. Distrust to Nixon-Kissinger Administration

The hatred and distrust towards Nixon and Kissinger administration that accumulated during the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal created a momentum in the US Congress that facilitated Greek lobbies’ effort to impose an embargo on Turkey.⁵¹⁸ While in the background there are structural elements such as the White House-the Congress power struggle, the unique style of the Nixon-Kissinger administration, particularly their performance in conducting foreign policy constituted an ideational cause in the form of distrust or even hatred that affected other foreign policy decisions.

7.4.3. Turkey Seek Autarky in Armaments

The documents reviewed in this study show that, major events of this period in the Turkish-American relations, particularly the embargo decision led Turkish policy makers to search for alternatives. Here again, the constitution of this ideational cause was depended on other causes: The Cold War, the détente, the Cyprus issue, and the Embargo were among the structural (formal) causes. Interpreters of this structure were agential forces, that included politicians, bureaucrats and the public opinion. They were facing urgent and constraining material causes such as aging military or economic difficulties while interpreting the structure so as to formulate foreign policy. Therefore, under these conditions, a strong ideational force that can be observed was the Turkey’s inclination to self-sufficiency.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid, p.69.

⁵¹⁸ Legg, p.123

Indeed, Harris captures that by maintaining that Turkey was seeking new dimensions in its foreign policy after the Cyprus issue. He argues, “Turkish foreign policy took on a more independent cast and sought to decrease reliance on just one ally.”⁵¹⁹

In documents reviewed here it is evident that starting with 1978, the Ecevit government insisted on adding an economic element to the new defense cooperation element. In many occasions he also suggested joint defense material production with allied countries. This attitude was a reflection of a firm policy change with regard to armaments in Turkey. After the embargo, the Turkish leaders, civilian and military bureaucrats agreed on the necessity of establishing national defense industrial base and reducing the dependence to a single source, i.e., the US.

On January 12, 1978 during the proclamation of his new government program, Ecevit announced a new defense and security concept.⁵²⁰ “Ecevit’s national defense doctrine” as cited by Çağrı Erhan⁵²¹ and İlhan Uzgel⁵²², was a new concept reflected a more determined approach to armaments based on national capabilities and avoiding single source in critical systems procurement. Ecevit elaborated on this new concept at the meeting of Supreme Military Council on February 13, 1978. In his opening speech, he declared that the crucial elements of this new national defense concept were the principles of not basing national security on foreign capabilities and recognizing the importance of the compulsory link between national defense and economic might.

⁵¹⁹ Harris, p.72.

⁵²⁰ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Term 5, Volume 3, Session 1, 21.02.1978 Tuesday, pp.376-377

⁵²¹ Çağrı Erhan, Diplomatik Muhakeme, Türkiye Gazetesi, May 5, 2009, <https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar/prof-dr-cagri-erhan/407529.aspx> last accessed June 10, 2020

⁵²² İlhan Uzgel, Türkiye’de Yeni Ulusal Savunma Doktrini, in “Türk Dış Politikası”, Ed. Baskın Oran, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p.674

7.4.4. Domestic Pressures, Sources and Constraints

Domestic sources of foreign policy also include ideational (final) causes. The domestic constituents, for instance, the public opinion, were formed and mobilized under the effect of other causal forces. Ideas against the US were developed under the détente climate, following the Vietnam war. Increased freedom and activism made governments more responsive to the demands and opinions of the public. Thus, the period studied in this dissertation were times of increased criticism against the Turkish-American partnership. According to Harris, “new pressure groups became involved on both sides. The Turkish press and opposition parties began to weigh in regularly, subjecting the alliance at times to bitter criticism.” Harris further argues that university students, “emerged as independent political players.”. Therefore, he summarizes, “these circles has a palpable impact on the Turkish Government, significantly limiting its freedom to conduct relations with the U.S.”⁵²³ Harris, on the other hand considers Congress, Armenian and Greek lobbies as powerful agents affecting Turkish-American relations.⁵²⁴

Some scholars see the opium issue as one of the basic reasons for the deterioration of the Turkish-American relations. It can be argued that this issue has been an important ideational cause that particularly affected the mood in the Congress, and that Turkey’s policies with regard to the opium issue paved the way for the embargo decision. Indeed, Uslu argues that opium problem normally should not be an issue, because the essence of the problem was not the production but illegal trade of the opium. Therefore, an effective control mechanism could be instituted. However, both countries preferred to use the issue to address their domestic public opinion instead of solving the problem bilaterally.⁵²⁵ Therefore it is safe to say that agents (both

⁵²³ Harris, p.73.

⁵²⁴ Harris, p.73.

⁵²⁵ Uslu (2016) p.279.

governments) preferred to use a material cause (opium issue) as an ideational cause for benefiting from it to gain in domestic politics.

7.4.5. Effect of neoliberalism

The neoliberal policies that started to govern the western world in the 1970s, can be considered as one of the ideational causes that shaped the Turkish-American relations. David Harvey provides a concise account of Neoliberalism in his important book “A Brief History of Neoliberalism.”⁵²⁶ He argues that the first neoliberal experiment came with Pinochet’s coup in Chile backed by Kissinger and the CIA. In Chile, with the help of Milton Friedman, an affiliated economist, a brutal neoliberal experiment was carried out.⁵²⁷ Harvey writes that “the grim reach of US imperial power might lie behind the rapid proliferation of neoliberal state forms throughout the world from the mid-1970s onwards.”⁵²⁸ As Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin observe in their seminal work, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, Turkey was one of the first countries which applied neoliberal policies. They argue that after the military takeover of 1980, “Turkey became among the first countries to adopt neoliberal reforms.”⁵²⁹

As an important ideational cause, neoliberalism has fundamental effects of transforming world economy in the direction of “interests of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital.”⁵³⁰ In order to ensure these aims, David Harvey argues, the neoliberal project envisages the creation of the neoliberal state, in order to create “best possible business climate” through competition

⁵²⁶ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005

⁵²⁷ *Ibid*, p.7

⁵²⁸ *Ibid*, p.9

⁵²⁹ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, Verso, London and New York, 2012, p.217

⁵³⁰ Harvey, p.7

between national states.⁵³¹ Therefore, even though a neoliberal idea project is an international one, it needs national incentives and motivations to create international competition between them. It makes it easier to frame efforts for creating national defense industry with the help of the very source that triggers that need. In other words, while Turkey was trying to establish its own defense industry after the embargo, it was seeking the US support for achieving it.

Interestingly, even though the embargo caused momentum in Turkey's self-sufficiency efforts, the new defense and economic cooperation set by the DECA, clearly reflects the neoliberal mood in the US-Turkey relations. While Turkey aims to establish its own defense industry, it started this endeavor by opening up to the Western based defense companies. The law regarding the development of defense industry with the number 3228 of 1985 was clearly encouraging the participation of foreign capital to Turkish defense programs. Indeed, the first defense companies that were established during this period were joint ventures with American and European companies.

Cağlar Kurç's PhD dissertation, titled "Critical Approach to Turkey's Defense Procurement Behavior: 1923-2013" elaborates on the role of neoliberal transformation on Turkey's defense industry development efforts. He argues that Turkey's inclusion to the neoliberal agenda starts with the standby agreements signed with IMF in 1978 and 1979 and "the transformation was made possible by the military coup's ability to crush and discipline labour and societal opposition, without which could not be done."⁵³²

Anouck Gabriela Côte-réal Pinto's study grasps the effect of neoliberalism on Turkey's defense industry development efforts by claiming, "in Turkey as in France,

⁵³¹ Harvey, p.85

⁵³² Çağlar Kurç, "Critical Approach to Turkey's Defense Procurement Behavior: 1923-2013", PhD Dissertation, METU, September 2013, pp.215-216

the project of military self-empowerment—a technological, economic and industrial project—did not challenge the Atlanticist alliance. Instead, it allows the heterogeneous interests of the strategic partners to be fueled”. They compares Turkey’s defense industry development project with the French experience of 1960s with NATO, underlining the similarities of the “the desire to move from being a nation guaranteed by NATO (through the concept of ‘collective defence’ provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) to being a nation also capable of self-defence.”⁵³³ They contend that Turkish efforts to create its defense industry “—a technological, economic and industrial project—did not challenge the Atlanticist alliance.” They claim that Americans supported Turkey in this endeavor “for commercial reasons: it would ensure the creation of a new market for US defence companies.”⁵³⁴ They gives the example of two primary Turkish-American joint ventures, armored vehicles producer FNSS and the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). They further argue that other than commercial interest, Americans calculated strategic interest under the intensification of the Cold War. Allowing Turkey and other allies to establish their own industrial bases would alleviate the economic burden on the American who were focused on increased armament race with the Soviets.⁵³⁵

7.5. Conclusions: Causal Forces Work Together: Complexes of causes

After showing four different causal forces that were effective in generating mechanism of bilateral cooperation between the US and Turkey, it would be necessary to see how these causal forces operate together as “complexes of causes” in particular cases.

⁵³³ Anouck Gabriela Côte-réal Pinto, *A Neo-liberal Exception? The Defence Industry ‘Turkification’ Project in Development As A Battlefield*, Irene Bono, Béatrice Hibou, Brill. (2017), pp 305-306

⁵³⁴ Ibid p.306

⁵³⁵ Ibid, p.306

Indeed, it is the aim of this study to develop a model to uncover generative mechanisms of the Turkish-American relations.

In line with the theoretical model advanced by Kurki based on Aristotelian multi-causal framework; the embargo decision, the removal of the embargo and signature the new defense cooperation agreement (DECA) will briefly be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

7.5.1. Causal Forces of the Embargo Decision

Congress' decision to suspend all military assistance to Turkey was officially based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, which required that the U.S. aid should only be used for self-defense purposes in NATO approved military actions. Therefore, for embargo to take place, this legal framework acted as *formal cause*. Naturally, Turkey's intervention to the island provided the general framework as another formal cause.

Turkey's lack of material capability and dependence on the US arms can be considered as the chief *material cause* since this deficiency was permissive for the embargo decision to be an effective disciplinary measure.⁵³⁶

As for the *final causes*, it can be argued that, the Congress' overall motives were

- to discipline the US Administration with which the Congress had at that time a fresh history of struggle during the Vietnam War,
- to take the conduct of foreign policy to its own hands,
- to punish Turkey and its intervention in Cyprus.

⁵³⁶ American's perception of Turkey's dependence on US military equipment is well described in FRUS 1969-76 Volume, Document 217 which was quoted in the previous chapter.

Individual members' motivation to answer lobby groups' demands also played as a final (ideational) causal force in the formulation of the embargo decision.

Efficient causes of the embargo include the Congress as a whole, individual members and group of members who sponsor the legal actions, the Greek lobby groups who press on these groups and individuals in the Congress. For the Turkish side, the turbulence in domestic politics also acted as an enabler at the agency level particularly as the absence of initiative as argued by Çağrı Erhan.⁵³⁷

To sum up, in the process of taking the embargo decision, the agents, (in this case the Congress), acted with the knowledge of material causes (the material possibility to discipline and/or punish Turkey) motivated by final causes (to discipline the administration, punish Turkey, respond lobby groups so as to be elected again etc) under the influence of other agential forces (the lobby groups) in order to respond formal causes (Turkey's violation of the Foreign Assistance Act through Cyprus intervention). Therefore, instead of explaining the embargo decision by one or two dimensions, this approach promises a bigger picture and opens avenues for more research taking into account of scientific realist notion of stratified realities.

7.5.2. Causal Forces of the Removal of the Embargo

It is possible to say confidently that, among *formal causes* that affect the removal of the embargo, structure of international system is the major one. The main arguments of the administration to press on Congressional members for the removal of the embargo was centered on the urgent need of supporting Turkey's aging military (a material cause), now that the embargo was deteriorating Turkish military, and Turkey was just too important to ignore as a NATO member and neighbor of the Soviets. Being allies in NATO was providing the main formal framework for the necessity of the removal of the ban to military aids and exports to Turkey. Nasuh Uslu underlines

⁵³⁷ Erhan, 2001, p.707

the fact that the decision coincides with the worsening situation in Iran which would result in loss of important military bases in the Middle East.⁵³⁸

Similarly, the chief *material cause* is the US bases. The geographical situation of Turkey, as mentioned above, was making the US military bases in this country extremely important. Since Turkey had closed its bases to the US military, except NATO approved operations, it was now an absolute necessity to reopen and operate these bases in Turkey.

The principal *agential or efficient causes* of the removal of the embargo involved Carter administration and the US Ambassador in Turkey who constantly underlined the importance of not losing Turkey against Greece as shown in the previous chapter. Other agents shaping the process include the Turkish military and political leaders along with the decreased influence of the Greek lobby during Carter's presidency. Indeed, Christos Kassimeris argues that the influence of Greek lobby during the Carter administration was weakened.⁵³⁹

It should be sufficient to analyze US Ambassador Spiers' telegrams in order to show how these causal forces operate together to affect the outcome. The ambassador (as an efficient cause) pressed on the US administration with his ideas (final cause) that had been shaped under the material necessities and his structural perceptions.

7.5.3. Causal Forces of DECA

Different from previous DCAs, the DECA of 1980 had an economics dimension and a special supplement that envisaged helping Turkey found its defense industrial base. This reflects the changing dynamics of the Turkish-American relations under the

⁵³⁸ Uslu (2016), p. 323

⁵³⁹ Christos Kassimeris, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 26, Number 1, May 2008, pp. 91-114

influence of the neoliberal agenda of the US. Before elaborating on this issue, four causal forces that enabled the signature of the DECA will be discussed.

Formal or structural forces are similar to that of the removal decision. Scholars cite the Cold War rivalry, Iranian revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as major factors affecting the changing direction of the US foreign policy. An important new structural force is the neoliberal policies which gained momentum in Turkey after the military coup of 1980.

Material causes include Turkish economic problems. As shown in the previous chapter, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit constantly pressed for including economic assistance element to the new DCA.⁵⁴⁰ The aging Turkish military equipment and necessity to support NATO missions, as well as the urgent need for military bases in Turkey are among the major material causes that fastened finalization of the new DECA.

Based on the official documents reviewed in this study, among the *Efficient (agential) causes* Ecevit's pressure to add economic dimension to the new agreement and Turkish military's pressure for a new defense agreement with the defense industry dimension is quite discernible.

Final or ideational causes include ideas shared by the both sides about the necessity of restoring the Turkish-American relations. This idea was shared by both administrations. In Turkey both Ecevit and Demirel governments pursued the same agenda with regard to restoring relations with the USA.

Hence in the process of signing this new agreement, all four causes operated together, shaping each other simultaneously. For instance, neoliberal model is a result of special interest of capitalist classes shaped in accordance with their ideologic positions,

⁵⁴⁰ FRUS 1977-80, Document 107

implemented by agents. The inclusion of defense industrial cooperation into the agreement also happened as a result of complexes of causes. For instance, Turkey during the Cyprus intervention and aftermath felt the necessity of alternative defense procurement sources, the Turkish military and leaders, particularly Ecevit started to defend this position. These were the agential (efficient) and ideational (final) causes. On the other hand, the rapid change of the structure, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or Iranian revolution, made the concessions from the US side a necessity. As a result, the path for the foundation of a self-sufficient Turkish defense industry was opened. However, it was the contribution of the US side for much to the benefit of US defense companies in the shorter term.

Table 4 Four Causes Model

Structural (Formal)	Material	Agential (Efficient)	Ideational (Final)
Détente	US Bases Turkey's contribution to NATO	White House Congress DoD, DoS	Domestic Politics Human Rights Independent FP
Escalation of Cold War	Turkish Economic Problems Turkish Military Needs	Ambassadors Turkish Politicians Turkish Military Greek Lobby	Neoliberalism Arms Race Alliance

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This study, adopting scientific realist philosophy, theoretically attempted to develop a comprehensive approach to show how structural, agential, material, and ideational forces were at play in determining Turkey and the United States' decisions and actions concerning their policies towards each other between 1973 and 1980. Structural (formal) and material causes were relatively easier to analyze at the empirical level since there is plenty of empirical evidence such as documents and statistical data. However, agential (efficient) or ideational (final) causes are not less important in determining the outcome. The scientific realist approach's superiority is that it accepts unobservable elements such as ideas or other social constructs as part of the ontology so that it can be possible to show how complexes of causes or generative mechanisms occur in tandem with each other. Putting agents in a structural framework, bounded by material realities and driven by ideational motives, makes a comprehensive approach possible to understand and explain their actions.

It is possible to draw three main conclusions from the theoretical attempt. First, the four Aristotelian causes suggested by Kurki (formal/structural, Agential/efficient/, ideational/final, and material) are suitable in explaining and understanding major turning points (i.e., the imposition and the lifting of the embargo). For this study, among major formal causes, the chief one was the international structure, particularly the Cold War rivalry. At the regional level, the revolution in Iran and the Cyprus crisis were also covered in this study as they were major structural causes. Material causes included the US military bases in Turkey, Turkish military capabilities, and the Turkish economy. They were material causes limiting and motivating foreign policy formulation and implementation for both Turkey and the US. The agential (efficient) causes were at the center of all decisions and actions. They included but were not

limited to politicians in both countries, the Congress, the US administration, high-level bureaucrats, special interest groups, and the Turkish military. Lastly, ideational (final) causes included in this study were US perceptions about Turkey, the distrust or hatred against the Nixon-Kissinger administration, domestic pressures, and the emerging neoliberal ideas. These ideational causes were motivators of agents' actions.

The second theoretical conclusion is that these causal forces work together in creating an effect. For instance, agents act with the knowledge of structural causes, motivated by ideational causes and bounded by material causes. In the documents reviewed here, it is possible to discern almost every example of how these multiple causes interact to create a result. The research reveals that the Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in the *détente* climate (which was permissive for punishing a crucial ally), under the influence of many ideas from hatred toward Kissinger to resentment toward Turkey because of the opium issue and Cyprus crisis, motivated by the Greek lobby. The administration had always struggled to keep defense cooperation with Turkey intact as dictated by bureaucratic and scientific wisdom. However, it was only able to persuade the Congress thanks to the changing structural circumstances (intensification of the Cold War, Iranian revolution, etc.) and material necessities (increased need to use military bases and not degrading NATO capabilities in a critical region). Even this basic explanation must consider structural, agential, material, and ideational factors and their infinite interactions.

Third, as suggested by the scientific realist philosophy, the reality is stratified, and these causal forces exist in every layer from empiric to unobservable levels. Therefore, these three peculiarities of the theory of causation advanced here make it possible to develop a comprehensive approach with its plural ontology. Thus, a widened theoretical perspective opens new avenues for further research.

In addition to revealing how complexes of causes can be useful as a theoretical approach in analyzing international relations, as a contribution to the literature, this

study also draws some practical conclusions concerning the Turkish-American relations based on the official US foreign policy documents.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war heralded early signs of worsening relations between Turkey and the US. During the said conflict, Turkey allowed the USSR aircraft to use its airspace while showing reluctance to permit the Americans' use of the İncirlik airbase. This attitude of Turkey caused dissent on the US side. The opium problem was really of no help in easing the relations between the two allies. Turkey's new leftist government was a source of further concern for the Americans. In such a climate, Turkey's Cyprus intervention on July 20, 1974, became the tipping point and led to Congress's embargo decision on February 5, 1975. In brief, this is the realist narrative based on empirical evidence, i.e., events observed in the field. In the détente climate, particularly under the conditions of facing imminent security concerns (Cyprus issue), it became possible for a weaker member of the Western block like Turkey to act relatively independent from the US, the leader of the block (USA).

However, the US administration was not sharing the eagerness of Congress to punish Turkey. President Ford vetoed the embargo decisions as long as he could. One of his last moves as president was to sign a new defense cooperation agreement with Turkey and convey it to Congress for endorsement. In several documents reviewed in this study, it was clearly stated by many US officials that Turkey was crucial for US security as a NATO ally. At the same time, the embargo would not help to solve the Cyprus issue.

On the contrary, those officials contended that it was hardening Turks' stance and even motivated them to look elsewhere to meet their armament needs. Yet, Congress's mood was against Turkey and against the administration itself in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. The divide between the Congress and the administration illustrates the importance of the agential and domestic level explanations and the realist interpretation at the structural level.

In retrospect, the US administration was struggling to develop a coherent policy towards Turkey. In their initial assessments, the chief material factors were the US military bases and nuclear presence in Turkey and Turkey's economic hardships. At the agential level, as revealed by some of the documents reviewed under this study, the US administration was weighing its options between Demirel, who was moderate and closer to the Americans, and Ecevit, who had intervened in Cyprus and represented a more radical but still manageable leader with leftist inclinations. While the embargo was imposed on Turkey, the US doubted its efficiency, particularly its impact on the Cyprus problem, its potential backlash on Turkey, and to what extent Turkey may be drifting away from the US. Their initial assessment was that Turkey was years away from developing an indigenous defense industry, and the likelihood of replacing the US with another source for armaments was very dim.

However, from the structural perspective, we see that due to a more liberal international political climate between Western and Soviet blocs created at the time by the *détente*, less powerful members of both camps began to act more autonomously and unhampered. It is interesting to note that Turkey tends to develop and implement multidimensional foreign policy when there is no hegemon or when that hegemon becomes less assertive. It was in the midst of another non-hegemonic era that Turkey had emerged as a new republic that pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy and sought to stay out of the Second World War as long as it could. After the Vietnam War, against the background of the oil crisis and the *détente*, Turkey had already acted more independently. At the very least, governments in Turkey had pretended to be acting more independently in response to the growing domestic public pressure. This was an argument, which we observe in the FRUS documents, used by both Demirel and Ecevit while negotiating with their American counterparts when they were complaining about the evident injustice endured by Turkey, a staunch ally of Western civilization. It is in this environment that Turkey seriously started its search for alternative armament sources. In such an environment, the last act of the Ford administration vis-a-vis

Turkey took the shape of signing a new defense cooperation agreement and sending it to Congress and rendering it a burden for the Carter administration.

Once more, according to the documents reviewed here, the Carter administration approached Turkey as amicably as the previous administration. It was a real sigh for Carter to accomplish the removal of the embargo and his administration accepted Turkey's demands for including defense industrial cooperation into the new defense cooperation agreement. Again, the international structure or formal causes were quite crucial as events were unfolding. The struggle with the Soviets was heating up, and a revolution was taking place in Iran. Consequently, the democratic majority in the Congress could be persuaded, though not easily, by the Carter administration to lift the arms embargo, which was proved to be ineffective in solving the Cyprus problem, and to endorse a new defense cooperation agreement instead.

Those years between 1973 and 1980 studied here were also times for Turkey of increasing economic woes and political instability accompanied by domestic violence between leftist and nationalist groups. In Turkey, both the governing party and its main opposition used the American embargo in domestic politics to mobilize their supporters. However, when they made contact with the American administration, both supported the strong relationship between the US and Turkey, and they always underlined their attachment to NATO and the Western alliance. Even during the bleakest moments of crisis, both Turkish leaders; Demirel, and Ecevit, maintained excellent relations with the US administration, particularly with Kissinger and presidents Ford and Carter.

These material, agential and ideational causes were important in shaping Turkish-American relations throughout the period. For the US, it became more evident towards the end of that period that Turkey was an indispensable ally for NATO. The military bases and intelligence facilities were too important to be abandoned. Leaving Turkey with its economic problems and carrying on with the arms embargo proved to be too

costly. It would also mean impairing NATO capabilities in the face of a re-intensifying Cold War.

Consequently, the US and Turkey signed a long-lasting new defense cooperation agreement (DECA) on March 29, 1980, which has continued to set the framework for defense relations between them. Besides being a foundation agreement to foster economic and social developments, DECA encompasses supplementary agreements on military affairs, defense industrial cooperation, and military bases in Turkey. Since its inception, there were a lot of discussions and complaints from both sides concerning its implementation. Some concrete projects identified under the supplementary agreement have never been materialized. However, the stimulus of this era on Turkey's defense industry development is apparent. Main defense capabilities for producing modern aviation equipment, armored vehicles, and radars and electronic warfare capabilities were launched as joint ventures between Turkish and American companies.

Indeed, one of the long-lasting results of the US arms embargo imposed on Turkey in 1974 was that it led to an awakening on the Turkish side and the push to establish a self-sufficient defense industry, as outlined by Turkey's National Defense Concept of 1978. Paradoxically, that impetus for establishing an autonomous defense industrial base turned into a cooperation item led by American defense companies. As outlined in Law: No 3238, enacted in 1985, one of the main features of this new defense industry policy was its openness to foreign investment. This could be seen as a development taking place under the influence of international developments requiring closer cooperation with the US and the US's new neoliberal agenda on its allies. To create a robust defense industry, Turkey needed a stronger economy. The DECA provided for a link between defense cooperation and economic cooperation. As a framework, it has profoundly affected Turkish-American relations during the years of the neoliberal age to come.

Apart from politicians, civilian and military bureaucrats, the particular roles of US ambassadors in Turkey appeared to be striking in all this. They were strong advocates of Turkish positions during the crises, such as the arms embargo, the consequent closure of US bases in Turkey, Cyprus intervention, and opium. Ambassadors were effective reminders of Turkey's importance for the US as a part of the Western Alliance and as a pivotal state bordering the US's primary Cold War rival, the Soviets. A review of official documents demonstrates that those US Ambassadors acted as very effective agential forces both in the formulation and implementation of Washington's policies.

The US Congress usually posed substantial challenges to the relationship between the two countries. These challenges were sometimes an outcome of Turkey-specific reasons such as the opium issue and Cyprus intervention. But it also had systemic reasons stemming from the contest in foreign policy formulation between the executive and legislative branches of the US. There was also the influence and interference of the Greek lobby in Congress. But consecutive US administrations acknowledged and accepted this reality and played their cards accordingly. As seen from the documents, sometimes the Congress's attitude was even used as an alibi by the administration to counter Turkey's demands.

The global context was the main background as the structural (formal) cause, impacting how the agents formulated and implemented policies in line with their material necessities, ideas, and perceptions. The détente, renewed Cold War rivalry, the Iranian Revolution and the pursuant hostage crisis, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Arab-Israeli tensions constrained and shaped both countries' policies towards each other.

Finally, an essential conclusion of this study is that the US's hegemonic position and emerging global capitalism profoundly affected Turkish-American defense relations in the period from 1973 to 1980. Against the background of a final and heated struggle between Americans and the Soviets, Turkey and the US quickly left problems aside and took their respective positions in increased cooperation. Turkey was becoming a

model neoliberal country, while the US was going to launch its final offensive on the Soviets by increasing defense spending, and bringing, in retrospect, the first financial, then the political collapse of the latter.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Giriş:

Bu tez çalışmasının amacı, Türk-Amerikan savunma ilişkilerinin en buhranlı olduğu dönemlerden birini, 1974 silah ambargosundan 1980 Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşmasının imzalanmasına kadar olan dönemi ele alarak nedensel mekanizmalarını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Afyon üretimi krizi ile başlayıp Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı ve Ambargo ile devam eden ve sonunda kapsamlı bir savunma işbirliği anlaşmasının imzalanmasıyla biten süreçte Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin en kötünden en iyiye doğru nasıl geliştiğinin, bu döneme ilişkin Amerikan resmi belgeleriyle ortaya konulması hedeflenirken, diğer taraftan da teorik açıdan Aristo'nun dört neden öğretisini Uluslararası İlişkilere uygulayan Milja Kurki'nin nedensellik teorisi kullanılarak Türk Amerikan ilişkilerinin dinamiklerinin kapsayıcı bir yaklaşımla ele alınması amaçlanmıştır.

Teorik ve ampirik iki amaca yönelik bu tez, analitik derinlik sağlamak ve geniş kapsamlı bir bakış geliştirmek için bilimsel gerçekçi felsefeyi benimsemiştir. Zira bilimsel gerçekçi felsefeye göre gerçeklik katman katmandır ve gözlemleyebildiğimiz kadar gözlemleyemediğimiz, fakat etkileri itibarıyla varlığını görebildiğimiz ya da yorumlayarak sezibildiğimiz unsurlardan oluşmaktadır. Bu yönüyle bilimsel gerçekçi felsefe, teze metodolojik zenginlik de katmaktadır. Çalışmada, döneme ilişkin Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini içeren ABD Dış Politikası belgeleri (FRUS) kullanılmıştır. Bu belgeler ağırlıklı olarak Türkiye'ye ilişkin yüksek seviyeli toplantıların notları, ABD Büyükelçiliği ile ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı arasındaki diplomatik yazışmaları içermekte, döneme ilişkin olarak ele alınan üç temel olgunun; ambargo kararının (1975), ambargonun kaldırılması kararının (1978) ve Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği

Anlaşmasının imzalanmasına (1980) ilişkin sürecinin gelişimine ABD politika belirleme süreçleri bakımından ışık tutmaktadır.

İkinci bölüm: Nedensellik Teorisini Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Uygulamak

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, çalışmada uygulanan teorik çerçeve ele alınmıştır. Bu tezde, bilimsel gerçekçi felsefe ışığında, Milja Kurki tarafından geliştirilen ve uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında uygulanması önerilen nedensellik teorisi uygulanmıştır. Bilimsel gerçekçi felsefeye göre, gerçeklik değişik katmanlardan oluşmaktadır. Gözlemlenebilen ve gözlemlenemeyen unsurlardan oluşur. Çalışmanın araştırma sorusu, Türk Amerikan ilişkilerinin 1973 ve 1980 arasındaki dönemine ilişkin olarak gerçekleşen büyük olayların nedensel mekanizmalarını araştırmak olduğu için nedensellik teorisi bu soruyu cevaplama yönelik olarak uygun bir araç olarak benimsenmiştir. Kurki'nin önerdiği nedensellik teorisi, Aristo'nun dört neden öğretisine dayanmaktadır. Aristo'ya göre bu dört neden, Maddi Neden (causa materialis), Formel Neden (causa formalis), Etken (fail) neden (causa efficiens) ve ereksel (amaç) neden (causa finalis) olarak sıralanmaktadır. Kurki'nin nedensellik teorisi, Aristo'nun bu öğretisini esas alarak aslında uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinde yaygın bir şekilde benimsenmiş olan Humecu yaklaşımı reddetmektedir. Çünkü Hume'un nedensellik anlayışında öne çıkan unsur, düzenlilik ve bu düzenliliğinin gözlemlenebilir olmasıdır. Kurki tarafından geliştirildiği şekliyle nedensellik teorisi maddi (material), yapısal (formal/structural), fikri (ideational) ve amil (agential) olmak üzere dört kategorideki nedenler üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Böylelikle sadece gözlemlenebilen nedenler yerine gözlemleyemediğimiz fikri ve yapısal nedenleri de analize temel almak imkan dahiline girmektedir. Bu çalışmada maddi sebeplere örnek olarak ABD'nin Türkiye'de bulunan askeri üsleri, Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu ya da ihtiyaç duyduğu savunma ekipmanı ve genel ekonomik durumu gibi hususları gösterilebilir. Yapısal sebepler arasında, özellikle uluslararası sistemi ve bu sistemde mevcut olan Soğuk Savaşı, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki yumuşamayı (Détente) ve Soğuk Savaş'ın daha sonra yeniden tırmanışını ve silahlanma yarışının hızlanması gibi

unsurlar bulunmaktadır. Fikri sebepler arasında, Türkiye'nin savunma sanayi geliştirme çabalarını, ABD Kongresinin daha önceki Başkan Nixon'un Dışişleri Bakanı ve Milli Güvenlik Danışmanı Kissinger ile birlikte dış politikayı yürütüş şekline duyduğu tepkiyi, yönetimine duyduğu güvensizliği ve yönetimi disipline etme arzusunu saymak mümkündür. Amil sebepler arasındaysa ABD Başkanları, Türkiye Başbakanları, ABD Kongresi, her iki ülkenin politik ve askeri liderleri, lobi grupları yer almaktadır. Nedensellik teorisinde önemli olan husus ise bu sebeplerin tek başına değil birlikte hareket ederek sonuç doğurmaları ve böylece gerçekliğin değişik katmanlarını inşa etmeleridir.

Üçüncü Bölüm: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Kısa Tarihi: 1973-1980

Bu bölümde, tezin incelediği dönemin iki ülke açısından önemli siyasi tarih gelişmeleri kısaca özetlenmiş ve çalışmanın tarihi arka planı ortaya konulmuştur. 1970li yıllar hem Türkiye hem de ABD için pek çok açıdan bir geçiş dönemi olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Uluslararası sistem noktasından bakıldığında, bu tezde incelenen dönemde Soğuk Savaş'taki yumuşama döneminin yerini yeniden silahlanma yarışı ve yükselen bir rekabetin aldığını görmekteyiz. Bu geçiş döneminin amiller seviyesinde de yaşandığı görülmektedir. ABD Başkanı Nixon, Watergate skandalından sonra istifa etmek zorunda kalmış, Nixon'dan sonra kalan dönemi tamamlamak üzere Başkan Yardımcısı Ford'un ABD Başkanlığını üstlenmiştir. Ford'dan sonra Başkanlık seçimini Carter'ın kazanmasıyla ABD'de yönetimin Cumhuriyetçilerden Demokratlara geçtiğini görmekteyiz. Başkan Carter insan hakları ve silahsızlanma gündemiyle başladığı görevini, Afganistan'ın Sovyetler Birliği tarafından işgali, Sovyetler ile artan bir gerilim, İran Devrimi gibi olayların gölgesinde bitirmiştir. Türkiye'de ise bu yılların kısa dönemli ve birbirini takip eden koalisyonlar dönemi olduğu, aynı zamanda politik ve ekonomik istikrarsızlığı sahne olan bu dönemde Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri açısından son derece önemli gelişmeler yaşandığı görülmektedir.

Ele alınan dönemde ABD Yönetiminin politika belirleme süreçlerinde Başkanların yanında çok etkili Dışişleri Bakanları ve Milli Güvenlik Danışmanlarının bulunması da dikkat çekicidir. Nixon ve Ford döneminde Henry Kissinger, Carter döneminde ise Dışişleri Bakanı Cyrus Vance ve Milli Güvenlik danışmanı Brzezinski çok etkili figürler olarak ABD dış politika kararlarının alınmasında ve bunların yürütülmesinde amil olmuşlardır.

1970'ler Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri açısından Afyon krizi ile başlamıştır. Türkiye'de iktidara gelen CHP-MSP koalisyonunun lideri Başbakan Bülent Ecevit, secim kampanyasında söz verdiği üzere ülkede daha önce ABD'nin talebi üzerine 12 Mart 1971 Askeri Cunta rejimi tarafından konulmuş olan Afyon üretim yasağını kaldırınca, bu karar ABD Kongresi başta olmak üzere ABD kamuoyunda büyük bir tepkiye neden olmuştur. Zira Amerikan kaynaklarının iddiasına göre ülkeye yasa dışı yollarla giren afyonun büyük bir bölümü Türkiye'de üretilmektedir. Kongre, afyon krizi yüzünden Türkiye'ye yaptırım uygulama seçeneklerini tartışmaktayken, Türkiye'nin gerçekleştirdiği Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı ile, Yunan Lobisinin de büyük çabalarıyla Kongreden Türkiye'ye askeri malzeme satış ve teslimine yönelik ambargo kararı çıkmış, buna cevap olarak Türkiye'nin ülkesindeki ABD üslerinin kullanımını askıya alması, ilişkileri oldukça derinden etkilemiştir.

Dördüncü Bölüm: Ambargoya Giden Yol

Bu bölümde resmi ABD dış ilişkiler belgeleri üzerinden ambargo kararına giden süreç ele alınmaktadır. Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri 1973 yılına gelindiğinde önemli sorunlarla karşı karşıyadır. 1964 yılındaki Johnson Mektubu olayı ile başlayan gerileme, 1973 yılında afyon üretiminin serbest bırakılması ve yine 1973 yılındaki Yom Kippur Arap-İsrail Savaşı sırasında ABD'ye incirlik üssünü kullanma izni verilmezken Sovyetler Birliğine Türkiye hava sahası üzerinden Arap ülkelere yardım amaçlı nakliye uçaklarına uçuş izni verilmesi ilişkileri büyük ölçüde germiştir. ABD Yönetimi ve Kongre'nin müttefikleri Türkiye'ye karşı geliştirilecek strateji ve muhtemel

yaptırımları tartışmakta olduğu bu ortamda Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının gerçekleştirilmesi, ilişkilere büyük bir darbe vurmuştur. ABD'deki Yunan lobisinin tazyiki ile harekete geçen Kongre, Türkiye'ye silah yardım ve satışını yasaklayan bir karar almış, ABD yönetimin veto ve engellemeleri netice vermemiş, nihayetinde Başkan Ford 30 Aralık 1974 tarihinde ambargo kararını imzalamak zorunda kalmıştır. Türkiye, ambargoya cevap olarak 1969 tarihli Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşmasını 25 Temmuz 1975 tarihinde tek taraflı olarak feshetmiş ve ülkedeki ABD askeri üslerinin kullanımını da askıya almıştır.

Bu döneme ilişkin belgelerin incelenmesi sonucunda öne çıkan hususlarda birisi, Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde etkisi bugün de hissedildiği üzere, dış politikanın belirlenmesi ve yürütülmesinde Kongre ve Beyaz Saray arasındaki rekabettir. ABD Yönetimi Türkiye'ye askeri yardımın devam etmesi gerektiğini her fırsatta dile getirmiştir. Bunun sebepleri olarak, ABD ve NATO'nun güvenliği, Ambargonun Kıbrıs sorununu çözmeyeceği, tersine daha da ağırlaştıracağı, Türkiye'nin siyasi istikrarı beklenmeden uygulanan yaptırımların sonuç vermeyeceği gibi argümanlar ortaya konulmuştur. Buna karşılık yaptırım taraftarı olan Kongre üyeleri ise Kissinger'ı Türkiye'yi değil Kongreyi yola getirmeye çalışmakla suçlamışlar ve ambargonun işe yaramamasının nedeni olarak ABD Yönetimini göstermişlerdir.

Bu dönemde yapılan liderler arası görüşmelerde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Süleyman Demirel, Türkiye'nin uğradığı açık haksızlığı ve hayal kırıklığını çarpıcı örnekler vererek dile getirmiştir. Bunlardan birinde, 29 Mayıs 1975 tarihinde Başbakan Demirel NATO zirvesi sırasında Başkan Ford ile yaptığı görüşmede, Türkiye'nin serbest piyasa ve demokrasi tercihiyle Batı ittifakında yer alarak Sovyetler Birliğinin komşusu bir ülke olarak büyük riskler aldığını buna rağmen parasını verdiği teçhizatı bile teslim alamayarak cezalandırıldığını, hatta bakım için ABD'ye gönderilen kendi uçaklarını bile geri alamadığını, üstelik geri alamadığı için de Lockheed firmasına ceza ödemek zorunda kaldığını etkili bir şekilde dile getirmiştir. Buna karşılık olarak Ford'un açıkça Kongre'yi suçladığı ve Türkiye ile ilişkilerin

düzeltilmesinin ABD Yönetiminin en öncelikli konularından biri olduğunu ifade etmiştir.

ABD Yönetimi, Kongrenin ambargo kararı sonrasında Türkiye'ye karşı izleyeceği politikaları belirlemek için bir dizi çalışma yürütmüş, Türkiye'nin ABD yerine alternatif geliştirip geliştiremeyeceğini anlamaya çalışmıştır. Nitekim bu konuda hazırlanan bir raporda kısa vade Türkiye'nin silah tedarikinde ABD yerine etkili bir alternatif bulamayacağı, zira gerekli fonu, altyapısı ve yetişmiş insan kaynağı bulmakta sıkıntı çekeceği, ancak Türkiye ve ABD arasında ambargonun neden olduğu güven bunalımının etkilerinin daha uzun süreceği vurgulanmıştır. Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliğine yakınlaşma çabalarının da ABD tarafından yapılan değerlendirmelere konu olduğu, fakat Türkiye'nin Batı ittifakına bağlılığının güçlü olduğu Sovyetlere yaklaşım konusunun bunun daha ziyade, ABD ile pazarlıklarda koz olarak kullanmayı amaçladığı manevralar olduğu düşüncesinin baskın olduğu görülmektedir.

Bu dönemde ilişkilerin yeniden kurulabilmesi ve Türkiye'nin feshettiği 1969 Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşmasının yerini almak üzere yeni bir anlaşma görüşmeleri yapılmış, mutabık kalınan metin Ford'un Başkanlığının son aylarında Kongreye gönderilmiştir. Bu süreçte ABD'nin Ankara Büyükelçisi Macomber'in de Türkiye'yi bir müttefik olarak kaybetmenin maliyetinin çok yüksek olacağına ilişkin uzun değerlendirmeleri dikkat çekicidir.

Ambargo kararına, nedensellik teorisi açısından bakıldığında, amil (agent) olarak Kongre'nin ve Kongreyi bu karara teşvik eden Yunan lobisinin, maddi olarak Türkiye'nin ABD silahlarına bağımlı olması gerçeğinin, yapısal olarak, halen bir yumuşama döneminde olan ABD-Sovyet ilişkilerinin ABD açısından Türkiye gibi bir müttefikine yaptırım uygulamasına izin veren bir ortam oluşturduğu, nihayet fikri neden olarak, Kongre'nin hem Türkiye'yi afyon sorunu ve Kıbrıs müdahalesi nedeniyle cezalandırma, diğer taraftan da zaten Nixon ve Kissinger tarafından yürütülen dış politikadan dolayı tepkili olduğu ABD Yönetimini disipline etmek, dış politikada belirleme ön almak gibi amaçlarının başat rol oynadığı incelenen

belgelerden de anlaşılmaktadır. Bu dönemin en belirgin özelliklerinden biri Kissinger'in ve ABD Başkanlarının Türk liderler ile görüşmelerinde de açıkça belirttikleri gibi Kongre ve Yönetim arasındaki görüş farklılıkları ve rekabettir.

Beşinci Bölüm: Ambargonun Kaldırılması

1976 yılında, ABD'de Başkanlığa Jimmy Carter seçildikten sonra gündemindeki ilk konulardan birisi, önceki Başkan Ford döneminde imzalanmış ve Kongre'ye onaylanması için sevk edilmiş Türk-Amerikan Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşmasıdır. Carter'ın ilk işlemi Kongreden geçmesini imkansız gördüğü bu anlaşmayı geri çekmek olmuş, bu da Türkiye'de yeni yönetime karşı tereddütle yaklaşılmasına neden olduysa da ikili görüşmelerle kısa sürede yeni yönetimin de Türkiye ile ilişkileri düzeltmeyi amaçladığı anlaşılmıştır. Carter bu amaçla danışmanlarından Clark Clifford'u Türkiye'ye göndermiş, Clifford, Türkiye'de Başbakan Demirel ve ana muhalefet lideri Ecevit'in yanı sıra bürokratik ve askeri çevrelerle de görüşmelerde bulunmuştur.

Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin finansal problemlerinin yükselişe geçtiği ve iç istikrarında da azalma olduğu görülmektedir. Ocak 1978'de Ecevit başbakanlığında yeni bir hükümet kurulurken, yazışmalardan da anlaşıldığı üzere Türk hükümetlerinin ABD ile savunma işbirliği konusunda aynı çizgide politika üretmeye devam etmişlerdir. Ecevit Batı ittifakına bağlı olduğu ve Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini düzeltme arzusunda olduğu mesajlarını ABD'ye iletirken, Başkan Carter'dan Türkiye'ye üst düzeyli bir temsilcisini görüşmeler için göndermesini istemiş, bunun üzerine Dışişleri Bakanı Cyrus Vance Türkiye'ye gelmiştir. Ecevit görüşmelerde Türkiye'nin askeri bir kabiliyet olarak değil batı değerlerini özümsemiş demokrasiye bağlı bir ülke olmasının ittifak için daha önemli olması gerektiğinin altını çizmiştir. Bu görüşmede ilk defa olarak Türkiye'nin yeni savunma işbirliği anlaşmasında ekonomik işbirliği boyutunun da yer almasını istemesi önemlidir.

Yine bu dönemde ABD'nin Ankara Büyükelçisi Spiers'in ABD'ye gönderdiği raporlarda Türkiye'nin ABD için önemini altı çizilmiş ve yeni savunma işbirliği

anlaşmasının bir an önce imzalanması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Türkiye'nin ABD ile ilişkilerinin düzeltilememesi durumunda Batı ittifakından da uzaklaşması tehlikesi bulunduğu dikkat çeken Büyükelçi Spiers, bunun da ülkeyi istikrarsızlığa iteceği uyarısında bulunmuştur. Nitekim Carter Yönetimi Ambargonun kaldırılması Kongre nezdindeki girişimlerini arttırmış, hatta Carter Ecevit'i de Kongre üyelerine yönelik lobi çalışmaları yapmasını tavsiye etmiştir.

Şubat 1975'te yürürlüğe giren ambargo, nihayet 26 Eylül 1978 tarihinde Başkan Carter'ın imzaladığı yasayla yürürlükten kalkmıştır. Ambargonun uygulandığı süre boyunca hem ABD Yönetimi hem de Türk Hükümeti bu ambargonun kaldırılması için işbirliği içinde çaba göstermişlerdir. Bu amaçla gerçekleştirilen görüşmelerde dikkat çeken husus, Türk tarafında ilişkilerin eski durumuna getirilmesinden ziyade ambargodan alınan dersle, ABD savunma teçhizatına bağımlılığın da azaltılması amacıyla yerli savunma sanayiinin kurulması için çaba göstermesidir. Bunlardan, özellikle Başbakan Bülent Ecevit ile ABD Savunma Bakanı Brown arasında 5 Haziran 1978 tarihinde yapılan toplantının tutanağı ilgi çekicidir. Bu toplantıda Ecevit, Türkiye'nin belirli teçhizatın üretiminde uzmanlaşmış, müttefiklerle işbirliği içinde ortak üretim yapan ve ihracat odaklı bir savunma sanayii kurmak istediğini belirtmekte ve ABD'den bu konuda işbirliği istemektedir. Bu dönemin gelişmelerine nedensellik teorisi uygulandığında görülmektedir ki, ambargonun kaldırılmasına etki eden yapısal nedenlerin başında uluslararası sistemin değişen koşulları gelmektedir. Soğuk Savaş'taki yumuşama dönemi geride kalmaya başlamış, bunun etkisiyle ABD yönetimi Kongreye karşı en etkili argüman olarak güneydoğu Avrupa'daki NATO kabiliyetlerinin Türkiye'ye uygulanan ambargo yüzünden gördüğü zarar ve ABD'nin Sovyetler Birliği komşusu bir müttefikindeki askeri üslerini kullanamıyor oluşu gösterilmiştir. Türkiye'nin bulunduğu coğrafyadaki istikrarsızlığın artması da önemli olmuştur. İran'daki gelişmeler, Şah rejiminin yıkılması ihtimalinin belirmesi, ABD'nin Türkiye'deki üslere duyduğu ihtiyacı arttırmıştır. Dolayısıyla uluslararası ve bölgesel gelişmeleri yansıtan yapısal nedenler yanında, bunlara bağlı olarak Türkiye'deki üsler gibi maddi sebepler daha belirleyici olmaya başlamıştır. Amil

nedenler (agential causes) arasında ise Ambargonun kaldırılması sürecini yöneten ABD Yönetimi, ABD Savunma Bakanlığı, Türkiye’de mukim ABD Büyükelçilerinin çabaları ve Türk Hükümeti ve diplomatlarının girişimleri gözden geçirilen belgeler ışığında belirgin bir şekilde öne çıkmaktadır. Türkiye’nin askeri kabiliyetlerinin güçlendirilmesi gerektiği, Türkiye’deki üslere ihtiyaç duyulduğu, esasen Kıbrıs sorunu bahane edilerek konulan ambargonun ne bu sorunun çözümüne katkı sağladığı ne de zaten Türkiye’nin ABD dahil müttefiklerden silah ve teçhizat alımını tamamen engelleyemediği argümanları da nedensellik teorisi içindeki fikri sebepleri (ideational causes) teşkil etmektedir.

Altıncı Bölüm: Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliğinde Yeni Dönem

Türkiye’ye uygulanan silah satış ve yardımına ilişkin ambargo kalktıktan sonra ABD tarafındaki ana beklenti askeri işbirliğinin devamı ve dolayısıyla Türkiye’deki askeri tesislerin kullanımına devam etmek olmuştur. Bunun için bu üslerin kullanımını düzenleyen yeni bir anlaşmanın da bir an önce imzalanması için çalışmalar başlamıştır. Türkiye açısından ise, yeni anlaşma ile hem ambargonun verdiği zararları giderecek bir ekonomik işbirliği tesis etmek, hem de yine ambargodan alınan dersle, bu yeni anlaşmayı Türkiye’de modern bir savunma sanayii altyapısının kurulmasına yönelik bir enstrümana dönüştürme çabasının belirgin olduğu görülmektedir. Bu dönemde aynı zamanda Türkiye’de iç istikrarın bozulduğu ve sıkıyönetimin ilan edildiğine tanık olunmaktadır. Türkiye’nin ekonomik sıkıntılarının da arttığı bu dönemde, ABD’nin Türkiye’ye ekonomik destek için uluslararası finans kuruluşlarının yanında Almanya, Fransa, Japonya gibi müttefik ülkelerden de yardım arayışında olması dikkat çekicidir. Nihayet, 10 Ocak 1980 tarihinde iki ülke arasında Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği anlaşması parafe edilmiştir. Buna göre, Türkiye’deki tüm üsler Türk komutanlar idaresine verilmiş, bu üslerin kullanımı Türkiye’nin nihai iznine bağlanmıştır. 29 Mart 1980 tarihinde imzaları tamamlanan anlaşma ile ABD Türkiye’ye ekonomi ve savunma konusunda destek vermek ve Türkiye’nin savunma sanayii kabiliyetlerinin

geliştirilmesi için en iyi çabayı gösterme (best effort) yükümlülüğü üstlenmiştir. NATO'yu kuran Kuzey Atlantik Anlaşması'nın ikinci ve üçüncü maddelerine atıfta bulunan anlaşma üç ek anlaşma ve sekiz ekten oluşmaktadır. Ek anlaşmalar, savunma işbirliği, savunma sanayii işbirliği ve askeri tesisler konularını düzenlemektedir.

Türkiye ile ABD arasında daha önce imzalanan savunma işbirliği anlaşmalarından farklı olarak, 1980 yılında imzalanan Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması, adından da anlaşılacağı üzere ekonomik işbirliği boyutu da taşımaktadır. Bu anlaşmanın eklerinden biri de Türkiye'de modern bir savunma sanayii altyapısı kurulmasına yönelik olarak ABD ile işbirliği yapılmasını öngörmektedir. Bu durumu, Türk-Amerikan işbirliğinin dinamiklerinde uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen değişikliğin bir yansıması olarak değerlendirmek mümkündür. Akademisyenler, yeniden hızlanan Soğuk Savaş rekabeti, İran devrimi, Sovyetlerin Afganistan'ı işgali gibi gelişmelerin ABD dış politikasına etkisine bağlamaktadırlar. Bununla birlikte yapısal nedenlere aynı zamanda fikri bir neden olarak da değerlendirilebilecek olan neoliberal politikalar eklenmiştir. Türkiye'de 1980lerden sonra uygulanmaya başlanan neoliberal politikalar, yabancı sermayeye açık bir savunma sanayii kuruluşunu kolaylaştırmıştır, nitekim Türkiye'nin savunma sanayii hamlesinin çerçevesini teşkil eden 3238 sayılı yasa da yabancı sermayeye açık ve ihracat ve uluslararası işbirliğini öncelikli gören bir savunma sanayi politikası ortaya koymaktadır.

Döneme ilişkin bir diğer değerlendirme de dış politikanın siyaset üstü seyretmesidir. Gözden geçirilen belgelerden anlaşıldığına göre, Türkiye'de birbirini izleyen Ecevit ve Demirel hükümetleri, ABD ile işbirliğinin yeniden kurulması konusunda siyaset üstü bir tutum izlemişler ve ABD ile yaklaşımlarında aynı argümanları savunarak süreklilik taşıyan, tutarlı bir yaklaşım takip etmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla uluslararası sistemik değişimler (yapısal), bu değişikliklere göre yeniden önem kazanan ABD üsleri (maddi), Türk savunma sanayiinin modernizasyonu ve işbirliğinin tesisi ihtiyacı (fikri), müzakereleri yürüten Carter yönetimi, Demirel ve Ecevit, Türkiye'nin Yunanistan'dan daha önemli olduğunu her fırsatta Beyaz Saraya hatırlatan ABD'nin Ankara Büyükelçisi (amil), dört ana kategorideki nedensel unsurları teşkil etmiş ve bu

unsurların birbiriyle ilişkileri sonucunda, ambargonun konulma sebebi olan Kıbrıs sorununda kayda değer bir gelişme olmamasına rağmen iki ülke Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması üzerinde mutabık kalmıştır.

Yedinci Bölüm: Türk-Amerikan Savunma İlişkilerinin Nedensel Analizi

Bu bölümde ambargo kararı, ambargonun kaldırılması ve SEIA'nın imzalanması süreçlerinde etkili olan nedensel mekanizmalar ve bunların birbiriyle etkileşimi üzerinde durulmuştur.

Tezde ele alınan dönemde öne çıkan yapısal sebepler arasında en önde geleni Soğuk Savaş koşulları olmuştur. Soğuk Savaş'ın yumuşama dönemi ve gerilimin arttığı dönemler ilişkiler üzerinde bu çalışmada incelenen diğer nedenler üzerinde çerçeveyi oluşturması hasebiyle belirleyici etkisinin bulunduğu görülmektedir. Uluslararası sistemin koşulları yanında bölgesel gelişmeler de yapısal nedenler arasında ele alınabilecek etkilere sahip olup bunlar arasında başta Kıbrıs sorununu, İran Devrimini, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Afganistan'ı işgalini, ABD-Mısır yakınlaşmasını saymak mümkündür.

Maddi nedenler olarak öne çıkan hususlar arasında Türkiye'nin savunma yeteneklerinin durumu, ekonomik koşulları ve belki de en önemlisi olarak ABD'nin Türkiye'deki askeri üs ve tesisleri sayılabilir. Bunların önemi uluslararası sistemde ve bölgede meydana gelen değişimlere, bir başka ifadeyle yapısal nedenlere bağlı olarak artıp azalmış, ilişkiler üzerinde rol oynayan temel kararlara doğrudan etki etmişlerdir.

Tezde incelenen ambargo, ambargonun kaldırılması ve SEIA'nın imzalanması süreçlerinde amil nedenler olarak ABD Kongresi, ABD Yönetimi, Türk Hükümetleri, sivil ve askeri bürokratlar, özel çıkar grupları ve lobiler sayılabilir.

Fikri sebepler ise amiller tarafından yapısal ve maddi nedenlerle sınırlanmış ve şekillendirilmiş motivasyon ve istekler şeklinde ortaya çıkmışlardır. ABD Kongresi'nin Türkiye hakkındaki fikri, afyon üretimi problemi ve Kıbrıs harekâtı

sonrasında olumsuz iken, ABD Yönetimi ve yönetime karar desteği sağlayan danışmanlar nezdinde Sovyetler Birliğinin komşusu bir müttefik olarak Türkiye ile ilişkiler büyük önem taşımıştır. Dolayısıyla bu fikirler, bu fikirlerin sonuç doğurma gücü diğer yapısal ve maddi koşullara göre değişmiştir. Yine fikirsel nedenler arasında ABD Kongresi ve Yönetimi arasında dış politikanın yürütülmesi rekabeti, özellikle Vietnam Savaşı sırasındaki dış politikadan rahatsız olan Kongre'nin Watergate skandalı ile istifa etmek zorunda kalmış Başkan Nixon'a duyduğu tepkinin özellikle ambargo kararında etkili olduğu izlenmiştir. Türkiye açısından da ambargodan alınan dersle yerli savunma sanayiinin kurulması fikrinin ikili ilişkileri etkilediği açıktır. Fakat bu fikir tek başına sonuç üretmek yerine uluslararası sistemdeki değişiklikler ve maddi koşullara paralel olarak şekillenmiş, ambargodan alınan dersle savunma sanayii kurulması çalışmaları hedeflenirken, gerek ekonomik problemler, gerek alternatiflerin azlığı gerekse de Soğuk Savaş gerilimin artması sonucu NATO ittifakı içinde işbirliğinin güçlenmesi eğilimi sonucu, yeni savunma sanayii hamlesi paradoksal biçimde ABD ile işbirliği halinde başlatılabilmektedir.

Sayılan bu neden kategorisindeki unsurlar birbirleriyle etkileşim içinde gerçekliğin değişik katmanlarını oluşturmuştur. Olaylar bazında incelendiği zaman, çalışmada gözden geçirilen belgeler ışığında bu sebeplerin birbirleriyle etkileşimini gözlemek mümkün olmuştur.

Ambargo kararında, Türkiye'nin ABD savunma teçhizatına bağımlı olması temel maddi neden olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Ambargo kararının alan amil olarak Kongrenin üç temel amacı olduğu görülmektedir. Bunlar, 1) Vietnam Savaşındaki Kongreye danışmadan yürütülen ve kötü sonuçlara yol açan dış politikası yüzünden ABD yönetimini disipline etmek 2) Dış politika yönetimini kendi eline almak, 3) Türkiye'yi Afyon üretimi ve Kıbrıs Harekâtı nedenleriyle cezalandırmak olarak sıralanabilir. Yapısal nedenler arasında ise hem uluslararası sistemin içinde bulunduğu yumuşama dönemi (détente) nedeniyle ABD'nin bir müttefikini cezalandırabilmesine imkan sağlaması gösterilebileceği gibi, Kongre'nin 1968 tarihli Dış Askeri Satış Yasası

koşullarının çığnendiği iddiası da kendi karar alma süreci açısından formel bir neden teşkil etmiştir.

Ambargonun kaldırılması sürecinde yapısal nedenlerin başında, Soğuk Savaş geriliminin yeniden tırmanma eğilimine girmesi gelmektedir. Ambargo kararının alındığı döneme nazaran bu defa daha aktif bir amil (agent) olan ABD Yönetimi, Türkiye'ye uygulanan ambargonun NATO'nun zayıflamasına neden olduğu, ayrıca Türkiye'deki askeri üslerin ve tesislerin hayati önem taşıdığı argümanlarını bu yapısal değişim sayesinde daha etkili bir şekilde kullanabilmiştir. Yine bu ortamda, ambargonun aslında Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne katkı sağlamadığı ABD Yönetiminin Kongreye karşı daha etkili bir şekilde savunulabilmiş, hatta bir noktada, Kongre liderleriyle ABD Yönetiminin yaptığı bir görüşmede Türkiye'nin kaybedilmesi halinde bunun sorumlusunun yaptırım ve ambargo yanlısı Kongre üyeleri olacağı ifade edilmiştir.

Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşmasına giden yolda her iki ülkenin hükümetlerinin önde gelen aktörler arasında yer aldığını görülmektedir. Bu anlaşmaya daha öncekilerde olmayan bir ekonomik işbirliği boyutunun eklenmesi Türkiye'nin ambargodan aldığı derslerle, içinde bulunduğu ekonomik sıkıntılarla ilgisi olduğu kadar, ABD'nin uygulamaya başladığı neoliberal politikalar ile de uyum içinde olduğu görülmektedir. Nitekim yerli savunma sanayii kurmak isteyen Türkiye, buna ABD firmalarının başat rol oynadığı bir model ile girişmiştir. Sovyetler Birliğinin Afganistan'ı işgali ve İran devrimi Türkiye'nin hem sağladığı stratejik maddi imkanlar hem de kaybedilmemesi gereken bir müttefik olarak ABD nazarındaki konumunu güçlendirmiş, aynı şekilde silahlanma yarışının hızlanması ve artan gerilim Türkiye'yi de NATO müttefikleriyle işbirliğine daha istekli bir pozisyona sürüklemiştir. Özetle ifade etmek gerekirse, yapısal nedenler, maddi nedenlerin önemini değiştirmiş, amilleri ve onların fikirlerini değiştirmiştir.

Sonuç:

Bu çalışma 1973-1980 arası Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin en kötünden en iyi seviyeye nasıl geldiğini üç gelişme, ambargo, ambargonun kaldırılması ve SEIA'nın imzalanması üzerinden, büyük ölçüde ABD diplomatik yazışmalarını içeren resmi belgelere dayanarak ve bilimsel gerçekçi felsefeye dayalı olarak Kurki tarafından önerilen nedensellik teorisinin uygulanmasıyla incelemiştir. Dolayısıyla hem teorik hem de ampirik sonuçları bulunmaktadır.

Teorik sonuçlardan birincisi olarak, Aristo'nun dört neden öğretisine dayalı olarak Kurki tarafından önerilen nedensellik teorisi, çalışmada ele alınan döneme uygulanmış ve açıklayıcılığı ortaya konmuştur. Yapısal nedenler arasında en önemlisinin uluslararası sistem ve Soğuk Savaş olduğu, Soğuk Savaşta yumuşama ve gerilimin artması dönemlerinin ilişkilere doğrudan tesir ettiği görülmüştür. Ayrıca, İran devrimi ve Kıbrıs sorunu gibi bölgesel gelişmelerin de yapısal nedenler arasında incelenmesi mümkündür. Maddi nedenler arasında ABD'nin Türkiye'deki askeri tesisleri öne çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca Türkiye'nin askeri ihtiyaçlarında ABD'ye bağımlı olması, Türk ekonomisinde yaşanan sorunlar gibi maddi gelişmeler ilişkileri etkileyen önemli kararlar ve dönüm noktaları üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Üçüncü sebep kategorisi olan amiller, dış politika kararlarının alınmasında, uygulanmasında ve dış dünyanın yorumlanmasında merkezi role sahiptirler. Bunlar arasında, ambargo kararını alan Kongre, bu kararda Kongreye baskı uygulayan Yunan Lobisi, ambargo kararının kaldırılmasında öne çıkan ABD Yönetimi, Türk politikacılar ve liderler, her iki ülkenin bürokratları ve ABD'nin Ankara Büyükelçileri öne çıkmışlardır. Son olarak fikri sebepler arasında ABD Kongresinin ABD Yönetimini disipline etme, Türkiye'yi Kıbrıs ve afyon üretimi konularından dolayı cezalandırma isteği gibi unsurların ambargo kararında rol oynadığı, benzer şekilde, Soğuk Savaş geriliminin artmasına koşut olarak bu defa Türkiye ile ilişkilerin ve dolayısıyla ABD üslerinin kurtarılması, Türkiye açısından ise ambargodan alınan dersle kendi kendine yeterli bir savunma sanayii altyapısının kurulması isteği gibi fikri unsurlar alınan kararlar ve gelişmelerde diğer sebepler ile birlikte rol oynamışlardır.

Burada önemli olan husus, aynı zamanda bu çalışmada ortaya konulan ikinci teorik sonuç, bu dört kategorideki sebeplerin bağımsız olarak değil diğer kategorileri de etkileyip değiştirerek kompleks bir mekanizma ile sonuç doğurmalarıdır. Örnek vermek gerekirse, liderler ve politika yapıcılar gibi amiller, uluslararası sistemin yapısına ilişkin algılarıyla eylemlerde bulunmakta ve bunu yaparken de kendi amaç ve stratejilerine uygun adımlar atabilme gayesiyle harekete geçmektedirler. Bu hareketlerinde ise yine uluslararası sistemin yapısı ve maddi gerçekliklerle sınırlı bir çerçevede içinde bulunmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, nedensellik teorisinin elimizdeki döneme uygulanmasının üçüncü sonucu olarak da bilimsel gerçekçilik felsefesince savunulduğu gibi gerçekliğin katmanlardan oluştuğunun gösterilmesidir.

Gizliliği kaldırılmış ABD diplomatik yazışmalarının döneme ilişkin gözden geçirilmesi tezin başlıca ampirik sonuçlarını ve literatüre olan katkıları içermektedir. Soğuk Savaş'ın yumuşama döneminde Kongrenin afyon üretimi ve Kıbrıs harekâtı gibi sorunları bahane ederek Türkiye'ye uyguladığı silah ambargosu, esasen ne Ford ne de Carter Yönetimleri tarafından paylaşılmamıştır. Nitekim Ambargo kararını Başkan Ford önce veto etmiş, daha sonra Kongre'de yeniden oylanmış yasayı imzalamak zorunda kalmıştır. Yönetimlerin bu yaklaşımlarını net bir şekilde ifade ettiklerinin pek çok örneği özellikle Türkiye liderleri ile yaptıkları görüşmelerde açıkça görülebilmektedir. Kongre ve Başkan arasındaki dış politika konusundaki Vietnam Savaşı döneminde başlayan yetki rekabeti, Türkiye ile olan krizde doruğa çıkmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Soğuk Savaş'ta yumuşama döneminin geride kalması ve Türkiye'nin de içinde bulunduğu bölgede istikrarsızlığın arma eğilimine girmesi, ABD açısından bu ülkede bulunan üslerinin önemini arttırmış, üstelik ambargonun Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne bir katkısının olmadığı da görülmüştür. Bu koşullar altında Türkiye ile ilişkilerin düzeltilmesi, Türkiye'nin ambargoya tepki olarak kullanımını sınırladığı üslerinin yeniden kullanılabilmesi amacıyla yeni bir savunma işbirliği anlaşması imzası görüşmeleri başlamıştır. Bu defa Türkiye açısından önem taşıyan husus, daha önce Johnson mektubu ile hissedilen ama özellikle ambargo sonrasında tecrübe edilen askeri malzemedeki tek kaynağa bağımlılığın mahsurları olmuş, yeni

savunma işbirliği anlaşması için Türkiye'nin temel isteklerinden birisi ülkesinde kendi kendine yeterli bir savunma sanayiinin kurulmasına yönelik ABD'nin katkı sağlaması olmuştur. Döneme ilişkin diplomatik yazışmalardan bu konuda önemli ipuçları ortaya çıkmıştır. Başbakan Bülent Ecevit'in 1978 yılında ABD Savunma Bakanı Brown ile yaptığı görüşmede yeni savunma işbirliği konseptine ilişkin belirttiği fikirler, Türkiye'nin 1980'lerde başlayan savunma sanayii atılımının stratejik planı niteliğindedir. Türkiye'nin belirli alanlarda uzmanlaşmış, müttefiklerle işbirliğine açık bir savunma sanayii kurmak ve bu savunma sanayiinin ülke ekonomisine yük olmaması için ihracatı öncelikli görmesi gerektiği gibi hususlar, 1985 yılında çıkarılan 3238 sayılı Kanun ile uygulanmasına başlanan yeni savunma sanayii politikasının temel unsurları olmuştur. Nitekim 1980 yılında imzalanan Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması bugün hala yürürlükte bulunan ve iki ülke savunma sanayii işbirliğinin akdi çerçevesini sağlayan belge durumundadır. Savunma işbirliğinin önemli bir paradoksu, Türkiye'nin ABD ambargosu nedeniyle başladığı savunma sanayii atılımına yine ABD firmalarının katkısı ile kurulan ortak yatırım şirketleri ile başlamasıdır. Tezin teorik çerçevesinde etraflıca değinildiği gibi uluslararası sistemin yapısı, Soğuk Savaş geriliminin artması bir yandan ABD açısından Türkiye'yi daha önemli kılarken, diğer yandan da Sovyetler Birliği'nin komşusu bir NATO ülkesi olan Türkiye için ABD ve NATO ile işbirliği daha acil ve önemli hale gelmiştir. Gerçekliğin bir başka katmanında ise ABD'nin 1980li yıllarda uygulamaya başladığı neoliberal politikaların bu gelişmede önemli bir rolü olduğunu düşündürmektedir.

ABD diplomatik yazışmalarının döneme ilişkin incelenmesinde dikkati çeken bir diğer husus, askeri ve sivil bürokratların ve özellikle de ABD'nin Türkiye'deki Büyükelçilerinin ABD Yönetimini sürekli olarak bu ülkenin kaybedilmemesi hatta Yunanistan'a nazaran çok daha önemli bir ülke olduğunun altını çizen hatırlatmalarda bulunmalarıdır. Dolayısıyla iki ülke ilişkilerinin korunması ve düzeltilmesinde amil dış politika kararlarının alınmasında ve uygulanmasında başta büyükelçiler olmak üzere savunma ve güvenlik bürokratların büyük katkısı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

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Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (March 1994 – February 2017)

- Strategic Planning Manager (2012-2014)
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