

ART AND DIFFERENCE IN DELEUZE:
HOW DO YOU GLITCH YOURSELF?

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MELİKE BAŞAK YALÇIN

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HOW DO YOU GLITCH YOURSELF?**

submitted by **MELİKE BAŞAK YALÇIN** in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of **Master of Arts in Philosophy, the Graduate School of Social
Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN
Head of Department
Department of Philosophy

Assist. Prof. Dr. Corry SHORES
Supervisor
Department of Philosophy

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fulden İBRAHİMHAKKIOĞLU (Head of the Examining
Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy

Assist. Prof. Dr. Corry SHORES (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy

Assist. Prof. Dr. İbrahim Okan AKKIN
Ardahan University
Department of Philosophy

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: M. Başak YALÇIN

Signature:

ABSTRACT

ART AND DIFFERENCE IN DELEUZE: HOW DO YOU GLITCH YOURSELF?

YALÇIN, Melike Başak

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The main concern of this thesis is to investigate the critique of representational thinking in Deleuze and to comprehend the notion of Body without Organs (BwO) in relation to aesthetic experience as an alternative to such thought. In order to do that this thesis problematises thought which ontologically priorities the principle of identity. Following that, it looks at subjecthoods and bodies constructed upon the same notion, and researches Deleuze's criticisms of them. Finally, it researches the effects of art on these constructions in connection to the former's power of affecting the latter in terms of turning it into a body without organs. Here the notion of glitch is introduced as an experiment that describes the violence of art to the organised bodies. This thesis holds the Deleuzian argument that new concepts help create new ways of thinking. Thus, it holds that using terms technology introduces brings forth the possibility of thought that previously was not possible. Accordingly, experimental music is offered as a possible event of glitch because it presents new sounds which previously have not entered into a representational relationship with the listener. In the final analysis, the event of glitch is equated with a method of becoming a BwO. In other words, art is discussed as a method that can shake representational and

conceptual thought; thus, it is taken as that which enables a direct relationship with the given.

Keywords: Deleuze, representational thinking body without organs, glitch, art

ÖZ

DELEUZEDE SANAT VE FARK: KENDİLİĞİ AKSATMAK

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Bu tezin başlıca amacı Deleuze’de temsili düşüncenin eleştirisini araştırmak ve organsız beden nosyonunu estetik deneyimle ilişkisi içinde bu düşünceye bir alternatif olarak kavramaktır. Bunun için bu tez ontolojik olarak özdeşlik ilkesine öncelik veren düşünceyi sorunsallaştırır. Daha sonra yine bu ilke üzerine kurulmuş özne ve beden mefhumlarını Deleuze’ün bu mefhumları eleştirisiyle birlikte inceler. Son olarak, sanatın bu kurgular üzerindeki etkisini onları organsız bedene dönüştürmesi yönünden ele alır. Burada aksaklık(glitch) nosyonu tanıtılır ve sanatın organize bedenlere şiddetini betimleyen bir deney olarak sunulur. Bu tez, Deleuze’ün yeni konseptler yeni düşünceler yaratır görüşünü benimser. Dolayısıyla teknolojinin ürettiği terimlerin daha önce mümkün olmayan düşünce biçimleri meydana getireceğini savunur. Buna uygun olarak, deneysel müzik dinleyici ile daha önce temsili bir ilişkiye girmemiş sesleri kullandığı için bir aksaklık anı olarak ele alınır. Son tahlilde aksaklık anı organsız bedene dönüşmekte kullanılan bir metot olarak düşünülür. Diğer bir deyişle, sanat temsili ve kavramsal düşünceyi sarsan ve verili olanla doğrudan bir ilişkiyi mümkün kılan bir metot olarak tartışılır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Deleuze, temsili düşünce, organsız beden, aksaklık, sanat

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Highly criticised by many, and yet celebrated by others, Gilles Deleuze maintains his popularity, although sometimes in a notorious way because of his dense language and interesting rhythm of expression. It is due this popularity -which is sustained despite the deviance proclaimed by many as well as Deleuze himself- that the Foucauldian foresight¹ is quoted in many essays written on Deleuze. His engagement with many disciplines of art such as painting and cinema may enhance the mentioned notoriety and lead to a tendency to place his philosophy mainly in aesthetics. Even though he welcomes similar labels by describing his own books as novels, (Deleuze,1990, p.xiv) a careful reading of his oeuvre makes it apparent that his usage of language and his mode of expression have a meaning other than being a sole literary style. Starting with his book *Difference and Repetition* (2004), the question of difference and the possibility of an experience of the self on the basis of its determination become one of his main issues. Along with his collaborations with Guattari, he maintains this central problem of difference throughout his life. Even though the question remains as one, by the very meaning of it, the problem of difference becomes that which constantly differentiates, therefore it turns out to be that which resists all attempts of unification. The notorious style, hence, becomes the apparatus of the philosophical notion of difference, rather than being a mere aesthetic concern.

In line with the creative notion of difference, Deleuze holds philosophy to be a tool box, (Deleuze,1995, p. 8) and a creative discipline which deals with concepts (Deleuze, 2006, p. 313). Hence, from the very beginning we can have an intuition on his approach to knowledge, -and therefore on his conception of truth- that it is not

¹“Perhaps, one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian.”(2016, p. 38)

something to be discovered, but something to be created. Unlike him, some philosophers deny the world of experience and of experiments and search for a truth that perhaps can only be found by the power of thought. Some claim the opposite and search it within the experience itself. This way or other, thought has always been philosophy's dearest tool. It is not wrong to say that starting with Kant, this tool itself came to be the very object of question. Philosophers following Kant first needed to address the conditions, foundations or whatness of the tool before making claims about the whatness of the world and the real. With that, the question changed direction and thought looked at itself in order to understand the reality. The claim that thought actually eludes the real was uttered by many (even before Kant), and as the ways of thinking the world and being proliferated, along with the social conditions which affect it, approaches to the question itself also proliferated. It can be said that it was Hegel who thought that if thought watches itself from the side, without itself actually moving with it in life, it eludes the real. Perhaps Deleuze holds the same problem, even though he is openly known to have held a distaste for Hegel. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 6) It can even be said that he is after the question of Being (in his own deviant way), but unlike Heidegger in whom he finds inspiration, Deleuze does not refrain from a rereading of history in search of alternative narratives. Although he sees the necessity of reading history of philosophy before putting forward a creative idea as philosophy's own Oedipal complex, he also admits that he had done "history of philosophy for a long time." (ibid., p., 5-6) Similarly, I maintain that prior to offering creative solutions, one should be informed on the historical problems pertaining to the matter at hand. Thus, this thesis follows Deleuze in his search for an alternative reading of the relationship between thought and the real in order to introduce a new concept -again, in line with his suggestions- which may help eliminate distinctions between them.

Due to the above-mentioned reasons, in the first three chapters following introduction, I present a historical reading of Deleuze's thought in order to identify and problematise the elements of representational thinking.

The following argumentation in the subsequent three chapters might at first seem too crowded. For, while it has a clear and a simple argument that it aims at communicating – namely, that the representational mode of thinking along with the subject that it produces elude the real and thus that we need an alternative mode of selfhood that can

account for the experience of the real – it perambulates through a very wide line of the history of philosophy. The reason for this long tour is because of the thinker who provides the theoretical background of this thesis: Gilles Deleuze. If the reader is familiar with the thinker, they will know that it requires quite a talent as well as a strong mastery of history of philosophy and Deleuze's own oeuvre to take a detour and directly engage with the topic itself, because Deleuze himself builds his philosophy upon the monstrous reading of numerous philosophers. If the limits of the writer of this thesis is considered, then it can be understood that in order to unfold and disentangle the seemingly simple topic, she needs to first clarify what is argued against, then to provide arguments following the path Deleuze himself created.

All in all what is aimed to be established is simply the following: that accordance of thought and the real is historically problematised; and Deleuze had proposed that thought is doomed to elude the real as long as it thinks about it, rather than thinking with it. Put it differently, when thought thinks the real in a certain problematic fashion, it re-presents it to itself. It paints a picture of it retroactively, so to speak. As a result, the real becomes an object of thought but cannot be apprehended. In this model, thought stays within a predetermined limit. The self who experiences the world, then, is also doomed to experience the real in a secondary manner, for it is founded upon the pre-established identity of thought. The antidote to this problem is to be found on difference *as such* as Deleuze calls it. Having this problem as the primary substance of my argument, I will first try to show in detail why the above mentioned problem is actually a problem. This will make up the first part of my thesis. In this first part, I will mainly refer to what is called Deleuze's magnum opus by some: *Difference and Repetition*. Drawing from Deleuze's debates and arguments, I will argue that there is a problematic image of thought that can be diagnosed, which mainly rests on the ontological primacy of identity. The resolution will be through the introduction of a plane of immanence. Upon this diagnosis, I will follow Deleuze in his examination of the subjectivities that are based on such thought, and later, his criticisms pertaining to organisations of bodies. Overall, in the first four chapters following the introduction, my aim will be a diagnostics of a triad which hinders thought to think the real, and I will trace it in Deleuze's various books.

Upon diagnosing the problem, I will look at the phenomenon of glitch as a means to turn oneself into a body without organs. A body without organs (BwO) can be apprehended as Deleuze and Guattari's solution to representational thinking; for, it denotes a body which refuses to be dictated from without as well as a mode of experience which is not ruled by a sovereign subject. It is an experimentation that renders body and thought compatible with the real. In Deleuze and Guattari's arguments, the experiment almost always concerns a form of art thanks to art's relationship with non-conceptual forces. The form of art I address will be music.

Although Deleuze himself never uses the term "glitch," I argue that its conceptual equivalents played an important role in his thinking on selfhood. Defining glitch as a short term problem that disrupts the expected flow of events, and referring to its application in the arts, I maintain that it can be proposed as a way of turning oneself into a BwO; for, the BwO is an experience of selfhood on the basis of difference, and glitch is a phenomenon that disrupts the self-same in experience. I propose that experimental art can be held as that which glitches or disrupts the organisation of body, which eventually leads to a dissolution of the subject.

Ultimately, the crux of the matter is that through experimentation, the self can find other modes which enable it to see difference qua difference. Put differently, becoming a body without organs denotes an attempt to understand life as becomings, as processes, or what I name following the footsteps of Deleuze: as pure immanence.

CHAPTER 2

DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD

I. A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilising, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos. Perhaps the child skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace. But the song itself is already a skip: it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in danger of breaking apart at any moment.

(Deleuze and Guattari, "Of the Refrain")

Throughout the history of philosophy, numerous philosophers have asked the question, "why is it that when thought tries to think the real, the real eludes thought's grasp; and furthermore, how might we more effectively think the real itself?" While these philosophers provided a variety of original answers, Deleuze offers a new account of that historical progress based on the role certain classic principles of thinking played in each philosopher's attempts to address these questions. Although this material lends itself to lengthy critical attention to Deleuze's sources, it will suffice for our purposes to focus primarily on Deleuze's own arguments and interpretations. For, what interests us here is the way Deleuze diagnosis the shortcomings in these prior attempts as resulting from a misguided adherence to the principle of identity as a foundation and rule for thinking, on the one hand, and from a centralisation of a self-identical subject performing these acts of thought, on the other. It is against this backdrop that Deleuze will propose an alternate mode of philosophical thinking that circumvents these very foundations. Thus, in the following I will first lay out the philosophical importance of this question regarding thought's thinking the real, and afterward I will examine Deleuze's own account.

2.1 The Problematic Image of Thought

Deleuze discusses the image of thought in multiple places, starting with his first original work *Difference and Repetition*, then *The Logic of Sense* (1990), which was published just a year after that, to *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) which he coauthored with Guattari. Perhaps it is not wrong to say that what is common in all of them is a diagnosis of a problem in which thought is regarded as an image rather than a creative force. He says in DR:

The thought which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but engendered in its genitility, is a thought without image. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 167)

The ramifications of it will be clarified in the following paragraphs. Yet first, I will follow the process of his diagnostics. He opens the above quoted chapter with Descartes; for, he is the one who suspends all judgement in search of “perfect knowledge”. Descartes, by means of the method of doubt, examines the relationship between thought and the real in an attempt to attain “clear and distinct perceptions” which are harmonious with the truth.

2.1.1 What is Real? Existence via the Self

Caroline Williams (2005) tells us that Descartes, overall, responds to the problem of his own age, that of the Renaissance. With the sudden outburst of the new techniques in art, the invention of the printing press and with its result of easier access to knowledge, developments in science, and new discoveries, the subject of the Renaissance radically breaks from history. Previously it was the Church and with it the unquestionable existence of God that guaranteed the subject and its experience in the world. The knowledge of the world as well as the subject itself is guaranteed through God. With the intervention of the Renaissance, the relationship between the self and knowledge came to be direct. Because reading, writing, experimenting with new techniques as well as the reinterpretation of ancient art became more prevalent, the self did not need to refer to God to validate her experience; instead, she became responsible for herself. As a result, knowledge also lost its ground, which was previously based on God. (ibid. p. 14-19). In such an atmosphere, where the self thought for herself, Descartes’ philosophy flourished. If human beings are to be trusted, then the problem arises: how can we trust the certainty of sensory perceptions?

In his *Meditations* Descartes adheres to this problem. How do I know that what I experience is contingent upon what actually exists? How do I know that my sensory organs provide me with certain knowledge? Descartes pursues this doubt up until a very radical point, where he suspends any judgement. Even if nothing is what it seems, even if an evil demon is tricking me to believe in what I see, there is one thing that I cannot doubt: the thinking self. I know from within that there is something that does this thinking, and I know that I am pursuing this activity. As a result of this line of thought he arrives at the certainty of the self; and from that point on, he is reassured of the existence of the world and others. The famous expression “Cogito ergo sum” is the result of his thought process. And if the thinking self exists, God, the necessary being, necessarily exists. Moreover, because he is a benevolent being, he would not trick the thinking self.²

All in all, the result which Descartes arrived at by means of suspending objective presuppositions renders the thinking self central to experience as well as to the real. By this move, he transfers the ground of being from God to the human subject. The most distinct characteristic of this subject is that it can guarantee itself only in thought. This mode of reassurance opens an insurmountable gap between thought and body; the thinking self certainly exists in a distinct fashion from the body; for, the knowledge that the body produces (such as sensory perceptions) cannot be trusted and cannot provide any certainty. This, in short, causes the mind and body dualism.

To conclude, it can be said that the task of certainty (of the real) begins with Descartes and his treatment of the seemingly objective presuppositions. Necessitated by a distrust to the sensory perceptions’ concord with the real, his search for distinct and clear ideas arrives at a subject who can be sure of the realness only of itself. This point in the history of philosophy is profound in many ways, yet I will only focus on its direct destination for the sake of the argument.

According to Deleuze, the Cartesian cogito functions with two logical values: “determination and undetermined existence.” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 85) Determination amounts to the *I think*. According to Kant, and following him to Deleuze, this

² See Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

determination is not enough to justify the existence of a thinking self. Deleuze argues that:

The entire Kantian critique amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the 'I think': 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.' (ibid., p. 86)

What this implies can simply be put as such: Determining the existence of a thinking subject as a substantial ground solely from the act of thinking is a paralogism, because it hints at a hidden assumption that thinking must be carried out by a subject which necessarily exists. However, what has been detected by the operation of doubt is only the act of thinking, there is nothing that guarantees the existence of a substantial subject. (Somers-Hall, 2013, p. 72) To put it differently, the existence of a substantial self cannot be inferred from the act of consciousness. Thus, Descartes' project at least partly fails in that it cannot achieve at the certainty it aims.

All in all, Deleuze takes up a project which is already running in both of the figures, Descartes and Kant. Since he observes that Kant answers to this problem which concerns thought's accord with the real, Kant will also be discussed in brief detail later on. For now it should be stated that with Kant's move, the accord between thought and real is secured through the mediacy of reason. Deleuze takes up the criticism and furthers it towards Kant himself, in whose effort he identifies a false belief, details of which will be discussed throughout this thesis.

In conclusion, it can be said that it is not groundbreaking to ask the question of relationship between thought and real. Deleuze, perhaps following Kant, looks at the thought itself to understand its situation, and he arrives at what he calls a dogmatic image, which brings us to the centre of Deleuze's critique. As we have seen, he identifies it in Descartes as Kant did in the form of a paralogism, as well as in Kant himself in the form of a false belief. This image gives him fruits to criticise the current condition of thought which eludes the real. So let us turn to this dogmatic image.

2.2. Dogmatic Image of Thought

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze devotes a chapter to what he calls the dogmatic image of thought. He starts the discussion by posing the question of the genesis of

thinking. He tracks the history of thought and arrives at an image of thought formed by eight postulates. These postulates are the results of his problematisation of agreed notions concerning thought, truth, the affinity between them, the very method of problematisation itself, and similar fundamental presuppositions that have been treated otherwise by thinkers. In other words, the image of thought is formed by presuppositions concerning the whatness of thought. According to Somers-Hall, the fundamental problem Deleuze identifies with such an image of thought is that representation is taken as the entirety of thought. He does not deny the representation or claim war on it; he just highlights that it is a moment of thought rather than its totality. (Somers-Hall, 2013, p. 97) The problem then turns out to be a confusion of the real with representation. Somers-Hall in another essay (2012) claims that this project is in fact very similar to that of Heidegger, for he also maintains a displeasure concerning the state of thought. (Heidegger, 1927, as cited in Somers-Hall, 2012, p. 341) The aim of recalling Heidegger is not making a comparison between him and Deleuze. It is rather to show that the problems Deleuze deals with are not new and were addressed by prominent philosophers who in fact influenced him. So we should ask, how Deleuze offers a new way to the same old problem of representation? Deleuze equates the real with difference in-itself, or what he says is difference as such throughout DR by proposing detailed discussions. Smith puts it very clearly as:

If Deleuze, following Bergson and Whitehead, formulates an original conception of the new, it is because he repositions the new as a fundamental ontological concept: Being = Difference = the New. (2012, p. 237)

However, rather than discussing the meaning of difference, I shall first turn to representation in order to clarify the problem. Thus, in the subsequent discussions I will follow Deleuze's arguments in the above mentioned chapter pertaining to the problem of representation.

Deleuze's criticisms concerning the image of thought, which he labels dogmatic, can be grouped around the notions of common sense and good sense.

At this point, however, we must refer to the precise difference between these two complementary instances, common sense and good sense. For while common sense is the norm of the identity from the point of view of the pure Self and the form of the unspecified object which corresponds to it, good sense is the norm of distribution from the point of view of the empirical selves and

the objects qualified as this or that kind of thing (which is why it is considered to be universally distributed). Good sense determines the contribution of the faculties in each case, while common sense contributes the form of the Same. Furthermore, if the unspecified object exists only in so far as it is qualified in a particular way then conversely, qualification operates only given the supposition of the unspecified object. We will see below how - in entirely necessary manner - good sense and common sense complete each other in the image of thought: together they constitute the two halves of the doxa. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 134)

Good sense can be understood as the general character of the experience. In *Logic of Sense* (1990) Deleuze mentions the books *Alice In Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*. There, the main character embarks upon some unlikely adventures. In one of them, Alice, the main character, drinks a strange liquid and starts growing. This particular instance is a perfect example of the good sense for Deleuze. He argues that we say “Alice is getting bigger” because of our one sided perception of the event. Alice is getting bigger, or moving in one direction of time because we compare her size to her previous size. However, Alice is getting smaller as she gets bigger if we speak in comparison to her next size. Alice is always smaller than what she is becoming. Yet she is also always bigger than what she was. The event she experiences does not allow us to fixate her state and measure her size so as to claim whether she is getting bigger or is she is getting smaller. It is “the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristics is to elude the present” as Deleuze says. (ibid., p.1) That being said, I should not elaborate further on the matter for its beyond the boundaries of this thesis. I should only argue that the good sense is what contributes to the construction of a dogmatic image of thought, and it concerns the distribution of the world.³

The notion of common sense can be analysed in terms of four different dimensions. Deleuze argues that philosophers, for the sake of the argument or for easing readers into their dialogue, tend to use expressions such as “It is clear that...”, “Everybody knows that...”, “Noone can deny...”. The expressions bypass a possible topic of

³ In the following pages, Deleuze introduces two different conceptions of time in connection with the paradoxical experience of Alice: Aion and Chronos. Chronos is the pulsed time, the time of the clock and the self-same identity, whereas Aion is the non-pulsed time: becoming. He maintains that we mostly think in terms of Chronos, and rarely approach Aion. That is to say that most of the time, prior to any discussion, the character of the real is accepted as being in a certain shape and structure. Throughout the mentioned book he elaborates on this idea.

argument and present their claims as though they are the natural characteristics of existence. If it is very clear, then perhaps asking about it would make someone look a little like a fool; how can anyone not know that? How can anyone raise an eyebrow to the first law of thought which is the law of identity? They are common sensical notions, clear to everyone, perhaps because of a shared structure of the human soul which enables people to perceive the world in the same way in which case we can call it *sensus communis*. Deleuze diagnoses that such expressions point out to the presuppositions that are pre-conceptual and pre-philosophical. They hint at the areas that are exempt from inquiry. The remaining dimensions can be explained in this fashion: that philosophy has always, in some way or another, found a way to preserve the identity of the subject, and the object of the encounter. We can always find a self that endures in all possible adventures in the world. Moreover, the object that this self encounters is always an object x. No matter what comes, it first enters into a structure that stabilises the character of it, and then it is presented. No matter what it is or what happens, it is always an object x. Put it differently, the unified self is what guarantees a common object. The identity of a unified self as well as the identity of the common object x makes up the other dimensions of common sense. Throughout the thesis I will invoke the notion of common sense to show how it functions in Deleuze's criticisms.

Problem of the real which Deleuze equates with the radically new and difference in-itself cannot be raised if thought holds into its dogmatic image, which I have preliminarily grouped under common sense and good sense. This image is sustained by eight postulates that Deleuze identifies and tracks. He continues the above quoted paragraph with:

For the moment, it suffices to note the precipitation of the postulates themselves: the image of a naturally upright thought, which knows what it means to think; the pure element of common sense which follows from this 'in principle'; and the model of recognition - or rather, the form of recognition - which follows in turn. Thought is supposed to be naturally upright because it is not a faculty like others but the unity of all other faculties which are only modes of the supposed subject, and which it aligns with the form of the Same in the model of recognition. The model of recognition is necessarily included in the image of thought, and whether one considers Plato's *Theaetetus*, Descartes' *Meditations* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, this model remains sovereign and defines the orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 134)

The postulates are the *cogitatio natura universalis*, the ideal, recognition, representation, error, logical function, modality, and the knowledge which all relate to either good sense or common sense. The problem with this image is that it no longer harbours thinking; the act in it turns into a mere phantasm; thought loses its power. In other words, it is taken as a representation of itself rather than the very act of it. Thinking is an act which can discover the limits and can destroy them, thus can meet with what is different; what is outside of its pre-determined and pre-established identity. This power is not a possession of thinking, it rather is its form. Admitting those qualities in the beginning determines the way thought will take and thus the whole enterprise ends up where it begins; within the pre-established identity of thought. The only discovery, then, can be made within the ground of this presupposed shape. The limits are determined in the beginning, and the act of thinking cannot move outside. Deleuze sees this in Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger and many more. According to him, they all had a veiled belief in this or that shape of thought. Deleuze identifies these beliefs and formulates the above-mentioned postulates around them. They appear as the following: thought can know, therefore should know. What is to be known can be known through correct orientation. The harmony of the faculties of the mind can yield in knowledge or thought as far as meticulous care is given. These are all such assumptions that grounded thinking. Deleuze takes a step further and looks at these fundamental aspects. Identifying the whatness of the object of encounter or understanding opposition in terms of the same turns out to be problematic because they all result from the belief in thought's ability to know and in the belief that the ground was laid in a way that can enable this knowledge. Yet this predisposition of being able to carries within it a disempowerment of thinking because if so, then thought includes within itself an aspect which stays veiled. Thus the picture stays the same because no matter how different the method and the starting point is, there has always been a presupposition to begin the thinking; or a presupposition concerning the affinity between thought and truth. Deleuze wants to go back to the very beginning; yet, his venture differs from the rest, because he does not hold a presupposition regarding the identity of thought. Put another way, we can say that he sees a danger in subjective presuppositions and finds them being applied in a pre-conceptual, pre-philosophical manner. This entails that thought as such will only serve to restructure the truths it presupposed, or as he says:

...[it] rediscovers all the current values that it subtly presented in the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified eternal object. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 136)

Philosophy done in such a manner will stay on an already discovered path, for it departs from a familiar point; and this path will present the difference in respect to the same; therefore, it will reduce it to the same and will never meet with a genuine new. Here the new is equated with the difference in-itself, for no relation or encounter can be called radically new if it occurs within one's limits; and the territory within one's limits cannot be other than the same.

In conclusion, it can be said that Deleuze borrows from previous philosophical discussions the Cartesian doubt, the Kantian concern for the question of the conditions of experience, and from Heidegger, the forgotten question of Being. In all of them he finds various conjectures that preserve the identity of thought pertaining to both its assorted character and its self-same model which impede a thorough treatment of the problems asserted as fundamental at the outset. In all of them he finds the trace of "quadripartite fetters": Identity, Analogy, Opposition, and Resemblance. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 138) He finds these notions as hindrances to thought to think with the cosmos, the real. They instead confuse the representation of thought with the real thought. For the sake of the argument I will only discuss the first two of the fetters in this thesis.

2.2.1. The First Fetter: Identity

Classical logic has three main principles: The law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle. The law of identity is the first law of thought, and it is formulated as $A=A^4$; A is A. It means "a thing is what it is", or "a thing is the same with itself; it is identical with itself". The simplest meaning of it is that a thing should be thought as being equal to itself, or at least be united with itself through a mediation. (Heidegger, 2008, p.) If we exemplify the matter for the sake of argument we see that what is at stake here is quite simple, yet very fundamental. Claims such as an apple is an apple, a human is a human, a thought is a thought, are not open to debate. They merely inform us on objects of encounter. However, they also expose the very foundation of our thinking, that essences dominate the realm of thought. Accepting this law as the first rule of thought means that the law of identity

⁴ its formal representation

precedes thought. Before even embarking upon a journey of questioning, the manner of the journey is established, because we have been told how to think and what to think before we even ask the question. In other words, it can be claimed that the ontological priority of the law of identity confines thought within itself because it determines the objects of experience as well as the identity of thought -that they are self-identical, self-preserving essences- by dictating a truth -that the law of identity is the precondition of any meaningful thought- before any possible adventure can begin. Deleuze maintains that as long as thought stays within this limit, it cannot apprehend the real. Rather, it builds more strong identities which elude real.

That being said, the history of philosophy gives us various examples where thought by means of this very law attempts at attaining the real. In this section I will take a closer look at such attempts and show why Deleuze thinks that they fail. In order to do that I will mainly follow Smith's discussion (2012) pertaining to the relationship between Logic and Existence.⁵

Smith begins his analysis of the infiltration of the law of identity into the realm of the actual with Leibniz. He argues that Leibniz is the first philosopher who made the claim that "all analytic propositions are true." (Smith, 2012, p. 74) The sentence "All triangles have three sides" is an example of an analytical proposition. It states a truth about triangles, and this truth necessarily applies to all possible triangles. Here the subject necessarily has a reciprocal relationship with the predicate. The subject "triangle" reciprocates with the predicate "having three sides". The two elements of the proposition are equated to each other while reserving their separate characters. Still, they form an identity together. Smith discusses that in order to extend this truth claim into the domain of the actual, Leibniz derives another principle from the law of identity, which is the principle of sufficient reason. This principle basically states that everything has a reason. One should be careful not to mix this principle with causation which mainly refers to physical and actual causes. Let me clarify this important difference with an example. Let us assume that on my desk, I have a cup of coffee that

⁵ *Logic and Existence* (1952) is a book by Jean Hyppolite. Deleuze writes and give lectures on the topic. Smith's essay *Logic and Existence: Deleuze on the Conditions of the Real* concerns these discussions and problematises thought's confusion of the possible with the real.

stands next to my computer. Because of the wind, my room's door shuts suddenly and makes a very loud noise. Startled, I look at my door impulsively, and because I act without caution, my hand hits the cup and causes the coffee to spill and wet my computer. So, if someone were to ask me why my computer's keyboard doesn't work, I would tell them that I have spilled coffee on it. My keyboard's dysfunction is caused by the spilling of a liquid substance. A causes B. But surely something else has had to cause A. That would be my accidentally hitting my cup. So: C causes A and A causes B. The line of questioning can be pursued further. We call this the chain of causation. The sufficient reason, however, would refer to the totality of the chain of causes concerning that particular event. If someone were to ask me the chain of events that lead to my keyboard's dysfunction, I would have to explain them the event itself, thereby showing not the single physical event but the totality of the actions that caused it. Returning to Leibniz, we see that he formulates this principle in a metaphysical way so as to fit all possible predications in to the nature of the concept itself. "All predication has a foundation in the nature of things" (ibid., p. 74)

A simple way to put it we can follow this route:

- {1} Assume everything is related to everything else, one way or another.
- {2} Each thing has a relational predicate stating such relations.
- {3} Assume there are an infinity of things.
- {4} Each thing has an infinity of predicates expressing their relations to everything else.
- {5} This means that within the full concept of one thing are predicates expressing every other thing.

This is bound up with sufficient reason. One thing expresses everything about everything else (although only God can know all that clearly and distinctly). This means that everything fully accounts for everything else, and so nothing that happens is without a complete and sufficient reason (discernible in any one thing or event). But if this is the case, then how can we account for differences? Leibniz's answer would be the following: everything perceives every other thing from their own unique perspective. Because the subject is limited and not infinite, she perceives the reality from her limited point of view. Reality is shaped according to the position of the perceiving subject, as a result, a concept can have a limited amount of predicates. In

other words, the concept cannot be comprehended in its actuality because of the position and limited perspective of the subject. All in all, with this proposition Leibniz accounts for the reality itself; with all of its possible aspects that transcends the limited subjects. Here, thought acquires the real from the identity of the concept. “A thing is what it is” becomes what constitutes the real. In this view, difference and identity is explained in a pre-given manner, and the difference between what is and how it seems in the world is allocated to the judgement of a limited subject.

The second law of thought, which is the law of non-contradiction, is derived from the first one. It is formulated in the language of formal logic as such: $\neg (A \wedge \neg A)$; that A cannot be A and not A. This means that two contradictory propositions cannot be true at the same time. The law is also called a tautology. According to Smith, Descartes is the first philosopher that developed this principle into the formulation as $I=I$. Even though this formulation seems similar to that of identity, there is more to it. When Descartes suspended all judgement, in that state he found an undoubtable identity. Even if nothing is real or what they seem, there is one thing whose existence as such that I cannot doubt. It is the thinking self. With this, Descartes has discovered an unconditional identity.

In other words, this time thought attains the real within; the only thing that surely exists is the self. As briefly discussed earlier, for Kant, this attainment of the real is achieved not through the suspension of judgement and later finding the certainty of the self within, for such a certainty of self cannot be proven that way. Rather, it is thanks to the very possibility of making any judgement at all, which is granted only with the existing world and “a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination.” (Kant, 2007, p. 133) I is I becomes a synthetic proposition this time, because the concept of the self can only be related to itself through another, which is the experience in time. Following Kant, Hegel proposes that the self does not reassure itself of its existence or identity through the mere experience of the world; rather, it finds itself when it meets with its limit, or to put it another way; the self becomes aware of itself when it sees something that is not itself. When the not I enters the picture, I becomes the not I . For Kant, the existence of I is proved with the possibility of experience, but for Hegel, the I finds itself within the actual experience. The undoubtable knowledge whose existence is assured becomes the self with its negations.

The last principle finds its expression with the existentialist thinkers, so suggests Smith. Sartre's formulation of the choice between choice and non choice, is the experience of the law of excluded middle; this or that, but not both, which becomes the very condition of experience. Deleuze criticises all of these attempts on the basis of one simple assertion: he thinks that all of these attempts of relating thought to the real have been made on the basis of the principle of identity. The world is validated either by the sameness of the thing with its essence, or by difference between identities, or by a choice between them. In all of these attempts, difference was subordinated to identity. It was always from the point of view of the self same thought; thought assigns the real its own characteristic. A simple example can make this point clear. In the first moment, an apple is thought in terms of itsappleness, in the second, in that an apple is not a human, or that it is not what it encounters in its experience; in other words what makes it is its difference from what it is not; and in the third, the choice is given between the terms, apple or banana. In all of them identity and the thing come first; the relations are formed according to them. Difference is considered as the difference between two things, e.g. an apple is different from a human.

To put it differently we shall turn to Smith who summarises this problem as follows: the Principle of Identity in the form of $A=A$, taken in a primary manner in thinking, necessarily considers difference in relation to presupposed identities. (Smith, 2007, p.1) In other words, under this conception, difference can only in the first place be 'A is different from B', which presupposes already that 'A is A' and 'B is B', thereby always prioritising identity over any difference whatever. As a result, we find ourselves forced to make claims on the nature of the world and knowledge solely on this basis. With such a model, we accept the unchanging identities of the things; therefore, we accept things; and we place difference and change as secondary to already formed things. The problem can also be formulated in a reverse fashion, namely, by approaching the question of difference from the viewpoint of identities and asking it in terms of the difference holding between two things that are identical to themselves, which eludes the possibility of conceiving real difference and thus yields other identities produced in a pre-established domain. We can add Williams' discussion that understanding reality in terms of fixations, which are identities, is a problem for Deleuze. (Williams, 2003, p. 11) He too argues that the presupposition of

the primacy of identity gives way to many other concepts which necessarily force thought to follow a pre-determined path. In summary, we can talk about two main problems Deleuze raises. First of all, thinking based on identity limits the creative unfolding of thought. Thought that is constrained by identity needs to discover what is pre-given, what is already formed and established as 'the identity', instead of having the capability for creation or genesis. Another result of this is that it renders the production of the new impossible; for, what is established as a result of the interaction of pre-given identities necessarily turns out to be terms between those initial identities, which have to preserve their relation to the first terms. This approach considers difference only as secondary to that which does not differ. The result, then, is that any sort of cognition that only replicates what is already conceptually given is at best recollection, which is a mechanical cognitive operation that does not suffice for thinking. But even conceptual analysis, if it produces something not known before for the thinker, is non-replicative for their own knowledge and understanding. The task of the philosopher, in light of this, would be to generate thoughts that other people cannot derive even by analysing very thoroughly what is already known. To do so means to find ways for thoughts to move through genuine connections without those conceptual connections being built-in from the beginning within the initial set of thoughts.

2.2.2 The Second Fetter: Analogy

In DR Deleuze says:

...Now, if we ask what is the instance capable of proportioning the concept to the terms or to the subjects of which it is affirmed, it is clear that it is judgement. [...] For judgement has precisely two essential functions, and only two: distribution, which it ensures by the partition of concepts; and hierarchisation, which it ensures by the measuring of subjects. (2004, p. 34)

Here he gives an account of judgement which, according to him, relates concepts either to terms or to subjects. Somers-Hall, deriving from him explains it as "the attribution of predicates to objects" or "to a subject". (Somers-Hall, 2013, pp. 4,22) So we can say that it refers to the ability to determine the objects and the subjects of experience. Deleuze then continues:

[...] the analogy of judgement allows the identity of a concept to subsist, either in implicit and confused form or virtual form. Analogy is itself the analogue of the identity within judgement. Analogy is the essence of judgement, but the

analogy within judgement is the analogy of the identity of concepts. That is why we cannot expect that generic or categorical difference, any more than specific difference, will deliver us a proper concept of difference. Whereas specific difference is content to inscribe difference in the quasi-identity of the most general determinable concepts; that is, in the analogy within judgement itself. (ibid.)

Accordingly, the ability to judge is procured by the application of the law of identity to the concepts in order to determine them in experience. This is at least true for Deleuze's reading of history of philosophy, especially for his reading of Kant who says in *Critique of Judgement* "Judgement is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal." (1987, p. 18) In order to determine the particular as well as the universal the identity, the self-sameness of concepts as well as categories are required. Prima facie, this undertaking looks the most logical, for it is able to provide a neat picture of the manifold. However, as discussed earlier, this undertaking implies an ontological preference in favour of identity without even considering alternatives. In the above-quote, along with various discussions in DR, Deleuze argues that thinking on the basis of identity results in a conception of a world in which things and concepts are organised according to pre-given forms. Consequently, judgment points towards a pre-philosophical choice in thought, and as a result, it structures a world or the conditions of possible experience favouring this choice. Analogy, therefore, amounts to how we understand the world if we base our thinking in the law of identity. It is in the form of judgement that analogy is found.

Following this argumentation, it would not be absurd to assert that Deleuze himself is concerned with the question of Being and a diagnostic concerning the current condition of metaphysics in a similar way with Heidegger (Somers-Hall, 2012, pp 337, 342), because he himself problematises the conception of the world. Following Somers-Hall, it can also be said that the same concern applies to Heidegger's discussion of ontology and theology. According to Somers-Halls, regarding the forgotten question of Being, Heidegger says being is understood from the perspective of beings and their relations to each other, in terms of a commonalities, which he labels onto-logic. Another way of understanding Being is considering it in terms of a highest Being which functions as a ground, it guarantees the existence of other beings. Heidegger calls this theo-logic. According to him, both of these approaches are problematic and doomed to miss the question of Being. (ibid., p. 342) Returning to

Deleuze, we can see that he diagnoses the inception of this shared problem in Aristotle, who understands beings in terms of their relationship and difference to each other. This approach necessitates a definition of being which cannot be given. It only describes beings within a system, in terms of relations. So overall, it does not approach the question of being, rather gives an explanation analogically. Referring to Deleuze's arguments against Aristotle, who can be said to be the first to "define the existence in terms of analogy", Williams puts the matter as:

...But, by defining existence in terms of analogy, Aristotle, then, misses this opportunity for defining difference in terms of being and free of the condition of prior concepts. That is, for him, things are in different ways and not in the same way. An analogy holds between the existence of different things - when we say that rocks and animals exist we mean that to be a rock is to satisfy the predicates of the concept rock in a similar way as animals satisfy the predicates of the concept animal. Rocks and animals exist but only according to an analogy that holds between the ways in which they are. This move to analogy sets philosophy in the context of judgement concerning the correct definition of genres and species (common sense) and the correct definition of the hierarchies of genres and species (good sense). Aristotle's philosophy does not give us the right definition of difference because it renders it secondary to the determination of conceptual identity (Williams, 2003, p. 62)

What this points out to can be briefly put as; that ontological primacy of identity in thought, yields a picture of the world which can only be conceived analogically. Furthermore this picture is painted by means of judgments pertaining to both philosophical judgement and judgements in non-philosophical conversations. Judgement works on the identity of the concept and divides the world into two as judged and judge, which then enables further hierarchies. Within this picture thought is hindered from penetrating behind the concepts. It cannot conceive difference, movement, and change in themselves, it perceives them through enduring self-same concepts.

2.2.2.1. Univocity

For a task which seeks an alternative to identity, Deleuze looks at the history of philosophy and finds a concept that in the first instance looks quite paradoxical for the mission, namely, univocity. In *Difference and Repetition* he says:

There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. There has only ever been one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voice. (2004, p. 35)

However, Deleuze's relation to this problem is on the basis of difference. The singleness he proposes concerning ontology is not that of Parmenides'. It implies multiplicity in one, in pure immanence. (Deleuze, 2004, p.36) In order to understand his conceptualisation we should turn to the history of the concept itself.

The notion of univocity is an answer to the problem of relation, mostly prevalent in medieval philosophy. In that time period the question which began with Aristotle concerning the organisation of Being evolves into the question: how should Creator and creatures be understood in terms of their relation and hierarchy? There are two main approaches besides univocity; equivocal understanding of being an analogical approach which was mentioned previously.

According to Thacker, Aquinas proposes that if being is understood in the same manner for both Creator and creatures, then the kind of being they both have would be reduced to the same. This sameness in the way of being is called univocity. The opposite would be equivocality which would deny any relation between the two. This time the problem of natural knowledge occurs. If there are no relations between Creator and creatures, how could one talk about the former? Aquinas' solution to this problem is analogy. He proposes that the latter can relate to the former by way of analogical relation. An example would be the following: God is infinite, so any property a finite being has, God necessarily has it infinitely; therefore, if a creature has speed, then God has infinite speed. Here, Aquinas tries to conserve elements from both concepts; some relation has to be conserved so as to claim knowledge of God, yet this relation cannot be the same with that of creature to creature. Duns Scotus, whom Deleuze mentions a lot in his book *Difference and Repetition*, takes up the same problem of relation and approaches it from a different perspective. For him, univocity does not erase all distinctions as Aquinas suggested. It can be understood as a common nature, a relation all beings have to each other while preserving their differences. For Thacker, we can understand his concept of univocity in three layers. In the first layer, the creature is related to others while its individuating principle, its thisness, haecceity, is preserved. In the second, we can talk about a common nature that relates things to

each other in terms of types of being. The individual human being (the haecceity) is related to other human beings, to other mammals, and to other life forms in terms of its being a life form. Here, Duns Scotus takes a step further and posits that the univocity is not just in the sense of a common nature that relates categorically relatable beings; but it is the common nature of all common natures. Thus God can be related to creatures while preserving its Godness. The univocity, then, is in the sense of a neutral, relational principle. (Thacker, 2010, pp.107-125)

Deleuze proposes three important moments of univocity in *Difference and Repetition*. In these moments, a philosophy on the basis of difference flourished, ephemeral yet powerful. The proposition of Duns Scotus becomes the first of these. (DR., 39) When thinking about the problem of life, especially in terms of creatures and Creator, Duns Scotus took a radical step by emphasising their commonality in terms of existence. The vertical relation between the former and latter, and the horizontal relation between the creatures, do not necessarily have their commonality in the kind of beings they have but in having a relation to each other. The common nature for Duns Scotus is the commonality itself. Rather than concerning identities or types of beings, it “conditions the relations” of them, as Thacker says. (2010, p.135) We see that relationality is what is emphasised here. After Duns Scotus, Spinoza enters the picture. He takes up this univocal understanding and emphasises the active nature of common nature. With him, the neutralised relation becomes what actively constitutes individuals. Deleuze thinks that Spinoza’s move turned Scotus’ common nature into what he calls affective becoming. With Duns Scotus the totality of the being was said in the same sense, however, things and identities revered their places. With Spinoza, the question of becoming entered into the picture. In the last moment, Nietzsche offers eternal return. (Deleuze, 2004, pp. 39-41)

In order to dive into the details of the notion of univocity, the terms nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy should be examined with a closer look. Colebrook argues that Deleuze’s use of the term nomadicism may be rendered rather clearer if it is considered in contrast to Kant’s usage of it where he refers it to illegitimate use of reason and thus dismisses it. Referring to the manner of *Critiques*, Colebrook argues:

Deleuze, by contrast, rejects the idea that a principle, or a power or tendency to think, should be limited by some notion of common sense and sound distribution. Nomadicism allows the maximum extension of principles and powers; if something can be thought, then no law outside thinking, no containment of thought within the mind of man should limit thinking's power. (2010, p. 186)

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze uses the concept of “nomadic distribution” to designate a distribution where the act of becoming creates space and beings prior to any creation, in contrast to the Neoplatonic understanding of the distribution of beings, which implies a space in which beings are differentiated. (2004, p. 36) Deleuze uses the term sedentary distribution to denote the latter. Such a distribution yields a model of organisation of the world in terms of things that are different from one another as allocated so by a higher principle, or a judgment. Colebrook explains that such a distribution functions by analogy, for it renders some beings more real -in terms of their closeness to the originary principle or originary being- than the others. (2010, p. 186) In *Logic of Sense* Deleuze describes this fixed distribution in relation to good sense, where the line of time is understood linearly. (1990, p. 90)

Nomadic distribution, on the other hand, designates an open space where neither the flow of time nor the organisation of the space is pre-determined. Colebrook states that unlike the previous distribution, nomadic one has its principle within itself. Here, the issue of hierarchy also comes into the picture. As stated earlier, Deleuze refuses the alignment of things according to a first principle. He proposes another kind from the point of view of Nietzschean conception of power, which refers to acts without doers¹, and he calls this “crowned anarchy”. (2004, p. 37) It denotes an understanding of being, or rather, becoming which is determined by the prevalence of forces. The idea that space and creation are organised according to a creative principle that gives way to another which prioritises act instead of identities and subjects, and as a result, to a one that does not allow hierarchies in terms of beings. The hierarchy may still be present but it is not in terms of beings, it is in terms of forces.

One may ask, how this kind of hierarchy differs from the other? To answer, we can evoke the notion Innocence Deleuze tackles with in his *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (2005) book. There he says:

[...] every force is referred to what it is able to do, from which it is inseparable.
[...] Whatever does not let itself be interpreted by a force nor evaluated by a will calls out for another will capable of evaluating it, another force capable of interpreting it. (ibid., 22)

What is meant here can be roughly summarised as the following: every force is limited with what it can accomplish, and it is the will that exerts the force. There is no intrinsic value in any force in terms of what it is capable of doing. The problem is in its representation through an identity. That means the value judgements are added later by an identity such as the self, or God. Subsequently in the same paragraph Deleuze writes that even though the situation is so, it is because we judge force according our personhood instead of the capability of the force itself. In other words, there is nothing in the becoming of the world - which is through the acts of forces and wills that exert them- that is intrinsically wrong or bad. Such value judgements are added when there is a person who interprets them according to their personal ideas and tastes, or when a transcendent God establishes moral rules prior to experience. Such judgements results in blaming the world and existence for being in this or that way, or deeming it worthy solely because of the compatibility of it with the individual. However, this is only a matter of interpretation. Becoming is innocent by itself; it does what it does due to its nature which is pre-individual. Returning to “crowned anarchy”, it can be said that the world is organised in a pre-individual matter. The hierarchy, if it exists, is in terms of the pre-individual character of the forces. Because they do not have pre-determined values in themselves, such an organisation of the world becomes innocent.

If we look at the issue from a broader perspective in Deleuze’s philosophy, we can see that univocity becomes the creative active force as the univocity of difference that accounts for the individual and the plane of immanence. In other words, the concept does not describe a being that is equal everywhere, nor a plane where beings are later distributed equally; it rather eliminates the ground that conditions beings. The univocity is the univocity of differentiation; it offers the plane of immanence instead of transcendence. Immanence: for there are no more beings or identities or fixations that organise the creation accordingly; all of them turn out to be equal in that none is primary but the act of difference.

In consequence, this discussion provides the first step in understanding Deleuze's ontology of difference for it introduces the plane of immanence. The question of Being and thinking of it posed in the beginning of discussion in relation to the dogmatic image of thought, which either by good sense or by common sense holds a problematic picture, thus resolves around the notion of univocity. From that point on we can replace the word being with becoming, because Being refers to an identity, or a totality, as well as a distribution of beings following the principle of analogy. Put it differently, law of identity presupposes beings and render difference secondary, as the difference between already formed things. Thought operating by abiding to this rule necessarily presupposes its identity as well as identity of things, and analogy gives us a picture of the world painted by this law. Such a picture necessarily eludes real because of all the presumptions which has been discussed so far. Yet if so, what is the alternative? How to think the real with itself rather than through representations?

2.3 Plane of Immanence

In the first chapter I have tried to lay out the theoretical foundation of the thesis. I have discussed that as long as thought is conceived as something distinct from being it portrays an image of itself to itself retroactively. Deleuze arrives at this conclusion by discovering various secluded and covert presumptions concerning thought and thinking. This treatment concludes that the main cause of the problem is thinking by basing thought on the law of identity. This law does not allow capturing movement and change, instead, it dictates that thinking should operate on pre-formed things, and accordingly, the analysis follows from their self-same being. Deleuze's attempt to deviate from that road brings about a world which is differential and univocal. In *Logic of Sense* he says:

[...] the death of God, the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the person, the disintegration of bodies, and the shifting function of language ... now expresses only intensities. (1990, p. 294)

Then it can be concluded that if thought is conceived by the domination of identity, then God, world, and person are necessarily constructed, along with a certain fixed function of language. However, if this rule is left and what is is understood in terms of intensities, then those five pillars will dissolve and give way something else, which here will be named as the plane of immanence. Put it differently, it can be said that for

Deleuze, the crux of the matter seems as the following: what is the possibility of talking about a field without a God which functions as the foundation, without identities and fixed structures, without divisions as knower and the known? Do we always have to give the issue to the hands of either a subject who is the ground of all possible being, or another who is limited yet still has a certain affinity with truth? By fixing identities, even when we assume we are free from them yet holding subjective presuppositions, what sort of a world do we construct, and what kind of questions elude us because of that? In the dissolution of all of them what we are left with is: an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, which does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields. (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 100-108)

The field determined here is the field or the plane of immanence, and if the previous discussion is recalled, its close affinity with the notion of univocity can easily be grasped. The notion is prevalent all through Deleuze's philosophy. Even though it is a complex idea, it can be understood as a ground in his entire thought. However, that should be taken with a caution; for immanence is neither a concept nor a foundation of the world. Deleuze warns us in many places that this field is not a pre-existing foundation of being, nor solely a conceptual tool that allows for philosophical discussion. Rather, it directly is related with his understanding of existence, or the real. It is pre-conceptual, pre-philosophical, concerns precisely the real, and is free from the dictation of identity.

In order to clarify the matter I will turn to Thacker's summary of scholastic discussions appropriated by Deleuze. It will enable me to draw a preliminary picture of the notion of immanence. Doing so I hope to at least construe what is at stake in Deleuze's refrain from previous formulations. Later, I will tie the discussion with life itself as it is offered by Deleuze in one of the latest published essays Deleuze wrote, namely, "Immanence: A Life" (2002).

Having written two different books on him, Deleuze also celebrates Spinoza, together with Guattari in *What is Philosophy* by calling him "the prince of philosophers". (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 48) The reason for this praise is Spinoza's conception of immanence. In *Ethics* he defines substance as "that which is conceived through itself, in itself" and that which "by nature is prior to affections". (p. 2) With this,

Spinoza refuses the condition of experience or a conception of a transcendent divine being. He pulls the divine into life itself, so to speak. In *After Life*, Thacker presents Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's conception of immanence within a historical framework. Immanence is mostly understood in contrast to transcendence. However, Thacker argues that according to Deleuze, it should also be considered in terms of what it is subordinated to, namely, emanation. (2010, p., 217) Due to this misconception, immanence is failed to be recognised in its full expression which is equated with life itself. Emanation takes place in two forms. Firstly, it is in terms of participation. In this mode, a part is considered in relation to a whole. The part becomes immanent to the whole, which subsists through the participation of many parts. Immanence here is understood in connection with a pre-given whole that is made possible through the participation of parts. Here, we cannot talk about a pure immanence because the immanence here requires the existence of other terms. It becomes a characteristic of a pre-existent part-whole relationship, thus it cannot be determined as pure. The second misconception is named emanation. It is very similar to the first one, yet this time it considers the whole itself rather than the part. The whole is understood as a ground which gives rise to everything without itself participating. It stays separate as a productive ground. In other words, while in the first instance everything is immanent to the whole they make up together, in the second, things are immanent to a pre-given ground which is distinct from the totality of the parts. What is common to each of these conceptions is that they both require a pre-existent term: either a ground which beings rise on, or a whole that consist of parts. Spinoza's conception resolves these problems and frees pure immanence from being subordinated to emanation. Thacker claims that Deleuze's reading "links immanence to an inventive, creative, and vitalist concept of expression". (2010, p. 218) Quoting Deleuze from Thacker (ibid.):

Participation no longer has its principle in an emanation whose source lies in a more or less distant One, but rather in the immediate and adequate expression of an absolute Being that comprises in it all beings, and is explicated in the essence of each. [...] Immanence is revealed as expressive, and expression as

immanent, in a system of logical relations within which the two notions are correlative. (Deleuze, 1990a, p. 175)⁶

All in all, together with the discussion of univocity, it can be said that Spinoza provides Deleuze necessary tools to free existence from pre-existent terms. Thanks to these terms life itself can be understood without the necessity to refer to something outside of it. Instead, life itself becomes the only plane of creation. Thacker summarises:

Expression, insofar as it is a principle of inventive, creative life, is here indelibly tied to the concept of immanence in itself—“immanence is revealed as expressive, and expression as immanent.” Expression, though it implies a basic temporal, causal dichotomy of expressor and expressed, Creator and creature, producer and produced—expression must take this dichotomy and flatten it out in terms of immanence, such that the expressor is not just “in” the expressed but coincident with it as well. Likewise, immanence, though it implies a static, fully actualised distribution, must take this plenum and render it dynamic and processual, such that immanence is precisely that which constantly invents and creates nothing other than immanence itself. (2010, p. 218)

Recapitulating him; first we see that expression brings dynamism to immanence, while immanence flattens expression by eliminating dichotomies. What is arrived at is a creative, dynamic and a flat plane of pure immanence. In view of this it can be briefly concluded that when the world is destroyed what is left behind is “free and unbound energy” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 107) which is univocity of difference, the plane of immanence. A plane of constant creation and dissolution of events, states, and assemblages, where fluid formations take place without collapsing into an undifferentiated, vague mass, giving difference its due, which then, allows the creation of fixations. Although this matter is not as simple as this and requires a detailed study of Deleuze’s Nietzsche in terms of will to power, his Bergson in terms of *élan vital*, and his own virtual philosophy, it is still safe to state that even at this point we arrive at a pure immanence which is equated with life.

As stated earlier, one of the last published essays of Deleuze is named “Immanence: A Life”. Smith defines it as a “strangely moving piece” (2012, p., 190) and I think many would agree with him. There, Deleuze invokes a novel written by Dickens, where a man who is mostly disliked by the people surrounding him falls ill. During his

⁶ Here I quote Deleuze’s *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1990) as cited by Thacker (2010).

illness, people who normally disdain him do their best to help him to regain his health. When he does, the situation goes back to its previous state; he becomes mean and people around him become cold again. Deleuze finds there an expression of a unique event which amounts to a life as he says, highlighted and treated with care and urgency precisely when the person is forgotten for the sake of his singular life. He says:

What is immanence? A life. . . No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if we take the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental. [...] The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a "Homo tantum" with whom everyone empathises and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularisation: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad. The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life . . . So immanence, this time quite apparently turns out to be life itself. As Smith describes, it denotes "an impersonal and non-organic power that goes beyond any lived experience. (2002, pp. 28-29)

So we arrive at a life which is immanence, which is univocal, and which is prior to any stratifications. Every thing becomes and passes away within this life.

To conclude, in this chapter I have tried to summarise the notion of pre-philosophical immanence. It is pre-philosophical because it is prior to philosophical determinations, however, to quote him, "it does not exist outside philosophy." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 41) This is so because Deleuze refuses the idea that there are pre-existing things and forms which wait to be discovered. There is no more a world systematically diverged and understood only by the relations of the terms. With this it can be said that the discovery is rather simultaneous with the creation. Accordingly, first, I have tried to show what pure immanence amounts to. It is pure because things are not immanent to something, or what is referred is not a sort of a divinity functioning as a ground which is immanent. Along with the introduction of expression, a dynamic aspect is also incorporated to the plane. Second, I have tried to show that this pure immanence is equated with a non-organic yet still a vital life. Deleuze finds aspects of it in Nicholas of Cusa (Thacker, 2010, p., 209) Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Bergson many more. Starting with DR to *A Thousand Plateaus* where it is discussed

as smooth space, we see the notion spread through all his philosophy. It is life itself, of intensities, forces, difference which appears when the world of identity is destroyed.

If we recall the five pillars I mentioned previously, we see that upon the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the subject comes. Remembering the discussions on identity we can now claim that such a field, which is immanence, cannot be approached from the point of the self-same subject. Consciousness or the subject does not have an affinity with this field; for, they require certain forms. For Deleuze, the question of “who is the subject of philosophy” has been historically answered in two ways: either in a metaphysical manner, where a groundless ground grounds all Being (as in Heidegger, theologically), or by positing “a finite synthetic form of a person” as the Kantian subject who by means of a synthesis unites the manifold and assures the possibility of experience. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 107) Either way, the condition of doing philosophy (and of existing) has been determined by the primacy of identity, and by positing subjects who are able to locate or at least search for it. Yet what happens if the inviolable state of identity dissolves? Then the ground of all Being or the ground which is the subject recedes. All in all, this is why Deleuze replaces the question of being with the question of difference, and it is from this perspective that he criticises the subject. In the following chapter I will look at some of those criticisms.

CHAPTER 3

DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

II. Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space. Many, very diverse, components have a part in this, landmarks and marks of all kinds. This was already true of the previous case. But now the components are used for organizing a space, not for the momentary determination of a center. The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. This involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction, in order to prevent the interior forces of the earth from being submerged, to enable them to resist, or even to take something from chaos across the filter or sieve of the space that has been drawn...

(Deleuze and Guattari, "Of the Refrain")

In the previous chapters I have tried to outline Deleuze's criticisms pertaining to the problematic image of the world. Following that, I have tried to show by the discussions of primacy of difference, univocity, and immanence a non-organic vital plane in which there are no pre-determined identities, beings and relationships. I have argued that the univocal understanding offers a flat dimensionality which also erases the distinctions between the object of knowledge and the subject of it. According to such conception there are no longer knower and known; rather, they are one and the same. The positions are secondary. Being is univocal; it is said of the same sense, thus, known and knower are not two distinct things. There is only the plane of immanence. The subject comes later. Accordingly, our knowing of this plane differs from the model that traditional subjectivity puts forward. To put it another way, it can be proposed that if the history of philosophy has been dominated by the ontological primacy of identity, as a result then, how the world is understood and how experience is structured have always been on the path that the ontological primacy of identity has carved previously. In that model, when the story of experience has been told, it has always accorded to a pre-made mould, reshaped according to the possibilities of identity. That is simply to say,

the ontological primacy of identity results in an epistemology which is also based on the law of identity. This results in, as discussed in the previous chapter, despite the recognition of the problem, thought still pursuing itself according to the rules that it prescribes to itself; the rules it assigns itself from within. The solution Deleuze proposes is to change the way we structure the question. If difference is to be found in the experience, it could only be done so by according ourselves to difference rather than to our pre-established internal rules and patterns. Ergo, the central concern of this chapter shall be first to understand the conceptualisations of the subject that are done following the representational mode of thinking, which priorities identity ontologically. The second concern is to argue that such conceptualisations of subjectivities do fall short to account for an experience of ontological difference. Therefore, in this chapter I will first talk about the historical constructions of the subject and later discuss why they are not compatible with the real, or with difference *as such*. Only after we see how the subjectivities are built upon the priority of the law of identity can we then understand why they are incapable for the mission at hand. After establishing the problem, I shall seek for alternatives. Thus, this chapter amounts to the discussion of the necessity of the dissolution of the self.

3.1. Descartes

We have discussed Descartes in the previous chapter. He gives an account of the subject; but because his way of grounding the subject amounts to the question of the real, I have placed its introduction in the chapter where I laid out the problem. Here I will discuss briefly the Cartesian self from the point of view of the common sense. Deleuze says in DR:

...in presenting the Cogito as a definition, [Descartes] therefore claims to avoid all the objective presuppositions which encumber those procedures that operate by genus difference. It is clear, however, that he does not escape presuppositions of another kind - subjective or implicit presuppositions contained in opinions rather than concepts: it is presumed that everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self, thinking, and being. The pure self of "I think" thus appears to be a beginning only because it has referred all its presuppositions back to the empirical self. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 129)

The problem, then, is that while the method of radical doubt aims at suspending all judgement, it still preserves its belief in a universal self that is experienced in the same

way by every human being. This suspension, in a way, is only the suspension of the empirical world. This problem can be analysed in terms of two perspectives of the common sense which is discussed in the previous chapter. First of all, in his method of doubt, Descartes assumes the identity of a self-same subject while doubting the self-same identity of the world of experience. Yet one should ask, what about the identity of the self? Where and how does Descartes describe the whatness of the concept of the self, other than presenting it as a result? If the method of radical doubt allows us to suspend all judgement pertaining to the objective world, how can the self escape from this process? It can be argued that because of the activity of thinking itself which assures the existence of God, the identity of the self can be rescued. Yet in the end, it can still be argued that the identity of the self is not suspended in the same way that the experience of the world is done. In sum, one of the problems with the Cartesian Cogito is that it is exempt from the method of doubt because the self is assigned a universal character. The common sense Deleuze criticises here is the subjective presumption of a universal self. Secondly, the problem with determining existence from the activity of thinking shall be labeled as a problem rising from the common sense. In the first chapter I briefly mentioned the problem. Here, I shall elaborate a little further. How do we know that the activity of thinking is the activity of a self-same subject? Deleuze thinks that there is an empty step, so to speak, to assign a self to the activity. It is added afterwards, as a result of the thinking process. Therefore, it does not say much about the real activity of thinking. Rather, it represents it through a subject who is able to carry out the activity. The suspension of the judgement that “any activity should be assigned to a subject” is missing. What Deleuze finds here is the representation of a real activity, which is attributed retrospectively to a subject.

In conclusion, Deleuze argues that the common sense works here in order to save the identity of the self and the world, first as the common sense which dictates that a universal self exempt from doubt exists and exists in the same manner for everyone, and second as the common sense that the activity of thinking is necessarily carried out by a unified subject. This approach necessarily eludes the real; the real, which is the activity of thinking, is considered later on as a guarantor of the subject and its self-same, enduring identity. It eludes the real because it presupposes the identity of the thinking self, thus, spares it from the method of doubt. It treats thought, which grounds

the self, as if it has an affinity with the real. It reassures itself without ever positing the question towards itself. This criticism of Descartes is not unique to Deleuze. In fact, most philosophers found the same mistake in him. The important matter here is that Deleuze attributes this presupposition not to a mistake unique to Cartesian reasoning, but to what he calls dogmatic image, which is sustained through other philosophers who criticised Descartes.

3.2. Kant

Besides calling Kant his enemy, (1995, p. 6) Deleuze properly engages with Kant, in whom he finds a profound genius, so much so that one of his first published book is called *Kant's Critical Philosophy* (1984). In the previous chapter I have stated that Deleuze answers to Kant from diverse points claiming that despite his genius in diagnosing great problems of philosophy, he himself still holds presumptions which affect his solutions. Having said that, it should be stated that my aim here is not to make an exhaustive critique of Kant from the perspective of Deleuzian philosophy, which would constitute a worthwhile yet massive undertaking all on its own. Rather, I will merely present Deleuze's criticisms and his answers. In order to dive into the subject matter, let me first very briefly present Kant.

Kant aims at justified knowledge; he wants to understand the limits of what can be called knowledge along with its conditions. For that, he proposes to judge thinking. In his first critique he establishes the following schema: Sensibility takes up the sensations, which later are taken up by imagination, and through its schematisation, they are given to understanding. Understanding is a faculty of mind that produces concepts, which become the foundation for ideas which are produced by reason. So, the aim of the first critique is to establish the boundaries of possible experience, and with that, to adjudicate the theoretical knowledge its legitimacy. For Kant, this is a crucial step, for while the reason can make claims on truth and on the absolute, it does so on a ground that it stands on unjustly. He calls such claims of reason dogmatism. Reason aims at that which is unitary, the absolute; yet contrary to its desires, it is discursive. It knows, but this knowing can never be fully. Therefore, drawing boundaries to it, establishing the domain of legitimate knowledge in order to clarify what is to be called knowledge and what is speculation, becomes the first task of philosophy. (Kant, 2007)

Only after this domain is established, Kant returns to reason and its interests. Even though reason is discursive, it still has the ability to reach the noumena. The way of doing that cannot be conceptual and cannot become the object of theoretical knowledge; it can only be practical. If such doings of reason can be explained through language by means of theoretical concepts, then it would cease to be about the thing in-itself. Reason cannot know what is in-itself; but through its affinity with it, it can provide the categorical imperative; that which one is to abide to in their every action. By establishing these two separate domains, Kant aims at legitimising philosophy. The knowledge claim in a conceptual and a theoretical manner regarding both would be an error, for the necessary, that which belongs to the domain of the understanding; and the possible; that which belongs to the domain of practical reason, cannot collapse, at least for the human. Reason can speculate beyond the boundaries of possible experience; yet this power of speculation does not provide one with justified knowledge. By this he draws the conclusion that the interaction with the world is always through representations of the mind; the thing in-itself, that which is beyond representations, cannot be known but only can be speculated about by reason. Furthermore, doing so he renders a harmony between the faculties of the mind and the world as it appears as well as a harmony between the faculties of the mind themselves. Working together in a unity, they produce a legitimate claim to knowledge. Hughes argues that Deleuze takes the Kantian critique very seriously and almost applies this critique to the Kantian subject itself and to its genesis. (Hughes, 2009, p. 3)

3.2.1 Fractured Self

Being a very straightforward and faithful reading of him, the book *Kant's Critical Philosophy* also hints at the main aspects of Deleuze's relationship with Kant, which is preliminarily summarised in the preface titled as "On four poetic formulas which might summarise the Kantian Philosophy". This introduction may at first seem trivial, it might be read as an attempt to ease the reader into Kant's "excessive atmosphere" as Deleuze calls. However, it is also very important for Deleuze's original philosophy. In each of the formulas Deleuze borrow quotations from four different literary works to introduce what he calls the great Kantian reversals, and by doing so the future key aspects of his philosophy is also foreshadowed.

The first reversal is to be found in Hamlet; "The time is out of joint" (vii) and it concerns time's freed subordination from movement. Deleuze says:

Everything which moves and changes is in time, but time itself does not change, does not move, any more than it is eternal. It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable Form which does not change. (Deleuze, 1984, p. viii)

Here, Deleuze refers to the change in the conception of time that took place with Kant. Time now is understood as the form that makes events possible. It is not added to things from without; it does not consist of successions of moments or the succession of things in an order. Rather, it is the pure form that enables the given to be given. There are many more conclusions on it, especially in DR, pertaining to Deleuze's idea of the third synthesis of time (James, 2011, p. 88), but they are beyond the limits of this discussion.

The second great reversal which will be of our concern is to be found in the expression by Rimbaud: "I is another." According to Deleuze, Kant finds different selves; one of which is Ego (moi), the empirical self which is fractured by time, and the other is the transcendental I which performs a synthesis to save the subject from being fractured. He says that Kant overthrows the substantial self that can be found in Descartes which endures change, by means of structuring a self that is fractured by time. (Deleuze, 2004, p.136) However, he then saves that self by employing common sense in the form of a presupposed identity of the I from the viewpoint of a pure self. According to Deleuze, here Kant discovers an alternative to common sense. The discovery of the fractured I is the discovery of the dissolved self. If Kant would have attempted to pursue that particular state of the self rather than fixing it, perhaps a possibility to think without image could have been found by him. Deleuze says:

...For the substantial self, he substituted a self profoundly fractured by a line of time; while in the same movement God and the self encountered a kind of speculative death. However, in spite of everything, and at the risk of compromising the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques, Kant did not want to renounce the implicit presuppositions. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 136)

Smith (2015) introduces the subject matter eloquently by stating the position Kant took against Hume, whom Kant says to have woken him up from his dogmatic slumber. Smith says that the critical question for Hume was "How is the subject constituted

within the given?” (ibid., p. 25) while for Kant it became “How can the given be given to a subject?”. Deleuze in the beginning of the second chapter of DR, “Repetition for Itself” invokes Hume. He says what Hume teaches is that

Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 70)

What he means to say is that the re-appearing of the object does not tell us anything about the re-appearing object itself. Rather, it points at the mind which expects the re-appearing and names it repetition. According to Hume, the repeated outcome, for example my touching to fire and burning my hand each time, does not necessarily show an intrinsic casual relationship between the two events. Rather, it points at the workings of the perceiving mind which expects the same outcome relying on the outcomes of previous ones. Hume calls it a habit and does not pose a substantial self behind the habit. Kant finds this discovery profound and sets off to resolve the problem it poses concerning the subject and the nature of the causation. According to him, the given is given as a flux and as a manifold. If there does not exist an a priori transcendental operation which unites this manifold, knowledge would be impossible. There would be no way to form what Hume calls habit. Knowledge is only possible on the condition of holding the manifold together in a unity through a synthesis. Otherwise there can be neither knowledge or a self that accounts for that knowledge. He says:

If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected. (Kant, 2007, p.130-1)

Here Kant asserts that in order for representations to yield knowledge, they require to be comprehended within a unity. Subsequently, he says that they need to be related to each other in a ground which is able to relate them to each other by means of a threefold synthesis. Even though the details of it being threefold is important for Deleuze, as he offers an alternative threefold synthesis himself in DR, I will not discuss the matter thoroughly; for, it is beyond the aim of this thesis. What matters here is that first, synthesis enables the manifold to be given in the order of time. Second, it asserts a ground of experience which holds the manifold as a unity. Third, it grants the object

of experience as the object=x, enabling the object to be placed under a concept. The famous example provided by Kant summarises the matter as:

If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy; if a man changed sometimes into this and sometimes into that animal form, if the country on the longest day were sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar. [...] There must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible. What that something is we soon discover, when we reflect that appearances are not things in themselves, but are the mere play of our representations, and in the end reduce to determinations of inner sense. (Kant, 2007, p.132)

In conclusion of this discussion, Kant denies the substantial self as the ground of the experience. However, by analysing the nature of the experience as well as its apprehension, he arrives at two distinct I's. One is the empirical self which is affected by particular representations, and is conscious of them through the inner sense. The second is the transcendental I which endures change. In order for given to be given as it is, it needs to be given as a unity which preserves its manifold character in the order of time. Put it differently, in order for the appearances to become knowledge, they need to be synthesised within a unity which is the second I. It is important to note that this I is not a substantial ground. Its existence is not determinable by its act; it is only a correlation. The problem of the substantial self thus is solved by the proposition that knowledge a priori demands a unity both within the representations and within the ground of representations, and the act of synthesis is attributed to a self which becomes a condition of unity; thus, it occurs as a correlation. This is where Kant's answer to Hume is to be found. Hume asserts that the self, the subject of the experience, is attributed to a bundling together of experiences due to a psychological principle which concerns human nature. Kant, on the other hand, answers that in order for the given to be given, both the knowing human and nature must follow the same principles. Thus, the self cannot be accounted for by merely empirical observations, it rather needs to be granted in terms of transcendental principles.

In the last analysis, "I is another I" can be summarised as the death of the substantial self. Instead, a transcendental operation relates the fractured I, which is always in time and is affected by representations, which can also become an object of itself, to a

transcendental I which turns out to be the very condition of knowledge. So the speculative death Deleuze mentions can be understood as the death of the substantial self. Its save, then, takes place by positing a synthesis and resurrecting the I, this time as a transcendental unity. It occurs as a correlate rather than the originary locus. Still, it is in that point that we run into common sense. Somers-Hall (2013) summaries that, common sense here is what operates at a transcendental level by means of the transcendental unity of apperception in order to ensure the identity of the pure self, the I. (p. 110) It is what saves the I from being fractured by time.

Overall, we see that this criticism brought only less to the conversation; the main problem Kant addressed is intact. How to account for experience without falling into paralogisms, without dictating substantial essences? Deleuze approaches the matter from a different perspective. As put in the first chapter, his argument follows that all of these problems stem from privileging identity. He instead provides an alternative philosophy of time which accounts for the genesis of the conditions of experience. Following a deviant line in the history of philosophy in search of answers to the prevailing problems, Deleuze turns to Maimon, a contemporary of Kant, who criticised Kant and probably effected his philosophy. Smith states that it is in Maimon whom Deleuze finds this genetic account.

3.2.2 Possibility of a Genetic Account

According to Smith, Maimon opposes Kant from two perspectives: First of all, he argues that Kant cannot escape from presupposing “original facts of reason - the 'fact' of knowledge and the 'fact' of morality.” (Smith, 2015, p. 29) We can recall previous discussion of dogmatic image of thought, and see that Maimon’s criticisms amounts to common sense; which causes to unjustly attribute an affinity to thought and truth in a pre-conceptual, pre- philosophical manner. The upright nature of thought and its congruity with truth are treated as if they are immune to inquiry. Passing without any juridical procedure, they are presented as truths in themselves. This bypass results in a self repeating process, as Smith puts:

“But this was a vicious circle that made the condition (the possible) refer to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. In other words, Kant's conception of the transcendental entailed a conformism -the value of knowledge and morality are never placed in question.” (ibid., 29)

To summarise, we can say that one of the first instances of Kant's holding onto the dogmatic image of thought is by preserving a common sense; namely, the thought that reason has an upright nature which is compatible with truth. And truth, in turn, pre-exists in a manner such that it can be attributed by correct reasoning. Such a treatment points out that both of the notions have unchanging and pre-established identities. Hence it can be said that this sort of reasoning privileges the notion of identity ontologically. Things (reason and truth, experience) and how they are (pre-established and compatible with each other) can escape jurisdiction due to their privileged positions. They enjoy a static state and cause thought to constantly restructure them. Maimon's opposition eventually arrives at the source of the problem; namely, the absence of a genetic account. Smith puts it as:

“In other words, the immanent ambitions of Kant's critical project could be realised only if, rather than simply assuming these 'facts' as given, it provided a genetic account of knowledge and morality.”
(ibid., p. 29)

Maimon's solution is to offer this genetic account by defining “the transcendental conditions of the real experience” rather than “those of possible experience.” (ibid., p. 29) In order to do that, he proposes formulating a principle of difference. If operating through the principle of identity results in unjust pre-suppositions and dualities such as the world of experience and thing-in-itself, then perhaps privileging difference ontologically may bring forth an account that does avoid such mishaps. In other words, to paraphrase Smith, if thinking on the basis of identity functions as the “condition of possibility”, then “the genetic condition of the real” can be looked for on the basis of difference. (ibid., p. 30) Thereby we arrive at a justification of employing the principle of difference prior to that of identity. It is not correct to say that this is a unique instant of justification of the principle of difference; Deleuze arrives at this notion throughout his life by means of various paths. Yet the commonality of all of them can be traced to their inability to provide a systematic philosophy which holds neither any pre-suppositions, nor any sacrosanct notions or personages.

In conclusion, so far I tried to present Deleuze's criticisms of the self by first referring to Descartes and then to Kant. Deleuze has a complex and an extended relationship with Kant. Therefore, by briefly referring to him, I tried to pave the way for dissolving

the self. I presented Descartes to show how Kant problematises the substantial self. Following that, I invoked Hume to show how Kant inserts common sense to hinder a deviation towards an alternative, which privileges difference. I tried to explain how this process works according to Deleuze. Finally, I invoked one of Kant's contemporaries whom Deleuze writes on, to present the alternative, which is to give an account of the condition of the real. If the reader recalls the previous chapter, they will now recognise the aim. By the result of these discussions it is possible to claim that the real amounts to the plane of immanence and it can be approached without necessarily inserting a self. The self only refers to a process of centralisation of the experience, and it functions by the law of identity. Thought does not require a substantial self or a self which organises the experience around itself by being the very condition of it. It rather is an outcome, produced as a result of various operations. The plane of immanence can be approached only by forgoing, dissolving it. This idea is spread through Deleuze's entire oeuvre. He talks about it in his early works as in Kant's book, and the latest published books and essays. Therefore we can bridge his own timeline and finalise the discussion with a quote from *A Thousand Plateaus*:

Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. ... Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 188)

3.3. Multiplicity

So far I have discussed the formations of the universal self that reached its peak with Kant. The aim of this historical presentation is to familiarise the reader with the Deleuzian critique of self. In this section I shall turn to Deleuzian criticisms of the self without referring to any particular philosopher. Here, I will present a brief introduction of the notion of assemblage that Deleuze had written about together with Guattari. The aim of this presentation is to approach the criticism of the self from a different point by way of showing how positing a self is understood to be a working of the representation. Deleuze and Guattari are philosophers of multiplicity. Therefore one of their main criticisms against modern subjectivities is against the notion of unity and totality that the modern subject encompasses within itself.

Now let us look at the notion of multiplicity in contrast to one. Multiplicity can be understood within an opposition with one. In other words, it may be understood as a numerical multitude. If so, in order for many to exist, One should exist prior to this multitude. The matter can be clarified by invoking the notion of a set. A set is a grouping together of various elements within a bundle. A set includes multiple members; however, each of the members are pre-existent individuals that exist prior to their relations. In this case the multiple is formed through various distinct Ones which exist by themselves. Their grouping together forms the set and their relations are formed thanks to the existence of the thing. However, if we understand the multiple in this way, it shows that thought functions within the domain of identity. That is so because it is put by the law of identity that terms exists prior to their relations, change, and difference. With this, One is understood as a self-same thing. Accordingly, the multiple is also understood by the law of identity. This brings us to the conclusion that multiplicity requires a different conception. In Deleuzian philosophy, multiplicity is not numerical. It cannot be conceived in terms of the participating terms. As Deleuze and Guattari say:

A multiplicity [...]has only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing nature. (1987, p. 8)

In summary, if this understanding is the result of thinking with identity as a primary ontological rule, what is the alternative? How can multiplicity should be understood without referring thought to One.

So we should try considering the real by leaving the rule of the one. In order for that, Deleuze and Guattari offer another way to think the multiple. The assemblage always brings us to the level of the real. The production may be a material one, it could be a literary one, it could be philosophical or artistic. In all of the cases, the first step comes from the level of the real. Let us consider the following sentence:

An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 1)

This is a description of a mother, breastfeeding her child. An organ machine is a mouth, and it is plugged into an energy source machine, which would be the breast. It is an energy source machine because it produces milk and so provides energy to the baby.

Why should we understand them as breast and mouth, when they never occur by themselves but are always connected to bodies of subjects? Because rather than starting the analysis from an already formed subject, Deleuze and Guattari invite us to turn to partial objects and the assemblages they form. When we think of a mother breastfeeding her child, we see many different connections taking place. It is never a unity, a unified event. When the child is feeding from her mother's breast, she may be holding the mother's hand at the same time. We can observe that they look each other in the eye. We can even develop the situation and say that the baby's little sister is touching the baby's feet. If we only focus on the baby's mouth and mother's breast, we miss other points of relations. As we see, the event that we consider as one, turns out to include many different connections; and all of them produce different flows and feelings. The sister may feel curiosity and love touching her young sibling, who in turn, feels the touch of the finger in her feet. From a biological perspective too, we can say that the nerves in the feet are triggered and deliver a message to the baby's brain. Should we consider the look, we can say that it is an important connection for the mother and the child which produces a feeling of intimacy on its own. This example should show that totalising an event is to ignore many different aspects and events that are happening at the same time. Moreover, we can see that presenting this event as "mother is breastfeeding her child" always refers us to a subject who actively chooses to tell the event from that specific perspective. The event is told later and all of its aspects except for one is eliminated from the presentation. It is re-presented. Representing the event in this fashion shows us the presence of an authority who can choose which aspects to tell and which aspects to leave behind. This is why Deleuze and Guattari do not start with the baby and her mother, but start with partial organs that form connections and relations with each other. If the baby is considered only from the perspective of one of its connections, then the remaining arrangements are lost. So we can say: it is the gaze that fixates upon the mouth; the actual is multiple. In other words, in the real event, many different connections are taking part, and many feelings are being produced. If it is reduced to a single unified event, it points out to an operation of re-presentation.

All in all, the first step of understanding the multiple can be through seeing the connections that partial objects form.

The notion of unity appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or corresponding subjectification proceeding.. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 8)⁷

Thus we see that the self is a product. However, it appropriates the assemblage and becomes the authority. As a result, what happens is presented to this central figure secondarily. In the first chapter of this thesis it has been laid out that such retrospective operations show us that thinking takes place in a representational mode. The real is experienced, but when it is thought or explained retroactively, the experience is reshaped according to the law of identity. Returning to our discussion concerning the multiple, we can say that even if the real and its experience is said to be multiple, it is unified in a post fashion if it is understood in relation to one. This unification points at a central figure, or a formation of a structure, an organisation ruled by a central authority.

As an assemblage, a book (a body) has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. We will never ask what a book (a body) means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge.

So, if following their footsteps, we understand anything as a body, then we can see that any body always forms assemblages. There is not a central figure, there is no need for an a priori ground to synthesis the flux. What is can be approached as it is.

⁷ I will refer to this quote in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4

DISINTEGRATION OF BODIES

...For sublime deeds like the foundation of a city or the fabrication of a golem, one draws a circle, or better yet walks in a circle as in a children's dance, combining rhythmic vowels and consonants that correspond to the interior forces of creation as to the differentiated parts of an organism. A mistake in speed, rhythm, or harmony would be catastrophic because it would bring back the forces of chaos, destroying both creator and creation.

(Deleuze and Guattari, "Of the Refrain")

Deleuze and Guattari see the world as an on-going process of production, where nothing is pre-determined or progressing towards a unity. They offer the plane of immanence to account for existence. Forces and flows continuously form relations, break relations, and produce new forms. Accordingly, the subject is a product that occurs as a result of such productions. It is what represents the given to the organism. In other words, we can neither talk about a self-identical, unified, and enduring object of experience nor such a self. Experience is consisted of a multiplicity. There are no isolated, self-enclosed objects or subjects, rather, there are relations. The subject is a result of an accumulation of power in an area, or as they say a "power takeover", which becomes the centre that organises the surrounding parts or organs accordingly. Within such organisations, experience is represented. In *What is Philosophy* Deleuze and Guattari give a reason for this, which can be seen as another way to articulate common and good sense. They assert that in order to protect ourselves from chaos, we undergo three sorts of organisations. First, we need an order in our thoughts. The law of identity becomes the ground of this order. Second, we need a regularity in the representation of experience. The unified self as a condition of the experience amounts to this regularity. Third, we also need a regularity in the experience of the sensations themselves. They say:

And finally, at the meeting point of things and thought, the sensation must recur— that of heaviness whenever we hold cinnabar in our hands, that of red whenever we look at it— as proof or evidence of their agreement with our bodily organs that do not perceive the present without imposing on it a conformity with the past. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 202)

The third one differs from the second because this time there is an emphasis on the bodily organs as well as the sensations themselves. In the first chapter I have laid out what amounts to the first organisation. The second chapter presented an argument tantamount to the second organisation. Thusly, throughout this chapter I will try to discover the third organisation, which eventually will unfold as the disintegration of body. Accordingly, first I will look at what is at stake in the notion of sensations, and second, I will turn to body.

4.1. Sensations

For Deleuze, the discussion of sensations is quite important. Starting with *Difference and Repetition*, he emphasises the being of the sensations. In the context of DR he pays a visit once again to Kant. According to him, Kantian sensibility is a passive faculty that only gathers what is given. (Deleuze, 1984, p. 1) In order for givens to be given as such, they need to appear in space and time, which are pure forms of intuitions. That means we assume that we are dealing with passive sensations which we synthesise to render relevant. By means of the synthesis they become representations, thus, objects of our knowledge. However, this is problematic because such an interaction with the world on the basis of representations already presupposes the conceptual nature of the given. According to Lord (2012), Deleuze reverses the situation and posits a turn to the being of the sensible as the source of representations. This is not a return empiricism which proposes that things are laid out there for us as things that give sensations. Rather, it concerns the problem of genesis and the impossibility of searching for it within the conceptual thought itself. Lord argues that one of the key aspects of Deleuze's criticisms of Kant is that "neither the concept nor the idea has any internal connection to being" in his philosophy. (ibid., p. 85) In search of a solution, one must turn to the being as difference that has a capacity to affect prior to giving rise to conceptual thinking.

All in all, this is the way Deleuze offers for leaving the domain of self-imprisoned conceptual thought. Sensations must be approached without referring them to conceptual thought. Deleuze's means to attain this aim have been various, yet one theme remains constant throughout his oeuvre: art and the aesthetic experience. In *Francis Bacon* (2003) he talks about sensation as the paint directly affecting the nervous system, rather than passing through the brain. In *Cinema II* (1989), he says that cinema directly communicates the 'real movement' into the mind, rather than constituting an abstract illusion or a mere representation of it. What is at stake here is that thought can engage with the movement directly, without a representation. In "Brain is the Screen" (2006), he again turns to this notion of sensations directly communicating themselves to the nervous system. All these discussions point out to the necessity of accounting for the experience of the real without a pre-established order in thought, or without referring to a central authority as the self. Hence, the aim of adhering to art is not to make a philosophy of art; rather, Deleuze points at the possibilities of new ways of thinking provided by art, as Sauvagnargues asserts. (2013, p. 12) Following Artaud, Deleuze suggests that by "producing a shock to thought", art forces thought towards its limits. (Deleuze, 1989, p.156) This shock is a matter of difference to the self-identical thought and to the self as the condition. By drawing from Kant, Deleuze hinges on the limit of the unknowable and derives from there the necessary violence that disturbs the self-same identity of thought. Sauvagnargues summarises that, in that very confrontation with its limit, thought is forced to face its exteriority, which means the exteriority of its identity. She elaborates that this shock, produced by art, causes a non-homogeneous, violent confrontation with the body, which was rendered as the exteriority of thought, where the latter was supposed to be passive. (2013, p. 56) Right in that confrontation, thought is forced to overcome this limit by means of disjunctive synthesis, which is defined as "the production of a series of differences" by Colebrook. (2010, p. 79) In that shock, the rigour of thought appears; and the problem of difference can be reconsidered. To put it differently; the aim being difference in-itself in virtue of its capacity to offer a genetic account of experience, and the fact that conceptual thought lags behind such an investigation, the main area of exploration then, will be in art; because art, by means of sensations, can produce a shock and affirm difference. As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, artistic means pose the opportunity to face the experience itself before

dealing with it in conceptual thought. (2004, p. 56) Art communicates directly to thought and to the nervous system before it reaches a conceptual realm.

.. an existential communication that would constitute the “pathic” (nonrepresentative) moment of the sensation.” (Deleuze, 2003, p. 42)

In conclusion, according to Deleuze, self-identical thought is problematic, and the solution cannot be found within such thought. What is needed is rather a direct, non-representational experience of sensation. Interestingly, the beginning of this can be traced back to Kant. In the previous chapter I have referred to “four poetic formulas” which, according to Deleuze, “might summarise the Kantian philosophy”. There I have mentioned the first two of them. Here I will return to the last one which is “A disorder of all the senses”. (p., xi) According to Deleuze, the third critique is quite important, because as in the first critique, Kant once again discovers a fracture and an alternative to common sense, yet this time, the fracture brings forth an actual pathos, and precisely in that point Kant acknowledges a “discordant accord” rather than positing a pre-existing harmony. The feeling of sublime with its negative attribution becomes a very important point for Deleuze here. He thinks that it is Kant himself who yet again finds a split, and this time with an alternative to common sense, because this time Kant recognises the negativity and violence which are produced by a difference in terms of the capabilities of the faculties themselves. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 146) The negative attribution and violence found in the sublime give Deleuze a tremendous material for his metaphysics of difference.

Hence, in search of an alternative to representation and self-same thought, I will turn my attention to the experience of the sublime in Kant’s philosophy and try to understand the meaning of it for him, as well as the significance it poses for Deleuze’s discussion of sensation. I will propose that the experience of the sublime offers a possibility of affirming difference, and thus, real experience in Deleuzian sense. I believe that a discussion of the analytic of sublime, along with a comprehension of the reflective judgement can become a cornerstone for understanding seemingly difficult Deleuzian notions. Borrowing the above mentioned philosophers’ own terms, I believe that the Sublime can be understood as the act of the Difference; where the Free opens itself up in the possible experience. Throughout the sections I will try to clarify these notions.

4.1.1 Aesthetic Judgement and Sublime in Kant

The first critique presents the faculty of judgement as a power functioning within the legislation of the faculty of understanding, as a mere connector. It accords understanding and reason and does so according to the rule of understanding. Judgement means the power to subsume the particular under the general. (Kant, 2007, p.177) The general concepts of understanding, which are shown to be belonging to theoretical nature, are given to judgement so that it can deal with the particulars in the experience in the manner of subsuming. The third critique addresses the issue from a different perspective; that is perhaps why Kant is being criticised as conflicting with himself. The problem is the following: what happens if the general is not immediately given in the manifold of experience? What is one to do when there seemingly is no general concept provided by the understanding to subsume the particular under it? (Kant, 1987) The peculiarity that may seem as a contradiction is the issue of givens without concepts. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the boundaries of the possible experience is justified through the concepts and categories of understanding. Yet here, Kant himself raises the problem of a seemingly unaccountable manifold. With that, he sets out an investigation.

He distinguishes determinative judgement from the reflective. The first two critiques treat judgment only as determinative, for in such dealings the domain and the ruling faculty is clear. If one is to cognise and deal with the particulars in a theoretical manner, then they are in the domain of theoretical nature, which is constituted by understanding. If the issue cannot be cognised and is related to freedom, to the in-itself, then the domain is that of desire and is constituted by the practical reason. In both of these domains Judgement does not need to have its unique problematisation and critique; for, all it has to do is to accord between faculties according to rules the dominant faculty provides. Yet, what happens when the domain cannot be established as easily? What to do when there is a manifold of particulars, with seemingly no general concept to relate to? Here, Judgement becomes highlighted as a faculty which accords on its own. In this gap, in a world of particulars with no concepts that can be related to neither of the domains, it provides itself with its own rule to do what it does, to accord, to harmonise. Its difference from other faculties is that it does not determine a domain of its own; rather, it functions as a uniter in the territory that is of both

understanding's and practical reason's. Because of the concealed state of the concept, judgement cannot function according to either of the faculties. The solution, as stated, is to legislate its own rule, its own principle to itself, in order to be able to function. Thus according to the principle of purposiveness, judgement, in its reflective aspect, functions. (Kant, 1987)

Aesthetic judgement is one version of the reflective judgement. When faced with a multiplicity in the experience, whose limits are known to be established by the understanding, judgement moves with its own principle of purposiveness if not presented with a general concept to act accordingly. The gist of this argument is in its recognition of the experiences that cannot be conceptualised. Kant admits such experiences and finds them a place in his philosophy under the name of aesthetic experience. This point will be very important for Deleuze later on. Kant calls such experiences aesthetic for they occur as feelings of pleasure and displeasure, prior to any theoretical cognition. (ibid, p. 29) One sort of such experiences amounts to the beautiful in nature and in art. They are what arouse the feeling of pleasure in a disinterested manner without any particular theoretical cognition. In the face of such experiences, judgement accords imagination to understanding freely; without a domination of any other, and thus so according to its own principle of purposiveness. Kant calls this purposiveness subjective; for, even though the feeling is aroused in the face of an object, there is nothing in the object that objectively causes it, maybe except for its ability to trigger the free accord of the faculties. Still, the feeling is the result of the play of the faculties rather than belonging to a cognisable quality in the object. This is why it is called subjective. The universal quality of it is that one expects the very same reaction from everyone without being able to pinpoint the reason. This universality stems from the universal quality of the faculties. In sum, it can be said that, this experience is neither merely subjective in the sense that it concerns only the individual and their interests; nor results from a definite quality in the object that can render it as an object of theoretical cognition. It rather is subjective in the sense that it concerns the faculties themselves without relating to theoretical cognition of any object; and is universal for one requires everyone to feel it as they do. In the light of this, beautiful can be discussed with respect to the nature or the artworks; for the experience is a pleasant feeling resulting from the harmony of the faculties of

imagination and understanding. The sublime, on the other hand, is experienced as a negative feeling at first. It amounts to that which is formless or limitless. (ibid.)

4.1.2 The Sublime as Discordance

As discussed above, the sublime is a feeling of pleasure, with the pleasure being secondary to displeasure. When the judgement is about the beautiful, one talks about harmony, namely, the harmony of the faculty of imagination and of understanding. One can claim that it is within the sphere of the self-identical for even though there is a loss of the proper concept, there still is a form that is given to imagination. If we are to look at this from a Deleuzian perspective, we can say that the priority of identity in thought is preserved, for the experience produces a pleasure resulting from the harmony. Even though there is not a proper concept, and as a result, a manifold that requires the operation of reflective judgement, the faculties can communicate at a certain level, so to speak. One cannot theoretically account for the communication of imagination and understanding; yet, one feels their affinity with each other. Neither the faculty of imagination nor understanding is necessitated to approach their limit. They can persist as they are and produce a feeling of pleasure in this accord. The sublime, on the other hand, crushes the notion of identity by means of a communication of violence within the faculties. The experience of the sublime brings imagination to its limit. Kant renders the experience of the sublime “a mere appendix to the beautiful” (Kant, 1987, p.100) for there is no object in it but only the experience of the losing of the object. The harmony that brings the pleasant feeling, that which guarantees the affinity of the faculties with each other, becomes a disoriented one. The sublime brings one face to face with one’s limit, with the outside, because no matter how hard the Idea of the reason is tried to be given, it stays out of reach. By the recognition of the limit, the faculty is forced to face its limitations. Hence, we can say that this limit points to the identity of the faculty, and to that which is out of its reach. Reason demands imagination to apprehend the totality, the absolute that is apparent to it. The imagination forces itself to its limit in order to answer to this demand; and in a peculiar resemblance to the mathematical sense of the word limit, the imagination becomes stretched there infinitely, without ever reaching the outside, or being able to present the Idea of reason. As a result of this stretch, a negative feeling is produced. (ibid.)

This experience is quite significant for Deleuze. As discussed above, Kant aims at fixing the fractures he identifies in experience, by means of a common sense that ensures the unitary character of it. Here, he admits the fracture and shows that a disharmonious accord of the faculties is actually possible. It is disharmonious because prior to pleasure, which is the result of the harmony of the faculties, a displeasure occurs. Deleuze argues that in this very point, the problem of the communication of different faculties finds a proper treatment. When Kant attributes all synthesis to a capable self, he does so on the ground of a transcendental operation; and this operation takes place because of a necessity. (Kant, 2007) For Deleuze, this necessity to presuppose the unitary character of the experience from the point of an object and a self that rescues itself from the fracturing of time, is a result of the loyalty to the principle of identity. However, this operation falls short to properly account for the communication of different faculties. In the sublime experience, because of the presence of the limit as well as the lack of a form, the communication cannot be held on a ground of a unitary self. The different faculties communicate themselves to each other by producing a violence which is experienced as a displeasure. This discord shows the possibility of a synthesis without the legislation of understanding or reason and without a unitary self that makes a coherent experience possible. Deleuze calls this disjunctive synthesis. (Deleuze, 2004) Kant describes synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge.” (Caygill, 1995, p. 382) In synthesis there needs to be two different things that are not derivable from each other, and knowledge is produced in their coming together. Disjunctive synthesis is different because unlike synthesis which brings two separate things together and from them into a unified whole, disjunction assures their separation. In other words, disjunctive synthesis highlights difference rather than sameness or unity. Here, disjunctive synthesis is to be found in the discordant communication of faculties.

In summary, the criticism goes as follows: for Deleuze, every philosophy takes an ontological stance in the very beginning; it is the presupposition of the priority of the law of identity. This stance may be covert or unrecognised. According to Deleuze, Kant is a philosopher who has discovered an alternative to this stance; yet he proceeds by saving the identity. For Kant, this identity is a necessary condition for possible

experience. Yet, Deleuze argues that Kant himself provides an account of violence which proposes difference, and in the experience of the sublime, this becomes quite highlighted.

The discord of faculties, their mismatch with each other, provides difference by means of a violence. Here, the ontological priority is given to difference by means of an experience that is prior to conceptual thought. The feeling communicated in the aesthetic experience, especially in the sublime, opens up the possibility of engaging with a given manifold with an alternative approach on the basis of the ontological priority of difference. In his own words, Deleuze summarises the core of the matter as follows:

The transcendental operation of the faculties is a properly paradoxical operation, opposed to their exercise under the rule of a common sense. In consequence, the harmony between the faculties can appear only in the form of a discordant harmony, since each communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence from the others. (Deleuze, 2004, p.146)

The meaning of it is that through the disharmony in the sublime, difference, by being non-conforming, can be experienced and justly included into the philosophical discussion.

Overall, the discussion of the sublime is important because it provides us with Deleuze's idea that difference can be apprehended as a sensation rather than a concept, by means of a shock. It is a pathos rather than a concept of thought, and it shows itself even in Kant.

4.2. Body

In the previous section I have, by quoting Deleuze and Guattari, draw attention to the emphasis on sensations and their affect with respect to experience. Now I will turn my attention the discussion of body and the experience of real. If we recall how Deleuze talks about sensations, we see that he also includes another aspect to his argument; the nervous system. The reason for that is to be found in the attempt to avoid representation. For Deleuze, stories, narrations, figurations operate within representation. For example in *Francis Bacon*, he assigns the painter originality so long as they take the hard work of clearing the canvas from clichés. The original

painter needs to engage directly with the paint, colours, and forces that can be rendered visible, otherwise, they will merely reproduce what is already said and done, because they will be operating within a domain filled with pre-established determinations. (Deleuze, 2003, pp. 86-99) Here, once again, we see his disparagement pertaining to reducing thought and experience into dictations of concepts. So long as the artist can turn to the sensations they can produce works that have real affects. What is more, it is at that point they leave the rule of the central authoritarian organ and engage with all of the body. (ibid. pp. 34-41) This may sound curious, as if one denies the power of brain. Although there is quite a discussion in Deleuze's oeuvre pertaining to that matter, I shall briefly clarify it. Perhaps it would not be wrong to interpret Deleuze's approach to body as holistic. Recalling the discussion of univocity, the same idea can be adapted here. Things, organs, beings are arranged and distributed in terms of their functions, and such functions are determined in terms of forces they are capable of exercising. The operation is not fixed, there is always room for new functions, new ways of being, and new arrangements. The body is not different, and neither is the distribution of its organs. The nervous system is a typical example of this matter. For instance, we know that formations of neural pathways make up habits, and by effort, they can be restructured. Or we know that amblyopia, a neurological problem in the eyeball, can at least be partially treated by working the neurones in the eye. "Brain is the junction" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2011, p. 208) of all of these workings, not the unified ruling centre. All of the body participates in the experience. It is in this manner that representation is assigned to the authority of brain. In such organisation where the brain is unquestionably placed in the very centre, the distribution of the world is also organised in a similar fashion. This brings us finally to the notorious notion: Body without Organs. It is prevalent in all of Deleuze's philosophy. He first introduces it in *Logic of Sense*, in the chapter "Thirteenth Series of the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl". It is a term Deleuze borrows from Antonin Artaud. In his 1947 radio play "To Have Done with the Judgement of God," Artaud says:

When you will have made him a body without organs,
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions
and restored him to his true freedom

It is use to denote the body when it reaches the limit of assigned organisation. Recalling previous discussions, we have seen that the dissolution of the person is followed by a disintegration of bodies. Just as dissolving the self means dissolving the common sense and thus representation, the disintegration of the body also attacks the same obstacles.

Quoting Deleuze:

The body without organs is opposed less to organs than to that organisation of organs we call an organism. It is an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive reality, which no longer determines with itself representative elements, but allotropic variations. Sensation is vibration. We know that the egg reveals just this state of the body “before” organic representation: axes and vectors, gradients, zones, cinematic movements, and dynamic tendencies, in relation to which forms are contingent or accessory. [...] It is a whole nonorganic life, for the organism is not life, it is what imprisons life. The body is completely living, and yet nonorganic. Likewise sensation, when it acquires a body through the organism, takes on an excessive and spasmodic appearance, exceeding the bounds of organic activity. It is immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion. (Deleuze, 2003, pp. 44-5)

The body without organs, then, is not a destruction of the body, nor getting rid of the organs. It is the body prior to representation, prior to fixed designations. It offers a certain freedom, for one does not to adhere to pre-determined rules and structures concerning the whatness of the body. Here, we should once again pay a tribute to Spinoza, who claimed that “No one has so far determined what the body can do.” (1677, III, 2, scholium). We do not know, because even though the human body has a certain shape and structure, the meaning pertaining to it is not intrinsic to it. For example, there are hardly ever final consensuses on various medical treatments. Furthermore, the affects of those treatments vary across people. No two individuals are the same. Recent biotechnology also can give us a clue about the capabilities of the body. Nowadays, prosthetics can mimic the limb by connecting to the nervous system and joining the electrical circuit of the body. That being said, I should also state that the expression of Spinoza does not merely refer to the human body. In the DeleuzoGuattarian context, a body should be taken as any assemblage, thus, the possibilities of the body should also be considered in a much wider context.

One other way to approach BwO is by considering Guattari's contribution to Deleuzian philosophy, mainly with the idea of machine. It is true that Deleuze had similar concerns prior to his encounter with Guattari. It can be detected in his appreciation of Simondon, who is famous for his fascination with machines and who gives a theory of individuation by considering techniques and technologies. Returning to Guattari, it can be said that his theorisation of machinic production draws from a rich history of philosophy of technics, technology, and economical theories of labour. Being a student of Lacan, and working actively in the field of psychoanalysis, he forms a theory of the unconscious which is machinic. Machinic unconscious theory is very rich; that is why its thorough discussion is beyond the boundaries of this thesis. For the sake of the argument, we should only dwell on the subject shortly.

It should be stated at first that Guattari is interested in the Real, rather than the symbolic (in a Lacanian sense) or the representational. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why he and Deleuze could make such a perfectly functioning assemblage. Putting this aside, we can see that his theorisation of the unconscious renders it as an operation on the level of the real. He refuses the Lacanian tripartite Real, Symbolic, Imaginary, and the rapture with the Real. In light of the arguments of Smith (2017), it can be briefly put that Guattari proposes machine instead of organism, and machinic production for that of organism. Machine, according to Smith, should be seen as something that repeats the difference, not the same. He thinks that the core problematic of the machine that can be traced through the history is the "duality" between it and organism. (Smith, 2017) Organism is a being that is ruled by a central authority. An element becomes too powerful and orders others.⁸ A machine, on the other hand, contains heterogeneous and non-hierarchical formations which always yields a product. Contrary to organism which is teleological, machinic production, then, does not have predetermined aims; it works by eliminating connections as well as forming them. Guattari uses it as a means to oppose the idea of structure, whether it be dynamic or stable. (ibid.) Machine is something which is always in relation with an outside, it is not enclosed within a structure. Thus, machinic production is open to new; it can constantly create new connections which cannot be conceived within the idea of

⁸ Recall the quote from last chapter pertaining to a power takeover.

structure. It cuts connections and breaks the current system because there is always an exterior to be connected to. An organism does not allow us to conceptualise the cuts, and the breaks; it always refers to connections formed around a central organ, such as the brain.

The production Guattari conceives is not in a metaphysical, abstract sense but it is a material production. Anything can be connected to any other thing and produce new relations. This idea is also one of the core points of assemblage. What is meant can be clarified by recalling an example of connection from the previous chapter. The mouth machine connects to another one, which itself produces a flow, in our case, milk. They connect, and one cuts the flow the other produces. This machinic operation allows us to account for the event without the authoritarian presence of an organism. There is no problem with the organ, the problem is with the organisation. It hinders the production of new, and flowing of flows. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 158)

In order to consider the function of breakage of machine *Anti Oedipus* (1983) can be considered, where Deleuze and Guattari propose three synthesis of the unconscious, one of which amounts to the disjunctive synthesis of recording. Akin to the disjunctive synthesis, this act of unconscious pertains to production of differences by means of severing established connections and disrupting harmonies. Deleuze and Guattari liken it to the Freudian theory of death wish. Freud tells us that the desire towards life is not unilateral; there is also a desire of destruction; the desire to attain nothingness; to return to the lifeless state. (Freud, 1989, p. 620) Deleuze and Guattari recognise this desire but with a twist. For them, desire does not work towards the construction of a unity that includes everything that may possibly exist. It is neither a drive to go back to a previous state of unity of undifferentiated matter. It rather is an unconscious productive life instinct operating in the level of the real. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, pp. 4-6) In line with this, disjunctive synthesis is a production of difference in terms of life instincts and impulses. It is a machinic operation which breaks existing connections, which causes stuttering in assemblages. (ibid., pp. 75-84) Considering it in terms of the body, we see that any partial organ desires to form new connections, thus it breaks the existing ones. It harms in order to make new ones. The child, feeding from her mother for example, stops feeding for a second to see the source of a sound. This is

disjunctive. This synthesis allows for the body to break its current connections and organisations so as to form new ones.

In the light of this discussion, Smith's description of BwO as "becoming-machine of the organism" fits well. He says:

[BwO] is what happens when one part of the body enters into combination with some other machine in a way which allows it to escape from the organism's regularising, normalising processes. Seen in this way, the body previously considered an organism is opened up to a whole host of new connections, each of which may lead to the production of an event. (Smith, 2017, p. 109)

All of these arguments considered, I approach BwO from two perspectives. First, I discussed it as the state of the body when the thought faces limits, thus the organisation of the body which is accorded to the identity of thought shutters. This description is more in line with the one Deleuze provides in his overall argument in LS. Second, I consider it in its contrast to organism: a machinic assemblage capable of producing new connections as well as breaking them. In each of them, disjunctive synthesis takes place. A body becomes what produces differences, something that is open to the outside. It is what enables one to conceive the "Production of the real as an intensive magnitude starting at zero" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 153), which is to say that an experiential, non pre-determined, open assemblage that allows for production of differences. They maintain "zero intensity as the principle of production." (ibid., p. 164)

Following this argument, it should be stated that a BwO should not be considered as a state of mind, as a concept, or as an idea in the sense of reason. What is at stake here is not the experience of a pre-existing form of identity but the genesis of it, the production of it. It is "a set of practices". (ibid., p. 150) "It is a limit", therefore, it is not attainable; one "forever attains it" (ibid.) In short, it is an experimentation done for the sake of washing off the body of its fixed organisations, so that forces can go through it and intensities be felt. For the production of a BwO, a difference to thought, a shock to the body is necessitated. Such difference and shock is discovered through experimentation, through utilising sensations before they enter into conceptual and representational relations with thought.

To recapitulate, it can be said that the BwO is an alternative to the subject whose only meaningful experience with the world is through conceptual thinking on the basis of self-same forms. BwO, on the other, is a body which enters a direct relationship between affects, forces, and becomings. As previously discussed, the vitality of life finds itself in the univocity of difference, in the plane of immanence rather than transcendence. As Sauvagnargues summarises, organisations of organs hinder this vitality by means of encapsulation and insistence in the identities, which assert a unitary model of power that organises life around a centre. (2013, p. 56) Difference, on the other hand, requires an equal distribution of power. Deleuze and Guattari express in *A Thousand Plateaus* that, “the BwO is the unformed, unorganised body with all of its flows, pure intensities...”. (1987, p. 161) As a result, the BwO can be understood as an alternative experience of selfhood which can produce a plane of immanence.

In conclusion, in this chapter I have tried to present the necessity of disintegrating the body, which is subsequent to destruction of the world and dissolving the self. The notion criticised here is the organisation of body which follows the law of identity and the model of representation. With this, I have tried to follow DeleuzoGuattarian argument which concerns “joining with the cosmic forces”. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 311) The aim is not to deconstruct every notion and present an image of a disorganised, destroyed, disenchanted world. This is perhaps the main criticism towards Deleuze and towards other postmodern philosophers.⁹ The aim of such a presentation is, first of all, to bring thought to the very edge by identifying and attacking every presupposition. And it is not a new aim; philosophy takes pride in this. Deleuze furthers this adventure and does not attempt to save any identity, be it of god, of the world or the self. In his philosophy, nothing is dismissed for being outside. If anything, the notion of inside is dismissed, for any inside points at a secondary creation. Identities, concepts, beings, structures, unchanging sets are all claimed so in order to ease achievement of results. Deleuze calls them, the identities, in his *Cinema I* book, “closed sets”. (p. 10) They sometimes help to do science, presents preliminary explanations, and help build more structures, yet they do not give an accurate image

⁹ It should be stated though, Deleuze is not exactly a postmodern thinker.

of the world. Perhaps such an image cannot ever be given; for, when all of these structures recede, only becoming itself remains. However, philosophy, according to him, should be compatible with it. Furthermore, because there are no pre-existing formations, philosophy does not discover anything as suggested very early on this thesis. It only creates concepts for thought to accelerate. and reach “infinite speeds”. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 42) Once again, as he says, it is a tool box for creation, not a tool for discovery. The question does not pertain to a transcendent truth, waiting to be discovered by a hero. It is only if it works, and if so, how? (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 7-8) For in the end:

“There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It’s like plugging into an electric circuit.” (ibid.)

CHAPTER 5

HOW DO YOU GLITCH YOURSELF?

III. Finally, one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, lets some one in, calls someone, or else goes out oneself, launches forth. One opens the circle not on the side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one created by the circle itself. As though the circle tended on its own to open onto a future, as a function of the working forces it shelters. This time, it is in order to join with the forces of the future, cosmic forces. One launches forth, hazards an improvisation. But to improvise is to join with the World, or meld with it. One ventures from home on the thread of a tune. Along sonorous, gestural, motor lines that mark the customary path of a child and graft themselves onto or begin to bud "lines of drift" with different loops, knots, speeds, movements, gestures, and sonorities.

(Deleuze and Guattari, "Of the Refrain")

Up until now we have seen how a world image along with a self who conditions it is constructed, sustained, and rebuilt when it shuttered. This affair can be likened to sorcerer's drawing of a magic circle. In ritual magic, the sorcerer, prior to performing rituals draws a protective circle called Goëtic Circle. It is believed that as long as they stay inside the circle, demons or other magical creatures invoked cannot harm them. (Shores, 2019, pp. 84-85) Just as the sorcerer, we too perform a magical act, so to speak, in order to save ourselves from the forces of chaos. Yet as expressed in the first paragraph of "Of the Refrain", sometimes the protective circle is broken. The reason perhaps can be searched within the impossibility of seizing and fixing becoming. At any rate, this brings me to the core argument of this thesis; that "finally, one opens the circle a crack" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 311), one "cracks up" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 161) joins with the outside (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 156). Becoming a body without organs, experimenting on oneself is one of Deleuze and Guattari's definitions for it. In this chapter, I will offer my own suggestion to turn oneself into a BwO. I will borrow a term from technology and argue that one can glitch themselves in order to become a BwO. My main line of questioning will be on the effects of art on the self in

connection to the former's power of affecting the latter in terms of turning it into a body without organs. I will question whether experimental music, as a result of being novel and non-conforming to the current state of affairs, can work as a glitch that deterritorialise the subject, and make them a BwO. I will argue that such a process can result in a change on the experience of selfhood and the self same subject, and I will try to show that this change can yield a glimpse of "life as immanence", as Deleuze calls it. (Deleuze, 2006, p. 385)

5.1 *Memories of a Digital Native*

With digital culture becoming the baseline of daily life, glitch has become a recurrent phenomenon. Thanks to its effects of visual and sonic corruption, it has also accumulated an aesthetic value. The amount of desktop and mobile applications that distort pictures, social media outlets offering "filters" that glitch pictures and videos are among the proofs. Last but not least, one can find shows, games, even companies named after it. But what is glitch, and should we try to incorporate it into the philosophical discussion? A glitch is a short term error in a given system. It does not cause an absolute malfunction, it does not mean the total breakage of the system. It rather is a momentary slip. Since its entrance into the cultural lexicon around the 1960's, it has gain quite a popularity in various areas, most of which is due to its aesthetic dimension. Nowadays, there is a musical genre, mixed medium artistic practises, and games pertaining to it. Setting aside the various areas it is found in, I should return to my other question: why is borrowing this term important for philosophy? What does it offer to us? There are many answers these questions. First off, if studied with a little depth, it will be clear that the notion has quite an affinity with some Deleuzian notions. Although Deleuze himself never uses the term "glitch," I will show that its conceptual equivalent played an important role in his thinking on selfhood. Defining glitch as a short term problem disrupting the expected flow of events and referring to its application in arts, it can be proposed as a way of turning oneself into a BwO; for, the BwO is an experience of selfhood on the basis of difference, and glitch is a phenomenon that disrupts the self-same in experience. The shock of art which is a violence to self-same thought, then, can be said to be an instance of glitching the self-same subject into plane of immanence.

Second, we see throughout history how science and philosophy have always been in close reciprocation. Scientific advancements have always gave philosophy new ideas, and philosophy has always furthered science. Living in the technology era, philosophy should pursue this relationship.

In order to clarify this, I shall return to Deleuze and show how he himself constantly borrows terminology from various disciplines, for which he sometimes is criticised. In a talk which later is published as “What is the Creative Act?” (2006), Deleuze provides a clear perspective on the relationship between disciplines such as art, science, and philosophy. According to him, what is common to all of them is ideas. However one should be wary; for, approaching an artwork or a scientific notion in terms of one single idea that the finished creation aims to present suggests that there is a core, and elements are built around it. The centre which carries the message is highlighted, while the techniques used to create it are devalued as being mere means. Consequently, it becomes the artist or the scientist who brings forth this secluded idea by shaping the material at hand.

Put differently, this understanding suggests that an idea exists in itself, and material bodies and means become secondary. The artist, having access to this idea looks at it and creates through whatever discipline they desire. An idea is thought to exist on its own; and the material bodies are in an eternal struggle to represent it the most perfect way. For Deleuze, on the other hand, ideas cannot be separated from their mode of expression. (ibid.) By extending this understanding, it is easy to see that new material bodies and new means bring about ideas that could have never existed before that body or that means exist. Cinema, for example, invents “blocks of movement/duration” whereas painting invents “blocks of line/colours”. Science, then, creates functions. (ibid., 314) Prior to the existence of a necessary means, the idea that gives rise to a specific function in science could not have been apprehended. In that case neither discipline, such as philosophy and science, need one another to be able to think; they only require their own unique means to do that. Yet still, they provide creations that are able to affect each other. In the previous chapter we have seen how sensations that painting produces affect thought by means of a shock. Science is not different. With technology becoming an indispensable part of life, and technological advancement is unprecedented, it deserves philosophy’s attention. Moreover, engaging with functions

it creates sometimes becomes a necessity, as Deleuze suggests in the above-mentioned talk. All these being said, then why not borrow a term which technology has produced into philosophy? Or to quote Deleuze:

What happens when [a creation] is an excellent [creation] and an affinity is revealed through which someone has an idea in [another discipline] that corresponds to the idea [in the creation]? (ibid., p. 316)

For this reason, I believe that there scientific and technological conversation can affect philosophy, because ideas which were not possible before are coming to the surface with new creations, and philosophy will have interesting correspondences with them. I believe glitch is an example of this. It is an accidental creation and it corresponds to ideas in philosophy. Therefore, this encounter offers novel creations on the part of philosophy. Even Deleuze could have not said something about it because his life was not dominated by computers and electronic devices.

People born after 1980, according to Prensky (2001), can be called digital natives; for, they born into an environment inseparable from digital technology. Many of those people have grown up immersed in technological devices. They played computer games, done their research on the web instead of using print encyclopaedias, and socialised via the internet. In short, technology is to be treated as an intrinsic part of their lives. That is why glitch makes more sense now. “Bug”, “lag”, “error” “blue screen of death” are all meaningful expressions for those people, but they do not make much sense to their parents. If that is the case, then incorporating the notion into the philosophical discourse, creating a concept out of it is a task for students of philosophy.

5.2 Glitch

If the effects of glitch in social conversation are undeniable, then one of the main questions would be the following: why does the visual production of distortion have such a value? Perhaps the answer can be found within an analysis of Dadaism, surrealism, or even in paintings of Bacon of whom Deleuze has written a book. However, my aim here is not to present an argument concerning glitch aesthetics. Instead, by acknowledging it as a product of digital technologies, I wish to treat it as an idea from which a concept can be drawn. That is, I wish to research a way to appropriate it into the philosophical discussion; for, I believe it can offer a novel way

to approach already discussed problems. Nonetheless, I will provide a brief introduction of glitch music because the method of glitching the self I offer is through the affect of music. Even though Deleuze has not provided an individual book on music as he did for cinema and painting, he still wrote about it. In FB (2003) he says; “It gives a disembodied and dematerialised body to the most spiritual of entities.” (p. 55) As glitch music is the intersection, I shall turn to the term glitch before talking about the power of music.

The Oxford Dictionary defines glitch as “a surge of current or a spurious electrical signal”. The etymological origins of it can be traced back to the Yiddish *glitsch*, which means “a slippery place” and to the German *glitschen* which means to slither. Various sources detect the first mainstream usage of it in astronaut John Glenn’s book *Into Orbit*. Quoting from Oxford Dictionary:

Another term we adopted to describe some of our problems was ‘glitch’. Literally, a glitch is a spike or change in voltage in an electrical circuit which takes place when the circuit suddenly has a new load put on it...A glitch, however, is such a minute change in voltage that no fuse could protect against it.

Since then, the word has been used to denote malfunctions, miscommunications, short lived errors, and miscalculated outcomes in circuits, electronic devices, and computational programs. Though these are the main domains we come across, the usage is not limited to them. In astronomy, for instance, it is used in the context of pulsars. It is also prevalent in a cultural sense. However, since the term entered into the cultural dialogue with information technologies, I shall provide a very simple technical definition following the discussion of Rosa Menkman, (2011, pp., 12-13) who is a glitch artist and theorist. She proposes a definition which derives from Shannon, who is considered to be the founder of information theory. Menkman cites that according the model Shannon provides, there are five aspects to be considered: information source, encoder, channel, decoder, and destination. The information source produces the message which is encoded by the encoder. Then, it is transmitted through a channel. The message finally arrives at the decoder which decodes it and transmits it to the final destination. This model makes a sharp distinction between the signal which is labelled information, and noise. This difference is not inherent; it is dictated according to the intention of the source and receiver of the transmission.

Explaining glitch according to this model, we can say that glitch is an accident, a corruption, or an accidental element within the transmission. Nevertheless, it is not limited with this model, both because this model is rather old and also because it can be stretched to be meaningful in any system.

Lastly, I argue that the notion should be distinguished from an error. An error is a mistake, a misjudgement, most of the time with visible consequences. It refers to difference between a plan and an outcome. Besides, errors may cause glitches. A glitch, on the other hand, does not necessarily cause a breakdown. It merely is a short term disruption. A system may work while experiencing glitches. Nonetheless, a glitch is always perceivable, whereas the errors do not have to be so. That is why the phenomenon has quite an impact on aesthetics.

5.2.1 BwO and Glitch

Since my aim is to present glitch as a new method of making oneself a BwO, I shall once again turn to Deleuze and Guattari to seek the experiments they offer. We know from ATP that there are many ways to turn oneself into a BwO. A masochist, a drug user are examples of this undertaking. In both of them, what is at stake is that the body is to be populated by intensities. (ibid., p. 153) In the masochist's case, the intensity desired is of pain. A masochist experiments on their body so as to constitute a body prior to organisations and stratifications, that is, prior to determinations which imprison the body to a representational mode. If we recall Spinoza's postulate "We don't know what a body can do", the experimentation on the masochist's part can be understood better. Organisations and stratifications dictate a static way of being. So long as the body is understood as such, its capacities will remain unknown. Cox (2006) puts the matter as:

To become a BwO is to destratify the body, to reconnect it with the intensive, impersonal, transhuman matter that composes and surrounds it, to open it up to new connections and assemblages, to explore the innumerable things it can do beyond the restricted set of habitual actions that characterise the organised body. When one does this, one transforms the body from a given entity with a specified functionality and direction of activity to a construction site of exploration and connection. One no longer actualises merely the specific set of affects that constitute, for example, Man as a normal, rational, heterosexual, productive human being but the entire (or, at least a larger) range of affects of which this body is capable. (p. 2-3)

The way the masochist does it is by using the intensities of pain. Pain as a sensation enters a relationship directly with “nerves and flesh” (Deleuze, 2003, p. 45). It is an intensity in direct connection with the reality of the body. It does not transfer a message which is to be decoded in the brain. It directly communicates itself to the nerves; thus, it bypasses thought. As a result, prior to the form of representation, forces that does not enter into the system of representation can be rendered apparent within the experience. In the case of a drug user, the intensity sought is that of absolute cold¹⁰. In both cases, the experiment pertains to flowing of waves and production of real, as they say. (Deleuze & Guattari p. 153) If we are to simplify this we can say that through sensations, intensities, body enters into a direct relationship with the real, for the body is no longer taken as a static given. Instead, it is a multiplicity which is open to plane of immanence. This is why a BwO is said to be a limit; it is always an ongoing experimentation, there is not a final state to be achieved, nor is there a pre-given aim. It is an ongoing production.

My argument follows from that: since the human being is understood as a multiplicity, an assemblage by itself which is always in connection with its surroundings, then the notion of glitch can be applied to it. Rosa Mankman, one of the leading theorists of glitch, adds a dimension to the definition which is closer to my conception. She says:

[glitch is] a (actual and/or simulated) break from an expected or conventional flow of information or meaning within (digital) communication systems that results in a perceived accident or error. A glitch occurs on the occasion where there is an absence of (expected) functionality, whether understood in a technical or social sense. Therefore, a glitch, as I see it, is not always strictly a result of a technical malfunction. (2011, p., 9)

Similarly, I am also interested in the aspect of it which refers to a mishap in the flow. Glitch is always thought in terms of a technological body, but if we look through the DeleuzoGuattarian lens we can extend it to any body. If so, a disruption on the normal experience of body and self can be considered a glitch. I will approach the disruption from the point of music, for as mentioned previously, it has a particular power.

¹⁰ There are no further arguments in the mentioned chapter pertaining to intensity of cold. That is why I merely present it as an example.

5.2.2 Glitch and Music

In 1993 two musicians from Germany noticed something unusual with their rented CDs. When they played them, they kept hearing slips and breaks, sounds that inform one that the physical body is broken or harmed. One can say that there is nothing unusual in the sounds themselves; they are just noises in the song which are not supposed to be there. The interesting part begins with the intervention of creative minds. The two musicians who make up the duo Oval recorded these sounds of error and produced music with those sounds on their digital audio workstations. This method is similar to the cut up technique in painting, or other forms of mix music. What is new here, and what I find important, is the incorporation of a new sound which come into existence only with the new technology and which is outside of one's construction. (They are sounds of errors.) Setting these aspects aside, we can say that by this new method, Oval came to be the first glitch music artists and creators of a whole new genre. Sanglid (2004) provides the following definition for glitch music:

Apart from damaging CDs, glitch artists collapse software processing, for example, by overloading processors, reducing bit rates and by reading files from another file format (text files, picture files, program files) as if they were audio files. The results are sampled and composed into a specific musical context depending on the aesthetic preferences of the composer. (p. 199)

What is important here is the inclusion the outside element, the random sound. This at first may seem rather unclear. One daily hears all sorts of noises and sounds. They make up a person's life, they are already in work. However, just as a painter needs to remove the givens in the canvas, clean it from cliches and representations, stories (Deleuze, 2003, p., 100), the musician also needs to embark upon a similar task. They need to a-signify the sound in order to free it from representation, and make sensation real. (2003, p., 45)

5.2.2.1 Representational Music

Research has shown that the musical perception varies across cultures. (Hu & Lee, 2012) Harmonic appreciation, pitch perception, and aesthetic valuation along with many other dimensions of sound which includes its effect on mood are shaped within the dominant culture. Put it differently, judgements of sounds as pleasant or dissonant

do not occur as a result of inherent values of the sounds themselves, rather, they stem from cultural background.

What is suggested in the previous paragraph is not limited to music. Perszyk and Waxman (2019) puts that assigning sounds meanings in fact takes place very early on. With their study they suggest that language plays a an important role in determination of some of the cognitive capabilities, such as receptivity of certain sounds. While infants up to six months can perceive speech sounds in their nonnative languages, this ability declines after eight months. They show less and less sensitivity to sounds that are not a part of their native language. Accordingly, while they could differentiate between different languages, they start losing this ability and become adapted to their native language. Speech skills which concern the production of the sounds are developed in the same fashion.

Both of these examples show that sound enters into a representational relationship. It cannot be considered separately from culture. Humans even lose the ability to perceive or produce some sounds because they are not dominant in their language. They react differently to the same music because of the difference in cultural signification of sounds and/or musical structure. The term noise is another example for this matter. Previously I have mentioned noise as the unwanted element in a given system. The term becomes most apparent when it is understood in a musical context. According to information theory's terminology, noise is an unwanted signal. It is labelled noise not due to an inherent value or lack of it, but because it does not correspond to any meaning in the given structure. While signal is the sound that is desired to be produced or reproduced, noise corresponds to elements that interfere with the desired transmission. With the introduction of recording and electrical transmission technologies, the noise within music started to become an important issue. These issues vary from the physical problems starting with the most simple, such as the position and quality of cable that carries the current, to software complications, as well as the sound engineering part. In short, we see that sound enters into a representational structure as the meaningful and pleasant sound and as the sound of error.

There are two ways to approach the problem of sound. First off, we can consider sound as a material flux independent of human beings. In that case, we perceive it as a

physical force which is capable of affecting humans as well as their surroundings. To quote Serres:

As soon as a phenomenon appears, it leaves the noise; as soon as a form looms up or pokes through, it reveals itself by veiling noise. So noise is not a matter of phenomenology, so it is a matter of being itself. (1995, p. 13)

Although Serres is pointing at the transcendental dimension of background noise as that which conditions any further determination of signal and music, (Cox, 115) I only want to point out the immanence of it into life.¹ Life is inseparable from the sonic flux, for sonic flux is a material phenomenon; it is a force that is intrinsic to other physical bodies. Noise then, can be understood as the sounds in the background of perception. In that case noise ceases to be an error, but becomes a physical reality.

Second, we can approach it from the perspective of meaning. Hegarty paraphrases noise in light of Attali's discussion:

“Noise then is an intervention at the level of meaning, one that challenges existing meanings and patterns, leading to questioning (and therefore highlighting the attribution of meaning) and, eventually, if not always, in the recuperation of noise as new system.” (p. 1)

Noise both as an unwanted signal, and as an intensive force (Cox, 2018) enters into the musical relationship as an a-signifying element. It is a-signifying because it is understood as a violence to the meaning structure at hand. The violence strips out the assigned meanings, and can be said to produce a disjunctive synthesis, as in the experience of the sublime.

All in all, all the above mentioned approaches to sound show that music is understood and valued in a contextual manner which renders a physical force, that is sound, representational, yet with a possibility of a shocking affect. The music of Oval becomes an example of this affect, by its inclusion of external sounds into the harmonic composition. Church (2017) summaries the situation as the following:

The philosophical and musical commitments of Oval's (a glitch music artist) predecessors suggest that glitch presumes conventional musical form to be tyrannical. As a point of departure, this analysis proposes that this tyranny is derived from music's focus on the representational structure of the song rather than the affect derived from the technology used to create it. It experiments with timbral contours and sonic colors instead of traditional instrumentation to divert listener attention away from structure (musical form) and toward

transformational process (sound repetition and timbral experimentation). (p. 4)

The crux of this discussion brings us to the experimental music, such as Oval's. In this kind of music, elements that are not pre-determined find their way into the production of the sound. Clicks and cuts in glitch music, for instance, are accidents, yet they are presented within a composition, so that their being accident (and its significance) can be communicated to the listener. The click of a broken CD does not have a shocking affect by itself. If one is to come across that sound, they infer that the CD is broken. However, when it is presented within a creative composition, it can become a violence, for with that, the sound of error finds a way into the aesthetic experience. As in the sublime experience, a negativity and discordance take place.

5.2.2.2 Refrain

In ATP Deleuze and Guattari deal with music from the point of view of the refrain, aspects of which I have quoted as introductions to each chapter of this thesis. Bogue simply puts refrain as "any rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory." (2003, p. 265) The first aspect is to find a stable centre in the chaos, and it is drawn by the singing of a child. Second, the centre is organised by putting "sonorous bricks", by organising the space inside the centre by means of sound, and it is equated with the organisation of an organism. Lastly, a differentiation within the circle takes place, which, once again, is attributed to a sonorous event. Bogue exemplifies it with "a bird's improvisatory salute to the dawn". Here is the point where we can dissociate music from painting or any other art form. As discussed so far, all of the art forms have unique ways of communicating forces without putting them into a representative relationship first. Painting, for example, "renders visible forces that are not themselves visible" (Deleuze, 2003, p. 56) Music, on the other hand, render forces sonorous. According to Bogue, all of the three above-mentioned aspects are related with three corresponding forces, which are: "forces of chaos, terrestrial forces, cosmic forces". (1996, p. 265) With that, music is related to a movement of territorialization. This is why Deleuze claims that music surpasses painting, that it is spiritual. That is so because while painting is about the materiality of body, music relates to its milieu and territoriality, and to leaving of that territory. That being said, approaching theory of music from the perspective of territoriality requires a detailed treatment on its own,

and such a treatment is beyond the boundaries of this thesis. For that reason I will only mention the forces and the three aspects of refrain very shortly, and I will do so in a very limited fashion.

As stated earlier, Deleuze and Guattari talk about three kinds of forces. First is the forces of chaos. It can shortly be said that chaos is not an undifferentiated, vague mass. Rather, it pertains to the outside of thought which is without representation. The plane of immanence, in that sense, is the act of rendering chaos thinkable without falling into representation. That is why philosophy has an affinity with the plane of immanence and problematises “acquiring a consistency without losing the infinite” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994 p. 42). That being said, chaos should not be understood as a preexisting and unchanging ground of creation. It is, as Beaulieu puts:

Virtual, chaotic, and non sensible forces actualise themselves in the state of affairs which in turn express this “event” through a counter-effectuation that produces new affective potentia (puissances) redirected in the virtual chaos. As the said counter-effectuation forms a conceptual expression, a conceptual plane takes shape of a “section of chaos. (2016)

Chaos should be thought in relation to difference qua difference. It is related with the genetic account of the condition of possibility which is discussed in previous chapters.

The second force corresponds to territoriality. Since it is a very complex issue, I will only briefly mention it. Deleuze and Guattari say that territories are extracted from milieus. (1987, p. 503) One of the influences for the idea of milieu is Jakob von Uexüll, a German biologist who died in 1944. He proposes a theory on the relationship between organisms and their environments.

According to him, a living creature cannot be considered separately from its environment. A bird, for instance, is a creature evolved in connection with the area that it dwells in. Its appearance, the way it communicates with others, the way its sight and hearing developed are all intrinsically related with its environment. Thus, it should not be studied without taking its environment into account. In consonance with this discussion, territory can be understood as various organisations pertaining to the individual’s life, and the organisations that take place within that life. As we have seen in the quote from “of the refrain”, it is related with making a home within the chaos. All in all, territoriality can be very simply understood as the selfhood, the identity of

the individual within the world. This identity should be understood as a fixed, calcified way of being. In other words, it is the organisation of life.

The last force is that of cosmos. I will approach it from the perspective of outside. Deleuze says:

It is an outside which is farther away than any external world and even any form of exteriority, which henceforth becomes infinitely closer (1988, p. 86)

Interiority and exteriority always refer to a system of signs and meanings. It considers the formations, thus, it is always within the system of identity. A self-enclosed, self-same object can be said to have an exteriority, for what is external to it can still be assigned a meaning and a form. Thus, it stays within representation. Outside, on the other hand, is that which escapes representation. In the first plateau of ATP, Deleuze and Guattari say that “A book exists only through the outside and on the outside” (p., 4) What is meant here is that if an object, an artwork, even the self of an individual is to be thought as an assemblage which is always forming connections, which is a becoming, then the idea of “inside” gives its way to outside, because inside can only be thought if the world is understood in terms of the law of identity.

Deleuze writes:

But the outside concerns force: if force is always in relation with other forces, forces necessarily refer to an irreducible outside which no longer has any form and is made up of distances that cannot be broken down through which one force acts upon another or is acted upon by another. It is always from the outside that a force confers on others or receives from others the variable position to be found only at a particular distance or in a particular relation.” (ibid.)

The outside then, should be thought in terms of being non-representative and in connection with the forces. In that sense, deterritorialisation can be understood as a movement towards outside. While the first aspect is of creation, the last one concerns breaking this creation. They describe it as deterritorialisation, which is “the movement by which one leaves the territory.” (1987, p. 508) It is an opening to the outside.

In conclusion, refrain can be understood as a movement of territorialization, which for the sake of the argument I shall treat as a movement of organisation. While this movement is intrinsically related with sound, the heart of the matter is that music

becomes a power of deterritorialisation of the refrain itself. (Bogue, 2003) The three aspects are not unique to human beings, “the cosmos is made of refrains” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 309). Music is then, the deterritorialisation of the refrain itself. Bogue puts it as:

Music is the deterritorialization of the refrain, and in this sense the refrain is “the block of content proper to music” (MP 368; 299). [...] Yet the basic function of the refrain is “essentially territorial, territorializing or reterritorializing, whereas music makes of it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression” (MP 369; 300). ”

By virtue of this, music can be treated as an art that is related to a movement of escape. In FB, Deleuze says that unlike painting, music does not only involve the materiality of body. It transverses it by way of its intrinsic quality of deterritorialisation; it “disembodies bodies”. (2003, p. 54) It opens the assemblage to the rest of the cosmos.

5.3 Glitch as Difference

So far I have considered music first as a violence, and second, as the refrain. Both moments concern a loss of identity by means of a violence and by means of a flight to outside. In conclusion, we see that in any case, violence becomes the very element that opens one to an outside. This brings me to my final point. Sound can cause a shock, thus can enable thought to apprehend the outside, or the cosmic forces.

Previously I have stated that Attali describes noise as a violent event, because it cannot be assigned a meaning in a given system. Experimental music such as Oval’s glitch music, or compositions of Messiaen whom Deleuze writes on provides examples of this violence. This relationship between experimental music and BwO is not novel. For example Cox argues that such musical compositions are musical BwOs themselves. (2006) Since I have not dwelled specifically on musical compositions and their qualities, I am only interested in the affect of such music on the listener. I propose that such a violence provided by experimental music, turns the listener into a BwO. Cox’s description of music as BwO is very useful for my aim:

No subjects, forms, themes, or narratives; just flows, cuts, aggregates, forces, intensities, and haecceities laid out on the smooth surface of pulse and drone. (ibid.)

Such a music then, presents intensities that can transverse the body of the listener. In light of the previous discussions, the body of the listener should be understood as an assemblage. In that case, the sound presents a shock to the self-same identity, it communicates a violence to the self same subject which is the listener, and with that, it causes a disfunction on the established organisation. Thus we can claim that sound as an intensity passes through the body and glitches the human, turns them into a BwO. By this, just as in the case of sublime experience, the subject, and its organisation are forced to become open to outside. The event can be considered as a glitch because by means of an element which is accidental, which does not belong to a system of representation, the assemblage experiences a malfunction in their sense of subjecthood and on their body, for sound is a physical intensity as well as being a line of flight when presented within a composition. Such a disruption is not permanent. It enters as a rapture, and opens the self to the nonrepresentational forces, or to an outside by means of rendering them sonorous. Szepanski who is an electronic music theoriser and owner of the record label Mille Plateaux which is named after ATP says that:

This disturbance remains equal in intensity or changes by beats. According to Foerster, clicks are the vocabulary of the neurones. Disturbances from the outside reproduce in the form of electric impulses along the nerve fibres. (p. 2)

Even though this is rather a materialistic approach, we can still follow Deleuze's own philosophy here. As previously discussed, Deleuze also talks about communicating forces directly to the nervous system. Here, the clicks of CD's become the intensive physical forces which directly affect the body. Their affect considered within he composition has the possibility of opening the totality of the organisation of the subject to an outside, because as stated, music is the force of deterritorialisation. The subject, situated within a culture and conditioned by representational thinking, most of the time has preferences concerning music, as I have argued previously. This predisposition relates to the territoriality of the mentioned subject. Studies show that mood perception and preference towards consonance differ across cultures. This difference is a matter of the territoriality of the subject. Experimental music cuts across this differences and disrupts expectations because what is at stake here is non-representational forces, whether it be by means of a physical sonic flux which previously was not represented or compositions that open one to an outside.

Consider the following quote from ATP:

As in the meat circuit according to Lewin, something flows through channels whose sections are delimited by doors with gatekeepers, passers-on. [...] The body is now nothing more than a set of valves, locks, floodgates, bowls, or communicating vessels [...] (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 152-3)

Here, they refer to Lewin's theory of habits and change theory. During World War II the US government aimed at changing the perception around organ meat and proliferating its consumption so as to address the food shortage. A prominent social psychologist Lewin conducted a study in order to change this perception, and developed a theory accordingly. Basically, he found out that a gatekeeper in a social group has a power to change and affect the rest of the group, and this effect spreads through the community. In his experiment, when the housewives he recruited as gatekeepers accepted organ meat into their households, they triggered a bigger change in the rest of the society. Lewin identified housewives as gatekeepers due their position: they control the channels through which a flow passes.

Deleuze and Guattari do not dwell on the details of the experiment. What seems to be at stake here is the formation of an assemblage or a production of a BwO. If considered in terms of psychology, then this example may not perfectly correspond with my argument. However, at the surface level it is an exact description I attempt to provide for an assembly and glitch. For Lewin, the meat circuit is the flow of organ meat which is to be consumed. For the purposes of this thesis, I read it at its face value and understand the "meat circuit" as a human body. When the body is considered as a circuit, the flow of sound as well as flow of forces that are to be rendered sonorous by music can be conceived clearly. Then, the notion of glitch becomes a meaningful event which denotes a disturbance to the organisation of the circuit.

In other words, I propose that the expression "meat circuits" is not intended as a mere metaphorical tool. In many different places Deleuze draws attention to the nervous system - which works through the transmission of electrical impulses-, brain, meat, electrical currents both on the body and in the world. Together with Guattari they give a machinic account of the world. If that is the case, then the human body can also be considered as a circuitry which constantly experiences passing of flows. That is why I maintain that the notion of glitch works in such a context, because sound is an

intensity, a flow that passes through the body, and the violence/cruelty amounts to its a-signifying operation. It causes a short lived malfunction (a shock/ a glitch) in the body and in the organisation of the self by means of a physical force which passes through the body.

5.4 Glitching into the Plane of Immanence

In the final analyses, I argue that the destruction of the world, the dissolution of self, the disintegration of body all aim at dismantling the systems of significance, subjectification, and organism. Overall, it is an attempt at demolishing the power takeover within an assemblage as mentioned in the previous chapter, and undo its uprooting from the field of immanence. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)

It is not a question of returning back to an original point, rather, it is about creating a differential series open to an outside. Art enters into the picture in this moment, because it can capture forces which are non-representational. Moreover, the communication can only be done as an event of violence, because it concerns a demolishing of a self-same structure. As a result of this violence one can construct their own field of immanence.

In the end, the discussion of immanence is crucial. It is another loaded and complex idea, but I follow one of the last published essays of Deleuze and accept it as *a* life. Deleuze uses the indefinite article to describe life because a life in immanence is stripped of all its self-enclosed identity. It is life, rendered thinkable amidst chaos. It is free, open, and a becoming. A BwO is, then, the experience of an a-signified, multiple, differential selfhood. In ATP they put it as:

..the indefinite article does not lack anything; it is not indeterminate or undifferentiated, but expresses the pure determination of intensity, intensive difference. The indefinite article is the conductor of desire. It is not at all a question of a fragmented, splintered body, of organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the opposite. There are not organs in the sense of fragments in relation to a lost unity, nor there is a return to the undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable totality. There is a distribution of intensive principles of organs, with their positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or multiplicity, inside an assemblage, and according to machinic connections operating on a BwO. (1987, pp., 164-5)

5.5 Recapitulations

Throughout this chapter I tried to bring together the notion of glitch with the movement of deterritorialisation and with becoming a body without organs of the subject. First, I presented an argument as to why one should undertake such a task. Second, I presented a short description of glitch. Lastly, I argued that experimental music can be used creatively so that it becomes an a-signifying and non-representational shock that opens one to an outside. I argued that it does so by means of intensities of sound that pass through an individual. New sounds, sounds of error, unlikely compositions all work exterior sounds into a creative composition so that the composition becomes a violence to self-same subject and to the body that was organised according to the law of identity. I have named this experiment, that which I have offered as another way to turn oneself into a BwO “glitching”, because it causes a malfunction in the circuit, that is the listener.

This study can be furthered with an analysis and comparison of refrain with the glitch. In this thesis, I approached the issue mostly by a study of earlier works of Deleuze, and tried showing a possible relationship between sensation, non-representational forces, an outside, and the overall Deleuzian project of life as immanence. I have left a large part of Deleuzian philosophy outside of the discussion. I merely tried to outline the problematic of representational thought and present an alternative to it. I identified the world, self, and body as hindrances to such a task. I have outlined the problematic parts of the mentioned constructions in the first four chapters. In the last one, I engaged with artistic and technological creations as possible solutions to representational mode of thinking.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The main problematic of this thesis is representational thinking, and the construction of the world, selfhood, and organisations of life that are shaped by that mode of thought. The problem is one that occupies Deleuze throughout his life. It finds one of its most clear articulations very early on in his thought. In the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, entitled “The Image of Thought,” he addresses it thoroughly. Later on in *Logic of Sense*, he expands this problem as he follows Klossowski, who considers God as the “guarantor of the identity of the self and of its substantive base, the integrity of the body.” (1990, p. 20) For Deleuze, representational thinking can be placed within an order, where each element included sustains each other, eventually causing an image of the world and an image of thought that elude the real. He calls this order “the order of God” or “the divine order.” The elements of it are:

the identity of God as the ultimate foundation; the identity of the world as the ambient environment; the identity of the person as a well-founded agency; the identity of bodies as its base; and finally, the identity of language as the power of denoting everything else. (ibid., p.292)

This order yields a representational mode of thinking which eludes the real, because it subordinates multiplicity to one, becoming to being, difference to identity. Deleuze aims at abolishing them one by one. Thus, he suggests the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the subject, the disintegration of body, and the death of god; the order of the Anti-Christ instead of the divine one. When the transcendent identities recede, a free world of immanence, which is the real, is left. He offers a self-hood, or rather an experimentation conducted on oneself, that has an affinity with the real. I propose that this experimentation is becoming a body without organs, and I offer a way of experimenting on the self-same subject by means of bridging together art and an idea offered by digital technology. Although body without organs is a term Deleuze

uses in various places, it is in *A Thousand Plateaus* that it is thoroughly addressed as a problem of experimentation conducted on the self. In the chapter named “How Do You Make Yourself a BwO?” Deleuze and Guattari talk about various experimentations. By following their footsteps, I propose that sonic experience can be taken as another experiment. In other words, I propose that one can make themselves a BwO through the power of sound. I term this experiment “glitching oneself;” for, I believe the violence of the sound breaks the organisations of the subject (how it conceives the world, how it conceives itself and its body; which together make up one’s territory) and opens it to an outside, which precisely coincides with the notion glitch.

Moreover, by taking Deleuze’s advice in “What is a Creative Act?” I find value in attempts at borrowing ideas from other disciplines.

Throughout my thesis, I trace this project of Deleuze, although in a rather limited manner. I begin the task by tracing the construction of the world on the basis of a problematic mode of thought. I discuss arguments of Deleuze pertaining to the image of thought, and I try showing why Deleuze finds the relationship between thought and the real problematic. I identify the problem as an ontological position which prioritises the law of identity. Thus, I briefly describe the law of identity on the basis of the correspondence of three principles of logic and moments of the history of philosophy. For this task, I mainly follow Deleuze’s -as well as of his commentators’- formulations on Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence*. Following that, I turn to analogy, which I interpret as the distribution of the world in terms of the basis of the principle of identity. After I identify the problem with analogy, I offer the notion of univocity as an alternative offered by Deleuze. In the final analysis, I introduce the notion of plane of immanence, which I interpret as the imageless thought of the world Deleuze suggests. Here I should mention that the idea of immanence is a very complex one which finds itself at least a mention in all books of Deleuze. Therefore, my analysis and interpretation should be taken as preliminary. I maintained it as the free, inorganic life that thought has an affinity with it. All in all, the first chapter deals with the problem of the image of the world and representational thinking, and offers a univocal becoming, difference qua difference, and a plane of immanence as alternatives.

Since the first chapter clarifies that problem is to be found in the primacy of identity in thought, in the second, I turn to the subject that is constructed by this primacy. I start the discussion by presenting Deleuze's criticisms of Descartes, because Descartes is the main figure who attributes the self as the guarantor of existence. Next, I turn to Kant. Kant is a very important figure for Deleuze. One comes across his transcendental philosophy very often in Deleuze's entire corpus, especially in his earlier works. He furthers Kant's criticisms of Descartes to Kant himself, mainly concerning the desire to pursue the primacy of the law of identity. According to Deleuze, Kant is the one who replaced God with the responsible subject, which basically only a mere change on the identity of the central guarantor of the existence, rather than being a radical alternative to thought. In this section, I try to clarify why Deleuze thinks so. However, once again I should warn the reader that my interpretations are limited, for I mainly aim at a brief presentation of the fetters of a free thought in a Deleuzian sense. The discussion of Kant follows a discussion of multiplicity. In that section, I present arguments, mainly from later works of Deleuze, to show another aspect of Deleuze's criticisms of the subject.

In the fourth chapter I continue following the project of destruction of the divine order and turn my attention to the problem of bodies. Deleuze very often celebrates Artaud, the creator of the theatre of cruelty. Artaud suggests that in order to free the body from the forms of judgements, one needs a shock to its present constructions. The theatre of cruelty is named after this thought, that only violence can break the established systems of morality which hinders freedom and imprisons people to fixed ways of being. Deleuze shares this discontent; he also maintains that difference can only be presented as a shock to self-identical thought, of whose account he discovers in Kant and the experience of the sublime. That is why he borrows from Artaud the notion of body without organs. In that line, I start my argument with a discussion of sensations. I argue that it offers a possibility of an encounter with the real prior to conceptual thinking. Secondly, I return to Kant in search of the violence and discordance in the sublime experience. Finally, upon discussing the notion of body without organs, I present an argument on the construction of it.

In the last chapter I present my own argument, that violence to the organisation of the self via the power of art can be taken as glitching the subject. I incorporate the notion

of glitch for two reasons. First of all, I believe glitch is a notion that has a great affinity with Deleuzian thought. Becoming a BwO, deterritorialisation, opening to the forces of cosmos can all be approached by means of glitching. In the most basic sense, I argue that in Deleuze's philosophy, bodies are considered as assemblages. An assemblage is always connected to an outside. However, sometimes a power takeover occurs and the assemblage is forced to enclosed within itself. There are many instances and many different ways that this event has been put in Deleuze's oeuvre. Yet in each case, a becoming, a dismantling, an experiment, a violence is called upon in order to free the assemblage. I propose that at that instance glitch becomes meaningful; for, glitch also concerns a disruption of flows within a given assemblage. The second reason I incorporate this term is that I believe philosophy should be in touch with other disciplines and use their ideas to create novel concepts. This is at least what Deleuze does throughout his life. I acknowledge that my attempt is very limited and should be discussed more thoroughly, yet I believe it is enough to at least suggest such a possibility.

In order to clarify the matter I give an account of the notion of glitch. Then, I argue my conception of representational music and of how sound can be in a representational relationship. Following that, I briefly mention refrain. I only superficially dwell on the subject; for, first off, the subject matter is quite condensed and requires a very detailed analysis by itself, and second, for highlighting a small part of the discussion which concerns an opening to an outside by means of music is enough for my project.

Although the proposition I offer can be discussed in terms of various forms of art, I restrict my argument to experimental music for two reasons. First, music is composed of physical forces that can affect material bodies. That is, in music what we have at hand is first of all a physical wave that transverses the body (or the assemblage). I argue that, if approached from the point of view of Deleuzian terminology, the body of the listener can be likened to an electronic circuit, and the transversing of sound waves to the flowing of electric current. In both cases, what happens is that a flow passes through an assemblage. If so, then glitch becomes meaningful in both cases, for in both of them it refers to an experience of a temporary malfunction caused by the cut or stuttering of the physical flow.

The second reason that I focus on experimental music pertains to the inclusion of sounds which previously had not entered into a meaningful relationship with the listener. That is, sounds of errors, sounds which have not yet been entered into a representational model are brought together in a composition in experimental music. I argue that such sounds offer an opening to an outside. To support my argument, I recall the experience of the sublime. In the sublime experience the violence is caused by the incompatibility of two faculties, but it is ignited by a sensation and lack of form. Here, the previously non-represented sound can act in a similar fashion; for, it also points to a lack in the established schema of representation. Second, I turn to Deleuze's arguments on *Francis Bacon*, particularly in "The Diagram" chapter, where Deleuze discusses how a painting can avoid the representational model, that is figuration, by means of the diagram; "operative set of a-signifying and non-represented lines and zones" (Deleuze, 2003., p. 101) Thus, a painting can cause a true pictorial experience that concerns forces. Similarly, experimental music, by means of a-signifying sounds and other elements, can cause a sonic experience that concern forces.

It should be noted that this study intends to present a doorway to further research in Deleuze's thought. A more detailed account of correspondence and comparison of Deleuze and other philosophers, especially Kant, a further distinction of sensations and forces in terms of art and the real, and terms such as exteriority and outside can be given as examples that can be developed. Also, this thesis leaves an important part of the discussion of music out. Therefore, further elaboration can be made on the topic from the point of glitch. Lastly, the drawbacks and further implications of becoming a BwO are also not included. The for this exclusion is that such an argumentation requires a detailed study of later works of Deleuze that he has written together with Guattari. They open a new horizon by drawing a lot from various distinct sources such as sociology and psychoanalysis, and a treatment of these later works requires detailed studies of the mentioned disciplines. Therefore, such additional studies lie at the horizon of this thesis, which has suggested a potentially viable new way to approach these paths of further research.

All in all, what I have tried to achieve in this thesis is briefly following Deleuze in his problematisation on the image of the world which is constructed on the law of identity. I have tried to describe and discuss problems he identifies in what he calls the divine

order. Upon outlining his general criticisms, I turned my attention to the alternative he proposes and offered my perspective by introducing a term from technology. With this, I aim to contribute to Deleuze studies by proposing a historical analysis of his thought which shows the problems in representational thought. In addition to that, I believe I also make my contributions by following his suggestions and attempt at a concept creation by keeping up with the problems of my age.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tezin bařlıca amacı Deleuze’de temsili dřnce eleřtirisini arařtırmak ve organsız beden nosyonunu sanat baęlamında deęerlendirip temsili dřnceye bir alternatif olarak yorumlamaktır. Bunun iin ncelikli olarak Deleuze’n temsili dřnce ile ne kastettięi tarihsel bir baęlamda ortaya konulur, sonrasında onun eleřtirisi genel hatlarıyla takip edilir.

Tezin blmleri sırasıyla “Dnyanın Yıkılıřı”, “Kendilięin znř”, “Bedenlerin Daęılıřı” ve “Kendini Nasıl Aksatırsın?” olarak isimlendirilmiřtir. Burada yapılmak istenen, Anlamın Mantıęı kitabında Deleuze tarafından ortaya konan Klossowski okumasını takip etmek ve sabit bir varlık anlayıřı sunan “Tanrı’nın Dzeni” yerine ne srlen ve aslında bir dzensizlik olan alternatifini anlamaya alıřmaktır. Tanrı’nın dzeni řu biimde karřımıza ıkar: řeylerin varlık temeli olarak Tanrının kimlięi, řeylerin anlam kazandıęı varlık alanı olarak dnyanın kimlięi, dnya iinde edim yetkisini elinde bulunduran znenin kimlięi, o zne zerinden kurulmuř ve belirlenmiř beden ve tm bunları aktaran dil. Bu tez, bu dzenden  tanesini ele alıp bunlarla aktarılmak istenen problemleri genel hatlarıyla anlamaya alıřır. Nihayetinde ise aksaklık nosyonunu, tartıřılan alternatifine bir rnek olarak arařtırır.

Tezin ilk blm dřnce ile gerek arasındaki iliřkiyi sorunsallařtırır. Deleuze, *Fark ve Tekrar* kitabında dřncenin problematik imgesi adını verdięi bir sorundan bahseder. Ona gre felsefe tarihi boyunca dřnce daima gereęi dřnmeye alıřmıř, fakat onu hep dıřardan ele almak zorunda kalmıřtır. Bunun sebebi dřncenin nelięine dair felsefe ncesi oluřturulan nyargılardır. Dřncenin ne olduęu, gereęin dřnceyle iliřkilenme biimi her zaman felsefe ncesi oluřmuř tanımlar zerinden anlařılmaya alıřılmıřtır. Bu da ikisi arasındaki iliřkinin problemli olmasına yol amıřtır. Deleuze iin bu dřnce temsili dřncedir ve gereęi asla yakalayamaz, onun yerine gereęin bir temsilini tasarlar. Deleuze’e gre filozoflar bu sorunun hep

farkında olmuş, fakat önerdikleri çözüm önerileriyle kendileri de eleştirdikleri hatalara düşmüşlerdir. Deleuze için düşünceyle gerçek arasında doğrudan bir ilişki kurabilmek en başta bu ilişkinin sağlanamamasının nedenlerini araştırmaktan geçer. Bu engellerin ilki özdeşlik ilkesidir. Bu ilkeye göre bir şey kendisine özdeş olmak zorundadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle A A'dır. A'nın kendisi olması bizi A'nın özüne götürür. A'ya A'lığını veren kendi özüdür. Diğer tüm ilişkiler ve özellikler bu ilkeyi takip eder. Deleuze için buradaki esas sorun varlığın biçimine dair felsefe öncesi yapılan bir yargıyı temel doğru olarak kabul etmek ve bu yargıyı daha sonra sorgulamaya hiç açmıyor olmasıdır. Buradaki felsefe öncesi yapıldığı iddia edilen yargı özün değişimden önce geldiğidir. Yani bu düşünce hareketine sabit varlıklardan başlar ve değişimi, farkı, hareketi zorunlu olarak kendisine özdeş, sabit varlıklara ikincil olarak açıklar. Deleuze bu seçimin tamamıyla yanlış olduğunu iddia etmez. Fakat bu şekilde düşünmenin bir seçim olduğunu ve düşüncenin önünü kapattığını öne sürer. Özdeşlik ilkesini temel alan düşüncenin alternatifi ise fark mefhumunu temel alan düşüncedir. Buna göre değişim ve oluş özlerin öncesinde gelir, en başta varlıkları ortaya çıkaran farkın kendisidir. Düşünce öze değil de farka giderse gerçekte temsili yerine direkt bir ilişki kurmuş olur.

Deleuze'e göre özdeşlik ilkesi düşünce için temel ilke olarak kabul edildiğinde ortaya çıkan dünya ancak analogik olarak tahayyül edilebilen bir dünyadır. Buna göre varlıklar birbirleriyle ilişkilerine göre hiyerarşik olarak düzenlenirler. Özdeşlik ilkesi yerini farka bıraktığında ortaya çıkan dünya ise tek sesli bir dünyadır, yani varlık temel bir prensip etrafında hiyerarşik bir biçimde sıralanmazlar; aksine hepsi varoluş bakımından eşittir. Tek sesli varlık düşüncesi içkinlik düzlemini anlamak için oldukça önemli bir basamaktır. Bu dünya anlayışında varlıklar değil oluş ön plandadır ve oluşta ortaya çıkmış her şey olmaları bakımından birbirlerine eşittir. İçkinlik düzlemi tam da bu hiyerarşileri reddeden, önceden belirlenmiş olmayan, oluşun içinde ortaya çıkan ve düşünceyle hakiki bir ilişkisi bulunan bir düzlemdir. Deleuze bu konsepti farklı kitaplarında farklı tasvir eder. Bu farkın sebebi kavramın anlamında meydana gelen bir değişimden ziyade kavramın kendisinin işaret ettiği düzlemle ilgilidir. Bu tez içkinlik düzlemini her yerde ve her biçimde eşit, birey öncesi yaşamın kendisi olarak okur. Özdeşlik ilkesi bırakıldığında düşünce dışarı açılır ve bu açılma içkinlik

düzleminin yaratımıdır da aynı zamanda. İçkinlik düzlemi için çok kısaca yaşamın yaratıcı kuvveti ile düşüncenin uyumunun buluşması denebilir.

Tezin ikinci kısmı, daha önce bahsedilen özdeşlik ilkesi neticesinde kurulmuş özne problemini ele alır. Deleuze Descartes'ın radikal şüphe yönteminde büyük bir değer görür. Fakat bu yöntemle varılan kendi kendisinin varlığını sağlayabilen özne tam da Descartes'ın eleştirdiği noktaya varır; yalnızca düşünsel çıkarımı yapılmış özne varlığını bu şekilde garantileyemez. Bunun yanında, çıkarımı yapılan öznenin kendisi de yine radikal şüphenin bazı kısımlarından muaf tutulmuş gibidir. Deleuze bu iz üzerinde ilerleyip Kant'a yönelir ve onun cevabını araştırır. Kant Descartes'taki problemi netleştirir ve oradaki sorunu ortaya koyar. Fakat nihayetinde kendisi de özneyi tamamen terketmez, ona aşkın bir kimlik vererek sorunu çözer. Deleuze için bu da problematiktir çünkü Kant öznesiz düşünme ihtimalini en başından kestirip atmış, öznesizliğe bir alternatif araştırabileceği noktada neredeyse felsefe öncesi bir tutum takınarak özneyi yeniden kurmuştur. Eğer özne zaman içinde kırılan ve birliği ve devamı sorun olan, kendi varlığını yalnızca kendisine başvurarak kanıtlayamayacak bir birlikse, o halde bu birliğin koşulunu veren nedir? Kendi kendine özdeş olan bir özne tasavvur etmeden düşünmenin bir mümkünatı olabilir mi? Deleuze'e göre bu özne tasavvuru felsefe öncesi bir karara işaret eder. Buradaki soruna işaret etmek için olanaklı deneyimin aşkın koşullarının araştırılmasından ziyade gerçek deneyimin aşkın koşulları konu edilir. Deleuze bu düşünceye Kant'ın çağdaşı olan Maimon'da rastlar ve bunu özdeşlik ilkesini temel almayı bıraktığımızda karşımıza çıkacak bir alternatif olarak yorumlar. Tezin bu kısmının devamı alternatif öznellik anlayışları ile ilgilidir. Bu da ancak çokluğu felsefi bir zeminde tartışmaya açarak mümkün olacaktır. Deleuze ve Guattari'nin birlikte yazdıkları kitapları *Bin Yayla'da* bu kavram derinlemesine tartışılır. Tezdeki bu tartışmanın amacı düşünceyi ve özneyi teklik ve birlik fikirlerinden uzaklaştırmaktır.

Tezin üçüncü kısmına kadar öncelikle düşüncenin gerçeğe ilişkisi problematize edilmiş, bu problemin de özdeşlik ilkesini temel almaktan kaynaklandığı tartışılmıştır. Bu ilke tekil ve kendisine özdeş, değişmeyen bir özne kurgusuna sebebiyet vermiştir. Buradaki ortak sorunsal bu teklik ve aynılık fikrinin dayanaklarının sanıldığı kadar sağlam olmamasıdır. Üçüncü kısım ise yine aynı ön kabulle; yani gerçeğin özdeşlik ilkesi ile uyumlu olduğu ön kabulü ile meydana gelmiş beden nosyonunu

sorunsallaştırır. Deleuze bedeni merkezi bir organ olan beynin yönettiği hiyerarşik bir yapı olarak anlamaz. Aksine, ne yapıp yapamayacağı önden keskin çizgilerle belirlenmiş olmayan, yeniye adapte olabilen, sınırları önceden belirlenmemiş bir beden tasvir eder. Bu önerme ilk bakışta anlamsız görünebilir, zira bedenin sınırları esasında oldukça keskindir. İnsan bedeni anatomik olarak belirli bir yapıya sahiptir ve ona insan bedeni diyebilmemizin ön koşulu tam da bu önceden belirleyebildiğimiz yapıdır. Fakat bu önceden belirlenmişlik bile hala içinde yeni için oldukça geniş bir alan bırakır. Örneğin bir sporcunun bedenini kullanışı ile bir yazarınki birbirlerinden farklı olacaktır. Edimler ve yaklaşımlar bedenin neliğini de bu şekilde belirleyebilir. Bunun yanında yaraların iyileşmesi, protez organların artık beyinden gelen sinyallerle kullanılabiliyor olması gibi örnekler verilebilir. Söylenmek istenen kısaca şudur; yapısı belli olsa da beden tekil bir anlatının ya da kullanımın altına sıkıştırılamaz, tüm belirlenmişliklerine rağmen hala yeniye ve dışarıya açıktır. Burada organsız beden kavramı devreye girer. Aslında organsız beden bir kavram da değildir. Farkı deneyimleyebilen, dışarıya açılmak ve sınırlarını görmek için kendi üzerinde deney yapan beden organsız bedendir. Organsız beden içkinlik düzlemiyle bir uyum içindedir çünkü içkinlik düzlemi bize farkın deneyimini tarif eder; organsız beden de farkı deneyimleyebilen, ayırıcı sentez vasıtasıyla birlikten ve teklikten uzaklaşıp yeniye açılan bir bedendir.

Özdeşlik ilkesi düşünceye temsili bir form verir, çünkü önceden belirlenmiş konseptlerin yanında bedenle düşüncenin ilişkisi de hiç kurulmadan bitirilmiştir. Bedenin olasılıkları düşünceyle asla bir araya gelmez. Deleuze tam da bu noktada yeniden Kant'a döner. Ona göre Kant, yücenin hissiyatını araştırırken kendiliğin süreksizliğinin olasılığını da keşfetmiştir ve bu keşif bedenle yakından ilgilidir. Yüce hissi aklın hayal gücüne dayattığı, fakat hayal gücünün ortaya koymakta yetersiz kaldığı fikirler neticesinde meydana gelir. Aklın işaret ettiği kesin bir nesne yoktur, fakat bir nesnenin tetikleme sonucu tahayyül edilmesi istenen bir fikir vardır. Hayal gücü bu noktada yetersiz kalır çünkü aklın talebi olası deneyimin imkanı dahilinde değildir. Sonuç olarak her zaman uyumlu çalışan akli kuvvetler bu defa bir uyumsuzluk yaşarlar. Hayal gücü kendi sınırlarına doğru itilir. Bu uyumsuzluk kişide önce negatif bir his uyandırır, daha sonra bu his yücenin hissi olarak ortaya çıkar. Buradaki negatiflik çok önemlidir çünkü akli kuvvetlerin sınırlarına işaret eder.

Deleuze bu noktada hissi mümkün kılan varoluşun ifadesini bulur. Öteki deyişle, akli kuvvetler kendi sınırlarını fark edebilir ve negatif hisse rağmen bir çeşit farkındalık korunur. Buradaki açıklık dışarı doğru bir açıklıktır ve kuvvetler ilk defa birbirleriyle iletişim girerler; uyumsuzluk onlara kendileri olmayanı gösteren, ötekiyle iletişimi mümkün kılan koşul olmuştur.

Özetle yüce hissi, deneyimi birleştiren ve uyumlu hale getiren bir sentezin mümkün olmadığı noktada ortaya çıkar. Bu da Deleuze için ayırıcı sentez anlamına gelir. Yani varlığın ve bilginin koşulu birleştirme işleminde olmak zorunda değildir, aksine yücede olduğu gibi ayırıcı bir sentezle mümkün olabilir. Ayırıcı sentez özdeşlik yerine farkın deneyimine işaret eder. Bunun bedenle bağlantısı da düşüncenin kendine koyduğu sınırdaki bedeni ve yalnızca beden aracılığıyla duyumsanabilecek hisleri bulmasında yatar. Deleuze ve Guattari temsili düşünceden kaçışın imkanını tam da burada bulurlar. Beden kendine özdeş düşünce ve özneye alternatif olarak ayırıcı sentezin mümkün kılınabileceği alan olur. Sanat, hislerin ve kuvvetlerin henüz temsili düşünceye girmeden duyumsanmasını sağlar. Bu da tıpkı yüce deneyiminde olduğu gibi düşünceyi kendi sınırına getirir ve dışarı açar. Bu da bedeni organsız bedene dönüştürmek anlamına gelir.

Buraya kadar en başta bahsedilen nosyon olan “Tanrının düzeni” üç farklı koldan ele alınmış ve tartışılmıştır. Yapılmak istenen her türlü ön kabulü fark etmek ve alternatif araştırmaktır. Deleuze tüm varlığın yıkılmasından korkmaz, aksine bunu ister. Düşüncenin ancak o zaman tam anlamıyla özgür olabileceğini ve gerçeği o zaman yakalayabileceğini iddia eder. Bunu mümkün kılmanın önemli bir yolu da sanattır, çünkü sanat temsili düşünceye hiç uğramayan kuvvetler ve hisleri konu edinir, onlarla uğraşır. Bu özelliğinden dolayı sanat farkın doğrudan bir deneyimini mümkün kılar. Farkın doğrudan deneyimi organsız bedenin ve içkinlik düzleminin inşası anlamına gelir. Buradaki asıl bir nokta dışarıda bir yerde kendi kendine varolan bir gerçeği yakalama, ona ulaşma meselesi değildir. Zira Deleuze halihazırda varolan şeyler fikrini benimsemez. Buradaki mesele daha çok dışarıya açık bir seri yaratmakla ilgilidir. Diğer bir deyişle, yapılmak istenen farklı bir düşünme biçimi sayesinde zaten olan bir gerçeği yakalamak değil, tüm kimlikleri ve varlıkları yaratan farkı kavrayabilmektir. Bu da düşüncede hareketi ve dışarıya açıklığı sağlamakla mümkün olacaktır. Sanat bu anda resme girer, çünkü temsili olmayan, düşüncede belirli bir

formu olmayan güçleri yakalayabilir. Üstelik iletişim, tıpkı yücenin deneyiminde olduğu gibi kendine özdeş bir yapının yıkılmasıyla ilgili olduğu için ancak bir şiddet olayı olarak yapılabilir. Bu şiddetin bir sonucu olarak kişi kendi içkinlik alanını inşa edebilir.

Tezin son bölümü de bu argümandan yola çıkar. Farkın deneyimini mümkün kılmak için verili özne ve beden anlayışları terkedilmeli, organsız beden inşa edilmelidir. Bu inşa kendilik üzerinde yapılacak bir deneyi gerekli kılar. *Bin Yayla* kitabında organsız bedene dönüşmek için bazı örnekler verilir. Deleuze ve Guattari bu örnek deneylerin ayrıntıları üzerinde durmazlar. Burada söz konusu olan bir birleşimin oluşumu veya bir organsız beden üretimidir. Yine de tüm örneklerin ortak noktası bir yoğunluğun yaratılması ve o yoğunluk üzerinden öznenin ve öznellik deneyiminin değiştirilmesidir. Bu tez bahsedilen örnekleri inceleyerek yeni bir deney ortaya koyar ve şu soruyu sorar; temsili düşünceye henüz girmemiş sesle özdeşlik ilkesi üzerinden kurulmuş kendilik aksatılabilir mi? Bunun için öncelikle aksaklık nosyonu araştırılmalıdır. Bu nosyon Türkçeye henüz tam anlamıyla çevrilmemiş Glitch nosyonudur. Bu kelime genel olarak elektronik sistemlerdeki kalıcı olmayan, sebebi her zaman açık olmayan anlık hataları ve aksaklıkları betimlemek için kullanılır. Günümüzde en çok bilgisayar ve internet bağlamlarında kullanılmaktadır. Bu nosyonun organsız bedene dönüşme deneyi için kullanılması en başta Deleuze düşüncesine yakınlığı sebebiyledir. Daha önce bahsedildiği gibi Deleuze için fark çok önemlidir. Farkın deneyimi de kalıplaşmış, aynılaşmış, hareketini yitirmiş düşünceleri ve olma biçimlerini terkederek mümkün olur. Aksaklık tam da bu aynılaşan ve kalıplaşan kimliklerde görünürde bir amacı ve sebebi olmayan, rastgele bir hatayı ve dolayısıyla bir şiddeti betimlemek için kullanılabilir. Plansızın, kendi sisteminin dışında kalanın hatırlatılması kişi için bir şok olacak, tıpkı yücede olduğu gibi önce negatif bir biçimde deneyimlenecektir. Sınırın gösterilmesi aynılığın sürekliliğinin kesilmesiyle mümkün olabilir. O halde aksaklık da bu aynılığın aksatılması olarak düşünüldüğünde tam da istenen yere oturur. Kişiyi ve düşünceyi dışarı açar.

Aksaklık nosyonun kendi bağlamı dışında kullanılmasının konseptsel benzerlik dışında başka bir amacı daha vardır. Deleuze *Yaratıcı Edim Nedir?* isimli konuşmasında farklı disiplinlerin birbirlerine etkilerinden bahseder. Ona göre hiçbir disiplin düşünmek için bir diğerine ihtiyaç duymaz. Örneğin bilim düşünebilmek için

felsefeye gereksinim duymaz, çünkü bilim fonksiyonlar yaratırken felsefe konseptler yaratır. İkisi de farklı yaratım alanlarıdır. Böyle olmasına rağmen farklı disiplinler birbirlerinden etkilenir, birbirlerini beslerler. Örneğin ancak bilimin mümkün kıldığı bazı konseptler felsefeye yeni yaratım ve üretim imkanları sağlar. Dahası, çoğu zaman bir düşüncenin ortaya çıkması ancak o düşünceyi yaratacak yeni yolların ortaya çıkışı sayesinde mümkün olur. Bu tezde kullanılan aksaklık nosyonu buna bir örnektir çünkü bilgisayar teknolojilerinin bu biçimi almasından ve bu denli yaygınlaşmasından önce böyle bir nosyon mümkün olamazdı. Bu nosyon ancak kendisini üretebilecek, görünür kılabilen teknolojilerin ve kullanım biçimlerinin doğması ile mümkün olabildi. O halde böyle bir kullanım daha önce mümkün olmadığından burada yeni bir konsept yaratımı mümkün olabilir. Bu da felsefe ile teknoloji arasında kurulan bir ilişkiye işaret eder. Teknolojinin ürettiği fonksiyonlar felsefe tarafından ele alındığında felsefeye yeni düşünsel alanlar açabilir, yeni konsept imkanları sunabilir.

Bu tez de kişiyi dışarıya açık bir çokluk olarak kurgulayıp aksaklığı böyle bir bağlamda okumaya çalışır. Aksatmanın yolu olarak ise temsili düşünceye girmemiş ses seçilir. Temsili düşünceye girmemiş ses yeni bir sese ya da o seslerle yapılan yeni bir kurgulama biçimine işaret eder. Buna örnek olarak Oval isimli grubun müziği verilebilir. Oval, çizilmiş CD'lerin çıkardığı ve aslında hata olan sesleri kaydedip onları yeni bir müzikal kompozisyon içinde kullanır. Böylece daha önce yalnızca hatayı temsil eden ses bu defa estetik bir biçimde dinleyiciye sunulmuş olur. Bu da o sesin yeni olduğu anlamına gelir, çünkü ilk defa sanatsal bir açıdan yaklaşılmış ve o bağlamda dinleyiciye sunulmuştur. Temsili düşüncede hata olarak bilinen ses dinleyiciyle yeni bir biçimde ilişkiye girmiştir. Bu tezde sesin seçilmesi tıpkı *Bin Yayla* kitabındaki diğer örnekler gibi onun da bir yoğunluk oluşundan kaynaklanmaktadır. Özetle, daha önce müzikal bir bağlamda duyulmamış ve deneyimlenmemiş ve bir yoğunluk olarak değerlendirilebilecek sesin, kendini bir birlik olarak anlayan kişiyi aksatacağı ve bunun da kendini organsız beden yapmanın bir yolu olduğu öne sürülür. Bu şu şekilde açıklanabilir: Deleuze birçok farklı yerde elektriksel uyarıların iletimi yoluyla çalışan sinir sistemine, beyne, ete, hem vücuttaki hem de dünyadaki elektrik akımlarına dikkat çeker. Guattari ile birlikte dünyanın makinik bir hesabını verirler, yani organik bir varlık yerine makinik, çoklu ve sürekli bir oluş anlayışı benimserler. Bu anlayışa göre şeyler ve onların farkı değil, akışlar ve bu akışların yavaşlaması ya

da kesilmesiyle ortaya çıkmış durağan kesitler vardır. Durum böyleyse, insan vücudu da sürekli olarak akışların geçişini deneyimleyen bir devre olarak düşünülebilir. Kendileri de *Bin Yayla* kitabında “et devreleri” tanımlamasını kullanır. Bu tez, yine Deleuze ve Guattari’nin önerilerini izleyerek "et devreleri" ifadesini yalnızca metaforik bir araç olarak okumaz. Beden bir devre olarak düşünüldüğünde sesin bedende aksaklıklara yol açabilecek akışı da net bir şekilde kavranabilir. O zaman aksaklık kavramının böyle bir bağlamda anlaşılması da kolaylaşır çünkü ses bir yoğunluktur, vücuttan geçen bir akıştır ve kesintisi ayırıcı bir sentezi mümkün kılabilir. Vücudun içinden geçen fiziksel bir kuvvet akışı ve akışının kesintisiyle vücutta ve benliğin organizasyonunda kısa süreli bir arızaya (şok/aksaklık) neden olabilir. Böylelikle aksaklık kavramı, devrenin organizasyonunda bir bozukluğu ifade eden anlamlı bir olay olarak düşünülebilir.

Nihayetinde yapılmak istenen, temsili düşünceye alternatif bir düşünce biçimi yaratmaktır. Bu da yeninin araştırılması ve düşünceye katılmasıyla mümkün görünmektedir. Özdeşlik ilkesi üzerine inşa edilen dünya imgesi, kendilik ve beden kavrayışları sorunsallaştırıldığında yeninin önü açılmış olur.

Sonuç olarak bu tezde kurulması amaçlanan düşünce basitçe şudur: Düşünce ve gerçek arasındaki uyum tarihsel olarak sorunsallaştırılır. Gerçek ikincil bir biçimde ele alındığı müddetçe düşüncenin dışında, kendinde bir şey olarak kurgulanacaktır ve hep dışardan kavranılmaya çalışılacaktır. Deleuze bu yaklaşımın gerçeği kaçırmaya mahkum olduğunu öne sürer. Sonuç olarak, gerçek yalnızca bir düşünce nesnesi haline gelir, ancak anlaşılabilir ve deneyimlenemez. Bu modelde, düşünce önceden belirlenmiş bir sınır içinde kalır. Öyleyse dünyayı deneyimleyen benlik de gerçeği ikincil bir tarzda deneyimlemeye mahkumdur, çünkü o da önceden belirlenmiş bir düşünce kimliği üzerine kuruludur. Bu sorunun panzehiri, Deleuze’ün öne sürdüğü şekliyle farkta bulunacaktır. Bu problem tezin ana argümanını oluşturur. Buna göre öncelikle yukarıda bahsedilen problemin aslında neden bir problem olduğu tartışılır. Çözüm, bir içkinlik düzleminin yaratılmasında aranır. Bu teşhis üzerine yine Deleuze’ün bu düşünceye dayanan öznelik ve beden örgütlenmelerine ilişkin eleştirileri takip edilir. Sonuç olarak aksaklık olgusuna organsız bedene dönüşmenin bir yolu olarak bakılır. Organsız beden Deleuze ve Guattari’nin temsili düşünceye alternatifleri olarak anlaşılır; çünkü bağımsız bir özne tarafından yönetilmeyen bir

deneyim tarzının yanı sıra dışarıdan dikte edilmeyi reddeden bir bedeni de ifade eder. Bedeni ve düşünceyi gerçekte uyumlu kılan bir deneydir. Deleuze ve Guattari'nin argümanlarında, sanatın kavramsal olmayan güçlerle ilişkisi sayesinde deney neredeyse her zaman bir sanat biçimiyle yapılır. Bu tez de deneysel müziği bir deney biçimi olarak merkezine alır.

Deleuze'ün kendisi hiçbir zaman “aksaklık” terimini kullanmasa da, kavramsal eşdeğerlerinin benlik hakkındaki düşüncesinde önemli bir rol oynadığı iddia edilebilir. Aksaklığı olayların beklenen akışını bozan kısa vadeli bir problem olarak tanımlayarak ve sanattaki uygulamasına atıfta bulunarak kişinin kendisini organsız bedene dönüştürmenin bir yolu olarak önerilebileceği öne sürülür çünkü organsız beden farklılık temelinde bir benlik ve beden deneyimidir ve aksaklık, deneyimde kendiliği ve özdeşliği bozan bir fenomendir. Deneysel sanat, bedenin organizasyonunu aksatan veya bozan ve sonunda öznenin çözülmesine yol açan bir deney olarak ele alınır.

Nihayetinde, meselenin özü, deney yoluyla benliğin farkı görmesini sağlayan başka modların araştırılmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, organsız bir beden olmak, yaşamı oluşlar süreçler ve Deleuze'ün tarifleriyle saf içkinlik olarak anlama girişimini ifade eder.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Yalçın
Adı / Name : Melike Başak
Bölümü / Department : Felsefe / Philosophy

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