TWO-FOLD CRISIS OF INTEGRATION: FIELD RESEARCH ON
NON-MUSLIM ASYLUM SEEKERS OF TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to answer a dissimilar question of whether there are divergent obstacles that non-Muslim asylum seekers are facing while integrating to Turkish society as a religious minority besides being an asylum seeker. In order to elaborate on that question, a field research conducted with 17 non-Muslim asylum seekers from the Middle East living in Ankara. The field research focuses on finding the root causes and consequences of this two-fold integration crisis by matching the brand-new data with the gaps in the literature. This study follows a deductive reasoning which starts with the incompatibleness of national and international migration legislations and followed by Turkey's three-pillared integration approach that includes cultural belonging, political interest and religion. This substructure to the integration problems brings us to Turkey's migration history and how the three-pillared approach occurs historically. Therefore, the third chapter focuses on integration problems of migrants in Turkey by discussing their participation to workforce and accessibility to social services. The fourth and the main chapter gives a glimpse of Turkey's strained past

with the religious minorities and shows how this past takes place in the experiences of non-Muslim asylum seekers by using the data from the interviews. As a consequence, this thesis is the first in-depth research to show two-fold crisis of integration of non-Muslim asylum seekers of Turkey.

Keywords: migration, asylum seekers, non-Muslim, integration, religious minorities

ÖZ

İKİ KATLI ENTEGRASYON KRİZİ: TÜRKİYE'NİN GAYRİMÜSLİM SIĞINMACILARI ÜZERİNE SAHA ARAŞTIRMASI

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Bu tez, Türkiye'de yaşayan gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sığınmacı olmanın yanı sıra dini bir azınlık olarak Türk toplumuna entegre olurken karşılaştıkları farklı engeller olup olmadığını sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Saha araştırması olarak kurgulanan bu tez için Ankara'da yaşayan ve Ortadoğu'dan gelen 17 gayrimüslim sığınmacı ile derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Saha araştırması ile ulaşılan yeni verileri literatürdeki boşluklarla eşleştirerek iki katlı entegrasyon krizinin temel nedenlerini ve sonuçlarını bulmak amaçlanmıştır ve bunun yöntemi ilk bölüm olan giriş bölümünde ayrıntılı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın, ikinci bölümü ise ulusal ve uluslararası göç mevzuatının uyumsuzluğunu göstererek Türkiye'nin göç tarihini, Türkiye'nin tarihsel olarak sıklıkla başvurduğu entegrasyon yaklaşımları olan kültürel aidiyet, siyasi çıkar ve din ile birlikte incelemektedir. Bu üçlü yaklaşımı takiben üçüncü bölüm, Türkiye'deki göçmenlerin işgücüne katılımlarını ve sosyal hizmetlere erişimlerini tartışarak Türkiye'deki göçmenlerin entegrasyon sorunlarına odaklanmaktadır. Dördüncü ve ana bölüm ise Türkiye'nin dini azınlıklarla olan sorunlu geçmişini özetleyerek, bu geçmişin Müslüman olmayan sığınmacıların deneyimlerinde nasıl yer aldığını sahadaki görüşmelerle göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Türkiye'de yaşayan gayrimüslim sığınmacıların yaşadığı iki katlı entegrasyon krizini ortaya koymak için yapılan bu tez çalışması göç literatüründe bu alanda yapılan ilk derinlemesine araştırma özelliğini taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: göç, sığınmacı, gayrimüslim, entegrasyon, dini azınlıklar

*To my beloved late grandmother Yadigar Başkaya and
my dear late grandfather Hayrettin Özlük…*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	: Anadolu Agency
AFAD	: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKP	: Justice and Development Party
BCP	: Bulgarian Communist Party
DGMM	: Directorate General of Migration Management
EC	: European Commission
ECtHR	: European Court of Human Rights
EU	: European Union
GDF	: General Directorate of Foundations
GMFUS	: German Marshall Fund of the United States
HDP	: Peoples' Democratic Party
HRW	: Human Rights Watch
ICG	: International Crisis Group
ICRC	: International Committee of Red Cross
IHL	: International Human Rights Law
ILO	: International Labour Organization
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MEB	: Ministry of National Education
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affair
MIPEX	: Migration Integration Policy Index
MPG	: Migration Policy Group
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
TBMM	: Grand National Assembly of Turkey
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPR	: Universal Periodic Review
US	: United States of America
USCIRF	: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"We were left behind," said the Orthodox Syrian asylum seeker Nasser in despair[1]

Today, Turkey is welcoming nearly four million refugees and asylum seekers[2]. This number brings many substantial responsibilities to the decision-makers. The then-transit yet recent destination country Turkey is experiencing a serious clash between the national interests and the necessities of international human rights principles. Right in the middle of this clash there is the non-Muslim asylum seekers from Middle East who are invisible to the literature and the estimations.

This thesis aims to answer a dissimilar question of whether there are divergent obstacles that non-Muslim asylum seekers are facing while integrating to Turkish society as a religious minority besides being an asylum seeker. In order to find the answer to these questions, there is a particular need to reach them. In the official statistics, the religions of the asylum seekers or migrants are absent because such data is not specifically being collected (Dinçer et al., 2013). The homogenous approach to Middle Eastern asylum seekers is a fuel to fire since they are massively displaced, and Turkey was not ready to host such amount of asylum seeker. Lack of infrastructure and the gaps in national mechanisms that are not entirely compatible with international mechanisms put them already in a puzzling place. Nevertheless, being a religious minority jeopardise the whole situation.

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[1] Nasser, Syrian, 31 years old, male.

[2] See the website of UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/tr/unhcr-turkiye-istatistikleri#:~:text=4%20milyon,T%C3%BCrkiye%20genelinde%2081%20ilde%20ya%C5%9F%C4%B1yor. (Accessed 31 January 2021)

There are the people who are out of the camps but enters a sociological camp named a Muslim dominant community, which has a strained past with its religious minorities. The situation as it seems a complicated one. The absence of data turns this problem into an invisible one in the literature. To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis has focused on an unprecedented space for migration studies in Turkey, the church.

In the locus of the church, Middle Eastern congregant shares their experiences as an asylum seeker in Turkey with 17 interviews. This study is not the first study to focus on non-Muslim asylum seekers, but it is the first study that examines the problem in-depth. For instance, compared to the published theses in the field of migration, the research on the Middle Eastern non-Muslim asylum seekers in Turkey is less than one percent[3]. However, it must be extended to make their problems and the discrimination they are facing visible. This could help to bring solutions to the table.

Until March 2020, when COVID-19 announced as a global pandemic, the interviews were conducted as scheduled. Following the announcement, the indoor places and the places of worship are closed down. Therefore, the remaining interviews had to be suspended. However, as the limited conditions caused by the pandemic are still continuing to this day, it became impossible to reinitiate the interview process. It should be added that since it was hard for the sample group to access both the technology and the equipment conducting the remaining interviews with the online tools was not possible. Also, revisiting or re-interviewing with them were impossible as well. As a result, this thesis contains only the pre-pandemic interview data. However, if the pandemic was not an obstacle, at least 10 more interviews could be conducted with the sample group.

Throughout the thesis, deductive reasoning effectively used to show the social integration processes of the non-Muslim asylum seekers in detail. This is why this

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[3] According to a keyword search in the database of the National Thesis Centre for the time period of 2015 – 2021, there are 514 theses containing the keyword "migration", 241 theses containing the keyword "refugee", 171 theses containing the keyword "migrant" and 73 theses containing the keyword "asylum seeker" in their titles. On the other hand, there is only one thesis containing "non-Muslim immigrant" and another thesis containing "Christian asylum seeker" as a keyword. Moreover, there are no theses containing the keywords "non-Muslim asylum seeker", "Christian refugee", "Jewish refugee" or "Jewish asylum seeker".

thesis starts with a comprehensive summary of international and national mechanisms that legislate migration and it goes until we confront the problems of a very specific group called the non-Muslim asylum seekers. The field study was not easy yet labyrinthic because it was hard to find the sample group and it was harder to create a mutual trust to dive deep into their problems. In the first confrontation, it was essential to differentiate their problems of being asylum seekers and being a religious minority in Turkey. After they start to express their troubles in Turkey there are problems that were very similar to other asylum seekers which will be examined in detail in the third chapter. However, there are divergent problems for them because of their religions. The small Christian congregants of Ankara open their doors to this research to help us to discover the two-fold integration crisis of the new members of their congregants.

In the introduction chapter, the methodology and the terminology will be examined in detail following the literature review. In this way it will be understandable how the chain of gaps turns into an abyss of integration, or even disintegration.

In the second chapter, the national and international mechanisms regarding migration will be discussed. The already existing literature shows the existent crucial gaps amidst these two legal frameworks. This chapter aims to understand these gaps in the legal documents since they create a lawful limbo in the situation. The same chapter will continue with Turkey's strategy for coping with migration and migrant's integration to the Turkish society is a ready-made scheme. The scheme includes three main patterns: cultural belonging, political interest and the religion. The interrelation of each migrant wave with these patterns and how they are rooted in the gaps of national legislation will show us that Turkey's perspective on integration is based on a superficial approach. The inertia of this approach will form the ground basis of this thesis which eventually turn the two-fold crisis of integration of non-Muslim asylum seekers because all three of them are not applicable for the sample group. Finally, Turkey's history with three significant migration flows and how it is responded to such flows will be examined.

In the third chapter, the problems experienced by the migrants in Turkey will be covered with the addition of non-Muslim asylum seekers' interviews. The problems

will be the residuum of the mentioned superficial approach of integration patterns which is a dilemma. Therefore, the third chapter will help us to understand migrants' problems by also examining the commonalities with the problems of non-Muslim asylum seekers. Mainly, the chapter will try to shed light on the common problems that occur regardless of the religion of the migrant. However, when going deep into the interviews it will get clearer that religion is not that completely apart from the experience of a migrant in Turkey but rather doubling the problems that a non-Muslim asylum seeker is facing. Besides being a non-citizen naturally neglected from having the same quality as the citizens, it should not be equal to having a fearsome life which we will examine how.

Lastly, in the fourth chapter, Turkey's strained past with the religious minorities will be discussed thoroughly in order to understand the integration problems of the non-Muslim asylum seekers and how this problem elicits the main argument of this thesis which is the two-folded crisis of integration. The preconception of migrant-hood and non-Muslim-hood is going hand in hand with an entangled situation which is the situation of double camp. This situation is the outcome of that two-folded crisis of integration. Also, this is the unattended space that lawful limbo takes place to flourish the obstacles that harden the lives of asylum seekers. For the sample group of this thesis the non-Muslim asylum seekers are under attack because Turkey is a place that already hard for non-Muslims and that limbo is already available in a different shape than the asylum seekers are experiencing. Therefore, it will become clear that camp is not only an address but a sociological enclave that signifies the embodiment of an unprecedented minority group. This chapter will present a brief glimpse of Turkey's past with the non-Muslims in order to understand the status quo. Following this historical background, the relationship of non-Muslim asylum seekers with the host community and the congregation will be discussed. This discussion will be the centrepiece of pages long framework analyses that took place until the fourth chapter.

1.1. Literature Review

Since the foundation of the social sciences, the human movement remains as an important research question. The human movement alters, evolves, and diversifies in

time. The changing face of the world affects the processes of this movement. Naturally, the speed, intensity, or the root causes for these actions varies. The movements are today called the "migration" (Düvell, 2005; Gurrieri, 1986; Hugo, 1998). There are many reasons for a mass or an individual to migrate to another country. Some part of these reasons includes brain drain, marriage, or labour, which are non-violent or non-forced activities. But there is a part of migration caused by wars, hot conflicts, death sentences, loss of shelter or security. This secondary category has given birth to a new concept called the "refuge."

During and following World War II, there were an increasing number of people who are fleeing their homes because of the war and the Holocaust; the United Nations (UN) decided to define the terms and statuses of being a refugee in 1951 with the Geneva Convention. The convention was the beginning of a chain of international regulations (Amerfoort & Doomernik, 1998) and also the foundation of more systematic international human rights law (IHL). In the 1951 Geneva Convention, which is also known as the Refugee Convention, the main statuses and responsibilities were defined (Parsons & Smeeding, 2006). This convention followed by two more substantial international legislation which are the 1954 Convention and the 1967 Protocol to enhance the international framework to protect the lives of the forcibly displaced people.

Especially the 1951 Convention was critical for Turkey because its geographical limitation principle directly effects the bridge-like position of Turkey between Europe and the Middle East (Atauz, Akbaş & Atasü-Topçuoğlu, 2009; İçduygu & Toktaş, 2002). However, in 1967, they removed these limitations to be more compatible with the new migration movements, but Turkey continues to hold its reservations on the article because of the security reasons. Historically Turkey, sees the non-European flows as security threats (Elitok, 2018; İçduygu & Keyman, 2000; Kirişçi, 2003).

The international mechanisms were critical, but the last decisions were determined either according to national interests or directly by the decision-makers (Chimienti, 2017; Evangelista & Tannenwald, 2017; Perrigo, 2010). Such as Turkey who put reservations on the international documents because of national interests. This strikes

the first flame over the problems of integration because this dilemma of never-ending conflict between international necessities and national interests never neutralizes each other. This power of national interests over the international mechanisms is what we will call the lawful limbo throughout the thesis.

Since its foundation, Turkey gets accustomed to migrations within or outside its borders. However, despite being aware of its geographical importance as a transit country, the preparations for that position were historically not sufficient. Even long before the 1951 Geneva Convention, Turkey prepared its first serious migration law in 1934 with the Settlement Law. The law was not a modern or a technical one but mostly a cultural tool to help its Bulgarian collaterals through "muhajir-ship""[4]. The relationship between the Bulgarian-Turks was founded on having the same cultural and historical background and in some ways on the Muslim-hood. This pattern was a regular approach of Turkey to integrate the migrants with cultural belonging along with the religion. The document criticized because its various chapters on resettling the non-Turkish citizens in Turkish-intensified areas to conduct a "Turkification" process and even assimilation of them (Alpakgir Cevheri, 2018; Demirhan & Aslan, 2015; İnan, 2016; Ülker, 2008). This also associated with a nation-building process of new republic (Berkes, 1964; Duman, 2019; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017).

After the failed attempt to build a national mechanism to regulate migration, there was a modern attempt in 1994. The 1994 Regulation commented the monitoring the situation of the asylum seekers by the Turkish government for the first time (İçduygu & Keyman, 2000). Since Turkey has the principle of geographical limitation, first clashes of the statuses of international protection and temporary protection had already begun in 1991 with the Iraqi-Kurdish migration. The 1994 regulation was not prepared to solve the status confusion but rather it served to save the day. The Iraqi-Kurds who were not granted with the refugee statuses had severe problems in Turkey. The migrants were welcomed as "temporary guests" (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999). This attempt was Turkey's integration pattern on political interest because throughout the

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[4] The term of muhajir is a concept derived from the Islamic sources. Muhajir is the Muslim who migrated (Hijrah in Arabic) to Medina from Meccah to escape the oppression of "non-believers" in Meccah. The community of Medina called "ensar" which means the helper to the muhajir. Both terms will be used in the second chapter of this thesis.

Iraq crisis the border security and how it is an ultimate priority of Turkey was promoted by the government. Apart from that, Turkey could not go with the cultural belonging or the religion because the profile of the Iraqi-Kurds was not fit into that equation.

Following these two regulations, Turkey released an up-to-date law on the international protection in 2013 (Yazıcı & Düzkaya, 2017). Similar to the interconnectedness between 1994 Regulation that was formed under the impact of Iraqi-Kurdish migration flow, there was a connection between the latest law on migration with the Syrian migration flow. Since Turkey's reservation on the geographical limitation principle continues, the law regulated the rights of the people who cannot be granted with the "refugee" status but can be "asylum seekers", i.e., who are under temporary protection and waiting for an international protection status. This resulted to render Turkey as a possible country of destination or transit for people who are affected the results of the Syrian Civil War from the whole geography of Middle East including Afghanistan[5].

This gap in the national mechanisms for not granting international protection status to the Middle Eastern migrants caused many problems. The problems that are occurring were actually substantial problems that are directly affecting the life quality and the success of social integration of the asylum seekers. These problems are categorized in the literature as participation to workforce, accessibility to social services and discrimination. The main reason why these obstacles are widely examined throughout the thesis is to show the negative outcomes of the existing gaps in the legal status. The absence of international protection ultimately alters the situation of migrants in the country of destination. Turkey's migration policies towards the Middle Eastern asylum seekers focus on the assumption of they are the guests. As a result, the first three to four year of the Syrian migrant flow was seen as something "temporary" which proved to be not correct. The literature solidly focuses on those problems and explains them in detail.

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[5] In this thesis Afghanistan as the East border of Iran, sociologically accepted as a Middle East country while considering its geographical proximity and its ethnic and cultural ties with the Middle East.

The problem of social integration commenced with the aforementioned assumptions in the migration policies. As the status of being a temporary guest, naturally, create an environment in which the asylum seekers perceive themselves as the temporary guests. The situation causes a two-way blockade to accept to integrate to each other. Therefore, the problems such as employment, anti-foreigner sentiment occurs. These obstacles not only reviewed in the literature but also reviewed with the international indicators such as the well-known Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in order to support the arguments with globally used indicators.

However, the extensive literature review on migration proves that there is something missing. This gap is the non-Muslim asylum seekers. Therefore, this research is built upon to fill this gap. The problems about the workforce, housing, security, health or even the discrimination itself omits the assumption of what a non-Muslim asylum seeker can experience in a Muslim dominant country. The main assumption is that they are facing a position of double camp which is a camp outside the camp. The already puzzled situation of an asylum seeker in Turkey is doubled with being a religious minority. Thereby, the research is designed to prove this hypothesis. The field research conducted with the non-Muslim asylum seekers in Ankara shows that the assumption of their *aforismos*[6] from the Turkish community is based on both their disadvantageous position as a migrant and also as a non-Muslim minority.

In order to understand the positions of this sample group, Turkey's strained past with the religious minorities will be carefully reviewed in the fourth chapter.

As the last word, the starting point is to fill the gap, which is highly essential in migration studies that is a vulnerable migrant group. The excommunication of this vulnerable sample group has two sides. First of all, being a non-Muslim, which lose its ties at the beginning of the foundation of the Republic with the "original" Turkish identity. Secondly, the migrant-hood as the non-validated citizen. This double camp situation of the sample group is unfortunately once more excommunicated from the

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[6] The anathema, excommunication in religion. This term deliberately used in Greek because its phonetical closeness to Turkish "aforoz" and its context in the understanding of religion in Turkey has a special place.

literature. As said before, the literature vastly expands with the basic assumption that every asylum seeker from Middle East is automatically Muslim. Not that they cannot be from other religion but because the majority of them are Muslims, which is true. However, there are various reasons for assuming them as Muslims. Firstly, there is a lack of statistics or reliable data on the religious numeric of the asylum seekers because the data of religion has not been collected from them at the entrance. Secondly, the language gap between the Middle Eastern asylum seekers and the Turkish scholars does make harder to research deep since it can be costly to translate the documents or work with a translator without funding. This is also one of the reasons why the field of this thesis is limited to one city.

Consequently, this thesis aims to find the obstacles that non-Muslim asylum seekers are facing in Ankara and examines their unprecedented experiences of two-folded integration crisis. This dissimilar sample group in migration studies is unfortunately absent in the literature of Turkey field. Throughout the thesis, the main research question of how non-Muslim asylum seekers end up in a double camp situation will be answered by addressing various literature on migration.

1.2. Methodology

A methodology for a field study in the area of migration is a key to successful research. It is because the sample group of the studies need to be taken care of so delicately that it would not harm them in any ways. Therefore, the methodology of this thesis is as delicate as the sample group. Under this subsection, the selection of the sample group, locations, sampling techniques, interview questions and the possible limitations will be examined and justified.

Since this is a field study, the necessary permissions from the Human Subjects Ethics Committee (HSEC) of the Middle East Technical University has been granted on 22 October 2019. Following the permission, Ankara Provincial Directorate of Migration Management also has been informed by mail on 4 December 2019 about the research. The official interviews that been used in this thesis conducted between 20 January 2020 until the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in March 2020.

Before conducting the official interviews, there was a certain need of preliminary research on the field to concretize the sample group. During the preliminary interviews no data was collected. They were only realized to measure the feasibility of this research and to develop acquaintance with the sample group.

The preliminary research was carefully conducted with the different churches in different provinces of Turkey with various clergy. Firstly, phone calls were made to the churches to learn availability of the clergy to receive preliminary information about the congregant. There are not many churches in Turkey to host Middle Eastern Christians many of whom do not speak Turkish and thus need to pray in Arabic or in Persian, it was difficult to find a sample for the research. The most populated churches in Ankara were contacted and two important sources has been found. To respect the privacy of congregant and clergy, neither the full names nor the addresses of the churches will be addressed in this thesis. The details will only be mentioned with nicknames. The preliminary research was conducted not only for Ankara but also for Izmir, Diyarbakır and Istanbul to find a feasible sample group. Under the subsection of the selection of the location the criteria and outcomes of the preliminary research will be widely discussed.

During the preliminary research, the congregant's reactions towards an outsider was also observed carefully. In the cases of too closed groups the existence of an outsider with a list of questions regarding the situation of group members might be perceived as intimidating or disturbing. To prevents such reactions, which might discredit the field research I tried to submit to the requests and limitations of the congregant as much as possible. When it was clear that there is no risk of disturbance, the research has commenced.

Until the pandemic, there has been 17 in-depth interviews conducted in Ankara with non-Muslim asylum seekers in a period of nearly two-months. During the interviews mostly there were no voice recording as the interviewees did not voluntarily accept a recording of our meeting. Therefore, most of the interviews were only conducted with note taking. Since there have been intense preliminary visits to the churches, most of

the interviewees were familiar and were ready to share their experiences. During the interviews in-depth interview technique were used to understand what the obstacles are they have faced and how it is connected to their levels of social integration via which channels.

The interviews were two-phased: the first part was an introductory questionnaire to collect a preliminary data regarding their age, educational background, marital status, specific sect of Christianity and so on. The second phase was the actual in-depth interview which lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. The questions of in-depth interview were semi-structured to provide fruitful environment to going into deep with their experiences.

After the first batch of interviews took place, the workplan for additional interviews were planned but never initiated because the churches closed due to the pandemic. The congregant was not open to online interviews since they neither have the technology nor were easy to reach via online channels. Therefore, there were no extension requested from the HSEC since the same problems are ongoing until the very end of the thesis term. However, when the analysis of the interviews holistically reviewed, it is clear that 17 interviews were intense enough to address the double camp condition of being a non-Muslim asylum seeker in Turkey.

Before going into deep to the main chapters, the methodology section will be divided into various subsections in order to completely understand the delicacy of the field and topic.

1.2.1. Selection of the sample group and location

The selection of the sample group was made possible after evaluating the feasibility of the field in the preliminary research phase. During the preliminary research, two clergy members from two different Catholic Churches in Izmir were interviewed. There were mild questions about the existence of non-Muslim asylum-seekers in their churches and if so, their approximate numbers were asked. The clergy members were welcoming and gave me preliminary information about their congregants.

Unfortunately, Izmir is the final destination of asylum-seekers in Turkey because they usually use Izmir to sail away Greece through the Aegean Sea. Therefore, there was not enough possible interviewees to participate in the research.

Secondly, an Armenian Orthodox church and its clergy were met in Diyarbakır. The church was a small one rather safeguarded from the outsiders. Unfortunately, the clergy member did not give any information regarding their congregants or the time of their services. In order not to cause discomfort, the preliminary research in Diyarbakır was discontinued. In the first place, the reasons why Diyarbakır could be a good field for this research were its geographical proximity to the border and its multi-religious nature.

As a third option the city of Istanbul, where there is a serious population of asylum seekers is considered. Due to high number of refugees and immigrants I considered that it was more likely to meet with more non-Muslim asylum-seekers, however due to lack of connection between the churches it took too much time to find a congregant that was formed by the Middle Eastern asylum seekers. Small interviews with the local non-Muslim congregant were preliminarily made but it revealed that a different and more comprehensive workplan was needed to dig in Istanbul. The limitations on time and budget made such a workplan impossible for this research. However, it is possible for other researchers to complete the field gap that this thesis leaves unattended.

Last but not least, Ankara as the capital of Turkey is one of the most migrant populated cities and thus have been searched for a sample group. Two Protestant Churches and two Catholic Churches were contacted through their clergy members during the preliminary research. In the pre-interviews, two Protestant Churches showed serious populations for asylum seekers. One of the churches was only for Iranian Christians and the other one has a special Sunday service in Arabic for asylum seekers. During the visits to both churches, various preliminary talks were held with both asylum seekers and the local congregant. This preliminary connection with the congregant took more than a year and frequent attendance to the Sunday services. This was necessary and beneficial for the official interviews. Therefore, because of the fruitful and welcoming environment, Ankara has been chosen as the main location for the field

research. As a side note, there was no relationship based on self-interest, but a semi-anthropological approach was embraced to get used to the congregant which was joyous and delightful.

After selecting Ankara as the main location for the field research, 17 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the non-Muslim asylum seekers. Gender parity has carefully respected. Therefore, there were 8 female and 9 male interviewees who participated. The average age of the participants was 27,4 and there were no participants under the age of 18. There were 1 Afghan, 3 Syrian, 3 Iraqi and 10 Iranian participants. Additionally, there were 3 Orthodox, 3 Catholic and 11 Protestant interviewees. Since both of the churches are Protestant church, the Sunday service in Arabic appealed for non-Protestant Christians to attend that specific service. The church welcomed for all without asking their sects. Because there was not much choice for Middle Eastern Christians.

Lastly, there were no Jewish participants because of three reasons. First of all, the local Jewish community was not visible enough, and it was nearly impossible to find a Jewish asylum seeker. Secondly, as Ankara was chosen for the main location for the field research, there were no active Synagogue open to worship in Ankara. According to President of the Ankara Jewish Community, Can Özgön, there are approximately 35 Jewish living in Ankara. Because of the principle of "*minyan*"[7] in Judaism, Synagogue of Ankara remains closed. He said, "We are trying to open the synagogue twice a year in *Rosh Hashanah*[8] and *Yom Kippur*[9] by bringing a rabbi from Istanbul," in an interview with Russian media outlet *Sputnik* in 2019[10]. Thirdly, the geographical proximity of Israel can be more alluring for the Jewish migrants to go there rather than coming to Turkey.

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[7] Requirement of at least ten Jewish men over the age of 13 required for certain prayers.

[8] New year in Judaism.

[9] Sacred day in Judaism. Translated as the Day of Atonement.

[10] See the interview: https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201902141037649991-ankara-otuzbes-yahudi-kaldi/ (Accessed 28 January 2021)

1.2.2. Sampling technique

The well-known sampling technique of snowball sampling technique was used during the research. This technique is also called chain sampling or respondent-driven sampling. This sampling starts with one sample and expand with the help of that original sample's environment. Since the sample group of this thesis selected from a very limited group it was nearly impossible to recruit people from the streets or via online tools, in fact both methods were tried and failed. The reason for this failure is because there are no visible non-Muslim asylum seekers in the easily reached places and it is impossible to tell them apart. Secondly, the online tools were alienating for the sample group because they are not on social media or did not necessitate to form an online communication platform. Therefore, the snowball sampling is the key to reach and recruit participants for this research.

The sampling started with the clergy who have permitted interviews with the congregant because some of the interviews conducted after the Sunday service. After reaching the first interviewees from the two different churches it expanded to the whole congregant. The asylum seekers who wanted to take part in the research interviewed in an order.

1.2.3. Interview questions

The interview questions were not final questions but rather the draft questions to help the formulate the interviews. During the interviews the questions changed and altered in some ways. Often there are follow up questions that are not in the list, as the nature of the research was semi-structured. However, the questionnaire remained the same and implemented to all participants. In the questionnaire there were multiple choice questions to facilitate their answers and ease the categorize the answers.

The questions and the volunteer form for the research were provided in three languages: Turkish, English and Arabic. Unfortunately, when the Persian translation received the churches closed due to pandemic. Additionally, the questions shared with the clergy beforehand to make sure that there are no offensive questions regarding the

congregant or the church itself. When it was positive, they were distributed and asked to congregant.

The topic of questions of the questionnaire as follows,

1- Age
2- Gender[11]
3- Employment
4- Income range
5- Education
6- Marital status
7- Children
8- Level of proficiency in Turkish language
9- Arrival period to Turkey
10- Citizenship status[12]
11- Sect of Christianity

The interview questions were as follows,

1- Could you briefly talk about your life in Turkey?
2- Do you think of leaving Turkey? If you are considering the reasons.
3- Have you applied to any of the commissioners, associations or foundations aimed at protecting asylum seekers such as UNHCR? If so, the result, if not, the reason.
4- What do you think about the biggest problem that you faced as a non-Muslim asylum seeker in Turkey?
5- What are the social services and opportunities you can reach? Is there a precondition for you to reach them? What are they?
6- How would you evaluate your participation rate in social life if you compare yourself with a Muslim asylum seeker?

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[11] The gender option of LGBTI+ made available for the participants but did not selected.

[12] This question was to make sure that they are stated that they are asylum seekers and non-citizens.

7- How would you evaluate your participation rate in social life if you compare yourself with a non-Muslim Turkish citizen?

8- To what extent do you feel yourself integrated into social life? What would make you feel more integrated if you don't?

9- How often do you go to church?

10- How the church has an impact on your integration with Turkey and Turkish communities? Or did it have an effect?

11- Do you see yourself in a more disadvantageous position than Muslim asylum seeker?

12- Do you have meetings with the church community outside the church?

13- How do you have relations with your neighbours, or do you have neighbours? Have you been subjected to bad / bully / discriminatory behaviours from your neighbourhood, or colleagues in your workplace? Have you had any other acquaintances who share the same experiences as you?

These questions, though not entirely, were remarkably changed during the interviews. The main reason for this situation was the language gap which there was a need to reformulate them sometimes. Another important reason was to minimize the intervention to interview because when an interviewee started to share his or her experience in a way that more convenient for them, I did not stop the flow in order to not disturb them.

1.2.4. Risks, limitations and mitigations

Since the beginning there is a reason for naming the sample group as a delicate one. Because religion as it is a sensitive topic and open to manipulation or even harassment. Accordingly, the methodology of this thesis thinks thoroughly and implemented by measuring the risk in the meantime.

The main risk for this thesis was the reaching out for the sample group. This was overcome with snowball sampling and frequently attendance to the ceremonies to establish a trustful relationship with all due respect to anthropological studies. Also,

the original informants were valued people in their congregation therefore it helped this study to be conducted with no obstacle.

Another risk was misunderstanding the responses because of the language gap. This risk was mitigated with having a translator in the congregation to help because s/he has already been used to its fellow congregants' backgrounds and how they respond to a question.

The main limitation was the COVID-19 pandemic that unfortunately stopped the interviews and there were no possible ways to solve it without reaching the deadline of a master's study. The online tools were not useful and not trustful for a vulnerable group such as the sample group of this thesis. The face-to-face interaction is the key to an in-depth research therefore there cannot be a good replacement to that.

1.3. Terminology

The migration terminology is destined to be overwhelmingly comprehensive. Because it evolves and widens everyday according to the unprecedented requirements as it is expected to be. Therefore, the terminology has the utmost importance to understand a text regarding the migration studies.

Often, the terms are used interchangeably which they must not be. For example, most of the migration literature regarding Turkey's field, uses the term "refugee" for Middle Eastern asylum seekers which is not correct. If the term "refugee" is used as an umbrella term or a sociological term rather than a technical term it can be understood but it is tending to be mixed up the conjuncture. For instance, the term refugee widely used in Turkey for the Syrian asylum seekers and it is shadowing the right violations occurred because of this lack of status of them. Therefore, this widespread practice to use refugee as an umbrella term does more harm than good. Despite this, the term of "migrant" can be used for an actual umbrella term for the non-citizens. Because rather than the term of refugee which is a term that has the utmost importance for the forcibly displaced people, the term "migrant" is globally used for non-citizens.

In order to prevent this sort of terminological confusion, under this subsection there will be a small glossary of migration for easing the reading of the thesis. Also, throughout the thesis the term "refugee" only used with the parlance of "Syrian refugee crisis or flow" which is used internationally. The reason why Turkish literature cannot use the term refugee for the Syrian or Iraqi or Iranian asylum seekers are the conflict of the national and international regulations. This conflict will widely be discussed under the second chapter.

The below table shows a selected list that includes frequent terms used in this research. As a warning, the definitions vary in the national and international sources, therefore the technical terms that assign a status to a migrant is defined by focusing on the national legislation. However, the terms about the migration management such as integration is derived from what is ought to be and not what is defined.

1.3.1. Capsule migration glossary

The below table presents a glossary for migration terminology to explain this thesis' core concepts and terms.

Table 1 Capsule migration glossary:

Term	Definition
Migration	An umbrella term for all human movement outside or within their national borders.
Regular migration	A variety of a migration that happens in compliance with national legislation.
Irregular migration	A variety of a migration that does not happen in accordance with law. This law can be the law of country or destination or origin or can be directly against the international mechanisms.
Migrant	An umbrella term for the person who move outside or within the national borders. Throughout this thesis this term also used as referring to asylum seekers.

Table 1 (continued)

Emigration	A variety of migration that changes the constant residence of a migrant to the country of destination. This term usually used as the perspective of country of origin.
Emigrant	The persons who are emigrated.
Immigration	A variety of migration that changes the constant residence of a migrant to the country of destination. This term usually used as the perspective of country of destination.
Immigrant	The persons who are immigrated.
Non-refoulement	The principle of not sending back a person to the country of origin if the life or freedom of that person is in danger.
International protection	A variety of protection that protects the rights of the people who are unable to return their country of origin in accordance with the international law.
Subsidiary protection	A variety of international protection that protects the rights of the people who cannot classified as refugee or conditional refugee.
Temporary protection	A variety of protection that provide temporary shelter to the mass influx of migrants. This term generally used for the Syrian asylum seekers. The term refers to a lawful limbo that is preventing a person's right to have international protection.
Refugee	The person who fulfils the definition of refugee in the national legislation. For the Turkish legislation, the refugee is the person who is displaced because of an event occurred in Europe. This status refers to international protection. Since the Syrian Civil War, the forcibly displaced people called "Syrian refugees" as an umbrella term, and in Turkish literature they also falsely called as refugees.

Table 1 (continued)

Refugee (continued)	Throughout this thesis the term refugee only used for referring the "Syrian refugee influx/crisis" as a sociological term.
Conditional refugee	A variety of refugee that waits for his/her resettlement to a third country. This status refers to international protection.
Asylum seeker	A person who is under temporary protection and waiting for an international protection.
Displaced person	A person who is involuntarily and forcibly displaced from his/her country of origin.
Stateless person	A person who does not recognized under any citizenship status of any country.
Country of origin	The departure country of a migrant. Also used as the "country of departure".
Country of destination	The arrival country of a migrant. Also used as the "country of arrival".
Host country	The arrival country. The term generally used interchangeably with the country of destination. However, recently it is avoided because it implies a host and guest relationship with migrant and the citizens which can be harmful for integration processes (IOM, 2019, p.93). Throughout this thesis Turkey refers as the host country because the official approach to asylum seekers is fundamentally built upon this understanding.
Integration	The body of processes of mutual adaptation of migrants and the citizens of country of destination. This integration can be categorized under social, economic or cultural.
Social cohesion	The co-existence of two group. This term can be understood as the ultimate social integration.

Table 1 (continued)

Social inclusion	The improvements to increase the social adaptation of the migrants to the country of destination.
Adaptation	A process of getting used to a new community.
Assimilation	The opposite of integration. The assimilation is the one-way approach of country of destination for the migrants which focuses to change them irreversibly.

This capsule glossary aims to clarify the key terms and help the reader understand migration's complex terminology if one is not used to it. Also, there are substantial differences between the national and international legislation, which has not been discussed under the table. Those clashes will be comprehensively discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

TURKEY AND MIGRATION: INSTRUMENTS, APPROACHES AND REPERCUSSIONS

This chapter aims to explain the international and national regulatory mechanisms and their code of conduct as well as the gaps in the implementation and the migration fluxes to Turkey. The first part of the chapter will discuss the international instruments as follows; 1951 Geneva Convention, 1954 Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol. The international mechanisms will be followed by the national instruments; 1934 Settlement Law, 1994 Regulation and 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection. The second part of the chapter will continue with the three-pillared approaches of integration that Turkey applies to migrants historically which they are cultural belonging, political interest and religion. Following to that 1989 Mass Migration of the Bulgarian-Turks, 1991 Mass Migration of the Iraqi-Kurds and lastly the 2011 Syrian Mass Migration by examining their hardship as the drawbacks of these gaps formed by the international and national instruments along with the three pillared approaches of integration.

Ultimately, the reason for this review on the migration related legislation is the lawful limbo that they are creating in the implementation process. This limbo will be uncovered in the migration influxes that Turkey has been experiencing. This experience will blend with Turkey's three-pillared integration approaches and the migration history. Consequentially, it is substantial to understand this superficial approach which is the root cause of the integration crisis. Throughout this thesis, the inability of these approaches to apply non-Muslim asylum seekers and of lawful limbo which creates the integration crisis will be one of the main constituents which eventually takes us to non-Muslim asylum seekers as the sample group of this research.

2.1. Instruments for Migration-Related Crises

The migration occurs as a social conflict for the host country (Düvell, 2005) and this social conflict aims to solve with the migration legislation. The mobilization of the non-nationals to the one's country brings a necessity of social cohesion between the citizens and the immigrants. Naturally, the international mechanisms are the framework documents to regulate this social cohesion. Therefore, the national and international mechanisms are essential regulatory instruments to solve migration-related crises with a toolbox of IHL. These regulations are formed to protect the rights of the migrated group outside their national borders as well as regulating and controlling the social, cultural and economic impact of migration to the host country (Amerfoort & Doomernik, 1998).

Historically, Turkey has been both a host and usually a transit country for migrants because of its geographical position as a bridge from Asia to Europe and likely to be the first asylum country (Elitok, 2018; Kirişçi, 2003). This geographical importance put Turkey in a very critical position which requires a successful migration governance with respect to international framework. However, international mechanisms are not above from the national framework because, all countries obviously have the right to interpret the international tools with their own understanding (Parsons & Smeeding, 2006, p. 465; Perrigo, 2010). For instance, Turkey has reservations on 1951 Geneva Convention to not grant migrants from non-European regions to refugee status (IOM, 2008; UNHCR, 2011b) because Turkey tends to treat the migrants coming outside of Europe especially from the East as a national security threat due to the decades long tension of the Eastern border issues. (İçduygu & Keyman, 2000). This is the main clash of the international and national mechanisms globally.

This chapter aims to illustrate the said clash by explaining the regulatory mechanisms both nationally and internationally and show their gaps in the implementation that we call lawful limbo. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will examine these international and national mechanisms and discuss the gaps in existing policies in the practice.

2.1.1. International Instruments

This chapter aims to discuss the main international instruments: the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 1954 Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol while rethinking their ability to transform according to new needs and changes in the field. Besides the two conventions mentioned above, there are many other agreements regarding the migration-related crises. European Convention on Human Rights, United Nations All Immigrants International on the Protection of the Rights of Workers and Family Members Convention, European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, and Human Rights Universal Declaration are the other examples to international mechanisms about refugees and migrants' rights (Demirhan & Aslan, 2015, p. 33). However, these documents shall not be the focus of this chapter because of their lack of direct relation to the main purpose of this study.

1951 Geneva Convention

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or in short, the 1951 Geneva Convention is a fundamental document regarding refugee rights. This document is undersigned in Geneva on 28 July 1951. The convention aims to regulate the rights of refugees in the host country such as the right to non-discrimination, right to non-refoulement, right to travel, employment and residence. While regulating the rights of refugees, this convention also addresses the host country with related responsibilities to protect the rights of the migrated group (Parsons & Smeeding, 2006).

"The Convention is both a status and rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement" (UNHCR, 2011b, p. 3).

Although the contracting party is subject to such responsibilities, countries have the right to put reservations on some of the articles which they find unsuitable for their national policies. Following this possible option, Turkey made reservations on the

article of geographical restrictions which means Turkey has the right to maintain the refugee status only to the people originating from Europe.

"The 1951 Convention, as a post-Second World War instrument, was originally limited in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe" (UN General Assembly, 1951, p. 154).

This time limitation is implying that the migrants were coming from Europe because of the communism threat but historically migration flow from Eastern Europe was very limited (İçduygu & Keyman, 2000, pp. 384-385). This article was later dismantled by the New York Protocol in 1967. We will discuss Turkey's drawbacks under the national instruments and how Turkey interprets these conventions.

1954 Convention

The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, in short, the 1954 Convention is signed on 28 September 1954 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and entered into force on 6 June 1960. The convention addresses the statelessness as "not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law" (UNHCR,2011a).

This document is a complementary document to the Geneva Convention because a migration is not always documented or endorsed by the host country. Therefore, international governance was in need of a new framework document. Unless this new document addresses the stateless person as a non-refugee and addresses that refugees are entitled to the regulations of 1951 (UNHCR, 2014), it must be mentioned here. Because, under Turkey's reservations to the 1951 Geneva Convention, most migrants are asylum-seekers who are under temporary protection and not refugees. Hereby, the definition of a stateless person in 1954 Convention is "the asylum seekers flee to Turkey under certain circumstances." Such as the undocumented Afghan migrants who cannot register because of the changes made in the Turkish legislation in 2018 (Leghtas, 2019). The registrations for Istanbul and the border cities were suspended for migrants coming from the Middle Eastern regions. (HRW, 2018) This caused many

undocumented migrants fleeing to Turkey illegally. Additionally, many migrants mobilize to Europe by using Turkey as a transit country, put Turkey in a position where many unregistered mobilization, even human trafficking including sexual trafficking of women happens occasionally (Atauz, Akbaş & Atasü-Topçuoğlu, 2009; İçduygu & Toktaş, 2002). The Convention has taken into effect in Turkey in 2014 with the law numbered 6549 (TBMM, 2014).

1967 New York Protocol

The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is an amendment to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The importance of this protocol lies in the removal of the geographical restriction which in this situation is Europe and dateline limit of 1 January 1951 (UNHCR, 2011a). These two restrictions were the major causes for not granting refugee statuses to individuals attempting to enter the country's border in the event that happened outside of Europe and thus they were blocking the non-European migration waves. Hereby, this article is lifted in 1967 but Turkey still continues to practice it and does not grant non-European migrants refugee status. Turkey still acknowledges them with "temporary protection" and occasionally calls them "guests" (Akkoyunlu Ertan & Ertan, 2018, p. 19),

Following the geographical limitation article, Turkey's reservation on the definition of refugee made Turkey come under criticism by the prominent actors in the international arena. In the report prepared by the European Commission in 2010, Turkey addressed to be a blockade against its own progress in the migration policies (EC, 2010, p. 82).

Aforementioned obstacle on Turkey's migration-related crises will remain while seriously limiting Turkey's ability to protect the migrants coming out of Europe by not giving them the official refugee status (Çelik, 2015, p.75; Ünlüer, 2015, p. 8). The results of this reservation will discuss in the third chapter extensively.

2.1.2. National Instruments

Regarding the many international initiatives to protect the refugee right holders, Turkey also could not resist to the changing environment in the IHL. Turkey as the natural stop of the migration flows because of its geographical location, needed extensive and comprehensive migration regulations to handle the migration-related crises. However, it was a late attempt for Turkey to form a modern regulation for migrants until 1994 because there were increasing cases of migration flows (Yazıcı & Düzkaya, 2017, p. 441). Therefore, this section will discuss the three fundamental documents: 1934 Settlement Law, 1994 Regulations and 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection.

1934 Settlement Law

The Settlement Law is a regulation that grants the Turkish collaterals the status of "muhajir" and regulate the procedures of other migrants came to Turkey. The law came into force in 1934 and was renewed in 2006. This was long before 1951 Geneva Convention and Turkey took the initiative to regulate the migration policies of its own with this early document. Unlike the successor documents, 1934 Law was a pre-modern, even an ethnic regulation rooted on nationalism and cultural motives which was not surprising with the conjuncture of the said date (İnan, 2016, p. 16).

In the Settlement Law there are two concepts which are the "muhajir" and "refugee". The occasional highlights to differentiate Turkish collaterals from an outsider. A muhajir is a Turkish collateral that share common bounds with the Turkish people and a refugee is the one who seeking asylum in Turkey and not sharing the same lineage with Turkish people (Turkey: Law No. 2510, 1934). Contrary to refugees, muhajirs can receive asylum and they can immediately be taken into Turkish citizenships (Turkey: Law No. 2510, 1934). There was an important sign that proves the 1934 Law was a pre-modern document is that the occasional highlighting to the Turkish culture and values. This led this document to be a proof that Turkey's migration policies lean over assimilation policies (Ülker, 2008). Accordingly, this law is limiting the non-collaterals to have residency in Turkey while also resettling the ones who gain

citizenship to certain places to fasten up Turkification processes (Demirhan & Aslan, 2015, p. 37). This attempt points out that Turkey merely had a constructed integration perspective on the migrants. Therefore, it has a traditional aspect on the migration crisis. The main goal or the solution was transforming them into Turkish to complete the nation-building process for the time being (Alpakgir Cevheri, 2018). Accordingly, when the law passed, a series of anti-Semitic events occurred in the Eastern Thrace which led to Thrace Pogroms or Thracian Events (Eligür, 2017; Bayraktar, 2006). After the etno-nationalist riots against the Jewish people living in Thrace and Istanbul, between three to seven thousands of Jewish people fled from Turkey (Eligür, 2017, p. 88). The same Turkification process has also flared up the tension between the Kurdish nationals and eventually led to Dersim Rebellion in 1937 (Kurban & Yeğen, 2012). The repercussions of this events have determined the Iraqi-Kurdish migration to the Turkey in 1991.

Also, the Surname Law that took into effect the same year of the Settlement Law was another sign of the process of nation-building. The law implicates all citizens to register under a surname. The non-Muslim community were not obliged to pick a surname, but records shows that they mostly did it (Türköz, 2004). The Kurdish nationals were often turned down because they would prefer to pick Kurdish surnames (Aslan, 2009). This shows that the fear of minorities had after the Turkification or assimilation policies are bound by the migration policies clearly. This problem will mention in detail in the fourth chapter which resulted the clash between non-Turkish-ness and non-Muslim-ness.

Consequently, this early law is not exactly a reference document for refugee protection law or IHL in general because it doesn't include a specific article to regulate refugees or asylum seekers rights (Çelik, 2015, p. 132). However, it is important to provide information on the law because in the case of the migration of Bulgarian-Turks and Iraqi-Kurds migration flows which will be discussed in the next section the differences this law makes for the Bulgarian collaterals unlike the Iraqi-Kurds or Syrians will be important for us to understand the situation.

1994 Regulation

Under the section of national instruments, we will continue with the 1994 Regulation and discuss how it was emerged and why it was necessary. The 1994 Regulation is the first modern regulation relating the situation of refugees or asylum seekers in Turkey (Demirhan & Aslan, 2015, p. 43), because for the first time Turkey started to monitor the situations of asylum seekers by itself rather than complementing UNHCR (İçduygu & Keyman, 2000). Until the 1994 Regulation, non-European asylum seekers were examined by the UNHCR, but the Turkish government only accepted less than the 40% of the applications (p. 393). Since then, it was clear that Turkey was decisive to implement its national agenda rather than be compatible with the international mechanisms.

This regulation outlines the principles and procedures for asylum seekers or individuals who claim residence permit from Turkey as a sanctuary. The legal basis of this regulation is based on both the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol. Considering that this document was prepared in 1994, it shows how belated it was since Turkey had already faced with two mass migration flows: one from Bulgaria and another from Iraq. According to İçduygu and Keyman (2000), the perspective of the 1994 Regulation did not solve the migrant problem rather deepened it. Still, this regulation was Turkey's awakening to the shifting nature of the non-European asylum seekers coming from the East, especially Iraqi-Kurds in 1991.

As mentioned before, the Turkey's drawbacks on accepting asylum seekers from non-European countries because of security threat related reasons are actually not unique. The same year Turkey released 1994 Regulation to monitor and control the non-European flows to Turkey, the Netherlands were preventing people who does not come from "safe country of origin" which they emulated from Germany (Meyers, 2004, p. 178). Following to that, when the pressure of migration flow rose to uncontrollable numbers, Turkey shared the halt of the Iraqi-Kurdish migrants with the Netherlands in 1996 (p.99). This shows that the national regulations protect the interest of nation-state at certain points and the international mechanisms could or would ever top the decision of the implementation country.

2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection

Turkey's first ever detailed and comprehensive national instrument regarding the migrants is the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) which took into effect in 2013 (Yazıcı and Düzkaya, 2017, p. 444). After 1994 Regulation, Turkey eventually constructed an instrument which is neither outdated nor traditional in the sense of IHL.

This new and up-to-date national mechanism explains the international protection with four subtitles as follows: "refugee, conditional refugee, temporary protection and subsidiary protection" (Turkey: Law No. 6458, 2013). However, the definition of "refugee" underlines that it is only granted to people who are subjected to events that occurred in Europe. Despite the fact that LFIP is an updated document compared to other initiatives, Turkey continues to put reservations on the geographical restrictions that were lifted in the 1967 Protocol. Thus, the law applies the geographical limitations in the granting of refugee status (Turkey: Law No. 6458, 2013).

> A person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and … the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. (Turkey: Law No. 6458, 2013).

The law states as the individuals that affected by an event that occurred outside of Europe before 1 January 1951, can only be eligible for the status of an "conditional refugee" and individuals who are affected by an event as states in the 1951 Geneva Convention can be granted as "refugee" statues. Whereas a person who did not fit for these two definitions only can apply for "subsidiary protection or temporary protection" (Turkey: Law No. 6458, 2013).

Six months after LFIP passed into law, "Temporary Protection Regulation" came into force to regulate the processes and procedures and to fill the gaps in the LFIP (Çelik, 2015, p. 71). In the 7th article of the regulation, the definition of the people that can

obtain a temporary protection is explained as "...aliens who came to our borders or crossed our borders individually during the mass migration," (Turkey: Law No. 6883, 2014). This part is added with the new regulation because the Syrian flow was not compatible with the previous definition in the LFIP. The Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was also established to administer migration in 2013 and regulated by LFIP (Arap & Çerçi, 2014).

The sample group of this thesis is under the temporary protection definition of the LFIP and treated as asylum seekers as defined under the related law. Under the next subtitle, we will examine that how all these mechanisms led to a lawful limbo that created a limbo for the non-Muslim asylum seekers.

2.1.3. Rethinking the Migration Legislation

Rather than accepting the international instruments as the bible of the migration studies or a wholesome documentation, the criticisms towards the gaps they are unable to fulfil or created shall be examined by including its shadow over the national mechanisms. The limitations of the existing legislation are the first step to challenges that migrants are facing today's world. Under this subsection, these limitations of national and international legislations will be discussed to reveal the root causes to integration crises.

First of all, many scholars criticize global governance for lack of institutional framework regarding the immigration regulation. The regulations which are already there to protect individual rights set to be non-migration specific and stayed numb to govern such crises (Koser, 2010). For instance, although it has been more than 50 years that 1967 Protocol is taken into effect, there are no satisfactory changes to the main text which cover the new patterns such as gender-blind migration regulations (Ari, 2008) or the new identities that emerged after 90's (Brinker-Gabler & Smith, 1997).

According to the commentary published by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in 1987 (Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman, 1987), the conventions are found outdated, despite the fact that it has only been 20 years after the 1967 Protocol to Geneva Conventions.

However, although humanitarian law had been developed and adapted to the needs of the time in 1949, the Geneva Conventions did not cover all aspects of human suffering in armed conflict. Moreover, by the 1970's even these were already a quarter of a century old and on some points had exposed gaps and imperfections. (Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman, 1987)

Additionally, this commentary also addresses that a country has the option to not adopt the conventions even if the mentioned national instruments point to more extensive aspects to protect the victims by its own terms (p. 851).

This tension between the national and international mechanisms can be found obvious because the states are actually the ones who decide to implement the regulation or not (Chimienti, 2017, p. 426). According to Chimienti (2017), "the problem is that those states which sign international agreements also define them in accordance with their national interests" (p. 425) and she continues to argue that "therefore, for those states which neither define nor sign them, international human rights treaties have virtually no impact." (p.426)

Therefore, like Chimienti, Perrigo (2010) proposes that the importance of the "internal policies of liberal democracies" is undermining international human rights law (IHL) (Perrigo, 2010, pp. 222-223) because the domination of national interests is over IHL. Hence, she underlines that it is pointless to expect gap-less international instruments to protect the rights of refugees or asylum seekers. According to Nevers (2006), those gaps are formed because today's new nature of wars is different than the classical form of wars when the Geneva Conventions were written.

Additionally, for the 1954 Convention, nation-state dominion continues to be a problem to the implementation of such documents. It is correct that these documents facilitate the registration of irregular or undocumented stateless person who fled their country for various reasons, these documents "aid no obligation on any state to admit stateless people expelled from the country in which they were living," (Dummett, 2001).

Likewise, some argues that the international human rights treaties such as Geneva Conventions depend on the political leaders or decision makers' willingness to how "internalized" and "socialized" that treaties are (Evangelista & Tannenwald, 2017, p. 12). This issue lays under the problem of particularity of the situation as discussed in the above-mentioned reference. Because, if conventions like Geneva do not have the ability to transform according to particular situations it does not matter to have them as a basic principle.

Following to that, Turkey's national mechanisms relating the situation of refugees and asylum seekers has used these gaps to fill its national dominion over the international regulations and Turkey's stance on the non-European flows stay intact. As a result, the differences between the terminology and legislation between the national and international instruments causes violations of rights in Turkey. For instance, unlike the IHL, in Turkish legislation there is no determined period of time to finalize temporary protection (Yazıcı & Düzkaya, 2017, p. 425). This uncertainty causes an inertia to create more solid solutions for the migration-related crises and has negative effects on the efforts on the amelioration of migrant rights in Turkey (p. 452) where a migrant can stay under temporary protection without an adequate legal status for years.

As mentioned, Turkey's first dissidence with the international governance of migration started in 1967 when the reservations on geographical limitation decided to be continued. This decision reflected on many regulations Turkey established. The reservation on geographical limitation is not merely an obstinacy of Turkey to be an independent agent on migration but based on two important reasons. First reason is the apprehension of security threats coming out of Europe, that we mentioned in the previous section. The second one is to prevent Turkey to become a buffer zone to Europe (Bozbeyoğlu, 2015; Türkoğlu, 2011).

The migration governance is a conciliator between the international and national mechanisms. As explained in the first section, it is always the host country that has the final say about the regulation that they choose to implement. Turkey came a long way to cover international regulations and blend them to its legislation despite its apprehensions (Elitok, 2018; Ergüven & Özturanlı, 2013; İçduygu, 2015; Örselli & Babahanoğlu, 2016). However, there are still certain problems in the implementation,

such as having a proactive and an adequate plan for mass migrations or solidly constructed an institutional basis (Akkoyunlu Ertan & Ertan, 2018; Ergüven & Özturanlı, 2013).

Turkey's relation with EU and the EU-accession period is jeopardizing Turkey's actions taken against the migration problems (İçduygu, 2014; İçduygu, 2015c). For example, Turkey's apprehension to become a "refugee buffer zone" for Europe seems to be cancelled, especially with the 18 March Agreement. The agreement was signed between EU member countries and Turkey to hinder the irregular migration to Europe in 2016. Since then, Turkey is implementing a cooperation with EU especially with Greece by the exchange of 6 billion Euros' fund to spend for asylum seekers.

In February 2020, Turkey suspended the agreement ex parte and open the Greek border for asylum seekers to overpass to Europe. Following to that order, on 1 March 2020, Greece suspended the application of international protection from the borders. Therefore, the migrants have been stuck in the border of Turkey and Greece[13] [14]. The crisis is still ongoing in the borders.

Consequently, one can conclude that the structural fatalities of old-fashioned international instruments are in fact facing a war within. It once again proved that the international instruments are only valid in an ideal world. Since there are no sanction or enforcement for the governments who does not apply the international regulation, or a supranational mechanism that has the power over the national mechanism the legislations are not powerful enough to protect migrant rights, In the middle of this weakness there is what we called the lawful limbo. Hereby, the conventions are solely abstract documents in a politicized world which cannot cancel the domination of national or political interests that uses those gaps to manipulate the related processes.

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[13] See the website of Human Rights Watch (HRW): News, updated 17 March 2020, https://www.hrw.org/tr/news/2020/03/17/339568

[14] See the website of Deutsche Welle (DW): News, updated 16 June 2020, https://p.dw.com/p/3dmBG

2.2. Migration flows to Turkey and Three-Pillared Integration Approaches

The geographical location of Turkey is a transition area between the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Europe which causes it to be a potential country to become subjected to many migration flows (İçduygu, 2015b, p. 279). As a result, Turkey has been a transit or a host country for many different migrant groups who have been displaced by large mass migration waves in the last 30 years (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 298). In this section, three migration waves will be examined chronologically:1989 Bulgarian-Turks' mass migration, 1991 mass migration of Iraqi-Kurds and the Syrian refugee crisis that began after 2011. The discussions regarding the migration flows and how the receiving migrants integrated into Turkish community will be analysed with Turkey's three-pillared integration approaches. Since these three pillars are not officially constructed policies but rather ad hoc implementations, therefore they will be used as the approaches but not policies.

These three migration flows are fundamentally different from each other. They have happened because of different reasons and had different impacts. Especially, the ongoing flow from Middle East because of the Syrian crisis is entangling the Turkey's migration governance ability (İçduygu, 2015c). According the latest statistics from DGMM, the number of Syrians who are under temporary protection as of 23 September 2020 is 3.621.968[15]. Additionally, the number of irregular migrants is 90,941 as of 24 September 2020[16].

However, Turkish governments historically do not focus on the integration of the migrants to the Turkish community (Duman, 2019). Rather it sees them as a settlement or a security issue. The migration problems are dealt with short-term solutions and this attitude is often seen as a heritage from the Ottoman Empire (p. 47). Because, Ottoman Empire did not have a motive of being a nation they rather assumed everyone in their territory as an "Ottoman vassal" (Ortaylı, 2004; Birsel, 2011) and in the vassal the

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[15] See the website of the Turkish Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM): Temporary Protection, updated 23 September 2020, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638

[16] See the website of the Turkish Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM): Irregular Migrants, updated 24 September 2020, https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler

Sunni-Muslims were the superior to other minorities. This understanding is reflected onto minority and migration policies and finally to integration policies (Oran, 2018a).

This political culture occurs as a problem when implementing international integration policies to national mechanisms. Because international tools read the integration as a technical set up for a vulnerable group but the Turkish perspective on integration is based on a historical assumption. This assumption is that the dominant Turkish culture will devour other subcultures while the subcultures are volunteer to do that.

However, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) perceives integration of the migrants as a serious problem which constitutes mutual responsibilities for both the migrant and the host community. In their glossary, IOM defines the integration as "the two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion."[17]The IOM explains the integration as a two-way street and puts the assimilation right against the definition of integration by defining it as a one-way process. According to IOM, the assimilation means "one-directional policy approach to integration whereby an ethnic or social group – usually a minority – adopts the cultural practices of another – usually that of the majority ethnic or social group. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour normally leading the assimilating party to become less socially distinguishable from other members of the receiving society" (IOM, 2019).

Regarding the main clash of integration and assimilation, some scholars argue that integration is born out of assimilation and rather end with a volunteer assimilation of the migrant (Duman, 2019). Likewise, IOM (2019) proposes that integration is no more than an eligible approach to form social cohesion between the host and the guest community (p. 12). Besides all, Turkey has not even constructed a solid integration policy before starting to debunk its usefulness. The Turkish government's unsecured integration approach was proved to be failed in 2016. The attempt of identifying Syrian

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[17] See the website of the International Organization for Migration (IOM): Irregular Migrants, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms

asylum seekers as muhajir or guest proved to be useless because it turned out that Syrians were not as muhajir as the Bulgarian-Turks and they are not guests who are turning back in a year like Iraqi-Kurds. Therefore, the three of the migration flows were substantially different.

The above mentioned three-pillared integration approaches have the utmost importance to understand the migration flows. The pillars are the cultural belonging, political interest, religion. These three components will show how Turkey built the national integration narrative, what it is based on and why it is not working.

Cultural Belonging

The first pillar is the cultural belonging which is based on cultural ties between Turkey and the migrant group. The first mass migration, Bulgarian-Turks were seen as they belonged to Turkish lineage and counted as collaterals both in legal and social means. The Bulgarian-Turks who were forced to migrate tried to integrate to Turkish society with the narrative of "returning to the homeland". This policy was not completely successful but comparing to the other migrations it was closer.

Also, Turkey's first instrument to govern migration the 1934 Settlement Law was built upon this principle of cultural belonging. Since this law divided the migrants into two groups according to their closeness to Turkish culture it was a clear tool to a practice integration through ethno-cultural ties. However, this legislation focused on the assimilating the ones who are not Turkish enough. This aim can again also be associated with the Turkey's nation building process (Berkes, 1964; Duman, 2019; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017).

The second mass migrated group, Iraqi-Kurds had cultural resemblances with the regions they were located in Turkey. South-eastern region of Turkey had intense Kurdish population thus this created a natural integration with the Iraqi-Kurds with the locals. This local integration might be effective, but the integration of the Iraqi-Kurds was a failed case because there was no integration motivation nation-wide and they were unable to live anywhere else but the provinces with high Kurdish population.

Also, Turkish government was not letting them blend in because they were labelled as security threat unlike the Bulgarian-Turks. As Kirişçi and Karaca argues, Iraqi Kurds who forced to emigrate to Turkey and repatriated as soon as they can do so, they integrated to Turkish community only with a certain level of religious and ethnic similarities where they located but were constantly seen as security threats (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 311).

The Syrian migrants does not have cultural bounds with Turkish people. Also, their "alikes" are very limited in contrast to Iraqi-Kurds. Therefore, Turkish government did not try to convince Turkish citizens with the cultural ties of two national groups.

Political Interest

All in three flows, Turkey assumed the role of the regional dominant power. Therefore, this diplomatic purpose formed Turkey's perspective on the integration approach. In the Bulgarian crisis, Turkey was trying to take advantage of the changing balances in the fall of USSR. As a NATO member, Turkey was trying to prove that the government was fighting with communism and saving its collaterals from it. This diplomatic interest led Turkey to show hospitality with opening the borders as fast as it can. Turkish government used its political interests including nationalistic motive for integrating two groups.

In the second case, the existing Kurdish issue had affected the decision of Turkey to take a side in the Gulf War. Accordingly, Turkey presented its motivation to accept Kurdish migrants to Turkey out of security issues and played the role as the regional stronghold. The already saturated terror problem mixed again with a nationalistic discourse to make Turkey terror-free.

Thirdly, Turkey's direct relation to the Syrian Civil War with its regional proximity to the conflict effected Turkey's decisions on the Syrian refugee crisis (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 307). Subsequently, Syrian asylum seekers that could not be culturally or historically similar to the Turkish people settled into Turkey because Turkey was trying to secure its borders and wanted to become regional power affronting the Russia

and Iran. Therefore, Turkey built the integration approach out of exigency and used the political interests of Turkey to leave no chance to both group but to "get used" to each other.

Regarding the political interest, the 1994 Regulation and 2013 LFIP are two documents that complementing each other by referencing the international migration glossary through clear interest of the nation's security. However, the terminological differences and especially the geographical limitation Turkey have been implementing made it hard to form an integration approach that is compatible with the international integration norms once again.

Religion

Turkey has used religion as an integrated component for both in Bulgarian and the Syrian case by defining them as muhajirs like Bulgarian-Turks and was assuming them culturally or religiously bounded with Turkey because they were already Muslims (ICG, 2016).

For Bulgarian case, religion was in the second place because the cultural belonging component was much more dominant. However, for the Syrian case, Turkey only could integrate Syrian asylum seekers with the Turkish community through religious integration (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 308).

Following to that, when we examine the religious components of the Syrian asylum seekers under temporary protection, they are predominantly Muslims, but some are Christians. Also, if we include non-Syrian and Middle eastern asylum seekers in this number, it can be seen that Christian asylum seekers who are affected by the Syrian crisis and directly from the ISIS are also in considerable amounts. As this research conducted with the non-Muslim asylum seekers, the interviews clearly proves that there is serious problem of integration of non-Muslim Middle Eastern asylum seekers to Turkey. Unfortunately, there are not enough studies related to this statistic, but the numbers in the field research of this thesis can shed light in the next chapter. This absence of data pointing to the presence of an important problem, this problem is that

the migrants are not considered in all aspects. Any regulation without knowing what elements a group is composed of will be hypothetical and fruitless. Also, it is nearly impossible to find reliable data about the religious composition of the asylum seekers on internet or from the archives because those data are not shared with the public or not collected.

As a result, non-Muslim asylum seekers unfortunately could not find a place in the framework of integration. Therefore, they could not enter the integration narrative but could only approach to the Turkish society through partial ties that they could establish through the church where provide them access to social life. This integration that is attached on the church axis where is running an unparalleled religious crisis in Turkey with no governmental or international support. The non-Muslim problem is perhaps forcing to enter the Turkey's political agenda. Even when it is possible for it to enter, it loses the possibility of being visible due to little awareness and lack of literature. This discussion will take place in the fourth chapter widely.

Therefore, the implementation of the national migration mechanisms and Turkey's three-pillared integration approaches will be examined with their relation to the solution of the problems that three mass migrations caused in the next section.

2.2.1. 1989 Mass Migration of Bulgarian-Turks

The first mass migration that Turkey has experienced was from Bulgaria. During the period between 1945 and 1991, Bulgaria's Turks had irregular migration trends towards Turkey because of the communist regime, but the numbers have increased between 1989 and 1997. (Çetin, 2009, p. 607). The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) who was ruling Bulgaria starting at 1944 were applying assimilation policies to Bulgarian-Turks and lastly between 1985 and 1989, the communist regime forced Bulgarian-Turks to migrate. According to the data, 300 thousand Bulgarian Turks who were forced to displace, immigrated to and settled in Turkey (p. 607). The Bulgarian Turks, who were disturbed by The BCP's minority policies under the "revival process" of modernized Bulgarian identity (Kılıçlı, 2019), were gradually deprived of certain basic human rights, such as the right to use their mother tongue, freedom of religion,

and even warned to use Bulgarian Christian names instead of using their own names (Haksöz, 2017, p. 32; Oran, 1993).

> Despite severe censorship of information about political cases Amnesty International obtained the names of over 250 ethnic Turks reportedly arrested between December 1984 and March 1985 when, according to officials, the entire ethnic Turkish minority -estimated to number 900,000 or 10% of the population -"spontaneously" and "voluntarily" renounce Islamic names for Bulgarian ones. Amnesty International adopted a number of prisoners of conscience, most of whom were reportedly imprisoned for refusing to accept new Bulgarian names. For example, at about on 23 December 1984, police with dogs and troops with tanks reportedly surrounded the ethnic Turkish village of Gorski lzvor in Kardzhali district near the border with Greece. Officials reportedly then visited every household with identity cards already made out in new Bulgarian names. (Amnesty International, 1986)

Consecutively, more than 240 thousands of Bulgarian-Turks granted Turkish citizenship because both in national and international instruments Bulgarian-Turks legally were refugees that can be granted by de jure refugee statuses and Turkish government used 1934 Settlement Law to grant them citizenship and residency permits.(Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 303) As the law permits, Bulgarian-Turks accepted as "muhajir" because of the 1934 Settlement Law accepted them as culturally bounded with Turkish ancestry.(Çelik, 2015, p. 75; Turkey: Law No. 2510, 1934) Therefore, this migration perceived by Turkey as the "returning to imagined motherland" (Dişbudak & Purkis, 2016, p. 372).

Regarding the immigration of Bulgarian-Turks, Turkey was already familiar with the movement of Bulgarian-Turks and had a prior agreement with Bulgarian government titled with "Close Relative Migration Agreement" signed in 1968 (Kamil, 2016, p. 32). This agreement was not signed out of goodwill but to reunite the families who have been grown apart after the first mass migration of Bulgarian-Turks happened between 1950 and 1951 (Korkmaz & Öztürk, 2017) More than 150 thousand Bulgarian-Turks displaced to settle in Turkey but after Moscow's intervention more than the half of the people were left without a visa and then they turned back to Bulgaria (p. 270). After the agreement ratified in 1969, 130 thousand Bulgarian-Turks migrated to Turkey (p.276).

This migration flow was containing all the necessary elements of national and international instruments to be recognized as a refugee wave. This facilitated Turkey a comfort zone to implement its own migration narrative for two reasons. First of all, when the first migration flow started to Turkey between 1950-1951 (Kamil, 2016, p. 32) from Bulgaria, Turkey already had practiced carrying out a foreign policy strategy towards Bulgarian-Turks which was rescuing Turkish collaterals from political atrocity of communist Bulgaria and unite them in the motherland. Following that, in 1989 Turkish government opened the borders to take Bulgarian-Turk collaterals (Atasoy, 2011, p. 3) to the homeland without making concrete plans and this attempt finalized with the closing of borders. Secondly, the 1934 Settlement Law was explicitly accepting the groups like Bulgarian-Turks as legit Turkish collaterals and granted them with residency permit (Turkey: Law No. 2510, 1934).

The plan of Turkish government for Bulgarian-Turkish migrant flow was implementing the cultural belonging and religion as an integration approaches consecutively. There was a clear advantage for using these tools because for the first time the international and national mechanisms were compatible to each other. However, this compatibility does not mean that Turkey implemented its approaches of integration successfully in respect to human rights. Likewise, the report released by the Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in 2000 interpreted the Turkey's attitude as "assimilationist strategy" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2000). They also proposed that because of the cultural and linguistic differences, many of the migrants returned to Bulgaria. Accordingly, after communist regime has overthrown, one third of the Bulgarian-Turks have returned to Bulgaria (Çeçen, 2016; İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, pp. 151-157).

Turkey's ethno-nationalist stance on the Bulgarian-Turk immigrants does not received as the best migration governance by many scholars. Bulgarian scholar Vasileva addressed that Bulgarian-Turks that returned Bulgaria criticized Turkey for not being able to provide them work permit and left immigrants with hard positions. Although Turkish government occasionally declared Bulgarian-Turks as collaterals, Vasileva underlines that the immigrants had also excluded from the community and left alone (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, pp. 151-157; Vasileva, 1992). Accordingly,

Turkish government used concept of muhajir-ness as a populist discourse to mask up the real problems that occurred by their unpreparedness which Özal government has been strongly criticized for by the scholars (Geray, 1989; İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014;).

According to the report prepared by Dişbudak, Akgün and Balmumcu (2012), more than 50% of the Bulgarian immigrants underlined that they came because of the oppressive policies of the Bulgarian government but not to reunite with their motherland or their relatives. Accordingly, 84% of the Bulgarian immigrants applied for dual citizenship because they did not want to lose their ties with Bulgaria (p. 5). According to the same report main causes of their return is based on the lack of socio-economic integration such as the factors of unemployment, life and work conditions (p. 3). Another relating study proves that lack of socio-economic integration of the immigrants who came from Bulgaria caused them to feel degraded and second-class citizens (Korfalı & Sert, 2019). Overall, Turkey has not managed to successfully govern Bulgarian-Turks' integration process. Even though they were announced to be Turkish collaterals and naturally belonged to the Turkish community.

It was no surprise that Turkey intentionally ignored the rooted causes of the Bulgarian-Turks' return, because in the meantime Kurdish problem in the Eastern and South-eastern border was enhancing (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, p. 155). This tension was preparing the second mass migration from Iraqi-Kurds in 1991 which will be examined in the next subsection.

2.2.2. 1991 Mass Migration of Iraqi-Kurds

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by President Saddam Hussein, the U.S-led coalition forces conducted a military operation in Iraq which called Gulf War I (Sirkeci, 2004, p.39). This series of events led Turkey to face another mass migration only two years after the Bulgarian-Turks' migration. The Kurds, one of the most affected groups in the conflict zone, started to migrate to Turkey. This conflict and Hussein's already-existed discriminatory Kurdish policy led Kurds to leave Iraq (p. 45; Deniz, 2011, p. 95).

After the migration flow grew intense, the local residents in the area outnumbered by the Kurdish asylum seekers and put Turkey in a difficult position, because Turkey had not yet built a migration policy.

> Şırnak province, which has a population of approximately 260 thousand has been granted asylum seekers equal to the total population within a few days; the province of Hakkâri, which had a population of 175 thousand had hosted more than 200 thousand asylum seekers. (Kavak, 2013)

According to 1951 Geneva Convention, Iraqi-Kurds are not included into the eligible refugee list because of the geographical limitation. Also, they are not Turkish collaterals that share the same cultural or historical features as the Turkish community, therefore they have been included in the eligible residence permit list according to the 1934 Settlement Law. Therefore, it was clear that cultural belonging would not be an integration possibility for the Iraqi-Kurds and since they are not Sunni-Muslim as the majority of Turkey, the religion was not a possibility either. Accordingly, Turkey took it chance to try integration of the new group with the pillar of political interest.

As a result, unlike the Bulgarian immigrants, the Turkish government or legislature did not "embrace" Kurdish migrants (Altıok & Tosun, 2019, p. 11) and the main policy goal was repatriating the asylum seekers (p. 2) and control the process as asserting Turkey's national interest. As Kirişçi and Karaca (2015, p. 304) argues that state policy was built upon rejecting the Kurdish identity:

> An increasing number of journalists, politicians and members of civil society, began to stand against the official stance rejecting Kurdish identity in Turkey. Turgut Özal, after being elected president, also announced that he is likely to have Kurdish origin and pledged to solve the Kurdish problem. (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015)

The then-president Turgut Özal was conducting a close cooperation with the Europe and the US because he was trying to take an advantage of the changing balances in the international relations after the fall of USSR in December 1991 (Özdemir, 2016). That's why he tried to manage the crisis by putting Turkey's security issues forward and did not allow the entrance of Iraqi-Kurdish migrants into Turkey right away.

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Therefore, the government did not use an open-door policy like the Bulgarian-Turks this time. The government did accept them because of the enhancing pressure from the international arena and the Iraqi-Kurds were only accepted as "temporary guests" but not refugees (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999).

Consequently, after a joint operation of Turkey and the US named Operation Hammer Force, the majority of the asylum seekers were sent back to Iraq (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015; Deniz, 2011). The operation succeeded in creating a safe zone that allowed Iraqi-Kurds to return to their countries quickly. Initially, Iraqi-Kurds were taken from the camps in the mountains and placed in nearly 20 transit camps on the Iraqi side of the border. Most of the 460 thousand asylum seekers had returned to their homes in five weeks. By the end of May, only 14 thousands of them were left." argued Kirişçi and Karaca (2015, p. 305). The Iraqi-Kurds that stayed in Turkey were waited to be sent to the third countries to be taken as official refugees.

The discussed unwillingness of Turkey to accept Iraqi-Kurds as refugees or grant them with citizenship, is related to political reasons, namely the Kurdish issue. This political issue is the reason why Turkish community is argumentative about the Kurdish identity (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 304). The main reason why Kurdish migrants excluded is the already existing tension between the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK)[18] and Turkey. The Kurdish problem inclined with the rising violence in the border and with the Gulf War. Because of the concerns about PKK terrorist organizations members' infiltration into Turkey with the security gap that war created (Özdemir, 2016).

Consequently, not only the absence of sufficient integration approach affected the situation of Iraqi-Kurds but also the related attitude of political interest harms the social cohesion between two groups. As Altıok and Tosun argues that government found a way to legitimize their foreign policy (Altıok & Tosun, 2019, p.7), Turkey and the existed Özal government legitimized asylum seeker policies regarding the Iraqi-Kurds by connecting it with security issues (p. 8)

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[18] PKK is an EU-listed terrorist organisation.

The distress of government on Kurdish issue made it harder to integrate the newcomers to the Turkish society. Often, the Turkish literature reads this integration problem is a problem of "adaptation" between the two groups (Deniz, 2011, p. 99) and don't mention integration usually. Under these circumstances, an efficient integration approach or a proper migration governance was not even mentioned in the political agenda. However, this act of Turkish government provoked some violation of IHL. For instance, as mentioned above, the Kurdish asylum seekers that were sent back to Iraq after a joint operation was the violation of the act of non-refoulement and therefore was criticized by the international community (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 311).

The 1934 Settlement Law, the only available national instrument of migration was already a bad start with the Kurdish nationals. As mentioned in the previous section, this law was aiming to enhance the Turkish culture in the certain regions. This attempt was seen as an assimilation policy towards Kurdish people by many scholars (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, pp. 126-127).

Consequently, Turkey's ways to deal with the Iraqi-Kurdish migration flow were not only insufficient but also ignorant to see Kurdish people as a heterogeneous group by treating all the migrants as security issues. Therefore, the situation with the Iraqi-Kurd migrants were very much different than the case of Bulgarian-Turks. But the fact that majority of the migrants have returned to their country after the operation, provides Turkey to forget to deal with them as migrants but a domestic problem.

2.2.3. 2011 Mass Migration of Syrians

The Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011 between the forces of government which were pro-Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria and the opposition forces later called the Free Syrian Army and the ISIS, UN-listed terrorist organization (Malsin, Shuster & Massimo, 2016, p. 40; Nas, 2019, p. 57). In the mid-2015 the war has grown intense and each group divided Syria into territories. (Malsin, Shuster, Calabresi & Thompson, 2016).

Regarding the deepening humanitarian crisis in Syria, Turkey played an important role because of the territorial proximity and direct effects of the crisis in the southern

borders. Turkey initialized an "open door" policy to the Syrian asylum seekers by following the escalated tension in the region, (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p.412). The open-door policy led Turkey to host about 4 million asylum seekers from 2011 until today (UNHCR, 2019a). Therefore, the problem leaped on the other side of the continent which shows the magnitude of the crisis which is known as "Syrian refugee crisis". This migration flow was the largest migration flow in Turkey's history both in "numerical terms and of its characteristics" (Erdoğan, 2014b). The flow was large and unmonitored which regular and irregular migrants were blend in together and caused hundreds of irregular migration and human trafficking to Europe through mostly the Aegean coastal to Greece (Nas, 2019, p. 59).

Therefore, this mentioned human trafficking through Turkey's borders included Europe to reverberate the Syrian Civil War. Accordingly, the crisis addressed a global problem that begins to be the top priority of the associated countries' political agenda.

Therefore, Turkey and the EU joined forces to deal with the irregular migrant flux and human trafficking in Aegean Sea and signed the Turkey-EU Agreement on March 18, 2016. The aim was preventing the irregular migration and ensure the safety of the coastal. In return, Turkey is promised to be granted with visa liberation to the Schengen area, 3 billion+3 billion Euros in the provision of financial funds and the placement 1 for 1 formula.

According to Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the measures taken by this agreement has maintained the peace in the Aegean as promised:

> "Due to Turkey's resolute action against irregular migration, irregular crossings in the Aegean Sea already decreased since October 2015, when daily data was around 7.000. The effective implementation of the Turkey-EU Action Plan on Migration by Turkey contributes to this decline. Accordingly, in March, daily crossings decreased to 859."[19]

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[19] See the website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): http://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-turkey_eu-agreement-of-18-march-2016.en.mfa [accessed 5 October 2020]

Since then, many third countries including Germany and France, implementing humanitarian admission programmes to the Syrian migrants with the cooperation of UNHCR. This admission program aimed to grant Syrian asylum seekers to international protection (UNHCR, 2019c). However, the 18 March Agreement between Turkey and EU abided Turkey to stay as the ultimate host country. Because the agreement originally formed as a readmission agreement to stop the irregular migration to Europe. According to the agreement, for every irregular migrant that stopped in Aegean Sea would be accepted by Turkey and exchange of every irregular migrant stopped in Aegean, Europe would accept a Syrian asylum seeker as a refugee in European countries. But, Greece, as the first stop of refugees, seemed to slow down or directly reject the application of the Syrian asylum seekers. Therefore, this agreement interpreted as a mistake (Ekşi, 2017). However, Turkish Foreign Affairs underlined that this method will prevent Turkey to become a "refugee depot" on their official website. [20]

Since the crisis burst out, Turkey, lightly brought solutions to the "Syrian refugee crisis" with the international and the national mechanisms we mentioned in the first part of the second chapter earlier. Regarding the actions that Turkey took until today, there is still a shortage in policy-making process. As İçduygu (2015a) proposes that Turkey need to revisit the laws and amendments:

> Two policy changes in particular appears necessary: (1) lifting the geographic limitation of its 1951 Geneva Convention obligations, which currently limits asylum rights to Europeans, and (2) revising the Settlement Law of 2006, which promotes the settlement of people of "Turkish descent and culture". (İçduygu, 2015a)

As discussed, the continuous problem of the geographical limitation that we mentioned throughout the chapter is still ongoing and it seems as a blockade against the implementation of IHL. Therefore, national instruments such as the Settlement Law and LFIP are also limiting the Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey to have international

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protection rights or statuses and granting them with "conditional refugee status" or "temporary protection" while Turkey tries to fill the legal gap (İnce, 2018, p. 125).

According to the report prepared by International Crisis Group (ICG), under the Turkey's current legal framework is hindering a long-term solution because without lifting the geographical limitation Syrian asylum seekers would never have recognized or integrated under fair conditions (ICG, 2016).

The report also proposes that majority of the Syrian asylum seekers are finding Turkey desirable for its proximity to Syria, cultural similarities and absence of Islamophobia (p. 4). According to the report, this was an opportunity for Turkey to create an integration plan for the migrants. However, the hurried policy making of the Turkish government did not take advantage of this, especially for the asylum seekers living inner cities and not in the refugee camps[21]. The non-camp asylum seekers identify as "puzzled about where to get information and learn registration procedures and access to services that differs from place to place and time to time" because of the Turkey's migration governance. This was a serious problem because, according to a report published in 2014, only the 13% of the asylum seekers were living in 22 camps in 10 provinces and almost all of the remaining 87% were living outside of the camps (Erdoğan, 2014a).

As a result, there were not enough precautions to integrate Syrian asylum seekers who are under temporary protection in Turkey, (İçduygu & Ayaşlı, 2019, p. 2). İçduygu argues that, main reason why the integration of the Syrian asylum seekers was ignored is because the temporary protected group is seen as guests that eventually are going to return back to Syria and only saw them as a foreign policy or a security issue (pp. 2-4). This official attitude of Turkish government reflected to asylum seekers as them believing that they are just "guests". Therefore, many of them did not learn Turkish because they saw themselves returning to Syria soon (ICG, 2016, p. 5).

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[21] Despite the fact that Syrian asylum seekers are not officially refugees in Turkey, the camps they are living called refugee camps.

This guest policy was Turkey's official demeanour for Syrian asylum seekers until it turned out that this is not a temporary situation. Likewise, Turkish government changed its official discourse for Syrians from "guest" to "muhajir" in 2015, when the migration flow grew intense, and described Turkey's position as being "ensar"[22] to them. Fortunately, this transformation of discourse was well-timed because according to a field research conducted in 2014, Syrians were highly disturbed by called as "guest" which made them feel unwelcomed by the "host" (Erdoğan, 2014a). This integration approach was solely based on the religion because the "muhajir" and "ensar" analogy is derived from the history of Islam. The approach was nothing unsimilar to previous approach, but non-Muslim asylum seekers were ignored. Not only the overwhelming number of asylum seekers are accepted in borders but lack of statsitcs regarding their backgrounds make it even harder to consolidate Turkey as a successful country of destination.

Likewise, the Turkish citizens were concerned about many matters but mostly for socio-economic matters because of the rising Syrian population, such as, high rents and unemployment. They were also associating Syrians with crime and felt themselves as second class citizen because they thought that Syrian asylum seekers were the priority for the government (Erdoğan, 2014a). Consequently, neither asylum seekers nor the citizens were comfortable with each other. Especially, people who lived in Kilis province[23] were disturbed by the Syrians because they were outnumbered by them (p. 19). The usual comments for Syrians were about stealing their jobs and social lives because there were so many of them. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss these problems that asylum seekers are having in Turkey by including 17 interviews of non-Muslim asylum seekers conducted as a field research for this thesis.

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[22] According to ICG (2016), "ensar" means an affirming descriptive for those who help fleeing Muslims (p. 11).

[23] City in South-eastern Anatolian Region of Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY AND MIGRANTS: HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE CHALLENGES AND HOW TO FRAME THEM

Turkey's migration history as discussed in the previous chapter gains a second dimension under this chapter with the other side of the coin: the experience of the migrants. The legal gaps that Turkey filled with a three-pillared integration approach have some consequences. These are the problems that occurred because of the shortages of these approaches which we will examine in this chapter.

Therefore, this chapter aims to measure the hardships of migration by evaluating the indicators of participation to the workforce and, accessibility to social services with the data derived from the 17 interviews with the non-Muslim asylum seekers and the literature. The commonalities between the obstacles they are facing will prove that being a migrant and being a non-Muslim asylum seeker has overlapping features. These overlapping problems are the second step to integration crisis because Turkey's integration approaches are not useful to solve the crisis.

As discussed in the second chapter, since the foundation, Turkey has experienced three major flows from its western and eastern borders. However, the last major flow was not only from Syria but rather it triggered various minor flows. These minor flows from Iraq, Iran and even from Afghanistan were related to rather internal complications or they were directly the results of the Syrian Civil War. The sampling group of this thesis is naturally from these certain regions: Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Certainly, these groups are only can be integrated into Turkish society through religion because neither the cultural belonging nor the political interest approaches are enough to handle the situation. Therefore, the challenges that are going to be analysed here belong to the last 10 years or even more recent experiences of the

migrant population. Since the troubles have not changed dramatically in the last decade, it is important to focus on the recent data from the field and the literature.

According to the data from the official website of the DGMM dated December 2020, the number of foreigners who gained residence permit and that are currently living in Turkey is 875.075 and 405.372 of them are living in Istanbul. Ankara, the capital of Turkey, is the second most populated city with migrant population of 89.216 foreigners with residence permit. The ethnic backgrounds of the migrants who live in Turkey with residence permits are Iraq, Syria, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Afghanistan, in descending order.

Unfortunately, in the DGMM's official website, there are no total data about asylum seekers who are under temporary protection besides Syrians. The lack of detailed categorization or comprehensive reports regarding the migrants' current situations show the inadequate approach of the migration policies in Turkey. This situation of under-reporting points out that Turkey has a certain assumption on a stereotypical migrant profile, especially after the Syrian refugee influx. This assumption prevents a successful integration policy since the migration policies need to be taken care of with a detailed vision to provide adequate and efficient services to the people in need. Surely this vision starts with analysing the population in question. For instance, compared to the Germany and the United Kingdom's corresponding official websites which have detailed local level data regarding the migrants, Turkey has a long way to go.

In the second chapter we have already discussed that Turkey tried to implement the integration approach of religion over the Syrian asylum seekers but failed to do so. Regarding that failure, the non-Muslim asylum seekers were not even in the assumptions or in the data. Hereby, the concept of discrimination as a blockade to the integration automatically starts creating obstacles in every field of the destination country.

Therefore, while examining different aspects of problems we must remember that none of them were opted out from the very reason of discrimination. Such as, the challenges

of participating to workforce, or having a sense of security or even having friends are unfortunately stems from discrimination. Therefore, discrimination as a substantial problem continues to puzzle the lives of asylum seekers and beclouds their social integration processes. This beclouding situation and the discrimination towards the foreigners are doubled when the group is non-Muslim: a situation which we eventually call as a double camp.

Under certain circumstances when the country of destination does not promote a solid integration, the approach of the host community to asylum seekers can be hostile. Their attitudes might be degrading and assaulting in work life and in daily life. Such instances make it even harder for displaced people to be integrated with the receiving community. In Turkey's case, it is more or less the issue. There is a genuine population of Turkish community who accept and embrace the asylum seekers regardless of their nationality, but the prolonging time of their stay and the density of the influxes shift the popular opinion from positive to negative. The Syrian asylum seeker influx has started in 2011 but things got jammed in 2013. Compared to the asylum seekers accepted to Turkey until the end of 2012 (14.237), the number increased nearly 15 times in a year (210.418)[24] . Same dense increase also happened in 2015.

The reports that dated back in 2013, when the first jump realized, show serious discomfort in the public, even in the border cities where the cultural proximity is high because its regional closeness to Syria. For example, in Hatay, it has been reported that many cafés banned Syrians to sit at the tables close to the front. Whereas many people accused Syrians with being uneducated, peasant and non-urban (Özden, 2013, p. 10). Additionally, many of the Syrian asylum seekers were falsely accused of getting a monthly stipend, credit money or scholarship from the government. Therefore, the social tension was risen up to the explained level of hatred. As a result, asylum seekers are discriminated based on their culture, cuisine, language, Turkish accent or their religion.

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[24] See the website of DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Accessed 27 December 2020)

Since all displaced people are exposed different types or levels of discrimination, it is safe to say that women are exposed to "dual discrimination" where they are least favourites for job postings, housing services or representation in the media (Duran, 2018; Elmas & Paksoy; 2018). Recent research on media representation of female asylum seekers is suggesting that women are purposely "destroyed symbolically" (Elmas & Paksoy; 2018). Likewise, under the first sub-section of the challenges of job market, it is clearly mentioned that women are least favourable to employers which makes them more open to oppression from the host community or even from their fellow asylum seekers.

There are many indicators that help to level the discrimination in the host community. One of the most important indicators is levelling the social cohesion between the two groups. Ultimately, when a social integration process finalizes, a certain level of social cohesion between the members of that society is established. For the migration, the final step for this integration is the citizenship. However, Turkey is far more distant to the idea of granting asylum seekers or refugees a Turkish identification card. Likewise, the public opinion is antagonising this idea's possibility. According to a research conducted on the popular opinion on granting the asylum seekers with citizenship there is a serious disagreement. The participants from where the asylum seeker density is high, disagreed with the suggestion of granting citizenship with 81,7 percent[25] (Erdoğan, 2014b, p.37). This data proves that there is nearly no available social cohesion achieved between the migrant and the host group.

There is a tendency to see citizenship as a free pass to avoid getting discriminated among the migrants. It is correct that it has tremendous advantages to be granted with a citizenship, like to have the rights and ease of the hardship of the integration process. Some reports highlighted that, when we left the accessibility to basic human rights aside, refugees seek citizenship to have a decent life (Mülteci-Der, 2017). This shows that citizenship is also a mental blockage to feel belonging to a society and feel integrated.

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[25] Disagreement percentage is calculated as the sum total of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" percentages.

In 2016, the Turkish government announced a possibility of citizenship for 300.000 Syrians and their families based on certain criteria. The Ministry of Interior underlined some possibilities of dual citizenship or "exceptional citizenship" formula. Since the republican and nationalist opposition parties strongly opposed to these suggestions and also the popular public opinion was agreeing with the opposition parties, government's intentions did not realize (International Crisis Group, 2016, p.23-25; Erdoğan, 2014b). According to the recent report published in July 2020, Syrian asylum seekers has expressed their willingness for citizenship. Only the 5,7% of the participants said that they are not interested in getting a citizenship (Erdoğan, 2020).

As mentioned, all the challenges that asylum seekers are dealing with in Turkey are largely related to how discriminated they are. As a result, they tend to see citizenship as an ultimate integrating instrument but in the recent circumstances it does not look possible. Therefore, another most favourable option to integrate into the country of destination is the speaking ability of the native language. The migration literature shows that language abilities are becoming substantial to start or continue their integration to the host community.

Therefore, the ability to speak the native language of the host country has proven to have effects on decreasing discrimination and reducing the vision of seeing a foreigner as an "outsider". Therefore, we can say that the language is a way to integrate asylum seekers to Turkey (Erdoğan, 2020; Bellamy, Haysom, Wake & Barbelet, 2017, p. 45). Language is seen as a social bridge to form a connection and perform shared activities such as sports and political activity (Bellamy et al., 2015, p.46). Also, it flourishes the social capital of asylum seekers and helps them to be better integrated into society.

Besides integration, the language barrier already hardens the lives of displaced people because it has negative effects on finding a job, receiving education or dealing with legal procedures. Some legal documents may be confusing for foreigners, also it is expected that they have trouble communicating with the staff, especially in small cities. Because generally there are limited varied staffs in small cities.

The report submitted by UNHCR to Universal Periodic Review (UPR) regarding Turkey's compilation to human rights in 2019 points out the same problems. The report addresses two important issues: protection of asylum-seeking women, girls and LGBTI individuals, and compliance with non-refoulement principle. The recommendations to solve the certain problems in these headings have something in common: language and interpretation support. The report underlines that Turkish government should ensure several languages supports for helplines to protect disadvantageous groups such as women and girls. Additionally, for the border and removal centres, government has been advised to have interpreters to provide adequate support (UNHCR, 2019b).

During the interviews the Turkish-speaking ability were asked to the participants and according to questionnaires, 12 out of 17 interviewees can speak Turkish. However, even it was not enough for them to escape from the discrimination because according to in-depth interviews, it is proven that religion is a prioritized tool to accept one as a part of the Turkish community which is absent in the sample group.

Finally, among many different indicators to measure the level of integration, this paper will focus on the topics of employment, and accessibility to social services such as education, health, housing and security. These indicators are rooted in the 1951 Geneva Convention and its subheadings about rights to employment, social security, education and so on. Accordingly, these indicators are used in various works. For example, Ager and Strang (2008) defines employment, housing, education and health as the core domains of integration. They addressed the rights and citizenship as the foundation of those core domains (p.170).

Another important instrument to measure integration is the indexes which use multiple sources and indicators to evaluate country's performance regarding integration, such as the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). This index has a comprehensive partnership list including very prominent NGOs and supranational bodies such as the European Union (EU) and Migration Policy Group (MPG). Their partner in Turkey is the Istanbul Bilgi University.

The MIPEX evaluates 52 countries according to their performances in eight policy areas such as anti-discrimination, education, labour market mobility and health. Their policy areas are matching this thesis' focus to elaborate on that matters. Therefore, they will be used effectively throughout this chapter along with the data derived from the field. The data will be present in tables under related subsections with related information.

For instance, the MIPEX statistics on discrimination are proving that Turkey needs to ameliorate its migration policies to integrate the asylum seekers. Between 52 countries, Turkey is the 44th country to provide an anti-discriminative environment to the asylum seekers[26]. It is suggested to Turkey to improve "harmonization" and to consider enforcing protection against nationality discrimination as a country approach[27]. Throughout this chapter, this index will be used to support the framework analysis of Turkey's performance on the integration indicators.

3.1. Participation to the workforce

First and the foremost of the many challenges that migrants are facing today is the participation to the workforce in the destination country. The marketplace is not hospitable to the foreigners in any country and Turkey is not an exception to that. Main reasons for this adversary in Turkey's case are the stance of the Turkish community regarding the asylum seekers and administrative limitations such as lack of work permits or difficulty of getting one.

According to a report published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in 2013, 70 percent of the Turkish citizens agreed on "immigrants take jobs away from native born" (GMFUS, 2013). For the integration policies it is important to have the support of the public to lighten the burden on the people who are subjected to immigration (Kirişçi, 2014). Otherwise, the mentioned results on the public opinion of the Turkish community with the newcomers are expectable. Since the Turkish

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[26] See the website of MIPEX: https://www.mipex.eu/anti-discrimination (Accessed 27 December 2020)

[27] See the website of MIPEX: https://www.mipex.eu/turkey (Accessed 27 December 2020)

economy is already puzzled by undocumented or informal economic activities that are blending with low value-added works (Bache, 2019, p.15), people were already a having difficult time having, finding or losing jobs.

The asylum seekers who do not have work permit, generally participate informal economic activities which is open to exploitation (Kirişçi, 2014). In 2016, Turkish government passed a new legislation that allows and fastens the process of work permit to hinder undocumented economic activities. According to the new legislation, migrants who have refugee or temporary refugee identities now also automatically accredited with work permits. Other migrants who are under secondary protection can apply for work permit six months after they received their official secondary protection status[28]. Numan Özcan, the president of Turkey office of The International Labour Organization (ILO) expressed that this legislation "will help move refugees to the formal economy, enabling them to build a decent life for their families and give them an opportunity to contribute to our society"[29].

This accurate but late attempt did not solve the problem of exploitation of labour of the asylum seekers in the marketplace and employment numbers of the asylum seekers living in Turkey did not increase after the new legislation (Salah, Pentland, Lepri & Letouzé, p. 125, 2019). This shows that either asylum seekers did not find jobs or the jobs they have found are still undocumented or informal.

Therefore, we can conclude that, it is still very difficult for them to find a job in the formal economy because of the following reasons:

1. Primary settlement locations are often small cities that offer extremely low wages or no job opportunities at all.

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[28] See the website of Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services: https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/ [Accessed 12 December 2020]

[29] See the website of the AA article (2016): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edsens&AN=edsens.51535948 1&site=eds-live [Accessed 12 December 2020]

2. Job market of formal economy is too competitive for the asylum seekers who does not speak Turkish or have the equivalent educational background (Akar & Erdoğdu, p. 932-933, 2019).

3. Presence of anti-foreigner sentiments (İçduygu, p.10, 2015a) such as discrimination, racism or xenophobia

4. Lack of the formal identification card or work permit

These reasons direct the asylum seekers' employment axis to the negative side. They either face unemployment for long periods of time or they are forced to choose a job that pay low wages by working in the undocumented sectors such as seasonal agricultural works, construction sites or heavy industries (Kirişçi, 2014).

Additionally, female immigrants are more disadvantaged in finding jobs in such industries or other ones. The employment rates of women asylum seekers are lower in numbers and once they lose a job, they tend to exit the workforce completely (Çeritoğlu, Yüncüler, Torun & Tümen, p. 15-16, 2017). Also, it should be noted, that the children refugees are seen more feasible by the employers because they pay less to children by taking advantage of their situations (Dinçer, Federici, Ferris, Karaca, Kirişçi & Çarmıklı, 2013, p. 26).

According to the data received by the field research, 10 out of 17 of the asylum seekers stated that they are currently unemployed. All of the employed asylum seekers underlined that they change jobs occasionally and earn very less. In the table below it is clear that their monthly income is vastly below minimum wage.

Table 2 Economic statuses of interviewed non-Muslim asylum seekers:

Interviewee's Nickname	Nationality	Gender	Employment Status	Profession	Monthly Income Range
Abanoub	Iran	Male	Working	Cook/Church volunteer	2.000 - 5.000

Table 2 (continued)

Elissa	Iraq	Female	Unemployed	Church volunteer	2.000 - 5.000
Samir	Afghanistan	Male	Working	Furniture worker	< 2.000
Najwa	Iran	Female	Working	Various	< 2.000
Alia	Iran	Female	Unemployed	-	-
Salwa	Iran	Female	Unemployed	Church volunteer	< 2.000
Bassem	Iran	Male	Unemployed	-	-
Dawood	Iran	Male	Working	Welding worker	< 2.000
Haifa	Iran	Female	Working	Tailor worker	< 2.000
Rami	Iran	Male	Working	Technical Service / Church volunteer	-
Gabrielle	Syria	Female	Unemployed	-	-
Nasser	Syria	Male	Working	Various	< 2.000
Amira	Syria	Female	Unemployed	-	< 2.000
Youseff	Iraq	Male	Unemployed	Translator	< 2.000
Nayla	Iraq	Female	Unemployed	-	< 2.000
Wissam	Iran	Male	Unemployed	-	< 2.000
Tariq	Iran	Male	Unemployed	-	< 2.000

Likewise, the MIPEX addressed that Turkey's performance on labour market mobility is unfavourable for the migrants. According to listing, Turkey is the 49th country between 52 other countries. The repercussion of this ranking is the occurrence of certain obstacles about participating to workforce in Turkey for the sample group. In the interviews 12 out of 17 interviewees expressed that they had troubles to participating in the marketplace in Turkey for the four main reasons that mentioned

above. Some of them expressed more than one reason why they are having troubles to finding or keeping a job in Turkey.

First of all, 5 out of 17 interviewees expressed their inability to participate in the workforce as the lack of job opportunities in the settlement cities. The settlement cities in Turkey often small cities and usually minority groups are not welcomed entirely.

The third interviewee Samir stated that his first settlement city in Turkey was Gümüşhane which can be considered a small city. He said that he could not keep up living in a small city like Gümüşhane and moved to Ankara because he could not find job or a social sphere. He shared that one of his friends was living in Yalova, again a small city, fired from his job because of his belief. He underlined that he is also acting like a Muslim to not get fired. He is an undocumented refugee and doesn't have a work permit or legal documents. This is why he is working informally as an unskilled labourer.

Also, like him, Salwa underlined that her family and she had hard times while looking for jobs when they were living in Afyonkarahisar, which is also a small city. She said that people in Afyonkarahisar were discriminating them because of their religion. This is why she volunteered to work in a church. Unlike Samir, Salwa already had an undergraduate degree in Iran but because of the language gap and lack of the equivalence in the degree she could not find a job that matches her qualification.

Nasser was a Syrian middle-aged man who had serious troubles with providing for his wife and their toddler. They were forced to migrate to Turkey in 2018 because of the elevated tension in their hometown Latakia and finally settled in Ankara. He said that he worked for the lowest wages in various jobs since then. Nasser said that he and his family is tired of the low income and the bad conditions at his various jobs referring to exploitation of his labour by employers both physically and mentally.

Amira, a middle aged unemployed Syrian woman with a master's degree in History stated that she and her family were very unhappy living in Çankırı, a central Anatolian city, because "nobody liked them" because they are refugees. Amira and her husband

had a hard time finding a job in Çankırı. Compared to Çankırı, her husband and their toddler are doing much better in Ankara, Amira said. This family of three earns a living with the husband's car wash job.

The fourteenth interviewee Youssef was an Iraqi man in his mid-20's. He conducted the interview in Turkish because he is a translator. He said that he learned speaking Turkish when they moved to Turkey in 2016. He shared that his father had a shop where they sell musical instruments in Iraq. Their shop was damaged by the racketeers because they are Christians. They were forced to leave their hometown after these incidents and came to Turkey. Youssef and his family were first settled in Kastamonu, a small city in central Black Sea region. They had trouble finding decent jobs because Kastamonu is a very small city. Nowadays, Youssef still doesn't have a regular job or a steady income.

On the other hand, five of the interviewees said that the competition in the job market makes harder to find a job. This problem usually occurs because there is no equivalency their diplomas in Turkey or they cannot speak enough Turkish to provide service.

The second interviewee Elissa is an unemployed young woman from Iraq. Elissa had a master's degree in her country but unfortunately is not employed by any company in Turkey, because of the lack of equivalency between countries, like Salwa from Iran. She can speak Turkish but cannot practice her profession in Turkey. She said that she has withdrawn her application to settle in third countries after getting married with an Assyrian man from Mardin. Elissa expressed that the main reason for her application to UNHCR was the impossibility of finding a job that pays well or even just finding a job in Turkey. She is a church volunteer and administers the church's association. Despite her academic background and hard work, she earns under 5.000 Turkish Liras in a month even when she defines her life as "work only" and she started going to the school again to gain a High School diploma. Elissa believes that if she receives an equivalence, she can find a job that pays enough.

Alia, Iranian young woman with an undergraduate degree shared a similar experience. She moved to Turkey in 2018 but could not find a job because she cannot speak Turkish. She underlined that she had no bad connection with Turkish people and even defined her relationship with Turkish people as "fraternity". Alia underlined that her biggest problem is not knowing the native language. Similar to her, Haifa, the ninth interviewee with the same academic and personal background said that her problem is unfortunately the language gap. To solve that problem, she is going to Turkish language courses and by that time she is working at a tailor shop as an apprentice.

Rami, a technical service worker in his late-20's stated that since he moved to Turkey in 2016, his biggest problem was the native language. Rami had difficulties at the beginning, but he said he is more familiar with Turkish people now because he has a job.

Amira and Salwa also expressed the difficulty of finding a job that fits their qualification because of the equivalence of degrees. Amira said that she was a secretary in municipality in Syria with a good pay, but she is unemployed now.

While the majority of the interviewees shared the problem of not having legal documents or being denied of work permits, two of the interviewees expressed that their main problem is not having formal identifications.

Abanoub, the first interviewee who is from Iran, is working as a cook in a café and volunteering as a musician in the church at the same time. Iranian man stated that he has been working so much that he did not even have a social life or any spare time that did not include work. He defines his life "non-stop working" and he adds "I wake up, go to work and I go home to sleep, nothing else". Even while we were doing the interview Abanoub was working in the kitchen at a café because he did not have any other time to conduct the interview. Unfortunately, he is working informally because he does not have a work permit. He underlined that having a work permit is so hard because he needs to find an employer who needs to be his reference and guarantor. He says that this is almost impossible.

Samir, the Afghan interviewee who ran away from Afghanistan because of the military problems said that he is undocumented in Turkey. Because of the lack of formal identification, he only works in temporary jobs and constantly changes where he works. Since 2017, he made various applications for being a legal asylum seeker, but Samir said that he kept being rejected. The third interviewee underlined that this is the main obstacle for him to have a stable job and life in Turkey.

Lastly, the five of the interviewees addressed that before anything else the anti-foreigner sentiment is what blocks them to find a place in the workforce. This anti-foreigner sentiment was laying under the anti-non-Muslim attitude of the workplace they had before which resulted to lose their jobs.

Samir said that the main reason why he was fired from his job is the anti-foreigner sentiment and he strongly underlined that the specific reason is because he is not a Muslim. The young Afghan man strongly highlighted this problem because, for him, this has nothing to with his look or language but with his religion. He said that he is a foreigner that experiencing bad treatment because his religion is a foreigner to the host community.

The fourth interviewee Najwa had various experiences in different jobs and now she is focused on to take a legit degree in Turkey. Iranian woman who came to Turkey in 2017 summed up her experience was a very hard one. Najwa was fired from her previous jobs because her colleagues accused her of being a "heathen". She said, "they asked me if I am a heathen," and "told me to go back and be a Muslim," which shows her that if you are not a Muslim you don't deserve a job here.

Dawood was an Iranian man in this mid-40's and a former merchant. He said that he earns way below the minimum wage and said that he "makes lower than his equals" because he is "an outsider". Unfortunately, after Dawood forcibly moved to Turkey because her wife was sentenced to death in Iran, the only job he can get was welding in some factory.

Nasser, the twelfth interviewee that mentioned above shared his similar experience in work by being seen as an outsider. He said that he got fired from his job because he was not a Muslim and added "they (his colleagues) constantly tried to convert me in Islam."

Lastly, Salwa who was a young Iranian woman shared that she had many troubles sticking in a job because of the pressure of everybody asking for her religion. She eventually ended up with leaving where she works.

As a last word, the experiences in the job market were the most intense trouble for the sample group which they elaborate on that topic on a very detailed fashion. Especially the anti-foreigner sentiments were the pathway to fourth chapter that will mainly discuss the distinctive experiences of non-Muslim asylum seekers besides the daily struggles which are commons with the Muslim asylum seekers.

3.2. Accessibility to the social services

Another challenge that migrants are facing in Turkey is the accessibility to the social services. These social services can be defined as accessibility to health services, education, housing support or sense or means of security. These very basic services are what shapes an asylum seekers' experience in a host country. However, like the hardship of economic participation, accessibility to social services makes things harder but not hard enough to make them go back to their homeland. The asylum seekers in Turkey are people who were forced to leave their countries because of war or similar reasons. The responsibility of the host country is making this accessibility easier or available for the people who are forcibly left their homes as regulated in the international instruments.

Before going deep on the interviewee's experiences on this matter, the indicators of how an accessibility can be measured is what we need to explain. The one can measure his or her accessibility to any service or determine their satisfaction level of that service can be related to following variables:

a. Identification card or legal documentation possessed
b. The location of the resettlement city
c. Educational background
d. Marital status
e. Having a child

These indicators can be changed according to the asylum seeker's marital status or whether he or she has a child or one's educational background. For example, the asylum seekers who have children are urged to answer the questions about social services immediately referring their children's education in the schools. People who are expecting children are focused on the quality of the health care services. On the other hand, asylum seekers who are recently graduated from high school or about to graduate mentioned their problems with their peers and even bullying incidents. Therefore, the table below is focused on the information about these related issues to understand how they are evaluating the performance of accessibility of social services.

Unfortunately, the interviewees generally abstained to answer about the identification papers they have because they were afraid of doing a misconduct. Therefore, the table does not have a separate column for legal documentation.

Table 3 Marital and educational statuses of interviewed non-Muslim asylum seekers:

Interviewee's Nickname	Nationality	Age	Gender	Education	Marital Status	Children
Abanoub	Iran	31	Male	University graduate	Single	No
Elissa	Iraq	24	Female	Postgraduate	Married	No
Samir	Afghanistan	21	Male	High School graduate	Single	No
Najwa	Iran	25	Female	High School graduate	Single	No
Alia	Iran	29	Female	University graduate	Single	No

Table 3 (continued)

Salwa	Iran	25	Female	University graduate	Married	No
Bassem	Iran	18	Male	High School (Senior)	Single	No
Dawood	Iran	40	Male	University graduate	Married	Yes
Haifa	Iran	30	Female	University graduate	Single	No
Rami	Iran	28	Male	Middle School graduate	Widow	No
Gabrielle	Syria	31	Female	University graduate	Married	Yes
Nasser	Syria	31	Male	University graduate	Married	Yes
Amira	Syria	32	Female	Postgraduate	Married	Yes
Youseff	Iraq	24	Male	University graduate	Single	No
Nayla	Iraq	42	Female	High School graduate	Married	Yes
Wissam	Iran	18	Male	High School (Senior)	Single	No
Tariq	Iran	18	Male	High School (Senior)	Single	No

3.2.1. Education

Migrant education is an important topic to integrate the people who were forcibly moved with the host community (Göktuna Yaylacı & Sirkeci, 2019; Şimşek, 2018). Unfortunately, Turkey's attempt to regulate education of migrants took place later than necessary. Also, because of the density of the Syrian refugee flow, other foreigner

flows were ignored in the literature and did not elaborate much. Most of the reports and articles were vastly focusing on the Syrian asylum seekers without referring any statistics about Iraqi, Iranian, Afghan or other foreign nationals' educational statuses or struggles.

Until 2013, regulations on education regarding people with foreign nationalities were absent, including the Syrians. In April 2013, Ministry of National Education released the first circular on migrant education matter to be distributed to local governmental branches (MEB, 2017). Turkish education ministry decentralized the decision-making process; therefore, the ultimate decision of accepting or rejecting to migrant students is making by the provincial education administrations. This decentralisation gave birth to other problems of difference of attitude or quality of education to foreigners.

Until the education regulation regarding the foreigners, Turkey had already been hosting 300.000 Syrian asylum seekers in the camps and 200.000 Syrian asylum seekers outside of the camps and this was a very late attempt to release the first ever education regulation (Seydi, 2014, p. 276). This circular was followed by another regulation numbered 1715 and was released in 2014 by Ministry of National Education[30]. According to the annual report of DGMM which was prepared right after the regulation has come to effect, at the end of the 2013, 45.000 children take education in the special education centres in the camps (DGMM, 2014).

It was clear that the government was convinced that the refugee flow is nothing temporary and people who were forcibly displaced were not going anywhere soon. Therefore, both circulars were focused on to prevent year losses in the education of migrated children (Artan & Arıcı, 2017) and also preventing to creating a lost generation (Erdoğan, 2014a). The regulation proposes that the Syrian education curriculum will be supervised by the Turkish ministry but any children who would like to continue with the Turkish curriculum will be welcomed (Artan & Arıcı, 2017). However, the Syrian curriculum is not as welcomed as it is and the content associated with the "glorification" of the Assad regime has been removed (Kirişçi, 2014, p.24).

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[30] See the website of the circular: http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/dosyalar/1715.pdf (Accessed on 19 December 2020)

Also, it was not possible for the migrant children to have equivalent degrees with the Syrian curriculum in Turkey. For that reason, Libyan curriculum has started to be implemented in the schools for the Syrian children from 9th grade to 12th grade (Kirişçi, 2014).

Regarding the curriculum issue, there is another topic that was being ignored but was a serious problem for the non-Muslim interviewees. The Gabrielle, Amira and Nayla were mothers of toddlers. Amira and Nayla shared their experience as parents in an anxious tone. They were having problems with the enrolment of religious culture and moral knowledge course in the school. The interviewee parents refused for their children to take the course because they were Christians and the course curriculum is vastly about Islam, but it was ignored by the school board. Despite the fact that Ministry of National Education allows parents to choose whether their children took religious culture course or not.

Another challenge was the medium of the education. The education with mother tongue has not been seen as an effective idea on integration of migrant children to Turkish society but children who cannot speak Turkish might be neglected if the education was completely in Turkish. Therefore, the government sought to find a middle way to implement education to children (Kirişçi, 2014). Relating to that, according to a research conducted in 2014, students who participated to the fundamental education levels in Turkish integrated to the Turkish community more than the others, because they socialize more (Artan & Arıcı, 2017, p. 10; Kartal & Başçı, 2014). However, students who take the education outside of the camps tend to fall behind of the students in the camps (Artan & Arıcı, 2017) even education in the camps is very limited (Akar & Erdoğdu, 2019, p.930). Probably because resettlement areas are in the small cities that are academically below the national average (Kirişçi, 2014). Also, Turkish students are not always socializing but bullying their non-national peers in the school which makes the foreigner students to discontinue their education.

Likewise, there are challenges that non-Muslim interviewees experienced regarding this issue. Basser, Wissam and Tariq were in senior grade in high school, and they

were being bullied by their peers. Especially, Bassem underlined that he was being bullied by his religious culture and moral knowledge teacher because he is Christian.

There is unfortunately not a comprehensive literature available on how non-Muslim asylum seekers are responding to the compulsory religious culture and moral knowledge course but there are secondary studies (Baltacı, Coşkun & Ceylan, 2019; Demir, 2019; Demir & Okşar, 2018; Tosun, Yorulmaz, Tekin & Yıldız, 2018;). These studies are generally suggesting that while integrating migrant children to Turkish community, religious education is important and useful because majority of them are already Muslim. Also, it is proposed that taking advices from religious culture and moral knowledge teachers is crucial to integrate migrant students to Turkish community (Baltacı, Coşkun & Ceylan, 2019). Despite they have missed to consider non-Muslim migrant children, one agreed that non-Muslim students are experiencing peer bullying and having hard times taking compulsory religious courses that is vastly about Islam (Tosun, Yorulmaz, Tekin & Yıldız, 2018). As the interviewees pointed out.

Higher education standards that have been implemented to the migrants are not less complicated than the primary or high school education. People who would like to continue university education in Turkey has to take an exam called Foreign Student Exam (Şimşek 2018, p.377). The students who ace the exam can continue to university if the current national regulation allows (Artan & Arıcı, 2017). As we mentioned in the second chapter, the national regulatory systems are the first to decide on which rights migrants can or cannot access and education is no exception.

Elissa, Najwa and Haifa have expressed their efforts to ace the Turkish lessons and high school equivalency to get in the university to get their bachelor's degrees.

The education for all levels necessitates legal documentation such as residence permit or foreign recognition document (MEB, 2017). According to the statistics of the Ministry of National Education in 2016, 59% (492,544) of the Syrian school-age children are enrolled in schools, while 41% (340,495) are not (MEB, 2017, p.55).

There is no data available about other nationalities because of the reasons mentioned above.

3.2.2. Health

Unlike the serious challenges on education accessibility of asylum seekers, health is the least problematic one. Before the Syrian Civil War has erupted in 2011 and triggered a refugee flow, Turkey had already included migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to the general health services law in 2008. The law was known as 5510 numbered law[31]. This law was regulating the migrants with residence permit, work permit, stateless person, foreign nationals in different sections. However, there was one condition to implement the general health insurance to migrants or asylum seekers. The condition was that the origin country of migrant had to grant same health services to the Turkish nationals (Ermumcu, 2013, p. 59). People who do not have work permit or residence permit were not included by the law, but if they had insurance in their own country, they could access the healthcare services in Turkey. If there was an emergency situation or communicable disease in question, they can also access the services (Çallı, 2016, p. 148; Ermumcu, 2013; Önder, 2019, p. 157).

In 2015, Turkey enacted a new circular on health services for the asylum seekers residing in Turkey[32]. This circular aim to regulate the migrant healthcare centres and staff. As of August 2018, there are 656 migrant health units in 172 Migrant Health Centres in 29 provinces (Önder, 2019, p. 146).

In the light of these information, it can be said that Turkey was prepared to provide healthcare services free and accessible to all foreign nationals. Likewise, according to MIPEX data in 2019, the most welcomed policy area of Turkey was health[33]. Comparing to other 51 countries in the MIPEX's index, Turkey was in the 15th place

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[31] See the article: https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5510.pdf (Accessed: 20 December 2020)

[32] See the article: https://dosyasb.saglik.gov.tr/Eklenti/1376,saglik-bakanligi-gecici-koruma-yonergesi-25032015pdf.pdf?0 (Accessed: 20 December 2020)

[33] See the website of MIPEX: https://www.mipex.eu/turkey (Accessed: 20 December 2020)

by passing Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark which are most favourable host countries to migrants.

However, Turkey is still not the most favourable country to be in as a migrant. Because despite the legal regulations there are serious problems in implementation of these regulations. Such as language barrier, lack of specialized healthcare, lack of women healthcare support or reproduction health expertise, shortage of healthcare specials or overworking healthcare professionals, procedural problems regarding the insurance documentation and lastly the difference of service receiving quality of in-camp asylum seekers and urban asylum seekers (Bükecik, Şahin, Abay, Kaplan & Düzgün, 2019; Koca, 2016; Kirişçi, 2014; Loris-Rodinoff, 2020; Özden, 2013). Additionally, the free healthcare or education services were causing discomfort in the public because refugee or migrant rights were not promoted enough by the government and it was backlashing when the public was already convinced, they were guests that were going to go back home as soon as possible.

Asylum seekers that reside in the camps have their own challenges but comparing to urban asylum seekers, in-camp asylum seekers were reaching the healthcare services in their area with easier procedures while urban asylum seekers were having hard times to reach an available migrant healthcare support in the cities. Also, the healthcare and the food were free in in-camp facilities and the staff were speaking Arabic, but these things had their own costs in the cities to reach it (Özden, 2013).

Last but not the least, the "*legal limbo*" that unregistered or undocumented asylum seekers were facing was crucial because it was primarily limiting the ability of reaching certain services (Loris-Rodinoff, 2020). When people with no documentation or people who somehow got rejected to have documentation are in need, they are doomed to be deprived of healthcare services or reach it late. Also, Turkish government was opening and closing the insurance services for non-camp asylum seekers anytime. Therefore, this makes it harder to reach many healthcare services for free or not reaching them at all.

Samir is an undocumented Afghan man, and he was afraid of being disclosed and deported, therefore he was abstaining to reach any services including healthcare. Abanoub, Elissa and Dawood underlined their troubles to reach healthcare because the government were "*closing the insurance services time to time*" for the asylum seekers and they are not sure when to reach or cannot reach to healthcare services exactly.

3.2.3. Housing and security

Another important aspect of the challenges migrants in Turkey are facing is the housing and security problems. Historically, migrants from the east tend to be seen as a security threat as explained in the second chapter of this thesis, but actually the migrants themselves need to feel secure because of the certain discomfort caused by public and being more vulnerable to criminals and opportunists. Because they are not favourable for landlords or neighbours as ideal tenant and they are left homeless or open to danger.

First of all, housing problem is a non-camp problem that occurs because of the lack of rental support from the host country and rising rental prices. Housing outside of the camps is expensive and hard to reach. According to LFIP, there are 62 satellite cities for asylum seekers to be settle in and they are mostly in small cities or border cities. Asylum seekers are responsible to pay their own rents without a fund from government.

Some landlords and neighbourhoods are not welcoming for the asylum seekers to live. Also, the opportunist landlords make it extra hard for them by demanding over the top rental prices. There are two reasons for this; first, the anti-foreign sentiment and second, the misconception of stipend payments made to asylum seekers which is nothing standardized or mostly not available regardless of EU-funded project-based services, fees, grants or in-kind supports. The victimized asylum seekers are pushed outside of city centres and sometimes bad neighbourhoods with no security (Kirişçi, 2014; Şimşek, 2018;). Therefore, asylum seekers are living together in one house with many families which increases to risk of health issues.

Secondly, the security threats towards the asylum seekers are not inconsequential to housing problems. Forcibly displaced people are often living in unsecured places or even abandoned apartments (Kirişçi, 2014) which is causing security gaps. Also, the unpopularity of being a migrant in Turkey is provoking sudden uproars in high migrant density cities.

Addition to that, in-camp areas are also not free from the risk of security threats. Camps are generally closed to public access and the security is provided by private organizations (Dinçer, Federici, Ferris, Karaca, Kirişçi & Çarmıklı, 2013). Because the camps are mostly in border towns, it is very likely to be dangerous. Also, the women and children are more vulnerable to abusive behaviours or acts, therefore a sense of security must be established or guaranteed for them. According to the report of Dinçer et al, "assistance to the Syrian refugees must be recognized as an essential protection strategy" (p. 36). This protection strategy can improve the life quality of asylum seekers and Turkey's performance as a host community.

CHAPTER 4

TWO-FOLD CRISIS OF INTEGRATION: TURKEY'S NON-MUSLIM ASYLUM SEEKERS

As discussed in the previous chapter, migrants in Turkey are having serious problems while integrating into society and mostly excluded from the workforce and social spheres. According to interviewees, non-Muslim asylum seekers are not only excluded but ignored in Turkey. Their problems are rather crucial to understand that there is a second fold for them which is their religion.

The two-fold crisis of integration that the non-Muslim asylum seekers are experiencing in Turkey is the core argument of this thesis. Under this chapter it will be discussed that what is meant to be a non-Muslim in Turkey and what it entails when someone defines themselves as non-Muslim. The sociological enclave of the non-Muslim asylum seekers arises right here at the very position of double camp. Throughout the thesis we discussed lawful limbo that provokes the integration problems and finally the data and the field will be converged under this main chapter.

4.1. Turkey's strained past with religious minorities

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The modern Republic was constructed as a secular state that has no direct connection or endorsement with the empire because it was built on the dissolution of the caliphate and authenticated as a secular state, in complete opposition to the foundations of the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad, 1993; Berkes, 1964; Barkey, 2010; Ünlü, 2018). Accordingly, in 1928, the state religion had been removed from the constitution to complete the secularisation transition to a constitutionally irreligious state (Kara, 2017).

Historically, the modern Turkish identity was built on the clash of religion and secularism (Berkes, 1964). Therefore, the modern national identity-building process was construed through a wide-ranging emulation of "Western Civilization", (Meşeci Giorgetti, 2020), especially France (Bolat, 2005), where we may find the roots of secularism. For example, the majority of the Turkish Constitution was drawn up by mirroring Switzerland's, Germany's and France's constitutions (Erbay, 2018). However, Turkey also took some modernisation steps before many of these European countries, such as in granting women the right to vote (Konan, 2011). Regardless, from the perspective of human rights, whether Turkish modernisation emulated Western Civilisation is not a significant question.

Certainly, de-Christianisation or intensifying the Sunni-Muslim identity was not a priority of the early Republic. On the contrary public opinion held that the new Republic was de-Islamising Anatolia with its secularisation programme. There was excessive tension between the far-right Islamist groups and the government, exemplified by the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925)[34] and the Menemen Incident (1930)[35]. These claims of de-Islamisation intensified with the Turkification of eastern Turkey, mainly to the detriment of the Kurdish people. As mentioned in the second chapter, at the time, the Republic of Turkey prioritised ethnic issues to do with the basic structure of the nation-state rather than de-Christianisation. Also, discussed in the second chapter, when the 1934 Settlement Law taken into effect, there are many discussions over the assimilation policies of the Turkish government. However, following to 1934 Law, the announcement of the 1936 Law that regulating the properties of minority foundations which we will discuss under this section and the announcement of the Law on Foundations and Wealth Tax (1942)[36] , it becomes undeniably clear that the nation-building process does not include the non-Muslim-ness either.

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[34] Pro-Sharia rebellion in the Eastern Anatolia. The rebellion was named after the Sheikh Said who was the leader of Naqshbandi order.

[35] Pro-Sharia incident in Izmir.

[36] A tax payable by wealthy citizens. on-Muslims were obliged to pay ten times higher than Muslim citizens (Yumul, 2007). People who could not pay the tax were sent to Erzurum-Aşkale Labour Camps. The vast majority of labourers were non-Muslim citizens (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010).

In the nineties, non-Muslim-hood reconstructed as a dangerous identity (Yumul, 2007, p.51). Yumul argues that the reason behind this position is the recognition demands of the non-Muslim communities as the result of rising identity politics in that period. The problematization of the non-Muslim identity crystallized with the visible clash between the recognition demand of the non-Muslim community and the counter-position of the government. This conflict is an ongoing situation in today's Turkey and leaving non-Muslim identity outside of the Turkish nation (p. 55).

Since the non-Muslim identity accepted by the Turkish government as more than a religious differentiation but a problem of perpetuity of Turkish identity, non-Muslims continue to be accepted as one of the antitheses of Turkishness. For example, even today there are active cases of Armenian citizens who wants to change their names to Armenian names because their given non-Armenian names assuming a Muslim identity to them. The demands are often rejected by the court with the reason of protecting the integrity of the Turkish state (Özgül, 2014). As discussed in the second chapter, the cases were rooted in the Surname Law that prohibiting non-Turkish surnames.

In chronological order, the following crimes were committed against religious minorities in Turkey: the events of September 6-7 or the Istanbul Pogrom[37] (1955), the Maraş Massacre[38] (1978), the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II (1981)[39], the Sivas Massacre (1993)[40], the assassination of Hrant Dink (2007)[41], Zirve Publishing House murders (2007)[42] (Karpat, 2012; Oran, 2018a; Ürer, 2003). The list may be elongated. Turkey's 2019 religious freedom report sheet consisted of a 27-

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[37] Attacks directed against the Greek-Orthodox minority.

[38] Attacks directed against the Alevi-Kurdish minority.

[39] The assassinator was a Turkish citizen who killed the Turkish journalist Abdi İpekçi in 1979. However, the Pope was not a religious minority in Turkey, the incident symbolizes the era's radical Islam disposition.

[40] Attacks directed against Alevi minority.

[41] Attack directed to prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist.

[42] Attacks directed against three Christian men in Malatya.

page long list of violations (US Department of State, 2020). The report was heavily criticised by Turkish government officials who argued it was not sufficiently objective.[43] The report summarised Turkey's standpoint on religious minorities by saying that they may practice their religions "freely as long as they are not directed against the 'integrity of the state'" (p.4). The integrity of the state is brought up frequently whenever an issue occurs related to religious minorities, who tend to be treated as non-citizens or second-class citizens for not being members of the Sunni-Muslim majority. As a result of the aforementioned events, religious minority communities have grown smaller and less conspicuous. The very concept of non-Muslim citizenship was completely erased, as not being a Muslim was historically equated with treason (Birsel, 2011; Oran, 2018b).

Today religious minorities stand at just 0.2 per cent of the total population. According to USCIRF (2020) report, "99.8 percent identify as Muslim; an estimated 77.5 percent majority adhere to Sunni Islam. Between 10 million and 25 million people identify as Alevi, a community that the Turkish government largely refuses to differentiate from majority Sunni Muslims. The remaining 0.2 percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha'is, Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, and other religious communities," (p. 83). The USCIRF report does not provide absolute numbers. Another US Department of State publication provides the following information and approximate numbers for populations of religious minorities: "these groups self-report as approximately 90,000 Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Christians (including migrants from Armenia); 25,000 Roman Catholics (including migrants from Africa and the Philippines); and 16,000 Jews. There are also approximately 25,000 Syrian Orthodox Christians (also known as Syriacs); 15,000 Russian Orthodox Christians (mostly immigrants from Russia who hold residence permits); and 10,000 Baha'is" (U.S Department of State, 2020, p.3). While these numbers may be low compared to the total population of 82 million, still a considerable population of religious minorities exists. Meanwhile, although the

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[43] See the website of the AA article (2020): https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-slams-us-international-religious-freedom-report/1873133 (Accessed 11 January 2021)

Alevi population numbers nearly 25 million, the Alevi could not avoid rights deprivations and violations throughout the Republic's history, and they have a very strained relationship with every different status quo.

While there are substantial problems regarding religious minorities, there has also been significant progress to ameliorate the lives of minority groups. The amelioration started after Turkey became a candidate for full EU membership in 1999. The efforts accelerated with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its broad agenda for full membership in the 2002 general elections. The government's approach, EU acquis and harmonisation process are discussed throughout this chapter.

It must first be understood that the minorities issue is not a recent problem but goes back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, Sunni-Muslim status was culturally, economically and politically superior to other identities. Following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, all citizens were considered equal by the constitution, but the Sunni-Muslim community was *primus inter pares* in even modern Turkish society despite efforts at secularisation. This weakens the connection between Turkishness and the non-Muslim identities or heterodox Muslim identities such as Alevism. Although Alevism is a sect of Islam, the Sunni Muslim majority tend to see Alevis as heretics or even "enemies within" (Tanyaş, 2019, p. 218).

The fractured relationship between the groups distorted the connection of minority groups with the rest of Turkish society and disqualified them from being "genuine Turks" (Tanyaş, 2019). Non-Muslims asylum seekers, who comprise the sample group of this dissertation, have experienced layered integration problems because they are not Turkish, nor citizens or nor Muslims. Therefore, religion is not independent from, but inherent to their issues regarding citizenship status.

To understand the recent problems that religious minorities have faced, we must understand the basic structural problems that form their bases.

4.1.1. Definition of minorities

Minorities have customarily been defined solely on religious, rather than ethnic or linguistic grounds. The rights of minorities were made clear in the section on minorities at the Treaty of Lausanne. The government signed the treaty and granted non-Muslim minorities equal rights with Turkish citizens. However, the non-Muslim minority was not specifically identified in the treaty. For practical purposes, the Turkish government interpreted the phrase to mean Armenians, Jews and Greeks (Bardakçı, Freyberg-Inan, Giesel & Leisse, 2017, p. 71; Karaosmanoğlu, 2010, p. 197; Sandal, 2013, p. 643;). Other non-Muslim groups such as Alevis, Syriacs, Chaldeans, Yezidis or Protestants were left out from the official status (Bardakçı et al., 2017; Karaosmanoğlu, 2010).

Differing interpretations of which groups constitute a minority jeopardise the access of religious minorities to certain minority rights that are protected under the Treaty of Lausanne. This issue has been strongly criticised by scholars and international bodies such as the EU, UN and various NGOs.

4.1.2. Recognition of places of worship

In 2003, churches and synagogues were recognised as *de jure* places of worship along with mosques with an amendment to the constitution (Bardakçı et al., 2017; Karaosmanoğlu, 2010). However, the amendment excluded *cem* houses[44] as places of worship because the government announced that Islam has only one type of place of worship, which is the mosque (Bardakçı et al., 2017). In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that the status of *cem* houses constituted a violation of religious rights and discrimination (pp.126-127). Turkey has not yet accepted the decision of the ECtHR.

The official recognition of places of worship is important because it shows that all religions are treated as equals. When Turkey belatedly accepted churches and

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[44] Cem houses (*cemevi*) are Alevi places of worship.

synagogues as places of worship equal to mosques in 2003, it is improved conditions for relevant minorities.

A second constitutional amendment in 2008 ensured that utilities bills of churches and synagogues would be paid out of government allowances, as is the case for mosques. However, this progressive move was strongly criticised by some members of the public who argued that a Turkish-Muslim country should not be pay for non-Muslims' bills with taxpayer money.

The government has strict policies regarding granting permission for founding or building Christian and Jewish places of worship and existing churches and synagogues face problems with their landlords, neighbours or visitors which amount to cases of religious discrimination or hate crime. Therefore, new churches or synagogues cannot be built or moved because of financial issues. In 2019, construction began on a new Syriac-Orthodox Church and President Erdoğan attended the ground-laying (USCIRF, 2020). This church will be the first Syriac church to be built from scratch in the nearly 100-year-long history of Republic of Turkey. However, after a long controversy about its status, the Hagia Sophia[45] was officially transformed from a museum to a mosque and opened to worship in 2020. While the international community criticised this decision, the Turkish government replied that the arguments depicted the status of mosques in the Europe.

4.1.3. Problems regarding the clergy

Another enduring problem with the religious minorities is to do with the titles and training of new clergy members. The Greek Orthodox Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary is the main theological school responsible for training clergy for the Eastern Orthodox Church's Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Bardakçı et al., 2017). The seminary closed down in 1971 with the Private Universities which bound all universities and their curriculum to the Republic of Turkey. Currently, the seminary is closed. There are currently no clergy training school for religions other than Islam. This makes it difficult for churches or synagogues to replace the old clergy when

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[45] Late antique basilica in Istanbul.

necessary. There are a visa and work permit scheme for foreign clergy which is not very practical because of legal obstacles and ad hoc regulations.

The Ecumenical Patriarch and Archbishop Bartholomew I of Constantinople is the global spiritual leader of Eastern Orthodox Christians. He was born and raised in Turkey and he studied Theology at the Halki Seminary. Archbishop Bartholomew I is not allowed to "use the ecclesiastical title Ecumenical" in Turkey (Venice Commission, 2010). In 2008, a decision of the ECtHR stated, "Turkey is not entitled to deprive the Ecumenical Patriarchate of its property acquired in 1902 without providing for appropriate compensation, and Turkish authorities violated the ECHR" (Bardakçı et al., 2017).

Problems with the clergy is one of the most debated issues also criticised by the EU and the international community because it deprives communities from training their own members actively serve its other members.

4.1.4. Establishments related to the non-Muslim community: The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and The General Directorate of Foundations (GDF)

The Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) is an entity founded in 1924 that "execute[s] works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten[s] the public about their religion, and administer[s] to the sacred places of worship" (Bardakçı et al., 2017). With its wide range of competence, the *Diyanet* is responsible for all places of worship currently operating in Turkey. The *Diyanet*'s curriculum is mostly based on the dominant Sunni Islam sect in Turkey. The *Diyanet* is strongly criticised for being biased (ibid, p. 105).

The other organisation related to the non-Muslim community is the General Directorate of Foundations (GDF). In 1936, Turkish government released a decree making it compulsory for non-Muslim charity organisations to register with the GDF and changed their status to foundations from charitable organisations. If non-Muslim organisations did not duly register as "community foundations", the GDF or the Treasury would have the right to prohibit their activities in Turkey. The motivation for this regulation was to regulate community foundations (Dürgen, 2016, p.129). Until

1974, community foundations had the right, granted by the 1936 decree, to register immovable property as owned by their legal entities. In 1974, they were prohibited from acquiring more immovable property and withdrawn the right to disposition over their immovable property with a new regulation (Çağatay, 2011; Çelikel, 2015). In 2002 and 2003, the government released new regulations to overrule this ban but until then, many immovable and other property belonging to community foundations was confiscated by the GDF or Treasury. Lawsuits regarding the confiscation of properties are ongoing.

Moreover, according to the Turkish Civil Code it is not possible to establish a foundation to support a certain community, referring to non-Muslim communities, or to establish a new community foundation. Today, there are 167 community foundations operating in Turkey under the supervision of GDF.[46]

Turkey made significant progress during the membership bid process and harmonization with the EU acquis. The progress began in 1999 and intensified in 2002 with the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the ruling party. Many developments for the actualisation of religious minority rights took place in the last 20 years. It was a late attempt however, as the population of the non-Muslim community had decreased to 0.2 percent of the whole. However, human rights are not based on the numbers of the people concerned but should be evoked even when a single person has had their enjoyment of basic rights violated or deprived. On the other hand, in the case of Turkey population mattered, as the relative invisibility of the communities led to both public and governmental inaction.

The attitude of the government is welcomed and debated at the same time. Some scholars see the AKP's actions taken to improve religious freedom rights as an election strategy, or even a "political marketing strategy" (Oztig & Aydın, 2017). The strategy of the AKP was to target non-Muslim voters to win elections by a landslide and to make up for the void left behind in its Kurdish voter base which turned in significant

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[46] See the website of the GDF for the recent statistics: https://cdn.vgm.gov.tr/genelicerik/genelicerik_945_290519/01-vakiflarin-turlerine-gore-dagilimi05082020.pdf (Accessed 15 January 2021)

numbers to the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). Oztig and Aydın argue that with this strategy the AKP ameliorates minority rights and makes itself more appeal to the minority voter at the same time (p.66). However, the "cosmetic" improvements hinder the government from having long-term plans and persistent changes to benefit minorities, and may even harm them (Sandal, 2013, p. 632). Both arguments on the AKP's disposition to the rights of religious minorities merit should be taking seriously. Progress must continue with a long-term dimension by establishing a safer space for non-Muslim voices to be heard and acknowledged and not only in the display.

4.2. Evaluation of interviews with non-Muslim asylum seekers

In 2017, a media outlet reported that "the Ministry of National Education, in a letter dated 8 September, asked all 39 district directorates in Istanbul to direct Syrian students to religious "*imam-hatip*" schools," (ICG, 2018, p.20), which deserves attention. Although such a move was not completely unexpected, because the Turkish government planned to integrate the new influx of refugees to the Turkish community by using the analogy of "*ensar*", an Islamic approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, this outlet proves that non-Muslim asylum seekers were clearly framed out from this hypothesis.

As discussed in the second chapter, the subsection 2.2.4. examined the integration patterns used by Turkish governments, which are cultural belonging, political interest and religion. Usually, the government picks one or more of the patterns to form official migration governance policies. For the recent Syrian refugee influx, Turkey tried to use the religion as an integration tool to build a common ground. But the government failed to form an official policy for non-Muslim asylum seekers because whether deliberately or not, their existence was simply not assumed. However, this thesis aimed to fill this gap in the migration literature by field research conducted with 17 non-Muslim asylum seekers residing in Ankara. The informative data can be found in the table next page.

Table 4 Nationality, age, gender and sect of Christianity of interviewed non-Muslim asylum seekers[47]:

Interviewee's Nickname	Nationality	Age	Gender	Sect of Christianity
Abanoub	Iran	31	Male	Protestant
Elissa	Iraq	24	Female	Orthodox
Samir	Afghanistan	21	Male	Protestant
Najwa	Iran	25	Female	Protestant
Alia	Iran	29	Female	Protestant
Salwa	Iran	25	Female	Protestant
Bassem	Iran	18	Male	Protestant
Dawood	Iran	40	Male	Protestant
Haifa	Iran	30	Female	Protestant
Rami	Iran	28	Male	Protestant
Gabrielle	Syria	31	Female	Orthodox
Nasser	Syria	31	Male	Orthodox
Amira	Syria	32	Female	Catholic
Youseff	Iraq	24	Male	Catholic
Nayla	Iraq	42	Female	Catholic
Wissam	Iran	18	Male	Protestant
Tariq	Iran	18	Male	Protestant

In addition to the table above, it is important to share the generic background information on the sample group as well. 16 out of 17 interviewees were under temporary protection with the status of asylum seeker. However, one of them were an undocumented Afghan man which in the second chapter it has mentioned that there are legal obstacles for Afghan migrants to receive even asylum seeker-ship. Fifteen of the interviewees arrived Turkey between the dates of 2015 and 2019 and just two of

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[47] The table gives information about the distribution of asylum seekers by religious sect. However, this thesis does not analyse the issue of how belief in different sects of Christianity affects the migrant experience in Turkey. The information is shared as it may be use in the future studies.

them arrived between the dates of 2013 and 2015. 10 out of 17 interviewees applied UNHCR for third country resettlement and only one of them is accepted.

Many problems of non-Muslim asylum seekers may seem common with other migrants or asylum seekers mentioned in the third chapter but in this case occasionally those common problems are deeply rooted in religion. For example, generally the problems occur when the non-Muslim asylum seeker enters Turkey. Because before anything else, the asylum seekers try to find shelter for themselves. For the asylum seekers in Turkey there are two options: refugee camps and resettlement in cities. For non-Muslim asylum seekers, it was harder to stay in the camps because the population of the camps were dominantly Sunni Muslims. Non-Muslim asylum seekers found it difficult to stay with Sunni Muslims that they possibly had a dispute within their homelands in small and enclosed spaces. They usually selected resettlement in cities to live close to other non-Muslim asylum seekers and to churches.[48]

Syrian Christians and Turkmen refugees too have preferred to stay out of the camps dominated by Sunnis. The government set up a camp for Turkmen refugees in Hatay and one for Christian refugees in Mardin. Christian refugees by and large belong to the Syrian Orthodox Church and many have found refuge with foundations and monasteries belonging to Assyrian communities in Turkey, mostly in Midyat in the province of Mardin. This seems to have occurred in spite of the fact that the Turkish government as well as AFAD had repeatedly expressed their openness to receiving refugees irrespective of their ethnic or sectarian background. Nevertheless, there are reports highlighting discrimination as well as a sense of insecurity among members of these minority refugee communities (Kirişçi, 2014, p.32).

Although asylum seekers from religious minority groups tend to seek housing in cities over camps, settling in the cities is not an ultimate solution because they have many problems with their neighbours, either because the city is not metropolitan, or the neighbourhood is not welcoming. Therefore, the chain of problems begins in their first

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[48] See Susanne Güsten's article in *The New York Times*: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/world/middleeast/christians-squeezed-out-by-violent-struggle-in-north-syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (Accessed 16 January 2021)

steps. Accordingly, we will analyse the interviews with non-Muslim asylum seekers that show they are doubly disadvantaged in Turkey for being a minority and being an asylum seeker at the same time.

In order to grasp the religious discrimination that non-Muslim asylum seekers experience in Turkey, the interviews are analysed under two headings: relations with the church and relations with the host community. First,part will be analysing how interviewees perceive their relationship with the host community and what they experience so far. Secondly, we will focus on the relation with the church and try to answer how the interviewees perceive their relationship with the church, how long they spend at church or with the congregation and how this affects their lives in Turkey. This gap in the literature regarding the non-Muslim asylum seekers' problems and their process of *aforismos* from the Turkish community will be examined throughout the chapter.

4.2.1. Relations with the host community

> If I were a Muslim, I would live more comfortably. Because then I could work anywhere. If I were a Muslim, they wouldn't see me differently. Sometimes when I enter a place, I get strange looks because I am Armenian or Christian. Because I wear the cross, they immediately see I am Christian. This place is just like Iraq, you would be comfortable if you were a Muslim because this is a Muslim country. If you are a Muslim, you are like a king. The most I would have to say would be 'I am Muslim, what do you want from me?' Sometimes being Christian seems terrible to me. I sometimes fear that they will come to kill me. I am still not well psychologically because of Iraq. If someone looks at me strangely, I am immediately scared. As I walk down the road, I grab my cross with my hand because I'm scared. I would feel this way if I were a Turkish citizen and still a Christian.[49]

The young Iraqi woman expressed her feelings sincerely, as quoted above. Her fears were not unique or one of a kind. Iraqi woman spoke of her experiences so frankly that she almost broke into tears. She knows that she is vulnerable to hate crimes more so than citizens and she has the urge to hide her religion. She said "My Armenian friends warned me about expressing my Armenian identity and told me not to tell anyone". Her friends were subjected to various forms of discrimination for being Christians and

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[49] Elissa, Iraqi, 24-years-old, female.

were called "*khafir*" ("infidel") by their co-workers, which effected Elissa very much. She underlined her concerns about her Christian identity being "uncovered" because she deliberately hides it. Her husband is a Syriac from Mardin and a Turkish citizen, but as he has a Syriac name, people can understand immediately that they are not Muslims. However, her husband does not want to leave his homeland Turkey despite she is accepted to be resettled in Canada by the UNHCR, they are not planning to leave Turkey.

"Political developments in Turkey bother me. I was in a similar situation in Iraq, I ran away. And here we have the same situation, and I do not want to raise my children in a place like this, but my husband does not want to go abroad" said Elissa. Because she can speak Turkish clearly, she can analyse Turkey's political environment and she expressed her fear of being in a limbo.

However, she said that in her daily live she spends most of her time with her fellow Christians from the church and therefore she does not feel pressure. Elissa said that she has experience of oppression due to her religion as she lived in Iraq, also a Muslim dominant country.

In this chapter, the insights of the non-Muslim interviewees will be given as direct quotations to understand their experiences in their double camp positions in Turkey. These insights will bring their divergent problems as being a non-Muslim asylum seeker in Turkey. In the third chapter their overlapping problems mentioned as detailed as possible because it was necessary for us to understand that their problems are intertwined with being in two different disadvantageous minority groups. Therefore, the breaking point of this thesis is their experiences with their own words.

In the third chapter, the interviewees vastly mentioned their problems in the workforce and education axis. This is a substantial data that shows us the most problem occurs when the sample group confront with the host community. This failed confrontation proves that two-fold integration crisis has serious repercussions as we mentioned throughout this thesis. The interviews will show us that there is no space left for them to integrate or even exist. Therefore, the next subtitle that will examine their relations

with the congregation and church will show the instinctual attempts of them to come alive.

> They asked us our religion for the first time in a marketplace in Turkey, we were very surprised. It may be because of our cross or our speaking Turkish. In Afyon, after they learned we were Christians, they treated us badly. People in Ankara are better educated, so they don't treat us badly. We have applied to the UNHCR, we want to leave Turkey. Like everyone else, we first came here not to live in Turkey but to go on to other places, but we accept that we are now here to stay. Even if I were a Muslim or if I can speak Turkish, I will always remain a foreigner for Turks, I will always be different.[50]

The experiences of Salwa were not indifferent to Elissa's yet, they offer an insight into geographical location of resettlement cities. As discussed in the third chapter, asylum seekers have troubles in the small cities of Turkey which are not metropolitan, and where locals are not accustomed to have foreigners around. The Iranian woman said that in Ankara they are doing better than in Afyonkarahisar because Ankara is the capital of Turkey and more metropolitan. Salwa said they even lost their jobs because the employers did not hire Christians in Afyonkarahisar. She also stated she is very troubled when she is asked about religion. For her, it will make no difference, as she does not and will not feel she belongs in Turkey. This is something many migrants feel about their second countries and asylum seekers in Turkey also express their concerns about the issue.

> I did not tell anyone I was a Christian where I work, I act as if I were a Muslim. Some people hate Christians. Therefore, I keep my religion to myself in order to keep a job and make a living. The people where I work do not want to work with Christians, they fired them when they found out. Like my friend, who worked in Yalova is a Christian and got fired after they found out.[51]

Like Salwa, Samir would like to leave Turkey for third countries because he does not feel safe or welcomed in Turkey. Samir insisted that he was not being discriminated against because he is Afghan, but because he is Christian.

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[50] Salwa, Iranian, 25-years-old, female.

[51] Samir, Afghan, 21-years-old, male.

The Afghan interviewee was not the only one to lead a Crypto-Christian life to keep a job, as other participants provided various examples. For example, Najwa said that she hid her Christianity at work because her former co-workers had told her "Are you a *khafir*? Repent and become a Muslim". Unlike Muslim asylum seekers, non-Muslim asylum seekers feel threatened at the workplace because of their religions. Likewise, Dawood, an Iranian Protestant man said.

> I earn less than the minimum wage. I earn less because I am a foreigner, but when they find out that I am a Christian, they behave even worse. I was fired when everyone in my workplace noticed that I did not attend the Friday prayer. Muslim refugees are in a more comfortable situation than we are.[52]

The middle-aged Iranian man Dawood spoke with distress and generally sounded sorrowful. His pregnant wife was sentenced to death in Iran because she is a converted Christian. After that, they immediately fled Iran and came to Turkey, leaving their home, car, jobs and loved ones behind. He said his experience in Turkey had not been ideal, but they were making do since 2014. They would like to go back to Iran, to their homes, but they are afraid of being killed according to *sharia* law.

> We were placed Çankırı when we first came to Turkey and we hid that we were Christians from everyone. We are more comfortable in Ankara, they did not like us in Çankırı. Someone once saw a cross on my neck and said, "It's prohibited here, you can't wear that.[53]

Amira, 32-years-old Syrian Catholic woman shared her experience in Turkey at her church after the Sunday service. She and her 10-year-old daughter come to Church every Sunday. Her husband did not accompany them as he was probably working at his car-washing job. She and her family fled Syria because of the ISIS risk against their hometown and settle into Turkey in 2014. Primarily, Amira expressed her concerns about her daughter because she was at risk of peer bullying not because she is Syrian, but because she is Catholic. Her daughter had a well-known Christian name that allows her peers to place her as an outsider. She focused on her daughter's problems at school with her compulsory religious culture and moral knowledge course.

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[52] Dawood, Iranian, 40-years-old, male.

[53] Amira, Syrian, 32-years-old, female.

She wrote a petition to school to exempt her daughter from the course. The school administration approved the petition and allowed her daughter to be exempt from the course. However, the Syrian mother said that she is still afraid because not taking the course also makes her daughter an outsider. The conundrum seemed to agonise her deeply. Amira concluded the interview by saying "I feel like we are at risk for wearing the cross and my daughter not taking religion lessons".

She was not alone in her experiences. Nayla, another Iraqi parent talked about her 16-year-old teenage son's problems at school.

> We got a permit from the Ministry of National Education so that my son would not attend religion classes, but the school forced my son into religion class. He had problems with his peers at school and now he cannot go to school because of these. At school, they pressured him, saying "become a Muslim, testify".[54]

This problem with the religious culture and moral knowledge course is a hot topic in Turkey. Long before the non-Muslim asylum seekers were facing this issue, native religious minority groups such as Alevis, Syriacs and Christians had the same complaints about the religious course mentioned in the interviews. In 2007, Hasan Zengin of Alevi faith filed with the ECtHR against Turkey. The case is known as the "Zengin group of cases", as a similar case (Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey) is also included in the same lawsuit. Hasan Zengin applied on the behalf of her daughter Eylem to be exempt from religious courses at school because "the course curriculum was based on the Sunni-Islam and this was against the principle of secularism" (Zengin, 2011). Turkey did not respond to the ruling of ECtHR, and recently in April 2020 The Alevi Philosophy Centre Association submitted a status report to the ECtHR demanding Turkey to submit a detailed plan about endorsing the ruling and about the compulsory religious courses.[55] Turkey's official response to the claims in the report was released in January 2021. The report stated that "having regard to the fact that the State may use its margin of appreciation to make this lesson compulsory with the aim of protecting the national identity of the society and including social values in the

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[54] Nayla, Iraqi, 42-years-old, female.

[55] See the report: DH-DD(2020)378: Rule 9.2 Communication from an NGO in the Zengin group v. Turkey. https://rm.coe.int/09000016809e42de (Accessed 21 January 2021)

system," and added that Turkey is considering "to objectively redevelop the content of the RCE lesson, including the Alevi-Bektashi tradition," in a separate working group regarding the matter.[56]

Nayla was with her older son at the interview, shared similar experiences with her fellow congregants after the Sunday service. She and her family also had similar experiences with resettling in a small city in Turkey. Her son, a young Catholic Iraqi man said, "We could not attend church for one and a half years after coming to Turkey, because we were first placed in Kastamonu".[57] The Iraqi mother said that because her older son can speak Turkish, they are relatively more comfortable in Turkey and also with their non-church friends and with neighbours. They have been living in Turkey since 2016.

> Normally it took two years to go to third countries after applying to UNHCR, but they don't call anyone anymore. Normally we could have gone on to Canada, but I have been waiting for three years, nobody calls. In Turkey, they do not befriend with us after we say we are Christians. People I knew from Iran were coming to this church, so I knew the church. I count the days until Sunday when we'll come to church. My neighbours don't know that I am a Christian. But the place where I work is comfortable, it would be more difficult if I were not here."[58]

Abanoub, a young Protestant man living in Turkey since 2015, left his native Iran because of internal disturbances. He did not have much time out of work because he needed the money, and he did not want to risk losing his jobs. The interview was conducted as he worked as a cook in the kitchen of a little café in central Ankara. Fortunately, his employer granted permission for him to participate in the study during his shift. As Abanoub worked double shifts, he looked tired but was very much helpful. Abanoub said, before finding this job, he had some trouble holding a work permit because Turkey's migration law necessitates a pre-application by the employer to the

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[56] See the report: DH-DD(2021)8: Communication from Turkey in reply to NGOs https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680a0eca2 (Accessed 22 January 2021)

[57] Youssef, Iraqi, 24-years-old, male.

[58] Abanoub, Iranian, 31-years-old, male.

ministry which is not easy for migrants to obtain. Abanoub said he was comfortable with his employer and co-workers, as they know he is Christian and treat him well.

The last two interviewees were a Syrian couple married with children. They came to Turkey in 2018 because of the Syrian Civil War affected their hometown of Latakia. The city was known for its sizeable Christian population (Oehring, 2017, p. 20).

The couple applied for resettlement in a third country but were rejected by the UNHCR. Nasser said, "Nobody cares about us at all," about their rejection. They commented that most Syrian asylum seekers had been resettled in third countries in the first years of their migration, but nowadays they were feeling left alone.

> I had a lot of problems in places where I worked, and they called me '*khafir*' many times. Both Turks and Muslim Syrians call me '*khafir*'. In my old workplace, my boss fired me after learning that I was a Christian. [59]

Nasser said that they are easy to spot by Arabs because they have a Christian surname. He and his family live in a neighbourhood with a concentration of Muslim Syrian asylum seekers, which is not practical for them. Rather they find it disadvantageous. Because Syrians know they are Christians, they face discrimination from their fellow citizens as well as the host community.

> Since I do not wear a headscarf, we have problems with neighbours, and we do not talk to them. Even when there is a wedding in our neighbourhood, they don't invite us. Because we are Christians, we got caught in the middle of many fights. They are constantly trying to convert us to Islam. [60]

Gabrielle shared her experience with their neighbours with despair after a Sunday service. It is hard enough being forced to leave one's country, but it is even harder to experience such discrimination from their fellow citizens. While for some migrants it might be advantageous to be settle in a pre-dominantly Syrian area, this was not the case for them. Gabrielle, the Orthodox asylum seeker said:

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[59] Nasser, Syrian, 31-years-old, male.

[60] Gabrielle 11, Syrian, 31-years-old, female.

> Some of our acquaintances, who are Turkish Muslims, made proposals like, "Become a Muslim, we will give you a house and a car." But not once did we think of converting. But despite everything, maybe if we were Muslim, at least we would have [good] neighbours. [61]

As in Turkish culture, "neighbourliness" is valued in Middle Eastern cultures. This is probably why it primarily came up when talking about their experiences in the interview. It was depressing and demotivating for them. Since they have a toddler, they expressed similar concerns with aforementioned parents and guardians. They are afraid their child will experience the same troubles at school their fellow congregants' children had.

In the middle of the interview, Gabrielle and Nasser both said "As soon as we found out about it, we started coming to church. We feel more comfortable at church." This is because the church is not just a place of worship for them but a place of integration, socialising and taking a deep breath.

4.2.2. Relations with the church and the congregation

The sample group of this study has various backgrounds and origin countries. One thing that unites them is their close relation to the church and its congregation. The interviewees overwhelmingly answered questions related to their social lives in Turkey by referring to the church community. Their foremost place of socialisation was the environment related to their religious lives and the space it created. It was an escape from their realities of bad experiences with the host community. The church is a necessary and also beneficial apparatus in the social integration process of non-Muslim asylum seekers.

Samir said, despairingly, "I have no life outside of my church". The young Afghan man shared his experiences as a non-registered asylum seeker in Ankara. He spends his whole time praying in church when he is not working. He also has no place to stay because of his financial situation. amir makes friends at church and learns Turkish from his church friends. This is a sign that the church plays a role in integrating non-

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[61] Gabrielle 11, Syrian, 31-years-old, female.

Muslim asylum seekers to the Turkish community, while the government fails to do so.

Likewise, Bassem, an Iranian high school student, said that he saw the church as an escape from school, where he is treated badly by his peers because he is a Christian. He said that when his religious culture and moral knowledge course teacher said something offensive about Christianity, he defended his religion in class. That was when his classmates figured out that he was a Christian. He usually has friends from church because his school friends do not like him. He said "I have a few friends from school. Not everyone acts badly, there are good people too. But some people have said to me many times, 'I'll give you 50 liras if you become a Muslim.'" He and his family were originally wanted to go Germany but their UNHCR application was not completed and they have been living in Turkey since 2015. His friends of same age from the congregation, Wissam and Tariq expressed similar concerns about discrimination by their peers at high school.

In the interviews, 13 of the interviewees clearly stated the following sentences:
- "I spend all my spare time with the people from my congregation."
- "The church helped me deal with migration stress."
- "I come to church every Sunday."
This shows that there are strong ties between the non-Muslim asylum seekers with their churches because there are no other people or organisations that welcome them. As the churches do not offer financial aid, they only help non-Muslim asylum seekers to adapt to Turkish society by forming spaces for socialisation with the local congregation and helping asylum seekers learn Turkish.

It is substantial for us to understand that when a non-Muslim asylum seeker feel degraded or left out, they go church as a safe haven. There is a psychological comfort that the church provides for them to settle into Turkey and this space turns out as an unprecedented integration tool. When Samir said he has no other life outside the church because he "*lives, eats and pray*" in a place his church provides him but nowhere else, he unwittingly addresses a new home to him in a foreign land. Especially, the asylum seekers who settled in small cities in Turkey as their first

destination stated that the impossibility of reaching a church gives such discomfort to them proves church as an entity of a living space. Consequently, it is clear that church and the new space it created has the utmost importance to understand the two-fold integration crisis of non-Muslim asylum seekers and the double camps they are living in.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Turkey has its triggers, resistance, and endurance to keep up with the population's changing face with the migration flows. Such as Germany or the UK, the countries dealing with migration for decades and learned well from their past experiences, Turkey is now also expected to have solid long-term solutions dealing with migration. Under the current circumstances as a brand-new country of destination that appeals to migrants, Turkey is and shall be the right candidate for administrating the migration.

As discussed throughout this thesis, migration did not go along without the very idea of integration of the migrants. As a result of this, the forcibly displaced people or the asylum-seekers as we named in the thesis are the sublime objects of this integration process. However, the non-Muslims of the asylum seekers are doomed to be ignored because of the stereotypical approach to the migrant influxes from the Middle East or North Africa. They are assumed to be Muslims. Today, many decision-makers did not make the troubles of non-Muslim asylum seekers to be socially accepted or endorsed in the community as their top priority. Not only because Turkey has a strained past with the religious minorities but also because they are hypothetically not a valid data in the influxes. Moreover, their confrontation is minimal with the governmental branches, yet this is also a by-product of this said strained past. Therefore, the non-Muslim asylum seekers, such as the Christian asylum seekers in Ankara, are experiencing a unique hardship of enduring to leave a homeland behind unwillingly. In order to find and address those problems, 17 interviews have conducted with the non-Muslim asylum seekers in Ankara. The interviews take two months of period but including the preliminary research in the field it took a year to settle in a city and a church. Ankara selected as the main field with two different Protestant churches in it.

The reason for the selection of Ankara as the main field is the welcoming clergy and the easy accessibility to the congregation.

During the interviews the non-Muslim asylum seekers mentioned the obstacles of being an asylum seeker in Turkey while defining what is meant to be a non-Muslim asylum seeker in Turkey. Since some of their problems were matching with the Muslim asylum seekers or migrant, the root causes for their problems were being a non-Muslim in Turkey. Therefore, this situation called double camp position of the non-Muslim asylum seekers throughout the thesis. The data that received from the field research proves their unique troubles to be integrated into Turkish society.

To conclude this thesis, we should comprehend the two-fold crisis, the reason of double camp, of integrating non-Muslim asylum seekers, discussed in detail in the fourth chapter. It proposed that non-Muslim asylum seekers are in a position that is naturally more disadvantageous than the Muslim asylum seekers because historically, Turkey is not very an ideal country that embraces religious minorities.

According to the findings of this thesis, Turkey's conventional patterns of social integration is not working. However, instinctually, the Christian asylum seekers find their own space to be integrated into the Turkish community, which is the church.

Since the integration of a migrant population should not be instinctual, preferably a well-constructed one, this process needs to be two-way street. Accordingly, a successful social integration entitles both parties with sensitive duties and responsibilities. According to Güngördü, both Turkey and the European Union put the sole responsibility to integrate the host community to the shoulders of migrants. This one-sided integration naturally causes a social tension between the groups without balancing the expectations (Güngördü, 2018). Mainly, the social integration policies must constitute social cohesion and decrease discrimination. As this is not integration but assimilation, which expects migrants to change accordingly.

However, this burden on asylum seekers' shoulders could be minimized by successful public opinion campaigns that prove that asylum seekers are not solely security threats

or burdens to the economy. Because this is no touristic travel but a mass of people with serious concerns about their lives and forcibly displaced from their homelands. Some scholars have proven that when associated with humanitarian concerns such as accepting asylum seekers as humans in need has a buffering effect of turning negative behaviours into positive ones. The Turkish people who have a nationalistic approach as a primary reaction to evaluating migration matters continue to perceive migrants as threats and even harmful for their ingroups (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018). This outcome shows us that there is a chance of integrating asylum seekers into the Turkish community with a humanitarian approach when used carefully. Because if uses too much, people respondent to see government as ignoring their opinions (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018).

When the process is not smooth or well-constructed, the host community tend to have misconceptions about asylum seekers or rejecting them as a member of the society. Unfortunately, the Turkish society had many misconceptions, especially about the Syrian asylum seekers. Such as the misconceptions of they have monthly stipends or a free pass to universities. As mentioned in the third chapter, they were not true or even close to being true. There are many obstacles waiting for asylum seekers that arrived in Turkey beginning from day one. As discussed, Turkey has its efforts to ease their stay here but seemingly not enough.

This deficiency starts with the official statuses of the forcibly displaced person. Like mentioned before, Turkey did not grant people from out of Europe a refugee status. Depends on the reason for displacement, it grants temporary protection, which leaves them as asylum seekers in Turkey. The case is as clear as this if someone is not from Europe. This situation creates an irreversible effect on the positions of a forcibly displaced person in the host country. Naturally, the asylum seeker-ship is different from the refugees, and it has a limited right range. However, it must allow the person to enjoy basic human rights. The problem was not solely about this national shortage, but many scholars were also finding the international sources outdated. Because even in 10 years, the dynamic of the migrations has drastically fluctuated. The Syrian refugee flow changed the face of human movement irreversibly. Until that time, the modern world did not face a movement that it is effective globally since the World

War II. Therefore, the regulations regarding the rights of the forcibly displaced person shall need to revise and cover every aspect of migration without a blind-sided approach. Perhaps, a mechanism that effective globally shall be executed also.

Aside from the national and international mechanisms' myopia, there are serious gaps in the migration literature. In this thesis, a wide and various range of literature has been reviewed. They were the mechanisms regulating the migration, the flows that Turkey has experienced and is experiencing, the challenges that migrants in Turkey have faced and is facing, finally, the two-fold crisis that non-Muslim asylum seekers are experiencing today in Turkey. The raison d'être of this research is to show and fill that gap for good. The possibility of asylum seekers may not be Muslims is vastly ignored, deliberately or not. When this merged with Turkey's already puzzled relation with the religious minorities, it was fuel to fire. It should be remembered that this is not the lack of perspective in academia, but there were shortages of data collecting from the asylum seekers because the religion of them was never asked by the government officials. Also, the data provided by the DGMM on their official website is minimal and mostly uncategorized or not detailed. This limits the scholars to question or research in-depth about the asylum seekers' demographic or sociological features. The field research aimed to fill that gap as much as it is possible.

The accessibility to the sample group was not easy yet labyrinthic. The group and their relationship with the citizens were fragile, and non-congregant people were seemed to upset or even give discomfort to them. This is highly understandable and surely respected throughout the research. Luckily, the clergy were more than helpful and kind. They mostly helped to accommodate the interviewees. However, it takes many Sunday services to reach the congregation for them to feel comfortable which was sincerely enjoyable to attend. The interviews were conducted in many various places to fit the interviewees in order to mitigate the risks that might occur. Also, if speaking Turkish or English were not an option, there was always a translator available for Arabic and Persian interviews. However, when the necessary permissions were received, and the interviews began, the COVID-19 became a global crisis. Therefore, the churches and other outdoor places closed, and the interviews stopped. The sample group was not available for online interviews, so it was not a feasible option for such a vulnerable group and most of the time, they do not have the technology for that.

The position of double camp of the non-Muslim asylum-seekers as a sociological enclave and their two-fold crisis of integration is certainly a brand-new topic. Also, a topic that must be examined delicately because besides it is migration research, it has bounds with religious studies as well. It is clear that there are many interrelated areas to this research, such as law, sociology, anthropology, political science, religious studies, public administration but the aspect of religion is fragile. However, one should not be mistaken that this is not a theological or ontological study. Therefore, it is vastly focused on the political science aspect of the problem.

As a final word, the lawful limbo that occurs as a result of the clash between the international and national instruments which followed by a dysfunctional superficial integration approach brought us the obstacles that the field of this thesis grounded. As a result, this thesis became the first in-depth study on the non-Muslim asylum-seekers' social integration processes. Hopefully, not the last.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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22 EKİM 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Reşide Ömür BİRLER

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız **Gülçe BAŞKAYA**'nın "**Gayrımüslim Mültecilerin Sosyal Entegrasyon Süreçlerinde Etken Faktörler ve İnanç-Göç İlişkisi Üzerinden Bir Saha Araştırması**" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve **365 ODTU 2019** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ
Başkan

Prof. Dr. Tolga CAN
Üye

Doç.Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şerife SEVİNÇ
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Müge GÜNDÜZ
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Süreyya Özcan KABASAKAL
Üye

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bugün Türkiye yaklaşık dört milyon mülteci ve sığınmacıyı ağırlamaktadır ve bu sayı, karar vericilere birçok önemli sorumluluk yüklemektedir. Geçmişte transit ülke olan ancak yakın zamanda hedef ülke haline gelen Türkiye, ulusal çıkarları ile uluslararası insan hakları ilkelerinin gereklilikleri arasında ciddi bir çatışma yaşamaktadır. Bu çatışmanın tam ortasında ise Orta Doğu'dan gelen ve literatüre henüz dahil edilmemiş olan gayrimüslim sığınmacılar bulunmaktadır.

Bu tez, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sığınmacı olmanın yanı sıra dini bir azınlık olarak Türk toplumuna entegre olurken karşılaştıkları farklı engellerin olup olmadığına dair farklı bir soruyu yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu soruların cevabını bulabilmek için ise bu kişilere ulaşmak önemlidir. Resmi istatistiklerde sığınmacıların veya göçmenlerin dinleri bulunmamaktadır çünkü bu tür veriler özel olarak toplanmamaktadır (Dinçer vd., 2013). Orta Doğulu sığınmacılara karşı bu homojen yaklaşım, kitlesel olarak yerlerinden edildiklerinden ve Türkiye bu kadar sığınmacıya ev sahipliği yapmaya hazır olmadığından bir çıkmaza yol açmıştır. Altyapı eksikliği ve uluslararası mekanizmalarla tamamen uyumlu olmayan ulusal mekanizmalardaki boşluklar, onları şimdiden kafa karıştırıcı bir yere konumlandırmaktadır. Tüm bunların yanında ise dini bir azınlık olmaları tüm durumu daha karmaşık bir hale getirmektedir. Kampların dışında olsalar da "çifte kamp" dediğimiz bir sosyolojik kampta yaşamaya çalışan gayrimüslim sığınmacılar veri yokluğundan dolayı literatürde görünmez hale gelmişlerdir. Bu tez, literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmak için Türkiye'deki göç çalışmalarında daha önce bulunmayan ve eşi görülmemiş bir alan olan kiliseye odaklanmaktadır. Çoğu görüşmenin kiliselerde yapıldığı bu araştırmada 17 gayrimüslim ile derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır.

COVID-19'un küresel bir salgın olarak ilan edildiği Mart 2020'ye kadar, mülakatlar planlandığı gibi yürütüldü. İlanın ardından kapalı mekanlar ve ibadethaneler kapatıldı. Bu nedenle, kalan görüşmelerin askıya alınması gerekti. Hatta salgının neden olduğu sınırlı koşullar bugüne kadar devam ettiği için görüşme sürecini yeniden başlatmak

imkânsız hale geldi. Örneklem grubunun hem teknolojiye hem de gerekli ekipmana erişmesi zor olduğundan, kalan görüşmeler çevrimiçi araçlarla gerçekleştirilemedi. Ayrıca, onları yeniden ziyaret etmek veya yeniden bu kişilerle görüşmek de imkânsız hale geldi. Sonuç olarak, bu tez yalnızca pandemi öncesi görüşme verilerini içermektedir. Bununla birlikte, pandemi bir engel teşkil etmeseydi, örneklem grubuyla en az 10 mülakat daha yapılabilirdi.

Tez boyunca tümdengelim yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu nedenle bu tez, göçü düzenleyen uluslararası ve ulusal mekanizmaların kapsamlı bir özetiyle başlıyor ve gayrimüslim sığınmacılar olarak adlandırılan çok özel bir grubun sorunlarıyla yüzleşene kadar da kapsamı daraltmaya devam ediyor. Saha çalışması zorlayıcı özelliklere sahipti, çünkü örneklem grubunu bulmak ve sorunlarına derinlemesine dalmak için karşılıklı bir güven ortamı oluşturmak oldukça uzun bir zaman gerektiriyordu. İlk karşılaşmada ise Türkiye'deki sığınmacı ve dini azınlık kimliklerinin farklı sorunlarını ayırt etmek çok önemliydi. Görüşmeciler Türkiye'deki problemlerini dile getirmeye başladıktan sonra, üçüncü bölümde detaylı olarak incelenen göçmen sorunlarına çok benzeyen sorunlara ulaşıldı. Ancak dinlerinden dolayı onlar için daha fazla sorun bulunmaktaydı. Ankara'nın Hıristiyan topluluğu ise Orta Doğu'dan gelen yeni üyelerinin iki katlı entegrasyon krizini keşfetmemize yardımcı olmak için bu araştırmaya kapılarını ilgiyle açtılar.

Tezin giriş bölümünde, literatür taramasının ardından metodoloji ve terminoloji ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir. Bu şekilde, boşluklar zincirinin nasıl bir parçalanma uçurumuna dönüştüğü anlaşılabilir olmuştur.

Göç alanında yapılacak olan başarılı bir saha çalışması için metodoloji anahtar niteliğindedir. Bunun sebebi, çalışmaların örneklem grubuna hiçbir şekilde zarar vermeyecek kadar özenle yürütülmesi gereksiniminden doğmaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu tezin metodolojisi örneklem grubu kadar hassastır. Metodoloji bölümünde de örneklem grubunun seçimi, lokasyonlar, örnekleme teknikleri, görüşme soruları ve olası sınırlamalar incelenmiş ve gerekçelendirilmiştir.

Bu bir saha çalışması olduğu için 22 Ekim 2019 tarihinde Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu'ndan (İAEK) gerekli izinler alınmıştır. İznin ardından Ankara İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü de araştırma hakkında 4 Aralık 2019 tarihinde posta yoluyla bilgilendirilmiştir. Bu tezde kullanılan resmi mülakatlar 20 Ocak 2020'den Mart 2020'deki COVID-19 salgınına kadar yapılmıştır.

Resmi mülakatlar yapılmadan önce, örneklem grubunu somutlaştırmak için sahada belirli bir ön araştırmaya ihtiyaç olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ön görüşmeler sırasında hiçbir veri toplanmamış, bu görüşmeler sadece bu araştırmanın fizibilitesini ölçmek ve örneklem grubuyla tanışmak için gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Ön araştırma, Türkiye'nin farklı illerindeki farklı kiliseler ve çeşitli din adamları ile dikkatli bir şekilde yürütüldü. İlk olarak, cemaatle ilgili ön bilgileri alabilmek ve görüşme imkanını ölçmek için din adamları ile kiliseleri üzerinden telefon görüşmeleri yapıldı. Türkiye'de birçoğu Türkçe bilmeyen ve bu nedenle Arapça veya Farsça ibadet etmeyi tercih eden Orta Doğulu Hıristiyanlara ev sahipliği yapacak çok fazla kilise yok, bundan dolayı araştırma için bir örneklem bulmak daha da zorlaşmaktaydı. Ankara'nın en kalabalık kiliseleri ile temasa geçilmiş ve iki önemli kaynak bulunmuştur. Cemaatin ve din adamlarının mahremiyetine saygı göstermek adına, bu tezde kiliselerin tam adları veya adresleri ele alınmamıştır. Görüşmeciler ise sadece takma adlarla belirtilmiştir. Ön araştırma sadece Ankara için değil, aynı zamanda İzmir, Diyarbakır ve İstanbul için de uygun bir örneklem grubu bulmak için yapılmıştır.

Ön araştırma sırasında cemaatin dışarıdan gelen birine olan reaksiyonları de dikkatle gözlemlenmiştir. Dışarıya kapalı gruplar söz konusu olduğunda, dışarıdan birinin varlığı, göz korkutucu veya rahatsız edici olarak algılanabilir. Saha araştırmasının güvenini zedeleyecek bu tür tepkileri önlemek için cemaatin istek ve sınırlamalarına olabildiğince anlayış göstermeye çalışıldı. Rahatsızlık riskinin olmadığı netleştiğinde, araştırma başlamıştır.

Pandemiye kadar, yaklaşık iki aylık bir süre içinde Ankara'da gayrimüslim sığınmacılarla 17 derinlemesine görüşme yapılmıştır. Görüşmeler sırasında

görüşmecileri rahatsız etmemek adına ses kaydı alınmamıştır. Bu nedenle, görüşmelerin çoğu sadece not alarak yapılmıştır. Kiliselerde araştırma başlamadan önce yapılan ön ziyaretler olduğu için, görüşmecilerin çoğu tanıdık hale gelmiş ve deneyimlerini paylaşmaya hazır bir durumdaldı. Görüşmeler sırasında yarı yapılandırılmış derinlenmesine görüşme tekniği kullanılmıştır.

Görüşmeler iki aşamalı olarak gerçekleştirildi. İlk bölüm, yaşları, eğitim geçmişleri, medeni durumları, Hıristiyanlık mezhepleri vb. ile ilgili bir ön veri toplamak için bir giriş anketiydi. İkinci aşama, yaklaşık 30 ila 45 dakika süren derinlemesine görüşmelerdi. Mülakatlar, ortaya çıkabilecek riskleri azaltmak amacıyla, görüşmecilere uyacak şekilde birçok farklı yerde gerçekleştirildi. Ayrıca, Türkçe veya İngilizce konuşmak bir seçenek değilse, Arapça ve Farsça görüşmeler için her zaman bir tercüman mevcuttu.

İlk grup ile görüşme gerçekleştikten sonra, ek görüşmeler için çalışma planı yapıldı, ancak pandemi nedeniyle kiliseler kapandığı için hiçbir zaman başlatılmadı. Bu nedenle, aynı sorunlar tez döneminin sonuna kadar devam ettiği için ise İAEK'den herhangi bir uzatma talep edilmemiştir. Bununla birlikte, görüşmelerin analizi bütünsel olarak incelendiğinde, 17 görüşmenin sonucunun Türkiye'de gayrimüslim sığınmacı olmanın "çifte kamp" koşulunu oluşturduğunu ele alacak kadar yoğun olduğu ise açıktır. Yapılan görüşmecilerle ilgili bir özet tabloya aşağıda bulunmaktadır:

Görüşmecinin takma ismi	Vatandaşlık	Yaş	Cinsiyet	Hıristiyanlık mezhebi
Abanoub	İran	31	Erkek	Protestan
Elissa	Irak	24	Kadın	Ortodoks
Samir	Afganistan	21	Erkek	Protestan
Najwa	İran	25	Kadın	Protestan
Alia	İran	29	Kadın	Protestan
Salwa	İran	25	Kadın	Protestan
Bassem	İran	18	Erkek	Protestan
Dawood	İran	40	Erkek	Protestan

Haifa	İran	30	Kadın	Protestan
Rami	İran	28	Erkek	Protestan
Gabrielle	Suriye	31	Kadın	Ortodoks
Nasser	Suriye	31	Erkek	Ortodoks
Amira	Suriye	32	Kadın	Katolik
Youseff	Irak	24	Erkek	Katolik
Nayla	Irak	42	Kadın	Katolik
Wissam	İran	18	Erkek	Protestan
Tariq	İran	18	Erkek	Protestan

Yukarıdaki tabloya ek olarak, örnek grupla ilgili genel arka plan bilgisinin paylaşılması da önemlidir. Görüşülen 17 kişiden 16'sı sığınmacı statüsüyle geçici koruma altındaydı. Bununla birlikte, bunlardan biri belgesiz bir Afgandı ve ikinci bölümde Afgan göçmenlerin sığınmacı statüsü almalarında bulunan yasal engeller olduğundan bahsedilmiştir. Görüşülen kişilerden 15'i 2015 ve 2019 tarihleri arasında Türkiye'ye gelmiştir, sadece ikisi 2013-2015 tarihleri arasında gelmiştir. Görüşülen 17 kişiden 10'u üçüncü ülkeye yerleştirme için BMMYK'ye başvuru yapmış ama sadece biri kabul edilmiştir.

Gayrimüslim sığınmacıların pek çok sorunu üçüncü bölümde bahsedilen diğer göçmenler veya sığınmacılarla ortak görünebilir, ancak bu durumda bazen bu ortak sorunlar dini azınlık olmalarıyla ilgili derin köklere sahiptir. Örneğin sorunlar genellikle gayrimüslim sığınmacı daha Türkiye'ye girdiğinde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü her şeyden önce sığınmacılar kendilerine sığınak bulmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Türkiye'deki sığınmacılar için ise iki seçenek bulunmaktadır: sığınmacı kampları ve şehirlere yeniden yerleştirme. Gayrimüslim sığınmacılar kendileri için kamplarda kalmanın daha zor olduğundan bahsetmişlerdir çünkü kampların nüfusu ağırlıklı olarak Sünni Müslümanlardan oluşmaktadır. Gayrimüslim sığınmacılar, büyük olasılıkla zaten kendi ülkelerinde bile anlaşmazlık yaşadıkları için Sünni Müslümanlarla birlikte küçük ve kapalı alanlarda kalmayı zor bulmuşlardır. Bundan dolayı genel olarak diğer gayrimüslim sığınmacılara ve kiliselere yakın yaşamak için şehirlere yerleştirmeyi tercih etmektedirler. Aslında hükümet Mardin'de Hıristiyan sığınmacılar için birer kamp kurmuştur. Fakat Hıristiyan sığınmacılar genel olarak

Suriye Ortodoks Kilisesi'ne mensup ve birçoğu Mardin ilindeki Midyat'ta olmak üzere Türkiye'deki Süryani topluluklarına ait vakıf ve manastırlara sığınmışlardır. Bu, Türk hükümetinin ve AFAD'ın, etnik veya mezhepsel kökenleri ne olursa olsun sığınmacıları kabul etmeye açık olduklarını ifade etmelerine rağmen gerçekleştiğinden dolayı çeşitli raporlar konunun temelinde ayrımcılık görme riskinin yanı sıra bir de güvensizlik hissinin varlığını işaret etmektedir (Kirişçi, 2014, s. 32).

Dini azınlık gruplarında bulunan sığınmacılar, şehirlerde konut arama eğiliminde olsalar da şehirlere yerleşmek nihai bir çözüm değildir, çünkü ya şehir büyükşehir olmadığı için ya da mahalle halkı hoş karşılamadığı için komşularıyla birçok sorun yaşamaktadırlar. Bu nedenle, sorunlar zinciri daha sığınmacıların Türkiye'ye ilk adımlarında başlamaktadır.

Metodolojinin ardından ikinci bölümde göçle ilgili ulusal ve uluslararası mekanizmalar tartışılmıştır. Halihazırda var olan literatür, ulusal ve uluslararası mevzuatta yer alan önemli boşlukları göstermektedir. Bu boşluk ise birçok hak ihlaline yol açsa da uluslararası mekanizmaların ulusal mekanizmalar üzerinde yaptırımı olmadığı tüm göç literatüründe açık olarak izah edilmektedir. Türkiye'nin bu yasal boşluk içerisinde göçmenlerin Türk toplumuna entegrasyonunu sağlamak adına kullandığı üç yaklaşımı bulunmaktadır. Bunlar; kültürel aidiyet, siyasi çıkar ve dindir. İkinci bölüm Türkiye'de yaşanan üç büyük göçmen dalgasının bu üçlü örüntü ile olan karşılıklı ilişkisini ve bunların ulusal mevzuattaki boşluklara nasıl dayandıkları anlatmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın ataleti, nihayetinde gayrimüslim sığınmacıların entegrasyonunun iki katlı krizini oluşturduğu bu bölümle birlikte inşa edilmeye başlamaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu bölümde Türkiye'nin yaşadığı üç göç dalgası kronolojik olarak incelenmektedir: 1989 Bulgar-Türklerin kitlesel göçü, 1991 Iraklı-Kürtlerin kitlesel göçü ve 2011 sonrası başlayan Suriyeli göçmen krizi. Türkiye bu üç göç dalgasında ise yukarıda bahsettiğimiz üçlü entegrasyon yaklaşımlarını kullanmıştır, bu bölümde de bu yaklaşımın kullanım alanları ayrıntılı bir biçimde analiz edilmiştir. Ayrıca hatırlamak gerekir ki bu üç yaklaşım resmi olarak oluşturulmuş politikalar değil daha ziyade geçici uygulamalar olduğundan, politika adı altında değil yaklaşımlar olarak adlandırılmaktadırlar.

Üçüncü bölümde, Müslüman olmayan sığınmacıların görüşmelerinin eklenmesiyle Türkiye'deki göçmenlerin yaşadığı sorunlar ele alınmıştır. Bu problemler, yüzeysel olarak kalan üçlü entegrasyon yaklaşımının sonuçları olarak doğmaktadır. Bu nedenle üçüncü bölüm, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sorunları ile benzerliklerini de inceleyerek Türkiye'deki tüm göçmenlerin sorunlarını anlamamıza yardımcı olmaktadır. Bölüm, esas olarak, göçmenin dininden bağımsız olarak ortaya çıkan ortak sorunlara ışık tutmaya çalışmıştır. Bununla birlikte, görüşmelerin derinliklerine inildiğinde, dinin Türkiye'deki bir göçmenin deneyiminden tamamen ayrı olmadığı, daha ziyade Müslüman olmayan bir sığınmacının karşılaştığı sorunları iki katına çıkardığı daha açık hale gelecektir.

Göçmenlerin bugün karşı karşıya kaldığı birçok zorluğun ilki ve en önemlisi, hedef ülkedeki işgücüne katılımıdır. İş piyasası hiçbir ülkedeki yabancılar için misafirperver değildir ve Türkiye de buna bir istisna değildir. Türkiye örneğinde bunun başlıca nedenleri, Türk toplumunun sığınmacılara yönelik tutumu, çalışma izni olmaması veya çalışma izni almanın zorluğu gibi idari sınırlamalardır. Türkiye'de göçmenlerin karşı karşıya olduğu bir diğer zorluk da sosyal hizmetlere erişimdir. Bu sosyal hizmetler, sağlık hizmetlerine erişim, eğitim, barınma desteği ve güvenlik olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu çok temel hizmetler, sığınmacıların ev sahibi ülkedeki deneyimini şekillendiren önemli unsurlardır. Bununla birlikte, ekonomik katılımın zorluğu gibi, sosyal hizmetlere erişim de hayatlarını zorlaştırmaktadır. Ev sahibi ülkenin sorumluluğu ise uluslararası belgelerde düzenlendiği gibi ülkelerini zorla terk eden insanlar için bu erişimi kolaylaştırmak veya erişilebilir kılmaktır.

Son olarak dördüncü bölümde, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların entegrasyon sorunları ve bu sorunların Türkiye'nin dini azınlıklarla olan problemli geçmişi üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Bu geçmiş önceki bölümlerle de birleşince en başta söz edilen "çifte kamp" durumu ve iki katlı entegrasyon krizi oldukça görünür hale gelmektedir. Kampın sadece bir adres değil, aynı zamanda benzeri görülmemiş bir azınlık grubunun somutlaşmış halini ifade eden sosyolojik bir yerleşim yeri olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu bölüm, statükoyu anlamak için Türkiye'nin gayrimüslimlerle olan geçmişine kısa bir bakış sunarken Türkiye'de gayrimüslim olmanın ne demek olduğunu da açıklamaktadır. Bu tarihsel arka planın ardından, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların Türk

toplumu ve Hıristiyan cemaatle olan ilişkileri tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışma, dördüncü bölüme kadar gerçekleşen sayfalar uzunluğundaki çerçeve analizlerinin hem sonucunu hem merkezini oluşturmuştur. Gayrimüslim sığınmacıların Türkiye'de yaşadıkları din bazlı ayrımcılığı anlamak için, görüşmeler kiliseyle olan ilişkileri ve ev sahibi toplulukla ilişkileri olmak üzere iki başlık altında incelenmiştir. İlk olarak, görüşülen kişilerin ev sahibi toplulukla ilişkilerini nasıl algıladıkları ve şimdiye kadar neler yaşadıkları analiz edilmiştir. İkinci olarak ise kilise ile ilişkilerine odaklanıp görüşülen kişilerin kiliseyle ilişkilerini nasıl algıladıklarını, kilisede veya cemaatle ne kadar zaman geçirdiklerini ve bunun Türkiye'deki yaşamlarını nasıl etkilediğini cevaplamaya çalıştık. Müslüman olmayan sığınmacıların sorunları ve Türk toplumundan dışlanma süreçlerine ilişkin literatürdeki bu boşluk bölüm boyunca incelenmiştir.

Aynı zamanda dördüncü bölümde, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların görüşleri, Türkiye'deki "çifte kamp" durumlarını ayrıntılı bir şekilde anlatmak adına doğrudan alıntılar olarak verilmiştir. Bu görüşler, Türkiye'de gayrimüslim bir sığınmacı olarak farklı sorunları beraberinde getirdiğinin kanıtı niteliğindedir. Üçüncü bölümde, birbirleriyle örtüşen sorunlardan olabildiğince ayrıntılı olarak bahsedildi çünkü sorunlarının iki katlı dezavantajlı durumunu anlamamız gerekiyordu. Dolayısıyla bu tezin kırılma noktası aslında onların kendi sözleriyle aktardıkları deneyimleri olmaktadır. Hatırlanırsa, üçüncü bölümde, görüşmeciler iş gücü ve eğitim eksenindeki sorunlarından çokça bahsetmişlerdir. Bu, bize en fazla sorunun, örneklem grubunun ev sahibi toplulukla karşılaştığında ortaya çıktığını gösteren önemli bir veridir. Bu başarısız karşılaşma, bu tez boyunca bahsettiğimiz gibi, iki katlı entegrasyon krizinin ciddi yansımaları olduğunu göstermektedir. Görüşmeler maalesef bize bu iki farklı grubun entegre olmaları ve hatta birlikte var olmaları için yeterli alanın oluşturulamadığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle gayrimüslim sığınmacıların kendi cemaatleri ve kilise ile ilişkileri sayesinde Türk toplumu ile oluşturmaya çalıştıkları bu öncül entegrasyon durumunu incelemek ve anlamak hayati önem taşımaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin her ülke gibi yaşanan göç dalgalarına ayak uydurmak için sahip olduğu tetikleyicileri, direnci ve dayanıklılığı vardır. Almanya veya Birleşik Krallık gibi onlarca yıldır göçle uğraşan ve geçmiş deneyimlerinden büyük dersler

çıkaran ülkeler gibi, Türkiye'nin de artık göçle ilgili sağlam, uzun vadeli çözümlere sahip olması beklenmektedir. Mevcut koşullar altında göçmenlere hitap eden yepyeni bir hedef ülke olarak Türkiye, başarılı göç yönetimi yapması beklenen ve gereken önemli bir ülkedir.

Bu tez boyunca tartışıldığı gibi, göç, göçmenlerin entegrasyonu planlanmanda başarılı olması beklenemeyen bir olgudur. Bunun bir sonucu olarak zorla yerinden edilmiş kişiler veya tezde belirttiğimiz gibi sığınmacılar bu entegrasyon sürecinin önemli özneleridir. Bununla birlikte, Orta Doğu veya Kuzey Afrika'dan gelen sığınmacılardan Müslüman olmayanlar, klişeleşmiş yaklaşımlar nedeniyle göz ardı edilmeye mahkûm olmamalıdır. Bugün, birçok karar alıcı, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sorunlarını onların Türk toplumuna sorunsuz bir şekilde entegre edilebilmeleri için bu konuyu öncelikleri haline getirmeleri gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle, Ankara'daki Hristiyan sığınmacılar gibi gayrimüslim sığınmacılar, istemeyerek de olsa eşsiz bir zorluk yaşamaktadırlar. Görüşmeler sırasında Müslüman olmayan sığınmacılar, Türkiye'de gayrimüslim sığınmacı olmanın ne anlama geldiğini tanımlarken, Türkiye'de sığınmacı olmanın önündeki engellerden bahsetmişlerdir. Bazı sorunları Müslüman sığınmacılar veya göçmenlerle örtüşse de sorunlarının birçoğunun temel nedeni Türkiye'de Müslüman olmamalarıydı. Dolayısıyla bu durum, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların tez boyunca "çifte kamp" denilen durumda bulunmaktadır.

Bu tez sonucunda, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların yaşadığı iki katlı krizi açıkça görüyor olmamız gerekmektedir. Bu tezin bulgularına göre, Türkiye'nin geleneksel sosyal entegrasyon yaklaşımları işe gayrimüslim sığınmacılar söz konusu olduğunda işe yaramamaktadır. Ancak, içgüdüsel olarak, Hıristiyan sığınmacılar, Türk toplumuna entegre olmak için kendi alanlarını bulmaktadırlar, ki bu durumda bu kilisedir.
Göçmen nüfusun entegrasyonu içgüdüsel değil, tercihen iyi yapılandırılmış bir süreç olması gerektiğinden, bu sürecin iki yönlü olması gerekir. Buna göre, başarılı bir sosyal entegrasyon, her iki tarafa da hassas görev ve sorumluluklar yükler. Yalnızca göçmenlerin üzerine yıkılan bu tek taraflı entegrasyon, doğal olarak beklentileri dengeleyemediği için gruplar arasında sosyal bir gerilmeye neden olur (Güngördü, 2018). Esas olarak, sosyal entegrasyon politikaları sosyal uyumu oluşturmalı ve

ayrımcılığı azaltmalıdır. Eğer durum böyle değil ise bu entegrasyon değil, yalnızca göçmenlerin değişmesini bekleyen bir asimilasyon sürecidir.

Bununla birlikte, sığınmacıların omuzlarındaki bu yük, sığınmacıların yalnızca güvenlik tehdidi veya ekonomiye yük olmadığını kanıtlayan başarılı kamuoyu kampanyaları ile en aza indirilebilmektedir. Çünkü bu turistik bir seyahat değil, hayatlarıyla ilgili ciddi endişeleri olan ve anavatanlarından zorla uzaklaştırılmış bir kitlenin yaşadığı durumdur. Bazı çalışmalar, sığınmacıları zor durumda kalan insanlar olarak belli insani kaygılar ile ilişkilendirildiğinde, olumsuz davranışların olumlu davranışlara dönüştürerek bu insani kaygıların tamponlayıcı bir etkiye sahip olduğunu kanıtlamaktadırlar. Fakat göç meselelerini değerlendirmeye birincil tepki olarak milliyetçi bir yaklaşıma sahip olan Türk toplumu, göçmenleri kendi iç grupları için tehdit ve hatta zararlı olarak görmeye devam etmektedir (Yitmen ve Verkuyten, 2018). Bu sonuç bize, dikkatli kullanıldığında insani bir yaklaşımla sığınmacıları Türk toplumuna entegre etme şansı olduğunu göstermektedir.

Süreç sorunsuz veya iyi yapılandırılmadığında, ev sahibi topluluk sığınmacılar hakkında yanlış fikirlere sahip olma veya onları toplumun bir üyesi olarak reddetme eğilimindedir. Maalesef Türk toplumunun, özellikle Suriyeli sığınmacılar konusunda birçok yanlış kanısı bulunmaktadır. Aylık maaşları veya üniversitelere ücretsiz geçiş hakları olduğu gibi düşünceler gibi. Üçüncü bölümde bahsedildiği gibi, bunlar doğru değildir, hatta gerçek olmaya yakın bile değillerdir. İlk günden itibaren Türkiye'ye gelen sığınmacıları bekleyen pek çok engel vardır. Tartışıldığı gibi, Türkiye'nin burada kalışlarını kolaylaştırma çabaları var ama görünüşe göre bunlar yeterli olmamaktadır. Bu eksiklik, zorla yerinden edilen kişinin resmi statüleriyle başlar. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Türkiye Avrupa dışından gelen kişilere mülteci statüsü vermemektedir. Yerinden edilme nedenine bağlı olarak, geçici koruma sağlasa da Orta Doğu'dan gelen göçmenler Türkiye'de sığınmacı durumunda geçici koruma altında kalmaktadırlar. Bu durum, ev sahibi ülkede zorla yerinden edilmiş bir kişinin konumu üzerinde geri döndürülemez bir etki yaratır. Doğal olarak, sığınmacı olmak mültecilikten farklıdır ve sınırlı bir hak yelpazesine sahiptir. Fakat, Suriyeli göçmen dalgası, insan hareketinin çehresini de geri döndürülemez bir şekilde değiştirmiştir. 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana modern dünya küresel ölçekte etkili olan böyle bir

hareketle daha karşı karşıya kalmamıştı. Bu nedenle, zorla yerinden edilmiş kişilerin haklarına ilişkin düzenlemelerin, kör bir yaklaşım olmaksızın göçün her yönünü gözden geçirmesi ve kapsaması gerekecektir. Bu durum hem ulusal hem de uluslararası ölçekteki mevzuatların yenilenmesini gerektirmektedir.

Ulusal ve uluslararası mekanizmaların miyopisi bir yana, göç literatüründe ciddi boşluklar mevcuttur. Bu tezde geniş ve çeşitli bir literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Bunlar, göçü düzenleyen mekanizmalar, Türkiye'nin tecrübe etmiş olduğu ve şu an tecrübe ediyor olduğu göç dalgaları, Türkiye'deki göçmenlerin karşılaştığı zorluklar ve bugün Türkiye'de gayrimüslim sığınmacıların yaşadığı iki katlı krizdir. Bu araştırmanın varoluş nedeni, bu boşluğu göz önüne sermek ve içini doldurmaktır. Sığınmacıların Müslüman olmayabileceği ihtimali kasıtlı ya da kasıtlı olmayarak büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilmektedir. Bu, Türkiye'nin dini azınlıklarla zaten karmaşık olan ilişkisi ile birleştiğinde, bir nevi ateşi harmanlamaktır. Unutulmamalıdır ki bu, akademide olan bir perspektif eksikliğinden değil, büyük oranda veri toplama eksikliğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, GİGM tarafından resmî web sitesinde sağlanan veriler asgari düzeydedir ve çoğunlukla detaylı kategorize edilmemiştir veya ayrıntılı değildir. Bu, akademisyenlerin sığınmacıların demografik veya sosyolojik özelliklerini derinlemesine sorgulamasını veya araştırmasını sınırlamaktadır. Bu saha araştırması, bu boşluğu olabildiğince doldurmayı amaçlamıştır.

Gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sosyolojik bir yerleşim bölgesi olarak "çifte kamp" pozisyonu ve iki katlı entegrasyon krizi kesinlikle yepyeni bir konudur. Ayrıca dikkatle ve hassasiyetle incelenmesi gereken bir konudur. Çünkü bu konunun göç araştırması olmasının yanı sıra dini araştırmalarla da bağları bulunmaktadır. Hukuk, sosyoloji, antropoloji, siyaset bilimi, dini araştırmalar, kamu yönetimi gibi bu araştırmayla ilgili birçok alan olduğu açıktır, ancak dini yönü kırılgandır. Bunun yanı sıra ise, bunun teolojik veya ontolojik bir çalışma olmadığı konusunda hemfikir olmak gerekir. Bu nedenle, tez hassasiyetlere değinse de büyük ölçüde sorunun siyaset bilimi yönüne odaklanmıştır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, gayrimüslim sığınmacıların sosyal entegrasyon süreçlerine ilişkin yapılan ilk derinlemesine çalışma olmuştur fakat sonuncusu olmayacaktır.

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