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HISTORICALITY AND THE END OF TRUTH
IN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

HISTORICALITY AND THE END OF TRUTH IN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

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The subject matter of this thesis is to show that truth, according to Heidegger's philosophy, is something historical, contrary to Platonic-Cartesian conception of truth, which considers truth as suprahistorical. In the conclusion, the meaning of historicity and the end of truth in the philosophy of Heidegger is discussed.

Keywords: The concept of world, subject-object dichotomy, being, history, truth.

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ÖZ

HEIDEGGER'İN FELSEFESİNDE HAKİKATIN
TARİHSELLİĞİ VE SONU

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Platonik-Kartezyen felsefede hakikat tarih-ötesi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu tezde amaç Heidegger'in felsefesinde hakikatin tarihselliğini göstermektir. Tezin sonuç kısmında Heidegger felsefesinde hakikatin tarihselliğinin ve sonunun anlamı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Dünya kavramı,özne-nesne ikiliği, varlık,tarih,hakikat.

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INTRODUCTION

Epistemology, since the philosophy of Descartes, has gained a central place in the philosophical arena and has sustained that role up to our age. In that view, man has been considered as subject, i.e., as an autonomous, atomic and rational self. Truth, on the other hand, has been considered as something supratemporal and beyond history, which is bestowed on subject's reason as object or reality. Man's confrontation with the truth has been conceived as a cognitive and rational act. The world was divided into two kinds of substances as the dichotomy of subject and object. The roots of this view is, indeed, found in the metaphysical tradition which defines man as rational animal and in the philosophy of Plato which determines all history of philosophy in its basic problems and concepts. According to Plato, the world of ideas which are in the static presence can be grasped only in terms of rational thinking, i.e., perceiving the idea, therefore truth is the correctness of perception as the agreement between perceiving and the thing perceived. Truth, however, before Plato, was the process of revealment of what is hidden, as *aletheia*. With the philosophy of Aristotle truth has been reduced to assertions; in other words, truth has been narrowed down to man's mind, i.e., truth and falsity is found in man, not in the things.

With the Cartesian thought what comes to fore is subjectivity, a decisive turn in the history of philosophy. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is a reevaluation of the Cartesian subject on the basis of transcendental subjectivity. Then, in the post-Kantian thought, subjectivity, i.e., reason and consciousness, takes the form of historical process, as clearly reflected in the philosophy of Hegel as the recovering of *Geist* through nature and man.

On the other hand, for the last centuries, there have arisen a strong critique of Cartesianism, concerning his dichotomy of subject and object, man as a rational, autonomous self, his view of language as an instrument in the use of man. In view of these critiques;

it is no longer possible to deny the influence of the unconsciousness on the consciousness, the role of the preconceptual and nonconceptual in the conceptual, the

presence of the irrational - the economy of desire, the will to power - at the very core of the rational. Nor is it possible to ignore the intrinsically social character of 'structures of consciousness', the historical and cultural variability of categories of thought and principle of action, their interdependence with the changing form of social and material reproduction.¹

In other words, the Platonic dichotomy of logic and poetics has been always in favour of the former; but now poetics comes to fore. As Rorty puts,

The Heideggerian thinks that the philosophical tradition needs to be reappropriated by being seen on a series of poetic achievements.²

The Platonic truth, which excludes untruth, turns to an 'illusion' or an 'error' in the philosophy of Nietzsche. Self is, now, conceived situated in a cultural-historical context, language is no longer a tool in the use of the subject, on the contrary, it is what determines subject's thinking and action. According to subjectivist understanding of language made dominant by Descartes, "in the mind there are 'ideas'. These are bits of putative representation of reality, much of it 'external'. Knowledge consists in having representation actually square with the reality... Words are given meaning by being attached to the things represented via the 'ideas' that represent them".³ But Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, develops a new theory of language in terms of discourse; that is, discourse as articulating the understanding, state-of-mind and, therefore, ultimately historical-temporal Being-in-the-world. Consequently, language becomes the articulation of the world. In later writings of Heidegger we see that man is in the service of language, i.e., man is used by language which is the house of Being.

An important point in overcoming epistemology is that Heidegger transforms Kant's transcendental subjectivity into Dasein's clearing of Being. The Kantian expression focuses on the mind of the subject and the conditions of 'experience'; but in the

¹K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy. Ed. by, *After Philosophy, End or Transformation*, "General Introduction" (Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1987), 4.

²Richard Rorty. "Philosophy As Science, As Metaphor, And As Politics", in *The Institution of Philosophy, A Discipline in Crisis*, ed by A. Cohen and M. Doscol (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1989), 13.

³Charles Taylor. "Heidegger, Language and Ecology", in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed by H. Dreyfus and H. Hall (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992), 248.

Heideggerian explanation transcendence is an ontological surpassing, as Daniel Dahlstrom puts:

... the problem of transcendence is for Heidegger not the difficulty by Kant in the Refutation of Idealism (or as Kant also puts it, the problematic idealism of Descartes), namely, "How a subject comes out to an object", but rather, "what makes it possible ontologically that a particular being (Seiendes) can be encountered within the world and, being encountered, can be objectified?"⁴

For Heidegger, Kant's theory of transcendence remains within the possibility of knowledge, i.e., the relation between subject and object, and does not go beyond experience, and he argues that,

If the essence of transcendence is construed more radically and universally, it is then necessary to work out the idea of ontology, and so of metaphysics, more primordially.⁵

Therefore, according to Heidegger, 'Dasein's transcendence' means the essence of its Being is such that it forms the world in the sense that it lets world happen and the world is the realm wherein the Being of beings comes to relation with Dasein as the Being-in-the-world. Hence, Heidegger defines transcendence as Being-in-the-world not in terms of subjectivity.

As for the problem of truth, Heidegger considers truth from three perspectives:

- a) the truth of Being, ontological truth as the clearing of Being, which is a historical and a dynamic process, in which beings are manifested,
- b) the truth of beings, ontic truth, as the manifestation of beings,
- c) propositional truth, which is the derivative of the second type of truth.

These three types of truth show that transcendence, as Dasein's clearing of Being, is a revelatory process, that is, it is *aletheia*.

Lastly, the self is defined by Heidegger as the they-self, i.e., man is conceived of not autonomous rational subject but in the they-self as a certain way of life which is temporal and historical in its essence. Since Heidegger maintains that people always fall

⁴Daniel Dahlstrom. "Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes on His Commentary on the *Kritik Der reinen Vernunft*" in *The Review of Metaphysics*, XLV; 2 (1991), 341.

⁵Martin Heidegger. *The Essence of Reason*, trans. by T. Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 41. Henceforth, this work shall be abbreviated as 'ER'.

into the they, i.e., into acting and encountering things and people in the ways they do, and, this is where Heidegger begins his philosophy, that is, everyday or ordinary life.

1. Historical Relativism and Heidegger

Traditionally understood, truth is something, which necessarily excludes untruth, is fixed, static, eternal; and therefore, is true for every epoch of history. For Heidegger, however, truth is a dynamic process as a counterplay between truth and untruth. Yet this should not imply that truth, in Heidegger's philosophy, changes arbitrarily in any epoch of history. Again it should not mean that truth changes in accordance with the fanciful ideas of man.

Heidegger seeing truth as *unconcealedness* criticizes the traditional conceptions of truth and gives new conditions for presupposing truth and by way of reducing it to the disclosedness of Dasein, that is, to the 'Da' of the Dasein, shows that truth is historical. Since, for him, Dasein in its essence is historical, this historicity of Dasein is rooted in the Being of Dasein which is temporal. Since 'Dasein is its disclosedness' and Dasein has the character of Being-in-the-world, the disclosedness of Dasein is, at the same time, the disclosedness of the world, i.e., they are the same. World is an important phenomenon, in the philosophy of Heidegger, which cannot be thought apart from Dasein. The 'Da' of the Dasein is the realm wherein the world comes to be and the beings, entities (*Das Seiende*) have their Being (*Das Sein*). In the world, disclosed by Dasein itself, Dasein encounters the beings and the world *is* as long as Dasein exists. The Being of any being is the truth of that being; to express it in the traditional terms, it is the essence, *essentia*, of that being. Any being has its Being in terms of Dasein's disclosing the world, or for the sake of Dasein. Since Dasein is temporal and historical in its essence, i.e., in its Being, then Being or truth in general is historical. This conclusion could be inferred by way of three maxims of Heidegger, to be found in *Being and Time*:

- Disclosedness is the primordial truth.
- Temporality of Dasein is the primordial time.

- There is truth, as long as Dasein is.

This conclusion, on the other hand, does not mean that truth is relative to Dasein, as relativity understood in the banal meaning. This conclusion, therefore, has no implication for historical relativism, which asserts that "all values and interpretations are seen embedded in the historical epoch in which they emerge, so that no transhistorical judgements are possible. Each historical period is unique and can be evaluated only in terms of the values immanent in that period".⁶ Heidegger overcomes this sort of historical relativism "by positing an underlying thread of meaning that weaves the whole course of historical events into a unified narrative".⁷ In other words, Heidegger's analysis of different philosophers in the history of Being are not examples of historical treatment in the generally accepted sense of that term. Such a kind of treatment and viewing of history is nothing but a kind of historical relativism.

It is mainly through his novel view of history (*Geschichte*) based upon the happening (*Geschehen*) that is Dasein, the fatefully sent destiny (*Geschick*) of Being that Heidegger attempts to overcome this pitfall of historical relativism.⁸

It is, therefore, not a fair interpretation to attribute historical relativism to Heidegger. In fact, in Heidegger's existential philosophy history itself, as the history of Being destined by Being, prevents us seeing any kind of relativism in history.

2. The Problem of *Kehre*

It is inevitable that we also considered in this study the so-called problem of *Kehre* (shift, reversal) in the philosophical development of Heidegger's thought. For no one can deny that there is a shift in his thought, but the nature of this shift has been a center of controversy. First, let us give the following examples of the so-called shift in this thought:

- a) Heidegger's phrase 'Here the whole is reversed' regarding to turn from 'Being and Time' to 'Time and Being'.
- b) The differences between the early Heidegger of *Being and Time* and later Heidegger of his other writings.

⁶Charles B. Guignon. *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 3.

⁷Dahlstrom, *op. cit.*, 341.

⁸*ibid.*, 341.

c) *Being and Time* remains as an uncompleted task.

d) Changes in the language of Heidegger, like the following concepts: 'Being' (*Sein*) turns to 'presencing' (*Anwesenheit*), 'time' (*Zeit*) turns to 'lightning-up' (*Lichtung*) of self-concealment. Moreover, there are also changes in the content, or meaning, of some concepts, like world (*Welt*). For 'world', in *Being and Time*, is thought of in its 'worldhood' and in terms of Dasein as the Being-in-the-world. But in later Heidegger we see that the concept of world is thought of in its 'worlding' together with the fourfold of world, i.e., earth, sky, mortals and divinities. As well, we see that in the later Heidegger the concept of thing which is thought of in the worlding of the fourfold world as thinging of the thing.

e) Language in *Being and Time* is the articulation of the world, in later Heidegger it is thought of as the 'house of Being'.

These examples can be augmented, yet I have based my thesis upon the supposition that there is not any *Kehre* in Heidegger's philosophical development. But this does not mean that I do overestimate the above changes. Despite them the issue here is that these differences do not give us the right for viewing his thought under two separate parts, like in the case of Wittgenstein. In other words, there is not any radical *Kehre* in his thought, since the unique question which underlies his all philosophical development is the same question, i.e., the question about the sense, or the truth of Being. According to him, this question in the history of Western philosophy has been asked only in the form of the Being of any being; any what-is; and the truth of Being has remained in oblivion. It is that question which permeates his all philosophical investigation.⁹ If one were to express it in Otto Pöggeler's words, one would say that Heidegger is the philosopher on the way.¹⁰ Hence, one would have to understand Heidegger's thinking as a way, but not as a way which restricts itself to a single, solitary thought. For Heidegger himself says that, the title *Being and Time* is a road marker belonging to such a way.¹¹

As for the phrase 'Here the Whole is reversed', Heidegger writes to Father Richardson that,

The Whole: This means the matter involved in 'Being and Time', 'Time and Being'. The reversal is in play within the

⁹Martin Heidegger. "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. by W. Lowitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 56. This work will be abbreviated as 'QC'.

¹⁰Otto Pöggeler. *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. by D. Magurshak and S. Barber (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1990), 2.

¹¹Heidegger. QC, 55 - 56.

matter itself. Neither did I invent it nor does it effect merely my thought.¹²

and add that,

The thinking of reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of Being and Time.¹³

As a provisional result we may say that the way of Heidegger's thought never changed, only he has gone on to walk on the same way and the reversal is inherent in the way which he takes since the publication of *Being and Time*.

There is another problem related to the unity or wholeness of Heidegger's thought; we may separate Heidegger's writings into three main groups. These are the followings:

- a) *Being and Time*: A phenomenological analysis of Dasein.
- b) The writings of him concerning to philosophical exegesis of the texts of earlier philosophers, such as Pre-Socratics, Descartes, Nietzsche, Kant and some essays of him about technology, art, language and poetry ect.
- c) Lastly, some definite essays, such as *Poetry, Language, Thought, The Thing, The Turning, The Danger* ect.

In my view, we may see these three groups of his writings in the following way. In *Being and Time*, he puts the question of Being and by employing the hermeneutical method, i.e., the exegesis of Dasein, tries to undermine the modern conceptions of man and world and gives to these concepts temporal basis. As for the second group of his writings we may consider them as the exegesis of the views of philosophers from Pre-Socratics to those of his age as the history of Being, that is, the question by which he begins *Being and Time*. And the essays belonging to the second group about art, technology ect. can be considered his endeavour for undermining modern view about them and going back to their roots in the history. Hence, we can say that in these two groups of his writings, Heidegger's basic question, i.e., the question of Being, and his method hermeneutic as the exegesis of Dasein and of the texts of the philosophers are the same.¹⁴ Finally, the third group can be considered as Heidegger's attempt for a new beginning in the history of the Western

¹²M. Heidegger. "Letter to Father Richardson" in *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1974), xli.

¹³*Ibid.*, xvi.

¹⁴Charles B. Guignon. *Heidegger and The Problem of Knowledge* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 7 - 8.

philosophy, on the condition that his endeavour for 'destructing' and 'overcoming' of that history is successful. According to his view, the history of Western philosophy from its beginning, i.e., Greek thought, up to the Twentieth Century has completed itself. In fact, he sees the metaphysics of Nietzsche as the mark of this completion.

Under these considerations, it might be said that we can read Heidegger's writings as if there has never occurred any *Kehre* in his thought, yet the opposite of this view is possible considering the changes I have outlined in the beginning of this discussion.

3. Classical Theories of Truth

a) Correspondence Theory

This theory has been defined firstly and strictly in the famous phrase of Aristotle as following.

To say of what is that it is and of what it is not that it is not, true, just as it is false, to say of what it is that it is not, or of what it is not that it is.

This statement, indeed, remaining without change in its very nature, has been repeated again and again in the subsequent tradition of Western thought by way of different formulas. As we will see, when Heidegger criticizes classical notion of truth, he always considers that approach to truth and takes it as the basic source of the problem of truth which underlies all Western philosophical thought. The roots of Aristotle's that phrase lies in the thought of Plato, according to whom, a false proposition asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.¹⁵

That formula of Aristotle has been best formed in the mediaval age as following, *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus* (truth is the agreement of thought or mind with reality). It means that something is true is to say that there is a correspondence - one to one relation - between what is said and reality about which a judgement is asserted. Yet the correspondence of the two things in the history of philosophy has been conceived of in terms of different concepts, for instance the former has been regarded as belief,

¹⁵*The Great Ideas*, Volume II, 916.

judgement, proposition, sentence and the latter as situation, event, state of affairs or thing ect. But the main issue is the same, a particular statement says how things are, the former refers to and represents the latter.

For Descartes truth or error can only arise in the judgement by way of ideas in one about the thing outside one. According to Spinoza, a true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea, in the mediaval age God as the primal truth, the correspondence regarded as the agreement between divine intellect and human intellect. For Locke, truth and falsity belong only to proposition; while for Kant they belong to or only to be found in a judgement.

b) Coherence Theory

The defenders of this theory assert that truth is not something between *intellectus* and *rei*, but it remains within only *intellectus*. According to this view, any judgement is true as long as it is acceptable in a system, that is, it should not contradict with the system in which it is asserted. To test the truth of a judgement is to test it with the system, not with the reality.

The great rationalist system-building philosophers such as Hegel, Spinoza, Leibniz are considered of belonging to this theory of truth, in the case of Spinoza it is disputable that whether his approach to the truth belongs to corespondence or coherence theory.

T.C. Mark argues that coherence theory be taken to include the following four thesis:

- a) Truth is defined as coherence within the orderly system that constitutes reality.
- b) The criterion of truth is coherence within the ordered system of reality.
- c) Relations are internal, that is, a thing's relations with other things are essential to its being what it is, indeed they may constitute what it is.
- d) Truth admits of degrees. Instead of being true or false, individual ideas or judgements are partly true or partly false. No idea except perhaps the idea of the whole can properly be said to be wholly true.¹⁶

¹⁶Thomas C. Mark. *Spinoza's Theory of Truth* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972), 2 - 3.

c) Pragmatist Theory

This theory, shortly, depends on the view that a statement, a belief or what have you is true as long as it work, fulfills a function. This means that the truth of a given assertion is identical with its utility. Pragmatist theory stresses that our intellectual functions are not independent of our practical activity. C. S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey are most known defenders of this theory.

c) Tarski's Theory of Truth

Tarski's semantic theory in fact is a repetition of Aristotle's theory of truth. This theory asserts that "x is true if and only if p, where 'x' is the name or description of a sentence and 'p' is the sentence whose name or description is 'x'".¹⁷

4. Some Contemporary Views of Truth prior to Heidegger: Nietzsche and Hegel

It is important for the project of this thesis to consider some crucial contemporary theories of truth, especially in relation to Heidegger's project in the same problem. Therefore, I find it relevant and indeed inevitable to present the theories of Nietzsche and Hegel in this regard. In what follows, then, I shall try to elucidate these two theories and to show their relevance for Heidegger's theory of truth.

a) Nietzsche's Theory of Truth

Nietzsche sees truth as error, illusion, truth for him is erring, before explaining this view we have to sketch out the underlying principles on which this view arises.

Firstly, Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of world as separated into two distinct parts, like Platonic separation of world of ideas, and of senses, or in the Medieval Age the divine world behind the actual world, or the worlds of Kant, the separation of *Ding*

¹⁷Alan R. White. *Truth* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 94.

an Sich and nature, phenomenal world. For Nietzsche, there is one world, which is sensible, the world of sense, of change and of becoming, this is the real and true world.

Secondly, according to Nietzsche, in the history of philosophy all traditional conceptions of truth has a moralistic origin. He sees as tradition that is guided, not by a desire for truth, but by a moralistic concerns and prejudices, by Plato's 'divine dialectic' which equates knowledge with virtue, and by Christian teaching, which makes knowledge subordinate to the salvation of the soul.¹⁸ For Nietzsche, this attitude to the truth is seen also in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. By this view traditional philosophy arrives at two central presupposition:

- a) The absoluteness and certainty of knowledge.
- b) The primacy and superiority of pure reason.

Thirdly, reason, for Nietzsche, is not something inborn to grasp absolute and eternal truth, he argues that if we separate reason from our senses and drives then it becomes a lifeless fiction, a meaningless abstraction.

Fourthly, the idea of truth as eternal and absolute and the quest for certainty comes from the presupposition that universe is fixed and static.

Nietzsche, therefore, destroys the classical fixed, eternal concept of truth and defines it as something dynamic and something which contains change and contradiction as does life itself. Truth is not something to be discovered and to be found but it is something to be searched, to be created, a process and has no an end. As he tries to overcome traditional ethic by going 'beyond good and evil' wherein evil is a necessary part of good, so he creates a theory of knowledge beyond truth and falsity wherein error is a necessary part of truth. Truth is something in the life, as it were, it is something alive. Nietzsche thus claims that "to err is the condition of life and life is a condition of knowledge".¹⁹ Consequently, in the view of Nietzsche, truth is also erring, which is not transcendent abstract concept but a judgement that grows out of the tangled perplexities of life.

¹⁸Rose Pfeffer. *Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974), 98.

¹⁹*ibid.*, 98.

b) Hegel's Theory of Truth

In the case of Hegel, what firstly comes to fore is that history as a contradictory process. 'World itself', for him, 'is contradictory' and truth must be understood in terms of contradiction which evolves throughout history. Understood in this way, truth is not the object of knowledge, but the goal of every human activity included in the whole history of mankind. And history is something reasonable, that is, it has a purpose, like nature as purposive activity in the philosophy of Aristotle, reason as purposive, goal-directed, pervades all history for its own aim in terms of contradictory world. Therefore, "truth is the whole", this means that in its very nature as process truth reaches its completeness in terms of its own development. In this self-movement of truth, it is the conceptual activity through which we conceive the world in terms of history by which a unifying activity of Spirit comes its goal, i.e., reason and history goes together.

Seen in this view, philosophy as an expression of the spirit of its times (*Zeitgeist*) evolves in terms of concept - idealism of Hegel -, but in this development of history every step is necessarily incomplete, i.e., false, hence the history of truth includes erring. In this erring and contradictory process, truth is not only the result but the process or the development itself. The triadic form of Hegel, i.e., the dialectic in the history, is the truth itself and not a method to get at the truth.

To conclude, the important features of Hegel's notion of truth are: "it is a heavily practical conception of truth" and "the so-called problem of truth must be explicitly situated in and traced from the whole history of human thought. Truth is a concept which must be understood in terms of its historical and philosophical development."²⁰

Considering classical theories of truth and those of Nietzsche and Hegel, the following points must be noted, in order for Heidegger's theory of truth to be evaluated more properly.

a) Especially as we have seen in Nietzsche's, and Hegel's views the conception of world has a directly bearing on the conception of truth.

²⁰Robert C. Solomon. *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 176 - 177.

- b) In the classical conceptions of truth there arises the problem of how a linguistic existence and a non-linguistic thing are comparable with each other.
- c) If truth is conceived of as a dynamic process it includes erring, falsity or untruth, otherwise it excludes these.

Finally, I would like to sketch out the contents of the following chapters regarding how the subject-matter of this thesis will to be dealt with. The First Chapter is an analysis and evaluation of Cartesian-Kantian conception of world. The Second Chapter is that of Heideggerian conception of world as explained in *Being and Time*. In these two chapters, my aim is to show that how Heidegger overcomes epistemologically defined world, man and truth notions, since these three concepts, including theory of language, are strictly related to each other and they are what constitutes the subject-object dichotomy, which, according to Heidegger, in the end creates the technologically imperialism of world.

In the Third Chapter, I will show that truth, in the view of Heidegger, is a historical process, including the 'who' of man, language, thinking, and it will be shown that truth always is untruth, as erring of man. Finally, the Fourth Chapter gives a short history of truth in the philosophy of Heidegger.

In the conclusion, I will discuss the meaning of truth's historicity in the thought of Heidegger, on the basis the 'who' of man, since, for Heidegger, his aim of altering classical conceptions of truth is in fact an alteration of 'in man's Being itself'.

CHAPTER-I

TRUTH IN THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY DEFINED WORLD

1.1. Epistemological Turn

The point, by which Descartes begins his philosophy and which determines the basic traits of the Cartesian world conception and by which philosophical tradition orients itself to epistemological issues as its main problems, is Descartes' doubt, which I shall call the 'epistemological turn'. In the Cartesian world conception, the main point is that man is seen as self-enclosed to itself, or as a *worldless* subject, an isolated subject. The roots of this view lie in the Cartesian doubt and this view makes up the way of philosophy from Descartes himself to this era in the guise of different thoughts. It is not an accident that Descartes is called the father of modern philosophy. By the philosophy of Descartes, epistemology has been taken to the centre of philosophy. In fact, according to Descartes, in order to do philosophy we need clear and distinct knowledge, upon which we base all philosophy. By clear and distinct knowledge he means that kind of knowledge about which we cannot doubt; it is thus indubitable and certain;

Descartes' *Meditations* is the *locus classicus* in modern philosophy for the metaphor of the 'foundation' and for the conviction that the philosopher's quest is to search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge.¹

That Archimedean point, for Descartes, is the ego cogito which could serve for such a purpose and which is undubitable as a firm and permanent foundation. By this shift metaphysics becomes essentially epistemological:

When doubting was brought to stand at the beginning of philosophy, Heidegger writes, 'a theory of knowledge had to be erected before a theory of the world. From then on epistemology is the foundation of philosophy, and that distinguishes modern from medieval philosophy'.²

¹Richard Bernstein. *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 16.

²Oliva Blahchette. "Are There Two Questions of Being", *The Review of Metaphysics*, XLV: 2 (1991), 274.

This development culminates in Kantian philosophy with a new twist; for by the philosophy of Kant, metaphysics becomes the science of epistemology. In the first *Critique* Kant asks, as the main problem of metaphysics, "how knowledge is possible? More exactly, it is, how is metaphysics as science possible?"³

1.2. World in Duality

In the Cartesian world conception there are 'three things' which make up the world; these are; *res cogitans*, *res extensa* and *res divina*. This division is maintained by Descartes, but we see that "the three kinds of things" as "nature, the soul and God" are also a division of metaphysics which Kant will strictly adhere to in the *Critique of Pure Reason*".⁴ It must be noted that Descartes uses the concept *res* (thing), instead of the mediaval concept *ens* (being) and Kant follows Descartes and uses the concept 'thing' as '*Dings an sich*'. Early Wittengenstein turns the concept 'thing' into the concept 'fact', namely, 'as that which makes up the world', the second proposition of *Tractatus* reads that *Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge*.

By omitting the concept *res divina*, if we turn to the Cartesian world conception, the main point is that, when we accept the *egocogito* as a foundation, the world in the Cartesian view becomes something specifically external. As the *egocogito* is "a self-grounding ground", that is, something as defined in terms of itself, then it becomes the spectator of other things.

Res cogitans, on the other hand, is the thinking substance. It is as such the subject grounding itself. In this case, all other things, namely, *res extensa*, according to this conception, are the substance having extension; in other words, they are the objects of the subject. When these two substances sharply seperated from each other as maintained by Descartes, the subject, as "self-enclosed to itself", becomes 'worldless' and the world is considered especially as the world of *res extensa* which is external to the subject.

³*ibid.*, 275.

⁴*ibid.*, 274.

Heidegger thus argues on the basis of his interpretation of the Cartesian conception of the world as follows:

Descartes has narrowed down the question of world to that of Things of nature [Naturdinglichkeit] as those entities within-the-world which are proximally accesible.⁵

The self-enclosed to itself can be traced in Locke's and Hume's philosophy also, for Locke self is the continuity of experience and memory, for Hume, it is approached as mind.

1.3. Truth in the Dualistic World

If man is seen as self-enclosed to itself and world is viewed especially something external to the self, then the problem of the truth is conceived of as the possibility of knowledge about the external world, as the relation between the subject and the object, i.e., the problem is put and solved in terms of epistemology. But the actual problem, here, is the contact of subject with its object, i.e., to get outside oneself to know the world. For Kant and Hegel this contact is by way of consciousness:

The *Phenemonology* begins, like the first *Critique*, with the declaration that, in Kant's words "all knowledge begins with exprience". "Science" is "the Science of experience of consciousness."⁶

For Descartes this is the knowledge itself:

The only genuine access to them (*res extensa*, or *res corpora*, added by me) lies in knowing *intellectio*, in the sense of the kind of knowledge we get in mathematics and physics.⁷

On the other hand, according to Descartes, the "seeds of truth are naturally in our souls"; and on the basis of them, we can "discover the general pirinciples, or first causes of all that are in the world."⁸

⁵Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquaire and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 133. Since this major book of Heidegger is referred to frequently in this study, henceforth, I shall abreviate it as 'BT'.

⁶Robert C. Solomon, *Op. cit.*, 184.

⁷ Heidegger. BT, 128.

⁸Quoted by Charles B. Guignon, from *Descartes' Discourse*, *op. cit.*, 36.

In this relationship what comes to the fore is that the subject, i.e., the *egocogito* which has consciousness, thinks and knows; in other words, it represents the object which has no such characteristics. Man thus becomes the representer of the world external to it.

The subject becomes the center around which all other entities revolve as object of experience: the self is the 'sub-jectum' that which is 'thrown-under' and underlies beings.⁹

Hence truth becomes the correct representation of objects in a rational way and accordingly "language" is "a set of lexical items that are on hand for our use in making assertions or statements about the world."¹⁰

Yet there is a problem which the Cartesian dualistic view has to resolve, that is, how a self enclosed entity, such as, us, the human beings, be sure that there is an external world, and how such a self be sure that it gets a contact with this external world? For Kant, this is "the scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general." Kant's solution of the problem is that 'Dasein knows things outside me' must be resolved in faith; for there cannot be given any rational solution to this problematic. But for Heidegger, this is a pseudo-problem.

The scandal of philosophy is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.¹¹

What causes that problem lies in the starting-point, that is, in the subject which is thought of as worldless. In Heidegger's view, the obsession with epistemology, in the modern age, is a short-lived aberration in the history of philosophy, which must be diagnosed and overcome, and this epistemological fascination "must be taken back, as an ontological one, into the existential analytic of Dasein."¹²

What has been presented so far can be summarized in Heidegger's own words:

Descartes' interpretation of what it is to be of truth first creates the presupposition underlying the possibility of a theory of knowledge or a metaphysics of knowledge. Through Descartes' realism is first put in the position of having to prove the reality of the outer world.¹³

⁹*ibid.*, 17.

¹⁰*ibid.*, 32.

¹¹Heidegger. BT, 249.

¹²*ibid.*, 248.

¹³Heidegger. QC, 139.

CHAPTER-II

TRUTH IN THE ONTOLOGICALLY DEFINED WORLD

2.1. The Aim of Heidegger's Philosophy: The Question of Being

In *Being and Time*, which appeared in 1927 and remained as an uncompleted work, Heidegger raises the question about the meaning of Being and says that his aim "is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely".¹ He raises that question, since "We are nowadays perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'".² According to him, since the time of Plato and Aristotle this question has been forgotten - the oblivion of Being - and it has remained by keeping their contributions to that question, in other words, this question has not been developed up to our time. In later developments a dogma has dominated the traditional ontology; any attempt to understand Being is futile, because this dogma stated firmly that Being is something which is self-evident, most universal and as a result indefinable.³

It is well-known that when Heidegger raises this question he has in mind the well-known phrase of Aristotle, which states that "a being becomes manifest (that is, with regard to its Being) in many ways". According to Franz Brentano's dissertation, on the manifold sense of Being in Aristotle, (1862), these manifold expressibility of Being are:

- a) the accidents, properties
- b) being in the sense of true, truth
- c) being in terms of potentiality and of actuality
- d) and being which is once more said in many diverse ways, namely in accordance with the multiplicity of categories.

According to Heidegger, as a result of Aristotle's above statement, there has appeared a decisive turning-point in the history of philosophy, since the question of Being turns into the question of being and the question of Being itself remains in oblivion under the guise of the question of being. This manner of questioning determines all subsequent

¹BT, 19.

²*ibid.*

³*ibid.*, 22-23.

philosophy until our age. (This subject will to be dealt with in the following two chapters.) Regarding that phrase of Aristotle, Heidegger asks:

Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: What is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One needs but runs over the names assigned to them in the language of the philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem, at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as potentiality and actuality, Being as truth, Being as schema of categories. What sense of Being comes to expression in these four headings? How can they be brought into comprehensible accord?⁴

Heidegger thus adds that "whence does Being as such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination."⁵

Since metaphysics, the philosophical manner of asking which begins by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, does not comprehend the profound difference between beings and Being, we must establish a new principle for contemporary ontology, in order to distinguish it from the traditional metaphysics. This new principle is called "ontological difference" by Heidegger, who believes that we need a new inquiry in which this difference prevails, that is, an inquiry by which we can reach the meaning of Being out of multiplicity of speaking about beings. This new ontology is called in *Being and Time* "Fundamental Ontology". Since, beforehand we do not know what Being is, there must be a gate for us to do this task. For Heidegger, this gate is Dasein, the human being itself. Dasein is distinguished from other beings as it has alone has a relationship to Being and has an understanding of Being. Even there is, *es gibt*, namely, 'Being for the sake of Dasein', since if there would be no Dasein, there could be only beings and not Being itself. For Heidegger, Dasein's priority among other beings is threefold. Otto Pöggeler cites these as:

- in
- a) Dasein has an ontical priority, it is distinguished from all other beings that it is defined by its relationship to Being, i. e., by existence;
 - b) on the basis of being defined by existence Dasein is intrinsically ontological, it understands Being and thus has ontological priority;

⁴Heidegger. "Letter to Father Richardson", *op. cit.*, x.

⁵*Ibid.*

c) on the basis of its understanding of Being, it understands its own Being and the Being of beings which lack the character of Dasein; thus it has ontico-ontological priority.⁶

Therefore, the gate to the fundamental ontology, i.e., to the question of the meaning of Being, is Dasein. It must be noted that fundamental ontology is placed before all ontology, since ontology fails to discuss the meaning of Being as such. Clearly, metaphysics and ontology are the same for Heidegger, which asks the question of being as being and not of Being itself. Heidegger argues that, for instance, the ontologies of Plato, Aristotle or Kant seemingly ask the question of Being, but indeed they are 'productive logics' for the possibility of any positive science. He thus states:

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.⁷

I would like to briefly discuss how Heidegger carries through his investigation of the question of Being in terms of Dasein. For this is crucial for my study of his understanding of truth. His investigation begins by an analysis of Dasein's understanding of Being which gives an ontological priority to it in this investigation. But Dasein's Being itself is an issue for it, this gives it an ontical priority. Heidegger thus wants to determine Dasein's Being or its essence as existence:

That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence'.⁸

Existence in this sense cannot be cited by a 'what', but by a 'who'; for Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, i.e., the particular Dasein 'can' decide its existence, since it has the possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself, that is, "Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already."⁹

⁶Otto Pöggeler. *Op. cit.*, 36.

⁷BT, 31.

⁸*Ibid.*, 32.

⁹*Ibid.*, 33.

The structures of existence are *existentialia* and the structures of beings whose Being is other than that of Dasein are categories and the kind of Being which belongs to them are called "presence-at-hand" (*Vorhandenheit*). Heidegger puts existentialia into two different groups as *extentiell* and *existential*; the former, as related to ontical level, does not require a theoretical transparency of formal structures and remains in concrete possibilities; the latter, however, as related to the ontological level requires an analysis of the contexts of such structures. Thus, concludes Heidegger, "fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein."¹⁰ But in turn "the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical."¹¹

According to Heidegger, the task of the working out the question of Being has a twofold character; in the first place, fundamental ontology must be defined clearly and developed on the basis of Heidegger's principle of ontological difference, which we have outlined above, and secondly, the destruction of the history of ontology, which means that, having in the view Dasein's historicity and temporality, and given the intimacy between Dasein and Being, the destruction aims at the roots of traditional ontology, the primordial experiences of Being, on which our very Dasein has based itself remaining unmindful to Being itself.

In this connection I would like to mention briefly the method applied in *Being and Time*, namely the method which Heidegger calls "phenomenology" and uses in his inquiry into the meaning of Being. He defines it in the following manner:

[Phenomenology is] ...to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.¹²

What Heidegger means by this is that the phenomena must be so described that we have to let it show itself as it is in itself, it must be so discovered that we can see it as it is. Therefore, by the phenomenological description Heidegger understands interpretation, i.e., hermeneutics. Phenomenology thus becomes hermeneutical phenomenology for

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 34.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*, 58.

Heidegger. "It is concerned with the bringing news about the Being of beings, but in a such way that Being itself appears."¹³ Heidegger in this way claims that he establishes phenomenology on the factual life, on the hermeneutic of facticity. Consequently, hermeneutical phenomenology, for Heidegger, is ontology in the sense of an exhibition of the Being of the beings and of its meaning. To sum up our presentation with Heidegger's own words, let us give the following quotation:

Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guide-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.¹⁴

2.2. Dasein as the Being-in-the-world

In comparison to the Cartesian world conception, Heidegger's theory of world differs basically in the concept of self, since, for him, to consider man as a worldless subject is itself the scandal of philosophy, i.e., man, whose Being is the Being-in-the-world, is already in the world. In other words, man and world, in the view of Heidegger, cannot be represented on the basis of the subject-object dichotomy as maintained in the Cartesian world conception. According to this conclusion the statement that 'Dasein transcends' in order to reach the object is a tautological proposition, since it is clear that

That toward which Dasein transcends we call the world, and we now define transcendence as Being-in-the-world.¹⁵

Therefore, for Heidegger, man and world go together with each other, and world, for Heidegger, is neither a particular being, nor the totality of things, the entire sum of what is. As we shall see in the following pages in detail, the worldhood of the world essentially belongs to Dasein's Being as the *Being-in-the-world*, an existential state and thus a category of existence for Dasein. World, as a common context, therefore, in which everything becomes meaningful by a referential totality, cannot be thought of without

¹³Otto Pöggeler. *Op. cit.*, 54.

¹⁴BT, 62.

¹⁵ER, 41.

Dasein's transcending, i.e., Dasein's disclosing the world and encountering the beings, or anything is in the world and has its Being for the sake of Dasein.

There is another point which must be kept in the mind in the following analysis of Heideggerian world conception. That point, as Hubert Dreyfus says, is:

In so far as, then, as the analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world offers a phenomenological critique of the subject/object relation, *Being and Time* would seem to stand in direct opposition to the technological understanding of Being.¹⁶

Since, according to Heidegger, Descartes' subject-object metaphysics, in the end, has necessarily brought about modern technology, in which the earth shows itself as the object of assault in terms of man's unconditional objectification according to man's willing, Heidegger thinks of the Being of any thing, not in its objectness, but in its usage as the readiness-to-hand (*Vorhandenheit*).

As we have seen in the previous pages, the question about the meaning of Being in general requires the analysis of Dasein, and we have said that Heidegger sees hermeneutic of facticity as the proper method for such a purpose, i.e., hermeneutic of everyday Dasein, or uncovering of average Dasein. As the question about the Being of Dasein cannot be cited by a 'what' and Dasein's Being is distinguished from other being's Being, i.e., "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence"¹⁷, Dasein is not something present-at-hand, hence the analysis of Dasein is to be performed in the factual life.

Being-in-the-world is presented, in *Being and Time*, as the fundamental structure of Dasein, and its existential meaning is care which is the unity of constitutives of Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is something a priori and is constantly whole but it can be analyzed in various ways, which are:

- a) The world in its worldhood,
- b) Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self,
- c) Being-in as such.

¹⁶Hubert Dreyfus. "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment" in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed. by H. Dreyfus and H. Hall (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992), 173.

¹⁷BT, 67.

a. The world in its worldhood

Being-in-the-world does not have any signification that Dasein lives in the midst of the totality of beings which together forms the world. Even the beings which are present-at-hand within the world worldless, yet they occur in the world in that Dasein has concern (*Besorgen*) for them, such as having to do with something, attending to something, interrogating, neglecting etc. Concern is possible only on the basis of Dasein's facticity which means for Heidegger that:

The concept of facticity implies that an entity within-the-world has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.¹⁸

The Being-in of the Being-in-the-world signifies Dasein's 'dwelling alongside', 'residing' or 'being familiar with' the world.¹⁹ World is the abode of Dasein and Dasein by using the beings gives them worldly character, i.e., their Being. 'Using' is no way restricted to the practical activity of Dasein, it includes Dasein's every way of concern with the beings. Therefore, as Pöggeler says,

Heidegger does not grasp the world in which Dasein exists as the totality of beings, but rather as the manner [das wie] in which beings as a whole can show themselves.²⁰

The world of everyday Dasein closest to it is the environment (*Umwelt*). Those beings with which everyday Dasein deals and encounters are ready-to-hand, namely 'a piece of equipment'. Equipment is a general name; "taken strictly there is no such thing as an equipment. "To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is."²¹ In this totality, a piece of equipment has its definite involvement, one piece of equipment refers to another; and so it has a meaning, it is something 'in-order-to'. Heidegger, then, defines the sum of the contexts of reference and of significance as the *world* that is environment.²² Nature is, therefore, not

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 80.

²⁰Otto Pöggeler, *op. cit.*, 39.

²¹BT, 97.

²²Pöggeler, *op. cit.*, 39.

just something present-at-hand, just "as the environment is discovered, the Nature is thus discovered is encountered too."²³

It must be also noticed that whenever we encounter anything in the world, the world has already been discovered. According to Heidegger, this can be expressed as "the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is earlier than any single item of equipment."²⁴ As a result, we could say that the worldhood of the world is grounded on the existential character of Dasein, or Dasein's assigning itself to the 'world'.

b. Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self

Being-with and *Being-one's-self* are the other constitutives of Being-in-the-world related to the 'who' of Dasein which analyzed in the 'they' sphere (*Das Man*). For Heidegger, the 'who' of everyday Dasein is not just the 'I myself', for the self of everyday Dasein is the they-self as an inauthentic existence. The Being-with of Dasein's Being means Being-with-others. However, others cannot be thought of as everyone else who stands againsts one, "they are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one *is* too."²⁵ Being-with is based on care-for-others, which means for Heidegger, 'solicitude' (*Fürsorge*). Just like concern (*Besorgen*) for ready-to-hand, solicitude, too, is interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of care (*Sorge*), which will be discussed in our subsequent treatment of Heidegger's doctrine of truth in its historicity.

c. Being-in as such

Being-in as such is related to the 'Da' of Dasein, namely the existential constitution of the 'there', which signifies Dasein's being disclosed. For Heidegger, "Dasein is its

²³BT, 100.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 116.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 154.

disclosedness"²⁶, which means 'to be illuminated', 'to be cleared', and Dasein as the Being-in-the-world gets cleared in a such way that it is itself the clearing.

By its very nature, Dasein brings its 'there' along with it.²⁷ The basic structure or make-up of disclosedness is threefold. They are state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*); understanding (*Verstehen*); and discourse or talk (*Rede*). In the state-of-mind as having a mood, Dasein finds itself in its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), in the midst of beings as a whole and in having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed as a being delivered over in its Being, i.e., facticity of Dasein. Dasein is factual in its thornness, but "facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something present-at-hand, but as a characteristic of Dasein's Being".²⁸ In the state-of-mind a mood assails Dasein, it arises out of the very Being of Dasein and in such a state-of-mind Dasein discloses the world.

Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state of-mind.²⁹

In the state-of-mind, with its mood, there is always an understanding. But in this state of existence, even understanding is also suppressed. Understanding, belonging to the state-of-mind, is the primordial understanding, and explaining, intuition, thinking, and ordinary understanding are the derivatives of it.

The Being of Dasein has its possibility, both for the world and for the others in terms of concern and solicitude; and in all these, the Being-possible pertains to Dasein's *potentiality-for-Being* towards itself; hence, the Being of Dasein is the Being-free for its ownmost *potentiality-for-Being*. "Understanding is the Being of such *potentiality-for-Being*",³⁰ but that Being is not present-at-hand, rather it lies in the existence and the existential structures of such an understanding, which is to be designated by Heidegger as 'projection' (*Entwurf*).

Whatever has been understood in the understanding gets developed in the interpretation, which is the working-out of the possibilities projected; hence,

²⁶*ibid.*, 171.

²⁷*ibid.*

²⁸*ibid.*, 174.

²⁹*ibid.*, 176.

³⁰*ibid.*, 183.

interpretation is an articulation, and interpretation of some thing depends on the totality of involvements. Finally, discourse or talk, as the existential-ontological foundation of language, is the articulation of intelligibility, an articulation of the totality of meanings. Everyday Dasein, as the inauthentic self, is lost in the 'they', i.e., falling (*Verfallen*) of Dasein, by means of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. The inauthentic Dasein individualizes, i.e., becomes authentic Dasein, in anxiety (*Angst*) which is the basic state-of-mind. Through anxiety, which is anxious, "the world collapses into itself, the world has character of completely lacking significance",³¹ and Dasein finds itself not-at-home, therefore anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for, the freedom of choosing itself, that is, its authenticity.

We have said that Being-in-the-world is a whole, and care (*Sorge*), in the view of Heidegger, is what unifies and harmonizes the constitutives of Being-in-the-world, which we have tried to sketched out so far. Care, as the Being of Dasein, is existentially a priori and "lies before every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein".³² In other words, Dasein's acts, thinking, behaviour are all based upon care as the Being of Dasein. We shall now investigate how Heidegger relates all his analyses to the problem of truth through his analysis of the concept of Being in relation to Dasein.

2.3. Temporality of Dasein

Since temporality is the meaning of the Being of care, Dasein, in its Being, is also temporal. For Dasein's Being is also care. According to Heidegger's existential-phenomenological analysis of Dasein, Being-towards-death and Being guilty are what make up Dasein's Being, i.e., care. On this basis, the call of conscience discloses Dasein to itself, to free itself for its world, for the authentic resoluteness. The resolute Dasein takes itself out of their resoluteness of the 'they', and thus become the conscience of others. The resolute Dasein lets itself come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, which is the

³¹*ibid.*, 231.

³²*ibid.*, 238.

primordial phenomenon of future as the basic source of temporality. Time, therefore, stems from the future in Heidegger's philosophy, as the following quotation testifies to this conclusion:

The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.³³

But Dasein has been thrown into the world and it is this existential state which reveals another moment of time, i.e., the past. Dasein also finds itself as what it is in the present situation; again an existential state which reveals the moment of temporality called 'present'. This *future oriented* conception of time reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care, and that 'authentic temporality' is the primordial time. By 'primordial time' Heidegger means that understanding of temporality, i.e., human conception of time, upon which all other temporal concepts are founded.

According to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's disclosedness, therefore, understanding as the projection of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being is primarily futural, state-of-mind temporalizes itself primarily in the past, and finally the fallingness of Dasein is the present situation. When these three constitutives of the 'there' are completely disclosed, they are articulated by discourse which is in itself temporal. All these temporal states are grounded as a whole in the unity of care-structure.

2.4. Historicity of the World

So far we have shown that Heidegger's conception of the world is carried out through the existential-phenomenological analysis of Dasein. This analysis has revealed in the first place that Dasein has the Being-in-the-world and its disclosing itself is, at the same time, the disclosedness of the world, these two are equiprimordial. Secondly that disclosedness has a temporal character. In other words:

In the disclosedness of the 'there' the world is disclosed along with it.³⁴

³³*Ibid.*, 378.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 416.

and;

in so far as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is too...,
the world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand,
but temporalizes itself in temporality.³⁵

Therefore, the temporality of disclosedness is what makes the historicity of the world and of Dasein. History is, therefore, possible on the basis of Dasein's temporality. For Heidegger, Dasein is primarily historical, and what is encountered within-the-world is secondarily historical.³⁶ By way of resoluteness coming back to itself, Dasein discloses the current possibilities of existing and takes over then by repeating, i.e., the heritage, in terms of this handing down. Dasein discloses new possibilities of existing, which makes the historicity of the world arising from Dasein's future, and in every case what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are incorporated into that history. Therefore the historicity of the world is rooted within the 'there' and the temporality of Dasein. We can summarize all these in what follows:

The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world.³⁷

2.5. Truth in the Heideggerian World

We have seen that in the Cartesian, i.e., in the epistemologically defined world, truth is the subject's correct representation of the object; in other words, truth is an epistemological issue between the knower and the known as a judgement, and the primordial form of that notion of truth stems from the philosophy of Plato as a correspondence between the thing perceived and man's perceiving. In this view, then, things, as objects of truth, are in constant presence, that is, truth is *supratemporal*.

For Heidegger, truth is an ontological issue, which must be analyzed in the 'there' of Dasein, i.e., in the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein, hence truth has a temporal character. For this reason, Heidegger resolutely tries to point to the temporality of truth, as connected with Being, in the following manner:

³⁵*Ibid.*, 417.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 433.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 440.

Being does indeed 'go together' with truth.³⁸

and;

Being (not entities) is something which 'there is' only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and only as long as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially.³⁹

The main difference between the above conceptions of truth lies in Heidegger's distinction between two different 'as' structures; 1. the apophantic 'as'; and 2. the hermeneutic 'as'. The former is a derivative of the latter which is primordial. Therefore, apophantic 'as' is of the assertion; but the hermeneutic 'as' is of Dasein's concerned dealings with beings, since Dasein by its very existential-ontological constitution is open to Being. Through its concerned dealings, Dasein encounters the beings opened up in their Being, and only after that disclosing of Dasein the assertion is possible.

Let us now take into consideration Heidegger's critique of traditional conception of truth. He views that conception of truth including following three main points, these are:

- a) The 'locus' of truth is assertion-judgement;
- b) The essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgement with its object;
- c) Aristotle not only has assigned truth to the judgement as its primordial locus, but has set going to the definition of 'truth' as 'agreement'.⁴⁰

In this conception of truth, truth is the *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, i.e., it is a relation between two things. Heidegger thus asks:

How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand?⁴¹

That relation subsists, but he asks that "what does such 'subsisting' mean ontologically?".⁴² According to Heidegger, that relation as asserting or judgement is possible only in terms of Dasein's uncovering the beings in their Being, i.e., on the basis of Dasein's concerned dealings with beings in the disclosed world. Therefore, the expression that 'an assertion is true' means that it uncovers the being as it is in itself.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 256.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 272.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 257.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 259.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 259.

This is what Heidegger has already designated by “the apophantic 'as'” which has already been explained above. That uncoveredness is a way of Being; hence,

The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering.⁴³

In conclusion, then, truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between subject and object; it is rather an *uncovering*. Considering what we have said so far, we can summarize Heidegger's levelling of truth(s) in the following main points:

First level, the disclosedness, the most primordial truth;

Second level, the uncoveredness, primordial truth;

Third level, the assertion, derivative of the primordial truth.

In so far as Dasein is, it essentially discloses the world and uncovers the beings; therefore, "Dasein" always "is in the truth".⁴⁴ This phrase must be understood in a such way that the following points are also included in its intention:

- a) Disclosedness in general through the phenomenon of care,
- b) Thrownness in a definite world, facticity of Dasein,
- c) Projection, Dasein's potentiality-for-Being including authenticity of Dasein which is the Dasein's own most potentiality-for-Being
- d) Fallingness, Dasein's being lost in the 'they' and the beings uncovered are at the same time disguised in the world of the 'they'. "Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state-of-Being is such that it is in untruth."⁴⁵

Consequently, Dasein is both in the truth and in the untruth. This is perhaps why Heidegger concludes that the Greeks has named truth *a-letheia*, primarily for this reason; which means 'to uncover'; or 'to free the beings from their hiddenness'. Truth, therefore, in Heidegger's view is essentially an uncovering through temporality, which, as we shall see, gives it a historical character that is termed by Heidegger 'historicality'.

Therefore, we have to mention as a conclusion that since truth comes to pass for the sake of Dasein's Being as the Being-in-the-world which is in its essence temporal, truth is also temporal, including the world, the Being of Dasein and Being in general. In other

⁴³*Ibid.*, 261.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 263.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 264.

words, *es gibt* of Being must be considered in a temporal-historical dimension, which will be the subject matter of the following two chapters.



CHAPTER-III

HEIDEGGER'S THEORY OF TRUTH

3.1. Truth and Being

As we have seen in the previous chapter, truth, in the philosophy of Heidegger, is not a correspondence between *intellectus* and *rei*. Also we have seen that Dasein in its Being is temporal, and for this reason, historical. Temporality is the primordial time and is the source of time in general.¹ In other words, history is directly related to the Being of Dasein. Heidegger says that:

Time produces itself only insofar as man is.²

and

Only ex-sistent man is historical. 'Nature' has no history.³

History in general is the realm wherein truth happens, i.e., wherein *es gibt* of Being comes to pass in the 'there' of Dasein, i.e., Dasein as ex-sisting being. It is to this point that Heidegger alludes to in the following passage:

Man is rather 'thrown' from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ex-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are.⁴

It must be clear that, Being, for Heidegger, is neither the totality of what is and nor something which has any character of constant presence. According to Heidegger that view belongs to traditional philosophy which accepts Being as something empty, general and universal. In other words;

¹BT, 457-460.

²Martin Heidegger. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. by R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 84; henceforth to be abbreviated as 'IM'.

³Martin Heidegger. "On the Essence of Truth" in *Existence and Being*, ed. by Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), 309; shall be abbreviated as 'EB'.

⁴Martin Heidegger. "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, ed. by D. F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 210; "Letter on Humanism", henceforth, shall be abbreviated as 'LH' and the *Basic Writings* as 'BW'.

The ordinary understanding of Being understands 'Being' as present-at-hand.⁵

On the other hand, Heidegger rejects any notion of truth, according to which truth is supratemporal, or eternal.⁶ Such views of truth are residuals of Platonic-Christian theology and also viewing man in its essence 'pure I, or 'consciousness in general', which does not consider the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein. In the following sections my aim is to clarify the historicity of truth as es gibt of Being in the philosophy of Heidegger.

3.2. Truth in "on the essence of truth"

We know that in the classical conception of truth, assertion is the bearer of truth as the essential and sole locus of it. In this view, since assertion represents its object, i.e., it truly asserts how it is, it necessarily excludes untruth. And assertion is an agreeing relation between *intelectus* and *rei*.

Heidegger asks that how such a relation is possible, i.e., the inner possibility of a such relation. As we know that he has analyzed that problem in *Being and Time* in terms of Dasein's disclosing the world and uncovering the beings. In 'on the essence of truth', we have a new technical term related to the same problem. Now he characterizes this relation as behaviour (*Verhalten*), which is possible on the overtness (*Offenheit*) of man, which simultaneously includes being overt of what-is, i.e., the beings.

All behaviour is 'overt' (lit. 'stands open', *offenstaendig*) to what-is and all 'overt' relationship is behaviour.⁷

And only Dasein might have such a behaviour which sustains itself in the open in which es gibt of Being, i.e., its truth, occurs. This means, for Heidegger, that man frees what - is concealed out of concealment into the unconcealment, i.e., a - lethia. Such freeing of beings constitutes the essence of truth.

The essence of truth is freedom.⁸

⁵BT, 441.

⁶*Ibid.*, 272.

⁷"On the Essence of Truth", *op. cit.*, 301.

⁸*Ibid.*, 303.

The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting-be' of what-is.⁹

Clearly, for Heidegger, freedom 'is a participation in the revelation of what-is-as-such', and these are all grounded on the 'there' of Dasein as being-there which clears, makes open and overt. But such freedom of man is not to be taken in the absolute sense, since "freedom is man's opening himself to the summons addressed to him and the way on which he is already being sent"¹⁰, and that sending is destined by Being itself.

History, or an important epoch of history, begins, for Heidegger, when such a question about what-is in its totality is raised.

Only where what-is is expressly raised to the power of its own revelation and preserved there, only where this preservation is conceived as the quest for this what-is-as-such, only there does history begin.¹¹ But since man is in its essence finitude, he cannot really let what-is be just what it is and it is, namely such revelation of truth necessarily includes untruth, i.e., *aletheia* is at the same time *lethe*.

This togetherness of truth and untruth provides the dynamic process of history, and concealment, *lethe*, as authentic untruth, is anterior to all revelation and remains always dissumulated. Such a dissumulation of untruth, i.e., "the dissumulation of the dissumulated", pervades all history as the absolute mystery, which necessarily remains forgotten. And Dasein, also, always insists in what has been revealed and fixes all his endeavour to them, therefore errs. Insisting and erring are always bound up with truth as belonging to essence of history, and, in the end, these are what leads man go to astray. The dissumulation of the absolute mystery including insisting and erring as untruth and freedom belong to the original essence of truth, yet there always remains non-essence of truth as untruth which points to the not-yet-experienced truth of the truth of Being.

The question about what is as such in totality, i.e., the question about the Being of what-is, or of beings, since the time of Plato has named philosophy or metaphysics. Philosophy, however, holds fast to what-is, neglecting the question of Being and directs its

⁹*Ibid.*, 305.

¹⁰William Lovitt. See his "Introduction" to QC, xxxiv.

¹¹"On the Essence of Truth", *op. cit.*, 308.

search in terms of its own laws, that is, it becomes "keeper of its own laws", namely philosopher insists and errs.

Heidegger concludes his essay 'on the essence of truth' with the following remarks which will be, hereafter, for us, fundamental propositions throughout this study. He asks that that essay does not lead to the these considerations.

- a. that, whatever the question of essence of truth is not the same question with the truth of essence;
- b. that, philosophy conceives 'essence' as Being;
- c. that, the nature of truth is not just the empty, general character of some abstract commonplace, but something that is unique in history (itself unique): the self-dissimulation of unveiling of the 'meaning' of what we call 'Being' which have long been accustomed to think of as 'what-is-in-totality'.¹²

Although he puts these remarks as if they must be thought upon, these are his very views which guides his thought.

3.3. Two Grounds of Truth

In the philosophy of Hegel, we know that, man in the process of history has a pseudo-role, what calls Hegel *List der Vernunft* and the dominant figure is of Reason. When the same question raised up in the philosophy of Heidegger, we see that man and Being have the equal efficacy, on the one hand man has freedom, yet on the other hand Being has its destiny.

Clearly, how can we understand such a word, like 'oblivion of Being', that is, whether Being falls itself into oblivion, it itself forgets itself, or man falls it into oblivion, in other words, whether Being's forgetting itself renounced in the thinking of man or man's thinking forgets the Being throughout history. For Heidegger, the genitive in the above word, i.e., 'of' is twofold. There is a mutual relationship between Being's destiny and man's freedom. They are the two grounds of history, one is the truth of Being and the other is the *Dasein*¹³. For instance, in discussing *aletheia*, as opening of presence, how truth changed from unconcealment to correctness of representation, he asks that:

¹²*Ibid.*, 322.

¹³*Ibid.*, 323.

Does it happen by chance? Does it happen only as a consequence of the carelessness of human thinking? or does it happen, because self-concealing, concealment, *lethe*, belongs to *aletheia*, not just in addition, not as a shadow light, but rather as the heart of *aletheia*?¹⁴

What is the 'rule' in this play between *lethe* and *aletheia* and what is the 'role' of man in that play, for Heidegger, that role and rule "remains concealed"¹⁵, yet only we can say that the simultaneous juxtaposing of the two grounds of history, i.e., the destiny of Being and the doing of man, is fundamental for Heidegger's viewing of history.

3.4 Historicality of the Essence of Man

In *Being and Time*, we read the following proposition which puts forward that,

The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence.¹⁶

and only Dasein has such a character, i.e., only Dasein exists, which means that Dasein as the being-there, Being in general is an issue for it, including Dasein's ownmost Being. Since Dasein exists in the 'lighting of Being', this means, for Heidegger, the 'Being' of the 'there' has "an ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being"¹⁷, that is,

the essence of ek-sistence derives existentially-ecstatically from the essence of truth of Being.¹⁸

Namely, since Being has its history, man as the bearer of the truth of Being shares that history, i.e., its essence as the ex-sisting changes according to truth of Being, hence man does not have the static essence of the animal rationale, or of the subject.

3.5. Thinking and History

We have said that is Dasein the being which exists in the 'there' of Being, this is called by Heidegger nearness. The nearness means that Being and man reach each other as they are what they are, i.e., they have their essential feature, and their reaching each other in their very core is what Heidegger calls event of appropriation, in that event "man and

¹⁴Martin Heidegger. "The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking" in BW, 390.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 390.

¹⁶BT, 67.

¹⁷LH, 205.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 212.

Being are appropriated to each other", "they belong to each other".¹⁹ Since man's distinctive feature lies in his thinking of Being, his openness to Being, by Heidegger's saying man 'listens to' Being and replies to it by words, "it is in words and language that things first come into Being and are"²⁰, in this reciprocal relation, man names the Being, that is, he bestows to beings their Being, and this naming renders the Being its house, i.e., language. Hence, thinking, in the Heideggerian language, is man's attunement himself to the Being itself, in which Being presences its truth, es gibt the truth of beings, and "that in all of this Being appropriates its own truth previously and always primarily and that this is the appropriating wherein Being presences".²¹ Therefore in the event of appropriation what comes to language is thinking, and thinking is always of Being:

Thinking is of Being inasmuch as thinking, coming to pass from Being, belongs to Being. At the same time thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being.²² In other words, in the event of appropriation truth comes to pass as the truth of Being.

It is also to be mentioned that, for Heidegger, Being and thinking belong to each

CHAPTER-IV

A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF TRUTH IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER

In this chapter my aim is to show Heidegger's viewing of the history of the truth as *es gibt* of Being. Since language is the house of Being, Heidegger traces that history in the words of philosophers who name the Being. The history of metaphysics is thought of by Heidegger as "the truth of what *is*, as such in its entirety, and not as the doctrine of any particular thinker".¹

The thought of Being, has, ever since Plato's day, been conceived as 'philosophy', later acquiring the title of 'metaphysics.'²

In what follows I shall give an account of the history of truth according to above considerations, and maintain that, for Heidegger, in that history there are three basic moods: 1. The attunement of thinking and Being, which are Greek astonishment; 2. The modern assurance; and finally 3. The contemporary distress.³

4.1. The Beginning of Philosophy

The question of whatness, namely, of quiddity, for Heidegger, is a philosophical question, that is, philosophy understood in the Greek sense and which sustains its basic attitude, both in questioning and in thinking, throughout the whole Western history, has been determined by the Greek question *ti estin*; which asks about the 'isness' (*Washeit*, whatness) of things. The 'isness' says the Being of that thing, i.e., the essence, *ousia* of the thing,

Ti estin is the manner of asking developed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. For instance, for Plato *ti* is *Idea*; for Aristotle it is *energeia*. Aristotle is the one who has developed that question into the form of *ti to on* (*Was ist Seiende*, the being, the what-is) in his *Prote Philosophia*. According to Aristotle the question *ti to on* must be answered in

¹"The Word of Nietzsche: "God is Dead" in QC, 54.

²"On the Essence of Truth", *op. cit.* in EB, 319-320.

³Martin Heidegger. *Was ist das, die Philosophie*, 38-42.

the form of *on he on* (*ens qua ens, Seiende als Seiende*), which means that the question of Being turns strictly into the question about beings. Heidegger thus claims that since then philosophers as ontologists, or as metaphysicians, insist, and thereby err on the latter question; thus remaining unmindful to the former question.

For a proper understanding of the above beginning of philosophy, we have to consider the Pre-Socratics. In the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus the main trait is that there is a harmony between logos and Being. The breakdown of that harmony has given rise to the way of traditional philosophy. Among the early Greeks, Being essentially and primarily has been *physis*, which meant for them 'coming out into open', 'self-disclosing'; or 'something which appears and comes to presence', that is, something which unconceals out of concealment. Since then, that which is said and that which is unconcealed have been the same, i.e., logos and Being have meant the same.

Das Sein ist die Versammlung-Logos.⁴

Therefore, for early Greeks "the logos as gathering was the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it"⁵ and what manifests itself in the unconcealment. In this understanding of Being, according to Heidegger, truth "is not [held to be] an appendage to Being" since "truth is inherent in the essence of Being"⁶ (words in brackets are my addition).

Heidegger interprets Parmenides' conclusion that "thinking and being are the same" in following: *Noein*, thinking, is the apprehension (*Vernennung*) of what is appeared, stood in the light, hence entered into unconcealment, i.e., *physis*, which means *einai*, Being, these two are the same, belong to each other.

Where Being prevails, apprehension prevails and happens
with it, the two belong together.⁷

As for his interpretation of Heraclitus', logos, Heidegger concludes that logos must be conceived as "the original collectedness which is in itself permanently dominant"⁸ and

⁴*Ibid.*, 22.

⁵*IM*, 186.

⁶*Ibid.*, 102.

⁷*Ibid.*, 139.

⁸*Ibid.*, 128.

this togetherness, "*panta rei*, everything flows" means that Being is the gathering of all conflict and unrest. "Conflict is the father of all" means that, in the conflict first the realm of what is in totality separates into opposites, then a world comes into being, i.e., a binding-together of all. Therefore world is a unity of all conflicts. That hidden harmony in all flux and conflict, for Heidegger, is Being itself, "*Polemos* and *logos* are the same."⁹

Therefore in early Greek,

Being is *logos*, *harmonia*, *aletheia*, *physis*, *phainestai*.¹⁰

How has this unity of *logos* and Being been separated, i.e., how has philosophy begun?

It was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere appearance and thus degraded. At the same time Being, as idea, was exalted to a suprasensory world.¹¹

This separating of appearance and *physis*, Being, is the point where philosophy begins. Thus, in this way *ti estin* as a philosophical question is given rise. *Ti estin* is a question of *essentia*, of whatness, of quiddity, which at the same time causes another question, that is, *hoti estin*, the question of *existentia*, of thatness, of quiddity.¹²

4.2. Change in the Essence of Truth

As a consequence of the above changes, truth itself has changed, that is, truth as unconcealment out of the concealment has turned into a mere unconcealment. Since appearance is the copy of idea, truth becomes only what is unconcealed from idea to appearance. Pöggeler points to this conclusion as well:

The idea, which is nonetheless the idea only on the basis of unconcealment, refers no longer to any concealment.¹³

Therefore, truth is no longer unconcealment of the Being, but it is a correctness of what is showed itself, i.e., idea. In this manner, "correctness as the corresponding of knowing with a state of affairs is secured in knowledge".¹⁴ With these changes, *logos* has

⁹*Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 133.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 106.

¹²*Ibid.*, 184.

¹³Otto Pöggeler. *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, *op. cit.*, 80.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 81.

lost its original meaning of gathering, collection of truth of Being and has come to mean only statement as the locus of truth. According to Heidegger's interpretation to state this correctly, one would say that 'what-is *is*';

It was Aristotle who first gave a clearer metaphysical interpretation of logos in the sense of statement.¹⁵

Consequently, according to Heidegger, philosophy or metaphysics as ontology, i.e., the manner of asking *ti estin* or *ti to on* strictly begins, Being itself remaining in oblivion,

Any metaphysical thinking is ontology; or it is nothing at all.¹⁶

It is this metaphysical thinking that determines all philosophy up to modern age:

All metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato.¹⁷

The question of *ti estin* is answered in the subsequent tradition, after idea and *energeia* as spirit, matter and force, will, substance, becoming, life ect. Yet these are all included, by Heidegger, in the history of Being in the sense that they appear in the light of Being.¹⁸

4.3. The Important Points in the History of Truth

Since, the remaining part of the hermeneutical discussion of Heidegger's philosophical tradition requires a great deal of study, I will sketch out that part regarding its main steps. Yet these steps, as oblivion of Being, must be considered in Heidegger's following words:

Oblivion of Being means: the self-concealing of the origin of Being divided into whatness and thatness in favor of Being which opens out beings as beings and remains unquestioned as Being.¹⁹

We shall now consider Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greek attitude to Being in the following points, in order to see what conclusions he will derive from this approach with regard to the problem of truth.

¹⁵JM, 58.

¹⁶"The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'" in QC, *op. cit.*, 55.

¹⁷Heidegger. "The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking" in BW, *op. cit.*, 386.

¹⁸Martin Heidegger. "The way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" in *Existentialism From Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, ed. by W. Kaufman (New York: New American Library, 1975), 265.

¹⁹"Metaphysics as History of Being" in BW, 4.

1) The transformation of Greek philosophy to Latin world, but Roman thought takes over Greek philosophy by distorting what really Greeks have experienced.

Things in the Roman world were 'finished pieces of work'²⁰.

2) In the mediaval age, Christian theology and its preoccupation with question of how man is in right relationship with God have raised the question of assuredness of salvation and security. That security question has renounced itself in the thought of Descartes as the beginning of modern philosophy. The methodic doubt of Descartes has found assurance, or security, within man himself, that is, in the *cogito*. The necessary conclusion of this development is the following proposition:

Man becomes subject and Things become object.

In the mediaval age, therefore, they have been considered as creatures. The form of thinking is representational thinking. In other words, subject represents object. The roots of representation is hidden in the philosophy of Plato, idea is represented in the phenomenon. The root of subject is also in the Greek concept *hypokeimenon*, which means 'that-which-lies-before'. By the time we reach the philosophy of Descartes, we see that truth turns into certainty.

3) Finally, when reaching the metaphysics of Nietzsche, philosophy as metaphysics consummates itself, and thus becomes nihilistic, since it has its end. Heidegger defines nihilism in the following manner:

Nothing is befalling Being and its truth, then metaphysics as the history of truth of what is as such, is, in its essence, nihilistic.²¹

That is, metaphysics has consummated its all pre-figured possibilities, such as, idea, theological God, substance ect., these all belong to suprasensory world and Nietzsche's claim 'God is death' symbolizes the end of such possibilities belonging to suprasensory world.

On the other hand, Nietzsche, according to this interpretation, tries to overcome the tradition, yet he still stands within that very tradition. Since, in the philosophy of

²⁰Martin Heidegger. "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by Albert Hofstadler (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 23; abbreviated as 'PL'.

²¹"The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'" in QC, 109.

Nietzsche the remnants of the tradition still prevail, *essentia* is the will to power and *existentia* is the eternal recurrence of the same.²² Being is thus degraded into a value, which posited by man as *overman* who tries to take over the empty place of death of God or suprasensory world. Overman characterizes modern humanity. The things are now in the disposal and in the service of the final expression of the executer of the unconditional will to power.

4) Modern Age: The will to power turns into the the will to will as only willing in the absolute sense without admitting any goal. Things are now the object of technology, as resources to be ordered and used for efficient further enchantment. Thus the following proposition is an inevitable admission of this attitude:

Thinking has the form of exact thinking.

World is represented by the subject as a picture. According to Heidegger, there are two main traits of modern age; these are westernization of world history and the danger.

a) Westernization of world history: Through spreading the Western science, technology, 'culture', its definition of man as subject and the world as object ect., the world history itself in general is absorbed into the history of the West in a nihilistic sense:

If metaphysics is the historical ground of the world history, i.e., being determined by Europe and West, then that world history is, in an entirely different sense, nihilistic.²³

b) The danger: Heidegger calls the essence of modern technology *Enframing*, i. e., things are viewed as standing-reserve, namely technologically organized man arrests things and objectivies them as standing-reserve, but at the same time man himself turns, in *Enframing*, into standing-reserve. This means, for Heidegger, that both the truth Being and man himself are endangered, i.e., :

Being itself endangering itself in the truth of its coming to presence remains veiled and disguised.²⁴

²²Martin Heidegger. "Sketches For a History of Being as Metaphysics" in BW, 70.

²³"The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'", *op. cit.*, 109.

²⁴"The Turning" in QC, 37.

In other words, *es gibt* of Being ceases, Being loses its relationship with Dasein, or man, and thus deprives its character of being-there, its existential-ontological constitution, the event of appropriation, thinking ceases and Being turns to *truthless* Being. This inauthentic state of affairs, according to Heidegger, is the end of truth.

It must be noted, however, that, for Heidegger, modern technology is also a mode of revealing in the sense of taking place unconcealment, truth, but it is the last of pre-figured possibilities of metaphysics, which in the end creates the Danger. Therefore, on the basis of this interpretation, for Heidegger, the Danger is the end of truth.

It has become clear by now that, in the philosophy of Heidegger, truth is something temporal and historical as *es gibt* of Being. This position as maintained by Heidegger, takes truth to be destined by Being itself and at the same time the occurrence of truth is dependent on man's freedom as the essence of truth. It has been also exhibited that such an understanding of historicity of truth has its proper end in the *end* of truth.

CONCLUSION

I would like to discuss now the meaning, or the outcome of the historicity and the end of truth in the philosophy of Heidegger. To begin with, I would like to take into consideration Josef Seifert's criticism leveled against Heidegger. The main question here is this: Is the existence of truth really dependent upon man?¹ Seifert criticizes Heidegger on the assumption that by making the existence of truth dependent upon man, Heidegger makes truth temporal and historical, yet indeed truth is the 'one', universal and supratemporal.

Seifert thus maintains:

In *Being and Time* and elsewhere M. Heidegger asserts that there is not truth prior to the 'discovering of being' of man (*Entdeckendsein des Daseins*). According to this view, the truth of Newtonian laws, for example, would have existed only since and through Newton's discoveries.²

Again he goes on in his argument by asserting:

If truth existed only as a property or relation bound up with human judgements, truth would certainly begin to exist in history and owe its being to the human mind.³

On the basis of this interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of truth, Seifert wishes to show the contrary thesis that "the very essence of truth implies that it exists independently from the human mind."⁴ According to him "there is only one truth, which is, in its inner identity, supraspatial and supratemporal".⁵ He thus concludes his argument against Heidegger in the following way:

Truth showed itself to be something superior to any measure in which man can capture truth in his thoughts and judgements. It showed itself to be one of those transhistorical, unchanging things which contemporary philosophy seems increasingly to ignore, and which confront man in the midst of time with a mode of being that is not absorbed in temporality but lies beyond all time.⁶

¹Josef Seifert. "Is Existence of Truth Dependent Upon Man", *The Review of Metaphysics*, 30;3 (1982), 461.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, 463.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*, 465.

⁶*Ibid.*

I have deliberately ignored the steps and proofs of Seifert's argument, since my aim is not to discuss Seifert's thesis comparing it with that of Heidegger. But to put the question in another way, I would like to consider the title of Seifer's article, "is the existence of truth dependent upon man?" Let us, then, ask; who is this 'man'? For Seifert, this 'man', upon whom truth does not depend, has 'mind', 'consciousness', makes 'judgements and propositions', 'thinks', has 'love of truth, philosophy in the original sense of the term'. The man of Seifer is the man of philosophy, i.e., animal rationale, who has survived since Plato. As it is seen, my question does not emphasize whether the existence of truth depends on man or not; it rather empasizes the *who* of man. In the following words of Heidegger it seems he is also trying to point to the same end:

Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as posed here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the traditional conception of truth, nor a complement of its current representation; what is at stake is a transformation in man's Being itself. This transformation is not demanded by a new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever. Man comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuienly fundamental, perspective: man in his relation to Being - s.c. in the reversal: Being and its truth in relation to man.⁷

As clearly seen, the question of truth for Heidegger is especially the question of man. Therefore, Seifert's counter-argument against Heidegger fails to have its legitimacy, since his argument based upon the supposition that man is *animal rationale*. If the question of truth, for Heidegger, is the question of man, we have to see why Heidegger raises that question, i.e., the question of man. We have seen that Heidegger characterizes the mode of revealing in the modern age as technology, whose essence is *Enframing* which in the end creates the Danger. All these mean that:

In-flashing of world into *Enframing* is in-flashing of the truth of Being into truthless Being.⁸

When Being ceases its character of *es gibt*, the belonging together of Being and man, *die Konstellation von Sein und Mensch* also ceases, which means that if the truth of Being throughout history of metaphysics has been consummated, the man of metaphysics, i.e.,

⁷"Letter to Father Richardson", *op. cit.*, xx.

⁸"The Turning" in QC, 45.

animal rationale, has also lost its 'who' i.e., *animal metaphysicum*. Now man turns to the laboring animal and gets fixed, since the truth of Being has ended. On this point Heidegger further argues that:

The decline of the truth of beings occurs necessarily, an indeed as the completion of metaphysics... The decline occurs through the collapse of the world characterized by metaphysics, and at the same time through the desolation of the earth stemming from metaphysics... Collapse and desolation find their adequate occurrence in the fact that metaphysical man, the animal rationale, gets fixed as the laboring animal.⁹

Considering what has been outlined above, in what follows I shall try to clarify the outcome of Heidegger's claim that philosophy has ended, or completed itself, together with its proper man, i.e., *animal rationale*. In order to do that task, firstly I shall give a short review of aspects of metaphysical thinking from Habermas's book *Postmetaphysical Thinking*.¹⁰ For I think that his interpretation of the problem has some bearing upon what we are going to do here. These are the following points:

a) Identity dominating thinking: Ancient philosophy begins with the view of the whole, but it distinguishes itself in terms of concept by which everything is related to one. This main characteristic of the Ancient philosophy is inherited from the myth. The origins in the myth are found in the narratives, but the many are grounded in the philosophy coming from something infinite, such as God or being, i.e., from the one.

b) Idealism: By the thinking of Plato the multiplicity of phenomena is found in the conceptual scheme which underlies and unifies that multiplicity. The idea of the good as the prime idea includes all other ideas in itself. The history of metaphysics derives its inner dynamic both from the two forms of knowledge - empirical and intellectual - and also from the paradoxical opposition of Idea and appearance.

c) *Prima philosophia* as philosophy of consciousness: Idealist philosophy renews both identity thinking and the doctrine of ideas on the new foundation that was exposed by the shift in paradigms from ontology to mentalism: subjectivity, which guides philosophy since Descartes' thought. Self-consciousness, the relationship of the knowing subject to

⁹"Overcoming Metaphysics" in BW, 86.

¹⁰Jürgen Habermas. *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, trans. by W. Mork Hohengarten (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 29-33.

itself, as the inner and absolutely certain sphere is the key to objects we have. German idealism has the form of subjectivity, like in the philosophy of Kant, in which transcendental subjectivity determines and makes possible the world in terms of foundationalist terms as subjectivity. The ideal essences are transformed into the categorical determinations of a productive reason. Hegel conceived reason dialectically as a spirit that recovers itself in a process through nature and history. Self-consciousness is put into a position not as the spontaneous source of transcendental accomplishments but as a spirit, it is itself elevated to the position of the absolute. In either case, reason is active as a simultaneously totalizing and self-referential reflection.

d) The strong concept of theory: Finally in the last step, the circuit of an identity thinking that self-referentially incorporates itself within the totality it grasps and that wants, in this way, to satisfy the demand for justifying all premises from within itself is completed. In scientific or scholarly method modern philosophy of consciousness turns into a theory which loses its exemplary character of life, and which remains in itself and for itself as absolute and self-justifying.

The matter is here that, for Habermas, philosophy from its beginning to modern period has had a salvational character as in the case of Buddhist or Christian religions. Each of the great world religions stakes out a privileged and particularly demanding path to the attainment of individual salvation - e.g., the way to the salvation of the wandering Buddhist monk or that of the Christian hermit. Philosophy recommends as its path to salvation the life dedicated to contemplation- the *bios theoretikos*. It stands at the pinnacle of ancient forms of life, above the *vita activa* of the statesman, the pedagogue or the physician.¹¹

But "in the modern period the concept of theory loses this link to the sacred occurrences, just as it loses its elite character, which is moderated into social privilege."¹² Theory thus becomes 'pure' in the sense of having been purged of all traces of its earthly origin. In other words, *bios theoretikos* having a salvational character turns into a theory which has no longer its exemplary character of life.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 32.

¹²*Ibid.*, 33.

Now let us consider Heidegger's analysis of the concept of *bios theoretikos*, and the concept of theory in the ancient world and in the modern world. According to Heidegger, *Bios praktikos* meant, in the Greek world, the way of life that is dedicated to action and productivity. In contrast to that *bios theoretikos* meant the life of beholding, in the sense that *theoria* was to behold what unconceals itself from concealment. In other words, man's taking hold of the truth, the clearing of Being, or in Heidegger's own words:

Theoria is the reverant paying heed to the unconcealment of what presences. Theory in the old, and that means the early but by no means the obsolete, sense is the beholding that watches over truth.¹³

Therefore, *bios theoretikos* was the way of life of the beholder, the one who looks upon what presences out of concealment as *es gibt* of Being. In this sense, for Greeks, *bios theoretikos* was the 'highest doing' in its purest form as thinking.¹⁴

On the other hand, in the modern world, for Heidegger, theory turns into a 'pure relation' as the subject-object relation, in the sense that the relation itself takes precedence over the object and the subject. He concludes that:

The subject-object relation thus reaches for the first time, its pure 'relational', i.e., ordering character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up standing-reserves.¹⁵

In other words, subject and object no longer stand in a relation of representation, but are both absorbed into a total systematic ordering, not only the object, but the subject, man himself, becomes a standing-reserve. Since, according to Heidegger, modern science is the theory of the real, which sets upon (*stellen*) the real.

Theory makes secure at any given time a region of the real as its object - area. The area-character of objectness is shown in the fact that it specifically maps out in advance the possibilities for the posing questions. Every new phenomenon emerging within the an area of science is refined to a such point that it fits into the normative objective coherence of theory. That normative coherence itself is thereby changed from time to time. But objectness as such remains unchanged in its fundamental characteristics.¹⁶

¹³"Science and Reflection" in QC, 161.165.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 169.

Objectness changes into the constancy of the standing-reserve, determined from out of *Enframing*, which causes the pure subject-object relation. In short, whatever is, such as nature, man, history, language, is changing into an object-area in its objectness as standing-reserve in terms of theory.

It can be said by way of a concluding remark that both Habermas and Heidegger take the Greek concept *bios theoretikos*, underlying history of metaphysics, in the same sense. For Habermas, it is the life dedicated to philosophical salvation, and for Heidegger, it is the life of beholding what presences as truth. Therefore, it is the highest doing in its purest form as thinking. In this way, they both come to the same conclusion about *bios theoretikos* in their own right, according to Habermas, through history of metaphysics, it turns into a 'theory' which is pure, i.e., theory now stands within itself; hence, without *bios*; while for Heidegger, it becomes a pure subject-object relation within it both object and subject, i.e., man including his life, *bios* change into a standing-reserve. In other words, *bios theoretikos* becomes 'the theory' without *bios*, and even sovereign over *bios*.

Now I would like to carry on this discussion in terms of Habermas's evaluation of Heidegger's philosophy. Habermas, in his other work, *vis.*, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, points out that the philosophy of Heidegger has a secular salvational motif.¹⁷ Habermas argues that, the motif of responsibility for one's own salvation is found in the thought of Heidegger as the formula about care for one's own existence, i.e., Dasein is such a being that for which its ownmost Being is an issue, i.e., his ownmost capacity to be.

Heidegger no longer wants to think the totality of the finite Dasein 'ontotheologically' out of an empowering relationship to some highest entity or to entities taken as a whole; but rather only out of itself - that is, as a self-affirmation that is paradoxical because it is without any basis.¹⁸

Man as Dasein grounds itself from out of itself, this lies in the transcendence of Dasein as freedom which is the essence of truth. That heroic and nihilistic self-affirmation of Dasein in its finitude and impotence is what constitutes the salvational motif

¹⁷Jurgen Habermas. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. by F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987), 145.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 150.

in Heidegger's philosophy, in the sense that Heidegger's attempt to carry through *bios theoretikos* as highest doing and in the form of *es gibt* of Being.

It must have become clear by the above discussions that not only for Habermas, but also for Heidegger, *bios theoretikos* has turned through the history of metaphysics into a theory which is neither the life dedicated to philosophical salvation, nor yet the way of life beholding of what presences out of concealment as *es gibt* of Being. Yet if we consider Habermas' claim that in the philosophy of Heidegger still such a salvational motif is to be found and also considering that according to Heidegger himself *bios theoretikos*' turning into a pure subject-object relation in terms of *Enframing* as the essence of technology destined by Being itself, then as a mode revealing of the truth of Being, what comes to fore is that Heidegger's recollection of history of metaphysics, including *Enframing* itself, belongs to *bios theoretikos* as a definite way of life of man. In other words, Heidegger's philosophy belongs to the traditional philosophy which he tries to overcome. Rorty also seems to argue for this point:

One may say of Heidegger what he himself says of Nietzsche: misled by a superficial understanding of the Platonic ideas, he tried to replace them, but instead only translated Platonism into a newer jargon.¹⁹

"Overcoming", according to Heidegger, "is the delivering over metaphysics to its truth".²⁰ But at the same time metaphysics delivers over its truth to Heidegger's philosophy, because his philosophy belonging to *bios theoretikos* is still a theory of truth, a theory of salvation and his basic concept Being, by which he unifies Western history into one account in terms of ontological difference, remains in the metaphysical tradition as a Platonic concept, as its concept of truth; the only difference being the fact that they are turned into the concepts having temporal-historical character by Heidegger..

At the very beginning of our discussion I have shown that Heidegger's main interest in the question of truth is indeed a question of man. And it has been shown that, for Heidegger, *Enframing*, on the one hand, means a turning of the truth of Being into truthless Being as the end of *die Konstellation von Sein und Mensch*; hence, the end of animal

¹⁹Richard Rorty. "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", *The Review of Metaphysics*, 30; 2 (1976), 305.

²⁰"Overcoming Metaphysics" in BW, 92.

rationale. On the other hand, it points to the end of *bios theoretikos* as the end of highest doing of man. Finally, I have argued that Heidegger's philosophy still falls within the boundaries of the tradition.

That Heidegger ends Being with truth, i.e., *es gibt* of Being, which are in their essence Platonic concepts, and he ends with the Platonic understanding of man, i.e., animal rationale, means the end of Da-sein, or rather, the being exists in the light of Being. As Derida argues in this regard:

The end of man is thinking of Being, man is the end of the thinking of Being. Man, since always, is his proper end, that is, the end of his proper. Being, since always, is its proper end, that is, the end of its proper.²¹

Heidegger seems to imply this conclusion also in the following words:

Precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence. Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken, and hence fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists...²²

If man is no longer Da-sein, including animal rationale, what is the 'who' of man. Heidegger leaves us only saying that man has to become mortal.

Metaphysics... thinks of man as animal, as a living being. Even when ratio pervades animalitas, man's being remains defined by life and life-experience. Rational living beings must first become mortals.²³

Since Nietzsche has also attempted to overcome tradition, and he has deeply effected Heidegger's thought, I want to evaluate Heidegger's claim of the end of philosophy, of Being, of man, of truth ect., by intruding Nietzsche's philosophy. The following points are what remain to us from Nietzsche's and Heidegger's philosophy either as a rejection or as an overcoming of the tradition:

1)The end of *bios theoretikos* and the end of truth. For Heidegger as the end of *es gibt* of Being, for Nietzsche as a rejection of Platonic-Christian world and its truth, therefore, "art is worth more than truth". Nietzsche thus concludes that:

²¹Jack Derida. "The Ends of Man" in *After Philosophy: End or Transformation*, ed. by K. Baynes, J. Bohmen and T. McCarthy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987), 149.

²²QC, 308-309.

²³"The Thing" in PL, 179.

A powerful seduction fights on our behalf, the most powerful that there has ever been - the seduction of truth-
'Truth'? Who has forced this word on me? But I repudiate it, but I disdain this proud word; no we do not need even this; we shall conquer and come to power even without truth. The spell that fights on our behalf, the eye of Venus that charms and blinds ever our opponents, is the magic of the extreme, the seduction that everything extreme exercises; we immoralists - we are the most extreme.²⁴

2) Finally, the life itself, i.e., *bios*, as taken Nietzsche's stand, and our death, as mortal beings, taken as Heidegger's stand distinguish both philosophers from each other.

²⁴Frederick Nietzsche. *The will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. I. Holligdale (New York: Vintage Press, 1968), 479.

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