TEZ ŞABLONU ONAY FORMU
THESIS TEMPLATE CONFIRMATION FORM

1. Şablonda verilen yerleşim ve boşluklar değiştirilmemelidir.
2. Jüri tarihi Başlık Sayfası, İmza Sayfası, Abstract ve Öz'de ilgili yerlere yazılmalıdır.
3. İmza sayfasında jüri üyelerinin unvanları doğru olarak yazılmalıdır.
4. Tezin son sayfasının sayfa numarası Abstract ve Öz'de ilgili yerlere yazılmalıdır.
5. Bütün chapterlar, referanslar, ekler ve CV sağ sayfada başlamalıdır. Bunun için **kesmeler** kullanılmıştır. **Kesmelerin kayması** fazladan boş sayfaların oluşmasına sebep olabilir. Bu gibi durumlarda paragraf (¶) işaretine tıklayarak kesmeleri görünür hale getirin ve yerlerini **kontrol edin**.
6. Figürler ve tablolar kenar boşluklarına taşmamalıdır.
7. Şablonda yorum olarak eklenen uyarılar dikkatle okunmalı ve uygulanmalıdır.
8. Tez yazdırılmadan önce PDF olarak kaydedilmelidir. Şablonda yorum olarak eklenen uyarılar PDF dokümanında yer almamalıdır.
9. **Bu form aracılığıyla oluşturulan PDF dosyasını arkalı-önlü yazdırın.**
10. Tez taslağınız, ilgili alanları (jüri imzalandıktan sonra, [Tez Juri Atama Formu](#) ile birlikte Lisansüstü Akademik Kurul Sekreterliğine teslim edilmelidir.
11. Tez taslaklarının kontrol işlemleri tamamlandığında, bu durum öğrencilere METU uzantılı öğrenci e-posta adresleri aracılığıyla duyurulacaktır.

1. Do not change the spacing and placement in the template.
2. Write defense date to the related places given on Title page, Approval page, Abstract and Öz.
3. Write the titles of the examining committee members correctly on Approval Page.
4. Write the page number of the last page in the related places given on Abstract and Öz pages.
5. All chapters, references, appendices and CV must be started on the right page. **Section Breaks** were used for this. **Change in the placement** of section breaks can result in extra blank pages. In such cases, make the section breaks visible by clicking paragraph (¶) mark and **check their position.**
6. All figures and tables must be given inside the page. Nothing must appear in the margins.
7. All the warnings given on the comments section through the thesis template must be read and applied.
8. Save your thesis as pdf and Disable all the comments before taking the printout.
9. **Print two-sided the PDF file that you have created through this form.**
10. Once you have signed the relevant fields in your thesis draft, submit it to the department secretary together with your [Thesis Jury Appointment Form](#).
11. This will be announced to the students via their METU students e-mail addresses when the control of the thesis drafts has been completed.

☒ **Yukarıda bulunan tüm maddeleri okudum, anladım ve kabul ediyorum. / I have read, understand and accept all of the items above.**

Name : Melih Can
Surname : Şahin
E-Mail : melih.sahin@metu.edu.tr
Date : 25.07.2021
Signature : _____

EFFECTS OF HEALTH AND SECURITY BASED THREATS ON THE TRUST
IN GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY, AND THE MEDIATOR ROLE OF
COLLECTIVE ANGST

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE BOARD OF GRADUATE PROGRAMS
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, NORTHERN CYPRUS CAMPUS

BY

MELİH CAN ŞAHİN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

AUGUST 2021

Approval of the Board of Graduate Programs

_____

Prof. Dr. Oğuz Solyalı

Chairperson

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science

_____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Hande Sözer

Program Coordinator

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____   _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Reşit Kışlıoğlu   Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özdemir

Co-Supervisor   Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özdemir   Political Science and
                                     International Relations Program
                                     METU NCC   _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazan Avcı   Psychology Program
                                     METU NCC   _____

Prof. Dr. Bülent Evre   Political Science and
                                     International Relations Program
                                     Bahcesehir Cyprus University   _____

iv

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Melih Can Sahin

Signature:

ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF HEALTH AND SECURITY BASED THREATS ON THE TRUST IN GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY, AND THE MEDIATOR ROLE OF COLLECTIVE ANGST

Şahin, Melih Can
Master of Science, Political Science and International Relations Program
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özdemir
Co-Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Reşit Kışlıoğlu

August 2021, 98 pages

Previous research found that people's trust in government (particularly right-wing and populist governments) increases in the existence of a societal threat or crisis. However, most of this research is conducted in individualistic cultures like the USA. In addition, most of the previous research focused on threats originating from a particular out-group (such as ISIS threat to the US). Experimental research on how societal threats not originating from a particular group against an in-group (such as COVID-19) affect people's political attitude is lacking. Also, current literature does not answer whether collective angst (concern for in-group's future vitality) can explain the relationship between health-related threats and trust in the government. Seven hundred twenty-two white-collar workers were enrolled in the online experimental study. The results yielded that participants exposed to health-based and security-based threat situations did not differ significantly from the control group in any of the research variables. Regression analyses showed that, only in the security group, the perceived threat level predicted collective angst, and in turn, trust in government. However, predictor variables accounted for the variance in outcome variables only fractionally; correlations between the variables were also weak. The implications of the results are discussed mainly based on the deficiencies in the

research design, cultural and educational background of the study sample, and past and current political atmosphere in Turkey.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE SAĞLIK VE GÜVENLİK TEMELLİ TEHDİTLERİN HÜKÜMETE GÜVENE ETKİSİ VE BU İLİŞKİDEKİ TOPLUMSAL KAYGININ ARABULUCU ROLÜ

Şahin, Melih Can
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Yonca Özdemir
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Reşit Kışlıoğlu

Ağustos 2021, 98 sayfa

Önceki araştırmalar, insanların hükümete (özellikle sağcı ve popülist hükümetlere) olan güveninin, toplumsal bir tehdit veya kriz varlığında arttığını ortaya çıkarmıştı. Ancak, bu araştırmaların çoğu ABD gibi bireyci kültürlerde yürütülmüştür. Ayrıca, önceki araştırmaların çoğu, belirli bir dış gruptan kaynaklanan tehditlere (ABD'ye yönelik IŞİD tehdidi gibi) odaklanmıştır. Belirli bir gruptan kaynaklanmayan bir gruba yönelik (COVID-19 gibi) toplumsal tehditlerin insanların siyasi tutumunu nasıl etkilediğine dair deneysel araştırmalar yürütülmemiştir. Ayrıca, mevcut literatür toplumsal beka kaygısının sağlıkla ilgili tehditler ile hükümete olan güven arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklayıp açıklayamayacağına cevap vermemektedir. Bu online deneysel çalışma yedi yüz yirmi iki beyaz yakalı çalışan üzerinden yürütülmüştür. Sonuçlar, sağlık ve güvenlik temelli tehdit durumlarına maruz kalan katılımcıların araştırma değişkenlerinin hiçbirinde kontrol grubundan önemli ölçüde farklılık göstermediğini ortaya koydu. Regresyon analizleri, yalnızca güvenlik grubunda, algılanan tehdit düzeyinin toplumsal kaygı aracılığıyla hükümete olan güveni öngördüğünü gösterdi. Ancak, yordayıcı değişkenler, sonuç değişkenlerindeki

varyansın çok küçük bir kısmını açıklamıştır. Bununla birlikte, değişkenler arasındaki korelasyonlar da zayıf olarak bulunmuştur. Bu sonuçlar, temel olarak araştırma tasarımındaki eksiklikler, çalışma örneğinin kültürel ve eğitim geçmişi ile Türkiye'deki geçmiş ve mevcut siyasi atmosfer başlıklarına dayalı olarak tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal Tehdit, Algılanan Tehdit, Toplumsal Beka Kaygısı, Hükümete Güven

To my beloved friends, Burak and Onur

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özdemir and Asst. Prof. Dr. Reşit Kışlıoglu for making it possible for me to work on this research topic. Your efforts, guidance, and teachings throughout the thesis process will also permanently shed light on my future academic life. And I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Nazan Avcı and Prof. Dr. Bülent Evre for accepting to be my Examining Committee Members. I feel gratitude for your comments and questions that have opened new potentials for more exciting research projects. I also appreciate the patience, help, and direction of Dr. İlker Öner during challenging times of our masters' education. And finally, I would like to thank Asst. Dr. Aslı Niyazi, Asst. Dr. Dogu Erdener, and Asst. Dr. Hande Sözer, for their endless support and guidance throughout my education life. I cannot express my gratitude with words for your contributions to my academic and personal life.

My lovely friends Sina and Nilay, thank you for not letting me feel alone during my master's studies and always being there whenever needed help. I gratitude your invaluable companionship during our journey to PhD studies. You will remain deep in my heart and memory! Kübra and Büşra... You may be out of sight, but you will always be close to my heart. Every time I remember you, a happy smile will appear on my face, longing for our happy reunions. I will be looking forward to meeting you at a table with Dayı Bey! Matthew, Zekican, and Hakan, I always felt that I was one of the luckiest residents of the dorm thanks to you. Thank you so much for being so supportive and standing beside me for the last two years! Tuğba Hanım, Günalp Bey, Cennet and Nazlı Hanım, thank you for providing me with a warm family environment here at METU NCC. Feeling your presence here has given me strength and made my life on the campus much more enjoyable; thank you so much for everything!

And finally, goodbye Queen of hearts. May we meet in other lands soon!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii

xiv

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The majority of research on the relationship between societal threat perceptions and political attitudes included zero-sum game perceptions. In this type of threat, there is an outgroup perceived as the source of a particular threat. For example, in the case of a terrorist attack, the source of the societal threat is posed by a particular group of terrorists against a particular nation (e.g., Solheim, 2018). However, the world has faced a different kind of threat that had severe adverse effects on life's social, economic, and psychological aspects. On March 11, 2020, COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic; since then, its impacts on people have increasingly continued throughout the world (Branswell & Joseph, 2020). Like the rest of the world, within a short period of time, the cases in Turkey took a sudden increase, putting Turkey first ten countries affected by the pandemic in terms of the number of cases (Johns Hopkins University, 2020). Economic effects of COVID-19 were the central aspect of this pandemic that was emphasized by many of the research in the literature; however, the social and political influence of the pandemic was ignored until a recent time (Karwowski et al., 2020) despite the crucial social and political conundrum coming along with the pandemic (Zangana, 2020). In line with this, Landler and Eddy (2020, para. 4) comment: "The economic, social and political grievances that fed populist and xenophobic movements in many countries are still alive, and indeed,

maybe reinforced by the ravages of the coronavirus pandemic…." As the coronavirus pandemic has hit people in social and economic aspects of life, it is beyond a mere health crisis. Moreover, natural disasters like this pandemic bring about "uncertainty" among the public. In these crises, governments are the nonpareil institutions that have the power to protect the public from the detrimental effects of the disasters; for this reason, it is possible that state-sided attitudes may increase in the times of COVID-19 as well (Crabtree et al., 2020).

1.1 Theories and Concepts Used in the Study

Before getting into the literature review and the scope of the study, it is important to understand the concepts and theories upon which this study is constructed. The following subchapters aim to facilitate understanding of the possible direct relationship between societal threats and increased trust in government.

1.1.1 Social Identity Theory and System Justification Theory

Some theoretical explanations may shed light on why trust in particular governments may increase during crises and threats. For example, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) explains a part of the story behind why people may produce responses such as an increased tendency to authoritarian and populist leaders. It suggests that any threat to social identities might result in diverse collective defensive responses in order to alleviate the effects of these threats. Stenner (2005) claims that these tendencies do not occur when the anxiety is induced at the

individual level, but they change people's political attitudes when they threaten collective identities. Katz (1960) suggests that leaning on authoritarian leaders and tendencies may work as a defensive mechanism against societal threats that instill people with anxiety about the "collective oneness" (as cited in Stenner, 2005). This is because they seek to compensate threatened social identities by embracing their in-group identifications, which may also result in supporting populist leaders that emphasize "us" over "them" (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2014), and giving the "real" people a saying in the governance of the country (Hameleers et al., 2021). In addition to the premises of Social Identity Theory, System Justification theory also gives us clues about why we would expect increased trust in government in the face of a societal threat. This theory resonates well with the rally the round effect discussed in depth in the literature review section. This theory suggests that even though a constructed political or social system negatively affects people's own interests, they tend to support and justify this formed societal structure because of the feeling of security found within the system. In the presence of a perceived threat, they become even more likely to support the status quo due to the ambiguity coming along with a threat. To get rid of these negative feelings, they also become inclined to trust in institutions (including governments) that are "capable" of dealing with the threat presented (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

1.1.2   The Concept of Populism

At this point, we should clarify the concept of populism and populist leaders. Similar to Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi (2020), I base my concept of populism on the conceptualization of Mudde (2004). According to Mudde, populism is more like a political strategy in which people are divided into groups of "real people" versus "corrupt elite" as well as "national sovereignty vs. sinister external and internal powers." Likewise, Hameleers et al. (2021) suggest that populism is a way of communication that leads governments to project themselves as those who can be trusted during crises situations; they merge the image of a particular society with their own image (against those who are enemy of the real nation, people's will prevail). Lastly, the researchers claim that populist attitudes can be awakened when a threat is made salient.

1.1.3   Cognitive Model of Anxiety

Before understanding how threatening situations may trigger anxiety, and in turn, various political leanings, we should better have a look at what anxiety means in the first place. The anxiety model upon which this thesis is built was proposed by Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985). Based on their definition, anxiety is the emotionally negative state that manifests itself by psychological (like tension) and physical symptoms. Regarding the relationship between fear and anxiety, they argue that while anxiety is an emotional state, fear is a cognitive state. And when fear is made salient around, anxiety kicks in the play. The Cognitive Model of Anxiety (CMA) is

proposed based on the premises given by the authors. Thus, three appraisals result in anxiety occurring at the individual level. The first one is harm probability, which defines the likelihood of a particular event to harm an individual ("how likely a diplomatic tension with another country harm me"). The second appraisal is harm severity, the state in which a person assesses to what extent they would be affected by a threat around ("how severely infected by coronavirus would damage my life"). The last one is identified as perceived self-efficacy, which acknowledges a person on how likely she would protect herself from this harm ("whether I can deal with the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic"). These components may also manifest themselves at various psycho-social outcomes. For example, these appraisals were found to be an indicator of low self-control, which leads to more reliance on religion and government (Kay, Gaucher, MCGregor & Nash, 2010), increased preference for autocratic leaders (Schoel et al., 2011), and more likelihood of feeling anxious due to COVID-19 (Li et al., 2020). Although this model was proposed to predict anxiety felt at individual level, it was adapted successfully for eliciting anxiety at the group level as well (e.g. Tabri, Wohl, & Caouette, 2018).

1.1.4 The Concepts of Threat and Collective Angst

The definition of threat in this thesis fits into Karen Stenner's (2005) conceptualization of threat. Stenner states that it is a concept pushing us to get anxious because it subverts beliefs about what makes people who they are, including shared values, systems, and "settled sameness" in a given society. More specifically,

such societal threats are shown to be increasing collective angst among people (e.g., Jetten et al., 2017).

Finally, some of these consequences are engendered by existential threats causing unsettlement of pre-formed believes and meanings laid upon group memberships (Rosenfeld & Tomiyama, 2020). For this reason, when people feel a threat to the society they are a member of, they can develop a feeling called collective angst due to the anxiety caused by a threatening situation. Collective angst is the feeling awakened when someone feels the future vitality of her in-group is in danger. In other words, it is the increased concern for the future vitality of a group. To protect their group's future from a threat, people may develop counterintuitive responses as a buffer against this societal threat. These responses change based on what is deemed as necessary by the people to get rid of this feeling (Tabri, Wohl, & Caouette, 2018). As will be discussed in more detail in the literature review section, these responses against threats may include an increased preference for conservative and authoritarian leaders. In the same vein, Mols and Jetten (2014) argue that populist leaders consistently exploit such threats to keep feelings of anxiety amidst public high, and their voting support is vital.

1.1.5   The Concept of Trust in Government

The trust in government in this thesis research was adapted to reflect people's trust in government in terms of how well the Turkish government performs in a given task such as competing with coronavirus and territorial issues. Also, I am reading the trust in government primarily through the confidence put in Recep Tayyip Erdogan throughout the thesis. This understanding is exemplified by Görener and Ucal (2011, p. 376), who argue that:

> "… it comes now as no surprise that he (Erdogan) has been at the center of decision-making in Turkey and that he has been the driving force behind many of his government's policy choices. His strong grip over the political process and his authoritarian tendencies have long been recognized by analysts as they have increasingly begun referring to Turkey as "Erdogan's Turkey" or "Erdogan's Ankara government'..."

1.2   The Current Study

It is now clear that threats that drive people to different socio-political attitudes can be examined based on two main types: those derived from an outgroup and those in which the source of threat is not a particular outgroup. While the tension between Greece and Turkey in the East Mediterranean can be evaluated under the former one (security threat), the COVID-19 threat can be regarded as a kind of societal threat described later (health threat). By drawing on the literature on the socio-political consequences of various societal threats, I will examine the effects of health and security-based threats to see if they yield similar political attitudes among people.

As exemplified below in the literature review section, pathogenic threats can be studied for their political outcomes at the intergroup or intragroup levels. This thesis will examine the political consequences of the pandemic at the intragroup level because intergroup level political attitudes may result from intragroup changes brought about by pathogenic threats (Tybur, 2016).

This is important to answer since threats like COVID-19 could not be exploited by the populist government in Turkey because the source of threat is not originating from a particular outgroup. This is why I will compare the threat caused by East Mediterranean tension with Greece (which is used by the government to induce hostility against an out-group) with the threat caused by COVID-19 (which is not a zero-sum game as the former one). Consequently, health-based threats are harder to induce people a populist tendency. In fact, in many parts of the world, many populists gained power during the pandemic (see; Yam et al., 2020). A possible reason behind this increased support may be the threat induced by the pandemic, just like it is in another kind of threat. This is why it is important to form a cause-effect relationship between the anxiety caused by societal threats and government trust. In this thesis, I will focus on the direct cause of threats on political attitudes.

The contribution of this study will be three-fold. First of all, It is already known that during a societal threat or crisis, support for the leaders in the office increases. Still, the question is whether this is caused by the anxiety elicited only by a particular outgroup (in this case, the threat would cause increased trust in government only in the security group). We can find an answer to this question by examining two kinds

of threats separately for the political outcomes they elicit. Besides, there is no study examining the direct effect of a health-based societal threat on political attitudes by experimental means. Moreover, although the collective angst was shown to mediate between perceived threat and trust in government in intergroup threats, its role in health-based threats is unknown. Lastly, almost all of the studies conducted on this relationship are conducted with people from Western countries. This research will be the first to examine whether the same threat inductions would work for the Turkish case as well.

Answering these questions will not only help us understand how and why people would appeal to populist, authoritarian leaders in the office but also will shed light on the political communication between leaders and the public. For example, what kind of threat discourses might be effective to increase government trust amongst the white-collar workers in Turkey? Answering these questions will also help us understand the political attitudes of white-collar workers in Turkey. For example, Turkish people might trust a populist government since this may be one of the responses adapted to alleviate anxiety engendered by different threats (intergroup tension and health-based threats).

Besides the advantages of the sample consisting of university graduates (as noted in the methodology section), it is important to keep in mind that the study does not reflect the overall Turkish population. Although this study will show what kind of threat would work in the sample of university graduates, we cannot compare whether the same result would be obtained with those with lower educational backgrounds.

In addition, as this study is the first of its kind in the Turkish sample, most of the scales in the study were just produced or translated into Turkish for the first time. It is important to conduct similar studies with samples representing Turkish society better and with scales that would capture psycho-social characteristics of individuals.

Based on previous research and premises of Social Identity Theory and System Justification Theory, I will try to find an answer to the following questions:

1. Does the level of identification with Turkey predict collective angst for the future of Turkey across the groups?

2. Does the level of perceived societal threat predict collective angst in the experimental groups?

3. Does the collective angst predict trust in government across the research groups?

4. Does collective angst mediate the relationship between perceived threat and trust in government?

The following hypotheses are made regarding the questions above:

H (1): Identification with Turkey will predict Collective Angst in all of the groups.

H (2): The level of perceived threat induced by articles will predict Collective Angst only in the experimental groups

H (3): The Collective Angst will predict Trust in Government in all three groups.

H (4): Perceived threat induced by articles and Trust in Government relationship will be mediated by Collective Angst in the experimental groups.

Below, the literature review part is divided into six main headings. After giving how previous literature studied threat and its societal effects, the first sub-section will follow. The aim of this section is to outline how and why authoritarian and populist leaders' appeals might increase under threats. I will begin with the threat caused by health-related issues to exemplify what kind of political attitudes these threats may cause. In the next part, I will exemplify threats caused by intergroup tensions whose effects on political issues are better known than the threat-based kind. Next, I will focus on mechanisms that may increase people's trust in governments under threatening situations. Lastly, I will talk about the implications of the societal segments for the societal threats and their political consequences.

In the methodology section, I will talk about the selection of particular sample and analysis methods. Moreover, I will outline why Turkey is a fit for this study by showing how Erdogan managed to influence people with his populist discourse and projected himself as the leader who can be seen as the "protector" of the Turkish society. In the next section, I will talk about the method acquired for the investigation of the main research questions. In the fifth section, the results gained from the statistical analysis will be reported. In the conclusion section, I will talk more about the results and provide theoretical background for the research findings.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the following sections, I will be utilizing both Psychology and Political Science literature. This is mainly because the topic this thesis research deals with requires one to comprehend the issue of trust from individuals, groups, and governments' points of view altogether. I believe the antecedents and nature of this kind of topic require researchers to utilize diverse disciplines, methodologies, and sample groups. Hopefully, the previous work on this issue will provide readers with such a resource to understand the issue comprehensively.

2.1   Previous Research on Threat and Political Attitudes

Threats and counterintuitive responses to these threats can be examined both at the personal and group level. As Social Identity Theory suggests, in the existence of a salient threat to people's self-esteem at the individual or group level, people generate compensatory responses stemming from their group-level identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To illustrate, Fein and Spencer (1997) manipulated the self-viability of participants by offering them negative or positive feedback based on their intelligence test scores. When they were given negative feedback, participants acquired stereotyping compensatory responses derogating outgroup members (study

2). This is an example of a threat to an individual that is compensated by derogation of an out-group. However, threats may also undermine one's group-level identity.

As Fein and Spencer's study exemplifies, rather than intergroup effects, a threat to self-identity may also come along with intra-group effects. For example, Kay et al. (2008) threatened participants' self-control by asking them to remember past events that left participants with a situation over which they had no control. In this condition, they were more likely to choose items endorsing the government's success. In other words, they relied more on the government as a compensatory response to their harmed self-control. In addition, in the face of such a threat, people are also more likely to endorse the controlling God and religiosity (Kay et al., 2010). Besides relying on institutions and religions, as Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggested, people may set forth their social identities in the case that their self-identities are undermined by lessened self-control. In accordance with our discussion, turning to "we" from "I" may also result in favoritism of in-group and ethnocentrism (Fritsche et al., 2013). In the same study, researchers induced participants with a "double threat." In addition to individual-based threats causing ambiguity, researchers also generated group-based threats. When the group agency (e.g., "endorsing in-group members who are working for their own interests") and homogeneity ("differences among the members of the group") are threatened, people's own group favoritism and biases are getting even more exacerbated. Also, in-group identification was found to be a strong moderator for this relationship.

Besides threatening group characteristics, Sprong et al. (2019) showed that threat to the structure of society also gives way to a particular defensive response: preference for more strong and authoritarian leaders. When they made participants face greater inequality in their imagined society, they became more supportive of such leaders. Researchers also showed this relationship to occur through the perception that society is getting languish, which is called "anomie." As one of the starting points of this paper, Sprong and his colleagues argue that such uncertainty and anxieties lead people to resign to authorities who are perceived as to be "capable" of alleviating sources of these negative feelings. More specifically, people may go for populist leaders, who are perceived and pictured as the leaders who can make the society wholesome and bring the voice of "the people," which can also be called "popular sovereignty" (Hameleers et al., 2021). This is one of the main reasons why the trust in today's Turkey's government, ruled by populist Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can be expected to increase when a societal crisis is made salient. As I will discuss in the *Trust in Government under Societal Threats* section, the Turkish government utilizes populist discourses to keep the distrust in government lower by generating real or imagined societal threats.

Although the effects of threats can be studied for intergroup and intragroup processes and changes (Tybur et al., 2016), as the previous and following studies show, throughout the thesis, I will focus on intragroup changes of attitudes. This is because this paper is interested in the political consequences of different threats, which constitute defensive responses directed at intragroup reactions.

We can see that the effects of threats on various political attitudes and consequences result in myriad ways of defensive responses. Similar to previously noted research findings, Jost et al. (2007) claim that when a person faces a threat, they embrace conservative values and leaders to overcome psychological disturbances entailed by ambiguity and threat. This is why the researchers say that threat is likely to make people preserve the status quo and become indifferent to social hierarchies. Regarding another possible political consequence of a societal threat coronavirus-based societal threat, as we will examine in more detail in the next sections, some researchers surmised that increased salience of COVID-19 threat might lead people to keep the political status quo by preferring conservative parties running the management of governments (Karwowski et al., 2020). The political discourses produced by some groups of political leaders, such as populist political leaders (see; Hameleers et al., 2021), may also exacerbate the tendency of people to go for extremist political attitudes. As a result of increased extremist political preferences caused by societal threats, the emerged political atmosphere contributes to the increased polarization even further (Pyszczynski, 2019). Laying their hypotheses upon the work of David Fromm, Scheepers, Felling, and Peters (1990) argued that when people feel anxiety and repression within their own social classes, they want to alleviate these feelings, which they cannot do on their own. This leads them to submit to authoritarian leaders who can be a "saver of the society."

Before turning our attention to specific threat types and their political consequences, I will open a new parenthesis for what kind of leaders are perceived as savers of societies and how they exploit mechanisms that would increase support for their

policies. The primary purpose of the following chapter is to exemplify, under societal threats, people tend to follow particular leaders or political parties that, in the eyes of people, carry the capability of resurrecting the country and freeing society from the threatening conditions.

2.2   Authoritarianism, Populism and Collective Threats

In her book called *The Authoritarian Dynamic* (2005), Karen Stenner links these authoritarian tendencies, including relaying on authoritarian powers, with the responses given against the societal threats. She deliberates on the nature of these situations eliciting societal threats. According to Stenner, these conditions encapsulate perception of social disorder, risk of society's destruction due to decreased morality, society's downturn nationally, and political instability. She also supports her ideas by giving examples of Nazi Germany, to which we will turn in the section below, titled *Trust in Government under Societal Threats*. For now, it is important to realize that the threats in our experiments also include some of these components, particularly national decline (societal breakdowns) and social disorder (societal tragedies). As I included the same elements based on the differentiated source of threats, this research will uncover whether these components would induce anxiety caused by diverse threat conditions (health and intergroup threats).

Apart from the increased salience of authoritarian dispositions among people, she also delves more into the political consequences of societal threats. Corresponding to previous studies noted earlier, she emphasizes that when the perception of societal

threat increases, it engenders intolerance, militarist attitudes, severe punishments against culprits, appealing to in-group and values further, as well as distancing themselves from out-groups. What leads people to generate such responses is the cleaving of psychological mechanisms that revives the feelings of security, meaning in life, and comfort. As Stenner suggests, in those inclined to think in an authoritarian manner, one of the components of what constitutes a dangerous world is losing their trust in leaders. We can say that in this situation, they would look for ways to boost their confidence in leaders and government to remove this threat of dangerous world posed against their collective identities.

Very well in line with the previously noted outcomes of societal threat, the issue of populist leader preference may also give us clues about the political leanings of people under threats to their collective identities. Palmer (2019, para. 2) cites Isaiah Berlin's words to illustrate the main idea behind populist leaders' politics: '"The notion that an authentic "true people" have been "damaged by an elite, whether economic, political, or racial, some kind of secret or open enemy."' Additionally, he combines Jan-Werner Müller's understanding of populism (populists are also anti-pluralist) with Berlin's populism. He asserts that the government in Turkey represents the Berlin-Muller type of populism. Some of the characteristics and discourses of populist leaders are important to consider here because they provide a background for removing psychological disturbances brought about by exposure to societal threats. For example, Palmer says that both populist leaders, Chavez and Erdogan, identify themselves as "the people," as Erdogan once said: '"We are the people! Who are you?"' As populist leaders mainly identify themselves as

representative of "true people" and protectors of their society, we can expect an increase of trust in those leaders under societal threats. This fits in very well with the background behind the production of psychological defenses, such as relying on strong leaders during a collective threat. Second, populist leaders are inclined to create enemies to societies; this is a strategic movement of populist leaders to push people against an "enemy" whether it is real or imaginative enemies of true people. For example, Palmer states that Brexit voters' main concern was a threat to their societies engendered by EU membership. And British politicians emphasized this threat to justify the Brexit decision in the public's eyes. As we will examine in more detail in the following chapters about threats, pathogenic threats can also be exploited by populist leaders for their own political benefits. McKee et al. (2020) note that there is a bidirectional relationship between COVID-19 and populist attitudes of leaders in a way that the spread of coronavirus can exacerbate the spread of populism and vice versa. Similarly, Gugushvili et al. (2020) give examples of historical cases illustrating the relationship between contagious diseases and increased preferences for the parties laying at the outmost edges of the ideological spectrum and exploitation of increased morality for political interests. Moreover, the political atmosphere during crises lets some governments diminish democratic institutions in a way that people become more sympathetic to political leaders who they perceive as the "protector of society" and the "strong man" against threats that have arisen. This situation also makes these people less likely to refrain from withdrawing their support from political parties they support and/or the party in office (Bayerlein & Gyöngyösy, 2020).

2.3   Health-Based Threats and Political Attitudes

One explanation of why health-based threats may shape political attitudes comes from the account of evolutionary psychology. When the salience of pathogenic stress is high, people get more conservative and traditionalist societal characteristics associated with religiosity (Duckitt et al., 2010) to avoid detrimental effects of pathogen threats (Tybur et al., 2016). The political outcome of this political leaning may manifest itself in the preference for authoritarian governments, which are characterized by the governmental endorsement of social conformity, lack of tolerance of dissent, and ethnocentrism – found to be correlated with the presence of authoritarian governance type and parasite prevalence across societies (Murray, Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013). Similarly, Thornhill, Fincher, and Aran (2009) claim that the democratization process in the US and Europe only became possible with the reduction of parasite stress –associated with conservative ideologies- in these regions in the 17th and 18th centuries. In line with this result, Varnum and Grossman (2017) claimed that decreasing pathogen threats in the US was linked to higher gender equity, and they suggest that this reduction in infectious disease is followed by this change. Moreover, in a meta-analysis study, the threat caused by pathogens was found to be increasing the out-group derogations, social and religious conservatism, traditionalism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and political conservatism (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). And the authors suggest that the same threat increased the support for parties endorsing conservative values.

20

Although these studies are important to show the effects of a particular threat shaping political attitudes, they do not outline the effects of different threats on political preferences, nor do they provide casual effects of threat on the same issue. The following study can be regarded as a partial solution to the problems noted: In order to assess the impact of different types of threat, Murray and Schaller (2011) asked participants to remember a time when they felt threatened in the face of a disease, in the second condition, participants were guided to imagine a time when they felt scared. They found that, compared to general threat and control conditions, the disease-based threat was significantly more likely to induce conformist attitudes among participants. Nevertheless, rather than threats caused by personal experiences, causal effects of health-based threats affecting a society thoroughly (e.g., COVID-19) remain to be answered.

Direct manipulation of this health-based threat will also eliminate another problem associated with observational research. Primarily, observational research cannot consider many other variables in a given time and situation. As noted by Adam-Troian et al. (2020), the relationship between pathogen threat and political consequences may be explained by many other structural factors such as the healthcare system or press functionality in a given country. In the same vein, detrimental effects of various pathogens on social and economic aspects of life tend to vary, as well as the politicization of the pandemic by governments. This, in turn, engenders the need to investigate the political consequences of specific pathogens putting societies under threat. For example, in the case of COVID-19, it came along with a severe and extended level of detrimental consequences to both societies and

governments. For instance, some governments had a difficult time in the politicization of COVID-19 because no particular out-group (real or imagined) could not be scapegoated (Bobba & Hube, 2021).

Nevertheless, some other governments could not directly convert COVID-19 into an intergroup tension. However, right-wing parties in some countries like Turkey managed to consolidate their supporters by deepening nationalist rhetoric such as "We are self-sufficient, my Turkey" ("biz bize yeteriz Türkiye'm") (Demiralp, 2021). On the contrary, Narendra Modi, leader of Bharatiya Janata Party, the ruling party in India, which is a right-wing nationalist party, for example, managed to exploit COVID-19 politically by keeping Muslims responsible for the diffusion of the pandemic (Prasad, 2020). Likewise, Donald Trump directly scapegoated China for the emergence of the virus and tried to incite confrontation against the members of this "outgroup." He was also kept responsible for some conspiracy theories to be diffused among the public (e.g., it was bred by the Chinese government to control the world) (Gugushvili et al., 2020). At this point, it is important to note that, in Turkey, exploitation of coronavirus for political interests took place in a different form than in the US and India; it was used by the government to deepen or catch nationalistic feelings with an alternative discourse. Then, COVID-19 in Turkey has different implications for political outcomes in that it is not like other intergroup threats (zero-sum situation like in India and the US), but, nevertheless, merged with nationalist discourses against a societal threat. Therefore, it is important to see the effect of such a threat (if any) on social identity and intragroup processes by building a cause-effect relationship in countries like Turkey.

2.3.1 COVID-19 and Political Attitudes

It is important to emphasize COVID-19 within the health-based threat because it is the most vivid and recent example of such a threat, which constitutes a societal threat (Adam-Troian et al., 2020). Indeed, many governments were chastised because they were not able to respond to the destructive social, economic, and psychological effects of the pandemic. For this reason, one may directly suppose that governments would suffer from decreased support among the public. On the contrary, a voluminous part of political science and psychology literature proposes an alternative scenario that may take place under societal threats (Yam et al., 2020), as noted previously.

The first studies conducted on the political consequences of COVID-19 suggested that it led to more conservatism (Karwowski et al., 2020) and stricter adherence to ideological defense and traditions (Su & Shen, 2020) because pathogens lead to more socio-political ideologies asserting conservatism (Thornhill, Fincher, & Aran, 2009). Finally, some of these consequences are engendered by existential threats causing unsettlement of pre-formed believes and meanings laid upon group memberships (Rosenfeld & Tomiyama, 2020). This resonates well with the conceptualization of the threat posed against the "settled sameness" that was discussed in the Introduction section.

Moreover, Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi (2020) indicate that populist governments politicized COVID-19 in a way that the emergency situation allowed them to get more extensive political powers by sanctioning emergence laws. And, they showed

that COVID-19 was away from damaging governments' reputation on its own, at least at the beginning of the start of the pandemic ("rally 'round the flag" effect; which is discussed in detail in the *Trust in Government under Societal Threats* section. In addition to this phenomenon, according to Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi, populism and pandemic-sourced threats are linked with political polarization; this political atmosphere prevents people from re-aligning their political views; instead, they stick even more to their current political views. COVID-19 illustrates the latest example of such a threat. For these reasons, we should open a discrete discussion on the effects of COVID-19 on political consequences, which was considered by only a few studies (Karwowski et al., 2020).

In line with outcomes of other pathogenic threats, COVID-19 also increased conformist and xenophobic attitudes of people (Adam-Troian & Bagci, 2020). Similarly, in other studies, it was found that those who scored high in COVID-19 threat perceptions were more likely to prefer conservative parties (Karwowski et al., 2020), and this might be because of the norm-creating tendencies of conservative parties (Adam-Troian et al., 2020). These results are consistent with other studies conducted on pathogenic threat perceptions and political attitudes relationship.

The primary problem in the majority of the research on the effects of COVID-19 on political consequences is that they do not allow us to draw a causal relationship regarding whether a threat is caused directly by COVID-19 perceptions. Likewise, it is also possible to conclude that those endorsing conservative values would be more anxious about the threat posed by COVID-19. This possible conclusion makes even

more sense when we consider the findings that conservatives are more likely to stay away from pathogens (Tybur et al., 2016) and interpret the world as more threatening (Duckitt, 2001).

In this regard, it is important to conduct a study that examines the effects of threats caused by exposure to COVID-19 related stories. In line with the importance of exposure to coronavirus-related news, correlational research yielded that exposure to COVID-19 related information over media is linked to higher anxiety, and consequently, more prejudice towards outgroups (Sorokowski, 2020). Exposure to media is crucial to understand how people may perceive COVID-19 as threatening. More surprisingly, Adam-Troian et al. (2020) showed that conservative voters were only affected by the "perceived" threat of COVID-19; when the "real" threat of COVID-19 (real number of cases and deaths) was taken into account, it yielded a non-significant effect on conservative party preferences. This is the starting point of this thesis regarding the method to induce threat caused by COVID-19. This way, participants' threat perceptions will be made salient through exposure to a fake threatening newspaper article. The niche for this thesis regarding the effects of a health-related societal threat, COVID-19, is that it will be among few studies showing political consequences of this threat (trust in government). Second, I will examine the effects of this kind of threat by directly manipulating the COVID-19 threat salience, which, to my knowledge, will be the first study to show a direct effect of such a threat.

The literature on this relationship opens another niche for this thesis to fill in. Much of the previous research mainly focuses on the impacts of contagious diseases on psychological outcomes such as social conservatism (e.g., Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013) and conservative party preference (e.g., Thornhill, Fincher & Aran, 2009) at the individual level. The threat felt at the individual level pushes people to get more conservative and more "in-group-verted" because they need to close themselves to the outside world and outgroup members. Still, these studies do not provide us with answers about the implications of threats caused by these diseases at the group or societal level. I will address this problem by directly manipulating the aftermath of COVID-19 at the group level. More importantly, whether these threat inductions work for collectivist countries like Turkey remains to be answered because these cultures were shown to be tempering the effects of societal threats induced by COVID-19 (see; Adam-Troian & Bagcı, 2020).

2.4   Intergroup Threat and Political Attitudes

Throughout human history, we can see that human beings always conflicted with other group members for a variety of reasons ranging from scarcity of sources to sacred lands heralded. Even tens of thousands of years ago, some theories associate the extinction of Neanderthals with the arrival of homo sapiens into the European continent (Harari, 2014). That being said, it is clear that organizational behavior and intergroup relations hold an important place for the continuation of human beings.

In this chapter, we will have a look at a particular form of threat anxiety emerging out of intergroup relations.

As discussed earlier in the paper, it is possible to produce responses aimed at strengthening intragroup values when people face a threat to their in-groups. This outcome of societal threat is important because they are intertwined with political preferences as well. For example, Wohl and Branscombe (2009) conducted a study to assess the changes that take place in Jews regarding their attitudes towards their in-group values. When Diaspora Jews are presented with reminders of the past holocaust, their preference for raising children with Jews values and tradition, preference for a Jew mate for marriage, denoting to a Jew charity as well as forgiveness for Israel for the harm aimed at Palestinians are increased (as cited in Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013). It would be expected that these tendencies would give way to more conformist and traditionalist political attitudes.

For the first time, to assess the feeling of threat anxiety felt due to exposure to intergroup threat, Tabri, Wohl, and Caouette (2018) extended the Cognitive Model of Anxiety to induce threat anxiety at the group level. In this study, the Cognitive Model of Anxiety was successfully adapted to the threat anxiety at the group level. They assert that even there is no direct harm to a person, if the social identity of someone is under threat, they may feel a variety of feelings such as anxiety or fear. More particularly, they claim that when the in-group's future vitality is threatened, then a feeling of angst will take place. In a similar vein, constructing on the premises of Social Identity Theory, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) came out with the

hypothesis that, in the presence of a threat to social identity, people would be more concerned about their group's future vitality. More specifically, they perceive a threat that might put a group's future in danger; they name this phenomenon as collective angst. Moreover, Wohl and Branscombe claim that, in the face of such a threat, people will appeal to defensive responses to get rid of the negative events discomforting people. In fact, although the feeling for the concern about the future vitality of an in-group stays the same across studies, responses change depending on the situation to resolve the threat anxiety caused by an out-group. For example, against a military attack from Iran, Israelis were willing to compromise with the Palestinian government, but not Hamas, through the effect of collective angst (see; Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013).

This study shows us that people may adopt various defensive responses to alleviate the feeling of uncertainty in the presence of a threat to their in-groups. Building upon previous research about the threat on in-groups, defensive responses may also include aligning more with the current government against a zero-sum game in the region such as East Mediterranean. The intergroup threat, in this case, is likely to elicit more out-group aggression because the conflict is still not resolved. Correspondingly, Spanovic et al. (2010) showed that when an intergroup conflict still preserves, the threat engendered by the out-group is more likely to lead to fear of that particular out-group, compared to the contexts wherein intergroup strife is over. Regarding the intragroup aftermath of an out-group attack, Solheim (2018) observed that the terrorist attack in 2011 in Norway was associated with trust in

government, which was even more pronounced for people who had higher trust in government already.

Nevertheless, these previous studies about intergroup-based threats do not give an answer about the nature of these threats: what is the source of this threat? Is it the zero-sum game that pushes people into the anxiety that they will lose against a particular out-group, or is it the concern about the future vitality of the in-group, or both? I am going to test these propositions by comparing the threat caused by a global pandemic and by an out-group (Greece and allies in the East Mediterranean). Second, this research will be the first to show if concern for in-group vitality also works for the health-based threat to change political attitudes (trust in government) to alleviate psychological distress. In the next section, I will delve more into the societal threats that increase trust in government. Furthermore, the political consequences of a zero-sum game, including two governments, and the possible mechanism for this relationship will still be niches for this thesis to be filled in.

2.5 Trust in Government under Societal Threats

One of the primary reasons behind the expectation that increased salience of crises would lead to increased support is "rally 'round the flag effect," or as also called: "let's-get-behind-the-president-effect" (Mueller, 1970). According to Mueller, there are three conditions for this effect to occur:

1. An event should be "international" and not just an internal crisis like a corruption scandal.

2. It should require the country and the president to be involved in the event.

3. The event should be "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused."

Based on these assumptions, we would say that, contrary to military-based threat condition, COVID-19 related threat may not factor in the salience of rally round the flag effect; because a threat incurred by intergroup tensions do not cause it. However, in the case of COVID-19, it was shown that non-populist and populist governments increased their support among the public at a similar rate. Moreover, this effect was only observed with the ruling populist parties but not with the opposition populist parties (Bayerleyin & Gyöngyösi, 2020). This shows that this effect may also work under other kinds of threats as well. In a similar vein, Yam et al. (2020) showed that increased cases of coronavirus lead to increased support for the current presidents of 11 countries. This correlational relationship was even more robust for culturally more individualistic countries (e.g., USA, UK, and Canada). As the authors suggested, this shows that this effect is not only restricted to inter-group tensions, as suggested by Mueller. Consequently, the Turkish government's challenge with coronavirus and other powers in the East Mediterranean can be expected to entail a "rally 'round the flag" effect and support in the government.

The second main reason for this pattern expectation is that people are more likely to keep the status quo under salient threats and tend to support more conservative governments. Similarly, those threatened with coronavirus showed an increased preference for leaders in the office across countries (Karwowski et al., 2020). The need to keep whoever is in the ruling of government in office arises from two critical

reasons. The first one is to get rid of the feeling of insecurity and ambiguity brought about by the change (Jost et al., 2007; Karwowski et al., 2020). The second reason is increased polarization. As previously noted, Pyszczynski (2019) suggests that societal threats increase polarization within a particular society. According to Bayerleyin & Gyöngyösi (2020), people are not willing to change which party they support in a political setting where polarization is high, especially in countries in which populist leaders rule.

Besides these mechanisms, Stenner (2005) draws attention to Fromm's and Reich's perspectives regarding why trust in government is likely to increase during threats to social identities. For example, Fromm's perspective indicates that embracing the fascist socialist party during Nazi Germany was an indicator of willingness to eliminate freedom. In this case, Stenner argues that what Fromm meant by freedom is the feeling of insecurity, uncertainty, and being in the middle of a way with no direction, which came along with the capitalist societal system. In a similar vein, she argues, Reich indicated that the society's perception that they were humiliated and lost security was one of the most important factors that increased support for Hitler's regime. What is important here is that, even if regimes come with serious harm to their own society, under threatening conditions, people may follow strong parties or leaders perceived as the "guider" or "saver" of the society. Most of the time, this political preference is brought about by an increased level of populist and authoritarian personalities under perceived threat to society, as discussed in the section of *Authoritarianism and Populism and Collective Threats*. At this point, we can see the importance of how populist and authoritarian leaders may project

themselves as the ones who can save society from troubles threatening a society. In accordance with this, Michael Hameleers and colleagues (2021) claim that people's political preferences are shaped by context (like a threat posed against a particular in-group) to make a particular political preference more salient, such as populist tendencies. Resonating with this understanding of threat: "danger to the order of a society," Rico and Anduiza (2019) found that people living in societies under economic difficulties are more likely to show populist attitudes and populist political attitudes, similar to the case of Turkey (Gürses, 2021). More specifically, such societal threats are shown to be increasing collective angst among people (increased concern for the future vitality of a group) (e.g., Jetten et al., 2017). Furthermore, Hameleers and colleagues (2021) surmise that exposure to mainstream media publications is one of the important channels through which this "shaping process" takes place. So to speak, this shaping process equips people with mental shortcuts or heuristics that they can use during a threat posed against a society. More specifically, in addition to what Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi (2020) discuss about populist leaders' tendency to weaken democratic institutions (which makes people to perceive them as the strong men who can save the society), governments may also try to keep public support stable and alive during crises by generating "imagined or real" threats. For example, during the economic crises felt by the middle and lower strata of the Turkish society, in order to temper the dissatisfaction of the public, the government appealed to "maneuvers" such as opening Hagia Sophia "against the crusaders," or they resorted to creating diplomatic confrontations with neighbor countries (Gürses, 2020). Gürses also states that 43.2% of Turkish people believe that the fluctuations

in the foreign currency is a result of foreign powers playing games on Turkey. This indicates that this kind of discourse merged with threats and political maneuvers works for keeping the public support relatively high. This result is in line with the finding that during an economic difficulty, people's populist attitudes are increased (Rico & Anduiza, 2019).

2.5.1 Anxiety Caused by Societal Threats and Political Attitudes

Jonas et al. (2014) suggest that it is common for all types of threats that they all push people to lean on their abstract belief systems, worldviews, and social identities. They assert that there are common reasons why people react similarly to diverse threat types such as intergroup conflictual issues or disasters. One of the main reasons is that all threats give way to anxiety because of the ambiguity caused. In addition to diverse political leanings mentioned before, these threats make people shift towards right-wing political attitudes (Mirisola et al., 2014). Another finding regarding how people react to social threats comes from the work of Stenner (2005). She suggests that people might be more likely to have authoritarian attitudes and leaders. She defines these tendencies as suppression of heterogeneity among society as well as perceiving society as a uniform entity. And, these tendencies result in subversion of individual autonomies and preference for group values and order. Unsurprisingly, this leads people to prefer leaders who are capable of providing such a political atmosphere in which order is secured, and ambiguity caused by societal threat is alleviated. In accordance, she claims that when people feel there is a moral

and national downturn within a given society, these anti-democratic inclinations emerge as a response to these threats. In addition, as exemplified before, under adverse economic conditions, people tend to show populist tendencies and preferences (Rico & Anduiza, 2019) because of the national decline perception elicited by economic hardships (e.g., Sprong et al., 2019). This result also resonates well with the Turkish case; according to a survey study, 43.2% of Turkish people believe that fluctuations in the foreign currency is a result of games of foreign powers (Gürses, 2020). This result also shows that populist discourses of the government accomplish what it is aimed at. In addition, it is not counterintuitive that these people would back populist leader Erdogan in the face of such an economic crisis that threatens society. In fact, particularly after the Gezi protests, the government exploited the "political strategy of attaching" a national threat to the issues they face. For example, for Gezi protests and 17-25 December corruption scandals, AKP ushered the discourses indicating the idea that these were all games of foreign and internal powers (Yesil, 2020). The most important advantage of this strategy is that they induce the perception of threat to society and keep their voting share high. To date, we know that AKP aimed to consolidate its votes among people who are conservative and living in rural areas (Gürses, 2020). However, there is no research on whether this kind of threat inducement would work for university graduates, white-collar workers in Turkey. We will have the chance to examine this directly by the experimental method acquired in this research.

Therefore, the last section shows that different kinds of societal threats may lead to particular political preferences in the countenance of populist and autocratic leaders.

Furthermore, we can see governments already exploit societal threats to keep the public support's trust in government high. Thus, it is possible to expect that when a particular threat is presented to a group, they would quickly adapt political preferences that would make them feel more comfortable, such as relying on the government that populist leaders run. The second critical question is whether these kinds of threats would work among white-collar workers in Turkey?

2.6 Different Segments of Societies and Trust in Government under Societal Threats

Another question that will be answered in this thesis comes from educational and economic class differences in political leanings. Although Hameleers and his colleagues (2021) surmised that populist rhetoric is more appealing to blue-collar workers and people with lower educational levels (who tend to be more attentive to nationalistic values), these data come from observational research. In other words, in the long run, people with higher educational levels may suppress the feelings of increased anxiety elicited by populist governments by focusing on more objective evaluative criteria. Moreover, in some experimental studies, it was shown that when it comes to reacting to a threat, people from different ideological spectrums tend to support the government (which is explained by rally the round effect) (Porat et al., 2019). Moreover, under some conditions, people may turn off even their most deeply held beliefs" (Strandberg et al., 2020), or conservatives and liberals may acquire reverse political attitudes upon some political temporal frameworks (Baldwin &

Lammers, 2016). Similarly, Özkırımlı (2020) argues that it is not necessary to be a nationalist, all segments of society may appeal to their governments when there is a threat that needs to be eradicated. This is because governments are perceived as competent in managing sources to challenge voluminous threats. Therefore, whether people with higher educational levels might also be, at least in the short run, vulnerable to such threat is another question that will be answered in this thesis. Although we would need to compare people from different educational backgrounds for an exact answer, time limitations did not allow me to collect data from various socio-political backgrounds. Nevertheless, if these threats would also work for the sample of this research, it will shed light on under what conditions Turkish people's political attitudes may be shaped.

2.7   Conclusion

One of the main gaps in the literature is that majority of the studies on when and how populist and authoritarian leader preference may increase come from developed countries, and studying these conditions in other regions are as important as these regions to understand the nature and antecedents of these political preferences (Hameleers et al., 2021). Furthermore, examining different kinds of threats in this study will contribute to understanding the ancestors of these political leanings noted previously, such as collective angst and trust in government. The most important niche in the literature is the limited number of studies purporting to show a cause-effect relationship between these variables. This will eliminate many other variables

that move with the main predictor variables observed in correlational and observational research.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Since one of the main aims of this thesis research is to determine whether there is a causal relationship between different kinds of societal threats and trust in government, an online survey experimental methodology was the best to adopt. The following subsections provide the basis for the selection of statistical analysis, sample, and Turkey as an example country fitting with the hypotheses of the study.

3.1   Selection of the Analysis Methods

This experiment was delivered through online survey links because I would be able to reach a significant number of participants required for the study. Second, for a quantitative study, it is important that questions are designed in a structured and standardized manner to conduct a reliable research analysis. These advantages were providing me with a relatively costless and effective way of conducting this experimental study.

Furthermore, as the experimental nature of the study requires, participants were exposed to three different newspaper articles. At the end of the survey, scores of those in the security, health, and control groups were compared to see if there is a direct effect of newspaper manipulations on the trust in government. The second aim

of the thesis is to identify a correlational relationship between the main variables. In order to do this, correlation analysis will be conducted. This analysis will show us which variables increase or decrease together. In addition, to see if the effect of one variable significantly explains variance in another variable, regression analysis will be conducted. The relationship between main variables and perceived threat will only be examined for experimental conditions. And lastly, to see if collective angst would mediate the relationship between perceived threat and trust in government, a mediation analysis will be conducted for each group. This analysis will show us the role of collective angst in the relationship between our main predictor (perceived threat) and the main outcome variable (trust in government).

3.2   Selection of the Sample

In this study, I focused on university graduates for both methodological and practical issues. Methodologically, I was interested in the direct effect of anxiety elicited by a "political" newspaper article. Thus, it was essential to logically determine the age range because while young people refrain from political issues, older people (60 and more) are less likely to react to and utilize contemporary political sources (Chrona & Capelos, 2016). Thus, it was important that participants read, understand, and react to the articles presented. For this reason, I tried to find a sample that is primarily composed of the age range between 25-50.

3.3 Selection of Turkish People and Government

The main aim of this section and the subsection that follows is to show that Turkey is an example of a country in which people would rely on the government in the case of a threat. First, I will talk about how Turkish society has come to justify Erdogan's government based on its populist style of politics. Then, I will exemplify how and why the Turkish government appeals to populist discourses and creates an expected reaction among people.

3.3.1 Populism in Turkey and How Erdogan Can Be Perceived as "The Protector" as a Populist Leader

Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) identified main changes as "Four Ds" taking place in the society that pave the way for populism to be prevalent among societies. Although they identified these changes for the nations in the West, it is also reflecting the populist politics in Turkey with a little variance. They argue that these changes make people concerned about the future vitality of their collective identities, and they become inclined to have populist attitudes in such threatening situations. First of these Ds is that people get convinced that they are pushed aside by "elitist" politicians in the past; this "distrust" towards politicians and institutions encourage people to look for leaders who can bring "the nation" into the stage of political conservation, and they can have a saying in the management of the country. From the beginning of the inauguration of Erdogan, his main emphasis was on the "unfair" attitudes of secular and militarist establishment (elites) that deprecated and kept the

41

"real people" outside of the political realm in Turkey; giving way to the dichotomy of "us" and "them." (Yesil, 2020). This political strategy presents Erdogan as the protector of society from the interest of minority elites. It makes people believe that he is "one of them," envisioning him as an "in-group" member. Second 'D' is the destruction of traditional styles of living. This political shift is associated with anti-immigration sentiments in the West. Still, the destruction of a society can also be managed by a liberal, elitist margin of political movements within a country, as it is in Turkey. Turkish populist agenda is not drawn upon pro or anti-immigration but "the elitist" – "the people" dichotomy and Erdogan used this arching for nostalgia to show that Turkey will be reborn from its ashes, as implied with the well-known slogan of AKP; ("Yeniden diriliş, yeniden yükseliş") (Elçi, 2021). Linked with the second 'D', the third mechanism is deprivation. Although the second D relates more to the power of governments, the third D is more related to feeling insecure about the vitality of the next generation because of economic turndowns. Perceived deprivation makes people believe that yesterday was better than today, and tomorrow is even more "bleak." Here, the primary mechanism between these two changes stays the same: people wish to have lived earlier, once the society and government were stronger. In his analysis of the effects of nostalgia on populist attitudes, Elçi (2020) showed that particularly arching for old Ottoman Empire times increased people's populist attitudes. This indicates that when Turkish people are presented with the threat that "once we were strong, but now we are weak," they turn more to populist attitudes and, as expected, would prefer populist leaders.

According to Eatwell and Goldwin, populist leaders also exploit the dissatisfaction coming along with de-alignment with mainstream political parties, which constitutes the last 'D.' They argue that liberal democracies are identified with stability in politics and parties with their loyal followers. However, when many people lose this alignment with their parties, a divided, volatile, and unpredictable political atmosphere occurs.

Yalvaç and Joseph (2019) summarized the development of the last 'D,' de-alignment in Turkey. They assert that de-alignment has developed in Turkey, especially after the 1980 coup that made Turkey involved in a full shift to neoliberalism, after which fusion of Islamism and nationalism has emerged. After this date, military power was institutionalized as a means to usher capital accumulation in the form of coercive state apparatus. Particularly under Turgut Özal's rule, conservative clusters involved in business had been tried to integrate into the new economic policies. Economic crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001 had wiped away Özal's exertions to create a societal basis for his "neoliberal hegemonic project." In addition to the hegemonic crisis, during the 1990s, Turkey was managed by coalition powers that were not satisfied with the policies of the military institution. When AKP first came into power, they tried to challenge the "secular and statist" regime to solve this hegemonic crisis with their own hegemonic project. Over time, AKP increased their hegemonic power on the basis of the "us" and "them" dichotomy to empower their standing against former "dominant classes." This, according to Yalvaç and Joseph, exemplifies the source behind the populist and authoritarian statist understanding of AKP; "partial-hegemony," that is embracing only a fractured segment of the society, which is "us"

(versus "them"). Shortly, although AKP continued authoritarian hegemony with neoliberal policies started after 1980, only they became successful in having been justified by society by combining their neoliberal policies with populist agenda (which was used as an instrument to elicit that these policies result from "national will").

3.4 The Rise of Erdogan's Populism

Whenever there is a threat, populist parties always create scapegoats for whatever problem arises. Rydregen exemplifies threats from which populist parties may keep responsible the others, internal or external antagonistic powers (as cited in Wodak, 2015):

> "important socio-political challenges that currently concern voters, especially during times of financial and environmental crises, and which are related to a multitude of fears, disaffection and pessimism: fear of losing one's job; fear of 'strangers' (i.e., migrants); fear of losing national autonomy; fear of losing old traditions and values; fear of climate change; disappointment and even disgust with mainstream politics and corruption; anger about the growing gap between rich and poor; disaffection due to the lack of transparency of political decision making and so forth."

Here I argue that this style of politics makes people believe that populist and authoritarian leaders are the ones they can rely on during a salient threat. Even it is not directly threatening a social identity; populist leaders also exploit populism to reflect a threat as if it is aimed at a particular collective identity, as surmised by Wodak. In fact, Erdogan's political argumentation style fits very well into what Wodak argues regarding populism. To illustrate, against the allegations of Sedat Peker, a gangland leader who allegedly had connections with governmental officers,

Tayyip Erdogan claimed: "We know that there is the discomfort felt from this climate of peace and trust in our country behind the attacks targeting our Minister of Interior. We stood by our Minister of Interior, we are with him, and we will be with him." (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Hedef İçişleri Bakanı değil, Türkiye'dir, 2021). Earlier, when there was a sudden value loss of Turkish Lira, Tayyip Erdogan said: "We will override the game on exchange rates" (Erdoğan: Manipülasyon yaparsanız, 2018).

These arguments not only contribute to strengthening and justifying Erdogan's rule but also creates the political atmosphere in which Erdogan is presented as a nation itself and the savior of the people. More importantly, this kind of populism has greatly taken its power from the de-alignment with the political parties during the 1990s. As Erdogan repeatedly articulates the notion of "old Turkey", and specifically targets 1990s governments and instability; "the instability period of the 1990s, which had high costs from politics to terrorism, from economy to foreign policy in Turkey, came to an end with the November 3, 2002 elections" (Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Sözde babaların racon kestiği Türkiye geride kaldı, 2021). Besides this rhetoric used by the populist government, Turkish policy during the economic crises and the pandemic is also in line with how authoritarian governments pave the way for the political survival of themselves. For example, in addition to having democratic institutions diminished, the Turkish government also put aside some professional organizations such as the Turkish Medical Union in the policy-making process during the coronavirus pandemic (Kirişçi, 200). As discussed in the previous section, these authoritarian maneuvers help leaders project themselves as the "protector of

society" from the devil's intentions of internal or external powers. Similarly, some political scientists argue that the populist and authoritarian tendencies of Erdogan and AKP have been on the rise since 2013 against the threats facing the "real people" and the political survival of AKP (Ersoy & Karakoc, 2021).

Consequently, populism and authoritarianism are important because they activate the underlying mechanism that populists can use to attract votes from the people. That is why I argue that this political background of Erdogan may make people feel that they need to appeal to his government under diverse societal threats.

Moreover, the effect of media in shaping Erdogan as the most powerful leader is indisputable. By projecting him continuously during his rallies, he is portrayed as a strong leader who can change wrongdoings by taking the initiative in his hand (Yesil, 2020). Similarly, when people perceive a downturn in society, they appeal to these perceived strong leaders who can remove democratic institutions when it is necessary (Sprong et al., 2019). Based on this discussion, here is an example to illustrate why Erdogan's discourse may help him reshape himself in the minds of people as a strong leader:

"There are two sides. There are terrorists targeting innocent people on one side, and on the other side, there are 79 million citizens who expect safety and justice. In order to protect the rights of 79 million innocent people, we have to crack down on these terrorists in the most severe and uncompromising way" (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2016; as cited in Yeşil, 2020, p. 345).

As this discourse also reproduces consolidation and polarization among the public, they also gave way to a more authoritarian regime for which society is a homogeneous group of people (Ersoy & Karakoç, 2021). In short, why would we expect the trust in the Turkish government to increase under societal threats are: its populist and authoritarian political style, people's need to keep status quo (rally the round effect), increased political conservatism, need to get help from capable institutions, and other results of the threatening situation on political attitudes explained in the literature review section.

3.5 Method

The aim of this sub-chapter is to acknowledge the specific sample enrolled in the study, how the online survey was conducted, and what instruments the experiment included. Required statistical analysis is reported for each scales adopted in the study under the *instruments section*.

3.5.1 Participants

The study sample was consisting of 757 white-collar workers operating in the banking and finance sector. The participants were enrolled in the study through convenience technique, which is reaching participants who are the most easily reachable, and snowball technique, in which enrolled participants are also asked to find future participants for the study. In addition to methodological reasons noted in the previous section, there was a practical reason for selecting this sample as a

research sample. Within the time limit given, I was able to reach a large sample of people working in these sectors through their personal e-mail addresses. After excluding data of 35 participants who did not answer questions entirely and were detected as outliers, further analyses were conducted with the remaining 722 people. Of these participants, 212 were female (29,4%), and 510 were male (70,6%). Most of the participants were college graduates (93,4%). The median income level of the participants lied between 5.000 and 7.499 Turkish Lira (47,6%).

3.5.2   Procedure

After the approval of the Middle East Technical University Northern Cyprus Campus Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Committee, participants were contacted through their e-mail addresses obtained from multifarious sources, including personal contacts and LinkedIn accounts. Once they accessed the online survey page, all participants were informed through informed consent. They were allowed to access the survey questions once they indicated that they understood and accepted the conditions presented in the informed consent form. Informed consent indicated that this study was about to detect participants' thoughts about current political issues in Turkey to prevent the possibility that participants may have predictions about the real aim of the study.

In the survey, all participants who accepted to start the survey firstly answered questions asking about their age, gender, educational level, and other basic

demographic information. After this, participants' level of identification with Turkey was assessed.

After the prior assessments, participants were directed to read newspaper articles depending upon their assigned groups. The security, health and control group newspaper articles are provided in Appendices F, G, and H, respectively. The instruction in this stage was: "*Please read the newspaper article that will be presented to you on the next page; please read it carefully. After you read the article, you will be asked some questions about the content of the article*." Each of the three groups included one of these stories that constituted the conditions: a security-based threat article describing the tension between Turkey, Greece, and its allies, as well as socio-economical outcomes of this tension. Health-based threat article describing the current pandemic, COVID-19, and possible mutated version of the coronavirus along with potential adverse socio-economic effects of this country-level virus and mutated versions. In the allergy control condition, they were presented with a newspaper article illustrating the development of a typical seasonal allergy.

Afterwards, the level of threat perceived after reading these stories was assessed with a perceived threat scale. Our mediator variable, collective angst, was assessed to see to what extent this perceived threat elicited concern about the future vitality of Turkey across the groups. Lastly, they were asked about their trust in the government based on its performance in the fight with the coronavirus across the country and Greece and its allies in the East Mediterranean region.

Upon finishing the survey, they were presented with a debriefing form revealing the real purpose of the study.

3.5.3   Instruments

Regarding the instruments of the study, first, I should note that they all loaded into single factors except for the perceived threat scale (the main independent variable of the study) which was presented after participants read the newspaper articles. 12th and 13th items of this scale were excluded from the further analyses because they were loading into a second factor, contrary to expectations. Next, as the mediator variable of the research, the perceived collective angst of the participant was assessed. Later, as the dependent variable of the research, participants were asked about their trust in government. Except for the Collective angst scale, whose response range was from 1 to 5, all other variables were assessed based on a 1 to 7 response range. Translated scales were adapted through the back-translation method; after the original scale was translated into Turkish, a bilingual person translated them into English. After this, under the supervisors' control, the translation was completed. The reliability level of each scale can be seen in Table 1 below. Cronbach's Alpha (α) is the level of internal consistency among the items, meaning that items measure same construct, thus, they correlate with each other). α score between 0.6 and 0.7 is regarded as a satisfactory level of α. Beyond 0.8 is considered a perfect level of reliability (Ursachi, Horodnic, & Zait, 2015).

Table 1. Reliability Levels of the Research Variables

Variables	Cronbach α
1. Identification with Turkey Scale	.61
2. Perceived Threat Scale	.91
3. Perceived Collective Angst Scale	.80
4. Trust in Government Scale	.69

3.5.3.1 Demographic Questions

In this section, participants were asked about their gender, age-range (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+), marital status, educational level (secondary education, undergraduate, postgraduate), department graduated, the position being worked, and monthly income range (0 – 3.499, 3.500-4.999, 5.000-7.499, 7.500-9.999). The questions asked in this section were provided in Appendix A.

3.5.3.2 Identification with Turkey Scale

Identification with Turkey scale was developed to assess the level of identification of participants with Turkey (Balaban, 2013). This scale was chosen for the purpose of the study because it measures identification with Turkey; as a country, it directly faces the threats elicited in the study. The scale consisted of six items, and example items include "I would miss Turkey if I was living abroad" and "My bond with

Turkey is strong." Participants were asked to rate to what extent they agree with the statements from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("strongly agree").

First of all, factor analysis is used to determine whether items in a particular scale are measuring concepts that is purported to measure in the first place. Before factor analysis, however, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure and Barlett's Test of Sphericity is assessed to see if the data is adequate for a factor analysis. To examine the factor loadings, the principal component analysis was used. All items in the scale loaded on a single factor, explaining 35% of the total variance. The result of this analysis yielded that Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure and Barlett's Test of Sphericity were significant (KMO = .738; (χ2 (15) = 378.819, p < .001, respectively). The reliability score of the scale was at a satisfactory level (α = .61). These statistics were revealing that the items in the scale were correlated to the extent that we can conduct further analysis. The questions asked in the scale were provided in appendix B.

3.5.3.3   Perceived Threat Scale

This scale was developed by Eadeh and Chang (2019) to assess the level of perceived threat. The scale is composed of 14 items. Item 5, 6, 7, and 14 were reverse coded. Example items are: "I feel under threat after reading this article," "The newspaper article made me feel anxious seriously about the people living in Turkey." Participants evaluated the statements from 1 to 7, the same as the previous scale. Cronbach's alpha was very good at the .91 level.

The scale was loaded into one component in the initial principal component analysis except for the 12th and 13th items. The following analysis was run after extracting these two items. Thus, for the remaining 12 items the statistics, the total explained variance was 51%. KMO and Barlett's test results came out to be as follows: The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO = .925) and Barlett's Test of Sphericity ($\chi2$ (66) = 4270.427, p < .001), were significant. This analysis showed that the items are sufficiently constructed to be included in further analyses. The questions asked are given in Appendix C along with each item's factor loadings.

3.5.3.4   Perceived Collective Angst Scale

The collective angst scale was developed by Wohl and Branscombe (2009) to assess the level of angst felt for the future vitality of a group with which people identify themselves: the higher the score, the higher the collective angst felt for Turkey. The scale is composed of 5 items; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd items are reverse coded. The following items are example items from the scale: "I feel confident that Turkey will survive" (reverse coded), "I feel threatened about the future of Turkey." Different from the two previous scales, this scale was rated on a 5 point Likert Scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The reliability analysis came out to be at an acceptable level (α = .80). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was satisfactory (KMO = .757) and Barlett's test was also significant ($\chi2$ (10) = 1177.548, p < .001). The principal component analysis revealed a single factor with 56% of total variance explained, factor loadings of each item are provided in Appendix D besides the scale.

3.5.3.5   Trust in Government Scale

To assess the trust of participants in the Turkish government, Han and colleague's (2020) scale was adapted into Turkish. Originally, this scale was developed to measure the trust of people in the government about how well it deals with the outcomes of the coronavirus. This scale was in line with the trust concept constructed throughout this thesis research. In addition, with the same wording of the scale, trust in government in dealing with the tension in the Mediterranean region was also constructed. Consequently, the scale was composed of 6 items, rated on a 7-point Likert type scale, except for the first and fourth items rated on 5 point Likert scale. Reliability analysis yielded an acceptable level of reliability level (α = .69). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was sufficient (KMO = .70). Barlett's Test of Sphericity ($\chi2$ (15) = 835.114, p < .001) was also significant. The principal component analysis revealed a single factor with 40.5% of the total variance explained. The component matrix and the scale are provided in Appendix E.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Prior to carrying on with the testing of main hypotheses, the data of participants were analyzed through SPSS. Although 757 people completed the survey, 722 people were left to be included in the main analyses after excluding missing values and outliers. To prevent any more missing data from occurring, and because the questionnaires were relatively short, the forced-choice arrangement was activated later in the data collection process. This provided us with questionnaires filled in by all 722 participants.

4.1   Descriptive Statistics

The sample included in the analyses was composed of 212 females (29.4%) and 510 males (70.6%) participants. Almost half of the participants (355) were between 40-49 ages (49.2 %), 163 were between 30-39 (22.6%), 159 participants were between 50-59 (22%), those between 18-29 were 43 participants (6%). The rest two participants were over the age of 60 (.3%). This age distribution was in line with the age range I described in the Participants Section. Almost all of the participants were university graduates (N = 651) with the percentage of 90.2. 48 participants were post-graduates (6.6 %). The rest of the participants were secondary-school graduates (3.2 %). Most of the participants' monthly salary was between 3,500 – 4,999 (N = 325;

45%) and 5,000 - 7,499 (N = 344; 47.6%). Those earning 7,500 – 9,999 were 40 participants (5.5%). The three groups of the study did not differ significantly in terms of demographic information and study variables.

4.2 Analyses of the Main Hypothesis

First of all, the assumptions of the analysis method were tested before the main analysis. In order to see whether our sample reflected a score distribution observed in general population, Test of Normality of the scales was run through Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The normality assumption check results yielded that none of the variables were normally distributed.

Nevertheless, as the survey was distributed online and was based on a Likert-type scale, the assumption test violation is deemed acceptable. In this case, skewness and kurtosis values can be taken into account to assess whether the variables can be used parametrically. According to George and Mallery (2010), kurtosis value between ±1 constitutes a perfect score; while, scores between ±2 value are acceptable for psychometric analyses. In line with this, variables that are identification with Turkey (skewness = 0.3, kurtosis = -0.5), perceived threat (skewness = 0.4 kurtosis = 0.1), collective angst (skewness = 0.4, kurtosis = -0.4), trust in government (skewness = 0.3, kurtosis = -0.8) all satisfied the criterion. The assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were also satisfied by all the variables.

4.2.1   Test of Newspaper Article Manipulation and Correlational Analysis

for the Study Variables

First of all, to test whether newspaper article manipulation was successful in eliciting threat across the groups, one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three groups: Coronavirus-based threat, security-based threat, and control groups. One-way ANOVA is used to compare three or more independent groups to see if they statistically differed from each other. The ANOVA analysis showed that security, health and control groups were not significantly different from each other in the perceived threat scale ($M = 2.77$; $SD = 0.69$), ($M = 2.89$, $SD = 0.65$), ($M = 2.86$; $SD = 0.6$), respectively, with $F(2, 719) = 2.47$, $p = .09$. The different kinds of articles were the main experimental manipulation in this study. Similarly, the security, health, and control groups did not differ significantly in identification with Turkey ($M = 3.62$; $SD = 0.62$), ($M = 3.69$; $SD = 0.62$), ($M = 3.67$; $SD = 0.63$), respectively, in collective angst, ($M = 3.25$; $SD = 0.78$), ($M = 3.17$; $SD = 0.76$), ($M = 3.15$, 0.79), respectively, and in trust in government variable, ($M = 1.55$; $SD = 0.38$), ($M = 1.54$, $SD = 0.4$), ($M = 1.53$; $SD = 0.39$), respectively.

As this manipulation yielded insignificant results, the rest of the hypotheses testing, including mediation analysis, will be conducted separately for each group. By this way, we will observe each of the hypotheses and variables across three groups to examine their relations with each other. Moreover, in addition to correlational analyses noted in the following sections for each group, the overall correlational analysis is noted in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Correlations between the Research Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4
Identification with Turkey	1	.08**	.03	.13**
Collective Angst	.08**	1	.16**	.21**
Perceived Threat	.03	.16**	1	.04
Trust in Government	.13**	.21**	.04	1

Note. * $p < .05$ and ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

4.2.2   Testing Hypothesis 1: Relationship between Identification with Turkey and Collective Angst

To test the correlational relationship between the variables, Pearson two-tailed correlation analysis was conducted. The Pearson correlation coefficient is used to determine the extent to which two variables are changing together linearly.

For the security-based threat group (N = 235), identification with Turkey and collective angst were significantly but weakly correlated: (r = .21, p < .01). In order to predict the value of an outcome variable based upon the value of a predictor variable, simple linear regression analysis is used. For this purpose, the simple linear regression model was run and it came out to be significant as well, identification explained 4% of the variance in collective angst: $R^2 = .04$, F (1, 233) = 10.051, p < .01.

For the health-based threat group (N = 240), the correlation between identification with Turkey and collective angst was not significant, (r = .13, p = .054). Similarly,

this relationship was not observed in the control group (N = 247) as well, (r = -.07, p = .29).

Overall, hypothesis 1 regarding the relationship between identification with Turkey and collective angst is supported only for the security group. However, the model indicated that only 4% of the change in collective angst was associated with the change in identification with Turkey. The practical implications of this result and possible reasons for this pattern are discussed in the Conclusion Section.

4.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 2: The Relationship between Level of Perceived Threat and Collective Angst in Experimental Groups

For the security group (N = 235), perceived threat and collective angst were positively correlated (r = .29, p < .01). When collective angst is regressed onto perceived threat, 8% of the total variance in collective angst was accounted for by the perceived threat: R^2 = .08, F (1, 233) = 20.904, p < .01. For the health group, there was no correlation between perceived threat and collective angst, (r = .08, p = .197). As expected, perceived threat did not correlate with any variables in the control group. These results indicate that hypothesis 2 was only supported for the security group. More specifically, collective angst was induced by the newspaper articles only in the security group, but not in health and control groups.

### 4.2.4 Testing Hypothesis 3: The relationship between Collective Angst and Trust in Government

For the security group, the result indicated that there was a positive but weak correlation between collective angst and trust in government (r = .26, p < .01). In addition, regression model indicated that 7% of the total variance in trust in government was explained by collective angst, $R^2 = .07$, F (1, 233) = 17.505, p < .01. For the health group, the correlation between collective angst and trust in government was significant but weak (r = .21, p < .01). Furthermore, regression analysis was significant, collective angst was explaining 4.4% of the variance in the trust in government: $R^2 = .044$, F (1, 238) = 10.970, p < .01. This relationship was also significant but weak for the control group as well, (r = .15, p < .01), and $R^2 = .03$, F (1, 245) = 5.772, p < .05.

Hypothesis 3 regarding the positive relationship between collective angst and trust in government is supported, yet the correlation between these variables was weak. Therefore, collective angst was in positive correlation with the trust in government across the groups. Contrary to hypotheses 1 and 2, this relationship was also significant in the health and control groups. We can infer that people with collective angst were more likely to trust in government. However, prior hypotheses testing showed that the source of this collective angst was only explained for the security group by the main independent variable of the study, which is perceived threat. To better understand this relationship, mediation analysis will be run in the next section.

4.2.5 Testing Hypothesis 4: Mediator Role of Collective Angst in the Relationship between Perceived Threat and Trust in Government in the Experimental Groups

Researchers frequently refer to Shrout and Bolger's (2002) steps in the mediation analysis. According to this, in the first step of the mediation analysis, the main predictor (in this research, perceived threat) is expected to affect the outcome variable (in our case, trust in government) significantly in the experimental groups. However, if it is possible to explain the insignificant effect theoretically, mediation analysis can proceed with testing other variables.

Based on this, as shown in figure 1 below, the direct effect from the perceived threat to collective angst was positive and significant ($b = .33$, s.e. $= .07$, $p < .01$). However, the direct effect of perceived threat on trust in government was not statistically significant ($b = .05$, s.e. $= .04$, $p = .21$). Nonetheless, when collective angst is added to the model, the effect (indirect) of perceived threat (IE $= .05$) on the trust in government becomes significant: 95% CI= (.02, .07). For the other two groups of the study, the effect of perceived threat occurred neither on the trust in government nor collective angst; consequently, it yielded an insignificant model. Consequently, hypothesis 4 was not supported in any of the groups but only yielded an indirect effect of perceived threat on trust in government.

Note. ** indicates significance level for p < .01

Figure 1. Indirect effect occurring only in the security group

4.3   Conclusion

The analysis results show that the expected difference across the groups did not occur. Furthermore, even when the correlational and regression analysis results were significant, the r values and R squared values came out to be much lower than expected. This means that correlations between the variables and variance explained by the predictor variables were not satisfactory. Nevertheless, the results illustrate that, except for the relationship between collective angst and trust in government, the expected significant associations were observed only in the security group. This result also signals that security-based threat was better at inducing emotions intended to be engendered by threat manipulations. The implications and possible reasons for the results are discussed in the conclusion section below.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The aim of the study was to show the causal effect of perceived threat on trust in government, along with the emotions regarding the future vitality of Turkey. As indicated, there was no effect of perceived threat in the health group. And in the security group, only a small amount of variance was explained by the perceived threat variable. Similarly, the results yielded that the explanatory powers of independent variables and the correlational relationship between other variables were also weak across the groups. This section will delve more into the possible reasons behind these study results and why intergroup tension threats might be unique in political attitudes studies.

Previous work regarding the perceived threat brought about by security-based threats and health-based threats were suggesting that, in the case of a salient societal threat, trust in governments –or leaders in office- would increase. Particularly if these governments are authoritarian or populist, this suggestion is more likely to come true (e.g., Stenner, 2015; McKee et al., 2020). This expectation is in line with the premises of System Justification Theory asserting that, in a case of threatened social identities, people would need to bolster an existing societal structure (e.g., political systems) (Samson, 2018). For this reason, I wanted to directly induce each type of threat through newspaper articles indicating either a threat originating from an intergroup

tension (Turkey and Greece in the East Mediterranean region) or from a health crisis (COVID-19 pandemic) to see if the same result would hold true for Turkey's case as well. However, each group, including the control group in which no societal threat was included, did not differ from each other to a significant extent for any research variables. Most importantly, the perceived threat (the manipulation variable) reported by participants was not significantly different from each other. This result suggests that the newspaper articles did not give the expected increases in the study variables in experimental groups. In a similar vein, I tested hypothesis 2, that level of perceived threat (the main independent variable), significantly predicts collective angst. The second hypothesis of the research was only supported for the security group. However, the variance in collective angst explained by perceived threat was only 8%. We can interpret that only the perceived threat on its own was weak in the prediction of the collective angst that occurred among participants. There are possible reasons that may explain these results. We can examine these reasons under two main headings: methodological problems in the design of the study and societal characteristics of the sample included in the study.

To begin with, I had already noted Yam et al.'s (2020) study on the relationship between the number of COVID-19 cases and trust in government. The results showed that as the cases increase in a given country, so does the people's trust in the governments' leader. However, they found that this relationship was strongest in individualistic cultures such as the USA, Canada, or the UK. This relationship was weakest in collectivist cultures like Japan. They speculate that this result might result from the expectations of people from the governments. While individualists perceive

COVID-19 as a disaster for which the government's head cannot take full responsibility, collectivists may see it as within the full responsibility of the government to deal with the coronavirus. Likewise, as people of a collectivist culture, Turkish people may have kept the government responsible for the threatening situation to be this severe, which may lead to lower trust in government and less likelihood to change negative attitudes towards the government.

Moreover, most of the previous work, including intergroup tension, was conducted on the perception of terrorist attacks in which governments can be perceived as relatively less responsible because the source of threat may not be perceived as "negotiable." In this research, the intergroup tension was based on the diplomatic relations of two sovereign governments. In this case, participants may have kept the Turkish government responsible because of "unsuccessful foreign relations." Consequently, future research should take into account the effects of "governments' perceived accountability" in the threat perceptions. In other words, who would people rely on if they think the government itself is responsible for the emergence, or at least exacerbation, of the threatening situation?

Another serious issue with the research design is that people might not have taken the newspaper articles trustable or related to their own lives. This is important because the same finding was indicated by Busby et al. (2019), claiming that only the stories perceived as relevant to one's own life and as credible were successful in the inducement of threat. As indicated above, the stories included intergroup tensions occurring between two legal governments. Unlike a terrorist attack, this tension

might have been perceived as less likely to result in social chaos or economic disaster. Similarly, they may not have perceived the story of mutated COVID-19 credible because the data collection timeline coincided with the time when the concerns over the virus lessened compared to its first peak worldwide. More importantly, unfree and untrustable perceptions of Turkish media (Müller, 2013, p. 129, also see; Saraclar, 2021) may contribute to these unexpected results as well. This is particularly important because the stories were given under the title of a newspaper article. Moreover, maybe even more crucially, the sample of the study was composed of banking and finance sector workers. They may have knowledge of the possible socio-economic processes depicted in the story and may have found the consequences of the stories non-credible. Eventually, future research should design the stories in a way that possible effects of participants' biases are minimized and use people from diverse occupations and socio-economic statuses.

This possible ineffectiveness of the stories may have also been worsened by another important deficiency. One of the most significant weaknesses of the study was that it did not include any elaboration task. For example, I may have included a task that asks participants to think about the possible harms that may be brought about by the situations depicted in the stories. Therefore, they could have found more time to elaborate on the feelings and could have responded accordingly. In my opinion, the emotion elaboration task is crucial for Turkish society. This is mainly because Turkish people have developed an important level of "ambiguity tolerance" because they have gone through political and economic instability in the 80s and 90s. This provided them with skills in survival amidst uncertainty induced (Pagda, 2019). In

future studies, to overcome these cultural "shields," elaboration tasks should be definitely presented after the main emotion manipulation.

Another critical reason behind gaining the unexpected results might be caused by the selection of the sample that came along with its own pitfalls. At the beginning of the study, my aim was to find a sample who are politically mature and can respond to the newspaper articles adequately based on some scholars' argument that the importance of ideological spectrum and educational level differences may decrease when we feel societal problems (e.g., Strandberg et al., 2020; Özkırımlı, 2020). On the other hand, there were other researchers who argued that those with higher education and from higher socio-economic status are less likely to be affected by threats (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2021). For these reasons, I expected that people would be more likely to trust in government under salient threats. The results indicate the latter explanation is more likely to be plausible. In addition to the problems associated with the research design, future studies should also adopt a more representative sample of Turkish society and pay special attention to the educational level by acquiring a sample from diverse socioeconomic statuses.

Regarding educational level, Konings and Mosaico (2020) argue that a higher educational level opens the door for people to a more universal and open-minded point of view, which makes them less susceptible to societal threats. On the other hand, people with less educational level are likely to stick to traditions and immediate identifications –such as national identification. For these reasons, less educated people become more likely to perceive societal threats. This is in line with Gurses'

67

(2020) observation that the government is aiming at getting votes of those who are conservatives in "grassroots."

The insignificant results between the study variables and trust in government can be partially accounted for by the items' too large scope (trust in government in dealing with coronavirus and foreign powers). For this kind of preliminary study effects of societal threats can be examined for a specific policy. For example, in the UK, an increased death rate was linked with increased support for Brexit voting (Koltai et al. 2020). Without understanding antecedents of trust in government in Turkey, it seems implausible to include the most powerful predictor variables. Therefore, researchers can start with attitudes towards more specific policies sanctioned by the Turkish government to understand these variables.

As the research groups scored similarly on the research variables, correlational and regression analyses were conducted for each of the groups separately to see the changing relationship of these variables with each other. First of all, I tested whether the prediction that those identified with an in-group are more likely to perceive collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) is also valid for Turkey (hypothesis 1). The results indicated that the relationship between identification with Turkey and collective angst was only supported in the intergroup tension group. However, regression analysis yielded that only 4% of the variance in the outcome variable (collective angst) was explained by the predictor variable (identification with Turkey). This indicates that the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable was minimal, and there were many other factors that may be accountable

for the change in collective angst perceived. Another possibility is that the group identification was not correctly assessed by the scale, which was designed to measure identification with Turkey as a whole, not with a particular group such as ethnicities (Turkishness) or any other particular in-group identification (political party affiliation). My main purpose of choosing this scale was to include individuals who are identified with Turkey as a society because threats were targeting the people living in Turkey as a whole. According to Social Identity Theory, social identities are important because they provide a baseline for people to regulate ad maintain their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For this reason, in a case of a threatened social identity, members of a particular group would be expected to produce responses against this situation undermining their self-maintenance. However, participants of the study might not have had their group identities prioritized relative to their personal identities. This makes even more sense because Turkish people are characterized by one of the societies having the weakest level of trust in the society (OECD, 2016). Instead of this general group identity measure, a scale measuring specific group identities could have yielded the expected results simply because the threat to the particular in-group identities would be more likely to be perceived as salient.

Regarding hypothesis 3, collective angst came to be a significant predictor of trust in government in all three groups. Although the results were consistently significant, a low level of variance explained by the predictor variable (collective angst) took place in this relationship as well. It was explaining 7% of the variance in trust in government in the security group, 4.4% in the health condition, and 3% in the control

condition. The results indicate that beyond collective angst, there were more important variables that were not included in the study. The most important point regarding this weak predictor power of collective angst is that, although people consistently rely on the government when they feel collective angst, this predictor remains weak in explaining the change in the trust in government. Consequently, these results indicate that despite the feelings of collective angst, they may not see relying on the government as, at least fully, a solution for the feelings of concern about Turkey's vitality in the future. Besides collective angst, there are more important contributions to the explanation of trust in government. More importantly, Fidrmuc and Tunalı (2015) suggest that Justice and Development Party's voting rate is derived from high religiosity and low educational level (also see; Bilecen, 2016). Then, it would be plausible that the current sample of the study, who are mostly university graduates, are less likely to be voting for Erdogan and his party. This is important because some previous studies suggested that in those countries where political polarization is high, it is really difficult to change one's political ideas and behavior (e.g., Pyszczynski, 2019; Bayerleyin & Gyöngyesi, 2020). This is likely to be true for this study and for Turkey's case because Turkey was ranked as one of the most polarized countries in the world (Lauka, McCoy, & Fırat, 2018). The explanatory power of collective angst might have been very low for this reason. This suggests that future studies should include people from diverse educational backgrounds and should take political orientation and ideology into account along with collective angst. I believe these co-variates will increase the variance explained in addition to collective angst.

70

The last hypothesis of the study was that the relationship between perceived threat and the trust in government would be mediated by collective angst. However, the last hypothesis was not supported for any of the groups in the study. This is because there was no direct effect of perceived threat on trust in government. Thus, there was no relationship left to mediate. Nevertheless, we can talk about only the indirect effect of perceived threat on trust in government. The results yielded that perceived threat affects trust in government indirectly through the collective angst perceived only in the security group. In other words, although the direct effect from the perceived threat to trust in government was insignificant, when we add the collective angst into the model, the indirect effect of perceived threat on trust in government became significant. These results mean that perceived threat, on its own, does not have any effect on trust in government in the security group. Nevertheless, it affects the trust in government through increased collective angst. Neither direct nor indirect effects were observed in the health and the control conditions.

Until now, I have addressed why I obtained unexpected insignificant results, or even though the results were significant, why the explained variances in outcome variables were all weak. However, considering the significant results and also the indirect effect analysis noted above, we can see that the security group somehow differed from other groups in some important aspects. The following discussions are held on why the security threat group might have differed from other groups.

First of all, the correlational relationship between identification with Turkey and collective angst was only significant in the security group. This is interesting because

the identification with Turkey scale was presented to participants before the manipulations. A plausible explanation might be that participants in the security group, albeit very slightly, were affected by the threat manipulation differently from other groups. This, in turn, brought about the slight effect of the identification with Turkey in the perceived collective angst. I believe that if some of the design problems I noted above are eliminated, e.g., using a more specific group identification scale, future research will yield healthier results in terms of showing the effect of the in-group identification on collective angst.

Second, the level of perceived threat was again significant only for the security group. This shows that only security-based threat manipulation was leading to more collective angst. The fact that 8% of the variance in collective angst was explained by threat perception suggests that threat could not lead to collective angst to the extent deemed satisfactory. However, again, this shows that if we empower the emotional elaboration and produce more individually related stories, I believe the effect of perceived threat can be read more correctly. In addition to this, the indirect effect analysis noted in the previous paragraph also signals that the perceived threat caused by the tension with Greece needs to be particularly focused on. Unlike other groups, only this type of perceived threat was statistically significant in that it predicted the trust in government through the increase in collective angst (but we should not forget that the effects sizes were minimal). At this point, I would like to reflect on why this might be the case. According to a recent study by Eadeh and Chang (2020), the ideology of a government might be important for people in particular contexts when they are to express their trust in government. The authors

argue that a health threat may increase the feelings of liberalism and may also lead people to appeal to more liberal parties. However, a terrorism threat might be perceived as "the job of right-wing parties," then, in a salient perceived threat related to security or terrorism, they will appeal to right-wing parties. This study may shed light on why perceived threats caused by intergroup tension indirectly affected government trust. As Erdogan's government is conservative and populist, this case might be only working in the security group. However, as I indicated, the explained variance by the predictor outcome was so small that a better design with better emotion inducement should be conducted before making clear-cut comments on this issue.

Consequently, although most of the hypothesis came to be significant, the variance explained by the predictor variables were very low. I tried to explain these results based on culture, socio-economic status of the participants, and problems with research design. I believe that if future studies develop better research designs, we would see the effects of different societal threats on diverse political issues much more clearly. A more representative sample, more predictor variables, and better scale design will all contribute to such an end. Furthermore, the principal component analysis also revealed that the single factor explained by the scales was not explaining much of the variance in the averages of the scale scores. This indicates that future studies should include more items in each of the scales in the hope that they can better comprehend the complexity of the issue. In addition, as can be seen from the conclusion section, traditional patterns and political culture of a country plays an important role in both perceptions of societal threat and to what extent they

would rely on government under these threats. Therefore, qualitative studies might also be important in uncovering people's mindsets about these issues because of the complex nature of the topic.

To get back to some contextual problems about the study, in addition to cultural aspects, socio-economic situation of the study sample, and research design difficulties, we should definitely keep in mind that Turkey was going through another surge of political distrust during the data collection process. As the sample was highly educated, it is likely that they are all aware of this "rigged" political situation. Similarly, according to MetroPoll (a polling company operating in Turkey), approval rates of Recep Tayyip Erdogan plummeted after the video releases of Sedat Peker (Bellut, 2021). Under this political turmoil and high polarization in Turkey, changing the emotions towards the government has been extra difficult for this study.

Besides, in future research, in a polarized country like Turkey, the initial affiliation of political parties and political ideologies should be included to see their effects on the government's trust. Furthermore, more specific in-group identification scales should be used to make the emotion manipulation more likely to be effective. Lastly, this kind of research should be extended to countries in which COVID-19 was able to be politicized by populist leaders, like India. My hope is that future studies would contribute to the understanding of the effects of societal threats and populist discourses across different cultures.

However, based on the results, a few comments can be made regarding the political implications of the analyses. Based on the analysis results and discussion above, we can say that the health-threat condition did not differ in any aspects of the control group, even for a slight difference. This tells us that COVID-19 politicization may not work in the long term, at least for those with higher educational backgrounds. This is contrary to some speculations about the imminent populist governments to reach a new peak (e.g., Bayerlein & Gyöngyösi, 2020). I think new populist government emergence is less likely to be dependent on the politicization of the COVID-19. Lastly, the results also support the idea that discourses inducing threat may mostly work for consolidating the voting rate among people who are conservative and less educated, rather than attracting votes from different segments of the Turkish society. However, future research is required for a more precise suggestion on the effects of these discourses on people from diverse socio-economic backgrounds.

REFERENCES

Adam-Troian, J., & Bagci, C. (2021). The pathogen paradox: Evidence that perceived COVID-19 threat is associated with both pro-and anti-immigrant attitudes. *International Review of Social Psychology*, 34(1).

Adam-Troian, J., Bonetto, E., Varet, F., Arciszewski, T., & Guiller, T. (2020). Pathogen threat increases electoral success for conservative parties: Results from a natural experiment with COVID-19 in France.

Balaban, Ç. D. (2013). *The roles of intergroup threat, social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism in predicting Turks' prejudice toward Kurds* (Master's thesis).

Baldwin, M., & Lammers, J. (2016). Past-focused environmental comparisons promote proenvironmental outcomes for conservatives. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 113(52), 14953-14957.

Bayerlein, M., Gyöngyösi, G. (2020). The Impact of COVID-19 on Populism: Will It Be Weakened? In Felbermayr, G. (Ed.), *The world economy after the coronavirus shock: Restarting globalization?* (pp. 90-96). Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 26, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).

Beck, A. T., Emery, G., & Greenberg, R. L. (1985). *Anxiety disorders and phobias: a cognitive perspective*. Basic Books.

Bellut, D. (2021, May 21). Turkish mafia scandal threatens Erdogan government. *DW.com*. https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-mafia-scandal-threatens-erdogan-government/a-57625598.

Bilecen, H. (2015). *The determinants of voting behavior in Turkey*. University of Houston.

Bobba, G., & Hubé, N. (2021, April 20). Populism and Covid-19 in Europe: What we learned from the first wave of the pandemic. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/20/populism-and-covid-19-in-europe-what-we-learned-from-the-first-wave-of-the-pandemic/.

Branswell, H., & Joseph, A. (2020, 11 March). Who declares the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic. *Stat*. https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/11/who-declares-the-coronavirus-outbreak-a-pandemic/.

Busby, E. C., Gubler, J. R., & Hawkins, K. A. (2019). Framing and blame attribution in populist rhetoric. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(2), 616–630. doi:10.1086/701832

Cheepers, P., Felling, A., & Peters, J. (1990). Social conditions, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism: a theoretical model of the early Frankfurt School updated and tested. *European Sociological Review*, 6(1), 15–29. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036543

Chrona, S., & Capelos, T. (2017). The political psychology of participation in Turkey: civic engagement, basic values, political sophistication and the young. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 17(1), 77-95.

Crabtree, J., Kaplan, R. D., Muggah, R., Naidoo, K., O'Neil, S. K., Posen, A., Roth, K., Schneier, B., Walt, S. M., & Wrage, A. (2020, May 16). *The Future of the State*. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/16/future-government-powers-coronavirus-pandemic/.

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Hedef İçişleri Bakanı değil, Türkiye'dir. (2021, May 26). *TRT Haber*. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-hedef-icisleri-bakani-degil-turkiyedir-583644.html.

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Sözde babaların racon kestiği Türkiye geride kaldı. (2021, May 26). *Sözcü*. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-grup-toplantisinda-6451489/.

Demiralp, S. (2021, March 22). *Covid-19, Populism, and Political Change In Turkey*. Turkish Policy Quarterly. http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1048/covid-19-populism-and-political-change-in-turkey.

Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 41-113.

Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., Krauss, S. W., & Heled, E. (2010). A tripartite approach to right-wing authoritarianism: The authoritarianism-conservatism-traditionalism model. *Political Psychology*, 31(5), 685-715.

Eadeh, F. R., & Chang, K. K. (2020). Can threat increase support for liberalism? New insights into the relationship between threat and political attitudes. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 11(1), 88-96.

Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). *National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy*. Penguin UK.

Elçi, E. (2021). Politics of Nostalgia and Populism: Evidence from Turkey. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-18.

Elçi, E. (2021). Politics of nostalgia and populism: Evidence from Turkey. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-18.

Erdoğan: Manipülasyon yaparsanız bedelini ağır ödersiniz. (2018, May 27). *Euronews Turkey*. https://tr.euronews.com/2018/05/27/erdogan-manipulasyon-yaparsan-z-bedelini-ag-r-odersiniz.

Ersoy, D., & Karakoç, J. (2021). Political science in the age of populism: perspectives from Turkey. *European Political Science*, 20(1), 204-217.

Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating others. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology*, 73(1), 31.

Fidrmuc, J., & Tunali, C. B. (2015). The Female Vote and the Rise of AKP in Turkey.

Fritsche, I., Jonas, E., Ablasser, C., Beyer, M., Kuban, J., Manger, A. M., & Schultz, M. (2013). The powerofwe: Evidence for group-based control. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49, 19–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.07.014

George, D., & Mallery, P. (14th Ed.). (2016). *IBM SPSS Statistics 23 Step by Step: A Simple Guide and Reference.* USA: Routledge.

Görener, A. Ş., & Ucal, M. Ş. (2011). The personality and leadership style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish foreign policy. *Turkish Studies*, 12(3), 357-381.

Gugushvili, A., Koltai, J., Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2020). Votes, populism, and pandemics. *International Journal of Public Health*, 65(6), 721-722.

Gürses, U (2020, September 12) Economic Discontent Deepens, so as misconception of Turkish gov't. *Duvar English*. https://www.duvarenglish.com/columns/2020/09/12/economic-discontent-deepens-so-as-misconceptions-of-turkish-govt.

Halperin, E., Porat, R., & Wohl, M. (2013). Extinction threat and reciprocal threat reduction: Collective angst predicts willingness to compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*. 16 (6), 797-813.

Hameleers, M., Wirz, D. S., Bos, L., Matthes, J., Corbu, N., Andreadis, I., ... & Schulz, A.   (2021). The Effects of Populist Identity Framing on Populist Attitudes Across Europe. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research.* *https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa018*

Han, Q., Zheng, B., Cristea, M., Agostini, M., Belanger, J. J., Gützkow, B., ... & Leander, P.   (2020). Trust in government and its associations with health behaviour and prosocial   behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic. *PsyArXiv Preprints*.

Harari, Y. N. (2014). *Sapiens: A brief history of humankind*. Random House.

Jetten, J., Mols, F., Healy, N., & Spears, R. (2017). "Fear of falling": Economic instability enhances collective angst among societies' wealthy class. *Journal of Social Issues*, (1), 61-79.

Johns Hopkins University (2020), "Coronavirus COVID-19 global cases by the centre for systems science and engineering"

Jonas, E., McGregor, I., Klackl, J., Agroskin, D., Fritsche, I., Holbrook, C., ... & Quirin, M. (2014). Threat and defense: From anxiety to approach. In *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 49, pp. 219-286). Academic Press.

Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying ideologies. *Current directions in psychological science*, *14*(5), 260-265.

Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity? *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, 33(7), 989-1007.

Karwowski, M., Kowal, M., Groyecka, A., Białek, M., Lebuda, I., Sorokowska, A. & Sorokowski, P. (2020). When in Danger, Turn Right: Does Covid-19 Threat Promote Social Conservatism and Right-Wing Presidential Candidates?   *Human   Ethology*,   35,   37-48, https://doi.org/10.22330/he/35/037-048

Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., McGregor, I., & Nash, K. (2010). Religious belief as compensatory control. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 37-48.

Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the government: testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support

of external systems. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 95(1), 18.

Kirişçi, K. (2020, May 8). The coronavirus has led to more authoritarianism for Turkey. *Brookings*. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/08/the-coronavirus-has-led-to-more-authoritarianism-for-turkey/

Koltai J, Varchetta FM, McKee M, Stuckler D (2020) Deaths of despair and Brexit votes: cross-local authority statistical analysis in England and Wales. *Am J Public Health* 110:401–406. https:// doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305488

Konings, R., & Mosaico, M. (2020). Explaining differences in perceived threat: Why education matters. *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education*, 12(2).

Landler, M., & Eddy, M. (2020, 10 November). Does Trump's Defeat Signal the Start of Populism's Decline? *The New York Times, p*ara 4. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/world/europe/trump-populism.html.

Lauka, A., McCoy, J., & Firat, R. B. (2018). Mass partisan polarization: Measuring a relational concept. *American behavioral scientist*, 62(1), 107-126.

Li, J. B., Yang, A., Dou, K., & Cheung, R. Y. (2020). Self-control moderates the association between perceived severity of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and mental health problems among the Chinese public. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 17(13), 4820.

McKee, M., Gugushvili, A., Koltai, J., & Stuckler, D. (2020). Are populist leaders creating the conditions for the spread of COVID-19?. *International journal of health policy and management*, 1-5.

Mirisola, A., Roccato, M., Russo, S., Spagna, G., & Vieno, A. (2013). Societal Threat to Safety, Compensatory Control, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 35, 795–812. doi:10.1111/pops.12048

Mols, F., & Jetten, J. (2014). No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant sentiments. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 43, 74-86.

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition* 39(4).

Mueller, J. E. (1970). Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson1. *American political science review*, 64(1), 18-34.

Müller, J. (2013). *Mechanisms of trust: News media in democratic and authoritarian regimes*. Campus Verlag.

Murray, D. R., & Schaller, M. (2011). Threat (s) and conformity deconstructed: Perceived threat of infectious disease and its implications for conformist attitudes and behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 42(2), 180-188.

Murray, D. R., Schaller, M., & Suedfeld, P. (2013). Pathogens and politics: Further evidence that parasite prevalence predicts authoritarianism. *PloS One*, 8(5), e62275.

OECD. (2016) Society at a Glance 2016. https://www.oecd.org/turkey/sag2016-turkey.pdf

Ozkirimli, U. (2020, April 14). *Coronationalism?* openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/coronationalism/.

Pagda, Z. (2019). The Replication of the GLOBE Study in Turkey: Understanding the Effects of Social, Economical, and Political Changes on Cultural Dimensions and Leadership Ideals: A Mixed Methods Study.

Palmer, T. (2019, July 2). The Terrifying Rise of Authoritarian Populism, para. 2. *Reason.com*. https://reason.com/2019/07/14/the-terrifying-rise-of-authoritarian-populism/.

Porat, R., Tamir, M., Wohl, M. J., Gur, T., & Halperin, E. (2019). Motivated emotion and the rally around the flag effect: liberals are motivated to feel collective angst (like conservatives) when faced with existential threat. *Cognition and Emotion*, 33(3), 480-491.

Prasad, A. (2020). The organization of ideological discourse in times of unexpected crisis: Explaining how COVID-19 is exploited by populist leaders. *Leadership*, 16(3), 294-302.

Pyszczynski, T. (2019). The role of death in life: Exploring the interface between terror management theory and evolutionary psychology. In *Evolutionary Perspectives on Death* (pp. 1-24). Springer, Cham.

Rico, G. & Anduiza, E. (2019). Economic correlates of populist attitudes: An analysis of nine European countries in the aftermath of the great recession. *Acta Politica*, 54, 371–397 doi:10.1057/s41269-017-0068-7

Rosenfeld, D. L., & Tomiyama, A. J. (2020, 22 April). Can a Pandemic Make People More Socially Conservative? Political Ideology, Gender Roles, and the Case of COVID-19. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/zg7s4

Saraçlar, S. N. (2021, July 17). *Gazetecilik öğrencileri en az A Haber'e, en çok BBC'ye güveniyor*. Journo. https://journo.com.tr/haber-guven-gazetecilik.

Scheepers, P., Felling, A., & Peters, J. (1990). Social conditions, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism: A theoretical model of the early Frankfurt School updated and tested. *European Sociological Review*, 6, 15–29.

Schoel, C., Bluemke, M., Mueller, P., & Stahlberg, D. (2011). When autocratic leaders become an option—Uncertainty and self-esteem predict implicit leadership preferences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101(3), 521.

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and non-experimental studies: new procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods*, 7, 422-445.

Solheim, Ø. B. (2020). Right-wing terrorism and out-group trust: The anatomy of a terrorist backlash. *Terrorism and political violence*, 32(6), 1206-1224.

Sorokowski, P., Groyecka, A., Kowal, M., Sorokowska, A., Białek, M., Lebuda, I., & Karwowski, M. (2020). Can information about pandemics increase negative attitudes toward foreign groups? A case of COVID-19 outbreak. *Sustainability*, 12(12), 4912.

Spanovic, M., Lickel, B., Denson, T. F., & Petrovic, N. (2010). Fear and anger as predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression: Evidence from Serbia and Republika Srpska. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 13(6), 725-739.

Sprong, S., Jetten, J., Wang, Z., Peters, K., Mols, F., Verkuyten, M., ... & Wohl, M. J. (2019). "Our country needs a strong leader right now": Economic inequality enhances the wish for a strong leader. *Psychological science*, 30(11), 1625-1637.

Stenner, K. (2005). *The authoritarian dynamic*. Cambridge university press.

Strandberg, T., Olson, J. A., Hall, L., Woods, A., & Johansson, P. (2020). Depolarizing American voters: Democrats and Republicans are equally susceptible to false attitude feedback. *PloS one*, 15(2).

Su, R., & Shen, W. (2020). Is nationalism rising in times of the COVID-19 pandemic? Individual-level evidence from the United States. *Journal of Chinese political science*, 1-19.

Tabri, N., Wohl, M. J., & Caouette, J. (2018). Will we be harmed, will it be severe, can we protect ourselves? Threat appraisals predict collective angst (and its consequences). *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 48(1), 72-85.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of inter-group relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole

Terrizzi Jr, J. A., Shook, N. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (2013). The behavioral immune system and social conservatism: A meta-analysis. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 34(2), 99-108.

Thornhill, R., Fincher, C. L., & Aran, D. (2009). Parasites, democratization, and the liberalization of values across contemporary countries. *Biological Reviews*, 84(1), 113-131.

Tybur, J. M., Inbar, Y., Aarøe, L., Barclay, P., Barlow, F. K., De Barra, M., & Žeželj, I. (2016). Parasite stress and pathogen avoidance relate to distinct dimensions of political ideology across 30 nations. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 113(44), 12408-12413.

Ursachi, G., Horodnic, I. A., & Zait, A. (2015). How reliable are measurement scales? External factors with indirect influence on reliability estimators. *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 20, 679-686.

Varnum, M. E., & Grossmann, I. (2016). Pathogen prevalence is associated with cultural changes in gender equality. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 1(1), 1-4.

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. Sage.

Wohl, M. J. A., & Branscombe, N. R. (2008). Collective angst: How threats to the future vitality of the ingroup shape intergroup emotion. In H. A. Wayment & J. J. Bauer (Eds.), *Decade of behavior. Transcending self interest: Psychological explorations of the quiet ego* (p. 171–181). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/11771 016

Wohl, M. J., & Branscombe, N. R. (2009). Group threat, collective angst, and ingroup forgiveness for the war in Iraq. *Political Psychology*, 30(2), 193-217.

Yalvaç, F., & Joseph, J. (2019). Understanding populist politics in Turkey: a hegemonic depth approach. *Review of International Studies*.

Yam, K. C., Jackson, J. C., Barnes, C. M., Lau, J., Qin, X., & Lee, H. Y. (2020). The rise of COVID-19 cases is associated with support for world leaders. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117(41), 25429-25433.

Yesil, B. (2020). Performing nationalist populism in Turkey: an exploration of anti-Western, anti-elite and Muslim conservative undercurrents. *Celebrity Studies*, *11*(3), 336-350.

Zangana, A. (2020, 28 September). *Has Covid-19 killed off populism in Europe?* Schroders. https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/has-covid-19-killed-off-populism-in-europe/.

A. Demographic Questions

1. Yaşınız

☐18-29 ☐ 30-39 ☐40-49 ☐ 50-59 ☐ 60+

2. Cinsiyetiniz

☐ Erkek ☐ Kadın

3. Medeni durumunuz

☐ Evli ☐ Bekar

4. En son tamamladığınız eğitim seviyesi nedir?

☐ Ortaokul ☐ Lise ☐ Önlisans ☐ Lisans ☐ Lisansüstü

5. Eğitiminizi hangi alanda tamamladınız?

☐ Sosyal bilimler ☐ Mühendislik Bilimleri ☐ Fen Bilimleri

6. Hangi pozisyonda çalışıyorsunuz?

☐ Asistan ☐Yetkili ☐ Yönetici

7. Aylık geliriniz nedir?

☐ 0-3499 ☐ 3500-4999 ☐ 5000-7499 ☐7500-9999

☐ 10000+

B. Identification with Turkey Scale (Balaban, 2013)

1. Kendimi Türkiye'ye ait hissediyorum ($FL = 0.657$)
2. Türkiye'nin gündemi günlük yaşantımı etkiliyor ($FL = .607$)
3. Türkiye'de yaşıyor olmak benim için önemlidir ($FL = .529$)
4. Türkiye vatandaşı olmak beni tanımlayan özelliklerdendir ($FL = .615$)
5. Türkiye ile bağım güçlüdür ($FL = .616$)
6. Yurtdışında yaşasaydım Türkiye'yi özlerdim ($FL = .484$)

FL = Factor Loading Value

C. Perceived Threat Scale (Eadeh & Chang, 2019)

1. Bu haberi okuduktan sonra tehdit altında hissettim (*FL* = .610)

2. Gazete haberindeki bilgilere karşı endişelenmiş durumdayım (*FL* = .679)

3. Verilen haberi okuduktan sonra güvensiz hissediyorum (*FL* = .792)

4. Okuduğum makaledeki durumun topluma karşı bir tehdit olduğunu düşünüyorum (*FL* = .717)

5. Haberi okuduktan sonra tehdit altında hissetmedim* (*FL* = .636)

6. Verilen bu habere karşı endişelenmedim * (*FL* = .777)

7. Verilen gazete haberindeki durumun topluma karşı bir tehdit olduğunu düşünmüyorum* (*FL* = .899)

8. Türkiye'deki insanların gazete haberindeki durumla ilgili endişeli olduklarını düşünüyorum (*FL* = .694)

9. Verilen haberi okuduktan sonra kişisel olarak endişelenmiş hissediyorum (*FL* = 731*)*

10. Bu gazete haberi Türkiye'deki insanlar hakkında ciddi bir endişe duymama neden oldu (*FL* = .620)

11. Haberdeki durumun beni de etkileyebileceğini düşünüyorum (*FL* = .536)

12. Haberde verilen olay potansiyel olarak benim hayatımla alakalı bir tehdit teşkil ediyor (*FL* = loaded into a different factor)

13. Haberde verilen bu olay tanıdığım insanlarla alakalı bir tehdit teşkil ediyor. (*FL* = loaded into a different factor)

14. Bu tip bir tehditin beni asla etkilemeyeceğini düşünüyorum* (*FL* = .722)

* = Reversed Items

FL = Factor Loading Value

D. Collective Angst Scale (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009)

1. Türkiye'nin hep var olacağından eminim* (*FL* = .837)
2. Türkiye'nin geleceği konusunda güvende hissediyorum* (*FL* = .819)
3. Türkiye'nin geleceği konusunda endişeleniyorum (*FL* = .697)
4. Türkiye'nin her zaman büyüyeceğine eminim* (*FL* = .743)
5. Türkiye'nin geleceği tehlikede olduğu için endişeleniyorum (*FL* = .608)

* Reversed Items

FL = Factor Loading Value

E. Trust in Government Scale

1. Koronavirüs salgınıyla mücadelede doğru önlemleri alması konusunda hükümete ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (*FL* = .643)

2. Hükümetin Koronavirüs ile mücadele edebildiğini düşünüyorum (*FL* = .586)

3. Hükümetin koronavirüsün getirdiği finansal ve ekonomik sonuçlarla mücadele edebildiğini düşünüyorum (*FL* = .864)

4. Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'de haklarını savunmasında doğru önlemleri alması konusunda hükümete ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (*FL* = .726)

5. Hükümetin Doğu Akdeniz'de Yunanistan ve diğer ittifak ülkelerle mücadele edebildiğini düşünüyorum (*FL* = .493)

6. Hükümetin Doğu Akdeniz gerginliğinin getirebileceği finansal ve ekonomik sonuçlarla mücadele edebileceğini düşünüyorum. (*FL* = .396)

FL = Factor Loading Value

F. Security-Based Threat Article

Doğu Akdeniz'de Türkiye'nin haklarının ihlali ve beraberinde gelen problemlerle mücadele Türkiye'nin uzun zamandır gündemini meşgul ediyor. Son zamanlarda gelişen ikili dialoglara ragmen Yunanistan'ın Akdeniz'de konuşlanan Türk gemilerine tacize devam etmesi Türkiye'yi Avrupa'da askeri tehditlerden en çok etkilenen ülkeler arasına taşımış bulunmakta. Yunanistan ve İsrail'in bölgedeki diğer stratejik planları ile ilgili tartışmalar ise hala sürüyor.

Savunma Bakanlığı tarafından yürütülen toplantıda konuyla ilgili bazı Milli Güvenlik Kurulu üyelerinin görüşmeye sunduğu bildiride dikkat çeken ifadelere yer verildi. Bildiriye göre Türkiye'nin Yunanistan, İsrail ve diğer ittifak ülkelerinin yeni stratejik ambargo planları ve askeri müdaheleleri ile karşılaşma ihtimali oldukça yüksek. Türkiye'nin şu anki askeri ve stratejik kuvvetinin etkisiz kalacağı böyle bir planın Türkiye'yi toplumsal bir faciaya götüreceğine kesin gözüyle bakılıyor. Yunanistan, İsrail ve diğer ittifaklar arasındaki yeni stratejik mütabakatın Türkiye'ye çeşitli alanlarda ambargo olarak dönebileceğini kaydeden yetkililer, askeri gerginliğin Akdeniz'de şehit haberlerine neden olacağını vurguluyor. Bunun yanı sıra, yetkililer ambargoların Türkiye'de toplumun ekonomik ve sosyal olarak boğulmasına neden olacağından endişe duyuyor. Yetkililer bölgede Yunanistan ile mücadelenin hızlandırılıp bir sonuca varılmasını, aksi takdirde toplumun ciddi bir faciaya sürüklendiği belirtti. Türkiye'ye dayatılan olası bir ambargo veya askeri

tehdit karşısında Türkiye'nin Akdeniz'de Yunanistan ve ittifaklarına karşı haklarını aramayla ilgili yetersiz olabileceği ise diğer dikkat çeken unsurlar arasındaydı.

G. Health-Based Threat Article

Koronavirüs ve beraberinde gelen problemlerle mücadele Türkiye'nin uzun zamandır gündemini meşgul ediyor. Son zamanlarda açıklanan vaka ve ölüm sayıları Türkiye'yi Avrupa'nın KOVID-19 visürüsünden en çok etkilenen ülekeler arasına taşımış bulunmakta. Mutasyona uğramış yeni türler hakkında tartışmalar ise hala sürüyor.

Sağlık Bakanlığı tarafından yürütülen toplantıda konuyla ilgili bazı bilimkurulu üyelerinin görüşmeye sunduğu bildiride dikkat çeken ifadelere yer verildi. Bildiriye göre Türkiye'de mutasyona uğramış, daha güçlü ve tedavisinde şimdiki yöntemlerin saf dışı kalacağı bir mutant virüsün görülme ihtimali oldukça yüksek. Aşıların işe yaramadığı bu tip yeni bir virüsün Türkiye'yi toplumsal bir faciaya götüreceğine kesin gözüyle bakılıyor. Bu mutasyona uğramış virus karşısında ölüm ve vaka sayılarının ülke genelinde çok daha artacağı, risk grubunun çok genç yaşlara kadar inebileceği belirtildi. Türkiye'de hali hazırda on binlerle ifade edilen toplam ölüm sayısının günlük ölüm sayısına dönüşmesinden endişelenen yetkililer, bir an önce koronavirüsle mücadelenin hızlandırılmasını, aksi takdirde toplumu geri dönülmeyecek bir facia beklediğini belirtti.). Türkiye'nin bu tip yeni bir mutant virüsün etkilerine karşı mücadelede yavaş ve yetersiz kalabileceği ise diğer dikkat çeken unsurlar arasındaydı.

95

H. Control Group Article

Mevsimin değişmesiyle alerjik reaksiyonlar gösteren bireylerin sayısı giderek artıyor. Yaş ve ekonomik sınıf gözetmeksizin herkeste görülebilen mevsimsel bazlı alerjiler yine insanların Google'da en çok arama yapılan kelimeler arasına girdi. Polen alerjisinin bu mevsimlerde artmasının sebebi ise çiçeklerin rüzgar veya arılarla çevreye yayılmaya başlaması. Arıların rolü özellikle ağır polenli çiçeklerde daha da önem taşıyor. Rüzgarla taşınamayan bu polenler arıların ve diğer böceklerin yardımıyla etrafa yayılıyor. Her şeye ragmen polenlerin yayılamadığı çevreler de mevcut. Örneğin deniz kenarlarında polenler ne rüzgar ne de böcekler yardımıyla taşınabiliyor. Ağır alerjik reaksiyonlar gösteren bireyler bu bölgelere gerelerek biraz daha rahatlıyorlar. Alerji ilaçları ise bu reaksiyonların azalmasına yardımcı olan ve en sık kullanılan çözüm aracı olarak gösterilebilir. Diğer alınması gereken önlemler ise sigaradan uzak durmak, burnun dış kısmına vazelin sürerek polenlerin vucüttan içeriye girmesini engellemek, ev içerisinde sık sık nemlendirici kullanmak, giysilerin açık havada kurutmamamanın olduğu belirtiliyor. Doktorların Eylül sonuna kadar sıkça devam edeceğini söylediği polen alerjisi gibi rahatsızlıklarla ilgili antibiyotik kullanımının azaltılması ve daha güvenilir tedavi yöntemlerine dönülmesi ise önemli. Uzmanlar antibiyotik gibi ilaçlar yerine polenlerden uzak durmanın ve gerekli temizlik önlemlerinin alınmasının daha sağlıklı olduğunu belirtiyor.

I. Informed Consent Form

Bu çalışma Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Doç. Dr. Yonca Özdemir ve Psikoloji Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Y. Doç. Dr. Reşit Kışlıoğlu gözetiminde, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Melih Can Şahin tarafından yürütülmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye'de yaşayan bireylerin Türkiye'de güncel politik olaylarla ilgili düşüncelerini tespit etmektir.

Çalışmaya katılım gönüllülük esaslı olup, istediğiniz veya rahatsızlık duyduğunuz bir anda çalışmayı bırakabilirsiniz. Araştırmayı tamamlamadan çekilmeniz halinde verileriniz kullanılmayacaktır. Anketi tamamlama süresi 15-20 dakikadır. Bu anketteki hiçbir soru kimlik belirleyici bir bilgi istememektedir. Vereceğiniz cevaplar sadece araştırmacılar tarafından değerlendirilip bilimsel amaçlar için kullanılacaktır; vereceğiniz tüm cevaplar gizli tutulacaktır.

Sorulan soruların doğru veya yanlış bir cevabı yoktur. Anketteki soruları sizin nasıl düşündüğünüze ve hissettiğinize göre cevaplamanız araştırmanın amacına ulaşması için çok önemlidir. Sorular rahatsızlık verecek bir ayrıntı içermemektedir ve araştırmaya katılımınızın öngörülen bir riski bulunmamaktadır.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak isterseniz Melih Can Şahin'e şu e-mail adresinden ulaşabilirsiniz: melihpaa@gmail.com

Eğer çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorsanız lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeyi okuduktan sonra "Evet" seçeneğini işaretleyip, ileri tuşuna basınız.

Yukarıdaki bilgilendirilmiş onam formunu okudum, vereceğim bilgilerin sadece bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacağını anladım ve çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

☐   Evet

J. Debriefing Form

Çalışmamıza katıldığınız ve zaman ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederiz. Verdiğiniz cevaplar gizli kalacaktır ve sadece bilimsel amaçlar için kullanılacaktır. Araştırmanın asıl amacı farklı tehdit unsurlarının hükümete güveni ve algılanan beka tehdidini nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktır. Daha spesifik olarak, bu araştırma algılanan tehdit ile hükümete güven arasındaki ilişki ve bu ilişkide algılanan beka tehdidinin aracı rolü üzerine bir çalışmadır. Bu amaçla üç farklı gruptan (sağlık tehdidi, askeri tehdit ve alerji hikâyesi kontrol grubu) birine rastgele yönlendirildiniz. Atandığınız bu gruba göre okuduğunuz gazete haberi gerçek bir gazete haberi olmayıp, tehditlerin etkilerini ölçmek için araştırmacı tarafından oluşturulmuştur. Araştırma hakkında daha detaylı bilgi almak, araştırma sonuçlarını öğrenmek veya soru ve görüşlerinizi iletmek için araştırmacıya melihpaa@gmail.com e-mail adresinden ulaşabilirsiniz.