THE MAKING, WORKING AND ENDING OF THE INF TREATY

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On 2 February 2019, the USA announced the suspension of its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which is the 1987 nuclear disarmament and arms control agreement signed by the USA and the USSR at the close of the Cold War era. After the announcement, it completed the process of full withdrawal on 2 August 2019. Following the collapse of the USSR, as the legal successor of the USSR, Russia became one of the two legal parties of the INF treaty. Russia responded to the US withdrawal in kind also by suspending the INF treaty as well as withdrawing from the treaty in the end. In that sense, this thesis analyzes the way in which the INF treaty was made, worked, and ended. To begin with, this thesis examines the way disarmament and arms control were discussed. This is to help to grasp the formation of the INF treaty with nuclear strategies of the USA, the USSR, and Europe. The INF treaty has two dimensions like disarmament and arms control. Therefore, the INF treaty is a good example to unfold that in the course of time, disarmament has weakened even though arms control has strengthened. Secondly, it shows the periods of the making, working, and terminating the INF treaty through scrutinizing the period of negotiations before the INF treaty, the Articles of the treaty, and the reactions to the end of the INF treaty to describe and categorize nuclear
strategies of the US, Russia, and Europe. The thesis adopts and stands both for qualitative and quantitative methods. Finally, it examines the relationship between the INF treaty and New START. In fact, it shows how New START undermines the INF treaty since both have been described as bilateral arms control treaties on account of having different extensions in essence.

**Keywords:** Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Arms Control, the INF Treaty, New START
ÖZ

INF ANTLAŞMASI’NIN OLUŞUMU, ÇALIŞMASI VE SONA ERİŞİ

YILMAZ, Buse
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Mustafa TÜRKEŞ

Eylül 2021, 195 sayfa

hem de nicel yöntemleri benimsemiş ve uyarlamıştır. Son olarak, INF anlaşması ile Yeni START arasındaki ilişiyi irdelemektedir. Aslında her ikisi de ikili silah kontrol anlaşmaları olarak tanımlanmış olsa da ounce farklı uzantılar sahip olmaları nedeniyle Yeni START’ın INF anlaşmasını nasıl baltaladığını göstermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Nükleer Silahlar, Silahsızlanma, Silahların Kontrolü, INF Antlaşması, Yeni START
To a world without nuclear weapons
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLAGIARISM</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖZ</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF SIGNED NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Subject of the Thesis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Research Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Importance of the Research Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Framework of Analysis and Methodology</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. Organization of the Chapters</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. History of Disarmament and Arms Control from the Interbellum to 1950s</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Nuclear Armament Strategies in the 1960s</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. The US Strategy</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. The USSR Strategy</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3. The European Strategy</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. The NPT: The International Framework of Arms Control</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. SALT Negotiations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. THE TEXT OF THE NEW START .......................................................... 164
D. CURRICULUM VITAE ......................................................................... 181
E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ................................................ 182
F. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU .............................. 195
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 From 2014 to 2019 Total Inventory of World Nuclear Forces................110
## LIST OF SIGNED NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGREEMENTS</th>
<th>DATED SIGNED</th>
<th>DATED ENTERED INTO FORCE</th>
<th>EXPIRATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 NPT</td>
<td>1 July 1968</td>
<td>5 March 1970</td>
<td>Indefinite Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ABM TREATY</td>
<td>26 May 1972</td>
<td>3 October 1972</td>
<td>13 June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 SALT I</td>
<td>26 May 1972</td>
<td>3 October 1972</td>
<td>3 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 SALT II</td>
<td>18 June 1979</td>
<td>Not entered into force</td>
<td>Januray 1980 Carter withdrew SALT II from the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 INF TREATY</td>
<td>8 December 1987</td>
<td>1 June 1988</td>
<td>2 August 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 START II</td>
<td>3 January 1993</td>
<td>Not entered into force</td>
<td>No expiry date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 SORT (MOSCOW TREATY)</td>
<td>24 May 2002</td>
<td>1 June 2003</td>
<td>5 February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 NEW START</td>
<td>8 April 2010</td>
<td>5 February 2011</td>
<td>5 February 2026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBM</td>
<td>Air-launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBM</td>
<td>Air-To-Surface Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>Dual Track Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLBM</td>
<td>Ground-launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-launched Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoN</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRBM</td>
<td>Long-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NST</td>
<td>Nuclear and Space Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>National Technical Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSIs</td>
<td>On-Site inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT I/II</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitations Talks I/II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START I/II</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I/II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVC</td>
<td>Special Verification Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAEC</td>
<td>United Nations Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW I/II</td>
<td>World War I/II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Subject of the Thesis

Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States of Amerika (USA) and Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary-General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the two Leaders, signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which was focal to Euro-Atlantic security, at a summit meeting in the East Room of the White House, in Washington on 8 December 1987\(^1\) at the close of the Cold War, after 7 year-long negotiations. It was put into force in June 1988, which ensured disarmament and arms control in a defined intermediate-range region.

With the inuring the INF treaty, existing a total of 2,692 nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM) and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), in sizes of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles\(^2\), travelling ranges


\(^2\) See that the text of the INF treaty, Article II for the purposes of the treaty;

1. The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
2. The term “cruise missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)” means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
3. The term “GLBM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.
4. The term “GLCM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.
5. The term “intermediate-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.
between 500 and 5,500 km by an implementation deadline of 1 June 1991, 1,846 missiles of the USSR and 846 missiles of the USA, had together been destroyed. It was followed by 10 years of on-site verification inspections. Under that agreement, the United States (US) and the USSR were prohibited from having, producing, or flight-testing these types of missiles. It is important that the treaty be the first agreement to push the elimination of a category of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons that threatened Europe, rather than simply limiting them.

In recent years, there have been mutual accusations between the US and the Russian Federation (Russia), the legal successor of the USSR, violating the necessities and obligations under the INF treaty. After a while, on 2 February 2019, the US suspended its obligations under the INF treaty with Russia on charges of violating it. It submitted a formal notice of withdrawal to enter in force on 2 August 2019 unless Russia returned to full and verifiable compliance, which was the US claim. Russia too suspended its obligations under the INF treaty in response to the act of the US. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that Moscow would give a “mirror response” to all US moves related to the INF treaty. It is necessary to grasp what the real reason for the US withdrawal from this treaty is. After the announcement, the US completed the

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6. The term “shorter-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.


6 The number of parties to the treaty expanded in 1991 to include successor states of the former Soviet Union - Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine - as well as Russia.

process of the full withdrawal from the INF treaty on 2 August 2019. Russia responded to the US withdrawal in kind also by withdrawing from the INF treaty.

1.2. Research Question

This thesis explores how the making, working, and ending of the INF treaty took place. It points out the strategies developed and materialized by the two major signatory powers, the USA and USSR (later Russia). It also looks into positions of European powers as they were being the most beneficiaries of the INF treaty. It is a fair inquiry to see if they had committed themselves to keep up the INF treaty and how they responded to the dissolution of it. Moreover, it is also a fair issue to take into account the China factor as both the US and Russian policymakers referred to.

All these have to be taken in a suitable framework and a relevant context that help explain the making, working, and dissolution of the INF treaty.

1.3. Importance of the Research Question

The nuclear attack that hit the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki kept the US supremacy of nuclear power until the USSR invented similar nuclear power that shaped a period of nuclear equilibrium which more or less continued until the collapse of the USSR.

On the other hand, the presence of huge nuclear warheads was not an obstacle to conventional wars or diplomatic and ideological warfare around the world. The obstacle to a great extinction could be that a massive nuclear showdown would destroy both sides; however, the main obstacle was the fact that it was an alternative. In this sense, disarmament has great importance.

This thesis displays that the INF treaty was signed under the compromise of thoughts of disarmament as well as arms control.
Firstly, Gorbachev noted that “genuine security can only be achieved through real disarmament” in his letter to Reagan 3 months ago before the signature of the INF agreement. Disarmament has been a way in which the USSR was persistent whereas the US has insisted on an arms control tool for nuclear weapons.

For instance, according to Lord Carrington, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), before the signature of the INF treaty, in which the agreement was good in a political way because it and its verification arrangements would provide greater confidence in East-West relations and promote mutually advantageous arms control measures.

Also, he added that

To those ... who claim that the INF agreement will somehow decouple the United States guarantee from Europe, I would say this. The Europeans are satisfied that, with over 4,000 nuclear weapons remaining in Europe and one third of a million United States troops, divorce or separation is not on the cards.... So, let us leave our American friends in no doubt that the INF agreement is in the interest of us all.

Before signing the INF treaty, Reagan said that for the first time in history, the language of “arms control” was relayed by “arms reduction,” which was the complete elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range US and USSR nuclear missiles. This arms reduction tendency could be explained by the influence of the USSR.

Moreover, he added

---


We can only hope that this history-making agreement will not be an end in itself but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us: strategic offensive nuclear weapons, the balance of conventional forces in Europe, the destructive and tragic regional conflicts that beset so many parts of our globe, and respect for the human and natural rights God has granted to all men.12

Gorbachev affirmed that with the signature of the INF treaty, “the signing of the first-ever agreement eliminating nuclear weapons, has a universal significance for mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism.”13

He also added that

For everyone, and above all, for our two great powers, the treaty whose text is on this table offers a big chance at last to get onto the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It is our duty to take full advantage of that chance and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children and grandchildren and for their children and grandchildren the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction. May December 8, 1987, become a date that will be inscribed in the history books, a date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life.14

According to Arbatov, the INF treaty worked towards rebuilding trust between the US and the USSR, and it released a series of disarmament stages that facilitated the end of the Cold War.15

It might be said that the US has turned into a “lonely sheriff.”16 Especially, in the post-1990 period, everything, the US and the circles that shaped the policies of the US-

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
based international order have tried, seems to have done nothing but maintained a system and course in which the US has lost power not only at home but also abroad, and other actors have gained strength and influence in the international realm.

Namely, the political and ideological opposition to the US global hegemony after the Cold War has been fragmented, reflecting the new configuration of social power. It experiences the current crisis of international order. It paves the way for policies that are the product of this crisis.

The INF treaty has weakened over time. For example, while Article XI of the agreement regulated a series of on-site inspections that lasted for 13 years to ensure that both parties comply with the elimination of prohibited weapons, this mechanism eventually ended and was not renewed and instead led to satellite observations to track compliance.

One of the reasons for the termination of the INF treaty, from the US perspective, is stated as a doctrinal violation of necessities and obligations of the INF treaty by Russia, which was a challenge to the existing deterrence paradigms in terms of nuclear weapons. The US claimed that Russia violated the INF treaty and then, it did not return to full and verifiable compliance to the treaty.

The discussions voiced by the US and Russia about who first broke a dysfunctional agreement are meaningless because both sides seem to act more audaciously as a need to use their military power as an instrument.

It can be said that the collapse of the INF treaty, which has lost its function for the US, includes the purpose of pushing the current international order into an imbalance, especially as China emerged for the time being an economic contender which poses a further question mark over political and military realms.


The main criticism for the dissolution of the INF treaty is that the states such as China may produce intermediate-range and shorter-range weapons, but both the US and Russia were the only subjects to certain restrictions in this regard.

The tendency to increase the tension of the time race and mutual alliance breaking maneuvers also points out the increase in the new and strategic nuclear capacities of Russia openly and China more secretly may not remain just word. It can be possible to state that with the dissolution of the INF treaty, nuclear powers can create a new multilateral treaty that included more arms and signatories. The INF treaty did not bind other actors with nuclear weapons.

In addition, it may be stated that technology will continue to enhance, thus, based on that, the technology of arms seems to develop, and states attempt to have more arms. Hence, the end of the INF treaty raises fears of a new arms race. Moreover, it may be that nuclear powers want to show their powers. Thus, arms control treaties like the INF treaty were able to lose their function.

While the so-called use of strategic nuclear weapons is debatable, all experts agree that tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons were no longer a matter in security policy after the end of the East-West conflict.\textsuperscript{20}

In a world, where the motivation that murdered thousands at the same time in 1945 competing with their counterparts, it would be naive after a while to expect control. The world is much closer to madness than it was before 1990. Moreover, existing fronts have been places where new technologies have been advertised for a while.

Moreover, the INF treaty was significant for European security because the treaty was not related to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the ban extended to weapons with intermediate-range and shorter-range under the INF treaty was a direct threat to Europe. Also, European states were not a party to the treaty, but the INF treaty enabled nuclear stability on the European Continent. In terms of nuclear weapons policy, Europe has been faced with new challenges with the end of the INF treaty.

Since the termination of the INF treaty is recent, new studies have not yet come out. However, lately emerged thesis, which introduces the US withdrawal from the treaty, would lead to strengthening relations between Russia and China if the US deploys intermediate-range nuclear weapons to the Pacific even though, unlike the US deployment, the Russian-Sino strategic partnership will likely remain undisturbed, which does not reflect reality.

1.4. Framework of Analysis and Methodology

This thesis examines the INF treaty in the framework of and through the terms of disarmament and arms control. That is, the treaty is described as an arms control treaty, but it is also about disarmament because one of the features of the INF treaty is associated with the destruction of the existing intermediate-range and shorter-range conventional and nuclear weapons whereas the production of new intermediate-range and shorter-range conventional and nuclear weapons instead is taken under control or prevented and verified.

Thus, the INF treaty has dual dimensions such as disarmament and arms control. That is why the INF agreement is a good and meaningful example in this regard as it can be grasped as the issue of both disarmament and arms control.

This thesis examines the process where the disarmament side of the deals gradually gets weaker, but the arms control part is stronger over time.

This research historicizes the way signatory powers are attributed to the INF treaty, and the first-hand documents are therefore examined and the declarations of the concerned parties are taken into account. The main effort of this thesis is devoted to bringing sources together and making research on the material regarding the INF treaty. Both the qualitative and the quantitative methods are used. When and if necessary, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s annual fact

sheets, included nuclear weapons data, are utilized. The documents were reached from the archives, parliamentary and congressional publications, and official statements, as well as secondary sources like reports, articles, news, writings, books, discourses, were used as a tool to evaluate the language of political actors, memoirs, and dated interviews of the scholars, the statesmen and the politicians are looked into. In particular, it uses the Articles of the INF treaty, which forms the basis of the legal aspect of research, to reflect as well as to discuss the situations regarding the INF treaty as well as the function of the agreement. In short, this thesis has adopted and stood both for qualitative and quantitative methods.

1.5. Organization of the Chapters

The organization of this thesis is as follows: having portrayed the subject of the thesis, literature review, research question, and framework of analysis and methodology in the introduction chapter, the second chapter is devoted to the historical background of disarmament and arms control.

The third chapter explores and portrays the making and working of the INF treaty.

The fourth chapter focuses on the termination of the INF treaty by taking the mutual allegations, the US withdrawal from the INF treaty, and the Russian response into consideration.

The fifth chapter explores the link between the INF treaty and New START, how the US and Russia saw each other’s acts is examined.

Finally, the last chapter, the conclusion, points out its concluding remarks.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

2.1 Introduction

The INF treaty is substantial in terms of the term “arms control”, and the classic definition as a strategic policy structure remains that of Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin state that

We believe that arms control is a promising . . . enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.22

At the bottom, the INF treaty has two significant features such as disarmament and arms control. Employing the inurement of the treaty, within the framework of disarmament, the existing types of missiles were demolished and then, inclusive of the margin of arms control, the having, producing, and flight-testing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles were under a ban.

This chapter aims to highlight the history of disarmament and arms control first to build a better ground to understand the way the INF treaty came out.

2.2. History of Disarmament and Arms Control from the Interbellum to 1950s

Disarmament means “the act of reducing”, “limiting”, “abolishing” as well as especially, “eliminating states’ military or specific sorts of weapons”. General and complete disarmament was described by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as the elimination of all weapon of mass destruction (WMD), associated with the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security.  

The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 marked the first significant attempts to codify the opening of the modern era of the efforts toward “international disarmament” and to produce or open the door to the era of arms control. A commonly held belief was that “casus belli” had been the escalating buildup of armaments between Great Britain and Germany from 1898 to 1912.

After WW I, the League of Nations (LoN) was established and one of its tasks was to limit and reduce arms, nevertheless, the enforcement of this was not potent. Despite the fact that the treaty of Versailles effectively disarmed Germany, progressively

23 UN General Assembly, “Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament,” para. 22.


common disarmament was pursued to reach over a while. The LoN, an international organization, was established on 10 January 1920 with the attempt of the victorious Allied powers at the end of WW I. The Article 8 of the Covenant members of the LoN recognized the fact that “the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety.” This was a reflection of point IV of the US President Wilson’s principles, “Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.”

What is more, in 1921, the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments was founded by the LoN so as to examine the problem of international disarmament in its widest aspects and to propose potential initiatives, plans and solutions as well as to explore the possibilities for disarmament. In the Australian Journal of Politics and History,

A fascinating experiment in the possibilities of transnationalism within an international organization, the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments both exemplified the fluidity of the League of Nations in its early years and showed the limited results a transnational approach could achieve on as contentious an issue as disarmament.


32 Ibid.
Several naval conferences like the Washington Naval Conference were held during the interbellum, the interwar years, in order to restrict the number and size of major warships of the five great naval powers.

On 6 February 1922, the Limitation of Naval Armament – The five-Power Treaty (Washington Treaty) - was signed by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan in Washington for the maintenance of the general peace and reducing the burdens of competition in armament. Due to that treaty, its parties’ respective naval armaments were limited. What is significant here is that with the Washington Treaty, the British Empire lost its naval supremacy for 117 years when the Battle of Trafalgar broke out on 21 October 1805, which had established British naval supremacy, and shared the naval supremacy with the US.

On 17 June 1925, the Geneva Protocol was signed. It entered into force on 8 February 1928. Geneva Protocol, the result of the 1925 Geneva Conference, banned chemical weapons during the war. It is important in terms of disarmament because it limited certain types of arms.

On 27 August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed. It was also called the Pact of Paris, whilst not effective, attempted for “providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.” Namely, it was described multilateral agreement attempting in order to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. It was the most imposing and peacekeeping effort after WW I.


34 Ibid.


37 Ibid.
Hoping to tie the United States into a system of protective alliances directed against a possible resurgence of German aggression, the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, first suggested a bilateral nonaggression pact in the spring of 1927. The U.S. secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg, prodded by the American “outlawry of war” movement and supported by those who were disappointed at the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, proposed that the pact be converted into a general multilateral treaty, which the French accepted.  

The Kellogg-Briand Pact had a political, social, and legal inflection feature because it catalyzed a lasting change in the way people and states thought, spoke, and acted about war.  

It can be stated that in the interwar years, the latest attempt on disarmament was held at the Geneva Disarmament Conference between February 1932 and November 1937, chaired by the former British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson. Germany wanted to revise the treaty of Versailles and the granting of military parity with the other powers whereas France decided to keep Germany demilitarized due to its own security. Simultaneously, Britain and the US were reluctant to ensure security for France commitments in return for conciliation with Germany. The discussions broke down in 1933 when Adolf Hitler withdrew Germany from the conference.  

After the Washington Treaty, Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament - London Naval Treaty - was signed in London on 22 April 1930 by the heads of states and government of the USA, France, the UK, Italy, and Japan in order to prevent the dangers as well as to reduce the burdens inherent in competitive armaments, and to carry the work forward which was initiated by the Washington Naval Conference and

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38 “Kellogg-Briand Pact.”


to facilitate the progressive realization of general limitation and the reduction of armaments.\(^{41}\)

The failure of the Geneva Naval Conference cast a gloom over the 1927 Assembly, which, adopting the course now customary at Geneva whenever disarmament prospects looked block, recommended a further study of the problem of security. The autumn session of the Preparatory Commission was enlivened by the first appearance of a Soviet Delegation under M. Litvinov, who made an eloquent plea for total and universal disarmament.\(^{42}\)

It can be stated as the fact that before WW II, the most important as well as the first General Disarmament Conference for limitation and reduction of armament was held in Geneva on 3 February 1932. The agreement was formed for “general disarmament” proposed at Geneva by the USSR,\(^{43}\) namely, in February 1932, it was that the USSR insisted on the general disarmament.\(^{44}\) It is prominent that the USSR pursued its strategy based on the policy of complete disarmament for a long time.

Have you ever thought that nuclear war could break out? asked by Ronald Reagan and who said that “to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used” to the people of the USSR in the 1984 State of the Union.\(^{45}\)

Nuclear weapons have involved an arms race of a very distinctive character. It is more dangerous and more complex than the one about heavy cruisers, tanks, and bombers earlier in the century. The development of nuclear weapons in the course of WW II

\(^{41}\) Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, p.1055.


has, thus, yielded an element of world politics as fundamental and new as the inter-systemic rivalry which emerged simultaneously from the defeat of the Axis states.\footnote{Fred Halliday, \textit{The Making of the Second Cold War}, 2nd ed., (London: Verso, 1986), p.33.}

At the final stage of WW II, the scientists of the USA tried to be the master of the atom and its capacity released its energy with the atomic bomb. In the end, the US initiative known as the Manhattan Project\footnote{Güvem Gümüş Akay and Erhan Naçacı, “Savaşın Hizmetinde Bilim: Manhattan Projesi,” \textit{Madde, Diyalektik ve Toplum} 2, no. 3 (August 2019), pp. 208-218.}, fed by the minds of the European diaspora in the US, faced the rope. After the first successful atomic bomb test, or detonation of a nuclear weapon in the New Mexico deserts in July 1945, the theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer triumphed at the start of the secret weapon development initiative, which can remind about “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds,” the most well-known line, from the Bhagavad-Gita in accordance with James Temperton.\footnote{James Temperton, ‘‘ ‘Now I Am Become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds’. The Story of Oppenheimer’s Infamous Quote,” \textit{WIRED UK} (August 9, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/manhattan-project-robert-oppenheimer, (accessed June 15, 2021).}

The number of nuclear weapons with the US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 has sustained and continued to multiply in the course of time despite the attempts for disarmament and arms control, which helped diminish the nuclear arms threat and build up.

After WW II, there was a tendency among military researchers to underestimate the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. However, this was not the case for top-level American military and political leaders, who quickly recognized the revolutionary character of nuclear power. After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman saw the atom bomb as a terrorist weapon and stated that the atom bomb should be treated differently than ordinary weapons such as cannons and rifles.\footnote{Scott Douglas Sagan, \textit{Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.13-14.}
statement, the Truman administration stated that nuclear weapons should be under international control.50

Arms control is usually about bilateral and multilateral agreements on small arms, conventional weapons, and WMD as well as states legally promise and bind themselves to restrict the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or use of nuclear, chemical, biological, or other types of weapons.51

An increase in any type of weapons can exceed an arms race and an increase in insecurity. Arms control agreements are often regarded as a way to avoid costly arms races that could adversely affect national goals and future peace.52 Arms control agreements can be also seen as ways so as to stop the spread of certain military technologies in lieu assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of these technologies. In addition, some of these treaties are entered to limit the havoc done by warfare, especially, to civilians and the environment, which is thought as distorted for all participants regardless of who wins a war, or not.

According to Croft, a typology of arms control strategies is based on his convincingly argued belief that arms control “has been, and continues to be, a much broader activity than is usually taken to be the case.”53

Indeed, arms control can be described to break the security dilemma which is

Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape


the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.54

It can be stated that the purposes of arms control as a defensive strategy in a principle are mutual security or mutually controlled armament, transparency, equality, and stability for each side. Besides, it comes with cost reduction and devastation limitations.

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was established in October 1945 with the aim of protecting world peace and security. On 16 March 1946, the Acheson Lilienthal Report, the Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, was submitted to the US Department of State. On 28 March 1946, it was released to the public. The Acheson-Lilienthal report called for the establishment of the Atomic Development Authority in order to oversee the mining and use of fissile materials, the operation of all nuclear facilities, capable of producing weapons, and the right to license countries seeking to conduct peaceful nuclear research.55 For the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, “no nation or private organization was to be permitted to engage in dangerous activities.”56 The plan was based on cooperation between the US and the USSR as its authors acknowledged that the USSR was unlikely to abandon its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on any issue.57 Also, it never mentioned when the US should destroy its nuclear arsenal, but it admitted that it was a necessity to do so.58 This report, included in the American proposals, served


58 Ibid.
as the basis for the Baruch Plan, which would be presented a few months later. Bernard Baruch suggested that in the plan he presented at the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946, the International Atomic Development Authority be established and that this institution be given the authority to sanction and punish violations. In other items of the plan, provided that it was under the supervision of the organization, there were provisions for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful nuclear research, and the destruction of existing nuclear weapons of the USA after the international control system was established and to stop its production. The plan also banned the UN Security Council’s veto power over the decisions of this organization.\textsuperscript{59}

Gregg Herken believed that the Baruch Plan was a product of the illusory belief that the atomic bomb might be used in a diplomatic or military way as the US “winning weapon” in the emerging struggle with the USSR.\textsuperscript{60}

The USSR was uncomfortable with the US changing the balance of power with its nuclear power and worried that the US would use its influence in the UN decision-making process in the UN Atomic Energy Commission. The USSR objected to the Baruch Plan and its representatives submitted the Gromyko Plan, named after Russian Ambassador to the UN Andrei Gromyko. On 19 June 1946, he countered with the Gromyko Plan that virtually ignored the Baruch proposals.\textsuperscript{61} This plan proposed “an international convention of infinite duration, open to all states and calling for an absolute prohibition of the use and the production of atomic weapons, and for the destruction of existing ones within three months of the convention’s ratification”\textsuperscript{62}. With the Gromyko Plan, the UN Atomic Energy Commission must first ensure that


\textsuperscript{60} Gerber, “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War,” p.70.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p.73.

existing nuclear weapons are destroyed, their production stopped and their production banned before an international inspection agency is established. For the USSR, an international control system could only be functional in this way. The Gromyko Plan also included the protection of the veto power of the UN Security Council.63

The USSR had a tremendous conventional power against the US with its influence and spread in Eastern Europe. It can be stated that with the balancing of the nuclear monopoly of the US and the possibility of invasion of Western Europe by the USSR, a mutual deterrence in nuclear and conventional weapons was formed between the US and the USSR.

The Conventional Armaments Commission, which was established by the Security Council in 1947 and composed of its members, did not start its serious work until 1948 after the Soviet proposal to consider conventional and nuclear disarmament together was rejected.64 At the time, when the US had a nuclear monopoly and the USSR was assumed to be the superior in conventional weapons, both sides made proposals that helped them maintain their position while neutralizing the other’s superiority.65

The USSR, which accelerated its nuclear studies, carried out the first successful atomic bomb test in 1949.

A new Disarmament Commission was established in 1952 with the same membership as previous Commissions - the Security Council plus Canada. Its responsibility was

regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful for purposes only.66

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65 Ibid., pp.151-152.

In 1954, the discussions moved to a subcommittee made up of Canada, France, the UK, the USSR, and the US, where it continued privately until September 1957.\(^{67}\)

In spite of the fact that negotiations were taking place, the US and the USSR began a nuclear arms race, with each striving to gain a military advantage over the other by building more and more nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.\(^{68}\) This race caused a debate on the proper means to cope with the nuclear arms problem via disarmament and arms control. Especially, collective arms control responses between 1925 and 1991 evolved into three types of agreements, which focused on “non-armament, confidence-building measures, and arms limitations.”\(^{69}\)

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons embarked on attracting international attention after 1945. This was a turning point in disarmament and arms control because changes in the quality of weapons caused the belief that disarmament and arms control was an open problem.

While nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated, arms controls on nuclear weapons of states are related to being limited and controlled on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, deployment and use of.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, it has been obvious that the development of nuclear capabilities by states could provide them with diverting technology and materials for weapons purposes. Therefore, preventing such tendencies became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After WW II, the UN was established for promoting and sustaining international peace and security.\(^{70}\) The

\(^{67}\) “SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968–69,” p.152.


\(^{69}\) Ibid.

US proposed the Baruch Plan in 1946 as a way to impose stringent international control over the nuclear fuel cycle or atomic weapons to the UN.\textsuperscript{71}

This illustrates the classic US position. It also shows what the US initial strategy was. That is the US acquired nuclear weapons itself, but it wanted others not to do so. Therefore, it tried to make a policy to prevent a global nuclear arms race within the UN framework to limit others from getting nuclear weapons. That was not something the USSR would accept.

Initial attempts, which was begun in 1946 by the UN, to create an international system to make it possible for all states to have access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective, because both the US and the USSR, two nuclear powers, had tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their stockpiles.

In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” proposal presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and urged that an international organization be established in order to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology while guarding against the development of weapons capabilities in additional countries.\textsuperscript{72} Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, and other leading scientists issued a manifesto warning of the dangers of nuclear war and urging all governments to resolve disputes peacefully in 1955.\textsuperscript{73} Eisenhower’s proposal resulted in 1957 in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\textsuperscript{74}, which was charged with the dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology.


\textsuperscript{74} “History of Nuclear Weapons.”
The IAEA technical assistance activities began in 1958.\textsuperscript{75} Within the framework of the UN, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early as 1957 and gained significant momentum in the early 1960s due to the fact that the United Kingdom (UK), France and China built and tested a nuclear explosive device.

In the United Kingdom, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), on 17 February 1958, held a public opening meeting in the Central Hall in Westminster, attended by five thousand people. After the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK held its first meeting\textsuperscript{76}, a few hundred left to show off at Downing Street.\textsuperscript{77}

The policies declared by the CND were the unconditional abandonment of the use, production, or dependence on nuclear weapons by the UK and a general disarmament agreement. The CND organized the first Aldermaston March, which took place at Easter in 1958. When several thousand people marched from Trafalgar Square, in London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment near Aldermaston in Berkshire, in the UK, to show off their opposition to nuclear weapons for four days.\textsuperscript{78} The Aldermaston marches continued until the late 1960s when tens of thousands of people joined the four-day marches.

\textsuperscript{75} “History of Nuclear Weapons.”

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.


2.3. Nuclear Armament Strategies in the 1960s

To begin with, it is important to describe what the nuclear strategy is. The nuclear strategy is concerned with “the relationship between political ends and military means the interest” and with “the theoretical and practical issues raised by attempts to extract political benefits from nuclear arsenals.”\textsuperscript{79} Explicitly, it is “the formation of tenets and strategies for producing and using nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{80}

Nuclear strategy can be understood under what circumstances it is employed for the interest of the nation so as to develop nuclear weapons, which kinds of nuclear weapons can be developed, and when and how such weapons can be used.

Unlike most military strategies, which are about how forces might be used against armed opponents, the discussion of nuclear strategy has been affiliated to deterrence and how to cope provided that it fails. Deterrence is a notoriously distinctive subject to obligate for it succeeds when nothing happens and relies on how threats are communicated and understood. At moments of crisis, governments have talked about the risks of nuclear war although at other times they tend to avoid speculating on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used.

As a result, to grasp the emerge of the INF treaty, it is necessary to scrutinize the nuclear strategies of the US, the USSR, and Europe, generally and specifically, starting from the 1960s.


2.3.1. The US Strategy

The USA broke ground in the development and use of nuclear weapons. According to Kissinger, the USA Strategy can be explained briefly as follows

Until the early Fifties, we had an atomic monopoly enabling us to substitute strategic power for conventional inferiority without fear of retaliation. Until the Sixties, we were in a position of such superiority that in a first strike we could probably have destroyed the Soviet retaliatory force, and the Soviets had no comparable capability. In any event, the Soviets, calculating the worst-case scenario, would not risk it. Until the early Seventies, in fact, the worst-case scenario analysis of the Soviets was bound to be a significant restraint on adventurism. Therefore, our loss of strategic superiority was a strategic revolution even if the Soviets did not achieve a superiority of their own. For that, to some extent, freed the Soviet capacity for regional intervention.81

What is significant here is that the US stereotype could be seen repeating. The US was trying to create a strategy by portraying the USSR as a threat to it and its allies. However, the real threat was created by producing the first nuclear weapon.

Regardless of whether the aggression of the USSR is reality or not, the US policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s argued that this aggression was real, and with the “massive retaliation” and “assured destruction” strategies tried to deter this aggression according to the US. These strategies envisioned a large-scale US nuclear attack on a wide range of targets in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China if the USSR or its allies launched a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack against the US or its allies.82

From the development of nuclear weapons, deterrence can be stated as the center of the security policy of the US.

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George F. Kennan, an American diplomat, and historian, who has an important place in American foreign policy, sent to the US administration “The Long Telegram”\(^83\) and with his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”\(^84\) published in Foreign Affairs by analyzing the policy of the USSR, he planned a strategy that would form the basis of the US foreign policy during the Cold War. Kennan envisioned limiting the spheres of influence of the USSR with the containment policy, Kennan predicted, would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power”\(^85\) as a theoretical framework. Developments such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO can be assumed the concrete tools of this policy.

NATO was structured in 1949 with the aim of defending Western Europe against the expansionism of the USSR, its ideology, and ensuring their security under the “nuclear umbrella” of NATO via nuclear-sharing of the USA against nuclear weapon threats. The founding purpose of NATO was expressed by Lord Ismay, the first General Secretary of NATO, to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”\(^86\) Undoubtedly, NATO has formed an important basis for deterrence in terms of being under a common defense roof against the USSR threat. It can be claimed that the US had a nuclear weapon monopoly until 1949 to opt for the “containment policy” of Kennan unlike the USSR was responding technologically.

What is deterrence? What is nuclear deterrence? Why do countries need to deter? Deterrence can be defined as a strategy to prevent military attacks or threats of the

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opponent. Nuclear deterrence is the threat of nuclear retaliation for prohibiting aggressive behaviors, usually an action on the threatening state. Every country which has developed nuclear weapons has justified the following nuclear deterrence. The security of the nuclear-weapon states and people who are interested in their own survival and fear the outbreak of war rely on nuclear deterrence.

In addition to the military reasons for the desire of states to have nuclear weapons, there are also studies drawing attention to the existence of political reasons such as facilitating the realization of foreign political goals and increasing the power and prestige of the nation. Sagan also participates in these studies, the reasons that push the states to nuclear armament, security, internal or domestic policies, and norms.\(^{87}\) That is,

Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.\(^{88}\)

During these years when the US was a nuclear monopoly, the USSR used its conventional power for deterrent purposes. Handover of nuclear weapons possession the USSR completed the construction of the atomic bomb in August 1949. With this event important for stability and new technologies for nuclear weapons, the idea that the first strike would win the war was no longer valid because it ended the absolute power promised by its rival nuclear weapon to the first strike.

Acquiring and developing nuclear weapons can be regarded as a survival issue. Thanks to nuclear weapons, it would like to deter threats. Security is different from survival. Survival is being alive whereas security is living. Security is described as survival-plus\(^{89}\) by Ken Booth. The plus here may be stated alongside other factors the nuclear weapon in particular.

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\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 55.

Nuclear weapons have become the main tool of the US effort to contain the USSR expansionism for a variety of reasons. After the US rapid demobilization of its conventional armed forces following WW II, nuclear weapons were viewed by the political and military leaders as the only possible deterrent force against the enormous conventional forces of the USSR.\textsuperscript{90} When deterrence by punishment is generally associated with nuclear deterrence, deterrence by denial is usually about conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{91}

Also, the concepts of “first strike” and “second strike” to deterrence had an important place. The first strike is a supposed ability that means a “disarming strike.” The second one is known as opposed to first strike purposes to absorb the strike of the rival, and then to strike back successfully by remaining sufficient forces. Namely, a retaliatory force survived the attack. Briefly, one of these capabilities means that the opposing side does not have any of them.\textsuperscript{92} The USSR could be seen as the first pre-emptive attack with nuclear weapons. The pre-emptive strike is about a sudden attack that prevents the other side from replying.\textsuperscript{93}

This situation, in other words, is that a party with the initial capacity minimizes the damage to the intended use of destroying the wrong capacity of the opponent. Because if the opponent cannot be completely destroyed in case of retaliation, the second-strike capacity arises and the opponent has the ability to use their nuclear weapons in retaliation.

With this view, it has become important to protect nuclear weapons and their means of sending from the effects of the attack and to have military capabilities and


\textsuperscript{93} Halliday, \textit{The Making of the Second Cold War}, p.74.
capabilities enough to respond to the first attacker. In 1960, the nuclear triad\footnote{“Nuclear Triad,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear-triad, (accessed June 15, 2021).} was completed when the USSR and the USA added nuclear submarines to their nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. Nuclear submarines are crucial to nuclear deterrence. These submarines, whose location cannot be determined, made the second-strike capacity possible. Some of the nuclear weapons are deployed in the form of bombers in continuous flight around the earth in the air, some nuclear submarines patrolling under the sea, and some in the form of missiles ready to fire in sheltered silos or on the ground. It is believed as the fact that nuclear weapons are always ready in this way and have provided the parties with the second-strike capacity and the second-strike capacity has deterred the parties from making the first attack.

Actually, on 30 October 1953, NSC 162/2: A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy was approved by Eisenhower. The US national security policy promoted the birth of a new policy of deterrence known as massive retaliation, a military doctrine that put forward the US nuclear strategy. According to NSC 162/2, “in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other munitions.”\footnote{“NSC 162/2: A Report to the National Security Council,” the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy, Washington, Copy 47 (October 30, 1953), p.22.}

John Foster Dulles, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Eisenhower government between 1953 and 1959 and one of the important figures of the Cold War, developed the massive retaliation strategy against the USSR. With this strategy, the USA declared that it would retaliate heavily with nuclear weapons against any attack from the USSR.\footnote{Samuel F. Wells, “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 1 (1981), p.35.} Massive retaliation strategy based on the total response, including nuclear weapons, to any conventional or nuclear attack by the USSR.

With the launch of Sputnik, the first satellite by the USSR in 1957, which “experts and citizens in the United States who had hoped that the United States would accomplish
this scientific advancement first,”97 but the most important event that troubled the US considerably was a report98 about the long-range missile test made by the USSR in 1957. At this time, specialists began to worry about a more dangerous state of affairs, a potential surprise attack of the USSR missiles bringing about their short flying and warning time. The lack of knowledge about the actual number of the USSR intercontinental ballistic missiles occurred in the mind, “missile gap.”99

The continuous increase in nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR caused the deterrence policy to be reconsidered. Indeed, both sides had huge numbers of nuclear weapons, and in the event of a war, they could be completely destroyed. Wohlstetter explained this situation with the article “The Delicate Balance of Terror.”100

From 1957 to 1961, the missile gap issue continued to affect the US nuclear strategy.101 The US national security policy changed dramatically on 20 January 1961 when the incoming John F. Kennedy administration began to replace Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation” with a new strategy of “flexible response.” Focusing largely on the end of the USSR threat to Western Europe, a flexible response strategy was seen as an important change that enhanced the so-called deterrence by offering flexible nuclear options to the president and increasing traditional abilities to deal with various military crises.102


99 Ibid.


In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the peak of the Cold War, confronted two
leaderships. The importance of concepts such as the aforementioned “Balance of
Terror” and “MAD” has emerged. The massive retaliation strategy was abandoned by
President John F. Kennedy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was replaced by the
more refined, but equally ambiguous flexible response strategy, “to deter all wars,
general or limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small.”

According to the flexible response strategy, the USA could respond to the USSR’s
activities with all kinds of weapons to the extent that it finds suitable. The flexible
response strategy prevents the direct use of nuclear weapons in a possible attack, and
foresees the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons in case of failure of conventional
weapons and finally the realization of a large-scale nuclear attack. In other words, the
flexible response strategy, which aims to prevent large-scale nuclear war and
concentrates on conventional armament, has suggested the priority use of short-range
tactical weapons rather than the use of nuclear weapons at the first stage.

Tactical nuclear weapons, also known as non-strategic nuclear weapons, are designed
to be used on battlefields for military purposes. There are various types of tactical
nuclear weapons such as unguided bombs, underwater bombs, nuclear torpedoes, land
mines, artillery shells, and short-range missiles. With these weapons usable like
conventional weapons, nuclear war, which was seen as unstoppable, became fought.
Therefore, one of the important factors of the increase in nuclear weapons stocks has
been the race in tactical nuclear weapons.

In addition, the theoretical spirit of the “Flexible Response” created US supremacy
and multiple options in the 1960s. This strategy had the task of two-way
v  targetings, such as a counterforce strike and countervalue strike, which would provide resilience
in a crisis where the US could strengthen both. The purpose of the counterforce
strike was to eliminate and accordingly limit the USSR nuclear forces. In addition to

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this damage-limiting mission, the guaranteed destruction mission aimed at destroying USSR countervalue targets, including USSR cities and industrial areas.\textsuperscript{105} Counterforce and countervalue strategies aimed at preventing the enemy from using their weapons and responding through deterrence.\textsuperscript{106}

In the late 1960s, the USSR military build-up in terms of ICBMs finally began to take place. It reached a higher level than the worst-case predictions. In terms of ICBMs, the parity emerged between the US and the USSR. Also, the USSR started the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). At the same time, the Johnson administration has reduced its spending on nuclear forces and kept the number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at the current level. In this context, it was possible to say that for the first time in its nuclear strategy, the US started to give up the principle of superiority and decided to be competent. Competence in strategic forces and stability in deterrence was considered the most desirable until the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{107} With the impending equity, and especially with the development of the USSR SLBMs, McNamara under Johnson’s rule partially abandoned the damage-limiting approach and underlined the duty of guaranteed the assured destruction mission.\textsuperscript{108}

During the last period of the Johnson administration, strategic defense incentives against the USSR missiles were revived due to the increase in the number of its missiles and the increase in the number of USSR missiles and in the late 1960s to balance the second offensive capability of the US deploying an early version of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system in the USSR region. Consequently, the Johnson


administration announced its intention to establish an ABM system known as the “Sentinel.”109

2.3.2. The USSR Strategy

At the close of WW II, the US introduced nuclear weapons. The USSR under Stalin’s leadership appeared to ignore the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy. This strategic approach changed so rapidly after the death of Stalin.

For many years after WW II, the US maintained its apparent military superiority over the USSR in most areas. In strategic nuclear forces, the US had an overwhelming advantage over the USSR. The USSR gained its capacity to strike US territory only in 1957, and it was only in the late 1960s that the USSR delivery systems had begun to approach the US levels in warhead numbers and megatonnage.110

In the 1950s, ballistic and cruise missile technologies, jet engines, and artificial earth satellites were introduced, as well as computers and automatic control systems. These significant events were known in the USSR as the “revolution in military affairs.”111

Nuclear weapons changed the nature and methods of armed struggle at a strategic level as they were able to fulfill the military’s strategic tasks without operational art and tactics. However, until Stalin’s death in 1953, the army of the USSR could not begin to explore the full strategic potential of new arms. Although Stalin pushed for the development of the “bomb”, he downplayed its importance and did not encourage the army to formulate a new strategy involving nuclear weapons.112


112 Ibid.
Although the first nuclear test explosion of the USSR happened in 1949, the transition to nuclear strategy began in the mid-1950s when the military thinkers of the USSR began to realize the importance of surprise, the early period of the war, and the use of nuclear attack so as to determine the course and outcome of the war.

In the 1950s, the increased mobility of armor and the striking power of nuclear weapons strengthened the concept of deep attack operation. The scope and depth of an operational attack grew and intensified. The military thinkers of the USSR believed they could achieve a decisive victory by launching pre-emptive nuclear attacks on targets behind the enemy and then encircling, cutting, and destroying the enemy’s troops with nuclear and conventional ammunition.\textsuperscript{113} The military writers of the USSR soon began to point out that radioactive contamination, fires, and floods caused by massive nuclear attacks could affect the success of operations.\textsuperscript{114}

In February 1955, Marshal Pavel A. Rotmistrov published a groundbreaking article on “surprise” in the magazine of the USSR Voennaia mysl’ (Military Thought).\textsuperscript{115} He stressed the importance of landing the first “pre-emptive” nuclear strike to destroy the enemy’s weapons, the second while preparing a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{116} Since the mid-1950s, the concept of pre-use of an enemy’s nuclear weapons has firmly placed in the military thinking of the USSR.

During the early period of the 1950s, nuclear strategy in the USSR remained for whatever reason heavily influenced by traditional military strategy. Moreover, in those early years of nuclear weapons of the US, its nuclear advantage was against the USSR’s conventional superiority in Europe.

\textsuperscript{113} “Russian/Soviet Doctrine.”

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
When the USSR military began to see nuclear weapons particularly suitable for general warfare, they needed a strategy for their use. In 1957, a series of top-level military seminars helped leaders develop elements of a new nuclear strategy. The USSR weapons succeed in 1957, and Khrushchev became confident enough to claim the USSR superiority in missiles in Pravda on 22 November 1957, to cast doubt on the US assumption that the US was militarily stronger than the USSR in Pravda on 26 January 1958, to throw out the traditional Stalinist concept of “capitalist encirclement” because it was “no longer clear who encircles whom” in an Interview with Paris Figaro on 19 March 1958, and to contend that the situation was such that the West would “hardly dare to unleash a war against the countries of the Socialist camp” in Speech in Krasnodar, Pravda, on 16 October 1958. Advances in the USSR weapons in 1957 seemed to have resolved the long-ambivalent problem in ruling circles of the USSR about the adequacy of deterrence. A group of military strategists of the USSR under Marshal Sokolovskii continued their seminar work. In 1927, they published the first USSR thesis on strategy, Military Strategy, in 1962.

As the USSR nuclear program evolved, tensions over military doctrine developed between Khrushchev and his senior military officers. Marshal Grechko emphasized the USSR armed forces “must always be superior to those of the imperialists.” In January 1960, Khrushchev announced the new nuclear strategy in a speech to “the


118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 “Russian/Soviet Doctrine.”

122 Ibid.

Supreme USSR.” According to Khrushchev, the aim of that strategy was to deter war rather than war. Despite Khrushchev’s emphasis on the deterrence and reduction of military manpower, “Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy” stressed the need for apocalyptic scenarios and mass armies for a world war with nuclear weapons. The idea of prevention reappeared on a transcontinental basis than as the USSR had purchased nuclear ICBMs and could threaten the US territory. Sokolovskii argued that the USSR side should “block” an attack by an enemy coalition by carrying out massive nuclear strikes on the enemy’s territory. These attacks not only destroy the enemy’s weapons but also the enemy’s will to continue the war, thus, limiting the damage done by a retaliatory attack.

Between 1962 and 1964, a series of articles analyzing the Western amphibious operations of WW II were published in military journals of the USSR, suggesting that there was an interest in the methods of projecting military forces far from the borders of the USSR. However, beyond the creation of a small naval force in both 1963 and 1964, there was no sudden change in policy from that interest, and the missions performed indicated that it was designed for the amphibious operations in order to support a ground operation in general warfare instead of the distant limited war role.

In the mid-1960s, the USSR military leadership attempted to add new, less destructive, strategic options, not only as a reception to a flexible response strategy but also because the leaders began to doubt the possibility of a true victory in a nuclear war. “The end of the period saw approximately equality in strategic nuclear weapons and

124 “Russian/Soviet Doctrine.”

125 Ibid.


127 Ibid., p.30.

128 “Russian/Soviet Doctrine.”
defense against them, and was ratified by a formal agreement with the United States at the Moscow Summit meeting in May 1972.”\textsuperscript{129}

The strategy of the USSR regarding nuclear weapons was to provide the disarmament position, which had followed conventional weapons in a logical way. To the extent that the US did not agree with the fact that those arms turned to control. The USSR entered a nuclear arms race to balance the nuclear superiority achieved by the United States in 1945. To a large extent, it had succeeded. At that time, the USA did not have a problem in finding resources and held one-third of the world economy even though the USSR was not in a position to devote its resources to weapons and, ideologically, allocating resources to weapons was a problem.

2.3.3. The European Strategy

Substantially, in terms of nuclear strategy, European non-nuclear allies and European nuclear allies completely relied on NATO nuclear umbrella including the US as a nuclear power during the Cold War period because European countries escaped from confronting the USSR, as seen as a threat, by themselves. NATO’s nuclear sharing was made through the United States despite the fact that the UK and France have had a nuclear capability. In that sense, it can be stated that the nuclear strategy followed by Europe during the Cold War is mostly a search for assurance in the context of the NATO nuclear umbrella. This has been met to a great extent by the US. For instance, West Germany began using nuclear energy in the 1960s with the help of NATO, however, in the early 1970s, a strong anti-nuclear movement formed with local groups organizing protests against the construction of new plants.\textsuperscript{130}

When Europe was scrutinized from the point of nuclear weapons in the 1960s, both the UK and France had their own nuclear forces, unlike West Germany. The UK

\textsuperscript{129} Jukes, \textit{The development of Soviet Strategic Thinking Since 1945}, p.38

carried out the first successful nuclear test on 2 October 1952 whereas France realized its first nuclear test on 13 October 1960. In fact, that shows that Europe could not be defined the nuclear strategy as a single. This is because there were either non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon states in Europe. In addition, even though not only the UK but also France had their own nuclear weapons, they did not offer the common use of these nuclear weapons to Europe. Moreover, West Germany did not have its own nuclear weapons, but it sought protection via nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. This situation fed and converged with the US policy of staying a monopoly on the issue of nuclear weapons. Nuclear sharing has been an important component of US policy towards the West. The inclusion of non-nuclear countries and West Germany, in a joint NATO force, would discourage them from seeking deterrents of their own, and in that way, it raised European unity to ensure Western European security.

In the 1950s and 1960s, West Germany and Italy were compliant with the US wishes about the storage of nuclear weapons on their soil as well as after all, their potential use in a European war.

On the other hand, France raised the concerns. In March 1966, it was announced that the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure of NATO and effective expulsion of NATO personnel from French soil. That is, the French President Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of US leadership and the withdrawal of French forces from the integrated military structure of NATO. For that understanding, the French come


first. France wanted their own force de frappe. For France, Washington might not use their weapons at all in a crisis.\textsuperscript{135}

Sharing possession of nuclear capabilities of the US strengthened NATO during the 1960s in Europe.

2.4. The NPT: The International Framework of Arms Control

Why is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) important? It can be stated that cessation of the continuing arms race and preventing the war technology can be realized through a treaty on general and complete disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. The NPT can be shown as a good example of that since it with a Preamble and eleven Articles, which is built on three pillars,

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology (Article 1, 2, 3),
- to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Article 4) with the help of [a] safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which detects the misuse of nuclear technology as well as to promote nuclear disarmament (Article 6)\textsuperscript{136},

but it has not achieved in general and complete disarmament for years, yet.

In the Cold War period, nuclear weapons production intensified. A treaty had been signed by both non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states in order to avert the danger of a nuclear war. Disarmament can be grasped as the best protection against the outbreak of a nuclear war, however, achieving that has been difficult.

With the NPT, nuclear weapons were enormously eliminated, nevertheless, the NPT has not prevented nuclear proliferation as well as not achieving total disarmament. The

\textsuperscript{135} “The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954-1962, Part I.”

structural problem of the NPT is that general and complete nuclear disarmament will not be able to be achievable.

The NPT is the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of general and complete disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states. It was opened for signature at London, Moscow, and Washington on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. On 11 May 1995, states parties to the Treaty agreed without a vote on the Treaty’s indefinite extension and decided that review conferences should continue to be held every five years. In other words, every five years, parties to the NPT meet to review its implementation.

The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of international behavior had become clear by the mid-1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, enable cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving general nuclear disarmament.

From 1953 to 1969, it was called the period of Oscillatory Antagonism, which was one in which attempts were made to lessen confrontation and reach an agreement, and to detach some of the tensions internal to each camp from the east-west confrontation as explained by Fred Halliday. The Treaty was signed in that period, and it was entered into force in the Détente period, which was marked by a retreat from the all-out arms race, by the rhetoric of peace and pursuit of agreed levels of armament from 1969 to 1979. Even though the NPT was the output of the Cold War, it has not


139 “Background Information,” The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

140 Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, p.3.

141 Ibid., p.6.
disappeared after the Cold War ended. Hence, to grasp the aim of the NPT, it is important to see how the NPT emerged.

The NPT divides the countries of the world into two categories, nuclear weapon states, and non-nuclear weapons states. This is significant because it is the only binding multilateral treaty with the aim of total disarmament by nuclear-weapon states. Currently, a total of 191 states have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states; China, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. The Treaty defines nuclear weapon states as those who have built and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967, namely, the US (First detonation in 1945), the USSR (1949), the UK (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, India, Pakistan, and Israel, which are known as nuclear weapons states, have never been signatories to the Treaty and might develop nuclear weapons outside it. Besides, North Korea is the only state to have left the NPT. Kibaroğlu and Sauer stated that

Each day the anti-nuclear norm has become stronger. For the same reason, a majority of states in the world are now banning nuclear weapons. That goal fits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and is the cornerstone of today’s global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Therefore, although the NPT is a prominent treaty in terms of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it seems difficult to approach those targets in the foreseeable future. This is because whereas states parties to the Treaty may realize those aims by themselves, there are states not parties to the NPT, which can continue to develop and increase nuclear weapons. This can be the reason why complete disarmament has not been achieved. Thus, it is used to justify the arms race in the existing system.

142 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”


144 Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Tom Sauer, “Mr. Trump, Post Nuclear Ban Treaty, NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in Europe Are Obsolete,” Insight Turkey 19, no. 3 (January 2017), p.25.
2.5. **SALT Negotiations**

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I on limiting both Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defensive systems and strategic nuclear offensive systems\(^{145}\) was fully launched in Helsinki on 17 November 1969 in the period towards Détente. The most important of the agreements that emerged during the negotiations was an interim agreement on certain measures limiting strategic offensive arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on the limitation of strategic defensive systems. During Nixon’s visit to Moscow in May 1972, they were signed by Nixon and Brezhnev within the framework of SALT I.\(^{146}\) Of these treaties, an interim agreement expired five years later. The ABM Treaty was accepted for an indefinite period of time and granted both parties the right to withdraw for six months after notification, in the event of a strategic situation that endangers the vital interests of any party. As a matter of fact, the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 by enacting this article in December 2001, on the grounds that it “hampers our ability to keep the peace, to develop defensive weapons necessary to defend America against the true threats of the 21st century.”\(^{147}\)

The ABM Treaty concerned the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile system. The Treaty limited both sides to only two anti-ballistic missile deployment zones, one in the capital and the other in an ICBM launch site. Each anti-ballistic missile field was limited to 100 launch systems and 100 interceptor missiles. It mandated all early warning radars directed outward around the country to prevent the establishment of a nationwide war management system. It also covered systems based on other principles,

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such as lasers in addition to traditional interceptor missiles, radars, and launch pads.\textsuperscript{148} With the agreement granting both countries the right to install only two anti-ballistic missile systems, both sides were able to protect only a small part of their countries. That arrangement, in which both sides were subjected to the deterrent effect of other strategic powers, strengthened the MAD strategy.\textsuperscript{149} Indeed, while both sides made population centers vulnerable to the first attack, the second hit they had the existence of its capacity discourages the other side from a nuclear war.

Another treaty was signed under SALT I about attack missiles. Within the framework of the interim agreement, the number of existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) was frozen at current levels for a period of 5 years. Thanks to that, an upper limit was imposed on the ballistic missiles that the parties could have, and the production of new missiles was carried out by dismantling the same number of old missiles, preserving the upper limit for ballistic missiles.

The USSR and the US nuclear weapon systems were different from each other, as both sides developed these systems in accordance with their nuclear strategy. The USSR continued to develop and deploy heavy ballistic missiles and had caught up with the US leadership in land-based ICBMs. The USA, on the other hand, had the upper hand in warhead, bomber, and missile accuracy.

What is significant here is that the term “Euro-strategic” is used to describe nuclear weapons located in or likely to be used in Europe, and which are capable of hitting targets located a significant distance within the territory of the opponent.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, they are different from tactical nuclear weapons, shorter range, and intended to be used within a battlefield. More commonly, and especially as a consequence of the SALT


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.

debate, such weapons have been defined as grey-area weapons, a term that indicates that they constitute contentious issues in arms control negotiations.151

The outline of SALT II was created a year later when Brezhnev visited Washington. The second part of SALT Negotiations began in late 1972. Because SALT I did not put back each side to increase their forces with the deployment of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) on their ICBMs and SLBMs, SALT II focused on restricting, and after all, reducing, the number of MIRVs.152

The negotiations involved the administrations of Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, also sought to prevent both sides from making qualitative breakthroughs that would destabilize the strategic relationship again.153

In November 1974, at Vladivostok Summit, Ford and Brezhnev accepted the fundamental framework of a SALT II agreement, which involved

a 2,400 limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for each side, a 1,320 limit on MIRV systems, a ban on new land-based ICBM launchers and limits on the deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms.154

Following the Vladivostok agreements, two countries were unable to resolve two other major problems in SALT I, the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each country’s arsenal.155 The first one was complicated by the USSR Recoil bomber, which in negotiations, the US believed, might reach the US, but the USSR refused to include it in the SALT negotiations.156 At the same time, the USSR


153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.
tried to limit the deployment of the US Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) but were unsuccessful, and then, verification also divided two countries, but they eventually decided to use National Technical Means (NTM), involving the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites.\textsuperscript{157}

On 18 June 1979, SALT II was signed in Vienna at the Summit Meeting between Carter, who were elected after Nixon, and Brezhnev.

With SALT II, the parties have the following rights

An equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles, an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles, and an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. An equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles - ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981.\textsuperscript{158}

During SALT II meetings, issues related to each other’s weapons, which are considered to be short-range, but that result in long-range missiles during the use were discussed between the sides.

The US tried to include these weapons of the opposing side within the scope of strategic nuclear by showing the ability of backfire bombers owned by the USSR to strike the US soil by replenishing in the air and return back to the US soil while the USSR tried to include these weapons of the other side in the scope of strategic nuclear.

Following a written promise by the USSR that backfires production would not be more than 30 per year and that the aircraft would not be transformed into an intercontinental role, backfire was not subject to significant restrictions in SALT II.\textsuperscript{159} The USSR

\textsuperscript{157} “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.”


invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 put an end to the possibility of accepting the treaty, which was submitted to the US Senate for approval after it was signed. This is why the US public, uncomfortable with the strength gained by the USSR in nuclear armament, thought that SALT II was against the United States. In January 1980, Carter withdrew the criticized SALT II from the Senate.

2.6. NATO Response to the SS-20 Missile: The Dual-Track Decision

The background history of the INF treaty was the first period of détente, “the Dual-Track Decision of NATO” to react to the USSR SS-20 and a negotiation record which finally achieved what almost no one would have expected when negotiators first sat down in Geneva.160

In the mid-1960s, the USSR deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that threatened Europe and the Far East.

In the late 1970s, the USSR introduced a new nuclear-capable intermediate-range missile, the SS-20, or the RSD-10 Pioneer, with a nuclear warhead, to replace older models of the intermediate-range missiles, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The SS-20 could potentially strike any target in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Alaska from deep inside the USSR territory. Hence, Western Europe feared geopolitical vulnerability. In the 1970s, it was faced with an economic crisis and social upheaval. The European ally of NATO, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in 1977, in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, could be understood the weapon as destabilizing and called attention to this new threat and highlighted the need for a NATO response. Given strategic nuclear parity between the US and the USSR, also, the USSR increasing in its INF assets, it was prominent to think about redefining the disparities of military power in the European continent. The US was concerned that

this development would give the USSR a strategic edge and would reshape the security environment in Europe and elsewhere.

After much debate, on 12 December 1979 NATO adopted “the Dual-Track Decision”\textsuperscript{161} to effectively mount a response to the growing USSR threat created. “the Dual Track Decision (DTD)” was brought forward by NATO for high policy and principal reasons. It genuinely contained the concept of collective action by the Atlantic Alliance in the name of European security. It had two components. Firstly, the deployment track focused on deploying new US intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles to Europe. Secondly, the arms control track involved bilateral US and USSR negotiations so as to secure a reduction of intermediate-range missiles. The second track, announced by US President Ronald Reagan in November 1981, was the so-called “zero option”\textsuperscript{162} – the US would cancel its deployments in exchange for the elimination of all the USSR shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles. Ministers noted that NATO’s resolve in implementing DTD was the key factor in persuading the USSR to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and would continue to be crucial to achieving concrete results.\textsuperscript{163}

2.7. Conclusion

The INF treaty had two main axes. One of them was disarmament, which came to the fore more in the interwar years while it was seen that the discussions, after WW II, focused on the second main axis of the INF treaty, arms control. That is why this


chapter shows how both disarmament and arms control were discussed before the INF treaty. Also, it displays that over time, and disarmament part of all the agreements mentioned has gradually weakened even though it was seen that the arms control part of them was getting stronger.

Strategy is the path that leads to the goal. Strategy from the standpoint of nuclear weapons definition is different for each country and group. The US goal was to put arms control as a tool for its strategy to maintain its nuclear superiority and to do so. Europe supported the US strategy. With this, Europe did not need to allocate resources. Europe could use the US posture as its strategy. Since the USSR cannot impose disarmament anywhere, they define their position in order not to allow the US to control everything in arms control.

The US strategy is based on having a nuclear strategy in the sense why preventing the other actors from getting and reaching such a technology. To ensure this, the US proposed that nuclear energy opened up its nuclear energy capability, but this was not welcomed by the other actors, particularly, the USSR because it tried to balance that without treating to balance that it is not acceptable by the USSR. This is because bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that the US put used atomic bombs. This was what happens when the Japanese were about to surrender. The USSR did not accept that. Whoever has nuclear weapons has the upper hand. The USSR could not ignore that. The United States wants to impose its nuclear power on the whole world.

It is in the logic of socialism that the USSR wants disarmament, in both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, mutual weapons to cease to be a threat, however, the US has based it on the logic of arms control from the beginning, rather than total disarmament.
CHAPTER 3

THE MAKING AND WORKING OF THE INF TREATY

3.1. Introduction

The emergence process of the INF treaty was the Détente period. After the negotiations between the US and the USSR, the INF treaty became an agreement beyond the expectations of both parties. The INF treaty set a remarkable example with respect including two extents, both disarmament and arms control.

This chapter focuses on when and why the idea of the INF treaty was raised, what the parties, the US and the USSR, foresaw initially with the INF treaty, and what kind of an agreement was constructed in terms of content to grasp both disarmament and arms control dimensions of the treaty.

3.2. Negotiations and Signing of the INF Treaty

In the mid-1970s, the USSR reached strategic parity with the US in terms of nuclear forces, which led to being qualitative and quantitative changes in European security.

The negotiations of the INF treaty began in November 1981. The main objective of the US during the negotiations was to restrict the USSR’s increasing and modern Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVed) and SS-20s. The
USSR accepted to eliminate all medium-range ballistic missiles such as SS-20s, SS-5s, and SS-4s in exchange for the elimination of the US Pershing II missiles as well as the US GLCMs, deployed against SS-20s in Europe in 1983.\textsuperscript{164} The deployment of the US was made by taking into account of NATO Dual-Track Decision in 1979.

The change in Western policy towards the USSR represented by the Dual-Track Decision found the USSR completely unprepared. They could not see the significance of what was happening. In the era of Brezhnev (1964-1982), with the support of the equally aging Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1957-1985), the USSR Government lost the pace of diplomatic initiatives. It was easier to assume that the relationship between the forces was still in favor of the USSR as the economic crisis in the West undermined NATO determination so as to resist the USSR in Europe, and the revival of the West determination to strengthen NATO defense was easier instead of ultimately reconsidering unsustainable, long-held assumptions and reorganizing policy in a completely new line, therefore, it took a while for the USSR to get used to the new reality.

At the outset, the USSR refused to enter into preliminary talks unless NATO revoked the deployment decision about its tactical nuclear weapons, however, in July 1980, the USSR’s position changed and preliminary negotiations began in Geneva in the autumn of 1980.\textsuperscript{165}

The US approach to the negotiations developed through extensive consultations within NATO required that any INF agreement would require to

provide for equality both in limits and rights between the United States and the Soviet Union; be strictly bilateral and thus exclude British and French systems; limit systems on a global basis; not adversely affect NATO’s conventional defense capability; and be effectively verifiable.\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{165} Thomas Graham and Damien J. LaVera, *Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2003), p.513

At the beginning of the talks, the USSR was against the deployment of any US INF missiles in European soils and offered a ceiling for 300 “medium-range” missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft for both sides, with nuclear forces of Britain and France counting toward the ceiling for the West.\textsuperscript{167}

Helmut Schmidt was isolated within his own Social Democratic Party and swept from office. However, Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democrats, solidly aligned with the US deployment, won the 1982 German elections. In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, also a strong supporter, led the Tories to a decisive victory in 1983.\textsuperscript{168}

On 8 March 1983, Reagan underlined that the USSR was an “evil empire”, and warns against “appeasement” and “the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.”\textsuperscript{169}

On 23 March 1983, he announced a “Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)”, a major shift in the US position that had so far embraced the doctrine of MAD to maintain strategic stability, and to create a space-based ballistic missile shield that might protect against the USSR nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{170}

In the first two years of the negotiations that ended with the USSR leaving on 23 November 1983, the US underlined the “zero option” preference even as it introduced the concept of an interim agreement based on equally low numerals of INF systems.\textsuperscript{171}

The Reagan administration centered on updating the US strategic nuclear arsenal and accelerating an overall military extension. Nonetheless, in November 1983, Reagan


\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).”
tendered the USSR with a so-called “zero option,” in which all USSR and US intermediate-range nuclear missiles would be removed from installations around the world.  

Reagan also offered a “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),” which seeks deep cuts in warhead counts and delivery vehicles. The USSR was concerned that the US and NATO started to deploy the Pershing II missile system in Western Europe.

INF negotiations were not done in 1984. The US deployments were used as planned in West Germany, Italy, and the UK, while preparations for deployment in Belgium were maintained.

In January 1985, the US and the USSR agreed to resume talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles on European soil, and to begin the third series of negotiations on “preventing an arms race in space.” The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), a new bilateral forum, was formed for negotiations.

The US and the USSR decided that all questions related to these three areas would be coped with in relation to each other. The negotiations would be led by a single delegation from both sides, divided into three groups, one for defense and space, one

172 “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control.”

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.


177 “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).”
for START, and one for INF. Official negotiations in all three areas resumed in March 1985.\textsuperscript{178}

In the fall of 1985, the USSR gave hints of the possibility of an INF deal independent of START or defense and space issues.\textsuperscript{179} As the US GLCM deployments continued, the USSR outlined a provisional INF agreement that would allow some US GLCMs in Europe, however, would allow SS-20 warheads to equal the sum of all warheads in the US, British, and French systems.\textsuperscript{180} The USSR also offered to freeze INF systems in Asia, subject to the US acceptance of its proposals and on the condition that Asia’s strategic situation did not change.\textsuperscript{181}

The USSR with Gorbachev returned to the table of negotiations in 1985 because its attitude about the European related INF has changed. Gorbachev made reforms on political and economic structures in order to reduce certain tension and pressure within the international realm and to cooperate and collaborate with foreign states. He introduced the policies of “glasnost,” in an attempt to improve relations with the West and more open in dealing with it, and “perestroika,” modernizing and rebuilding the USSR.\textsuperscript{182}

In November 1985, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev met in Geneva, where they issued a joint statement calling for a provisional agreement on INF.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{178} “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).”

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.


At the end of 1985, the United States proposed a limit of 140 launchers in Europe for both sides and proportionate reductions in Asia while emphasizing collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles, since these systems can cover the same targets as longer-range systems.  

A series of high-level meetings were held in August and September 1986. After those meetings, a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev was held in October 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland. In Reykjavik, both the US and the USSR run-in with equal global ceilings for systems capable of carrying 100 INF missiles warheads, none of which in Europe, would not be deployed. The USSR suggested the freezing of shorter-range missile deployments and decided, in principle, to intrusive on-site verification.

On 28 February 1987, the USSR introduced its readiness to attain a divided INF agreement.

On 4 March 1987, the US put on the table a draft INF treaty text reflecting the deal attained in Reykjavik and presented a comprehensive verification regime. In April, the USSR submitted its draft treaty. By July, it adopted as the principle to some of the provisions of the US comprehensive verification regime, involving data exchange, on-site inspection of the elimination as well as INF missile inventories and facilities’ on-site inspection.

However, in a major change, the USSR side proposed the inclusion of US warheads in the West German Pershing IA missile systems. The US responded by reaffirming

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184 “INF Treaty.”

185 Ibid.

186 “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).”

187 “INF Treaty.”

188 Ibid.

189 “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).”

190 Ibid.
that the INF negotiations were between only the US and USSR, and could not be included third-country systems or affect existing cooperation models.\textsuperscript{191}

Gorbachev proposed the elimination of US and USSR short-range missiles at meetings with Secretary Shultz in Moscow in April 1987.\textsuperscript{192} At the North Atlantic Council meeting, in June 1987, NATO foreign ministers expressed their support for the global elimination of all US and USSR intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. On 15 June 1987, Reagan offered the abolition of all US and USSR short-range missile systems.

On 22 July 1987, Gorbachev weighed in with a “double global zero” treaty so as to eliminate intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles after the US in a formal way introduced its “global double zero” position calling for the total elimination of all US and USSR forces.\textsuperscript{193}

On 26 August 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced that West Germany would dismantle 72 Pershing IA missiles and would not be replaced with updating weapons if the US and the USSR scrapped all INF missiles as envisioned in the resulting treaty.\textsuperscript{194} This was a unilateral declaration by West Germany, not a part of the INF treaty.

In September 1987, both the US and the USSR agreed in principle to conclude the treaty before the end of the year. On 8 December 1987, the INF treaty was signed by Reagan and Gorbachev at a summit meeting in Washington.\textsuperscript{195} At the time of its signing, the treaty’s verification regime was both parties’ a complete abolition of all


\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., pp.49-50.

INF weapons declared within three years of the treaty’s entry into force, and a total ban on the possession and use of those missiles.196

In light of the INF treaty, many people, including NATO Ministers, called for the modernization and re-equipment of the NATO nuclear arsenal.197 Pressure has increased to maintain with new programs to “compensate” for the impending removal of Pershing IIs and GLCMs from Europe.198 Any modernization of NATO nuclear forces would be controversial.

Essentially, the INF treaty provided convenience to countries in Europe. They did not need to enter such a nuclear arms race. European states stayed out of the process because they did not enter the arms race. They spent their budget on other areas such as economic and social domains.

3.3. The Content and Working of the INF Treaty

The main objective of the INF treaty was to stabilize the heretofore rapidly expanding nuclear forces of the US and the USSR as well as to prevent nuclear war between them.199

Structurally, the INF treaty includes a Preamble and 17 Articles. The related Memorandum of Understanding on Data, Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are complementary parts of the treaty.

Indeed, the Parties to the INF treaty,


198 Ibid.

199 “INF Treaty.”
conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of [an] outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the NPT\(^{200}\), agreed to the Articles.

Consequentially, the content of the INF treaty involves a number of breakthrough precedents. It marked the first time when the two leaders of the Cold War period had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate all intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification.\(^{201}\) In this regard, what is significant here is that it tries to display what the Articles of the INF treaty reflect.

Briefly, it is that as follows:

\begin{quote}

in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.\(^{202}\)

\end{quote}

In epitome, Article I of the INF treaty is about fundamental necessities, Article II is related to denotations used throughout the treaty, Article III gives information about existing types of intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles of the Parties to the agreement, Article IV sets lowering and elimination of intermediate-range missiles, Article V establishes the elimination of shorter-range missiles, Article VI is related to production and flight-test prohibition, Article VII is about counting rules, Article VIII requires standing and transit of intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles, Article IX defines data exchanges and notifications, Article X is about elimination continua, Article XI shows the way of On-site Inspection, Article XII

\(^{200}\) See that in Preamble of the text of the INF Treaty.


\(^{202}\) See that in Article I of the INF Treaty.
national technical means of verification, Article XIII is associated with Special Verification Commission (SVC), Article XIV is related to no conflicting necessities, Article XV establishes the duration of the agreement and the situation of the withdrawal, Article XVI is about changes or modifications, and finally, Article XVII is about entry into force and inurement.

3.3.1. Limitation

According to Article II, both ballistic and cruise missiles are subject to the INF treaty. It involves the necessity that they must be weapon-delivery vehicles to be subject to the treaty.

For paragraph 2 of Article IV, both the US and the USSR shall begin and continue the reduction of deployed and non-deployed medium-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles during each phase and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.

According to paragraph 1 of Article V, in terms of limitation, parties to the treaty shall destroy all short-range missiles, their launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment in the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding on such missiles and launchers no later than 18 months after the entry into force of the treaty. Such missiles, their launchers, and support equipment shall not be seized by either Party.

Article VI limits the US and the USSR from producing and flight-testing INF missiles in the future.

For Article VII, the parameters for R&D missiles are not defined as INF missiles, but whose ranges are within INF range and existed before the treaty was signed.

Article VIII sets the limitation about location in deployment areas, missile support facilities, or transit of all intermediate-range missiles and their launchers.
According to Article XV, the treaty shall be an unlimited duration.

Thus, the treaty prohibited and limited both the US and the USSR as the parties of it from possessing, producing, and flight-testing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. What is significant here is that both conventional and nuclear INF missiles were not produced.

The US removed missiles from bases in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany, and the UK when the USSR removed their missiles from bases in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.  

3.3.2. Elimination

For Article I, ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers are eliminated. These missiles are conventional and nuclear.

According to, Article III, definite missiles for the US, “the Pershing II, 1a, 1b and BGM-109G GLCM” and, for the USSR, “the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23 and SSC-X-4 GLCM” are eliminated.

For paragraph 1 of Article IV, Each Party shall eliminate all medium-range missiles, their launchers, all their support structures, and their support equipment listed in the Memorandum of Understanding on such missiles and launchers, thus, no later than three years after entry into force of this treaty, such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall not be positioned by either Party.

Paragraph 2 of Article V introduces no later than 90 days from the date of entry into force of this treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to screening facilities and retain them until completion. It was eliminated in accordance with the

procedures outlined in the Elimination Protocol. No later than 12 months after the entry into force of this treaty, both the US and the USSR shall complete the removal of all non-deployed short-range missiles to screening facilities and hold them until they are removed according to the established procedures.

Also, paragraph 3 of Article V establishes shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located in the same screening facility. Such facilities will be separated for no less than 1,000 km.

As a result, the INF treaty was the first agreement between the leaderships of two different social systems, two contesting states, which eliminated the entire intermediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons. Both sides agreed to the elimination of all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. However, it did not involve air-delivered or sea-based missiles. With the inuring, the INF treaty, existing a total of 2,692 shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 1,846 missiles of the USSR, and 846 missiles of the US, had together been destroyed.

Moreover, with the INF treaty, the US nuclear warheads in Europe were diminished from 4,318, in December 1987, to 3,256, after it entered into force.

3.3.3. Inspection and Verification

“Trust, but verify.”

The INF treaty verification is achieved through “On-Site inspections (OSIs)” and “National Technical Means (NTM)”. On-site inspections include basic data


inspections, closed facility inspections, and missile systems screening inspections. The treaty establishes continuous portal and environmental monitoring activities at former missile production facilities on the soils of each Party.

Paragraph 2 of Article IX requires the US and the USSR to provide data updates and notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. For Paragraph 4 of Article IX, both the US and the USSR enable data updates no later than 30 days following every six-month interval after entry into force of the treaty. They are required to provide a number of notifications, including notifications of elimination dates, locations, number, and types of items of missile systems to be eliminated. Notifications are also required for launches of R&D booster systems. Information may also be exchanged through “the Special Verification Commission (SVC)” forum.

Article X sets the procedures and ways of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

Article XI defines extensive On-Site Inspection rights for verification of compliance.

For Paragraph 3 of Article XII, to improve surveillance by means of national technical verification, each Party shall, until the treaty enters into force between the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic offensive weapons, but in any case, for a maximum of three years after the entry into force of this treaty, road-mobile vehicles with a range capability exceeding 5,500 kilometers. Demanding the implementation of cooperation measures at deployment bases for GLBMs and are not former missile operating bases eliminated in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article X of this treaty. The Party making such a request shall notify the other Party of the base of deployment where cooperative measures will be implemented.

Article XIII establishes the SVC as the framework for meeting to discuss treaty-related issues.

Article XIV sets the US and the USSR shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or commitments that conflict with the provisions of the treaty.
According to Article XVI, each Party may propose changes to this treaty. The agreed changes will enter into force in accordance with the procedures set out in Article XVII governing the entry into force it.

In addition, Paragraph 1 of Article XVII defines this treaty to include its memorandum of understanding and the Protocols forming an integral part of it and shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This treaty will enter into force on the date the instruments of ratification are exchanged. Also, paragraph 2 of Article XVII states that this treaty will be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Hence, the INF treaty marked the first time that intrusive on-site inspection was required for nuclear-armed weapon systems.

With that on 31 May 2001, the 13 years of OSIs under the INF treaty was concluded, the right of the US and Russia to conduct continuous monitoring of one of each other’s missile assembly plants under the treaty ended.

The right of the US and Russia to carry out short-term OSIs at other facilities declared under the agreement has also expired, nevertheless, the INF treaty has an indefinite duration and the parties will maintain to pursue the compliance of each other by using their own UTMs, involving remote monitoring capabilities.

Also, verification was required for a treaty eliminating an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of the world’s two nuclear powers, two leaderships of the term. The treaty has formed SVC in order to set off as a forum for the US and the USSR to resolve

207 1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
   2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.


209 Ibid.
compliance agonies or disagreements. It can be claimed that the INF treaty has outlined one of the most extensive verification systems of any disarmament and arms control treaty.

The SVC, with the purpose of resolving interpretation, implementation, and technical questions, met in good order. There was a lack of credence about any mechanism in order to continue the treaty due to the innovation of military technologies with regard to shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles.

The Thirty-First Session of the SVC under the INF treaty was held in Geneva on 12 and 14 December 2017.\textsuperscript{210} Delegations from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and Ukraine met to discuss questions regarding compliance with the obligations. The delegations expressed that the INF treaty played an important role in international security, nuclear disarmament, and non-proliferation.\textsuperscript{211}

\textbf{3.4. Conclusion}

The Negotiations output on INF envisages disarmament, but unfortunately, there is no mechanism to enforce it.

During a particularly tense period of the Cold War, the INF treaty neutralized a dangerous conflict between the US and NATO countries on the one hand, and the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other hand.

The INF treaty succeeds in eliminating a huge number of short-range and intermediate-range missiles that were more successful than it had been initially calculated. The INF treaty also achieved in terms of arms control limitation and verification which were


\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
created and implemented to large extent, however, there was not a solid mechanism to control and implement the provisions of the treaty.

European states were satisfied with the INF treaty because the USSR dropped its opposition. Had the Dual-Track Decision of NATO, a binary compression model of the USSR, continued, perhaps an arms race would have been faced. Via the Dual-Track Decision, NATO wanted to define the framework of the agreement. Hence, it is important that the INF treaty prevented the nuclear arms race in Europe.
4.1. Introduction

On 2 August 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said “Russia is solely responsible for the treaty’s demise.”212 “With the full support of our NATO allies, the United States has determined Russia to be in material breach of the treaty, and has subsequently suspended our obligations under the treaty” he added.213

On 2 August 2019, Russia’s Foreign Ministry confirmed the INF treaty was “formally dead” in a statement carried by state-run Ria Novosti news agency.214

The US accused Russia of violating the INF treaty. This is one of the reasons that was discussed. How did the US and Russia read China in that picture? Whether the INF


treaty, in terms of technology, was relevant to long-range missiles, or not. All these factors affected the survival of the INF treaty.

4.2. The US Withdrawal from the INF Treaty

Both the US and Russia were in conditions that suspended the INF treaty because, for years, they accused each other of the violation of the obligations under the INF treaty. On 2 February 2019, the US announced that it withdrew from this treaty due to Russia’s failure to comply with the INF treaty. Shortly thereafter, Russia announced that it suspended its obligations of the treaty, as well. Finally, six months later, on 2 August 2019, the INF treaty was formally terminated.

“The United States will not remain a party to a treaty that is deliberately violated by Russia,” Pompeo said in a statement related to the US withdrawal.215

“Russia’s noncompliance under the treaty jeopardizes US supreme interests as Russia’s development and fielding of a treaty-violating missile system represents a direct threat to the United States and our allies and partners” Pompeo added.216

The INF treaty had an indefinite duration. However, either party could withdraw from the treaty after giving six-month’s notice, if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests pursuant to Article 15 of the INF treaty.217

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has raised the possibility of withdrawing from the INF treaty as the deal unfairly prevents it from possessing weapons that its neighbors, like

215 Zee Media Bureau, “It's Formally Dead: Russia after US Pulls out of Key Nuclear Treaty.”

216 Ibid.

217 See that the text of the INF Treaty, Article XV, “Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”
China, are developing. In 2007, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov had publicly questioned the treaty.

The gravest mistake was the decision to scrap a whole class of missile weapons—medium-range ballistic missiles. Only Russia and the United States do not have the right to have such weapons, although they would be quite useful for us.\textsuperscript{218}

The US and Russia informed, on 25 October 2007, a statement at the United Nations General Assembly reaffirming their “support” for the INF treaty and calling on all other states to take part in giving up the missiles banned by the treaty.\textsuperscript{219}

In 2013 and 2014, the US administration had worries about the compliance of Russia with the INF treaty. The US did not raise the issue with Russian officials until 2013, and it did not brief NATO on the subject until 2014.\textsuperscript{220} The US State Department, in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, argued that it has resolved that

the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{218} Ulrich Kühn and Anna Péczeli, “Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 70-71.


In late 2016, the US officials expressed their fears that Russia generated more missiles than needed to remain a flight-test program.222 Russia had continued to reject the accusations and tabled a number of counter-charges against the US.223 On 14 February 2017, the US officials declared that Russia had deployed an operational unit of the treaty-non-compliant cruise missile known as the SSC-8, of which the Russian designation is 9M729.224 On 8 March 2017, General Paul Selva, the second-highest-ranking military officer in the US armed forces, confirmed that Russia had deployed its new ground-launched SSC-8 cruise missile.225

Russia denies that it breached the treaty and has raised its own concerns about the US compliance with it. It charged that the US was placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that might also be used to fire cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF treaty missiles, banned, and making armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles.226

The US Congress called for more ambitious military and economic responses to Russia’s breach in the past few years. Section 1243 - Compliance Enforcement regarding Russian Violations of the INF treaty- of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 would make a statement of Russia about the violation of the agreement, in light of such a material breach, the US is legally entitled to suspend the


operation of the INF treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in that.\textsuperscript{227}

On 8 December 2017, the 30\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the INF treaty, the Trump administration stated that it adhered to the agreement, but regarded a situation in which continued to comply with the agreement while Russia was violating it as “untenable.” The administration announced an “integrated strategy” of diplomatic, military, and economic steps to bring Russia back into obedience and to ensure that Russia did not gain any military advantage if it continued its violation.\textsuperscript{228} Trump declared his intent for the US to withdraw from the treaty on 20 October 2018. The violation of the INF treaty was not the only reason Trump gave to explain this decision. He noted that other countries like China were not part of the treaty, as well.

On 22 October 2018, Sam Nunn, the former US Senator for Georgia, and Ernie Moniz, the former Secretary of Energy under President Barack Obama, said that

Both sides should make a more serious effort to address respective claims of non-compliance and offer transparency and verification mechanisms to resolve the current problems with INF. They should also continue to implement the 2010 New START Treaty and agree to extend it through 2026.\textsuperscript{229}

Besides, Jim Miller, the former undersecretary of defense for policy under President Obama, stated that Russia needed to face consequences for not complying with the INF treaty, nonetheless, disagreed with the Trump administration’s process. On 22 October 2018, he said that

The rollout of this decision put the U.S. in the position of being the one that will have killed the treaty, and that will be detrimental to our ability to work not just with Russia or China, but our allies as well, and it will be detrimental


to our ability to sustain the New START Treaty, which is even more in the U.S. interest than the INF treaty.\textsuperscript{230}

Also, on 22 October 2018, Richard Burt, the former U.S. chief negotiator of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty under George H.W. Bush, said that

The INF failure and the failure to get into discussions about extending New START is a sign of the U.S. sleepwalking into a new nuclear arms race. This is going to have consequences for the U.S. and our allies that we haven’t thought through.\textsuperscript{231}

What is more, on 25 October 2018, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former president of the USSR, one of the signers of the INF treaty, said that

President Trump announced last week the United States’ plan to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and his country’s intention to build up nuclear arms. I am being asked whether I feel bitter watching the demise of what I worked so hard to achieve. But this is not a personal matter. Much more is at stake. A new arms race has been announced. The INF Treaty is not the first victim of the militarization of world affairs.\textsuperscript{232}

In addition to that, on 25 October 2018, George P. Schultz, former secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan, one of the signers of the INF treaty, said that

Now is not the time to build larger arsenals of nuclear weapons. Now is the time to rid the world of this threat. Leaving the [INF] treaty would be a huge step backward. We should fix it, not kill it.\textsuperscript{233}


\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.


Also, internally, on 25 October 2018, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (Ret.), former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (R-Ind.)

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is gravely misguided. Withdrawing will not make us safer; it will rob us of leverage essential to our own security and power...An important step toward greater stability would be for President Trump to offer to extend New START to 2026. I urge him to do so.234

On 30 November, the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats detailed the US accusations of “how Russia has violated the treaty, how they have denied its violation, and the broader security implications of this violation.”235

On 4 December 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the US “has found Russia in material breach of the treaty and will suspend our obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance.”236

On 15 January 2019, under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Andrea L. Thompson and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov met in Geneva. “Inter-departmental consultations on the problems of the INF Treaty will be held in Geneva on January 15. It will be the only issue on the agenda.” Ryabkov said.237 “We are pleased to note that the US side has finally agreed to hold these consultations following our numerous invitations.” he added.238 “The only issue to be


238 Ibid.
discussed will be the INF Treaty." he also said.\textsuperscript{239} He followed that “As a matter of fact, we have enough material for the whole day."\textsuperscript{240} He also underlined that “The US has even made their stance on the INF Treaty tougher. We see it as a not very favorable signal.”\textsuperscript{241} Moreover, Thompson said that

Today we held talks with a Russian delegation on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In doing so, we are upholding Secretary Pompeo’s commitment to continue to talk with Russian officials to urge Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty before the 60-day deadline announced on December 4. The meeting was disappointing as it is clear Russia continues to be in material breach of the Treaty and did not come prepared to explain how it plans to return to full and verifiable compliance. Our message was clear: Russia must destroy its noncompliant missile system. The U.S. delegation will brief allies and partners, including at NATO tomorrow, on these discussions.\textsuperscript{242}

This shows that the US and Russia were seen as reaching a compromise. They had collusion on the following dates.

On 2 February 2019, the Trump administration announced the suspension of its obligations under the INF treaty. In response to that, Russia announced that it suspended its obligations of the agreement, too. Officially, the US withdrawal from the INF treaty took effect on 2 August 2019 with the full support of NATO Allies. The Allies issued a statement attributing sole responsibility for the termination of the treaty to Russia and announced their decision to react in a measured and responsible manner, strictly adhering to effective international disarmament, arms control, and

\textsuperscript{239} “Russia, US to Hold Consultations on INF Treaty in Geneva on January 15 - Russian Diplomat.”

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.

non-proliferation. The US administration claimed that Russia violated the INF treaty and, hence, it did not return to full and verifiable compliance to the treaty.

It can be seen as a punishment for Russia at first glance, however, it is not a punishment, on the contrary, it can be seen as an award for Russia on account of the fact that Russia got rid of the restrictions through the dissolution of the INF treaty.

On 5 February 2019, US President Trump delivered the State of the Union Address

Under my Administration, we will never apologize for advancing America’s interests. For example, decades ago the United States entered into a treaty with Russia in which we agreed to limit and reduce our missile capabilities. While we followed the agreement to the letter, Russia repeatedly violated its terms. That is why I announced that the United States is officially withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty. Perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others, or perhaps we can’t—in which case, we will outspend and out-innovate all others by far.

Behind that legal pretext, Russia’s material breach, which can be the reason for the US withdrawal from the INF treaty is associated with China’s status as a non-signatory to the INF treaty. In 2007, Russia stated that the INF treaty did not offer them an opportunity and the treaty was against it. In addition, the US assessment of the INF treaty in 2017 converged with Russia’s view of 2007.

There are nuclear powers such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which have not been limited by the obligations of the INF treaty. For instance, China since its first detonation in 1964 has not been a signatory

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of the treaty whereas the US and Russia were signatories of the treaty, therefore, they were not free to develop weapons that were banned by the INF agreement while it has been able to field as many intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as it wants. Therefore, it might seem a threat not only for the US but also for Russia. Trump suggested that “perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others.”

As a result, the INF treaty has become a burden for the US and Russia when the other powers with nuclear capabilities have not been constricted. It may be stated that the US and Russian policymakers’ displease of the INF treaty helped to converge their strategies. The first step was to come from the US by using the accusation of Russia violating the treaty. It may be speculated that if the US had not firstly withdrawn from the treaty, Russia might have done so. For sure, the INF treaty had already lost its function in the eyes of both the US and Russian administrations. In addition, according to the US, it can be an easy way to get rid of the INF treaty in order to create a new multilateral INF treaty with bringing in other nuclear powers, especially China, though no progress in this line has been achieved.

4.3. The Reactions to the US Withdrawal from the INF Treaty

4.3.1. NATO

Having reviewed the security implications of Russian violation of the INF treaty, NATO sounded to promise to both ensure the credibility of the alliance’s deterrence and defense as well as to strengthen arms control measures. For the USA, as advocated

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by many, the violation, which started in the mid-2000s, falls into a broader pattern of hostile Russian behavior toward its neighbors and NATO.247

In July 2018, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary-General stated that after years of denials as well as mystification by Russia, and in spite of Allies repeatedly raising their concerns, Russia had only recently acknowledged the existence of the missile system without providing the necessary transparency or explanation.248 Stoltenberg claimed that Russia has secretly developed new missiles which carry nuclear warheads to the capitals of European states. “These new missiles are hard to detect, they are mobile, they are nuclear-capable and they reduce the warning time and thereby also the threshold for any potential use of nuclear weapons in a conflict.”249 A pattern of behavior and information over many years led to widespread doubts about Russian compliance with the treaty. NATO Allies said that, in the absence of any credible answer from Russia on that new missile, the most plausible assessment was that Russia violated the treaty.250 In other words, NATO Allies reached the conviction that Russia was violating an important security treaty.

On 24 October 2018, Stoltenberg said that

We believe in arms control but it has to be balanced and verifiable and therefore I welcome the fact that one of the issues that [have] been discussed between the US and Russia, which are parties to the New START Agreement, is that they need a new decision to maintain the New START of 2021. I hope that they will find a way to do so because arms control is a way to avoid a new arms race and it is especially important when it comes to nuclear weapons and therefore, I welcome it.251


249 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “UK and @NATO Allies will continue to work towards making the world a safer place. Russia needs to do the same. #INF Treaty,” Twitter (August 2, 2019), https://twitter.com/FCDOGovUK/status/1157242014381084672, (accessed June 15, 2021).

250 “NATO and the INF Treaty.”

251 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”
He also said that

So, I again urge Russia to ensure full compliance with the INF Treaty with full transparency - and without delay. NATO has no intention to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe. But as an Alliance, we are committed to the safety and the security of all our nations. We must not allow arms control treaties to be violated with impunity, because that undermines the trust in arms control in general.\textsuperscript{252}

published by El Pais and La Repubblica, part of the Leading European Newspaper Alliance (LENA) on 29 November 2018.

In December 2018, NATO Foreign Ministers supported the finding of the US that Russia was in material breach of its obligations under the INF treaty and called on Russia to urgently return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty.\textsuperscript{253} They are firmly committed to the preservation of impressive international disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation.\textsuperscript{254} Therefore, they stated that they would maintain to uphold, support, and further strengthen disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment.\textsuperscript{255}

Allies continued open to dialogue and engaged Russia on its violation, including at a NATO-Russia Council meeting on 25 January 2019.\textsuperscript{256} Russia persistently denied its


\textsuperscript{253} “NATO and the INF Treaty.”

\textsuperscript{254} “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”


INF treaty violation and took no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance to the treaty as advocated by NATO.

On 19 January 2019, Stoltenberg said that

We have to make sure that NATO continues to provide a credible and effective deterrence and defense. At the same time, we don’t want a new cold war, we don’t want a new arms race, so what we will do will be measured, it will be defensive, and we don’t mirror what Russia does, missile for missile or plane for plane, or battle tank for [a] battle tank. We need to make sure that we have effective credible deterrence, but not necessarily mirroring exactly what Russia does. And at the same time, we will continue to work for arms control and I also welcome the initiative by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas to convene a conference in Berlin, to address arms control and how to make progress on arms control. So, we will of course address the military aspects, but also continue to work for effective arms control.257

The US administration continuously advocated the line that due to Russia’s continued non-compliance, on 1 February 2019, the US announced its decision to suspend its obligations under Article XV of the INF treaty. Other NATO Allies followed this line and went on to say that “Russia would bear solely responsibility for the dissolution of the Treaty.”258 They repeatedly asserted that they regretted that Russia displayed no willingness to return to compliance with its international obligations.

It can be stated that NATO would react in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile to Allied security.259 Hence, they agreed “a balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO’s deterrence and defense posture remains credible and effective.”260


259 Ibid.

260 Ibid.
On 13 February 2019, at a press conference following the NATO meeting, Stoltenberg said that

All [NATO] Allies stand ready to engage further with Russia. But we are also preparing for a world without the INF Treaty. And Defense Ministers discussed this today. NATO is currently assessing the consequences of Russia’s breach of the Treaty. I will not pre-empt the outcome of this process. But any steps we take will be defensive, measured and coordinated. And we do not intend to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe. NATO will continue to maintain credible and effective deterrence and defense. At the same time, Allies remain committed to effective arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. NATO does not want a new arms race.\textsuperscript{261}

On 15 February 2019, he once again recalled at the Munich Security Conference that it was on this very stage, at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, this was the place that President Putin first publicly expressed his desire for Russia to leave the INF Treaty. A treaty that is only respected by one side will not keep us safe.\textsuperscript{262}

It may be stated that NATO did everything so as to encourage Russia to return to compliance before 2 August 2019 in order to preserve the INF treaty.\textsuperscript{263}

On 26 June 2019, NATO Defense Ministers urged Russia once again to return to full and verifiable compliance.\textsuperscript{264} They also considered potential NATO measures – such as “exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defenses, and conventional capabilities, and agreed that NATO would continue to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.”\textsuperscript{265} At the same time, Defense Ministers


\textsuperscript{262} “NATO and the INF Treaty.”

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{265} “NATO and the INF Treaty.”
confirmed that NATO had no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, and did not want a new arms race.\textsuperscript{266}

Despite its determined stance to keep the INF treaty not terminated, when on 2 August 2019, the US decision to withdraw from the treaty entered into force. NATO issued a statement fully supporting the US decision.\textsuperscript{267} No criticism was extended to the US position, but NATO argued that Russia had “sole responsibility” for the treaty’s demise.\textsuperscript{268} NATO also made it clear that its firm commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.\textsuperscript{269}

NATO in a way tried to allay the potential criticism to the US decision as NATO declared that

Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty. We regret that Russia has shown no willingness and taken no demonstrable steps to return to compliance with its international obligations. A situation whereby the United States fully abides by the Treaty, and Russia does not, is not sustainable. NATO will respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile to Allied security. We have agreed [on] a balanced, coordinated and [a] defensive package of measures to ensure NATO’s deterrence and defense posture remains credible and effective.\textsuperscript{270}

Briefly, it was clear that the US decision to withdraw from the treaty was not questioned but fully supported by NATO Allies.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{266} “NATO and the INF Treaty.”

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{271} “NATO Statement on the Collapse of the INF Treaty.”
4.3.2. Russia

After US President Donald Trump’s public statements about the intention to withdraw from the INF treaty unilaterally, the World had focused on this matter. The world became more and more aware of the risks and threats that the decision could bring about not only for the region but also for global international security and stability as a whole.

On 26 November 2018, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov conducted a full press conference dedicated to discussing the situation around the INF treaty.272

On 5 December 2018, Putin responded to Secretary Pompeo’s announcement of the 60-day countdown to the US INF treaty suspension. Putin noted that Russia would respond “accordingly” to the US withdrawal from the INF treaty, and General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of staff of the Russian military, noted that the US missile sites on allied territory could become “targets of subsequent military exchanges.”273

On 23 January 2019, the Russian Defense Ministry conducted a military briefing with a presentation of the 9M729 missile of the Iskander-M complex for foreign military attaches.274


On 2 February 2019, Putin had a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. He addressed the reaction of Russia to the US withdrawal from the INF treaty as below.

All our proposals in this area remain on the table just as before. We are open to negotiations. At the same time, I ask both ministries (Defense and Foreign Affairs) not to initiate talks on these matters in the future. I suggest that we wait until our partners are ready to engage in equal and meaningful dialogue on this subject that is essential for us, as well as for our partners and the entire world. Our response will be symmetrical. Our US partners announced that they are suspending their participation in the INF Treaty, and we are suspending it too. They said that they are engaged in research, development and design work, and we will do the same.  

On 4 February 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation released

This is yet another demonstration of the fact that NATO has fully blended with Washington’s line aimed at the final scrapping of the arms control system painstakingly built over many years. The collapse of the INF Treaty will have grave and far-reaching consequences for the entire European security architecture NATO is allegedly deeply concerned about – and naturally, for the US allies in Europe.

from Russia’s Information and Press Department in response to the NATO Council statement on Russia’s failure to comply with the INF treaty.

On 11 February 2019, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released that

Seeking to justify its destructive decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, the United States is waging a propaganda campaign that is based on an unscrupulous interpretation and bare-faced assumptions. Apart from underhanded attempts to place the blame squarely on Russia, the United States

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276 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”
is deliberately downplaying the importance and validity of Russia’s longstanding concerns about Washington’s compliance with the INF Treaty.277

On 22 February 2019, Putin delivered the annual Address,

I have already said this and I want to repeat: Russia does not intend – this is very important; I am repeating this on purpose – Russia does not intend to deploy such missiles in Europe first. If they really are built and delivered to the European continent, and the United States has plans for this, at least we have not heard otherwise, it will dramatically exacerbate the international security situation, and create a serious threat to Russia, because some of these missiles can reach Moscow in just 10–12 minutes. This is a very serious threat to us. In this case, we will be forced, I would like to emphasize this, we will be forced to respond with mirror or asymmetric actions.278
to the Federal Assembly.

Later that day, Putin held a press conference with the Russian media. He said that

[The Americans] are creating more and more problems. There are joint mechanisms and instruments for dealing with these problems. I hope they will be used to prevent a new global crisis such as the Cuban missile crisis. There are no reasons for this, no reasons for aggravating the international situation to this level.279

On 4 March 2019, Putin signed an executive order “to suspend the implementation” of the INF treaty “until the United States of America rectifies its violations of the said Treaty or until it expires.”280


279 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”

On 5 August 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered that

Let me emphasize that all the responsibility for what has happened rests with the United States...In this context, considering the current situation, I instruct the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Intelligence Service to monitor in the most thorough manner future steps taken by the United States to develop, produce and deploy intermediate-range and medium-range missiles. If Russia obtains reliable information whereby the United States completes the development of these systems and starts to produce them, Russia will have no option other than to engage in a full-scale effort to develop similar missiles.281

after the official US withdrawal from the treaty.

Therefore, it can be stated that Russia came up with a tit-for-tat response to the US withdrawal, so Russia also withdrew, and then, the INF treaty was terminated.

4.3.3. Europe

Nuclear deterrence within Europe has mostly been provided by NATO nuclear umbrella as the leadership of the US. However, due to the recent declarations of Trump about NATO and the strategic pivot taken by the US towards Asia.282 Thus, the future of European nuclear abilities and revival of the question about the creation of a proper European nuclear deterrent, based on the two nuclear arsenals, such as the UK and France, present on the continent.

This can be explained by the deterioration of the EU security and strategic context. For Europe, the election of Trump as the US President in 2016 started doubts about the


credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence commitments.\textsuperscript{283} Therefore, it states that this new global concern has also been marked by increasing tensions among military powers, escalating regional security crises, and the deterioration of international arms control.\textsuperscript{284}

The INF treaty enabled nuclear stability on the European Continent. In terms of nuclear weapons policy, Europe has been faced with new challenges due to the dissolution of the INF treaty.

The INF treaty included all nuclear ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. They had posed an enormous threat to Europe’s security. Therefore, since the INF treaty entered into force about 33 years ago, it had been important for European security. This is because when signed over 33 years ago the pact led to a breakthrough in the Cold War negotiations removing thousands of missiles from European soil and reducing inter-systemic tensions.

In that context, it attempts to show how Europe has responded to the withdrawal of the US from the INF treaty.

The INF treaty has provided a great deal of security to Europe since 1988 even though there has been no European state as a party to the treaty. It was the foundation for denuclearizing Europe. The US claimed that it withdrew from the treaty because of Russia’s non-compliance with it. It was seen as a threat to US allies in Europe. This can be inferred from some European states’ responses after the announcement of the US withdrawal from the treaty. Also, it could be deduced that they had called both the US and Russia to remain engaged in a constructive dialogue in order to preserve the INF treaty and on Russia to address the serious concerns about its compliance with the treaty.

Trump’s sudden announcement on 20 October 2018 that the US would withdraw from the INF treaty owing to the Russian violations of the treaty without any reference, a move responded by European countries.

\textsuperscript{283} “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: the Case of Europe.”

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid.
For example, Gavin Williamson, UK Defense Secretary, said that “Our close and long-term ally, of course, is the United States and we will be absolutely resolute with the United States in hammering home a clear message that Russia needs to respect the treaty obligation that it signed.”

Besides, Heiko Maas, Germany’s Foreign Minister sounded more critical as follows:

The announcement by the United States that it intends to withdraw from the INF Treaty is regrettable. It poses difficult questions for us and for Europe. For 30 years, the INF Treaty, which prohibits Russia and the United States from possessing and testing ground launch intermediate-range missiles, has been an important pillar of our European security architecture. It is therefore hugely important, particularly for us in Europe.

What is more, Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that

The Spanish government expresses its concern with the United States’ announcement of its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty...This treaty, signed between the United States and the then Soviet Union in 1987, is one of the essential pillars of the Euro-Atlantic system of weapon control and, as such, is a safeguard of peace and security in Europe.

Also, Giuseppe Conte, Italy’s Prime Minister, said that

Our government pays close attention to peace processes. I am concerned over the US’ decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, I will be in Moscow, I will meet with [Russian] President Vladimir Putin, and I hope to discuss that” He further

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noted that due to its traditions and history, Italy "is always ready to cooperate and contribute to peace processes." 288

Press briefing by a spokesperson for France’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that

President Macron reminded President Trump of the importance France ascribes to this treaty, in particular for [the] European security and our strategic stability. France attributes great importance to conventional and nuclear arms control instruments. The Allies’ concern over the very likely Russian violation and the lack of transparency on Russia’s implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was reaffirmed at the NATO summit this past July…We call on all the parties to avoid any hasty unilateral decisions, which would be regrettable. 289

Moreover, Maja Kocijancic, European Union Spokesperson said that

The United States and the Russian Federation need to remain engaged in constructive dialogue to preserve the INF Treaty and ensure its full and verifiable implementation which is crucial for Europe’s and global security…. The world doesn’t need a new arms race that would benefit no one and, on the contrary, would bring even more instability. 290

Also, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo Soini met with US Senator Risch. They talked about why the INF treaty is vital both for the US and Europe and with Senator Tom Udall from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minister, Soini discussed the meaning of the treaty for the security of Europe. 291

Moreover, Federica Mogherini, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Union said that


289 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”


291 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”
I am extremely worried because we have always been convinced that agreements, first of all, are important; secondly, need to be respected and implemented at full; and thirdly, if there are issues and problems in their implementation, we believe the right way to go is to insist on the full implementation rather than withdraw. We still hope that there is a space for strengthening its implementation rather than dismantling it...[T]his is less for the European Union, but very important for Europe, because if we go towards the dismantling of this agreement, Europe’s security risks to be put at risk, and we definitely do not want to see European territory to go back to be a battlefield for other powers, as it has been the case for so long in the past. We do not want to go back to that kind of tensions, to that kind of situation, and we still hope there is a space for saving the agreement and implementing it.

In a similar fashion, Heiko Maas, Germany’s Foreign Minister said that

We want to put disarmament and arms control back on the international agenda in the coming months. For what is at stake is no more and no less than humankind’s survival. That’s why we’re working to persuade the United States not to hastily withdraw [hastily] from the INF Treaty. We don’t want Europe to become the scene of a debate on a nuclear arm build up.

Finally, the UK Secretary of Defense Gavin Williamson, speaking to reporters at the Reagan National Defense Forum, tended to emphasize the tone of blaming Russia that

[W]e want the INF Treaty to continue and to be a successful treaty...The next few weeks are so incredibly critical. It’s where as much pressure from every European nation needs to be placed on Russia, for Russia to abide by its treaty obligations. Because I don’t think anyone would want to see the treaty end, but the treaty doesn’t exist when you have one nation ignoring its obligations as part of the treaty.

On 4 December 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared Russia to be in “material breach” of the INF treaty. He announced that the US planned to suspend the US obligations under the agreement in 60 days unless Russia returned to compliance.

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292 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”


294 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”
On 11 January 2019, Heiko Maas, Germany’s Foreign Minister revealed the reality that

The Cold War times have passed. We don’t need [a] reraiment debate, we need a debate about disarming. We cannot answer today’s security questions with the deterrence ideologies from [the] last century...Even if we are unable to save the INF Treaty, we cannot allow the result to be a renewed arms race. We cannot establish peace and security against one another, only with one another... European security will not be improved by deploying more nuclear-armed, medium-range missiles. I believe that is the wrong answer.295

On 1 February 2019, the U.S. Secretary of State announced that the US would simultaneously suspend its obligations under the INF treaty. The US also submitted the formal notification of its withdrawal the following day.

European countries reacted to that move in their own security perceptions.

For instance, on 1 February 2019, Angela Merkel, Germany’s Chancellor said that

If the United States announces it will suspend compliance with the INF nuclear missile pact with Russia, Germany will use the six-month period that the formal withdrawal period lasts to hold further discussions...If it does come to a cancellation today, we will do everything possible to use the six-month window to hold further talks...It is clear to us that Russia has violated this treaty... The important thing is to keep the window for dialogue open.296

Also, on 1 February 2019, Margot Wallström, Swedish Foreign Minister, tweeted

Deeply concerned by the state of nuclear arms control after US announcement to suspend the INF. Fundamental cause is Russia’s non-compliance. Trend of less cooperation on disarmament must be reversed


and new ways forward explored. Joint responsibility to avoid nuclear arms race.\textsuperscript{297}

Besides, on 1 February 2019, Karin Kneissl, Austrian Foreign Minister, said that “Lack of mutual trust has led to persistent accusations of treaty violations that could not be efficiently resolved. The US and Russia must work harder. The aim of the dialogue should obviously be to preserve the INF.”\textsuperscript{298}

In addition, France regretted reaching a situation in which the US provided notice of its withdrawal from the INF treaty. On 1 February 2019, France stated that

France calls on Russia to use the six-month period triggered by the suspension of U.S. obligations provided for under the INF Treaty in order to return to full compliance. During this period of time, France will continue to promote in-depth dialogue with Russia and to coordinate closely with its NATO allies … France encourages Russia and the United States to extend the New Start treaty on their nuclear arsenals beyond 2021 and to negotiate a replacement treaty.\textsuperscript{299}

Moreover, on 8 February 2019, Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released that

The position expressed by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation regarding the violation of the provisions of the INF Treaty by NATO’s missile defence system, whose components are also deployed at Deveselu, is completely irrelevant, whereas the Deveselu anti-missile system is not subject to the INF Treaty…”...”We reiterate that NATO’s missile defence system at Deveselu, whose components are hosted by Romania, has no offensive capability, being a purely defensive instrument, essential for ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The concept of NATO’s missile defence system represents a proportional response to current threats and complies with all international commitments, including the INF Treaty. Any attempt by the


Russian Federation to deny this fact is a flagrant disinformation and an attempt to distract attention from the real violation of the INF Treaty by the Russian state. We remind that the position of Romania and its Allies on the INF was clearly expressed in the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council from 1 February 2019.\footnote{Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Guvernul Romeniei, https://www.mae.ro/en/node/48149, (accessed June 15, 2021).}

On 15 February 2019, Jacek Czaputowicz, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the 2019 Munich Security Conference discussion panel on the future of defense cooperation, said that

> The implications are enormous … but let me start with the assessment that it was Russia who broke the treaty; the treaty does not exist if only one party observes; so NATO decided to support the decision of the United States to withdraw from the treaty, and we are not very much in favor—we are definitely even against—deployment of missiles on our soil. But, we will work out the solution with our allies in NATO because it must be [a] united response to [the] Russian threat in that case. So I do not accept your assessment, or your opinion, that we are willing to host rockets or missiles on our territory … if we do it, it will be a decision of all the alliance.\footnote{Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.}

Also, on 15 February 2019, Gavin Williamson, the Secretary of State for Defense of the UK, at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, said that

> Russia, despite its denials, has clearly breached the INF treaty. It has made clear [that] it is developing more missiles and nuclear-capable weapons that [may] break this agreement. Trying to goad the West into a new arms race it simply is not interested in and does not want….But, as a nation who hold dear the values of democracy, tolerance and justice we must not be cowed or intimidated. That’s why our military continues asserting its legitimate freedom of access and action across the globe, deploying our forces in a measured and resolute way. And, we all continue to work together to lift the veil on this behaviour and always deliver a clear response - for actions must have consequences…..But, let me be clear this is not the relationship with Russia that we want. We remain open to a different kind of relationship and options of dialogue remains on the table. It is vital that we always work to avoid escalation and avert risks of miscalculation.\footnote{The Munich Security Conference,” GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-munich-security-conference, (accessed June 15, 2021).}
On 16 February 2019, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, said that

For us Europeans, if I may be so bold, the really bad news this year was the announcement of the cancelling of the INF Treaty. After not decades, but years of violations of the terms of the treaty by Russia, this was unavoidable. We Europeans all understood this. Nevertheless – and I say this to our American colleagues – it leaves us with a very interesting constellation: a treaty that was essentially designed for Europe, an arms reduction treaty that directly affects our security, has been cancelled by the United States of America and Russia (the legal successor to the Soviet Union). And we are left sitting there. Given our elemental interest we will obviously make every attempt to facilitate further arms reduction. The answer cannot be a blind arms race.303

Following the USA’s actual withdrawal from the INF treaty on 2 August 2019, France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs stated that

France regrets that no solution could be found to preserve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and that Russia did not respond to requests for explanations or to repeated calls last year for compliance with the treaty. The INF treaty was a central component of Europe’s security architecture and strategic stability. The end of this treaty raises the risks of instability in Europe and erodes the international arms control system. France reaffirms its commitment to arms control and to real and verifiable nuclear disarmament anchored in legal authority, and encourages Russia and the United States to extend the New START Treaty on their nuclear stockpiles beyond 2021 and to negotiate a successor to that treaty.304

On 2 August 2019, Heiko Maas, German Foreign Minister, said that

With the end of the INF Treaty, a piece of Europe’s security has been lost...I firmly believe that we must manage once again today to agree to rules on disarmament and arms control in order to prevent a new nuclear arms race. The challenges that we now face have become greater as a result of the end of the Treaty and are no longer only confined to Europe...We therefore now call on Russia and the US all the more urgently to preserve the New START Treaty as


a cornerstone of global arms control. Nuclear powers such as China, which wield more clout in the world than during the Cold War, must face up to their responsibility in the area of arms control.305

On 2 August 2019, Dominic Raab, British Foreign Secretary, tweeted

Russia has caused the INF Treaty to collapse by secretly developing and deploying a treaty-violating missile system which can target Europe’s capitals. Their contempt for the rules based international system threatens European security. UK fully supports NATO’s response.306

On 5 August 2019, “It’s not been asked of us, not being considered, not been put to us. I think I can rule a line under that.”307 Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison said of the notion regarding US Secretary Esper’s comments on potential US missiles based in Europe and Asia.

All in all, European members of NATO argued that Russia, despite its denials, had breached the INF treaty. Besides, European states wanted the US and Russia to be able to maintain a constructive dialogue for the protection of the INF treaty. They asked for this treaty to save for their security. In other words, they focused on preserving the INF agreement against all odds and against the arms race implying instability.

Thus, reacting to the end of the INF treaty, it could be stated that some European countries have been displeased at the US unilateral decision to withdraw from the treaty since the INF treaty, at least, had prevented a rapid nuclear arms race in Europe. Since then, Eastern European states sought for more of increasing NATO deterrence role as they saw Russia as a real threat while many Western European states called for increased dialogue on arms control with Russia. All in all, the significance of NATO increased for all European states.

305 “Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”


With the dissolution of the INF treaty, theoretically speaking, nuclear powers are able to create a new multilateral treaty that may include more nuclear states, more arms control facilities, and other signatories. All these are potentially possible, though whether it is probable or not is questionable. Above all, can European states be part of such a new treaty so as to protect their own security?

The US and Russia are doing their best to maintain or improve their nuclear posture. This renewed focus on nuclear arms capabilities. It is thought that the US stores “tactical” nuclear weapons, intermediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons, in several European countries under what is known as “nuclear sharing.” Currently, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey host the US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. That helped the US enhance its nuclear umbrella over the European continent.

Lately, the idea of Europeanisation of the French nuclear capability was reminded by Macron, who had stated in February 2020 that French nuclear forces strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence, and proposed to have a “strategic dialogue” with the EU partners about the role of the French nuclear weapons in the security of Europe.308 For Macron, this issue is even more significant today, as “Europeans must collectively realize that, in the absence of a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional, even nuclear, arms race on their soil.”309 France can protect itself in nuclear terms, but France has no obligation to share its nuclear power and technology with Europe.

The reaction of a German deputy close to Angela Merkel, to Macron on Twitter showed some engagement, though being very sarcastic, “Europeans should take up


immediately Emmanuel Macron’s offer. If it is serious, it is the first step towards integrating French nuclear deterrence into European defense.”

4.3.4. Asia

On 22 October 2018, Yoshihide Suga, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, said that

We attach great importance to the historic role of this treaty on the issues of arms control and disarmament. We would not like a situation when the US would really have to withdraw from the treaty. We hope that the situation will improve.

Suga added that the changes in the global security situation “pose a serious problem for stability and peace in Japan.”

On 2 February 2019, Geng Shuang, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, said that

The multilateralization of the INF Treaty involves a series of complex issues covering political, military and legal fields, which draws concerns from many countries. China opposes the multilateralization of this treaty. What is imperative at the moment is to uphold and implement the existing treaty instead of creating a new one.

On 4 February 2019, Suga told that


312 Ibid.

As the treaty has played a historic role in arms control and reduction, it is undesirable that the treaty be ended … The issue of missiles under the treaty is directly linked to security in East Asia. (Japan) will communicate with relevant countries, including Russia and China, while cooperating with the United States.\(^{314}\)

On 2 August 2019, Hua Chunying, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, said that

> Withdrawing from the INF Treaty is another negative move of the U.S. that ignores its international commitment and pursues unilateralism. Its real intention is to make the treaty no longer binding on itself so that it can unilaterally seek [a] military and strategic edge.\(^{315}\)

What brings the US and Russia together for the termination of the INF treaty is that China is actually out of this equation, and therefore, China can produce weapons that the agreement has prohibited. Of course, it is not just limited to China although both the US and Russia have put forward discourses that bring China to the fore. However, it should be emphasized that actors outside of China, that is, those who have the capacity and technology to produce nuclear weapons, are also outside China. Nonetheless, the discourse expressed by the US and Russia is a movement on the assumption that they can include it in this equation. The US has done this openly, but as of the point it has reached, China does not want to enter into such an equation. Briefly, Chinese nuclear weapons’ goals are “to counter nuclear coercion” as well as “to deter nuclear attack.”\(^{316}\)

On 5 August 2019, Choi Hyun-soo, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesperson, talked about Secretary Esper’s comments on potential US missiles based in Europe and Asia “Our government did not have any official discussions with the U.S. on the possible introduction of intermediate missiles (on South Korean soil). We have not

\(^{314}\)“Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis.”


internally reviewed the issue and have no plan to do so.”  

“As of now, I believe that [the matter] is not among agenda items for the upcoming defense ministers’ talks.” she added.

Hence, it can be stated that the reaction of the Chinese to the US withdrawal from the INF treaty was as expectedly negative. Asian allies of the US are also opposed to the deployment of the US missiles on their soils. Expert assessments display that to possess a strategic impact in a conflict with China, existing and most prospective US ground-based intermediate-range systems would have to be stationed no further away than Japan and South Korea. These two countries are to welcome the US missiles. For instance, the United States situated in South Korea an active defence such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missile defense system that destabilized the regional missile defense system.

Sze-Fung Lee, a Researcher, at Global Studies Institute, Hong Kong, argues that developing nuclear weapons may not be the wise choice for East Asian countries at the moment, however, given the fact that regional and international security in the Asia-Pacific is deemed to curtail, regardless of their decision to go nuclear or not, East Asia nations should increase their latency nuclear deterrence.  


318 Yonhap, “US to Decide Missile Deployment Locations in Consultation with Allies: Esper.”


320 The THAAD terminal (formerly theatre) high-altitude area defence missile system is an easily transportable defensive weapon system to protect against hostile incoming threats, such as tactical and theatre ballistic missiles, at ranges of 200 km and altitudes of up to 150 km. See that “THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense - Missile System,” Army Technology, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/thaad/, (accessed June 15, 2021).

What is more, the INF treaty was prominent for Turkey since intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles can be seen as a threat. In this context, on 4 September 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told members of his party in the city of Sivas that “some countries had missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two, but they told us we could not have them, which he could not accept.” Explicitly, he criticized the NPT, which Turkey signed on 28 January 1969 in the status of a “non-nuclear-weapon state”, which has acknowledged that it will not develop nuclear weapons and will not obtain such weapons and ratified on 17 April 1980. Also, he implied that Turkey can have a nuclear weapon. Such a move may cause a sharp break from obligations by Turkey. Before that, in November 2017, Erdoğan highlighted the inequality between states with and without nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in 2017, Erdoğan eluded that Turkey can obtain these weapons.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that “an invaluable brake on nuclear war” was being lost. Dr. Harald Müller (Germany), a nuclear expert, means the INF treaty is now more than 30 years old, and there are new owners of intermediate-range missiles who should in some way be covered. It could be expanded to include countries like China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel an idea that both the US and Russia had indicated being open to. Intercalary, it can be argued that today there are not enough negotiations and agreements on nuclear weapons. The US side considered that Russia committed something, Russia would blame the US, then, dialogue on strategic stability was closed. After the US pulled out of the deal, some sources argued this would allow it to counter the missile forces of...


Russia and China more effectively. In other words, with the termination of the INF treaty, it can be stated that a renewed competition in nuclear arms has been announced. The obligations of the treaty for Russia and the United States have disappeared. Moreover, what is significant here is that new arms technology may be wanted to be advanced, especially, on weapons limited by the agreement.

4.4. Conclusion

There was a fundamental problem in the formation of the INF treaty, which was brought about by the fact that only two states, the US and the USSR, Russia, as nuclear powers signed this agreement. While this agreement limits the two signatory states, the fact that it offers non-signatory nuclear states like China the opportunity to produce nuclear weapons that can be used at short-range and intermediate-range missiles does not comply with the logic of arms control, and as a result, it can be said that the INF treaty is de facto unsustainable. Both parties want this agreement to be terminated anyway.

As a result, it displays the INF treaty, as a disarmament and arms control treaty, the product of the end of the Cold War era, lost its function in the 21st century. Also, it attempts to offer some explanations on the question of how security perceptions can be shaped without the INF treaty.

As is seen out of the declarations by European foreign ministers, there are different categories of European posture against the termination of the INF treaty. First of all, the UK and France have their nuclear weapons. They are considered nuclear European states. When France led a nuclear strategy for Europe, the UK opted for the US position in the dissolution of the INF treaty. Baltic states sided with the US position. Germany is a different case. It did not want to see a polarization between Russia and the US. Still, Germany in nuclear issues is under the guarantee of NATO nuclear umbrella as a nuclear deterrence posture, has no aspiration to possess nuclear weapons.

France’s position as a solo action, force de frappe, is not the European Union policy, as for France priority is “the French first policy.” Yet, the EU has not had a separate
common European strategy for the limitation of nuclear weapons, it acted under the nuclear umbrella of NATO.

Surely, Europe did not sound like a single voice regarding the ending of the INF treaty. The UK and France, as they have their nuclear weapons, acted in line with nuclear states posture, the Eastern European and the Baltic countries have historically perceived Russia as an immediate threat and, sought to invite a counterforce, thus, they have taken a position in line with the US position. Germany was cautious about the unilateral termination of the INF treaty, though kept blaming Russia and stood together with the US as the treaty was suspended.

In the final stage, it is seen that all of them took the side of the US when the withdrawal and dissolution decision on the INF treaty was made. This is because the nuclear protection umbrella is within NATO, thus, they grasp NATO as their nuclear protection umbrella. For this reason, instead of questioning the US position, the European powers supported the US strategy as long as the US and their strategy converged, and NATO played a crucial role in bringing them together.
CHAPTER 5

THE NEW START: THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

5.1. Introduction

On 31 July 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) was signed between the US and the USSR during the last year of the Cold War to reduce strategic nuclear weapons of both parties. After START I expired, START II, a new treaty, came into effect on 3 January 1993. Moreover, Russia, the legal successor of the USSR, and the US signed the New START in 2010. The new agreement would have expired unless it was extended on 5 February 2021. Nevertheless, the treaty was extended until 5 February 2026 as the new US administration, under Biden, decided to rectify the Trump administration’s hastily decision of not extending it.

This chapter attempts to examine the relationship between New START, the only remaining bilateral arms control agreement worked out and recently extended, and the termination of the INF treaty. It also examines how the New START affects the INF treaty.
5.2. Extension of the New START

President Obama and Russia’s President Medvedev outlined their purposes for the negotiations on a New START in early April 2009. In a joint statement issued after they met in London, they showed that the subject of the new agreement “will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.”

It can be stated that the security environment has sorely changed since New START was negotiated in 2010. The New START covers solely a part of the “security equation” wherein missile defense, new weapons systems, space-based assets, and advanced technologies are not subject to formal arms control agreements.

The Presidents also agreed that they would look for reducing their forces below those of the 2002 Moscow Treaty and that the new agreement would

mutually increase the security of the Parties and the predictability and stability of their strategically offensive forces, and involve effective verification measures, which is taken from the experience of the Parties in the implementation of the START Agreement.

The Presidents further cultivated their New START’s objectives, and gave the first indications of the range they were considering for the limits in the treaty through a Joint Understanding they signed at their summit meeting in Moscow in July 2009. They weighed in with that the new agreement would restrict both parties from 500 to


1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and from 1,500 to 1,675 associated warheads. In addition, they committed that the new treaty would contain provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.

On 26 March 2010, Obama and Medvedev formally announced they had reached an agreement on the New START. The United States and Russia signed the New START on 8 April 2010.

The new treaty is not an extension of the START. The US and the USSR negotiated the original START during the 1980s when the two rival states were still adversaries. The provisions in the original treaty reflect the uncertainty and suspicion that were evident in the last years of the Cold War. The New START has produced within a different period as well as a different relationship between the US and Russia.

The dissolution of the USSR led to a delay in the entry into force of START I, as the assorting of states as nuclear and non-nuclear had to be settled. Nuclear weapons’ reductions had to be completed within seven years after entry into force and continued


for another eight years. With the on-site inspection, states were verified. Both the US and Russia maintained reduction workings. START II as a new treaty entered into force, which caused START I to expire.

Actually, the parties to the New START still seek provisions that will allow for predictability and transparency in their current forces and future intentions even though the US and Russia have facilitated and simplified central limits and monitoring as well as verification provisions.

The new agreement does not include the layers of boundaries and glorification. Both the US and Russia can designate their own mix of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. What is more, currently, the parties were far less interested in fostering continued cooperation and openness between both parties than in drowning pathways for potential avoidance plans.

After a surprisingly contentious process, the US Senate gave consent to ratification of the New START on 22 December 2010. The Russian State Duma completed the third reading and approved New START on 25 January 2011, and then on 26 January 2011, the Council of Federation voted unanimously in favor of New START.

On 28 January 2011, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a bill of ratification of the New START. The Russian bill expressed that the New START can only be fulfilled if planned the US missile defense systems do not reduce the Russian nuclear deterrent.


336 “Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).”

337 Ibid.

338 Ibid.
On 5 February 2011, the treaty entered into force the following Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. New START took place in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty known as the Moscow Treaty, which then ended in 2012. New START provided that within seven years, the parties completed their required reductions.

New START would be set to expire on 5 February 2021 unless the US and Russia agreed on extending it for no more than 5 years.

In this context, the provision of New START warranting the extension of it is involved in Article XIV, paragraph 2 of the treaty, which expressed

> If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

On 21 January 2021, the Biden Administration indicated that it would look for a full five-year extension of the New START. For an Administration official, “New START is manifestly in the national security interest of the United States and makes even more sense when the relationship with Russia is adversarial.”

Secretary of State Anthony Blinken expanded on this point in his statement released after the final exchange of diplomatic notes on 3 February 2021. He noted that

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339 The Moscow Treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 2012, unless replaced by a subsequent treaty.


341 See that Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Extending the New START Treaty ensures we have verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026. The New START Treaty’s verification regime ... provides us with greater insight into Russia’s nuclear posture, including through data exchanges and onsite inspections ... Especially during times of tension, verifiable limits on Russia’s intercontinental-range nuclear weapons are vitally important. Extending the New START Treaty makes the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the world safer. An unconstrained nuclear competition would endanger us all.  

According to the US President Biden, the extension of the New START is only the beginning of the efforts to address 21st-century security challenges in terms of arms control reducing the dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal and the effective arms control that enhances stability, transparency and predictability while reducing the risks of costly, dangerous arms races.

The Biden Administration’s immediate announcement of its intention to extend the New START was due to the short deadline that existed before the agreement expired on 5 February 2021. The Obama Administration considered extending a period before leaving office in 2016, but, did not raise the issue with Russia. The Trump Administration continued its extension negotiations in the last year of its term but failed to reach an agreement with Russia.

In 2018 and 2019, Trump Administration officials had indicated that they were reviewing the treaty and assessing whether it continued to serve US national security interests before deciding whether the United States would propose or accept a five-year extension. Deputy Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg expressed their concerns about the treaty in their statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2019. They noted that Russia had developed new types of strategic offensive weapons not covered by

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344 Ibid.

the treaty and modernized and expanded its short-range non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles outside the treaty’s scope.

They also noted that China was modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal. China, which remained much smaller than the US and the USSR arsenals; is not a party to the treaty.  

In April 2019, US President Trump directed his staff to develop proposals for expanded arms control efforts that would include China as a party, noting that the United States should “persuade China to join an arms control pact limiting or verifying its capabilities for the first time.”

The New START limits the two largest nuclear weapons arsenals of the World. The agreement is based on both sides eventually reducing their nuclear arsenal to a total of 700 missiles, 1,550 warheads, and 800 launchers.

The public debate about the extension of New START has combined views on how to address these concerns. For instance, some experts believed that the US and Russia should extend the agreement, and then should use the time during the extension to discuss how Russia’s new types of systems would be included within the boundaries of the treaty. They pointed out that most systems would not enter Russian forces until the late 2020s, so they did not see the need to stipulate extension now for their eventual inclusion. They also stated that this approach would allow the United States to preserve the benefits of New START while trying to negotiate a tripartite agreement with

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Russia and China.\textsuperscript{348} Some have also suggested that the US and Russia extend the treaty for less than all five. They emphasized that preserving the limits and transparency in the treaty while pressuring Russia and possibly China to negotiate a continuation agreement could relieve US concerns.\textsuperscript{349}

The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia’s extension of the New START will help overcome the tendency to undermine arms control mechanisms and is ready to work with the United States to strengthen global strategic stability.

On 3 February 2021, Russia and the USA exchanged information on the completion of the internal procedures required to extend the New START. The contract was extended for five years until 5 February 2026, without amendments and additions.

The US Department of Defense said the extension of the New START with Russia is the beginning of efforts to address nuclear and strategic concerns.

Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said that

> the President has made clear that the New START extension continuation is the beginning, not the end of our efforts to engage the Russian Federation and other countries to reduce nuclear threats and address strategic stability concerns. I think you also saw when the intention to extend was made early on in the administration as the Secretary came out in full support of that as well, just to -- just to level-set and remind you that.\textsuperscript{350}

According to the US State Department statement, the extension will guarantee that the Russian nuclear arsenal has “verifiable limits.” It is stated that the extension of the


New START Agreement ensures that there are verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until 5 February 2026.

Russian Foreign Ministry declared that

We expect that the understanding, reached with Washington regarding the future of the New START Treaty as a cornerstone of international security, would allow to leave behind the trend towards dismantling of arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms, so prevalent in recent years due to U.S. destructive policies. Significant steps would be required to return our bilateral dialogue in this area back to a more stable trajectory, reach new substantial results which would strengthen our national security and global strategic stability.351

It may be assumed that the decision taken to the extent the New START help overcome the tendency to collapse arms control mechanisms. This is the only remaining mechanism that brings the USA and Russia to work together to strengthen global strategic stability. On the one hand, the USA and Russia see themselves as the legitimate actors of arms control and, on the other hand, there are other nuclear powers who remain out of such arms control mechanism, but they are possessing nuclear arms.

5.3. The New START Undermined the INF Treaty

After the INF treaty was terminated, the only bilateral agreement between the US and Russia is the New START agreement.

On 5 February 2018, the US and Russia met the pivotal limits of the New START. From that date, they have stayed at or below them. They are

700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit); 800 deployed

and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.  

The New START is related to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) unlike the intermediate-range INF treaty. Weapons within the scope of the New START use advanced technology that covers the technology applied in the intermediate range INF treaty. It may be said that the scope of New START includes technology and distance aspects of the INF treaty, therefore, the New START undermined the significance of the INF treaty.

Regarding the China factor, the United States and Russia will not take kindly to pulling China into such an equation. Why will not they do that? That is because, in order to be drawn into this equation, the stockpile in China’s hands can be as much as that of the US and Russia, which means that the right has been legally given to China.

The criticism in the INF treaty is that countries like China could produce short-range and intermediate-range weapons whereas only the US and Russia were subject to certain limitations in this regard.

Looking at the New START, if a conclusion based on this is made, if an attempt is made to put China and other nuclear countries into such an equation, it means equalizing the level of stockpiles and preventing the race in the field of ICBMs. The US and Russia want to keep what they have in the new start.

The point that makes the INF treaty technologically invalid or dysfunctional is that the intercontinental ballistic missiles are very advanced. This poses a question mark on the need for shorter and intermediate-range missiles reduction and arms control.

In fact, the stockpiles of the ICBM owned by the US and Russia are more than the other nuclear states.

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Table 1: From 2014 to 2019 Total Inventory of World Nuclear Forces

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7,260</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>6,450</td>
<td>6,185</td>
<td>5,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,290</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>6,375</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>290</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>China</td>
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<td>270</td>
<td>280</td>
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<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>90-110</td>
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<td>120-130</td>
<td>130-140</td>
<td>130-140</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>80-90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(10-20)</td>
<td>(10-20)</td>
<td>(20-30)</td>
<td>(30-40)</td>
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<td>15,850</td>
<td>15,395</td>
<td>14,935</td>
<td>14,465</td>
<td>13,865</td>
<td>13,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 1, it may be said that total inventory has diminished from 2014 to 2019. However, there is no intention to reduce all nuclear forces by the nuclear-weapon states.

When the New START is examined, it can be said that what forms the basis of the agreement is that the stockpiles in the hands of these two countries, the USA and Russia, are sufficiently high, and they are more technologically advanced, therefore, the opportunities provided by the INF treaty are not very valid. This does not mean that elsewhere in Europe and East Asia other states are not to produce such weapons. For the USA and Russia, it can be said that the INF treaty had no technological importance anymore, and in any case, in the INF framework the old weapons were

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destroyed, and hence, the US and Russia focus more on ICBMs, not on INF-type
distances, so it can be said that the New START is more significant than the INF treaty.

5.4. Conclusion

The New START currently exists as the last remaining legally binding agreement on
arms control between the United States and Russia, which have the world’s largest
nuclear stocks. It does not seem to be rational to invite or force the other nuclear states
to take part in the New START as such a move is likely to allow newcomers to increase
their stockpiles to the level of the USA and Russia which means a contribution to the
nuclear arms race. This is the contemplation that keeps the US and Russia away from
the opening of the Pandora’s box and, hence, they seem to have been satisfied with the
extension of the New START for the next 5 years.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The INF treaty, with its disarmament and arms control aspects, had a significant place within the architecture of nuclear agreements. Following its entry into force, the INF treaty largely fulfilled its specific task of reduction of intermediary-range nuclear weapons ranging from 500 to 5,500 km. Hence, many continental European and Asian countries benefitted from both elimination and arms control of specific nuclear weapons, though from the very beginning it had two shortcomings: First, following the initial elimination of existing nuclear weapons it did not play any significant role in preventing the production of long-range, intercontinental nuclear weapons; second, as it was signed between the two powers, the US and USSR, the INF treaty did not prevent third powers to have such weapons.

The INF treaty contributed to nuclear arms control until it was abolished, however, its stipulations became effective over time as the pace of military technology development was very fast. The signatory powers reshaped their nuclear capabilities. Thus, disarmament and arms control treaties, like the INF treaty, gradually lost their functions.

The US and Russia had the largest nuclear arsenals in the world and wanted to show their powers not only against each other but also against other aspirant powers as well. This is another reason why they signed the INF treaty and did not seek for a strategy to find out a possibility to include other nuclear or non-nuclear states to be included into the INF treaty nor did they come to a conclusion that they should genuinely seek to destroy all existing nuclear weapons in the world.
Yet, following the dissolution of the INF treaty, nuclear powers were able to create a new multilateral treaty that included more arms and signatories. The INF treaty had not bound other actors with nuclear weapons. For instance, China, France, the UK, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and other actors were not parties to the INF treaty. This was a serious shortcoming.

Although the underlying causes and objectives were different in 1987, the US and the USSR came to the point of eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Today, both the US and Russia can produce, develop, test, and deploy weapons banned by the INF Treaty if they would like to do so. The danger of nuclear weapons continues.

The breakdown of disarmament and arms control agreements, which have very little function in reality, and the nuclear arms race in intermediate-range and short-range missiles, which is open today, reveal how dangerous the course of the world people live in.

It is hypocritical for the US and Russia to accuse each other of not complying with the agreement or to claim that it fulfilled the requirements of the agreement while the other side violated it, as both invested in nuclear weapon technology and competed against each other.

It may be underlined that throughout the Cold War years, particularly in the interwar period, the USSR proposed and advocated total disarmament which could not find genuine support in the West. At the close of the Cold War period, the diplomatic position and pressure of the USSR and the USA aimed at limiting the use and production of nuclear weapons at least in the short and intermediary ranges through the INF treaty, but after the abolishment of the INF treaty, they have very few instruments to maintain the arms control.

The NPT agreement was supposed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, with this agreement between the USA, Britain, France, Russia, and China, it was claimed that nuclear weapons would be in safe hands and would be reduced and destroyed over time. The five countries called the nuclear club would not transfer technology to other countries in this field, countries that did not sign the agreement.
and those trying to acquire weapons would also face sanctions. If this agreement had achieved its declared purpose, nuclear disarmament should have been achieved in the intervening 36 years. But this is not the case at all. The nuclear club protects its privileged monopolies.

Finally, there is a significant difference between the main dilemma of the INF treaty and the stalemate of the New START agreement, and in a conjuncture where INF is terminated, the protection of New START has become essential, in other words, New START has, for now, put the USA and Russia under the control of nuclear weapons. However, it can be said that this agreement will also be questioned in the long run as nuclear weapon technology changes and that this agreement is likely to become controversial when its reason for existence wears off. This kind of trend also affects the main architect, the NPT, in the medium and long term.

All in all, it may be stated that unless a common strategy for total disarmament in the world is worked out and implemented, it is likely that the debate is to be limited with arms control rather than any real disarmament.
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APPENDICES

A. THE TEXT OF TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

*Have agreed as follows:*

**Article I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

**Article II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

**Article IX**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. **On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3).**

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
B. THE TEXT OF TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Signed at Washington December 8, 1987
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate May 27, 1988
Instruments of ratification exchanged June 1, 1988
Entered into force June 1, 1988
Proclaimed by U.S. President December 27, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I
In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

Article II
For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

   (a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

   (b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.
12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

   (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

   (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

   (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

   (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.
Article IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:
   (i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

   (ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

   (iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

   (iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

   (v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.
Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

   (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

   (b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Article VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.
3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of the type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

   (a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

   (b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and
(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.
4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.
4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;
(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.
3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

   (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

   (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

   (a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;
(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, 
notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating 
bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are 
thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such 
an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the 
elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of 
that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 
13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 
20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of 
this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, 
and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party 
shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year 
within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to 
conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of 
missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination 
facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the 
categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment 
located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of 
the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support 
facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other 
than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the 
right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of 
continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of 
a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-
propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile 
production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-
range GLBMs were produced.
The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.
3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and
(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
C. THE TEXT OF THE NEW START

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations,

Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,

Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,

Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat,

Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation,

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach,

Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties,
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLMs on strategic stability,

Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century,

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved,

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,

Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,

Have agreed as follows:
Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol.

2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

   (a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

   (b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

   (c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.
Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty:
   (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.
   (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.
   (c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty:
   (a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.
   (b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber.

3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of this Treaty:
   (a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.
   (b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.
   (c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.
   (d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.
(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.

5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility,
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed;

(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber airframes.

6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

7. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply.

(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty or to the limitations thereof when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.

(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;

(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II.

(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.

(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;
(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLEBM launchers Trident II.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall base:
   (a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
   (b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.

2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLEBMs only on ballistic missile submarines.

3. Each Party shall locate:
   (a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases;
   (b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLEBMs only at, as appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLEBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLEBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLEBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLEBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLEBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.

4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLEBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.
5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges.

6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten.

8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.

9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.

11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

Article VI

1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be carried out by:
(a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of this Treaty; and

(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VII

1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Categories of data for this database are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty.

4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.

5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public data related to its respective strategic offensive arms.
6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.

Article VIII

In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other channels.
Article IX

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information.

Article X

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

   (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;

   (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and

   (c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.
Article XI

1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated.

In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections.

4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.

Article XII

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article XIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.
Article XIV

1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.

4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.
Article XV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article XVI

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Prague, this eighth day of April, 2010, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
D. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Yılmaz, Buse
Nationality:
Date and Place of Birth:
Marital Status:
email:

EDUCATION

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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

HOBBIES
E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


INF anlaşmasının yürürlüğe girmesiyle birlikte, SSCB’nin 1,846 füzesi ve ABD’nin 846 füzesi olmak üzere, mevcut toplam 2,692 adet 500 ve 5,500 km mesafeden nükleer ve konvansiyonel karadan atılan balistik füze (GLBM) ve karadan atılan seyir füzesi (GLCM), orta menzilli ve kısa menzilli füze, 1 Haziran 1991 tarihine kadar imha edilmiştir. Bunu 10 yıllık yerinde doğrulama denetimleri izlemiştir. INF anlaşmasına göre, ABD ve SSCB’nin bu tür füzelere sahip olması, üretmesi veya uçuş testi yapması yasaklanmıştır. Antlaşmanın, Avrupa’yı tehdit eden bir orta menzilli ve daha kısa menzilli nükleer silah kategorisinin sadece onları sınırlamak yerine ortadan kaldırılmasını zorlayan ilk anlaşma olması önemlidir.

tamamlamıştır. Rusya, ABD’nin geri çekilmesine aynı şekilde INF antlaşmasından çekilerek yanıt vermiştir.

1945 yılında ABD’nin Hiroşima ve Nagazaki şehirlerini vuran nükleer saldırılarıyla elde ettiği asimetrik nükleer güç, SSCP’nin 1949 yılında nükleer gücünü üretmesiyle başlayıp, SSCP’nin çöküşüne kadar devam eden zaman diliminde, hiçbir zaman tam olarak emin olunamasa da, bir nükleer dengeden söz etmek mümkündür.


INF antlaşması sıradan bir antlaşma değildir. 1930’lu yılların başından itibaren uluslararası gündemin odagında bulunan silahsızlanma ve 1950’li yıllardan itibaren öne çıkan silahların kontrolü anlayışlarının kısmen de olsa içselleştirildiğini görmek mümkündür. Bu tez, INF antlaşması ile silahsızlanma ve silahların kontrolü düşünçesinin nasıl uygulamaya konduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır.


Örneğin, Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşma Örgütü (NATO) Genel Sekreteri Lord Carrington’a göre, INF antlaşmasının imzalanmasından önce, bu antlaşma siyasi açıdan iyi olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Çünkü antlaşma ve doğrulama düzenlemeleri Batı
ile ilişkileri ve karşılıklı olarak avantajlı silah kontrol önlemlerinin teşvik edilmesi ile Doğu’ya daha fazla güven sağlama düşüncesini içermekteydi.

Carrington, INF antlaşmasının bir şekilde ABD garantisini Avrupa’dan ayıracağı iddia edenlere Avrupalılar, Avrupa’da kalan 4,000’den fazla nükleer silah ve bir milyon ABD askerinin üçte biri ile NATO politikalarından ayrılanın söz konusu olmadığını konusunda memnun olduklarını ve bu yüzden, Amerikalı dostlarına INF antlaşmasından hiç şüphe duymadan antlaşmanın her iki tarafın da çıkarına olduğunu söylemiştir.

Reagan, INF antlaşmasını imzalamanın önce, tarihte ilk kez, “silah kontrolü” dilinin, ABD ve SSCB nükleer füzelerinin orta ve kısa menzilli kuvvetlerinin tamamen ortadan kaldırılması anlamına gelen “silahların azaltılması” ile aktarıldığını ifade etmiştir. Bu silah azaltma eğilimi SSCB’nin etkisiyle açıklanabilir. Ayrıca Reagan, yalnızca, bu tarih yazan antlaşmanın kendi içinde bir son olmayaçağını, ancak önlerinde duran diğer acil meseleleri ele almalarını sağlayacak bir çalışma ilişkisinin başlangıcı olacağını umarak, stratejik saldırı nükleer silahları, Avrupa’daki konvansiyonel güçler dengesi, yerkürenin birçok yerini saran yıkıcı ve trajik bölgesel çatışmalar ve Tanrı’nın tüm insanlara bahşettiği insan haklarına ve doğal haklara saygı gösterilmesi gerektiğini ifade etmiştir.

Gorbaçev, INF antlaşmasının imzalanmasıyla, “nükleer silahları ortadan kaldıran ilk antlaşmanın imzalanmasının hem dünya siyaseti hem de hümanizm açısından insanlık için evrensel bir öneme sahip olduğunu” belirtmiştir.

Gorbaçov, herkes için ve her şeyden önce iki büyük güç için, metni masada olan antlaşmanın, sonunda felaket tehdidinden uzaklaşmak için büyük bir şans sunduğunu söylemiştir. Bu şansı sonuna kadar kullanmak ve gelecek nesillere korkusuz ve anlamsız bir israf olmadan, tatmin edici ve mutlu bir yaşam vaadini veren nükleersiz bir dünyaya doğru hareket etmenin herkesin görevi olduğunu belirtmiştir. Ayrıca, imha silahlarına ilişkin kaynakların, 8 Aralık 1987’nin tarih kitaplarına yazılacak bir tarih olacağını, artan nükleer savaş riski çarşığı insan yaşamının silahsızlandırılması çağından ayıran dönüm noktasını işaret edecek bir tarih olacağını belirtmiştir.
Arbatov’a göre, INF antlaşması ABD ile SSCB arasındaki güveni tesis etmeye çalışmıştır. Bunun ile ilgili Soğuk Savaş’ın sonunu kolaylaştıran bir dizi silahsızlanma antlaşması yayınlanmıştır.

Huntington’ın ifade ettiği gibi ABD’nin “yalnız şerif”e dönüştüğü söylenebilir. Özellikle 1990 sonrası dönemde her şey, ABD ve ABD merkezli uluslararası düzenin politikalarını şekillendiren çevrelere denediği, ABD’nin güç kaybettiği bir sistemi ve yurtiçinde ve yurtdışında diğer aktörlerin güç ve etki kazanırken ABD’nin rotayı sürdürmekten başka bir şey yapmadığı görülmektedir.

Yani, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ABD’nin küresel hegemonyasına yönelik siyasi ve ideolojik muhalefet, toplumsal gücün yeni konfigürasyonunu yansıtacak şekilde parçalanmıştır. Uluslararası düzen mevcut krizini yaşamaktadır. Bu kriz ile politikaların önüne açılmaktadır.

INF antlaşması zamanla zayıflamıştır. Örneğin, antlaşmanın XI. Maddesi, her iki tarafın da yasaklı silahların ortadan kaldırılmasına uymasını sağlamak için 13 yıl süren bir dizi yerinde incelemeyi düzenleyen bir dizi mekanizma sona ermiştir ve yenilenmemiştir. Bunun yerine uydu gözlemlerinin izlenmesine uyulması gerekmektedir.

ABD’nin bakış açısına göre, INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesinin nedenlerinden biri, nükleer silahlar açısından mevcut caydırıcılık paradigmalara meydan okuyan Rusya’nın INF antlaşmasının gereklerini ve yükümlülüklerini doktriner olarak ihlal etmesidir. ABD, Rusya’nın INF antlaşmasını ihlal ettiğini iddia etmiştir ve ardından antlaşmaya tam ve doğrulanabilir bir şekilde uymadığını ifade etmiştir.

Dönemsel olarak işlevsz bir antlaşmayı ilk kimin bozduğu konusunda ABD ve Rusya’nın dile getirdiği tartışmalar son tahlilde anlamsızdır. Çünkü her iki taraf da askeri güçlerini bir araç olarak kullanmak için daha çabuk,davranmaktadır.

ABD için işlevini yitiren INF antlaşmasının çok süsünün, özellikle Çin’in o dönemde ekonomik bir rakib olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla birlikte, mevcut uluslararası düzeni bir dengesizliğe itme amacını da içerdiği söylenebilir ve bu da başka siyasi ve askeri alanlar üzerinde birçok soruyu gündeme getirmektedir.
INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesine yönelik temel eleştiri, Çin gibi devletlerin orta menzilli ve daha kısa menzilli silahlar üretebileceği ancak bu konuda sadece ABD ve Rusya’nın belirli kısıtlamalara tabi tutulduğu yönündedir.

Zaman yarışı ve karşılıklı ittifak bozma manevralarının gerilimi artırma eğilimi, Rusya’nın açıktan ve Çin’in daha gizli yeni ve stratejik nükleer kapasitelerindeki artışın sadece sözde kalmayabileceği de işaret etmektedir. INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesiyle nükleer güçlerin daha fazla silah ve imza sahibini içeren yeni birçok tarafı antlaşma oluşturabileceklerini söylemek mümkündür. INF antlaşması diğer aktörleri nükleer silahlar bağlamında bir zorunluluk yüklememektedir.

Ayrıca, teknolojinin gelişmeye devam edeceğinin, dolayısıyla buna bağlı olarak silah teknolojisinin geliştiği ve devletlerin daha fazla silaha sahip olmaya çalıştığı söylenebilir. Bu nedenle, INF antlaşmasının sona ermesi, yeni bir silahlanma yarışıın ilerlemesine ve silah kontrol antlaşmalarına sağlaması gerekiyordu.

Stratejik nükleer silahların sözde kullanımı tartışmalı olsa da tüm uzmanlar Doğu-Batı çatışmasının sona ermesinden sonra taktik veya stratejik olmayan nükleer silahların güvenceli politikasında artık önemli olmadığını konusunda hemfikirdir.

1945’te binlerce insanın aynı anda öldüren motivasyonun benzerileriyle rekabet ettiği bir dünyada, bir süre sonra kontrol beklemek safhaktır. Dünya 1990 öncesine göre çığlığına çok daha yakındır. Üstelik mevcut cepheler bir süredir yeni teknolojilerin reklamını yapmıştı yerler olmuştur.

Buna ek olarak, INF antlaşması Avrupa güvencelişi için önemliydi. Hiçbir Avrupa devlet antlaşmaya taraf olmamıştır ve kitalara balistik füze (ICBM’ler) ile ilgili olmayan bu antlaşma sayesinde Avrupa’ya yönelik doğrudan tehdit kontrol altına alınabilmştir. Kısaca, INF antlaşması Avrupa’nın nükleer istikrarı sağlamıştır.

INF antlaşmasının yok olması ile nükleer silah politikasını açısından, Avrupa yeni zorluklarla karşı karşıya kalması gözlümektedir.

INF antlaşmasının feshi yeni olduğu için henüz yeni çalışmalar ortaya çıkmamıştır. Bununla birlikte, son zamanlarda ortaya çıkan ve ABD’nin antlaşmadan çekilmesini...

Bu tez, INF antlaşmasının yapım, çalışma ve sona erdirilmesinin nasıl gerçekleştiğini araştırmaktadır. İki büyük imzacı güç olan ABD ve Rusya tarafından geliştirilen ve hayata geçirilen stratejilere işaret etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, INF antlaşmasının en çok yararlanan Avrupalı güçlerin pozisyonlarını da incelemektedir. ABD ve Rusya’nın INF antlaşmasını sürdürmeyi taahhüt edip etmediklerini ve antlaşmanın feshedilmesine nasıl tepki verdiklerini incelemektedir. Buna ek olarak, hem ABD’li hem de Rus politika yapıcıların ifade ettiği gibi Çin faktörünü de hesaba katmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bütün bunlar, INF antlaşmasının yapımını, işleyişini ve feshedilmesini açıklamaya yardımcı olacak uygun bir çerçeve ve ilgili bir bağlamda ele almaktadır.

Bu tez, INF antlaşmasını silahsızlanma ve silahların kontrolü çerçevesinde ve üzerinden incelemektedir. Yani, antlaşma bir silah kontrolü antlaşması olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ancak aynı zamanda silahsızlanma ile de ilgilidir. Çünkü INF antlaşmasının özelliklerinden biri, mevcut orta menzilli ve daha kısa menzilli konvansiyonel ve nükleer silahların imhasıyla ile ilgiliyken, diğer taraftan, orta menzilli ve daha kısa menzilli konvansiyonel ve nükleer silahların yenilerinin üretilmemesi, kontrol altında alınması ve engellenmesi özelliği bulunmaktadır.

Dolayısıyla, INF antlaşmasının silahsızlanma ve silahların kontrolü gibi ikili boyutu bulunmaktadır. Bu nedenle, INF antlaşması hem silahsızlanma hem de silahların kontrolü konusunun kavranabilmesi açısından anlamlı bir örnektir.

Bu tez, antlaşmaların silahsızlanma tarafının giderek zayıfladığı, ancak silahların kontrolü tarafının zamanla güçlendiği bir süreçte incelemektedir.

Bu araştırma, INF antlaşmasına atfedilen imza yetkilerinin ve dolayısıyla ilk elden belgelerin nasıl incelendiğini ve ilgili tarafların beyanlarının nasıl dikkate alındığını tarihseleştirmektedir. Bu tezin ana çabası, INF antlaşması ile ilgili materyalleri bir

Bu tezin organizasyonu şu şekildedir; giriş bölümünde, yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi tezin konusu, literatür taraması, araştırma sorusu ve analiz ve metodoloji çerçevesini tasvir edildikten sonra, ikinci bölüm, silahsızlanma ve silah kontrolünün tarihsel arka planına ayrılmıştır. Üçüncü bölüm, INF antlaşmasının yapılış ve işleyişini araştırıp, tasvir etmektedir. Dördüncü bölüm, karşılıklı iddialar, ABD’nin INF antlaşmasından çekiliş ve Rusya’nın tepkisi dikkate alınarak INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesine odaklanmaktadır. Beşinci bölüm, INF antlaşması ile Yeni START arasındaki bağlantıyı keşfetmeye çalışmakta, ABD ve Rusya’nın birbirlerinin hamlelerini nasıl gördükleri incelenmektedir. Son olarak, son bölüm sonuç değerlendirmesine ayrılmıştır.

Öncelikle, ikinci bölümde, INF antlaşmasının nasıl ortaya çıktığını anlamak için daha iyi bir zemin hazırlamak adına ilk olarak silahsızlanma ve silah kontrolünün tarihi vurgulanmaktadır.

Strateji, hedefe giden yoldur. Nükleer silah tanımı açısından strateji her ülke ve grup için farklıdır. ABD’nin amacı, nükleer üstünlüğünü korumak ve bunu sağlamak için silah kontrolünü stratejisine bir araç olarak ortaya koymaktır. Avrupa (Fransa ve İngiltere’nin kendilerinin nükleer stratejileri bulunmasına rağmen), ABD stratejisini desteklemektedir. Bu yolla, Avrupa’nın nükleer silahlara kaynak ayırmamasına gereksinim kalmamaktadır. Avrupa, ABD’nin duruşunu kendi stratejisi olarak kullanmaktadır. SSCB hiçbir yerde silahsızlanmayı empoze edemediğinden, konumunu ABD’nin silah kontrolünde her şeyi kontrol etmesine izin vermemek için belirlemiştir.


SSCB’nin hem konvansiyonel silahlarda hem de nükleer silahlarda silahsızlanmayı, karşılıklı silahların bir tehdit olarak çıkarmasını istemesi sosyalizm mantığı ile uyuşmaktadır. Ancak ABD baştan beri bu topyekün silahsızlanma ile değil, silah kontrolü mantığına dayandırmıştır.

INF antlaşmasının esasını teşkil eden düşüncecinin ortaya çıkış süreci Détente dönemindeken. ABD ve SSCB arasındaki müzakerelerin ardından INF antlaşması, her iki tarafın da beklenmeyen bir öneme kavuşmuştur. INF antlaşması hem silahsızlanma hem de silahların kontrolü olmak üzere iki boyutu içermesi bakımından dikkate değer bir örnek teşkil etmiştir.

Üçüncü bölümde, INF antlaşması fikrinin ne zaman ve neden ortaya çıktığı, tarafların, ABD ve SSCB’nin INF antlaşmasıyla başlangıçta neler öngördükleri ve hem silahsızlanmayı hem de silahların kontrolü kavramının boyutlarını kavramak için içerik olarak nasıl bir antlaşma inşa edildiği üzerinde durulmaktadır.
INF antlaşmasındaki Müzakerelerin çıktısı silahsızlanmayı öngörmektedir. Ancak ne yazık ki bunu uygulayacak bir mekanizma oluşmamıştır.

Soğuk Savaş döneminin özellikle gergin bir döneminde, INF antlaşması bir yanda ABD ve NATO ülkeleri, diğer yanda SSCB ve Varşova Paktı ülkeleri arasındaki tehlikeli bir çatışmayı etkisiz hale getirmiştir.

INF antlaşması, başlangıçta hesaplandığından daha başarılı olan çok sayıda kısa ve orta menzilli füzeyi ortadan kaldırmayı başarmıştır. INF antlaşması, büyük ölçüde oluşturulan ve uygulanan silah kontrolü sınırlama ve doğrulama açısından da başarılı olmuştur. Ancak antlaşmanın hükümlerini kontrol edecek ve uygulayacak sağlam bir mekanizma ne yazık ki yaratılamamıştır.

Avrupa devletleri, SSCB muhalefetini geri çektiği için INF antlaşmasından memnun kalmıştır. SSCB’yi ikili sıkıştırma modeli olan NATO’nun “İkili Yol Kararı” devam etsiydi belki de silahlanma yarıyla karşı karşıya kalıacaktır. NATO, ikili yol kararına antlaşmanın çerçevesini belirlemek istemiştir. Bu nedenle, INF antlaşmasının Avrupa’da nükleer silahlanma yarışını engellemesi önemlidiir.

2 Ağustos 2019’da ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Mike Pompeo, antlaşmanın sona ermesinden yalnızca Rusya sorumludur demiştir. NATO müttefiklerimizin tam desteğiyle ABD, Rusya’nın antlaşmayı esaslı olarak ihlal ettiği belirtmiştir ve ardından anlaşma kapsamındaki yükümlülüklerini askıya aldıklarını eklemiştir.

2 Ağustos 2019’da Rusya Dışişleri Bakanlığı, devlet tarafından işletilen Ria Novosti haber ajansı tarafından yapılan bir açıklamada INF antlaşmasının “resmen ölü” olduğunu doğrulamıştır.


INF antlaşmasının oluşumunda, nükleer güç olarak sadece iki devletin, ABD ve Rusya’nın bu antlaşmayı imzalamasının getirdiği temel bir sorun vardır. Bu antlaşma, iki imzacı devleti sınırlandırırken, Çin gibi imzacı olmayan nükleer devletlere kısa ve
orta menzilli füzelerde kullanılabilecek nükleer silah üretme imkanı sunmasının silah kontrolü mantığına uymadığı ve sonuç olarak INF anlaşmasının feshedilmesi olanak sağladığı söylenebilir. Her iki taraf da bu anlaşma'nın her halükarda feshedildiğini ifade etmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, Soğuk Savaş döneminde son ürünlerinden olan INF anlaşması, 21. yüzyılda işlevini yitirmiş bir silahsızlanma ve silah kontrolü anlaşması olarak görülmiştir. Ayrıca, bu tez, güvenlik algılarının INF anlaşması olmadan nasıl şekillenebileceği sorusuna da bazı açıklamalar getirmeye çalışmaktadır.


Fransa’nın tek başına bir eylem olarak pozisyonu, force de frappe, Avrupa Birliği (AB) politikası değildir. Fransa’nın önceliği “Fransa’nın ilk gelmesi politikası”dır. Ancak AB’nin nükleer silahların sınırlanmasına rağmen bir ortak Avrupa stratejisi yoktur. NATO çatısı altında hareket etmektedir.


Son tahlilde ise INF anlaşmasının ilisiklerinde çekilme kararı alındığında hepsinin ABD’nin yanında yer aldığı görülmektedir. Bunun nedeni, nükleer koruma şemsiyesinin
NATO’nun içinde olması ve bu nedenle NATO’yı nükleer kورuma şemsiyesi olarak kavramalarıdır. Bu nedenle, Avrupalı devletler ABD’nin pozisyonunu sorgulamak yerine, ABD ile stratejileri birleştği sürece ABD stratejisini desteklemişlerdir ve NATO onları bir araya getirmeye çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır.


Beşinci bölüm, üzerinde çalışılan ve yakın zamanda uzatılan tek ikili silah kontrolü Antlaşması olan New START ile INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesi arasındaki iliskiyi incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, Yeni START’ın INF antlaşmasını nasıl etkilediğini de incelemektedir.


INF antlaşması, silahsızlanma ve silahların kontrolü yönleriyle nükleer antlaşmaların mimarisi içinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Yürürlüğe girmesinin ardından, INF antlaşması, 500 ila 5,500 km arasında değişen orta menzilli nükleer silahların azaltılması konusundaki özel görevini büyük ölçüde yerine getirmiştir. Bu nedenle, kita Avrupası ve Asya ülkelerinin çoğu, en başından beri iki eksikliği olmasına rağmen, belirli nükleer silahlarnın hem ortadan kaldırılmasından hem de silah kontrolünden yararlanmıştır. Birincisi, mevcut nükleer silahların ilk ortadan kaldırılmasının
ardından, nükleer silahların önlenmesinde önemli bir rol oynamamıştır. Çünkü uzun menzilli, kıtalararası nükleer silahların üretimi devam etmiştir. İkincisi, iki güç, ABD ve SSCB arasında imzaladığı için INF antlaşması, üçüncü güçlerin bu tür silahlara sahip olmasını engellememiştir.

INF antlaşması, ortadan kalkıncaya kadar nükleer silahların kontrolüne katkıda bulunmuştur. Ancak askeri teknolojinin gelişme hızının çok hızlı olması nedeniyle hükümleri zaman içinde gücünü yitirmiştir. İmzacı güçler nükleer yeteneklerini yeniden şekillendirmiştir. Böylece INF antlaşması gibi silahsızlanma ve silahların kontrolü anlaşmaları da yavaş yavaş işlevlerini yitirmiştir.


Ancak INF antlaşmasının feshedilmesinin ardından nükleer güçler, daha fazla silah ve imza sahibini içeren yeni birçok taraflı anlaşmalar oluşturabilirlerdi. INF antlaşması diğer aktörleri nükleer silah sınırlarını ile bağlamamıştır. Örneğin Çin, Fransa, Birleşik Krallık, Hindistan, Pakistan, İsrail, Kuzey Kore ve diğer aktörler INF antlaşmasına taraf değildi. Bu ciddi bir eksiklikti.


Gerçekte işlevi çok az olan silahsızlanma ve silah kontrol anlaşmalarının çöküşü ve günümüzde açık olan orta ve kısa menzilli füzelerdeki nükleer silahlanma yarışı, dünya insanlarının içinde bulunduğu gidişatin ne kadar tehliki olduğunu gözler önüne sormaktadır.

ABD ve Rusya’nın birbirlerini anlaşmaya uymamakla suçlamaları veya anlaşmanın gereklерini yerine getirdiğini, karşılık tarafın ise nükleer silah teknolojisine yatırım
yapması ve birbirileyle rekabet etmesi nedeniyle antlaşmanın gereklerini yerine getirdiğini iddia etmesi inandırıcı değildir.

Soğuk Savaş yılları boyunca, özellikle iki savaş arası dönemde, SSCB’nin Batı’da gerçek bir destek bulamayan topyekûn silahsızlanmayı önerdiği ve savunduğu bilinmektedir. Soğuk Savaş döneminin sonunda, SSCB ve ABD’nin diplomatik konumu ve baskı, nükleer silahların kullanımını ve üretimini INF antlaşmasıyla en azından kısa ve orta menzillerde sınırlamayı amaçlamıştır. INF antlaşmasının silah kontrolünü sürdümek için çok az araçları vardı.


Sonuç ve son söz olarak, dünyada topyekûn silahsızlanma için ortak bir strateji geliştirilmediği ve uygulanmadiği sürece, tartışımanın herhangi bir gerçek silahsızlanmadan ziyade silahların kontrolü ile sınırlı kalması muhtemel gözükmektedir.
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